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THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

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AND

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HIBBERT JOURNAL

CREATIVE EVOLUTION AND PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT.

THE RIGHT HON. A. J. BALFOUR, M.P.

I.

I HAVE been requested by the Editor of the HIBBERT JOURNAL to indicate the bearing which M. Bergson's *Évolution créatrice* has upon the line of speculation which I have long endeavoured to recommend to those who are interested in such matters.

If I accept the invitation, it is not because I imagine that any widespread interest is felt in my philosophical opinions, still less because I suppose them to provide a standard of comparison against which such theories as those of M. Bergson may fittingly be measured. It is rather because, in dealing with a writer whose range is so wide, some limitation of commentary is desirable; and, in the nature of things, the limitation suggested by the Editor is the one most suited to my particular capacities. It may involve some appearance of egotism; but I trust the reader will understand that it is appearance only.

The problems in which philosophy is interested may, of course, be approached from many sides; and schemes of philosophy may be cast in many moulds. The great metaphysical systems—those which stand out as landmarks in the history of speculation—have commonly professed some all-

inclusive theory of reality. In their theories of the one and the many, it is the one rather than any individual specimen of the many which has mainly interested them. In the sweep of their soaring speculation, the individual thinker, and the matters of which most closely concern him, vanish into negligible particularity. There is room for them, of course, because in such systems there is room for everything. But they hardly count.

Now it must be owned that when the Universe is in question, we and our affairs *are* very unimportant. But each several man has a position, as of right, in his own philosophy, from which nothing can exclude him. His theory of things, if he has one, is resolvable into separate beliefs, which are *his* beliefs. In so far as it is a reasoned theory, these beliefs must be rationally selected; and in every system of rationally selected beliefs there must be some which are accepted as inferences, while there must be others whose acceptability is native, not derived, which are believed on their own merits, and which, if the system were ever completed, would be the logical foundations of the whole. Some beliefs may indeed have both attributes; the light they give may be in part original, in part reflected. We may even conceive a system tentatively constructed out of elements which are first clearly seen to be true only when they are looked at as parts of a self-evident whole; cases in which one might almost say (but not quite) that the conclusion is the proof of the premises, rather than the premises of the conclusion.

It will be observed that this way of looking at philosophy makes each individual thinker the centre of his own system—not, of course, the most important element in it *as known*, but the final authority which justifies him in saying *he knows it*. The ideal order of beliefs as set out in such a system would be the order of logic—not necessarily formal logic, but at least an order of rational interdependence. There is, however, another way in which beliefs might be arranged, namely, the causal order. They may be looked at from the

point of view proper to psychology, instead of from that proper to philosophy. They may be looked at not merely as premises but as causes, not merely as conclusions but as effects; and so looked at, it is at once obvious that among the causes of belief reasons often play a very trifling part, and that among the effects of belief we cannot count conclusions which logically might be drawn, but in fact are not.

This general way of considering philosophic problems, which throws the primary stress not on what is, or is presumed to be, first in the absolute order of reality, nor first in order of practical interest, but what is first in order of logic for the individual thinker, was forced upon me (I speak of a time more than forty years ago) by a condition of things in the world of speculation which has since greatly changed. In those days, at least at the English Universities, the dominating influences were John Mill and Herbert Spencer—Mill even more than Spencer. Their doctrines, or a general attitude of mind in harmony with their doctrines, penetrated far more deeply into the mental tissue of the "enlightened" than has been the case with subsequent philosophies. The fashionable creed of advanced thinkers was scientific agnosticism. And the cardinal principles of scientific agnosticism taught that all knowledge was from experience, that all experience was of phenomena, that all we can learn from the experience of phenomena are the laws of phenomena, and that if these are not the real, then is the real unknowable. To their "credo" was appended an appropriate anathema, condemning all those who believed what they could not prove, as sinners against reason and truth.

Theories like these were a challenge; a challenge, however, that could be taken up in more ways than one. It might be said, as metaphysics and theology did say, that reason, properly interrogated, carries us far beyond phenomena and the laws of phenomena. On the other hand, attention might be concentrated not on what the agnostics said was unknowable, but on what they said was known. If the great desideratum is un-

trammelled criticism of beliefs, let us begin with the beliefs of "positive knowledge." If we are to believe nothing but what we can prove, let us see what it is that we *can* prove.

I attempted some studies on these lines in a work[1] published in 1879. And I am still of opinion that the theory of experience and of induction from experience needs further examination; that the relation between a series of beliefs connected logically, and the same beliefs mixed up in a natural series of causes and effects, involves speculative difficulties of much interest; and that investigations into the ultimate grounds of belief had better begin with the beliefs which everybody holds than with those which are held only by a philosophic or religious minority.

It is true that isolated fragments of these problems have long interested philosophers. Achilles still pursues the tortoise, and the difficulties of the chase still provide a convenient text on which to preach conflicting doctrines of the Infinite. The question as to what exactly is given in immediate experience, and by what logical or inductive process anything can be inferred from it, the nature of causation, the grounds of our conviction that nature follows laws, how a law can be discovered, and whether following laws is the same as having a determined order—these, or some of these, have no doubt been subjects of debate. But even now there is not, so far as I know, any thoroughgoing treatment of the subject as I conceive it; and certainly Mill, who was supposed, at the time of which I have been speaking, to have uttered the last word on empirical inference, stared helplessly at its difficulties through two volumes of logic, and left them unsolved at the end.

It was not on these lines, however, that the reaction against the reigning school of philosophy was to be pursued. In the last twenty years or so of the nineteenth century came (in England) the great idealist revival. For the first time since Locke the general stream of British philosophy rejoined, for

[1] *A Defence of Philosophic Doubt.*

good or evil, the main continental river. And I should suppose that now in 1911 the bulk of philosophers belong to the neo-Kantian or neo-Hegelian school. I do not know that this has greatly influenced either the general public or the scientific world. But, without question, it has greatly affected not merely professed philosophers, but students of theology with philosophic leanings. The result has been that whereas, when Mill and Spencer dominated the schools, "naturalism" was thought to have philosophy at its back, that advantage, for what it is worth, was transferred to religion. I do not mean that philosophy became the ally of any particular form of orthodoxy, but that it advocated a spiritual view of the Universe, and was therefore quite inconsistent with "naturalism."

Though I may not count myself as an idealist, I can heartily rejoice in the result. But it could obviously give me very little assistance in my own attempts to develop the negative speculations of philosophic doubt into a constructive, if provisional, system. With the arguments of *Foundations of Belief* I do not propose to trouble the reader. But it may make clearer what I have to say about *L'Évolution créatrice* if I mention that (among other conclusions) I arrive at the conviction that in accepting science, as we all do, we are moved by "values," not by logic. That if we examine fearlessly the grounds on which judgments about the material world are founded, we shall find that they rest on postulates about which it is equally impossible to say that we can theoretically regard them as self-evident, or practically treat them as doubtful. We can neither prove them nor give them up. "Concede" (I argued) the same philosophic weight to values in departments of speculation which look beyond the material world, and naturalism will have to be abandoned. But the philosophy of science would not lose thereby. On the contrary, an extension of view beyond phenomena diminishes rather than increases the theoretical difficulties with which bare naturalism is beset. It is not by a mere reduction in the

area of our beliefs that, in the present state of our knowledge, certainty and consistency are to be reached. Such a reduction could not be justified by philosophy. But, justifiable or not, it would be quite impracticable. "Values" refuse to be ignored.

A scheme of thought so obviously provisional has no claim to be a system. And the question therefore arises—at least, it arises for me—whether the fruitful philosophic labours of the last twenty years have found answers to the problem which I find most perplexing? I cannot pretend to have followed as closely as I should have desired the recent developments of speculation in Britain and America—still less in Germany, France, or Italy. Even were it otherwise, I could not profitably discuss them within the compass of an article. But the invitation to consider from this point of view a work so important as *L'Évolution créatrice*, by an author so distinguished as M. Bergson, I have found irresistible.

II.

There cannot be a topic which provides a more fitting text for what I have to say in this connection than Freedom. To the idealist, Absolute spirit is free; though when we come to the individual soul I am not sure that its share of freedom amounts (in most systems) to very much. To the naturalistic thinker there is, of course, no Absolute, and no soul. Psychic phenomena are a function of the nervous system. The nervous system is material, and obeys the laws of matter. Its behaviour is as rigidly determined as the planetary orbits, and might be accurately deduced by a being sufficiently endowed with powers of calculation, from the distribution of matter, motion, and force, when the solar system was still nebular. To me, who am neither idealist nor naturalist, freedom is a reality; partly because, on ethical grounds, I am not prepared to give it up; partly because any theory which, like "naturalism," requires reason to be mechanically determined, is (I believe) essentially incoherent; and if we abandon mechanical determinism in the case of reason, it seems absurd

to retain it in the case of will; partly because it seems impossible to find room for the self and its psychic states in the interstices of a rigid sequence of material causes and effects. Yet the material sequence is there; the self and its states are there; and I do not pretend to have arrived at a satisfactory view of their reciprocal relations. I keep them both, conscious of their incompatibilities.

A bolder line is taken by M. Bergson, and his point of view, be it right or wrong, is certainly far more interesting. He is not content with refusing to allow mechanical or any other form of determinism to dominate life. He makes freedom the very corner-stone of his system—freedom in its most aggressive shape. Life is free, life is spontaneous, life is incalculable. It is not indeed out of relation to matter, for matter clogs and hampers it. But not by matter is its direction wholly determined, not from matter is its forward impulse derived.

As we know it upon this earth, organic life resembles some great river system, pouring in many channels across the plain. One stream dies away sluggishly in the sand, another loses itself in some inland lake, while a third, more powerful or more fortunate, drives its tortuous and arbitrary windings further and yet further from the snows that gave it birth.

The metaphor, for which M. Bergson should not be made responsible, may serve to emphasise some leading portions of his theory. What the banks of the stream are to its current, that is matter generally, and the living organism in particular, to terrestrial life. They modify its course; they do not make it flow. So life presses on by its own inherent impulse; not unhampered by the inert mass through which it flows, yet constantly struggling with it, eating patiently into the most recalcitrant rock, breaking through the softer soil in channels the least foreseen, never exactly repeating its past, never running twice the same course. The metaphor, were it completed, would suggest that as the rivers, through all the wind-

ings imposed on them by the channel which they themselves have made, press ever towards the sea, so life has some end to which its free endeavours are directed. But this is not M. Bergson's view. He objects to teleology only less than to mechanical determinism. And, if I understand him aright, the vital impulse has no goal more definite than that of acquiring an ever fuller volume of free creative activity.

But what in M. Bergson's theory corresponds to the sources of these multitudinous streams of life? Whence come they? The life we see—the life of plants, of animals, of men—have their origin in the single life which he calls super-consciousness, above matter and beyond it; which divides, like the snow-fields of our simile, into various lines of flow, corresponding to the lines of organic development, described by evolutionary biology. But as the original source of organic life is free, indeterminate, and incalculable, so this quality never utterly disappears from its derivative streams, entangled and thwarted though they be by matter. Life, even the humblest life, does not wholly lose its original birthright, nor does it succumb completely to its mechanical environment.

Now it is evident that if the ultimate reality is this free creative activity, *time* must occupy a position in M. Bergson's philosophy quite other than that which it holds in any of the great metaphysical systems. For in these, time and temporal relation are but elements within an Absolute, itself conceived as timeless; whereas M. Bergson's Absolute almost resolves itself into time—evolving, as it were by a free effort, new forms at each instant of a continuous flow. A true account of the Absolute would therefore take the form of history. It would tell us of the Absolute that has been and is, the Absolute "up to date." Of the Absolute that is to be, no account can be given; its essential contingency puts its future beyond the reach of any powers of calculation, even were those powers infinite in their grasp.

Now this view of reality, expounded by its author with a wealth of scientific as well as of philosophical knowledge

which must make his writings fascinating and instructive to those who least agree with them, suggests far more questions than it would be possible merely to catalogue, much less to discuss, within the limits of this paper. But there is one aspect of the theory from my point of view of fundamental interest, on which something must be said—I mean the relation of M. Bergson's free creative consciousness to organised life and to unorganised matter—to that physical Universe with which biology, chemistry, and physics are concerned.

This subject may be considered from three points of view: (1) the relation of organic life to the matter in which it is immersed; (2) the relation of primordial life and consciousness to matter in general; (3) our justification for arriving at conclusions under either of these heads.

M. Bergson, while denying that life—will—consciousness, as we know them on this earth of ours, are mere functions of the material organism, does not, as we have seen, deny that they, in a sense, depend on it. They depend on it as a workman depends on a tool. It limits him, though he uses it.

Now the way in which life uses the organism in which it is embodied is by releasing at will the energy which the organism has obtained directly or indirectly from the sun—directly in the case of plants, indirectly in the case of animals. The plants hoard much but use little. The animals appropriate their savings.

To M. Bergson, therefore, organised life essentially shows itself in the sudden and quasi-explosive release of these accumulations. Indeed he carries this idea so far as to suggest that any material system which should store energy by arresting its degradation to some lower level,[1] and should produce effects by its sudden liberation, would exhibit something in the nature of life. But this is surely going too far. There are plenty of machines used for manufacturing or

[1] This refers to the second law of thermodynamics. It is interesting to observe that M. Bergson regards this as philosophically more important than the first law.

domestic purposes which do just this; while in the realm of nature there seems no essential physical distinction between (on the one hand) the storing up of solar radiation by plants and its discharge in muscular action; and (on the other) the slow production of aqueous vapour, and its discharge during a thunder-storm in torrential rain. Yet all would admit that the first is life, while the second is but mechanism.

It is rash to suggest that a thinker like M. Bergson has wrongly emphasised his own doctrines. Yet I venture, with great diffidence, to suggest that the really important point in this part of his theory, the point where his philosophy breaks finally with "mechanism," the point where freedom and indeterminism are really introduced into the world of space and matter, is only indirectly connected with the bare fact that in organic life accumulated energy is released. What is really essential is the *manner* of its release. If the release be effected by pure mechanism, fate still reigns supreme. If, on the other hand, there be anything in the mode of release, however trifling, which could not be exhaustively accounted for by the laws of matter and motion, then freedom gains a foothold in the very citadel of necessity. Make the hair trigger which is to cause the discharge as delicate as you please, yet if it be pulled by forces dependent wholly upon the configuration and energy of the material universe at the moment, you are nothing advanced. Determinism still holds you firmly in its grip. But if there be introduced into the system a new force—in other words, a new creation—though it be far too minute for any instrument to register, then if it either pull the trigger or direct the explosion, the reality of contingency is established, and our whole conception of the physical world is radically transformed.

This, I conceive, must be M. Bergson's view. But his theory of the relation between life—freedom—will, on the one side, and matter on the other, goes much further than the mere assertion that there is in fact an element of contingency in the movements of living organisms. For he

regards this both as a consequence and as a sign of an effort made by creative will to bring mechanism more and more under the control of freedom. Such efforts have, as biology tells us, often proved abortive. Some successes that have been won have had again to be surrendered. Advance, as in the case of many parasites, has been followed by retrogression. By comparing the molluscs, whose torpid lives have been repeating themselves without sensible variation through all our geological records, with man, in whom is embodied the best we know of consciousness and will, we may measure the success which has so far attended the efforts of super-consciousness in this portion of the Universe.

I say, in this portion of the Universe, because M. Bergson thinks it not only possible but probable that elsewhere in space the struggle between freedom and necessity, between life and matter, may be carried on through the sudden liberation of other forms of energy than those which plants accumulate by forcibly divorcing the oxygen and the carbon atoms combined in our atmosphere. The speculation is interesting, though, from the point of view of science, somewhat hazardous. From the point of view of M. Bergson's metaphysic, however, it is almost a necessity. For his metaphysic, like every metaphysic, aims at embracing all reality ; and as the relation between life and matter is an essential part of it, the matter with which he deals cannot be restricted to that which constitutes our negligible fraction of the physical world.

But what, according to his metaphysic, *is* the relation of life, consciousness, in general, to matter in general ? His theory of *organic* life cannot stand alone. For it does not get us beyond individual living things, struggling freely, but separately, with their own organisms, with each other, and with the inert mass of the physical world which lies around them. But what the history of all this may be, whence comes individual life, and whence comes matter, and what may be the fundamental relation between the two, this has still to be explained.

And, frankly, the task of explanation for any one less gifted than M. Bergson himself is not an easy one. The first stage, indeed, whether easy or not, is at least familiar. M. Bergson thinks, with other great masters of speculation, that consciousness, life, spirit is the *prius* of all that is, be it physical or mental. But let me repeat that the *prius* is, in his view, no all-inclusive absolute, of which our world, the world evolving in time, is but an aspect or phase. His theory, whatever its subsequent difficulties may be, is less remote from common-sense. For duration with him is, as we have seen, something pre-eminently real. It is not to be separated from the creative consciousness. It is no abstract emptiness, filled up by successive happenings, placed (as it were) end to end. It must rather be regarded as an agent in that continuous process of free creation which is life itself.

Since, then, consciousness and matter are not to be regarded as entities of independent origin, ranged against one another from eternity, like the good and evil principles of Zoroaster, what is the relation between them? If I understand M. Bergson aright, matter must be regarded as a bye-product of the evolutionary process. The primordial consciousness falls, as it were, asunder. On the one side it rises to an ever fuller measure of creative freedom; on the other, it lapses into matter, determinism, mechanical adjustment, space. Space with him, therefore, is not, as with most other philosophers, a correlative of Time. It has not the same rank (whatever that may be) in the hierarchy of being. For, while Time is of the essence of primordial activity, Space is but the limiting term of those material elements which are no more than its backwash.

I do not, of course, for a moment delude myself into the belief that I have made these high speculations clear and easy. The reader, justly incensed by my rendering of M. Bergson's doctrine, must find his remedy in M. Bergson's own admirable exposition. I may, however, have done enough to enable me to make intelligible certain difficulties which press upon me, and may, perhaps, press also upon others.

III.

Hegel's imposing system professed to exhibit the necessary stages in the timeless evolution of the Idea. Has M. Bergson any corresponding intention? The evolution, to be sure, with which he deals is not timeless; on the contrary, it is, as we have seen, most intimately welded to duration—a difference of which I am the last to complain. This, however, taken by itself, need be no bar to explanation. But how if we take it in connection with his fundamental principle that creative evolution is essentially indeterminate and contingent? How can the movements of the indeterminate and the contingent be explained? I should myself have supposed the task impossible. But M. Bergson holds that events which, because they are contingent, even infinite powers of calculation could not foresee, may yet be accounted for, even by our very modest powers of thought, after they have occurred. I own this somewhat surprises me. And my difficulty is increased by the reflection that free consciousness pursues no final end, it follows no predetermined design. It struggles, it expends itself in effort, it stretches ever towards completer freedom, but it has no plans. Now, when we are dealing with a fragment of this consciousness embodied in a human being, we regard ourselves as having "explained" his action when we have obtained a rough idea of his objects and of his opportunities. We know, of course, that our explanation must be imperfect; we know ourselves to be ignorant of innumerable elements required for a full comprehension of the problem. But we are content with the best that can be got—and this "best," be it observed, is practically the same whether we believe in determinism or believe in free will. Of primordial consciousness, however, we know neither the objects nor the opportunities. It follows no designs, it obeys no laws. The sort of explanation, therefore, which satisfies us when we are dealing with one of its organic embodiments, seems hard of attainment in the case of primordial consciousness itself.

I cannot, at least, persuade myself that M. Bergson has attained it. Why should free consciousness first produce, and then, as it were, shed, mechanically determined matter? Why, having done so, should it set to work to permeate this same matter with contingency? Why should it allow itself to be split up by matter into separate individualities? Why, in short, should it ever have engaged in that long and doubtful battle between freedom and necessity which we call organic evolution?

It may be replied that these objections, or objections of like pattern, may be urged against any cosmogony whatever; that the most successful philosophy cannot hope to smooth away all difficulties; and that in metaphysics, as in other affairs, we must be content, not with the best we can imagine, but with the least imperfect we can obtain. To this modest programme I heartily subscribe. Yet fully granting that, in the present state of our knowledge, every metaphysic must be defective, we cannot accept any particular metaphysic without some grounds of belief, be they speculative, empirical, or practical; and the question therefore arises—On what grounds are we asked to accept the metaphysic of M. Bergson?

This brings us to what is perhaps the most suggestive, and is certainly the most difficult, portion of his whole doctrine—I mean his theory of knowledge. The magnitude of that difficulty will be at once realised when I say that in M. Bergson's view not reason, but instinct, brings us into the closest touch, the directest relation, with what is most real in the Universe. For reason is at home, not with life and freedom, but with matter, mechanism, and space—the waste products of the creative impulse. We need not wonder, then, that reason should feel at home in the realm of matter; that it should successfully cut up the undivided flow of material change into particular sequences which are repeated, or are capable of repetition, and which exemplify "natural laws"; that it should manipulate long trains of abstract mathematical inference, and find that their remotest conclusion fits closely

to observed fact. For matter and reason own, according to M. Bergson, a common origin; and the second was evolved in order that we might cope successfully with the first.

Instinct, which finds its greatest development among bees and ants, though incomparably inferior to reason in its range, is yet in touch with a higher order of truth, for it is in touch with life itself. In the perennial struggle between freedom and necessity which began when life first sought to introduce contingency into matter, everything, it seems, could not be carried along the same line of advance. Super-consciousness was like an army suddenly involved in a new and difficult country. If the infantry took one route, the artillery must travel by another. The powers of creation would have been overtasked had it been attempted to develop the instinct of the bee along the same evolutionary track as the reason of the man. But man is not, therefore, wholly without instinct, nor does he completely lack the powers of directly apprehending life. In rare moments of tension, when his whole being is wound up for action, when memory seems fused with will and desire into a single impulse to *do,—then* he knows freedom, *then* he touches reality, *then* he consciously sweeps along with the advancing wave of Time, which, as it moves, creates.

However obscure to reflective thought such mystic utterances may seem, many will read them with a secret sympathy. But, from the point of view occupied by M. Bergson's own philosophy, do they not suggest questions of difficulty? How comes it that if instinct be the appropriate organ for apprehending free reality, bees and ants, whose range of freedom is so small, should have so much of it? How comes it that man, the freest animal of them all, should specially delight himself in the exercise of reason, the faculty brought into existence to deal with matter and necessity? M. Bergson is quite aware of the paradox, but does he anywhere fully explain it?

This is, however, comparatively speaking, a small matter.

The difficulties which many will find in the system, as I have just described it, lie deeper. Their first inclination will be to regard it as a fantastic construction, in many parts difficult of comprehension, in no part capable of proof. They will attach no evidential value to the unverified visions attributed to the Hymenoptera, and little to the flashes of illumination enjoyed by man. The whole scheme will seem to them arbitrary and unreal, owing more to poetical imagination than to scientific knowledge or philosophic insight.

Such a judgment would certainly be wrong; and if made at all, will, I fear, be due in no small measure to my imperfect summary. The difficulties of such a summary are indeed very great, not through the defects but the merits of the author summarised. The original picture is so rich in suggestive detail that adequate reproduction on a smaller scale is barely possible. Moreover, M. Bergson's *Évolution créatrice* is not merely a philosophic treatise, it has all the charms and all the audacities of a work of Art, and as such defies adequate reproduction. Yet let no man regard it as an unsubstantial vision. One of its peculiarities is the intimate, and, at first sight, the singular, mingling of minute scientific statement with the boldest metaphysical speculation. This is not accidental; it is of the essence of M. Bergson's method. For his metaphysic may, in a sense, be called empirical. It is no *a priori* construction, any more than it is a branch of physics or biology. It is a philosophy, but a philosophy which never wearies in its appeals to concrete science.

If, for example, you ask why M. Bergson supposes a common super-physical source for the diverging lines of organic evolution, he would say that, with all their differences, they showed occasional similarities of development not otherwise to be explained; and in proof he would compare the eye of the man with the eye of the mollusc. If, again, you asked him why, after crediting this common source of organic life with consciousness and will, he refuses it purpose, he would reply that evolution showed the presence of "drive," "impulse,"

creative "effort," but no plan of operations, and many failures. If you asked him why he supposed that matter as well as life was due to primordial consciousness, he would say (as we have seen) that in no other manner can you account for the ease and success with which reason measures, classifies, and calculates when it is dealing with the material world. Plainly this pre-established harmony is best accounted for by a common origin.

It must be owned that in M. Bergson's dexterous hands this form of argument from the present to the past is almost too supple. Whether diverging lines of development show unlooked-for similarities or puzzling discords is all one to him. Either event finds him ready. In the first case the phenomenon is simply accounted for by community of origin; in the second case it is accounted for—less simply—by his doctrine that each particular evolutionary road is easily over-crowded, and that if creative will insists on using it, something must be dropped by the way.

Even the most abstruse and subtle parts of his system make appeal to natural science. Consider, for example, the sharp distinction which he draws between the operations of mechanism and reason on the one side, creation and instinct on the other. Reason, analysing some very complex organ like the eye and its complementary nervous structure, perceives that it is compounded of innumerable minute elements, each of which require the nicest adjustment if it is to serve its purpose, and all of which are mutually interdependent. It tries to imagine external and mechanical methods by which this intricate puzzle could have been put together — *e.g.* selection out of chance variations. In M. Bergson's opinion, all such theories—true, no doubt, as far as they go—are inadequate. He supplements or replaces them by quite a different view. From the external and mechanical standpoint necessarily adopted by reason, the complexity seems infinite, the task of co-ordination impossible. But looked at from the inside, from the position which creation occupies and instinct comprehends, there is no such complexity and no such

difficulty. Observe how certain kinds of wasp, when paralysing their victim, show a knowledge of anatomy which no morphologist could surpass, and a skill which few surgeons could equal. Are we to suppose these dexterities to be the result of innumerable experiments somehow bred into the race? Or are we to suppose it the result, *e.g.*, of natural selection working upon minute variation? Or are we to suppose it due to some important mutation? No, says M. Bergson; none of these explanations, nor any like them, are admissible. If the problem was one of mechanism, if it were as complicated as reason, contemplating it from without, necessarily supposes, then it would be insoluble. But to the wasp it is not insoluble; for the wasp looks at it from within, and is in touch, through instinct, with life itself.

This enumeration is far from exhausting the biological arguments which M. Bergson draws from his ample stores in favour of his views on the beginnings of organic life. Yet I cannot feel that even he succeeds in quarrying out of natural science foundations strong enough to support the full weight of his metaphysic. Even if it be granted (and by naturalistic thinkers it will not be granted) that life always carries with it a trace of freedom or contingency, and that this grows greater as organisms develop, why should we therefore suppose that life existed before its first humble beginnings on this earth, why should we call in super-consciousness? M. Bergson regards matter as the dam which keeps back the rush of life. Organise it a little (as in the Protozoa)—*i.e.* slightly raise the sluice—and a little life will squeeze through. Organise it elaborately (as in man)—*i.e.* raise the sluice a good deal—and much life will squeeze through. Now this may be a very plausible opinion if the flood of life be really there, beating against matter till it forces an entry through the narrow slit of undifferentiated protoplasm. But is it there? Science, modestly professing ignorance, can stumble along without it; and I question whether philosophy, with only scientific data to work upon, can establish its reality.

In truth, when we consider the manner in which M. Bergson uses his science to support his metaphysic, we are reminded of the familiar theistic argument from design, save that most of the design is left out. Theologians were wont to point to the marvellous adjustments with which the organic world abounds, and ask whether such intelligent contrivances did not compel belief in an intelligent contriver. The argument evidently proceeds on the principle that when all imaginable physical explanations fail, appeal may properly be made to an explanation which is metaphysical. Now, I do not say that this is either bad logic or bad philosophy; but I do say that it supplies no solid or immutable basis for a metaphysic. Particular applications of it are always at the mercy of new scientific discovery. Applications of the greatest possible plausibility were, as we all know, made meaningless by Darwin's discovery. Adaptations which seemed to supply conclusive proofs of design were found to be explicable, at least in the first instance, by natural selection. What has happened before may happen again. The apparently inexplicable may find an explanation within the narrowest limits of natural science. Mechanism may be equal to playing the part which a spiritual philosophy had assigned to consciousness. When, therefore, M. Bergson tells us that the appearance of an organ so peculiar as the eye in lines of evolution so widely separated as the molluscs and the vertebrates implies not only a common ancestral origin, but a common *pre*-ancestral origin; or when he points out how hard it is to account for certain most complicated cases of adaptation by any known theory of heredity, we may admit the difficulty, yet hesitate to accept the solution. We feel the peril of basing our beliefs upon a kind of ignorance which may at any moment be diminished or removed.

Now, I do not suggest that M. Bergson's system, looked at as a whole, suffers from this kind of weakness. On the contrary, I think that if the implications of his system be carefully studied, it will be seen that he draws support from sources of a very different kind, and in particular from two

which *must* be drawn upon (as I think) if the inadequacy of naturalism is to be fully revealed.

The first is the theory of knowledge. If naturalism be accepted, then our whole apparatus for arriving at truth, all the beliefs in which that truth is embodied, reason, instinct and their legitimate results, are the product of irrational forces. If they are the product of irrational forces, whence comes their authority? If to this it be replied that the principles of evolution, which naturalism accepts from science, would tend to produce faculties adapted to the discovery of truth, I reply, in the first place, that this is no solution of the difficulty, and wholly fails to extricate us from the logical circle. I reply, in the second place, that the only faculties which evolution, acting through natural selection, would tend to produce, are those which enable individuals, or herds, or societies to survive. Speculative capacity—the capacity, for example, to frame a naturalistic theory of the Universe—if we have it at all, must be a bye-product. What nature is really concerned with is that we should eat, breed, and bring up our young. The rest is accident.

Now M. Bergson does not directly interest himself in this negative argument, on which I have dwelt elsewhere.[1] But I think his whole constructive theory of reason and instinct is really based on the impossibility of accepting blind mechanism as the source—the efficient cause—of all our knowledge of reality. His theory is difficult. I am not sure that I am competent either to explain or to criticise it. But it seems to me clear that, great as is the width of scientific detail with which it is illustrated and enforced, its foundations lie far deeper than the natural sciences can dig.

But it is not only in his theory of knowledge that he shows himself to be moved by considerations with which science has nothing to do. Though the point is not explicitly pressed, it is plain that he takes account of "values," and is content with no philosophy which wholly ignores them. Were

[1] *Philosophic Doubt and Foundation*, ch. xiii.

it otherwise, could he speak as he does of "freedom," of "creative will," of the "joy" (as distinguished from the pleasure) which fittingly accompanies it? Could he represent the Universe as the battle-ground between the opposing forces of freedom and necessity? Could he look on matter as "the enemy"? Could he regard mechanism, determinateness, all that matter stands for, as not merely in process of subjugation, but as things that *ought* to be subdued by the penetrating energies of free consciousness?

This quasi-ethical ideal is infinitely removed from pure naturalism. It is almost as far removed from any ideal which could be manufactured out of empirical science alone, even granting what naturalism refuses to grant, that organised life exhibits traces of contingency. M. Bergson, if I correctly read his mind, refuses—I think, rightly refuses—to tolerate, conceptions so ruinous to "values" as these must inevitably prove. But can his own conception of the Universe stand where he has placed it? By introducing creative will behind development, he has no doubt profoundly modified the whole evolutionary drama. Matter and mechanism have lost their pride of place. Consciousness has replaced them. The change seems great; nay, it is great. But if things remain exactly where M. Bergson leaves them, is the substantial difference so important as we might at first suppose? What is it that consciousness strives for? What does it accomplish? It strives to penetrate matter with contingency. Why, I do not know. But concede the worth of the enterprise. What measure of success can it possibly attain? A certain number of organic molecules develop into more or less plastic instruments of consciousness and will; consciousness and will, thus armed, inflict a few trifling scratches on the outer crust of our world, and perhaps of worlds elsewhere, but the huge mass of matter remains and must remain what it has always been—the undisputed realm of lifeless determinism. Freedom, when all has happened that can happen, creeps humbly on its fringe.

I suggest, with great respect, that in so far as M. Bergson

has devised his imposing scheme of metaphysic in order to avoid the impotent conclusions of Naturalism, he has done well. As the reader knows, I most earnestly insist that no philosophy can at present be other than provisional; and that, in framing a provisional philosophy, "values" may be, and must be, taken into account. My complaint, if I have one, is not that M. Bergson goes too far in this direction, but that he does not go far enough. He somewhat mars his scheme by what is, from *this* point of view, too hesitating and uncertain a treatment.

It is true that he has left naturalism far behind, His theory of a primordial super-consciousness, not less than his theory of freedom, separates him from this school of thought as decisively as his theory of duration, with its corollary of an ever-growing and developing reality, divides him from the great idealists. It is true also that, according to my view, his metaphysic is religious: since I deem the important philosophic distinction between religious and non-religious metaphysic to be that God, or whatever in the system corresponds to God, does in the former *take sides* in a moving drama, while, with more consistency, but far less truth, he is, in the non-religious system, represented as indifferently related to all the multiplicity of which he constitutes the unity.[1]

Now, M. Bergson's super-consciousness does certainly take sides, and, as we have seen, his system suffers to the full from the familiar difficulty to which, in one shape or another, all religious systems (as defined) are liable, namely, that the evils or the defects against which the Creator is waging war are evils and defects in a world of His own creating. But as M. Bergson has gone thus far in opposition both to natural-

[1] This view, at greater length and therefore with much less crudity, is expounded in *Foundations of Belief*, p. 308. Since writing this portion of the text I have seen Professor William James' posthumous volume, where an opposite opinion seems to be expressed. I do not think, however, that our disagreement is substantiated. I think he means no more than I myself indicated earlier in this article. Let me add, that the last opinion I desire to express is that absolute idealists are not religious.

istic and to metaphysical orthodoxies, would not his scheme gain if he went yet further? Are there no other "values" which he would do well to consider? His super-consciousness has already some quasi-æsthetic and quasi-moral qualities. We must attribute to it joy in full creative effort, and a corresponding alienation from those branches of the evolutionary stem which, preferring ease to risk and effort, have remained stationary, or even descended in the organic scale. It may be that other values are difficult to include in his scheme, especially if he too rigorously banishes teleology. But why should he banish teleology? In his philosophy super-consciousness is so indeterminate that it is not permitted to hamper itself with any purpose more definite than that of self-augmentation. It is ignorant not only of its course, but of its goal; and for the sufficient reason that, in M. Bergson's view, these things are not only unknown, but unknowable. But is there not a certain incongruity between the substance of such a philosophy and the sentiments associated with it by its author? Creation, freedom, will—these doubtless are great things; but we cannot lastingly admire them unless we know their drift. We cannot, I submit, rest satisfied with what differs so little from the haphazard; joy is no fitting consequent of efforts which are so nearly aimless. If values are to be taken into account, it is surely better to invoke God with a purpose, than supra-consciousness with none.

Yet these deficiencies, if deficiencies they be, do little to diminish the debt of gratitude we owe to M. Bergson. Apart altogether from his admirable criticisms, his psychological insight, his charms of style, there is permanent value in his theories. And those who, like myself, find little satisfaction in the all-inclusive unification of the idealist systems; who cannot, either on rational or any other grounds, accept naturalism as a creed, will always turn with interest and admiration to this brilliant experiment in philosophic construction, so far removed from both.

A. J. BALFOUR.

LIFE AND CONSCIOUSNESS.[1]

HENRI BERGSON.

GENERALLY speaking, when a lecture is dedicated, as this is, to a thinker or scientist whose name it bears, the lecturer has to make an effort, at times an effort of some difficulty, to maintain himself, by the choice of his subject, in the sphere of interests of this thinker or scientist. But, for a lecture associated with the great name of Huxley, no such effort is necessary. Rather, indeed, we may ask what scientific question, what philosophic problem, is there which did not interest that luminous intellect—one of the broadest and most comprehensive that nineteenth-century England produced, fertile in great intellects as it was?

It has seemed to me, however, that the question of consciousness in general—of its relations with nature and life—corresponds fairly well with one of the main lines of Huxley's thought, with one of his chief pre-occupations. And as I personally know none more important nor more crucial in the whole range of philosophy, that is the subject I have chosen.

But, before attacking the problem itself, there is one point to which I wish to call your attention—namely, the meagre light thrown on this problem by the "systems" of philosophy properly so-called. What are we? What are we doing here? Whence do we come and whither do we go? These,

[1] The "Huxley Lecture," delivered at the University of Birmingham, May 29, 1911, with some additions.

it seems, are the essential and vital questions, the questions of supreme interest, which first present themselves to the philosopher and which are, or should be, the very cause of philosophy's existence. But not at all. If we consider the enormous work done in philosophy from antiquity down to the present time, we find that attention has been engrossed with a host of special problems in psychology, in morals, in logic, as well as a crowd of very general metaphysical speculations on the more or less hypothetic principles of things; and then again we find a welter of critical reflections on the manner and method of knowledge, and finally a multitude of works of history and discussion which give us the opinions of thinkers on the opinions of others; but we perceive that those problems which interest us as *human beings* above all else, and which are for us *the* vital problems, have very seldom been squarely faced. I mean that the solution given has been thrown out in passing, as a consequence of certain very general and highly abstract conceptions of Being, of Thought, of Extensity, of Substance, etc. It seems as if philosophy thought it would be slighting the claims of these problems, failing in respect to them, to study them in the same way as an ordinary question of biology or history, which cannot be resolved save in an approximate, imperfect and provisional manner. No; it seems that for the answer to these great problems some great system is necessary in which solemnly and immutably it may take its place, as a geometrical theorem takes its final place in a book of Euclid. The disadvantage of this way of proceeding is that we thus put in the second place problems which should be in the first; but, besides that, we render the solution of these problems dependent on general systems of philosophy, with which they stand and fall. And then the solution shares in the strictness and rigidity of the system to which it is attached; it must be taken or left, just as it is, and admits of no gradual development or perfecting.

Either I am much deceived or the future belongs to a

philosophy which will give back to these problems their rightful place—the first!—which will face them in themselves and for themselves, directly; which, no longer returning to these questions an answer deduced from systematic principles (a self-styled "final" solution, to be replaced in its turn by other solutions which will claim equal finality), will be gradually perfectible, open to corrections, to retouchings and unlimited amplifications; a philosophy that will no longer pretend to have reached a solution of mathematical certainty (which mathematical certainty, in such a case, must always be deceptive), but will be content (like a good number of sciences at the present time) with a sufficiently high degree of probability, with a probability capable of being pushed farther and farther till it becomes so great that it may end by becoming practically equivalent to certainty. In short, I am of opinion that there is no absolutely certain principle from which the answer to these questions can be deduced in a mathematical way. Nor does there exist a privileged fact, or a collection of privileged facts, from which the answer can be inferred, as, for example, occurs in a problem in physics or chemistry. But it seems to me that in a great number of different fields there is a great number of collections of facts, each of which, considered apart, gives us a direction in which the answer to the problem may be sought—a direction only. But it is a great thing to have even a direction, and still more to have several directions, for at the precise point where these directions converge might be found the solution we are seeking. What we possess meanwhile are *lines of facts*, none of which goes far enough, none of which goes right up to the point which interests us and at which we want to place ourselves; but these lines may be more and more prolonged, and they, moreover, already sufficiently indicate to us, by the ideal prolongation that is open to us, the region in which the answer to the problem will be found.

Now, it is some of these lines that I desire to follow with you to-day. Each of them, taken apart, will give, I repeat,

nothing but a probability; but all together, by converging on the same point, may give us an accumulation of probabilities which will gradually approximate scientific certainty.

Here is the first line I wish to follow, the first aspect of the question that I wish to point out to you. What we call "the mind" is, before all, something conscious—it is consciousness. But what do we mean by consciousness? You rightly guess that I am not going to define this simple thing which eludes all definition, and which everyone can experience. But, without exactly giving a definition which would be much less clear than the thing defined, we may at least indicate its most obvious and most striking character. Consciousness signifies, above all, memory. The memory may not be very extensive; it may embrace only a very small section of the past, nothing indeed but the immediate past; but, in order that there may be consciousness at all, something of this past must be retained, be it nothing but the moment just gone by. A consciousness which retained nothing of the past would be a consciousness that died and was re-born every instant—it would be no longer consciousness. Such is just the condition of matter; or, at least, such is just the way we represent matter when we wish to oppose it to consciousness. Leibnitz defined matter — that is to say, what is not consciousness — by calling it a momentary mind, an instantaneous consciousness. And, in fact, an instantaneous consciousness is just what we call unconsciousness. All consciousness, then, is memory; all consciousness is a preservation and accumulation of the past in the present.

But, on the other hand, all consciousness is an anticipation of the future. Analyse your mental state when you hear someone speaking: you are intent on what is being said, but also on what is coming; and even the present only interests you in so far as it will profit the immediate future. We are essentially drawn and, as it were, inclined towards the future, because we are creatures of action, and every action is like a leap into the future—into the next moment.

So that to remember the immediate past and to anticipate

the immediate future is the most striking function of consciousness. Indeed, what we call the present instant is something that hardly exists except in theory, for it has already ceased to exist when it attracts our attention. Try to catch the present instant, it has already gone, it is already far away. Practically, what we call our present is something that has a certain length or breadth of duration, and is composed of two halves, one being our immediate past, the other our immediate future. What we feel ourselves to be at any given moment is what we were just before and what we are just about to be: we recline on our past and incline towards our future, and that reclining and inclining seem to be the very essence of our consciousness. So that consciousness is, above all, a hyphen, a tie between past and future. Now what is the use of such a tie, and what is consciousness called upon to do?

To reply to this question, we must first ask what are, in the whole of Nature, the creatures which, to all appearances, are conscious beings. To tell the truth, in order to be absolutely sure that a being is conscious like ourselves, we ought to penetrate it, to be it. Here, again, if we seek for mathematical certainty, we shall obtain nothing, for you cannot even be mathematically sure that I, who am speaking to you at this moment, possess a consciousness. I might be a well-constructed automaton—going, coming, speaking—without internal consciousness, and the very words by which I declare at this moment that I am a conscious being might be words pronounced without consciousness. However, though this is mathematically possible, and consequently the existence of my consciousness cannot be for you a matter of mathematical certainty, I think that it is sufficiently probable for you. The truth is, that whenever you assume consciousness in a being other than yourself, you infer this consciousness from certain outward analogies that you find between this being and yourself. So let us follow up this reasoning by analogy, and ask ourselves up to what point it is probable that

consciousness may be imputed to nature, and at what point it probably stops short.

One reply sometimes made to the question is this: In ourselves, consciousness is bound up in one way or another with a brain; we may therefore assume the presence of consciousness in all those living beings in whom a brain is found, and in those alone. But a moment's reflection will show us the fallacy of this reasoning. For in applying elsewhere this mode of argument, we might as well say: digestion in us is bound up with a stomach, therefore we ought to attribute the faculty of digestion to the living beings who possess stomachs, and to those alone. Now this would be absolutely wrong, for living beings who have no stomachs and even no organs, which consist of a simple protoplasmic mass, are still able to digest. Only, in proportion as the organism becomes more perfect, a division of labour is brought about: special organs are destined to diverse functions instead of the whole mass doing all, and the digestive faculty becomes localised in a stomach and in other organs which accomplish it *better*, whilst the rest of the organism renounces the faculty, having got rid of this care by putting it on to a special organ. But the function was previously performed in the undifferentiated organism: it was performed all over it, though with less precision. Now, without doubt, in ourselves consciousness is bound up with a brain in some way, but as we descend in the animal scale we see the brain become more and more simplified (as also does the whole nervous system), and then the nervous centres separate from each other, until finally the nervous elements are merged in the mass of undifferentiated living tissue. Now, is it not probable that if, at the top of the organic scale, clear and distinct consciousness is bound up with a brain and a highly differentiated nervous system, consciousness accompanies this system the whole length of the descent, and that ultimately, when the nervous substance is merged in the rest of living matter, consciousness itself is diffused in the

whole of this mass: diffused, confused, weakened, but not reduced to nothing? So that, in the end, consciousness might exist in Nature wherever there is living matter. At least, it is not impossible. But is it actually the case? I believe it would be going too far, and here is a fresh line of considerations which will, I think, lead us to limit this conclusion to a certain degree.

We have just said that in the conscious being that we know best—namely, man—consciousness appears in some way to be bound up with a brain. Since in this case it is through a brain that the consciousness works, and since the work is thus performed with the greatest precision, let us glance at the brain, and ask ourselves what are its most obvious functions. The brain, as you know, forms part of a whole called the cerebro-spinal nervous system, which, in addition to the brain itself, comprises the spinal cord, the nerves, etc. In the spinal cord are set up mechanisms which permit the various parts of our body to perform complicated and well co-ordinated movements. These mechanisms may be set in action without the intervention of the brain, under the direct influence of an external stimulus; in such a case, the bodily reaction follows immediately on the stimulation. But there are cases in which the external stimulus, instead of obtaining at once, through the spinal cord, an appropriate bodily reaction, goes up to the brain, in order to come down again thence to the spinal cord, and only then obtains from the cord the complex physical movement. Why did it go to the brain? And what has it gained by this roundabout proceeding? A glance thrown on the general structure of the brain will answer these questions. The brain is in communication with those mechanisms of the spinal cord that we have just referred to, and can send to any one of them the order to work. Imagine a stimulation coming to the brain from without, by the eye, ear or touch. The brain is like a switch having the faculty of putting the current thus received in communication with one or other of the motor mechanisms of the spine, chosen at will. So that in

sum, and broadly speaking, the spinal cord is a storehouse of ready-made complex actions, and the brain is the organ permitting choice, in any circumstances, of that particular complex action which is appropriate. The brain is the organ of choice.

Now, according as we descend in the animal scale, we see that the functions of the brain and those of the spinal cord become less differentiated, as if a part at least of the faculty of choosing, which in us is attached to the brain, had descended to the spinal cord. In this latter, then, we see that the mechanical attachments are fewer, and probably also constructed with less precision. Finally, it seems indeed as if the two functions, the one an absolutely precise automatism, the other an absolute faculty of choice, become mingled, and blend with each other so thoroughly that when we arrive at organisms in which there are only a few heaps of nerve-cells scattered here and there, and even more so when we come to organisms where there are no longer differentiated nerve-cells, we are faced by a living substance such that external stimulus provokes from it a reaction both undecided, though not altogether chosen (there comes in the element of choice), and ill-defined although aiming at a certain precision (there comes in the element of automatism). Such is probably the condition of an amœba—of one of those tiny lumps of protoplasmic jelly you can see with the microscope in a drop of water. When anything that can be turned into food floats by, the amœba throws out in various directions protoplasmic filaments which draw the substance towards it. These pseudopodia are temporary organs, ill-defined (there comes in the element of mechanism), but everything seems to happen as if there were at least a rudiment of intention on the part of the little organism, a certain choice of appropriate movements.

It appears, therefore, as if from the top to the bottom of the animal scale there is present (although the lower we go, the more vaguely it is seen) the faculty of choice, and more particularly the choice of action, of combined movements, in response to stimulation arising from without. This is what

we find in pursuing our second line of facts. Now, observe that the point we come out at is pretty close to that to which the first line led us. We said, you will remember, that the function of consciousness seemed primarily to retain the past and to anticipate the future. That is quite natural if its function is to preside over actions which are *chosen.* For choice implies that one thinks of what is to be,—of the immediate future,—with a view to creating this future to some extent; and that cannot be done save by profiting from past experience—by retaining the past in order to project it within the future.

But all this gives no answer as yet to the question we put: Does consciousness cover the whole domain of life? and if it does not extend everywhere, where does it stop?

We have not yet the answer to this question, it is true; but we are getting near it. For if consciousness implies choice, and choice amongst various possible actions, consciousness will not be found presumably in organisms that do not possess the power of free action—the power, consequently, to choose between several actions. In very truth, I believe no living organism is absolutely without the faculty of performing actions and moving spontaneously; for we see that even in the vegetable world, where the organism is for the most part fixed to the ground, the faculty of motion is asleep rather than absent altogether. Sometimes it wakes up, just when it is likely to be useful. Therefore, in principle, this faculty of spontaneous motion probably exists in every living thing; but, in actual fact, many organisms have given it up,—as, for example, the numerous animals living as parasites on other organisms, and thus able to get their food on the spot, and again, almost the entire vegetable kingdom. It seems probable, therefore, and this is my last word on the point, that consciousness is in principle present in all living matter, but that it is dormant or atrophied wherever such matter renounces spontaneous activity, and on the contrary that it becomes more intense, more complex, more complete, just where living

matter trends most in the direction of activity and movement. Observe that this is a point we can experience in ourselves. Precisely as our actions cease to be spontaneous and become automatic, consciousness is withdrawn from them ; when we learn a new physical exercise, for example, and have to decide on each of our motions and choose that which is appropriate, we have distinct consciousness of each. As we get used to the exercise and it becomes automatic, consciousness fades away. Again, when is our consciousness most acute, most intensely alive? Is it not, above all, at those times of internal crisis when we are hesitating between several possible actions, several lines of conduct that are equally possible? Consciousness in each of us, then, seems to express the amount of choice, or, if you will, of creation, at our disposal for movements and activity. Analogy authorises us to infer that it is the same in the whole of the organised world.

Let us consider living matter, then, under its simplest form, as it may have been in the beginning: a simple mass of protoplasmic jelly like that of an amœba. This mass can change its shape at will—it is therefore vaguely conscious. Now, in order to develop and evolve, two courses are open to it. Either it may follow the path leading towards movement, action—action growing more and more complex, more and more deliberate and free as time goes on: this means adventure and risk, but means also a consciousness more and more wide awake and luminous. Or, on the contrary, giving up the faculty of movement and choice that it possesses, even though of course in very feeble degree, it may decide to fix itself just where it finds suitable conditions of life which will do away with the necessity of going to seek the materials it requires: that means an assured and tranquil life, a humdrum sort of existence, but it involves the drowsiness which dogs our inactivity, the slumber of consciousness.[1] The former direction corresponds in the main to the line of animal development (I say in the main, because many species of animals

[1] See on this subject: Cope, *The Origin of the Fittest*, 1887, p. 76.

give up their mobility, and thus probably also their consciousness); the latter, in the main, is proper to vegetables; again I say "in the main," since the faculty of moving, and probably therefore also of consciousness, may occasionally reawaken in vegetable life.

Now, if we consider from this standpoint the entrance of life in the world, this entrance will appear to us like the introduction, into the world, of something that encroaches upon inert matter. In the non-living unorganised world, if this were left alone, necessity would sit enthroned. In determinate conditions inert matter reacts in a determinate way; in the inanimate world nothing is unforeseeable, and if our science were sufficiently advanced we should be able to foretell what will happen there, precisely as we can foretell the eclipses of the sun and moon. In short, inert matter is subject to mathematical necessity. But, with the coming of life, we see the appearance of indetermination. A living being, no matter how simple, is a reservoir of indetermination and unforeseeability, a reservoir of possible actions or, in a word, of *choice*. And in it, too, we find that faculty of imagining future eventualities (or, speaking more generally, of anticipating the future), and at the same time of storing up the past for that purpose, which is the faculty of consciousness.

If this be so, consciousness and matter would appear to be antagonistic forces, which, nevertheless, come to a mutual understanding and manage somehow to get on together. They are antagonistic in this, that matter is theoretically the realm of fatality, while consciousness is essentially that of liberty; and yet life, which is nothing but consciousness using matter for its purposes, succeeds in reconciling them. Life, therefore, must be something which avails itself of a certain elasticity in matter—slight in amount as this probably is—and turns it to the profit of liberty by stealing into whatever infinitesimal fraction of indetermination that inert matter may present. Now I believe that this twofold conclusion is precisely what we shall come to after following certain other lines of facts,

and that in following these lines we may, moreover, catch a glimpse at once of *how* consciousness finds matter an obstacle, and *how*, notwithstanding, it succeeds in making use of it. I will begin with the last point.

If we ask ourselves *how* a conscious animal succeeds in obtaining from matter—that is to say, from its body—the execution of movements on which it has decided, we find that its method consists in making use of special substances which might be called "explosives." These substances are the food-stuffs, more particularly those called ternary, the essential elements of which are carbon, oxygen and hydrogen. In these food-stuffs is stored up a considerable amount of potential energy, ready to burst out suddenly, like the energy stored up in gunpowder. This energy has been slowly, gradually, borrowed from the sun by plants; and the animal which feeds on a plant, or on another animal that has fed on a plant, or on an animal that has fed on another animal that has fed on a plant, etc., thus passes into his own body an explosive made by life through a storage of solar energy: when this animal performs voluntary movements, it does so by simply producing the infinitesimal spark which sets off the explosive—by, as it were, just brushing the trigger of a pistol and thus setting free a considerable force in the direction chosen at will. Now if, in the beginning, the first living beings swayed between animal and vegetable conditions, sharing at once in both one and the other, it is because life at its origin had to perform the double work of making the explosive and turning it to account. In proportion as plants and animals differentiated, life split up into two kingdoms, of which one, the less concerned with movement, was more concerned with making the explosive, whilst the other confined itself to making use of it. Nevertheless, the essence of life seems to be to secure that matter, by a process necessarily very slow and difficult, should store up energy ready for life afterwards to expend this energy suddenly in free movements. ' Now, what precisely would a free cause do—a cause incapable of forcing the necessity of matter, or

only able to force it to an infinitesimal extent, and which, nevertheless, were desirous of producing movements of increasingly greater power? It would act in precisely this way. It would arrange so as merely to have to press, as it were, the trigger of a pistol in which there would be no friction, or to furnish an infinitesimal spark, profiting by an energy that it would have gradually accumulated by turning every movement to account.

But we arrive at the same conclusion if we regard the living and conscious being along a different line of facts—not on the side of "choice," but on that of "memory." By what sign do we recognise in current experience a "man of action,"—I mean a man able to impress his mark on the events, large or small, amongst which he evolves? Surely by the fact that he can take in, at a single glance, a great number of things, especially a great number of previous happenings. He seizes all these in a single perception which instructs him for the action he prepares. The more successive events he seizes in this single glance, the better he succeeds in dominating them. Now, if we consider consciousness confronted with matter, we find that it is characterised by just this fact, that in an interval which for it is infinitely short, and which constitutes one of our "instants," it seizes under an indivisible form millions and billions of events that succeed each other in inert matter. Yes, that indivisible sensation of light which I have at this moment, if I open my eyes for a single instant, is the condensation of an immensely long history unrolling itself in the world of matter: there are, in that single instant, billions of successive vibrations—that is to say, a series of events such that, if I wished to count them even with the utmost rapidity, it would require thousands and thousands of years for the enumeration. It is this immense history that I seize all at once under the pictorial form of a very brief sensation of light. And we could say just the same of all our other sensations. Sensation, which is the point at which consciousness touches matter, is, then, the condensation, in the duration

peculiar to this consciousness, of a history which in itself,—in the world of matter,—is something infinitely diluted, and which occupies enormous periods of what might be called the duration of things. So, looked at from the side of sensation, consciousness gives us the same impression as it did just now from the side of movement. Consciousness behaves just like a power entering matter in order to draw the highest possible advantage from the elasticity it finds therein, to take possession of matter from the side of movement as well as from that of sensation: from the side of movement, by an explosive action setting free, in a flash, energy drawn from matter through years and years, and directing this energy in a chosen way; from the side of sensation, by an effort of concentration which seizes as a whole, in one moment, billions of events happening in things, and thus allows us to control them.

Thus all the lines of facts we follow seem to converge on the same point, a point at which we seem to see the following image arise: on the one hand, matter subject to necessity, a kind of immense machine, without memory, or at least having only just sufficient memory to bridge the interval between one instant and the next, each of the states of the material world being capable, or almost so, of mathematical deduction from the preceding state, and consequently adding nothing thereto; on the other hand, consciousness—that is to say, on the contrary, a force essentially free and essentially memory, a force whose very character is to pile up the past on the past, like a rolling snowball, and at every instant of duration to organise with this past something new which is a real creation. That these two forms of existence, matter and consciousness, have indeed a common origin, seems to me probable. I believe that the first is a reversal of the second, that while consciousness is action that continually creates and multiplies, matter is action which continually unmakes itself and wears out; and I believe also that neither the matter constituting a world nor the consciousness which utilises this matter can be explained by themselves, and that there is a common source of both this

matter and this consciousness. But I cannot now enter deeply into this question. Let it suffice to say that I see in the whole evolution of life on our planet an effort of this essentially creative force to arrive, by traversing matter, at something which is only realised in man, and which, moreover, even in man, is realised only imperfectly.

There is no need to recall here all the facts which, since Lamarck in France and Darwin in England, have been adduced to confirm the idea of an evolution of species, that is to say, of the generation of some species from others, commencing by forms probably of infinite simplicity. I think that on this head it is impossible to dispute the results accepted to-day by practically all biologists. And it is impossible not to admire the enormous amount of effort expended during the last fifty years to show the part played in the evolution of living beings by the necessity these labour under to adapt themselves to their environment. But this necessity of adaptation explains, to my thinking, the arrests of life at such or such determinate forms much more than the movement through which life becomes more complex and raises itself towards greater and greater efficiency. A very simple rudimentary being is as well adapted as a man to its environment, since it succeeds in living in it: why, then, if adaptation explains everything, has life gone on complicating itself, and, moreover, complicating itself more and more delicately and *dangerously*? Molluscs such as the Lingulæ, existing at the present time, existed also in the remotest ages of the palæozoic era. Why did life go any further? Why, if there is not behind life an impulse, an immense impulse to climb higher and higher, to run greater and greater risks in order to arrive at greater and greater efficiency?

I think it is hard to survey the whole of the evolution of life without the impression that this impulse is a reality. The error is to believe that this impulse has projected living matter in a single direction, that species are classified along a single scale, that everything has gone on smoothly and without

let or hindrance. It is, on the contrary, obvious that the force I speak of has found resistances in the matter it had to make use of; that it has been obliged to split up—I mean to share along lines of different evolution the different tendencies it carried; that on each of these lines there is a crowd of failures, of deviations, of reversions; that many of these lines of evolution have not been able to go on very far; that two alone seem to have led to a certain success, partial only on one, but relatively complete on the other. These two lines are those of the Arthropods and the Vertebrates. At the end of the first we find instinct in its most marvellous forms; at the end of the second, the human intellect. It seems then, indeed, as if the force I speak of were a force that contained in itself, at least potentially, and interfused, the two forms of consciousness that we call instinct and intelligence.

Things seem to happen as if an immense current of consciousness (a consciousness which includes a multitude of potentialities all crowding on and hindering each other) had traversed matter in order to entice it to organisation and make of this matter, which is necessity itself, an instrument of liberty. But it has scarcely escaped being itself ensnared. Matter, which is essentially automatism and necessity, enfolds the consciousness which seeks to entice it, converts it to its own automatism, and lulls it into its own unconsciousness. On certain lines of evolution, as, for example, in the vegetable kingdom, this automatism and unconsciousness have become the rule, and the liberty of the evolutive force cannot show itself except in the creation of forms which are, indeed, veritable works of art. These unforeseeable forms, once created, repeat themselves automatically, and the individual has no power of choice. On other lines, consciousness succeeds in disentangling itself sufficiently for the individual to have a certain latitude of choice, a certain feeling, but the necessities of life are there, and make of this power of choice a simple auxiliary of material existence. Thus, along the whole course of the evolution of life, liberty is dogged by automatism, and

in the long run is stifled by it. With man alone the chain has been broken. I cannot here enter into detail as to the causes which have permitted life, by a sudden leap from animal to man, to break the chain. I confine myself to saying that the human brain, although, seen from without, it differs little from that of a highly developed animal, yet possesses this remarkable feature—that it can oppose to every contracted habit another habit, to every kind of automatism another automatism, so that in man liberty succeeds in freeing itself by setting necessity to fight against necessity.

I doubt that the evolution of life will ever be explained by a mere combination of mechanical forces. Obviously there is a vital impulse: what I was just calling an impulse towards a higher and higher efficiency, something which ever seeks to transcend itself, to extract from itself *more* than there is—in a word, to create. Now, a force which draws from itself more than it contains, which gives more than it has, is precisely what is called a *spiritual* force: in fact, I do not see how otherwise spirit is to be defined. But, on the other hand, we are wrong when we fail to take into account, in the explanation of the organic world, the obstacles of every kind which this force encounters. The spectacle of the evolution of life from its very beginning down to man suggests to us the image of a current of consciousness which flows down into matter as into a tunnel, which endeavours to advance, which makes efforts on every side, thus digging galleries most of which are stopped by a rock that is too hard, but which, in one direction at least, prove possible to follow to the end and break out into the light once more. This direction is the line of evolution resulting in man. Now, what has been gained by forcing this tunnel, and why did life start on the undertaking? Here, again, new lines of facts might lead us to a plausible conclusion, one that may become more and more probable. But I have so little time, and it would be necessary to enter into such great detail on the mechanism of psychical facts—above all, on the physio-

psychological relation—that I can now only formulate briefly my conclusions. When, setting one against the other, we examine consciousness and matter in their mutual reactions, we have the impression that matter plays at first, in relation to consciousness, the part of an instrument that cuts it up in order to bring about a greater precision. A thought only becomes precise when it is divided into words, that is, if it can be so divided; an orator does not quite know what he is going to say, and what he means to say, until he has taken a sheet of paper and set forth clearly in separate phrases, placed side by side, what in his mind was given in a state of mutual interpenetration. Thus first does matter separate that which was blended, and distinguish what was confused. But moreover, and above all, matter is what provokes effort and renders it possible. The thought which is only thought, the work of art which is only in the conceptual state, the poem which is only a dream, costs as yet no effort: what requires an effort is the material realisation of the poem in words, of the artistic conception in a statue or a picture. This effort is painful, it may be very painful; and yet, whilst making it, we feel that it is as precious as, and perhaps more precious than, the work it results in, because, thanks to it, we have drawn from ourselves not only all that was there, but more than was there: we have raised ourselves above ourselves.

Now, this effort would not have been put forth without matter, which, by the unique nature of the resistance it opposes and the unique nature of the docility to which it can be brought, plays at one and the same time the rôle of obstacle and stimulus, causes us to feel our force and also to succeed in intensifying it.

Philosophers who have speculated on the significance of life and the destiny of man have not sufficiently remarked that Nature has taken pains to give us notice every time this destiny is accomplished; she has set up a sign which apprises us every time our activity is in full expansion; this

sign is joy. I say joy; I do not say pleasure. Pleasure, in point of fact, is no more than an instrument contrived by Nature to obtain from the individual the preservation and the propagation of life; it gives us no information concerning the direction in which life is flung forward. True joy, on the contrary, is always an emphatic signal of the *triumph* of life. Now, if we follow this new line of facts, we find that wherever joy is, creation has been, and that the richer the creation the deeper the joy. The mother looking upon her child is joyous because she has the consciousness of having created it, physically and morally. A man who succeeds in his enterprise—for example, a captain of industry whose business is prospering—is he joyous solely on account of the money he is winning and the notoriety he has acquired? Doubtless these elements count for much in the satisfaction he feels; but they bring him pleasures rather than joy, and whatever true joy he tastes belongs essentially to the consciousness he has of having established an enterprise which marches on, of having created something that goes ahead. Consider exceptional joys like those of the great artist who has produced a masterpiece, of the scientific man who has made a discovery or invention. We sometimes say they have worked for glory and derive their greatest satisfaction from the applause of mankind. Profound mistake! We care for praise in the exact measure in which we feel not sure of having succeeded; it is because we want to be reassured as to our own value and as to the value of what we have done that we seek praise and prize glory. But he who is certain, absolutely certain, that he has brought a living work to the birth, cares no more for praise and feels himself beyond glory, because there is no greater joy than that of feeling oneself a creator. If, then, in every province, the triumph of life is expressed by creation, ought we not to think that the ultimate reason of human life is a creation which, in distinction from that of the artist or man of science, can be pursued at every moment and by all men alike; I mean the creation of self by self, the continual enrichment of personality

by elements which it does not draw from outside, but causes to spring forth from itself?

May we not therefore suppose that the passage of consciousness through matter is destined to bring to precision,—in the form of distinct personalities,—tendencies or potentialities which at first were mingled, and also to permit these personalities to test their force whilst at the same time increasing it by an effort of self-creation? On the other hand, when we see that consciousness, whilst being at once creation and choice, is also memory, that one of its essential functions is to accumulate and preserve the past, that very probably (I lack time to attempt the demonstration of this point) the brain is an instrument of forgetfulness as much as one of remembrance, and that in pure consciousness nothing of the past is lost, the whole life of a conscious personality being an indivisible continuity, are we not led to suppose that the effort continues *beyond*, and that in this passage of consciousness through matter (the passage which at the tunnel's exit gives distinct personalities) consciousness is tempered like steel, and tests itself by clearly constituting personalities and preparing them, by the very effort which each of them is called upon to make, for a higher form of existence? If we admit that with man consciousness has finally left the tunnel, that everywhere else consciousness has remained imprisoned, that every other species corresponds to the arrest of something which in man succeeded in overcoming resistance and in expanding almost freely, thus displaying itself in true personalities capable of remembering all and willing all and controlling their past and their future, we shall have no repugnance in admitting that in man, though perhaps in man alone, consciousness pursues its path beyond this earthly life.

This is as much as to say that, in my opinion, the aspirations of our moral nature are not in the least contradicted by positive science. On this, as on many other points, I quite agree with the opinion expressed by Sir Oliver Lodge in many of his works, and especially in his admirable book on *Life and*

Matter. How could there be disharmony between our intuitions and our science, how especially could our science make us renounce our intuitions, if these intuitions are something like instinct—an instinct conscious, refined, spiritualised—and if instinct is still nearer life than intellect and science? Intuition and intellect do not oppose each other, save where intuition refuses to become more precise by coming into touch with facts scientifically studied, and where intellect, instead of confining itself to science proper (that is, to what can be inferred from facts or proved by reasoning), combines with this an unconscious and inconsistent metaphysic which in vain lays claim to scientific pretensions. The future seems to belong to a philosophy which will take into account the whole of what is given: I shall have attained the object I proposed if I have succeeded in indicating to you, however vaguely, the direction in which such a philosophy would lead us.

HENRI BERGSON.

PARIS.

THE CHRISTIAN MYSTERY.

ALFRED LOISY.

THE Gospel of Jesus was not a religion. Christ came to accomplish the hope of Israel: the fulfilment of the Gospel would have been the final establishment of the Jewish religion in the kingdom of God. However, less than thirty years after the death of Christ, a religion had issued from the Gospel; and this religion was not a split (*dédoublement*) from Judaism, it was not a heresy or schism which would have broken Judaism up; it was an independent religion, and one which was even to detach itself entirely from Judaism before the first generation of believers had disappeared. This birth of a new cult, which came into being in the full daylight of history, continues to be for us a problem in many respects unsolved. It was not due to the will nor to the direct action of Christ. No more does it result from this —that Jesus, without having the express intention of so doing, virtually brought into the world a religion essentially new, the revelation of the good God, who pardons sin, and is honoured by trust in his mercy alone. For this so-called essence of the Gospel is not the faith that conquered the world. Christianity is not Judaism, but it owes to Judaism its idea of God, of revelation, of tradition. It is likewise distinguished from all forms of Greco-Roman paganism; but it owes to this its conception of salvation, its mode of understanding the Christ and the essential rites, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, rites which came to it, as the Christ did, from Judaism.

What, in effect, was the Gospel of Jesus? The proclamation of the kingdom of God at hand. We know how, during the last centuries before our era, the hope of Israel had developed. Since the rise of the Maccabees against Antiochus Epiphanes, Judaism had been in a crisis of religious effervescence, which was only calmed by the final ruin of Jewish nationality in the time of Hadrian. Dreams of national independence and of perfect justice in a happy city were mingled in diverse degrees: the sole matter at stake was always the triumph of Israel and its God. The ideal of Jesus was national in its setting, religious and moral in its spirit, the mystical programme of a universal revolution of which the execution was left to the omnipotence of the Eternal. God was at last about to reveal himself, as the prophets had predicted he would; he was prepared to exercise his justice upon all nations, and especially upon his own—upon Israel, heir of the promise. He would come at an unexpected moment, like a thief. The righteous who were alive would be gathered together amid the commotion in which the world was to be plunged, even as Noah with his family was saved in the ark when the deluge came. The righteous who were dead would be raised to life. The wicked would be left to punishment or to eternal death. Some righteous pagans might be admitted to the society of the elect. Over this society God would veritably reign, represented by a predestined leader (*chef*), the Messiah. This leader was to be none other than Jesus himself, and he was to appear as leader in the great manifestation of power by which the age of felicity would be inaugurated on the regenerated earth.

In the meantime, Jesus was only the prophet of the expected kingdom; he declared it imminent, and he required that instant preparation should be made for it; he stated the conditions on which access could be had to it. Descent from Abraham was not a sufficient title; even the external observation of the law, in all the rigour which the Pharisees applied to it, was no guarantee. What was indispensable was to

believe in the messenger of Heaven, to prepare for the coming of the great Judge, to acquire the state of feeling befitting the servants of a good God. The love of this God for men knew neither reserves nor limits; so too should it be with the love of men towards God, and with their charity one towards another. All concern with the interests of the earth and its future was unnecessary. A new world was about to be born in which human relationships would be changed along with the whole condition of man; the family, the political state, would be no more, but there would be a race of immortals, leading on earth the life of the angels, under the presidency of the King—Christ. This beautiful dream terminated in the Cross of Golgotha.

At this same time there began to spread widely over the Western world certain cults of the East which assumed the form of mysteries, addressing themselves indiscriminately to men of every race, and offering them certain promises of happiness in the other life. This was done by ancient Eleusis, with this difference, that the Eleusinian worship remained attached to a single place, having neither apostles nor local branches in the empire, and fictitiously regarding as Hellenes all whom it admitted to initiation. In the chief of these cults a divine myth, expressed in one way or another by liturgical acts, was, as it were, the prototype of the salvation promised to the initiate. The initiate participated mystically in the trials of the divinity; thereafter he was associated with him in his joy and in his triumph; he saw the god and was united with him. This revelation and this union became the pledge of his own immortality. The votary of Eleusis shared the anguish of Demeter seeking her daughter, carried off by Hades. And he participated equally in her happiness when she had recovered her: he fasted as she did; he drank the kykeon as she did, when she betook herself again to joy and hope. The friendship of the goddesses was assured to him both in life and in death. It was to Osiris that the votary of Isis was assimilated. The rites by which the great Egyptian

goddess had formerly recalled to life her spouse Osiris, slain and dismembered by Seth, and introduced him to immortality, were applied to his adherents. Isis herself calls in dream those whom she had predestined. As Osiris was plunged in the waters of the Nile in order to revive him, so the novice receives a baptism whereby he is regenerated. He does not merely see the death and resurrection of Osiris in figure; he himself enters into the sacred drama, with a principal part to play; he becomes Osiris, as did the Egyptian dead, as did even the living Pharaoh; his initiation completes itself in an apotheosis: clothed with a shining robe, bearing on his head a crown of rays, he becomes identified with the Sun like Osiris, and he receives the homage of the faithful; his new profession implies duties; it is a yoke to be borne, but the assistance of the goddess will not fail those who are vowed to her.

In the worship of the Great Mother of Pessinus, the initiate takes on the person of Attis. The lover of Cybele was a dying and reviving god, like Osiris; his passion and resurrection were duly celebrated; his fanatics mutilated themselves after his example. The initiation of the devotees was co-ordinated with the representation of the adventures of the god; after a service of lamentation over the dead god a light was brought to announce his resurrection, and the priest, administering to candidates the unction of life which he had already poured on the image of the god, said to them: "Courage, ye devotees; the god is in safety; for you also there will be deliverance from your sufferings." Closely related to this rite of anointing is found the bloody baptism of the taurobole, which was also a sacrament of regeneration and of immortality; the candidate, lying in a trench in which he is inundated with the blood of the victim slain above him, is a dead man, whom the libation of blood has to bring to life; when he reappears he receives the veneration which befits a god. Mithra also at the beginning of the ages celebrated, if he did not undergo, a saving immolation; he sacrificed the

bull from which the seed of life came upon the earth. The rites of Mithraic initiation are not known to us in the detail of the seven degrees it involved; but it is certain that these degrees and their attendant rites were connected with the legend of the god, and part of the object of initiation was to unite the devotee to the god, to assimilate him to the Sun and to Mithra, and to prepare him a place in heaven near to these. Mithra also had his baptism; and Tertullian, following Justin Martyr, informs us that he had in like manner his "oblation of bread," a sacred banquet, the representation of which is seen on monuments, the prefigurement, no doubt, of the heavenly banquet, since it corresponds in the mythical legend to that which Mithra took with Helios before ascending to the sky.

Each of these cults was a system of salvation, which a god was supposed to have instituted at the beginning either by his own will or by the simple fact of his example and of the lot which had fallen to him. A divine legend served as an explanation of a scheme of rites by which the initiate entered into intimacy with his god, received his revelation, even saw him, and participated in his life, in his spirit, while expecting to participate in his immortality. These religions were addressed to individuals, and they were addressed to all without distinction, for they had lost their national character, and had no other object than that of achieving the happiness of man, not that of a particular State. They have many analogies with one another, and are not mutually exclusive; they are magical formulæ (*recettes*) of immortality rather than systems of belief. Their theology is a mythology which admits of more than one interpretation. All of them involve a certain moral discipline, and even, on occasion, a certain asceticism. It is hardly necessary to say that they were more living than the ancient national cults, especially than the old Roman religion, and that they were bound to find credit in proportion to the decline of the official religions, which concerned the good of the city, not the eternal future of individuals. The mysteries them-

selves were the issue of these religions, but by a long evolution had become what we have just seen them to be. If the resources of our information permitted, nothing would be more interesting than to trace the stages of growth in these cults, from their origin in primitive society up to the time when they were competing with Christianity for the empire of the Mediterranean world. But what concerns us now is to ascertain how the Christianity which displaced them was also a mystery, conceived in its general lines on the same model as those of which we have just been speaking.

There were at the beginning, says the apostle Paul, two men who are the heads of humanity. The first was sprung from the earth, and he was of earth; this was Adam, who, being of flesh, sinned and received death as the recompense of sin. Flesh, sin, death—such is the inheritance he transmitted and still transmits to his descendants, who reproduce in them the type of earthly and sinful man. The Law was given by Moses for the Jews; but the Law can bring nothing to good, for the knowledge of the Law by carnal man merely contributes to the multiplication of sins. Moreover, the proof that the Law does not justify is that Abraham, before the Law, was justified by faith, as the Scripture says, on account of the trust he had in the word of God which promised him posterity. It is faith, then, that saves. This faith it is that men must have in the second man, the last head of humanity, Jesus Christ. He is from heaven; he was in heaven, in the form of God, and Son of God; by obedience he took the form of earthly man and appeared as one of the children of Adam, born of woman and living under the Law. This was done in order to redeem those whom nature and the Law had made slaves of sin. Being made flesh, it might be said that he was made sin; but for this very reason it was enough that he should die in order to destroy sin in death. This he did, undergoing the death of the cross. But being of heaven, being spirit by his origin, he could not himself remain in

death; therefore God raised him; and he lives for ever, for the Christ, once raised, dies no more. And as we have borne for our condemnation the image of the earthly man, so now we must assume for our salvation the image of the heavenly man; as we have been drawn by Adam into sin and death, so, if God calls us, we can follow the Christ in righteousness and immortality, live like him in spite of death, become *spiritual* (*des spirituels*) like him, sharing his spirit in this life and his glory in the other.

Such is the secret of redemption, the mystery that must be believed: very different, surely, from the Gospel preached by Jesus of Nazareth. The scheme of Messianic salvation, of which the Galilean prophet thought himself the destined head, became a myth of universal salvation, which the historic existence of Christ served to fix upon earth and in the time-order. Jesus was no more the King of Israel who was to sit on the throne of David in order to rule the children of Abraham in righteousness, the angelic Prince who presided over the blessedness of the elect, the personification of the ideal Israelite. He was a saviour-god, after the manner of an Osiris, an Attis, a Mithra. Like them, he belonged by his origin to the celestial world; like them, he had made his appearance on the earth; like them, he had accomplished a work of universal redemption, efficacious and typical: like Adonis, Osiris, and Attis he had died a violent death, and like them he had returned to life; like them, he had prefigured in his lot that of the human beings who should take part in his worship, and commemorate his mystic enterprise (*sa mystique aventure*); like them, he had predetermined, prepared, and assured the salvation of those who became partners in his passion. To have a share in this benefit there was no need to be reckoned among the posterity of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The God who had thus given his Son to the world knew neither Jew nor pagan, Greek nor barbarian. No privilege existed for Israel. The Law, of which it was so proud, was a thing out-of-date; it had never been an instrument of salvation. The spirit of God, the life eternal,

were the gifts brought by the Christ who had come from heaven to earth, and which whosoever would could appropriate through faith, without troubling about Jewish observances. God was in Christ to reconcile the world to himself, not to save Israel; and the people who claimed to be chosen played no other part in the divine epic than that of the people who had been cast out. The Messiah whom they expected was not come for them, did not belong to them; the Heavenly Man belonged to humanity. Neither did the gods of the mysteries belong to the country of their origin; they had ceased to be national gods that they might become universal saviours. And the Christian myth was no more a fact of history than were the pagan myths; the Heavenly Man of Paul was no more real a person than Attis; the idea of universal Salvation by the death of Christ was no more consistent in itself than that of salvation procured by the death of Osiris. These are analogous conceptions, dreams of one family (*rêves apparentés*), built on the same theme with similar imagery.

The affinity is no less close in all that regards the mystery as practised, the acts performed, in order to enter into communion with the Christ Saviour, which constituted the initial form of Christian worship. We know how Paul explains himself on baptism in his epistle to the Romans (vi. 3–11): "Are ye ignorant that all we who were baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death?" Baptized that we may belong to Christ, we have been baptized in order to be dead like him. "We were buried therefore with him through baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life. For if we have become united with him through the likeness of his death, we shall be also by the likeness of his resurrection: knowing this, that our old man was crucified with him [Jesus], that the body of sin might be done away, that so we should no longer be in bondage to sin; for he that hath died [in baptism with the Christ] is justified

from sin. But if we died[1] with Christ we believe that we shall[1] also live with him; knowing that Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more; death no more hath dominion over him. For the death that he died, he died unto sin once; but the life that he liveth he liveth unto God. Even so reckon ye also yourselves to be dead unto sin, but alive unto God in Christ Jesus." Modern exegesis has taxed its wits to find in this passage nothing but moral truths expressed in somewhat bold and unusual metaphors. This is a thorough misunderstanding of (*méconnaître grandement*) the mentality of the Apostle and the ideas he really wishes to express. What we have here is quite different from a theory of justification by faith alone and of the change of life. No doubt a moral element intervenes, since the believer is said to be justified, turned from sin, and morally renewed; but the general doctrine is one of highly realistic mysticism. The initiate of the Christian mystery is held to die in order to be re-born, as in the pagan mysteries. This death in truth is not actual (*effective*), but neither is it purely symbolic. A death acknowledged to be real is the matter at stake—that of Christ; it is admitted that by baptism one is virtually made a partner therein, although in fact he does not die: the Christian under the water of baptism is Christ in the tomb; he is dead in a certain manner, mystically, since Jesus is dead, and the believer is partner with him, dies in him, in order to rise with him—not only in a renovated consciousness, but in a new being, even in the being of the immortal Christ, in that communion of his spirit by which we live for eternity, assured that we shall pass through death without harm (*impunément*) when the time comes to undergo it. A moral change is the fruit of this new life; it is by no means the substance of it. Paul has said elsewhere (Gal. ii. 20): "And yet no longer I [live], but Christ liveth in me." It is impossible to take these words too literally if one would enter into the thought of their author. This

[1] R.V. In the translation of M. Loisy these verbs are respectively "nous sommes morts" and "nous vivrons."—Ed.

thought owes nothing to Jewish Messianism. Mystical union with a divine spirit does not come from the monotheism of Israel.

The interpretation of the Lord's Supper corresponds to that of Baptism. But the language of Paul allows us to see more clearly the part which fell to him in the mystical explanation of the rite. Paul it was who produced the myth of the institution. The manner in which he introduces the narrative of the Lord's Supper (1 Cor. xi. 23–27) gives us to understand that this narrative is personal to him, and borrows nothing from the tradition of the Galilean Apostles. In fact, we cannot find any meaning in it except by relation to the general body of Pauline doctrine, not by relation to the Gospel of Jesus. Every time the faithful eat together the bread and drink of the cup in memory of Christ, they show forth the benefit of his saving death until he come. They commemorate, therefore, the death (*supplice*) of Jesus, in the hope of his near advent for the resurrection of the just. Nevertheless they do not only commemorate this; we may say they go through it over again (*la réitèrent*) for themselves, as the votaries of Osiris or of Attis renewed for themselves the death of their god. Whosoever lacks the right dispositions for partaking of the eucharistic bread and wine renders himself guilty towards the body and blood of Christ. For the bread is the body of Christ, for the sake of his disciples; the content of the cup is his blood whereby he has sealed the new covenant. One would say that Paul, who did not hesitate to make Jesus say over the bread "this is my body," did not yet dare to make him say over the cup "this is my blood." To drink blood was for the Jew the summit of abomination, and the formula, even understood in the mystic sense, terrified the Apostle, who had it in his mind and turned it round, so as not himself to be startled (*effarouché*). The meaning is there none the less, since this cup, which is said by metonymy to be the new covenant in the blood, is evidently supposed to contain the blood of the covenant, the wine being the blood as the body is the bread. Thence comes it that the evil dispositions

of the communicant are a personal offence to the Christ. Paul has so fully present in mind the idea of sacrilege that he attributes to this cause the deaths and the diseases which are produced in the community at Corinth. The bread which is broken in the gatherings of believers causes them to communicate in the body of Christ; the cup over which the words of benediction are pronounced causes them to communicate in his blood; they communicate in Christ as dying, although Christ is now immortal. Faith is not embarrassed by logical contradictions.

For the rest, the bread and the wine are "spiritual" foods, which does not mean that they are pure symbols, mere images of truth; they are penetrated with divine virtue, they are the vehicle of the spirit, the means of the mystic unity between Christ and his believers. These latter constitute the body of the immortal Christ; they are its members. But it is not necessary to argue from the fact that the community of believers is called the body of Christ in order to demonstrate that the words "this is my body" point directly to the mystic body, and not to that body which was sacrificed on the cross. The words "this is my body" do not express a material reality —the sudden transformation of bread into living flesh. Nevertheless the formula "this is my body which is given for you" cannot mean "the bread represents my body, which is yourselves." The declaration would be without interest for those whom it concerns. If the eucharistic cup is the new covenant in the blood of Christ, it is because the wine is mystically, virtually, the blood of Christ, through which those who partake of the cup come into the covenant. In like manner the bread is mystically, virtually, the body of Christ through which those who share the bread come into or are maintained in the social body of Christ, the community of his believers. The thought of Paul wavers between the natural body of Jesus, delivered to death just as the bread is broken, and his immortal body, which is the human aspect of his being, now imperishable. The two make but one in perspective; it is the same

body which underwent death for man, and which continues to exist for them in order that they may be admitted into it. For, between this immortal, spiritual, heavenly body and the mystical body of Christ there is truly no separation, no absolute distinction, but rather substantial identity, the believers being constituted in their new being by the Christ-spirit, by the very life of Christ, one and multiple, personal and universal. In this unique life we discern two aspects: the individual aspect if we consider it in its principle, which is Christ; and the social aspect if we regard it in its expansion, which is the Church. Paul can speak alternately or simultaneously of the body of Christ in either sense or both, the two making but one for him. It occurs to him to write (1 Cor. x. 17): "Seeing that there is one bread, we who are many are one body: for we all partake of the one bread." Here, it will be said, is the social body, the mystic body of Christ. But what is the one bread? More than one loaf of bread was consumed in the banquets of the community; if the Apostle speaks of one only bread it is because he has in view the Christ, and consequently the one bread is the personal body of Jesus, the bread which makes the unity of the mystic body.

Thus the eucharistic meal is a mystic rite (*un rite de mystère*) like Baptism, and for a still stronger reason. We know too little in detail of the liturgy of the pagan mysteries to enable us to indicate a specific relation between the Pauline conceptions and those of any particular oriental cult. But it does not seem less evident on that account that the idea of a holy communion in the bread and the wine, of mystic participation in the flesh and blood of a celestial being, of the commemoration of a divine death, interpreted as a sacrifice for the salvation of man, does not come from the Judaism of Paul's day, but from paganism, and, in particular, from the mysteries of which the Apostle was by no means ignorant, and the influence of which was brought to bear more or less directly on his thought. It was after the pattern of these mysteries that the Lord's Supper—at first a repast of brethren

similar to those which Jesus had formerly taken with his disciples and to that which had taken place on the eve of his death, where the feast of the kingdom of heaven was anticipated —became a veritable sacrament, the rite in which the union of believers in their immortal Saviour was more particularly effective and deeply felt. Thus the system is complete: in its worship as in its belief, Christianity is a religion of mystery.

It would still have to be explained, by history and by psychology, how the transformation could have come about; how, in the pagan world and under its influence, the Christian religion arose from the Gospel. It would not be possible to attribute such an evolution, either entirely or in principal part, to the action of a powerful personality, who, in full consciousness of his aim, and with deliberate intention, might have directed the course of faith in this sense. Such a task could be accomplished only under the pressure of circumstances, because it was the response to a necessity, because it took place of itself. The men who contributed the largest share to its accomplishment were only the representatives of tendencies and ideas which were dawning spontaneously around them. To all appearances Paul was the most important worker in this metamorphosis, but he was not the only one. Participant in it, in a sense and in certain measure, were all the pagans, or Jews more or less penetrated by pagan ideas, who had let themselves be won over to the hope of the Gospel, and who in consequence, and almost without thinking of it, and without willing it, translated the Gospel according to the spirit of their religious needs, according to their mentality, which was not that of the Jewish environment in which the Gospel was born. These well-meaning souls unconsciously appealed to the preachers of Christ to offer them a belief they could understand, a mode of worship which answered to their aspirations; they formed for themselves this belief and this mode of worship, creating in part the faith they were accepting. The case of Paul, independently of its individual

significance, has therefore the character of a type; the Apostle of the Gentiles in some manner personifies a movement by which he is carried along while directing it. At all events he laboured therein, as he boasts, more than anyone else; more than any other man he elaborated the definition of the new faith.

If we are to believe him, from the time even of his conversion, in the vision he had of the risen Christ, he was aware of his providential calling to his apostleship to the pagan world; he was aware of what he calls his Gospel, of what we can now call the revelation of the Christian mystery. We have the right not to interpret in their full rigour the assertions of an enthusiastic visionary and ardent controversialist; but we have no right to eliminate or suspect this eminently sincere piece of testimony. Paul did not studiously work out his doctrine into being; he *saw* it: certainly he did not grasp it entire, at the first flash, on the road to Damascus; but the subsequent visions and illuminations did no more than complete, develop, clear up the first, in such a manner that he was able to attach the whole of his teaching to the vision which had made him a believer, and apostle of Christ.

The testimony of Paul does not admit, without many reservations, the conclusions which M. R. Reitzenstein, in his suggestive work on the Greek Mysteries (*Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen*, Leipzig, 1910), has formulated in regard to the manner in which Paul had acquired and utilised his knowledge of the pagan cults. Having never been initiated into any of these mysteries, he could have learnt about them only by the mystical literature of paganism. As to this literature, he would have studied it before his Conversion, and would thus have been prepared to be converted; once converted, he would have studied the literature more closely still, in order to acquaint himself with the religious ideas of the races he would win, to find rules for the organisation and worship of the communities he would found; in short, he would have made himself familiar with the diction of the mysteries, and with a mass of conceptions

or figures which would become the sensible form of his religious life, the content whereof had been otherwise given.

The distinction between content and form is here exceedingly subtle. If the words quoted above, "it is no longer I that live, but Christ that liveth in me," express a pagan idea, how can it be maintained that this idea with Paul does not belong to the very substance of the faith? And if the conversion of the Apostle was prepared by the knowledge he had of pagan beliefs, how can we suppose that these conceptions were no more than the external garment of his Christianity? But our first concern is to explain how the ideas of paganism were introduced into the Gospel which Paul preached. It is hard to imagine such a man, whether before or after his conversion, anxiously reading the pagan writings, magic or other, which would be at his disposal, and setting himself to find in their books the words and the ideas which would render his faith intelligible and acceptable to the non-Jews. Had he pursued this quasi-scientific method, he would not have had the right to say that he held his doctrine from Christ himself. Here was no savant, no musing quietist (*un méditatif*), but a soul impassioned for its faith. Before his conversion his zeal seems to have especially exercised within the pale of Judaism; but he had grown up outside of Palestine, at Tarsus, an ancient pagan city, a centre of Hellenist culture, in a country where the mysteries of Mithra had been planted before they spread themselves in the Western world. It is possible to believe that before embracing the faith of Christ he was not exempt from proselytising intentions towards pagans, and that he had frequent occasion of discussion with them. These relations, much more than the books, would have made him acquainted with the scheme of the mysteries, and with the manner in which pious pagans understood salvation.

It is possible that from that time onwards his Messianic faith received an orientation in the direction of pagan beliefs, and became insensibly detached from ideas purely Jewish and Pharisaic. The moral shock which his conversion adminis-

tered will then have turned him at once towards the evangelisation of the pagans, the more readily so because his antecedents did not permit him to preach in Judea. He will have become persuaded that Jesus was the Saviour who realised his ideal of Christ; and of salvation as understood by the pagans, and as he himself was already accustomed to understand it. Without doubt he regarded himself as provided with a sufficient initiation, a sure call, and a complete doctrine, since he took no pains to obtain either instruction or authorisation from the premier apostolic group. Nevertheless, he was not ignorant of what the older apostles were teaching, and he did not disguise the fact that his own doctrine was different enough from that teaching. His conversion itself, in consequence of a celestial vision, and the lofty attitude he afterwards assumes, bear witness that he was imbued with the spirit of the mysteries. His subsequent experiences did no more than confirm him in these dispositions. It was after his conversion and during the first period of his apostolate that he definitely constructed his theory of salvation, his doctrine of Christ, his interpretation of Baptism and the Lord's Supper. But the fundamental principle of all this teaching had been acquired by the conversion itself, if Paul was persuaded that the mediation of the Crucified accomplished veritably what was related of the saviour-gods in the mysteries.

Thus we explain his declaration that he has no wish to know Christ "according to the flesh" (we should say nowadays —the historic Christ). Most assuredly he does not profess that certitude is an affair of inner experience, nor that it is not to be obtained by the consideration of the visible world or the phenomena of history. Still less does he pretend to insinuate that the faith has no dependence on human recollections which are neither infallible nor concordant. But the earthly career of Jesus, in which he finds nothing conspicuous (*qu'il trouve sans éclat*), is for him bereft of signification; what really matters is his death, abstraction being made from the circumstances which brought it to pass; and it would have been no

advantage to him to have been the witness of it. An initiate of the Isis mysteries would in the same manner have declared that he had no need to have lived in the time of Osiris, to have seen him killed by Seth and resuscitated by Isis, so long as he was united to Osiris in his mystic rites. Paul having transformed the passion of Jesus into a myth of Salvation, the Christ of history had no place at all in his religion. The declarations of the Apostle on this subject are within the logic of his faith, as they are within the interest of his independence of the older apostles.

In the same way we understand how the translation of the Gospel into a mystery was not thought out (*n'ait pas été réfléchie*), nor expressly intended even by those who, like Paul, took the most considerable part in effecting the change. The missionary to the Gentiles never calculated that he would make more proselytes by assigning to Christ a place in the scheme of salvation analogous to that of Mithra, Attis, and Osiris, by interpreting baptism as a sacrament of regeneration, and the eucharist as mystic communion with a crucified and resuscitated Christ. Such artifice was not in his character, and would probably have yielded but mediocre results. But the analogy of the evangelic data and the primitive Christian rites with the beliefs and customs of the mysteries determined, under the rule of circumstances, the fusion of the one with the other. Paul did not think that Christ had need to be like Mithra in order to recruit adepts among the pagans; he thought that Christ must fulfil effectively, and excellently, the part which the devotees of Mithra assigned to their god. He did not think that the Christian practices would appear ineffectual and empty unless they were presented as sacraments parallel to those of the mysteries; he thought that baptism really communicated the new life, and that the eucharist procured union with the Saviour-God under the conditions in which the rites of the mysteries were understood to yield these benefits. Quite naturally he attributed to his Christ and to the Christian rites the maximum of grandeur and power,

according as his knowledge and religious experiences suggested this to him.

His persuasion was that he was building on the foundation laid down by Christ himself, obedient to the death of the cross, and exalted by that obedience above all beings in the universe. The suffering servant of Isaiah had been enough to lead him to this first idea; but it was the pagan conception of the dying god which gave it its final form. Jewish tradition had been able to furnish him with the idea of a Christ pre-existent in God; the pagan beliefs aided him to image this Messiah in the form of a God, as a divine type of humanity, a mediator of creation and of salvation, an immortal spirit capable of effecting an entry into man so as to regenerate and deify him. Baptism was a symbol and means of purification. Since adhesion to the Gospel implied, in addition to repentance, in view of the near advent of the kingdom of God, a kind of participation in the immortal life of Christ, therefore baptism became the sacrament of regeneration, of illumination, to which was attached the guarantee of a blessed immortality, as it was in the initiation to the mysteries. The eucharistic meal was in its origin an act of communion, a meal of brethren bound together in the hope of the Messianic advent; it took place amid memories of Jesus dead and raised from the dead—the expected Messiah; it was a religious meal which could not fail to be interpreted as a mystic banquet so soon as the relation of Christ with the faithful should come to be understood in the same manner as that of a Saviour-God with his initiates: it was so much the easier to see in this religious meal a meal of sacrifice if the work and memory of Christ were synthetised in his death, as was the case with Paul; the bread of the meal became the material of a sacrificial oblation in becoming identified with the body of the immolated Christ; the wine likewise became a libation of blood, the blood of Christ, the victim of salvation. It was by means of consecrated meats that man entered into communion with the gods; it was in the sacrificial banquets that the union was

consummated between the initiates and the divinities who granted a share in their immortality in the mysteries; it was by means of consecrated bread and wine that man enjoyed communion with the Christ who died and rose again.

Christianity was able to assimilate what was suitable to itself, and if it became a mystery it yet succeeded in not becoming a mystery like all the others. It drew peculiar force from elements which did not come to it from the pagan mysteries. The Gospel fact (*le fait évangelique*), whatever Paul might say of it, was not reducible to the myth of a saving death, of a divine immolation, the object of an august faith, which might be held without regard paid to the memories of Peter and of the Galilean apostles. The tradition of the Gospel gave Christianity a point of departure in history, a recognised founder, who had gathered into a very simple synthesis the doctrine and hope of the Jews, and brought to a living emotion the ethical monotheism to which Judaism had come. After Paul, his mystery was combined with the apostolic tradition instead of being substituted for it, and the Gospels are the records of this mixture: in them the intention is to demonstrate, while making use of what the Galilean apostles had related of Christ "according to the flesh," that Jesus was the spiritual Christ, not only the Messiah whom Israel expected, but the Saviour of the human race. The work is no more than sketched in Mark and the other two synoptics; it is brought to a conclusion in the Fourth Gospel, a book of mystery, which fixes the teaching of the Church concerning Christ by presenting the view of Jesus as the manifestation of the Word, the Son of God. From Judaism, Christianity retained its idea of a unique and transcendent God, and its sacred Scriptures, which were supposed to contain a revelation from on high, unique in its kind; hence the God of the Christians refused to be in any way identified with the pagan gods; and if the Christ assumed a rôle analogous to that of the gods honoured in the mysteries, the Christian economy of salvation was not on that account regarded any the less as the

only true, the only real economy, of which the pagan mysteries were merely the caricature, and not the equivalent. Finally, Christianity retained from Judaism the idea, or the feeling, of religious unity; the mystic cults did not constitute Churches, and Paul himself, who laid down in principle the absolute independence of the spiritual man, would only have been able to found brotherhoods of inspired persons unless, by an inconsequence which he did not perceive, he had retained the Jewish idea of the kingdom of God, of the true Israel, of Jerusalem built as a city, whose members, recruited from all lands, formed a new people replacing the posterity of Abraham; the Christian communities were not mere groups of enthusiasts without internal cohesion and without reciprocal bond; they were synagogues of Christians, as much concerned about their mutual union as if they had constituted a single nation dispersed over the world.

Thus did the Christian Mystery become established. Having borrowed much from the pagan mysteries, it went on to supplant them and to eliminate them, because it had the advantage over them of a firmer doctrine of God and of immortality; of a divine Saviour more living, nearer the heart, and possessed of a place in history; of a stronger unity in belief and in social organisation. Even its exclusive spirit was of service. It had to conquer or die; and it did not die.

ALFRED LOISY.

GREEK AND CHRISTIAN PIETY AT THE END OF THE THIRD CENTURY.

ADOLF HARNACK.

I.

THE conflict waged against the Church by the Roman State at the beginning of the fourth century, under Diocletian, Galerius, and Maximinus Daza, was the bloodiest and most obstinate of all. The State sought to overthrow the Church; that is to say, it was bent on compelling her to give up her own peculiar character, and to comply with its rules regarding worship, and determined to extirpate her if she refused to obey. The Church, on the other hand, carried on the war as one against the devil and his demons, and her priests invoked the sternest words of the prophets and of the Revelation to inflame the faithful to withstand the State. The contrast between Church and State, between the State religions and the worship of Christians, was never more strikingly conspicuous than during those years of their last encounter.

And yet this contrast was to a great extent more apparent than real. The life which the two opponents had lived side by side for two hundred years had continually brought them closer together, and a peaceful *modus vivendi* had long ago been found. For forty years long (260–303 A.D.) the peace between them had suffered no disturbance worth the mention.

How had this understanding come about? The answer is not difficult to find. The chief cause of peace was the

weakness of the State and the great extension and increasing power of the Church. Ever since the days of Elagabalus and Alexander Severus the condition of the State, in spite of one or two energetic emperors, had been one of decay and dissolution. It was, however, just in this period that the Church was growing up into a state within the State. The Christian communities in one province united together in the closest bonds. Several provinces would join to hold synods in common. The Church of Egypt, Libya, and the Pentapolis formed a single whole. The Churches of Palestine, Arabia, Phœnicia, Syria, and Eastern Asia Minor entered into a close alliance. The Churches of Greece and those of Western Asia Minor were united in one, and in the West there were four great Church sodalities, Italy, Africa, Spain, and Gaul. These seven or eight great societies stood together in coalition, had on the whole the same rules and regulations, and possessed, in the episcopal constitution, a more effective organisation than any society had ever possessed before. The bishop promoted and protected the independence and power of the single community, and was at the same time bound, as a successor of the Apostles, to keep always in view the welfare of the whole Church of Christ. He held at once the highest office in the community and the highest office in the Church: in the one he was an almost absolute master; in the other he was a member of an "ideal" college, which tended more and more to become a perfectly "real" one. It was through this episcopal constitution that the Church had gained its power in the third century, and grown into a state within the State, which the weak emperors, distracted with wars and revolutions, were no longer strong enough to attack.

But it was not only the increase of power in the Church which constrained the emperors to leave her alone: there had been ever since Hadrian's time an intrinsic, spiritual adjustment, in which Church and State met each other half-way. I have described the progress of this *rapprochement* in a paper called "Church and State down to the Foundation of the

State Church."[1] I have there shown how, in every embodiment of the progressive life of the Church—in her doctrine, her discipline, her worship, her attitude towards society and the civil professions—she had paid her court to the world that surrounded her, so that in the third century she had become a "syncretistic" religion, adapted to the understanding and the desires of the "heathen." When the most considerable Greek philosopher of his day, Porphyry, could certify concerning the most considerable Christian theologian, Origen, that "in respect of his views regarding the universe and the Godhead he thought like a Greek,"[2] it is clear that no fundamental difference any longer obtained between the Greek and the Christian metaphysic and religious philosophy. When the Bishop of Antioch was at the same time a high official at the court of Queen Zenobia, and another bishop was the manager of the imperial purple-factory, when many Christians served in the army as officers and soldiers, and others occupied civic posts, it is plain that Christians and heathen were no longer kept apart by the variance of their rules of living. When the Lord's Supper was celebrated with solemn ritual as *mysterium tremendum* and as a sacrifice, when baptism was decked out with many mysterious ceremonies, and a gorgeous service was held in churches like temples, with elaborate discourses and long prayers, it is out of doubt that even the heathen must declare such a worship sublime and edifying. Conversely, when the State ceased to persecute, Christendom could not but remember that the powers that be are ordained of God. When the philosophers drew nearer and nearer to pure monotheism, the conviction must needs gain ground among the Christians that God had made preparation for the religion of His Son not only through Moses and the prophets, but also through Socrates and Plato. When they saw how the State,

[1] "Kirche und Staat bis zur Gründung der Staatskirche," in the comprehensive work, *Die Cultur der Gegenwart,* published by Paul Hinneberg, part i., section 4: *Geschichte der Christlichen Religion*, 2nd ed. 1909, pp. 132–163.

[2] Porphyry apud Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, vi. 19.

guided by distinguished jurists, was progressively growing more humane in its legislation, and taking a decided stand on the side of morality, they were forced to acknowledge the duty of taking part in the public life.

And so the two great parties were drawing continually nearer to one another. What was there that was still able to part them? First of all, as soon as power was regained by the State—and that happened through the reforms of Diocletian,—the question of power. The newly strengthened State could not tolerate the establishment within its borders of a Church-state, whose supreme officials had more power than the governors and mayors. Secondly, moreover, they were also severed by ancestral tradition—that is to say, by "Myth" in the widest sense of the word. Greek civilisation, religion, and manners, however great a change had befallen them, were still rooted in Homer, in the old sagas and records, and in the world of the Greek gods. Re-interpreted, allegorised, symbolised, they still formed the nutriment of the mind, the fund of narrative for the young people and the school, the foundation of religious practice and of patriotism. Among the cultivated Romans, who were half Greeks, it was just the same; but with them the history of their fatherland came also into play. All this was rejected by the Christians, who put in its place the Old and New Testaments: "They thrust out philosophy, and set up a foreign Myth"; "they are barbarians"; "they care nothing for the gods of our fatherland." No doubt the old spirit had long ago departed from Greek Myth; but what remained was not mere husk and rind; it was the centre of an unforgetting patriotism, to which the memory of the fathers, the tradition of the school, art, and religion clung. Besides the question of power and the influence of Myth there was a third cause of severance: in spite of the close approximation of Greek and Christian science there still remained points of controversy. "The world is eternal," said the Greek philosophers; "the world is created," said the philosophers of Christendom. "The supreme Deity

administers his rule," the Greeks asserted, "through the agency of lower gods"; "there is but *one* God," affirmed the Christians. "The Deity cannot mix with earthly things," pronounced the Greek teachers, "but his most beautiful revelation is the sun"; "God became man," proclaimed the Christian teachers: "the sun is a created thing, unworthy of worship." "The body perishes," said the Greek philosophers; "the body is raised," taught the Christians. The contradictions were not quite so blunt as they appear in these formulas, but they nevertheless caused a cleavage between Greeks and Christians.

It was for the sake of power and the Myth that Diocletian and Galerius, when the State had regained strength, entered into a conflict with the Church; and it was as champions of the Myth for the sake of Homer, and because of their objections, described above, to the Christian philosophy, that the Greek philosophers acclaimed the emperors' action. The strife ended unfortunately for the State; it was obliged to let the Church go her own way. But Constantine the Great gave such a turn to this mischance that it resulted in advantage for the State; he used it as a starting-point to bring the tolerated and privileged Church into subjection to the State, and so to gain for the State the power of the Church. He recognised that it was possible and necessary for the State to get control of the bishops, and through them to incorporate the Church in the State. He perceived that when the State sways the Church it will sway the conscience too, and will so win a much greater power than it ever possessed before. He saw that, and acted accordingly. What the heathen State had never attained, the subjection of the Church, was attained by the "Christian" State.

II.

The preceding sketch deals with the power, the philosophy, the Myth, and the worship of Greeks and Christians, but an important element has not yet been mentioned—piety.

The nature and development of piety cannot be observed

by the historian so easily as the other great functions of human life. It is characteristic of piety that her manifestations do not press into prominence, but take effect for the most part in silence and solitude. When, however, they do emerge, they must often comply with convention and the organised public worship, and it cannot be known how much is true and vital. How hard it must be, then, to determine the quality, in any age, of the piety then existing, and the characteristics of its intrinsic religion! Are we at liberty to judge it by the inscriptions on tombstones, by the prescribed hymns and invocations, by the ceremonial of the mysteries? Assuredly not. It is only by the life and personal utterances of the pious that the nature of their piety can be judged and decided. Unless we possess such evidence for any epoch, we can reach no verdict at all concerning the inner religion of that time. But, it may be demurred, even when we do possess such evidence, we shall never be able to fix the nature of the piety of the period, but only the personal piety of single persons. This objection is not sound. Real, deep devoutness, such as controls the whole life, is certainly a power that is only to be found in a few. But it is on the basis of those few that the nature of an age's piety must be determined, just as we must determine the art of a period on the basis of the real artists. For in those devout men, as in those artists, lives the eternal, ever-moving spirit of religion and of art, and they compel the rest, even though slowly and gradually, to follow after them, and at least to acknowledge as form and authority that which they cannot receive as spirit. But many out of the throng do receive a ray of the spirit, and warm their cold life with it. Anyone, therefore, who desires to depict the piety of the West in the fifth century must describe the piety of Augustine; whosoever wishes to understand the piety of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries must study the piety of Bernard of Clairvaux and Francis; he who seeks to grasp the piety of the sixteenth century must make acquaintance with the piety of Luther, Calvin, and Knox; and so throughout.

But these names also show what a power piety has been in the history of the world and of civilisation; these names show that the fear of the Lord was the beginning not only of wisdom but also of might. Ought I to add the name of Cromwell or of Muhamed? The greatest events and changes in the history of the world have had their origin in religion—not in the public religion, but in the purely personal, in that secret religion which remains hidden in the individual, until it suddenly jets forth as if from a newly breaking spring.

Accordingly, when we inquire how Greeks and Christians had approached nearer to each other in the course of two centuries, we cannot confine ourselves to the domain of religious philosophy, worship, rules of life, and morals; we must go on to ask how the individual piety of Greek and Christian stood related to each other, and whether a mutual approach had been made on this ground also. In order to answer this question we must not, as has just been shown, compare the organised worship on both sides, or interrogate the epitaphs and the text-books of Greek and Christian dogmatic—not that these are altogether unenlightening, but what they tell us is vague and insecure; we must look about for outstanding personalities, and search for immediate evidence concerning the inner piety of these individuals.

By a happy fate a writing has been preserved to us by one of the most eminent Greek philosophers of the latter half of the third century—Porphyry: a writing which is a pure expression of his piety. It is the letter to his wife Marcella. If we compare the religious content of this letter with the Christian piety of Origen, which we well know, we shall be able to judge how far apart, or rather how near to one another, Greek and Christian piety had stood shortly before the time of Diocletian and Constantine. For the heathen piety a better witness than Porphyry could not possibly be desired. True, according to the testimony of Socrates,[1] during a period in his youth he had had relations with Christianity, perhaps had even

[1] *Hist. Eccl.*, iii. 19; see also Augustine, *De civitate dei*, x. 28.

been a Christian; but he afterwards turned his back on the Church. In one of his earlier writings, *Philosophy from the Oracles*, he still shows an appreciation of Christ, such as the emperor Alexander Severus had possessed, but his hatred for the Christians is already evident. Later he composed his great work in fifteen books against the Christians—the most comprehensive and profound piece of polemic that was written against the Church in antiquity. His chief aim in this work is, by means of a detailed and fundamental criticism of the narratives and doctrines of the Old and New Testament, to destroy the foundations of Christianity—the "Myth." In particular, the evangelists and apostles appear to him not only uncouth and foolish persons, but also liars and scoundrels. It is true that he distinguished Jesus from them, but he has no reverence for Him, and charges Him with vacillation and inconsistencies. Since the appearance of this work the Christians have always regarded Porphyry as their worst and most dangerous foe. What kind of piety, then, belonged to this greatest assailant of the Church? A partial answer to this question is afforded by his great work, *On Abstinence*, but the best answer is to be found in the letter, mentioned above, to his wife Marcella.

Porphyry was already a mature man, verging upon old age, when he married, in Rome, Marcella, a widow with seven children, some of whom were grown up. He married her, although she was quite without means, because he had perceived in her a deep aptitude for philosophy. He knew that this alliance would involve him in severe monetary anxieties, but he was determined to accept and endure them, and much defamation besides. Ten months after the wedding, during which time the married pair had undergone many sore trials, which had only strengthened their relation to one another, Porphyry was obliged to undertake a distant journey. Marcella had been very loth to let him go, had fears for his health, and was herself exposed at home to the persecutions of malicious neighbours: so Porphyry wrote her a consoling

letter. It has reached us in only one manuscript, which is in the Ambrosian Library at Milan. In what follows I shall give some account of this letter.

III.

The dominating ideas of the letter are these: man's highest task is to know God and gain a firm relation towards him; everything sensual and transient is valueless, only the eternal has worth; the worst evil is sin, the highest good is knowledge and purity of soul; it is God who creates all that is good; only when we live with him, and he operates in our soul, can we attain to the good and to eternal life.

These are thoughts which had developed among enlightened Greek and Roman philosophers from Plato onward—to name only Seneca, Epictetus, and Plotinus; but it is important to see how Porphyry has made them his own, and how he lives in them. To him they are no merely theoretical ideas; he draws from them real consolation; they have become the mainstay of his life. After he had passed through many vacillations in his systematic philosophy,[1] and had freed himself from a congenital tendency to vanity, he bent his whole mind upon the divine and the eternal. He knew the power that gives strength and support to life; he knew it, he called it to him, and armed himself with this power against "a sea of troubles." And in his letter to his wife he poured forth that of which his own heart was full, in order to dispel all cares from her also. In doing this he cannot and will not quite put aside the schoolmaster, the teacher; but, speaking in the language of the school, he still speaks as a true pastor of souls.[2] The most important thoughts, as they

[1] He was derided for this, and a verse was made about him, which runs much as follows: "Porphyry's tongue is sharp, but his conviction is unstable" (Georgius Pisides, *Cosmürg.*, 1045). Eunapius, in the *Vita Porphyrii*, justifies this inconstancy by pointing out that it was an advance.

[2] The letter may have been intended in the second instance for publication; a good deal is to be said for this assumption; but in any case the address of the letter to his wife is to be taken seriously.

flowed from the spring of his piety, may be set down here together:—

1. Sorrows and cares are the necessary preparation for the future life to which we look forward; he who takes life easily can never attain to the true good (ch. 5).

2. He that would return to the gods from this foreign land in which we dwell must abandon all pleasures and levity and must strenuously climb as if ascending a high mountain. Man must strive and contend: the gods alone live in blessed ease. The fallen soul must embrace fatigue; if it is indolent, it forgets heaven and languishes in sleep (ch. 6).

3. Better wear iron chains than golden; the iron compels us to think upon our sins and reform our disposition (ch. 7).

4. He only who has learned to bear the worst can return to God (ch. 7).

5. He that has become a believer must so live that he may be to his hearers a faithful witness of what he preaches (ch. 8).

6. Every passion of the soul makes against our salvation (ch. 9).

7. The divine is everywhere perfectly present; his real temple is the mind of the wise; only they who know God aright can worship him aright (ch. 11).

8. God needs no one; the wise man needs God alone, and cannot be good and noble in any other way than by receiving into his spirit the good that flows from God (ch. 11).

9. Only that man is unhappy who makes his soul a lodging for evil spirits (ch. 11).

10. God gives the wise man the power of God; in the knowledge of God the man in man disappears (ch. 11).

11. All the good we do is God's work; all the evil we do is our own work, and God has no blame for it (ch. 12).

12. We must ask of God only such gifts as are worthy of God—that is to say, such things as we cannot obtain from any except God (ch. 12).

13. The prayer of one who does not pray in earnest is an empty word (ch. 12).

14. Ask not God for any good that thou canst not keep for ever; God gives nothing that is not eternal; concern thyself only with what thou needest after this life, and call upon God to be thy helper (ch. 12).

15. Presume not to ask anything of God before the time, but ask when God makes known to thee the right petition. By means of such prayers the invisible God himself is seen as in a mirror. Do thou will and seek from God what he himself wills and is (ch. 12).

16. The wise man is known of few, yea, he remains unknown to all; but he is known of God (ch. 13).

17. Rather fall with the confession of truth than conquer with the word of deceit (ch. 14).

18. No one can at once love God and the carnal appetites (ch. 14).

19. He that loves money must needs be unjust; he that is unjust transgresses against God and men. Even if he slaughters hecatombs and decks the temples with countless oblations, he remains a transgressor and an impious man (ch. 14).

20. With him whose teachings thou canst not follow thou shalt not associate, nor yet speak with him about divine things (ch. 15).

21. Between theology and a vain, empty soul there is no link (ch. 15).

22. A man that is worthy of God is himself as God (ch. 15).

23. Thou honourest God best when thou framest thyself inwardly like unto God; only by virtue canst thou attain thereunto; for virtue alone leads the soul upward unto that which is akin unto herself; beside God and after him there is nothing great save virtue; but God strengthens the man who does that which is good (ch. 16).

24. The wise man is blessed because he stands under the providential care of God (ch. 16).

25. Before God the tongue counts for naught, the deed is

all; the wise man, even though silent, offers praise to God through his silence (ch. 16).

26. The wise man alone is priest, is pious; he alone knows for what we should pray (ch. 16).

27. He that trains himself in wisdom trains himself in the knowledge of God; he does not continually babble prayers and make sacrifice, but he practises piety in deed (ch. 17).

28. That man makes himself well-pleasing to God, yea, he makes himself divine, who makes his inner self like unto the Godhead that is blessed in immortality (ch. 17).

29. God sends suffering to none, for the Deity is good; thou thyself art the source of thine own sufferings, especially when thou knowest not who God is. To withhold homage from the images of the gods is a lesser sin than to think such thoughts of God as the multitude think (ch. 17).

30. The chief fruit of piety is to honour God and the ancestral ordinances (ch. 18).

31. Observance or neglect of the temple service neither helps nor harms; but if a man serves God as if God needed anything, he sets himself up, without knowing it, above God (ch. 18).

32. The gods know no wrath (ch. 18).

33. God is not moved by tears and entreaties, nor honoured by sacrifices, nor is his glory extolled by abundance of oblations; it is only when our inner self is filled with God that we become united with him (ch. 19).

34. Short and easy is the discourse that flows from a knowledge of God (ch. 20).

35. Where God is forgotten the evil spirit gains entrance; for the soul is the dwelling-place either of God or of evil spirits (ch. 21).

36. Those who believe neither that the gods exist, nor that the divine providence rules all things, will suffer punishment for their unbelief. Those who think they honour the gods, and believe in their existence, but neglect virtue and wisdom, deny and dishonour the gods; since it is no dull-

hearted belief, but only a right belief that leads to God (ch. 22 *seq.*).

37. If pleasing God depended on the number of sacrifices, there would be injustice, since not every man can bring them; but God takes pleasure only in a clean heart. Then offer sacrifices to the Deity according to thy means, but honour him in thy heart above thy means (ch. 23).

38. No god is ever the author of evil, but man makes it for himself through his freedom (ch. 24).

39. In the relation to God four main elements must be clung to: faith, truth, love (*eros*), and hope. That is to say, we must have faith that salvation is only to be found in the return to God; we must strive with all our powers as far as possible to know the truth in respect of God; when we know him we must love him; when we love him we must nourish the soul with good hopes regarding the course of life (ch. 24).

40. Three kinds of laws must be distinguished: the divine law, the natural law which relates to transitory nature, and the civic law. If man examines his inner self he perceives the divine law, impressed from eternity upon his soul. From this divine law the law of nature is also derived. The civic law is intended for petty folk, not to keep them from doing wrong but to keep them from suffering wrong (ch. 27).

41. No fool is content with what he has, but he is tormented with longing for what he has not. And so they are always athirst, as if in a fever, after the most contradictory things. For this reason the gods have enjoined upon them abstinence from meats and from amatory indulgence (ch. 28).

42. Nothing is so needful as to know what goods we do not need (ch. 28).

43. Accuse not thy flesh, but thy soul (ch. 29).

44. Wisdom and knowledge have nothing to do with fortune (ch. 30).

45. The soul will one day cast off the body as the child casts off the integuments that covered it in its mother's womb (ch. 32).

46. Naked hath God sent thee forth, therefore call thou upon him naked and unencumbered with the alien burden of the body. Ask not whether thou art man or woman: feel thyself sexless, and so appear before God (ch. 33).

47. Sick people often part with a diseased member for the sake of the health of the body; part thou with thy whole body for the sake of the salvation of thy soul (ch. 34).

48. Be not unjust towards thy slaves, and chastise them not in anger; when thou must chastise them, persuade them first that it is salutary for them, and give them an opportunity beforehand of justifying themselves (ch. 35).

49. It is much better to suffer death than to enfeeble the soul through dissipation (ch. 35).

50. No unjust man is able to worship God; the root of piety is philanthropy (ch. 35).[1]

IV.

These sentences express the piety of Porphyry, the great foe of Christianity! If instead of "the wise" we write, with Clement of Alexandria, "the gnostic" or "the pious," and if we disregard the fluctuation between "God," "the Deity," and "the gods"—Porphyry always means in his heart the one God, who operates also in the gods,—his piety is hardly to be distinguished from that of the Greek Christian theologians of the third century. It is true that Porphyry allows

[1] With this sentence the letter, as we have it, breaks off short. The conclusion (perhaps of considerable extent) is unfortunately wanting. But probably (*v.* Nauck, *Porphyrii opuscula tria*, 1860, pp. xliii. *seq.*) the following apophthegms in the *Florilegium* of Johannes Stobæus, which are there ascribed to Pythagoras, really belong to our letter:—

51. We should strive to have such a spouse and such children and friends as may remain to us even after death.

52. Rather seek to be strong in soul than in body.

53. Know that nothing is in thy possession unless it belongs to thine inner self.

54. Seek to be the parent of such children as shall—not cherish the body in old age, but—nourish the soul with food eternal.

55. Do not attempt to hide thy sins behind words, but by full exposure to heal them.

sacrifices and temple services to continue, because they belong to the "ancestral ordinances" (No. 30, ch. 18), towards which he feels an obligation. But the old spirit had departed from these ancestral ordinances, and Porphyry's inmost soul and heart are no longer in them. True, he is able to write to his wife that he married her in order to propitiate the *dii genitales*, but that seems to be a mere surviving figure of speech.

The piety of Porphyry is not only similar to that of the Christians of his day—it accords with theirs just in its deepest elements, and all deep elements are comprised in it. Proof is hardly necessary, for the reader of the excerpts given above will have reached that assurance for himself. The consciousness of sin and the conviction that good is wrought only by God is here as sharply pronounced as it is in Origen. All good and all succour comes from God!

Piety like this needs no myth and no sacrament. But it is also true, according to Clement of Alexandria and Origen, that the Christian gnostic on the highest grade needs neither the Saviour Christ nor any sacrament. On both sides everything lies in the sphere of the soul, of inner feeling and of pure knowledge. This piety is luminous and "rational." Theurgy and sacramental magic lie far behind, and are not admitted.

What lies at the base of this piety is the fundamental distinction between soul and body, between God and sensible nature: therefore it leads of necessity to—monasticism. The contemplative monk who emancipates himself from the world is the ideal of Porphyry and the ideal of Origen. But the one feels himself bound to the "ancestral ordinances," the other to Christ and the Church—that is the difference. It is a difference that touches only the circumference; in the core, in the essence of their piety there is no difference at all.

The form which shapes the pious thoughts of Porphyry, as well as his speech, is—with one exception, to be spoken of immediately—the Grecian, without any biblical admixture.

But the language often lies only like a thin veil over the thoughts, which seem to be entirely those of the New Testament; *cf.* Nos. 5, 6, 7, 10a, 12, 15, 16, 18, 20, 24, 26, 29, 38, 46, 50b, 51, 52, 55. In some places we can hardly suppress the suspicion that Porphyry knows the biblical form of the thought, but intentionally chooses another; and yet I am not sure that this assumption is correct. It may well be, however, that Christian reminiscences, derived from his youth and his studies, have influenced him without his knowledge. But even in that case we must assume that they merged harmoniously with thoughts that did not grow on biblical soil, but sprang up in the line of development which had begun with the teachings of Socrates and Plato. This line of development is an actual parallel to that of the later Judaism and of Paul.

One exception must, however, be recognised. When Porphyry declares (No. 39, ch. 24) that the four main elements of religion are faith, truth, love, and hope, this formula cannot be independent of the Christian formula with its three elements of faith, love, and hope; for, so far as my knowledge goes, this triad never appears on Grecian soil before Porphyry. Porphyry has not left the Christian formula unaltered; for, instead of *agape*, he follows Plato in inserting *eros*, and to faith he adds truth as an independent element. But the change is not great; for by *eros* he hardly means anything substantially different from what the Christian theologians meant by *agape*; the addition of truth to faith is quite in the spirit of the fourth Gospel, and the definition of faith as a firm conviction that "salvation is only to be found in the return to God" is not to be distinguished from that of Paul. Finally, when he brings hope to bear upon the course of life he probably means, like Paul, that the life in the flesh will reach an end and an eternal life will then begin.

Porphyry, the "heathen," recognised the essence of piety in the three chief virtues of Christianity; conversely, a hundred years later, Ambrose laid the foundations of his ethic in the four chief virtues of heathendom! It is not that the

two have exchanged parts: it is only that their fundamental religious and moral views were in reality so close together.

V.

It was not only then in the sphere of doctrine, of organised worship, and of discipline, that the two opponents, the Greek and Christian philosophers, had approached one another, but equally in the domain of the innermost life, the domain of piety. What still parted them was the "Myth" alone. But that was no slight matter; rather it was indeed a great chasm. On that account peace was impossible: one of the two antagonists must fall.

At this point applies a great word spoken by Origen. He says that Christianity is the religion which even in its mythic form possesses the truth. Comprehended in its profundity, this word is true. Even Christianity has certainly much that is really mythical. But it made a clearance of polytheism; it had in its "Myth" a historic personality of unique loftiness and power, Jesus Christ; and it possessed a book with which neither Homer nor any other book could be compared, a book of history—the Bible.

Christianity really did away with polytheism, whereas the Neoplatonic philosophy of Porphyry did not possess the courage for that: herein lay the greatest difference. This religious philosophy lacked the power of exclusiveness, and of that lack it died.

Christianity really abolished the service of temple and sacrifice, with which the deeper religious sense was no longer satisfied; Neoplatonism was not capable of such a feat: herein lay the second difference.

Christianity, because it had a genuine myth—because it proclaimed the history of creation in the words of Genesis i., because it taught men to pray in the words of the Psalms, and because it possessed Jesus Christ—was able little by little to disseminate its deep monotheistic piety even among the masses. This was beyond the power of Neoplatonism.

Finally—the Greek Christian theologians of the third century agreed closely in the nature of their piety with the Neoplatonists. But those Christian theologians were themselves dependent on Greek philosophy, and did not truly express the essence of the Gospel. The Gospel is simpler and richer, above all, less intellectual, and by no means so contemplative and ascetic as it appears in Origen and his disciples. When therefore the theology of Origen and the Christian episcopal Church prevailed over the theology of Porphyry and over the heathen sacrificial priesthood, it was not a pure Christianity that conquered Hellenism, but a Hellenic philosophical Christianity that conquered heathenism. But this Grecian philosophic religion was not the last word of Christianity. Nay, it entered on a new development of greater breadth and depth, the initiator of which was Augustine.

ADOLF HARNACK.

THE APOCALYPTIC ELEMENT IN THE GOSPELS.

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THE question of the apocalyptic element in the Gospels has given rise to rather acute controversy in recent years, but I think that at the present moment it may be said to be working itself out satisfactorily. There has been the usual swing of the pendulum, first to this side and then to that; but a truer balance seems on the way to be reached. It is probably true that in this country the strongest impulse came from Schweitzer's book, *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* (Tübingen, 1906), now translated into English under the title *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* (A. & C. Black, 1910), with a preface by Professor F. C. Burkitt. I must take my own share in the responsibility for calling attention rather markedly to this work (in *The Life of Christ in Recent Research*, 1907). The independence of treatment and the freshness and force of the style perhaps attracted me somewhat unduly; but I welcomed the book as breaking what was to a considerable extent new ground, and as likely to offer a corrective to much that seemed to me to be shallow and wrong in current criticism. Schweitzer did not profess to be the first to lay stress upon the apocalyptic side of the Gospels. Among his more immediate precursors he gave especial credit to Baldensperger (1888), and still more to Johannes Weiss (1892 and 1900); and in his estimate of these writers I was quite prepared to agree with him. But I do not think that I was much less

conscious of the audacity and exaggeration of the greater part of Schweitzer's own constructive theories. I cannot profess to have been satisfied with my own mode of presenting the matter. Most of one's efforts begin by being tentative, and it is only by degrees that they acquire balance and precision. The chief defect in Schweitzer's views—itself a product of his youthful impetuosity and enthusiasm—seemed to me to be a tendency to push things to extremes at the dictates of logical consistency. He called his own theory "konsequente Eschatologie," *i.e.* "consistent or logical eschatology": he sought in it the single key to the life and acts and words of Christ; and in this I believe that he was undoubtedly mistaken. His book appealed to me as putting an effective check upon the persistent process of minimising and levelling down that had been going on for so long, though the particular form that the theory took was less acceptable. The great point about Apocalyptic, and the great value of its recognition to us at the present day, is that it postulates throughout a real manifestation of God upon earth, and not merely a teacher more eminent than the rest. If it did this under the form of figure and symbol, that was only a common feature of biblical religion. And another great point about the insistence upon Apocalyptic is, that it is true; by which I mean that it finds in the Gospels something that is really there, and not merely read into them from the outside.

If I were to try to sum up the effect of the five years of discussion since the appearance of Schweitzer's book, I should be inclined to say that it was marked, on the one hand, by the strong affirmation of the reality and importance of the apocalyptic element in the Gospels—not exactly as *the* starting-point, but as one main starting-point for the teaching of our Lord, and for His own conception of His mission. If we look for the deepest roots of that teaching and of that mission, we must go back to the Old Testament as a whole; but if we are to single out the particular line of connection and descent to

which our Lord's teaching and constructive view of His own person are immediately attached, then I think that we shall have to turn to apocalyptic—the apocalyptic which had its beginnings in the Old Testament, but was developed in contemporary Judaism. On the one hand, we must emphasise the part played by this apocalyptic in the preparation of our Lord's coming; and on the other hand, we must emphasise no less the new turn and new significance that He gave to it. The language of which He made use was to a large extent the language of apocalyptic; but He applied it in a manner and gave to it a meaning that was essentially His own.

As I look back, it seems to me that the right note was struck at the meeting of the Congress on the History of Religions held here, in Oxford, on 16th September 1908. On that occasion papers were read on New Testament Eschatology by Professors F. G. Peabody, of Harvard, and E. von Dobschütz, at that time of Strassburg (now of Breslau), and the subject was further discussed by Professor Kirsopp Lake and others. A year later, Professor von Dobschütz gave four lectures at Oxford, which were printed in *The Expositor* for the first half of 1910; and both the Congress paper and the lectures were afterwards reprinted in a volume entitled *The Eschatology of the Gospels* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1910). In my opinion this book hits the mark more exactly than anything else that has appeared in the interval, though not a little debate has been going on which has contributed to the same result.

I.

The first thing that we have to do is to grasp the historic background as it existed at the coming and during the life of Christ. It is certain that in this background Apocalyptic played a considerable, though not a dominating part. The dominating influence at this period was that which is represented by Pharisaism. But it should be always remembered that as yet Pharisaism and Apocalyptic were by no means mutually exclusive. They were rather divergent branches

growing out of the same stem—and in many cases hardly even divergent. The Pharisees began as those who aimed at a higher standard of piety in the nation. Their conception of piety was naturally that which they found in the Old Testament, especially in the Pentateuch. The Pentateuch came to them as a legal code, consisting of precepts "Thou shalt" and "Thou shalt not." Their study was concentrated upon this code. They sought to apply it to the conditions of their own time. Where it needed extension, they extended it by an elaborate system of rule and inference. It was in this process of extending the Law, of deriving from it precepts applicable to their own day, that they became involved in the casuistry of which we hear so much in the Gospels. But this condition of things inevitably grew worse as time went on. The original impulse was one of genuine religion; it was only by degrees that it became narrowed and hardened. The Law, as law, always held the first place in the mind of the Jew; but the Jew of our Lord's day had all the rest of the Old Testament behind him: if he studied the Law, he studied the Prophets and the Psalms and the Wisdom Books as well. Of course this study varied in its proportions according to the bent of the individual. The general tendency, and especially (we may say) the official tendency, was to gravitate more and more towards the Law. But as yet the field was open; no one tendency was definitely proscribed and shut out, as the apocalyptic tendency came by degrees to be. Apocalyptic linked itself on to Prophecy; and many pious souls gave free rein to their hopes and aspirations in this direction. While no less scrupulous and careful than their neighbours in the observance of the Law, they found more nourishment for the religious life in the Psalms and the Prophets. And accordingly, when the events and vicissitudes of the time impelled them to take up the pen, their imagination was apt to soar into the region to which Psalms and Prophets pointed.

It was in this way that the apocalyptic influence became so strongly marked as it is in the period which may be said to

cover just three hundred years from B.C. 165 (the probable date of the Book of Daniel) to 135 A.D. (the final suppression of the revolt of Barcochba and the death of Rabbi Akiba). Throughout this period the spirit of legalism, against which Christianity was a reaction, was strengthening its grip upon the main body of the Jewish nation. But all the time, even till near upon the end, individuals here and there, sometimes more and sometimes fewer, sometimes in groups and sometimes by themselves, gave utterance to the hopes and consolations that were in them; and these hopes and consolations took by preference the form of Apocalyptic. I speak of groups, because many—perhaps most—of the books that have come down to us appear to be composite in their origin; they are not the work of a single hand, but of several hands. Criticism has brought home to us the fact that not a few of the books of the Old Testament are similarly composite. In modern language we should say that they are the product not so much of an individual as of a school. A great prophet arose and his work was continued by his disciples; and the writings of the disciples and of the master were copied in the same roll, sometimes with a certain amount of rearrangement and what we should call interpolation. The same spirit animated all the writers, and their work deserved preservation; indeed it is an edifying thought to discover that the prophetic inspiration —and in fact inspiration generally—was more widely diffused than we had supposed.

There is something analogous to this in the case of Apocalyptic. Conspicuous examples may be seen in the groups of writings which bear respectively the names of Enoch, of Ezra, and of Baruch, and in the Jewish parts of the Sibylline Oracles. It is a remarkable fact that so much of the literature that has survived from the three centuries of which I have spoken should be apocalyptic. The reason would seem to be twofold. On the one hand, it was the custom, continued from Old Testament times, to set down apocalypse in writing, while the legal discussions of the great

Rabbis, such as Hillel Shammai and Gamaliel I., were both conducted and transmitted orally. Neither rabbis nor apocalyptists regarded themselves as primary authorities. The rabbis only professed to comment upon and interpret a law already given; and the apocalyptists did not write in their own name, but sheltered themselves behind the authority of some greater name belonging to the past. The other reason for the preservation of these writings was that they appealed specially to Christians, and Christians copied them and handed them down to posterity.

If we understand the conditions of which I have been speaking, we shall also, I think, understand better than we might otherwise do the background of the teaching of our Lord and His Apostles. The Judaism of those three centuries from 165 B.C. to 135 A.D.—to fix upon definite dates, though the processes at work were, of course, really fluid, and not accurately definable—was altogether wider and freer, and in parts more spiritual than that which came to be afterwards consolidated and codified in the Talmud. Apart from, and yet in more or less near proximity to, Christianity, it threw up aspiring growths which form the literature that we call Apocalyptic. We must think of this as not deliberately or openly antagonistic to the Judaism of the time, but as expressing some of its better elements. Along with the more fantastic and imaginative side of eschatology, it contained a great amount of earnest moral teaching, directly based upon the Canonical Books of the Old Testament, and developing the principles of spiritual religion therein laid down. When Christ came, there were not a few men and women scattered over the Jewish world in Palestine and the Dispersion who were already almost Christians, waiting for the kingdom of God, and ready to greet it when it arrived.

They did not form the mass of the nation; they were rather what might be described as a backwater from the main stream. The mass of the nation, again, was broken up into sections, not sharply divided from each other, and with

tendencies flowing over from one into another, including the apocalyptic. The strongest dividing line was that between the men of thought and study and the men of action. There was many an ardent patriot, ready at a moment's notice to draw the sword and fling himself upon the Roman legions. Ever since the death of Herod the Great these turbulent forces had been seething in the cauldron, until at last they boiled over in the tumultuous rising of 66 A.D. Meantime the Rabbis and the Sadducees looked on, the latter with anxiety and fear for themselves, the former in part with sympathy and in part with something of the disdain of religious self-satisfaction and pride.

II.

It will be apparent from what has been said that the soil, though not flooded, was in many places strongly saturated with apocalyptism. From what follows, it will be seen that Christianity and Apocalyptic had a natural affinity. And we shall therefore be prepared to find that Apocalyptic has left a deep impression upon the Gospels. To determine precisely how deep the impression was is part of our present problem.

In any case we must start from the fact that all the documents, or literary strata, which criticism has distinguished in the Gospels, contain clear traces of apocalyptic influence. It is not surprising that these traces should differ somewhat in degree. We should expect beforehand that the Christian writings would reflect the fluctuations of feeling that we know to have existed. Besides the differences in different localities, there was also a certain rise and fall in the intensity of the eschatological expectation as one decade of history succeeded another. The expectation came and went in waves, which at one moment were high and at another were comparatively low. We cannot always define the exact moment to which an apocalyptic writing belongs. But we may say, broadly, that in quieter times the eschatological expectation had a tendency to relax and subside, and the greater the stress and

strain the greater was also the eschatological excitement. Thus Caligula's attempt to set up his statue in the Temple was a crisis which has left its mark, *e.g.* on 2 Thessalonians, composed some ten or a dozen years later. And the insurrection of A.D. 66, with the struggle that followed, and the siege and destruction of Jerusalem, the whole not brought to an end till A.D. 73, was a still greater crisis. On any estimate, it is certain that these events found an echo in Christianity.

It has lately been observed that there is a progressive development of the eschatological idea in the evangelical documents. The emphasis upon it is least in Q (the nucleus of which is represented by the common matter of St Matthew and St Luke not found in St Mark, and which is probably to be identified with the so-called Matthæan Logia); it increases in St Mark, and still more in St Matthew; but it is again somewhat restricted by St Luke, and recedes still more into the background in St John. This gradation would correspond roughly to the chronological order. We may believe that Q was written somewhere in the decade 50–60 A.D.; St Mark, not long before A.D. 70; St Matthew, some years later; and St Luke, later still (about 80); and St John, nearer to the end of the century.

This progression is well brought out in an appendix contributed by Mr B. H. Streeter to the *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem* (1911). Practically the same result is arrived at by Professor von Dobschütz in the volume of lectures to which reference has been made.

The amount of definitely apocalyptic or eschatological language in Q is not large; and what there is, is for the most part vague and reticent. The strongest passage is that which contains the promise to the Twelve that at the coming of the Son of man they should sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel (Luke xxii. 30 = Matt. xix. 28). It may, however, be said that the presence of a detail of this kind possesses a significance beyond itself. On the one hand, it

is probable that it represents a real saying of our Lord; and on the other hand, it suggests that, if one such materialistic expression was used, it is probable that others were also used, and that our Lord did not, on principle, avoid them. The rarity of these expressions in Q would be due to the comparatively small extent of that document.

It is interesting to place the two passages side by side.

Luke xxii.	Matt. xix.
28 But ye are they which have continued with me in my temptations; 29 and I appoint unto you a kingdom, even as my Father 30 appointed unto me, that ye may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom;	28 . . . . Verily I say unto you, that ye which have followed me, in the regeneration when the Son of man shall sit on the throne of his glory,
and ye shall sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel.	ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.

We can say with some confidence that the two Gospels have behind them a common original, and yet that original is reproduced in each with a considerable degree of freedom. Besides the close resemblance in the phrase "sitting upon thrones," there is the coincidence at the beginning; for "continued with me in my temptations" (*i.e.* remained faithful to me in the trials and persecutions to which I have been exposed) is but a somewhat free Lucan paraphrase of the idea that is expressed by the simpler "followed" of St Matthew. St Luke introduces the eating and drinking "at my table in my kingdom," with such parallels in his mind as, xiv. 15, "Blessed is he that shall eat bread in the kindgom of God," and Matt. viii. 11, "sit down with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven." St Matthew has nothing of this, but he uses the peculiar word "regeneration" which is found in Josephus and Philo as well as in Tit. iii. 5 (see a full collection of parallels in Grimm's *Lexicon*). Rather similar is the "restitution" (A.V.) or "restoration (R.V.) of all things" (ἀποκατάστασις) of Acts iii. 21. In spite of the variation of phrase, this passage may be taken as a typical

example of the authentic character of the attribution to our Lord of language that has its counterpart in Judaism.

Generally speaking, it would seem that Q did not lay stress upon the catastrophic nature of the Second Coming, but it did distinctly recognise that there would be such a Coming. The points on which it does chiefly lay stress are its suddenness, and the necessity for watchfulness (Matt. xxiv. 37–51; *cf.* Luke xvii. 26–30, 39–46).

Of another important characteristic of Q—its tendency to speak of the kingdom as present, and not only future—I shall have occasion to speak more at length directly.

Mr Streeter and Professor von Dobschütz have both shown clearly that, as compared with Q, St Mark tends to heighten the apocalyptic imagery. Where Q has "whosoever shall deny me before men, him will I also deny before my Father which is in heaven" (Matt. x. 33), or at most "he that denieth me in the presence of men, shall be denied in the presence of the angels of God" (Luke xii. 9), St Mark has at greater length (viii. 38): "whosoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words in this adulterous and sinful generation, the Son of man also shall be ashamed of him, when he cometh in the glory of his Father with the holy angels."

Mr Streeter calls attention to the definite dating of the Second Coming that we get in St Mark ix. 1: "Verily I say unto you, there be some here of them that stand by, which shall in no wise taste of death, till they see the kingdom of God come with power." It is pointed out that "Q never dates."

It is St Mark who records the express declaration of our Lord before the high priest (Mark xiv. 61, 62): "Again the high priest asked him, Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed? And Jesus said, I am: and ye shall see the Son of man sitting at the right hand of power, and coming with the clouds of heaven."

These are pointed examples. Still more important is the elaborate apocalyptic chapter, Mark xiii., commonly known as the "Little Apocalypse," where St Mark is at the base of

the other two Gospels. But I will reserve what I have to say about this for a few moments.

In any case the most apocalyptic of the Gospels is St Matthew. This appears not only from the Evangelist's fondness for particular phrases, such as "the consummation of the age" (*συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος*, Matt. alone five times) and "weeping and gnashing of teeth" (six times in Matt., once only in Luke), or from the addition of such parables as those in ch. xxv. (The Ten Virgins, The Talents, and The Sheep and the Goats), but especially from the strongly apocalyptic interpretation that the Evangelist gives to the two parables of the Wheat and the Tares and the Drawnet. It seems probable that this aspect was not so prominent in the parables as originally spoken; that the stress lay rather on the mingling of good and bad than on their final separation.

An eschatological turn is given to the saying Matt. vii. 21, "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven," which is wanting in the parallel passage of St Luke vi. 46. This seems to be a distinct saying from Matt. vii. 22, 23 (= Luke xiii. 26, 27). This is pointed out by von Dobschütz, who also notices an opposite tendency in St Luke, who in at least two cases refers or suggests the reference to historical events of sayings that seem to have been originally eschatological. Thus the saying, Luke xiii. 35, "Ye shall not see me until ye shall say, Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord," seems to be placed where it is in order to point forward to the Triumphal Entry. That perhaps is not certain; but Luke's "When ye see Jerusalem compassed with armies, then know that her desolation is at hand" (Luke xxi. 20), compared with Mark's "When ye see the abomination of desolation standing where he ought not" (Mark xiii. 14 = Matt. xxiv. 15), has clearly been modified in a historical sense.

These observations would seem to confirm the conclusion to which we had been led provisionally, that the eschatological attitude and temper was by no means a fixed quantity, but that

it varied considerably in the period within which the Synoptic Gospels were written; sometimes it was stronger and sometimes weaker; it took a deeper hold on some minds than on others. Allowance has to be made for this in estimating the extent to which the Gospels preserve for us the true proportion of the mind of Christ. The objective facts are one thing, the subjective medium is another; however desirous the writer of a Gospel might be to set down faithfully what he knew, he could not help being unconsciously influenced by his own prepossessions; he fell into the attitude that was natural to himself. Therefore, especially in this matter of eschatology, the medium through which we look is not a pure transparency, but more or less coloured. The general agreement of all our documents makes it certain that our Lord Himself did actually use the eschatological language of the time; but when we ask precisely how far He used it, how far He expressed His innermost thought by it, there must be a margin of uncertainty. It is impossible to say exactly what belongs to the Master and what to the disciple.

The uncertainty reaches its highest point in regard to the so-called "Little Apocalypse" of St Mark xiii. and the parallels in the other Gospels. It is very nearly fifty years since the hypothesis was first thrown out that a number of verses in this chapter—some fifteen in all (Mark xiii. 7, 8, 14–20, 24–27, 30, 31)—formed a little document to themselves, a sort of fly-leaf, put into circulation shortly before the fall of Jerusalem, as it became clear that the city was doomed and the signs of the times seemed to portend a greater catastrophe still, nothing less than a complete break-up of the existing order of things. It is true that it is not difficult to detach these fifteen verses or so from their context. They fall easily into a sort of drama in three acts, describing the final catastrophe in the familiar language of Jewish apocalyptic: first, the so-called "woes" or "travail-pangs of the Messiah," the famines and wars and rumours of wars which were to be the preliminary signs of the approaching end; then, the

gradual culmination of horrors, "the abomination of desolation in the holy place," vaguely hinted at in prophecy; and, lastly, the appearance of the Son of man on the clouds of heaven. The lurid colouring of this picture is all strictly Jewish; and in critical circles the view widely prevails that these dramatic sections, separable with no great difficulty from the rest of the chapter, are an intrusive element in the text of the Gospel, not resting upon words actually spoken by our Lord, but incorporated by the Evangelist with his narrative from some external source. It would make not a little difference if we could be sure that this hypothesis was true. The verses under discussion concentrate in themselves all the more striking features of Jewish apocalyptic; apart from them we should have but little evidence that our Lord adopted the more extreme and fantastic features of this branch of Judaism. When it seemed that these features could be thus got rid of, the hypothesis by means of which the amputation was performed was eagerly welcomed and from that time onward has been a generally accepted part of the liberal tradition. But we must distinctly recognise that it is nothing more than a hypothesis. The proof of it is very far from being stringent. It is one thing to say that certain verses are detachable from their context, and another thing to infer that therefore they ought to be detached. For myself, I fail to see how the decision can ever be final; if we accept the verses as an integral part of the discourse, we still cannot be sure that they are not an interpolation; but, on the other hand, if we reject them as an interpolation, we can have no guarantee that they may not after all be genuine. When I say "genuine," I mean of course as words of the Lord; there is no doubt that they were from the first part of St Mark's Gospel.

III.

It is no doubt a misfortune that we should have to leave this uncertainty behind us. But it cannot be helped; where

the data themselves are not decisive, we cannot make them so. It will be better to approach our subject from another side.

Looking at the contents of the Gospels broadly, we are struck by the fact that so many of the leading terms employed in them should be either directly apocalyptic or closely associated with apocalyptism. This is true of the whole group of titles of which our Lord Himself and the Primitive Church made use to describe His mission: such titles as Messiah, Son of David, Son of man, Son of God. And it is no less true of another group of prominent terms which describe the aim and effect of His mission in its working among men —kingdom of God (or of heaven), repentance, judgment, watchfulness, resurrection. All these terms, if not exactly apocalyptic in origin—for many of them go back to the earlier period of prophecy—had acquired an almost technical sense in the apocalyptic vocabulary.

The fundamental idea of all apocalypse is really one that goes back far in the history of Israel, and is found in germ as soon as men began to reflect upon the nature of Monarchy, and in particular of Hebrew Monarchy. There soon grew up the conception to which Josephus gave the name of "theocracy." The rightful King of Israel was God; the human king was at best only God's vicegerent. The age when as yet there was no king in Israel was idealised, and hope for the future took the form of a restoration of that ideal condition. When the independent Hebrew monarchy came to an end, religious people were soon reconciled to its loss, and they began to look more and more for a revival of the primitive theocracy in a more effective and penetrating form. There was a double line of thought corresponding to the historical experience of Israel. On the one hand, there was the pure theocracy as an idealised conception; and, on the other hand, there was the monarchy, not opposed but only subordinated to the theocracy, and itself also idealised under the form of its highest historical expression, the reign of David. Accordingly, we find that the hopes for

the future took on a double aspect. Sometimes God Himself was to reign upon earth; sometimes He was to reign, not in person, but through His Viceroy, the Davidic King, His Anointed or Messiah. There was not felt to be the slightest antagonism between these two ideals; they might quite well exist, and they did exist, side by side. The Messianic Kingdom was only a more fully equipped embodiment of the theocratic. The idea of a personal Messiah goes back to Isaiah, and perhaps Jeremiah; but in subsequent prophecy and apocalyptic it was more often latent than expressed. The fullest and clearest portraiture of the personal Messiah as Son of David is that which is given in Pss. of Solomon xvii., xviii. It is a conception of this kind that the Gospels reveal to us as more or less consciously present to the popular mind at the time of our Lord's Coming. It is strongly particularistic. Israel is the favoured people, and the chief function of the Messiah is to put down its enemies and oppressors and to inaugurate its final triumph.

Not really dissimilar is the Messiah of the Similitudes of the Book of Enoch, the Elect One, the Son of man, though the line of origin is somewhat different and the conception is more transcendental. The title Son of man appears to take up the vision of Daniel vii. 13, 14. It is true that there the vision of "one like unto a son of man" is not the vision of a personal Messiah but of the kingdom or domination of "the saints of the Most High" (vv. 18, 22, 25, 27), *i.e.* the regenerate Israel, the ideal Chosen People. Israel is conceived of as a world-power, corresponding and succeeding to the other world-powers, the Babylonian, Median, Persian, and Greek. At the same time the personal (or Messianic) Head of this kingdom, although not expressly mentioned, is also no more excluded than in the case of the other kingdoms. If the "lion" impersonates the king as well as the people of Babylon, so the "man" impersonates the "kingdom of saints" as an organised whole including the Messiah. Hebrew thought was concrete and not abstract, even when it allegorised.

It is a mistake to suppose, as is often done on the strength of Mark xii. 35–37 and parallels, that our Lord in any way disclaimed the title "Son of David." The question that He propounds was a real problem for the exegesis of the time. We may believe that He had Himself meditated upon it and upon its application to Himself: how could the same person be at once David's Son and David's Lord? In Himself He felt that the enigma was solved; He was David's Son by human descent, but He was also and at the same time Son of God, and in that capacity David's Lord.

It is a mark of the sobriety and historical accuracy of the Gospels that our Lord is so rarely represented as calling Himself directly "Son of God." He is more often represented as receiving that appellation from others. It is in particular the charge brought against Him at His trial (Mark xiv. 61 and parallels). It is not quite the same thing when He is described as speaking of God as "my Father" (Matt. xi. 27; xviii. 35; xx. 23). This is not so much a claim to a recognised title as the natural expression of a consciousness of personal relations of intimate communion.

The idea of the kingdom of God (or of heaven) is still more comprehensive than that of the Messiah, because it embraces equally the forms in which stress is laid upon the personal Head and those in which it is not. It is indeed the central conception of all forms of apocalyptic, as it is also the central subject of the teaching of our Lord. In both cases the essence of the idea appears to lie in its supernatural origin. The kingdom is realised by a direct intervention of God in the course of human history, though we shall see presently that there is an important difference as to the mode of such intervention. Repentance on a large scale was to be a necessary condition of its establishment. And accordingly we find that John the Baptist began by preaching repentance as a preliminary to the coming of the kingdom; and our Lord opened His own preaching with the same call to repentance. The original idea of the "day of the Lord" involved the

executing of judgment upon Israel's enemies; and it was only by degrees that the prophets made the great moral advance of turning this judgment upon Israel itself. The judgment which at first was thought of as redress or vengeance for Israel assumed a larger scope as a great act of divine justice, rendering to every man according to his deeds. Sometimes it is God Himself who judges and sometimes it is the Messiah (as in Enoch lxii., lxix.). There can be little real doubt that our Lord claimed for Himself the function of Judge (Matt. xvi. 27, xxv. 31 ff., etc.). Bousset has tried to eliminate this claim (*Jesus*, p. 203), but on *à priori* rather than historical grounds; and the attempt can only be regarded as a paradox.

The various exhortations to watchfulness are all eschatological. The attitude of a true disciple must be one of constant vigilance in view of the suddenness of the Coming of the Son of man; if he neglects his duty or abuses the position of trust committed to him, he may find himself surprised in the very act, with no chance of escaping punishment (Matt. xxiv. 43–51 = Luke xii. 39–46).

The idea of resurrection first came in with the more developed eschatology. It was the only way in which the divine vindication of Israel could be made good for those who had already passed into the under-world. The first clear announcement of the doctrine is in Dan. xii. 2, 3, "And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt. And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever." The Resurrection of Christ Himself is essentially eschatological. It is the crowning proof that He was really the Messiah, and it is the pledge, not only of His own return in glory, but also of the resurrection to eternal life of all who believe on Him.

IV.

All these terms our Lord took over from the apocalyptic branch or side of Judaism. But He did not simply take them over and leave them as they were. There can be no doubt that He introduced into them profound modifications.

The greatest changes were those which affected His conception of His own Person and His conception of the Kingdom. Perhaps the simplest and best way of exhibiting the nature and extent of these changes will be, first, to give examples of features in the old conception that are wanting in the new, and then of features in the new conception that are wanting in the old.

The Messiah of the Psalms of Solomon is essentially a warrior, though the weapons of his warfare are not carnal. His object, like that of our Lord, is to make Israel righteous; but it would seem as though this condition of righteousness was to be brought about by force. The heathen nations are to be destroyed or reduced to subjection, and heathen immigrants who have settled among the chosen people are to be rooted out.

Pss. Sol. xvii. 23–28, 31, 32–35:

23 "Behold, O Lord, and raise up unto them their King, the Son of David, in the time which thou, O God, knowest, that he may reign over
24 Israel thy servant. And gird him with strength that he may break in
25 pieces them that rule unjustly. Purge Jerusalem from the heathen that trample her down to destroy her, with wisdom *and* with righteous-
26 ness. He shall thrust out the sinners from the inheritance, utterly destroy the proud spirit of the sinners, *and* as potter's vessels with a rod
27 of iron shall he break in pieces all their substance. He shall destroy the ungodly nations with the word of his mouth, *so that* at his rebuke the nations may flee before him, and he shall convict the sinners in the
28 thoughts of their hearts. And he shall gather together a holy people, whom he shall lead in righteousness; and shall judge the tribes of the
31 people that hath been sanctified by the Lord his God. . . . And the
32 sojourner and the stranger shall dwell with them no more. . . . And he shall possess the nations of the heathen to serve him beneath his yoke; and he shall glorify the Lord in a place to be seen of the whole
33 earth. And he shall purge Jerusalem and make it holy, even as it was

34 in the days of old. So that the nations may come from the ends of the earth to see his glory, bringing as gifts her sons that had fainted,
35 and may see the glory of the Lord, wherewith God hath glorified her."

We only need to place by the side of this the incident of the sons of Zebedee and the Samaritan village (Luke ix. 52–55), and the application to our Lord by the First Evangelist of the Isaianic "My servant shall not strive nor cry, neither shall any man hear his voice in the streets. A bruised reed shall he not break, and smoking flax shall he not quench, till he send forth judgment unto victory" (Matt. xii. 19, 20).

Indeed, the one decisive change is the attribution to the Son of man of traits like those of the Servant of Jehovah. We cannot easily imagine the writer of the Psalms of Solomon penning such words as these:

"The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests: but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head" (Matt. viii. 20).

"And he began to teach them, that the Son of man must suffer many things and be rejected by the elders, and the chief priests, and the scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again" (Mark viii. 31).

"The Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many" (Mark xi. 45).

"Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly of heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls" (Matt. xi. 29).

It is the same with the conception of the kingdom. The apocalyptic "kingdom" is wholly future; and there is no doubt that our Lord also repeatedly used language which spoke of His own kingdom as future. To "inherit the kingdom," and "to enter into the kingdom" are standing phrases. But by the side of the passages which describe the kingdom as future, there are others which no less certainly describe it as present. Such would be:

"If I by the Spirit of God cast out devils, then is the kingdom of God come upon you" (Matt. xii. 28 = Luke xi. 20; from Q).

"From the days of John the Baptist until now the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and men of violence take it by force" (Matt. xi. 12 = Luke xvi. 16; probably from Q). Compare Matt. xiii. 16, 17 (= Luke x. 23, 24): "Blessed are your eyes, for they see; and your ears, for they hear. For verily I say unto you, that many prophets and righteous men desired to see the things which ye see, and saw them not; and to hear the things which ye hear, and heard them not."

We cannot doubt that, while our Lord regarded the full manifestation of His Messiahship as still to come, He also regarded Himself as already the Messiah, with all the potentialities of the Messiah, and His kingdom as already begun, though not yet developed as it one day would be.

There are other respects in which the kingdom as conceived by our Lord differed from the apocalyptic. No apocalyptist would have written "The kingdom of God is within you" (Luke xvii. 21). Dr Field proved long ago that this is the proper rendering of the Greek, and not "among you," as some scholars still maintain. And that this is the sense appears, not only from the context ("Neither shall they say, Lo, here! or there!" which is supported by Mark xiii. 21 = Matt. xxiv. 23), but also from Mark vii. 18–23 (That which proceeds from within defiles the man).

Passages like these are all moving towards such a formulation as we find in St Paul: "The kingdom of God is not eating and drinking; but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost" (Rom. xiv. 17). This clear affirmation of the essentially inward and spiritual character of the kingdom which Christ came to found does not cancel the use of such expressions as "inheriting the kingdom" (1 Cor. vi. 9, 10; xv. 50; Gal. v. 21), or "being called to" or "counted worthy of the kingdom" (1 Thess. ii. 12; 2 Thess. i. 5), any more than the petition in the Lord's Prayer, "Thy kingdom come," was felt to preclude the view that in a certain sense and degree the kingdom of God had already begun. Both for our Lord Himself and for His great Apostle the idea of a kingdom supernaturally induced and manifested in miracle was being subsumed under the yet larger idea of a kingdom that did not cease to be supernaturally induced, though it found its expression in the still small voice of conscience. It was not necessary to discard and disavow all the old grandiose imagery handed down by tradition; the new ideas would quietly and gradually take its place as the minds of men became more and more able to receive them. The old skin would be sloughed

off as the new skin formed underneath it. There was no opposition between the old and the new; they meant essentially the same thing, though a system of expression by symbol in the one case gave way to a more literal presentation of higher realities in the other.

And we in these latter days reap the benefit of the large and tolerant and wisely conservative spirit which presided over the beginnings of our religion. Because we have entered upon the dispensation of the Spirit, we are not reduced to the bareness of intellectual purism; we are not called upon to strip rudely away all that is still shrouded in symbol and metaphor. We may leave ourselves room for the expectation of a new heaven and a new earth, though we cannot guess what outward form of embodiment they may assume.

The fundamental mistake of Schweitzer's theory lies just in what he believes to be its special virtue, the rigorous application of logic. Because the leading terms of the Gospel had their origin in apocalyptic, he will have it that they must be apocalyptic to the end. According to him the ethical teaching of our Lord is an *Interimsethik*, *i.e.* a system of ethics strictly adapted to the short interval of time that still remains before the end of the world. *À priori* it might have been so, but as a matter of fact it was not so. Only by a good deal of forcing can the ethics of Jesus be described as an *Interimsethik*. Indeed, we may generalise and say that the ethics of the apocalyptic writers in no case answer to this description. Neither our Lord nor St Paul nor the writer of such a book as the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs really preached an *Interimsethik*.

St Paul is a good example. When he wrote his earlier epistles, he certainly believed that the world was near its end; and these epistles contain a great amount of ethical teaching (*e.g.* Gal. v. 13, vi. 2; Rom. xii. 3–xiii. 10). The eschatological motive is appealed to in Rom. xiii. 11–14 as an incentive to right action; but the morality is that of the Ten Commandments, expanded to meet the needs of the Christian society. The place

in which St Paul goes furthest in regulating conduct by the nearness of the end is the advice about marriage in 1 Cor. vii. It is true that he does in this passage dissuade his readers from entering upon the married state because of the troublous times that lay before them. But neither there nor anywhere else does he relax the obligations of the married state for those who are in it. St Paul is a great moralist; he is constantly enforcing moral duties, with much delicacy of description in detail. But all this is quite independent of his eschatology.

Advanced ethical teaching is characteristic of the writings of this period, Jewish as well as Christian. The book called the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs is a notable example of this; and here too there is eschatology. But the eschatology and the ethics are kept quite apart from each other; the ethical teaching is developed in a direct line from that of the Old Testament, applied in a gentler spirit.

And if we turn to our Lord Himself we must say much the same thing. With Him ethical teaching is coloured by religion. His own intuition of the Divine Fatherhood affects the whole attitude which He enjoins upon His followers. It is true that His teaching does not cover the whole ground of ethics. But that again has nothing to do with eschatology. It arises rather from the fact that He takes society as He finds it. He has nothing to say about the civic virtues as such. These virtues have a different history, for which we must go to Greece and Rome rather than to Israel.

Apocalyptism was really after all an excrescence upon an old and deeply rooted stock, the religion and morality of the Old Testament; it was an outgrowth that had at least a tendency to become somewhat rank and wild. Was it to be expected that in deference to such an after-growth as this the fundamental legislation of Israel would be abolished and re-written? Was it to be expected that a new Decalogue should be substituted for the old, that the lessons learnt by every child at its mother's knee should be re-cast and adapted

to the conditions of a dissolving world? It would be to misjudge the hold which his divinely given law had on every Jewish mind to suppose that any such thing was possible. It is true that by the side of the movement which tended to rivet the chains of legalism, there was another which tended to spiritualise and refine the precepts of the ancient code. That second movement, of which we find many traces in the apocalyptic writings, went steadily on, and was continued and developed in Christianity. But it was rather parallel to the apocalyptic movement than a direct product of it. The two grew together side by side. A Western mind might perhaps have been thinking of the claims of logic; but such drastic logic was not to be looked for on the soil of Palestine. And, even if the outlook did excite some speculation on the lines of logic, the momentum of the past was far more powerful than any such dreams conjured up by the future.

V.

The relation of our Lord to eschatology suggests a deeper question. We should not have been surprised if His contemplation of the near approach of the end had caused Him to renounce the world and retire into the desert as His forerunner had done. But His real outlook upon life was different. Indeed, He expressly contrasts the attitude of His forerunner with His own. "John came neither eating nor drinking, and they say, He hath a devil. The Son of man came eating and drinking, and they say, Behold, a gluttonous man, and a winebibber, a friend of publicans and sinners! And wisdom is justified by her works" (Matt. xi. 18, 19). The immediate purpose of this passage is to rebuke the perverse and shallow judgments which the world is apt to pass upon those who try to reform it. But incidentally it gives a picture of the manner of our Lord's life which is confirmed by all the rest of the evidence. Our Lord mingled freely in the innocent festivities and hospitalities of the neighbourhood in which His lot lay. His parables show what an open and observant eye

He had for the life around Him. Descriptions such as "Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin," and sayings like "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? And not one of them shall fall to the ground without your Father," are significant of His interest in lowly things. Jesus was no solitary ascetic. His largeness of view was like the largeness of nature, like the sun which rises upon the evil and the good, or the rain which refreshes the just and the unjust. But the comparison prepares us to find our Lord transcending the common antitheses of life. For Him it was not a question between the ascetic and the non-ascetic. He chose what might have seemed to be "the primrose path"; but that He did so was not due to any easy-going good nature. We have only to think of the terrible issues that He faced without flinching. What becomes of the "idyllic spring" in the light of Gethsemane?

If we are to draw a lesson in this respect from our Lord's life, it certainly would not be that

> "He who lets his feelings run
> In soft luxurious flow,
> Shrinks when hard service must be done,
> And faints at every woe."

It would be rather that the brightest and tenderest human life must have a stern background, must carry with it the possibility of infinite sacrifice, of bearing the cross and the crown of thorns.

VI.

There has been too great a tendency to concentrate attention upon the predictive aspect of the eschatology of the Gospels. Its real importance does not lie in this, but in the fact that it supplied the forms under which our Lord expressed His conception of His own Person and Mission. Those two terms in particular, the Son of man and the kingdom of God, are quite astonishing in the depth and richness of meaning of which they were capable, and He availed himself of this in

the fullest degree. No other clue to the significance of His life and work is nearly so helpful.[1]

But when we look away from this really central aspect of things and dwell rather upon the incidental forecasting of "times and seasons," we soon lose ourselves in speculations that are far less profitable. In point of fact, Christian thought has dallied with these speculations more than was good for it. It soon found itself running up against obvious difficulties. I have spoken of the difficulty of being sure that we have before us the actual words of the Master. Our Gospels and the documents out of which they are composed were written at a time when the expectation of the end of the world was very strong. The minds of the writers were full of it; and they have let us see what an effect it had upon them. There is certainly no hesitation about such sayings as these: "Verily I say unto you, Ye shall not have gone through the cities of Israel, till the Son of man be come" (Matt. x. 23); "Verily I say unto you, There be some here of them that stand by, which shall in no wise taste of death, till they see the kingdom of God come with power" (Mark ix. 1). We observe in both cases the formula of strong asseveration. No doubt that formula reflects the state of mind of the writers; but does it equally reflect the mind of Him to whom it is referred as speaker? We cannot be confident one way or the other. I am rather surprised to see Professor von Dobschütz dismiss the first saying so easily as he does. In any case, I should have thought, it must have been set down extremely early. The idea of systematically "going through" the cities of Israel cannot have lingered long. I should have little doubt that the writer fully believed that he was recording a genuine saying. It would not follow that it was really original, and a

[1] This consideration enhances the value of the wonderfully close and detailed examination of the uses of the phrase "Son of man" in Part viii. of Dr E. A. Abbott's *Diatessarica,* though I cannot think that Dr Abbott is right in practically leaving out Dan. vii. 13, 14, and the Similitudes of the Book of Enoch. It is just these passages that are needed to put the title in its place in the apocalyptic series.

slight difference of wording might give it a different turn; but such "might have beens" cannot be otherwise than precarious. As the saying stands it certainly refers to the eschatological Coming, and in that sense we should have to admit that it has been contradicted by the event.

In regard to the other saying, there is more room for another interpretation. I gave the saying in the form that is found in St Mark ("the kingdom of God come with power"). This might be explained of the outpouring of the Spirit and the spread of the Christian Church. I quite believe that in the mind of our Lord Himself "the kingdom of God" had a meaning of which this would be the nearest realised expression. But St Matthew at least took the saying eschatologically. In his version it is not "the kingdom of God," but "the Son of man" who comes with power. That is quite unambiguous; and in that sense we cannot say that the prediction has been fulfilled. We must state the facts as they are, and not as we should like them to be.

In my book, *The Life of Christ in Recent Research*, I dwelt upon the great difficulty and ambiguity that attaches to all prophetic prediction. What measure are we to apply to it? Are we to measure it strictly by what was in the mind of the speaker? If we do that, then we have to allow that not a little Old Testament prophecy came far short of the reality. If we are to measure prediction by what it meant for the hearers, then the gap between prediction and reality would be greater still. If we measure prediction by that which the Spirit of God intended when it inspired the prophet, then history itself becomes the key to prophecy.

But in the case of our Lord we know that He referred all things to the Father. To all His acts He annexed the condition: "Nevertheless not my will, but thine, be done." In all His words there is implied the reservation: "I speak not in my own name but in the name of my Father which is in heaven." And it must of course never be forgotten that in these eschatological matters the reservation is quite express:

"But of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father" (Mark xiii. 32; in Matt. xxiv. 36 the clause "neither the Son" is omitted by many authorities, but not on the whole the best); and, "It is not for you to know times or seasons, which the Father hath set within his own authority" (Acts i. 7).

If, in regard to these times and seasons, we can reach no assured result, that is only in accordance with the Divine intention. We must be content not to know, as the Son Himself was content not to know. We can discern three distinct strains in the human consciousness of our Lord: (*a*) a strong sense of impending catastrophe over Israel as a nation; (*b*) a deep conviction of His own mission to bring about restoration and regeneration; (*c*) a prophetic forecast in which the immediate future is filled with an eschatological "outpouring of the Spirit" (Joel). But it is probably beyond us to say exactly with what degree of sharpness and clearness these different strains of thought presented themselves to Him. And in any case they have become more or less blurred and confused in the tradition that has come down to us. I am afraid we must be content to recognise this confusion so far as it exists for a fact; the uncertainties that remain when criticism has exhausted its resources prevent it from being wholly disentangled.

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IS THERE ONE SCIENCE OF NATURE?

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§ 1. THE desire for a monistic theory of the universe is as strong among students of science as it is among philosophers and men in the street. All three are alike fascinated by the endeavour to see the world whole from one point of view. But there is an attraction which appeals to the student of science in particular—the attraction of ideally precise description. It was Kant who said that knowledge is scientific in proportion as it is mathematical, and all who hold the view that it is the aim of science to describe facts of experience as exactly as possible, as simply as possible, and as completely as possible, will agree that this ideal comes nearest realisation in such sciences as gravitational astronomy, where mathematical formulation reaches its highwater mark. Now if there is one science of nature, it must be an extension of that which deals with what we usually regard as the simpler and more primitive order of facts—the order, at any rate, that we think we know best; it must be one which interprets the organic in terms of the inorganic; it must consist of precise physico-chemical descriptions which have been, or are in process of being, summed up in mathematical terms. In short, it must conform to the type of science which we regard as most perfect. And this, we say, is an ideal that appeals strongly to the scientific worker. Let us consider briefly, from our biological point of view—necessarily a somewhat naïve one—why we do *not* believe that there is one science of nature.

Many considerations other than biological must weigh with

us in regard to this important question, the answer to which colours our whole outlook on the world. There is the perennial "soul and body" problem in its higher reaches; there are various borderland phenomena studied by the Society for Pyschical Research; and there are *other* non-biological data relevant to the discussion. But in this paper we wish to keep to the biological point of view.

§ 2. In his experience the student of science has to deal, *inter alia*, with an order of facts which he calls purely physical—the movements of the earth and the heavenly bodies, the seasons and tides, the sun and the wind and the rain, the weathering of the mountains, the making of the fruitful land, and so forth. Within this order the processes are marked, as everyone knows, by their rigid uniformity of routine, their monotonous sequences, which are like chains of iron. They can be described, satisfactorily for the most part, on the view that all are "merely complicated cases of change of configuration in a system of mass particles." They can be described, that is to say, in terms of matter and motion.

Scientifically, then, the whole physical order can be treated as a mechanism; it can be described with extraordinary precision by means of formulæ which have only a few factors in them. At present, these factors seem to be not more than five: the ether, the electron, the atom, the molecule, and the mass, energy being "involved in the construction of any of these out of any other." Our question is whether these concepts are adequate for a useful description of the activities of organisms—for *a description which will make the facts of life more intelligible.*

§ 3. That the animate order of facts transcends in some way the purely physical seems to certain minds, and to certain moods of other minds, almost self-evident, and the mechanistic theory appears almost obviously inadequate. For the world of life is full of individuality, and we cannot, as in the purely physical order, predict with certainty how a living creature will answer to a given stimulus. Organisms are full

of purposiveness, even when they have no brains for holding a purpose. Although they sometimes make fatal mistakes, they tend in their normal environment to respond effectively, making for self-preservation and betterment. They are genuine agents in a sense that is not true of inorganic factors—of the river carving its way in the rock or of the lightning striking the steeple—for they often seem to "try" one reaction after another until they find that which is most effective; they profit by experience; they trade with time. In a word, they are historic beings.

But to this, and much more of the same nature, it may be answered that while no one doubts that a bird is something very different from a stone, the question is whether we can discover qualitative criteria of livingness which will apply all along the line. In studying a contrast like that between male and female, we must not restrict our survey to such cases as lion and lioness, stag and hind, peacock and peahen, ruff and reeve, we must come down to cases like starfish and sea-urchin, where we often require a microscope to be quite sure of the sex. So in studying a contrast like that between animate and inanimate, we must not keep to the upper reaches of life, we must consider the lichen on the wall as well as the cedar of Lebanon, the microbes and slime-fungi as well as the queens of the air; and we must not shut our eyes to such phenomena as latent life and local life, the survival of a minute fragment of an egg, and artificial parthenogenesis. We propose, therefore, to take a wide biological survey, illustrating from many different corners why it seems necessary to believe in the autonomy of life.

I. The Argument from Everyday Functions.

§ 4. Let us begin with *the functions of everyday life*, such as the contraction of muscles, the irritation of nerves, the digestion and absorption of food, the process of respiration, and the filtering of the blood in the kidneys. Has any vital function as yet received a mechanical explanation, that is to

say, a description in physico-chemical terms? From our understanding of the facts of the case we are led to answer "No." As there is a widespread impression that the answer should be "Yes," let us explain the point at issue.

In the first instance, we must be perfectly clear that there are in the living body numerous chemical and physical events which can be accounted for as one might account for an explosion of fire-damp or a shower of rain. Some of them can be made to occur in a test-tube outside of the body. We can buy pepsin at the chemist's and digest beef with it in an egg-cup. We know of specific oxidations and reductions, hydrations and fermentations, which occur in the body, and can be mimicked outside of it; we know of phenomena of surface-tension and capillarity, of elasticity and diffusion which are wrapped up with the ordinary life of the body and which admit of ordinary physical description. There is every reason to believe that the progress of physiology will increase the number of these definitely known chemical and physical processes which go on within the bodies of plants and animals. Will that not result in a physico-chemical description of vital processes?

In such matters we must keep, first of all, *to what has been actually achieved*, and we submit (*a*) that there has not yet been given any physico-chemical description of any total vital operation, such as the secretion of digestive juice or the filtering of blood by the kidney; (*b*) that the progress of physiology seems at present to make vital functions appear less, not more, reducible than they seemed half a century ago; (*c*) that we are not within sight of a physico-chemical interpretation of the most distinctively vital processes, such as anabolism and growth; and (*d*) that even if we had a complete record of all the transformations of matter and energy that go on within the living body in its everyday functions, we should not be answering the biological questions. Let us take these points *seriatim*.

§ 5. (*a*) No physico-chemical description has yet been given

of any total vital operation. The history of physiology is here very instructive. We find that about the middle of the nineteenth century there was a remarkable mechanistic boom. The application of the methods of chemical and physical analysis to the functions of the body led to discoveries of the greatest importance, and the impression became prevalent that the citadel of life was about to be taken by storm. Mayer (1845) showed that vital energy—the animal's power of doing work—is accounted for by the oxidations that go on in the living body. This was the beginning of the end of the view that there is a distinctive "vital force" in organisms, a special source of energy apart from what we can account for by the chemical and physical circumstances of the case. Du Bois-Reymond's studies on animal electricity raised hopes of an electrical explanation of the action of nerves. Ludwig brought forward his mechanical theories of secretion and the like (see Dr J. S. Haldane, "Life and Mechanism," *Guy's Hospital Reports*, vol. lx., 1906).

The inevitable reaction followed. Things are not so simple as they seemed. Carbon compounds are certainly consumed in the living fire, but Pflüger and others have shown that "the oxidation does not, like ordinary chemical oxidation, increase or diminish in proportion to the varying supply of oxygen brought to the seat of oxidation, but is controlled by living cells." It is not merely what happens, but the way in which it happens, that we have to consider. If we inquire into the passage of digested food from the alimentary canal into the blood, or the interchange of gases in the lungs, or the filtering that goes on in the kidney, we certainly find that these involve physico-chemical processes, and we detect in their occurrence nothing that contradicts the principles of physics and chemistry; *and yet* the physico-chemical formulæ do not suffice for a complete description of the vital function. They do not quite fit; the living cells make a difference—a difference which we have at present to accept as a fact.

In his exceedingly valuable Gifford Lectures, Dr Driesch discusses very carefully the various "means" of morphogenesis — the part, for instance, that surface tension and capillarity play in the architectural processes of the developing organism. He recognises their importance. "But let us never forget that the laws of surface tension only give us the most general type of an arrangement of elements in all these cases, nothing else. A physical law never accounts for the Specific! Capillarity gives us not the least clue to it. As the organic substance, at least in many cases, is a fluid, it must of course follow the general laws of hydrostatics and hydrodynamics; but life itself is as little touched by its fluid-like or form-like properties as it is by the fact that living bodies have a certain weight and mass." . . . "*We must be cautious in admitting that any organic feature has been explained, even in the most general way, by the action of physical forces*" ("Science and Philosophy of the Organism," vol. i. pp. 92–93).

§ 6. (*b*) Experimental science is hardly older than Galileo, and experimental physiology practically dates from Claude Bernard, so that it is preposterous to venture any statement as to what progress may or may not be made in the way of reducing things to a common denominator. We do not know how soon the movements of corpuscles in a living body may be brought into line with those in an inanimate system. Every year we know more about the physical and chemical processes that occur in living bodies. But we must take things as they are, and it does not seem as if the physico-chemical explanation of vital functions was coming any nearer. There is no dogmatic insinuation in this statement as to what the future may have in store, but there is surely significance in the fact that increased knowledge of physiological chemistry and physiological physics has brought the distinctively vital into stronger relief. It has not made it more intelligible, that is, it has not shown it to be a particular instance of something more general. Some have indeed maintained that what there is left of biology

after organic chemistry has had its fair share may be referred to hydrodynamics, but the number of students who can be gulled with this sort of bluff is happily decreasing.

It may be useful to cite the conclusions of three authorities, whose concrete work is well known. Professor Bunge once wrote: "I think the more thoroughly and conscientiously we endeavour to study biological problems, the more are we convinced that even those processes which we have already regarded as explicable by chemical and physical laws are in reality infinitely more complex, and at present defy any attempt at a mechanical explanation." Dr J. S. Haldane goes even further: "If we look back at the phenomena which are capable of being stated, or explained in physico-chemical terms, we see at once that there is nothing in them characteristic of life. . . . We are now far more definitely aware of the obstacles to any advance in this (physico-chemical) direction, and there is not the slightest indication that they will be removed, but rather that with further increase of knowledge, and more refined methods of physical and chemical investigation, they will only appear more and more difficult to surmount." As Dr Driesch points out: "What at first seems to be the result of mechanical pressure may afterwards be found to be an active process of growth, and what at first seems to be a full effect of capillarity among homogeneous elements may afterwards be shown to depend on specialised metabolic conditions of the surfaces as its principal cause." Speaking of other physical phenomena, such as osmotic pressure, he continues: "But all these processes are only means of the organism, and can never do more than furnish the general type of events. They do not constitute life; they are *used* by life."

§ 7. It may be fairly asked, however, whether the mechanistic hypothesis has not been the inspiration of many of the most famous physiologists. Has it not led them to great discoveries? Does it not toe the pragmatist line as a theory that has worked well? The answer must be that in one way

it has worked well, as an engine of research, and that in another way it has not worked at all—as a formulation of the facts. Treating the organism as a machine has led to great clearness in regard to the big transformations of matter and energy that go on in the body. Without Chemistry and Physics what would be our understanding of respiration, of animal heat, of muscular work, or of the significance of the various kinds of waste? But have Chemistry and Physics helped us towards an understanding of the way in which the great workshop of the body is regulated, of the way in which the different functions are adjusted to every varying need, of the way in which they work into one another's hands, so that a unified effective life results? To take one clear instance, it is no longer a difficult physico-chemical problem to account for the animal heat, or for a large fraction of the animal heat; but how does this or any other physico-chemical description help us to account for "warm-bloodedness," that is to say, for the regulation of heat-production and heat-loss, so that the temperature of the body of bird and mammal remains approximately constant whatever the outside temperature may be? We may know a great deal about what is called "the thermotaxic mechanism," but the more we know the further off it seems from any possibility of mechanical explanation.

§ 8. (*c*) If no everyday function of the body has found complete description in physico-chemical terms, it follows *a fortiori* that we are not within sight of an explanation of such fundamental vital processes as growth and reproduction. The minute crystal of alum dropped into a solution of alum forms the centre of a crystalline growth—a type of many wonderful and beautiful inorganic growths. We have only to think of the fascinating jewels and minerals in the geological museum, of the dendritic markings on the quarry-stones which look like mimicries of fossil ferns and zoophytes, or of the still more familiar frost-flowers on the window-pane. In what ways does organic growth differ from these? The inorganic structure grows at the expense of material chemically the same as itself;

the organism *assimilates*. The grass grows at the expense of air, water, and salts which, with the sun's aid, it builds up into complex organic compounds; the foal grows at the expense of the grass. Moreover, organic growth is almost always accomplished by a most intricate process of cell-division, by which the organism continually maintains its specific structure or, more briefly, *itself*. In most cases organic growth is an integration, the new material being not merely added on, as it is in crystals, but incorporated and unified. We must not make too much of this, however, remembering cases like the spreading slime-fungi (Myxomycetes)—which almost require a subkingdom for themselves—and the very imperfectly integrated growth of some simple animals like sponges, or some simple plants, like many of the Thallophytes. Yet this seems to us clear, that organic growth is an active process, that it is selective, and that it is essentially self-expressive. We do not hesitate to use such a term in reference to the growth of even an amœba, for the growth is a reproduction of the specific organisation and of no other, and it is related essentially, not topographically, to what is already present. This is indeed a fundamental biological conception, which has been well stated by Dr J. S. Haldane: "A living organism is distinguished by the fact that in it what we recognise as specific structure is inseparably associated with what we recognise as specific activity. Its activity expresses itself in the development and maintenance of its structure, which is nothing but the expression of its activity. Its identity as an organism is not physical identity [we should say, not *purely* physical identity], since from the physical standpoint the material and energy passing through it may be rapidly changing." In his valuable address Dr Haldane tests the mechanical theory of life, first in relation to ordinary functions, and then in regard to the most distinctive vital processes, and finds it inadequate. "The first requisite of a working hypothesis is that it should work, and I have tried to point out that as a matter of fact the physico-chemical theory of life has not worked in the past, and never can work. As

soon as we pass beyond the most superficial details of physiological activity it becomes unsatisfactory, and it breaks down completely when applied to fundamental physiological problems, such as that of reproduction."

In the production and maintenance of its specific form the organism is *assisted*, as we have seen, by physical phenomena, such as surface-tension and capillarity; and part of the difficulty of clearness is that these, or others like them, may be closely interlaced with the intricate processes of growth and cell-division,—"internal morphogenetic means," as Driesch calls them, "which are of a so-called physiological character, that is, which nobody claims to understand physically at present." Thus osmotic pressure may go hand in hand with real cellular growth in effecting increase in size, and we need to bear in mind Driesch's caution against believing that too much is explained by the simple physical process which is the concomitant of another very much more complex. "It is the organism which by the secretion of osmotic substances in the cavities or the protoplasm of the cells prepares the ground for growth even of this osmotic sort. The real cellular growth which proceeds on the basis of assimilation cannot, of course, be accounted for by osmotic events, not even in its most general type."

§ 9. (*d*) To those who have not considered the question from the point of view of scientific method, it may seem strange to assert that even if we had a complete record of all the transformations of matter and energy that go on within the living body in all its everyday functions, we should not be answering the biological questions. Why not? What are the unanswered biological questions? The answer is simple. As biologists we wish to describe the activity of the creature as a whole: What is the "go" of it, how does it keep agoing? And while the analysis of particular items in the activity clears the ground and is important for special purposes, *e.g.* in medicine, it certainly does not give us a biological description. The mechanist's idea is that by a summation of the physico-

chemical descriptions of the activities of all the different parts we shall get what we want. But this is not so. Not merely because complete physico-chemical descriptions of the particular activities are far to seek, but because if they were complete they would not explain how the various activities work in a variable way into one another's hands, how they are co-ordinated in a harmonious result, how they are adjustable to changeful external conditions.

We must bear in mind the extraordinary complexity of the problem of the everyday life of a common animal. For what is a creature but a huge army with battalions which we call organs, brigades which we call systems; it advances insurgently from day to day always into new territory—often inhospitable or actively unfriendly; it holds itself together, it forages, it makes good its own losses, it even recruits itself; it pitches a camp and strikes it again, it goes into winter-quarters, it retreats, it recovers itself, it has a forced march, it conquers. What the biologist wishes is a description of the organism's daily march which will not ignore the reality of the *tactics*—the intra-organismal tactics.

In discussing these difficult questions it always appears to us sound policy to appeal to those who are actually working at the facts of the case, and while we cannot pretend that there is anything like unanimity, there appears to be an increasing number of physiologists who will at least go the length of agreeing with what Professor E. H. Starling said in his Presidential Address to the Physiological Section of the British Association in 1909: "In his study of living beings the physiologist has one guiding principle which plays but little part in the sciences of the chemist and physicist, namely, the principle of adaptation. Adaptation or purposiveness is the leading characteristic of every one of the functions to which we devote in our text-books the chapters dealing with assimilation, respiration, movement, growth, reproduction, and even death itself." Now adaptation or purposiveness requires a historical explanation; it is a supra-mechanical concept.

At the same time, we admit unreservedly that when we watch a living animal, especially one in which we can see the internal movements of various parts—the beating of the heart, for instance—we are irresistibly reminded of a complicated, smoothly working machine. It is plain that both are material systems adapted for particular kinds of work, for particular transformations of matter and energy. It is undeniable that the comparison is a useful one, and that it is a fertile method of discovery to press it to its farthest. All we are pleading for is, that the facts of the case be not treated with a false simplicity. We would point out, for instance, that the organism differs from any machine yet invented in its greater efficiency, giving more return from its fuel; and there is no doubt that this corresponds to a deep difference from the point of view of dynamics. One of the attempts to define this difference which has always impressed us is contained in a paper on "The Abundance of Life" by Professor Joly: "While the transfer of energy into any inanimate material system is attended by effects retardative to the transfer and conducive to dissipation, the transfer of energy into any animate material system is attended by effects conducive to the transfer and retardative of dissipation." Assuredly the organism may be called an engine, but it must be remembered that it is a self-stoking, self-repairing, self-preservative, self-adjusting, self-increasing, self-reproducing engine!

"And this also must be remembered in comparing a living creature and a machine, that the latter is no ordinary sample of the inorganic world. It is an elaborated tool, an extended hand, and has inside of it a human thought. It is because of these qualities that highly complex machines come to be so like organisms. But no machine profits by experience, nor trades with time as organisms do. Therefore it is that the formulæ which serve to re-describe the activity of a machine will not suffice for living creatures which demand a historical explanation" (Geddes and Thomson, *Evolution*, Home University Library, 1911).

II. The Argument from Animal Behaviour.

§ 10. The inadequacy of a physico-chemical account of vital activity becomes even more obvious when we pass from the everyday functions of the body to a connected series of external activities—to animal behaviour.

Let us consider first of all the microscopic newly hatched larva of the liver-fluke, which is of so much practical importance to sheep-farmers. It has no organs in the strict sense; it has only a few cells altogether; it has no hint of a nervous system. It is covered with cilia, and has energy enough to swim about for a day in the water-pools by the pasturage. It comes in contact with many things, but it responds to none, until haply it touches the little freshwater snail—the only contact that will enable it to continue its life. To this it responds by working its way in at the breathing aperture, and within the snail it goes through a complex series of multiplications and metamorphoses, the upshot of which may be that a sheep becomes infected with a young liver-fluke. Our point, however, is the delicate adaptation of brainless protoplasm to the one stimulus which will enable it to continue its life. This seems to us far beyond all possibility of mechanical description; it requires a historical explanation.

Now what we have alluded to is not a rare curiosity; it is a common and characteristic feature in animal behaviour that the creature is historically tuned to be a receptor of one particular but absolutely indispensable stimulus which may not occur more than once in the life-history. The freshwater mussel carries her young ones in her outer gill-plate, and does not set them free unless there be a stickleback or the like in the immediate vicinity. When the fish comes near, the mother mussel, whom it is no libel to call "acephalous," liberates a crowd of pinhead-like larval mussels or Glochidia, who rush out into the water like boys from the opened school door. They snap their tiny valves; they are aware of the stickleback; they fasten on it to begin another chapter of their

life. Even in the laboratory, when they have been removed from the mother, they become extraordinarily excited if a morsel of stickleback is dropped into the dish in which they are. It is this organic memory of the essential stimulus that is characteristic and supra-mechanical, and though simpler in expression, it is as well marked in the absolutely brainless larva of the liver-fluke as in the larval mussel which has the beginnings of a nervous system, or in a higher migratory animal with a richly endowed brain. One of the interesting results of the Aberdeen University Bird Migration Inquiry at present in progress has been the definite proof that a swallow which leaves us at the end of summer "for warmer lands and coasts that keep the sun" may return the following spring to the farmyard which was its real homestead. And our question in this paper is this: Does the return of the swallow differ from the return of a thrown boomerang in kind or only in degree; that is to say, does it require different fundamental concepts for its interpretation?

And if it be objected that it is complicating the issue to bring in cases of extremely intricate behaviour, such as migration, in higher animals, where very fine brains have been developed, and where no one denies the very high development of "intelligence" and "instinct," our answer must be (1) that some of the mechanists do not hesitate to apply their machine theory here also, and (2) that we can find analogous kinds of behaviour at all levels of nervous development. Thus, to cite, from the instinctive level, a case so familiar that we have ceased to wonder at it at all: there seems to be no doubt that a worker-bee leaving the hive the first time will fly confidently into a new world and will burglar a difficult flower like a past-master. As we say, it is "to the manner born." Those who have experimented tell us that if we take a bee from the hive, put it in a box, place the box in our pocket, walk an intricate half-mile, and then open the box, the liberated insect will make a bee-line for home. The bee has a brain of an entirely different order from a bird's, and

the same sort of thing occurs at levels where there are no brains at all. The behaviour of organisms requires historical explanation, and that irrespective of the soul and body problem. We may keep ourselves clear by remembering that the problem of the autonomy of life would confront us even if—to make an impossible supposition—there were no animals in the world at all, only plants and us—Jack and his bean-stalk, in fact. We may also remember that Dr Driesch has got to his strong convictions of vitalism by studying eggs, where, again, there are no data as to mental processes.

§ 11. Let us select some instance of animal behaviour and look at it from the mechanist and the vitalist point of view. We take a vivid one, the migration of Eels, which has been recently discussed in this connection in a masterly article by Mr E. S. Russell ("Vitalism," *Rivista di Scienza*, April 1911). It is a very useful case, because the eel has a brain of a very low order, and we are not warranted in using in regard to it the psychological terms which are indispensable in the case of the more intelligent birds and mammals.

The remarkable story, some chapters of which have recently been worked out, is in outline as follows. The eels of the whole of northern Europe probably begin their life below the 500-fathom line on the verge of deep sea away to the west of Ireland and southwards towards the Canaries—*on the verge* of the dark, cold, calm, silent, plantless world of the abysses. It is apparently in the great depths that the young eel passes through the early chapters of its life-history; but these remain very obscure, and need not at present concern us. The young eel rises to the upper sunlit waters as a transparent, sideways flattened, knife-blade-like larva, about three inches in length, with no spot of colour except in its eyes. It lives for many months in this state—known as a *Leptocephalus*—expending energy in gentle swimming, but taking no food. It subsists on itself, and becomes shorter and lighter, and cylindrical instead of flat. It is transformed into a glass-eel, about two and a half inches long, like a knitting-needle in girth. It

begins to move towards the shores. After about a year it is one of a million elvers passing up one of our rivers—in the wonderful "eel-fare," which we have described in our *Biology of the Seasons* (1911), one of the most remarkable sights of spring. If it is not fortunate, it may take much more than a year to reach the feeding ground—those that ascend the rivers of the eastern Baltic have journeyed over three thousand miles! Eventually, however, large numbers succeed in finding rivers, and there is a long period of feeding and growing in the slow-flowing reaches and in fish-stocked ponds. There is never any breeding in fresh water, but after some years a restlessness seizes the adults as it seized the larvæ—a restlessness due to a reproductive, not a nutritive motive. There is an excited return journey to the sea—and they don wedding garments of silver as they go and become large of eye. They appear to migrate hundreds of miles, often out into the Atlantic to the verge of the deep sea, where, as far as we know, the individual life ends in giving rise to new lives. In no case is there any return.

We ask, then, what the Machine Theory of Life can make of a story like this, which is a type of many. Let us consider in particular the second last chapter, the migration from the rivers to the spawning-grounds. Like many other fishes, the eel requires for spawning very definite conditions of depth, salinity, and temperature. The North Sea will not serve, for it is too shallow; the Norwegian Sea will not serve, for it is too cold.

Now, what can the physiology that is only applied physics and chemistry tell us? It can tell us, for instance, a most useful thing to know, how the energy for the journey is obtained from chemical explosions of reserve material in the muscles of the eel's tail. It can tell us some of the steps in the making of this fuel out of the eel's food. It can tell us that the muscles are kept rhythmically contracting by nervous stimuli, and so on for a whole volume. And yet does it really help us to understand the migration of the eels to the distant

spawning grounds? To take items in the process and reduce them (as far as possible) to physical and chemical common denominators does not make any clearer the interconnection of all these items into the single act of migration. Let us apply physico-chemical methods by all means, the results are always of interest; but are they *useful* in making the biological fact of migration more intelligible?

Let us linger over the illustration, for it is very instructive. As Russell says, in his luminous contribution to the discussion of vitalism: "The migration is, so to speak, a fact of a higher order than any physical or chemical fact, although it is made up of an indefinitely large number of physical and chemical facts. To explain the fact one must accept it as a whole, not seek to conquer it by dividing it, for if one analyses it into its components, one inevitably misses the bond of union. . . . To decompose the act of migration into an infinity of physico-chemical processes is to take an infinity of little partial views of the act; but what one needs for an explanation of the fact is a comprehensive view which will unite all the relevant features of it into one picture. To the chemist confronted with this problem, there is no fact of migration at all; there is only an intricate enravelment of chemical reaction. To the biologist the fact of migration to a particular region for a particular purpose is cardinal, and the chemical processes involved in the action are negligible."

Surely, however, the chemical processes cannot be negligible, for is it not for subtle chemical reasons that the eel does not spawn in fresh water? is it not for subtle chemical reasons that the stimulus which sets spawning agoing is not merely salt water, but salt water at a particular temperature? and so on. The answer to this kind of question is simply: (1) that the word chemical begs the question, physiological being the proper term unless a complete reduction has been effected; (2) that the occurrence of the physiological stimulation in the deep sea, but not in fresh water, requires a historical explanation; and (3) that the active seeking out of the area of

appropriate stimulation is something supra-mechanical. If it be objected that one can think, in dreams at least, of a torpedo so delicately adjusted that it descended rivers, went out to sea, kept off the rocks, turned corners, and did not explode until it could do so effectively in an area of appropriate stimulation, the answer must be that this mechanism is as yet a hypothetical construction, and that if it were constructed it would not be a fair sample of the inorganic world. For obviously it would have a human idea and a human purpose inside of it—the very essence of its constitution.

But if the mechanistic account of the eel's migration fails, is the vitalistic one—or, as we prefer to say, the biological one —any better? Let us turn for a little to this aspect of the case. The aim of biology is not to give either ultimate or mechanical explanations, it is to render biological phenomena more intelligible; and that means obtaining general conceptions as to their nature. We "explain" a thing biologically when we relate it to some general fact or formula of living things, when we bring it under the heading of some fundamental property.

Therefore, if pressed to make the story of the eel's migration less of a curiosity, we should ask to be allowed to start with the concept of an organism, a specific individuality, a historical being. It is determined by the past—its own past and the past of its race. Its inheritance is a treasure-store of the ages, a registration of long experience. Non-living things have no history in the biological sense; they do not trade with time. We do not need to remember their history in order to understand their present operations. The hand of the past has certainly left its impress on them, but the living hand of the past is on the organism for ever. In the organism, as Professor Bergson says, the past is prolonged into the present. Thus we pass on to a new level of explanation or interpretation, which is historical. And whenever we mention that the eel is one of a deep-sea race which has adventurously taken to colonising the fresh waters—just as the salmon is one of a freshwater

race which has taken to exploiting the sea—and notice further that animals in general return to their birthplace to breed, as in the familiar case of the migratory birds, then at once the biological light begins to be shed on the eel's strange history.

§ 12. The conception of an organism as a historic being was finely expressed by Professor W. K. Clifford: "It is the peculiarity of living things not merely that they change under the influence of surrounding circumstances, but that any change which takes place in them is not lost but retained, and as it were built into the organism to serve as the foundation for future actions. . . . No one can tell by examining a piece of gold how often it has been melted and cooled in geologic ages. . . . Anyone who cuts down an oak can tell by the rings in its trunk how many times winter has frozen it. . . . A living being must always contain within itself the history, not merely of its own existence, but of all its ancestors." Yet even this is putting the case too *statically*. Bergson gets nearer the heart of the matter when he maintains that all organisms share with us a persisting experience of time. Both have the mysterious quality of "durée"—but duration in more than the merely physical and chronological sense; for what Bergson means is "the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances." "Our personality shoots, grows, and ripens without ceasing. Each of its moments is something new added to what was before. We are creating ourselves continually." So of an organism, it may be said that "its past, in its entirety, is prolonged into its present, and abides there, actual and acting." "Continuity of change, preservation of the past in the present, real duration—the living organism seems, then, to share these attributes with consciousness." But he goes further, and, as the title of his remarkable book, *L'Évolution Créatrice*, suggests, seeks to show that life, like conscious activity, is unceasing creation.

It is not merely that the organism's fundamental quality is self-preservation, in a deep, not too external sense, a con-

tinuous re-creation of the specific structure, a continuous re-assertion of the specific activity. There is more than that. The spontaneity of life is manifested by a continual creation of new forms. For Bergson gives us a forceful re-statement of the essential thought of Lamarck, of Goethe, of Robert Chambers, of Samuel Butler, and of later vitalists: in fact, of all who have most deeply felt the supreme importance of the organismal factor in evolution. He thinks of a cumulative hereditary change as "related to some sort of effort, but to an effort of far greater depth than the individual effort, far more independent of circumstances—an effort common to most representatives of the same species, inherent in the germs they bear rather than in their substance alone, an effort thereby assured of being passed on to their descendants. There is an original creative impetus in life which passes from generation to generation of germs, is sustained right along the lines of evolution, among which it gets divided, and is the fundamental cause of variations, or at least of those variations that count." This may be still too abstract for the biologist, but there is concrete evidence also leading us to attach more and more importance to what we may call the intrinsic character of variations. Many facts point to the view that the secret of variability—which is the central secret of evolution—lies deep in the nature of the organism itself. The living being has been a Proteus from the first; changefulness is its most abiding quality; in short, the essence of the creature is in its innate creativeness. If this be true, we are far from the dogma that there is only one science of nature.

In a subsequent article I shall deal with the arguments from organic development and organic evolution, and sum up the case for the autonomy of biology.

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A PSYCHOLOGIST AMONG THE SAINTS.

By L. P. JACKS.

"Enfin, pour tout dire, nous ne voyons pas les choses mêmes; nous nous bornons le plus souvent, à lire des étiquettes collées sur elles. . . . . Et ce ne sont pas seulement les objets extérieurs, ce sont aussi nos propres états d'âme qui se dérobent à nous dans ce qu'ils ont d'intime, de personnel, d'originalement vécu."—HENRI BERGSON, *Le Rire*, pp. 156–7.

THE day's work was done, the family had retired to rest, and the house was still. George Marsh sealed up the last of many letters, drew the curtains closer, and pushed an arm-chair in front of the fire. One quiet hour—the most precious of the day or night,—and he too would retire. Should he read or think? He resolved to think.

Not wisely, perhaps; for his mind was troubled, and he began to brood upon a thought. The thought was one which had been nascent within him for months; he had felt it stirring within him all day long, and as he sat and brooded it was born. "I shall die as I have lived," he said aloud, "—an unconverted man. I shall never be converted." And a profound melancholy overpowered him.

George Marsh was fifty-five years of age. By outward seeming he was a successful and a fortunate man. In the matter of health and wealth, of wife and child, he had won and kept what few men win ever and what fewer keep for long. None the less he seemed to himself, as he spread his hands over the dying fire, an utter failure and most unfortunate.

"It has all come to nothing," he said; "it will never come

to anything." The clock struck twelve, and George Marsh heard "never" repeated twelve times. "That settles it," he went on, addressing the fire. "I *cannot* be converted now. I know too much."

That day he had finished his course of lectures on "The Psychology of Religion," of which subject he was a professional teacher. The lectures had attracted a great audience, and been a brilliant success. He had been told by a friend that they constituted an "epoch-making event"; not that Marsh himself attached much value to the epithet, for he had heard it too often about books and things which had been forgotten in a fortnight; but it was pleasant to hear, all the same.

In the last lecture he had dealt with "The Phenomena of Conversion: their Inner Nature and the Laws of their Occurrence." He had laid down the famous "Three Laws" of Conversion, "which," said an admirer, "are destined to revolutionise our conceptions of the spiritual realm as completely as Newton's Three Laws of Motion have revolutionised our conceptions of the physical universe." George Marsh ought to have been a proud man.

His brooding continued. "I have made my own conversion impossible," he thought, "by learning to understand conversion. Nay, I have done more—and worse. I have let my audience into the secret, and as I cannot be converted, so neither can they. Once my book is published, conversion will become impossible to its readers for the reasons that make it impossible for me. It must never be published."

Hereupon a sudden impulse seized him. He rose from the fireside and snatched the manuscript of his lectures from the table. He hesitated for the moment, for the best of his life-work lay in those pages.

The door opened, and his wife entered the room.

"What has happened to you?" she said. "It is past two o'clock. Are you going to sit up all night? And what are you doing with those manuscripts?"

"I'm going to throw them into the fire," said Marsh.

"Nonsense!" She snatched them out of his hand and promptly locked them up in a drawer. Mrs Marsh was not unprepared. For many days she had heard her husband's mutterings, and had divined the thought which was working, like a maggot, in his brain. "Now go to bed," said she, "and don't be a fool."

Marsh obeyed; and thus the work "which has produced a revolution in the spiritual realm" was saved for posterity.

George Marsh had spent his life, as all men do, in the pursuit of the Infinite; and the long and short of it is that the quest had failed. Had he pursued the Infinite under the stimulation of alcohol, or the lulling dreams of opium; had he tried the love of women, the heaping up of riches, or the "will-to-power"; had he sought the goal in the secret of perpetual motion or the squaring of the circle—his failure would have been no more complete. George Marsh had had recourse to none of these things; he had pursued the Infinite along paths which sages had trodden before him; but the Infinite was still uncaptured. This thought added to the bitterness of his defeat.

"I don't believe there *is* any Infinite," he said, "for if there were I should have found it ere now." This was not the language he used in his lectures; but it was language that came into his thoughts as he sat in the silent house on the night when this history begins.

Now the seekers of the Infinite may be divided into two classes. The first class is represented by any person who may happen to have spent a long morning searching for his lost spectacles and then found them on his nose; the second class by the Irishman who had to find the spectacles before he could look for them. The Infinite and the spectacles have this in common, that you may lose them as readily by putting them in the right place as by putting them in the wrong. Lost in either way both Infinite and spectacles are equally difficult to find. To which class of losers George Marsh

belonged, I do not know; but he certainly belonged to one of them, for there is no third.

I.

He had been brought up in the straitest traditions of Evangelical piety. But the reader must not infer from this that the parents of George Marsh were ignorant and narrow-minded people. They were eminent in every quality that is lovable: in the words of a distinguished American author who spent a month as the family guest, "they were the most lovely people he had ever met." And the same words may be applied to the aged clergyman, a noted Simeonite, who taught the family faith with learning and eloquence, and sustained it by the example of his character and daily life. I remember that circle well, and it stands out in memory like a place of palms and running waters amid the deserts of life. It may be that the prejudice of the years is creeping over me; for among the faces I see around there are none which speak to me of more honourable things. The type, they say, is disappearing; so much the worse for the world.

The evangelical teaching of those days reposed on a mechanical diagram, precise as if its reference were not to the fate of immortal souls, but to the working of an eight-day clock. This was a source both of strength and of weakness. Of strength, because method, unity, coherence, with all their attendant mnemonic advantages lay in the diagram; of weakness, because the neophyte was left to his own devices at the most dangerous point in his conversion, the point namely where the mechanism had to be transformed into a living thing. Hence it was that many stopped short at the mechanical outline, and play-acting had to do the rest. George Marsh was one of these. Whether the fault was his own, or whether it lay in the system, I cannot decide. But here are the facts.

When George was seventeen those about him became anxious for his conversion, and measures were taken to bring

that event to pass. The chief agent in these proceedings was the Simeonite clergyman. He set the appointed mechanism in motion, explained its working, and told the boy what to do and what to expect. All that was required of him in the way of prayer, repentance, faith, and works George was made to understand; and the good Simeonite rested not from his labours until he was satisfied that the pupil had the lesson well by heart.

Nor was there the least recalcitrancy in George. Anxious as others were for his conversion, he was ten times as anxious himself. Before all things else he desired to be converted. Eagerly he drank in the words of his instructor, and being a boy of good memory, he repeated the lesson to himself in his leisure moments and made sure that he had got it right.

His knowledge of the way of salvation was perfect; but he could not persuade himself, though he often tried to do so, that he himself was saved. This troubled him greatly. Not that his father or mother worried him about the matter, though he was conscious of their solicitude. They were content to wait upon God's good pleasure and were confident of the result.

The trouble began over the question of Repentance. George was willing, nay eager, to repent of anything, if only he could think of something worth repenting of. But he couldn't. A thousand times he told himself that he was a miserable sinner, but he didn't feel like one, and couldn't for the life of him understand what wrong he had done. It is true he had fired a pea-shooter at the cat; he had once killed a blackbird; he had kicked a little boy for making faces at him; he had been rude to his aunt; but he had far too much good sense to treat these actions as the needed raw material for a genuine repentance. Once in his father's study he had seen a cash-box lying open on the table and had seriously debated the question of stealing a sovereign, in order to get a point of departure. But again his good sense came

to the rescue. God was not likely to be deceived by so shallow a trick.

He took the difficulty to his spiritual adviser, from whom he learnt that he had been on the "wrong tack" in hunting for particular sins; that this was the false Romish method of dealing with human nature; that the root of the evil lay further back. Then the clergyman reminded him of his fallen condition. This George never doubted for an instant; he admitted it was a most lamentable state of affairs; but somehow the admission made no difference. After a good night's rest he woke up feeling just as jolly as if the Fall were unhistorical. Then it occurred to him that feeling jolly was the very sin of which he had to repent, for what fallen creature has a right to feel anything but miserable? So he fell on his knees, convinced that repentance had at last begun. "O Lord," he said, "I am very miserable because I felt so jolly just now. I repent of my fallen state." A moment later—for he was an honest boy—he cried, "O Lord, it's a lie. I'm only pretending. I'm not miserable at all." But he *was* miserable all the same.

As the days wore on his misery increased until it became intolerable. But one night a thought flashed through George's brain and gave him instant relief. "This misery," he suddenly reflected, "*is* my repentance. Why, I have been repenting all along without knowing it! Hurrah!" His devotions ended, he went to his collar-drawer and took out a card, hidden under the white paper which covered the bottom of the drawer. On this card he had written down the scheme of salvation under numbered heads. He now put a tick against Repentance, to indicate that the event had taken place. It was one of the happiest moments in his life.

But a new difficulty arose in regard to Faith. Here again he followed his instructions to the letter. The Simeonite told him what he must believe; and it fell under three heads. George was confident he would have no difficulty in believing them all, both in severalty and in combination. He fell asleep

saying to himself for the hundredth time that he believed; and he went on saying it in his dreams. Next day he remembered his professions overnight, and looked in his heart for signs of the new birth that was to follow. But he couldn't find them. Again there seemed to be no difference. "Perhaps," he reflected, "the trouble comes from my not believing *enough*. I'll have another try to-night. I must *realise* these things." So he hit upon a plan. He wrote out the required acts of faith on three separate cards, and when night came he placed them in turn under the light of the gas, staring fixedly at each for many minutes and trying to *realise* what it meant. This went on for weeks. But it was no good. The only tangible result was that George had to take sleeping-draughts, to pay a visit to the oculist, and to wear blue spectacles for three months. But there was no new birth; at least there was nothing that he could identify under that description.

Of all the accessory exercises he neglected none. He prayed, and read his Bible, making strenuous efforts to "take in" what it meant, and staring at the great and blessed words, just as he stared at his card, until the letters swam together and his head ached. All in vain. Do what he would, he couldn't get himself converted.

Then it occurred to him that perhaps he had been converted all the time without knowing it. The episode of his repentance might be repeated in his conversion as a whole. This gave him a passing comfort, and sent him to the Simeonite with the question on his lips, "What does it *feel like* when you are saved?" The Simeonite, in all kindliness and sincerity, told him what it "felt like." George groaned in spirit and said, "I don't feel like that—not one little bit." He was not converted, after all.

Nevertheless the interview was not without its fruits. Following his former practice, George, on returning home, wrote down on a card a list of the "feelings" that would arise within him at the hour of his new birth. He wrote them down in the very words of the Simeonite. "At all events,"

he reflected, "I now know what I am to expect. As soon as any of these feelings begin I shall know that I'm coming all right."

Every night, and at other times as well, he would draw forth his card of "feelings" and run his eye down the list. "Nothing to-day" was the usual result. "I've not felt any one of them." Sometimes he would get a little hope. "Numbers 1 to 5—nothing. But Number 6—well, I did feel a bit like that when I saw those two drunken men being taken to prison. I must try to get it back again. O Lord, I thank Thee for giving me a little of Number 6—give me some more, I beseech Thee. And oh, for Thy great Name's sake, give me Numbers 1 to 5." But the heavens were deaf.

The spiritual pathologist who was doctoring George's soul, having failed in his first course of treatment, tried another. He presented the boy on his eighteenth birthday with the works of John Bunyan; and his aunt—the one to whom he had been rude—added Law's *Serious Call*. Into this literature he launched forth, the Simeonite and the aunt standing on the banks, as it were, to give him his sailing directions. He relaxed none of his efforts. He was willing to embark on the very waters of death, on the bare chance of finding "saving truth." He would have eagerly swallowed the bitterest soul-medicine; and when medicine failed he would have submitted to the cruelest surgery, even to a capital operation, without anæsthetics, had such a thing been proposed. As a matter of fact, in his desperation, he did macerate his poor body in many ways, until the thing was discovered by the Simeonite and checked as a Romish error —of which George stood in the utmost fear. He spent whole nights in agonising prayer. The result was that for the second time he passed out of the care of his ghostly physician and was handed over to those who heal the body. This brought some relief to his weary nerves and palpitating heart.

Then it was that George plunged into his birthday litera-

ture. He began with *The Pilgrim's Progress*, and followed it with *Grace abounding to the Chief of Sinners*. And now his miseries came back upon him in a flood. Let no one suppose, however, that they bore the least resemblance to the appalling woes of John Bunyan. They did not—and there was the trouble. To be able to reproduce the Bunyan-agony was the very thing that George desired. But he could not reproduce it, though he tried with all his might. He would have given a king's ransom to feel that Satan was at his elbow. But Satan never came near him. George took solitary walks in the darkness and tried to imagine that the whispering winds were the voices of fiends. But he knew very well that they were nothing of the sort. One night he actually found himself praying to the Devil to come out and fight him. But the Devil was as deaf as the rest—at all events, he was in no humour for a fight with George Marsh. Then he stole out all alone to a dark lane, the high banks crowned with interlocking trees that formed a tunnel. This was the Valley of Humiliation. An old ilex grew in the ditch. As George, who was now growing short-sighted, saw the shadowy form swaying in the wind, he tried to feel sure that Apollyon was advancing in all his fury. But he didn't feel sure. Nevertheless, on coming up to the tree, he made three passes at it with his stick, and then struck it a heavy, back-handed blow. The tree didn't care a pin, and George knew it didn't care. He tried to make the tree say, "Now, I have thee," and, finding it silent, he stabbed into its foliage again and again until a swaying branch knocked his cap off.

On another occasion the poor boy tied his old school-books into a big bundle, which he strapped on to his shoulders like a knapsack, and walked a long mile to another tree, a tree with bare arms outstretched, which suggested Something to George. He wanted to know "what it felt like," and thought that the experiment might prompt the beginning of "the real experience." Coming to the foot of the tree his back was nearly

broken, and the buckle of the strap refusing to yield, George, who felt he couldn't stand the weight another minute, cut the leather with his pocket-knife. The bundle fell to the ground with a heavy thud and burst, and his big Latin dictionary flounced into a puddle; the mud can be seen on its pages even unto this day. He spent the rest of the night cleaning his books, for the boy was fearful of being found out.

II.

His failure to "act Bunyan" caused him an infinite melancholy, and well-nigh broke his heart. This was his condition when the time came for him to go to the University. He was no longer the healthy boy who had discharged his pea-shooter at a cat. He was a tall, weedy youth of nineteen; there was a stoop in the narrow shoulders, and an ugly wrinkle between the eyes; he wore spectacles and looked on the ground.

He was sent to Oxford with a view, of course, to taking Orders. He was entered at a college where the Church influence was strong, and of the sort approved by his spiritual guides. "It will all come right in due time," said the Simeonite to George's parents. "The work of grace is only being delayed—no doubt for wise reasons. It is often so. We must wait in faith and prayer. I doubt if George will find peace until he begins the active work of the ministry." From which remark it will be seen that the excellent man was at his wits' end. To George he said, "Don't be over-anxious, my dear boy. Continue to pray and to read your Bible. One day you will feel something break within you, and then the new birth will begin."

So the boy went to Oxford expecting something to "break" within him. He kept a diary, and each entry for the first six weeks concluded with these words, "Nothing has broken to-day."

But the pressure had been forced to the bursting-point, and an explosion was inevitable. In the seventh week of his

first term the explosion took place; but it assumed a form and produced results which no one in the least expected or foresaw. In this it resembled all the conversions that have taken place since the world began.

One day he was on the tow-path watching the practice of his College crew. He wished he could row. His long arms and legs, he thought, would give him a splendid reach; and no doubt with a little training he could straighten his back and broaden his chest.

The wind was keen, and the water was rough. The coach on the tow-path was abusing Number 4 for his bad recovery, and Number 4 was listening to the coach with an air of admirable docility. Somehow Number 4, as he listened to the coach, reminded George of himself as he used to listen to the Simeonite; and for a moment religion and rowing were strangely mixed up in his mind.

The Cox cried "Paddle!" and the eight oars struck the water, once, twice, three times. Then came confusion. Something was wrong with Number 4. He failed to recover; his sliding seat gave way with a crash; his oar was in the air, his body at the bottom of the boat, and in an instant the whole thing was overturned and the crew were struggling in the water. The coach swore a mighty oath, the dripping crew waded ashore, and a thought flashed like lightning through George's brain. "By ——!" he said aloud, echoing the words of the coach, "it's all one piece of humbug from beginning to end. I'm going to chuck religion."

Had the youth paused to analyse what he "felt like" at that moment he would have noticed that he was feeling almost everything which the Simeonite had said he would feel at his first effective encounter with saving truth. He would have noticed that a great burden had rolled from his back and that his body, his whole being, was buoyant as air. He would have been aware that something "had broken" within him; he might even have heard it "go snap" in the middle of his head. He would have perceived a strange luminosity in the atmo-

sphere, and he would have heard voices saying anything it pleased him to make them say.

But he had no leisure for introspection. He was in a hurry to do something and was busily thinking what he would do. He resembled a friend of mine who studies seismography in a Midland town. This gentleman had been longing all his life for an earthquake to shake his house. Hearing that some shocks had been felt in the neighbourhood, he sent his seismograph to the makers to be adjusted. Hardly had he parted with his instrument when a slight shock, the only shock felt in that city for a hundred years, rattled the crockery on his dinner-table. So it was with George. His conversion took place at an unguarded moment when the means for recording it were out of gear. He failed, therefore, to make a mental entry of its arrival; thereby inadvertently proving the genuineness of the occurrence.

George rushed from the tow-path, made his way to the nearest public-house, and ordered a glass of beer—a drink which he held in peculiar abhorrence. He took a sip and replaced the glass on the counter; a sweep emptied it the moment he turned his back. Next he went to the tobacconist and bought a pipe and an ounce of tobacco—which he never smoked; thence, to the bookseller's for the last sensational novel—which he never read. Arrived at his College room, his first act was to fling Law's *Serious Call* out of the window; five minutes later he went out into the quad and picked it up. This was the beginning of George's education in iniquity—but he never followed it up.

His conversion was not so complete—what conversion ever is?—as to effect a total breach between his present and his past. The idea of some entirely new state of being, arriving with cataclysmic abruptness, and bringing with it a new consciousness, continued to haunt him. This idea, which he had first imbibed under the forms of the evangelical tradition, now took other forms, but its principle remained unchanged. As the artists in *Punch* exaggerate the length

of the Prime Minister's nose while respecting the general formula of its construction, thereby endowing him with what is, to all intents and purposes, a false nose, but without doing injustice to the original, so George obtained his new opinions by slightly caricaturing the salient features of the old.

It is true that George had become a prominent member of that drastic body—the Young Men's Latter-Day Association. But if you had listened to him as he aired his views at the weekly meetings of the Association, on the New Era, the New Order, the New Morality, the New Thought, the New Man, the New Woman, the New Everybody, the New Everything, you would have recognised at once that he was still preaching the New Birth, with a slight difference of accent and terminology. At nineteen years of age he was an adept in the Signs of the Times; and his Scheme of Salvation was if anything more completely articulated, and assuredly more dogmatically enforced, than is that other Scheme, to indoctrinate him in which the good Simeonite had taken such pains. His Eschatology was worked out with that attention to minute detail which becomes a great commander in planning a campaign. If you wished to know what would happen to yourself under the New Order—whether, for example, you would be allowed to retain your latch-key—George could tell you. Latch-keys would be public property. If you asked what treatment would be meted out to Mrs Brown, who was just going to have her seventeenth baby, George could tell you. Mrs Brown would receive from the State a retiring pension and a medal. A certain group of young gentlemen called "we" had settled all that; they had the Future in their waistcoat-pockets, and they were going to stand no nonsense at all. These young gentlemen lived in close and conscious proximity to a Great Event—a trait so precious, whether in youth or in age, that if egotism or excess should appear among its by-products we can welcome both. Egotistical and extravagant they undoubtedly were. In their own eyes they were the

Saints of the New Order and the Elect of the Future, and they had little doubt that when the Great Upheaval came, as it assuredly would come in a few years, the brains of the entire human race would be turned inside out, while they themselves, so to speak, would be caught up into the air and set on thrones to judge the nations of the world. These Eschatologists were most excellent young men; the root of the matter was in them; they were pursuing the Infinite after their own fashion — and half of them are now dead. Some died in their mothers' arms, and the lilacs bloom above their graves; India has accounted for others; one, still a youth, the war correspondent of a London paper, was shot through the heart while taking notes in a square attacked by savages; one, grown grey in many battles, was blown to fragments by a shell in South Africa, and all they ever found of him was the hand on which he wore his dead wife's wedding-ring. Of the survivors I know of one who is an Archdeacon; another is a captain of industry and a philanthropist; and only the other day, a third, who is a judge, broke down before the court while sentencing a wretched murderer to death. Fundamentally they were not mistaken. The Great Event has happened to most of them, and proved more surprising than their most confident predictions or their wildest dreams.

I am sorry to say that dissensions presently broke out in the Young Men's Latter-Day Association, and some of the more prominent members were driven into exile. From what the schism arose I do not know; perhaps it was the Election of the Committee, though I rather think it was the Constitution of the Universe. Among the exiles was George Marsh. He was not aware of any change in his principles; but there was some bad temper, and it was a noteworthy circumstance that from the date of his expulsion the books which had been previously open on George's table were now stowed away on the least accessible of his shelves.

III.

Those were stirring times for young men. The enthusiasm created by Carlyle had hardly begun its present lamentable decline; the bloom was still fresh on the *Origin of Species*; Huxley was firing great shot at the Towers of Darkness; Tennyson was in song; Ruskin was hard at work. Matthew Arnold, too, was at his best; and George Marsh, who began to browse in fresh fields, read *Literature and Dogma*, then a new book.

Now George, whether by temperament or by early education, was never happy save in pursuit of a Secret. The locked chamber of a New Experience always adjoined the plain apartment in which he lived, and George's business throughout was to find the key to that chamber and *get* the Experience that awaited him within. The experience that is was never good enough for him; the experience that is not, but may be, was what he must have. *Literature and Dogma* was therefore the very book to lay hold of him. For *Literature and Dogma*, as everyone knows, deals with a certain Secret, held forth as the vital principle of religion. Now with religion George had resolved that he would have no more to do. But when he found, in conjunction with the denial of his rejected faith, the positive assertion of a new Secret, the young man at once pricked up his ears and became docile. The Secret seemed genuine. He resolved, therefore, that he would have it by hook or by crook, and he applied himself, heart and soul, to follow the directions given in *Literature and Dogma*. Not being sceptical by nature, he didn't pause to ask whether a Secret which worked so mightily while it remained a Secret would retain its efficacy after it had been found out and retailed in the booksellers' shops at so much a copy.

Behold him then with *Literature and Dogma* under the lamp, a blue pencil in his fingers, a note-book at his elbow. He learns that the Secret consists in a certain sweet reasonableness; that the way to the Secret is Conduct; that Conduct

is three-fourths of life; that Religion is morality touched with Emotion; that there is a Something, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness; that the righteous have experimental proof that this Something is real. Each of these propositions is duly recorded. George is a little perplexed as to their relations with one another; but he infers that if he duly attends to Conduct the various propositions will relate themselves in a New Experience and so give him possession of the Secret.

Poor boy! You are too deeply in earnest; you are repeating your old mistake. If you would take what is written as so many themes for Literature, or as a true record of what can never be exactly repeated, or even as matter to preach about, it would all prove manageable enough. But these things will bring you into trouble if you read them as fixed Sailing Directions for the human soul on the fateful seas of life. And that, unfortunately, is what you are going to do!

Without delay George proceeded to put his new programme into practice. He betook himself to Conduct; made it not three-fourths merely but the whole of his life, or very nearly the whole; put himself under the severest self-discipline and studied Conduct with an ardour truly admirable. I am afraid —indeed, I know—that he encountered much bewilderment, and found many moral questions hard to decide which had seemed easy enough before he began to think about them; moreover, he sometimes lost sight of great principles in the confusion of detail which attends their application. But he did his best; no Rabbi of olden time could have found much fault with him. He knew, of course, the dangers of self-righteousness, but guarded himself against them by a method of his own. What with one thing and another he had a hard time of it. But he stuck to his task, hourly expecting the Secret to disclose itself, and looking into himself for signs that the New Experience was coming to the birth.

Now I am not going to say that all this effort was wasted. From what I know of George Marsh I am inclined to think

that it did him more good than all the rest of his education put together, and there are several young gentlemen of my acquaintance whom I would urgently advise to take a leaf out of this part of George's book. None the less it must be recorded that in one sense the enterprise was a failure. True, he found a Secret and got a New Experience; but the Secret he found was not the Secret he sought, and the New Experience he got was not the New Experience he expected. Furthermore—and this is the most important of all—it was not till nearly thirty years had elapsed after the cessation of these efforts that he realised they had yielded him any Secret or any Experience whatsoever.

His great difficulty lay not in the practice of morality, though this was often hard enough, but in securing "the touch of emotion." The morality came, but the emotion seemed to linger. Here, however, he was again mistaken; and the mistake was a repetition, with a difference, of one he had made on former occasions. He had formed in advance a certain notion of what it would "feel like"; but it felt like something else. When therefore the emotion came, and it came in abundance, it was so entirely different from what he had expected that he failed, as before, to recognise that it was emotion at all.

George had expected exultations and splendid agonies. What came was depression and carking care. When he read the word "emotion" on the printed page he thought of thrills, of splendours, of ecstasies; of Love that is mightier than death; of Peace that is deeper than the sea; of Compassions that moan like the winds; of luxurious griefs; of overwhelming visions from the mountain-tops of life; of music, starry spaces, and the calm of ancient groves and vast cathedrals; of the flowers that never fade and the odours that are wafted from Elysian fields. These were the emotions whose "touch" upon morality would clothe the dry bones with flesh and put the living spirit within them. But George had not reflected that there are emotions of another order; that these, too, may "touch" morality and transform it not into the likeness of

life, but into the very dust of death. And these were the emotions that actually came and "touched" poor George; they came in secret; came like thieves in the night; came without any labels on their backs; came and went without suffering him to know their names or even to observe that they had come. Instead of the scent of flowers he felt the prick of thorns; instead of exultations there was anxiety; instead of the victor's crown there was the yoke of self-contempt; instead of great music there was the crack of whips; instead of the joy of attainment there was the lurking horrible fear that he was becoming a moral prig. With all these unexpected emotions there mingled a feeling of bitter disappointment at the non-arrival of the emotions that were expected; and this bitterness was itself the principal emotion that touched the morality of George Marsh. In fine he was intensely miserable, and his misery was his emotion. "Oh, wretched man that I am," he might have cried, "who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

He was satisfied that he had made no mistakes. He was confident that he understood the construction of this new machine, that he had put the parts together in the right order, that he had got his steam to the right pressure, that he had pulled the levers in the right way. How was it, then, that the wretched thing wouldn't work? Why of course there was only one explanation. "It was a piece of humbug from beginning to end. It never had worked and never could work. I'm going to chuck morality," said George.

IV.

For a whole twelvemonth or more George lived under the firm belief that he had "chucked" morality. And he certainly did chuck it in the papers he read before the College Dialectical Society, and in temerarious conversations with certain gentlemen who were twice his own age. These gentlemen were much concerned for his future and took pains to convince him of the error of his ways—or rather of

his words. The result was that his "views" became yet more startling and scandalous. He even went so far as to sketch the ground-plan of one or two splendid sins. Meanwhile he was living a most innocent life and reading poetry. He began with Swinburne, and in due course—for he was no slave to chronological order—he came to Wordsworth.

His first attitude to Wordsworth was contemptuous. But he was too well-born, and too innocent, to keep that up for long. Besides, there was something in Wordsworth that touched the deepest spring of his being. It was the hint of another world—a world of New Experience, to which entry could be found by the lifting of a veil. Before George had finished the second reading of the *Prelude* he had repented of his resolve to "chuck" morality. Then he turned to the *Excursion*, some parts of which had a reviving effect on the abandoned resolution. But when he came to the Vision of the Wanderer, he was completely conquered. He laid down the volume with a fixed resolve that that Vision should be his own. The prophets, he thought, had deceived him, but the poet cannot lie.

His preparations were made with the forethought which characterised all his spiritual experiments. He studied the Vision and everything that has been written about it. He made acquaintance with certain philosophers who have used the Vision as a text. He even went into a kind of training for the Great Event, kept a watch on his thoughts, took lonely walks into the country, and practised Visions from the modest hill-tops of the neighbourhood. George was a little disconcerted with the result of these preliminary exercises; but he set it down to the tameness of the local scenery.

He had ascertained the exact spot in the Lake District at which the Vision of the Wanderer is supposed to have occurred, and he had taken up his quarters at the nearest hotel. He waited until the conditions were perfect for the experiment; watched the barometer, and felt his pulse; deferred action the first day because the clouds threatened; started the second,

and then came back because his head was not clear. On the third day health and weather were both favourable, and with prayers on his lips, he took his way to the sacred spot. Arrived there, all seemed to promise him fair. He drew the volume from his pocket and read the Vision aloud. As he read the sun rose in all its splendour, and the world was bathed in glory. George waited for Something to Happen.

Nothing happened.

"Nothing happened." These were his own words when he told me the story in after years. But they are not true to the fact, and they illustrate once more the tendency of his introspective faculty to overlook what was essential in his experience. Something *did* happen—something not in the formula. *The whole experiment fell flat as any thrice-told tale.* He was looking at sublimities beyond the power of words; the world was drenched in loveliness and light; but for any ecstasy produced in George he might as well have been gazing at a miserable collection of stage properties. Under other circumstances he would have taken a healthy soul's delight in what he saw, and would certainly have forgotten himself. But at this moment the mountains wore a perky air of artificiality, as though they had got themselves up for their parts; the heavens had been painted blue by some self-conscious impressionist; the clouds seemed made of cotton-wool; all was mechanism and vulgar pretence; and so far was that would-be visionary from entering into rapt communion with Nature that never in his life did he experience so deep a sense of loneliness and utter separation from the world. His self-consciousness became intense, and it was the consciousness of an outcast. He fixed his eyes on the loftiest peak, and the impression deepened that the thing was sham. He looked up to the sky, and became suddenly conscious that his right boot was pinching him. He listened to the bleating of sheep in the valley below, and instantly, to his shame, he thought of mutton-chops. A shy primrose attracted his attention; he recalled Peter Bell, stared at the primrose for five full minutes, concluded that he had never seen so un-

interesting a flower, and then, feeling a sharp pain in his eyeballs, remembered the warnings of his oculist. Was some spirit mocking him? Or was Nature offended at his errand? With these questions in his mind he rushed down the mountain, ate a scanty breakfast, packed his copy of Wordsworth at the bottom of his trunk, and took the next train home.

V.

It may be thought that with three disappointments placed to his credit George would now abandon his attempt to obtain Initiation into the Mysteries. But the chains of destiny are not so easily broken. Fate had decreed that he should turn a blind eye to his experience and attend only to his experiments. The New Experience for which he was ever on the watch was to come as the result of a New Experiment conducted according to formula. If an experiment failed, it was because the formula was faulty and needed amendment. George was none of your faint-hearted seekers who abandon the quest on the failure of their first attempts. He thought of Science and remembered the disappointments of the laboratory. He saw the great discoverers testing hypothesis after hypothesis, conducting fruitless experiments by the score, trying this and trying that until in a happy moment they hit upon the formula which covered the facts. Had he experienced fifty disappointments instead of three, he would have proceeded with unabated ardour to make the fifty-first.

The next experiment lasted over twenty years. When George had taken his degree he resolved, with the advice of his tutors, to devote himself to the study of Philosophy. In a few years he became a notable exponent of Pantheism, wrote a book, and received an academical appointment. It was whispered that he had become a Buddhist.

During the whole of that period he seemed to himself on the very eve of success, never quite attaining, but so near attainment as to leave no doubt in his mind that he had found the right formula at last. Meanwhile the river of

life was pouring its waters under the mill, and every moment marked the birth of a New Experience and the initiation into a Mystery. But he was not attending to that. As usual, he was busy with an Experiment.

In his pantheistic period George was fully convinced that the sensible world is an illusion, and that he himself was no more than a stain on the radiance of Eternity. The trouble was that his "feelings" didn't keep pace with his convictions, and this emotional impotence was exceedingly hard to cure. He found himself utterly unable to "realise" the illusoriness of the world—which is not to be wondered at; and he had to confess that in himself he didn't "feel like" a stain—on Eternity or on anything else. Nay, there was something more; and students of Marsh's *System of Philosophy* will remember that the matter is fully discussed in the chapter entitled "The Inverse Ratio of Conviction and Feeling." The fact was, that by as much as the logic became irrefragable which demonstrates that the world is an illusion by so much the more did the "feeling" grow that the world is intensely real. He found, moreover, that the very ease with which he could prove, on paper, that he was Nothing gave him, oddly enough, the "feeling" that he was Something. He also noticed that the process of handling particular things by the Pantheistic Logic had a kind of indurating effect upon their substance, in consequence of which those things refused to melt at the moment when, theoretically, they ought to have dissolved themselves into the All. Again it was rather disconcerting; but he set it down to some defect, or excess, in his imaginative faculty

He resolved therefore to make himself acquainted with the facts of Conversion as recorded in the mystical literature of all ages, in the hope that these would incidentally reveal what was wrong with him. For ten years he devoted himself to this study with unremitting ardour. The result was that he became an authority on mysticism, obtained qualifications which caused him to be appointed to his lectureship in the

Psychology of Religion, and discovered the "Three Laws of Conversion" which have produced a revolution in the spiritual realm, and made the discoverer famous all over the world. But at the end of it all George Marsh remained an unconverted man.

Then occurred the incident related at the beginning of this narrative.

VI.

As the lightning which shineth from the one part of heaven even unto the other, so is the coming of everything that is critically important for the human mind. No prophet can foretell the hour, the place, or the form. The secret chambers are empty; the wilderness utters no sound; two men are in one bed; two women are grinding at the mill; and the pendulum of time swings undisturbed. Suddenly the Sign of the Son of Man leaps across the sky and astonishment falls on the face of all the earth. The effect is visible, but the cause is hidden; and History, seeking to recover it, can find no more than the Shadow of a Shade.

There happened to be living at this time, in a remote part of the country, a certain poor and solitary man, the only religious genius I have ever seen in the flesh. A stream, famous for trout, ran across the line of this Poor Man's beat: and it was not altogether without design on my part that George Marsh, who was an ardent fisherman, spent a summer on the banks of that stream. There he met the Poor Man—and quarrelled with him. But later on—through the intervention of another person—the two became friends.

From that time his luck as a fisherman seemed to desert him. Day after day he came back with his basket empty. But the truth was that, as often as not, he had never cast a fly on the water. He had been wandering in solitary places seeking out the Poor Man.

"He's a most extraordinary person," said George to me.

"So are we all," I added.

"True. That's precisely what I have learnt from him.

Do you know, he's the only religious man I ever met whose religion was not at least three parts an imitation? In him the proportions are reversed. I wish I had known him before I wrote my big book. He has upset one of my theories."

"He has upset several of mine," I said.

Five years later George Marsh passed away after a lingering and painful illness. I saw him often during that period, and never did he appear to me a disappointed man.

Once he said to me, "I am thinking of writing my Autobiography. It would throw some light on the Psychology of Religion; more, by far, than anything I have written hitherto. Of all the facts I have discovered in my studies, none is so wonderful as the course of my own life. It has been an amazing experience. As I lie here and recall what has happened, it seems to be that I have been an instrument in the hands of some inscrutable Power. At times I fall into a state of pure astonishment. But I am glad that things were as they have been; after all, nothing has come amiss, nothing has been unkindly done."

Later on, when the end was drawing near, I found him with Harnack's *Wesen des Christentums* open on the coverlet. "Somehow," he said to me, "I think that Harnack has missed the essence of Christianity. If a man tried to be a Christian on the lines of Harnack's definition[1] he would get into all my old difficulties."

"Where do *you* find the essence of Christianity?" I asked.

"In the Parable of the Great Surprise," he answered.

"Which do you mean?" I asked. "All the Parables are 'Great Surprises' in a sense."

"Yes; but the one I mean is not merely a surprising Parable; it is the Parable *of* a Surprise." And then he began to quote, "Lord, *when* saw we thee an hungered," and so on to the end.

[1] "Eternal life in the midst of time, by the strength and under the eyes of God." T. B. Saunders' translation.

"George," I added after a little. "*He* never said what people expected He was going to say."

"Nor *did* what people thought He ought to do. His sayings are like great explosions, and His deeds are much the same. At least"—and here he seemed to correct himself—"it is the unexpected which has left its impress on the record. Miracles are the only fitting atmosphere for such a character. By the way, I have an idea for a new theory of the Dual Nature of Christ which you may add, if you like, to the multitude already in existence." And a faint smile came over the wan features of my friend.

"Tell it me."

"He was Man in so far as He did what was expected, and God in so far as He took the world by surprise."

"Rank heresy," I said, "from every point of view. Orthodoxy would be furious to hear it; and scientific theology would condemn you for degrading the Modern Conception of God."

"Perhaps both parties would make some allowance," he answered, "if they had had an experience like mine. It's no uncomfortable faith even for a man in my condition. Life and death and all that lies beyond fall into the same category. Or rather they fall into no category at all. I've not done with surprises. There are others in store for me." And his white fingers began to fumble with the sheets.

In the Chapel of his College a brass tablet has been erected to the memory of George Marsh. It simply gives his name and age, and states that "he was a distinguished member of this University." At his wife's request no mention was made of his services to the Psychology of Religion. But she caused these words to be added at the foot, and I think she must have heard them from his own lips, for he had often used them even to me:

"Marvellous are Thy works; and that my soul knoweth right well."

THE CORRUPTION OF THE CITIZENSHIP OF THE WORKING MAN.

PROFESSOR HENRY JONES.

THERE is no tissue so hard to tear as that of the political State; but it is difficult to show with any precision by what forces it is held together. The ties of blood which give unity to the family, or clan, or tribe count for little or nothing in it, and it is not easy to say what has taken their place. There are common traditions, common customs, and common interests; but the traditions and customs have no fixed permanence, the interests which are common and which it is the business of the State as a united whole to conserve are rarely in evidence, and traditions, customs, and interests alike have to pass through the transmuting medium of the individual mind. The State is being renovated continually, and is unintermittently born again. It depends entirely for its being and character upon the character of its citizens, and has neither roots nor sustenance except in their wants, their desires, their convictions, and their purposes. But these are diverse, inconsistent with one another, and in perpetual change. Moreover, they are mostly private in character. The ends of the citizens rarely have the comprehensiveness of the purposes of the State. They concern directly the individuals themselves or the hearth with its material and spiritual upkeep, and the State only most remotely. And they absorb almost the whole of life: they are pursued ardently and continuously, and with little regard to the political organisation without

which none of them are attainable and which is as much taken for granted as is the general earth and sky. The pursuit of these private ends amalgamates men into unions if their interests happen to coincide, and divides them into conflicting factions if they do not. Society is stratified into classes, and the State is strained by internal dissensions. It is more complex, more disturbed, the arena of more numerous and more inconsistent and conflicting elements than the soul of a moral agent. Nevertheless it holds together, grows and prospers as one living whole in spite of all these disruptive forces.

And it seems to maintain its unity of itself. If we are asked who preserves it, or to whom it is the object of watchful care, or even who comprehends it, we can hardly answer. The State survives our neglect and sustains itself against our ignorance of its laws and the ill-treatment which ignorance rarely fails to bring.

Those who occupy themselves with its affairs are, as a rule, engrossed by its detailed needs, and have little occasion to give thought to its organic wholeness. They are few in number, and they generally assume their care for it without any obvious practical apprenticeship in government, or any definite theoretical equipment in economics, or ethics, or politics. They are not more unfit for its service than their neighbours and critics; but not all of them are less unfit. They are not led into the service of the State by any conspicuous passion for the public good, nor by any unusual intensity of social sympathy; and they are not sought for or singled out by their constituents for these reasons. The position of the ordinary member of Parliament is distinguished, its duties are on the whole agreeable, and its responsibilities sit lightly upon him. They occupy the leisure of life in a pleasant way, and they furnish opportunities for a species of wordy warfare which men eschew when, as in a meeting of company directors, they are really engaged on business.

If we turn from those who rule to the mass of the citizens, we find that the interests of the State as a whole are still more

remote from their thoughts. They recognise that the affairs of the State are important, but they do not feel that they are vital unless legislation threatens to touch their particular interests, or except on the rare occasions of genuine national danger. It is true that passion for party runs high at times, and that political discussion is nearly always heated. But neither the heat nor the passion can be taken as reliable evidence of care for the State as a united whole. Most of the heat is due simply to the friction of opinions; and the victory or defeat of one's party is apt to obscure if not to take precedence over the interests of the State.

The patriotism of the ordinary citizen in ordinary circumstances is genuine enough; but it is not earnest. The feeling of direct, personal responsibility for the State is not present except at great crises: when it is, the wordy warfare ceases; the newspapers close their columns against discussion; the people wait expectant; the differences of parties disappear, passion is hushed, and the nation concentrates its will. In short, the apprehension of public disaster awakens a different mind in the people; and men in earnest are rarely vocal, and hardly ever loquacious.

Now, during the last few years we have heard more than usual of the pending ruin of the country. It is said to be losing its trade and industries, one commodity after another "is gone"—we must change our fiscal methods. The empire is but a loose collection and its loose unity is breaking up—we must stimulate the loyalty of our colonies by taxing our own imports. We are losing our pre-eminence as a sea-power, for we are not twice as strong as our strongest neighbours—we must build more ships, or risk the chance of starvation. Our constitutional safeguards are being destroyed, and the way is being cleared for reckless legislation—we must preserve the political wisdom which comes with wealth and heredity. The character of the people is deteriorating, they are losing their honest pride and manly independence, their respect for private property, and their regard for the sacred ties of the family—

we must return to the past. To all these things we have listened, and they have moved us to nothing, except to a somewhat more hurried shipbuilding. The nation as a whole feels secure, and its spirit is serene. It is going about its practical affairs unalarmed, and muddles along without despairing of its trade, or its supremacy on the sea, or of its constitutional safety. Even its educated classes, from whom come most of its political leaders, give less of that serious reflection to the principles of social welfare which could issue in tried and secure knowledge, than they do to the minutiæ of chemical analysis or to the idioms of a dead language. In truth, these are discouraging times for the prophets of evil.

No doubt they will regard this general unconcern as the worst of all symptoms. 'Wisdom cries, and understanding puts forth her voice; she standeth in high places, and crieth at the gates; but we will have none of her counsel, and despise all her reproof.' What can the political pessimist conclude, except that the gods have made us deaf, and mean to destroy us?

But there are other alternatives. His message may not be quite true, nor his mood quite sincere. His eloquence may have been too elegant, and his words may have lacked that rough quality which is characteristic of force, and which convinces, converting speech on occasion into the sound of hammer and anvil forging arms. And the British public, supposed to have a good ear in politics, may have discerned a false ring in the music of his oratory. It seems to doubt whether even the most apprehensive of all the prophets really believes that the country is in danger. Lord Rosebery, when he predicted "the end of all things," including most of the virtues, and found the privacies of life thrown open to the intrusion of the State official, did not, after all, take a ticket for Turkey. His countrymen, on their part, heard him gladly, delighting in his rhetoric, but they went their ways as before, with its harmonies murmuring in their ears. He is a great national asset. We

rejoice in him, honour him, love him; but we will not believe him. And he is by far the best of his kind.

Moreover, it is possible to discern beneath all the forebodings of natural evil a presupposition which has not been proved, and which may be false. It is assumed that our perils are those of an enfeebled political state, of a civilisation which is becoming effete, of a people whose strength is spent and which is losing its virile virtues.

I question the diagnosis. I look around and can discern few signs of the staleness which creeps over the world and its affairs where either a man or a people is falling into senility. What I see, or believe that I see, is a nation full of enterprise, trying new experiments in industry, social life, politics, and even in morals: venturing into regions in which the experience of the past furnishes but little guidance. Our perils are not those of a worn-out nation, but of a young and possibly too adventurous democracy. The common people are not becoming servile, nor is their pride or independence decaying. On the contrary, they are asserting their independence in new quarters and with a new emphasis, and are engaged in claiming as rights what they once gratefully received as doles. Some of their leaders, no doubt, propound schemes which would destroy their independence and convert free citizens into pieces of a social machine. But the socialist, in proposing his schemes, so far from intending such results as these, believes that he is extending the scope of the effective will of the people and giving to their freedom fuller play. What he *intends* is to sway the social forces and employ the economic resources of the State so as to turn them into instruments of the individual's will. He would tame leviathan, play with him as a bird, and bind him for his maidens. I believe that he will fail. His wilder schemes are too new, for they are a sheer addendum to the nature of things, and will never even be tried. Nevertheless his errors, and the vogue which his theories have, are no indication of national senility; they are signs rather of the imprudence and inexperience of an

age which is young, and whose aspirations outrun its wisdom. But he is a better interpreter of his times, though he may be a more dangerous guide, than those who see nothing around them except degeneracy and decay.

If we turn from the dreams of the socialist to the practice of the politician, we shall discover the same evidence of youthful adventurousness. The statesmen who mean most at present are precisely those whose imagination has been touched by the new social conditions under which we now live. They have recognised that the accumulated forces of industry and the vast economic necessities of these times toss the individual about as they never did before, and they would bring in the State to help the people to organise their resources for their own defence. The State shall undertake new tasks. It shall secure its citizens against want in old age and sickness; it shall moderate the collision of capital and labour, and settle their disputes wherever it is permitted to do so; it shall mitigate the effects of the fluctuations of trade, tempt the working man into thrift, and assist him during periods of unemployment. Those who are responsible for these new departures have introduced the taxpayer into purlieus hitherto undisturbed, and they have naturally been regarded by some as portentous political marvels, partaking of the spirit of the socialist, and exhibiting his recklessness even while professing to reject his theories. The best that they can say of them is that they know not what they do, have no clear vision of the more distant social and political results of their actions, and, having neither method nor system in their policy, are the vehicles of sporadic inspirations and the victims of impulsive bursts of social sympathy.

But, it may be replied, even if that were so, their faults are not those of enfeebled leaders of a decaying and exhausted people. They are follies, if they are follies, not of age but of youth: for the times *are* young to them and the air is full of enterprise.

Nor is it impossible for their view of the times to be right,

or at least less wrong than that of those who, from time to time (like Tennyson in his old age), see the people at every change set itself to ruin their country:

> "Bring the old dark ages back, without the faith, without the hope;
> Break the State, the Church, the Throne, and roll their ruins down the slope."

After all, nations are not incapable of being born again. The inspiration of new ideals sometimes renews their strength; for ideals are "not pretentious things, up in the clouds, but simply a firmly grasped, well-grouped, strongly held body of convictions about the political ends which really matter for the country and (if we are able to rise to that larger outlook) to the world."[1] The changes in our ways of life brought about during the last one hundred years—not by the politician, for he is comparatively an after-effect and by-product, but by the thinker and inventor—have not affected its material conditions alone. Science and philosophy, and I must add poetry, have touched the *minds* of the people, and set them to seek new creeds—more socialised morals, more moralised politics, and a more ethical and less super- or infra-natural religion.

And now, if this be so, if the nation has indeed renewed its youth, as its adventurousness in all these respects seems to imply, how are its steps to be guided? Surely not by the irrelevant lucubrations of the prophets of despair. If you speak to lusty youth of cankering cares, and, bidding it overleap the years, show it to itself furrowed with sorrow, bent with burdens, feeble and baffled—a withered leaf clinging to a wintry bough, will it believe? Can it comprehend? On the contrary the message, even if true in itself, would be meaningless. Its spirit is wrong, and it is out of season. A young man is educated not through his fears but through his hopes. It is not Nature's way to break his faith in himself, and she does not let loose her terrors upon him. She hangs before him a succession of fair ideals, and guides him to the realities of manhood through a series of generous illusions. She approves his confidence, fosters his independence, praises

[1] M'Cunn, *Ethics of Social Work.*

his strength; but she entraps him into reflection and gradually lures him into the late love of wisdom; and she does so by appealing to that which is best in him, namely, the abundance of his virility and the generosity in which it can express itself.

Not otherwise can this age be guided. Indiscriminate denunciations cannot help a young democracy. It will not believe that it is losing its respect for private property and bent on robbery; or that it is casting away its honest pride and independence and becoming a mendicant desirous of living on the State. Such warnings as these are unheeded; they are felt to be unjust, and are therefore not relevant; and the lamentations of our Jeremiahs are merely interesting. The democracy believes, rightly or wrongly, that its spirit is just. The social and political reformers in whom it trusts are, in its opinion, engaged in exacting better justice for the people, and fuller freedom and scope for their manhood.

And the true reformer, on *his* part, has faith in the people. He does not hold that their intelligence is low, or their motives mean; and he does not lower his teaching, as the politicians of all grades are so apt to do, to "their" level. On the contrary, he deems them worthy of the best he knows, places ideals of conduct before them whose worth is absolute, and demands the highest from them. What a faith in humanity is implied in the Sermon on the Mount, and what vogue has followed the teaching of him who bade men be perfect with a perfection that is divine!

Now, it is for this faith in the people that I wish to plead; and especially would I plead for it with those who profess, and are generally acknowledged to be, its chosen leaders. For there is amongst us a line of prophets whose words do not fall idly into the ground, and whose teachings, so far from being without significance to the State, touch the vital conditions of its welfare. The influence which these men have upon their times shows that they are in real touch with their times. They are the exponents of democracy because they are its products; they share its aspirations, strive to give

articulate expression to its desires, and endeavour to define the good at which it should aim. Like the true sons of democracy they stand primarily for "the masses"; they have devoted themselves mainly, if not exclusively, to the rectification of the wrongs of the working class and to the affirmation of their rights. These are the wrongs which they themselves have shared, and the rights with which they themselves have not been endowed: other rights and wrongs make feeble appeal to them. To secure these rights and rectify these wrongs seems to them to be the one serious business of earnest citizens, and to the attainment of these purposes they would turn the powers and resources of the State. I refer especially, I need hardly add, to the representatives of labour in the British Parliament.

I have no doubt that they will regard any appeal to them to have faith in the people as supererogatory. It implies a charge which, if it is not true, is an insult. It implies that they do not appeal to what is best in the people even when they endeavour to serve their interests, nor therefore call forth the best that is in them; but that they are occupied amongst the cruder and less generous motives of the citizens. To imply any such charge except under the compulsion of reluctant conviction, and on grounds which can be shown to be good, were not only wrong but contemptible.

I make that charge. If I had the power, as I have the will, I would arraign the Labour Party before the national conscience and ask it to show cause why it should not be condemned for corrupting the citizenship of the working man.

I refer to it, I need hardly say, only so far as concerns its political activities, and even in this respect I would limit the charge. As individuals, so far as I know them, the Parliamentary representatives of labour have some qualifications for effective and valuable legislation which most of the members of the Senate do not possess. Some of them are apt to be truculent, and many of them have something of the prophetic weakness of infallibility which leads them to preface their

utterances with a "Thus saith the Lord." But these defects are superficial and not unentertaining; and they hardly weigh against their more solid qualities and real advantages. Amongst the latter I would reckon the fact that they are sent to Parliament for purposes which are specific and with definite tasks to perform, and not merely in order to be beneficent at large; they are commissioned to rectify the wrongs and to secure the rights of labour. The wrongs are for the most part real, and the rights are worth securing; for labour has not as yet come to its own. Moreover, the current of the times runs strongly in their way; they are advocates of causes which are prevailing; their influence is far greater than their number would imply, and they experience the inspiration of success. They themselves have been nursed on the wrongs against which they declaim, and have felt the want of the rights they would secure: their words tell in consequence. The power they possess and the influence they exert have been gained by them in a hard and educative struggle; for they have emerged from the masses whom they lead. They have done so, I must believe, not merely nor mainly because they possess the doubtful gift of tongues, but because they can give articulate utterance to wants and aspirations which their constituents can only feel. Intensity of social sympathy and integrity of political purpose should come easy to such men; and I believe not only that they ought to be, but are conscientious and earnest in their devotion to the public good.

In the next place, I may say that I cannot condemn their desire to secure to the working class a larger share of political power, and to awaken them more fully to the value of the power they already possess. In my opinion, the working man has as good a right to a vote, and as large a stake in the country, as the wealthiest plutocrat or the most aristocratic person in the land; for there is no difference between one man's stake and another's where everyone stakes everything. He has a better right than either, if he happens to be a more sensible or a better man. And, so far as I can judge, he is as likely as any-

one to exercise the rights of citizenship wisely. The hammer and the chisel, the daily task and the simple life, are as good teachers in citizenship as the counting-house of the merchant, and better than the easy plenty of the undisciplined rich. Indeed, I believe in the education of the practical judgment by the use of tools more than in much mere learning, and in the discipline of the desires and the will by the criticism and competition of equals, much more than in the protection of privilege. And although the political knowledge of the working man may be very narrow—without being narrower than that of others—his political instincts may be sound; for these depend mainly upon the justice of his spirit and the purity of his citizenship. It is on these latter qualities that the welfare of the State mainly rests. Its strength is measured by the mass of moral motive present and operative in the common people; for all moral motive is social motive, and there are no purely self-referent virtues. Such ethical qualities as these are good guides on broad issues, and they have in the past enabled the common people on the whole to discern their true leaders. Occasionally the people have been wiser than their leaders, as in their steady adherence to the cause of the Northern States of America during the Civil War. So long as the populace exhibits these inconspicuous virtues the welfare of the State is not insecure.

But these virtues are being attacked. The qualities which make the working man a good citizen are being subjected to a strain in these days to which the past offers no parallel. The economic, social, and political circumstances in which he is placed combine to make "the trial sore and the temptation sharp": and it is not certain that he will come out a victor. No one at the present time can tell whether the democracy will rise to the occasion and bring at last for the waiting world the late reward of the long labour of centuries—a nation which will not suffer one class to oppress another, but which knows no class because its spirit is just, and, valuing freedom above all else, secures for all its citizens alike that which is the

essence and true worth of freedom, namely the opportunity for realising through duty their highest manhood. All that we know with certainty is that everything depends upon the use to which the democracy puts these circumstances; and that they will serve the democracy best who strive most earnestly against its tendency to continue into the future the class prejudices, and selfishness, and cupidity, and injustice which disturbed and degraded the political life of the past. Are the leaders of labour engaged in this high enterprise? Is this the mission of the Labour Party?

In order to answer these questions we must look a little more closely at the situation. In the first place, it will be acknowledged at once that a great change has come over the political circumstances of the working man. He is no longer an alien in his own country, subject to laws which he has had no share in making, but a citizen. He possesses a vote. After a longer delay than anyone could have anticipated, he is gradually becoming conscious of its use and power; and, in consequence, he is setting a higher value upon it, and employing it more as a free man should, namely, in order to assist in the achievement of political purposes which he himself approves. It is, further, becoming more evident to him that the supreme condition of the attainment of these purposes is that he should combine with others of like mind; and as the more obvious interests of the working classes are common, their experience in many respects similar, and their outlook the same, it is natural that they should gradually learn to stand together. In a word—for this is not a matter on which we need dwell—the prolonged political slumber of the labouring classes has been disturbed; the democracy is stretching its limbs like a strong man awaking: and it is about to stand on its feet and move about its business. It is told, and it is beginning to believe, that the State lies at its mercy to do with it what it pleases.

Now, this is all to the good, provided that one condition be fulfilled, namely, that the sense of responsibility on the part of the democracy is growing *pari passu* with its sense of its

power. But there is no clear and convincing evidence that such is the case; at least I see no such evidence, and am quite unable to prophesy. What I can see around me is a great power for good or for evil, not yet committed to what is worst, nor as yet grown into a reckless assertor of its own interests, nor inflamed with the spirit of cupidity; but which is being tempted into the ways of injustice by some of those who profess to be, and would fain be, its truest friends.

It is not possible to commend the political education given to the democracy by either our precepts or our example. It does not owe its political insight to its political leaders, nor its sympathy with what is just and hatred of what is wrong. It has been taught by its own experience of social hardships and obstructions which the State has been slow to remove, even if it does not seem to have imposed. Hence it is difficult for the democracy to reverence the State; and it is impossible for it to guide it wisely without reverence. Could any one gather from the daily press, which is, in fact, the people's only political handbook, that the affairs of the State are sacred, or the State itself the vessel of our most precious life? Where are the proofs that there is being devoted to its problems that reflectiveness of spirit and scrupulous truthfulness of mind, and that sober and sustained inquiry which we bring to bear on other problems which are far less difficult to solve and less important? If we listen to what politicians have to say of one another during Parliamentary elections, or even in Parliament itself, can we conclude that their sense of responsibility for its welfare is as active and strong as is their desire that their own party should prevail? Is there any other region of human interests in which discussion is so disfigured and degraded by misrepresentation of facts, looseness of argument, unfairness of spirit, and the reckless use of opprobrious epithets and accusation of ignoble motives? Verily, it is not easy for the common people to believe, in the teeth of such appearances, that, after all, the statesmen who count on either side of politics are aware of the weight of their trust

and faithful to it. The democracy needs less ambiguous witnesses to the sacredness of the State—some Burke or Milton to

"Give us manners, virtue, freedom, power."

The heart grieves for the democracy, for it is well-meaning and very helpless.

We cannot afford now to ignore its demands, nor do we assail it in the old way, and ask, like Sir Henry Maine, if "roughs" and "clowns" can be expected to solve our political problems. But the people is feared rather than respected, cajoled and flattered rather than rationally led. To one class of politician it is a presupposition and almost an axiom that the intelligence of the democracy is low, its political motives crude, and its leaders reckless and void of principle —"demagogue" is still an opprobrious epithet. It is believed that its purposes are ignorant and its tendencies dangerous, and it is feared that it will use its strength oppressively, doing to the other classes as it has been done by, and brutally avenging old wrongs. The majority of one of the Houses of Parliament has that conception of itself and of the people, that it considers its main function to be to protect the democracy against itself. They think that the House exists in order to save it from the gusts of its greed and passion, and to delay the legislation for which it clamours. It hardly occurs to them that the democracy may best know its own real needs, or that its political instincts may be sound. In consequence, they hardly appeal to its reason and they do not lead; they bow to necessities which they despair of being able to control. Verily the rôle of the aristocracy and the plutocracy has changed, and the political circumstances are new. It is neither the King nor the Lords, but the people who now say: "The State—we are the State."[1]

But the social circumstances have changed still more; and they mean more. Indeed, the new political situation is only one of the results of the new social conditions; and it is not

[1] M'Cunn's *Ethics of Social Work*.

only sequent in time but secondary in importance. For, after all, the legislature is only one of the instruments by which society expresses its wants and seeks to realise its will; and at the best it is a crude instrument only roughly applicable to the more general public necessities. In fact, Parliament is really a servant. It discovers the public wants and formulates its desires: but it does not create them. The wise statesman in a democratic country is the interpreter, rather than the maker, of the best mind of his times.

It is a misfortune that this secondary character of politics is not more clearly recognised, and that the distinction is not more clearly seen between political and social changes. It would allay our fear of the former and lead us to a more serious endeavour to comprehend the latter: we should be less prone to excitement over the symptoms and more careful to deal with the causes of social disease. We should not sit together so unanimously in fear of "hasty legislation," nor devote so much of our political ingenuity to the invention of methods of delay. We should be apprehensive, rather, lest the legislature should fail to keep pace with the social changes, and express the purposes of the times.

Where, indeed, can anyone point to examples of "hasty legislation"? How often has the legislature been called to undo its own work? Over what have we hurried? Do the Tariff Reformers find the legislature in a hurry to change our fiscal ways? Have we dealt hurriedly with Ireland, or with the Church Establishment in Wales, or with the demand of women for the political vote? Nay. I shall set aside the questions on which we are divided and turn to diseases of which we are all aware, which we all deplore, and which we would all remove—destitution, pauperism, squalor, unemployment, commercial crises, the depopulation of the rural districts. On none of the former matters, after many years of discussion, wise and foolish, by every method of voice and pen, have we legislated at all. And what have we done for the latter? Do not these diseases fester still? Meantime, the circumstances,

the structure, nay, the very mind and spirit of society, which the legislature is meant to comprehend and to serve, have changed so completely that there is hardly any instrument with which it provides for its wants which is not new, or any machine which has not been scrapped except the legislative machine. That machine is confessedly overburdened, and set to perform tasks for which it is ill-fitted, many of them local in character and insignificant, to the detriment of other interests which are momentous. It has become entirely inadequate to meet the demands of an empire which has changed in character and in the multiplicity of its wants as much as it has changed in extent. Nay, one is at times tempted to say that the very mind of the legislature is becoming obsolete: for it is not infrequently endeavouring to apply to an age which is new, ways of thought which grew amongst, and were fitted for, conditions of social life that have passed away, never probably to return.

If it be asked why the legislature is so slow to accept its inspiration and guidance from these circumstances, I could give no better answer than that men have always found it difficult to mark the signs of their times. Social changes come about silently. Their significance is concealed by their universality. We note them as little as the pressure of the atmosphere. They are the results of many unobtrusive and apparently small causes. They spring from the thoughts of reflective men and the inventions of science, and, affecting the material conditions of life first, gradually change the spirit of the people, so that it is carried smoothly along by their current, as on a broad river whose banks are out of sight, and is not aware of the movement. It is only by looking back to ways of life that have passed away and comparing them with our own that we can realise what has taken place. May I ask the reader to set aside the general conceptions by which we eviscerate the meaning of facts and look for a moment at a few details of one aspect of the social change?

A little while ago, except for the most general purposes

and during the most imperious crises, the British people was not conscious of its unity. Indeed, the country was hardly one country. It consisted of little communities, each of them engaged on its own concerns, immersed in its own affairs, thinking its own thoughts, speaking its own dialect, more isolated, less dependent on its neighbours than is now the case with our most distant colonies. Each parish was a compact little realm, holding the most meagre communication with the world without. It grew its own corn and ground it in its own mills, and if the harvest was scanty or bad, bread was scarce and unwholesome. It fed its own sheep and cattle, and clothed and shod itself with their fleeces and skins. The whole story of its food and furnishings fell for the most part within the parish and the range of the village industries. Master and man sat side by side in the workshop; the mistress and maid span and wove side by side in the kitchen: and they ate from the same table. Their daily round of duties brought them together from morn till eve and held them in red-ripe human relations, personal to the core. Society was not stratified into classes, there was no faintest rumour of such abstractions as labour and capital, nor could imagination have conceived the harshness with which they could conflict.

Now, the separating walls have all been taken down, not merely between parishes but between nations. The world of commerce is one tumultuous whole, a world whose powers never rest any more than the waves of the open ocean. The merchant, sitting in his office, finds that the lines of his business extend to places remote and that they are entangled with others in one limitless mesh: and his success or failure may come from the ends of the earth. Nor is there any nook in which the humblest worker may hide himself and find safe refuge. Evil times, when work is scarce and food is dear—which "economic depression" means for him,—travel obscurely from trade to trade and from country to country, their causes unknown and their course uncontrolled, and they strike the tool from his hand and the food from the lips of his children.

Economic forces have been generated which are in truth like those of the ocean, and merchant, master, and man are as driftwood, now on the top and now in the trough of the waves.

Under such circumstances men have no resource except to combine with one another whenever their economic condition is similar and the nature of their occupation permits. And as one combination generates another, each calling forth its opposite and competitor, the structure of economic society has changed. It does not now consist of individuals in personal relation to one another, so much as of powerful organisations whose interaction has a quasi-mechanical character. They assert themselves against one another with a remorselessness which is characteristic of natural forces, and which we do not know, as a rule, how to modify. So that many of the kindlier ways of trade when it was simple have become impossible. The ethical temper of the economic world has changed for the worse. We may deplore it, but we know not how to prevent it. Nothing can come of appealing to the sentiments of a machine, and benevolent business men cannot permit charity to have a say in the management of their business concerns.

The organisations which have been evolved for the distribution of wealth are not so obviously justifiable as those which exist to produce it. But apparently the latter must bring the former with them, though they suffer, with all society, from their strife. So that, directly or indirectly, the economic world in all its functions seems to be destined to be compacted together of grouped interests, imperfectly equilibrated, held together by their mutual tension in times of peace, and very remorseless when at strife. So far, no method has been devised for arresting this tendency: the trend of things is towards larger and larger combinations, and the interests which are not combined are becoming fewer in number, and their existence more precarious year by year. The discontent of the working men with their share of the products of labour—to take one instance—is being fomented; they are not only incited to enter into trades unions, but urged

to unite all trades unions in one whole, and stand together in one mass. Not otherwise is it deemed possible that the working men shall possess a will adequate to cope with the formidable will of capital—which will also combine.

It is evident that the existence of such combinations, frankly formed for their own abstract purposes, are a danger to civilised society. But we cannot forbid them. We cannot even infuse a different spirit into them. It is probable that the danger to the State must become still more formidable before we are sufficiently enlightened to call in the State to adjust their differences and are sufficiently wise to submit to its decisions.

The truth is, that economics is the sphere of the abstract, self-regarding will. Its spirit is individualistic to the core. Every unit within it, whether individual or corporate, seeks primarily its own exclusive well-being, without direct regard for any others. It is true that they are dependent upon one another; they cannot destroy one another without destroying themselves. But it is not less true that their unity and mutual service are indirect and come by the way, unsought of any of them; and that they must contend with one another for supremacy, leaving their equipoise, which is vital to all of them and to civilised society itself, in the risky and uncontrolled power of mere chance.

What I wish especially to bring forth is that these features of the modern economic world are not accidental, but that they express its intrinsic character. Not only has no method been devised by which the economic value of things can be ascertained except through the higgling of the market—which implies the strain, however pacific and just, of one will against another—but no other method is possible. The family may distribute its wealth according to another law, and give its best to the most helpless. But the economic world is not a family—it has other elements otherwise related to one another. Even in a perfect state—which, of course, implies perfect citizens—business, as we say, will remain business. The

industrial sphere as such, or in its naked character, is meant to be a sphere in which all motives are directly self-referent and only indirectly social, and whose maxim is *pro se quisque.* There is no business which must not, and ought not *as business*, to strive to become a monopoly. Nothing can, or should be allowed to attempt to prevent it from becoming a monopoly except the successful competition of its like. It is only in this way that the economic welfare of society can be attained. The fittest for its service must prove itself to be fittest by the crude method of the struggle for existence.

On such grounds as these it must be admitted, it seems to me, that the economic world has its own justification, in spite of the strain of its elements and the crudity of its morals. But it does not follow that its methods can be applied universally. It does not follow that even within its own sphere it can be left entirely to its own ways. For, after all, the purely economic world is an abstraction, and the merely economic man is a fiction. The industrial world presupposes, exists within and in virtue of a wider social order whose interests are as multifarious as the desires of man and which is indefinitely richer in ethical content. At its best it is only a means and instrument, and can supply man with only the raw material of his real life. Its value does not lie in itself, but is relative to its use, and depends upon the kind of satisfaction which is sought by means of it. It is, therefore, only one of the organs of the State, and is subject, even when the State is far from attaining any kind of perfection, to its restraints and discipline. As well claim unlimited range for the animal propensities in man, appeal only to his appetites and ignore his rational and moral nature, as allow economic conceptions to dominate politics, and the methods of industrialism to go their way undisputed and unrestrained within the State. What is animal in man is qualified by its relation to his manhood: to forget this fact in dealing with him is to subject him to an intolerable indignity. The same truth holds, *mutatis mutandis*, as to the relation of industrialism to the State.

And this truth has began to dawn upon us, and to influence our politics. We have travelled far away from the time when it was assumed that the part of the State was to stand aloof, permitting the business man to make any bargain he pleased with man, woman, or child, and conduct his industrial operations under any conditions which he pleased. These methods have become to us now methods of barbarism. The State recognises that it has its own stake in the matter, and is gradually learning to confine their use.

But if these methods cannot be allowed free range within the economic world itself, far less can they be applied to the State and its affairs.

The State has its business, of course, which it must try to conduct in a businesslike way: but it is not a business concern. This "partnership in all science, in all art, in every virtue and in all perfection," as Burke called it, "must be looked on with other reverence." The needs out of which it has grown, the purposes for which it exists, the principles which sustain it in existence, animating its parts and securing through their very freedom its own life and well-being, differ, *toto cœlo*, from those of the world of industrialism. The State is imperfect enough in every respect. If we compare it with its ideal, which, like our own, is ethical and which it cannot even conceive except in dim outline, we must speak of it as we do of ourselves, calling it an "unclean thing" and all its "righteousnesses filthy rags." Nevertheless, to allow the presuppositions of commercialism and industrialism to determine our attitude towards it can only have one result: it must distort our view of the whole range of our duties both towards the State and towards one another as its citizens, and indefinitely lower the level of civic life.

Now, it is the essence and gravamen of my whole charge against the Labour Party that in its political activities it has fallen into this error. In so far as its actions as a political party correspond to its own conception of its function and purpose they are not distinguishable in their intrinsic character

from those which are done in an industrial struggle, in which even the economic forces exhibit themselves at their worst.

What is this conception? What political mission has called the Labour Party into existence? How is its mission distinguished from that of the other political parties? If it fulfilled its mission and achieved its purpose what would be the nature of the State which it would establish? I know of only one answer, if I am to judge it by its own creed and profession. It stands for the interests of one class, and if it recognises any others except as secondary and subordinate, it exceeds and may even contradict its mission. It seeks to organise working men together in order to secure these interests: for it appeals to them not as citizens but as constituting a class held together by similarity of economic conditions. It presses these interests upon the State, and approves the State or holds it up to opprobrium according as it does, or does not, lend itself to these interests. It aims at making this class dominant over the State in order that the power and resources of the State may be subservient to it. Its excuse is that these interests are paramount in importance, and have been neglected and violated in the past. It does not deny all rights to other classes, but it considers them to be irrelevant to its mission. It could hardly refuse to acknowledge that they too may combine in the same way, employ the same methods, and aim at the same result without exposing itself to direct refutation. Its attitude, rather, is that of challenging the other classes to make good what they consider to be their rights—if they can. It accuses them of having forgotten all interests except their own in the past, and of being ready to do so again in the present and in the future. It treats their profession that their politics are inspired by more generous aims, and that what they seek, by means of the other political parties, is the good of the State as a whole and their own good only as subservient thereto, as mere hypocrisy, or at best as otiose and ineffective good intentions. Hence if the Labour Party were to philosophise on politics, and survey the situation as a whole, it must

conclude that the good of the State can come only through the collision of class interests; its equilibrium will result from the strain of their competition; and the voice which succeeds in being loudest will be the voice of Universal Justice. In one word, the State, which is *not* constituted of classes, becomes the analogue of the competitive, contentious, restless, unstable, and morally crude world of industrialism. The Labour Party is the victim of the presuppositions of trades unionism. It is suffering from the environment in which it has been nurtured. It is corrupt in its very conception.

I admit most readily and gladly that the Labour Party is better than its creed; but that does not justify the creed nor deprive it of its evil influence. If it were not better than its creed, it would go down under a condemnation which would be universal, and in which its own constituents would join. For the working man is not merely a working man, nor can all his interests be subsumed under the term "Labour." The working man is, and knows himself to be, the citizen of a great State. He has a dim consciousness, which occasionally breaks out into flame, that the State somehow stands as the common guardian of all just interests; that as such, and only as such, is it the defence of his own freedom and the security of his own life, and the condition of all the virtues; and that when its life or its welfare is at stake, everything is at stake. Hence, when he is told that the aristocracy of the past has legislated in its own interests and that the plutocracy of the present would do the same, he does not approve of them. And when it is added that they are not to be blamed, that it is "human nature," and that it is now *his* turn to assert *his* will, he is not so confused as to think that the argument is sound or that the appeal is worthy. On the contrary, he *does* blame them, and regard their action as due to "human nature" perverted and degraded; and if his spirit is as just as I believe it is, he will not perpetuate the see-saw, but regard the time that is past as sufficient for the rule of the aggression and despotism of

classes, and yearn for the dawn of a day when another spirit shall rule, and peace shall be as a river, and righteousness as the waves of the sea.

Such, in my opinion, is the true reason why the Labour Party is still a small political party, and its progress in power is slow and uncertain. In these democratic times whose spirit is deeply infected with commercialism and the conflict of whose economic forces brings so much tragedy into the lives of men, the Labour Party has everything at its back except the power of a generous idealism. Behind its sympathy with the working man, which is genuine, and its devotion to his well-being, which is sincere, there lurks an insult which the working man confusedly feels and which makes him a laggard when he is called forth to subject the State to his own interests. The appeal is to his cupidity; and he resents it even when he knows that his wrongs are real and his rights worthy of being affirmed and secured by the whole power of the people.

The error of the Labour Party is in the last resort the same as that of its most extreme opponents, whom we have already found to accuse the democracy of a universal bent towards greed. It is lack of faith in the people. When the true leader of the working man appears he will bring with him scorn of class conceptions, and resentment against the indignity which appeal to them implies. He will not sit in Parliament as the representative of abstract interests, nor appeal to any such interests when he asks for his commission. He will come armed with more generous ideas of the working man, and a nobler ideal for the State; and he will find that the democracy will respond.

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DECADENCE AND CIVILISATION.

W. C. D. and C. D. WHETHAM.

There are no problems of greater interest than those which are involved in the study of the rise and fall of successive civilisations. Until now, the subject has been left for the most part in the hands of the historians, who have striven to extract a plausible explanation for the phenomena from an analysis of the social and economic conditions of the nations under discussion, or from a criticism of their foreign and internal policy and of their methods of government. The very fact that there is no general agreement between the principal authorities as to the causes of the successive disasters may well shake our faith in the correctness of any given solution.

But, since the rise and fall of nations is an indisputable fact, since we ourselves and all that our forefathers dreamed of and strove for may be and probably are involved in an identical process of growth and decay, it is impossible for a serious student of life to put the subject on one side. Moreover, in the light of modern biological knowledge we are compelled to regard the problem from another point of view and to ask ourselves whether the process has not its origin in some fundamental misadjustment of social conditions; whether civilisation as it has been hitherto understood does not inevitably carry with it the seeds of its own decay.

It is an assured fact that many causes must contribute to any great social upheaval; and, in the compass of a short

paper, only a brief and one-sided treatment of the subject is possible. But, for the ordinary person as well as for the man who is in possession of specialised knowledge, there are many advantages in a suggestive and challenging statement as opposed to an exhaustive and balanced study.

The particular aspect of the problem that we propose to discuss here is one which will surely attract more attention as time goes on, for it will be seen to have bearings on almost every subject that arises in connection with the conduct of affairs in civilised communities. It is the question of the opposition of heredity and environment: the question—not how far the future of the human race may be moulded by the two forces of heredity and environment in so much as these two forces are complementary to each other, when their effects are often indistinguishable,—but how far and in what ways heredity and environment are opposed to each other in their actions, and when and where they work at the expense one of the other.

If we are able to show that, at any rate in certain stages of civilisation, the two influences which mould humanity for better or worse are acting in opposition to each other, it will be important to realise what effect the recognition of such an antagonism between them must have on our current modes of life and thought and on our ideas of social responsibility.

Taking, then, the conception of the human race as it has existed throughout the ages, we will accept the probability of some increasing purpose moulding it progressively for ends not fully revealed to us, and we will assume that further progress is an essential part of the scheme, for we have no reason to suppose that we are any nearer to our goal than we are to our point of departure, whatever that may have been. Can we, looking back at the history of the human race, assign any definite functions in the upward course to the influence of environment and heredity respectively?

It seems that Nature—we will not define that term, we

will all put what interpretation on it we choose—has acted by the methods of heredity; that is, by the incessant elimination of the unfit, and by the increased chances given to healthy, able, and competent men and women to establish themselves and their offspring in a condition of security and so to obtain a predominant survival and reproduction. Man, the individual, has laboured incessantly to improve his surroundings, to better his immediate social conditions, to secure, as far as he was able, a vantage-ground in which he could realise his gradually developing powers and from which he could move on to the next stage of his slow progress. The individual may not inherit the acquired characters of his predecessors, but the social organism as a whole certainly does profit by the labours and experiences of its forbears.

As long as, or whenever, man has been an unconscious, natural, freely breeding animal, Nature has provided a sure method of attaining her end, the survival of the fittest, and man has found himself endowed progressively with the necessary means of keeping pace with her movements and has been able to profit by every increase she has effected in his aptitudes and intelligence.

Yet we have much evidence that this slow onward movement has not been quite of the nature of an orderly march; that there have been cataclysms and social disasters on a large scale, that nations have disappeared and that civilisations of great achievement and greater promise have been wiped out incontinently. Let us ask ourselves if we can suggest any reason why the processes of Nature and the labours of man—why the constant and apparently united efforts of heredity and environment—have failed to accomplish their object, or what want of adjustment between them may have led to such disasters.

In the first place, we must recognise an essential difference between the two methods we are contrasting. To put it briefly, it seems as though work done by heredity was work done once for all. The destruction of a tainted stock will

leave a race eternally the better for its removal, the breeding out of a good strain causes an irreparable loss, whereas improvements due to environment alone require a constant expenditure of energy to maintain them in existence. The one may be compared to an actual gain of capital as far as the human race is concerned, the other involves a constant expenditure of income, perfectly justified as long as the increase in capital is maintained.

To take an example:—we, with our Western civilisation, believe it to be desirable that all men should learn to read and write. To teach each succeeding generation to read and write will represent a certain, constant outlay of human energy. To accomplish our object, a definite proportion of human time and thought must be earmarked in each succeeding generation for that sole object. We have decided, rightly or wrongly, that our civilisation requires in perpetuity this definite item of expenditure.

Now let us consider how we might deal with this problem by the two methods of heredity and environment. Let us imagine it possible for two or three generations to pick out and breed exclusively from children of the type who by the time they were six or seven years old "taught themselves to read," as the saying goes. Like breeds like; we should soon have established a class of persons on whom the annual expenditure of teaching to read would be at a minimum; a state of affairs which would correspond to a definite increase of capital. Now let us try to imagine what expenditure would be required to teach all members of our population as at present constituted to read fluently by the time they had attained the age of seven. To anyone acquainted with our elementary schools, or indeed with the usual type of healthily resistent child, the mind reels before the immensity of the task. One feels almost tempted to doubt whether the whole energies of the nation, directed to no other object, could accomplish the Herculean task. The expenditure of energy involved would bankrupt our section of the human race.

Looking at our problem in this light, we see that there must be some relation between the average innate capacity of the nation and the effect likely to be produced by the expenditure of a given amount of energy towards improving the environment, whether educational or otherwise. If a race falls back in its inborn qualities, if, owing to the efforts of philanthropists and the burdens of unsound taxation, more of the failures of civilisation reach maturity and parenthood, and fewer competent persons are brought into existence to support them, not only has the nation less energy to use for the maintenance and improvement of its social conditions, but such energy as is available will produce a correspondingly smaller effect. The old standard can only be maintained, if at all, by a policy of overspending leading to bankruptcy. We have, in fact, conditions in which retrogression will set in and the environment will follow the heredity downhill.

The sociologist of the future, of three or four hundred years hence, may be very much struck by a coincidence in the social development of our country at present unnoticed.

The years 1870 and 1871 were remarkable for the assumption on the part of the community of the responsibility for the literary training—and ultimately, as it has proved, for the partial maintenance—of the children of the poorer, less competent, possibly less fortunate, sections of the nation. The year 1875 marks the beginning of the decline of the birth-rate among all the able, more intellectual, and more prosperous classes, on whom the chief burden, financial and administrative, of this environmental improvement fell. The decline has now reached a point at which it becomes clear that at least one-half of the children, who would prove the most effective and most valuable citizens and the best worth educating, are annually withheld from us.

What, our future sociologist may reasonably ask, are we to make of the state of mind of a nation which thought and talked so much about the advantages of a special sort of educational environment for all children, whether suited for

it or not, and refused to provide an adequate number of children, of the type most fitted to profit by the expensive and elaborate system that they had established?

Let us direct our attention to another problem. Alcoholism, the desire to drink, the ease with which a man or woman succumbs to the temptation to drink and drug, is probably in most cases a definitely heritable weakness.

Now, what is the meaning of the curious fact that the nations round the Mediterranean Sea are among the most sober of mankind, that a drunken person is a rare object in their midst, and yet that there is abundance of evidence from their early records to show that drunkenness was once a besetting sin among them, Egyptians, Greeks, Jews, Romans alike, a sin railed at by their philosophers and comedians, lamented by their social reformers. What has altered their innate character? Neither prohibition nor any unending temperance crusade. Is it possible to follow Dr Archdall Reid and consider as the cause of the improvement the fact that abundance of wine throughout long ages has enabled the victims of the drink craze most frequently to eliminate themselves before the period of reproduction? The drunkard has died without issue, or more probably, with but few children, who, in their turn, if they inherited their parents' failing, have seldom survived to reach maturity. Thus the nations in question have been purified of their taint, have become progressively more sober, freer from the alcohol craving, and we now marvel at their temperance amid the vineyards.

So in England, for the last three or four hundred years, the upper classes have been able to procure abundance of alcohol in palatable forms. When we read the annals of the eighteenth century, we often have occasion to realise how they drank themselves gradually sober. To a large degree the drink craving is extinct among the upper classes. We have purchased immunity at a price that can often be calculated out of truthful family records. As a higher moral or conventional standard arose with regard to drunkenness, largely

owing to the gradual elimination of these afflicted persons, such people as were left who possessed the drink craving sank to a lower social status. One still sees the sorting process at work. And behold, the upper classes are now relatively sober, probably owing to no merit of their own.

But large sections of our people have not yet had alcohol sufficiently long and freely to be sure of themselves. If one member, through marked ability, rises to a position securing to him and his family among other blessings the benefits of unlimited alcohol, his offspring not infrequently remind us that the taint still lives in the class from whence he came, and is not to be extinguished merely by a rise in the social scale.

A savage nation, on whom alcohol is suddenly thrust, shows us the horrible spectacle of a people collectively drinking themselves sober in a single generation. All classes succumb to the drink fiend. There has been no previous gradual exorcism.

In this light, a nation of mixed ancestry—as far as the drink craving was concerned,—where strict prohibition was enforced for many generations, would possibly have to be considered as a nation of potential drunkards. Its members, after a few generations of breeding from unproved stock, could never leave its temperate shores in any confidence of a return in a state of sobriety. Moreover, they would be compelled for ever to maintain an expensive army of vigilant custom officials and to breed or import a regiment of incorruptible excise men. And even then, after centuries of prohibition, a wave of alcoholic desire might arise into consciousness in their midst, reverse the legislation, and destroy the people.

Then the suppression of alcohol alone will not solve the problem, even temporarily. We must bear in mind also the long list of drugs over which it is scarcely possible to exercise effective control, which alternate with the craving for alcohol in the desires of the unhappy people who suffer from this

racial weakness. The facts that in homes and institutions where alcoholism and the drug habit are treated, over fifty per cent. of the patients are feeble-minded or mentally unbalanced —two definitely heritable weaknesses,—and that most of the women have had unusually large families, throw great light on the nature and extent of the ill with which we have to contend.

Here again we get some conception of an adjustment between the amount of alcoholic taint latent in the stock and what we might call the "natural" degree of temperance to be expected from it. Merely to exact a higher standard in the present, unless we are also prepared to consider and pay for some rigid scheme for the segregation and permanent detention of our afflicted citizens, may easily result in diminishing the prospects of temperance for future generations.

It is very striking, after one has studied a great many pedigrees of unhealthy, weak-minded, and neurotic stock, to realise how often alcoholism in the men seems to correspond with a tendency to tubercular disease in the women, and how both are interchangeable with a low or unstable type of mental character. One gets a very strong impression that, in a certain sense, these things are symptoms rather than diseases, and that it is to the stock which produces them rather than to the individual who suffers from them that we should turn our attention.

Thus we see that the question of drawing up a profit and loss account of our efforts in this direction would not be such a simple matter as many of us would like to believe. Merely to stop drinking and drunkenness is of no avail as the permanent solution, any more than giving coppers to beggars in the street will solve the vagrant question, although it may get that particular beggar out of sight for the evening.

And it might be instructive also to consider the workings of other racial taints, such as the tendency to tubercular disease, in a similar way. There is no doubt that immunity has been secured in the past largely by the continuous removal

of the most susceptible subjects before the period of parenthood and child-bearing; and although immunity to disease is not the highest attribute of the human race, it seems clear that it will always play an essential part in the progress of mankind. The recent outbreak of measles in England and Western Europe, and of plague in the East, shows that a period of comparative freedom from these diseases in no way indicates any gain of immunity, that the lull produces an increased liability to a severe form of attack, just as the Red Indians and Pacific Islanders, to whom our diseases were previously unknown, died by hundreds of thousands when they were first subjected to the infection. Therefore, unless their results be closely watched, it is conceivable that a wilderness of sanatoria may serve as easily to increase tubercular disease in the future as to diminish it in the present. There is no certainty that it will solve the problem, and it may intensify it for our descendants.

Education, temperance, and hygiene are three of the movements on which the social reformers of the last two or three generations have spent their most fervent efforts. Let us now consider another movement, which is greatly in evidence among us, from a point of view that is not usually broached in discussing the matter. We refer to the endeavour to use women industrially, socially, and politically on the same footing as men, all such uses being, obviously, primarily environmental, although some of their indirect effects are of sinister import from the point of view of the race.

There can be no doubt that woman's essential function on this globe is motherhood. Statistics show that, allowing for those who will not grow up, those who will not marry, and those who, though married, will have no children, four children to every fertile marriage is the very least that will maintain the numbers of the race unaltered, while, if the race is to improve, considerably more must be born and reared in the abler families. It is therefore essential to the race that the ablest, healthiest, and finest women should be encouraged,

tempted, compelled if necessary, by circumstances to devote themselves to family life by becoming wives and mothers, and it is doubtful how far it is expedient to draw them off, even for a time, to other occupations.

We are inclined to classify, as we have done elsewhere, women and men as respectively the capital and income of the State. Now, no sound economic enterprise can afford to allow its capital either to lie idle or to be spent at will.

Tacitly the national system of economy, by the scale of payment of their services, has always insisted on a vital difference between men and women. A man's wages are calculated to represent not only his own keep, but also a sum sufficient to maintain a wife and family. A woman's wages represent her keep only, or sometimes merely pocket-money, while she lives under her parents' roof. This means that it is recognised that a man has and can perform adequately two duties to the State. He can do his day's work and be the father of a family. A woman can only perform one, either earn her living or give birth to and bring up an adequate number of children, in which case her payment is included in the father's wage.

As soon as the married woman becomes a wage-earner, the birth-rate drops disastrously, or the infant mortality runs up. If we raise the wages, the unmarried or childless woman will always have the advantage of additional comfort or luxury, which will probably have the ill effect of disinclining her towards the more arduous, more responsible, more exacting duties of marriage and child-bearing.

Apparently, for a time, we can shift a great part of the burdens of the country on to women, who can undersell their husbands and brothers; we probably effect thereby a distinct temporary improvement of environment in our own generation, for a woman of better education and character can always be secured at a lower rate of pay; but we are devouring our one essential form of life capital, female humanity, and the process must end in disaster.

It should be remembered also that whenever by the employment of a woman we displace a man—never mind that he be a less competent one,—he is thereby less able to maintain a wife and family, and thus some other woman is thrown out of her normal employment. Good heritable aptitudes are probably destroyed in more directions than one.

There is evidence that every improvement in environment—be it in education, hygiene, local government, or where you please—effected by the employment of women is, if it is to be maintained, not only a charge in perpetuity on the income of the human race, but is almost certainly a direct inroad on its capital.

It would be very desirable to have figures concerning the marriage-rate and subsequent birth-rate among the multitude of competent women who work among us as teachers, nurses, factory inspectors, clerks, and the thousand posts created during the last fifty years, where we take their offices as a matter of course and call out constantly for an increase of their number. We do not, be it remembered, absorb the feeble-minded and incompetent into these race-destroying occupations. We leave them to propagate their species at will, providing maternity wards and skilled attendance for the purpose. Among the women at the older Universities in England, the record is profoundly unsatisfactory, and American sociologists are alarmed at a similar survey in their own country. There is a marriage-rate of less than 25 per cent. and a birth-rate that is most disquieting, when we consider the intellectual capacity and high moral tone of the women affected thereby. In many of the employments open to women, we know that at forty or fifty years of age women are considered to be too old to continue in their work. What are they to do then? Well, Nature at any rate is not of opinion that twenty-five years' exclusive service in the cause of environment fits a woman to take up the far more essential claims of heredity, though twenty-five years in the service of heredity is not a bad training for a would-be worker at

environment. It is not a mere coincidence that the women whose names are best known and most distinguished for social, artistic, or literary services were for the most part unmarried or childless, so that the special gifts which brought them fame died with them.

There is an historic aspect to the question which is too little known and too often neglected. We know both in Athens and Rome, at the close of their period of splendour, that the dearth of children in the patrician and upper classes, and others as they successively came to the front to fill the empty places, was regarded with alarm by the statesmen of the day, and that the constantly increasing tendency for the best women to interest themselves outside the homes was seen as a source of national danger. Law after law was passed to compel men of good family to marry early, to give special advantages to parents of three or more children, to induce patrician women to bear children; but how to restore the environment of seclusion, security, and comfort—possibly of privilege — in which the elements recognised to be of the greatest value to the State could be persuaded to breed freely, was probably as much outside the intention of the Roman democratic legislator as it was beyond his power. The long centuries of barbarism and the squalor and turmoil of the Dark Ages were the price to be paid for the failure to solve the problem.

There are incidents in the history of Sparta which are most interesting in this connection. Sparta was a primitively organised State, of matriarchal form, as regards the descent of property, and consequently it was not difficult for the women to get a considerable share of control. Moreover, the constant absence of large bodies of fighting men in the prime of life left the government of the State largely in the ineffective hands of old men and boys. So at a certain period of their history the women appear to have demanded and secured the right to take part in the public meals, which was equivalent to a participation on equal terms in the political life of the

country. As we might expect, they seem to have been thoroughly efficient, and the experiment succeeded admirably, with the exception of the fact that in two generations the Spartan nation had ceased to exist, for a plague of empty cradles had fallen upon it. A hundred years of better government, brought about by the use of the women for political affairs, may have cost the nation its very existence.

Venice also has her tale to tell: "At the end of the seventeenth century, new rivals and new trade routes took away much of her trade, and her protective tariffs drove a good part of what remained to the open ports of Genoa, Ancona, Livorno, and Trieste. Venice itself was still a centre of luxury and display, and strangers flocked to share in its gaieties, sure of excellent police and admirable sanitation" (we are quoting from the pages of the *Cambridge Modern History*), "but during the eighteenth century, limitation of families, strict entail, and the custom of younger sons" (presumably daughters also, in corresponding numbers) "taking Orders, so diminished the nobility that the members of the Grand Council decreased from fourteen hundred to seven hundred. All through the century the physical weakness and the political and moral decadence of Venice continued; yet the changes which accompanied her decay were so gradual that they can only be estimated by their ultimate results."

We have dwelt particularly on the histories of these two small states—Venice and Sparta—because it is easier to see the effect of certain actions when they are working on a reduced scale. A small trading concern, for instance, that takes to bad ways comes to grief and points its moral sooner than a big business that has a large capital and credit to draw upon. In some way or other, both Sparta and Venice overspent themselves disastrously, and there is much evidence to show that they did it by endeavouring in various ways to improve or maintain their environment at the expense of their heredity. They forgot that it is the inborn qualities of

the citizens rather than their material welfare that constitute the true wealth of nations.

There are some figures in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, given by the editor in his summary, which are worth consideration. He believes that, except perhaps for the nineteenth century, the level of ability required to secure admission to its pages has remained fairly constant, though it seems probable that the increasing amount of documentary evidence in existence as the centuries come near to present days would naturally tend to a slight progressive lowering of the standard of admission as time went on. There are 186 entries for the eleventh century, 377 for the twelfth, 515 for the thirteenth, 678 for the fourteenth, and then a drop to 659 for the fifteenth, in spite of the fact that the population remained fairly constant throughout these and the two succeeding centuries.

Where shall we look for a reason for this phenomenon, this arrest of the appearance of ability among us? There was a great humanising movement on foot in the thirteenth century, a marvellous record of endeavour to mitigate suffering and to equalise social advantage. It took the form of the coming and establishment of the friars in our midst, Blackfriars, Whitefriars, Greyfriars, names familiar in the topography of every town existing from those days. All the best of the nation flocked to join the celibate ranks of St Francis and his imitators. The *Dictionary* gives us one view of the result of their labours, in this drop in the number of men of ability living in the succeeding century; and who shall say what consequences, political, social, religious, followed in the trail!

Let us continue with the figures from the *Dictionary*. The movement exhausted itself. The friars and the monastic orders fell into disrepute, and Henry VIII. completed the destruction of the celibate orders. The sixteenth century leaps up to 2138 entries, the seventeenth again rises to 5674, while the eighteenth, in spite of the increase of population, which was beginning to make itself felt, has only 5788, just a hundred

more instead of twice five thousand, as we might have expected. We are tempted to account for this check by the premature destruction of great and good men during our Civil War, a war quite remarkable for the admirable purpose and high character of the persons who engaged therein, and also by the constant departure of emigrants of good ability and inheritance from our shores to America, and by the dislocation of family life in general throughout those troublous times.

It is well to remember that in England we have one special point in common with the great empires, such as Rome and Spain, that have passed away. There is a constant drain of men, especially of men of high spirit, good character, and administrative ability, to our tropical dependencies whose business it is to improve the environment and maintain the blessings of British rule in foreign parts. This drain has been going on for over a century, and the openings afforded have always supplied an attractive career to the younger sons of good families—a class which to-day is unfortunately almost extinct among us. Tropical dependencies are notoriously unhealthy, and white life there is often cut off prematurely. There are many difficulties in the way of taking out a wife and rearing a family. In other colonies the presence of a large, semi-barbaric native population or the existence of conditions of great hardship and labour cause parents to deem that the environment is unsuited to their carefully nurtured daughters. Hence we lose, year by year, to our Colonies and dependencies, as Rome and Spain did before us, an appreciable fraction of our most valuable young men; hence we are left, year by year, with an increasing number of superfluous women, who, bereft of their natural occupation, have become almost "a danger and a menace, a wandering fire, a disappointed force." And then, as if to emphasise the fact that one cannot with impunity sacrifice heredity to environment, we are presented with the direct outcome of our scruples in the large half-caste populations of certain of our dependencies, a problem that will tax

our ingenuity to the utmost. It is probable that the demand for the equalisation of the political, social, and industrial status of men and women in England, and the difficulties of the English with the half-caste populations in the various parts of our empire, owe their origin to one and the same cause.

It matters nothing in the long run, when the men of a great nation go forth to govern or to settle in strange lands, unaccompanied by their women folk, whether, as in Spain, the women stay behind and go into convents, or whether, as in England, they remain at home and go on to County Councils — the result, as far as the race is concerned, is precisely the same in both cases.

Throughout the history of the nations, the demand for the equalisation of the status of men and women seems to come invariably from the classes — usually the more intellectual classes—when and where, for various economic, religious, and social causes into which we cannot go, the marriage-rate and birth-rate have become abnormally and dangerously low.

It is extremely interesting to study this influence at work among the women who are now prominent in political agitation and social and philanthropic enterprise. Many of these women are unmarried, and very few appear to have the normal family of four children and upwards. This fact alone throws great light on the psychology—perhaps it would be more correct to say the morbid psychology—of the whole movement.

There is probably no way in which the capital of the human race is more directly attacked and eaten into than by the habitual employment of women in the task of improving environment without regard to the more direct and pressing claims of heredity.

There is one fact that is constantly put forward as a complete justification for all our efforts to improve environment during the last hundred years, and that is, that although many of the beneficent effects are so masked as to make it difficult to put the finger of the unbeliever on the exact spot, *one* certainly is capable of absolute proof. There is no doubt

that the average length of human life has been greatly increased and the death-rate among us is in a fair way to be reduced to its lower limit.

That is a fact we cannot gainsay. In London, up to a hundred years ago, there was probably a death-rate of 80 per thousand, while the country districts met a birth-rate of about 40 per thousand with a death-rate of very little less. A couple of hundred years ago a man of fifty was an old man, whose sons and daughters would not long be kept out of their inheritance, and need not, in the leisured classes, where the paternal inheritance is an important fact, defer their marriages till half a lifetime had slipped away.

"We dare not hope much from an old man," wrote the physicians of the Commonwealth when Admiral Blake, aged fifty-three, was brought in wounded after the three days' engagement with the Dutch.

And life prolonged for all means life greatly improved for others and made tolerable for yet a lower stratum of the population.

It also means—we must never forget it—life made possible for a class of people of weak character and shifting purpose, of whose effect on society many of us take no account; and it means—in our present irresponsible and ignorant social organisation—the possibility of life for a whole herd of organisms, diseased in body and mind, whom it is an outrage on the human race to have called into existence.

But, forgetting the dark side of our picture and looking only at the prolongation, at the improvement, let us ask ourselves if we can tell at all on what fund we are drawing to pay the bill for this great advance, this undoubted improvement in environment. Taking money values, there is no doubt that the twelve millions sterling required annually for the Old Age Pensions is a small instalment of the payment—very valuable as an example of direct cause and effect. The next question, of course, is from where the money comes. It would be interesting to know how much of the money

required for the purpose has been saved partly by the suppression of the children who should have been there to bear the burden; or, should the cost and personal exertion of supporting and tending our aged, our incapable, our incompetent population increase, how many more children will be suppressed among the thrifty and far-seeing in order to meet this and other additional burdens.

The fact that the number of old persons among us is constantly increasing and that the relative number of the young is falling off, that the multitude of the feeble-minded, the alcoholic, the incompetent is growing, while the healthy, the strong, the able are limiting their families, means that the nation is growing distinctly older and more infirm on the average than it used to be, and it seems that this effect is what people are striving to express when they attribute the fall of empires to the fact that they grow old and decay. There is no reason why, given a normal birth-rate and death-rate and the working of selection on a naturally breeding population, there should ever be any racial "*growing old*"; but it is the obvious consequence when a form of civilisation is established which produces increase of years in all classes with decrease of birth-rate among the able and thrifty, thus adding to its other misdeeds the reversal of natural selection. Such a state of society is essentially unstable, and carries in its midst the seeds of its own decay.

When we come to the point of determining whether that prolongation of life for which we have made such efforts and on which we pride ourselves so greatly, whether in the most favourable circumstances it is an advantage, a thing to be sought after, we are not likely nowadays to hear many doubts expressed on the subject. Yet a few centuries ago in England, and at the present time in other countries and under other religions, the concensus of opinion would be by no means necessarily in favour of the proposition. Many religions have maintained the contrary opinion. It comes to this in

the end, that what a man does and how he acts depends on what he believes.

If we feel a strong probability that this life is everything, an end in itself, by all means let us prolong life, let us eat, drink, and be merry, improve our environment and invite as many persons as possible to the feast. Life, the be-all and end-all of everything, cannot be made too pleasant for everyone. If we believe that this life is an episode, a preparation, a testing-ground, a trial of strength, and that there is something beyond, waiting to compass its ends for the arrival of a higher humanity than any that has yet occupied this globe, then the future prospects of the human race, the increasing innate worthiness of the citizens of this world and the next, become the urgent consideration.

If now, bearing in mind the influences at work among us which we have discussed in the earlier part of this paper, we look around on our civilisation, remembering the fate of the nations that have gone before us, the prospect cannot be anything but profoundly disquieting. On many sides we see signs of the rocks on which other great empires have made shipwreck. There is evidence that the two forces which mould our humanity, heredity and environment, Nature and Man, are working, here and now, almost directly in opposition to each other. Now—we need make no mistake about it—it is only a question of time for Nature, somehow and somewhere, to get the upper hand and resume her progress, so that all labour undertaken in opposition to her courses is vain.

Let us sum up our position. In the first place, we are spending vast and increasing amounts of money and energy on a type of education which is possibly only fitted to a small section of the population, and of which a certain effect is to withdraw from motherhood and family life a number of competent women. *Ipso facto*, we entrust the bringing up of the next generation, not to the parents, but, once more, largely to a type of celibate teachers who have neither the accumulated wisdom, the ripe tradition, nor the religious purpose of the

mediæval teaching orders they replace. The spinster influence, divorced from the fuller knowledge, the deeper experience that comes from direct contact with the great mysteries and emotions of life, is a new and disquieting feature of Western civilisation, apparently inseparable from our current ideals of educational efficiency.

Much of the work undertaken in the cause of temperance and hygiene falls under the same grave suspicion. It is not that too much effort has been spent in grappling with these problems. That is impossible. The danger lies in the fact that too little knowledge has been applied to their study in all its bearings. The average philanthropist is a man of heart, not of head. It is much easier for him, as for most men, to act on impulse than to make a reasoned forecast of the probable results of his actions. The very good qualities of the social reformer —the sympathy with suffering, the hatred of injustice, the intolerance of oppression—make it difficult for him to restrain himself from action, to acknowledge his impotence to deal swiftly with an evil without increasing its future proportions, to admit reluctantly that it is right and necessary that one generation should suffer for the sins of its forefathers, and to acknowledge in all humility that the most we can hope to do in many cases is to improve the lot of some generation to come by governing our impulse to take action, exercising restraint on ourselves and others, or compelling against his will some heedless, hapless creature, whose only fault lies in being the child of his parents.

In the second place, the whole of the movement for the equalisation of the political and social status of men and women is a sign of ill-omen, an oft-told story, arising at certain critical periods in the history of civilised nations, intimately connected with definite economic and environmental changes, and apparently—for reasons that are clear to those who study society from the biological standpoint—necessarily associated with an arrest of national development and the incipient stages of decadence and decay.

That the symptoms we deplore are not imaginary but are actually visible in our midst may be plainly seen from a consideration of the reports of the Poor Law Commissioners, the Commissioners for the Care and Control of the Feeble Minded, the Commissioners in Lunacy, and the annual Judicial Statistics. Clearly there is something radically wrong with a civilisation and with a method of government when, in spite of improved economic conditions, in spite of (it may be on account of) enormous sums spent each year on primary education and public health, there is no diminution of pauperism, and there is a constant and sustained increase of crime, of lunacy, and of mental defect.

The sense of social responsibility, the growth of moral consciousness, have come to life and have reached a certain point amongst us—a point that the student of sociology may well call a danger point. If, accepting the burden of moulding the destinies of the race, we relieve Nature of her office of discrimination between the fit and the unfit, if we undertake the protection of the weaker members of the community, if we assume a corporate responsibility for the existence of all sorts and conditions of men, then, unless we are prepared to cast away the labours of our forefathers and to vanish with the empires of the past, we must accept the office of deciding who are the fittest to prosper and to leave offspring, who are the persons whose moral and intellectual worth make it right that they and their descendants should be placed in a position of pre-eminence in our midst, and which are the families on whose upbringing the time and money of society are best bestowed. We must acquiesce in the principle that the man who has made his five talents into ten shall profit by the skill and energy he has shown, and that the man who has repeatedly failed to use his one talent shall have no further chance of wasting the corporate resources on himself and his belongings.

Stated in this way, the line of action foreshadowed as being necessary to reverse the process of decay is so contrary to present tendencies and to the egalitarian trend of contemporary

thought that we may reasonably despair of its adoption in a society developed and brought up in the present environment. The sense of responsibility has gone as far as other intentions of similar well-meaning but ill-directed purpose to pave the path to national destruction. It has not risen to the heights of self-knowledge, self-control, and self-sacrifice necessary to lead the social organism onwards and upwards.

The problems of the reconciliation of civilisation with biological progress, of high moral intent with unfaltering purpose, of the rightful and necessary pre-eminence of the fit, and the wise and sympathetic treatment of the unfit, still remain to be solved, and none of us can say how many thousand years must pass away before a nation arises which can adjust its religious teaching and its social environment to the unceasing purpose of the ages.

Oligarchies and tyrannies without number have disappeared in the history of the world because of a failure to recognise the claims of all capable members to some share in the expression of the national consciousness. It may be that a long series of democracies and constitutional monarchies will follow them into oblivion before a true aristocracy arises wise enough to exercise discrimination with discernment, strong enough to temper mercy with justice, sufficiently self-sacrificing to recollect that the rights of its descendants to a goodly heritage of physical, mental, and moral health are greater than the claims of any existing population to subsistence, to ease, or to licence.[1]

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[1] A further article on this subject by M. René L. Gérard of Liège will appear in the January number. See also M. Gérard's article "Civilisation in Danger" in the *Hibbert Journal* for July 1908.—Editor.

THE SIKH RELIGION.

THE REV. J. ESTLIN CARPENTER, D.LITT.,

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"I BRING from the East," says Mr Macauliffe,[1] "what is practically an unknown religion." Historians have written of the Sikhs and their wars. Brave, loyal, obedient, they are said to make the finest soldiers in the East. In the Punjab and the North-Western Provinces they number over two million. Some thirty thousand are enrolled in the Indian army; and they are to be found in various capacities of service, from the native regiments of east and central Africa to the police force in the treaty ports of China. But little has been accurately known of their religion. The author of the Persian treatise entitled the Dabistan, or "School of Manners," was acquainted with them, and heard their sixth Guru teach in 1643.[2] But even as late as 1848 Professor Wilson could find but scanty material for describing their sacred rites and institutions, and declared that the Sikh religion scarcely deserved the name of a religious faith.[3] It was known that they possessed a book of Scripture, designated the *Ādi-Granth*; but its contents remained inaccessible until an English version of large parts of it appeared, under the auspices of the Indian Government, from the pen of Dr Trumpp, a German scholar, in 1877. It was the result of seven years' hard labour, but it could not be

[1] *The Sikh Religion: its Gurus, Sacred Writings, and Authors*, by Max Arthur Macauliffe; Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1909. In six vols.

[2] See the translation by Shea and Troyer (1843), vol. ii. pp. 276, 281.

[3] *Essays on the Religion of the Hindus*, vol. ii. p. 149.

pronounced successful. Much of the original had become unintelligible to the modern Sikhs; and Dr Trumpp failed to obtain from them the needful help in the interpretation of old grammatical forms and obscure words. Moreover, he lacked the sympathy needful for such an enterprise. He pronounced the collection "incoherent and shallow in the extreme"; to read but one of its divisions was "a most painful and almost stupefying task." A fresh presentation, therefore, was urgently needed.

This duty was undertaken in 1893 by Mr Macauliffe, at the request of representative Sikh societies. Several years were occupied in making his first translation. There were then no dictionaries of the Granth, and the interpreter not only needed an acquaintance with Sanskrit and Prakrit, and the current vernacular dialects, he must also know how to trace obsolete words to Arabia or Persia. Mr Macauliffe adopted the wise and novel plan of submitting every line of his work to the most searching criticism of the best Sikh scholars. Even with this aid a margin of uncertainty remains.[1] But the present rendering has the warm commendation of the leaders of the community; and the Scriptures, which have become unintelligible to ninety per cent. of their co-religionists, will reveal to them anew the meaning of their faith. The method in which the contents of the Granth are finally presented is not, however, without its drawbacks for the student. The Granth is a compilation from the compositions of the founder, Nānak, and the Gurus (or teachers) who followed him. The light of Nānak was believed to pass at his death (1539 A.D.) into his successor, and was transmitted through the whole series to the tenth and last, Guru Govind Singh (1675–1708). He appointed no one to follow him, but bade his disciples regard the Granth as the embodiment of the mystic personality which united him with his predecessors. Mr Macauliffe learned that his orthodox Sikh friends feared that if his translation were printed in the order of the

[1] For instance, i. 198 shows five alternative renderings of a single verse.

original "it would not receive the same respect and attention in foreign countries as in India." He has accordingly presented the Sikh view of their religion in the form of a series of lives of the ten teachers, in which many of the sacred hymns are interspersed. The lives are based upon early biographies which are rich in incidents of contemporary religious conditions, as well as in legendary material. But the poems are constantly inserted without any clue to their place in the different divisions of the Granth, and of its literary form and arrangement the reader can consequently gain no clear idea. This is perhaps a minor drawback, as it affects only the actual order and contents of the Scriptures. The picture of the development of the whole movement must be gathered from the complex series of hymns and devotions, on the one hand, and the narratives upon the other.

I.

The religion of mediæval India flowed through many streams. With the decline of Buddhism, the varied forms of Hindu piety were stimulated from time to time by leaders of philosophical thought and devotees of impassioned mysticism. The ancient teachings of the Upanishads found their chief exponent in the famous Çaṅkara, against whose monistic idealism Rāmānuja led a kind of religious revolt in the eleventh century. Founding himself on a reinterpretation of the sacred teaching, he devoted himself to the promotion of the worship of one God under the form of Vishnu as the infinite Creator, and spent a long life (reckoned by tradition at 120 years[1]) in travel and preaching. One of his teachers, Mahāpurna, had communicated to him a spell which would ensure divine protection and deliverance from the pain of transmigration. But he was forbidden to reveal it. After long pondering, however, he convinced himself that the secret of salvation could not be rightly withheld, and resolved to risk even eternal

[1] Chariar, *The Vaishnavite Reformers of India*, no date, Madras, p. 76.

punishment by the disclosure.[1] His followers rapidly multiplied, and, with Hindu subtlety, divided into various sects. He had laid great stress on rules of cooking and eating, designed to secure the utmost personal purity. Rāmānanda, the fourth in spiritual succession from him, took a further step, and set free the service of religion from all dependence upon caste restrictions. Calling his disciples the "liberated," he opened his teaching to men of every degree: the knowledge of God meant emancipation from all social bondage. The Brahman, irreproachable in conduct, but without love in his heart, was inferior to the low-caste man full of devout adoration to his Creator. By this time the Mohammedan conquests were well established. At Benares, Rāmānanda disputed with the Mullahs of Islam as well as the Pandits of Brahmanism, and fresh impulses of mysticism were to influence Hindu thought. The filiation of Nānak's teaching from that of Rāmānanda is indicated by the inclusion of one of his hymns in the Granth.[2] The link between them is found in the weaver Kabir.

The activity of Rāmānanda is commonly placed in the latter part of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth centuries. Legend assigned the birth of Kabir to the year 1398, and prolonged his life to the age of 120 years, like that of Rāmānuja. His death in 1518 appears better established: the earlier date is probably due to the desire to make him contemporary with Rāmānanda.[3] Among the Teacher's attendants at Benares was a Brahman, whose virgin widowed daughter was one day allowed to prostrate herself before him. Ignorant of her widowhood, Rāmānanda promised her a son. His words could not be recalled, but he covered the situation by the further prophecy that no signs of motherhood should be apparent. Miraculously conceived, the boy was born,[4] and exposed on a lake a little way from Benares. There, on a

[1] Macauliffe, vi. 96. [2] *Ibid.*, vi. 105.

[3] G. H. Westcott, *Kabir and the Kabir Panth*, Cawnpore, 1907, p. 3, note 6.

[4] According to one version, from the palm of his mother's hand; Westcott, p. 5.

lotus flower, he was discovered by a Mohammedan weaver, who brought him up in his house. His youthful religious precocity excited universal astonishment. He vanquished Brahman and Musalman alike in theological debate, but at length became a disciple of Rāmānanda. As he grew up he continued to practise his foster-father's trade, while he at the same time served men of both religions, irrespective of caste. Brahmanical persecution was met by miracle; temptation assailed him in vain; trial of many kinds left him unscathed. He closed his long life at Maghar, in the district of Gorakhpur, a place so scorned by Brahmans that they would only allow to those who died there rebirth in the form of an ass. But the saint rebuked the disciples who desired that he should pass away at Benares. "What is Benares, and what Maghar? He who dies at Maghar is not dead when Rām (God) has taken up his abode in my heart."[1] The saint was vindicated by the sequel of the strife which followed. The sovereign of Benares (Hindu) wished to cremate the body. The Nawab of Gorakhpur (Mohammedan) desired to bury it. Kabir himself appeared, and bade the disputants raise the shroud which lay upon the corpse. They did so, but the body had vanished, and a heap of flowers filled its place. Some days later the departed Teacher appeared to a disciple in Mathura and gave him divine instruction. There, too, he met the faithful Dharm Dass, whom he had appointed his successor; he laid down forty-two articles for his followers, and finally departed to the eternal union which he had already temporarily realised before his death: "God and Kabir have become one: no one can distinguish between them."[2]

This is the mystical note of all the higher Hindu religions from the days when the forest sages formulated the identity of the self with the universal Self in the famous phrase *Tat tvam asi*, "That art thou." This was the goal of faith. It was reached not so much by dialectic as by intuition; and it was

[1] Westcott, p. 23. [2] Macauliffe, vi. 139.

realised in the later religious devotion through an intense emotional experience of adoring love:[1]

> "Turning away *from the world* I have forgotten both caste and lineage;
> My weaving is *now* in the infinite silence.
> I have now no quarrel *with any one*;
> I have given up both the Pandits and the Mullas.
> . . . .
> My heart being pure, I have seen the Lord;
> Kabir having searched and searched himself, hath found God within him."[2]

Mosque and idol were alike too poor for God's dwelling; whether Allah or Rām, what mattered the name; "search in thy heart," pleaded Kabir, "search in thy heart of hearts, there is his place of abode."[3] Not, however, without conditions. "Unless you have a forgiving spirit, you will not see God."[4] Resembling rather the Sufi saints than the Hindu Pandits in his commendations of humility and his condemnation of pride, he could say with the Apostle who described himself as chief of sinners,[5] "I am the worst of men." That only made the marvel of grace the more wonderful:

> "My dread of transmigration is at an end
> Since God displayed his love for me.
> The light hath dawned, the darkness is dispelled,
> . . . .
> All my sins have been blotted out,
> And my soul is absorbed in the Life of the world."[6]

From the Hindu side he warned his disciples that as long as they had "duality" in their hearts, they could not attain God's court.[7] Let them love the ever-present God, and then their heart should be pure. If by worshipping stones they could find God, Kabir declared he would worship a mountain; but better than idols were the stones for human service in the mill in which men ground their corn.[8] Let men leave the

[1] Among Kabir's predecessors in this field, whom he himself quotes, were the poet Jāyadeva and the Marathi saint, Nāmdev.

[2] Kabir in the Granth; Macauliffe, vi. 260.

[3] *Ibid.*, vi. 276.

[4] From the Bijak, the earliest collection of his teachings; Westcott, p. 53.

[5] 1 Tim. i. 15, without reference to the question of authorship.

[6] Macauliffe, vi. 276.

[7] *Ibid.*, vi. 195.

[8] Westcott, p. 58.

picture and turn to the painter; learn that "there is but one Soul which occupieth all bodies";[1] then they would understand that the great Lord of the earth is their Father:

> "I am thy son, thou art my Father,
> We both live in the same place."[2]

It is not necessary to attempt any reconciliation of the language of religion with that of philosophy. Under the influence of the Vedânta the poet might also sing of God as the "illusionist." The cycles of creation and dissolution might be regarded as part of a divine play:

> "When the Actor beateth the drum,
> Everybody cometh to *see* the show:
> When the Actor collecteth the stage properties,
> He abideth alone in his happiness."

Such a world was ruled by that inflexible moral order which expressed itself in the doctrine of the Deed. For those who remain entangled in the world, the process of transmigration must continue. Die in life to your egotism and pride, and you will know God; meditate on the Stainless One, and you will go to that place whence there shall be no returning.

Here was a religion of inwardness, which recognised an identity of experience under varieties of form. The differences of sects dropped away. Outward practices, such as bathing in sacred rivers, lost all value.[3] Caste simply disappeared. The pretensions of Pandits and Yogis, of Sanyāsis and Penitents, were worthless. Nay, more, the Hindus and the Musalmans had the same Lord: "make thy mind thy Kaaba," he said, when he was advised to go on a pilgrimage to Mekka.

Not dissimilar was the movement led by the saint of Nuddea, known to history by the name of Chaitanya. Born in 1485 in a high caste Brahman family, he early devoted himself to the study of the Nyāya philosophy which had its home in Nuddea, and at the early age of sixteen opened a grammar school and gathered followers and pupils. Initiation

[1] Macauliffe, vi. 159. [2] *Ibid.*, vi. 197.

[3] If salvation could be secured by bathing, observed Kabir, frogs would obtain it.

into the Vaishnavite faith and a pilgrimage to Gāyā where Vishnu worship was installed in the ancient home of Buddhism awoke in him an impassioned devotion to Krishna. Visions and trances brought him into ecstatic communion with the divine object of his affections, and disciples in later days told how the Lord had deigned to unite himself with his devotee and occupy his person. Settling in Orissa, he converted its king; then he travelled and taught, extending his journeys even to Southern India,[1] vanquishing Brahmans at Benares, and preaching everywhere the way of deliverance by the love of Krishna. For him, too, the divisions of caste and the diversities of religion were abolished by faith: "the mercy of God regards neither tribe nor family."[2] Hindu and Musalman could alike receive salvation. He subdued robbers by his sanctity, and converted them into disciples; even the outcast Chandāla, "whose impurity is consumed by the chastening fire of holy faith, is to be reverenced by the wise, and not the unbelieving expounder of the Vedas." Once more, personal religion broke the bonds of tradition; on the heights of contemplation, ritual was needed no longer; and the soul, freed from the stains and frailties of the body, should rise into a realm of beauty and sinlessness, or soar into the heaven of Vishnu himself.[3] To the believer Chaitanya became a divine incarnation; even in his own lifetime he was an object of worship, and for four centuries the apostle of Orissa has been approached with daily ritual of prayer.

II.

Chaitanya disappeared in the year 1527; the life of his contemporary Nānak (1469–1538) overlapped his career at both ends. His parents belonged to the farming class, living in a village in a vast forest south-west of Lahore. The babe entered life with the usual premonitions of future greatness.

[1] So Chariar, *Vaishnavite Reformers*, p. 158.
[2] Wilson, *Religion of the Hindus*, vol. i. p. 162.
[3] Hunter, *Orissa*, i. p. 107.

His utterance at birth was "as the laughing voice of a wise man joining a social gathering"; and the astrologer who drew his horoscope duly regretted that he would never live to see his future glory, bearing the umbrella, the symbol of regal or prophetic dignity. At five years of age the child talked of religion; at seven he was taken to the village school, the teacher wrote out the alphabet for him, and the boy promptly composed an acrostic upon it. The forest round his village was the home of recluses and ascetics who sang to him the songs of the Lord; and he became familiar with the aspects of nature, which are frequently reflected in his hymns. When the time arrived for him to be invested with the sacred thread, he refused to wear it, and the boy of nine was credited with the declaration:

> "By adoring and praising the Name, honour and a true thread are obtained. *In this way* a sacred thread shall be put on, which will not break, and which will be fit for entrance into God's court."[1]

Sent into the forest to herd buffaloes, he plunged into meditation, and his hours of rest were adorned with wonder. The shadow of a tree remained stationary for him as for the youthful Gotama; or a large cobra watched over him and raised its hood to protect him. Reproaches for idleness were of no avail; agriculture was turned into parables. When his father called for his help on the land the youth replied:

> "Make thy body the field, good works the seed; irrigate with God's name;
> Make thy heart the cultivator; God will germinate in thy heart."[2]

Tillage, shop-keeping, horse-dealing, Government service, all failed to hold him. When the doctor was brought and the youth was asked about his symptoms, he could only say that he felt the pain of separation from God, and a pang of hunger for contemplation of him. At last, however, he became store-keeper under Daulat Khan, and discharged his duties with great success. But one day in the forest he was taken in vision into God's presence, and the memory of that supreme

[1] Macauliffe, i. 17.

[2] *Ibid.*, i. 21.

communion was enshrined in the opening verses of the poem known as the Japji, the morning devotion of the Sikh:

> "There is but one God whose name is True, the Creator, devoid of fear and enmity, immortal, unborn, self-existent, great and bountiful.
> "The True One is, was, O Nānak, and the True One also shall be." [1]

So he abandoned the world, faced the charge of possession by an evil spirit, put on religious dress, and after a day's silence inaugurated his new career by the solemn declaration "There is no Hindu and no Musalman." Both had alike forgotten the inner secret of their religion. Interrogated by the magistrate in the presence of the Mohammedan governor, the seer explained his meaning thus:

> "Make kindness thy mosque, sincerity thy prayer-carpet, what is just and lawful thy Quran,
> Modesty thy circumcision, civility thy fasting, so shalt thou be a Musalman." [2]

When they adjourned for afternoon service to the mosque, Nānak laughed in the magistrate's face as he conducted the service. The outraged official complained to the governor, who had also been present. He was full of apprehension, replied Nānak, for a new-born filly, for he suddenly remembered a well in the enclosure where it had been unloosed, and feared it would fall in. The governor's prayers, he added, were equally worthless, for *he* had been meditating on buying horses in Kabul. The stricken culprits acknowledged the charge. Such was the need of inwardness instead of lip-service.

Thus launched on his career as prophet, he broke down caste restrictions in every direction. In the house of a carpenter of the lowest caste he declined to eat his food within the usual enclosure smeared with cow-dung: "the whole earth," he pleaded, "is my sacred lines, and he who loveth truth is pure." He converted thieves; he cured a leper; as Kabir had reanimated the emperor's cow, so Nānak at Delhi brings to life an elephant belonging to the reigning sovereign, Ibrahim Lodi. He reverses the Gospel miracle of the blasted

[1] Macauliffe, i. 35. The poet's name is usually inserted as a sort of signature. [2] *Ibid.*, i. 38.

fig-tree, and a withered pipal-tree beneath which he rests suddenly becomes green.[1] He is tempted in the wilderness, and the Lord of the age offers him a palace of pearls, beautiful women, the sovereignty of the East and West; he is unmoved. So he passes to and fro among devotees and ascetics, among the learned Hindus and the Mohammedan saints, in courts and in cottages, till after twelve years he returns home. Fame has preceded him, and his father goes out ceremoniously on horseback to meet him. But neither parental entreaties nor conjugal duties can detain him, and the prophet sets forth anew with his faithful follower, the minstrel Mardana.

Such a teacher naturally gathered disciples (Sikhs) around him, and little societies formed themselves in the places which he visited. At Kartarpur, east of Lahore, devotion began, a watch before day, with the repetition of the long composition entitled the Japji. Other hymns were read and expounded before breakfast; the disciples met again in the third watch; in the evening they dined together and sang hymns before retiring. The teacher demanded of them freedom of mind from the distractions of sense, pious discourse and devout praise, instead of holding up an arm, standing on one leg, living upon roots, or scorching amid five fires. They must associate with holy men, serve those who were superior to themselves, expel all evil from their hearts, renounce slander, pride, and obstinacy. In token of humility, the custom arose of drinking the water in which the Guru had washed his feet. That act of reverence made a man a Sikh.

Tradition extended the area of Nānak's preaching as far as Ceylon, and even sent him to Arabia. In the blue dress of a Mohammedan pilgrim, with a faqir's staff in his hand and a book of his hymns under his arm, he made his way to Mekka and sat among the worshippers in the great mosque. As he lay down to sleep at night he turned his feet towards the sacred stone. An Arab priest angrily kicked the sleeper

[1] Macauliffe, i. 59: the miracle occurred again in Ceylon, 155; and once more before his death, 188.

and asked why he had turned his feet towards God. "Turn my feet," was the well-known reply, "in the direction in which God is not." The indignant Musalman dragged his feet round, whereupon, to justify the Guru, the whole temple revolved to match. Devout rationalists understand the wonder in a spiritual sense, and read in it a symbol of the conversion of the centre of Islâm. The Teacher vindicated himself before the authorities of the sanctuary by quoting a hymn of Kabir:

> "O brethren, the Vedas and the Quran are false, and free not the mind from anxiety.
> If for a moment thou restrain thy mind, God will appear before thee.
> . . . .
> Take heed, ever fix thine eyes on him who is everywhere present.
> God is the purest of the pure: shall I doubt whether there is another equal to him?
> Kabir, he to whom the Merciful hath shown mercy, knoweth him." [1]

And addressing his hearers in Persian he added:

> "I have consulted the four Vedas, but these writings find not God's limits.
> I have consulted the four books of the Mohammedans, but God's worth is not described in them.
> . . . .
> I have dwelt by rivers and streams, and bathed at the sixty-eight places of pilgrimage;
> I have lived among the forests and glades of the three worlds, and eaten bitter and sweet;
> I have seen the seven nether regions and heavens upon heavens;
> *And I*, Nānak, *say* man shall be true to his faith if he fear *God* and *do good* works."

At Baghdad he proclaimed the call to prayer, substituting other Arabic words for the mention of Mohammed, and announced his mission: "I have appeared in this age to indicate the way unto men.[2] I reject all sects, and only know one God, whom I recognise in the earth, the heavens, and in all directions."

[1] Macauliffe, i. 177.

[2] An early tradition related that on Nānak's death in a prior age two roads opened before his soul; one led to heaven, the other to hell. Nānak chose the latter, and having descended to the nether realms brought all the inhabitants out. The Lord God said to him: "These sinners cannot enter heaven; you must return into the world and liberate them." So Nānak came into this world, and the Guru comes and goes till that multitude shall have found their salvation. *Dabistan*, ii. 269.

The years ran on, and the Teacher returned to Kartarpur, where his faithful follower, the minstrel Mardana, died. "Sit on the bank of the Ravi," said his Master; "fix thine attention on God, repeat his name, and thy soul shall be absorbed in his light." A little later it was the Guru's turn. His own sons were unfit to continue his work, and he chose a devoted attendant, Lahina, to whom he gave the name of Angad,[1] to succeed him. Kinsmen and disciples, whole troops of Sikhs, Hindus, and Musalmans, gathered round him to bid him farewell. In solemn words he was believed to sum up his life's teaching; the omnipresence and omnipotence of God, the illusoriness of the world, the destiny of the soul according to its deeds, were the great themes of his message.[2] The Hindus said they would cremate him, and the Mohammedans wished to bury him. "Let the Hindus set flowers on my right hand," said the dying Teacher, "and the Mohammedans on my left. They whose flowers are fresh in the morning shall dispose of my body." They sang, at his request, a hymn of praise; he made the last obeisance to God, and blended his light with Guru Angad's. In the morning the flowers on both sides were fresh; but when the sheet spread over his body was lifted, it had disappeared.

The hymns of Nānak, like those of Kabir (whom he was supposed to have met as a young man of twenty-seven in the year 1496),[3] contain two distinct currents, which frequently, like the Rhone and the Saône, flow on side by side and hardly mingle. On the one hand is a mystical pantheism: "Wherever I look, there is God: no one else is seen."[4] He is the lake and the swan, the lotus and the lily, the fisherman and the fish, the net, the lead, the bait. So he is "himself the worshipper"; "search not for the True One afar off, he is in every heart," the light within.[5] Salvation, on this basis, lies in knowledge of God, in recognition of the mystery of

[1] Meaning "a part of my body"; Macauliffe, ii. 9.
[2] *Ibid.*, i. 188.
[3] Westcott, *Life of Kabir*, p. 2, note 4.
[4] Macauliffe, i. 319.
[5] *Ibid.*, 254, 265, 328.

identity, in the intuition of the illusion of separateness. And this is the act of his grace: "he to whom God giveth understanding understandeth."[1] But while he thus works in the soul, the field of conduct is marked off for the will; and the disciple is summoned to make his own destiny by shaping his own character. Worldliness and hypocrisy, the profession of religion and secret vice, sensual indulgence combined with the Hindu ascetic's long hair and ashes smeared upon his person, the Mohammedan judge telling his beads and taking bribes, are lashed with unsparing scorn. Of what avail the shaven head, the penance of the five fires, the beggar's patched coat, with a heart full of pride or covetousness! Abandon falsehood and pursue truth, put away lust and wrath, slander, avarice: "All men's accounts shall be taken in God's court, and no one shall be saved without good works."[2] Here is an ethical demand, strictly controlling the raptures of religious ecstasy, which recognises a sphere of independent action, and sets up man as the maker of his own fate. Nānak leaves the antinomy as he found it in the great religious tradition of his race. On the one hand, the world is the scene of God's Providence, and he who created it has to take thought for it also.[3] On the other, it is only a divine sport, and all living creatures are his play. Anon, they are under the dooms of destiny; they are involved in the ocean of births; they rise and pass away in virtue of their merit or their guilt in former lives. The law of transmigration implies separateness. That is the great illusion which the true Teacher must continually seek to dispel. The Pandit and the preceptor may "ever read the Purānas, but know not the Thing within them—God, who is concealed within the heart." Deliverance only comes to him who can say, "If it please thee, O Lord, thou art mine and I am thine."[4]

[1] Macauliffe, 289.
[2] *Ibid.*, 357, 369.
[3] *Ibid.*, i. 228, 248; cp. the image of the herdsman, 301.
[4] *Ibid.*, i. 317.

III.

Here lay the significance of the Guru. Though it is God who imparts wisdom and causes man to do good works, the mediation of the Teacher is still essential. Truly to serve the Guru was to know the Lord; "God saveth man through the true Guru's instruction—the true Guru is the giver and procurer of emancipation."[1] The maintenance of the succession thus became matter of the first importance; without it, the loose company of the first disciples could never have been organised into a close-knit and coherent religious community.

Very different were the characters and destinies of the nine Gurus who followed Nānak. Angad succeeded Nānak (1538) at the age of thirty-four; Amar Das who followed him in 1574 was already seventy-three, and ruled for two-and-twenty years. With the fourth Guru, Ram Das, the office became hereditary, though it did not descend to the first-born. Very pathetic is the picture of the boy Guru, Har Krishan, who solemnly instructed his Sikhs at five years old. Summoned to Delhi by the Emperor Aurungzeb, who was believed to aim at converting all the Hindus to Islâm, he heals the halt and leprous by the way, cures the sufferers from the plague at the capital, but succumbs himself with gentle resignation to an attack of small-pox at the age of eight (1664). Some are devoted to the chase, and fight in the grand style with lordly courtesy, smiting tiger or warrior in two at a single sword-stroke. Arjan dies a martyr by order of the Emperor Jahangir, at Lahore (1606); and Teg Bahadur, refusing to embrace Islâm, is put to death by Aurungzeb (1675); while the last of the ten, Gobind Singh, after his sons have been slaughtered, perishes by the assassin's dagger,—he is afterwards seen riding in the forest, bow in hand,—after solemnly announcing that the Granth shall be the future Guru: "Let him who desireth to behold me, behold the Guru Granth. Obey the Granth Sahib. It is the visible body of the Guru."[2]

[1] Macauliffe, i. 363. [2] *Ibid.*, v. 244.

A mysterious bond united this succession. Early Mohammedan speculation had described Mohammed as a primeval light before God, a divine spark sent forth from the Infinite Radiance. Deposited in the loins of Adam, it had passed on to Noah, and thence to Abraham, Moses, and Christ. A similar continuity united the ten Gurus. The light of Nānak blended at his death with that of Angad, and in due course was transmitted through the rest.[1] There was a sense in which they were but one, and Nānak was the real author of his successors' hymns.[2] The conception of the Guru, however, advanced to still higher flights. In a land of Avatars it was not difficult to claim for him some kind of transcendental unity with God. To the disciple he became "God in Person."[3] Miracle and prophecy manifested his power, He that hath seen the Guru hath seen God: "O God, the Guru hath shown thee to mine eyes."[4] God's word and the Guru are interchangeable terms: "The Word is the Guru and the Guru is the Word":[5] nay, more, "know that God and the Guru are one."[6] It was not wonderful, therefore, that at the death of the sixth Guru, Har Gobind (1645), the sky should glow rose-red, songs of welcome should be heard on high, soft fragrant winds should blow, and a vast multitude of saints and demigods should assemble.[7] So the last Guru proclaimed himself a "Son of the Immortal," and declared "I tell the world what God told me: as God spake to me I speak."[8]

To the Granth, therefore, containing the hymns of the Gurus, their authority was in due time committed. The successor of Nānak, Angad, wrote down many of the prophet's

[1] Cp. Macauliffe, iv. 214–5; v. 294–5.

[2] For somewhat similar phenomena in modern Babism compare Mírzá Jání in the *New History* (translated by Prof. E. C. Browne), p. 331; and the doctrine of the "Return," *New History*, p. 335, and *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1889, p. 952.

[3] Macauliffe, ii. 145. [4] *Ibid.*, iii. 312. [5] *Ibid.*, ii. 339.

[6] *Ibid.*, iv. 285. So Beháulláh, the successor of the Bab, was designated "God" or "the Truth," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1889, pp. 518, 519

[7] Macauliffe, iv. 236. Cp. similar manifestations at the death of the Buddha

[8] *Ibid.*, v. 61, 300.

hymns in a modified Panjábi dialect. But the formal compilation was not completed till a later day. This was effected by the fifth Guru, Arjan (1581–1606). His purpose was to show that saints of every caste and creed were worthy of reverence, and he invited the followers of both Hindu and Mohammedan teachers to supply poems for insertion. Some were possibly altered on the way; but two Mohammedan compositions were included. The Pandits might object to the use of a vulgar instead of a learned tongue, but Guru Har Gobind (1606–1645) replied that the Granth must be preserved in a language which women and children could understand, so that all persons of whatever caste could read it.[1] So the religion of the Sikhs became a book-religion, and the first step towards a new formalism was taken. To study the Granth became more than a duty: it was a passport to salvation: "Even if an ignorant man read the Gurus' hymns," said Har Gobind, "all his sins shall be remitted."[2]

Parallel with the creation of a Scripture ran the organisation of worship and the foundation of a temple. Daily devotions had been obligatory from the days of Nānak. But the fourth Guru, Ram Das ("Servant of God," 1574–1581), who established the principle of hereditary succession for the transmission of the Guruship, provided a cultus and an ecclesiastical centre. No less than his predecessors, he preached the doctrine of the universal presence of God. "The soul of the world is everywhere diffused and filleth every place; within and without us is the one God"; "I am searching for my Friend, but my Friend is with me."[3] But at the same time he instituted a Mekka for his Sikhs, in the temple erected in the midst of the "Pool of Ambrosia," known as Amritsar. Guru Amar Das (1552–1574) had already, in obedience to Nānak's command in a vision, established a sacred well as an

[1] Macauliffe, iv. 136.

[2] *Ibid.*, iv. 58. Cp. the reading of it for the repose of the soul of Gurditta, p. 221.

[3] *Ibid.*, ii. 335, 347. The logical sequel of this was, "wherefore I go nowhere," iii. 331.

object of pilgrimage, to preserve the Sikhs from perversion by Hindus at holy centres like Benares. Ram Das proceeded to construct a second; and on a site said to have been granted by the Emperor Akbar, thirty-two miles east of Lahore, he excavated a vast pool. Its miraculous efficacy was soon attested by the cure of a leprous cripple, and, in spite of the ridicule repeatedly poured in the hymns on the sixty-eight bathing-places of Hinduism, the Guru promised that whoever bathed in Amritsar should gain all spiritual and temporal advantages.[1] Founded in 1577 on an island in the midst, the temple was completed under Guru Arjan. In token of humility, he ordered that it should be approached by descending steps; in contrast with Hindu temples entered only from the east, it was open on all sides, to give access from every quarter under heaven; and the Guru renewed the promise of forgiveness of sins to all who duly bathed and worshipped God.[2] So ceremony began to creep into the religion of the spirit.

This materialising tendency was further promoted by the rise of a military organisation in the new community. The tolerant Emperor Akbar, curious about so many religions, did not neglect the growing order of the Sikhs. He visited the third Guru, Amar Das, and condescended to eat the coarse unseasoned rice which was all that his kitchen could provide. He ordered the Granth to be read to him, in consequence of complaints that it spoke contemptuously of Mohammedan teachers and Hindu deities. He tested it in various places, and declared that he found in it nothing but love and devotion to God.[3] But his successor, Jahangir, adopted a different policy. Guru Arjan aided Akbar's unfortunate son Khusro with money on his flight to Afghanistan, and paid for his rash pity with his life. As he passed from his prison at Lahore to the bank of the Ravi, where he was permitted to bathe before his death, he is said to have sent a message to his son and

[1] Macauliffe, ii. 271. He had laid it down otherwise that "Religious ceremonies produce pride," *ibid.*, ii. 309.

[2] *Ibid.*, iii. 13.

[3] *Ibid.*, iii. 83.

successor, Har Gobind (1606–1645): "Let him sit fully armed upon his throne, and maintain an army to the best of his ability."[1] The youth of eleven was not slow to follow his father's advice. He promptly called for arms and arrayed himself in martial style; and, to his mother's remonstrances that his predecessors handled no weapons, and the family possessed no treasure, no revenue, no land, no army, the boy boldly replied in his father's words, "The Lord, who is the searcher of all hearts, is my guardian." So the faithful brought offerings of arms and horses; warriors and wrestlers were enrolled as a body-guard; and the duties of preaching and organising services were diversified with military exercises and the chase. For a while all was secure. Robbers vanished like owls and cats at sunrise. Travellers passed in safety through the forest. Songs of joy rose out of village homes, and the golden age seemed to have returned.

But such assumption was naturally provocative. Collisions followed with the royal troops. The speeches and combats of the protagonists are related in Homeric style. The Guru, when his adversary is unhorsed, disdains to press his advantage, dismounts and offers him a choice of weapons; they fight with sword and shield, and "when the combat was becoming monotonous," Guru Gobind at one blow severs his opponent's head from his body.[2] It is a long way from the language of the third Guru, Amar Das. When his Sikhs asked how long they should bear the tyranny of the Mohammedans, he replied, "As long as you live; it is not proper for saints to take revenge."[3] The principle of militarism, once established, held its own through varying fortunes, and the community was finally consolidated on a fighting basis by the last Guru, Gobind "the Lion" (1675–1708). It was his ambition to create a national movement and rule North-West India; and for this end he organised his forces as a kind of "church militant," to which he gave the name of Khalsa, or "The

[1] Macauliffe, iii. 99.
[2] *Ibid.*, iv. 212.
[3] *Ibid.*, ii. 68.

Pure."[1] Starting with five Sikhs who were willing to stand the severest tests of obedience and offer their heads for their Lord, he gave them the half-punning name of Singhs or "lions," and baptised them by sprinkling a special consecrated water on their hair and eyes. They promised, and thousands followed them, to worship one God, to honour Nānak and his successors, to keep their hair unshorn,[2] to carry arms, to help the poor, to eat out of one dish,[3] to avoid tobacco, and to be faithful to their wives. Of these vows the "five K's" were the symbol—five articles the names of which began with K—the uncut hair, short drawers, an iron bangle, a small steel dagger, and a comb. The sacred food of a communion meal must be prepared, with prayer, by a Sikh who had bathed in the morning, and could repeat at least the Japji from memory.[4]

IV.

Thus was a sect converted into a nationality. Two sets of influences may be traced in its creed, for the Hindu and Mohammedan elements meet, but do not always blend. The hymns assume throughout the Indian scheme of transmigration, regulated by the unvarying action of the Deed. The cycles of time are arranged in the same succession of ages. But the believer's goal is now Nirvāna, where the saint unites his life with God, and now a Paradise where sorrow and sickness and death enter not, and the saints are ever hymning the Creator's praise.[5] So the Deity is presented in some hymns in the two-fold aspect of philosophical pantheism; as the Absolute, raised above all differentiation, of whom nothing can be predicated because he is without attributes (*nirguna*); and as the immanent Deity of the phenomenal scene, as fully contained

[1] The word is said to come from the Arabic *khālis,* "pure." Macauliffe, v. 95, note 1. With this the teacher identified himself so completely that he could say, "The Khalsa is the Guru, and the Guru is the Khalsa," *ibid.*, 96.

[2] This is justified by the examples of Christ and Mohammed. *Ibid.*, v. 90.

[3] "How," asked the Hindus, "can the four castes dine together?" *Ibid.,* v. 97.

[4] *Ibid.*, v. 114.

[5] *Ibid.*, v. 223.

in the ant as in the elephant,[1] dowered with all the qualities of his boundless creation (*sarvaguna*).[2] The link between the two is the Vedântic *māyā*, the mysterious source of the illusion of relative reality, so that the whole world is bound by love of her. "Rid thyself of duality," is the Teacher's cry on this side. There is nothing here like the profound motive of Mahommedan piety, the desire of God for self-revelation. When David asked, "O Lord, why hast thou created mankind?" God answered, "I am a hidden treasure, and I would fain become known." But anon, in other hymns the language of metaphysic is dropped. God is the universal Father,[3] the mighty Maker of the earth and sky, Ocean of mercy and Saviour of sinners. The confessions of sinfulness are pitched in a key not often employed in Indian literature, and may perhaps be due to association with the saints of Islâm. Azrael appears again and again as the counterpart of the Dharma-rājā, the "king of righteousness," the title of Yama, the sovereign and judge of the nether realms, in ancient Hindu folklore. The saint who can say, "My soul is reconciled with God, and become imbued with his wondrous love," exclaims, "What can Dharmraj do, now that all his account-books are torn up?"[4]

The language of erotic devotion has plenty of antecedents in the religions of *Bhakti*, without resort to Sufi ecstasies: "Give thy heart to thy Darling, enjoy him, and thou shalt obtain all happiness and bliss": the longing of the chatrik for the raindrops, of the bumble-bee for the lotus, of the sheldrake for the sun—these are but faint images of the love man should bear to God. And God's love is shown not only in the beauty and the bounty of nature, but in his constant provision for human deliverance: "it hath ever been usual that when God seeth his people suffering, he sendeth a Saviour of the world": "he was saved himself," they sang of the Guru, "and

[1] Macauliffe, iii. 174; v. 262. [2] *Ibid.*, iii. 117. [3] *Ibid.*, iii. 112.

[4] *Ibid.*, v. 355; cp. iii. 417. The seven heavens and the seven hells, v. 285, are Semitic rather than Hindu.

he saved the world."[1] Yet the whole is only an infinite sport; God plays his own play; "as he pleaseth, he maketh men to dance; who else can criticise him?" "There is no fault with the vessels of clay, and no fault with the Potter."[2]

Very singular, in the presence of this sole activity of God, is the part occasionally played by the miracles of the Guru or his family. They are depositaries of supernatural power. They heal the sick, they give sight to the blind, the deaf hear, the dumb speak; they even raise the dead. Teg Bahadur causes the chains of three followers imprisoned with him at Lahore to fall off; the prison doors open, the guards snore, and they walk away, while he remains to give his life for his people, and by his sacrifice secure the undoing of the Mohammedan power.[3] But he refuses to perform a miracle to convince the emperor, because it was "the wrath of God." When Baba Atal, the darling son of the sixth Guru, Har Gobind, who had been warned not to display his power, brings back to life a playfellow who has been bitten by a cobra, his father vehemently rebukes him for interfering with God's will. "Now, whenever a son may die, the parents will bring him to our door. Whose son shall we reanimate, and whose shall we allow to die? God showeth no favour to man, who must enjoy or suffer the result of his acts"; "thou must be working miracles, while I teach men to obey God's will." The boy humbly announces his departure to the skies; bathes in the ambrosial tank, circumambulates the Golden Temple four times, repeats the Japji, and blends his light with the light of God.[4] Years afterwards, the Guru's eldest son, Gurditta, was out hunting, and one of his Sikhs shot a cow by mistake for a deer. Gurditta offered compensation in vain; the angry shepherd demanded the restoration of the cow. Gurditta at last put his cane on her head and said "Arise and eat"; the beast obeyed and joined the herd. The Guru condemned the act: "It is not pleasing to me that anyone should set himself

[1] Macauliffe, iv. 357, 239.
[2] *Ibid.*, iii. 233, 239, 253, 314, 417; iv. 17.
[3] *Ibid.*, iv. 382.
[4] *Ibid.*, iv. 131.

up as God's equal and restore life to the dead. Guru Nānak ordereth that we should accept the will of God. If thou persist in doing acts contrary to God's will, thy further residence on earth is unprofitable." The young man accepted his doom, circumambulated the Guru in token of offering himself as a sacrifice to him, and laid down his life at a neighbouring shrine.[1]

Here the vicissitudes of daily experience are viewed in the light of a divinely realised moral order. To this belongs a practical ethic of a humane and vigorous activity. Man must always reap what he sows; and while the earlier Gurus are never weary of warnings against externality and ostentation, they lay the utmost stress on the homely virtues of pure family life. Every reader will be struck with the part repeatedly played by the Guru's mother, and the reverence paid to her. Truthfulness and honesty, humility and obedience, are demanded from all. Like the early Christians, the Sikhs must be given to hospitality; they must bear injuries and conquer revenge; they must avoid covetousness. Kings must not oppress their subjects: let them construct tanks, wells, bridges, and schools, and extend religion throughout their dominions.[2] The worship of ancestors was futile, and Amar Das discouraged the burning of widows. With the usual transference of the external practice into the interior sphere, he declared that "they are known as Satis who abide in modesty and contentment, who wait upon the Lord, and, rising in the morning, ever remember him." Arjan, starting on the journey to Lahore which ended in death, enjoined his wife not to cremate herself when he was gone. Guru Gobind sarcastically inquired why, if salvation was to be secured by burning oneself, even the serpent in hell should not be saved.[3]

Thus the early Sikh religion gathered into itself all kinds of contradictions. Starting with a Puritan quietism which repudiated all external acts, and conceived the life of the believer

[1] Macauliffe, iv. 221. [2] *Ibid.*, iv. 288.
[3] *Ibid.*, ii. 228; iii. 91; v. 275.

as a continued communion with God, it developed temple and ritual and observances of ceremonial piety. Rejecting every form of violence, and enjoining the completest forgiveness of wrongs, it protects itself by military organisation, makes disciples into warriors, and turns the devotee into the soldier-saint. It announces religion in the most universal terms, breaks down all barriers of caste, and then imposes the obligation of the sword with a rite of initiation which draws the tightest of limits round the community. The ninth Guru, Teg Bahadur, was said to have warned the Emperor Aurungzeb that the Europeans would come from beyond the seas and destroy his empire. When the Sikhs assaulted Delhi in 1857, under Nicholson, this, says a modern Sikh writer, was their battle-cry, and the Guru's prophecy was gloriously fulfilled.[1] But this kind of religious militarism lacks all expansive power. The Sikh of to-day may establish newspapers, and colleges, and associations; these devices will hardly restore the ancient hardihood. The lengthy devotions of three centuries ago are irksome to the modern spirit; against the austerity of their ritual many Sikh women prefer the colour and festivals of idolatry; there are men who no longer wear their hair uncut, and are hardly distinguishable from Hindus. The present revival, like the corresponding revival of Buddhism, may for a while quicken the decaying energies of faith. It appears doubtful whether it can serve the imperial ends in which Mr Macauliffe would gladly see it enlisted. With the gradual spread of the modern spirit the claims of its Gurus will fade, and its truths will no longer stand apart from pieties that are diffused all round the globe. But its witness will then have done its work; and if its separateness disappears, it will only be to merge in that far-off goal when "the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea."

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OXFORD.

[1] Macauliffe, iv. 381.

THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM JAMES.

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FEW things are more memorable about William James as a philosopher of religion than the open and generous attitude which he always maintained toward every one else's religion and every one else's philosophy. There was never a mystic, never a visionary, never an enthusiast so extreme who, provided he were sincere and in earnest, could not win James's serious attention; and that must be a strange creed or cult indeed in which he could not find something that was good. No one could see through the extravagances of the Christian Science theory more clearly than James, yet no one not a follower of Mrs Eddy has ever seen more that is genuinely good in it or spoken of it in higher terms of praise. To the scandal of orthodox practitioners and of his numerous scientific friends he appeared in defence of it and of other new methods of treatment before the committee of the Massachusetts Legislature. I have even heard him say that there might be something good in Joseph Smith. A writer in a recent number of the *International Journal of Ethics*[1] reports him as exclaiming with amazed impatience over the inability of us Anglo-Saxons to realise that lower races "really had insides of their own." James never found it hard to believe in the "insides" of any cult or creed to which

[1] Professor A. O. Lovejoy; see the number for January 1911, p. 140.

living people really held. In short, he wished earnestly to give every poor devil his due, including in the list even the Absolute of the Neo-Hegelians. For though the Absolute is a "rubbish-heap of crazy notions" (as he used to call it), it too has its merits, even if they be no greater than that of giving us "a moral holiday." In fact, few even of the worshippers of the Absolute have celebrated its glory in more glowing terms than James.

It was, therefore, not through any lack of appreciation of the appeal of the Absolute that James opposed Monism. He knew its beauty, its pragmatic value, and would have liked to retain it in his philosophy if it had been possible. Somewhere in his *Psychology* he says, "As a rule we believe as much as we can. We would believe everything if we only could." James would have believed in the Absolute if he only could. But those who accuse him of believing what he liked with no regard for logic have altogether misunderstood him; he gave up the beauty and peace of Monism largely because he felt it was inconsistent with the kind of universe that in his opinion we actually have on our hands.

For the basis of James's religious philosophy was his pluralism. This pluralism he maintained, as I have just indicated, because he considered it the view most in harmony with the facts of experience. And I must of course add that, like every other thinker, he was influenced in making up his *Weltanschauung* by the demands and preferences of his own disposition. He was first of all interested in individuals — having the eye to see that all individuals had "insides of their own"—and the dynamic and dramatic aspect of life and of the world was what chiefly appealed to him. It was perhaps this native taste and interest that suggested, as it certainly seconded, the conclusions to which his patient thought also led. The monistic and all-inclusive Absolute, with its world in which everything is from all eternity settled and saved, appealed neither to his intellect nor to his imagination. There was, he thought, no good reason for believing in

it, and still less any good reason for wishing it. This world certainly does not *look* like one that is altogether rational and good from any point of view. It is partly rational, indeed; but if we know what we mean by rational and irrational, by good and evil, then certainly there seems to be a good deal of irrationality here that must be faced and acknowledged, and if possible overcome.

The pluralistic world in which James believed was a dynamic, a dramatic world,—yes, even a tragic one. All is not yet settled and decided, and it may never be. It is a world characterised by those words of which James makes so much in his last published paper[1] (which seemed so like a deliberate farewell!)—"ever not quite." The finishing stroke has never been added to the universe—and perhaps never will be. It is not a world that is saved from all eternity, but one in which there are real perils, real crises, real losses, and consequently one in which there is genuine struggle and something for us actually to do. The struggle is not yet decided, and we may therefore have a share in deciding it. "I am willing to think," he writes in *Pragmatism*, "that the prodigal son attitude is not the right and final attitude toward the whole of life. I am willing that there should be real losses and real losers, and no total preservation of all that is. I can believe in the ideal as an ultimate, not as an origin, and as an extract, not the whole."

The God of such a pluralistic universe is evidently a very different being from the Absolute. He is, as James used repeatedly to call Him, "a God down in the dirt." (For James was always willing to accept all the bad names his opponents could invent for his theories, and to suggest a few additional ones himself. "A sand heap," "a Dyak's head," he called his own pluralistic world, while he was willing the monistic world should be pictured as a "Greek temple," though he more often called it "a block universe.") This "God down in the dirt" would doubtless have very great power, but He must

[1] "A Pluralistic Mystic," *Hibbert Journal*, July 1910.

not be conceived as absolutely omnipotent. This being the case, we retain the right to call Him good, and to believe that He cherishes the great ideals for which we long and for which we live, but which we do not find as yet realised in this world. For such a philosophy the problem of evil has no terrors, because its God *finds* these evils instead of making them, and fights against them as we do.

James was certainly no theologian, nor even what might be called a systematic philosopher. He rather disliked system —or at least more than a little of it—and I think he felt a little cramped by creeds. Hence he never made any full and complete statement of his religious philosophy. He was far too consistent an empiricist ever to be dogmatic about anything, and he would be the first to admit that it was quite possible that all his beliefs and conclusions were fallacious. And yet his point of view and his temperament were emphatically those of the believer rather than those of the sceptic. And his belief, though never dogmatically expressed in a formal statement, he made quite clear in his books and classes and his talks with friends and students. And while this belief was certainly not orthodox and was always held tentatively and with an open mind, it included in a way the two things which are commonly considered the most important points of religious belief—namely, faith in some kind of God, and at least a living hope for some kind of immortality.

Some years ago I had occasion to get out a questionnaire on various religious subjects, and William James not only aided me in the formulation of the questions, but also kindly wrote out his own personal answers to them all. One of the questions was, "Do you believe in personal immortality? If so, why?" To this his answer was: "Never keenly; but more strongly as I grow older," and, "Because I'm just getting fit to live." In this connection too should be mentioned the very considerable impression which the results of psychical research made upon his mind. He was, indeed, never convinced that the survival of death had been proved, but he felt that we had

not yet got to the bottom of the question, and that there might be more in the deliverances of the mediums than orthodox "Science" would allow. Once he thought he had "treed a ghost" himself; but this ended with that baffling inconclusiveness in which the most promising investigations of the kind usually terminate,—once more a case of "ever not quite." As a good empiricist he made little or nothing of the Platonic "proofs" of immortality, but he none the less felt strongly that no refutation of it had ever been given by physiological psychology or any other science. Most readers of this Journal will doubtless remember how brilliantly, in his Ingersoll lecture, he demolishes the claims sometimes made in the name of physiology or psychology that survival of bodily death has been shown to be impossible, and how he vindicates for faith at least the right to believe.

But James's hope for immortality was bound up with the larger question whether the spiritual or the mechanical were the dominant power in the universe, and so is only a part of his larger faith in a spiritual world leading out from our own, of which God is a part. And here again we never find James laying down any systematic demonstration or even any complete statement of his position; and yet there is hardly a book of his that does not seek in some way to justify this faith. If I, then, may venture to be systematic with the work of one who himself never was so, I might say, in very general fashion, that James justified his religious hope in two ways. He showed, in the first place, that to cherish one's hopes rather than one's fears was the rational thing to do; and, in the second place, he appealed as a psychologist to the facts of human consciousness to show the probability of the kind of spiritual world in which he believed.

In the popular mind James probably stands, more than for anything else, for the "Will to Believe." And in one way this is quite as it should be. But the particular turn which that expression has taken in the common estimation, especially since the beginning of the pragmatist controversy, has tended

to rob James's views of much of their persuasiveness. For pragmatism has been popularly interpreted to mean believing what you please, and the will to believe is sometimes taken to be an attempt to lift yourself—and the universe—by your bootstraps. This is as unfair as it is unfortunate,—a simple travesty of the doctrines involved. And in spite of the close relation between James's temperament and his philosophy, few thinkers have been more conscientious than he in their attempts to reject all views that are not really justified by logic and experience. James never said, and certainly never for a moment meant, that we might rightly believe whatever we liked. His thesis in the essay "The Will to Believe" is that when we are presented with a forced option between two alternatives, both of which are genuinely alive but neither of them demonstrable, then the course of wisdom is for us to choose tentatively that one which is in accord with our hopes rather than with our fears, and to *act as if it were true*. Often, to be sure, we need not choose nor act at all. But there are some questions whose answers we may never learn but upon which we must take one side or the other—because to refuse to choose is itself an act and a choice. Primary among such questions is the religious one. Here choose we must, for this is a matter in which life itself forces us to choose.

It is, therefore, essentially rational for us to *act* as if the religious hypothesis were true. But have we any *reason* for believing that it *is* true? James makes very little of the historical arguments for the existence of God. But in characteristic fashion he finds in human psychology facts which lead him to consider the religious hypothesis more probable than its rival. The more exuberant and indescribable forms of conscious experience which refuse to submit to logical photography seemed to him peculiarly significant and worthy of study. "I suppose," he writes in answer to my questionnaire, "that the chief promise for my hospitality toward the religious testimony of others is my conviction that 'normal' or 'sane' consciousness is so small a part of actual

experience. Whate'er be true, *it* is not true exclusively, as philistine scientific opinion assumes. The other kinds of consciousness bear witness to a much wider universe of experiences, from which our belief selects and emphasises such parts as best satisfy its needs." These "other kinds of consciousness" to which James appeals are of course those commonly included under the broad term "Mysticism." In his long and careful study of human consciousness, especially as displayed in religious faith, the conversion experience, the mystic tradition, he felt he had found certain facts of considerable significance on ultimate problems. Especially the almost unanimous testimony of the mystics, the world over and the centuries through, to the existence of a spiritual beyond with which they came in touch, appealed to him as something that could not lightly be explained away. And he felt the more convinced of this because of the saving and transforming experiences brought about by religion in innumerable individuals in other respects quite far from mysticism.

It was, perhaps, unfortunate that James's treatment of these facts of the religious life was so closely connected with the view of the subconscious self which he borrowed from F. W. B. Myers. Unfortunate I call it, because Myers's rather poetical hypothesis, once improved and supported by James, has lent itself to all sorts of popular exaggeration and cheap metaphysics, and also because (to tell the simple truth) it is rather questionable psychology. But this entanglement with the subconscious should not be allowed to rob James's real position, based as it is on a broad empirical foundation, of its genuine strength. And his great work, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, has made it for ever plain that the voice of the religious consciousness of the race must be heeded and reckoned with by whosoever would deal profoundly with the question of man's spiritual environment and destiny, and that the ultimate significance of the mystic tradition on the nature of the universe is itself one of the profoundest problems of philosophy.

James's respect for the mystics was an excellent instance of his open mind and empirical point of view; for he was himself no mystic and always disclaimed having what he called the "leaky" form of consciousness. In answer to a certain question in my questionnaire on this point he replies as follows: "I believe in God, not because I have experienced His presence, but because I need it so that it 'must' be true." "The whole line of testimony on this point [the existence of such an experience] is so strong that I am unable to pooh-pooh it away. No doubt there is a germ in me of something similar that makes admiring response." This "something" in him which at least corresponded to the mystic's consciousness of God he once described to me in another fashion. "It is," he said, "very vague and impossible to describe or put into words. In this it is somewhat like another experience that I have constantly—a tune that is always singing in the back of my mind but which I can never identify nor whistle nor get rid of. Something like that is my feeling for God, or a Beyond. Especially at times of moral crisis it comes to me, as the sense of an unknown something backing me up. It is most indefinite, to be sure, and rather faint. And yet I know that if it should cease there would be a great hush, a great void in my life."

This personal side of his religion and its close connection with his religious philosophy comes out more clearly in a letter which he wrote to a friend[1] who had disagreed with him on the proper interpretation of the mystic consciousness. This letter he kindly allowed me to copy, and with the permission of the friend to whom it was written I shall reproduce part of it here:

"If mystical states with all their differences have a common nucleus, then this nucleus should be reckoned a co-ordinate factor with reason in the building up of religious belief. The intellect is interpretative and critical of its own interpretation, but there must have been a thesis to interpret, and that thesis

[1] Professor James H. Leuba.

seems to me to be the non-rational sense of a 'higher' power. Religious men largely agree that this sense has been that of their 'best' moments, best not only in passing but when looked back upon. The notion of it has leaked into mankind from their authority, the rest of us being imitative, just as we are of scientific men's opinions. Now may not this mystical testimony that there is a God be true, even though the precise determinations, being so largely 'suggestive' contributions of our rational factor, should widely differ? It seems to me that to throw out the whole mystical life from a hearing, because of the facility with which it combines with discrepant interpretation, would be like throwing out the senses for a similar reason, from recognition as a factor of our 'rational' knowledge. Is there diabolic mysticism? Even so there is toothache, nausea, vertigo, 'nervousness.' It is evident that our data are complex, however we confine them, and that *sifting* is necessary, be the mystical door left open or kept closed. The truth is what will survive the sifting, sifting, by successive generations and 'on the whole.'

"I find it preposterous to suppose that if there be a feeling of unseen reality shared by large numbers of best men in their best moments, responded to by other men in their 'deep' moments, good to live by, strength-giving, I find it preposterous, I say, to suppose that the goodness of that feeling for living purposes should be held to carry no objective significance, and especially preposterous if it combines harmoniously with our otherwise grounded philosophy of objective truth.

"My personal position is simple. I have no living sense of commerce with a God. I envy those who have, for I know that the addition of such a sense would help me greatly. The Divine, for my active life, is limited to impersonal and abstract concepts which, as ideals, interest and determine me, but do so but faintly in comparison with what a feeling of God might effect if I had one. This, to be sure, is largely a matter of intensity, but a shade of intensity may make one's whole centre of moral energy shift.

"Now although I am so devoid of *Gottesbewusstsein* in the directer and stronger sense, yet there is *something* in me which makes *response* when I hear utterances from that quarter made by others. I recognise the deeper voice. Something tells me, 'Thither lies truth.' And I am sure it is not old theistic prejudices of infancy. Those in my case were Christian, but I have grown so out of Christianity that entanglement therewith on the part of a mystical utterance has to be abstracted from and overcome before I can listen. Call this, if you like, my mystical *germ.* It is a very common germ. It creates the rank and file of believers. As it withstands in my case, so it will withstand in most cases, all purely atheistic criticism; but interpretative criticism (not of the mere 'hysteric' and 'nerves' order) it can energetically combine with.

"Dogmatic atheism or naturalism is a consistent position. Without any mystical germ at all in us, I believe that is where we would probably all be to-day. But the mystical germ (or flower or fruit) points elsewhere; and if you once allow any influence to its pointing, it seems to me that you are in the position occupied by my book."

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REVELATION AND BIBLE.

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CHRISTIAN Revelation is really Redemption. It is not showing something, nor telling something, but doing something, and something very decisive. It is not truth about God, it is God coming as His own truth. It is truth in the form of life, God's life, God's action. And what kind of action? It is not God parting the curtains, looking out, and permitting Himself to be seen in a *tableau vivant*. It is not God manifesting Himself as the spiritual or the moral ideal, writing Himself large to our sight, as if He were some vast and glorious constellation high in our soul's heaven. As even Jonathan Edwards said, the revealed glory of God does not consist in the exhibition of His attributes but in the diffusion of His fulness. What we need is power to be and do what we know. We know much more than we can realise. Of course we do speak of the great impressions or discoveries in man or nature as revelations, but that is using the word in a secondary sense. Revelation is really a religious word. It is not God standing in front of man, but God casting Himself into the heart of man. It is God giving Himself to man, pouring Himself into human history, sacrificing Himself for human recovery. And since sin can only see God by being saved from guilt, therefore revelation can only come home as redemption. The unholy must be redeemed into the power of seeing the holy, and the holy must so come. Therefore revelation is God as poignant

as the cross, as deep as death, as active as evil, as intimate as the Spirit, as final and permanent as our salvation. It is God not only made flesh, nor made death, but made sin for us. It is God Himself become our justification and redemption.

The Gospel is the one central and final revelation which gives real and eternal value to all else we call revelation. Elsewhere we know; there alone we are known, and we know as we are known. It has not to do with science, or knowledge as knowledge, it has not to do with history as mere history. It has not to do with the mere occurrence of a fact, but with the meaning of it; and with its meaning not for the constitution of either God or man but for their will; it has to do with purpose and destiny. It does not tell us of God's metaphysical nature, but of His will and love. It does not give us a speculative theology, but an experimental. Nor does it give us a science of man. There is no revealed anthropology or psychology. Nor does it give us a history verified beyond all possibilities from a criticism merely historic. None of these is the gift in revelation. What is revealed is a teleology. It is man's destiny and God's practical guarantee of it. It is what He is going to do with us; nay, more, what He has done with us—not simply what He proposes with us, but what He has committed us to. When Christ died all died. Our divinest destiny is not simply revealed in the Gospel, it is conveyed to us there. It is not written up in Christ, it is branded in; it is not written on our sky, but burnt in on our soul by the cross of Christ. It is not a matter of knowledge but of life, of action, of power, of fire, of crisis, of change; of a new world, a new Humanity, rising by a new creation from the ashes of the old. We can only know it as we are changed by it. It is new light as it creates new life. At its root the Christian revelation is the Christian redemption and nothing less.

But when we say revelation is redemption we mean three things which it is not. First, it is not merely the Bible. Second, it is not merely illumination and inward light, either

rational or spiritual. And third, it is not evolution; though there is evolution in it (as I shall show), and its scope develops upon us. Evolution as a complete system is fatal to it.

On this relation of revelation to evolution I do not here touch. But I should like to say a word about the second point before I go to the first.

The Word of God is not merely illumination, either rational or spiritual. Revelation is not a matter of reason apart from faith; nor is it a matter of spirit, of spiritual subjectivity, apart from the apostolic Word. Mere rationalism, apart from the Christian revelation, is bound to end, where historically it has ended, in agnosticism, or in a monism which comes to much the same thing in practice. Without Christ history has no God in the end. And mere spiritualism, or trust in the inner light detached from the historic Word, destroys revelation in other ways. It swallows it up in the fogs, bogs, and flows of mere subjectivity. No religion is possible without a revelation, and no Christian revelation is permanently possible without a historic redemption. Religion without a revelation is mere subjective religiosity; and revelation which is not redemption is mere illumination, a mere branch of spiritual culture. It is its theology that distinguishes Christianity both from the world and from all other religions. Christianity is Christianity by the redemption which distinguishes it historically from mere manifestation, mentally from mere illumination, and morally from mere amelioration.

There are many to-day who are interested in the idea of revelation, but who are repelled by the idea of redemption. "Revelation," they say, "is not a mere theological term; it has to do with religion. But redemption is theology, and theology is mere intellectual mythology. Indeed," they say, "revelation is becoming a living idea only now. We are recovering it, loosing it and letting it go. Last century, to be sure, agnostic science immured it, locked the door, threw away the key, and wrote up 'Ignoramus et ignorabimus.' But to-day," they continue, "science itself turns gnostic and mystic. In

the hands of the biologist, the physicist, the psychicist, the historian, revelation looks out and bursts out everywhere. There are many voices, and not one of them is without signification. We must own a revelation world-wide for a world beyond. But redemption is another matter. It is an idea which belongs wholly to the past, and we escaped from it long ago." You will find Christian people, I grant, who feel or who speak like that, people at least in the churches, or not unfriendly to the Church. Indeed, in many respects to-day the severest strain is not between the Church and the world, but within the Church itself. It is set up by the question whether the Gospel is a religion of revelation without redemption, or whether it is a religion where revelation must be redemption. And by redemption is here meant something radical—the redemption of the conscience, redemption from guilt, forgiveness, redemption which involves a theodicy. I do not mean mere release from the poison and pressure of life; for guilt is something more than either disease or difficulty. Is redemption, is forgiveness, but one phase in Christianity, an element early and somewhat mythological, and one fittest still for the gross sinner and the less cultured circles; or is it the very essence always of any religion in which sinful man has to do with a Holy God? Is it a crude stage which we outgrow as we pass upward in spiritual refinement, and learn to see revelation everywhere as the inflow upon the soul of divine light and power? Is forgiveness and its reconciliation an interest which belongs chiefly to the first phase and lower end of the Christian life? As culture grows do we leave the notion of sin behind and demand something more psychological than theological for our spiritual food; an inner process promoted rather than an outward relation restored; a new way of construing the soul and its working, religion and its processes; an illumination in the soul instead of a reconciliation in Christ? Is it the soul coming to itself rather than to Christ—to its deep subliminal self instead of to its heavenly Saviour? Is Christianity to

live chiefly in that region of psychological revelation, where the deeper self has well emerged through our worldly crust and dropped all the fragments of shell; and is it then to condescend to adapt itself patiently and tolerantly to those who are in the first tumult of the eruption, in the raw redemptive stage? Is God's supreme revelation of Himself some deeper depth of our nature that wells out when the subliminal fountains of our being are broken up, something that gradually emerges upon man's consciousness as he better understands the processes of the religious soul; or is it His constant and final redemption of us by a permanently super-historic act in the historic Christ?

To that question the New Testament gives but one answer from the past, and it is the condition of the Church's future, as it has been the marrow of the Church's long experience. By all means let our preaching of the Word grow more psychological, as skilled education does; but the Word we preach does not come by any discovered psychology of ours, it comes by God's revealed act and gift in the cross of Christ. It comes in experience but not from it, else it were no revelation. Human speech becomes the divine Word only as our words are moved, filled, and ruled by the grace of God. The gift in revelation is not truth but life, not light but power, not novelty but certainty, not progress but finality not a new stage of evolution but a new creation, a new birth, a passage from death to life. No amount of light can annul a moral curse, no science, no intuition. And it is a moral curse on us that a saving God has to do with, as a holy God. Our hell is nothing He can slake with the dew of His pity, but something He must quench in the blood of His grace. In His love and His pity He may redeem us, as He did Israel, from outward foes; but it is in His holy grace and His holy cross that He must save us from ourselves, from our guilt, from man's fear and hate of His holy name. If that is not a situation manufactured by an old and morbid theology, it indicates the revelation we need in our last stress.

It is the revelation neither of an Ideal nor a Lover, but of a Redeemer.

I now come to my first point in connection with what revelation is not. Revelation is not merely the Bible. It is what gives value to the Bible; it is the Gospel in the Bible. It is not a book saying something, but a person doing something. We may mislead the unskilled by a certain way of speaking of the Bible as the Word of God. The Word of God is the Gospel, which is *in* the Bible, but it is not identical with the Bible. The soul is not the body, though it is inseparable from the body, and is the object of the body. Revelation is less than the Bible, and it is more. Its compass is very small, smaller than the Bible. So far as words go, you can pack it into a much less space. In mere statement it is simply the message of Christ living on earth, dying, risen, and living in glory, and all for God's glory in our reconciliation. You can get it into a verse like John iii. 16. But if its compass is small its content is vast, infinite. It is like a soul of genius, like an eternal soul, in a small body. Its range is beyond the compass of any book. For it can only be written out on the scale of all Humanity. And it is to be satisfied with nothing less than the total conquest of history, and its complete absorption in the Regeneration. Christ's span of life was brief enough, yet He contains Christianity, He did not simply found it. And, moreover, above all its range in history, past or future, this revelation, this Gospel, involves at its spring the whole resource of infinite God. You can have that in no possible book or library of books, but only in the soul of Christ, in the work of Christ, in a present Christ, in the Holy Ghost.

If revelation is, at the root of it, redemption, if it is God's redeeming Act on life, and not a mere reinterpretation of life, then it cannot be identical with a book. The book of a great genius might interpret life anew, but it could not redeem life. Novelty, a new problem, a fresh insight, is not the essence of either revelation or redemption, but power is. And yet how could this revelation reach us without a book? Of course a

book is not an act; it is the record of an act, or it is the product, the monument, of an act. It tells us of an act before it, or it registers the act done in producing it. The book indeed is not the act, true enough; but yet it is quite a necessary part of the act and its effect. What would our past be to us if we had no record of it? What were the drama of *Macbeth* transacted in Shakespere's imagination alone if he had not given us the play in our hands?

Is it not clear that for a revelation like God's we must have a book, and yet more than a book? I will put it thus. In the strict sense, revelation has to do only with God, and with God only in His personal relation to us. *To us.* But then *we* are not a heap of sand. Humanity is not a mere mass of units. It is an organism, with a history. And revelation therefore is God's treatment of us *in a history*, in a Humanity. Paul says it is to bring all mankind to the fulness of the stature of a colossal man in Christ Jesus. If God's treatment of us be redemption, it is a historic redemption. Its content is the living, loving, saving God; its compass is cosmic; its sphere is human history, actual history. The means it must use is action, it is not literature. God does not save man by authorship, by dropping a book from the sky, by dictating a work of more than genius. That might be the way of Mohammedanism, or Mormonism, but it is not the way of the Gospel. God did not save us even by inspiring a book. He did something, which in its turn inspired the book. Christ wrote nothing, He commanded nothing to be written. And for both prophets and apostles, for Old Testament and New Testament, the writing was an afterthought. The Gospel gift from God is neither a book nor a genius, but a Christ. It is Himself. It is a person, an incarnation. It is Himself in history, that is to say, Himself in personal, moral action, Himself acting with all His holy might in sinful Humanity and on its scale, Himself made sin for us. The gift, then, is not a book but a fact, a Person, and His consummatory Act.

But it is not even these treated as bare facts and locked in

a glass shrine like holy relics with a *χάρις ἀθίκτων ἱερῶν.* They are facts with a meaning and a value. Christ's revelation is not an incident that happened to Him, but an Act that He put Himself into. He gave Himself in it; and gave Himself, not to our historic knowledge, nor to our rational conviction and assent, but to our living faith. And what does that mean? Does faith mean just that we credit the fact of Christ or of the Cross? Does not everything turn on the content and meaning of that fact, its inner value, the purpose of that act, the moral interpretation of it, the intention and effect of it, the way God knows us in it? Especially on this last. To know that is more than just knowing God to be there. It is rather knowing that there we are known of God. That is the kind of revelation that makes Christian religion. Revelation is less being taught of God than being known of God; and religion, faith, is knowing that we are known, knowing *as* we are known, knowing in kind God's knowledge of us, knowing it back again, knowing the true inwardness of the historic fact in which we are known, apprehending that wherein we are apprehended in Christ.

So it is not a matter of sight but of insight, of personal response, of response with our person. The mere crucifixion of Jesus was no revelation. Many people saw it to whom it meant nothing more than *any* execution. It does not reach us as a religious thing, as revelation, till it receives a certain interpretation. And not any interpretation, allegorical or fanciful, will do, but the interpretation which saw God in it, and especially saw what God saw in it; which saw not what He had to put up with but what He did in it, and saw that with the whole person and not with the vision alone, with an act of will and final committal and not of mere perception. Not a soul saw it in that way when Christ died. No one saw it or answered it as the Act or Purpose of God, only as the failure of another Messiah. Therefore, besides God's Act we must have God's version of His Act. God must be His own interpreter. He must explain Himself, and His action. We have seen that none can act for God, none reveal Him, but only

Himself in Christ. But we must take this other step. None but Himself can reveal His own revelation. "God only knows the love of God," when it comes to this. So, besides God's own Act in Christ's cross, we must have, as part of it, God's own reading of it as His, and as He meant it. A man's great life-work may be to write a book revolutionising thought, but it is useless unless he secure that it is published, read, attended to—sometimes expounded. So God's own Act of redeeming is not completed without its self-interpretation. That is *His Word.* The Work goes sounding on its glorious way in the Word of it, the preaching of it. The Act of redeeming completes itself in the Word of reconciliation. The redeeming Act in Christ goes on preaching itself in the apostles it made. Truly, God's self-revelation is done in the redeeming Act of Christ—"He commendeth His own love to us in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us"; but it only comes home by the Word, the *preaching*, of the apostles, whereby Christ reveals His revelation to individual experience. The apostles did not sit down to *write* as soon as they were inspired with insight into the meaning of Christ crucified. They gave themselves up to the new Christ as they had never done when they were but disciples, and they began preaching. They were preaching the Word, and sending home, in His Spirit, God's Act in Christ, *before* the most precious part of the Bible was there at all—the New Testament. It was the Word, the Gospel, that made the New Testament. It was the preached Word that completed the revelation—not the written Word, which is but the memorandum, or the supplement, of the preaching, and reflects that kind of power. The grand value of the New Testament, then, is that it is the supreme monument of the apostles' preaching and action. To put it in a crescendo, it is the condensed *register* of their spoken *insight* into God's *meaning* of His own *action* in *Christ.* And it was the inspiration of the Redeemer that gave them this understanding. So that we might, perhaps, put it also in this way: God smote upon the world in

Christ's act of redemption; it sounded in the apostles' word of reconciliation; and it reverberated, and goes on doing so, in the Bible.

Have we not, then, the three things in revelation? We have, first, God's pure Fact and Act of redeeming revelation in Christ and Him crucified; we have, second, His true, but not pure, Word of revelation in the apostles; and thirdly, we have one monument of that twofold revelation in the Bible. (The other monument is the Church, which I have not to discuss here.)

But, "God's true, *but not pure*, word of interpretation in the apostles"! This need make no one uneasy. Christ's interpretation, in the apostles, of His sinless Self and His finished Word was done through fallible men under historic and imperfect conditions. The sense of their translation is sound and final, but the form is not perfect like a statue, nor is the marble without flaws. May I remind you that God's own Act in Christ itself rose out of the very midst of human history, and so it has pieces of that history clinging to it. It did not hover over history like the cross seen by Constantine's army. Nor was it let down on history, perfect in beauty, final in form, and four square every way, like the heavenly Jerusalem descending out of heaven from God merely to *alight* on earth. That is poetry, not history. The act of God in Christ was imbedded and involved in history. It was woven into the tissue of history. It had a long and wide preparation in history. It was blended into the pattern of Humanity. It was grafted into the great psychology of the race. Miraculous as it was, it was that. Transcendent as it was, it was immanent in the vast continuity of human affairs. So much was this the case that it has created the most tremendous difficulties for our faith. The greatest difficulties have been created by the fact that the death of Christ, which consummated God's purpose with the race, was yet a judicial murder and a national crime. "Him, delivered by the determinate counsel of God, ye *wickedly* slew." The one act in which God forgave the world

was, on its under side, an act never to be forgiven. The eternal salvation came by what Christ called an eternal sin. I do not go into discussion of that vast, that unspeakable problem. I only mention it to show what we must be prepared for if we take in earnest a historic Christianity, how mixed in its form such a revelation must be, how we must allow discounts and rebates. I am suggesting that if that is so with the *Act* of salvation it is true also of the *Word* of that Act, and especially of the Bible *record* of that Word. Divine truth and human error are distinguishable but inseparable. If the pure and perfect Act of God when it entered human history was mixed with human sin in a way that baffles our thought, need we be surprised that the Word of that Act, as *it* entered human vehicles and human story (by speech or writing), should also be mixed with foreign and imperfect elements in a perplexing way, and a way we cannot mark off with scientific exactness? If the *Act* of salvation was bound up with a crime, need we be startled if its *Word* is mingled with error? Nay, the sinless Son of God Himself—God's Word in John's sense—was, by His own consent, by His emptying of Himself, limited and wrong on certain points where now, by His grace, we are right. I mean points like the authorship of a Psalm, or perhaps the Parousia. Need we be surprised, then, if we find in the written Word the limitations which were part of the incarnation of the eternal Word. The Bible is at once a document of man's religion and more inwardly and deeply, a form of God's Word, and the chief form that we now have; but, as it wears a human and historic shape, it is not immune from human weakness, limitation, and error. The Bible is the great sacrament of the Word, wherein the elements may perish if only the Word itself endure. The letter of Scripture is the reverend bread and wine, but the consecrating Word and the power they convey is the Gospel.

The Bible is there for the sake of the Gospel within it. Anything might happen to the Bible if only it glorified the Gospel. That is the true and safe perspective for us. We

must take the whole Gospel for our salvation, but we need not take, cannot take, the whole Bible. I find some help in a way of putting it which others may think fine drawn. I ventured once to say we need not take *the whole Bible*, but we must take *the Bible as a whole*. Truly, we cannot do what we are sometimes asked to do. We cannot dissect the Word, the revelation, out of the Bible and hold it up to be sharply seen; but we can distil it. We can see it as a finer light in light. We can feel in the Bible a fulness which we can never put together from its parts. It is the "fulness of the whole earth that is God's glory," not its detail; so it is the fulness of the Bible, the Bible as a totality, that is the Word of Gospel, not a Bible in sections, texts, and atoms. There is a Bible within the Bible emerging and enlarging through it. That is God's saving will and work, which He makes felt. It is the gospel of His redemptive purpose and action. The Gospel, the revelation, is organic in the Bible, it is not composite. It came in divers times and manners, but as the dawn comes in different skies, and lands, and seasons; it is not pieced together as a puzzle that can be taken down. The Bible is not true in compartments. Only the lowest organisms are equally vital in each several and severed part.

And, again, this unity and fulness of the Bible, like the fulness of the whole earth, is not something to be viewed on the flat, but in a perspective. To the infant everything is equally near, and it puts out its hand for the gas as it does for its bottle. Only an experience (which we all forget) teaches us the meaning of near and far. And there is no greater difference between the trained and the untrained mind than the power of judging distance, the sense of relative values, the tact of degrees, the grasp of the hierarchy of truth; or in religion it is the measure of things according to what Paul calls the proportion of faith. To the untaught man most things, except so far as they affect his business or his bosom, are of equal and monotonous value. His world is a mere background for some form of egoism; and it is a

background painted as a piece of decoration would be, and not as a picture—it is on the flat. It is without perspective. Heaven is as near as earth; the horizon is at the door. The man is as ready to be interested in one thing as another, if only it be made interesting. His universe is like an infinite newspaper in which items of every kind are lowered before him on one sheet of things clean and unclean. But that is not the way of life or the manner of truth. Truth and reality exist in infinite gradations; among truths there is primogeniture and prerogative; there is degree, priority, rank, and place; there are shades, perspectives, evolutions. Beginnings rise to closes; there is a development of truth as well as of time, which grows richer and fuller always, and shows more and more the true right to reign. The truth of the world as one universe, the truth in which it is all destined to end, rises out of it in the glorious hierarchy of a varied and ordered fulness, from men, angels, and archangels, to the very Son of God. Out of a fiery mist and chaos the world rose, and out of the world comes the wonder of human society, its ordered discipline and achievements, the principles of genius, the victory of the saints, and the redemption of the Son of God; from which the Church rises as the greatest product of history, and the Bible as the senior colleague of the Church. So it is also within the Bible itself. Elements are there which in time we leave behind, because they were only a soil from which the ruling truths grew, a medium from which they condensed and rose. Beliefs and cults are shed which were but the chrysalis of living faith. The silk is drawn off the cocoon and spun fine. Truths themselves are refined and exalted, and lost in higher truths. Out of the flux of imagination there crystallises the jewel of faith. To change the image, out of the popular religion of Israel as a mere piece of civilisation hatches the living revelation of God, with healing in its wings. Out of tribal wars and national deliverances rises the world's redemption. In the midst of some Hebrew superstition emerges the prophetic religion. Out of

orgiastic dervishes develop the prophets. Out of prophetic fantasy ascends apostolic faith. Eschatological dreams ascend and come to themselves in the kingdom of heaven and the city of God. Thus as we ponder our Bible it becomes alive not at points only, or in great texts, but all along the swelling line. We come to see in it a living process, in which there are continually being thrown to the surface those things that are meant to consolidate, and stay, and rule. And there is also a debris thrown down, which we can then afford to leave and lose. There is a great process of crystallisation going on, and the mere bulk of the book is no measure of the diamonds it makes. The Christian doctor, for instance, loses his belief in demons, while he gains faith in Christ who exorcised them. The preacher gains faith in the Spirit as he strips off those early rhapsodies of wild seers in Israel, or the first babblings of the young Church as it spoke with unruly tongues. Even Isaiah (to go back for an instance) held and spread the fatal belief that Jerusalem was impregnable; and long afterwards it created the public infatuation in which Jerusalem was overthrown; but Christ drew the heart out of the prophet's message, and founded on it a Church against which the gates of hell cannot prevail. We are being taught by recent scholarship that almost every Christian belief is the sublimation and, still more, the capitalisation into eternal values, of dreams or mythologies that filled the world of that time. They had worked like yeast in the generations before, and they swelled in aspiration among the peoples around. Christ said the great Amen to the human prayer, but not to every petition of it. He answered its need, and not its ignorance, in asking. In the Bible the Spirit of God is continually coming to itself in a creative evolution, finding itself, shedding the form of a stage to win the freedom of the goal, and keeping only the things that are before out of all the things it leaves behind. Yea, the very teaching of Christ in His apostles corrects, sublimates, and eternalises the words of His own mouth upon earth, which were sometimes said but to the hour or the man, and did not

bind the Church for ever. But if ever Christ's teaching in His preaching apostles is more valuable than His teaching of His learning disciples, it is only because of His own Act in the Cross and in the Spirit, which fulfilled and finished all. It was Christ teaching all the time, and teaching concretely, as His way was—speaking to the existing situation with the opportunism of the changeless and eternal.

Let me close by illustrating what I mean from within the teaching of Christ Himself. Take the parable of Dives and Lazarus. Regard it for a moment as if the whole Bible were squeezed into that tractable size. Treat it as the Bible in small —as a Bibelot. What have you there? You have the medium and the matter, the husk and the kernel, the setting and the jewel, the ore and the gold, the scenery and the soul. You have the large pictorial element, the vehicle, and within it the truth or idea. You have scenery sketched in from the notions current at that time about the world beyond death, and you have the truth which Christ used these to teach. You have a background taken over ready made from inferior artists, and you have the foreground carefully painted by the Lord Himself. The day is gone by when we could find in the drapery of the parable a topography of the future state, guaranteed accurate by the authority of Christ. He tells us nothing of such posthumous geography or precedure. He gives us no book of the dead. He did not come either to correct or to sanction the popular ideas on such things. He simply made parables of them, as in other parables He invented or remembered. He may have shared these popular beliefs, as He knew but of a flat earth and a revolving sun. He could treat these notions as the mere setting for His truths. They were but fuel for His flame.

But beyond all the scenery He had two ideas in the front of this parable that He did mean to stamp and to wing—possibly there may be two parables fused up in our story, with an idea to each. First, He did want to press the truth, which so often engaged Him, of heaven's *bouleversement* of earth, God's

subversion of the social verdict. He often taught that the kingdom of heaven was in a standing irony to the social order, that grace upset the current criteria of social worth (as in the case of the prodigal and his brother), and that it meant the revaluation of the moral values of the natural order, and often their inversion,—the first last and the last first. And, secondly, He wished to send home the principle that, in spite of that, grace had a moral basis, that it was not freakish, and was not magical, and was not sensational, that the soul's fate was settled by a moral revelation rather than a miraculous. "If they hear not Moses and the prophets neither will they believe if one rise from the dead." It is the moral appeal that is the marrow of the Gospel, not the prodigious, not the portentous, not the thaumaturgic, not the astounding; it is the spiritual, the redemptive, not the sensational. The saving revelation is addressed to the guilty conscience, not to the domestic affections, and not to the sense of wonder. It is directed to the sinful soul and not the mind agape. Its genius is faith and not imagination, not mere sensibility; and what it would produce in us is not an impression but a confession.

Such is the Gospel in this parable; it is its truth, its burthen, its message. And such is the place of the Gospel in the Bible. It is blended, for educational purposes, with much that has no voucher, no perpetuity. Much is scaffolding that is taken down for the house to appear. The Bible has its earthly house which must be dissolved for the sake of God's building, heavenly and eternal. It is this latter that concerns our Eternity. We shall not be judged by what we thought of the Bible, but by what we did with its Gospel; not by what we knew of the Bible, but by the way it made us realise we were known of God. We shall be rich not by the ore but by the gold. It is not our wonderful body that goes with us into eternity, it is our more precious soul. So it is not the Bible, it is the Gospel. We shall not read the *Bible* any more when we pass from this world (so far as one may meddle with such forecasts); but the *Gospel* we shall read

for ever and ever; and it will deepen upon our gaze as life unto life or death unto death.

But is not all this fatal to the Bible? Is it not its destruction by modern criticism? To which may I answer that the Christian function of death is not destruction but resurrection? The Bible would die well if the Gospel lived better. In the grace and providence of God Christian criticism is doing for us what death is meant to do in the same providence. It is detaching and releasing, loosing and letting go; it is sifting the eternal Gospel from the form of history and the *milieu* of time. It is distilling the precious soul from the valuable body for heavenly places—as indeed all experience is meant to do. The great function of criticism is positive. It is not negative, not fatal. Death and judgment are not there to upset all, but to set all up; they are there less to destroy wrong than to establish right. The end of judgment is righteousness. And criticism is but the Greek for judgment, and judgment is but the Latin for righteousness. So criticism is the agent of right and truth. Judgment is not a dreadful thing but a glorious, not an awful doom but a mighty hope. That, at least, is the Bible view of it. It was looked forward to. And such is the purpose and promise of the form of judgment called criticism. It is the elimination of the Gospel from the religion of a certain race and from the record of a certain stage of culture. It is its clear display by a slow, careful, brilliant, and luminous search of the Scriptures. Amid all our popular neglect of the Bible in the Church it has never received such attention from the *mind* of the Church as it has to-day. The form of the attention is critical, and criticism always begins by being analytic, negative, and even censorious, because the abuse of authority leaves so much to clear away. But it ends with being positive and appreciative. It is a cleansing fire. It prunes for the sake of more fruit. And at this moment it is passing from the one stage to the other. It is passing into the positive, appreciative, and constructive stage. The Bible

is not dead, it is in the course of resurrection. And in such a way as I have shown. Revelation is truly in the greatest danger from evolution; but criticism would release it from mere evolution by making the book of one age to be the preacher to all time, by distinguishing the revelation from the preacher who is only made by the revelation; and it would secure by worship of the Gospel more true reverence for the Bible that grew round the Gospel.

Criticism, therefore, is not to be discouraged but to be criticised. It grows to its work at compound interest, so to say, by the criticism of criticism. One school criticises the other, correcting but continuing its tradition, and exalting its life. The higher criticises the lower, and all is criticised by the highest, by the central revelation and gospel of grace. The Bible is to be judged by its Word, and its Word is judged by its Christ and His work—the Book by the message and the message by the Act in Jesus Christ.

The one fatal thing against which I would presume to protest is the vague, careless, and, forgive me if I say, lazy habit of dismissing the Bible from your interest because you have heard, because Gashmu hath said it, that criticism has knocked the bottom out of the Bible and left the sides to fall in. You do not really know that it is so, but you have vaguely heard it. The real students of the Bible do not speak in that way, the men you do not hear so much about, but who really settle things. It is only the casual, the shallow, the gossips of that region who talk so. And to judge the Gospel by gossip, or the Church by chit-chat, is as if you should be engrossed by the tattle of strangers about the frail and aged body in which your mother carries still a spirit so high and a faith so eternal.

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THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRESENT AGE.

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THE entire social life of the Middle Ages was based upon the principle of subordination: in religion, morals, politics, economics, education, science, and philosophy the word authority was writ large. As the vicegerent of God on earth, Holy Mother Church assumed the mastership in things spiritual and things temporal, and spoke with authority. Since she received the truth from God direct, what need was there of searching for it: what need for philosophy except as the handmaiden of theology? Human reason was limited to systematising and rendering intelligible the revealed truths or dogmas of the Christian religion. The individual was subordinate to the Church in his religious beliefs: the Church stood between him and his God; in all the important matters of life and death, the shadow of the cross appeared. There was no salvation for the individual outside the great organisation which watched him from the cradle to the grave, and even gave him his passports to heaven. Education, too, was a function of the ecclesiastic hierarchy: to be sure, who should teach God's truth but the medium through whom it was revealed; and who, besides, should exercise the censorship over human conduct but the supreme earthly authority of right and justice?

The same principle of authority and subordination for a

time determined the relation between Church and State; the Church considered herself superior to the State: as the moon is to the sun, so is the State to the Church. Picture to yourselves the German Emperor doing penance before the castle of the Pope at Canossa, and praying for the removal of the ban of excommunication! And within the State itself the individual again found himself under discipline and restraint, socially, politically, economically: for the great mass of people obedience was the law of life, subjection of the self to the authority of some group: obedience to the rulers, obedience to the guild, obedience to the lord, obedience to the head of the family.

The entire history of the modern era, from the fourteenth century on, may be viewed as an awakening of the spirit of reflection, as a quickening of criticism, as a revolt against authority and tradition, as a protest against absolutism and collectivism, as a demand for freedom of thought, feeling, and action. The political conflict has been settled in favour of the State, and the State has gradually absorbed the functions of the Church as the organ of civilisation: ecclesiasticism has given way to nationalism. Within the State itself there has been a growing tendency towards individualism: the spirit of democracy, the demand for equal rights is abroad in every land. The spirit of independence which raised its voice against the authority of the Church, in time attacked the paternalism of the State, and the doctrine of political non-interference finally became the ideal of the individualist. The same spirit manifested itself in the economic sphere: the old guild system disappeared, the individual threw off his fetters, and demanded to be let alone in working out his economic salvation.

We are confronted with the same phenomenon in the empire of the intellect, with the same antagonism to tutelage, the same demand for a free field. Reason becomes the authority in science and philosophy. The notion begins to prevail that truth is not something to be handed down by authority or decreed by papal bulls, but something to be

acquired, something to be achieved by free and impartial inquiry, and the gaze is turned from the contemplation of supernatural things to the examination of natural things, from heaven to earth,—theology yields her crown to science and philosophy. What characterises the higher intellectual life of the centuries immediately following the Middle Ages is an abiding faith in the power of human reason, an intense interest in natural things, a lively yearning for civilisation and progress. Knowledge, however, let it be noted, is esteemed and desired not only for its own sake, but also for its utility, for its practical value: knowledge means power. Nearly all the great leaders of thought, from Francis Bacon down, are interested in the practical applications of the results of scientific investigation, and look forward with an enthusiastic optimism to a coming era of wonderful achievements in the mechanic arts, technology, medicine, as well as in the field of social institutions. The apotheosis of reason is reached in the eighteenth century during the so-called period of enlightenment, the self-conceited age, as Goethe once called it; reason now proudly sits upon the throne once occupied by ecclesiastical authority, and in her supreme self-confidence believes herself competent to solve all problems: everything is clear to her, she has a rational explanation for everything, for the State, religion, morality, language, and the universe as a whole: she sees through them all.

But pride goes before the fall. The spirit of criticism which had undermined tradition and authority and enthroned reason, at last began to assail that reason itself and to question the truth of its deliverances. Criticism insisted that before reason venture upon the sea of speculation, the seaworthiness of the craft be examined. For more than a hundred years the work of testing the vessel of knowledge and of taking soundings has been going on, with the result that the old ship is seldom seen on the high seas any longer. To put it mildly, our age is sceptical of the power of the human reason to reach a rational explanation of the universe as a whole: for it metaphysics or

philosophy as certain knowledge of the hidden essence of things is an unrealisable illusion. Philosophy has been relegated with theology to the lumber-room of thought. We cannot prove the existence of God, freedom, and immortality; such questions, and indeed all questions of ultimates, are beyond our ken. We can know only what we experience; we are limited to our sense-perception, and even here we can reach only a high degree of probability.

This sceptical and agnostic attitude towards philosophical inquiries and the restriction of knowledge to the field of experience have exercised a significant influence upon the current of latter-day thought. The interest in natural science, as the only sphere in which practical certainty can be reached, has steadily increased; scientific methods have been introduced into other fields of study; modern research has become wonderfully intensified and specialised; and remarkable practical results have been achieved. The fond hopes of the pioneers of the modern era have been more than realised, and our generation has made the most wonderful progress in the application of the physical and biological sciences that the world has ever seen.

One of the consequences of this aversion from philosophy and glorification of the natural sciences was the reappearance of materialism. Forgetful of the protests against metaphysics as a sham science—physics, beware of metaphysics!—men of scientific bent began to embrace materialistic world-views under the label of scientific truth, during the middle of the nineteenth century. Nothing seemed simpler than to construct the universe out of numberless particles of matter in motion. The problem of life, to be sure, had seemed a stumbling-block to many: they could not account for the wonderfully adapted organic forms by means of mechanical principles alone. But materialism received a powerful ally in the new theory of evolution which was proposed by Charles Darwin, and which, for the majority of scientific thinkers, smoothed out the difficulties in the mechanical explanation of the world. It

seemed easy enough to account for simple protoplasmic matter as the coming together of material atoms, so that when man was shown to have evolved from this simple beginning, the trick was done, the problem was solved, the world's secret was out. This evolutionistic materialism became the creed of the new scientific enlightenment, and I wonder whether it is not still the most popular, though secret, doctrine among the great mass of students of science to-day?

Strangely enough, the despisers of philosophy have overlooked the fact that this materialism is itself nothing more nor less than a system of metaphysics. So strong is the metaphysical craving in the heart of man that even the most cautious scientist cannot pluck it out. Many scientific thinkers, however, are coming frankly to recognise that materialism is a philosophy and not "a scientifically proved fact," and are relegating it with all philosophy to the fairyland of poetry, conjecture, and faith, taking the agnostic ground that we can know nothing except what we experience through our senses. Other leaders of science are attacking materialism itself, declaring it to be a false theory, one not at all justified by the facts of natural science, and are repudiating the attempt to explain the universe by means of mechanical principles. Occasional voices are also being heard in the camp of the biologists against the mechanical theory of life and even against the Darwinian doctrine of evolution, and a tendency to go back to some form of vitalism is asserting itself.

But the evolutionary conception remains the dominant idea of our age. Though the modern thinker may refuse to accept all the consequences that have been drawn by enthusiastic supporters of Darwinism, he still continues to believe that things are not made, but grow, that they are products of evolution, that to understand a thing, you must know how it came to be what it is, and, if possible, what it is going to be. This evolutionistic or genetic way of looking at the world has taken the place of the old rationalistic interpretation of the eighteenth century, and is being applied in all fields of

investigation, not only in biology, but in religion, morality, politics, language, literature, and art.

With the ascendency of the natural sciences metaphysics fell into neglect and even into contempt, and philosophy, the former queen, became almost apologetic in her tone. The philosophers began to devote themselves to a more critical study of the particular branches of their field, like logic, psychology, ethics, æsthetics, and the history of philosophy, and fought shy of system-building. But the reappearance of the old enemy, materialism in modern garb, aroused their fighting blood and united them in a common cause of opposition. And to-day we note also, here and there, cautious attempts at constructing a theory of the universe. This is a favourable sign, for no civilised people can long rest content without a *Weltanschauung*, without some conception of man's place in nature. And it is also a favourable symptom, in my opinion, that modern philosophy is written in an idealistic key; perhaps it may succeed in winning its way into the life of our age and arousing a love of ideals. There are abundant expressions of discontent with a purely materialistic interpretation of the world, symptoms of a growing faith, crude though they often are, in a world of ideas, as witness the interest in Christian science, psychic research, and similar movements.

In spite of these favourable signs, however, of a revival of the philosophical spirit, our times may still be described as sceptical and indifferent so far as the discussion of ultimate questions is concerned, particularly in the United States. The age looks with a kindly eye upon investigations that promise practical results, and philosophy bakes no bread. The practical test is applied to knowledge; we even have a philosophy, an American philosophy, pragmatism, which makes the practical test the criterion of truth. The popular question is: What is the use of your knowledge, what can you do with it? What are the results? And a narrow interpretation is more often than not placed upon the practical consequences demanded: such knowledge is valued most

as will help most to advance material progress: we are fond of speaking of our prosperity, our wealth, our natural resources, our crops, our cattle grazing on a thousand hills.

The critical, individualistic, and practical spirit of the times has also affected our religion. The old theology is spoken of as dead—except for an occasional heresy trial it shows no signs of life,—and it would be difficult to discover from the sermons preached in the different churches what the dogmas of these churches are. Religious individualism has continued to grow since the Reformation, and the sects have multiplied beyond all measure, particularly in the democratic countries. The clergy are interested in the practical problems of the day, in social, economic, political, and moral issues, and many attempts are being made to improve the material and moral conditions of life, to make life in this world worth living, to establish the Kingdom of God on earth.

The tendencies we have been describing have been active in all departments of life. In the political and economic spheres there has been a constant digging up of the roots and a steady struggle for independence and individualism since the Middle Ages. The watchwords of the French Revolution, liberty, fraternity, equality, and the American doctrine that all men are created free and equal, are political expressions of the same spirit that broke the power of the greatest religious organisation that ever existed. The democratic ideal of government of the people for the people and by the people is still fighting for realisation,—in monarchies and democracies alike, and on both hemispheres. The problems yet to be solved are many and serious. In our own country political individualism has shown a tendency to degenerate into political selfishness. The will of the people is frequently thwarted by combinations of selfish individuals, a hierarchy of bosses with an organisation so strong that nothing short of a moral revolution can break it. The faith of the people in the representatives appointed for them by these feudal

lords—often at the behest of self-seeking economic groups—is not strong; the spectacle of our National Congress often controlled by a few bosses is duplicated on a smaller scale by many Legislatures and Town Councils or whatever their names may be. Formerly, parliamentary bodies represented the people against the encroachments of the overlords, nowadays the relation is frequently reversed, and it often happens that our higher executive officers represent the people against the representatives of the people. This fact accounts for the popularity of men like Cleveland, Roosevelt, Hughes, and Wilson among the common people of the land, the great army of the unorganised, and this fact too accounts for the growing demand for direct primaries, the nomination of senators by the people, the initiative, the referendum, and the recall. All these reforms are indicative of the people's distrust of the organs which have been evolved to give expression to the popular will, and reveal a purpose to correct the evils of a selfish individualism. This active phase of political selfishness is matched by a passive side, which is shown by citizens who neglect their political functions: these are men who, on the plea of attending to their business, are unwilling to make any personal sacrifices for the public good. Some selfish individuals, in other words, go into politics for their own selfish purposes; other selfish individuals stay out of politics for their own selfish purposes. And the pernicious inactivity of the latter class is perhaps largely responsible for the pernicious activity of the former.

In the economic field we find a similar situation: the emancipation of the individual from control has not proved an unmixed blessing. Economic individualism has brought many evils and problems in its train. The stronger individuals have gained wealth and power, the weaker ones have discovered that they cannot stand alone. Unrestricted individualism has defeated the very object of individualism, which was the development of a society of free individuals. The demand to be let alone, *laisser-faire*, which now comes from

the man who is satisfied, is met by the plea to make the other fellow stop, which now comes from the dissatisfied. In the industrial realm there is friction between the big men and the little men, and there are clashes between capital and labour. Huge industrial enterprises have been formed which have not always been actuated by a keen desire to respect the rights of the weaker. It is not astonishing that these large concerns have been able to influence legislation in their interest when we remember that there are corrupt political machines which know no party in their loyalty to the common platform called the pocket-book. Nor is it astonishing that the working-men should have formed unions for their protection and improvement, and that they too should manifest a deplorable unwillingness to sacrifice their selfish interests to the common good.

Many remedies are being proposed to cure the inequalities in the distribution of wealth, to prevent the exploitation of the weaker by the stronger, and to enable each individual to lead a dignified human life. Socialism declares that this end can be reached only by a collective system of production which would place the means of production under official administration. This theory represents the most drastic reaction against the *laisser-faire* or let-us-alone doctrine and unrestricted individualism. In the meanwhile the State has been attempting to cure abuses by a stricter regulation of the free play of egoism: laws have been enacted regulating trusts, railroads, interstate commerce, and the relations between employers and employés: eight-hour laws, factory laws, child labour laws, and laws looking to the protection and improvement of the labourer in general. In many countries the State is extending its functions, approximating more closely the socialistic ideals: the State administration of the postal system, the government ownership of railroads, telegraphs, telephones, forests, mines: the establishment of labour-insurance and old-age pensions by the State: the municipal ownership of water, lighting, telephone, and transportation systems

are all examples of the changing conception of the functions of government.

As has been said, these tendencies in government and the promulgation of socialistic theories may be viewed as a reaction against the *laisser-faire* doctrine as it has worked out in practice. Protests against selfish individualism have also been raised in modern systems of ethics, which make social welfare or the greatest happiness of the greatest number the ultimate standard of right and wrong. The climax in the opposition to individualism is reached in the teachings of those who make sympathy and the renunciation of self the criteria of the true morality. This doctrine, which was taught by the German philosopher, Schopenhauer, was preached as the essence of true religion by the Russian Tolstoi. But individualism too has its defenders and prophets: one of them, Herbert Spencer, the philosopher of industrialism, a native of the country in which the *laisser-faire* theory has always felt at home; another, Friedrich Nietzsche, the child of a people among whom socialism has made great headway. According to Spencer, who plants himself on evolutionistic ground, the prosperity of a species is best subserved when, among adults, each experiences the good and evil results of his own nature and consequent conduct. Hence the individuals must not so interfere with one another as to prevent the receipt by each of the benefits which his actions naturally bring to him, or to transfer to others the evils which his actions naturally bring. The incorporated mass of citizens has to maintain the conditions under which each may gain the fullest life compatible with the fullest lives of fellow-citizens. All-embracing State functions characterise a low social type, and progress to a higher social type is marked by relinquishment of functions. The State must protect its members from foreign invasion and hinder internal aggressions, and for the rest keep its hands off.

The theory of evolution has also been appealed to in support of an extreme form of individualism. Life is a

struggle for existence; every individual strives to preserve himself and promote his own interests. He enters into competition with his fellows for the means of subsistence which are limited, and to the victor belong the spoils. The individuals who are best fitted for the struggle win and ought to win, for the survival of the fittest is the end of existence. They are the ones who ought to be selected in the great winnowing process of life, and they will be selected if nature is allowed to prevail, if unnatural and artificial conditions are not introduced to interfere with progress. Sympathy or altruism is injurious to the survival of the fittest, for it tends to preserve not the fit but the unfit, the sick, the halt, the lame, and the blind; the defective, the delinquent, and the abnormal, the derelicts and failures. Sympathy leads to the preservation of the incompetent. The free play of egoism would lead to the elimination of the undesirable elements in our civilisation: the failures could not stand alone; without the help of the strong they would go to the wall. This way of looking at life has been presented in the most exaggerated form by Nietzsche: and it is the practical philosophy of a great many persons who would never confess it even to themselves.

Political individualism reaches a climax in anarchism. Nietzsche did not preach anarchism,—indeed he was most violently opposed to it. He believed in a firm government, in the strong arm, in the exercise of force. But the power was to be in the hands of the powerful, of the best, of the aristocrats. The mob, the rabble, the failures, must be ruled with rigour by the strong; the populace is to be used as an instrument in the hands of the overlords, the overmen, for the realisation of their ideals. Nietzsche's individualism is therefore not a theory of unrestricted individualism: he believes in severe discipline and order. But healthy individuals cannot be developed unless they are released from responsibility for and to the weaklings. Philosophical anarchism, however, demands the removal of political restraint, it believes that restraint hinders progress and happiness, that if governmental force were removed, in-

dividuals would be best able to take care of themselves. It is interesting to note that Tolstoi pleads for the removal of force for a different reason: the exercise of force violates the principle of love: resist ye not evil. Militant anarchism believes in using any means whatever to break down force and to free the individual. Its aim is to destroy the force of authority by means of force. In this form of anarchism we have come to the total bankruptcy of unrestricted individualism.

All these views represent a protest against over-socialisation and a plea for the self-assertion of the individual. They appeal to thinkers who see in our modern life an increasing tendency to subject the individual to too much restraint, to make him a cog in a machine, to rob him of his independence of thought, feeling, and action, to hinder him from living out his own natural life. This spirit has issued in a protest against the compulsion of tradition and authority in religion, law, morals, education, literature, art, and all the departments of life. It is the same old ego that is here struggling against its fetters, trying to burst the bonds that civilisation has woven for it. The movement is expressed in literature by personalities like Walt Whitman, Ibsen, Hauptmann, Sudermann, Maeterlinck, Strindberg, and d'Annunzio.

I have tried to trace the evolution of the individualistic spirit in the theoretical and in the practical fields. It must not be supposed, however, that individualism as a philosophy of life is the paramount philosophy, for that is not the case. Ever since the days of Socrates, ethics has demanded that the individual subordinate himself to the law of reason, and in the most recent ethical systems regard for the social welfare has been emphasised as the true moral criterion. Hegel's view that the highest form of morality consists in subordination to the State, and Green's conception that the true self is realised in devotion to the good of others, certainly leave no room for *laisser-faire*. Spencer qualifies his individualism and promises that in the future men will vie with one another in the performance of altruistic acts, and even Nietzsche demands that

his overmen treat each other with justice and kindness. The aim of modern ethical philosophy as a whole has been to keep the balance between individualism and universalism: it has warned against exaggerated self-assertion as well as exaggerated self-renunciation. The fear that restrictive measures may degrade the individual and hinder the creation of a higher type has aroused a protest against over-socialisation in many quarters, and this after all is a healthy symptom in our civilisation, as wholesome as is the protest against over-individualisation.

We have outlined some of the currents in our modern life. We have noted an opposition to authority, a striking-out of the individual in politics, religion, philosophy, science, education, morals, literature and art, in the field of economics and every form of social life. This attitude has resulted in scepticism with regard to metaphysics, agnosticism and atheism in religion, and positivism in science; in theoretical and practical materialism; in the exaggeration of practical efficiency everywhere; in the decline of the civic virtues and the patriotism of peace; in egoism and pessimism. And now what is the outlook? Are we on the down-grade?

"Have the triumphs gained over matter and space," asks Lowes Dickinson in his *Letters of a Chinese Official*, "been secured at the cost of spiritual insight and force? Has the immense achievement of our people in the development of the practical arts been accomplished by any serious contribution to science, literature, and art? Has the soul grown with the body, or is it tending to atrophy and decay?" And his answer is not encouraging: "When I review my impressions of the average English citizen, impressions based on many years' study, what kind of man do I see? I see one divorced from nature, but unreclaimed by art; instructed but not educated; assimilative but incapable of thought. Trained in the tenets of a religion in which he does not really believe,—for he sees it flatly contradicted in every relation of life,—he dimly feels that it is prudent to conceal under a mask of piety the atheism he is hardly intelli-

gent enough to avow; and, what is more important, his morals are as conventional as his creed. Charity, chastity, self-abnegation, contempt of the world and its prizes—these are the words on which he has been fed from his childhood upward."

All living processes show tendencies of dissolution which we are bound to misinterpret if we consider them out of their relations. There is no need of pessimism when we take a broad view of the whole course of human development, when we compare our time with the past, and take account of the progression from a stage of close organisation, authority, and force towards a stage of higher individual freedom, the stage of citizenship, as Hobhouse calls it, at which the individual is no longer a subject, but a member of society, a free individual who approves of the social union. In working away from authority we have somewhat overshot the mark: the problem here is to correct the evils of an exaggerated self-assertion, to harmonise the freedom of the individual with the good of the whole, and in the solution of this problem we are at present engaged. Our ideal must always be to produce strong, self-dependent personalities, but we are unwilling to regard anyone without social feeling as a completely developed personality. A self-seeking man, a man who rides roughshod over his fellows, a man devoid of moral sense and sympathy, is not a strong personality. The social man is the superman.

What we particularly need is an abiding faith in ideals—in spiritual ideals, for mere material progress is not worth fighting for, except as a means to something better. If all the sweat and blood and tears of mankind shall mean no more than the preservation of atrophied souls in bodies that wax fat in idleness and luxury, then indeed life becomes a stupid farce, and the sooner its actors are chased from the boards the better. Only a worthy life is worth living. If we mean by rabble purely vegetable existences, then Nietzsche is right, the rabble is not worth while.

FRANK THILLY.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

SOCIAL SERVICE. No. 1.

ANOTHER APPEAL TO ENGLISH GENTLEMEN.

THE RIGHT REV. A. F. WINNINGTON-INGRAM, D.D.,
Bishop of London.

WRITING as I am on the spur of a hill overlooking forty miles of the lovely scenery of Surrey and Berkshire, watching the evolutions of my comrades of the London Rifle Brigade, my first appeal to English gentlemen must be the obvious duty of learning how to defend their country.

(1) I am by my calling, and I hope by my temperament, a man of peace; but some of the talk of the present day condemning all forms of military service seems to me to partake of the nature of Cant.

Patriotism always has been considered a religious duty; and, as I understand Christianity, there is no idea in it of underrating the old solid virtues which have been admired in all ages, and which belong to natural religion. The saying of the old Latin poet, "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori," is still true, and still it ought to be a sweet and pleasant thing to live for your country and to serve it.

I confess that it makes me angry to hear a man lounging in an arm-chair in Piccadilly speak contemptuously of the young fellows from the city who give up their only fortnight's holiday in the year to learn how to handle a rifle or "form fours";

or of the other young men who, after being trained in the Officers' Training Corps, spend weeks in camp in training their companies.

I have long thought that we shall come to universal service, and that it will be a good thing for the morale and physique of the nation when we do; but those who most dislike the idea, and most firmly believe in the voluntary principle, should be the first to come forward and make the step unnecessary in the only possible way, which is, by making the Voluntary Territorial Army an unqualified success.

Already we are looking forward with considerable apprehension to 1913, when many of those who have signed-on will have finished their contract; but if English gentlemen would really take the matter up, they still have sufficient power of leadership to make the thing a success, and would find, I believe, a new interest in life.

(2) But then I must go a step further—we must train the boys.

Nothing in my recollection has done so much good to the London boy as the semi-military training under which he has been brought by the Boys' Brigade, Church Lads' Brigade, Cadet Corps, and now by the patrols of Scouts. One visit, for instance, to Caxton Hall, when the old members of the London Division C.L.B. are gathered for an annual meeting, would convince anyone who was doubtful of the wonderful success of the movement. A visitor would see five hundred young fellows of from nineteen to twenty-three years of age, set-up, strong, healthy, nearly all teetotallers, and with the alertness, self-respect, and discipline they have learnt by their years in the Brigade.

Now, how is this wonderful work to be kept up? Only by the self-sacrifice and public spirit of English gentlemen.

Already many companies in London are languishing and likely to be given up from want of officers; and yet, could there be a more delightful task than having the manly, wholehearted devotion of some twenty to thirty London lads, who,

despising all sickly sentimentality, value greatly the true friend who will take a little trouble over them, and who will have for his reward a gratitude and a lifelong affection which will more than repay him for any evenings he has spared, week by week, from other engagements.

Of course the ideal thing for the English gentleman to do would be to be trained first in an Officers' Training Corps, and then add to his duties the training of a company of the C.L.B. One of our own Majors in the London Rifle Brigade is Colonel of his local C.L. Brigade.

But, if this seems too great a tax upon men already, doubtless, busy in other ways, then let a man have just so much drill as is necessary for his work, and take up the Lads' Brigades or the Scout patrols from a social and religious point of view. Some will feel that they are incapable, or at least unwilling, to undertake definitely religious work; then let them take up a patrol of Scouts and teach them the B.P. Scout Law, which contains a great many injunctions of the Church Catechism, in a practical form, to which all must assent. Many will feel that if they are to deal with this work at all, they would rather take it up in a form in which they would be able to deal with the highest and the deepest part of boy nature; then let them take up the Boys' Brigade or the Church Lads' Brigade, or any branch of the Scouts where the Sunday Bible Class forms an integral part of the work.

(3) But, of course, I am aware that many of the readers of this *Journal* may feel quite unfit for this work from age or from the overwhelming claims of business; then let my next appeal be for a kind of work which is within reach of all.

The point on which the public opinion of English gentlemen is still in the most rotten condition is on the moral question. Again and again the same feeble, untrue things are passed from lip to lip in the office or the club, and the same stories told in the smoking-room. Now the least which can be asked from English gentlemen is to verify the statements which they make; and I am prepared to produce the

statement of a hundred of the leading London physicians that vice is mischievous to body as well as soul, that it is wholly unnecessary, and instead of being helpful, is destructive to a true man's life.

My third appeal, then, to English gentlemen is to give a far stronger and more outspoken moral witness in office and club than has been the case hitherto, and especially see that the younger men who come to London find a public opinion among their elders to steady them instead of pulling them down.

But, to go further, why should not every English gentleman join a branch of the Public Morality Council formed now in every borough of London, or form one, if there is not one in the town where he lives?

These local Councils watch the bad houses in a neighbourhood, and stir up public bodies to put the law into action with regard to them, stimulate the erection of clubs for boys and girls, back up with funds the rescue work carried on by good women, which is often left to their slender purses to support, and generally form a public opinion in their locality towards making and keeping their town or borough morally clean. Those who live in London and who wish to join in this work should write to the Secretary, Public Morality Council, 37 Norfolk Street, Strand.

(4) But the mention of clubs opens out a fresh and interesting sphere of work for English gentlemen. After all, as Miss Ellice Hopkins used to say, "Better a fence at the top of a cliff than an ambulance at the bottom"—and a fence at the top of a cliff means the club in connection with church or chapel, college mission or school mission, proved beneficial to thousands of boys.

The beauty of the club system is that those can take part in it very usefully who do not see their way at present to take part in more definitely religious work, and that a man can do very useful work who can only spare two evenings or even one evening a week.

Take the experience of one man to whom I have been speaking in camp to-day. He goes down two nights a week from the West End to a school mission. He gathers in the very roughest material which live in that district. He starts with the simplest things: he gives his boys three marks—*a* for attendance, *b* for behaviour, and *c* for cleanliness, a weekly hot bath being an essential preliminary for taking part in the weekly gymnastic class.

Self-respect and a desire to look clean and smart is soon evoked among the poorest London boys, and is a substratum on which almost anything can be eventually built. Anyone who will read *Across the Bridges* by Mr Paterson will see a life-like description both of the material he will find ready to his hand and also many suggestions as to what he may evolve from it.

Let the reader of this article ask himself whether his college or university or public school has a Mission; and if so, why should he not in this way make himself useful at it; or, if it has not, whether the hard-working parson of his own parish should be left to bear his burden alone, and often have to do the work which really should fall on the laity as well as his own proper work.

(5) And that leads me to one more field of work on which I should like to touch before I conclude this appeal, and that is, the whole field of Finance.

I have taken for granted, perhaps, all through, a certain amount of superabundant energy among the English gentlemen I have ventured to address. But let us suppose the reader is a man well advanced in life, with great business responsibilities, which leave him little time for anything else. Why should he not take wholly on to his shoulders the finances of the church or chapel near which he lives? The accounts which weigh down the man who has never been trained to finance are mere child's play to him. No wonder that he has to complain of feeble sermons or out-of-date statements in theology or history when the man who ought to be regularly

reading his two or three hours a day is, as a matter of fact, writing begging letters, or attempting to balance an impossible account.

Never shall I be grateful enough to the young chartered accountant (as he then was) who shouldered the whole accounts of the Oxford House during the nine years I was its Head.

These are merely suggestions. The field of work and influence for English gentlemen is unlimited. My appeal to them in the name of their country, their church, and their God is to be up and occupy it.

A. F. LONDON.

THE

HIBBERT JOURNAL

CIVILISATION IN DANGER.[1]

(*Second Study.*)

FRANCE, ENGLAND, GERMANY.

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In these days it is a commonplace to speak of the decadence of France, or of the decadence of the Latin peoples.

These formulæ are supposed to correspond to a reality. But they disregard the fact that certain signs of decadence, very evident in France, exist to a lesser degree among the greater part of the civilised peoples of Europe. The peoples of Germanic origin, especially the English, even the Germans, are not exempt. On the other hand, certain of the Latin peoples, as the Spanish and the Italian, who have played a secondary part for two or three centuries, give evidence of revival rather than of a new falling-off.

Instead, therefore, of studying the decadence of France in isolation, it were well to examine the causes of enfeeblement which affect civilisation throughout the whole of Western Europe. Certain of these causes are general. They are

[1] A previous study under this title appeared in *La Belgique artistique et littéraire,* March 1908, and in the Hibbert Journal, July 1908. See also the article, "Decadence and Civilisation," by Mr and Mrs Whetham, Hibbert Journal, October 1911.

revealed in France with a special clearness of outline because France, being in advance of other nations on the road of evolution, is also nearer to the inevitable decline. Yet, once again, if there is here much to be said about the decadence of France, it is rather by way of example and object-lesson than with a view to pronouncing a special condemnation on French civilisation.

In what follows it is proposed to indicate rapidly the signs of the decay of which we have just spoken. Afterwards we shall seek the causes of it; and we shall finally inquire what opening exists for the suggestion of remedies.

I. The Signs.

The characteristic feature of a human society, and especially of a great historic nation like France or England, is that it possesses a collective existence beyond the particular existence of the separate individuals who compose it. And the collective activity of these individuals is what makes the grandeur or the littleness of the nation's destiny.

To speak of collective activity, and especially of collective work, is to speak of organisation: to accomplish a work in common it is obviously necessary that the efforts employed should act to the same end instead of thwarting one another. The vitality of a human society is therefore greater in proportion as its organisation is more robust and more conformed to its needs. By parity of reasoning, disorganisation, disorder, anarchy imply, always and in all spheres, decadence and enfeeblement.

Granting this, let us consider the case of France.

The signs of disorganisation in France are very evident. The chief of them shall be briefly mentioned.

First and foremost stands the profound disorganisation of belief and conduct.

Religion, while preserving a considerable intellectual power, has lost much of its social influence, and consequently, of its effectiveness as guardian of moral order and tradition. In

past ages the Catholic Church and the temporal power, intimately allied, supported each other. Now that their divorce is complete, both Church and State come forth weakened from their separation. Till now, it is the Church which has suffered most: public life has been entirely secularised (*laïcisée*); in private life religion is left further and further aside, save on certain solemn occasions. A man may, without scandal, live completely outside its influence.

This victory of the political and civil power, thus liberated from trammels and tutelage, is, however, more apparent than real, for the disorganisation of belief is accompanied by a growing disorganisation of conduct, the germ of most serious difficulties for the civil power itself.

This is an alarming sign, for conduct is more important than doctrine; it is, if you will, the cement which holds together the social edifice.

In France the Catholic religion has never been very exacting in the matter of conduct. Nevertheless, it has rendered the service of continually proclaiming and recalling the existence of a moral law. Now that it has lost its credit, many matter-of-fact minds (*esprits simplistes*), empoisoned by a narrow rationalism, deny the very principle of all obligation whatsoever, whether towards their neighbour, towards society, or towards their native land. They are impatient of all authority, of all hierarchy, of all discipline. The Frenchman, addressed continually on the subject of his rights, has been deprived of every notion of subordination and of duty, in preparation for the advent of universal egoism.

The picture of moral disorganisation in France has been often drawn: it is superfluous to draw it again. The book of M. Paul Bureau, *La Crise morale des temps nouveaux*, a book written from the Catholic point of view, displays it well.

There is, however, a sign which deserves a special recall. This is the lowering of the birth-rate. It is known that the French population is almost stationary, that in many departments of France the deaths exceed the births. There is

no surer sign of decadence. A nation of which the population does not grow is without defence, if not against warlike invasion, at least against the pacific invasions of foreign peoples. M. Gustave Le Bon, in his book *Les lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples,* has shown conclusively how pacific invasion, more surely than warlike invasion, destroys the souls of races and their civilisation. Imperial Rome suffered, as France is suffering, from the lowering of the birth-rate. The slow decay of Roman civilisation was the sequel.

The words of M. Gustave Le Bon (p. 119) may be quoted:

> "Even if they (the Barbarians) had never attacked Rome, and had confined themselves to mingling more and more with the Romans, whose numbers were becoming daily less, the course of history would not have been changed. They would not have destroyed the Empire, but the mere influence of their intermingling would have been sufficient to destroy the Roman soul."

Later on (p. 124 *seq.*) he adds, in regard to the pacific invasions:

> "There is one state in Europe, France, which is equally threatened. It is a rich country, of which the population does not grow, surrounded by poor countries, of which the population is growing continually. . . . If the actual conditions do not change, that is, if these invasions are not arrested, but a very short time will be needed for a third of the population of France to become German and a third Italian. What becomes of the unity, or even of the existence, of a people under such conditions? The worst disasters on the field of battle would be infinitely less formidable for it than such invasions are."

In France, as in Rome, the numerous measures proposed to raise the birth-rate will probably produce no great effect.

A low rate of births has economic causes which may be partly remedied. But in the main it arises from a psychological cause, selfishness, over which the laws have no power. How is it possible to penalise the man who refuses to undergo the responsibility for a family, and the woman who is averse to maternity?

In this connection it is interesting to notice, as M. Paul Flat has done in a recent book on French women of letters, that the sentimental ideal of former times has given place, in their writings, to the cult of sensation pure and simple.

Woman will no longer abdicate her personality in presence of the personality of man; from man she demands pleasure, but will sacrifice nothing of herself. This thoroughgoing individualism is perhaps the sign of a higher civilisation, but it is a fatal sign. If it marks a summit, it marks yet more surely the beginning of a decline; for a race in which women refuse to become mothers is a race which commits suicide.

To this disorganisation of belief and conduct there is added to-day a beginning of political and social disorganisation, that is, of anarchy.

The same rationalist and individualist impulse which has destroyed the prestige of the religious power threatens to-day the existence of the civil power.

Political life is profoundly disordered. Government, at once too centralised and too weak, depends on a parliament composed of men many of whom possess but little capacity, and are not highly regarded. M. Emile Faguet has said, and unhappily been able to prove, that the reign of democracy is characterised by the cult of incompetence and the dread of responsibility. Thus the higher interests of the nation are continually overlooked, and a rupture is produced between the organs of Government and the industrial and commercial classes, the most active and useful in the country.

The Government has no more the force, and not always the will, to restrain the ferments of disorder and disorganisation which become more and more virulent. It has not been able to prevent strikes of officials and workers of the railways, which have suspended the entire activity of the nation. It is without defence against the syndicalist movement, a movement the character of which is clearly anarchic. In fact, while Socialism is trying to organise society on a new plan, by means of a discipline, if need be, very hard, Syndicalism is preoccupied only with the immediate result. Considering each group of workers in isolation, it is summed up in a violent claim for increase of wages and diminution of the hours of work; and this without the least regard to economic possibilities, and

with no consideration for the social disorganisation which these proceedings bring in their train.

From this impotent Government men are asking more every day. Animated by a spirit analogous to that of the workers' syndicates, groups of citizens whose affairs are in jeopardy—generally in consequence of their own want of energy or initiative—appeal to the Government to intervene in their favour. If it refuses, these groups become insurgent. And it can only satisfy them by doing injury to other groups of citizens, who then rise in their turn: the history of the recent crisis in the vine-growing industry was just this.

The time is perhaps not far distant when the citizens will not content themselves with claiming from the Government more ample subsistence or easier work, but will also demand to be gratuitously amused in their hours of leisure. Then we shall have returned to the régime of the Rome of the Emperors, when the notorious cry *panem et circenses* summed up the whole ideal of a degenerate people. On the approaching day when that cry is to be heard in France, the hour of Cæsarism would perhaps be imminent.

A part of the indications of decadence which we have just noticed in France are found, less plainly declared, among the majority of the peoples of Western Europe. This is true especially in regard to the disorganisation of belief and conduct.

From this point of view it is interesting to speak of England, a country remarkably religious and faithful to its traditions.

Thoroughgoing rationalism has had in England but little success; it runs contrary to the profound instinct of the race. Nevertheless the religious sentiment has no longer the same power it once had, or, at least, the same influence on conduct. In proportion as the Established Church inclines to the formalism of the Catholic Church and is impregnated with its spirit, religion is more widely separated from life, and conduct gradually liberated from the strict discipline of the past.

The increase of wealth, the widely diffused habit of foreign

travel, the presence in the country of considerable bodies of foreigners, especially Germans and Americans, further the movement in the same direction.

The old Puritanism has almost disappeared from the upper ranks of society; it is retrogressive in all social classes. Many little facts, each insignificant in isolation, mark the road traversed during a quarter of a century. We may note the frequency of scandalous divorce cases, of which the abundantly detailed reports are awaited with impatience by numerous readers; following which there is the diffusion of novels,[1] the appearance of which would have caused scandal at an earlier period, and which are now read by almost everybody. Once more, the inobservance of the Sabbath, formerly consecrated exclusively to religion and the family life, but now spent in distractions, frequently of a most profane character.

To accumulate these marks of slackening would be easy; to evaluate their bearing is more important. At first sight we have merely the abandonment of a discipline too narrow and too irksome, even puerile in certain respects, in favour of the more enlightened and tolerant morality which forms the common basis of Continental civilisation. A somewhat easy-going morality is congenial, even indispensable, to certain nations like France and Italy; too strict a limitation would run the risk of fettering the free play of their genius. But qualities which under certain skies and among certain temperaments are mere flexibility, and challenge only a smile, become, under other conditions, dissolution and disorder, and indicate the beginning of a trouble which will not be arrested. In other words, what we need to ask is whether the régime of greater freedom, which England has adopted, has strengthened or weakened her.

The answer is hardly doubtful. It is pretty plain that it is at the expense of his vitality that the Englishman has realised in his life more joy and less constraint.

He has no longer his blind but fruitful confidence in him-

[1] Those, for example, of Victoria Cross, Hubert Wales, etc.

self and in the destiny of England. The fear of decadence has entered his soul; it pursues him and enervates him,—the earliest sign of waning vigour. There is, however, a more conclusive sign, the lowering of the birth-rate. Between 1878 and 1910 the birth-rate has fallen from 36·30 per thousand to only 24·80. In spite of the inexhaustible reserves of men possessed by the Colonies, the purity of the English race, which is a high product of evolution, will perhaps be soon impaired, to the great injury of its moral and material supremacy.

Analogous points might be specified in regard to other European nations. Almost all of them suffer from the same evil—the incapacity to adapt their religious and moral doctrines to the conditions of modern existence and the affirmations of modern science. The most prosperous nations do not escape from the trouble arising from this discord. In certain parts of Belgium the birth-rate is still lower than the average of France. In the German towns the same phenomenon makes its appearance, accompanied by a general slackening of morality. It may seem puerile to evoke the question of decadence in connection with Germany, a nation in the full expansion of its force. But we must remember that the evolution of civilisation has now become astoundingly rapid. Observing in a nation certain of the disorganising ferments which are now weakening France, who could affirm that in fifty years their ravages will not have become equally great elsewhere?

France, then, is not alone in suffering from the growing disorganisation of belief and conduct. Nor will she long possess the unenviable monopoly of political and social disorganisation.

Democratic government, which is too often government by mediocrities and incompetents, displays in most countries its habitual vices. The existence of universal or general suffrage diminishes the intellectual value of parliaments, and brings the parliamentary régime itself into disrepute together with the governments to which it has given birth. Austria-Hungary

and Belgium are to be cited in this connection. England has resisted so far. In respect of the quality of its members, the value and dignity of their work, the British Parliament is the first of the world. But it is preparing a voluntary lowering of its own prestige in deciding that for the future the members of the House of Commons are to be paid. Through this first rent all the vices of professional politicians will probably come in to corrupt one of the last elective assemblies to escape their contagion.[1]

A last aspect of the decay which infects our civilisation remains to be indicated. This is the gradual levelling, from the material, intellectual and moral point of view, of the various classes of society. Under the action of this levelling process all social superiorities are disappearing little by little; the ancient aristocracies are being eliminated, and nothing is coming to replace them. None the less, all the best work that has been accomplished by humanity is the work of superior individuals and not the work of the masses. In tending towards a level our civilisation, therefore, tends towards universal mediocrity. This point was developed in our former study.[2]

This exposition of the symptoms of decadence which disclose themselves beneath the imposing surface of our civilisation is extremely incomplete.[3] It is to be hoped, however, that it will suffice to cause the reader to recognise the deep reality and the widespread existence of the evil from which civilisation is suffering.

[1] We shall say nothing here of Socialism, the enormous progress of which is well known. The reason of the omission is that Socialism implies, along with forces of destruction and disorder, interesting elements of construction and of organisation.

[2] See Hibbert Journal, July 1908.

[3] We have deliberately refrained from speaking of economic questions. They require a special study and, further, there is no necessary correlation between the slackening of the economic activity of a people and the loss of its vitality. A people which, after having devoted all its energy to the accumulation of wealth, applies itself with the same resolution to science and art, does not decay. Quite the contrary.

II. The Causes.

The nature of the evil being determined, it is fitting that we should seek for its causes. At first sight—and this is the conclusion of many writers—the abandonment of old beliefs and the development of rationalism explain this decadence. In fact it is easy to see that the nations whose decadence is the most advanced are those which have most completely abandoned their beliefs.

To reason in this manner is, we think, to mistake the effect for the cause.

To believe that philosophic and religious doctrines create morals and civilisations is a seductive error but a fatal one. To transplant the beliefs and the institutions of a people to new regions in the hope of transplanting thither their virtues and their civilisation as well is the vainest of follies.

If beliefs are born and destroyed with civilisation and draw these along with them in their decay, it is obviously because the beliefs are one of the elements of the civilisation and one of its essential elements. They have the same deep basis, they are children of the vital instinct, of that which Nietzsche calls, in his somewhat obscure language, the will-to-power, which is nothing else than the instinct of preservation, the instinct of the struggle, not only for existence, but for supremacy.

The greater or less degree of vigour in a people depends on the power of its vital instinct, of its greater or lesser faculty for adapting itself to and dominating the conditions of the moment. When the vital instinct of a people is healthy, it readily suggests to the people the religious and moral doctrines which assure its survival.

It is not, therefore, because a people possesses a definite belief that it is healthy and vigorous, but rather because the people is healthy and vigorous that it adopts or invents the belief which is useful to itself. In the same way, it is not because it ceases to believe that it falls into decay, it is because

it is in decay that it abandons the fertile dream of its ancestors without replacing this by a new dream, equally fortifying and creative of energy.

The surest proof of vitality which any people can give is that of adapting its beliefs to its new intellectual and material wants. The Germanic peoples from the time of the Reformation have known how to do this, and their collective energy has been thereby considerably augmented.

The most highly civilised peoples of the present time, having doubtless lost their bearings under the prodigious changes which have taken place during a century, have not yet succeeded in accomplishing this indispensable work of adaptation. The disorganisation of belief and of conduct is the first consequence of this; the threatening disorganisation in politics and society is the remoter consequence. The gradual ruin of our civilisation will be its fatal conclusion, unless our vital instinct suggests to us the indispensable solution.

Certainly it is of instinct that we must here speak. The study of history shows that such adaptations are instinctive, or, if you will, unconscious—it is the same thing—rather than reflective. A single instance will suffice: when the Barbarians, having destroyed the Roman Empire, adopted Christianity, a religion whose doctrines of humanity and of forgiveness were flatly opposed to their mentality as conquerors, they were evidently not following the deliberate choice of conscious reason. Unconsciously they yielded to the prestige of the new religion; but in adopting an ideal so foreign and so superior to that which had guided them up to that time, they strengthened their soul and their collective life and passed on to a higher level of civilisation.

The place here given to instinct, that is, to unconscious personality, will perhaps be found surprising. To understand this, we must consider instinct, not as an inferior product of the work of the organism, but, on the contrary, as the result, not only of our personal experience, but also of the accumu-

lated experience of those from whom we are descended. We think that each man preserves, beyond the unconscious memory of all he has lived through and experienced, the deep though far-off impress of what his ancestors perceived, suffered, and willed.

The instinct of civilised man is by no means any longer that of a savage. All the intellectual and moral acquisitions of the past have contributed to its enrichment. Thus regarded, unconscious personality becomes the vast storehouse of notions, the almost inexhaustible reservoir from which conscious reason must incessantly be nourished, on penalty of being forced to function in the void upon words deprived of life. The function of conscious reason is to avail itself of the acquisitions and the impressions stamped upon the unconscious by bringing them back to the field of its brilliant but limited light.

The rôle of the conscious reason is, in spite of all, the higher rôle. Nevertheless, while its conclusions are above discussion in the realm of exact sciences, in which all the conditions of a problem can be envisaged, and all the causes of error excluded, the case is quite otherwise when reason is applied to decide in the most advantageous sense questions born of the evolution of man or of society. In spite of its efforts, reason can bring before its tribunal only the scattered elements of this infinitely complex and delicate matter. Consequently, it is dangerous to trust oneself blindly to precarious, fragile, and constantly changing conclusions. And rather than march lock-step with the rationalists, intoxicated with their system and blinded by the pride of men who pretend to be creators, it were better to trust oneself to the sure counsel of instinct, that is to say, to the inspirations of feeling and to the results of the experience of centuries.

As we have said above, the counsels of instinct are never at fault and are always fruitful among people whose vitality has remained unimpaired. We repeat that, when the vital instinct of a people is healthy, it readily suggests to that people the religious and moral doctrines which ensure its survival.

On this essential basis of belief and of conduct the conscious intelligence can then work usefully in its turn, and construct according to its genius institutions, laws, systems, and all the framework of civilisation. But, once more, this religious and moral foundation is solid only so far as it is instinctive, and in consequence protected from destructive ratiocination. The instant it is subjected to discussion without being replaced by a new ideal it splits up and disintegrates and the whole edifice which it supports is in danger of collapse.

The cause of the incipient decadence of certain people is, therefore, not doubtful. It is the weakening of their essential instinct of preservation and domination. Their intelligence is unimpaired; it has never been more brilliant. But their vitality is decreasing, and, with this, their power of adapting themselves to the changed conditions of contemporary life.

In presence of the evident correlation between the weakening of races and their degrees of civilisation, one is led to ask if civilisation itself is to blame for this weakening.

Man, it has been said, is the more civilised the further he is removed from nature. If this formula is exact, the highest form of civilisation seems to be a kind of defiance of nature, and the degeneration of over-civilised man becomes the punishment of human pride, which pretends, in its madness, to place itself above the laws of life.

We consider this conception to be false.

In the first place, to become civilised is not necessarily to get away from nature. The higher aspirations of man, his moral, intellectual, and æsthetic wants, are just as truly his nature as are the wants of his body.

Further, the study of vanished civilisations indicates that human evolution pursues its course in the form of progress, a progress which is unequal in its pace and often interrupted, but always renewed. We ought, then, to have confidence in the future of civilisation.

Nevertheless, history provides us with another observation, less reassuring for our *amour-propre*: races grow old like individuals, like everything which lives. At the end of a certain number of centuries of intense and progressive life, their vitality grows weak, they disappear or they slumber.

For any race or determinate collection of mankind there seems to be a degree of civilisation which it is forbidden to pass. When it tries to transgress this limit the germs of death are introduced into its organism, it changes progressively, then it slowly withers and ends by dying.

Fortunately it does not wholly die. The light sprung from its genius is then obscured, but it is not extinguished. New races may gather the heritage it leaves behind, and revive it in a more glorious form. The civilisations of Greece and of Rome are dead, but the radiant torch they kindled still illuminates the whole civilisation of to-day. Perhaps our contemporary civilisation has reached this critical age of its apogee, the precursor of its decadence. Perhaps we shall see France, irremedially disorganised, perish the first, submerged by the pacific invasion of the Barbarians of to-day. Other similar disasters are perhaps inevitable.

These fears are not illusions. Is it not presumptuous to hope that our civilisation will escape the common lot of all those that have preceded it?

However, we must never resign ourselves to decline, to diminution. We must always struggle, even though we have but a desperate chance. And here, as we shall see, nothing is desperate.

III. The Remedies.

The modern man, called to defend himself from the decay which surely threatens all completed civilisations, has a mighty weapon, which the men of other times did not possess. This is his more exact knowledge of the laws of evolution and of psychology.

It is for him to study with profit the evil from which he

suffers, and to succeed in thoroughly understanding it. When he shall have taken full cognisance of the evil, he will be able to resist it effectually.

The characteristic nature of this evil, as we have seen, is that of being a malady of instinct and not of intelligence. Hence it is not necessary even to examine all the remedies which profess to heal the disease by treating the intelligence. To preach either a return to the beliefs of former times or a new belief founded on reason would be ineffectual.

The unconscious gifts of personality, that is to say, will, energy, initiative, the love of life—these it is that need reinforcing, for it is they that are weakened. This programme once realised, a new and fertile belief, an adaptation of old beliefs to existing needs, will come into being of its own accord.

Since the question is that of preparing a more robust generation, the rôle of education is essential here. But education cannot be beneficial unless it develops precisely those gifts of personality which have just been enumerated. English education, for the most part, answers to this demand; French education provides for it extremely ill. None the less, to create in each country, while taking note of its special needs, a type of education which shall render this service, is the urgent task of to-day. The peoples who will not arrive at such a system are doomed.

Side by side with this remedy which needs, in order to become effective, profound reorganisation, there is another, still more important, in regard to which a rapid agreement could be realised. It is, in plain words, the active warfare on physical degeneration, with the object of raising the level of the public health.

The old distinction between moral health and physical health, between the ills of the mind and the ills of the body, is happily no longer the current coin of thought. Broadly speaking, it may be said that there does not exist a single moral disorder, a single blemish of character, a single vice,

perhaps, which does not correspond to a physical disorder, to some apparent or hidden defect of the organism.[1]

If our instinct of preservation and domination is weakened, that is because our physical condition has been weakened equally. The surest means of strengthening instinct—the only means—is that of strengthening the body. A healthy individual, free from unfavourable heredity, is much less exposed than a weak one is to deviation and error. He has the love of life, foundation of moral health; he has confidence in himself and in his destiny; he has the balance, thanks to which the most vivid emotions pass without creating disorder. If only the education he has received and the environment in which he has lived have confirmed these natural gifts instead of corrupting them, he will easily avoid the excesses of individualism and the equally deplorable excesses of the spirit of sacrifice and mysticism. He will be the normal man; and, therefore, the moral man.

Such, we think, is the great remedy, or at least the most accessible remedy, against the enfeeblement of the race. It is for doctors and experts in hygiene to suggest the best methods of invigorating the public health. In this attempt the demands of individual liberty will have to be respected. It were better, however, that individual liberty should undergo some inconvenience rather than allow so indispensable and urgent a work to be hindered.

Fortunately this work is, in a certain measure, begun. The interest in hygiene occupies almost everywhere the position which it rightly claims—the first. And more especially, one may see growing up in most countries, even in France, a new generation of young people, trained by the exercise of sport as well as by the discipline of college. It is eager for life and action, ardent, bold, and sometimes adventurous. It is less preoccupied with ideas and with literature than was its pre-

[1] This must not be understood as a profession of materialism. The question of the existence of the soul is entirely independent of the observations just made.

decessor; but it is healthier. It willingly enters into marriage and faces the risk of large families with a fine carelessness.

Here, perhaps, we have the beginning of a renovation, a rejuvenescence of peoples grown old but not yet exhausted. And yet this renovation is, so far, to be observed only in the leisured classes. The benefit must percolate little by little through all the strata of the population so as to revive them in their turn.

What precedes indicates sufficiently how the Latin and Germanic peoples whom we have discussed in this study can offer a long resistance yet to dangerous senility and to pacific or warlike invasions of outside enemies.

It is, however, too much to believe that these peoples can maintain indefinitely the first rank in the civilised world. But it depends on their own energy not to yield before the ineluctable hour.

A considerable work, perhaps a magnificent work, remains for them to realise. In place of the economic and material supremacy which is already departing from some of them, it is fitting that they should at least defend and maintain their intellectual and artistic supremacy.

Their honour will be to have put forth all their powers and to have bartered away no creative effort.

Their glory will be to leave behind a heritage of civilisation so rich and fertile that the life of the generations to come will be furthered and embellished.

If this task is accomplished without weakness, the more perfect humanity which shall succeed us will give to our efforts the same recognition and homage which every civilised man to-day offers to the immortal genius of Greece and Rome.[1]

RENÉ-L. GÉRARD.

Liége.

[1] Translation revised by the author.

BALFOUR AND BERGSON.

SIR OLIVER LODGE.

MORE than thirty years ago, when many of us were still in the unfledged student period, Mr Balfour published a book which rebelled to some extent against the orthodox philosophy of that day. Its aim was to show that the most positive science was based on a tacit system of axioms and postulates—and, for that matter, of intuitions—which were no whit stronger in reality than those on which some of the main religious doctrines are based. But the title, *A Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, deceived many of the public; they took it to be a defence of religious scepticism—the popular word "doubt" being almost more alarming than the technical term "scepticism" which had been discarded from the title—so the timid orthodox ignored it, while the few who were attracted rather than repelled by the suggestion soon found it useless for their purpose. Nevertheless, the advance of modern thought certainly tends in the direction advocated by that book; and it is natural for Mr Balfour, in approaching a criticism of M. Bergson, to preface his remarks by an allusion to this book and a repetition of part of its thesis:—

"that the theory of experience and of induction from experience needs further examination; that the relation between a series of beliefs connected logically, and the same beliefs mixed up in a natural series of causes and effects, involves speculative difficulties of much interest; and that investigations into the ultimate grounds of belief had better begin with the beliefs which everybody holds, than with those which are held only by a philosophic or religious minority."

He also quotes a proposition from his later book, *Foundations of Belief*, where he claims

"that in accepting science, as we all do, we are moved by 'values,' not by logic. That if we examine fearlessly the grounds on which judgments about the material world are founded, we shall find that they rest on postulates about which it is equally impossible to say that we can theoretically regard them as self-evident, or practically treat them as doubtful. We can neither prove them nor give them up."

I have been asked by the Editor to contribute to the friendly discussion which Mr Balfour has opened—indeed, to reply to his criticism in an interim manner, until such time as M. Bergson himself may be able to write further on the subject. But, if I thus presume to intervene, it is obviously necessary for me to speak from the side of science rather than from the side of philosophy; and it is only because I regard M. Bergson's philosophy as peculiarly acceptable and interesting to men of science that, amid the press of duties, I welcome the invitation.

I wish to prelude my remarks by acceptance of the main part of Mr Balfour's contention, as above set forth; though truly there is nothing peculiar or venturesome in that acceptance now, since many physicists would say — some indeed have said—the same sort of thing.

The usual index set up in the contrary direction is attached to the finger-post of mathematical axioms and theorems. For instance, it is said the three angles of a triangle do really equal two right angles, and there is no hypothesis or approximation or uncertainty about it. About the abstract plane triangle, No. But what about a concrete triangle—one traced on the surface of a calm sheet of water, for instance? The surface is part of a sphere, and the proposition is not true. Or the lines of least distance between three stars?—I should not venture to doubt it in that case myself, but that brilliant mathematician, W. K. Clifford, maintained[1] that we could not be sure that

[1] Lecture to British Association Meeting at Brighton in 1872. See *Lectures and Essays of Clifford*, edited by Leslie Stephen and Sir Frederick Pollock, vol. i. p. 155.

there was not some discrepancy, increasing in proportion to area of triangle, such as had been studied by great modern geometers, and which we may call, roughly, a possible curvature of space, which would make the proposition appreciably inexact for a sufficiently gigantic triangle.

In other words, abstract mathematical propositions are infallibly true for the abstractions with which they deal, but when applied to concrete realities they involve an element of contingency in no respect differing from the rest of human knowledge. The following quotation from Clifford (*loc. cit.*) will forcibly illustrate the fact that mathematicians are not blind to this view :—

> "The conclusions to which these investigations [those of Lobatschewsky and Gauss, of Riemann and Helmholtz] lead is that, although the assumptions which were very properly made by the ancient geometers are practically exact —that is to say, more exact than experiment can be—for such finite things as we have to deal with, and such portions of space as we can reach; yet the truth of them for very much larger things, or very much smaller things, or parts of space which are at present beyond our reach, is a matter to be decided by experiment, when its powers are considerably increased."

And in order to illustrate the matter further, in what may seem almost a frivolous way, I would contend that whereas the proposition that one added to one makes two is abstractedly beneath controversy, it need not be true for the addition of concrete things. It is not true for two globules of mercury, for instance, nor for a couple of colliding stars; not true for a pint of water added to a pint of oil of vitriol, nor for nitric oxide added to oxygen, nor for the ingredients of an explosive mixture; not necessarily true, either, for snakes in a cage, or for capital invested in a business concern, flourishing or otherwise; nor is it true, save in a temporary manner, for a couple of trout added to a pond. Life can ridicule arithmetic.

The moral of all which is, that propositions can be clear and simple and sure enough, indeed absolutely certain, as long as you deal with abstractions; but that when you come to concrete realities, and have all the complexities of the universe behind you—nor only behind but in front and among

and intermingled with every simplest thing,—then we perforce step out of the realm of positive dogmatic security into the region of reasonable and probable inference, the domain of pragmatic conviction, of commonplace intuition, of familiar faith.

This surely is analogous to what is maintained by William James, and also by Professor Bergson. They claim that the philosophy of the past has formulated a complete scheme too speedily; that in the present stage of our knowledge a thoroughly unifying philosophy is not attainable; but they fully admit that unification should shine before us as an ideal, and that we should carve our way towards it by the best steps immediately possible. Theirs is a tentative and groping philosophy, just as ours is a tentative and groping science: no scientific man imagines that he understands the universe bottom up and through and through. There may be men in the street who do so, but in all worthy judgment we are only beginning our task of exploration; our organised system of truth is but a sample of what it will grow to be in the future; and, however far we look ahead, there will still be an infinitude of existence uncharted and unexplored.

To suppose that we have absolutely infallible security for some of our beliefs, extreme probability for others, and only practical conviction based on experience for some more, may be needlessly to raise up barriers against our own progress. Facts of existence ought to be allowed their due weight and be tentatively accepted, even though we cannot adduce superhuman testimony for their truth, and even though we cannot at present see how to weld them into one completely unified and comprehensive scheme.

But effort at unification must be made, and any system which accomplishes one stage, or opens out one avenue, towards that ultimate goal, without pretending that it has done more than prepare and make ready a portion of the way—such a system of thought is very welcome; and that is exactly what M. Bergson's system claims to do.

In comparison with this effort of his, some of the old philosophers—so far as an outsider may judge—have seemed to be beating their heads against a locked door to which no key could be found. With inadequate scientific equipment for the most part, and sometimes with elaborate complications of theory, they have led us up to the door again and again, but we have got no further. The barrier between mind and matter has remained unshaken. The conflict between freedom and necessity has waged as fiercely as ever. The two opposing sides clamour against the barrier, or try to fly over it, but the door remains locked. Some, like William James, recall us to common-sense, and bid us cultivate both sides of our garden in peace and quietness, not worrying about the impassable barrier in its midst. Through mind and body both sides are accessible to us, both are of practical service; and although they form two irreconcilable tracts of land, what of that? In all probability the door will never open; it has always been locked. Locked the door is still; but M. Bergson has found something that to me, at any rate, from a distance, looks very like a key. We have yet to clamber to its hiding-place, to clear away the marl with which it is encrusted, and then try whether it will fit the lock.

For I conjecture that one of the features of the Bergsonian philosophy, though it is only dimly sketched in or barely indicated at present, is that the clue to the relation and interaction between matter and mind is contained in the idea that they have a common ancestry—that they are related somewhat as animals are to plants.

Widely divergent as the animal and vegetable kingdoms have now become during the long course of evolution, it is well known, or at any rate admitted without controversy, that they must have arisen from a kind of cell which was neither the one nor the other, but which incorporated the principle of life in its simplest most essential germ, and thus enabled life to gain a foothold on this planet, and gradually to manifest, through association with matter, the vast variety of which it was capable.

Taking this as a sort of parable, may we not conjecture that the faint beginnings of consciousness and the fundamental rudiments of matter—utterly divergent as they are now, so that it is surprising that there can be any sort of relation between them—may have arisen from something which was neither consciousness nor material, but which had within it the potentiality of the development of both.

To take another illustration: common salt is neither sodium nor chlorine, nor has it any of the properties of either of those vigorous elements, but Davy taught us its constitution, and showed us how the separation might be effected. So, on an altogether higher plane, this unknown x, let us say, had constituents or aspects of mechanism, and aspects or elements of freedom, in combination; and at a certain stage in evolution it became plain that they could develop better in mutually sustaining and mutually opposing independence. Consequently a separation took place—part of x became inert matter, absolutely controlled by *vis a tergo* forces, dependent wholly on the past and on surroundings; and part of it became life, with an incipient anticipation of the future, guided by perceptions rather than urged by force, influenced by habits and character rather than by external circumstances alone, and possessing nascent power of self-determination and choice.

Through this subdivision or bifurcation, regarded from a human point of view, part might be said to have become elevated in the scale of existence and part degraded; the degradation serving a useful purpose and being justified, just as the degradation of energy is frequently justified—the degradation of some often elevates the rest,—since thereby an instrument, a vehicle, a staircase was provided, steps on which the other portion could rise to higher things.

For by separation of the two entities or constituents of the universe, freedom and mechanism, an arena of conflict and struggle and effort was provided; and the result was that vigorous vitality appeared in the universe—it has appeared

at least on this planet,—an output far more profitable, of far greater value, than the dead level of inactivity and beatific torpor which might otherwise have been the sole representative of Existence. Life, with all its potentialities, both of suffering and of enjoyment, came into being, and has continued to interact with and incarnate itself in matter ever since; making use of its many advantages, overcoming its many defects, obstructed and defeated by its passive resistance, yet coercing it into works of art, stimulating itself always to greater and higher effort to overcome inherent difficulties, and to realise, sooner or later, some of its own far distant ideals.

To sustain such a thesis, or to hold even tentatively such a position, we must admit Evolution to be a great reality, and Time an entity of profound significance. For progress must really depend on Duration; and the condition of things in the far past must have been inferior, as a whole, to conditions which subsist to-day.

If it be asked how such a notion can be reconciled with the idea of Eternity, the only reconciliation I can suggest lies in the conception of possible alternations of phase, extending over vast regions of space and through great tracts of time. For it is conspicuously true that apparent waste and long periods of preparation—lavish provision for its ultimate ends—are not eschewed by Nature.

To illustrate the meaning of phase-alternation in this connection, the alternation of summer and winter will serve. To an organism living only in the spring, the world would seem bursting with youth and hope, an era of rising sap and expectation; to an organism living only in the autumn, over-maturity, decay, and despair would be the dominant feature. But to creatures whose life is long enough both phases are welcome, and are recognised as parts of a larger plan.

Just as the planet has gone through millennia of development, ages before a human race made any signs of appearing, so, without any knowledge of what is happening elsewhere,

we may surmise that this region of space known to us has been evolving on fairly terrestrial lines, or on lines not utterly discordant, during this present vast era, of say a billion centuries. But what has happened to it at epochs so remote that imagination boggles at the conception of them, who is to say? Similarly, we know nothing of what is happening in the unimaginable depths of space, beyond the range of the most powerful telescope and most sensitive photographic plate. The process of evolution in some of its many possible forms cannot be limited to our portion of time and space alone; it may have gone through many phases in its majestic transformations, and may have achieved unknown and inconceivable results.

Speculation beyond our limits of time and space seems hardly likely to be fruitful—is not really legitimate save as a warning against a narrow view: its only merit lies in suggesting such an enlargement of scope as to remind ourselves that not even by so novel a conception as the common ancestry of mind and matter—not even by discovering the nature of the unknown x, and recognising the Cause which may have guided and be still guiding the special phase of evolution which moulds us and which we can dimly contemplate—not even so can we presume to be engaged in formulating any valid conception of the Ultimate, Omnipresent, Dominating, Eternal Influence, the Nameless, worshipped under a thousand names, and here best referred to in reverent silence as I AM.

What we can study in the highest Philosophy must really be as limited as that which we can study in the highest Science. Data there must be, boundaries and terminology there must be, to make things tractable or ideas expressible. The data of one branch of science are sometimes the objects scrutinised by another. The data of the biologist are cells and nuclei and protoplasm. The data of Chemistry are atoms and molecules and forces of affinity. The data of Physics are matter and energy, ether and motion. The data of Philosophy are Space and Time, Mind and Matter, Life and Consciousness; and its

problems concern their interrelation. The solution of these problems — distant as that solution now seems — will leave plenty more unsolved. A fair comprehension of the nature of life, and the way it is able to interact with matter, must surely be within our human grasp. We are not near it yet, but the effort to reach it is worth while.

The crux, the essential puzzle to be faced, comes out very clearly in Mr Balfour's article. As M. Bergson has truly said, life utilises solar energy to store organic explosives, and then pulls a trigger, a frictionless easy trigger, that requires only a nearly infinitesimal force. That is indeed a not unusual way of formulating its function, except among those who try to consider that life is itself a form of energy. But, says Mr Balfour, to pull even a hair trigger *some* force is required, no matter how small. How is life or mind to exert force on matter? By what process is a mental idea translated into terms of physical motion? It is not enough that in organic life accumulated energy is released. "What is really essential," says Mr Balfour, "is the *manner* of its release. If the release is effected by pure mechanism, fate still reigns supreme."

M. Bergson says that Life is

"something which avails itself of a certain elasticity in matter—slight in amount as this probably is—and turns it to the profit of liberty by stealing into whatever infinitesimal fraction of indetermination that inert matter may present."

I confess I cannot myself take refuge in this supposed slight indetermination of matter, this slight inaccuracy in the laws of physics. When we really find the key, its efficacy will depend not on any peculiarity or inadvertence, to be excused by reason of its smallness, but on some satisfactory and complete subservience to vital action, potentially existing in and displayed by sufficiently complex organic molecules.

The interaction of mind and matter is a real and ancient puzzle. The brain and nervous system evidently constitute the mechanism by which it is accomplished, but the theory of their action is as yet incomplete—whether for the production of

movement or for the translation of air-waves or ether-tremors into sensation of sound of definite pitch or light of definite colour. The transition from mind to matter, and *vice versa*, is an affair of everyday experience, but it is not understood.

There is nothing surprising in that, nothing that ought to tempt us to deny the existence of mind and take refuge in materialistic monism; it is stupid to deny merely because we do not understand. The much simpler occurrence of the fall of an apple is not understood either. Newton knew well enough that, though he applied it to astronomy, he never explained gravitation itself. Its nature remains unknown. This problem, however, is quite thinkable; it can be definitely formulated—at least by those who admit the existence of an Ether—and by some is thought to be beginning to show signs of being tractable by reason, even if not yet by experiment; while the other problem, the interrelation between mind and matter, is still excessively obscure.

My own view is that life does not exert force—not even the most microscopic force—and certainly does not supply energy; that the whole of its control over muscular movements is what is involved in the terms "aim" and "timing"; that it utilises the spontaneous activities and processes of nature, and determines occasionally when they shall occur and for how long they shall be retarded. It can water one plot of ground and screen the sun from another.

Much guidance may be exercised by mere adjustment of relative phase in any pair of synchronous alternations which are already going on. Imagine an intermittent mountain-stream near a watershed above the Engadine, and let it work a synchronously oscillating sluice-valve. By merely adjusting the phase of its oscillations, the whole stream might be transmitted to the Danube, or the whole might be deflected into the Rhine.

By coupled alternation of phase, I signify such concordance or discordance between two rhythmical processes as shall combine them either for acceleration and advance, or for

regress and retardation. For instance, to a physicist, the electric and the magnetic constituents of an electro-magnetic wave is a well-known case; but a simple example is the slide valve and piston of a steam-engine. They are usually in accelerative or adjuvant phase, but by throwing them out of step the engine may be stopped or it may be reversed. Such readjustment may be brought about by the machine's own energy, and may be done either automatically or in response to an intelligent arrangement or act of will.

What, then, I want to suggest is, that the special changes produced in matter by will and intelligence are explicable by a process of timing—a process adapted to the directing of energy, quite independent of any alteration in its amount, and without any interference with—indeed with full assistance from—the laws of physics. The cells of the brain are presumably not stagnant until the will acts on them: the cells of a living body must be as active as atoms of radium. Energetic instability of structure is essential to protoplasmic molecules. Withdraw the controlling influence of life, and they speedily work havoc and devastation.

Illustrations abound. A pointsman may pull his lever over at the wrong moment and send a train to destruction, or at the right moment and send its passengers to their homes. They depend on the man's good will, and are safe until by habit or weariness his actions become mechanical, and one day mistaken. With insufficient food, it is true, he may not be able to act at all; but it is not his lack of energy that has to be inquired into in case of an accident, but its misdirection—the use he has made of it. The right lever, at the right time, is the essential thing.

Thus it is that a gun is aimed and fired by a sportsman. All the energy is in the powder and the man's breakfast. He determines what shall be done with it, and brings about a desired extinction of life. In a cannonade, just as much energy and mental activity are needed to aim and fire at a friend as at a foe; the nicety of this difference is not physical at all.

Whether a bill is read now or this day six months is all the same as regards the work of reading, but not all the same as regards the bill, and perhaps not all the same to the nation. Liberation of the energy of compressed air can be so timed by an organist as to re-awaken the thoughts of Bach.

All this can be admitted, and yet the question will remain —How does man pull the lever or press the key? How do I move any muscle of my body by an act of will? Physics and Physiology are expected to explain the whole of the material circumstances, both outside and inside my body; but neither will explain, nor does Psychology explain, how the mental idea translated itself into the necessary brain-cell-stimulus and nerve-impulse. There let us leave that problem at present, and enter on a new one.

> "Inert matter," says M. Bergson, "is subject to mathematical necessity; but with the coming of life we see the appearance of indetermination. A living being, no matter how simple, is a reservoir of indetermination and unforeseeability, a reservoir of possible actions, or, in a word, of *choice*. And in it, too, we find that faculty of imagining future eventualities (or, speaking more generally, of anticipating the future), and at the same time of storing up the past for that purpose, which is the faculty of consciousness."

No differences arise between the authors on this latter contention. They both agree practically as to freedom; but a divergence begins with respect to the ideas of ultimate aim and of control by the future—the question of teleology and far-reaching design. Mr Balfour says that M. Bergson

> "objects to teleology only less than to mechanical determinism. And, if I understand him aright, the vital impulse has no goal more definite than that of acquiring an ever-fuller volume of free creative activity."

Well, but that is a good enough goal, a real end in view, a sufficiently controlling and stimulating impulse. Is it not the goal of every great artist? The teleology suggested by Mr Balfour's simile of a river is an external teleology—control by external forces. Although said to "press ever towards the sea," a river is not really making "free endeavour" towards a goal, it is merely driven by the slope of its bed along a permanent channel to a fixed destination: while a flood or an

eruption of lava takes the path of least resistance with no aim at all. But M. Bergson is appealing for what may be called an immanent teleology; and the simile he employs, for something working in the dark yet not without ultimate aim, is a tunnel:—

"the image of a current of consciousness which flows down into matter as into a tunnel, which endeavours to advance, which makes efforts on every side, thus digging galleries, most of which are stopped by a rock that is too hard, but which, in one direction at least, prove possible to follow to the end, and break out into the light once more."

Why should it do this? asks Mr Balfour, why should consciousness immerse itself in matter? Why have anything to do with matter? Well, let us consider what it is that consciousness is striving for. If it be thought that its aim is to inoculate matter with its own freedom, and that it is smitten with failure in so far as "a huge mass of matter remains what it has always been—the undisputed realm of lifeless determinism"—an entire misunderstanding is exhibited. The aim of life and consciousness is self-development, not the development of matter; the aim is to bring into full activity every fibre of our being. "Never, most equal sisters," writes Ben Jonson in his dedication of *Volpone* to the two Universities, "had any man a wit so presently excellent as that it could raise itself; but there must come both matter, occasion, commenders, and favourers to it." Matter is a means to that end; it is used in the process and discarded, and remains as it was before.

Matter has provoked effort and rendered it possible. Force cannot be exerted when there is no resistance; you cannot give a violent push to a floating feather. The fruitless violence of "missing the globe" is a familiar and wasteful expenditure of energy in a well-known game. The ball must obstruct the club to just the right amount in order to yield any satisfaction to the player.

So the very inertia and obstructiveness of matter, the resistance which it offers to the realisation of ideals, con-

tribute to the development of incarnate consciousness, and enable it to rise in the scale of existence.

> "The thought which is only thought, the work of art which is only in the conceptual state, the poem which is only a dream, costs as yet no effort: what requires an effort is the material realisation of the poem in words, of the artistic conception in a statue or a picture. This effort is painful, it may be very painful; and yet, whilst making it, we feel that it is as precious as, and perhaps more precious than, the work it results in; because, thanks to it, we have drawn from ourselves not only all that was there, but more than was there: we have raised ourselves above ourselves."

That is the aim of the whole process, and that is how matter, by its very inertness, can contribute to the result; its very necessity makes of organised matter an instrument of liberty, and the fact that there has been a real aim all the time is proved by the sense of joy which follows its accomplishment. And surely joy is felt also during the effect, and is an indication of right progress and good work.

Values must truly be taken into account, as Mr Balfour says, but such efforts are surely not aimless. There is no ignorance or uncertainty as to the desired goal, though there is a contingency as to its being reached in any attempted direction; and there is always a danger lest the current of consciousness shall be ensnared by association with matter, enfolded and converted to its own automatism, as M. Bergson expresses it, and lulled into its own unconsciousness. In the vegetable kingdom this has happened, and in the animal kingdom there is constant risk of like degeneration. Hence genuine anxiety may be felt by Higher Powers, and constant help given from instant to instant, in the effort to shape our rough-hewn ends and carry out as far as possible a preconceived plan. Absence of complete predestination is not the same as absence of plan; a *desired* goal is not identical with a *destined* goal—a chess player is in no doubt on that score; and moderate and interesting and stimulating contingency is quite consistent with pursuit of a longed-for and eagerly expected end. "Journeys end in lovers meeting," but there may be many accidents by the way.

Complete Indifference as to final result would be irrational and absurd, and cannot be admitted for a moment by any creatures who have risen to the knowledge of what foresight and love and benevolence are. On the other hand, complete passive Security as to result would likewise savour too much of mere inert mechanism, and would be quite inconsistent with the spirit and meaning of life. We must surely feel that the whole is striving together towards some end. Organisms are known to help each other—mother-love is a blessed reality—why should we draw a line and exclude such attributes from the heights of existence?

There is plenty of room for guidance amid the laws of physics; and the effort need not be a blind effort, save perhaps to the particular organism which is struggling with its difficulties and finding that its best course is to do the duty nearest and have faith. Supervision and assistance may be realities, and yet the struggle may be a real one, involving uncertainty as to measure of success, and real risk of failure. The path to be followed need not be laid down like a line of rails, nor need the precise form of the destination be pre-determined.

Evolutionary progress is not like a river-bed, flowing in a predestined channel, nor is it like the march of the land-crabs in inexorable straight lines over and through every obstacle and danger; no, but it is like an Anabasis. Each marching day so many *parasangs*, so many *stadia*, halts of given duration by the way, natives questioned, hostilities avoided, difficulties overcome; and at length the sea which washes the shores of the homeland is sighted, with the bursting forth of shouts of joy.

To maintain a rational conception of teleology, M. Bergson warns us, we must beware the analogy of mechanical construction to a design. The "artificer" notion must be got rid of, not only as regards the workshop, but as regards the drawing-office. The real kind of teleology is difficult to conceive, and we may often overpress an analogy. Very

likely! Why should it not be difficult for us to understand the mode of working of higher intelligence? We are constitutionally hampered by our purely motile conception of power and activity. We ourselves are limited to movement of objects; so far as the external world is concerned, we put things together and trust to their inherent properties; but Life is working the inherent properties themselves. We place an egg in an incubator and a chicken results. Nature or life works in a totally different way from us: it does not directly *move* things at all, though it may cause them to move each other, and it achieves portentous results.

We perceive this best in cases of instinct, or of such unconscious processes as those to which we owe the growth and sustenance of our own bodies. It is easy to illustrate the futility of intelligence as compared with the unconscious activity of an organism. When we seek to do things by our brain and muscle alone, how limited our scope, how helpless we are; how much more powerful is our instinct—instinct of all grades, rising to the instinct of genius! Compare the futility of a dog's parlour-tricks with the superhuman skill of a sheep-dog or a bloodhound, yes, or a carrier pigeon. So it is with all our highest functions—the best of them are semiconsciously performed. Who, by taking thought, can write a great poem or paint a great picture if the gift is not born in him? To manufacture a new human being is an impossible task; but hand the problem over to life, and it is absurdly easy. And even our most intellectual senses—how saturated they are with instinct! Take vision. The retina has a pattern of ether-tremors focussed upon its rods and cones, and from the distribution of that mosaic of sensation a whole landscape is perceived—it cannot be said to be "inferred." Ordinary sight is not an affair of intellect, any more than the intellect of the newly-hatched chick enables it to descry and peck at a seed. We are still far more dependent on intuition than on reason.

The subliminal super-consciousness, to which in our highest

state we attain access, is not to be confused with the dull narcotic influence of matter. The rapt inspired mood of the poet is furthest removed from enslavement by matter, and the unconsciousness to material surroundings thus experienced is "utter clearness" of pure thought,

> "and thro' loss of Self
> The gain of such large life as match'd with ours
> Were Sun to spark."

Is there not more fundamental Freedom, also, about instinct than about intelligence? Birds are proverbially free, but so are most animals—even insects. Few working men are as free as the working bee. It can take up its work at any stage, and pass from one cell to another doing a little job at each. If no wax is provided it sets to work to make some. If wax is supplied it begins by moulding it. If it is partially moulded or stamped out into incipient cells it draws out the walls and completes them. If ready-made cells are introduced into a hive, the bee saves all this preliminary labour and begins to fill them, gathering its honey from where it will.

Yet there is clearly an aim in all this, and life is always subject to its own laws. There is a controlling entity in a seed whereby the same product results, no matter amid what surroundings. If an acorn can grow at all, an oak results.

There is thus a "finalism" even about life, but it is not Leibnitzian finalism, it is not "radical finalism," as Bergson calls it. That was the kind of teleology to which he was objecting, not the kind for which Mr Balfour is pleading, and which I feel reasonably sure M. Bergson would heartily concede. If not, we shall hear in due time: and of course he is not responsible for any misrepresentation or modification of his meaning, which I may have occasionally assumed to be more like my own than it is.

It is the trace of mechanism lingering in mechanical finalism that Bergson objects to. Both mechanism and finalism are standpoints, so he contends, to which the human mind has

been led by considering the work of men. We must get beyond both points of view. A workman, he says,

"proceeds by the assemblage of parts with a view to the realisation of an idea or the imitation of a model. Mechanism, here, reproaches finalism with its anthropomorphic character, and rightly. But it fails to see that itself proceeds according to this method—somewhat mutilated! True, it has got rid of the end pursued or the ideal model. But it also holds that nature has worked like a human being by bringing parts together, while a mere glance at the development of an embryo shows that life goes to work in a very different way. *Life does not proceed by the association and addition of elements, but by dissociation and division.*"

The universe, as we perceive it, does not set to work after our conscious manner and put things together to a design—no; but that is no adequate reason for denying an aim, a superconsciousness, and an ultimate goal.

Yet, though there must be a plan, it is a plan impossible to formulate; for

"Evolution creates, as it goes on, not only the forms of life, but the ideas that will enable the intellect to understand it, the terms which will serve to express it. Its future, therefore, overflows its present, and cannot be sketched out therein in idea."—(*Creative Evolution*, p. 108.)

Whether the ancient appearance of inconsistency between freedom and foreknowledge can thus be removed, whether sequence and duration can ever be resolved by some lofty apotheosis into an equivalent simultaneity, whether complete and absolute foreknowledge—based on thorough acquaintance with the character of every creature at every instant—can be evaded, or need be evaded, by relegating such ultimate perception solely to an existence so high as to be inconceivable—far above the proximate agents and controllers of this present scheme—all this is more than doubtful; but, for my own part, I am impressed with two things—first, with the reality and activity of powerful but not almighty helpers, to whom we owe guidance and management and reasonable control; and next, with the fearful majesty of still higher aspects of the universe, infinitely beyond our utmost possibility of thought.

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IS THERE ONE SCIENCE OF NATURE?

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In a previous article [Decennial Number, October 1911, pp. 110–129] *dealing with this question we brought forward a number of arguments in support of a vitalistic position. We gave our reasons for maintaining the autonomy of life, and even more keenly the autonomy of biology. We drew our arguments from the study of (I.) everyday functions and the fundamental vital processes of growth and reproduction, and (II.) animal behaviour with all its convincing evidence that living creatures are historic beings. We continue the inquiry by considering the problems of development and evolution.*

III. THE ARGUMENT FROM DEVELOPMENT.

§ 13. When we watch a transparent marine animal, such as one of the Salps, and see the actual working—the movements, at least, of various parts, such as the one-chambered heart, we are, as we have admitted, reminded of a smoothly working machine. On the other hand, when we have the good fortune to observe a development actually going on, in perfect transparency, for instance in the moth *Botys hyalinalis*, our unprejudiced impression must surely be that this is very far away from anything mechanical, that it is in fact very unlike anything else in the world. When we take the most familiar case of all, the development of the chick in the course of twenty-one days from a minute clear drop of living matter lying on the top of the yolk—the emergence of the obviously complex from the apparently simple—how marvellous we must confess it to be! In spite of all that has been done, how true it is still, what Harvey wrote three centuries ago: "Neither

the schools of physicians nor Aristotle's discerning brain have disclosed the manner how the cock and its seed doth mint and coin the chicken out of the egg." We get the same impression of the super-mechanical when we pass to trivial details, such as the making of the silk-like threads composing the common bath sponge. Large numbers of secretory cells called "spongoblasts" group themselves in double file in the middle stratum of the sponge, as if some unseen captain marshalled them. Up the middle of the double file spongin is secreted, made at the expense of the living matter of the contributors, and the many individual contributions coalesce in a spongin-fibre. Or, similarly, when we see the making of a bone, with its sappers and miners, the osteoclasts, and its builders, the osteoblasts, all working away like busy ants, we feel that we are far away from mere mechanism. The central wonder of development is the general process of differentiation, but this is enhanced by many accessory facts: there is the power the embryo often shows of righting itself when the building materials of its edifice have been artificially disarranged; there are interesting "regulation-phenomena" by which it adjusts itself after disproportions have been artificially induced; there are the strangely circuitous paths, reminiscent of ancestral history, by which it reaches its goal; there are the different ways of securing the same results, and so on.

§ 14. The vitalistic argument from the facts of development has found its finest expression in the work of Dr Hans Driesch, who was led to his theoretical position by a series of steps well marked in his successive papers, and corresponding definitely to a series of brilliant embryological experiments. He endeavoured to get nearer the secret of development by altering the normal environment of the egg and observing the results, or by tampering with portions of the developing egg itself. Step by step, as he made his concrete discoveries, summed up all too briefly in his *Encyclopædia Britannica* article "Embryology," he made an advance in vitalistic theory, and he presented his views in rounded-off completeness in his

Aberdeen Gifford Lectures, published under the title, *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*—one of the biggest contributions to the New Vitalism. We wish to *illustrate* —we cannot do more—the two proofs which he gives of the autonomy of life. The first is based on a study of morphogenesis, *i.e.* of the way in which an organism realises its specific form and structure. The second is based on a study of inheritance.

§ 15. Let us indicate the nature of the first proof by means of an illustration. One of the most beautiful sights on many parts of our coast, in the deep, narrow gullies among the rocks, is a bed of Tubularia. This polyp has a flower-like elegance and a fine translucent pink colour. It grows four or five inches high, about as thick as a knitting-needle, a slender, tubular animal with two beautiful whorls of spreading tentacles around and near the mouth. It often lives in gullies where the water rushes violently at every tide, and it may get broken in this way, or it may be cut off by hungry animals. But it has a remarkably strong "regenerative capacity"—that power of regrowing lost parts and repairing injuries usually well developed in those animals or in those parts of animals which in the natural conditions of their lives are peculiarly liable to injury.

Now this Tubularia is a perfect type of what Driesch calls a "harmonious equipotential system." "You may cut the stem at whatever level you like; a certain length of stem will always restore the new head by the co-operation of its parts." For the new flower-like head is not simply budded off from the wound; it is restored by the combined work of many parts of the stem. "As the point of section is of course absolutely at our choice, it is clear, without any further discussion, that the prospective value of each part of the restoring stem is a 'function of its position,' that it varies with its distance from the end of the stem; and so at once we discover one of the chief characteristics of our systems." In a "harmonious equipotential system" the prospective value of

any element (X) is a function of three factors. In the first place, it is a function of the absolute size (s) of the actually existing part of the system in the particular case: thus, if a portion of the gastrula embryo of a starfish be cut off, a proportionately smaller embryo will result. In the second place, the prospective value of an element depends on the actual position (l) of the element. For the same element (X) might be in the centre of one piece and at a corner of another of the same size, and its actual fate will be different according to the lines of the actual cut. Thus the formula stands, $p.v. (X) = f(s, l \dots)$. "But the formula is not yet complete: s and l are what the mathematicians call variables: they may have any actual value and there will always be a definite value of *p.v.*, *i.e.* of the actual fate which is being considered; to every value of s and l, which, as we know, are independent of each other, there corresponds a definite value of the actual prospectivity." But there is another factor at work in every case of development, whether experimental or normal, which is *not* a variable, but the same in all cases. This third factor is "a something embraced in the prospective potency of our system, though not properly identical with it."

"The prospective potency of our system, that is to say, of each of its elements, is the sum total of what can be done by all; but the fact that a typically proportionate development occurs in every possible case, proves that this sum comes into account, not merely as a sum, but as a sort of order; we may call this order the 'relation of localities in the absolutely normal case.' If we keep in mind that the term 'prospective potency' is always to contain this order, or, as we may also call it, this 'relative proportionality,' which, indeed, was the reason for calling our systems 'harmonious,' then we may apply it without further explanation in order to signify the *non-variable* factor on which the prospective value of any element of our systems depends, and, if we denote the prospective potency, embracing order, by the letter E, we are now able to complete our formula by saying $p.v. (X) = f(s, l, E)$."

As this conception of harmonious equipotential systems, analysed in this formula, is fundamental, a little time may be given to getting hold of the idea. It is not much to ask for as many minutes as Driesch has given years. Returning to Tubularia, we find that if a piece be cut out less than ten millimetres in length, the absolute size of the head restored is in close relation to the length of the piece. The fate depends on actual size as well as on position. And if we know also what is included under the letter *E*, *i.e.* the normal proportionality of the Tubularia, we can venture to predict the result of the regeneration in particular cases.

As another very typical case of a morphogenetic system of the harmonious type, Driesch takes the Ascidian Clavellina, which is much higher in the scale than Tubularia. The body consists of two very different chief parts, the branchial apparatus and the so-called intestinal sac. If these be separated, each may regrow the other from the wound. Or the branchial apparatus may lose almost all its organisation and become a small white sphere, within which a small but complete Ascidian develops! Or, if the branchial apparatus be isolated and cut into two, in whatever direction you please, each piece, if it thrives, will develop into a complete little Clavellina! "So we see that not only is the branchial apparatus of our animal capable of being transformed into a whole animal by the co-operative work of all its parts, but even each *part* of it may be transformed into a small *whole*, and it is quite at our disposal how large this part shall be, and what sort of a fragment of the original branchial apparatus it shall represent. We could hardly imagine a better instance of a harmonious equipotential system."

Having analysed the harmonious equipotential system, Driesch continues with the problem of "morphogenetic localisation." What is the nature of the factor *E*, the "prospective potency," responsible, among variables, for what becomes of the section of Tubularia stem or the fragment of the branchial apparatus of Clavellina. He appeals for aid to the "means"

or conditions of morphogenesis — the elementary processes of growth and cell-division, of surface-tension and osmotic pressure, but finds no help there. He appeals for aid to "formative stimuli," such as the exposure of the wounded surfaces to the water, but finds no help there. "So we see there is nothing to be done, either with the means or with the formative stimuli; both are entirely unable to account for those kinds of localisation during differentiation which appear in our harmonious systems." He then tries the theory that a chemical compound of a very high degree of complication might by its disintegration direct the morphogenesis; but "specificity of organic form does not go hand-in-hand with specificity of chemical composition, and therefore cannot depend on it; and, besides that, specific organic form is such that it can never be explained by atomic or molecular arrangement in the chemical sense; for, to state it in a short but expressive manner, the 'form' of an atom or molecule can never be that of a lion or a monkey." Driesch then comes to the last possibility, that there is some kind of a real machine in the system, which, if once set agoing, would result in the differentiations that take place. Then the "prospective potency" would be a very complex typical configuration of chemical and physical constituents, by the acting of which a typical effect is produced. In a most sportsmanlike manner he works with this machine theory in the light of experimental facts. He shows that every volume which can perform morphogenesis completely must possess the machine in its totality; but as every element of one volume may play any possible elemental rôle in every other (according to the nature of the cut), "it follows that each part of the whole harmonious system possesses any possible elemental part of the machine equally well, all parts of the system at the same time being constituents of different machines. A very strange sort of machine indeed, which is the same in all its parts." In a pertinacious, thorough way, characteristic of German thinkers, Dr Driesch tests the machine hypothesis in case after case,

and finds that it will not work. What can you say of a machine, for instance, that remains itself if you remove parts of it or if you rearrange its parts at will?

So after his patient work, which strikes us as equally fair-minded and subtle, Driesch reaches a conclusion of the very first importance. "No kind of causality based upon the constellations of single physical and chemical acts can account for organic individual development; this development is not to be explained by any hypothesis about configuration of physical and chemical agents." He goes on to the positive statement that the factor *E* in his formula is a vitalistic factor, "a true element of nature," "a factor of true autonomy," an "intensive manifoldness," which he calls "Entelechy," without identifying his doctrine with what Aristotle meant by the word. But without going on to his philosophical construction, we wish to emphasise his scientific result, for while it is necessarily negative in form, it is an indirect proof of the autonomy of life. Here we find no doubt as to the proper answer to the question which we have ventured to discuss: Is there one Science of Nature? "*Life, at least morphogenesis, is not a specialised arrangement of inorganic events; biology, therefore, is not applied physics and chemistry: life is something apart, and biology is an independent science.*"

§ 16. Let us now illustrate more briefly Dr Driesch's second proof of the autonomy of life, which is based on the facts of inheritance. He begins by drawing one of his interesting distinctions between two types of morphogenetic systems, that is to say, unities consisting of elements equal in morphogenetic faculty. It is the contrast between a harmonious equipotential system, such as Tubularia or Clavellina, and a "complex equipotential system, such as a reproductive organ." "Whilst in the harmonious system the morphogenetic acts performed by every single element in any actual case are single acts, the totality of all the single acts together forming the harmonious whole, in the other type of systems

now to be examined, complex acts, that is, acts which consist of a manifoldness in space and in time, can be performed by each single element, and actually are performed by one or the other of them." Thus the hollow tube of cambium between the wood and the bast in a Dicotyledonous stem is a complex equipotential system; either branch or root may originate from any one of its cells, as circumstances require. Similarly, the ovary of the sea-urchin is a morphogenetic system, every element of which is equally capable of performing the same complex morphogenetic process—the production of the whole individual.

Whether we take the ovary or the cambium, we must regard it as the result of a consecutive number of cell-divisions, leading back to the fertilised egg-cell. Now, suppose we make the assumption that the development of the egg-cell "proceeds on the foundation of a very complicated sort of machine, exhibiting a different kind of construction in the three chief dimensions of space, as does also the organism which is to be its result." How will such a conception work? Driesch's argument is that it will not work at all.

"Could such a theory—irrespective of all the experimental facts which contradict it—could such a theory stand before the *one* fact, that there occurs a *genesis* of that complex equipotential system, of which our one single egg forms a part? Can you imagine a very complicated machine, differing in the three dimensions of space, to be divided hundreds and hundreds of times and in spite of that to remain always the same whole?" . . . "Therefore, there cannot exist any sort of machine at the starting-point and basis of development." Driesch applies the name entelechy again to that which lies at the very beginning of all individual morphogenesis, at the very root of inheritance, or at least of the outcome of inheritance, in virtue of which the specific form of existence is re-created.

Similar to Driesch's second proof of the autonomy of the life is the argument used by Haldane in his Presidential

Address to the Physiological Section of the British Association (1908). For instance: "Difficult as it may be to form any conception of the mechanism of a secreting cell, it is infinitely more difficult to form the remotest idea of that of a germ-cell. But we are still only at the beginning of the difficulty. The assumed tremendous mechanism of the germ-cell has been developed, together with the whole of the rest of the parent organism and countless other germ-cells, from a previous germ-cell. What must the 'mechanism' of this cell have been? And that of its endless predecessors? We have reached the Euclidean *reductio ad absurdum.*"

If the egg has a chemico-physical mechanism with the potentiality of the future development, it is a mechanism which can enter into a working combination with another equally complex in fertilisation, and it is a mechanism of which a fragment seems as good as the whole, as the development of fractions of an egg seems to show (Delage's "merogony"). But there is difficulty enough in the single experiment that in several cases it is easy to get twins from one egg by shaking the first two cells apart. Even at the four-cell stage in the lancelet a good shaking may result in quadruplets! We do not say that it is easy to understand this sort of thing on any theory, but it does seem to transcend mechanism.

§ 17. We are ourselves greatly impressed by Driesch's thoroughness, but we do not suppose that either his "proofs" of the autonomy of life, or his theory of the "Entelechy," can be regarded as beyond criticism. Let us illustrate. It is objected by Russell that the "machine" in the case of Tubularia is not "a piece of transcendental horlogery *contained in* each section of stem, as Driesch seems to suppose"; "it *is* each portion of stem and the environment therewith," so far as that is able to exert an effective action on the regenerative fragment. We suppose that Driesch would answer that he has given a full discussion of the possible rôle of external formative stimuli. It is objected by Russell

that the difficulties in which Driesch so skilfully lands the mechanistic theory are in part artificial. We are intellectually incapable of imagining a mechanism sufficiently complicated for the purposes required, so we involuntarily make good our defect by an image which is too simple, which therefore proves insufficient. To which it does not seem unfair to answer that in testing the possibilities of a mechanical description we can only argue about mechanisms that we know about. or imaginative combinations of these. Moreover, as it seems to us, we must restrict ourselves to the types of mechanism that occur or may be plausibly conceived of as occurring in inorganic nature. Whenever we begin to imagine ingenious combinations of human invention, then we are on a vicious circle, for these are mechanisms with ideas inside them.

In the second place, in regard to the "Entelechy," there is difference of opinion as to the advisability of giving a name to that new aspect of reality which becomes dominant and operative in organisms. It may be that Biology will have a freer scope for development if the concept is left undefined. "In this respect," as Sir Oliver Lodge says, "biologists are only in the predicament of the gravitational astronomer, who, though able to apply his theory to the most hidden perturbation and announce predictions which are capable of triumphant vindication, yet is ignorant, completely ignorant, of the nature of the gravitational force itself."

To Professor Jennings, who has discussed the utility of the "Entelechy" concept at some length, "it seems to be merely a way of collecting all the difficulties together and giving the bundle a name"; it is a problem, not a solution. "Surely, if a complex harmonious action leading to a definite end is something requiring analysis and explanation, or implying a development, it is equally so whether it is found in a physico-chemical complex or in an 'Entelechy'!" This was written, however, before the elaborate exposition of the "Entelechy" hypothesis in the Gifford Lectures.

Similarly, Dr J. W. Jenkinson, who speaks with authority as an experimental embryologist and a trained philosopher, gives, in his able article on "Vitalism," in the April number of this Journal, an adverse criticism of Dr Driesch's theory. "This 'psychoid,' to which the name 'Entelechy' is surely misapplied, this rudimentary feeling and willing, which is aware of the form it desires to produce, must be psychically at least as complex as the phenomena it is designed to account for, and stands, therefore, as much in need of explanation as they. As Kant has observed, this will involve us at once in an infinite series of such entities. In fact it is only a 'photograph' of the problem, and no solution at all. Nothing is gained by multiplying these entities beyond necessity, and the progress of science would be better served by a simpler philosophy." Dr Driesch may be safely left to look after himself, and we are ourselves attracted rather to his proofs of the autonomy of life than to his theory of "Entelechy." But vitalists and mechanists alike should read Driesch's own exposition, an intellectual gymnastic of no mean order, in his Gifford Lectures, remembering always that the ingenious author has probably thought more continuously and deeply on the subject of development than anyone —not excepting Von Baer—since Aristotle wrote his *De Generatione.*

Dr Driesch conceives of "Entelechy" as "an agent at work in nature," "of a non-spatial nature," without a seat or localisation; it is immaterial and it is not energy; it is not inconsistent in its agency with the laws of energetics; its function is to suspend and to set free, in a regulatory manner, preexisting potentials, *i.e.*, pre-existing faculties of inorganic interaction. "There is something in the organism's behaviour —in the widest sense of the word—which is opposed to an inorganic resolution of the same, and which shows that the living organism is more than a sum or an aggregate of its parts. . . . This something we call 'Entelechy.'"

IV. The Argument from Organic Evolution.

§ 18. There is a good deal to justify the familiar terms, "cosmic evolution" and "inorganic evolution," and they are certainly very convenient. Since the days of Kant and Laplace there have been discussable theories of the formation of the solar system: criticism and construction continue to-day. Since the work of Lyell, we have had an increasingly precise knowledge of the successive chapters in the history of the earth. There is abundance of speculation and a beginning of experiment in regard to the transmutability of the chemical elements. Modern work is suggesting that there may be a common basis for matter of all kinds, as if the different kinds of atoms consisted of different numbers of smaller corpuscles of the same kind. And so on, for there are many illustrations of the summary statement that "nature is a realm of evolutionary processes." But is there not a considerable risk of error in using terms like "cosmic evolution" and "inorganic evolution" to sum up the history of the past which we have just referred to—the risk of identifying processes which are really very different, of taking for granted that inorganic evolution and organic evolution are the same sort of thing?

English biologists are accustomed to draw a distinction between development and evolution, which appears to us to be often overlooked in discussion. Development (Haeckel's ontogeny) is the becoming of the individual; evolution (Haeckel's phylogeny) is the becoming of the race or stock. How do they agree and differ? In both cases there is a succession of stages, and the scientific assumption is that each stage is conditioned by the preceding stages. In individual development we start with an inherited nature, a potential organisation and specific activity, which, given its appropriate nurture, expresses itself or realises itself. It does so more or less fully and perfectly in proportion to the normality of its nurture, but always with some plasticity and individuality. The

continuity between successive stages is one of personal identity; one stage is physically continuous with the next. In racial evolution the stages are physically discontinuous; there is a genetic continuity of generations sustained by the lineage of germ-cells. But the radical difference is surely this, that in any stage in racial evolution there are numerous individuals that do not figure in the final result; they are outside the pale of success; they die before their time or they have small families; in any case they and theirs are eliminated in Nature's sifting. They are "cast as nothing to the void." In some individual life-histories, complicated by metamorphoses, alternation of generations, and the like, there is a certain amount of sacrifice and experimentation, but there is nothing comparable to the staking of individual lives and losing of them that goes on in that sublime and romantic adventure which we call organic evolution.

It appears, then, that it would be more accurate to speak of the *development* of the earth, the *development* of the solar system, and so on, keeping the term *evolution* for the organic and the super-organic. But more important than any question of terminology is a recognition of the deep difference between the inorganic and the organic processes. In the former there are no alternatives; every stage is the necessary outcome of its antecedents; all is mechanically determined. In the latter there are alternatives (for one species may split into several); the organism is a genuine agent; the mechanical categories are transcended. Analogies between organic and inorganic evolution have often been elaborated, and Spencer made much of them, but they are very unconvincing. "The process by which worlds emerge from the primal nebula depends upon the conflict of attractive and repulsive forces," just as the process by which species emerge from a primal stock depends upon the struggle for existence. But "the conflict of attractive and repulsive forces" is a highly metaphorical expression, and in many cases of the struggle for existence the struggle is far to seek. What we have in the

organic world is a continual creation and a sifting, but the sifting is often a very gentle process. The alternating periods of stability and instability in inorganic development find their analogy in organic development rather than in organic evolution. At the best we do not get beyond formal resemblances, and such force as these may have is not increased when we go on to inquire more particularly whether the factors operative in organic evolution may not be interpreted mechanically. As Professor W. R. Sorley puts it in his very valuable paper on "The Interpretation of Evolution" (*Proc. British Acad.*, vol. iv.): "To establish the desired connection between inorganic and organic evolution we should have to show an identity of causes—to demonstrate that the effective factors in the evolution of life can be accounted for completely by the forces already operative in inorganic evolution—greatly complicated, perhaps, and newly distributed, but not different in nature."

§ 19. There are many reasons why we cannot regard the process of organic evolution as mechanically describable. The organism plays such an active part. It is active in its variability; for a variation is not like a card which the organism throws down—it is a self-expression. The modifications, which are somewhat more passively acquired as the results of changes in function or as dints due to changes in environment, do not seem to count for much in evolution. The unfortunate word "fortuitous," which it seems impossible to banish, is almost meaningless in regard to organic variations, except as a confession that we do not know much in regard to their origin. But whether we take the smaller "continuous" variations, whose registration often shows a normal curve of frequency, or the "discontinuous" mutations, which take a larger step at once, we must regard variations as self-expressions, even though some environmental stimulus may pull the trigger which liberates them. Moreover, the organism is in some measure active in the process of natural selection. It does not simply submit to the apparently inevitable. It often

evades its fate by a change of policy or of environment; it compromises, it experiments, it is full of device and endeavour. Therefore, apart from the fact that the Theory of Natural Selection rightly starts by assuming certain fundamental properties of the organism, *e.g.* variability, which are not mechanically explained, we see that the process itself transcends mechanism.

§ 20. In spite of the great difficulties presented by the origin of living creatures, the genesis of consciousness, the beginnings of intelligent behaviour, the emergence of man, and other "big lifts" in the process of evolution, we assume its continuity, for that is implied in our ideal concept of evolution. It is not very easy to say what it is that is continuous, but we mean in part that there is at no stage any intrusion of extraneous factors. But this continues to raise in the minds of many the natural difficulty that the results seem much too large for their antecedent conditions. How can the world of life, with its climax in man, have been evolved from a nebulous mass?

Let us recall Huxley's famous statement of his radical mechanism: "If the fundamental proposition of evolution is true, namely, that the entire world, animate and inanimate, is the result of the mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of forces possessed by the primitive nebulosity of the universe, then it is no less certain that the present actual world reposed potentially in the cosmic vapour, and that an intelligence, if great enough, could, from his knowledge of the properties of the molecules of that vapour, have predicted the state of the fauna in Great Britain in 1888 with as much certitude as we say what will happen to the vapour of our breath on a cold day in winter."

If this strong and confident statement be true, then there is indeed but one science of nature. But it makes many assumptions regarding which one may fairly argue. Professor Bergson, for instance, calls attention to its denial that time really counts. "In such a doctrine, time is still spoken of:

one pronounces the word, but one does not think of the thing. For time is here deprived of efficacy, and if it *does* nothing, it *is* nothing." Huxley denies the creative individuality of organisms which trade with time in a spontaneous and unpredictable way all their own. Moreover, as we have said elsewhere, the general idea of evolution (which Huxley invoked) does not warrant us in supposing that intelligent behaviour, for instance, "reposed potentially in the cosmic vapour" and could be predicted from a "knowledge of the properties of the molecules of that vapour"; for molecules and the like are abstractions of physical science which, for the purposes of that science, may be treated as if they represented the whole of the reality. The "primitive nebulosity of the universe" was a reality which, for the purposes of physical science, would be analysable into a whirling sea of molecules; but that certainly cannot have been the whole truth about it, if within it there reposed potentially the present actual world. It is an enormous assumption that the physical description exhausts the whole reality. The "molecules of the cosmic vapour," in the contemplation of which the man in the street thinks that he is getting down at last to the very bed-rock of reality, what are they but concepts devised for the convenient physical description of things, for dealing with an abstracted aspect of reality? It is true that they correspond to that aspect so accurately that we risk lives and fortunes on them, but to say that they exhaust the reality appears to us to be a contradiction in terms.

In Conclusion.

§ 21. A consideration of the everyday functions of organisms, of their behaviour, of their development, and of their evolution, leads us away from Kant's view that there is one science of nature, and leads us to follow Driesch and others in maintaining that biology must be ranked beside physics as a fundamental and autonomous science. Another line of argument would, we believe, lead us, even from the

naturalist's point of view, to recognise the autonomy of psychology.

We recognise three orders of facts: the physical order, where mechanism reigns supreme; the animate order, where mechanism is transcended; and the psychical order, where mechanism is irrelevant. It is obvious that the physical order overlaps the animate order, for organisms are material systems and their life includes a concatenation of chemico-physical processes. At the same time, as we have seen, we cannot explain the fundamental properties of the organism, which we start with in biology, in chemico-physical terms, nor would a complete chemico-physical description of what goes on in the life of an organism be the kind of description which a biologist seeks. The same applies to the psychical order, which is overlapped by the biological. In short, the sciences are differentiated not merely by their subject-matter, but by their characteristic questions and methods and concepts.

§ 22. It may be pointed out that in maintaining the radical apartness of biology from physics, we are by no means surrendering the hope that biology may rise nearer the position of an "exact science." For we protest that this honourable rank is not exclusively for the sciences which deal with processes that can be described "by aid of elementary corpuscles having ideal motions." The term "exact science" may surely be used without injustice more widely, to indicate all science that has resolutely begun to "measure," including in "measurement" all forms of precise registration. Not a little of the modern work in psychology is very exact, but the description of its subject-matter "in terms of ideal motions" is certainly not its end. Biology is inexact compared with gravitational astronomy, partly because the astronomer is a master workman, the biologist still only an apprentice, and partly because we deal in biology with an order of phenomena more complex than in astronomy, with living creatures which are personal agents, individualities which are variable and spontaneous, always to some extent unpredictable. It is well

known, however, that there has been a modern movement towards exactness even in the most difficult departments of biology. There has been for a long time much exact science in comparative anatomy and comparative physiology, but the recent labours of the biometricians on the one hand, and of the Mendelians on the other, have already done much to bring the study of evolution problems nearer the ideal of exact science. In fact, as has been sagaciously pointed out, biology has already become a science to a degree that Kant deemed impossible, and this achievement keeps the biologist from admitting the force of the Kantian argument, one conclusion of which was that there is only one science of nature.

§ 23. Perhaps we may be allowed to refer to three remarks on the subject of our discussion which come from the plain man in the street, who is not at most times far removed from most of us. He wondered, in the first place, at the longevity of the problem discussed and at the oscillations of human judgment from one side to the other. We must admit that it is a very old question indeed, for Aristotle was a thorough-going vitalist, and his biology was in conscious opposition to the dogmatic mechanism of the school of Democritus. There must be intrinsic difficulty in the problem, vital activity being something between mechanical causality and our own conscious purposing. For this reason, the secret of life is baffling to the human intelligence, refusing to be formulated, receding as we approach. For this reason, Wordsworth, Emerson, Meredith, and many other nature-poets are perhaps the truest, because deepest, biologists of us all, having touched through sympathy what the cold hand of intelligence cannot reach.

But how can we explain the historical oscillations of biology between the mechanistic and the vitalistic interpretations of the living organism? Now it is a machine and again it is a spirit, now an automaton and again a free agent, now an engine and again an entelechy? Why does the pendulum of reflection swing so? It is partly because success attends the

prosecution of chemico-physical analysis, and the investigators, flushed with success, insist on premature generalisation. It is partly because vitalism is apt to become mystical and vague, provoking the positivist recoil which is within its limits quite wholesome. And doubtless there are other reasons, for judgment on this question is bound up with many other judgments, and science has ever a tendency to take on the colour of its time.

§ 24. In the second place, the plain man in the street wonders why we should worry over such an academic question as that of the number of the sciences. Vitalist or mechanist —a plague o' both your houses!—will either view make any difference to this life of mine? This raises large questions, but perhaps one answer will suffice. Suppose the mechanistic theory of the organism be wrong—a false simplicity—a materialism—it behoves us in the love of truth to fight, for the same sort of argument applies to the autonomy of psychology and the rights of sociology. Those who maintain that biology is only applied chemistry and physics are of the company of those who say that psychology is a branch of physiology and sociology a pseudo-science. Moreover, though the mechanistic intrusion into biology is a question of scientific method and interpretation, it tends, for subtle reasons, probably for the most part misunderstandings, to strengthen the hands of the unpoetic, the unromantic, the wonderless, who are unaware of the fundamental mysteriousness of nature.

§ 25. In the third place, the plain man in the street observes, and we have much sympathy with him: "This big talk about the autonomy of the organism, and so forth, is all very well, but do you mean that there is in the living creature more than meets the eye? Is there more than matter and energy, or not?" But to this and similar demands we fear that the disappointing scientific answer must be given that the question is not rightly put. We do not know what matter really is, nor what all the energies of matter may be. What we do know is that present-day physico-chemical formulæ do not

suffice for the adequate biological description of organisms, and that we require to use historical explanations which are outwith the limits of physics and chemistry. And we find no warrant for asserting that the physical concepts of "matter" and "energy," abstracted off for particular scientific purposes, exhaust the reality of Nature. We see before us an ascending series of individualised activities correlated with an increasing complexity of material organisation — the two aspects are inseparable: the worm is a higher synthesis than the mineral, and the bird than the worm, but we cannot explain the fundamental properties of these successive syntheses in terms of anything else. We feel sure, however, that organisms reveal a deeper aspect of reality than crystals do (deeper, because it is nearer what is most real to ourselves, our own conscious experience), and that in this sense there is more in the plant than in the crystal, more in the animal than in the plant, more in the bird than in the worm, more in man than in them all.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

ABERDEEN.

IS THE UNIVERSE FRIENDLY?

PROFESSOR GEORGE T. LADD,
Late Professor of Philosophy in Yale University.

An intimate friend of the late Frederick W. H. Myers once proposed to him this query: "What is the thing which, above all others, you most desire to know? If you could ask the Sphinx one question, and one only, what would that question be?" After a brief period of thoughtful silence, Myers replied: "If I could ask the Sphinx one question, and one only, and hope for an answer, I think it would be this: 'Is the Universe friendly?'"

After the first shock of pleased surprise at the picturesque character of this way of stating a grave problem, one is more and more impressed with the extent and profoundness of the problem itself. Indeed, there are few or none of the major questions attempted by the reflective thinking of mankind that may not be, directly or indirectly, concerned in the answer given to this question. Nor is this true of theoretical philosophy alone; for the principles of conduct and the issues of life, in logic and in fact, largely depend upon whether one says Yes or No to the same question. Under the wings of the thought which broods over it may be gathered the most vital and cherished offspring of psychology, metaphysics, and ethics. What does Myers' question imply as to the thoughts and emotions of the questioner—the man, who proposes the query? What does it suggest, or even imply, as to the reality questioned about—the Universe taken in a large way? What

follows as to the attitude which it is reasonable and practicable to establish between the two—between man and the Universe in which he lives and moves and has his being?

The very putting of the question, "Is the Universe friendly?" and especially its eager and persistent putting as the question which, above all others, it is best worth the mind's while to have answered, is intensely and even awfully human. It involves the whole of human nature with its various capacities and varied experiences. It is the question of a being who has, not simply as a sentient animal, been caught in the universal struggle for existence, suffered and enjoyed, succeeded and failed, in the gratification of appetite and desire. It is rather the question of a being who has reflected on this experience, revolted against it in part, and charged it up against the *System* over which he has little or no effective control. Neither has the suggested problem reference to the present alone. It is not simply the question of an individual Englishman, living in comfortable circumstances in an environment created by the most advanced modern civilisation. It is the question of the race, a question of human nature since the time man began to think. It is the cry of Job, ringing through the ages: "Oh, that I knew where I might find him! I would know the words which he would answer me." Nor is the bearing of the answer to the proposed problem confined to the interpretation of both the present and past experiences of mankind. Past and present evil happenings, if the future seemed secure, would furnish a ground too cold to nourish such an urgent growth of interest as this question implies. Only a being who looks inward and forward could encourage the task of essaying a problem like this. And, indeed, it is the curiosity, the fear, the hope, the awe, which the thought of a future existence awakens, that imparts much of its vivacity and pungency to the query: Is the Universe indeed friendly to man?

But the bigness and force of such a question as this, when viewed in the light of modern science, are scarcely comparable

to the character which it assumed in the reflective thinking of ancient or mediæval times. Surely never before did the vastness of the Universe stand in such oppressive contrast with the littleness of man. Never before did the sphere in which he moves with a relative independence seem so small. Never before did the spirit seem so powerless to enforce its ideals on the rigid mechanism of the system of material things. And how pitiless is the Universe in its remorseless waste of human life, as though it made no distinction between it and the most worthless of the materials it moulds in fragile shapes, then breaks and throws away! How hideous are its contrivances for disseminating among human beings the seeds of suffering, disease, and death! Nor can we fail to notice the inescapable nature of so much of this suffering and disease: the cunningly devised traps Nature has set for man at every turn in his existence, and the seemingly malicious craft with which they are baited with the most alluring of enticements. At the same time, the realisation of his ambitions after a physical and social betterment, which shall include the surer and fuller satisfaction of imperative natural wants, has one of its foreboding and yet inevitable results in producing a greater unfitness for enduring patiently the evils which his environment seems determined for ever to enforce. Relaxation of the stern and painful discipline begets increased softness in human nature; and increased softness paves the way for increased pain.

Thus is the revolt of a sentient nature converted into reasons for the conclusions of a pessimistic philosophy. Thus does man seem, as it were, constructed and environed so that he *must* press the question more eagerly as his rational development goes on; but *must* also find it more difficult to answer at all, or more heavily weighted with reasons for a negative answer. "Is the Universe friendly?" The answer which the spirit craves appears to be made impossible by the facts of experience and by arguments of the intellect in view of these facts. Is man, then, left for ever longing to answer

Yes, and yet compelled to say, "I cannot tell, or if I answer at all, it must be with a No"?

But when we face the other side of our question more reflectively and more objectively, as it were, two related facts emerge which may well cause us to pause and consider the subject more profoundly before uttering an impulsive or a despairing negative. Perhaps the most impressive and mysterious thing about the question is the existence of the question itself. For something very important is implied as to the nature of the Universe from the very nature of all our querying about it. In a word, the question itself implies that the constitution of the Universe itself is *personal.* Friendliness and unfriendliness are personal attitudes; the terms are meaningless when we try to use them of impersonal beings and impersonal relations. With things, as mere things, we cannot fitly speak of our relations as friendly or unfriendly. Of the animals, in their varying moods and attitudes toward one another and toward us, we use these words only so far as we recognise, so to say, certain inchoate and partial characteristics of personality as belonging to them. If the big World, the one that includes the totality of existences as set in a system of relations and especially as constituting man's environment, is unpenetrated, uncontrolled, unappreciative, as respects the feelings, thoughts, and practical interests of humanity; then, even to ask after its attitude to man, or to consider what responsive attitude of a sentimental or moral sort is fitting on man's part, is to be absurd. *Friend* of mine, I will not call a Universe that does not know what it is about, or in some sort choose what it is about; but neither can I regard such a Universe as unfriendly.

Yet all through human history, from the scientific as well as from the ethical and the religious points of view, man has been putting questions to the World in which he lives, *as though* it really had some personal attitude toward him and toward his welfare, and *as though* it solicited or demanded in return some personal attitude toward it from him.

This personification of the principle which is to account for the varied phenomena of the physical world is as complete, although more naïve, in the most abstract and materialistic of scientific systems as it has ever been in any form of philosophical monism or deistic theology. It is essentially the same thing when Parmenides says of Nature: "She rules over all painful birth and all begetting, driving the female to the embrace of the male, and the male to that of the female"; and when "the formative power of the formless protoplasm calls forth the highest admiration" of Haeckel. Ugliness and beauty, kindness and cruelty, rewards for virtue and enticements to vice, are by a sort of invincible intellectual instinct ascribed to the Universe as the Mother or Father of mankind. And confessedly, this same instinctive personifying, with its inquiry how some particular manifestation, or the whole of Nature, feels toward the individual human self, is the perpetual source of Nature worship and of the arguments of so-called "natural theology." The earlier claim that religion is the offspring of fear alone has, indeed, been thoroughly discredited by the facts which show how often it is rather that desire for good fellowship which begets a less slavish attitude toward her divine power. For the human spirit wants to get on good terms with the spirit of the Universe, not simply that it may escape the evils which may otherwise come to it, or gain the advantages to be won only in this way, but also for the satisfaction of certain feelings of a higher sort.

The basis of all the higher forms of religion, of all monotheism, is just this same personification of the Universe, whether it be under the claims of a so-called "light of nature" or of general or special revelation, including the belief in prayer and the founding of the obligations of obedience and of worship, with all their intellectual and emotional satisfactions. Still further, the mysterious feeling of kinship with Nature, which plays so large a part in the æsthetical culture of man and in the progress of the expressive arts, has for its roots the belief in the personal characteristics, both wrathful and

peaceful, terrifying and soothing, repulsive and attractive, depressing and uplifting, of the total environment in which the life of man is set.

What wonder, then, that in all ages of the world men of every phase of philosophic conviction and every form of religious belief, or of no belief, have been ready to praise or blame the Universe for the way in which it has treated them? Strange paradox of human reason! Or, shall we not say, of the heart against the reason! For those who profess least of all the trustworthiness of this trick of personification, not infrequently are most bitter in their condemnation of the machine-like structure which is grinding them and the things they value so remorselessly fine. This grotesque act of unreason can scarcely be wholly due to the unmanly willingness to shift the blame of one's own ignorance or wrongdoing upon the shoulders of the stone or bronze Atlas that, all unthinking and unfeeling, bears up the physical world. Yet, of what fault can the Universe be guilty, or to what praise can it be entitled, if no personal life is thinking, feeling, planning underneath its awful mask?

Let it then be once for all agreed that unless we attribute personal characteristics to the Universe, the profoundly interesting question, "Is the Universe friendly?" has no intelligible meaning. This inference admitted, three answers are possible to our question. The Universe is wholly, or in the main, friendly. The Universe is wholly, or in the main, unfriendly. The Universe is partly friendly and partly unfriendly. The last answer is what, naïvely expressed and understood, the multitude of mankind have thought and said.

But there is a "previous question" to be raised, the answer to which must largely determine our conclusions regarding the inquiry with which we are chiefly concerned. What is it to be friendly? In human social affairs the ordinary tests of friendliness consist of such expressions of sympathy, or practical devices of help, as beget emotions of pleasure in the recipient or smooth his way to the attainment of cherished

ends. To the friend men look for increase in the feelings of self-approbation, for the sharing, and so the mitigating, of sorrows and disappointments, and for assistance in the avoidance or the bearing of losses and pains. That the Universe, if concerned at all in human affairs, is not solely or chiefly bent on the end of making man's life pleasant or comfortable, is obvious enough. Indeed, not only in many of its aspects, but also in not a few of its most essential contrivances, it seems the rather bent on furnishing him an abundance of painful work and suffering of every sort. So pervasive and overwhelming are the evidences of this that any fair adjustment of the balance between the wrongdoing of man and the wrongdoing of the World would seem almost inevitably to warrant the conclusion (which religious feeling pronounces blasphemous) of Omar Khayyám:

> "For all the Sin wherewith the Face of Man
> Is blacken'd—Man's forgiveness give—and take!"

From the same point of view, even if we introduce the word "needless" before the words "pain and loss and disappointment," we do not greatly improve our argument, on a basis of fact, for an affirmative answer to our question. So long as we hold this hedonistic or utilitarian view of the ends to be preferred for human life, there is abundant evidence that the Universe is largely engaged in thwarting the attainment of just these ends. How then can it be called friendly?

But even the poor and incapable friendships of earth, in their higher forms, as practised and appreciated by the best of men and women, are concerned for something far more than the common pursuit of freedom from pain and the increase of happiness. And one may be well loth to believe that the standard of the Universe, in determining its attitude toward men, is lower than that of the best prevailing among men toward one another. For this best human standard has, somehow or other, come out of the Universe's Self. According to this standard, friendship is the bond which unites kindred spirits in genuine and sympathetic assistance toward

the ideals cherished by them all. And never has it been true that the highest ideals, the supreme interests of human endeavour, have been the attainment of the maximum of pleasure with the minimum of pain. So that the Universe *may be* man's good friend, even if (or even because) it does not care chiefly for his leading a life that is happy, irrespective of its attitude toward, and achievements in, the higher ethical and æsthetical ideals. But for the mind that does not believe in the supreme value of these ideals, and in the obligation to strive for their realisation at no inconsiderable cost of toil and suffering—indeed, often without counting cost at all,—there is little use in striving to prove the friendliness of the Universe by any line of argument.

Given these two conclusions from the two related sets of facts,—namely, the source and setting of man's life, when conceived of as an orderly whole, is conceived of in terms of a larger Personal Life; and, this Personal Life is not friendly to human longings for a life free from pain and toil—we may still lift up our question and look at it again from a loftier point of view. And now a most remarkable fact of human experience throws some softening light over its rugged outlines. For there is something truly surprising about the answer given to it by those who have lived their lives in the fullest confidence in the verity and value of the things of the spirit, of the ethical, æsthetical, and religious ideals. The testimony of these spirits, when dwelling upon their own experience as having tested the purifying effect of this unfriendly (?) treatment of the Universe, is quite uniformly of an encouraging sort. However much they may have been downcast at times by the way, they have come at the last to count it gain and even joy to have failed so frequently and to have suffered so sadly, if they can see—as they quite uniformly think that they can see—that these very experiences have helped them toward the goal of the ideal life. And the attitude which the individual takes toward this Universe seems to them the essential thing about this ideal life. In this one thing the tenets of

classical Stoicism, the quietism of Hindū philosophy, the exhortations and practices of Buddhism, and the faith and life of the religion of Jesus, are in complete accord.

What, then, is the value, as evidence, of this testimony? It is from experience. It is the collective voice, if not of the majority, at least of the good few, of those who have suffered much at the hands of the Universe, but who have in and through this suffering realised what they regard as a far greater amount of a higher good. They have answered the complaint, "Zeus does not order these things rightly," in the words of Epictetus: "Why so? Because he has made you to be patient? Because he has made you to be brave? Because he has made them to be no evils?" Or, they have heard the words of divine suffering: "In the world ye have tribulation: but be of good cheer; I have overcome the world." When this attitude is fairly won, then the disposition to rail at the world and to condemn its conditions of existence and of slow and painful progress passes away, and is replaced by a disposition to admire, to trust, and even to love.

It is, however, when these good few sympathetically contemplate the vast number of their brethren, the race at large, who either because of their greater burden of trouble or inferior strength to bear, answer the same problem in the spirit of sullen or violent revolt, or with an experience of increasing darkness rather than light, suicide rather than self-surrender, and despair rather than resignation or joy, that their doubts and difficulties return in a yet more perplexing and fundamental way. Is the Universe friendly to the race? For my answer to this inquiry, I cannot accept the advice of Epictetus: "Let not another's disobedience to Nature become an ill to you; for you were not born to be depressed and unhappy with others, but to be happy with them." On the contrary, it was perhaps just for the purpose of bearing more than my seemingly just share of others' disobedience to Nature that I was born. It was not his private woes that drew from Martin Luther the audacious question: "My God! art Thou dead?"

It was the weight of vicarious doubt and suffering that pierced the darkness of Calvary with the cry, "Eli! Eli! lama sabachthani?"

Is, then, the Universe friendly, not simply to the good few, who prefer its uplifting discipline to any conceivable amount of freedom from discomfort, disappointed expectations of pleasure, and accessions of pain; but is It friendly to the race? Here is where the comforting and glad faith of a religion of redemption can alone serve to answer the question affirmatively. Is there a historical process at work, which includes the triumph of all the forces that make for the realisation of humanity's most cherished ideals? If experience says "Yes" to this question, then faith and hope may say "Yes" to the other question. But if "No" to the one question, then "No" to the other.

That such a process is actually at work, with the Will of the Universe behind it, has been for centuries the supreme object of faith, hope, and endeavour, for the highest forms of man's religious consciousness. In confirmation of this faith and hope, demonstration is as yet impossible; polemical discussion is of little value; the fact that the answer given to it by the religious doctrine of redemption has been so long existent, so persistent, and progressively dominant, must be left to speak chiefly for itself. But all the higher forms of the development of man's religious consciousness are religions of redemption.

This more hopeful and glad answer to the query, Is the Universe friendly to the race? is, however, not without a certain amount of collateral evidence. If we understand the profounder message of art, as delivered in far the greater number, if not in all, of its masterpieces, it is the same essentially as the message of the religions of redemption. Take from every form of high art what it has won from suffering, sorrow, disappointment, and loss, and you rob it of its choicest qualities, its worthiest benefits, its profoundest ministrations. Indeed, what would be left of such art would scarcely be worth the saving, even as a means of entertainment; and it

would be not only dull and insipid, but largely ineffective as a means of culture. In music especially, the minor chords are abundant; the discords are not infrequent; but the underlying and finally dominant harmonies are the most signal thing. How does Beethoven, who said of his own music, "It comes from the heart, and it must speak to the heart," tell the story in that last and great C minor sonata, when the storm of passion rises and falls throughout the first movement until it yields to the spirit of resignation, and the voices of the angels are heard aloft as the closing strains of the arietta die away. "They learn," said Shelley, of all the greater poets, "by suffering what they teach in song." It is tragedy which not only reaches the highest form of æsthetical literary expression, but also teaches the profoundest views as to the constitution of the World, and of man's relations to the World, which can be taught by the dramatic art.

On the whole, then, art says to us: Yes, you may surely regard the Universe, as I interpret it, to be friendly, if you will not ask it to do your bidding simply, or chiefly, as a minister of comfort or of pleasure. The Universe is indeed friendly to mankind, but in subtle, intricate, and mysterious ways.

Even the positive sciences, while they cannot be claimed to speak with united voice or with much assurance, and may, as such, take no interest in the moral and religious aspects of our question, would seem, on the whole, not to be unfavourable to its affirmative answer. Do you, students of the world's ongoings from the more material points of view—physicists, chemists, and biologists—find the Universe on the whole friendly to man? And how fares the judgment with you sociologists and students of human history from the evolutionary point of view? If asked the question, would not these devotees of fact and of generalisations well grounded in fact, in case they gave any answer at all, take the optimistic and hopeful point of view and give the answer of optimism and of hope? After all, the cardinal impressive fact remains: the Universe has begotten and developed man—his nature as viewed

on its ideal side, as well as on its side of instinct, appetite, passion, and susceptibility to pain and to vice. While science cannot vie with religion and with art in its ministrations to faith, hope, and resignation, it is showing more and more—is it not ?—how out of the loss of the lower comes the higher, out of pain comes the improvement of the species, out of death comes more valuable life.

Probably, however, in most minds no other considerations weigh so heavily in favour of an affirmative answer to our inquiry as those derived from the consequences that follow upon a negative answer. Against a hostile or indifferent Universe it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a life of loving trust and devotion toward the ideals of morals and the essential tenets and inspiring cult of true religion. Indeed, unless the World be regarded as the embodiment or manifestation of Divine Good-will, religion becomes degraded to a slavish superstition, or else loses all hold on the reason and conduct of man. Prayer ceases to be spiritual communion, and becomes either cowardly or grotesque. Indeed, that attitude of filial piety in which the very essence of subjective religion has come to consist becomes incompatible with a rational regard for the facts ; what remains of so-called religion relapses into that lower complex of vague fears and tremulous questionings, out of which it has taken the greater religions of the world countless centuries of pain, doubt, and struggle to emerge.

But it will be contended that we have no right to construe the Universe in terms satisfactory to our hopes and fears, when these terms are so different from those inexorably dictated to us by the plain truth of the facts. And the reasonableness of such a contention must, in general, be conceded as beyond all doubt. The will to believe may, in fact, have much to do with our attitude toward the Universe, but it cannot be used to determine what is the attitude of the Universe, in fact, toward the entire race. Let us then face with heroic defiance the plain truth that either agnosticism or

negation is the only justifiable answer to the query, Is the Universe friendly to the race of man?

But that the Universe is *not* friendly is not a plain truth. And even if it must be admitted,—neither is it a plain truth that the Universe *is* friendly,—still, what it means to some of the dearest interests of man to hold, and hold by, this side of the contested question, cannot fail to influence profoundly the doubtful mind. Nor is this simple arbitrary will, conditioning or dictating belief. The rather is it the persistent demand of reason for a version of Reality that shall harmonise with its own ideals.

And where, indeed, do these ideals themselves come from, if not out of the bosom of Reality? If they were merely the products of the fantastic dreaming of a few individuals, or of some single epoch or age, the case might seem far different. But they are not this. They are the fruits of the toil and the suffering, of the reflective thinking, the intense craving, the strong crying, the heroic striving of the race in all the ages. And of this race every individual is entitled to say: From the World I have come, with all that is best in me. Shall I believe that the Being which has been for me the spring of all my well-being, the source of all my aspiration, the object of my feelings of highest obligation, is satisfied with anything less and lower than what, of that which is best, it has begotten and developed in me? Shall I not rather say with Marcus Aurelius, "From Thee all things come; in Thee all things subsist; to Thee all things return? And so I say of the World: Dear City of God."

Especially insistent does our query become when we consider how its answer is linked up with the fears and hopes of men, projected into the life beyond the death of the body. The pre-Kantian rationalistic demonstrations of the so-called "natural immortality" of the human soul, as possessed of a sort of *non-posse-mori*, have ceased to convince the modern mind. The discoveries of the biological and physiological sciences as to the intimate relations between consciousness

and organism are quite confidently—though, to the candid student, unconvincingly—urged as a demonstration of the unreality and perishableness of the same so-called soul. Thus over against the old-time maxim the spirit is honoured with a *non-posse-vivere* after the dissolution of the body. The net result of all the recent efforts to re-establish the doctrine of immortality on a basis of experience supplied by communication with the departed, has been something worse than the disappointment of candid inquirers. It has awakened the scorn of the sceptical, and a measure of disgust in many of those who were formerly only tenderly dubious, while longing to be convinced. The array of psychological and social arguments, which were so skilfully marshalled by idealism from the time of Plato down to the latest advocate on behalf of Christian dogma, sound, to the ear accustomed to weigh evidence in anything like the scientific manner, rather abstract and dreamy, if not hollow and sophistical.

Never before, however, did the material and sensuous satisfactions of the human soul seem so inadequate. Never before have men longed more eagerly to know whether they might not hope for a life of freedom and friendship, better and nobler and more appeasing to the soul's aspirations than aught this life affords. Is it too much to say, then, that the problem of immortality has become, as never before, involved in the question: Is the Universe indeed friendly to man? If No: then what reasonable ground for his hope of the realisation of the vision of a "Dear City of God," of a "New Jerusalem coming down out of heaven from God"? The vision of Elysian fields beyond the setting sun fades away in the daylight of modern science, like the dream of the mariners of old. But if Yes: then a friendly Universe may perhaps be trusted to furnish another vehicle for the spiritual life, after the vehicle for the psychical life has broken down. And those who have the experience may accept in good faith and hope the words of Jesus: "Let not your heart be troubled . . . in my Father's house are many mansions."

The answer to the third question, What follows from this sort of optimism as to the reasonable and morally right attitude of man toward the Universe? needs little or no exposition or defence. Indeed, what attitude but one of reverence, sympathy, affection, and obedient co-operation can the reasonable and good man assume towards a friendly Universe? Surely not the attitude of soft sentimentality or tolerance of physical and moral evils which challenge control and justly provoke resistance. For this friendly Universe has its awful side of severity, its unceasing call for the endurance of pain, loss, and self-sacrifice; and for the punishment of wrongdoing, and the rise only through struggle toward higher stages of existence. But friends of God and friends of man, so far as they can discern, comprehend, and follow the Divine pattern, all those who believe in the friendliness of the Universe are surely compelled to be. In the matter of Divine, as of all human friendship, the principle, "We love him because he first loved us," is not easy to be broken.

In a word, the query which Myers proposed in such picturesque fashion is the world-old problem of evil in the form of a theodicy. The more the "goods" of human living increase, and the more what is called (oftentimes with hypocrisy, often with cynicism, oftenest with flippancy) "modern civilisation" advances, the more does the consciousness of evil deepen and increase in thoughtful minds. Thus the demand for relief from life's burdens, theoretical and practical, gains in insistency and emphasis. For the ideal good, which the higher religions promise and expect, the need of humanity increases rather than diminishes with advancing race-culture. "It is the yearning cry," says Wellhausen, remarking on the dark side of the modern world, "that goes through all the people; as they advance in civilisation, they feel the value of the goods they have sacrificed for it."

We cannot demonstrate. We cannot argue so as to retire in shame from the field of wordy contest the confirmed agnostic

or sceptic. But we can strengthen faith and encourage hope with reasons the intrinsic worth of which cannot be for long successfully resisted or denied. For some men, and they, all things considered, the choicest and best of earth, the experience of suffering and disappointment in their own lives, instead of embittering, softens and refines; so that the more of this experience they have, when its influences mature and its fruits ripen, the more they grow in the confidence that, *toward them at least*, the World, just because it is God's world, has been really and profoundly friendly.

And when these same souls contemplate, as they must, with sadness, the seemingly harsh and ruthless way, not to so evident purpose as in their own case, the World treats the multitude of their fellow-men, they seek a stronghold for their faith in the doctrine and practices of a religion of redemption. *If* the Universe is indeed lifting and leading the race toward the goal of a redeemed humanity, *then* toward the race, as toward the favoured few, this Universe is really and profoundly friendly.

This confidence once gained in the truthfulness of an affirmative answer to our question, the other essential tenets of morality and religion, and the life of conduct in the pursuit of the ideals of morals and religion, become reasonable to hold, and relatively easy to achieve. Of him who attains this confidence at whatever cost, it shall be said: This man "shall be like a tree planted by the rivers of water, that bringeth forth his fruit in his season; his leaf also shall not wither, and whatsoever he doeth shall prosper." And if he cannot depart this life with a triumphant vision for the future, he is at least entitled to have placed upon his tombstone, "I have lived and loved and laboured. All is well."

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THE "CORRUPTION" OF THE CITIZENSHIP OF THE WORKING MAN: A REPLY.

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I.

THE other day I read an attack upon Free Trade by the Venerable Archdeacon Cunningham,[1] in the course of which he committed himself to the following judgment upon Free Traders:

> "To teach the poor man to exercise his political power without any thought of the good of the State, and merely with reference to his own personal and immediate interests, is to degrade him. . . . Politicians who pose as nervous lest any taint of corruption should affect the administration of public affairs, might have been expected to become scrupulous about resorting to wholesale bribery."

Immediately afterwards my HIBBERT JOURNAL came to hand, and in due course I found myself in the midst of an article by Professor Henry Jones on "The Corruption of the Citizenship of the Working Man," written for the purpose of arraigning the policy and the methods of the Labour Party. There I read:

> "If I had the power, as I have the will, I would arraign the Labour Party before the national conscience and ask it to show cause why it should not be condemned for corrupting the citizenship of the working man."

The words of the two writers were extraordinarily similar, and the similarity took away some of their impressiveness.

[1] *The Case against Free Trade.* Murray.

The Archdeacon frankly confesses he is a partisan fighting with ordinary party weapons ordinary party battles; Professor Jones takes higher ground, but the weapons and the blows are suspiciously like those which the Archdeacon uses.

The sentence I have quoted from the attack on the Labour Party was written as a preliminary to a protest against modern methods of political controversy which are responsible for discussions "disfigured and degraded by misrepresentations of facts, looseness of argument, unfairness of spirit, and the reckless use of opprobrious epithets and accusation of ignoble motives," and I waded through page after page of critical comment on politicians in general, House of Commons practice, newspaper conduct, economic assumptions, hoping that, as Professor Jones was well aware of the gravamen of the charge contained in his title, I would at last come to some body of reason justifying its use—as I find it very difficult to class him with the Archdeacon. I was interested in his discussion of the comprehensiveness of the purposes of the State and the limitations of the ends of the citizens. With practically everything contained in his indictment of a degraded politics I agreed. The same case in the same way has been put times without number from Labour Party platforms. Part of our success is due to such criticisms. Indeed, as I went on, it was hard for me to believe that I was not reading some Labour Party pamphlet, burnished in its imagery and glowing in its diction, but old in its substance and familiar in its argument. The title, which became more mysterious as I went deeper into the article, alone jarred upon the pleasant harmony. I think Professor Jones must have shared my feelings. For at unexpected moments he seemed to be conscious that he had to write up to his title; and, breaking the smooth flow of his thoughts every now and again, he dragged in the Labour Party by the scruff of the neck, and, without explaining why or wherefore, blamed it for troubling him, menaced it, ordered it again into the background until he explained something new; and, finally, in the

three last pages, which have no more connection with the rest of the article than a treatise of astronomy has with the Gospels, accused it roundly of vices which he made no attempt to attach to it except by his own unsupported *obiter dicta.* In fact, the references to the Labour Party are mere excrescences on the article.

I can only protest right away against this attempt to attribute to my friends a sole responsibility for, or a special connection with, failings which at the hands of no body of leaders have received more uncompromising chastisement than at ours; and I must particularly object to a title which is not justified by the faintest shadow of evidence—even in the somewhat stilted academic sense in which it has apparently been used.

Before passing to details I must offer a general observation. It is just such attacks, with neither substance nor excuse, that keep the Labour Party alienated from, and a little contemptuous of, the professional frame of mind. For we must reflect in our quiet moments that the darkening outlook which clouds Professor Jones's heart with pessimism, and my own (apparently) more stoical one with misgivings, is caused not by the misdeeds of the men who come from the Labour Party, but of those who have been cultured by lectures on moral philosophy delivered at universities. If the situation demands the setting up of courts to try culprits, the rôle of the professors and the preachers is not that of the accuser, but of the accused. The Labour Party may betimes fall on the mud which it is trying, with such little support from men better equipped than it, to clear away, and those who stand by on the clean places may be able to point to our bespattered garments. The Party may also lapse into the very errors of which, as a Party, it has been the sole combatant. That is human, especially when men are working at the removal of evils, and not merely talking or writing about them; but in spite of that, those who are working so, find their very errors to be instruments of greater truth. Whoever is at all likely to understand the Labour Party's

possibilities for good, must first of all understand how to regard its shortcomings, for the Party is not to be frightened out of existence by scoldings from the dainty minds of university professors. On wide fields of life the Party has little experience — as yet; it has come into an inheritance of entanglement and disorder; it has to get the country out of the failures of its predecessors; its recruits have had but scanty training except in factories and fields, and when called upon to lead in politics they have to lay aside old tools and pick up novel ones; the language of their two states of activity is not the same. Not a man amongst us in Parliament has set his foot inside a university class-room to be taught. The result is, our propagandists simplify the world; they see plain oppositions; they bring only their own range of experience into the settlement of difficulties which arise from wider ranges. But, however deadly an attack by mere literary troops may be on the pronouncements of such a Party, its simplicity of thought and appeal convey more real truth to the people in forms of expression that are perhaps faulty, than the man of academic training can embody in the most accurately expressed phrasing of the schools.[1] Professor Jones misses all this. Rough truth pulsing with passion and experience jars upon him. He sees ungraceful lumps upon it; he misunderstands it; he misinterprets it. If it speaks of "class," of "worker," of "rights," he puts his academic meaning upon the words; he passes with disgust the Sermon on the Mount shouting at a street corner, and sighs for it reading a discourse from a pulpit. Morals red in the face with passion have no doubt gone astray—but not quite so far astray as when they have become anæmic and lackadaisical. The Sermon on the Mount is not the sum and substance of

[1] Between finishing the manuscript of this article and correcting the proofs I have been reading Mr Reynolds' interesting interpretation of the working-class mind, *Seems So!*, where this point is elaborated. Mr Reynolds' experiences do not agree with mine, and they are indeed but very limited. But the broad facts he emphasises of the character of those I indicate above, are most indisputable and are generally overlooked.

Christ's life. He also spoke of a "generation of vipers" and whipped money-changers from the Temple. The Labour Party takes the whole of the gospels and not extracts. Here runs the gulf which yawns between the Labour Party and its professional critics. The Labour Party knows as much of life as professors know of books; the Labour Party is as proud of its knowledge as the professors are of their learning; and it is the false antithesis of these two aspects of human capacity which is keeping apart the labour mind and the professional mind. Both sides are at fault, the professional fault being better illustrated by Professor Jones's article than by anything else which has come under my notice for a long time; and unfortunately I have only too good reason for knowing the evil effect which it has already had on the minds of some of my colleagues.

I am fully aware of the fact that an appeal to practical results is not always a very satisfactory way of assessing the value of any movement. It is not only impossible to assign to any one cause what are called "practical results," but it is also difficult to say which, if any, of these results is itself to be productive of good or bad as time goes on. But I make bold to credit the Labour Party with two changes of which Professor Jones approves. He produces evidence that society is still "young," and most of his evidence is the reaping of Labour Party sowing. Indeed, the greatest menace which faces progressive legislation at the present moment is that Parliament may rush to pass legislation which it does not understand, but which meets the sentiments of the public. The Labour Party and the movement which it embodies make opinion, or at any rate shatter old opinion, and the politician, with his ear on the ground, produces Bills to pacify the changed public mind. The Labour Party, with its greater knowledge, sees the dangers and the shortcomings of the Bills proposed, and is constantly in the difficult position of having to choose between no legislation at all and very faulty legislation (as was the case with the Insurance Bill). Moreover, the necessity of recommending to

the public such ill-understood legislation lowers the character of political controversy, because, when principles are not understood and valued, selfishness is the easiest base upon which to fall back. If there is "corruption" in politics to-day, the party which professes to give ninepence for fourpence is responsible for it—not only because the statement it makes is untrue, but because this is couched in the language, not merely of the economic conflict, but of the market. That being the party to which Professor Jones himself belongs, however, its offered "bribes" only inspire him with the conviction that society is still "young."

The other change is the more frequent references which we now have in politics to the moral responsibility of the community. This is largely the result of Labour Party activity, for, however the Labour Party appeal may be framed, its aim is to reach the elementary moral sentiments of the people. Its descriptions of fact may be biassed, but its final appeal is, "*Ought* this so to be?" and in the real world of political conflict and clash of interest, the finely drawn distinctions of wordy light and shade upon which Professor Jones lays so much stress do not exist and have consequences neither for good nor for evil. The Party has brought moral consciousness right into the midst of the political arena as a judge. If it has a few scalliwags amongst its retainers, what matter? They have committed self-destruction by backing such a judge. The world is a rough-and-ready place. Its rugged imperfections, like the barbaric crudity of some details of Gothic architecture, only add to the magnificent and commanding beauty of the whole. I admit the imperfections of our appeal. But what are they in its overpowering force of truth?

II.

It is very profitable, when a line of thought is broken by many parenthetical explanations and by the pursuit of converging subsidiary lines, to sweep the secondary considerations aside and trace the essential argument. This is an

admirable exercise for keeping both the writer and the reader to the point, and for protecting them against conclusions which are "palmed off" rather than established. Let me try to state the series of essential propositions round which Professor Jones has constructed his article. Parliament does not studiously and intelligently pursue the interests of the commonwealth; society has not become old—indeed, there are abundant signs of youth in its movements; the appeal which has to be made to it, if it is to be guided aright, is one which does not hold that the "people's intelligence is low or their motive mean," and it must be made by a leader who "does not lower his teaching, *as the politicians of all grades are apt to do,* to 'their' level." So far so good—the point of it all being emphasised by the words I have italicised. Then he states without an attempt to explain why, without a quotation from the speech of a responsible man or a reference to an illustrative action taken by the Party as a whole, that the Labour Party offers this low appeal. At this point he makes a fresh start in stating his case. In certain specified respects the Labour Party is to be praised, but does it tell the democracy of its responsibilities as well as of its power? The daily press does not teach reverence for the State; working-class experience is defective in the same way; the attacks of Tariff Reformers and others upon Parliament also weaken the sense of political reverence; outside, the changes that are taking place in industry "are a danger to society," which, however, "we cannot forbid," nor "even infuse a different spirit into them," and for which, consequently, no one party is responsible; these economic states of mind are invading politics. And then he returns once more to his point:

> "It is the essence and gravamen of my whole charge against the Labour Party that in its political activities it has fallen into this error"—

the error, be it noted, into which the whole of our political life has fallen, but which in the case of the Labour Party alone is "corruption." The three pages which he devotes to substantiating his conclusion I shall deal with later. The

accusation is surely feeble enough, and I am almost inclined to let the readers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL come to their own conclusions without offering a word for the defence. I write, however, with the desire of trying to establish some better relation between the student and the workman, the study and the platform, the lack of which has been so hampering to the growth of an "intellectual democracy" in this country.

I must assume that the general complaint has something to do with the Labour Party. Professor Jones sees what appears to be a dangerous condition of political life, and he describes what he sees in words which I need not challenge. The rise of partisan politics, the difficulties which the House of Commons experiences in doing its work, the injurious effect of most of our newspaper polemics on the public mind, have been, as I have said, familiar texts for Labour Party speeches during the last twenty years.

But what assistance does Professor Jones give us? Let me assume we are in the ditch where he imagines he sees us. "You ought to be out of that," he says. But suppose we have to be there because it is there that the current of political life is running? Indeed, Professor Jones admits so much, because his indictment is against social conditions. His criticisms, then, amount to this:—In his descriptions of what is, he mournfully states that "no other method is possible," "we know not how to prevent it," and so on; but, turning to the new Labour movement, he wrathfully accuses it of following these inevitable paths, advises it to disregard existing conditions, blames it for starting its reforms in a scientific and not a metaphysical spirit, and calls its method "corruption." He posits an ideal conception of the State and an ideal conception of the democratic movement, and, playing the part of the creator, he gives us political advice. His quarrel is really not with the Labour Party at all, but with creation for prescribing a certain process in the evolution of democratic reforms and organisation. And, to crown it all, the blame for the evil is heaped upon a party of forty-two members of Parliament, and an organisation that has

been in existence only a dozen years! Rationally he can do one of two things. He can flout creation to its face and shut himself up in the darkness of his own pessimism and keep his mind quiet by professing the creed that the world is hopelessly out of joint; or he can accept facts and begin to fashion them into the image of his ideals. The latter is the Labour Party method. A condition of this latter method is that the potter must not ask for ideal clay, but must work with what he has got in spite of its coarseness, lack of plasticity, impurities. But Professor Jones will neither curse creation nor accept it, and he gets out of his difficulties by blaming the Labour Party for building the social temple for the human soul from its foundations and not from the cross at the top. I can assure him we shall neither accept his blame nor follow his advice.

Another reflection forces itself into my mind here—a reflection which apparently was in Professor Jones's mind when writing one part of his article. He says:

> "The legislature is only one of the instruments by which society expresses its wants and seeks to realise its will; and at the best it is a crude instrument, only roughly applicable to the more general public necessities. In fact, Parliament is only a servant. It discovers the public wants and formulates its desires; but it does not create them. The wise statesman in a democratic country is the interpreter, rather than the maker, of the best mind of his times."

That is true, and that throws light upon the Labour Party's method and position. I should add, in order to augment the truth which it contains, that the medium in which the legislator works is not that in which the philosopher works. We cannot offer any profitable criticism of Parliamentary work of a moral character, unless we remember that Parliament and politics are not the expressions of an absolute social idealism, but an application of that idealism to the circumstances of the time. The political method of the Labour Party is a severe interpretation of the passage I have just quoted. It is not true to say that the Party has no conception of the unified and coherent state, for its very *raison d'être* is such a conception. Its economics aim at a co-operative use of factors

that are now employed as rivals—like capital and labour; they are a denial of the rivalry between man and the instruments of production, and an assertion that human interests should dominate all industrial operations; they claim a unity based upon the sovereignty of the living factors in production over the dead ones. Deprive them of these characteristics and they cease to exist altogether. And this conception of an organic society which has created its special economic doctrine governs its sociology, its ethics, and its politics, in spite of its apparent class appeal. Indeed, so clearly have the Labour leaders laid down this conception of the organic unity of society, that one of the most common attacks made upon them is that they allow that conception to obliterate what should be the complementary one of individual freedom.

But that is not all. Although the Party speaks most frequently of its economics, as it must if its method is to be scientific, it regards the State not merely as an economic organisation but as a spiritual one. To this its other categories of relationship are subordinated, and in this they are set. Its tests and its aims are qualitative, not quantitative, and that is why its missions are often conducted with a fervour and devotion which only churches can command.

I know not if Professor Jones will take an early opportunity of telling us what was in reality the cause of his attack. Will he tell us what leader of the Labour Party has written or said words which justify his charge, which, I agree with him, "if it is not true, is an insult"? If I press this point, it is for a sound ethical reason. For some years past I have read as nearly as possible everything I could find written by the "intellectual" classes about the Labour Party. And I have invariably found in these writings a recklessness of statement and accusation against workmen, their ways and their motives, or a patronising air of superiority of mind and conduct, which is nothing but the manifestation of a class feeling from which the writers innocently believe they are free. This is, as I have said, one of the impediments

which our critics of the superior minds place in the way of the Labour Party appreciating the help which the intellectual sections could render it. When this "intellectual consciousness" is combined with the impractical political reason either of the middle-class Fabian or the metaphysical critic, the unfortunate effect upon the Labour Party, and upon those in whose hands is its leadership, need not be described.

I return to the mid-stream of my argument. The language which the Party advocates use is generally economic in its form. But economic suggestions call up conceptions of right and wrong, of sympathy and pity, of fraternity and justice, in the minds of a poverty-stricken people. When a poor man finds a friend in his poverty, his heart warms to all men. There are gateways to the moral sentiments which close and open with the times, and the wise man uses them. Indeed, the man who is in touch with life uses them without thinking why. They are the open road of his quest.

Although this is so, it is not true to say that the appeal of the Labour Party, even in its literary form, is always to economic rights and never to social duties. I doubt if any body of men, or of leaders, have told the workmen so faithfully as my colleagues in the House of Commons have done, that the burdens which acquired rights impose are heavy, and that a man must *do* righteously. There is not a crusade for temperance, for clean living, for national and racial righteousness, for spiritual idealism, but has had the support of my colleagues. When it is remembered that a considerable proportion of them came to the Labour Party as Sunday-school teachers and lay preachers, their general bent of thought can be imagined even by those who have never read a line of their political speeches. Indeed, they are superior both in their mind and their practice to the preaching abstraction of a man whom Professor Jones has in mind as the model labour leader. We have had more than enough of vague expressions of goodness in general. Everybody uses them, nobody acts upon them; everybody cheers them, nobody *believes* them. I can well

imagine a perfervid oration on general democratic responsibility being received with wild enthusiasm by a crowd of workmen—or of millionaires; I can also conceive that someone who misunderstands life would think that such a demonstration had more divine promise in it than one which, stiff-lipped and sullen-eyed, swore solemnly that slum landlords ought to be hanged. A movement that is doing righteously would combine both—as the Labour Party does. If it asks for State powers, it is, as one of its leaders has said, "because the State is a moral organisation which can only fulfil its functions when anti-social interests no longer control it."

The Labour movement lives in its ideal city, the walls and the streets, the temples and the dwellers of which it describes with a fond and rich idealism. But it is sojourning amidst injustice, amidst ill, amidst ugliness. It is scientific and not metaphysical, however; it is oppressed too closely by the *is* to allow it to do nothing but dream sweet dreams of the *ought to be.* It therefore has wrath as well as aspiration. It hits the enemy which oppresses it, as well as welcomes the hosts that are to liberate it. It takes very often a specialised view of its business. If, however, it is charged with being a class movement, it may either reply that it is not, or it may retort that we are now ruled by class interests; and both replies would be right. Using its ideals as guides, it experiments, just as the chemist does in his laboratory, with legislative and administrative change. In its transforming work it uses claims of right aggressively stated, just as well as admissions of duty honestly accepted, and it is perfectly justified in doing both. Professor Jones visualises the movement of the democracy as a gracefully posed lady with a harp in one hand and a book of elegant extracts in the other. It is not that. It is a Millet figure, bowed, rough, tarnished with the conditions of its toil, but with all the secrets of the Divine will in its heart. So even in his form of praise Professor Jones is mistaken. The Labour Party is not "better than its creed." Like everybody else who is living the strenuous life and is not

content to write about it, it is worse than its creed. The good I would, that I do not; the evil I would not, that I do.

III.

Only on the three last pages of his paper does Professor Jones address himself specifically to the cruel accusation he makes in his title. The Labour Party "stands for the interests of one class," to which it appeals, "not as citizens, but as constituting a class held together by similarity of economic conditions." In so far as it recognises the existence of classes other than the workers, it challenges them to prove their value, and it seeks the good of the State through the clash of interests thus brought into conflict. The explanation of this is that the Party has brought its economic experiences of the workshop into politics. It is "the victim of the presuppositions of Trade Unionism. It is suffering from the environment in which it has been nurtured"—and, without another word of explanation, or another reason, this extraordinary conclusion is laid down in all its raw irrationality: "It is corrupt in its very conception"!

What is the position of the Labour Party in this respect? It appeals mainly to the working classes. That is admitted. The reason is in the main twofold. The idealism of the Labour Party is democratic, and, as in the day of Christ, so it is now, certain classes by reason of their experience and interests hear certain gospels more gladly than other classes. Moreover, the economic problems which have now to be solved as the next epochal advance in social growth, lie within the field of conflict where the working classes are the chief victims. In doing this, we are warned, the Party appeals only to the animal in man. When the body is out of gear by reason of the failure of one organ, the restoration of that organ to health is not its own concern merely, but that of the whole body. A doctor who does not prescribe a course of the HIBBERT JOURNAL to a dyspeptic patient cannot be accused of taking an animal view of man. In the industrial field, it is admitted by our censor, a suicidal conflict rages, dividing man from

man and interest from interest, and my claim is that the political *and ethical* genius of the Labour Party is shown in no better way than in its discovery that political action alone can end this conflict, and establish in its stead the organic co-operative State.

In so far as the charge against us is that we have made the industrial conflict the subject of the political conflict, I ask what can we think of a political creed which begins by ruling out of its view an industrial organisation which produces the condition of social injustice about which Professor Jones confesses to a pessimistic gloom—a creed which declares that there can be an ideal political state within or alongside (I am not very sure how to put it) an unjust and immoral industrial state? At the point when Professor Jones feels justified in demanding his verdict against us, the position of the Labour Party is infinitely superior ethically to his own; for whilst he has no policy which unifies his State in all its many activities, we have. Political power is that which above all other power enables the citizen to determine how he is to live, and we relate that political power to economic as well as to civic problems. If we direct our attention to the condition of the working classes in the conflict which we wish to end by the establishment of the organic State, the reason is that this is the only means by which the organic State can ever be established. Again, our censor, whilst imagining he is quarrelling with us for acting in this way, is really objecting to face the problem of social politics under the conditions which creation has determined.

But the charge against us in this respect may be made upon a slightly different ground.

If the point of Professor Jones's accusation is that we ought not to make the industrial opposition a political opposition, my reply is that it is not brought into politics as a permanent opposition—no more than the opposition in politics between Welsh Disestablishment and English Establishment is permanent—but as a battle of conflicting conceptions of social

right which must be fought out on the political field now, and be made as quickly as possible the occasion of a synthesis of idea and of constructive legislation which will put an end to the conflict altogether. What is our point of view on this matter? Professor Jones deplores the industrial conflict, but he seems to assume that it is of the nature of "essential evil." We do not agree. We think that there is an authority which is custodian of the common interest—the State; and if we, the victims of the conflict, ask the State to settle it, what evil do we do? True, we take one side. But the Legislature is a Court of Conciliation in which both sides sit, as *sides*, and agree as they best can upon conclusions satisfactory to the community composed of the conflicting interests. After a careful reading of the opening pages of the paper, I think that Professor Jones has a notion that Parliament should be an impartial tribunal every member of which is a just man made perfect. That is an utterly impossible view. Parliament is not a committee of judges, and to regard it as such is to raise political problems as insoluble as they are fantastical. So I cannot help entertaining a suspicion that Professor Jones has declared war because he entertains mistaken views of Parliament, politics, and representative government.

But whatever be the exact point which Professor Jones seeks to press home against us, he has failed to interpret the true meaning of those who do make a class appeal. The struggle of classes as a mode of evolution has become part of the studies of everyone who is trying to understand Labour and Socialist movements wherever they are to be found in the world. It belongs to the inheritance of Hegelian-Marxism which has been handed down to us from our founders. But the explanation of historical change by the operation of class conflicts has been more emphatically and categorically denied by the British Labour Party than by similar parties in any other country. It has not entered into the political programme of the Party; it has no place in its manifestoes. The Party has never made a class appeal. It

has had to protect itself against champions who in its early days offered to serve it, without accepting its declared purposes and methods, intending to use it when it suited them and be independent of it when they thought well. It had, therefore, to begin with a constitution, and its constitution had at first to secure a good stable nucleus for whatever additions had to be made afterwards. It was therefore to be a combination of Trade Unionists and Socialists—not a combination of one class, be it observed, but a combination of experience and thought, of criticism and construction. Socialism was recognised because it alone had a clear theory of social progress—it alone supplied the hypotheses which were to guide, at the same time as they were to be tested by, legislation. Trade Unionism was also essential because in the fulness of time the industrial combination of the workman was called upon *by the State as a whole* to influence social legislation. It was in reality no new chapter that was opened; it was only a new paragraph. For the Factory Code of legislation had foreshadowed the wider move. The political State had already stepped in to modify the industrial conflict and to protect those who would be ruthlessly victimised by it; and as the economic power grew through the concentration of capital, the capture of the press, and the colouring of the minds of judges and juries, political power had to be organised and directed if the civic State was to be preserved from the disintegration which industrialism had brought upon the moral State. Real politics to-day can no more disregard the industrial conflict of the workshop than they can disregard the changing moral standards of the mind of the individual. How is it to be faced? Professor Jones suggests, so far as I can make out, a series of variants on the Sermon on the Mount. But that is mere transcendental futility. Neither from the pulpit nor from the platform will the preaching of the Sermon on the Mount save men. It has to be applied, and we have to discover instruments for applying it. The first thing is to accept the problem, the second to understand it, the third to choose the kind of men who are most

likely to help you to solve it. These men will be those who suffer and those who have thought out, in some considerable body, common proposals for a solution. This was all very carefully considered, and the Labour Party is the consequence. If Professor Jones has heard it express its genesis in "class" phrases, he ought to know the meaning behind the words, for even the most devoted adherent of the class-struggle theory explains that this phase of evolution ends when the working class has become supreme. I have combated that idea many times; my most prominent colleagues have done the same; so has the Labour Party officially. But even if these facts are quietly overlooked in the formulation of the indictment to which I am replying, Professor Jones ought not to have omitted to state that those who purposely use the phrases of the class struggle have "philosophised on politics," have "surveyed the situation as a whole," and have come to the conclusion that at present a class appeal is an essential preliminary to the organic State. He is wrong in attributing the appeal to the Labour Party; he does not touch the real objections to such an appeal, because he misses the significance of its moral intention.

So with the use of the word "worker." The expression, I have heard Labour Party speakers without number explain, does not mean manual-worker but service-giver, and I know of hardly a discussion on economic exploitation that does not emphasise that the machinery of exploitation fleeces the brain-worker as well as the hand-worker. What antagonism there is between the brain- and the manual-worker is not, as Professor Jones suggests, economic and political, but rather the kind of antagonism which he shows in his article. Of course, the Labour Party was founded on its own basis. It has its views and its methods. It offers no hospitality to those who do not share its views and who reject its methods. But it has never acted as though one class of worker had to do the one, and another class of worker had to do the other. It assumes in a general way that class interests are factors in moving

individuals; but both the Liberal and the Conservative Parties proceed upon the same assumption, and express it in language as crude as that ever used by a Labour advocate.

So my reply to the charges which are really specific to the accusation is: (1) That if they are true, they are not of the nature of corruption but arise from a certain reading (misreading, I think) of history; but (2) that they are not true in the form Professor Jones states them. (3) The economic problem being the social problem at present, its conditions must influence politics and political parties. Whilst this may conduce to some narrowness in party thought, it will affect all parties and not one, and must be guarded against by the ordinary means of democratic enlightenment. (4) No body of men in public life have been more willing to strengthen and support these means—for instance, the Adult Schools and the Workers' Educational Association—than the Labour Members. (5) The Labour Party view of work is whatever yields a valuable service to society, and it seeks to elevate this idea of service-giving into a test of the claims which both classes and individuals may legitimately present for a share in national wealth and esteem.

But, in concluding, I return to my first impression of Professor Jones's article. It has really little to do with the Labour Party at all, except upon the single point that the Party is translating workshop conflicts into political values, and is in this way degrading politics. This view, however, assumes a false idea of political action and function, and a mistaken explanation of what the Labour Party is actually doing. The readers of the Hibbert Journal may indeed rest assured that the leaders of the Labour Party do not under-emphasise the spiritual side of democracy. But I hope that those readers will not murmur at our necessarily ungraceful attempts to turn the money-changers from the Temple, at the same time that our hearts dwell in the gracious repose of the Sermon on the Mount.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

IS PERSONALITY IN SPACE?

THE RIGHT REV. C. F. D'ARCY,

Bishop of Down.

DR SANDAY has continued his researches into personality in its relations to the conscious and subconscious elements of our mental constitution. He has published, in pamphlet form, under the title *Personality in Christ and in Ourselves*, a work which forms a supplement to his *Christologies Ancient and Modern*. This work contains a development and a modification of the doctrine of that volume, and is at the same time a reply to criticism.

Every reader must acknowledge and admire the candour and courtesy, the humility and the courage, which mark Dr Sanday's spirit in dealing with his great subject, and with the critics who have examined his treatment of it. For my part, may I be allowed to say, I thank him for the serious attention he has given to the comments which I ventured to offer in an article in the HIBBERT JOURNAL of January last.

My purpose on the present occasion is mainly to show reason why I cannot regard as conclusive Dr Sanday's view of our mental life in relation to space. In reply to the statement that "mental facts of all kinds, feelings, thoughts, impulses, volitions, are not in space," he writes: "But surely they are *ours*, and *we* are in space; we carry them about with us; they are where we are, and they are not where we are not. How, then, can they help being in space?"

A statement like this raises the whole question of the

Kantian criticism of experience. To deal with it fully would involve a summing up of the whole movement of thought which has expressed itself in modern philosophy. But, happily, it seems to be possible to put with a fair degree of clearness in more popular fashion a sufficient justification of the thesis that our mental life is not in space.

When Dr Sanday says "*we* are in space," he means, of course, that our bodies are in space—an assertion that no one ever thought of denying. But it is surely plain that when a thinking man asserts "we are not in space," he means something very different. He means that our minds are not in space. When questioned, he will go further and state that it is just this distinction between body and mind which marks the distinction between space and not-space. Bodily things are in space, mental things are not.

Spatial things can be measured in spatial terms. You can express them in metres or millimetres; in one, two, or three dimensions. Or, if they are mere mathematical points (which, by the way, are not things at all), or systems of such points, you can express them by means of spatial co-ordinates or vectors or angles. Will anyone dare to say that measurements of these sorts have the slightest meaning in relation to such an experience as a thought or emotion?

But, it will be said, emotion has physical effects which can be measured. Is not this the very thing upon which experimental psychology has been busy in recent years? And further, it will be added, sensations can be localised to some extent in the brain or nervous system; and if we knew more about the constitution of the brain, we could probably localise every mental element. But those who think thus forget to distinguish between the physical concomitant and the mental fact in its own intrinsic nature. The physical organ and the mental experience which it subserves belong to different orders of being, different universes; and you can no more speak rightly of an emotion being in space than you can speak rightly of a blue smell. Much less correctly, indeed; for colour and

smell, though diverse in kind, both belong to the realm of sensation, while the mental and the physical form diverse universes.

When, in a common-sense way, we begin to think of self and the world, or of self and the facts of which self is aware, we find that among the latter a great division must be made. There is an outer world and an inner world. The outer world is in space and time, the inner world is not in space; it is in time only. In this inner world facts do not lie side by side; they succeed one another. The measurements which belong to the outer world, by means of the standards which we call length, breadth, and depth, have here no meaning. This distinction is fundamental; and it is surely legitimate to say that no thinking man who has once grasped it will be able to regard it as capable of being explained away. It is only when we begin to puzzle ourselves with scientific concepts and to apply these concepts beyond their sphere that we get confused. Then we begin to speak—as some of our modern psychologists do—as if thoughts and emotions lay about like tables and chairs.

So far common-sense. A deeper and more philosophical examination shows that the whole distinction between the outer and the inner, between the physical and the mental, is just the distinction between space and time, or rather it is the distinction between those parts of experience which are in both space and time and those parts which are in time only. Here is the essential difference between things and thoughts.

If this distinction is sound, I do not see how anyone can deny that the application of spatial and material metaphors to mental experiences is extremely misleading. Nor do I think that the eminence of any psychologist is so great as to exempt his work from the criticism which I ventured to pass upon several of our modern writers. Extraordinary vividness is attained by the use of language which presents the obscure processes of thought in sharply outlined visual images. But it is surely necessary to ask if such vividness is worth having

when it means the giving of a factitious clearness to experiences which, in their own nature, are incapable of possessing it. As Bergson shows, with cogent logic, the forms of human thought and language were shaped to suit the practical uses of life. They were not created to serve either the psychologist or the philosopher. Man, in the effort to satisfy his practical needs, has to deal with material things. Hence it follows that the imagery which belongs to the material world has provided him with all his primary forms of expression. It is only after reflection that he is forced to read into these forms meanings which have to do with the non-material.

It is therefore unfair to reproach philosophy on account of its inability to express itself in popular language. The difficulty arises from the nature and history of human thought. Dr Sanday quotes a striking passage from *Othello*, and challenges one of his critics to paraphrase it in terms of the philosophy which maintains the non-spatial quality of mental phenomena. Let the difficulty, not the impossibility, of such a paraphrase be granted. The charm and vividness of Shakespeare's phrasing depends upon the fact that, with characteristic daring and happy skill, he uses material imagery to express the immaterial, and therefore makes himself intelligible to the average mind. Yet, as Dr Sanday admits, the result is not consistent; and a careful examination will show that this whole inconsistency arises from the fact that the material imagery which the poet employs is not able to express the spiritual reality to which it is applied.

What is the Ego, the Self, the Person? Surely it is clear that, from the nature of the case, a definition, in the strict sense of the term, is impossible. You cannot define that which is pre-supposed in all definition. The Ego is the name we give to the agent (or subject) which is implied in all the processes of conception, thought, and will. In our experience, there can be nothing of which we are aware which is not what it is, in relation to all the other elements in experience, by virtue of the activity of the Ego. Here is the principle

which combines the many in the one. The elements which are *given to* our experiences from the world without us must be subordinated to this combining activity in order to enter into relation with the whole.

This is what I meant when describing the Self as the "synthesis" and "containing principle" of all its experiences. I grant at once that the words "synthesis" and "containing" are suggestive of spatial images. Owing to the origin of language, it is impossible to avoid such suggestions. But it would be easy to show that these words have, in many instances of their use, escaped the bondage of the material. It would be easier still to substitute others which are more completely emancipated.

When this view of the nature of the Self has been gained, there is an inevitable danger lest it should be regarded as an abstract form of thought. The truth is, surely, that it is for our experience the most concrete of realities. For every activity of the Self, whether perception, thought, or will, is the defining or determining of an element in relation to the whole of experience, and the principle which grasps both the element and the experience is the Self. Thus the Self possesses greater concreteness and higher reality than any element in its experience, and for that very reason is incapable of definition. It is the universal pre-supposition of every conscious experience.

Great light has been thrown on this concreteness of the Self by Bergson's demonstration of the fact that mental states permeate one another. When we think of them as simply successive in time, we are, in another instance, victims of the illusions created by the application of spatial symbolism, for we attribute to them the impenetrability which belongs to things in space, and which, as a matter of fact, they do not possess. And further, we think of time as marked out into successive moments, each of which is occupied by its own definite content, not considering the fact that time appears to assume such a form only when it is subjected to measurement by relation to spatial things. Mental states existing in time

do not therefore succeed one another like milestones on a road; they interpenetrate, each assuming a quality which contains, or represents, all that have gone before. These considerations are profoundly interesting in connection with the problem which puzzled Mill, and which he regarded as the "final inexplicability." Arriving at the conclusion that Mind may be described as a "series of feelings," he admits that we are obliged to regard it as "a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future." How can a series be aware of itself as a series? "The true incomprehensibility," writes Mill, "perhaps is, that something which has ceased, or is not yet in existence, can still be in a manner present; that a series of feelings, the infinitely greater part of which is past or future, can be gathered up, as it were, into a single present conception, accompanied by a belief of reality."[1] But when Mill calls Mind a series of feelings, he is the victim of a spatial symbol. It is of the very essence of mental facts that they permeate one another so that the past lives in the present.

To think, then, of the Self as a material atom, or mathematical point, located in the brain, or to suppose that it dwells in the body in any spatial or material manner, is to yield to an illusion created by the nature and history of our forms of speech. It must be true that the brain is the organ of the Self, but what is there to show that when the Self uses an instrument it must be located within that instrument? The fact is that the very idea of a locus or place has no meaning when applied to the Self when considered apart from, or in antithesis to, the material organ which it employs. The material instrument has a locus; the Self, in contradistinction to it, has no locus.

It may help to make this whole distinction clearer to ask: Does Dr Sanday, when he argues that our feelings and thoughts must be in space because "they are ours, and we are in space," really touch the question at issue at all? We are in space in the sense that our bodies form part of the

[1] J. S. Mill, *Examination of the Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton*, ch. xii.

material universe which exists in space. But when the psychologist speaks of the field of consciousness, of the centre and the margin, of the threshold above which thoughts and feelings must rise in order to enter consciousness, of processes taking place or results "incubating" in subconsciousness, he means something very different. The psychologist, reflecting on his own inner experiences, thinks of the feelings which pass through his mind, the impulses which move him, the memories he recalls, the thoughts by which he endeavours to grasp the facts of his experience, the anticipations which lure him on, the perceptions by which he apprehends the external world. All these are the elements of his psychical experience. But how can they be grouped, and how described? While in doubt as to this difficulty, the clearness of visual perception comes to his aid. Visualise everything in imagination, and description becomes easy. Hence arises the imagery of the field and the threshold. But even when he yields himself most willingly to the attraction of such imagery, the psychologist is very far from meaning that the various mental elements actually occupy positions in space relatively to one another, as the body occupies a position relatively to the material objects which surround it. If Dr Sanday's argument has any validity, he ought to mean this. The argument is that because the body is in space, the mind, which employs that body as an instrument, must not only have all its experiences in space, but all these experiences must, relatively to one another, form a spatial field, capable of description and measurement in spatial terms. If this be a sound conclusion, I would ask Dr Sanday to prepare a map locating all the feelings, etc., in relation to one another. If it be replied that science may some day draw a map of the brain, in which all mental conditions and processes are assigned their proper centres and nerves, I answer that nervous matter is one thing, feeling and thought, as known from within, are wholly different things. Dr Sanday's map of the field of consciousness must not be a map of the brain; it must be a map of the field of

consciousness, as seen introspectively by the self-conscious subject.

The truth is, that we have here simply the old puzzle of body and mind in a new form. It is safe to say that no one will ever approach a solution of it by confusing the fundamental distinction—the distinction between things in space and things not in space.

I trust that Dr Sanday and the readers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL will pardon the abrupt, seemingly dogmatic, manner in which I have found it necessary to express much of what I have written above, and will accept the assurance that this manner is merely the result of a determined effort to make my meaning clear.

CHARLES F. DOWN.

POPULAR PHILOSOPHY.

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THE limits between philosophy and popular philosophy are by no means strictly drawn. I remember T. H. Green's essay on popular philosophy, in which not only amateurs and dilettanti are considered, but many of those who have a place in the history of philosophy among the celebrated names. The difference between philosophy and ordinary reflective or moralising literature is not always easy to fix; many philosophers address themselves to the "reading public." Descartes, Locke, and Leibnitz have in their day been fashionable, and Hume was disappointed, as everyone knows, because his *Treatise* had no success among the booksellers. Still, there is a difference between Locke and Hume on the one side, and the merely literary work of those writers who use philosophical ideas without a proper philosophical object or method. Locke in his *Essay* and Hume in his *Treatise* have a definite philosophical scope and purpose, which makes their work, in spite of its affinity to polite literature, more truly philosophical and technically more important than the writings of Goethe, Burke, Wordsworth, or Carlyle, even though these may in other directions carry more weight and make a deeper impression. Locke and Hume may have an amateurish appearance on the surface; possibly their thinking may have suffered from their too great regard for the ordinary reading man; but the nature of their work is determined, first, by its scope, and secondly, by their own purely philosophical energy, which is strong enough and sincere enough to keep them out

of the ranks of mere popular essayists. Goethe and Burke, Wordsworth and Carlyle and Browning are more than mere popular essayists and preachers, and they, one or another or all of them, may have had as much philosophical talent as Locke or Hume, but their work is done by different means and for a different end, which cannot be called purely philosophical.

I submit that, for the sake of clearness, it is well not to reckon Locke, Berkeley, and Hume among the amateurs, in spite of the popular literary character of their writings. Their work is popular philosophy in one or more senses, but not in the sense which I have chosen for this paper: I am speaking of the use and application of philosophy outside of the proper philosophical sphere.

Here I may quote—to be filed for reference—the saying of Rivarol about the influence of philosophers. It is a mistake, he says, to imagine that philosophers are dangerous to society (as was supposed by many who attributed to philosophers all the evil of the Revolution): it is not the philosophers who do the mischief, it is the people who read their books.[1] This, I venture to maintain, is the most glorious of all the bulls that have ever appeared in any ring. It might be a good text for the present discourse.

Coming back to my own experience, I find that at one time in the Moral Philosophy class in Glasgow, and in debating and essay societies where the lectures of Edward Caird were not forgotten by his pupils, we were accustomed to speak with condescension of the *ordinary consciousness.* The ordinary consciousness was that which believed in the external world; it was the consciousness of Thomas Reid and the School of Common-sense; the extraordinary consciousness, which belonged to us, was of various degrees. It might be content with the simple idealism of Ferrier;

[1] "Il faut pourtant observer que les livres des philosophes n'ont point fait mal par eux-mêmes, puisque le peuple ne les lit point et ne les entendrait pas; mais il n'est pas moins vrai qu'ils ont nui par tous les livres qu'ils ont fait faire, et que le peuple a fort bien saisis."—*Mémoires de Rivarol*, ed. 1824, p. 87.

it might have accepted the machinery of Kant. But more commonly we found Kant too complicated; his devices for getting the senses neatly packed into the frame of the intellect as troublesome and over-elaborate as the cycles and epicycles of the old astronomy; and we took up with Hegel, diluted to our taste. The worst of the *Critique of Pure Reason* was that you had either to know it or not to know it; if you let go at any point you fell off, with more or less damage. Hegel, though outwardly more difficult, was practically much easier. You might indeed spend hours in staring at the beginning of the *Logic* (in Hutchison Stirling's *Secret*), trying to see Being turning into Not Being, and persuading yourself that at last the thing was beginning to move. But that was a callow, elementary stage; the older sophists in our class had a better trick than that, and contented themselves with "sublating" anything that came in their way.

One of the most certain and lasting results of those days was (I think) the clue to the history of philosophy which was given by Caird, and by the reading to which he directed us in Hegel's *History of Philosophy*. This was much easier than the *Logic* of Hegel, at the same time that it was a proof of the validity of the *Logic*; the difference between *Seyn* and *Wesen*, the immediacy of the first stage, the duplicity, disruption, discomfort of the second, seemed to be exhibited in the history of Greek philosophy on the one hand, of modern philosophy (from Descartes onwards) on the other, while the third stage, in which *Seyn* and *Wesen*, immediacy and reflection, were to be reconciled, was either that in which we were then living, or, at the worst, not very far ahead in the future.

I remember clearly the difference between the historical views of Comte and Hegel as they were presented to the young students of philosophy, and I think some moral may be drawn from a comparison of the two theories. Comte's law of the three stages — theological, metaphysical, and positive—is put forward as an account of human progress from obscurity and superstition to clear understanding. But

there is nothing historical (or very little) in the exposition; the passage from one stage to another is made at a jump; the positive philosophy starts with a metaphysical hypothesis as arbitrary as any that are ridiculed by Comte in his account of the second stage, viz. the assumption of that *spontaneity* in human nature which leads men to personify the causes of movement in nature, to explain all things by a will like their own (*volonté mobile*). Comte's law of the three stages has all the faults of popular philosophy; it is unhistorical, it begins with a *petitio principii* (that same *spontaneity*), it puts things side by side and assumes that they are connected. At the same time it wishes to pass for something more than popular—as an explanation of the life and destiny of mankind. It pretends to be philosophy; it fails even as popular discourse, because the ordinary man with some reading and experience will remember cases that make him incredulous; will find in history such mixtures of theology and positive science, such varied tides of belief and speculation, as prevent him from accepting the too easy formula.

Comte is too simple. He allows no room for successive fulfilments of his cycle. There are three stages and no more There was no philosophy before Comte; *therefore* there cannot have been more than one theology, one metaphysic. Monotheism began with Christianity, metaphysic in the Middle Ages.

Hegel is different. The three stages of his dialectic—the strophe, antistrophe, and epode—first the obvious unity, second the reflective duplicity, third the harmony of the two in a mode which is both simple and reflective—this may be a mere formula—mere fancy—a precious thing for fools and impostors to make play with, and imagine they are "sublating" the contradictions of the world. How tiresome it became when it was used as a substitute for thinking! an optimistic amulet against the shocks of the real world and the painfulness of any particular study! But, on the other hand, whenever one came to deal with the history of Greece and Christendom the

formula became alive. Could it be denied that in Christendom, in the mediæval and the modern world, there was prevalent the character of Hegel's second stage? It is given (quite independently of Hegel as far as I know) in Browning's *Old Pictures at Florence*:—

> "Is it true we are now and shall be hereafter
> And what—is depending on life's one minute?
> Hails heavenly cheer or infernal laughter
> Our first step out of the gulf or in it?
> Shall man, such step within his endeavour,
> Man's face, have no more play and action
> Than joy which is crystallised for ever,
> Or grief, an eternal petrifaction!
>
> On which I conclude, that the early painters,
> To cries of 'Greek Art and what more wish you?'
> Replied 'To become now self-acquainters,
> And paint man, man, whatever the issue!
> Make new hopes shine through the flesh they fray,
> New fears aggrandise the rags and tatters:
> To bring the invisible full into play!
> Let the visible go to the dogs—what matters?'"

It is not a complete philosophy of history to say that Greece is *perfection* and Christendom a craving for the infinite *beyond perfection*, a refusal and rejection of the obvious world for the sake of the soul. But this saying can be justified in many different ways. Of course, every historical generalisation can be contradicted; there are exceptions everywhere. The classics are not as classical nor the Middle Ages as romantic as they ought to be for the purposes of a formula. But it is true of Greek philosophy as a whole, including the most reflective part of it, that when compared with Descartes, Hume, and Kant it is still not far from the mind of the early Greek philosopher who looked into the whole heaven and said, "It is One"; it still has in Aristotle that simplicity which is able to include the whole universe, which sees man as a part of the wide world, not yet as a soul to be saved beyond space and time, or as the point of self-consciousness on which the existence of the world depends.

In Hegel's contrast of Greece and Christendom, his

comparison of ancient and modern philosophy, there is something which the "ordinary consciousness" can understand; Hegel in his history of philosophy, his philosophy of history, and his *Aesthetik* is, if not a popular philosopher, at any rate a contributor of suggestions to the literature of the nineteenth century, an aid to critics, to sophists if you choose to put it so, to students who are concerned with particular matters, *e.g.* with literature, and not with a philosophical system.

Hegel's lectures on *Aesthetik*, on the philosophy and history of art, are not such a mechanical application of formulæ as some of us used to practise in our essays and debates. The historical reality is *not* forced into the three compartments; and those lectures are *not* a convenient example of the working of the Hegelian dialectic in its neat perfection. On the other hand, they are full of the dialectical movement, and just because they are comparatively informal they are the more instructive: though there is not so much of the dialectic apparatus as in some other parts of his philosophy, it may be that those lectures reveal the origin of the Secret of Hegel.

The rule of the dialectic is that every stage is right in its own way, and every stage is partial and incomplete; that the virtue of each leads to its own destruction; the thing that comes to perfection perishes, and is followed by a new stage in which the former one is contradicted and complemental. Now the history of art, the history of literature, is full of such oscillations, of progress by negation and contradiction, of attempts at the reconciliation of opposites—"the law of writ and the liberty." One example is in Reynolds' *Discourses*, where the painter is found explaining the Ideal and the Great Style as something loftier and nobler than portrait painting; the individual character, the significance of the portrait, is not proper for the heroic form of art. You see that Reynolds was distracted between two modes, the complements of one another:—the Ideal, the Great Style, which he recommended to the students of the Royal Academy, and the Lower Style, in which he excelled as a portrait painter:—

"It happens in a few instances that the lower may be improved by borrowing from the grand. Thus, if a portrait painter is desirous to raise and improve his subject, he has no other means than by approaching to a general idea. He leaves out all the minute breaks and peculiarities in the face, and changes the dress from a temporary fashion to one more permanent, which has annexed to it no ideas of meanness from its being familiar to us. But if an exact resemblance of an individual be considered as the sole object to be aimed at, the portrait painter will be apt to lose more than he gains by the acquired dignity taken from general nature. It is very difficult to ennoble the character of a countenance but at the expense of the likeness, which is what is most generally required by such as sit to the painter."

Hegel, who was not in practice as an artist, had felt, theoretically, the same sort of contradiction. He lived through the debates of his time about "classical" and "romantic"; he chooses "romantic" as the proper title for all modern art. On the one hand he was a lover of Greek poetry and Greek sculpture; on the other, he found in the art of Christendom something beyond the Greek limits, something which is not merely recommended to him as a philosopher by its deeper self-consciousness, but by its new music, its lyrical raptures. He traces the course of romantic, of modern art to its end, to its failure. Only in Greek art is there the proper balance, or rather identity, of purport and form; in romantic art the greater spirituality means ultimately the failure of art to express what is in the mind.

Much of this in Hegel's *Aesthetik* may be called popular philosophy—popular, though it cannot be called easy; much of it is not more technically philosophical than Reynolds' *Discourses*; and all of it is profitable for historians of poetry, not to speak of other arts. One of the remarkable things about it is that it reveals the origin (or one of the main origins) of the *Logic* itself. In thinking about Greek and modern poetry, about the contest of "classical" and "romantic," Hegel found the dialectical process in his own mind; in his own mind he lived through the stages of Greece and Christendom; he could for the time be wholly taken up with Sophocles; he could not help going on to Shakespeare. It was not merely putting down one book and taking up

another, going from the Greek room to the Mediæval room in the Museum. It was his own mind that led him from Greece to the new splendour, the new significance of the art of Christendom.

Hence (in part at any rate) the great difference between Comte's law of development and Hegel's. Comte does not really care much for his first and second stages, the theological and the metaphysical. He wants the third, the positive philosophy; and he builds up a makeshift history in three stages, theological, metaphysical, and positive; gets a cheap theological tortoise and a stuffed metaphysical elephant to support his positive world. The advantage in Hegel was that he had lived through some preliminary modes before he came to the absolute Philosophy. Not to speak in this place about his studies of religion, he had in his literature, in his meditations as an art critic, verified for himself the formula of his dialectic, the progress by contradiction and reconciliation—from unity, by disruption, to another form of comprehension. It is not a formula coolly invented and applied to matter. The inventor was deep in poetry and in other studies not purely philosophical when he began to work out his system.

Historical students of literature are compelled to work with philosophical notions. It is one of the difficulties of the business. They cannot get along without "the spirit of the age" in one shape or another. They talk of "general tendencies," they read "the history of thought." Further, they have to study those authors whom I named before as not philosophers but full of philosophy — Goethe, Burke, Wordsworth. What are they to do? They have generally to get on as well as they can with a kind of more or less respectable sophistry. They live in a region of opinion, where debaters can play with any number of plausible commonplaces—"progress," "reaction," "tendency," "development," and so forth. They are exposed to many cruel hazards, especially in dealing with those authors who are both philo-

sophical and imaginative in genius, and chiefly imaginative in their mode of speech. It is so easy to translate them into summaries that have a noble sound about them, and yet are worthless because they try to give the poet's meaning without the poet's eye and voice. The prophet or the poet may find significance and value in common things. The plausible summarist reads in his own way, and is edified, and proposes to edify other men; he finds Ezekiel or Wordsworth prophesying about a *tile* or an *iron pan, handfuls of barley and pieces of bread*, and then he goes telling his friends complacently that "nothing is ignoble," that the real world is wonderful in its meanest capacity. Then that is fulfilled which was spoken of by Tennyson in the *Holy Grail*—"Lo, one hath seen, and all the blind will see." The poet or the painter has a right to speak of what he sees:—

> "And when the evening mist clothes the riverside with poetry as with a veil, and the poor buildings lose themselves in the dim sky, and the tall chimneys become campanili, and the warehouses are palaces in the night, and the whole city hangs in the heavens, and fairyland is before us—then the wayfarer hastens home; and the working man and the cultured one, the wise man and the one of pleasure, cease to understand, as they have ceased to see, and Nature, who for once has sung in tune, sings her exquisite song to the artist alone, her son and her master—her son in that he loves her, her master in that he knows her."

Whistler, the artist, speaks with authority. The worst of it is that Formalist and Hypocrisy are waiting, on the lookout for a short cut, and it is so easy to repeat, "Nothing is ignoble," or "Every common bush afire with God," when the real meaning of the plausible doctrine is that the edifier is unable to tell the difference. The dangers of plausible popular moralising are frequent in the history of literature, and may justify the study of grammar and comparative philology as a refreshing change.

There is one part of philosophy where the student of literature is better off than his philosophical neighbour. He is protected against some of the common fallacies of ethics. He will not say that conduct is three parts of life. He knows, if he has properly attended to his novels and his

comedies, that conduct is four parts of life. That is because he knows something about characters and humours, and sees nothing in the demeanour and conversation of anyone that may not be called conduct, nothing that dces not come under the moral law, whatever laws may be. He is also generally indifferent to ethics. What is commonly called ethics is apt to strike him as moralising carried on by preachers who know less of humanity than Mrs Oliphant or Anthony Trollope. For a metaphysic of ethics he may have some respect, because it is out of his element; and he ought not to speak irreverently of Aristotle, but he cannot help wishing that the author of the *Nicomachean Ethics* had read a few novels. The ordinary consciousness, when it belongs to a novel-reader, is sometimes ready to exclaim against the philosopher for taking human beings too much in the lump. The novel-reader is not only a casuist, who likes to take each case as it occurs; he is a thorough-going nominalist, for whom each individual is separately valuable and irreplaceable. Some of the poets who have attempted moralising have been strong on the value of particulars as against generalisations; Blake and Shelley agree in this. Shelley says (it is the title of a chapter in his *Speculations on Morals*)—"Moral Science consists in considering the difference, not the resemblance, of persons"; and again, "in truth, no one action has, when considered in its whole extent, any essential resemblance with any other." This may seem a little exaggerated, or at any rate open to misconstruction. The novel-reader in his experience finds too many actions which resemble one another. But the opinion of Shelley, as a poet's criticism of moral philosophy, is significant. I do not know whether philosophers have any value for the poet's contribution; it expresses the mind of many who touch the outskirts of philosophy, in the debatable land between imagination and pure reason: a dangerous enchanted ground.

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IN A PREHISTORIC SANCTUARY.

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For a week it had been warm work in the Onzième Section. Toulouse under an August sun was hot. Hotter still, however, was the daily discussion in the Lycée. Does the Aurignacian horizon antedate the Solutrian? Are eoliths man-made, or can mere earth-pressure produce their like? Such questions fire the blood, especially if there is a strain of the South in it. Decidedly it was time that the protagonists of the prehistoric department of the Association Française should betake themselves to the cooler air of the mountains.

So long as its train-service lasts, France is secure against national decadence. The *rendez-vous* was for 5 a.m. We all turned up at the station notwithstanding. A few of us are strangers, the much-honoured *invités du Congrès.* The rest, our guides, are a band of the foremost archæologists of France, led by the veteran M. Cartailhac. At that hour it was deliciously cool. Yet, as we rolled through the plain by the Garonne, an unclouded sun already lit up the white backs of the oxen straining at the wheat-cutting machines, and glittered from the surface of the cisterns from which the long rows of vines draw their freshness. We thread the valley of the Ariège, and, a little after Foix, catch sight of the piled-up blocks of a long moraine. It is a grim reminder that we are about to step back into the neighbourhood of the great Ice Age. We leave the train at Tarascon. This is not the home

of the immortal Tartarin. Far away by the Rhone is the sleepy provincial town where the Tarasque is stabled, that last of prehistoric monsters. The other and smaller Tarascon of the Little Pyrenees nestles amongst greenery under crags and mountain masses at the confluence of the Ariège and the brawling Vic-de-Sos. Thrice-blessed stream, whichever of the two it was that furnished those excellent trout wherewith our breakfast at the inn was graced! The ancestor of these well-born fish was to appear presently.

After breakfast, business. We must mount several miles up the valley of the Vic-de-Sos to our left. There wait on us conveyances of a sort. The leading vehicle under the weight of four prehistorians—brain is heavy—collapses. The prehistorians are flung into the dust. *Sacré nom d'un pétard!* exclaims our leader in the pardonable excitement of the moment. But no bones are broken. We are soon on our way up the defile. It is a scene of desolation. On every side are the remains of deserted iron-works. These were formerly nourished by the "Catalan" system of wood-fuel, but alas! it no longer pays. The mountain walls on either side are scored and polished for the greater part of the way up—say, for 500 metres above our head, that is, about 1000 metres above sea-level—by the action of former glaciers. The cave we are about to visit, Niaux, is at least 200 metres below the high-water mark left by the ice. Clearly, then, we have here an upper limit of time for its wall-paintings. Whilst the cave was below the level of the glaciers, torrents must have torn through its galleries, scarifying the sides from top to bottom.

But this is to anticipate. There remains for us the problem of reaching Niaux from the halting-place of the carriages. It is solved—*scrambulando*. If the intrepid M. Daleau, owner and explorer of the famous *Grotte de Pair-non-pair* at Bourg-sur-Gironde, near Bordeaux, can manage the climb, lame as he is, we others have no excuse. The sun blisters our backs, but as a compensating boon it has filled the rocks with wide-open white daisies, and has brought out the smell of the wild

lavender. Besides, as we ascend, we rejoice in an ever-widening prospect, as, for example, up the valley, where the ruins of the mediæval castle of Miglos are seen sitting crestfallen upon their lonely rock.

To stand at the door of Niaux yields no foretaste of a mile-long subterranean cathedral with pillars, side-chapels, and confessionals all complete. It is only fair to state that nature designed a more imposing entrance somewhere to our left. This, however, it closed again with a landslip, as it likewise closed many another cave, about the time when the curtain was rung down on the last act of the drama of pleistocene humanity—*l'époque du grand détrique*, as M. Rutot has ventured to name it. Nevertheless the present rat-hole of a mouth is of respectable antiquity. For it has been fenced round with a cyclopean wall by men who here sought shelter from an enemy, Visigoth or Roman or still earlier invaders. Moreover, within the cavern, near the opening, coarse sherds of neolithic or bronze-age pottery are to be found. To post-palæolithic man, however, the ingress to the inner sanctuary was not improbably barred. A little way in, there is a drop in the level, which rises some 25 metres on the further side, and in even moderately wet weather the dip becomes a lake. If, then, the holocene epoch was ushered in, as there is reason to believe, by a "pluvial period" of considerable duration, the chances are that the spirits of the Magdalenian men were free to carry on their mysteries undisturbed long after their bodies were dust; nay, probably right up to the day when modern science burst in upon the darkness with its acetylene lamps.

The lamps in question took some time to light. In the meantime some of us donned as a protection against wet and slippery places the local *espadrilles*, rough canvas shoes with soles of string. Others prudently turned their coats inside out, a simple and effective device for keeping clean, but with a countervailing tendency to cause inside pockets to void their contents. Thereupon we bow our heads that we may clamber down a precipitous descent into the grave-like depths that

gape for us. Very chill these are, away from the summer sun, and very still, but for the occasional dripping of water. Behind the wavering lamps of our guides we stumble over stepping-stones across what remains of the lake. Then, leaving a mass of boulders and erratic blocks behind, we steer our way amid fantastic stalactites and stalagmites along an exceedingly narrow passage known as *le passage du diable.* Next, more boulders have to be tackled. We note in passing that we are in the channel of a former rushing river. Especially at the junction of two arms of this many-branched cave can it be seen how a conflux of swirling streams has carved out a mighty basin, using stones and sand as its excavating tools. So far there are no signs of man. At last, at a point about 500 metres from the entrance, where an opening in the vault above our heads affords a glimpse of a set of upper galleries, our guide cries Halt!

The demonstration opens quietly. On the wall to the left, at about shoulder-level, underneath a glazing of stalactite, are five round marks such as might be made by the end of a finger dipped in paint—that and nothing more. We are bidden to possess our souls in peace and move forward. A short way on, to the right, are more of these marks, some black, the product of manganese, others a warm red, showing ochre to have been used. Nor is it a question of round marks only. There are likewise upright lines, not unlike those whereby the Australian natives represent throwing-sticks in their caves and rock-shelters. Other similar upright lines have a boss on the upper part of one side, and recall the shape of a certain type of Australian throwing-club. Finally, there is a thick oblong smudge indented at one of its narrow ends. Just as the upright marks have been classified as "claviform," so the oblong mark enjoys the unconvincing designation of "naviform." Similarly, in remoter parts of the cave we are shown other marks to which distinguishing names have been assigned. For instance, uprights with many branching lines on both sides at the top or bottom are called "dendri-

form," though it is almost certain that we are dealing here with the representation of missile weapons and not of trees. Or, again, an arrangement of crossed lines, not unlike the skeleton of a sledge, is termed "tectiform." Lastly, it may be mentioned here that the round dots, with which lines, circles, and other patterns are composed, go by the name of "Azilian points," because of their undoubted resemblance to the marks on the painted pebbles of the decadent pleistocene people who inhabited the cave, or rather river-tunnel, of Mas d'Azil.

Such names are necessarily bestowed "without prejudice." Doubtless there is meaning in these marks. All analogies support the view that they are signs, symbols, pictographs, embodying veritable inscriptions. But we are quite unable, at present, to read their message. At most in one instance is this at all possible. When we proceed along the main artery of the cave, 100 metres or so past the place where the vast ante-chapel of the Salon Noir opens to the right, we are presented with a *rebus*, as M. Cartailhac might well call it, which is not entirely beyond conjectural interpretation. Reading from right to left, we have what look like one throwing-stick of the straight kind and two of the sort furnished with a boss. A multitude of "Azilian points," thirty-one in all, grouped more or less irregularly, follow, then an upright throwing-stick, then eight more points in two parallel rows, then fourteen other points enclosing a central one, an arrangement probably to be discerned also amongst some of the preceding thirty-one points. Last of all comes a cleverly designed little bison, the dorsal line of which is merely a projecting ridge of rock. A natural accident has been utilised—nay, has perhaps suggested the representation. This bison, unlike any other that is figured in this cave, has its legs drawn up close to the body, and this rearing position, so suggestive of a death-struggle, together with the large red mark on the flank, for all the world like an open wound, makes the intention of the primitive artist passing clear. He here portrays the slaying of the bison. The other

marks are presumably meant to lead up to this, and signify the weapons that are to deal the blow, the circling movements of the hunters, and who knows what besides? But why such a hunting scene at all? Let us defer the discussion of this question until we have had time to finish our visit of inspection.

Pursuing the main artery, we encounter few drawings but many symbols, until, about 1100 metres from the mouth, we are pulled up short by a lake into which the vault dips. It is possible by diving to penetrate into still remoter recesses of the cave, which, moreover, are not without their prehistoric designs. M. l'Abbé Breuil has done it. We prefer, however, to trouble neither the lake nor the inhabitants thereof. For M. Viré, an expert in subterranean biology, finds in the water four kinds of myriapods, all blind. So we retrace our steps, and brace ourselves for the culminating experience, the sight of the Salon Noir.

This side gallery is truly magnificent. As one mounts steadily up a long slope of billowy sand, the walls fall back till they are beyond the range of the lamps, whilst overhead there is positive nothingness, not a glimmer, not a sound, no motion, no limit. Suddenly M. Cartailhac scares us out of our senses by kindling a Bengal light. Not only are we scared; we are slightly shocked. Is this a place for pyrotechnics? But we see by this means what we could never have seen with our powerful lamps, and what primitive man could certainly have never seen with his feeble ones; for a hollowed pebble holding grease, with a piece of moss for wick, was all he had. We behold a cathedral interior such as a mediæval architect might have seen in his dreams, aerial, carven, and shining white.

We reach our destination, an immense rotunda. The circular wall descends almost vertically until it is a little more than the height of a man from the ground. At this point it breaks back into concave niches with smooth surfaces, thus forming, as it were, a series of side-chapels all waiting to be

adorned. Here the primitive painter worked at ease. On the contrary, to produce the beautiful ceiling-pieces in the cave at Altamira, in Spain, he must have lain more or less on his back, as Michael Angelo did in the Sistine Chapel. Again, at Niaux he did not, as the Altamira artist, seek polychrome effects, but was content with simple black-and-white. In a hollow stone he mixed oxide of manganese with charcoal and a little fat, and laid it on with such an apology for a brush as the modern savage uses to-day. What matter the materials, if the artist sees? This man had the eye.

We were led straight up to the *chef-d'œuvre* of the Salon Noir. Under a low vault is a snub-nosed horse, or rather pony, of grand workmanship, measuring about a metre and a half from the forehead to the root of the tail. Back, belly, and legs are outlined in thick black. Muzzle, neck, throat, and saddle are covered with shaggy hair, indicated by no less bold, but finer strokes, so blended as to convey the happiest impression of muscular chest and glossy barrel. It is the living image of Prjewalski's wild horse of the Mongolian deserts. The picture stands out strongly, despite the fact that it is cluttered up with not a few rival frescoes. A springbok (*bouquetin*), a brace of bisons, and a couple of smaller horses independently compete for the scanty room available in this apparently much-coveted corner. As the primitive artist has no notion of grouping, but concentrates on the single figure, so he likewise seems to ignore the rights of prior occupancy, and is apt to paint right over another work of art. The caves of the Bushmen of South Africa present similar palimpsests, though we are told that with them a masterpiece was inviolate until three generations had passed. In Niaux, exigencies of wall-space could hardly account for the crowding and overlapping of animal designs, unless indeed there was more mystic virtue attaching to one spot than to another. Thus it is easy to suppose that where the rock bulges out in the likeness of an animal's body, with all the effects of bas-relief, so that only a little paint is required to help the illusion out, or

again, where a hole in the rock may be converted with a stroke or two of a stone chisel into the front view of a stag's face, to which antlers are added in colour—devices which are both to be met with in the Salon Noir—the lead given by nature to art should be regarded as full of good omen.

We have been the round of the wall-paintings from right to left, and studied them carefully, as their merits deserve ; for, of some seventy or eighty, as there are in all, hardly one shows a lack either of care or of downright skill. Let us note before we leave them that nearly all have what look like weapons—spears of various shapes or a throwing club—attached to their sides or overlying the region of the heart. But the best wine has been kept for the end of the feast. Away to the left the wall bends back a little above the level of the floor, and over-arches a small tract of sand, by this time of day coated with stalagmite, though not thickly. We stoop, and behold traced on the sand the unmistakable forms of two trout, own brethren to this morning's trout of tender memory. At last we were in touch with the spirit of our pleistocene forerunner. He knew those trout, we knew those trout, and his emotion was ours. But a stranger thing was at hand. Hard by, similarly sheltered by an overhanging ledge, might be seen the much bestalagmited print of a naked human foot—rather a small foot, it seemed. Silently and in awe we turned to retrace the long journey to the outer world. At last we had met the ghost of prehistoric man.

And now that at length we are back again in the light and warmth of the good sun, which by this time is westering redly, we talk theory. And the question that seems to sum up all the others is, In what sense, if any, is this painted cave a sanctuary ?

For the more cautious of us, the answer to this question was not formulated all at once. Our education in prehistoric art and its purposes had scarcely begun. Next day we must be spirited off from Toulouse by a no less early train in quite another direction—into the department of Hautes-Pyrénées,

to view the cave of Gargas, near Aventiron, in the valley of the Neste, in a hill surrounded by all the débris of the Ice Age, moraines, rolled stones, and erratic blocks. Afterwards we abandoned Toulouse for Périgueux as our centre, and under the guidance of M. l'Abbé Breuil crawled painfully through the long narrow gully of Les Combarelles to inspect its numerous rock-engravings of animal and human, or at least semi-human, forms; whilst at Font-de-Gaume the impressive, if somewhat obliterated, polychromes were made clear as noonday for us by their discoverer, M. Peyrony. To describe our delightful experiences in detail is impossible here. It must suffice to draw freely upon them in order to assist the suggestion that such a cave as Niaux is truly a prehistoric sanctuary.

First of all, how is a sanctuary to be defined? A sanctuary is a sacred place, whether sacred in its own right or because sacred ceremonies are there celebrated. And sacred, in its primary meaning at least, is equivalent to *tabu*, that is, "not to be lightly approached." Was such a cave as Niaux a place of mystery, a place to be entered only when solemn and esoteric rites were to be accomplished? That is the question.

Let us approach the subject of Niaux by way of Gargas. At Gargas we are amongst the pioneers of pleistocene art, the so-called Aurignacians. An hour's exciting excavation in the remains of the hearth near the mouth of the cave made me the happy possessor of a very typical Aurignacian scraper; and, without going further into the evidence, I may refer the reader to the paper on Gargas of Messrs Cartailhac and Breuil, in *L'Anthropologie*, xxi. (1910), for sufficiently persuasive reasons for thinking not only that the Aurignacians had set to work on the cave walls, but further that, before the later Magdalenians could even aspire to improve on their designs, a fall of rock hermetically closed the cavern from that early date up to the present day. Now, the Aurignacian was no great hand at drawing. He makes the child's mistake

of confusing what he knows with what he merely sees. Thus at Gargas we noticed the side-face of a bison surmounted with two branching horns such as could only go with the full face. Similarly, the artist was apt to pause as soon as he had made his intention manifest. Thus a horse's head stands for the entire horse. In particular, he neglects to finish off the legs of his animals. Now, this principle is excellent in magic, if questionable in art for art's sake. Magically, the part can stand quite well for the whole.

Perhaps it is an application of the same rule, in its magico-religious bearing, that will account for the numerous hands, a hundred and fifty at the least, stencilled in red or black on the cave-walls. It is provoking that, when the Australian is found to do the like at the present day, it should be so hard to be sure of his motives. Thus Mr Roth informs us that his Queensland natives told him that this practice, which they called *kapan-balkalkal*, "mark-imitate (or make)," was a mere amusement, though one that is special to boys and young men (W. E. Roth, *N. Queensland Ethnography*, Bulletin No. 4, 12). Even if it be an amusement now—and the savage is an adept in disguising his mysteries—it does not follow that it was always so. Undoubtedly at Gargas a good many of these stencilled hands occur near the entrance, where the well-developed hearth shows that the people camped. Yet the designs are even here mostly in dark corners and alcoves, whilst other examples are met with in devious recesses far from the mouth. It is at least possible that primitive man was here registering, so to speak, by contact with a holy spot, some charm or vow making for his personal betterment. It may be asked, too, at this point why so many of the hands appear to lack one finger or several. My friend, Sr. Alcalde del Rio, the explorer of so many Spanish caverns, has made the rather gruesome suggestion that the owners of the imperfect hands were sufferers from leprosy ("Apuntes sobre Altamira," *Limia*, No. 5, Fev. 1911, 2). It is to be remembered, however, that Australians and Bushmen maim their

hands for ceremonial reasons. Besides, is it so certain as the French archæologists suppose it to be that a man with a sound hand cannot produce these effects of stencilling? Professor Sollas of Oxford, without sacrificing a single finger-joint in the cause of science, has by straightforward stencilling admirably mimicked the mutilated hands of Gargas, as I can personally vouch.

Again, what is the meaning of those strange arabesques or "meanders" with which the walls and roof of Gargas are decorated in its remoter depths? Sometimes they appear to have been made simply with the fingers in gluey clay which has since been mostly glazed over by stalactite, and sometimes they are traced by means of an instrument shaped like a trident. These marks are so uncommonly like the scratches which the cave-bears have left in the same cave, as a result of sharpening their great claws, that one is almost tempted to wonder whether Aurignacian man had a cave-bear totem, or otherwise had a ritual reason for assimilating himself to a creature so full of obvious *mana*.

Enough of Gargas and its problems, with their hint of magical, striving with purely decorative and artistic, purposes. At Niaux we are amongst later Magdalenian artists who could, and did, draw true to life. Did they live at the mouth of their cave? It appears not. Certainly, if their art was play, they sought a remote playground, penetrating half a mile or more into the underground world, with narrows to squeeze through which even in the mind of modern man are associated with the devil. At Font-de-Gaume there is a similar needle's eye to negotiate, for which fasting would be a very suitable preparation. Les Combarelles, again, is literally inaccessible except on one's knees, and no artist ever graved animals, or men with the heads of animals—masked dancers, it may be—for simple fun in such a place. These, then, must have been sanctuaries, if only because no one would dream of hedging round a mere picture-gallery with such trying turnstiles.

The great difficulty is to make intelligible to ourselves the

spiritual motives that could lead men in dark and remote places to celebrate mysteries that involve the designing of animal forms, the use of symbols, and so forth. Our hope of one day throwing light on these obscure matters lies in either of two directions. The prehistorians, by comparing together all that remains of this widespread culture—one might almost say, civilisation—of late pleistocene times, may inductively acquire a set of clues. The material is, in its way, rich. There are some nineteen painted caves known in France, and the discoveries in Spain, which every day increase, bring up the total number of such caves and rock-shelters to at least fifty. Nor must we forget that there are innumerable other sites which, though without paintings, illustrate the customs and ideas of the same period.

Or, again, there is possibly assistance to be afforded by the student of existing savages. These are so much alike in their fundamental ways of action and thought all the world over, that it is not extravagant to conclude that the inhabitants of prehistoric Europe had likewise the type of mind that to-day seems to go regularly and inevitably with a particular stage of social development. On such a working hypothesis, those ceremonies, best known to ethnologists in their Australian form, whereby savages, by magico-religious means, including the use of sacred designs, endeavour to secure for themselves good hunting and a plentiful supply of game animals, take us by analogy straight back to the times of prehistoric artistry.

Magdalenian man drew better, it is true, than does the Australian, though perhaps not better than the Bushman, about whose ceremonies we unfortunately know so little. And, sad to say, it is too often the case that good religion and good art tend to thrust each other out; so that the religious man turns towards his ugly Byzantine Madonnas, whilst the Florentine artist makes glorious pictures and statues for popes and cardinals who are men of the world in the worst sense. We may allow ourselves to conceive, however, that sometimes religion and art may go together, that the artist

may try to serve God by drawing nobly. Perhaps, then, the artist of Niaux may have felt in a vague way that the better he drew his beast the surer he was to have at his back the kindly powers that send the spear straight at the quarry.

For man of the primitive pattern there are two worlds, a workaday and a sacred. Whenever he needs help in the one, he resorts to the other. The threshold between the two is clearly marked. He crosses it always in a ceremonial way, with nice attention to the traditional details of behaviour; and his ceremonies enhance, as they certainly reflect, the mood in which he draws near to the unseen source of his spiritual comfort. It matters not at all whether we classify as magic or religion the practices that result, so long as we recognise that all genuine rites involve one and the same fundamental mood and attitude, a drawing near in awe. Thus, then, we must suppose it was at Niaux. The man who left his footmark there had drawn near in awe, whether it was spell or prayer that accompanied his painting. And perhaps the best proof of all is that the spirit of awe and mystery still broods in these dark galleries within a mountain, that are, to a modern mind, symbolic of nothing so much as of the dim subliminal recesses of the human soul.

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THE PRIMITIVE CONCEPTION OF DEATH.

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In recent years there has arisen in France a school of thought, led by Durkheim, which has given a new direction to the studies which deal with the earlier history of human society. One of the objects of this paper is to criticise the latest development of the ideas of this school, and for this purpose I propose to consider the mode of conceiving death among people of low culture, and especially among the Melanesians, with whom I have myself worked. Perhaps the most convenient way in which I can illustrate in brief compass the leading ideas of the French school will be to describe their attitude towards the line of anthropological inquiry which is now, and has for long been, dominant in this country.

According to the French school, the work of practically the whole body of English anthropologists suffers from the radical defect that it supposes social institutions to have arisen as the result of the realisation of ideas of primitive man which are of the same logical order as those of ourselves. Our social ideas have been moulded by long ages of the evolution which has produced our present condition of society, and Durkheim and his disciples reject the view that they have been operative at all stages of man's history.

Further, according to the French school, it is not only wrong to suppose that the psychology of the civilised individual can

be used to explain social facts, and especially the facts of primitive human society, but it is urged that motives derived from the psychology of the individual at all are out of place in such a study. It is claimed that social facts are of a special order, just as objective and independent as any of the other facts of the universe, and require their own special mode of explanation. The members of the French school assume, and they have every justification for the assumption, that in early society there was a solidarity in the actions of men as members of a social group which gave those actions a quite specific character, and makes it wholly illegitimate to suppose that they were directed by motives of the same order which set into activity the individual; and they assert that the explanation of the facts of early society is to be sought in social conditions which have as their psychological correlate or expression what they call collective representations.

Durkheim and the other members of his school have made little attempt to formulate the psychological character of the collective representations of which they make so much use, but last year there appeared a book by Lévy-Bruhl[1] which attempts to formulate more definitely their nature. Lévy-Bruhl puts forward the view that primitive thought is of a wholly different order from that of civilised man, being differentiated from it by two chief characters, one positive and the other negative. The positive character is, that primitive thought is under the dominance of what he calls the law of participation, while negatively it is not subject to the law of contradiction which dominates our own thought and logic. It is with the second of these two characters that I shall deal especially in this paper, and I will content myself with only one example to show what Lévy-Bruhl means by the law of participation. This law is an expression of a large body of facts which indicate that primitive man has not the same category of individuality as that possessed by ourselves. We analyse an object, say a human being, into various parts, his skin, his hair, his head, body and

[1] *Les Fonctions mentales dans les Sociétés inférieures*, Paris, 1910.

limbs, his internal organs, etc., and we regard these products of analysis as having a more or less independent existence, so that if we cut off a piece of hair it becomes a separate individual object, and we have no idea of any necessary connection between the person and his hair except that they once formed part of an object which we regarded as an individual. It is certain that primitive man has carried out a process of analysis similar to that of ourselves, but his category of individuality has remained different from ours in that he still believes in a connection between the parts of what was once a whole. The mere separation of a man and his hair, so that they come to occupy separated regions of space, makes them no less parts of the same individual; and, on the practical side, he believes that by acting on one part of the separated individuality he can act on the other.

This is merely one example, but it will perhaps be enough to illustrate the kind of attitude which Lévy-Bruhl is thinking of when he speaks of the primitive mind as being under the sway of the law of participation.

The other and negative feature of primitive thought, according to Lévy-Bruhl, is that it is not subject to the law of contradiction. Primitive man is not disturbed by what are to us obvious contradictions, and seems to hold, with apparently perfect comfort, opinions which are to us wholly incompatible with one another. I will give an instance from my own experience. During the course of the work of the Percy Sladen Trust Expedition to the Solomon Islands, we[1] obtained in the island of Eddystone a long account of the destination of man after death. We were told that he stays in the neighbourhood of the place where he died for a certain time, when spirits arrive in their canoes from a distant island inhabited by the dead to fetch the ghost to his new home. On one occasion we were present in a house packed tightly with people who heard the swish of the paddles of the ghostly

[1] The facts recorded in this paper were obtained in conjunction with Mr A. M. Hocart.

visitors and the sound of their footsteps as they landed on the beach, while for several hours the house was filled with strange whistling sounds, which all around us firmly believed to be the voices of the ghostly visitors come to fetch the man who had lately died.

Later, after visiting a cave at the summit of the island, we were given a circumstantial account of its ghostly inhabitants, and we learnt that after death the people of the island inhabit this cave. Here the natives possess two beliefs which seem to us incompatible with one another: if the spirits of the dead go to a distant island, they cannot, according to our logic, at the same time live in a cave on the island where they died. Of course the natural interpretation is that the ghosts live in a cave in the interval between death and the setting out for the distant island, or that, while some go to the distant island, others take up their abode in the cave. It was clear, however, that the contradiction was not to be explained in these simple ways, but that the people held the two beliefs that the dead go to a distant island, and yet remain on the island where they died.

I have taken this instance from my own experience, but it is a good example of the kind of attitude which has led Lévy-Bruhl to assert that primitive thought is not subject to the law of contradiction. He has taken the two characteristics I have described as those of a special order of mentality for which he has used the term "prelogical." The collective representations of the Durkheim school are held to be the expression of a prelogical mentality which is regarded as an early stage of thought distinguished by a collective as opposed to an individual character, and by the two special features which I have just considered.

Taking the primitive conception of death as my subject, I hope to be able to show that much of the supposed contradictoriness of primitive thought with regard to this topic is the result of a conception of death widely different from our own, and that, once this difference is recognised, not only do

the apparent contradictions disappear, but it becomes even probable that the logical processes involved in the beliefs and activities connected with death differ in no essential respect from our own.

Death is so striking and unique an event that if one had to choose something which must have been regarded in essentially the same light by mankind at all times and in all places, I think one would be inclined to choose it in preference to any other; and yet I hope to show that the conception of death among such people as the Melanesians is different, one may say radically different, from our own.

If any collection of words used by savage peoples in different parts of the world be examined, it will be found that each native word is given its definite English meaning, while for many English words there is also given a definite native equivalent. Often it is stated that the natives have no equivalent for certain terms of the English language, but rarely is any doubt expressed about the equivalence in meaning of the words that are given in the vocabularies of primitive languages. Thus, on looking up any Melanesian vocabulary it will be found that some form of the word *mate* is given as the equivalent of dead, and that dead is given as the meaning of *mate*, but as a matter of fact such statements afford most inadequate expression of the real conditions. It is true that the word *mate* is used for a dead man, but it is also used for a person who is seriously ill and likely to die, and also often for a person who is healthy, but so old that, one may suppose from the native point of view, if he is not dead, he ought to be. I well remember an early experience in the island of Eddystone in the Solomons, when a man whom I knew well was seriously ill. I heard that he had been visited by my friend Kundakolo, a great native physician, who was shortly expected to return, and presently there came along the narrow bush-path the usual procession in single file, headed by my friend, who, in answer to my inquiries concerning his patient, mournfully shook his head, with the words, "*Mate, mate.*" I

naturally supposed that the end had come, only to learn that all that was meant was that the man was still very seriously ill, and, as a matter of fact, he recovered. Again, one of the men in this island of whom I saw most was Rinambesi, the oldest man in the island, almost certainly over ninety years of age, and he was not only regarded as *mate*, though really one of the most live people on the island, but in speaking to him people made use of an expression, "*manatu*," which otherwise is only used in the religious formulæ of the cult of the dead.

It is clear that it is wholly wrong to translate *mate* as dead or to regard its opposite "*toa*" as the equivalent of living, and that these people have no categories exactly corresponding to ours of "dead" and "living," but have two different categories of *mate* and *toa*, one including with the dead the very sick and the very aged, while the other excludes from the living those who are called *mate*.[1]

Further, here—as, in my experience, universally in low states of culture—these are not mere verbal categories, but are of real practical importance. Everyone has heard of the customs of burying the living, customs well known to have existed in Melanesia; and I have little doubt that in the old days, whenever a suitable opportunity arose, those who were called *mate* would have been actually submitted to the funeral rites, which would have made them dead in our sense as well as *mate*. Even now the Melanesians do not wait till a sick man is dead in our sense, but if he is considered sufficiently *mate*, movements or even groans will furnish no ground for stopping the funeral rites, including among these rites the process of burial; and a person who, through external interference, is rescued from this predicament may have a very unpleasant time, for it would seem that nothing would make such a man other than *mate* for the rest of what we call his life.

[1] A similar condition seems to exist in the Polynesian island of Tikopia, where, as the Rev. W. J. Durrad tells me, "life and health are synonymous ideas."

I cannot say positively that the Melanesian categories of *mate* and *toa* are universal in low stages of culture, but I have very little doubt that it is so, and the frequency of the custom of burial of the living suggests their wide distribution. It must be remembered that nearly all our stock of anthropological data has been collected by persons—missionaries, officials, or others—who, for their practical purposes, want the English equivalents of native words, and do not discover, or ignore, such differences of meaning as those to which I have just drawn attention. I may cite the story—I am afraid I do not know how far it is authentic—of the missionary who was invited to a funeral. On joining the funeral procession he could see no sign of the object which is usually the most prominent feature of such an occasion, and, on inquiry, there was pointed out to him an old woman whom he had already noticed as quite the most cheerful and animated member of the party. If he had inquired into the point I have no doubt that he would have found that she was *mate* (or its equivalent), and that the object of the occasion was merely to carry out the logical consequences which followed from the application to her of this term.

These practices of burial of those still living have been definitely used by Lévy-Bruhl as examples of prelogical mentality, and therefore it would seem that he supposes such cases to be examples of belief in contradictories; that the people behave as if a person could be at the same time both living and dead. If he were to take up this attitude explicitly it could at once be pointed out that one term of the supposed contradiction is being taken from a civilised category and the other from a native category, but that if it were once recognised that the natives have their own categories, which are different from those of the civilised, there is not only no contradiction, but their proceedings become even strictly logical. The burial of a person who is *mate* is the perfectly logical consequence of what I may call his *mate*-ness, and it would seem wholly false to label such customs as prelogical

or to regard them in any respect, so far as logic is concerned, as different from those of ourselves.

There is one further point to be noted which increases our tendency to regard such actions as those I have described as irrational. We think of burial as a means of disposing of the dead body; but to primitive man it is possible, I believe even probable, that the matter is not at all regarded in this utilitarian way, but that burial or other means of disposing of the body is to him merely one of the rites suitable to the condition of what I have called *mate*-ness. One of the fundamental fallacies of the anthropologist—I would call it the anthropologist's fallacy, if I were not afraid that it is merely one among many—is to suppose that because a rite or other institution fulfils a certain utilitarian purpose,[1] it therefore came into being in order to fulfil that purpose; and, though it may perhaps seem strained and far-fetched, I am quite prepared to consider whether even such a practice as burial, which seems to have so obvious and utilitarian a purpose, may not really have come into being from some quite different motive. However that may be, the special point now raised is that, whatever may have been its original cause, it is probable that to man in low stages of culture burial is conceived as merely one of a chain of rites designed to effect the passage of mankind from one stage of existence to another.

I suggest, then, that more exact and complete knowledge of primitive beliefs would almost certainly show that many of the instances which are brought forward by Lévy-Bruhl as examples of prelogical mentality are cases in which there is no real contradiction at all, in which there is no failure of logic in our sense, but that they are merely cases in which the facts of the universe have been classified and arranged in categories different from those of ourselves; and I now give an example to show that a Melanesian would probably come to much the same conclusion about ourselves as Lévy-Bruhl has reached concerning them.

[1] Cf. *Man*, 1910, vol. x. p. 163.

There is no social institution which shows more clearly the existence of different principles of classification than that of relationship or kinship. In nearly all peoples of low culture the whole system of denoting relatives is so fundamentally different from our own that we have in our language no really equivalent terms for any one of the terms used by them, while, conversely, such people have no terms which are the exact equivalents of ours. Thus a Melanesian term which we translate "father" is also applied to all the brothers of the father and the husbands of the mother's sisters, and, it may be, to various other classes of relative, for whom "father" is obviously a wholly inappropriate rendering; and this applies throughout the whole circle of relationships. Further, the whole system of relationship plays an enormously more important part in the lives of the people than among ourselves. It has all sorts of practical importance, and has far more than purely verbal significance. I hope the assumption will not be thought too grotesque, that a group of Melanesians, while preserving their own social institutions and beliefs, acquire a knowledge of psychology and logic. Let us suppose that one of their number, fired with a desire to understand the mental processes of other peoples, sets out to investigate the condition of these islands. The extreme importance of relationship in his own community will naturally lead him to decide that the best way of procedure would be to study particularly our system of relationship as a means of understanding our psychology. He would soon find that we use terms of relationship in a way which to him is hopelessly confused and inexact. In studying the connotation of such terms as uncle and aunt he would find that we include under them relationships which he distinguishes very carefully. He would find even that we often apply the term "cousin" not merely to persons of our own generation, but to those of generations older and younger than our own, betraying, it would seem to him, an almost inconceivable looseness of thought, so that he is tempted to suppose that we are not

subject to the law of contradiction, but believe that persons may be of the same and of different generations. He will return to his home and announce to his fellow-islanders that the English people, in spite of the splendour of their material culture, show in many ways signs of serious mental incapacity; that, in spite of their fine houses and towns, their trains and their ships, their talking machines and their flying machines, they are subject to the most appalling confusions of thought; and it may even be that, at a meeting of the native Philosophical Society, he propounds the view that the hyper-development of material culture has led to an atrophy of the thought-processes; and suggests as a suitable title for the condition that of postlogical mentality.

I believe this is something more than a frivolous travesty of the mode of procedure which I am considering. I believe that my idealised Melanesian would be proceeding on precisely the same lines and making exactly the same kind of mistake as those who neglect the possibility that the apparent confusion and contradictoriness which they find in savage thought may be, not in that thought itself, but only in their own conception of it.

The conclusion to which I have been trying to lead is, that many of the primitive beliefs and institutions which have been regarded as indicative of prelogical mentality are not really so if you once recognise that they are the result of different principles of regarding and classifying the universe, and that, once this is recognised, there is not only no contradiction, but the behaviour which follows, behaviour which often seems to us unnatural and inhuman, is merely the realisation of these principles in a thoroughly logical manner.

I do not wish to imply a belief that all the obscurities to be found among savage peoples can thus be explained. As an example of a different kind, I may take the instance I have already given of the apparently contradictory beliefs of the natives of Eddystone Island concerning the abode of the dead. In this case I believe the proximate explanation of the con-

tradiction to be, that we have to do with a case of religious syncretism; that the religion of these people is the resultant of the mixture of two cults, one possessing the belief that the dead dwell in a cave of the island, and the other being the cult of an immigrant people whose dead returned to the home whence they came. I fully recognise that such a condition is not sufficient to explain the apparent comfort with which the people now hold these contradictory beliefs, but it seems to me to remove the necessity for any assumption of a radically different mental structure. The failure to attend to the contradiction becomes merely an example, partly of mental inertia, a failure to synthesise their religious beliefs, partly of a tendency to accept religious teachings without question, and without attention to the consequences to which these teachings lead if followed out logically, a tendency which is certainly not confined to primitive man. Even, however, after such cases have been put on one side, it is probable that there will still be found other cases of real contradiction in primitive belief, but it seems probable that these are examples of a mental attitude which, again, is far from being limited to primitive people, and perhaps is not primitive at all. It seems not unlikely that this residuum of cases will be found to be of an order met with at all stages of human culture; cases such as that of people who are perfectly happy in professions of belief on Sunday which their whole lives are devoted to contradict on the other six days of the week, who are yet apparently in no way the subject of any mental discomfort or dissatisfaction on the score of the contradiction.[1]

Even if the prelogical nature of primitive human mentality in Lévy-Bruhl's sense were established, it seems to me that the concept would furnish a very unsatisfactory working hypothesis for sociology. Prelogical mentality would almost certainly tend to become a convenient title wherewith to

[1] I must be content with this somewhat crude example, for I do not wish to consider here how the general attitude which Lévy-Bruhl calls prelogical is related to religious mysticism.

label any manifestation of the human mind we did not readily understand. The concept is like those of phlogiston and vitalism, concepts which have had much truth, but yet have provided, and in one case still provide, most dangerous working hypotheses. The adoption of the prelogical nature of human mentality as a working hypothesis would tend to draw away attention and effort from what I believe to be a fundamental duty of anthropology at the present time and for long times to come, viz. the discovery of primitive methods of classification and of the ways in which early man conceives the universe and himself. I am inclined, therefore, to think that in his book Lévy-Bruhl has taken a retrograde step. Some of the most valuable work of the Durkheim school has been in the study of primitive modes of classification;[1] and Lévy-Bruhl's own law of participation is, of course, but another attempt in this direction. It is not to this part of his book that I object. It is the stress he lays on the contradictoriness and illogical or prelogical nature of primitive thought which seems to me to be a step backwards in the work of his school.

I am afraid it may be thought that till now I have said little to justify the choice of the title of this paper. I have merely taken a primitive way of conceiving death as the basis for criticism of the latest way of conceiving primitive thought in general. I have tried to show that much that has been supposed to be contradictory in primitive thought is the result of a certain manner of conceiving death; and I should now like to go a little way—I am afraid it will be but a few steps—in the direction which seems likely to show us the nature of this primitive concept.

The problem to be dealt with is the determination of the nature of the state which the Melanesian calls *mate*, the condition of *mate*-ness. The first point to be noted is that, while with us death is an event which sharply marks off one

[1] See especially Durkheim and Mauss, "De quelques formes primitives de classification," *L'Année sociologique, etc.*, vi. p. 1, 1903.

durable state from another, *mate*-ness is itself a state rather than an event, which may last for long times, in some cases perhaps for years. No progress is likely to be made till we have recognised that, using the English term, death in primitive thought is not an event, but a durable state or condition.

Next, it is clear that the two states which lie on either side of this condition of *mate*-ness are to the primitive mind much less different from one another than are the two states separated to the civilised mind by the event of death. Even to the most fervent believer in existence after death among ourselves, the gap between life here and life hereafter is something enormous. Death is a sharp point of separation between two modes of existence so different that few are perhaps able to form any clear conception of that one which is yet to be experienced, and with this difficulty of conception there must go a great difference in the sense of reality. If it be claimed that both are equally real, it is clear that the word "real" is being used in two different senses, or in one sense widely different from that of everyday usage.

To primitive man, on the other hand, I believe that existence after death is just as real as the existence here which we call life. The dead come to him, and he sees, hears, and talks with them; he goes to visit the dead in their home, and returns to tell his fellows what he has seen and heard and done, and his story is believed, and he believes in it himself, just as fully as if it had been an account of a journey to some country of the living. Further, the life after death has the same general characters as that before it. Thus the Melanesian ghost eats and drinks, cultivates and fishes; he goes to war and takes the heads of his enemies; and, most striking fact of all, he dies: the life after death is not to be confounded with immortality, which is a far later and more developed concept. The second point, then, is that the existence after death is as real to primitive man as any other condition of his life, and that the difference between the two existences is probably of much the same order to the primitive mind as two stages

of his life, say the stages before and after his initiation into manhood.

I may next point out that the life of primitive man is far more definitely divided into periods than that of ourselves. We have certain landmarks in our lives, as when we first go to school or university, or when we begin to earn our own bread, but such periods in the life of primitive man are far more clearly separated from one another. He does not gradually grow from boyhood to manhood, but he changes from the definite status of a boy to the definite status of a man by means of ceremonial, which often lasts for a considerable time, it may be for years, and during the whole of this transitional period he is in a definite state or condition. There is a state or condition of a certain kind corresponding to the transition from boyhood to manhood, just as there is a definite state or condition corresponding to the transition from life to death. Other periods of life are similarly accompanied by ceremonies which seem to indicate a belief in similar transitions from one state to another. In a very fascinating book, van Gennep[1] has pointed out the general similarity of the rites which accompany the chief events of life, including death. In all cases there are rites which may be regarded as connected with the separation from the life of the previous state, while others are associated with the transitional condition, and other rites, again, accompany the return to ordinary life in the new state—rites of reintegration, as van Gennep calls them, into ordinary life. While the subject of the rites is in the stage of transition he has certain attributes which may be regarded as sacred, so that the rites of separation and reintegration may be regarded as rites of sanctification and desanctification respectively.

The important point to which I now call attention is, that the rites connected with death would seem to have the same kind of character as those accompanying various transitional periods of life. Taking Melanesia as my example, it seems

[1] *Les Rites de Passage*, Paris, 1909.

possible to extend the conception of van Gennep, and to suggest that the condition of *mate*-ness is the transitional stage; that certain funeral rites are designed to promote the separation of the person from the ranks of the *toa* and his assumption of the condition of *mate*-ness; that other rites are associated with the condition of *mate*-ness itself, while other parts of the ceremonial of death are rites of integration into the ghostly life, which is regarded as not widely different from life itself.

According to this conception, the passage from life to death is looked on by primitive man in much the same light and treated in much the same way as the passage from one condition of life to another. In order to understand the primitive conception of death, we must study the ritual of death in conjunction with that of life. It would seem that the state of *mate*-ness is not something unique, but is one with which in other forms a man has already made an extensive and intimate acquaintance. To one who is not greatly affected by recent attacks on the doctrine of Animism, it will be natural to suppose that at these transitional epochs man is believed to be under the dominance of some spiritual influence; but it would take me too far to attempt any examination of the facts from this point of view. I must be content to have indicated the possibility that to the primitive man death is not the unique and catastrophic event it seems to us, but merely a condition of passing from one existence to another, forming but one of a number of transitions, which began perhaps before his birth, and stand out as the chief memories of his life.

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THE ECCLESIASTICAL SITUATION IN SCOTLAND:

ANOTHER POINT OF VIEW.

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IN January 1911 this Journal had an article on "The Ecclesiastical Situation in Scotland," written from the Establishment point of view. The writer of this article is convinced that an impartial survey of the civil and ecclesiastical history of Scotland, especially during the last hundred years, must lead to the conclusion that, inasmuch as religious toleration no longer satisfies lovers of civil and religious liberty, the day of religious equality is about to dawn.

But before the present ecclesiastical situation in Scotland can be profitably discussed, the principles involved being of world-wide application, it is necessary, in a rough and ready way, to classify and explain the various possible relations between Church and State. The simplest and most instructive classification is into three main divisions. The first may be entitled Hildebrandism, or the Church ruling the State; the second, Erastianism, or the State ruling the Church; and the third, Voluntaryism, or Religious Equality, the State agreeing not to favour any one Church, but to leave every Church free to develop along its own lines, so long as these do not conflict with civil rights and duties.

Against Hildebrandism history has already pronounced an irrevocable verdict. No civil ruler will ever again go to

Canossa. The Church, when supreme over the State, used at its pleasure the civil arm to punish heretics, and would, had that been possible, have extirpated heresy by force. Under this system the rulers of the Church, in order to attain their ends, never shrank from employing the most cruel forms of persecution, as is proved by the annals of the Spanish Inquisition, the St Bartholomew massacres, and the fires of Smithfield and St Andrews. The darkest pages of European history are those which contain the record of religious wars; but a religious war between Christians is now unthinkable. The possibility of such a war vanished in 1870, when, side by side with Prussian Protestants, Bavarian Catholics fought with unwavering courage against Catholic Frenchmen. Patriotism was then proved to be a more potent binding force than a common creed and allegiance to the Pope of Rome. No Church will ever obtain supremacy over a modern State.

Erastianism is based on the principle that the State has the right, and should exercise the power, to decide which Church is the true Church, and then confer on that Church whatever privileges and powers the State may see fit to concede. When Henry VIII., for a variety of reasons—some of them peculiar to himself—determined to sever, and succeeded in severing, the bonds by which the Pope would fain have bound the unruly subject whom he had once hailed as "Defensor Fidei," it was but natural that King Henry should arrogate to himself the spiritual jurisdiction hitherto exercised in England by the Bishop of Rome, and claim the Headship of the Church of England, a claim which as yet there was none to dispute. But is there any natural or legitimate connection between the occupancy of the British throne, or any earthly throne, and the headship of a Christian Church?

Erastianism, however, is of two kinds. While supporting one favoured Church, it may either persecute or tolerate all other Churches. In its first stage, the persecuting stage, Erastianism has often shown as intolerant a spirit as Hildebrandism, and its annals contain pages quite as dark and

blood-stained. Think of the persecutions that constrained the Pilgrim Fathers to set sail for America on board the *Mayflower*; of Bunyan imprisoned for years in Bedford jail for attending a prayer-meeting; and of the Scottish Covenanters being shot at sight on the moors and mosses of their native land by Claverhouse and Grierson of Lag, for refusing to betray "the Crown rights of the Redeemer." On Erastianism of this kind history has passed as emphatic and as irreversible a verdict as on Hildebrandism.

On Erastianism of the milder type, what may be called "Tolerant Erastianism," history is not yet able to pronounce quite so clear a verdict, since the struggle between it and Voluntaryism is still going on. Tolerant Erastianism dates only from 1689, the year when the Toleration Act made the existence of Churches other than the State Church legal. Till then, such Churches had been illegal associations, the members of which could be punished with the full rigour of the law. The Toleration Act, however, rendered such legalised infringement of the liberty of conscience henceforward impossible in Britain. What, however, was really involved in the passing of this Act? Those who believe, like Dr Macmillan, in the Establishment principle, may not care much for the inferences a Voluntary draws; but Dr Macmillan, at any rate, after writing a glowing eulogy on Dr Wallace's essay entitled "Church Tendencies in Scotland," must surely admit that Dr Wallace's inferences deserve consideration; and most readers of Dr Macmillan's article will be more than astonished when they discover that the essay he so warmly praised contains such sentences as I am about to quote. Feeling certain that Dr Macmillan had not given an accurate description of Dr Wallace's position in 1870—because when in Parliament Dr Wallace consistently advocated and voted for the disestablishment of the Church of Scotland—I turned to Dr Wallace's essay to ascertain what he did say. This is part of what I found: "An Established Church contradicts the idea of a State that has adopted the principle of toleration.

It was philosophically consistent in the days of Knox, when it was the duty of the King to put to death persons who went to Mass or denied the Trinity. But it began to be unreasonable at the Revolution; and it is more unreasonable now that Catholics and Jews sit in Parliament, and share in State functions. The tolerant State, in its State capacity, has no creed. Accordingly, when such a State takes a particular set of doctrines and devotes national funds to their promulgation, it assumes a false position." Thus argues Dr Wallace; and no Voluntary need desire a more logical statement of the Voluntary position. Dr Wallace likewise says that the democratic spirit "feels the establishment of a particular Church by a perfectly tolerant State to be irrational; . . . . and so it labours to be rid of it"; and yet again, "The feature the Established Church of Scotland has in common with the late Irish Establishment lies in its being an offence against theory. This, however, constitutes a formidable danger. Society, especially in the democratic stage, presses on towards the realisation of its idea; and institutions that refuse to conform to the idea ultimately fall." Surely the writer of these words held that the disestablishment and the disendowment of the Church of Scotland were inevitable. I wonder, therefore, what Dr Macmillan could have been thinking about his own views, when he penned these words: "Dr Wallace's article, as those who knew him in the House of Commons would naturally expect, is thoroughly well-informed, calmly reasoned, absolutely fair . . . . and indicates the tendencies which were at work and the results that might reasonably be expected to follow." That a defender of the Church of Scotland should write in such laudatory terms of an article containing the sentences quoted is a curious psychological phenomenon.

The final verdict of history on tolerant Erastianism may be easily inferred from what has happened since 1868. In that year Mr Gladstone disestablished and disendowed the Episcopal Church of Ireland. In ecclesiastical history, therefore, Mr Gladstone will be known as the statesman who

inaugurated the era of religious equality within the United Kingdom. This honour is enhanced rather than diminished by the fact that, though the Liberals of Scotland and of Wales have never since ceased to demand the same measure of justice for their respective countries, no statesman has yet been able to overcome the *vis inertiæ* that enables many an institution, secular as well as religious, to continue an uneasy existence long after it has been pronounced unjust and out of date. If religious equality is right in Ireland, how can it be wrong in Scotland? Justice scorns geographical boundaries.

Mr Gladstone frankly acknowledged in 1885 that all over the world the current in favour of complete religious equality was growing steadily stronger. The truth of this declaration has since been amply proved. Though the population of France is overwhelmingly Catholic, her popularly elected representatives have not only disestablished the Roman Catholic Church in that country, but have disendowed it in a more drastic fashion than that adopted by the British Parliament in disendowing the Episcopal Church of Ireland. Portugal has followed the example of France; and neither country is likely to retrace its steps.

It is still more important, however, for the readers of this Journal to bear in mind that in all the self-governing British dominions beyond the seas religious equality is already an accomplished fact, and that in the United States of America, which contain an English-speaking population more than twice as large as that of Great Britain, there is also no Established Church. With these facts writ large in the history of the civilised world, can any intelligent Churchman doubt that the Liberal party will soon succeed in implementing the promise made by Lord Rosebery in one of the Queen's Speeches for which he was responsible as Liberal Premier, to introduce and pass into law a Bill disestablishing and disendowing the Church of Scotland?

Lord Balfour of Burleigh, in his recent book on *The Rise and Development of Presbyterianism in Scotland*, confesses

that by the second decade of the nineteenth century "the Seceders had mostly become opponents of church establishments and were a formidable body to reckon with. Finding themselves flourishing on the support of their own people, and peculiarly open to the democratic ideas then prevalent, most of them had adopted Voluntary principles. Burghers and Anti-Burghers coalesced under the name of the United Secession. They speedily showed themselves an earnest and active Church, intellectually and religiously alive, and they became advocates of the disestablishment of the Church of Scotland on the ground of principle. The union of Church and State, hitherto practically unchallenged in Scotland, was now for the first time made an object of criticism and of attack." This is a remarkably fair statement of the Voluntary position in Scotland a hundred years ago; and this generous praise of the United Secession Church, by so outstanding a State-Churchman as Lord Balfour of Burleigh, may be commended to the attention of his fellow-churchmen and of Mr Bonar Law, who, in his first speech at Leeds as leader of the Conservative party, declared that Voluntaries are advocating "a policy for Wales which has nothing even to explain it except prejudice and bigotry." Lord Balfour of Burleigh, however, has no hesitation in admitting that the Voluntaries have a principle, and that their advocacy of disestablishment and disendowment is not due to unworthy motives such as Mr Bonar Law imputes to them.

The Voluntary controversy was the one controversy in which the redoubtable Dr Chalmers was signally worsted. Even his devoted admirer, Sir Wm. Robertson Nicoll, confesses that, when this life-long antagonist of Voluntaryism demanded a grant from the State exchequer to build churches rendered necessary by the rapid increase of population, he committed "a fatal blunder." But why was this a fatal blunder on the part of one who believed sincerely in the principle of State endowment of religion? What else could have been expected of him? No doubt Sir Wm. Robertson Nicoll is right thus

far, that it was a grave *tactical* blunder on the part of Dr Chalmers. The failure of so powerful a personality to secure an additional grant proved to a demonstration that State endowment was now felt to be so unjust that no increase of it could be sanctioned. If, therefore, the State Church were to increase at all, it could do so only by appealing to the voluntary liberality of its own members, a liberality killed, or at least grievously injured, by State connection. Yet, if it be just and right, and in accordance with the teaching of Christ and of political economy, for a nation to maintain a national Church, then due provision ought to be ungrudgingly made by the legislature for the natural growth of that Church. Why should not the necessarily growing expense of a national Church be met out of the national exchequer exactly as the necessary expense of the army or the navy is? Evidently because Parliament and the majority of the nation no longer believe that it is the duty of the State to maintain an efficient national Church. In the days of Chalmers the Voluntaries of Scotland, though unable to overthrow the existing Establishment, were sufficiently powerful to prevent its further endowment. Lord Balfour of Burleigh is therefore right in stating that even a hundred years ago the Seceders were "a formidable body to reckon with."

It might easily have been foretold that the new wine of practical Voluntaryism which Dr Chalmers was compelled, by circumstances beyond his control, to pour into the old bottles of the Scottish Establishment would soon burst them. This bursting, however, came about in an infinitely more dramatic fashion than the clearest-sighted Voluntary of that generation could have foreseen. The bursting took place in 1843; and the chief actor in that historic scene was Dr Chalmers himself. This does not mean that Dr Chalmers and the Disruption Fathers who followed him out of the State Church were Voluntaries. On the contrary, these men went out in 1843, holding to the Establishment principle in the abstract, and, unfortunately, not merely dreaming of a return to a purified

Establishment, but sometimes publicly proclaiming that such was their hope. Right dearly had their successors to pay for their ancestors having entertained this foolish hope. The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in 1904 was avowedly based on the fact that the founders of the Free Church of Scotland, while renouncing their position in the existing Establishment, had not expressly discarded the principle of Establishment. This decision, though not the first, is likely to be the last, great act of injustice perpetrated on Scottish Dissenters in the name of the Establishment principle.

What, then, were the real reasons that caused the Disruption of 1843, an event destined, in due time, to bring a vast number of recruits to the Voluntary ranks? The General Assembly of 1834 passed an Act, known as the Veto Act, declaring it to be a fundamental law of the Church that no pastor should be intruded on any congregation contrary to the will of the people, and instructing presbyteries to reject any presentee of whom the majority of male heads of families disapproved. Nobody but a State Churchman would regard the first part of that declaration as anything but a self-evident proposition; and most Voluntaries, and I should think all Presbyterians of to-day, would be surprised to learn that by this Veto Act no members of the Church *except male heads of families* were given the right to object to a presentee, however objectionable they might think him. So far from democratic were the ideas of an Evangelical Churchman like Chalmers so late as 1834! The Veto Act having been passed, it was soon seen that a struggle between Church and State was inevitable. Only one incident in this ten years' conflict need be mentioned. In 1838 the Court of Session decided in the "Auchterarder Case" that a presbytery had no right to reject a presentee on the sole ground of objection by a majority of male heads of families. The Veto Act was therefore found to be contrary to statute law; and to statute law every State Church must submit.

On what grounds, then, did the Civil Courts decide against the Church Courts? Two pregnant sentences from the speech

of the Lord President will suffice to explain these grounds, and will at the same time prove how completely under the thumb of the State the Church of Scotland is, and must continue to be, so long as she remains a national Church. Readers must remember, while perusing Lord President Hope's startling words, that he is speaking, as a judge, of a State Church at that time in a recalcitrant and defiant mood; otherwise they might be tempted to regard the Lord President's words as akin to blasphemy. His exact words are these: "That the Saviour is the head of the Kirk of Scotland in any temporal, judicial, or legislative sense, is a position which I can dignify by no other name than absurdity. Parliament is the temporal head of the Church, from whose Acts, and from whose Acts alone, it exists as the national Church, and from which alone it derives all its powers."

The Auchterarder decision has never been repealed. It has not even been challenged by those who remained in at the Disruption. On the contrary, these men quietly submitted to it; and they and their successors have continued to enjoy the State emoluments which the Disruption Fathers so unhesitatingly surrendered. The words of Lord President Hope, true when he uttered them, are as true now as they were then. It is therefore still an absurdity to speak of the Lord Jesus Christ as being in any judicial or legislative sense the Head of the Kirk of Scotland. A national Church can have no inherent rights or powers at all. Every national Church owes its existence to an Act of Parliament, and derives all its powers from Parliament alone. How absurd, then, for Dr Macmillan to declare that the passing of the Patronage Act in 1874 "really amounted to a revolution in the constitution of the Established Church." That Church had to go, cap in hand, to the British Parliament, and ask for the change as a favour from the State; and as a favour it was granted. Consequently the Church of Scotland acknowledged by this very action that it has no powers except what Parliament sees fit to confer; and what Parliament can confer, Parliament can, at its pleasure, take away.

Little wonder, then, that the ministers and the laity of the Free Church of Scotland refused to re-enter the Church of their fathers, as the authors of the Patronage Act had fondly hoped, and that since 1878 the Free Church Assembly has made a demand, almost every year, for the disestablishment of a Church which had re-affirmed its willingness to continue in the Erastian bondage so graphically depicted in the judgment of Lord President Hope. No one who understands his words can be surprised that all the best and noblest in the Established Church came out in 1843. Ever since that memorable date, the so-called National Church of Scotland has been national *de jure* only, and not national *de facto*. No Church that is merely the Church of a minority can be a *de facto* national Church, though, of course, a Church containing the veriest fraction of a nation may continue to be the national Church *de jure*, as, for instance, the Episcopal Church of Ireland till it was disestablished by Mr Gladstone, and the present Episcopal Church in Wales. In Scotland, at the present moment, the Established Church ministers to a minority of the population; and doubtless it was due to a consciousness of this patent fact that she made overtures to the United Free Church for "co-operation with a view to union" at what must have appeared to every impartial outsider a most inopportune time, a time when the Free Church section of the United Free Church did not possess a single ecclesiastical building it could legally call its own, nor a single penny of the endowments it had, up till August 1904, possessed and used—a strange time, therefore, for a State-endowed Church to approach a sister Church that had already paid such an unprecedented price for union, and request her to consider another union.

There is one other recent action of the Established Church which cannot be passed over in silence, especially as Dr Macmillan mentions it with approbation. In this connection it is interesting, in view of very recent developments within the Conservative party, to recall the fact that, shortly after the

consummation of the Union in 1900, the Premier, being a Scotsman, was invited to address a United Free Church meeting. This invitation Mr Balfour accepted; and in a characteristically able and appropriate speech, he declared the Union to be an act of enlightened Christian statesmanship. Four short years after, the Union which Mr Balfour had so cordially blessed, Lord Halsbury pronounced illegal. This legal decision was immediately denounced by Sir Robert Reid, now Lord Loreburn, the present Lord Chancellor, as neither "law nor equity"; and Scotland gave unmistakable proof that the judgment would not be tolerated. Naturally, a Government which had Mr Balfour at its head took effective steps to eviscerate this decision, which was in danger of undermining the authority and majesty of British law in Scotland. The Bill by which this specific injustice was to be remedied ought to have dealt exclusively with the relations of the two parties which had been before the law courts. This must surely be admitted by every unprejudiced person. Yet into the very heart of that Bill the friends of the Established Church succeeded in inserting a clause which dealt with a matter that concerned the Established Church alone. This alien clause, which came to be known throughout Scotland as "Clause 5," gave the Established Church power to frame a new formula by which her office-bearers might express their adherence to the Westminster Confession of Faith. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, then the Leader of the Liberal Opposition, exposed the selfish and unworthy character of this unprecedented procedure, but at that time even he was powerless. Accordingly, the Established Church has, by this artful conduct, secured for her office-bearers a liberty which, in normal circumstances, she had never summoned up sufficient courage to ask from Parliament.

Despite the irritation thus produced in the United Free Church, the Church of Scotland, conscious of being in a position of unstable equilibrium, determined to follow the scriptural maxim of trying to agree quickly with the adversary.

She therefore made proposals both to the United Free Church and the Legal Free Church for a conference on "Co-operation with a view to Union." This proposal the Free Church gruffly declined, notwithstanding that it had won its case on the ground of "holding the Establishment principle." The United Free Church courteously offered to agree to a conference, provided it was "free and unrestricted," and not for the purpose of considering union, but for a much more definite and easier task, that of finding out "what are the main causes that keep the two Churches apart." After two years of private conference, the two committees, numbering one hundred and five members each, presented to their respective Assemblies in May last a Joint Report which, though very carefully worded, makes perfectly clear to every careful reader what the obstacles to union are, and that, until these obstacles have been taken out of the way by Parliament, it is impossible for the two Churches even to enter into negotiations for an incorporating union.

Before discussing the probable effect of this report, we must describe the ecclesiastical position as it was in 1847 when the United Presbyterian Church was formed. Much water has flowed under the political and ecclesiastical bridges since then; but the main obstacles to union are still exactly the same. In 1847 the positions of the three largest Presbyterian Churches may be thus contrasted. The Church of Scotland, that is to say, the Erastian part of that Church which had remained in at the Disruption, accepted State pay on the State's terms. The Free Church might have accepted State pay, but only on its own terms, which would, by this time, have been much higher than those which the State had in 1843 flatly refused to grant. The United Presbyterian Church would not accept State privilege and State pay on any terms. Clearly, therefore, the Free Church was occupying a middle position, and would soon have to make up its mind in which direction to move. To put each position in still more antithetic terms, the Church of Scotland both in theory and practice were Anti-Voluntaries, the Free Church were

in theory Anti-Voluntaries but in practice Voluntaries, and the United Presbyterians were Voluntaries alike in theory and in practice. It is obviously a great advantage when theory and practice agree, and a very great disadvantage when they disagree. Hence even a master of persuasive eloquence like Chalmers, when he went out of an Established Church and proceeded to practise Voluntaryism without preaching it, had the utmost difficulty in showing how the theory which he and his Church had inherited could be permanently held.

Ere long, the Free Church, through practising Voluntaryism, began to look with more kindly eyes upon the United Presbyterians who preached as well as practised it. Negotiations for union were begun, but eventually came to nothing, because there was still a large minority in the Free Church which persisted in looking back, like Lot's wife, to the city from which they had come out. But the disestablishment of the Irish Church, and, still more, the Anti-Patronage Act, greatly reduced the numbers of that minority; and in 1878 the Free Church Assembly at last assumed the aggressive and demanded from Parliament the disestablishment and disendowment of the Church of Scotland. Dr Macmillan therefore betrays a woeful ignorance of Scottish politico-ecclesiastical history when he asserts that the agitation for disestablishment was started by the Free Church. Nothing could be farther from the truth, as may be seen from the tribute paid by Lord Robertson, from his seat on the bench, to the United Presbyterian Church, for her staunch and persistent advocacy of Voluntary principles:—

"In 1843 they [*i.e.* the United Secession and the Relief Churches], as after 1847 their successor, the United Presbyterian Church, were the exponents in Scotland of Voluntary principles. By this, as it ought to be unnecessary to say, I mean not merely that in fact they were not endowed by the State, but that they were opposed on principle to the endowment of religion by the State. It is honourable to the United Presbyterian Church that, in good times and in bad, it

has never used ambiguous language or nicely balanced phrases about this matter, and has never sailed under false colours."

The United Presbyterian Church could do nothing else but demand the disestablishment of all State Churches, one of its distinctive principles being this: "It is not competent to the civil magistrate to give legislative sanction to any creed in the way of setting up a civil establishment of religion, nor is it within his province to provide for the expense of the ministrations of religion out of the national resources, and that Jesus Christ as sole King and Head of His Church has enjoined upon His people to provide for maintaining and extending it by freewill offerings."

On the question of Voluntaryism, then, the Free Church was being very rapidly educated, and somewhere about 1880 I had the pleasure of hearing Principal Lindsay, when speaking in the Free Church Assembly, declare himself a Voluntary; and the outspoken declaration was received by the fathers and brethren, and especially by the audience, with ringing cheers. In 1885 no fewer than 1475 dissenting ministers in Scotland signed a document demanding that "the unjust and injurious connection between the Established Church and the State" should be brought to an end at the earliest possible moment, and they described the existing situation in Scotland as "a religious scandal and political injustice." These ministers belonged to eight different denominations, Episcopalians and Roman Catholics not being included; and among them were upwards of 750 Free Church ministers and 500 United Presbyterians. Those who put their names to this uncompromising document also promised to do all that in them lay to help in carrying into law "this indispensable measure of liberal and enlightened statesmanship." Nothing, so far as I know, has happened since to make any of them change this determination, but much that has happened should confirm them in it. Turning now to the report of the Conference Committee, we find the two main obstacles that keep the Churches apart thus described:—

"A main cause of separation between the Churches is that in the view of the United Free Church, the Church of Scotland does not possess that freedom in matters spiritual which the Church of Christ is bound to conserve." And again: "The representatives of the United Free Church stated that they regard the national recognition of religion as embodied in the existing constitution of the Church of Scotland as open to objection in principle, and as therefore forming another main cause of separation. It involves a statutory control and regulation of procedure in spiritual matters which the State is neither fitted nor authorised to exercise."

These quotations make the United Free Church position quite clear. We shall now quote two sentences which should be regarded as the most important in the whole report, inasmuch as they have the unanimous imprimatur of the Established Church representatives:—

"It is an inherent right of a Church to frame or adopt her subordinate standards, to declare the sense in which she understands the same, to modify them from time to time, and to define her relation thereto; always in conformity with the Word of God, and with due regard to the liberty of the individual conscience.

"And it ought to be recognised as the right of a Church, as she shall see cause, to exercise the above power in conformity with the safeguards for deliberate action and legislation provided by the Church herself, without any external interference."

The claim which has been formulated in these carefully chosen words is one which no Parliament will ever grant to a State Church. At any rate no State has ever yet established a Church that is free to make any creed it pleases. A State, in the very act of establishing a Church, makes a contract with that Church, and the State must retain the right to see that the contract is kept. Spiritual independence in a State Church is therefore an impossibility. Moreover, a national Church as by law established can never mean anything but a State-privileged, State-paid Church. The State being the

Church's paymaster, has the right to fix the exact terms on which the State pay is to be earned. Consequently the State must always retain the right to determine the creed for the preaching of which it is going to pay. How, then, can a State Church, paid to teach a particular creed, claim to have an inherent right to modify or change that creed without external interference, that is, without interference on the part of the State? If the Church of Scotland is at last in earnest about this inherent right which she has now declared a Christian Church ought to have, she must take immediate action in her Supreme Court and ask Parliament to release her from the contract which she accepted voluntarily in 1843, by deleting her protest of the previous year for the very freedom which she now desires.

It has been suggested that if the United Free Church would consent to go to Parliament along with the Church of Scotland and ask that full spiritual independence be given to her as an Established Church, then she would agree to divide the teinds with the ministers of the United Free Church. That suggestion will not be entertained. The United Free Church will never agree to go to Parliament to ask for any privilege that is not to be granted to every Church in Scotland, the Roman Catholic included. The proposal to divide the teinds among Presbyterians involves an indefensible injustice to all other denominations, and concurrent endowment is impracticable as well as unjust. The most conclusive argument, however, is that, the teinds being national property, it is for Parliament, and not for Presbyterian church courts, to determine from time to time the national purposes for which the teinds shall be used.

What, then, is likely to be the course of events when the inevitable appeal to Parliament is made, and the final struggle between Voluntaryism and Erastianism is begun? He who interprets the past aright has a shrewd idea of what the future will bring about. In this connection it is well worth our while to remember that the continuous history of the present

Church of Scotland, as a State Church, is only forty-three years longer than the history of the oldest section of the United Free Church. In 1733 the four Secession Fathers formed themselves and their congregations into a Presbytery at Gairneybridge. At that time the Established Church would have well over 900 congregations. In 1843, 450 ministers came out of the Established Church and formed the Free Church of Scotland. By 1900 the Free Church had grown to 1100 congregations and the United Presbyterian Church to 600. Consequently the United Free Church began its career with over 1700 separate charges. In 1911, despite the losses caused by the Halsbury decision, and notwithstanding the fact that there have been already more than 100 cases of local unions between two and sometimes three neighbouring congregations, to the great advantage of themselves and the denomination, the United Free Church has still some 1600 fully equipped charges. According to Lord Balfour of Burleigh the Church of Scotland has 1437 separate charges. Of these, however, 460 are what are called "*quoad sacra*" churches. These have all been built and endowed by the involuntary Voluntaryism of Christian people who hold to the abstract theory of State endowment, but admit that their theory is, in present circumstances, impracticable. Not one of these 460 churches will be affected in a pecuniary way, when the State withdraws from the Church of Scotland the usufruct of the national property which that Church presently enjoys. Hence, since 1733, while the number of the Established Church congregations has increased from somewhere over 900 to 1473, the churches which make up the United Free Church have grown from 4 congregations to 1600. Moreover, in the eight largest towns in Scotland the United Free Church has about two hundred congregations more than the Established Church. Is the flowing tide, then, with the State Church or with the Free Churches? To that question these statistics give a conclusive answer. No wonder that Voluntaryism has begun to be aggressive. For centuries its adherents were persecuted

first by Hildebrandists and then by Erastians. For more than a century after 1689 they were content to be tolerated; but during the last century they have been gradually growing stronger and stronger, wringing concession after concession from their Erastian opponents; and now in Britain these opponents are on the defensive. Voluntaries are now in a position to push home the attack and capture the citadels of Erastianism, at any rate, in Scotland and in Wales.

With every fresh increase of the people's power there has come a fresh extension of religious liberty. No sooner was the second Franchise Bill passed than the Irish Church was disestablished; and it is no mere coincidence that, in the very first session after the Lords have been deprived of their absolute veto, the Welsh Church is to be disestablished and disendowed.

How, then, do the various political parties in the House of Commons stand towards this far-reaching question of religious equality, now up for solution? The Conservative members are to a man Pro-establishment, no matter whether they are English, Scottish, Welsh, or Irish representatives. The overwhelming majority of Scottish Liberals are, and have been for more than a quarter of a century, pledged to vote for Disestablishment and Disendowment. All the Welsh Liberals and the Irish Nationalists are in the same position; and, most significant fact of all, the Labour Party are unanimously in favour of complete religious equality. Voluntaryism, therefore, is already within sight of final victory.

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MYSTICISM AND RABBINICAL LITERATURE.

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THE two terms which constitute the title of my paper require definition. Let me define Rabbinical literature first. People commonly understand it in two senses. Firstly, the narrower, which comprises the literary output of the Palestinian and Babylonian Academies, which commenced in or about the century preceding the rise of Christianity, and lasted on to about the eleventh century—in other words, the literature familiarly known as the Mishna, Midrash, and Gemara. Secondly, there is the wider, which embraces the aforegoing epoch, and in addition the literature of the mediæval Jewish commentators, poets, and philosophers, the works of Aben Ezra, Maimonides, Nachmanides, Karo, the authors of the Kabbalah, and a host of others, both contemporaneous with, and successors of, these, and stretching practically down to our own day. This ambiguity of the term "Rabbinical" really arises from the uncertain and elastic usage of the term "Rabbi." Whereas some would understand the title as referring only to a teacher of the Talmudic age, others would claim it equally for any mediæval or modern Jew who was distinguished in this particular branch of knowledge. In the course of this paper we shall confine ourselves to the narrower connotation, although it must be said that were we to venture into the larger field we should find far ampler substance. For

we should then have to comprehend the mediæval Kabbalah in the scope of our investigation; and the mediæval Kabbalah is a veritable hotbed of mysticism.

Now, what is mysticism? Mysticism might be defined simply as that phase of thought or feeling which tells us that God is a supreme, all-pervading, and all-indwelling power in which all things are one. To the mystic, God is not an external Being or object merely to be worshipped or thought about or spoken to in prayer. God is a living Presence which the mystic experiences within his own soul. In his book on *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, Professor Edward Caird says: "Mysticism is religion in its most concentrated and exclusive form; it is that attitude of mind in which all other relations are swallowed up in the relation of the soul to God." The mystic is conscious of God as an indwelling Father in his own soul, as an immanent spirit of goodness in the world. His aim and purpose is to know this indwelling Father, to experience and realise this spirit of goodness, and by these means to unite himself to God in as close a bond as it is possible for any human being to effect. In a work published last year under the title *Studies in Mystical Religion*, Professor Rufus Jones gives the following excellent definition: "Mysticism is the type of religion which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and intimate consciousness of the Divine Presence. It is religion in its most acute, intense, and living stage." In fine, the mystic is he who lives religion, not merely feels or professes it.

It goes without saying that, covering such a wide area as it does, the name of mysticism is given to a great many differing tendencies of religious thought. Besides, mysticism, on account of its dealing with abstractions, is a branch of philosophy as well as of religion. But what is most germane to our present argument is the fact that all forms of religion possess a mystical element. For what is the acme of all religious teaching but the truth that man is face to face with

God, that he hears His voice and feels His presence, that he can only find his veriest sanctification, his being's highest and holiest joy in drawing as near as he can to the love that radiates from the Divine Presence. There is no religion in which the word "love" and the idea it stands for do not occupy a commanding place. And it is mysticism that pushes love to the forefront. The mystic's soul reaches out in loving yearning to commune with God. And he knows that he has found God because he has felt the thrill of His answering love. Indeed, it is hard to see how any religion can resist the wear and tear of time unless it emphasises the emotional element far and away above the intellectual. The religious man *feels* rather than knows. To quote Father Tyrrell: "Everyone is something of a mystic; no one is nothing but a mystic." By "everyone" he probably means every professor of a religion, excluding, of course, the atheist. It is this over-towering predominance of feeling in faith that is the burden of the well-known mystical lines of Tennyson:—

> "If e'er when faith had fallen asleep,
> I heard a voice—'Believe no more,'
> And heard an ever-breaking shore
> That tumbled in the golden deep,
> A warmth within my heart would melt
> The freezing reason's colder part;
> And like a man in wrath the heart
> Stood up and answered, 'I have felt.'"

Furthermore, a strong feature of religious teaching is the fact that in its conjunction with the body, the soul is the superior partner. The soul is the seat of love. The body is the abode and instrument of sin. The soul must be stronger than the body, because in the sight of God love must vanquish sin. Mysticism elaborates this idea by declaring that man's love calls out the Divine essence in response. But in order that this communion should be complete the bar of our lower self must be removed. There must be a total self-surrender to God on man's part, otherwise he cannot possibly be united to God. In this way, mysticism is really

reinforcing religion's universal preaching on the necessity of the suppression of sin before man can claim the title of a child of God.

Yet one further point. Mysticism may be said to express the inmost core of religion, because in its insistence upon the "nearness" of God and the fatherhood of God, it, *ipso facto*, conveys the sterling truth of the "nearness" of man to man—in other words, the brotherhood of all men. It is thus the greatest incentive to works of altruism, to self-sacrifice on the noblest scale. The true mystic can never be a self-centred individual. He must recognise the image of God in every fallen brother. Sympathy, love, benevolence, mutual helpfulness and encouragement must be the practical outcome, whether of the individual mystic or of the nation in whose fundamental beliefs and hopes mysticism is enshrined. Jews claim this prerogative for Judaism; Christians for Christianity. Both sects adduce instances from their theologies and histories to prove their contentions. And the fact that of all the world's faiths it is just these two that are the concomitants of the highest grades of civilisation and enlightenment goes a long way towards showing the indispensableness of mysticism to religion. It makes it a living power.

To demonstrate that the theology of Talmud and Midrashim is coloured with a considerable tinge of mysticism is to vindicate for Rabbinic Judaism two claims which are made by present-day Christian thinkers for Christianity exclusively. *Firstly*, it is maintained that a religion can only hold its ground to-day provided its fundamental doctrines and demands are in keeping with the findings of modern empirical science. Religious facts are getting to be treated more and more after the fashion of the phenomena of science, of astronomy and geology, of botany and zoology, of human physiology and psychology. We seek empirical evidence of God, first-hand experience of Him. We want to weigh and examine, accepting little which comes from any other channel, no matter how hoary it may be with the veneration of past ages. The final

test of the rightness or wrongness, the credibility or falsity of a religious fact consists in the ability of the individual to experience this fact. We *live* religion and not merely derive it from books or formulæ. And it is by taking the noblest types of men and women who have lived religion and noting the records of their first-hand experiences in this domain, that we can lay down for ourselves the surest line on which to base our own religious conduct.

Well, the apologists for Christianity to-day attempt to bring their faith into line with modern empirical science by showing how the wonderful power and irresistible fascination which the Nazarene wielded over primitive Christianity were due primarily and essentially to his direct experience of God and how this experience of God gradually filtered into the hearts of his followers, binding them together into a fellowship with the Divine, raising them to the level of feeling themselves the objects of a constant incoming of the Divine life, partakers of the Holy Spirit which filled them within and enveloped them without, and in which they lived and moved and had their being.

Assuming for the moment that all this is a correct deduction from the recorded facts in the Gospels and Epistles, what has Rabbinic Judaism to say for itself? Must it confess its exclusion from such a beautiful inheritance? Or can it show that at epochs both preceding and succeeding Jesus and the Apostolic age its adherents also had experiences of a Divine Presence filling them and encircling them and following them whithersoever they went. It certainly *can* do this. And accordingly it too can enroll itself among the mystical religions. It too can bring itself into line with the canons of modern empirical science. *Secondly*, there is nothing more harassing in reading the opinions of the average Christian theologian upon Judaism than the ever-recurrent taunt that the Jewish theological thinkers and teachers of Old Testament as well as New Testament times confined their horizon wholly and solely to the Transcendence of God. It was left, say they, for Pauline Christianity, with its mystical teachings

on the Holy Spirit that dwells *in* man and unites him with his Maker, to complement and correct this one-sided view of religion; and by thus bridging the gulf between God and man to give the world the first complete understanding of the truest and worthiest moral relationship between man and his Heavenly Father. The same argument is sometimes presented in another way. The so-called "inwardness" of the Christian faith is contrasted with the alleged "outwardness" of Rabbinical Judaism. Even an acute thinker like Professor Henry Sidgwick—who, however, writes as a philosopher and not as a theologian—lets himself be drawn into the same stereotyped rut of error when on p. 114 of his *History of Ethics* he contrasts "the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees" with the "inwardness" which, says he, "is the distinctive feature of the Christian code." The implication here is, of course, that the "righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees" was merely an external punctiliousness in ceremonial observances of all kinds which left the heart untouched and implied no underlying spiritual content. It is too well known to need mention here how these arguments have been given their quietus over and over again by scholars like Mr C. G. Montefiore, Dr Shechter and others. But if the contention which I am urging in this paper is a correct one, viz., that Rabbinical literature is permeated with hosts of strongly pronounced mystical elements, then we are furnished with a new weapon for fighting the foe. If it be a fact that, as Dr Shechter so laconically puts it in his *Aspects of Rabbinic Theology* (p. 633), "to the Jew, God was at one and the same time above, beyond, and within the world, its soul and its life," then who will arise and deny the virtue of inwardness to Rabbinic Judaism? For who could have realised the presence of God more acutely, more intensely, and more vitally than the Rabbinic Jew, who aimed at sanctifying even the smallest details of the physical life because he regarded nothing as being too humble to come within the purview of Him whose glory fills the universe and whose word is the mainstay of all.

To say that Rabbinical literature embodies mystical thoughts and teachings is tantamount to saying that it teaches the truth of the Immanence of God. The opposite of the Immanence of God is the Transcendence of God. Let me for a moment make clear the exact meaning of these two terms by a quotation or two. In Isaiah xl. 22 we read, "It is He that sitteth upon the circle of the earth, and the inhabitants thereof are as grasshoppers; that stretcheth out the heavens as a curtain, and spreadeth them out as a tent to dwell in." Here we have an instance *par excellence* of the Transcendence of God. The Divine Being is represented as a kind of magnified man sitting far away from the world which he has long ago created, surveying it unconcerned from some incomparable height. He is like a superannuated workman that, after once having set the engine of the universe going, has retired from it and views it from a distance. Take again such passages in Job as the following:—"Great is God, and we know Him not." "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is high as heaven; what canst thou do? Deeper than Sheol; what canst thou know?" "Behold, I go forward, but He is not there; and backward, but I cannot perceive Him; on the left hand where He doth work, but I cannot behold Him; He hideth Himself on the right hand that I cannot see Him." Now what are the basic ideas in these verses? They are (1) that God is isolated, far away from, all contact with man and the world; (2) that He is unapproachable; (3) that He is unknowable. Deism, which found such a great stronghold in England and France during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, preached this Transcendence of the Deity. There is a great deal of it in the Old Testament. But let us now turn to adduce illustrations of Immanence. One flies instinctively to the magnificent lines of Psalm cxxxix.: "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy face? If I climb up into heaven, thou art there; or if I make my bed in Sheol, lo! thou art there. If I lift up the wings

of the dawn and settle at the farthest end of the sea, even there thy hand shall lead me and thy right hand shall hold me." Here we have the very core of the mystical idea. The universality of God, His nearness, His ever-active love, His indwelling in the very recesses of the heart, His Fatherhood, which involves an amount of interposition in human affairs—the Psalmist voices all these conceptions. And so does the author of Deuteronomy when he declares, "For the Lord thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp to deliver thee and to give up thine enemies before thee; therefore shall thy camp be holy. . . ." And so does Elihu in the Book of Job when he exclaims, "Verily, there is a spirit in man; and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding." The spirit is an emanation of God; and from it there flows man's wisdom, his authority, and his sense of justice.

Having now made clear, as I hope, what is in a general way the pith and marrow of mysticism, let us now come to close grips with our main subject and see of what nature is the mysticism embedded in the vast and variegated domains of the Rabbinical literature. Investigation has led me to divide the subject off into two independent departments. These are (*a*) the mysticism of the Shechinah, (*b*) the mysticism of the "Ruach Ha-Kodesh," or Holy Spirit.

To deal with Shechinah first. It is a noun from shākan = to dwell; but whenever it is found in Talmudic or Targumic literature, it is invariably in the sense of God's dwelling, *i.e.* the abiding of the Deity in either a finite or infinite space. Thus in Psalm lxv. 2 the phrase, "God is in Zion," is rendered by the Targum, as "God whose Shechinah is in Zion." But a process of development is obvious. From meaning the localised abode of God, both the word and the underlying idea were widened to mean God Himself. And from meaning a finite locality it came to connote the infinity of the Deity. The material husk was dropped and the spiritual kernel alone retained. Shechinah became coined as a new word signifying the universal Godhead quite apart from any notion of

space. How this development came about in Rabbinical literature we shall shortly see. Let us first quote one or two illustrative instances from the Targum. In Exodus xvii. 7 the words, "Is the Lord among us, or not?" are rendered as, "Is the Shechinah of God among us, or not?" This is an enormous stride in advance of the localised idea. In Numbers v. 3 the phrase, "I dwell among them," is translated, "My Shechinah dwells among them." In Psalm xliv. 10, "And thou goest not forth with our armies" is paraphrased as, "Thou causest not thy Shechinah to dwell in our armies." The rendering of the famous eighth verse of Psalm xvi., according to the Targum, is, "I have set the Lord before me continually, because His Shechinah dwells upon me, and therefore I shall not be moved." It is a moot question whether the Greek σκηνή in the New Testament is or is not a reference to the Rabbinic Shechinah. Thus, in Hebrews viii. 2 we read, "A minister of the sanctuary and of the true tabernacle (σκηνή) which the Lord pitched." Here obviously it cannot mean the Shechinah, because both the grammatical construction of the phrase and its meaning are quite foreign to Shechinah ideas. The passage in Revelation xxi. 3, "Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and He will dwell with them," etc., seems to be but a reproduction of Ezekiel xxxvii. 27, 28, where "mishkani" and "mikdashi" are used indiscriminately to mean "tabernacle" or "sanctuary" in an unquestionably localised sense. The allusion, however, in the Gospel of John (i. 14), where the Logos is said to have "dwelt among us" (ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν), seems a probable reference to the mysticism of the Shechinah ideas. And this view derives support from the fact of the striking usage in that chapter of words like "light," "word," "son," "glory," all of them strongly reminiscent of the Rabbinic usage of Shechinah, or Kabod, Yekara (in the Targum), as well as the oft-mentioned Rabbinic references to the Sonship of the Messiah. Harnack, in his recent booklet on Dr Rendel Harris' edition of the *Odes of Solomon*, thinks that the Gospel of John is the work of a Jew, in or about the first Christian

century, who was steeped in these prevailing Jewish mystical conceptions.

The treatment of the Shechinah idea in the literature we are considering is developed on the following lines:—*Firstly*, it is regarded as a material thing. It is light or fire, or a cloud, or a bird with wings, or some object that emits a noisy tinkling sound. Let us quote a few examples. In T.B. Sabbath 22b, we are told that the light of the Menorah is a testimony unto all who come into the world that the Shechinah rests in Israel. In the Sifri on ישא, also in Numbers, Rabba xi. 5, the phrase, "May the Lord cause the light of His countenance to shine upon thee," is interpreted as, "May He give unto thee of the light of the Shechinah." Deuter., Rabba xi. 3, alludes to an imaginary dialogue between Moses and Isaac, in which the latter is told that his eyes became dimmed through the dazzling light of the Shechinah which he saw when stretched out on the altar, whereas the former spake with the Shechinah face to face and was unhurt. Then there is the זיו, "shining brightness," of the Shechinah. A passage in the Song of Songs, Rabba iii. 8, compares the "tent of the congregation," which was full of the זיו of the Shechinah, to a cave by the sea-shore. The sea rushes in and fills the cave; but the sea suffers no diminution of its waters. It is as full as before. Just so the "tent of the congregation": the Divine Presence filled it, but it filled the world just the same. There is, by the way, a passage in the *Confessions* of St Augustine which bears a curiously close resemblance to this Midrashic simile of the sea and the cave. These mystic ideas of light seem to be the starting point of the mediæval Kabbalistic ideas of אור (= primal light), אויר (primal ether), and נקודה (condensation point), as they appear in the works of Moses de Leon, Abraham Alulafia, Recanati, and others. And with these might be compared the idea of the "spark" in the mysticism of Meister Eckhart.

With the conception of the Shechinah as cloud or as the wing of a bird we are in the main pretty well familiar, and

time will only allow us to deal with one little interesting point in this connection. In the New Testament, Mark i. 10 (as well as in Matthew iii. 16, Luke iii. 22), the Founder of Christianity is reported to have seen the heavens opening and the Spirit like a Dove descending upon him. In a recent book by Professor Swete of Cambridge on the Holy Spirit, the author alludes to an essay by Conybeare in the *Expositor*, where he shows how Philo regarded the dove as the symbol of the Divine Wisdom; and Swete regards it as possible that the Christian symbol is due to the popular association in Philo's time of the Dove with Wisdom or the Holy Spirit. But Philo, as more than one modern scholar has shown, was influenced by the early Haggadah of Palestine. It seems, then, to be possible to go a little further than Swete does, and say that Philo's associating the Dove with Wisdom or Spirit may be but a sort of Hellenisation of the Rabbinic notion of the wings of the Shechinah. As a matter of fact there is a passage, seemingly old, in T.B. Chagiga 15a, where Ben Zoma says as follows to R. Joshua ben Chananya: "I was gazing at the space between the upper and lower waters, and I see that there is only an interval of about three fingers' breadth between them, as it is said, 'and the spirit of God was hovering upon the face of the waters, *i.e.* as a dove which hovers over her young, but does not touch them.'" But the quaintest instance that I have met of the materialisation of the Shechinah idea is the event mentioned in T.B. Megillah 29a, where the father of Samuel and Levi (Babylonian Amoraim of the third century), sitting in the synagogue of Shef-we-Yatlib in Nehardea, hear the noise of the coming of the Shechinah and immediately leave the synagogue (probably out of fright), whereas R. Shesheth, having the same experience on another occasion, is undisturbed by the occurrence.

Secondly, a striking development and refinement of these teachings is noticeable in those numberless passages where the Shechinah is personified. It speaks, walks, weeps, rejoices. This is the stage where the Rabbinic mystic is able to dis-

sociate, disentangle the idea of the Deity as the immanent Power and Love embodied in the material phenomena, from the material phenomena themselves. But let it not be thought that we are verging here upon any suggestion of a plurality of persons in God. We know the uncompromising repugnance of the Rabbins to any doctrines which possess even the barest hint about שתי רשויות. Besides, side by side with passages like "שכינה אומרת," "the Shechinah says," we get passages like "השרה הקבה שכינתו על . . . ," "God caused His Shechinah to dwell." The danger that Shechinah might be interpreted as a person by the side of the Godhead is done away with by our being shown that after all Shechinah is only one of the active manifestations or emanations of the Deity.

Then, *thirdly*, a development is noticeable in the following respect: We find many statements in Rabbinical literature telling us that the Shechinah has constantly or unfailingly accompanied the Israelites in all the lands of their dispersion, and that it ever hedges round every individual Israelite. The classical instance for this first bit of teaching is the well-worn dictum of R. Simeon b. Yochai in the Baraita (T.B. Megillah 29a): "Come and see how beloved are the Israelites before God, for whithersoever they journeyed in their captivity, thither the Shechinah went along with them," etc. etc. Another and an even more pointed illustration of the second theme is a passage in the Palestinian Talmud Berachoth (פ הרואה) [repeated in brief in Deut. Rabba ii. 16]: "A ship, whose passengers consisted of heathens with the exception of one only Jew, was once in great difficulties when in mid-ocean. The passengers in the wildest dismay flock to the Jew and beg of him to pray to God for help. The Jew prays, and the ship is saved. When the harbour is reached, those on board, feeling exceedingly hungry, petition the Jew to disembark and procure food for them. But to this the Jew replies, 'Am I not a stranger here as well as you? I do not know this place any more than you do!' 'Not so!' reply the passengers flatteringly. 'Is, then, a Jew a stranger anywhere? Is not God with you

wherever you go? Does not your Bible say, For what nation is so great that hath God so nigh unto him?'" So far so good. But then we can adduce another and a considerable batch of teachings which distinctly lay it down that the Shechinah only rests upon certain persons who are equipped in certain mental, spiritual, and even physical respects. He that does so and so, that acts in such and such a way, will be worthy of the Shechinah or Ruach Ha-Kodesh.

We need not give quotations; they are familiar. How can the doctrine which tells of the Shechinah as an ever-present and realised fact be made to tally with the doctrine which says that it is an ideal only to be realised as the result of a spiritual, intellectual, and physical discipline? As a matter of fact, the two cannot be reconciled. And to expect it were to expect too much of Rabbinic logic. The Rabbins were not metaphysicians; theirs was not the speculative but the childlike spirit. We can take up their stray remarks here and there on theology and ethics and a host of other things, and by induction and classification reach what we think to be their theories and dogmas and doctrine. But this is only what *we* think, because we are always so anxious to see how these problems work out when they are applied to the things of the ordinary life. There were no such attempts at co-ordination with them. Even in this very matter under consideration it is not impossible for us by our theorising to make out a plausible reconciliation of the apparently contradictory teachings. Thus: the Shechinah is ever present with every Israelite. Put into other words, this means that as men we carry about with us and are hedged round by a certain godliness. As creatures of God we share all of us in the effluence of His light, His life, His love, an effluence which is not entirely absent anywhere, and from which no one of us is necessarily shut out. But, say the old teachers, the Shechinah only rests upon men who have reached a high spiritual equipment. Quite right! A certain amount of divinity we all have. But in some of us it is dormant, in-

operative. It is for us to rake it up: the germ only fructifies when it finds a congenial soil. We have the present possibility of acquiring the highest spiritual perfection. It is our fault if the possible does not become the actual.

Then, *fourthly*, we are accustomed to the taunts hurled against Rabbinical teachings by those who say that to the ancient Jew God was only the God of the Jew. The world had to look to Paul and Christianity to overthrow this narrow nationalism and particularism by such pronouncements as, *e.g.*, "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female" (Gal. iii. 28), because, as the Epistle goes on to imply, all are equally one before God, in accordance with the fundamental teachings of the Christian faith. Now it is quite true that in a preponderating number of cases the Shechinah is not made to extend outside Palestine or outside the Temple or outside the Synagogue; and it is mostly the prerogative of the Jew, the non-Jew not being usually thought of as worthy of inclusion in the privilege. But an investigation into this subject has proved to me that Rabbinism is not so bereft of universalist elements as it is customarily represented to be. Besides, the political circumstances of the period covered by this literature are a great factor in the case. The Jews were in a state of tutelage in which the ruling power was more often than not the oppressor. This state of things could not be expected to generate in the Jew the highest and broadest and most refined religious attitude towards the non-Jew. Yet we do find ever so many pronouncements in which not only the Jew but all the world are made to be participators in the immanent Love of God—the Shechinah. One illustration may be regarded as typical of a large class. In Exodus Rabba ii. 2 we have as follows :—"Until the Temple was destroyed the Shechinah abode in it. After the destruction it departed and ascended up to heaven, as it is said, 'the Lord hath established His throne in the heavens.' R. Eliezer, however, said that the Shechinah never left the western wall, as it is said, 'and mine eyes and my heart shall be there

perpetually.' . . . . What says Cyrus? He says, 'and build the house of the Lord God of Israel, He is the God who is in Jerusalem' (Ezra i. 3). Cyrus hereby implies that although the Holy City was as yet in ruins, nevertheless God was still there. R. Aba said that the Shechinah never departed from the western wall, as it is said, 'Behold He standeth behind our wall' (Song of Songs ii. 9). . . . . R. Yanai said, although the Shechinah is in heaven, nevertheless His eyes behold, His eyelids try the children of men."

In the aforegoing we have three different opinions:—

(i.) That after the fall of the Temple the Shechinah left the universe entirely.

(ii.) That it abode in the western wall, *i.e.* that it was still, so to speak, hovering round the spot once so sacred, but went no further.

(iii.) That it became the possession of the whole world; this is the broad view of R. Yanai when he says that the heavenly Shechinah still tries and proves the children of men. God's immanence, which was concentrated in the Holy House, disseminated itself universally after the House was no more.

I fear that there is no space left to speak upon the numberless passages in the Talmud and Midrashim where allusions are made in all sorts of ways to the "Ruach Ha-Kodesh" (Holy Spirit). The study of it goes hand in hand with that of the Shechinah. It is a parallel piece of teaching.

But we must pass by all these and many more kindred fascinating themes, and proceed to ask ourselves, What are the general deductions with regard to the nature of Rabbinic theology which we are justified in making on the assumption that that theology is deeply engrained with mystical elements? In other words, if it be true—as we maintain it is true—that the several usages of the Shechinah idea really point to an inward, first-hand experience of religion, the individual Israelite or the whole race of Israel feeling themselves actually encircled with the mystical presence of God and in a sort of organic union with

Him; if, further, it be true—as we maintain it is true—that the various applications of the term Holy Spirit show how clearly the Rabbins realised the seed of divinity which we carry in our breasts, how it is an emanation of God which is the originator of the prophetic faculty, and how like the Shechinah it is the medium by which we get awareness of the nearness of God, of His Fatherhood, and of His ever-constant accessibility to our desire to hold communion with Him,—then to what conclusion are we inevitably led with regard to the much-discussed but so frequently prejudiced question, What is the correct Rabbinic conception of God and religion?

One conclusion is obvious. Rabbinism is not mere legalism. Hitherto the usual means for combating the accusations of Schürer and Weber and others that Rabbinism was mere law pressing with an unrelieved and unremitting burdensomeness upon every moment of the life of the Jew who lived under it, took the form of either or both of the two following arguments:—Firstly, that the evidences to hand of the social, domestic, and religious life of our fathers prove to the hilt that the word "burden" is an entire misnomer, and that the statutes of the law were a joy to them. Secondly, that ceremonial and ritual meant something inward as well as outward. The sense of loving obedience to a Divine Father which underlay the act was greater than the act itself. But it seems to me that once we establish the thesis that a strong mystical element breathes throughout Rabbinical literature, we obtain a more comprehensive argument and get at the truth by a closer cut. If the Rabbinic conception of God were really that of a rigid and narrow legalism, then there could not possibly be room in Judaism for a spiritual life. That there is room in Judaism for a spiritual life is shown by the strong infusion of mysticism that characterises it. In his article on mysticism in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Professor Pringle-Pattison says: "The Jewish mind did not lend itself to mysticism because of its rigid monotheism and its turn towards worldly realism and statutory observance"; and again:

"Mysticism instinctively recedes from formulas that have become stereotyped and mechanical into the perennially fresh experience of the individual." But what becomes of the Professor's theory if we lead him to see the literature of the Shechinah and the Holy Spirit and kindred themes, and show him how the Jewish mind, with all its indubitably rigid monotheism, with all its insistence upon statutory observance and formulas, yet finds ample room for teachings about the immanence of God—a doctrine which is the central core of mysticism? The mistake lies in thinking that monotheism must necessarily be synonymous with a rigid transcendence of the Deity, As a matter of fact, the Rabbinic God *had* contact with the world; He ruled it from within as well as from without; the Jew's relations to God were not external and accidental; God was not only viewed as the Creator of the cosmos, but as the immanent Shechinah, and the traces of Himself which were embedded in the human heart were the unmistakable workings of the Holy Spirit.

And that statutory observance can very well consist with this inner sense of religion, and as it were dovetail into it, is seen from, among other quotations, that surpassingly great dictum in the Sifri: "Peradventure thou mayest say, 'Verily I will learn the Torah in order that I may become rich or that I may be called "Rabbi," or that I may receive a recompense in the future world.' Therefore doth Holy Writ say 'to love the Lord thy God.' Let everything that thou dost be done out of pure love for Him."

And this brings us to our final consideration. Mysticism must by its very nature be the most individualistic type of religion. The mystic believes in God not so much because he has been taught to believe in Him, whether by books or men, but because he can experience God. Religion is a subjective matter. Rabbinical Judaism, as commonly understood, stands at the opposite pole. So far from being individualistic and subjective, it is a body of objective teachings in which formalism and tradition demand a more or less uniform obedience.

But by our hypothesis, based upon the hosts of references to the Shechinah and Holy Spirit, Rabbinism does possess a strong mystical element. Hence we logically conclude that it is a compound consisting of the harmonious co-existence of the two factors, viz., mysticism and formalism. Does this theory square with the facts? Yes. R. Meir (in T.B. Menachoth 43b) says it is the duty of everyone to utter a hundred benedictions daily. This is formalism with a vengeance. Prayer becomes a mechanism, and among enlightened and unenlightened alike it must finally receive its quietus. But no! another Rabbi says (T.B. Sanhedrin 22b) that "He who prays must look upon himself as though the Shechinah were standing over against him, as it is said, 'I have set the Lord before me continually.'" Thus, through being a blend of the formalism of tradition with the individual independence of feeling, prayer retains its validity for us.

And so one might go on showing from many more characteristic observances of Rabbinic Judaism how it is this very fact of the interweaving of these two elements—the mystical and the authoritative—that has proved the safest anchorage of the religion of the Jew. Not that mysticism is, for the Jew also, without its intellectual and moral dangers, but fortunately Rabbinical mysticism was judiciously balanced. The history of Judaism, with its proud roll-call of martyrs, with its moving record of outrage and pain, loneliness and death, bears witness to this great fact. The Jew's trust in the all-encompassing love of God is, to us, the least contestable of truths. And the consciousness of our fellowship with the Divine is so all-important, seeing that it sets up before our mind's eye an ideal from the pursuit of which we may never for a moment turn back. To be Shechinah-possessed is to be no idle dreamer. The nearness of God realises itself only through our active obedience. It urges to a life lived on the highest plane, a life rich in service to all things that constitute the practical demands of religion.

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We touch the profoundest subjects of thought in asking what we mean by reality, essential truth, the universe, its nature and integrity, the idea and being of God, the significance of human life. Anyone may well dismiss conceit and dogmatism in approaching subjects so vast and deep. What is man, the creature of a day, tenanting a tiny point in the midst of the flux and flow of changing constellations, that he should dare to think that he can know anything of the ultimate nature of a world of infinite depths and heights!

And yet the enduring wonder is that man cannot stop asking the great questions. It is as if some spark of immortal intelligence was in him, never letting him cease from his quest for the secrets of truth. Deeper than the depths of the starry spaces lies the mystery of the mind of man, traversing the limitless spaces, proposing to itself the comprehension of the Universe, using infinite space and time as its habitual furniture, and, whether God is or not, at least supposing a God of absolute goodness. Let alone the universe if you please; you have nevertheless to account for yourself, the child of the universe; and presently every problem of the universe haunts you with its presence.

Moreover, everywhere, even in philosophy, the time has come for co-operation and construction. Let no man imagine his thought to be his own private possession, like a house to be defended against bandits. As if engineers were laying out a road

together, let each man simply report what he finds. It is with this method of approach that I venture to set forth a chapter of intellectual experience. If it happens to coincide in any respect with other men's views, so much the better.

Grant at once that man cannot adequately describe or put into words anything more than a picture of the world that he sees in his vision. In each case he must do his work with only a few lines and shadings on a flat surface. It is enough if he can draw his picture so that other minds can recognise it.

Let us first endeavour to show the wonderful background of all life. We call it by its various aspects, the "Fount of being," the Infinite, Eternity, Space,

> "Path, Motive, Guide, Original and End."

Out of this deep comes the procession of events of which we are both spectators and participants. It is marvellous that, while we almost split our brains in trying to conceive of the infinite, at the same time we cannot get on without it. However far the phenomenal universe stretches, we cannot conceive that there is not, immediately beyond, at least the possibility of other universes as immense. Space is our sense of endless possibilities. With comparative ease the mind handles, at least algebraically, with solar diameters for its foot-rule, whatever is in sight of our telescopes, and straightway calls out for more beyond to put its measuring-rod upon.

On the other hand, the infinite is not necessarily big. The visible universe might conceivably be shut up in a cell under a microscope. In a way we comprehend it all in our thought. Time likewise may be roughly defined as the endless possibility before and behind, in which happenings may occur and stories of worlds be told. On the other hand, there is a sense in which we seem able to conceive that all the events in time, seen once as a procession or rolling panorama, might be seen again crowded together, as it were, into one canvas or flat chart, an infinite picture—all time, past and future, thus contributing an eternal *Now.*

There are those who say that their minds always go back to the question, "Who made God?" or, in other words, What lies back of, and caused, the present world? The tremendous saying about God in the Shorter Catechism offers a brave answer to that question. Why should there not be eternal Being, Power, Intelligence, Beauty, Purpose or Will, Goodness, Life? Why should not this Infinite Life, the fountain of all being, eternally express itself or himself (whatever pronoun may mean most to you)? Why may not the phenomenal world, with all its material, whether ultimate force, or matter, or will, be just a means of divine expression, equally eternal with the life out of which it rises? This is the direction in which my mind tends to move without finding any insuperable veto or hopeless contradiction. My intelligence is brought up speedily with a sense of utter bafflement and shock at the suggestion either of a world that began out of nothing, somewhere back in time, or a universe that grew up by chance, or out of the collision of atoms from the possible wreckage of other successive earlier universes. What, pray, started the first one, or gave intelligible law or character to any of them, or provided the power, or the groundwork of matter, or the semblance of intelligence and the superb mathematical patterns, that this world everywhere discloses?

My mind seems to demand for its sanity more than the continuous and the manifold, namely, something which abides, out of which the continuous proceeds, which binds the manifold together into a unity on which we can depend and rest. I care little what we call it—the One, the Constant, the Law, "the Source divine and Life of all," out of which the infinite world of things springs. If I venture, though with veiled face, to move at all in the vast abysses of thought (and my mind is self-impelled to move), I move in the direction which I have tried, vaguely enough, to indicate.[1]

[1] Let me say in passing that if I use the word *absolute* at all (a very pitfall of a word, so tenuously algebraic is it to carry the depths of mystery), I do not use it with its *minus* sign, to denote absence of reality, but rather all reality that is.

Let us leave the deeper places awhile, and pass on to what is nearer and presumably easier, namely, the consideration of the self, or soul, or person of each one of us. How does my self look to myself? What is myself? Be patient if I only try to do as well as I can in laying bare the appearance of the self of a man as he tries to examine himself.

On the surface I am body, with specimens of the stuff in it, they tell me, of the various elements seething in the heat of the sun. I govern a realm of millions of whirling atoms which build my bodily frame. Every corner of it, however, is in flux and change. And yet, with all its manifoldness of part and feature and function, it makes a sort of unity, distinct for the time from every other assemblage of atoms in the universe. Through all its changes it keeps the unity by which my friends know me. This is not a static or mechanical unity, as a table might be, but a vital unity.

My body, however, is not I or myself. I can conceive that I might leave it aside for a while, or take some other kind of body. I never think of it as "me." You might cut it away piecemeal and I should still be intact, at least till you struck the mystery in me called life, after which I simply do not know what would happen; or, until you made some fatal lesion in the brain tissue, where, they tell us, every movement of thought and consciousness has its registration office. You might damage or alter the records there so that I could not, at least immediately, find myself, or carry on business under my own name.

There is mystery enough in these fine brain processes and the infinitesimal cells to coil us up in interminable puzzledom. A tiny cell, that you would not know from a fine bit of pulp, may carry an imprint, like a photograph, by which, in the marvellous transmission of life from parent to child, all the parts and functions, and even the features and the peculiar characteristics of the parent's mind and taste, are colonised, as it were, in a new life.

Photographed through the retina of the eye, a vast world

stretching to distant constellations is continually being made over into pictures with lines and colours, and, more wonderful yet, with some strange new kaleidoscopic combinations of ideas. The orderly miracle of this transformation is created out of waves of light and pulses of sensation, travelling in an unseen world outside of us and within us. We cannot say that anything is really what it seems to be. Ought it not, however, to be enough if it makes sense and contributes its rational part to the life of the man as spectator or participant? What if the cold type are not in the least like the thrilling words that they spell to the reader? If the type, being each in place, tell the story to the waiting mind, who cares what metal they are made of!

The question presses—What am I, the self, into whose mysterious consciousness what we call "the world" constantly breaks through, sometimes with blows and pain and hurt, but again with all sorts of fragrances and harmonies and wonderful suggestions, stirring a reaction of feelings, guesses, questionings, desires, and hopes?

First, Where am I? I never seem to myself to be fixed in the brain any more than I seem to be merely inhabiting the body. I am where my voice goes. The orator or the singer is in the whole hall. The patriot leader is in a host of men. In one aspect I am a stream or flow or thread, of all sorts of moments of consciousness. Lights, sounds, pains, pleasures, recurring memories, new sensations, are all strung together like so many beads. In hours of deep repose only the string remains. But the self is evidently more than a stream or flow of consciousness. What is the thread that keeps the beads together?

We may help ourselves here better by parables than by definitions. Here is a painting, for example, Millet's picture of the "Angelus." Its beauty depends on the relation of a manifoldness of lines and feature to a guiding unity of design. Every line must help tell its story toward the unity of the painter's thought. There must be no needless or contradictory

line. So of the unity of great architecture, its simple ornamentation subserving the idea or use of the building. So of a noble drama. Words, sentences, scenes, characters, the play of the humour, the moments of thrilling horror or fear, the contrasts of feeling, combine to the single message of the poet, it may be simply the idea of devotion, as in the *Antigone*. It is thus given to man to create works of beauty, temples, orations, oratorios, symphonies, whose triumph is in the domination of a thought or idea, under whose rule every detail, every tool and instrument is compelled to co-operate, a unity in which the humblest man is made to rejoice and to rest satisfied. Every art suggests the highest of all arts, namely, beauty and unity of life.

It is true that the climbing steps by which we rise from the mere animalism of a baby to the idealism of a beautiful and noble human life, or self, have been the pathway of troops of sensations from the outer world. So much the more marvellous is the fact that, having so come, the idea of the nature of man's inner self stands revealed, as if a language were being thus spelled out in so many forms of type.

We did not at first know what to call the self. Could we say that we believed in anything so vaporous as soul or spirit? It is not of much consequence what name we use. But I propose fearlessly henceforth, whenever we see the ideal self as we have imaged it, to call it "soul" and "spirit." For it surely is not mechanical or material. Spirit rather than matter, therefore, expresses what we mean. This is the unifying kernel or nucleus of the man, as distinguished from a mere body.

We appeal to facts of experience. At our best, there is not merely inward integrity — honour, courage, truth, self-control, singing like a chorus, with the good will beating the baton—but there tends now to be unison throughout the whole man to the tips of his fingers. The brain now does its best work; the nerves are at rest, the muscles obey, the unseen functions of the heart and lungs go on together and take charge of the bodily circulation, the tones

of the voice become agreeable. It is as in the old story of Aeneas, whose goddess mother clothes him in radiance for the court of the Queen. Such is the normal motion of the good will, or the best self, whenever for an hour it takes command and overrules the activities of the life into unity. So far have we travelled from the idea of the self as only a thread of jangling and varied experiences.

Note now another remarkable aspect of the unity of the developing spiritual selfhood. We agreed that a piece of art takes up into its beauty every minute factor of its material. Each atom of pigment counts towards the result; the shadows in the picture have their place and use. So exactly in the life of man. All sorts of experiences go together to make a unity of effect. The kernel of the life, once seen to be the kernel, takes up and incorporates every item of material. This at least is the law and the tendency. At times, especially in difficult or critical moments, it may seem as if quite unassimilable material were present, overloading the life, and outside of its unity. But wait a little, and you never can tell what item, even of sorrow or pain, you could have afforded to omit.

Observe now what a man, at his best and on the side of his personality, can do. We only begin to know, but we know enough already to fill us with wonder. There is a certain infinite element in the man. As we have seen, if he cannot adequately comprehend the idea of infinity, he cannot get along without it. There is infinity in his intelligence, for his mind seems, in its way, to mirror the universe. He actually weighs the stars. He measures the waves of light. He handles endless problems in numbers, and builds ideal schemes of geometry. There is an infinity also in the heights and depths of his conscience, of his loyalty, of his faith, of his love. At his best he has no price. In his integrity, he is indestructible. He will suffer and die, but his spiritual life goes straight on, fearless of death.

We have already intimated that the best in man is always

growing, but has never attained his growth. The ideal, the true and perfect self, is always above him. This ideal self, moreover, does not stand still, at least to our vision. Like the sun and the whole solar system, it seems to be also in motion, as if to the gravitation of a higher or central life. As a matter of fact, the ideal self is more beautiful and complete in detail through every decade of any normal man's life. How could we see the wholeness and the beauty of it at once!

Let us try to sum up what we find in the facts, both outward and inner, of the life of a man. We have first a material aspect of the man, through which all kinds of appetites and passions play, with ancestral roots far back in generations of animalism, in which various vital functions act more or less harmoniously together, constituting the visible and organic unity of the man. We find, in and behind, and brimming over this unstable organic and bodily unity, something conscious, intelligent, purposeful, whose distinguishing marks are faith, duty, loyalty, love, striving ever with the body or through the body, or even despite the body, to self-realisation and expression. At its best, it seems to blossom out like a flower. In the sky of the consciousness of this striving, growing, aspiring being, always shines forth, as often as the man looks up, the picture or image of the self that he ought to be. It is as if, above the draughtsman in the architect's office, as he works over his drawings, there hung the great architect's plan, which the youth only half understands. More wonderful yet, this inner self, like Socrates' "Daimon," stands always ready, if you will let him, to come down out of the frame of the picture and to assume the part of a veritable companion, wise, genial, noble, restful, and sympathetic. Be modest, be hospitable, listen, and he will tell you what you ought to do and how to do it, as if God spoke.

If the word "Trinity" had not been spoiled by dogmatic use, one could discern a sort of tri-unity in the person of the man. First, an eternal and guiding and elder self; next, a procession of all manner of forming experiences that the man

undergoes, the material of his life; and third, the self that is being built up by all the processes into the image of the originating kernel of the life. We may perhaps see later something like this in the interpretation of the universal life.

We have proceeded so far, someone may say, over very thin ice. How does anyone know that there is any truth? What business have we to appeal to consciousness, and thus backwards to the stories that the senses tell, when everyone knows that the senses play every kind of illusory trick on our minds? We should be fools, we answer, if we did not use the only tools we have as well as we can, guarding against obvious error by such other tools, like the judgment and reason, as are given us, and correcting one sense by another.

Here, again, faces us that intellectual principle of unity which we can never long escape or elude. Our minds seem to be made to follow a pattern of unity, and to demand that the factors and elements go together and match. What is not in the unity, but seems outside of it, whatever is contradictory or discordant, distresses us. We never, however, can bear to give up the idea of the unity. We always suspect that the alien or discordant or contradictory item will be found, on closer search, to fit into place, and so to make final harmony. Everything that we gain comes by our trust in this overpowering law of intelligence. Suppose, then, that life somehow bears in on a man the story of even a possible unity of beauty, of purpose, of a ripening good will. Why should he not trust the story rather than have no story at all, or a story of triviality and purposelessness, like a grotesque dream in the night? The presumption is in favour of the reality of that which makes sense and gives satisfaction.

We all constantly use the word "Universe." We here come upon the most magnificent conception that man could entertain. No child or savage sees a universe. He sees the manifold; he sees a fight; he hears discords, but no symphony. The fact is, the unity is behind and beneath the manifold and

its confusing changes. The gravitation, the electric energy, the light never conflict with each other. We find the hint of a single ruling force, or will, behind all of them. We guess that the various elements, oxygen and iron and the rest, are so many forms of universal substance, or, if you like better, of a single universal activity. Thus all things are found working together. We surmise that there is nothing outside of the universe or alien to it. It is self-existent. It takes account of all its atoms, and has a place in its order for them all.

Moreover, all seeming antagonisms upon the surface are continually found, as we watch, to be taken up into the unity. Even the law of the survival of the fittest, which in the lower strata seems to mean bloody strife, proves, when we come to the development of man, to fall under the more social and spiritual principle of pity and co-operation. This principle had indeed always worked to guide the ascent of life. The ants and bees had built together, and the wolves had hunted in packs.

May there not, however, be other and different worlds, in some of which our order of intelligence would not find itself at home, in which two and two might make anything else than four? Or, may it not be that there are blind alleys and unassimilable matter all about us in this so-called universe? May it be, not a universe, but a conglomerate affair, with possibilities, upward and downward, of completion or greater dissonance, or even of total wreck?

While modesty surely forbids any dogmatic answer to these questions, yet rationality, with equal sureness, insists upon putting the burden of proof on those who deny the reality of the order and unity. In the face of the childish impression of hopeless variety and discord, the process of rationality has actually worked to discover underlying and dominant lines converging toward unity. As a mere working hypothesis, this seems to be by far the most fruitful, as well as the only, conception that can satisfy the mind. With any other or less conception, whether dualistic, or pluralistic, or

agnostic, the intelligence only gets on upon at least a faith that order and unity, and significance and purpose, making what we deem beauty and goodness, are here in parts of the scheme, if not in the whole, with the hope that somehow they will prove to be the victorious elements, in other words, that they belong to the very essence of the structure.

This is the conviction of those who dare to say that they believe in the Absolute or perfect God. Grant that these words are insufficient. We are trying to tell what they mean for those who find meaning in them. We are unable to think that the values which we associate with a veritable universe—ideas of the good, the true, the beautiful—have only been precipitated out of the ever-changing flux of human consciousness, and hence have no more stable character than the stuff that dreams are made of. We do right "in scorn of consequence." If we ought really to do right with this infinite sense of duty upon us, I cannot conceive of any realm in any universe or any terrifying environment in time when it would not still be our part to go on doing right. In mathematics, in art, in ethics, we surmise that man's nature, imposed upon him by the great Nature which he faces, constitutes him a citizen for ever. There would not, we suspect, be a place or a time where, if you colonised the man, he would not be able to adjust himself and recognise the universal lines, and begin to build with whatever type of material offered itself. Such is the faith of the intelligence in the quality of the universe!

On the other hand, we certainly find a world of phenomena in motion. If we see evolution, we see nothing that is finally evolved. In our own human world we are satisfied with nothing. Is there, then, an unreal world that changes, and to which we belong as sharers in its processes; and is there another invisible universe, behind which alone is reality?

It is all real, we reply, as the unseen thought of the thinker is real, and also the sounds and the words, harsh or smooth, with the help of which the thinker unravels his thought and conveys it to you and me. The thought was

there before the word was spoken. It remains whether we understand it or not. The words are not outside of reality, for this would be to place them outside of the universe!

It seems to me that what we have already discovered about ourselves holds true in our thought of the universe. The kernel of a man's reality is the best or true self, the scheme of the man, ever suggesting itself, more clear and beautiful every day. But the man as a child, a youth, a learner, a blunderer, even a sinner, is not unreal. The thought of the original thinker, whose energising word builds the worlds, shines through the man's feeblest utterance and proclaims him a man, though only in process of growing. Raise him at length to actual manhood, and every item of the crude processes will at last be recognised as entering into the unity. The universe likewise is real; every star and ray of light, and shadow and cloud, held in the grip of a spiritual unity, which uses every means to express itself.

We are bound to touch the crux of all philosophy and religion. There is a fact known as "Evil." In human development especially we are haunted by the sight of pain, failure, frustration, error, sin, apparent decadence. What sort of a reality have we in which evil is admitted? Or must we at last confess to the fact of a fatal rift in our universe? It is suggestive to observe that we have ceased to admit any rift or to find any doubleness in the phenomenal world. The storm sweeps over the continent in unison with the heat-waves of the beneficent sun. No one dreams of wishing to vote fire out of the world because it will burn a finger or a city. You cannot even use the *minus* sign and call things bad except by reference to the scale of positive values in goodness which characterise an ideal universe. The very thing which you call bad by itself ceases to be bad when seen in its relation to the whole. It is like the daub of paint on the picture, ugly when taken out of its place, but necessary to the painter's work. Would you like a perfectly smooth and insignificant

world—no contrasts, no prick of pain or hunger or other urgency, no splendid risks or ventures; only one continuous flow of mild and futile breath? The fact is, we could not have vigorous and growing life without the urgency of at least a certain measure of contrast and "evil."

Let us be bold now to go a step further, and question whether the presence of contrast and "evil" in our outer world is not throughout a parable and an object-lesson of the working of a similar and necessary principle of the moral or spiritual life. Why is moral evil so different from any other kind of contrast—partialness, imperfection, immaturity, and incidental disease—that we should have to invent a bogey to explain it, or to split the universe and leave this item of sin outside? What is sin?

The analogy of good and bad art will help us here. We see no rift in the universe because the world is full of bad art work. We believe all the more in the conception of a real universe because, behind all sorts of feeble and ugly attempts at art, there rise the everlasting standards of real beauty. The bad work itself is a sort of tribute to the reality of good art. Its faults and its ugliness bring the simple laws of beauty into relief.

What, now, would you expect in human conduct? You have a world of children growing up out of animalism, every mother's son of us born on the plane of the animal world. Sin, non-existent among animals, comes to view by virtue of the conception of an ideal and spiritual universe. You see in your vision, as if it were a picture let down from heaven, a sketch of perfect social relations, each man just, true, modest, faithful, bound in the harmony of a controlling good will with every other man. Moral evil, like the bad art, is wherever this ideal fails of realisation. Wherever sin is, the underlying condition is the want of good will; that is, of social or spiritual life. There is no rift in the universe, because this high form of life comes by growth.

There are indeed cases of moral evil so malicious and cruel

as to seem at first to lend themselves to the theory of diabolical agency. Browning's Guido in *The Ring and the Book* is such an instance. Study, however, with proper pity, the origin and growth of this kind of character, and it always goes back for its root to the crude animal nature which we all share. The brute power, and even the intellect, left to act by themselves, are dreadful. This is to say that an everlasting urgency exists to add love and make a whole man.

But, some one says, moral evil is complicated with the mystery of freedom. There is no more practical reason for complication here than in the case of the backward or unwilling art-student. Whatever we say about free will, the practical problem is the same for the teacher as for the moralist. The worst of boys or men has interests, susceptibilities, ambitions, humanity. We need not call him by hard names; we must not depress and discourage him; we must wake him up and stir his natural interests and give him hope. This is the only way to develop the man or the artist. It is as sure in its working as the processes of agriculture when directed to the growing of corn or fruit.

This is to say that the ruling condition of moral life is the atmosphere and circulation of good will. Good will is indeed the only free will, as ill will or self will is constrained will, subject to frustration. The presence of moral evil in the universe, therefore, no more breaks its integrity than the presence of green apples or blight in an orchard breaks the unity of the science of agriculture. You can rid yourself of the blight. You cannot even have ripe apples without first having green ones. The fact is, we come at last to love the grand language of beauty, truth, integrity, and goodness, with which the spirit of the universe speaks to us, all the better because it comes in the form of a wonderful drama.

I am aware that to certain minds the idea of the integrity of the universe seems to suggest a dead "block-system." Everything appears to be determined without chance or

freedom. This objection seems to me to arise from a misapprehension. In the first place, as far as we mortals are concerned, we are going to have all the zest there is in the unexpected risk and venture of life, whatever the theory be of its essential nature. Whether Shakspeare or Bacon wrote the play, whoever sees it for the first time sees it substantially as it unrolled from the mind of the master. Suppose the play of the universe life is conceived to be as immutable as the supposed text of the Biblical canon. What does any man lose? Even so, no two men will see it in the same way. No man will see it alike at any two successive readings. Do I, child that I am, want to imagine that I have power and freedom to alter the plot? As if I should alter it for the better! What I want is that I may enter into and share to the uttermost the thought, the life, the good will, the integrity.

We shudder, indeed, at the idea of a mechanical scheme which would make automata of us. But the soul that thinks grand thoughts, sees unity, feels beauty, aspires and loves, is the citizen of an ideal world; no theory in philosophy can make an automaton of him. As a child in the great school of life, I am happy to think that the master is bound to do his best by me, that I cannot anyway escape the fascination of his plan, that he is resolutely determined that his will shall be my will. The sooner I come to this conclusion the more sense I show.

I care little by what name we call our thought of the Divine Unity. Some may call it "pantheism." God is all in all. All things exist in Him. "In him we live and move and have our being." Why not? The only abhorrent kind of pantheism is the idea of a mere inconsequent aggregation of all things, in which no guiding principle or Life compels the lines and dots into any unity. But suppose we believe in a real universe where good will dominates. At my best, the world makes this its most enduring impression upon me. Every other impression is faint in comparison. In fact, other impressions seem to be flitting shadows of this one.

We have so far preferred mostly to use the word "universe," and we have been shy of saying "God." We are doubtless the children of the Universe. Cannot we get along without any God? This seems like the question whether the man cannot get on without any soul. We have seen that for practical purposes we cannot get on without positing something that we call "soul" or person. There is a principle of unity in us, for ever tending, the more normal we become, to assimilate our experiences into a certain integrity of being. We come to the idea of God in the same way. There is universal power and intelligence, blossoming everywhere into forms of order and beauty. There is everlasting pressure upwards into higher forms of life. As we are only children of the universe, as we do not make the power, but only draw on it, as we do not create the intelligence, but only express it, as we see moral standards, but do not invent them any more than we invent the patterns of the crystals, so we do not make good will. but only use it. We are children of the good will of the universe as we are children of its beauty or its power. In other words, we seem to find in the macrocosm of the world what we find in ourselves, namely, a principle of spiritual unity under the great names of Energy, Mind, Beauty, and Goodness. The universe thus appears to us in the terms of Person or God. In the case of God, as in the case of man, we do not mean limitation when we say person. We mean the infinite and spiritual element in the Universe.

We see no sign of God, some one says. He is not in outward nature. Surely he is not in the last horrible tragedy reported in the morning paper. So might some tiny corpuscle in me fail to find me and deny my existence, and especially my integrity and good will. My good will, while using every part and each corpuscle, and working in an actual harmony of all the parts, nevertheless cannot reveal its whole self in every part. My nature is disclosed in the wholeness of my action. So, if God is in each moment of time and each point of space, yet all of God is not seen in every point and every moment.

Behold now the life of God as in and behind all things, ever seeking to express itself and to pour itself out. It shows itself in inorganic things as energy and as intelligence. What more could you have in things? It bursts forth in the world of plant and animal life, and rises toward the dawn of sympathy and the rude beginnings of a social sense. What more of God would you expect to find in the animal world? It builds up the life of man, half animal and half child, with gleams of the light of Deity in the faces of mothers and infants. What more would you look for? By and by there stand out heroes, singers, teachers, true-hearted, modest, and fearless; Messiahs, Sons of God. There is no difficulty about our conviction of the reality of God as soon as the wholeness and perfectness of the divine nature shine forth. The most sceptical corpuscle in me would be satisfied, I trust, if I could make him see what I am about whenever the best self in me rules my life.

> "From the first Power was, I knew;
> Life has made clear to me,
> That, strive but for closer view,
> Love were as plain to see."

We have insisted upon the divine unity. "With him is no variableness or shadow of turning." But this is no bare or unsocial unity. When once you have seen a unity in manifoldness, or, better yet, have given the name of good will to the central life, you have asserted a social nature in God. You have the eternal fountain of life manifested in ceaseless expression to a world of conscious beings, the children of his good will. You conceive of the spirit of the universe behind all space and time, yet always bearing beings, after the nature of his own being, in his thought and will. Time and space furnish only the field in which the procession of power and thought and goodness goes over into action.

We have been compelled to put into the conception of God every ultimate value. It is no abstract God. It is not mere mind or thought. It must include, with the energy, that which gives energy significance, namely, consciousness, if

not precisely in our form, then in some higher form. It must include joy and beauty. Why not? for these things are ultimate. It must be unified in the highest of all things, good will. For justice and truth are only forms or by-products of good will. Has not the fault of the philosophers been that they have brought the energy and mind of God to the front, but they have taken no pains to bring good will to the front?

When we say good will, we venture to add that which is for ever the basis of true consolation. We believe that there must be sympathy or sorrow with the Eternal. As cost, in terms of energy, is the law of the world of things, so cost in pain seems the law of the realm of spiritual development. The integrity of life demands this. "Perfect through suffering" is the most profound of philosophies. God could not be God in the nature of good will, and not suffer in and with his growing and travailing creation. So far from this being a limitation upon perfect love, it is the fulfilment of love in God or man.

Finally, it is impossible to dissociate the intellectual from the practical interest. The thing that is true or ideal ought to work. The plan of the universe ought to be usable for the citizens of the universe. This is merely to enunciate again our fundamental doctrine of integrity. The divine world fits together. Thought moves to action, ideals fit and guide conduct. The best in conduct, namely, the conduct of intelligent and steadfast good will, ought to prove best, and does prove best and most effective everywhere, in economics, in politics, in statesmanship, and in social relations. It ought to be and is the law of happiness.

CHARLES F. DOLE.

SOCIAL SERVICE. No. 2.

PERNICIOUS LITERATURE.

The Rev. Canon H. D. RAWNSLEY.

The first thing we have to realise is that in the last few years the organised production and distribution of indecent pictures and immoral books in all languages has immensely increased. In our own country six years ago a judge declared from the bench that close upon half a million of indecent papers were being circulated every week, and that four tons of one of the worst of them was being exported to our colonies.

The circulation of these indecent weeklies is said to be nearer a million than half a million to-day. The letterpress of these papers, obtainable at many newspaper shops and until recently found upon the railway bookstalls, contains stories of seduction, debauchery, the life of the *demi-monde*, in some instances, details of the worst crimes in the week, and the history of criminals in the past; and much of this corrosive press is grossly illustrated by pictures of women in every stage of undress and every attitude of lasciviousness.

The degrading post-card has an enormous vogue both here and on the Continent. In a police raid at Bradford a few months ago, soon after it had obtained the Hull Act, 32,000 of these post-cards were discovered as the stock-in-trade of one purveyor. At Birmingham, as reported in the *Birmingham Post* of June 22nd, a woman was charged with sending through the post packets containing books and articles of an objectionable character. Under the pretence

of being surgical manufacturers, a company which had a place of business in Paris as well as in Birmingham was issuing broadcast catalogues of the worst books that have been published during the last few years, and with advertisements of demoralising goods. No less than fifty complaints were received by the Birmingham police of these circulars sent through the country.

But the post-card nuisance is aggravated by the fact that thousands are only on the border line of indecency, and could not successfully be prosecuted. Their vulgarity is undoubted. They are shameless, not only in their mockery of pure family life and true courtship; they turn drunkenness into ridicule, and sail very near the wind in matters of blasphemy. They often take texts of Scripture as the *motif* of their illustration, and give a grotesquely vulgar and suggestive picture above the sacred text.

Even tender childhood is used to promote quite premature sexual suggestiveness. You would suppose that children of three to five years old were chiefly concerned, not with their toys, but in making love one to the other.

We are told that eight hundred million post-cards pass through the post every year. A single indecent or suggestively vulgar post-card may carry cruel harm right into the heart of the home. The vulgar comicality of this type of missive is almost as bad in its degrading work of unrefinement as the indecent post-card is mischievous in its appeal to animal passion. We have only to turn to the Blue-book of the Joint Select Committee on Lotteries and Indecent Advertisements of 1908, which can be obtained for a shilling from the King's Printers, 109 Fetter Lane, E.C., to find what an enormous trade is being done in the production and distribution of these abominations; but if we read that Committee's report, we shall also find how powerless, as the law is at this present moment, the police usually are to deal with the matter. Thus, for example, search is impossible even of suspected manufactories of these indecencies after sundown, and not at all on Sunday;

and except under a special Act, such as is now in work at Hull and Bradford, a raid cannot be made on a suspected shop, nor can a misdemeanant be dealt with, summarily.

We have been promised amendments of the law for nearly three years; when we shall get it the Home Secretary alone can tell us. The anomalies of the law against pernicious publications at present are most remarkable. Thus, for example, if I procure an obscene picture for the purpose of sale I am indictable and punishable for misdemeanour at common law, but it is no misdemeanour for me to be possessed of it with intent to publish or sell.

Again, if I put an indecent post-card picture or advertisement into a public letter-box anywhere in the Empire I am amenable to the law, but I may put any number of them into a private letter-box and go scot-free.

The cheap weekly pictorial is doing as much harm as a grossly indecent photograph. Owing to continued agitation, bookstall agents on our main railways have removed these. There is no reason why they should ever have been allowed on the stalls except that it pays, for the directorates of our railways, I am informed, in all their agreements with their bookstall agents have a clause that nothing objectionable shall be exposed for sale on their stalls; and though still there may be found in some of the weekly papers admitted for sale suggestive letterpress and serial stories that pivot round seduction, the worst of these papers have been relegated to the small newspaper shop in the side street, and from any of the papers found on the railway bookstalls the old criminous advertisements have been removed.

With regard to the bioscope and the cinematograph show, we have here engines that may help to make or mar a nation. Complaints from many parts of England have been made of the grossness of some of the bioscope views, and the bioscope proprietors in some instances, even where their pictures were harmless, have been found to mislead the prurient youth of our land by suggestive titles.

With regard to the cinematograph, it has not got down to the real bedrock of vulgarity as may be found in Italy at the present time, but it is very questionable whether the choice of films is always carefully selected, seeing that children make up so large a portion of the spectators. It would be a good thing if licensing authorities insisted that matinées should be given for children once or twice a week, at which the films should be specially arranged for their young minds. The cinematograph is so educational in the best sense that one is very anxious it should not be used in any way to demoralise the young mind. A prize-fight or a battle seen by a young child may haunt its mind with horror for years, and pictures of a burglar at work may do as much harm in the making of boy burglars as a halfpenny dreadful of full detailed accounts of crime in a paper in the education of young criminals.[1]

But as far as a nation's morals go the chief degraders to-day are the nasty novelists. Women in this field of licence vie with men in writing seductively and realistically, but with no serious purpose, what they are pleased to call the sex problem.

These novels, some of them, the publishers tell us, have gone through a million copies. They glorify lust; they preach up free love; they mock at marriage as a relic of barbarism, and appeal to pure animal passion and appetite. This erotic, contemptible trash has great vogue with the idle classes, and, though it cannot be obtained at our free libraries, is found upon the top-shelf literature of many small lending libraries.

[1] A writer to *The Times* of 21st October says:—"Some days ago I took two children to see a cinematograph show. The film being exhibited when we entered showed a bull-fight, one horse with his entrails hanging out. I left this place and tried another. Here we were shown first a rat-killing competition, with two dogs tearing a live rat in two, and then a murder being committed. I decided to try one more place. This time we were shown a man being hanged. The cinematograph theatres where these things were exhibited are all in the south-western district, and are patronised chiefly by the children of the poorer classes. A touch of unconscious humour was supplied by the legend displayed outside one of these houses—'To instruct, elevate, and amuse' (*sic*)."

The proprietor of the small lending library has no wish to spread this gospel of animalism, but he is besieged by readers of both sexes for a certain book, and in self-defence procures it. Luckily the public who wish to avoid this sort of thing are forearmed, for the few publishing houses in the land who have so degraded the bookselling trade as to pander to this demand for what is called "a live book" are by this time quite well known.

The worst of it is that our daily press sometimes befriends both publisher and writer, and instead of severely leaving alone the nasty novel that has no serious purpose, reputable papers which, we should have thought, would have been on the side of the angels in this matter, are found giving half-column reviews to the nasty book. The book trade is beginning to feel that some censorship is very necessary. A few prosecutions have worked wonders. The police magistrate and the police themselves are more on the alert than they were a few years ago, and if everyone who finds a corrosive book has been sold to him will make a note of the seller and the publisher and the writer's name and send it direct to the Home Secretary with a request that it be submitted to the public prosecutor, or direct to the superintendent of the Criminal Investigation Department, Bow Street, he will at any rate find that he has not appealed to deaf ears.

It is sometimes said that it is unfair to prosecute the distributor and let the publisher go scot-free; but in these days when the distributing firms are of such magnitude, it is quite certain that if they refuse to sell these pernicious wares, the publishers will not be found willing to take the risk of publishing them. The publishing firms which have amalgamated to protect themselves against such prosecutions have already worked quite a revolution in the trade of the nasty novel; and it was high time, for these corrosive novels were flaunted beneath the eyes of a passing public in the most seductive guise. One of the worst of them a year or two ago, which under threat of prosecution was withdrawn from circulation,

came out magnificently apparelled in royal purple and coroneted. A lady found it on a railway bookstall which she believed was impeccable, and, because she had just repapered her bedrooms with the same royal purple, purchased five of these beastly books right off, and put one in each of the said bedrooms.

Again, a young Eton boy purchased another of these abominations to give to his mother as they travelled together to Eton, because it was such a pretty book.

What is really needed is that the arm of the law should be so strengthened as to make either the publisher or the distributor of these disgusting novels with no serious purpose, fear it. We may take a leaf out of the book of the Swiss Republic in this matter. The year before last the canton of Berne, after much controversy and much consideration, passed a law which runs as follows:—

"1. Whoever by pictures, writings, speech or actions, publicly offends modesty or morality, shall be punished with a fine up to 300 francs, or by imprisonment up to three months.

"2. Whoever produces for sale, introduces, sells, publishes, circulates, advertises, lets for hire, or exhibits obscene writings, pictures, or any other obscene objects, and whoever arranges obscene performances at places that are accessible to the public, shall be punished with imprisonment up to three months; in less offensive cases by a fine up to 300 francs. The obscene pictures, writings, or other articles shall be destroyed.

"Lastly, whoever sells, publishes, circulates, lets for hire, shows, or advertises offensive writings, pictures, or any objects liable to expose to danger the moral welfare of young persons, shall be punished with a fine up to 100 francs, or to imprisonment up to one month."

But it is no use making new laws until we have used the ones we have to their uttermost, and even where the Hull and Bradford Act does not exist the police may be appealed to. The Home Secretary and the Commissioner of Police at Bow Street have their minds open to this running sore. The

directorates of our railway lines and the purveyors of literature thereon are quite glad to have their attention called to any bad book or demoralising paper that falls into the hands of the public. We can form vigilance committees, as has been done at Birmingham, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Limerick, Dublin, and elsewhere. At Limerick, at the call of a single church, twenty-two newsagents have refused to stock the corrosive weekly, and newsboys have refused to sell it in the streets. We can all of us be more careful than heretofore about seeing the sort of books that are brought into our own houses and handled by our children; and, last, we can help to form a taste for the reading of good books throughout the land by getting the education authorities of counties and parishes to do as has been done by the Cumberland and Westmorland County Councils, and probably by others, namely, to form a central library of select works of fiction, biography, natural history, science, poetry, etc., from which boxes of books go to all the schools three or four times a year. These books are taken home by the children, and delight not only the scholars but their parents also.

There can be no doubt that children learning a taste for a better article will not be put off when they leave school with the trash and rubbish of the halfpenny comic or the penny dreadful.

H. D. RAWNSLEY.

KESWICK.

DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

MR BALFOUR ON TELEOLOGY AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1911, p. 1.)

"Yet I doubt not through the ages one *increasing* purpose runs."

In the essay which he contributed to the October number of this Journal, Mr Balfour has raised several interesting issues. The most important of them appears to be the problem of teleology in relation to creative evolution. Mr Balfour's uneasiness at M. Bergson's rejection of teleology is probably shared by a wide circle of sympathisers with the new philosophy. The general favour with which the philosophy of creative evolution has met, and deservedly met, is due in large measure to the encouragement which it seems to give to human interests and aspirations. Long oppressed with the leaden weight of lifeless mechanism, man eagerly cherishes a larger hope when the cosmic process is shown to be, not dead, but living, not chained and fettered, but free and spontaneous, not mechanical, but creative. So far so good. But if that is all, is it enough to justify the new hopes? Even supposing that the cosmic process is free from the rigid fetters of mechanical determinism, does not the value of this freedom depend entirely upon the use made of it? What if this freedom is not devoted to the realisation of some worthy purpose? What if the cosmic process, be it ever so free and creative, knows no aim, and pursues no end? What if it spend its vital energy in sheer exuberance, and seek no other good? In that case, would not human aspirations be as much doomed to disappointment as they were under the régime of mechanism? Mr Balfour, therefore, voices a natural feeling of uneasiness when he complains that M. Bergson "does not go far enough." By rejecting teleology, M. Bergson appears to rob his philosophy of its chief human interest.

All this, it may be said, is only a cry of the heart. Philosophy may

gain in popularity by following too readily the logic of the heart, but it will forfeit the respect of those who believe in the scientific frame of mind. Philosophy must be guided primarily by reason, not by sentiment. There is some truth in the objection. And, having regard to this, one ought to praise M. Bergson, rather than blame him, for not going "far enough" to appease the human heart. He has shown admirable self-restraint—especially remarkable in view of his unbelief in reason.

But if it could be shown that teleology of a certain kind is not incompatible with creative evolution, then it would be an unnecessary and gratuitous self-immolation to deny the claims of human aspiration, merely in the name of scientific caution. And the object of the following remarks is to suggest a way of reconciling the claims of creative evolution with those of teleology.

M. Bergson has made it perfectly clear that his objections to teleology are exactly the same as his objections to mechanism. The cosmic process, he maintains, is essentially a process of spontaneous, creative evolution, and real time or duration is not an empty appearance but the very substance of reality. Such a view is inconsistent with mechanism. For mechanism implies that the world is completely determined from the first, and that time is more or less of an illusion resulting from our mental impotence to seize the whole universe in one comprehensive grasp. And teleology is objectionable for similar reasons. If the world simply realises a pre-arranged plan, then the cosmic process cannot be free and creative; it is tied down to an externally imposed programme; and, seeing that the result is predetermined, the duration of the process seems futile, for the end is inevitable and might as well have been realised from the first. Teleology is, consequently, as fatal to creative evolution as is mechanism. In fact, teleology, M. Bergson says, is only inverted mechanism, substituting the *pull* of the future for the *push* of the past. Mechanism and teleology, both alike, make novelty and spontaneity impossible; both alike make time insignificant; both alike imply that all is given ready-made from the first. The philosophy of creative evolution, on the contrary, maintains that nothing is given ready-made, but all is in the making; that time is supremely real; that the cosmic process is ever new, creative. M. Bergson accordingly opposes teleology almost as much, though not quite so much, as he opposes mechanism. And he not only objects to the application of teleology to the cosmic process as a whole: he also objects to its particular application to explain the co-ordination of the parts of a single organism with the organism itself. In fact, he is more strongly opposed to the particular than to the general application of teleology. He insists that if teleology be true of life in any way it must be true of the all, or not at all. But he does not think it is true of the all.

M. Bergson's criticism of teleology seems sound. The teleology which he considers is certainly not consistent with his view of creative evolution. But is that the only way of conceiving teleology? Is it necessary to regard teleology in the universe in the way of one predetermined final end

imposed upon the cosmic process from without? Is it necessary to conceive cosmic purpose as something that would so enslave the cosmic process as to rob it of freedom, initiative, creative power? I do not think that it is necessary to do so. I do not think that it is right to do so. Professor Bergson is right in rejecting *such* teleology; but I do not think he is justified in rejecting *all* teleology.

If the philosophy of creative evolution will insist on rejecting all teleology, root and branch, how can it deal successfully with man? For man certainly forms and pursues ends. Will it be maintained that man's teleological attitude is mere delusion, his conduct consisting really in aimless outbursts of exuberant vitality? To explain away in this wise such a generally recognised fact as the human pursuit of aims would be as unsatisfactory as the mechanistic denial of the significance of duration. Much, no doubt, is gained when free spontaneity replaces mechanical determinism in the conduct of humanity. But it is scarcely satisfactory to regard hnman activity as a purposeless ebullition of vital energy, be it ever so spontaneous and original. A closer adherence to the seemingly obvious facts of human life will, I venture to suggest, not only show accurately how teleology actually operates in the conduct of man, but will also disclose a truer analogy for the conception of the operation of teleology in the universe as a whole.

Now, looking at human life at its best, it appears that our highest aims and purposes are not imposed upon us from outside, but self-imposed, immanent. And the presence of such aims and purposes is not felt to make our conduct any the less free, less spontaneous, or less creative. On the contrary, the very formation of our highest aims is felt to be the most original part of our mental life; and our conduct is then felt to be most free, most our own, when we are pursuing and trying to realise our highest self-evolved aim. Our highest ideal, however, is not, as a rule, completely determined from the first. Often it changes as we change. At the very least it grows in fulness and richness as we grow in knowledge and wisdom. But it is *we* who form, change, and perfect our ideals. The evolving and perfecting of our ideals is the best work of our growing powers. The time spent is no mere unnecessary blank; it is filled with living experiences which we utilise in evolving and developing our ideals, as well as in seeking to realise them. And the result of such improvement in our ideals is that each man's highest ideal is always ahead of his practice, and his conduct is ever striving to transcend itself and rise to a higher plane—and life, so far as appears, comes to an end long before man has attained his last aim.

Can we not legitimately conceive the cosmic process to proceed teleologically somewhat after the analogy of human experience as just indicated? Why should not the cosmic process show its freedom and originality in the formation, improvement, and pursuit of ever-growing cosmic ends? Such immanent, evolutionary teleology, it seems to me, is not only perfectly consistent with creative evolution, but is even necessary in order to raise the cosmic process at least to the dignity of the best human

conduct, as contrasted with that random busyness to which an aimless cosmic process (be it ever so free and creative) would appear to be reduced. Not teleology, but only an externally imposed and completely determined teleology, is incompatible with creative evolution.

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DECADENCE AND CIVILISATION.

(*Hibbert Journal, October* 1911, p. 179.)

I.

The brilliant article which appeared under this title in the October issue is so direct and unsparing in its handling of a complex human problem that responsive discussion of it seems inevitable. Few of us, like the writers, hold ourselves so ably equipped for the exploration of the dark places of that problem in all its intricacies; but there are three points which seem to have received less justice at their hands, and to have been treated in a vague and general manner not characteristic of the rest of the article. This may be due to the fact that these points are of such a nature that it is difficult to bring to bear upon them that paralysing battery of statistics over which the writers have such mastery. They are:

I. The drain of young men to our tropical dependencies.
II. The prolongation of life.
III. The "spinster influence."

I. On page 193 there is a complaint of "the constant drain of men, especially of men of high spirit, good character, and administrative ability, to our tropical dependencies," where "there are many difficulties in the way of taking out a wife and rearing a family," and where "the existence of conditions of great hardship and labour causes parents to deem that the environment is unsuited to their carefully nurtured daughters."

Now, by far the largest and most important of our tropical dependencies is India, and "an appreciable fraction of our most valuable young men" do pass yearly into the ranks of its Civil Service. I am aware that several other honourable services and professions not only exist in India, but are able to flourish in the largest human sense; but I take the Civil Service because it can claim the ablest (intellectually) of our young men, and can then offer them what can be called emphatically "a career"—that which has been defined as "a profession wherein a man is able to marry by the time he is thirty and to marry for love." Indian civilians do not, as a rule, remain bachelors; they tend to marry early and to become the fathers of large and eugenic families who, in their turn, have not been behindhand in showing "the mettle of their pasture." Moreover, though India may be an expensive place of residence, it is not "notoriously unhealthy," nor do its conditions necessarily entail "great hardship and

labour." I understand also from many who manage to exist and to enjoy existence in India that the reluctance of British parents to submit their daughters to its environment is not so marked as the writers suppose.

II. The Prolongation of Life.—In the passing pageant of the peoples which the writers have ranged vividly before us, they have not given a place to the Jews. Yet, I would ask, where in all the world shall we find a race more eugenic, more civilised, less decadent than theirs? They alone have known how to keep themselves unspotted from the errors and adverse influences which have withered the development and hindered the progress of other nations; they have abounded, multiplied, endured. Since the genius of their race has taken to expressing itself in business and the management of affairs, there has become apparent in them the development of that strong acquisitive faculty at which we who are not of them choose to scoff; but it does not seem to have destroyed or even threatened the existence of a prevailing instinct for the honour, protection, and cherishing of their aged. Longevity continues to be the rule—not the exception—among them. I blush to have to confess to the high-minded authors of the article that the suggestions so "ambiguously frightful" as to the premature disposal of the aged are not original to themselves; they have been anticipated by the Rev. Mr Slope of *Barchester Towers*; only, he with his theory of the rubbish-cart was franker and more practical as becomes a pioneer. Perhaps we have hitherto misjudged Mr Slope, who seems now as one born before his time, and who may have been more of a practical sociologist than we knew.

III. The Spinster Influence.—"We entrust the bringing up of the next generation," say the writers, "not to the parents, but, once more, largely to a type of celibate teachers who have neither the accumulated wisdom, the ripe tradition, nor the religious purpose of the mediæval teaching orders they replace." Surely it is a pity to mar an article full of so much insight and experience by a statement which is obviously informed by neither. I take it that the writers have chiefly in view schools for girls and preparatory schools for boys; and I question whether there are many, if any, schools of the kind in England where religious purpose is not the fundamental principle by which not only the teaching but the daily life is fused. Most people who can bring themselves to view with impartiality the manners and customs of our public schools will acknowledge that we may sometimes pay too dearly for "ripe tradition." There are hundreds of unmarried women in this country and in our colonies and dependencies whose teaching and training of our daughters and young children are replete and vital with "accumulated wisdom," which I hold to be the true spirit of motherhood, and which need not owe its existence to a fortuitous physical fact. Those women who are giving expression to the noblest part of themselves in educating and influencing other people's children are often clearer-sighted with regard to them than are the parents, perhaps because they are free from certain other toils and cares incident upon matrimony which tend to confuse a parent's perspective. At the same time, they have taken no

public vows of celibacy and renunciation of human claims like "the mediæval teaching orders they replace." On the contrary, they are often excellent daughters and sisters, powers in their families, builders and welders, sometimes actual supporters of the home. Every mother who is wise and honest will avail herself of "the spinster influence" whenever she can, and will acknowledge that its exercise generally, if not always, results in a wholesome strengthening of family ties and of natural womanly ideals. The scoff at "old maid's bairns" is now out of date; has not an eminent psychologist put on record his confident opinion that the future of the rising generation is in the hands of its—preferably unmarried—aunts?

I would not for a moment cite Charles Lamb as an authority on Eugenics; but for those who are married, or about to be married, he has certainly much good counsel. Specially and obviously I would recommend *A Bachelor's Complaint of the Conduct of Married People.* It is true that we, the married monopolists, and especially the parents among us, have our temptations to superiority of attitude; "and pity 'tis 'tis true" that we sometimes succumb to them. So should it do us no harm to see ourselves arraigned at the bar of Elia's gentle irony; and it may give us pause before we deny utterly to the unmarried and the unchilded that "fuller knowledge and deeper experience that come from direct contact with the great mysteries and emotions of life."

JANETTA C. SORLEY.

II.

As a believer in "eugenic" teaching, I wish to offer a protest against the tone of the article in the *Hibbert Journal* for October, entitled "Decadence and Civilisation." The article presents a curious psychological problem. The authors are such eager disciples of the modern teachers of eugenics, and at the same time so prejudiced against the woman's movement of to-day, that they are carried away into theories the violence of which they do not seem to realise. The fine language in which they are expressed perhaps veils somewhat the crudity and the cruelty of the logical consequences of their suggestions.

The article surveys the world from China to Peru, and traces movements through all ages, past, present, and to come. In a short note it is only possible to touch on a few points. Let us consider their views on the care of the weakly and the aged. "A couple of hundred years ago a man of fifty was an old man, whose sons and daughters *would not long be kept out of their inheritance*, and need not, in the leisured classes, where the paternal inheritance is an important fact, defer their marriages till half a lifetime had slipped away." The italics are mine. Mr and Mrs Whetham imply that it is a misfortune for the nation and the race that life is prolonged so far beyond the fifties. The care of the aged and the weak is a burden and an expense which acts as a severe check on the birth-rate of the less well-off classes, while, as we have seen, in the better-off classes the "inheritance" is unduly delayed. What do they suggest? It is hardly

credible that at this point they do not suggest anything. They express their belief in a future world!—a convenient belief, inasmuch as it relieves them from any motive for prolonging the life of the aged and weakly in this world. Yet should we not be ethically unfit to be parents if, knowing how to preserve life, we neglected to preserve it?

We turn now to their strong views on the ordering of women's lives and their stern disapproval of present-day methods and tendencies. In their comparison of our times and problems with those of the past, physicists step in where expert historians and philosophers have always feared to tread. The mystery of the rise and fall of nations has always roused the interest and baffled the wisdom of the wisest students. The "fall," at any rate, is simply and easily explained by Mr and Mrs Whetham. The women of the nation in question had begun to take too much upon themselves, decline of families and disaster following. It is almost Adam and Eve over again. To avoid our own fall as a nation one piece of advice is given. It can hardly be called practical. Our capable women are to be "compelled if necessary, by *circumstances*," to marry. Well-off parents of a large family of daughters may contemplate with equanimity other people's daughters being so compelled. No parents could face it for their own children. Some of us are hoping to make girls realise that marriage only for a home is a degradation, and we are thankful that it is no longer the only career open to women. We also want girls to require a higher standard of conduct in their future husbands. The article in question is curiously silent on the subject of the husband and father; not once does it mention his share of the responsibility both for the health and for the numbers of the next generation. And yet the worst legacies of heredity are the result of the low standard of morality that public opinion has required in husbands and fathers.

The decline of the birth-rate is a matter of serious importance, and it would be well if our would-be guides had thrown some light on the solution of the problem in the world as it *now is*, and under conditions which *now exist*. We are a small country where there are more women than men. Economic conditions make life hard for all except a few. Between five and six millions of women are forced to earn their own living, and many of them to provide for others as well. It is futile to say that women must be compelled to marry, and that diversion from the occupation of motherhood even for a time is undesirable as conducing to a decline in the birth-rate. Mr and Mrs Whetham do not advocate polygamy, nor yet the exposure of girl babies, but how otherwise is their suggestion to be carried out?

But perhaps the strangest feature of the paper is the slight on the large body of unmarried women to whose fostering, high-minded, and loving care the education of our children is so largely committed. The spinster life is not of necessity divorced from the wide and deep emotions. A wise and broad-minded sympathy is a matter of temperament and not of circumstance, not even of such a large circumstance as marriage. Because

the highest happiness is not theirs they are branded as "superfluous" and "restless," sneered at as "going on to County Councils," regarded as almost a "danger and a menace," as in some way exercising a sinister influence on the next generation.

It is indeed only too true that "there is something radically wrong with a civilisation and with a method of government" which have led to the present state of things. Let us then try to change the standards of our governors and aim at different ideals of private life from those which are so commonly and readily accepted.

Lamentations and sneers will help no one, especially sneers at the wrong people—at those women who, without the reward and the joy of the fullest life, devote their lives to others' needs, nurse other women's sick, tend and succour other women's children, serve and slave for other women's homes, hold up the banner of higher education and an ideal of wider and deeper service to the State for other women's daughters. A declining birth-rate would be for some of us no matter for regret if the race can only be perpetuated on such terms as those suggested in this article. Better "race-destroying occupations," among which nursing and teaching are specified, than the soul-destroying atmosphere of the eugenic materialism which is advocated here.

Edith Bethune-Baker.

Cambridge.

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.[1]

PHILOSOPHY.

Professor G. DAWES HICKS.

Philosophical discussion during the last six months has largely centred round the theories of Bergson, and the publication of the lectures on *The Nature of the Soul*, given by him in London in October, will be eagerly awaited by a numerous body of readers. The two Oxford lectures, entitled *La Perception du Changement*, have already been issued by the Clarendon Press, and they throw not a little light on Bergson's main position. In the first lecture, the author connects very suggestively what he has been in the habit of describing as "intuition" with the process of perception. Had our senses and our consciousness an illimitable field, were our faculties of perception, external and internal, indefinitely extended, we should, he contends, never have recourse to the faculties of conceiving and of reasoning. We seek to make up for the narrow range of perception by the process of generalising. The utility of general and abstract ideas can no more be questioned than the utility of bank-notes can be. But just as the bank-note is only a promise of gold, so a concept only gets its value from the possible perceptions which it represents. No metaphysician, no theologian, has ever doubted

[1] The Theological portion of the Survey is unavoidably held over to the next issue.

that a perfect being would know all things intuitively, without having to pass through the intermediary stage of ratiocination, abstraction, and generalisation. Philosophical speculation owes its birth to the weakness of our faculties of perception. Usually philosophers have agreed to see in philosophy a substitution of concepts for percepts. But without relinquishing such help as can be got from our faculties of conceiving and reasoning, ought we not rather to return to perception itself, and seek to obtain from it what it would give were it enlarged and expanded? Should it be contended that such enlargement of perception is impossible, the reply is that we have veritably an instance of it ready to hand in the case of the artist. The function of art is just to enable us to discover a multitude of things in nature and in spirit which do not explicitly strike our senses and our consciousness. The great artists are in truth revealers; they show us that our faculties of perception *are* capable of being extended. One of the profoundest of Kant's results in the *Critique of Pure Reason* was the establishment of the fact that if metaphysics is possible, it is so by an effort of "intellectual intuition," not by an effort of dialectic. Bergson maintains, in other words, that intuition —extended and expanded perception—is a means of apprehending an object as an organic whole, or absolutely, and that such intuition must be the direct, immediate perception of change and mobility. In the second lecture, three theses are advanced and defended: (1) All change, all movement, ought to be represented as absolutely indivisible. (2) There are changes, but there are not things that change: change is not in need of a support. There are movements, but there are not of necessity objects which are moved: movement does not imply a mobile. (3) If change is real, and even constitutive of all reality, the past ought to be envisaged, no longer as the non-existent, but as conserved in the present. Man's relation to the universe will become clearer, it is argued, when these fundamental points are recognised. The more we habituate ourselves to the apprehension of things *sub specie durationis*,

the more shall we penetrate into the nature of real duration, the eternity of which is not to be regarded as immutable eternity, but as an eternity of life and movement. "How, if it were not so, could we live and move in it?" Mr Lindsay's admirable Jowett Lectures on *The Philosophy of Bergson* (London: Dent, 1911) were written before the appearance of the publication just referred to, but no better study of Bergson's philosophical system could well be desired. With conscientious care and thoroughness most of the fundamental principles of the three larger treatises are explained, and in an extremely interesting way their connection is traced with the Kantian criticism of knowledge and metaphysics. Mr Lindsay is, it is true, mainly concerned with the psychological and epistemological portions of Bergson's work. He discusses in detail Bergson's objection to the prevalent modes of regarding psychical states (and Bergson has done, I think, in this connection a most valuable service to psychological science) and the relation of mind and body; he expounds with much skill and lucidity Bergson's theory of space, time, and motion, then his account of perception and memory, and of the relation of consciousness to action; and he considers, lastly, the nature and function of intelligence and intuition. With his exposition Mr Lindsay mingles here and there some thoughtful and suggestive criticism, as, for example, when he argues (p. 195) that it is a mistake to conceive of action over against thought as being necessarily final, and (p. 197) that the organisation of thought must follow the nature of the real, because it is based on universals discovered in action, and in turn looks forward to action. So, again, he presses an important point when he insists (p. 217 *sqq.*) that intuition must be more, not less, rational than discursive thought, if it is to be the method of philosophy. Mr Joseph Solomon's little volume on Bergson (London: Constable, 1911), in the series of *Philosophies: Ancient and Modern*, is written in a more popular style than Mr Lindsay's Lectures, and deals more particularly with metaphysical problems. In a bright

and original manner, Bergson's views on Change, Life, Evolution, and Knowledge are worked out, and often an apt and telling appeal to concrete example helps to elucidate the meaning. Mr Solomon is perhaps inclined to be unduly cynical in referring to Hegel and the writers influenced by him, and it is a pity to find a crude popular misapprehension of Hegel's use of the principle of contradiction (p. 58) disfiguring the book. Dr A. Wolf has also written a descriptive sketch of Bergson's philosophy in the *Jewish Review* (July 1911), dealing mainly with the doctrines of *Evolution Créatrice*. Further, in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (N.S., vol. xi., 1911) Mr H. Wildon Carr, examining the doctrine of Psychophysical Parallelism, bases his criticism largely on Bergson's argument in a well-known article published in 1904. In the same Society's *Proceedings*, Dr Bosanquet discusses Bergson's doctrine that the essential work of the intellect lies in binding the same to the same, and that induction rests on the principle of identity. In opposition to this view Dr Bosanquet contends that the normal working of intelligence is constructive, tending towards the concrete and to continuity within differences (*cp.*, however, Lindsay, *op. cit.*, p. 228 *sqq.*). There is also in *Mind* (July 1911) an article by Mr D. Balsillie ("Bergson on Time and Free Will"), who maintains, as against Bergson, that there is no such complete permeation of mental states as makes separation of any one of them from the whole impossible except to abstract thought.

By far the most fruitful and promising of recent tendencies in English philosophy is the development of a theory of critical realism for which the work of Adamson prepared the way, and to the working out of which the writings of Mr Bertrand Russell have materially contributed. In the *Rev. de Mét.* (vol. xix. 3) Mr Russell discusses the philosophical significance of Mathematical Logic, and his article contains a useful résumé of results he has tried to establish more elaborately elsewhere. Mathematics, he insists, requires propositions not based on sense experience, and at the same time compels the

admission of general truths that are no less objective in character than the particular facts of the physical world. Universals must be allowed to possess subsistence, although they cannot be said to exist after the manner of concrete particulars. Pure mathematics, or logic, is the science of all that can be known, either immediately or by demonstration, of certain of these universals. Mr Russell handles another aspect of the subject in his paper on "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description" (*Proc. Arist. Soc.*, N.S., vol. xi., 1911). The object itself is, he argues, brought before the mind in the former of these alone. We have *acquaintance* with sense-data, with many universals, and possibly with ourselves, but not with *physical* objects or with other minds. We have *descriptive* knowledge of an object when we know that it is *the* object having some property or properties with which we are acquainted. Our knowledge of physical objects and of other minds is only knowledge by description, but all intelligible propositions concerning them are composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted, for a constituent with which we are not acquainted is unintelligible to us. From a somewhat different standpoint, that, namely, of a realism more radical and thorough-going than any which Mr Russell would now sanction, Professor S. Alexander treats of "Self as Subject and as Person" (*ibid.*). He distinguishes between (*a*) the bodily self, which like other external things is a percept, (*b*) the self as subject, that which in the act of experiencing an object is the experiencing, and (*c*) the self as person, which is formed by the combination of the subject with the body. The subject, he insists, is a thing among other things. It is part of the same world to which external things belong. And it is experienced, though not in the same way as the object upon which it is directed. It is not an object experienced, but an experiencing experienced,—experienced as a transition, a becoming, a lived or "minded" activity. It is enjoyed or suffered, but it is not revealed to itself, it is not contemplated. The similarity of several of Professor

Alexander's results to those of Bergson will be obvious; he differs, however, from Bergson in his view of space, and in his somewhat startling contention that consciousness itself has spatial character. In America there are several thinkers who are working at the problem of perception from a realistic point of view. A striking and original treatment of the question comes from Professor James Dewey in the shape of two "Brief Studies in Realism" (*Journ. of Phil.*, 20th July and 28th September 1911). Professor Dewey's main point is that perceptions should be regarded not as cases of knowledge, but as simply natural events having, in themselves (apart from a *use* that may be made of them), no more knowledge status or worth than, say, a shower or a fever. We talk, for example, of a "seen light." But what is implied by "seen" really involves a relation to organic activity, not to a knower, or mind. Not only so. The seen light is not in relation *to* an organism. There may be a relation of vibrations of ether to the eye-function, but to speak of the relation of the perceptual light to an eye, or an eye-activity, is nonsense. For the seen light is conditioned by the joint efficiencies of the eye-activity and of the vibrations, and as such is no more a case of knowledge than gnawing or poking is. Professor A. O. Lovejoy, in an article entitled "Reflections of a Temporalist on the New Realism" (*Journ. of Phil.*, 26th October 1911), presses the objection that what he calls the new realism is inconsistent with the admission that any perception or other presentation can be false or illusory at the time at which it occurs—an objection, be it remarked, with which both Russell and Alexander, each in his own way, have dealt at length, although their arguments are not here referred to. In regard to the doctrine of external relations, upon which Mr Russell bases his realism, two useful articles may be cited—one by Mr H. T. Costello in the *Journ. of Phil.*, 14th September 1911, and the other by Professor T. de Laguna, on "The Externality of Relations" (*Phil. Rev.*, November

1911). Both these writers contend that certain entities are more constituted by their relations than others, that certain of the relations of a given entity are more essential to it than others. The non-mathematician will also find much to interest him, with reference to this subject, in what Mr M. R. Cohen has to say of "The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Mathematics" (*Journ. of Phil.*, 28th September 1911), and the altogether excellent little treatise of Dr A. N. Whitehead, *An Introduction to Mathematics* (Williams & Norgate: Home University Library, 1911), will be to him most helpful. I can here do no more than mention the very elaborate and exhaustive work of Ernst Cassirer on *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff: Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik* (Berlin, Cassirer, 1910). Cassirer writes from a more or less Neo-Kantian standpoint, but he emphasises the fact that in scientific procedure the mathematical concept of function is taking the place of the genus-concept in the old Logic, and that general rules which enable us to see at a glance a whole series of possible determinations are replacing the fixed attributes that were formerly regarded as characteristic of reality. Cassirer maintains that the various parts and elements of experience are logically dependent upon experience as a whole. In the *Rev. de Mét.* for September (xix. 5) there are three articles bearing upon the same theme. H. Dufumier writes on "La Généralisation Mathématique," and Charles Dunan on "La Forme Moderne du Problème des Universaux," whilst V. Delbos discusses very thoroughly and lucidly the important work of Husserl that ought to be better known than it is in England, dealing especially with his criticism of what the Germans call "Psychologismus," and his conception of pure logic.

Meanwhile, those who are working at philosophical problems from the point of view of the older idealism have contributed not a little to the discussion of several outstanding questions. Mr F. H. Bradley's article on "Some Aspects

of Truth" (*Mind*, July 1911) is full of acute analysis and evinces a resolute effort to make his own position clear. The problem of truth's reference to an object beyond itself is to be solved, he maintains, by discarding the abstract separation of the knowing subject and the known object, and by conceiving of them as two aspects of one reality. Mr Bradley answers the question whether I may think a truth which has never been thought before by insisting upon what he regards as a vital distinction. As a particular judgment with its unique context, my truth is new, but as an element in an eternal reality, it was waiting for my discovery. To say that we "make truth" is merely a one-sided emphasis on the aspect of the finite expression of truth. To deal with truth apart from any examination of the nature of reality is, he contends, futile. The criticism contained in Mr E. H. Strange's article on "Mr Bradley's Doctrine of Knowledge" (*Mind*, October 1911) is, for the most part, a repetition of what others have said before, but the arguments are skilfully stated and marshalled together. Mr Strange insists, after a manner now familiar in Oxford, that no object of which I am aware is in any degree *made* what it is by my awareness of it, that knowing cannot be resolved into making or constituting objects, or indeed into anything other than itself. Mr H. H. Joachim faces an issue of far-reaching bearing and significance in an able essay on "True and False Pleasures and Pains" (*Phil. Rev.*, September 1911). Does the distinction which is generally admitted in regard to "knowing" and "willing," between the act or process of experiencing and the content experienced, hold also in the sphere of "feeling"? The author replies to the question by insisting first that the distinction does not hold in the former case except under the proviso that the aspects distinguished are essentially correlative. The question of truth or falsity can only be raised when both factors, which analysis distinguishes within the whole, are recognised as being mutually implicated. Grant this, and then, he contends, there is no insuperable difficulty in admitting that "feeling"

likewise demands an analogous distinction. For here, too, analysis must recognise "the fact of feeling" and the "somewhat felt" as correlative and inseparable *distincta*. What is felt may be real and genuine, or illusory and imaginary, and these distinctions are necessarily reflected in the "fact of feeling," since that is nothing but the occurrence of the somewhat felt. In a closely reasoned paper on "The Object of Thought and Real Being" (*Proc. Arist. Soc.*, N.S., vol. xi., 1911), Professor G. F. Stout argues (*a*) that if generalities belong to the real constitution of the universe—and without them there would be no universe left—then it follows that alternative possibilities must also belong to the real constitution of the universe, and (*b*) that on this view an intelligible account can be given of the nature of error. For error, or the risk of error, would first arise when the mind not only thinks of a possibility being fulfilled, but also *believes* in its being fulfilled. No new object of thought would be involved, only a new mental act in relation to the same object. When we believe in a possibility being fulfilled, our belief is false when the alternative asserted is other than any fulfilled alternative; it is true when the alternative asserted is coincident with a fulfilled alternative. Professor Stout's view of real, objective possibilities opens up a promising line of reflection in regard to the vexed and ever-recurring question of freedom and necessity. The title of Professor J. S. Mackenzie's article "Mind and Body" (*Mind*, October 1911) hardly describes its true character. The writer is concerned in fact with the metaphysical controversy between idealism and realism, and he tries to show that these are not so essentially opposed to one another as at first sight appears. It is, he argues, a mistake to suppose that the critical realism of recent times is a refutation of idealism, in the sense in which that term is now understood. A true idealism is not subjectivism, but rather a form of realism; it is a realism in which the effort is made to think of reality as a whole,—a whole that can only be a spiritual whole. It does not imply that reality consists exclusively of modes of con-

sciousness or of experience, and is in that respect entirely in accord with the newer forms of realism.

A series of investigations, which will probably give rise to much discussion, has been published by Professor A. E. Taylor, of St Andrews, under the title *Varia Socratica*, First Series (Oxford: Parker & Co., 1911). In these essays, Professor Taylor aims to show that the portrait of the personal and philosophical individuality of Socrates presented in the Platonic Dialogues is in all its main points strictly historical, and that the whole of what passes in the current text-books as the orthodox account of Socrates and the "minor Socratics" will have to be re-written. What the genius of Plato has done for his master is not, it is contended, to transfigure him, but to understand him. In particular, the writer claims to have proved that many of the peculiar doctrines of the Platonic Socrates, his conception of φιλοσοφία as an ascetic discipline, leading to the attainment of everlasting life, the stress laid on the μαθήματα as a vehicle of spiritual purification, and the doctrine of the eternal things, the ἀσώματα καὶ νοητὰ εἴδη, as the true objects of knowledge, were no inventions of Plato, but belonged, as their common faith, to the Pythagorean or semi-Pythagorean group, of which Socrates was a central figure. Professor John Burnet in his excellent edition of *Plato's Phædo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911) expresses himself as in substantial agreement with Taylor's conclusions. Already, however, these conclusions have been called in question by Mr R. Petrie, who in an article on "Aristophanes and Socrates" (*Mind*, October 1911) maintains that the *Clouds* do not in the least justify the contention that the historical Socrates held the doctrines enunciated in the *Republic* vi.–vii., but that, on the contrary, they agree very closely with the testimony of Xenophon. Whatever the ultimate judgment of scholars may be, Professor Taylor's investigations cannot fail to lead to further inquiry and research, and to a renewed interest in Platonic philosophy.

Two small but valuable works in the department of Ethics

ought to be noted. Professor W. R. Sorley has published an extremely useful "popular account of the nature of goodness in human life" in the *Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature*, under the title of *The Moral Life and Moral Worth* (Cambridge University Press, 1911). The virtues of Temperance, Courage, Wisdom, Justice, and Benevolence have each a chapter devoted to them, and the book concludes with a discussion of the relation of religion to the moral life. The author contends that the religious attitude influences the whole content of morality: gives it form and accentuates certain qualities in the moral life which, apart from religion, would not receive the same prominence. Professor John MacCunn's *Liverpool Addresses on Ethics of Social Work* (Liverpool University Press, 1911) will be welcomed by all who are familiar with his *Ethics of Citizenship* and *The Making of Character*. Professor MacCunn deals with such subjects as "Local Patriotism and Education," "Political Party and Political Conviction," "The Teaching of Religion and the Art of Education," and no social worker can fail to derive suggestion and help from his wise and weighty remarks.

The enterprising editor of the *Rev. de Mét.* has issued a special number of that periodical containing *in extenso* the chief papers read at the Fourth International Congress of Philosophy, held at Bologna in April last, and abstracts of the contributions made to the various sections. The delightful opening address of M. Emile Boutroux on "The Relation of Philosophy to the Sciences" ought to become widely known. Boutroux lays emphasis upon the circumstance that whilst the natural sciences deal with facts purely from the objective point of view, in philosophical reflection all the parts of experience are, or ought to be, treated as in relation to the interests and aspirations of the human thinking subject. *Dies*, said Goethe, *ist die Eigenschaft des Geistes, dass er den Geist ewig anregt.* E. Durkheim handles a theme that is coming more and more into the forefront of philosophical discussion, the relation, namely, of judgments of value to judgments of

fact. He attempts to show how sociology can help towards the solution of this problem. P. Langevin writes on the evolution of our conceptions of space and time, and calls attention to the special significance of modern kinematics in this connection. Incidentally, M. Langevin offers a proof that the velocity of light must exceed that of every other movement of translation, because if it did not, there might be observers for whom the effect would happen before the cause. It may be added that the next Congress will be held in London in 1915, and that Dr Bosanquet will be President.

I should like in conclusion to offer a word of welcome to the journal *Logos*, an international periodical for *Philosophie der Kultur*, the first volume of which has been recently completed (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1911). The journal is managed by an international committee, which is divided into national sub-committees, and is edited by G. Mehlis, with the co-operation of such well-known thinkers as Eucken, Husserl, Rickert, Simmel, and Windelband. It contains many articles of great interest and value. What Husserl says in a very able and exhaustive treatment of "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" suggests comparison with the contention of Boutroux's address referred to above. That which is most of all needed, he urges, is an impersonal, scientific method, and it would add steadily to an accumulation of valid philosophical knowledge. The essay of Hans Cornelius, "Die Erkenntnis der Dinge an Sich," is an acute piece of reasoning in support of the thesis that the thing in itself is explicable as the coherent and permanent body of laws governing our perception of an object, and the appearance as the momentary presentation of the object during our actual perception.

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REVIEWS

Some Problems of Philosophy. A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy.—By William James.—London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911.

In the prefatory note to this volume Mr Henry James, junior, says: "For several years before his death Professor William James cherished the purpose of stating his views on certain problems of metaphysics in a book addressed particularly to readers of philosophy. He began the actual writing of this 'introductory text-book for students in metaphysics,' as he once called it, in March 1909, and to complete it was at last his dearest ambition. But illness, and other demands on his diminished strength, continued to interfere, and what is now published is all that he had succeeded in writing when he died in August 1910." Professor James in a memorandum directing its publication wrote of it: "Say it is fragmentary and unrevised," and "call it 'A beginning of an introduction to philosophy.' Say that I hoped by it to round out my system, which now is too much like an arch built only on one side."

The book *is* fragmentary and incomplete. It breaks off just when sufficient of its scope has been revealed to make the reader feel what a great work it was going to be; but what there is of it sufficiently fulfils the author's hope to make it in some ways the most interesting of all his works.

An introductory text-book to metaphysics is not a simple thing to write. Rather it is a work to be undertaken, as this book was, at the end of a long career of teaching and writing philosophy. Professor James had peculiar aptitude for the task. He had a quite extraordinary power of investing the most abstruse subjects with interest, and a lucid and simple style which made the most difficult things simple. His special philosophical characteristics, his empiricism, his preference, as he describes it in this book, for taking things piecemeal, and his great power of getting inside the minds of the most different people, are gifts most needed for an introduction to metaphysics. James does not begin with a definition or the outlines of a system, but with the facts of ordinary experience which lead to philosophy, the special character of some minds, the importance and difficulty of certain problems. The first chapter, "Philosophy and its Critics," is mainly a defence of philosophy against the criticism of science.

Such criticism is shown to rest on a false antithesis between science and philosophy. Philosophy is thought to make no progress only because, as it solves its problems, they become scientific. James shows how historically philosophy has always included science. "The sciences are themselves branches of the tree of philosophy. As fast as questions got accurately answered, the answers were called 'scientific,' and what men call 'philosophy' to-day is but the residuum of questions still left unanswered." The modern divorce between philosophy and science is new, and the outcome of a mistaken tendency. "The older tradition is the better as well as the completer one." If there are differences in the methods of science and philosophy, if philosophy is dogmatic, if it dispenses with verification and is out of touch with real life, that is because philosophy has been wrong. Philosophy ought to be, and must be, as scientific as any of the sciences.

This attempt to describe a philosophy which shall be scientific is the great interest of the book. But in the account of philosophy and science in the first chapters there is a certain ambiguity which it is important to resolve. The passage quoted above might seem to suggest that the distinction at any time between philosophy and science was determined by historical accident. "Philosophy has become a collective name for questions that have not yet been answered to the satisfaction of all by whom they have been asked." But, in that case, as philosophy becomes scientific, it will cease to be philosophy. But two other conceptions of philosophy appear in the chapter: one, that philosophy is not any particular science, but is concerned with the co-ordination of all the sciences; "It (philosophy) aims at making of science what Herbert Spencer calls a 'system of completely unified knowledge'": the other, that philosophy is "man thinking about generalities rather than particulars." In this second sense philosophy is concerned with certain general problems, twenty-one of which are enumerated in the second chapter.

This James calls metaphysics, and, while maintaining that philosophy proper is concerned with the co-ordination of the sciences, announces his intention of confining this book to metaphysics. We find, accordingly, the list of metaphysical problems in the second chapter, and the remaining chapters are taken up with a consideration of a selection from the list—the problem of being, the problem of the one and the many, of the nature of percepts and concepts, of novelty and the infinite, and of causation.

As an introduction to philosophy such treatment has its advantages, and yet it leaves the nature of philosophy singularly indefinite. However the connection of philosophy and science may have been conceived in early times—and the proper demarcation of the spheres of such separate inquiries is necessarily a late and not an early achievement—there is no warrant for thinking that the general problems enumerated in the second chapter are to be studied in the same way as the problems within a single science; or, if we take the wider meaning of philosophy, the co-ordination of the sciences with one another is not necessarily achieved by the same methods as the building up of any one of the sciences. As the first chapter

presents the matter, philosophy in the wide sense and metaphysics are two separate inquiries. The truth surely is that such separation is impossible: that the various problems of metaphysics are not to be considered as a number of interesting puzzles which happen to have occurred to curious minds. They can only be understood, as James himself is the first to insist, in their relation to the sciences or in a consideration of the relation of the assumptions of the sciences to the postulates of action, and that implies that the two meanings of philosophy, as distinguished by James, are really the same. Metaphysics is not a separate science just because it is concerned with the results and assumptions of all the sciences; and unless we make clear the distinction between the separate sciences and that inquiry which reflects upon them, we cannot properly examine the question as to whether the methods of philosophy and of the sciences can be the same.

James seems to hesitate between two conceptions of philosophy. Both imply that philosophical thinking begins with isolated questions; but while one assumes that these questions can only be answered by a systematic review of the results of the sciences, the other assumes that they remain always isolated questions. In other words, the first assumes that we take things piecemeal because they attract our attention in that way, and that we then proceed to find their places in the whole to which they really belong; the second assumes that things really exist "piecemeal."

We find both these views reflected in the rest of the book. There are three chapters on "Percepts and Concepts," two on "The One and the Many," a discussion of the relative advantages of monism and pluralism; the remaining chapters are devoted to the problem of novelty, two to "Novelty and the Infinite" and two to "Novelty and Causation."

The great interest of all these chapters is that James is both empirical and objective—an obvious but somehow a rare combination in philosophy. In the chapters on percept and concept he insists, in the manner of Bergson, that concepts are relative to percepts, and are necessary because of the limited nature of our perception, that all attempts to express reality in conceptual form are inadequate because concepts are designative. Yet at the same time he upholds the theoretic use of concepts, and the independence and objectivity of the *a priori* sciences. "The map which the mind frames out of them (concepts) is an object which possesses, when once it has been found, an independent existence. It suffices all by itself for purposes of study. The 'eternal' truths it contains would have to be acknowledged even were the world of sense annihilated."

The reconciliation of empiricism and rationalism in these chapters seems to me of very great value, and ought to make possible a further reconciliation of pluralism and monism. James's real quarrel with monism is that it tries to deduce the parts from the whole, that it asserts unity without specifying what kind of unity or realising that things are one in very different ways, and that it assumes that everything is given and that novelty is impossible. Now some forms of monism have been guilty of these mistakes, and James's criticism of them seems convincing, but they

are the result not so much of monism as of an intellectualism which believes that it is possible ultimately to dispense with perception. For a radical pluralism which starts with parts and seeks to make wholes comes to conclusions as absurd if it takes the parts as really separate. How can essentially disparate parts be made into wholes? Hume showed the impossibility of such an attempt, and the moral of Hume is that we can only proceed in thought from part to whole because we begin with a whole given in perception, and perception is as incompatible with radical pluralism as with radical monism. The real result of James's arguments in chapters iv., v., and vi. is that the opposition between pluralism and monism as such is of no value. All that we can get from considering it, is that the world cannot be a mere many or a mere one; but simply to see the one in the many, as Plato said long ago, is a child's problem. What we want to discover is what kinds of unity and what kinds of multiplicity exist, and the attitude implied in such an inquiry is neither pluralistic nor monistic. Yet there are some places in the later chapters on infinity where James seems to imply that the fact that we must examine things "piecemeal" implies that they exist piecemeal, and that somehow radical pluralism is a consistent and satisfactory doctrine.

These criticisms have suggested themselves because the chief impression forced upon one's mind in reading this book is that James had got to a position where he really appreciated both sides of a controversy in which he had long been a chief protagonist; that he was indeed "rounding out his system" and displaying the great philosopher's power of reconciling opposing schools; yet here and there one seems to find traces of a one-sidedness inconsistent with the main argument. The wide comprehensiveness of that argument makes us the more lament that the book was unfinished. Candour and honesty of mind, a belief that the philosopher must always be a learner, sympathetic eagerness to understand an opponent's position, and an unsurpassed clarity of exposition—these are qualities which are manifest in every page of the book, and make it, for all its fragmentariness, a fitting memorial of William James.

I have noticed only one slip in the editing. A book entitled *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* is on p. 53 ascribed to Aristotle, and on p. 54 to Professor Santayana!

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Vie et Œuvres de Descartes. Etude historique par Charles Adam.—Supplément à l'édition de Descartes, publiée sous les auspices du Ministère de l'Instruction publique.—Paris: Léopold Cerf. 1 vol. 4to, pp. xiii + 646. 2 guineas.

M. Ch. Adam, the Rector of Nancy University, has now completed the great work on which he has been engaged for twenty years, and which is certainly one of the finest achievements in the history of philosophy—the

final edition of Descartes' works. After the death of Paul Tannery, whose help had been invaluable to him, he continued his labours unaided, and has just put the keystone to this imposing edifice—a vast historical survey of the philosopher's life and works, which has been published as the twelfth volume of the whole edition. English readers who have already become acquainted with Descartes, thanks to Miss Haldane's most excellent monograph,[1] will, now that the Cambridge Press has just issued the first volume of the English translation of Descartes' works,[2] welcome the exhaustive study of M. Ch. Adam.

It is not a study of Cartesianism, but an interpretative biography. The author does not attempt to elucidate or to expatiate upon the doctrine of Descartes, nor to examine the far-reaching influence it had on European thought; he considers the works of Descartes from a strictly historical standpoint, and throws full light on the circumstances and conditions in which they have been written and published. The volume is historical, not philosophic; it is, in the author's own words, a contribution to the history of French ideas and of the French genius in the seventeenth century. M. Adam quotes many MSS. of which he could not avail himself in the preceding volumes, and includes, among the plates, a portrait of Descartes, discovered of late years in Sweden, which it is interesting to compare with the painting by Franz Hals engraved by Jacquet on the frontispiece.

The author establishes a close connection between Descartes' works and his biography. He follows step by step the philosopher's life, and endeavours to point out the acquisitions and discoveries which mark its successive stages. The interest of the first book, which deals with Descartes' family, college life, and early manhood (1596–1628), culminates with the meditations on universal mathematics and algebra in the famous "poêle" in Germany. The second book, which takes us to Holland, dwells on Descartes' audacious views on physics, and his treatise *Le Monde*, which he abstained from publishing, owing to Galileo's significant condemnation (1633). In the third book, the author examines the scientific works, *Dioptrique*, *Météores*, and the short preface *Discours sur la Méthode* (1637), which is obviously far more important as an autobiographical document than as a systematic epitome of philosophy. The fourth book opens with an account of the metaphysical works, viz. *Meditationes de prima philosophia* (1640–1642), with the objections raised by Hobbes, Gassend (not Gassendi, as it is commonly misspelt), Arnauld, and others;[3] and, after recalling Descartes' controversies in Utrecht, Groningen, and Leyden, it leads us to the *Principia Philosophiæ* (1644), which the author, following the method he uses throughout, explains in the light of

[1] Elizabeth S. Haldane, *Descartes: his Life and Times*, John Murray, 1905.

[2] Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, *The Philosophical Works of Descartes, rendered into English*, in 2 vols., Cambridge University Press, 1911.

[3] These objections, together with Descartes' replies, will form the second volume of Miss Haldane's and Dr Ross's translations.

biographical analysis. Lastly, the fifth book, which emphasises more especially Descartes' moral philosophy (*Les passions de l'âme*, 1645–1649), shows us the interesting figures of Princess Elizabeth (a niece of Charles I.) and of Queen Christina of Sweden.

A characteristic feature of the book is the picturesque minuteness of detail and anecdote, and the vivid description of the life of the period. And yet the environment is always pictured with extreme simplicity of style and great scientific accuracy. The "good fathers" at La Flèche; the Parisian "libertins" coeval with Théophile de Viau; the prosperous Dutch merchants with their broad-brimmed felt hats; the pedantic Protestant theologians; the "honnête gens," all friends of Descartes—magistrates in black velvet robes with large ruffs and square beards, who seem to have some kinship with the son of the Councillor at the Breton Parliament—captains with buffalo-skin collars and yellow scarfs, who admired in him the soldier of the Palatinate, pass before us in a series of graphic portraits. We are taken from the "Jardins de Touraine" to the pretty pavilion at Utrecht (which is reproduced from an old drawing); we are shown the old Castle of Egmond with its garden, where we can picture Descartes receiving friends or pursuing his meditations and experiments; and we visit the little village of Santporte, where the philosopher led a peaceful life with his child Francine and her mother Hélène. All these sketches are picturesque landmarks scattered here and there throughout the book, and, needless to say, they relieve the austerity of scientific exposition.

Around Descartes are gathered his contemporaries, friends or enemies: good-natured Gassend, irreverently termed "caro optima," but soon to be brought closer to Descartes through the kind offices of César d'Estrées; young Pascal with his experiments on barometric pressure; faithful Huygens; the wealthy Marquis of Newcastle and his friend Hobbes; the brothers Cavendish; Henry More, with his questions about the union of soul and body; eager Mersenne; skilful Chanut; sprightly and youthful Queen Christina; the Princess Elizabeth, perhaps his most intimate friend, who finds in philosophy an occasional refuge from the vulgarity of the small Court in exile; and lastly, Voët, the stubborn Huguenot who reviles Descartes as a papist, a Jesuit in disguise, and an immoral profligate luring the Dutch Phrynes to his remote cottage.

Our philosopher stands in the foreground, reserved, but kind-hearted; courteous, yet plain-spoken and rather blunt with his friends; prudent in action; slowly but surely laying down his principles; steering a middle course between Protestants and Catholics, Rome and Science; a Catholic, because a loyal subject of His most Christian Majesty, and at bottom a pure Idealist; full of enthusiasm with his discoveries, and yet cautious in the wording and application of his ideas, and on the whole exemplifying much more the typical scientist and the "honnête homme" than the professional metaphysician.

And indeed this is the leading idea of the book. Descartes is the first thinker who forms a clear idea of *Life* as well as of *Science*. He reminds

the author of the adage, "primò vivere, deinde philosophari," and lays great stress on actual life with all its needs, making them, indeed, the main themes of his correspondence with Elizabeth. Then Science *underlies* and *pervades* his whole work. In fact, the sole Reality is Reality made intelligible by Science: which is Descartes' final expression of Idealism. Descartes' ethics have no theological basis and are entirely derived from the psychology of the passions; his metaphysics only serve as a provisional support, like a scaffold erected for the construction of a house and dispensed with as soon as the building is completed. This is, indeed, clearly formulated in Chanut's epitaph on Descartes. He found the way of understanding and conquering Nature:

> "Apertam ad penetralia naturæ mortalibus viam
> Novam, certam, solidam. . . ."

To conclude, M. Adam, referring to the sixth part of the *Discours*, shows very clearly that the Cartesian notion of Science exactly corresponds to the modern conception, in contradistinction to the ancient as well as mediæval idea. Antiquity, on the authority of Aristotle, believed that Science was exclusively speculative—was not metaphysic the first, because most useless, science? The Middle Ages took an essentially utilitarian view of Science, which became "ars magna," a vague divination which resulted in practical, though unsystematic, action of man on natural and even supernatural forces: alchemy contemplated a valuable transmutation of metals, nay, possibly a creation of life itself. Descartes, in his mathematical idealism and in his application of Science to physical and moral purposes, reconciles both conceptions, and this accounts for his enthusiastic belief, which he expressed in the original title of the *Discours*, "Projet d'une Science universelle qui puisse élever nostre nature à son plus haut degré de perfection."

M. Adam's objective view of Descartes, which, while never losing sight of the philosopher, lays more emphasis on the man and the scientist, is Cartesian in the true sense of the word, and this vivid resuscitation of a past age in the person of its most representative genius is certainly the more remarkable, based, as it is, entirely on the positive data of historical science.

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The Working Faith of the Social Reformer, and other Essays.—By Henry Jones, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow.—Macmillan & Co., 1910.

This volume is a collection of essays on ethical topics. The various essays have been previously published, partly in journals and partly in the form of a pamphlet. About half of the volume has already appeared in the pages of the *Hibbert Journal* as a series of articles on "The Working Faith of the Social Reformer," and "The Moral Aspect of the Fiscal

Question." The concluding essay on "Social Responsibilities" is reprinted from a pamphlet published in Glasgow.

The essays have a unity of principle and a uniform practical purpose in view which enable the reader to obtain a definite impression from the whole, and amply justify the author in collecting the separate discussions into a single volume. They are written in a popular, attractive, and sometimes eloquent style, which is essential if a writer wishes to arrest the attention of the man of affairs and gain for philosophical principles some access to his mind in his spare moments of reflection. But while thus popular in character, the essays rather seek to treat practical subjects from a philosophical point of view, than philosophical subjects in a popular way. The serious aim of the volume is dominant throughout, and prevents the discussion from ever degenerating into the wearisome make-believe of "popular philosophy."

Professor Jones remarks in his preface that in practical life "we do best with very few" principles: "I am not sure that we need more than one, provided it will bear the articulation of practice." The essays in the volume certainly bear out this remark. Varied as they are in subject-matter, there is but one principle offered to unlock the secrets of all the social problems raised, only one practical maxim recommended to face all social difficulties. This principle is, that all the contrasts which are presented by social life, and which give rise to the various social problems of the reformer, the politician, and the citizen, are but differences within the unity of human spiritual existence; and that the problems which society presents can only be solved if we see that the differences must involve their unity, and the unity must involve its differences. Strictly speaking, the essays are merely illustrations of the use of this principle in certain selected social contrasts: the "individual" and his "environment," "individualism" and "socialism," "economic" and "political" life, "man and society," "character" and "circumstance," "heredity" and "initiative." In all cases we are shown that there is essentially but one and the same general problem; and therefore one and the same general solution is offered. Social difficulties arise from opposition of elements; opposites imply their identity; removal of difficulties comes by reconciliation of the opposites through and in their common identity.

This principle is, of course, not established anywhere in these essays; it is assumed; and it would be unfair in the present connection to ask for the philosophical theory on which the principle rests. But the reader for whom the essays are intended will naturally be desirous to see that the principle works out, that it "bears the articulation of practice," and will assist him in dealing with the practical problems of social life. Considered from this point of view, he will hardly be able to regard the discussions with unqualified approval. The principle is handled too abstractly, and applied, in consequence, quite externally to the facts. The facile manipulation of the sword of the spirit in face of the opposing forces of social elements seems in every case to give the swordsman such an easy victory that

the spectator will be inclined to think that either the battle is a stage-fight or the enemy hardly worthy of so skilled a combatant. In the abstract the principle is obvious, for it is the principle of thought, and thinking is just the process of uniting differences; and, again, in social experience the facts are obvious, for the opposites are everyday phenomena. If, therefore, the solution of his perplexities is so easy, the practical man is sure to think either that his difficulties have been mere foolishness, or else that the author has not really appreciated them. The social reformer will most likely adopt the second alternative after perusing these essays; and one is bound to admit he will have much justification. It is right to insist, as the author does, that opposites cannot be kept apart, and that one should not be allowed to exist at the expense of the other. But to insist on passing from one opposite to another, and then to the unity of the two, is not the same thing as to bring out the specific value and nature of opposites in concrete instances. If it is a mistake to pause between the words difference and identity, we are not necessarily any nearer the real truth by saying difference and identity in the same breath. And we shall see by taking the essays in turn that in the main the result of the application of this principle to the difficulties of the social reformer is, that the formula is either repeated in the different cases or restated in another way, which leaves the old problem where it was.

In the group of essays on "The Working Faith of the Social Reformer," the first essay seeks to show that the reformer must have faith in the goodness of the world "as it is" if he is to make anything of a world which he wishes to "reform." This is wholesome advice, for it may lead to a better understanding of the "world as it is"; but it hardly seems illuminating to the reformer. For surely the reformer's work just lies in the contrast and continuity between the world "as it is" and the world "as it ought to be," and he cannot "reform" unless he takes his material as it is and tries to make the best of it; if the world were wholly bad it could not be "reformed," it could only be changed by being re-created. Moreover, "faith in the world as it is" can only mean for the reformer a belief that the present world is capable of taking on the new form. It cannot mean belief in the complete goodness of the present world, otherwise reform would be unnecessary. But to tell him to have faith that the present world is capable of improvement, is to tell him to believe what he believes already, viz. that reforms are necessary and can be carried out. The reformer might perhaps say that the faith he wants for his task is rather a faith in his ideals in spite of the world as it is. In any case the important questions for him are, how much of the actual world should be allowed to exist as it is, and how he should proceed to alter it; and no light is thrown on those questions by telling him to believe in the world that is, and to make the future continuous with the present.

The essay on "The Misuse of Metaphors in the Human Sciences" enters a useful protest against interpreting human society by conceptions drawn from inorganic or merely organic action, and commends the conception of

"spirit" as more adequate to the facts of social experience. This essay may be taken along with the following essay on the "Metaphysical basis" of social theory, where to some extent the character of "spirit" is delineated and defended, as indeed is very necessary if the conception of "spirit" is to be of any use in dealing with practical problems. Applying the principle of unity in and through difference, the author argues that spirit and nature must be as really different as they are really a unity; nature must not be merely idealised in spirit, but spirit must be realised in nature; or the world must not only be subjectified in spirit, but spirit must be objectified in the world. This may be excellent as a demand; but the real question is, how is it to be done? The only hint the author gives as to how to proceed in dealing with social facts is in the extremely ambiguous propositions, "spiritual facts are mutually inclusive," "rational life consists in internalising its environment," "there is nothing in the world that is not the potential contents of spirit." Anyone reading these statements would naturally think that the author was supporting subjective idealism, but this is certainly not his position. A careful examination will show that statements such as "character and environment are not even separate elements," "what we call character from one point of view we call environment from another," they are "mutually inclusive," are not merely ambiguous, they are misleading. Character surely is not environment in any sense, for if so the moral problem disappears; both are no doubt aspects of one moral experience, but that is quite a different proposition. The author himself goes so far as to say (p. 52 ff.) that with the individual development a stage may arrive where character is so fixed that it cannot be changed by the reformer, and if that character is vicious it must "fail to appropriate the good that lies in its environment": *i.e.* character may exist on one side and have an environment as a sheer opposite. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the author is to reconcile the "inclusiveness" of character and environment with his insistence on the "reality" of difference as well as of unity. Further, if we compare the statements above given with the line of thought developed in the essay on "The Child and Heredity" (especially pp. 169 ff.), it is impossible to obtain a consistent view of the author's position. The fact is that the term "environment" is used throughout in two distinct senses: environment as consciously formed by the individual and so corresponding very closely to his type of character, and environment in the wider sense as the given objective scheme of circumstance which co-operates with and operates upon the individual largely in unconscious ways, and is never wholly determined by him. These two senses are not distinguished by the author, and only confusion can arise from constantly oscillating from one to the other. Again, even at the best, the insistence on the spiritual "inclusiveness" and "identity" of the "individual" and his "world," of character and environment, merely *names* the distinction between the two in another way than that generally adopted, and can hardly be said to throw any light on the "reformer's" real practical problem, viz. whether the relation between

them is "fatal," and therefore beyond "reform," or is inherently and permanently "free," and so capable of practical and indefinite modification.

The fourth essay on the "Coming of Socialism" might well be grouped with that on "Social and Individual Evolution," and the four brief essays on "Social Responsibilities," with which the volume concludes. They all develop the same line of thought, and sometimes repeat the same arguments. The essay on "Social and Individual Revolution" is by far the most interesting of the group, and indeed will probably be reckoned the best essay in the volume. The style is all that could be desired, and the subject is admirably adapted alike to the author's imaginative form of thinking and his warm human emotion. The reformer will scarcely derive from the essay any practical help towards the solution of his concrete problems; but he will be a poor reformer if he is not transported by the argument into a mood of hope, or lifted to a level of enthusiasm for his task, which, after all, is perhaps the best result of "good advice." The thought developed in this group of essays is very simple and very important. It is that the individual and society are equally necessary to one another; that the life of both is built on the same plan; each is enriched and impoverished by the other; their interests cannot really clash, for they are controlled by an identity of end; they grow together, the individual being "suckled at the breast of the ethos of his society," the objective order of society being perpetually reborn and restored in the recurrent generations of individual lives; they depend on each other, "society on man," "man on society"; the end of the individual is to be "socialised" and so "humanised" through society, the aim of society is to realise humanity as an end in itself. As a point of view from which to regard complete social experience, this line of thought coincides with the best that idealism has ever had to say about social life. In only one respect does the author's view seem to diverge from that of other idealists. He says (*e.g.* on p. 114) that the "essence of society is moral"; that as practical reformers we should seek to "moralise our social relations as they stand." This may be merely a manner of expression, but it seems to imply that "morality" is one fact and "society" another, and that morality has to be conveyed into or imposed upon society. If this is the implication, it would be difficult to know what the author means; for the order and the process of maintaining society *are* morality. Morality and society do not "stand and fall together," as two mutually supporting props might be said to "stand or fall together"; morality surely is just the system of conditions or laws of the *existence* of society. If the implication indicated is not intended, the above expressions are rather unfortunate. The author shows the inherent relation between the individual and society merely by a particular application of the general principle of unity in difference. But once again no assistance is thereby rendered to the practical solution of practical problems. A spiritual, *i.e.* "inclusive," opposition of individual and state or society has been substituted for a mechanical, *i.e.* "exclusive," opposition; that is all

we have gained from the argument. Yet surely the opposition of the two is no less *real* when it is spiritual than when it is mechanical; it is merely a different *kind* of opposition. On the author's own showing, the opposites cannot be abolished in their unity. If so, the mere substitution of one (no doubt truer) conception of opposition for another does not give the "reformer" any practical help as to how to proceed to harmonise the opposite elements. It does not of itself throw any light, *e.g.*, on the problem of the conditions and character of state-regulation of individual life and property; and this is one of the most pressing problems for reformers at the present time. We have searched in vain through these essays for a clear statement, by way of deduction or otherwise from this spiritual unity of the individual and society, which might be taken as an immediate and convincing solution of any practical economic or political question. The "unity of the two" is at best but an abstract "point of view," not a self-articulating solution of practical difficulties.

Passing over the essay on "The Child and Heredity," to which reference has been made, and which is perhaps the least satisfactory in the volume, the two remaining essays on the "Moral Aspect of the Fiscal Question" and "Idealism and Politics" may be described as, in the narrow sense, political in character. In the first it is urged, and rightly urged, that we cannot take the economic relations between societies or individuals in a society as the final determining cause of political action; that economic problems are at the same time moral problems, and that a sound political policy must remember that the good life does not consist in the abundance of things possessed. This is excellent counsel. But again the pressing practical question is, how are "fiscal" and "moral" to be co-ordinated so as to secure the maximum of good to the state? and to this no answer is given. The author opposes the "fiscal reform" proposals of the Conservative party on the ground that they ignore the deeper relations of members of society to one another. Whether these proposals are right or wrong we need not here discuss, but no one can fairly argue that the party supporting them ignores the deeper relations between states and individuals. In point of fact, these proposals have been advocated by many because fiscal reform can be used for the purpose of strengthening empire, increasing imperial unity, and so deepening the relations between individuals. Thus the fiscal reformer can appeal to the author's principles to justify the very policy which the author, appealing to these principles, seeks to condemn. This illustrates the difficulty of drawing any practical assistance from such an abstract argument.

The essay on "Idealism and Politics" is mainly a review and criticism of Mr Hobhouse's book on *Democracy and Reaction*. The author seeks to defend idealism against the attacks made upon it by Mr Hobhouse. The defence is very eloquent; but it must be admitted that the conclusion is somewhat unfortunate for anyone who may read these essays in order to find assistance from a convinced idealist in dealing successfully with problems of life, either theoretical or practical. Throughout all the other

essays idealism has been assumed as the satisfactory guide to social questions. But here it is frankly admitted that the "category of 'spirit' . . . . is only a hypothesis" (p. 223). Perhaps the expression is merely unfortunate, but it must be a little disconcerting. For it is impossible for the practical reformer to put his trust in a principle which, being only hypothetically valid, may turn out deceptive or delusive in its promises. Science may admit of "hypotheses," but practice, certainly moral practice, will not. Faith in the ideal is always linked with hope for its attainment; and these two together operate on the present in a way which leaves no room for guesswork, doubt, or denial. And when the energetic practical reformer is offered as his guide and consolation an idealism which rests on a "hypothesis," we must not be surprised if he compares it with the house that is built on sand.

J. B. Baillie.

University of Aberdeen.

The Vitality of Platonism, and Other Essays.—By James Adam; Edited by his wife, Adela Marion Adam.—Cambridge: at the University Press, 1911.—Pp. viii+242.

This volume of the late Dr James Adam's papers is sure of a wide welcome, not only from his old students, but also from those who have known him only through his published works. It may be regarded as a supplement to his book on *The Religious Teachers of Greece*; for the majority of these essays deal in greater detail with points which were passed over rapidly in the wide survey of the Gifford Lectures, or bring into a single focus aspects of Greek thought which were there dealt with in a more fragmentary way. The qualities which gave Dr Adam's larger work its value and charm meet us again here. To wide and accurate scholarship he added that glow of enthusiasm, that touch of poetic feeling, and that constant sense of the great encompassing problems of life and death, which alone can make the thought of the *Symposium*, the *Phædo*, and the *Republic* living and powerful for the men and women of to-day.

The six papers here gathered have been well chosen and carefully edited. Mrs Adam remarks in the preface that it has not been found possible to avoid all overlapping between the single essays or between them and *The Religious Teachers of Greece*; nor can exception be taken to the recurrence of certain of the author's favourite thoughts and quotations, such as the *τὸ γάρ ἐστι μόνον ἐκ θεῶν* of Pindar or the *ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν* of Cleanthes. Yet, in the case of the long essay on "The Hymn of Cleanthes," one or two passages (*e.g.*, pp. 126–31, 163–5) so closely reproduce what has been said in the earlier essays that some abridgment might perhaps have been possible, which would have improved the book as a whole without injuring the essay in question. Two minor points which call for remark are, that the form of Cleanthes' saying given above is rejected as corrupt in the later

essay (*cf.* pp. 20, 104 n., 122); and that the most familiar name among the Cambridge Platonists appears on p. 27 as "Henry Moore."

Of the different essays only one is limited in its appeal to scholars or students of philosophy. It is a careful discussion of the use of the term λόγος in Heraclitus, in which the author gives in full his defence of the position maintained in *The Religious Teachers of Greece* (pp. 217 ff.). He argues that Heraclitus used the term in the sense of "Reason," and so is rightly regarded as the founder of the "Logos-doctrine," as against Professor Burnet, who follows Zeller in narrowing its meaning to "reasoning" or "argument" (yet in his second edition Professor Burnet, while still holding that the traditional philosophic use of λόγος is post-Aristotelian, accepts Adam's point of view so far as to translate λόγος by "Word" instead of by "discourse" or "argument").

The other essays all have a large measure of human interest. That which stands last deals with the central theme of Humanism, "The Moral and Intellectual Value of Classical Education." The author especially dwells on the stimulus both to intellect and character caused by the sense of contrast, when the mind is first brought into contact with a world of life and thought so different from our own (pp. 221 ff.); and it is characteristic that he illustrates this less by reference to the sphere of language or logic or even politics, than by examples "belonging to the sphere of religion and ethics" (p. 231). It is in this direction that his thought naturally travels. Thus, in discussing the "Vitality of Platonism," he finds in the conception of "the essential divinity of man . . . the most living, aye, and life-giving of all Platonic doctrines" (pp. 21 f.; *cf.* 8, 33 f., 59).

Another thought which appears in both these papers, and also in the author's account of Stoicism, is that of the positive and intimate relation of Nature to the Moral Life (pp. 11 ff., 49 f., 157 ff., 223 ff.). It is well that this should be clearly and persuasively brought out, as it is in these essays, for remnants of the old idea that interest in and love of Nature are of purely modern growth still linger on. Yet, in the thought of Plato at least, we cannot overlook the negative view that Nature, as revealed through the senses, is the sphere of becoming and change over against that of true and abiding Reality. Dr Adam's positive interpretation of the Platonic idea of Nature depends on his setting out from the *Timæus* (p. 9) a dialogue whose importance is due rather to historical causes than to its intrinsic rank among Plato's writings. He illustrates the influence and vitality of Platonism by a wealth of apt poetical quotation from Boethius and Michael Angelo to Tennyson and Swinburne; but one misses a reference to the great Platonist among the singers of the English Renaissance—"our sage and serious poet Spenser." But where so much is given, it is unfaîr to complain of omissions; and this essay on a subject of rare fascination gives an outline which every lover of Plato may fill in for himself. "The vitality of Platonism" is in no small measure due to its range and width (*cf.* pp. 4, 9). The logician, the mystic and the

poet, the communist and the seeker after a true aristocracy—every man, in brief, who deserves the name of idealist in whatever sense—can trace his lineage to and draw inspiration from "the Father of Idealism."

The second essay, which is perhaps the freshest and most valuable in the book, traces from Pindar downwards the "Doctrine of the Celestial Origin of the Soul," which the author has already set forth as the central thought of Plato. He shows how it developed through a stage which might be described as "Nature mysticism," with which was associated the thought of "cosmic immortality" (pp. 51–4), to its final and highest form; and how in Plato the ethical idea of the Divine Nature is attained, and thus the ideal, as well as the origin, of the soul is to be found in God. "The Manlike, in short, is the Godlike" (pp. 62–4).

The essay on the "Hymn of Cleanthes" is a suggestive exposition of the doctrine of God and man in early, and also to some extent in later, Stoicism. The author brings out the universality of its teaching (p. 122); and also shows very clearly how the ideal of the Sage, with its exaltation of *αὐτάρκεια* and *ἀπάθεια* and its consequent tendency to a hard individualism, was more and more supplemented by the doctrine of brotherhood and of the "*communis deorum atque hominum domus aut urbs utrorumque.*" "The Stoic conception of self-realisation, so far from being monastic, can only be attained through the service of others" (pp. 142 f.). The close of this essay is devoted to a comparison and contrast between Stoic and Christian thought (pp. 178 ff.; *cf.* 68, 139). The author ascribes the failure of Stoicism as a popular force partly to its hesitating utterance in regard to immortality, but chiefly to its "lack of the motive principle of personality." Yet he notes the growing tendency of later Greek thought to personify the moral ideal, and sees in "the Stoic doctrine of the *σοφὸς* or *σπουδαῖος* . . . . a 'preparation' for the Christian identification of the Logos with Jesus Christ." It is doubtless true that the idea of the Sage, based on the character of Socrates, fulfilled the same preparatory part in Greek thought as was performed in Jewish thought by the ideal of the Suffering Servant which grew up round the character of Jeremiah. But in the main during these centuries the thought of the Divine Nature tended to become more remote and more distant from human personality, both for Jew and Greek; so that Christianity appears as fulfilling, but also and more notably as reversing, the dominant religious tendencies of the age. Throughout the volume there are many proofs of the author's interest in the points of contact between Greek and Christian thought. In the main he followed the Alexandrian thinkers in this respect. But if a fuller consideration had been given to the closing sections of Cleanthes' Hymn, material might have been found for a not less instructive parallel and contrast between the Stoic idea of sin and redemption there briefly expressed, and the far deeper and more searching conceptions of Jewish and early Christian thought.

The remaining essay, on "Ancient Greek Views of Suffering and Evil," shows not only that the darker side of life is faced in Greek literature, but that all the main attempts to find a solution of its problems are there

represented—moral dualism, as well as the three great views of evil and suffering, as punishment, as a reformatory discipline, and as a necessary element in the completeness and harmony of the universe. This was "the author's last public lecture"; and with its closing words we may take leave of a book rich in stimulus both intellectual and religious:—

"We cannot in this world see the true harmony of the universe, but among the Greeks there are many signs of a firm belief in its existence; and of the hope of a hereafter in which the mystery shall be solved, for

> 'Death is the veil which those who live call life;
> They sleep and it is lifted.'"

G. F. Barbour.

Edinburgh.

Studies in the Origins and Aims of the Four Gospels. Being Two Courses of Sermons preached in Worcester Cathedral on the Sunday Mornings in Lent and in July 1910.—By Rev. J. M. Wilson, D.D., Canon of Worcester.—London: Macmillan & Co.—Pp. vi + 140.

The Ascended Christ: A Study in the Earliest Christian Teaching.—By Henry Barclay Swete, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge; Hon. Canon of Ely.—London: Macmillan & Co.—Pp. xv + 168.

Dealing, the one with the earthly life of Christ, the other with His glorified life, these books have, nevertheless, more than one point of contact. Thus, in his description of the circumstances out of which arose the demand for written memoirs of Christ, Canon Wilson says of the first preachers of the Gospel, "It was not Christ after the flesh, our familiar Jesus of Nazareth, our Jesus of the Gospels that they preached, except incidentally: it was the risen, ascended, omnipotent, indwelling Christ that they spoke of, the Christ in the heart; some mystical identification of this glorified Christ with the believer; something indescribable in words of common experience; something that transcends definition" (pp. 8, 9); while of St Paul's teaching Dr Swete says, "The Christ of the Epistles is a living Person who exists in the fulness of human nature behind the veil of sense, and is actively engaged in the shaping of events and the salvation of men. The historical Christ has, from the Apostle's point of view, passed into the mystical, and the works and teaching of the ministry are surpassed, almost eclipsed, by the wonders of the life with God" (p. xiii). For both authors there is no distinction between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith. The one work treats of the Gospels, which are practically our sole source of information as to the life of Christ on earth; the other treats of what may be gleaned from the rest of the New Testament as to His life in heaven.

Dr Wilson seeks to popularise the results of recent inquiry and criticism. In his preface he acknowledges his indebtedness to such men as

Professors Swete, Harnack, Sanday, and other New Testament scholars, while regretting that Dr Flinders Petrie's *The Growth of the Gospels* appeared too late to be consulted. It is difficult to see how the last could be utilised without dislocating the whole scheme of these sermons. Canon Wilson proceeds on the ordinary critical lines, finding the original Gospel in the present St Mark, which he dates about A.D. 63, and in any case earlier than A.D. 70. Matthew and Luke come less than twenty years later, incorporating Mark and adding to it; while John is nearly twenty years later still. This is a sufficiently accurate statement of the general agreement about dates, and of course it is supplemented elsewhere by information as to the non-Marcan sources.[1] But Dr Flinders Petrie, by a method which he calls "structural criticism," arrives at the result that in the Synoptic Gospels there is a "nucleus" which he dates at "probably before 40 A.D., certainly before 50 A.D.," and which itself "suggests a document drawn up within a few months of the final events." After this he thinks that "Mark and Luke collaborated on additions to the nucleus when in Jerusalem, 54–56. After the first third was written, Luke left with his material, which he had personally collected in Galilee, and finished his Gospel elsewhere. Mark then obtained Matthew's Gospel, so far as then accreted, and finished his Gospel, which remained in Egypt isolated from further accretion." Incidentally this theory involves the posteriority of Mark to Matthew, a posteriority which he endeavours to prove by a number of test passages, perversely (as it seems to me) taking up each by the wrong handle. Evidently this plan could not be amalgamated with the plan of the book before us.

The Fourth Gospel is ascribed by Canon Wilson in the main to St John, and the evidence for this belief, both external and internal, is set out as fully and fairly as it could well be in a volume of sermons, necessarily popular although preached to an educated congregation. Canon Wilson must have momentarily forgotten St John when he wrote, "It is plain that the type of a gospel was irrevocably fixed by St Mark. Any new gospel must conform to the same outlines. . . ." (p. 45). The Fourth Gospel departs from St Mark's outlines pretty widely! These sermons must have been heard with interest, and were well worth publishing.

Dr Swete's book is a sequel to his previous study of *The Appearances of our Lord after the Passion*,[2] and should be read in connection with it. If published anonymously it would have demanded respect as a careful and accurate, and withal inspiring, collection and restatement of the New Testament evidence as to the ascension of Christ and His subsequent session in heaven; coming with its author's name, it is known to have behind it an immense weight of learning lightly worn, so that no position is taken up without the strongest reasons. The New Testament teaching is examined very carefully, but is treated as symbolical. When we substitute modern philosophical terms for the Biblical words, "we do little more

[1] Cp. Dr Sanday, "Apocalyptic Element in the Gospels," *Hibbert Journal*, x. 1, 90.
[2] See the *Hibbert Journal*, April 1908, p. 691.

than substitute one set of symbols for another; the ultimate truths remain impenetrable while we are here" (p. xiv). The elevation of Christ from the Mount of Olives (Acts i.) is regarded as an actual historical event. "The cloud which seemed to mark the Lord's upward way lingered in sight perhaps for long, and the Eleven, from their place upon the hillside, watched it gradually disappear. But the Lord's journey was surely completed in the momentary act of will by which He finally left the world and went to the Father; that instant all the glory of God shone about Him, and He was in heaven" (p. 9). These two sentences give in some measure an indication of the character of the book which, resting on a historical basis, is what many would call "mystical" in its exposition.

G. E. Ffrench.

West Camel.

Miracles in the New Testament.—By Rev. J. M. Thompson, Fellow and Dean of Divinity, S. Mary Magdalen College, Oxford.—London: Edward Arnold, 1911.—Pp. xv+236.

In method and general aim Mr Thompson's book resembles a little monograph on the same subject which was contributed by Herr Traub, four years ago, to the *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher.* Both are popular works. Both begin with an introductory chapter on the meaning of miracles; both proceed to discuss Paul's evidence and the synoptic narratives; and both conclude by denying that the New Testament miracles are organic to the essential gospel. Mr Thompson, however, goes into more detail. He also formulates a much richer Christian theology than Herr Traub, and this is the remarkable feature of his book. To quote his own words: "*Though no miracles accompanied His entry into, or presence in, or departure from the world; though He did not think or speak or act otherwise than as a man; though He yields nothing to historical analysis but human elements*; *yet in Jesus Christ God is Incarnate—discovered and worshipped, as God alone can be, by the insight of faith.* . . . There was a time when the belief in miracles played an important and honourable part in religious experience and Christian faith. That time is now passing, and will not return. A stage has been reached in the development of natural and historical science from which the popular position ought to be challenged—not only for the sake of clearer thought and higher worship within the Church, but also for the sake of those outside who are looking for God in Christ, but who cannot recognise Him from the description which is given of Him by His friends" (pp. 217–218).

These are unambiguous sentences, and they are characteristic. Mr Thompson's pages are candid, and mean to be constructive. Three hundred years ago Shakespeare made Lafeu remark: "They say miracles are past; and we have our philosophical persons, to make modern and familiar, things supernatural and causeless." There is a caustic touch in this curiously modern bit of criticism, but Mr Thompson's withers are unwrung. Like

Dr E. A. Abbott and Dr G. A. Gordon of Boston, he believes frankly and sincerely in the supernatural. His aim, which will command widespread sympathy, is to prove that the divine authority of Jesus Christ does not vanish with the belief in miracles; that the rejection of this belief is "the only condition upon which science and supernaturalism can survive side by side"; and that Christianity will not only survive, but actually be the stronger for, the waning of a theory which eagerly sought and found proofs of God within the causeless and anomalous.[1] Be it so. Only, this requires a "philosophical person." Lafeu was right so far, and it is precisely the philosophy of Mr Thompson's religious *Weltanschauung* which is the weak point. This has the effect of making his book more significant than important as a contribution to the subject.

The misleading term "miracle" covers a number of phenomena recorded in the New Testament which the newer psychology, medical research, and literary criticism may be held to have removed from the category of what Thomas Aquinas called miracles of the highest order, viz. deeds of God which Nature can never do. This narrowing of the term is all to the good, since it helps to make faith more intelligible for many in view of historical and scientific methods. But it is another thing to reduce the miraculous element to the vanishing point and at the same time to propound a scheme of Christian faith involving the Incarnation of God in the personality—presumably sinless—of Jesus Christ. Can the two be logically regarded as compatible? If it is true that "*God's supernatural love worked for the salvation of the world through the natural birth of Christ*" (p. 160; the italics are Mr Thompson's); that "the divinity of Jesus Christ is entirely spiritual. The life in which it is manifested carries no external signs of the Godhead" (p. 215); that "the *complete* mediation of God by man is the essence of the Christian Incarnation"; and that "it is only by the rejection of miracles that this doctrine can come to its full rights" (p. 213),—then we have indeed a Christian theology, but it is a theology formulated upon presuppositions about the Incarnation which belong to a very different order from that of the scientific and historical categories dominating the author's criticism of the New Testament narratives. The latter, it might be argued from one side, cannot be stopped short; it will explain the rise of the Incarnation-christology as well as the thaumaturgic shape into which natural incidents have been so often expanded. Both were inevitable, and both are unessential. Current ideas about God, together with the enthusiasm of faith, combined to form the various messianic and Logos christologies in which the growth of a pious belief in Christ's divinity robed itself for that age. If you presuppose devotion to a gifted Jewish prophet, martyred cruelly for the messianic cause, that core of fact, set inside the religious temperament of the first century, corresponds in historical theology to the nucleus of physical incident which gave rise to the miracle-narratives, *e.g.* about the raising of the

[1] As Traub puts it (p. 67): "Gewiss ist das Wunder des Glaubens liebstes Kind. Eben deshalb ist es nicht der Vater des Glaubens."

dead. The process which developed the one will account for the development of the other. From the opposite side it might be argued that an "entirely spiritual" divinity of Jesus Christ, whose manifestations never went beyond the limits of human capacity and normal experience, is an unthinkable phenomenon; that it involves an isolation of "spiritual" which is inadequate, *e.g.*, to the problem of sin and evil, as well as untenable upon the principles of any thoroughgoing Incarnation theology; and that such a transcendent phenomenon as the complete mediation of God by a single personality in history renders it highly probable (to say no more) that its effect upon the natural order would have been correspondingly unique and transcendent. Mr Thompson's position, or something like it, might conceivably be held under this double fire, but it cannot be held, I think, on the arguments he has brought forward. The fact is, his book would have been more impressive and cogent if it had developed the philosophical and theological aspects of the problem with greater fulness. The real issue, for his theory, lies in the "insight of faith" and its implicates. The space assigned to the examination of the documentary evidence is out of proportion to its significance, and it is often occupied by discussions which are scarcely central. Mr Thompson uses a special hypothesis about Mark's gospel, to prove that "the miracle stories belong to Galilee, to the earlier and obscurer times of the ministry, and to the enthusiasm of the lake-side fishermen" (p. 31). Neither Matthew nor Luke, it is argued, adds any fresh evidence for the miracles; they merely witness to the Church's growing passion for pious exaggeration. All this, with the exploitation of Harnack's peculiar views about Q and Acts, is really beside the mark. Even if it rested critically on surer foundations, it complicates the issue needlessly with literary minutiæ. The exegetical data could have been handled in larger masses at least as effectively for the purposes of the writer's argument, and this would have had the further advantage of leaving more than the unsatisfactory amount of twenty pages for the crucial problem of the relation between the "non-miraculous" view of Jesus and the Incarnation-theology. The person of Jesus Christ, on the latter scheme, has an importance to which every other issue is subsidiary, and the estimate of it must largely determine the final judgment passed by historical analysis on any given miracle in the gospels.

What Mr Thompson has actually furnished in the main part of his book, however, is a convenient and succinct summary of the case against the miraculous element in the New Testament, or rather, an account of how the miraculous narratives originated. The visions and cures are explicable on the lines of faith-healing and religious psychology; the wonders, or nature-miracles, are misunderstandings or misrepresentations of natural events.[1] In the treatment of specific incidents or narratives

[1] This is sometimes pushed to a curious extreme, as when the author declines (p. 75) to pronounce upon the natural event which has been transformed into the story of the coin in the fish's mouth (Matt. xvii. 24–27) since "we have not enough material from which to reconstruct the original incident."

there is nothing that is particularly new or striking. Even the sections which are devoted to an examination of the evidence for the Virgin-birth and the Resurrection—the latter of which is distinctly good as far as it goes—follow quite familiar methods. The various chapters marshal the data in a matter-of-fact style, and the reader has the satisfaction of finding that for once a writer upon this subject is no more evasive than he is iconoclastic. It is very rarely that any relevant item of evidence has been missed, though some allusion ought to have been made, on p. 156, to the curious early variant of John i. 13, which originated in the interests of the Virgin Birth dogma. To the mediæval illustrations or parallels, which are not confined to the Appendix, I may add one from the experience of Joan of Arc. In her cross-examination she confessed that she rarely heard the voice from God "without its being accompanied also by a light. This light comes from the same side as the voice. Generally it is a great light."[1] This illustrates what Mr Thompson says on pp. 202 f. about the great light at the appearance of Jesus to Paul.

James Moffatt.

God in Evolution: A Pragmatic Study of Theology.—By Francis Howe Johnson, author of *What is Reality?*—Longmans, Green & Co., 1911. —Pp. vi + 309 + appendices 44.

In the *Hibbert Journal* for April 1911, I asked the question, "Can theology become scientific?" This book is a triumphantly affirmative answer to that question. In an article in the *Contemporary Review* for January 1911, the editor of the *Hibbert* said—"I shall be very much surprised if further developments do not show that it is in ethics that pragmatism has its most effective, and absolutism its least effective, weapon." The author of *God in Evolution* applies the pragmatic method with startling effectiveness to ethical and theological problems. He uses the method for the purpose of bringing together, classifying, and helping us to move about among religious facts. He never confuses the reality of his hypotheses and theories with the reality of the religious experiences which are the foundations of his edifice. The instrument he employs for producing an ordered structure is the principle of evolution, that is, progressive becoming. He uses this principle not as a generalisation more essentially real than the facts which it co-ordinates, not as a law outside the facts and coercing them, not as an emotional substitute for accurate thinking, but as an instrument for arranging religious facts in a conceptual order, for vivifying them so that they mean much more than when they are taken as detached events, and for enabling him to see the probable course of the religious life in the future.

Mr Johnson revalues religious life by his ideal arrangement of its facts.

[1] *Cf.* Mr T. Douglas Murray's *Jeanne d'Arc* (1907), pp. 17, 24.

He translates religious percepts into ideas. And, as William James says, "the translation appears as far more than the original's equivalent." Then he returns with the ideas to the religious experiences, and shows how they now bring within their vitalising activity facts which before had been detached and unproductive.

The author begins by sketching the probable results of adopting the pragmatic method in theology. It would banish "to the limbo of disused instrumentalities," "the authority that takes its stand on a unique, divine revelation granted to a specially appointed group of men, who act as its guardians and interpreters." Then "it would set up another kind of authority . . . the authority of human experience"; it would transfer theological problems to "the tribunal that adjudicates all questions that arise in every department of science." Lastly, it "would put an end to the remote separateness of theology . . . and bring it into accord with the community of interests that jointly affect the welfare of man." Mr Johnson shows how the generally accepted Protestant theology has brought about, but has not settled, a conflict between corporate faith and individual faith, wherein there is little agreement regarding what truths are vital and must be retained, and what may be modified or abandoned. One of the most admirable passages in the chapter "Concerning Method," is that wherein the author meets the contention, that the adoption of the pragmatic method in theology will destroy stability, by showing how crude and erroneous is the popular notion of stability. He then makes clear that the conception of progressive becoming has made it impossible to find satisfaction in the pre-evolutionary scheme of "pan-mechanism."

"In its simplest statement, evolution is the process by which all things have come to be what they are." "It does not admit of demonstration other than that of the practical sort. It appeals to the intellectual judgment of men by the concurrence of several lines of testimony emanating from different sources." In the course of applying the conception to the facts of natural science, questions arise which must be sharply distinguished from the main scientific issue. "Some of these are as follows:—First, Are the changes which lead from one species to another always gradual, or is evolution characterised by distinctly new departures of great significance? Second, Are the most efficient factors in the process those working from within the organism or those which influence and shape it from the outside? Third, Does intelligence play any part in the process? And if so, is it that of the creature alone, or must we assume also the working of a higher wisdom, an indwelling and directing power, that has shaped the process from the beginning?" The author regards these questions as supremely important. He holds that "they admit of solutions in which the mind of the average man as well as that of the most highly trained can find satisfaction and power."

"It is easy to see that the method used in this book might be applied to these questions in a loose and slipshod manner, which would yield only a flabby, intangible pulp; or, it might be applied so inhumanly and formally

as to produce nothing but what William James calls "a skinny outline." Mr Johnson has avoided both of these dangers. He has made a real strengthening of theology as a science; he has given a warm, glowing, and reasonable help to the religious life; he has laid a well-grounded foundation of religious hope. In dealing with the question of the omnipotence of God, the author uses the hypothesis that this omnipotence is "not *quite* so absolute as we have imagined it to be." "This," he says, "is also the conclusion forced on us by God's revelation of His methods in evolution." He is now free to deal with God's benevolence. "He is for each one of us *the personification of the supreme ideal.*" "We make God in our own image because He first made us in His." Mr Johnson says that "evolution implies a God who is still creating"; and so he proceeds to consider "the living, never-ceasing stream of influences that work within and without us." He finds an expression of the principles to which the study of the progressive leads him, in the old formula: "Work out your own salvation. It is God that worketh in you." This, he asserts, is the mandate of evolution. The rest of the book is occupied with expanding, illustrating, and applying this mandate.

I have given the merest skinny outline of this remarkable book. It is truly scientific, that is, pragmatic. It is full of suggestive thoughts. It is a consistent, harmonious whole. It is inspiring, refreshing, and eminently sane.

M. M. Pattison Muir.

The Mishna on Idolatry: 'Aboda Zara.—Edited, with translation, vocabulary, and notes, by W. A. L. Elmslie, M.A. ("Texts and Studies," vol. viii. 2).—Cambridge: at the University Press.—Pp. xxix +136. Price 7s. 6d. net.

This tractate contains rules for preserving the loyal Jew from the insidious contaminations of pagan idolatry, directions as to his intercourse with pagans, his attitude toward idol-foods, and his relation to the business of idol-manufacture. In tone and method, it approximates to Tertullian's tract upon idolatry rather than to Paul's treatment of the same danger in his epistles. Its main interest is antiquarian rather than ethical, for ourselves. Still, as the editor pleads, though many of the enactments "must seem over-scrupulous or even casuistical, they are the outcome not of a mean and pettifogging spirit but of the attempt rigidly to carry out a high ideal, difficult of attainment." This is true, although an ideal which involves such hair-splitting directions for its practice does not appeal with a claim to possess high moral reality.

Hitherto, students have had to work with Strack's German edition of this tractate, a serviceable monograph which has passed recently into a second edition. Mr Elmslie's valuable edition will supersede Strack for English readers. It is a great help for students of early Christianity or of

comparative religion to have competent editions of such Jewish tractates, and, thanks to the labour of men like Strack and Fiebig, the Germans have been hitherto better off than ourselves in this respect. If Mr Elmslie will continue the work already done by Dr Charles Taylor and Mr Streane, he will be doing a welcome service to his countrymen in this difficult field of scholarship. The present monograph is to be cordially welcomed for its own sake, and for its promise; the scholar who can produce a first work of this thorough character is likely to add fresh laurels to a name which is already honoured in English Semitic study.

The translation is less literal, yet not less accurate, than Strack's. The notes are repeatedly suggestive for the general history of contemporary religion; Mr Elmslie has evidently read all round his subject, and his comments are often illuminating. One curious parallel I may add, in connection with the stringent prohibition of dates and fir-cones (i. 5) as articles of sale to pagans. In the Mohammedan *Gospel of Barnabas* (cxiii. *e*; ed. Ragg, p. 259) it is expressly said that the disciples brought Jesus "pine-cones, and by the will of God they found a good quantity of dates." Although 2 Macc. xii. 40 is quoted by Mr Elmslie (p. 65) as a proof that even pious Israelites could hardly shake off the habit of using images, the relevance of the reference is more apparent than real. The fallen warriors of the Maccabean army were indeed found wearing amulets, but their sin was not in wearing amulets as such (see on this, Blau's *Altjüdische Zauberwesen*, 87 f.); what made the amulets sinful was their connection with the idols of Jamnia.

James Moffatt.

THE

HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND LOCK-OUT.

(*See note at the end of the article.*)

ROBERT A. DUFF, D.Phil.

The many claims that are now being put forward, and pressed, under a threat to cease work, have at least one good effect—they drive us back upon the consideration of fundamental principles. And the question I wish to ask is this: Is the social and industrial order of such a nature that it is able to bear up against the shocks to which it is now subjected, and can it fairly be asked to sustain them?

Let me premise my consideration of the question by stating that if there are any principles governing the situation, they will hold good equally of the strike and the lock-out. If I do not at *every* point of my argument make the twofold application, it is only for the sake of brevity. For any limitations or restrictions which the necessities of our social system may impose upon the workers will be equally binding upon the employers. And my object is to ascertain whether there are such bounds, beyond which the claims of loyalty to the social whole are paramount over even the claim to industrial freedom.

Further, it has to be said, in view of the claims frequently made by masters and men to have an absolute right to work or not work at their discretion, that such a claim is without warrant from the State. For there are no single or separate

rights inherent in single persons or in combinations of persons which give them an absolute title to act in this way or that. All rights that may be enjoyed within a State form a system or unity. They are dependent on one another, limited by and effective through one another. Hence a claim to have a right to act in a particular way is baseless unless it lends support to other rights, and is required to secure the unity and strength of the social order of which it is one expression. I have no right to act in a way which will lead to the disintegration of society. My title, for example, to the possession and use of property is limited in many respects that it may be subservient to this larger end. Even though the property is in the popular sense my own, there are many uses of it which I am not entitled to make. For example, I may not buy a war-vessel with it, nor use it to bribe a magistrate, or to procure false witness, or to support a rebellion or a crime, or to erect houses contrary to the Buildings Regulations Act, or to set up an obstruction on the highway, or to print a libel.

And what is true of property is equally true of life and working power. In an extreme case the State may rightfully ask me to resign both to preserve social order. And even in the ordinary run of affairs it sets up many bounds and restrictions upon the use I may make of my life. There are many things I have no right to do. And these limitations are imposed mainly for two reasons. On the one hand, because all the rights which the law does recognise as vesting in me and in others must fit into and support one another; and on the other, because all rights vesting in anyone are powers or modes through which the social order can most effectively maintain and express itself.

From this it follows that no individual or combination of individuals can have even a *prima facie* claim to act according to their own discretion, unless they can show that the general interest will be better served by allowing such discretion. It also follows that any limits which may, in the general

interest, be imposed on such a discretion are not an unwarrantable interference with a primitive right inherent in individuals, but are the necessary conditions on which alone a right can exist at all or be capable of general application.

I preface my paper with these semi-philosophical, or common-sense, remarks because one hears so much loose talk indulged in by both masters and men to the effect that the State has no right to interfere in trade disputes, that as its interference is always mischievous it should hold its hand, or at the most should see that the game (or the fight) is fought fairly.

For this contention there is no ground. The State has a right—and not only a right but a duty—to intervene (or, if you like, to interfere) when its own unity, strength, and security are involved, compromised, or endangered. It can no more be an idle that it can be an uninterested spectator of any struggle that threatens its prosperity and even its very existence. What the limits of this interference should be and what forms it can best take are matters of fair discussion. But the *right* of the State to interfere if its well-being is imperilled cannot be seriously questioned.

Even the parties to the dispute do not themselves seriously question it. For each of them is quite ready to invoke the help of the State to concuss the other party, while vigorously objecting to be itself concussed by the same authority. It is, indeed, almost ludicrous to read the inconsistent eloquence which invites the State to use its utmost power to force the other party to grant the demand made on them, while it denounces any pressure put upon themselves as taking sides in the dispute and playing a partisan part. With somewhat less eloquence and somewhat more logic or sense of fair play the situation would much clarify itself.

The rest of this paper will be an enquiry into what is involved in the Right to Strike in theory and in practice, and how far these claims can be admitted by the State.

The Right to Strike has been defined by a zealous defender of it as the right to demonstrate the value of labour by with-

holding it. And this definition will give us a convenient point of departure.

One may take exception to it, first of all, on the ground that you cannot demonstrate the *value* of anything by withholding it. You may prove it to be indispensable; but there are so many things indispensable to a civilised existence that their respective values cannot be determined in this way. In a watch, for example, every piece of the mechanism is indispensable to the whole and to each of the other parts. The absence of one wheel or pin would bring the whole to a standstill. But the withholding of one part will in no way show what its value is as compared with the other parts. Similarly, the withholding of labour would prove that without it our present type of life was impossible; but the same result would follow if capital were to withhold itself, or if the directors of industry were all to go on holiday. Such tactics, therefore, would teach us nothing of the relative values of the different factors in production, or of the reward that was proper for each of them to receive.

In the next place, we have to point out that the definition is inadequate, because both in theory and in practice a strike involves much more than a simple withholding of labour.

First of all, it is a *combined* or *organised* stoppage, and involves concerted common action on the part of a considerable number of persons for a single end. This puts it at once on a different plane from the liberty to work or not work which the law allows to each individual. For even if we grant that each man should enjoy the freedom of working or not working at his own option, it by no means follows that the law should equally sanction his liberty to combine with any number of others for an organised stopping of work.

It has, indeed, almost passed into a legal maxim that that which it is lawful for one man to do, or to abstain from doing, must be lawful also for any number of men to combine to do or abstain from. But the maxim may very well be only a feeble and mischievous generalisation. For the very agree-

ment and combination on the part of many may entirely alter the act itself and the conditions that result, so that the act is really a different act. It may very well be that the State can allow certain liberties to each individual only if too many do not claim to exercise them at once, and that if all wished to exercise them at once, the State would be bound to refuse them to all. For example, A is at liberty either to sell or to refuse to sell food to Y. So also is B and C and D, etc. And the State can allow this liberty because it is on the whole in the interest of each. But if A, B, C, D, etc., all combine to refuse to sell food to Y, Y may justly ask the State to compel them, as their combination is a negation of his very existence.

Or again, though each of us has liberty to walk along the street, if ten thousand of us agree to go in a solid procession through the streets we may lawfully be forbidden to do so. Or, though each of us is at liberty to stand at a shop window or door, it does not follow that a thousand of us have the same right at one and the same time. Or, if anyone is at liberty to ring your bell and call on you, it is not intended that a thousand people should agree to ring your bell and call on you consecutively or together in one day. In a meeting each man is at liberty to speak, but we are not at liberty to combine and all speak at once, else there will be no meeting.

My point is that an act innocent, or so little troublesome as to be lawful, when done by any single person, may be most harmful if a large body of persons combine to do it at one time. And the very aggregation or combination may entirely change its character, just as a little food or drink or even poison may prove a tonic to the body, while much of it may be its destruction.

At this point of our argument I do not venture to say which combinations may be of this nature, still less that all combinations are; but I do wish to enter a warning against the common assumption that what anyone has a right to do everyone may claim the right to combine to do. In every

case the extension of the right needs to be justified on its own merits as conducive to greater social solidarity and mutual serviceableness. If it cannot be justified on these grounds, it is an unwarrantable demand.

Another element that enters into both the theory and the practice of the strike is the claim that no one else shall do, or be allowed to do, the work of those who go on strike. This distinguishes it from every voluntary discharge. The men stop work, but they don't intend to give up the work. They still consider that they have a paramount claim to the posts they have hitherto had, and that every means should be used to keep their posts open till they get terms that will satisfy them, and permit them to resume work.

This is why there is so much bad blood when they are asked to hand back their uniforms, or to vacate their employers' houses. For this means a definite termination of their employment. And in their own judgment they are not A's discharged workmen, but A's employees on strike.

It is for this reason also that when the strike is over (whichever side has proved successful), they not only demand to be taken back, but to be taken back as a body, without any of their number being victimised, and each man reinstated in precisely the same post as he had before.

Hence any person or arrangement that interferes with this reinstatement is strenuously opposed. And it is rapidly becoming a point of trade-union ethics that if those who have hitherto done any particular work refuse to do it under the conditions imposed, then every means should be used to prevent anyone else undertaking it. Sometimes this is secured by persuasion more or less peaceful; sometimes abuse, intimidation, and even violence are incidental to the struggle. In any case, every nerve is strained to see that those who have hitherto done the work shall not be replaced by new-comers.

Now consider what this involves. It means that if those who carry on a particular service decide either that they will no longer carry it on, or that they will only carry it on under

conditions for which they stipulate, then the community must go without that service until they please or until their terms are granted. In this way each particular social function is entirely at the mercy of the particular set of persons who at present carry it on.

A claim of this nature is obviously little removed from taking society by the throat. For it means that each section of our very complex industrial organisation will be wholly within the control of any small body of men. And not only each section, but the whole industrial life of the community; for the whole would in a few days or hours come to a standstill if any one of a hundred trades or occupations were to be wholly stopped.

For our industrial order is much more complex than any machine, more so even than any animal. And we know that in the animal the removal of a part, or the total arrestment of a function, means either a crippled life or a speedy death. Some parts and functions are no doubt more vital than others; but there are many whose unimpeded action is essential to existence, and many more whose activity is essential to working capacity.

In the animal organism there is, indeed, a certain power of repair, of replacement, of substitution, whereby organs lost or impaired can have their functions discharged less perfectly by some substitute. And this power of replacement and repair exists to a much greater extent in our industrial organisation. Accidents, dislocations, disturbances of the ordinary machinery of production and distribution can very largely and very promptly be set right by making new arrangements or adjustments which enable the social whole again to fulfil its end with more or less sufficiency.

But it is just this capacity for repair and replacement which the modern method of the strike is intended to paralyse. The community is to be allowed neither the original organ nor any substitute for it. And anyone who directly or indirectly seeks to restore the service is boycotted, held up to opprobrium,

exposed even to personal violence as a traitor to his class if not also to the community.

Of course, the purpose of this is obvious enough; for if by some, or by any, method replacement or restoration of a service can be prevented, the inconvenience, discomfort, and dislocation for the whole community are kept at a maximum, are in fact so great that a speedy capitulation within a short period to any demand made by any section is a foregone conclusion. The often-repeated statement by the leaders of a strike, if we can only get everyone out and keep everyone out for three days the victory is ours, is in many services no empty boast but a simple fact. The inconvenience, loss, and paralysis to the nation's life would be so great that the pressure to settle at any price would be irresistible.

A railway strike is generally regarded as a unique case And in some respects it is; for a paralysis in the transportation of commodities would, like the stoppage of the circulation of the blood, bring every other function to a speedy end. But in reality a railway stoppage does not differ from a general stoppage in any one of a hundred trades, except in being more *rapid* in its effects. If all the miners, or bakers, or sailors, or farmers, or scavengers, or policemen, or clerks, or foremen, or merchants, or women were to stop work and prevent anyone else doing their work, precisely the same paralysis would follow with little more delay.

For this reason I have no faith at all in the remedy so frequently put forward as a preventive of railway discontent, viz. that the railways should be taken over by the State, and managed, like the Post Office, as a Government department. This may, or may not, be a good thing on other grounds — with that we are not now concerned — but as a cure for the present evil it seems to promise little relief. For these reasons:—

1. I have yet to learn that Government services like the Post Office are conspicuous for the contentment which reigns among the workers.

2. If the State did take over the railways, the employees would become civil servants, and the right to strike would be forbidden to them. In fact, the very reason for withdrawing the railway enterprise from private ownership would compel the segregation of the workers from the general body of workers, the reason, viz. that this service was so vital to the community that no interruption of it on any ground could be any longer permitted. Any organised attempt to dislocate it would be a serious criminal offence. If this were so, unions amongst the railway workers would either not survive at all, or would be restricted to a very subordinate function.

3. If when the railways are in private hands the Government in sending the civil and military forces to see that those who desire to work are not interfered with is accused of taking sides against the strikers, the charge would not only be made, but would be true, if the State owned the railways directly. It would then be at once the employer and the judge, would decide on conditions of employment, and at the same time have not only the right but the duty to compel the obedience of the workers. Every dispute about working conditions would be like a mutiny in the army, a revolt against lawful authority. What is true of the railways would be equally true of the general proposal to improve the conditions of the workers in all industries by nationalising them all. For whether the workers' conditions would be improved or not—regarding which there may be difference of opinion—at least the first thing to disappear would be the Right to Strike. Any refusal to work under the conditions imposed by the State would be a criminal, and probably a treasonable, act, punishable by fine and imprisonment. Until Trade Unionists are ready, in theory and in practice, to give up the Right to Strike, they have not imbibed much of the spirit of Socialism, nor are they ready for the nationalising of industry in even its simplest forms.

What, therefore, I wish to emphasise is that State ownership does not offer us any solution of our problem either in

the world of industry as a whole or in the smaller railway world. The Trade Unionist would be the first to resent this form of remedy if he obtained it. And the other classes in the community would probably come to the conclusion that they had only got from the frying pan into the fire, when the State was a direct party in every labour dispute and had its impartiality impugned at every turn.

Setting aside State ownership therefore as (at least for the present) no solution, we have to face the real problem, viz. Is a stable industrial order consistent with the claim now made that each section of the whole shall have uncontrolled discretion to say whether the service it has hitherto carried on shall be continued to the community or not, or to stipulate the terms on which alone the community shall be allowed to have it? Should we begin to reconcile ourselves to the idea that the vital necessities of our national existence are at every moment at the mercy of what each section of the workers or the employers may think to be their rights or their due reward? Or is this a condition of things fraught with peril to the interests of all?

One reply, doubtless, will be that the different sections, viz. the particular trades and occupations, can be trusted not to put forward unreasonable demands and only to ask for good conditions for carrying on the service by which they live. But this reply begs the question at issue. Can they be so trusted? Can any class enjoying unchecked power be trusted to be a fair and just judge in its own cause? And who is to decide whether the conditions in any industry are good or not? Conditions are never good to human nature unless they cannot be better. To the man with 20s. a week, good conditions mean 25s., then they mean 30s., then 40s., and so on. To the employer getting a return of 4 or 5 per cent., good conditions mean a return of 6 or 7 per cent., and then of 8 or 9 per cent., and so on. If one can get better terms, why should he not press for them?

It will be said, no doubt, that public opinion will be strong

enough to put the curb on any unreasonable or excessive demands on the part of any section. But in this there are two difficulties:—

1. Has the general community any reliable means of judging whether a claim put forward is reasonable or unreasonable? How can they tell whether 20s. or 22s. or 25s. or 30s. be a fair reward for a railway porter, a carter, a baker, a tramwayman? And what data are there to guide them in judging whether a railway guard should have more or less pay than a tramway guard, or a miner more or less than a plumber?

2. Suppose the general community to *have* formed a definite opinion, what power does it have at present to make its opinion operative? If it believes, for example, that the demand of a certain section, which is supported by a strike or a lock-out, is unwarranted, and should not be granted, what power of resistance or of exercising pressure does it have? At present, none. And hitherto we have muddled along without such power. Not indeed without grave and lasting detriment to our general prosperity and comfort; for however acutely the direct parties to such disputes may suffer, even greater is the total inconvenience and loss inflicted on the general community. But we have been able to move along somehow without special power, chiefly for three reasons: (1) that hitherto the strike or lock-out has seldom been universal even in a particular service; (2) that the sympathetic strike was neither preached nor practised; (3) that the power of adjustment, repair, and replacement was not effectively interfered with. Hence hitherto during periods of labour disputes some temporary devices and modes of supply of a more or less defective kind could be brought into play instead of the normal ones.

But now all these conditions are changed. Both strikes and lock-outs tend more and more to be general, if not universal, so that a particular service is not merely restricted, but is wholly cut off. The sympathetic strike tends to widen indefinitely the area to which such paralysis extends. And

the power of replacement and repair is more and more effectively prevented. The first of these devices is equally practised by Capital and Labour. The second and third *as yet* are largely peculiar to Labour, though it will obviously not be long ere Capital, were it only in self-defence, will be forced to grasp and wield them in earnest.

For this is a ruthless game at which one party can play as well as the other, and only a certain amount of provocation is needed to precipitate a reckless and a suicidal struggle, in which the pawns in the game will be men's livelihoods and lives.

Ere this comes it would be well for the workers to ask themselves seriously whether the paralysing of industry can bring them aught but suffering and loss. It may have an apparent success once or twice; but ere long it will be met with like weapons, and those who hoped to do the paralysing will get a longer period of it than they expected. After all, there is nothing fresh, or clever, or effective in it. It is pure coercion, reckless of all consequence, like presenting a pistol at a man's head, or starving him into compliance with your demands. You may do this once, but he will take means to see that you shall not do it again.

We are in danger of forgetting the old maxim that force, or coercion, is no remedy. For each section of the community to arrogate to itself the power to say to the whole, you will yield to our demands or we will starve you till you do, is nothing more nor less than a deforcement by violence of the national reason and will. And I much mistake the temper and the mind of this nation if they will yield to deforcement what they will not yield to reason.

At present, for example, the railway workers maintain that the beauty of their position is that the country would be starved straight away if they all came out. Therefore they regard themselves as entitled to put forward any claim they themselves may judge to be reasonable, and demand that it be granted on pain of this disaster.

But such a claim, whether made by a body of workers or a body of employers, is so contrary to all principles of equity and justice that it only needs to be stated to be repudiated by everyone not personally interested. If our whole national existence and complex arrangements are to be at any and every moment at the mercy of any section which, with or without reason, conceives that it would like better conditions, and that it has only to paralyse the service by which it gets a living to compel the granting of its demands, then the State may as well resign its authority, and industry revert to its primitive simplicity of organisation or absence of organisation. The complex structure of our present civilisation, with its close and vital dependence of one class and occupation on another, is possible at all only because each section has not hitherto claimed the right to paralyse, when it pleased, its own service and thereby the whole life of the community, even if it considered that it had fair grounds for asking better rewards and conditions of work.

And, after all, it has no such right. The fact that one man and his mates have hitherto made the shoes of the whole community surely gives them no right to say, henceforth we shall make no more shoes for you, nor shall we allow anyone else to make shoes for you ; nay, you shall henceforth go shoeless, unless you agree to the demands we have formulated. Hitherto the community has been able to protect itself against such coercive demands, or has been able to test the reasonableness of the claims put forward, by saying, we shall find others who will make shoes for us on less onerous terms. But this means of testing the reasonableness of any demand is now largely cut off by the operation of certain well-known tactics. These tactics are chiefly peaceful persuasion, refusal of unionists to work with non-unionists, picketing, intimidation by threats, by verbal abuse, by the gathering of crowds, and by actual deforcement, or violence against persons and property. Only some of these are at present legal, and only those that are legal are officially advocated by the workmen's organisations.

But there are certain questions which inevitably present themselves to any mind which looks closely into recent industrial dislocations. One is, why should the powers that are legally recognised pass so readily into the use of powers which are the subversion of the law itself? Is it inevitable that trade disputes be accompanied, or marked, by intimidation, fear of mob-rule, or actual personal violence? It is universally admitted that every trade dispute imposes an anxious and arduous, and not seldom a costly, burden upon the local police authorities, even where there is no attempt to disturb public order; and where there is such an attempt, the ordinary forces of the law are quite inadequate to secure that protection to property and liberty which the State is bound to supply.

I am not concerned to ascertain how far the unions or their pickets may be personally involved in the intimidation and violence which have so frequently of late paralysed that public protection from wrong which the State owes to all its citizens. To ascertain that would be important if one were assigning each individual's liability. But with that I have no concern. What I am interested in is the question of why trade disputes do lead to coercion, terrorism, breach of the peace, violence, and so lay upon the police duties far beyond their power to cope with? Is there anything in the rights granted to the parties to such disputes which makes a resort to illegal and indefensible weapons of struggle natural, easy, or inevitable?

In my judgment there is. And it is because the law legalises and recognises methods that can hardly do other than degenerate into illegal ones that its authority is so quickly and so easily set at naught. Because it does not try to control the situation when it might, it cannot when it would. What I mean is, that there is so little real difference between the things it allows and those it disallows, and the transition from the one to the other is so easy and imperceptible, that no real bulwark is raised against disorder. The persons

tempted to have resort to threats and violence receive no timely warning ere they overstep the limits of the law, and the forces of the law receive no timely notice that the situation is rapidly passing out of their control.

I notice that the Prime Minister said recently in answer to a question that the law at present was quite strong enough to protect the rights and liberties of all even during trade disputes, and that, in his opinion, after much experience, the only difficulty was that of getting evidence. Surely this is just the most conclusive proof of the weakness of the law at present, that not only are the offences committed, but that they are so numerous and so widely spread that those who are wronged are even afraid to complain, that terrorism is so general that even authority itself inspires no confidence.

I cannot go more fully into this point now. But I believe that some of the safeguards of public order and personal liberty as the law at present stands need to be strengthened and modified if they are to be more than empty words, and that until this is done a baleful crop of illegal and coercive conditions will be our portion during any trade dispute.

I come now to deal shortly with the limitations that seem to be required on the right to strike and to lock-out.

First of all, I wish to say that those two, the strike and the lock-out, are correlative and interdependent. The one is the workers' weapon, the other that of their employers. Hence if there are cases in which one of the parties has been deprived of this weapon, the other party must resign his as well. Otherwise it would be a case of an unarmed man being set to fight with one fully armed. Are there such cases? Obviously there are. Every service in fact which is legally bound to maintain its operation at all times is in such a position. It cannot lock out its men and bring its work to a standstill. Therefore it cannot in any way retaliate if an organised strike takes place amongst its employees.

The primary functions of the State are all of this nature, and in respect of these we have already recognised the principle

for which I contend. The services of the army, the navy, the civil servants, etc., cannot be intermitted. There cannot be a lock-out because the service cannot be dispensed with, and for the same reason a strike is illegal, is in fact a mutiny. For this reason, also, employees in gas-works and water-works are under special disabilities as the law at present stands.

But the same principle will force us to extend its operation further. For municipal services certainly come within the same class. The municipality has not the option of supplying them or stopping them when it pleases, as the private employer has. Its public authority or the Acts of Parliament under which it works compel it to carry them on constantly and steadily. The supply of water, gas, transport, the services of the police, the poor law officers, the lighting and cleansing staffs, cannot lawfully be intermitted. If this obligation rests upon the public authorities, a corresponding obligation should rest on the employees to refrain from organised disorganisation of the services to which they are attached. Each of the employees may indeed still have the right to give up the service if he pleases; but while he is in the service the very nature of it should preclude all concerted action along with others to paralyse it, and should preclude also the claim to stop work and still remain an employee.

Further, a strike by the employees of a local authority seems to me not only an offence against society, but a grave menace to free democratic institutions. For the employer here is the whole community acting through freely and publicly chosen representatives; and any worker or class of workers employed under a local authority has the right to appeal not only to the popular representatives, but also from them to the electors as a whole. That is to say, there are ample *constitutional* provisions made for full investigation and consideration of any grievances. If any section of the workers under a local authority chooses to disregard these means of redress, or, having exhausted them, chooses to set itself to stop the service by which it lives, that section is not only the enemy of the

common weal, but also of every other section of the working classes. It is seeking to force from the community by coercion what the judgment and the will of the people have refused. If our representatives are not allowed to exercise their judgment, or if, having exercised it, they are deforced from the execution of it, then our free popular institutions are reduced to a hollow sham, our servants have become our masters, and all of us hold our existence at the whim of any recalcitrant section.

It has also to be kept in mind that if services that must be constantly maintained impose additional responsibilities and restrictions upon the workers as well as upon the local authorities, such services have many compensating advantages; and these advantages may well be set against the added obligation. For a service that must be constantly carried on offers to its employees great regularity and continuity of employment. Any man, in fact, of good habits and fair efficiency may easily have in it practically a life appointment. There is also the fact that the public is brought more in touch with such workers, and has a better knowledge of their work and working conditions.

The railway service also falls into the class whose continuous operation is vital to all callings and persons alike. For this reason the railway companies have had the obligation imposed upon them of always maintaining their services. They are not at liberty to lock-out or stop when they like.

It seems to me that this principle cannot remain only a half principle. It must apply to both employers and employed, or to neither. Otherwise one of two results will follow. Either the companies will be unable to carry out their obligations, and the Government will be involved to the point of using its forces to carry on what all admit to be vital to our very existence; or the companies will be forced to yield to any and every demand from any section of their workers, however unreasonable, excessive, or prejudicial to themselves or to the public.

Neither of these is a position to be contemplated with equanimity. And it has also to be borne in mind that the railway companies have a much less free hand to deal with such situations than a local authority has. The latter may in most services impose whatever rates and charges it pleases. Hence any concessions in wages and working conditions which it may make to its employees are easily set off by asking for more rates. In fact, the main difficulty of all commercial concerns, how to secure on every year's business a balance on the right side, simply does not exist for a local authority. In this, the most worrying part of business management, a local authority simply does not know that it is born. But it is the most anxious, and sometimes impossible, task a railway company has to face. With fixed rates for this and that, with methods of changing them so protracted, and costly, and uncertain in their issue, that the game is seldom worth the candle; with Board of Trade and other regulation of working conditions, with Government inspection and Parliamentary restrictions, its freedom to adjust its employees' wages and working conditions from time to time is almost destroyed. It should also be added that any concessions in wages and hours of work which might be given in prosperous times inevitably become a permanent charge and have to be paid also in the lean years, when perhaps they would be quite unwarranted. For, if there is a worse grievance than not getting what you ask, it is getting what you ask and then having it withdrawn.

For these and other reasons I think that the railways are unduly handicapped in adjusting their income and expenditure, and are thus gravely hampered in their dealings and negotiations with their workmen about wages and hours. And much of the present fiction I believe to be due to these causes, to too little elbow-room, in fact, and not either to the want of "recognition" of the unions or to defective machinery for conciliation and settlement of disputes.

Speaking personally, but from some intimate knowledge (though this is aside from the precise subject of my paper),

I believe that the railwaymen have real and substantial grievances which demand speedy redress, and for this I would be prepared to fight hard that the redress should be real, and that there should be ready means of adjusting differences. But the grievances I believe on the side of the companies are no less. And the condition of the workers will not, in my opinion, be bettered but worsened by resort to an organised stoppage of work. This will exasperate public feeling, and justly, against them, it will prejudice their fair and just claims, will bring the extremity of distress and suffering on those who are least able to bear them, and take a heavy toll of all industry and of the wages and food of all other workers. More than that, it will cause a reaction of feeling throughout the country which will set back the cause of unionism for many a day.

It is not by such coercive measures that better relations are established, but by seeking out the real causes of the difficulty. And that difficulty, in large measure at least, is common to both the companies and their servants, and arises from the heavy burdens imposed upon this public service by legislation, by imperial and local taxation, and the absence of any simple method of adjusting the charge to the discharges. Hence capital is hard to get, workers are kept on small wages, and there is serious friction all round. If the real problem is to be faced, still more if it is to be solved, a larger and broader view will need to be taken by the State and by the public, as well as by the parties themselves, of the conditions necessary for success in this field.

But I am convinced that the less the workers rely on their trump card, the Strike, and the more they rely on full and accurate public ventilation of their case, the sooner will a remedy be found for their real grievances. They will make a grave mistake in tactics if they turn the sympathy of the public with their reasonable claims into the exasperation of the man who feels himself ill-used without cause. And they will gain much more in the end by asking for, and *abiding by*,

some neutral arbiter's award, than by any attempt to coerce a whole nation into compliance.

Lastly, the sphere of general industry may seem to present a less clamant case for the restriction or the prohibition of the strike and the lock-out. And that *has* been the case in the past, because stoppages were partial and some form of supply or some substitute could be got at a sacrifice. Hence the community could afford, by paying a price, to stand aside and let the parties fight it out. But the price which the neutral has now to pay threatens to be too big. If the sympathetic strike, the general strike (national or international), and the prevention of replacement extend as they threaten to do, they will bring about an imperative call for the legal prohibition of this form of warfare and the institution of compulsory arbitration. The power to dislocate or to stop industry has been allowed so long only because it was exercised with some limit and moderation. If it is to be advocated and used as a ruthless and reckless weapon before which nothing is sacred and nothing safe, it will be struck from the hands that would so abuse it. Society cannot afford to grant to any of its members or to any class within it the right to gamble with those interests which are vital to its solidarity.

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Note.—The foregoing Article was in type before the occurrence of the Coal Strike. The Author, in a letter to the Editor, states that whereas, if the Article were to be written now, the illustrations might be chosen from another field, the effect of so choosing them would be to strengthen his argument.—Editor.

THE JESUS OF "Q"—THE OLDEST SOURCE IN THE GOSPELS.

GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT.

ANY discovery that affects the picture and conception of the historical Jesus affects the highest interests of human society. Such a discovery—known for some time to New Testament scholars—is the recognition of the fact that a collection of the words of Jesus, a document which was probably compiled prior to the earliest of our Gospels, lies before us embedded in Matthew and Luke. This document is now commonly called "Q" from the German word *Quelle* (source).

The significance of this discovery cannot easily be overestimated. For this collection of the words of Jesus is the most authoritative document on the nature and scope of Christianity. Of this there can be no question. If it be true that no deliverance of the Church is of the same weight as the New Testament, it is also true that no part of the New Testament is of the same weight as the words of Jesus—him out of the fulness of whose spiritual forces the Christian movement sprang. The words of the Master—profound, figurative, fascinating words—were variously interpreted even in his own lifetime, and not seldom misinterpreted. We do not wish to accept a misinterpretation, and we should have difficulty, most of us, in choosing between the various interpretations given by early disciples. But more than this, as disciples ourselves, or, at least, as intelligent men and women who desire to judge of the foundations of the Christian religion for ourselves, we recognise that the ultimate source

of documentary authority is the teaching of Jesus. Of this teaching the earliest, the most various and complete collection is that which is here designated by the letter Q.

We must frankly admit at the outset that it is not altogether easy to determine the exact limits of this uniquely precious collection, and also that it is not a light task to decide, at times, what the Master really said, because of the important differences between the reports of his words in Matthew and Luke. Thus, for example, did he give his disciples a model prayer which contained *five* petitions, as it is reported in Luke, or *seven*, as it stands in Matthew? Did he utter a blessing on the poor, as we read in Luke, or was it a blessing on the poor *in spirit*, as we read in Matthew? Did he set himself in pointed and absolute opposition to the Law, as the report of the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew would lead us to think, or is the Lucan report correct which lacks this outspoken antithesis? Such divergences in the two versions of Q furnish problems for the technical scholar, and should induce caution in our statements regarding its exact contents, but they by no means rob it of its right to be considered the chief jewel in our evangelic literature.

The significance of the fact that we have in Matthew and Luke, separable from the rest of those writings, an older document consisting of words of Jesus, is clearly manifest when, through the medium of this document, we study the Master's thought of himself and his work. There is a contrast between the Jesus of Q and the Jesus of any one of the four evangelists which is nothing less than startling. To some features of this contrast we now ask the reader's attention.

The document before us contains, according to the narrowest estimate of its limits, approximately 180 verses,[1] or about one-sixth of the Gospel of Matthew or of Luke. Of these 180 verses by far the greater part are ethical or

[1] The reader who would like to identify these is referred, among recent books, to Harnack, *The Sayings of Jesus*, 1908, or Sir C. Hawkins, *Horæ Synopticæ*, 1911.

religious, like the injunction to love one's enemies, and the prayer, "Father, hallowed be thy name," and they present Jesus to us as a great spiritual prophet, as one who was in the line of Isaiah and Jeremiah. They are impersonal: their authority lies in their evident truth; it does not rest on the office or the person of the speaker. But this ethical and religious teaching of Q, while it puts Jesus in the same class with Isaiah and Jeremiah, clearly presents him as their master. If Aristotle, as Dante tells us, is "master of them who know," in the realm of philosophy, then he who spoke the words of Q is master of all who know in the realm of ethics and religion. In simplicity and universality of thought, and not less in their tone of certainty, these words are easily separable from the best utterances of the older prophets. Particularly is this true of those utterances which touch directly on God and man's relation to him. Though these, taken separately, may be thought but "broken lights" of God, yet in their mutual consistency, their lucidity, and their power to make themselves felt and remembered by the heart of man, they are the manifest culmination of all prophetic literature.

This, then, is the first and basal fact in regard to the Jesus of Q. He stands among the teachers of Israel a prophet according to his own confession, and we come up to him from companionship with an Isaiah or a Jeremiah as a traveller who climbs up from some deep valley at sunrise passes out of twilight into full and perfect day. The light of the valley and the hilltop are one, derived from the same fount in the same manner, only in one there is more of earth-shadow than in the other.

So far as the great bulk of the words of Jesus in Q are concerned, the speaker makes no formal claim for himself, not even the claim common to the elder prophets, that what is said is from Jehovah. He speaks winged words, but the wings spring naturally from within; they are not artificial, and owe not their strength to any official position or Messianic claim.

But what now of the remaining words of Q in their portrayal of the speaker? Do they lead to something generically different from the conception of a prophet, or beyond that of the supreme and final prophet? I think not.

Let us take our stand at once before that loftiest utterance of a personal sort which is found in Q: "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding, and didst reveal them unto babes: yea, Father, for so it was well-pleasing in thy sight. All things have been delivered unto me of my Father: and no one knoweth the Son save the Father; neither doth any know the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him." This word may well have been spoken in the great hour at Cæsarea Philippi when, after a long and increasingly intimate fellowship with the Master, Simon Peter confessed his belief that Jesus was the Messiah, the hope of Israel. Whether this was the historical occasion on which the words were spoken or not, we leave an open question: what concerns us is their great personal claim. This is that Jesus had an unique knowledge of the Father, a knowledge such as no one else had possessed, and that he could impart this knowledge of the Father to his fellow-men. The statement that he possessed a knowledge of the heavenly Father which no one else possessed was only another form of the thought that prophets and kings had vainly desired to see the things which his disciples saw and to hear what they heard. It was a more definite expression of the same truth that Jesus uttered when he declared that "something greater" than Solomon and greater than Jonah was manifested in his appearance and mission. Jesus knew within himself that he had a more perfect vision of God than his predecessors possessed.

With this consciousness of unique knowledge there went, of necessity, a conviction that he was called with a unique calling, for his unique knowledge was to Jesus the highest good, and he could not enjoy it alone. He must communicate it to

others. Now, in the fact that it was *communicable*, that the men about him *could* receive it in its fulness, there is involved a most important truth. It suggests nothing less than an answer to the question, How did Jesus attain his unique knowledge of God? It suggests that he attained it, as all true teachers of God before him had attained their knowledge, by meditation and experience. Let us see how this follows. The knowledge of God which Jesus had was an inner conviction permeated with absolute trust and love. There is not a verse or a word in Q that is tinged with any speculation regarding God. To Jesus, God is the object of a boundless affection and confidence, and no one really knows him who does not trust him. The knowledge of God which Jesus had was the knowledge of friendship. But this sort of knowledge cannot be passed from one to another as one can pass on the contents of a book. It begins with the beginning of friendship and it grows with friendship's growth. Jesus felt confident that he could initiate men into this friendship and this knowledge, because he by his intimate friendship with God had come to know him so well.

We go on a vain quest when we search the words of Jesus for answers to our speculative questions concerning God—his nature, his eternal counsels and decrees. For light on such high themes we must go to the professional theologians of the old school, to men like Thomas Aquinas; but if we wish that knowledge of the Father which comes through companionship, we may go to Jesus for guidance.

We say, then, that the greatest utterance of a personal sort in Q—that which was quoted above—does not carry our thought of the speaker beyond the conception of the supreme prophet. It does, however, carry it to that sublime height. By every test that can be applied we must admit that the assurance of Jesus regarding his knowledge of God was well grounded. His confidence is confirmed by the test of history, for Christian civilisation is better than any that preceded Jesus, and this civilisation springs ultimately out of

the knowledge of God which Jesus communicated. His confidence is confirmed also by individual experience, for no other teacher or agency has made God so real and so powerful for good in the individual life as has this Jewish prophet. His confidence, finally, is commended to reason by the fact that his life was as wonderful as was his claim to know God uniquely. The setting was worthy of the jewel.

There are some other words in Q that are strongly personal, but their thought blends with that of the passage which has been considered. Thus, when the Master declared that his teaching was a sure foundation on which to build, and when he said that the Son of Man would confess or deny, in the presence of God, those who confessed him or denied him before men, he only expressed what necessarily follows if he had indeed a unique knowledge of God.

Hence, according to Q, Jesus comes before us as the supreme prophet. This is the conclusion that we draw both from that part of his teaching which makes no allusion to himself, and also from those exceptional verses which contain such allusions.

How great is the contrast between this Jesus of Q and the Jesus of the first two chapters of Matthew and Luke, or the Jesus who is introduced in the first eighteen verses of John! No longer is it a Jewish prophet whom we meet, but in one case it is a being without earthly father, and in the other it is one in whom was incarnated a divine and eternal Person. It may be regarded as probable that the story of the Nativity in Matthew and Luke is an attempt to explain the greatness of Jesus, and that the vast speculation of John is an attempt to commend Jesus and his teaching to the philosophical Greek world. In the light of Q both are equally impossible if regarded as history. They have permanent value and undying interest, but this is because they help us to realise the profound impression which Jesus made on the ancient world. When read as history rather than as early attempts to *explain* history, they effectually obscure the portrait of

Jesus as this may be recovered from the oldest collection of his own words.

Again, the document Q is remarkable for its implications in regard to the *work* of Jesus. Here, too, the clearest utterance of the document is that which has already been considered from a different point of view. In that hour of profoundest feeling of which this source knows, that hour of completest confession of his own inner life, the Master spoke of his unique knowledge of the Father, and indicated that it was the aim of his life to *reveal* the Father to men. The only method of revealing him of which we learn in Q is the prophetic method of teaching—teaching both by word and example. The joy that filled the heart of Jesus on the occasion when he spoke the words about knowing and revealing the Father is probably to be accounted for as caused by his seeing in his disciples some good evidence that his teaching had taken hold of their lives. But whether that was the case or not, his declared mission was to reveal the Father, and as far as we learn from Q he hoped to accomplish this end in his lifetime. There is no reference in Q to the death of Jesus. There are elsewhere a few references to it by the Master which are of unquestionable historicity, but they do not ascribe to it any unique value. Death is the fit ending of a prophet's career; it seals the message he has given; it is the culminating expression of the principle of service which Jesus had often enforced.

Thus the document Q—and substantially the same may be said of all the well-accredited words of Jesus—is in sharp contrast with the teaching of Paul and of the Christian Church from Paul's time to the present, for the Apostle Paul and many great teachers of the Church have seen the most essential service of Jesus, not in his life and words, but in his death on the cross. According to this conception he was not, primarily, a prophet, but a sacrificial offering. It is obvious that this view of the mission of Jesus ill agrees with what he regarded as the aim of his life, viz., to reveal

the *Father*. It turns our thought to a *legal* view of God, which is radically unlike the view of Jesus.

It was not the revelation of Jesus that made the cross the chief symbol of the Christian religion. That was due rather to the theology of Paul. If the cross be taken to mean denial of self, it is an extremely poor symbol of the life-giving words of the Founder; indeed, it is quite alien to what he regarded as central and fundamental in his teaching. If, again, the cross be taken as a great divine index-finger pointing the world to Calvary, it is equally inadequate, for it does not point to what Jesus thought was the vital centre of his revelation. Were we to-day dependent upon the oldest collection of the words of Jesus for our view of the Christian religion, we certainly should not make the cross its peculiar symbol. If we were to choose some concrete object to represent the service of Jesus, it might be a loaf of bread, or an overflowing fountain, or an opened sky; and if we took a *word* to epitomise it, we should not take a negative term like denial of self, but some infinitely rich and positive word, as Life, Love, Fatherhood.

It remains to notice that the Jesus of Q says nothing of his rising from the grave. There are two sayings which seem to imply that he anticipated a violent death at the hands of men, but there is in this connection no allusion to his resurrection. He looked forward to an existence in heaven. He took for granted that he should meet, in the presence of God, both those who confess him now and those who deny him; but here also there is no word of rising from the grave.

Undue stress might easily be laid upon the significance of this silence of Q. The case is not absolutely closed with these data. We have simply heard the oldest and—taking all things into account—the most competent witness. But there are authentic words of Jesus outside of Q, and among these there is a saying, perhaps thrice repeated, which refers to a "rising" or a "being raised" on the third day, or after three days. Yet neither this saying itself nor the context in which it stands suggests that the cause of Jesus was in anywise bound up

with what would happen to his physical body. The saying is merely a personal expression of the thought contained in the poet's line—

> "Truth crushed to earth shall rise again."

It promises the triumph of the *cause* of Jesus, and should not be pressed to yield any further meaning.

We conclude, then, that Jesus, according to his words in Q, attached no further significance to his death than any one of the elder prophets might have attached to his own, and that we have no right to attribute to him the thought that his material body would be raised from the grave.

How far has not the Church gone in her doctrine of Christ and his work from the teaching of the Master as contained in this oldest collection of his words! To the question put to the disciples in one of the villages of Cæsarea Philippi, "Whom do men say that I am?" the answers of the orthodox Church of to-day have far less support in Q than had the answers which were quoted to the Master on that historic occasion. Some thought that he was John the Baptist risen from the dead; others that he was Elijah; and others that he was Jeremiah or one of the prophets. They whose opinions are cited all thought that Jesus was a prophet, and indeed a very *great* prophet; and so far they were wholly in accord with the teaching of Q. Simon Peter went beyond these unnamed thinkers, for he saw in Jesus the fulfilment of the hope of Israel. His estimate, however, differed from theirs in degree rather than in kind.

The significance of the portrait of Jesus which can be obtained from Q is heightened by the fact that the other well-attested words of his are in substantial accord with it. But when we come to the various *explanations* of Jesus and his work, which abound even in the earliest of our Gospel narratives, then we pass at once into a different sphere of thought. These explanations, however, have been accepted as authoritative, and the Church has been content to look at the Master through the eyes of early disciples. But that

content is now being undermined. The process is inevitable in an age of historical investigation. That this process will ultimately lead to a radical reconstruction of Christian doctrine regarding Jesus and his work—a reconstruction more significant even than that of the Reformation of the sixteenth century—anyone who has followed the march of historical investigation of the Gospels during the past twenty-five years, and who believes that the words of the Master must at length prevail over the words of his disciples, will accept as certain.

GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT.

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THE GREAT QUESTION.

WILLIAM DILLON,[1]

Chicago.

I.

The Present Status of the Question.

What is to become of me after death? If the great majority of men and women to-day devote little time to thinking over this question or trying to answer it, that is certainly not because it does not interest them. If we could imagine the miracle repeated in our days of calling a dead man back to life, and if such a man were to announce that, at a stated time and place, he would give an account of his experiences after death, and if we could further imagine that those to whom the announcement was made were in some way impressed with the conviction that the account would be a true account of what he had actually been conscious of during the time which elapsed between the departure of the spirit from the body and its return, what hall in London or Paris or New York would be sufficient to hold the crowd who would want to hear him?

In all ages, the great majority of men who have not had

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religious faith have been content, so far as this question is concerned, to accept and act upon the philosophy of Horace: "Take and enjoy the gifts of the fleeting hour; think as little as may be of what is to come." Or, perhaps it would be more just to the more serious of these to express their mental attitude towards the question in the words of an Irish poet:—

> "'Tis idle; we exhaust and squander
> The glittering mine of thought in vain.
> All-baffled reason cannot wander
> Beyond her chain.
> The flood of life runs dark;—dark clouds
> Make lampless night around its shore.
> The dead, where are they? In their shrouds—
> Man knows no more.
>
> No more, no more. With aching brow,
> And restless heart and burning brain,
> We ask the When, the Where, the How,
> And ask in vain.
> And all philosophy, all faith,
> All earthly, all celestial lore
> Have but one voice, which only saith,
> 'Endure, adore.'"

"The dead, where are they? In their shrouds." This does not, of course, mean that, in the view of the poet, when we see the dead body of a friend in its shroud, we see there the personality we knew in life. It means that all we can really know, in the way of answer to the great question, concerns the body with which the spirit and personality have been mysteriously associated in life; that, as regards what has become of that spirit and that personality, our reason can tell us absolutely nothing.

But it would be by no means true to say that this has, in all ages, been the mental attitude of all men towards the great question. Some of the most profound intellects the human race has known have held that the fact of the immortality of the human soul can be known by and demonstrated to the reason of man. Of all the so-called proofs of the immortality of the soul which have yet been

attempted, that offered by Plato in the dialogue known as the *Phœdo* is the most famous. It need not be said that this dialogue, being one of the best of the Platonic dialogues, is beautiful. It is beautiful in its setting and in its surrounding circumstances; most beautiful in the skill with which that setting and those surrounding circumstances are woven into the dialogue so as to be vividly present to our consciousness as we read; so that, when the final moment comes and the master drinks the hemlock, and we are told of the weeping and lamentation of the disciples, we too find it hard to repress our tears. It is worthy of note also that, in the *Phœdo*, as in the *Symposium* and other dialogues, by much the finest parts are those in which Socrates abandons for the time being dialectic and cross-questioning, and gives, in the form of continuous discourse, his views and beliefs, without attempting to prove them. But, conceding all this, I must confess that, as a proof of the personal immortality of man, the *Phœdo* seems to me decisively to fail. Where the dialogue is used as a form of controversy, there is always a temptation to set up arguments opposed to the view the writer aims to impress much as nine-pins are set up in the game. The arguments are set up so as to be easily knocked down, and with the intent that they shall be knocked down. The most enthusiastic Platonist will hardly deny that Plato frequently yields to this temptation. Closely allied to this is the temptation to cause the opponents of the view which the writer champions to express themselves as entirely convinced by arguments which are indeed far from convincing. Every now and then, as we read the *Phœdo*, we find ourselves smiling as Simmias or Cebes admits the absolute conclusiveness of the argument.

And, indeed, it may be noted here that the reader of Plato finds himself constantly startled at the contrast between the profundity of the intuitions and the shallowness of the dialectic. Every now and then we come—most commonly in the longer discourses—upon dazzling flashes of intuitive insight into the

deepest problems of human thought which, so to speak, sweep us off our feet, and which account for the enthusiastic veneration with which the deepest thinkers in all ages have hailed Plato as their master, and "the master of those who know." Side by side with these, shortly preceding or shortly following them, we find arguments which, if anyone but Plato had used them, we should not have hesitated to denounce as shallow sophistry. Explanations of this have been given by Dr Jowett and others; but with these explanations we are not here concerned.

The opening argument of the *Phædo*—that based on the proposition that opposites are generated from opposites—is little more than an ingenious play on words. The concluding argument—that based on the proposition that opposites, or the ideas of opposites, mutually exclude one another—is perceived by the hearers to be inconsistent with the opening argument; and Socrates is not particularly happy in his attempt to explain away the inconsistency. This latter argument comes nearer to proving the conclusion sought to be proved than any other argument used by Socrates in the *Phædo*, with the possible exception of the ethical argument to be referred to later. The soul or spirit is the principle of life which gives life to the body while it stays with the body. It therefore excludes its opposite, which is death. When it leaves the body, it causes the radical change in the condition of the body which we call death. But to say that the principle of life itself dies, or ceases to exist, when it leaves the body, is to affirm what comes very near to being a contradiction in terms. This argument has force, but, for reasons which will be suggested later on, it falls decisively short of proving the personal immortality of man, or of the soul of man. What Plato evidently intended to be the main argument of the *Phædo* is the argument based upon the favourite Platonic doctrine of the real existence of abstract ideas, which are eternal and in which the human soul participates. It is from this argument that the concluding argument, just referred to, is developed. This argument, also, is respectable,

as an argument; but it fails to carry conviction nowadays because the premise is not conceded.

In the twenty-three centuries or thereabouts which have elapsed since Plato wrote the *Phædo*, much has been thought and much has been written upon this question of the immortality of man. It would be wholly beyond the scope of the present essay to attempt even a brief summary of the arguments used, even if the present writer had the necessary reading. Those who have curiosity on the subject may be referred to an article in the recently published eleventh edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* under the title "Immortality."

This article can be read in fifteen minutes, and it perhaps contains as full a summary of the modern arguments in favour of man's immortality as could be packed into the same amount of space. The writer classifies the arguments as: (1) *Metaphysical*: based upon the essential nature of the human soul, so far as the intellect of man has been able to apprehend that nature. (2) *Juridical*: the word does not seem to me to be descriptive of what the writer desires to describe, but I adopt it, for want of a better word. Many minds, both before and since the Christian era, have been able to attain to belief in the existence of an all-wise and all-good personal creator of the universe, without the aid of revelation. This belief, coupled with our instinctive perception of what is just and what is unjust—briefly called our sense of justice,—strongly impels us to believe in a future life for each individual personality, in which the shocking injustices of this life may be set right. (3) *Ethical*: life for those who recognise and try to act up to a moral law is a continual struggle to assert the higher nature as against the lower. The lower nature is intimately and necessarily identified with the body. Its impulses are in the nature of bodily appetites. With the higher nature it is wholly different; the more completely it can separate itself from the body and render itself independent of the body, the

more it approximates to its natural perfection. Death is the complete separation of this higher nature from the body; therefore it is only by and through death that this higher nature of ours can attain to that perfect realisation of itself to which, during the term of its imprisonment in the body, it constantly aspires.

This argument, it may be noted, is stated very effectively at the opening of the *Phædo.* It is not stated expressly as an argument for the immortality of the soul; in fact, it is stated before the discussion of the question of immortality begins. It is given as a reason why the true philosopher should not fear death.

(4) *Emotional or affectional.* This is the argument worked out by Tennyson in *In Memoriam.*

To these may be added the argument based upon the universal aspiration of humanity. It is of this argument that Emerson speaks as follows: "The impulse to seek proof of immortality is itself the strongest proof of all." And it is this argument that Addison relies on in the well-known lines:—

> "Else whence this pleasing hope, this fond desire,
> This longing after immortality?"

Upon the whole, it is, perhaps, not too much to say that, confining ourselves to reasons suggested by and addressed to the rational, as distinguished from the emotional, element in man's nature, the argument stands to-day pretty much where Plato left it.

Has the reason of man said its last word on this question? Is it possible for the human reason (and we are concerned here only with reason, and not at all with revelation) to raise the veil in any degree higher than it has been raised? "All-baffled reason cannot wander beyond her chain." Has the limit of the chain been reached, and is that limit to remain where it is as long as human life upon this world shall endure?

Assuredly no effort will be made here to raise the veil in any degree higher than it has been raised. Assuming that

reason has reached the limit of its chain in this regard, I shall try to specify, as definitely as the nature of the case admits of, the limit of what reason has shown that it can do in this matter.

I propose, then, to examine what I conceive to be the strongest abstract argument in favour of the proposition that the human soul or spirit is immortal. I shall then ask, and try to answer as definitely as the case admits of, the question—In what sense, and in what degree, can we justly claim that the proposition is, by this argument, proved?

Before doing this, however, it will be well first to answer, so far as may be, these two questions:—(1) What do we mean by the immortality of the soul? and (2) What do we mean by "proof," when we talk of proving such a proposition as that the soul of man is immortal?

II.

The Question Stated.

When we affirm that the soul of man is immortal, just what do we mean by this proposition? The average man, if this question were put to him, would probably answer: "I know what I mean as definitely as the nature of the case admits of. I mean that the higher element in my nature, the spirit that is in me, does not cease to exist when it leaves the body at the moment of separation which we call death. I mean that this spirit or soul continues to exist after it has finally left the body." But a little reflection will, I think, convince us that, when we speak of the immortality of the soul, we mean something more than this. If we mean nothing more than this, then our belief in immortality does not necessarily imply anything more than the pantheism of Spinoza and other thinkers. If the life or spirit or soul of man be nothing more than an emanation, or mode, or manifestation of the universal Deity, then it is obvious that such spirit or soul may continue to exist after death, and yet that the individual personality may absolutely cease to exist.

Now, it does not need a very strict examination of our consciousness to satisfy us that the idea of continued personal existence is of the very essence of our conception of the immortality of the soul. Some of us may not be able to give a definite account of what we do mean; but with all of us the idea of a continued existence of the conscious personality is present when we think of the immortality of the soul.

Our conception of immortality is necessarily vague, and it is impossible to define it in the sense in which we can define our ideas of material objects, which are apprehended by our senses. But I think it is possible to frame a definition which will bring out the essential element in the conception, and which will enable the average man to form an idea in some degree more definite than that which he had before reading the definition. If I were asked to say what I meant by the immortality of the human soul, I should answer in this way: By the immortality of the human soul I mean that the spiritual, as distinguished from the bodily, element in the nature of each man will continue to exist after death; and that such continuance of existence will be accompanied by a consciousness of continuance of individual personality.

The fact that persistence of personality is, consciously or unconsciously, implied in the conception which men have formed of the immortality of the soul, is curiously exemplified in the manner in which men have, in all ages, associated the idea of immortality with a continued existence of the physical form which the body had in this life. In all ghost-stories the ghost appears in the form of the body with which the spirit of the deceased was associated in this life. When, in the eleventh book of the *Odyssey*, Homer makes his hero visit the regions of the shades, Ulysses there sees his mother and his departed friends in the same forms which their bodies had while they lived and walked upon this earth. Virgil gives his hero a similar experience in the sixth book of the *Æneid*. So of the supposed experience of Dante in his immortal vision.

Whether it be in the *Inferno*, the *Purgatorio*, or the *Paradiso*, he sees the spirits of his departed acquaintances in the same shape which they had upon this earth, and recognises them by that shape. It would be easy to multiply instances. No one needs to be told the part which this belief in the persistence of physical form after death has played in Christian art.

Now, a disembodied spirit, assuming it to still personally exist, is certainly not apprehensible by our senses. This proposition requires no proof. Nor does it need any deep thought to enable us to see that a something which is not apprehensible by our senses cannot have physical form in the sense in which objects which are perceived by our senses have physical form. We may not be prepared to go the whole way with Berkeley. We may not be prepared to admit that we can know nothing regarding external objects beyond the fact that certain sensations or effects are produced on our consciousness by the action of our senses; and that our belief in the actual existence of external objects which, through our senses, cause those effects on consciousness, is a pure assumption. But, whether we accept this doctrine or not, we cannot, I think, escape the conclusion that, if things which are not apprehensible by our senses can have physical form at all, it must be in some sense which entirely transcends our reason. Nor can we, with the reason which God has given us, understand how it could be that a disembodied spirit, not having senses of sight and touch such as ours, could perceive physical form in others, whether material or spiritual.

My aim in saying what has just been said is to make it as clear as may be that, so far as our reason is concerned, the only available test of persistence of personality is persistence of consciousness of personality. Persistence of shape or form there may be in some sense which transcends our reason, but our reason is unable to realise any sense in which form or shape can be predicated of that which is not apprehended by, and which produces no effect upon, our physical senses.

It may be objected here that, with our limited understanding, we can no more conceive how a disembodied spirit can be conscious of persistence of personality than we can conceive how such a spirit can have physical form. To answer this objection fully would call for a deeper analysis of the limits of human thought than I care to attempt here. Suffice it to say that we can perceive that consciousness of persistence of personality is of the very essence of personal immortality. We cannot form the idea of personal immortality without its implying such a consciousness. This is certainly not true of persistence of physical form. Our conception of personal immortality does not, in the least degree, imply a persistence of physical form; and the more deeply we think on the question, the more clearly we perceive that, so far as our reason is concerned, there is no good ground for believing that there is any such persistence.

So much as to the definition of immortality. Now, as to what we mean by proof, when we speak of proving that the soul is immortal.

Proof is the inferring a proposition, the truth of which is not apparent to the mind, from other propositions, the truth of which is apparent to the mind. Writers on logic tell us that there are two kinds of proof—deduction, or the inferring of particular conclusions from universal premises; and induction, or the inferring of universal conclusions from particular premises. In either case, the conclusion is demonstrated, not merely shown to be highly probable. There is a sense, no doubt, in which inductive reasoning can be said never to do more than make the conclusion highly probable. Yet, it is none the less true that, before a perfect inference by way of induction can be made, there must be practical certainty; and further, that our experience amply justifies us in saying that practical certainty can be attained in such matters. Now, the first thing we have to note in regard to proving such a proposition as that the soul is immortal is that proof, in the strict logical sense just referred to, is wholly out of the

question. We might certainly construct a syllogism, which would be perfect as an argument in point of form, and of which the conclusion would be that the soul of John Smith was immortal; but such a syllogism would be open to the serious objection that the major premise begged the question at issue. So, again, if we were allowed to assume that the souls of A and B and C and a number of other persons were immortal, we might infer the conclusion that the souls of all men were immortal; but here again our inference, while correct in form, would obviously have no value whatever as proof.

Therefore, the word proof, if it be applied to the argument in favour of such a proposition as that the soul is immortal, would be a misnomer. If we use it at all, we must keep in mind that we are using it in a sense widely different from that in which it is used by logicians. The most we can hope to do by abstract reasoning for the proposition here in question is to make it appear to be probable. I speak here of the average mind. To some exceptional minds the abstract arguments may seem to approximate to demonstration. It would appear from the *Phædo* that they did so seem to Socrates. But for the great majority of minds — for the average mind—arguments addressed to the reason can at best result in raising a presumption, more or less strong, in favour of the truth of the proposition. If we want to attain to, or approximate to, the condition of practical certainty, we must bring to the aid of our reason another element in our nature.

For, it must always be remembered, a man may attain to practical certainty of a proposition which is by no means axiomatic, and which he may be wholly unable to prove either to himself or to others. Instances of this kind of practical certitude could easily be given, but they will, no doubt, suggest themselves to the reader.

Passing over for the present the aspect of the question here suggested, we shall now proceed to indicate, as definitely as may be, the kind and degree of probability that may be reached by abstract reasoning.

III.

The Limits of Possible Solution Indicated.

We see a friend die. We see the dead body after death. We feel sure that that body is not the person we knew in life. The mysterious something which constituted his personality, which made him what he was, is gone. The body lying there has still the same physical form, but it is no more the personality we knew than any article of furniture in the room is that personality. So far there is no doubt. But then comes the great question—what has become of the personality which has gone? To this question we may give one of three answers:—It has ceased to exist. It continues to exist. We have no means of knowing whether it still exists or not.

In deciding which of the three answers we shall give, the following considerations must be taken into account, In the first place, it is now clear that the body and the mysterious something which constituted the personality were separate and distinct existences. During life they were intimately and mysteriously associated, but even then we could perceive that they were distinct; and the better a man the deceased was, the more apparent was it that these two elements in his being were in conflict. Again, a little thought will suffice to convince us that the fact that the spirit, after it has left the body, is not in any way perceptible by our senses, does not give rise to even the slightest presumption that it has ceased to exist. It was not perceptible by our senses when it was united to the body during life. It manifested its presence in various ways, through the instrumentality of the body, by speech and by action. But the spirit, the personality, the mysterious something, which was behind this speech and this action, could not be seen or heard or touched by us. Death has finally separated the two. The spirit remains after death, just as it was before death, incapable of being apprehended by our senses. Obviously, this fact does not, after death, give rise to any presumption that

the spirit has ceased to exist, any more than the same fact gave rise, during life, to a presumption that it did not then exist.

Further, we can now perceive, more clearly than we could while he was alive, that the mysterious something which is gone—we may call it soul or spirit or personality—was the higher and better part of him. This too we saw "as through a glass darkly" while he was alive. We saw that he had two natures; that the body, and the appetites and impulses more intimately associated with the body, constituted his lower nature; that he had a better and nobler nature aspiring after higher and holier things; that these two natures were in conflict; and that his moral standing as a man depended upon which of the two natures habitually prevailed. All this we realise more fully now. We see what a poor, helpless, inert thing the body is in itself, now that the spirit is gone. From this fuller realisation we naturally pass to this further thought. Death has separated the spirit from the body. In making this separation, it has not annihilated the body. The body still exists. It is there, and we can see and touch it. True, if left to itself, it will, after a time, undergo those modifications known as decay; but even then its substance will not cease to exist, but will only be changed into other forms. If death, then, in causing the final separation, does not terminate the existence of the body, which is the lower element in man, is it likely that it terminates the existence of the spirit, which is the higher element?

So far, I think, most men of fair mind, who may read this argument understandingly, will go with me. It appears to me that this argument does make it at least probable that the spiritual element in man is not annihilated by death. But the pantheist will claim that it does nothing more than this. The objection which you state to the theory of annihilation, he will say, is fully met by pantheism, and fully met without in the least conceding the personal immortality of man. You have given a strong reason for believing that the spiritual element in each man survives death, but you have given no

reason for believing that the individual personality of each man survives death.

I confess I find it hard to answer this objection in any way which I can feel confident will prove convincing to other minds. To me, thinking as deeply as I can over the argument as I have stated it, and striving to see as clearly as I can all that it fairly implies, it does seem that the reasoning goes far enough to raise a presumption in favour of the continued existence of the individual personality. Death has not destroyed the distinctive form of the body: why, then, should we believe that it has destroyed the individual personality of the spirit? But I cannot conceal from myself the fact that other thinkers, more profound than I can pretend to be, have regarded the objection to the theory of annihilation, which I have stated, as being fully met by the pantheistic answer. I have already indicated what that answer is, and need not repeat it here. Suffice it to say that it affirms the immortality of the spirit or soul of man, but denies a personal immortality to the individual man.

Confining myself, then, for the present to the single argument which I have stated, I affirm that, for the great majority of fair-minded men, the argument, when fully and clearly understood, will suffice to raise a strong presumption in favour of the conclusion that the spiritual element in man does, in some sense, survive death; and further, that, for a large number of fair-minded men (the proportion, of course, I cannot even approximate), the argument will suffice to raise a presumption in favour of the conclusion that the spiritual personality of each individual man survives death, in the sense above indicated.

There are, of course, other arguments besides the one here relied on. The leading arguments have been briefly referred to in the first part of this essay. Both of the conclusions just stated—that as to general immortality and that as to individual or personal immortality—might be to some extent fortified by the use of these other arguments. The conclusion as

to personal immortality might certainly be fortified by the juridical and ethical arguments above stated. But the result in each case would only be to somewhat increase the degree of probability. The resulting statement, as regards the general degree of approximation to certainty which may be attained by arguments addressed merely to the reason, would still remain the same.

But, it will be said, as a matter of fact, many men have in all ages, in regard to this question, passed far beyond mere probability, and attained to practical certainty. There are, so far as I can see, three ways in which men have done this. Firstly, by faith in a direct revelation from the Supreme Being, which is above and beyond our reason. Secondly, in the case of those exceptional minds above referred to, by a process of reasoning. And thirdly, by calling in the aid of the emotional element in human nature to fortify and intensify the conviction which is prompted by the personal experience of such belief in others, and of the moral results which such belief in others is able to realise. Of the first two ways nothing further need be said here. With a few words in regard to the third way, I shall conclude this essay.

After all, the great argument of the *Phœdo* is not what Socrates said, but what Socrates did. I can well imagine that the disciples, when they left the prison, after taking their last look at the bodily form from which the spirit of their master had departed, may have felt an absolute conviction that that spirit and that personality had not ceased to exist. But that conviction was not the result of his arguments. It was the result of what they had seen and what they knew as to how he lived and how he died. They knew that he was their superior, morally and mentally. They had seen how calmly and nobly, without the least suggestion of ostentation or vain-glory, he had triumphed over the fear of death. They had seen how, up almost to the very moment when the effect of the poison had separated his spirit from his body, he had retained a calm but absolute confidence that, while death might separate,

it could not destroy. Were they to believe, could they believe, that that confidence was a delusion?

And for us, nowadays, even a higher degree of certitude is possible than was possible for them. Our certitude can be higher in degree just in proportion as the moral law introduced by Christianity is higher than any moral law that was known to Socrates or his disciples. The two great basic principles of Christian morality are stated in the two great beatitudes: "Blessed are the clean of heart," and "Blessed are the merciful." Or, to put it as St James puts it: "Religion, clean and undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation; and to keep one's self unspotted from the world." The habitual subjection of the gross and earthly element to the pure and spiritual element in our nature; the habitual dwelling of the mind upon high and holy and clean thoughts; this, combined with the habitual living for others rather than for self, constitutes the highest type of Christian life, and therefore the highest type of moral life, known to men. No one, who does not know it by actual experience, can realise the extent to which a man or a woman of this type can acquire the faculty of habitually realising the unseen; of living for and in the things that are not perceived by our senses. We have all of us known at least some few men and women who have lived this life. We have seen upon their faces at times an expression which has helped us to realise what (if, indeed, in some way that is above our reason, spirits have forms like unto ours) may be the expression on the faces of angels; which has helped us to feel the full force and meaning of those beautiful lines of Milton:—

> "A thousand liveried angels lackey her,
> Driving far off each thought of sin and guilt,
> And, in clear dream and solemn vision,
> Tell her of things that no gross ear can hear.
> Till oft converse with heavenly habitants
> Begins to cast a beam on the outward shape,
> The unpolluted temple of the mind,
> And turns it by degrees to the soul's essence,
> Till all be made immortal."

Some of us, at least, have had the privilege—I say it advisedly—of seeing such a man die. We have seen him sustained to the last gleams of expiring consciousness by the absolute confidence of a personal immortality, and in and by that confidence we have seen him triumph over the terror of death. For our present purpose, it matters not how he came to have that confidence. It may have come to him, as it seems to have come to Socrates, as the result of a process of abstract reasoning; it may have come to him, as it came to the early Christian martyrs, as the result of an absolute and unquestioning acceptance of a revelation; it may have come to him because he has had some such experience as we are here endeavouring to describe. But, however it came, it is there, and being there, it imparts to him a spiritual strength and courage which is superhuman, almost to the very moment of the final parting. As a result, we, who have known what he was in life, and who have seen him die, feel an abiding, overmastering conviction that his life has not proved vain; that his belief has not proved a delusion; that, somehow and somewhere, his spirit still exists with a consciousness of continuing to be the same personality that it was when united to the body upon this earth.

Let me not be misunderstood. I am not here describing this experience with the intent of using it as an argument in favour of the personal immortality of the soul with those who have not themselves had the experience. It is of the very essence of the kind of certitude, an idea of which I am now trying to convey, that it arises from the actual having of the experience. The narrative of the experience addressed to others as an argument in favour of the personal immortality of the soul amounts to nothing more than saying: Someone better than you in every way has believed; therefore you may well believe. This is not without force as an argument; yet, for obvious reasons, it will fail to bring conviction in the great majority of cases. But the man who has had the experience does not rest his certitude upon this argument.

He is not merely believing because his friend believed. He has a certitude which transcends argument. He is certain of a proposition which is not self-evident and which he cannot demonstrate. He will, if he be wise, accept his certitude as a fact, and not allow his reason to undermine it by demanding that he shall render an account of how and whence it has come.

The conclusion of the whole matter, then, is this. For those who will accept no test but reason, and who will not believe the proposition unless and until it is proved by arguments addressed to their reason, there can be nothing beyond probability. This probability will be greater or less according to the special character of the particular mind to which the arguments are addressed. For some few very exceptional minds it may approximate to certainty. But as a general proposition, and in the great majority of cases, certainty, or practical certainty, can only be attained by either one of two classes:—Firstly, by those who are still able, in this age of higher criticism and scientifie doubt, to accept a revelation with that simple, childlike, and absolute faith with which the Christian revelation was accepted by the Christians of the earlier centuries, and with which the same revelation was subsequently accepted by probably the great majority of the people of Europe in those ages which some call the dark ages, and others the ages of faith. And, secondly, by those who have had such a personal experience as I have endeavoured to describe above, and who are wise enough and strong enough not to allow the corroding acid of intellectual doubt to eat into and destroy the blessed certitude which, apart from revelation, such an experience alone is able to bestow.

WILLIAM DILLON.

CHICAGO.

BRAHMA.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE CENTRAL DOCTRINE OF HINDU THEOLOGY AS UNDERSTOOD IN THE EAST AND MISUNDERSTOOD IN THE WEST.

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I.

MANY Christian scholars of distinguished ability have been most disinterestedly devoting their lives to the study of non-Christian thought of all times and countries during the last three-quarters of a century. As in this study a place, by no means unimportant, is occupied by Indo-Aryan thought, much work has been done by these scholars to make its teachings known among Christian peoples. This is proved by the fact, among others, that not less than seventy per cent. of the volumes published in "The Sacred Books of the East" series treat of the subject. Notwithstanding all this, however, we are surprised to come across strange remarks made by some of the most eminent Christian thinkers about Indo-Aryan thought in general, and particularly about that branch of it which is called the Vedanta.

We—that is, the followers and admirers of the Vedanta—need not complain if Christian thinkers, like Dr James, remark, in a jeering tone, that "the paragon of all monistic systems is the Vedanta philosophy of Hindustan" (*Pragmatism*, p. 151). For, in the first place, Dr James, in making the above remark, is evidently referring to one particular phase or branch of the

Vedanta, and that too as interpreted by one modern Vedanta thinker, namely, Swami Vivekananda. And, in the second place, no follower of the Vedanta need be perturbed by the adverse remarks of those Christian thinkers, like Dr James, who make the truth or falsity of the solutions of philosophical problems a matter to be decided by popular vote. For they fully believe in the expounders of the Vedanta when the latter teach that even to understand philosophy a man is required not only to have undergone a long intellectual and moral discipline, but also to have lived a long spiritual life.

We have, however, a right to complain when such Christian thinkers as Professor Howison make assertions like the following: "For, to take the situation in, we must bear in mind that to every older religion, even the most improved and enlightened, such as that of the Jews, the very essence of the Divine lay in an exaltation above all categories in which man could share—lay in its intrinsic and unapproachable *sovereignty*. God, in all these religions, is at best conceived as an awful and ineffable Majesty, before whom even angels and archangels may only veil their faces, prostrate themselves, and cry 'Holy, holy, holy! *Lord*, God *Almighty!* There is none like unto Thee!' How much more, then, must men lie prostrate and keep silent before Him! . . . To break away from this magisterial and monarchical conception of God, which left men nothing but the submissive subjects of a Lord, ... was indeed a great and unprecedented step. But Jesus took it. Instead of Majesty and a Lord, he presents God as the Friend and moral Father of men, who calls every human being, every spirit, to the equality of sharing in that fullness of spiritual powers which constitutes the Divine Glory" (*The Limits of Evolution*, pp. 252–254).

When Professor Howison makes such a sweeping assertion in reference to every religion that existed in the world before Christianity was born, we feel tempted to inquire if he has ever read anything about what are called the Aryan religions in general, and the Indo-Aryan religion in particular? Does

he know, for instance, what is said by Dr Tiele, who classifies all religions in the world that existed before Christianity into two families—namely, the family of the Semitic or theocratic religion, and that of the Aryan or theanthropic religion: "If the feeling of God's exaltation and absolute sovereignty over man predominates in the theocratic religions, in the theanthropic it is the intimate relation between God and man that comes into the foreground" (*Elements of the Science of Religion*, vol. i. p. 160).

Though, however, we may successfully appeal to Dr Tiele against the adverse remarks of Professor Howison, still there is ample ground for us to complain against Dr Tiele also, for he says: "In order to see these (*i.e.* theanthropic) religions in full vigour we should study the Indian examples. All the other theanthropic religions of which historical records exist have come more or less into contact with the theocratic, and have been influenced by them. . . . But it seems to me very doubtful whether the Aryans of India ever came under Semitic influence, so as to lead them to adopt anything from a theocratic religion. We there, accordingly, become acquainted with theanthropism in extreme one-sidedness. The offerings, at first regarded as homage to the gods and as means of strengthening them or of securing their help, then become mere mystic observances, which have no connection with any definite god, but are only intended to procure supernatural power for the worshippers, in order that they may counteract the power of the hostile spirits. And these practices accordingly soon fall into disrepute. This superhuman power can be procured better in other ways, as by calm meditation and abstinence. For by these means, by one's own power and exertions, one can attain the *moksha* or redemption—that is, one may thus become exalted above all that is finite and limited, above pleasure and pain, above desire and aversion, above love and hatred,—and one can thus attain a condition which, consistently carried out, culminates in non-existence, in Buddhistic Nirvana. But in this condition man becomes equal—nay, superior—to the gods.

. . . The Indian pantheism, which identifies the individual soul with the world-soul, paves the way for different systems and for Buddhism, which is only to a small extent a reaction against Brahmanism, but is mainly a continuation of it. It has been called atheistic ; and so it is, from the theocratic point of view, as well as from our own ; but in reality it is not. It exalts man to the throne of the highest deity. . . . And thus theanthropism, in its one-sided development, with an almost entire disregard for the truth embodied in the theocratic religions, has reached its final goal. God, in the theocratic sense, has been dethroned, and man has become God" (vol. i. pp. 169–171).

Then, after having shown the equally one-sided growth and the consequent defects of the theocratic religions, Dr Tiele concludes: "In Christianity this confluence of the two great streams of development is consummated. While Buddhism has reached the extreme limit in the theanthropic direction, and all the Divine unites in the Illuminated, but soon again to degenerate into a complex mythology and abject superstition, and while Islam in its almost fatalistic monotheism represents the extremest theocracy, and at the same time falls back to a great extent into the old particularism, Christianity unites the two opposite doctrines of transcendency and immanency by its ethical conception of the Fatherhood of God, which embraces both the exaltation of God above man and man's relationship with God" (vol. i. pp. 208–209).

What we have most to complain of in these remarks of Dr Tiele is, first, his almost surreptitious introduction of the word "pantheism" with the word "Indian" prefixed to it, without even saying to which phase of Indian thought he refers; in the second place, his assertion that the Indo-Aryan thought does not contain, in due proportion, the best element of what he calls theocratic religions ; in the third place, his assertion that Buddhism was the first outcome of the Indo-Aryan thought as a whole; and in the fourth place, his assertion that Buddhism was followed by nothing but "complex myth-

ology and abject superstition." We cannot help feeling that a scholar who makes such assertions must have completely misunderstood the place which Buddhism occupies in the whole course of the Indo-Aryan thought, and must be totally ignorant of the line of development which that thought took after Buddhism.

It is not necessary to quote any remarks of other Christian thinkers about Indo-Aryan thought which strike us as strange; but perhaps two more deserve to be quoted. Says Dr Caird: "The Indian mind is never very far from an abstract pantheism; and before the Vedic collection of hymns was completed, it had reached and expressed it in no uncertain sound" (*The Evolution of Religion*, vol. i. p. 262). And last, but not least, Professor Watson says: "Where, as in Ancient India, pantheism was not a mere doctrine but a life, its fruits appeared indifferent to the wildest excesses of passion or in the conservation of immemorial customs" (*The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, p. 464).

We think that we have a special ground for complaining against such remarks coming from Christian thinkers who belong to the school of thought to which Dr Caird and Professor Watson belong, *i.e.* the school of Constructive Idealism. For, in the first place, they, as well as Christian thinkers of other schools, should bear in mind that in Ancient India there was not *one* system of thought, but *many* systems existing side by side; and the germs, and nothing more than germs, of all these systems are contained in the Upanishads. Whether, therefore, they speak of the earlier germs of Indian thought, or of the later systems of that thought, it is, to say the least, uncharitable on their part to give one name to all those systems or their germs, and that a name, the very application of which to any system of thought would be sufficient to condemn it. Moreover, in the second place, the Constructive Idealists ought not to forget that the Christian scholars who have, until now, contributed to spreading the fame, good or ill, of Indian thought among Christian peoples,

have been, without an exception, dualists—if not Deists. That being so, it was but natural that they should apply to the monistic systems of the Indian thought with which they first came into contact the name of the only monistic system of Western thought which they already knew, or of which they had already heard, namely, Pantheism. And the name, once given, has stuck. Remembering, accordingly, how those Christian thinkers who do not belong to their school of thought yet stigmatise their doctrine by calling it pantheism—even Oriental pantheism,—the Constructive Idealists should pause to consider whether a real injustice might not have previously been done to that system of Indian thought which is regarded as coming nearest to pantheism, namely, the Vedanta as expounded by Shankar.

In order that those Constructive Idealists who happen to come across this paper may be able to judge for themselves as to whether the charge of pantheism, brought against the Indo-Aryan thought in general and the Vedanta in particular, is justified, I proceed to give below a sketch of the Vedanta as interpreted and expounded by Shankar, both in its religious and in its philosophical aspects. For, if there is any system of the Indo-Aryan thought which is open to the charge of pantheism, it is the Vedanta as interpreted and expounded by Shankar. If, therefore, it can be shown that even the Vedanta is not open to that charge, then, of course, all the other forms of the Indo-Aryan thought must necessarily be pronounced "not guilty," at least on this count. It may be added that, even granting this form of the Vedanta to be pantheistic, it does not follow that this judgment ought to be extended to the other forms of the Vedanta or of Indo-Aryan thought, unless each of them has been carefully studied, and unless all that can be said in justification of each of them has been attentively and patiently heard.

A word of caution must be added before we begin the sketch. It is true that Shankar does use words in connection with the world, for instance, which in the ordinary sense are

usually and correctly translated by such English words as "illusion," "unreal," "name and form," etc. It is not fair, however, to take words or phrases at random from a system of philosophy, and translate them into another language as if they were used in their ordinary sense. For it may be, as it is in the case of the Vedanta, that those words and phrases are used in a highly technical sense. The readers of this paper, therefore, are requested to forget, for the moment, all that they may have already read or heard about the Vedanta, and to read the following sketch as if they were reading or hearing about Indo-Aryan thought for the first time.

II.

The fundamental position of the Vedanta is that *All this is Brahma.* In order to understand what this means, let us first trace the steps by which the Vedanta reaches this proposition.

(1) The first of these steps is that Brahma is, and that Brahma is the cause of the creation, sustenance, and dissolution of *all this*, *i.e.* of the entire world with every thing and being that exists in it, and every change and event that takes place in it[1] (*Brahma Sutras*, I. i. 2). (2) The second of these steps is that Brahma, which created the whole world, is itself uncreated, *i.e.* is eternal (*Brahma Sutras*, II. iii. 9).

But the proposition that the uncaused, eternal Brahma produced the world, requires explanation in order to be properly understood. For it may be variously interpreted. It may be said, for instance, that, side by side with Brahma and independently of it, existed, from eternity, matter in its primary form, and that Brahma produced the world by means of this matter. But this is not the meaning of the above proposition as it is maintained by the Vedanta. (3) For the Vedanta teaches that there is no material element that was not produced by Brahma (*Brahma Sutras*, II. iii.

[1] For the present we shall suppose that human souls are only a part of the world and on the same level with the other parts.

1–8, 10–15). Again, it may be said that though Brahma produced the primary material elements, still, it bestowed on them such power or powers that all the later production of the world was due to the activities of these elements; so that the activity of Brahma was not, or is not afterwards, required for the creation of the world. But even this is not the Vedanta interpretation of the proposition that Brahma created the world. (4) According to the Vedanta, that proposition means that when (for instance) the first material elements were produced by Brahma, it entered into and lived in each of them as its self; and that, when afterwards new things were produced, apparently by the combination of two or more of these elements, it was really Brahma, living in the elements combined as the self of each of them, that produced those things by its own direct activity (*Brahma Sutras*, II. iii. 13; II. iv. 20).

According to this Vedanta view, not only were the elementary constituents of the world created by Brahma by its direct activity, but the whole world, with every thing and being that exists in it, and every event and change that takes place in it, is wholly due to the direct activity of Brahma as the self of that which seems to be its physical cause. For instance, if fire burns anything, then the Vedanta holds that really it is Brahma, living in fire as its self, that burns that thing. If oxygen and hydrogen, when combined in a given proportion, produce water, then the Vedanta maintains that it is Brahma, living in oxygen and hydrogen combined as the self of each of them, that produces water. If from one living being is produced another living being, then the Vedanta maintains that it is Brahma, living in the former as its self, that produces the latter. If from one rational animal another rational animal is produced, then the Vedanta holds that it is Brahma, living in the former as its self, that produces the latter. If ever it could be shown that from an inanimate thing a living being is produced, or that from a non-rational being a rational being is produced,

then the Vedanta will hold that it was Brahma, living in the former as its self, that produced the latter.

Before, however, we fully understand the Vedanta view of the creation of the world by Brahma, one more point must be taken into consideration. We have seen that, according to the Vedanta, the elementary constituents of the world were created by Brahma by its direct activity, and that every thing that is constituted by these elements is also created by Brahma by its direct activity. In other words, all the activity that is manifested in the world belongs directly to Brahma. But this may be taken to mean that the primary elements (*e.g.*) were first created by Brahma by its omnipotence; and then, by externally using these elements and their mixtures or combinations as material, Brahma worked them into the vast multiplicity of things and beings that make up the world, by means of its power—just as a potter produces pots out of clay, or a goldsmith produces ornaments out of gold. The only difference being, that the potter or the goldsmith does not produce the clay or gold, nor does he live in it; but Brahma itself produced the primary matter of the world and lived in it. This view of production expressed above is technically expressed by saying that Brahma is only the efficient cause of the world, but not the material cause. This, however, is not the Vedanta view of the creation of the world by Brahma. (5) For it explicitly and emphatically maintains that Brahma is the material as well as the efficient cause of that which it produces (*Brahma Sutras*, I. iv. 23–27).

And this fifth step takes us directly to the fundamental position of the Vedanta, namely, *all this is Brahma.* For, if not only the efficient but also the material cause of all this is Brahma, then it necessarily follows as a corollary that all this is Brahma—in the same way as every thing the material cause of which is clay, is clay; or every thing the material cause of which is gold, is gold. Nay, that all this is Brahma is true in a fuller, deeper, and more accurate sense than that clay-pots

are clay, or that gold ornaments are gold. For clay-pots are clay and gold ornaments are gold *only* in respect of their material cause, but *not* in respect of their efficient cause; but all *this*, *i.e.* the world, is Brahma, not only in respect of its material cause, but also in respect of its efficient cause.

This proposition of the Vedanta, however, naturally gives rise to two questions, namely: (1) If all this is Brahma and everywhere there is Brahma, why do we not see it anywhere? (2) If all this is Brahma, does what we common people call the material and mental world exist according to the Vedanta; and if it exists, how is it related to Brahma? Let us take the latter question first.

The first part of this question is whether, on the Vedanta view that all this is Brahma, the world of finite material and mental things, beings, qualities, and states, has or has not any existence? In order to arrive at the answer to this question, let us take into consideration those theories of Indian philosophy which the expounder of the Vedanta, namely Shankar, rejects.

(1) The first of these theories is that nothing whatever exists—neither the material world nor the mental world, not to speak of Brahma or the human soul. This view is known as the *Shūnya-Vāda.* Shankar rejects this view by saying that, since it is opposed to all means or tests of knowledge, it is not worth consideration (*Brahma Sutras*, II. ii. 31).

(2) The second of these theories agrees with the first in maintaining that neither Brahma nor the human soul nor the external world exists; but it maintains that the mental world, in the form of mental states, exists. This view is known as the *Vijñāna-Vāda.* Shankar rejects this view by saying that, in the absence of the soul and the material world, there cannot be even a mental world; and that anyone who asserts that the external world does not exist is as untrustworthy and makes himself as ridiculous as one who, being hungry, is eating food, and is enjoying the consequent satisfaction, and yet asserts that he is neither hungry nor

eating nor enjoying the satisfaction (*Brahma Sutras*, II. ii. 28–31). Since, then, Shankar deliberately rejects both these views, he must so far be understood to admit that both the material and the mental worlds exist.

(3) But now comes before us a third view, which admits that both the material and the mental worlds exist; but maintains that every thing that exists has only a momentary existence. This view is known as the *Kshanika-Vāda*. Shankar rejects this view, holding that, on the supposition that nothing exists more than a moment, the world—its existence and continuance—cannot be accounted for (*Brahma Sutras*, II. ii. 18–27). So Shankar, as he rejects all these three views, is bound to admit that the external and internal world, as we know it, exists.

(4) We have now to notice a fourth view, which admits that the world exists as we know it; but maintains that what is known as the human soul and the mental life of man is only a modification of inanimate and non-intelligent matter. Those who maintain this view are known as the *Lokāyatiks*. Shankar rejects this view also, maintaining that it is beyond all doubt that the human soul exists apart from, and independent of, the human body, *i.e.* matter (*Brahma Sutras*, III. iii. 53–54). He must, therefore, be regarded as holding that the external world, the inner world, and the human soul exist; and that the human soul is not a modification of matter, but is independent of it.

(5) At this point, therefore, the second part of our present question arises, namely: If, according to the Vedanta, the world in all its aspects, together with the human soul, has existence, how is it related to Brahma? And here we come across a theory of the Indian philosophy which admits the conclusion reached by the rejection of the above-mentioned four theories, but denies the existence of Brahma, and attributes the creation, sustenance, and dissolution of the world to an inanimate and non-intelligent primary matter called the *Pradhāna*. This view is known as the *Pradhāna-Vāda*.

Shankar rejects this view, maintaining that the non-intelligent being, such as the *Pradhāna*, cannot produce the world—nay, cannot have any activity whatsoever, *unless* it is put into activity by an intelligent being; and, since this cannot be done by the human soul, the existence of Brahma must be admitted (*Brahma Sutras*, II. ii. 1–10).

(6) But here comes before us another view which admits that the world exists, that the human soul exists and is independent of matter, and that Brahma also exists as the cause of the world; but maintains that Brahma is only the efficient cause of the world, the material cause being the *Pradhāna*, which exists eternally with, and independent of, Brahma, and which Brahma uses as the matter for the creation of the world. This view of the Indian philosophy is known as the *Ishvar-Vāda.* Shankar rejects this view, holding, as we saw, that Brahma is the material as well as the efficient cause of the world (*Brahma Sutras*, II. ii. 37–41).

(7) And, holding this view, Shankar agrees with a view known as the *Bhagavata-Vāda*, so far as it maintains that Brahma is the material as well as the efficient cause of the world, but rejects it for some other elements in that view (*Brahma Sutras*, II. ii. 42–45).

So, by considering the critical parts of the Vedanta, we have reached the same proposition at which we arrived by considering the constructive parts of it, namely, the proposition that Brahma is the material as well as the efficient cause of the world. But we have now learnt that Shankar expressly, deliberately, and emphatically insists that it is wrong to hold that the world—either external or internal—does not exist, or that it exists but the existence of every thing in it is strictly momentary, or that it exists as we know it but human souls as such have no existence.

So far, then, the answer to the question, Does the Vedanta, as interpreted and expounded by Shankar, deny the existence of the world? must emphatically be in the negative. And the answer to the question, What, according to the Vedanta, is the

relation of the world with Brahma, or of Brahma with the world? is, that the relation is such that Brahma is the material as well as the efficient cause of the world, and of every thing and being that exists in it. It is easy to see that, on this view of the relation between the world and Brahma, the world cannot even merely exist apart from Brahma. In other words, the materialistic view of the world is an abstract view of it. Similarly, the world, as we ordinarily see or know it, is a mere abstraction, and could have or can have no existence whatsoever apart from Brahma. This view is expressed by Shankar by saying that the world is *ananya*, *i.e.* non-different from Brahma. And if the world, if *all this*, is thus non-different from Brahma, then we can truly say that *all this is Brahma*. For all this literally lives and can live, moves and can move, and has and can have its very being only in, through, and on account of Brahma. So, wherever we see any thing or being, there is Brahma inseparably bound up with it, and existing through and through inside it and outside it. To express this relationship of the world to Brahma, the Vedanta calls Brahma the *Paramātmā* (*i.e.* the highest soul), *Jagadātmā* (*i.e.* the soul of the world), *Sarvātmā* (*i.e.* the soul of all).

The only question that remains now to be considered is this: If Brahma is thus everywhere, why do we nowhere see it? In order to get and understand the answer to this question, it is necessary first to consider two other questions, namely: (1) What is the nature of Brahma as the soul of all? (2) Is the relation between the human soul and Brahma the same as that between the other parts of the world and Brahma, or different from it; and, if different, what is that relation?

III.

What, then, is the nature of Brahma, according to the Vedanta as interpreted by Shankar? Before explaining how the Vedanta defines Brahma, it is necessary to insist upon two

or three points, and to request the reader carefully to bear them in mind. One of these points is that the founders of the Vedanta did *not* get their conception of Brahma by the process of what is called "abstraction"—the process, namely, by which Parmenides is said to have arrived at his conception of Being, or Spinoza at his conception of Substance, or Spencer at his conception of the Unknowable. They arrived at it by Revelation—which, in the language of the Vedanta, means Divine Inspiration, or spiritual insight. And the expounders and the followers of the Vedanta accept the conception of Brahma as it is defined in the inspired works of the founders of the Vedanta, known under the name of the Upanishads. In order to understand and appreciate the Vedanta properly, it is most important carefully to remember this point. And, if we remember this, then we can at once see that one of the chief objections that is brought against pantheism does not at all apply to the Vedanta. This objection is that, if we get the conception of a being by eliminating all differences, then that being cannot be the source of those differences. Thus, it is said about the Substance of Spinoza that, "as all differences vanish in it, so no differences can proceed from or be predicated of it. It not only contains in it no principle of self-determination, but it is itself the negation of all determinations" (John Caird's *Spinoza*, p. 140).

But still it may be asked, Does Brahma, as it is conceived by Shankar, contain any principle of self-determination? And the answer is that Shankar most clearly and emphatically maintains that Brahma does contain such a principle. And this principle is what, in the Vedanta language, is called *Māyā*. Now, the Sanskrit word *Māyā* ordinarily means illusion. But in the Vedanta, as expounded by Shankar, the term *Māyā* is used in several technical senses. In the present case it is used to denote the absolute *potentiality* of the whole world that is to be, but is not yet. And Shankar points out that unless we regard Brahma as possessing *Māyā* in this sense, Brahma cannot be the cause of the world. Since, however,

this *Māyā* is a mere *potentiality*, it is neither a thing or being, nor a quality; it is nothing that is real, and yet it is not unreal. In other words, it is absolutely indescribable (*Brahma Sutras*, I. iv. 3). It is completely under the control of Brahma, and Brahma is absolutely free with reference to it (*Brahma Sutras*, I. iv. 3).

Another point which ought to be carefully borne in mind is that Shankar not only indirectly admits, but explicitly maintains, that the world—external as well as internal—exists, and has the same qualities, etc., as it is known to possess through perception, inference, and other means[1] of knowledge. And of this world (which, for our present argument, may be taken to include human souls), according to the Vedanta, Brahma is the cause, in the sense explained above.

One more point that ought to be remembered is this: According to the Vedanta view of Brahma being the cause of the world, the relation between the world and Brahma is analogous to that between a body and its soul. Thus Brahma is the soul of which the whole world is the body. Now, if we take a human being that forms a part of the world, we find, on the Vedanta view, that his body has for its soul what is called the human soul embodied in that body; but the soul of that soul (and therefore also of the body) is Brahma, which is the soul of the world and everything in it. Evidently, the soul of the human soul is, in all respects, superior to the human soul. This being granted, the Vedanta applies the same threefold gradation to the case of the world. For it maintains that the world is the body; Brahma, as the cause of this world, is the soul of this body. In this sense, Brahma is often called Ishvar.

[1] If, notwithstanding this, any serious student of the Vedanta doubts the truth of the assertion that Shankar admits and maintains the existence and reality of the world, all that can be said is that he should define his test of what he understands by the reality of the world, so that it may be possible to consider and decide whether, on Shankar's view, the world does not stand that test.

IV.

According to the Vedanta view, a human being consists of two parts, the body and the soul. The body is a highly complex material object formed by the combination of a large number of constituents. And, like any other complex material object, each human body has for its self Brahma as the self of its constituents. This body is used and controlled by the human soul embodied in it (*Brahma Sutras*, II. i. 6). And this human soul has for its self Brahma. But the most important point to remember in this respect is that Brahma, which is the self of each human soul, is Brahma in its *unmodified* form, not Brahma as the self of some created thing (*Brahma Sutras*, II. iii. 17). This fact, according to the Vedanta, constitutes the most fundamental difference between man, *i.e.* the human soul, on the one hand, and on the other hand every other finite thing in this world (that is, the world in which man lives). For there is no other finite thing in this world which has the unmodified Brahma for its self, and which, like the human soul, is by nature conscious and self-conscious (*Brahma Sutras*, II. iii. 18). But the human soul is not only conscious and self-conscious like Brahma, but is, like Brahma, eternal and all-pervading or infinite (*Brahma Sutras*, II. iii. 16 and 29). Man, therefore, according to the Vedanta, is Brahma in a sense in which no other thing or being in this world is Brahma. It is for this reason that this world and every thing in it, other than man, may be called (and is called) the body of Brahma, which is its self; but the Vedanta, as expounded by Shankar, never calls the human soul Brahma's body, but only Brahma's *ansa* (*i.e.* part) or *abhas* (*i.e.* reflection): in what sense, we shall immediately see (*Brahma Sutras*, II. iii. 43–45; II. iii. 50).

Though, however, the human soul is thus essentially superior to all other things in this world, and is in a special sense Brahma, still it is inferior to Brahma. For it is mostly ignorant, simple, weak, and subject to pain and misery; while

Brahma is omniscient, omnipotent, and absolutely free from sin, pain, or misery (*Brahma Sutras*, I. ii. 2–8; II. i. 22). And it is to indicate this inferiority of the human soul to Brahma that the Vedanta, as we saw, calls the former a part or reflection of the latter.

We have just seen how, on the Vedanta view, the human soul is Brahma in a sense in which no other thing in this world is Brahma. But there is another reason why the Vedanta teaches that the human soul is Brahma. It does so not only because, according to it, as we saw, the human soul has for itself Brahma in its unmodified form, but also because the human soul has the inborn and inalienable capacity for completely realising or directly experiencing this fact. On this view, the relation between Brahma and the human soul is, in fact, one that can be best expressed by saying that each is the self of the other. It may here be noticed in passing that, from the above account, it is abundantly clear that the Vedanta is not open to the charge that is brought against pantheism, that "Pantheism conceives of the Divine as equally manifested in nature and in mind" (Watson's *Philosophical Basis of Religion*, p. 444).

So far, we have considered the teaching of the Vedanta as regards the relation of man to the material world on the one hand, and to Brahma on the other. Turning now to its teaching as regards the relation between man and man, we have to observe that, according to the Vedanta, human beings naturally differ from one another, not only in respect of their bodily attributes, but also in respect of their intellectual, moral, and spiritual capacities—the difference being due to their previous lives. From this it follows, in the first place, that, according to the Vedanta, one man may be inferior or superior to another in his bodily, intellectual, moral, and spiritual attributes; and that, in the second place, every man is or becomes what he makes himself. That is, he has complete freedom to determine his destiny. This Vedanta view is embodied in what may be called the *Law of Karma*. This

being so, the Vedanta is not open to the objection brought against pantheism, namely, that "its theory . . . . is the radical contradiction of real freedom and significant immortality" (Howison's *The Limits of Evolution*, p. 75). We may here notice, in passing, that Professor Royce, taking by itself the theory embodied in this *Law of Karma*, asks: "Admit that, and what logically follows?" And he answers: "It follows, so I must insist, that the moral world itself, which this free-will theory of the source of evil thus abstractly stated was to save, is destroyed in its very heart and centre" (*The Studies of Good and Evil*, p. 12). But may we ask, "thus abstractly stated" by whom or by what? Not, of course, by the Vedanta. For the theory forms only one part of the teaching of the Vedanta, *inseparable from its other parts.* It is, then, "thus abstractly stated" by Professor Royce himself. But is it fair first to state a theory "abstractly," and then show that it leads to absurd consequences?

Though, however, any two human beings that we may take may, on the Vedanta view, differ from each other in any degree of superiority or inferiority, still, as conscious and self-conscious beings, as beings each having for his or her self Brahma as it is in itself in its unmodified form (as defined above), and as beings each having the inborn and inalienable capacity completely to realise this union, they are, in fact, so intimately related to each other that each of them ought to regard the other as his or her self. And it is for this reason that the Vedanta maintains that so long as, or as far as, one human being loves another, not as his or her self, but simply as his wife or her husband, or his or her child, etc., the former loves the latter for his, the lover's, own sake, and not for the sake of the beloved.

If, however, all is Brahma, if the self of each and everything that we anywhere meet with, if the self of each one of us, is Brahma, the question now comes with a greater force, namely: Why is it that we nowhere see Brahma? The Vedanta answers that we do not anywhere see it, because

Brahma is not the object of—and, therefore, cannot be seen through—any of the ordinary means or instruments of knowledge, *i.e.* the senses, the understanding, reasoning, etc.

We may finally turn to the religious aspect of the Vedanta, which is briefly treated in the following section.

V.

According to the Vedanta, taking refuge in Brahma is the only efficient means of attaining the goal of man's life, and consists in complete self-surrender to Brahma—complete self-surrender, without any reserve whatsoever, in respect of the body, intellect, feeling, and will. And the course of life which, when pursued, enables a man to attain this self-surrender, is what the Vedanta calls *Karma-yoga* or *Bhakti-yoga*.

But now the question arises, What does the Vedanta mean by a complete surrender to Brahma of our body, intellect, will, and feeling? To answer this question fully, a detailed exposition of the teaching of the whole *Gītā* would be required. But to state it briefly: The surrender of will to Brahma consists (1) in totally abstaining from doing any act (*a*) which is positively bad or sinful, or (*b*) which is directly or indirectly selfish (*Gītā*, xvi. 23 and 21; ix. 20–21); and (2) in always most willingly doing every act that is in conformity with the will of Brahma simply and solely because it is Brahma's will that we should do it (*Gītā*, iii. 8 and 19; xviii. 5–6 and 9). The surrender to Brahma of feeling consists (1) in making Brahma, as defined above, the highest object of our love (*Gītā*, xviii. 65; vi. 47; xii. 2; x. 9; ix. 34), and loving other beings as our very self (*Gītā*, vi. 32; xii. 4), so that our love of them will contribute to our love of Brahma (*Brihadāranyaka-Upanishad*, ii. 4, 5); and (2) in feeling satisfaction and delight, not as the result of selfishly pursuing any object or doing any thing that is not in conformity with Brahma's will (*Gītā*, xviii. 38–39), but in the consciousness that we have done or tried our best to do what, according to

the will of Brahma, we ought to have done (*Gītā*, xviii. 37 and 45). The surrender to Brahma of intellect consists in pursuing, by every means, whatever knowledge is necessary in order that will and feeling may be surrendered to Brahma in the sense explained above (*Gītā*, xiii. 23 and 34; xv. 19). Of course, the surrender of the body to Brahma consists in taking care of it in such a way that it may best contribute to the surrender to Brahma of will, feeling, and intellect, *i.e.* of the whole soul.

This is, from the practical point of view, the highest ideal which the Vedanta as religion requires its followers to pursue with all their heart and might. It need hardly be mentioned that this ideal is extremely difficult even for the most saintly human beings to attain—not to speak of ordinary men and women. The Vedanta, however, promises that any step, however small, that is deliberately taken by a man or a woman with the desire to act up to this ideal, secures, for him or her, the grace of Brahma to that extent; and thereby he or she becomes better able to take, on the next occasion, another step which is more in conformity with that ideal (*Gītā*, ix. 26).

Such, in partial, meagre, and rough outline, is the philosophy and religion we call by the dear name Vedanta. If, after having properly understood it, the reader thinks that the name Pantheism (in its current sense) fits it, all that need be said is—let him please himself by giving it what name he likes.

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THE ESSENTIALS OF A UNIVERSITY EDUCATION.

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I.

IN 1910 it was my good fortune, during an educational tour in America, to pay a visit to the secondary school of Madison, the capital city of the State of Wisconsin. The population of the city is about 24,000. The school buildings were erected recently at a cost of about £50,000. At the date of my visit there were 720 boys and girls in attendance. Of this number, 108 were leaving school at the end of the summer term 1910; and of these 108 scholars, 75 were proceeding at once to Wisconsin University.

Such an example illustrates the hold which University education has gained over the American mind. It is to be feared that an English example equally convincing would be difficult if not impossible to find. According to the estimate of a recent writer in the *Morning Post* (September 13, 1911), the number of students who each year take a degree at our Universities hardly exceeds one per cent. of those of the population who in each year reach the degree age. Nevertheless, in England, as in other leading countries, University education is steadily becoming not only more necessary but more popular. Twenty-five years ago—a brief period in the history of educational progress—the number of full-time University students in this country, outside Oxford

and Cambridge, was almost negligible. To-day, at the new English Universities alone, such students number 8000. The growth is likely to continue, for the expansion of our secondary education system which has taken place during the last ten years has naturally given rise to an increasing demand for certain kinds of further education which properly fall within the province of a University. Every year a larger number of boys and girls of ability desire to supplement the preparatory training of school by some form of training at a University.

The growing number of those aspirants is not, however, the only reason why University education now plays a greater part in the intellectual life of the nation than at any former time. Everyone knows that the list of English Universities has in modern and quite recent times been augmented. London, Durham, and Wales, followed by the independent Universities at Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield, Birmingham, and Bristol, have made vigorous encroachments upon the monopoly of University education tenaciously maintained in bygone times by Oxford and Cambridge. The avowal made in 1911 by Reading University College of its intention to apply for a charter in the near future shows that the movement to establish new University centres is not yet spent. Altogether, in England and Wales, at least a dozen institutions will be supplying what in each case claims to be a University education. Without contesting the claims, we may at once draw a conclusion. It is clear that the expression "University education" must be singularly flexible and accommodating. For it will not be argued that it means the same thing at Oxford as at Leeds, or the same thing to undergraduates of Peckham and Hoxton as to the residents of Hulme Hall at Manchester or Wantage Hall at Reading. Are we, then, to pare away the meaning of the expression until there is left no more than the fact of having qualified for a degree at some University? If University education means more than this, what are these additional meanings? Is there a core of essentials, not one but several, which must

be included in any sound conception of a University education? It is the purpose of this article to consider this question because of its deep importance both to Universities and the public, and because, notwithstanding a plethora of educational talk, it usually escapes notice. We shall not be lured aside into controversies affecting the curriculum, or tempted into discussing the treatment accorded in modern Universities to religious and theological learning. These are separate problems, and a genuine University education is consistent with different solutions of them. Our object is to ascertain, if we can, whether we may affirm that, unless University education provides certain experiences and conditions, the term is a misnomer.

What is a University? The time-honoured definition is that a University is a *studium generale*, or school of universal learning: "a school," as Newman said, "of knowledge of every kind consisting of teachers and learners from every quarter." The idea is eternal and fundamental: every University must rest upon it, and derive its inspiration from it. To a University knowledge is one, and the quest and service of it are not restricted by the barriers which divide mankind. It is, of course, the great ancient Universities, with their long prestige and perfected intellectual armament, which display this universal character most impressively. They seem to have taken all knowledge to be their province, and they draw teachers and disciples from every land. But so far from departing from the traditional conception, the Universities of recent foundation have in two respects even extended it. They have scrupulously protected knowledge, and both teacher and learner, from ecclesiastical control and religious tests; and they have boldly included within the circuit of University studies new branches of knowledge. The older University tradition has often greeted with amusement or indignation the announcement of degree courses in engineering, or commerce, or metallurgy, or agriculture—forgetful, perhaps, that a chief motive and function of mediæval Oxford and

Cambridge, and of mediæval Universities generally, was the achievement of practical ends. "The rapid multiplication of Universities during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries," says Dr Rashdall, "was largely due to a direct demand for highly educated lawyers and administrators." And just as mediæval Universities endeavoured to bring to bear knowledge, as they knew it, upon the training of lawyers, doctors, and ecclesiastics, so a modern University, properly shaping a policy in harmony with modern needs, is bound to associate with its faculties of arts and pure science, faculties and schools of technical and applied knowledge. The public indeed, always caught by novelty, is apt to think of the new Universities as wholly devoted to technology, to science in its applications to industry and business, whereas there is not one of them which does not put in the foreground of its activities a curriculum of humanities and of pure science. Manchester is not the only instance of a modern University where the Faculty of Arts shows the largest roll of students. The aim of the new Universities, in short, has been to reinforce the older studies by organising instruction and training in those branches of applied knowledge which have risen to importance in modern life; and in spite of a dubious experiment here, or a positive blunder in policy or principle there, it can be argued on their behalf that their policy is justified by the example of mediæval Universities as well as by the circumstances of the present age.

The fact, then, that a University is an intellectual organisation of this breadth and individuality must affect the character of the educational experience it provides. This aspect of the matter deserves close attention.

A University is the sanctuary of the mind. It is a trustee for the intellectual welfare of man. It is a place, as Newman declared, where "mind comes first and is the foundation of the academical polity." It is a place, perhaps the only place, where knowledge is pursued not for material reward, or for reasons of utility or social ambition, or to advance a cherished

cause, but for its own sake. Unless this purity of motive prevails, and is robust enough to weather the storms of circumstance, the temptations of expediency, and the contempt of worldly standards, a University impairs its right to the name which it has taken. Probably in every age, and certainly in this, Bacon's censure has had justification: "Among so many great foundations of Colleges in Europe I find it strange that they are all dedicated to professions and none left free to arts and sciences at large."[1] It is true that a University may, nay must, subserve ends of practical utility; but the spirit of its work and endeavour must transcend all such considerations. It was never more necessary than now, when plausible eloquence so often cloaks deadly compromise, to assert that a University does not exist primarily to grant degrees, to train for professions, to earn grants, or to minister to material progress. Its supreme duty is to be the sanctuary of mind: to increase knowledge, to communicate it, to inculcate reverence for the intellectual life, and respect for every form of action which protects intellectual power and helps it to serve humane ends. To fail here is to lose the keel from the ship. It is this devotion to intellect which alone justifies the claim of Universities to rank first of all educational institutions.

If, however, a University is to discharge this great trust with effect, two conditions must be forthcoming. First, it must be free. A spirit of endeavour such as that described was never yet born of external dictation. It cannot be manufactured to order. It may be said that this is to touch upon a highly speculative danger, that in England no such dictation need be apprehended. It is not so certain. Every year the voice of the State becomes more authoritative in the affairs both of societies and of individuals. The circumstances of every modern English University are such as to expose it to pressures from without, often subtly and inoffensively masked. These Universities render services to the State and to local authorities in return for cash; they are dependent in

[1] *Advancement of Learning*, bk. ii.

large measure upon the bounty of the State, and they cherish a lively expectation of favours to come: they are subject to a control, the boundaries of which are ill-defined, by a government department. Some of these things are positively good; all may be necessary. But with the history of educational administration before us, it is idle to pretend that they are unaccompanied by dangers to freedom and initiative. The subject is too large to discuss at length. But one dogmatism may be hazarded. If the Universities do not defend and perpetuate their own proper independence, no one else will. The ears of the public have become hardened to the wails of educationists who complain that their elementary and secondary schools have been harried by the agents of officialdom; and if Universities consent little by little, and in ways hardly to be perceived, to become the supple tools of administration, however enlightened, few will trouble about their fate, even though it involves one more sacrifice of spontaneous idealism to regulation and routine.

Secondly, a University must possess great teachers. The point is commonplace, yet how profound is its significance! At school the task of education is preparatory: at a University the aim is mastery. To teach well in a school demands a delicate combination and balance of gifts: for a University teacher many gifts are desirable, but only one is indispensable, namely, power over his subject. It is not simply a question of efficiency: this age is rich beyond the dreams of avarice in its opportunities of efficient instruction. But the man whose teaching stirs heart and brain by unfolding new realms of thought and hope, whose sure guidance makes the wilderness plain and fixes the gaze of followers upon the confines of knowledge, is as hard as ever to find. Yet these men, imparters and makers of knowledge, alone can give to a University its proper intellectual atmosphere. University education should afford the student the shock of a new experience: it fails if it amounts to no more than a prolongation of school, or a mean wrestle with text-books and examina-

tions in order to achieve a commonplace triumph. But if we ask in what the new experience consists, we can only answer that it consists in coming into personal relations with teachers who approach their subject, and communicate a knowledge of it to others, with freedom and mastery, who not only teach others but investigate for themselves, whose authority is at first hand. It is under these conditions, and perhaps under these conditions alone, that oral teaching claims a rightful superiority over every other kind. Carlyle, in a perverse moment, declared that the true University was a collection of books. Books are very well if it is a question of gaining intellectual entertainment, or æsthetic pleasure, or useful information, or if it is a question of preferring the winged words of a master to the stumbling utterances of a hack. But if the question is the gaining of mastery over a difficult branch of knowledge, the living voice of a great teacher is indispensable. To hear and see him at his work is to gain an insight into method and aim which can be gained in no other way, to learn the true proportions and relationship of parts and the central point of view, and to experience the stimulus of personality.

Teaching of this order, it may be said, might well be given, with all the resulting advantages to the learner, by an isolated group of specialists. But a University possesses an added and peculiar power in this respect, that, so far from being a learned coterie, or a professional academy, or a single school of specialists, it owes the very essence of its character to the fact that it is a society of wide and diversified membership. It is a place of universal learning: a resort, to quote Newman once more, where there is "collision of mind with mind and of knowledge with knowledge." It affords many outlooks over the realms of knowledge. It is this rivalry and association of knowledge with knowledge which corrects the excesses of specialism, and it is this ordered confusion of intellectual activity which fascinates the imagination of youth. Breadth, power, influence, and liberality are the

University watchwords, rather than exclusiveness, expertness, and intensity.

When, then, these conditions prevail we have the first and greatest essential of University education. In such a place the student is plunged into an atmosphere new to his experience, at first perhaps a little bewildering, but charged with intellectual stimulus. He is forced to take account of new values, for in every direction he finds, or should find, that intellectual standards prevail. It is true that the whole of University education is not summed up in these experiences; but a University which can inculcate a genuine respect for mind has achieved its first and greatest end, and equipped its disciples with a potent antidote to the materialism of the world.

II.

So far we have dealt with the purely intellectual aspect of University education, and we have been concerned to vindicate the freedom of a University to pursue knowledge for its own sake. It has, however, been remarked incidentally that, besides fulfilling this high mission, a University must also answer ends of direct utility. It must bring knowledge into the service of man, and above all it must train students for careers of usefulness, and for life itself. At first it might appear that a University, with its breadth and variety of opportunity and its exalted idealism, while fitted to produce men of learning and ideas, was not well fitted to give men the special and exact training needed for the professions and occupations of modern life. On the one hand there is distrust of the professor when he draws near the realm of practical affairs, and upon the other special competency seems to be the natural outcome of exclusive concentration. But when we talk of training specialists, or of any training which aims directly at professional competence, it is important to avoid exaggeration. Mere specialism is an impossible ideal, because it is inhuman. Any proposal that a

man should spend his individuality in the performance of a single function runs counter to his nature. A man is not a bee; and if it were possible for him to become as absorbed in a particular function as a bee is in honey-making, the price would be the loss of attributes and powers which have given him mastery over the rest of creation. Perception of this truth lies at the root of the admitted doctrine that the period of education which belongs to the school should be spent in laying the foundations of a wide range of knowledge and culture. On the assumption, however, that the school has done its work properly, it is widely held that the student during the later stages of education can advantageously specialise in certain lines of study regardless of the rest, in order to attain a particular competency. The arguments used in support of this view, which roughly speaking may be said to have dictated most of our degree courses of study, are numerous and cogent, but they are not to be admitted without qualification, and they do not destroy faith in the value of University training and influences even for specialists and professionals. In the first place, secondary education cannot at present be depended upon to provide with uniform certainty this broad basis of culture and knowledge. Secondly, even when the school provides all that can be desired, it by no means follows that the scholar profits accordingly. It ought to be more recognised than it is that in a large proportion of cases no real quickening of intelligence takes place until schooldays are over. This is but one of the many reasons why any analogy derived from manufacturing processes is so misleading when applied to education. To suppose that human material can be passed promptly from one educational stage to another with certainty as to the effect of the treatment accorded at each stage is a delusion, and one which accounts for many failures. In the case before us the point is that, since many pupils do not become intellectually eager about anything till the school period is over, it is most important that they should not be denied a generous breadth

of opportunity in the next stage of their education. That is the argument for giving, not indeed to the failures and dunces of school, but to those who have missed, no less than to those who have gained, distinction there, the opportunity of a University education, and in support of it probably every University could point to *alumni* who, without brilliant antecedents at school, have surprised their schoolmasters, their parents, and themselves by their success at the University. And lastly, to come fairly to grips with this obstinate question, surely out of the dust of educational controversy there is emerging one incontrovertible maxim—that the best specialist is not the product of mere specialisation. Practical power is the object; and there is no department of action in which special and trained capacity is not made more effective if it is founded upon a wide intellectual experience. There is a difference, which all men recognise in fact while shying at expressing it in words, between the crank or expert and the master; and what the modern world so imperatively needs as leaders of its politics, its professions, its commerce and business is these men of mastery. Here lies the opportunity of the University. The University stands for the whole intelligence first, and secondly for the special capacity. Ideally, perhaps, it would subject every student to a single broad discipline crowned by a special training. Practically, it effects a compromise, and for this compromise it doubtless pays penalties, illustrated, for example, in the production annually of many science graduates who are deplorably uneducated in literature, and of many literary graduates who are strangely ignorant of science. But these shortcomings still leave intact the superior merit of the Universities as a training ground for professional and practical life. No other type of institution can rival a University in its power of training students for special careers and for active life under the most liberal and inspiring conditions. Specialisation loses much of the evil otherwise inseparable from it, if it is pursued in the atmosphere of a University penetrated throughout by the conception that

knowledge is one whole; where on every side intellectual energy is varied and intense; and where it is difficult to spend three or four years without acquiring by intercourse with others, or in ways more direct, a corrective to the narrower forms of intellectual pretension.

III.

The third great essential of University education is that which is concerned with the life. To suppose that a staff of learned professors and a varied supply of useful training provide the only necessary or important ingredients of University education, and determine its whole character, is to overlook a fundamental fact. A University is a society; and that society has a life of its own, apart from the lives of the individuals who compose it. A great body of teachers and learners cannot gather and abide in one place without developing a life and spirit of their own, potent to influence all who come within its range. The question is whether this life is to be the life of a mob or the life of a community. It is a question which cannot safely be left to settle itself: no University can take that view and act upon it without dereliction of duty and the certainty of troubles to come. For education has to do with character as well as with mind, and good characters are not made without effort and attention. It is an historic problem, and experience, both old and recent, warns us not to pretend that it does not exist now and always. Centuries ago the collegiate system of Oxford and Cambridge was devised in order to deal with this problem of the life. In modern times the new Universities of America are learning the old lesson that growth and prosperity bring with them an aggravation of troubles unless ample and thoughtful provision of many kinds is made for the corporate welfare of students outside official hours of instruction. The Chancellor of St Andrews University, in his address on the occasion of the recent quincentenary celebrations, deplored the comparative indifference with which Scottish Universities

in the past have regarded this aspect of University education: "Let them not allow students to lose one of the most fertilising influences of the University, in the association of a common social life. It was that influence which would mould the character and make of it all that was implied by fitness for the battle of life. . . . He thought that they, in the Scottish Universities, had still more to realise the value of corporate life"; and Lord Balfour of Burleigh went on to recommend the institution of residential colleges upon a larger scale than hitherto. The same problem of the needs of corporate life confronts the new English Universities; and it is not too much to say that the whole future of University education in this country, so far at least as it rests with them, depends upon the effectiveness of the solution which they are able to find. At bottom, the question is whether our University systems are to produce men and women trained and disciplined both in character and intelligence.

The student body of a modern University is very variously composed. It includes representatives of all classes in society, from different localities, from foreign countries as well as from the outer Empire and at home, and it includes women as well as men. The last circumstance affects every aspect of corporate life. Moreover, these students with few exceptions are not wealthy; many of them can only just make ends meet. The problem, then, how to give them, or how to enable them to realise, the best possible conditions of University life is by no means simple, and it calls increasingly for attentive consideration.

There is first the question of the situation of a University. Lord Rosebery has lately given us the reasons why in modern times a University is unlikely to arise elsewhere than in the heart of a great city. It is in such centres of population that the intellectual demand arises, and that the necessary funds are raised with least difficulty. And it cannot be denied that a University gains dignity and prestige from the fact that it is the University of a great city, and a proud emblem of its

power and aspiration. Nevertheless, any University thus situated labours under some difficulties and disadvantages which must adversely affect the conditions of University life. If we argue that the work of a University seems to demand seclusion and quiet concentration, it may be retorted that the spacious buildings of a University supply in themselves both opportunities satisfactorily, and that the environment of a great city acts upon many natures as a positive stimulus. But consider the matter from the point of view of the student's welfare. The University student who lives at home—and the University of a great city naturally draws most of its students from its own neighbourhood—may lose one of the principal benefits of a University experience. It is often of critical importance to the development of a youth of eighteen or nineteen that he should undergo the shock and challenge of being placed in totally new surroundings. And whether he lives in the familiar home, or as a stranger in lodgings, or as the member of a residential hall, he has to accept disadvantages which arise solely from the situation of his University in a populous city. He may have to spend hours daily in trains and trams. A recent writer (*Morning Post*, August 4, 1911) has said: "It is not unusual to discover that a student (at one of the London Colleges) is as much as four hours a day in tram and train." Consider what this means not only as wear and tear, or as a deduction from hours of study and probably of sleep, but also as taking away from opportunities of recreation and fellowship. Playing-fields, again, are usually obtainable only on the outskirts of the city; to reach them costs both time and money. Nor are the distractions of the city favourable to the welfare of students, while the University itself may easily fail to gain commanding ascendancy over the imagination because, powerful though it may be, it often presents itself as only one of a throng of competing interests. These considerations are not intended to convey that true University life is impossible in a great city. But they are intended to convey that under such con-

ditions it is difficult to attain, and that it will not be attained effectively unless very special measures are taken. Those founders who, whether in ancient or in modern times, pitched the site of their University in a comparative solitude, acted upon reasons which have lost little or nothing of their force.

The character of University buildings is necessarily governed chiefly by the nature and extent of the site. Perhaps there is nothing in an American University which an English visitor regards with more envy than the usually splendid extent of the campus. The broad, leisurely spaciousness of the site gives a dignity which not even a freakish architecture can wholly take away. But the new English Universities have either not had the initial funds, or, if money has been forthcoming, have not been able to possess themselves of so much land. At every stage of their growth they have had to wrestle with the problem of insufficient space. Consequently, with rare exceptions, a far-sighted and ordered scheme of building has been impossible. Moreover, the need of economising space has often led to the erection of buildings of a characteristic city type—buildings of imposing frontage, storey above storey, rising from the pavement edge, full of echoing corridors and stone stairways—which are not particularly well suited to University purposes. Each University has its own building problem, and the most admirable ideas will often be thwarted by circumstances. It may, however, be observed that a University is a human place, and that, if it is to appeal to the imagination of youth, it should possess features of beauty and dignity. It is not necessary (unless the site compels it) to carry an elaborate architecture throughout the scheme. There are parts of a University, for instance the laboratories, where the word "workshop" most nearly suggests the ideal character: in these parts it may be a disaster to introduce an architectural scheme which makes growth or alteration difficult. On the other hand, the great hall of a University, the library, the galleries devoted to painting or sculpture, the buildings devoted to the simple and almost

changeless uses of literary study, the students' unions and halls of residence, admit of, and in some cases demand, a more elaborate treatment. The purposes of a University are very varied; and the character of its buildings should reflect these purposes, and is not enriched but rendered dull by a ponderous uniformity. If a University is so happily placed that it can intersperse its buildings with lawns and garden spaces, it will gain two things of value. The first is quiet, so necessary to intellectual concentration and to oral teaching. The second is that even the plainest buildings, when properly disposed amid such surroundings, will gain a dignity and attractiveness often denied to a more imposing architecture.

Of the other conditions which affect most closely the student life of a University, the chief are halls of residence, students' unions, and students' societies. There is no question that alike in England, Scotland, and the United States the hall of residence is coming to be regarded as an indispensable feature of University life. Statistics collected by the Board of Education show, nevertheless, that the total accommodation provided for students in halls of residence attached to Universities and University Colleges in England represents not more than 950 places, of which about 440 are for men and 510 are for women.[1] So far as women students are concerned, the necessity of such provision is obvious. The University which attracts large numbers of women students from distant places and leaves them to the tender mercies of the lodging-house must sooner or later find the penalties of its error to be intolerable. The case of men students is somewhat different, but for them too, with rare exceptions, residence in hall during all or the greater part of their University course is an immense advantage. The hall is a safeguard against the grosser forms of indiscipline. It deepens *esprit de corps* and offers no encouragement to cliques; it is the place where intimate friendships are made, where constant discussion and intercourse with fellow-students rounds off the corners of

[1] *Universities and University Colleges*, 1911, p. xii. (Cd. 5872).

egotism, and where the lesson of corporate responsibility is best learned. If, however, halls of residence are to render these invaluable services, certain conditions should prevail. The hall is a desirable complement to the professorial system of the University which views students collectively rather than individually, but it is perilous to allow it to encroach upon the teaching functions of the University. Unless it is strictly ordained that the hall exists for residence and for corporate life, and not for tuition, there may be some risk of the growth in course of time of the Oxford or Cambridge collegiate system in a petty form. Secondly, halls of residence should be moderate in size, and every student should have a private room. There is little to be said for the incessant publicity of life in a crowd. Thirdly, the students of a hall should not be all of one kind. It is a mistake, for example, to erect a hostel solely for students in training for the teaching profession. Students of different antecedents and different destinies will make a far more interesting society and do one another far more good than can possibly happen when all are cast in a single mould and are passing through the same intellectual experience. And lastly, the hall of residence, whether for men or for women, should be conducted upon University lines. Both the buildings and the life must possess charm and dignity, and bear no dreary suggestion of the barrack. Its discipline must not be the discipline of the school, but the product of a genuine co-operation between students and authority. There is not the slightest reason why residence in a hall should mean a sacrifice of the liberty and independence proper to a University student; while, upon the other hand, no part of University experience is of more value to the student than that which compels him to realise his responsibility to himself and to others, and to gain his first lessons in the art of dealing with men.

Halls of residence, however, even though they may be numerous and excellent, cannot do everything. There will

always be a considerable body of students who for various reasons, but chiefly because they reside in their own homes, do not experience their advantages. For these students particularly, and indeed for the student body as a whole, some kind of central clubhouse at the University itself, or close to it, is most desirable. At several of the new Universities large sums have been or are being spent in the provision of Students' Unions. The Union house is the headquarters of the Union society, the function of which commonly is to gather within the web of a single organisation all the student societies which arise at every University, and also to constitute a representative council of students which undertakes many responsible duties, the chief being that of placing before the University authorities from time to time the views of students on questions which concern them. The students' representative council is the highest expression of student self-government, and the presidency of it is a coveted honour. The duties of these councils tend to increase in importance, and the complaint is sometimes heard, both from teachers and students, that the holding of a leading office encroaches unduly upon the student's time. There are ways of surmounting this difficulty, and it is important that the good work of the councils should not be endangered by any failure to deal with it.

This problem of the life is second to none of those which come before a University. It demands comprehensive, sympathetic, and most liberal treatment. At present, notwithstanding signs of vigorous activity, it is the radical weak spot in the new English Universities. No University can rise to the full height of its power to influence youth unless it will consent to remember and provide what youth needs for its happiness and health. Why we so often fail in our University schemes is through thinking in compartments. We think of research, of instruction, of buildings, of ways and means. There is no escape from these things; but nevertheless the first question and the last is—what is the

whole duty of the University towards these young men and women? To that question there is no answer which can stand for a moment unless it includes a comprehensive thoughtfulness for their life, and provision for its needs, during the years of their stay at the University. And thus the last word on this subject must always touch upon the personal influence of the teacher in authority. Whether the influence of a University is good or the reverse will always depend on the extent to which those who are vested with authority are prepared to give thought to the welfare of students, individually and collectively. "An academical system without the personal influence of teachers upon pupils is an Arctic winter; it will create an ice-bound, petrified, cast-iron University, and nothing else."[1]

IV.

The essentials of a University education, as set forth here, would seem to leave this picture on the mind:—A University taking all knowledge to be its province, drawing teachers and learners from all quarters, pursuing knowledge for its own sake, and inculcating by its example reverence for the intellectual life. A University free from external control, forming and expressing its own individuality of its own will and motion. A University in full sympathy with the aspirations and needs of the age, and endeavouring to serve them, but not subjected by them. And a University which is not merely a chilly sanctuary of the intellect or a place of mechanical instruction, but a great comradeship and a school of character and manners. At such a University the student may look to gain a true preparation for life as well as an academic qualification.

W. M. CHILDS.

[1] Newman, *University Sketches*, p. 73.

IS CIVILISATION IN DANGER?[1]

A REPLY.

JOSEPH M'CABE.

THE creation of modern historical science, the gathering of the scattered records of the fortunes of mankind into an organic narrative, may fitly be assumed to have put us in a position, in some measure, to direct the present and give an orientation to the future in the light of the past. Unhappily, this historical record has become so vast that no man can obtain command of more than one or two branches of it, and the philosophic historian is in danger of framing generalisations which rest upon somewhat superficial detailed studies. The most familiar illustration of this danger is found in the very common practice of speculating on the rise and fall of nations. When we find nation after nation occupying the central stage of history for an hour, then being displaced by a more vigorous successor, we feel that distinct civilisations are as the generations of a continuous story; that each must die and entrust its achievements to the hands of the rest. And when we find in these dying civilisations one or other symptom which we seem to recognise in our own, we are apt to conclude that we too have passed our manhood, and are sinking towards the tomb.

This facile generalisation is the real basis of most of our contemporary pessimism, yet it is generally an inaccurate and unscientific interpretation of history. Two circumstances

[1] A further article on "Race Decadence," by Max Nordau, will appear in the next issue of the Journal.—ED.

warn the careful student of history against deductions of this nature. One is that the life of ancient civilisations has varied so enormously in its duration that no general application can be made to a contemporary civilisation. The dynastic civilisation of Egypt lasted 5000 years, that of Mesopotamia more than 3000 years, and China has maintained its vigour unimpaired for 3000 years; while Persia, Athens, Sparta, Venice, etc., measure their lives, as high civilisations, only by a few centuries, and even Rome rounds out its great story well within the limits of a millennium. Whether it be true or no that nations must wax and wane, there is no appointed term of life.

It is even more important to reflect that there has been a most important change in what may be called the vital conditions of a civilisation. The old process of the death of a great nation was, in the last analysis, that its physical or muscular standard was gradually lowered until the barbarians who surrounded it on every side could rush its barriers. When two civilisations coexisted, they bled each other in war, and hastened the day of the barbarians. The invention of gunpowder and perfecting of arms of precision have altered the situation. The muscular barbarian is negligible. A score of civilisations, with the same virtues and vices in varying equilibrium, fill the stage. Hardly a single symptom, that is regarded as a symptom of decay, can be found in one that is not found in the others. The planet is becoming culturally concentrated and more homogeneous. In other words, the environment of nations is wholly different from what it used to be, and earlier experience must be applied with great caution.

If, however, these considerations make the historian hesitate to subscribe to some supposed law of the death of civilisations, the very fact that several brilliant civilisations have perished so suddenly must dispose him to examine with especial interest the features of contemporary powers which seem to coincide with those of older civilisations in their later stages. Can he

detect, say in contemporary England or France, the beginning of the hectic flush, the languor of limb, the irregularity of function, which have in the past heralded the coming death? This has been suggested, in recent numbers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL, both of England and France, and it raises an issue of very great interest.

Speculations of this nature are commonly complicated, and made uninteresting, by what one may call their sectarian character. A man is interested in some particular ideal which his nation is abandoning, or declining to accept, and if he can find a similar state of things in one of the decaying empires of the past, he leaps to his conclusion. It is wholly unscientific and unphilosophical. A decay of religious traditions, for instance, accompanied decline in nearly all the old empires, but was clearly a normal outcome of their cultural development; yet the coincidence with our own time is often said to be a warning to us. It is just the same with the woman-movement, as far as Greece and Rome are concerned (not—people usually forget—in the case of Egypt and Assyria), and humanitarianism generally. For others the growth of cosmopolitanism, of democracy, of education, is a symptom of decay. It is forgotten that earlier nations reached their highest civilisation just before they decayed, and real virtues mingle with vice and disease in their last hours. The most careful discrimination is needed.

It seems to me that neither M. Gérard nor Mr and Mrs Whetham have escaped this fallacy. M. Gérard is no doubt confirming a suspicion that is widely entertained in this country when he fears that France is in decay, if not entering upon her death-struggle. One may gravely doubt, however, whether the symptoms of decay which he indicates will be widely recognised as such. His paper in the HIBBERT JOURNAL for July 1908 is merely an attack upon democracy, or the "egalitarian tendency" which Mr and Mrs Whetham also regard with suspicion. Such an issue is so plainly coloured by one's political creed that it is useless to discuss

more than the specific indications of evil result which the French observer gives us. Some of these indications are at once inacceptable. That the ideal of general culture is disappearing with the increase of specialism has nothing to do with decay. We can hardly plead for an arrest of research for the convenience of luxurious scholars. The decay of religion, again, is not obviously a symptom of social decay; to be recognised as such, it must show social and moral consequences —a point to which I will return. Again, that art and culture are (as D'Annunzio also has said) in danger owing to the growth of democracy is opposed to historical and contemporary experience. Did democratic Athens or aristocratic Sparta do most for art and culture? Did the Roman Republic or the Roman Empire do most? Did the Dutch Commonwealth favour art and culture less than the Spanish Netherlands? Do the United States, or Australia, or even France show any disdain of culture? If there is no better-founded reason for concern about France than the statement that "intellectual" is a term of reproach in modern Paris, and that "nobody troubles to ask himself whether, in a civilisation turned exclusively in the direction of wealth, there remains any longer a place for art or beauty, or even for happiness," lovers of France will be content.

Somewhat more material and applicable to the present situation of France are M. Gérard's charges in his more recent article. Apart from a general lament of the decay of religion, and a desire (apparently) to substitute the vague and very vulnerable mysticism of Bergson, the first definite charge is that conduct is deteriorating. It is hardly satisfactory to say that this is too well known to need proof, or to refer us to a Catholic writer for it. English people who make the assertion usually base it on some supposed increase of crime in France. There is no such increase, as I will show, and M. Gérard is too well informed, I assume, to mention France's criminal statistics. The decay of the birth-rate and the weakness of France's democratic rulers are the only definite indications of

decay given by him in support of his heavy laments. As the decay of the birth-rate is a general phenomenon, and other countries are rapidly coming to the level of France, I reserve it until later. As to the weakness of the Government in face of industrial disorder, it is so plainly due to the closer approach in conviction and sentiment of justice between the French workers and French democratic statesmen, that one must see in it only a temporary embarrassment arising from a real moral progress. Such industrial conflicts are bound to increase in the future, whether nations decay or no.

M. Gérard is not more successful in indicating symptoms of decay in England. That England is "remarkably religious" (when at least two-thirds of our people in large towns do not attend church), that the novels of Victoria Cross and Hubert Wales (whose name I never heard before) are "now read by almost everybody," and that a middle-class London suburb is "impervious to every great idea," are statements which few Englishmen would make. The frequency of unsavoury divorce cases has no social significance until we have exact comparative statistics on the subject. Our abominable divorce law, which makes adultery the only escape from unhappy marriage, is responsible for much of the evil: the press responsible for the exaggerated impression given to foreigners. The decay of observance of the Sabbath is a purely sectarian complaint, and the statement that the fear of decay has "entered the soul" of the Englishman and "paralysed" him seems to be difficult of verification. In fine, of the two remedies which M. Gérard proposes for our undoubted maladies, the first—that we must "yield to instinct," carefully avoiding any "destructive ratiocination" about it—is a prescription we are not likely to follow; and the second—that we shall fight physical degeneration—is one that our democratic Government, like that of France, is taking up more seriously than aristocratic powers ever did in the history of England.

In turning to the substantial and closely reasoned argument of Mr and Mrs Whetham, one feels that one is confronting an

ideal that appeals to many thoughtful minds in our generation. Maurice Maeterlinck somewhere finely contrasts the method of nature and the method of man. When nature would conduct water to the distant sea, the stream meanders blindly over the landscape, reaching its goal after lamentable waste of space and energy; when man intervenes, the canal cuts straight and clean across the region. So we rear our cattle to-day, and our dogs and our orchids. Why not our human beings? Nay, the authors say—and it is the most challenging part of their theme — we have suspended the operation of nature's method and substituted no other; we have interfered with the elimination of bad stocks and given no culture to the good; our whole humanitarianism, of which we boast, is a misguided interference, not neutralised by selection of stocks, and must ruin our civilisation.

But this apparently strongest point of their argument is really the weakest. A dozen pessimists tell us that we *must* be decaying: the narrower theologian, the anti-Malthusian, the anti-suffragist, the eugenist, etc. And the answer is simple: we are not. Quite the contrary. Fact is notoriously better than theory, and the argument of Mr and Mrs Whetham is obviously based on an unproved and much disputed theory of heredity and environment. Let us first see the facts.

After many proofs that we *ought* to be degenerating, the authors come to the "signs of rocks." The first is that our education is conducted by "celibate teachers who have neither the accumulated wisdom, the ripe tradition, nor the religious purpose of the mediæval orders." Most of us, especially those of us who know something of conventual education, will contemplate that rock with equanimity. The second is the lack of restraint on the part of humanitarians; but as this only means that they do not accept the theory of race-culture, we must postpone discussion of it. The third is that "sign of ill omen," the women-movement, which is "necessarily associated with an arrest of national development and the incipient stages of decadence." If that is an appeal to history,

it is entirely erroneous. No such movement—rather a reverse movement—accompanied decay in Egypt and Assyria; Greece never sufficiently developed a woman-movement to have the least influence on its life; and if the coincidence of a strong woman-movement with the decay of Rome is pleaded, one may reply that there is not a serious authority in Europe who will connect the two. It had no more to do with the decay of Rome than the bettering of the lot of the slaves had. In so far as it means a falling birth-rate—in which connection it is unintelligible to mention the claim of the suffrage—I will consider it presently.

But at last the authors come to statements of fact. They point to the figures published by our Poor Law and Lunacy Commissioners and our penal authorities; they say that there is "no diminution of pauperism and a constant and sustained increase of crime and lunacy and mental defect." Here undoubtedly we have the supposed facts which justify pessimism and radical proposals of reform in contemporary English literature. And here precisely I join issue, and say that the idea is not founded on a serious comparative study of statistics, and is almost wholly incorrect.

The increase of lunacy is one of the most familiar considerations put forward by the race-culturist, yet the highest authorities on the subject have repeatedly pointed out that if there is any increase of mental disease in modern civilisation, especially in England, it is very slight, and is due to plain environmental causes. It is strangely ironical to find that, while the eugenic movement takes a particular pride in its reliance on statistics, this very common appeal to lunacy statistics is a singularly confused and superficial piece of special pleading. It is not *proved* that there is any increase of mental disease in England out of proportion to the growth of population: if there is an increase, as there probably is, it is only what the increase of city life naturally implies. In any case, England shows a better record than most other complex civilisations in the matter, and, in fine, when the

problem is reduced to its proper dimensions, it is found to be a relatively small and unimportant evil in the general task of the nation. These points must be somewhat fully substantiated, as eugenic writers have made this a critical phenomenon.

The fact on which emphasis is usually laid is that the census returns show that, while the "feeble-minded" were 336 to the 100,000 of the population of the United Kingdom in 1881, the proportion had arisen in 1901 to 429 in 100,000. In quoting these figures, however, it is rarely mentioned that the heading in the census-paper was changed in 1901 from "idiots" to "feeble-minded," which would make a considerable difference to domestic classifiers. It should further be noticed that the increase was considerably greater in Ireland (355 to 561 per 100,000) than in England and Wales (325 to 407 per 100,000): a point which throws greater stress upon environment. But the serious social student relies rather on the figures published by the Lunacy Commissioners, which return the total number of "lunatics" as, in 1908, 126,000 in the whole of England and Wales, or 356·7 per 100,000 of the population—less than four in a thousand.

Here again there is, superficially, an ominous increase. In twenty years (1889 to 1908) the number had doubled, and the proportion increased from 296·5 to 356·7. Apart, however, from the fact that in 1876 the imperial authorities made a grant of four shillings per pauper lunatic to the local authorities, and this has led to an increasing disposition to relieve the rates by removing feeble-minded paupers to the milder category of lunatics, we have many considerations to take into account. Chief of these are increased stringency in the registration of lunatics—a prosecution took place within the last few months—and the gradual improvement of public asylums, and education of the community in their real significance. Essayists and lecturers sometimes argue as if we had a full record of lunacy for many years back, whereas there is even now hardly any country in the world with reliable and ample records of the

mentally diseased except England. Taking Europe generally, the social phenomenon of modern times, in this field, is the increased registration of lunatics and more conscientious discharge of public duty in regard to them. The swelling of the figures is largely a social gain.

Experts, both in England and Germany, are almost entirely agreed that these considerations—together with the modern recognition of milder forms of mental disease and the inclusion of certain paralytic and puerperal patients—make it quite impossible to say positively that there has been an increase of lunacy beyond the increase of population, and that in any case the increase must be slight. I would add that a careful examination of the figures plainly connects this increase with environmental causes rather than heredity. In the kingdom of Prussia, for instance, the proportion of lunatics rose from 22·4 per 10,000 in 1871 to 26 per 10,000 in 1895; but in the Berlin circuit the increase was from 12·2 to 28·7. In other words, the increase of city life and strain is an outstanding factor. The high increase in Ireland, on the other hand, points no less clearly to economic causes involving a lessening of vitality. It is also noteworthy that while our pauper lunatics have increased by 50 per cent. in twenty years (75,000 in 1889 to 115,000 in 1908), the patients in private asylums have increased by only 25 per cent. (or according to the normal increase of population). When we recollect how freely our large and comfortable private asylums and hospitals of mental disease—I recently delivered a scientific lecture in one to a hundred keenly interested "patients"—are now used even for lesser disorder, we see much significance in this. The class which is supposed to be lowering its standard by restricting its birth-rate is not deteriorating, according to this important positive test; the increase of lunacy is among the poor, with their harder economic conditions and their slower appreciation of the need to treat mental disease. Lastly, one must remember that the better care and conditions in our asylums have increased the longevity of patients.

The whole question requires very careful analysis instead of superficial references to the mere increase of figures. Professor Karl Pearson, the statistician of the eugenist movement, has at times held up to us the healthier standard of our colonials. It is interesting to notice that while the ratio of lunatics is 356·7 to the 100,000 in England and Wales, it is 354 in New Zealand, 360 in New South Wales, 379 in Queensland, and 396 in Victoria. The position of those who fancy that England is decaying relatively to the other powers in Europe is even worse. Broadly speaking, our figures of lunacy have increased by 50 per cent. in *thirty* years. In Germany the figures have increased by more than 50 per cent. in *ten* years, and more than 100 per cent. in *twenty* years. In Holland they have increased by 60 per cent. in fifteen years; in Belgium, by 70 per cent. in twenty years. In France, one may remind M. Gérard and all who lament its falling birth-rate, the figures have increased by only 29 per cent. in twenty years! I must, however, add that I am merely protesting against a superficial appeal in the interest of a theory or creed. Lunacy statistics are exceedingly imperfect, and offer as yet little basis for deductions. It is enough to show that in the case of England, where the figures are the most reliable, this reliability and fulness could only be obtained by a very misleading growth of the figures, and the statement that there is a great increase of insanity is demonstrably false.

Finally, let us set the problem in its true proportions. Less than four in one thousand of our people are afflicted with mental disease, including light and temporary forms, and certain forms of paralysis and puerperal disease. Of these fully one-half belong to families in which mental disease had been unknown; and one-half of the remainder have only collateral or remote indications of hereditary disease. In regard to the families or stocks in which one case of mental disease occurs at intervals among a large number of quite healthy members, one would like a plain statement of eugenic

proposals. I was recently informed by the very able and thoughtful medical head of one of our larger hospitals for the insane that he had made very careful inquiry into the families of the patients under his charge. He found that in the vast majority of cases the diseased member of the family had to be set against a large number of perfectly healthy, clever, and useful citizens, who came of the same stock. Are we to sacrifice the nine useful and happy citizens to relieve ourselves of the burden of the tenth? I may give point to the consideration by recalling that the acknowledged dean of English literary men, one of our sanest and shrewdest critics until a few years ago, belonged to such a stock. There remain the small minority of more seriously tainted stocks. By all means let us have candid and sensible discussion of the problem, when our scientific men have come to some agreement about it. But to make a momentous business of a problem which involves one or two in every thousand of our population, and a burden which amounts at the outside to a couple of million pounds a year for the nation, is somewhat disproportionate.

The statement of Mr and Mrs Whetham that there is "a constant and sustained increase of crime" in England is even more unfortunate. It is hardly scientific, or conducive to sound social thinking, to take the figures of crime and ignore the increase of population. I take the figures for the last twenty-five years (to the last codified), and find that the ratio of criminals to population has actually diminished in a most comforting degree. In the five years from 1883 to 1887 the proportion of crime committed (whether conviction followed or not) was 328·85 to every 100,000 of the population; the ratio has fallen steadily, with some comparative rise in recent years, to 271·85 per 100,000 in the years 1903 to 1907. The ratio of persons tried for indictable offences was 212·50 at the earlier date; 175·87 at the later. The ratio of persons arrested for non-indictable offences was 2263·5 at the earlier date; 2113·2 at the later. And again a closer examination discredits

the theory on which these false charges against our country are so often brought. Murder and violent assaults have gone down steadily and very considerably. It is offences against property, more clearly connected with economic and social conditions, which persist. Drunkenness, again, has decreased, taking the number of convictions. It grew again toward the end of the century, in a wave of national prosperity, but is sinking once more, and has positively decreased in the twenty-five years. The consumption per head of alcohol has gone down remarkably and steadily in the last ten years.

Apart from Japan, which has an extraordinarily honourable record in this respect, there are few countries in the civilised world which show a record equal to that of England. One of these few countries, many will be surprised to hear, is France. In the last thirty years it has reduced the ratio of criminals to population; in twenty years its actual numbers of convictions have diminished, in spite of a constant slight increase of population. As the problem of education is likely to be raised again soon, I take this opportunity to call attention to the exceptional and honourable records of Japan and France, and would add Victoria and New Zealand, which also have no religious lessons in the schools. Germany, Holland, Belgium, Austria, etc., cannot even equal the record of England.

Mr and Mrs Whetham say, lastly, that there is "no diminution of pauperism." It would be remarkable to find that there had been, when our poorer families are flooding an overcrowded labour market with an uncontrolled production of children; yet, to the credit of England, this is what we do find, to a slight extent. According to Webb's supplement to Mulhall, the number of persons in receipt of relief has gone down steadily from 31·2 per 1000 of the population in the seventies, to 22·1 in 1908. In conclusion, I would add that nearly every other positive and statistical test of the nation's health shows improvement and not decay. The illegitimate birth-rate has gone down, and is one of the lowest in Europe, only beaten by those of Ireland, Holland, and Servia. The

numbers—not merely ratio to population—of the blind and the deaf and dumb have decreased in the last twenty years.

There remains the single social fact which can be adduced by our theorists and pessimists: the fall of the birth-rate. I chance to be one of those social observers who, both on economic and humane grounds, regard that fall with satisfaction, but will consider it candidly. What is the social evil of a falling birth-rate? According to M. Gérard and Professor Le Bon it means that a nation will, if it be not forcibly invaded and conquered, at least suffer a peaceful invasion of workers which will in time swamp its national character. Is that happening in France? Is there a country in which the birth-rate is so low that the labour markets are not filled, and over-filled? The need of a sustained birth-rate for military purposes I decline to discuss. That we must overcrowd our markets, burden our mothers as they were burdened in the old days, and enhance the squalor and poverty of the lower working world, to feed the real Moloch of human history, is a strange proposal. Rather let us make war on war, and wipe out from the chronicle of man's misdeeds the stupid and barbaric practice that has left a trail of blood and ruin on every page of the history of civilisation.

It is, however, pointed out that we are controlling the birth-rate of the better stocks and letting the inferior breed prolifically, and that degeneration is bound to ensue. M. Gérard reminds us of Rome—as so many do—and Mr and Mrs Whetham speak of Sparta and Venice. Here are positive statements which one may discuss satisfactorily. Has any serious historian given encouragement to the popular cry that the restriction of the birth-rate in a certain class of Roman citizens was a material cause of the downfall of Rome? What are the facts? In the reign of Octavius, four hundred years before the fall of Rome, the patricians evaded parental duties, and caused a very widespread decay of the old patrician stocks. I would go so far as to say that this was an advantage to Rome. By the end of the Republic

those stocks were so largely tainted that, when, from the reign of Vespasian onward, they began to be replaced by vigorous provincial blood, the Empire made a remarkable recovery, and stood the drain of internal and foreign war for three hundred years. Apart from the degenerate patricians under the Cæsars, there is no proof of any restriction of births of a serious magnitude. The causes of the fall of Rome include depopulation, but on account of war, crushing taxation, and wasting of territory.

In regard to Sparta, again, the causes of decay assigned by historians do not include the admission of women to the common weal or any deliberate refusal of parenthood. Sparta could not possibly hold her power in Greece. Her arrogance, luxury, and avarice raised enemies against her on every side, and her aristocratic régime drove her workers to rebellion. Once war had worn down her forces and conquest had made her leaders luxurious, she was bound to fall with a crash.

In the case of Venice it is even more misleading to quote the restriction of births. Burckhardt expressly observes that the plain causes of the decay of Venice are exceedingly numerous, and neither he nor any other authoritative historian mentions the restriction of noble families as one of those causes. When the rival Italian cities reached their full development, her trade inevitably fell; and when the Turks closed the eastern Mediterranean and engaged Venice in an exhausting struggle, and when in addition the Cape route to the Indies diverted commerce from her, she was doomed. The words of Mrs Vernon which Mr and Mrs Whetham quote from the *Cambridge History*—with which they have, without informing their readers, taken the most extraordinary liberties—describe Venice when it is in full decay; when the limitation of families is as much an effect, as a cause, of decay. But even Mrs Vernon merely mentions the limitation of families as one among many causes (the more important of which are omitted by Mr and Mrs Whetham in their strange summary of her words) of the decay of the nobility.

History does not lend any weighty sanction to the lament about the modern restriction of families, nor can we see much reason for it from the social point of view. The nations which are most conspicuous for falling birth-rate in Europe to-day are the healthiest in respect to those figures which furnish some positive test of a nation's condition, and are not the least prosperous commercially and industrially. In whatever form a test is proposed, it tells against the theory advocated. Recently Dean Welldon stated that there has been deterioration in the class of men who pass through Oxford and Cambridge. The statement was widely quoted, and it seemed to confirm the fear that is expressed about the restriction of the birth-rate in the middle and upper classes. But when a monthly magazine (*Strand Magazine*, December 1911) asked the opinion of eleven distinguished authorities at Oxford and Cambridge, not one agreed with Dr Welldon; seven said that they saw no deterioration, physical or intellectual, and four said that there was an actual improvement. The restriction of the birth-rate is now proceeding rapidly in every civilised country—it has even begun among the Slavs—and we shall before long have a general level of restriction, which will neutralise the fear of absorption or conquest.

I regret that space is not available to comment on many other interesting points raised by Mr and Mrs Whetham. They suggest that the burden of pensions and education induces middle-class people to forgo offspring. As the two together only cost the nation about forty millions a year, a great part of which is supplied by death-duties and income tax at the upper end of the scale, and beer-duties on the workers at the other end of the scale, it is easy to work out the proportion between the burden of a professional man and the cost of a child. They say that the Mediterranean races have drunk themselves sober, and hold out to us the appalling prospect of letting our nation do the same. I have not space to consider how loose and unreliable the ancient references to drunkenness are, how the Latin references are

confined to Rome, where the workers received food for nothing, how it comes about that Northern Italy, in which the old stock is largely absorbed in invaders, is more sober than the purer Italian stock in the south, or how long it really is since our ancestors began to use intoxicating drinks. But I may at least point out that the majority of the Mediterranean races have not been sobered in that way at all, but by environment (Mohammedanism), and that the temperance movement (in the broad sense) in modern England is accredited by its achievements. Modern humanitarianism has done much to brighten England, to rid it of disease and crime, to let sunshine into the dark places. Judge it by its fruit. If, indeed, an auxiliary force from the eugenic side could be enlisted in the work, we should be criminal to refuse to consider it candidly. But when proposals of reform are merely based on scientific theories of heredity that are seriously challenged by masters of the science all over the world, and when their supporters dare not suggest, even in broad outline, how their idea might be realised apart from a few minor reforms (negative eugenics), many of us prefer to rely on the proved and accredited agency of bettering the physical, moral, and intellectual environment of the race.

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FRESH LIGHT ON THE SYNOPTIC PROBLEM.

MATTHEW A LUCAN SOURCE.

ROBINSON SMITH, M.A.

THE Synoptic Problem is in this stage of solution: after a century of investigation scholarship has proved that Mark was the earliest of the Gospels, and that Matthew and Luke derived from him such matter as the three have in common. With this fact established, the next question was: did they take from the Mark that we know or from an earlier Mark? Again, opinion is practically unanimous: from the Mark that we know. For a time an earlier Mark was postulated, but this was found to be so like our Mark as to be the same. The reason for postulating it at all was that in their derivations from the Second Gospel the First and Third show common divergences, too many and too striking to have "happened" independently. From this the natural inference would be that either Matthew had seen Luke or Luke Matthew, and while copying from Mark had also incorporated some of the phraseology and arrangement of the other. But this inference has not been upheld by the higher critics. Harnack says: "The researches of very many scholars have led them to the unanimous conclusion that neither Saint Matthew nor Saint Luke has copied the one from the other."[1] And Sir John Hawkins writes to the same effect: "The probability that

[1] Harnack, *The Sayings of Jesus*, Introduction, p. i., London, 1908.

it (a common source) was used by the two Evangelists independently and not by either of them through the other as an intermediary source . . . is now very widely recognised."[1] It is this position that I purpose to attack in the present article.

My first approach will be by way, not of the divergences from Mark common to Matthew and Luke,[2] but of the derivations peculiar to one or the other. For in any list of appropriations from Mark by Matthew and Luke you will find one thing stand out clearly: Matthew appropriates certain things and Luke certain others, and if you examine more closely you will find that where a choice from two or more Marcan expressions has been made, the first choice falls to Matthew and the second to Luke. For example, where Mark says, At even, when the sun was set, Matthew appropriates only "at even" and Luke only "when the sun was set."[3] Where Mark says, After two days was the feast

[1] Hawkins, *Horæ Synopticæ*, p. 107, Oxford, 1909.

[2] Burkitt, *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, pp. 39–60, Edinburgh, 1911, deals with twenty of these divergences, and attempts to explain them away. But there are many more than twenty cases in which Matthew and Luke diverge together from their Marcan source, some of them quite as radical as those mentioned by Professor Burkitt. And in addition to these there are a number of cases in which Matthew and Luke agree in omitting Marcan words, phrases, and incidents; *e.g.* both omit "take up thy bed" of Mk. ii. 9. Chance and assimilation of manuscripts might account for two or three of Matthew–Luke agreements against Mark, but not for over a hundred (see list in Stanton, *The Gospels as Historical Documents*, ii., 207–19). I shall refer to this matter more explicitly in another paper, as well as to four other lines of evidence pointing to this same fact, that, not only are Matthew and Luke inseparably related in their derivations from Mark, but also the relation is from Matthew to Luke and not from Luke to Matthew. These four other lines of evidence are: the fact that where Matthew drops Mark's order of events, Luke takes it up, or at least retains it, though free to drop it where Matthew does not; secondly, the evidence afforded by Luke's "doublets," where he adopts a verse from Mark directly and the same verse from Matthew, who though taking it from Mark had put it another place; thirdly, a number of cases where Luke appropriates a detail peculiar to Mark and another peculiar to Matthew, as where (Lk. iv. 2, 3) he makes Jesus tempted both *during* and *at the end of* the forty days; fourthly, the evidence of Marcan expressions which must first have passed through Matthew before they appear as they appear in Luke.

[3] Mk. i. 32; Mt. viii. 16; Lk. iv. 40.

of the passover and of unleavened bread, Matthew says, After two days is the feast of the passover, whereas Luke retains only the third part of the phrase: Now the feast of unleavened bread drew nigh.[1] Mark says, They caught him and beat him and sent him away empty. Matthew gives the first two actions, Luke the last two.[2] Again Mark says, And the first day of unleavened bread when they killed the passover, and again Matthew gives the first and second parts of the phrase, Luke the second and third.[3] Mark says that at the time of the trial they spat upon Jesus, blindfolded him and smote him. Matthew records the first and third of these actions, Luke the second and third.[4] Here it might be thought that Luke omitted the first action, that of the spitting, because of its unseemliness, but he does not hesitate to mention it where it is spoken of in prophecy—where, however, it is omitted by Matthew.[5] Mark gives in order and by name six districts from which the multitudes came. Matthew mentions all these save the last, Tyre and Sidon. Luke in his list omits the first, fourth, and fifth, but does mention the last, Tyre and Sidon.[6] Where Mark says, When the even was come because it was the preparation, that is the day before the Sabbath, Matthew says, When even was come, and Luke the rest.[7] Where Mark says, For my sake and the gospel's, Matthew has "for my name's sake," and Luke "for the kingdom of God's sake."[8] And, as indicated above, where prophetically it is said in Mark that Jesus "shall be delivered unto the chief priests and unto the scribes . . . and they (the Gentiles) shall spit upon him," Matthew retains the first clause, omits the second, and *vice versâ* in Luke.[9]

[1] Mk. xiv. 1; Mt. xxvi. 2; Lk. xxii. 1.
[2] Mk. xii. 3; Mt. xxi. 35; Lk. xx. 10.
[3] Mk. xiv. 12; Mt. xxvi. 17; Lk. xxii. 7.
[4] Mk. xiv. 65; Mt. xxvi. 67, 68; Lk. xxii. 63, 64.
[5] Mk. x. 33, 34; Mt. xx. 18, 19; Lk. xviii. 32.
[6] Mk. iii. 7, 8; Mt. iv. 25; Lk. vi. 17.
[7] Mk. xv. 42; Mt. xxvii. 57; Lk. xxiii. 54.
[8] Mk. x. 29; Mt. xix. 29; Lk. xviii. 29.
[9] Mk. x. 33, 34; Mt. xx. 18, 19; Lk. xviii. 32.

With five other cases mentioned in the note,[1] these represent fourteen clear cases where Matthew chooses the first of two or more duplicate expressions from Mark and Luke the second, or at least not the first. To these fourteen cases might be added four others,[2] the first of which is sometimes listed as a duplicate expression, but which is more correctly to be grouped with the three other cases mentioned in note 2, as representing not duplicate or correlative expressions within the Marcan verse, but rather uncorrelative ones, the first of which Matthew chooses and the second Luke. I make mention of them, not because they strictly belong to the list of fourteen, but because they are more than enough to offset the two or three or at the most four cases of Marcan expressions, duplicate or otherwise, of which Luke chooses the first part and Matthew not. These two or three or at the most four cases are:—1—Mk. i. 42: The leprosy departed from him and he was cleansed; Lk. v. 13: The leprosy departed from him; but Matthew's phrase (viii. 3), His leprosy was cleansed, really combines the two ideas. 2—Mk. xiv. 30:

[1] Mk. v. 24: And Jesus went with him; and much people followed him and thronged him; Mt. ix. 19: And Jesus arose and followed him, and so did his disciples; Lk. viii. 42: The people thronged him. (2) Mk. xii. 4: At him they cast stones, and wounded him in the head, and sent him away shamefully handled; Mt. xxi. 35: They beat one and killed another and stoned another. Lk. xx. 11: They beat him also and entreated him shamefully. (3) Mk. vi. 34: And Jesus, when he came out, saw much people, and was moved with compassion toward them, because they were as sheep not having a shepherd. And he began to teach them many things. Mt. ix. 35 speaks of the teaching, but this verse is derived from Mk. vi. 6. In his next verse, ix. 36, Matthew therefore suppresses the teaching, but speaks of the "sheep having no shepherd," which, characteristically, Luke (ix. 11) suppresses, but speaks of Jesus teaching. (4) Mk. ix. 12: He must suffer many things, and be set at naught; Mt. xvii. 12: Shall also the Son of man suffer of them; Lk. xxiii. 11: Set him at naught. (5) Mk. x. 39: Can ye drink of the cup that I drink of, and be baptized with the baptism that I am baptized with; Mt. xx. 22 in most MSS. has only the first part of this phrase; Lk. xii. 50 has only the second.

[2] From Mk. xi. 2 Matthew chooses "as soon as," Luke "entered"; from Mk. v. 30, Matthew chooses "turned," Luke "the questioning"; from Mk. vi. 11 Matthew chooses "hear," Luke "for a testimony"; and fourthly, from Mk. ix. 33 Matthew chooses "the entering into Capernaum," Luke "the disputing."

This day, even in this night, before the cock crow; Lk. xxii. 34: The cock shall not crow this day; Mt. xxvi. 34: This night before the cock crow. Since it was toward midnight that this was said, this is again not a strong case for Luke. 3—Mk. xiv. 37: And he cometh, and findeth them sleeping, and saith unto Peter, Simon, sleepest thou? couldst thou not watch one hour? Lk. xxii. 45, 46: And when he was come to his disciples, he found them sleeping for sorrow, and said unto them, Why sleep ye? Mt. xxvi. 40: And he cometh unto his disciples, and findeth them asleep, and saith unto Peter, What! could ye not watch one hour? Here, to be sure, Matthew has not the first question, Sleepest thou? but does he not recognise it by saying, What? and thereby does he not save himself from redundancy? Certainly in the fourth and last instance he does—Mk. xv. 26: And the superscription of the accusation was written over; Lk. xxiii. 38: And a superscription also was written over him; Mt. xxvii. 37: And set up over his head his accusation written.

We have now examined twenty-two instances, and I believe these to be all, in which Matthew and Luke exercised a choice of expressions from their original, Mark, and in eighteen of these twenty-two instances we have found that Matthew had "first choice" and Luke second, and in the remaining four cases it is pretty clear why Matthew, with his tendency to choose the salient part of the expression, did not in these four instances choose the first part. It is important that these twenty-two examples should be studied carefully and weighed fairly, for they can, of course, mean but one thing, namely, that Matthew was written before Luke and that Luke had Matthew as well as Mark before him when writing his own gospel. Once that fact is established, the solution of the Synoptic Problem is in sight, and a hundred questions regarding the Life and Teaching of Jesus Christ are settled once for all.[1] But even though it is clearly seen that this

[1] It is easier to underrate than to exaggerate the importance of the fact that these that seem the reports of different eye-witnesses of the same event

priority of choice on the part of Matthew exists to an extent that could not possibly have "happened so," even though it is ungrudgingly granted that never in the world would it have happened that Matthew and Luke working independently chose one the first part, the other the second part, of expressions in their common source, I am afraid that some persons will still ask: Is this position, so suddenly obtained, one that is likely to be kept? Are there no other phenomena that will at once dispute it?[1] On the contrary, once the fact is thus established that Luke followed Matthew and knew of him, other phenomena rush to support that fact. They are perhaps less concrete; and since one requires very tangible evidence as proof, it was necessary to put forward the "first and second choices" at once, in order to take the position, before calling up the reserves. But this allied evidence draws really upon a broader base, the base, namely, that purely Matthæan material meets with precisely the same treatment at Luke's hands that purely Marcan material does. Let us examine the Marcan material first, since this is no longer debatable ground, and he that has eyes may see for himself just how much of light and

are, in general and with the notable exception of the Crucifixion period, truly not so at all, but are the working-over by Matthew of Marcan matter and by Luke of both Marcan and Matthæan matter. It is soothing (and lazy) of us to say that Luke after all contains his view of the Truth. What we especially need is that the deeds and very words of Jesus should be vividly before us, and these we find (so far as "Synoptic tradition" goes) most truthfully portrayed the deeds in Mark and the words (in general) in Matthew, except where he is drawing on Mark. Mark, for example, says: Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary? This became in Matthew: Is not this the carpenter's son? is not his mother called Mary? This in turn was changed by Luke: Is not this Joseph's son? Similarly Mark has Christ's original words: A prophet is not without honour but in his own country and among his own kin and in his own house. Matthew dropped "and among his own kin," and Luke still further dropped "and in his own house." These are only two of scores of such confusions reduced to simplicity the moment we understand the Mark-Matthew-Luke sequence. We may sit back and say, These little things do not matter. But everything bearing on Christ matters, and matters tremendously, if we are to convince people that what seems confusion and even contradiction can easily be accounted for.

[1] I have already indicated, page 616, note 2, four other lines of evidence that converge at this same point of Matthew's priority over Luke.

truth the Second Gospel lost when it was made over into the Third.

Harnack says of Luke that he amplifies, exaggerates, emphasises, accentuates.[1] But in handling his Marcan material Luke does this and more. He blurs, obliterates, blunders, fabricates, falsifies, flattens out, mutilates, murders. Take the first instance in which the words of Christ, as recorded by Mark, are given by Luke—Mk.: Come ye after me and I will make you to become fishers of men; Lk.: Fear not; from henceforth thou shalt catch men.[2] Again, Mk.: We never saw it in this fashion; Lk: We have seen strange things to-day.[3] Mk.: Else the new piece that filled it up taketh away from the old and the rent is made worse; Lk.: If otherwise, then both the new maketh a rent and the piece that was taken out of the new agreeth not with the old.[4] Mk.: In what place soever ye enter into an house, there abide till ye depart from that place; Lk.: And whatsoever house ye enter into, there abide and thence depart.[5] Mk.: For he wist not what to say; Lk.: Not knowing what he said.[6] In the fourteenth chapter Mark tells us how the chief priests and scribes sought to kill Jesus, but "not on the feast day lest there be an uproar of the people." In Luke this becomes: The chief priests and scribes sought how they might kill him; for they feared the people.[7] Mk. says: Let him that is on the housetop not go down into the house, neither enter therein to take anything out of his house. And let him that is in the field not turn back again to take up his garment. In the parallel passage, taken directly from this, Luke says (not having mentioned a house): Let them which are in the midst of it depart out, and let not them that are in the country enter thereinto.[8] Yet Luke transfers the passage accurately enough in another place.[9] In other

[1] Harnack, *The Sayings of Jesus*, p. 113, London, 1908.

[2] Mk. i. 17; Lk. v. 10.

[3] Mk. ii. 12; Lk. v. 26.

[4] Mk. ii. 21; Lk. v. 36.

[5] Mk. vi. 10; Lk. ix. 4.

[6] Mk. ix. 6; Lk. ix. 33.

[7] Mk. xiv. 1, 2; Lk. xxii. 2.

[8] Mk. xiii. 15, 16; Lk. xxi. 21.

[9] Lk. xvii. 31.

words, he not only gives variety to the Marcan narrative, but he secures variety of expression within himself, making one Marcan verse say two different things.

But Luke does more than this. Mark, it will be remembered, says that after the feeding of the five thousand Christ bade his disciples to get into the ship and go "to the other side before unto Bethsaida." Luke makes no mention of this, but he begins his account by saying that the miracle occurred in "a desert place belonging to the city called Bethsaida."[1] This is a favourite method with Luke: namely, to transpose a Marcan word or idea from the end to the beginning of the incident or from the beginning to the end. Sometimes he does this harmlessly, as where, unlike Mark, he introduces the "legion" demoniac as naked, leading us to think it an added detail, till we see that he borrows the suggestion from the fact that after the demoniac was healed, Mark says the people found him "clothed and in his right mind."[2] Sometimes the transposition is more misleading, as where Luke represents Jesus, Moses, and Elias "speaking of his decease, which he should accomplish at Jerusalem," though there is nothing in Mark to support this assumption, nothing to suggest it save that as they came down from the mountain Jesus talked with his disciples of this event—a fact suppressed by Luke,[3] though he seizes on the phrase "be set at nought" for the (peculiar to Luke) trial before Herod—which is, in truth, a very patchwork of appropriations from other incidents.[4]

There can be no mistaking these transformations by Luke, for they are done deliberately, for a purpose and withal clumsily—he is at pains enough to make the incision, but often careless about healing the gaping wound, as where he bodily removes the incident of the scribe asking Jesus which is the first commandment—removes it to another place in order to lead up to the Parable of the Good Samaritan.

[1] Mk. vi. 45; Lk. ix. 10.
[2] Mk. v. 15; Lk. viii. 27.
[3] Mk. ix. 12; Lk. ix. 31.
[4] Lk. xxiii. 8.

Luke changes "scribe" to "lawyer" and the question to "What shall I do to inherit eternal life?" although he has the incident that is rightly introduced by that question elsewhere.[1] In Mark this incident of the scribe and his question occurs immediately after the incident of the Sadducees and the resurrection. Mark closes the second of the two incidents by saying that the scribe agreed with Jesus, and that after that no man durst ask him any question. Having cut out as much of the incident as he could use, Luke leaves these last verses an inappropriate tag to the incident of the Sadducees and resurrection.[2]

Now, precisely as Mark fares at the hands of Luke, so does Matthew fare—only the results are more serious, since whereas Mark chiefly records incidents, in Luke's adaptations from Matthew it is the very words of Christ that suffer. But the Lucan treatment, whether of word or of incident, is the same, and there are sufficient Marcan sayings to lose their identity in Luke, to tell us what will be the fate of Matthæan sayings. The historian that could make the proverbial phrase, Whosoever shall say unto this mountain, Be thou removed and be thou cast into the sea, to read, Ye might say unto this sycamine tree, Be thou plucked up by the root and be thou planted in the sea[3]—the historian that could do that with a verse of Mark could also change Matthew's "When ye come into an house, salute it," into, Salute no man by the way,[4] or his "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing?" into, Are not five sparrows sold for two farthings?[5] The Luke that changes Mark's verse, And Herod said, That John the Baptist was risen from the dead and therefore mighty works do shew forth themselves in him, into, And Herod said, John have I beheaded, but who is this of whom I hear such things?[6] is the same Luke that dilutes Matthew's verse, Ye are like unto whited sepulchres,

[1] Mk. xii. 28; Lk. x. 25; Lk. xviii. 18.
[2] Lk. xx. 39.
[3] Mk. xi. 23; Lk. xvii. 6.
[4] Mt. x. 12; Lk. x. 4.
[5] Mt. x. 29; Lk. xii. 6.
[6] Mk. vi. 14; Lk. ix. 9.

which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones and of all uncleanness, till it becomes, Ye are as graves which appear not and the men that walk over them are not aware of them.[1]

It is needless to go further, though the further one goes the more serious does the total of corruptions become. Luke is not here to defend himself, nor are we here to condemn him. Our duty as Christians is simply to see what has occurred, whatever be the cause, and to bracket as untrustworthy or at least as open to suspicion all the matter in Luke, about three-fourths of it, which finds a parallel in either of the earlier gospels. Now and then, to be sure, Luke sticks closely to his originals, but usually the ways and words of Our Lord are in some measure distorted. He is made to say things He did not say, He is made to do things He did not do. I have discussed elsewhere[2] to what extent, if any, we should also be on our guard when reading such portions of Luke as are peculiar to him. Here I have tried to show how faulty he is when we have another to check him by. Destructive as the results are as regards the Gospel according to Luke, they are wholly constructive as regards the person and teaching of his Master. Not only is the decisive character of Christ's utterances as found in Matthew reaffirmed, but their natural sequence as found in the Sermon on the Mount may now for external reasons be preferred over the disorderly and scattered presentation of them given us by Luke. That Luke, with the discourses as found in Matthew, should have wilfully broken them up and scattered and spoiled them, in trying to piece out his own narrative, has been the impossible hypothesis that for eighteen hundred years and more has blinded us to the fact that he did. Now that we can prove it on him, it seems equally incredible that we should not have discovered it before. And yet in both cases "what couldn't be, just was."

[1] Mt. xxiii. 27; Lk. xi. 44.

[2] In the Introduction to *A Consecutive Life of Christ*, published by Sampson Low, Marston & Co., London, 1911.

In another paper I shall treat of the bearing upon the dates of the gospels of this new fact I have tried here to establish: the priority, namely, of Matthew over Luke. Sufficient to indicate that if Acts was written in A.D. 62, or toward the end of the second year of St Paul's stay at Rome, as Harnack, following others, now seems assured,[1] and Luke was written before Acts (of which fact there is no question), then Matthew, slipping in between Mark and Luke, must of necessity throw Mark still further back, further than the date now assigned to him by Harnack and others, the beginning of the sixth decade, for they have gone on the supposition that Matthew came after Luke. We thus would come very close to the Resurrection, perhaps to within fifteen years, and the possibility of legendary and controversial elements having entered into the gospel story would accordingly be reduced to a minimum. But the theory of the authorship of Acts in 62 A.D., now adopted by Harnack, is still in the process of acceptance or rejection, and in this, as in all such questions, we must proceed "with lead in hand," the more that the proof of Luke's indebtedness to Josephus grows all the stronger now that we can compare that with the manner of his indebtedness to Matthew. Where we may at once proceed more confidently is in our study and statement of the dependence of one Synoptic upon another, since with our understanding of Lucan derivations from Matthew, as well as from Mark, the ghost of a chance of existence belonging to postulated common sources, such as an earlier or a later Mark and a Q, is frightened away, and we are left with the gospels Mark, Matthew, Luke, written in that order, written, except for the end of Mark, almost precisely as we have them to-day, and, except for the derived portions of Luke, for a hundred statable reasons worthy of our acceptance and belief.

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[1] *Dates of the Acts and the Synoptic Gospels*, chap. iii., London, 1911.

THE OCCULT OBSESSIONS OF SCIENCE—WITH DESCARTES AS AN OBJECT-LESSON.

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In a series of essays,[1] I have attempted to show that the permanent gains made in science have been the result of observing and recording phenomena, and of classifying them under laws which find their best expression in mathematical formulæ, and that besides this proper scientific procedure, which I may designate the realistic method, we have persisted in the effort to explain the causes of these phenomena. This endeavour has led us to construct fantastic and imaginary worlds which have not, and never can have, any resemblance to the actual universe. This hypothetical method, far from aiding us to gain real and clear ideas, has burdened science with useless and complicated metaphysical systems. Instead of being a symptom of power, the reluctance to recognise the limits of science comes rather from a certain intellectual cowardice which refuses to acknowledge the truth, that we can attain knowledge not of things themselves but only of their attributes as they affect our senses. If we really face the question, strip our scientific hypotheses of their technical phraseology and complex logic, and try to get a clear and simple idea of what they mean, we find that we have been

[1] Hibbert Journal, July 1909 and July 1910; *Philosophical Magazine,* July 1909 and February 1911.

deceiving ourselves. In the first place, we use words, which ordinarily convey definite ideas, in a sense purely symbolical, and then confuse the image and the reality. For example, when we define space or the æther as a perfect fluid, we deceive ourselves into believing that we have gained a clearer idea of space by applying to it a term which signifies the mobility of matter. But this attribute can be applied only to a material fluid whose change of position may be measured, and such a fluid appeals to us as something essentially different from immaterial space. Nor do we overcome this difficulty by qualifying space as a perfect fluid; any fluid is perfect which satisfies the laws of its nature, and we practise deception when we inject the ethical meaning of "perfect," as being something above ordinary criticism, into the scientific definition of a fluid. We have also constructed a symbolic language, in mathematical analysis, whose characters and terms are so removed from ordinary speech that it imposes on our minds an impression of not being limited by the bounds of logic. Thus, if we derive a mathematical formula for the quantity of heat or electrical energy which passes through free space, we deceive ourselves into thinking that we have an expression not only for a quantity of energy, but that also we have in some unaccountable way gained a knowledge of the nature of energy and of the attributes of space. And we slur over the scientific axiom, that since these mathematical symbols did not express in the beginning something concrete, they cannot after any manipulation give a result which is other than imaginative. Again, we postulate some entity such as matter, energy, or electricity as a foundation, and attempt to derive logically from it all the phenomena of nature, and ignore the plain fact that nature reveals itself to us as a succession of events, either not connected at all in a logical sequence of cause and effect, or at least in such an intricate tangle as to defy our powers of analysis.

During the last two decades, there has been discovered an unusually large number of physical phenomena, and it is

no exaggeration to say that we have mastered them with surprising rapidity and with great ingenuity. At the same time we have turned to these new manifestations of matter and energy with the hope that in them we have at last found the materials for a new and lasting scientific cosmogony. But the edifice differs in appearance only from that built long ago by Descartes; and the materials in both are the same, changed in name but not in substance. This I hope to show by a discussion of the scientific system of Descartes, and by a comparison of it with those of Lucretius, of Kant, and of Laplace.

By a scientific cosmogony, as distinguished from revelation and from metaphysics, is here meant that we first postulate an archetypal form of substance and certain fundamental forces, few in number and inherent in this entity, and that then the universe, as it now exists, follows as the result of the continued action of these forces on this substance. That is, the state of the universe may be expressed at any time subsequent to the initial action of the forces by a set of mathematical or verbal formulæ. And if we could actually, as we can theoretically, reverse the action of these forces in time and in direction, the primal condition of the universe would again result. It is furthermore postulated that this archetypal substance existed originally in the form of minute particles, separate from each other and exactly similar in character, and that the forces acting on these particles were in such perfect balance that the total value of their effect was zero. From some cause, generally unexplained, this balance was destroyed, and, like a clock when its pendulum has once been jogged, the panorama of cosmical history unrolls itself inexorably. Thus the universe becomes a sort of machine whose parts are mechanically driven, not by some external motive force but by the mutual reactions of its parts, and so destined in time to run down when this internal and available energy shall have exhausted itself. And when we speak of the universe, all that part of it designated as living

bodies and vital forces is to be included; because of the belief that they can be considered as ponderable masses subject to physical and chemical forces.

As an original hypothesis the work of Lucretius is of no consequence. In fact, his atomic theory was taken almost entirely from Democritus, and it was rather by the vision of the poet than by the logical analysis of the man of science that he developed these ideas into a picture of the nature of our world. His theory was, in brief, that the universe contained in an otherwise empty space an indefinite number of indivisible and immeasurably small particles, called atoms, which differed only in size, position, and shape. These atoms were indestructible, and by their combination and separation formed all natural bodies. The motion of the atoms did not arise from external forces, but was an inherent property of their nature. With a common impulse, they all moved toward the centre of the universe, but in addition they possessed an individual power of irregular deflection which introduced variety in matter. By their union they formed bodies; and by their impact and rebound they caused vortical motions which now find expression in our term, "energy." As an explanation of natural phenomena the theory has no value, as it originated long before the mathematical laws of forces had been formulated or the phenomena of matter had been accurately observed; but as a guide to thought it has been the basis of most of the later scientific theories. Gradually elaborated by Gassendi, Newton, Boyle, Kant, Laplace, Dalton, and others, this atomic theory is still the touchstone of modern chemistry and physics.

Possibly the most important consequence of the atomic theory is the nebular hypothesis developed independently by Kant and Laplace. Essentially this theory is a restatement of the ideas of Democritus and Lucretius, yet the discovery by Newton of the mathematical law of the force of gravitation permitted for the first time a true scientific method. Thus, while they were compelled to assume, as arbitrarily as did

Lucretius, an initial state of chaos when matter was scattered in atomic masses throughout space, they nevertheless had a cause, experimentally verified and mathematically expressed, to account for the gradual agglomeration of atoms into larger masses at definite places, from the fact that any two masses of sensible size were known to have a mutual attraction varying inversely as the square of the distance between their centres. The active attribute of matter, ruling and guiding its motion, thus became independent of fancy and subject to experimental verification. The nebular hypothesis has remained more or less a fragment, limited to the determination of the sizes, masses, and positions of celestial bodies and systems. Neither Kant nor Laplace, except for a discussion of temperatures, included in their scheme of the evolution of inorganic matter the causes of the complex forms and forces of matter now observed on the earth or stars. Nor, beyond assuming that matter was determined by mass and an inherent power of attraction, did they make any attempt to explain how this occult force acted through a distance. And from this simplified idea of matter without variety and without complexity, they were able to deduce mathematically and logically the evolution of cosmical matter, from a condition of uniform distribution, at least to its segregation into cosmical systems: suns, planets, and satellites. And if we remember that Kant approached the problem from the standpoint of the metaphysician, and Laplace from that of the pure mathematician, we can readily understand why they both were satisfied to take such an abstract view of the universe, and also the simplicity and the insufficiency of such a method. Astronomy is the one science, because of the comparatively enormous magnitude of its units, which permits such an abstract simplification of matter as to consider it merely in the form of masses concentrated at mathematical points. Where we deal with bodies measured in millions of tons and with distances in millions of miles, such variations as are found in the laboratory sink into comparative insignificance, and we can deal with

averages instead of particulars. On the whole, their attempt was a success, and we can find few flaws in the general conceptions of the nebular hypothesis. And just because the phenomena discussed are so few in number and so general in character, there was not the need for supposititious causes and fictitious attributes, provided we grant their initial state of the universe and the first cause contributing to irregularity and the beginning of motion. These postulates are of course entirely arbitrary, and require us to assume an existence previous to time, since time has no meaning in a universe which is everywhere in a state of perfect rest. Undoubtedly the reason why this hypothesis persists in its principal features to the present time, in spite of constant attacks, is just because its authors exercised self-restraint, holding to general laws and avoiding irreconcilable details. Some form of cosmical evolution is now generally granted, and the heavens are swept by gigantic telescopes which linger on the nebulæ, in the hope that accurate measurement will show that these apparently chaotic masses are slowly changing into the more stable form of stellar systems.

Side by side with the belief in atoms, separated from each other in empty space, has grown up the directly contrary idea that substance is continuous and space is a plenum. This doctrine permits us to make no essential difference between space and matter. Space is continuous substance unvaried, and so imperceptible to our senses, while matter is merely a localised variation of this same substance of such a nature as to make it perceptible. And it is significant of these two systems, that although they begin with contradictory premises, they both lead to the same conclusions after apparently rigorous deductions.

The doctrine of continuity owes its rise to Heraclitus, and, amongst the Greeks, was most highly developed by Aristotle. They announced this postulate because the notion that a body can attract another through an intervening vacuum and cause it to move introduces an occult or inexplicable idea.

Our experience teaches us that motion results only from a push or impact between bodies actually in contact. But it is quite evident that, in refusing to accept a force which acts contrary to our experience, which all goes to show that a material link is necessary to produce motion between bodies, they fell into as serious a difficulty, for they were compelled to create an occult substance to serve as the material link between bodies, and occult variations in it for the bodies themselves. As explanations of phenomena both ideas are occult, but not to the same degree. We know, for a fact, that there is an attractive force between bodies of sensible size, although we cannot explain its cause, and we can in our imaginations transfer a like form to bodies of an insensible size with some probability of truth. But the postulation of a plenum of continuous substance and of variations in it, which affect us as matter, is wholly occult, since we have no experience from sensible matter to guide us; in fact, both plenum and its variations always have characteristics assigned to them directly contrary to the evidence of our senses.

The history of scientific theory is a record of the conflict between these rival ideas. While the atomistic school has frequently had the advantage, since the time of Descartes the doctrine of the continuity of matter has persisted in some form, and at the present time is again established as the basis of physical theory. Nevertheless, the cosmical system, as deduced by Descartes from this hypothesis of a plenum, has suffered shipwreck, and comparatively few think it profitable to study it in detail. Before we adopt his principles and discard his conclusions, it is at least advisable to see whether his errors lie in the principles themselves or in the inability of Descartes to derive true conclusions from correct principles. Fortunately we have in the *Discours de la méthode*, in the *Principia Naturæ*, and in the many letters of Descartes an unusually complete record of his principles, his method, and his conclusions.

Descartes has in his *Principia Naturæ* set forth with

specious simplicity the causes, laws, and the phenomena of the universe as he finds them. Geometry is to be the ruler, or at least the vicegerent, and no substance will be discussed except such as may be divided, figured, and moved according to the laws which geometers hold to govern quantity, nor will any proposition be considered proved unless it has been deduced with such evidence as would suffice for a mathematical demonstration. With vexatious inconsistency he then destroys the force of this admirable introduction by carefully warning us not to consider his premises true or his conclusions conformable to fact, since his scheme is really an hypothesis or supposition as to what might be, and not what is.

The first aim of Descartes is to record for us how he arrived at the postulates from which he developed his natural laws. Having previously laid aside preconceived ideas, he found that to doubt is the first and only means of knowledge: we can doubt the existence of everything except that which doubts; therefore that which doubts or thinks, exists. Whence he derives the principle that our thoughts, and the things we have an idea of, are real and objective to us. However, by such a process we do not obtain a knowledge of things themselves, but only of their attributes. Hence, the final reality must be those attributes which are inseparable from our conception of all phenomena, and there should be some one essential attribute which may be used to designate things in general. Thus hardness, while it is an attribute, is not essential, for a body moving at the same speed as ourselves does not give us the sensation of hardness. After careful consideration, he found that simple extent in length, breadth, and thickness is the attribute essential to matter. Not only is this true, but the extent of matter is identical with the extent of space: "The same extent in length, breadth, and thickness, which constitutes space, constitutes a body; and the difference between them lies in this, that we attribute to a body a particular and limited extent which changes position with the body as it moves, and that we attribute

to space an extent so general and so vague that when we remove from a certain space the body which occupied it we do not think we have transported the extent with it; meanwhile, the extent of the body remains of the same size, of the same figure, and has changed position with respect to the body only as we determine position by other bodies."

Since matter is thus identical with space, and consequently continuous, there can be no action between bodies at a distance, and all motion is the result of a push or impact. Motion, therefore, he defines as the transference of a part of matter or of a body from the neighbourhood of those which touch it immediately, and which we consider at rest, to the neighbourhood of others. And since all space is full of matter, or rather is matter, each body is so fashioned that it can never occupy a greater or a less space, nor can any other body occupy the space while it is there.

These postulates of Descartes, that space is a plenum and motion the result of an impact, required him to oppose such theorists as Gassendi, who were advocating the atomic theory and an occult attractive force in matter as its cause of motion. It thus became of prime importance for him to formulate laws of impact and motion. This was an extremely difficult problem, especially so as the available knowledge of the phenomena of impact and motion was very deficient, and, such as it was, indicated that friction produced an uncompensated diminution of velocity. For the most part his laws were erroneous and have been abandoned.

With these general principles determined, the nature of space and matter and its conservation of quantity and action, Descartes then proceeds to explain the various kinds and phenomena of matter. While the state of knowledge was not sufficiently advanced for him to avoid giving causes and explanations which seem to us puerile, yet we must admit that his postulates are those even now advanced as the basis of modern theory, and that his deductions were as logically derived as those of modern theorists.

We are to suppose that, in the beginning of time, God divided all space or substance into like parts, and caused them with equal force to have two motions: each to rotate about its own centre, and many to revolve about common axes. In the course of time, the collisions between these particles knocked off their angular corners and edges and reduced them gradually to the shape of spheres. This attrition gave rise to three kinds of elementary matter which constitute the entire universe.

Matter of the first kind is composed of the cosmic dust, or little fragments resulting from the collisions. They are so excessively minute and of such various shapes that they always accurately fill any space which would otherwise exist between the larger spheres from which they were formed. The second kind of matter consists of the little spheres worn away from the original matter. There is also a third kind of elementary matter formed by gross and conglomerate masses of the first two kinds which have become so intricately linked together as to be inseparable.

The motions, which Descartes assigned to these particles, produced his famous stellar vortices and accounted for all the mechanical, thermal, and other energy of the universe.

It is generally assumed that these three elementary forms of matter are antiquated and grotesque, yet it is easy to draw a close parallel between them and modern ideas. The first kind of matter, which forms the sun and the fixed stars, he supposed to be flame. And this idea, under different disguises, lasted well into the nineteenth century as the explanation of heat, which was held to be an intangible substance called caloric. The matter of the second kind, which filled the interstellar spaces, still persists in science under the name of the luminiferous æther, whose properties have been modified again and again, and are still as unsatisfactory as Descartes's little spheres. The mass of facts now known about terrestrial matter has undoubtedly produced great changes in the hypotheses now advanced concerning molecules of matter. But is there any essential difference between the modern

molecule, which is said to be a system of small and identical particles held together by occult forces, and Descartes's third kind of matter, made up of similar parts linked together?

And in this system we have a splendid example of an hypothesis, whose foundations now seem ridiculous, whose laws are not correct generalisations, and whose conclusions are unlike the phenomena of nature, which, nevertheless, anticipates an idea to be advanced again after a century and a half. His hypothesis of light, that it is caused by the pressure of matter particles, contains as a corollary the germ of the kinetic theory of heat. Descartes discards the notion, which then generally prevailed, that heat was a sort of mysterious substance called caloric, for which indeed there was no place in his universe, and defines it as the oscillatory agitation of terrestrial particles, set up by the pressure of light. This idea accounts for such properties of heat as expansion, since vibrating particles usually require more space than quiescent ones; but, on the other hand, they might be so shaped and arranged as to occupy less space when in motion, and such a body should contract if heated. Such an effect was unknown at that time, but we ought to claim that the theory was brilliantly verified when, in later years, water was observed to contract when heated from zero to four degrees centigrade. Not to contradict known phenomena, and to anticipate some unknown ones, is held to be the justification of such hypotheses; by this standard Descartes was successful as few others have been. Yet, if we compare the splendid advances which he made in science by his experimental discoveries and his application of mathematics to physical laws, with the mass of falsehood in his metaphysical schemes by which he dominated science, and which still flourish in the metaphysical theories now in vogue, we can hardly tell whether he has benefited or done harm to science by his labours. Possibly no labour is too great, if by it we arrive at ever so little truth; but no one can believe that this mediæval conception of light and heat induced his successors to seek for a possible, but

unexpected, contraction of water. Surely the converse is the case, and his metaphysical divination was purely specious; the phenomena were discovered without any reference to his theory, and probably without even a knowledge of it, and now we may use them as a buttress for Descartes's tottering edifice.

Even from this brief sketch it will be seen how scientific hypothesis has always suffered by its obsession for the occult, and how Descartes's method still flourishes in the modern theories of physics and of the other sciences. He is to be admired in this respect: when he once outlined his premises and his method, he deduced his conclusions as rigorously as possible, and compared them consistently with experience; whereas it has become the custom now to alter postulates whenever their conclusions point to error, with the result that it is most difficult to outline a consistent and individual modern theory. If we study modern scientific theories we find that the postulates are as metaphysical as, if not more so than, those of Descartes. They are stated with much assurance, but as the conclusions unfold themselves we begin to notice a certain hesitation and a desire to limit the discussion to a small and related class of phenomena. Or if an excursion is made into a wider field, lack of confidence increases, and usually results in a modification and confusion of the postulates. If Descartes's theory may be illustrated as a tree, with all its conclusions branching out from a single idea as a stem, our present state of physics is like a thicket of bushes with many stems so concealed and interwoven that the parent stem of any branch cannot be distinguished.

We have sketched the most elaborate and comprehensive hypothesis ever developed in the name of science, which, if it means anything to mankind, is his best expression of verity and fact. Yet we see Descartes, an illustrious man of science, devoting his talents to the exposition of an openly confessed fiction. And his reputation rests on the belief that he has spun a web of fancy so subtly that it can deceive us. While

additional knowledge has been acquired by us, no one has shown that modern theorists have discovered a method different from, and more trustworthy than, that of Descartes. We recognise that many of the laws he formulated are false, and that most of his facts have been corrected or disproved, but we should remember that modern hypotheses also are developed as a means of attacking unexplored regions of science where our own knowledge is either meagre or false. For example, he felt it necessary to find a cause for the recently discovered sun-spots, and then extended its action so as to change a vortex into a primitive terrestrial planet. A better knowledge of these spots on the sun proves that his whole reasoning was false, or shall I say childish? But was it less plausible at that time than is now our most recent theory: that an atom of matter is a system of corpuscles, each of which is a unit of free negative electricity moving with the velocity of light, and that this denatured bit of electricity is nothing but a localised strain in an ætherial plenum? Let us examine such a postulate as we would a similar statement if it had been made by Descartes. We may admit, with Lord Kelvin, that we know nothing about the real nature of electricity. We do, however, know experimentally that electricity seems to be associated always with matter; that the greatest velocity we have caused or observed any body of an appreciable size to have, is about one hundred thousand times less than the speed of light; that an ætherial plenum is certainly only a matter of imagination; and that the conception of matter as a strain in this imaginary plenum is hardly a clear idea. So it seems that the facts supporting our modern postulates regarding the nature of substance are as meagre and doubtful, and our ideas as obscure for our purpose, as those of Descartes were for his.

On the contrary, it is no exaggeration to say that there probably never lived a man better equipped than Descartes to make and to defend an hypothesis; his scientific scepticism, his freedom from the trammels of authority, his devotion and

skill in experimental work, his determination to submit his ideas to the rigorous logic of mathematical analysis, in which he was the leader of his age, were admirable qualities for such a purpose.

Dazzling as the system of Descartes appears when viewed as a whole, it has a foundation of sand and an imaginary rather than a substantial superstructure. But even if we showed, as has been done by others, that the scheme not only was not true, but even not capable of resisting the most cursory criticism, we should be met by the answer: that as knowledge increases, details which are erroneous will be abandoned, and new ones substituted which better approximate to the truth. This counter-criticism seems aside from the question; it would be strange if the efforts made to discover new phenomena and laws, and to correct false ones, did not increase our knowledge. But is this aim furthered by such hypothetical systems, which attempt to describe the mechanism of these phenomena and laws, and which assume that their authors are the creators, and not mere observers of the universe, whose laws and phenomena are independent of them—a confusion of subjective ideality and objective reality? Also, however it advances, our knowledge of nature will always be so inadequate that the very announcement of a system of nature should cause us to suspect it of being etched out by fancy, and to be useless as an aid to scientific investigation. Nor can we find a system which does not transgress constantly the limitations of science, and it is safe to say none will ever be proposed which will not transgress them, because it is the desire for such a system that is false, and not its development.

On the other hand, the discovery and verification of phenomena should be unreservedly advocated, also their classification into laws and even the restricted use of hypothesis. But the latter has come to have two meanings in scientific usage. The word hypothesis very frequently signifies a law which has been pretty accurately expressed and verified by

available experience, but which still does not embrace some phenomena believed to be related to it, or is contradicted by some others; for example, the law of conservation of energy was an hypothesis in this sense, until the discovery of the mechanical equivalent of heat proved that the mechanical energy, apparently lost in every action by friction, was accurately balanced by the thermal energy produced by the friction. Such hypothetical reasoning is quite warranted; in fact, a law or hypothesis of this sort should always be announced as soon as a sufficient number of facts point to its probable truth: such tentative laws always direct attention to the phenomena involved and stimulate research.

But hypothesis in the other sense does not gradually crystallise into law as our knowledge increases. No information, however greater than ours at present, will ever advance Descartes's hypothesis a step closer to a law. We shall never have any data about his three kinds of matter, his nature of free space, etc.; we learn constantly more about the action of light, but we still drift confusedly and without a guide between his apparatus of pressures, Newton's corpuscles, and Huygens's waves; the latest treatise on optics now states that we may have to mix together all three of them.

The system of Descartes will fascinate anyone who surrenders himself to its spirit and scope, but illusion is not the function of science. Nor can I find any more accurate and just criticism of this and all other hypotheses than that given by Bolingbroke: "The notion Descartes entertained and propagated, that there is, besides clear ideas, a kind of inward sentiment of evidence, which may be a principle of knowledge, is, I suppose, dangerous in physical inquiries as well as in abstract reasoning. He who departs from the analytic method, to establish general propositions concerning the phenomena on assumptions, and who reasons from these assumptions, afterwards on inward sentiments of knowledge, as they are called, instead of clear and real ideas, lays aside, at once, the only sure guides to knowledge. This Descartes did

very widely in his construction of a world, and yet by dint of genius he gave a great air of simplicity and plausibility to his hypothesis, and he knew how to make even geometry subservient to error. . . . The plenum of Descartes is well nigh destroyed; many of his laws of motion are shown to be false; the mills that served to grind his three elements are demolished; and his fluid matter in which, as in a torrent, the planets were carried around the sun, whilst a similar motion in the particular vortex of every planet impelled all bodies to the centre, is vanished. Notwithstanding all this, how slowly, how unwillingly have many philosophers departed from the Cartesian hypothesis!"

That Bolingbroke was mistaken when he said that the plenum, the vortices, and all the other apparatus of Descartes have been destroyed, can be readily seen by reading any modern treatise on physics, or from the statement of Sir Oliver Lodge in his *Ether of Space*: "I am able to advocate a view of the ether which makes it not only uniformly present and all-pervading, but also massive and substantial beyond conception. It is turning out to be the most substantial thing—perhaps the only substantial thing—in the material universe."

But he was vividly correct in the larger and more important part, when he finds that all such hypotheses are based on an inward sentiment of truth and not on clear and real ideas. An inward sentiment of knowledge is, and must be, the final guide of anyone who employs this hypothetical method, for how can anyone have clear and real ideas about such things as transcend experience? And amongst the many following this method, what man can be the arbiter to declare which one has been gifted by a divine power with the *true* inward sentiment of knowledge?

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BUSINESS, GOODNESS, AND IMAGINATION.

GERALD STANLEY LEE.

THE modern imagination takes, speaking roughly, three characteristic forms:—

1. Imagination about the unseen or intangible — the spiritual—as especially typified in electricity, in the wireless telegraph, the aeroplane: a new and extraordinary sense of the invisible and the unproved as an energy to be used and reckoned with.

2. Imagination about the future—a new and extraordinary sense of what is going to happen next in our world.

3. Imagination about people. We are not only inventing new machines, but our new machines have turned upon us and are creating new men. The telephone changes the structure of the brain. Men live in wider distances, and think in larger figures, and become eligible to nobler and wider motives.

Imagination about the unseen is going to give us in an incredible degree the mastery of the spirit over matter.

Imagination about the future is going to make the next few hundred years an organic part of every man's life to-day. The imagination of men about themselves and other people is going to give us a race of men with new motives, or, to put it differently, it is going to give us not only new sizes, but new kinds of men. People are going to achieve impossibilities in goodness, and our inventions in human nature are going to keep up with our other inventions.

I.

Imagination about the Unseen.

The most distinctively modern thing that ever happened was when Benjamin Franklin went out one day and called down lightning from heaven. Before that, power had always been dug up, or scraped off the ground. The more power you wanted, the more you had to get hold of the ground and dig for it; and the more solid you were, the more heavy, solid things you could get—the more you could pull solid, heavy things round in this world where you wanted them. Franklin turned to the sky and turned power on from above, and decided that the real and the solid and the substantial in this world was to be pulled about by the Invisible.

Copernicus had the same idea of course when he fared forth into space, and discovered the centre of all power to be in the sun. It grieved people a good deal to find how much more important the sky was than they were, and their whole little planet with all of them on it. The idea that that big blue field up there, empty by day, and with such crowds of little faint dots in it all night, was the real thing, the big, final, and important thing, and that they and their churches and popes and pyramids and nations should just dance about it for millions of years like a mote in a sunbeam, hurt their feelings at first. But it did them good. It started them looking Up, and looking the other way for power.

Very soon afterwards Columbus enlarged upon the same idea by starting the world toward very far things on the ground, and he bored through the skylines, a thousand skylines, and spread the nations upon the sea. Columbus was the typical modern man, led by the invisible, the intangible; and on the great waters somewhere between Spain and New York, between the old and the new, Columbus discovered the Future Tense, the centrifugal tense, the tense that sweeps in the unknown, and gathers in, out of space, out of hope, out of faith, the lives of men. The mere fastened-down stable

things, the mere actual facts, ceased to be the world with Columbus, and the air and the sky began to be swung in, and to be swept through the thoughts and acts of men and of women: miners, mariners, explorers, inventors. The impossible steamship, the railway, the impossible cotton-gin and sewing-machine and reaper, Housac tunnels, and Atlantic cables—the impossible became one of the habits of modern life.

Of course, the sky and the air and the unknown and the future had been recognised before, but only a little and in a rather patronising way. But when a world has made a great solid continent by following a horizon-line, it begins to take things just beyond very seriously. And so our Time has been fulfilled. We have had the Stone Age. We have had the Iron Age, and now we have the Sky Age, and the sky telegraph, and sky men, and sky cities; mountains of stone are built out of men's visions, and towers and sky-scrapers swing up out of their wills and up out of their hearts.

. . . .

Not long ago as I was coming away from New York in the Boston express, which was running at fifty-five miles an hour, I saw suddenly some smoke coming up, apparently out of a satchel on the floor, belonging to the man in the chair in front of me. I moved the satchel away, and the smoke came up through the carpet. I spoke to the Pullman conductor, who was passing through, and in a second the train had stopped, and the great, wild, roaring Thing had ceased, and we stood in a wide, white silence in the fields. We got off the car, some of us, to see what had happened, and to see if there was a hot box on the wheels. We found that the entire under side of the floor of the car was on fire; and what had happened? Nothing except a new impossibility, nothing except that a human being had invented an electrical locomotive so powerful that it was pulling that train fifty-five miles an hour while the brakes in the car were set—twelve brakes all grinding twenty miles on those twelve wheels; and the locomotive paid no more attention to the brakes of that

heavy Pullman than it would to a feather or to a small boy, all the way from New York to Stamford, hanging on behind. As I came in I looked again at the train—the long dull train that had been pulled along by the Invisible, by the kingdom of the air and the sky—the long, dull, heavy train! And the spirit of the far-off sun was in it!

In Count Zeppelin's new airship the new free social spirit has a symbol, and in the gyroscopic train the Inspired Millionaire is on a firm foundation. The power of the new kind and new size of capitalist is his power of keeping an equilibrium with the people, and the men of real genius in modern affairs are men who have motor genius and light genius over other men's wills. They are allied to the X-ray and the airship, and gain their pre-eminence by their power of forecast and invention—their power of riding upon the unseen, upon the thoughts of men and the spirit of the times. Even the painters have caught this spirit. The *plein air* painters are painting the light, and the sculptors are carving shadows and haloes, and we have not an art left which does not lean out into the Invisible. And religion is full of this spirit, and theosophy, and Christian Science. The playwrights are touched by it, and the action, instead of being all on the stage, is thrown out into the spirit of the audience. The play in a modern theatre is not on the stage, but in the stalls. Maeterlinck, Ibsen, Shaw, merely use the stage as a kind of magic-lantern or suggestion-centre for the real things that, out behind us in the dark, are happening in the audience.

II.

Imagination about the Future.

I remember looking over with H. G. Wells one night some time ago, a set of pictures or photographs of the future in America, which he had brought home with him. They were largely sky-scrapers, big bridges, Niagaras, and things; and I could not help thinking, as I came home that night, how much more Mr Wells had of the future of America in

his own mind than he could possibly buy in his photographs. What funny little films they were, after all: how faint and pathetic, how almost tragically dull, those pictures of the future of my country were! H. G. Wells himself, standing in his own doorway, was more like America, and more like the future of America, than the pictures were.

The future in America cannot be pictured. The only place it can be seen is in people's faces. Go out into the street, in New York, in Chicago, in San Francisco, in Seattle; let men look eagerly as they go into the faces of the passers-by, and they feel hundreds of years—the next hundreds of years,—like a breath, sweep past. America, with all its forty-story buildings, its little play Niagaras, its great dumb Rockies, is the unseen country. It can only as yet be seen in people's eyes. Often, flowing sublime and silent through our noisy streets, and through the vast panorama of our towns, I have heard the footfalls of the unborn, like sunshine, around me.

This feeling America gives one in the streets is the real America. The solidity, the finality, the substantial fact in America, is the daily sense, in the streets,—of the future. And it has seemed to me that this fact—whether one observes it in Americans in America, in Americans in England and in other nations (in what one might call, for lack of a better name, the American temperament in all peoples)—is the most outstanding typical and important fact our modern world and our philosophy about the world have now to reckon with. Nothing can be seen as it really is—if this amazing, pervasive, hourly sense of the future is left out of it.

Several corollaries follow.

All power is rapidly coming to be based on news—news about human nature,—and about what is soon to be done by people. This news travels by express in boxes, by newspapers, by telephone, by word of mouth, and by wireless telegraph. Most of the wireless news is not only wireless, but it is in cipher; hence prophets, or men who have great sensitiveness,

men whose souls and bodies are films for the future, platinum plates for the lights and shadows of events; men who are world-poets, sensitive to the air-waves and the light-waves of truth, to the faintest vibrations from to-morrow, or from the next hundred years hovering just ahead. As a matter of course, it is already coming to be true that the most practical man to-day is the prophet. In the older days, men used to look back for wisdom, and the practical man was the man who spoke from experience; and the prophet was crucified. But to-day, the practical man is the man who can make the best guess on to-morrow. The cross has gone by—at least, the cross is being pushed further along. A prophet in business or politics gets a large salary now; he is a recognised force. Being a prophet is getting to be almost smug and respectable.

We live so in the future in our modern life, and all our rewards are so great for men who can live in the future, that a man who can be a ten-year prophet, or a twenty-five year prophet like James J. Hill, is put on a pedestal, or rather is not wasted on a pedestal, and is made president of a railroad. He swings the country as if it were his hat. We see emperors clinging to the skirts of Count Zeppelin. We only crucify a prophet now if he is a hundred or two hundred or five hundred years ahead. Even then, we would not be apt to crucify; we would merely not use him much—except the first twenty-five years of him.

The theory is no longer tenable that prophets must be necessarily crucified. As a matter of history, most prophets have been crucified by people; but it was not so much because of their prophecy as because their prophecy did not have any first twenty-five years in it. They were crucified because of a blank place or hiatus not necessarily in their own minds, but at least in other people's. People would have been very glad to have their first twenty-five years' worth if they could have got it. It is this first twenty-five years, or joining-on part, which is most important in prophecy, and which has become our speciality in the Western world. One might say, in a

general way, that the idea of having a first twenty-five years' section in truth for a prophet, is a modern — an almost American—invention. We are temperamentally a country of the future and think instinctively in futures; and perhaps it is not too much to say (considering all the faults that go with it for which we are criticised) that we have led the way in futures, as a specialty, as a national habit of mind; and though with terrific blunders, perhaps we have been really the first people *en masse* to put being a prophet on a practical, every-day basis—that is, to supply the first twenty-five year section, or the next-thing-to-do section to Truth: to put in, as it were, a kind of coupling between this world and the next. This is what America is for, perhaps,—to put in the coupling between this world and the next.

In former days, the strength of a man, or of an estate, or a business, was its stability. In the new world, instead of stability, we have the idea of vibration; and the power consists not so much in stolid, brittle, foundation-quality as in conductivity. Socially, men can be divided into conductors (men who connect powers) and non-conductors (men who do not); and power lies in flexibility, adaptableness, and impressionableness. The set, conservative class of people, in three hundred years, are going to be the dreamers, inventors, those who demonstrate their capacity to dream true, and who hit shrewdly upon probabilities and trends and futures; and the greatest power of a man is coming to be the power of observing atmospheres, and of being sensitive to the intangible and the unknown. People are more likely to be crucified two thousand years from now for wanting to stay as they are. There used to be the inertia of rest; and now in its place, working reciprocally in a new, astonishing equilibrium, we step up calmly on our vast moving side-walk of civilisation and swing into the inertia of motion!

The inertia of men, instead of being that of foundations, conventions, customs, facts, sogginess, and heaviness, is getting to be an inertia now toward the future, or the next-thing-to-do.

Most of us can prove this by simply looking inward and taking a glimpse of our own consciousness. Let a man draw up before his own mind the contents of his own consciousness (if he has a motor consciousness), and we find that the future in his life looms up, both in its motives and its character, and takes about three-quarters of the room of his consciousness; and when it is not looming up, it is woven into everything he does. Even if all the future was for were to help one understand the present and act this immediate moment as one should, nine-tenths of the power of seeing a thing as it *is* turns out to be one's power of seeing it as it is *going to be.* In any normal man's life it is really the future and his sense of the future that makes his present what it is.

History is losing its monopoly. It is only absorbed in men's minds—in the minds of those who are making more of it—in parts, or rather in elements of all its parts.

The trouble with history seems to have been, thus far, that people have been under the illusion that history should be taken as a solid. They seem to think it should be taken in bulk. They take it, some of them, a solid hundred years of it or so, and gulp it down. The advantage of prophecy is that it cannot be taken as a solid by people who would take everything so if they could. Prophecy is protected. People have to breathe it, assimilate it, and get it into their circulation and make a solid out of it personally and do it all themselves. It is this process which is making our modern men spiritual, interpretative, and powerful towards the present and towards the past, and which is giving a body and soul to our knowledge, and is making knowledge lively and human—the kind of knowledge (when men get it) that makes things happen.

III.

Imagination about People.

Every man one knows can be seen doing his work in this world on a great background—a kind of panorama or stage setting in his mind, made up of history and books, newspapers,

people, and experience, which might be called his theory of the world.

It is his theory of the world which makes him what he is: his personal judgment or personal interpretation of what the world is like, and what works in it, and what does not work.

A man's theory as to why people do or do not do wrong, is not a theory he might, in some brief, disinterested moment, possibly at luncheon, take time to discuss. His theory of what is wrong and what is right, and of how they work, touches the efficiency with which he works intimately and permanently at every point every minute of his business day.

If he does not know, in the middle of his business day, what his theory of the world, of human nature, is, he would better stop and find out.

I would like to propose—as a basis for the judgment of men and events, and as a basis for forecasting the next men and the next events—and arriving at a vision of things as a whole, the following theory.

If the men who were crucifying Jesus could have been suddenly stopped at the last moment, and if they could have been kept perfectly still for ten minutes and could have thought about it, some of them would have refused to go on with the crucifixion when the ten minutes were over. If they could have been stopped for twenty minutes, there would have been still more of them who would have refused to have gone on with it. They would have stolen away and wondered about The Man in their hearts. There were others there who would have needed twenty days of being still and of thinking. There were some who would have had to have twenty years to see what they really wanted, in all the circumstances, to do.

People crucified Christ because they were in a hurry.

They did what they wanted to do at the moment. So far as we know, there were only two men who did what they would have wished they had done in twenty years. There was the thief on the other cross, who showed The Man he

knew who he was, and there was the disciple John, who kept as close as he could. John, perhaps, was thinking of the past, of all the things that Christ had said to him, and the man on the other cross was thinking what was going to happen next. The other people who had to do with the crucifixion were all thinking about the thing they were doing at the moment and the way they felt about it. But The Man was thinking, not of his suffering, but of the men in front of him and of what they could be thinking about, and what they would be thinking about afterwards, in ten minutes, in twenty minutes, in twenty days, or in twenty years; and suddenly his heart was flooded with pity at what they would be thinking about afterwards, and in the midst of the pain he made that great cry to heaven: "Father, forgive them; they know not what they do."

It is because Christians have never quite believed that The Man really meant this when he said it that they have persecuted the Jews for two thousand years. It is because they do not believe it now that they blame the founders of many of our great modern fortunes for doing what most of them twenty years ago would have done themselves. It was one of the hardest things to do and say that anyone ever said in the world, and it was said at the hardest possible time to say it. It was strange that one almost swooning with pain should have said the gentlest-hearted and truest thing about human nature that has ever been said since the world began. It has seemed to me the most literal and perhaps the most practical truth ever spoken.

It goes straight to the point about people. It gives one one's definition of goodness both for one's self and for others. It gives one a programme for action.

Except in our more joyous and free moments, we assume that when people do us a wrong, they know what they are about. They look at the right thing to do and they look at the wrong one, and they choose the wrong one because they like it better. Nine people out of ten one meets in the streets

coming out of church on Sunday morning, if one asked them the question plainly, "Do you ever do wrong when you know it is wrong?" would say that they did. If you ask them what a sin is, they will tell you that it is something you do when you know you ought not to do it.

But The Man himself, in speaking of the most colossal sin that has ever been committed, seemed to think that when men committed a sin it was because they did not really see what it was that they were doing. They did what they wanted to do at the moment. They did not do what they would have wished they had done in twenty years.

I would define goodness as doing what one would wish one had done in twenty years—twenty years, twenty days, twenty minutes, twenty seconds, according to the time the action takes to get ripe.

It would be far more true and more to the point if, instead of seizing upon some flagrant Mere Millionaire and scolding or admiring him for his skilled labour in getting too rich, we were to point out mildly that he has done something which in the long run he would not have wanted to do; that he has lacked the social imagination for a great permanently successful business. His sin has consisted in his not taking pains to act accurately and permanently, in his not concentrating his mind and finding out what he really wanted to do. It would seem to be better and truer and more accurate in the tremendous crisis of our modern life to judge him, not as a monster of wickedness, but merely as an inefficient, morally underwitted man. There are things that he has not thought of that everyone else has. We see that in all those qualities that really go to make a great business house in a great nation, he must stand as the most colossal failure that our American business life has produced as yet. To point his incompetence out quietly and calmly, and without scolding, would seem to be the only fair way to deal with our millionaire. He merely has not done what he would have wished he had done in twenty—well,

possibly, two hundred years, or as long a time as it would be necessary to allow for him to see. The one thing that the world could accept gracefully from an individual of that character now would be the establishment of a great endowment of research and education to help other people to see in time how they can keep from being like him. If he lead in this great work and see it soon enough, perhaps he may stop suddenly being the world's most isolated man.

Many men have been lonely before in the presence of a few fellow human beings; but to be lonely with a whole nation, eighty million people: to feel a whole human race standing there outside of your life and softly wondering about you, staring at you in the show-case of your money, peering in as out of a thousand newspapers upon you as a kind of moral curiosity under glass, studying you as the man who has performed the most athletic feat of not seeing what he was really doing and how he really looked in all the world—this has been the lot of many a millionaire. He has not done what he would wish he had done in twenty years.

Goodness may be defined as getting one's own attention, as boning down and finding out the best and most efficient way of doing what one has to do. Any man who will make adequate arrangements with himself at suitable times for getting his own attention will be good. Anyone else from outside who can make such arrangements for him, such arrangements of expression or of advertising goodness as to get his attention, will make him good.

If two great shops could stand side by side on the main street of the world and all the vices could be put in the show window of one of them, and all the virtues in the show window of the other, and all the people could go by, all day, all night, and see the windowful of virtues as they were, and the windowful of vices as they were, all the world would be good in the morning,

It would stay good as long as people remembered how the

windows looked. Or if they could not remember, all they would need to do—most people—when a vice tempted them would be to step out, look at it in its window a minute, possibly take a look, too, at the other window, and they would be good.

If a man were to take a fancy to any particular vice and would take a step up to the window, and take one real look at it in the window, see it lying there, its twenty years' evil, its twenty days', its twenty minutes' evil all branching up out of it, he would be good.

When we see the wrong on one side, and the right on the other, and really see the right as vividly as we do the wrong, we do right automatically. Wild horses cannot drag a man away from doing right if he sees what the right is.

A little while ago in a New England city where the grade crossings had just been abolished, and where the railroad wound its way on a huge, yellow sandbank through the most beautiful part of the town, a prominent, public-spirited citizen wrote a letter to the president of the company, suggesting that the railroad (for a comparatively small sum, which he mentioned) plant its sandbank with trees and shrubs. A letter came the next day saying that the railroad was unwilling to do it. He might quite justifiably have been indignant, and flung himself into print and made a little scene in the papers, which would have been the regular and conventional thing to do under the circumstances. But it occurred to him instead, being a man of a curious and practical mind, that possibly he did not know how to express himself to railroad presidents, and that his letter had not said what he meant. He thought he would try again and see what would happen if he expressed himself more fully and adequately. He took for it, this second time, a box, seven feet long. The box contained two long rolls of paper: one a picture by a landscape gardener of the embankment as it would look when planted with trees and with shrubs; and the other a photograph—a long panorama of the same embankment as it then stood, with its two great broadsides

of yellowness trailing through the city. The box containing the rolls was sent without comment, and with photographs and estimates of cost on the bottom of the pictures.

A letter from the railroad came next day, thanking him for his suggestion and promising to have the embankment made into a park at once.

If God had arranged from the beginning, slides of the virtues and had furnished every man with a stereopticon inside, and if all a man had to do at any particular time of temptation was to take out just the right slide, or possibly try three or four up there on his canvas a second, no one would ever have any trouble in doing right.

It is not too much to say that this way of looking at evil and good—at the latent capacities of evil and good in men, if a man once believes it, and if he once practises it daily as a part of his daily practical interpretation and mastery of men, will soon put a new face for him on nearly every great human problem with which he finds his time confronted. We shall watch the men in the world about us—each for their little day trying their funny, pathetic, curious, little moral experiments ; and we shall see the men—all of the men and all of the good and the evil in the men this moment, daily before our eyes working out with implacable hopefulness the fate of the world. We know that in spite of self-deceived syndicalism, and self-deceived trusts, in spite of coal strikes, and all the vain, comic little troops of war-ships around the earth, peace and righteousness in a vast overtone are singing towards us.

We are not only going to have new and better motives in our modern men, but the new and better motives are going to be thrust upon us. Every man who reads these pages is having, at the present moment, motives in his life which he would not have been capable of at first. Why should not a human race have motives of which it was not capable of at first?

If one takes up two or three motives of one's own, the small motives and the large ones, and holds them up in one's hand and looks at them quietly from the point of view of what one would wish one had done in twenty years, there is scarcely one of us who would choose the small ones. People who are really modern—that is, who look beyond themselves in what they do, to others, who live their lives as one might say, six people away, or sixty people further out from themselves, or sixty million people further,—are becoming more common everywhere; and the people who, in what they do, look beyond the moment to another day, who are getting more and more to live their lives twenty years ahead, and to have motives that will last twenty years, are implacably driven to better and more permanent motives.

Thinking of more people when we act for ourselves, means ethical consciousness or goodness, and better and more permanent motives.

In the last analysis, the men who permanently succeed in business will have to see further than the other people do.

Men like our millionaire, who have made failures of their lives, and have not been able to conduct a business so as to keep it out of the courts, have failed, because they have had imagination about Things, but not imagination about people.

The millionaire became rich by co-operating with other rich men to exploit the public. The man of the immediate future is going to get rich, as rich as he cares to be, by co-operating not merely with his competitors, but by co-operating with the people.

It is a mere matter of social imagination, of seeing what succeeds most permanently, most honourably—in other words, of putting what has been called "goodness" and what is next going to be called "business" together. In other words, social imagination is going to make a man gravitate toward mutual interest or co-operation, which is the new and inevitable level of efficiency and success in business. Success is being transferred from men of millionaire genius to men of social and

human genius. The men who are going to compete most successfully in modern competitive business are competing by knowing how to co-operate better than their competitors do. Employers, employees, consumers, partners become irresistible by their co-operation: only employers, employees, consumers, and partners who co-operate better than they do, can compete with them. The Trusts have already crowded out many small rivals, because, while their co-operation has been one-sided, they have co-operated with more people than their rivals could; and the good Trusts, in the same way, are going to crowd out the bad Trusts, because the good ones will know how to co-operate with more people than the bad ones do. They will have the human genius to see how they can co-operate with the people instead of against them.

They are going to invent ways of winning and keeping the confidence of the people, of taking to this end a smaller and more just share of profits. And they are going to gain their leadership through the wisdom and power that goes with their money, and not through the money itself. It is the spiritual power of their money that is going to count, and wealth, instead of being a millionaire-disease, is going to become a great social energy in democracy. We are going to let men be rich because they represent us, not because they hold us up, and because the hold-up has gone by (that is, getting all one can), and service (that is, getting what we have earned) has come in.

The new kind and new size of politician will win his power by his faith, like U. Ren of Oregon; the new kind and new size of editor is going to hire with brains a millionaire to help him run his paper; and the new kind and new size of author, instead of hanging on to a publisher, will be paid royalties for supplying him with new ideas and creating for him new publics. Power in modern life is to be light and heat and motion, and not a gift of being heavy and solid. Even money shall lose its inertia.

We are in this way being driven into having new kinds

and new sizes of men, and some of them will be rich ones, and some of them will be poor, and no one will care. We will simply look at the man himself and at what size he is.

If our preachers are not saving us our business men will. Sometimes one suspects that the reason goodness is not more popular in modern life is that the wrong people have taken hold of it, or that it has been taken hold of the wrong way. Perhaps when we stop teasing people and take goodness seriously and calmly, and see that goodness is essentially imagination—that it is brains, that it is thinking down through to what one really wants,—goodness will begin to be more coveted. Except among people with almost no brains or imagination at all, it will be popular.

Perhaps it is unnecessary to say that these things that I have been saying, or trying to say, about the flexibility and the potentiality of the human race, at its present crisis—in its present struggle to maintain and add to its glory on the earth—are all beyond the range of possibility and the present strength of manhood. I can only hope that these objections that people will make will turn out like mine. I have been making objections all my life, as all idealists must—only to watch with dismay and joy the happy, old-time, obdurate way objections have of going by.

People began by saying they would never use automobiles because they were so noisy and ill-odoured and ugly. Presto! The automobile becomes silent and shapes itself in lines of beauty.

Some of us had decided against balloons. "Even if the balloon succeeds," we said, "there will be no way of going just where and when you want to." And then presto! regular channels of wind are then discovered and the balloon goes on.

"Aeroplanes," we said, "may be successful, but the more successful they are, the more dangerous, and the more danger there will be of collisions, collisions in the dark and up in the great sky at night." And presto! man invents the wireless

telegraph, and the entire sky can be full of whispers telling every airship where all the other airships are.

Some of us have decided that we will never have anything to do with monopoly. Presto! there is suddenly evolved an entirely new type of monopolist, the man who can be rich and good, the millionaire who has invented a monopoly that serves the owners, the producers, and employees, the distributors, and the consumers alike. An American railway president has been saying lately that America would not have enough to eat in 2050; but it would not do to try to prove this just yet. Someone will invent a food that is as highly concentrated as dynamite, and the whole food supply of New York—who knows?—shall be carried around in one railway president's vest-pocket.

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LONDON.

THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF EUCKEN.

Baron FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL.

It may well appear superfluous, in view of the numerous works of Professor Eucken, which can now be read in English, and of the extensive literature which, also in England, has already commented upon this writer's message and idiosyncrasies, to attempt a further penetration of his meaning, his weaknesses, and his power. Especially has Mr Boyce Gibson's book, *Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life*, given us authoritative biographical details and ever sane, sometimes searching, criticism. Yet Eucken still remains difficult as a whole, though valuable in many directions and instructive even where we cannot follow him; and it may be that I, who am half a German by blood and training, a Roman Catholic by hard-won, severely tested conviction, and now for twenty years a close student and a gratefully receptive yet frankly sincere correspondent and friend of Eucken, may still be able, through my greater closeness to and greater remoteness from this philosopher, to add something to the English comprehension of this richly endowed German and Liberal Protestant.

The psychological moment for such a study from such a quarter seems to have arrived with the appearance in English of Eucken's chief religious work, *The Truth of Religion*, since Eucken's studies, from his *Einheit des Geisteslebens* in 1888 onwards, have ever increasingly been devoted to religious

philosophy; and the present writer's interest in his labours has, from the date of the publication of his *Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker*, 1890 (also recently translated into English by Messrs Hough and Boyce Gibson, London, 1911), been specially busy with this his central interest.

We propose, then, in the following to bear specially in mind the very extensive *Truth of Religion*, now translated by the Rev. Dr Tudor Jones (Williams & Norgate, 1911), the considerably shorter *Christianity and the New Idealism*, translated by Mrs and Mr Boyce Gibson (Harpers, 1909), and the pertinent sections in the *Problem of Life*. Dr Jones knows Eucken's philosophy well, but his task has been a most difficult one, and the first half of his work invites further revision. Mr Boyce Gibson and his collaborators have dealt with shorter or easier books, and have, I think, almost always caught the precise meaning of the originals. But let the reader first be warned that it is through Eucken's account and criticism of other thinkers that he will most securely attain to a love, we believe even to a comprehension, of Eucken himself; certainly the present writer attained to and renews his understanding and affection chiefly in this way. Indeed, Eucken here is, again and again, unsurpassed, sometimes unmatched.

Let us briefly place Eucken in contact and contrast with the thinkers he most nearly resembles or most instructively differs from. Let us next develop as clearly as possible Eucken's method, stages, and conclusions in religious philosophy. Let us then attempt to locate the inarticulations, inconsistencies, and inadequacies of this philosophy. And let us finish with an indication of what appear to be the chief abidingly precious teachings to be found in Eucken's pages.

I.

A careful study of *The Problem of Life* would alone suffice to show us, amongst the figures in the past, the three triads of thinkers and revealers who, in considerably different degrees and ways, have most strongly influenced Eucken: Plato,

Aristotle, Plotinus, for the pre-Christian or non-Christian world; Jesus (His sayings as given by the Synoptists), St Paul, and St Augustine, for the specifically Christian world; and Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, for the modern world.

From Plato Eucken assimilates the convictions as to the universal nature of philosophy, its constant relations with all departments of human thought and action, as against the post-Aristotelian schools, with their unanimous restriction of philosophy's task to the finding of peace for the individual soul; as to the soul's ceaseless need of recollection, purification, redemption, liberation, the turning round of its whole self to the world of being, the hatred of self, and the escape from self; and as to a transcendent world of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness, which gives of itself to, but does not exhaust itself in, the phenomenal world, existent only through this participation—these two latter convictions in contradiction to Aristotle. Especially has Eucken adopted Plato's courageous love and utilisation of all the nobler passions, as reason's aid against our ignoble tendencies, and as the sole means of awakening the whole of life to an affective, and hence fully effective, reasonableness. From Aristotle Eucken takes the profound conceptions of the Organism and its essentially teleological categories; and of "Unmoving Energy," peaceful, because overflowingly full, "action," as against feverish, weak "activity." And Plotinus has influenced Eucken almost as much as he has influenced Bergson, by his "shifting of all categories into the non-sensuous, the living, the inward; his recognition of time as the product of a timeless soul, even space seeming projected from the mind itself"; and the way in which here "the process of life is no longer a commerce with an external though kindred reality," but "a movement purely within the spirit."

Yet it is doubtless the specifically Christian Triad which gives Eucken his central convictions. Above all, the teaching of Jesus (beautifully described in *The Problem*), especially as interpreted by St Paul, which in its uniquely probing and

comprehensive illumination of suffering and its continuous insistence upon God's prevenience and the freedom and necessity of His grace, permeates all this deeply religious mind's profoundest thinkings. And from St Augustine Eucken has gathered lessons and warnings in profusion: "one of the few personalities who serve as a lodestar in the solution of those eternal problems which transcend all ages."

The Modern Triad's influence penetrates deep into Eucken's thought, especially in their common "shifting of truth and reality from Object to Subject, from the World to the Soul"; and still deeper where, each thinker in his own way, they re-enforce certain axiomatic convictions and experiences of Christianity. On the other hand, each in turn fails to enlist him as an unconditional disciple of that particular system, and leaves him keenly alive to the limitations and mistakes in each respective attempt to harmonise the general philosophical position and the specifically Christian convictions. Thus in Kant Eucken accepts the starting-points and main outlines of his Epistemology, though he discovers in it various excesses or defects; whilst in Kant's Ethics Eucken loves the fear of Eudæmonism, and especially the finding that moral evil lies in the will, and is something positive, even radical; but he dislikes Kant's legalist formalism. But especially does Eucken carefully differentiate Ethics from Religion, as against Kant's all-devouring Moralism.

As to Fichte, Eucken tells us in his highly characteristic *Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt*, "We cannot go far with this mighty thinker; yet his starting-point, of an original and world-creative vital process within man, counts with us also as the foundation of all future work of the reason." Thus with Eucken, as with Fichte, the new world is full of self-activity; it forms a systematic whole; requires, itself being freedom, to be freely appropriated; excludes mere nature, and is thoroughly autonomous and teleological. But Fichte starts with self-observation; Eucken from analysis of the great complexes of human experience. Fichte's true

philosopher loses error, care, sin out of his life; Eucken ever retains the keen sense of them. Fichte identifies the human reason with the absolute; Eucken perceives this to be an exaggeration. The later Fichte indeed recognises the autonomy of religion, but conceives it as a mysticism unrelated to history; Eucken finds religion to culminate in a "characteristic," deeply historical, stage.

Finally, Hegel profoundly influences Eucken in three fundamental matters: in "his thought of a life in perpetual movement, individual forms changing in response to the changing conditions of the whole; his idea of a reality which refuses to accommodate itself to our likes and dislikes, completely beyond the control of this school or that; and his revelation of the immense power of negation in our lives, and how the spiritual advance is achieved through opposition." But for Eucken these great perceptions and demands spring from Hegel's wealth of intuition, whereas his system, if pressed, transforms all reality into a tissue of logical relations.

Note how sensitively hostile Eucken is to every Ethical Monism; Plato, St Paul, St Augustine, Kant are here his masters, and here he has no love for Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz. And see how keenly irritable he is against all Epistemological Dualism, especially of the moderate, realistic kind, with object and subject equally distinct from and non-creative of each other, both necessary, both ever entering into all our cognitions, volitions. lives. On this account he loves in the old world only Plotinus, and in the mediæval world hardly anyone at all. In spite of Aristotle failing him in both these matters, Eucken loves the Stagirite, but only because of his doctrines of the "Unmoving Energy" and of the Organism. For similar reasons Eucken dislikes Schleiermacher and Lotze, but appreciates much of Schopenhauer. Amongst now living philosophers Windelband, Siebeck, and Troeltsch in Germany, Boutroux in France, Royce in his *The World and the Individual* in America, and Pringle-Pattison in England, are probably, in various degrees and ways, the most like to Eucken.

II.

Eucken's position and trend are by this time so fixed and continuous, and in certain respects, for reasons to appear later, so bafflingly obscure in their very lucidity, that we propose here first to give them as precisely as possible, but in our own words: illustrative passages stand on almost every page of the works in question.

Throughout, Eucken's acceptance of the position that things do not really enter as they are, or ready-made, into our consciousness, and that we cannot deduce God and immortality by arguments from an external world, taken as truly extant and fixed, is emphatic, yet also irritatedly alert or angrily contemptuous. This position is for him *the* modern conquest, *the* quite final gain, a strict Idealism. Yet with, or in spite of, this, there is the strongest possible insistence upon the more than simply individual, indeed the more than exclusively human, character, origin, and worth of man's deepest experiences, convictions, motives. He will have no Solipsism, no Naturalism.

This combination is possible only through Eucken's profound conviction that man's deepest life is, and can be shown to be, not merely human, but cosmic, in character; and that it not only communicates with, and receives from, beyond the mere human range, but that, by and with such communication and reception, it can and does build up slowly, painfully, never perfectly, yet still most really and abidingly, certain realities and values which can indeed be increased, but cannot again be completely lost. It is a kind of Theistic Absolutism.

This communication and this creative operation are ever more or less preceded, accompanied, followed by man's awakening to a dualism within himself, to an utter dissatisfaction with a merely naturalistic unity—a unity exclusive of the truly spiritual values and previous to the second birth. We get thus a negative, purificatory, self-renouncing element.

This dissatisfaction with the simply naturalistic unity, and

this thirst for a deeper unification after the awakening of the dualism, are characteristic of man in all the various complexes of his deeper life. Epistemology, History, Æsthetics, above all, Ethics and Religion, are constituted out of parts which derive their meaning from their position within wholes, wholes to which they contribute and in which they are variously necessary, and all this as against mechanical systems which are exhausted by the sum of the external relations between their otherwise identical and interchangeable points. Thus Religion does not stand as the sole Spiritual Life against the rest of life, as purely natural; but within the rich, wide whole of the Spiritual Life in general there are variously deep complexes, each with its special spiritual experiences and categories, and of these complexes Religion is by far the deepest—Religion, not Pietism.

And nowhere, within these higher complexes, does man advance in a simply automatic, necessarily continuous manner, but everywhere here man's action has to be costly, and in actual life is always more or less intermittent or even backward-running, as compared with technical improvement and the superficial ordering of life, with their relative continuity and assurance. True life is thus an heroic achievement.

The entire Spiritual Life, in each of its Complexes, passes through certain successive Stages. The Religious Complex has two such stages — the *Universal*, General Stage, largely an inarticulate demand, and the *Characteristic*, the Specific Stage, predominantly an articulate supply. Thus religion is, at first and largely to the end, a vague or poignant dissatisfaction and seeking, or even a more or less general finding; and next, and often imperfectly even at the last, a supply, indeed stimulation, of that demand by the characteristic religions. Religion, whilst still general and mostly a demand, is vague and weak, but free from acute perplexities and difficult entanglements; religion, when characteristic and predominantly a supply, is concrete and strong, but more or less replete with difficulties and provocative of reactions of a

dangerous kind. Thus Characteristic Religion becomes specially and inevitably involved in all the perplexities and abuses connected with historical events and persons, authoritative institutions, creeds, theologies ; and yet the Characteristic Stage in its substance is the very certain crown of, and answer to, the Universal Stage. Thus a Religion is ever in need of purification, and ever contains within its own self the materials and means of this purification.

The Characteristic Religions again belong to two degrees or kinds—the Religions of Law, and the Religions of Grace and of Spirit ; these latter, with Christianity as their full expression, constituting the richest articulation and satisfaction of the longing which, from the first has moved, and worked within, humanity. Religion, the flower of the deepest life, culminates, like all deep life, in a loving, spiritual spontaneity.

From first to last the desire and the satisfaction come from more than mere man, yet ever in the self-determination of man ; they are as truly *given*, graces, effects, and operations of the spirit, God, as they are truly the *free deeds*, the fullest self-actuation of man's deepest spirit. Here "Natural" and "Revealed" Religion are replaced by Universal and Characteristic Religion ; nowhere is there found a religion carried as far as "mere reason" will go, and then a religion proceeding directly and exclusively from God, but everywhere only religion proceeding, as such, from God, in man's thirst for Him and in man's assuagement of this his thirst. And here even Religion as Universal for the most part only indicates Spirituality, the Divine, the Godhead, to be its own ultimate cause and end ; as Characteristic alone does it vividly and persistently apprehend this its prevenient mover and centre to be fully self-conscious, distinct Spirit, to be God.

III.

The points which, in Eucken, have increasingly failed to satisfy the present writer are five.

1. Everywhere in this philosophy we find the assumption

of a strictly Idealist Epistemology, and an insistence (impressive on the lips of one so courageously combative of many an ancient and modern opinion, even when first fully formulated by Kant) upon this Idealism as the starting-point of every philosophy that has a right to count at all. Yet philosophy thrives only under continual criticism; and in Epistemology the present writer has been driven to think that an unprejudiced analysis of our actual knowing, the discoveries and requirements of modern times, the history of Epistemology itself, and the evidences and needs of the spiritual life, conjointly clamour for a frank reconsideration of the entire question, and even for some critically Realist conclusion.

Thus we have self-consciousness, distinct from thought, and yet a *sine qua non* condition of all thought, of all necessary thought, of all certainty of trans-subjective validity; and the activity and stimulation of the senses, in ways and by "things" obstinately recalcitrant to all resolution into simply mental processes or spiritual realities, is an absolutely necessary antecedent or concomitant of this self-consciousness. To despise or ignore something so essential to all cognition cannot be made philosophical even by a Kant or a Hegel. And in knowledge we have the irreducible trinity of knower, known, and knowing, since the distinctness and independence of the known from the knower and the knowing ever appears as a fundamental condition of anything being known, and as part of the information yielded by the analysis of the knowledge thus achieved. And the attempts to study knowledge apart from its, ever particular, known, to discover the conditions for the possibilities of all knowledge instead of simply the elements of our actual knowledge, to identify our process of knowing with that of making or of building, to insist that the mind simply recognises in the object what itself has placed there, and to assume that man's impressions of the rest of a world to which he undeniably belongs, must be essentially dissimilar to the reality of that world,—will assuredly not remain sacrosanct for ever. Volkelt, in his lifelong researches (1879, 1886, 1906),

and now Prichard and Professor Cook Wilson, and again Mr Clement Webb, in their vigorous or delicate studies at Oxford, appear to be here more careful and sober than the Idealists.

Certainly modern man, with his immensely increased penetration and power as to things and realities not himself, is badly strained if his Epistemology requires him to treat all that insight and leverage as simply so much penetration and hold of his own mind, or of human mind in general, by his own mind. And doubtless his admiration of a Darwin depends upon his conviction that Darwin lovingly entered into, and thus genuinely understood, beings and lives really distinct from and really penetrable by his own.

And the history of Epistemology points to such Idealism as a reaction and excess. Certainly Berkeley's rejection of the reality of the primary qualities of matter, and hence of the reality of an external world in general, was determined, not by epistemological necessities, but by the desire to "dish" the materialists. And the passion of reaction against the Mediæval Realism, with its grave inadequacies and oppressions, is plain, further back, in Descartes and, later on, in Kant, Fichte, Hegel. Modern philosophy will still have done great things, and have had ample excuse for many a fault, even if it also has largely to begin afresh, on a wider, less polemical, non-sceptical, and non-absolutist basis, in this all-important matter of Epistemology. The religious disadvantages which, to our mind, result from the Idealist method and position largely constitute our remaining differences with Professor Eucken.

2. The chief cause of Eucken's strangely elusive obscurity proceeds, we think, from the position and function he assigns to his central concept, "Geistesleben." For here, surely, we have an almost Hegelian persistence in treating an abstraction as though, of itself, the most fruitful of realities. As in Hegel the various categories attain a life, a generative and cosmic power of their own, and as, although simple abstractions from real things by real minds, they now turn against those realities, so somewhat similarly in Eucken

"Spiritual Life" "grows," "mounts," "penetrates," "divides itself"—all this apart from any appropriation to a precise living subject. So that when, later on, we do reach precise substrates for this, so far unappropriated, "Geistesleben," they cannot but look as if they had not been there from the first, and, indeed, as if they were the eventual effects and self-differentiations of that general "Spiritual Life." Methodically this proceeding has, indeed, the advantage of postponing the profounder question concerning the ultimate cause of Spiritual Life, and of beginning with a description and analysis of the vicissitudes and character of this life itself. Yet Eucken during those preliminaries undoubtedly allows the reader to forget that "Geistesleben" without a concrete bearer of it is a sheer abstraction. And we think this happens because Eucken himself is indeed keenly alive to the difference between Spiritual Life and simply Natural Life, but, in idealist fashion, is ever shy and reluctant as to distinctness between subjects. God, *the* Spirit, may exist—indeed, Eucken believes He does, and ends by showing you how and why he thinks so; but there is nowhere, we find, any keen sense of how, ontologically, "Spiritual Life" simply follows from, is merely the action of, the interrelation between, *the* Spirit and spirits, God and men. And thus the ordinary mind has to wait impatiently till near the end of Eucken's books to find there at last what it holds as the beginning and substrate of everything; indeed, it has meanwhile been puzzled by the attempt to give the vividness of concrete reality and history to what, if left to itself, has but the clearness and immobility of an abstraction. It is thus that Eucken's very clearness and vividness baffle us. And certainly the fully live religious soul will also feel itself dissatisfied by this method, in so far as the *Ontological instinct*, the sense of the distinctness from the soul of the reality which the soul experiences—an instinct central in such souls—appear to be largely supplanted by the *Idealist hunger* after identity between being and knowing, between knower and known. The joy of religion resides,

surely, in the knowledge, the love, the adoration of One truly distinct from, whilst immensely penetrative of, ourselves.

3. Another point where Eucken, contrariwise, is sufficiently clear, yet again, we feel, inadequate, lies at the other extreme of reality. For the same Idealism which makes him so slow and hesitating in the discovery and proclamation of a self-conscious Reality distinct from the entire human reality, at the one end of this our human range of experience, makes him frankly restive and irritated against all insistence upon, or spiritual utilisation of, any reality distinct from the human reality, at the other end. Undoubtedly Eucken is nobly in the right in his continuous requirement of a Cosmos—a world which, in spite of all the darkness, sin, and trouble we find there, is, at bottom, inter-connected into a whole and bears the marks of reason and of love; a world of which we form a part, and which we therefore can rationally apprehend, and utilise, and improve. But this unity, we submit, is not "created" by us, is not simply introduced by us, even simply within the purposes of our knowledge; it is a unity discovered by us, because it is *there*, and it is *there* because a profound Reason, Will, and Love is somehow the continuous origin and fount of this Cosmos which includes us also—a Reason, Will, and Love (thank heaven!) *not* our own. That Reason and Love no doubt fully understands sub-human reality as well as the super-human reality and Itself; enough if we apprehend, because we are affected by, both these opposite ends of reality, each ever in, against, and with the other. And precisely this our capacity for knowing what we are not, and of apprehending what we cannot comprehend, indeed, this necessity, so clearly marked in all our life, of knowing, even of apprehending ourselves, only together with other persons or things — gives, we think, the specifically human happiness, confidence, and pathos to our human lot and knowledge. Why should it necessarily be an irritation, an oppression, to be surrounded by, to acknowledge and utilise, matter, things, determinisms? Why must Sacra-

ments, conceived as in any degree and way effecting, and not merely as expressing, Spiritual Life, be pure superstitions? Eucken constantly writes of the spirit's intolerable bondage to, and intermixture with, matter, in such Realistic systems. Cannot, then, matter be, is it not as a fact already everywhere in our lives, the essentially necessary stimulus, spring-board, and stretcher of the mind? Certainly any conviction that mere matter can automatically effect spiritual good in the soul is superstition; but that minds, spirits, persons are developed only by contact with spirit and personality is demonstrably untrue. Material symbols, acts and art, then, are not only required to express and suggest an already achieved spirituality; but the sense of the Infinite, of God, of the soul's own depths, is awakened in life generally, on occasion of the soul's contact with the finite and sensible, and religion has but to find or to transmit specially appropriate connections and contacts of this kind, especially such as may be introduced and may bear the impress of the great religious Revealers of the Infinite Spirit, God present amongst us and within us.

4. Our next dissatisfaction with Eucken's religious philosophy concerns the uniqueness of Jesus Christ. Here we indeed feel how right is his protest against the emptying of Our Lord's earthly life of all real growth and real temptation—facts still patent, indeed emphasised, in St Luke's Gospel and the Epistle to the Hebrews; against the claim of practical omniscience for Our Lord's humanity; and against such a Christocentrism as would leave the pre-Christian and non-Christian world without any light or life or God at all. But Eucken goes considerably further than this, and in so doing, seems to us unsatisfactory in the following ways.

Eucken himself has admirably shown, in his *Philosophy of History* (*Kultur der Gegenwart*), how a temporally *later* spiritual act or person can radically change past events and acts appurtenant to that same person's life, since such act or person can thus place all the past into a fresh context,

as did Augustine, by his conversion. But there is nothing, we think, in life, or indeed in Eucken's philosophy, to prevent our holding such a change to be possible also *forwards*, and for others as well as for the person concerned; indeed, Eucken himself has grandly described the permanent, incalculably wide and deep, unrivalled change introduced into life by Jesus Christ. And if all that men are and effect, of any abiding spiritual worth, is possible and actual through the prevenience, sustenance, self-restraint of God within and through them, and if the higher we go in the scale of reality, the more the differences, even within the apparently same class of individuals, become, in reality, differences not of degree but of kind, and the closer and fuller grows the indwelling of God within these human intelligences and wills, then Our Lord, if His purity, power, and permanence be indeed as great as Eucken pictures them, can rightly be accepted as the uniquely full, direct and abiding revelation and incarnation of God.

Again, we strongly feel with Professor James Ward, in his rich new book, *The Realm of Ends*, how immense are the probabilities that intelligent beings, quite other than, and indefinitely superior to, man, exist in the other worlds partly visible in the stars above us. For this reason, and so far, he treats the belief in Angels with a wise respect. And for a similar reason the uniqueness of Our Lord, even simply as man, is, we think, a deeply enriching doctrine.

And, finally, we indeed realise how carefully mediatorial conceptions require to be worked, and how little Christians can desire any restoration of a Neo-Platonist endless ladder of intermediaries. Yet the fully wholesome and fruitful disposition is, surely, one of joy at what, in various degrees, is quite unattainably above ourselves. Here once more any Hegelian Anthropism and Absolutism really conflicts with Eucken's deeply Christian, creaturely spirituality.

5. And, finally, Eucken's attitude to all the extant religious institutions is, to our minds, inadequate, precisely because of

the defects in his more general religious outlook which we have hitherto discussed. Eucken indeed sees admirably the need of a specific social organisation and of a visible, symbolic articulation for religion, as for all the other spiritual complexes. And again, he is doubtless right in many a criticism of the weaknesses or failures of the extant institutions in view of the acute problems and tasks of our swiftly changing, profoundly agitated times. But we nowhere find that he vividly sees what, after all, these institutions, and these alone, continue vividly to perceive and massively to supply in the spiritual life. A religious philosophy which, as Mr Boyce Gibson also feels with some dismay, has no explicit place for, or even discussion of, Prayer—that very breath of Characteristic Religion,—and which nowhere appears to realise the pressing need of Cultus, and of direct adoration of and communion with God, cannot probe to their depths the central living forces still held, and the clamorous needs still vividly proclaimed and largely supplied, by Mosque and Synagogue, by Christian Chapel and Church, indeed also by the purer Brahmanism and by, now more or less Theistic, Buddhism. The keen sense of the Ontology of Religion, with regard to its great subject, God; the live apprehension of man's need of matter and of symbols, for the full awakening, as well as for the full expression, of religion; and the consciousness of man's need of beings more closely and otherwise united to, and permeated by, God than are we ourselves: for all these fundamentals of live religion we still look in vain amongst the philosophers and philosophies, and we still find them alone amongst the specifically religious institutions or amongst such individuals as, with Eucken himself, owe their early inspirations and ineffaceable impressions to institutionally trained religious souls. It is, then, what the extant institutions specifically possess and give that keeps us with them; and it is, we think, the inadequate apprehension of the importance attaching to these their intuitions and traditions, and of the dreary absence or insufficiency of these

uniquely profound things in all the world outside these institutions, that, now in striking contrast with Professor Troeltsch's great new book, *Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen*, makes Eucken so fully persuaded that religion and Christianity can and must reorganise themselves outside of any and all extant religious organisations.

IV.

How great, how much greater, than all such defects, even if they be actually present in his books, remain Eucken's helpfulness and greatness! Especially are there eight positions here which twenty years of study and of life's testing have shown the present writer to be of ceaseless fruitfulness and truth: positions which can hardly be found elsewhere so persistently worked into every part of a large, organised conviction.

1. There is the historical method, the constant endeavour, first, to let every thinker fully explicate his position; yet this from no indifference or neutrality, but, contrariwise, from the conviction that all sincere thought contains, at least indirectly, some contribution to truth, which contribution, however, can mostly be elicited only by a complete, preliminary, sympathetic study of the position. This Eucken doubtless learnt from Trendelenburg.

2. There is the sense that all in man's deeper, truer life hangs together, and yet in complexes having each its special interests, autonomy, method, tests, and place; so that there is much give and take, friction and fight, tension and complexity, yet a mutual enrichment and deepening. Religion is here the deepest life, also because it is not all life. This Eucken will have largely learnt from Krause, the master of his master Wilhelm Reuter—the latter a strictly institutional Christian.

3. There is the nobly poignant negative element—the demand of an awakening to the duality within us, of a turning away from and against self; the costliness and unique preciousness of a spiritual personality; and the reality, the "positiveness"

of evil—there *is* such a thing as the soul's sinning against its own deepest insight. Plato and Kant, above all Our Lord Himself, are here reaffirmed with bracing courage and manly sincerity.

4. The spacious, yet closely knit and finely organic, conception of the two interdependent Stages of Religion, with Universal Religion demanding what Characteristic Religion supplies; neither of them a matter of mere reasoning, both of them arising within, and claiming man's entire nature, though at different levels and with varying precision and fruitfulness. Mr Boyce Gibson is surely singular in finding this conception so little helpful.

5. The truly exquisite penetration into the essentially non-atomistic character, a character above mere space and clock-time,—the non-naturalistic quality, of all specifically human aspirations and achievements in Science, Art, Philosophy, Social matters, Ethics, and into the way in which this leads on to and seeks, indeed is already penetrated by, Universal Religion. In spite of certain obscurities and repetitions, is there anything finer anywhere than, say, pages 243-283, 391-409 of *The Truth of Religion*? Thomas Hill Green alone is perhaps, in this, Eucken's equal.

6. There is the striking combination of a keen sense that Religion must move on from the Universal Stage to the Characteristic, with as acute a perception of the numerous grave complications and dangers arising precisely from this advance. Professor Troeltsch alone, we think, equals Eucken in this respect.

7. There is the finely wakeful opposition to all attempts to evade Metaphysics. A Metaphysic of life and not of the schools, but a Metaphysic still, is proclaimed here; and especially deep and courageous is the unflinchingness with which the variously dim dissatisfactions and demands of Universal Religion, as, indeed, of all specifically human endeavour, and the variously clear supplies of Characteristic Religion in its great revelations and personalities are found, in spite of the Idealist reluctance

dwelt upon by us further back, to result, in their substance, from the presence in our lives of the Infinite Spirit, God.

8. Finally, there is a continuous profound perception and estimation of the apparent paradoxes of religion, especially as most fully revealed by Christianity—true Liberty attainable only through the Given, through God's prevenience and grace; genuine Self-Realisation, spiritual personality, achievable only through a continuous Self-Dedication to, and incorporation within, the great realm of spirits; and the Immanence within our lives of the Transcendent.

May these poor pages lead others to a close study of a thinker who cares so profoundly for the realities best worth caring for, and who, whatever the imperfections in the periphery of his work, himself so largely supplies his own correction, as a spirit and life profoundly penetrated by the specific temper, requirements, and gifts of religion.

FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL.

London.

DIVINE PROMPTINGS.

SIGNORA RE-BARTLETT.

SINCE the days when Socrates was guided by his Daimon and Joan of Arc by her Voice, there have always been people subject to unseen guidance. But either they have been few, or else they have been people singularly lacking in the gift of expression. So much so, that even in this enlightened century there are few people who possess clear ideas as to the nature of this guidance. The public generally is wont to look upon it either as a *delusion* on the part of those individuals who have imagined they possessed it, or else as something very rare—only to be met with at some special crisis in history, or in connection with some unique personality.

And this idea must continue to exist so long as the conception of guidance is connected with the marvellous: so long as men imagine that divine commands can only come to them in some dream or vision—with some circumstantial setting that marks them off from the things of every day. Such a setting is rare, and one feels like adding "Thank God for it!" for, whether real or unreal, a life lived in the expectation of visions is not among the most wholesome.

But what men have yet to grasp is that this power of receiving guidance has only so far been surrounded with mystery because it is a power with which humanity has not yet become familiar. We all know how different is our impression of anything the first time it comes within our experience, from what it is when we have experienced that

same thing many times. The experience shrinks—it does not necessarily become in any way *cheapened*, but it becomes familiar: the awesome touch of the unknown departs—it becomes something we can quietly criticise and reflect on.

Now, with regard to those who received guidance in the past, one can only think, from the confused accounts they have sent down to us, that either they did not receive it frequently enough to reach the stage of quiet observation with its accompanying power of simple expression, or else—the more probable explanation in many cases—that they were individuals with so strong a religious bias that it would not have been possible for them to explain their experience in terms other than those with which this religion furnished them. In other words, that the idea of the *marvellous* was so firmly fixed in their minds as the proper medium for divine expression, that any experience lacking this form would by them have been discredited at once.

But to-day, thank God, we have got a little further than this. The divinity of humanity—of simple human life in all its phases—is beginning at least to be whispered. We do not keep 'God' in one watertight compartment, and 'man' in another, quite so much as we used to do. God, as the completion of that of which man is the potentiality, is more the general idea. And the growth of such ideas should make it possible for us to arrive at truer and clearer conceptions as to the nature of biddings and guidance.

Can we not conceive of a divine self within us—a growing consciousness—the seed of our future self, as it were—which is ever seeking to impress itself upon our brain consciousness, sometimes succeeding and sometimes failing, but through persistent struggle making itself ever more felt, more familiar? Such a theory would account for our first experiences of this kind shaking us greatly—causing great strain, and seeming to us something altogether abnormal; yet with repetition becoming something almost as simple as any other happening in our daily life. If only our mind were open in regard to

them—free of any bias, conscious or unconscious, requiring them to conform to some given pattern.

This is what is lacking in most cases—this freedom from preconception. It would be jarring to most people to think that God could give them a bidding while they were eating their dinner, for instance, and if a bidding came in such wise, many would accordingly let it pass.

But all this comes from having ideas about God more vague than vital. The theory suggested does not in any way dispense with a God outside us—there are many facts in life which cannot be covered wholly by a divine principle within us. But the suggestion is that whether what is coming to us is coming from within or from without, it is essential that the human mind which has to receive the impression should be free from preconception and able to receive such impression quietly.

And this is obtained partly by repetition, but largely also by the recognition that things divine do not need to be abnormal. If we could get rid of some of our anthropomorphic ideas about God, and conceive of Him more as standing for divine power wheresoever manifest, we should then be approaching that attitude of mind which would let us receive these divine biddings simply.

For we should then begin to comprehend that not the manner, but the matter, is what imports in these cases. We should begin to judge them by their inherent value apart from any setting. We should come, with practice, to recognise them by their *quality*, and should become so familiar with that quality that we should be able always to detect it instantly, even though the biddings should come to us every time in some unexpected form. It generally is in unexpected form that these biddings come, and such unexpectedness is one of the best tests of their non-human origin.

But a bidding may very well be non-human without being divine—it may come from a force lower than the human, as well as a force higher. If unexpectedness may serve as a test

that the prompting is not self-suggested, what can give us the further assurance needed—that it is an impulse righteous, holy, divine?

This comes from the sense of peace which accompanies such biddings always—a sort of hush which enfolds us instantaneously with the coming of the idea, and lets us know at once that the thing is perfectly right and perfectly beautiful—lets us know this *before the mind has time to work.* A little bit the same as if we were standing in a dark room, and suddenly an electric light were switched on, revealing a beautiful picture in a flash. We should know instantly that the picture was beautiful—if it were—before we could embrace the detail. So with these biddings. Those which are divine make us know it instantly by the hush and beauty which they wrap round us. But then, just as standing before the picture the detail would sink into the mind, and we should see the *reasons* of the beauty, so with these biddings also reason quickly comes to supplement perception. There is no discord in divine promptings. There may be pain and difficulty for the human self in the carrying of them out, but there is always that sense of perfect harmony which accompanies the satisfaction of all our highest faculties—spirit, conscience, and reason. And we rightly learn to look for this harmony as the hall-mark of the divinity of any bidding—this, together with the instantaneous sense of beauty which accompanies the idea. Both are needed, but it is the fact that the sense of beauty comes first, before reason can work, which gives us the sense of revelation—of being 'instructed,' not guided by our human mind or will.

And does it greatly matter that we should know precisely where these ideas come from—from an external God, or an internal God—once we can assure ourselves by practice, and by some tests such as the above, that they constitute a power which works for holiness? Surely this is the essential. The ideas, as they come to us, are facts of consciousness. If we translate them into action, those actions too are facts, and if

we observe carefully the working out, we begin to get precise knowledge as to the value of such ideas. Surely this is worth more than much theory. And this refusal to dogmatise involves no denial of God. It is rather like waiting simply for God to tell us what He is, instead of attempting to tell Him.

There is no irreverence in the attitude of open-mindedness—there is more irreverence in any attempt at limitation—any attempt to define the manner in which God shall manifest Himself. And we only do this so long as our inner sense of the divine is undeveloped. It is this which makes men cling to the outer form, because many recognise it as their only criterion of judgment—they feel they would not know God if He did not come to them with some recognised demonstration of divinity. Yet just as a wise father gives ever less direct instruction to his children as they grow older, may we not conclude that humanity, as it evolves, will be required to discover God in ever wider, perhaps, but ever subtler forms?

A sense of the dignity of all life, and the power of truth to justify itself without our doctoring, is perhaps what is chiefly required for putting us into a condition to receive divine promptings. In this state we accept truth in whatever form life brings it to us. A period of illumination, when life shows us only its beauty, may be followed by a period in which we see only its sordidness and its pain. At such times the lover of truth sets his teeth, if he be an idealist. He keeps firm hold of the beauty he has already found and tested, but he does not refuse to admit the ugly facts into his consciousness as well. His faith in truth, and life as its exponent, is greater than his faith in his own day-dreams. He is ready to face the destruction of the latter, assured that if he can but faithfully observe what life is building, he will catch a glimpse of a scheme of architecture far lovelier than his own—designed by a far greater Architect.

It is always the deepest faith which lies behind the most rugged demand for truth—it is the demand of the man who is not afraid of whatever he is going to find. And this ability

to abstain from doctoring, this innocence of any desire to prove a personal view, is that which more than any other thing lays man open to a higher influence. Who is it who has written, "Only when the heart is empty can it receive God?" Somebody who knew. Yet this need not mean a state of broken-heartedness. It means only a state of detachment—of open-mindedness—that state in which the mind is not blocked by human desire or preconception, but is open, as it were, on all sides.

In this state it will not shock us if the biddings come in the simplest, humblest ways, and if our inner sense of truth and sacredness has been developed, as it will have been if we have faced life ruggedly in the way above indicated, we shall not even desire with them any impressive setting. We shall recognise rather that such setting, if not the result of our own defective observation in first instances, was then something analogous to those object lessons which are given to young children, but with which older children are expected to be able to dispense. 'Visions' are not the maturest stage of the spiritual life—that stage is rather marked by the ability to detect the divine unlabelled and under any form.

And this power becomes ours by the rugged facing of life and truth above indicated. It may well be that before men can catch the divine under any guise, they will have to travel the road of both light and darkness. The first instruction may come through illumination and some species of vision or other abnormal manifestation: then may follow a period of darkness, in which they will be thrown back seemingly upon merely human power. But this "merely human" period is the period when men learn the divinity of things human: as they tread doggedly this darkened stretch of life, following simply truth—truth always—they begin to find that by simple human usage they have so developed their sense of truth that it is beginning to give them information of that instantaneous kind, independent of reason, which in earlier days could only be furnished by some abnormal incident. In other words,

they begin to find themselves possessing in simple daily fashion, without strain, a power which previously shook, each time it illumined them. It is at this stage that men realise practically the divinity inherent in them. They have worked in two ways—first from above downwards, then from below upwards, and at a certain point they find the results joining.

And it is from this point onwards that those who travel on this path find no difficulty, and no jar, in receiving divine promptings without any impressive setting. An idea may come to them as they eat a meal, or as they walk down a crowded street. They test it by its beauty—by its power to instantly convey conviction of its rightness. For years perhaps they have tested and put in action spontaneous ideas in this way, never calling them divine, but observing only that, fulfilling the test of beauty and harmony, such ideas make ever for righteousness. But there comes a day when the observant recognise that illumination as great is coming in this way as ever came by the abnormal methods, and in that day they recognise quite simply that divine and human are not sharply divided, but very often blended.

Since the age of Bacon the inductive method of reasoning has been allowed to prevail over the deductive in all fields of thought except religious thought. Here alone, in this most important field, it seems to be mistakenly regarded as destructive of truth, and the upholders of revealed religion regard often with suspicion the upholders of the teaching of experience. Yet it is in the modern psychologist and modern mystic that religion to-day should look for its strongest allies. The consciousness of a maturing humanity is rising to meet the authoritative revelation of a younger age. But by the modern method of experience. The modern need finds expression in those lines of Pope:

> "God works from whole to parts, but human soul
> Must rise from individual to the whole."

LUCY RE-BARTLETT.

ROME.

SOCIAL SERVICE. No. 3.

WHAT PUBLIC SCHOOL MEN CAN DO.

S. P. GRUNDY,

General Secretary, Manchester City League of Help.

NEARLY two years ago there appeared in the HIBBERT JOURNAL an "Open Letter to English Gentlemen," addressed chiefly to the young men of the public schools and universities, and making to them an appeal on behalf of the Agenda Club, based on the highest idealism, to serve their country as some return for benefits received. It would be impossible for one whose life is mainly spent in dealing day by day with the social problems of a northern industrial city to add anything of value to the force of that appeal on the plane of idealism; but as it evoked the most extraordinary response from men and women in all parts of the country, and of all stations in society, it would not perhaps be out of place to ask, and to try to answer, what such idealism can do in the practical world; how it can be fostered and directed?

The problems of the practical world are innumerable. The restlessness of the working classes has its parallel in the restlessness of the well-to-do, awakened by the injustices of everyday life, and by the failure of any economic theory to fit in with the facts. We can no longer hold the self-complacent creed that poverty is invariably attributable to faults of character, or that everybody can by his own initiative achieve a full and happy life. These misgivings of the well-to-do are

one of the most hopeful signs of a new social conscience, of a new conception of justice and liberty.

The appeal of the Open Letter having been made to the members of a particular class, it would be well to consider some of their individual characteristics. They are the sons and daughters of those who in past generations have prospered materially and intellectually; they start with inherited capacities for government and business management, good health, good home conditions; physically they enjoy from the moment of birth the best that the world can give; they know neither cold nor hunger; they have abundant fresh air, leisure, and enjoyments, and in ill-health the best medical advice and treatment. At the age when working-class lads are leaving the elementary schools, and embarking on life as independent economic units, the middle- and upper-class boy enters for the first time a highly artificial society, largely governed by customs often centuries old; he learns, frequently by the brutal persuasion of a knotted towel or the bristles of a hair-brush, to conform to a public standard of conduct, which, stripped of unessential details, requires him to sink his own individuality for the honour, first of his house, and then of his school. Keenness in games is demanded of him, and strict discipline of body and mind, solely as a means to a corporate end. When he leaves school, he encounters the same driving force which calls for his best efforts in college rivalries, and the inter-university struggles on the river or the playing field. The results of this system are the self-effacement and *esprit de corps* of the best type of English gentlemen—men doing their work without any idea of reward, modestly disclaiming merit, and prepared to make any sacrifice for the good of their cause, whether political, social, or religious.

But the system carries with it disadvantages which are often seized upon by hostile critics. The distaste for any public expression of personal emotion may degenerate into, or be confused with, apathy; the class separation necessary for the cultivation of public spirit may and often does persist

in after life, in an exclusiveness which refuses to associate with those who do not conform to certain arbitrary standards of dress or conduct. To speak quite plainly, there is some danger that the spirit may be deadened by formalism, and that Pharisaism still exists in the twentieth century. The reasons for this may to some extent be found in the artificial nature of the environment. It has been truly said that education requires a highly sterilised atmosphere. Those who are responsible for the management of schools and universities rightly take every precaution to exclude the lower aspects of human life from their charges. Vice, disease, poverty, and crime are not problems for the young. Protected by an assured economic position from actual want, they are even more carefully sheltered from the knowledge of external evils. On the whole, the results are surely justifiable, but it would be absurd to claim that the product of such a training is a fully developed individual, or one capable, without further guidance, of taking his place in a self-governing community.

The system which has educated him is, from the point of view of the economist and the sociologist, closely allied with the industrial system, with all its horrors of slums, sweating, drink, overcrowding, injustice, and oppression. Occasionally in some newspaper paragraph the veil is lifted, and the report of an inquest or a police court scene discloses the darker side. Outside the charmed educational area reigns industrial chaos, the struggle of man with man for the necessaries of life ; failure in this struggle, whether caused by individual defects of character or by evil environment, involves the heaviest penalty.

If the boy who has learnt to "play the game" at school wishes to play the game as a man in after life, he must continue his education, and resolve that, whatever the consequences to his future professional or business career, he will at any rate know and fight against the evils of our civilisation. If he takes this first step, he will soon find that the same

ideals which applied to his games and his social intercourse may be applied to the wider field of real life.

One frequently hears from men of a certain type that the local council or board of guardians is not "fit for a gentleman," and recognises in the snobbish complaint a confession of indolence and lack of public spirit. If indeed, and there is considerable doubt on this point, the tone of our local government, which closely affects the lives of everyone in the country, is low and corrupt, surely those who feel themselves better fitted to carry it on are in honour bound to take their share in improving it. An Act of Parliament, even if compulsory, will require to be administered, and, if permissive, to be adopted by the local council; in every large city and urban district, as well as in the county areas, are urgently needed men who will come into local government, and give the best that they have. Why, in any case, should not the man who has had a good home training, and who knows the value of fresh air and cold baths, use his knowledge on the Public Health or Housing Committee, and agitate for public baths, thrash out the details of a local anti-tuberculosis campaign, or press for the adoption of a town-planning scheme? Why should not the 'Varsity Blue, when too old and stiff to play himself, give the Parks Committee the benefit of his special qualifications, and help to organise football and cricket in the parks? Why should not an Honours man assist the local Education Authority in drawing up the syllabus for evening classes on his own subject, or act as school manager; or, if too busy to take up regular work, persuade the Libraries Committee to buy the best books on serious subjects instead of useless fiction?

It may seem that the public school spirit alone is a poor equipment for public life, but, supplemented by experience, the service it can render is obvious. The "interests" on a local council, whether of jerry-builders trying to stultify the local building bye-laws, or of slum property owners wishing to avoid the condemnation of their cottages, or again of

brewers seeking to protect their trade, or of professional men upholding their own avocations, or even of trade-unionists who may be tempted to push an unfair advantage for one section of municipal employees, all these require the leaven of a higher ideal than self-interest. In addition, the routine administration of each department needs constant oversight, lest any minor officials should overstep their powers, as sanitary inspectors, school nurses, school attendance officers, or police constables, to tyrannise over those who fall within their jurisdiction; or lest, on the other hand, those same officials should find themselves handicapped in the proper performance of their duties by unsympathetic or short-sighted superior officers or members of committee.

But, it may be objected, everyone is not fitted for, or desirous of, public life. For such there is the large sphere of philanthropic and charitable effort, often doing pioneer work in carrying on experiments which are afterwards adopted by the local authorities. This demands unlimited human endeavour, for it is not money alone that is needed, but often rather patient drudgery on obscure committees, investigating, perhaps, the causes of individual breakdown, and advising wisely after careful and searching consideration of all the circumstances. And for those, again, who prefer to be independent of all restraint, there are enough isolated victims of personal oppression only to be dealt with or relieved by drastic personal action, impossible for anyone holding an official position in political or social organisations. Under existing conditions, the unscrupulous landlord, debt-collector, or employer can exercise abominable tyranny over the poor. What would not be the value of a few men whose social position, placing them above suspicion of self-advertisement, would act as free-lances in the exposure of such tyranny—men to interview the employer, who, fined by the magistrates for a breach of the Factory Acts, resulting in a serious accident, revenges himself on his workpeople by discharging all who could be suspected of informing the Factory Inspector; men

to remonstrate with the landlord who threatens a penniless widow in arrears with her rent, "that if she is not out of the house by Friday, he will take steps to have her Old Age Pension stopped"; or with the debt-collector, who tells the wife of a chronic invalid that she need not appear in court, and in consequence fraudulently obtains by default of attendance an order of commitment to prison. For none of these cases is there any possibility of legal redress, and yet a man who would run the risk of a libel action in exposing such things would be rendering a public service which could not be too highly appreciated.

Now, to sketch in the part that the Agenda Club might "play in this game."

In the first place, without overlapping, or entering into competition with the educational propaganda on social questions at present carried on in public schools and the universities, the Agenda Club might, so far as possible, co-ordinate it and take steps to fill up any existing gaps. It might also ascertain that in every school and college there are one or more masters or dons who have grasped the necessity for the public school spirit in national life. It might be the aim of the club that no one left school or college without realising the importance of further social education. Casual conversations with undergraduates have revealed the fact that a large percentage go down from the universities either to enter lukewarmly some profession chosen for them by their parents, or indifferently to wait and see "what may turn up." It should be one of the supreme functions of the club to ensure that no possible recruit for social work should come to a decision without having had the hard facts of life driven home to him by personal and direct contact with working-class men and women. The almost exaggerated diffidence, the fear of notoriety, the horror for anything approaching priggishness, invaluable as they are as correctives to youthful egotism, must not be allowed to stand in the way of human experience. All over England, however, there are men and women who

have come through this difficult stage, and, having themselves gained the necessary knowledge, can sympathetically guide others along the most suitable lines.

By its national machinery, the Agenda Club could put every young man with any undeveloped interest in social work into touch with an experienced member of the club, who in a friendly way could direct his energies appropriately. Obviously the man who in course of time would become a partner in a large business firm would require different treatment from that given to one reading for the bar, or about to take orders. The primary aim should be to break down conventional class distinctions, preferably through one of the recognised channels of social experience, such as a Settlement or a Lads' Club, or work for a Charity Organisation Society or a Guild of Help. For most, Lads' Club work appears eminently suitable as a preliminary; it requires qualifications which even the most diffident undergraduate can hardly deny he possesses—a knowledge of football, cricket, billiards, chess or draughts, or the elements of drill and scouting learnt in the Officers' Training Corps, or, as a last resource, the piano accompaniment of the latest music-hall success. But whatever his special line may be, he will be brought into intimate relations with boys of another class at an age when their confidence is easily secured, and under conditions in which his own superior economic and social position will be least considered. He will be able to form frank friendships which will destroy in a few weeks the distinction he had previously drawn between 'Varsity and Townee. From his acquaintance with the boys, he will soon be introduced to their parents, and as he sees them in their daily lives and under natural conditions, he will understand once and for all the claims of our common humanity. In whatever way this lesson is learnt, he will never forget it, but will carry it through his future life, and will find without difficulty opportunities for realising his ideal of playing the game as between class and class.

In addition to all this, the Agenda Club might organise

throughout the country informal groups of members, men and women already engaged in social work, and representing every school of thought and every grade of society. These groups could, without much effort, survey the local conditions and estimate the needs of all branches of public, charitable, or private social work. They would naturally attract and absorb all new recruits, and would be in a position to indicate the ways in which the latter could best use their several abilities in connection with work already being done. The national head-quarters would be the inspiring force of each group, suggesting, by means of a definite "agendum," some line of action, and linking up the whole. In the governing body would be concentrated the enthusiasm of the component parts, moulding it to a coherent policy, and, by judicious encouragement and direction, would open up to every member of the club the opportunity of rendering that special service for which he is most fitted. It should thus in course of time co-ordinate and stimulate all social endeavour throughout the country.

It may be objected that these outlines contribute little of value to a practical programme, for the temptation is always strong to make to the general public a widespread appeal which will meet with a large, but temporary, response. It is the writer's opinion that no effective national campaign can be successfully carried through without a long and slow process of minute organisation. The greatest common measure of agreement which would secure the support of all who are quickened with the Agenda spirit must necessarily be vague in its details, and the individual must be left to work out the letter in his own surroundings, in his own way. The idea contains elements vital to our existing social conditions, and its own strength ensures its victory. Those who are most sympathetic realise this the more deeply because of the strengthening and renewing of their faith by the inspiration of the Open Letter.

S. P. GRUNDY.

Manchester.

DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

PERSONALITY AND SPACE.

I.

In Reply to the Bishop of Down.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1912, p. 362.)

I hope it will not be thought very pertinacious of me if I say that the Bishop of Down's article in the last number of the *Hibbert Journal*, considerate and unambiguous as it is, still leaves me quite unconvinced. It is no doubt impossible for me to mistake the Bishop's meaning; but I cannot help desiderating something more in the way of proof. It seems to me that the main position is throughout assumed, but in no sense proved. The Bishop seems to think of it as self-evident; but to me it is not even evident, much less self-evident.

Of course, this may be largely due to my own ignorance and inexperience in such matters. I have never made any systematic study of philosophy; I have only read a little here and there upon the subject in a desultory way. And I confess that my reading does not enable me to put the Bishop's doctrine at once into its place. It would be the greatest help if the Bishop would be so good as to refer me to some standard or representative work in which views like his are expounded more at length. I can hardly think that these views are at all widely diffused. I have on my table what is evidently an important and valuable book, *Body and Mind*, by Mr William M'Dougall, Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford. It is called expressly "A History and a Defence of Animism"; and so far I suppose that Bishop D'Arcy and I should both be in hearty agreement with it. I cannot claim to have really read it; but I have looked through it in vain for any suggestion that the mind or soul "is not in space."

The Bishop begins his article by interpreting my language for me:

"When Dr Sanday says '*we* are in space,' he means, of course, that our bodies are in space—an assertion that no one ever thought of denying." I am afraid that I cannot accept the interpretation. Perhaps it is what I ought to have meant, but—although the Bishop throws in "of course"—it is not what I actually did mean. When I said "*we* are in space" I meant the whole man, body and soul together. The Bishop seems to make a strange sort of dualism: the body is in space, but the mind is not.

Is it possible that such a division as this can really be worked out? A thing is known only through its self-expression. Now the mind expresses itself through the body; in other words, its self-expression is in space. Are we to say that the self-expression of the mind is in space, but the mind itself is not in space? The Bishop seems to say explicitly that we are:

> "The physical organ and the mental experience which it subserves belong to different orders of being, different universes; and you can no more speak rightly of an emotion being in space than you can speak rightly of a blue smell. Much less correctly, indeed; for colour and smell, though diverse in kind, both belong to the realm of sensation, while the mental and the physical form diverse universes."

Two things that are so nearly related, that are so constantly acting and reacting upon each other, the thing and the organ of the thing in "different universes"! One is inclined to exclaim, Surely, if that is possible, all things are possible! At any rate, it is very strong doctrine.

And the doctrine does not become any less strong when the Bishop goes on to add that, although the mind is not in space, it is in time. Can it be wondered at that we plain people, who are outside the philosophic circle, find ourselves staggered? We begin to think of centaurs,

> "Gorgons, and hydras, and chimæras dire."

The philosophers' world, apparently, has some rather fantastic inhabitants, which more prosaic minds find it hard to grasp.

The Bishop will doubtless say, But the mind or soul is immaterial, and the body is not. Agreed—at least as between us two. But, I should reply, to be immaterial is one thing, and to be "not in space" is another. Allowing that we, the persons—you and I and our neighbour—so far as we are persons are immaterial, that does not take us out of space. We are individuals; we have each our own distinct locality; we do not blend with or "permeate" each other; or at least, if we do, it is in subtle and elusive ways that are not inconsistent with individuality. It is true that influences pass backwards and forwards from person to person; development in society is a different thing from that of the hermit in the desert; but the fundamental distinctness is never wholly removed. One of the most obvious difficulties that Dr D'Arcy would have to meet in any fuller exposition of his views would be to show how this distinctness can be other than local. The local aspect of it may not be the whole aspect, but it has at least a concrete reality attaching to it.

I am prepared to admit that there may be a difference between the

language of locality as applied to the body and the same language applied to the mind. Of the mind itself, apart from its manifestations, we know extremely little; but what little we do know is largely conveyed in spatial metaphors. My critic himself confesses the attractiveness, and even the necessity, of such metaphors:

> "The psychologist, reflecting on his own inner experiences, thinks of the feelings which pass through his mind, the impulses which move him, the memories he recalls, the thoughts by which he endeavours to grasp the facts of his experience, the anticipations which lure him on, the perceptions by which he apprehends the external world. All these are the elements of his psychical experience. But how can they be grouped, and how described? While in doubt as to this difficulty, the clearness of visual perception comes to his aid. Visualise everything in imagination, and description becomes easy. Hence arises the imagery of the field and the threshold."

But what is it that constitutes the attractiveness and necessity of this class of expressions? Surely we use them because they are the best that we can find to use. And they are the best because they correspond most nearly to their object. We use them as instinctively to describe the object as we use the ordinary terms of language—of colour, form, dimension and the like—to describe a chair or a table. We cannot go behind the instinct which impels us to this use. We must either use these expressions or none at all; at least, if we do not use them, we must fall back on others confessedly inferior.

The psychologist, we are told, condescends to join in this usage; but it seems as though he did so only to evacuate his words of all meaning:

> "But even when he yields himself most willingly to the attraction of such imagery, the psychologist is very far from meaning that the various mental elements actually occupy positions in space relatively to one another, as the body occupies a position relatively to the material objects which surround it."

I admit that there is an element of metaphor. When we speak of locality in relation to spirit, we do not mean precisely the same thing as when we use similar terms in relation to body. But we do mean something analogous *mutatis mutandis*. So far as I can gather, the "psychologist" means nothing at all. If we have recourse to language which implies visuality, position in space, etc., and then at once proceed to subtract from it all the ideas that we associate with such qualities, what then is left? I would invite my critic to say what meaning he himself attaches to the language which he admits that he finds convenient? Why is it convenient? It is convenient because it obeys a natural instinct; but what is the use of obeying an instinct if we at once impugn and repudiate its validity? "If the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is the darkness!"

I am aware that the philosopher—or at least this particular school of philosophers—distrusts these common instincts and all that goes along with them. That is just where, with all respect, I yet feel compelled to join issue. I am at least compelled to ask what better thing they have

to put in their place, and how are we to know that it is better? I submit that up to the present, though we have been told very explicitly that "personality is not in space," that personality and the modes of its expression are in "different universes," that the Self is "the most concrete of realities" *and therefore* "is incapable of definition," we have not yet had any good reason shown for these rather remarkable affirmations.

Pending the production of such reasons, I am afraid I must continue to regard the idea of "personality not in space" as belonging to the region of what I cannot help calling philosophical mythology.

W. Sanday.

Oxford.

II.

The Bishop of Down shows clearly the many misconceptions concerning thought which may arise through the habit of describing mental states in spatial terms and explaining them by spatial metaphors which properly apply only to matter, the dimensions of which can be measured.

He refers also to "Bergson's demonstration of the fact that mental states permeate one another," and says, "When we think of them as simply successive in time, we are, in another instance, victims of the illusions created by the application of spatial symbolism, for we attribute to them the impenetrability which belong to things in space, and which, as a matter of fact, they do not possess."

May not some of these difficulties be removed by considering certain facts involved in musical thought?

Music, though caused by instruments which produce vibrations in the air, is, nevertheless, pure thought. The well-known question concerning a bell-buoy brings out this fact. If a bell fixed to a buoy rings far out at sea—so far out that no one can hear it—the question is asked whether it has produced sound or not. No doubt it has caused vibrations in the air, but not sound, for that is only a perception of the mind. A succession of musical notes is not a material procession, like a procession of marching soldiers, which is spatial, but rather a procession of thoughts in the mind which belong to time, but in no sense to space.

But let us consider facts concerning one note struck. When we hear it, it is one thought. It may be the key-note of a common chord. Then add to it a third and a fifth; it is still one in time, for the three notes sound together, but it is no longer one thought, but a permeation of three thoughts simultaneous in time.

Take, next, the same chord played on a full organ. We have in it the bass key-note; the quint, a fifth above it; the principal, an octave higher; the twelfth; the mixtures or sesquialter; and the fifteenth, two octaves above. This is a complex sound, for all occur simultaneously in time, and yet there is in it no suggestion of movement. It is only a permeation of hundreds of simultaneous thoughts.

The Bishop of Down speaks of some mental states as "anticipations

which lure him on." There must be a suggestion of movement in time in every anticipation.

Well, let us now introduce into this complex mass of simultaneous sound-thoughts a single diminished seventh, and at once the whole chord becomes unstable, and must advance, not in space, but in time, for it must fall, not on its own ground tone, but on the ground tone of its relative key. Thought demands the resolution of the dissonance, and gives an impulse of motion in time which is irresistible.

Thus in music we have instances of a multitude of thoughts present to the mind simultaneously, and, again, an anticipation of movement in those thoughts existing solely in time, and in no way connected with the law of impenetrability which governs all the phenomena of matter.

CHARLES T. OVENDEN.
DUBLIN. (*Dean of St Patrick's*).

THE "CORRUPTION" OF THE CITIZENSHIP OF THE WORKING MAN.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1912, p. 344.)

I.

I SHOULD like to say, as a member of the professional classes rebuked by Mr Macdonald, that, personally, I feel that rebuke to be perfectly just, even if bestowed too comprehensively, and I agree with Mr Macdonald that we greatly need to mend our manners and verify our assumptions in regard to working-class questions. The root of the matter is largely that very few of us have any idea how complicated those questions are. We live for the most part, strange as it may seem, in a stage of social evolution earlier and more simple than that in which the manual workers now find themselves. The professional man fails to realise how different his position is from that of the wage-workers who are employed by the directors of vast aggregations of capital. One may often hear professional men—still more, perhaps, their wives and daughters—discussing labour questions in terms that are almost obsolete, and with a naïve oblivion of the vast changes made by the industrial revolution. This is, I imagine, especially the case with Londoners. In the North and in the Midlands facts are more roughly intruded upon the notice even of gently bred women. But London is so vast, and the suburbs inhabited by the well-to-do lie away from the quarters where the work of the world is done. Again, although the dwellings of "the poor" honeycomb the town pretty completely, that very fact helps to disguise the true nature of labour questions, for the charitable work taken up by middle-class or upper-class women often brings them in contact chiefly with those classes who make a living by attending to the personal wants of the better-off—livery-stable workers, men employed by plumbers or greengrocers, waiters, small dressmakers and laun-

dresses, and so forth. Many gently bred women thus arrive quite honestly at a conviction that the main occupation of the working class is to do little odd jobs *for them*, which explains the inveterate habit of quoting the case of domestic servants as if it were on a par with or could be illustrative of the "great industry" of modern times. There are thus two pitfalls for the well-to-do in discussing working-class questions: in the first place, they confuse personal service or work done for the use or convenience of the employer with work done under conditions of profit-making enterprise; secondly, they fail to grasp the position of the worker in the great industry who when bargaining for his livelihood is confronted with vast aggregations of organised capital. They still think of industry in terms of the petty employer or craftsman stage, in which for the most part their own class still pursues its vocation, and one result of this confusion is that the working class is often blamed for evils which are really incidental to that immense, little-understood series of changes and transformations that we describe loosely as the "industrial revolution." Faulty bricklaying, for instance, is laid to the charge of the bricklayer, the fact of the work being done under contractor's orders and at a pace which frequently does not admit of care or accuracy not entering into the middle-class critic's consciousness. Or again, trade is depressed; many men are turned adrift; but someone's friend has an aunt who offered work to an unemployed man who was subsequently found unsatisfactory. *Ergo*, the unsatisfactoriness of workers is the cause of unemployment. Now, as Mr Hobson shows, it may quite well happen that in periods of bad trade the less efficient worker will be turned off first. But to argue that if all were equally efficient, all would be in work, is like saying that because some theatre-goers are quick enough to get into the front row of the pit, if all were equally quick they could all get there.

My object in offering these few pages to the *Hibbert Journal* is to ask its readers to try and realise how this supercilious tone strikes workers who are bearing the burden and heat of the day, and also to inquire whether the extremely pessimistic tone it is fashionable to adopt in regard to working-class character and achievements generally is justified. It is frequently remarked, "They are idle, they are idle"; yet surely the railway strike of last summer, through its exceptional inconvenience, might have taught us how great is the service we take as a matter of course in normal times. It is also fashionable in some quarters to exalt war as an ennobling influence, and say that our young men must be braced up to face danger and death. There is no need of such an expensive method of education for the working class; it is not necessary to make war to teach *them* to endure hardness. Every day or every night, as it may be, the miner, the engine-driver, the worker in lead or chemicals, the sewerman, and many others employed in unsavoury but necessary trades, face danger, and when necessary, death, in order that England may have the greatest trade and industry in the world. They take these risks daily and nightly, and somehow when one man is in danger in mine, sewer, or what not, it

generally happens (although they do not get V.C. for it) that another man goes in after him. Meanwhile the clubs and the drawing-rooms discuss the decadence of the race. Is it not time for us to change our attitude on this matter? Could we not manage to preach a little less and learn a little more? Mr Macdonald says that in reading what is written about the Labour Party he has found "a recklessness of statement and accusation against workmen, their ways, and their motives, or a patronising air of superiority of mind, which is nothing but the manifestation of a class feeling from which the writers innocently believe they are free." I cannot deprecate Mr Macdonald's accusation, for the attitude complained of by him is one that forces itself continually on one's attention. If we knew more history (*e.g.* Hammond's *Village Labourer*), we might perhaps find that the causes of much social strain and difficulty are to be found, not so much in the moral defects of the working class of the present day, as in the mental defects and want of foresight of the governing classes of the past.

B. L. Hutchins.

II.

All sane men must wish that the best representatives of Labour should have every facility for introducing the views and needs of their class to the knowledge of the general community, must applaud the writer's determination to see these facilities afforded, and must appreciate his disapproval of mere library theories (I am not saying that Sir Henry Jones' views are such); for Mr Macdonald takes us out of the quiet library and shows us over the slum tenement.

Equally must every wise man dread any chance of the authority of the labouring classes outbalancing all other authorities.

In no less degree must every informed man readily acknowledge that if the working classes determine to ruin the country by revolutionary experiment it is entirely in their power so to do.

I have ere now ventured to invoke the authority of that inspired political prophet, the late Sir John Seeley, in his praises of a former harmonious balance of the three forces of King, Lords, and Commons: the first-named giving the advantages of a single decision; the second, those of experience of the world and its ways, and that calm responsibility which men in a stable position alone can possess; while the third supplied the energy engendered amid the dynamos of hard physical work.

As I understand him, Mr Macdonald's remedy for existing discomforts is to be found in the Collectivist system of a Socialist State; with its theory of a bottomless State purse, its gratuitous postulate of honest and wise men in despotic control of his State;—later, its disillusioning trail of self-seekers and oligarchic tyranny.

By the time these last phenomena were all fully developed the labouring classes would to some extent appreciate the feelings of the frost-bitten survivors of Napoleon's Russian army as they crept back to France. "Experience," says Heine, "is a good school, but the fees are high."

I feel sure that it is rather by an elaboration of co-operation between employer and workman, and by a cheapening of our transport facilities (referred to later on), than by Socialistic experiment, that our salvation will be found.

The Collectivist would attack (1) the Capitalist, acting as middleman between demand and supply, and (2) the "rentier"—the man living on his investments.

As to (2) "the rentier," he can shift his investments, or he can depart bodily; and he is thus able to escape attack—in fact, has already booked his passage. With him would, however, depart much that is very useful to the community, derived both from the economic nutrition of his invested money (which, in smaller parcels than those of the Capitalist, supplies the motive power of commerce and manufacture), and from the various and frequent personal services of himself, his sisters, cousins, and aunts, his "territorial" sons, and so forth.

As to (1), it has always been quite open to the working classes to (*a*) propose profit-sharing schemes to the Capitalist, or (*b*) start co-operative associations among themselves, which should supply them with commodities at cost price.

Why have they done so little in this second direction? Has the idea not occurred to all of them? Or do they distrust such of themselves as would be capable of conducting these enterprises?

And if they dare not trust the latter, how dare they trust those who from the summit of a Collectivist State would wield far greater powers?

Why not try Collectivism privately (so to say) among their friends first of all, to see how it works; or, if they regard history, consult the experiences of William Lane and his *New Australia*?[1]

Why should the whole structure of the State be turned inside out in order that a theory which was disproved on the smaller scale should be tried in one chaotic experiment upon the whole fabric of Great Britain?

Mr Macdonald says that we have to discover instruments (the word certainly suggests force) for applying the Sermon on the Mount.

If, as appears, these words are meant to connote compulsion, why drag in the Sermon on the Mount, which is based on the very antithesis of compulsion? Jesus Christ, with all His fierceness when it was necessary to be fierce, was, above all, immeasurably a gentleman, and knew better than man ever did when to apply dynamite, and when to use that equally powerful force, His winning sweetness. So, I doubt not, does Mr Macdonald, so far as any of us may imitate that example.

Great Britain is a constitutional monarchy (not, as she is often carelessly dubbed, a democracy), and long may she remain so. There never existed a true democracy in ancient times; in those States which have been called such, smaller privileged groups quarrelled among themselves and ruled over hordes of slaves.

[1] Vide *New Australia*, by Grahame, price 6d., published by Morgan, which gives an interesting account of this disastrous fiasco.

No one can survey the condition of politics in the existing democracies and semi-democracies of the United States and in several of our dominions without a certainty that such a welter cannot be permanent; and it is permanency rather than experiment for the sake of change that Britons wisely love.

The populations of the far countries just mentioned inhabit millions of acres of recently virgin soil, and have had an arduous task in exploiting these lands by their agriculture and their railways, their factories and their mines.

Too occupied in these essentials to attend to politics, they have allowed themselves to be dominated by governments which were certainly not composed of the ἀρίστοι ("the best").

None of these countries and dominions have ever come up against world politics, which incessantly confront Great Britain—they are only just beginning to be aware of their existence. And, when they do come up against them, it is entirely unquestionable that they will have to evolve aristocratic institutions—the word "aristocratic" being here used in its proper sense, entirely dissociated from any notion of a "hidebound *noblesse*"—or their political structures will melt like snow in May.

Like all healthy communities throughout history, British affairs were, till recently, conducted by a wide system of true aristocracies, of which the landed interest, which controlled home and foreign politics, was only one.

Not only our political machinery, but also our trades, crafts, professions, sciences, and arts were largely dominated by small groups of men who, from time to time, co-opted to their ranks those from below who were best suited to share their rule and fill their gaps.

The free instincts of the British, informed and guided by democratic influence with its knowledge of "where the shoe pinches," have, in the past, enabled our State to develop and expand harmoniously: under our rapidly developed manufacturing conditions a prodigious amount remains still to do—and it must be noted that it was under the guidance of an aristocratic system that, amid the European revolutions of the last two hundred and twenty-four years, we kept our heads and our internal peace.

It follows from all the above that no system of pure democracy will work satisfactorily for us: nor will any system whose leaders think mainly of vote-catching. Which of our present mob orators has ever given thought to the ideas conveyed in Commander Bellairs' most striking suggestions in the *Nineteenth Century* for February concerning the cheapening of transport, and the immense benefits that might follow for us if it were achieved, or the vital need of an increased Gold Reserve?

All I would contend for, then, at the moment is that instead of the suggested Collectivism some stable aristocracy, duly informed of, and sensitive to, the needs of the proletariat should govern our internal and external politics, that it should be firmly rooted and thus not dependent on base vote-catching, and that its characteristic should not be mere wealth.

BARTLE C. FRERE.

ATHENÆUM CLUB.

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

PHILOSOPHY.

Professor G. DAWES HICKS.

A real service has been rendered to students of philosophy by the publication in a convenient form of the late Professor Adamson's article on "Logic" contributed to the ninth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica.* The value of this extremely able critical survey of the history of logical theory has long been recognised, and its unaccountable omission from the eleventh edition of the *Encyclopædia* must have been a disappointment to a number of those who make use of that work. The long and learned treatment of the Aristotelian Logic, one of the very best and most reliable accounts in any language, ought, in itself, to save the article from oblivion. I know of no survey in which conciseness and minute accuracy are so admirably combined. Fortunately, the manuscript of the article had been preserved, and some fifty passages, struck out when it first appeared, in order to economise space, have been restored. The little volume, published by Messrs Blackwood, under the title of *A Short History of Logic*, is edited by Professor W. R. Sorley, and he has added, as supplementary material, the author's article on "Category" and three of his reviews contributed to *Mind* — those, namely, of Lotze's *Logic* and *Metaphysic* and of Mr Bradley's *Logic.* The whole constitutes a singularly compact and helpful study of the more fundamental problems of logic and the theory of knowledge. From the Cambridge University Press there comes the first volume of *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, rendered into English by Miss E. S. Haldane and Dr G. R. T. Ross. Besides the better-known treatises comprised in Veitch's edition, the present volume contains also translations of the *Regulæ* and of the striking psychological work, *Les Passions de l'Ame.* The translators have used the new and complete edition of Descartes' works prepared by Adam and Tannery, and the translation has been, on the whole, carefully done, although, doubtless, some of the *Errata* which Professor Taylor has noted in *Mind* are unfortunate. If the Cambridge Press were to follow up this work by

offering us some day a translation of the philosophical works of Malebranche and Arnauld, it would satisfy a need that has long been felt. The *Kantgesellschaft* is embarking upon a praiseworthy undertaking in commencing the re-issue of a number of scarce philosophical treatises that have been of influence in the intellectual development of the last two centuries. The series starts with *Aenesidemus*, under which title the acute criticism of Reinhold's *Elementar-Philosophie*, written by G. E. Schulze, was published in 1792. This book is of peculiar interest in the development of the Critical Philosophy. Schulze has little difficulty in disposing of Reinhold's crude conception of a *Vorstellungsvermögen*, as the unity of the cognitive functions which Kant had distinguished as sensibility, understanding, and reason. And he brings to bear on the Kantian philosophy itself a skilfully directed attack, designed to show that each of the knowing activities which Kant discriminates amounts, in truth, in Kant's hands, to a thing-in-itself, called in merely as the unknown cause of certain empirical functions, and a cause which can be characterised only through these, its assumed workings. Seldom has the argument against the assumption of problematical "faculties" or "powers" been better or more effectively stated. Mr J. Creed Meredith has provided an excellent and useful translation of the first half of the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, under the title of *Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1911). Prefixed to the translation are seven introductory essays, dealing chiefly with points open to some difference of opinion, and a number of helpful notes are added. Mr Meredith seeks to bring out the importance of Kant's contribution to the solution of the problems of æsthetics, and his careful study ought to elicit attention from students of art no less than of philosophy. His way of describing Kant's peculiar manner of exposition will be a surprise to many readers, yet it embodies a certain measure of truth. Kant "is," it is said, "of all philosophers, with the possible exception of Plato, the most dramatic. He writes his critiques as if they were plays; the books being acts and the sections different scenes. He introduces faculties upon the stage as if they were so many *dramatis personæ*, and lets them betray their character chiefly by the part they play. He raises problems, complicates them, and withholds the solution, awaiting some unexpected *dénouement*. He seeks to sustain interest by always leaving an outstanding difficulty, and delights in working his way out of apparently inextricable situations." In the last number of the *Kantstudien* (xvi. 4), which presents its readers, by the way, with a fine portrait of Friedrich Paulsen, there is contained a hitherto unpublished essay of Fichte's, "Gegen das Unwesen der Kritik," in which the author feels himself constrained to claim once again protection for genuine scientific work against the unscrupulous activity of immature reviewers. It is a characteristic essay, written with all Fichte's fervour and persuasiveness. Dr E. Cassirer contributes to the same number an interesting article on "Aristoteles und Kant," suggested by Görland's elaborate comparative treatment of the Aristotelian and Kantian theories of knowledge. An

important point of view is emphasised by the author that seems to him to pervade Görland's discussion. Throughout the entire history of theoretical philosophy we are met, he thinks, by a problem, that can be abstractly expressed as the problem of the way in which relation stands connected with the elements related. According as the advance is made from one or the other of these moments, whether from the system of relations to the elements related or *vice versa*, two typically different modes of philosophical interpretation will result.

Two books of a more or less biographical character call for notice here. *James Hutchison Stirling: His Life and Work*, by Amelia Hutchison Stirling (Unwin, 1912), is a fascinating account of the career and the labours of a very remarkable man—a thinker whose rugged genius and transparent sincerity of purpose won for him the esteem and respect of all his contemporaries in philosophical research. The *Secret of Hegel*, notwithstanding its peculiarities of form and expression, was a great and striking masterpiece, "epoch-making," as Lord Haldane puts it. The writer of this biography gives an admirable account of Stirling's philosophical development, whilst telling, at the same time, the story of his strenuous years of intellectual toil. The letters of Carlyle and of Emerson add greatly to the value of the book; their appreciation of Stirling's work was a consolation to him in the midst of many disappointments and much discouragement. The other volume to which I allude is Professor Boutroux's estimate of *William James* (Paris, Armand Colin, 1911), which has been translated into English by A. and B. Henderson (Longmans, 1912). It is a kindly, sympathetic account of James's life and work, written by one who enjoyed his friendship and who, to some extent, shared his opinions. Professor Boutroux believes it would not be contrary to the underlying trend of James's philosophy to admit, behind the ready-made list of immutable categories, a living concrete reason, having to do, not with empty concepts, but with actual beings, and desirous not only of unity, of immutability, and of necessity, but also and above all of free harmony and inward communion. Alongside of Boutroux's monograph is to be placed that of Professor Flournoy, *La Philosophie de William James* (Saint-Blaise, Foyer, 1911), expanded from a lecture given at a meeting of the Swiss Association chrétienne d'Etudiants. The author quotes some interesting remarks of James's in reference to Secretan's criticism of Renouvier's philosophy, and tries to show that he and Secretan had much in common. In this connection, also, should be mentioned Professor Josiah Royce's volume, *William James, and other Essays on the Philosophy of Life* (Macmillan, 1911). The first essay, originally an address delivered at Harvard, is a fine appreciation of the author's friend and colleague. James's robust faith is declared to be "the spirit of the frontiersman, of the gold-seeker, or the home-builder, transferred to the metaphysical and to the religious realm." He was the interpreter of the ethical spirit of his time and of his people, and the prophet of the nation that is to be. At the same time, in the fourth essay, on "The Problem of Truth," Professor

Royce argues that any mere relativism in the interpretation of knowledge, such as James maintained, is doomed to failure. The truth that the human intellect seeks is truth that possesses completeness, totality, self-possession, and therefore absoluteness. "Our concepts of the objectively real world, our ethical ideals of conduct, our estimates of what constitutes the genuine worth of life—all these constructions of ours are determined by the purpose to conform ourselves to absolute standards." In the *Philosophical Review* for January, Professor Dewey replies to the contention of this essay that a recognition of the social implications of ideas and beliefs is fatal to the instrumental conception of truth, and maintains on the contrary that such recognition is of the essence of the said conception. In the third essay, Professor Royce answers the question, What is vital in Christianity? by insisting upon two theses as summing up the fundamental truth of Christianity: (*a*) that God wins perfection through expressing himself in a finite life and triumphing over and through its very finitude; and (*b*) that God too must sorrow in order that he may triumph, and therefore our fulfilment, like our existence, is due to the sorrow and the triumph of God himself.

In further development of the system of realism, upon which in recent years he has been engaged, Professor S. Alexander has published two strikingly original articles—one in *Mind* for January (N.S. xxi.) entitled "The Method of Metaphysics and the Categories," and the other in the *British Journal of Psychology* for December last (iv. 3) entitled "Foundations and Sketch-Plan of Conational Psychology." In the former, the author explains, in the first place, the nature of what he regards as a fundamental distinction in knowledge, the distinction, namely, between enjoyment and contemplation. The mind is enjoyed, its objects are contemplated. So too, on the level of life, before mind came into existence, living things, so far as living, enjoy their life and contemplate mere physical things. And in the same way, in higher grades of existence than our own, *e.g.* that of angels, our minds might be contemplated objects. Wherever a new order of beings emerges, those beings enjoy their own peculiar existence, but they contemplate everything lower than themselves. Metaphysics, it is contended, may be regarded as an attempt to describe the ultimate character of existence and the pervading or pervasive character of things. The pervasive characters of things are familiar to us as the categories, "the playthings of philosophy" as Lotze calls them, whether of sense or understanding. The categories are those characters of things which are both enjoyed and contemplated, for they are found both in mind and in things outside us. Thus, to enjoy a category in myself is also to contemplate a category outside of me. For example, he who seeks for causality will find it most easily by observing the enjoyments which constitute an act of will. In the latter of the two articles mentioned, it is maintained that the important distinction for psychology is not between cognition and conation as mental elements, for there is no element of cognition in the mental process itself; but between

the practical and speculative varieties of conation. The cognitive element in an experience is purely non-mental; there is only one mental process, namely, conation with its connected feeling. These conations or enjoyments are what are called "consciousness"—consciousness is the general form of such enjoyments. Psychology is confined to an account of the intrinsic characters of the enjoyments themselves, together with whatever further data may be utilised for more fully elucidating and explaining them. But this means not the abandonment of the greater part of present psychology; it means only a rearrangement of existing material or future material of the same sort. In an article on "The New Realism and the Old" (*Journ. of Phil.*, January 18, 1912), Professor W. P. Montague traces the stages of development from naïve realism to the problematic idealism (as Kant called it) of Descartes and the subjective idealism of Berkeley. The first and greatest problem for the new realists is, the author thinks, to amend the realism of common sense in such wise as to make it compatible with the universal phenomenon of error and with the mechanism of perception upon which that phenomenon is based and in terms of which it must be interpreted. Professor W. H. Sheldon dwells on "The Consistency of Idealism with Realism" (*Phil. Rev.*, January 1912). Idealism, he assumes, follows from the internality of relations, realism from their externality. According to the former, every object is dependent on mind for its existence and character; according to the latter, real external objects are independent thereof. But the independence means that their unique characters, *considered abstractly*, are eternally the same, no matter what I or anyone may do or think; this does not, however, contradict the assertion that they may also be parts of a system which mind helps to constitute.

Discussion continues largely to centre round the theories of Bergson. The address given by Professor Bergson himself at the Bologna Congress on "L'intuition philosophique" is published in the *Rev. de Mét.* for November (xix. 6). In it he contrasts the attitude of science towards reality with the attitude of philosophy, and refers in a very interesting way to the leading conceptions of Berkeley's idealism. Dr J. M'Kellar Stewart's *Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy* (Macmillan, 1911) is an able and careful treatment of the subject. The book is divided into two parts, the first being mainly expository and the second critical. Dr Stewart presses many relevant objections against the fundamental positions of Bergson's system. He urges, for example, in reference to the distinction between intelligence and intuition, that a mind-constructed representation of the world which differs from the world as it is can hardly serve the interests of *practice* better than an immediate and accurate, or, to use Bergson's word, an "intuitive," knowledge of the material world, and asks whether the *Élan* of life has not made a mistake in degrading itself into this intelligence which misrepresents the actual material universe in which we are called upon to live. Again, he contends that Bergson's theory of matter bristles with difficulties. There seems to be no reason at all why

the original creative activity should ever be interrupted; and even if it does throw out so many jets, there seems to be no reason for believing that these jets should at once begin to "fall." Further, seeing that the essence of the knowledge of time is the distinction between past, present, and future, Dr Stewart inquires why the fluent mass of on-going life should be called time rather than anything else. The author emphasises also some very pertinent considerations in reference to Bergson's way of conceiving the nature of human freedom. The significance of this philosophy for future thought lies, he thinks, in the stress Bergson has laid upon the principle that the whole of reality must be interpreted in terms of activity. A more severely adverse judgment is passed by Mr Sydney Waterlow in an article on "The Philosophy of Bergson" in the *Quarterly Review* for January 1912. Bergson's account of the nature of our minds breaks down, he contends, at all the main points. Mental states are not qualities, and Bergson only calls them qualities because he fails to distinguish between the act of sensation and the object which is given through sensation, because he confuses blue, for instance, which is a quality, with my sensation of blue. Moreover, it does not follow, he insists, that because we cannot help believing certain things, those beliefs are even probably false; merely from the fact (if it be a fact) that our minds are so constituted that they cannot help taking a certain kind of view of reality, no inference of any sort is possible as to either the truth or the falsity of that view. Professor R. B. Perry, writing from another standpoint, makes some interesting criticisms in his "Notes on the Philosophy of Henri Bergson" (*Journ. of Phil.*, December 7 and 21, 1911). With reference to conceptual knowledge, he urges that a statement may *mean* continuity, even though the symbols and words are discrete, just as the word "blue" may mean blue, although the word itself is not blue. If it were not possible to employ spatial images for the knowing of non-spatial things, Bergson himself would be even more helpless than those whom he criticises. Such terms as "flux," "continuity," "interpenetration," "fusion," and the like, suggest images essentially spatial. Bergson, in short, arbitrarily imputes to others a naïve identification of object and symbol which he disclaims on his own behalf. Finally, to the *Philosophical Review* for January, Professor A. O. Lovejoy contributes the first of a series of articles dealing with "The Problem of Time in Recent French Philosophy," in which he discusses the reasoning of Renouvier with respect to the reality of time. These articles will be of great use for understanding the course of philosophical development that led to the speculation of Bergson.

In the current periodicals there are several interesting treatments of other philosophical systems. A. Lalande, in his article entitled "Le Voluntarisme intellectualiste" (*Rev. Phil.*, January 1912), discusses Fouillée's recent volume on Thought and the new school of "Anti-Intellectualism," and compares suggestively the work of Fouillée and Bergson. L. Dauriac, writing on "Positivisme, Criticisme et Pragmatisme" (*Rev. Phil.*, December 1911), shows how Auguste Comte anticipated

many of the well-known contentions of William James. Dr W. Pieth contributes a short "Kritik der Lotzeschen Psychologie in der Analyse ihrer Grundlagen," dealing especially with Lotze's conceptions of the soul as a substance, the origin of the soul, the relating activity of the soul, and with the doctrine of local signs. Julius Schultz discusses "Das Verhältnis des reinen Kritizismus zum Phänomenalismus" (*Vierteljahrsschrift f. w. Phil.*, xxxv., December 4, 1911), and maintains that Kant unconsciously made use of psychological assumptions in the course of argument that led him to phenomenalism. The *Philosophical Review* for January 1912 contains Professor Külpe's Bologna address on "The History of the Concept of Reality." The author traces the concept in its various forms from the time of the Greeks to the present day, and argues that Kant's theory of the formal sciences needs to be supplemented by the theory of the real sciences.

Mention should be made of two small volumes on Greek philosophy. Siegfried Marck's *Die Platonische Ideenlehre in ihren Motiven* (München, Beck, 1912) is perhaps somewhat slight and superficial, but it calls attention to several important aspects of the Platonic theory, for example, the increasingly greater significance assigned by Plato in his later writings to teleological considerations. Students of Aristotle will welcome the re-issue of Franz Brentano's pamphlet, *Ueber den Creatianismus des Aristoteles*, in a greatly enlarged form, so that it becomes virtually a new book, under the title *Aristoteles Lehre vom Ursprung des menschlichen Geistes* (Leipzig, Veit, 1911). It is a very elaborate and exhaustive series of arguments against Zeller's view that Aristotle attributes to *νοῦς* pre-existence, though in a certain impersonal sense. Brentano, following the interpretation of Aquinas, maintains that according to Aristotle man receives the immortal part of his soul at his birth through an immediate operation of the creative energy of God. He examines in detail the objections raised by Zeller to this contention, and tries to show that they can none of them be sustained. It is a very powerful piece of polemic, such as could only come from a profound Aristotelian scholar.

"Does Moral Philosophy," asks Mr H. A. Prichard (*Mind*, January 1912), "rest on a mistake?" His reply is that it does when we want to have it *proved* to us that we ought to do certain things, *i.e.* to be convinced of this by a process which, as an argument, is different in kind from our original and unreflective appreciation of it. That demand is illegitimate, and if by Moral Philosophy is meant the knowledge which would satisfy such a demand, there is no such knowledge. There is no possibility of proving what can only be apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking. The realisation of the self-evidence of our obligations is, however, positive knowledge, and so far, and so far only, as the term Moral Philosophy is confined to this knowledge and to the knowledge of the parallel immediacy of the apprehension of the goodness of the various virtues and of good dispositions generally, is there such a thing as Moral Philosophy. There is a valuable treatment by Felix Adler of "The Relation of the Moral

Ideal to Reality" in the *International Journal of Ethics* for October 1911. The chief ethical rule to be derived from what he calls the organic ideal may be formulated, so the author thinks, as follows: So act as to elicit the best in others, and thereby you will elicit the best that is in yourself. In the light of this rule he considers the institution of marriage, the labour problem, the conception of the State, of international relations, and of the Church. Not the realisation of the ideal is, he argues, our earthly goal, but the realisation of the reality of the ideal.

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THEOLOGY.

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The most important general contribution to this department is the fourth volume of Dr Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* ("Confirmation" to "Drama"), which happens to include articles on "Consciousness" (by Principal Iverach), "Conversion," "Degeneration," "Divination," and "Desire," all bearing witness to the current interest and newer methods in the psychology of religion. It is along this line that theological activity is most productive at present, though quantity is not an index to quality. "Religionspsychologie und kein Ende," says Mayer with humorous complaint at the beginning of a recent survey in the *Theologische Rundschau* (December 1911, pp. 445–464). He points out that one of the serious defects in many books of this class is their concentration upon individual and eccentric phenomena, to the neglect of the average piety which, after all, is most characteristic of any religion. This is a criticism which is not unjustified. Evidence drawn from Jump-to-Glory-Jane and Billy Bray is often good copy but inferior as a transcript of reality. Wundt, in his *Probleme der Völkerpsychologie*[1] (Leipzig, 1911), has protested against this method, and, as Mayer argues, it is particularly frequent in American studies. One notable exception, however, falls to be chronicled. In the "Library of Philosophy," edited by Professor J. H. Muirhead (London: George Allen), Professor G. M. Stratton has just published a study upon *The Psychology of the Religious Life*. He concentrates his attention upon the variety of motives in religion. His book is divided into three parts, the first dealing with conflicts in regard to feeling and emotion, the second with conflicts in regard to action (ritual and ceremonies), and the third with conflicts in the sphere of thought. It is the sense of tension which characterises religion for the author. "At every instant," he observes, "the mind is driven powerfully in opposite directions: it at once clings to and abhors the self and the world, both physical and social; it wishes to act in conflicting ways, and at the same time to remain passive;

[1] This book is discussed by Dr Karl Thieme in an article on the genetic psychology of religion in the *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie* (1911), pp. 289–316.

it depends upon and despises its own powers of sense and of intellect; it would have its divinity both many and one, both near and far, both known and unknown." But the significant feature is the method employed in the writer's investigations. Instead of seeking fundamental truths of religion in the answers or memoirs of individuals, he rightly prefers, in the first instance, to analyse the prayer, the hymn, the myth, the sacred prophecy, *i.e.* reliable and widespread accounts and expressions of religious feeling in various nations, instead of running the risk "of laying undue stress upon what is exceptional and even morbid" in the introspective records of individual piety.

A valuable monograph upon one feature of primitive Christian psychology[1] has been published in German by another American scholar, E. Mossiman. In *Das Zungenreden geschichtlich und psychologisch untersucht* (Tübingen, Mohr), Herr Mossiman discusses the significance of glossolalia in the light of cognate mediæval and modern phenomena, which are held to be substantially identical with the glossolalia which Paul encountered in the Corinthian Church of the first century, and not merely imitative. In a review of M. Lombard's similar volume, *De la glossolalie chez les premiers chrétiens*, Professor P. Bovet (*Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, lxiii. 296–310) suggests that the Pentecost phenomena were originally an automatic, psychical state suggested by Hebrew prophetism.

It is psychology, also, which is uppermost in most of the newer studies upon the Bible, and especially upon the religious consciousness and theories of the apostle Paul. Theology, like philosophy, has its cycles. Now that the Drews controversy, which succeeded the Jesus-Paul storm, has blown itself out, the interest of New Testament theology seems to be settling once more upon the personality and influence of Paul. It is remarkable, at any rate, that the output of articles and monographs upon Paul and Paulinism should form so striking a feature of recent theological criticism. Among the most important books is Professor Kirsopp Lake's *Earlier Epistles of St Paul* (London, Rivingtons), which deals with the background of their thought and experience. The writer discusses the literary and critical problems of Thessalonians, Galatians, Corinthians, and Romans, but he also pays special attention to the world of the Hellenistic Mystery Religions in its influence upon Gentile Christians, who sought and found in baptism and the eucharist, as preached by Paul, the sacramental regeneration vainly proffered by the Greek cults. This position is shared by Professor Percy Gardner in his *Religious Experience of St Paul* (Crown Library); the fourth and fifth chapters of this sympathetic and penetrating study are devoted to the relation between the mysteries and the Pauline sacraments. On the other hand, Dr Schweitzer, in his new volume on *Die Geschichte der Paulinischen Forschung*, strenuously opposes such theories, as due to the misguided interpretation of Paul from Hellenism.

[1] Mr O. C. Quick's essay on "The Value of Mysticism in Religious Faith and Practice" (*Journal of Theological Studies*, 1912, 161 f.) covers more than primitive phenomena.

Professor Deissmann's *Paulus, Eine kultur- und religionsgeschichtliche Skizze* (Tübingen) contains, among other features of interest, a particularly good map, and, like Lietzmann (*Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, pp. 345–354), he gives an excellent account of the Delphi inscription in its bearings upon the chronology of Paul's life. Principal Garvie's thorough *Studies of Paul and his Gospel* (London, Hodder & Stoughton) are theological rather than historical; and in the *Studien und Kritiken* (1912, pp. 38–67) Professor von Dobschütz similarly discusses the meaning of justification by faith in Paul, a doctrine which he regards as the restatement of an essential element in the gospel, and as much better understood by Luther than by Augustine. Schweitzer interprets this doctrine naturally from the eschatological interest which he finds throbbing behind Paul's general theory of redemption. In this respect, his methods approximate to those of Professor Lake rather than to those of Professor Gardner, who is not an ardent eschatologist. Bousset, again, in a review of Deissmann (*Theologische Litteraturzeitung*, 1911, p. 780), desiderates a closer grasp of the strict juridical spirit which plays so large a rôle in Pauline conceptions like those of justification, adoption, and the righteousness of God.

Both Schweitzer and Professor Lake set aside the van Manen hypothesis upon the origin of Paul's epistles, but the more recent attempt to evaporate Paul and Jesus by means of mythological methods has been met with special acumen in the country of its origin. M. Reinach's *Orpheus* has supplied the text for the first and third of Loisy's five essays in *A propos d'Histoire des Religions* (Paris, E. Nourry), which point out that taboo and magic are secondary rather than primary, in relation to animism, and that a comprehensive estimate of religion, particularly in its Biblical representation, does not justify Reinach's definition of it as "un ensemble de scrupules, qui font obstacles au libre exercice de nos facultés." In his Versailles lectures, an English version of which has just been issued under the title of *The Credibility of the Gospels* (Longmans, Green & Co.), M. Batiffol makes equally short work of Reinach's opinions upon the Gospels. The lectures voice the Roman Catholic point of view, but they are at one with Loisy's pages in the stringent and occasionally ironical criticism which they pour upon this section of *Orpheus*. The historicity of certain elements in the Gospels has been challenged afresh, however, from two other quarters. In an elaborate study upon the influence exercised by Old Testament prophecy upon the narratives of the Passion (*Studien und Kritiken*, 1912, pp. 167–286), Herr Weidel seeks to show that the synoptic account of the sufferings and death of Jesus is largely unhistorical, based upon an interest in Old Testament prophecies. The "Wahrheit" is overlaid with "Dichtung" even in Mark. Ahithophel furnishes the type of Judas; Joseph in prison, of the thieves on the cross; Daniel in the lions' den, of Jesus' burial, and so forth. Herr W. Brandt, in one of the "Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die altestamentliche Wissenschaft" (*Jüdische Reinheitslehre und ihre Beschreibung in den Evangelien*, Giessen), has again raised the question whether the sayings of Jesus about

purification (Mark vii. 2 f., Matt. xxiii. 25 f., Luke xi. 39 f.) can be regarded as historical in view of contemporary Jewish practice, and answers in the negative. He regards them as glosses due to the later controversy of the apostolic Church over the differentia of Gentile and Jewish Christianity, or rather of Christianity and Judaism. In addition to these queries, the mythological theory reappears unexpectedly in the pages of *Studien zur Odyssee*, by C. Fries. The author, on the lines of *Orpheus*, seeks to prove that the wandering Odysseus, who is welcomed by the Phæacians, is a type of the god (Marduk) entering his temple, and that—among the numerous mythological parallels—the entry of Jesus into Jerusalem is simply another form of this astro-mythological phase of the spring-god's festival, or of Odysseus, the ascetic *bhikshu*. The cleansing of the Temple is the destruction of chaos by the deity and the re-establishment of a new world.

In the more serious criticism of the Gospels, Professor Spitta, who has for long been an almost solitary advocate of the superiority of the Lucan tradition, will rejoice to find himself reinforced by Herr F. Dibelius. The latter scholar (*Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1911, pp. 325 f.) now argues that the majority of the specially Lucan passages go back to the Jerusalemites in the church of Antioch, the city of the evangelist's birth. Luke, he concludes, after an exhaustive study of the exegetical material, must have had access to evangelic traditions, independently of Mark's gospel, which often lend particular importance to his narratives. Although the third gospel was the last of the synoptic gospels to be composed, it contains for the most part the earliest material of tradition, and in investigating the life of Jesus we should start with Luke instead of Mark. In connection with Luke's gospel, also, Mr J. G. Machen (*Princeton Theological Review*, 1912, pp. 1–38) examines the hymns in the first chapter, which he assigns to Zacharias and Mary, probably in Aramaic; and Dr Adolf Rücker has published a critical monograph upon *Die Lukas-Homilien des hl. Cyrill von Alexandrien* (Breslau, 1911), whose exegetical importance he values highly.

The fourth gospel has received less attention. Herr Pfättisch, on *Die Dauer der Lehrtätigheit Jesu nach dem Evangelium des hl. Johannes* (Freiburg), contends for a two years' ministry, and energetically opposes any attempt to rule out the reference to the passover in vi. 4 as a later gloss. A volume of posthumous studies by F. Overbeck, *Das Johannes-evangelium*, has also been edited by Dr C. A. Bernoulli (Tübingen), which will bring small comfort to those who believe in the Johannine authorship, or indeed to any who, whatever their critical attitude to the tradition may be, are indisposed to believe that the theology of the fourth gospel is a radical corruption of the Christian religion.

Outside the Gospels, the interest in the Odes of Solomon continues unabated, but the tendency of recent research is more and more to associate them as Christian products with the post-apostolic Church. De Zwaan (*American Journal of Theology*, October, pp. 617–625) adduces

parallels between them and Ignatius, which suggest affinities; Professor Bacon views them in relation to the literature of later Hellenistic Judaism (*Expositor*, September, pp. 243–256); but Herr Frankenberg's monograph, *Das Verständnis der Oden Salomos* (Giessen), definitely places them in the neighbourhood of the Alexandrian school, and Gressmann has emphasised their affinities with the early Gnostic movement (*Christliche Welt*, pp. 633 f., 650 f., 674 f., 703 f.); P. Kleinert points out what seem to be Mandæan elements (*Studien und Kritiken*, 1911, pp. 569–611); Mr Conybeare, like Herr Fries, Montanist proclivities; while Mr W. R. Newbold (*Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1911, p. 161 f.) begins a study of them in connection with the theology of Bardaisan, the great Gnostic. The difficulty of distinguishing any Jewish source in the Odes, as Harnack conjectured, is shown afresh by Rev. R. H. Connolly in *The Journal of Theological Studies* (January 1912, pp. 298 f.).

The subsequent course of theological thought down to the Reformation is lucidly outlined by Dr H. B. Workman in *Christian Thought to the Reformation* (Duckworth), with a particularly adequate chapter (pp. 180 f.) upon Augustine. He points out that the logical unity given by Augustine to the doctrine of original sin was gained "at too great a cost, since it tended to lay the whole stress of sin upon the sexual desire. We see the outcome of this doctrine in the stress which for a thousand years was laid upon celibacy as the supreme grace of the would-be saint." This is one of the features in Augustine's system which have prompted Dr Thomas Allin, in *The Augustinian Revolution in Theology* (London, James Clarke), to attack with vigour the mischief and errors of Augustinianism as a supernatural criminology. Augustine, he contends, was responsible for that distortion of the Catholic faith which reappeared pre-eminently in Calvin. Herr Scholz's *Glaube und Unglaube in der Weltgeschichte* (Leipzig) is more historical and dispassionate; it is a commentary upon the *De Civitate Dei*, which traces back the idea of the Church as a divine state to Ticonius, and show incidentally how the imperialist prejudice of Augustine made pride and disobedience the cardinal sins of unbelief.

In a valuable excursus upon *Fruitio Dei*, Herr Scholz refers the origin of the conception not simply to Neo-platonism but to the Old Testament. This leads me, in the little space left, to add a paragraph upon some recent criticism in this department of theology, and at the outset to call attention to Mr A. T. Chapman's *Introduction to the Pentateuch*, which forms a supplementary volume in the Cambridge Bible series. The book presents a succinct outline of the critical principles and their main results. Three theses of research are postulated: (i.) that the Hexateuch contains passages later than the age of Moses and Joshua; (ii.) that the Hexateuch is a composite work, in which four documents at least can be distinguished; and (iii.) that the laws embody three separate codes, JE, D, and P, belonging to successive stages in the religious development of the nation. Mr Chapman meets by anticipation the use made of the Samaritan Pentateuch by those who still challenge what is essential in the Wellhausen reconstruc-

tion of the Old Testament. The other line of criticism, levelled from the Elephantinê papyri, is being discussed especially in the pages of the *Expositor* by a series of scholars. Professor Burney, in the February number (pp. 97 f.), makes it clear, in reply to Professor Sayce, that even if the Jews of Elephantinê were acquainted with some ritual regulations like those of the Priestly Code, this would not invalidate the critical hypothesis, since that code, *ex hypothesi*, included many old usages and ceremonies. In the stricter field of Old Testament criticism, we have to chronicle editions of Exodus and Numbers by Dr Driver and Mr A. H. MacNeile respectively in the Cambridge Bible series, Dr Driver's articles on the book of Judges which are appearing in the *Expositor*, and an article by Mr L. B. Wolfenson upon "The Character, Contents, and Date of Ruth" (*American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature*, pp. 285–300), in which it is argued that Ruth belongs to an early period, originally as one of the popular stories in J, which has been separated from its position prior to Samuel and edited with Deuteronomist aims, the genealogy in iv. 18–22 being added by the editors of P.

In a volume of studies on the Psalter, entitled *Life, Death, and Immortality* (London, Murray), Dr Oesterley agrees with Dr Morris Jastrow that the parallel between the penitential psalms of Israel and Babylon is superficial rather than real. The main part of the book, indeed, is occupied by a study of the doctrine of sin within the Psalter. The cognate problem of the hostile references to sacrifices is again discussed by J. C. Matthes in *Theolog. Tijdschrift* (1911, pp. 361 f.), where he defends his thesis that some of the Psalms are as definitely opposed (not merely indifferent) to sacrifice as the prophets.[1] I have only a line or two, unfortunately, to devote to recent literature on the prophets. Dr G. W. Wade, in the "Westminster Commentaries," has edited *The Book of the Prophecies of Isaiah* in English (London, Methuen), analysing it into a triple scheme—chaps. i.–xxxix. containing three groups or collections; chaps. xl.–lv. dating from 546–538 B.C., and chaps. lvi.–lxvi. being post-exilic. Professor Peake has now completed his succinct commentary on Jeremiah and Lamentations in the *Century Bible*. Professor P. Riessler has edited *Die kleinen Propheten* (Rottenburg, W. Bader), with careful attention to the numerous glosses which have crept into the text; and three American scholars have collaborated in the "International Critical Commentary," to produce an important and welcome volume on *Micah, Zephaniah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Obadiah and Joel*. Professor J. A. Bewer is responsible for Joel and Obadiah, Dr W. Hayes Ward for Habakkuk, and Dr J. M. Powis Smith for the others. It may be said that their processes of literary analysis are more thoroughgoing than Professor Riessler's, though not more so upon the whole than B. Duhm's in his recent *Anmerkungen zu den Zwolf Propheten*.

JAMES MOFFATT.

[1] Cp. Mr W. R. Betteridge in *The Biblical World* (1911), pp. 41 f., on Isaiah i. 18–20.

REVIEWS

The Life of John Henry, Cardinal Newman.—By Wilfrid Ward.—
London : Longmans, Green & Co., 1912.

The biographer makes a claim in the introductory chapter of his work which, on the whole, is justified. In the concluding words of that chapter he says :—

"Only a comparatively small selection from a large correspondence can of course here be published. But the views he expressed on the critical questions of the day are given with perfect frankness.

"My endeavour throughout is so carefully to preserve the true proportion between the various elements of his character and opinions that further letters, while they may add much knowledge of detail, will find their natural place in the picture presented by the present work as a whole."

More especially does he strongly insist, in the same chapter, that he has fully represented Newman's criticism of the Church authorities. We must take Mr Ward's word for it, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine anything stronger in this respect than some of these letters. Take, as an instance, certain passages in the letter on page 588 of vol. i., which are too long for quotation. Surely such an outspoken condemnation of the system has never before been penned by one who was recognised by those authorities themselves, at least in the closing years of his life, as a faithful and devoted servant of the Church. Mr Ward has printed (advisedly as he says) a considerable number of letters which represent Newman in his lighter moods, some humorous, others showing his interest in men and things. In the case of one so widely known, and only known (to the majority) through his religious and philosophical writings, this is necessary if the subject of the biography is not to remain an abstraction.

Yet this aspect of him serves merely as a foil to his asceticism, which was his much more prevailing characteristic, and extended even to his intellectual life. His secular reading was on severely restricted lines, and he had little sympathy with what is called "the spirit of the age." He classed this as "Liberalism," which, whether in religion or politics, was anathema to him (i. 506 ; ii. 458, 459 ff., 513). Yet no one has put the case more tellingly for Agnosticism than he, and that without supplying any counter-argument (knowing this to be useless), except the positive dogmatism which he believed and taught as necessary to salvation (i. 393, 394 ; ii. 492, 493). Yet in the Church of his adoption he was the great

protagonist of a less rigid theory of scriptural inspiration, a wider interpretation of dogma, a more liberal education for Catholics, and a more modern apologetic than those which prevail. This attitude threw him for many years under the shadow of the suspicion of the authorities of his Church, a state of things which caused constant anguish to his sensitive and loyal mind, as many of the letters contained in this volume bear witness.

This seeming paradox was apparently due to the fact that he possessed not only an exceptionally keen and vigorous intellect, but also very strong moral and religious sentiments, in which the sense of the unseen world was very highly developed. He distrusted reason (i. 506), for he did not know whither it might lead him, and so by the force of will (i. 242) he kept it within certain limits, the limits set by the dogmas of the Church. But it was always tugging at the chain, and the authorities were for long afraid of him. He says himself that they regarded him as a kind of curious wild animal which they had captured. But he possessed wonderful control over his reasoning powers, and permitted himself their exercise only so far as he thought good for his salvation and the service of the Church.

The secret of his position was his first conversion, in which he was convinced that he entered into relations with the personal God of Christianity, and which stamped the fundamental dogmas of that religion, for ever after, as true for him. Thenceforth he could not doubt, and therefore he could suffer his reason to play around subjects in a way which would have been fatal to other men's faith. There can be no doubt that the experience of his conversion was as great a reality to him as was theirs to St Paul and others. The effects of it lasted, without diminishing, the whole of his long life; a sufficient evidence of his sincerity.

At the same time, he sought to justify his beliefs to his intellect by a double process. *The Grammar of Assent*, though coming so many years after *The Development of Dogma*, really precedes it in the natural order, since it deals with the first principles of the individual mind. And here let us note once more the curious combination of a free and scientific method subjected to the service of absolute dogma. The method of both these works is the psychological, and, if Newman is not the initiator of it, he was at least the first who attempted to popularise it within the limits of the Church. None saw plainer than he that abstract argument leaves out a host of elements that contribute to the conclusion, or, at least, to the mental assent. That assent does not depend ultimately on argument, but is reached through a psychological process which he endeavoured to analyse. In attempting this, he fell into one of the principal fallacies of that scholasticism which he had set out to avoid; that is to say, his conclusion, or something like it, was already present in his basal assumption. And this was because he took for that assumption the Christian conscience, just as it is, without seeking to separate those elements in it which it has acquired from Christian tradition. In fact, his analysis did not go back far enough. If it had, it would have led him to the primitive elements

of the religious sentiment, enumerated by Darwin in his *Descent of Man*, and which form the basis of all religions. But, even as he took it, there was an immense hiatus between the psychological facts and his conclusion. To infer from the presence of certain sentiments in the human mind the existence of an Almighty Person is a step which no logic can warrant. Hence Newman acknowledged the mysterious nature of the principle by which the gulf was bridged and named it "the illative sense." He might just as well have said at once that the belief in God is instinctive and needs no argument to support it. Anyway, if he was justified in believing himself, there was nothing in the argument which justified his imposing the conclusion on others. Yet he not only did so, but asserted that whoever came to a different conclusion had started from immoral assumptions and should use his will and the power of prayer to bring himself to the assent of faith (i. 242; ii. 526, 492, 330, 264, 257). He asserted this even in the domain of history (ii. 249). He believed that if reason were left to itself, without this guidance of moral sentiments, it would infallibly run to wrong conclusions. He evidently was no believer in the "anima naturaliter Christiana" (i. 506). And, further, he could not possibly have been acquainted with the moral principles of Buddhism, almost identical as they are with those of Christianity, or with the lives of some Buddhistic saints, otherwise he would have been obliged to admit that, even when the best moral sentiments are at the base of the intellect, and issue in a holy life, these do not necessarily lead to Christian theism.

Yet, with all this, Newman's acute mind could not rid itself of the suspicion that, so far from this conclusion representing a correct analysis of the psychological facts, there was another which had a much greater claim to be so taken; one, too, which lies at the basis of the Buddhist position. So he admits, after all (ii. 330), "that something which has dues upon us is to us God. I will not assume that it is a personal God, or that it is more than a Law."

But, though the interior conviction produced by his conversion was sufficient for himself, he would hardly perhaps have ventured so to insist upon it as a duty for all, except for the support given him by the age-long traditions of a vast communion.

The Development of Doctrine applies to the history of theology the same principles as the *Grammar* to the individual. The relations of the different dogmas to each other and to their several states in different ages are organic rather than logical. And the theory has the same limitations, that is to say, the analysis is not carried far enough back. There is a "deposit," which contains in embryo the whole faith. Historical and textual criticism have, since then, carried the process much further, and reduced "the deposit" to its probable elements. But, by retaining a "deposit," Newman was able still to maintain the absolute character of Dogma.

It has been seen how Newman distrusted the reason as an instrument of arriving at the truth, except it assumed moral premises. And he

extended this uncertainty of its results even into the domain of mathematics and mechanical science, thus endeavouring to weaken the main stronghold of reason in order to subject it to the moral and dogmatic teaching of the Church (ii. 249). Not being a philosopher, as he himself admits (ii. 257), he recognised no distinction between the action of reason within the domain of sensible experience and in that where there is no such universally recognised experience. And yet such distinction is vital. To blur it is fatal. Hence the charge brought against him by Dr Fairbairn, and also by some of his own communion, of intellectual scepticism was fully justified. At the same time, it must be recognised that, while Newman allowed too little authority to reason and sought to make it the slave of "moral assumptions," Dr Fairbairn claims too much for it. On its own proper ground, where the categories of the understanding are at one with the experience of perception, in the phenomenal world of co-existences and sequences, reason must be trusted, but it can never be made to demonstrate the truth of Theism. And Newman was quite right in maintaining that instinctive intuition plays a large part in arriving at truth. But this has only found its due place and proportion in the philosophy of Bergson.

In spite of his quasi-scientific method, the exacting nature of the scientific method, when thoroughly and consistently carried out, seems to have been a sealed book to him, as appears from several passages in this work, and notably in a very interesting interview which the biographer reports on pages 490–497 of vol. ii., when he had come to consult Newman on some lectures which he proposed to give young men in order to counteract unbelief. Yet, in this same interview, Newman showed his mind to be as keen as ever, notwithstanding his fourscore years, for he demolished his own argument for Christianity as none other could have done it.

He "went on in this way for some time, and soon I was beginning to press him for advice as to the way in which I should deal with any young man who came to me and talked in a similar strain, when the bell rang for dinner."

The interview was not renewed till the next day, and, as on previous occasions, the refutation of the sceptical argument was never given.

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Studies in the Synoptic Problem.—By Members of the University of Oxford. Edited by W. Sanday, D.D., Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity.—Pp. xxvii + 456.—Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911.

This collective utterance is the outcome of a "Seminar" which has been held nine times a year in Canon Sanday's lodgings at Christ Church since the year 1894. Now at last six of the more prominent members, with

Canon Sanday at their head, have put forth to the world their somewhat conflicting views on the Synoptic problem. They have all deeply studied the question with a view to arriving at truth; and as they are all clergymen, belonging, with one exception, to the Church of England, they can hardly be suspected of a bias against Christianity. This gives a peculiar importance to their views, as a sign of the times.

The volume is by no means adapted to the general reader. It bristles with Greek, breaks out towards the end into Hebrew and Aramaic, and requires throughout the closest attention to a number of minute details in order to appreciate the force of the argument. Under these circumstances, many readers of the *Hibbert Journal* will no doubt be glad to have a simple statement of the results arrived at.

But, first, what is the Synoptic problem? It is the question as to the relation to one another of the three Gospels according to Matthew, Mark, and Luke. This used to be regarded as a religious problem: it is now treated as a literary one. As a religious problem the solution given was a simple one—that it had pleased the Holy Ghost to inspire one writer to utter the word of truth in one way and another in another. Now, however, the Synoptic problem takes its proper place among other purely literary problems. It bears a certain resemblance to the Homeric problem as to the unity or multiplicity of authors in the *Iliad*. The making of Homer has been compared by Professor Gilbert Murray with the making of the Hebrew Bible; and the criticism of the New Testament is compared by Mr Addis in Essay XII. with that of the Hexateuch. Mr Addis must have infallibility somewhere, and he now attaches it to the principles of criticism. These, he says, "are always and everywhere the same. Either these principles are unsound and should therefore be entirely dismissed, or they are valid and must be applied without fear or favour." This, we venture to think, is a great deal too peremptory, if by "the principles of criticism" be meant the principles actually employed by Biblical critics, some of whose principles have been absurd. In the case of the Hexateuch the uninstructed mind is apt to be disgusted at the apparent temerity of a critic who will take a single verse, split it up into sections *a*, *b*, and *c*, and then assign *a* to one source, *b* to another, and *c* to a third. And yet the critics of the Old Testament seem to have made good their main contention as to composite authorship and the "contamination" of different yet similar narratives running through the Hexateuch. J, E, and P appear to have some substantial reality underlying them, and are hardly likely ever to be relegated to the limbo of exploded hypotheses. The same can certainly not be said of the M^1, M^2, M^3 in Wendling's audacious theory as to the origin of St Mark's Gospel, which Mr N. P. Williams in Essay XIII. treats perhaps too kindly in saying that "it cannot be denied the merit of ingenuity and plausibility." M^1 is supposed to be an historian, M^2 a poet who puts colour into the work, and M^3 a dogmatic theologian. The Gospel, as we have it, is partitioned out between these three authors. This fantastic theory, it may be observed, emanates from Tübingen, where

the *genius loci* seems still to assert itself. It stands in striking contrast with the sound and cautious methods followed by English critics, as displayed in the volume before us.

What was the state of the problem before these writers took it up? There was a pretty general agreement that Matthew and Luke had had Mark before them when they wrote. Further, it was evident that there must have been another source of some kind to account for the matter which is common to Matthew and Luke and is not drawn from Mark. This source was denoted by the symbol Q (Germ. *Quelle* = source). In passing we may note the desirability of keeping Q as a purely non-committal term, as a mere symbol for the source in question, of what kind soever. This source may be the Logia of Papias; it may be mere discourses or a rudimentary Gospel containing discourses in a setting of narrative; it may be one document or more than one; it may not be a document at all, but only the voice of tradition—for those at least who can accept that view. We therefore do not suppose that Canon Sanday is wishing to define Q once for all when he says (p. 4), "We call the second document in Sir John Hawkins's reconstruction (which is shared by many other scholars) Q." Q is a mere query, a mere *quodcunque*, which will serve to cover any view as to the source of the non-Marcan matter common to Matthew and Luke. It does not, indeed, apply to Archdeacon Allen's reconstruction of the Book of Sayings from Matthew, because that is not put forward as a source for Luke. Hence Canon Sanday suggests in passing that that might more appropriately be called L (= Logia).

Out of the 661 verses contained in the Revised Version of Mark all but about 50 have been incorporated in the other two Gospels. This makes it difficult not to accept the initial assumption that Matthew and Luke used Mark. Add to this the further assumption that Q was a written, not an oral, source, and you have what is called "the two-document hypothesis."

"We assume," says Dr Sanday, "at starting what is commonly known as the 'two-document hypothesis.'" But against this there are two dissentient voices raised within the volume itself. For Dr Vernon Bartlet declares himself to have long ago reached the conclusion "that the First and Third Evangelists cannot have used the same document for the non-Marcan element common to them"; and Archdeacon Allen is of opinion that any acquaintance that Luke possessed with Matthew's non-Marcan source was only indirect (p. 281). This dissentience, however, as Dr Bartlet himself puts it, is of the nature of "a minority report," and for our present purpose of giving the main results of the book may be treated as a negligible quantity. For these main results we must have recourse to the contributions of Sir John Hawkins and Mr Streeter, with which Canon Sanday himself is most closely in sympathy.

It is laid down that as a general rule Matthew and Luke used Mark "not only as one of their most important sources, but as a framework." To this general rule, however, there are some important exceptions. In

chapters viii.–xiii., which constitute about a quarter of the whole Gospel, Matthew is not following Mark. The exceptions in St Luke, which are dealt with by Canon Hawkins in Essay II., are still more considerable. (i) To begin with, there is what is known as Luke's "great interpolation" (ix. 51–xviii. 14), which amounts to nearly a third of the whole; and also his "lesser interpolation," a matter of eighty-three verses, from vi. 20 to viii. 3. Let it be understood that by "interpolation" is here meant only that Luke has inserted matter from some other source into the framework which he takes over from Mark. (ii) Secondly, there is the omission by Luke of Mark vi. 45–viii. 26. (iii) A third exception to the general rule of Luke's following Mark lies in the unusual freedom and independence of Luke in detailing the narrative of the Passion.

As to the first of these points, Sir John Hawkins holds that the disuse of Mark by Luke in the great interpolation is not only comparative, but entire. It contains, indeed, some thirty-five verses in which Luke might seem to be following Mark, but Sir John Hawkins thinks it more likely that even here Luke is drawing on some other source.

As to the second point, we have to notice the curious fact that in these sections omitted by Luke, Matthew still continues to follow Mark. What is the interpretation to be put upon this fact? If these sections were in Luke's copy of Mark (assuming the documentary hypothesis), they were omitted by Luke either by accident or design. If they were not in it, why not? Had Luke a mutilated copy? Or were the sections not yet written? If so, there were successive editions of Mark, and Luke used an earlier edition than Matthew. This would make it probable that he wrote before Matthew. Now, Sir John Hawkins holds that Luke had before him the whole of Mark, and that the omission was due either to accident or to design or possibly to a combination of both. Mr N. P. Williams, on the other hand, thinks the simplest explanation to be that Luke omitted these sections because they were not in his copy of Mark. He supposes the original form of Mark not to have contained either these sections or chapter xiii. After that chapter had been inserted he supposes the Gospel to have been used by Luke, and after the further insertion of vi. 45–viii. 26 (when it had attained its present form) by Matthew. Dr Sanday in his introductory matter (p. x) signifies his dissent from this view and his agreement with Sir John Hawkins "in believing that the Second Gospel lay before St Luke substantially in the form in which we have it now."

With regard to the third point the question presents itself—How is it that Luke in his Passion narrative deals so much more freely with his Marcan source than he does elsewhere? The suggestion put forward by Canon Hawkins is that Luke, who is mentioned in Philemon among Paul's "fellow-workers," was in the habit of preaching the Pauline Gospel. One of the main points in that Gospel was "a crucified Messiah." Hence the narrative of the Crucifixion had been worked up in Luke's mind during the constant process of verbal treatment into a form peculiarly his own. Dr Sanday does not think that Luke's *additions* to Mark are sufficiently

accounted for by this suggestion, and he is in consequence inclined in this matter to hold a three-document hypothesis (p. xiii).

Mr Burnett Hill Streeter, a comparatively young writer, has won to himself much glory by the part he has played in this volume. His method of procedure seems sound, as being a process from the known to the unknown. On p. 145 he lays down this principle: "It may be presumed that Matthew and Luke would each deal with his secondary authority in much the same way as he deals with his first." Again, on p. 147 he says, though not exactly in these words: "It is likely that an editor would bring scattered but related matter together; it is unlikely that he would scatter what is related." The conclusion to which these principles lead is that Luke has, on the whole, preserved the order of Q, whereas Matthew has made very free with it. Hence when a thing is well placed in Matthew, but ill placed in Luke, it is inferred that its place in Q has been changed by Matthew. "Everything," he says, "tends to show that Matthew has entirely disregarded the original context of Q, and used it simply as a quarry from which to hew stones for the building up of his great discourses and the enlargement and embellishment of the main structure which he takes over from St Mark" (p. 157). For the fragmentary nature of Q, which, "considered as a Gospel is a mere torso" (p. 142), Mr Streeter accounts by supposing that it "is a selection, compiled for a practical purpose, of those words or deeds of the Master which would give guidance in the actual problems faced by the Christian missionaries" (p. 212). He supposes further that Q was written "*to supplement* the living tradition of a generation which had known Christ" (p. 215), that its main author was Matthew, and that the document was identical with those words of the Lord on which Papias wrote a commentary in five books (Eus., *H.E.*, iii. 39).

Another important conclusion reached by Mr Streeter is that "Mark was familiar with Q," wherein he agrees with many eminent scholars. To this conclusion Dr Sanday tells us (p. xvi) he has himself reluctantly come round—"reluctantly" because it tends to complicate matters instead of simplifying them. Mr Streeter, however, holds that Mark's use of Q was very limited; indeed, he thinks that Mark "wrote *to supplement* Q" (p. 219).

We regret to see Mr Streeter taking up with Colani's theory that Mark xiii. is a "little Apocalypse." Mr Streeter supposes this document to have been composed about A.D. 70, and to have been inserted whole by St Mark under the idea that it was "an authentic word of the Lord" (p. 183, n.). The only excuse which suggests itself for this procedure is that innovating critics have so often dealt thus cavalierly with what did not suit their purpose, that a conservative critic may well be tempted into showing that two can play at that game. It should be added that Mr Williams enters a protest (p. 416) against Mr Streeter's views on this point.

Archdeacon Allen's contribution on "The Aramaic Background of the Gospels" (Essay X.) has an importance all its own, in that it gives reasons for the assumption, so probable on the face of it, that Mark is a transla-

tion from the Aramaic. This view, which was held by Blass, has lately, it seems, been acceded to by Wellhausen, who is quoted as saying, "The evidence rather suggests a translator of an Aramaic document who sometimes misinterprets by translating too literally" (p. 293). It is in this direction that we must look for the explanation of such a curious divergence as that pointed out by Professor Sanday between Mark xi. 3 and Matt. xxi. 3 (p. 6). Archdeacon Allen himself, in 1902, suggested that Mark was a translation from the Aramaic, and he lets us see that Wellhausen has availed himself of many of his references, but he would do well not to claim Dan. iii. 9, as that reference is wrong.

So much must suffice as a sketch of the chief results arrived at in this laborious and fruitful volume. Except in the matter of Mark xiii., these results seem to be reached solely on the evidence. Indeed, so far from the writers twisting the facts into conformity with their own views, it appears to me as a bystander that they have not made the most of their own case. Subject to the higher duty to truth, from which no one can escape, these men are bound by their office to defend the authenticity of the Sacred Books of the West. But they are quite faint-hearted in doing so. For instance, near the end of the volume (p. 433) we find Mr Streeter saying, "The sayings preserved in Q were not taken down at the time by a shorthand writer." How does he know this? Shorthand was employed by Cicero at the trial of Catiline, and great improvements were made in the art just about the time of Christ's ministry. But without insisting on the shorthand, is it supposed that Matthew could not write, or that he had not interest enough in his Master's words to make jottings (*ἀπομνημονεύματα*, Justin Martyr, *Apol. I.*, lxvi. 3) of them, when he had left all to follow him? If to the world Jesus was at that time a person of little importance, yet not so to his disciples. They took notes of his discourses, as Xenophon did for Socrates, and Arrian for Epictetus. Had they not done so, so many sayings, with so much vividness and so marked an individuality about them, could never have been preserved to us. The age was a literary age, and the Jews were a literary people. These written records underlay the teaching of the Apostles spoken of in Acts (ii. 42) and are "the words of the Lord Jesus" to which St Paul refers as the type of sound doctrine (1 Tim. vi. 3); they were from the first recognised as Scripture on a level with the Old Testament (1 Tim. v. 18); they are the Logia, which were incorporated into our Gospels, and on which a commentary was written by Papias; they are also, with additions, the Memorabilia of the Apostles which Justin Martyr says were called Gospels (*Apol. I.*, lxvi. 3), and which were read in Church on Sundays (*ibid.*, lxvii. 3). Matthew was the chief author of them. "He wrote them in Hebrew (= Aramaic), and everybody interpreted them as best he could" (Eus., *H. E.*, iii. 39). Hence we have the kind of mistakes that come of mistranslation.

In the last number of the *Hibbert Journal* Canon Sanday sums up thus the chronological results of his investigations: "We believe that Q was

written somewhere in the decade A.D. 50–60; St Mark not long before A.D. 70; St Matthew some years later; and St Luke, later still (about 80); and St John, nearer to the end of the century." It is hazardous to challenge the conclusions of a man who knows his subject and weighs his words, but I cannot help thinking that, except as regards St John, everything should be put earlier.

Why does Luke break off Acts where he does? The unsophisticated answer of the man who has no axe to grind is, "Because he has brought his narrative up to date." Now Mr Turner gives A.D. 61–2 as the date for the close of St Paul's first captivity in Rome. This, then, was the time at which the Acts was written. But Acts is a continuation of Luke's Gospel, and is shown by the preface to have been written later; how much later we cannot say. And Luke's Gospel incorporates pretty well the whole of Mark, which must therefore have been written before it. And Mark is shown to have been acquainted with Q, which must therefore have been written earlier still. Let us at a venture assign Luke's Gospel to A.D. 60, though, if he is "the brother whose praise is in the Gospel," it ought to be put back before the date of Second Corinthians (? A.D. 58). Canon Sanday puts Mark ten years earlier than Luke. We will therefore put it in A.D. 50. Now Mr Streeter says that Q "was probably written twenty years before Mark" (p. 219). This would throw back Q to A.D. 30 at the latest. There seems, therefore, to be no improbability in supposing that the discourses of Jesus were taken down from his own lips by his disciples. And in conclusion let us ask, What more satisfactory reason could there be for Q's containing no account of the Passion than that it was composed before the Passion?

St George Stock.

University of Birmingham.

The Religious Experience of Saint Paul.—By Percy Gardner, Litt.D., F.B.A.—Williams & Norgate, 1911.

To interpret truly the religious experience of any remarkable man must require a sympathetic mind; and in order to interpret the religious experience of St Paul the sympathy must be both wide and deep. If we compare the outward lives of the two men, that of an Oxford professor must seem but a poor preparation for understanding the mind and heart of the great Apostle of the Gentiles. Yet there are men who would willingly sacrifice much of their scholarly lumber for one revealing flash of the Spirit, and have sought in quiet and hidden depths for an understanding which no merely intellectual study can bring. Dissimilar as the scholar and the Apostle may appear, the earnest student may have his dream and his vision, and bring these to the aid of his scholarly and systematic interpretation. Professor Gardner's is a reverent and serious attempt to interpret, not the precise meaning of a few ancient letters, but the inward experience of a man who has been one of the greatest spiritual

forces of the world; and whether or not the interpretation commands our complete assent, it must receive a cordial welcome, as coming from one so well qualified for the task by his earnestness, his scholarship, and his freedom from the bias of a professional theologian.

As the sources from which his material must be drawn, Professor Gardner accepts as genuine all but the Pastoral Epistles, with some slight reservation in regard to Ephesians. While he does not reject the Lucan authorship of Acts, and can quite understand that a warm-hearted Greek physician may have been ill-qualified to sound the depths of a mind like Paul's, he reminds us that "we must never absolve ourselves from the duty of caution and criticism" if we read the narrative simply for historical purposes. But whatever may be the value of Acts, it is only from the Epistles that we can "discern what is the nature of the Pauline teaching, and what was the spring of energy which led to a life of such spiritual transport, and such suffering, of such enthusiasm for humanity, and such wisdom in counsel, of such high passions, which yet never broke away from the controlling power of a will which depended on a continuous divine inspiration."[1] These high passions explain some inconsistencies in Paul's views. "Like many men of genius, he saw but one thing at a time, and saw that one thing with an intensity which made it for the time seem all-important."[2] It may, however, be questioned whether Paul's inconsistencies in his view of the law are so marked as Professor Gardner alleges.[3] Surely it was possible to believe at the same moment that the law was the divine standard of conduct; that by virtue of its holiness and authority it converted into sin, and by the introduction of self-consciousness roused to a fiercer activity, what otherwise might have been innocent instincts; and that it thus prepared the way for its own transience, when, by means of the revelation of the filial life in Christ, man became conscious of his sonship through the power of the Divine Spirit within him. All these phases are parts of one consistent view, which sprang directly from Paul's "religious experience."

"The Pauline Mystery" is regarded as "the crucial point of the present treatise, which was originally suggested by the discovery that the word 'mystery' and the ideas which it conveys play a much larger part than is generally recognised in the writings and the thought of St Paul."[4] The exposition of this subject is full of interest, and is carefully guarded against extravagance. The author had already abandoned the view that the origin of the Pauline rite of the Lord's Supper was due to suggestion from Eleusis;[5] and, while he alleges that "in the whole character of Christianity as understood by Paul we may trace great and undeniable likeness to the pagan Mysteries," he adds, "I do not mean to assert that he plagiarised from them. When he speaks of them it is in terms of the greatest dislike and contempt. It is not a field in which he would choose to dig, even for pearls of price. But everyone who has studied the his-

[1] P. 13. [2] P. 37; see also pp. 161 *seq.* [3] P. 46.
[4] P. 57. [5] P. 110, note 2.

tory of ideas must have learned that ideas are propagated from school to school and teacher to teacher less often by the direct borrowing which comes of admiration than by the parallel working of similar forces in various minds. When ideas are in the air, as the saying is, men catch them by a sort of infection, and often without any notion whence they come."[1] This is a carefully limited statement, and, considered as a general proposition, is unexceptionable. Nevertheless, the evidence which is produced of Paul's indirect indebtedness to the Mysteries seems to me rather unsubstantial. Following Anrich, Professor Gardner recognises three notable characteristics of the Mysteries: all have some rites of purification; they are all Mysteries of communion with some deity; all extend their view beyond the present life to that which is to come.[2] But surely such characteristics, appealing as they do to the religious wants of mankind, did not constitute, and need not have been borrowed from, the Mysteries. Was it not the secrecy of a particular cult, which was revealed only to the initiated, that turned these things into a Mystery? Professor Gardner seems to me rather to assume than to establish the existence of this secrecy in Paul's teaching. He says, "The Christian mystery then lies in a relation between the disciple and his heavenly Master. This he bears about with him as a sacred secret, the spring of conduct, and the ground of hope for the future."[3] And again, "Christianity, as he [Paul] views it, has certain secrets which belong only to the believer."[4] But where does Paul inculcate this secrecy? Wherever he throws any light on what he means by "mystery," it is something which has been secret, but is secret no longer; for instance, the admission of the Gentiles to the full privileges of Israel. The distinctive character of Christianity, with Paul, is not that it contains secrets, but that it is a revelation which dissipates the darkness of the past. If this revelation is perceived only by the Christian, it is not because it is carefully kept from the eyes of the profane, but because the latter are blinded by their own worldliness, and walk in the midst of light without discerning it.[5] Paul boasts that he uses "great plainness of speech," and makes no use of a veil to hide the splendours of communion;[6] and he asks the Ephesians to pray for him that his mouth may be opened to make known with boldness of speech the mystery of the gospel.[7] That Paul's language, and to some extent his thought, should be coloured by the language and thought around him in the Greek cities, is no more than we should expect in a broad-minded and sympathetic man; but only a very meagre vocabulary of this kind is produced. Τέλειος, *φωτίζειν*, and *μυεῖσθαι* are alleged as pointing to Paul's knowledge of the Mysteries. The first two words are in no way characteristic, and, if a source must be looked for, may have been derived from the LXX; and, indeed, the figure of light, and the exhortation to perfection are both found in the teaching of Christ. Μυεῖσθαι, which is a technical term, is used only once, and then in a

[1] P. 80. [2] P. 69. [3] P. 78. [4] P. 79.
[5] See especially 2 Cor. iv. 2–4. [6] 2 Cor. iii. 12, 13. [7] Eph. vi. 20.

purely figurative sense,[1] and no more proves a knowledge of the Mysteries than our own use of the word "initiate"; on the other hand, such technical terms as Τελετή, τελέομαι, μύστης, μυστικός, μυσταγωγός, καθαρμός, ὄργια and connected words are wanting. It seems to me, then, that though the Mysteries may to some extent have prepared the way for the acceptance of the Pauline gospel, the features in which the latter resembles them are derived from the Apostle's own profound experience, and bear the indelible marks of originality.

In the valuable chapter on "The Pauline Ethics" the opinion is expressed that "the similarity of the Synoptic and the Pauline ethics is a phenomenon which can scarcely be explained historically."[2] Without in the least denying the possible influence of one spirit on another, which Professor Gardner suggests as the source of the resemblance, I am inclined to think that an historical connection may be easily understood. It seems to me probable that long before the Gospels were composed a large amount of Christ's teaching must have been current in its Greek form, whether oral or written, and must have been quite familiar to the Christian missionaries; and while Paul's expression is generally his own, there are at least a few instances in which he seems to betray a knowledge of phrases which are now found in the Gospels.[3] In the same chapter it is said "that Paul much more frequently speaks of the love of Christ than of the love of God."[4] But statistics do not always confirm impressions. If I have counted rightly, there are sixteen references to the love of God (whether his love to us, or ours to him), and eleven to the love of Christ.

The following quotations will sufficiently indicate the view which governs this interesting study of St Paul's religious experience: "There never was a thinker who more decisively set fact and experience above theory and doctrine."[5] After a reference to miracles, we read, "An intellect so keen and aggressive as that of Paul was of course obliged to think about these marvels, and to bring them into some sort of intellectual order. But such thinking does not result in a carefully articulated system, but in a number of detached and sometimes inconsistent views, fused by the fire of imagination and enthusiasm into a sort of nebula, whence many new planets may arise in the course of cooling."[6] "There is no end to the confusions and difficulties into which we may fall if we insist on treating the Pauline Epistles as dogma rather than as literature."[7] "Speculative theology has no attractions for a teacher so intensely earnest as Paul."[8] These sentences may express rather an extreme way of regarding the many-sided genius of the Apostle; but they are a valuable corrective of the view which has too generally prevailed. The old conception, however, is not easily flung aside, and I am not sure that Professor Gardner does not once or twice take too literally the language of high-strung emotion; and

[1] Philip. iv. 12. [2] P. 154.
[3] I may be permitted to say that these are referred to in my recent little book on *Paul: His Life and Teaching*, in the chapter on "Paul's Moral Teaching."
[4] P. 148. [5] P. 175.
[6] P. 179. [7] P. 203. [8] P. 204.

in one place he seems to have sacrificed his Greek to the dogmatic prejudices of the revisers, for he accepts their rendering of Philippians iii. 9.[1]

There are many other points on which something might be said; but I must be content, in conclusion, to commend to the earnest attention of the reader this interesting and stimulating volume.

JAMES DRUMMOND.

OXFORD.

Johannine Thoughts.—By James Drummond, M.A. (Oxon.), LL.D. (Dub.), Hon. D.Litt. (Dub.), etc.—London: Philip Green, 1911.—Pp. 200.

DR JAMES DRUMMOND is one of a small band of saintly and scholarly minds who are of so rare a distinction that the world has not learnt how to honour them aright. He shrinks from publicity and from praise. His books are not popular wares for the bookseller's counter, and may easily be passed by amid the loud competition of much-talked-of and more showy stuff. His reputation moves modestly from study to study among the discriminating, and is of a kind which cannot be made or marred by the daily newspapers or by log-rolling reviews.

The present volume, though slight and unambitious, is yet by virtue of this unassuming nature well fitted to convey to us the essentials of his personality through beautiful prose and simple, heartfelt poetry. The old maxim, *Pectus est quod facit theologum*, receives fresh and precious illustration from these meditations suggested by passages in the Fourth Gospel. The prose sections may have been delivered as devotional addresses to sympathetic congregations, but, in degree hardly less than the poetical pieces, they have the inner note of spiritual intimacy and self-revelation which belongs to the secret cell and the private oratory. An ever-old, ever-new aroma of confiding piety gives the book a unique and sacred charm which will appeal to all "gentle" readers. It reproduces for us the peculiarly personal mysticism of the Fourth Gospel blended with a Wordsworthian appreciation of Nature which is only subordinated to the love of Christ, who is the author's main theme. The mysticism of objective Nature is, as a rule, easily distinguishable from the mysticism of the subjective life; but Christian mysticism is different from either, for it seeks to unite the universal spirit of the world with the social spirit of the Church, and to relate both most intimately to the spirit of the historical Jesus. By temperament and by the entire fashion of his thinking, Dr Drummond is a Christian mystic fore-ordained, one might almost say, to be an interpreter of the beloved disciple and of his Master. Having in a classical treatise dealt with the authorship of the Fourth Gospel he here unveils its innermost life; yet so that he tests his own spiritual instincts and the intuitions of his own heart by verifiable human data and by the consensus of the experience of the faithful. Hence the unfailing sanity of his judgment and the sound character of his theology. The method of this volume is to take a verse

[1] P. 53.

or a subject like "The Loneliness of Christ," "The Church of God," "I am the Way," and to make each of these the text of a prose reflection followed by poetry in harmony with the theme discussed. Thus, for example, after a brief meditation on our Lord's "Lonely Hours of Prayer," we come upon these verses under the heading "He withdrew again into the mountain Himself alone":

> "O silent, lonely tarn
> Asleep within the mountain's breast,
> Thou seemest, from the world so far withdrawn,
> To dream of rest.
>
> So, deep within my heart,
> There is a silent, lonely cell,
> Where I may rest, and worship God, and feel
> That all is well."

In a meditation on "The Peace of Christ" we breathe the purest fragrance of Catholic piety: "If we make the world's gifts the ruling object of our lives, they will only bring a deeper dissatisfaction the more they accumulate. For where our treasure is, there will our heart be also, and it will be set upon things which are subject to all the accidents of time, and which in a few years must cease to be ours. Envy, anxiety, and greed are evil gifts, and they are poorly compensated by a brief uncertain period of unsubstantial glitter. The vanity of human wishes has been a theme for satire; and the transient world can never satisfy the deep desires of an immortal soul. But the peace of Christ carries us into the eternal realm; and the more the world unclasps its hold on our affections the more profound and calm does our inward rest become. And then, by a strange alchemy, the world is transmuted; and new heavens and a new earth, full of the glory of God, reveal themselves to our enraptured sight. We have renounced all things, and lo! all things are ours. The beauty of God glows in earth and sky; and adoration and trust and love take possession of our vanquished hearts. May that peace, the precious gift of Divine grace, come to us, and abide with us for ever."

The volume is made up of such passages, which give away with a courageous unreserve the secret of the author's power and link him with the great devotional writers of Christendom. His words are the unaffected outpouring of a soul that has known the Great Peace and heard within the Silence a still, small voice. It is a book for the Christian heart to cherish and to use. It should find its place on that choice shelf where we put the *De Imitatione* and the *Speculum Perfectionis*. His old pupils who have the privilege of knowing and of loving Dr Drummond as the wisest and most venerable of their teachers, will feel that here is a treasure to be received, like the bread of life, meekly kneeling upon their knees.

J. M. Lloyd Thomas.

Nottingham.

Among the Idolmakers.—By L. P. Jacks.—London : Williams & Norgate. 5s. net.

There is much of Professor Bergson's philosophy in this volume of stories, but in one respect Mr Jacks unconsciously refutes a favourite theory of Professor Bergson that "laughter is always the laughter of a group." It is true, no doubt, that men in association laugh much more easily than man in solitude. An assembly will be convulsed by a poor joke which would not call forth the shadow of a smile from a lonely individual. But the best humour is that which compels laughter when we are alone. Mr Jacks' book can bear this hardest test of humour. It is almost impossible to read it without laughing: it is difficult to read it without sometimes verging upon tears.

There is a quality in this book which it is difficult to define in words. Very naturally so, since the underlying motive of the book is to express the impossibility of expressing in word or thought the fundamental realities of life. It is marked by a deep human sympathy, by a sense of "the tears in things," and by a feeling of the wrong-headedness and noble-heartedness of men. Mr Jacks does not, like the satirist, scourge the follies of his age. He does not, like the wit, merely make fun of them. He does not, like the philosopher, confute them; or, like the preacher, condemn them. His method is on the whole a kindly irony.

Irony is the appearance of agreement half covering a profound disagreement. It is saying one thing and meaning another. There is nothing hypocritical about it, because the ironical writer makes it perfectly clear that he does not mean what he says.

Great irony does not merely profess sympathy with one point of view while all the time hating it and feeling the deepest sympathy with the opposite view. The great ironical writers really do feel sympathy with the point of view that they express while at the same time implying their condemnation of it.

There is irony, for instance, in Milton's conception of Satan. He does not give us incarnate vileness fighting against God, but "an archangel ruined." He sympathises with Satan's strength and determination and "courage never to submit or yield," and yet he regards Satan as the supreme enemy of God and man. The best irony does not describe with an elaborate appearance of flattery and approval a man who is absolutely absurd or radically wicked. There is pity, fellow-feeling, kindliness in the description, there is some appreciation of the position, while at the same time there is a strong underlying disagreement with the man and condemnation of his acts.

This is a characteristic of Mr Jacks' irony. None of the leading characters in his stories are entirely foolish or bad. They represent frequently a point of view which he condemns, but we feel that he likes and admires them in spite of their wrong-headedness.

The mental condition which Mr Jacks condemns in nearly all his stories is rigidity, system, the attempt to live by pure logic.

"Cut yourself off from the social instincts and betake yourself for guidance to logic and science, and it's a mere matter of temperament or accident what kind of crank you become, but a crank of some kind you will inevitably be." "Pure Reason, unrestrained by natural instinct and the intuitions of common sense, leads men on to greater follies and calamities than all the passions combined. Compared to this, fear, hate, love, jealousy are poor themes for tragedy. The Excesses of Pure Reason! Why, man, didn't Hegel himself say that truth is drunk in every limb?"

Those words, "The Excesses of Pure Reason," really describe the general character of Mr Jacks' book. He distrusts "pure reason" as Ruskin distrusted "pure selfishness." Political economy, so Ruskin thought, was wrongly treated as the science of pure selfishness. Philosophy, so Mr Jacks thinks, is wrongly treated as the science of pure reason. You do not attain to any wise understanding of life by isolating one element in human nature. In arriving at the true laws of political economy, you must take into account altruistic as well as self-regarding motives. In arriving at a philosophy of life, you must take into account the instincts, the traditions, the ideals, the free-will of men, and the spontaneity of God: you must not expect to deduce the whole course of events and the right forms of conduct from principles established by pure reason and worked out by logic into a detailed and all-embracing system.

The world is a wild place, full of the unexpected. No one is so little prepared to make the best of it as the man who imagines that he thoroughly understands it, and who has a theory which explains everything.

This lesson is most manifestly enforced in the tragedy of Professor Denison. He is described to us as a prosperous, comfortable, sheltered, successful Oxford don, thoroughly at home in his little world, ready with his explanation for everything.

"His life was like a broad river fed by many tributaries, but unbroken by a single cataract. A cross-section of it taken from one part of its course would have seemed very like a section taken from any other. Or you may liken it to a tall, umbrageous tree planted in a sunny spot unvisited by storm. Denison fed on ideas as the tree feeds by its roots: he absorbed them as the leaves absorb the light. But the oak-splitting thunderbolt had never riven him: the wild boar had never sharpened its tusks upon his bark. Every year his circumference spread wider: the birds of the air built their nests among his branches, and wayfaring companies lodged under his shadow. He had many diplomas but few scars. To all that was explosive, unexpected, or apocalyptic he turned an incredulous ear or a face of contempt.

"His world was an embodied syllogism; the Creator was its Author in an almost literary sense, and the history of men and nations unfolded itself from first principles like a course of lectures. In that world events never 'happened.' They 'took place,' falling into niches which had been

fitted up and upholstered for their reception before the foundation of the world."

When the unexpected happened in the death of a beloved son, Professor Denison's first thought is that it need not have happened, reason and knowledge could have prevented it.

Death is for him not merely a heart-breaking sorrow: it is an outrage upon his system. In addition to the emotional misery which any man must feel, there is intellectual chaos.

He does not, like Job, under stress of experience, break with an intellectual theory which is false to facts. His mind is too much a part of his system, and when his system is shattered his mind is shattered too.

In "A Psychologist among the Saints" there is the same underlying thought. He has a perfectly clear notion of how he ought to be converted, and sets himself to achieve conversion according to one teacher after another, following the plan marked out. He can never achieve conversion just because he seeks it by rule. He knows exactly what ought to happen and how it ought to happen, and on that account it never does happen. The deepest things in life cannot be had to order. Mr Jacks' ideal is that expressed by Cromwell when he said, "A man never rises so high as when he knows not whither he is going."

In the story of "Mary," again, we have a woman who dares to act on a theory in despite of her highest womanly instincts. It is not passion that leads her astray, but the desire to be true to her theory that marriage is a ridiculous convention. Those who criticise the ending of the story seem to miss this important distinction. It is not the story of a woman giving all for love. If it had been, we are confident Mr Jacks would have treated it differently. Mary would not have married happily in the end. But it is the story of a woman with fine instincts and noble nature allowing herself to be dominated by a false intellectual plan of life. She suffers much: she realises her mistake, but the sin is rather intellectual than moral, and she is not tied so irrevocably to the past as she would have been if her whole nature had been involved.

The story of Rodright the idolmaker is more subtle and cryptic in its idea, but it is still on the same lines. The pure intellect cannot create, it can only imitate. Under the impulse of worship, or the sense of beauty, or the longing for truth, idols, works of art, poems, religions are created. The intellect can only produce more or less perfect resemblances and repetitions of those things. Half the popular objects of worship or admiration are cunning intellectual fakes. Clever men make money and reputation by intelligent copies of original creations. The copies may even come to be more valued and admired than the original, as in *Æsop's Fable* the imitation of the cry of a pig was considered by the people to be more lifelike than the cry of the pig itself.

That blind admiration of copies, intellectual shibboleths, endless repetitions of thoughts which came from the deep and can only be known when deep answers to deep—this is the object of Mr Jacks' irony in the

story of Rodright. We must not indeed press his meaning too far. Mr Jacks' men and women are real flesh and blood, not lay figures on which to hang a moral. It is a series of stories, not a series of lessons in philosophy which he gives us. We shall not find the same idea latent in every incident. Nevertheless, speaking generally, they are full of a sense of the mystery of life and of the failure of pure reason as a guide to truth and right.

In his first story, "The Castaway," which may surely be regarded as a kind of autobiographical Confession of Faith, he says:—

"All day long I was breaking the barriers and peering into secrets that lie beyond the flaming walls. I went through Wonderland in evening dress. I made strange land-falls in a drawing-room. I was blown 'ten thousand leagues awry' while listening to a modern play. . . . Desolate islands more than I could ever explore, more than I could count or name, I found in the men and women who press upon me every day. Nay, my own life was full of them: the flying moment was one: they rose out of the deep with the ticking of the clock. And once came the rushing of a mighty wind: and the waves flowed backwards till the sea was no more. Then I saw that the islands were great mountains uplifted from everlasting foundations, their basis one beneath the ocean floor, their summits many among the sundering waters—most marvellous of all the works of God."

We thank him for these fragments of life which he has given us, life in it chaos, its beauty, its tragedy, its wonder, and in its relation to the ever-present tremendous realities which no human voice can interpret and no human mind can understand.

HENRY GOW.

The Mediæval Mind: A History of the Development of Thought and Emotion in the Middle Ages.—By Henry Osborn Taylor.—2 vols. Macmillan & Co., 1911.—Vol. i., pp. xv+613; vol. ii., pp. viii+589.

HAS it ever been the reader's good fortune to travel through an unfamiliar country in the company of a thoroughly intelligent and sympathetic guide, not a man who earns his living by conducting tourist parties, after the manner of the worthy dragoman furnished by Mr Cook, but an amateur who travels for the love of travelling, and yet has been through the country so often before, and has made himself so much at home in its scenery and institutions, that he can tell you in an instant just what are the things that are best worth seeing? If so, he will appreciate the delight which the reviewer has found in Mr Taylor's book, and be in a mood to appreciate his advice to make its acquaintance for himself.

There can be no doubt that to most of us the country of which Mr Taylor writes is unfamiliar enough. We call it the Middle Ages, that vast tract of time that stretches, roughly speaking, from the sixth to the sixteenth centuries, including within its thousand years the beginnings

of the history of every one of the great nations of Europe, and the life-story of many of the most important names in literature, in art, and in religion. And yet how remote and distant it seems to many a modern man! It is like Central Africa in the old maps, a blank that we passed over in our thought because it did not give us any familiar associations on which to rest.

This is not due to lack of literature. Of books on the Middle Ages there are enough and to spare. But for the most part they fall into two groups. Either they are technical treatises dealing in a technical way with points which are of chief interest to the scholar, or they are so superficial as to pass lightly over the most important matters and leave our deeper questions unanswered. Mr Taylor's book avoids this double danger. It is at once thorough and sympathetic. He has the knowledge that comes from long and patient study of his sources, while at the same time he has retained that sense of the vital and the significant which prevents him from losing his way in the mass of details. For this reason his book, while one which scholars may study with profit, may be commended with confidence to all who are interested in the story of the spiritual life of man.

Mr Taylor's subject is the Mediæval Mind, or, as he himself paraphrases it in the sub-title, it is the History of the Development of Thought and Emotion in the Middle Ages: not the external fortunes of the actors in the drama, but their inner life, the ideals that animated them, the ends for which they most cared, the methods by which they tried to realise them, and last, but not least in importance, the quality of their emotional life. This it is which supremely interests the author, and this it is which he seeks to interpret to us.

He has exceptional qualifications for the office. In the first place, he knows his sources. Mr Taylor is one of the few English-speaking writers who have read Thomas and Duns in the original, and is competent to speak at first hand of that complex mass of acute reasoning, profound emotion, and childlike credulity that we call scholasticism. Moreover, as he has already shown in his earlier books, *Ancient Ideals* and *The Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages*, he is equally at home in the classical literature which the schoolmen inherited. Last, but not least important, he has a sympathetic insight into the history and meaning of that great religion whose union with the thought and aspiration of Greece and Rome gave its distinctive quality to the mediæval mind. He not only knows Plato and Aristotle, but Origen and Augustine; and he not only knows them, but he feels with and for them in what they experienced and were trying to express.

Yet, withal, he has his own independent standards. "An historian," as he himself tells us, "explains by the standards and limitations of the times to which his people belong. He judges, for he must also judge, by his own best wisdom. . . . He cannot state the facts and sit aloof, impartial between good and ill, between success and failure, progress and

retrogression, the soul's health and loveliness, and spiritual foulness and disease. He must love and hate, and at his peril love aright and hate what is truly hateful. And although his sympathies quiver to understand and feel as the man and woman before him, his sympathies must be controlled by wisdom" (Preface, p. ix).

It is this combination of sympathetic insight and wise discrimination which gives Mr Taylor's work its peculiar charm. It makes no difference what topic he touches. Is he writing of scholasticism? The scholastics, he tells us, "were men, and so are we. Our humanity is one with theirs. Men are still under the necessity of reflecting upon their own existence and the world without, and still feel the need to reach conclusions and the impulse to formulate consistently what seem to them vital propositions. Herein we are blood kin to Gerbert and Anselm, to Abaelard and Hugo of St Victor, to Thomas Aquinas as well as Roger Bacon: and our highest nature is one with theirs in the intellectual fellowship of human endeavour to think out and present that which shall appease the mind. Because of this kinship with the scholastics, and the sympathy which we feel for the struggle which is the same in us and them, their intellectual endeavours, their achieved conclusions, although now appearing as but apt or necessitated phrases, may have for us the immortal interest of the eternal human" (vol. ii. p. 285).

This interest in "the eternal human" explains the method which Mr Taylor has followed in his book. It is a method of copious illustration and citation. In order to make us understand the mind of the Middle Ages, he brings us into contact with the representative thinkers and presents us with extracts, longer or shorter, from their works. These extracts are chosen judiciously and always with a purpose. They are designed in each case to illustrate some point in the logical progress of the author's own thought, but they have the incidental merit of giving us the idea in living form as it was not only thought but felt by its author. The translations which fill many pages of the book are for the most part the author's own, and are made with exceptional skill and success. Anyone whose fortune it has been to read many pages of mediæval Latin will feel a special obligation to Mr Taylor for the happy way in which he has rendered the sense of the original into forceful and idiomatic English. The student, too, who has sought in vain in the available dictionaries for the meaning of abstruse terms will be especially pleased at the frankness with which here and there the author confesses with reference to a difficult word that he does not really know what it means. Such instances, however, are rare. In the main, Mr Taylor makes us feel that he has understood his sources, and that he is able to pass on that understanding to us.

Some idea of the wealth of material of which Mr Taylor treats may be gained by a brief review of the contents of his book. Its twelve hundred closely printed pages are divided into six books. The first treats of the elements which entered into the making of the mediæval genius. Here the author discusses the form in which the classical heritage of

Greece and Rome was transmitted to the later age; the new elements—Celtic and Teutonic—introduced by the barbarian invasions, and the ways in which Christianity and antique knowledge were brought to these northern peoples.

The second book treats of the early Middle Ages, and, after a brief introduction on the Carolingian period, discusses in some detail the mental aspects of the eleventh century, as illustrated in Italy, France, and Germany. Here we meet such interesting and picturesque figures as Peter Damiani, Anselm, Gerbert, and Odilo of Cluny, and read of the strange spiritual experiences of Othloh as they are described in his book concerning the temptations of a certain monk. Incidentally, we learn something of the educational system of the time, the Trivium and Quadrivium, and the like. The book ends with a chapter on the growth of mediæval emotion.

Book III. treats of the contrast between the mediæval ideal and its actual realisation, as illustrated in the lives of the saints. Here we have a discussion of the reforms of monasticism, and of those more extreme manifestations of the hermit temper which meet us in Peter Damiani, Romuald, Dominicus Loricatus, and other ascetic figures. Special chapters deal with the quality of love in Saint Bernard, and with that personality of perennial interest, Saint Francis of Assisi. The mystic visions of ascetic women are brought before us in striking illustration, as, for example, in Elizabeth of Shonau and Hildegard of Bingen, after which we are brought back to earth in a chapter on the "spotted actuality," which shows us how far even the best of men were from realising their own ideal. The book ends with a most picturesque and charming abstract of one of the most racy of contemporary chronicles, the journal of Salimbene, a very Pepys among monkish writers, who through a long life observed what was going on about him with wide-open eyes, and has left us the record of what he saw.

Book IV. continues the contrast between the ideal and the actual, as it meets us in secular life. Here the ideals of feudalism are brought before us as illustrated in such valiant heroes as Godfrey of Bouillon and Saint Louis, the story of romantic chivalry and courtly love as illustrated by Roland, Tristan, and Lancelot, and, above all, by Parsifal, the brave man, slowly wise, in whom we have the synthesis of the two great ideals, the sacred and the secular. Finally, in the heart of Heloise, we hear again that story of supreme passion which will be remembered as long as men and women live and love.

Then follow two books of more or less technical character, the first dealing with symbolism, or the pictorial and imaginative forms through which the writers of the Middle Ages represented and interpreted the supreme realities; and the second (on Latinity and law) with the effects of the classics upon the style of the mediæval writers, with the evolution of mediæval Latin prose and verse, and with the mediæval appropriation of the Roman law.

The last book is concerned with the ultimate intellectual interests of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Here we have Mr Taylor's discussion of scholasticism, its spirit, scope, and method, and the illustration of this spirit in the person of its greatest representatives, Abelard, Bonaventura, Albertus Magnus, and, above all, Thomas Aquinas. Here, too, we have the story of the growth of the universities and of the rediscovery of Aristotle. We hear how the mendicants, after a long struggle, gained their commanding place among the intellectual forces of the time. Here, too, we see the first beginnings of the new age making their presence felt in the critical and protesting spirit of Roger Bacon, and the more thorough-going scepticism of Duns Scotus and Occam. Here, finally, we contemplate the supreme expression of the mediæval spirit in that great synthesis of intellect and emotion given by Dante in his unforgettable poem.

It would be too much to assume that every reader will find all the parts of Mr Taylor's long discussion equally interesting. Even in the most repaying journey there are monotonous stretches through which one has to pass for the sake of what lies beyond. The lay reader will, we suspect, find most to interest him in Books III. and IV., with their picturesque descriptions of the mediæval ideal in lover and saint, and their vivid presentation of the men and women who had high ideals, but only in part succeeded in realising them. But even in the more technical parts of the book one is continually coming upon little touches of human nature which brighten and beguile what might otherwise prove an arduous path. Witness, for example, this bit of homiletical advice given by a certain worthy monk named Honorius, upon which we alight in the midst of a discussion of Symbolism. "Often," he says, "put something like this in your sermon, and so you will beguile the tedium," and then proceeds with an illustration as follows: "Brethren, on this holy day there is much to say which I must pass over in silence, lest disgusted you should wish to leave church before the end, for some of you have come far and must go a long way to reach your houses. Or perhaps some have guests at home or crying babies . . . so I omit much for everybody's sake, but still would say a few words" (vol. ii. p. 57). Continually too we are rewarded by bits of sly humour, as when the author, in remarking upon the comprehensiveness of the mediæval intellectual ideal, calls our attention to the following two items taken from the table of contents of Vincent's *Speculum*: "The number and matter of all the sciences." "Chronological history of events in the world, and memorable sayings, from the beginning to our time" (vol. ii. p. 318); or when he gives apt and pithy characterisations, as in speaking "of a certain genial youthfulness in Anselm's reliance upon single arguments, noble and beautiful soarings of the spirit, which, however, pay little regard to the firmness of the premises from which they spring" (vol. ii. p. 338). Particularly happy is his description of mysticism in vol. ii. p. 363, too long to quote here, and the description of the mediæval university, which "in its scholastic obsequiousness sought to set upon one throne the antique philosophy and the Christian revelation,

that it might with one and the same genuflection bow down before them both" (vol. ii. p. 379).

As one follows the author from topic to topic through his richly laden pages, as informing as they are stimulating, he is reminded of his own description of Salimbene, that racy chronicler of the eleventh century, to whom we have already had occasion to refer: "His wide-open eyes are his own. He sees with a fresh vision; he is himself; a man of temperament, which lends its colours to the panorama. His own interest or curiosity is paramount with him; so his narrative will naïvely follow his sweet will and whim, and pass from topic to topic in chase of the suggestions of his thoughts. The result is for us a unique treasure-trove" (vol. i. p. 496).

W. Adams Brown.

New York.

Creed and the Creeds: their Function in Religion. Being the Bampton Lectures of 1911.—By John Huntley Skrine, Vicar of St Peter's-in-the-East, Oxford, sometime Fellow of Merton College.—Longmans, Green & Co., 1911.

We welcome most heartily a new writer in the theological and philosophical world. The subject he has chosen is not in itself attractive, but the lecturer deals with it in an able, and often fascinating, manner. His style is frequently archaic, and the use of such words as "lesser" and "gospellings" takes us back to the days of Bunyan. Nevertheless, there are passages of rare beauty, and his happy use of similes and metaphors is strikingly illuminating. But he does not discuss either creed or creeds in the usual and technical sense of these terms, which is very disappointing to the reader; while one of his fundamental faults is the mixing up of creed with the more elemental religious function of faith: "A man's creed is the faith that saves him" (p. 6). To do this is to give to creed a quality that does not belong to it, for it is rather the intellectual vehicle of belief than one and the same thing. He is more correct when he says that creed is a confession and definition of faith, and that both are necessary to hold and retain it. Creed may, it must be allowed, assist in creating belief, but it cannot be a substitute for it, and should not be confused with it, since a person may have a saving faith who is unable to put it into a creed. Creed is an action of the mind, while faith is the energy of the whole man: mind, heart, and will.

"It is supposed we are to be saved by our thoughts, our thoughts digested in a creed. This cannot be right" (p. 37). And yet our author, in spite of the foregoing, speaks of creed as giving "life" or "salvation" to men. Salvation is the spiritual equivalent of life, and as life may be defined as "the mutual and interdependent self-giving of organism and environment," so salvation is a mutual giving of the soul to God, and of God to the soul; or, in other words, salvation or life comes through a

double sacrifice, the giving of the self to God and the giving of God to man; the fusion of these two brings salvation or life. To speak thus is quite true, but when surrender on man's part is spoken of as creed, the common meaning of the word is strained; and when creed is spoken of as "surrender of the whole personal being," our author really means faith. He feels the pressure of this argument, and allows that "the confession of a creed may make for life, but cannot make life. This can only come through faith"; but to utter faith by a creed is to surrender self. Here the lecturer confuses things that differ, and makes a term to include something that does not necessarily belong to it. It is quite true that he admits that a creed which does not lead to life or salvation is worthless. Here he is an out-and-out pragmatist. The supreme question is, Does a thing, or such a view, work? "Creed has no significance or worth except as an instrument that saves us." But here, again, there is a confusion of things that differ.

Mr Skrine has two able and significant chapters on "Immortality" and "The Resurrection," in which he argues that the certainty of life to come, which the believer possesses, is a proof that he has salvation, and that his creed is real and vital. But the argument used here comes perilously near to a vicious *circle*. The soul's sense of life is evidence of the reality of the life to come, and the reality of the life to come which the soul feels, is evidence of the soul's life. Both cannot be true; so all that a thinker can do is to take his choice between them. It is quite true that belief in a life to come is part of the Christian creed, but such a belief is not wholly the outcome of this creed, for it existed among the ancient Egyptians and Greeks (*vide* Plato), and is strong in present-day Mohammedanism. The acceptance of Christianity strengthens belief in a future life, but does not necessarily carry such a dogma with it; for while belief in Jesus was never deeper nor stronger than at present, yet belief in the continued existence of the individual is much weaker to-day than in many periods of the past. This sense of life, consciousness of continued existence, possessed by most men, is more the outcome of intuition, of the instinctive desire and will to live on, than it is the result of the acceptance of any creed, although it is enriched by creed. This our author admits (p. 69). But he sees that intuition in itself is not sufficient nor satisfactory; that it requires to be converted into experience, which can only be done through the "imagination." The unseen world "needs to be imaged forth. Imagination gives a peep into the world beyond; at the same time, it creates but a precarious basis for belief in that world. Intuition is a far firmer foundation, but neither it nor imagination creates certainty. This comes alone through the soul's complete self." This is the conclusion of the lecturer, which, when analysed, amounts to saying that knowledge comes through faith and not through creed. Not that doubts do not arise, for they do. Faith says I am as sure of my friend's existence behind the veil as I am that he is here. But are we? I am sure of my friend being here because there are certain reactions and correspondences

between us that make his existence real. So are there (so it is argued) between me and my friend beyond. But, so the unbelieving may object, you never can be sure that such reactions are not imaginary. It is true that telepathy proves that distant spirits can communicate; but even this does not create certitude; it only accentuates the hope of immortality, which neither logic, nor intuition, nor imagination, nor creed, but faith makes certain. No doubt the facts investigated and corroborated by the "Psychical Research Society" are helping to buttress faith, and bid fair to make it scientific.

Mr Skrine devotes two chapters to the "Making of Creed and Creeds," a task in which the Church has taken a leading part—for creed is not merely individual opinion but collective. "Creed is the means by which a Christian lives the life of the Spirit, not as an individual, but as a social being." The Church has been forced to formulate her beliefs not only for the sake of her own clear thinking, but on account of the attacks of heretics. These she has had to meet in the field of dialectics, and when she has won the truth, has then been compelled to put the decision in definite and precise words. At the Council of Nicea, *e.g.*, Arianism fought for the ascendency, leaving the Trinitarian victors, who put their triumphant view into dogmatic form. Hence creed may be said to be the intellectual side of faith. And so the view that "dogmatic statement gives life" is not true, and another half-truth, "that an undogmatic believer cannot be saved without creed," is needed to make a whole truth. A man cannot be saved as a whole by an intellectual conception, or through his reasoning faculty, which is only a part of the whole. "Faith is life unto God, and of this life, creeds are the ministers." But life only comes from life, and can only be propagated by life, and a creed is only a living thing when it has ceased to be a hearsay, or a repetition of words, and has become our own. Hence it follows that creeds that are vital, and which can be propagated, are limited, for a creed that commands one man fails to convince other men. Therefore it follows that the essence of the Christian creed is small, and may remain unaltered from age to age. But this norm has increased and even changed from time to time, and parts of a creed quite suitable for one age would be useless and even wrong for another one. Hence some of the creeds become like the dead branches of a tree, useless and a hindrance, and so need to be cut off. It is the living part that is preserved; and it is the life of Christ in His Church that is kept and propagated, and not that in which it is enwrapped. And when a creed imparts and continues life, then is it proved to be true. For example, the conclusions of Nicea revealed their truth in the life of the post-Nicene Church. In other words, the Nicene Creed proved itself true because it *worked*.

The living nucleus of the creed of Christendom has had parts added to it which have been dropped again without interfering with the original content. For example, belief in verbal inspiration, the creation of the world in six days, the Augustinian doctrine of election and reprobation,

were regarded for many years as necessary to salvation. But these beliefs, with many others, have been shed as the crab sloughs his shell, and this process has gone on without touching the creed's essential life. As a modern instance of changing creed, the *Quicunque Vult* serves as an example. The main parts of this creed, notwithstanding its extremely metaphysical form, can be still accepted without doing violence to Catholic consciousness, but its damnatory clauses are being dropped because they are felt to be out of harmony with the general Christian consciousness.

In a chapter on the historic Christ the lecturer comes near to the heart of his subject, for by Him, Christ, is the vitality of creed tested. Belief in Christ brings the life of God into the soul, which proves Him to be Very God. Nor is belief in His deity dependent upon belief in the Virgin birth, nor upon perfect knowledge, nor upon His view of the coming kingdom. The fact that life of God comes into every man who believes in Christ proves Him to possess a "life that is life indeed."

If believing in Christ is identified with a given view of Him, then it may be said that creed has a saving influence, but to identify both is not quite clear or exact thinking. In a rough and ready way it may be correct to say, "when a believer recites a creed, either he does nothing at all, or he offers, by the help of words, a sacrifice to the creator of his whole personality." But is not such a surrender a person's faith rather than his creed? An energy that might be exercised where creed has not yet been formulated, or indeed may be absent; and only as it assists the soul to surrender is it of value. There may be some natures which need creed to assist the exercise of faith, while there are others who may feel it to be a positive hindrance. The latter person is an idealist while the former is a dogmatist, and possibly the believer will more happily and securely walk between the two, and certainly only such a combination will secure real Church unity. In this connection the lecturer is right, but when he says that his own church "is Christendom's best magnet to re-unite the Churches," we feel that he is claiming too much. For until she becomes more tolerant, and will admit that the Holy Spirit is present in other communions besides her own, this cannot be allowed. But he will carry most evangelical Christians with him when he asserts that "a creed's rehearsal is not an act of faith" (p. 214), and will leave many in the rear when he insists on creed being necessary to salvation.

This is in some respects a great book. Its thinking is strong, its philosophy is vital and up to date—indeed, is its strongest feature; and the author's passionate effort to unite all phases of the Christian faith is entirely praiseworthy, if not completely successful.

W. Jones Davies.

Hartley College.

Life, Love, and Light: Practical Morality for Men and Women.—London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.—Pp. viii+177.

This stimulating book, published anonymously, is worth a welcome, if for nothing else, at least for the fact that it is—a somewhat rare thing—a comparatively original study of ethical questions and problems. There is practically none of the method and little of the language of the conventional book on ethics. The writer pursues an original road and takes a decidedly original point of view. The object of the work seems to be not definite teaching, but simple, helpful suggestion in the conduct of daily affairs. The purpose of the book will be served if any reader by his reading is helped in understanding and living the life of morality. Taken in this way, as a piece of unconventional writing, intended to help the reader for himself to put the best into and get the best out of the moral life, the book is admirable and deserving a warm welcome on its own account; and, indeed, a book on ethics that does no more than make suggestions is doubly valuable now, at a time when we are not disinclined to view morality as rather an art than a science, rather a matter of taste and good judgment than of fixed rule and definite standard.

We cannot do more here than briefly outline the underlying attitude of the book, the author's interesting way of facing his subject. That mankind does, in some measure, lead the kind of life which we call moral is a fact of experience: to ask why mankind does this, why there should be a moral life at all, is to propound a really irrational question. At the basis of it all, says our author, there is a postulate, "an Act of Faith," which declares that "there is a game to be played and that it is worth the playing, a fight to be fought that is worth the fighting"; what we call morality is just the endeavour, individually and collectively, to find the best way of playing life's game and fighting life's battle. How to judge what is the best way? Well, that is a matter of taste, of culture, of imagination, of accumulated experience, resting on certain fundamental instincts in man which lead him to value and admire some things and to despise others, instincts "which find free play in his judgment of others and struggle with other instincts for the mastery of his own conduct." These instincts in themselves belong to recesses of man's nature deeper even than morality; they are the instincts which lead men, everywhere and at all times, to preserve their life, to care for their fellows, and to pursue activities whose end is not guaranteed by the present moment. When Nature ejected man into the world, she marked out the line of his activity in three directions; she ordained that he might do, or must do, three things: firstly, he must battle in order that the life that is in him may be kept going as long as possible; secondly, he must seek to pass that life on to others, by the way of love, affection, friendship, and co-operation; and, thirdly, he must give higher value to that life by pursuing ideals, by labouring for ends, which exist for him only in imagination, and of which the knowledge comes to him by insight. All that man has accomplished

in every direction rests at last on the endeavour he has ceaselessly made to satisfy these three instinctive demands of his nature. In the words of our author, man has needed and sought for three things, Life and Love and Light, and this because a vast natural compulsion has been on him. Each of these three instinctive directions of activity begets qualities which men naturally admire. Thus the struggle to preserve Life begets "the power of courageous endurance," a fine strength of will, a certain healthy joy in conflict, and a radiant hopefulness of success. The satisfaction of the demands of Love begets sympathy, self-sacrifice, altruistic qualities of all kinds. The search for Light brings with it loyalty, faithfulness, the qualities we call intellectual virtues, and, finally, the most exquisite attributes of the religious life. Morality is just the way we behave in regard to each of these instinctive lines of our activity with its resultant qualities, and in regard to all three together; and when morality becomes, as it were, an end in itself, then it is the endeavour to behave *admirably* in all three directions, to put the best into and get the best out of the material given by the instinctive movements of our nature, to produce that harmony and fullness of existence in all directions and under all aspects which shall display the greatest abundance of qualities we naturally admire, and the greatest absence of qualities we naturally despise. Life, Light, and Love are the sources of all our virtues, and their combination into harmony gives the standard by which all our actions must be judged.

We can say nothing of the interesting applications of this point of view made by the author in the various directions of temperance, wisdom, chastity, justice, the problem of evil, and so forth. We mention only the wise words on the subject of chastity, of the relations between men and women resting on sex, a matter at the present day urgently demanding discussion in a clean, wholesome, and candid manner.

The book as a whole leaves us with the impression that morality is a fine adventure of the spirit in which there is always something new and valuable to be discovered; and this is at least a pleasant change, thoroughly accordant with the trend of modern thought, from all those older views of morality, made familiar by innumerable works on ethics, and by countless needless sermons, as, in some way, a cut-and-dried system of rules and maxims, a thing of the law and not of grace.

STANLEY A. MELLOR.

Falling Upwards (Leibniz): *Christ the Key to the Riddle of the Cosmos.* By the Rev. F. W. Orde Ward, B.A. Oxford.—London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co. Price 5s. net.

THAT the Incarnation is an eternal process, and that Christianity is a temper rather than a creed, are the two theses which together form the key to this remarkable collection of essays.

Humanist and mystic, modernist and churchman, the author is a man

of wide sympathies and considerable scholarship; and if, at times, he seems to treat orthodoxy as a mere convention, it will be found that it is only for conventionalism that he has no mercy,

It has often been said that those who talk about the main Idea or the essence of Christianity are going outside the limits of human thought, if Christianity be a religion divinely revealed. But no one need deny that Love, as fulfilling all law—not only the laws of a Lawgiver, but also what we, by a metaphor, call the laws of nature,—is the central doctrine of Christianity. This doctrine is not yet an Idea, but the central conception of an Ideal, slowly evolving its Idea. In other words, we might say, it is a mystery slowly reconciling its antinomies. Orthodoxy, then, may be considered to be something real and important, if it be the social expression of man's attempt to express and take part in this evolution; but something false and arrogant, if it assumes it has reached its end and been able to give expression to its essence and formal statement to its Idea. This distinction is, perhaps, not very commonly made with sufficient clearness, but it is assumed tacitly, even by the Catholic Church, in the acknowledgment of the necessity of General Councils, and explicitly in the terms in which that Church has condemned every kind of finalistic philosophy.

Such a conception as that of a progressive orthodoxy, though not directly expressed, lies at the basis of these admirable essays, so that, though brilliant in expression and easy to read, they never become declamatory or incoherent, but suggest, in a series of resonant sentences, that we are not to look for a solution or reconciliation of the antinomies in Christianity, but for the direction in which such reconciliation may be gained. Here is the place for coherency; here is the place for logic—namely, in finding the point at which we must start and the direction in which we must go, and *not* in the statical finalism of those theologies and philosophies which conceive the goal as (at least intellectually) already gained, the solution of the problem already completed.

W. J. Williams.

Eastbourne.

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THE

HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE DEGENERATION OF CLASSES AND PEOPLES.[1]

DR MAX NORDAU.

I.

BEFORE I begin to consider the social and political aspects and effects of degeneration, I wish to give once more an exact definition of this term. This can best be done in the words of the writer who first introduced it into science, Dr B. A. Morel. In his *Traité des Dégénérescences* he says: "We must regard degeneration as a morbid variation from an original type. This variation . . . includes transmissible elements of such a nature that anyone who carries the germ of them within himself grows continuously less and less capable of fulfilling his tasks in humanity, and that intellectual and moral progress, which is already impeded in his own person, is threatened also in his posterity."

To this I add: "Not merely moral and intellectual progress, but even existence itself." For unless a vigorous renovation and improvement of the organism is induced by means of a fortunate admixture of new blood, degeneration increases from generation to generation, and very quickly reaches a point beyond which the degenerate cannot pass; because he is either genetically incapable or else produces children that are still-

[1] Translated for the HIBBERT JOURNAL by the Rev. E. W. Lummis, M.A. Translation revised by Dr Nordau.

born or die in infancy. Woman resists the influences that cause degeneration better than the male, but even she cannot permanently escape them. The degenerate woman becomes less and less able to perform her biological function as child-bearer. In such a woman we observe certain well-known physiological deficiencies which result in sterility. It stands to the credit of Dr Larcher to have shown that difficult births caused by one or other of these defects are regular symptoms of degeneration in a woman. If the degeneration is sufficiently advanced the man cannot beget and the woman cannot bear children. The cycle is closed. By a process of elimination the race has freed itself from a noxious element. That is the cruel but effectual method by which Nature herself remedies a morbid disturbance in the evolution of a race that is still fit to live, still capable of the strife for existence. This elementary fact of experience was obviously overlooked by Dr Robert Reid Rentoul, when he proposed the "Sterilisation of certain Mental and Physical Degenerates." We need not interfere. The process accomplishes itself automatically.

Let us attempt to understand the mechanism of degeneration. When the organic vigour of parents has, through one of the causes to be adduced later, been weakened, they engender offspring whose morphological elements are, from the outset, of an inferior character. The germs themselves, which break away from the organisms of the parents to unite in producing a new living being, are weak, defective, laden with an insufficient store of life-energy. They are not able to develop up to the goal which a normally strong and healthy individual of the given species can attain and ought to attain. Their evolution comes to a standstill at a greater or less distance from the point which it should reach, or deviates from the line that leads to its natural goal, and pursues a false direction, which is more or less remote from the norm of the species and alien to it. I will try, by means of an illustration familiar to everybody, to make this clear even to readers who are not well versed in biological ways of thought. The healthy and efficient organism may be com-

pared to a locomotive which is meant to travel, say, along the South-Eastern and Chatham Railway from Victoria to Dover, is provided with the requisite amount of coal and water, is under the charge of a capable driver and a good stoker, runs without a hitch and arrives when it is due. The degenerate organism and its development might be represented by the same locomotive if it were built of poor metal, had a drunken or overworked driver and a lazy and careless stoker, and started with insufficient coal and water. Such an engine is exposed to various mischances on the journey. Being so badly built, it may break an axle or start a leak in the boiler, and be left unable to proceed. The incapacity of its driver and stoker may cause it to leave the metals, or may take it along a wrong branch, or bring it on a blind siding, where it will be wrecked on a bulkhead. The most probable thing that can happen is that, after using up all its coal and water, it should come to a stop through exhaustion, somewhere perhaps between Sittingbourne and Canterbury. One thing is certain: it will not reach its destination at Dover.

As this parable clearly implies, the degenerate individual deviates from the racial type either through a check in development or through erratic formation. Arrested development results in atavism, where the individual comes to a stop at an early point on the road over which the species has travelled, and cannot go further. Erratic development leads to monstrosities, which do not correspond to any point which the species, in its normal development, has ever passed. All the anomalies of degeneration can be referred to these two formulas — arrested or aberrant development, atavism or monstrosity—but as a rule they combine the two.

The origin of degeneration, as was suggested above, is to be sought in the unsatisfactory condition of one or of both parents at the time of procreation. Here, again, the multiplicity of the individual cases is merely the various expression of one simple, fundamental law. The organism has been rendered inefficient either through a morbid change in the

chemical character of its cell-plasm and its fluids, or through an impoverishment of its vital power. The morbid change is in all cases an intoxication, which may be brought about by the introduction of poisonous substances such as alcohol, morphia, cocaine, and the like, or through the toxins of pathogenetic, parasitical micro-organisms like Koch's tubercular bacillus, Laveran's microzoon of malaria, Schaudinn's treponema, and so forth. Impoverishment sets in when the organism has been overworked. Whenever catabolism, the decomposition of organic material that goes on during activity, outweighs anabolism, the building up of material that goes on during rest, the organism is growing insolvent and making progress, gradually or swiftly, towards bankruptcy. Excessive fatigue not only causes structural changes in tissue, but also brings about an accumulation of waste matter, too great or too concentrated for the emunctory organs to dispose of adequately. In their effect on the organism these waste substances are toxins, and it may well be that what we call fatigue and exhaustion is ultimately nothing but an intoxication; in that case intoxication would be the only source of that deterioration of the organism which leads to degeneracy in its offspring.

Weismann has attempted to deny that the germ of life which is transmitted by parents to offspring can share in the change sustained by the parental organism. To future historians of science it will be a matter for astonishment that such an extravagant doctrine can have been conceived by a biologist and accepted, for a time, by serious scientists. Weismann's contention cannot have been founded on observation. The heritable properties of the germ are not perceptible by the senses. Weismann, then, has simply constructed a theory out of his own imagination—a theory which is refuted both by common sense and by the rational interpretation of experience. According to Weismann the germ-plasm, uninfluenced by its bearer, is transmitted without change by its first engenderer, whosoever he may have been, to his posterity; and throughout the incalculable succession

and multiplicity of offspring it is received and passed on in its material identity by relay after relay of new individuals. To recognise the monstrous absurdity of Weismann's theory we need not even have recourse to the presumption that all organic life on the earth has a unitary nature and a common origin; consequently that all animals and plants that have ever lived or will live on our planet are derived from a common ancestor, perhaps from one or more microscopic one-celled creatures; for however small we may suppose that group of atoms to be which could be the bearer of heritable organic characteristics, it is still unthinkable that those one-celled organisms from which all life on earth has emanated should have contained already all the material germs which have since, throughout all geologic periods, been transmitted by the parental organisms to the fruit, in every several generative act, whether we speak of the division of the cell-nucleus of a bacillus or the fertilisation of the egg of a diplodocus. But we need not, I say, have recourse to that assumption; the theory remains unthinkable even when we do not derive all life from one primitive cell or from a few such cells, but confine ourselves to humanity, and advance the postulate that the life-germ of every single human being that the species has produced from its beginning and is yet to bring forth before its end—and not only this, but also all the germs which did not lead to the emergence of a new life—were materially contained in the spermatocysts and ovaries of the first human pair or the first group of human pairs. Weismann's theory is not a scientific hypothesis, but mysticism of the worst kind. If it has been taken seriously, that is the consequence of a not infrequent logical fallacy. Because its author is a biologist, it has itself been taken for a biological theory. It was not, however, as a biologist but as a dreamer and dogmatising visionary that Weismann conceived it, and it has no more foundation, and ought to have no more authority, than any of the amusing fancies of H. G. Wells in *The War of the Worlds* or in *The Time Machine*. The theory of Weismann

is not confirmed by one single observed fact; it is contradicted by all. If acquired characteristics were not inherited, evolution would be altogether unintelligible and impossible; for it cannot be understood how one identical germinal substance could produce, one after another, the most divergent forms of life: unless, indeed, we should ascribe to it the mysterious property of consummating within itself—of its own power and its own impulse, independent of its temporary bearer and of any external impetus—that evolution whose expression consists in the appearance of more and more highly developed organisms on the earth. Such an assumption hardly differs from that of a new divine act of creation as the origin of every single life. It has certainly passed beyond the point at which it could be called biological science: it must be called faith.

Not all acquired characteristics are heritable, it is true. Only those are heritable which influence the quality of the germ. The accidental loss of a limb, the attainment of any bodily or mental skill or practice through exercise, have no effect on the germ-plasm, and so are not heritable. On the other hand, a state of the nervous system which affects the innervation of the germ-glands and their physical and chemical function, a dyscrasy of the organic liquids, through which the chemical composition of the glands, the nutriment drawn into them from the blood, and the germ-cells formed and secreted by them, is altered, do influence the germ-plasm to such an extent as to make it quite intelligible that it should form new individuals who resemble their parents, but are somewhat different, or very different, from their more distant ancestors. The procreative individual does not pass on to his descendants the identical material germ-plasm that he received from his ancestors. Every individual forms his own germ-plasm afresh in his own germ-glands, out of his own resources, and transmits to it the morphological and physiological tendencies that he himself has inherited. The individual is nevertheless able to modify those tendencies, in accordance with his own character; to give them greater energy, finer co-ordination, or, on the

other hand, a feebler tension, a more languid impulsion, a more defective co-ordination; and the deterioration of the germ-substance can go so far that its tendencies, instead of being co-ordinated, fall into anarchy, no longer strive towards any organic finality, or are quite extinguished and no more fit to exert any formative influence. This is the mechanism of degeneration, and this is nothing else than one form of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, which is alone sufficient to destroy the theory of Weismann.

II.

The phenomenon of degeneration, whose reality was for a certain time contested, is now no longer doubted by any man of scientific culture. Moreover, the bodily and psychical symptoms by which the state of degeneration is revealed are generally known. The only matters of controversy that survive are the somewhat ill-defined concept of Professor Magnan's "dégénéré supérieur," in which many prefer to see, instead of a retarded type, an advanced, evolving, higher type, and the significance of some particular bodily formations, which are claimed on one side as stigmata of degeneration, on the other as normal variations of form. Such, to mention only one example, is asymmetry of the face, which, according to Lombroso, betokens an arrest of structure, and is therefore of a degenerate nature, while Dr Liebreich describes it as a natural and necessary result of the situation of the fœtus in the womb.

Every cultivated person knows to-day that the lowest grades of degeneration are idiocy and imbecility; somewhat higher stand mental instability, weakness of will or abulia, cases of phobia and obsession, eccentricities of character, perversions of the most important instincts, and weakness or lack of self-control, involving a strong preponderance of instinct over reason, and exaggerated emotionalism. The way in which these defects and perversions of thought and feeling express themselves in æsthetic activity, in art, poetry, and taste, shall here be passed over, since it has no great importance for the

social life of mankind or of a nation, and closely affects only comparatively small circles. On the other hand, I wish to dwell on those manifestations of degeneration in which the state and society have a great practical interest.

The first phenomenon that forces itself upon our attention is the great increase in lunacy in all highly civilised lands. The studies and statistics of Dr F. Winslow for England, Dr I. H. Kellog for the United States, and Dr Bertillon for France, are so well known that their figures need not be repeated here. If an isolated writer here and there denies the greater frequency of mental derangement and also its connection with degeneration, that is a mere paradox, which it would be waste of time to refute.

The increase in crime is also a fact proved by the official statistics of all countries. On this head doubts and objections are more admissible. It is maintained that the increase is only apparent, that the larger numbers in the statistics result from the fact that by means of new laws whole categories of punishable acts have been created which did not exist formerly, and that infringements of the law are now more zealously prosecuted than in the days when police and justice were less developed. That is true with regard to offences against the fiscal, industrial, educational, and sanitary laws of every kind. It is false if crimes against the person and against property are alone considered, since these were always penal, and were always prosecuted with all possible energy. But even this category of crimes shows a steady growth in its figures. Other critics will not admit that criminals are degenerates, but see in them quite normal human beings who, through defects in rearing and education, through irreligion, through evil example, through a depraved environment, through the temptations of their calling or of special conditions, have been led into sin. There are certainly many criminals to whom this applies, and even Lombroso has never contested it; for alongside the born criminal he expressly describes the occasional criminal, whose fault is not the result of psychic compulsion but of external

circumstances. Still, the great majority of professional criminals and of those who commit crimes of passion perpetrate their offences through inability to check their impulses, through organic incapacity for regular, steady work, through malice and cruelty, through bluntness of conscience, through the need for change, adventure, and peril, through lack of judgment, or simply through stupidity. But the slackening or abolition of inhibition, constitutional laziness as a result of weakness of will, moral insanity, lack of logic and foresight, are, indubitably, psychic stigmata of degeneration.

Insanity and crime are extreme cases. They certainly do great harm to the life of the community through the unproductive expenses which they impose upon it, and the sum of all the distress and discomfort which they bring to individuals. But they have no influence on the fate of the realm, except indeed in the exceptional case, which hardly occurs nowadays, of a despot whose Cæsar-madness brings catastrophes upon his people. They are exactly defined and easy to recognise, macroscopic, so to speak; they are therefore continually controlled, and the defence of the community against them is no insoluble problem. But besides those extreme forms of degeneration there are milder forms, more or less inconspicuous, not to be diagnosed at a first glance, cases that might be called microscopic; and these are the most dangerous for the community, because their destructive influence only gradually makes itself felt; we are not on our guard against it, indeed in many cases we do not recognise it as the real cause of the evils it conjures up, evils whose serious importance no one can doubt.

A mattoid or half-fool, who is full of organic feelings of dislike, generalises his subjective state into a system of pessimism, of "Weltschmerz," weariness of life. Another, in whom a loveless egoism dominates all thought and feeling, so that the whole exterior world seems to him hostile, organises his anti-social instincts into a theory of anarchism. A third, who suffers from moral insensibility, so that no bond of sympathy links him with his fellow-man or with any living

thing, and is obsessed by vanity amounting to megalomania, preaches a doctrine of the superman, who is to know no consideration and no compassion, be bound by no moral principle, but "live his own life" without regard for others. When these half-fools, as often happens, speak an excited language—when their imagination, unbridled by logic or understanding, supplies them with odd, startling fancies and surprising associations and images—their writings make a strong impression on unwary readers, and readily gain a decisive influence on thought in the cultivated circles of their time. Be it observed, I do not maintain that Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Mainländer change vigorous and cheerful human beings into pessimists, that Bakunin and Max Stirner make bomb-throwing anarchists out of peaceful citizens, that Ibsen causes loving wives and mothers ruthlessly to forsake home and children in order to "live their life" as vanity and selfishness ordain, or that Nietzsche leads conscientious and considerate persons to pursue their path of life as "supermen" over pitilessly trampled human hearts, and to practise the morality of the assassins, "Nothing is forbidden: everything is permitted." What I mean is that the preachings of these mattoids are favourable to the development of the germs of similar dispositions in others, serve to polarise, in their own sense, tendencies of hitherto uncertain drift, and give thousands the courage openly, impudently, boastfully to confess and act in accordance with convictions which, but for these theorists with their noise and the flash of their tinsel language, they would have felt to be absurd or infamous, which they would have concealed with shame and perhaps earnestly striven to overcome in their own nature, which in any case would have remained monsters known only to themselves and imprisoned in the lowest depths of their consciousness.

So through the influence of the teachings of degenerate half-fools conditions arise which do not, like the cases of insanity and crime, admit of expression in figures, but can nevertheless in the end be defined through their political and

social effects, and which history, at any rate, can retrospectively identify. We gradually observe a general loosening of morality, a disappearance of logic from thought and action, a morbid irritability and vacillation of public opinion, a relaxation of character. Offences are treated with a frivolous or sentimental indulgence which encourages rascals of all kinds. People lose the power of moral indignation, and accustom themselves to despise it as something banal, unadvanced, inelegant, and unintelligent. Deeds that would formerly have disqualified a man for ever for a public life are no longer an obstacle in his career, so that suspicious and tainted personalities find it possible to rise to responsible positions, sometimes to the control of national business. Sound common sense becomes more rarely and less worthily appreciated, more and more meanly rated. Nobody is shocked by the most absurd proposals, measures, and fashions, and folly rules in legislation, administration, domestic and foreign politics. Every demagogue finds a following, every fool collects adherents, every event makes an impression beyond all measure, kindles ridiculous enthusiasm, spreads morbid consternation, leads to violent manifestations in one sense or the other, and to official proceedings that are at least useless, often deplorable and dangerous. Everybody harps upon his rights and rebels against every limitation of his arbitrary desires by law or custom. Everybody tries to escape from the compulsion of discipline and to shake off the burden of duty. A mean, cowardly egoism, which is pleasantly dubbed "sovereignty of the personality," smothers public spirit, the sense of national solidarity, energetic patriotism ; self-sacrifice for the common weal is becoming a rarity, while antimilitarism, antipatriotism, and twaddle about the theory of anarchism abound.

A nation that shows these symptoms of degeneration grows incapable of any hard and sustained collective effort. It cannot maintain its place in the sharp competition of the peoples. It is not in a position to wage successfully a long and toilsome war. The first defeat demoralises it to the point of dissolution. It

has not that elasticity which leads to victory. A conflict, such as cannot always be avoided, makes it the victim and the prey of an adversary in whom degeneration has not yet wrought so great devastation. And such adversaries, so far as we can see, will always exist, since civilisation has not everywhere advanced to the same point. If the dream of an eternal peace were realised the moral distraction and enervation of a people would not betoken a peril of death. But in a world bristling with weapons, a world in which the stronger watches for the moment when he can fall upon the weaker to destroy him, the disintegrating influence of degeneration threatens a nation with ruin.

III.

In face of the advance of degeneration every alarm is intelligible. Still, not every alarm is justified. Timid natures go so far as to fear not only the weakening by it of this or that people, not only the undermining of this or the other state, but even the destruction of civilisation itself. This disquietude, I believe, goes too far. It is bad enough, if by its means great, highly cultured nations are brought to decadence. For even the philosopher whom no Chauvinism can touch, even the convinced individualist who decidedly rejects the doctrines of organistic sociology, and regards as absurd the view that the State is a higher living organism, in respect to which the individual, as a dependent cell, has no claims and no significance of his own—even the individualist, even the philosopher is convinced that the maintenance of the nation is of the highest importance for its constituent individuals, since it is only through their ordination in an organised collectivity that they are enabled to fulfil the loftiest material, intellectual, and moral functions of humanity. But civilisation itself is not threatened by degeneration. I will give the reasons for my conviction at a later point. Meanwhile the mischief which it does to the nation and the State is enough to force upon us the question whether there is any remedy for degeneration.

I fear that in the present state of science and of culture,

in the present political and economical constitution of society, we must answer "No" to this question. In theory, indeed, we can establish the conditions for the prevention of degeneration, but it appears impossible to realise those conditions in practice.

For the degenerate individuals themselves there can be no restoration, and but little can be done to improve their state. You cannot add inches to one who is a dwarf by growth. The wry soul cannot be reduced and straightened. The feeble-minded cannot be made intelligent and clever. Education may attempt to suppress the germs of evil in the degenerate, to prevent their development. The constraint of a continuous and severe discipline can often save the degenerate from becoming an unresisting victim of his own dangerous instincts. But no human power is able to transmute the bad organic material, of which the degenerate is built, into good material. His destiny is marked out for him by his constitution, and he must fulfil it. His heredity is his Fate; the only hope that remains for him is that he may not transmit his malady undiminished to posterity. The best that could happen would of course be that he should have no posterity. But of his own free will he will hardly ever practise complete continence, and nature does not step in to prevent his propagation until deterioration is far advanced. The second best is a gradual improvement of the blood through marriage with a carefully selected healthy individual. This too is eugenics, but not of the kind advocated by its partisans. We are not concerned with the mating of two equally choice specimens of humanity in order to maintain and raise still higher their noble type, but with an attempt to bring back the descendants of a degenerate to the norm, through the influence of a healthy half in their parentage. Then what Byron records of a noble Spanish family might perhaps happen:

> The sons no more were short, the daughters plain.
>
> (*Don Juan*, First Canto, lviii.)

In order to be operative the treatment of degeneracy must not take the degenerates as its object. In their case it comes

too late. It must apply itself to their progenitors, who are not themselves degenerate, but have reached a condition in which they give life to organically inferior offspring.

We have seen that the root of degeneracy is an intoxication of one or both progenitors. If it were possible to prevent intoxication there would soon be no more degenerates. So far as the poisons that damage the parental organism are introduced from without, a fight against them is not without prospect of success. The introduction of the Gothenburg system in Sweden, the prohibition of the manufacture and sale of absinthe in several cantons of Switzerland, the temperance movement which has been instituted by influential societies in England and North America, and supported by the Church, have doubtless effected a decrease in the craving for alcohol, and restricted the use of one of the most destructive poisons. The new way of treating syphilis with Ehrlich's salvarsan, the greater readiness with which concealed forms of this malady are discovered by means of Wassermann's reaction, the measures against infection which have everywhere been undertaken in popular hygiene and police regulations, promise in time to make this pest, one of the most pernicious to the species, in civilised countries, as rare as leprosy, which, in the Middle Ages, was likewise a widely spread endemic disease, and now has almost disappeared from Europe. The drainage of marshes, the destruction of the larvæ of the anopheles (*zanzara*), the exclusion of these infection-carrying gnats from human dwellings by setting gauze in doors and windows, and the prophylactic use of quinine have almost completely delivered the sorely tried population of the Maremma in Tuscany and of the Roman Campagna from the scourge of malarial fever, and will have the same effect in all fever-ridden districts. The slow poisoning of the masses with adulterated food-stuffs is being met by a methodical police inspection, and by the strict punishment of the adulterators. All these sources of mischief are accessible to the intervention of the legislator, the government, the forces of society. The

case stands otherwise, alas! with the second great cause of degeneration, auto-intoxication and organic wear and tear—I repeat that I regard these two processes as identical—through fatigue consequent on over-exertion. But this is the inevitable result of the whole course of modern life, and in order to prevent it the modern way of life must be radically reformed.

What this means shall be briefly indicated. The work done in the civilised world to-day is incomparably greater than at any former time. Even the poorest workman who is not a beggar, but earns his own living, makes greater demands on his existence than his forefathers did, and the rise in his standard of life imposes correspondingly greater efforts upon him, since it is not compensated by the general rise in wages. The dominant part played in production by the machine, to a mere attendant on which man in the factory has been degraded, and the ever-increasing division of labour, which condemns the worker to an eternal, automatic repetition of a small number of movements, and reduces the part taken in his work by the intellectual faculties to a minimum, wears him out one-sidedly, and therefore quicker and more completely than is the case when, with a varied, manifold activity, which calls in turn upon different groups of muscles and requires the continual intervention of imagination, judgment, and will, he manufactures some complicated object of common use from the raw material up to the perfect article. In ever greater numbers the population makes its way from the country to the town, to exchange agricultural occupations for labour in workshops and factories. The number of people that dwell in towns of over 100,000 inhabitants is everywhere swelling; everywhere among civilised nations the tendency appears to transform a people that lives on the land and raises natural products into a people of great cities, producing differentiated goods. The fact is so well known that I may dispense with the citation of figures.

The whole end of civilisation seems to be economic. All progress aims at facilitating and augmenting the production

of goods. That in this process the individual is being worn out is not considered. The world-economy is not eudæmonistic. It does not ask whether it enhances the happiness of the single human being. It produces wealth, and sets this on a level with happiness—a manifest illusion. The peasant is attracted to the town because he is hypnotised by the figure of industrial wages, which he compares with the pay for agricultural labour, or the net profits of a small farmer. He does not understand or consider that the higher wage is set off by incomparably higher expenses, and that more money will buy less pleasure and bodily prosperity in the town than less money in the country. He is enticed, moreover, by the excitement, the variety, the amusements which the town offers, and he does not see that these doubtful advantages are balanced by quite certain disadvantages—periodic unemployment, a shorter working life, a poor and forsaken old age, and a permanent dependence on great industries and unsentimental enterprise, between which and the workers there exists no thread of human, personal relation. But in all this nothing can be altered. The world-economy will not dispense with the division of labour, with its great material advantages, and will never return to the idyllic style of production of which Ruskin dreamed, where every workman thinks out with his own head, as a creative artist, the products of his industry, gives his heart to his work and carries it out with his own hands. And teaching and persuasion are likewise useless to stem the flow towards the town.

Theoretically, it is true, we can construct a state of things that might satisfy the postulates of racial hygiene. We can posit garden cities, that combine the highly paid differentiated labour of industry with the advantages of country life. An intensive social solicitude in the form of a generous provision for old age and insurance against unemployment would relieve the proletariat from the oppressive, disorganising care for the coming day and from the dread of an invalid old age. A return to the community of all the instruments of labour

and a co-operative organisation of all work would, by suppressing the interest on capital and abolishing the employer, make the worker into an independent lord of the full value of his production. In one word, extreme State-intervention in the sense of the socialistic programme, while it would deprive the individual of all economic autonomy, would probably ensure to him better hygienic conditions, short hours of labour, a better style of living, freedom from care, and leisure to occupy himself in things that bring diversion and entertainment, and would rescue him from the over-exertion and fatigue that make him a progenitor of degenerates. Since, however, it seems chimerical to look for a realisation of the integral socialistic programme at any date to which we can now look forward—modest tentative measures like Mr Lloyd George's Old Age Insurance are of no efficiency—we must regard this theoretically conceivable remedy for degeneration as practically inapplicable.

IV.

Degeneration is no new phenomenon. It is probably as old as humanity itself. We may assume that it began in prehistoric times. We know that it has been present in the whole course of history. Only it never before had the range and the character which we now observe. Formerly it only attacked the ruling class of the nations, the dynasties and the aristocracy. In these circles life was always lived too intensively, and more vital energy was expended than was received; their vital economy showed therefore an organic deficit, that ordinarily required but few generations to lead the family and individuals to bankruptcy. The rapid exhaustion of great houses, and especially those of rulers, their collapse in madness, their extinction through languor, celibacy, and childlessness, have often been studied. I need point only to the fundamental work on the madness of the Cæsars by the Russian author Jacoby, and to the recently published researches into the biological relations of dynasties by the Swedish writer Gustav Sundborg. This degeneracy, which was con-

fined to the upper stratum, was deplorable from the point of view of the class affected, but without any real mischief in respect of the community. The pinnacle of the social edifice was always crumbling away, but it was always being renewed. A ceaseless circulation brought the exhausted families down from their height into ruin or obscurity, and brought fresh stocks up out of the depths. The deep masses of the people afforded an inexhaustible source of supply, out of which the life-sap pressed and mounted continually towards the summit of society. Ambitious, energetic individuals, and those that stood out above the rest in character and mental endowment, perhaps, too, by the help of some peculiar, specific talent, thrust aside those that had become decrepit, and took their place. No doubt, thanks to the conservatism of the multitude that clings to the accustomed, the prestige of high position, the interests of class, party, or group with which they were interlinked, and the institutions which surrounded them like a rampart, the exhausted and worn-out families could survive for a certain time their decrepitude; but sooner or later they were forced to yield to the pressure of the more efficient. That is the history of the Stuarts in England, the elder line of the Bourbons in France, the Tsing or Manchu in China. History also offers examples of the decline of a whole people through degeneration. The Roman conquerors of the world came to ruin through debauchery and childlessness; Italy was depopulated by its system of slave-cultivation (the latifundia): the infiltration of the freedmen into the ruling class soaked it with bad anthropological elements, and slavery wrought physical and moral destruction on the masters as well as the slaves. But Roman civilisation did not perish with Rome. For there was at that time in Europe an enormous reserve of robust peoples in the best biological state—barbarians, but of the same race as the degraded Romans, and perfectly capable of acquiring their culture. These reserve peoples began then in their turn to migrate from their Germanic forests, refreshed the impoverished blood of Italy, Gaul, Spain, and Britain, and

ended, after centuries of war and obscuration, by extending yet further the Græco-Roman civilisation.

But to-day the conditions are different. Degeneration attacks not only the pinnacle of the social building, but also its broad base; not a privileged class, but the whole stratum of the large-town population, that is to say, a very important part of the people, in some lands even the majority of the nation. There is no doubt that degeneration has its chief home in the large town, and that the population of the large towns is condemned, as a whole, to degeneracy. The decadence of the peasantry in whole provinces, such as that of the Italian Maremma through fever, that of Normandy through alcoholism, is an exception; but the decline of the town population is the rule. The large town gives the highest percentage of crime, insanity, and constitutional diseases; the large town is the focus of all the frenzies of fashion, all hysterical aberrations of public opinion, all anarchical movements in politics, social customs, morality. It is in the large town that celibacy and childlessness are most to be found. In the large towns the tall races are dwarfed: not, indeed, among the patrician class, which has country houses and only spends a part of the year in the town, but among the multitude that is born in the town, lives there, and dies there. In Rouen the Norman people, which even at the beginning of the nineteenth century was rich in splendidly built men and women, is declining at such a rate that to-day 78 per cent. of its young males are unfit for military service. The Prussian Guard, which enlists none but tall men, and is quartered in Berlin and Potsdam, receives only its smallest part from Berlin itself. The stunted forms that we meet in the slums of East and South-East London are the descendants of the gigantic peasants of Saxon Sussex, of Danish and Norwegian Hertford, of Jutic Kent, and of Anglian Northumberland. In the large town, families which had originally the finest constitution disappear in four or five generations, if they are not renewed by a continual infusion of fresh blood

from the country. In London and Paris—the young cities of America cannot here come into question—there are probably not a hundred persons who can show a pedigree of a hundred and fifty years, consisting, on both sides, of ancestors born only in London or Paris. The large town is an abyss, in which the population that pours in from the whole country and from foreign lands oozes and trickles away. But for that inflow from without it would be extinct in about a century and a half, since its population is not renewed out of its own resources. For the present, the country population is still capable of feeding the large towns. But the day will come when the depopulated country will have no more reinforcements to bestow on the great city, and then the danger of national degeneration will have come very near to us. This danger will be European in its scope, since one people after another is adopting the large-town civilisation, and the white race has no more barbarians in reserve to step into the weakened ranks and fill up their gaps. On the other hand, the elementary feeling of the white race revolts against an afflux of the unexhausted coloured races.

Anthropologically the large town is ruinous. For progress it is indispensable. The large town is the focus of civilisation. In the large town new thoughts flash into being, not merely bad and perverse thoughts, but also such as are good and fruitful. The inventors that take out patents, the investigators that discover new scientific truths, the artists and poets that endow the world with new beauty, are almost all dwellers in the large town, and by its air their genius is first kindled. But for this intensification of mental activity a dear price must be paid: the swift drying up of the organic powers. The large town is a far-shining lighthouse, whose lamp consumes a mighty deal of fuel.

Civilisation is not imperilled by degeneration, but civilised people are imperilled. The first or second generation of city dwellers, under the powerful stimulus of its new surroundings, puts forth its maximum of intellectual achievement, but its

posterity is the prey of degeneration. The problem then takes this form: in the stress of intensive modern culture the peoples that take the lead must needs wear themselves out. Only if they had the courage to retard the rhythm of their economic progress, only then could they retain their health and their full powers. They cannot at the same time be rich and able, shine and endure, but only the one or the other.

It would of course be an elegant solution to set up a cruel division of labour: to abandon one part of the nation to the large town, the mighty machinery of industry, the wild race for success; to retain the other in the comparatively narrow, indigent, primitive conditions of the agricultural village. The first part represents the lost outposts; it wins, for its nation and for humanity, the palm of victory in the Olympic games of the mind, and it succumbs; the second part keeps the nation organically sound, and gives it a fund of character, warriors, a stock for human breeding.

But I see no practical means of restraining the country population from yielding to the seduction of the town, as the moth yields to that of the lamp at which it scorches its wings. The only thing that the legislator can do is, by homestead laws, by the cheapest possible agrarian credit, by other measures that I will not recount, for fear of trenching against my will on the field of party politics, to make his native clod so attractive to the peasant that the seductions of the town cannot charm him into migration. One thing is certain: in the great historic contest of the nations the advantage will rest with those that know how to maintain a strong and tolerably prosperous and contented peasantry, and the first to go under will be those that most thoroughly transform themselves into peoples of large towns.

Upon the other conceivable remedy, a complete revolution in economic and social organisation, I will not linger. That would no longer be science, but utopian fiction.

MAX NORDAU.

PARIS.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JESUS FOR HIS OWN AGE.

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

The following article was originally written to be delivered as a half-hour's address at the Conference of Unitarian and Liberal Congregations held in Birmingham in April of this year. Its origin sufficiently explains its compression—its bald and bare assertions of statements and opinions which it would need a book rather than an article to set forth and justify in detail.

"THE significance of Jesus for his own age." These words can be interpreted in more than one way. Let us first assume them to mean: the religious results which Jesus achieved; or, more broadly, the religious results which followed from his existence. Now, according to the critical investigations which seem to me the most probable, those gigantic results were partially due to causes which lay outside the actual religious teaching of Jesus himself. They were due, first, to the manner and occasion of his death; secondly, to the belief in his resurrection; thirdly, to the life and teaching of Paul; fourthly, to the religious doctrines and cravings of the world beyond Judaism, or, at anyrate, beyond the official religion of the Palestinian synagogue.

Yet these four causes would not have produced the results we know without something else. That something else was Jesus himself. Not only is it reasonable to argue that the records are adequate to prove the historical character of the main incidents of his life, and of the main elements of his teaching; not only is it reasonable to argue that the myth

hypothesis, and the hypothesis of a founder of whom one knows absolutely nothing except that he was put to death, are in themselves unprovable and unworkable, but it is also possible and reasonable to argue back from the results to the living likeness of the actual man. The death, the story of his resurrection, Paul, the non-Jewish religious environment and atmosphere, were all necessary. But they were not adequate. It needed something upon which they could act. And that something was, I repeat, Jesus himself. His significance for his age lies not merely in that he died, and that he was supposed to have risen from the tomb, not merely that he was the starting-point of the Pauline theology, the *nidus* round which the non-Jewish religious ideas of the age could cluster, but it lies in his character, actions, beliefs and teachings—in a word, it lies in himself.

Next, assuming that Jesus was an actual historical personage, of whose teachings, character and deeds something can still be ascertained, let us interpret "the significance of Jesus for his age" to mean the religious results which may more strictly and accurately be attributed to himself.

If the phrase be so interpreted, the truest, though doubtless a very unusual, way of summing up the facts would be, I think, to assert that the significance of Jesus for his age lay in this, that he caused fundamental beliefs of Judaism, and more especially fundamental religious relationships of the Jews to one another and to God, to flow over to, and become the possession of, the world at large. These beliefs and relationships—with diverse additions, modifications, improvements and retrogressions—leaped over the barriers of race and nationality, and, breaking down these non-religious separations and limitations, they became the religion, or they formed the main elements of the religion, of all those who believed in Jesus, the divine Saviour, the Son of God.

The religious significance of Jesus for his age was that he brought about the diffusion and universalisation of some fundamental tenets of Judaism. It may be true that

Christianity would, without Paul, have remained a mere Jewish sect; yet, even so, my statement is, I think, accurate. It is, I admit, unusual. For was not, it might be said, the teaching of Jesus essentially anti-Jewish, or, again, was not so much of it original that it is absurd and ridiculous to attach the old name to the new product?

It is right carefully to distinguish between the two adjectives, "anti-Jewish" and "original." "Anti-Jewish" I would call only those elements in the teaching of Jesus which were off, or even opposed to, the main Jewish line of doctrine, as it then was, and as it continued for many centuries to be. Using the word in that sense, I do not deny that some few such elements exist. The most important of them is undoubtedly the teaching as to certain features of the ceremonial Law and as to the value of outward rules and rites, even if "Mosaically" ordained. For though the doctrine of Jesus joins on again here with the teaching of Amos and the older prophets, and though that teaching has been revived in another form by the Liberal Judaism of to-day, the doctrine was nevertheless anti-Jewish in the sense defined.[1] "Original," on the other hand, does not necessarily mean anti-Jewish. It may only mean complementary—developing, accentuating, selecting, unifying and generalising. In these senses of the word I most assuredly do not mean that there was nothing new in the teaching of Jesus, and nothing original, or nothing which was not both new and true, both good and original.

Take it, however, all into account; take into account the

[1] Other such anti-Jewish elements would perhaps be the doctrine of divorce, if the view be correct that Jesus forbade divorce on every possible occasion and ground, certain teachings in regard to marriage (Matthew xix. 12), the line taken up in Mark x. 21 and cognate passages as to property, and so on. But the exact meaning and bearing of these elements of the teaching of Jesus are not without doubt. Some at least were relative to the men to whom, and the circumstances in which, they were spoken. It does not follow that Jesus, had he supposed that the "age" was going to last and that the Messianic era and transformation were not near at hand, would have taken the exact line which he did on various social questions, such as riches and property, family ties, or marriage.

fresh contributions to the conceptions of self-sacrifice and suffering and inwardness, the new passionate enthusiasm for the moral and religious regeneration of the outcast and the sinner, the modifications in the doctrine of retribution and merit and the relation of suffering to sin, the new attitude towards the Law, the revived prophetic proclamations about the relation of the ceremonial to the moral, and yet the new sinks into insignificance in comparison with the old.

For, once again, what is the significance of Jesus for his age? Or may I for the moment drop the last three words and say, what is the significance of Jesus? What did his appearance mean? It meant that what Judaism or some Jews had been for, say, a couple of hundred years trying to do on a small scale, always hindered by the barriers of race and nationality, was now, through the advent and teaching of Jesus, to be done upon a scale commensurate with the greatness of the object. It meant that Judaism in its large essentials was to set forth to conquer the world.

For men were now to learn, albeit, as some of us think, with inadequate purity, that there is one God only, and that this one God is spirit. They were to learn that God is eternal and omnipresent. They were to learn (with whatever added inconsistencies) that the one God was perfectly wise and perfectly good. They were to be taught that he was the source and embodiment of righteousness and love, that as Creator and Father he cared for his human children, and wanted them to be good and just and pure. They were to learn that the main duty of man consisted in righteousness and lovingkindness, in justice and mercy, and in the reverence and the love of God. They were to be taught (with divers darkenings) the doctrines of repentance, of chastity and of humility, the doctrines of respect for human life, respect for another's property, honour, good fame. They were to be taught the varied meanings of charity, to care for the sick and the poor and the needy, and to love their neighbours (with whatever limitations) like themselves. They were to learn

the meaning of prayer—how God helps those who earnestly seek him to find him, how he gives them strength to resist temptation, strength in suffering, strength in well-doing. They were to be taught—those at least who knew them not—the doctrines of the resurrection of the body and the immortality of the soul. They were, in fine, to be taught the obligations and the solace of ethical monotheism, and that all alike, rich or poor, learned or ignorant, could learn to know God and to love him.

All these teachings were Jewish teachings. One and all formed part and parcel of contemporary Judaism. They were a portion, and the biggest portion, of the Judaism of the first century, as they were a portion, and the biggest portion, of the Judaism of the seventh century or of the tenth. And these teachings, *when taken together*, are so large and so important, just as, *when taken together*, they were so novel and so impressive, that they outweigh the differences between Judaism as a whole and the total religious doctrine of Jesus.

My point, as against a frequent Christian view, is that the improvements made by the *historic* Jesus upon Judaism (as a whole) are small *in comparison with the agreements.* My point, as against a frequent Jewish view, is that in comparison with *both* agreements *and* improvements (taken as a whole) the retrogressions are small likewise.

It is the agreements, however, which I here desire to emphasise. And if what I have so far been saying is correct, it is not surprising that the religious significance of Jesus for his own Jewish contemporaries was comparatively small. This was not because the Jews were blinded by God or by their own wickedness. It was not because they were obtuse, self-righteous and proud; it was not because they were so pitifully obstinate in their attachment to a Law, under the burden of whose myriad enactments they groaned, but for the sake of which they were nevertheless fools enough in their thousands to die. It was not because they had to fill up the long measure of their iniquity, and to drink the cup of misery

and persecution to the bitterest dregs. The true reason is totally different. The true reason is that, *in comparison*—mark those two words—with what he had (after his death) to say to the Gentiles, Jesus had (in his life) little to say to the Jews.

If subtraction be made of those who only temporarily adhered to Jesus, and of those who just applauded, or heard him gladly, and gave no further heed, the number of his convinced followers and believers must have been extremely small. His significance in his lifetime to the men of his own age was, in this sense, but meagre. And in fact, though they could, with much advantage and with good consistency, have adopted several of his peculiar teachings, the Jews as a whole could get on very fairly well without him. They already possessed a religion which prompted them to noble living and dying. They already possessed a religion which enabled them to have fair and holy relations with God, and stimulated them to act justly and charitably with one another. The best religion seems unable to prevent some hypocrites and impostors, and doubtless these existed (in what numbers is very uncertain) in the age of Jesus among the Jews. We must judge Judaism, as we must judge any other religion, less by exceptional failures than by both average and conspicuous successes. If we so judge it, what I have said will be true of it not only in the age of Jesus, but in the Rabbinical period as a whole. The weakness of Judaism lay in its relation to the Law and in its relation to the outside world. But in neither of these matters had Jesus laid down a new theory which could supplant the old. He had indeed (as I shall observe later on) paved the way, but he had not directly done more. As regards the outside world, Jesus had not determinately and advisedly taken it within his mission and purview. He had felt himself sent to the lost sheep of the house of Israel and not to those who lived beyond Israel's borders. And he had not put forward any *consistent* theory about the Law, which could have been substituted and adopted for the old theory, the

old faith, that the Law was perfect and divine in all its parts, and that its observance was obligatory upon every Jew. On this point he had only given vent to striking apophthegms, to penetrating sayings, which did not hang together, or consistently cohere, with the fundamental presuppositions either of the general religion or of his own. And though in other matters the Jews could, as I have said, have appropriated many of his teachings with advantage and consistency, they had the most important things already. Hence they could dispense, without such heavy loss, with the extras. For they had God—the one God, their Father and King—his righteousness and his loving-kindness. They had the reverence and the love of him. They had his service: they had prayer and adoration. They had the love of their neighbour, a love which was more profound, far-reaching and delicate than the outer world (almost always hostile or prejudiced) has cared or been able to discern. They had humility and chastity; they had repentance and the divine forgiveness; they had the study of the Law; they had almsgiving and charity. They had memories of the past and hopes for the future; they had the conviction of resurrection and immortality.

God was, indeed, their Father, as near, as loving, and as findable a Father as ever he has been to any Lutheran in Prussia. They were, indeed, his children; he loved them in spite of their sins; and they loved him in spite of his disciplinary chastisements, the chastisements of his justice, which were also, as the best among them taught and believed, the chastisements of his love.

But they were his children because Abraham was their ancestor. And though, in their highest moments, the Rabbinical authorities might say that Abraham was the father of the proselyte quite as much as he was the ancestor of the born Jew, yet as a matter of fact the transference of Judaism to the Gentile upon any large and adequate scale was beset with difficulties. The ceremonial law, the national consciousness, the covenant in the flesh, formed barriers which the

Gentiles were not willing to climb over, and which the Jews were not willing to cast down.

The significance of Jesus for his age lies, then, in the fact that by certain elements in his teaching, and by certain qualities in his personality, he enabled these barriers of law and nationality to be overcome and broken down. New barriers were, indeed, to arise in the place of the old; new restrictions to every human individual being regarded, by the mere fact of his humanity, as a child of God. But these barriers were set further off than the old. For though a child of God were only to mean a believer in Jesus, the divine Saviour, yet that new meaning implied much wider limits than for the same term to mean the descendant—even the spiritual descendant—of Abraham. For all men could become believers in Jesus by an act of faith: his yoke demanded a circumcision of the heart, but not also the circumcision of the flesh.

The significance of Jesus lies in the fact that he started the movement which broke down the old barriers and brought about the translation of Judaism into the Gentile world,—the translation of Judaism with many modifications, curtailments, additions, both for better and for worse, for good and for evil.

He started the movement: not only his actual death and his supposed resurrection, not only Paul and the religious ideas of the heathen world, had a hand in it, and brought it about, but Jesus himself, Jesus the living, historic man, his character, his teachings and his life.

And what were the qualities or the teachings of Jesus which seem specially to have helped to produce this result? What were the qualities or the teachings which were helpful to this end, and which men remembered, and kept on remembering, and which were even chronicled and written down? I will answer summarily and like a catalogue, for if details and arguments were attempted, the limits of a brief article would inevitably be overstepped.

The first and most important quality was surely the lovableness of Jesus—or shall we rather say the greatness of

his personality? Some could not perceive this greatness, and some, for various reasons, may have been repelled by it, but for those few, upon whom the lovableness and greatness acted, an ineffaceable memory of it remained behind. His capacity for giving love awoke enduring affections in others. For he was a man who loved God exceedingly, and realised his nearness and his fatherhood with extraordinary intensity and vividness. He was a man who greatly loved others (not *all* others, for, like many reformers who believe in themselves, he was irritated by opposition), and he could make some of them greatly love him. He cared deeply for the simple and the poor, the lowly and the suffering, and the very measure of his greatness and nobility was realised in his service of them, and in his devotion to them. The leader servant; the servant leader. Such was he. Thus he could create a religious brotherhood, the members of which were limited, not by race or by nation, but by a common love, a common devotion, a common service, both to him and to one another. It was the historic Jesus, the real, living and loving man, who suggested and made possible, even though he did not actually say, the immortal words: "Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren, even these least, ye did it unto me." And he not only suggested and made possible the words: he suggested and made possible the thing.

These are general characteristics, though all-important and significant, but now in the catalogue's list I must mention two others which bring us nearer to the actual question of diffusion, to the extension, through Jesus, of fundamental Jewish doctrines into the gentile or pagan world.

Jesus seems to have been a man who, though his mission was to his own people and race, yet nevertheless laid little religious stress upon blood, and was uninterested in the political fortunes of his nation. He was inclined to welcome and cherish faith and trust and kindness wherever he found them. He did not theoretically or directly break down the wall of severance between the Jew and the Gentile, but his

teaching paved the way for, and could easily be fitted into, the doctrine of a successor who should find the bond of union not in race, but in common attachment to the same Saviour and the same Lord. He rebuked those who relied upon birth, and not upon goodness or contrition, in order to secure and retain the covenanted mercies of God. He believed and declared that into the Kingdom of God, which was so near at hand, many would be welcomed and would enter who were no lineal descendants of Abraham.

In these respects, in this wideness of view, Jesus resembled the prophets in their moments of universalism. Yet the prophets were more interested in the people as such, in the state, the national future and the national glory, than he. Herein he parted company from them. Yet in another respect, now to be mentioned, he joins on to them, joins on to them so clearly and definitely that it is with good reason that Luke makes the disciples describe him as "a prophet mighty in deed and word before God and all the people." In this respect he was indeed another Amos or Hosea, who, even though the infallible and immutable Law had "come in between," did not scruple to repeat what the herdman of Tekoah had said more than seven centuries before. As Amos and Hosea and Isaiah had denied the outward and belauded the inward, as they had depreciated ceremonies and extolled justice and compassion, so now Jesus, even though the Law, which he too held to be divine, demanded the outward with almost as urgent an insistence as it demanded righteousness and lovingkindness. Never mind the seeming inconsistency. The saying stood. "There is nothing from without the man, that going into him can defile him: but the things which proceed out of the man are those that defile the man." He spoke the word, and whether he meant the deduction or no, the deduction was nevertheless makeable, and before long the deduction was actually made: "*This he said, making all meats clean.*" Thus here too, untheoretically, casually, in the heat of conflict, with the flash of prophetic intuition, and with the penetrating

insight of genius, Jesus paved the way for breaking down the separating and nationalist trammels of the priestly and ceremonial law. What Jewish propagandists had never wholly succeeded in doing even in their conscious efforts to win many proselytes, Jesus, without intending it, accomplished. He laid the train: it was not difficult to apply the fire.

And now a word about the significant characteristics in Jesus, which were either defects of qualities or were qualities that, from a Jewish angle of vision, led to retrogressions in his Church.

Jesus, like the olden prophets in salient elements of his teaching, was, as we have seen, unlike them in his apparently indifferent attitude towards the state and the national glory. But he was also unlike them—even unlike Amos, the least national of all the prophets—in another matter of tremendous future significance. The prophets believed in their cause, their mission and their inspiration, but only in that sense can they be said to have believed in themselves. They strike no personal note. But Jesus strikes it. He does not merely speak in God's name; he speaks also in his own. The "I say unto you" of the Sermon on the Mount is a phrase which, even if it be not authentic, is yet certainly *ben trovato*. Moreover, though the Servant, or just because he is the Servant, Jesus is also the Leader. Unlike the prophets, he founds a society. For the Kingdom of God which he announces is not only God's kingdom: it is also *his* kingdom.[1] In that kingdom, if God is the Sovereign, he, Jesus, is to be the viceroy. Doubtless, much that we already find even in Mark has to be deducted. For even to the oldest Evangelist Jesus was much more than a "mere man," and was separated from other men by more than his peculiar goodness or his special power of healing or miracle. Much must be deducted even from Mark in order to reach the historic Jesus who bade his disciples call none good but God. But, nevertheless, that historic Jesus

[1] Luke xxii. 30, Matt. xx. 21. The authenticity of the exact words hardly matters.

surely believed that he had been given an authority, and was before long to be invested with an office, which none had possessed before. He had received, and he felt himself inwardly endowed with, an authority which so impressed his disciples that they were assured that, in the sense of *his* mastership or leadership, none other might assume the name. If the famous verse in Matthew be authentic, "All was delivered unto me by my Father; and no man knoweth the Son except the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son would reveal him," the argument here taken would need no further elaboration. The man who could say these words would necessarily regard himself as wholly different and removed from other men, greater than they in nature as in authority, in kind as in degree. For my own part, I agree with Loisy as against Harnack in rejecting the authenticity of this verse. I even doubt the authenticity of the absolute use of Son and Father in Mark xiii. 32. But we need not rely on these special and disputed passages. The messianic consciousness is enough with the messianic claim. And that this consciousness and claim are historic, that the one was really felt and the other actually put forward, cannot, I think, be contested. But if Jesus claimed to be, or if he thought he would ere long become, the predicted Messiah,—then, however much he gave to the old term a new meaning, he did believe that he stood, or would shortly stand, in some special relation of pre-eminence or dignity towards the Divine Father. By the grace of God, if not by his own inner worth, he was, or would become, nearer to God—perchance even he knew, or would know, more about God—than any of those who were then living or than any of the mighty dead. And if he felt like this, it was possible for him to have taken the great, the severing step—severing him, I mean, from the purest Jewish tradition—and to have not only said, "Believe in God," but also "Believe in me."[1]

[1] It is true that of the wording of Matt. xviii. 6 ("the little ones who believe in me") Loisy says we have here a "façon de parler absolument

It was by Jesus, and not only by Paul, that the old barriers of race and nationality came to be broken down. But in their place arose a new barrier, less narrow, but less plastic, set further off, but yet more menacing, than the old. The old religion had said, "Love your neighbour," and by neighbour it had meant "your fellow citizen, your fellow Jew." But it had also said, "Love ye the stranger," and by stranger it had meant "Love the foreign settler." It was a hard command, a hard ideal, so hard indeed that many Christians, and more than one Christian Government, conspicuously violate it at the present day. The new religion said, "Love one another," and even "Love your enemies," but by the second no less than by the first of these commands it was soon and for many centuries to mean no more than "Love the fellow-believer, love those who have, or can be induced to accept, the same faith; love those who adore, or who can be persuaded to acknowledge, the same Saviour, as yourselves."

Therefore in the personal note struck by Jesus—so new, and, it might even be added, historically so un-Jewish—lies an immense feature of his peculiar significance. The new limitation of love—an orthodox belief in the person of Christ—is not without its ultimate basis in his own teaching, his own claims, his own faith. The worship of Jesus is mainly, indeed, due to the other four causes mentioned at the outset, but it is partly due to himself. The strong claims which he made for love and self-surrender to his personal leadership did not, for him, I feel sure, involve any confusion of thought or feeling between himself and the divine object of worship. But these claims had implications, and received developments, of which he could not have dreamt. And thus, if Jesus had not taught and said what he did, his death, and his supposed resurrection, and Paul, and the pagan religious environment,

inusitée dans la bouche du Christ historique." Nevertheless, I cannot but think that in virtue of the authority which, as he believed, had been granted him, and of the office which would shortly be his, Jesus, as the representative of God, might well have used some such phrase, or at any rate given the impression which led up to it.

would not have sufficed to crown him with Godhead, or to have produced, even after centuries of development and struggle, the imposing Athanasian Creed. The germ goes back to Jesus, and in that germ is contained a big chapter of his significance.

Let me recapitulate and sum up. To Jesus we owe the diffusion of Judaism—with modifications for good and for evil—throughout the world. He brought about this diffusion not only because he was great and good, an enthusiastic lover of God and of man, but because he showed a certain indifference to the political status and national glory of his people, because he rebuked the pride of race, displayed now and again friendliness to Gentiles, and on occasion predicted the inclusion of many of them in the Kingdom of God, and lastly because, under different and difficult circumstances, he spoke depreciatingly, like one of the older prophets, though without a theory and without theoretic consistency, about this and that detail and ordinance of the ceremonial law. Herein I find his special significance, but I find it also in the new note of authority, in his peculiar and messianic self-consciousness, which, while leading on to his worship and his deification, was also in itself one of the very reasons which caused the survival and diffusion of his teaching. For it was not merely the teaching of a passing prophet: it was the teaching of a beloved and commanding personality. There was, indeed, as the generations passed, a shifting of emphasis, but this very shifting is, in the last resort, due to Jesus himself. The centre of the teaching of the historic Jesus is God: the centre of the teaching of his Church is he. And yet the centre is in a sense brought back again to where it was before. For the Son becomes at last to the Christian believer of one substance and coeternal with the Father.

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CHRIST AS "THE TRUTH."

R. KENNARD DAVIS.

One of the principal claims set forward by every religious system in the past has been the claim to the possession of truth, or rather, perhaps, The Truth. The devotees of practically every faith have named it the true religion; as though truth were the highest quality of a religion, and its supreme claim to recognition.

Now, in view of this, it is remarkable that very often the most devoted adherents of a religion show little regard for the defence of its doctrines; and that the "truths" of any given religion have often so changed their meaning, if not their form, in the course of ages that one is driven to conclude that, if the essence of the religion lay in them, it could no longer be the same religion at the end of the process that it was at the beginning. Further, there will be found in different lands, or even in the same small neighbourhood, men professing the same religion and yet attaching widely different meanings, and almost more widely different values, to the beliefs which that religion represents.

All these are common phenomena, and yet they seem to demand a fuller and more resolute explanation than is commonly given to them. In the old days the differences alluded to were taken much more seriously. Men's belief in the truth was far more definite and securely held than it is now, and they were more logical, if less humane, in their method of dealing with those who refused to accept it. Now-

adays men are content, under a plea of "tolerance," to leave unexplained the contradiction between the importance which they nominally attach to the possession of a true belief, and the supreme indifference they exhibit towards the varying tenets of their fellows.

The reason is that it has long ago been tacitly realised, if not outwardly declared, that while the universe as revealed to us is perpetually growing and changing—is, in fact, a living thing—any precise statement about it is either meaningless or dead. Thought is organic, propositions are inorganic. The most we can do by any statement is to exhibit as it were a cross-section of the growing thought, the thought which even as we write is outgrowing its expression. Thus the statement, "I believe in God," is meaningless if the content of the word God is left to be supplied entirely by the person to whom it is addressed; for it may mean, and has meant, entirely different things to different people in different stages of racial or personal development. On the other hand, if a rigid definition of the word is given, that definition is certain to be superseded in time, as new knowledge about the universe, and therefore about God, changes our conception of what the word means.

From this dilemma the English Church has hitherto saved herself by admitting a considerable latitude of interpretation of her creeds: how far that provision will ultimately prove adequate it is not easy to say, although there are not wanting signs that men's powers of interpretation are in some cases becoming strained. The Church of Rome has adopted what is really a more logical course in admitting the development of doctrine as a principle and setting up a living authority by whom that development is, by presumed inspiration, to be directed. The obvious disadvantage of this latter method is that development comes through the natural and free play of men's intellects; and these are hampered by the artificial restriction of submission to an arbitrary and external authority as much as by a creed which they are allowed within limits to interpret so as to suit the conclusions of their own thought.

Is there then such a thing as truth at all? In this perpetually shifting universe, can we find any secure resting-place, or is every support we cling to liable to be taken from us? The universe is growing; we are growing with it. Are we destined to outgrow every belief that has sustained us in the past? If every statement we make about the universe is ultimately untrue, or only partially true, is there anything left but to despair of religion?

We are in the position of men being swept along by an overpowering current down a dark river. From time to time we have snatched at ropes, beams, or the branches of trees on the bank, but the force of the stream has carried us irresistibly past them, until they have been left behind and disappeared into the distance. Obviously our only chance of escaping from the water is to find some boat or raft that is journeying with us, from which we should be able securely to survey the course that we are compelled to take, and possibly to gain some vision of the ocean towards which we are being carried.

The truth cannot be contained in a statement. This does not, indeed, prevent statements from being true, because there is a difference between true-ness and the truth—one being a quality, the other being conceived as an entity. Is there, then, any vehicle for truth or vessel for containing it, other than the statement?

Jesus said, "I am the Truth." The ordinary reader is apt to regard this, as he regards many of Jesus' sayings, as a figurative expression, or as interpretable only in some mystic manner. But in the light of our inquiry it is seen to possess a very simple and very important meaning. It suggests that a person may be what a statement cannot be—a perfect vehicle for truth, capable of expansion as the truth expands, and capable of retaining through all apparent changes and varieties of experience the unity which gives it permanent significance.

Now I would suggest that this is exactly what the most genuine and sincere followers of Christ have always felt about him. Secure in their devotion to his person, they have watched

without fear the storms that have raged about the doctrinal interpretation of his religion. They have something better, something at the same time more definite and more abiding, than a creed. Having faith, they can afford to be untroubled about belief. The "Word" for them is not graven in hard and unalterable characters upon tablets of stone; it is incarnate in a personality at once infinite and definite, many-sided but single-hearted.

A simple illustration of this feeling with regard to Christ is afforded by the title of a widely-read book, *What would Jesus do?* There is a large and ever-increasing number of important branches of knowledge about which the question, "What does the Creed say?" is irrelevant or meaningless. There are many problems of conduct in which we can derive no help from asking, "What does the law enjoin?" But it is impossible to conceive a situation in life demanding a moral decision in which the question, "What would Jesus do?" might not be asked with pertinence. This is a test that may be applied in dealing with circumstances that were unknown in our Lord's time, and for which his recorded teachings afford no guidance. The reason is that his personality has in it that element of the universal that enables the man who studies it to fill in, from the partial and broken records of it that we possess, the features which, possessing an underlying unity in themselves, would adapt themselves to all the varying occasions of life.

If we proceed to ask ourselves, What does this perfect adaptability of character to circumstances imply? the inevitable answer is sufficiently striking. Before we formulate it, however, we must guard ourselves against misconception. We are not asserting dogmatically that Jesus possessed this to an absolute degree. The most we are prepared to state here is that the experience of many has led them to regard him as possessing it; they are sure, from their impression of his character, that he would hold the clue to right action in any given situation, and they believe that by the close and sympathetic study of his personality they can acquire for

themselves some portion of that insight into the problems of life which he possessed.

Now for the answer to our question, which is, that this power of acting, under all circumstances, in precisely the *right* way, could only be possessed by one who was in the most intimate possible union with the directing principle of the universe: two forces which can go through an intricate series of changes and developments in perfect and uninterrupted correspondence can hardly be completely disconnected. The sailor who can maintain his equilibrium upon a rolling and pitching ship does so because he has, perhaps unconsciously, mastered, or put himself into close touch with, the principles underlying the ship's motions. Yet if the ship were for any reason, such as a collision, suddenly to lurch in an unaccustomed direction, the sailor would very probably be thrown off his feet. Now in life all of us have to some extent this power of adaptation; it implies a connection between us and the principle of the universe, which we explain by describing ourselves as children of Nature or children of God, according as we are excluding from or including in our conception the idea of conscious moral purpose. But we are all of us, like the sailor, apt to be thrown off our feet by some sudden movement of the universe for which we were not prepared: a phenomenon which we describe either as error or as sin according to the considerations mentioned above.

Now the person in whom the adaptation was absolutely perfect must needs be in a connection with the principle alluded to so close as to be equivalent to identity. In other words, he would be Nature or he would be God. This is what is meant by the Divinity of Christ.

We have, then, reached the conclusion that if in Christ is to be found the "Truth" which men seek in their religion, this is so because of Christ's union (or one-ness) with God. But, it may be asked, what need is there for us to seek any "Truth" at all, or any "representation" of reality, that is to say, of God? If God is the living principle of the universe

in which we live, why cannot we know him directly, without any medium either of statement or person?

We shall find the answer when we have seen rather more closely what we mean by "knowing" God. Let us approach the question first by seeing how one method of trying to "know God" has broken down.

The founder of modern philosophy, Descartes, made it his aim to arrive at a certain knowledge of God and the universe by the processes of pure reason. He started with the famous axiom—that without which all reasoning would be impossible—*Cogito ergo sum*: my ability to think presupposes my existence.

So far so good. But the next step, namely, that of proving logically the existence of anything outside the self, has never been satisfactorily accomplished. The position of the man who denies it is, logically, unassailable. "How can it be proved," he says, "that the so-called external world is anything but the creation of my own mind? That which I call my knowledge of it comes to me solely through my own senses. I know nothing, and can know nothing, except my own sensations."

And in a sense he is right. The knowledge of the outside world cannot come to him as the result of the operations of pure reason. It cannot be "proved."

Whence, then, must that knowledge spring? Not from the senses alone, for the evidence of the senses is liable to correction by the intellect, and contains no force of certainty. Not from the emotions alone, for a like reason. Our knowledge of reality must be based on something more secure than these. Its security must be equal to that of our conviction of our own existence, if it is not to be upset by criticism. We must be able to show that we apprehend outside reality in such a way that to deny its existence is to deny, not merely the certainty of the evidence of the senses, not merely the claim of an emotion to an explanation, not merely the validity of a logical process—but the very existence of ourselves. The connection between us and the outside universe must be not

merely logical, sensational, or emotional, but essential, if it is to bring to us the certainty we demand. We can only know that the universe is real because of our need for it. The connection between the animal part of our nature and the material world is certified for us by such needs as that of food. Is there any condition in which our whole nature feels a similar need of an external object—a need the failure to satisfy which would imply the stultification of our whole existence? What connection can we find between our whole nature and the outside universe that can claim, by virtue of its necessity, to give us a certainty of the object as great as is our certainty of the subject?

The only union of such a kind we know is that which we call Love. We know God or our fellow-man, with a conviction that possesses certainty for us, because, and in so far as, we become one with him through sympathy or love. The next step to *Cogito ergo sum* is *Amo te ergo es*: "I love you, and so I know you exist because my existence is bound up with yours." Objects other than ourselves are real for us in proportion as we can make them part of ourselves (or ourselves part of them) through this power of sympathy or love. "Doubt that the stars are fire," says Hamlet, "doubt that the sun doth move, doubt truth to be a liar, but never doubt my love." His love for Ophelia is, at the moment, amid doubt and uncertainty, the one chain that binds him to reality. Doubtless it was in this same spirit that Paul wrote, "For me to live is Christ."

Now, it is perhaps necessary to point out at this stage that in this view of truth and knowledge there is no intention of depreciating the work of the reason. All true sympathy must be based on understanding, and the deeper the understanding the surer is the sympathy. It is not to be regarded as a merely emotional thing. It is essentially an activity of man's whole nature, in which the intellect arranges the data of the sensations, and presents them for the life-giving action of the emotions; just as the philosopher, or even more, the poet, kindles into life the dry fuel which the scientist has collected

and prepared. This he does by his power of sympathy; by an imaginative union with the living spirit which is behind the phenomena of the universe; in a word, by a judicious anthropomorphism.

For—this is important—like can only love like.

> "Man's soul is moved by what, if it in turn
> Must move, is kindred soul: receiving good
> —Man's way—must make man's due acknowledgment."

And if man's sympathy is aroused by an "inanimate" object, whether it be the work of Nature or man, it is because he recognises in it, explicitly or only instinctively, the impress of a spirit like his own. Nor need we be ashamed of an "anthropomorphism" which pictures God to us in the likeness of the highest which we can know of men, if we believe that the Hebrew fable, which represents the Deity as saying, "Let us make man in our image," contains the germ, poetically set forth, of a truth: the truth, namely, that we are children of Nature and of God, and that the whole universe, ourselves included, is the manifold representation of one creating and sustaining spirit: in other words, if we accept the consequence of a monistic belief.

We cannot, as yet, understand the flower "root and all." That is the goal to which human science, with the aid of poetry, is slowly approaching. But we can to a very much greater extent understand, with the help of self-surrendering sympathy, a human character "of like passions with ourselves"; and it is in this way that we can approach most nearly to the knowledge of the ultimate reality which we seek. For "he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?"

This, then, is our answer to the question asked above—Why do we need a "representation" of reality? It is because we must progress from the known to the unknown—from the human that we can understand to the Divine that for us is only knowable in terms of humanity.

In this sense, then, Christ himself, and every human

character that approaches Christ in that absence of error to which we referred above, becomes for us the truth, the revealing "Word" of God, the "Mediator" between God and man.

But this identification of "knowledge" and love (or sympathy) leads us still further. For if it is by sympathy that we enter into the fullest union with the universe outside and every portion of it, it follows that the real nature of that universe and of every portion of it must be its nature as an object of love. Everything, we may then say, exists to be loved—as an object not necessarily of *our* love, but of love. And, further (since love is between likes), it is not merely an object of love, but a subject, or else (as shown above) the expression of a subject of love. Thus it is the love-relation that is the unity and spirit of the universe: and the God whom we figure to ourselves is at once the lover and the loved and the love—the Absolute in which Subject and Object and their relation become one.

We will now see briefly how far our theory of the nature of truth and knowledge is borne out in the sphere of ethics. We shall find that men's views of the nature of right conduct correspond closely with their conceptions of knowledge and truth, and that the highest ethical ideals tally with, and are indeed based by implication on, the view here put forward.

In the history of man's conception of truth, there are three stages: the first, in which it is regarded as consisting of isolated "*facts*"; the second, in which it is viewed as a "*system*"; the third, in which the dead "system" is discarded for the living *person*. Similarly in the case of knowledge there are three stages: in the first it is held to be the grasp of isolated fact by the *memory*; in the second, the grasp of principles by the *understanding*; in the third, the grasp of persons by *sympathy* (or love). We therefore expect to find, in men's ethical notions, three points of view corresponding to the stages they have reached in their view of truth and knowledge. This conclusion is, I think, borne out by the facts.

The most elementary view of ethics, and the earliest in

the history both of races and of individuals, makes right conduct consist in the observance of a number of isolated rules. Many of these rules, no doubt, are founded on principle, but the principles are not explicitly realised. This is shown by the fact that often the rules are interpreted with no reference to the principles by which they might be to some extent justified, and also by the existence of other rules originating simply in habit. The teaching of the Pharisees and Scribes is probably the most generally familiar instance of this type of morality, though in their case it probably represents a degeneration from the second point of view.

This second point of view bases conduct on certain abstract principles, or virtues—courage, wisdom, temperance, and the like. It criticises the rules of the earlier morality from this standpoint, rejecting all those which cannot be shown to be based implicitly upon such principles. Examples of this stage are too numerous to need special mention.

The third point of view is that in which right conduct is based, not on the observance of rules, nor on the understanding of principles, but on the "knowledge," which is the love of persons; of God, that is to say, and of one's neighbour. In this sense of the word "knowledge" does the paradoxical saying of Socrates, "Virtue is knowledge," find its completest justification. This love, being the fullest expression of man's whole nature, in a way in which no rules or principles imposed or inculcated from without could ever be, is the true and inevitable guide of his actions, which are free just because they spring from his nature. In this way are the law and the prophets—the rules of the legislator and the principles of the seer—fulfilled, or brought to their logical completion; man's true position in the universe is recognised, and in proportion as his power of understanding and sympathising with his fellows increases, so much the nearer does he approach to the attainment of that position.

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THE CHURCH, THE WORLD, AND THE KINGDOM.

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THERE is a growing conviction among Christian thinkers that we are bound to determine more strictly than heretofore the interrelations of the three cardinal concepts which stand at the head of this article. In offering some materials which may be of service to those who are devoting attention to the problems involved, I propose to limit myself to their pragmatic aspects. That is to say, I shall try to keep myself down on the solid earth. I shall take the World as equivalent to human society and its concerns, in their so-called secular aspects. I shall leave on one side its cosmic aspects, as also any attempt to account for the lack of harmony with, if not the antagonism to, the will of God which it so continuously manifests. By the Church I shall understand the faithful company of all those who look to the Lord Jesus Christ as its Founder and its Head. That is to say, I shall avoid attempts to distinguish between the Church visible and the Church invisible. As regards the master concept of the Kingdom of God, I shall treat of it only in its bearing on the Church as we know it, and the world in which we actually live. That is to say, I shall consider the Kingdom in so far only as it is an answer to the prayer, "Thy will be done on earth."

Moving, then, within these limits, I would first note the fact that any definition of the three concepts before us, even

in their restricted range, is one of extreme difficulty. They have each and all been subjected to the law of change during the passing of nearly twenty centuries. What they meant for the early Christians was not what they meant for mediæval Christians; and what they mean for us is again something different from all that has gone before. How could it be otherwise if the Spirit of God is working in and through human history at large?

But even if accurate definition is out of our power, we need not at any rate perpetuate certain confusions of thought which I hold to be as harmful to sound theology as they are obstructive to religious progress. For example, there are still far too many who treat the Church and the Kingdom as convertible terms. The conditions prevailing in apostolic and sub-apostolic times, with their vivid eschatological hopes, were not conducive to systematic thinking on the subject. In mediæval times, the claims of the Bishop of Rome as Vice-Regent of the Kingdom suppressed unbiassed study. It remained for modern criticism to examine afresh our Lord's own teaching, to clear it of preconceptions, and to make it plain that the scriptural Kingdom of God is a majestic, all-embracing conception, consisting of many parts, of which the Church is one.

An error of an opposite kind, but one no less pernicious, is found in the tendency to draw a line of absolute separation between the Church and the World. For the early Christians the distinction could not fail to be sharp, and pregnant with practical meaning. But as the historic Church felt and responded to the social influences around her, and, as her divine Founder had foretold, gradually leavened the world with His spirit and His teaching, the sharpness of the line necessarily faded. To suppose it otherwise would be to bring a fatal and final dualism into God's universe.

The three concepts, then, though distinct, are none of them mutually exclusive, nor mutually inclusive. I find it helpful to liken them to three intersecting circles, of unequal

size, the centres of which are at first as far apart as is consistent with their having a small area in common. The largest circle is fixed, and represents the Kingdom; the circle of intermediate size represents the World; and the smallest represents the Church militant. The two latter circles are supposed to have a double motion—tending simultaneously to become concentric with each other and with the larger circle. The areas marked out by the intersecting arcs are full of suggestion. We find, for instance, that there is part of the World which enters the Kingdom without being included in the Church, part of it which enters the Kingdom in union with the Church, and part of it which is in union with the Church without having entered the Kingdom. Or, looking at the circle of the Church, we find there is one part outside the Kingdom, one within the Kingdom, one which coalesces with the World without entering the Kingdom, and one which is in union with the World within the Kingdom; thus allowing fully for the complex character of the Church as a spiritual society in historical contact with the World. The circles, I said, are tending to become concentric. When this movement is complete, the lines defining the smaller circles are supposed to fade away, and to supply a representation of the time when Jesus Christ shall deliver up the "Kingdom to the Father, that God may be all in all." I do not, of course, for one moment press this symbolism, more especially because I recognise that we are dealing, not with mathematical, or even logical, data, but with living processes. Nevertheless, I venture to think that such a symbolism may help to guard us from the errors I have repudiated.

I have spoken of the Kingdom of God as the "master concept." Can this expression be justified? Few will deny its substantial truth when they examine our Lord's own teaching in the Gospels. They will find that whereas He is represented as mentioning the Church twice only, the Kingdom of God is before Him from first to last. And it is evidently a universalising concept. It means righteousness and joy and

peace for the World at large. It means the bringing of every department of life, every social and political institution, into a spiritual order, an all-inclusive cosmos. Now, it is surely plain that even the most fully developed Papal theory cannot equate the Church with such a Kingdom. To take the most obvious case, the Church and the State may be brought into even deeper and closer fellowship, but they cannot be identified. And yet we know that the kingdoms of this world are to become the kingdoms of God and of His Christ. How grievously we miss the grandeur of our Lord's ideal when we cramp it within the bounds of a narrow ecclesiasticism! And yet, even in the worst days, that grandeur has not been wholly obscured. Some dim, even though subconscious, glimpse of the wider prospect must come to all when they pray, "Thy Kingdom come."

I avoid here all controversies as to the import and the extent of the eschatological element in our Lord's conception. It suffices for me, that whatever may be the results of these controversies, our Lord's conception expands beyond them on every side. He speaks to men living in an actual world. The bulk of His teaching was eminently social and practical. He never tires of emphasising man's duty to his neighbour, putting it on a level with the duty to God—"the second" Commandment is like unto "the first." And not only is His teaching practical, but He Himself exemplified it in action. However near or however far in time might be the Parousia, at any rate there were actually before Him men and women who were poor, ignorant, sick, dying. They must be cared for here and now. Nay, the healing of the afflicted, the comforting of the poor, were themselves the clearest signs that the Kingdom was at hand. How trenchant in this regard are the grounds He gives for decision in the final Judgment. "I was an hungered and ye gave Me meat; I was thirsty and ye gave Me drink; I was a stranger and ye took Me in; naked and ye clothed Me; I was sick and ye visited Me; I was in prison and ye came unto Me." How striking! nay, how startling! The final test of

fitness for the perfected Kingdom is social service in the imperfect World that now is. That is to say, the Kingdom is to be realised, not in abstraction from the conditions of human life, but by continued contact with those conditions, that God's will may here and now be done as it is in heaven.

But although I avoid eschatological controversies, I would not pass by the abiding truth that they contain. Apart from any special teaching concerning the Parousia, the Kingdom is to be realised by an influx of higher and spiritual forces into a world which, of itself, is unequal to the task. Character and conduct are its marks, service its law, inwardness its essential condition. And these are to attain their highest development by new and subtle workings of the Holy Spirit, the Life-giver. But here, again, we must be on our guard against over-statement. In the World at large God has never left Himself without witness, nor without light and leading. As Kant has nobly declared, the principles of "truth and goodness have their basis in the normal disposition of every human being." But we may hesitate to grant unreservedly Kant's further assertion that the operation of this naturally good principle "works towards erecting in the human race, as a community under human laws, a power and a Kingdom which shall maintain its victory over evil, and secure to the world under its dominion an eternal peace." We hesitate unless we may underline the words, "works towards." For experience forces on us the sad conclusion that although the ideals are here, although the aspirations grow in volume and in intensity, the World lacks spiritual power. It is plain to most serious students of human nature that the ideal city must come down from heaven. But it is also plain that this coming is a process, a "becoming," a growth by stages, "first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear."

These things being so, it is sufficiently evident that we cannot measure the coming of the Kingdom by the growth of the Church alone. Our thoughts and our hopes must take a wider sweep. Even of the Pagan empire of his day

St Paul could declare that its powers were ordained of God. How much more shall this be true of the modern Christian State, in which society has, however partially and imperfectly, still, very really, absorbed so much of our Lord's spiritual idealism, and responded to the impulse He has given to the thirst for righteousness and the longing for social harmony. We have to distinguish also the realms of art, literature, science, mathematics, and the rest. These, though they may be put to use by the Church, are yet distinct in their sphere of existence and operation. But they are of the Kingdom, for that "ruleth over all."

Be it ours to let the grandeur, the supreme humanity, of our Lord's ideal sink deep into our souls. What a light it throws upon history! We see therein, not a chaotic clash of spirits broken away from divine rule, but the unfolding of a divine purpose, the education of a race destined to joy and peace in the Kingdom of the God Who is at once Righteousness and Love. It brings into organic unity every stage of human progress. It is to govern human life as a whole, to afford firm ground for social hope, and lasting inspiration for social service.

Such being, in broad outline, the interrelations of the Kingdom and the World, I turn to consider the place and function of the Church. A natural preliminary would be to give some more or less satisfactory definition of the Church. But there are few indeed who have not apprehended the distracting perplexity of this question. I have decided to confine myself to the historical Church as we know it. Many difficulties are thus avoided from the outset. But how formidable are those which still remain! Christendom is divided and subdivided. Even within the bounds of Catholicism we have the Roman Church separating itself from the Greek Church on the one side and from the Anglican on the other. And there are the various bodies which range themselves outside the strictly historic succession. Here and there one among the smaller sects is still undeterred from looking

upon itself as the only elect body in God's wide world, and a greater number maintain a stolid, if not a proud, exclusiveness. But why further enlarge on this well-worn theme? Rather let us ask what causes we assign for the existing condition of Christendom.

It will not satisfy us, surely, to attribute the blame in a wholesale fashion to the sectarian spirit or to personal causes. As a late Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Oxford assures us, "we must go deeper than this." He asks whether we may not see "in the existence of the several Nonconformist bodies of the English-speaking world an evidence that they were designed to exist, and to grow on till the time comes, as we have the right to believe it will come, when they and we are ripe for re-union." That our unhappy divisions should thus be attributed to the Divine purpose may seem to many a hard saying. But if we study history, as the Regius Professor has studied it, we shall be driven to see that none of the greater, and few of the lesser, sections of Christendom can be attributed to personal causes. They have been the outcome of deeply seated political and social forces, and have the appearance of design just because they were so inevitable.

The outstanding cause of the divided condition of Christendom is, to my mind, unmistakable. The Church is not a theoretically constituted society, with a stereotyped set of canons and ordinances, and a rigid constitution. She is a living, growing organism—a vast tree, with roots, and trunk, and branches, and branchlets. Like all other institutions on our earth, though rightly demanding recognition of certain spiritual powers and functions, she has nevertheless been moulded by the great social law of continuous development by way of adaptations to an ever-changing environment. Would we have proof of this? Consider the type of Christianity which arose out of the solidity of the Roman civilisation; compare it with the type which emerged from the subtle interplay of Greek and Eastern thought; and

compare these again with the type most characteristic of the Englishman or the Scotchman, and nurtured in the comparative isolation of the British Isles. Yes, it is impossible to doubt that the Church, placed in the main stream of historical development, and brought into contact with varying social and political conditions, has undergone profound differential modifications in her various parts. She has at sundry times and in divers manners assimilated the intellectual forms and social ideals of successive epochs and of diverging civilisations. Such power of assimilation is the chief mark of a living organism. It proves that she is the Church of the living God Who guides the whole course of history. And where there is growth, mere system-making and purely dogmatic theology are bound to come short of the full reality. Life will not be bound by fetters however strong, nor be forced into moulds however theoretically perfect. It will burst the bonds, or perish.

Note further that this power of assimilation is not destructive of individuality or uniqueness of function. If the Church has received much she has also given much. She has poured into the veins of decaying empires and barbaric races the life-giving sap of the Gospel of the Cross. Adown the generations she has warned the sinner, cheered the saint. She has revealed to mankind the secret of her Divine Master. She has shared and spread abroad His ideals; she has brought this workaday world into touch with invisible sources of spiritual power, and has set the things of time and space in the light of eternity.

Let us take the Church, then, in this ideal sense—ideal, not as unreal: that would defeat my purpose, which is eminently practical; but ideal in the sense of regarding her from the most comprehensive view-point. We ask—What is her mission in the World of to-day? I answer, that she must be brought into increasingly vital relation with that World. It will not do to hark back to mediæval ideals, nor even to precedents of the Apostolic Church. The World has moved on, and the Kingdom has grown. *Tempora mutantur, et*

ecclesia mutatur in illis. The foundations of the city are stable; the buildings vary and increase. The roots and trunk grip fast the ancient soil; but the cambium layer adds ring to ring, and branches, old and new, wax or fade unceasingly.

And what would this vital relation imply? That she shall leaven herself and leaven the World with the Spirit of Christ. And how potent the means at her disposal! She wields the fundamental doctrines of the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. She proclaims Jesus Christ as the Divine Elder Brother of an emancipated and spiritualised humanity. She bids men listen to the still, small voice of the Holy Spirit that bears witness with their spirit that they are sons of God, and points to that same Holy Spirit as the unseen but essential bond of every true and healthful form of social union and fellowship. Thus will she foster and develop the higher qualities of our strangely composite nature. Thus will she lift up the banner of the cross, and spell out with ever new emphasis and meaning her ancient motto, *In hoc signo vinces.*

Shall anyone fail to realise that a Church that can fulfil such a mission as this has a place in the World of to-day? Look around at the clash of interests, the material aims, the unworthy ideals, the lack of open vision. Whence shall come salvation? If there are any who question the Church's power, how far shall she exonerate herself from the blame of so disastrous a conclusion? How far has she herself apprehended the urgency of the work, or her calling, to accomplish it?

The Church, it may be argued, is divided—hence her weakness. There is, alas! only too much truth in this assertion, though we may comfort ourselves by the thought that the master concept of the Kingdom gives much practical singleness of aim in spite of lack of visible cohesion. Let us, however, consider, from this point of view, the most general and far-reaching of the differences which divide Christendom, and which take shape in the antithesis of Protestant and Catholic.

I begin with Catholicism. What are its outstanding

characteristics, and how far are they fitted to fulfil the Church's mission to the World of to-day? Viewed broadly, they would seem to be three in number—the ideal of a visible society with no break in its historic continuity, and universal in its aims and ideals—a consequent claim to special authority in matters of faith and morals—and a system of symbolic ritual which gives outward expression to its claims and teaching.

I maintain that these three characteristics, taken in and for themselves, and freed from prejudice and undue exaggerations, are profoundly adapted for accomplishing the mission of the Church, the bringing in of the Kingdom of God.

Take the first, the ideal of a universal spiritual society, linking together not only individuals, but successive generations. This must surely be of enormous value in the realisation of that larger brotherhood for which men are yearning. Who shall estimate the debt of modern humanitarianism to the influence of the Catholic ideal of a world-wide spiritual unity? Who shall guarantee the staying power of our social enthusiasms if that ideal were ignored or lost? We may believe that human society contains the possibilities of a reconstituted social order. But a cold materialism, or shallow sensualism, can never develop the germs just waking to life. They call for the nurturing warmth of social mysticism—the mysticism which the Catholic conception supplies in its purest form, and fills with its richest content.

Or take the claim to authority in faith and morals. The reigning doctrine is that of evolution. What does this imply? That every form of life and of social institution is what it is by virtue of a previous age-long series of adaptations to environment. We argue, therefore, that such an institution as Catholicism, which has stood for so long the test of "fitness to survive," must have adapted itself in no small degree to the forces which have operated around it. And since its present is organically connected with its past, it must have a special value of its own as an agent for the moral and spiritual education of man-

kind. It must have gained a store of specialised experience in the province of its specialised activities. Its claim to exercise a certain authority is thus shown to be scientifically grounded, and our age will do well to pay to it a respectful, though wisely critical, attention. It is also necessary for Catholicism to prove that it is willing to use its unique stores of specialised experience, not for selfish aims or love of power, but from a whole-hearted longing for human welfare.

Is it urged that this authority has been abused? I grant it. But I am judging by the best, not by the worst. True, men will not easily forget the forced retractions of Galileo, nor the burning of Bruno, nor the fires of Smithfield. No, but the memory of these things should not drive us into the extremes of private judgment, nor into the waywardness of individual caprice. The age calls for discipline in every department of life—in matters of religion and morals among the rest. License is not liberty; nor is anarchy freedom. To yield a reasonable obedience to a reasonable authority is the part of a wise man. The ideal Catholicism, with its accumulations of specialised experience, has a vital part to play in evolving the latent spiritual capacities of the race.

And what of the symbolism? What of the stately ritual, the majestic buildings, the sacramental rites by which Catholicism presents itself to the outward eye, and by means of which it so powerfully stirs the emotions? Catholicism doubtless expresses itself naturally in art and music, and loves to adorn itself in colour and beauty. But the modern man can hardly condemn this tendency, so long as the symbolism employed is living and wholesome. I judge that Catholicism is thus in harmony with human nature and with the times in manifesting its claims and its teaching by means of an impressive and historic symbolism.

But there is a particular merit in this Catholic tendency in its present-day aspect. Our social consciousness is developing lustily. But does it not often lack that subtle charm and purified exaltation which comes from a breath of the unseen

and the infinite? Our social imagination has to be trained and softened, lifted on to a higher plane. How better attain these ends than by the wise use of a cultured and reverent symbolism?

On these and similar grounds, therefore, I urge that the three outstanding characteristics of Catholicism—the unity of a spiritual society, authority in matters of faith and conduct, and a rich historic symbolism—are such as to give them a unique and essential rôle in the social developments of the day. They are potent instruments for bringing into the Kingdom of God the modern World that seems at times to be moving away from its destined goal.

Let us now turn to the outstanding characteristics of Protestantism. Regarded from one point of view, they are largely negative. For Protestantism presents itself as the inevitable and wholesome reaction against the dangers and tyrannies of an overgrown and degenerate Catholicism. But we must not allow its negative functions to hide from us the many invaluable positive traits it possesses in its own right. Taken at its best, it has made definite contributions of its own to the religious experience of the race, and has brought into due prominence many factors which the historic development of Catholicism had tended to obscure.

If I were asked to give the essence of Protestantism in a single phrase, I should say that it has discovered, and still maintains, the rights of the individual. Consciously or unconsciously it insists on the central maxim of Kantian ethics, that each man is to be regarded as an end in himself, and never as a mere means. Hence it is the religion of spiritual and moral freedom, and has laid the civilised World under a weight of indebtedness which cannot well be overestimated, and which will never be forgotten.

All that is popularly deemed to be most distinctive of Protestantism will be found to fall naturally into place if once its central inspiration is grasped and appreciated. The Bible is declared to be the sole authority for faith and practice,

as containing all things necessary to salvation. This position, especially when taken in conjunction with the doctrine of verbal inspiration which so long prevailed, would seem to imply a mere substitution—the Bible instead of the Church. But the principle of freedom is saved by a correlative insistence on the right of private judgment. And it is further interesting to note that even in this regard modern Protestantism is relying more and more on religious experience rather than on any form of external authority—thus approximating to certain phases of Catholic mysticism, both ancient and modern.

So also with its general doctrines concerning the Church, the Sacraments, and the Ministry. These vary, of course, indefinitely. But the key throughout is found in the determination to uphold the rights of the individual. And it needs no exposition to prove how absolutely all this is in harmony with the modern spirit. The great advance of the present, over precious, ages is just this deepening insistence on individuality, and this enhancement of its significance. Liberty is looked upon as being of the very substance of life, and our sympathy with the love of liberty — political, moral, and religious—is spontaneous and complete.

Such I take to be respectively the strong points of Catholicism and of Protestantism in relation to the master concept of the Kingdom of God. Is it impossible to combine them? At first sight the antithesis of authority and liberty seems to be final. But realise the great danger we are in through our unhappy divisions—the tendency of unrestrained Catholicism to resuscitate the dominant ideas of mediævalism—the tendency of unrestrained Protestantism to endless fractionising, with consequent wasteful dissipation, of spiritual energy. Do not these provoke us to examine more closely whether some higher synthesis may not be attainable? We are faced by the same antithesis in the social sphere—how to reconcile the conflicting claims of the individual and the community. Is our faith in God's government of the World so flabby that we must pronounce these two mighty problems

insoluble? Shall God's children on this little planet despair of ever learning to live as brethren, each for all and all for each—losing the life to find it? Away with such fatal pessimism! Already on every side there are signs of the coming of the higher synthesis.

Not the least significant of these is the Modernist movement, stirring within the very citadel of the most rigid Catholicism. The venerable Roman Church is feeling the impulse of the Time Spirit. What may come of the movement we cannot tell; we must await its further developments. But meanwhile, how cheering, how invigorating, such an utterance as this from Father Tyrrell. A real and vital Catholicism (he says) will exist "not to decide and impose points of theology, ethics, and politics, under pain of eternal damnation, but to proclaim the Gospel of God's Kingdom upon earth as it was proclaimed by Jesus Christ." Or, again, hear this from Lilly: "Modernism is not Catholicism yielding to certain influences of the time, and allowing itself to be moulded by them in some of its superficial aspects. It is Catholicism actively seeking to penetrate the whole life of the time in the conviction that it will find in that life a new witness to its own faith, and a further vital development of it." With such utterances as these before us, representative of the feelings and aspirations of a large and growing body of men permeated with Catholic ideals, who shall say that the new synthesis is not already dawning for a world weary of theological strife, and yearning for spiritual leadership? May we not adopt the words sent of late by certain priests at Rome to the Mayor of their city? "A great hope lives in our hearts; the hope that the Church, which finds herself in the dilemma by which humanity exacts from her either to be a means of life or to die, may yet find again new ways to become, as the Gospel says, 'light of the world' and 'salt of the earth.'"

The parallel movement on the Protestant side may be found in the growing desire for reunion. The prayer of our

Lord that His people may be one as He and the Father are one, is finding its echo in many hearts hitherto deaf to its pathos and its profound idealism. But the unity they have in view is not the hard externalism of the mediæval system, but the kinship of soul with soul, deep calling unto deep. The Church, I have insisted, is an organism. St Paul calls it "the body of Christ." Its unity, then, must be a unity in difference. A well-known Church dignitary, in a recent letter to me, speaking of the condition of things in England, writes thus:—"There is a rapid and continuous evolution of thought going on here, but whether it tends towards one goal or many who can say? Diversity in thought, unity in conduct and ethics, I think." Here is an arresting question and an equally arresting answer. If the opinion just given is right, is it compatible with any reasonable hope for the reunion of Christendom?

I am bold enough to reply in the affirmative. For mark, the springs of conduct are in the emotions and the affections; and these, again, are increasingly acknowledged to be products of social life. A growing unity in conduct, therefore, would seem to carry along with it a growing social solidarity. Men's intellectual activities and conclusions may differ, but they may nevertheless be drawing nearer to one another, not only in moral ideals but in spiritual aspirations. This line of thought would apply to human society as a whole. But when we speak of the reunion of Christendom, the case is indefinitely more hopeful. Granted there will always be a number of intellectual and spiritual freelances—how often we have had to thank God for them!—the great bulk of Christian men and women have a common centre of attraction in the Person of the Lord Jesus Christ; they open their hearts to the operation of one divine unifying influence, that of the Holy Spirit of God. Is it Utopian to hope that, in spite of intellectual differences, the World may yet see a truly Catholic Church?

I have tried to show that the three concepts of the World, the Church, and the Kingdom, while in one sense separate, are

not self-contained. They interpenetrate at a multiplicity of points; they are joined into an organic unity by an infinity of living fibres. I am convinced that this mode of viewing the three concepts by at once distinguishing and correlating them, is of immense value for the age of transition through which we are passing, and will pave the way for a higher synthesis in which many of our religious problems, theoretical and practical, will find a natural solution. As things are, civilised society is straining after social reconstruction, and, alas! has almost concluded that the State does not need the aid of the Church in the realisation of its hopes. In other words, I maintain the Church is face to face with a crisis as great, or greater, than any with which she has ever yet had to deal. I use this word "crisis" not as an alarmist, but in its sober sense of a time of judgment.

Will the Church be equal to the emergency? There is no need for her to become political: but there is need for her to preach and work towards the Kingdom that is "righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost": there is need for her to be the bearer of good tidings to men of good will, to be the welder of the bonds of brotherhood.

Let us be thankful that many of the finest spirits of modern Christendom are arousing us to a sense of the magnitude of the Church's danger and the grandeur of her opportunity. She is called upon to win democracy for Christ, and she has as her working ideal, as well as her goal, the perfect city eternal in the heavens, whose architect and builder is God. Moreover, she has the inspiring belief that this ideal city itself is but a phase—a mode—in the all-inclusive at-one-ment which is to close the mystic process of creation. For the three circles of the Church, the World, and the Kingdom are destined to become concentric—"God shall be all in all."

J. E. TASMANIA.

HOBART.

THE UNGODLY ORGANISATION OF SOCIETY.

The Rev. A. W. F. BLUNT, M.A.,

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The conflict and contrast between religion, in the popular sense of the term, and the tendencies of modern life, is a feature of our time that certainly does not suffer from lack of notice. That conflict appears, perhaps, most obviously in a country like France, where the most rigid type of ecclesiastical organisation co-exists with the most intense and brilliant development of modern culture. The religious future of France, as of other Roman Catholic countries, is a problem about which none but a very bold or a very ignorant man would at present venture to make any definite prediction. But if we confine our attention to the position of affairs in England, we are faced with evidences of the same or a similar conflict; and it appears to many that, in accordance with the national faculty for tinkering, the champions of organised religion in England are failing to appreciate the real essence of the antagonism. They are uttering ejaculations of pained astonishment at the abstinence of "working men" from Church services; they are adopting all sorts of means, sometimes rather dubious, to draw them there — extra-special missions and mission services of the "brief, bright, and brotherly" type; extra-special men's services; P.S.A. services which assimilate worship to the concert and the conversazione; topical sermons, socialistic sermons,

sermons with titles like those of cheap novels; they are making loud outcries for the modernisation of the Prayer-Book and Bible; and so forth. I do not wish to say that any, or all, of these methods and reforms may not be right and necessary: but I emphatically assert that they do no more than fuss around the fringe of the difficulty. The problem is far wider and deeper than the mere question how to get working men to church. We are faced with a general diversion from organised religion, which affects every class. The root of the mischief lies not in the austerity of Church worship—it may be doubted whether the breezy and vulgar type of service is any more likely to produce a permanent spiritual effect; not in the antiqueness of the phraseology of the Bible and Prayer-Book, for countless uneducated people understand as much of it as they find sufficient for their needs; not in the dulness of sermons—the average sermon is neither dull nor unhelpful to those who wish to listen and learn. Some of these may be secondary causes, some may be adduced as primary excuses. But the trouble lies deeper; it is due to two general facts of modern thought, and not to even a host of superficial anomalies and anachronisms. The first of these facts is that modern thought is drifting more and more into a worship of works, to the neglect of the spiritual side of religion. I need hardly elaborate instances of this tendency; we find such in the so-called "religion" of Socialism (Socialism may be a good or a bad economic and political theory, but it is certainly not a "religion," in the Christian sense of that word), in the preponderant stress which is now laid on philanthropic and social activity, to the neglect of that faith which ought to be the groundwork and motive power of such activity, in the popular proverb that it does not matter what a man believes so long as he acts rightly, in the current depreciation of church-going on the score that many who do not go to church are as good as those who do. This tendency may be summed up as a substitution of morality for spirituality. We are losing the idea of holiness as the religious ideal and communion with

God as the religious inspiration for man; we are putting an ethical ideal and a social inspiration in its place; the common good of mankind is ousting the will of God from its position as the dominant motive of human endeavour. And there are too many signs that religious teachers are swimming with the tide, that their gospel is becoming one of social ethics rather than of religious faith. This may be due to a reaction from a corresponding neglect of that side in past ages, from a lack of emphasis on the social and ethical teaching of Christianity; but there is reason to think that the reaction is in its turn becoming extreme and perverted, and that it is time to protest, in the interests of the spiritual basis of religion, against a one-sided and mutilated conception of Christianity as a mere gospel of social reform or of individual morality.

The other fact is no less notable; it is that the whole conception of modern culture rests upon the worship of autonomy and the dislike of discipline. This is the fetish of political thought and of modern society. And superficially it comes into immediate conflict with the claims of organised religion. A Church, even when it calls itself a free Church, must, merely because it is a society, claim some measure of authority over the individual member; and this claim seems to conflict with the ideal of autonomy. Of course, it is easy to see that this conflict is only seeming. I suppose that even the most tyrannical Churches profess to be the organs not of a heteronomy, but of a theonomy. The claim of any Christian body to authority over its members is based upon its claim to subserve thereby the best interests of the human spirit. The underlying notion is that God's will and man's will ought to collaborate, and that the rule of God's will can only exist in the human soul which wholly and freely assents to it; that what is effected by Church discipline is thus only human autonomy raised to its highest perfection, when God and man are entirely at one; and that, when man is most truly the servant and organ of God, he is most truly his own master, most truly realising his own nature—in short, no Church

professes to exact more than that service of God which is perfect freedom. But, superficially at least, the claim of organised religion comes as the claim of a Church; and to the ordinary man the Church is merely a congeries of men, or perhaps merely a congeries of parsons, seeking to impose a heteronomous dominion upon a world which bends the knee to the idol of autonomy.

These are the two essential facts which appear to be often neglected, if not by the protagonists, at least by the deuteragonists of organised religion; and it surely behoves us to realise and face them boldly, instead of being content to tinker with the difficulty, whilst we fritter away our energies on internecine squabbles over little measures which barely touch the outskirts of the evil. It is more than small anomalies and antique survivals of customary practice which produce the conflict. We are faced with a definite challenge on the ground of general theory. A certain, possibly an increasing, section of society is claiming to be able to organise itself altogether apart from God. How long it will be successful in doing so is a question for the future to answer; at present the centuries of religious teaching still have their effect, and such a thing as a purely atheistic social order does not exist, if it ever can. But, with all such deductions made, we must allow that to a large extent this professedly ungodly organisation of society seems to be, even if it will be so for only a short time, strikingly successful. We find real philanthropy, a genuine desire for social reform, and genuine activity in good works, in people who overtly reject the intrusion of any religious motive; we obtain a fine effect from the cult of human autonomy, interpreted in the light of the modern social theory, without any reference to a belief in anything divine or transcendent in the scheme of things. It is possible, of course, to say—nor would I deny the truth of the statement—that the life of infidel philanthropy differs very much from that of Christian love in its fervour and motive energy. In the one case life is on the platform of the eternal, in the other

on that of the temporal; and I am inclined to believe that philanthropic activity, divorced from the practice of Christian humility and the Christian doctrine of sin, redemption, and grace, generates in man a somewhat pert self-satisfaction and a fussy self-importance, which is very inferior to the character of the saintly Christian philanthropist. A large amount of the philanthropy of the present age produces a result wholly disproportioned to the efforts put forward, simply because it has no spiritual basis in prayer and communion with God. It is all fuss and little power. But the surface effects, which are all that the ordinary man sees or looks for, are in each case much the same; the philanthropic atheist can, and often does, live as honourably, work as hard and as enthusiastically in the cause of social righteousness, as the philanthropic Christian. And the consequence is that the modern man, looking only at works, thinks Christian faith superfluous. It does not matter what a man believes, so long as he acts rightly. The ethical ideal of human brotherhood seems to produce as good results as the religious ideal of the love of God and of man in God. It is, as I said, a definite challenge on the ground of general theory. Is the faith in God necessary for a right organisation of society? Organised religion says "Yes"; modern society often tends to return a negative answer. And though we may believe that modern society will in time find out its mistake, yet time passes; and if it be a mistake, we are not exempt now from the duty of showing where the mistake lies, and of emphasising the true theory in opposition to the false.

We need not anticipate that religion of all sorts will ever be expelled entirely, or even very widely, from human life. The religious instinct is primary in average humanity; and the belief in some sort of God is likely to survive although the beliefs in any particular sort of God were to be extinguished. If we are destined to revert to Paganism in a modernised form, the probable exit from that stage will be (as Mr Chesterton, I believe, somewhere warns us), as it was from the older form of Paganism, the exit into Christianity;

and so we shall be once more boxing the compass of religious progress. But the practical question for us creatures of a day is whether, in the immediate future, Christianity as an organised religion, such as we know it, is likely to survive, whether any form whatever of systematic Christianity has a prospect of remaining in the field. Are we about to relapse into a vague and indefinite Theism, *plus* a social programme, with Christ as the leader and prophet of social reformers, or will anything more definitely Christian, in the accepted sense, be likely to remain? Some may even deny that any kind of theistic theory will stand its ground, and may prophesy that we shall arrive eventually at a social positivism and nothing else. And personally I am disposed to think that, if once Christianity gives way and is submerged, the life of Theism will be a very short one indeed. There are other alternatives: we may be trending towards an impersonal Pantheism, with a supremely uninteresting God, eviscerated of all characteristics which have any attraction to the human heart, a God who is nothing more than the spirit of social progress gradually coming to self-realisation in human society. But, without complicating the question by the introduction of too many possibilities, I ask whether we are to suppose that any organised Christianity is likely to remain, or that all human aspiration is going to diffuse itself in vague theistic or socialistic emotionalism, destitute of any personal appeal to the religious instincts of humanity. As to the ultimate result, those who believe in Christ as expressing truly and completely God's purposes can have no doubt whatsoever. But, short of ultimate success of the faith in Christ, what may we speculate as to the immediate prospect of that faith in England?

I have asked the question, but I should be more than presumptuous if I claimed to be able to give a complete answer. It is something to ask a question, if the question is worth asking. And the answer to this question requires far more prophetic insight and foresight than I possess. But yet I will venture to summarise certain considerations which may

help us to see the line along which an answer is to be looked for. And by way of preface I may say that any system which is to redeem organised Christianity in England must be prepared for a conflict with the spirit of the age. The fault of our present attitude is that we are often too apt to give in to it. This fault, I believe, is very much more marked in the Nonconformist bodies, who seem officially to be making the same mistake as the mediæval Papacy made, and to be substituting the ideal of temporal predominance for that of spiritual attractiveness, and a social or political propaganda for the ideal of general spiritual growth. But the spirit of the age is too all-pervading and all-enveloping for any body of Christians to have entirely escaped its influence. No doubt there are still the seven thousand who have not bent the knee to Baal; no doubt there are still many who want, as all need, a spiritual Christianity. But such are usually the least talkative amongst us; and, measured by the talkers, the spirit of the age is patently unspiritual. Therein it is a spirit with which it is fatal for organised Christianity to compromise. A system that does so may remain strong in popular favour, but it achieves this result at the price of a total loss of religious character. We have to correct, not to submit to, this spirit; and yet we must understand it, if we are to have any chance of tackling it successfully; we must study it, so as to be able to approach it on its most accessible side. And I would suggest that the three main points in the Church's system which will sway the issues of the conflict will be—firstly, its conception of its pastoral function; secondly, its teaching; and thirdly, its conception of its corporate life.

In the first place, every tinge of the old false sacerdotalism must go. It is not all gone yet; but the modern world will not tolerate much longer any theory of a class of people officially privileged to stand in an attitude of peculiar intimacy with God. The theory is not democratic; but, worse than this, it is not true, nor truly apostolic and Catholic. We know enough by now of the primitive Christian doctrine of grace

to know that the priestly body is the whole Church first, and that the clergy are but representatives of the Church. Any notion of a special and exclusive grace belonging to the clergy as such and only mediated to the Church by their agency, is neither scriptural nor Catholic. We must emphasise more and more the representative and not the exclusive position of the ministry. We must revive the idea of the ministry as the official and representative organ of Church life, set apart for purposes of decency and order to do special things, but not thereby endowed with authority or prerogative, except in so far as a minister can personally make good his claim to it; and we must revive the idea of the unofficial ministry of the laity, of the vocation to ministry of every individual Christian, and of his capacity of direct approach to God. Clerical and priestly exclusiveness has often been simply the result of lay indifference and apathy. The call is to the laity to realise their ministry as a high duty and their vocation as a spiritual prerogative, which they are bound to exercise. Thus only can we sanctify the human desire for autonomy by abolishing all suspicion of a human heteronomy, exercised by men of like passions to those whom they serve in the Lord.

Secondly, we must realise that the modern objection to Church creeds and dogmas is not so much that they are not sufficiently intelligible, as that they are not sufficiently understood. In particular, their relation to practical life is not apprehended. We need to emphasise the working value of creeds and dogmas if we are to commend them to the modern mind with its severely practical outlook upon life. If, therefore, with regard to the ministry we must go back to the apostles, with regard to our creed we must go back to Christ, and give to the moral content of the figure of Christ all the stress that we can. It is the merest sensationalism to talk of a new birth in Christ, of being cleansed by the blood of Christ, or of entering into sacramental communion with Christ, unless it is distinctly added that the Christ spoken of is a definite

moral personality, and that these mystical terms imply a recognition of definite moral duties and the definite acceptance of Christ's standpoint towards the moral problems of modern society; that thus "we in Christ," and "Christ in us" are phrases whose meaning on the practical side can only be seen in the fruits of life after the pattern of Christ, and that this is the test and proof of that mystical relationship of which we speak. Again the call is to the laity; they are asked to create and consolidate a definite Christian opinion upon moral questions such as social reform, marriage, the opium and slave and drink traffics, and so on; they are asked to carry their religious principles into the circumstances of English life and to insist upon the observance of these principles in all affairs over which the nation has any control. They are able to insist that, whether politics be Conservative or Liberal or Socialist or anything else, they shall be honest and clean and just to all men; that whether national reform take one shape or another, it shall be inspired by the desire to do what is most in accordance with God's will for mankind, inspired by the vision of the kingdom of Christ, and that whatever laws relating to human life be passed, they shall be animated by the wish to help individual, family, civic, and national life to be pure and holy and God-fearing.

But while we must lay stress upon the works of love as the proper moral outcome of Christian faith, yet there must be no sort of acquiescence in the modern theory of works as the one thing needful. Unless Christianity tries to lift life to the plane of the eternal, it is nothing more than a system of ethics. There must therefore be a proper emphasis upon the doctrine of grace to counteract the modern satisfaction with the temporal and the visible. This life must be placed in its proper perspective as a stage in an eternal process; and in order to make this real, there must be a decided insistence upon the value of the sacramental system and the theory of the sacramental life. Some of the fiercest controversies in religious history have been waged round this idea; but such

controversies have lately affected the setting rather than the doctrine of sacramental practice, and even these are now becoming outworn. We are emerging into a larger age, an age in which the old lines of parties are proving too narrow to hold the flood of spiritual aspiration which is running silently in the souls of many men. Old discussions of externals are losing their interest. There are still extreme partisans on either side; but a vast body of central opinion is forming, which desires and sees its way to real, if not complete, agreement over fundamental realities, and is beginning to perceive that sacramental realities can be equally thoroughly taught, in company with almost any kind of ritualistic framework. This possibility has been and is being proved by experience; and it is here that the Church's chance lies. If its conception of its corporate life is to have any power to spiritualise the mind of the modern world, that conception must place the underlying truths of the sacramental system as the basis and centre and inspiration of Christian life, of its growth, and of its strength. It is here that we can lift life out of the region of purely human ethics into the region of the eternal spiritual values, and so lead mankind to appreciate the difference between a society organised apart from God, and a society organised upon a divine and eternal life. It is by this means that we can prove the inadequacy of the gospel of modern society and can justify the claim of organised religion to be the inspiration of the highest kind of human existence, of the existence which finds its principle of vitality in the flesh and blood of the Son of man. Works alone will never save mankind, nor, probably, a single human soul; but work based on grace, inspired by the Spirit of God, filled with the life of Christ, is the lever, and the only lever, which will uplift the world.

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CONFORMITY AND VERACITY: 1662 AND 1912.

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THE feast of Saint Bartholomew on the 24th of August will mark the 250th anniversary of the date when the Act of Uniformity became effective in 1662. On that day all ministers of the Church of England who had not complied with the demands of the Act were declared to have forfeited their benefices. Most of those affected had already, following the lead of Richard Baxter, resigned their cures; some few preferred to wait and be ejected; in all, about 2500 clergymen passed out of the ministry of the Church.

This was an event of capital importance, for good or evil, in the religious history of England. The Church by law established became a Church in which only a part of the sincere and earnest Christians of the land could find a place. In spite of the determination of the bishops, in spite of the wistful love with which the ejected ministers themselves clung to the hope of an undivided national Church, the Act of Uniformity was necessarily an Act for the creation of Nonconformity. The Conventicle Acts and the Five Mile Act only hastened what they sought to prevent. The Indulgences of Charles, James's Declaration for Liberty of Conscience, the Toleration Act of 1689, were, under the conditions existing, inevitable consequences of the bishops' policy in 1662.

The effect of the Act is in evidence, and cannot be disputed; but the real nature of those points of conscience for

which men laid down their calling and their livelihood, the real difference between the Conformists and the Nonconformists, have been much misunderstood. That difference was not primarily or essentially a difference of doctrine. "We do not dissent," said Baxter, "from the doctrine of the Church of England, expressed in the articles and homilies." Among the ejected there were some who had been loyal churchmen before the Commonwealth, and had subscribed the old prayer-book, but could not subscribe the new. The Nonconformists had no rooted objection to episcopacy; Baxter's own scheme was episcopal. Still less can they be credited with a modern desire for unlimited toleration, liberty to form and preach their own opinions, or freedom from liturgical regulation. Baxter "distinguished," in his own words, "the tolerable party from the intolerable," and in the intolerable party he included "Papists and Socinians"; in 1659 he had written, "Alas, we have real heresies enough among us—Arians, Socinians, Ranters, Quakers, Seekers, Libertines, Familists, and many others; let us reject those that are to be rejected, and spare not." On the one doctrinal point which was prominent in their protest—the salvation of baptised infants—the Nonconformists were less "liberal," in our sense, than the Conformists. And all alike desired uniformity.

It is true that many of the Puritan divines would have preferred another kind of Church government and a very different order of worship. But these objects of desire were less dear to them than the unity of the Church. They yielded every point that was not a point of conscience; and it is important to observe exactly where it was that their conscience made a stand.

First and chiefly, they scrupled to subscribe assent and consent to all and everything contained in and prescribed by the prayer-book imposed by the Act. Many, if not most of the clergy, had not seen the book, and very few, except the bishops and members of Convocation, could have had time to study it in detail, before the Act came into force, for it was issued only a few days before the day appointed. But certain

passages in it, "by-passages and phrases," as Baxter calls them, had already become known, just because they were stones of stumbling to the Puritans. These men could not in conscience express assent and consent to things which they had never examined; and, in particular, there were certain turns of expression, known to be in the book, which stated or implied an interpretation of the accepted Church doctrine such as they could not with truth adopt.

Of a like nature were the other two main objections of the Puritan party. They were called upon to renounce the Solemn League and Covenant as an unlawful oath. There were many who had not taken this oath, some that had even opposed its imposition, who yet did not in conscience believe that it was in itself unlawful. They were called upon to receive episcopal ordination, unless, like Baxter, they had already been ordained by a bishop. In dioceses where such ordination was offered hypothetically, as baptism is administered when a child is not certainly known to be baptised, many Presbyterians accepted it. But in other places they were asked to renounce, in a set form, their "pretended letters of orders," and this would have involved an insincere assertion of disbelief in their own status as lawful ministers. In sum, they did not refuse to submit their own desires to the welfare of the Church; they did refuse, even for the sake of unity, to make solemn assertions which they did not believe to be true. Their scruple of conscience was a scruple of veracity.

Keeping this in mind, and adopting the point of view which it suggests, let us consider the men of the other party, the Conformists. Two classes among them, each of unknown magnitude, may be dismissed at once. The merely professional churchman, bent on preferment as a chief end, would naturally make no bones about subscribing. The excellent but muddle-headed man whose understanding was not acute enough to perceive the differences on which the whole question depended would also sign; why should he not? The conformity of these two classes can hardly be related to the merits of the

particular issue, since it is clear that any subscription test, whomsoever it may exclude, will always admit the rogues and the dunces. With regard, however, to the residue, the reasonably conscientious and intelligent men who conformed, can we form any idea of the standard of verbal veracity with which they were satisfied?

We must, in the first place, remind ourselves that the majority of them recorded their assent and consent to all and everything contained in an unknown document. It is probable that most of them had not seen, certain that very few of them had carefully examined, the schedule of the Act. Those who had not seen the new book could not possibly judge how far it differed from any earlier Book of Common Prayer. The House of Commons had intended to re-enact the second prayer-book of Edward VI., and if this intention had been carried out, many or even most of the Puritan clergy would have conformed. But the original copy could not readily be found, and the Commons therefore substituted the Hampton Court prayer-book, which was a slightly revised version of that of Elizabeth. Even this would have caused a much smaller number of refusals to subscribe. The House of Lords, however, declared for a new revision by Convocation, and hung up the bill for more than ten months while this revision was being prepared. When the bill came back to the Lower House, members accepted this new schedule. At the same time they insisted, against the Lords, on the bill itself, in its full vigour, passing into law without amendment. It is quite clear that the House of Commons was very keenly desirous of Uniformity, but very little concerned about the wording of the document to which the clergy were to be forced into assent and consent. And it is more than probable that they represented, in both points, the general sense of the anti-Puritan party. We cannot resist the impression that most of the Conformists were ready to subscribe any prayer-book, known or unknown, that should be approved by the bishops and enacted by Parliament.

The element of partisanship must, indeed, be allowed for

on both sides. In the nature of things the Puritans were inclined to suspect, their opponents were inclined to welcome, a book prepared under the presidency of Sheldon. To the average Conformist the prayer-book was well enough guaranteed, and even if he had received his copy in time, he would not have dreamed of searching it in a critical spirit. His signature was regarded by himself rather as a stroke of victory over Jack Presbyter than as a solemn self-committal to professions of personal belief. In helping to achieve the ascendency of his own party he believed that he was furthering the true interests of the Church and of sound religion. But when all has been said, and when we have acknowledged that there were good and evil motives, right intentions and wrong opinions on both sides, still, when we consider the nature of the subscription and the circumstances under which it was made, we must conclude that the Conformist party was not marked by any high standard of verbal veracity.

The Church-constitution inaugurated by the Act of Uniformity excluded, among others, men who loved the Church, who were at one with her in doctrine, who were ready to submit to her will in external things, simply because they were scrupulously truthful in the use of words, and admitted to the ministry, among others, men who differed from these only in the one respect that their verbal veracity was less scrupulous. That constitution still exists, and still excludes, and still admits, by that same test of fitness for service in a sacred office. It is true that the points to which this test applies have shifted. The formula of assent has been so modified, and so interpreted both in civil and ecclesiastical courts, that it can hardly put constraint on the most tender conscience to-day. But the form of public worship has remained unchanged, while the belief of all cultured persons has changed very much. The resulting state of things is, in some respects, much more lamentable than was the Ejection of 1662. There is now no question of Church politics, no rough-and-ready dealing by one party with another, to obscure the

naked fact. Many a man who loves the Church as a mother, who shares her ideals, delights in her atmosphere, sees men of his own theological colour usefully and happily active in her ministry, is yet forbidden, by nothing but his own scruples on the point of verbal truthfulness, from sharing in her service.

Before I press this point, let me disclaim, eagerly and sincerely disclaim, any intention of casting blame on those who do not feel any such scruple. It cannot be denied that the unscrupulous man and the stupid man do find their way through barriers which a certain kind of scruple, in men not without intelligence, is unable to pass. But then the unscrupulous man finds his way into all ministries, and is not characteristic of any ; and it is not amiss that here and there a poor understanding should make known, by works that shine before men, how much greater is the worth of character than of mere intellect in the care of souls. I am not now speaking of these. I am speaking of two classes of men, equally good, equally able, equally earnest, but marked by this difference, that the one class has a greater tendency than the other to scruple on the point of veracity in uttered words. Can it be maintained that such a tendency ought to disqualify any man for sacred service in a church? Can it be denied that it does, in fact, disqualify for service in the Church of England?

The actual phrase that arouses a scruple of veracity may be this or that. The theology and cosmology of the seventeenth century cannot possibly provide, to a cultured man of the twentieth century, a liturgy free of all offence. It may be a collect, which asserts that God once drowned the whole world except eight persons ; it may be the Athanasian Creed, or some verse in it, or the Apostles' Creed, with its suggestion of a local heaven, in which is enthroned an incarnate Christ : somewhere in the book, in words which must be uttered in public worship, everybody will find something which he cannot, with strict veracity, utter in a natural sense. During the last few decades this trouble has reached an acute pitch as the result of critical study of the New Testament. A

great company of men, under the guidance of this new knowledge, have developed convictions concerning the person of Jesus Christ which, while confirming and even deepening their reverence for him, have altered its character. They may be men of a fine spiritual sensibility, conscious of a vocation to minister in the Christian Church, competent and sympathetic; and yet, if they happen to be rigorously conscientious in the use of words, they will find it a hard matter to reconcile themselves to the liturgy of the Church of England. Many, no doubt, do overcome or override their scruples, obeying what they regard as a preponderant obligation. Such men are not unknown nor even rare in the Anglican priesthood. The bishops tolerate them, so long as they duly recite the prescribed offices, and refrain from preaching against certain doctrines. But there are others, probably a much greater number, who cannot conquer their repugnance to the use, in worship, of words that do not express their secret feeling or conviction, words which seem to them to convey, sometimes, the very opposite of what they regard as true, or to express a spiritual state which they cannot approve and adopt.

If any good end is served by the exclusion of these men from the ministry, let them remain in exile. The welfare of the Church may well outweigh much agony of soul in individual Christians. But it is difficult to see what good end is served by the exclusion of the scrupulously veracious, while their less scrupulous fellows (less scrupulous on this single point) are admitted. Rather it would appear that the Church herself must suffer by the loss of some of the best and best-equipped minds from her service. Is there any way of bringing it about that a scrupulous verbal veracity shall no longer disqualify for Holy Orders?

Three ways are conceivable. The first is a revision of the liturgy, and the concession of a somewhat larger discretion than now exists in the omission of particular passages. What the prospect may be of eventually effecting such a reform it

would be hard to say; but it could only be achieved after long effort, perhaps after the passing of more than one generation.

A second way would be the carrying into law of a declaratory act, carefully worded, to make clear that the recitation of the liturgy does not actually imply a personal avowal of belief in every statement it contains. There are many to whom this would bring no relief; but there are certainly some to whom many expressions would become possible, if taken as religious poetry, which when they seem to be meant for religious science are obnoxious.

Thirdly, it might be possible to save these wasted men for the Church by establishing in the common sense of the Church itself a conviction that the words of her liturgy are not meant to declare any personal opinion, or to bind the intellect within a narrow hedge of doctrine; that their whole value lies in their appeal to faith, hope, and love, those weightier matters, beside which doctrines and forms are idle things. After all, verbal veracity is the lowest stage of truth, and only exists so long as words are interpreted on their lowest plane, as vehicles of mere information. Is religion concerned with this? Her interest lies in wisdom, power, and holiness. The noble liturgy of the English Church, rescued from the sordid mesh of opinion and dialectic, would be found rich in the truth of wisdom, which has inspired all that is best in Protestanism, and the truth of power, which has lived through all the corruptions of Catholicism, and would help us all, liberal and orthodox, towards the higher wisdom of holiness. If this last way could be pursued it would soon make any other way superfluous; for it would inevitably happen, with or without statutory revision, that jarring and unhelpful phrases would disappear, by disuse, from the liturgy, leaving the rest in greater beauty and strength. With them would go the pest of esotericism, some scandal, and much pain. Perhaps this mode of ending the evil, even if the time is not yet quite ripe for it, may soon dawn above the horizon of the possible.

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THE VAIN APPEAL OF DOGMA TO SCIENCE.

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In an article which appeared in the issue of this Journal for April 1911 I sketched what seems to me might happen if theologians were content to treat theology as a science. Theological dogmas would become theological theories. As intellectual instruments these theories would be re-shaped from time to time; as intellectual concepts their relations would at times be readjusted. Recent writings show that some theologians are not unwilling to set out on the path which leads to this goal, but most of them draw back when they see the goal to which the path is leading them. In this article I will try to develop somewhat more fully what I take to be the fundamental difference between theological dogmas and scientific, or pragmatic theories, and to set forth some of the effects of each of these kinds of concepts on intellectual, emotional, and practical life.

One may best understand the nature of theological dogmas by considering some instances of their use. There was once an old Scotchwoman who showed a complete understanding of the meaning of theological dogmas by the ruthlessly logical application she made of one of them to the conduct of One other than herself. Her eternal verity was, "Observe the Sabbath day . . . in it thou shalt do no manner of work." When some one remarked that Christ walked in the fields on

the Sabbath day and plucked ears of corn, she, true theologian, replied, "And indeed I never thocht the better o' Him for't." Bishop Wilberforce fell far short of the clear understanding which brought this fearless courage when he declared that one who denies that Balaam's ass really and literally spoke with a man's voice is thereby robbing men of "the very foundation of the Faith."

To both of these theologians a dogma was an assertion, a declaration, of a principle, or a fact, or a rule of conduct, which had to be accepted because of the authority that made it, and by virtue of its bearing the stamp of that authority became more real than any facts of human experience. An examination of the writings of theologians shows that some of them regard a dogma as the telling of a fact; some as the announcement of a principle or an intellectual concept; some as the promulgation of a rule of conduct; and some as the declaration of an emotional impulse. The expression *a revealed truth* is used in place of the word *dogma* by theologians who differ as to the exact meaning, position, and use of authoritative formulas. The essence of a theological dogma is its claim to be a declaration made by extra-human authority, which must be accepted by human beings as more real than any religious experiences, and more binding intellectually than any conceptions humanly formed to explain these experiences.

Recently published writings show that theologians still insist on regarding, and using, dogmas as fundamental realities. In his interesting book, *Faith and Experience*, Bishop Chandler says that in fashioning a creed the intellect "simply tries to translate a symbolic and pictorial revelation into a body of systematic and balanced propositions." When one finds that he declares some of the "systematic and balanced propositions" to be at once "basal facts" and "revealed truths," while he leaves to philosophy the task of determining the character of the other parts of the "body," one discovers that he places his selected propositions on a higher level of reality, and therefore of importance, than either the facts of religious experience or

the untranslated "symbolic and pictorial revelation." The argument is interesting. A divinely given revelation becomes more *basal*, more *true*, by being translated, by human minds, into human concepts which are themselves signs and symbols of human religious experience.

An important controversy concerning "Liberty of Criticism in the Church of England" was carried on by Dr Talbot (Bishop of Winchester) and Mr Emmet in the *Nineteenth Century* magazine in the last three months of 1911. Both of these theologians agree that a very important function of the Church is to bear corporate witness to revealed truth. Dr Talbot asserts that even a slight explanation of the theological dogmas contained in the ancient formularies of the Church cannot be given without risk to "the integrity of the Trust." *The Trust* seems to be an obligation to act as the repository of certain "systematic and balanced propositions" which must be regarded as more important to the Christian Society than anything else. Mr Emmet appeals to "the stored spiritual experience of humanity" as the tribunal which is to decide what is "the inner faith . . . which lies behind the changing analysis and explanations of that faith worked out by theology." To this authority Mr Emmet assigns much the same function as most orthodox theologians assign to the official authorities of the Church. The main business of the authority is to declare essential truths. An examination of the example given by Mr Emmet of these essential truths shows that it is not a *truth*, in the meaning given to that word in science and in pragmatic philosophy, but that it is an assertion which must be accepted as more real than the facts of religious experience. Dr Talbot and Mr Emmet are like other theologians; both use experience, not to gain true conceptions, but to witness to the reality of an indefinite but all-important something beyond experience called *essential truth*. This is not the method of gaining truths which is used in science and in pragmatic philosophy.

What is meant in science, in pragmatic philosophy, by

explaining? What is the function of a theory? How does pragmatic science deal with realities and with truths? What is the essential difference between a theory and a dogma? In the intellectual life "we harness perceptual reality in concepts in order to drive it better to our ends."[1] I am sure that all students of natural science would admit this to be their practice. They make the harness; they do the harnessing and the driving. Nature spreads before them a network of roads and paths; the successful driver is he who has a disciplined instinct for choosing the best road. As a class, theologians maintain that religious reality is harnessed, not by them, in dogmatic concepts, and that it can be driven to good ends only by driving it to ends imposed by the authority which did the harnessing.

The fundamental difference between the position and the use of theories in theology and in science I take to be this. One practice accepts theories as the dogmatic harness which an external authority has so finely fitted to the facts of religious experience that if an attempt be made to remove it —it may, perhaps, be re-adjusted—the facts shy and refuse to be driven to a place of safety. When Dr Temple made a mild attempt to do a little driving on his own account, he was declared by Dr Pusey to be "responsible for the ruin of countless souls." The other practice—the scientific or pragmatic—uses theories as the most suitable harness which can be made by us, at the time, for keeping teams of facts together and driving them to a place where fresh facts wait to be added to the team, or to take the places of some that are over-driven, where the harness can be removed and replaced by better.

Theologians accept ready-made harness, and hustle teams of religious facts till, somehow or other, they are got into the harness. Men of science select teams of facts from nature's spacious, overcrowded stables, and make the harness fit the team.

Theologians begin with dogmas which they try to

[1] William James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 65.

rationalise by religious facts. Students of science begin with facts which they rationalise by theories. Theologians try to rationalise dogmas by making their terms like the facts of religious life, and then assume that the religious experiences are held together by constraining laws, discovered in the dogmas. They who practise scientific method rationalise the facts which they observe, and experimentally discover, by likening them, one by one, to the terms of a theoretical series; then they assume that the relations which hold good among the latter also hold good among the perceptual experiences; and they test this assumption by returning to these experiences. Theologians distil facts from dogmas. Men of science distil theories from facts.

The best, the truest theory is the one which reveals the most relations between natural facts. The best, the most theologically-satisfying dogma, is the one which most authoritatively declares the relations of religious facts, and has the most convincing appearance of reflecting its own certitude on to religious experiences.[1] A scientific theory is a map on a flat surface, the features of which are "signs and symbols of things that in themselves are bits of sensible experience." Bits of religious experience are, for the theologian, signs and symbols of eternal verities which are shadowed forth by dogmas.

The theological method has been tried, again and again, in science—for instance, by the alchemists, for many centuries; it was abandoned because it did not produce genuine knowledge. This method is doubly misleading. It makes dogmatic reality vastly more important than perceptual reality; its *laws* are intellectualistic definitions extracted from dogmas, and are regarded as exerting a compelling force on experiential realities. Scientific method, beginning with perceptual realities, makes *laws* which are descriptive formulas applicable to classes of facts, and includes them in

[1] Compare William James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, chap. IV., especially pp. 70–74. Compare also Poincaré, *Science and Hypothesis*, pp. 161–163.

theories which are intellectual working-substitutes for large portions of the perceptual series. The theologian may sometimes seem to take religious facts as his fundamental realities; but his final appeal is always made to some dogmatic assertion which he declares to be the unchangeable foundation whereon alone the edifice of his religious truth can be built. For him, certain dogmatic statements exist; he does not discuss their truth or falseness; they are; they are the touch-stones by which he tries what he calls the truth of religious experiences. If religious experiences lead to, and issue in, these dogmas, they are declared to be true; if they do not lead to, and issue in, these dogmas, they are declared to be untrue. Dogmas are theological realities; religious experiences are more or less true. For the man of science, as for the pragmatic philosopher, certain perceptual realities exist; he does not think of them as true or untrue; they are; he uses them as touch-stones by which he determines the greater or less truthfulness of his theories. Facts are scientific realities; theories are more or less true.

Theological method is scientific method standing on its head with its feet in the air. The two methods cannot be reconciled. Like right-handed and left-handed gloves, one cannot be superimposed on the other. We have seen some theologians vainly striving to draw right-handed gloves on to their left hands.

There are some modern theologians who tell their readers that scientific theories are like theological dogmas, that they are as real to men of science as the experiences which they are used to explain. These theologians, being accustomed to confuse truth and reality, say that scientific men also confuse truth and reality. In his book, *The Faith and Modern Thought*, Mr Temple writes: "The scientists who have produced the electrical theory of matter believe that the result of their scientific inquiry is fact; that the chairs and tables of our ordinary use consist not only of molecules, which consist of atoms, but that even the atoms themselves are each a kind of solar system of centres of electrical force.

Well, they do not look like it; and yet it is believed; it is believed on the simple evidence of reason. You are assuming that when you have thought accurately about the facts of perception, the result of all your thinking is fact equally with the thing you first perceived. That is the basis of all science; it is a colossal assumption, but science cannot move one step without it."

It is not difficult to understand why a determined theologian should completely misunderstand scientific method, should hopelessly confuse facts and theories, realities of experience and truthfulness of hypotheses, accurate reasoning and unreasonable dogmatism. He applies his false method to theological dogmas, and triumphantly announces that science bids him declare these dogmas to be statements of facts. He argues thus: Men of science declare that "when you have thought accurately about the facts of perception, the result of all your thinking is fact equally with the thing you first perceived." The Church has been thinking about religious facts for a long time. As the Church is supernaturally enlightened and guided, you must admit its thinking to be accurate. The results of the Church's thinking are expressed in the authorised formularies. Therefore we are compelled by the teaching of science—teaching which must be obeyed—to accept these formularies as facts. And these formularies are universal facts. They are not, like the religious experiences of the individual, realities for this man or for that man; like scientific theories, they are true for all men, under all conditions.

Mr Temple's book went into a second edition a few months after its publication.

Theologians used to abuse science and preach the limited application of scientific method. They are now learning a better way. They boldly assert that their method is the method of science, and then declare that their devotion to science compels them to use its method in theology.

Scientific method and theological method have nothing in common. Scientific theories and theological dogmas differ

fundamentally in their meaning, their functions, their influence. The use of scientific method produces a mental temperament, an outlook on life, a conduct of life, very different from the temperament, general outlook, and conduct which are produced by the use of theological method.

To live in the world of theological dogmas is to live in a world of unrealities. The acceptance of these dogmas protects a man from the great trouble of life, the trouble of thinking. Contact with new religious experiences produces in many theologians a feeling of irritation, which finds vent in querulous protests and impassioned denunciations. The instances which are enumerated by Mr Emmet in his historical survey of the actions of Anglican theologians in the last half century give ample proof of the justness of this assertion. When new religious facts are discovered, some disagreeable hypothesis has to be grafted on to the dogma which used to fulfil its function of "protective resistance." The result is unsatisfactory. There is an emotional and intellectual gap between the old dogma and the new guess. This must be so if it is taken for granted that the reality of the religious facts is to be tested by their agreement with the dogma which is more real than they.

To live in the world of scientific theories is to live in constant contact with realities. He who is accustomed to use scientific theories is brought at every moment into close touch with an unending series of sensible impressions. The botanist makes no progress in his use of the conception of constructive metabolism, unless he is constantly watching the growth and the decay of a thousand diverse plants. The chemist in his laboratory is guided to-day by the conceptions of atoms, molecules, electrons, and energy; but at every moment he is living in personal contact with discrete facts, the throbbing reality of which makes his theories warm, and therefore directive.

The man of science welcomes each new, upsetting experience; for every one of them widens his outlook, brings to him

the sense of spaciousness, the joy of movement. The theologian dreads change; for, though he loudly declares that he holds absolute truth, he fears lest at any moment his truth should be proved untrue. When "a new planet swims into *his* ken," he is afraid. His essential truth allows no place for new appearances. Comets and meteor-showers are forbidden in the theological sky; they are eagerly sought for, and welcomed, by the scientific astronomer. The man of science delights to find change everywhere. Rest, changelessness, immobility, to him are death. At each step he modifies his intellectual conceptions. Surrounded, impressed, by the appalling, but comforting, manifoldness of natural facts, he would not be guilty of the comical impertinence of claiming that any of his little schemes embodies the absolute truth. Walk in the woods, with seeing eyes, and receptive heart, and active mind, "in the spring-time, when birds do sing, ding-a-dong-ding"; you soon forget all about *absolute truth*; you hear the call of living things, and you realise that life is best. The myriad changes of Nature should stir a man's enthusiasm, rouse his admiration and wonder, increases his courage, strengthen his will, bring to him the delicious sense of contact with a world of realities which slowly but unceasingly grows more familiar but can never be wholly known.

Faith, hope, and love, these three, become matters of little importance when the acceptance of theological dogmas is made the test of religious living. When disputes about dogmas have worn themselves out, there remain mental lassitude, emotional coldness, practical unbelief. Happily, the theologian sometimes forgets his theology and drifts back into religion.

However strange dogmas may appear to those who are accustomed to use scientific theories, there can be no doubt that the state of mind, the general view of life, the manner of intellectual and emotional living which are produced by using dogmas, appeal to the plain man. The plain man welcomes dogmatic certitude, guaranteed by authority. He

accepts with joy an authority which seems to be definite, but is really vague. He delights in phrases which all of his kind can recite, while each attaches to them his own indeterminate meaning. How admirably do theological dogmas fulfil these conditions! Advanced theologians soothe the anxious inquirer by assuring him that the essential truth of a dogma has little or nothing to do with the facts of which untrained minds suppose it to be the expression. No one can ask for greater elasticity than that. Dogmas seem to be sharp, definite statements of facts, conceptions, beliefs; they really encourage each interpreter to find behind them the essential truth he has himself placed there. They are "lathes painted to look like iron"; therein lies their abiding influence over human beings. The plain man rejoices when he is encouraged by theologians to speak of "the old creed presented in new intellectual forms." He expands his chest, and feels himself an orthodox freethinker. Like the theologians, the plain man finds support and uplifting in the use of capital letters. To begin an ordinary word with a capital letter is, for many, to change a word into a mystic symbol.

Theologians follow the traditional philosophy which has always taught that abstract thinking is vastly superior to living in perceptual realities. Life is very interesting, but it is terribly unsatisfying to him who longs for the changeless immobility of absolute truth. Life is palpably imperfect, because it is life. "What's come to perfection perishes." It is natural to human beings to assume that perfection and changelessness are identical. This was the dominating idea of alchemy. The alchemists sought perfection in immobility. The result of their quest is chemistry, which finds stability in processes of change.

When it has been found possible to substitute for pieces of perceptual reality, in which no event ever exactly repeats itself, mind-models that are comparatively simple and tangible, men jump to the conclusion that the intellectual substitutes are more real, because less changeful, than the ceaseless ebb and

flow of tangled experiences. They are able to handle the mind-models with mental satisfaction, and to use them as guides in their excursions into the mazes of facts. They find that the models are enormous helps to them in their endeavours to move about, intelligently and comfortably, amid the flux of perceptual realities. No wonder that they regard the simple schemes, constructed by human minds, as more real than the disconcerting facts. No wonder that they then declare the facts to be illusions, the intellectual scheme to be the essential truth. No wonder that the next step is to regard the essential truth to be a shadowing-forth of the absolute truth to which they will attain when they are freed from the shackles of passing illusions. It is so easy to forget that essential truths are only signs and symbols of parts of some of the intertwined, palpitating experiences which are life. It is so delightful, because so easy, to live intellectually in signs and symbols, and to forget realities. One is saved many difficulties, many bewilderments, many disappointments. But one must pay for the luxurious delights. Realities become unreal; changelessness is the longed-for goal. Vivifying thinking stops. As Bishop Westcott said, "Art becomes photography, and faith is represented by a phrase."

From the desolating hope of immutability we are saved by the vision of that rich, full, warm *becoming* which science has brought to men. If we long for intellectual immobility, we shall do well to rest, now, in theological dogmas. If we eagerly expect intellectual and emotional "adventures brave and new," we shall do well to prepare ourselves for them, now, by the constant use of scientific theories.

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LOGIC, M. BERGSON, AND MR H. G. WELLS.

PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN.

FROM the time of Newton till about half-way into the nineteenth century, and, in some quarters, up to the present day, the triumph of mathematical physics — especially in astronomy—brought about a belief that the world is constructed of mathematical concepts. Thus, people have believed that matter is an aggregate of attracting or repelling points, or that atoms have the character of manufactured articles, and so on; and theories of the ether also retain traces of an analogous metaphysical error.

The Theory of Evolution, with its emphasis on the fact that the things in the world around us are in a perpetual flux,[1] began to disturb those who think that logic is a science for dealing with those ill-defined collections of natural objects that are called in common parlance, "classes." This view is undoubtedly encouraged by elementary text-books. Thus, Jevons, in his *Elementary Lessons in Logic*, uses names like "metals" as logical class-names.[2] But such pseudo-concepts as are represented by the class-names of ordinary language

[1] *Cf.* for these kinds of views in logic and physics, J. B. Stallo, *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics*, 4th ed., London, 1900, pp. 137, etc.; E. Mach, *History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy*, Chicago, 1911, p. 17.

[2] However, in a note, on p. 38 (I quote from the 1907 edition), on the ordinary definition of the term "metal," Jevons remarks that: "It is doubtfully true that all metals possess metallic lustre, and chemists would find it difficult to give any consistent explanation of their use of the name; but the statements in the text are sufficiently true to furnish an example."

are, as Herbart, Hamilton, and Stallo[1] have observed, transformed by a judgment which brings them into relation, by either amplifying or restricting their respective implications. "From the judgment of Thomas Graham that 'hydrogen is a metal,' both the term 'hydrogen' and the term 'metal' emerged with new meanings."

Of all things in nature, it seems to be true that they grade into one another. All things are more or less rigid and more or less fluid, and we find neither absolutely rigid bodies nor perfect fluids. Things seem continually to escape description and classification, owing to their being in a perpetual flux. "Imagine," says Professor James Ward,[2] "as Mach suggests, that the earth were the scene of incessant earthquakes, or that the stars behaved like a swarm of flies: how should we apply the law of inertia then? Well, but to those who mean seriously to handle the universe as a mere problem in abstract dynamics we must reply that the earth *is* the scene of incessant convulsions and the fixed stars *are* like a swarm of bees. The costliness of the devices to eliminate terrestrial oscillations in certain attempts at experimental precision and the elaborate calculations to unravel the 'proper motions' of the less distant stars are plain evidence of the truth of this seemingly extravagant statement."

I.

Mr H. G. Wells[3] finds fault with Logic because it seems to him "a system of ideas and methods remote and excluded from the world of fact."[4]

Books on Logic seemed to Mr Wells to be assuring him that he always thought in the form:

"M is P,
S is M,
S is P,"

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 36.

[2] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 2nd ed., London, 1903, vol. i. p. 79.

[3] The part of Mr Wells's writings with which we are concerned here is pp. 13–43 of his *First and Last Things: A Confession of Faith and Rule of Life* (London, 1908).

[4] *First and Last Things*, p. 13.

whereas the method of his reasoning was almost always in the form:

"S_1 is more or less P,
S_2 is very similar to S_1,
S_2 is very probably but not certainly more or less P.
Let us go on that assumption and see how it works."

"I looked," said Mr Wells,[1] "into the laws of thought and into the postulates upon which the syllogistic logic is based, and it slowly became clear to me that from my point of view, the point of view of one who seeks truth and reality, logic assumed a belief in the objective reality of classification of which my studies in biology and mineralogy had largely disabused me. Logic, it seemed to me, had taken a common innate error of the mind and had emphasised it in order to develop a system of reasoning that should be exact in its processes." In reality, no class has sharply defined boundaries; "classification and number, which in truth ignore the fine differences of objective realities, have in the past of human thought been imposed upon things . . ."[2]; and: "these things —number, definition, class and abstract form—I hold, are merely unavoidable conditions of mental activity—regrettable conditions rather than essential facts. *The forceps of our minds are clumsy forceps and crush the truth a little in taking hold of it. . . .*"[3]

As an illustration of what he meant to convey in this "attack upon the philosophical validity of general terms," Mr Wells[4] described a process-reproduction of a photograph: "At a little distance you really seem to have a faithful reproduction of the original picture, but when you peer closely you find not the unique form and masses of the original, but a multitude of little rectangles, uniform in shape and size. The more earnestly you go into the thing, the closelier you look, the more the picture is lost in reticulations. I submit, the world of reasoned inquiry has a very similar relation to the world of fact. For the rough purposes of every day the net-

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 14. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 17. [3] *Ibid.* [4] *Ibid.*, pp. 17–18.

work picture will do, but the finer your purpose the less it will serve, and for an ideally fine purpose, for absolute and general knowledge that will be as true for a man at a distance with a telescope as for a man with a microscope, it will not serve at all.

"It is true you can make your net of logical interpretation finer and finer, you can fine your classification more and more —up to a certain limit. But essentially you are working in limits, and as you come closer, as you look at finer and subtler things, as you leave the practical purpose for which the method exists, the element of error increases. . . . Every species waggles about in its definition, every tool is a little loose in its handle, every scale has its individual error."

In principle this illustration is the same as Bergson's cinematograph described in section II. below. And Mr Wells's[1] later came even closer to Bergson's illustration:

"The current syllogistic logic rests on the assumption that either A is B or it is not B. The practical reality is that nothing is permanent; A is always becoming more or less B or ceasing to be more or less B. But it would seem the human mind cannot manage with that. It has to hold a thing still for a moment before it can think it. . . . It cannot contemplate things continuously, and so it has to resort to a series of static snapshots. It has to kill motion in order to study it, as a naturalist kills and pins out a butterfly in order to study life.

"You see the mind is really pigeon-holed[2] and discontinuous in two respects, in respect to time and in respect to classification; whereas one has a strong persuasion that the world of fact is unbounded or continuous."

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 25.

[2] Mr Wells (*ibid.*, p. 16), speaking of the class *chair* which has not sharply defined edges, says: "It is only because we do not possess minds of unlimited capacity, because our brain has only a limited number of pigeon-holes for our correspondence with a world of objective uniques, that we have to delude ourselves into the belief that there is a chairishness in this species common to and distinctive of all chairs."

To these strictures of Mr Wells on logic we may reply, it seems to me, that either they are psychological—in which case they are irrelevant to logic—or they are false. It is not a problem of logic to provide things which actually occur in the real world with definitions with, so to speak, sharp edges, nor even to decide whether this is possible; but what logic is concerned with is the drawing of conclusions from given premisses.

And again, Mr Wells does not analyse deeply enough. In his description of the process of conclusion generally used by him, he speaks of S being "more or less" P. What he means is that some S is P and some not. Mr Wells denies this for all the S's and P's with which we have to deal. But, as Frege[1] says, "Such pseudo-concepts (*begriffsartige Bildungen*) logic cannot recognise as concepts; it is impossible to establish exact laws about them." Are there, then, any concepts? Mr Wells doubts this,[2] and unaccountably seems to have forgotten that there is a science of arithmetic. Suppose that we lived in a fluid world. This is indeed the case, but let us suppose the fluidity greatly exaggerated. Would twice two be four then? It would be practically certain that if we added two things to two things they would coalesce. Even in our own world, if we brought such solid-looking things as apples together very slowly, so that we took some years about it, the result would seem to Mr Wells to disprove arithmetic, for there would be no apples left.[3] If there were no comparatively solid bodies in the world, it is possible that we should never have discovered the multiplication tables; but they would have been true, though undiscovered, just as the North Pole

[1] *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*, Bd. ii., Jena, 1903, pp. 69–70; *cf.* Frege's letter to Peano in the *Revue des Mathématiques*, t. vi.

[2] Mr Wells (*op. cit.*, p. 19) says that the neat, sharp-edged circles of logicians are "required for the purposes of his science, but they are departures from the nature of fact."

[3] *Cf.* Mr B. Russell's argument against empiricism in geometry, in his *Principles of Mathematics*, Cambridge, 1903, pp. 405–406.

existed before Commander Peary was born, and just as nobody believes that Columbus created America.

Writers of text-books on Logic, then, mislead some good people by their illustrations, which are rarely taken, as I think they ought to be taken, from arithmetic and geometry.

The law that S is either P or not P requires S and P to be concepts, and thus sharply defined. If some S is P and some not, we must analyse S, and then we find the law to hold about the elements—the points, so to speak—of S. Mr Wells regards it as an inherent vice in the human mind so to analyse. He has avoided this vice by not remarking that, though by microscope or knife we shall never succeed in separating any piece of matter into its ultimate elements, we have succeeded in constructing, out of conceptions which *can* be so analysed, mathematical models of parts of the universe, which reproduce with great closeness natural events such as the motion of the earth round the sun and the moon round the earth. Therein, of course, lies the value of mathematical theories of natural phenomena; we can make our model work quicker or slower at pleasure, and thus, with a very fair probability of accuracy, reconstruct a certain kind of past events and predict future ones. In many cases, this process has been shown to be possible by the actual manufacture of a working model: hence the importance of logical and mathematical conceptions for those empiricists who implicitly complain of the exaggerated importance given to the number 2 (which nobody has seen or touched), and, in their haste to think about actual things, overlook the way they must think, even in order to think about them.

And both M. Bergson and Mr Wells lament that we must think in propositions, and not in propositional functions. It requires a *function*, containing a variable, to assert something about all the members of a certain class, such as a class of instants, while a *proposition* contains nothing variable. Thus, if we suppose "it rains at the point (x, y, z) of space at the instant t" to represent, when x, y, z, and t are given fixed

meanings, a proposition,[1] the phrase "it rains at the given point (x, y, z)" represents a propositional function of the variable t. It only becomes the representative of a proposition when t is fixed. Thus the very essence of a propositional function is that it takes the place of a whole class—in general infinite—of propositions. The theory of propositions, being that of all deduction, is fundamental to the whole of logic, and to require, as M. Bergson does, a movement to be indecomposable is to assert that a propositional function cannot be explained as a certain class of propositions, but contains, besides the notion of functionality, yet another indefinable element not reducible to the notion of proposition. And the contention of M. Bergson and Mr Wells that the continuum of nature cannot be reduced to a cinematographic series of events of instants is a result of this. But the contention is made plausible by the correct observation that a continuum of change cannot be reproduced by a finite series of statical states, any more than a circle is a regular polygon of a great number of sides. This is true, but all depends, in this sentence, on the word *finite*. There is no paradox in the statement that a continuum is a series (of numbers or points), providing that this series is infinite and has a certain ordinal character.[2] And Zeno's flying arrow is really at rest at every moment of its flight,[3] only the series of moments is what is known to mathematicians as "continuous" and accurately described by them in logical terms. If it were possible so to arrange that the photographs in a cinematograph formed a continuous, and therefore infinite series, there would be no difference, in respect of continuity, between the actual motion and the reproduced one. In this we assume that actual motion is what mathematicians call "continuous"; though a mathematician's "continuity" is a conception unnecessarily refined for the

[1] In point of fact, of course, "it rains" cannot, it seems, be given a precise definition. Legal definitions, it should be noticed, are unsatisfactory attempts to combine logical exactness with practicality.

[2] See B. Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 347–8.

usual gross needs of the physicist. Physicists, as a rule, do not feel the necessity of analysing logically the conceptions which they use with a sort of pious faith.

II.

Let us now try briefly to give an account of the views of M. Bergson to which we have already referred.

According to Bergson, the intellect is so constructed as to apprehend reality in a static fashion; the discontinuity which appears to us to characterise the external world is the form that the understanding gives to the external world as a necessity of its function; the continuity which is the essence of life and reality can only enter the categories of the understanding as a discontinuity; the paradoxes of Zeno and Kant lie in the nature and limitations of the intellect, which can only represent change and movement statically—that is, as states which themselves do not change or move; the intellect is like a cinematograph: to the intellect, movement, change, and becoming seem to consist of a succession of unchanging states, and these fixed states are then thought to be the reality.[1]

In *L'Évolution Créatrice*, we read[2] that "our concepts have been formed in the image of solids, and our logic is above all the logic of solids." The fourth chapter of this work[3] is partly devoted to an exposition of "the cinematographic mechanism of thought and the mechanistic illusion."

To confute the argument of Zeno about the flying arrow, Bergson[4] says: "But the arrow never *is* in any point of its trajectory. . . . It is true that, if it stopped there, it would remain there. . . . The truth is that, if the arrow sets out from the point A to reach the point B, its movement A B is

[1] Hibbert Journal, vol. viii., July 1910, pp. 880, 881, 882. These sentences are from an article by H. Wildon Carr on "The Philosophy of Henri Bergson" (pp. 873–883).

[2] Paris, sixième édition, p. i.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 295 *sqq.*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 334.

as simple and as indecomposable, *quâ* movement, as the tension of the bow which projects it."

III.

We now return to Mr Wells, and give some other extracts illustrating his views on the nature of Logic.

"We have," said Mr Wells,[1] "to disabuse ourselves from the superstition of the binding nature of definitions and the exactness of logic. We have to cure ourselves of the natural tricks of common thought and argument. You know the way of it, how effective and foolish it is; the quotation of the exact statement of which every jot and tittle must be maintained, the challenge to be consistent, the deadlock between your terms and mine."

"There is a growing body of people which is beginning to hold . . . that counting, classification, measurement, the whole fabric of mathematics, is subjective and untrue to the world of fact, and that the uniqueness of individuals is the objective truth."[2]

And lastly: "Man, thinking man, suffers from intellectual over-confidence and a vain belief in the universal validity of reasoning";[3] and "we have to discourage the cheap tricks of controversy, the retort, the search for inconsistency. We have to realise that these things are as foolish and ill-bred and anti-social as shouting in conversation or making puns; . . . ."[4]

We are afraid, then, that it is a breach of good manners to point out, *à propos* of Mr Wells's sentence, on the same page: "Of everything we need to say: this is true but it is not quite true," that the principle of the argument called *reductio ad absurdum* is that whatever implies its own untruth is untrue. Thus the principle that no truth is quite true, implying, as it does that itself is quite true, implies its own falsehood, and is therefore false.[5]

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 31. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 34. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 42. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 43.
[5] Russell, *Amer. Journ. of Math.*, vol. xxviii., 1906, p. 168.

IV.

Finally, we may refer to the other objection of Mr Wells to Logic—his dislike of negative terms.

Mr Wells, after pointing out[1] the "incurable mental vice" of imagining something answering to a perfectly meaningless name, of imagining that to this name corresponds a not-empty, or, as Mr Wells expresses it, a "positive,"[2] class. And "this is true not only of quite empty terms, but of terms that carry a meaning. It is a mental necessity that we should make classes and use general terms, and as soon as we do that we fall into immediate danger of unjustifiably increasing the intension of these terms. You will find a large proportion of human prejudice and misunderstanding arises from this universal proclivity."[3]

Strangely enough, Mr Wells speaks[4] of the class of negative terms "Not-A" as "empty," when, as he correctly remarks,[5] where the A-terms are represented by the points within a circle, the not-A-terms should be rather represented by all the rest of the plane. "But the logician finds it necessary for his processes to present that outer Not-A as bounded, and to speak of the total area of A and Not-A as the Universe of Discourse; and the metaphysician and the common-sense thinker alike fall far too readily into the belief that this convention of method is an adequate representation of fact."[6]

"Whatever positive class you make, whatever boundary you draw, straight away from that boundary begins the corresponding negative class and passes into the illimitable horizon of nothingness. You talk of pink things, you ignore, as the arbitrary postulates of logic direct, the more elusive shades of pink, and draw your line. Beyond is the not-pink, known and knowable, and still in the not-pink region one comes to the Outer Darkness. Not blue, not happy, not iron, all the *not* things meet in that Outer Darkness. That same

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 20–21. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 20. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 22. [5] *Ibid.* [6] *Ibid.*, pp. 22–23.

Outer Darkness and nothingness is infinite space and infinite time and any being of infinite qualities; and all that region I rule out of court in my philosophy altogether. I will neither affirm nor deny if I can help it about any *not* things. I will not deal with *not* things at all, except by accident and inadvertence. If I use the word 'infinite' I use it as one often uses 'countless' . . . or 'immeasurable' . . . that is to say, as the limit of measurement, as a convenient equivalent to as many times this cloth yard as you can, and as many again and so on until you and your numerical system are beaten to a standstill."[1]

And some words, such as "Omniscient," impress Mr Wells[2] as being words with a delusive air of being solid and full, when they are practically negative terms, "really hollow with no content whatever."

There are two questions which Mr Wells should have answered: how is it that A (a positive class) is not-not-A? For this must seem to Mr Wells like the peculiar process imagined by some mystical mathematicians of going from the real to the imaginary and interpretable and back again to the real, by a process of deduction which is valid throughout. And secondly, how is it that certain things, as an infinite class, for example, can be given both a positive and negative form of definition?

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[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 23–24. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

THE ARTISTIC ATTITUDE IN CONDUCT.

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There is, says Plato, a certain ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; and a difference, at least, between artists and moralists has descended to Whistler and Tolstoy. Though most attempts at reconciliation have only embittered the parties and discredited their authors, it may still be worth asking whether they, together with the original coldness, are not founded in a misunderstanding.

As the question has been most often treated in the form: how far the moral point of view may or must be introduced into art, I propose to confine myself to the converse: how far the artistic attitude is necessary in conduct.

If it may be assumed that æsthetic perception is an end in itself, whether it also has good effects upon conduct, health, and commerce, or not; and also that it gives us some better insight or emotion as to the world, and is no mere pleasant feeling, incapable of any kind of rightness; we find ourselves faced by the paradox that art has commonly been suspected by the graver moralists of being hostile, or at least dangerous, to right conduct. Those who definitely held that art made men worse, have generally been driven to deny one of my axioms, and, refusing it the honour of an end in itself, to expel it from their republic; often justifying themselves by denying also the other and holding that art is not capable of any kind of truth.

But in both these theses I venture to assume that they were wrong, so that the practical reform they deduced from them was impossible. Wrong too, for the same reasons, I assume, were those who, without courage for such extreme courses, felt it necessary to apologise for their toleration, and to point out with Horace, Sidney, and Dr Johnson, that art may by care be made harmless or even mildly corrective though still fairly palatable.

What might well puzzle the unsophisticated inquirer is how or why ever this suspicion, this need for apology, this armed neutrality arose. Why is "the artistic temperament" often thought to be a soft name for roguery, and the moralist almost of necessity a philistine? There is not much empirical evidence for the notion that Sophocles, Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, Wordsworth, or Pheidias, Michelangelo, Titian, Velasquez, Constable, were worse behaved than any similar set of great statesmen, lawyers, or soldiers; while *a priori*, as has been indicated, it is a paradox that any mode of truth should be inimical to morality. Some excuse for the coldness may perhaps be discovered in the loose and extravagant theories of the artists, but it is doubtful if the fault be really theirs, for they have merely accepted what philosophers have told them about morality, and agreed that that is the enemy of art, while perhaps the philosophers have found a stumbling-block in art because they were themselves on a wrong road. What, then, it is necessary to ask, is the true business of the moral philosopher, what is his right relation to conduct? It seems certain that it ought to be a purely scientific one; that his aim is to formulate in general terms the essence of right actions, and his method to examine the moral consciousness as it already exists in himself or others, so as to discover what sort of acts we think right and on what sort of grounds. He may conclude that whenever a man thinks anything right it is because he thinks it serves the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or because he thinks it pleases God; but, in any case, he has merely to describe truthfully in general the grounds on

which people do, in particular cases, think acts right. As a moral philosopher he should no more wish to amend the popular morals than the metaphysician to reform reality or the astronomer to regularise celestial goings on. It is the preacher or political propagandist who, like a medical practitioner, wants to improve something that is wrong; but, unfortunately, as it is more amusing to diet our friends than to study physiology, moralists have allowed a human weakness for proselytising to invade their scientific research. And having laid down that all men believe a certain kind of conduct to be right, when they are confronted with men who hold it in detestation, they have a resource not open to the refuted astronomer; for they may reply that at least men ought to think it right, that they are abominably wicked if they do not, and must be persuaded to reform their corrupt opinions. But this is surely absurd. The moralist has no source from which to derive his theories except the moral judgments of men. If he distorts these in himself or others till they fit the theories which should describe them, he is tampering with the evidence and incurs the reward of Procrustes. God, to apply Hobbes, has not been so sparing to man as to make him barely a two-legged creature and left it to Aristotle to make him moral.

Yet this is no peculiarly philosophic vice from which the plain man may boast immunity. Hardly any man is so plain or so immoral as not to moralise; and it may be in part the plain man's demand of edifying generalities from his philosophers which has created the supply. There is no vice more radical in the human mind than the original sin of vegetation, and this tendency to act by rule and habit is only a form of mental indolence. We all want to be told how to behave, because that will save us the trouble of deciding; we want general principles which we may follow with a blindness nearly as comfortable as the reflex actions or unhesitating instincts of our animal ancestors, and we do not want to weigh the merits. Almost anyone who will give us a general maxim, such as

always to pass the wine in one direction, always to be loyal to our party, or never to give money to beggars, earns our gratitude and our obedience. We speak of acting on principle as if it were some excuse for acting wrongly; and obstinancy, intolerance, and cruelty are always defended on this ground. Principles in some degree general may be necessary for purposes of discussion, though the value of such discussion either for theory or as a preliminary to action, is usually in inverse proportion to their generality; but to act from principle is exactly what is meant by being a prig, it is moral pedantry. General maxims are either too vague to guide us, such as "Never over-eat," or so narrow as frequently to mislead, such as "Never inflict pain." Conduct which a man thinks right is right just so far as he has been able to take all the qualifying circumstances of the situation into account, and has grasped its quality as a concrete, unique, bit of life, transforming itself even now under his hand; while the man who turns up some kind of moral index: "Lies: when to tell," is as effective as a duellist with a guide to fencing in one hand.

Apart from the rather rare case of deliberate vice which makes no attempt at self-deception, there is no source of error in conduct so fruitful as this substitution of abstract formulas for a real estimation of what lies before us. It betrays itself in the use of phrases to save sympathetic thinking—"chunks" of sound, as Stevenson called them, to save a precise accommodation of language to fact,—and in the consequent attachment of our affections to principles and to catch-words instead of to their proper objects, so much more difficult to live with, individual human beings. Anyone can be faithful to a cause at the cost of a little intellecual candour, but in dealing with our friends, our colleagues, our parents, or our children, we are certain to need patience, and may have to change our tone.

The case may be as M. Bergson has suggested, that our understanding has been evolved mainly in a struggle to overcome natural conditions. Man's pre-eminence is due to the

fact that he is pre-eminently the tool-making, the manufacturing animal, who fights matter, animals and savages, and makes weapons with which to fight them. Even the savages and animals which he fights are, if considered as mere pests or as possible instruments, themselves matter; for their feelings are of no importance but only their dexterity or strength. So when at a later stage man's moral nature puts out its tender but triumphant flower, it is blighted by an atmosphere of abstraction. By the expression "moral nature," I here intend loosely all those personal relations, emotional, social, religious and civic, which demand as their essential a sympathetic realisation of other people's feelings. Possibly those are not wrong who suppose these to be the flower and end of the universe which we know; but, in any case, they were not the anvil on which that intellect and that language were forged, which find themselves at home, rather, with spatial matter and its symbolic treatment in mathematics. For the engineer abstract thought and language are an admirable instrument; his calculations may be enormously complex but at least they are certain; his materials may be unattainable, but at least they are not variable; if there is any uncertainty or real subtlety about his transactions, it arises only from what, as manufacturers, we rightly consider an irrelevant nuisance,—the passions and idiosyncrasies of our workmen. Most moral and political failure arises from an attempt to transfer this agreeable accuracy of formulation to another subject-matter, the obscure, the incalculable, in a word, the living mind of man. If in that sphere we try to treat passion, idiosyncrasy, fickleness, as an irrelevant nuisance, we are, not undeservedly, lost.

And yet the difficulty is that in politics and morals we must attain truth largely by discussion, and the forms of prosaic thought and language have been created in the service of the manufacturing animal, as an instrument not for understanding one another, but for constructing a machine, the machinery of a Dreadnought or of a political caucus. But perhaps we need not despair, since even philosophers have

often adumbrated some higher and harder way of attaining truth on these high matters than either the mechanical foot-rule of the understanding or the irresponsible infatuation of the enthusiast.

The attempt to explain epistemologically this other knowledge, the knowledge of living individuals, would be an ambitious one; but it may not be useless to try to describe the practical vice and the practical remedy. Though in our moral and political dialect we must use more or less abstract language, we can at least endeavour, by making it a real dialectic and not an *a priori* harangue, to escape the slavery of names and classifications. We can recognise stereotyped language as only the symbol for what is really at stake, and a symbol constantly in need of illustration, adjustment, modification:

> "Not as our glory and our absolute boast
> But as a succedaneum and a prop
> To our infirmity . . . .
> . . . . a false secondary power
> By which we multiply distinctions, then
> Deem that our puny boundaries are things
> That we perceive, and not that we have made."

For what is always at stake, what is the only thing in itself valuable, is some individual, aware of good and evil, happiness and misery, and, as an individual, presentable only by the artist. Fanaticism is just the irrational state of mind in which the enthusiasm proper to such concrete objects is transferred to the machinery by which they may be served, but by which they may just as well, in altered circumstances, or in another frame of mind, be entangled and ruined. "There is," says George Eliot in *Middlemarch*, "no general doctrine which is not capable of eating out our morality, if unchecked by a deep-seated habit of direct fellow-feeling with individual fellow-men."

Honour, Purity, Candour, Liberty, and Equality become for some people fetishes to be dragged relentlessly over the welfare of mankind, as if they were real beings whose satis-

faction might quite well justify the decapitation of the human race. So Communism and Property become supernatural entities, by whose incantation even sober men think to solve real questions of policy, whereas they are in truth, both of them, just conceivable artifices for keeping the wolf from the door. Such dead formulas acquire by contiguity a mechanical cohesion; so that some blind spirit of sheepish solidarity ordains that those who dislike Trade Unions are of the same mind towards Disestablishment, Home Rule, Free Trade, and the Female Franchise, things seem to be conjoined, not known to be connected. It is said that a parliamentary candidate who had pronounced for woman's suffrage was told by his agent that this would gain him little, unless he also put upon his platform total abstinence, vegetarianism, anti-vivisection, and anti-vaccination; and that he courted sure defeat by his not inconsistent programme of Wein, Weib, and Vaccine.

An excellent example of this faith in rhetorical clinches was the recent manifesto of the Portuguese Republic, which, amid all the useful drudgery of a peaceful revolution, found ardours for "The Régime of Liberty now rising luminous in its virgin essence." Possibly this engaging image throws some light upon the life of a citizen of Lisbon to-morrow or of Paris or New York to-day, but, unless an Englishman's ears are prejudiced, the true statesman will see in it a debauching stimulation of excitement with little recommendation of measures: stale rhetoric and bedlam politics. Such are the orators described by Sir William Davenant: "So much the more unfit for governing as they are more fit for sedition," and the same criticism of them is offered by Burke in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*:

"I cannot stand forward and give praise or blame to anything which relates to human actions and human concerns, on a simple view of the object as it stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction. Circumstances (which with some gentlemen pass for nothing) give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing colour and discriminating effect. The circumstances are what render every civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind. Abstractedly speaking,

government, as well as liberty, is good; yet could I in common sense, ten years ago, have felicitated France on her enjoyment of a government (for she then had a government) without enquiry what the nature of that government was, or how it was administered? Can I now congratulate the same nation upon its freedom? . . . . This would be to act over again the scene of the criminals condemned to the gallies, and their heroic deliverer, the metaphysic knight of the sorrowful countenance.

"When I see the spirit of liberty in action, I see a strong principle at work; and this, for a while, is all I can possibly know of it. . . . I should therefore suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of France, until I was informed how it had been combined with government; with public force; with the discipline and obedience of armies; with the collection of an effective and well-distributed revenue; with morality and religion; with the solidity of property; with peace and order; with civil and social manners. All these (in their way) are good things too; and without them liberty is not a benefit while it lasts, and is not likely to continue long. The effect of liberty to individuals is, that they may do what they please: we ought to see what it will please them to do, before we risque congratulations which may be soon turned into complaints."

But perhaps it is in religion rather than in politics that this word-idolatry has had the most extreme and the most degrading effects. It inherited a lingering taint from that magic original in worship, which thought by the sound of incantation, or the orthodox charm of posture, to exercise a compulsion on the most high; it was reinforced by the crust of dogma, deposited upon a glib congregation by that living doctrine, which had been pressed out from the vintage of a spiritual experience in the solitary circumspection of metaphysic. Soon the salvation of souls was staked upon a *memoria technica* of second intensions, garbled by the official theologians, and rashly bandied between the free-thinker and the pulpit. Men have been found confessing a sacrament of goodwill and charity; agreed, even, sometimes, that its efficacy depended upon both a faithful recipient and a sacerdotal function; allowing, what was indeed manifest, that the elements suffered no sensible change; yet conjured to one another's damnation by the six-syllabled ambiguity of a merely metaphysical substance.

"Im ganzen haltet euch am Worte!
Denn geht ihr durch die sichre Pforte,"

is the advice of Mephistopheles to the young theological student. And his end has been achieved as often as true religion has been stifled under that load of its own indifferent symbolism, which looms so largely, for the secularist, in the chatter of church circles, and so little in the good man's heart.

But those who, like St Francis and the great reformers, have felt these things in their individuality, have been able to express them with all the freshness of the great artist. They have abolished ceremonies, once filled with passion, now grown respectable; they have denied doctrines, which by ceasing to matter had become easy to believe; and to Mephistopheles their reply has always been:

> "Es sagen es aller Orten,
> Alle Herzen unter dem himmelischen Tage,
> Jedes in seiner Sprache,
> Warum nicht ich in der meinen?"

The spirit opposed to this tendency to live on abstractions, on empirical generalisations and on authority, I have ventured in a somewhat loose surmise to identify with the artistic spirit. And by this is to be understood not the bohemianism which is a mixture of selfishness and untidiness, but the artistic spirit which has been defined as that of the man who regards individuals not that he may make or get, nor yet that he may systematise and tabulate, but that he may realise and feelingly know. For the artist above all men must have cleared his mind of cant phrases; he must come to every situation frankly and let it play upon his ingenuous receptivity. And so his moral judgments are apt to embarrass the codifiers, for so long as he is an artist he is always intuiting, never resting on customary reactions or memorial classifications.

The orator, as has been well said, thinks with his muscles; and this, no doubt, is the easiest, the most cheerful, and the most effective way of thinking. Those who hesitate to say what they do not know are readily convicted of the ultimate ignorance,—of not knowing their own minds. To reach conclusions rapidly, decisively, without modifications or reserves,

commands admiration, adherence, and immediate success. For public life is like fencing: what you are concerned with is not truth—that is the concern of the academic,—but your opponents' version of the truth; and one abstraction may be contradicted by another without any reality being touched. Reforms may be only a change of formulas. Words are a legal tender, more convenient than bread in the pocket, until a man happens to be hungry. So for the platform-speaker phrases and repartees must be a habit; and yet to form habits, as Pater truly said, is to fail. Only unhappily in this our life success in one thing inevitably means failure in another; you cannot use your energies and have them, and nothing demands so much energy as weighing the circumstances and deciding the merits. The best course seems to be to form habits of dealing with the material machinery of life, in order to save time and energy for a more artistic manipulation of personality. In higher things Pater is right. What is done habitually, in the true sense, is done mechanically and absently; and habits of speech, still more the consequent habits of thinking, are spiritual death. All general principles, all language indeed, except the language of the poet, have a tendency to this deterioration. The Romantic Spirit and the Rules of Poetry; Evolution and Mysticism; the Constitution and the Rights of Man Chivalry and our Natural Feelings: if such paper currencies be ever realised, discussion will be more arduous, but it will be more improving, and action will be less mechanical if less enthusiastic. Woman's sphere may become a sphere known only to the ancients—*orbis veteribus notus*—and Woman's Rights an imaginary line drawn about its greatest circumference. The New Woman will have lain down with the Eternal Womanly, and both be buried under their own monumental rhetoric.

Such words though still irritating to virulent behaviour, are, for the reason, dead, not closely applicable to the definite things we meet. Words are always dying, and it is only the artist in words, often enough an unconscious one, who recreates and

sustains them. A paradox, when it is not nonsense, is only the breaking of a bad habit, often, unhappily, to substitute a fresh one. Something of this art belongs to the great scientific writer. Every word of the good lawyer is weighed; he says nothing that he does not mean and means distinctly what he says. Nor does the natural philosopher fear to lay violent hands upon the *primum mobile* itself if some smaller word is more faithful to his experience. The poet aims at this adequacy in a higher sphere, for his task is no less than the presentation of the individual. But all these, if their art be merely verbal, are beset by the old vice in a subtler shape, when their very concentration upon transparency of expression leads them into indifference to the clearness of their minds. It was not for want of his own wise examples in Idols that Bacon, by his admired doctrine of Forms, has confounded the conjecture of ten generations. The mathematician, aware that his formulas are neither ambiguous nor invalid, may neglect to inquire of what realities they are true. Just because a legal right has been so decisively limited by his intelligence, the lawyer may be content to look no further, and, as though an infinite passion could be exhausted in entail, may confound morality with the right side of the law. Just because the poet feels that he has expressed his sentiment, he is apt to claim and to receive from us approbation for something other than his expressiveness, as though he who speaks with the voice of angels must surely bring good tidings. Swinburne, for instance, sometimes so far fails of the artist, that the fire with which he sings of liberty or passion is continually passing from the perfect transmission of his ardours to an insistence that these things have absolute value: that, but for the pope, we were all honest men, and that by its violence a desire is justified. It is indeed often thought that this enthusiasm for abstractions is proper to the poet; and Shelley may be cited against Shakespeare. But so long as Shelley is a genius he treats the emotion for an abstraction, like any other emotion, as an individual state. Hogg's life of him gives a ludicrous

instance how the abstract tendency may, in the little things of life, lead even a genius to behave.

"'When will your dinner be ready; what have you ordered?'

"'I am to have have some fried bacon.'

"He was struck with horror, and his agony was increased at the appearance of my dinner. Bacon was proscribed by him; it was gross and abominable. It distressed him greatly at first to see me eat my bacon; but he gradually approached the dish, and, studying the bacon attentively, said, 'So this is bacon!' He then ate a small piece. 'It is not so bad either!' More was ordered; he devoured it voraciously.

"'Bring more bacon!' It was brought and eaten.

"'Let us have another plate.'

"'I am very sorry, gentlemen,' said the old woman, 'but indeed I have no more in the house.' The Poet was angry at the disappointment, and rated her.

"'What business has a woman to keep an inn, who has not enough bacon in the house for her guests? She ought to be killed!'

"'As there is nothing more to be had, come along, Bysshe; let us go home to tea!'

"'No! Not yet; she is going to Staines to get us some more bacon.'

"'She cannot go to-night; come along!'

"He departed with reluctance, and when we arrived the first words he uttered were, 'We have been eating bacon together on Hounslow Heath, and do you know it was very nice. Cannot we have bacon here, Mary?'

"'Yes, you can if you please; but not to-night. Here is your tea; take that!'

"'I had rather have some more bacon,' sighed the Poet."

It is not impossible to imagine what devastation such a habit of mind might easily carry into friendship, into a family, or into society. If Shelley had been brought into equally close relations with an object of some other antipathy, a priest, say, or a despot, his poetic intuition of reality might similarly have led him to modify his condemnation.

Yet it is more reasonable to think that a great poet must be a great teacher, than to believe a rhetorician because he is eloquent. The great artists not only, like the rhetoricians, express finely, but they see clearly; not only do they see the parts of life distinctly, but also its whole steadily; in their company we learn to exercise our intuition. Most of us are content to label what we see, happy if we can find it when it will be serviceable; the verbal artist will rewrite our labels

more handily, expressing neatly and with conviction what has been often vaguely felt; a great artist at his best hardly labels at all, for what he sees is always individual and unique. Though Paolo and Francesca are in hell, they are what they were; and though his divine cosmology of heaven and hell should pass away, the poet cannot gainsay, for he has seen them. Though his theological system calls upon him to curse, and his chivalrous system to bless them altogether, he feels both their condemnation and their glory:

Come vedi, ancor non m' abbandona.

Such things disturb us as a child does, by its simplicity, who ignores dignities, and will not call things by their names. The artistic spirit preserves this primitive simplicity through all the hardening pressure of experience; in spite of all the dictionaries it must be prepared for a bully to be a coward or true love to die.

It is hard indeed to live always on these high levels; not to see last year's fashions only as dowdy and those of the last century as only picturesque. Perhaps those who find sublimity in mountains and romance in rustic life would, without these book-feelings, have felt nothing but horror or nastiness. And it is often positively needful, if some end is to be gained, that it should be seen in a halo of borrowed blessedness. The Milanese merchant is indeed probably a happier, possibly a better, being than he would have been under Austrian government, and any improvement in our human lot is worth fighting for; yet it was the vision of no tolerable tradesman, but of a star which spilt noble spirits for the Redemption of Italy. If all the Socialist can say is true, man's life would be a little easier and a little better under the better conditions he promises; but, if we know man, it is not what he will then indeed be that must inspire him to labour and to sacrifice, but the Perfect State. Yet our very reason for this apotheosis of new bottles into which the old wine of mortality must still be poured, is that, without it, we should make a poor fight against the many who, with still less reason, proclaim the old ones

were not only better but divine. The reformed people must be peculiar so long as the old sect is orthodox. Socialism must be puffed as a panacea so long as property is unctuous with an inspired sanction. It was because the homely uses of monarchy or of aristocracy stalked the stage as a divine right of tragedy kings, that the somewhat greater goods of democracy strutted it as the tragedy republican mouthing the Rights of Man. If the Burkes had always been content to talk prose the Shelleys could always have written poetry, and there need have been no tragedy at all. Unfortunately, tragedies born of rhetoric, though they should be melodramas, have unhappy endings, where many slay and are slain. "The eighteenth century," says Croce (*Logica*, p. 369) "mathematical, abstract, intellectualist, rationalist, unhistorical: the century of reformers and at last of Jacobins, was the legitimate offspring of that Cartesian philosophy which mistakes the logic of mathematics for the logic of philosophy. France, which was the country of its birth and greatest popularity, owes to it perhaps more than to anything else that she is typically the country of the abstract intellect."

My summary of the whole matter would be this. When I overhear myself and other people discussing politics or morals in railway carriages and newspapers, common-rooms or public-houses, I am often conscious of an obscure irritation, a sense that the whole method is at fault. And there is no doubt a counter-irritation, with which we all have our moments of sympathy, on the part of the scientific plain man, the practical man as he calls himself, caused by the intrusion upon him of the artistic spirit with its refusal to accept classifications, principles, and formulas. I have tried to explain to myself these mysterious antipathies by suggesting that there may be two ways of thinking: one proper to inanimate subject-matter, where individuality is of no account, or to those cases, if there be any, when we may treat living beings as mere instruments, not ends in themselves; the other attempting, by a sympathetic imagination, to deal with those developing individualities

to whom the symbols of the understanding are fundamentally inadequate.

I have chosen the expression "artistic attitude" to describe the last of these; for if art is anything it is essentially sympathy with individuality, the attempt to adjust our feelings to their proper objects, to feel what the object for itself is; while science is the calculation of the lifeless. Artistic intuition recognises the individual only; and, as individual, nothing else recognises that. At all events, the clear artistic intuition of the individual is the necessary foundation for any other relation, theoretical or practical, that we may propose to initiate with him.

And the artistic spirit, thus defined, leads I think to the truly moral spirit and the truly religious spirit; for it is the sympathy likely to make a man contributory to the happiness of others, and likely to make him unselfishly happy in their well-being, and in the vital processes of the universe, whatever his own misfortunes. But moralists have been apt to mistake it, because they have been apt to mistake their own task. They have thought it their province to demonstrate moral principles, and to impose them upon the idle conscience, instead of formulating for the intellect the intuitive moral judgments which are lived rather than thought by the good man.

Fanny Burney has preserved for us Dr Johnson's supreme pronouncement in artistic criticism, which I should like transferred to the criticism of life. "There are three distinct kinds of judges: the first are those who know no rules but pronounce entirely from their natural taste and feelings; the second are those who know and judge by rules; and the third are those who know but are above the rules. These last are those you should wish to satisfy. Next to them rate the natural judges; but ever despise those opinions that are formed by the rules."

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THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPHECY.

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I AM a son of the parsonage, and I well remember that in the days of my childhood my father used to attend a clerical meeting in the Midlands of England, at which meeting I believe the principal subject of study was Prophecy—and unless I am much deceived, "unfulfilled prophecy" rather than fulfilled. By "unfulfilled prophecy" was meant prophecy still awaiting fulfilment. In those days it occurred to few or none, at all events among the clergy of the Anglican Church, that any prophecy in the Holy Scriptures could ultimately lack an accomplishment. Of course I was never present at these assemblies of clergy, and my recollection is only of what I may have accidentally heard in casual conversation; but, such as it is, it is distinctly confirmed by memories of references to the book of Daniel and to the Apocalypse, to the little horn, the seven seals, the seven trumpets and the seven vials. We were supposed to be living during the actual outpouring of I know not which of the vials; and Daniel and the Apocalypse between them were assumed to contain an anticipatory history of events to the end of the world. Gibbon was read for the purpose of ascertaining how much was already fulfilled; and students of prophecy thought themselves entitled to announce beforehand the issue of contemporary political movements. The gradual decay of the Ottoman Empire was symbolised by the drying up of the Euphrates,[1] and I retain a not indistinct recollection

[1] Rev. xvi. 12.

of a good deal of chaff arising out of the announcement at the outbreak of the great war of 1870 that, "The French march to victory."

Nor was this way of dealing with prophecy entirely confined to any one school of thought. Cardinal Newman seems to have thought that the future appearance of Antichrist and the destruction of the world by fire were just as certain, and just as legitimate subjects for definite instruction, as the historical events of the past. Younger men, who have had their theological education in the last ten or fifteen years, have scarcely heard of these modes of thought, and consequently have little idea of the enormous advantage which is theirs in having been born into the modern world, where men's eyes are comparatively open, and where for those who care about matters of real importance there are numerous excellent guides. I am not sure, however, but that it is more interesting to be able just to remember the disappearing of the old ideas and the awakening of the new; the disappearing and the awakening, I mean, among the general body of Biblical students. There has never failed a succession of rational interpreters of Holy Scripture, though it was the fashion to dub them "rationalistic," and they were as voices crying in the wilderness. It seems strange now that the whole question of the authorship of the later chapters of the Book of Isaiah was considered to be settled by, *e.g.*, St Paul's quotation from the 65th chapter, as follows, "Isaiah is very bold, and saith, I was found of them that sought me not; I became manifest unto them that asked not of me."[1] St Paul, it was argued, ascribes the passage to Isaiah, and how should modern human learning presume to correct an inspired apostle? And with this crushing blow the critic was demolished.

However, criticism refused to be thus silenced, and at last common-sense prevails. It prevails, that is, so long as it is content to call itself common-sense. There are still numbers of excellent people who are scandalised so soon as common-

[1] Rom. x. 20.

sense assumes its technical name and calls itself "Higher Criticism." Indeed it must be admitted that some Higher Critics have not been conspicuous for common-sense, though their science is properly nothing but the application of common-sense methods of study to documents the textual history of which is already known so far as it is ascertainable.

The locus classicus of prophetical study is 2 Pet. i. 20, "No prophecy of scripture is of private interpretation," *πᾶσα προφητεία γραφῆς ἰδίας ἐπιλύσεως οὐ γίνεται*, and it is curious to learn in what a variety of senses this has been taken. (1) The authority of Bede, Bengel, Alford, and other eminent commentators is educed in support of the opinion that the reference is to the prophet's own interpretation of God's revelation. Translated word for word, Bede's comment runs thus, "No one of the holy prophets by his own interpretation preached to the people the dogmas of life, but what things they had learnt from the Lord, these they communicated to their hearers to be done." The context rather bears out this exposition, for it continues, "For no prophecy ever came by the will of man: but men spake from God, being moved by the Holy Ghost." (2) Another way of taking the passage is in consonance with that notorious decree of the Council of Trent, which sounds so like a bad joke, viz., that Scripture must not be interpreted "contra eum sensum quem tenuit et tenet Sancta mater Ecclesia . . . . aut etiam contra unanimem consensam Patrum." (3) A third explanation is that prophecy is not to be interpreted according to man's private judgment, but by the Holy Spirit who inspired it. This is advocated by Luther, Erasmus, Grimm-Thayer's Lexicon, and others. (4) Lastly, there is the explanation given by J. B. Mayor in his noteworthy Commentary on Jude and 2 Peter,[1] from which I have taken the other expositions also. In his own words Mayor's exposition is this: literally translated, he says, "the statement is, 'No prophecy falls under private interpretation,' or, to put it in positive form, 'Prophecy is of general inter-

[1] Macmillan, 1907.

pretation,' *i.e.* it is not exhausted by one interpretation to which it is, as it were, tied." It will be noticed that here ἴδιος is understood as *private* or *individual* as opposed to κοινός, and in support he quotes from Dr Arnold, who writes, "History is especially ἰδίας ἐπιλύσεως; that is to say, what the historian relates of Babylon is to be understood of Babylon only. But what prophecy says of Babylon is κοινῆς ἐπιλύσεως; it does not relate exclusively, nor even principally, to the Babylon of history, but to certain spiritual evils of which Babylon was at one time the representative, and Rome at another, and of which other cities may be representatives now." I confess that to me this seems by far the most reasonable explanation of this difficult phrase. The quality of the highest literature, of that literature which is not for an age but for all time, is not to exhaust itself in one reading or in one generation, but to go on giving new stimulus in new circumstances of which the original author never dreamed. The great classical writers, whether of the ancient or the modern world, could never have anticipated the manifold applications of their words and thoughts which have been made by generation after generation of readers. They threw out ideas which were more pregnant than even they themselves knew, vital principles which acquire fresh force with each succeeding age. Much more must this be the case with those works which attain to the highest level of what we call *Inspiration.* To define Inspiration in this sense is more than I will undertake to do. It is a commonplace of theology that we ought to be thankful that the Church has never committed herself to a definition. I will content myself with repeating that "Men spake from God, being moved by the Holy Ghost," ὑπό πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι, which might perhaps be rendered, "being actuated by a spiritual gift." Men thus inspired must be supposed to have published great divine principles which are not exhausted by any single fulfilment, but go on unfolding themselves in the course of human development.

If we could accept 2 Peter as the work of the apostle whose name it bears, our most reasonable course would be to turn to what is recorded elsewhere of St Peter's teaching, in order to learn from it how he actually carried out his own canon of interpretation. But unfortunately we cannot assume the Epistle's authenticity. It belongs to a relatively late date; and though with Ramsay we may think there is no decisive evidence of Peter's death in the Neronian persecution, and he may have lived on much later, still there is no likelihood that he survived till the "nearer 80 A.D. than 70," which, as we are assured, the Epistle demands for its date. Anyhow, the opinion of those best qualified to judge is so strongly against the Petrine authorship that we are unable to assume it. All the same, we shall scarcely get a more suggestive lead than is given by St Peter's use of prophecy on the day of Pentecost—or, if the reader prefers it, by the use of prophecy by the historian who puts the words into his mouth. All that I am concerned with here is the prophecy quoted and the comment on it, not at all with the identity of the speaker. Well, then, Peter is reported as quoting from Joel the prediction of the outpouring of the Spirit; but he does not stop there, but continues, "And I will show wonders in the heaven above, and signs on the earth beneath; Blood, and fire, and vapour of smoke: the sun shall be turned into darkness, and the moon into blood, before the day of the Lord come, that great and notable day."[1] Now, not to dwell on the insignificant verbal variations in the quotation, the point is that the prophet particularises certain physical signs which were to come to pass, not one of which as a matter of fact did happen on the day of Pentecost, and yet the apostle declares that the prediction was then and there fulfilled: "This is that which hath been spoken by the prophet Joel." From this it would seem to follow that in St Peter's opinion (or in that of the author of the *Acts*), the details of the prophecy did not in the least matter. In order to find a fulfilment all that was

[1] Acts ii. 19, 20; Joel ii. 30, 31.

necessary was to be able to point to an outpouring of the Holy Spirit. It would also seem to follow that any outpouring of the Spirit in the Christian dispensation is equally a fulfilment of Joel's prophecy. And this exactly tallies with our previous conclusion, that prophecy is of *general*, κοινῆς, rather than of *particular*, ἰδίας, interpretation.

In the New Testament interpretation of Old Testament prophecy this principle, that details are of no consequence, is nowhere more thoroughly carried out than in the first Gospel. St Matthew (to use the common title) is continually discovering the accomplishment of prophecies. His regular formula is, "That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Lord through the prophet"; but the very vaguest correspondence suffices for him, and sometimes the fulfilment even turns on an inaccurate translation from the Hebrew. His very first Old Testament quotation is a case in point: "Behold, the virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a son,"[1] where the application turns altogether on the LXX. ἡ παρθένος for the Hebrew הָעַלְמָה. From Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho[2] we learn that the Jews in his day maintained that the true translation was νεᾶνις, not παρθένος, an assertion which rouses Justin's indignation. So, too, Irenæus[3] states that both Theodotion and Aquila translated. And the Jews were right. As regards its radical meaning, the Hebrew word is derived from the root עלם (obs.) = to be ripe or mature (sexually), and therefore not necessarily implying virginity. If in Isa. vii. 14 the LXX. have παρθένος and the Vulgate *virgo*, in Cant. vi. 8, they have respectively for the same Hebrew word, νεᾶνις and *adolescentula*. As the commentators on Isaiah explain, the sign does not depend on the mother's virginity. She is not *Jungfrau*, but *junge Frau*. As Bernh. Duhm puts it: "העלמה ist nicht eine Jungfrau (בתולה), sondern ein mannbares, verheirathetes oder ledige, keusches oder hurerisches Weib." (Not a virgin, but a marriageable young woman, whether wedded or single, whether chaste or immoral.) This being so,

[1] Matt. i. 23; Isa. vii. 14. [2] cc. 43, 67. [3] Contra Haer., c. 21.

it is evident that Matthew finds in Isaiah's prophecy not merely a meaning which was not in his mind, but one which is even alien to the original sense.

A few verses later in Matthew we have the narrative of the flight into Egypt, with the remark, "That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Lord through the prophet, saying, Out of Egypt did I call my son."[1] On this all that is necessary in the way of comment is to refer to the source of the quotation, Hosea xi. 1, "When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt."

In Matt. iii. we come to the ministry of John the Baptist, with the inevitable Old Testament quotation, "For this is that which was spoken by Isaiah the prophet, saying, The voice of one crying in the wilderness, Make ye ready the way of the Lord, make his paths straight." According to the fourth Gospel this prophecy had already been claimed for himself by John,[2] but there the quotation need not be more than an application. In Matthew, however, it is asserted that the ancient prophet foretold the Baptist's ministry. Yet anyone who goes back to the source of the quotation (Isa. xl. 3) will see at a glance that it belongs to the preparation for the exile's return from Babylon, and that the prophet means to say that as the Lord led the people through the wilderness from Egypt, so He will lead them through the wilderness from their new captivity in Babylon. The application of the words to the Baptist is natural and obvious, but it is not within the scope of the prediction when first uttered.

At this point it will be appropriate to remark that considering Matthew's fondness for Old Testament prophecy, it is curious that he has not quoted Isa. liii. in his narrative of the Passion. One would have thought that he could not pass by so obvious an interpretation. It may be added that Matthew is not alone in this oversight. Whatever theory may be held as to the original of the Suffering Servant, it must be admitted

[1] Matt. ii. 14. [2] John i. 23.

that nowhere in Scripture is there a closer correspondence than that between Isa. liii. and the Passion narratives; yet in not one of the latter, according to the true text, is there a direct citation from the former.[1]

In so brief a paper this much must suffice for the Gospels. In the Acts, I will refer only to one other quotation attributed to St Peter in the same speech or sermon in which he used the words of Joel. He is there reported as claiming that David in Psalm xvi. foretold the resurrection of Christ: "Thou wilt not leave my soul in Hades, neither wilt thou give thy Holy One to see corruption." Turn to the Psalm itself and read the context, when it will plainly appear that the author is not expressing his conviction of his own or any-one else's rising from the dead, but his certainty that he is not going to die at that particular moment: "Thou wilt not abandon my soul to Sheol, neither wilt thou give thy holy one to see the pit."

Paul's allegorising of the Old Testament and his Rabbinical interpretations of prophecy are familiar to all readers, but we must beware of carelessly treating them as though they were developments of the methods of the first Gospel. We need only to remind ourselves that Paul's Epistles were written long before the Gospel; though, on the other hand, Matthew's applications of the Old Testament may very well not have originated with himself, but have been already current in the Church when the Gospel was compiled. It is probably impossible to say with whom this manner of interpretation began—impossible, that is, if we refuse to connect it with Christ himself, who, as we know, regarded himself as the fulfilment of the Old Testament, but certainly did not give fantastic expositions of individual oracles. We should like, if it were possible, to lift the veil and learn what he said to Cleopas and his companion when "Beginning from Moses and from all the prophets, he interpreted to them in all the scriptures the things concerning himself."[2] But no methodical

[1] But Luke xxii. 37 quotes Isa. liii. 12.

[2] Luke xxiv. 27.

explanation has been transmitted of even the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament.

Prophecy, as is universally admitted, was not limited to prediction, but we are entitled to say that prediction was an essential element of prophecy, both in the Old Testament and in the New. The Old Testament was a preparation for the Christ, and a foretelling of his coming, though it may be difficult to see the exact bearing of particular prophecies. And the New Testament contains some prophecies which have been already fulfilled, such as our Lord's forecast of the destruction of Jerusalem (for I cannot admit that these oracles, though they may have suffered some modification, are in substance later than the event), together with others which at all events *appear* still to await fulfilment, such as many of those in the Apocalypse. What we learn from the New Testament treatment of the older prophecies seems to me to be no more than this, that men who themselves experienced the inspiration of the Divine Spirit felt no compunction in rending words from their context, divorcing them from the historical circumstances of their delivery, or even in taking them from an erroneous translation, if thereby they could gain the most arbitrary connection with contemporary events. It is as though with reference to a Parliamentary election we were to quote Virgil's, "Scinditur incertum studia in contraria vulgus," or Shakespeare's, "The blunt monster with uncounted heads, The still-discordant wavering multitude," and to quote them not merely as illustrations, but as definite and intentional pre-figurings of the horde of modern voters. The New Testament writers were well acquainted with the text of the Old Testament books, but they had no conception of a scientific scheme of interpretation. Their tendency was to see Messianic prediction or type in every conceivable place, and this tendency of theirs was enormously exaggerated in subsequent ages. One advantage of even a slight acquaintance with the works of the Christian Fathers is to make one estimate more highly the extreme moderation of the canonical

writings, and to give us some criterion of the inspiration of their authors. It is Clement of Rome who starts the idea that Rahab's scarlet cord was a revelation of the λύτρωσις through the blood of Christ. "Ye see, beloved," he says, "that not only faith but also prophecy was found in the woman."[1] Justin Martyr being the man he was, it is, we might say, inevitable that he should lay hold of the same scarlet cord, which he does with the not inappropriate remark that as the sign (σύμβολον) of the scarlet cord was given to Rahab the adulteress, so through the blood of Christ adulterers and unjust out of every nation are saved.[2] Irenæus gives a different turn to the same incident, making the spies *three* in number, and perceiving in them a type of the Father and the Son, together with the Holy Spirit.[3]

At an earlier date, among the Apostolic Fathers, the most wonderful interpretations are to be found in Barnabas. Familiar as these are to students of theology, I may be allowed to refer to two for the benefit of those readers whose studies have not lain in these quarters. Who would have supposed that Abraham's servants were typical? Yet according to Barnabas they were, for their number is 318, and in Greek 18 is represented by IH, the first two letters of Jesus, and 300 by T, in which at once you have the cross.[4] The other example which I will give has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with prophecy, but its very strangeness must be my excuse for deviating for a moment. He alleges that Scripture forbids the eating of the hyena (though one would like to know where he found the prohibition), and he explains this prohibition as being really an injunction against adultery or fornication, because "this animal changes its sex annually, being at one time male, at another female."[5]

That the New Testament is latent in the Old is a fact so evident to Christians that it scarcely needed the authority of St Augustine to enforce it. But some of the Fathers exagger-

[1] xii. 7. [2] Dialog. 111. [3] Contra Hær., iv. 20.
[4] Barnab., ix. 8. [5] x. 7.

ated the foreshadowings beyond all reason. In the fine flour which a leper, if cleansed, was to present as part of his thank-offering Justin Martyr sees a type of the bread of the Eucharist;[1] and in the extended arms of Moses praying for victory Tertullian sees a type of the cross.[2] Tertullian,[3] again, refers to the bearing of the cross, Isaiah's "The government shall be upon his shoulder," connecting it with that reading which so many of the Latin Fathers found in Psalms xcvi. 10, "The Lord reigneth *from the tree*." Of the Greek Fathers Justin appears to be the only one to support this interpolation, and he accuses the Jews of cancelling the words, "ἀπὸ τοῦ ξύλου."[4] The passion, not quite extinct even now, for finding Christ in every line of the Old Testament might be well illustrated by a few sentences from Irenæus, but the passage is too long for quotation. It may be read conveniently in the translation in T. & T. Clarke's Ante-Nicene Library.[5]

Seeing that even the great Origen assumes as a matter of course that Moses wrote the last chapter of Deuteronomy, giving beforehand the narrative of his own death and burial, we need not wonder at any extravagance of credulity as regards the ascription of prophetic vision to the writers of the old covenant. That the human authors were supposed to have *consciously* anticipated the future in this fashion is more than we are entitled to affirm; but it was often taken for granted that the true author was the Holy Spirit, and that in his utterances there was an ulterior meaning of which the amanuensis might be ignorant. The Scriptures being assumed to refer to Christ in every tittle, their most straightforward and simple statements were too often regarded as enigmatic oracles, and exegesis became a solution of self-imposed riddles. Read in this manner, the Bible is the most obscure and tantalising of books. It is the great service of criticism to this age to have swept away the mass of this antiquated rubbish, and to have shown the component parts of the Scriptures taking

[1] Dialog. 41. [2] Against the Jews, x. [3] *Ibid.*
[4] Dialog. 73. [5] *Against Heresies*, xxi.

shape as the living winged words of real breathing men. The prophets lived in, and were interested in, the events of their own time, and, in the first place, spoke for their contemporaries. I say "in the first place," for, sometimes consciously, and sometimes more or less unconsciously, they spoke for the future as well. And inasmuch as no criticism can take away the divine inspiration, we may believe that the Fathers were not altogether wrong in thinking that the Prophets sometimes spoke more than they themselves were aware of. If they were the mouthpieces through which God made known to the world, πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως, the great principles of the divine order, it is likely that these principles would go on unfolding themselves in various ways, and that the words in which they were first revealed would go on having new accomplishments.

The prophets were sometimes enabled to foretell particular contingent events, as when Jeremiah foretold the death of Hananiah within the year, and it happened in the seventh month.[1] If this be a proof of inspiration, we seem almost compelled to include George Fox the Quaker in the list of inspired men, for under the date 1653, he writes in his Autobiography: "Great openings I had from the Lord, not only of divine and spiritual matters, but also of outward things relating to the civil government. Being one day in Swathmore Hall, when Judge Fell and Justice Benson were talking of the news, and of the Parliament then sitting (called the Long Parliament), I was moved to tell them, before that day two weeks the Parliament should be broken up, and the Speaker plucked out of his chair; and that day two weeks Justice Benson told Judge Fell that now he saw George was a true prophet, for Oliver had broken up the Parliament." If this is not a particular prediction, what is?

More usually the prophets dealt with the broad principles of God's government, but it was something more than the prescience of far-seeing statesmen which enabled them to

[1] Jer. xxviii. 16, 17.

speak as they did of the Captivity and the Restoration, and, above all—if we rightly understand them—of the future reign of a Divine Messianic King. The difficulty of reconciling this figure with that of the Suffering Servant in 2nd Isaiah has led to the explanation of the two Advents, which is at least as old as Origen. How far the prophets could enter into the details of future events is a point on which it is difficult to come to a satisfactory decision. Zechariah's prophecy[1] of the King riding into Jerusalem on an ass had a literal fulfilment; yet it may fairly be argued that all that Zechariah consciously predicted was the advent of the Messianic King, whose distinguishing characteristic was lowliness, and that he illustrated this conception by the picture of a king mounted on an ass instead of the captain's war-horse. It would then follow that Jesus, asserting himself to be this King, elected to enter Jerusalem in this manner with the express intention of fulfilling the prophecy to the letter.

This somewhat desultory discussion does not lead to any definite conclusion, unless it be the unsatisfactory one that the Interpretation of Prophecy is an extremely difficult subject, on which it is well not to dogmatise. The instances which have been educed are for the most part warnings rather than examples. We can have no doubt that many Old Testament prophecies have been fulfilled in the New. Equally we can have no doubt that there are other prophecies which have never been fulfilled in any real manner, and which are not likely now ever to be fulfilled. New Testament prophecies have also been fulfilled, such as our Lord's prophecies of the coming of the Holy Spirit, the destruction of Jerusalem, the extension of his kingdom, and such like. But what are we to say about the future? There are a number of people endowed by nature with a plentiful lack of understanding, and weighted with a load of painfully acquired ignorance, for whom Daniel and the Revelation have an irresistible attraction. Incapable of using such helps as Driver for the elucidation of the one, or Swete

[1] Zech. ix. 9.

for the elucidation of the other, they blunder from absurdity to absurdity, with an assurance which is calculated to bring the whole subject into contempt. I can only express my personal conviction that prophecy is not a writing of history beforehand,[1] and that we are in no case intended to know the course of events before they happen. Considering how grievously the Jews in the time of Christ misread their own Scriptures, and how woefully many commentators have gone astray since, I see little reason for thinking that we shall do better now, unless by taking a great deal more pains than most of us give to this branch of study. The confidence with which, in some quarters, the future is anticipated seems to me perfectly amazing; and it is all but certain that in the view commonly held about the second Advent of Christ, the Church is just as far astray as were the Jews about his first Advent. The "shout, the voice of the archangel, and the trump of God" in St Paul[2] are in the same category as Joel's "Wonders in the heaven above, and signs on the earth beneath; Blood, and fire, and vapour of smoke," and the fulfilment is no more likely to be literal in the one case than in the other. Yet this does not lead to the conclusion that the study of prophecy may safely be neglected, but, on the contrary, that it deserves much more attention than it commonly receives, even from professed theologians. According to the Apostle, the deep things of God are spiritually discerned; but spirituality is not superficiality, and he who aspires rightly to view God's unfolding of His dealings with man must be prepared to make the necessary effort. We may be glad that we live in days when so much has been done to enable us to gain a clearer insight into the principles of prophecy, while at the same time we acknowledge that much remains to be accomplished.

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[1] In spite of Bishop Butler's opinion that it is. *Analogy II.*, vii.

[2] 1 Thess. iv. 16.

THE SISTINE MADONNA.

ARCHIBALD A. BOWMAN.

It is not possible to affirm with confidence (what was formerly supposed) that the picture painted for the Convent of San Sisto at Piacenza is the last of the long series of Madonnas which we owe to Raphael; but the work is beyond doubt late in point of time and marks the culmination of an æsthetic manner and conception. The value of such a consideration lies in the fact that it warrants a guarded critical survey of the artistic preparation that attended the work; and this, when conjoined to the more general antecedents and accompanying circumstances, constitutes a large part of what we can hope for from the analytic method of criticism, as applied to a transcendent work of art.

Among the general considerations we must place in the forefront Raphael's position in the heart of those tendencies which we designate, collectively, the Renaissance. In such an era we note, along with the inevitable excess of life and the almost wanton riot of productivity, a certain predilection and aptitude for the normal forms and proportions of things. It is this affinity with the normal that marks the age, in spite of its excesses, as genuinely classical. If we take Erasmus as a typical figure from the field of learning, we shall find, in his *Colloquia*, for instance, combined with a charming average of human sensibility and the finest instincts for pure speech, a certain prodigality of phrase, a revelry in the almost exhaustless resources of his Latinity, sustaining him, apparently, through eight hundred pages of delightful trivialities, on the

mere joy of wringing dry the last vestiges of language over every conceivable topic. And in the sphere of art we see the same irrepressibility, the same "superb exuberance of abounding and exulting strength," devoted to the creation of sustained harmonies and natural combinations. Prior to the attainment of the final æsthetic ideals the artistic manner is generally found labouring up through eccentric forms—Greek sculpture, for example, through the stiff figures and grinning countenances of the Æginetan school, and Renaissance art through the abnormal creations of the primitives. Where the archaic manner passes into the classical there is a transition from laboured failure to easy perfection and from the eccentric to the natural. The Parthenon is peopled with living horses and their riders.

The result of such a conjunction is in any age the creation of titanic master-forms—true in their immense proportions—an Agamemnon, a Lear, a Falstaff; the symbolic figures of Day and Night or the Moses of Michael Angelo. At the culminating point in every great artistic era we find a certain sublime uniformity of achievement that, in a sense, eliminates the highest works from their historical environment and ranges side by side the world's masterpieces as coequal though infinitely varying expressions of one everlasting truth.

Raphael is a true child of the Renaissance, going direct to nature to learn what nature is like. His figures are measured by the proportions and modelled on the forms of actual men and women. There is evidence in the many sketches at Venice, Lille, Oxford, and elsewhere of the careful study and preparation which preceded his finished works. For the obscure mysticism of his predecessors he gives us the transparent yet no less genuine mysticism of embodied ideas. In place of the primitive drawing, conjoined to a meticulous and often grotesque or shocking realism, we find a breadth of treatment, a free and even loose handling of detail, and that unerring sense of relation which presupposes studies in the life as surely as it presupposes a natural sense of fitness.

How far these remarks are directly applicable to the Sistine Madonna is a matter for conjecture; but the various questions involved lose something of their critical importance when we remember the date of this masterpiece. Lübke points to the fact that no studies for the picture are extant and that several corrections are recognisable (the double outline of the left curtain would be an example) as evidence that the picture was an improvised work of genius.[1] Certainly there is a freedom in the execution amounting almost to abandon. But even admitting this, we must remember that the artist's whole life was a vigorous training for such a work; and we may safely assert, on the strength of many well-accredited studies, that without such training no such masterpiece could ever have been executed.

The allied problem, how far we can find traces of an actual model, admits at present only of a similar general solution. It may be that we are justified in associating the sublime womanliness of the Virgin's features with the "bella Fornarina" who is thought to appear again, still beatified, in the *Donna Velata* and in the Magdalene of the *St Cecilia*. Doubtless the Virgin has taken some elements from the fair bakeress whom we know in the flesh from Giulio Romano's portrait, and are perhaps warranted in identifying with the "widow Margarita," daughter of Francesco Luti of Siena, who was admitted on the 18th of August 1520, some four months after Raphael's death, to the Congregation of Sant' Apollonia in Trastevere, a home for repentant women. But the question sinks into relative insignificance when we consider the ineffable transformation which the features have undergone. Giulio Romano has painted a baker's daughter with fleshy, voluptuous lips and bold, dark eyes: Raphael has drawn a woman with a small and infinitely delicate mouth, and with eyes that are refined and spiritualised beyond the suggestion of sense. If, therefore, we attach any importance to the identification of the model, still we can no more hope by such means to trace the picture back to its raw

[1] *Geschichte der Italienischen Malerei,* ii. p. 344.

material or groundwork of suggestion than we can divine by what alchemy the legend of Saxo Grammaticus became the history of the soul of Hamlet.

We shall return to the Virgin's transcendent charm ; but first of all a consideration of the composition as a whole, from the standpoint of its general conception and design, offers the prospect of some illumination. Regarded piecemeal and abstractly, the canvas probably contains nothing that is not either obvious or conventional. The pyramidal arrangement of the figures is a mannerism characteristic of one whole phase of Raphael's art. The introduction of the saints is a conventional idea, imposed, no doubt, by the terms of the commission. The curtains are quite usual. We have them, for instance, in Raphael's own *Holy Family of the Convent of St Anthony at Perugia*, where the Virgin is seated under a curtained canopy, and in the *Madonna del Baldacchino*, in which the curtains are held back by two angels. Choirs of angels or of cherubs are a common feature, found, for example, in the *Madonna di Foligno* and the *Dispute on the Sacrament*. There is a suggestion, too, in the Sistine Madonna of the double motive of heavenly calm and earthly trouble which is expressly worked out in the *Coronation of the Virgin* and in the *Transfiguration*. The Pope points as if supplicating the attention of Mary and her Child for the Church on earth: St Barbara averts her gaze and looks down confidently on the scene beneath.

There are at least two sources of æsthetic convention—what we might call the ornamental or purely æsthetic, and the symbolic. Each of these contains one aspect of that universality which it is the business of art to unfold in ideal combinations ; but there is a fundamental distinction between symbolism and ornament. This depends on the fact that the one is to be taken literally and demands for itself all the regard which we pay to an ultimate and exclusive centre of interest. In ornament the universal idea is immediately particularised, and we are forbidden to look for its meaning beyond its explicit determination in some specific form. Its *Dasein* is its truth.

The truth and worth of symbolism, on the other hand, rest upon the *representative* value of the determinate image.

The distinction is the legitimate product of analysis, and indicates a fundamental difference within the completeness of every æsthetic creation; but the *nature* of the difference must be very exactly specified if we are to escape irresolvable contradiction. It is not meant, for example, that some works of art make a direct and exclusive appeal to the mere sensuous beauty of the forms they exhibit, while others depend entirely on the force of their ideal suggestiveness. This would leave us with the two limiting instances of a beauty which *meant* nothing and a representation through symbols which contained no beauty. At the very lowest a beautiful form contains a certain complexity, and this in turn implies the determinate relationship of elements in a way which we can only designate as more or less definite *meaning*. We cannot even assert that the beauty may be its own meaning, or content; for in order to have beauty at all we must have a beautiful *object*, and we cannot have an object without referring it to some category other than that of pure æsthetic value. A beautiful line, for instance, is always something other than the beauty of the line. It is a line as well as beautiful, and any attempt to reduce its linearity to pure æsthetic quality would be as futile as the attempt to reduce the latter to its character as a particularisation of the linear universal. Neither aspect is prior: neither is capable of elimination. The only way, therefore, in which we can regard them is as two mutually implicit and ultimately irreducible differences within the concrete totality of experience.

This amounts to saying that beauty which tries to realise itself exclusively as such, or in divorce from truth, ends in self-contradiction, while truth which tries to render itself independent of sensuous form can never be *æsthetic* truth. The conjunction of irresolvable differences with an indissoluble unity results in many paradoxes; but they are paradoxes which bear the stamp of truth. Thus, in order to realise

the ideal of perfect beauty, art must not pursue the beautiful too exclusively. The purely æsthetic when realised turns out to be the æsthetically indifferent. Again, the beautiful having resigned its claim to be its own exclusive standard and admitted the true as an organic element in its constitution, finds that truth in itself furnishes no criterion of beauty and throws no light upon its nature. The beauty which despairs of purity and consents to include an alien matter purges out all impurity in the very act, and reveals itself as still intrinsically subject to the intrinsically distinct standard of the beautiful. On the other hand, *naked* truth can never be completely true; and in order to realise itself it must see itself clothed in a form which offers no criterion of truth as such. The æsthetically true becomes in the end identical with the purely æsthetic.

We shall start from this position, and assert at once that the subject-matter has something to do with the greatness of this overwhelming canvas. God in the arms of a human mother—this and no less it is that Raphael has undertaken to present in visible form—a stupendous theme. But the statement is once more too abstract and does not convey the distinctive greatness of this special presentation. The Virgin with the Child is the commonest of themes, but all Madonnas are not equally beautiful or impressive. This brings us back to the purely æsthetic aspect of the work, and here we again reach the limits of general statement.

A work of art is great, we have said, in the first place according to the worth of the ideas it contains. By worth is meant what the things signified by the ideas count or mean to us—the *difference* that they make. All human passions, for example, make a difference, and are fit themes for art: motherhood and fatherhood, ridiculous situations, the nature and being of God are things that count. In the abstract, or as ideas, these have their significance; but their worth as such is impaired by the fact that they are still indefinite. They acquire their completeness of meaning only when bodied forth

in all the definiteness of actual experiences. Every general idea may be described as an indefinite potency, suggested in outline, of such actual experiences. God in the arms of a human mother is a general idea. It is the potency of limitless presentations—limitless as the possibilities of conception and imaginative expression. The actual Madonnas which art has given us are each of them a modification of the general idea into some specific embodiment; and when we come to these, criticism must subject itself to their teaching in all its individuality.

The individual embodiment is at once the realisation and the limitation of the general idea. It is the limitation in so far as it checks that indefinite ranging of the imagination which it has itself provoked. The idea of God in the arms of His mother sends us for our apprehension of definite motherhood, of womanhood, of Godhead and incarnation, deep into the wealth of our own experience; but from that wealth we are forbidden to draw scrapmeal or at random. It is not *any* motherhood or any incarnation with which the imagination likes to furnish us that we are allowed to appropriate. Our experience may even fail to furnish us with definite symbols at all. We must return to the actuality of the work before us, and find in it an exact and satisfying formulation of the idea moving obscurely over the surface of an experience which is rarely transparent. Thus the æsthetic creation demands in the first place that we seek for its meaning in an experience which lies confusedly beyond it; in the second place it recalls us and bids us look for its meaning, and the meaning of experience as well, only in itself. It asks illumination from without, but having found it there, it breaks into such a glory of light that it suffuses and transfigures the pale source of its own brightness. It subordinates to itself the experience on which it has risen to the veritable position of a transcendental principle; and its ability to do this may be taken as the measure of its æsthetic value as a whole.

The vision of the Sistine Madonna rests upon a religious

dogma—a dogma the acceptance and special significance of which presuppose certain more or less definite conditions within experience. It is not everyone who can, in a certain determinate sense, accept the doctrine or the history of the Incarnation. But the picture lays upon us the absolute injunction to accept the truth here particularised before our eyes. It demands this much, and it allows no more. Thus, it is required of the onlooker that no dogma on the one hand or scruple on the other shall stand between him and the immediacy of the presented truth. What the latter claims we must concede, and our appreciation will be in no small measure conditioned by our competence to this act of faith. On the other hand, we must not obscure the simplicity of the presentation by the presumptions and confusions of our theology.

The last word on art is neither art for art's sake nor art for life's sake. Art exists by virtue of, and for the sake of, its own masterpieces. These are for us the ultimate and only general terms of beauty. They decide for us the principles of æsthetics.

It remains to follow out in further detail the application of these remarks to the work before us.

To begin with, in the Sistine Madonna we find an elimination of all particularities of ornamentation which might claim a spurious, independent interest and so interfere with the free and direct expression of the vast yet simple symbolism of the piece. The curtains, which in the *Madonna del Baldacchino* are part of a canopy, mere furniture, have become a symbol. A curtain hung from a canopy is part of a canopy; but a curtain suspended one knows not how across the face of infinity is the embodied idea of a holy mystery. Where does the rod hang, from which these heavy green folds depend? To what is it fastened? We are no more tempted to inquire than we are to ask for a definite landscape if we are told that at times the green curtains of nature are drawn aside and the mystery beyond revealed.

The cherubic heads which throng the celestial spaces are likewise subordinated to the general purposes of symbolism. The significance of these faces has not always been grasped. To describe them as beautiful is absurd. In the reproductions they are apt to be over-accentuated: in the original they cannot anywhere be clearly made out. They are faint articulations of the blue ether, hardly distinguishable and quite impersonal. Raphael had no desire here to draw infant portraits; rather he is painting, so to speak, the sound of the universal praise which the initiated ear may catch at intervals throughout nature. We are not invited to grasp the actuality of their forms, and when the mind struggles to wrest from the outlines the literal features of the faint symbolic presentation, we are offered in place of human faces the blue sky of Italy. Undoubtedly these spaces are to be taken as a virtual transcript of nature, and the handling is a triumph of atmospheric perspective. The heavens recede behind the sharp outline of the curtains, and the flow of the Virgin's robe, meeting the Pope's brocaded mantle, leaves a clear triangular space below, through which the eye actually catches depths beyond depths of faint blue heavens.

Let us turn our attention now to the vision itself. Here symbolism and actuality have laid a mutual restraint upon each other until they have emerged a transcendent unity. Against the dim background, with its suggestion of a spiritual meaning breaking everywhere through nature, there stands out boldly on the clouds and in a radiant light the ineffable figure of the Virgin. Since Pheidias revealed the beauty of the draped female form poised upon one limb, the other just breaking the severity of parallel folds, the lines of the Athena have taken on a rounded softness and new graces. In their attitudes, their arrested movements, even the titanic figures of Michael Angelo, who represents force rather than sweetness, are billowy and voluptuous; and Raphael has put into sweetness and grace the genius which the Grecian artist put into an austerer majesty. Yet this transcendent Virgin, for all the

lightness and flow of her lines, is no less majestic. She is majestic in her pose and proportions, but above all in her individuality. She is no mere abstract of womankind, and the cruder symbolism of the white, red, and blue is not obtruded. Her individuality, however, emphatic as it is, is not of that kind which depends upon minor peculiarities of form and feature. It rests rather upon the perfection of her beauty and her chastity. It is the individuality of that which is normal in being most free from limiting eccentricities. Thus, whatever racial strain may be detected in the features, Mary is neither a distinctively Hebrew nor a distinctively Italian mother. Most Western nationalities might claim her, and she would probably meet the ideal demands of all. To be universal in this sense, to be what all can affirm, and what, in affirming itself, does not deny everything else, is to be individual in the highest, because in a spiritual sense.

Thus the Madonna of San Sisto loses nothing in being a typical embodiment of her sex; and this we feel her at once to be. Contrast her with the other female figure in the composition. St Barbara is a woman after a kind. Even in her dress, her modish coiffeur, her gay green sash and yellow sleeves, we miss the something elemental which marks the Madonna's attire. One might conjecture she wore shoes. In the saint's downcast eyes and averted face we read a peace and hope for the Church and the world on which she gazes; but it is the faith of the lower and dependent order which has been raised to assurance by the vision of higher things. Run the eye rapidly a number of times from her face to that of the Virgin and back again, and the contrast becomes irresistible. The peace that dwells in this transcendent face and in these deep eyes is more than the confidence of the believer. It is the peace of one who has been called to look into the mystery and has found there the eternal affirmation of the good. This is that Mary who has "kept all these things and pondered them in her heart." Her great eyes dwell mildly upon the future. The exquisite mouth expresses a refinement

of confidence that is almost contempt. It is as if she would stay the world's unquiet with a word, but checks the needless thought and mocks our human speech instead.

There is more in this serenity than the confidence of one who has pondered. There is something which is at once the limitation and the distinction of the Virgin. For although she has been chosen among all her kind for a singular honour at the hand of the Deity, she is herself something less than divine. She is lowly and a handmaiden. This too turns to her glory. Raphael in this Madonna, this essential woman, has universalised the destiny of her sex. Coming forward with her offering on her arm, she embodies the unconscious triumph of centuries of offering-bearers. The Greek poet of the *Trachiniæ* saw something of the solemn inwardness of this history. The poet of the *Medea* divined something of its pangs, and wrote these words:

> . . . . τρὶς ἂν παρ' ἀσπίδα
> στῆναι θέλοιμ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ τεκεῖν ἅπαξ.[1]

A few others, Shakespeare, and in late days Meredith, have sounded its depths. It is a heroic history, but it has few heroines; for this stupendous mission is the normal destiny of women, and they are gifted to transmute its heaviest passages into the grace of quietness. Generation after generation they tread a silent *via dolorosa*; in endless procession they come forward cheerfully to accept and affirm their portion of pain. Before such infinite deserts the compliments of passion and of chivalry grow silent with impotence, and the erotics of a Catullus himself appear something little better than the rapacity of a ghoul.

The greatness of Raphael's Madonna lies in this, that the visible form presented fits irresistibly the symbolism of the great thought of motherhood. Great in herself, the Virgin is still an integral part of something more inclusive. We cannot take the Child from His mother's arms without

[1] "I'd rather stand thrice under arms than give birth once."—*Med.* 250–1.

destroying each. As the painter has drawn them they are a unity in the composition.

This unity goes further, although its centre is the mother-child relationship. The whole hangs together round and from the Child. In this we see the use to which the symbolism of the work has turned the pyramidal arrangement. The Mother depends on Him, but so do the Church and the world. St Barbara glances downward to the earth, but Pope Sixtus gazes steadily up at the Child. For him it is a moment of ecstatic contemplation. He too belongs to the dependent order, although the head of that order. As pope and saint he is privileged to kneel on the clouds and behold the majesty of the ages; but as pope and saint he must kneel. He is finite, a tonsured priest, an official, a man in a place and after a mode, subject to the change of years and marked by a destiny peculiarly his own. It is a *portrait* we have here. Those weathered features, benign in old age, lend him a distinction, but it is the distinction which cuts off. He wears the dalmatica: the threefold crown of the papacy lies beside him on the parapet. All that he is and means he derives from his relation to one who is more universal man than he—the naked Child to whom he kneels.

And now we approach the heart of the mystery. Why is it that the eye prefers to dwell on the Mother? Perhaps it is that the serenity of the Virgin's face is more untroubled, and that we seek relief in it. In the Mother's look there is no suggestion of fear or pain. The sorrows of motherhood are finite and may be swallowed up in the joys. *Her* great task is running its auspicious course: *her* discharge is writing itself with each day's service, and she does not divine the cost of a world's regeneration to the Child. In His calm eyes there is something more than peace (and peace there is)—something that breaks the quiet of the composition with the hint of an infinite woe.

But deeper than this is the fact that the Child does actually *mean* for us the embodiment of the Godhead—not doctrinally,

but in the way indicated by the irresistible claim of the master-form to the free and absolute determination of its symbolic content. The incarnation with which we are here concerned is an æsthetic and not a theological or a metaphysical mystery. But it cannot be fully considered even from an æsthetic point of view without taking in these further standpoints in a certain sense; for the æsthetic appropriateness of the Child's figure and face to the expression of the infinite is connected with the general question of the adaptability of the finite form to an infinite content.

Without entering fully into the metaphysical merits of the question, we shall take as a presupposition (which indeed the work compels us to do) that the finite is actually capable of conveying some suggestion of infinitude. It is already part of our thesis that every sensuous form in art has more or less of symbolic significance—that is, that it suggests or conveys something more than we actually see and hear. And we have made it essential to the æsthetic value of a work of art that the literal presentation should first stimulate and then check the vagaries of the imagination, bidding it rest upon the embodied form before it and find in that the direct and complete unity of its fragmentary and chaotic experience. How it is that the work of art comes to have this satisfying effect of *fulfilment* is its own secret; and any attempt at a general statement brings us once more into the futile *circulus in definiendo.* But in the actual creations we find everywhere realised that congruity between the creation and the symbolic content which satisfies the need they themselves create.

Take by way of example the master-thought which constitutes the uniform background of Keats' poetry—the mournful contradiction between the transitory form and the general mixed and feeble strain of life on the one hand, and on the other the infinite purity and worth of its content in the culminating moments when beauty and passion meet. Again and again the baffled yearning of the mind gathers its sporadic forces into the shelter of the verse that perfectly expresses it.

Or to take an instance of another sort—the transcendental God-idea, the infinite perfection of all things, can find *no* congruity with itself in such a form as this, where Hermes describes his occupation:

> *τὰ λοιπὰ τηρῶ σκευάρια τὰ τῶν θεῶν,*
> *χυτρίδια καὶ σανίδια κἀμφορείδια:* [1]

or in this description of Herakles:

> *πρῶτον μὲν αἴ κ' ἔσθοντ' ἴδοις νιν, ἀποθάνοις.*
> *βρέμει μὲν ὁ φάρυγξ ἔνδοθ', ἀραβεῖ δ' ἁ γνάθος,*
> *ψοφεῖ δ' ὁ γόμφιος, τέτριγε δ' ὁ κυνόδων,*
> *σίζει δὲ ταῖς ῥίνεσσι, κινεῖ δ' οὔατα.* [2]

Yet such imaginative forms are quite suitable to certain aspects of Greek religion—the same religion that was capable of incorporating the phallic and skommatic traditions.

Now the expression of the Infinite through the child-form is not altogether paradox. For once we grant the possibility of such finite expression, mere differences of scale become relatively insignificant. Finite differences in any case all alike fall within the Infinite, and it is a matter of comparatively small importance (except for one reservation) whether we represent God as a child or as a man. That one reservation depends upon the following consideration. When we depict God under a human form, we employ this form not merely in virtue of the general representative character which it shares with other finite things. If this were all, a stone or a tree would suit our purpose equally well; for these things have for thought infinite organic implications with the totality of being. The human representation means something more. It means that we do not merely expand the Infinite *out of* its own finite moment, but that we conceive it as realised *within* the inner determinations symbolised to sense in the

[1] Aristoph., *Pax*, 201–2: "I'm minding the rest of the gods' bit furnishings, pottikins and bit trenchers and wee jars."

[2] Epicharmus, *fr.*, *Bousiris*: "First, if you just saw him at his meals, you would die—with his gullet inwardly a-gurgling, with champing jaw, with molar on the grind and screaking canine, while he snuffles with his nostrils and sets his ears agog."

form of man. Indeed, it is to the conscious life suggested by that form that we attach the notion of Infinitude. Now the child's form is less adequately symbolic of consciousness at a transcendent level. On the other hand, the symbolising power of the naked child-body is enhanced by the fact that it represents inchoate but infinite potencies, and is not yet stamped with the limitations of a particular experience.

By a miracle of genius Raphael has overcome the difficulty of representing a profound self-consciousness in the features of a child. No amount of analysis will penetrate to the secret of this extraordinary boy's-face,[1] but we can point to one or two of the conditions under which Raphael's conception was necessarily realised. In the first place, the child is not a new-born infant. He has lived long enough to have lost the vacancy of babyhood; and the general posture, the ease and grace with which the hands and limbs are disposed, is indicative of power and mastery. Yet there is nothing here that is unchildlike or unnatural. This is the perfect combination of the symbolic with the pure æsthetic.

In the face of the Child we should say that the mystery is insoluble, were it not that the fact, once more, is its own solution. The Christ *is* a child and He looks one; yet the child-face is assuredly made to *mean* Godhead. There is in the features a calm sublimity, a dignity of power and pain, which stamp them with a something far more, though not other than, the child-look. The artist has carried the transcendent symbolism through a difficulty which might seem insuperable. It frequently happens that young children assume a look of gravity and mature wisdom. The effect is ludicrous and insignificant. We do not accept the look as genuinely symbolic, and we laugh at nature's innocent attempt at deceit.

[1] The creative instincts of one artist may of course glean the secrets of another. Crowe and Cavalcaselle trace in the child's features of a Madonna picture painted by Fra Bartolommeo in the hospital of the Dominicans at Pian di Mugnone, "the glance . . . which Raphael gave to the Christ in the Sixtine Madonna." *History of Painting in Italy,* vol. iii. p. 458 (1st ed.).

Now, when we combine the usual symbol of a reflective expression with the features of a child's face, what we should expect to get is this serio-comic look—what in children we call an "old-fashioned" air. Apart from the originative potency of a creative genius, the symbolic forms of our experience would seem to have nothing else to furnish. But it is just this that Raphael has avoided. The symbolic value of such an air is purely human and was not to his purpose. He gives us instead a Child who is veritably such, and yet a Child whose look, troubled, yet reassuring, seems to search the end of things through all the agony of a God.

But the wonder does not end here. For, not content with his supreme achievement, the artist goes on to present us with the human symbol as well. By a compelling paradox, two cherubs have flown out of the dim background of elemental voices, and have perched below on the parapet in all the actuality of infant portraits; and the master exhausts the resources of genius in pushing his paradox to its uttermost limits and defending it there. It is essential to his conception that the conventional choir of angels should recede into the dim element. They are the faint, scarce articulate harmonies of nature at the lower limits of consciousness. Yet two of them have pushed their way to the extreme forefront of the canvas. The artist seems to say: "You ask to see the actuality of these faint adumbrations, where the symbol and the symbolism tremble into one another and are lost? That is folly—yet: look at these." It is a mischievous and almost wanton exercise of power where power is all but limitless. As in the case of the Child he matches a mysterious and transcendent idea with a mysterious and transcendent symbol, so here Raphael fits the lower idea with two sets of symbols, distinct and opposite, yet each of them the intrinsic and inalienable expression of the one idea.

Not only so, but he turns this wanton redundancy to a deeper harmony, and the composition reverberates with a new fulness of expression. The cherub-forms are a variation on

the same child-figure that symbolises the Godhead. They too are no helpless infants. As they lean and gaze, their easy attitude, saucy and content, shows them adapted to the familiar movements of life. But it is the familiarity of little things with little functions. All that is asked of them they can do without a thought—can fly and gambol in the spaces of heaven, or lean and rest upon celestial parapets. Existence is a humorous play.

Here, again, the paradox is compelling. The winged boys stand at the lowest level of the sentient beings who depend upon the Divine Child and bring Him praise. They are less conscious of dependence, and are therefore more helplessly dependent. As they melt and mingle in the vacant spaces, we feel that they are on the frontier-line of responsibility, and Raphael has given them the looks of sages. He has embodied the idea of a God, infinite in power, the source and centre of all, around whom the other types of being are grouped, and from whom they depend, and he has given to this the form and face of a Child.

In order to gauge the immensity of this conception, with its contradictions dissolving everywhere in surprising harmonies, we must, of course, consider the composition as a whole. The pyramidal arrangement and the conventional choir of angels have become subservient to the highest purposes of genius in these marvellous collocations. We fix our eyes upon the cherubs, upon the saint, the prelate, and the mother, and we turn them to the Child. In each case the God-symbol is enriched with a new and unique relationship ; and all these relationships, themselves symbolic, and ranging from the dependence and praise of the lowest sentience to the infinite conscious dependence of the mother on her offspring, and of all upon their God, are centralised and unified in the marvellous Child-symbol of the Infinite.

ARCHIBALD A. BOWMAN.

GLASGOW.

THE GODS OF EPICURUS.

A PLEA FOR THEIR SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.

B. A. G. FULLER.

"Gli Dei d' Epicuro, entrati serenamente nella pace olimpica, lasciavano la natura alle proprie leggi e l' uomo alla propria coscienza." [1]—Trezza.

There is probably no nearer approach to fairyland in philosophy than the "medius intervallus hujus et alterius cœli," where the Epicurean gods had their quiet seats untouched by storm and untroubled by care. For philosophy and theology have never taken the Epicurean vision seriously, and no critic, ancient or modern, seems to have felt that it was of any general philosophic importance or had anything significant and valuable to teach us to-day.

The reason for this neglect lies perhaps in the fact that the critics of Epicureanism have been either too ethical or too materialistic. And indeed no one can pretend that regarded as either morals or science (in the popular and narrow sense of the word) the Epicurean theology is not open to question. Both the nature of the Good, and the nature and extent of the realm of concrete existence, are debatable points. Whether the kind of life lived by the Epicurean Gods represents the *summum bonum* of human aspiration, and whether such a life is actually lived anywhere in the universe, are problems to be

[1] "The Gods of Epicurus, serene within the peace of Olympus, have left nature to its own laws and man to his own consciousness."

dealt with respectively by the ethical and the physical sciences. But there is another point of view from which we may approach our subject. Philosophy too often seems, not a comprehensive and impartial survey and interrelation of the goals of different interests and the results of various lines of investigation, but an attempt to interpret from the standpoint of some one particular interest—to colour with its hue and imbue with its taste and smell, as it were—the fruits of all other interests and researches. Thus materialism is apt to treat consciousness and all that it enshrines as a form of physical energy, and idealism is apt to deny the ultimate validity of the concepts arrived at by the physical sciences, and to transmute matter and space and time into terms of "experience" or "thought" regarded as the Absolute. Naturalism is prone, in its zeal to banish the categories of preference and value from the physical world, to consider them as altogether unreal and illusory. And conversely the moralist in his insistence on the validity and significance of the ethical categories in human life is liable to extend them beyond their sphere, to think them explanatory of the existence and operations of physical nature, and generally to see "lessons in stones, and God in everything." From any of these points of view the Epicurean theology must necessarily appear fanciful and unmeaning.

Suppose, however, we conceived a philosophy which did not take it upon itself either to criticise the assumptions of the special sciences or to supersede their results with a new set of entological postulates and hypotheses, but accepted frankly such assumptions as primary and such results as final. Suppose, for example, that instead of arguing that the world of matter moving in space and time which is discovered by the physical sciences, and the phenomenal world of consciousness, and the logical and moral worlds of value and ideals, were one kind and level of being and reducible to a single common denominator in fact and value, we accepted frankly the possibility of different ultimate sorts of being and regarded the sciences which dealt with them as authoritative within their provinces. We might

leave it then to logic to define the sphere and lay down the laws of the thinkable and possible, to ethics to determine what of the thinkable and possible is desirable and good, and to psychology and to the physical sciences to discover how much and what of the possible is realised concretely and given existential status in an actual "living" universe. In that case the task of philosophy proper and the unity which it seeks would be achieved in grasping the relations which pertain between the various *termini* of thought in various kinds of being. That is, we should have systematic, without necessarily substantial or moral, unity.

It is with this interest in philosophy as re-marking and accurately figuring the relations of diverse levels and sorts of being to one another, that I propose to approach the Epicurean theology. And I venture to hope that, seen from this new angle of vision, some of its apparent shallows may acquire depth and significance. Granting that the character and status which it attributes to the Gods are open to question, it still remains to be seen whether it may not possess a true insight into the nature of the interconnection of the order constructed by ethics and the order discovered by physics, and prefigure correctly the relation of the Ideal to the mechanical, seen from a naturalistic standpoint which allows and is impartial to both.

Let us, then, approach the theology of the Epicureans as given in their own words. Their creed cannot be better given than it is in the lines of Lucretius :—

> "The divinity of the gods is revealed, and their tranquil abodes which neither winds do shake nor clouds drench with rains nor snow congealed by sharp frosts harms with hoary fall : an ever cloudless ether o'ercanopies them, and they laugh with light shed largely round. Nature too supplies all their wants and nothing ever impairs their peace ot mind." (iii. 18 *et seq.*)

> "For the nature of the gods must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immortality together with supreme repose, far removed and withdrawn from our concerns ; since exempt from every pain, exempt from all dangers, strong in its own resources, not wanting aught of us, it is neither gained by favours nor moved by anger." (ii. 646 *et seq.*)

> "This too you may not possibly believe, that the holy seats of the gods exist in any parts of the world : the fine nature of the gods far withdrawn from

our senses is hardly seen by the thought of the mind; . . . And therefore their seats as well must be unlike our seats, fine, even as their bodies are fine. (v. 146 *et seq.*)[1]

These passages state, I think, the gist of the Epicurean positions. The Gods have physical bodies like ours, but theirs are beautiful and deathless. Like ourselves, they live in space and time, but in a space in which there is no storm and a time which brings no unhappiness. They are not interested in human affairs, and do not exercise any providential control of them. And they have no direction over the course of physical events. Though natural facts, they are not natural forces. But they are happy natural facts.

The most striking philosophic implication of such a theology is its reversal of what one might call the order of creation as commonly held by other systems. Instead of the Gods creating the world, the world creates the Gods. Were there no physical universe to embody, shelter, and sustain them, they could not exist. Their existence is incidental to the physical structure of the universe, and they are produced in the same way and by the same causes as any event. They are no more and no less incidental to the mechanical process, no more and no less "important," than any individual thing which may for more or less time be shaped out of the atomic storm. Their divinity lies wholly within the sphere of ethics.

Now this implication of the Epicurean theology is explicitly proclaimed by the naturalist as the true relation between the moral and the natural orders. The world of consciousness —the world of human life with its fruition of ideals and visions — he would say, is in a sense a product of the physical world. Were there no matter to be conscious, there would be no consciousness. Were there no mechanical process with its ordered sequences and its limited possibility of situations, there would be no selection among the infinite possibilities of being, no distinctions in values,

[1] Munro's Translation.

no concentration of experience about foci of universal and eternal significance—in short, no world of determinate ideals at all. That is, the processes of the physical and mechanical order determine what ideas shall have existential status and moral value. And finally, the naturalist, approaching the situation from the direction of ethics, might hold that without the physical there would be no theatre for the moral order. An idea which is nobody's idea has no importance. Ideas become ideals and teleologically operative only in association with the mechanism of the natural world.

At the same time, the naturalist would be careful to point out that those occurrences in the physical world which are the substratum of consciousness and value—the bodies of the Gods, for example—must not therefore be regarded as having a different physical status from that of non-conscious atomic configurations. They are dispositions of matter in no wise, save in configuration, different from other dispositions, and occur in exemplification of the same laws and have their causes and their mechanical effects wholly within the same spheres and on the same level as all other arrangements of the atoms. Their dignity, like that of the Gods, is a moral value, not a physical peculiarity; means indeed just the appearance of values and consequently of the category of importance in the universe. This new kind and level of being—consciousness with its entertainment and evaluation of ideas—is added to the mechanical order without altering or affecting it. The Good is a by-product in the operation of physical Nature.

The obverse of this position is set forth in the Epicurean insistence upon the non-providential character of the Gods. They have no power over the affairs of men or the operations of nature. They do not govern the world. Ancient critics ridiculed and rebuked their doctrine. Cicero is ironical, though not shocked: "Nihil habet, inquit, negotii. Profecto Epicurus quasi pueri delicati nihil cessatione melius existimat. At ipsi tamen pueri, etiam cum cessant, exercitatione aliqua

ludicra delectantur; deum sic feriatum volumus cessatione torpere, ut, si se commoverit, vereamur ne beatus esse non possit."[1]

Seneca is shocked into more than his usual lack of humour. "Tu denique, Epicure," he begins with the solemn inflection of true pulpit oratory, "Tu denique, Epicure, deum inermem facis. Omnia illi tela, omnem detraxisti potentiam, et ne cuiquam metuendus esset, proiecisti illum extra mundum. . . . . In medio intervallo hujus et alterius cœli desertus, sine animali, sine homine, sine re, ruinas mundorum supra se circaque se cadentium evitat, non exaudiens vota, nec nostri curiosus."[2]

Plotinus, too, has his fling. The Gnostics are worse, but that is about all that one can say. *ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀναιρῶν τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι, ὅπερ ἦν λοιπόν, τοῦτο διώκειν παρακελεύεται· ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος* (the Gnostic teaching) *ἔτι νεανικώτερον τὸν τῆς προνοίας κύριον καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν πρόνοιαν μεμψάμενος*,[3] etc., leaves the world without a moral shred to hide its ugly form.

Now so far as this question is a matter of physics the naturalist can deal with it shortly. Seneca's reproach, "et ne cuiquam metuendus esset, proiecisti illum extra mundum," is really an objection against the whole motive, procedure, and result of the physical sciences. The genius of science, the

[1] *De Natura Deorum*, i. 36, § 102: "The gods have nothing to do, Epicurus says. Truly, he like spoilt children thinks nothing better than idleness. But even children in their idleness amuse themselves with some action-game, while we wish God to be so lapped in idleness that if he so much as makes a movement, we fear we cannot be happy."

[2] Seneca, *De Beneficiis*, iv. 19: "Thou then, Epicurus, makest God inactive. Thou hast taken from him every weapon and every power. And, that no one may fear him, thou hast cast him out of the world. In the space between this and the other heaven, deserted, without a living being, without man, without anything, he keeps clear of the ruins of the world's falling above and about him, deaf to our prayers and heedless of our fate."

[3] *Enn.*, ii. 9, 15: "Epicurus, who does away with Providence, bids us pursue what is left, pleasure and enjoyment. But with ever greater insolence the Gnostic teaching by upbraiding the Lord of Providence and Providence itself . . . ."

naturalist would say, lies in its vision of the uniformity of nature and the universality of mechanical causation; its success, in its substitution of efficient for final causes, and its banishment of chance and miracle and divine intervention from the natural world, and the consequent establishment of human life on a secure and calculable basis. In denying supernatural intervention in the workings of the universe the Epicureans were strictly scientific. Unfortunately, however, they lost the advantage they had won, when for the interference of the Gods they substituted a doctrine of the spontaneous deviation of the atoms.

The critics, however, whom we have quoted, were not so much concerned with the physics as with the ethics of the question. They felt, as so many critics of so many things have always felt, that the doctrine could not be true, because they thought it undesirable. We are confronted, then, with a purely theological question, which must be decided on purely theological grounds. We are not asking now whether or not the Ideal in itself, apart from its association with the machinery of the physical world, is a power. We are asking rather whether it is ideal to conceive the Ideal as a physical force, or, to put the question in the form in which it was fought out between the Epicureans and the Stoics, whether God is worthy of worship because of his providence and benefits, or simply *propter maiestatem eius eximiam singularemque naturam*? Is he to be adored for what he does, or for what he is?

We might, I suppose, evade the point by denying that the issue is of practical importance. Whether we regard God as an ideal, pure and simple, or as also a natural force, whether we conceive thought to be of itself a power, or the matter which thinks to be the real agent in a casual sequence, the everyday situation is unchanged. The same work is done, be it consciousness or the substratum of consciousness which performs it. We eat, for instance, and it is matter of only academic interest whether our eating is caused teleologically by our feeling of

hunger, or mechanically by the physiological condition. There is causation, whatever the level may be on which it takes place. In any cause the teleological operation in consciousness is validated by the corresponding mechanical sequence, and the play of natural forces acquires in an organism the meaning and value of a teleological process.

This question, however, leads us to too deep and interesting a problem in theology to be thus slighted. Again we put the question, Is it good to conceive the Good as a natural force? The answer comes in the guise of a formidable dilemma of the moral and religious consciousness. The Gods, to be divine—that is, to respond wholly to our need and aspiration—must, it would seem, unite within themselves two incompatible characteristics. They must be, to use an Aristotelian expression, at the same time unmoved and moved movers. They must be both the final and the efficient causes of human progress. On the one hand, they must wait for us beyond the world. fulfilling in their lives that cessation of struggle and suffering and sorrow, that spontaneous righteousness, and that free and universal happiness, the aspiration toward which guides and sustains our effort. To attribute to such deities any feeling or relation which implies consciousness of imperfection on their part is not only self-contradictory from the point of view of logic, but defeats and shocks the moral longing which is crystallised in it.

> "How should the calm ones hate?
> The tearless know the meaning of a tear?"

On the other hand, this conception does defeat and shock another no less insistent, though, I venture to think, less profound and less religious demand. For we also call upon our Gods for help, and ask that they should come down into the world and meet us half way. They must desire and work toward something which they, no more than we, have attained. They must share our ideals, and fight with us to bring those ideals to pass. In a word, they must become at the end that which we suppose them to have been from the

beginning. They must win their way to themselves. Their will which is done must be accomplished.

The practical situation out of which this contradiction arises is plain enough. It lies in the contradiction by the facts which we find of the ideal which we entertain. As a result we see perfection double—as an ideal to be attained, and as the best way of attaining it. There is a perfect life absolutely, and a perfect way of living in an imperfect world in such wise as to bring absolute perfection as nearly as may be to pass. No man can in the nature of things lead the two lives at the same time. The one implies the cessation of the other. Yet we, since both have an ideal value for us, require that the same Gods shall show us how to live them both.

It is only fair to say, perhaps, that this attempt on the part of theology to consider God as both a realised ideal and an efficient force progressing toward it has received considerable support from philosophy in the various attempts of metaphysics to amalgamate the two characteristics in the Absolute. But I cannot feel personally that these efforts have been crowned with success. They make the heart of attainment to consist in pursuit, the condition of the existence, nay, of the value of perfection, to lie in never reaching it. The happiness of the Absolute according to such a philosophy is in chasing its own tail.

We conclude, then, that it is not good to conceive the Good as a natural force. We base our conclusions on two considerations. If it be the sum-total of natural forces that manifests the Good, or, in other words, if the universe be the expression of the will of God, it is impossible, judging by the facts of the case, to regard the Good as good, or the will of God as divine in the ordinary and only meaning of the terms. But if it be only one force at variance with and in antagonism to other forces which manifests the Good, that force cannot be itself the Ideal, but is a mere striving towards it, and conversely the Ideal must be found, not in the force but in the goal toward which the force is moving. In theological terms, it is the old

puzzle again. If God's will is done, He is not good ; if it is not done, not He, but the end He is striving to attain, is the Good —is his God and our God in the deepest sense of the word.

Now the Epicurean theology comes to precisely the same conclusion. It declines to join together what God hath put asunder, and it carries out its refusal to its logical consequences. Its insistence upon the non-providential character of the Gods, upon their imperturbability, upon their carelessness of human fortunes, and their inaccessibility to prayer, merely states in theological form the philosophy which holds that happiness does not consist in the vain pursuit of itself, and that the Good is the final, not the efficient, cause of progress. And for all those who were shocked at their position the Epicureans had their answer. God should be worshipped, they said, not on account of his power and benevolence, but for his perfection —*propter maiestatem eius eximiam, singularemque naturam.* Even Seneca found something fine in this attitude.

Indeed, the Epicureans in this respect are but following the lead given them by Aristotle, and in some ways improving on their master. They, too, conceived the Gods as unmoved movers, moving *ὡς ἐρώμενόν τι*, unmindful of what was inspired and uplifted by their loveliness. But whereas Aristotle, making of the divine attraction a magic power pervading and inciting the physical world, introduced with such disastrous effects final causes into nature, the Epicureans with clearer insight excluded such causes from the material universe, and confined teleology to the moral order. The Gods have no word to calm or turn the atomic storm ; their word is the moral suasion of the ideal in the hearts of men.

It is true that we lose the austere grandeur of the Aristotelian conception of the Good as *θεωρία*. 'Αταραξία is less fine, less rare, less difficult. But it should be remembered that the Gods are conceived as philosophers as well as men of the perfect world, though the Epicurean imagination loved to play about the pomp and glory of their natural circumstance. It is as if the Epicureans, enchanted with the magnificence

of the *dramatis personæ*, the beauty of the *mise-en-scène*, and the amenity of the stage directions, forgot the lines of which such a setting was worthy. But the sin was of omission, not of commission. Moreover, ἀταραξία is presupposed in θεωρία as a necessary preparation and condition. Only in a world such as the Epicurean depicted, perfectly adjusted to the needs and luxuries of the spirit, could life be frictionless and perfect thought be unfalteringly sustained.

Moreover, Aristotle's conception of the divine life is apt to give, rightly or wrongly, the impression of a somewhat narrow intellectualism. He saw clearly enough the variety of interests and relations involved in a perfect human life, but he made the mistake of supposing that perfect human life was not divine. As a result he, in a way that reminds us of the Protestant reformer, uprooted the divine Ideal from the fulness of human life, denied to aspirations and yearnings capable of contributing their share to the vision of perfection their right to offer themselves upon its altar, and consequently left the shrine of many a natural and noble worship empty. The Epicurean restores the balance. At his hands the Ideal recovers its relevance to human life, and all the manifold wealth of our experience regains its right to share in fashioning the image of the divine.

The materialism of the Epicurean conception excited considerable comment among the critics. That the Gods should have bodies and live in palaces seemed a shallow and childish idea. To believe that here and now somewhere in the universe such beings actually exist may seem fanciful; though after all it may be that in some other planet or system Nature has been kinder than she has been here, and has produced forms of life to whose interests and ideals she is perfectly adjusted. Still, for such Gods we have swept the heaven in vain with our telescopes. But is not the underlying principle philosophically significant, that life can fulfil itself, and attain its divinity in the midst of, and under the conditions imposed by, a material universe; nay, that after all the sovereign Good of

beings rooted in a physical world and living in space and time can only be significantly and intelligibly prefigured in terms supplied by their nature and their environment? Is it not perhaps a true and wise, and not a gross and outgrown instinct, which has led the Church, with its centuries of wide inquiry and deep insight into the fundamentals of human aspiration, to hold to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, while foes have ridiculed and reproached her position and friends explained it away? Nor is the vision of the quiet seats, unshaken by storm and bathed in perpetual light, any more absurd than the revelation of all things made new in a new heaven and a new earth where there is no more death, neither sorrow nor crying nor any more pain, and the water of life is given freely to all who are athirst. Neither vision is absurd. Both are beautiful, both are moving, both are true to the real situation and the practicable goal of human life. Both depict happiness under the conditions under which it is alone conceivable and attainable.

Nor are they "materialistic" conceptions, as "spiritually-minded" critics assert. The trouble is that we bandy the terms "spiritual" and "material" about, and make easy antitheses between them without analysis of their meaning, or distinction of the spheres to which they are appropriate. We make of spirit a kind of supernatural matter having a concrete and quasi-physical status; or we turn matter into God's thoughts or our own, in the same breath that we piously oppose it to them in scope and moral significance. The root of this confusion is easily found. It is the confusion of physical with ethical materialism, of ethical with physical idealism; or at least it is the feeling that the one involves the other. But the most incorporeal spirit might be materially-minded, and conversely the densest of bodies might be spiritually disposed. The real question is not whether it be mind-stuff or corporeal atoms which are so minded, but what their mind is. In a word, spirit is an attitude, a property, not a thing. It is not another substance outside the material but a value resident

within it. It is not a stuff for composing new bodies, new heavens, and new earths; it is a disposition to which this body and this world of flesh and sense may be brought. The spiritual world, that is, is not another immaterial world; it is this world made amenable to our interests and ideals. When a man talks of a spiritual life led apart from material conditions, his ideas evaporate very quickly, and he is saved from absolute dryness only by a certain residuum of material imagery held in solution in his thought and precipitated unwittingly from time to time in his discourse. Reason and imagination leaving the solid earth reach no new sphere. They only lose sight of the old, save for a few misty and clouded glimpses which they mistake for intimations of a spiritual landscape. So it is that a heaven which is not frankly a fairer and nobler earth is apt to be only ghostly and grotesque. For example, Dante's terrestrial paradise is a heavenly spot, and naturally invites to noble leisure and humane life, but the visible and outward sign of the communion of the saints in the celestial paradise is a pyrotechnic display in empty space.

The visions, then, of the Apocalypse and of the Epicurean theology are materialistic only in the sense in which anything has to be materialistic if it is to be truly ideal. That is, they are capable of incarnation and realisation in the physical world. But their value, their soul, as it were, is wholly spiritual, in that they picture the moral regeneration of the physical, the prevalence of the Ideal, and the establishment of the Good.

We come now to what I think is the deepest lesson of the Epicurean theology, that moral perfection is compatible with a material and mechanical world. It is commonly held that the establishment of the Good is logically impossible on a natural basis. And the deepest rooted if not the fairest flowering objection to naturalism is that it is a teaching subversive of morality. Hence it is that we find in most attempts to prefigure the realisation of the Good an effort to destroy, transcend, transubstantiate, or at least to supplement the physical order. But a little reflection, it seems to me, should convince

us that moral perfection might flourish in a mechanical and material order as easily as in any other. There is nothing in the idea of mechanism and matter to confound the hope of happiness. Of course, whatever we conceive the world to be like at heart, its face is often cold and grim. If "reality" be a mechanism, we must confess that it is a mechanism which grinds us evil as well as good. But if it be the experience of an Absolute, we have to confess that it is a pathological experience, or if it be the work of a God, that his will is not done. Whatever the constitution of the universe may be, evil is none the less real, suffering none the less poignant, sin none the less scarlet, happiness none the less thwarted.

At the same time, however, an Absolute may be logically conceived which is sane, or a God whose will is done on earth as it is in heaven. And, so far as I can see, there is also no logical bar to conceiving a material and mechanical world so constituted and operative that it is in all its events wholly stimulating and congenial to the self-fulfilment of human life. Such a world would not differ greatly from our own. It would contain all that is now desirable and ideal in Nature and human achievement. But there would be no friction between man and man or between man and Nature. The ideals Nature creates within him she would enable him to satisfy freely. And death she might abolish as she did in the case of the Epicurean Gods, or imbue us with an instinct which should at the end aspire towards death as drowsiness welcomes sleep at the close of the adventures of a brilliant and happy day. But these are fancies.

It is a fancy too, perhaps, to ask whether the world will ever be wholly remoulded and God made all in all. It would seem at first sight, indeed, as if the fancy could be turned into a reasonable hope by introducing into the world as guarantees of ultimate perfection powers for righteousness more efficient than ourselves. But such a guarantee gets no security from the universe. Conditions which obviously have proved recalcitrant to divine agencies through an infinity of past time

may reasonably prove so throughout the everlasting future. On the other hand, the application to human betterment of an increasing knowledge of the world disclosed to us by science affords vistas of a progress to which no limit can be safely set. However that may be, the question whether perfection be attainable or not has but a minor interest for ethics. Ethics need only be sure that in forecasting the conditions of attainment it does not do violence to the nature and conditions of life itself, and thus destroy its own picture. Thus we need not ask, in order to justify the Gods, whether we can ever achieve that perfect adjustment of the universe to the life it has produced, and of life to the world in which it finds itself, the spontaneous existence of which the Gods exemplify. We have only to consider whether such an adjustment, were it realised, would not mean the transfiguration of human life, in its own dear and familiar shape, with a divine value.

The spirit, perplexed by these questionings, not disobedient to the heavenly vision, yet loth to abandon the native landmarks of sense and the sure, tried ground of science, comes out of the presence of the Epicurean Gods comforted. To such an one they hold out the assurance that there is nothing in the mechanical and material character of the order revealed by science as the foundation of his life to make him feel that the moral struggle "nought availeth." We can fancy how the Epicurean of old who had made the sublime and fearful flight through the closed portals of nature far beyond the flaming ramparts of the world, and had poised over the void with its atoms plunging for ever through an infinity of empty space, might have been awed and shaken, and felt for a moment that the vision he had invoked to save, could only destroy, his happiness. And we can fancy, too, how his eye must have been steadied and cleared, and his heart uplifted, by the bright and steadfast apparition, set like a rainbow in the midst of the storm and like a rainbow deriving the span and glory of its existence from the raining atoms, of the immortal form and splendour of a liberated and perfected life. He may well have

read therein the promise that human life should endure and fulfil itself within the "ruinas mundorum supra se circaque se cadentium" of the physical order, fusing the iridescent lights of sense and thought and emotion into the white radiance of a perfection which was not extinguished but kept burning by the flux.

Such are some of the reasons for taking the Epicurean theology seriously. The gist of them would be that the Epicureans correctly divined the dependence of the Good on the physical world for both its ground and its theatre, and at the same time, with the exception of their one argument for the existence of the Gods, rightly understood theology to be a normative, not a physical, science engaged in the demonstration not of what is existent but of what is ideal. These divinations seem to me to have some interest for modern theology. If I might be permitted a criticism of the theology of to-day (my criticism, it should be remembered, is that of a naturalist), it would be that theology was willing to sell its birthright for a mess of pottage. It is sacrificing its proper theological function of understanding and expressing the ideal world towards which religious experience aspires to a vain attempt to manufacture concepts so vague and so soft that the physical sciences will not stumble over them. Its chief concern is with the existence rather than the essence of the divine, and it is willing to deplete that essence indefinitely if only it may save a remnant which it thinks "reason" will allow to exist. But the wavering silhouettes toward which liberalism, modernism, new theology, or whatever we may call the movement, tend, have really no more claim to existential status than the thoroughly thought-out concepts of scholastic theology. It is no more probable that the God of Emerson or of Parker or of Martineau exists than that the God of St Thomas Aquinas exists. Indeed, in a sense it is less probable, since all that scientific inference from experience has heretofore discovered to be existent has happened to be intelligible.

To this growing nebulousness, this acceptance of emotion as a substitute for thought (which is quite different from the acceptance of emotion as a partner of thought), this habit of theological fasting till a man thinks he can edge sidewise along with science, first if possible, through the "arta naturæ portarum claustra," the Epicurean opposes the need of definiteness, intelligibility, robustness, and relevance to human life as the prime requisite of a theology. He teaches us, even in his untenable argument for the existence of the Gods, that the scientific method is the only method for discovering the existence of anything, and that the physical sciences are the only means for determining how much, and what, is enacted beyond the world of sense. He would have us inquire into human nature and penetrate the significance and implication of its ideals before prefiguring their realisation. He would have us include in our picture all those amenities of the senses and of outward circumstance which it is normal to prize and to consider as contributive to the dignity of existence. In short, he makes the Ideal—the life of God—something which can be thought of in the only terms and realised under the only conditions which life as we know it offers us ; that is, in the only terms and under the only conditions which have any real significance and value for us. Surely such a view is direct, modest, and just.

It is true that the Epicureans believed this ideal to be already realised, and "living" Gods actually to dwell far off in the intermundane spaces. And for this belief they were ready with their reasons. Our experience, they said, is due to the impact upon our senses of atomic images of things. The atomic configuration of the tree, for example, is constantly giving off atomic miniatures of itself which travel swiftly through space on every side. Meeting the eye, they produce in us the perception of the tree. Now, all men entertain images of the Gods. These images can come from none save the very Gods themselves. Naïve as this argument appears, it bears an amusing resemblance to some later arguments commonly counted pro-

found. Substitute the word "idea" for "image" and it is to all intents and purposes the Cartesian teaching that the idea of God can be produced in us by no other than a divine cause. Moreover, it is strictly scientific in its method. It seeks to infer from experience and verify in experience a theory regarding the nature of the ground of phenomena, without any admixture of moral motive or emotional yearning. It does not find that the Gods exist because we cannot be good or happy without them, but because phenomena are such that they can be explained only on the hypothesis of a divine cause. We reach these deities in the same way, by the same method, and subject to the same verification as we reach the atom or the law of gravitation. In principle, the Epicurean argument is one of the sanest of theistic arguments, imposing upon theology the only procedure by which one can reach sound conclusions of any sort regarding the extent and nature of the substratum of phenomena. We may not agree with the necessity or probability of the hypothesis, but the manner of inferring and verifying it is correct.

Moreover, in embodying the sovereign Good as he conceived it in the persons of the Gods, the Epicurean after all was doing no more than every theology, often for reasons methodologically less sound, has done. Every theology believes the world it constructs to be already somehow and somewhere realised. We emphasise, as it were, the value of our ideals by believing them to have a concrete existence of their own apart from our realisation of them. In this respect the Epicurean compares neither favourably nor unfavourably with other theologies.

It is doubtful if this deep-rooted psychological habit of projecting dreams and ideas will ever cease. It appears in earliest childhood and reasserts itself in later years whenever sobriety and caution relax their discipline of our thought. The shades of other possible worlds, demanding to taste of the red blood of existence, ever press close to that line which adventurous thought must draw between the unprophetic and unrealised forms of what might be, and the

prophetic and dynamic nature of what is—if our speculation is to receive safe directions for its journey and home-coming. Nor is this fertility of the imagination one of the graver sins of thought. It is the same power which, when disciplined, leads to the projection of the more cautiously inferred and more widely and plainly attested order in which science moves. And it is more intelligent to place the accent of supernatural existence upon an ideal than to believe that without that accent the Ideal has no significance.

This last is moral materialism, the real sin against the Holy Ghost. But it is also more intelligent, if one chafes against the restriction of knowledge and cedes to the importunities of faith, to project ideals which are intelligible, and give existence to Gods like those of Epicurus and Lucretius, who are friendly to the manifold wealth of human interest and responsive to our aspirations toward clearness of intellectual vision, beauty of sense and of outward things, and dignity of emotion, as well as to our desire for frictionless relations to society and Nature. The ten commandments define the bare necessities of divine and perfect living. It is the other things which are its luxuries and distinctions. It is more intelligent and more spiritual, I repeat, to believe in such deities, than in the obscure and confused divinities with which so-called liberal and progressive theology, by abandoning close and precise thinking in a kind of false humility, belittles the real perfection and majesty of God.

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SHERBORN, MASS.

SOCIAL SERVICE. No. 4.

THE HARDSHIPS OF SEAMEN'S WIVES.

EMMA MAHLER.

THE grievances of seamen were much before the public last year, but I venture to say that comparatively few of those whose sympathies were aroused had any idea of the hardships with which their wives have to contend — largely through causes that are preventible. It is of these causes, and their effects on the seamen, their wives and children, that I wish to speak.

The unsatisfactory condition of the homes of seamen is often commented upon, and rough judgment passed, especially upon the women. It is easier to condemn than to seek to understand the cause of an evil, and for this reason, probably, we have until lately had very little knowledge of the difficulties under which the wives of sailors labour. A careful inquiry into the matter was conducted by the Liverpool Women's Industrial Council two years ago, and since then taken up by the Scottish Council for Women's Trades and the London Women's Industrial Council; and the result revealed the fact that much of the misery was attributable to the present system of seamen's allotment and advance notes. The position until a few months ago was, that under the Merchant Shipping Act of 1906 a woman was only entitled to half her husband's pay during his absence at sea, and this amount, in strict accordance with the law, could only be given monthly. It is true that she could sometimes obtain it fort-

nightly, and in very rare instances weekly, but this was a concession granted at the shipowner's personal risk. Instead of these allotment notes, advance notes are sometimes given. That is to say, a man receives shortly before sailing a note for anything from one quarter to the whole of his first month's wages, primarily in order to enable him to procure his outfit. At the end of the second month he may send money home from some port of call; but if he is not so inclined, the wife must wait until the end of the voyage, which may be of several months' duration. Not infrequently monthly allotment notes are given as well as the first advance note, and may be drawn at the company's office on the fifth week of the seaman's absence. Advance notes cannot be cashed until from three to ten days after the man has sailed—the interval being decided by the length of time the ship takes before being clear of ports which allow opportunities of desertion. The sailor therefore goes to some publican who knows him well and is willing to give him the money in exchange for the note, or he must put himself in the hands of a money-lender, and pay interest varying from 1s. to 5s. in the £.

Having outlined the methods of payment common amongst seamen, let us examine their effects on those most concerned. We will take an example of a woman with an average family, say, of five children. Her husband, if he is careful and well disposed, will leave her the little he can spare after he has rigged himself out with his advance money; but it is very rarely that a wife gets any of this, and she must struggle on as best she can during that first month of his absence until she can draw her first allotment note on the fifth week after his departure. The usual wage of an A.B. (able-bodied seaman) is £4 or £4, 10s. monthly (somewhat higher since the strike); and of this, £2 is left for the wife to draw at the company's office each month. By the fifth week the landlord begins to get restive, and there are other debts which begin to accumulate, and which have to be at least partially met.

In addition to this, when the woman suddenly finds herself with £2 after an empty purse, and probably empty hearth and very meagre food, it often proves too much for her self-control, and she explains apologetically that she must now "do justice to herself and children," which in many cases means reckless expenditure for the first few days or week. At the end of that time the money is well-nigh spent, and she once more falls into debt until the second month is up; and the same thing repeats itself, in increasingly aggravated form, during each successive month until her husband's return.

But when men take advance notes in preference to allotment notes (or are only allowed by certain firms to do so), and the wives have money sent very irregularly, or not at all, from abroad, the difficulties are greatly intensified, and the position is indeed an impossible one for a mother of a family. She may struggle on bravely for the first month; but as week after week—and at times month after month—passes by without her receiving any money-order from her husband, is it any wonder that she has fits of despair and recklessness, and that at times she seeks to drown her misery in drink? One thing after another gets taken to the pawnshop; and when nothing else is left to pledge, the alternative is to turn to the workhouse, or to money-lenders—and it is much oftener that these last are chosen, in spite of the misery such traffic entails. The maternal instinct, even in the roughest women, fights as long as it can against the institution that will separate her from her children.

Of course, all cases are not so desperate. Some are helped by relatives who will take a child or two until the seaman returns. Others may be capable or fortunate enough to find work, but the market for unskilled labour is not large, and it is badly paid, and if the work is such as to take a woman from her home she must out of her earnings pay a neighbour to look after her children. In some cases she is able to take in sewing, and I recall to mind one plucky woman who, after looking after her family of eight little children, including one

with hip disease, from 7 a.m. until 8 p.m., then turns to "slop work" in order to earn "another shilling or two." Wearied out after her twelve hours' ceaseless care and labour, she yet works at heavy dungarees and oilskins until 11 p.m. or midnight. "It's dreadfully hard to manage, only getting one's money once a month," she said; "but I'm lucky to get it regular, and my husband is one of the best, and always pays the rent for me when he comes back."

This, unfortunately, happens far too seldom, as will be pointed out later on. But although it is so important that a woman should receive her money regularly, and at much shorter intervals than once a month, it is quite as important that a larger sum than one-half of her husband's wages should be allotted to her, and the following illustration may make this clear. In one of the houses I visited, the mother, pale, slim, and worn, was nursing a delicate child on her knee; one a little older was lying asleep on the sofa; two others, little more than babes themselves, were seated on the floor, listlessly gazing about them. The two eldest were at school. In the course of conversation the woman informed me that her husband was an A.B. earning £4 monthly, out of which she received £1 fortnightly to keep herself and family going, and that she generally managed to have a lodger who brought her in another 2s. 6d. per week. "Goodness knows," she added, "how I'd manage without that—it's quite bad enough as it is. One pound a fortnight, that is ten shillings a week, to pay the rent, find the food, and keep the children in shoes—well, it just can't be done! And," she continued, pointing as she spoke to two miserably underfed children, "just look at these two little ones: they've had measles, and ever since they've been wasting away. The doctor says they're not getting enough food, that they want nourishment and change of air; but it's easy enough to say that—how can *I* give it? Oh," she added bitterly, "it's only them that does it that knows what it means to keep body and soul together on ten shillings a week, when there are six children to feed! And where's

the money to come from for their boots alone? They're that delicate I daren't let them out on cold, wet days without something on their feet." "But surely," I interposed, "if you have been here for some little time, and your husband is well known, the landlord will wait for his rent, or the tradespeople will give credit?" Again a look of bitterness came over her face as she replied, "It's just because they know him too well that they won't do that. They know as well as I do that it's precious little of his money *we* shall ever see. There are things he wants on the way, and nearly all the rest goes in drink and treating as soon as he lands."

We have said that under the Merchant Shipping Act of 1906 it was made a practical impossibility for a seaman to make adequate provision for his family even if he wished to do so. Is it not extraordinary that a clause should have been inserted in an Act making it illegal for a wife to receive more than half her husband's wages? Is there any other trade or profession where a man is made to feel that he has done his duty if he hands over half his earnings to his wife, to keep herself, the children, and the home going? And it must be noted that more than half is reserved to the seaman—as his board and lodging are free whilst he is at sea. It will be urged that on their return men will, or can, hand over the balance of their wages to their wives. That is true; but in this case the actual falls far short of the ideal, and it must be remembered that good laws are not made for the righteous and the just, but to prevent injustice and to help the weak.

Let us now consider, generally, how the men spend their money. Their first month's wages goes to rig them out for sea, after which there are "things" they want on the way, about which much could be said. There are the temptations awaiting them at different ports, and on their return to the home port, when they suddenly find themselves with a large sum of money in their hands, and surrounded by harpies and touts, whom only the strongest and best seem able to resist. It is appalling to find what big amounts are squandered in

drink, and in other undesirable ways, on the first day of a man's arrival home, and how little he often has to hand over to his wife. Shipowners and their representatives, missioners and relieving officers—all testify to the frequency of this trouble; and when we realise the hardships and restrictions at sea, we can perhaps hardly wonder that so many men succumb when they suddenly find themselves free and "rich." But we wish to minimise these temptations. In reply to questions, a highly respected secretary of a Seamen's Union and a member of a C.O.S. said: "I have been a seaman myself for thirty years, and have constantly gone in and out of my comrades' houses and seen for myself the great difference in the condition of those homes where the women have received their money weekly or fortnightly and where they have had two-thirds, and in rare instances three-quarters, of their husbands' wages. Doesn't it stand to reason too that a man is much less likely to turn into a public-house, when he knows he has a decent and comfortable home to return to?"

This brings us to the explanation that one or two enlightened and philanthropic shipowners, having realised the evils of the existing methods of payment, undertook at their own risk to give the wives weekly or fortnightly allotment notes to the extent of two-thirds, and even three-quarters, of their husbands' wages. This, of course, was done with the consent of the seamen, many of whom, we know, are only too anxious to leave their wives better provided for.

The injustices and hardships arising out of the strange clauses referring to methods of payment amongst seamen have been strongly felt by a number of people in all sections of the community, and early last year Mr Richard Holt, M.P., introduced a Bill as an amendment to the Merchant Shipping Act of 1906. This was passed in August, and is now known as "The Seamen's Allotment Act, 1911," and provides that a shipowner *may*, if the seaman so desires it, grant allotment notes at more frequent intervals than once a month, and for a sum not exceeding one-half of his wages.

We wish the Act had gone further, but it is a step in the right direction, and we most earnestly urge shipowners to take advantage of the permission now granted them. Several leading firms have already done so, and we have received most encouraging testimony as to the satisfactory working of the methods of payment we advocate.[1] The objection that this alteration of system involves greater clerical work, and increases the risk of desertion amongst sailors, has of course to be considered and met; but we would suggest that in offering these men better terms for their wives a better class will be attracted, and that, therefore, fewer desertions may be anticipated. This hope has been in a measure justified, and our expectations confirmed, by the assurance of two leading shipping firms, who have for over twenty years granted the higher scale of allotment, that they do not think that either of them has during that period lost £5 by doing so.

We fully realise that some lines run much greater risks than others, and that in these cases a greater possibility of loss has to be faced. But we believe that few shipowners who once realise the hardships and difficulties connected with the prevailing system will allow themselves to be deterred from taking advantage of the present Seamen's Allotment Act on that account.

We make our appeal in order that seamen may have the chance many of them wish to have of providing more adequately for their wives and children; and we press it, also, because we realise the importance of *raising* rather than lowering their sense of responsibility towards their families. Up to the present, the burden of bringing up and providing for the children has fallen almost entirely upon the women, and this in itself is morally degrading to the men. By leaving more adequate provision for his family, and having

[1] A member, for instance, of one shipping firm wrote us: "Our shipping department tell me that the men are turning up better to time and seem more sober than they used to be in the old days, and this all points, I think, to things progressing in the right direction."

less money to spend upon himself, the seaman's temptations to drink become minimised and his finer nature has a better chance of asserting itself. The hardships of the women would be greatly lessened, and they would no longer fall—as so many of them do fall—into that state of apathy or hopelessness which results from the continual ineffectual fighting against the too great odds of life.

And we plead specially for the little children—the future men and women of England—that they may have a chance given them of a better physical and moral development than falls to their share at present, and that the predominating recollection of their childhood may not be that of incessant hardship and struggle, but of a sense of healthy growing and sweet wholesome sunshine. Such an atmosphere is more calculated to bring forth good fruit and better citizenship than the present rough-and-tumble existence which is all that so many of these children know of life.

On all these grounds, therefore, we earnestly hope that every effort will be made by shipowners and seamen alike to take advantage of an Act that so largely helps to bring about these better conditions.

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DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"IS PERSONALITY IN SPACE?"

(*Hibbert Journal,* January 1912, p. 362, and April 1912, p. 693.)

I.

In the friendly controversy which has arisen between Dr Sanday and Dr D'Arcy two questions have come into prominence. (1) Is personality in space? (2) Does personality possess what may be called space-qualities, and in what sense is it correct to speak of the *field* or *centre* or *margin* of consciousness? Dr Sanday has argued that mental facts are in space, for "surely they are *ours*, and *we* are in space." Dr D'Arcy opposes this view. He opposes it partly on the ground that "spatial things can be measured in spatial terms. You can express them in metres or millimetres. . . . Will anyone dare to say that measurements of these sorts have the slightest meaning in relation to such an experience as a thought or emotion?"[1] This objection implies that an entity cannot be in space without occupying space. But is such an assumption defensible? What, for example, of the many forms of force with which we are acquainted? Life is certainly in space, so is electricity, so is gravitation. And yet do any of these entities occupy space? Can we measure them spatially? Can we speak of gravitation, or electricity, any more than of thought or emotion, as being so many inches thick, or wide, or high? Surely a force may be in space without occupying space. And Dr D'Arcy's conception of personality seems to represent it as a force, or at any rate as a combining activity. See page 366 of his article in the January number of this Journal.

But now, what about the second question, which is the crux of the problem? How far are we justified in speaking of the self as possessive of space-qualities, in using such terms as the region, or field, or centre, or margin of consciousness?

Let us first remind ourselves that Personality represents the highest form of existence of which we have any experience. There are degrees of personality, and "human personality is no more perfect personality than is human love perfect love." But of a personality more perfect than our

[1] P. 363.

own we have no actual experience; we may argue as to its possibility, and that is about all we can do. This is of considerable importance so far as any attempt to explain personality is concerned. For "explanation" may be said to be of two kinds. We may either explain the higher by the lower, or we may explain the lower by the higher. In the case of personality, only the former of these two methods is open to us. We have to use lower forms of existence in order to explain it. We have to approach it, as it were, by means of the paths that lead upwards. And the more of these paths we can make use of, the more complete our explanation will be. Being shut up to this particular mode of explanation, we can never fully express what personality is. For its differentia, the very characteristic which distinguishes it from all lower forms, will of necessity remain unrepresented by us.

Now, in the world as we know it there is matter, and there is force, and there is personality. Of these three the third ranks above the other two. When therefore we use material terms, *i.e.* spatial conceptions, to elucidate personality, as some psychologists do, we are seeking to explain the higher by means of the lower. But have we any business to do this? Well, a non-spatial world, or a non-spatial form of existence or state of being, is simply unthinkable by us. For example, Dr D'Arcy makes much of the distinction between space and time. But is time conceivable by us without the help of some sort of spatial qualities? He says that mental states interpenetrate.[1] And this very idea of interpenetration has its origin in spatial conceptions, and is unthinkable without them. Again, when Dr D'Arcy argues of the Self that it has no locus,[2] that the very idea of a locus or place has no meaning when applied to it, he is suggesting to us a conception of selfhood that is simply unthinkable by us. Let the reader test it for himself, and he will discover how true this is. The fact of the matter is, that for purposes of "explanation" or "description" we have got to bring that which is without spatial qualities, in the sense that arithmetical measurements do not apply to it, into a world of space. We cannot discuss it, or think about it, or write about it at all, if we do not do this with it. Thus M. Gérard, in his article in the January number of this Journal, in speaking of instinct as a kind of unconscious personality, refers to the latter as "the vast storehouse of notions, the almost inexhaustible reservoir from which conscious reason must incessantly be nourished."[3] So also, as Dr Sanday points out, everyone speaks of the *contents* of consciousness. And other psychologists write of the *current* of thought. Not only, then, can we say that the material *may* be used to explain the spiritual: the spiritual *must* be explained in this way if it is going to be explained at all. We have got to explain the higher by the lower, though that this is only "explanation" and not exact description is shown by the fact that arithmetical measurements, which apply to the material, are inapplicable so far as the spiritual is concerned. But then those psychologists who speak of the region or

[1] P. 366. [2] P. 367. [3] P. 284.

the threshold of consciousness are not suggesting that consciousness is measurable as space is.

On the other hand, what of force? Can we use it to "explain" personality? If we can, we shall still be explaining the higher by means of the lower. And further, we shall be explaining the incomprehensible by means of that which is only less incomprehensible than it. For a force, in and by itself, apart from the matter wherein it manifests itself, is unknown to us. Now, to say that personality is an energy, a thinking, loving, willing energy, may be more accurate than to describe it as a region of consciousness. Dr Illingworth, for example, reminds us that personality "is, perhaps, better described as an energy than as a substance."[1] The late Dr Moberly wrote of it, somewhere or other, as a relating centre. And Dr D'Arcy emphasises the same idea: "In our experience, there can be nothing of which we are aware which is not what it is, in relation to all the other elements in experience, by virtue of the activity of the ego."[2] At the same time, to say that personality is an activity or an energy, while it may be a more accurate statement than to describe it as a region of consciousness, is also more obscure. And, after all, the aim of our thinking is to make the hitherto incomprehensible less incomprehensible to us.

To the writer it seems that for the present we have to be content with describing personality in two ways. It is a region of thoughts, desires, volitions; it is also a thinking, desiring, willing activity. The one cannot be without the other, and we have got to find room for both. The thoughts cannot be without the thinking, the thinking is inconceivable without thoughts. Apart from Dr Sanday's remark that mental facts are ours and we are in space (which remark is of secondary importance), we may say that both he and Dr D'Arcy are right. In so far as personality is an activity or energy, spatial qualities cannot be ascribed to it. One cannot speak even of the contents of an energy; it is a centre which has no parts and no magnitude. But the energy is unthinkable without its results; without them it is a mere abstraction. And the results, which are a real part of the self, can only be represented under some sort of spatial conception, as a region or current of thoughts, desires, volitions. In so far as personality in this aspect of its being is to be "explained" by us, we have to make use of material metaphors. No other course is open to us. The higher has to be explained by means of the lower.

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II.

Reply to Dr Sanday.

The affectionate reverence with which, in common with all students, I hold Dr Sanday would prompt me to refrain from using the privilege of the "last word," which the rules of the *Hibbert Journal* confer upon the writer

[1] *Bampton Lectures*, p. 39. [2] P. 365.

of a paper that has been criticised in the Discussions. I must, however, in necessary self-defence, point out that I did something more than, as Dr Sanday thinks, assume my position as self-evident. As a matter of fact, I put forward three reasons, which I stated as clearly as I could, and which seem to me to demonstrate conclusively the statement that our personality, with all its thoughts and feelings, is not in space. (1) I pointed out that thoughts and feelings are incapable of measurement in spatial terms—in terms of inches or angles. (2) I made use of Bergson's remarkable presentation of the fact that mental states permeate one another. This quality distinguishes them in a very marked way from things in space, which are impenetrable in relation to one another. Dean Ovenden has given a very beautiful and admirably clear illustration of this truth from music, in his contribution to this Discussion in the last *Hibbert Journal.* (3) If Dr Sanday's view is correct, a psychologist ought to be able to draw a map of the field of consciousness, and this, as I pointed out, must not be a map of the brain, but a plan exhibiting thoughts, emotions, feelings, etc., in spatial relation to one another. The absurdity of such a proposal is, of course, obvious. But, if Dr Sanday is right, it must be possible.

I cannot see that Dr Sanday has dealt with any of these arguments, and I do not think it fair to say that a doctrine which can produce them is to be labelled "philosophical mythology." We are familiar with mediæval pictures in which souls are shown as little people coming out of the mouths of dying men. That would seem to me the mythological doctrine. It represents the view that personality is spatial. The one point in Dr Sanday's statement which seems to bear on these arguments is his contention that "to be immaterial is one thing and to be 'not in space' is another." Dr Sanday holds that mind is immaterial, yet that it is in space. Is it, then, of the nature of ether—the element which modern science assumes to exist in order that certain phenomena may be explained? If so, every mental element must, at least, have position in space. Indeed, no matter what it be like, if it be in space at all, it must have position. But everyone is surely aware that, of all forms of being, position in space is that which has been most perfectly subordinated to mathematical measurement. Why, then, do such measurements not apply to thoughts and emotions? Dr Sanday should explain.

Dr Sanday wonders where I learned this strange doctrine. I answer, From physical science. My teachers were careful to point out that the vibrations which form the physical concomitants of the sensations of sight and sound are not to be confused with those sensations. The physical side can be measured by science, the mental side cannot. Were the mental side in space, it could be so measured.

Charles F. Down.

Culloden, Craigavad, Co. Down.

THE CRIMINAL AND THE PUBLIC.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1911, p. 779.)

I HAVE received the following papers, which form a contribution, not without importance, to the discussion of the treatment of the criminal. I have no personal acquaintance with the writer, and I have struck out the dates and names from his communications, as their presence could serve no good purpose and might create trouble. JAS. DEVON.

"7–7–11.

"Sir,—Having read your article in *Hibbert Journal*, I thought you might be interested in my experiences, which would more firmly convince you of some of the facts you mention. In —— I was sentenced by Justice —— at —— to twelve months' hard labour under the Mod. Borstal System for burglary. I was then about nineteen and a half years of age, and it was my first conviction. I was transferred to ——, and was placed in the carpenter's shop, where I learnt nothing of any practical use to me. Not that I was particularly dull, for I was as good as any of the other prisoners. I asked that work would be found for me on my release, and was given to understand that it would be. I was not allowed to attend school, probably because I told them that I had passed all my standards. On my release, it was a great blow to me to learn that work had not been obtained for me. I know that they cannot command work, but it was wrong of them to give me the impression that they could. I was sent to ——, to be under the care of Mr ——, the P.C.M., who would find work for me. I was still hopeful. I had nearly thirty shillings, some of my own and some I had earned. Mr —— sent me to the S.A. Lodging House, where I had an unpleasant surprise on meeting some of the chaps who had been discharged two months before me, out of work, practically starving, and sleeping out each night. They had been assisted considerably, but could get no more. Mr —— tried to get me work, giving me letters to take to the big shipping firms, and I also tried hard to get work myself, but nothing came of it. Had I got a job I would have worked hard and been a credit. I mean what I say. My hopes gradually were shattered, and my funds became low; and I turned desperate, and done something which was rather illegal, and cleared out of the locality with a few pounds in my pocket. After that I done a few more unlawful acts until about Christmas 1909, when I knocked them off for good, and have done none since. I then took up peddling, although I had no certificate, and am still a pedlar. I have obtained a certificate now, and was very lucky to get one. It would not have done for me to have told quite the whole truth.

"Now if I had been caught and sent back to ——, the chaplain would have at once said, 'I am glad I had no job for that man, for he would have been back in any case.' But if he had obtained me a job, I know that I should have committed no further crime. It confirms your remark that officials do not understand prisoners. There was a chap about

my age doing six months. On his release they found him a job. Shortly afterwards he was back awaiting trial, and eventually got three years. Whoever got him the job did not understand him. I was not surprised at all to see him back. For I had more chance of knowing him than any of the officials, for he could speak to me with greater confidence than with one who is on a higher footing than himself. I told the carpenter and a lot of the chaps that he would be back. The reason why he again landed into trouble was because he had a mad spirit of adventure, and until that was knocked out of him he would continue to do wrong. The fault was on the side of the prison authorities, for they should have known their man better. Even a warder seldom has a correct impression of a man's character, although he thinks he can read a man like a book. The very fact that two warders will often have a totally different opinion of a man is conclusive of this.

"Now as to the effect that the prison system had on me: I am much about the same now morally as before I went under the treatment. The cause of my crime was poverty, and if I steal because I have no other way of living, I fail to see that I have any natural criminal tendencies. When I finished my time and committed other offences, I think I deserved to get clear, for I had great provocation, for the prison authorities should not have raised false hopes in me. No doubt they had good intentions, but it wasn't fit in my case. If, as you suggest, I had been asked to state the whole of my life up to my conviction, the reason of my downfall, and what would be beneficial for me, they could have made something of me. I could have supplied them with references from my employers—for I have never been discharged for dishonesty. My biggest fault was that I was too independent.

"Owing to having so much trouble over looking for jobs, I now detest the sight of hard work, and am sure that I'll never do any if I can possibly help it. Prison is responsible for that, although, of course, I never was extraordinarily fond of hard work. Shortly I am going to ——, and will call on the chaplain to let him know that I am still at liberty. I shall also ask him for a suit of clothes, but don't suppose for a moment that I shall get it. He gave me six shillings last November, and I expect he will think that I have had sufficient. Now, if I was locked up for anything again, and applied for a suit of clothes, I would not probably get it. There ought to be a charity specially for old prisoners who keep out of prison. I could write pages more, but am doubtful if it would be perused. Should you manage to wade through as far as this, Sir, a reply would be much esteemed by—Yours sincerely, (Signed) —— ——."

"(Postmark, 14th July 1911.)
"Post Office, ——

"Sir,—As I should not like you to be under any wrong impression, I wish to state that the chaplain here has given me a suit of clothes and some money, for which I am extremely grateful.—I remain, yours truly,
"—— ——."

CIVILISATION IN DANGER.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1912, p. 273, and April 1912, p. 599.)

I DESIRE to answer briefly some of Mr J. M'Cabe's observations concerning my two articles, "Civilisation in Danger," published in July 1908 and January 1912 in the *Hibbert Journal.* I remark first that, in these papers, I had no intention whatever of solving so vast a question as the future of civilisation. I wished merely to draw attention to the subject and to present a view of it. In doing that, I was perfectly aware that I was dealing only with one aspect of the problem, and that the other aspects were numerous. But I am satisfied with the result, not only because a most interesting discussion has been opened, but also because I believe that my method, which consists in throwing light on one side of the problem, without attempting to be exhaustive, is the only one adapted to questions bearing upon contemporary evolution. So far as these questions are concerned, every day that passes brings new elements to light, and it is therefore impossible to consider them all and draw a definitive conclusion.

Our difficulties are increased by the fact that, as Mr M'Cabe truly observes, "the environment of nations is wholly different from what it used to be, and earlier experience must be applied with great caution." Whether Mr M'Cabe has, in his reply, always made use of the historical argument with the caution he himself recommends, seems to me somewhat doubtful. Nevertheless, his advice is excellent. We must consider the present in itself, and not leap to rapid conclusions drawn from the comparison with past civilisations.

Considered in this way, the chief characteristics of the present time I take to be these:—1. In the material world, the progress of science and technical knowledge has, in less than a hundred years, transformed the conditions of life more radically than the accumulated effort of many centuries had been destined to do. 2. In the moral world, the diffusion of the scientific spirit has been accompanied by a general decay of religious belief. In the past, many religions have died, but new religions have always taken their place. For the first time in human history, there seems to be little chance of the appearance of a new religion to fulfil the great rôle which religion has fulfilled in previous ages. The immense importance of such a change is obvious, and the rapidity with which it is being accomplished, astounding. If we bear in mind that man himself, on the contrary, changes very slowly, we must necessarily expect that he will not be able to adapt himself to such completely altered surroundings without some difficulty. That is the origin of what has seemed to me and to many others a crisis of our civilisation. It is very possible—and we may all hope—that this crisis is only what we call in French "une crise de croissance," and that our civilisation will not only survive, but considerably improve. But I believe the reality of the crisis itself cannot be seriously denied. That all the symptoms I have indicated, taken separately, as Mr

M'Cabe has taken them, can be disputed, I do not question. But I think the *ensemble* bears a significance not to be thus disposed of. One of Mr M'Cabe's contentions greatly surprised me. He says my statement that England is "remarkably religious, when at least two-thirds of our people in large towns do not attend church," would be made by few Englishmen.

I think, on the contrary, that almost every Englishman who has travelled abroad would agree that, *compared with most Continental countries*, England is indeed remarkably religious; England possesses a State religion; nominally at least everybody belongs to some definite Church; civil marriage, civil burial, etc., are comparatively unknown. Education and religious teaching are still closely allied; the observance of the Sabbath, although no doubt decaying, as I have said, is still general. The influence of religion on social life is considerable, and the clergy occupy a position of rank and enjoy a respect unknown on the Continent. It is generally recognised that nothing of the sort exists in most countries. The progress of socialism and the progress of atheism frequently go together, as they do in France, and civic life is generally organised without any interference on the part of the religious authorities. I believe these considerations justify my above statement, that England is remarkably religious.

René-L. Gérard.

Liége.

SIR OLIVER LODGE ON "BALFOUR AND BERGSON."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1912, p. 290.)

I venture to submit that the curious polytheism, to a belief in which Sir Oliver Lodge testifies at the conclusion of his article, and which he seems to claim as supported by religious experience, is not consistent with the normal type of that experience. What believers in general are directly conscious of is communion with an "almighty" Power or Being. The Being with whom they claim communion is, evidently to them, the untrammelled controller of their circumstances even to quite minor details, and absolutely supreme over the whole course of events. Apart from this conviction, they can make nothing of their experience; no other hypothesis is, for them, in the least adequate to rendering any ordered account of that experience. And such experience is enjoyed by many who are fully acquainted with the results of modern science and philosophy; in fact, just as clearly and vividly as by simple-minded, old-fashioned believers. Of course, it is open to anyone else to set down this consciousness of theirs as a delusion. But if their experience is valid at all, it is valid to the extent of affirming the omnipotence and supreme sovereignty of the Being with whom they have communion. If it cannot be relied on for this affirmation, it is worthless as testifying to any objective Power or Being as its cause or ground.

What they are conscious of is the being in living contact not merely with a higher Power of some sort, but with the Supreme; this is an element in their experience as central, and as inseparable from the rest of the experience, as any element in it whatever.

This was the fundamental matter at issue in the Arian controversy—whether the God with whom we have to do in our religious life is the Most High, or only a secondary and inferior deity. Sir Oliver Lodge (following the late Professor James) is seeking to revive Pagan and Gnostic modes of thought with which the Christian Church fought her critical (and, we had thought, her final) combat in the contest with Arianism.

I quite admit that the highest "aspects of the universe" are "infinitely beyond our utmost possibility of *thought*." We cannot clearly grasp *intellectually* any sharply defined, still less any adequate, conception of God. But the most fundamental claim of religious experience is to take us to far more central and vital apprehensions of the universe than *thought* can reach. Those aspects of these "highest aspects" (if one can speak of an aspect of an aspect) which are of most interest to humanity can be grasped by the religious consciousness quite sufficiently for all the needs of life.

N. E. Egerton Swann.

Paddington.

"THE RIGHT TO STRIKE."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1912, p. 512.)

The reading of such an article as that under the above title in your last number causes one to inquire ironically why it is that the comfortably placed are always so ready to offer the worker advice as to what he is entitled to do to better his position, and to point out how he should endeavour to do this without causing much inconvenience or discomfort. As usual, one finds reiterated the well-worn threat, that if a strike is unreasonably prolonged, they (the workers) will inevitably turn public opinion (meaning thereby, doubtless, the opinion of the comfortably situated) against them.

Is it not time that those who really have the national welfare at heart, and not the making of individual profits, should face this question, not in the philosophic and academic manner of those who are obviously out of touch with the actual condition of the worker's life, but from the standpoint of the citizen's right to a share in that which he produces for the nation?

Dr Duff contends that the State has not only a right, but a duty, to interfere when its strength and security are endangered. Just so! Why, then, is it that it sits with arms folded and sees large numbers of its citizens starve, and offers no redress, unless those same citizens organise themselves and threaten its very existence?

To term this "pure coercion" is simply "pure" nonsense. It is the

only ready means which the organised worker can use against the existing coercion of the employer who says to him, "Have what I offer you, or starve."

Of course, the educated working man realises that this is only a temporary remedy, and that his ultimate path lies in parliamentary representation. This will come in time, probably sooner than Dr Duff, or those whose opinions he gives voice to, imagine; because, as Henry George pointed out thirty years ago, "To educate men who must be condemned to poverty is but to make them restive."

It is absurd to suppose that men who are being paid from 18s. to 25s. a week, and who are beginning to realise their position, are calmly going to sit still and wait until their masters (I do not know by what right they are so called) choose to give them a little more. And until Dr Duff and others of his school are prepared to deal with the question practically, they may just as well write on "missionary enterprise" in Timbuctoo, or some other far-away subject, as attempt to deal with strikes by lengthy articles of dubious worth.

The rock bottom of the whole article seems to be the inability of the general community to fix a wage which shall enable a man, responsible for the bringing up of future citizens, to live in a decent manner.

It has, however, already been pointed out that we experience no difficulty in fixing a figure which will enable the King to live up to his required standard; and even the remuneration of an M.P. raises no insuperable difficulties. It is therefore clearly a case of evasion to pretend not to be able to determine the lowest amount a man (whatever his position in life may be) can support himself and family on, according to the present cost of living. The "good conditions" referred to by Dr Duff, when a man will claim more than the bare necessaries, can come afterwards. Why not?

In the meantime, let those who have a sufficiency of life's good things be honest enough to acknowledge that the conditions under which the majority of our labouring classes live is a disgrace to any State.

H. O. Montague.

S. Norwood.

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

GERMAN philosophy has recently suffered a heavy loss through the death of two distinguished thinkers, Otto Liebmann and Wilhelm Dilthey. Both were earnest students of the Critical Philosophy, and it is fitting that in the current number of the *Kantstudien* (xvii. 1 and 2) some reference should be made to their life and work. The article on Dilthey, by Max Frischeisen-Köhler, contains a vivid picture of the man and of his manifold interests. For Dilthey philosophy was a study of the great interpretations of life in all their historical variety, and in his long series of historical studies he made the problem of human individuality his central theme. In his *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, a work of singular power and originality, Dilthey sought to exhibit the uniqueness and independence of the humane sciences as against the preponderating influence of the spirit of scientific naturalism within the sphere of philosophical reflection. It was owing to his endeavours that the Berlin Academy undertook the task of bringing out the elaborate edition of Kant's works now in course of publication. Professor Eucken's eloquent tribute to his friend and colleague, Otto Liebmann, and Dr Bruno Bauch's address, on behalf of the *Kantgesellschaft*, make one realise how great and good a man he was. "He was indeed," says Bauch, "a leader in philosophical research, a leader through what he accomplished, but also through what he was. As that clearness which only intellectual depth can secure was the characteristic feature of his philosophical thought, so was resolute and downright sincerity the distinguishing mark of his philosophic spirit." Liebmann has been called by Windelband the "truest Kantian," but, as Bauch remarks, his faithfulness to Kant consisted not in a faithfulness to the words of the master, but to the spirit of transcendental idealism. Happily, the *Kantgesellschaft* has been enabled to reissue, in its excellent series of *Neudrucke seltener philosophischer Werke*, Liebmann's youthful work, *Kant und die Epigonen* (Reuther & Reichard, 1912), in which, at the end of each of the

four chapters dealing with Hegel, Herbart, Fries, and Schopenhauer respectively, there occurs the famous watchword of the Neo-Kantian movement, *Also muss auf Kant zurückgegangen werden!* The book, which first appeared in 1865, was an examination of chief philosophical systems that had been developed from the Kantian, and the burden of its appeal was the necessity of a return to Kant and of a fresh analysis of knowledge from the critical point of view. It has certainly a message also for the present time.

In the same number of the *Kantstudien* there are several other articles of interest. Dr Bauch's *Antrittsvorlesung* at Jena, on "Immanuel Kant und sein Verhältnis zur Naturwissenschaft," presents a general account of those features of Kant's theoretical philosophy which possess special interest for the scientific work of the present time. In particular, Kant's attitude towards the problems of biology is discussed, and it is contended that Kant's support cannot be rightly claimed by the adherents of the doctrine of Vitalism. A teleology in the sense of biological final causes was expressly repudiated by Kant, and to him, as to Weismann, it seemed to be the special business of biology to explain the appearance of purposiveness in nature without resort to teleological principles. Richard Hönigswald, in an article on "Wissenschaftstheorie und -systematik," handles the problem of the relation of the historical to the natural sciences, with special reference to Professor Rickert's work, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft*, whilst Julius Schultz discusses the significance of Vaihinger's *Philosophie des Als Ob* for present-day epistemology. Writing on "The Problem of Knowledge" (*Journal of Philosophy*, 29th February 1912), Professor Norman Smith criticises in a suggestive way the Kantian theory of the nature of experience. Kant, he finds, made a strenuous attempt to combine phenomenalism with realism. And, although most of the inconsistencies in his teaching are traceable to the almost insuperable difficulties to which any such attempt gives rise, it is the source of much that is most significant in his teaching. Kant maintained that the individual is himself known only as appearance, and cannot therefore, be the medium in and through which appearance comes to be. Though appearance comes into being only in and through consciousness, it is not due to any causes that can legitimately be described as individual. Sensations have, according to Kant, Professor Smith points out, a twofold origin, noumenal and mechanical. They are due, in the first place, to the action of things in themselves upon the noumenal conditions of the self, and also, in the second place, to the action of material bodies upon the sense-organs and brain. A volume on *Kant and Spencer* has just been published by Messrs Houghton Mifflin Company, of Boston. It is the work of the late Professor B. Barker Bowne, and is based upon lectures given during many years to his students. The matter was dictated by him to a stenographer, but it had not received final revision from the author's hands. I am doubtful as to the propriety of its having been published in its present form. So far as I can discover, the lectures contribute nothing new to

the exposition of the Kantian system, and they do scant justice to the really central principles of Kant's thinking. What, for instance, can be more perverse than such a statement as this: "He was led by his doctrine of the subjectivity of the categories to overlook the fact that the forms of the understanding cannot be arbitrarily impressed upon experience"? As though arbitrariness of application were not the very thing that Kant was above all else anxious to avoid. The treatment of Spencer is more satisfactory, but there was no particular reason for connecting Kant's philosophy with Spencer's, and I think the very fact of his making the connection indicates a serious lack of judgment on the author's part. The book contains, however, some interesting criticism of Spencer's fundamental position, and also of the various subsidiary doctrines.

Professor James Seth's *English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy* (London: Dent & Sons, 1912) traces the history of English thought from Bacon to our own time. Written with much lucidity and freshness, the volume ought to prove useful and helpful both to students and to the general reader. It contains an excellent presentation of the idealism of Green, Caird, and Bradley. In the section on Bradley, however, I think it would have added to the value of the account if the influence of Herbart upon Mr Bradley's method of procedure in *Appearance and Reality* had been indicated. The concluding chapter, on "Present Tendencies in English Philosophy," is much too brief to do justice to the subject. The work of Adamson and of Shadworth Hodgson deserved fuller treatment. In conjunction with Professor Seth's book, the volume on *Present Philosophical Tendencies* by Professor R. Barton Perry (London: Longmans, 1912) may suitably be mentioned. Naturalism, Idealism, Pragmatism, and Realism are the several tendencies dealt with. Idealism, it is contended, has sought to prove not only the universality but also the spirituality of logic; it has sought to prove not only the independence of moral science, but its logical or universal character as well. And the result has been to confuse logic, and to formalise life. In dealing with realism, Professor Perry maintains that all values are absolute in the sense that they are independent of opinion. If anything is good, in that I need, like, or aspire to it, *that fact* can be neither made nor unmade by any judgment or opinion concerning it. There is an appendix on "The Philosophy of William James," in which a careful account is given of James's conception of mind, of his theory of knowledge, and of his philosophy of religion. "James," it is said, "never confused *the* world with man's world, but he made man's world, thus progressively achieved, the principal object of his study. Man conquers his world first by knowing it, and thus presenting it for action; second, by acting on it, and thus remoulding it to suit his purposes. But these operations are the inseparable parts of one activity through which a humanised and moralised world is developed out of the aboriginal potentialities." Mr Bertrand Russell's little volume on *The Problems of Philosophy* in the "Home University Library" (London: Williams & Norgate, 1912) is an excellent and

valuable piece of work. It is mainly occupied with the presentation of a theory of knowledge, in regard to which it seemed to the author possible to say something positive and constructive. Mr Russell outlines a new view of the relations of sense-data to physical objects. He now holds that the existence of sense-qualities depends upon the relation of the sense organs to the physical object—the object, namely, as the physicist conceives it. We have a direct immediate acquaintance with the data of outer and inner sense, with universals, and probably also with Self; we are not immediately acquainted with physical objects (as opposed to sense-data) nor with other people's minds. These latter things are known to us by what is called "knowledge by description"—knowledge, that is to say, which is expressed by means of propositions, and enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience. The problem of error does not arise with regard to knowledge by acquaintance, for there is no error involved so long as we do not go beyond the immediate object: error can only arise when we regard the immediate object (*i.e.* the sense-datum) as the mark of some physical object. Philosophical knowledge does not differ essentially from scientific knowledge; there is no special source of wisdom which is open to philosophy but not to science. The essential characteristic of philosophy, which makes it a study distinct from science, is criticism. It examines critically the principles employed in science and in daily life. The value of philosophical contemplation lies in the fact that it enlarges not only the object of our thoughts, but also the objects of our actions and our affections. It makes us citizens of the universe, not only of one walled city, at war with the rest. In this citizenship of the universe consists man's true freedom, and his liberation from the thraldom of narrow hopes and fears.

The Bergson literature continues to increase at a rapid pace. First, there is to be mentioned the admirable little work of Mr H. Wildon Carr (the Secretary of the Aristotelian Society), entitled *Henri Bergson: The Philosophy of Change* (*The People's Books*, London and Edinburgh: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1912). The distinctive feature of Mr Carr's book is the emphasis it lays upon the specifically metaphysical side of Bergson's philosophy, particularly upon the solution that philosophy offers of the problem of matter. For the universal life, as for every individual life, matter, according to Bergson, is the momentary point without duration that exists only where the movement is creating. And so the whole seeming dead-weight of matter is a view only of universal life. It is nothing to us, therefore, that the life which has evolved on this planet is small and weak compared to the mass of the dead matter it has moved within; or that it is confined to the surface, and that the energy it has arrested is derived from the sun; for the life that is manifest in this creative evolution is one in principle with universal life. The descending movement may be here more powerful than the ascending movement, so that life on this planet may be only arresting a descent. In other worlds it may be otherwise, for even in the universe that science reveals worlds are being born. Dr William Brown

contributes an able paper on "The Philosophy of Bergson" to the *Church Quarterly Review* for April. The article is mainly devoted to Bergson's theory of perception and memory, and his general view, based thereon, as to the relation of mind to brain. Dr Brown points out that Bergson's system of psychology stands or falls with his theory of "pure perception." Bergson, he thinks, evades a serious initial difficulty by identifying external matter with "images" themselves akin to consciousness. Intellectual operations, so far as Bergson refers to them at all, are described throughout after the manner of mechanical processes, and the problem of judgment is ignored altogether. In *Mind* for April there is also a discussion of "Matter and Memory," by Mr E. D. Fawcett. Mr Fawcett finds a discrepancy between *Matter and Memory* and *Time and Free-Will*, in that in the former sensation is said to be in its essence extended and localised, whilst in the former sensations are treated as inextensive and consequently not to be regarded as quantities. It is also argued that, whereas Bergson holds free acts to be relatively rare, strictly speaking he ought to regard all our acts as free. Professor A. O. Lovejoy continues in *The Philosophical Review* for May his articles on "The Problem of Time in Recent French Philosophy," and examining Bergson's theory of time and real duration, he has some acute criticism to offer. On the other hand, Mr Hugh S. R. Elliot, in his book, *Modern Science and the Illusions of Professor Bergson* (London: Longmans, 1912) has no acute criticism to offer, and the volume is saturated with a kind of dogmatism which happily has now become well-nigh obsolete amongst genuine thinkers. Here is an instance of the sort of criticism Mr Elliot thinks effective: "Time is a stuff both 'resistant and substantial.' Where is the specimen on which this allegation is founded?" And Sir E. Ray Lankester, who conceives it to be "an injustice as well as an inaccuracy" to speak of M. Bergson as either "great," or "French," or a "philosopher," assures us that Mr Elliot exposes "the illusions and perversions" of M. Bergson "in a masterly way." One can only express regret that a distinguished man of science should give his sanction to anything so futile and irrelevant as this volume, for the most part, contains. Finally, Dr Ernst Müller's short article on Bergson in the *Archiv f. system. Phil.* (xviii. 2) should be noted. It contains nothing new, but it is a suggestive sketch of Bergson's fundamental contention. In connection with the philosophy of Bergson, it may be well to draw attention to a thoughtful essay on "Evolution" in *The Philosophical Review* (March 1912) by Professor F. J. E. Woodbridge. Evolution, it is argued, is history; it is pluralistic, implying many histories but no single history of the world; man writes the history only of his own world; since, however, he discovers his world to be a history, he may have a science of history or evolution which is universal; and this science indicates that evolution is progressive.

Writing on "The Determination of the Real" (*Phil. R.*, May 1912), Professor J. E. Creighton maintains that the logic of the modern systems of thought seems to justify us in regarding experience as involving both a real

world which is progressively being determined, and a mind through which these determinations become known. The mind has its reality, however, only in and through its relation to objects; whilst the order of nature has a reality that is independent of, and in some sense prior to, any finite knower. In the knowing process, the relation of the mind to the world of real objects reveals itself as inner and essential. But this does not mean that things are "reduced" to qualities in a mind, or that the difference between the two sides of experience disappears. In the March number of the same Review, Professor E. B. M'Gilvary discusses "The Relation of Consciousness and Object in Sense-Perception," and contends that the relational view of consciousness is compatible with the recognition of the same real object being in different consciousness. In dealing with the question whether we now see a star which became extinct a thousand years ago, Professor M'Gilvary argues that our consciousnesses spans the thousand years, just as when we see an object a mile away our consciousness spans the mile. But while spanning time and space, any consciousness is centred in a definite time and place, the time and place of the body. Consciousness has a limited eternity and ubiquity, but its ubiquity and eternity radiate from the here and now.

There was mentioned in our last Survey an important Aristotelian monograph by Franz Brentano. Another small treatise, entitled *Aristoteles* (Quelle u. Meyer, 1911), by the same author calls to be recorded here. It is an extremely striking and original piece of work, mainly concerned with the Aristotelian metaphysics. A considerable part of the book is devoted to Aristotle's doctrine of God. Brentano contends that when Aristotle spoke of a desire on the part of matter for God, and attributes to matter a desire to become like God, he was using the term not in the ordinary sense, but metaphorically. What he meant to refer to was the Divine Will ordering and arranging the whole of nature. Those modern interpreters who take desire to be used in the ordinary sense of the word virtually make Aristotle's whole doctrine of *ὄρεξις* to be as devoid of sense as he himself thought the Platonic notions of *μέθεξις* and *μίμησις* to be. In a second article on "The Ethical Significance of the Idea Theory" (*Mind*, April 1912), Mr R. M. MacIver tries to show the connection of Platonic doctrine with the philosophic system which the Megarians imperfectly constructed. The essence of the Megarian theory was that Oneness and Goodness, the world regarded as a scientific system and the world regarded as the manifestation of purpose, are identical. Both the *Theaetetus* and the *Parmenides* were definitely associated with Megarian thought. In Plato's later doctrine, the One, or the scheme of relations in which the world exists for thought, and the Good, or the purpose revealed in that scheme, were partially divorced. The difficulty of the divorce is never overcome, perhaps never can be for ethical thought. All we can say is that Plato moved nearer and nearer to the heart of the difficulty.

The two important series of Gifford Lectures, Professor Ward's on *The Realm of Ends* (Cambridge University Press, 1911), and Dr Bosanquet's on

The Principle of Individuality and Value (London: Macmillan, 1912), I need not refer to, as they are reviewed in detail in the present number.

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THEOLOGY.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.LITT.

WE have to chronicle the arrival of two new periodicals in this department. One is the *Nieuw Theologisch Tijdschrift*, an Amsterdam quarterly, edited by Professor H. J. Elhorst. The other is the *Journal of the Manchester Oriental Society*. The greater part of the latter journal was written by Professor H. W. Hogg, but he has not lived to see the publication of the number, and it is published with a warm tribute to his scholarship and character from the pen of his colleague, Professor Peake.

Three manuals have appeared in the study of comparative religion. The first is a collection of the articles which have been appearing in the *Revue du clergé français*, during the past two years, edited by M. J. Bricout. In almost every case an expert has been entrusted with the particular subject—for example, M. de la Vallée Poussin with the religions of India, and M. Carra de Vaux with Islam. The title of the book is *Où en est l'Histoire des Religions*, and the second volume will embrace Judaism and Christianity. In *Christus* (Paris: G. Beauchesne), Professor Huby has edited a similar manual, also designed primarily for members of the Roman Church, but including Judaism and Christianity. M. Poussin has again done India for this volume, and M. le Roy contributes the section on savage religions. One admirable feature of this handbook is the series of bibliographies appended to each chapter. The third manual appears in Italian, edited by N. Turchi (*Manuale di Storia delle Religioni*, in the *Piccola Biblioteca di Scienze Moderne*); it has excellent bibliographies, but it excludes from its purview both Judaism and Christianity. In the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, 1912, pp. 79–94, M. Nariman adduces a number of parallels between Buddhism and Parsism, connected, *e.g.*, with marriage, the disposal of the dead, the temptations of the two religious leaders, Saoshyant and Maitreya, etc. Dr W. A. Shedd, again, in the *International Review of Missions* (No. ii., pp. 279 f.), attributes the demoralisation of the Persian character largely to the later influence of Islam. "Very possibly," he admits, "it goes back to the rule of the Zoroastrian clergy under Sassanian kings, but at all events it was intensified by the Arab conquest. One may believe that the conception of an almighty and living God, preached with the force of faith, was a great factor in the conquest of Persia by Islam; but the sword was the most prominent factor and there must have been much insincere profession. As time passed and the irresistible speculativeness of the Persian mind

produced variations of doctrine, some of them revolutionary in character, the insincerity became more widespread, especially among the intellectuals. Finally Shi'ite Islam formally recognised the rightfulness of insincere profession; and this theory of ethics is accepted by every Persian sect, including the Bahais, and is practised by all." The small volume on *Early Religious Poetry of Persia*, which Professor J. H. Moulton has contributed to *The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature*, deals with primitive Zoroastrianism, but he, too, notices the probability that the Avestan allusion to "Gaotema," over whom the victory is to be won in controversy, denotes Gautama the Buddha. In an address upon the study of Comparative Religion in *The Expository Times* (April, 295 f.), Dr J. A. Selbie, the well-known sub-editor of the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, observes that his study of religions has led him to the conclusion "that there is only one of the religions of the world that can be regarded as a serious rival to Christianity, and that is Buddhism." He also enters a "most earnest protest (a protest in which probably every student of Comparative Religion would join) against the extremely prejudiced and misleading account given of Brahmanism by Mr Harold Begbie in his book (just published) entitled *Other Sheep*."

The title of the last-named work recurs in a large American plea for Church Union, called *Other Sheep I Have*, by Theodore Christian. It is thrown into the form of a semi-allegorical report of the proceedings of a Celestial Commission on Church Unity. Bishop W. M. Brown of Arkansas is more direct in the proposals of his *Level Plan for Church Union* (New York). He honestly believes he is an "illustration of the power of a sectarian leopard to change, by God's grace, some of his spots. For I have reached the point when I think that Christian unity in the United States, by an absorbing process on the part of the Episcopal Church, would be a misfortune." What he proposes is a federation of the American churches, upon the basis of a republican reorganisation of the episcopate, though he refuses, in the light of historical research, to attach any importance to the historic episcopate either in its Anglican or in its Roman form. "The Methodist Episcopal, the Presbyterian and the Congregational forms of the Ministry are just as truly of Divine origin and authority as the Roman, the Greek, or the Anglican." This practical volume rests upon a theological analysis of sacerdotalism as a fiction imposed on Christianity. The religious aspect of sacerdotalism is discussed, in connection with the characters of Andrewes, Herbert, and Keble, by Rev. R. H. Coats in a charming volume of studies entitled *Types of English Piety* (Edinburgh: Clark), which submits the Evangelical and the Mystical types to an equally penetrating and sympathetic criticism. "Sacerdotalism, because of its tendency to attach too much importance in worship to what is non-moral and merely ceremonial and institutional, is a sure breeder of scepticism and irreligion." As an offshoot and an antithesis to this line of argument upon the historical side of English theology, we may notice Mr Arthur Ogle's *Canon Law in Mediæval England* (London: Murray),

an able work, the thesis of which is that the late Professor Maitland was wrong, historically, in impugning Stubb's theory of the Canon Law. Mr Ogle is specially eager to warn his readers against Maitland's view, as it is being used to further the case for the disestablishment of the English Church in Wales.

The theological basis of such modern views is treated by Professor Otto Scheel, in the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* (1912, pp. 440, 3ff.). His article, on the problem of the primitive Christian Church's organisation, is written in view of Batiffol and Harnack, with occasional references to Sohm. The trend of recent discussions, he observes, is to make the conception of the Church a much more primitive element in early Christianity than some Protestant historians had been disposed to admit; but, as against Batiffol, he declines to trace back any authoritative organisation to Jesus, and he objects to Harnack's use of the term "theocracy" in connection with early Christian institutions. "No apostolic, episcopal, clerical office existed in primitive Christianity. Paul's epistles to the Corinthians and the Romans utterly refute the genuinely Catholic thesis, and leave it beyond doubt that πνεῦμα and χάρισμα were the central ideas of the Church." So far as Paul is concerned, says Scheel, the Church was a "pneumatocracy" or a "Christocracy"; it was not a theocracy in any strict sense of the term. Paulinism, in the light of recent research, is as opposed to the Catholic thesis of Batiffol as to the conventional Protestant view of the primitive church.

The criticism of the gospels, and particularly of Matthew's, forms an important part of such arguments on the primitive idea of the Church, and in this department of theological study two books have heen issued which stand decidedly apart from ordinary methods. In *La Solution du Problème Synoptique*, L'abbé Pasquier revives the old notion that Mark is dependent on Matthew and Luke, abridging, harmonising, and correcting his predecessors. The other novelty is an English treatise, which is devoted to the matter rather than to the literary criticism of the gospels, though it is almost as revolutionary to find, in the *Oracles of the New Testament* (London: Hodder & Stoughton), that Dr E. C. Selwyn is endeavouring to show that the Greek Bible was the most important book to Jesus as well as to the early Church. Thus the messianic secret is found in the LXX of Isa. xxxi. 9, xxxii. 1; Ps. lxxxix. 36 f., and Wisd. ii. In a special chapter Dr Selwyn argues that the logia of Papias were simply a collection of such Old Testament prophecies about Christ, and not sayings of Jesus himself, and that the bishop edited Matthew's earlier treatise for Greek scholars. So far as the general principle of interpretation goes, Dr Selwyn is on much the same lines as Dr E. A. Abbott, to whom he pays a tribute in the preface, although, as he observes, "few of the trains of thought here followed have been anticipated by that accomplished theologian." One of these trains is the argument that "a careful search will disclose beneath every page of Acts the Old Testament passages—the oracles—which were actuating the minds of the characters

and of the writer to act and to say and to write as we see them doing." A different and more normal view of Acts is presented by Dr W. M. Furneaux in his recent commentary for English readers, *The Acts of the Apostles* (Oxford). Dr Furneaux also adheres to the Lucan authorship of the book: and the same position is held by Mr Herbert M'Lachlan in a fresh study of *St Luke, Evangelist and Historian* (Sherratt & Hughes), which is devoted to a consideration of the Western text as a source of information about the historian's methods and characteristics. Thus the Western reading in Acts xi. 28 is interpreted as a delicate allusion to his own conversion at Antioch, under the influence of Paul, and the *Pericope Adulteræ* is claimed for Luke on the grounds of style and spirit. In one chapter Mr M'Lachlan collects evidence to show Luke "not only as a gifted, and within certain limits as an accurate author, but also, alone in the New Testament, as a humourist."

The Lucan problem emerges also in Mr E. R. Buckley's *Introduction to the Synoptic Problem* (London: Arnold), where it is argued that the historian used a second complete gospel (T), in which much of the Lucan material usually relegated to Q was already embodied. The *Pericope Adulteræ*, also, is supposed by Mr Buckley to have been originally part of T. His volume is not an ordinary handbook to the subject, written for popular use, but in several respects, as, *e.g.*, in the discussion of Luke, an original contribution to the subject. It does not fall within the scope of his work to investigate Luke's second treatise, but he suggests that "for the earlier portion of Acts, Luke may have used a written source," which was akin to T.

The broader and more theological aspect of the gospels is handled by Von Dobschütz in the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* (1912, pp. 331–366). He takes up the problem formulated by Harnack two years ago, but concludes that there is not a "double" gospel in the New Testament. The point of his article is that the main differences between the preaching of Jesus and the apostolic theology—*i.e.* the larger emphasis upon the person of Christ, the presentation of his death and resurrection as fundamental saving facts, and the concentration upon redemption from sin—can be explained readily from the change of historical situation. "For all three we have got starting points in Jesus: it was only natural that he should speak of them infrequently." In a footnote, Von Dobschütz equally protests against Schweitzer's attempt to impose a "double" gospel of another kind on Jesus: it is to make a mystagogue out of Jesus, he argues, if we attribute to him an ethical gospel for the people and a mysterious sacramental gospel for the inner circle of the disciples. The views of Schweitzer, however, are discussed more in detail by Reitzenstein in Preuschen's *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* (1912, pp. 1–28), apropos of the former's recent work upon Pauline Research. Reitzenstein begins by pointing out that the Religionsgeschichtliche Methode is opposed to Schweitzer's one-sided treatment of the later Jewish eschatology; Hellenism is not so alien to that eschatology as

Schweitzer assumes. "He argues: Mysteries and mysticism are foreign to Judaism, eschatology is Jewish, and the whole of Paul's theology is in an eschatological setting. Therefore mysteries and mysticism in Paul must have developed spontaneously from his eschatology, and they have nothing to do with similar phenomena in Hellenism. The error of this is plain to me." A concrete example is discovered by Reitzenstein in the explanation of the sacraments. He points out how difficult it is for Schweitzer to distinguish in non-sacramental Judaism sufficient elements for the developed sacramentalism of the apostle, and that Hellenism has at least as many and as obvious suggestions of the Pauline doctrines of baptism and the eucharist. Finally, he objects to the retirement of Paul, in the theory of Schweitzer, behind a system of eschatology which we are not allowed to explain psychologically. "Paul's conversion thus loses its proper significance. . . . In his mysticism, in the absolute surrender of his whole being and life, I feel there is a depth of personal love which I cannot explain adequately on psychological principles, by mere messianic hopes and an eschatological idea. For this life of emotion Christ is God . . . . I certainly have no wish to deny the importance of eschatology for Paul; but I cannot believe that it was merely eschatology, *i.e.* merely what was a strange, transient, contemporary element, which formed the starting-point for the entire thought and experience of Paul." By a dexterous turn, Reitzenstein thus brings against Schweitzer the very charge which has been so often levelled against the Religionsgeschichtliche school, viz. a failure to appreciate personality in the study of ancient religion. Mr Warde Fowler, in the *Modern Churchman* (April, p. 31), enters a similar caveat. "I think we should be careful to take full account of the remarkable personality of the man and his peculiar mental build. He was intensely practical, but he blended his practical genius with a strong mystical or transcendental tendency, which is quite in harmony with the spirit of the age, yet need not be due to any special manifestation of it."

So far as the Schweitzer theory affects the gospels, it is set aside in its rigid form by Mr E. C. Dewick (*Primitive Christian Eschatology*, 1912: Cambridge). Dr Selwyn (pp. 428 f.) also rejects the theory, on the ground that the so-called messianic "secret" was an oracle of Isaiah which Jesus resolved to fulfil; while Dr E. Digges La Touche, in his Donnellan lectures on *The Person of Christ in Modern Thought* (London: Clarke, pp. 150 f.), more directly criticises the Eschatology theory on four sides. The *Interimsethik* doctrine is pronounced unsatisfactory as a complete account of the teaching of Jesus: the Kingdom is claimed to be more than future: the sayings about the Son of Man imply more than a future messiahship: and finally the eschatology interpretation "is really an attempt, in defiance of all the laws of historical probability, to reduce the dominant Personality in human history, the one Being whose Personal influence has increased, not diminished, with the passage of time, to terms of a narrowly national and decadent religious conception." The thesis of the volume, in general, is a restatement of

the older confessional Christology as opposed to Modernism, Ritschlianism, Liberal theology, and even Dr Sanday's hypothesis of the subconscious element in Christ's person. Dr La Touche thinks that "the assumption of a continuous act of self-limitation on the part of the Word meets all the demands of Scripture, and gives us considerable assistance in conceiving the character of the Incarnation of the Eternal Son." One aspect of the latter problem is presented in Dr J. H. Skrine's pamphlet on *Miracle and History* (Longmans), where he defines "miracle" as "the presentation, not to the mind, but to the whole soul or personality, of new fact which provokes the movement of wonder," and applies this criterion to the Virgin-birth and the Resurrection. The object of faith in the doctrine of the former is the sinlessness of Jesus, which does not necessarily depend upon the particular mode of his birth. "When assured that, as a fact in history, one was born in Bethlehem who was a sinless One, we have the assurance which our soul demands, and which we had thought we could only possess if He was born in miracle. Having this, we can bear the suspense while the Church is weighing again her teaching which historical doubts have challenged." Similarly, the writer argues, what stirs religious wonder in the resurrection is "the manifestation in the temporal order of a fact in the eternal order—the power of Personality, human Personality, when it attains by self-sacrifice the perfect life unto God, to overcome the limitations of matter . . . . and remould matter to the will of spirit." The bodily resurrection is too often handled by opponents and defenders alike on the plane of an antiquated view of matter. "If the Risen Body of Jesus is what we find a body to be, the sum of relations between the person of Himself who appears, and the person of him to whom He appears, the question about the body which was buried, what happened to it, what change or transfiguration or annihilation befell it, are questions which, though of interest, are of a subordinate interest. . . . What our faith seeks for its assurance in the tradition of the Rising of Christ is not miracle but history. It craves a certitude that the event has happened, that Jesus, with whom men had been in communion before the day of the Cross, was after the Cross in communion with them once more, and that these men were certain it was so. For this historic certitude Christians have been asking under an inadequate name, when they have asked for assurance that the Body laid in the grave was revived again for the service of the Crucified now become the Glorified." The pamphlet is written in a singularly persuasive and irenical spirit.

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REVIEWS

The Realm of Ends, or Pluralism and Theism. Being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St Andrews in the years 1907–10.—By James Ward, Sc.D. (Cantab.), LL.D. (Edin.), D.Sc. (Oxon.), F.B.A., Professor of Mental Philosophy, Cambridge.—Cambridge University Press, 1911.

Professor Ward's new volume has been eagerly anticipated, and it will be thankfully received by a large number of readers. The earlier lectures on *Naturalism and Agnosticism* were, for the most part, occupied with a critical examination of ways of thinking which the author found to be radically defective. By means of such criticism, the lectures aimed at establishing the priority of an idealistic or spiritualistic standpoint, but only a general outline of that standpoint could then be attempted. The present work, like its predecessor, contains much interesting and valuable criticism. But the central purpose here is positive and constructive,—to ascertain, namely, what can be known, or reasonably believed, concerning the constitution of the world, interpreted in terms of Mind; to develop, that is to say, a system of spiritualism which shall not be out of accord with the assured facts of empirical research. The result is a notable and significant contribution to religious philosophy. The argument is sustained throughout on a high level, and the book is full of pregnant and suggestive thought.

For his point of departure, Professor Ward takes the conclusion reached in his former work, that when we turn to actual concrete experience what we find is not a dualism of material phenomena and mental phenomena, but a duality of subject and object, a duality which turns out to be a duality-in-unity. The recognition of the duality-in-unity tends, it is maintained, to a spiritual monism. For it at once leads to the conception of the unity of nature as the ideal counterpart of the actual unity of each individual experience, where synthesis ever precedes analysis, and things are only distinguished one from another so long as they are apprehended together by one and the same conscious subject.

So far, Dr Ward is in sympathy with the great idealistic systems of the nineteenth century. The next step, however, reveals a radical divergence. To begin with the notion of an absolute unity, to adopt what may be described as an *a priori* or speculative method, seems to our author not only a serious error in philosophical procedure, but to be

courting disaster at the start. For the idea of the Absolute thus formed is invariably obtained through a process of abstraction, and from it there is no possibility of advance to the multiplicity characteristic of the world of real existence. Whether the Absolute be conceived as the ultimate Object, after the manner of Spinoza, or as the ultimate Subject, after the manner of Fichte, or as the ultimate Self-Consciousness, after the manner of Hegel, the consequence is the same—the distinct reality of the Many is transcended and annulled, and the supreme unity resembles the lion's den, towards which all the tracks make and from which none proceed. The Absolute is declared to be perfect and complete, but no intelligible explanation is, or can be, offered of the way in which what is in itself perfect and complete becomes splintered up into a multiplicity of modes which are neither perfect nor complete.

Not only so. Dr Ward insists that those thinkers who have attempted to begin with the Absolute have not really succeeded in doing so. Hegel's philosophy, for example, is by common consent, whatever else it may be, a philosophy of history in the widest significance of the term; and in treating the world historically, Hegel's leading conception was the conception of development,—a conception which involves a trend of thought essentially pluralistic in character. Hegel oscillates, it is true, between two different kinds of development: the dialectical, which is timeless, and the historical, which presupposes a time-process, and in the consideration of which the concrete and particular are the primary factors. But the former is only distinct from the latter by being abstracted from it after reflexion has revealed its presence there; at the outset, philosophy, *die denkende Betrachtung der Dinge*, has, even for Hegel, to begin with its "voyages of discovery." In the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Hegel takes for investigation what may be described as a generalised or typified individual. He endeavours to trace in this individual the typical stages through which mind has, as a matter of fact, gone through in the course of its history. Starting from sense apprehension in its crudest and vaguest form, the advance is made from phase to phase, until, finally, the whole development is found to culminate in what is called absolute knowledge. The *Logik* is concerned with the absolute truth of this highest mode of experience or reality; Logic, as Hegel regarded it, may be said to be a process of disentangling from experience or reality, in its completest form, the several elements which are indispensable to its constitution, such indispensableness or necessity being implied in any theory that postulates a single ground for the variety of things. Accordingly, phenomenology, the "science of experience," furnishes the presupposition of speculative Logic, in the sense that its business is to establish what the latter throughout assumes as proved—the unity, namely, of thought with reality, of *Begriff* with *Sein*. Nay, the very procedure of the *Phänomenologie* has its counterpart in the *Logik*. The transition, the *Uebergang*, from category to category in the latter, expresses for logical purposes the *Umkehrung des Bewusstseins* in the former. So far, then, as the order of experience is concerned, there

can be no question as to the "strong undercurrent of pluralism running through the whole of Hegel's philosophy." What, however, is *πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον* need not be *φύσει πρότερον*, and the important consideration is whether, from the latter point of view, unity was, according to Hegel, the ground and starting-point or the goal. Dr Ward thinks there is much to justify those interpreters who take Hegel's conception to be that of a plurality organised into a unity, rather than that of a unity differentiated into a plurality. One may perhaps ask if Hegel was bound to accept either of these alternatives. With whatsoever shortcomings, was he not trying to maintain that the real universe can, with as little propriety, be called a monistic as a pluralistic universe, but is rather the *unity* of the One and the Many—the One being not an absolute *One* at the expense of the Many, nor the Many separately independent Many at the expense of the harmonising unity of the One? There are, however, no "Hegelians" left now to maintain that this, which I understand to be the position Dr Ward is, in his own way, seeking to develop, can be made out along the lines of Hegel's dialectic.

The method pursued by Dr Ward is very different. Recognising that the Absolute, although it may be the goal of philosophical speculation, cannot be the starting point of real knowledge, he takes his stand unreservedly on the basis of pluralism, and proposes to see how far it is possible, on that basis, to advance, not indeed to a final explanation of reality—an undertaking left to the "man of science off his beat,"—but to a rationally satisfying view of the general nature of the universe. As contrasted with naturalism, the pluralistic is, he holds, pre-eminently the historical standpoint, from which the whole world is regarded as made up of individuals, each distinguished by its characteristic conduct or behaviour.

We assume, then, an indefinite variety of psychical existences, some indefinitely higher, some indefinitely lower than human agents, but even the lowest exhibiting behaviour directed towards self-conservation or self-realisation. The possession of selfhood, in however small a degree, implies that no two of these monads are exactly alike, that diversity and spontaneity are fundamental, whilst orderliness and regularity are the *result* of conduct, not its presupposition. No natural laws will be "in force," so to speak, from the beginning; they will be evolved through the mechanisation of what was originally purposive activity or conative impulse, the spontaneous and tentative thus gradually becoming the habitual and regular. Consequently, there will be no rigorous and mechanical concatenation of things; fixity, so far as it is real, will embody the result of experience, so far as it is apparent, it will be due to the statistical constancy of large numbers. In such a world, contingency, in the sense of new unforeseen beginnings, will be inevitable; but this contingency is not to be identified with chance, nor does the primitive state, which pluralism postulates, imply chaos. What Wundt has called "heterogony of ends," the objective realisation of adaptations that were not subjectively intended, finds illustration in every community of individuals, and in the earlier

phases of history must have played a more conspicuous part than in the later phases. Yet, through all the phases, definite progression is manifest, and the further we advance the more we see of guidance and direction. Such progression cannot, however, from the point of view of pluralism, be said to be "evolution," in the literal meaning of the term, not "evolution," that is, as the explicating of what is implicit from the first. What takes place, according to pluralism, would be more accurately expressed by Harvey's term "epigenesis,"—the gradual organising, that is to say, of new products in the whole, which its constituents in their isolation did not possess. This concrete integration of experience is no merely mechanical composition of units; it is always (to use Wundt's phrase) creative synthesis, the synthesis, for instance, that is involved in the apprehension of a melody which is more than the sum of its separate notes. Not new entities but new values thus come into being, and these tend not only to be conserved but to make higher unities and worthier ideals possible. "When at length the level of human culture is attained, we reach a good that is not diminished by being shared, and one that yields more the more it has already yielded. And here, in form at any rate, the final goal of evolution comes into sight, not a pre-established harmony, but the eventual consummation of a perfect commonwealth, wherein all co-operate and none conflict, wherein the many have become one, one realm of ends" (p. 435).

For this pluralistic philosophy, the Monadology of Leibniz has served as the type. But the doctrine of pre-established harmony has been wholly discarded, and with it that of the self-exclusiveness and "windowless" character of the monads. On the other hand, the principle of continuity between one monad and another has been, in its essential features, retained, and its retention leads Dr Ward to give his adherence to the view that everything in the universe entitled to claim real existence must be psychical in nature. Clear evidence of psychical being we find, he admits, only in connection with comparatively complex organisms, and for us, undoubtedly, cognition is always recognition, implying assimilation, and, therefore, memory in the widest sense. When, however, we imagine the complexity decreased without limit, we reach the concept of the bare monad, which must, in some sense, be its own body, and which can be described as having only a momentary consciousness without memory—an immediacy of awareness, answering to what psychologists call "pure sensation." The existence of an indefinite number of such bare monads, interacting directly without any intervening medium, would, it is contended, provide all the "uniform medium" for the intercourse of higher monads that these can require, and would render explicable the appearance of mechanism in the so-called inorganic world. With much care and thoroughness Professor Ward works out, as has never with such detail been worked out before, the account which, on this theory, can be offered of the relation between body and mind. We are to conceive of the soul, or dominant monad, as standing in a specifically close and intimate relation to each of the groups of innumerable subordinate monads that constitute the

reality of the bodily organism, so that whilst the organism is opaque to all other subjects, it is diaphanous for its own subject. The relation is unique—not that of subject to object, but rather that of subject to subject, an immediate or sympathetic *rapport*, of the kind sometimes meant by telepathy, and of which striking illustration is furnished from the higher sphere of social organisation. The monads ministering as subordinates to the dominate monad are not for this monad phenomenally extended as they are for other monads; the totality of their relations at any given time answers to the objective experience of their dominant monad at that time, and answering to the sensations of the latter are particular changes in the said totality, initiated by certain of the subordinate monads. Further, since these subordinate monads are related also to the so-called "material" environment, conceived as consisting in the last resort of bare monads, it can be understood how, through the double mediation of organism and environment, the acts of one dominant monad give rise to sensations in another dominant monad.

Criticism of Professor Ward's philosophy will, I imagine, be largely concentrated upon the "panpsychism" to which I have just been alluding. To me, I confess, the arguments in support of ascribing the characteristic of psychical or mental to everything that really exists seem the least convincing part of Dr Ward's work. I cannot feel that the principle of continuity, even though its validity be granted, is at all adequate to bear the weight thus imposed upon it. Moreover, I doubt whether the principle of continuity, in any sense approaching that which it possessed for Leibniz, can be retained by a pluralism in which the doctrine of the mutual exclusiveness of the monads is abandoned. I do not see how each monad can then any longer be said to mirror from its own point of view the entire universe. And if not—if, for instance, among the lower monads, some, in responding to external influence, are aware of sensations of one kind and some of sensations of other kinds—it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the discontinuity which subsists between the different kinds of sensation must subsist also between the monads that respond in these particular ways. Dr Ward has abundantly shown the impossibility of taking the abstract dynamical concept of a mass-point as a centre of force to represent an existing reality, but he has not shown that matter, as we actually know it—matter, that is to say, possessed of manifold properties—is equally disqualified for having a place assigned to it in the realm of real existence. The latter question turns, no doubt, in the long run, upon the account we have to give of sense-perception, and it would not be fair to bring against Professor Ward's metaphysical position a view of the nature of sense-qualities which he does not share. It may, however, perhaps be permissible to press the following consideration. We should not in truth get rid of mechanism even were we able to trace the way in which the "appearance of mechanism" may possibly have arisen. If we insist that the distinction between person and thing, matter and mind, is not an ultimate distinction, if we insist that "material phenomena are only the manifestation of minds"

(p. 247), still even phenomenal manifestations need accounting for, and in accounting for them we should find the fact of mechanism returning, in an altered form, upon our hands. Suppose it be said, for example, that sense qualities arise as the result of a relation among monads. Then that mode of production *is* mechanical,—mechanical, I mean, in the sense that it takes place wholly below the level of conscious or purposive activity. As compared with the view which assigns a real existence to perceptual objects, we should simply have extended enormously the range of what Lotze used to call "psychical mechanism." And it may well be questioned whether the real problem which the presence of mechanism in nature forces upon us is thereby, to any appreciable extent, lightened. Dr Ward lays emphasis, as I have said, upon the distinction between mechanical conjunction and "creative synthesis," and the distinction is beyond all doubt an important distinction. But does the circumstance that "all real synthesis entails new properties which its component factors in their previous isolation did not possess" (p. 102) suffice in itself to remove such synthesis from the category of the mechanical? If spatial perception be a conspicuous example of creative synthesis (p. 105), so also is the fluidity of water that ensues when oxygen and hydrogen, in certain proportions, are chemically combined. The synthesis is as little the result of *purposive* activity on the part of the apprehending subject in the one case as in the other. In assimilating, then, the former to that "veritable creation" which is involved in the formation of social, ethical, and religious values and ideals, are we not really hiding from ourselves just the distinction that is of vital moment?

It is not on account of any inherent inconsistency in pluralism that Professor Ward finds himself compelled to advance beyond it. An absolute totality of individuals, unified in and through their mutual intercourse, has not, in his judgment, been proved to be self-contradictory. Moreover, there is no logical incompatibility between pluralism and the assumption of a single personality as the supreme spirit of the universe. On the contrary, the principle of continuity would itself seem to suggest the existence of higher orders of intelligence than our own, and thus lead to the conception of a Highest of all. Pluralism suggests that "upper limit"; it can, however, do no more than suggest. And so long as we abide by the principle of continuity, the Supreme Being will be *primus inter pares,* the dominant monad of the whole community of monads, but not an Absolute including them all. Again, the principle of continuity would seem also to suggest a "lower limit"; but here, again, it can do no more than suggest. In the regress towards an original beginning, we seem, indeed, to arrive at a state of things that would afford no ground for differentiating the monads; we seem, in other words, to arrive at an indeterminate ἄπειρον, in which the Many would be merely nascent. A *Primum movens* would appear to be required in order to quicken the bare potentiality of a world into actual motion and life. The question, then, presents itself, whether we may not, after the manner of Aristotle, regard

the two limits as related, and, stepping beyond the confines of pluralism, postulate a transcendent Deity as the Creator and Ground of the universe? It is true that if stress be laid on conation or will, as fundamental to life, it may be urged that the efficient causation we are in search of is really provided in a totality of individuals, since *all* the individuals, as thus conceived, would be prime movers. But, in any case, there would remain for pluralism, as a final philosophical standpoint, two embarrassing difficulties. In the first place, it would be committed to the belief in some mode of individual pre-existence, and metempsychosis of some sort or another would be well-nigh inevitable. And although these doctrines cannot be ruled out as absurd, they are hardly reconcilable with the known facts of development and heredity. In the second place, pluralism fails to provide any guarantee for the conservation of values created by human individuals. "Without such spiritual continuity as theism alone seems able to ensure, it looks as if a pluralistic world were condemned to a Sisyphean task. *Per aspera ad astra* may be its motto, but *facilis descensus Averno* seems to be its fate" (p. 215). Pluralism cannot be charged with inherent inconsistency; but, taken alone, it is essentially unsatisfying and incomplete. "A plurality of beings primarily independent as regards their existence, and yet always mutually acting and reacting upon each other, an ontological plurality that is yet somehow a cosmological unity, seems clearly to suggest some ground beyond itself" (p. 241).

Theism, however, is not simply the completion of pluralism; it introduces one essential modification, the idea, namely, of creation. Theism implies that the many do not merely co-exist along with God, but exist somehow in Him and through Him. Dr Ward struggles hard to justify philosophically the idea of creation—the idea which was for Leibniz an *impasse* before which he found himself at a stand. In the first place, our author endeavours to free the notion from a number of implications it has been, erroneously, as he thinks, supposed to carry with it. Creation does not mean a making out of nothing; it is not a making or shaping at all. Creation, again, is not to be brought under the categories of either transient or immanent causation in the sense in which these find application within the world of plurality itself. Creation, once more, is not the literal unfolding of a plan completely specified in every detail. Creation means rather that God is the ground of the world's being, its *ratio essendi*—that, as such, He is transcendent to it, and yet because he ever sustains it, He is immanent in it, that it is His continuous manifestation. Creation implies, not indeed that God has been limited from without, but that He has limited Himself; a God whose creatures had no independence would not be a Creator. "Unless creators are created, nothing is really created."

The last sentence suggests the only criticism I must venture now to offer. The creation of creators—are we not stretching the significance of the term "creation" almost to its breaking-point in so employing it? After all, it is with the relation of individual minds to God that Professor Ward is, in this connection, alone concerned, and I am inclined to think there is in

the Christian conception of the divine Fatherhood a deeper thought involved than in the idea of creation, even as it emerges from the purifying influence of Dr Ward's analysis. We do not speak of human parents as creators of their children, and, perhaps, what restrains us from doing so is a sense, not so much of the greatness, as of the inadequacy of the conception. Be that as it may, such human relationship is, I take it, the nearest analogy we can have to the relation between God and dependent minds. For those of us, however, who cannot accept the view that all existence is psychical existence, the stress of the problem chiefly centres upon the relation of God to the non-psychical elements of the world. Indeed, as I have already tried to indicate, this aspect of the problem remains even for those who take the elements in question to be phenomenal in character. And here, also, the notion of creation appears to me unavailing. Certainly the qualitative characteristics of what we apprehend as material are in no sense deducible from the nature of consciousness. We can in no way see how they come to be from the activity of mind. And perhaps we are victims of an illusion in imagining that they do "come to be." It is puerile, at any rate, to ask how reality itself came to be, seeing that there can be no "coming to be," except within reality (pp. 225–7). But in order to be at all, reality must obviously have some characteristics. Why, then, may we not take *all* qualitative differences to be as ultimate as reality itself is ultimate? In other words, is not the notion of "making" as inappropriate with reference to sense qualities as it is in regard to finite minds or monads? With respect to physical nature, Dr Ward's striking analogy of the originality of genius, and his description of God as the Absolute Genius, the World-Genius, seems to me both helpful and suggestive. I find it less so with respect to the relation between God and dependent minds.

Want of space compels me to leave untouched the very full and valuable discussions of human freedom and immortality. In the last resort, Professor Ward holds, with Kant, that the main argument for the existence of God and for a future life is the moral argument. And the moral argument is a matter of faith—not of knowledge. But there is no dualism between the two. Invariably we are led to trust and to try before we know. The book concludes with an impressive vindication of the faith of reason in the rationality of the world. "Thoughtful men have been driven to call life an enigma, but few have been willing to curse it as a folly or a fraud; it has too much meaning, shows too much purpose for that, though its secret and its goal be not yet clear. Mists may envelop us, mountains seem to bar our way; but often we have heard when we could not see, and found a way by pressing forward, though, while we halted, there seemed no way at all" (p. 441). It is no slight reward for the labour of speculative inquiry when in the end so strong and hopeful an assurance as that is attained. And I should like once more to express my deep sense of the importance of Professor Ward's work as a permanent contribution towards the solution of the greatest problems of thought and life.

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The Principle of Individuality and Value: The Gifford Lectures, 1911–12. —By Bernard Bosanquet.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1912.

There is a striking difference between the measure meted by philosophy to knowledge and to the reality which knowledge is meant somehow to stand for or express. It has rarely been denied that knowledge must have some degree both of unity and diversity, and it is attributed a systematic character without any misgiving. But philosophers hesitate and compromise when they speak of reality. They generally give precedence either to its unity over its diversity, or to its diversity over its unity. If the Real is held to be "One," then its differences are accorded only some derivative or subordinate or secondary and precarious existence; if the Real is held to be "Many," then it is their unity that is dubious both as to value and existence.

There have always been witnesses to each of these opposing views. And that is fortunate; for it is safer to be the victim of two abstractions than of one, as it is better to entertain unreconciled beliefs than to empty the mind. Our own times are more than usually fortunate in this respect, for the advocates of the "Many" and those of the "One" have rarely been so equally matched, nor has the controversy between them concerned more weighty issues. The diversity of things, the inconsequence of events, the contingencies which run into the very heart of the Real and stultify the conception of the Absolute, were never more vigorously rendered; and, on the other hand, the universality of law, the stern linkage of necessity, the impotence and transiency of the particular, the significance and sweep of the universal, the cosmic unity of the whole, are maintained with no less tenacity. The advance of knowledge, and especially of the sciences of Nature, has strengthened the case of each of the schools. In the face of our fuller acquaintance with the complexity of even the simplest natural things, it is difficult for the advocate of "the Whole," whether he be Idealist, Materialist, or Absolutist, to attribute only a secondary significance and an attenuated and borrowed reality to the particular and finite; and, on the other hand, it is difficult for the Atomist, Pluralist, Monadist, Individualist, Intuitionist—or whatever name he goes by—to deny or to extenuate the cosmic unity of the whole scheme.

The consequences are very interesting. It looks as if the opposing schools might learn to respect each other, and "easy pluralism" become as difficult as "easy optimism." In any case they are becoming cautious, and neither the "One" nor the "Many" gets unmitigated emphasis. If they start from particulars as the only "realia," they recognise the need and would find room in the end for some kind of universal. If the world is not a complete cosmos it is orderly in parts, and if there is no Absolute there is a God who is doing the best he can. On the other hand, their opponents start with the "One," but would arrive at a "Many" which, if not "real," is at least not mere appearance; and over against unity and dissociation is at the worst given a subordinate place.

One hopeful and promising element in the situation is the dissatisfaction which is implied in this attempt to compromise. Another is the evident flimsiness of the connection by means of which transition is made from the one aspect of reality to the other, and the doubtful and apologetic reality which is accorded to the aspect which is taken as secondary and has to be "brought in." The movement of the "selves L, M, N," and their respective not-selves "non-L, non-M, non-N," from individual to universal experience, by means of such elements as they have in common when they are supposed to have nothing in common, is perhaps not more unique than the opposite break into diversity, or self-differentiation, behind all time and beyond all possible experience, of a mere "One." And the particulars or the "Many" which have nothing but the unreal reality of "appearances" and which must, transmuted beyond recognition in the Absolute and made not-to-be in order to be, do not give more satisfaction than the "Universal" which is only an abstraction, a hypostatised generalisation, and which has to maintain itself in face of the conviction that "all our assertions of identity are at bottom negative, amount simply to saying that we discern no difference."[1]

It is dissatisfaction with this see-saw of Universality and Particularity which is in the last resort accountable for the very remarkable contribution to philosophic literature that Mr Bosanquet has made in his Gifford Lectures, and published in his *Principle of Individuality and Value*. I believe I should not err if I said that, if it is not his sole, it is his main object, to put an end to this alternation, and thereby "exclude ways of approaching the problem of philosophy which," in Mr Bosanquet's view, "are certainly unfruitful." I have misunderstood his main intention if it be not true that he would measure his own success or failure by the value of his polemic against "the abstract particular" and of his proof of the "concrete individuality of the Absolute." On the one hand, he would maintain "the dissociation" of the particulars in all its obstinacy, minimising no difference and palliating no negation; but, on the other hand, he would show as the other aspect, or rather as the essential presupposition of this truth, that "all the detail of the Universe is elicited into mental foci," and "external conditions are held together in such foci, and pass through them into the complete experience which we call the Whole or the Absolute" (xxxvi.).

In the course of his exposition Mr Bosanquet gives in outline, or perhaps I should say in "principle," a complete system of philosophy; for he deals with Nature, Man, and the Absolute in their relation to one another. His method is frankly "intellectual," for he relies on "Logic": though it does not follow in the least that it is "merely intellectual." I am not sure that Mr Bosanquet could say what that might mean. In any case, methodic thought seeking systematic truth carries with it all other values for him. Philosophy, which is the supreme instance of this method, is to him "knowledge carrying deep conviction and appealing to our whole

[1] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. 161.

being"; and it raises issues which are "grave for human practice." "The things which are most important in man's experience are also the things which are most certain to his thought." And it is these which Mr Bosanquet would expose to view, without flinching from facing "the arduousness of reality." He does not profess to introduce "new conceptions"; but he does attempt "to recall and concentrate the modern mind out of its distraction," and "express and define the reasonable faith of resolute and open-minded men."

The task is nobly conceived, and it is executed in a great manner. *The Principle of Individuality and Value* is a contribution to present philosophic thought whose value can be compared only to Mr Bradley's *Appearance and Reality.* It will not appeal to the same audience as M. Bergson's works, or the brilliant irresponsibilities of the much-beloved and lamented William James, but it will engage the attention of philosophic thinkers for a long time, and, like *Appearance and Reality*, give legitimate occasion to much fruitful controversy.

Mr Bosanquet's own book is controversial; and he is like the builders of the Temple in the time of Nehemiah, who "every one with one of his hands wrought in the work, and with the other held a weapon." One of the main elements of value in his book springs from the fulness of his knowledge of the arguments of his opponents and his earnest way of dealing with them. He strikes both at the "isolated particular" and the "bare universal," recognising that they are but the two faces of the same error; and I am tempted to think that his polemical success is even greater than his positive and constructive achievement. He deals much in "instructive negations." He "meets with uncompromising resistance the attempt to take any form of immediateness, understood as excluding mediation, for an absolute and reliable datum." And he is quick to discover every form in which the "immediate datum" may present itself: whether in that of "the object of simple apprehension," the mere "fact," the little bit of the direct real on which one might take one's stand; or in that "indeterminate creative impulse called by the name of life"; or in "the impervious and isolated subject of experience called by the name of self" (see p. 13).

Mr Bosanquet totally disbelieves all these "three immediates." They are the creations of our own fear, "arbitrary refuges or timid withdrawals from the movement of the world." We are so concerned about ourselves that we cannot venture into the open, as if there were no other way of maintaining the real existence of the things for which we care except that of walling them in from the world. But counsels of mere prudence in matters of morals and speculation turn out false. And the final results of clinging to immediate data as reliable are in Mr Bosanquet's view disastrous. They involve Individualism and they "rule out tension from perfection"; that is, they betray both the One and the Many, "thrusting the Absolute out of life." They leave us no criterion for either our knowledge or our practical life. "The concrete system of ultimate values which ought to

be immanent as our clue and guidance to the conception of the best, is allowed to drop out." "We necessarily split up our experience and omit to employ what is really one half of it as a factor in our ideal. And, therefore, we fail to catch the heart-beat of the Absolute in our actual world, and to be convinced that the things which are best to us are really and in fact akin to what is best in the Universe; that these fundamental tendencies are discoverable by the study of our surroundings, and in ultimate reality, though modified, are not reversed" (see p. 20).

It is not difficult to gather from those things which Mr Bosanquet is most concerned to disprove what kind of doctrine he would put in their place. His "inmost aspiration would be expressed," he tells us, "if [he] could say to the critics of Absolutism, 'Mark now, how a plain tale shall put you down.'" The tale is not always plain: Mr Bosanquet's writings are not capable of being read profitably except by a most "living mind." But his purpose is not in doubt. He would detect "the heart-beat of the Absolute" in all finite things. He would prove that "we feel the Absolute more fully and intimately" than aught else—were there aught *else*—and "feel it in everything." For the Absolute is "a perfect union of Mind and Nature, absorbing the world of Nature, by and through the world of selves."

This, of course, is no new enterprise, and Mr Bosanquet makes no pretence of establishing a "New Philosophy": he knows the history of philosophy too well. His anticipations are modest with the modesty and sincerity of wisdom. "The outside of what I could hope to achieve would be sometimes to insist in words on what [resolute and open-minded men] think too obvious to be said, and by insisting on thorough-going logical connection of what is immanent in all sides of experience, to establish that a sane and central theory is not full of oddities and caprices, but is a rendering, in coherent thought, of what lies at the heart of actual life and love" (p. 30).

It is not possible, within the limits of a short review, even to summarise the main lines of his argument. It is only the thoughtful and repeated reading of his own work that will yield — yield even to those who cannot accept his doctrine—the impression of the wealth not only of his philosophical knowledge but of his experience, and of the reserve and dignity of his whole treatment of the great issues of life.

I shall refer briefly, in the first place, to the polemical part of his task.

It is manifest that Mr Bosanquet's rejection of "immediate facts as absolute and reliable data" brings him at once into collision, along the whole line, with some of the most interesting philosophical writers of the present day—amongst them, with M. Bergson, against whose method, if that term be admissible, he has the most gentle and genuine aversion. And, in the last resort, he makes the same charge, detects the same fundamental error, in them all. They assume "that the conditions of individuality conflict with the postulate of universal law." It is this assumption which accounts for Professor Pringle Pattison's "unique individuality" and "impervious self"; for Professor Ward's view that "the essence of the self

is to be *sui generis*"; for Professor William James's claim that room must be left for "the will to wiggle"; for the notion of Lotze and many others "that spontaneity must lie in escaping from general rules." Law is assumed by them to mean rigidity, fixity, iteration, sameness; and room must be provided for the play of contingency.

Mr Bosanquet shows that the fallacy is at bottom logical. It rests on a false view of the universal. It confuses unity with likeness, diversity with unlikeness, identity with sameness, negation with contradiction. And the error is expressed in æsthetic and general, no less than in philosophic, literature: in accounts of the nature of genius, of creation and invention, no less than in the representation of the uniformity of nature as "a repetition of resembling elements, instead of the coherence of differences in a whole." Instead of this barren universal, the truth of which he totally denies, Mr Bosanquet would substitute a universal which "holds between different parts of an individual system, such that the parts, and their variations, though not similar, determine each other, as in any machine, or more completely in an organism or mind."

Mr Bosanquet's dealing with this well-worn problem of the nature of the Universal, and his treatment of contradiction and negativity, ought to be of permanent value. Indeed, to those who can regard his conclusions on these matters as sound, the most "unfruitful of the ways of approaching the problem of philosophy" will have been closed. And if they do not attain that hyper-Hegelian altitude from which unity can be seen *as* difference, they will at least recognise the use of the conception of concrete individuality.

It is hardly necessary to say that the positive value of Mr Bosanquet's own doctrine depends upon the degree in which, while showing that "all of us experience the Absolute, because the Absolute is in everything," he has definitely averted or overcome the discontinuities of the various forms of the pluralism, or dualism, which he condemns. We are familiar enough with the doctrine of the mutual implication of elements within the whole, and the reference of all to the Absolute, for their meaning, function, and reality. But, unfortunately, the Absolute in and by and through which all things are is too often spoken of as "behind" or "beyond" or "within" the finite. It is only an otiose background and indefinite object of unreasoned faith, which leaves the elements unaffected, and allows the pluralisms, though disguised, to remain.

In order to ascertain how far Mr Bosanquet has really interrelated the elements and intensified their unity without weakening their dissociation, and thereby shown the Absolute, "in principle, as the totality of a hold on reality which permeates in its degree all the conscious creatures of the creation and all externality," the reader will do well to mark his treatment of mechanism and purpose, of the functions assigned to mind and to Nature, of the relation of mind and body and of finite minds to the Absolute.

On all these matters I find it difficult to form a clear conception of

Mr Bosanquet's conclusions. His affirmation of the persistence of mechanism in organic processes, and even in mental processes, is emphatic; but the mechanism that survives is "relative," and we are not told what that means. Mind in its dealing with things finds things lay down the law for its dealings, and there can be no ultimate dualism; but that some of the operations of mind seem to be mechanical, while some are not; and unfortunately "kinship" is a metaphor that does not explain.

Mr Bosanquet's rejection of "parallelism, interaction, and epiphenomenalism" is as decisive as his rejection of materialism and panpsychism. "Mind is the perfection and co-operation of the adaptations and acquisitions stored in the body, and not a separate thing, independent of these, and acting upon the body from the outside." But, on the other hand, "consciousness" comes out of the blue, as usual, and is a miracle and "supervenient perfection." It is not merely unlike anything which has appeared in the long so-called natural process which has prepared for it—unlikeness is of no consequence, seeing that there is unlikeness everywhere and likeness nowhere. Unfortunately it is an empty "principle of totality," potent on account of its emptiness, and drawing its determinate being and content from "external nature." Is this the old dualism, with a new face? If the scheme is genuinely one, can parts be assigned to Nature on the one hand and to mind on the other? I cannot find any clear answer. Nor can I see how the question of the relation between mind and body could arise for Mr Bosanquet; far less how it can be answered by means of a theory which is in any way "akin to parallelism."

But the part of his doctrine which those who sympathise with his main aims and conclusions will find most fruitful for reflection, critical and otherwise, is that which concerns the relation of finite selves to the Absolute. The function which he attributes to finite mind is definitely subordinate,—"based on arrangements below it, transcended by arrangements above it." The relation of finite minds to the Absolute is left precarious and indefinite; for there is nothing which belongs to the former that is not transmuted in the latter, and transmuted, we must gather, in ways to which the changes in our own experience offers no clue or analogy. Mr Bosanquet, for instance, will not attribute "moral goodness" to the Absolute, and one may agree with him; but he does attribute "moral goodness" to man, meaning by that a goodness in which the distinction between "what is" and "what ought to be" is final. He is thus unjust to man, and his Absolute is, after all, not revealed.

But these are great and difficult matters, and I can merely refer to them. I must content myself with recommending the work of Mr Bosanquet to the reader with whole-hearted admiration and gratitude.

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The Phenomenology of Mind.—By G. W. F. Hegel. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes, by J. B. Baillie. — London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1910.

The appearance in English of still another of Hegel's masterpieces can hardly but be regarded as an event of some moment in the world of thought. Since he was first introduced to English readers by the late Dr Hutcheson Stirling, Hegel has found a steady stream of capable exponents whose work has been accumulating down to the present time. This fact is both a tribute to Hegel's genius and a symptom of the present state of thought. For it has never been a merely historical interest which, in this country, has followed the labours of workers like Professor Baillie and Mr M'Taggart in their persistent study of Hegel. It has been a direct interest in world-philosophy; and the same interest is being shared at present over a very wide field, as the citation of a few names would be sufficient to show. At such a moment it is right that we should know the real character of Hegel's metaphysical effort, the most titanic and probably the most influential of any effort of the kind since Aristotle. And, for many reasons, no work is better able to make Hegel intelligible to us than the *Phänomenologie des Geistes.*

The difficulty of understanding Hegel is largely that of getting to his system from anything outside. In the exposition of his subject he does not believe in taking up, say, the familiar positions of his contemporaries or predecessors and "explaining" on what points he agrees with them and on what he differs. "The demand for such explanations, ... may very easily pass for the essential business which philosophy has to undertake. . . . If, however, such procedure is to be more than the beginning of knowledge, if it is to pass for actually knowing what a philosophical system is, then we must, in point of fact, look on it as a device for avoiding the real business at issue, an attempt to combine the appearance of being in earnest and taking trouble about the subject with an actual neglect of the subject altogether."[1] In his great introductions Hegel does indeed indulge a good deal in "explanations" of this kind. But these are regarded by him as remarks *about* the system, not part of the system itself. In his systematic exposition he does not wait to bring the reader up to his point of view. He simply commences the serious work of thinking, and assumes from the outset that the reader is in it. The result is that there are no "approaches." No portion of the system is intelligible without the rest. Like Fichte's, it has to be understood all together if it is to be understood at all.

Now, so far as "leading-strings" are concerned, whereby the reader might arrive safely and by easy stages at the required point of view, the *Phänomenologie* is at the same disadvantage as the other great expositions of Hegel's system. Except for the polemic against Schelling in the "Introduction," this work abstains from the "explanations" repudiated

[1] Professor Baillie's translation, p. 3.

above. But it has characteristics which go far to make up for the want. For one thing, Hegel here displays an amazing extent of knowledge; for his mind was of encyclopædic capacity and his genius ripened late. Moreover, he seems in this work to have summoned the whole resources of that knowledge, and focussed it into one intense centre. That he should do so, lay in the very nature of his task. The principle he had to advocate was that Reality is of the nature of Self-consciousness or Spirit. This principle had not been discovered by Hegel. It had been half understood by Kant, developed by Fichte, and had latterly been taken up by Schelling. In Schelling's hands, however, it had been, as Hegel thought, not so much completely developed as forced into an altogether premature fruition. To save it, Hegel had to bring it back into relation with actuality. And the *Phänomenologie* is the record of his first effort to do so.

Schelling's genius was not of the kind to be entrusted with the exposition of a spiritual philosophy. He was apt to believe in it too easily and too much. He had no sufficient sense of the need for evidence. With his æsthetic and somewhat mystical temperament he was content to grasp the spiritual character of the universe by a sheer leap of intuitive vision, and then preach what he had seen. The result was that philosophy seemed to Hegel to have degenerated in Schelling's hands into the mere reiteration of pious sentiments about "the beautiful, the holy, the eternal"; and he distrusted it. He bated no jot of his belief in the principle. But he had to reassert the claims of "science and the necessities of thought." If the principle was true, it had to be made out. The whole realm of nature and history and the mind of man must be exhibited in such a way that they proclaim their own spirituality to all who will but examine into their truth. And it was not till he felt himself able to substantiate such a position that he wrote the *Phänomenologie*. As a consequence, the book is encyclopædic in compass, and is written with all the freedom and all the reckless courage of a mind ablaze with a great message and launching it for the first time on the world. It presents in a concentrated picture an array of subjects so vast and so diversified that the mere idea of finding essential connection in them might seem to be preposterous. Nevertheless, connection does appear. The ceaseless labour of the dialectic takes up each subject as it comes, lays bare its essence, and exhibits it in its place as a phase in a necessary process. Nay, there is not even a "taking up" of any subject. There is but the constant observation of Reality as it breaks forth into form after form, building itself up until it appears in its full proportions as self-conscious spirit.

The subject of the *Phänomenologie* is the evolution of Reality. For Hegel, rightly or wrongly, it is not the human intelligence that moves over the surface of reality in comprehending it. But it is the real, that is the spiritual, which itself moves. The principle is that of all Idealism from Plato downwards. Take Reality in any form in which it appears, and let it work out what is in it; it will ultimately show itself a whole which is Spirit. Hegel begins with the very barest and simplest reality

that there is, namely, the purely sensuous—a truth so simple that it is dumb; it cannot so much as be spoken, but only "meant." He observes the whole series of forms which Reality takes, ending with a real which is spirit comprehending and willing itself. The forms are a necessary, not a fortuitous, succession. The necessity is the tendency residing in each separate phase to complete itself. Each phase, in the effort to reach the truth which it itself is after, finds itself becoming the next. Sense is no sooner fully sense than it is perception, perception comes out as understanding, that again as consciousness of self. The development of self-consciousness involves such phases as the relationship of master and slave, Stoicism, Scepticism, and that form of pious self-alienation found in early Christianity and called by Hegel the Unhappy Consciousness. This phase, again, finds its outcome in the sphere of Reason. Reason is further developed through scientific and moral experience, and emerges finally in Religion and Absolute Knowledge.

It is this abundance of material, thrown together with such confidence and exhibited as the embodiment of a principle, which brings into light the real character of Hegel's system, both in its strength and its weakness, in a manner not found either where the author is dealing with very abstract principles, as in the *Encyklopädie* or the *Logik*, or where he is writing on a special subject like Art or History. To use a crude metaphor, in the *Phänomenologie* the skeleton of the system is approximately complete, and it is clothed with flesh and blood. Of course, there are very hard passages in it—harder, perhaps, even than in the *Logik*,—places where the thought tunnels, as it were, through long tracts of darkness, where you seem to hear it but see nothing until it emerges somewhere to the light again. The understanding of the book, in fact, is largely a matter of knowing at any particular point in the argument through what region of experience the dialectic is proceeding. And in this task the translator has rendered signal service; for he has prefaced every considerable section of the work with short "introductory notes" exhibiting the "background of Hegel's thought"—that is, the concrete material of the dialectic process, the eras of history or systems of philosophy or phases of Art or Literature through which the principle of Spirit is working its way into view.

But perhaps the best service which the appearance of the *Phänomenologie* is fitted to render to students of Hegel and of Philosophy lies in the light it is likely to cast upon old-standing difficulties of principle. The conviction is hard to resist that our conception of Hegel's method has been narrowed by too exclusive or perhaps too one-sided study of the *Logik*. Hegel's passion for science and the necessities of thought has been alluded to. It was possibly the dominant note of his mind. It is in the *Logik*, naturally, that these necessities are most clearly felt. It is a true instinct, therefore, that has led those who want to understand Hegel profoundly to turn their attention to that quarter. But there is danger in the procedure. The *Logik* is the most abstract of Hegel's treatises. The large aspects of the universe are here reduced to their net value as leading towards the

whole. The forward impetus of the dialectic is thrown into strong relief. We see the necessity which bids the mind "nor sit nor stand but go," and which denies it any rest anywhere till it reaches the "Absolute Idea." What especially comes to view is thus the transitoriness of the lower categories, their inability to maintain independent being or have final value. The result is, unless the student is careful, a tendency to rush the lower categories towards the ultimate one—to dwell always on the positive value of a category as absorbing the one lower than itself, and obscure its negative value as resisting the one higher. In a word, we learn to subordinate the moment of negation till we lose the sense of its value. And there is no end to the mischief thus begun. The dialectic becomes a process, not of experience but of the thought-aspect of experience.[1] Moreover, the dialectic is not the truth even of that aspect. The true nature of thought is expressed in the Absolute Idea, and as the Absolute does not contain the previous stages as they appear in the dialectic but only the "truth" of them,[2] the dialectic itself is but a subjective process and not objectively valid of the nature of thought. Again, we become familiar with the notion of "applying" the results of the dialectic "in the interpretation of concrete facts," as though human experience were cleft in two and we had first to understand one side of it, and then, by means of that, find our way through the other.

Now, it is more than questionable whether this eliding of the negative is the true intent of Hegel's thought even as expressed in the *Logik*. But however that question may be decided, the emphasis on the negative seems altogether unambiguous in the fresh, first expression of his doctrine now before us. No one can read the powerful chapters on Scepticism and Stoicism and the Unhappy Consciousness without feeling how bitterly in earnest Hegel meant the negative movement of Spirit to be taken. Moreover, the phases of experience here passed in review resist, by their very vastness, a pantheistic interpretation. The Family, the Nation, Culture, Morality, Religion—these are realms of human fact too great and too independent to admit of a final collapse of all their value in the identity of a distinctionless Absolute. We are driven to articulate our conception of the Absolute till it can contain them unimpaired; and that means that we are driven back upon the ineradicable value of the negative.

The tendency to sever the *Logik* from the rest of the system originates in a laudable desire to feel that cogency and necessity upon which Hegel relied for the establishment of his principle. But it is a device which there is every reason to think Hegel himself would have repudiated. The cleavage of experience in two is but an instance of the use of those "exclusive" categories of the understanding which he spent his powers in criticising. Experience is for him a whole, and that necessity which is its salvation in disguise, is operative throughout. It is safe to predict that the Hegelian philosophy will be influential in forming the course of Modern

[1] See M'Taggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, sec. 15 ff.

[2] M'Taggart, *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, sec. 291 *passim*.

Idealism only in so far as this fact is perceived—in so far as the system comes to appear not merely as a piece of cogent ratiocination, but as a fruitful rendering of the meaning of experience in its entirety.

And it is interesting to note how far this misrepresentation of Hegel is responsible for the objections brought against him. Objections of principle are pretty well summed up in the term "Intellectualism." The late Professor James, for example, testified to the soundness of Hegel's "centre of vision" with a generous readiness.[1] What was wrong, apparently, was not that Hegel misunderstood the fundamental character of the world of fact, but that he had recourse for an explanation of it to something other than itself—something which seemed in a distant way to deserve the name of logic. What he ought to have done was to throw himself into the arms of experience and let it carry him forward. Now, in the *Phänomenologie* this is just what Hegel does. The difference between the result and the kind of result Professor James wants, is to be explained simply by Hegel's taking in earnest the principle on which empiricism itself relies. For the demand of the empiricist to trust experience always proceeds on the assumption that there is an implicit rationality somewhere in experience which ensures that the thinker who gives himself up to it will get somewhere. Professor James expresses the assumption in so many words at the close of his article.[2] What distinguishes Hegel is simply the completeness of his faith in this—his faith, as he expresses it elsewhere, in Reason and the might of Mind. Nevertheless, it *is* faith. He neither dogmatises about it nor "edifies." And it is faith in what the common man worships. The "Absolute Knowledge" in which the whole movement of spirit in the *Phänomenologie* culminates, is meant to be the final justification of the religious attitude to the world.

A competent edition of the *Phänomenologie* was a peculiarly fitting addition to a series which, like the "Library of Philosophy," aims at tracing the historical development of thought. The translator has played a rôle finely consistent with the nature of his task. Doubtless, as we have said, the real value of the work will lie in its directive influence upon contemporary thought, and Professor Baillie's other works show that he is fully conscious of the fact. But in his translation he has kept this point of view admirably in reserve. He has never allowed himself to be tempted to drag in unnecessary references to contemporary movements or topics of merely transitory interest. There is nothing either in his little introductions or his footnotes but a scholarly attempt to make the work stand on its own feet. Professor Baillie has indeed given us more than a translation. But he has been content to compress a great deal of research into brief, unobtrusive references; and he has consistently kept out of his author's light. The influence of the book will be all the greater because of these things.

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[1] See his article on Hegel's Method in this Journal, vol. vii.
[2] See *Hibbert Journal*, vol. vii. p. 75.

Body and Mind: A History and a Defence of Animism.—By William M'Dougall, M.B.—London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1911.

It is commonly believed that the problem of the relation of mind to body is one for the metaphysician, not the psychologist, to solve. Even writers of text-books on psychology seem to hold this opinion, for they discuss the question in an early chapter, with a minimum of reference to psychological fact and with arguments that are confessedly philosophical. The general view has, for some years past, been that the mind is in *direct* relation with but a small portion of the body, viz. with the layer of grey matter, about ·1 mm. in thickness, covering the two cerebral hemispheres. Three alternative theories of the nature of this relation are usually enumerated, and the choice of the most satisfactory one is made by a chain of formal reasoning which is heedless of the detailed nature of the mental life and dogmatic as to the corresponding physiological processes involved. A point-to-point correspondence between psychical processes and physiological processes in the cerebral cortex is assumed without further ado, merely upon the strength of the facts of cerebral localisation as at present known; and a special view as to the nature of the causal relation—that it can only join processes that are similar, or at any rate not too disparate, and quantitatively comparable—is as a rule considered sufficient to justify the summary rejection of the theories of epiphenomenalism and interactionism, and the acceptance of parallelism as a scientific hypothesis whose perplexing difficulties are to be eventually met by a strictly metaphysical investigation into the nature of mind and the nature of matter.

Mr M'Dougall's treatment of the subject in *Body and Mind* is very different from this. He does indeed give us a discussion of all the stock arguments, "from the nature of the causal relation," "from the unity of consciousness," "from the principle of the conservation of energy," etc., and, wherever necessary, follows the philosopher upon his own ground; but his interest is predominantly scientific, and with the firm conviction that empirical evidence can decide the claims of the rival theories to solve the problem, he ransacks biological and psychological science for facts bearing upon the psycho-physical relation. The result is that not only has he produced a study of the psycho-physical problem hitherto unequalled in profundity, interest, and extent: he has also written a book dealing fully with all the more general problems of psychology in an original and stimulating way—a book all the more valuable for its opening chapters, which form an important contribution to the history of psychology, besides being the most complete history of animism yet extant.

Exception might be taken to Mr M'Dougall's sub-title, since the "history" and the "defence" are not of exactly the same thing. Nevertheless, "animism" is an expressive name for the form of psycho-physical interactionism which he himself adopts and defends, an interactionism which refuses to regard the physical organism as merely a complex machine theoretically explicable in terms of mechanism, and which associates and in

a way identifies the "vital force" of the neo-vitalists with the "mind" and "psychical dispositions" of the psychologists. His view is well expressed in the closing paragraph of the book: "According to this view, then, not only conscious thinking, but also morphogenesis, heredity, and evolution, are psycho-physical processes. All alike are conditioned and governed by psychical dispositions that have been built up in the course of the experience of the race. So long as the psycho-physical processes in which they play their part proceed smoothly in the routine fashion proper to the species, they go on unconsciously or subconsciously. But whenever the circumstances of the organism demand new and more specialised adjustment of response, their smooth automatic working is disturbed, the corresponding meanings are brought to consciousness, and by conscious perception and thinking and striving the required adjustment is effected" (p. 379). A hasty reading of the book might suggest to a hostile critic the objection that by "vitalising" the cerebral cortex or physiological correlate of psychical process the author has neutralised the force of the Lotzian "unity of consciousness" argument; in other words, that the two arguments taken together prove too much. Lotze himself was not a vitalist, and therefore, according to his system, the unity of consciousness absolutely necessitated the hypothesis of a substantial soul upon which the different influences might compound their effects, as the forces do by acting at a point in the Law of the Parallelogram of Forces. For the vitalist, however, the body already possesses a unity of its own, transcending the mere systematisation of its parts according to physical and chemical laws, and therefore the unity of consciousness is more easily conceived as the psychical aspect of this unity—which brings us back to parallelism. But according to Mr M'Dougall's view the psychical includes, in some sense, the vital, and there can in this sense be no talk of parallelism between the psychical and the physical. The psychological arguments brought against such a parallelism are overwhelmingly convincing. Many cases of sensory fusion, such as the binocular fusion of red and blue to give purple, are purely psychical fusions, since fusion of the separate underlying physiological processes is impossible. Many, if not all, consciously synthetic activities of the mind have no physical correlate. A close consideration of the possibilities of brain-activities shows that a physical correlate of "meaning" is inconceivable. In this last instance M'Dougall has probably not given due weight to the possibility of outgoing nerve-currents acting as the physical correlate for so-called mental "attitudes," but the entire chapter on Meaning is a very powerful one, and agrees closely in spirit, though of course not in content, with Bergson's polemic against the view that pure memory has any physical correlate.

The author presents once more an argument for the direct action of psychical upon physical with which readers of his *Physiological Psychology* are already familiar, and which has never been refuted. It is the argument from the fact of Subjective or Hedonic Selection. Only in terms of Interactionism can the correlation between Pleasure and Appetition, and

Pain and Aversion, be rendered intelligible without resort to a theory of Pre-established Harmony. Evolution explains in an obvious way the general correlation of Appetition and Beneficial Process and Aversion and Harmful Process, but the terms of the relations are here all physical. Only an assumed dynamical efficiency of Pleasure in determining and sustaining Appetition can explain this relation between psychical and physical, and similarly in the case of Pain and Aversion. Another strong argument for mental efficiency is that based upon the fact of "persistence of conative tendencies" in a subconscious form, which is becoming familiar to modern psychologists through the writings of Professor Freud and other psychopathologists. With the progress of psychology it is becoming more and more apparent that conation cannot be conceived under a mechanical form, but is a "self-sustaining and self-directing activity, to which no mechanical process is even remotely analogous" (p. 328). Consciousness of value is relative to the strength of the conative tendency or tendencies excited. Hence, "value, like meaning, is a purely psychical fact" (p. 329).

It would thus seem that, in M'Dougall's view, nothing but "sensory contents" (to use a somewhat unsatisfactory phrase) have physical correlates. Now, of these it has been convincingly shown by Bergson that memory images, so far as they are sensory and not motor, have no physical correlate, and it only remains for M'Dougall to alter his view as to the nature of sensation and perception, to bring himself very close indeed to Bergson's position, especially as he has accepted the latter's momentous distinction between habit and memory, and has even brought forward additional arguments in support of it.

M'Dougall candidly states (p. 333, footnote) that he does not understand the doctrine of "pure perception" of *Matière et Mémoire*, and it almost seems as if he is resolutely determined not to examine, from an epistemological or metaphysical point of view, the general nature of the concrete perceptions upon which, as a scientist, he bases his psychophysical hypothesis. He tacitly accepts the view that sensations are psychical. Yet the distinction between the *act* of sensing, perceiving, etc., and the *object* sensed, perceived, etc., seems, to many philosophers, perfectly obvious and even insurmountable. Granting this and the equally obvious connection between perception and action, one has a point of view from which Bergson's doctrine of perception becomes at least plausible, and, to some philosophers, convincing in the highest degree.

It is somewhat of a disappointment to find no reference in the book to modern doctrines of aphasia, the importance of which in coming to a decision on the psycho-physical problem has been so clearly brought out by Bergson. To set against this, however, we have a most welcome chapter upon "The Results of 'Psychical Research,'" which refers all too briefly to groups of accurately ascertained facts which the majority of psychologists still resolutely ignore. The possibility that empirical evidence of this nature may improve both in quality and in quantity in the future is a powerful motive for preferring animism to parallelism as a working

hypothesis, since it is the only one which would not be summarily refuted by such evidence.

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A Philosophical Study of Christian Ethics.—By G. F. Barbour, D.Phil. Edinburgh.—William Blackwood & Sons. 1911.—Pp. xiv + 440.

THE main object of this substantial volume is best stated in the author's own words. It is "to 'christianise' certain of the great 'notions' or concepts of Moral Philosophy, that is, to show how certain of the persistent problems of ethics appear in the teaching of the New Testament, and to examine the specifically Christian answer to them . . . and in so far as this attempt is successful, it may give some added clearness to our understanding of the ethical teaching of the New Testament, and at the same time show how that teaching forms the completion and crown of the ethical thought both of Greece and of the modern world." To some such an ambitious enterprise will appear to be foredoomed to failure. No one will deem it easy. Even Dr Barbour is not confident of success, and modestly describes his results as merely preliminary studies or prolegomena which may prepare the way for other workers. It would be idle to suggest that the author has been particularly successful in the realisation of the aims of this volume, but he has succeeded in writing an interesting study of the fundamental ethical conceptions of the New Testament in the light of the moral philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, and others. The principal topics considered in the book are —the synthetic character of Christian ethics; the value of the individual; the community of the good, and the relation of the inward and the outward aspects of virtue; the nature of Christian universalism; the kingdom of God; reward and the disinterestedness of virtue; moral continuity and the possibility of new beginnings; the Christian idea of the moral law; law and freedom; the natural and the spiritual order. Such a comparative study, even if it should have no great value as a contribution to the advancement of moral philosophy, is of considerable interest, especially to the student of Christian ethics. Those who read the book in this spirit will not be disappointed, for it contains the fruits of much study, and is often suggestive. Though the book has faults, and the remainder of this review will be devoted to the consideration of these faults, the present writer would nevertheless assure his readers that Dr Barbour's *Study* is very interesting and even edifying.

Perhaps the most salient defect of the volume before us is its neglect of certain preliminary problems which require to be dealt with before such comparative investigations can be pursued to the greatest advantage. A man's views on Christian ethics, and the value of such views, depend in large measure on his attitude towards the literature of the New Testament.

Does he take it all at its face value? Does he assume implicitly that its ethical teaching is all perfectly consistent and homogeneous, or what? Not that one expects an adequate discussion of this question in a volume like the present; but the author may be expected to give a concise statement of his views, which would be a great help to his readers. For aught the reader can tell, Dr Barbour's attitude towards the literature of the New Testament is uncritical, and when Dr Barbour sees doctrines which are only *apparently* inconsistent but are really elements in a higher synthesis, the more critical reader may suspect a real inconsistency and only an ingenious reconciliation. Hegelian synthesis covers a multitude of contradictions. Again, nothing is said about the difference between moral precepts prescribed by positive religion, and philosophical ethical theories (even when these culminate in a religious view of life). In short, no distinction seems to be made between moral preaching and moral philosophy. Indeed, the author seems to pass from the one to the other without warning, and apparently unconscious or oblivious of the difference —forgetful of Schopenhauer's dictum: *Moral predigen ist leicht*, *Moral begründen schwer.* Schopenhauer may have underrated the difficulty of preaching morality. To preach morality effectively may be as difficult and as important as to ground it philosophically. But, in any case, moral preaching is not moral philosophy. It is a mistake to mix them up, and even go the length of supposing, as Dr Barbour seems to suppose, that the most effective sermon is necessarily the last word in moral philosophy. So much as regards sins of omission. We may turn next to sins of commission.

Dr Barbour's anxiety to show that the ethical teaching of the New Testament "forms the completion and crown of the ethical movement both of Greece and of the modern world" betrays him occasionally into utterances which do more credit to his Christian zeal than to his critical insight. Both Greek and Jewish ethics are treated with some unfairness, which is no doubt unintentional. Let us consider Greek ethics first. The Aristotelian doctrine of virtue as a mean is dismissed as unsatisfactory, because, on the surface at least, it is "a doctrine of avoidance," and "lends itself to a negative interpretation," whereas the Christian moral ideal is essentially positive. As a matter of fact, the Aristotelian doctrine is *not* negative, and Dr Barbour is aware of this. The fact that it "lends itself to negative interpretation" is irrelevant, for the same may be said of Christian ethics. Dr Barbour himself refers to "the view of certain modern critics of Christian morality that it is essentially negative, a matter of renunciation and escape from sin." Again, we are told that in the New Testament "there is no apprehension lest the different virtues should be carried too far," and the implication is that Aristotle was obsessed by such an apprehension. But that is a mistake. Once more, when Dr Barbour describes Christian ethics as synthetic in form, that is to say, as demanding a combination of apparently opposed virtues, he rightly enough credits Plato with the conception of the synthetic form of morality,

but in his eagerness to maintain the superiority of the Christian synthesis, he fails to appreciate the fact that Platonic ethics was more successful than Christian ethics in overcoming the tendency to forswear the world and the flesh, and that, on the whole, the Platonic ideal of human life did more justice to the many-sidedness of human interests. Again, the way in which Dr Barbour contrasts the Christian idea of the "Infinite" with the "indeterminate from which the thought of the Greeks recoiled," only serves to suggest that he does not sufficiently appreciate the difference between the two conceptions to realise how irrelevant it is to compare them at all.

Next we may consider some of the author's references to Jewish ethics. When discussing Christian Universalism, Dr Barbour speaks of the leaders of the Jewish people in the time of Christ as "deeply entangled in their narrow religious prejudices." On the very next page, however, he has occasion to insist that in the New Testament "the value of the individual is dependent on his relation to the whole body of believers and to their Head" (*i.e.* Christ). To the unprejudiced thinker this simply means that Christian universalism is, after all, not true universalism, since it does not embrace the whole of humanity but only Christians, and is therefore not altogether free from some of those "narrow religious prejudices" which Dr Barbour so readily detects elsewhere. The Greek Cynics of the fourth century B.C. had a much truer conception of Universalism. Again, when dealing with the moral law, he quotes Deut. iv. 11 f. as evidence of the "austere remoteness" of the moral law as conceived in Jewish ethics, which in this respect resembles Kantian ethics. That the *inwardness* of the moral law is emphatically taught in Deut. xxx. 11–14, and elsewhere in the Old Testament, does not appear to matter. That in Hos. xi. 4 the moral law is conceived as a law of love, also seems to be of no consequence. Why exactly "the Jewish view" should be identified with the lower rather than with the loftier view, is not explained. From a footnote, however, we gather that the cruder Jewish view affords to some people a more satisfying measure of "the interval that separates Christian thought in this respect from the Judaism out of which it sprang!" On the other hand, Jer. xxxi. 33 f. is quoted in illustration of the *Christian* doctrine of the autonomy and universality of the moral law, and elsewhere Spinoza is cited to illustrate some other Christian thoughts. The "logic" of this procedure may be stated as follows: Whatever is best is Christian (even if it originated elsewhere); whatever is inferior is Jewish or Greek, but not Christian (even if it should also be found in Christianity). In other words, "Heads I win, tails you lose." But this is not playing the game. Unfortunately, however, this kind of method is all too common among certain theologians of various creeds, who labour under the painful misapprehension that blackmailing other faiths is one way of showing that they appreciate their own.

Having referred to Dr Barbour's discussion of the moral law, a word may be added to indicate a certain confusion which seems to underlie his

treatment of the subject. Like so many others, he emphasises the fact that "Christ is the Christian Law," and contrasts this "personal" form of the moral law in Christianity with its general and abstract character in philosophy. Needless to say, the comparison is not in favour of philosophy. But the whole comparison really rests on a confusion of thought. Christ may be described as "the Christian Law" in one of two senses, namely, either (1) as the Lawgiver who commands obedience to the law, or (2) as the model and example of a noble life for others to imitate. But in either case it is irrelevant to compare Christ as the Christian Law with the moral law of philosophy. As regards the first of these meanings, philosophy as such is concerned with the ultimate *rational* justification of morality, and cannot therefore countenance any kind of *ipse dixit*, which is simply irrelevant to its aims. But Dr Barbour is thinking chiefly of the second of the above meanings. For he dwells fondly on the charm and attraction which the life of Christ has exercised and is exercising on Christians and (one may add) on others. The reality of this influence may readily be granted. One may well allow the contention that, with the bulk of humanity, the influence of a personal example is far more effective than the influence of abstract general principles. With philosophers it may be different. But in any case, what bearing has all this on the philosophical conception of the moral law? Moral philosophy is concerned, not with the persuasive preaching of morality, but with its rational explanation and justification: and all rational procedure is essentially general and abstract in its methods. Now, even if the life of Christ be regarded as the supreme example of the moral life, it can in no sense be regarded as a *philosophy* of the moral life, and it is altogether irrelevant to drag it into the discussion to the disparagement of philosophy.

Notwithstanding these faults, Dr Barbour's book is recommended to the attention of all who are interested in Christian ethics. Philosophical readers will not be disappointed even if they fail to find in it the completion and crown of all ethical theory. They will scarcely expect to find such finality anywhere, and they will certainly find here much that is suggestive. To others the very points which appear to the present writer as faults may possibly serve to recommend the book all the more. Let them read it by all means. They will find it edifying.

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Aus Wissenschaft und Leben.—Von Adolf Harnack.—Zwei Bände.—Giessen: Töpelmann, 1911.

It is not difficult to understand why Professor Harnack exercises so great an influence upon the life and thought of Germany. He exhibits four qualities which are not often found together. As a historian he is distinguished by the comprehensiveness of his outlook, not less than by the

sincerity of his vision; as a statesman he combines the enthusiasm of a convinced partisan with a calm and sober judgment upon social issues. No one is now surprised that the historian of the early Church should be called into the councils of the German Empire.

The speeches and articles collected in these two volumes range over a period of seven years. They enable us to estimate the tendencies and value of Harnack's statesmanship, no less than his brilliance as a scholar. For he is much more than a historian. In a living and working manhood he embodies a great fraction of the spirit of the age. This message from Germany comes to us with particular emphasis at this moment. Allowing for certain superficial differences, we can recognise the sympathy of intention and likeness of method which produces at once the feeling that we are at home with the writer. Every page is an unconscious protest against the fratricidal conflict with which the two great Teuton nations have been threatened.

As I turn over these pages, with their lucid style and masculine grip, the most vivid impression which they give is that of a definite personality for whom increased knowledge does not mean the blurring of differences, whether religious or political. Reflection has not led Harnack to a helpless scepticism which is panic-stricken whenever a decision must be made. We are all too familiar with the student who is unable to decide, as if his decision were for eternity, and not, as is always the case, for time. People who do not know Harnack have been surprised at the part which he took in a recent trial for heresy. They seem to have thought that his historical method involved a sceptical attitude towards all propositions. Such a mistake could only have arisen among those who are imperfectly acquainted with the present conditions of religious life in Germany. The Lutheran Church regards itself as the rightful heir of the mediæval Church, and Harnack gives the most emphatic expression possible to this view. "We are, as Lutherans, a reformed Catholic Church; on the other hand, the reformed churches outside Germany are a new church. Near as we may stand in dogma, religious feeling, intellectual and political opinion, we are *toto cœlo* distinct in relation to the foundation and method of ecclesiastical procedure and activity" (ii. 146).

He presents us here with a picture of the Christian layman which offers a striking and instructive contrast to religious life in England: "The German evangelical layman who is well disposed to the church, maintains his churchmanship in his high estimate of baptism, of the religious instruction of his children, of confirmation, of marriage, of religious burial, and in going to divine service from once to thrice in the year. Apart from this, he feels himself to be a free Christian who must himself seek his own way and his own edification, and appropriates as little or as much of the ecclesiastical tradition as suits him. . . . It is this state of things that has given us Lessing, Kant, Hamann, Schiller, Goethe, and others, and, finally, Herder and Schleiermacher. Only in the German evangelical churches is there a free Christianity (it is quite otherwise and much freer than Chris-

tianity in America: it is truly free!), and, indeed, all the laity enjoy it without exception—but at the cost of a strictly bound ministry. Even the 'theologians' are as good as free" (ii. 146). In England we do not know where we stand, because few of our teachers can resist the temptation to colour their facts. Candid utterances, like that which has just been quoted, would rouse indignant protests from many quarters. It is interesting to note that Harnack sympathises neither with the pietist movement, nor with the attempt of liberalism to introduce democratic government into the Church.

We shall understand Harnack better so far as we bear in mind the influence which Goethe exercises over the whole German nation. One Sunday evening in March 1832 Goethe said to Eckermann: "We do not know what we owe to Luther and the reformation in general. We are become free of the chains of a spiritual narrowness; in consequence of our advancing culture we are become capable of returning to the fountain head, and of comprehending Christianity in its purity. We have the courage once more to stand with firm feet upon God's earth and to be conscious of our human nature with its endowment of God's grace." If in Goethe's rounded life there is thus room for the religious element, so, on the other hand, the theologian and the scholar have left room in Harnack for much more than they. "What I have learned," says he, "I have learned in the history of the Church, and, if it is allowed me to step beyond her limits, she has shown me the way: for nothing human is foreign to her."

Hence Harnack can speak of science with enthusiasm; he warms his hands at the divine fire kindled in Berlin so long ago by Leibniz and Wilhelm von Humboldt. "The best that we can learn from von Humboldt is that in his arrangements for higher instruction he did not allow himself to be driven by the passing moment, but acted throughout from convictions and principles. These were his aims; no points of view of common or higher utilities controlled him—there we can easily err,—but he valued above all the knowledge of the truth" (i. 35). It is in this scientific spirit that Harnack has proceeded in his study of history. "History," he tells us, "can be studied under three aspects: the materialist, that is to say, ethnological and economic; the traditional, that is to say, the history of the state and the higher culture; the individualist, that is to say, the history of heroism." Of these three Harnack lays most stress upon the history of constitutions. "Without the idea of the state, history falls asunder, or loses its outline and is prematurely put to the use of highly generalised speculations, mostly of natural science." This interest in constitutional history is the key to much of Harnack's work, both as a student and as a politician. It is with the history of the world for a background that Harnack seeks to portray the history of the early Church. "The study of political history is the necessary presupposition of the history of the Church." For "the Church, at all times, has had the tendency to imitate in itself the constitution of the state in which it

lived" (ii. 46). And here it is noteworthy that Harnack, without exaggerating the value of the two classical literatures, dwells upon the importance of a knowledge of the antique world for the historian. In so doing he prepares the way for a new valuation of the early Roman Empire. "The time of the emperors, with its religious and ethical achievements, and its violent religious conflicts in which at last Christianity is victorious, is to be described as the conclusion and acme of the ancient world." Now it is well known that the history of the first Christian century remains to be written. Mommsen's work upon the Roman provinces is but a partial contribution towards this magnificent task. But I think that Harnack indicates better than anyone else the lines along which this crying need will be some day satisfied.

We are now prepared to understand the criticisms which Harnack passes upon certain contemporary tendencies. It has been left to Professor Drews to represent in this country a German movement upon which Harnack passes the severest judgment from the standpoint of scholarship. "They are amateurs whose clumsy historical mistakes and unrestrained suppositions show that they have never received a methodical discipline in church history. In any other science one would pass by them to 'the order of the day.' But 'the public' runs after them, and it is a duty to protect the public against mystifications" (ii. 168). The abuse of the comparative method is indeed becoming a scandal. The most superficial analogies are treated as if they demonstrated complete identity. Professor Cheyne, in a previous number of this Journal, quotes sufficient examples from Drews' *Christ Myth* to make one almost wish that the comparative method had never been invented (vol. ix. 660). Even an elementary study of logic should be enough to check philosophers from these all too confident inferences about the complex past. But when, as Professor Cheyne says, such "writers have paid the penalty for their audacity in a plentiful crop of errors," they cut themselves off from a place in the sober studies, for which alone our brief life affords us time.

From another quarter we have an attempt to reconstruct tradition in order to mould it to the supposed needs of the moment. If Jesus is caricatured as a phantom in order to suit an evaporating idealism, he must also become a German socialist, because the economic and political conditions of the German Empire stand between the soul and the religious life. Harnack protests in the most emphatic way possible against this view. "What Jesus fought against was the service of Mammon, anxiety that leaves God out of account, merciless self-seeking, but not against actual social circumstances; and what he would bring about is the rule of God in the heart, but not a new social programme. The transformation of values which Jesus demands does not call for a determinate new order of things" (ii. 257). Christianity in its beginnings was not confined to the poorest classes. It is therefore not to be treated merely as a movement of the proletariat. Harnack draws attention here to the high estimate which Paul put upon the intelligence of his correspondents. Such intelligence

implies a degree of education which would scarcely have been found in a society confined to the poorest classes. In a word, the universal character of Christianity can never be sacrificed to the needs of the moment.

And here Harnack lays down a principle of the first importance. "Nearly all historical forces may be regarded as without moral character until they receive a positive or negative sign from the state of things to which they belong and on which they operate." Only a trained political judgment can determine this character. But Harnack finds in "the spirit of humanity," of goodwill, something of which the character is always positive (i. 165).

What, then, are the contributions which Harnack offers to the social politics of to-day? He is, to be sure, bitterly opposed to the social democracy of Germany. But he welcomes the tract in which Carnegie declares it to be the duty of the rich to distribute their wealth during their lifetime among those institutions which promote the noblest culture (i. 167). With a like spirit Harnack champions the taxation of legacies from the standpoint of social ethics. In this way he reconciles the right of private property—which he regards as the lever of progress—with the social needs of the present.

If we turn from home to foreign politics, Harnack speaks with authority upon the relations of Germany and England. "The secret of peace between nations is to make oneself indispensable to a rival, both in economics and in culture; and there are no two peoples in Europe which can fulfil this programme so easily as Germany and England" (i. 198). As a comment upon this utterance of two years ago, there is shortly to be published a pamphlet by Harnack in which he points to the moderation displayed by the German people during the autumn of 1911. It is difficult for the outsider to pass judgment upon the issues of international politics. But this at least is certain, that peace has not been broken between England and Germany; and that there must have been mighty influences in both countries upon the side of peace in order to counteract the chauvinism from which neither country is free. The love of peace is a bond of union between Harnack and the wise ruler, whose confidence, to some extent, he is believed to enjoy. These speeches and letters and articles, therefore, have a double interest. They are the expression of a great historian's judgment upon many important questions. Still more are they a practical guide by which we may come to know the great nation which is our rival in the noblest arts of peace.

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L'Évangile selon Marc.—By Alfred Loisy.—Paris, Émile Nourry, 1912.

This study of Mark is based in part on M. Loisy's larger work, *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*, and is to be followed by two separate volumes devoted to Matthew and Luke. After considering the synoptic gospels in

their mutual relation, the author thinks it useful to examine each apart, in order to penetrate more effectively into its special character. M. Loisy disclaims the intention of adding another erudite work to the multitude that already treat of the synoptic problem. His aim is simply to throw some light on the nature, origin and object of this writing; in so doing he takes up a purely critical and historical point of view, and seeks only to make clear the present state of the various problems that arise, the apparent meaning of the text and "la vérité des choses." So much we learn in a very brief preface.

The book consists of an introduction of 52 pages, followed by a text and running commentary which cover 447 pages. It is written for French readers; references to the Greek are avoided, and the great learning of M. Loisy is put at our service in the clearest and simplest form of expression, without any parade of technical scholarship. The style, it need hardly be said, is lucid and vivacious, and every page makes us feel at once the spiritual and the logical acumen of this accomplished critic.

It is almost inevitable that the Introduction, which gives a succinct account of the author's views and conclusions, should be more interesting, and in a sense more important, than the Commentary. The latter merely draws out those views in detail, and seeks to confirm and apply those conclusions by a consideration of single passages, and is quite as truly a commentary on M. Loisy's theory of this gospel as an exposition of the gospel itself. The Introduction is divided into four sections. The first consists of a summary of the notices in Mark, so arranged and annotated as to enforce certain proportions announced at the beginning, and to prepare the way for the literary criticism of the second section: we are dealing with a religious legend, full of marvel, poor in material, badly constructed; a few stories, ill connected; a few brief sententious utterances, with now and then a somewhat longer discourse which does not fit the circumstances assigned to it. There is no historical framework, no chronology; the only note of time is a mention of Herod or of Pontius Pilate. In the first part of the gospel (as far as x. 52) confusion reigns supreme; in the second part there is, indeed, a chronological frame, but it does not appear as necessarily implied in the matter of xi.–xvi. 8; on the contrary, the matter has been accommodated, more or less successfully, to a frame already prepared for it.

M. Loisy's literary criticism of the gospel, in his second section, tends to establish certain very definite views. He recognises an Ur-marcus, based on written sources, the chief of which was Q (M. Loisy gives no hint of doubt concerning the reality of that hypothetical document), and itself the object not only of additions by successive redactors, but also of mutilation. In the work of these redactors M. Loisy perceives definite Christological intention; the character and effect of the whole gospel are due to the doctrinal handling by the last redactor of what he found in Mark. The specific preoccupations of this redactor are, therefore, much more important than any details of literary criticism. We are brought, by a

new route, to a position very like that of the Tübingen school. Mark is a Tendenzschrift by a Paulinist. "What constitutes the particular interest of the second gospel is the way in which the Pauline idea of salvation takes possession of the matter of the gospel, while it adapts itself thereto. The death of Christ remains the true object of his mission; but his terrestrial career, of which Paul did not wish even to speak, is taken as a manifestation of his power." This thesis, which is worked out with subtlety and force in the third section, has no doubt reacted upon the literary analysis which is intended to lead up to it. We must be on our guard, in fact, against the peril which besets all attempts to distribute a composite text into its constituents by means of subjective reasoning—the peril of the circular fallacy. The conclusion which the results of our analysis suggest cannot claim logical validity unless it is entirely distinct from the assumptions which have guided us in making that analysis. Where those assumptions relate (as those of M. Loisy in his second section predominantly relate) to doctrinal tendency in supposed additions and suppressions, and our conclusion imputes a doctrinal tendency to the final redactor, that condition of logical rigour has not been observed. But even apart from this danger subjective analysis is at best a precarious process. A case in which M. Loisy has the support of many critics is that of Mark iii. 22–30. The exclusion of these verses from the original text, so as to bring Mark iii. 19b–21 and 31–35 into organic connection, is extremely plausible. Yet the textual facts point rather to another hypothesis, namely, the exclusion of Mark iii. 19b–21. What if this passage were added by a late hand, in order to soften the seeming harshness of verses 33–35? It would then be exactly such an addition as we know to have been made in Matt. xvi. 22b. In support of this supposition we have (1) the omission of the passage by both Matthew and Luke; (2) the use of *ἔξω* in Mark iii. 31, and in both the other Synoptics, to mean apparently "outside the circle of the crowd," and not "outside the house"; (3) the use in iii. 19b–21 of several suspicious expressions: *ὥστε μή*, which is characteristic of Marcan passages unknown to Matthew and Luke, *οἱ παρ' αὐτοῦ*, which is unexampled in the gospels, *ἐξέστη*, which in this sense is unparalleled in the New Testament.

The fourth section deals with the attribution of the gospel to Mark, and is chiefly devoted to a shrewd criticism of the notice ascribed to Papias.

The book is stimulating and suggestive. In literary quality it stands high above the level of what we expect in a biblical commentary. That imaginative sympathy which is characteristic of M. Loisy finds abundant opportunity in this artless string of stories about the events in Galilee and Jerusalem.

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Lollardy and the Reformation in England.—By James Gairdner, C.B., D.Litt.—Vol. III.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1911.

When the first two volumes of this history appeared, we wrote in these columns not only of what seemed to us the author's bias underlying his essential honesty of purpose, but also of definite and serious errors of fact, especially in his treatment of the monastic question. It is all the more agreeable, therefore, to begin by noting here that Dr Gairdner has shown a moral courage not always vouchsafed even to men as learned and laborious as himself; for he publishes with this third volume a very full apparatus of errata and cancel-pages, in deference to criticisms from various quarters. There are still some important points, it is true, upon which some might still think his text inconsistent with his documents; but we fully recognise his right to a different opinion under the circumstances, and must therefore heartily applaud a proceeding which will add even to Dr Gairdner's high reputation. On these doubtful points we should trace his assertions either to a perfectly honest and open preference for the orthodox as opposed to the Reformation ideal, or to a natural unfamiliarity with many technicalities of an historical period rather earlier than that which he has made so peculiarly his own. In this third volume (or rather in the corrections which accompany it) he does more justice to Froude, and admits very frankly the substantial truth of the terrible accusations published by Cardinal Morton against the morals of St Albans Abbey in 1489. But he still denies any judicial (as distinguished from accusatory) character to Morton's letter, and speaks of the evidence as founded upon "common report"; a phrase which has encouraged apologists who have not studied the actual text of Morton's letter to exonerate the St Albans criminals altogether. Yet the fact is that Morton's phrase *communis fama* should rather have been translated "common *notoriety*"; for so it is defined by mediæval canonists, in contradistinction to the *vanæ voces populi* which would answer to our "common report." Moreover, Morton definitely stigmatises the Abbot as *diffamatus* of all the crimes specified in the letter; the legal effect of which was to leave him thenceforth under so strong a presumption of guilt that judgment must needs go against him by default, unless he appeared at the ordinary's summons and succeeded in "purging" himself of the *diffamatio*. This, of course, the Abbot never ventured to attempt; and on this point Froude's interpretation of the document remains more correct than Dr Gairdner's, though the latter has doubtless studied the whole case more carefully, and corrected at least one unjustifiable exaggeration of Froude's. Moreover, a still more serious misconception of canon law seems to underlie Dr Gairdner's use of the word *heresy*. He defends himself against the late Canon Bigg's trenchant criticism by pleading: "I and the late Canon Dixon agree in the use of the word 'heretic' in its strictly historical sense; that is to say, we call those persons heretics who were called heretics by their contemporaries." By

this argument, it would have been "strictly historical" for Grote, who knew that the Greeks called contemporary non-Greeks "barbarians," to speak twice or thrice in every chapter of the "barbarous Egyptians" from whom Hellas herself learned so much of her art and letters. Nor is Dr Gairdner more happy in defending himself against this name "heretic" which Dr Bigg retorts upon him. His plea that "sound Roman Catholic divines" do not think him a heretic is transparently sincere, but rests upon very bad canon law. St Thomas Aquinas formulated the Roman Catholic doctrine plainly enough, though he has often been strangely misread. He does excuse Jews and pagans, it is true, from the worst forms of religious coercion; though even these were to be dealt with very much as England (to her shame) dealt with Irish recusants in the bad old times. But a person once validly baptized is thenceforth (according to Aquinas) a member of the Catholic Church, and amenable to her fullest discipline. In such a man, the worst ignorance may for a while be excusable; yet, when once the true doctrine has been duly explained to him, he must accept it on the authority of his teachers or undergo the extreme penalties due to pertinacious heresy. We emphasise these points in order to explain why even Dr Gairdner's honest and laborious pleading leaves us unconverted. Firstly, he persists in identifying the Reformation ideal with what was only a temporary fashion, its technical doctrine of "justification"; yet Dr R. L. Poole wrote nearly thirty years ago, at the end of his *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought*, "[Wycliffe] has not indeed the credit of having discovered the peculiar formula of 'justification by faith' which to superficial readers appears to constitute the kernel of Reformation teaching; but he has dared to codify the laws which govern the moral world on the basis of the direct dependence of the individual man on God"; this anticipatory criticism would probably be endorsed by the majority of Dr Gairdner's readers. Again, a second explanation of his attitude may be found in that comparative unfamiliarity with the *ancien régime* of pre-Reformation England which we have tried to emphasise above. But let us repeat that Dr Gairdner shows all his cards upon the table, and that, when all deductions have been made, we welcome this third volume as containing facts which he alone of living men could have given us.

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Idealism, Possible and Impossible.—By Alice Blundell, formerly Lecturer in Philosophy at Bedford College, London.—London: Ouseley, 1911.

Of the three essays here included it is the second, that on Optimism, which, by its greater scope and general interest, chiefly claims consideration. It presents from a rationalist standpoint, resembling in many respects that of Mr Bradley, the claims of pessimism as a philosophic system.

The writer's assertion that optimism "tends unfailingly to life" would

for the pragmatist have its value as evidence for the philosophic truth of the theory. But the pragmatist position is at the outset doubly disallowed on the two grounds that "no kind or accumulation of reality can ever establish value"; and, conversely, that the validity of the ideals of optimism is powerless, except in the logical form, to establish their reality. Such logical satisfaction does not give to the hedonistic, æsthetic, and ethical forms of the theory "the very different satisfaction which is wanted."

In these three forms, then, the optimist theory is criticised and rejected. In the finite world, which is claimed as the proper area of investigation, the result of the inquiry leads in every instance to pessimism. But even if a reference to the Absolute could so change the balance of facts as to return a favourable answer, the total result would not necessarily be altered; for the question at issue "whether the world is worth while," must for optimism receive its justifying answer from the finite. Hedonistic optimism, compelled by the "thoroughly inconvenient facts" to claim no more than a balance of pleasure in the universe, fails to substantiate even this, whether the evidence be drawn from individual lives, where numerically "a generally painful life bids fair to be normal," or from races, where "material progress seems to run a losing race with sensibility." The possible alteration of the balance by death is conceded to this form of the theory, but the concession is afterwards on metaphysical grounds withdrawn. As for the Absolute standpoint in the connection, "perhaps none is so religious as to found an optimism on the happiness of the Absolute."

Both hedonistic and æsthetic optimism fail as philosophic systems because they cannot make room for the opposite principle. Pain and ugliness require apologies to the end. Their necessity is at the most psychological. But it is the ethical optimist who makes the best and most various attempts at including the opposite and winning his case not in spite of it but with it. The close argument in this section is, I think, occasionally liable to the criticism that it is not so much a proof as a presentation of pessimism. But there is real service rendered by this marshalling of facts, many of them from that shrouded hinterland of experience which is too seldom allowed its due weight as evidence. The facts can be ignored, but not denied. The ethical optimist is driven from his first line of defence—the justification of evil in the finite as unreal or as instrumental, or as contingent—by the counter-contention that there do exist certain positive, "pure formations" of evil; that evil does not always involve good, whereas "moral goodness is always a by-product of pain, only developed in conditions admitting at least of fear"; and that, if evil be contingent, the price of good, also contingent, is too high, "the evil road to good" too narrow for anything but sure success to justify. Then he falls back on the Absolute, only to be forced into a theory of ἀκολασία more fatal to him than to the hedonist.

Let us concede to the writer, at this point, that ἀκολασία does confront any theory which, while facing the facts, regards the Absolute as

outside the evil, transforming it to good for itself but not for the finite. The voice of perpetual accusation against this less than human justice, the note of Omar and of Shelley, is not stilled either by philosophic absolutism or by a religion that is dominantly transcendental. But the alternative, as expressed by immanence doctrines or by theories of atonement in the "religions of pity," is, I would urge, too readily set aside on the unproved assumption that "the utter separateness of selves" from each other and from the Absolute makes such theories as impossible as they are illogical. Does not the whole argument depend on this very thing that is unproved—the separateness of selves? Two reinforcing arguments are adduced against atonement theories—that the suffering of the Absolute cannot equal the suffering of the finite, because for the former the whole of experience is present as "an insinuating context"; and that the voluntary character of the suffering must for the Absolute completely transform the experience. Granted, but do not these arguments furnish corollaries which give to optimism its surest stronghold? The insinuating context and the voluntary character of pain are potentially true, with their transforming power, for the finite also.

Of the remaining essays, the first, entitled "Analogies of Relativity," is a brief exposition of the universality of the mental contribution to fact, and of the frequent falsification of judgment which occurs in every department of life through failure to give due recognition to this factor except in specialised areas. The "Recantation of Pericles," the last essay, is an application of the writer's political philosophy to the present-day situation in England, under the guise of Athenian politics in 427 B.C. The parallel is drawn with subtlety and force. The more trenchant criticisms of democracy, the statements, *e.g.*, that the individualism which it fosters is "the apotheosis of *βαναυσία*," and that "the nominal equality of unequals is a stepping-stone to the real equality of insignificance," will be admitted as applicable to the "perverted types" by those who disallowed them in the case of true democracy. It is such perverted types that are sometimes responsible for sincere recantations.

M. L. V. Hughes.

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