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A THEOLOGICAL HOLIDAY—AND AFTER.

THE EDITOR.

I.

THERE is a well-known passage in the writings of the late William James[1] in which, after severely criticising the conception of the Absolute, he yet allows that it has one useful office—that, namely, of providing a "moral holiday." He does not mean by this, however, that the Absolute discharges ordinary men and women, even for a time, from the obligation of doing their duty. The people for whom the holiday is provided are moral philosophers. On them falls the burden of finding a theoretical ground for the distinction between right and wrong; and it is from this burden, and the sore travail it involves, that the conception of the Absolute gives the philosophic mind a temporary respite. According to James, by postulating the Absolute you abolish the distinction between right and wrong, and are, in consequence, relieved for the time being of the worry of having to find and hold the grounds on which the distinction rests. That is the holiday you now enjoy—a purely theoretical affair; but, like most holidays, it is of brief duration and may be rudely interrupted at any moment by the occurrence of a concrete moral question. None the less it will have done you good;

[1] *Pragmatism*, p. 73 f.

the intellect will have had a breathing space; and from your sojourn in a world of moral indifference you will return with recuperated energy to deal handsomely and luminously with the sharp moral distinctions of actual life. We may further presume, though James does not say so explicitly, that the value of these moral holidays, which philosophers enjoy while contemplating the Absolute, depends, like so many other moral conditions, on the *time* they occupy. Our contemplations of the Absolute should last just long enough to refresh us, but no longer. Prolonged indefinitely they will intensify the evil they might otherwise cure, they will enervate the faculty of decision, and the Absolute will then become the Capua of the moral consciousness. Kept within due bounds, on the other hand, they will provide a remedy for the intellectual lassitude, for the dry feverishness and contentious sterility, ending sometimes in delirium, which characterise so many of our efforts to prove ourselves in the right and our opponents in the wrong. To be of real value, therefore, moral holidays, especially when they are obtained by contemplating the Absolute, should be reasonably short. Perhaps we may add that, as a matter of fact, they are seldom very long. For the conception of the Absolute is one which no human mind can hold before itself continuously and always; by its nature it tends to evanescence; so much so that probably few minds could retain it for ten minutes at a stretch.

The amazing activity of the contemporary mind in the connected field of theology, with which activity the editor of the HIBBERT JOURNAL has, during the last fourteen years, been brought somewhat closely into contact, has often suggested the thought that in theology, as in morals, an occasional holiday would not be a bad thing—that is, if the like conditions were observed. I do not mean, of course, that men would do well to forget God, or their belief in God, even for a day; any more than James, in advocating a moral holiday, meant that men should temporarily neglect their duty. But no one, I think, who has had a large opportunity of witnessing the flood of

discussion which the modern mind has let loose on all the problems of religion can resist the conviction that what theologians need most at the present moment is just time to turn themselves round. Viewed superficially the phenomenon in question seems to betoken an unexhausted and inexhaustible fund of energy in the human spirit. But those who study in detail the theological product of contemporary thought do not always get that impression. Much of this literature when closely scanned shows signs of exhaustion, and suggests the thought that the writers of it are not expressing their sense of spiritual realities but rather putting up a fight, often a desperate fight, against the conscious waning of that sense. Only a crude psychology would infer that the intensity of belief in a given truth may be gauged by the fervour and the frequency with which men argue on its behalf. As often as not the contrary is the case. We argue most vehemently not for what we believe but for what we wish to believe. We have an example of this at the present moment in the laborious efforts made by German thinkers to prove that England instigated the present war. So, in religion, a restless zeal in discussing the faith may be a sign that our own faith is a vanishing quantity. Were we suddenly compelled to take a theological holiday, were something to happen which deprived us of our accustomed audience, were the means of expression taken away from us, and the whole apologia of our faith thus brought to a standstill, then many of us would realise that the God in whom we really believed was not quite identical with the God whose existence we had proved, that the Christ we actually loved and tried to follow was not the Christ of our books, lectures, and articles, that the morality by which we lived was of another order from that on which our philosophy had set its seal. I am far from suggesting that such a discovery would involve a descent from a higher to a lower and abash those to whom it came. In some instances this might happen, but the net result would be in the contrary direction. We should find

that many an article of faith had suffered by our attempts to make it good. Our brief theological holiday—and to be efficacious it should only be brief—would show us how much easier it is to be religious ourselves when we are not engaged in proving religion to other people. Natural religion (in the deeper sense of "natural") would gain; only artificial religion would suffer; which is as much as to say that the net result would be to the good. Is it too much, then, to believe that a temporary suspension of theological activity would be presently followed by a new revelation? "I began to respect the universe," said a retired philosopher, "on the day when I ceased to explain it." To which may be added a remark once made to me by a distinguished preacher: "I should have been a religious man," he said, "if I had not had to preach so many sermons." "If you want people to come to church," said another, "cease giving them reasons why they should come."

II.

And now is there not ground for believing that a theological holiday, partial at all events, has actually been imposed upon Europe, and to a lesser extent also upon America, by the present war? A glance at the publishers' lists reveals at once an enormous reduction in the number of theological books issuing from the press; and in this connection it may be noted that an important theological Journal which devotes its pages to the reviewing of these books has recently announced its suspension for "lack of material." And I will venture to add an item of experience gathered from a quarter nearer home. For fourteen years a continuous and ever-growing stream of articles, dealing with "theology, philosophy, and religion," had been finding its way from all quarters of the globe to the office of the HIBBERT JOURNAL. When the war broke out, almost on the very day, this stream, now grown to the dimensions of a torrent, was suddenly reduced, until at last it became a mere trickle; and so it has remained ever since. It is true that other streams hardly less voluminous

broke out from new quarters; but the source of these was not in the field of "religion, theology, and philosophy," as these terms are commonly, though perhaps too narrowly, understood. A "new theology" began in fact to form round the war itself; but so different from the old both in topics and method, and in the persons from whom it originated, as to suggest the conclusion that many of our former friends, the theologians of ante-bellum days, were taking, or being forced to take, a holiday.

Though the reasons for this are obvious enough, it may be useful to bring some of them together.

In the first place, we have the fact that the theological forces of Germany are for the moment immobilised. For well-nigh a century Germany has been the source, or the chief source, of the movements and "tendencies" which have kept the theological mind of the world in a state of perpetual unrest. There is no denying the immense contributions which German thinkers have made to theological science in all its departments. But these contributions have been so numerous, so disturbing, so various, so inconsistent among themselves, so short-lived in their popularity, and so rapidly displaced by their contraries, that to follow them was to dance attendance on a feather tossed by the wind. I am not in the least concerned to underestimate the debts which so many of us owe to individual German thinkers; but I do not hesitate to say that the net result on British theology of the paramount German influence has been to produce a degree of confusion and unrest which have done damage to a science which, more than any other, requires a calm atmosphere to produce its best results. Nor can there be a doubt that our habit of leaning on the German prop, and supporting our arguments by German footnotes, has greatly restricted the range of our own originality, and in some cases smothered it altogether. And now, all of a sudden, that prop has been knocked away from us. The German output of new theology has ceased so far as we are concerned. The old supply indeed, the accumulations of many

years, still occupies our shelves and still provides a source of borrowing and reference. But the old has always required the new to freshen it, and this being no longer forthcoming, there is a certain stagnancy in the waters and our borrowings are more reluctant in consequence. The age of German footnotes is on the wane. And besides all this there is a deeper feeling, having its root in certain human instincts of which even theology occasionally feels the force. Strive as we may against illogical prejudice, we must yet confess that the intellectual eminence of Germany in the field of theology is challenged, and to some extent already discredited, by its association with the spectacle of present German conduct. True, the association of ideas does not work logically; but it works powerfully, and it cannot be expected that with the vision of the sinking *Lusitania* fresh in mind we can feel much confidence in the spiritual guidance of men who either justified that massacre or abstained from condemning it. This indeed does not apply to German theologians, for example Schleiermacher, who are no longer living to tell us what they think of such crimes; but the influence of German thought, as a whole, will of a surety be greatly impaired if we are driven to the position that the only German thinkers whom it is safe to follow are the dead ones.

These two causes working together—the sudden and complete cessation of the new supply of German theology, and the diminished respect for the old supply already on our hands—have had the effect for the time being of damping the ardours of theological speculation in so far as these were dependent, as to a great extent they were dependent, on German sources for their inspiration. It is certain that if you arrest or eliminate from modern theological scholarship all that part of it which has been thus inspired and thus maintained, the remainder is far from being sufficient to provide full employment for the existing body of theologians: all will be thrown out of work to some extent, and some will be thrown out of work altogether. The arrest has already taken place, the elimina-

tion is far advanced, and a much-needed theological holiday has set in.

But deeper causes than these are at work. The war has suddenly launched us all into a new world where the laws and formulæ of the old order are difficult to apply. Between our theology on the one hand, and our estimate of human nature and our vision of the world on the other, there exists, as all must admit, a very close relation—not necessarily a relation of dependence, but one, at all events, which allows of no contradiction between the conception of God and the conception of the world, physical, social, human, in which we live. A time in which men do not know what to make of human nature, nor of the world order, is one in which theological speculation will be held up. Men will hesitate in the propositions they make about God, until they are sure that these are in harmony with the propositions they have to make about themselves and about their environment. Now one effect of the war has been (this, I think, may be said with confidence) to challenge many of our pre-existing notions of human nature and to confuse greatly our vision of the world. We don't quite know what to think, what to say, about either. Our anthropology is at sea in one direction; our cosmology in another. The war is the work of human nature; it originated in human nature, and is carried on by human nature. What comment, then, on human nature, what light on its "value," its position in the hierarchy of being, is offered by this, the latest, of human nature's works? "By their fruits ye shall know them." We hesitate in the answer. We look on the heroism and self-sacrifice which are being so variously displayed, and we feel that our former estimate of man was not nearly high enough. A moment later, however, we are impressed by the enormous stupidity of the whole proceeding; we see the wild fury of the nations, the blood-lust, the cruelty; we hear the whole world roaring with lies, with execrations and the gnashing of teeth, and our impulse now is to place man at the very bottom of the animal creation—nay, outside the animal creation

altogether, perhaps among the fiends. In like manner our vision of the world in which these things are happening oscillates between extremes. The heroism and the self-sacrifice are phenomena within the world order, and the vision of these things brings moments of exaltation when we seem to be living in the home of the Gods. But the world order is implicated also in the other side of the picture, and, shifting the angle of vision so as to bring this into prominence, we can hardly resist the feeling that we are in hell already. Is the world *good*? Is the world *bad*? Hardly a day passes but we are ready to shout an affirmative answer to both questions. Meanwhile our speculations about God are held in abeyance; the time for them will not come until we have recovered our lost bearings in the actual world. Let us first know what kind of a world it is in which we are living, and whether our human nature has or has not the force to establish the thing it believes to be good.

III.

And if the discussion of these greater topics must be suspended, what is to be said about "the questions debated between the sects"? I believe there are a few people still left in England who are sufficiently interested in the "Kikuyu controversy," and other controversies of a like nature, to take up their pens in defence of one or other party to the dispute. But I know—and in this matter I have some opportunities of forming a judgment—that the number of persons who would read what the controversialists might write is exceedingly small. At the present moment the thoughtful public is not interested in such questions, and theologians if they discuss them at all do so with diminished zeal and to small audiences of their own class. Numerical comparisons in such cases are of course precarious, but perhaps I am within the mark in saying that for every hundred readers which a HIBBERT article, devoted to this type of controversy, would have found two years ago not more than one reader would be found at the present time. In regard to all the questions which stand upon that level of importance

a theological holiday has undoubtedly set in. How much of their interest these questions will recover after the war I do not pretend to predict; but it seems hardly possible to believe that they will ever again occupy quite the same place in the eyes of thoughtful men. A wise theologian anxious to secure for his science the prosperity it deserves will make his account with this. Questions which have a sectarian reference only will fall, more and more, under the Law of Diminishing Returns. For the fact is that as Christians, no less than as citizens, the war has done something to unite us. Politically it has united us against the Germans: spiritually it has united us against the devil. A slump in sectarianism is for the moment in progress; and though, when peace comes, we shall again tend to split asunder, the distances which separate us from one another will hardly be as great as before. The war, by bringing into relief the essential evils of our civilisation, and the duties in regard to these evils which all sects had neglected in common, is giving us a juster sense of proportion, which will have the effect of making us a little ashamed of the emphasis previously placed on matters now seen to be irrelevant. This sense of shame for the false emphases of the past, coming *simultaneously*, I do not say to all the sects, but to many of them, is itself a uniting force of no mean value. Of course it will not heal all divisions nor dissipate all controversies; it will leave enough of both to keep the sects alive and in good health; but *some* controversies will disappear, and that in the only way which effectually puts an end to this sort of controversy, namely, by being forgotten. For this good result we shall have largely to thank the theological holiday imposed upon us by the present war.

IV.

Regarding the war as what it undoubtedly is, a crisis in the everlasting conflict of Good and Evil, the question arises, What effect will this have on the direction of theology when holidays are over and work resumed?

Historically the science of Christian theology has always tended to assume one of two forms. Whenever the world was regarded as essentially evil, and human nature held at a low estimate, theology has interpreted religion in terms of *salvation*. Under the depressing circumstances of his lot, the paramount need of man has then seemed to be that of redemption from the world and from himself, and the business of theology has been to expound the means by which this could be accomplished. Whenever, on the other hand, generally under the influence of long-continued peace and prosperity, the state of the world seemed hopeful and progressive, and human nature showed signs of improvement, the need of salvation has fallen into the background, men have recovered confidence in themselves, and believed themselves able, by their own unaided powers, to control their higher destinies and reach the desired haven of some "far-off divine event." In such an atmosphere, charged with man's belief in himself, theology tends to interpret religion in terms of *the pursuit of moral excellence*, and takes on a predominantly if not exclusively ethical character. The moral excellence is of course variously conceived; it may be social or individual, and may be expressed as the imitation of God, or the imitation of Christ, or as obedience to a universal principle of right. In general, we may say that the less men believe in themselves, and the lower their estimate of the capacities of human nature, the more do they lean to a theology of salvation. On the other hand, the more optimistic they are about the natural order, and the more impressed by their own moral achievements, the less need do they feel for the saving grace of God, and the more content they are to regard God as a being who is the active principle of human progress and looks on with approval while men fulfil their vocation, as they then seem well able to do.

This last is the attitude towards which Liberal Theology tends, though in very various degrees of approach. If the different forms of Liberal Theology be compared, beginning

with those which stand closest to Christian orthodoxy, and ending with those furthest removed from this, it will be seen that as orthodoxy is left behind there is a gradual increase in the spiritual competence assigned to man, and a gradual decrease in the part assigned to the saving power of God, until we pass into what is almost pure moralism, in which the name of God is little more than the reminiscence of a past development. Of orthodoxy, on the other hand, the main characteristic always is that saving power is regarded as exclusively in God's hand, or in that of some delegated authority or person appointed by Him.

These two types, though easily distinguishable, are seldom found quite distinct. The theology of moral excellence retains much of the language and some of the thought which belong to the theology of salvation. The theology of salvation, again, has always been willing to make concessions to the other type. Most forms of Christian theology are in fact a compromise between the two, embodying elements which reflect the various views, optimistic and pessimistic, concerning man and the world held in successive periods of history.

Recurring to our original question, what, when the present lull is over, will be the effect of the war on the interpretation of religion in theology, the analogy of the past suggests that, whatever happens, there will be no arrest or breakdown. Religion and theology have proved over and over again that they are able to maintain themselves in presence of the most deeply pessimistic views of the world and of human nature. They have often flourished most vigorously when the grip of evil was felt at its strongest and man in the deepest despair about himself. They can assimilate any event; they can accommodate themselves to any conceivable set of conditions; and are as much at home among the ruins of civilisation as when confronted by its greatest triumphs. But their *form* will vary according as the circumstances to which they must adjust themselves are of the one kind or the other. When all goes well and man seems to be making a

success of his life, the theology of moral excellence will be in the ascendant. When all goes ill and the devil seems master of the world, the theology of salvation is bound to assert itself.

We may be tolerably sure, therefore, that the effect of war will be to promote development in one or other of the two directions indicated. Which of the two directions will be taken depends very largely on the visions we are gaining during our present theological holiday; on the general impression left by the state of the world which the war will leave behind; and on our interpretation of the war itself when its full significance shall have been disclosed to us, as it will not be till long after the issue is determined. It may be that the issue of events will be such that we shall be able to look back on this tragedy as the most splendid episode of history and a crowning evidence of the nobility of man. That will be good for the theology of moral excellence. But this is by no means sure, and can only happen if certain forces, not yet victorious, get the upper hand. It is possible that humanity may emerge from this conflict not proud of its achievements but thoroughly ashamed of itself. Nothing may happen on a scale sufficiently significant to redeem the manifest stupidity and wickedness of certain current actions. An adequate atonement may not appear, at least, not for a long time. The hidden triumph of great tragedy may be wanting. In which event, all those forms of thought which rest on the postulates of moral excellence will receive a set-back, and men will fling themselves, as they have often done in darker times, on the grace and the mercy of God. That will be good for the theology of salvation.

At the moment the prospects of the first type, that which interprets religion in terms of the pursuit of moral excellence, are not very promising—though, of course, they may change at any time. Taking it all in all, the history of the last fifteen months provides a sad comment on the moral achievement of humanity up to date. Whether or no we have overestimated the moral capacities of human nature, it seems certain that we

have overestimated the actual degree of its moral progress. We have been too prone to measure progress by the doctrines which moralists were *teaching*, and have failed to ask ourselves how much of this teaching was being actually *learnt* by the world at large. "Brotherhood," for example, has been inculcated everywhere, and this has lulled many of us into a belief that "brotherhood" was not far from being an accomplished fact. Events have shown us the extent of our error. In morals, as in other things, there is often a wide discrepancy between what is being *taught* and what is being *learnt*; and the war has opened our eyes to this in the case of our humanitarian principles. Much, no doubt, may be said on the other side. The war has provided an astonishing revelation of man's capacity to sacrifice himself for an ideal. But *what* ideal? Had we been in earnest with the pursuit of moral excellence our ideal would have been one which would have rendered this war impossible. Consider only one among the multitudes of causes which produced the present crisis—I mean the enormous amount of deliberate lying which went on in certain places high and low. Had not the liars done their deadly work the war would never have taken place; and even now would cease automatically if all the newspapers, orators, professors, statesmen, Kaisers, and other users of language in Europe were to speak the truth consistently for a week on end. So brief an exercise of veracity is no extravagant demand to make of a group of civilised nations which for many centuries have been pursuing moral excellence, or at least evolving morally, under the guidance of Christian teachers, Greek philosophers, and Gothic metaphysicians. Alas! there is not the faintest chance that the demand will be satisfied—a sad comment on the moral attainments of the human race.

Who, then, can doubt that if the pursuit of moral excellence is to turn out a success, man will have to do much better in the future than he has ever done in the past? There is no reason why he should not. Nay rather, the disgrace which has been brought on the human family as a whole by the actions of

some of its members creates an opportunity for the others, as well as for the chief sinners themselves, to wipe out the disgrace by actions of a contrary kind. What, for instance, is to be the answer of every nation of seafaring men to the German outrage on the great and solemn traditions of the sea? I imagine it will be the resolve to uphold those traditions with a more unswerving loyalty than ever. That is the spirit which, if extended to the whole horrible situation created by the present war, might cause it to issue in a moral triumph.

Man, meanwhile, is neither as wise nor as good as he thought he was. A damaging blow has been dealt at the reputation of human nature; man's self-respect is for the moment lowered; and unless humanity redeems its character by some great act of atonement, as it conceivably may, it is probable that the theology which interprets religion as the pursuit of moral excellence will remain below the horizon for some time to come. Nor must the upholders of that school expect in the future to derive much assistance from the Germans, who have so often encouraged them in the past. True, the Germans are at the moment engaged in what to them must be the delightful employment of contemplating themselves as a race of heroes; and this might seem at first sight a point in favour of the theology of moral excellence. But, unfortunately, they are also engaged, under the guidance of their most distinguished professors,[1] in contemplating the rest of humanity in a much less favourable light: the English being "hucksters," the Americans "cheats," the Russians "savages," the French "decadents." No doubt the German intellect is equal to almost anything; but even the German intellect will hardly be able to vindicate the self-respect of humanity in a world where the moral attainments of Germany, illustrated by her recent actions, are alone entitled to admiration.

EDITOR.

[1] The article which follows will supply instances.

SOME RECENT GERMAN WAR LITERATURE.

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Of the making of German books there is no end. In peace time Germany probably produces more books, booklets, pamphlets, and brochures than any other country in the world. Mountains of printed matter accumulate every year; one only wonders who reads them all. An enormous output of books on the war was therefore to be expected. From August 1914 to May 1915 no less than 4518 publications about the war have made their appearance, including 1166 items under the heading *belles lettres*, 1061 under politics, economics, and sociology, 887 under edification and instruction, 227 under military legislation, and 799 under diaries of the war. The last named are very miscellaneous in character. There is *Der grosse Krieg*, a history published in fortnightly parts by the *Frankfurter Zeitung*; there is an illustrated history of the war; there is a record of the official documents and despatches;[1] there is even a *Verse Chronicle of the Great War*,[2] by Wilhelm Widman, the first part of which runs to 128 pages. Other poetical productions are numerous enough, and all the well-known writers, *e.g.* Hauptmann, Ganghofer, and Richard Dehmel (to name but three whose poems we have seen), have

[1] *Kriegschronik in authentischen Berichten und offiziellen Depeschen: Eine Geschichte des grossen Krieges*, 1914.

[2] *Reimschronik des grossen Krieges*, Stuttgart.

contributed their quota. There is nothing noteworthy in these productions; the sentiments are such as can be easily imagined, the theme only varying with each writer's genius. War poetry was bound to be abundant in every land, and Germany is no exception. But we believe that war songs are a German speciality. *Germany, be Watchful,*[1] is the title of one song-book, with words and music for people's choirs; *German Anger in Verse and Song*[2] is the title of another. Some of the collections are partly patriotic, others are semi-religious in character; some are reprints of well-known popular songs, others have been specially written.

But these are by-products of the war literature. The main stream is composed of publications dealing with the origins of the war, with politics, economics, and finance. The quality of these literary productions varies considerably. The greater number are the weak offspring of small minds, badly written and badly argued, strong only in their expressions of hate. But there are a goodly number likewise written by responsible men, whose views may be momentarily distorted by war-madness, but whose presentation of their case must be admitted to be dignified and scholarly. One of the best series of pamphlets by various authors, edited by Ernst Jäckh under the general title *The German War,*[3] contains some excellent papers on various aspects of the war, much on the lines of our Oxford pamphlets.

Among the writers who treat of their subject more at length, pride of place belongs to Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, who in a pamphlet of thirty-one pages, *The Origin of the War,*[4] reproduces his famous lecture on the historical causes of the conflagration. Great scholar though he is, the war fever has changed him into another man. The old campaigner of 1870 has come to the fore in him. Well do

[1] *Deutschland, sei wach!* by Simon Breu.
[2] *Der deutsche Zorn in Versen und Liedern,* by Martin Hildebrandt.
[3] *Der deutsche Krieg: Politische Flugschriften,* Stuttgart.
[4] *Kriegesanfang: Die geschichtlichen Ursachen des Krieges,* Berlin.

we remember his lectures in Berlin on Greek mythology; his audience felt that a poet and a seer was talking to them. Where is that seer now? He considers Germany's opponents in turn and tells his countrymen why they are Germany's foes. France still longs for her lost provinces. But what can you expect of France to-day? She is a fen of stagnant waters. Passion is rife in her midst, and society is rotten to the core. You need only read Anatole France to see that. Russia? She covets Constantinople. Her ruling classes, the Czar at their head, are corrupt degenerates. They realise their weakness and tremble for their safety. A successful war is their last hope, so they have plunged their country into this mighty conflict. England is no better than she should be. She is jealous of Germany's excellence in industry, and of the skill of her traders. Besides, internal disruption threatens her. The Suffragette peril and the Irish Civil War are real dangers. Only a war in foreign parts can stave off the evil. So she too is against Germany.

One cannot help asking, where is the seer who discoursed so pleasantly about the Greek Gods and made the small Hellenic villages to live again before our eyes? Here was insight and sympathy. We miss that insight now. Wilamowitz ought to know his England better; and what would he say if a Frenchman were to suggest that Frank Wedekind's writings (say *Frühlings Erwachen*, which drew crowded houses to the Deutsches Theater in Berlin) bore unanswerable testimony to the decadence of German society? What would he say if one turned up leading articles in the German Liberal press accusing the Junker of being corrupt—of avoiding the payment of income-tax, of unduly raising the price of agricultural produce, and of illegally influencing elections? This is what German "militarism" has made of this high priest of classical learning.

But while Wilamowitz's view about England's part in the war is accepted in Germany, it is by no means universal. Karl Rathgen, the Professor of Economics at Hamburg's

future university, places England in a different light. In *Germany and the War*[1] he attempts to show that the French and the Russians dragged the English into the struggle. The French want to be a world-power, though they lack all the essential qualifications for such a rôle. They are afraid of responsibility; they limit their families; they prefer a safe billet to an enterprising career; their great ideal is to retire and live on their incomes. In Russia, again, there was pan-Russianism, ready to devour like a ravenous lion. The two partners of England thus set on Germany and forced England in against her will. But even this view of England does not satisfy everybody. There is thus a third picture drawn by W. Dibelius in his *England and Ourselves.*[2] Here England is depicted as thoroughly materialistic, worshipping the golden calf; large-scale production is in her midst; she has prostituted her idealist aims for filthy lucre. If this were not so, should we hear the call to repentance from so many voices—Ruskin's, Carlyle's, Morris's, George Meredith's, Galsworthy's, Wells'? Germany, on the other hand, loves learning; and every German is ready to sacrifice himself to the interests of the community.

Whatever the variation, the theme is the same: England is the foe! Professor Spies, who occupies the chair of English at Greifswald, and who therefore ought to know something of this country, asserts (*Germany's Foe! England and the Preliminary History of the War*)[3] that the English regard themselves as the chosen people. He urges on his countrymen a better acquaintance with England so as not to follow in her evil footsteps. "The more we learn of England, the less danger we shall run of becoming 'Englishfied.'" Whatever may be thought of his reason, the advice of Professor Spies is certainly good. The unfortunate thing, however, is that the German books about England published since last summer

[1] *Deutschland und der Krieg* (Deutsche Vorträge Hamburger Professoren, No. 1).

[2] *England und Wir* (No. 2 of the above series).

[3] *Deutschland's Feind! England und die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges*, 103 pp., Berlin.

breathe anything but the spirit of calm description. *Why England declared War on Us: John Bull's Trump Card*[1] (J. O. Voelk); *Away with the English World-yoke*[2] (G. Irmer); *How England became our Enemy*[3] (Felix Salamon); *England's Destiny*[4] (K. L. A. Schmidt); *The Real England*[5] (Edmund von Heyking); *England the Originator of the World-crisis*[6] (H. Oberwinder); *The Foe of the Past* [France], *of the Present* [England], *and of the Future*[7] [Russia] (E. von Kahler); *Our Settlement with England*[8] (H. Oncken), are a few of the titles of the more popular productions, and not a word of comment is necessary. Nor is the attempt to show England in the light of English and foreign opinion any more successful in the achievement of the aim Professor Spies has set his countrymen. Quite a number of such books have appeared, but we need hardly add that German opinions in praise of England (and their name was legion before the war[9]) are lacking. Here are a few of the titles: *How Our Enemies Love Each Other: Critical Expressions of Opinion of famous Frenchmen, Englishmen, Russians, Belgians, and Japanese about each other's Countries*[10] (W. Klette); *English*

[1] *Weshalb England uns den Krieg erklärt: John Bulls letzter Trumpf*, 32 pp., Munich.

[2] *Los vom englischen Weltjoch!*, 43 pp., Leipzig.

[3] *Wie England unser Feind wurde*, 32 pp., Leipzig.

[4] *Das Ende Englands*, 46 pp., Dresden.

[5] *Das wirkliche England*, 23 pp., Berlin.

[6] *England der Urheber der Weltkrise*, 88 pp., Dresden.

[7] *Der vorige, der heutige und der künftige Feind*, Heidelberg.

[8] *Unsere Abrechnung mit England.*

[9] Let one specimen be given:—"We seamen think very differently about the English from what the landsmen at home do. We meet the English in all the havens of the globe, and we know that they are the most 'decent' of all peoples. Behind the high chalk cliffs yonder dwells the leading nation of the world—distinguished, tactful, brave, united, and wealthy. For ourselves, we have from of old but one of their characteristics—bravery. Another we are slowly attaining to—wealth. Whether we shall ever obtain the others, that for us is the vital question."—*Peter Moors Fahrt nach Südwest* (p. 17), by Gustav Frenssen. (An English edition of the book is published by Messrs Constable.)

[10] *Unsere Feinde, wie sie einander lieben: Kritische Äusserungen berühmter Franzosen, Engländer, Russen, Belgier, Japaner über ihre Verbündeten*, 186 pp., 75 caricatures, Munich.

World-Politics mirrored in English Opinions[1] (W. Tönnies); *England as Seen by the Rest of the World*[2] (C. Strecker); *English Views about England*[3] (said to be the work of a Russian officer, with a preface by Dr Franz Oppenheimer); *English Politics judged by Neutral Countries*[4] (E. Sidler Brunner). One exception to this foolish bleating must, however, be mentioned: *England in the Judgment of the Great Men of All Ages*,[5] which Dr H. Vaerting has published. "I can in no wise join in the shriek of hate against England," he says. "Like all other people, the English have their strength and their weaknesses. But at any rate humanity should be grateful to them for at least three things. They were the first to fight slavery; they kept the food of the people untaxed; and they gave hospitality to all political refugees no matter what their origin." Nor does Dr Vaerting forget the value to the world of the "Mother of Parliaments" and of free institutions; of the wonderful capacity of the Englishman for colonisation and of the beneficial influence of his rule. In the author's view it should be the German's ultimate goal after the war to cultivate the friendship of England. An Anglo-German alliance would safeguard the peace of the world.

But the great mass of the German people do not as yet care about the peace of the world, and have but little wish for friendship with England. Their political writers tell them that England's ideals are so totally opposed to their own that not only is a *rapprochement* with her unthinkable, but also undesirable. It is to be feared that this point of view is widespread in Germany, and one of its doughtiest champions is Werner Sombart. To those of us whom he taught the economics of modern life his change of heart comes as a most astonishing phenomenon. In the olden days he was a revolutionary. He smote the powers that be with the rod of his

[1] *Englische Weltpolitik in englischer Beleuchtung.*
[2] *England im Spiegel der Kulturmenschheit.*
[3] *Engländer über England.*
[4] *Englische Politik in neutraler Bedeutung.*
[5] *England im Urteil grosser Männer aller Zeiten.*

mouth, and many a time and oft his biting sarcasm threw ridicule upon them. The Kaiser trumpeted abroad: "Our future lies on the sea." Sombart dared to preach: "Our future lies on land." Was it any wonder that this man did not obtain official recognition in his profession? He was one of the most popular teachers in Breslau, and yet the Government did not appoint him to a full chair in his subject. The reason was well known. Sombart was the *enfant terrible* at the University of Breslau, opposed to all that the authorities stood for; to whom nothing was holy, not even the Kaiser. And now this man is among the staunchest supporters of German militarism and all that it connotes; he is the prophet of a new gospel for the German people. Such is the influence of the Demon of War!

Heroes and Hucksters[1] is the title of the booklet wherein Sombart utters the burden of his message—for Germans only; he cares not what the rest of the world thinks. The English are the hucksters, the Germans the heroes: the English are the warehousemen, the Germans the warriors. Turn to the table of contents and you find the usual clear disposition of the subject-matter. There is an Introduction, followed by Three Parts. In the first is set forth the nature of English commercialism; in the second the essence of heroic Germanism; and the third deals with the true mission of the German people.

The little book suffers from the usual excellences and defects of the author. Its brilliancy must be admitted, but whether the thesis is true is another matter. An idea flashes through Sombart's mind; it looks attractive; he therefore writes a book around it. So he informs us in his opening sentence that "all great wars are wars of religion; they were so in the past, they are so in the present, and will be so in the future." If you venture to assert that this generalisation is a little too sweeping, the author will probably tell you, in the

[1] *Helden und Händler,* 145 pp., Munich. Sombart is fond of such parallels; *Krieger und Krämer* occurs pretty frequently in this little book.

classical phrase of the treatise, to go to the Devil! The preliminary statement is the foundation on which his structure stands, and that is enough. In the present war the religion of the shopkeeper is at death-grips with that of the warrior. Would you know what the shopkeeper's religion is, go to his philosophers. From Francis Bacon to Herbert Spencer, they are all only "philosophers" (in inverted commas). He scoffs at them for being political economists, practical fellows, loving comfort and material well-being. Only a nation of shopkeepers could produce philosophers such as these; a nation with common sense, a nation whose leaders pride themselves on being able to understand the man in the street. Look at the quality of their ministers. Compare Grey with Bethmann-Hollweg! When he wrote that, Sombart must have forgotten the significant story that is being retailed in all neutral countries and is not unknown in Germany itself. The war is over; England is defeated. Germany dictates her terms. England must pay an enormous indemnity. What can a defeated England do? She agrees. Furthermore, England must hand over her navy to Germany. A bitter pill, but a conquered people must needs submit. Thirdly and lastly, Germany demands to be relieved of her diplomatists; England must take them into her own service. "No!" say the English. "That is too much. We shall fight on."

Sombart next attacks English ethics. "The greatest good of the greatest number"—there you have the highest ideal of a trafficker's soul. His virtues? They are "the negative virtues" of contentment, honesty, moderation, diligence, justice, self-control, modesty, patience. One could not desire a better enumeration of English characteristics. Truly, Sombart is here "a Daniel come to judgment," but he knows it not. On he stalks, telling his countrymen that the State in England is in no wise a living organism but a mechanical entity; that English world-politics is but the policy of an enlarged universal provider or store; that war for the Englishman is something in the nature of sport; and that England has

contributed but little to the world's intellectual values (he is careful to add "since Shakespeare"). Nothing in religion; a few poets, who were, however, of Irish birth, "and therefore anti-English"; nothing in music; in painting, ditto. In fact, a nation of shopkeepers cannot evolve any intellectual values, neither now nor in all eternity, even if they wished to. But they do not wish to; all they want, all they find delight in, is comfort and sport.

All this requires no comment. It would seem that in war time German scientific method, so justly praised hitherto, is suffering a temporary bankruptcy. Let it be recalled that the writer of such utter shallowness as this is a scholar whose views on economic problems respectfully command the attention of two continents. Only one explanation is possible: hate has made him blind. "There is something peculiar about national hatred: you will always find it strongest and most violent in the lowest stages of civilisation." So Goethe told Eckermann (March 14, 1830); but Sombart, who knows and loves Goethe, must have overlooked the passage.

When we turn to the section on German heroes, we are singularly disappointed. At best all that Sombart can say about them is that the German soul utterly rejects everything that even distantly resembles English—or, better, West European—thought and feeling. A cynic might aver that he well believed that. But too much need not be made of the statement; it is very questionable. When Sombart comes to something more positive he is at any rate easy to follow. Duty is the watchword of the hero; Duty the lodestar of the German. Ask any German soldier in the trenches, even the commonest man, why he is there, and he will reply in the words of the Great Frederick: "It is not a necessity that I should live, but it is undoubtedly a necessity that I should do my duty and fight for my Fatherland." According to Sombart, only the German can die for his Fatherland. The Russians, the French, the Belgians, the Serbians, the Italians (we will not mention the English)—what of them? For what

have they laid down their lives? We wonder if Sombart, who is an omnivorous reader, has ever come across the simple words, "Who dies, if England lives?" Some of Rupert Brooke's war poems might also help him to a better understanding, and to the reconsideration of such a statement as this: "To be German is to be heroic." And what are the ideals of the hero? Self-sacrifice, Fidelity, Reverence, Bravery, Piety, Obedience, Kindness of Heart!

Sensible men in Germany will be hardly likely to claim a monopoly of all these virtues for their own nation; what men outside Germany will say on this point we can well imagine. But Sombart proudly proclaims that he cares nothing for the opinions of the world. He pictures Germania as a giant figure in shining armour, towering above the landscape, disdainful of the mud that the petty nations sling at her. Germania has a monopoly of all that is best in the universe. Even her Constitution is the best possible. Is this Sombart, this the critic of Prussianism? Has he forgotten the franchise in Prussia, described as the most reactionary in the world; has he forgotten the treatment of the Poles and the Social Democrats; does he know nothing of State anti-Semitism; has he never wished for a free press and freedom of speech? It would seem that militarism has darkened his vision. He adores it. He sees in it the quintessence of the German heroic spirit. He has forgotten all about the cry of the ill-treatment of soldiers that was heard so loud in the Reichstag a year or two ago. "We are a nation of warriors," and warriors are brave and obedient; they exercise self-control and are subject to discipline. Everybody who knows Germany will ask how it is that the German conception of women hardly fits in with this picture. They will recollect a number of not unimportant members of the Prussian Diet weeping bitterly over the depravity of Berlin; they may recall the wise words of men like Professor Ziegler on the scandalous immorality prevalent in German student circles.

We have dwelt at some length on this little book, first,

because the author's name is very well known in German-speaking countries, and therefore likely to attract a large body of readers; and secondly, because it is an extreme presentation of the views of the military party in Germany, where the book will be quoted as "scientific." Before the war, life was empty and meaningless—so Sombart tells his countrymen; it was "without any ideals—that is to say, not life at all but death, and stinking rottenness." Nothing availed to revitalise life—neither the numerous new "religions" of mushroom growth, nor Socialism with its hopeful prospects. War alone has breathed a new soul into the corpse; war worked a modern miracle. Could the militarists wish for a better armoury? Could they desire more attractive arguments? Nor has Sombart overlooked the future. Of course, he can think only of a victorious Germany. What are its ideals to be? It must reject everything English. Sport is undoubtedly good, but no English sports must find German devotees. Not tennis, football, or cricket—things of evil omen; but walking, running, skating, shooting, hunting, mountain-climbing, boating, swimming, fencing, riding—all true German sports and all heroic. Criticism here is superfluous; a mere statement of Sombart's opinions suffices to show how ridiculous they are. Germany is to become the super-State, strong and self-sufficing economically and intellectually, having as little intercourse as possible with other States. More especially in the intellectual sphere, for "no people on earth can give us anything worth mentioning in learning, technology, art, or literature which it might hurt us to have to do without." This pride is in accord with the rôle Sombart has ascribed to Germany. What the Greeks were among the Barbarians, and the Jews among the Heathens, that Germany is to be to-day. "The German people is the chosen race of this century." Is it any wonder that a good many critics assert that the Germans have no sense of humour? And is it any wonder that the list of German war literature should contain books entitled *Why*

do the Nations hate us?[1] by Magnus Hirschfeld, and *Why are the Germans hated?*[2] by E. Mackel.

Sombart is a great scholar, a man with brilliant ideas, an inspiring teacher, a force in the Germany of to-day. All his pupils can bear witness to this. But they know too that his conceit is boundless. In his latest production it surpasses itself. But it helps us to realise the inward thoughts of a people taught to believe that the war was forced upon them. Even after a year has elapsed since those fatal July days, Germany has not learned anything new. Its very latest apologia, *Germany and the World-War*,[3] published in the middle of July 1915, and containing the presentation of Germany's case by such scholars as Oncken of Heidelberg, Hans Delbrück, Gustav von Schmoller, Erich Marks, and Karl Hampe, has nothing fresh to retail. The book reiterates the old cry of August 1914: "We must defend our holiest possessions, the Fatherland itself and our hearths and homes, against a ruthless onslaught." Such are the Kaiser's own words; and the lie that was then coined has found currency in Germany down to this day.

The manner of the defence of "the holiest possessions" has been carefully considered too. In *The Present War in the Arena of International Law*,[4] Herbert Kraus admits that Germany when it invaded Belgium acted contrary to international agreements; but seeing that the measure was in self-defence, it was justifiable, as witness the bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807 and the *Caroline* case in 1837. Pretty much the same argument is advanced by Ludwig Beer in his *Public Law and War*.[5] A candid admission of wrongdoing such as the Chancellor made in his famous Reichstag speech of August 4, 1914, is much more straightforward than a series of twistings

[1] *Warum hassen uns die Völker? Kriegspsychologische Betrachtungen*, 43 pp., Bonn.

[2] *Warum sind die Deutschen so verhasst?* 43 pp., Brunswick.

[3] *Deutschland und der Weltkrieg*, Leipzig (Teubner).

[4] *Der gegenwärtige Krieg vor dem Forum des Völkerrechts.*

[5] *Völkerrecht und Krieg.*

to attempt to prove that Germany did not sin against the law of nations. Even an indictment of the war methods of the Allies from the point of view of international law, as set forth by the famous Reichstag deputy Ernst Müller-Meiningen in his *World-War and the Law of Nations*,[1] is preferable. That was only to be expected. But to urge that Germany was acting in accordance with law is really asking the world to believe too much.

Only one German writer, so far as we know, has seen the true aspect of the whole business, and he has had to remain anonymous. He is the author of a book published in Switzerland and entitled *J'Accuse*.[2]

As a piece of historical writing the book will rank high. It is logical, it is critical, it is suffused with a burning indignation against the authors of the "crime." Not an opinion in it but rests on documentary evidence. The book appeared in April 1915 when all the available official papers were at hand. On these the anonymous German has based his indictment of Germany, and the work could not have been better done. The writer knows his Germany well; knows all the currents and cross-currents of her politics; and shows how the military clique, the Crown Prince at their head, were like so many battle-steeds neighing for the fray. He shows convincingly that England never had aggressive intentions towards Germany; on the contrary, England strove all she could to hold out the hand of friendship to her German neighbour. Nor was France evilly minded. As for Russia, not one reason is advanced for her alleged hatred of Germany. The truth is that the military party won the upper hand in Germany, and carried even the Chancellor with it. How this came about the writer of *J'Accuse* traces with all diligence. And then he goes into the history of the "crime" itself. He

[1] *Weltkrieg und Völkerrecht*, 378 pp., Berlin.

[2] *J'Accuse, von einem Deutschen*, 378 pp., Lausanne. This book should be read by everyone who wishes to understand all the bearings of the war problem. A French edition was issued long ago, and Messrs Hodder & Stoughton have brought out an English version.

begins with Austria's part; his story here is complete and full. Even more detailed is his consideration of the rôle of Germany, with its procrastination and pretence. In the critical hours of those July days, when the fate of Europe hung in the balance, Herr von Jagow received Sir Edward Grey's proposals with what appeared to be a friendly countenance, but as for his answer—"they had not had time to send an answer yet." As our author shows, to the final propositions for a peaceful ending of the difficulty Germany never sent any answer at all. He points out further that the reasons for the German mobilisation against Russia were utterly groundless. He does not shrink from calling them inventions. But he has his evidence ready, and every right-thinking person cannot but be convinced by the demonstration. Likewise the whole involved question of Belgium he unravels in a masterly fashion. Especially touching is his outcry against the German people for their heartlessness in the matter of Belgium. The people that became ecstatic over Schiller's *Wilhelm Tell*, that showered its loving admiration on the heroic deeds of the little band of Swiss mountaineers opposing the bully and the tyrant, now behaved like that tyrant and bully towards Belgium. His indictment must make even the Crown Prince's followers blush for very shame if they have hearts within them. And granted, our author proceeds, that all the German accusations against the hopeless Belgians be established; granted for the moment that the boiling oil and the other stories are true. Was not the burning of ancient cities, the wholesale shooting of civilians, the destruction of numberless villages punishment enough for the alleged misdeeds? Why then the levies on Belgian communes? How can that violence be excused? Be it remembered that a German asks the question. It could not have been easy for him to come to this conclusion: The guilt of having kindled the European war must be laid on Germany and Austria.

The anonymous author of *J'Accuse* turns the German case inside out, and shows its hollowness and hypocrisy.

It is impossible to assume that the book will not find its way into Germany, despite the censorship. There must be, indeed there are, a very large number of Germans who were not satisfied with the official view of the war now shouted from the housetops. Let it be remembered that at the general election of 1912 four and a quarter million electors, or 35 per cent. of the total, voted for Social Democratic candidates. Not all of these four and a quarter millions were professed Socialists. They included a very large number of the discontented. In Germany there is no other way of registering your dissatisfaction with things as they are except by voting for the Social Democratic party. And even if we make an allowance for those among them whom patriotism or chauvinism has carried away, there must be left a goodly company still of whom the newspapers tell but little, and of whom therefore we in England have but scant information. It is impossible to believe that such men have ceased to be. They are silent as yet. They commune within their hearts on Germany's development, as set forth perhaps in Karl Lamprecht's[1] *Rise of Germany, 1750 to 1914*,[2] and look to the time when a better Germany will arise after the war. Their influence will tell in the long run. *J'Accuse* is its first expression.

M. EPSTEIN.

LONDON.

[1] The well-known historian of German civilisation, who was Professor of History at Leipzig, died on May 12, 1915. It is one of the concomitants of a state of war that no record of the fact appeared in this country.

[2] *Deutschland's Aufstieg, 1750 bis 1914*, Gotha.

A GERMAN ON THE WAR.

G. LOWES DICKINSON.

It is one of the evils of war that it cuts off the belligerent nations from all knowledge of the enemy's point of view. The press reproduces what it thinks will inflame opinion, not what it hopes will inform it; so that each belligerent comes to think that the enemy nation not only has no case, but does not even believe it has a case. Whole nations may thus come to be regarded as something monstrous and outside the pale, and the re-establishing of mutual comprehension be made unnecessarily difficult. Now, in the present war, nothing is more remarkable than the conviction of the people of every belligerent country that they are fighting a righteous war of self-defence, and even that they are fighting it honourably and their enemies dishonourably. Thus, while the English dwell on German atrocities in Belgium, the Germans dwell on Russian atrocities in East Prussia and Galicia; while the English talk of poisoned gas, the Germans talk of dumdum bullets; while the English reprobate the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the Germans reprobate the naval policy which they represent as an attempt to starve the women and children of a whole nation. These mutual recriminations do not, of course, determine the balance of right and wrong one way or the other. That only an impartial authority could do when passions have cooled. But meantime it may help us to judge more justly if we understand that there is, to the German mind, a German case. To illustrate this, I have brought together a few passages from a pamphlet

by Dr Friedrich Wilhelm Förster, entitled *Deutschlands Jugend und der Weltkrieg.* Dr Förster is Professor of Education at Munich, and exercises a great influence over the youth of Germany. He is, it will be seen, a pacifist, in spite of his idealisation of the moral discipline of war, and an internationalist, in spite of his German patriotism. And though, of course, he speaks only for himself, his opinions may be taken to be at least as representative as those of men like Reventlow or Rohrbach. The reader will supply his own comments. I spare him mine.[1]

First, then, as to the origin of the war. Dr Förster repudiates all responsibility for his own Government and nation: "Our Kaiser allowed our opponents to get the advantage in mobilising that he might have the advantage in love of peace. This moral advantage is of much greater significance, even for military power, than any external advantage that can be won at the cost of conscience." "We neither desired nor caused the war." On the contrary, the war was a conspiracy against Germany. And for this conspiracy our author attributes a chief share of blame to England. He pleads, nevertheless, for a just estimate of the English contribution to civilisation, and against the passion of hate that has swept through Germany:—

"Hate disorganises, love disciplines. Fill yourselves with deepest sympathy for all who suffer in war, whose hearts are crushed, whose bodies are broken, whose homes are burned. Fill yourselves with enthusiasm for everything which your nation in the future shall build above these wrecks and ruins, and then charge and fight as one consecrated to death, doing your utmost to end this horror and win a peace which shall make a recurrence of such things impossible. Such a purification from the passion of hate is often easier on the field than at home. Those who remain behind have an abstract enemy in view. The soldier sees living men who suffer and die like

[1] I cite from a translation made by Mrs Felkin, the translator of several works of Herbart.

himself. He learns to value efficient, even knightly, qualities in the enemy, and thus reality corrects of itself the formula with which he went into the war. How can the English soldier help the vile munition that is served out to him? The really guilty ones are on the other side of the Channel. God will judge them, if our sword does not reach them." The reference here to "vile munition (*niedertraechtige Munition*)" is further explained by the following passage: "Our Government has rightly given the word that we Germans owe it to ourselves not to follow the practices of our opponents, except in extreme necessity of self-defence. To make dumdum bullets, to maltreat prisoners and wounded—that would be for us nothing but the worst form of 'foreignism' (*Ausländerei*). Let us 'barbarians' remain true to ourselves and set a better example." This passage will startle the English reader. And for that very reason it is important. For it illustrates how in war all sense and knowledge of fact disappears among the belligerents, and each nation believes all bad of the enemy and all good of itself. Our author proceeds: "Just at such a time as this is it important for our soul's peace that we should cleanse ourselves from hatred of whole nations. To indulge unbridled antipathies is not in harmony with that great discipline of soul by which alone we can win the day. It is not only Lord (*sic*) Grey that England has given us, and the rowdies, rogues, and hypocrites who have this war on their conscience. England has given us also the Salvation Army, and invaluable higher points of view for the treatment of Labour questions and social work. She has taught our revolutionary spirits and moderated our party passions. Let us always remember this, and in that remembrance grasp again in the future the proffered hand. Nay, more! It is for that better England we are fighting when we do all we can to humble and tame thoroughly and for its own good that lower England that is now in power. And it is better for us to fight for that better England than to rage and spit upon Lord Grey and his followers.

"In sleepless nights kindle the eternal light of Christ in your souls and try to love your enemies. Think of that great William Booth and of all the English greatness and goodness embodied in him; of Florence Nightingale, the heroine and saint, whose pioneer work is still binding up to-day unnumbered wounds; and think of Carlyle, Ruskin, and Toynbee and of those mighty forces of conscience which spoke in their words and gave to us Germans, and will give us yet, so much that is great. Think in sorrow of the mighty nation that could be so alienated from those noble men; but believe also that great traditions can never perish, and do not forget that a people with such gifts should be honoured even in its degradation."

And now, a striking passage as to the supposed cause of this supposed degradation:—

"And let us be no pharisees! It is owing to her colonial empire that England has sunk so low; it is through her rule of lower and less civilised peoples, and all the fearful temptations such a power carries with it.[1] Should we ourselves have

[1] Editorial Note.—Welcome as are the signs of rightmindedness shown by Dr Förster in other passages quoted, this statement goes far to spoil the impression. Dr Förster evidently dreads the effect on his countrymen of ruling conquered races; and well he may, with his eye on Schleswig-Holstein, Poland, and Belgium; to say nothing of the German colonies. In all these instances the method employed is precisely that which "degrades" a conquering race; for its principle is to recognise only the culture of the conqueror and stamp out that of the conquered. But this is not the method by which the British Empire has been founded and is being maintained to-day. The Empire with its population of four hundred millions contains races in every stage of culture from the highest to the lowest, and the problem of holding all these together in a single society and under a single rule has at least taught the British the lesson of conceding rights to cultures and civilisations other and possibly lower than their own. Had not that principle been followed the British Empire would never have been in existence; nor would it last for a day if the principle, which we are fighting to maintain, were abandoned. Had Germany, on the other hand, learnt the same lesson she might be free at this moment from the most "degrading" of all her vices, which is national egotism. In short, the passage here quoted from Dr Förster states the precise contrary of the truth, and is only another instance of that profound ignorance of the British Empire which has already led his countrymen into so many disastrous mistakes. At other points Dr Förster seems to be exceptionally free from the national vice aforesaid; his error at this point is therefore the more inexcusable.

been proof against such temptations? The *Investors' Review* calls the imperial degradation of England 'Africa's revenge.' Let us draw from that a solemn warning for our own future colonial empire!"

With regard to the effects of the war upon the national conscience, our author seems to alter his position as he proceeds. At the beginning he is full of that kind of hot idealism of war which seems to be peculiar to Germans, and which constitutes their chief menace to civilisation. He speaks sometimes as though life existed for the sake of sacrifice, and as though the sacrificing of life more than made up for the taking of it. But later he asserts roundly that war is opposed to Christianity: "Christianity must not be swallowed up in the war-spirit. Much has been said on this point in the last few months in an unchristian spirit, and the divine truth has been betrayed to temporal interests and passions. Christ stands against war and above war. He who loses sight of this truth slays that deep conscience of civilisation which is meant to goad us unceasingly on to allay this fury of war. We know well that if we were Christians there would be no war."

Then follows a passionate outbreak against the German jingoes:

"People who have neither suffered nor sacrificed anything, who have seen nothing of the nobility and suffering of the enemy, but who want to swallow and exploit the German victory—weak creatures whose egotism our new mortars have inspired to thunder enormously, so that they think they must open their mouths forty-two centimetres wide, and that he who will not do that is no patriot. We hear them already here and there raising their voices, mostly anonymously—cowards, who belittle all clemency and humanity towards the enemy, and send into the hospitals to denounce all acts of kindness to wounded prisoners. These are the elements that have always made the German name hateful abroad, these are the last and most dangerous foes of our country.

To conquer and silence them must be your first task, young men of the new Germany; you who have been purified by sacrifice and suffering. For what would it profit our people if it gained the whole world and lost its own soul?"

Finally, Dr Förster protests against the excesses of nationalism and ranges himself with those profounder minds of all countries who see that in internationalism lies the only hope of civilisation:

"The national principle has had a disastrously destructive effect on world-civilisation. True, the nation is an invaluable aid and force for civilisation, and it was undoubtedly a necessary phase that great national unities should find themselves, discover their right, join together in their own way, and become conscious of their peculiar mission. But all this is worthless, it destroys itself, annihilates the whole sum of civilisation, if these national unities do not perceive that a wider phase must follow—the re-establishment of true co-operation between the different races. What Goethe said of the selfish man, 'He secretly destroys his own worth by unsatisfying selfishness,' applies also to the nation that turns about itself as centre. In our new task of civilisation the national principle must begin at last a great constructive world-policy. Otherwise there will ensue a fresh, even greater, world-conflagration, in which civilisation will be annihilated. Humanity has reached a point at which mutual completion, co-operation, education, of the nations is essential. No nation can solve its own problems without the aid of the traditions of foreign nations. France needs Germany, and Germany France. Germany needs the spirit of the Slavs, and the Slavs need that of Germany. England needs Germany, and Germany England. We may indeed say that the deterioration of England is due primarily to her isolation. The individual nations are no less necessary to one another for their spiritual completion than are the two sexes. Without such higher companionship both nations and souls must be ruined by their own onesidedness. In the union of races will the universal Christ be born in

us. We Germans must be the bearers and guardians of the future United States of Europe. That alone corresponds to our great traditions. Let us discard the foolish imitation of foreigners in superficialities, let us preserve our character and old German style—but let us make ourselves the centre of a deep mutual education of the nations."

These extracts will serve to give some idea of the contents of this popular tract. There are in it many statements and assumptions which an Englishman cannot accept, many omissions of what he regards as essential points—for instance, there is no reference to Belgium,[1]—and much in the tone and manner which is distasteful to our less romantic temperament and more sober intellect. Nevertheless, a candid reader, who may have been swept off his balance by the events of the war, will recognise that it is not a nation of "barbarians" that the author represents.

G. LOWES DICKINSON.

CAMBRIDGE.

[1] The sinking of the *Lusitania* occurred after the pamphlet was published.

AN AMERICAN THINKER ON THE WAR.[1]

Professor ROYCE.

In my last letter I believe that I laid some stress to you upon the necessity, both patriotic and academic, of my trying to preserve a formally strict neutrality of expression, not merely because the community of mankind as a total community is my highest interest, as it is yours, but because our President's advice to the nation, and our manifold relations to foreigners, both in academic life and in the world at large, limit our right, or have limited our right, to express ourselves regarding matters of the war and of current controversy. It is now a relief to be able to say with heartiness, that one result at least of the *Lusitania* atrocity has been and will be to make it both necessary and advisable to speak out plainly many things which an American professor in my position has long felt a desire to say upon occasions when he still supposed it to be his duty not to say them. Thus, for instance, immediately after the *Lusitania* incident, and before Wilson's first letter, addressed to Berlin, I quite deliberately told my own principal class in metaphysics that, and why, I should no longer endeavour to assume a neutral attitude about the moral questions which the *Lusitania*

[1] The title is the Editor's. The text consists of the relevant extracts from a letter written by Professor Royce to the Editor, permission for the publication of which is given on p. 41. With the exception of two passages (in the first paragraph on p. 40 and the end of the last paragraph), the extracts were published in the London *Morning Post* of July 5, 1915.

It will be noted that whereas Dr Förster's pamphlet, discussed by Mr Lowes Dickinson in the preceding article, was written *before* the sinking of the *Lusitania*, Professor Royce writes *after* that event.—Editor.

incident brought to the minds of all of us. That friends of mine, and that former pupils of mine, near to me as the students whom I was addressing are near to me, were on the *Lusitania*—this, as I said to my class, made it right for me to say, "Among these dead of the *Lusitania* are my own dead." And so, I went on to say, "I cannot longer leave you to suppose it possible that I have any agreement with the views which a German colleague of mine, a teacher at Harvard, recently maintained, when he predicted what he called 'the spiritual triumph of Germany.' It makes very little difference to anybody else what I happen to think, but to you, as my pupils, it is my duty to say that henceforth, whatever the fortunes of war may be, 'the spiritual triumph of Germany' is quite impossible, so far as this conflict is concerned. I freely admit that Germany may triumph in the visible conflict, although my judgment about such matters is quite worthless. But to my German friends and colleagues, if they chance to want to know what I think, I can and do henceforth only say this: 'You may triumph in the visible world, but at the banquet where you celebrate your triumph there will be present the ghosts of my dead slain on the *Lusitania*.'"

I insisted to my class that just now the especially significant side of this matter is contained simply in the deliberately chosen facts which the enemy of mankind has chosen to bring into being in these newest expressions of the infamies of Prussian warfare. I should be a poor professor of philosophy, and in particular of moral philosophy, if I left my class in the least doubt as to how to view such things. And that, then, was my immediate reaction on the *Lusitania* situation.

Of course, one still has to live with his German colleagues in the midst of this situation. I am glad to know at least one such German colleague—and, I believe, a thoroughly good patriot—who views the *Lusitania* atrocity precisely as any honest and humane man must view it, unless wholly blinded by the present personal and social atmosphere of

ferocity and confusion in which so many Germans live. I do not endeavour to have unnecessary controversy with these colleagues, or with anybody else, and have spoken of the matter both to colleagues and to students precisely as much and as little as the situation seemed to me to permit and require. But it might interest you to know that, in my opinion, the *Lusitania* incident has affected and will affect our national sentiment—and what has been our desire for a genuine neutrality—in a very profound and practical way.

Of the political consequences of the incident up to this date, you will have, I hope, a sufficiently definite ground for judgment. Fortune is fickle; and war is a sadly chaotic series of changes. But this I warmly hope: henceforth may the genuine consciousness of brotherhood between your people and mine become more and more clearly warm, and conscious, and practically effective upon the course of events. The *Lusitania* affair makes us here, all of us, clearer. A deeply unified and national indignation, coupled with a strong sense of our duty towards all humanity, has already resulted from this new experiment upon human nature, which has been "made in Germany," and then applied to the task of testing what American sentiment really is. I do not know how often the changing fortunes of war, or the difficulties about neutral commerce, will bring to light causes of friction or of tension between our two peoples. But I cordially hope that we shall find ourselves, henceforth, nearer and nearer together in conscious sentiment and in the sort of sympathy which can find effective expression. It is a great thing to feel that Wilson, in his last two notes to Germany, has been speaking the word both for his nation and for all humanity. I am sure that he has spoken the word for a new sort of unification of our own national consciousness. Unless Germany substantially meets these demands, I am sure that she will find all our foreign populations more united than ever through their common resentment in the presence of international outrages, and through their common consciousness that our unity and

active co-operation must have an important bearing upon the future of all that makes human life precious to any of us. In so far as our German-American fellow-citizens fail to appreciate the call of humanity in respect of such matters as this, they have further lessons to learn which America will teach them,—peaceably if we can, but authoritatively if we must, whenever an effort is made to carry dissensions into our national life for the sake of any German purpose. As a fact, I believe that unless Germany meets the essential demands of President Wilson, our German-American population will be wholly united with us, as never before, in the interests of humanity and of freedom. In brief, the *Lusitania* affair, and its consequences, give one further tiny example of that utter ignorance of human nature and of its workings which the German propaganda, the German diplomacy, and the German policy have shown from the outset of the war. Submarines these people may understand, certainly not souls.

I do not love the words of hate, even now, or even when uttered over the bodies of those who were slain on the *Lusitania*. It is not hate, but longing and sorrow for stricken humanity, which is with me, as I am sure it is with you, the ruling sentiment. I have no fondness for useless publicity. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the words which I have just written down may not only have a little friendly interest to you as expressing a certain change in my own attitude towards those problems about neutrality which I mentioned to you before, but may conceivably suggest to you some way in which a more public expression of mine might be of real service to some cause which you, or which other of my English friends, hold dear. The controversial literature of the war is, as you know, and as you yourself have said, a cup which seems to be overfull. Yet I now no longer feel that any duty or desire makes me hesitant concerning the expression of whatever plain speech and worthily strong sentiment might be able to contribute to a good cause. You will see from the way in which I spoke to my class, after long

dutifully preserving a deliberate reticence in the classroom regarding the war,—you will see that my mouth is now open enough, if only any words that could be of use for the cause of true peace, or against the deeds and the motives of the declared enemies of mankind, could be uttered by me. It is a relief to have in such matters not only a free soul, but a perfectly free right of speech, so long as one's speech promises to contribute anything, however little, to the cause of mankind which such bitter and cruel enemies are now assailing in the sight of us all. So do with this letter, or with any part of it, precisely as you think best,—not indeed making it seem as if I were at all fond of notoriety, but merely using the right which I give you as my friend to let anybody know where I stand. I am no longer neutral, even in form. The German Prince is now the declared and proclaimed enemy of mankind, declared to be such not by any "lies" of his enemies, or by any "envious" comments of other people, but by his own quite deliberate choice to carry on war by the merciless destruction of innocent, non-combatant passengers. The single deed is indeed only a comparatively petty event when compared with the stupendous crimes which fill this war. But the sinking of the *Lusitania* has the advantage of being a deed which not only cannot be denied, but which has been proudly proclaimed as expressing the appeal that Germany now makes to all humanity. About that appeal I am not neutral. I know that that appeal expresses utter contempt for everything which makes the common life of humanity tolerable or possible. I know that if the principle of that appeal is accepted, whatever makes home or country or family or friends, or any form of loyalty, worthily dear, is made an object of a perfectly deliberate and merciless assault. About such policies and their principles, about such appeals, and about the Prince who makes them, and about his underlings who serve him, I have no longer any neutrality to keep. And without the faintest authority in any political matter, without the faintest wish for any sort of notoriety, I am

perfectly willing to let this utterance receive any sort of publicity that, in its utter unworthiness to express adequately or effectively the nature of the crimes and of the infamy which it attempts to characterise, it may by chance get, should you or anybody else wish to make use of it. Of course, I need not tell you that a Harvard professor speaks only for himself, and commits none of his colleagues to anything that chances to be in his mind or on his tongue.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE WARFARE OF MORAL IDEALS.

PROFESSOR E. B. M'GILVARY,
University of Wisconsin.

Is there some indubitable and invariable standard which determines at all times and in all places what is right and what is wrong? Is morality something eternal and immutable, and can we assume that every intelligent man needs only to have the right pointed out to him to secure his acquiescence in it as right, in much the same way as intelligent children need only to have their attention called to simpler number relations embodied in concrete instances to make doubt of the truth of the multiplication table impossible? The history of ethics has been largely that of attempts to set forth some incontrovertible principle or principles which must be used to decide in the individual case what is moral and what is immoral. The number of these alleged principles has been great, and it would be impossible to give ofthand a complete enumeration of them. Ranging all the way from Paley's notorious dictum that virtue is "the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness"—how this must have thrilled some of his readers as the definitive definition!—to Kant's "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law," we find almost every conceivable way tried of justifying moral judgments and moral conduct. Whatever differences there may have been in what was found, there was seldom any doubt or disagreement in

what was sought: the quest was for demonstrable certainty. One writer has exactly expressed the prevailing spirit of ethical inquiry when he says: "What the moralist wants is such a distinction between right and wrong as does not depend on any mere accident of reality, even upon the accidental existence of a moral sense. He wants to find the eternal ethical truth. We must insist then that one of the first questions of the moralist must be, *why conscience in any given case is right.* Or, to put the case otherwise, ethical doctrine must tell us why, if the devil's conscience approves of the devil's acts, as well it may do, the devil's conscience is nevertheless in the wrong." The devils, forsooth, must be made to believe—and tremble!

It would seem that where so many principles are put forward, each alleged to be beyond peradventure, but each conflicting with the others, the natural conclusion should be that there are no infallible principles, and that morality is relative. This conclusion would doubtless have been more frequently drawn had not Fear stood in the way—fear that the relativity of morality would prove the death of morality, or at least its hopeless debilitation. "If there is nothing good or bad but thinking makes it so—why! thinking as we jolly-well-please, let us eat, drink, and be merry, and gaily let morality go hang." This is the invariable retort made to the suggestion that morality is not immutable and eternal.

There is still another motive, allied to Fear, that has blocked the path to the acceptance of the relativity of morality. A spokesman of ethical orthodoxy — the same spokesman already quoted—has expressed it: "A minor power for good is not enough. It will not suffice that one bit of reality fights for our moral needs while another bit of reality fights against them, unless we can in some way harmonise these conflicting aspects, or unless we can show that they that be with us are not only more important or more significant than they that be against us, but are really the deepest truth of things. Else we shall be left face to face with a gloomy world of conflict, where good and bad are mingled in hopeless confusion." This writer,

like many another man, wants, before committing himself to a battle for his ideals, to know that the universe is with him. He would prefer not to play an uncertain game. He calls for loaded dice, for stacked cards. Unless he holds the trumps he does not relish the idea of letting the game go on. "Let us throw the cards on the table and have a new deal."

William James, the gallant adventurer in all new enterprises of the spirit, felt and recognised the occasional force of this appeal. There are times when in our conflict for our ideals we grow weary. Flesh and blood cannot stand the strain of unintermittent struggle; some time we must lay our weapons aside and take a rest. At such times it is a comfort to know that our temporary withdrawal does not give the enemy an advantage. It is necessary, if we are to rest in peace, that we should be assured that the fight is going on and that our cause is being pushed to victory. An absolute ideal which condemns the wrong even when our vocal cords are too weak to echo its judgment, stands guard over the cause in which we are enlisted; a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness gives us the privilege of a "moral holiday." The Absolute is the warrior's lullaby, the hum of assurance in the ears of the exhausted man that He that keepeth Israel shall neither slumber nor sleep.

The problem of this paper is not to disprove the absoluteness of morality. It is a very wise man—or a fool—who *knows* that there is no Absolute. Most of us can do no more than wonder with varying degrees of credulity or incredulity, of interest or indifference. We are not certain. But we must act. Is the only way open to the man of action the way of "The Will to Believe"? Must we cry, "Lord, I believe, help thou my unbelief"? I shall try to show that, however it may be with the Absolute and his standards, we mortals, having no natural access thereunto, can make right and wrong out of such materials as are at our disposal and can very well make shift with the result. But before we take up this problem, let us examine the motives that, as we have seen,

have stood in the way of the acceptance of the relativity of morality, and see whether they are definitive.

The fear that morality would be compromised by a recognition of its relativity is groundless—unless morality be something disconnected with our interests. It is usually assumed in such reasonings as are urged against ethical relativism, that no one can be enthusiastically interested in a cause unless he be convinced that it is a cause that appeals to all men—at least to all reasonable men. This assumption is directly opposed to all experience. Fighting for a cause against those who fail to recognise its value often gives added value to it—witness the present conflict! Championship in the face of opposition may enhance the charm of that for which we battle. The knowledge that our efforts are needed to make the cause prevail may add to our loyalty. If we really have ideals, the fact that these ideals are not shared by all, and the fact that they are attacked and endangered, may make us rally with greater zest to their defence. Opposition whets the edge of fealty in most human affairs. Why should morality be the sole exception? Of course, it is a fact that devotion may breed the illusion that the object of devotion is intrinsically precious; but it is perverse to explain the devotion by the illusion rather than the illusion by the devotion. What we want with our whole heart assumes for us by a sympathetic fallacy a cosmic importance; what we long for is likewise the World's Desire. But it is not because the red rose cries and the white rose weeps, the larkspur listens and the lily whispers, that Maud is the lover's dove and dear and life and fate. So when one asks, as our aforequoted orthodoxologist asks: "To the unsympathetic man, how shall you demonstrate the ideals you found upon the feeling of sympathy?" he should be answered Yankeewise by the question: "How to the unenamoured man shall you demonstrate the charm and beauty that you found upon your feeling of love?" Suppose that, foolishly, you wished to arouse the same passion in another man's breast that you feel in your own, what would

you do? You would tell off the qualities that fascinate you; if they left him unresponsive, little would it boot to search for some intellectually self-evident premise upon which you could rear a syllogism whose conclusion should be amorous rapture.

An ideal is not a cold idea; it is heated in the flame of passion, else it were no *ideal.* It is what we yearn for, not what we passively contemplate. A moral ideal is a glowing vision of conduct and of social life, such as we burn to see realised. It is our ardour for it that converts it from what it would otherwise be, an idle reverie, into a dynamic force. There is no more danger for my moral ideal—provided it be my *ideal*—in the recognition that it is *my* ideal, than there is jeopardy for my love in the knowledge that if I had Mr Robinson's nervous system I should love Mr Robinson's wife instead of loving my own. It so happens that my nervous system is my own and not Mr Robinson's, and therefore the relativity of my love is not relativity to nothing in particular, but a relativity that ties it down hard and fast to given fact. People argue about relativity as if relativity were something up in the air; as if to be in relation were not precisely to be in some definite relation to some definite thing. The fact that the New York Subways would be valueless in Manunkachunk or Sun Prairie does not make them the less valuable in New York. So the fact that our moral ideals would not fit the primitive conditions in Australia does not make them any the less compelling or the less enticing to *us*, being what we are and where we are.

As to the uncertainty of the realisation of our ideals, a hint has already been given as to what seems the proper attitude to take toward this objection. It is cowardly not to make an effort to get what we want, if the failure is due merely to the fact that we are not sure of success. When human nature shall have lost its venturesomeness, when only certainties attract and all uncertainties leave us unnerved, then indeed it will be time to fear a view that makes the realisation of our moral ideals problematic. Meanwhile, there is zest in the very

fact that something precious is at stake and may be lost or won. The objects most eagerly worked for, the games most strenuously contested, the wars most bitterly fought, are those in the balance. All we need is *not* to know that the end is unattainable, and to believe that there is a chance for success. Fighting for an ideal is subject to all the hazards of war: we may win or we may lose; but if the thing is worth fighting for, it surely does not lose its value just because we are not sure of getting it. Let us take the spirit of adventure into our moral life. In our quest for the moral ideal it may be that the gulfs will wash us down; it *may be* we shall touch the Happy Isles; but the uncertainty should not mar the temper of heroic hearts.

But here again Nature is generous to us. She does not ask us to venture for those causes alone that are sure to prevail; but she often does grant us the comfort of believing, when we have hoisted sail and reached the deep, that our quest will reach the goal. The certainty comes from our committing ourselves; we are not called upon to commit ourselves because we are certain. It is not logic and reason that bring conviction here; it is action and enthusiasm. This assurance will have no scientifically evidentiary value; it is merely Nature's earnest to the earnest. If the pledge is to be redeemed, it is we who must exact the redemption.

Having thus put our moral ideals on a par with our other preferences so far as their source[1] and their outcome are concerned, having made them spring from our likes and dislikes and depend for their achievement upon our efforts, we have now to consider the problem of the conflict among moral ideals and the methods by which this conflict is resolved. The title of this paper indicates the answer we shall give to this problem. The adjudication of differences here is not made by appeal to some *a priori* canon; it is the result of

[1] There is another source for moral ideals—some of our ideals are not autonomous, and perhaps for most men most ideals are not so. But into this matter we cannot enter here.

an actual fight eventuating in victory of one ideal over another. Where the appearances point to a contrary conclusion, the standard by which the difference is settled is itself one that has come to be accepted after being in dispute. This can be seen in concrete instances. In civilised countries there is now general acceptance of the principle that with certain limitations private revenge is immoral. Lynch law and the vendetta are regarded with wellnigh universal detestation, except when mob passions are burning hot or where isolated communities have succeeded in maintaining as survivals what have long ago become obsolete in the wider field of common practice. An historical study of the gradual elimination of the blood-feud gives something more than colour to the view propounded by Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic* that justice is the interest of the stronger. In ancient Palestine and in modern England, to mention only two cases, we can trace the process by which governmental punishment of crime was substituted for the older practice of clan revenge. When the government first took the control of criminal law into its own hands public sentiment was against the usurpation. The clan system had been in vogue for countless generations, and what thus had the sanction of immemorial usage was naturally regarded as just and moral. The encroachments of the Crown were resented as unwarranted interference, and a struggle was precipitated as soon as the centralised power undertook to administer what had always been in the hands of the smaller social units. It was the strength of the Crown as compared with the growing weakness of the clan that gave victory to the principle of State control. The will of the stronger formed the basis of the new justice. In the course of time the sentiments of the community became adjusted to the new order of things, ideas of what was right were moulded upon the practice which had come to prevail, and what a short time before was fought as an intolerable infringement is now regarded by most people as a self-evidencing right.

In this struggle, of course, economic conditions played a most prominent part; but it must be remembered that the part they played was the part of a might—they lent their weight to turn the scales in favour of the Crown. It was victory of the Crown, by whatever means gained, and with whatever allies, that resulted in the newer conception of justice in criminal law. The matter was not decided by appeal to the abstract principle that contending parties are by their very interests not fit to pass upon the points in dispute, and that only an impartial tribunal can render the true decision. The tribunal, not always impartial, was first established and maintained by force, and the abstract principle was literally an abstraction from accomplished fact.

Any number of instances could be recited to point the same moral. In the American Civil War one of the issues was slavery. The two parties to the conflict had sprung from the same racial stock; they had much the same traditions behind them; they shared a common heritage of European and Christian ideals. But they differed in certain political and economic practices, and the prevalence of these practices gave rise to divergent ideals in the matter then at issue. From the same Bible the North and South drew different conclusions; the reason was there was always a suppressed uncanonical premise—inspired indeed, but with an inspiration not of God but of gold. The conflict was at bottom then a conflict between different desires springing from different conditions of life. It is often said that this conflict settled the question of slavery for all time. At any rate it settled the question of one kind of slavery for our time and in our country. But this settlement, be it noted, was by force of arms. Slavery was proved to be wrong because its advocates did not prove to be strong. Might made right.

The doctrine that might is right is often regarded as a thoroughly immoral doctrine, a pernicious perversity of view, a damnable heresy. And so it is if taken in a narrow sense. The triumph of a cause by force of arms does not decide the

issue of rightness immediately. It did not with the generation of slave-holders in the South. The defeated party, though cast down, did not straightway bow to the justice of the decision. But time completed the work which military victory began. The ideals of the victors gradually became the ideals of the defeated, and before two generations have passed many of the very descendants of those who were loudest in asserting the right of the eventually doomed cause look back upon the conflict as one for a mistaken principle. It is so regarded because the defeat established a new order of things, and to this established order the sentiments have gradually adjusted themselves. The sons of those who fought the Union in the early sixties were found fighting most loyally for the Union before the close of the century. The slavery which had been regarded as an institution ordained of God came to be looked upon with critical eye as condemned of God; and many of the children of those who gave their blood to defend it now look upon that blood as nobly offered in a wrong service.

The adjustments of sentiments and emotions to what has become the established order is one of the most powerful factors in moral history. Mohammedanism fought its way into Africa by the sword. In a few generations it flourished there by the devoted acceptance of those who sprang from its deadliest enemies. Tradition as well as trade follows the flag. This is what gives extreme significance to the world's greatest battles. Had the Persians won at Marathon or the Turks at Lepanto and Vienna, and had they followed up their victory, the moral history of Europe, with its accompanying *ideals*, would have been incalculably different. Might long enough continued wins recognition as right, until overthrown by a greater might meanwhile gathering strength. If we, looking back upon the course of history, decline to acknowledge that in any particular case might was right, it is because another might *has* meanwhile arisen and brought our sentiments into accord with its sway; and from the point of view of the new

ideals that have thus triumphed we condemn what was once victorious. Naturally we use our own ideals in our judgments; but we are likely to forget that these ideals are in great measure the outcome of just the kind of victory which in the case we condemn we deplore as the triumph of might over right. Such a judgment is nothing but the shadow of a new might cast back over what formerly stood bathed in the light of another ideal.

Between the older and the newer right who is to decide? The decision *now* is *ours*, and of course we make it in the only way we can, with our standards to control it. But we should not mistake our decision for the utterance of eternal and immutable truth. Having our ideals, however we came by them, we properly use them for what they are, as sources of standards not only for our conduct but also for our judgments. What diverges from our standards is wrong—when measured by these standards; and it is false modesty not to insist on our standards because forsooth there are other standards which have the same footing in the world as ours. Different moral standards, being what they are, namely, dynamic principles, are of course in conflict. It is as unreasonable to demand in the name of theoretical unity or of tolerance that one of them shall fail to energise, as it would be absurd to ask that gravitation should decline to pull upon a marble block which is rising to its place in the dome of a Capitol. If the issue between moral ideals is to be decided *by the issue*, why should one ideal politely, nay ignominiously, withdraw from the scene of conflict? And who is to fight for *my* ideals but myself and those who share them with me? The very recognition that might makes right should hearten us to fight with might and main for our ideals and thus make them right. If we fail to champion what we love, our cause is doomed, and some other ideal will prevail. Hegel's dictum, *Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*, is no cold-blooded statement of fatalistic fact; it is to any man with backbone and red blood a challenge to make history, that little history that lies within

his reach, so as to have the world-verdict handed down in his favour.

If after having fought our good fight we lose, we shall be tempted to complain:

> "I found Him in the shining of the stars,
> I mark'd Him in the flowering of His fields,
> But in His ways with men I find Him not.
> I waged His wars, and now I pass and die."

Happy shall we be if before the end we have the grace to see:

> "The old order changeth, yielding place to new,
> And God fulfils Himself in many ways,
> Lest one good custom should corrupt the world.
> . . . . . .
> For so the whole round earth is every way
> Bound by gold chains about the feet of God."

Every way—the way of might as well as the way of gentleness—the way of defeat as well as the way of victory.

This leads me to correct the one-sidedness of my previous statements. Heretofore I have argued as if the only might that counts is the might of the sword and of the forty-two centimetre gun; as if God were only on the side of the heavy battalions. But the weapons of the moral warfare are not all carnal, carnal though many of them assuredly are. In the moral armoury we find along with material instruments tools of another temper. Every virile moral judgment is itself such a weapon. When we condemn an alien ideal or an act which embodies such an ideal, we are not merely stating an objective variance between two ideals, or between an ideal and an act. We are using powerful insidious means of gaining victory for our own ideal. It is true that praise and blame are not first uttered with self-conscious intention to defeat an opposing ideal; but neither are tooth and claw first used with self-conscious intention to rout the foe. We first react instinctively to the situation that confronts us, and only later and by slow degrees do we come to see clearly the relation of means and end. We first eat not to sustain life but because we are hungry. It is only the sophisticated man

who eats to live. Our first loves are not directed to the propagation of an ever-improving race. It is only the eugenist who has achieved as a vision what the sex-instinct has blindly and passionately groped after in the form of act. And so our scoldings and beratings and chidings and lambastings are at the outset unenlightened expressions of instinctive anger and hate, nature's offensive weapons. It is the deterministic moralist who comes to see that moral disapprobation and censure and reprimand are means to be used for the protection of one's ideal and the annihilation of their rivals. Moral indignation is chastened anger, moral blame is chastened scolding, and moral vengeance is chastened vindictiveness; just as moral love is chastened sexuality subdued to the useful and the good, and ennobled by the vision of larger and more comprehensive ends.

Regarded thus, not as *ex post facto* pronouncements presupposing the indetermination of the culprits' acts but as directed to the determination of their future conduct and that of others, blame is seen to be a weapon used in the warfare of moral ideals. I attack opposing ideals by condemning them. I seek by expressing my disgust to produce similar disgust in others; I show myself nauseated, so that by the contagion of nausea others shall spue out the abomination. The moral ideals that have conquered in the course of history have had at their service a full equipment of such implements. Read the Hebrew prophets and note how effectively they wielded the lashing tongue. One of them succinctly summarised the mission of his order in these words: "However, I sent unto you all my servants the prophets, rising early, and sending them, saying, Oh, do not this abominable thing that I hate." Saul of Tarsus, protagonist of a moral ideal which has been one of the most potent forces of history, well understood the power of this weapon. How did he treat the now unnamable practices which many of the best Greeks and Romans looked upon not only as innocent but as highly praiseworthy? His method was disgust: he aroused

æsthetic repugnance. Mark his vocabulary: "Uncleanness," "vile affections," "a reprobate mind," "professing themselves to be wise they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." The author of the Revelation of St John the Divine adopted the same means against the same enemy: "So hast thou also them that hold the doctrine of the Nicolaitanes, which thing I hate." It is he from whom I just borrowed the metaphor which is rather an almost literal description of moral condemnation: "So then because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will spue thee out of my mouth." It was not by reasoning —for the wisdom of this world was to these men foolishness— it was by denunciation and by the *argumentum ad nauseam*— a sanctified Billingsgate—reinforced by "the expulsive power of a new affection," that Christianity waged its relentless war against conduct it abhorred and the world idealised. The terminology of morality is and always has been and always must be unlike the impartial terminology of objective science. The word thief, for instance, does not simply connote the taking of another man's property without his knowledge and consent. It stirs up all the age-long passions that centre about the institution of property and hallow it. The moral judgment injects poison into the winged words it lets fly. It does not describe—it damns.

Another blade used in moral warfare is punishment, forged of an alloy of condemnation and force. Antagonistic emotion there must be if punishment is a moral reaction. Punishment administered without emotion is a purely mechanical process, similar to the digging of weeds out of a garden, the use of disinfectants, or the employment of a stomach-pump. What distinguishes or should distinguish punishment, or the damaging treatment of the morally responsible offender, from the treatment of the irresponsible, is just this element of passion directed against one who is believed to be practically *responsive* to the emotions of his fellows. We do not—or should not—

punish the kleptomaniac. Why? Because the passion of taking another's goods is so strong in him that it cannot be overcome by considerations of what may be done to him or felt against him in consequence of his act. If he is not responsive to our indignant reaction, such indignation should be withheld in just the same way in which, when we have arrived at years of self-inhibition, we decline to rage against a stone that has caused us to stumble or a door into which we have run in the dark. Such rage, we have learned, does no good, and we have learned to call it foolish. In the case of the normally responsive man, on the other hand, society's displeasure is a mighty preventive, and that society is mawkishly sentimental which declines to make use of this effective weapon. The judge and the jury, in trying the case, are agents of society in seeking to discover impartially what has been done. In pronouncing a sentence, however, the judge is no longer the representative of the inquisitive instincts of society—he is not only the representative of society in determining what shall be done to the convict on the basis of the findings of fact: he is also the mouthpiece of society in expressing abhorrence of the crime committed and of the criminal.

I shall probably be accused of pressing analogies too far when I now pass to the consideration of another instrumentality used in moral warfare. But all war is struggle for ideals, and when this is recognised, what may otherwise be regarded as superficial resemblance will come to be seen as fundamental affinities between species of the same genus. Moral praise, and rewards of a more material kind than praise, are comparable to honourable mention, to the Victoria or the Iron Cross, or to a dukedom with estates conferred upon some successful commander. In war it is not only necessary to disable the enemy, but also to keep up the spirits of one's own forces; and the prospect of glory is recognisedly one of the most effective incentives to deeds of heroism. No less effective in moral warfare than in national conflicts is the desire for glory. Every conquering moral ideal has made use of this motive. "He

that is slow to anger is better than the mighty, and he that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh a city." "Ye which have followed me, in the regeneration when the Son of Man shall sit on the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel." In moral education we are constantly using praise and reward, if not directly given to the one whom we wish to encourage, then indirectly by lauding those whom we hold up as examples, thus suggesting that those who follow in the footsteps of these worthies may expect the same meed of honour. But the strait-laced theorist strangely enough insists that love of praise is not a moral motive. Any motive is a moral motive that supports a moral ideal, and the soldier of the moral ideal who refuses to use all the weapons that make for victory is as stupid as a general who should decline to appeal to his men in the name of glory, insisting that devotion to the cause is the only motive to be tolerated.

The recognition that the confrontation of diverse moral ideals is warfare enables us to understand what at first sight is so puzzling a paradox in moral struggles, namely, the improper employment of physical force by men of otherwise high principles. In this very description of what we find puzzling we are using terms that show our alignment in the struggle; we are not giving expression to impartial judgments. Moral conflicts are actual warfare, and no wonder if those who find the organised might of society arrayed against them resort to extreme methods. The Nihilist of Russia, the Fenian of Ireland, the Kuklux of the South, the militant suffragette, the structural iron worker, the Industrial Worker of the World, and the Syndicalist, all these on occasion use methods we strongly disapprove. The means they adopt, judged by the law of the land or by the ideals of those opposed to them, are viciously immoral. But all these men and women are engaged in a fight, and when met by force they naturally use force in return, and use it not too nicely. I am not justifying the wisdom of their procedure, nor am I expressing my acquiescence in their methods. Our question

is now not one of expediency but of understanding. There are causes that cannot be submitted to arbitration, and what these causes are it is only for their adherents to decide. When a cause has become so precious that its value is felt to be greater than that of the continuance for the time being of the ordinary forms of peaceful intercourse, or of international law, then war is the only arbiter. And such causes may divide not only nation from nation, but also classes from classes within the same nation. Civil war, in the latter case, is the result, often a guerilla war rather than open battle.

How then shall I judge them? There are two answers, both of which must be given if we are to do justice to all the facts. One answer is that these disturbers of the peace, these rebels against the present organisation of society, are justified by their ideals in fighting for their ideals. There is no one ideal that can be used unimpassionedly for the measuring of all others. The ideal expressed in some form of civilised government is only *one* ideal, and when it is used to condemn those who fight against the government, there is a most lamentable *petitio principii.* The ideal of settling disputes by appeal to the ballot or to the court—or to international usage—is just one ideal, and is not the decisive ideal *when it is itself in dispute.* But this is not the sole answer. What is a begging of the question when construed in terms of logic becomes *in practice* a demand that the question be settled in accordance with *our* ideals when the question comes up to *us* for a hearing. While, therefore, we may theoretically admit the right of anyone to fight for his ideals in any way his ideals allow, we as partisans practically must deny this right when his manner of fighting clashes with our ideals. In other words, we do not solve the moral problems, here presented, in an impartial manner: we come to them with a prejudice, a prejudice to which we are just as much entitled as those whom we condemn are entitled to theirs. In our judgments upon violence in labour and suffrage conflicts or upon "frightfulness" in military operations, we take sides. The fiction

that we are impartial is itself one of the means we employ to give victory to our ideal. Having elected our ideal, we seek to hypnotise others against the seductiveness or even the possibility of other ideals by claiming for our ideals the sole right. Herein we are wise—but the wisdom is the wisdom of action. When, however, we seek to see with open eye and to understand with open mind, we should recognise that our noblest impartialities are partialities eulogised. Their nobility is derived by patent from our fundamental preferences; similarly the partialities of others to whom we are opposed hold patents of equal temporary validity. Such patents are merely licences to "make good" against all rivals.

Our view, thus presented, leaves us engaged in a "world of conflict where good and bad *are* mingled in confusion." But the world of conflict is not gloomy to one who has an interest in the struggle, and the confusion is not hopeless. We have indicated some of the agencies which are always at work to secure victory for some ideal, and victory has actually been achieved time and again by successive ideals. If the devil's conscience approves of the devil's acts, as well it may, the question for us is whether we shall let the devil's conscience become *our* standard. And as for the devil himself, first we must defeat him, and then, if he has the adaptability he is rightly credited with, his case may not be desperate. Moral warfare, as also national warfare—witness again the present conflict—is always a struggle between God and devil; but which is God and which the devil can be answered only by the touchstone of our own ideals. Your God may be my devil; the Kaiser's God is Sir Edward's devil, and Sir Edward's is the Kaiser's. Prior to trying the spirits whether they be of God, we have first to choose which God we shall serve. God is, in fact, the title of homage and fealty we apply to the personification, whether real or imaginary, that embodies for us what is morally most precious. God is the Lord whom *we* have elected to serve; the devil is the devil because he is His enemy and ours. This explains the present dismember-

ment of God among the present nations of Europe. Only a decisive and overwhelming victory of one side can accomplish the task of Isis for this Osiris.

We shall close our discussion by glancing at the bearing of our view upon the question of moral progress. Such a theory as we have been upholding recognises change, but does it give the basis for any recognition of progress? Is it true that progress is, as Bernard Shaw maintains, an illusion? Are we on a higher plane of morality than our forefathers? Have we been moving forward in the meantime, or just moving *about*? The answer to this question requires the singling out of some goal, approximation to which or recession from which determines progress or retrogression. As a matter of fact, we all do in our judgments of progress more or less clearly single out some such goal. But the question is whether such a selection is anything more than an expression of our preferences. Has the replacement of the Indian tribes by the white civilisation of America been a step upward or downward? Upward, of course! But upward — *nobis judicibus.* The Indian may judge differently.

Is there then no perfect judgment of all-seeing Jove which shall settle *this* difference. Even if there be, it still remains a matter of preference, Jove's preference instead of ours or the Indian's. If we deliberately confine ourselves to the question whether a larger number of human beings share in a fuller satisfaction as the result of the Indian's displacement, whatever answer we give, that answer will be what on the face of it it purports to be, namely, a statement that a growing number of men do or do not find an increasing satisfaction as the result of the direction taken by history's movement. And it can only be the nature of these men's desires and aversions that finds expression in such satisfaction. To make the matter clearer by another reference, suppose that industrial progress shall one day make possible that a large majority of men live in Sybaritic idleness; suppose that medical science shall by that time have solved the problem of the removal of all

infectious diseases; suppose that the family as we now know it shall then have become obsolete, being replaced by sterilised free-love on the one hand and by state-controlled parentage on the other. Would the attainment of such a state be an achievement of progress or would it be a deplorable retrogression? The majority of the judges contemporary to such a civilisation would undoubtedly call it progress. But *would* it be? There is no doubt that many of the things we now value would have been lost; but suppose the loss were no more felt than we in general feel the loss of the gladiatorial sports that once delighted the Roman populace, not having ourselves been brought up to the habit. Would the loss, unfelt, of our present values, however precious to *us*, counteract the gains appreciated by those who then should have free opportunity of enjoyment along the lines of habits meanwhile established? Such a question admits of no impartial answer. We can answer only in accordance with the standards set by *our* ideals. Those who cherish our institutions because they embody what they hold dear must unreservedly say that any civilisation that comes to be built upon the wreck of these institutions would for them be a lapse from a higher state. There would be a sorry exchange of spirituality for sensuality. But the children of that supposed generation would give a different rating of the direction that had led to what they should find good. Spirituality and sensuality are names given to different things at different times and places. The exercise of what at any time are regarded as the higher functions of man is for that time spirituality, provided that exercise be controlled by the highest accepted standards; the exercise of the lower functions is sensuality. With changing evaluations of the higher and the lower, there would come about a "transvaluation" of the spiritual and the sensual. A notable instance of such a change is seen in the spread of the ascetic ideal in the early centuries of our era, resulting in the disparagement of marriage as an unholy state.

But suppose we forestall such a "weak-kneed" defence of

our present ideals by saying with Stuart Mill that it is better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. Would not this end discussion by making the quality of pleasure the ultimate criterion? Alas, not. It is better to be a Socrates unsatisfied—better for whom? For Socrates or for the pig? But a pig! Who would be a pig? Is he not loathly? Assuredly he is—*to us;* but *to himself* not so assuredly. Who knows what preciousness there may not be to pigs in unadulterated piggery? Who then shall decide? To what arbiter shall we appeal?

It is strange that when such a question is asked, it is overlooked that it is not thrown out to the universe in general. It is we men and women who are asking the question; we are asking it of ourselves; why not answer it for ourselves? We are not particularly interested in the question whether pigs like to be pigs. It matters not if they do. We are concerned with the question what *we* should like to be, what we should like to help our children to become, what kind of civilisation we shall lend our efforts to build up for the future. The fundamental question to be answered before any question about progress can be answered is the most momentous question in the world for us as moral agents. The question is *what we really want.* This is not a question to be answered lightly. Knowledge of all sorts is of help in answering it, especially knowledge of the consequences of getting what we want. But when all the knowledge is got that can be got, when we have obtained as clear vision as with our human limitations we can obtain, still we shall find ourselves passively contemplating a wan and colourless future unless our desires rise up to seize some envisaged possibility and invest it with the charm of the ideal. That which we prefer above all else when we know all that we can know about it, that for us is best. Movement in the direction of this our enlightened preference is progress; movement away from it is retrogression. To a man with active preferences, progress is not an illusion, because his preferences are indubitable fact. The only illusion

is in supposing that a preference of his own is the universe's choice, that a fact here and now is a revelation of what the universe is at bottom and at all times.

The evolution that has given birth to us men is an evolution upward, because it is we men who are now assessing its value. The moral evolution that has given birth to our ideals has been progress, because it is we with these ideals who are at present the court of last resort. In this asserted humanisation and temporalisation of our judgments of progress we have a fact analogous to the terrestrialisation of judgments of up and down which took place when modern astronomy ousted the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian conception. For Aristotle there was an absolute up and an absolute down; what was above was aboriginally and intrinsically and eternally above—above yesterday, to-day, and forever; above here, there, and everywhere. Students of history know the confusion that the enforced surrender of this view brought about in the world of established thought. It turned everything topsy-turvy. The dialectical arguments pressed against the new view were the outcry of a muddle-headedness caused by practical disorientation. But for all that men did get adjusted to the new view; and when they did they found that they had not lost the practical advantages that went with the old, and that they had gained much from the change. The relativity of the spatially up and the spatially down does not divest us of our sense of direction or of its significance, for our semicircular canals do not have to adjust themselves to the bottom of the universe. The centre of gravity of our little planet is all that they have to keep in mind. We are terrestrial beings, each for a time in a definite place where the direction of gravitation is a definite fact; and from this place we get our bearings. In the same way the mere thought that there are many antipodal ups and downs in moral matters may and undoubtedly will and must introduce confusion. Accustomed as we are to believe that we cannot be right without being eternally and everlastingly right, we argue with impeccable logic to the

conclusion that the denial of absoluteness in moral standards is a denial of morality altogether. But we must not mistake a faultless syllogism for the ascertainment of truth. New facts may give us new premises, and from these new premises we may still defend a vigorous moral thesis. The ever-new fact that every vital moral judgment has to reckon with is the new place in the moral economy which the new judge occupies. Just as the pull of gravitation tells the traveller which way is down and which is up for whatever place he may for the moment occupy, in like manner, but inversely, it is the pull of our system of desires that determines which way is up and which is down in moral movements. Heaven is the vision of fulfilled desire.

The moral to be drawn from the relativity of the moral ideal is an old one. "Keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life." But this moral must be reinterpreted, interpreted not in the spirit of asceticism but of aspiration toward a fullness of life. To keep one's heart with all diligence is to keep the fountains of desire ever flowing. The larger the number of springs that well up within it, the stronger will the current be that finally courses forth. But let the incoming jets become confluent in the central basis, mixing their waters there first; what shall then issue from the common reservoir will be a homogeneous stream. The direction of progress for that stream will not be a matter of doubt; it will be marked out for it by the particular configuration of the land it will have to traverse. As it flows forward it will be joined by other streams from other springs; the mingled waters will with ever more majestic sweep press forward till at last they reach the ocean. But even there there will be no rest: there are currents in the sea as well as in the rivers, and from the sea will be drawn that which is to feed new springs whose turn it will be to keep the ocean full.

EVANDER BRADLEY M'GILVARY.

University of Wisconsin.

FACTS AND QUESTIONS BEFORE US.[1]

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT BRYCE, O.M.

THE year that has passed since the last general meeting of the Academy has been an *Annus Mirabilis*, full of unexpected and terrible events. To most of us it has been also *Annus Deflendus*, a year that has brought private sorrow to nearly every household as well as public sorrow to us all for the calamities in which it has involved the nation and the world. The British Academy has carried on its meetings and public lectures, making no change save one. The Council has this year proposed no foreign men of learning to be elected as Corresponding Fellows, fearing lest the judgment of their merits might be, or might possibly seem to be, influenced by the political relations in which the country stands. No suggestion has come from any quarter that we should deprive of their position as Corresponding Fellows any subjects of those foreign States which are now at war with Britain. The same may be said of our illustrious elder sister the Royal Society. The general feeling has evidently been that the more all learned bodies are kept outside the passions of war the better for them and for the nations. When strife has ended and a period has elapsed long enough to soften the bitterness of feeling which now exists, it will be for learned bodies to try to link up the bonds of personal regard and intellectual co-operation, now unhappily severed, which

[1] Presidential Address delivered on June 30, 1915, to the British Academy. Some portions relating to the affairs of the Academy are omitted.

have in time past served to bind the great peoples to one another.

Many will have felt, and all will admit, the dangers that surround anyone who, influenced by strong emotions and possessing imperfect knowledge, should now commit to print his judgment of the events of the last eleven months. Every one among us must sometimes have had cause to regret, when reading them years afterwards, words which he wrote in the heat of the moment. Time modifies our judgments as it cools our passions. Neither the friendships nor the enmities of nations can last for ever. You remember how Ajax, in the drama of Sophocles, says that he has learnt

> ὅ τ' ἐχθρὸς ἡμῖν ἐς τοσόνδ' ἐχθαρτέος
> ὡς καὶ φιλήσων αὖθις.

It is better that nothing should be said to-day in an address to the Academy which any one of its members, to whatever country he may belong, would feel pain in reading ten or twenty years hence. Newspapers and pamphlets will convey to posterity sufficiently, and even more than sufficiently, the notions and fancies and passions of the moment.

What we may do, not without profit, is to note and to set down in a spirit of detachment the impressions made upon us by the events which our eyes see and watch as they pass into history. Many a pen will for centuries to come be occupied by the events of this year, and endless controversies will arise over them. It is well that whoever has gained from his studies something of an historical sense should in an historical spirit place on record from month to month the impressions he receives. The record will be almost as useful if the impressions should turn out to be erroneous as if they should be confirmed by subsequent events, because what the historian of the future will desire to know is not only what happened but what people believed and thought at the time it was happening. That which is omitted has also its value. Fifty years hence men will be struck by the signifi-

cance of things whose significance was not perceived by contemporary observers, and will seek to know why those observers failed to see or comprehend facts which will then stand out in bold relief.

So let me now try to enumerate briefly what are the facts of the present situation by which we are chiefly impressed—facts that make it novel as well as terrible.

The first fact is the immense width and range of the war. Thucydides observed that men always thought the war they were then engaged in the greatest that had ever befallen. But here we have facts which show how much the present conflict does transcend any seen in previous ages. This might have been foretold twenty years ago, assuming that Russia, Germany, and Britain were involved, seeing how vast are the possessions and claims and ambitions of all three States. Yet the reality goes far beyond every forecast. All the six great European Powers and four lesser Powers are involved. So is the whole extra-European Old World, except China and Persia and the possessions of Holland and Portugal. In the New World it is only the Dominions and Colonies of Britain that are affected—a noteworthy illustration of the severance of the Western hemisphere from the broils of the Eastern.

Secondly. There is the prodigious influence of the war upon neutral nations. This also might have been foreseen as a result of the development of world commerce and the interlockings of world finance. But here too the actual results are transcending expectation.

Thirdly. The changes in the methods and character of war have been far more extensive than in any previous period. It took much more than two centuries from the invention of gunpowder for musketry and artillery to supersede completely archery and defensive armour. The long pike, after having been used for some twenty-five centuries at least, was still in use as late as the Irish Rebellion of 1798, and to a slight extent in the abortive rising of 1848. War, however, is now a totally different thing from what it was in the campaign of

1870–71, or even in the war between Russia and Japan of 1904. Chemistry has changed everything by increasing the range and the power of missiles, while electricity, without the wire, supplies new means of communication not only along battle lines but across hostile territory. Warfare in the air and warfare under the sea were heretofore undreamt of.

Fourthly. The cost of war is greater in proportion to the size of the armies, immensely larger as these armies are, than it ever was before. The ten belligerent European Powers are estimated to be spending now more than ten millions sterling a day. At this rate their total expenditure for twelve months could not be less than 4000 millions, and may be much more. But some competent economists put it at 5000 millions, figures which are hardly more realisable by us than are those which express the distances of the fixed stars.

Fifthly. In each nation the whole body of the people is more fully and more hotly interested in, and united by, this war than by any it ever waged before. During the eighteenth century it was in most countries only the monarch and the ruling class that knew or cared what was happening. The great European conflict that began in 1793 brought a change. But this war is far more intensely national, in the sense that it has roused the feelings of the whole of each people from top to bottom, than any preceding conflict, and it is everywhere waged with a sterner purpose. In this respect we are reminded of the citizen wars of the small city states of ancient Greece and Italy, and of the Italian Middle Ages. There certainly never was a great war less dynastic than the present.

Sixthly. Some grave moral issues have been raised more sharply than before. Is a State above morality? Does the plea of military necessity (of which it is itself the judge) entitle it to disregard the rights of other States? (*Cf.* Thucydides v. 84–113, the case of Melos.)

Seventhly. The predictions that the vast interests involved, the increasing strength of defence as opposed to

attack, and the growth of a general pacific sentiment would avert strife have all proved fallacious. The wisdom of the wise, where is it now? Some twelve years ago Maurice de Bloch, in a book that made a great impression at the time, argued that the growing difficulties of conducting military operations on a very large scale would prove an effective deterrent. More recently an accomplished and persuasive English writer has shown how much more a nation has to lose by war than it can possibly gain even if victory crown its arms. Others have thought that a sense of solidarity among the workers in each industrial country would be strong enough to restrain their Governments from any but a purely defensive war. Others, again, have declared that democracies are essentially peaceful, because the mass of the people pay in their blood, other classes merely in their wealth. I do not say that these arguments are unsound, but the forces they rely upon have not proved strong enough for the occasion. For practical purposes the wisdom of the wise has been brought to naught, because the rulers of the nations have been guided by other motives than those of pure reason.

These observations relate to the palpable facts we have witnessed. Let us turn now to some of the reflections which the facts suggest. It is not easy to express these with that cold detachment at which the historian is bound to aim; but the effort must be made.

On that reflection which rose first to our minds when the war began, and which continues to be the sombre background to every aspect it presents—upon this I will not pause. After more than forty centuries of civilisation and nineteen centuries of Christianity, mankind—in this case more than half mankind—is settling its disputes in the same way as mankind did in the Stone Age. The weapons are more various and more destructive. They are the latest product of highly developed science. But the spirit and the result are the same.

There has never been a time in which communications were so easy, and the means for discovering and circulating in-

formation so abundant. Yet how little is now certainly known as to the real causes which have brought about the war! The beliefs current among different peoples are altogether different, not to say contradictory. Some are almost demonstrably false. Even in some neutral nations such as Holland, Switzerland, and Spain, opinion is sharply divided not merely about the rights but also about the facts. The whole German people seem to hold just as implicitly that this is for them a defensive war as the French hold the opposite; and however clear certain points may appear to us in Britain, there are others which may remain obscure for many years to come.

How few are the persons in every State in whose hands lie the issues of war and peace! In some of the now belligerent countries the final and vital decisions were taken by four or five persons only, in others by six or seven only. Even in Britain decision rested practically with less than twenty-five; for though some few persons outside the Cabinet took a part, not all within the Cabinet are to be reckoned as effective factors. It is of course true that popular sentiment has to be considered, even in States more or less despotically governed. Against a strong and definite sentiment of the masses the ruling few would not venture to act. But the masses are virtually led by a few, and their opinion is formed, particularly at a crisis, by the authority and the appeals of those few whom they have been accustomed to trust or to obey. And after all, the vital decision at the vital moment remains with the few. If they had decided otherwise than they did, the thing would not have happened. Something like it might have happened later, but the war would not have come then and so.

How swiftly do vast events move, how quickly are vast decisions taken! In the twelve fatal days from July 23 to August 4 there was no time for reflection. Telegrams between seven capitals flew hither and thither like swift arrows crossing one another, and it would have needed a mind of more than human amplitude and energy to grasp and correlate all the

issues involved and to foresee the results that would follow the various lines of action possible in a game so complicated. Even the intellect of a Cæsar or a Bonaparte would have been unequal to the task. Here the telegraph has worked for evil. Had the communications passed by written despatches, as they would have done eighty years ago, it is probable that war might have been avoided.

Sometimes one feels as if modern States were growing too huge for the men to whom their fortunes are committed. Mankind increases in volume, and in accumulated knowledge, and in a comprehension of the forces of nature; but the intellects of individual men do not grow. The power of grasping and judging in their entirety the far greater mass of facts to be dealt with, the far more abundant resources at command, the far vaster issues involving the weal or woe of masses of men—this power does not expand. The disproportion between the individual ruling men with their personal prejudices and proclivities, their selfish interests and their vanities, and the immeasurable consequences which follow their individual volitions, becomes more striking and more tragic. There were some advantages in the small city states of antiquity. A single city might decline or perish, but the nation remained, and another city blossomed forth to replace that which had withered away. But now enormous nations are concentrated under one Government, and its disasters affect the whole. A great modern State is like a gigantic vessel built without any watertight compartments, which, if it be unskilfully steered, may perish when it strikes a single rock.

How ignorant modern peoples, with all the abundant means of information at their disposal, may nevertheless remain of one another's character and purposes! Each of the nations now at war has evidently had a false notion of its adversaries and has been thereby misled. It has not known their inner thoughts, it has misread their policy. It was said in the days of the American Civil War that the misconception by the Southern States of the Northern States, and their belief that the North

cared for nothing but the dollar, was the real cause why their differences were not peaceably settled, and yet they were both members of the same Republic and spoke the same language. European nations cannot be expected to have quite so intimate a knowledge each of the other, yet both their commercial intercourse and the activity of the press and the immensely increased volume of private travel might have been expected to enable them better to gauge and judge one another's minds.

Historians as far back as Thucydides have made upon the behaviour of nations in war time many general observations, which have been brought out in stronger light by what passes from day to day before us. A few of these I will mention to suggest how we may turn to account the illustrations which Europe now furnishes.

When danger threatens a nation its habits change. Defence becomes the supreme need. In place of the ordinary machinery of government there starts up a dictatorship like that of early Rome, when twenty-four lictors surrounded the magistrate, and the tribunician veto, with the right of appeal, sank away. The plea of public interest overrides everything. The suspension of constitutional guarantees is acquiesced in, and acts of arbitrary power, even if violent, are welcomed because taken as signs of strength in the ruler. Even the withholding of information is submitted to. The voice of criticism is silenced. *Cedit toga armis.* The soldier comes to the front, speaks with an authority greater than that of the civilian statesman, is permitted to do whatever he declares to be necessary for the nation's safety. So long as that is secured, everything else is pardoned, and success gives enormous prestige.

Whoever watches these things must see how dangerous to freedom is war, except in those communities where long tradition has rooted constitutional habit very deep. In old Greece seditions opened the way to the Tyrant. Napoleon supposed that the Duke of Wellington would, after Waterloo, have made himself master of England. So might a victor of another quality have done who had achieved such a triumph

as Wellington's, had not an ancient monarchy and Parliament stood in his way. War is the bane of democracies. If it be civil war, he who restores peace is acclaimed like Augustus. Even a Louis Napoleon may be welcomed when he promises security for property. If it be foreign war, the man of the sword on horseback towers over the man on foot who can only talk and administer.

So, too, those psychical phenomena which former observers have noticed when a country is swept by war or revolution have become vividly real to Europe now. The same passion seizes on every one simultaneously and grows hotter in each by the sense that others share it. It is said that when sheep, feeding unherded on a mountain, see the approach of a danger they all huddle together, the rams on the outside facing the foe. The flock becomes one, with one mind, one fear, one rage of fear. So in times of danger a human community feels and acts like one man. The nation realises itself so vividly that it becomes a law to itself and recks little of the opinion of others. The man is lost in the crowd, and the crowd feels rather than thinks. Passion intensified supersedes the ordinary exercise not only of individual will but even of individual reason. Fear and anger breed suspicion and credulity. Every one is ready to believe the worst of whoever is suspected. What is called the power of suggestion rises to such a height that to denounce a man is virtually to condemn him. Lavoisier is sentenced to be guillotined; he pleads that he is a harmless chemist, but is told that the Republic does not need chemists. After the death of Julius Cæsar, Cinna, the poet, is seized, and, when he protests that he is not Cinna the conspirator, is nevertheless killed for his name, the bystander (in Shakespeare) adding, "Kill him for his bad verses." A foreign name is taken to be evidence that its bearer is a spy. There is no tolerance for difference of opinion, and to advance arguments against the reigning sentiment is treason. Any tribute to the character or even to the intellectual gifts of an enemy is resented. Sentiments of humanity towards him are

disapproved, unless the precaution is taken of expressing these in the exact words of Holy Scripture. The rising flame of hatred involves not merely the Government and armies of the enemy, but even the innocent citizens of the hostile country. These well-known phenomena are all more or less visible in Europe to-day, though in our own country the coolness of our temperament and the fact that no invader has trodden our soil have been presenting them in a comparatively mild type.

The intensification of emotions includes those of a religious kind, and these not always in their purest form. In most countries, it is only the most enlightened minds that can refrain from claiming the Deity as their peculiar protector and taking every victory as a mark of His special favour. Modern man seems at such moments to have reverted to those primitive ages when each tribe fought for its own god and expected its own god to fight for it, as Moab called on Chemosh and Tyre on Melkarth. True it is that a nation now usually argues that Divine protection will be extended to it because its cause is just. But as this is announced by every nation alike, the result is much the same now as it was in the days of Chemosh and Melkarth. Oddly enough, the people in whom fanaticism used to be strongest are now responding more feebly than ever before to the appeal of the Jihád. Is it because the Turkish Mussulmans have infidel Powers for allies as well as for enemies that this war seems to them less holy than those of the centuries in which their conquests were won?

Upon other symptoms indicating a return to the conditions of warfare in earlier ages I forbear (for a reason already given) to comment. It is more pleasant to note that some of the virtues which war evokes have never been seen to more advantage. Man has not under civilisation degenerated in body or in will power. The valour and self-sacrifice shown by the soldiers of all the nations have been as conspicuous as ever before. The line of heroes that extends from Thermopylæ to Lucknow might welcome as brothers the warriors of to-day; while among those at home who have been suffering the loss of sons and

brothers dearer to them than life itself, there has been a dignity of patience and silent resignation worthy of Roman Stoics or Christian saints.

In these and other similar ways we see many a feature of human character, many a phase of political or religious life recorded by historians, verified by present experience. We can better understand what nations become at moments of extreme peril and supreme effort; and those of us who occupy ourselves with history find it profitable to note the Present for the illumination of the Past.

But the Future makes a wider appeal. Everyone feels that after the war we shall see a different world, but no one can foretell what sort of a world it will be. We all have our fancies, but we know them to be no more than fancies, for the possibilities are incalculable. Nevertheless, it is worth while for each of us to set down what are the questions as to the future which most occupy the public mind and his own mind.

Will the effect of this war be to inflame or to damp down the military spirit? Some there are who believe that the example of those States which had made vast preparations for war will be henceforth followed by all States, so far as their resources permit, and that everywhere armies will be larger, navies larger, artillery accumulated on a larger scale, so that whatever peace may come will be only a respite and breathing time, to be followed by further conflicts till the predominance of one State or one race is established. Other observers of a more sanguine temper conceive that the outraged sentiment of mankind will compel the rulers of nations to find some means of averting war in the future more effective than diplomacy has proved. Each view is held by men of wide knowledge and solid judgment, and for each strong arguments can be adduced.

The effects which the war will have on the government and politics of the contending countries are equally obscure, though everyone admits they are sure to be far-reaching. Those who talk of politics as a science may well pause when

they reflect how little the experience of the past enables us to forecast the future of government, let us say in Germany or in Russia, on the hypothesis either of victory or of defeat for one or other Power.

Economics approaches more nearly to the character of a science than does any other department of inquiry in the human as opposed to the physical subjects. Yet the economic problems before us are scarcely less dark than the political. How long will it take the great countries to repair the losses they are now suffering? The destruction of capital has been greater during these last eleven months than ever before in so short a period, and it goes on with increasing rapidity. It took nearly two centuries for Germany to recover from the devastations of the Thirty Years' War, and nearly forty years from the end of the Civil War had elapsed before the wealth of the Southern States of America had come back to the figures of 1860. One may expect recovery to be much swifter in our days, but the extinction of millions of productive brains and hands cannot fail to retard the process, and each of the trading countries will suffer by the impoverishment of the others.

This suggests the gravest of all the questions that confront us. How will population be affected in quantity and in quality? The birth-rate had before 1914 been falling in Germany and Britain: it had already so fallen in France as only to equal the death-rate. Will the withdrawal of those slain or disabled in war quicken it? and how long will it take to restore the productive industrial capacity of each country? More than half the students and younger teachers in some of our Universities have gone to fight abroad: and many of these will never return. Who can estimate what is being lost to literature and learning and science, from the deaths of those whose strong and cultivated intelligence might have made great discoveries or added to the store of the world's thought? Those who are now perishing belong to the most healthy and vigorous part of the population, from whom the strongest progeny might have been expected. Will the

physical and mental energy of the generation that will come to manhood thirty or forty years hence show a decline? The data for a forecast are scanty, for in no previous war has the loss of life been so great over Europe as a whole, even in proportion to a population very much larger than it was a century ago. It is said, I know not with how much truth, that the stature and physical strength of the population of France took long to recover from the losses of the wars that lasted from 1793 till 1814. Niebuhr thought that the population of the Roman Empire never recovered from the great plague of the second century A.D.; but where it is disease that reduces a people it is the weaker who die, while in war it is the stronger. Our friends of the Eugenics Society are uneasy at the prospect for the belligerent nations. Some of them are trying to console themselves by dwelling on the excellent moral effects that may spring out of the stimulation which war gives to the human spirit. What the race loses in body it may—so they hope—regain in soul. This is a highly speculative anticipation, on which history casts no certain light. As to the exaltation of character which war service produces in those who fight from noble motives, inspired by faith in the justice of their cause, there can be no doubt. We see it to-day as it has often been seen before. But how far does this affect the non-combatant part of each people? and how long does the exaltation last? The instance nearest to our own time, and an instance which is in so far typical that the bulk of the combatants on both sides were animated by a true patriotic spirit, is the instance of the American War of Secession. It was felt at the time to be almost a moral rebirth of the nation. I must not venture here and now to inquire how far the hopes then expressed were verified by the result: for such an inquiry would detain you too long.

These are some of the questions which it may be interesting to set down as rising in our minds now, in order that the next generation may the better realise what were the thoughts and anxieties of those who sought, *sine ira, metu, studio,* to

comprehend the larger issues of this fateful time. It is too soon to hope to solve the problems that are crowding upon us. But we can at least try to see clearly what the problems are, and to distinguish between the permanent and the temporary, the moral and the material causes that have plunged mankind in this abyss of calamity: and we can ask one another what are the forces that may help to deliver it therefrom. This is a time for raising questions, not for attempting to answer them. Before some of them can be answered, most of us who are met here to-day will have followed across the deep River of Forgetfulness those who are now giving their lives that Britain may live.

BRYCE.

THE EFFECT OF THE EUROPEAN WAR ON HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA.

CHARLES FRANKLIN THWING,
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THE effect of the war upon the higher learning of America is nothing compared to its effect on that of the nations at war. Neither the number of students nor income has been affected in any appreciable degree. A few American professors have found their sabbatical vacations interrupted, and a few scores of hundreds of students who had planned to go to Germany or France or England have been obliged to change their plans. German books and periodicals come not at all to the libraries, or come irregularly. Pieces of physical and chemical apparatus, made best and cheapest in Germany, are not to be bought. Certain fields of research in this and other sciences are not cultivated by reason of the lack of these tools. But beyond these and similar obvious conditions, the war brings no special suffering to the normal course of the more *material* part of our higher education.

Although the interest, too, of American teachers and students in the great war is not at all comparable with the interest of their European brothers, yet this interest cuts down deep into the heart and mind. The movement of the campaigns is followed, the victories and the defeats quicken or depress, the value of the forces is estimated, and the prognosis is debated. The sympathy of at least nineteen-twentieths of all academic people is with the Allies. The

most common remark made about Germany is that she is obsessed. The feeling toward her is rather one of pity than of anger, and rather one of anger than of hatred. That the final triumph will represent a victory for the Allies is not deeply doubted, but that the war will be a long one is generally conceded in academic companies.

It may also be said that at least five medical schools with affiliated hospitals have sent delegations from their instructing and medical staffs to the field. The Western Reserve University Medical School and its affiliated Lakeside Hospital was the first to send a unit of twelve representatives, having for its head Dr George W. Crile. Members of this delegation spent from six weeks to three months in Paris.

Already Harvard has followed with a second unit, and other schools are to succeed. These services represent a contribution which the university medical schools are glad to offer.

The effects of the war on the studies of teachers and students is a more complex question, as it is a more general one. The effect differs according to the character of the studies themselves. For instance, the effect upon the pursuit of the ancient classics in American colleges could on the whole be neglected. My associates say that apparently the subjects of their teaching in Latin and Greek do not suffer even a temporary loss. But outside of these fields, permanent results are to be seen in most of the departments established in American universities and colleges. For instance, a distinguished teacher of biology writes:

"It is evident that the biological value of the war diminishes rapidly with the perfection of military weapons and machinery, all tending to an indiscriminate slaughter more and more complete. The element of personal encounter and the matching of individual brawn, wit, or prowess is more and more reduced, to the present moment, when they must be regarded as negative quantities. Though it requires the highest degree of skill to design modern weapons, but

little is needed to use them, and unskilled labourers are marched to the front by thousands in every modern war.

"The present great war is resulting in an indiscriminate eliminating of the fittest physically of all the contending nations, and from the standpoint of eugenics is the greatest calamity that could happen.

"The conquered nations in the present war will undoubtedly in time renew their depleted life, though bled to the last ounce of blood, for statistics seem to prove that in a virile race hard conditions tend to increase the percentage of male births, and to stimulate variation; by thus favouring adaptation, the race may be tided over a period of crisis, however acute. The decision of the present war will depend upon other factors than biological fitness, and the result can be nothing less than a colossal biological waste.

"As a partial balance to the overwhelming tide of baser passions engendered by every war, whether of victor or vanquished, we have to recognise the *esprit de corps* and communism which are usually developed, and which may be regarded in the light of virtues, though bought at a wholly ruinous price."

The results which will be wrought in the subjects of modern languages are, of course, also great and diverse. Perhaps the effect upon the teaching of the German language will be the most marked. One of my colleagues, a professor of German, says:

"It is my opinion (expressed, however, with the diffidence that becomes a prophet) that the position of German as a subject for teaching and for research will not be altered if Germany is unsuccessful in the present war. Materialism and militarism have been in a fair way to kill off all that is best in Germany. Defeat should restore the nation to its wholesome self."

Another distinguished teacher of this language says:

"As I see things now, the effect will be hurtful, chiefly because the sympathy of the American people is not with

the Germans in the conflict. Whether rightly or wrongly, the average American holds Germany in a large measure responsible for the war, forgets what that great people has done and been in the past, regards Prussian militarism as the sentiment of the whole nation, and construes natural German patriotism, once war is started, as the expression of a desire to rule the world. Such a feeling, I think, is strong and cannot fail to turn our young people away from German study. Of course, it should do the opposite, for if we cannot agree with another, we should study him all the harder, in order to understand him better; but I fear it will not be so in this case.

"If Germany should win in the war, I think this lack of sympathy would change into a still stronger feeling, which would only make matters worse. If she should lose, I fear her loss of prestige would still further lessen American interest. And whether she win or lose, she herself will be set back half a century in all the arts of peace: to my mind, the best claim any people can make to the interest of another."

The intimations of what the effect of the conflict will be upon the French language and literature give promise that the results will be still more marked and impressive than upon the Teutonic. One professor of Romance speaks of the French conditions as follows:

"An editor of a leading firm of publishers of college and high-school text-books wrote me last September that he foresaw a considerable increase in the number of students of French owing to the European war. I am unable to say on what grounds his prediction is based, but it has been realised at least in our College. Reports from two important universities further west indicate a similar state of affairs. The cause, or one of the causes, may be a reaction of the evident sympathy of the American public with the side of the Allies. After the war increased travel will probably be indulged in by Americans, who will want to visit places and countries made memorable by great events. To this effect a conversational knowledge of French will be an almost indispensable adjunct,

and such a knowledge will be rightly desired by students who contemplate going abroad. We shall have to meet such a demand in a manner that will not interfere harmfully with the study of the literary masterpieces.

"As far as research studies are concerned, it is a well-known fact that since the French universities have offered foreigners the same opportunities and prerogatives that their own youth enjoys, Americans whose elders used to go to Germany even for advanced work in Romance tongues, have turned to France in yearly increasing numbers. The war is likely to accentuate this movement, because of the enhanced prestige France will derive from her eventual victory, or through a realisation that Germany may lose her position as a great world-power. The experience of the present struggle must also bring home to thinking people the fact that German culture, which started from a highly idealistic basis, has somewhat deteriorated in the keeping of her modern representatives."

The effect of the war on the whole domain of philosophy it would be extremely difficult to prophesy. One finds it hard to accept the fact that the nation of Kant has so far forgotten herself as to be at war with the lands in which the influence of Kant has been so mighty. It is to be noted, however, that a follower of Kant, Fichte, has in his idealistic and egotistic philosophy laid a very deep and almost forgotten cause of the present obsession. It also seems to me not improbable that the great conception of Schopenhauer, in presenting the world as will, has had a formative and evilly inspiring force far greater than is commonly recognised in either England or the United States. For, as Schopenhauer declares, "The Will has all of the excellences and none of the defects of the Intellect. It is the original, essential, and primary element of existence; the Intellect is the derived, the accidental, the secondary."[1]

[1] The following, gathered up from Schopenhauer's principal work, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, is a summary of the excellences of the Will and of the defects of the Intellect:

"'The Intellect flags; the Will is unwearied. . . . All cognition is connected

But, aside from the evil inspiration of Schopenhauer, there are many sides of our philosophy which are touched by the great conflict. One of my colleagues writes with wit and sadness:

"The war supplies no end of material for the illustration of principles in Psychology and Ethics, and they keep crowding upon me in the classroom, though of course I try to avoid using them. Treitschke, Bernhardi, *et al.*, with their outspoken defence of strong-arm methods to win a place in the sun, do not seem to me so very different from any other revolutionists who feel that the rules of the game were made for the benefit of someone else at their expense. England's past 'thefts' and present 'hypocrisy,' as described by those amiable Germans, are quite comparable to the past and present sins of landed proprietors, mine-holders, and the idle rich. In each case the party in possession of the world's goods invokes an existing moral code for his protection, and in each case the party that envies him demands a revision, and is willing, if need be, to fight for it. In both cases the revolutionists would find much

with exertion; but Willing is the essence of our being, whose manifestations continue without trouble and of themselves. . . . Will alone is uninvited; often, therefore, it is too ready and too strong in its activity. . . . From the lack of weariness of the Will arises the fault which is more or less common to all men, and which can only be overcome by education, precipitation. . . . Scarcely have we seized and hastily connected by cognition a few data regarding the circumstances in question . . . than out of the depths of our being arises, uninvited, the ever-ready, never-tiring Will, and manifests itself as terror, fear, hope, pleasure, desire, envy, sorrow, zeal, anger, courage. . . . The Intellect is to the Will in man what the bridle and bit is to the unbroken horse: it must be led by the bridle, it must be instructed or educated, or it is as wild and fierce as the power shown in the dashing waterfall. . . .'

"Will is the essence not only of man, but of the world. 'The world itself is an enormous Will constantly rushing into life.' It manifests itself not only in the desire and struggle of man to live, but also in the conservation of all natural forces: in gravitation . . . in chemical activity, in perdurability and inflexibility, in electricity and magnetism, and in the alternating growth and decay of vegetable life. . . . At all times and in all places the Will strives for a manifestation of itself; nowhere does it find a limit, any complete gratification, any point of rest." It is at this stage of the development of his philosophy that Schopenhauer's famous theory of pessimism appears.

to support them in the ethical conceptions of James and Dewey. Moral code is a matter of will, not of personal principles, declares James in his *Essentials of a Moral Universe*, and Dewey is never tired of declaring that the rules of morality must change continually to meet new conditions, and thus help realise man's ultimate end—abundance of life. And yet I am against the Germans! Thus you see that from the standpoint of ethics the war arouses the most vital of all problems.

"As to the broader and more abstract phases of philosophy, when you find a man like Eucken joining with Haeckel in the cheap pamphleteering they have indulged in, with all its bias and calumny, it is easy to realise that belligerent philosophers can teach us very much more about mob psychology than about the things of the spirit.

"As to the philosophy of religion, the war simply illustrates and accents the need for a pretty radical revision, or rather a thorough reconsideration, of traditional conceptions, in the spirit of democratic generosity. The Kaiser's impious exclusive partnership with God finds its parallel in Psalms that we read religiously in divine service, and while we raise our thanksgiving hymns of praise to the Providence that gave us peace and plenty, it is hard to keep from wondering what some poor Belgian thinks of Providence whose pregnant wife is murdered and whose daughter is outraged before his eyes. Vested interests in theology do not count for much more than vested interests in empire at a time like this."

Another philosopher says:

"One cannot but be struck by the phenomenon of the leading lights in German philosophy uniting so wholeheartedly in the active moral support of the German military cause, but all that it seems legitimate to infer from this is that philosophic calm and the breadth of vision which should characterise the contemplations of the philosopher are ideals which quite lose their power when the primitive instincts of man or the patriotic prejudices of a nation are aroused."

But this war of the world has its most fundamental relations with the sciences that are called social. The war belongs to society—to humanity. It is the conflict of men. It belongs to governments, which are composed of men. It belongs to economics, which is the science of man. It belongs to that vast and still forming field of sociology, the science of men in relation to each other as human beings. It belongs to history. In this vast foursquare field of political science, economics, history, and sociology the war is having its most tremendous effects. One teacher of government writes:

"As to government in general, the war has raised the issue between modern social democracy, as exemplified in England, and the bureaucratic, militaristic system of Prussianised Germany. The suddenness and irresponsibility with which war was declared is explained by the autocratic nature of the Prussian-German Imperial Government. The German people looked on as spectators, while one man, the Kaiser, by a stroke of his pen, plunged all Europe into conflict.

"After the war, when the nations come to reckon up profit and loss, I think it is not unlikely that safeguards will be thrown about the right to declare war. I look for the German people to insist upon far-reaching changes in the government in the direction of greater responsibility of the Emperor and his ministers to the representatives of the people in parliament. It seems probable that Russia, if she succeeds with the help of her Allies in treading down Prussian militarism, will receive an infusion of liberalism. The triumph of democratic England and France and the fate in which Prussianism will be involved, cannot but have an effect upon her. I should not be surprised to see the Russian people advance to a greater measure of self-government.

"Another significant result which this war has already achieved is the complete vindication of the enlightened British colonial policy of the latter half of the nineteenth century. The wisdom of that policy has frequently been questioned even by Englishmen, who harked back to the eighteenth-

century colonial ideas; and the loose tie between England and her colonies has been scoffed at by Germans as a sign of weakness and pending disintegration. Such doubts as these will now have vanished.

"As for International Law, a victory for the Allied Powers would strengthen the respect in which it is held among nations. If Germany can be made to pay dearly for her ruthless violations, the sanction of International Law will become all the more effectual. But, putting aside this assumption of victory for the Allies, there is much evidence that the consciences of the nations at war and of neutral nations are sensitive upon the subject of violations of International Law. All of the belligerents seem animated by a desire to set themselves right in the eyes of neutral nations, and neutral opinion seems to be exercising a perceptible influence in restraining further possible violations. My opinion is that International Law will emerge from the war with undiminished prestige.

"When the horrors of this war are fully known, there will be a revulsion of sentiment in favour of the humane regulations contained in the Hague Conferences. Undoubtedly at a future Hague Convention certain practices of the present war will be the objects of prohibitory legislative action.

"In respect of maritime warfare, the present war has already brought some backward steps. England has been disposed, so great is her desire to cut off Germany commercially, to push her belligerent rights somewhat beyond the terms of the London Declaration in dealing with neutral commerce. Whether in future England can be led to consent to an enlarged freedom of private property at sea in war time is somewhat problematical.

"I anticipate that the war will stimulate an interest in the study of International Law and Diplomacy. The American public has been acquiring knowledge of the recent history of Europe at a rapid rate, but the subject of International Law is not yet popularised."

A teacher of sociology says:

"As to the effect of the war on sociology both as a subject for teaching and for research, therefore, I suggest that on the whole it will be auspicious, especially in America. Among the warring nations, the evil will largely outweigh the good for at least a generation to come. This will be more apparent if we analyse the conceivable efforts of the conflict into their good and bad components:

"1. The war has stimulated and will stimulate a tremendous amount of interest in social relations generally, and in the causes and the effects of the war as a social phenomenon particularly (and of this interest the science of sociology is merely the organised expression)—a good and useful result.

"Now as to the first proposition. The situation in the United States is altogether different. America has long been the scene of intense interest in social questions. Contrast Germany, where to this day there is not a single chair of sociology. This does not mean that social problems do not occupy the Germans, but it does mean that Americans were among the first to believe in the possibility of a science of society and that ascertainable social laws have a practical bearing. To the further development of sociology in the United States, therefore, the present war will give a powerful impetus. More departments of sociology will be established, and more students and teachers.

"2. On the other hand, it will revive a number of biases which make blind to facts and cloud judgment—an unmitigated evil, hurtful in the pursuit of many sciences, but especially fatal in sociological research.

"If we examine the facts underlying the second proposition, we find that no science has suffered as has the science of society from various biases present in the minds of its votaries. We can observe the operations of the religious bias and the class bias, but chief among all the patriotic bias. How this bias works out is well illustrated in the present war in the wholesale renunciation of foreign honours and degrees—

from the point of view of the neutral, an extremely puerile display of national vanity. When we realise the importance of comparative methods for the student of human institutions, we begin to see what havoc with judgment and the results of research the injection of such puerile and childish sentiments and prejudices will wreak. The biologist or the engineer has no such difficulties to contend with. A French scientist accepts without misgiving the statement of a German that a certain insect has parasitic habits, for he knows the German has no motive to misinterpret the facts. If a German sociologist, however, affirms that the French people are 'degenerate' or their 'institutions inferior,' there is trouble at once. National pride is aroused. For the sociologist the human group is what the bug is to the biologist. But he approaches the object of his study not with the dispassionate, scientific interest of the latter, but with an ethnocentric or national prejudice which leads him to cherish and overvalue the characteristics of his own group at the expense of foreign or outgroups. This attitude is akin to that of the missionary who is shocked by the religious customs and beliefs of those whom he has come to convert. It is the human equation, which in sciences like physics and biology is negligible. It has always been the bane of sociology. Now, whatever tends to increase this basis, as war does, is inimical to the scientific spirit of sociology. This state of affairs bodes a dark day for the social sciences of Europe.

"As for sociological research, the results cannot but be beneficent. In the first place, the war should serve to dispel several illusions as to the character of human society, and lead to a greater measure of agreement among sociologists. Such questions as whether society is a 'subjective' or an 'objective' reality must be discarded as metaphysics. Likewise the problem of a progress must be given up. If the present war has demonstrated anything, it has shown that there is a tragical sameness about all human events. What Lyell asserted of geological evolution is equally true of human society. The forces in operation to-day must be conceived to have operated

during all past time; *i.e.* as far as human society is concerned, its character, as determined by the nature of man and by the life conditions on the earth, has remained the same from primitive times to the present. Nothing sets forth the fundamental needs and interests of societies as does war. Those interests, for the warring nations, have narrowed down to two: food and men. The commissariat and population policies, as expressed in the reported suspension of marriage bans in Austria and of marriage fees in England—how significant are these facts! How primitive the motives back of them!

"The war is bound to have a sobering effect upon students of society. The search for panaceas and Utopias, as well as the eugenic dream of a 'superman,' should be given up. If the social scientists can learn to deal with men as they are and with conditions as they are, there is hope that sociology will grow into a science valid in theory and practical in bearings. The war should give an impulse in that direction. By freeing the subject of accessories and side-issues, it should have the effect of making research more purposeful and more truly utilitarian. This is all to the good of the American student who makes even the slightest attempt at maintaining his 'mental neutrality' and cultivating a spirit of scientific fairness and impartiality. Sociology has a bright future in our country."

Upon economics the effect of the war will be still more marked. A professor of that great subject says:

"Much has been made of the economic explanation of the struggle. For example, the alleged importance to Germany of colonial outlets for her manufactures and emigration. Doubtless there will be a reconsideration of the relative significance of economic factors as compared with other influences, such as the spirit of nationality, upon the situation that led up to the conflagration. A clearer understanding of these forces may result in a truer evaluation of their importance and a more rational reaction of the human spirit subject to their influence. Pleas like Norman Angell's may have a

readier hearing and more effective influence upon public policy.

"If the reaction after the war turns the minds of men toward the peaceable fruit of social righteousness, there will be a strong interest in the study of economics for an understanding of the material reconstruction of shattered human relationships. The previous equilibrium among labour, capital, and natural resources will have been disturbed, and a readjustment will have to be sought that will distribute the results of production among them in somewhat different proportions, thus affecting rates of real wages, interest, and economic rents. While nothing so revolutionary is to be anticipated as the effect of the Black Death in 1348, which depleted the labour supply and radically altered the economic status of the labourers and methods of agriculture, still the great destruction of life now going on is bound to be felt economically. It is true that the reduction of the supply of labour has been accompanied by devastation and vast expenditure of wealth that might have been used as capital, but it is improbable that the two types of losses have been in the same degree. It is probable that we underestimate the recuperative powers of society in recovery from losses of property. Forced economy that would lead to a stoppage of waste would rapidly replace the material values destroyed. Nevertheless considerable adjustment, demanding an appreciable length of time, will be necessary to meet the new proportion in which the factors in production will occur. From this task of finding a new equilibrium will arise problems both in research and exposition that will test the powers of observation and reasoning.

"Whether we turn to the fundamental forces that govern human conduct, or to the field of public policy relating to international trade, or to the distribution of wealth among the producers, the outcome of the war, assuming that it will continue at the present rate of destruction over a period of years, is bound to have an epoch-making influence on the

economic interests of mankind and hence upon the science concerned with these interests. To predict in detail would require the prescience of a seer. These broad generalities, I fear, will not be of much interest. I can only plead that a prophet's real function is not to foretell but to lead to repentance."

I now come to a brief statement of the effect of the war upon history. For, as I have intimated, the war is the result and the cause of tremendous historical movements. If one could hint what Europe will be after the signing of certain treaties, he would indeed be a prophet. But if one wisely declines to figure in such a rôle, one can refer to such minor effects upon ourselves as students and teachers of history. Two teachers of the great subject whom I have consulted believe that the war is greatly stimulating the study of the subject. Teachers will offer more courses in the recent history of Europe. It also will open up a field of tremendous importance for research. The current discussions of the origin of the war, the division of responsibility, and the proof about atrocities will in the not remote future come under the microscopic and telescopic eye of investigation. One teacher adds:

"It seems to me that the history teacher, on the defensive for his subject before a world too little appreciative of historical values, finds his position suddenly strengthened; for the war brings into strong relief his contention that only a knowledge and understanding of the past can make the present intelligible."

This compilation of opinions, which might be greatly prolonged, illustrates several great truths.

It illustrates the intimacy of the ties binding nation to nation. These ties are not simply diplomatic understandings and political alliances. They are also great relationships covering every part of the life of man. No nation can say to another nation, "I have no need of thee." The relations are the growth of generations of struggle and of mingled fellow-

ship and enmity. Any breaking of these ties throws each of these relationships out of its proper place. Education among them is thus made to suffer. Its place in the sun is thus obscured, its laws are broken, and its workings interrupted.

This review also illustrates the duty of the educationalist to make use of this war of the world to enforce certain great truths which times of peace cannot enforce. Among these truths are the worth of history as a subject of study, the importance of international law, the exposition of the different types of nationalities, the advantages and disadvantages of different forms of political government, and, most timely of all, the effect of the devastation wrought by war on the highest life of the nation.

This review also enforces the lessons that nations, as well as individuals, should stand for the noblest type of being. It also illustrates the duty of each nation to stand for a noble type of individual life and of international conduct and relations. One would like to believe that the war would promote such understanding as now consciously or unconsciously controls the bearing of individual men toward each other. That great word "Gentleman" I should like to enlarge into the word "Gentlestate." The Gentlestate should exist for all of its citizens, and all of its citizens should exist for it. Reciprocity of rights and duties should be the rule. The Gentlestate may be the centre and the source of power, but if it possesses the giant strength, it is too great to use it like a giant. It seeks to do justice, to love mercy, and it walks humbly. If it has enemies, it treats them as if they were to become its friends. It has too much good sense to be responsive to insults and too much generosity to bear malice. It is too eager about great things to be annoyed by small irritations, and too much concerned about the good of all to be keen about any lack of respect to itself. It seeks to see the large as large, the small as small, the ephemeral as of the day, and the lasting as permanent, being ever guided by a sense of proportion. It respects the rights of other states with that same honesty

and integrity which it merits from others. It makes few or no demands. It has no occasion for self-defence. It seeks only to have desert. It is tolerant of others' weaknesses, patient toward their limitations, never finding in either weakness or limitation any excuse for its own aggrandisement. It seeks to enrich as well as to be enriched, to enlarge as well as to be enlarged, and it vastly prefers to be the victim than the agent of any misinterpretation or wrong-doing. Its protective policy is to shield the weak, and its free-trade theory is to give every other state more than it demands. This Gentlestate is considerate in thought and feeling, without either hardness or mysticism, cordial without effusiveness, forceful and direct without harshness, firm in conviction without obstinacy, of the highest idealism, ever exercising a goodwill without giving any impression of weakness. This Gentlestate has no armies and no battleships for attacking on either land or sea. Its chief fortresses are the cardinal virtues and the cardinal graces of faith and hope for humanity's future and love for humanity itself.

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THE PROVINCE OF THE ARTS AND HANDICRAFTS IN A MECHANICAL SOCIETY.

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We can no longer discuss the question of Art and Handicraft in modern society as a question *sui generis*. It is now no more a question merely for the artist—the fad of a polite and exclusive society. The days of Ruskinian romanticism are gone by, when it was possible to say "This piece of work made by hand is good, and that made by machinery is bad." We know now—and it is the discovery of the last twenty-five years—that there are deep underlying social and ethical principles involved. It behoves us to find what these principles are. When therefore we set about to define the province of the arts and handicrafts in a society which, like ours, is based on mechanical production, we have to consider machinery as a whole. We know that we are not going to give up our great ships, our motor cars, our flying machines, our electric light; we have to enlarge our view.

The question is one of the evolution of thought in the last twenty-five years; we have arrived at another stage not only in national but in human development, and this stage is marked down for us by the trial through which we are passing at this moment. The war has set a red stroke through all our thinking, and the reflection of our thought which "the arts" imply is in sharp contrast with the destruc-

tion of the arts now going on in the war. To many the war is the final consummation of mechanism, and the mechanical order which has gradually and logically led up to it. If we compare this with the spiritual achievement of, let us say, a room full of pre-Raphaelite pictures and the production of the men whom during the last twenty-five years that movement inspired, we realise how absolutely we have been cut off from our past.

It is not my object here to show how this development of our mechanism has, on the one hand, led step by step to the European cataclysm, or how coincidently it has destroyed the constructive promise of a generation of artists, poets, and thinkers. I want rather to point to the future. I want to show rather on what line, when we are free again to create, all our new constructive enterprises should run. When therefore we look at this question as a whole, we have to lift it entirely out of the sphere of economics. It is no more a question of whether machinery raises wages, or multiples commodities, or saves labour, or increases population, or mitigates unemployment. It may do all these things. Those were important issues no doubt, and they disturbed the economists of a generation that has passed away, but for us the question is altogether larger. It is one of mind and soul, of how man is shaping his life.

It has been wisely said by an Eastern thinker, that, since the Renaissance, Western civilisation has more and more concerned itself with the mental, scientific, and analytical functions of life, and so come to a "disvaluation of doing and feeling." What once we did with our hands we thought through our hands, and perhaps the two finest examples of this thinking through the hands, which modern mechanism, in the crowning achievement of the Krupp guns, has destroyed, are the Cathedral of Rheims and the market square of Ypres. The one the embodiment of the mediæval religion of France, the other of the Flemish Guild system. In each of these was the soul that a people had expressed through doing and feeling.

To our time, so apt until the great awakening of August 1914, to point to one or another material function of the body social as being out of order, we may not inaptly apply Browning's verse:—

> "You are sick, that's sure, they say;
> Sick of what? they disagree:
> 'Tis the heart, holds Doctor A;
> 'Tis the brain, says Doctor B;
> The liver, my life I'll lay;
> The lungs, the lights, ah me!
> So ignorant of man's whole,
> Of bodily organs plain to see;
> So sage and certain, frank and free,
> About what's under lock and key—
> Man's Soul!"

Regarded then as a matter no longer merely of economics, this question of machinery becomes one of ethics, of the mind and soul, of how the conditions of life are to be shaped out of mechanism, of the sort of society that is to be based on what we may call the mechanical order. "Capitalism," as the Socialists see it, is only one of the conditions of this order; "Socialism" as commonly understood is another; it is the protest, the organised protest, of labour against the ugliness and injustice of the mechanical order. But there is another way of looking at life, and that is the way of the artist. I do not mean merely the painter, but the man who works with his hands under direct, personal, creative thought. To the artist the "joy of life" is a gospel; the one important thing for him is to do as he feels and to express himself—his feeling—through his hands. Morris held this view. Many others have held it. The men who created Rheims and Ypres held it. It is a point of view quite common to humanity; but the mechanical order allows it no expression. This want in life of doing and feeling has to be made good. Some means has again to be found of satisfying man's need for personal expression. Here lies the artist's function. If the mechanical order is to attain the poise and stability of the older civilisations, this artist's function must no longer be atrophied.

We have only to look about us to note how, in a hundred ways, our mentality has been harmed by mechanism. It has induced in us a blindness, a bluntness of sensibility. Compare the average industrial town of England or America—not the great city, but the average town given over to factory production—with any existing non-industrial city in Europe that survives to us from the seventeenth century. The latter, with all its drawbacks, its petty antiquity, fulfils a want in life which the former comes nowhere near satisfying. Or take the ordinary utensils of the pre-machine era; everything we handle has in it some personal quality. When we compare them with the furniture and utensils of our own time, we become conscious of a loss in ourselves. Familiarity with standardised ugliness has blunted our sensibility to the beauty of the personal creation; little by little we discover what we have lost. Or if we seek a human example—the product of the mechanical order in England, let us say,—compare the English peasant now with the peasant of the pre-machine era. The men who lived in the seventeenth-century stone and thatched cottages of Gloucestershire, Worcestershire, and Oxfordshire, who practised a craft of consummate all-round skill, applicable to the changing seasons of the year, and left us a body of English folk-song among the most beautiful of our national records; these men were a different people from our modern labourers. The labourer now, living on a starvation wage, is callous, dull, has as little care for the finer things of life as the factory hand; all he desires is to "better himself" by quitting the country for the town. His desire is to become a factory hand at a living wage because in his own sphere both the personal craft and the wage are denied him.

When we begin to search out the remedies for this bluntness, for this harm that mechanism has done us, we are forced to the admission, not that the machine itself is wrong, but that it is misused. We find that it is often used in the wrong place, that it is often used to destroy, and that when it might be used to prevent destruction it is not used. What we need,

in short, is an ethical interpretation of machinery. We need to find out where it is right to use machinery, as in chain-making, and where it is wrong to use machinery, as in the more personal and intimate objects of daily use. My own feeling is that everything we have about us in our daily lives should have some quality of beauty, some personal touch conveyed through itself from the maker to the user. I believe that a great deal of the joy, the helpful progress of life, is thus conveyed from one human being to another. A work of art or craft thus used has a responsiveness—much as a musical instrument has—which no mechanism can ever give.

But it is as yet difficult to speak absolutely of machinery. We are only on the threshold of a great era. But given this sense of ethical interpretation, we can begin to discriminate. We can say that there is machinery that injures and machinery that is beneficial. Also we have to balance the indirect influence of it for good or ill. We have to ask, so to speak, of any given machine, Is it worth while? Such a machine, for example, as the "spinning-chuck" in metal work. Here is a machine which displaces human labour and produces in the finer examples of metal work approximately the same results as those of the hand. The "effect" of the hand can be got by a final tapping over with the hammer instead of by days of hand-tapping. The rightness or wrongness of the spinning-chuck cannot be argued on the ground of æsthetics. But those who seek to develop the creative invention and skill within the workshop know that an ethical problem is involved; they know that the spinning-chuck disintegrates the whole craft, because the process of "hand-raising" which it displaces is a vital process in the learning of the craft.

Again, machinery is not good merely because it multiplies objects for human use. In many cases where it does this it is to the detriment of the finer and more imaginative labour. Where it deliberately tells lies it is actively harmful. For instance, in the first category we could put all machine-made jewellery and lace. We are much better without such things.

Nor is the plea of sentiment any justification for their use. There is no need for them ever to have been made, when it is possible for the human product to have been created in their stead; while if by their existence, as in the case of machine-made jewellery and lace, they displace the human product, they are doubly mischievous. Into the second category come the deliberate lies. The building trade reveals to us an appalling condition of affairs. Here we have a hundred and one shams and falsifications; earthenware made to look like stone, iron made to look like wood, cloth made to look like tiles, something ever pretending to be something else until the trade has become corrupted through and through with lying and chicanery. This constant effort to produce something a little cheaper that shall look like something else is the result of machinery—the mechanical order as revealed in the craft of the builder.

Broadly, I think we may say that such machinery as tends to destroy human imagination, fancy, and invention, is bad, and clearly there is a great deal of it about; while machinery that helps to develop the higher human faculties is good. Thus it is good to make ships or to polish lenses by machinery, but it is bad to use the American "carving machine" by which a carved sixteenth-century panel is set on one grade while a dozen or so mechanical replicas, all imitation "sixteenth-century" panels, are cut out of the wood by mechanical power without any reference to human fancy or imagination.

When once we admit the distinction of the good and bad in machinery, it follows that the time has come for us to apply the ethical test, to discriminate wherever we can, to test machinery by new standards, and as a consequence to build up a body of legislation that shall protect character and "human quality." Adam Smith told us that one of the great advantages of machinery was that it encouraged the workman to fresh inventions. He was wrong. The inventiveness that was really set going in those days was the result of traditional craftsmanship. It was due not to the mechanism,

but to the old tradition of thinking and feeling that the men still had. His statement, which appeared true in his time, does not apply to ours. The elaborate mechanism of a great factory has stopped that fresh invention in the workshop. Sub-division of labour has gone beyond itself. The time has come then for us to establish a new tradition that shall bring us once again the human and personal quality. This quality needs protection, and there is a right and wrong protection. Nor is the question one that admits of argument on the lines of protection and of free trade as commonly understood. Free trade may be sound enough; so under certain conditions may be protection; but this newer ethic of industry cuts across the lines. What we now need is a protection of standard of quality whether in the man or the product. Certain things are affected by Gresham's law; the law that says, Given certain conditions, the good coin drives out the bad. Many examples of the working of this might be quoted.

This implies that we must extend the anti-individualistic legislation of the post-Manchester School of Economics and politicians into other provinces of life. We do not want again the system of protection which the Manchester School destroyed, but we do want to protect the finer things. As we protect scholarship so we should protect craftsmanship —protect the standard of quality. We know now that it was not necessary to destroy the craft guilds that stood for standard of quality for the sake of the great factory industry; we know that there was room and need for both. So it is with other things, *e.g.* the milk factory and the human milker. At present the small farmer is in danger of being crushed out by the milk factory run on co-operative lines. Again, there is room for both. The peasant and his cow are essential. It is protective legislation we want to prevent the machine destroying the handicraft wherever it is vital, whether it be in agriculture or in art, and the two are curiously akin, because they have in them the direct human touch of man upon material.

Another aspect of the question, and perhaps the most important because it involves constructive legislation, is how the wrong machine shall be stopped. Only in very few cases, such as occupational diseases, *e.g.* where lead poisoning induces phossy-jaw, need legislation be preventive in the sense that actual machines should be forbidden. Rather should we permit all machines, but by endowing the good and useful and noble occupations, among which we find most of the handicrafts, and doing this out of the ever-increasing surplus wealth our mechanism yields us, we should gradually convince the public of the futility of much of our existing mechanism, and so of the advantage and beauty of the handicrafts. We waste a great deal of our surplus wealth in futilities. I came across an example of this once when building a number of workmen's houses. I was asked to see if the tenants had any complaints to make. I had taken great care about my ranges and had put in good standardised mechanical ranges for the housewife. I went into one cottage and asked the woman how she was getting on. Everything was right, she said, except the range, but it appeared she did not know how to use it because she had never been taught. She did not know how to cook because she had never been taught. She was cooking raw beef-steak on the open fire in the parlour, and while this was going on she had a gramophone playing canned music which had cost her at least four pounds. Here was an example of waste; waste of a good mechanical range, and waste through a bad mechanical toy. We have got to utilise this surplus wealth to protect our handicrafts—the finer things of life.

Nor is it alone a matter of Education. It is rather a matter of "Art" Education and all that it implies. Here lies the province or the function of the Arts, and the purpose of art teaching in a State based on the mechanical order. The Arts must always be non-mechanical. At present they are, in a thousand hard and bitter and destructive ways, subject to the competition of mechanism. The function of the Arts in

the modern state is to set a standard of quality in life and labour. We need the artist, the man who studies these things, to establish for us such standards of quality in all those human occupations where fancy, invention, and imagination enter, or might enter. What we productive artists most need is a continuous workshop tradition. Men of business know how the one thing necessary to carry on a trade is continuity. That is what we productive artists feel with our workshop traditions; we want to make them continuous. Hence, if I were seeking for a formula in which to state the arguments I have outlined, it would be somewhat thus: "That there is a good and a bad in machinery; that the time has now come to discriminate between them, and that this discrimination is the province of the Arts." In this formula is my own particular panacea, and to that end I would disendow all our existing Art schools, crystallise them into productive guilds, and so establish a State-aided guild system, based, for preference, on the principle of the minimum wage. The object of such a system should be the maintenance of standard of quality. These guilds I would have conducted by the craftsmen themselves, and not by committees of ratepayers composed of politicians, manufacturers, and financiers. No new live creative art is possible under such leadership. We might make a great Reality out of our Art schools if we emancipate them and make them productive. At present they have only unreality. The vast sums of money we spend on Art teachers, who train more Art teachers, and Art inspectors who write elaborate and turgid reports to one another, would be much better spent in the mere creation of beautiful things.

The final object of a well-organised modern State is to put the machine into the same relation to life as the slave held in ancient Greece, or the serf in the Middle Ages. Both these periods produced a great civilisation and a great Art. We have not yet done this, because instead of mastering the machine we have allowed it to master us. Industrial peace, as we lived it up to August 1914, only differs in degree from

civilised war, and the one leads to the other. What we need is a new ethic of industry that shall show not only how the two are knit together, but how they shall be humanised, how their mechanism shall be rightly used:

"What shall we aim at? What shall we do?
If we will the dream the dream comes true.
I see no difference in peace that brings
Hate, with a million mechanical things,
And war, that snaps each feverish joint,
Because hate has brought us to breaking point.
Churches—Catholic, Orthodox, Free—
Marionettes decked out to dance;—
Force that mocks the eternal good;—
God maligned as were blind chance;—
This talk of the making and marring of States;—
Dynasties guttering out in stink;—
What should we aim at? How shall we think?
There's the spot of light shines clear
On the soul of man we would ransom here.
If there's a will to power, why then
Let it be power that shall make men.
If there's a need in men for strife,
Let it be turned to the lust of life.
These corn-fields trodden down in blood;
These broken records of what was best
In a world that felt ere it understood;
These children dead at their mother's breast;
These lads that answered their country's call
Each had a thought in his heart as he fell:—
'What sort of a world shall come out of it all?'
The aim, my brothers, is life, not hell."

C. R. ASHBEE.

CHIPPING CAMPDEN.

IBSEN'S TREATMENT OF GUILT.

THE REV. PRINCIPAL FORSYTH, D.D.

IT may be doubted if it is the pulpits that at this hour feel and press most keenly the action of guilt in society. Their metaphysic and mystic have dulled their moral realism till a European war is required to wake it. Their sympathetic insight has in many cases cost them the ethical. Love has thrown holiness to the rear. And the power of a realist and penetrating moral psychology to "find" men and women, though not to heal them, is often rather with the stage than the pulpit. The problem of guilt is presented with first-rate power by the great dramatists of the day, by men like Wagner and Ibsen, who combine the high mystic and symbolic note with a searching moral realism that shears through every lenitive to the bitter truth and inmost ache of life. It is singular how the dramatists gravitate to the philosophies of pessimism. They are not Hegelian. They prolong outside Christianity the old prophetic line of deepening insight into the guilt not of the soul alone but of society—sin solidary, which is more than sin hereditary, as infection from a neighbour is more deadly than entail from our sires. It is no mere fate they find looming over us, but our own past. We are not simply the victims of a driving doom. We are not predestined to failure, and moral failure, by the perversity of things. These dramatists see a different world from Mr Thomas Hardy's. We are not in our misery the sport of the President of the Immortals, nor atoms of a world which has but blundered into being and

deviated into sense. Ibsen especially is more faithful with us than that, and less disposed to encourage our self-excuse and self-pity. He is not tender, but we have many who can be tender for one that is true. Such men tell us that our character has become our destiny. It is our deeds that accumulate our fate. We are responsible for our hypocrisy and its *débâcle.* Tess may have been more of a victim than of a sinner; but the sinners who made a fate for Tess are no mere pawns. They are criminal, they are guilty.

> "Our deeds still travel with us from afar,
> And what we have been makes us what we are."

What we need most, and at bottom most crave, is not extenuation for ourselves, nor evolution beyond ourselves, but the regeneration of ourselves.

To this temper, this sense of social guilt and peril, heading for such a judgment as the war, Ibsen especially has been no mean contributor. And this, by virtue, first, of the moral realism which made him tear the veil from so much stock belief, trite ethic, vulpine egoism, and simpering religion in society; and, second, through the indelible spiritual instincts which drove him to create a poetic symbolism for them in default of any that *he* could find in the Church. The social realism of many of Ibsen's successors and imitators, like Galsworthy or Shaw, is mean and gritty enough. It can be sordid enough and satirical. It is fierce in exposure, but destitute of revelation. It spares not, but it loves not. It can show up inconsistencies (any moral amateur can do that), and it does this neatly (which few can do), but it brings no reconciliation. It cultivates Ibsen's eye for these social hypocrisies and ironies which strike a realism merely empirical, or a vision more quickly witty than deeply wise; but it does not reach that ulterior realism which makes men not only wild but wistful, and whose sense made Ibsen not only a critic but a prophet and a poet. Nor is there much sign that the situation is for them what it was for him—a part of his personal and earnest religion. Their works do not leave us, as even the gory close

of a Shakespeare tragedy does, with the sense of something far more deeply interfused and dimly rounding all. We have from them the sound in our ears of the frayed surf grinding on the broken shore, and dusted with the driven sand; but we have not the murmur nor scent of the infinite sea, beating upon these ragged rocks, and meeting their hideous cruelty with something higher than the soft, the shining, and the fair —whose cruelty can be worse than theirs.

I make another approach. The most obvious sign of the moral deepening and inwardness which have marked the modern mind is the development of the idea of personality. This shows itself not only in a psychology almost entirely new, but also in a warm sympathy and a practical concern for the individual life even of the child, with its needs, powers, and rights. "Little else," says Browning extravagantly, "is worth study than the development of a soul." All this means at last a higher sense of the soul's value. In the region of moral psychology, indeed, the progress is not so great. In the region of what Kierkegaard (another great Scandinavian) has called the psychology of sin we have not achieved so much, partly because we have not been left with so much leeway to make up. The soul (small or great) has been much engrossed with its inspissated sin ever since it felt the holy touch of Christ. The penitential practice of the Middle Ages, and the profound evangelical experience of the great Reformers growing out of that tradition, have produced a literature of repentance and its treatment whose wealth we may see both in Taylor or Donne and in the leading Puritans, and especially in a genius like Goodwin. We are now, indeed, far from the Puritan age on its positive side, but we are not so strange as we may think to its central problem, the problem of sin. And Ibsen, as the representative of a whole class of dramatists, home and foreign, shows that this is so, however it may be ignored by the lighter litterateurs, the cynic wits, or the amiable theologies. The passage from a natural individuality

to a moral personality is for him a stormy one and a tragic. To turn the *Selbst* to the *Ich* is a passage from death to life by an agony. Individualism, which was at once Ibsen's strength and his weakness, is but the early stage of that personalism, truly free, wherein we acquire our souls. Our individuality we begin with, but our personality is a growth—especially by grace.

The stress on personality to which I have alluded has become so great, and its effects so rich, that it has passed into a cult. It may indeed be said to be the chief cult of culture, in so far as that rises above mere æsthetic. And none of the worshippers has been more earnest than Ibsen. His individualism is so titanic that it becomes more than individualism. It becomes personalism. It sacrifices everything, I will not say to egoism, nor to selfishness, but to self-realisation, to the acquired Ego rather than to the instinctive, not to the *Selbst* but to the *Ich*. It is vast enough to provide material of tragedy. But it is individualism all the same—up to his very latest works at least. It remains self-centred. Self-realisation becomes self's occupation. Self-salvation becomes the pursuit in life. Life's very oblations become but efforts, tragically futile, for its own enhancement. And its very self-sacrifice is therefore self-regarding; it is sterile, therefore, and suicidal. Ibsen brings to us no vaster whole, either as a God or a Kingdom of God, in which the soul finds itself. He knows nothing of a new birth in which life, with its old problems still unsolved, yet has found its answer, its world, its destiny, and its peace. The self comes to itself in nothing beyond it; therefore it never really arrives. And the dramatist's heroic individualism ends in a vast gloom and pessimism, as all individualism must when its breezy youth or its blind passion reaches the nether bars of the world and touches the foundation of things. All this cult of personality as the modern type of religion is the idolatry of a principle which, indeed, when it is properly used, carries us far into new regions of the holiness of God. But as culture treats it it is idolatry. It is

the sop of intellectualism or naturalism to ethic. It is the religion of those who think more than they act, who enjoy more than they serve, who criticise more than they learn, and who judge without a measure for any constructive criticism or any last judgment. Veracity, individuality, and freedom, whose ardour is the breath of life to many spiritual failures, are but forms after all; and they may be very empty forms, barren, and even cruel. The question is, what content fills them? Free for what? Free by what? What is free? Why should the individual expect to arrive? What claim has he for completion? What guarantee? He may be unique, but is he indispensable? What grievance if he is arrested or extinguished? What is the value of his little vortex for the great ocean of reality?

Besides, it is the greatest mistake to think that we can achieve our personality by cultivating our individuality. Individuality may provide characters, but not character. To cultivate our own individuality is to think of it much and often, to assert it and resent intrusion. It is often to pamper it. At the upper end this means the Superman, at the lower the crank. We cannot by taking thought add a cubit to our moral stature. To work directly and deliberately at our moral perfection is to ruin it. To take up our own self-culture, even our spiritual self-culture, for a profession is the worst use of life. You cannot make a business of cultivating sanctity without great danger of becoming prigs; or you end as the victims of a demoralising subjectivity which lives in introspection, and frays the religious nerves to shreds. We become our true selves without knowing, while we are dying for some other and better self than ourselves. A whole Saviour is needed, a whole God as Saviour, to extirpate self, to organise the Ego into the divine person and kingdom. It is beyond effort of ours. The most powerful personalities have been people who hardly knew there was such a thing as their personality. They were lost in a task, a duty, a cause, a God. They grew up in their work day and night, they knew not

how. They came on themselves by surprise. They received a salvation they never achieved. They had their souls given them for a prey. They turned them over to their Saviour. They had another end than their self-culture. They did not spend their days and powers tinkering at their perfection. They were not listening to hear their own grass grow.

But when we have written off this idolatry of a great and growing principle like personality, we must recognise how valuable it is in its place. It is a sound thing to be directly and supremely concerned for the unearthly interests of the moral personality—especially if it is not our own. Ibsen makes very much of the social responsibility of the individual as the person which only society can make him to be. And no wonder. This personal interest is slowly becoming our ruling concern both in politics and religion, in affairs and in theology. It even rises to the idea of a collective or corporate personality, like that of a triune God or of a society like the Church. It is an interest that cannot be served without conflict, and often desperate conflict; for it means the bitter collision—less of good and evil than of old good and new. Its ideal is not the idyllic life nor the contemplative, but the earnest, the dramatic, the tragically holy—as God's supreme act of the Cross reveals the holy to be.

Now, when Ibsen as a dramatist set himself to ask what it was that stood most stiffly against his ideal of free and fertile personality, and what most bitterly thwarted it, he came face to face neither with human weakness, ignorance, nor misfortune, but with human guilt, guilt bearing down upon us from the race as heredity, but increased by individuals. And guilt is self failing itself. To choose self is to die, but to repent is to find self newborn. For Jesus guilt was not but one of many evils. Guilt was all evils in one. Hence his religion was "Repent," "Be redeemed." And the negative side of this message is Ibsen's also. Guilt was the curse. And it demanded more than amnesty, and more than deliver-

ance for the future. It demanded atonement for the past a cure which could only be real, he thought, in the form of sacrifice and death. Yet mere sacrifice, mere death, does not atone. We do not feel that it does in any of Ibsen's tragic *dénouements*. For he did not really get beyond the notion of each man being his own atoner, the notion of a kind of atoning suicide, in a death that satisfied as nemesis but not as holy judgment or Redemption (*Rosmersholm*), and far less as Reconciliation. He felt this himself. For him death conquers life, not life death. His reformers become guilty failures. The brevity of life and its guilt are the two things that for him destroy man's power to stand up to the world; and they are powers with which he has not resources in himself to cope. He must be redeemed. So far the dramatist sees. But his Redeemer never stands on the earth.

Ibsen is a moral critic of society, he is not a revealer of the holy. So far he is analytic rather than prophetic—though it is a prophet's analysis. At the core of his moral and spiritual world he does not rise to a positive faith in the ability of the moral Power to recover its own loss at the hands of society; he has not a faith in the self-recuperative power of the All Holy, the faith of God's self-revelation by a New Creation which transcends the old. He has only the negative sense of man's degeneration, set in the light of a moral ideal too æsthetic, and therefore too inert, to redeem. He has the sense of the sinfulness of society, some sense also of his own mission to bring home its guilt as by fire, and leave it no hope but in a redemption; yet this redemption he cannot ensure. Such redemption as he allows is but a new nature-force, when the call is really for a new moral act re-creative on the world scale. What is needed by the world he exposes is beyond evolution, it is rescue. Social reform can never meet the case, but only a revolution in the soul; he is rather disrespectful to social reformers. It is more than fresh impressions or sanguine impulses that man needs, more even than powerful ideas; he needs radical regeneration. He needs

most, neither the high dream nor the good wish, but the good will. He needs to be "soundly converted," a radical change both of soul and of heart. Poets he requires, and lovers of freedom, in their place, but, above all, apostles of redemption in the name of righteous love. He might abjure the phrase, but it is his meaning. Ibsen is not an apostle of Christianity, but he does drag his age to God's bar as its great concern. He drags it to God's righteous bar, if he does not meet it with His holy Grace, His judging, rectifying Grace. He is a prophet of righteousness if strange to Grace, of judgment if he fall short of a New Creation. And his religion is deeper even than his ethic. It is a mystical ethic, and a religion which, like Christianity, is driven by its ethical nature to deal with society as desperately wrong, damnably wrong, rather than either ideally great or pitifully weak. Ibsen is at least in the vestibule of the Christian temple. He has not "found Christ," but he has found what drives us to Christ, the need Christ alone meets. He unveils man's perdition, and makes a Christ inevitable for any hope of righteousness.

Christianity is not primarily a religion of either idealism or kindness, neither of imagination nor of heart, but of conscience. What drew Christ to earth was (so far as faith's knowledge goes) the guilt of the world. It was love at issue with such guilt. For it was holy love. The mere affection or the pity, even of God, could not save a world like this, nor set up a new heaven and earth of righteousness. What reaches us from Him is holy love acting in grace to the sin that wounds it to death. And if such terms are banned as theological, we must simply give up discussing the problem. They belong to the deep moral psychology of the situation. Anti-theology is here Obscurantism, not to say Philistinism. Philanthropy, of course, Christianity intends; but chiefly final and spiritual and social righteousness. That is the theological problem. It is not speculative but practical and constructive. It is of the conscience. And one bane of what is called Christian society is what Ibsen presses without mercy—that

it has sacrificed the conscience to prosperity and social comfort, reality to effect, truth to getting things done, and the Kingdom of God to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. It has sent guilt to sleep by benevolence; it has softened egoism by charity rather than subdued it by faith; and the manner of acquisition has been salved by the style of distribution.

"Christianity," says Troeltsch, "must not shirk the reproach of a moralised conception of history." This is a way of understanding history foreign to many, who would seek in it nothing but interconnections dynamic but ethically indifferent. The deeper and more ethical view, truly, is spreading even among scientific historians; but it was certainly foreign enough to those exponents of the Cross, its history, and its social ethic with whom Ibsen had to do in the official religion of his day. From the Church of his land and race, with its caked and sun-dried Lutheranism, he received nothing. It was to him but the organ of the conventional, pharisaical, and reactionary—more orthodox than evangelical, with its great swords now turned to grubbing ploughs, and its old fires making coffee. Nor did Teutonic Idealism, with its optimistic worship of the good, the lovely, and the true, offer him a gospel. His tragedy is not easily brought under Hegel's æsthetic of tragedy as the collision of two goods (which, indeed, hardly fits the greatest tragedy in the world, *King Lear*). Nothing ecclesiastical, philosophic, or economic could cure the public situation as this seer read it. Nothing in the present war would have surprised him. It is but a transcription in red of the drab curse in a competitive peace. No alliance with these great empires of Orthodoxy or Idealism could save the public from the consequences of the incurable Philistinism of the fabulously rich, the princes of this world, the men who carried everything before them—from them and their idolaters. But at least he could lay bare their hollowness, slit their pious illusions, carry into their houses the poison of their public falsity, and let out their sawdust by his ruthless exposure. He did not denounce; he simply laid

bare the ghastly nakedness of this worldly modernity. Their world, he says, *ruit mole sua.* Its own prosperity damns it. Hell comes very near the surface in most places. The warmth which makes life comfortable for many comes from cellars stoked by demons. And such religion as they have is a propriety or a luxury where it is not a veneer.

It is a result of this acute and ruthless "inwardation" of the moral life, at once so subtle and so universal, that the idea of sin changes accordingly. With the course of history we grow more familiar with spiritual wickedness in high places and seats deep hidden. We pass from youth to maturity, from mediæval sin, instinctive, elemental, naïf, and personal, to modern sin, more cool, organised, and inveterate, more respectable, social, and hollow. Hate is organised. The Prince of Darkness is a gentleman—at least he plays the devil for "culture." We know relatively less, perhaps, of passion which bluntly ignores a God it owns, and relatively more of the passion that will not own, that denies or sneers. For organised, defiant rebellion of the Satanic kind, with God very real, we have organised servile and cynical hypocrisy of the Mephistophelian and insinuating kind, with heaven but an empty eye-socket. Ibsen's conception of sin is Mephistopheles stripped of his romance, stupidly wicked, and haunting ignoble hearts and homes. Evil for him has no glamour of grandeur; it is mean and even squalid.

The vices Ibsen exposes are perhaps tougher in an old society like that of Europe than in newer lands. And no doubt there is another side to things. There is a world of belief, honest and kind, within the Christian Church in lands where it is more active than in Lutheranism, a world of more than ethical Puritanism which he and his like have never trod. But even there, even in Anglo-Saxondom, we are made to feel the sterile result of severing the prophetic from the apostolic, judgment from promise, and promise from grace —the result of finding, like Carlyle, the word of God's severity elsewhere than in the Cross of His love. On the

other hand, we see no less in evangelical pharisaism the vicious moral results of separating the apostolic from the prophetic, of canonising doctrine, of canalising grace, of crystallising truth, and closing inspiration; or, on the other side, of sweetly detaching the love and comfort in the gospel from the judgment in the Cross and the righteousness of the Kingdom.

Ibsen's is a dismal lesson, but one that the age and the Church alike much need if only it were properly read to them, as Ibsen does not. The kind of revelation we need most is one that will read the lesson to us in the process of a still higher work with us. The misfortune is that while the critic with the judgment does not grasp the revelation, the Church with the revelation does not critically grasp the problem, nor duly attend to those who do. Therefore it cannot adjust its revelation to the age. It is too occupied with the comfort of religion, the winsome creed, the wooing note, and the charming home. It does not realise the inveteracy of sin, the ingrained guilt, the devilry at work, and the searching judgment upon society at large. God's medicine for society burns as it goes down. And we need a vast catastrophe like a European war to bring home what could have been learned from a Christian revelation that gave due place to the element of saving judgment in the Cross of Christ. What could the state of European society bring from a God of holy love but something like this?—which in so far therefore is good. At least it is neither outside nor irrelevant to the providence of God's salvation of the world. It is the coefficient of judgment in that redemption writ large. The love of God is there for something more than the social comfort, domestic delight, and refined religion even of the Church. Spiritual evolution is an ascending procession of tragic crises. The Cross of Christ shows that to be the nature of man's redemption. Holy love saves by divinest judgment. What reveals love to men establishes righteousness among men in the same tremendous act. The Cross that forgave also set up God's

kingdom. He who is the world's salvation is also its last judgment. The divine prophet is not there chiefly to please and to be popular. Even the apostle's more illuminating and empowering word is too solemn to be merely beautiful, successful, and happy. Yet I turn from Ibsen's searching, not to say shattering, exposures of our decent and prosperous guilt, and of our powerlessness to escape it. And, seeking a warmer climate, I pick up by accident Baron von Hügel's *Catharine of Siena.* And my eye lights on this: "Our true self-love is the love of God; for we were made by that love and for it." That goes higher than Ibsen, and deeper. But it is more than a sweet saying, more than beautiful, more than soul-soothing, more than anything for which it would be quoted in most pulpits, and mentioned by the hearers as the sermon's beauty-spot. It plants us on the reality which is the consuming fire at the centre of the moral world, the world of history, to be out of which flame is perdition. If there were any for whom the present calamity of the world impugned the goodness of a Sovereign God, they might be invited to reverse the action of their thought, and to reflect that if goodness be righteous and not only kind, and if love be holy and not only sweet, then the chief challenge of God's providence would arise if there were no such *débâcle* of the Europe we have come to see. The worst judgment on God would be if he had no judgment for such a state of things, and did not turn into the hell of war the nations that forget him and his Kingdom in a kingdom of this world richer than ever before in all ways but those that are most surely his.

There is one theme in particular to which Ibsen returns again and again. It is that which his own experience and observation combined to teach him about the insufficiency for himself of the natural man, if nature is pronounced in him at all. The dramatist can never get away from the moral collapse that he sees waiting upon dull success, upon the mere able instinctive man, the decent, capable worldling, at a moral

crisis. He is always showing us the collapse of lusty social energy before the action of the great powers which have the last arbitrament of affairs, the final ruin of "the prince of this world," whom I have already described as the man who carries all before him, without moral thoughtfulness, to say nothing of moral scruple. It is a collapse where the man's dim spiritual presentiments and sensibilities only increase the confusion and hasten the tragedy. We need but take for an example *The Master Builder*.

I have been reading extracts from the articles of the dramatic critics in the press some twenty years ago, when that play was first presented in English, both in London and New York. And the dullness and the abuse in them is of a very distressing kind. Their writers seem to have been all their lives so preoccupied with the Georgian conventional, and the Victorian sentimental, so strange to ethic and so engaged with æsthetic interests of a tartan type, that their moral insight sinks to theatrical *blague* set in literary stodge. They are stupid and turgid. They seem the work of good fellows and moral dullards overtaken and surprised by a genius whose word is a sword; and they are fumbling for their stage thunder in the dark. We are really getting on; for it is not easy now to understand their bewilderment and their fatuity. I remember the like note when Browning began to be reckoned with. Only critics of the first rank can recognise the genius when he comes in the shape of a prophet, with the power to criticise criticism itself by the last standard of all. Solness the builder is but one of many types in Ibsen's work of the way in which the artist who is more than a dreamer takes the lead of the mere man of energy and power; only, however, to be ruined by the finer conscience which, as artist, he carries with him, and which is not strengthened by any divine faith to endure its own revelations, or to turn its searching judgments to saving purpose. The artist rises above the mere man of power, but he gains his end at a frightful cost to himself and others, a

cost too crushing for anything but a living faith to bear. No art, nor art's public success (Ibsen would tell us), can avert the collapse through homely guilt, or make the morbid conscience strong. The searching charges of such a conscience cannot be written off as sickly by a conscience merely robust and too morbidly healthy to feel them. They can only be met by redemption—not by pooh-poohing the charge but by dealing with it divinely at its worst. "O God, whose omnipotence is shown most chiefly in having mercy and forgiving," as the Collect greatly says. Nothing becomes the best or greatest of us like humble repentance.

> "The best of what we do and are,
> Just God, forgive."

Nor can ideals realise themselves. With Solness, we cannot climb as high as we build. Less and less, as we rise from mere power or ability to art and conscience, can we make the deed match the thought. As our ideal refines, the *remora* is felt to be heavier and heavier, and we drag a longer chain. There is a paralysing accuser following us but the more subtly. We may pine to reform things, and to release upwards either society or ourselves, but without our soul's release it ends at last and at most in the futility of a self-atonement which is but suicide. We can do as Solness did, we can ignore God in our joy of power and seek last his Kingdom in our success, we can renounce his Revelation, we can adopt Humanitarianism for Faith, we can give up building churches and devote ourselves to provide homes for the people, homes even with high towers. But such ardours and inspirations will not avert the guilty downfall—so deadly because it is from our chief height. Mere thought, mere culture, takes us in visions to the pinnacle of the temple only to cast us down and dash us to pieces. It is the present tragedy of an emancipation which renounces redemption, a civilisation without regeneration. We can burn the past, but we cannot create a future. We can wreck civilisation by culture, but do nothing for the reign of God and much for the kingdom of Satan. We can release

ourselves from all we have received, from the past, from parents, home, tradition, reverence, faith, and God. We can develop the cynical Superman who thinks to defy God, man, and morals with engines and artillery. We can dismiss both pity and chivalry and meditate terror. But we cannot release ourselves from conscience for ever, and especially from the terrible action in us and on us of a Christian conscience which has ceased to be a clear voice, and still more to be a mighty word, but whose righteousness is none the less the subtle and final power of human society, and whose mills grind slow but small. That release of us, that restitution of things, is God's monopoly. He alone has the power that heals the conscience by calamity, wipes out guilt, and creates in us and for us the only condition, the moral condition, for the final realisation of our ideals.

The moral situation of the world is the central issue in it; and it is a situation so tragic that the central reality of the world must act tragically in saving it. God's act in redeeming such a world must be the victory in a moral tragedy which compresses human history. For its Redeemer could not stand outside it and save by fiat. And perhaps we might speculate that art will find no due expression of religion till some genius arise to do for the social soul what Shakespeare did for the individual, and to write the *Hamlet*, *Macbeth*, or *Lear* of the race, ending with its *Tempest* and the pacification of all things. But, after all, the tragedy of the social soul, being more or less impersonal, may be to that extent incapable of poetic or artistic treatment. The divine comedy of paradise regained for the race may be less at the command of genius than the human tragedy of a paradise lost in a pair.

There are genial mystics and moral amateurs who, being unable to find a healer for the guilt of the world, escape from the situation by reducing its poignancy. They answer the problem by the previous question. The sting of sin is only in our feeling. Nothing is really written up against us. That is

an illusion. Why bother about sin? There is really no guilt. There is error. There is ignorance. There is weakness. And there is a power in such things to hamper our present, and maim our future. But there is no guilt. For there is no supreme revelation of a holiness absolute, irresistible, and blessed, with which we have first and last to do. The sequel of sin mars our future, but the guilt of it need not terrify us from the past. The wrath of God is a metaphor, or a morbid product of our disordered conscience. To speak of a curse on us from the moral power with which we are at strife is language extreme and archaic. It is inconsistent with any revelation of the divine Love that suffuses all and will smooth out all.

But Ibsen, being a man of genius and, above all, of moral and religious genius, being, too, the legatee of an ancient, experienced, and disenchanted civilisation which is weary with its own extravagance and impotence, has an insight of the conscience too incisive for any such happy issue from the trouble. At least he does not take short cuts and easy methods. It is true that such seers are pooh-poohed by the bright spirits of an untried naturalism. But the optimism of a young world with its shining face is no more equal to the last problems of spirit and conscience, as such genius poses them, than the invasion of the Northern races with their Arianism was equal to the task which Catholicism had to accomplish for the Europe of that day. The guilt of the situation haunts Ibsen everywhere. But it is no mere spectre to him. Those "Ghosts" are an awful reality within us, as he preaches in one whole play of that name. They are more than an entail. They have become part of our personal being. And religion, so far from laying such ghosts, rather wakes them—such religion at least as Ibsen has; and he has much of his kind. And much of our kind. It goes much farther than monistic harmony or genial love. Self-accusation, repentance, closes his vision of the modern soul and its success. Most of his heroes, as I have said, are sinners, capable sinners,

who break on their sense of guilt and on the impotence it entails to escape from the ban of self. There is but one way, he says, to rear the true Ego out of the deadly self, to raise personality out of sterile pride, and make a mule a man. It is the way of repentance. It will not do here to take refuge in the plea of weakness and mere regret. He felt his own weakness keenly. His letters (which I have been using for commentary) show how autobiographical his dramas were. But he could not give the trouble the name of weakness only. He was thorough, and he called it guilt. And it wore him down. He had enough conscience to know the nature of tne human burden ; but he had not enough to bear it, still less to roll it upon another. He would be his own Redeemer, but he could not. There was no one to create in him the repentance which alone must create personality out of such chaotic material as he found. He had the conscience to feel the sin of the world, but not the power of remedy. This is no construction of his mind on our part ; it is his own confession. A Messiah, he saw and said, was the need of the soul. But the hour for him was not ripe. "I am not he, though few feel the curse as I do." Like his age, he knew what a redemption should be better than he knew the Redeemer that has been. And, like many a thinker to-day, he understood the psychology of Redemption more than its power, the way it should take more than the way it did. The Christian Messiah of the New Humanity he could not accept. He had the moral vision to feel the need of him, but not the spiritual power to recognise the gift of him through the hulls of his Church. "The Messiah must be sinless—and I am too tied and bound in the chain of the egoism of my age." He is Amfortas, and he has no Parsifal. He has an immense sense of himself, but no faith in himself. He is deeply religious, but he has no personal trust.

We shall not understand Ibsen nor his moral value to his age till we feel that he was not simply a power, nor an artist, nor a sharp moral realist in his criticism of society, but, behind

and beneath all this, a prophetic and religious spirit: one most deeply moved by the spiritual problem and weakened by the spiritual failure of his time — by the lack of a gospel adequate to the doom he so profoundly saw and felt behind the very humdrum of society. He was always aware of the rodent with sharp eyes and teeth, living in fierce terror behind the grubby walls of life—walls pretentiously papered with so much that was dead in tint and common in design. He was never taught by any competent mind to haunt the spot where absolute ethic and infinite mystic meet in Christ. Like many of his kind, he seems never to have made effort to come to close quarters with any of the Christian master-spirits of his age—as Schleiermacher and others—whose genius and whose knowledge of the human heart are not unworthy of his own, but whose knowledge of the saving revelation is still greater—original, profound, and searching. How did he miss his own Scandinavian Kierkegaard and his inspired revision of the Lutheran creed? Such men as these construe the gospel in full sight of the great soul's moral problem and the world's last crisis. The great Reformers did, as the legatees of Evangelical Catholicism. If it be true empirically that we know good through evil, it is still more true spiritually that we know evil by good and curse by Christ. For there we know man's conscience in its moral malady, misery, majesty, and redeemed destiny.

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THE WAR: A QUAKER APOLOGIA.

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PROFESSOR SONNENSCHEIN, in the HIBBERT JOURNAL for July, says: "It is a strange thing that the Society of Friends, which has always made the doctrine of the Inner Light a prominent feature of its system of ethics, should fall back upon texts of scripture as a bulwark for the defence of the doctrine of non-resistance."

When a man so generally well-informed thinks that the Quaker testimony is a deduction from texts—that Friends "pin their faith to the text 'Resist not evil'"—I welcome the opportunity of correcting an error probably widespread. Like other people, we Friends often refer to the teaching of the New Testament, but on this, as on every other subject, our guidance is living and immediate. No merely external law will bear strain. Others have the texts as well as we. Their meaning is unmistakable, as I will try to show; but how do fading Greek words on vellum, copied countlessly into modern print, stand against the living call of the nation? The voice of the pulpits, where the recruiter is often to be heard, is a sufficient answer.

But we believe that we and all men have, or may have, at the back of our personality, a Presence, a Spirit which is akin to, or one with, the spirit which was at the back of the outward human personality of Jesus Christ. No one who is familiar with the inward landscape and with the puzzles of

personality will quarrel with my alternative phrasing, "akin to" or "one with." Sufficient it is that our supreme authority, sitting at the ganglion of the nerves of motive, habitually referred to for guidance in small things and great, obedience to whom brings peace to a man and dignity to his conduct, this Lord of life, we call the living Christ. His instructions are, in the spirit but not necessarily in the letter, like such instructions of the historic Jesus as have escaped the scattering years. With all solemnity and reverence I make this great human claim. It is not a claim to infallibility. Those, again, who know the inward landscape and the complexity of human personality will easily grant me this. But this Presence gives to the common world a worthy significance and an undying freshness. This anchor holds where texts are ignored; and that is why Friends can take no part in war. For to do so would foul the Christ Within, would desecrate the inward personality, as war destroys every lovely outward thing the great Handicraftsman through long æons has made. War is a form of collective mental disease and moral plague. This call is to us supreme over every other; it makes for us a transcendental moral obligation; therefore Friends find that they must serve their country in some other way.

Our faith is that "the Lord God omnipotent reigneth." These words were prefixed this year as a motto to the Yearly Meeting's Epistle, a sort of annual encyclical to Friends everywhere. They can hardly mean, in face of a ruined Europe, that some omnipotent Person, watching every detail from afar, and loving all men, could raise a finger and stop it by miracle to-morrow, but chooses not to do so. We must look deeper. We are in a world not, to all appearance, governed by beneficent Omnipotence, a world where God's "love is at issue still with sin, visibly, when a wrong is done on earth"—a world where our help is actually needed to achieve any good, where God's workmen are all human. But we hold, all the same, the faith that the Lord God *all-*

conquering reigneth. That is, we believe in the supremacy of spiritual forces over material, in the long run.

What the attraction of material particles under the law of gravitation is in the physical world, that we believe the attraction of persons under the law of love is in the human world. It is the condition of stability, the law which always has its way in the end. Volcanoes may throw up their tons of fiery matter, earthquakes make foundations shiver, tempests turn the sea into rolling ridges; but all settles again. So war and the pride of Empire, blood and iron and "the will to power" have their day of destructive triumph; but they pass, and friendly human helpfulness rebuilds the ruin they have wrought. We know that conquest is a will o' the wisp; that all Empires have fallen; that our own so-called Empire, more truly a federation mixed with empire, can only survive by losing its Imperial characteristics of conquest and subjugation; we know that conquering force is not only no remedy, but carries its own destruction with it. One might expand at length here; for love, in one or other of its forms, called sometimes friendship, sympathy or pity, is the test of value applicable to all experience; it makes "the green and gold of life."

Broadly, we believe that it is our duty and privilege to be faithful to the all-conqueror whose name is Love, in spite of "principalities and powers, the world-rulers of this darkness." We expect that this may bring us into difficulties, perhaps into much suffering. We know that our position is awkward, "wrongheaded" I see one clergyman calls it in the last number. We realise that as part of the nation, particularly of a democratic nation, the individual who isolates himself must bear the burden of justification. We know that we seem to be shirking, to be holding cheaply and even selfishly a high profession; that while others die for us in war, we escape.

Believe me, this situation has caused among us much searching of heart, and made difficult many a personal decision

—whether to enlist or not. To refuse out of fidelity to the "Strong Son of God" makes a great demand on faith. It is, I think, a high and difficult attainment; indeed, I speak not "as having attained, but as pressing forward to the mark of the prize of the high calling." It is not surprising that some of our young men have felt it right to enlist—about one in ten as compared with the rest of the people. On the other hand, many outside our Society are with us in our protest.

I am bound to admit that we are in this dilemma, and that we therefore do well to walk with humility, with careful stepping, free from all censoriousness or spiritual swagger, respecting the convictions of others and not belittling their great sacrifice. But we are not without our defence, even to the practical man who is deaf to our doctrine.

Though it is not ours to kill, it may be ours to heal; and healers are needed. Up to the present four hundred and fifty of our young men, with doctors and nurses, have gone to the war at our own cost as an Ambulance Unit, and as a War Victims' Relief Force or Reconstruction Unit. The applications for service have been greater than the organisations could accept. These lads have done the most dangerous and the dirtiest work. Four of them were said, by a colonel who watched them rescuing the wounded under fire all through the second battle of Ypres, to have deserved the Victoria Cross. Some have dropped home broken in health. Their capacity, their cheerful labours, and their single-minded ways have earned golden opinions from the French military leaders. The Reconstruction Unit is building huts, providing seed, caring for orphans, providing maternity homes, and restoring sanitation in the Marne and other desolated districts. Many thousands of bales of clothing have gone from our London collecting warehouse. The interned foreigners in England and their English wives and families left destitute, and the prisoners of war, are the special care of another large committee, whose work has plainly helped international goodwill.

Again, if we cannot make war, it may be ours to make

peace. It may be well for the nation that there is a nucleus of watchful people, not touched by the gadfly of war, ready to put in an oar whenever there is the remotest chance of peace. If we can accelerate it by a single day, we may save our country three millions of money and a thousand lives. There is great need also for enlightening public opinion on the conditions for permanent peace in Europe. To this we have set ourselves. Some three hundred meetings on this and kindred questions were held by Friends in the first six months of the war.

Perhaps (if I may be pardoned this foolishness of boasting) it may be permitted to say that most Friends did not become patriots in August 1914, and that it has often been difficult for them to find out what change in their habits would serve the country better than the work they have always done. They are busy with many social tasks which this war will make harder, and if we seem to do less just now than others do, perhaps the quiet years of dull work in the past and in the future may equalise our service to our land.

As things are, Friends are so few that their young men are not missed in the army, and can be of use in special services elsewhere. But how if we constituted a serious fraction of the nation, or our opinions were even in a majority? This objection to Christian practice occurred to Celsus, and will have occurred to others. Many other things would, however, be different then. If pacifists were a large minority here, they would be sure to be strong abroad also; and between us we might have saved Europe the war altogether. It is enough that we solve the present problem and that we find, as mathematicians would say, a particular integral; for there are not enough data in hand to find the constants for the general form of solution. We should need at least three, concerning time, place, and persons.

And, real as our dilemma is, it is not so bad as that in which those Christian ministers who believe in war find themselves. I think it would be more frank avowedly to drop Christ for the time. But that they cannot openly do. I am

not mocking. They have my real sympathy, whether they value it or not. But they will demand proofs of my assumption that ours is the Christian line of conduct, and so here beginneth at length an array of texts.

It is not necessary to take the "Sermon on the Mount" literally in order to get at the mind of Jesus. It is not a "Sermon," but a collection of the memorable sayings of the Galilean ministry, gathered together in the manner of Matthew, scattered in fifteen passages under the more historical scheme of Luke. No one knows the context of any, the possible qualifications, the changes caused by a generation of verbal transmission. Nor does any one of my readers even begin to obey it literally. We do not give to everybody who asks us, we discriminate; we do not lend all we have without security. We insure our lives, though we are bidden to take no thought for the morrow. On similar lines we must doubtless interpret "Resist not evil." All these passages have a clear meaning (here irrelevant), and so has "Love your enemies," and "Turn the other cheek." All that my argument requires is that by no allowance for epigram, or poetic vividness, or uncertain context, or Oriental manner, can these passages be made to mean the precise opposite of what they say. Neither they, nor the nine fruits of the Spirit, would be in place on the standards of an army.

But, as said above, we do not deduce "non-resistance" from the literal form of these or any texts. This word says both too much and too little, and it is not the best way to describe Friends' attitude. It is a negative word, a legal prohibition, and therefore dangerous, wooden, and unadaptable—as Law is. There may be imagined cases where resistance would be the best course. Let us speak, instead, of following the law of loving-kindness. This is positive, adaptable, a gospel, not a law.

More penetrating than any words was our Lord's refusal, in the Temptation, of the suggestion of a military career; though the Son of Man would have been welcomed by all

readers of the Book of Enoch, then current literature, at the head of a liberating Jewish rebellion, to conquer for God and righteousness "all the Kingdoms of the World and the glory of them." But he believed that spiritual forces rule material, and chose to use them. He took hearts captive, not bodies. If a war for righteousness and the Kingdom of God under Jesus Christ was regarded as a temptation of the Devil, what shall we say of wars for the balance of power?

It may be better to deal with the difficult texts rather than to accumulate the easy ones, out of the abundance available. It is said that there is no definite instruction in the New Testament on the subject of war. True. The early Christians did not attack the institutions of their time, such as slavery. Paul returned a runaway slave, and exhorted Christian slaves to obedience. The New Testament contains no word on gambling, on suicide, on teetotalism, on polygamy, on public or political conduct. Timothy's stomach, the slavery of the Old Testament, the inferiority of women, the poor "always with you," are well-known phrases from texts which have been thrown at reformers all along. Happily there exists in the Bible no systematic treatise on Christian ethics. Gospels and Epistles were written to meet immediate needs; and under the Roman Peace war was far away and not in question.

The "Two Swords" passage (Luke xxii. 35–38) I have treated at length elsewhere.[1] Here all I can say is that our Lord was, in the deep depression of Gethsemane, reversing all His old instructions for His missionaries. They were now to take purse and scrip, money and food, like other people, as well as a sword—"for the things that concern me have an end" (τὰ περὶ ἐμοῦ τέλος ἔχει). He seems at the moment to have thought that all was over. He had just achieved His last great act of submission to His Father's

[1] *Interpreter*, April 1912; and my *War from the Quaker Point of View*, section 5 (Headleys), 1915; also the volume reporting the United Summer School of Social Workers at Swanwick, 1915. It has not been "ignored," as Professor Sonnenschein says.

will, that is, to the pain and shame of the Cross. Compare the words on the Cross, "It is finished" (τετέλεσται), and the misery of despair in "Why hast Thou forsaken me?" This translation of τέλος is the only one the word will bear; it is so rendered in A.V., and supported in Thayer's ed. of Grimm's N.T. Lexicon, and admitted to be the translation of the "Greek" in the Revisers' margin. The occurrence of a "fulfilment" of prophecy, irrelevant and unlikely to be due to our Lord, has misled the Revisers, who translate τέλος as "fulfilment." Moffatt's New Translation supports my rendering. The advocates of war are thus reduced to a word of momentary despair, rectified immediately afterwards when Peter used the sword.

The question as to how the two swords came to be there cannot be answered for lack of information. It is most natural and probable that one or two disciples had turned timid in face of the crisis evidently at hand, and had taken arms. Is it seriously suggested that the Twelve and their Master generally travelled armed?

As to the scourge of small cords with which "He drove them all out, *both the sheep and the cattle*" (R.V. in John ii. 15), I never heard that a shepherd's staff was an instrument of war. The text and the situation alike show that the scourge was needed for the animals. To purify the temple nobody would begin single-handed to thrash a company of drovers; He would drive out the cattle and sheep, and the men, under the influence of a great personality, would follow. Similarly, He overturned the *tables* of the money-changers, He did not scourge the men; and when it came to baskets and cages of doves, where the co-operation of the owners was necessary to remove them, He *exhorted* them to take these things hence. Much unimaginative rhetoric has been spilt over this example of purely moral power.

That Jesus and His disciples were polite enough to centurions not to be always reminding them of the wickedness of their profession, and that they often dined with them,

is an example which I hope would be followed by the stiffest Quaker. What scanty imaginations some text-hunters possess!

The Christian attack was not upon institutions; for the Master saw that, as bees secrete the wax for their honeycomb, so men secrete their institutions; and that the Roman Empire, slavery, war, and much beside, could only give way to a Kingdom of God which was within. For the coming of this He worked.

The most surprising use of a Scripture passage in favour of this war which I have yet met with, is in the turn given, in the July number of the HIBBERT JOURNAL, by Dr J. M. Wilson, to the three similitudes connected with the shepherd and the flock, at the beginning of the tenth chapter of John. Canon Wilson treats them as one and calls them by a new title, "The Parable of the Wolf and the Shepherd." The first deals with the thief who climbed over the wall, as compared with Christ Himself, who entered by the door. This parable, avowedly directed against the Pharisees, it is said was not understood by them. In v. 7 we begin a new parable, probably spoken on a different occasion, but placed here from its verbal likeness: "Then said Jesus unto them *again* . . . I am the door of the sheep," clearly a different metaphor. Thirdly, we come to the parable of the Good Shepherd, as compared with the hirelings who flee when danger comes because they are hirelings. The wolf occupies a subordinate position in the background; there is no emphasis upon him, nor any light on whether the shepherd's mere presence would have kept him off, or whether the use of his staff was contemplated. A thunderstorm would have served the purpose of the teaching as well as a wolf. For the object of the three parables was to attack the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the established paid religious teachers. "All who came before me are thieves and robbers." Happily we do not call them hirelings now, but this is a parable which had, and doubtless always will have, a value of its own; and we must not make the wolf the party attacked, and let the hireling shepherds off. Canon Wilson rightly finds in it an echo of

Ezekiel xxxiv., which is devoted to an attack upon the shepherds of Israel, who fed themselves but not the flock. Canon Wilson says these were the secular rulers; but I am not so sure of that; and Jesus did not so apply it. His "thieves" were certainly men, not, as Canon Wilson says, wolves. Very queer results often follow from working out all the details of a parable, as though it were a dogma, instead of letting it remain a parable, an illustration of just one idea. We shall remember the sleepy unjust judge, the unjust steward, the "austere" man, and others.

Canon Wilson goes on to assert that the Germans are the wolf, we the shepherd, and I am not sure who exactly are the sheep, unless it be mankind in general. These are arguable propositions, and from them Dr Wilson writes an admirable essay on the "Wolf Spirit"; but he must not claim to be interpreting the parable of Christ. The parable is his own. Fighting, which does not come into the parable at all, becomes here its central feature, and we are even warned against a premature peace. The hireling, the central subject of our Lord's parable, does not appear in this exposition. When a man so acute, and withal so moderate and liberal, as Dr Wilson is driven to press into the service of the present war a passage so irrelevant, one feels that there can be no case for Christ's sanction to war.

Space forbids us in this article to enter on the practice of the early Christians and the Teaching of the Fathers, more than to say summarily that up to 150 A.D. there were no Christians in the army, except some who were converted while already soldiers, and not yet released; that with few exceptions this continued till about 200 A.D.; that during the third century the practice of enlistment became gradually commoner, as the early enthusiasm faded, though it was still forbidden by the leading Fathers; and that the fourth century, which saw the paganising of the Catholic Church in so many other ways, saw it, under state patronage, supporting war. The original Christian ferment, exhausted in the dough of

the Empire, was left to work only through a series of mystical sects down to our own day. Professor Sonnenschein's statement that "large numbers of early Christians served in the Roman armies" is one of those loose assertions that ought not to be made in a historical enquiry. It treats all early Christians as though they lived at the same time.[1]

Doubtless the question is complicated by the fact that the oath to the deified emperors had to be taken by a soldier. But the words often used show plainly the objection to war as war. Tertullian said that Christ, in disarming Peter, had disarmed every soldier, and declared that litigation was forbidden to Christians, much more war. Justin Martyr said that Christians did not fight, but counted the Devil as the source of war, and Christianity as the fulfilment of the prophecy that swords should be turned into ploughshares.[2] A more complete treatment of this part of the subject would include references to Irenæus, Tatian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Cyprian and Lactantius, besides Justin Martyr and, above all, Tertullian.

The third century was the time when the Church changed its love feasts into copies of the great Mysteries of the Greeks and Asiatics, with their sacramental efficacy; when it found the need for creeds as a defence against diversity of thought; and when the sacerdotal idea crept back out of Judaism and Paganism into Christianity. The same causes as were working here silenced the testimony against war. It is also profoundly interesting that the same Fathers who disapproved of a military life, disapproved of judicial oaths also. The whole movement of the third century was a single self-consistent withdrawal from the ideals of Jesus into more habitual ways which the multitude could walk in. The Quaker movement was "Primitive Christianity Revived," or it was, and is, nothing.

[1] For references to support this patristic argument I must refer again to my recently published book on *War*, section 6; also to W. E. Wilson's *Christ and War* (Headleys), to Dymond's *Essay on War*, to Robert Barclay's *Apology*, chap. xv., and to Backhouse and Tylor's *Early Church History*.

[2] *Trypho*; *Apol. II.*; and *Ad Zenam*.

Let me guard, in conclusion, against one common error. Friends do not follow Tolstoy in his objection to all force, and therefore to all government. From many a dock a Quaker prisoner in the seventeenth century pleaded his loyalty to the Government, though he could not take the oath of allegiance. (To tender this oath was an easy and common way for the Anglican magistrates of Charles II. to get rid of a troublesome Quaker.) Isaac Penington wrote fully on the subject in his "Somewhat Spoken to a Weighty Question concerning the Magistrates' Protection of the Innocent." Friends believe in the police, and in all analogous uses of force. But we do not believe that foreign nations are a criminal population, nor that war works the ends of justice. The whole spirit of war is the denial of law. But it is too rough and vague a treatment of so complex a moral issue to confuse war, as a special and unique form of force, with force in general. Professor Norman Smith, in his article on "The Moral Sanction of Force" in the July number of this Journal, appears to use the terms as equivalents. At the top of p. 722, for instance, he says, "We live in a continuous state of war. Our civilisation cannot be understood save by recognising that the appeal to force is something quite fundamental to it. . . . What is the actual situation *in time of peace*?" But this lumping together of such diverse things leads us nowhere in ethics. One might as justly identify the taking of all business risks with speculative gambling, because they are connected by a series of steps each a more dubious transaction than the last; or we might as truly call all wage-earning servitude, from the skilled trade unionist or the domestic cook to the coolie labourer.

The end of war will not come except by the long labour of a minority; and though the position of such a band is difficult, they may yet prove to have been among the faithful servants of their country.

JOHN W. GRAHAM.

MANCHESTER.

TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY.

PROFESSOR HUGH WALKER.

THERE is no phase of human activity in which success is so highly prized as it is in war. Armies and nations avert their faces from defeat; for defeat in arms is the most appalling form of national bankruptcy. The monuments great states erect are monuments of victory. The Arc de Triomphe in Paris commemorates only French victories; and though the Sieges-Allée in Berlin is crowded with mere Margraves and Electors and Kings, great, medium, and little, its name proclaims its purpose. We might expect, therefore, that the poets would strike a similar note, and that the verse inspired by war would be a succession of pæans of triumph. My purpose is to show that, on the contrary, for the poet triumph is most commonly veiled in a pall of tragedy.

But why should the poet write of war at all? War is horrible and brutal; poetry is beautiful and deals with beauty. There would seem to be an impassable gulf between them. The lesson of life, however, is that we must learn to reconcile contradictories. Evil is inextricably woven in with good; pleasure cannot permanently be divorced from suffering. There is a beauty which is awful; there are joys which are stern and delights which are fierce. And with the horror and the brutality of war there are mingled elements of awful beauty, of stern joy, and of fierce delight. History shows again and again that there has been in war a something ennobling which, at least in part, redeems its horror and its brutality. There

are men, not the least thoughtful or the least humane, who hold that this ennoblement cannot be otherwise achieved. Though Ruskin ranked war as one of the four "sources of all evil," he nevertheless declared that "no nation ever yet enjoyed a protracted and triumphant peace without receiving in its own bosom ineradicable seeds of future decline." Is not history on his side? There are men who think that war is a law of human existence; and evolution supports their view. Now, more than ever, we recoil from such an opinion, because it is so German; but, pushed though it has been to the verge of lunacy by Bernhardi, it may be worth while to ask ourselves whether there be not in it an element of truth. Some of the greatest saints thought so. Mons. Sabatier has recently reminded the world that St Francis was no advocate of peace at any price: "He did not beg the people of Perugia no longer to make war on Assisi. He began by fighting them." The poets have been of the same opinion. Tennyson, in *Maud*, plainly indicated that he believed war to possess at times a power to purify. Wordsworth thought so too; for though he cancelled the line, "Carnage is Thy daughter," he did not retract the thought. The two lines substituted for the four which were deleted merely express again a softened form of the same idea; and their context leaves no doubt that the "pure intent" of which the poet speaks is conceived to be attained by war. Browning applied a cognate conception to the most spiritual of all institutions known to man—the Christian church. Into the mouth of his grandest character, the Pope, he puts the thought that, to a church enervated by prosperity and sunk in sloth, redemption may come by tribulation, even to the shedding of blood and the rekindling of the martyr's torch. The summit of manhood is attained when

> "Man stands out again pale, resolute,
> Prepared to die,—which means, alive at last."

Which means, alive at last. In Browning's view, then (if we may identify Browning with his own Pope), it is not till he is prepared to die that man is fully alive. And is not an

inarticulate sense that this is true at the root of the admiration nearly all, even of the most unwarlike, feel for the soldier? All women feel this admiration, and it is not to be explained by a cheap sneer at the fancy for a red coat. It survived when the red became khaki; and khaki means mud-coloured. Whether the coat be gay or sombre, the true explanation is that the man by his profession proclaims himself prepared to die, and therefore alive at last. And as for the cheap sneer, women pay almost, if not quite, as high a price in war as men; for

> "Not a shot comes blind with death,
> And not a stab of steel is pressed
> Home, but invisibly it tore
> And entered first some woman's breast."

They who only stand and wait have perhaps the hardest form of service.

War, then, implies intensity of life and exaltation of the soul; and therefore no one who loves poetry and feels its vital characteristics will be surprised that in all ages it has inspired verse. For what distinguishes the poet from the ordinary man is just intensity of life and exaltation of the soul. The poet's eye penetrates beneath the surface. He sees the light that never was on sea or land. To the ordinary man, a primrose by the river's brim is just a yellow primrose; to the poet, it is that—and something more. His ear hears the music of the spheres, which we, hemmed in by "this muddy vesture of decay," cannot hear. His peculiar gift is a power of observation which nothing can escape. So thought Browning; and he added that it was the poet's business to note *everything*, the most trivial fact as well as the greatest.

The military metaphors which abound in the poem just referred to, *How it Strikes a Contemporary*, are notable, but not surprising. If it is the poet's business to observe trifles—the cobbler at his trade, the lemon-slicer, the coffee-roaster; if when any beat a horse or cursed a woman, he must "write it fully to our Lord the King," surely much more when any ventured to devastate provinces and send souls by the

thousand to their account. If poetry means intensity of life, where is the tension greater than in the battle-line? There, if anywhere, every nerve is strained and every muscle braced. Certainly the poets of all nations and in all ages have judged that their business lay there. One of the grandest battle-hymns in literature is the song of Deborah. It was not merely blood and iron, but the strains of Tyrtæus as well, that forged in Laconia the greatest military state of ancient Greece; and the clash of battle sounds through the long roll of Homer's hexameters. Every student of Elizabethan literature knows how deep and how broad, in historical plays and in chronicle poems, is the mark of the victory over the great Armada. The German, too, before he accepted the ghastly creed that blood and iron are all that matters, sang thrillingly of the boundary of his Fatherland, and of the majestic river which he claimed for his own. Now he sings hymns of hate—and hate never yet made a poem. Not the least of the things for which we have to be thankful is that the spirit which the present war has breathed into the opponents of Germany is of a very different sort. Some of the poems which it has inspired are on fire with indignation, but none breathes the spirit of hate. The best of them must have suggested the reflection that, wasteful and sorrowful as war inevitably is, it is yet not wholly without compensation. Many must have felt this when, on the morning of the 5th of August, they read once more Sir Henry Newbolt's beautiful stanzas, *The Vigil.* Only the imaginative anticipation of the supreme trial could have called forth this solemn appeal to England to kneel beside her arms and pray God to defend the right. The sense of the vastness of the issues of war had stirred the poet's spirit and quickened his imagination.

What, then, is the character of the poetry thus inspired? The pæan of triumph is certainly heard in it. Deborah rejoices over the fallen enemy: "At her feet he bowed, he fell, he lay down; at her feet he bowed, he fell: where he bowed, there he fell down dead." *Ye Mariners of England*

expresses the poet's proud confidence in his country, the confidence that the day of battle will set in victory. But on the whole it is surprising how little of this there is in the poetry of war. Mere triumph is subordinate; and there are profound reasons, psychological as well as artistic, why it is so. There is no very complex music to be got from the drum and trumpet; the poet must know how to bring in a whole orchestra. And further, it is effort rather than attainment that satisfies the spirit; and frustrated, or at best chequered, rather than victorious effort that comes home to the heart, perhaps because it corresponds more closely with human destiny. "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity," was the utterance of the wise man when he reviewed life; and millions since his time have, by the occurrence of some one of those bereavements which none can escape, been convinced of the emptiness of what is called worldly success. Hence, sometimes in spite of themselves, the poets have been impelled to concentrate attention upon the defeated and the fallen, rather than the living and victorious. Deborah did not intend it, but against her will the heart goes out to Sisera and not to Jael. Cæsar borne in triumph along the Sacred Way is a poor subject for the poet; Cæsar muffling up his face at the base of Pompey's statue is an admirable one. The vanquished Hector is more winning than the victorious Achilles. Before the eyes of Byron meditating upon Waterloo rises the figure of the doomed Duke of Brunswick, and he sees Ardennes, "dewy with Nature's tear-drops," grieving over the unreturning brave. Scott is more successful in his picture of Flodden, a defeat for his country, than in that of Bannockburn, a victory; and at Flodden what he brings so vividly before the mind is rather Marmion waving his broken blade and raising his dying voice in the shout of victory, than the conquering Stanley charging with Chester and with Lancashire. Most of all, it is the desperate circle fighting round their king:

> "Each stepping where his comrade stood,
> The instant that he fell."

The shout of battle was a complex sound to Scott's ear, and there was far more in it than the cheer of victory:

> "O life and death were in that shout,
> Recoil and rally, charge and rout,
> And triumph and despair."

It is true that Drayton in his *Ballad of Agincourt* and Campbell in his *Battle of the Baltic* choose success for their theme; but Tennyson sounds a deeper note than either in *The Revenge*, a story of proud sacrifice and destruction foreseen and dauntlessly accepted. And long before Scott and Tennyson, and in still simpler verse, the higher poetic value of sorrow and death than of triumph was felt and expressed. Even the early ballad-makers wander beyond the bounds of pure narrative, and what they most love to introduce is some touch of tragedy or pathos. They are not content with the mere flight of arrows, or the thrust of the spear, or the rain of blows from sword or battle-axe. They too throw a glamour over the fallen, far lovelier than the glare which falls upon the chief who rides back in triumph. In the heroic old ballad of Otterbourne, the victorious leader falls mortally wounded, but knows that the victory is his; for in a dreary dream he has seen a dead man win a fight—and if victory be gained, "what recks the death of one?" And so the dead chief becomes the most memorable of all the ballad heroes. When Scott has occasion to refer to him in one of the most impressive passages in *The Lay of the Last Minstrel*, it is to show the dying lamps burning over his low and lonely urn; and, as if to brand the passage in the ballad for ever on the memory, when his own strength was broken and the lamp of his life dying, with a burst of tears such as rarely broke from that stoic heart, he quoted to Lockhart the words of the fallen Douglas:

> "My wound is deep, I fain would sleep;
> Take thou the vanguard of the three,
> And hide me by the bracken bush,
> That grows on yonder lilye lee."

In William Morris's rendering of a still more ancient type of legend, it is just the same. Of the numerous fights in *Sigurd the Volsung*, the finest is that which ends in the death of Sigmund, when the dying hero turns his eyes till the low beams of the rising sun bathe them for the last time. There is a profounder appeal to the heart in the roll of muffled drums and the Dead March than in the blare of trumpets and the tumult of the charge. There is an appeal profounder yet when even the muffled drum is silent. No drum is sounded and no farewell shot is fired over the grave of Moore. The lantern burns dim, there is neither shroud nor coffin, the sullen boom of the distant gun tells that danger still threatens. And yet, unutterably mournful though they are, Wolfe's immortal verses sound the proud note of victory.

Paradoxical though it seems, then, the poets have drawn far more from death and sorrow and defeat than from the intoxication of victory. The Cavalier cause produced more poetry than the Puritan (for Milton rises above both), and the Jacobite than the Hanoverian. The wail in the Jacobite songs gives more than half their charm: "Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thought." This charm survives long after the cause is lost, and is wholly independent of the political views which inspired its adherents. Swinburne himself was seldom more happily inspired than in his Jacobite ballads. But the principle reaches beyond even the wide field of poetry. "The pencil of the Holy Ghost," says Bacon, "hath laboured more in describing the afflictions of Job than the felicities of Solomon." And we feel that those darker scenes are more in harmony with the tone of life and with what life really demands. Of the three things, labour, and sorrow, and joy, which Ruskin thought that life needs, two are akin to the afflictions rather than to the felicities. "*Here lies one who meant well, tried a little, failed much,*" is Stevenson's epitaph upon the soldier borne defeated from the field of life. And he adds that even the greatest are defeated: "Defeated, ay, if he were Paul or Marcus Aurelius."

Hence it comes that the poet has comparatively little to do with mere victory. He inspires to action, or he traces the course of action and marks its result. He is sensitive to heroism in any of its phases. The national songs are inspirations to action. The great Welsh march of *The Men of Harlech* seeks to rouse men who are asleep; the *Marseillaise* is not a song for glory won, but a call to advance and win it. Burns does not hesitate to make Bruce bid his soldiers welcome to a *gory* bed, or to victory. The triumph is not yet achieved: it is in the thrill of that stern welcome that it is to be won. The inferiority of *Rule, Britannia!* is partly due to the fact that it is too jubilant. The poet does wisely who lays stress upon the difficulty and the danger.

But the poet who would inspire to action must appeal to some principle; for men do not take their lives in their hands for nothing. Now the principle appealed to by the poet of war and patriotism seems to be invariably liberty, though in many a piece the word is not uttered. Nay, more, the word may be obedience, rather than liberty: "Stranger, tell the Lacedæmonians that we lie here, in obedience to their orders." The true poet loves more the soldier who seeks only "duty's iron crown" than him who fights for glory. But the principle is still the same. Men do not hug their chains; they are never enthusiastic for slavery. If they insist upon their obedience, it is because they feel, dimly and inarticulately, the truth of Goethe's great maxim that law alone can give us freedom. They identify themselves with their country and bear the burden she lays upon them, because they feel that she enables them to attain a freedom that would otherwise be beyond their reach. And this sentiment animates not only the citizens of democracies or of states which we should call free. No state ever suppressed the individual more ruthlessly than Sparta; yet no citizen has ever felt this sentiment more deeply than the Spartan. The man of the West regards Russia as an autocracy; yet when the war-drum sounded the Cossacks streamed in eagerly from their

remotest villages. That they had little or no share in political power was nothing to them; it was enough that the Russian State guaranteed that the Cossack might realise the life he knew and loved—might, in short, go on being a Cossack. In Elizabethan England the liberty of the subject was imperfectly secured and his political rights only half developed. Yet surely the lyrical rapture of some of Shakespeare's expressions is more than dramatic and indicates a personal feeling. "This royal throne of kings, this sceptred isle," "this other Eden, demi-Paradise,"—these expressions seem to burn with the emotion of the poet himself. The man who wrote thus had found in England something richly satisfying. In truth the State we know is in the mind of each of us identified with the life we know, and its overthrow means the overthrow of that life; and only when life becomes intolerable do men dally with the thought of revolution. Short of that, they bear all imperfection for the sake of the beloved familiarity. "An ill-favoured thing, sir, but mine own." Grant that German "Kultur" is superior to mere English or French or Belgian culture, the German is still making a mistake in thinking it will do for us. The civilisation we have made is in our blood and bones; Paris and London can no more become as Berlin than the Ethiopian can change his skin or the spotted leopard become as the milk-white hind.

The idea of liberty certainly lies behind the patriotic passages of Shakespeare, but the *word* liberty plays little or no part in them. In the main it belongs to circumstances other than those he delineated, or to a different stage of political development. Chivalrous soldier though Hotspur is, his rebellion is full of self-seeking; and it is as much as ingenuity can accomplish to put a plausible face upon Henry V.'s war with France. That was a war of aggression; and it is when a country is fighting for its existence against a foreign foe that the word liberty is naturally used. In Barbour's *Bruce* the fine apostrophe to freedom is appropriate. So too when the nations of Europe intervene to deprive France

of the right to manage her internal affairs, Coleridge sees his vision of the threatened country uprearing her giant limbs and swearing she would be free. When France in turn becomes the aggressor and subjugates Switzerland, he prays to Freedom to forgive his dreams. It was the revolutionary cry of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," which made enthusiasm for political emancipation general; and from that time onwards the conception of political liberty for the citizen plays a part in verse greater than it had ever played since the Athenians sang of Harmodius and Aristogiton. Shelley shows this enthusiasm in his *Ode to Naples* and in his *Ode to Liberty.* Byron too is the champion of liberty, and fervidly asserts his faith in her ultimate triumph, notwithstanding treason and defeat:

> "Yet, Freedom! yet thy banner, torn, but flying,
> Streams like the thunder-storm *against* the wind."

In the tremendous wars of the time through which he lived, he stood critically aloof, sympathetic towards the Revolution, condemning the Napoleonic aggression which followed it, suspicious of the kings who had leagued together to oppose the aggression. He links Waterloo with Cannæ as both fields of carnage, and is dubious as to the result:

> "Did nations combat to make *One* submit;
> Or league to teach all kings true sovereignty?"

In Morat and Marathon he sees instances of noble war, where the cause fought for is freedom.

Of all the poets of the revolutionary period, however, Wordsworth was the one who most deeply felt and most nobly expressed the love of liberty. Though he changed sides and, from being a supporter of the Revolution, became an advocate of constituted authority, it was because, rightly or wrongly, he believed that freedom was to be won in the latter way. In his *Poems dedicated to National Independence and Liberty* it is always freedom to which he appeals. It is as the vanguard of liberty that he apostrophises the men of Kent. He is convinced that the flood of British freedom can

never perish in bogs and sands, for the great ones of the past lay an obligation upon us:

> "We must be free or die who speak the tongue
> That Shakespeare spake; the faith and morals hold
> Which Milton held."

The voice of the mountain and the voice of the sea have been from age to age the chosen music of liberty, and the poet mourns when one of them is silenced. He is an advocate of the negro cause, and to Toussaint L'Ouverture in his prison addresses a sonnet expressive of unconquerable faith in freedom, even though thus eclipsed. "Live and take comfort," says the poet to the prisoner:

> "Live and take comfort. Thou hast left behind
> Powers that will work for thee; air, earth, and skies;
> There's not a breathing of the common wind
> That will forget thee; thou hast great allies;
> Thy friends are exultations, agonies,
> And love, and Man's unconquerable mind."

It is a great faith, and a bracing one for these days of storm and stress.

The prevailing note of these poems of Wordsworth is certainly not that of jubilation; it rather reminds us that he too lived in a time of storm and stress. He inspires his countrymen to high-strung effort, he urges them to face danger and to struggle with difficulty. When the victory is won he sinks to a much lower level. The *Thanksgiving Ode* ranks far below the great sonnets of the years of gloom; the sonnet in anticipation of victory over the expected invaders, "Shout, for a mighty Victory is won!" is poor compared with that which was wrung from him at the desperate juncture when Pitt was ready to roll up the map of Europe: "Another year! another deadly blow!" It is then that the poet is most heroic, welcoming the perilous honour of standing alone against the victor:

> "'Tis well! from this day forward we shall know
> That in ourselves our safety must be sought."

The same conclusion, that sorrow is deeper than joy, and heroic sacrifice far richer in poetry than mere triumph, is to

be drawn from a consideration of those poems which are founded upon special incidents of war; and such incidents are better adapted to the purpose of the poet than campaigns or even battles. It was a sound instinct that made Tennyson seize upon the two great cavalry charges and leave Balaclava unsung. It is a sound instinct which leads the poet generally to select an incident of tragic colour, even if it be not pure tragedy. Horace is inspired less by the glory of the Roman arms than by the self-surrender of Regulus. Kempenfelt and his eight hundred sinking "fast by their native shore" lift Cowper above himself. The tragedy of Rustum discovering in his dying foe his own son stirs the soul of Matthew Arnold. It is not the storming of Ratisbon, but the pride of the boy soldier wounded to death that kindles Browning.

But to nothing is the poet so responsive as to the spirit of *noblesse oblige*, which almost always involves sacrifice. This spirit is the essence of chivalry. Byron reproaches Napoleon with the lack of it; he should have died on his last battlefield. Lovelace proclaims it when he declares that he could not love his lady so much did he not love honour more. De Argentine turns back to die at Bannockburn, because he has left his gage there. This sentiment makes Roland Cheyne urge his master to face tremendous odds at Harlaw, because the gentle Norman blood must not "grow cauld for Highland kerne." But perhaps the most remarkable illustration of it is one which brings out the injustice lurking beneath this haughty aristocratic pride—though in its turn it illustrates the pride of another aristocracy. Sir Francis Hastings Doyle's Private of the Buffs was last night a drunken private soldier:

> "*To-day*, beneath the foeman's frown,
> He stands in Elgin's place,
> Ambassador from Britain's crown,
> And type of all her race."

Dusky Indians may whine and kneel; he, an English lad, must die. Home, and all he loved at home, rise in his mind —peaceful Kentish hop-fields, never to be seen again, father

and mother who shall welcome him back no more, unless he humble himself. But to humble himself is to humble England. And this marvellous pride of race, and the discipline of an army every man of which feels himself a part of an imperial power, lift the rude untaught boy to the loftiest height of heroism.

Grandeur and solemnity, and not triumph, are the characteristics also of the two great pictures of the ideal soldier with which Wordsworth and Tennyson have enriched English literature. Wordsworth sees in his *Happy Warrior* one

> "Who, doomed to go in company with Pain,
> And Fear, and Bloodshed, miserable train!
> Turns his necessity to glorious gain."

There is triumph as well as conflict in Tennyson's *Ode on the Death of the Duke of Wellington*, but conflict predominates; and, while the poet is proud that his hero never lost an English gun, he is still more proud that what he sought was duty, not glory. He sums up that long life of unbroken victory in the words:

> "The long *self-sacrifice* of life is o'er."

The close is solemnly religious. The poet remembers that the greatest and the least alike are "heirs to some six feet of sod," and finely uses the Dead March and "ashes to ashes, dust to dust," in order to turn our thoughts elsewhere. This religious strain is characteristic of the poetry of war; and rightly so, for it has been characteristic also of great soldiers. The names of Havelock and Gordon, in our own recent history, leap at once to the mind, and that of Stonewall Jackson in the history of America. In recent poetry the strain is heard in *The Vigil*, already referred to, in James Elroy Flecker's rewriting of *God Save the King*, and in Mr Kipling's *Recessional* and his *Hymn before Action*. Still more clearly, perhaps, it is heard in one of the noblest products of the present war—Canon F. G. Scott's lines *On the Rue du Bois*, where the poet sees in the horrors around him

the world's awakening from an empty dream, and in bereavement the promise of a richer life:

> "For lonely graves along the country side,
> Where sleep those brave hearts who for others died,
> Tell of life's union with the Crucified.
>
> And new light kindles in the mourner's eyes,
> Like day-dawn breaking through the rifted skies,
> For Life is born of life's self-sacrifice."

In comparison with all this how trivial seem the pieces devoted to mere rejoicing! Man deludes himself with the belief that the issue—and a successful issue—is everything. The poet knows better, and shows that it is the struggle that matters. The philosopher knows better too. Lessing declared that if the Almighty offered him the choice between Truth and Search after Truth, he would unhesitatingly take the latter.

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THE IDEA OF RESURRECTION.

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THE most urgent question in present-day theology concerns the nature and the place of values of individual religious doctrines. For the greatest enemies of the religious life are those who lead men to fix their gaze on the insignificant and worthless to the neglect of what is fundamental. Opposition to, and even entire rejection of, the religious view of life is not seldom due to a misunderstanding of the relative significance of the elements of the usual theological exposition. The submission of a religious belief to critical examination has therefore the same purpose as the placing of metallic ore into the furnace: to separate the valuable material from the undesirable elements associated with it in its original form. The present paper is limited to some reflections upon the idea of resurrection, considering it in relation to the belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus.

Theology has three tasks: the description and analysis of the religious experience; the critical examination of the contents of this experience in consideration of the truth of religious doctrines and the validity of religious value-judgments; and the constructive elaboration of an ideal of religious life, with its fundamental principles and ideas.

Though there appears a super-temporal aspect in religious experience, the attainment of new ideas and new feelings in the religious life is essentially an event occurring in "time."

A doctrine may be true apart from any particular time-relationship, nevertheless every doctrine arises or gains power in the minds of men at particular periods. This is the case with all kinds of knowledge. The law of gravity, for example, is valid apart from any particular time-relationship: the fact it indicates was real before it was discovered. There was a period before any human being was aware of it, so that its appearance as an element of human knowledge was at a particular point in time. How an idea first came into the mind of any man, or how it came to exercise a marked influence over the lives of men, are questions quite distinct from that of its truth or validity. The origin of an idea is often of no vital consequence to us now, and in no way affects its value.

Through nearly two thousand years the idea of resurrection has formed an integral part of Christian doctrine, having an importance and exercising an influence that cannot be denied. But it has been almost inseparably associated with the belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus. Without entering at all into the vexed question of the validity of that belief, it is certainly allowable, justifiable, and, indeed, necessary to examine its religious implications.

What is the value for theological thought and the religious life of the belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus? As a matter of logical method one instance to the contrary suffices to refute a universal statement. The resurrection of Jesus is adequate to overthrow the view that men are all merely physical and entirely cease to exist after physical death. It implies that man is more than body and is not absolutely dependent upon the physical. On the other hand, however, it is quite insufficient to warrant the view that "all men are immortal," or that "all men shall rise again." What is told us of Jesus involves His spiritual persistence for a length of time after His physical death; and manifests the power of His spirit to enter into relation with His material body: but His continued existence is not thereby established, nor is the

view of the persistence of others after death made secure. Though it may generally be thought improbable, it is not impossible that only those who reach a certain degree of spiritual power and character will survive. To recognise the limitations of the belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus in its bearing upon the question of immortality need not in the least lessen one's faith in immortality.

The physical resurrection of Jesus, it may be contended, has a special significance in relation to His character and His claims. Here theology is faced with a question which no thinker who is at all impartial can regard as settled; a question which at this date appears almost impossible of final answer: "What claims did Jesus actually make?" That He regarded Himself as in some sense the Messiah cannot reasonably be doubted, but that by this or any other expressions He used He meant to proclaim Himself co-equal with the Father, "very God of very God," there seems no adequate evidence to assert or to deny. But suppose He made the highest of these claims. The resurrection of His body is no evidence of their validity; there is no logical connection between the two. It is not open to a Christian to put forward the suggestion that one who rises from the dead is God. In the Apostles' Creed the idea of the resurrection of the body is applied to men generally. Yet, on the other hand, disbelief in the physical resurrection does not necessitate the denial of the Deity of Jesus.

No greater strength of argument for the validity of the claim of Deity is obtained by combining the belief in the physical resurrection with other beliefs. Virgin birth is no ground upon which to argue that one so born is "very God of very God." Dr Gore, who ardently defends the doctrine of the virgin birth of Jesus, takes it as a consequence of belief in His Deity rather than as a ground for that belief. For the Incarnation of the Son of God there would be, we are to suppose, an extraordinary birth. Again, unless it is assumed at the outset that no merely human being can be

sinless (an assumption we do not seem warranted in making), there is no logical transition from the sinlessness of Jesus to the doctrine of His Deity. Virgin birth, sinlessness, physical resurrection, taken separately or all together, do not justify the attribution of Deity. No valid reasons have ever been given why these doctrines may not be true of a merely human being. None of these things really affect the question of the Deity of Jesus.

What the significance of the physical resurrection of Jesus may be to one who believes in His Deity is not at all clear. It can hardly argue human immortality, for the question may be asked, though with difficulty answered: "How can the spiritual persistence and physical resurrection of God be evidence of the immortality of man?"

On an analogy with the physical resurrection of Jesus, the orthodox Christian also believes in "the resurrection of the body," as applied to all mankind. The resurrection body of Jesus was that of His crucifixion and burial, as is maintained by the record of the empty tomb and the form of His appearance. Thomas, the doubter, was bidden to behold His hands, and to thrust his hand into His side (John xx. 27). It apparently had new qualities—He appeared suddenly in the midst of His disciples in a room with locked doors—but it is certainly represented to be the same body. Yet the view that all human beings will rise again with the bodies with which they died is quite untenable. The analogy between the resurrection of Jesus and that of any other person can only be accepted in a general sense, if it is accepted at all. To one who has faith in spiritual persistence after physical death, it may suggest the idea that the spirit always has some form of manifestation corresponding to what is meant by body.

The significance of the belief in the resurrection of Jesus cannot be truly estimated apart from the fact of His crucifixion and the nature of His life and teaching. He had preached the advent of a new world of love, the Kingdom of God, to inaugurate which was His mission. Nothing represented this

kingdom so well as the family: all are brothers as the sons of God. In their close personal attachment to Him, His disciples felt something of the reality of His ideal and of His confidence. Whatever eschatological elements there may have been in His conception of the kingdom, it is from the moral and spiritual fundamentals that the good and great in Christianity has sprung. His disciples certainly looked forward to an early triumph and the accomplishment of His mission in an external manner. He went to Jerusalem, and some of them followed Him. Then, with a diplomatic suddenness, He was taken and crucified. Their hopes shattered, the disciples fled. The aims of Jesus, the kingdom He was to set up, seemed a dream that was past. But it was not so: they recovered faith. The existence of Christianity to-day is absolute proof that, whatever the truth about the body of Jesus, in the minds of the disciples there was indeed a resurrection to a more abundant life and a wider faith than they had felt before. This new life wove itself around the belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus; but the question whether that belief was a factor leading to the wider resurrection or was itself a product of their faith cannot be indisputably answered to-day. For the point at issue, the value of the idea of resurrection, the question is not a vital one. The truth of the idea of resurrection cannot stand or fall with the resuscitation of a particular body. What is essential for Christianity in this connection is that the crucifixion did not mark the end of the mission of Jesus, but was the way through which the narrower organisation and messianic hopes died to give rise to a universal movement.

The experience of these first members of the Christian Church has given to it the principle of its life. At every stage of its advance there has been a break from some form of narrowness. The Reformation achieved in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the death of much which limited the religious spirit and it was a resurrection to a life of greater freedom and wider outlook. The Protestantism which then arose has itself to die, is indeed dying at this hour; and not

a few stand by looking on as did the Roman soldiers and the Jews of old at the death of Jesus. Leaders of the Churches seal down the stone of tradition and set a guard. Nevertheless men look forward to a fuller life which will assuredly come. If the earlier Reformers unwound the mediæval shroud from the feet of Christianity and thus allowed it freedom of movement, the ardent souls of the new Reformation have to uncover its head, that, in the light of intellectual truth, it may see clearly the needs of mankind. Of a certainty resurrection is a fundamental principle of Christianity.

No one has a right dogmatically to deny the physical resurrection of Jesus. Whatever be the value of its assertion now, its influence on some minds in the early spread of Christianity cannot be disputed. The idea of resurrection, whether it was independently conceived or not, has become a force in the thought and life of Western peoples through the preaching of the physical resurrection of Jesus. Many occurrences in nature suggest the idea; but Christianity alone makes it fundamental for man. Here, however, far too often the attention of mankind has been directed to the transitory rather than to the vital and eternal. Not belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus but the idea of resurrection in its fullest and widest application is the source of moral energy and religious hope. Though a man declare himself agnostic with regard to the former, or even if he reject it outright, all that the latter implies is still open to his faith.

That death is a necessity and resurrection a reality is the import of much of the teaching of Jesus, and it is as valid of individuals as of societies and movements. He came that men might have life and that they might have it more abundantly. Each must take up his cross and follow Him—to crucifixion and death—and resurrection. The prodigal, morally degraded and reduced to poverty, finds the power to arise and go to his father. Zacchæus dies to his old ways and starts anew on the path of justice and love. Mary Magdalene, under His influence, looks up from her death of

sin and lives afterward a life of pure devotion. That was the resurrection with which Jesus was concerned. "There is more joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety and nine self-righteous persons." The way to life is through death: "For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it." In a world of moral values, such as ours, the reality of resurrection is the only ground of a universal hope.

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FECHNER'S THEORY OF LIFE AFTER DEATH.

J. ARTHUR HILL.

THE scientific watchword is Continuity. We want a theory, therefore, which shall make death as little catastrophic as possible; which shall retain the dead in close touch with matter, and not afar off in another order of existence. We want smoother transition, not this great jolt. The theory of Gustav Theodor Fechner, born before its time and neglected as a freak by most of his contemporaries, supplies this want. Professor Paulsen, in his introduction to the second (1907) edition of *Über die Seelenfrage* (forty-six years after the first edition and twenty years after the author's death), acknowledges his own indebtedness, and expresses the opinion that the time is now ripe for Fechner to come into his own. May it be so!

Fechner's method is the scientific method of analogy. He examines that which is best known to us, and then uses the process-principles which he finds, as hypotheses wherewith to explain the unknown. He has three main arguments, each addressed to a cardinal difficulty of the survival doctrine. These three difficulties may be indicated somewhat thus:—

1. Inorganic matter has no consciousness associated with it. When we die, our bodies become inorganic matter, sooner or later—almost immediately if we are cremated. Therefore, at death or soon after, consciousness perishes.

2. If there is anything in us that is unaffected by bodily

death, how can it survive individually, when it no longer has a body to contain it and separate it from others? Will it not rather merge into a general psychic mass?—"the Dewdrop slips into the shining Sea." In particular, how can we conceive of individual *memory* persisting, when we no longer have a brain? Admittedly, personal survival must involve memory-continuity. I shall not be myself unless I carry at least my principal recollections with me. And how can I be supposed to do that when I no longer have the brain in which they were stored?

3. Put shortly, the foregoing difficulties amount to this: we must be able to see continuity, smooth transition, before we can believe in survival. The future life must be seen as *a further stage of evolution*, not as a metaphysical affair islanded off from our present state.

Fechner deals with these difficulties as follows:—

1. The major premise of this negative syllogism is false. Inorganic matter is *not* unconscious and dead. Living creatures have arisen out of the earth. Has, then, the dead given birth to the living? Surely not. Is it not more reasonable to suppose that the earth is not a dead lump but is somehow alive—for science teaches that all matter is intensely active on the molecular and electronic scale—although her life is manifested in ways different from those of our own bodies? If my body is the material sustainer or concomitant or expression of my spirit, is it not reasonable to suppose that the whole earth is the material sustainer or concomitant or expression of an Earth-Spirit? May not all planets and suns be similarly ensouled—Uriel, the sun-angel, no longer a myth but a reality; and all their spirits parts and ministers of the God in whom they live and move and have their being—the whole material universe being His body, and the various subordinate beings serving the same purpose in Him as the different human faculties serve in the one human mind? He is thus immanent in nature. Fechner might have quoted Virgil's most central, most Virgilian, passage (as Myers calls it) in support:—

> "One Life through all the immense creation runs,
> One Spirit is the moon's, the sea's, the sun's;
> All forms in the air that fly, on the earth that creep,
> And the unknown nameless monsters of the deep,—
> Each breathing thing obeys one Mind's control,
> And in all substance is a single Soul."[1]

The universe is, then, matter saturated with mind. The earth, a portion of that universe, is body and spirit, as we ourselves are, still smaller portions of that portion. When we die, our bodies rejoin the earth's mass, from which indeed they were not severed except as being points at which material activity of a peculiar kind was manifested; and our spirits rejoin the earth's spirit-mass, from which they were not severed except as being points at which psychical activity of our particular human kind was manifested. The old materialists thought that when the body died the psychical activity formerly associated with it became extinct. But this is not scientific. To suppose annihilation of anything is to fly in the face of science, which sees in Nature change but not annihilation. The material of our bodies does not go out of existence at death. It only changes its form and the manner of its activity. So with our spirits. They are not annihilated. They survive, but they change the manner of their activity. They rejoin the Earth-Spirit, which is itself a part of the immortal Universe-Spirit: thus rejoining, how can they die?

But how, exactly, do they rejoin it? Merged, like water in a flask which is broken in the sea? No, says Fechner. No cessation of individuality is involved. We continue to exist as conscious selves. Here we pass to the next line of argument, for this continuation of individuality requires support. The body-analogy fails, for the body is quickly absorbed into other organisms or is converted into a few gases and a handful of calcareous ashes: its materials are not annihilated, but they

[1] *Æneid*, vi. (F. W. H. Myers's *Classical Essays*, p. 173). Sir Oliver Lodge says, similarly: "The soul in this sense is related to the organism in somewhat the same way as the 'Logos' is related to the Universe" (*Man and the Universe*, p. 106, 5th edition).

are so much diffused that we see no likeness to the old body. We are thus led to suppose that the spirit, if there is such a thing, will similarly disintegrate: its elements of sensation, perception, recollection, and the like, will diffuse, and its recognisable personality will vanish. But Fechner will not accept this. He argues for personal continuance, invoking other analogies.

2. The first part of our mental life is sensation and perception. These experiences are then transferred into the domain of memory, where they are variously compounded and interrelated, though without in the least losing their individual character. A visual perception remains a visual memory, as individual as it was in perception. Fechner likens this life to the domain of perception, and the after-life to that of memory. When I die, the Earth-Spirit ceases to perceive through me, but my whole mind enters into that Spirit's memory-life, acquiring wider relations and closer communion with other spirits, yet without losing its individuality. Also it continues to develop, as a recollection develops. I may not have seen Antonine's Column since I was a boy, but it is much more to me now than then, because I have read history and the *Meditations*. In the same way, a spirit grows after death—becomes more to its containing Earth-Spirit—by its interaction with other spirits and by the perceptions of the still living. And spirits continue to influence the living reciprocally, as our recollections or apperception-masses influence all our perceptions. My recollections of trees influence my perception of a tree: I import into the visual sensation which is all that the tree really causes, all sorts of remembered experiences, and I think of it not only as a flat patch of colour and light and shade, but as a round and rough and rustling thing. I perceive it as a tree, though I do not sense all the attributes of its tree-ness. Similarly, my impressions of an evening prospect may be enriched by the memory of an Ode to the Setting Sun or the similar monologue of Faust: Thompson and Goethe are influencing my perceptions.

Minds, then, are closely connected and interpenetrative. If it be asked: "How can conscious personality be maintained if this is so?" Fechner answers with another question: "How can the individuality of perceptions and recollections be maintained, when they are propagated over the same nerves and mixed up in one brain?" Yet they do remain distinct. Also, notes retain their individuality in a symphony, though the vibrations blend inextricably. Similarly, our spirits, though it might seem that they must by intermixing be merged into homogeneity at death, may really retain their individuality quite unimpaired.

Then as to memory. We have admittedly no physiological theory of memory, and consequently there is no great difficulty in supposing full memory to be carried over by the spirit when it leaves its body. We do not know how we remember things even now; is it not rather over-exigent to demand explanation as to how we shall remember them then? At least, is it not over-fastidious to reject the survival-belief because such explanation is not forthcoming? Still, it must be admitted that this, at best, leaves us agnostic. And if further advance in brain-anatomy should yield a physiological theory of memory (thus upsetting Bergson's doctrine in *Matière et Mémoire*), belief in *post-mortem* memory would at once become unscientific, unless some material basis for it could be discovered. And this leads to the larger question of the post-mortem body. The spirit seems to have no material vesture. The ancient query arises: "With what body do they come?" The fleshly garment is transitory—is as grass, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven. That body, at least, is done for:—

> "'Tis but a Tent where takes his one day's rest,
> A Sultan to the realm of Death addrest";

but if there is a Sultan at all—addrest, as survival-evidence indicates, not to Death but to Life—he must have another Tent somewhere, after his this-day's abode is struck. We do not see it, and are perhaps inclined to fall back on "etherial"

bodies. But the ether is continuous, and any dividing of it up into bodies seems difficult. We must turn back and see if we have really exhausted the possibilities of matter.

3. Beginning, as is his habit, with the known, Fechner directs our attention to the fact of our persisting identity. The matter and the form of a human being are in continuous change, and there is absolutely no identity in either, between the child and the octogenarian. Yet we say he is the same person. His shape is unrecognisably different, and all the molecules of his body are different; yet he is the "same" person. In what, physically speaking, does the continuity of personality inhere? It is in this, that *the later body has grown out of the earlier one.* The body of to-day is the effect of the body and its environment yesterday.

But the body's activities are not confined to producing the body of the moment ahead. We are continually affecting the external world by our actions and words, perhaps even by unspoken or unacted thought—for thought presumably is accompanied by cerebral changes, and those changes must affect the entire universe, by ether-pulses or what not. Well, the total of our effect on the world, the matter which has been affected by our activities, forms the body of our post-mortem consciousness. A brain and body is like a seed, which puts forth from the small and delicate structure which is soon abandoned, something far greater and richer. Whatever each one of us has contributed to the construction of the organisation of the world, he will have in the after-life as the material basis of his spirit (*Tagesansicht*, p. 98; *Zend-Avesta*, ii. p. 258).

The matter which Fechner himself affected was largely in the brains of other human beings, but the sequelæ flow outward infinitely and untraceably. My own brain is different from what it would have been if Fechner had not lived. My mind partakes of his spirit. He has largely entered into my thoughts. The brain-changes which have occurred in me as I absorb a part of his spirit are the basis of his spirit in me—the material concomitant of his self-conscious activity in me.

If it be objected that "changes" seem an unsatisfactory material foundation for consciousness, the sufficient reply is that change is the one constant thing in the universe: all is in flux: my ordinary consciousness itself is supported or accompanied by continual bodily change. My body is not the same for two consecutive seconds. And if continual change is the material concomitant of my consciousness, so may it be with any other.

A Darwin discovers a new law. Immediately the brains of others are modified by the reading of *The Origin of Species*, and their minds are influenced concomitantly. Darwin's spirit lives in them. The contemporaries of Darwin die, and he ceases to live in their particular brains, but lives on in those who read his books and who have in any way been influenced by his life and work. Thus Darwin's present body is made up of matter spread widely over the earth. It exists wherever his spirit exists; wherever his thought is still active. And in thus really entering into the minds of men, he is in far closer communion with them, and with a far larger number of them, than is possible in the present life: for here we can be in touch with only one or two other minds at a time, and that through the dimming and distorting medium of sense and language.

If it is said that this widely diffused body seems an absurd idea—that the body does not hang together—the reply is that all matter is connected, and that distance is a relative thing. To a blood corpuscle, it may be unthinkable that one consciousness is spread over such a huge area as a human brain. To a molecule of protoplasm it would be more unthinkable still. Molecules are separated from each other by spaces proportionally much greater than those which separate human beings; how can the same consciousness include such widely sundered particles—how can they hang together as parts of one particular whole, when obviously, to molecular consciousness, they do not hang together at all? Yet the fact is that they do; that the same consciousness does include them all. So also may

the matter-particles which—to us widely sundered—serve as the body of a "departed" spirit. He has dropped the little body which we knew; but he has only gone out into the wider body which he built by his activity while incarnate (*On Life after Death*, pp. 90, 91; *Zend-Avesta*, ii. p. 254). Perhaps we may regard this wider personality, on its psychical side, as the "subliminal" of Myers. During the incarnate life it remains asleep, and is outside normal consciousness. In certain abnormal states we have flashes of "supernormal" knowledge which are shot up from that wider self, but ordinarily we do not enter into possession of it until we leave our flesh. This sleep of the wider self during our present-life incarceration is supported by an ingenious analogy to be noted presently.

It is often asked, concerning the future life: "Shall we know each other, and, if so, how can we represent to ourselves such recognition, when the well-known body is no longer there?" The answer is that the effects of our bodily life will still represent that former body, to those in the next world, when suitable occasion arises; somewhat as in memory we are able to recall perceptions without re-experiencing the old sensory stimuli. "The spirits will be able to see each other in their former semblance, without possessing a small, spatial, material eye, when they turn their attention to each other. . . . At present a wall, or distance, prevents my seeing others. Barriers of this kind do not continue to exist in the memory-world; the future-life form can appear instantaneously, here or there, whenever it is conjured up. Still, bounds and barriers will not be altogether done away with: some will exist, as in our memory-life now; for recollections are only called up according to the laws of association, and with the psychological laws of the present those of the hereafter will coincide" (*Tagesansicht*, p. 100). Fechner then goes on to tell two more or less evidential apparition-stories related to him by scientific friends of his own. As to the inferences to be drawn, "apparitions of this kind afford in themselves no

means of deciding whether they are projected into the external world from the brain of a living person by some abnormal functioning of the imagination, or whether they impress us from the external world in consequence of causes somehow abnormally functioning in the spiritual realm, or whether perhaps there is a mixture of the two, in some mutually conditioning way. [This is quite in the best modern S.P.R. manner.] . . . But if we turn for help to our usual analogical method . . . it at once strikes us that in our own thought-life there are not only things that have really existed, but also imaginary things woven out of different recollections—indeed, the novelist invents whole histories" (*Tagesansicht*, p. 102). Thus, as Fechner would now say, apparitions may be really supernormal and objective, yet not evidential of survival, though they may seem so. They may be dreams sent here from the spiritual world, yet from no one in particular. Some such notion, even as to evidential things—precognition and the like—is rather suggested by facts like the Greek Oracles, if we accept some of the stories that have come down to us. There is evidence of precognition and clairvoyance, yet we do not believe in the existence of Apollo who purported to send the messages. Perhaps we get what we seek. Perhaps our wills draw something from the spiritual world, but the something runs into the mould of the beliefs and expectations which happen to be fashionable at the moment. However, I am here elaborating rather beyond the system I am mainly discussing. As a further illustration of the more extensive life of the hereafter, Fechner points to the wider memory of the somnambule, somewhat in the same way as Myers. The deeper the sleep, the nearer the approach to after-life knowledge, which, however, cannot be altogether brought over or back into the present small consciousness, the latter not being big enough to hold it. Death is only a sleep so deep that the spirit goes out of the body entirely, staying out instead of coming back. When we go out and take possession of this "subliminal," we shall remember all that

we have forgotten. We only forgot it because it went to the hereafter-life before us.

Now to the further analogy, already foreshadowed, with reference to the sleep of the subliminal during incarnation.

Man lives on earth in three stages. In the first (the uterine) he is asleep, in the dark, alone, developing from the germ a body fitted for the second stage. In the second stage (this life) he alternates between waking and sleeping, in light and darkness alternately, associated with yet separate from his fellows, developing his mind from the germ, and fashioning organs for its use in the third stage. In that third stage he is awake for ever, interwoven with the life of other spirits, consciously working in the higher life of the Highest spirit. Death is a further Birth. Each step leads to fuller consciousness. Birth leads us forth to see the world outwardly. Death leads us into the wider vision, to see the world inwardly. As Bergson might say, Stage Two is intellectual, while Stage Three introduces us to feel the reality of things from within. "Instead of passing by hills and meadows, instead of seeing around us all the beauties of spring, and grieving that we cannot really take them in, as they are merely external, our spirits shall enter into those hills and meadows, to feel and enjoy with them their strength and their pleasure in growing": instead of laboriously expressing ourselves in words, we shall dwell in the inmost souls of our friends, thinking and acting in them and through them.[1]

The wider body of the third life is asleep, not self-conscious, until after death, as the body of the second life is asleep and not self-conscious until after birth. What is it, one may ask, that wakes the third-life body to self-consciousness at death? The answer is that it is precisely the fact of death. Conscious energy is like physical energy—it is conserved, cannot be destroyed and produced afresh. It only changes its place, form, and manner of acting, as the body does. When it sinks in one place it rises in another. "That your eye may

[1] *On Life after Death*, pp. 32, 33.

be awake, may see consciously, your ear must go to sleep for a while." For mental activity to exist in high degree, all the senses must more or less sleep; we cannot think if we are continually having our attention occupied with sights and sounds. Now the most complete sinking of sense-consciousness is that which takes place at death. Therefore there will be a correspondingly high rise of consciousness elsewhere.

Fechner's scheme, as will be seen from what has been said, is strictly scientific. Indeed, it is more scientific than the schemes of the scientists, for most scientists seem unable or unwilling to extend causality into the mental domain. No one can deny that thought-activity exists. It is more certain than brain-activity. And if all activity has an effect, a sequel or train of sequelæ, there must be something mental as a sequel to this-life mentality, concomitant with the physical effects of the this-life corporeality. The two trains of effects are the spirit and body, respectively, of the after-life.

J. ARTHUR HILL.

BRADFORD.

MYSTICISM AND MAHOMEDANISM.

THE LATE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL E. C. THWAYTES.

"EX ORIENTE LUX." Asia has been the cradle of most of the modern sciences of Europe, and it is there that the germs of all the great religions of the world, including Christianity, have first been planted, for the Oriental mind has ever been speculative in regard to death and what may follow it.

The religions of Asia form themselves into three groups, which either remain separate from one another or enter into combination:

(1) The absolute separation of the Creator from His Creation. An example of this is to be found in the Jewish religion as laid down by Moses, and also in Islam as defined by Mahomed.

(2) The fusion of the Creator with His Creation. An example of this is encountered in the belief of the Hindus that all created things are only particles of the Divine Mind, and that all things will eventually rest or gain beatitude by absorption back into the Deity.

(3) The gradual perfection of individuals or their growth by stages, until they eventually attain a state of beatitude. These are the tenets of the Buddhist.

When two nations, having entirely different standards on which their civilisation is based, come in contact, an antagonism between their different ideals is thereby set up. By contrast

they present a more conspicuous view of their divergence, and act on one another as do the positive and negative in electricity. The stronger race endeavours to force its civilisation on the weaker; and, at the same time, must be reacted on in return, unless it pursues a policy of extermination, or does not truly colonise and remains aloof from the people with whom it comes in contact.

The injunctions given to the Jews to exterminate the races of Palestine were meant to preserve their religion from assimilating foreign ideas. In the spread of Islam the Moslems did not carry out the principles of extermination so completely as did the Jews. Other sects were allowed in the territories that they overran, and in which they settled and with the former inhabitants of which they associated on equal terms, provided that the latter paid a contribution to the general treasury of the Moslems in return for being allowed to practise their own rites of worship and preserve their own modes of thought. Moslems have truly colonised —in the strictest sense of the term—the countries that they have occupied. Islam, as defined and laid down by the Prophet Mahomed, has thus absorbed the philosophical ideas prevalent in the East—a fact which has led to the appearance of the Sooffee, the mystic, and the Dervishes. The Moslem believes in the resurrection of the body, in the same material condition that it held on the earth, and which he declares must ever be its nature in opposition to that of the Creator; and, in consequence, the Paradise that he pictures must be a material one. Islam also requires God alone to be the sole object of the adoration of man, and the follower of Islam therefore should hold that there is a complete separation between the entity of the Creator and that of His Creation. But the aim of the Dervish and of the mystic (who in Persia has taken the name of Sooffee, Soofee, or Sufi) is to seek union with the Creator by the merging of his individuality into the Divine Essence.

Such aspirations would seem to be directly attributable

to the influence of Hindu or Buddhist beliefs. "It is in India, beyond all other climes," says Sir John Malcolm in his *History of Persia*, "that this delusive and visionary doctrine has most flourished. There is, in the habits of that nation, and in the character of the Hindu religion, what peculiarly cherishes that mysterious spirit of holy abstraction in which it is founded: and we may grant our belief to the conjecture which assumes that India is the source from whence other nations have derived this mystic worship of Divinity."

After pointing out that there is no country over which the tenets of the Sooffees have, at different periods, been more widely diffused than Persia, and that the great reputation acquired by one of their priests enabled his descendants to occupy the throne of that kingdom for more than two centuries, the same writer continues: "The Sooffees represent themselves as entirely devoted to the search of truth, and as constantly occupied in the adoration of the Almighty, a union with whom they desire with all the ardour of divine love. The Creator is, according to their belief, diffused over all His Creation. They say the Creation proceeded at once from the splendour of God, who poured His spirit on the universe as the general diffusion of light is poured over the earth by the rising sun; and as the absence of that luminary creates total darkness, so the partial or total absence of the divine splendour, or light, causes partial or general annihilation."

Mahomedan authors agree in regarding the Sooffee enthusiasts, though co-existent with their religion and aiding it in its first beginnings, as distinctly unorthodox and among the most dangerous of its enemies. "There can be no doubt that their free opinions regarding its dogmas, their contempt of its forms, and their claim to a distinct communion with the Deity, are all calculated to subvert that belief for which they outwardly profess their respect; and their progress has, consequently, been deemed synonymous with that of infidelity."

Besides the doctrine of a mystical union with the Deity,

another fundamental difference between the two systems is that the Sooffee or mystic requires the aid of a holy teacher before he can be capable of the adoration of the Creator. He does not, therefore, recognise the ability of the mind and soul of man to appeal direct to the Creator for guidance and support, which the teaching of the Koran asserts to be his right. And quoting again from Sir John Malcolm: "The wild and varied doctrines of their teachers are offered to the disciples of this sect, in place of the forms and usages of their religion. They are invited to embark on the sea of doubt, under the guidance of a sacred teacher, whom they are required to deem superior to all other mortals, and worthy of a holy confidence that borders on adoration."

Their doctrine teaches that there are four stages through which man must pass before he reaches the highest, or that of divine beatitude; when, to use their own language, "his corporeal veil will be removed, and his emancipated soul will mix again with the glorious essence, from which it had been separated, but not divided."

"The first of these stages," says Malcolm, "is that of humanity, which supposes the disciple to live in obedience to the holy law, and the observance of all the rites, customs, and precepts of the established religion; which are admitted to be useful in regulating the lives and restraining within proper bounds the vulgar mass, whose souls cannot reach to the heights of divine contemplation, and who might be corrupted or misled by that very liberty of faith which tends to enlighten and delight those of superior intellect or more fervent devotion. The second stage, in which the disciple attains power or force, is termed the road or path; and he who arrives at this leaves that condition in which he is only admitted to admire or follow a teacher, and enters the pale of Sooffeeism. He may now abandon all observance of religious forms and ceremonies, as he changes, to use their own phrase, 'practical for spiritual worship': but this stage cannot be attained without great piety, virtue, and fortitude; for the

mind cannot be trusted in the neglect of usages and rites, necessary to restrain it when weak, till it has acquired strength from habits of mental devotion, grounded on a proper knowledge of its own dignity and the divine nature of the Almighty. The third stage is knowledge; and the disciple who arrives at it is deemed to have attained supernatural knowledge; or, in other words, to be inspired; and he is supposed, when he reaches this stage, to be equal to the angels. The fourth or last stage is that which denotes his arrival at truth; which implies his complete union with the Divinity."

Mansur Helaj, a well-known mystic, is stated to have arrived at this last or final stage; and he gave evidence of the fact by constantly declaring, "I am the Truth." But as the Mullahs regarded his statement as blasphemous, they decreed that he should be impaled. When all preparations had been made for his execution, his body took up a position between the earth and the sky, defying the laws of gravity, and his soul sought communion with the Almighty, who persuaded it to return to its body and suffer the latter to undergo the decreed punishment, in order to uphold the principle of good order in the world!

Though a belief in predestination appears to be inculcated in the Koran by the words, "The fate of every man have we hung about his neck," few of the orthodox Moslems give a literal construction to the words of their prophet on this subject. They deem it profane to do so, as it would make God the author of the guilt of man. Almost all the Sooffees, however, are predestinarians. "They believe that the emanating principle, proceeding from God, can do nothing without His will, and can refrain from nothing that He wills. Some of them deny the existence of evil, because, they say, everything proceeds from God, and must be good. Others admit that there is evil in the world, but contend that man is not a free agent, as the poet Hafiz did" (Malcolm).

Mahomedan ethics or moral philosophy is founded to a great extent on the teaching of Plato and Aristotle. The

guiding principle aimed at is "mens sana in corpore sano." It is considered to be the duty of man, in order that he may live in the state in which he is intended to live, not to neglect the cultivation of any of his mental or bodily powers. Each sense or power is given man as part of his corporate body, to be used in the same way that all the different individuals of a state or civilised community are supposed to work together for the mutual benefit of all members of that state or community. Each sense or power is thus represented as having legal rights in the commonwealth of powers of which man is composed. By the encouragement to excess, or by the neglect of any of his mental or bodily powers, man is considered to act unjustly to himself, and to bring himself to a state of disorganisation, in the same manner that a nation would do the respective members of which neglect the proper duties and tasks allotted to their individual stations.

Rational man is stated to have two faculties or forces, which are of a passive and an active nature, to assist him to discern the lines on which his conduct and thoughts should be based. The passive force is the power of observation, which consists of intellectual sight, or the forming of intellectual impressions derived from sublime sources; and also in active intellect in the exercise of thought and consideration. The other force is the power of action, which manifests itself in anger or in the repulsion, by forcible means, of what is disagreeable; and also in desire, which manifests itself in the acquirement of what is agreeable.

When each of these powers of man is exercised in a manner conformable to reason, from the advantages to be derived from intellectual sight, which is the first branch of the power of observation, wisdom is obtained; from active intellect, which is the second branch, equity is acquired; from the force of anger and repulsion, bravery; from the force of desire, temperance. Whenever one of these forces gains too much ascendancy, it does so to the detriment of the other forces or of the other subdivisions into which they are divided. The

principle advocated is a proper equipoise of the different parts of the system, as essential to the perfection of man. Virtues when carried to excess develop into vices, as they also do when their practice is unduly neglected.

The virtue wisdom, when in excess, becomes presumption or cunning; when in deficiency, it becomes stupidity. Bravery, when in excess, develops into foolhardiness; in deficiency, cowardice. Temperance has for its corresponding vice lasciviousness or indifference. Equity may become tyranny or servility.

In the more esoteric parts of their philosophy the Mahomedans state that magic is of two kinds, white and black. White magic is said to be that practised by the prophets, who obtained their knowledge direct by divine inspiration. It was always employed for purposes of good. Some have been inclined to regard true mysticism as allied to this white magic; for all higher aspirations help to build up the great Temple, made without hands, which the creature, man, is constantly raising in honour of his Creator. It may be said of this species of mysticism, that it is the great voice of Nature within us crying out to its Creator.

We must remember that such mysticism encounters difficulties in expressing itself in the idioms and metaphors of mundane language, or even in that to which the mystic is compelled to resort for communicating his conceptions to his fellow mortals. The imagery that the mystic is compelled to employ must appeal to the religious influences under which those he addresses have been brought up. As a conspicuous instance of mundane description of a mystic conception, one may cite the New Jerusalem of the Book of Revelation.

The Mahomedan mystic naturally chooses material imagery, because it is the principle of his religion to insist on the equality and the preservation of the balance between mind and matter, or on the co-existence of his bodily nature with his spiritual one, both in this world and in the next. On the other hand, the Christian and the Buddhist declare that, in the

state of beatitude or in the world to come, the spiritual nature of man will gain complete ascendancy over the bodily; and in this life—as the training-ground for the life to come—they naturally seek to advance the spiritual qualities at the expense of those that are material.

The Dervishes and Sooffees are divided into innumerable sects, as must be the case in a doctrine that has been rightly called the belief of the imagination. One sect maintain that the clapping of hands, dancing, and singing, which they practise, are involuntary. In these fits, God comes and tells them secrets. "They lay their heads on His bosom, and He lays His head on theirs." It is the stirring of the divine nature, engrafted within them, which leads to all their extravagant joys. Others assert that, "when they dance till they fall down insensible, they enjoy the society of the houris of Paradise, and that these delightful beings tell them of mysteries." Another sect say that none but themselves know God. Reason can never, they say, lead to this knowledge; it must be attained through the aid of a holy teacher. Others express themselves ardent lovers of God, but assert that "worldly love is the bridge over which those must pass who seek the joys of divine love."

But whatever divergencies may exist among the Sooffees in the expression of emotional susceptibility, it remains true that the essence of Sooffeeism is poetry. Many of the Oriental poets are mystics, and among them the Persian poet Hafiz may in many ways be considered typical. In reading him it is therefore important to recognise not only that his work is permeated with the mysticism of the East, but also that he was brought up in the traditions of Mahomedanism. In the imagery he makes use of to express his mystical ideas he naturally does not select that which a European Christian poet might be expected to choose. If he employs the symbols of LOVE and WINE, it is "with a difference." We should remember that wine of an intoxicating nature was forbidden by Mahomed, who himself was accustomed to drink water

in which dates had been soaked, but before the infusion had become fermented. While with regard to love, it has already been stated that a sect of Sooffees or mystics inculcate that "worldly love is the bridge over which those must pass who seek the joys of divine love," and the religion in which Hafiz was brought up has declared the continuance of earthly passion in the Paradise that is to be after the day of judgment.

The position of women with the Mahomedans is very much the same as with the Jews. By the majority of Mahomedans polygamy is sanctioned, though it may not always be practised. There is no warrant for the opinion that Mahomed denied that women have souls. Their funerals are conducted similarly to those of men; and during the service, the two angels, who are said to inquire into the beliefs and faith of the deceased, are supposed to approach their corpses after they have been placed in the grave, and examine them as they do those of men. Their position in Heaven after the day of judgment has not been defined at length. The generally accepted opinion among Moslems seems to be that those who were married will be with the husband or one of the husbands that they had on the earth, with whom they will reside in the enjoyment of conjugal rights, should both parties desire such an arrangement. They, as well as their husbands, will be invested with perpetual youth; but their domiciles they will share with the houris of Paradise.

Of the Paradise that will come after the day of judgment the Koran contains the following description:—

"Therein are rivers of incorruptible water; and rivers of milk, the taste whereof changeth not; and rivers of wine, pleasant unto those who drink; and rivers of clarified honey; and therein shall they have plenty of all kinds of fruits; and pardon from the Lord" (Koran, chapter xlvii.).

"They who approach near to God shall dwell in the gardens of delight; reposing on couches adorned with gold and precious stones; sitting opposite to one another thereon. Youths, who shall continue in their bloom for ever, shall go

round about to attend them, with goblets and beakers, and a cup of flowing wine (their heads shall not ache by drinking the same, neither shall their reason be disturbed): and with fruits of the sort that they shall choose, and the flesh of birds of the kind that they shall desire. And there shall accompany them fair damsels, having large black eyes, resembling pearls hidden in their shells, as a reward for that which they have wrought. They shall not hear therein any vain discourse, nor any charge of sin; but only the salutation, peace, peace" (Koran, lvi.).

In *Frondes Agrestes* Ruskin remarks: "Perhaps few people have ever asked themselves why they admire a rose so much more than all other flowers. If they consider they will find, first, that red is, in a delicately graduated state, the loveliest of all pure colours; and, secondly, that in the rose there is no shadow, except what is composed of colour. All the shadows are fuller in colour than its lights, owing to the translucency and reflective power of its leaves."

The rose has ever held a high place in Oriental mysticism.

It may be that in his reference to the attachment of the nightingale for the rose Hafiz unwittingly echoes the myth of the loves of Cupid and Psyche, making the rose—the symbol of passion—play the part of Cupid. It is Psyche, however, who woos Cupid! An interesting and profoundly suggestive reversal of the method in which a Christian mystic, expressing himself in accordance with the religious sentiments of those he addresses, might be expected to treat the subject.

E. C. THWAYTES.

DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"DIE WELTGESCHICHTE IST DAS WELTGERICHT."

A REPLY to my friend and master Dr Macan his "Adelphian response," in the July number, "to my friend Mr E. F. Carritt in return for the gift of a copy of his paper in the April number of the *Hibbert Journal*, 1915."

"A Sage comes by and chops the paradox
Of Vision into a thousand prosy blocks."
Ah, but when the ultimate event is tried
Even Wisdom of her child is justified;
Since what block-Heads prosaically part
Is fused anew in the poetic Heart,—
Fused not confused, for we must only hold
Heads clear or blocked, Hearts only warm or cold.
So, Hegel! though by capital misprision
Which takes for true or false the poet's Vision,
What genius could from logic liquidate
Thou did'st invest in Prussian Bonds of State,
Let History judge thee. Since thy bad, my worse,
End, as they had their birth, in genial verse,
For what thou Dost *I* pardon what thou Mean'st,
And own *Das Denken auch ist Gottesdienst.*

E. F. CARRITT.

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"THE MORAL SANCTION OF FORCE."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1915, p. 717.)

THE reason given by Professor Norman K. Smith why an international judiciary, including its constabulary, must be ineffective, viz. that many international grievances are unjusticiable, is insufficient. Such an inter-

national peace league would have indeed, as one of its ends, to adjudicate international grievances, but its main purpose should be to keep the peace, on the ground that it is more to the world's interest that unjusticiable grievances should remain unsettled than that they should be settled by war.

If we fix our thoughts on peace-keeping, the problem simplifies itself. Peace can be broken in two chief ways—by invasion of a neighbour's territory and by attack on his shipping. Territorial invasion can always be detected. It will be met by ejecting the intruder, no matter what his plea. Attacks on his shipping are acts of violence for which, as for territorial invasion, a money compensation will be exacted by the international court, and enforced if need by taking possession of the offender's custom-houses till the sum, with costs, is collected. So with attacks on consulates, citizens, etc.

The State judiciary, besides adjudicating wrongs, keeps the peace where the wrong is unjusticiable. The wrongs which my neighbour does me by rudeness, by keeping hens, and by noise during my study hours are now unjusticiable; the constable prevents my redressing them by unauthorised force. The unjusticiable cases are indeed in greater proportion and more grievous among international than among State grievances, but this difference gives no reason why the world constabulary should not stop all attempts to redress the unjusticiable ones by unauthorised force quite as the State constabulary does now.

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"THE GOLDEN RULE."

(*Hibbert Journal,* July 1915, p. 859.)

PROFESSOR SONNENSCHEIN's contention that the Golden Rule is often misinterpreted, and made to signify something quite alien to the teaching of Jesus, seems to me both just and timely. But is not this due to the frailty of human nature rather than to mistranslations? Even taking the "worst" translation, that given in *The Twentieth Century New Testament*, "Do to others whatever you *would wish* them to do to you," are we led directly to the ἄτοπον of the "beggar" illustration? Retaining that rendering, may not the meaning be, that it is our duty to put ourselves in the place of the beggar, to try to understand the situation in all its bearings, and to act as *we* should wish others to act to us in the same situation? The mistake is in supposing that by putting ourselves hypothetically into the circumstances of the beggar we cease to be ourselves, and become someone else with other desires and with other views on mendicancy. But that stultification of personality, that mistaken view of what is involved in genuine sympathy, though it may be very common,

is not contemplated in the Golden Rule, and does not seem necessarily involved in any common translation of it.

Apart from the question of the accuracy of the translation, Professor Sonnenschein advances, as I understand, two objections to the "would wish." It emphasises the hypothetical character of the rule, and it also seems to make moral conduct a matter of inclination. But even if this be so, is it altogether to be deplored? Imagination and inclination are very vital elements in all such moral decisions. I do not think that concrete cases can always be determined in a philosophically detached way on merely abstract principles of the good. We do need to imagine ourselves sometimes in the actual concrete situation, to get, so to speak, experimentally at the point where the moral principles converge or collide, before we see the true solution. If the conditional "would" reminds us of this, there is something to be said for its retention. And with regard to "inclination"—if this means whim or fancy or momentary impulse we should all agree with Professor Sonnenschein that the rendering "would" is faulty. But I cannot see that the "would," when prefixed to "wish," turns the wish into a mere impulse or transient mood. And the wish or inclination, properly understood, is of the highest moral significance. The wish of the genuinely moral man, after he has duly considered all the bearings of the case, will generally point to a right solution. It is his bent or inclination. The moral man acts rightly because he wishes to do so. And, we may add, the hypothetical nature of the rule, the call to imagine fully the situation, gives the needful time for the real wish of the man to assert itself.

Two further observations are suggested:—(1) Valuable as the Golden Rule is, we should remember that it is only a rule, and its utility depends largely on the moral qualities and standpoint of the person applying it. It need not lead to uniformity of action. Although Confucianism and Christianity both sanction the Golden Rule, a Confucianist at the World's Parliament of Religions condemned proselytising as a breach of it; whereas the disciples of Christ believe they are fulfilling it by preaching the Gospel to every creature and "compelling men to come in." If they differed on the obligations of caste, Arjuna, shrinking from the slaughter of his kinsmen, and Krishna, commending it, might each have appealed to the Golden Rule. Unless war can be shown on other grounds to be absolutely wrong, the soldier and the pacifist may both justify their position by the Golden Rule. (2) Although Jesus adopted the Golden Rule as summing up the highest teaching of pre-Christian moralists—the law and the prophets—He gave His disciples a much better and more exacting rule —not, "as ye would have others do to you," but, "as I have done to you." And, moreover, He showed clearly that no "rule," however exalted, could express all that was essential in Christian morality, or prove an adequate guide.

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SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

THE death of Louis Conturat, who, during the early days of the war, was killed by a heavy automobile rushing at full speed into the carriage in which he was travelling, is a heavy loss not only to French philosophy but to science and philosophy generally. Writing of him in an article on "Philosophy in France, 1913–1914" (*Phil. R.*, May 1915), M. Lalande observes that "he had in him none of that surface originality which displays itself in unexpected formulæ and striking phrases to pique the attention," but that "he possessed the rarest kind of originality: he illumined every study that he undertook." In 1896 Conturat published his important work *De l'Infini Mathématique.* The thesis he there maintained was that number and quantity are wholly independent categories, and that the application of number to quantity, such as is made in measurement, is based on no other ground than that of convenience. Infinite quantity, he contended, is given *a priori.* It depends in no way upon infinite number; it depends upon continua, and does not necessarily consist of a collection of units. From the study of the Infinite, Conturat was led to occupy himself with the writings of Leibniz. As a result of consulting the unpublished manuscripts of Leibniz in the Hanover Library he brought out a volume of Leibnizian *Inédits* containing more than two hundred new fragments, many of them of considerable philosophical interest. In 1901 there appeared from his pen a large work, entitled *La Logique de Leibniz*, in which he expounded with great care and precision a phase of Leibniz's thought that had previously been neglected. Not many months ago he contributed an article on "The Principles of Logic" to the first volume of the *Encyclopædia of Philosophy*, organised by M. Ruge. It is grievous to contemplate a life such as his being cut short by a tragic accident in the fullness of his maturity, when he was only forty-six years of age. The death of two distinguished German philosophers, Witasek and Meumann, is also recorded. Stephan Witasek, who was only in his forty-sixth year, was director of the Psychological Laboratory at Graz, and one of the ablest of Meinong's followers. Two small volumes of his are well known to students of philosophy in this country. The *Grundzüge der allgemeinen Aesthetik*, published in 1904, is an extremely suggestive

and thoughtful treatment of the fundamental conceptions of the science of æsthetics, and it exhibits a breadth of view often lacking in books of a similar title. His *Grundlinien der Psychologie*, which appeared in 1908, seems to me the best text-book of psychology that has yet been written. A good English translation of it would supply a real want. It is based largely on Meinong's teaching, but it bears throughout the stamp of an independent and acute mind, and is full of stimulating reflection. Ernst Meumann, who died at the age of fifty-three, was called not so very long ago to fill the chair of psychology at Hamburg. He was one of Wundt's pupils, and he commenced his scientific career by conducting a long and elaborate series of researches in the Leipzig Institute on the consciousness of time. This piece of investigation was certainly one of the most successful and fruitful bits of psychological work that has yet been attempted by the method of experiment. Latterly Meumann devoted his attention mainly to æsthetics and pedagogy. In 1907 he published two bulky volumes, *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die experimentelle Pädagogik*—a very painstaking and exhaustive discussion of the entire field. One of the most genial and delightful of men, he will be mourned not only in his native land but in this country also by a wide circle of friends. To the July number of *Mind* Professor Pringle-Pattison contributes an interesting and appreciative article on Alexander Campbell Fraser, who died last year at the advanced age of ninety-five. Fraser taught in the University of Edinburgh for thirty-five years, and many of the best-known workers in philosophy at the present day in the English-speaking world were trained under him. His edition of Berkeley's writings is, as Professor Pringle-Pattison says, "a monument of loving care and sympathetic exposition," and "his *Life* was the first adequate presentment of Berkeley's fascinating and romantic career." Fraser's own philosophy was no doubt largely a development of what he called the "spiritual realism" of Berkeley, but he supplemented Berkeley's speculation on a side which Berkeley himself left comparatively unexplored. The facts of our moral experience formed the fulcrum of his thought, and became his key to the whole enigma of the universe. He translated Hume's psychological "custom" into a metaphysical "faith," and this faith was presented by him, in his Gifford Lectures, not as a principle by which to eke out the defects of knowledge, nor yet as a principle on which to fall back when confronted by ultimate contradictions, but as the fundamental presupposition of all knowledge and reasonable action—the ultimate hypothesis which stands between us and a scepticism in which the very idea of knowledge or truth would disappear. "He was accustomed to say," we are told, "that, if he ever felt intellectually stale, a few pages of Hume acted as an infallible stimulant."

It is a pleasant duty to welcome the appearance of the fourth edition of Professor James Ward's classical work, *Naturalism and Agnosticism* (London: Black, 1915), now published in one volume and at a considerably reduced price. In view of the subsequently written volume on *The*

Realm of Ends, the author suggests that a better title for the present book would perhaps have been *The Realm of Nature, or Naturalism and Spiritualism.* The two courses of Gifford Lectures really form parts of one whole, and together they constitute a contribution to philosophical thought of permanent value and significance. No such thorough and penetrating criticism of Naturalism as that undertaken by Professor Ward has ever yet been written. Two booklets issued by the Open Court Publishing Company ought here to be mentioned. The one is a translation by Mr Philip E. B. Jourdain of Georg Cantor's historic essay, *Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers.* Mr Jourdain has added greatly to the value of his translation by writing a long and interesting introduction in which he deals with the investigations that led up to those of Cantor, and tries to bring out the significance of Cantor's work itself. The other volume is entitled *Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense*, and is edited, with an introduction, by Mr G. A. Johnston. The selections are made for the most part from the writings of Reid, but these have been supplemented by typical passages from Ferguson, Beattie, and Dugald Stewart. Considering the prolixity of these authors and the shortness of human life, the *Selections* should be useful to students who desire to be saved from having to "wade through the ocean of words" in which the philosophy of common sense is often enveloped. Mr Johnston's introduction is written with judicial fairness and with critical insight.

The new volume of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (N.S., vol. xv.; London: Williams & Norgate, 1915) is full of interesting matter and of discussions of questions now uppermost in philosophical thought. The president, Mr A. J. Balfour, was prevented from opening the session owing to the strain of the political situation, and in his place the inaugural Address was delivered by Dr Bernard Bosanquet, who chose for his subject "Science and Philosophy." Dr Bosanquet maintains that whilst philosophy is a theory and its interest is theoretical, there is no presumption that its object-matter is in turn theory. Its object, *prima facie*, is the universe, with all its activities and values, among which the theories of exact science with their objects form only a certain proportion. Besides the theory of what concerns the sciences, a philosophy is bound to undertake a theoretical consideration at least of beauty and goodness. Nothing can be affirmed as true in philosophy which does not sustain itself in a thinking process to which the whole of experience is contributory. Philosophy does not emulate the advance of the particular sciences, by making discoveries after the manner which their problems prescribe to them, but it can never fail to be progressive so long as thinking is possible and human nature changes. One of the ablest papers in the volume is undoubtedly that by Mr C. D. Broad on "Phenomenalism," written with special reference to Mr Russell's Lectures on "Our Knowledge of the External World." Phenomenalism is taken to be a philosophical theory which claims to be able in some sense to dispense with physical objects. From the

ordinary common-sense point of view, sense-data are conceived as only existing in connection with living minds and bodies. But Russell assumes the existence of sensibilia not only of which no one *is* aware, but of which no one ever *can become* aware. Mr Broad argues that such sensibilia do not differ in any important logical respect from the physical objects which the common view is so blamed for introducing. There is nothing, he contends, in Russell's phenomenalism with which a reasonable and atheistic Berkeleian need quarrel. Mr Broad's main argument is that if we confine ourselves to a belief in phenomenal laws and deny a high intrinsic probability to certain physical laws, we shall have no right to believe many phenomenal laws nearly so strongly as all physicists, including those who are phenomenalists, do believe them. This may not, he admits, be a conclusive argument against phenomenalism, but most phenomenalists are far from clear as to the implications of their views. Professor Lloyd Morgan's "Notes on Berkeley's Doctrine of Esse" are both timely and suggestive. Whilst Berkeley held that a "thing" is a collection of ideas whose esse is percipi, yet he taught that there is one Substance—the Eternal Spirit—who is the Source of all phenomena. And Professor Morgan considers that the very notion of phenomena implies a source on which phenomena are dependent. The whole method of exact thought deals with terms in relation. So that when we take the whole universe of phenomena as a complex term we are impelled, in further pursuance of that method, to seek a noumenal term to which this phenomenal term is in relation. The world as ordered implies some ordering agency. Professor G. F. Stout's subtle criticism of "Mr Russell's Theory of Judgment" is too technical to be outlined here, but it should be missed by no one who has followed the recent development of Russell's philosophy. I may note, however, that Professor Stout takes knowledge by description to be as ultimate as knowledge by acquaintance. The possibility of it rests for him on the fact that some entities, at least, have a certain kind of incompleteness, such that on apprehending them we are able to apprehend them as being incomplete and are therefore aware of something as being necessary to complete them. We may also know that the something, inasmuch as it has to satisfy this condition, must be of a certain general character, although its specific nature has, in most cases, to be otherwise ascertained. In a paper on "Complexity and Synthesis" Mrs Adrian Stephen makes a comparison of the data and philosophical methods of Russell and Bergson. Russell, she points out, insists that some of our data which appear not to be logical must be so in fact, and that, since some must be, it is reasonable to suppose that all are. Bergson, on the other hand, sees no reason to believe that logic must apply to all data, and gives instances of data of change which contain neither terms nor relations. The main distinction between the method of the two thinkers lies in the view each takes of the work performed by attention. For Russell a synthesis is nothing but a complex with some of the parts left out, and we can pass from a synthesis to a complex by attention, which discovers

relations of difference not previously distinguished but there all along. Bergson holds, on the contrary, that attention arrives at complex data, not by discovering *more*, but by *leaving out* much of what was originally given in the synthetic datum. The volume includes two important symposia —one on "Instinct and Emotion," in which Mr M'Dougall, Mr A. F. Shand, and Professor Stout take part, and the other on "The Import of Propositions," in which the papers are by Miss E. E. Constance Jones, Dr Bosanquet, and Dr F. C. S. Schiller.

Professor John Dewey is severely critical of Mr Russell's phenomenalism, to use Mr Broad's term, in an article on "The Existence of the World as a Problem" (*Phil. R.*, July 1915). The writer attempts to show that the identification of what are called "data" as "data of sense" for the purpose of raising the problem, whether the existence of anything other than our own sense-data can be inferred from the existence of those data, already involves an affirmative answer to the question—that it must be answered in the affirmative before the question can be asked. For what justification is there for calling immediate data "objects of sense"? That colour is visual, in the sense of being an object of vision, is a proposition about colour and it is a proposition which colour itself does not utter. It presupposes as a condition of the question existence beyond the colour itself. And to call the colour a "sensory" object involves a like assumption but even more complex —involves, that is to say, even more existence beyond the colour. Nor can such terms as "visual," "sensory," be logically neglected without destroying the force of the question. The question is, can we "know that objects of sense, or very similar objects, exist at times when we are not perceiving them"? But without the limitation of the term "perceiving" by the term "sense" no *problem* as to existence *at other times* can possibly arise. For neither (*a*) reference to time, nor (*b*) limitation to a particular time, is given in the bare fact of colour or of perceiving colour. There must be some ground for assuming the temporal quality of the object other than the momentariness of the mental event of our being aware of the said object. Moreover, how is it that even the act of being aware is describable as "momentary"? Is there any other way of so identifying it except by assuming that it is delimited in a time continuum? And if not, is it not superfluous to trouble about *inference* to "other times"? They are assumed in stating the question, which thus turns out again to be no question at all. Professor Dewey maintains that we never in any actual procedure of inquiry throw the existence of the world into doubt, and that we cannot do so without self-contradiction. What we do is to doubt some received piece of "knowledge" about some specific thing of that world, and then set to work as best we can to rectify it. An equally severe criticism of Mr Russell's view is worked out by Professor Theodore de Laguna in a paper on "The Logical-Analytic Method in Philosophy" (*J. of Phil.*, xii. 17, Aug. 19, 1915). Mr Russell's unperceived sensibilia are, it is insisted, mere *Dinge an sich*. Their resemblance to actual sense-data is a pure fiction. Mr Russell admits that our actual sense-data vary with

a multitude of physical and physiological conditions. But the unperceived sensibilia are sensibilia for which the physiological conditions of sense-data are absent; and, on Mr Russell's principles, these conditions cannot be supplied without changing the sensibilia themselves. They must, with scientific prudence, be regarded as *at least* as different from all our sense-data as cold is from middle C, or pain from a hue of the spectrum. Nay, they must be regarded as immeasurably more different. Even the statement that they *become* sense-data under certain conditions is an exaggeration. They become such *at most* as the white becomes sweet when sugar is put into the mouth. There is no ascertainable or imaginable continuity. All that can properly be said is that they are *replaced* by sense-data under the appropriate conditions. They are things-in-themselves.

Dr J. Ellis M'Taggart's Sidgwick Memorial Lecture for 1914 on "The Meaning of Causality" is printed in the July number of *Mind*. Dr M'Taggart holds that two characteristics have been universally admitted as essential to causality. The first of such characteristics is that causality is a relation of determination, and the determination in question is a determination of implication. Implication is strictly speaking a relation between propositions, or truths, and not between events. But it is convenient to extend our use of it, so as to say that, if one proposition implies another, then the event asserted in the first implies the event asserted in the second. This is what is meant by saying that the cause implies the effect. The second characteristic is that the relation of causality is always held to be a relation between realities which exist, as distinguished, for example, from truths. The writer urges that these two characteristics only are essential to causality, and that causality should be defined as a relation of implication between existent realities. Other characteristics, however, have frequently been included. Causality, it has been said, (*a*) is always a relation between substances. But this is implied in the two characteristics mentioned. Again, it is often maintained, (*b*) that the cause exerts an activity on an effect. But Dr M'Taggart can see no reason for believing that any such activity exists. Once more, it is sometimes asserted (*c*) that a causal law does not only say that every occurrence of X implies the occurrence of Z, but that in some way it shows us *why* every occurrence of X implies the occurrence of Z. But Dr M'Taggart insists that the causal connection is a connection of which we know that it does exist, but do not know why it exists. Again, the author considers that philosophically it is more convenient to speak of causal relations as existing between two terms, but not to speak of one of these terms as cause and of the other as effect. He would not, therefore, include the temporal priority of the cause to the effect in the definition of causality. The question whether the notion of causal determination is valid is not discussed. But it is pointed out that, if it is to be shown to be valid, it can only be in one way. It cannot be proved empirically, and it is clear that the universal validity of causal determination is not self-evident

a priori. There remains only one alternative: it must be capable of proof, if at all, by a chain of reasoning resting on premises known *a priori.*

Dr A. Wolf's Lectures, delivered last February at University College, London, on *The Philosophy of Nietzsche* (London: Constable, 1915), have been published at an opportune moment, and will probably be widely read. Dr Wolf begins by repudiating the charge that Nietzsche wittingly incited Germany to a a war of aggression. So far from encouraging German megalomania, Nietzsche was one of its most scathing critics. He denounced German pride of race and taunted German pride of intellect, telling his countrymen in 1871 that the culture of vanquished France was incomparably superior to theirs. Again and again he denounced German state-idolatry and its militarism, and remonstrated with his compatriots for putting a policy of "national and political lunacy" in the place of the culture which they formerly possessed. After dealing with Nietzsche's method and with the motive of his philosophy, Dr Wolf devotes two interesting chapters to his theory of knowledge and his theory of the universe. Nietzsche, it is pointed out, is inclined to suspect all so-called human knowledge. The very relationship between knowing and the known seemed to him to indicate the likelihood of human knowledge being coloured by features which originate from the mind itself. "Perhaps," he writes, "man ultimately only finds in things what he has put into them." So that all the categories of common sense and of science *may* be so many ways of veiling reality. And yet, even though our beliefs are alike untrue, it does not follow that they are all equally worthless. Some beliefs are helpful, others are injurious, to life. There are "useful errors" and "errors that are not useful." For "utility" is not truth; and although it is conceivable that beliefs may be useful because they are true, yet they may be useful even if they are not true, perhaps even because they are not true. Nietzsche's cosmology is essentially allied to that of Schopenhauer. Nature, he thought, consists of centres of impulse in various stages of development, impulse in its most developed form being commonly described as "will." Each centre of impulse strives to become master of all space, and to thrust back everything that resists it. Accordingly, Nietzsche sums up his view in the dictum, "This world is the Will to Power and nothing else." Although he felt strong antipathy to what he took to be the Christian conception of God, Nietzsche's philosophy, Dr Wolf thinks, is not so irreligious as it appears to be. The conception of a "becoming God," who is identical with the universe at each culminating stage of its development, is more than once thrown out by him. The book concludes with a well-written chapter on Nietzsche's theory of life and conduct. Altogether Dr Wolf has given us the best English exposition of Nietzsche's philosophy, if philosophy it can rightly be called.

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THEOLOGY.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.LITT.

THE issues of Bousset's weighty volume, *Kyrios Christos*, continue to be discussed. In *The Princeton Theological Review* (April, pp. 161–189), Dr Geerhardus Vos begins an investigation into the problem whether the title *kurios* really was, as Bousset thinks, first applied to Jesus by Christians of Hellenistic sympathies, and not by the Primitive Church; whether, in its pregnant sense, the title, as it occurs in the gospels, is not an anachronism. Dr Vos seeks to show that in Mark and the Logia there are distinct traces of the familiarity of the Palestinian community, as represented by these sources, with the conception of the lordship of Jesus. In an inaugural lecture, M. Charles Porret (*Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, pp. 5–36) criticises Bousset from a less detailed point of view. He is discussing "l'essence de l'évangile," and protests against Bousset's tendency to evolve Christianity from the faith—with a good deal of "Dichtung"—of the early Church, under the fostering atmosphere of Oriental mysticism and Gnosticism. This only illustrates, he holds, the incipient sceptical bias of those who refuse to believe in miracles. "On a commencé par éliminer les faits miraculeux, puis, une fois ce levier en fonction, on a écarté, comme non historique, tout ce qui, de la personne du Christ et de son rôle, dépassait les proportions humaines, et l'on en vint à ne plus conserver de son enseignement que ce qui ressortit à la morale, ou ce qui le fait considérer comme un doux illuminé! Les évangiles ne sont plus pour ces savants ce qu'ils sont pour nous, savoir la rédaction du témoignage qui a fondé la foi de l'Eglise; ils sont bien plutôt le résultat de cette foi. Bousset va jusqu'à dire que jamais Jésus ne s'est donné le nom de Fils de Homme. C'est l'Eglise qui l'a appelé de ce nom et a vu en lui le Messie. Et ainsi du reste."

One of M. Porret's points against rationalist criticism of the gospels—a point which he claims has been sharpened by the war—is that any identification of Christianity with mere progress is a defacement of the gospel. This had been a practical deduction already drawn by some of the eschatological school, as a result of their reading of the teaching of Jesus. "Close thy Darwin, open thy Daniel" was the motto. Catastrophe, not evolution, is to be expected on the lines of the gospel. A similar moral is drawn in the *Church Quarterly Review* (pp. 374 f.) by Rev. Herbert Kelly, S.S.M., who writes from far Japan upon "Eschatological Interpretations and the War." Mr Kelly is far enough from the lines of Schweitzer; his paper is a piece of what we may term "lively orthodoxy," arguing that the eschatological predictions of the Bible are capable of repeated and various interpretation, and that the immediate historical application, which criticism lays bare, is not exhaustive. There is a truth in this position, as many heroes before Mr Kelly have discovered, but it is not aided by contending that the end of things, contemplated by biblical

eschatology, is merely the end of a passing order, or by resting on the difference between the Greek words *kosmos* and *aion*. Such an expedient would not, for example, be adequate to the Johannine Apocalypse, which certainly anticipates the destruction of the present physical universe. Mr Kelly considers that we know only two things about the present crisis. The first is that history shows "righteousness is a question of truth, but immediate victory is not to truth, but to faith," the opposite of faith being arrogance—"an unreasonable belief in oneself that one can do anything in the way one chooses. Arrogance is the ground of all failure. . . . Harold's Englishmen had a good cause, but they cared so little for it that they could not lay aside their local jealousies to take it up. The Crusaders had a true faith, but mixed with so much arrogant self-confidence that they would not take the trouble to learn the very elements of their fighting business." The second of these historical instances, at any rate, is open to question. But, apart from that, arrogance in this aspect is twofold; there is the arrogance of which Mr Kelly speaks, which is too proud to learn, and there is another arrogance which learns how to use the weapons of success and then, as Habakkuk said of the pitiless Chaldæans, "sacrifice to their net, and burn incense unto their drag," defying or ignoring God as well as man. The second truth which, according to Mr Kelly, we can hope to know just now is that the good purpose of God cannot fully be worked out within the compass of an individual life. Which is true, but hardly relevant to the eschatological hope of the New Testament. "It is well to be hopeful, but I know no reason, in Scripture or out of it, why things should come to our ideal, least of all in our time. I know no essential reason why this should not be the beginning of the long end of our European civilisation. The only good we do know is with the Psalmist —that 'it is good for me to hold me fast by God.'" This is Mr Kelly's conclusion of the whole matter, as water to the wine of the eschatological hope which he has been justifying from the Bible. And the Psalmist also said, "I should utterly have fainted but that I believe to see the goodness of the Lord in the land of the living." The large majority of pamphlets which we have received, dealing with the religious or theological issues of the war, are best hurried to the wastepaper basket, but one shining exception is Canon Streeter's *War, This War, and the Sermon on the Mount* (Oxford University Press), a short, sensible tract, which, for the price of twopence, brushes away the same sort of cobwebs from the house of life as are handled by Mr Lloyd Thomas in his vigorous book on the *Immorality of Non-Resistance*, which was reviewed in vol. xiii. of this journal (pp. 687–688). It would be a service if some competent person would write a similar tract on the time and way in which nationality first became a problem for Christian ethics. The theology underlying current views on this topic is sadly in want of correction.

Not long ago we had occasion to notice a study of "The Sources of Luke's Perean Section," by Dr D. R. Wickes in the valuable Chicago series of *Historical and Linguistic Studies in Literature related to the New*

Testament (Cambridge University Press). Another monograph has been issued in the same series by Dr E. W. Parsons on "A Historical Examination of some Non-Marcan Elements in Luke," which argues that Luke ix. 51–xviii. 14 is a block of material, possibly composite in its origin, dating from the primitive Jerusalem Church, and reflecting a period whose interests correspond to the Palestinian community prior to the acceptance of the Gentile mission about 55 A.D. The argument is historical rather than literary; it depends largely on a comparative criticism of the section with the records in Acts and the Pauline Epistles. Dr Parsons is evidently sceptical about the current theories of Q, a scepticism which has something to say for itself. On the other hand, the method of reconstructing the interests which are supposed to underlie a tradition of any particular saying of Jesus is apt to prove a temptation to imaginative treatment; it is a risky business to determine what were the problem-situations round which incidents or sayings gathered. This risk becomes more obvious in the further attempt made by the author to prove that in Luke iii. 7–viii. 3, Luke is using not only a special source in vi. 20–49 (the Sermon on the Plain), but a christological document drawn up "with the definite interest of meeting the difficulties which confronted the early Church when it attempted to demonstrate the messianic office, dignity, and power of Jesus while he was on earth." Both sources are regarded as Palestinian, emanating from the Jerusalem Church, but the former betrays the influence of Stoic literary forms. The data are somewhat speculative at this point, but Dr Parsons has brought forward considerations which require to be taken into account in the higher criticism of the synoptic problem, and his essay is a welcome counterpart to the ultra-literary tendency which here, as in the criticism of the Hexateuch, needs to be supplemented and modified. Dr E. A. Abbott's latest volume, *The Proclamation of the Gospel* (Cambridge University Press), only carries on the commentary on the synoptic tradition from Mark i. 16 to iii. 35, so that it affords no means of checking Dr Parsons' conclusions. Like all the author's works, it contains much more than its title promises. The series of which it is the third volume is entitled *The Fourfold Gospel*, and the synoptic tradition is invariably compared with the Johannine, in order to bring out the underlying unity of purpose in the four gospels. Dr Abbott still maintains and illustrates his thesis that when John intervenes in the synoptic tradition it is mostly "with a view to elucidating Mark where Luke omits, or alters, some Marcan tradition." The high road of the book, *i.e.* the investigation of the thoughts of the gospels, is linked to what the author calls "cross-roads," or investigations into particular words, and readers of the series know how often these cross-roads lead into useful places. The present volume is indexed as admirably as its predecessors. "Pains have been taken," we are told in the preface, "to make consecutive reading unnecessary." This is a just claim, and the book is serviceable to those who wish to find any passage discussed in the relevant sections. Even when the author's

particular hypothesis is rejected, his learning and freshness of outlook reward the student. His *Miscellanea Evangelica* (II.), which has subsequently appeared, is a discussion of Christ's miracles of feeding, minute, subtle, and suggestive; "it gives reasons for believing that the Eucharist of the Last Supper was the outcome and climax of earlier meals that were not only eucharistic but also altruistic." A less allegorical view of the miracles is taken by Dr Percy Gardner in his charming and lucid volume on *The Ephesian Gospel* (Williams & Norgate), which furnishes the ordinary public with an exposition of the origin, value, and contents of the Fourth Gospel as viewed from the standpoint of liberal criticism. Dr Gardner's judgment on the authorship is not that of Dr James Drummond in his well-known treatise, but he resembles the latter theologian in his combination of scholarly acuteness and sympathetic interpretation. *The Ephesian Gospel* forms an admirable sequel to his previous study of St Paul in the Crown Theological Library.

Dr Abbott's views of the Fourth Gospel have been criticised as too subtle and Philonic, but they combine, also, the critical temper with an appreciation of the inner spirit of the book. He argues, for example, that this gospel can help us to understand Jesus, "if we can but overcome our objections to the indirectness of" the evangelist's method, and then adds that "tortuous" might be a better adjective than "indirect." "Jesus is represented as saying, not only in effect but in word, 'I am the Way and the Truth and the Life,' and 'I am the Light of the World,' and 'I am the Good Shepherd,' and 'The Resurrection.' Few certainties can be more certain than that Jesus did not utter these exact words. Why, then, does the Evangelist thus repeatedly and with obvious deliberate iteration impute them to Him? The best explanation is that he *knew* (or, as I should prefer to say, *it was revealed to him*) that Jesus meant them, and he did not know how otherwise to express the knowledge or revelation." Whether this theory is regarded as satisfactory or not, it will be admitted to be anything but dry and superficial. But there is a type of criticism still lingering on earth which handles the Fourth Gospel differently, and it is exemplified by Soltau in a recent essay on John's Gospel in Preuschen's *Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* (1915, pp. 24–53). Soltau supplements his previous essays on the same subject by conjecturing that once upon a time there was a collection (R) of sayings and speeches of Jesus, which the evangelist (G) expanded and edited, principally in i. 35–51, iii. 22–31*a*, iv. 10–15, 31–38, vi. 66–71, vii. 1–x. 1, x. 30–xi. 46, xii. 20–45, xiii. (21–30) 31–45, xx. 3–11, 24–29; finally, further additions were made, perhaps by the author of the twenty-first chapter, and so the Fourth Gospel was fashioned. Soltau recognises, like Dr Abbott, the close relation at several points, *e.g.* xiii. 36–38 and xiv. 30, between Mark and John; but his criteria of distinction between R and G are both arbitrary and fanciful, and the literary judgment displayed is of the weakest. Lord Jeffrey once said, in a notorious article, that you might look long enough among the nervous and manly lines of Burns before you found any stuff about

dancing daffodils. What Wordsworth's deep mind was to Jeffrey, devotion to Christ is to Soltau; he cannot forgive its presence in the Fourth Gospel, and his highest praise is for the few "synoptic" passages in which that "stuff" is not obvious. The result is an intricate and unsatisfactory analysis of the gospel, much below the recent analytic efforts of Spitta, Schwartz, and Wellhausen.

It is not so much antipathy to "stuff about dancing daffodils" as a misconception of the mystical element in religion that engages two essayists, Dr Rufus M. Jones (*Harvard Review*, pp. 155–165, "Mysticism in Present-day Religion") and Professor E. S. Ames (*American Journal of Theology*, pp. 250–267, "Mystic Knowledge"). One of the main differences between the modern return to mysticism and the three older movements of the pre-Reformation epoch, the counter-Reformation, and the spiritual reformers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as Dr Jones admits, is that the leaders of the latter movements[1] were themselves "luminous mystics who interpreted their own experiences, while to-day, on the other hand, very few firstrate prophets of mystical religion have appeared among us, and our movement has been in the main confined to the historical and psychological interpretation of mysticism as revealed in the autobiographies and expositions of dead prophets." This may, of course, be the precursor of a more original phase. But Dr Jones ventures to predict that mysticism will not become a real force until it is emancipated from its traditional alliance with the classical philosophy, *i.e.* with the more or less inherent metaphysic of the Neoplatonists. Dr Ames, again, points out that when the great speculative, metaphysical systems of the Middle Ages were undermined by the Renaissance, the mysticism which had flowered under their shadow began to wither, and that it is only now, when speculation is beginning to build on the natural sciences, that mysticism is once more alert to meet the craving for some direct open way to the Absolute which any individual can tread. Some idea of God must be dominant; that is an essential condition for mysticism, which aims not at speculation, but at putting man into vital relations with what is accepted or logically established as Reality. The mystic takes his conception of this Reality from the surrounding environment, hypostatises it, and then seeks union with it by methods which seem to transcend ordinary knowledge. "Modern psychologists agree with the mystic that this is not a rational process, but they do not admit that it cannot be understood and induced." Dr Ames thinks the antagonism between this emotional method and the method of science is not, or need not be, so sharp as each side occasionally assumes. The devotee and the logician are not, psychologically, at daggers drawn. He elucidates this along familiar lines with some freshness, and concludes by claiming that even the concepts of science are not cold and remote, but often instinct with "the two most powerful elements of mysticism, the feeling of contact with actual reality, and the sense of

[1] Miss Underhill has just published in the "Quest Series" (Bell) a short, sympathetic account of *Ruysbroeck*.

mystery of the unfathomed." Only, what the social and physical sciences of our age attain is not the old knowledge which the mystics sought through systems of Pure Thought, but "a development of controlled and disciplined intelligence warm and vital with instinct, eagerly aspiring to fulfil man's deep and growing needs and to illuminate his pathway." This attitude corresponds to Professor Keyser's position in his recent *Science and Religion*, that the emotions of the religious consciousness develop with the fuller knowledge of the order of reality, which is super-rational and from which they are derived, for in these days mysticism and mathematics kiss one another. As Dr Starbuck has shown in his article on Intuitionalism (*Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. vii. pp. 397–400), mystics and mathematicians may alike base themselves on intuitionalism as a philosophic theory of knowledge. And, even apart from this theory, the two interests, apparently so disparate, may harmonise.

One or two contributions to exegetical theology may be chronicled. Dr A. H. M'Neile has published a large and scholarly commentary on *The Gospel according to St Matthew* (Macmillan). In a brief introduction, he dates the gospel between 80 and 110 A.D., as the composition of an author who "was certainly not Matthew the apostle." The strength of the edition lies in the notes, which are lucid, well informed, and frank. Now and then he practises a voluntary humility, as when he declines to comment on the meaning of the words, "This is my Body," because the meaning of the phrase "varies for Christians with their varieties of spiritual experience." But, as a rule, the editor faces the problems of the text bravely, and his comments are, for the most part, critically adequate. The edition forms a valuable companion to Dr Allen's edition in the "International Critical Commentary"; it is less engrossed with the niceties of the synoptic problem, and consequently is able to devote more space to the historical and religious contents of the gospel. Dr Alfred Plummer has added an edition of Second Corinthians to the "International Critical Commentary" (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark), a series of which he is now the only surviving editor. Dr Plummer differs from the latest English editor of the epistle before him, Dr Allan Menzies, in adhering to the hypothesis that chaps. x.–xiii. form part of a separate, severe letter written prior to chaps. i.–ix., and conveyed to the Corinthian Church by Titus. Two studies of the Epistle of James have appeared, one by an English preacher, Mr H. M. Smith (Oxford: Blackwell), the other by an American professor, Dr A. T. Robertson of St Louis (New York: George H. Doran).[1] Dr Robertson is more exegetical than Mr Smith. The latter deals rather with the general ethical principles and problems suggested by this primitive Christian homily. Mr Robson's *Studies in the Second Epistle of St Peter* (Cambridge) is an attempt to show how an early Christian editor put together four fragments (i. 5–11, i. 16–18, i. 20–ii. 19, iii. 3–13) of genuine Petrine composition, and introduced them in the apostle's name to a later age. JAMES MOFFATT.

[1] The full title of Dr Robertson's book is *Practical and Social Aspects of Christianity: The Wisdom of James.*

A SOCIAL SURVEY.

BEFORE THE WAR.

There is now no lack of books by competent hands which describe the former history of the nations involved in war, and the seeds of the present conflict, often sown generations ago. Treitschke, the perfervid pamphleteer rather than the scientific historian, of whom before the outbreak of war the average non-German had not even heard, now appears in an English dress (*History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century*, by H. von Treitschke, translated by E. and C. Paul, with introduction by W. H. Dawson, vol. i., 12s. 6d. net: Jarrold). These glowing and passionate pages reveal to those who had not previously discovered them the spirit and method of Treitschke which have gradually dominated the university life of Germany and passed thence through the whole intellectual fabric of the Prussianised Empire. *The Soul of Germany*, by Dr T. F. A. Smith (Hutchinson & Co., 6s. net.), is an appalling, but, as everyone who has had any genuine intimacy with Germany for the last decade knows, an unanswerable indictment of the state of Germany from the moral point of view. The statistics of vice and crime upon which the author relies are drawn from German official sources. *Russia and the Great War*, by Gregor Alexinsky (Fisher Unwin, 10s. 6d. net), is of great importance because written from the standpoint of a Russian revolutionary, who is nevertheless on the present occasion intensely patriotic and hopeful of Russia's future. This patriotism and hope he says, are shared even by the classes and nationalities in Russia who before the war were most oppressed and ill-treated. Of unusual interest is *Belgian Democracy: Its Early History*, by Henri Pirenne, translated by J. V. Saunders (Manchester University Press; Longmans & Co., 4s. 6d. net), first published in 1910, and now translated. It shows how Belgian democratic feeling and love of liberty are the deeply ingrained results of the slow and chequered development of civic life in the Low Countries during the Middle Ages.

The Partitions of Poland, by Lord Eversley (Fisher Unwin, 7s. 6d. net), describes the scandalous transactions, disgraceful to all directly and indirectly concerned, by which Poland was partitioned among Prussia, Russia, and Austria, with the connivance of other nations. By common consent Austria's treatment of her section has been least discreditable. The point

upon which many thoughtful people are now looking for light is not whether Poland is to have Home Rule under the protection of Germany or Russia, as the case may be, but whether there is a common denominator of national feeling in all three sections of Poland sufficiently strong to establish a Polish State, independent of both Russia and the Central Empires, to neither of whom the Poles have much reason to be grateful. *Roumania and the Great War*, by Dr R. W. Seton-Watson (Constable, 2s. net), is a brief sketch of the main features of Roumanian history and an estimate of Roumanian policy in relation to the war. Roumania's importance consists in the fact that "she is the guardian of the mouths of the Danube . . . the sentinel of Latin culture in the east of Europe . . . the third in the chain of non-Slavonic races which stretches from the Baltic to the Black Sea and keeps the two main Slavonic groups apart." "Even on the most moderate estimate the Roumanians are numerically the strongest race of the whole Balkan and Danubian systems." Dr Seton-Watson's concluding chapter, especially in so far as it deals with Roumania's reasons for not entering the war up to the present, is most illuminating and instructive. *Serbia: Her People, History, and Aspirations* (Harrap, 3s. 6d. net), by Worslav M. Petrovitch, a former attaché to the Serbian Legation in London, describes clearly and simply the past history and recent ideals of Serbia, and the causes which led up to the war. *Bohemia's Claim for Freedom*, edited by J. Prochazka (Chatto & Windus, 1s. net), and published on behalf of the London Czech Committee in memory of John Hus, will be read with sympathy by all who feel for small and oppressed nationalities "rightly struggling to be free." It contains a short survey of Bohemian history and of the struggles of Hus, and brief accounts of Bohemian language, literature, music, folklore, and peasant art.

An indispensable companion for all serious students of foreign politics is *The Statesman's Year Book*, edited by Drs J. Scott Keltie and M. Epstein (Macmillan, 12s. 6d. net), which, so far as possible, has been revised up to date, and contains a valuable bibliography of publications on the war, including German, arranged according to their countries of origin.

WHEN PEACE COMES.

The confused thinking and bandying to and fro of mere catchwords in the press and on public platforms have made a fine opening, which they have not been unduly hasty in accepting, for the intervention of the economists. Mr F. W. Hirst, editor of *The Economist*, steps into the breach with *The Political Economy of War* (J. M. Dent & Sons, 5s. net), a suggestive piece of pioneer work, which deals with the reactions of war on credit, banking, and trade; the problems which arise out of the means used to finance war; and, most important of all, the industrial and social consequences of war. Mr Hirst is of opinion that the only "tolerable prospect for Europe in the long years of industrial and commercial depression that lie ahead" is that the Powers should "abandon by mutual consent the system of conscription, and be content, for a long time to come,

with a very small expenditure on armies and navies." But the adoption of this method is very unlikely "unless the statesmen and diplomatists of Europe have the wit to strive for a settlement which does not sow the seeds of a future conflict." Professor F. Y. Edgeworth, in his lecture *On the Relations of Political Economy to War* (Oxford University Press, 1s. net), considers "the science of economics as rendering the ends for which war is waged less desirable." He points out that the economic arguments employed by recent writers against resort to war contain much that is true, but little that is both true and new, and little that was not familiar to the great classical economists. He also recalls a very apposite quotation from J. S. Mill, whose devotion to liberty is surely above reproach, and who, writing to *The Times* (March 11, 1871), advocated universal military training: "We are living in a time when wars are made by nations in arms. . . . A nation in arms requires a nation in arms to withstand it. . . . Henceforth our army should be our whole people, trained and disciplined" (but after the Swiss rather than the Prussian model). Mr J. H. Jones, in *The Economics of War and Conquest* (P. S. King & Son, 2s. 6d. net), subjects Mr Norman Angell's economic doctrines to a rigorous examination, and sums up against them.

A Primer of Peace and War: The Principles of International Morality, by the Rev. C. Plater, S.J. (London, P. S. King & Son: New York, P. J. Kennedy & Sons, 2s. net) is a text-book of extraordinary merit. It contains a vast amount of information on the growth of international law, lucidly and compactly arranged, and, though written by a Catholic for Catholics, the appeal is in the main to reason, and is such that it must commend itself to thoughtful men, whether or not they are able to accept the Catholic or any other form of Christian teaching. It is by far the ablest text-book on war from the Christian standpoint which has appeared in recent times in English, and could only have been written by one who is thoroughly versed in all live thinking, both ancient and modern, on a difficult topic. "Stable peace in Europe," says the writer, "can only be secured by bringing *international relations* once more under the moral law—that is to say, by insisting on States keeping the law of God in their dealings with one another." Mr C. E. Fayle, in *The Great Settlement* (Murray, 6s. net), analyses the facts leading up to the present war, due, as he considers, to the conception of nations as rivals, and lays down general principles which must be borne in mind at the settlement. Of these the chief is to set up, instead of the old belief in the essential rivalry of nations, a conception of a community between them based on common interests. In his remarkably sane and helpful study Mr Fayle recommends the establishment of a general alliance, secured by definite treaty, of States pledged to defend any of its consenting parties against aggression on the part of any Power or Powers. Mr J. A. Hobson, in *Towards International Government* (Allen & Unwin, 2s. 6d. net), maintains that one essential for the prevention of war is that the relations between States shall no longer be left in the hands of a small diplomatic caste, with their outworn traditions of crooked

and secret diplomacy. The International Council, therefore, to be established after the war for the settlement of non-justiciable disputes shall be composed not of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors, who merely represent the Governments of their States, but of persons chosen to represent the people included in each State. *The New Statesman* special supplement, "Suggestions for the Prevention of War" (July 10 and 17, 1915), proposes the establishment of a Supernational Council, whose members should be mutually pledged against aggression and against making war except as a final resource. Other proposals include an International Secretariat, an International High Court (open only to State Governments), the immediate publication of all treaties, existing and future, and a mutual undertaking to submit all justiciable questions to the International High Court. *The War of Steel and Gold*, by H. N. Brailsford (Bell & Sons, 2s. net), now appears in a new and cheaper edition. It is a brilliant and suggestive study of British foreign policy of recent years. The author attacks the doctrine of the Balance of Power ("a metaphor of venerable hypocrisy which serves only to disguise the perennial struggle for power and predominance"), and maintains that the only alternative to an endless struggle for a Balance of Power is the uniting of Europe in a Federal League, the details of which he sketches in an appendix. Dr Gilbert Slater, in *Peace and War in Europe* (Constable, 2s. 6d. net), describes the causes of European wars, whether these causes be due to economic, religious, or nationalist motives, or to the manipulation of armament manufacturers. He suggests that in the making of peace "one of the objects sought should be the abolition in all countries of the private trade in munitions of war, and that this manufacture should in all countries be a Government monopoly." He also outlines a scheme for the establishment of an International Court of Honour, created in the first instance by voluntary international association, which should be concerned not merely with questions at issue between Governments, but with anything calculated to embitter foreign relations, as, for instance, the diffusion of false or misleading statements in the Press of other countries.

Goodwill, the organ of "The World Alliance of Churches for Promoting International Friendship," contains interesting matter about the feeling of the Churches of various countries with regard to the war. The July number is noteworthy for the reproduction of an article by Professor F. W. Foerster of Munich on "The State and the Moral Law," which, as the writer says, is "a protest against the idea that the words of Treitschke and Bernhardi represent the last word of German political thinking." *The War and After*, by Sir Oliver Lodge (Methuen, 1s. net), maintains that the present struggle is an inevitable conflict between two irreconcilable ideals of government, the result of which will be ultimately wholesome for all the nations concerned, including Germany. To Professor L. T. Hobhouse, in *The World in Conflict* (Fisher Unwin, 1s. net), the war is a struggle "for the fundamentals of the modern civilised order, not merely for national freedom, but for something deeper even than national freedom

—for a belief in primary rules of right binding all nations and all men in every relation and under every circumstance." The war is due to evils which have been most rampant in Germany, but by no means unknown in Great Britain and elsewhere, and in fact common to all Western civilisation, especially in so far as it has put its trust in a philosophy of force. Out of the struggle, however, Professor Hobhouse is confident that there will emerge "a new and more real feeling for the unity of human interests."

Ordeal by Battle, by F. S. Oliver (Macmillan, 6s. net), caught the public imagination at once, and within a month of its first appearance in June appeared in a second edition. It is not merely a brilliant literary document—it is a searching analysis not only of German but of recent British policy, and a vigorous plea for "national service." The point of view of the book is that the present war was not inevitable, but could have been avoided on the one condition—that England had been prepared. Mr Oliver deals out shrewd blows to all and sundry, especially to Liberals and lawyer politicians; but he is much more than a vigorous controversialist. He is an unusually well-equipped critic, whose arguments are difficult to parry. As the war has been produced over the heads or behind the backs of most of us, Mr A. G. Gardiner's study of *The War Lords* (J. M. Dent & Sons: 1s. net), an analysis of "the origins, issues, and conduct of the war in the light of the personalities of the principal actors," will be most interesting and helpful.

Property: Its Duties and Rights (by various writers, with an introduction by the Bishop of Oxford, 2nd edition, Macmillan, 5s. net) is reissued in view of the long and tedious days when the belligerent nations will have to repair the battered, or perhaps shattered, fabric of society. It furnishes "a reasoned justification of the principle of the relativity of private property to the common weal." "The recognition that our daily life is a campaign for a high common cause, with its constant call for loyalty and discipline and self-sacrifice, and its lesson that individual rights in property are all relative to dutiful use in that cause, is being burnt into us by experiences which must leave each and all either more sensitive or more callous to the solidarity of human life in a nation." In an additional chapter, Professor W. M. Geldart describes some of the chief aspects of the English law of property, which, like most English institutions, is a bundle of compromises, but flexible and adaptable to new needs and new demands. *Outlines of Sociology*, by Drs F. W. Blackmar and J. L. Gillin (New York: The Macmillan Co., 8s. 6d. net), is a useful text-book which discusses the nature and import of sociology, social ideas and social control, social pathology, methods of social investigation, and the growth of social philosophy and of a science of society.

SOCIAL EXPERIMENTS.

Information on the efforts made by belligerent countries to meet the new situation created by the war is gradually coming to hand. *Germany's Food: Can it Last?*, a study by German experts, edited by Dr Russell

Wells, with an introduction by Dr A. D. Waller (London: University of London Press; Hodder & Stoughton, 2s. net), describes with Teutonic thoroughness and detail the efforts made in Germany to defeat what the writers call "der englische Aushungerungsplan." Incidentally the book throws valuable light on the commercial, industrial, agricultural, and economic, as well as domestic, aspects of German life under war conditions. Russia's War Relief Work is described in detail in the latest of the valuable Russian supplements issued by *The Times* (June 28). In Russia there has been a happy combination of State with private, and central with local, effort for the prevention and relief of distress. Our own measures were discussed at a Conference held under the auspices of the Charity Organisation Society at Caxton Hall in June, the proceedings of which were reported in the July number of *The Charity Organisation Review* (Longmans, 6d.). Mr C. E. B. Russell, discussing "The Discharged Soldier and Sailor," was of opinion that the return to civil life of the men of our new armies need not be attended with danger provided the discharges are made gradually, and that, by careful collaboration between the municipal authorities, the Local Government Board, and the War Office, arrangements can be made for large numbers of men to take up employment on works to be set going after the conclusion of peace.

Social Workers and the War, by Captain J. W. Petavel, with preface by Professor H. S. Jevons (Educational Colonies Associations, 3 Victoria Street, Westminster, 1d.), a pamphlet which deserves the serious attention of all thoughtful people, advocates *neo-coöperation* (*i.e.* the co-operative production of the necessaries of life under ordinary management) as a remedy for social ills, and especially as an immediately practicable means of meeting the problems which will arise with the cessation of the war—for instance, as regards the employment of discharged soldiers. In Captain Petavel's view, the twenty years' experience of the Swiss colony at Witzwil has shown that a self-contained organisation, even if of quite moderate size and employing for the most part the labour of the unskilled and ne'er-do-well, can produce, over and above the principal necessaries for its own workers, enough for sale to be able to pay for competent management and meet all establishment expenses. If this can be done with unsatisfactory material, such as that at Witzwil, what possibilities might there not be for educational-industrial establishments for normal boys and vigorous ex-soldiers many of whom have been skilled craftsmen?

The Annual Charities Register and Digest (published by Longmans for the Charity Organisation Society, 5s. net) is as useful as ever. Besides containing all its old features, the general introduction, "How to Help Cases of Distress," has been revised, an interesting "Review of the Year" has been added, with a most useful section containing short practical introductions to particular branches of social work (*e.g.* among the blind, cripples, tuberculous, inebriate) by experts in these departments. A suggestive little handbook, issued with the approval of The Schools Personal Service Association, is *I Serve* (A. & C. Black, 1s. 4d. net), which discusses

the position of the individual in society, the rationale of social service, and practical suggestions for various forms of social work. That the efforts of a generation ago have to be reshaped to meet new needs is proved by the announcements that the settlement part of Toynbee Hall has been removed from Whitechapel (which is now mainly tenanted by strenuous if not very well-to-do Jews) to Poplar, a district more suitable for the kind of work the authorities of Toynbee Hall have in mind; and that Passmore Edwards Settlement has become a women's institution to meet the demand for educated women specially trained for social work, or to take advantage of the numerous openings which are now presenting themselves for capable women. That these openings are not confined to social work or the higher professions we see from *Careers*, the fourth edition of *The Finger-Post: a Guide to the Professions and Occupations of Educated Women and Girls* (Women's Employment Publishing Company, 1s. 6d.). One of the possibilities now open to women has been ably and persuasively described by Mrs Philip Martineau in the August *Englishwoman* in her article, "An Assured Future for Women on the Land."

As the circumstances of the war have made more important than ever the question of educational ideals and methods—to what extent, it may pertinently be asked, are German schools responsible for German barbarism? —we may perhaps turn for light to some other countries. *The School System of Norway*, by Dr D. A. Anderson (Harrap & Co., 5s. net), shows how it is possible to combine efficiency with freedom, and firm administration with abundant scope for individual development and initiative. Everybody has heard of Rabindranath Tagore, the poet, mystic, and dreamer of beautiful dreams, but not everyone of his remarkable efforts as a practical educationalist and reformer. His school at Bolpur, which with other aspects of his life is described in a biographical study by Mr Ernest Rhys (Macmillan, 5s. net), is founded on the principle of self-government; and though the suggestion for this method appears to have come from the George Junior Republic, the school is in the best sense Indian and national. That the method of the Republic is efficacious even with the worst young criminals was stated by Mr Homer Lane, Superintendent of the Little Commonwealth, at a conference on New Ideals in Education held at Stratford-on-Avon in August.

R. P. FARLEY.

REVIEWS

The Stewardship of Faith.—By Kirsopp Lake.—London: Christophers, 22 Berners Street, 1915.—Pp. 195.

THIS is a book which is bound to bring the whole critical discussion of Christian origins to a head. Its own case could not be better stated. It is an admirable piece of work from end to end. It is delightfully lucid, winning, and frank. It captivates the reader by its simplicity of purpose and its purity of tone. It is obviously real and sincere. It tells you what it is at, and shows you why it says what it says. There is a most inviting transparency of mind that cannot but win your confidence. Every line in it makes you like the writer. And what will especially attract the general reader will be, without doubt, the utterly reasonable and intelligible character of the account given of the origin and rise of Christianity. Any man, as he reads, will say: "How clear that is! How natural! How perfectly simple and obvious! This makes everything happen in a way that I can understand. This interpretation commends itself at first sight as a rational account of those facts which had always puzzled me. I can accept this limpid explanation straight away. It travels along the lines that I understand and accept." That is the effect produced mentally by it, as you glide easily from page to page, and find things always within your compass and your normal anticipations.

It is only when you lay down the book, and stop to reconsider the whole position, that you recognise that this lucidity of interpretation has been purchased at the price of omitting all the special facts that cried out for interpretation. The book has explained everything except that which it set out to explain—the origin and growth of Christianity in the form which it historically took. Let me justify this strong assertion.

(1) Christianity appears, at its very start, as soon as we have documentary evidence of its existence, as inspired, from end to end, by faith in the Person of Jesus Christ. As a religion this is its distinctive mark. It stakes the universal religious issue on a certain significant relationship to His Personality. All religion that is proper to man is an approach to God the Father; and this universal movement of humanity Christianity focusses and concentrates into this one special mode of arrival at the

supreme goal. It is achieved for all mankind through Jesus Christ our Lord. There is that in Him which brings it to pass. He has done something which enables it to be. And this deed is identified with a certain act of death and of resurrection, enacted at a certain date under Pontius Pilate, and fulfilled in a certain place, when He was seen alive in Jerusalem, having left His tomb empty. Since that moment He is the actual Force that is making God the Father manifest on earth. He is at the right hand of God, in power, making Himself felt, through the Spirit, as a vital recreating energy wherever faith admits Him into action. All religion consists in admitting Him into play. His Name is the one source of efficacious renewal. In His death, all have died: in His risen life, all have been made alive. Every motion of the believer is instinct with Him. He is taken up into Him, to become a member of His body. He exists to embody and express the will of Christ. He is no longer alive with his own life, for he is himself dead; and all his real life is the life of the Christ that lives in him. His one desire is to be "in Christ." One with Christ he is made one with God, and one with all who are brethren in the body. He names but one Name, in order to interpret every act and purpose of his being. By force of his personal, intimate love for Christ his faith perfects itself in fellowship and joy and peace. Christ is all in all. His is the Name above every name, to which all life has surrendered itself, that every tongue may confess that Jesus is Lord, to the glory of God the Father. Into this new life every believer has been born by a new birth at baptism, so that in Christ he is a new creature. And his central activity, now, is to show forth the Lord's death till He come, and to feed on His risen humanity by eating of His flesh and drinking of His blood.

Now, there is no Christianity known to us historically that does not mean this. It enters on the scene in this form, with this belief already there. Its original and earliest documents are the earlier Epistles of St Paul. These report it in the form in which it won its way to be a religion. If we want to read its evidence in the historical order, we must begin with the Epistles to the Thessalonians, the Corinthians, the Galatians, the Romans. That is the Christianity which converted the world.

And the primary function of criticism is to account for this extraordinary and overwhelming significance attributed to an absolutely unique Personality, and more especially to His death and resurrection. For the entire religion consists, according to its chief exponent, in nothing else at all but in preaching Christ crucified, and in straining to realise the full meaning of the resurrection from the dead. A critic is judged by his success in interpreting this absorbing emphasis on these two vital facts. How, then, does our critic now under review stand, judged by this test?

He can see nothing in the life and career of Jesus to account for the phenomenon that we have described. The historical Jesus has, practically,

no essential relation to this belief of the first Church. For that belief sprang wholly out of a desire for conversion. It expressed the passion to be dead to sin and born again into life. This was the imperative need that was met by the Cross and the Resurrection. Unless a man can be born again, he cannot enter the kingdom of Heaven. All the Gospel is summed up in the fact that "ye are dead, and your real life is hid with Christ in God." This is the heart and soul of all the worship that is centred round the Name of the Christ. Man was to be so changed in Christ that he becomes a new creation.

Now, according to Dr Lake, the historical Jesus never had the necessity of such a change in His mind. It did not belong to the Jewish horizon of experience. The Jew only asked what he was to do—not what he was to become. The baptism of John simply meant that men were baptised "in order to escape the wrath to come. It had merely an eschatological significance." There was no suggestion that their nature would be changed: though this might be implied in the Greek word for repentance, it is not the Jewish thought. "They were prepared for a change of society by the removal of the excrescences of sin. . . . This change is ethical and eschatological, but not in the Greek sense a sacramental mystery." And the baptism of our Lord followed on these lines. The first believers had no use for sacramental grace, for they were not in need of a new birth. They had no "cultus": their rites were simply eschatological signals. For the Jew, conduct was the whole of life. He asked for a code of action.

It was the Greek who forced the question, What am I to be? It was he who wished to become something different—to be changed. He felt his being to be corrupt, and, in the language of the mysteries, he asked to be "born again." And the Greeks who were converted to Christianity by St Paul believed that this had really happened. To meet their need Christianity took on the form of a mystery, of a religion of conversion, of a life out of death. For this it became a "cultus," and its rites became sacramental and its whole secret an act of regeneration.

All this carried it far from the primitive Jewish belief which Jesus had left behind Him. For Him there was no such mysterious significance in His death. In fact, did He anticipate death at all? We cannot say. "It must always remain doubtful whether Jesus went up to Jerusalem with the expectation of death or of the coming of the kingdom. That He expected rejection is clear; but did that imply death? Was the triumph that He expected to be the Parousia, or a resurrection from the dead? In the light of history Christian tradition decided for death and resurrection rather than rejection and Parousia." "But did Jesus speak in this way Himself? These are questions difficult or impossible to answer." "As for the resurrection, it had no mystical meaning: it was only the proof and declaration that, at the coming of the kingdom, Jesus would be the Messiah."

Rebirth, then, through his own death and resurrection, was no part of the original Jewish gospel. It belongs to the later Greek develop-

ment mediated through St Paul. Yet it was most certainly (as Dr Lake allows) this gospel of the rebirth that converted the world and constituted living Christianity. We are landed, therefore, in this desperate position. Here is a religion which exists solely in, and through, a spiritual relationship to a certain Person. He *is* the religion. The acts of His life are the acts in which it still lives. His believers hold themselves to be alive only in Him, and to have no reality or worth outside Him. They are "in Him"—"in His body." They exist by having put Him on, and by feeding on Him. Their one desire is to be upheld by His grace and to be quickened by His Spirit, in whom they have become new creatures. Yet of all this the Person, in whose being they are what they are, knew nothing, said nothing, implied nothing. Such a belief lay outside His mental review —outside His religious experience. He had no part or lot in it. Therefore He had little or nothing to do with the religion, as it historically manifested itself. His Messiahship, with its eschatological outlook, conveyed nothing to the Gentile converts. The kingdom to which He pledged Himself was a noble illusion, that died of itself. His name became greater and greater the further it moved from any meaning which He had put into it.

So we are led to say by this sort of criticism. And in saying it we are bound to recognise that the statement confutes itself. Its conclusion is obviously futile. It is simply a confession that, along this line, no explanation can be given of the facts before us. We want to be shown why a certain Personality was overwhelmingly paramount; and we are told that it wasn't.

Let us try to look back, and see how we were landed in such an *impasse.* We might start from the strange statement that the desire for conversion and the new birth had no meaning for a Jew, and was not arrived at from a Jewish ground of thought. Not Jewish! But what about the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans? This is the cardinal gospel of conversion. This is the disclosure of how the necessity for regeneration came about. Here is the key-text of grace. And could anything be more steeped in Judaism? Every term has a Jewish story to tell. The entire struggle is given in the form in which it was created by the Jewish law. The whole ethical controversy has its roots in Jewish experience. The cry of "O wretched man that I am!" is wrung out of the agony of a Pharisee. And has it not a deep Jewish tradition behind it? Does it not run back to the cry of Isaiah, in the hour of his supreme vision: "Woe is me! I am a man of unclean lips!"? Is not the fifty-first Psalm felt alive in it: "Make me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me"? And what of Ezekiel, with his promise of the new fountain opened for uncleanness, and the new covenant, and the heart of stone taken away that it may yield its place to a wholly new-created thing, a heart of flesh? Can phrases be more charged with Jewish instinct and Jewish passion than these? And they find their clue in the cry with which the best and purest type of a simple Jew qualified himself

to become the agent and instrument of the new covenant—the cry of Simon Peter in the boat: "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord." In the craving for conversion, wrung out of the heart of Israel, he became fit to fish for men in Christ's name.

And then, in order to justify the Pauline dialectic, with its ethical salvation from the body of common human experience, there is the baptism of John. What else did it exist for, except to insist that the Jew, as Jew, needed just one thing, and one thing only—a rebirth? This was its very purpose—to force upon the Jew his own impotence. It told of an axe laid to the root of the Jewish tree: of a purging fire that not even the purest Levite could be spared: of a furnace that would burn up the Jewish chaff with unquenchable flames. And this evil that was to be destroyed was no mere excrescence that a Jew could strip off if he was given the true standard of conduct. On the contrary, it was just the evil which the highest prophetic power in Israel was powerless to undo. Prophetic aspiration, prophetic intuition, prophetic force, could not go beyond that of the Baptist. Not only a prophet, but greater than a prophet! No one born of woman was greater. Yet he had this one express message to deliver—that he could do nothing to relieve the situation, to heal and save. Neither his baptism of water nor their efforts at confession and reparation were of any avail. In convicted impotence, he and they could but look away from all their own endeavours to Another. From beyond themselves the deliverance must come. He, that Other, would release a new energy, vehement as a wind, violent as a fire. This would do what John could never do. They would be remade. That was John's baptism—the confession by the Jew of his final failure to attain what he had so long desired. His highest gift of inspiration, prophecy, could not carry him home. Something more must come about, and he must become something else.

And that baptism is the one essential experience through which the meaning of Jesus Christ becomes intelligible. Only to those who have understood the significance of John can He tell by what authority He cleanses the temple. And the point of this lies, not in His likeness to the Baptist, but in His contrast. It is really incredible that Dr Lake should speak as if Jesus merely stood where the Baptist stood and repeated his call to repentance, only adding to it the claim that He Himself would be the Messiah in the new kingdom. The Gospels have been written in vain if this be true. Their one object is to assert the difference between them. Jesus came to do what John declared himself incapable of doing. That is why He is of another order than the Baptist.

This, of course, is the most emphatic theme of the opening chapters of the Fourth Gospel. The author's special anxiety is to show why, though they looked so much alike, the one coming after the other, yet the cleavage between them was absolute. They stood on different planes: they belonged to different worlds. The one had no part or lot inside the work and joy of the other. Enough that he could recognise His voice, and himself

vanish, as a flying cry in the wilderness. He never enters the Promised Land. He stands outside. And he knew it: he confessed it—with his own mouth. So this Gospel insists.

But the division is quite as marked in the others. "The law and the prophets were until John." A whole period ended in him. After him a new thing had begun. He was the very greatest of the old, yet he stood at a level below the very lowest in the new. All through we are pointed to One who was to bring into play that new creative energy which John was without. Dr Lake actually argues that the Baptism and Supper of Jesus could not be regenerative and sacramental, because there was nothing sacramental and regenerative in John's baptism. But John declared that the baptism of his Successor would differ from his own exactly in this—that it would carry with it a regenerative energy which his lacked. It would, that is, be sacramental in precisely the sense that Dr Lake denies. The Gospels are written to prove that the whole mass of Israel was led, by John's baptism, to look for some deliverance which John himself could not effect. This should arrive through Another greater than he, whose shoe latchet he was not worthy to unloose. So clear and decisive would the cleavage be between them. To ignore this vital cleavage is to misread the Gospels.

This Other is to do some great thing by which He will set the new force free. What is that that He will do? The Gospels have a consistent and undeviating answer. The Other, who comes, has a baptism to be baptised with—a cup to drink—a commandment to fulfil. And He is straitened until this be achieved. It occupies His whole mind. It shakes Him: it possesses Him: it exalts Him. As He moves before His disciples, rapt up in that imperious purpose, they are frightened at His exaltation, and cower behind Him. When He allows the three friends to enter into His hidden broodings on high hills, it is with this that He is found to be preoccupied. It is the exodus, the decease, that He will accomplish at Jerusalem. Death, and death at Jerusalem. This is His secret.

Dr Lake pronounces it doubtful whether He did, or did not, anticipate this conclusion to His entry into the Holy City. If this is doubtful, then I do not know what there is which can be trusted in the Synoptic Gospels. Embedded in the central core of the most authentic tradition that we possess lies the triple reiteration of this certain issue, made over and over again to the astounded disciples. The threefold repetition implies that it was the constant theme of His speech to them throughout an entire period of His ministry, beginning with the confession of His Messiahship by Simon Peter, and closing with its consummation, the march on Palm Sunday. All this time he insistently pressed home upon them the end that He consciously foresaw and deliberately challenged. It was His central and permanent objective. It was the special disclosure that He had to make to them, and the crucial test for which He devoted all His energy to prepare them.

Dr Lake lays all this positive proof aside, on the ground that the disciples could not have been so taken by surprise in the event if He had so spoken. Exactly! that was precisely what they themselves felt to be so strange. How could they have been so dull in apprehension, so stupid, so deaf? So they asked themselves, in the after days. The Gospels reveal this astonishment at themselves. Looking back, they confess with amazement that, though He had so spoken, and spoken so often, yet they, the disciples, never took hold of what He was saying. "They understood none of these things: and these things were hidden from them, neither perceived they what he said." Could any confession be more natural, more human? Obviously, they were aware of the flagrant contrast between His clear prevision and their total collapse. And they frankly confess it. They never could imagine what He meant when He said it. It had always appeared to them incredible and intolerable. Once, at first, Simon Peter had repudiated the possibility: "This be far from thee, Lord!" The stinging rebuke with which this was met silenced all tongues; but that only meant, as the record implies, that they lapsed into dumb recalcitrance. They were afraid to ask. They understood nothing. And so, when the awful blow swiftly fell, it simply stunned sense, and memory, and mind. They lay in blind despair upon the floor in the closed and darkened chamber, and recalled no word that could have given them relief. The very books which tell of the precise forecast tell also of the stupidity which refused to take it in. The inconsistency, the stupidity, is the moral evidence of the genuineness of the record.

And, granting this, we can go further. Obviously, the Master was in full possession of His secret before He first spoke of it to them. He could not speak until He had secured their adherence to His Messiahship. The moment that this was signalised, He began. He had His mind formed and made. It was pent up. He was only waiting his opportunity. As soon as that was given, He poured out incessantly what He had in view. Every bit of it had been considered. He had gathered up all the conditions of the situation. He saw it all before Him in detail. Of course, it is possible that the after event has sharpened the edge of His statement in this detail or that. The disciples may have thrown back something out of their experience into the language of the anticipation. But most certainly He used words which were perfectly clear and deliberate. He had already brooded over it so that it was presented to His imagination in vivid and real distinctness. He had thought it all out. This emphasises the completeness, and the depth, and the persistence, and the profundity with which the conviction of the coming death had become a part of His very life.

And, again, the intense concentration of His mind, for several months, on that entry into Jerusalem which He took such personal pains to make as pronounced and public an affair as possible, elaborately evoking the popular attention, and refusing to check, as so often He had done, the Messianic enthusiasm, exhibits the fixed determination with which He faced

the inevitable close. He was "in the way, going up to Jerusalem." He set His face to Jerusalem. He went before, "going up to Jerusalem." "And they were afraid." "Can you be baptised with the baptism wherewith I am baptised: can you drink of my cup?" There is no other thought in Him. There is no other end before Him. To doubt whether He went to Jerusalem to die is to throw all our materials for forming a judgment to the winds, and to resign all hope of understanding or interpreting the only Jesus of whom we know anything at all. If He did not definitely and resolutely go straight forward to a foreseen death, then our only tradition is worthless.

But if He did foresee, with absolute certainty, the inevitable end which awaited Him in Jerusalem, then it becomes quite certain that He had been to Jerusalem before, and had experienced the certainty of its adverse decision. Jerusalem has already given judgment against Him. And, indeed, unless this has happened, the Synoptic story is unintelligible; for, as it stands, it does not account for His death. It cannot explain the rapid resolution of Jerusalem to kill.

Dr Lake and the critics whom he follows, such as Schweitzer, confess this; for they find themselves obliged to go beyond the tradition and suggest or invent possible causes for the event. Dr Lake discerns it in the blow dealt to the finance of the high priest's party by the cleansing of the temple. It held the bank of exchange; for the money paid for sacrifices was bound to be exchanged from Roman into Jewish coinage, and this was their monopoly. Till that attack on their wealth came, there had been no material reason for collision. But, by the overthrowing of the tables of the money-changers, not only was their authority challenged but also their financial stronghold was touched. This is what drove them to take extreme measures.

Now, if this were the cause, it would at least involve accepting John's account of the cleansing, and placing it far back; for otherwise there is no time in which to come to so crucial a decision. It can hardly be, as Dr Lake imagines, that the collision and the resolve to kill came to a head within the inside of a single week. But, even then, it would remain purely speculative. There is no single syllable in the tradition which gives emphasis to the finance. And it can only be suggested because, without it, there is no sufficient reason given for the act.

So, again, Dr Lake considers that the decision came out of Judas's betrayal of the Messianic secret. They did not know of His claim to be Messiah until Judas betrayed it. Here, again, we have an interesting suggestion, but it has nothing in the tradition to back it. Not a word in the Gospel deposit implies that Judas did anything more than supply them with a favourable opportunity for a secret and safe seizure.

The truth is that the Synoptic writers hand on a tradition which could not account for the death, just because it reflects the mind of those who had not had occasion to know the mind and temper which Jerusalem had already formed. This is why they can never believe the Master's forecasts

of His fate there. They have no estimate of the forces ranged against Him there, of which He is so acutely conscious. They are ignorant of what He is talking about. They are full of hope. They would say, with the crowd, "Thou art mad! Who goeth about to kill Thee?" So much had gone on of which they knew but little. Their tradition hinted at it, without explaining it.

For instance, the Marcan story said that Jesus came into Galilee because John had been put into prison: and St Matthew amplifies this into "withdrew." Withdrew from where? and why withdrawn? The explanation is that somewhere, not in Galilee, He is already prominent enough to make it dangerous for him to abide. He will be the next to be taken. He withdraws from a peril. And the peril must be in Judea. This would account for His withdrawing further and further afield, as the emissaries from Jerusalem came down to disturb His work in Galilee. He flies over the lake: to the wilderness: to the frontier of Tyre: to Cæsarea Philippi. His peril is dogging Him.

Then there is His obvious intimacy with the situation at Jerusalem, with which His hearers in Galilee are wholly unfamiliar, and by which they are bewildered. Thus St Luke lets out the unaccountable confession that He had striven so often to gather the children of Jerusalem, as a hen gathers her chickens under her wing. They all agree that Jerusalem's day of visitation is already past. She has had her chance. Now He only goes up to pronounce her doom. Her house is left unto her desolate. The kingdom is taken away from her. And this they tell, without one word to hint when this visitation had taken place or when she had made the great refusal.

And then, to our surprise and theirs, when he arrives for apparently the first time in the city He finds there a circle of devoted adherents, friends whom He dearly loves, who will provide Him with a house to hide in through days of darkest danger—the house of Mary and Martha and Lazarus at Bethany. And another loyal disciple, whose very name is unknown to the Twelve, is ready to keep a large room for Him in Jerusalem at any hour that He may want it; and with this friend the Master has arranged a code of signals by which to hold communication—a man bearing a pitcher to a well who will turn and lead them to a certain house, into which they may enter and say unto the good man of it, "The Master saith unto thee, Where is the guest-chamber, where I shall eat the Passover with my disciples? And he will show them a large upper room furnished." And, again, there is Joseph of Arimathæa, who will come forward with such courage now that the worst has befallen.

When had Jesus knit these friends so fast to Him? When had He won such passionately loyal followers? The Synoptic tradition offers no solution whatever. It is obviously incomplete. It does not explain its own story. Those critics who confine themselves to the tradition given through Mark and "Q" always regard it as giving an adequate and self-sufficient account of the Lord's career and death. In reality, it raises a

swarm of questions which it does not attempt to answer. It supplies no coherent reason why the Death came about, as we have seen; nor does it offer any solution of our Lord's intimate familiarity with Jerusalem, nor for His withdrawal into hiding in Galilee, nor for His exact knowledge of the fate that awaits Him if ever He returns to the city which has already rejected Him.

And there is something yet stranger and deeper which the Synoptic tradition leaves wholly unaccounted for. And here again we have to complain that Dr Lake wipes off the slate the very problem which has to be faced. He makes the statement that "so far as can be seen from the Synoptic narrative, when Jesus was speaking in public He said nothing of Himself. His personality was entirely subordinate to His preaching." But is not the critical problem of the tradition the extraordinary emphasis given to the personal equation? True, this may primarily be felt in the assumption that underlies the teaching, rather than in the public teaching itself. It is not pressed forward by open statement in the first instance; but the assumption of it is unceasing and immense. He always claims to stand in a unique and supreme relation to the Father. He demands of men a personal devotion that has no limits. Anyone who loves father or mother or children more than Him is unworthy of Him. He is greater than David, or than Solomon, or than the Temple. He stands outside and above all sin, and forgives it in the same sense in which God forgives it. This He does as Son of Man; and by "Son of Man" we gather that He means not the ideal humanity of Daniel, but the individualised apocalyptic "Man" of the visions of Enoch, whom God has prepared for Himself, and in whom God will make His final convulsive invasion upon earth. Again, the personal authority to speak which lies behind the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount is set on a level with the voice that spoke on Sinai. He offers Himself to all as their sole refreshment and rest. He will give His life for their ransom. And this silent assumption of unqualified personal righteousness is bound to provoke the inevitable inquiry, "Whom do men say that I, the Son of Man, am? Whom do ye say that I am?" That question, with its answer, is absolutely crucial and decisive. Our Lord Himself deliberately forces it upon those who are worthy to follow Him. The crisis of the drama turns on it. And to those who answer it adequately He asserts the final and eternal value of His own personality. His language is pronounced and explicit. There is the famous text which "Q" admits: "All things have been delivered to me of my Father; and no one knoweth the Son save the Father; neither doth any know the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him" (St Matt. xi. 27). There is the declaration of the final judgment of God on all men, which will turn solely on men's relationship to Him. To confess Him is to be accepted. To deny Him is to be denied "before the Father which is in heaven."

And, again, the value of the merciful deeds done by the righteous among all nations will turn, not simply on their mercifulness, but on the

fact that the mercy shown to the poor was done to Him. He, again, identifies Himself with the elect corner-stone of the house of God, and with the stone flung out of heaven to shatter in pieces the kingdoms of the world. He will come in the clouds with all the holy angels, to render to all according to their deeds. The whole story from end to end presents us with a personal claim so tremendous in its character that it falls outside all our categories.

It is this intense and awful insistence on His personal righteousness, combined with His absolute meekness and unselfishness, which constitutes the staggering problem of the Synoptic Gospels. They put it out, and leave it unsolved. But it is impossible to stop where they stop. They rest on assumptions which cry out for justification. In themselves they are confessedly incomplete and inexplicable.

Now, it is just at this point that we can return to the first question which we began by asking: How did the body which already held the creed which is the familiar background of St Paul's early Epistles find itself satisfied by the presentation of our Lord embodied in the Synoptic tradition? For we cannot too often recall that this written tradition was produced and approved by a body already at the advanced stage of belief. Dr Lake sketches five stages through which the belief grew. But these stages disappear when we reflect that the earliest belief of which we have positive evidence is already at his ultimate stage. We begin there. And any indirect evidence that we have of an earlier condition of faith is itself derived from the writings of those who have always held the full later belief, and do not see any inconsistency between it and what they report.

St Luke, whom we accept as the writer of the Third Gospel and of the Acts, most assuredly held the strong creed of his Master, as we have it in the Epistles to the Romans and the Corinthians. He had never been taught any other gospel. Yet, holding this with heart and soul, he is satisfied to write his Gospel without letting his creed peep through; and he enjoys reporting the early speeches of St Peter in the Acts without any feeling of their inadequacy. The believing body accepts the Gospel and those speeches as corresponding to its spiritual needs. We are not, then, in presence of two separate stages. The two are cotemporaneous. They are capable, therefore, of some reconciliation. They are correlated by some bond of unity, so that they hang together in mutual correspondence. It is the task of criticism to account for this cotemporaneousness. It is a most interesting phenomenon. A criticism that simply makes them separate and separable stages has surrendered its task.

How can we explain it? Well, it explains itself, if what we have said be true. The Synoptic record sets a question which it does not answer. The creed of the Pauline period is the answer. The underlying personal assumption which gives all its force to the record finds in the creed its open and explicit justification. If Jesus Christ be what the full faith declares Him to be, then, and then alone, the record of the old days, when the disciples accepted, under the dominance of His personality,

so much that they could not understand or account for, is explained. They heard Him forgive sins. It should have appeared to them to be blasphemy, but it didn't. It seemed natural and inevitable that He should do it. Why? They could not have told then. Now they can say. So it is that there is a satisfaction in recalling the experiences of those days, when the real meaning was "hid from their eyes, and they understood none of these things, neither perceived they what He said," in the light of the knowledge which has now made everything intelligible to them. This may or may not be the full explanation; but at least it attempts to handle the actual problem set us to solve—which is why and how the same set of people accepted and approved of both presentations at the same time, and saw no difficulty in putting them together.

There is one more matter in which Dr Lake seems to me to leave the real problem alone, untouched. It is in his treatment of the Lord's eschatology. He takes the ordinary and obvious view that if we were certain that this world, as we know it, was going to cease "to exist in a few months, we should not take any interest in social conditions or in the smaller problems of daily life." Therefore it is natural that our Lord should have "cut out all social values" from His ethics. "The effect of this expectation was to hide almost entirely the more obvious duties of a world-affirming ethic in daily life." Well, so we might have imagined; but the curious characteristic of the Christian eschatology is that it had exactly the opposite effect. It intensified the value and reality of social duties. It enriched and enforced the domestic obligations. Take any reference to it in the New Testament, and this is what you find. "The end of all things is at hand," says St Peter; "therefore be sound and sober, use hospitality, minister your gifts as good stewards. Let none of you suffer as a murderer, or a thief, or an evildoer, or as a meddler in other men's matters." This is the unfailing consequence drawn by St Paul. "The Day cometh as a thief in the night." Therefore they are to walk in the light. They are to be sober, to be at peace among themselves, to admonish the disorderly, to encourage the faint-hearted, to support the weak, to be long-suffering towards all. Never to render evil for evil, but to follow after what is good. To abstain from any appearance of evil. All the virtues of the good citizen receive their emphasis from the great Expectation. And in the later Epistle to the Colossians it is because they are dead, and their life is hid with Christ in God, in that heavenly citizenship for which they look, that therefore all the daily domestic duties of the household become so urgent; and they are to put away all lust, and anger, and wrath, and malice, and vanity, and to speak no lies, and to put on kindness, humility, forbearing one another, forgiving one another; and wives are to obey their husbands, and husbands to be kind to their wives, and children to obey their parents, and fathers to be good to their children, and servants to do good service, and masters to pay fair wages; and they are all to walk in wisdom toward those without, and to keep their talk bright and brief.

All this stress on social and domestic morality comes straight out of the belief in the great Day. Why so? What is the force of the argument from the Expectation of the Lord to the vital value of the present? That is the problem which criticism has to answer. By saying that the Expectation cuts out and obscures all social and domestic values, it avoids the very question that it has to answer. That question is: Why did it *not* produce the effect that we should have thought inevitable?

It is worth noting that while Dr Lake relies on the eschatology to prove that Christ cut out from His ethics all social values, Dr Cairns, in his noble work *Christianity and the Modern World*, appeals to the same eschatology to prove how deeply Christ concerned Himself with social interests. And this last judgment is surely right. Eschatology is the last word of Jewish prophecy; and Jewish prophecy was social in its ethics through and through. It looked for a manifestation of divine righteousness on earth; and so did eschatology. They only differed as to method.

It is, then, the very excellence of Dr Lake's book that emphasises its failure. The work could not be better done. Tone, temper, quality, are admirable. Throughout it is suggestive, sympathetic, catholic-minded. It shows a most lucid and instructive insight into the values of traditional theology. It commends its own position by every possible attraction. But this serves only to make more acute our sense that actual Christianity remains wholly unaccounted for.

Let us repeat our position. Christianity means that, at a certain moment, a Personality smote in upon the human story with a force that clove that story in twain and created the epoch round which all after-history turns. This Personality put out a potency of which humanity found itself possessed, enthralled, quickened. For those who came under its sway it was the sole and paramount reality that filled heaven and earth. Life won its whole worth from its service. There was nothing else that counted. What God is to the soul of man, that this Personality meant to those who believed. Nothing short of that could express what He was. Into Him all died, they became as dead things; in Him they were alive with the only life that really lived. In His strong will and masterful dominance all judgment was summed, all value was consummated. And, above all, His personal attraction drew every heart into the utter surrender of a love that knew no bounds, as it drank from out of His life all that constituted its peace and its joy. This astounding effect of His appearance did not pass away at His death, but through that very death created a body of believers who perpetuated this miracle of adhering and adoring love.

This is the problem—this is the fact to be explained. And it is no explanation at all to offer us a vagrant and uncertain impression left by One who had died under a dire disaster before the kingdom which He had promised had ever come to pass—an impression which became detached from its Jewish base in concrete fact, and wandered off to change its shape

under the shifting currents that it encountered, and to take on colour from novel environments which had little enough to do with its original motive. This Personality, which by some mysterious visions after death had recovered its authority, was dropped away, leaving behind it an illusion about the end of the world; which is not unhealthy, but which has little or nothing to say on the present conduct of life and on this world's ethics. It is not clear what His relation was to the religion that actually named itself after Him, nor to the essential and fundamental and formative ideas which were its inspiration. For these spring wholly out of His death and resurrection, His atoning and redemptive efficacy, the rebirth of humanity by His baptism, the worship paid to Him in the mystic cultus, and the life given through His sacramental feast. And in all this He had no part. It belonged to a different condition and atmosphere. But how, then, if He meant so little, did His believers think that He meant so much? That is the question to which we have received no answer.

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The Study of Religions.—By Stanley A. Cook, M.A.—London: A. & C. Black, 1914.

IN this book Mr Stanley A. Cook, the well-known authority on the early religions of Canaan and the adjacent lands, sets himself the task of taking a broad survey of all that is involved in the comprehensive term "Religions." The study is, as the author reminds us, pre-eminently a "live" one, having been brought to the front, not only by the increased knowledge of the thoughts and ideas of primitive man, whether in the past or in his present-day representatives, the backward races of mankind, which is due to the science of anthropology, but also by the prominence given to it by the successive Congresses of the History of Religions which have been held in recent years.

Not so very long ago it was possible to think and speak of a primeval revelation given to man which was preserved in the line of Noah and handed down to Abraham and his descendants, and which in the line of Jacob became the religion of Israel, *i.e.* of the nation descended from him. This revelation was fully set forth in the "Law of Moses" which that great leader received directly from the Almighty, and advanced under the teaching of the prophets till it culminated in the Christ and Christianity. In the case of the majority of the human race this revelation was, however, lost, or forgotten, and degraded by a vast mass of superstitious ideas and practices. This was a very simple and easy way of solving all difficulties; but, chiefly through the better understanding of the course and progress of the religion of Israel herself derived from the Higher Criticism of the Old Testament, it is altogether out of the question to-day. Indeed, the very use of the word "superstitious" might have warned the adherents of this theory that the matter was not so simple as it seemed, for what is "super-

stition" but a survival, under a new environment, of beliefs and practices which had a living meaning and an uplifting influence on the lives and characters of those who first held the beliefs and engaged in the practices? And this is itself a sufficient demonstration of the baselessness of the notion of any primeval revelation.

The problem set before modern students is a far more difficult and complex one. It may be briefly summarised as consisting in the endeavour to discover the unifying principle which underlies all diversities, and to recognise the progress that man has made in the knowledge of God in spite of the lapses which have undoubtedly occurred here and there from time to time from a higher to a lower level of thought. Just as we observe this process continually throughout the course of the history of Israel, so Christianity also exemplifies it in the course of its now lengthy history. What can be higher in its noble simplicity than the teaching of our Lord, what more grandiose than the theology of St Paul, what more spiritual than that of the school of St John? What can be lower or more degraded than the religion of the average Irish or Neapolitan peasant? Yet these latter are only low or degraded because ideas associated with animism or fetishism which once swayed the minds of primitive thinkers to high issues are still found possessing a living influence in a different environment and under different circumstances on minds which ought to have advanced to a higher plane.

The greater part of this book goes back to college lectures given in the winter of 1912–13, while the last chapter is based on a lecture given in March 1914, so that the book was practically complete before the great war began which is now trying all the nations of the world and throwing all ideas into a fiery crucible from which they are bound to emerge transformed and transfigured, at once simplified and enriched. It is, the author states, "an endeavour to take a 'long view'; it is ignorant of current events, it treats in a dispassionate and international or cosmopolitan spirit some grave questions which have been slowly coming to the fore, and which sooner or later will require the earnest attention of the best minds."

But it is in this endeavour to take a "dispassionate view" that the difficulty arises. The author takes his stand, like some god on the summit of Olympia, and surveys, or tries to survey, the struggling efforts of the puny race of mortals to seize the foothold by which it shall rise from the valley of ignorance to the heights of knowledge and spiritual attainment, he himself having no interest in the struggle beyond that of the watcher on the heights. How far he has succeeded it is for the reader to say, but it is questionable whether any man can so rid his mind of the preconceived notions, prejudices if you like, due to his own environment, as to take an entirely "dispassionate view" of all the upward struggles of every race and religion of mankind. In other words, it is doubtful if a man brought up in the atmosphere of Christianity can altogether divest himself of his predilections in its favour, and we cannot think that the author has succeeded in this—nor would it be well that he should!

There is an undoubted truth in Matthew Arnold's inspiring lines:

"Children of men! the unseen Power, whose eye
For ever doth accompany mankind,
Hath look'd on no religion scornfully
That men did ever find.

Which has not taught weak wills how much they can?
Which has not fallen on the dry heart like rain?
Which has not cried to sunk, self-weary man:
Thou must be born again!"

And yet the man brought up under the influence and in the environment of Christianity must believe that this religion enshrines within itself the highest message of God to man, and displays to man in the teaching and exemplar of its Founder the noblest road of approach to God—that of self-sacrifice and obedience.

In commencing the study of religions the author rightly decides that it is not necessary to discuss current definitions of religion: "All know what is commonly involved in the term 'religion' as apart from any estimate of its value: it is a way of thinking and the expression and result of it. It includes personal experiences of a peculiarly distinctive, private, and convincing character; but the essential difference between the religious and the non-religious attitude may be said to lie in the fact that in religion we have to take into further account experiences and beliefs touching the Supernatural, the Unseen Order, or the Power or Powers superior to man." This, of course, takes into account the attitude towards the Unseen of all religions at all stages of development, and leaves out of account the question as to what may be considered lower or higher stages in the development.

Bearing in mind what has been said as to the author's standpoint, the book constitutes a masterly analysis of the subject in all its aspects, and one well worthy of the consideration of the patient student; though its somewhat dry presentation, and the careful marking of each division of the argument in paragraphs after the fashion of a text-book, are rather calculated to repel the casual reader. We have first a careful account of what is implied in the comparative study of religions, followed by a description of the evolution of thought in regard to its progress; to this succeed two chapters on Specialism and Individualism, two on Survivals and their significance, two on the Environment and Change, and two on Development and Continuity; while two final chapters deal with the failures that await all efforts at reform owing to the fact that individuals are experimental and specialistic while the environment is comprehensive, and with the problems of the Self and the Ultimate, Anthropomorphism and Personality, and the Universe and Reality.

There are three factors that make this study specially appropriate to the present age: (1) the accumulation of material owing to the discoveries of hidden civilisations and religions in the *disjecta membra* of the implements, weapons, and artistic products of early man, and in the remains of

Egyptian, Babylonian, and Mycenean culture, to which are co-ordinated the results of the research of a large army of investigators into the ideas and practices of the primitive peoples as we find them to-day; (2) the application of the idea of evolution which is found universally to prevail in the natural world to the progressive development of consciousness in man, both as regards the individual and the race; and (3) the influence of the Higher Criticism of the Old Testament. These three factors, taken in order and together, are found not only to assist in the analytical process of the study, but to converge to a higher synthesis in which the several parts are no longer viewed singly and apart, but can be merged in a broad survey of the whole.

The author's studies in Semitic religion enable him to give a convincing picture of the advance of the religious idea in Israel from a stage in which it differed little from the nature religions of the surrounding peoples, till its emergence into the full ethical monotheism of the prophets and its fixing in the ritual of the second temple, from the point of view of the results of Old Testament criticism; and in this special case we may see processes at work which may be more or less discovered throughout the religious development of mankind. It is this that makes the religion of Israel of such supreme importance in the study of religions.

On the vexed question of the relationship between magic and religion—whether, that is, magic preceded religion, or whether magic is itself a factor in the evolution of religion—the author takes a middle line. While agreeing with those who hold that magic is the "science of primitive man," and that therefore magic, as the endeavour to coerce nature or the powers behind nature to some predetermined end, is the precursor of what is more properly understood as religion—the difference, for example, between a "charm" and a "prayer,"—he yet points out that there are numerous cases in which ceremonies have lost all their original psychical value for the participants, and that thus some light is thrown on the very common transition in religions when the "religious" aspect has been replaced by the "magical." But that is, after all, only to say that in those particular cases the votaries, whoever they may be, have reverted to type, as in the case of the Irish or Neapolitian peasant mentioned above.

On the question of "survivals" the author has some illuminating remarks to make, but we would put it to him whether he is altogether sure of the ground he takes up. This is not an essay but a review, and we must not unduly obtrude our own views; but is it not the case that many "survivals" are in reality the true expression of ideas only faintly shadowed forth in earlier time? In other words, are not ideas and practices which we find among the primitive races the adumbrations and forward-reaching germs of conceptions which we only find in their fullness among the higher races and in the great religions of mankind? For example, in one sense the Sacraments of the Christian Church may be called "survivals" destined to give place to higher spiritual ideas, as the Quakers teach; in another sense they are still "survivals," but embody in

themselves all the notions of purification, of sacrifice, and the communion by eating of a common life, after which primitive man groped in his rites of initiation, of purification, of human sacrifice, and of the eating in common of the flesh of the victim slain; and thus the Sacraments, as being the reality of which primitive rites were the mere shadow, can never grow old or lose their efficiency by the lapse of time.

This book, being cast, as we have said, in a series of propositions, is not an easy one to read, but we heartily commend it to the thoughtful and discriminating student. It will cause him "furiously to think." At the same time it will enhance its author's reputation as a careful and painstaking cultivator of a hitherto almost untrodden field of research.

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Confucianism and its Rivals.—By Herbert A. Giles, LL.D., Professor of Chinese in the University of Cambridge.—London: Williams & Norgate, 1915.

Students of the history of religion have already received from Professor Giles so many valuable contributions towards a better knowledge of Chinese literature, that they will give a cordial welcome to *Confucianism and its Rivals*, the lectures recently given in connection with the Hibbert Trust. Those of us who are ignorant of the language are very grateful for any careful translations of characteristic writings, and for all interpretations of Chinese thoughts and ways by competent observers. It is only by the multiplication and improvement of these helps that progress can be secured in so vast a field of research as that of the history of religion.

As we should expect, Professor Giles is very far from overestimating the achievements of scholarship in his own particular field. Some of us may recall the timely plea which he made at the third International Congress of Religions that "some of the annual batch of graduates in the Greek and Latin languages, in view of the comparative exhaustion of these fields of research, should turn their attention to the almost virgin fields of Far Eastern literatures." But many, possibly, are not quite prepared for the frank acknowledgment contained in these lectures, that "few foreigners are capable of writing even a simple letter in Chinese by themselves," and that "no foreigner has yet seen the light who could attempt, unaided, such a work as [the translation of] the Bible, or indeed any portion of it" (p. 257). Is European scholarship really in quite so backward a condition as this? Is it possible that after all these years of growing intercourse, our travellers, officials, scholars, and missionaries should still be so ignorant of the genius of the Chinese language as to be unable to make a translation "which reproduces with fidelity the sense and spirit of the original"? Are all our scholars still at the mercy of native interpreters?

Professor Giles is equally modest in his description of the aim of these

lectures. They are written from a "purely secular point of view" (p. v). Readers of the volume may think that the author is not quite fair to himself in this characterisation of his work: but there is truth in it. This is not the work of a student of religion, still less of a theologian. No serious student of religion would be content to adopt a purely secular standpoint in dealing with the religions of any country. It is no more possible to understand religion from an outside or secular standpoint than it is to understand mathematics or poetry from a merely commercial point of view. It is only fair to remember the limited and unsatisfactory conditions, which the lecturer imposed upon himself, in judging the value of the work as a whole and of the opinions it contains. When, then, we read that Confucianism is more "practical" than Christianity (p. 85), or that in the West religious feeling has nothing whatever to do with the intellect (p. 214), or that the Chinese people should be encouraged to return to the religion of four thousand years ago (p. 264), we must remember that the author has, in advance and voluntarily, by the limitation of his point of view, deprived his judgments of almost all serious value. These questions cannot be decided from the secular or non-religious standpoint.

It is not easy for readers of this book, and especially when taken in conjunction with other writings of Dr Giles, to attach any meaning to his use of the word "religion." Let us take the following: "The Chinese are not, and, so far as we can judge, never have been, what we understand by the term 'a religious people'" (p. 1). Yet more than 4000 years ago a monotheistic faith had arisen in China, sacrifices were offered, belief in a hereafter was firmly held, and the universe was regarded as pervaded by spiritual beings, all subordinate to the Supreme. This is a remarkable result for a people who were not "religious." It is true that there seems to have been some falling off in the centuries that followed. Confucius and his successors were partly responsible for this; but, taking the lowest estimate possible of the "religious" value of Confucianism, it has never been the sole representative of the religious instincts of the Chinese. It was to stem the powerful tides of religious feeling—undisciplined religious feeling—that Confucianism arose. Taoism, too, was forced to come down from its philosophical heights and constitute itself into a religion; and, as though this were not enough, China allowed a foreign religion to come in and supplement its indigenous faiths. Why, if the Chinese were not "religious," did they accept Buddhism, and accept it in its most religious or Mahayana form? The Chinese, with these three cults, which Dr Giles himself sometimes speaks of as "religions," are very strangely denied the right to be called a "religious" people. But the context of the quotation shows that by "religious" Dr Giles means, taking one's religion so seriously as to be willing in its behalf to kill other persons, or suffer death oneself. The latter is a somewhat exacting test, and the former is somewhat curious. But even accepting the tests, one would have thought that the Chinese had qualified. Have not the Christian martyrs in recent times shown that the Chinese can die for their faith? Even Taoism has had its martyrs. But

Buddhism has afforded a more conspicuous proof of the invincible strength of the religious nature of the Chinese and of the fanaticism of their rulers. From the fifth to the nineteenth century there has hardly been a single century in which the Buddhists have not been the victims of cruel persecution. Professor De Groot thinks that "in the history of the world there is no second instance of such wholesale destruction of people by their rulers for the sake of politico-religious fanaticism" as the massacres about the opening of the nineteenth century; and adds, "It has made the altar of Confucius, on which the Chinese people is frequently immolated, the bloodiest ever built." We should have to say that Confucianism was un-Chinese before we could clear China from the reproach of being eminently "religious" in this sense of the word.

But we are not at the end of our perplexities with regard to this word "religion." Professor Giles, though he sometimes speaks of Confucianism in the ordinary way as a religion, tells us elsewhere, "Confucianism is therefore entirely a system of morals, and not a religion;" (*Religions of Ancient China*, p. 37); and the context shows that it is not a religion because Confucius regarded duty to God as subordinate to duty to man, and conceived of God "more as an abstraction than as a living sentient Being with the physical attributes of man." We cannot stop to inquire whether this emphasis on the ethical was really "irreligious"; but with regard to the conception of God, the Hibbert Lecturer, though he tells us that "Mencius was a Confucianist to the backbone and jealous of what he fancied might involve even the faintest deviation from the way of his Master" (p. 107), yet says, "upholding a belief in an anthropomorphic God, as described in our first lecture, Mencius taught that man was created in God's own image. Our physical bodies, he said, in regard to shape and appearance, are of the nature of God" (p. 91). Do these words of Mencius represent God "more as an abstraction than as a living sentient Being with the physical attributes of man"? Further, Professor Giles gives his own description of the "religion" or "system of morals" of Confucius thus: "It is certain that he believed firmly in a higher Power, the God of his fathers . . . he was conscious, and expressed his consciousness openly, that in his teaching he was working under divine guidance," and gave that testimony though in danger of violence (p. 67). Again, we read: "But just as it is obvious that Confucius believed in a God, so it is also obvious that he believed in the existence and, on occasions, in the presence of spirits of the departed dead" (p. 77). Is all this mere ethics?

It is a great misfortune that Professor Giles does not appear to remember what he has written before. Another egregious example is to be found on p. 44. Speaking of the "annals and the commentary alike," Dr Giles says: "The intervention of God Himself in the current affairs of man was firmly believed in, and is alluded to again and again in terms of the simplest faith." In the *Religions of Ancient China*, p. 37, he says: "It is also a curious fact that throughout the annals . . . there is no allusion of any kind to the interposition of God in human affairs."

A very interesting question suggested is, whether the Chinese have any conception corresponding to that of Fate among the Aryan races. In the case of Confucius, Dr Giles decides in the negative. *Ming* might be so translated, if it always stood alone. But it sometimes has *T'ien* prefixed. Therefore when alone in the ancient classical literature it is elliptical. The ultimate conception for the Chinese is *T'ien Ming*, the decree or will of God (p. 70). But this brings us back to the controversy as to the significance of *T'ien*. Dr Giles takes a view with regard to *T'ien* which has not yet commended itself to all students of Chinese literature. It was originally an anthropomorphic conception, the Chinese character representing the figure of a man (p. 11). As compared with *Shang-Ti* it is perhaps more abstract and less personal (p. 37). It may also be regarded as God passive, whereas *Shang-Ti* is God active (p. 37). Yet he would always translate it "God," and not the impersonal "Heaven." But if the personal idea should always be implicit in *T'ien*, the idea of an impersonal absolute did make its appearance in Taoism—which, we must remember, also professed to rest upon the ancient classical literature. This Professor Giles acknowledges: "In spite of the lofty position accorded, as we have seen, to God, there was something—we cannot say someone—on which Chuang Tzu, following Lao Tzu, made God Himself dependent, not only for power, but even for His very existence. This something was called by Lao Tzu *Tao*" (p. 135). We get back then to an impersonal absolute upon which the more or less personal God is dependent. Is there much to choose between this and fatalism? And if Lao Tzu or his followers found it in the ancient classical literature, may not Confucius also have found it there?

There are many minor points raised in these instructive lectures. Do not the statements with regard to worship in ancient China (p. 17) require some modification? What would modern theologians say to Parkhurst on Romans v. 12 as adequately expressing the essential Christian doctrine of original sin (p. 84); of the comparison between Tao and the ὁδός of the New Testament (p. 135); of the adoption of the phraseology of the Athanasian Creed to describe the relation between *T'ien* and *Shang-Ti*; of the selection of Jahve as the analogue of *T'ien*, the passive and less personal aspects of God? And what is to be thought of this: "it may be said without fear of contradiction, that considering the sacrifice both of blood and of treasure, the growth of Christianity in China has been disappointing to its supporters" (p. 260)? If Dr Giles will make that statement in the board-room of one of our missionary societies which has a considerable number of missionaries in China, say the London Missionary Society, I think he will find that those who have given most to China will be the most emphatic in their contradiction; and that if it is possible for supporters of Christian missions to take a "purely secular" view, some of them will say that even from that point of view the results have been worth more than the cost.

However much we may differ from Professor Giles on certain points,

we may acknowledge the worth of the book as a historical sketch and a collection of interesting information. It does not touch some of the great critical questions connected with the religions of China; its method is anecdotal rather than scientific; as a historical sketch it is of course incomplete. But there are useful stores of knowledge provided for us here, which difference of standpoint and disappointment with the method ought not to be allowed to conceal from us.

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What is Living and what is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel.—By Benedetto Croce.—Translated from the original text of the third Italian edition, 1912, by Douglas Ainslie, B.A.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1915.

What is living in the philosophy of Hegel in the view of Benedetto Croce is the doctrine of a logic of philosophy, a special and particular method, such as that expressed in the termination "ology" in such words as psychology, sociology, anthropology, and the like. This logic of philosophy was Hegel's discovery, a momentous event of inestimable value in the history of human thought and a permanent enrichment of human reason. It has become familiar, and we are able to discover the elements of it, or at least to discern a reaching towards it, in the works of his predecessors, notably in the three great Critiques of Kant, but its clear formulation by Hegel was nothing short of a revelation. It seemed, and it still seems, a bold paradox, but it has become a possession of philosophy. Reality is a concept, concrete and universal, holding together in indissoluble unity terms which, in abstraction from one another and from their unity in the concept, are contradictions, absolutely exclusive and even destructive of one another. The best-known and typical example is the first concrete concept with which the "Logic" opens, the category of becoming. Becoming is the synthesis of two categories, being and nothing, each of which in the abstract is the negation of the other. Their union in the concrete concept is not mutual destruction and pure negation but the attainment of a higher reality by the negation of negation. This is the principle of thought or reason in all its manifestations. Thinking is a movement through negation to a reconciliation of contradictions in a higher, that is, a concrete unity. It is the great distinction and the lasting glory of Hegel to have made this logic of philosophy explicit. In this sense only was it a discovery. Has not Heine said that the serpent already six thousand years before Hegel's birth promulgated the whole Hegelian philosophy in the Garden of Eden?

What is dead in the philosophy of Hegel is a certain application of this logic outside the sphere of philosophy. Not that in the ultimate sense any reality falls outside philosophy, but that a logic specially fitted

to be the peculiar instrument of philosophy does not of necessity supersede the particular logic which each great branch of human knowledge requires. The notable cases in point are the application of the logic of philosophy to art, to history, and to nature. Hegel did not recognise that besides a logic of philosophy there is a logic of mathematics, a logic of natural science, a logic of æsthetic, a logic of history, etc., and that these logics are not modes of treating particular parts of reality, but modes of treating all reality, modes which arise and persist side by side with the philosophical, precisely because, within their own limits, they do not compete with philosophy.

Hegel had clearly shown that the abstract concept cannot stand alone, that it is driven by the very movement of thought itself to affirm the antithesis which contradicts it, and that only in the synthesis which reconciles the contradiction of the elements does thought find the concreteness combined with universality which characterises the real. But there are concepts which are not abstract but concrete, and yet exhibit a diversity within them which drives thought to the affirmation of their other, which manifest an internal discord that requires reconciliation in a higher unity. Hegel thought the same dialectic triad was at work here, and that the same method would be triumphantly vindicated. Hence a confusion in his doctrine, a failure to distinguish between the contradiction of the abstract elements of the concrete concept and the grades or degrees of reality which the concrete concepts all possess. A logical theory of classification must here give place to a logical theory of implication. An example may make it clear. Consider the relation of the two concepts art and philosophy. In Hegel's treatment these become a dialectical triad in which art is the thesis, religion the antithesis, and philosophy the synthesis. This is typical of Hegel's treatment of innumerable concrete concepts: they become triads, such as, thesis, the family; antithesis, civil society; synthesis, the state: also, thesis, life; antithesis, knowledge; synthesis, absolute idea. To return to our first example, who can persuade himself that religion is the negation of art and that art and religion are two contradictory abstractions which possess truth only in their synthesis philosophy? Yet art and philosophy do stand to one another in a relation of identity in difference, and if we hold that philosophy is the higher and more perfect unity, it is because we recognise that art implies philosophy and that philosophy includes art. Those familiar with Croce's philosophy will recognise in this last remark one of his characteristic and fundamental doctrines.

When, however, Hegel went further still and applied the dialectic to the particular empirical objects of special science, and to the events and facts of history, fantastic and even ludicrous results followed. The Prussian monarchy and Prussian political institutions became the synthesis of a triad of which Oriental despotism was the thesis, Greek freedom the antithesis. Ruskin has told us in one of his autobiographical writings that when he was composing the *Seven Lamps of Architecture* he experi-

enced considerable difficulty in keeping them within the sacred number, and Hegel was often driven to sorry shifts to cram awkward facts and events into his triads. The old world with its three continents conformed naturally to the arrangement. The first, Africa, he said, represents the dumb mind which does not attain to knowledge; the second, Asia, is the wild bacchantic rout, the region of formless, indeterminate generation, incapable of ruling itself; the third, Europe, represents consciousness, and constitutes the rational part of the earth; and the centre of Europe is Germany. But where, it may be asked, do America and Australia and other large islands find a place? He left them out because they seemed to him "physically immature." North America, he thought, might be regarded as an appendix of European civilisation, but he refused to recognise any claim for consideration in the ancient civilisations of Mexico and Peru. They were bound to disappear, he said, at the approach of mind.

It was, however, in its application to natural science that the dialectic met its most direct challenge and seemed most signally to fail. Hegel himself was undismayed, and met his opponents partly with invective, partly with sarcasm. Challenged by "the poor devil Krug" to deduce the moon, or, if not, then a rose, or a horse, or a dog, or at least the pen with which he, Krug, was writing at that moment, Hegel could only reply that science has far more urgent tasks on hand than the deduction of Mr Krug's pen. Some apology has been offered for Hegel's special hostility to Newton in the fact that he was not alone in opposing Newton's theory, and that Goethe, who had a rival theory, was his personal friend. It was not, however, a particular theory but the whole positive method of science which was being called in question by the speculative method of philosophy. A jesting remark on the anecdote of the apple is amusing. Thrice, he said, had this fruit proved fatal to the human race, causing the fall of Adam, the destruction of Troy, and now, by tumbling on Newton's head, the ruin of natural philosophy. Croce will not allow the fact that Hegel wrote before the great expansion of experimental science in the nineteenth century to be pleaded in excuse. His fault was not that he failed to see the direction of human thought and to appreciate the inductive method which was leading to vast scientific discovery. It was that he fell into confusion in regard to two truths of equal and fundamental importance in philosophy, he confused the synthesis of contradictions with the degrees of reality and truth. Confident in his new discovery, the dialectic triad, he thought it applicable to the concrete and the particular as well as to the abstract and universal. This meant that wherever there is distinction there is also contradiction, only to be reconciled in a new and higher concept. But distinction and difference have also another signification—that conveyed by the logical term implication. No partial reality stands alone, however relatively complete and self-subsistent it may appear—it holds within itself distinctions which point beyond itself not to its negation but to its inclusion within a larger system. Hence the task of philosophy is not to

classify entities or facts, but to draw forth their implications. The theory of degrees of reality was implicit in Hegel, it permeates all his works, but it nowhere receives full and explicit recognition. According to Croce, Hegel himself positively obscured it by conceiving the movement of thought as necessarily triadic in form, and so it is that, notwithstanding his immortal discovery, his works are encumbered with so much that is no longer living but dead.

Whether or not this judgment on Hegel's work is just, it cannot fail to cause surprise to many English readers. Certainly all (and they are probably many) who have learnt philosophy from Hegelian teachers, and who perhaps count themselves Hegelian without having actually studied Hegel's works, have been accustomed to regard this doctrine of degrees of reality and this theory of implication as the most living Hegelian doctrine. Croce is no doubt right when he says that it is nowhere explicit in Hegel. We owe it to his followers, especially to those known as the Hegelians of the left, but none the less is it the direct living outcome of Hegel's notion. And if it is so, what matters all the dead stuff? Is it more than the shell and wrappings shed by the seed in the very process of its development and growth?

There is a short but very interesting comparison of the Hegelian principle with the metaphysic of Bergson in the concluding chapter. I notice it gladly, for many have been struck with the analogy. Quoting Bergson's description of an intuitive knowledge *qui s'installe dans le mouvement et adopte la vie même des choses*, he says: "Was not this just what Hegel demanded, and the point from which he began—to find a form of mind which should be mobile as the movement of the real, which should participate in the life of things, which should feel 'the pulse of reality,' and should mentally reproduce the rhythm of its development, without breaking it into pieces, or making it rigid and falsifying it?" The difference in Croce's view is that for Hegel such an effort was a starting-point, whereas for Bergson it is a conclusion, and that it involves a renunciation of thought which would have been asked of Hegel in vain. This opens a large question the discussion of which would be out of place here.

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London.

Politics and Crowd Morality.—By Arthur Christensen.—Translated from the Danish by A. Cecil Curtis.—London: Williams & Norgate, 1915.

Perhaps the most urgent intellectual need of our time is an adequate social psychology. We all feel that if peace when it comes is to lead to anything but a series of internecine wars, we must study, more successfully than we have hitherto done, the psychological conditions of national and international feeling and action. I believe, therefore, that it is a real misfortune for the world that a social-psychological scheme so inadequate

as that invented by M. Gabriel Tarde and popularised by M. Le Bon should have acquired its present wide influence in the universities of America and Europe. That scheme was in its origin a reaction against the "intellectualism" of the early nineteenth century. Tarde and his first disciples were brought up on books and lectures which assumed that every human action was the result of a passionless, fully informed, and completely conscious calculation of "self-interest." History and their own observation showed the Tardists that mankind were ignorant and passionate; that their mental processes were often very different from those described in the logic-books; that they were never fully conscious of the causes of their own actions and opinions; and that their unconsciousness ranged from unnoticed changes of taste or opinion in a fashionable woman or a newspaper-reading politician to the complete hypnotism of a mesmerised subject. To account for these irrational facts the Tardists employed three methods. They studied the behaviour of "crowds" instead of single persons; they accounted for the behaviour of crowds by the instinctive "imitation" of originating individuals by the passive majority; and they explained imitation by an analysis of the phenomena of "suggestion." When they found that "imitation" and "suggestion" in their ordinary senses did not account for all the social facts which they studied, they used them in new senses, and invented such terms as "counter-imitation," "self-imitation," "counter-suggestion," and "auto-suggestion," until finally both "imitation" and "suggestion" were left with no more precise meaning than the old bible-reader's "Mesopotamia."

Of this school Mr Arthur Christensen's *Politics and Crowd Morality* is a typical product. Mr Christensen is a patriotic Dane, and, to judge from his book, an intelligent and well-read observer of contemporary society. What he says about the non-moral "Real-politik" of the Great Powers, and the constant danger which it involves to the independence of the smaller Powers, has been amply justified by the events which immediately followed the publication of his book. His pessimistic account of representative democracy is a sincere criticism of real evils, though it seems to be based rather on the reading of books and newspapers than on actual political experience.

But the book claims to be, not a series of political criticisms, but a demonstration of political principles, founded upon a rigorously scientific psychology; and in that respect it seems to me to fail completely. Mr Christensen's psychology never influences his politics except for the worse, because his psychology itself is so loose that it confuses instead of directing his observation.

His use of the term "suggestion" is crucial for his method. On p. 12 he defines "suggestion" as "the phenomenon which subjects the individual, with no contributory effort of will on his part, to an impression which forces his thought-processes in a definite direction." He divides suggestion into "foreign suggestion" (due to an external stimulus) and "auto-suggestion." Giddiness when standing by a precipice is given as an

instance of auto-suggestion (p. 16). Another instance of auto-suggestion is "disgust at the sight, smell, or touch of certain animals" (p. 16). "Prejudices rest partly on foreign suggestion, partly on auto-suggestion" (p. 16). As the book goes on he apparently uses the word "suggestion" to mean any intellectual or emotional process except the pure reasoning of an imaginary omniscient and passionless individual. "All the movements," he says, "with which history deals, war and peace movements, are operations of suggestion" (p. 46). "The 'Ideal' politician is . . . entangled in the suggestion exercised by the idea of progress" (p. 112). If pacifists and social-democrats argue that war does not pay, Mr Christensen adds: "But these tendencies, which are backed by the suggestion of humane ideas, are confronted by others backed by national suggestion" (p. 162). Of even so rigorous a rationalist as Voltaire we are told that "Voltaire was a striking instance of a suggester . . . several of the mightiest monarchs of the time thought it an honour to correspond with him" (p. 47); while, on the other hand, religious devotion "is a condition of suggestion, especially auto-suggestion" (p. 36). Instinctive reactions like fear or disgust, emotions like affection or admiration, solitary thought accompanied or guided by emotion, the abstract thought which an ignorant man necessarily substitutes for concrete demonstration, all are called "suggestion," which becomes for Mr Christensen a mere vague and general term of contempt.

Mr Christensen's use of the term "crowd" is equally crucial. He defines a crowd as "a group of individuals which, in a given moment, is filled with a common idea or a common desire, and is conscious of this community of thought, will, or action" (p. 11). Parliamentary constituencies are crowds, Parliament itself "constitutes a crowd with all the characteristic features of a crowd" (p. 57). "States are crowds, enormous and very heterogeneous crowds" (p. 77). Crowds may be either "local" or "scattered." Instances of local crowds are "every gathering of chance passers-by in the street, the audience of the pulpit and the stage," etc.; and instances of scattered crowds are "the men who have received suggestion from the same books or the same newspapers . . . most of them without being aware of each other's existence" (pp. 44 and 45). Every human being must belong, in fact, at any given moment, to at least twenty different "crowds," and "the crowd-soul is only the sum of the single souls which make up the crowd" (p. 24). But Mr Christensen adopts, and indeed exaggerates, all the abusive statements made by M. Le Bon as to the "mental life of crowds." "The crowd," he tells us, "is by nature incapable of pursuing an independent train of thought" (p. 21). "The mental life of crowds is . . . very primitive" (p. 26). "The crowd is impervious to logic, acts impulsively, irresponsibly, deflected by all the suggestions which offer themselves on its path, and easily inflamed by enthusiasm or fanaticism" (p. 33). Even the hideously rational theologians of the Inquisition constituted apparently a "crowd" (p. 32).

One remembers Sydney Smith's request to the swearing squire, "Sir,

let us assume that everything and everybody is damned, and proceed with our conversation"; and one is inclined to say to Mr Christensen, "Let us recognise that all human beings are ignorant and excitable, that their consciousness is often 'narrowed' (p. 12), and that they may sometimes excite themselves or each other into a condition of 'Wach-hypnose' (p. 12). Nevertheless, men have to live and act in societies, and it is the business of social psychology to ascertain the conditions under which they are likely to live and act more wisely or less wisely."

Mr Christensen's refusal to recognise that social psychology deals, not with a problem of black and white, but with the various shades of grey produced by the combination of innumerable psychological factors, is, it seems to me, equally misleading in the two instances in which he refuses to call a psychological process "suggestion," or a body of human beings a "crowd." If a philosopher could become king, if an omniscient man absolutely uninfluenced by the feelings or thoughts of his fellow-men could be made a despot, that, Mr Christensen is convinced, would constitute a perfect Government. "As it is always the individual, not the crowd, who creates, absolutism would be the ideal form of State, if it were certain that the ruler always was cleverer, more prudent, and more upright than everybody else in the land; in other words, if the monarch were a god" (p. 171). But this leads us nowhither, since the monarch will necessarily be a man, whose ignorance must be helped out by the special knowledge of his subjects, and his policy guided by their feelings. Mr Christensen's sudden transition from the pure black of the actual world to the pure white of Utopia is still more remarkable when he deals with what he calls "corporations," *i.e.* associations of human beings based on a common economic "interest." "The *corporation*," he says, "is essentially different from the crowd, being a gathering of individuals with common material or intellectual interests" (p. 46), although such a corporation is clearly included in his own definition of a crowd. This dogma leads him to propose a quasi-syndicalist organisation of society, in which each special social function is exercised by the "experts" in that function, and where common interests are controlled by a body of representatives of economic groups. In defending this proposal Mr Christensen uses eighteenth-century terms like "nature" and "reason." "That form of popular representation," he says, "which was based on trade groups would be the most natural and the most rational" (p. 229). "Everywhere, from Hanseatic patricians and University doctors down to draymen, gravediggers, and beggars, natural social groupings are to be found" (p. 230). "The corporation . . . is a natural grouping in contradistinction to the party, which is an artificial association" (p. 247).

The problem how far economic or other functional groups can be made a basis of government, in substitution for or in addition to local constituencies, is one of the most interesting of those which social-psychology must examine. But it is certainly not solved by saying that a constituency is a crowd and unnatural, and a professional organisation is not a crowd and

natural. During the last thirty years I have had about equal experience of propagandist committees, local political associations, and local representative bodies (all of which Mr Christensen would call unnatural crowds), and of professional organisations like the National Union of Teachers or the Academic Council of London University (which he would call natural groups). Both types have their virtues and defects, and both are probably required in a good social organisation. But both are composed of human beings, and are subject to the passions and limitations of human beings. Both may be improved by that delicate process of analysis and invention which it is the business of social psychology to render possible; and no thinker, even if he be so industrious and well-meaning as Mr Christensen, will assist that process if he confines his analysis to the application of vague terms of contempt like "crowd" and "suggestion" to the one type of organisation, and vague terms of commendation like "natural" or "rational" to the other.

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A Book of Devotional Readings from the Literature of Christendom.—Edited by Rev. J. M. Connell.—London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913.

THE worth of such a book as this can best be proved by habitual use, and this may justify what must otherwise appear a somewhat belated notice. The book is offered not for private devotional reading alone, or family use, but distinctly for public worship in the Church, as a supplement to the Bible, where an extended lectionary is desired; and by its fitness for this purpose it is to be judged. There is no suggestion of offering something better than the Bible, but simply of extending the field from which "scripture inspired of God" may be gathered, for the enrichment of public worship. While the Bible remains the book of books for all Christians, as the editor says, "both for its own supreme merits, and for the consecration which the piety of the ages has given to it," there are strong reasons for turning also for lessons to the literature of subsequent Christian centuries. For so the larger conception of Divine inspiration is vindicated in the practice of the Church; and while the supreme worth of the Bible comes out the more clearly in such an extended field of choice, the great wealth of teaching and of inspiration is not neglected, which demonstrates the living power of religion in each succeeding generation. It is good thus to realise in the act of worship this greater communion and fellowship of the Spirit, and it is as an earnest attempt in this direction that Mr Connell's book is to be specially welcomed.

The selections are arranged chronologically, and with a wide catholicity of choice. The authors (some of them unknown) belonging to the first ten centuries number 24 out of the total of 115, among whom seventeenth and nineteenth century men are the most numerous. The company as a whole

ranges from the scribe of *The New Sayings of Jesus* and the unknown authors of *The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* to Matthew Arnold and Tolstoy. Most of the selections are in prose, and the poets might well furnish a companion volume, though here already there are a few examples, such as Wordsworth's "Ode to Duty," the central verses of Browning's "Abt Vogler," and two passages from Dante. An instance of the living touch, for the enrichment of our lectionary, may be found in the fact that the book appeared in time for the lines from Tennyson's "Ulysses" to be read as a lesson on the Sunday after the news had been received of the disaster to Captain Scott's Antarctic expedition. Of the 210 selections in the volume not all are equally serviceable as lessons. For such a purpose there should be in each passage a certain unity of spiritual impression and impulse, and adequacy of form in its presentment. Obscurity either in thought or expression is fatal; and while historical interest in the record of the centuries is not to be ignored, that in itself can hardly lift a reading to the level that fits it for a place in the service of devotion. On the other hand, in such a passage as the letter of John Hus to the Bohemian nation there is added to the personal and historical interest the direct appeal of living religion in heroic form, which adds just the touch required. With this, we note the passage from Mazzini on "The Victory of Truth."

Among the most helpful lessons on the inwardness of the religious life and true spiritual worship are passages from the *Imitatio*, from Dr John Smith the Cambridge Platonist, Robert Barclay, William Law, and John Woolman; and on the practical side the passage on "The Way of Life" from *The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*, the well-known chapters from the *Imitatio* on "Bearing with the defects of others" and "A good peaceable man," Francis de Sales on "Cherishing the small virtues," Fénelon "On the faults of others," Lamennais on "Love," and John Caird on "Religion the art of being and doing good." Such lessons as these are surely justified when compared with chapters from the Book of Proverbs and other Wisdom literature, and admirably continue the teaching of the Gospels. Of parables there are Latimer's "St Anthony and the Cobbler" and Jeremy Taylor's "Abraham and the Stranger," while to the wealth of Psalms are added St Francis of Assisi's "Canticle of the Sun" and a passage from Rowland Williams. One of the noblest of the lessons is from Carlyle, on the Dignity of Labour, manual and spiritual.

The book is, of course, only one essay in a great field. It is a challenge, salutary and full of hope for the vitalising of public worship. It will surely lead many others to further search and testing of this great wealth of material which the Christian centuries offer, both for private and for public use.

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The Natural Theology of Evolution.—By J. N. Shearman.—London: Allen & Unwin, 1915.—Pp. xvi+288.

Mr Shearman in this volume undertakes to restate Paley's argument, which proceeds from the order which we find in nature, to the existence of a divine intelligence which has designed and still controls the order of nature. In this restatement he accepts Paley's illustration of the watch as convincing within the limits laid down for Paley by the scientific knowledge of 1800. But Mr Shearman goes further, and maintains that the theory of evolution, so far from rendering the argument from design less credible, actually adds to the force of the argument.

We are first referred to common sense (p. 61): "There are certain primary or fundamental beliefs which are involved in all our life or action, and which cling to our minds in such a way that they can never be got rid of." And among these beliefs we are expected to find the belief in "the presence of foresight and design" in the ordering of the world (p. 74). Next we are offered a philosophical argument which is intended to satisfy the few who push their speculations beyond the regions in which common sense moves. We perform an experiment in order to receive light upon the meaning of "necessity," "chance," and "order." We are to throw a collection of letters, such as are used for spelling games, upon a smooth level surface such as that of a dining-table, and to observe how far the letters group themselves into anything like order or meaning (p. 103). The author certainly deserves the credit of putting the successive stages of his thought in a vivid light, and gains from his illustration a real help towards the solution of his problem. In the third part, the argument that the order of nature is complex beyond any possibility of an origin from chance, is applied to a series of particular instances of adaptation such as the fertilisation of orchids, the structure of the human eye in relation to its functions, and so on. The book concludes by considering some objections to the argument: I presume we are to understand by "argument" the process by which the mind moves from the observation of order to the affirmation of an intelligent designer (p. 267).

It would have been better, I think, if the author had regarded his work as an introduction—for it is scarcely more—to a very complex subject. As an introduction the book is deserving of commendation, especially to those persons who feel impelled to go beyond the attitude of common sense and examine for themselves what is involved in that attitude. But for an amateur who is not acquainted with the resources of contemporary logic a little assistance is certainly necessary. I do not know whether the common sense or the philosophy of Mr Shearman is to blame or to be praised for the contradictions in which he occasionally indulges. If matter is inert (p. 90), what is meant by material force (p. 91)? If "the mere fact of evolution has no influence on the argument" (p. 35), it is difficult to see how from any point of view "the modern discovery of

Evolution is a very happy addition to the resources of the argument" (p. 270). I have mentioned these two points not, indeed, to suggest that Mr Shearman's book is carelessly written, but in order to show once more that statements must always be judged by their context; in other words, that in logic form cannot be separated from matter. Hence the oneness of logic or of reason (p. 279) cannot mean that we proceed in the same way on every occasion. For this I appeal to Mr Shearman himself. If reason is one, how far may we distinguish between the common sense which is the hero of the first part, and the abstract thought of the second part which plays the villain in arid places (p. 89)? At any rate, we can take for granted a difference between these two modes of apprehending the world. And we may also admit that they severally help towards the total result. But how is it that we are not informed more fully by Mr Shearman about the attitude of reason which is appropriate to the facts of evolution? What is the "very happy addition to the resources of our argument" which evolution affords (p. 270)? In passing, we may note that Bergson's theory of intuition is too lightly dismissed as at variance with the presumed oneness of reason (p. 256).

For my own satisfaction I will dwell for an instant upon one or two topics which are almost ignored by Mr Shearman, and yet they offer fruitful suggestions. Paley was obliged to attribute the order and design which we can especially trace in biology to the one creative moment in which life began (p. 271). But what process of thought is involved when we are instructed rather to contemplate the continuous development of living creatures from one moment to another? In the first place, the problem of time demands attention. But in order to put the right emphasis on time, it is not necessary to identify life with duration. There is an alternative principle which has found expression often enough in the past, but yet awaits application to the problems of the present. To Descartes this principle appeared in the form that each moment involved a new creation. In other words, the continuous existence of anything is not guaranteed merely by its past. Or, to put the same thought in another form, when a moment of time is gone by, whatever existed in that moment is annihilated except in so far as it is represented in the living present. There is no bridge other than the present which connects the past with the future. Now the things of the present are either ostensible or immanent. Hence the things of the past which are not represented in the ostensible present must, in order to survive at all, be represented in the immanent present. And this explanation may suffice to account for the reappearance of what ostensibly belongs only to the dead past. It follows that the future which may follow from the present is more real than a past which cannot recur. Hence it is doubtful whether the conception of a creative moment is really permissible (p. 271). In order to assure the reader who may fear that the ideas just expressed are excluded from the region of common sense, I may refer to Longfellow's *Psalm of Life*, where he will find somewhat similar ideas expressed. For the more abstract

thinker who shrinks from playing the part of the philosophic villain, there is a consolation in the precedent afforded by St Paul. Since eschatology is the counterpart of an ordered evolution, the eschatological thought of St Paul sheds a considerable light precisely in this field.

Let us therefore translate the term design, which Mr Shearman uses to cover a wide range of meaning: we must disentangle the intellectual implications of design from the energy which is required to produce the transformations foreshadowed. We may therefore regard design as a forward-looking intuition which works itself out from a past which it discards to a future which it seeks. To take an illustration, the various parts of the spike of the cuckoo-pint are probably a co-operative society working with dim consciousness towards an end (p. 133). Mr Shearman, with a refinement somewhat excessive, is moved to apology when he compares God to a workman (p. 193). But I find something else even in Mr Shearman's survey which is redolent of the craftsman. The clever workman employs many *small* artifices to ensure the success of his work. In the same way, the development of natural species is apparently brought about by the successive accumulation of minute changes. There is nothing in the course of nature, so far as it is known, to confirm the idea of creation as the immediate and simultaneous carrying out of a huge design. This fact should qualify our anticipations of the course of the divine providence. Human plans seek to determine the future in bulk, and they are disappointed. Such, however, does not seem to be the working of the divine mind. It has moved slowly towards purposes which apparently developed and were rendered more complex in the process of their realisation.

Hence, alongside with the realisation of the divine purpose, there is found much which suggests failure. Forms of life reach a high level of complexity and then pass away like the mammoth. In those types which survive there is not always complete adjustment of the organism to the end proposed. The superfluous muscles of the ear in man form but one out of many examples. Our survey has taught us, however, to be more patient than Mr Shearman. There is no need, if we remember the extreme slowness with which God in nature moves towards the future, to regard anything which falls short of perfection as of necessity contradicting the divine will. Let us rather dwell upon what is undoubtedly excellent as the pledge of better things to come. Hence I must consider it an unfortunate expedient when Mr Shearman has recourse to the theory of angels in order to exculpate God, because some men do not see in nature the marks of perfect goodness and benevolence which they would expect to find (p. 280).

What I have said is by way of friendly criticism. For the book is eminently suited to help towards clearer thinking upon religion the public to which it is specially offered.

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THE

HIBBERT JOURNAL

ON SOME MORAL ASPECTS AND ISSUES OF THE PRESENT WAR.[1]

COUNT GOBLET D'ALVIELLA,
Ministre d'État.

I.

I SHOULD be going over beaten ground and breaking an open door if I tried to show where, in the present battle of nations, lies the just cause. Facts and documents speak enough to remove, even amongst neutrals, any genuine doubt, if there was any such at the outset. What I will point out is that this is no ordinary war. Most of the wars our generations have witnessed were waged to conquer or to retain territorities, to acquire new markets or to remove some competition, to foster or to crush national aspirations. The aim of the present war is to settle whether one Power is, or is not, to realise the often conceived but always disappointed dream of controlling the world. Nay, more: what is at stake is the choice between two ideals of life and humanity. In one word, it is a struggle between Civilisation and Culture, this last term being taken in the German sense.

Civilisation may be defined as the whole of ideas, institutions, and arts which concur in securing to men the greatest amount of enlightenment, happiness, liberty, and morality. Culture is the scientific organisation of all the national forces

[1] Written in English by Count Goblet d'Alviella.

with a view to increasing the power of the State. Civilisation is cosmopolitan and pacific, only using force to enforce the right. Culture is national and particularist, resting on force and growing by war. Civilisation is the common property of mankind, open to all men in proportion to their respective aptitudes. Culture varies with each race or country, and its most powerful forms tend to absorb the others, in accordance with the example given by nature in the universal struggle for life.

The Germans themselves have perceived this opposition. Professor Lasson, in his essay *Das Kultur Ideal und der Krieg*, writes (p. 79): "Civilisation leads to concord, but Civilisation is not Culture. Between different forms of Culture there can be only hatred and struggle. . . . To ask for a pacific development of Culture is to ask for the impossible, to reverse the order of nature, to put a false idol in the place of real morality." Another writer, Thomas Mann, who defines Culture as "a spiritual organisation of force," after asserting that it is above morals, reason, and science, adds that "it will destroy civilisation." What a hope and what a confession!

This is not a mere quarrel of words. To-day the defenders of Civilisation fight for right, which they proclaim independent of and superior to might; the German Culturists fight for *their* right, which they pretend to base on *their* force. The Allies fight for the liberty of Europe, for the right of the nations to dispose of their own destinies, to warm themselves at the sun of general Civilisation; the Germans for the enslaving or the destruction of anything or anybody who opposes the spread of their own Culture. The Allies fight for a lasting peace, based on respect for treaties and on the maintenance of international law; the Germans for war itself, which they proclaim the supreme law of nature and the best instrument of progress. "You must love war more than peace, and a long war better than a short one." Thus spake Zarathustra, or rather Nietzsche. They should both be satisfied to-day.

Here we have two orders of conceptions in absolute contra-

diction to each other. Much more than the extraordinary number of fighters on the field or the striking novelties in the art of killing, it is this shock of two ideals which imparts to the present war, on both sides, an exceptional character, a special importance, a kind of grandeur and mysticism such as Europe has not witnessed since the wars of religion, perhaps since the Crusades, when soldiers were conscious of fighting for something higher than material or even national interests. Thus is explained why, inside each of the belligerent States, the political, religious, and social differences went down so quickly before the common purpose, and why everywhere the people accepted with so little complaint their sacrifices and losses. But it also shows that a premature peace is impossible, and that even any suggestion of such an issue, if it should come from outside, would be regarded as an insult, and, if from inside, as treason.

Behind every ideal, especially in Germany, stands a certain metaphysic. I need not explain, after so many others, how the present temper of the German race is an outcome of the philosophical evolution from Fichte to Nietzsche, passing through Hegel. German transcendentalism, which was running high during the first part of last century, lost a good deal of ground when the positive methods arose, but the mind of Germany has shown once more its ability to absorb, from every current of thought, anything that helps its pretension to the upper place in the world. From Darwinism it borrowed the law of the survival of the fittest, taking as a criterion of fitness only the manifestations of material force. From the philosophy of evolution, which Herbert Spencer carried to the vindication of extreme individualism, it drew the necessity of the natural laws which bring more and more co-ordination into social organisms. From materialism and some agnostic schools it took its denial of duty, except towards the laws enacted by the State for its own preservation. Lastly, from Nietzsche it adopted the doctrine that the aim of life is neither happiness nor morality, not even rest, but domination obtained

by struggle and maintained by force. All this, blended together with older inspirations, has blossomed into the creed of Pan-Germanism which has found in Treitschke its most thorough and influential exponent.

It is obvious that in this creed there is only one Culture worthy of the name, the German *Kultur*. Fichte already taught that there is only one real nation, Germany, and that she is to other people what the non-Ego is to the Ego. Professor Schönerer writes: "We are not only men: we are more than men, because we are Germans." Nobody smiled in Germany when, in 1905, the Kaiser said at Bremen in a public oration: "We are the salt of the earth. God has called upon us to civilise the world. We are the missionaries of Progress." They have shown it well!

Under these conditions it is easy to understand that every attempt to frustrate or even to oppose German Culture is regarded as a sin, an impious revolt which requires to be suppressed with a strong hand. A professor of Berlin University, Dr Köhler, wrote in a recent pamphlet, *Noth kennt keine Geboth* ("Necessity knows no Law"): "Every fault meets with its punishment on earth. The faults committed by States are vindicated in this world. A heavy responsibility falls on the shoulders of the Belgian statesmen. There is only for them one excuse: they did not know the grand, the unique, the noble Germany." I am afraid that now we know her only too well! A Major Bister von Stranz, describing his personal experiences in a book entitled *Die Eroberung Belgiens*, does not hesitate to address the Belgian people in this way: "And now you, presumptuous little people, you pretend to stop us—you, to whom we had promised peace and protection, provided you did not stop us in our great work. And now you make common cause with our enemies. It is as if you attacked a priest carrying the Holy of Holies. We are consecrated by the grandeur of our destinies!" When lately the *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* told its readers of the capture and destruction

of Belgrade, it added: "The punishment of God has passed over Belgrade." This is exactly the language held thousands of years ago by the Assyrian kings when they had sacked and destroyed, in the name of their Lord Assur, the neighbouring cities which had been sacrilegious enough to resist their armies.

II.

For more than half a century we have seen amongst the Germans history, anthropology, philology, sociology going hand in hand with philosophy to justify and to spread this worship of Kultur. All branches of science and art have joined in. Literature has taken for watchword *Deutschland über alles.* I know no more disgraceful document than the paper signed about a year ago by ninety-three professors, scientists, artists, and men of letters, who give themselves out, and not without grounds, as the best representatives of German Culture. We all have known some of these men. We have often met them, in Oxford for example, in international congresses of all kinds. We used to listen to them, to admire and to follow them, for the value of their methods, the deepness of their knowledge, the extent of what we thought their scientific probity: a Harnack, a Wundt, a Haeckel, a Lamprecht, a Deissmann, a von Gebhardt, and so many others. What faith can we have in them henceforwards, after having seen them shutting their eyes to the clearest evidence and ready to swallow the plainest distortions of facts, in order to conclude by an open apology of Prussian militarism?

The Kaiser has even found the way of turning the Christian religion—Christianism of all religions!—into a servant and ally of Cæsarism. At first it seems as if religion, at least in its established forms, had very little to do with this war. There are Protestants, Catholics, Orthodox, Jews, Mahomedans fighting on each side, and everyone of them feels more in sympathy with his companions in the trenches, whatever

creed they profess, than with his own co-religionists standing under the opposite flag. But, besides bringing back many minds to the thought of the beyond and to the fold of the Churches, as is often the case in the great crises where death, mourning, and misery are always rampant, the war has revived, at least on the German side, a type of worship which we deemed utterly extinct amongst civilised communities since the rise of universalist religions. I mean national religion, which, in the religious evolution, represents a form intermediate between the tribal or municipal and the world religions. The fact is frankly admitted in Germany. A theologian from the University of Berlin, Professor Leissmann, admits recently in a pamphlet, *Der Krieg und die Religion*, that "to consider the national religions as inferior is a mistake well shown by the present war." In a lecture delivered at Berlin during March last, Dr Max Lenz acknowledges that God Himself has become "nationalised." The well-known historian, Carl Lamprecht, proclaims: "Who will deny that there is even now a Christian German God, and that sometimes He reveals Himself to strangers as a strong and jealous God?"

Let us hear the Kaiser himself. In a speech delivered in August 1907, he said to his people: "I believe that, in order to unite all our citizens, all our classes, there is only one way, that is religion; not religion understood in the narrow sense, ecclesiastic and dogmatic, but in a larger sense, more practical, more in relation with life." The idea is fine and lofty. But one has not to go very deep to find out that if the Kaiser carries all religions in his heart, including of course Islamism, it is only so far as they consent to serve his political ends. One of his favourite chaplains, the well-known Dr Stocker, soon learned at his own expense what it costs to go, in the way of Christian socialism, further than his imperial master wished. The God Wilhelm II. worships and invokes is not the Christian God, the just and merciful Father. It is a "*von Gott*," according to a witty French Catholic; in reality, a personified symbol of German Kultur and nothing else.

The false position in which the official Protestantism of Germany has thus placed itself is significantly illustrated by a correspondence exchanged in the first days of the war between a French Protestant minister of Nîmes, Hr Babut, and Dr Dryander, first Preacher at the Court of Berlin. On 4th August 1914 the former sent to his German colleague a letter proposing that together they should draw up a declaration, to be submitted for signature to Christians in Germany, France, England, Belgium, Russia, and Serbia—in fact, "to all those who had been baptised in the name of Jesus Christ." They were to affirm that, while they intended to remain faithful to their feelings and duties, each towards his own country, they at the same time should remember that Jesus Christ is the Saviour of all, and that He commanded all men to love each other like children of the same father. Consequently they should promise to expel from their hearts "all hatred against those they were obliged to call momentarily their enemies; also to use their influence in order that the war may be conducted with all possible humanity; that the winner should not abuse his strength, that the persons and the rights of the vanquished should be preserved."

Dr Dryander took five weeks to answer, and then, in the name of several of his colleagues, he absolutely rejected the proposal, "because," he said, "there must not be the slightest appearance that any suggestion or effort is wanted in Germany to have the war conducted according to the needs of mercy and humanity." Then he went on: "For the whole of our people as well as for our military Head Staff, it is self-evident that the war ought to be pursued only between soldiers, while sparing carefully the defenceless and the weak, attending the wounded and the sick without discrimination." And he dared to add: "*We are convinced, with full knowledge of the case, that on our side the fighting goes on with a self-restraint, a conscientiousness, and a kindness of which history so far affords few examples.*" This was written on the 15th of September, when the whole world was ringing with the atrocities com-

mitted at Visé, Aerschot, Louvain, Andenne, Dinant, and a dozen other places!

Have the Roman Catholics of Germany a better record? There is no injustice, no exaction, no cruelty over which their leaders in Parliament and outside have not thrown the mantle of their imperial loyalism. Not a word have they uttered against the invasion of Belgium, not a word against the execution of innocent priests, as denounced by Cardinal Mercier, not a word against the wanton destruction of the University of Louvain and the Cathedral of Rheims. When one of their former friends, the Catholic leader in the small Parliament of Luxembourg, Hr Prum, tried to open their eyes, their only answer was to have him prosecuted for libel and imprisoned by German authorities. Just as the Social Democratic party has become the Emperor's socialists, so they have deserved to be called the Catholics of the Kaiser.

III.

This convergence of all moral and material forces towards a national aim is undoubtedly a source of strength. But it is also a cause of weakness, when it proceeds from an infatuation which refuses to take facts into account. The Germans have absorbed themselves in the contemplation and worship of their own soul to such a degree that they have become incapable of understanding the soul of their neighbours, nay, the soul of humanity. For instance, look at their mistake in resorting to war at a time when they were already conquering the world by a natural expansion and slow infiltration. Within the last forty years they had passed from forty million souls to about sixty-five millions; an increase coincident with their transformation from an essentially agricultural into an industrial nation. In the commercial scale they had attained the second rank amongst the people of the world. Their capital invested abroad, mostly in enterprises due to their initiative and placed under their control, amounted to untold millions. Their goods, made in Germany, flooded all the markets of the globe.

Their ships crowded every sea. Their clerks, bankers, engineers, and what not, pushing and helping each other, were everywhere displacing the representatives of the local industrial and commercial classes. There is perhaps no example in history of a nation having made such strides in wealth and influence during so short a period of time. Now all this gain has been set at naught by their premature rush for political domination. Even if they should win, they would have to bear for many years the burden of their losses in men and money. Defeated or even simply frustrated in their calculations, they will forcibly lose everything they had gained abroad and suffer mortal damage for several generations in the very sources of their prosperity.

Their judgment has been especially misled when they flattered themselves in turn that Russia might be frightened into letting them crush Serbia; that France would not dare to come to the rescue of her Russian allies; that Belgium would prefer her security to her honour; that England would never go to war for "a scrap of paper"; that Italy would be induced by a petty territorial concession to join hands with them or at least to remain neutral. Then they believed that, outside of Germany, everybody and everything were to be bought, even public opinion. Who will ever know the many millions they have spent among neutrals to buy over a motley host of journalists and politicians, besides flooding the world with mendacious pamphlets soon reduced to their real value? Misled by the reports of their agents and their spies, who simply echoed their own illusions, they imagined they were going to find everywhere houses divided against themselves, on the verge of civil war, and therefore an easy prey. They had overlooked that while amongst themselves they expected all political differences to be merged into the national upheaval, the same phenomenon might take place amongst each of their foes; as indeed it did.

Yet their greatest and most damnable mistake was the persuasion that by terrorising the inoffensive part of the population they would more easily bring their enemies to

terms. "When a national war arises," writes General von Hartmann, "terrorism becomes from a military point of view a necessary principle."[1] He adds: "It is half measures and kindness which are cruelties, because they lose sight of the purpose of the war and postpone the conclusion of the peace." A manual published in 1902 by the Prussian Military Staff for the instruction of officers, under the title *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*, warns them against the temptation to transform the laws of war "in a sense which is in absolute contradiction with the end of war, although it found favour in the Convention of Geneva and in the Conferences of Brussels and The Hague." Everybody remembers the strange speech of the Kaiser to his troops starting for China: "Behave like Huns and Vandals." The advice was to be followed in other countries. One may well imagine what becomes of such instructions when they are carried out by drunken soldiers and bloodthirsty officers. I will not dwell on the awful page of the atrocities committed by the Germans against the civil population in Belgium and in France. I will only add that the responsibility of these crimes falls not only on those who executed them, but equally on those who ordered them or justified them in advance. And what has been the result? If there is a lesson to draw from these infamous schemes, it is that finally they turn against their authors. The sacking of open towns has not hastened for a day the fall of a fortress. The murder of innocent people has not prevented one soldier, one official, one priest from doing his duty. The wanton destruction of Louvain, of Ypres, of Rheims has not brought the Allies any nearer to the opening of negotiations for peace. The cowardly use of hostages as living shields, unknown in preceding wars, has not prevented an assault, nor paralysed a resistance. Each murderous excursion of the Zeppelins against British towns has simply acted as one of the best recruiting agencies. The piratical feats of the submarines,

[1] "Militarische Nothwendigkeit und Humanitaet," in the *Deutsche Rundschau*, 1878–1879, vol. xiii, pp. 459–462.

culminating in the destruction of the *Lusitania*, have frightened away neither passengers nor goods from the seas held by the English and the French. In fact, by all their abominations they have only succeeded in making war more desperate and peace more difficult; they have closed against themselves for generations countries which otherwise might perhaps have forgotten the blood shed on the battlefields; they have lost the sympathies they had kept amongst neutrals, and they have irretrievably disgraced themselves before impartial history. A French statesman once said that in politics faults were worse than crimes. Here we have both, and, I am glad to add for the honour of mankind, with a negative result.

IV.

The end must come sooner or later, perhaps sooner than we expect. There are only three issues possible. One is the complete overthrow of the Allies. I leave it out, because, taking all facts into consideration, I deem that, in spite of the Turks and the Bulgarians, it is absolutely impossible. The Germans pretend that a decisive victory of theirs would mean perpetual peace, for the good reason that nobody would dare to oppose them any more. They would give us a *Pax Germanica*, something like the *Pax Romana* so much praised in the far past. But it is just the kind of peace Europe does not want, because it would be peace in servitude.

Another hypothesis is the conclusion of a half-hearted peace, a lame peace as the French say, more or less on the basis of *statu quo ante bellum*. This would be no solution at all, but simply a respite, an insecure truce, and the whole thing would begin again, the same way, perhaps in a very few years. No doubt Germany will try to come to terms, as soon as she realises that the ground is giving way under her feet. We shall see her, at that moment, resorting to the same methods in the interest of peace—her peace, of course—which she has tried in the interest of her war. She will have her

agents endeavouring to convince the neutrals that the war has become a deadlock, and that their interests are endangered by a prolongation of the struggle. She will apply, in the name of religion and humanity, to those shortsighted people who, in every country, are always willing to welcome peace, provided it calls itself peace. She will attempt to push forward on one hand the head of the Roman Catholic Church, who offered to join in whenever a neutral should offer its mediation; on the other hand her own Socialists, always ready to play the rôle of those domesticated elephants which are sent amongst the wild herds of their kind in order to induce these to enter the corral where slavery is awaiting them.

Now, let every sincere mind, even amongst neutrals and pacifists, consider that, in such case, Germany, robbed of her expectations but not cured of her ambitions, anxious above everything to get her revenge, will at once throw herself into the preparations for another war. Whereupon our own people, taught by experience, an experience dearly paid for, will have to follow in order to outwit her before the crash, and therefore the whole of Europe will sink more and more under such a burden of armaments that we shall have to sigh for another war to decide once for all whether the world is to remain free or to become the slave of Germany. Is that the peace neutrals want? As to the pacifists, can they not see that those who recommend such peace fight against their own colours and betray their own cause?

There remains only one issue: the surrender of Germany, the full acceptance of the conditions drawn by the Allies. It is not for me to foresee or even to suggest what these conditions may be. What I can say is that the peace I conceive must be a settlement worthy of the great cause for which we are fighting. It must be a just peace, a lasting peace, a preventive peace, and perhaps a step to something higher still.

A just peace must include, firstly, *reparation*. The assertions of the most prominent English statesmen and the general

agreement of the other Powers warrant the belief that Germany will have to pay for all damage she has inflicted; at least those that can be paid for, for there are many losses which are beyond estimation. Yet, to have a just peace, something more is required: punishment. Germany will have to suffer the penalty for her misdeeds and worse than misdeeds. Of course, one cannot pronounce capital punishment against a nation of fifty million souls, even for perjury, plunder, murder, and arson. But take a map of Europe: leaving out Turkey and Bulgaria, which may be dealt with separately, we see that the two central empires rule over twelve or thirteen provinces inhabited by populations foreign to the German race which have been engulfed by force after the destruction of their independence or at the expense of neighbouring states. Everyone of them Germany and Austria will have to disgorge, in order to let these victims of German greed follow their ethnical or traditional inclinations.

This done, and whatever fate is in store for German colonies, I for one do not think that we ought to go further. Of course, it would be good policy to encourage any spontaneous revolt in the south of Germany against the pressure of Prussian militarism, but there is one thing we must not and cannot take away from the German race: that is, Germany itself. Besides, I should pity the State which imagines that it is going to increase its power or its prosperity by swallowing a morsel of German population, thus fixing in its own side a permanent focus of hatred and disorder. Let us rather remain faithful to the modern principle which must preside over this remodelling of Central Europe: the rights of nationality, which means simply the right of the people to dispose of themselves. Here I foresee an objection. The Germans are a sturdy, patient, laborious, and tenacious people. Let them alone, they will in a few years regain their former strength, and then we will have to reckon with them again, especially if the Allies of to-day are no more united between themselves. Germany will not be slow to seize the occasion. I will answer that a defeated

and reduced Germany, after the losses she sustained, having to pay and not to receive an enormous indemnity of war, is not likely to resume her warlike abilities for many years to come, and the question is, whether war will still be possible? The answer is with us.

V.

I do not wish to make excursions in the land of Utopia. Let us avoid the big words of Perpetual Peace or even of the United States of Europe. Yet what should prevent the Allies, after they have settled with Germany and her accomplices, to sign between themselves an agreement to take arms against any nation, even if it were one of themselves, which should refuse to submit its international claims to a Court of Arbitration, or which should decline to carry out the sentence, after having accepted the jurisdiction?

There is a precedent: the Holy Alliance of a hundred years ago amongst the Continental Powers, after the fall of the first Napoleon. This Alliance, holy or not, was not a success. It aimed at maintaining not only the possessions, but also the governments of the different States; in fact, it was an insurance society of the kings against their people as well as against their neighbours, and it took no account of national aspirations which were going to alter the face of Europe. The principal representative of liberal ideas in those days, England, kept aloof, and she was right. Its only application was the mission entrusted in 1823 to the French Government of the Restoration, in order to suppress the Spanish insurrection against Ferdinando VII. The revolutions of Greece and of Belgium gave it the last blow, and nobody spoke of it any more. What we need is a Holy Alliance of the peoples, not against their kings, but against any disturber of the peace in Europe. And this will be so much easier that, if the redistribution of lands to follow this war is to be carried out so as to satisfy the claims of nationalities, nearly all the irritating questions, even nearly all the possible causes of

war, will have disappeared from our political horizon.[1] The neutrals themselves, who have felt to a large degree the curse of this war, and who would dread above all to be some day implicated in a similar cataclysm, will be only too glad to join an alliance of this sort. It is with them that the idea of general arbitration mostly finds favour. Would they not accept with joy and alacrity a scheme to lay down in international society the juridical principle which has brought peace and made progress possible in the relations of individuals?

We have been told lately more than once that the humanitarian reforms in the practice of war, on which all civilised nations had agreed during the last fifty years, have become valueless, since there is not one of these conventions that has not been disregarded or openly transgressed by the Germans. Can we even speak any more of international law, when its very existence is denied both theoretically and practically by a nation which refuses openly to be bound by treaties, whenever she thinks it her interest to do so? All this may become true, should the Germans have the last word. Then their views about right and might, about laws of war and treaties of peace, might of course become a new rule or at least a new guide for the relation between Powers to be. But, if they lose the game, there is no doubt that the movement for a code of international law and for the establishment of general arbitration will make a new start; just because the people will be under a near impression of this long, awful, and exhausting war. But let us have no illusion. All the progress, all the reforms, all the conventions in that line, even the opening and working of courts of arbitration, run a risk of becoming mere "scraps

[1] Since this was written I have become acquainted with a remarkable essay on *The National Principle and the War*, published by Mr Ramsay Muir amongst the Oxford pamphlets on the war (Oxford University Press, tract No. 19). The author, who shows himself thoroughly versed in the ethnography and history of modern Europe, clearly points out how the continent can be reconstructed on rational lines by following the claims of nationality, and why this would be a guarantee for future peace. Passing over some minor difficulties, which arise from the actual conditions in the Balkans, I can say that I agree with every word he says.

of paper" so long as there does not stand behind them a power of some kind to enforce their decrees. So long as men are not angels—and they are still far from it, although perhaps a little nearer than their primeval ancestors—force may have to be used in order that right may prevail, and the best we can do is to place force at the disposal of right.

Professor Oswald has written: "What does Germany want?" And he answers to himself: "She wants to organise Europe, which is so far unorganised." This contains a truth and a mistake. The truth is that Europe is still unorganised; the mistake, that she needs Germany for the task. All those who feel some interest in the establishment of an international order, statesmen, philanthropists, sociologists, especially every woman, sister or mother—whose eternal feeling was described by the Latin author when he denounced *bella matribus detestata*—must realise that this problem of problems will never be solved by sentimental declamations of good souls, by the denunciations of the Churches, by the pressure of public opinion, nor even by the intervention of some big Power. The only hope is a gradual grouping of nations, large and small, which would be willing, while respecting each other's real autonomy, to make the sacrifices needed for the working of some form of international justice. The winners in the present war will come out of the furnace deeply scorched—like those mediæval knights who were paying with the blood of their many wounds for their victory over the wicked dragon. Whatever may be the indemnities of war extracted from our enemies, everybody's fortune will be hard hit, taxation will be increased in an enormous proportion, hundreds of thousands of families will feel the loss of their dear ones, hundreds of thousands of maimed soldiers will recall in the streets the horrors of the battle. What will the leaders of the victorious nations have to offer to their people, besides victory itself, in exchange for their sacrifices and their sufferings? Let them at least attempt to earn the

gratitude of the next generations by taking a decisive step towards a reform which will lift our society on to a higher plane. Never will they find such an occasion again.

An old proverb, which we had too much forgotten, tells: *Si vis pacem, para bellum.* It should be quite as true to say: *Si vis pacem, para pacem*; and this is my excuse, if someone should find my utterances somewhat premature. The essential aim of war, in spite of what the present scholars may say in Germany, is not war itself; it is not even victory: it is peace, a lasting peace, the peace we want, if we are to save our civilisation from a fatal arrest of development. Now, there are some hopeful signs. A community of people does not pass through a fiery ordeal like the present without leaving behind many things which were impeding its progress and without acquiring new things which will help its ascent towards a better state.

War itself has some compensation for its evils. It certainly brings into prominence certain qualities, courage, endurance, discipline, the feeling of solidarity, the consciousness of the serious side of life—above all, the spirit of sacrifice without which there can be done nothing grand nor durable. But these virtues are equally needed during peace to build up character and to improve institutions. Who has not been struck by the ease with which have been given up, since the war begun, some features of our overheated civilisation which were deemed lately a necessity of refined life and were often denounced by the Germans as a symptom of our decline, although they had the same, perhaps in a grosser form; for instance, certain exaggerations in the luxuries of the table, in the dress of women, in the number of servants, the excesses in alcoholic drinks, the tyranny of fashion, the mania for change, the taste for speculation, the tendency to curtail labour in all classes, and many other items? May these riddances remain as a legacy of war time to peace time!

I dimly perceive, through the smoke of the battlefields, the laborious childbirth of a society distinguished by more

simplicity in taste, more solidarity between the classes, more moderation in political differences, more toleration in religious questions, more faith in a common ideal; where everyone will better understand that scientific progress is not enough, unless it goes on a par with moral progress; where, finally, the rights of weaker nations and the conquests of human genius will not remain at the mercy of a brutal conqueror. Perhaps all this is a dream. But now and then it is good to dream in the midst of harsh realities; and, besides, there are some dreams which become realised, provided those who attend to them can find the necessary force—not the brutal force dear to the German Culturists, but the moral force that moves mountains, the force of the will.

GOBLET D'ALVIELLA.

PALAIS DES MINISTÈRES, HAVRE.

THE "FIGHT FOR RIGHT" MOVEMENT.[1]

SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, BART.

THE purpose of the "Fight for Right" movement is to encourage our fellow-countrymen, as well non-combatant as combatant, to use their utmost endeavour, in the several ways open to them, towards the end of attaining decisive victory as the only sure means of honourable and lasting peace; to maintain in them the spirit of bold confidence in a righteous cause, without which full success is not possible; and to make plain to them the unexampled character of this war, being a war not merely for British interest but for the freedom of the civilised world, as a reason for the most strenuous effort and for ungrudging sacrifice.

This movement began, almost by accident, in thoughts which occurred to Sir Francis Younghusband, in the summer vacation, at a patriotic meeting in South Wales. He entered into communication with several persons whom he thought likely to be helpful; informal conferences were held during some weeks in London; as the result of these, an executive committee was formed, and Sunday afternoon meetings were held during six weeks in November and December, as a sample, in a general way, of what may be done and, as we hope, will be done throughout the country. A special feature of these meetings is the combination of music with speaking; I confess that the suggestion of it had a great, perhaps a decisive, part in determining me to join the movement, and,

[1] Further particulars of this movement will be found in the advertisement pages of the present issue.

even if this were all, I think Sir Francis would have made a profitable contribution to the lawful arts of propaganda for the King's and the country's service.

Being avowed propagandists in a cause which we are convinced is just, we make no pretence of being judicial or impartial. Our primary question is not: Is this war righteous? but: This war being righteous, what is the right spirit for winning in a greater contest than any living man remembers? Much has been done in the way of historical and political instruction; the conditions leading to the war have been explained and discussed in many forms of publication and from many points of view. Little attention has yet been given to the men and women, probably a large number, who do not need further argument, being satisfied in their judgment, but do need moral encouragement. Some are indolent in mind, seeing the facts but not seeing the consequences. Others are indolent by disposition, and take refuge in diffidence: what should their little effort matter among so many? Not a few are sound enough on the root of the matter, but too easily cast down by idle rumours or worse than idle depreciation of our leading and resources. We want to bring spiritual help and encouragement home to all these; to make them not only know but feel that, if this is a long war, the end we seek is worth all our patience; if it is a hard war, victory is worth all our effort and endurance; if it is a war of cruel losses, peace and security for our children are worth all the sacrifice. We want all our countrymen to realise that mere passive fulfilment of legal duties is not enough for a secular combat against the powers of evil. We want them to have the assurance that all active help given for this cause, be it more or less, is good and amply worth all it costs; not only fighting or administering or making munitions is active work. It is good work for the common service to save the nation's means by curtailing unproductive expense. It is good work to

encourage a high and cheerful spirit and rebuke evil-speaking and despondency. The least gift, the shortest word that will keep any fighter or worker in good heart, is good work.

This kind of moral assistance cannot, so it seems to us, be conveyed by the written word alone, or by set speeches in occasional meetings. It is not enough for men and women to be like-minded as individuals; they need the assurance of meeting face to face, and the warmth of the living voice; to which we add the secret but most surely operative power of music, the one art which goes nearest to raising man above the things of this present world. Therefore we are working for the establishment of centres of meeting, and provision for regular meetings and for all things necessary to their competent conduct and effectual results. By the time these words are published, we expect to see our way to the formation of many local centres, with local committees arranging the details in the light of their special knowledge and experience. Different meetings and audiences, within limits of quite reasonable variation, and consistently with agreement on a common object and principles of common method, may have different requirements to be satisfied for each centre in its own way. The central committee will be glad to give all assistance in its power, but has no desire to impose a fixed pattern of proceeding on the branches. Before long, moreover, the larger branches at any rate ought to be self-supporting, and then they will have something like the rights of autonomous colonies. Meanwhile a general meeting of members in London is to strengthen our executive by making it representative in form as well as in substance.

So far as we know, there is not any other organised body doing or trying to do just this work. It may be asked, indeed, why the Churches are not doing it. Now, a full answer to this might be pretty hard to arrive at, and harder to state without entering on contentious matter. But it is not our business to find an answer, beyond pointing to the obvious fact that the

Churches are divided, in some cases forbidden to work together, and in no case furnished with any convenient meeting-ground for united work. Only a movement that welcomes all denominations and is officially attached to none can spread the net wide enough. Ours is of that character; if I do not use the epithet unsectarian, it is because in some people's mouths it connotes the exclusion of those who are sincere and active members of a visible Church. Anyone who will examine the list of our vice-presidents and committee can easily see that we repudiate anti-ecclesiastical no less than ecclesiastical exclusiveness. It may be superfluous, but also it may not be wholly useless, to mention explicitly that we are equally remote from collective attachment or inclination to any political party, being of opinion that in war time there should be no parties. I am by no means sure that I could give a tolerably correct guess at the political opinions, in time of peace, of my colleagues on the executive committee. For this reason we have not thought it wise to ask for support, material or moral, from any prominent politician. There is only one party to which we are opposed; and that is not a party, as "that foolish people that dwelleth in Sichem" was not a nation. It is the congregation of the croakers and the scolders, the amateur generals who never handled a rifle, the correctors of naval strategy who have never been to sea, the dictators of foreign policy who know no language and no country but their own, all of them crying out how much better they could have done the business themselves, and, what is more and worse, crying out for the enemy to hear. We have nothing to do with their motives. Those may be not only patriotic but disinterested for anything we positively know. Good intentions, however, will not excuse those who execute them by doing their best to create an atmosphere of gloom, depression, and distrust; certainly they will not excuse libel of any kind, much less libels which a century ago would have been held seditious if not treasonable. We do not pretend, therefore, to regard pessimist agitators

otherwise than as public enemies. As for those well-meaning persons, including some really able ones, who cannot or will not see that this war is not like other wars, and therefore deny that it imposes any special duty on private citizens, we are willing to give them the benefit of invincible ignorance. Their ignorance goes to the point of not knowing that the German General Staff is not yet within any measurable distance of beginning to consider the minimum terms of the Allies. At most hints are thrown out that the Germans might be willing to evacuate occupied territory in Europe—if they were paid for it elsewhere.

The Western Great Powers of Europe are fighting against a system which openly claims to make the interests of Germany and her satellite Austria paramount from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, and ultimately beyond the oceans also; to disregard the right of smaller nationalities even to existence; to subordinate the faith of treaties to the strategical views of the General Staff, and the commonest respect for humanity to military convenience as judged on the spot by the commanding officer. With such a system, we judge, there can be no compromise. How shall we bargain with men who will, on their own avowed principles, hold themselves free to treat any convention they sign as a mere scrap of paper? How can we be content to leave them with their means of offence unimpeached or easily reparable, and the nations hitherto neutral exposed to the same choice between extinction and submission to German or Austrian masters that was offered to Belgium and to Serbia? We are fighting not for territory, not for trade, not for the security of Britain or the British Empire alone, but for the liberty of nations to live each in its own way. As no power is too great to be put forth in such a cause, so no help is too small to be contributed. In the name of the Fight for Right, those for whom I speak are trying to contribute theirs.

FREDERICK POLLOCK.

LONDON.

AGAINST DEPARTMENTAL RELIGION.

THE RIGHT REV. J. W. DIGGLE, D.D.,
Bishop of Carlisle.

IN his recently published Gifford Lectures, a rich storehouse of high and suggestive thought, Mr Balfour declares his discontent with those forms of belief which keep God out of any province of human life and treat Him as a "departmental Deity." "I could not be quite content," he writes, "with any form of Theism which did not sustain in every essential part the full circle of human interests."[1] This article was written before I had the joy of reading Mr Balfour's great book, but his phrase "a departmental Deity" so exactly expresses the dangerous departmentalism to which the Christian religion has been, and still is, exposed, and against which my article was written, that I have ventured to modify and adopt it as the title of my theme instead of the title originally chosen.

In Apostolic times the conviction that all things, and not merely some things, were of God, to God, and from God, was a profound, vital, effectively real conviction. It was not a mere abstract opinion, but an earnest living faith. The Apostles roundly refused to recognise the notion of a broad, elemental distinction between things secular and things sacred. They scouted the doctrine that social, civic, week-day matters had no relationship to God. In their view everything on earth that was not sinful derived from

[1] P. 249.

God, and belonged to Him. Accordingly, no man's time was by them regarded as his own, but God's; no man's money as his own, but God's. No man's gifts or talents, of whatever sort, were deemed his own: all were God's. Marriage was in their eyes a divine relationship; so also were parenthood and childhood. The status of masters and their servants, of employers and employed, of capital and labour, was held by them to be a divine status, a mirror of the Masterhood of Christ and of that heavenly service which is both allegiance and freedom. They taught that all the powers that be are ordained of God: civil powers not less than those denominated ecclesiastical. To them the tenet that the Church is God's, and the State not God's, would have sounded like atheism. And so indeed it actually is. A god who is only supreme in one place and at fixed times—a Sunday god, a church-or-chapel god—is not truly and in fact a living, governing god, but only a dead fetich and thing of naught. A god who is not everywhere, at all times, and over all things, cannot be a god over anything, at any time, or anywhere. A god who does not direct our work as well as inspire our worship, who is not as supreme in the seat of custom as in the seat at church, who does not preside in the council chamber as well as at the Communion Table, is not the Christian God at all—not the God in whom Apostles believed and whom they proclaimed as the Author and Giver and Owner of all things on earth no less than in the heavens, and from whom they enthusiastically taught that every man receives everything he has, and as surely as he has received it will ultimately be required to render an account of it.

No doubt there are special times and special places for special touch and special communion with our omnipresent and omnigoverning God. Sunday is a special time. Church and the Holy Table of the Lord are special places. The Bible is a specially sacred library. The secret chamber and the family altar may be specially hallowed by habitual prayer.

Yet in what does the special sanctity of all these seasons, books, times, and places consist? Is not the purpose of their special sanctity to convey universal sanctity to all other seasons, books, places, and times? No Sunday is a true Sunday which does not supply fresh spiritual force and nutriment for the other six days of the week. Unless Sunday makes the week-days Christian, it is itself non-Christian. So with Communions. If they are not feasts to strengthen love; if they leave the communicants selfish, querulous, cynical, spiteful, malevolent; what relation have they to the Holy Supper of the Lord? One of the chief fruits of sacramental grace is the increase of charity; and if charity does not follow from participation in this blessed Sacrament, is it not certain that sacramental grace has neither been sought nor received? A communicant whose communions have no purifying or elevating effect upon his character and conduct, his commerce and trade, his occupations and amusements, his labour and leisure, communicates both unworthily and in vain. Similarly with the Bible. What is the Bible for? The Bible is both a this-worldly and an other-worldly volume. It contains great revelations both for the life which now is and for that which is to come. Of its revelations for the life to come I say nothing now, but touch only on its revelations for the present life. How splendid, how grand, how glorious these revelations are! That God is no respecter of persons, but is the Father of all alike: that He made of one blood, though not of one form and colour, all the men that dwell upon the face of the earth: that in Christ Jesus, who lived and died, rose and ascended for all, there is neither Jew nor Greek, barbarian nor Scythian, male nor female, bond nor free, but all alike are brethren: that worship is not acceptable merely when paid at Jerusalem or on Mount Gerizim, but only when paid in spirit and in truth, yet then everywhere and always: that none but the hypocrite need despair of salvation: that the most sensual of sinners may go in peace, if only they will sin no more: that nothing done here on earth in the name of a disciple, however small,

will lose its eternal reward: that the ministry of service is the most majestic of honours:—what a greatness and a glory revelations such as these pour down upon the humblest and most homely of human lives! They transfuse our poor humanity with the life and light of true divinity; and make earth, as it ought to be, a foretaste of heaven. Whosoever truly believes, actualises, and assimilates these revelations, for him this corruption has already put on incorruption, this mortal has been already clothed with immortality: both death and life have been for him swallowed up in victory, because God has become his all in all.

Again, the Bible unfolds grand revelations not only for individuals, but for nations also, and is a manual of national as well as personal religion. Its leaves are a divine medicine for the healing of the nations. A large part of the Old Testament is concerned with national religion. Eliminate all records of national religion from the Old Testament and you will at the same time eviscerate much of its meaning, value, and power. But what is the use of reading these far-off records of national religion, these annals of God's dealings with the elder nations, unless they were written for our modern learning? The Bible is not a mummy of dead antiquity. It is meant to be an inspiration and living force for every age throughout the whole procession of the suns. God's past dealings with Israel were but a type of what His dealings have been, are, and will be, with every other nation of the earth. As God is no respecter of persons, neither is He any respecter of nations. He putteth down one and setteth up another according to His own sovereign will, which is the will not to particular favouritism but to universal and impartial righteousness. If sin was a reproach to Israel, so to England also is sin a reproach. If nothing but righteousness could establish Israel two thousand years ago, then nothing but righteousness can establish the British Empire to-day. As God desired to gather Jerusalem under the wings of His brooding love long, long ago, so now He desires to gather all the nations of the

earth as a hen gathers her chickens for nourishing warmth and protection. But as then, if a city knew not the time of its visitation, no single stone in it was left upon another, so now if a nation or empire understands not the signs of the times but disregards the day of its visitation, it also will be left desolate, undefended, unsheltered by the delivering, all-conquering presence of God. God is not departmental, either in time or place; and the sole practical, beneficial way of reading for ourselves the national records of the Old Testament is to substitute in them Britain for Israel, Britain for Judah; and then to realise that as God dealt with ancient peoples so has He dealt, is He dealing, will He deal, with the present peoples of the earth. Such is the only useful method of Biblical exegesis: a method which brings the Bible home and makes it a quickening reality; and among other things teaches us that as Sunday was given not to keep God out of the week but to bring Him in, as church is meant not as an exclusive habitation of God but as a place for the hallowing of all other places, as Sacraments were ordained by Christ not as superstitious or magical ordinances but in order to impart a veritable sacramental character to all our ways and all our works, so God's laws in the guidance and government of Israel are unchangeable laws, and may be discerned in our own history and our own times, if only we have eyes to see and ears to hear and minds willing to understand.

Likewise with the Church. The Church of Christ was never intended as a set-off against the State: far less as an antagonist to it. To range these two against each other, as if the Church were God's department and the State the department of Mammon, is one of our most prevalent ecclesiastical vices. If the Church were alone of God, and the State altogether of Mammon, then, as our Saviour taught, no man could love them both. Yet we know that multitudes of Christian people love and are loyal to both of them: the reason being that both essentially belong to God. And one of the best purposes of the Church is to convert

the State to the realisation of its debts and responsibilities to God. This it can in no wise succeed in doing so long as it keeps aloof from the world or sets up a barrier of separation between secular and spiritual departments—whether in courts or in commerce, — or treats Church ordinances as ends in themselves, instead of means to higher ends. Church *versus* State is not a Christian formula. It is anti-Christian. No Church ought to be regarded as instituted for its own sake alone. The highest meaning and mission of every true Church is to recreate Creation, to make the entire world Christian; not to hallow it merely in departments, or sanctify it in sections, but to turn it wholly upside down, to change it from bottom to top, to regenerate it altogether and in every part, to bring in a new type of humanity, a twice-born humanity, reborn out of a materialistic into a spiritual manhood.

How far the Church has hitherto failed to really Christianise the world, and how deplorably departmental and non-permeating our average Christianity now is, is abundantly testified by the raging of the present anti-Christian war. All war is indeed essentially anti-Christian. For if Christianity means anything at all, it means brotherhood and love. War, on the other hand, is the negation of brotherhood and the destruction of love. By no possibility can Christianity and war be harmonised. They are diametrically opposed to each other. Their origins and springs are fundamentally contrarient. The root of Christianity is love. Its fruit is also love. Where love is not, Christ is not. But war is not born of love. War is always born, on one side or both, of envy, greed, covetousness of possessions, or lust of power. You may Christianise, through the help of God, the results of war; but neither God nor man can Christianise war itself. War is the doing of the devil and a fruit of the flesh; and the fact that good often springs out of it does not make it good, any more than the fact that the sacrifice on Calvary brought in the redemption of the world acquits the

Sanhedrin of ecclesiastical murder. The hands that slew the Christ were wicked hands, although His slaying was the source of our salvation. And war is none the less essentially devilish because it frequently brings to light the heroism, the valour, the nobility of self-sacrifice of those engaged in it, and the splendid patience and uncomplaining endurance of those who suffer and are bereaved by its carnalities and brutalities, its barbarities, atrocities, and iniquities.

In modern times the Christian Church has happily done much to assuage the horrors and mollify the sufferings consequent on war. Its ministries of sympathy and healing and alleviation have been truly splendid. Ancient warfare knew nothing of Red Cross societies, or ambulance corps, or medical staffs, or devoted chaplains, or generous provision for the families of sailors and soldiers: nothing of fighting solely for the maintenance of righteousness, liberty, and public law. All ancient wars were wars of utter selfishness in some of its myriad forms. The British Empire may humbly, yet proudly, boast that on its part at least this present war is a war of righteous self-defence, if not even of unselfishness. Our Empire might have kept out of this war, and left Belgium to her fate, France to her fate, Poland to her fate, Serbia to her fate, Russia and Italy to struggle unassisted against despotic domination and piratical bureaucracy. We entered the war without any thought of aggression, annexation, political or material advantage. All the evidence goes to prove that the war was imposed upon us reluctantly, forced upon us by the menaces and subtleties of an unprincipled antagonist, and that we could not escape from it without betraying our friends and stimulating the insatiable industrial and territorial thirst of the enemies of peace and liberty and the brotherhood of men. If, on our part, this war had been a war of selfish aggression, it is certain that our Colonies—the foster-mothers and nurseries of freedom, justice, and peaceful progress—would not have run with such magnificent loyalty and splendid prowess to our aid. The Christian Church has,

to its glory and honour, achieved this much at least among the English-speaking peoples of the earth, that wars of sordid greed and dynastic ambition and territorial aggrandisement are for them at least, for all future ages, impossible and beyond belief.

But in twenty centuries the Christian Church ought to have done much more than this, and would have done it, if only it had been fearlessly loyal to the teachings and ideals of its Founder and its Lord. The clear purpose of the Christ was to transform the world—not to leave it as it is to go its own way, but to radically change its heart and mind, its will and aims, and bring them into reconciliation and harmony with the mind and will of God. Instead of this the Church has too much conformed to the world, compromised with the world, accommodated itself to the standards and opinions of the world. Notably so with respect to war. In the course of its career it has actually fomented many impious and irreligious wars in the name of religion and of God. Not a few of what are miscalled "wars of religion" have been wars of sheer wickedness. So feeble and flaccid has at times been the attitude of the Christian Church that some of its leaders and professors have not blushed to teach that war is God's only medicine for the sloth and slackness of the world: that in a world which Christ came to redeem by love, only force can be the final and ultimate arbitrament either in civil disputes or international differences. Christ did not teach like this; nor does that Church belong to Christ that teaches so. A carnal world may laugh and mock at the ideals of the Christ, may pour upon them ridicule and scorn, and denounce them as mystic dreams and impracticable fancies. None the less they are, whether baseless fabric or solid rock, the code of Christ, the published command of the Head of the Church; and therefore the plain duty of the Church, which is the Body of Christ, is to declare frankly and without reserve its uncompromising allegiance to the principles propounded by its Head. This the Church has not always done. It has been sometimes

cold and sometimes hot, but not continuously Christian. It has tried to face two ways at once: to pay homage to God and make terms with His adversaries. It has ofttimes been half-hearted—yea, even also disloyal to the glorious ideals of its Founder. What wonder, then, that the world has not thought it worth its while to strive to carry those ideals into practice? When the Church has so long been teaching that force is the remedy, force the final arbiter, what wonder, I say, that the world-spirit has taken with it seven other spirits more wicked than itself, and that the greatest of all wars is now raging through the world?

If the Church had striven more strenuously to teach the precepts and actualise the ideals of its Lord, then long before now the world would have begun to deem them less impracticable. If the Church had boldly and steadfastly uplifted these ideals, the world would ere this time have been drawn at least into admiration of their beauty and their worth. But the Church has not itself really believed in their practicability for the present world. It has set them aside, or passed them by, as too high and good for the world's low and evil state. It has taught and acted as if the Sermon on the Mount might be possible for angels, or in some other world; but, alas! is too mystically dreamy and impracticable for this practical world of practical people. This disloyalty of the Church to its Lord's ideals is the root of the world's disbelief in them. How can the Church expect the world to believe in these nobilities and sublimities unless for itself it first believes in them and squares its teachings with their standards? Dreams they are! Yes! But it is one of the highest missions of the Church to dream dreams and teach the world to dream them also and give them effect. Worldly, time-bound common sense should not be a prominent characteristic note of any Church. Far otherwise. The characteristic notes of a true Church are those of an uncommon sense and an uncommon spirit. From the point of sight of worldly common sense, the humiliation at Bethlehem was foolishness; the Cross foolishness; and every Christian

martyr a madman. But what is meant by the common sense of men? Merely the sense which is common among men. But the Church ought to have a higher common sense: a common sense peculiarly its own: a Christian common sense: the sense common to both good men and God. We do not desire to drive out real, noble common sense from our religion. We want to bring it in. Yet we ought to drive out the vulgar common sense which imagines that man knows better than God by what principles the world should be guided; and at the same time bring in the divine common sense which is convinced that God knows better than man both what is best, and what also is most practicable, for the world—which, after all, is His world. It is the most shallow and stupid of heresies to suppose that God is dreamy and non-practical. God surely is wise. To disbelieve in the ideals of Christ, or dub them impracticable, is essentially to charge Him with folly. Yet to this charge all are open who acknowledge that God can rightly manage the department of the Church, but disallow His practical ability to guide and administer the various departments of the world; who consider Him careful for the Church, but careless about the State; who yield Him homage in the department of worship, but keep the department of war in their own hands. Such departmentalism is the ruin of religion, and the annulment of its influence. For one sure result of confining religion to any single department of human life is ultimately to expel it from all other departments; and a Church which tries to keep God to itself will in the end find that both God and the world keep away from it.

A few chosen heroes of God have indeed from time to time in various Christian ages raised aloft with noble courage the glorious banner of the Christ; yet in spite of this the Church of Christ as a whole has failed to keep it flying. It has been too busy with ecclesiastical frivolities and futilities to preach ceaselessly and fearlessly the ethics and ideals of the Gospel. But the time has come, and this war has ushered it in with the sound of a deafening trumpet, to change all this—to get

rid of the departmental deities of all the Churches, of departmental religion altogether, in all its manifold cloaks and guises, and to declare, without fear or flinching, that of Christ, and through Christ, and to Christ are all things. Not things sacred only, but things secular also; not merely things of the next world, but things of this world as well; not bits of anything, but the whole of everything: the shop as well as the sanctuary, both the newspaper and the Bible, politics and prayer, work and worship, trade and devotion, diplomacy and divinity, the world as well as the Church. When this is done, then shall we no longer see the grievous spectacle of a powerful Christian pontiff neutral in politics which is right, but impartial in morals which is wrong; too timorous to denounce categorically, without hesitation or faltering, the murder of his own priests as murder, and the rape of his own nuns as rape, and the destruction of his own cathedrals as sacrilege, and the imprisonment of his own Cardinal as unbridled barbarism.[1] No longer shall we see a great Christian commonwealth authoritatively silent and governmentally speechless on clear moral issues; nor any longer see capitalists making huge profits out of war, vast companies making vast dividends out of armaments, and stirring up strife for the sake of their dividends; no longer see labourers deliberately idling while their comrades are being murdered through lack of munitions, and cowards losing their souls and saving their skins rather than losing their skins and saving their souls in resistance to a godless tyranny and in defence of mercy, truth, righteousness, and honour rooted in human brotherhood, watered from the fountains of Divine Father-

[1] This timorousness is not, I am persuaded, due to any lack of personal courage or conviction in the pontiff, but solely to the falseness of his dual position as a political partner in State strategy and an eminent guide in plain morals. For no man can possibly, at one and the same time, perform the function of a faithful priest and an ecclesiastical politician; be a fearless prophet and a subtle diplomatist; an advocate of the ideals of the Christ and an administrator of the ideas of the Curia. It is entirely beyond the power of the most able and ardent casuistry to keep these antagonistic functions from clashing, and in the clash we have sadly seen which emerges as supreme.

hood, and blossoming to the fruitage of the beautiful peace of universal goodwill among men.[1]

This great hope is not an impossible or unrealisable dream. Many facts prove the possibility of its ultimate realisation. On the horizon there are streaks of the approaching dawn. Even now the world is not altogether bad. There are multitudes, multitudes, that do not bow the knee to Baal: the Baal of greed and lust, of cruelty and arrogance, of selfish aggrandisement and cowardly fear. Men and women of all ranks and stations, from the mansion to the cottage, are bravely crowding to the rescue of liberty from the fetters of tyranny, to the side of right and truth in the battle against the duplicities of might and the perils of brutish force. The Churches are being quickened into new life and strength. The end of the war may yet not be in sight, but the day of victorious deliverance is steadily drawing more near and clear. It is impossible, as I have already said, to Christianise war; but in the midst of war we can at least resolve that when the war is over we will Christianise peace: that we will accept no mere worldly and diplomatic peace, the germ and cause of future wars, but only peace on God-like terms—the terms of freedom to the weak as well as the strong, of repentance towards God and restitution towards men, of the liberty of all nations to lead their own national life and in friendly federation with other nations to coalesce and unite in a common brotherhood for the welfare of mankind.

J. W. CARLIOL.

[1] No one, of course, doubts the integrity and nobility of President Wilson's personal character, or the heroic patriotism of multitudes of our capitalists and workmen; but when religion becomes departmental, and is kept out of political and industrial provinces, then, alas! may the upright President of a splendid Commonwealth find his lips bound by political bandages, and selfishness, rather than self-sacrifice, be frequently acknowledged as the prince of the industrial world.

MR BALFOUR'S "THEISM AND HUMANISM."

PROFESSOR A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON.

"WRITTEN before the war"—this simple note, appended to one of Mr Balfour's pages, is a reminder of the gulf, not to be measured in months or years, which lies between the inception of these Lectures and their present publication. Delivered in January and February 1914, their first written form dates back to the previous year, but they were revised and largely rewritten between March 1914 and May 1915. "No one who took any part in public affairs between March 1914 and the outbreak of the war, or between the outbreak of the war and the present moment," says Mr Balfour in his Preface, "is likely to regard these months as providing convenient occasion for quiet thought and careful writing." Yet it may be truthfully said that never was the author's intellectual grasp more assured or his language a more perfect instrument of his thought. Undertaken in the leisure following on his retirement from political leadership, their publication finds him absorbed in the task of national defence, the responsible head of the great Fleet which stands between Europe and an intolerable tyranny. Future historians may remark the fitness of the conjunction, for Prussianism is, in its essence, the apotheosis in practice of the Naturalism against which Mr Balfour wages speculative war. Naturalism, embraced as a creed, Mr Balfour has long warned us, would speedily destroy at the root those faiths or ideals of value from which all that we prize in human history has sprung. How speedily

and how completely the gospel of naked force may make an end of mercy and truth the world has had an opportunity of learning by terrible demonstration from the multiplied acts of calculated ferocity by which Germany has shocked the conscience of mankind.

Nothing is more remarkable in Mr Balfour's philosophical writings than the persistence with which he urges one fundamental thesis in the face (as he himself intimates) of a somewhat discouraging reception, both from the idealistic philosophers to whose conclusions his own are akin and from the general reader. The latter has perhaps been puzzled rather than convinced by an argument whose very simplicity makes him distrustful of the immense conclusion which it claims to establish. There has frequently been a tendency to treat his reasoning as a dialectical *tour de force*, rather than a profoundly serious attempt to analyse the presuppositions of scientific experience and ordinary belief. Mr Balfour has a right, I think, to be disappointed with the reception accorded to his efforts, even although he may sometimes in the past have invited misunderstanding by the form of his expression. But any misconception as to the real nature and purpose of his argument ought to be removed by his impressive restatement of the fundamental issue in the new volume of Gifford Lectures.

In an interesting "autobiographical parenthesis" Mr Balfour gives an account of the genesis of his speculations which defines, with a clearness that leaves nothing to be desired, both his own philosophical attitude and the position against which his attack has been consistently directed. Although the passage is long, the essential parts of it must be quoted, for it is the key to all that I have to say in the present paper.

"I went to Cambridge (he tells us) in the middle sixties, with a very small equipment of either philosophy or science, but a very keen desire to discover *what* I ought to think of the world and *why*. For the history of speculation I cared not a jot. Dead systems seemed to me of no more interest than

abandoned fashions. My business was with the ground-work of living beliefs; in particular with the ground-work of that scientific knowledge whose recent developments had so profoundly moved mankind. And surely there was nothing perverse in asking modern philosophers to provide us with a theory of modern science. I was referred to Mill; and the shock of disillusionment remains with me to the present hour. Mill possessed at that time an authority in the English Universities . . . comparable to that wielded forty years earlier by Hegel in Germany and in the Middle Ages by Aristotle. Precisely the kind of questions which I wished to put his logic was deemed qualified to answer. He was supposed to have done for scientific inference what Bacon had tried to do, and failed. He had provided science with a philosophy. I could have forgiven the claims then made for him by his admirers; I could have forgiven, though young and intolerant, what seemed to me the futility of his philosophic system, if he had ever displayed any serious misgiving as to the scope and validity of his empirical methods. . . . But he seemed to hold, in common with the whole empirical school of which, in English-speaking countries, he was the head, that the fundamental difficulties of knowledge do not begin till the frontier is crossed which divides physics from metaphysics, the natural from the supernatural, the world of 'phenomena' from the world of 'noumena,' 'positive' experiences from religious dreams. . . . For my own part, I feel now, as I felt in the early days of which I am speaking, that the problem of knowledge cannot properly be sundered in this fashion. Its difficulties begin with the convictions of common sense, not with remote, or subtle, or other-worldly speculations; and if we could solve the problem in respect of the beliefs which, roughly speaking, everybody shares, we might see our way more clearly in respect of the beliefs on which many people are profoundly divided. That Mill's reasoning should have satisfied himself and his immediate disciples is strange. But that the wider public of thinking men whom he so powerfully influenced should, on the strength of this flimsy philosophy, adopt an attitude of dogmatic assurance both as to what can be known and what cannot, is surely stranger still. Thus, at least, I thought nearly half a century ago, and thus I think still."

It is, then, this "attitude of dogmatic assurance," characteristic of "the ordinary agnostic position," which has been from first to last the object of Mr Balfour's attack. On it he poured the vials of his youthful contempt in 1879, in the *Defence of Philosophic Doubt.* He returned in the *Foundations of Belief* to riddle its incoherencies and to press home, in a more constructive spirit, the implications of the mutilated "experience" which it unquestioningly, but inconsistently, accepted. And the kernel of the present volume is the same sustained protest against the illogical procedure of popular agnosticism and naturalism in substantiating our ordinary scientific beliefs as a body of rational conclusions, while

evading the general inquiry into the conditions of our intellectual experience as a whole. The *Defence of Philosophic Doubt* was described by the author in his preface as "a piece of destructive criticism," and it does not on the whole profess to be more than this. Mr Balfour was not yet in possession of his constructive principle. It is true that the argument is conducted in the interest of religious truth; and certain "practical results" are indicated as deducible from it in that reference. But the actual conclusion drawn is that both the creed of religion and the creed of science are equally baseless, in the sense of being "incapable of any rational defence." "Religion is at any rate no worse off than science in the matter of proof." Both have claims on our belief, but these claims are not to be construed as reasons. "Whatever they may be, they are not rational grounds of conviction. . . . It would be more proper to describe them as a kind of inward inclination or impulse, falling far short of—or, I should perhaps rather say, altogether differing in kind from—philosophic certitude, leaving the reason, therefore, unsatisfied, but amounting, nevertheless, to a practical cause of belief, from the effects of which we do not even desire to be released." Or, as he puts it in another place: "I and an indefinite number of other persons, if we contemplate religion and science as unproved systems of belief standing side by side, feel a practical need for both." But the existence of "an ultimate impulse to believe a creed" is in no sense to be regarded as a reason for believing it, nor does the impulse become a better reason the more people there are who feel its influence. There can be no argument in such a case from one individual to another. "We are in this matter, unfortunately, altogether outside the sphere of Reason."[1]

In view of expressions like these it was, I venture to think, not unnatural that Mr Balfour's position should be taken at its face value as an undiluted scepticism, and that his concluding pages should be construed as an attempt to enlist

[1] *Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, "Practical Results," pp. 315–320.

that scepticism in the service of orthodoxy. The deliberate substitution of psychological causes for logical grounds does, indeed, place all our beliefs "altogether outside the sphere of Reason"; it is exactly the procedure of Hume in the *Treatise*,[1] and, if consistently applied, would make argument on any subject ridiculous. Masterly in its destructive criticism, the book suffers from the characteristic defect of the *tu quoque* controversial method; and, as Mr Balfour himself hints in his autobiographical parenthesis, the complete irrationalism in which he apparently rests may perhaps be taken as an extreme form of expression into which he was hurried by his "contempt for the complacent dogmatism of the empirical philosophy" which he so mercilessly criticises. And as it is sufficiently obvious that no one seriously interested in religion would accept such a vindication of its place in our constitution, we may accept Mr Balfour's present assurance that—though as a matter of fact he said it—"that is not what he ever wanted to say." His real meaning is no doubt better indicated by the phrase "practical need" than by such terms as impulse and inclination, and it was in connection with that phrase that his thought was constructively developed in the *Foundations of Belief*.

In that volume also Mr Balfour contributed to the misleading of his critics by the gusto with which he backed Authority against Reason as a determining force in human affairs. On a nearer examination it speedily appeared that Mr Balfour was using Reason, in a sense common in our older English writers, as equivalent to reasoning or conscious logical ratiocination, while he arbitrarily extended the term Authority to include the influences of "custom, education, public opinion," "the contagious convictions of countrymen, family, party, or church." Taking the terms in this sense, it was easy for him to prove the vastly preponderating influence of "authority"

[1] Thirty years ago I referred to the volume as "perhaps the ablest English exposition of pure philosophic scepticism since Hume." Article "Scepticism" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, ninth edition.

in determining our ordinary beliefs, and to make sport of the idea of a community which should attempt to put in practice Descartes' ideal of founding the conduct of life on a logically concatenated system of truth. He was disputing, in fact, without an antagonist. But the gratuitous importation of the term Authority into the argument undoubtedly tended to perpetuate the preconceptions existing in the minds of many readers as to his own philosophical position and his controversial methods. The introduction was regrettable, because it threw out of focus the main thesis of the volume, which was so far from being inimical to reason that it turned upon the *irrationality* of Naturalism as a final account of our cognitive and ethical experience.

The contrast between "causes of belief" and "reasons for belief" received still greater prominence than in the earlier volume; but it reappeared in a new light, or rather it was used with a different purpose. All our beliefs may be regarded as members of a causal, as well as of a logical, series; and Naturalism, in the causal explanation which it gives of them, insists on treating the whole fabric of our experience as a result of the blind operation of purely non-rational forces. The pivot of Mr Balfour's constructive argument was (in his own words) "the ineffaceable incongruity between the origin of our beliefs, so far as these can be revealed to us by science, and the beliefs themselves." We escape from "the confusion which the naturalistic hypothesis introduces into every department of speculation and practice" only if "behind these non-rational forces, and above them, guiding them by slow degrees, and, as it were, with difficulty, to a rational issue, stands that Supreme Reason in which we must thus believe if we are to believe in anything."[1] To put it briefly, the facts of human experience only become intelligible in a theistic setting. That is what Mr Balfour means by bracketing "Humanism" and "Theism," as he does in the title of his present lectures. Let us consider the argument, then, in the form in which, after an interval of

[1] *Foundations of Belief*, pp. 321, 323.

twenty years, he once more presses it upon the consideration of his contemporaries.

In the first two "introductory" lectures and in the "summary and conclusion" which occupies the tenth lecture, Mr Balfour is himself at special pains to define precisely the nature of his procedure, the premises and assumptions from which he starts, and the conclusion he seeks to establish. It is not an argument from common sense, but the beliefs of common sense supply the material on which the argument works. These beliefs, which Mr Balfour proposes to call "inevitable," include a belief in an independent world of things and persons, and a belief in universal causation or what is commonly called the uniformity of nature. Besides the more strictly intellectual beliefs of which these are the most important examples, there are also certain beliefs regarding the ends of action and others regarding objects of contemplative interest — ethical and æsthetical beliefs and sentiments, if we use these terms in the widest sense—which, in one form or another, are entertained by all men and may therefore be placed in the same class. These beliefs, accepted without criticism in their modern and most developed form, constitute the *datum explicandum.* What does their presence and acceptance imply? And inasmuch as the beliefs in rationality, in goodness, and in beauty, with the emotions which gather round them, are the most precious and distinctive possessions of humanity, the argument which starts from them may be described as "an argument from value." Put more specifically, the central problem of the lectures is "the relation which origin bears to value"; and Mr Balfour's contention is that the naturalistic theory of their origin leaves the emergence of such beliefs and emotions inexplicable, and, if we could believe it, would render their persistence impossible. As he states it in his final review: "The root principle which, by its constant recurrence in slightly different forms, binds together, like an operatic *leit-motif*, the most diverse material, is that if we would maintain the value of our highest beliefs and

emotions, we must find for them a congruous origin. Beauty must be more than an accident. The source of morality must be moral. The source of knowledge must be rational. If this be granted, you rule out Mechanism, you rule out Naturalism, you rule out Agnosticism; and a lofty form of Theism becomes, as I think, inevitable" (pp. 249, 250). The argument, therefore, though not an argument from design in the ordinary sense, might be called, he says, an argument *to* design; but inasmuch as it is based upon considerations drawn from the mind and soul of man, "it is design far deeper in purpose, far richer in significance, than any which could be inferred from the most ingenious and elaborate adjustments displayed by organic life" (pp. 45, 51).

The argument from value, though it may be said to underlie constructive philosophy from the beginning, has been especially prominent under that formula in recent discussion. Thus Höffding, in his admirable *Philosophy of Religion*, after laying down the conservation of value as the characteristic axiom of religion, declares the final problem of philosophy to be the relation of our highest human values to existence as a whole. And in the same spirit Sidgwick, seeking to define philosophy, indicates as its most important task that of "connecting fact and ideal in some rational and satisfactory manner." In his treatment of this problem, Mr Balfour seems to me to employ the fundamental argument of every idealistic or spiritual philosophy, that the cause must be adequate to the effect, and that consequently (in his own words) "all creeds which refuse to see an intelligent purpose behind the unthinking forces of material nature are intrinsically incoherent" (p. 257). The argument seems to me valid and its conclusion indisputable. Mr Balfour tells us repeatedly that he offers his results not as "a philosophy of the universe" but only as "a point of view." But this modesty is due to an exaggerated estimate of what a philosophy of the universe is or can be—an estimate founded, perhaps with a certain irony, on the exaggerated claims of system-builders in the past. Philosophers themselves tend to

become more modest. For my own part, I do not believe that philosophy can carry us much further than such a general point of view as Mr Balfour indicates. But if it can carry us so far, perhaps we may be content.

Mr Balfour anticipates that the lectures dealing with the intellectual values—the application of his method to knowledge — will rouse the most serious opposition. "The endeavour to treat our beliefs about the world and our beliefs about God as interdependent will seem to many extravagant, even unnatural" (p. 25). Now I agree that, in the detailed working out, there are statements made in these lectures, or at least forms of expression used, which are open to criticism. I shall refer to some of them presently. But the main argument, as Mr Balfour himself states it, both here and in the *Foundations of Belief*, seems to me, on the contrary, precisely the most closely knit and most convincing piece of reasoning in the book. Perhaps this impression on my part is due to the fact that I consider the argument to be in substance identical with the transcendental proof from "the possibility of experience" when that is disengaged from the historical accidents of the Kantian statement. "Something may also be inferred," said Mr Balfour in the *Foundations of Belief*, "*from the mere fact that we know*, a fact which, like every other, has to be accounted for." And we have seen, in the autobiographical fragment quoted, how he denounces the procedure of the empirical school in treating our everyday practical and scientific knowledge as standing securely on its own feet, and suggesting that philosophical difficulties begin only on the frontiers of metaphysics and theology. "The problem of knowledge cannot properly be sundered in this fashion" (p. 252). "It is the criticism of our common knowledge," he urges, which "brings us ultimately to Theism." "God," he says in his concluding page, "must not be treated as an entity which we may add to, or subtract from, the sum of things scientifically known, as the canons of induction may suggest. He is Himself the condition of scientific knowledge." And he

instructively compares his own procedure with that of Descartes who, after his attempted start with the independent certainty of the *Cogito, ergo sum*, found himself driven to seek the ultimate guarantee of all our beliefs in the truthfulness of God. I cannot forbear remarking that Mr Balfour might have found a more recent parallel to his own position in the "theistic faith" of my own venerable teacher and friend, Professor Campbell Fraser. This faith is presented by Fraser also, "not as a principle by which we eke out the defects of knowledge, but as the fundamental presupposition of all knowledge and reasonable action." The ground of induction occupied a large place in Fraser's reflections, as it does in Mr Balfour's speculations, and he saw quite clearly the impossibility of an inductive proof such as Mill attempted. The whole procedure of science, as well as the ordinary activities of life, depend, he constantly urges, on the supposition that we are living in a cosmos, not a chaos. Our reliance on the laws of nature implies an ultimate trust in "the reasonableness or interpretability of nature," and is therefore "unconscious faith in God omnipotent in nature." And so, he tells us in his *Biographia Philosophica*, "I gradually came to think of this theistic faith, not as an infinite conclusion empirically found in finite facts, but as the necessary presupposition of all human conclusions about anything."

Mr Balfour handles this question of the ground of induction in his eighth lecture, on "Uniformity and Causation." He begins by dismissing Mill's "attempt to treat instinctive expectation as a form of rational inference." The general principle of the regularity of nature is, in point of fact, "assumed in every scientific speculation and in every purposeful action reflectively performed." It outruns the evidence, for vast regions of the universe remain unexplored; and even within the region accessible to us, we are frequently confronted by apparent irregularities. But we attribute these to our ignorance or our errors, and the further progress of investigation constantly justifies our

faith. That means that "we interpret our experience in the light of a preconceived scheme of things . . . and so strong is this speculative prepossession that there is no experimental evidence which would convince a man of science that, when physical causes were the same, physical consequences could be different" (pp. 198, 199). Taking the principle as commonly formulated (everything is caused, and the same causes are always followed by the same effects), Mr Balfour proceeds to observe that, in order to be of any practical use, the principle requires to be supplemented by another. Every event in nature might be causally determined in the sense that the condition of the world at any given moment was strictly determined by its condition at the preceding moment. But that is not enough for science. "Such a world might have a history, but it could never have a science." The laws or uniformities which science formulates depend upon the fact that similar events are repeated, and that it is possible, therefore, to isolate definite sequences or connections. Such isolation involves, moreover, Mr Balfour urges, the principle of "negligibility," seeing that perfect similarity between the cases is unattainable. Innumerable circumstances may, in fact, coexist with all our experiments, or change between one experiment and the next, which we deliberately disregard as irrelevant to the particular causal nexus with which we are concerned.

It will be readily agreed, I think, whether we dignify it with the title of a principle or not, that induction assumes negligibility in this sense; and there is perhaps no reason to object to Mr Balfour's statement that, in deciding what may reasonably be treated as negligible, we are guided by "a feeling of antecedent probability." But the apparent attempt to treat negligibility as a principle on the same level as universal causation is, I think, a mistake. And this seems to be unconsciously admitted by Mr Balfour himself; for after saying "you trust yourself to a feeling of antecedent probability," he concludes his sentence with the words, "and your trust will

sometimes be betrayed." That is, of course, exactly what does happen. Circumstances which we had hitherto assumed to be negligible are found, as the result of some unexpected discovery, to be linked up in unforeseen ways with the phenomenon we are investigating. We accept the correction without hesitation, and anticipate many similar corrections as we penetrate more and more into nature's secrets. But in the case of universal causation, Mr Balfour has himself told us, no experimental evidence would convince a man of science that the assumption was wrong; and Mr Balfour admits that, in the face of apparent exceptions, this confidence is always eventually confirmed. The contrast in this respect between the two "principles" is complete. The truth is that in the latter case we are dealing with the very idea of law or orderly connection—what Kant called the idea of a nature in general—without which the whole effort of science to determine particular connections becomes a futility, whereas in the former case we have to do only with the empirical question of what is connected with what, or (as it might perhaps be better put, seeing that everything is connected with everything else in the world) the intimacy of the connection existing between different sets of facts. I hold that the former is the necessary, that is to say, the indispensable, condition of scientific knowledge, as distinguished from instinctive expectation, and that it is also, *pace* Mr Balfour, an assumption implied in all purposeful action. If we imagine a total absence of regular connection—what, I suppose, is meant by chaos—purposeful action would obviously be completely impossible. If we imagine a world in which causes and effects, means and ends, are regularly connected as a rule, with inexplicable lapses from time to time, I suppose we might rub along, generalising the uniformities and trusting to our luck to dodge the exceptions. But the reasonableness of purposive action would be undermined just to the extent of the frequency of the lapses. In any case, there would be an end of the rationality of the universe. It seems to me, therefore, unfortunate to use an expression like "intuitive probability" to

describe our attitude towards the fundamental condition of scientific knowledge and reasonable action, even if we also describe the belief as inevitable. For probability, as Mr Balfour says, "is evidently a matter of degree," and inevitableness in such a view is merely "an extreme form of plausibility." He proposes, in fact, to treat it as "the last term of a series whose earlier members represent varying degrees of plausibility." On this view, he continues, "we should regard our beliefs about the universe as moulded by formative forces, which vary from irresistible coercion to faint and doubtful inclination" (p. 218). And as regards both the earlier and the later members of the series, he adds, "Both are to be regarded rather as the results of tendencies than as the conclusions of logic."

It is here that I am obliged to part company with Mr Balfour, for the point of view here suggested, and especially the expressions last quoted, seem to indicate a recurrence of the tendency, so conspicuous in his first book, to substitute causes for grounds and so to resolve all logical necessity into psychological coercion. Now the belief in the causal connection of events, when reflectively analysed, appears to me to be a clear example—if not the supreme example—of logical necessity or rational implication. The fundamental condition of real inference may not be, in the technical sense, a conclusion; but it is surely indissolubly knit together with the inferences which it legitimates, and the necessity with which it imposes itself is the same in kind. It is the active universal which realises itself in the infinite particulars of advancing knowledge, and together they constitute the living body of truth. Sever the two, and you are left with nothing but habitual association and instinctive expectation. An animal existence may be carried on at that level; Hume's psychology, it has been remarked, is an excellent account of the animal mind. But it is not too much to say that reason and the possibility of science are born with the very idea of connection, the idea of one event as dependent on another: for in grasping such an idea there is already involved the conception of the

world as a rational order. I cannot sufficiently emphasise the importance of the step from association to reason. It matters not in what creatures it takes place, nor how gradual the process of transition may appear to be: the two lives are on different planes, and there is no passage from the one to the other save by a leap.

Mr Balfour's general argument, as we have seen, starts from "the working body of root-beliefs about men and things" upon which we all act, alike in scientific procedure and in practical life. He may be said roughly to assume the truth of these beliefs and to ask what is implied in their being true. And in so proceeding, I think he does well. For the task of philosophy is not to prove by some esoteric method what no man seriously doubts, but rather to fit these beliefs together into the larger whole which they imply, or, as Mr Balfour puts it, to provide them with a "setting" which shall not be radically incongruous with the beliefs themselves. But, unfortunately, Mr Balfour persistently ignores the fact that this is the avowed procedure of all recent philosophy worth the name. He seems always to think of philosophy as a series of premises and conclusions, in which the start is made from some proposition or propositions put forward as self-evident, as in the deductive systems of Descartes and Spinoza, or from particular experiences which are supposed by empirical philosophers to yield us laws without the intervention of any general principle whatever. But since Kant translated the first part of his inquiry into the questions—"How is mathematics possible?" and "How is pure physics possible?"—this ideal of demonstrative method must be pronounced obsolete. In a sense the transcendental argument neither starts from premises nor arrives at conclusions. What Kant does is to take successively our scientific, our ethical, and our æsthetical experience, as it actually exists, and to seek to determine the conditions of its possibility. The proof by reference to the possibility of experience is what he constantly returns to emphasise. I am well aware that, in

Mr Balfour's case, Kant is not a name to conjure with. He speaks incidentally in this volume of the Kantian system as "a philosophy which is artificial through and through." Like William James, he seems to have a constitutional antipathy to the crabbed scholasticism of the Kantian terminology and the endless divisions and subdivisions of his subject-matter, prompted, as it is easy to see, by an exaggerated passion for symmetry, and due too often to forced parallels with the traditional text-books of formal logic. For my own part, I am willing to surrender to Mr Balfour almost every specific doctrine of the system, in the form in which Kant presents it; but the kernel of his thinking, the transcendental form of proof, in the sense attributed to it above, is independent of the specific doctrines of historical Kantianism. And in point of fact, in the elaborate contrast which Mr Balfour draws (p. 263) between himself and the philosopher, the contrast is really between a deductive system of the Cartesian type and the transcendental analysis of experience which is common to all idealistic philosophy since Kant. The description which he gives of his own procedure and assumptions might be adopted, almost *verbatim*, by any follower of the Kantian tradition as an account of the normal method of philosophy.

In itself the method is neither very recondite nor perhaps very new, for it simply asks what are the *implications* of our actual knowledge, our actual morality, and our actual æsthetical judgments. It has sometimes been instructively compared with the ordinary procedure of science by hypothesis, deduction, and verification. Descartes had generalised the deductive procedure of geometry, and prescribed it as the philosophical ideal. Kant points out in different places why that method is inapplicable in philosophy, as a theory of reality; and he may be said, on this view, to have substituted for it the actual method by which the sciences of the real have advanced. What we are in search of is a hypothesis which will explain the facts. But, as Mr Balfour correctly observes, if we take hypothesis in the ordinary

scientific sense of the word, the immovable belief in orderly connection (identity of result where there is no relevant difference in the conditions) has never been treated as a hypothesis requiring verification—"a speculative conjecture about which doubt was a duty till truth was proved." "Beliefs like these are not scientific hypotheses, but scientific presuppositions, and all criticism of their validity is a speculative afterthought" (*cf.* pp. 205, 239). Nor can such a principle be verified in the ordinary sense, for the process of verification assumes it. It is well, therefore, not to stretch unduly the analogy between the procedure of the philosopher and that of the man of science. The term hypothesis had best be retained in its accepted meaning, which confines it to specific conjectures as to the connection of particular facts within the cosmos, conjectures which may be confirmed or refuted by specific evidence. It is difficult (and intelligibly so) to state the nature of the tenure by which we hold an ultimate conviction like that of the rational orderliness of the universe. The term "postulate" is not infrequently used, and might not be inappropriate; but, like hypothesis, it has already a technical meaning, which is apt to raise confusing associations. The more general term "presupposition," which Mr Balfour uses, would seem to be unexceptionable, unless it is considered to convey the suggestion of something blindly accepted, independently of the consequences which follow from it. The term "faith," for which there is much to be said, may also be held, on account of its traditional opposition to reason, as open to the same criticism. At all events, a critic might urge, it has the disadvantage of seeming to separate the inseparable and make the operation of reason depend upon an antecedent act of faith. Whereas, if we speak of faith in this connection, it is the active faith of reason in itself which we mean, and this faith may well be said to be of the essence of reason itself. A rational being cannot by any effort of his imagination place himself outside the pale of reason. To do so would be, in effect, to place himself outside the universe.

Mr Balfour says in his concluding chapter that if he were asked what "categories" would most fitly express his point of view, he would answer Providence and Inspiration, the latter being the one appropriate in the case of our beliefs. To use such categories, "defaced and battered," as he says, "by centuries of hard usage," is undoubtedly to run many risks; but I at least should have no difficulty in accepting the view that to be rational at all implies the presence to the individual reasoner of that Reason which is the "light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." But I do not know whether I should attach precisely the same meaning to the statement as Mr Balfour does. He comments upon the advantages, in the way of social co-operation and institutional community, which result from the fact that, in their formulas of belief, men do not necessarily believe exactly the same thing because they express their convictions in exactly the same phrases. In philosophy the introduction of popular terms often causes similar ambiguities without the same compensatory advantage.

Let us ask, then, in conclusion, what is the nature of the "Theism" which Mr Balfour conceives his argument to establish. He distinguishes sharply between the metaphysical and the religious conception of God, the former emphasising his all-inclusive unity, while the latter emphasises his ethical personality, and he adds, "it is the God according to religion, and not the God according to metaphysics, whose Being I wish to prove." He admits that many philosophers and some of the greatest religious teachers have held that the two conceptions can be harmonised, but he confesses that he has not himself succeeded in doing this to his own satisfaction. Accordingly, "when, in the course of these Lectures, I speak of God, I mean something other than an Identity wherein all differences vanish, or a Unity which includes but does not transcend the differences which it somehow holds in solution. I mean a God whom men can love, to whom men can pray, who takes sides, who has purposes and preferences,

whose attributes, howsoever conceived, leave unimpaired the possibility of a personal relation between Himself and those whom He has created" (pp. 20, 21). But although such are the lineaments of the God whose existence he is concerned to prove, I do not think Mr Balfour would claim that so much can be established by the argument developed in the Lectures. I doubt, indeed, whether results quite so definite can be yielded by any philosophical method. Mr Balfour ridicules philosophical theories which tend to regard God as "the logical glue which holds multiplicity together and makes it intelligible"; and one can recall idealistic arguments which lend colour to such a travesty. But it lies in the nature of the case that the conclusions of philosophical analysis are too general, too coldly abstract, in their character to satisfy the demands of practical religion. From an analysis of knowledge we may infer, as Mr Balfour infers, that to found reason upon unreason is intrinsically incoherent. But that does not in itself suffice to settle the question of the personality of God, still less a question like that of prayer. From an analysis of our æsthetical judgments and our ethical beliefs and practice we can infer that beauty and morality are not "accidents," but are founded in the deepest nature of things. But, again, the metaphysical conclusions which we can base even upon our ethical experience fall far short of the definiteness of popular religious conceptions—as the divergence among philosophers sufficiently shows. Perhaps the most that can be accomplished by such philosophical prolegomena is, by ruling out the various forms of naturalistic theory, to provide a congruous setting for science, morality, and art, and also for the higher religious life in which these main tendencies of our nature attain their consummation and consecration. And that is exactly how Mr Balfour has consistently described the scope and purpose of his intervention in the philosophic debate.

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VITALISM.

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In *Science Progress* for January 1915, Mr Hugh Elliot gives what he calls a "Survey of the Problem of Vitalism," and of the character of the arguments used on either side. The title is a misnomer. It should have been "A Vigorous Polemic against Vitalism," and then we should have known what to expect. Mr Hugh Elliot is known as a very enthusiastic partisan on one side of the controversy which he styles Mechanism *versus* Vitalism, and in any "Survey" made by him we might be sure that he would take care that the Whig dogs should not get the best of it; but still, the title "Survey" does imply a pose of impartiality. It prepares us for a statement of the arguments on both sides of the question, and Mr Hugh Elliot does in fact promise us such a statement; but he does not keep his promise. He trots out all the familiar arguments in favour of his own view, and gives no hint to lead his readers to suppose that they have all been answered; nor does he attempt to give any rejoinder to these answers. The presumption is that he cannot.

He begins by saying: "The whole problem is a survival of mediæval modes of thought, possessing no greater reality than the cognate problem of the site of the soul. It rests upon a totally false conception of the relation between mind and matter." This is pretty well for the opening of an impartial survey, a summary of the arguments on both sides; and it shows what a completely open mind Mr Elliot has.

When he says the whole problem, he does not mean the whole problem, nor any part of it. He means a prejudiced and question-begging statement of the way in which his adversaries' solution of the problem affects him. The problem does not and cannot rest upon a conception, true or false, of the relation between mind and matter. The problem is, What is the relation between mind and matter? and when Mr Elliot says the problem rests upon a false conception of this relation, he means that the solution proposed by his adversaries rests on a conception that he does not accept. The problem is whether this conception is right or wrong, and Mr Elliot begs this question in the opening sentence of his impartial survey—a curious display of impartiality.

There are many hypotheses of the relation between mind and matter, and one of these is interacting dualism, which Mr Elliot vituperatively calls Vitalism, and empties the vials of his wrath upon. On this hypothesis it is supposed that there are two substances, mind and matter, and that they act and react upon one another. It seems harmless enough, but under the name of Vitalism it excites Mr Elliot to the same pitch of fanatic hatred that was roused in his ancestors by Prelacy and Erastianism. What the true gospel is that he would have us believe, he has never yet revealed, and indeed it would appear that he has not yet decided upon it; but no doubt when he has finally come to a decision he will call down fire from heaven on all who do not agree with him.

Whether Mr Elliot denies that matter can act upon mind I do not know. He persistently ignores this aspect of the problem, although it has been brought to his notice; and he concentrates his attack upon the thesis that mind can and does act upon matter—that, in short, our conduct is impelled by motive and guided by reason. Those who are of this opinion he calls vitalists, and those who agree with him that motive and reason are powerless to sway human conduct he calls mechanists.

The whole problem as understood by Mr Elliot—it is really only half the problem, as I have pointed out to him before—is whether the mind can and does so act upon the brain as to originate and guide human conduct. Mr Elliot says it does not and cannot; that we are mere automata, our conduct determined by solely physical processes in which the mind has no part or lot beyond that of a passive spectator. The interacting dualist would say that Mr Elliot, in writing the article that I am now criticising, was moved and determined by some motive, and that it was this motive, this mental desire, or craving, or aversion, that set him in action. Moreover, the interacting dualist maintains that in marshalling his arguments, which seem in places to be the expression of a certain amount of intelligence, however distorted and misguided, Mr Elliot was directed by his own mental processes; that he was reasoning, not very soundly or cogently, but still to the best of his ability he was reasoning; and that if he had had no mind at all, he could no more have written the article than a tree could have written it. This Mr Elliot denies. He says that what moved him to write the article was a physico-chemical process in his brain, in which neither desire nor will nor intelligence was concerned except as a passive spectator, looking on, strangely enough, with approval, but taking no part whatever in the execution. Intellect is a mental process, an affair of mind; and no mental process, says Mr Elliot, can guide a pen, a material object. The article was produced by mechanism alone; it was a product of reflex action. Having regard to its close similarity with previous articles on the same subject by Mr Elliot, we must confess that there is a certain *prima facie* plausibility in this contention; but on examination it will not hold water.

"The mechanist," says Mr Elliot, "begins by pointing out that the whole course of science has led to the adoption of material forces alone, and the regular and uninterrupted substitution of material agencies for the spiritual agencies so copiously invoked by uncivilised races," with whom, as he

broadly hints, his antagonists the vitalists should be classed. In a previous discussion I have already answered this argument, and shown how utterly fallacious it is. It amounts to this: that since it has been found that the action of mind does not account for the movements of inanimate things, therefore it cannot account for the movements of animate things; but when Mr Elliot's arguments are met and destroyed, his only resource is to repeat them.

"With these processes [nervous processes in the brain] the spiritual will has no more to do than an inert and accompanying shadow. The nervous processes are the counterpart of the will and indistinguishable from it." In the first assertion Mr Elliot airily begs the whole question at issue, and states his own opinion as an indisputable fact. In the second, he contradicts the first. The first adopts the hypothesis of psycho-physical parallelism: the second is a statement of monism.

"The argument of the mechanist is based, therefore, mainly on the fact that spiritual intervention is a factor unknown to science." This is a trick much resorted to by weak controversialists, and has been borrowed by Mr Elliot from Professor Karl Pearson, who uses it *ad nauseam.* "Unknown to science" really means in their mouths no more than "distasteful to us." If they were candid, the very utmost they could say would be, "unknown to what we call science—unknown in the physical sciences, which are all the sciences we know anything about; in short, unknown to us." Did Mr Elliot never hear of mental science? and is mental intervention, which, to raise prejudice, he calls spiritual intervention, unknown to mental science? And, apart from this, what if the problem is not a problem in science at all? I have already shown to Mr Elliot that it is a problem not in science, but in metaphysics; and this Mr Elliot has admitted. Then how is the ignorance of science relevant to the question? Obviously, in the first place it is not true, and, in the second place, if it were true it would not be relevant.

There was once, we are told, an ancestor of Mr Hugh Elliot's who cocked his beaver and marched down the street declaiming:

"My name is little Jock Elliot,
My name is little Jock Elliot,
My name is little Jock Elliot,
And wha daur meddle wi' me!"

And so the descendant of this doughty swaggerer cocks his beaver and declaims:

"My name is Physical Science,
My name is Physical Science,
My name is Physical Science,
And wha daur meddle wi' me!"

Well, Mr Physical Science, you can get out. You have no business here. These matters are beyond you. Crow as loud as you please upon your own scientific dunghill, but do not presume to raise your voice on the fox-earth of metaphysics, or you are like to get your neck twisted for your pains. Mr Elliot says, in effect, that investigators in the physical sciences, investigating physical phenomena by physical methods, have found therein no evidence of the action of mind. Is it likely they would? Just so might a microscopist deny the existence of the stars, on the ground that they are "unknown to science," that is, to microscopical science. In deciding whether an object is or is not coloured, I, for my own part, should not accept the evidence of a blind man, nor should I accept the evidence of a man who had never had an opportunity of seeing it.

"When we invoke physical or chemical forces, we are dealing with things we understand; . . . we know what we are talking about. But when you invoke a spiritual or vital force, you are dragging in a new and unknown conception of which you have not the slightest knowledge, nor the slenderest rag of evidence for its existence." Shade of Berkeley! So Mr Elliot understands physical and chemical forces! Kindly make a note of that. He rests the main weight of his objection to what he calls vitalism on his inability to conceive how

mind can act upon matter. Since he cannot conceive how mind acts upon matter, he denies that it does act. This is his strongest argument, and he is never tired of insisting on it. But can he conceive how matter acts upon matter? Can he conceive how the sun attracts the earth through so many million miles of space? Can he conceive how oxygen combines with hydrogen? Can he conceive even how glue sticks to wood? He is dealing, he assures us, with things he understands. He knows what he is talking about. Then, Mr Elliot, perhaps you will explain; and when you have explained by what means the sun and earth attract each other, and by what means oxygen and hydrogen combine together, I promise you I will explain by what means the mind acts upon the brain. Gentlemen of the Scotch Guard, fire first! If you understand these things, of course you can explain how they happen; and if you cannot explain how they happen, then, by your own showing, they do not happen. Then when you invoke gravitation or chemical combination you are dragging in a new and an unknown conception of which you have not the slightest knowledge, nor the slenderest rag of evidence for its existence. *Habes.*

But then, says Mr Elliot, so many things that were once thought to be due to the action of spirits are now known to be due to the action of mechanical forces, that we may be quite certain that everything else that has been attributed to the action of mind will be found to be due to the action of mechanical forces. Like the rest of his arguments, this has been effectually answered before; but he takes no notice of the answer, and trots the argument out again as if it were conclusive. We may note in passing that his nomenclature, "spiritual influences," "spiritual agency," "spiritual initiative," is calculated to raise prejudice, and is no doubt intended to raise prejudice. If we substitute for "spiritual" the word "mental," which is what Mr Elliot really means, his argument comes to this: that since we have ceased to believe in the production by mind of movement in things that have no mind, therefore

we ought no longer to believe in the production by mind of movements of the human body, which has a mind. Whenever we have attributed the movements of mindless things to a hypothetical mind in these things, we have been mistaken; therefore we are equally mistaken in attributing to mind the movements of things that unquestionably have minds. This is Mr Elliot's argument. It is one of his two chief arguments. What is the value of an opinion that rests upon such arguments as this!

Then he plunges into irrelevancies about the reflex arc, and illustrates the molecular constitution of the brain by the simile of a number of billiard balls on a table. The illustration is something musty; but I will accept it, and show how easily it can be turned against him. He supposes a ball, without being struck, to move of its own accord and begin hitting other balls, and says that here we are in the presence of a miracle. So would say the yokel, who knows not that the ball is of steel, and that under the table there is an electro-magnet that can be magnetised and moved at will. Mr Elliot is indeed less pardonable than the yokel, for the yokel does not know that the magnet is there; but if he saw it, and saw that the balls followed its movements, he would scarcely be so foolish or so prejudiced as to deny, because he could not explain how it acted, that it did act on the balls. Mr Elliot does know that the magnet—the mind—is there. He does see that the movement of the balls—the cerebral molecules—follows the movement of the magnet; but as he cannot explain how the magnet acts upon the balls, he denies that it has any action. On the same ground he must deny that the sun exerts any action on the earth. I do not say that the mind is a magnet, or that the cerebral molecules are of steel; but I say that the analogy of the billiard balls can be made quite as consistent with the "vitalistic" as with the mechanistic hypothesis; and if experience had not shown me that the hope is vain, I should hope to hear no more of this analogy.

Mr Elliot next says there are arguments of an ethical character. "*If* the mechanistic theory is true, then there is no such thing as moral responsibility, and we are landed in a doctrine of fatalism." Mr Elliot, I find, can notice those of my arguments that he thinks he can answer, though he ignores those that he cannot answer. His answer to this argument is that a true theory is not falsified by having results that we deplore. I agree: but this is not my argument. My argument is that the test of the truth of an hypothesis is that conduct based upon it never brings us up against experience that is inconsistent with it. If it does, the hypothesis is untrue, and must be abandoned. Now the whole course of our lives is inconsistent with the doctrine of fatalism, and therefore of mechanism; and it is this result of our experience, and not repugnance to the doctrine of fatalism, that is the argument I advance. We constantly find our own conduct actuated by motives and guided by reason. The whole of our dealings with our fellow men and women is founded on the hypothesis that their conduct, like our own, is actuated by motives and guided by such reason as they possess. We constantly appeal to the motives—to the desires, aversions, wishes, hopes, fears, interests, and other states of mind—of those around us, on the hypothesis that they are free agents, and can and will modify their conduct in accordance with the attitude and working of their minds; and *experience never contradicts this hypothesis.* We always find that they do act in consonance with their mental attitude and processes. We may not, we often do not, assign their motives correctly, but we never find reason to believe that they are not actuated by some motive. We are compelled, therefore, to believe that the hypothesis is true, and we all, Mr Elliot with the rest of us, continue to act upon it. He may verbally deny his belief, but his conduct denies his denial. By acting on it he shows that he does believe it, however stoutly he may maintain that he does not. Conduct is the test.

"In the second place, past vitalists have cited direct intro-

spection as evidence of this theory. This contention is now almost wholly abandoned, and is recognised to be based upon a misunderstanding. When, by an act of will, we move an arm, we are conscious of two things: the act of will and the motion of the arm; no flight of introspection can disclose the process intervening between these events, and it is just these processes that are the subject of discussion; . . . we could not explain *how* we did it." This argument I have refuted before, but Mr Elliot trots it out again as if it were both new and conclusive. The refutation is childishly easy. "It is just these processes that are the subject of discussion." Yes, but it is not the *nature* of the processes that is the subject of discussion; it is the *existence*, it is the *occurrence* of the processes that is the subject of discussion. If we are to wait until we can explain *how*, in the sense of by what means, a process occurs before we can believe that it does occur, we cannot yet believe in any process whatever, not even in the process of a body falling to the ground. Thus I may paraphrase Mr Elliot's argument. "When we cut the string that sustains a weight, we are conscious of two things: the cutting of the string and the fall of the weight; no flight of observation can disclose the processes intervening between these events. We could not explain *how* it was that the weight fell." By what means the earth pulls the weight down to it we cannot imagine, but none the less are we certain that it was the cutting of the string that caused the weight to fall.

"The mechanism," says Mr Elliot, "has to be laboriously worked out by the physiologist." I have explained to him before, and must explain to him again, that in this matter the evidence of the physiologist is as irrelevant as the evidence of the astronomer or of the mineralogist. The matter is outside the realm of physiology. Physiology can carry us as far as the cerebral processes (about which, by the way, physiology knows very little), but then it is done. Whether the cerebral processes are or are not set in action by the mind is as com-

pletely outside the scope of physiology as whether matter does or does not exist. The problem is not a problem in physiology: it is a problem in metaphysics, and physiology has nothing whatever to do with it.

"If we want to know by what process a man performs a certain act, the proper scientific method is to look inside him and see." Really! Does Mr Elliot suppose that if he split a man's head open he would see the mind at work? Does he suppose that he would be able to ascertain, by actual observation, whether the mind does or does not act upon the brain? Does he suppose that he would see even the cerebral molecules? If I acquit Mr Elliot of such folly, it must be at the expense of his sincerity; and I cannot acquit him of an attempt, not the only one, to impose on the ignorance and credulity of his readers by making play with the word "scientific," the unfailing indication of the consciousness of a weak case. When a disputant hides himself behind the words "scientific," "unknown to science," "scientifically impossible," and so forth, it is a sure indication that he feels the weakness of his case, and is trying to bolster it up by frightening his opponents with a bogey. I can imagine the scorn with which Mr Elliot would treat the argument that his view is irreligious, or inconsistent with Scripture: I am affected in precisely the same way by his argument that "vitalism" is "unscientific" and "inconsistent with scientific truth," and so forth. It is not an argument. It is an attempt to raise prejudice. Science is not a little tin god. It is not even a body of irrefutable truths. It is a body of opinion, subject to continual revision. If the arguments in favour of vitalism are unscientific, or repugnant to the scientific spirit, or unknown to science, or scientifically impossible, all that these expressions mean is that the person who uses them thinks otherwise. If so, they are, or ought to be, founded on reasons. Very well, then let us have those reasons, and let us hope they will be more cogent than Mr Elliot's. Any reasons that scientific men, or other men, can bring forward, I shall be pleased to examine; but I

am not to be frightened by the bugaboo of scientific impossibility, especially in the realm of metaphysics. Mr Elliot need not trouble to prove that his arguments are scientific: let him show that they are reasonable; let him show that they are valid; let him show that they are borne out by the evidence; their "scientific" value will take care of itself.

It is true that by the nature of the case we can never have any direct evidence of the action of the mind on the brain, and so upon conduct; but we have abundance of indirect evidence, and it all points one way. In the first place, although we have no direct evidence that the mind acts on the brain, we have a plethora of evidence that the brain acts upon mind. Every normal sensation we experience is evidence of that. Sensations of light, sound, taste, colour, smell, temperature, and so forth, normally take place in the mind when and only when, as long and only as long, as the brain is set in action by stimuli on the organs of sense. It is all very well to call the sensation an epiphenomenon. We can call it a Mesopotamia if we like, but that will not alter the facts, which show indisputably that there is no insurmountable barrier between brain and mind. Communication in one direction is certain, and frequent, and free. If the "mechanist" alleges that there are valves between them which admit of communication from brain to mind but forbid communication from mind to brain, then his is the allegation, and on him lies the burden of proof. He cannot shuffle off this burden by asserting that there is no evidence: there is evidence; there is abundance of evidence. Every exertion of will that is followed by action is evidence. The whole course of human conduct is evidence. I do not say that it is irrefragable proof, but most unquestionably it is evidence. That we cannot picture to ourselves the *modus operandi* by which the mind modifies the action of the brain is no argument at all. It is neither proof nor evidence. If it were, we should be obliged to abandon all our beliefs in the commonest and most certain instances of causation. We must cease to believe that heavy bodies, when unsupported,

fall to the ground; we must cease to believe that wounds and bruises cause pain.

Another kind of indirect evidence, not so very indirect, has already been touched upon. It is extremely cogent, so cogent that it would take the most convincing evidence to the contrary to rebut it. It is the whole experience of every human being of his own conduct, and the whole experience of every human being of the conduct of others. We know by daily, hourly, and momentary experience that our own conduct is, in fact, originated, guided, and controlled by our own mental states and processes; that we act according to our desires, wills, aversions, beliefs, reasons, and so forth; and, acting on the supposition that the conduct of others is determined in the same way, we never meet with an experience that contradicts the supposition. I am quite willing to accept the assertions of physiologists that our movements are due to muscular action, which is due to nervous action, which is due to cerebral action; but there the physiologist must stop. He has reached the end of his tether, and is brought up with a round turn. Anything beyond this is *ultra crepidam*, and here he is no authority. He may say, if he pleases, as Mr Elliot says, that we are mere automata, and that with the same cerebral structure we should act in the same way, even if we had no minds at all; but here he is out of his element, and what he says as a physiologist carries no weight and is of no consequence. If this view is correct, what is mind for? What is the use of it? According to Mr Elliot, it is a mere ornamental appendage, that we should be just as well without: then how did we come to possess it? Mr Elliot, as a mechanist, must believe in the efficacy of evolution, of natural selection, of the survival of the fittest, for it would be highly "unscientific" not to hold these opinions, and Mr Elliot piques himself upon being before all things "scientific." Then how is it, if mind is of no use as an aid to survival, that man or any animal has acquired it and developed it? and how is it that intelligence increases and develops with the development of the physical animal? And

if mind does aid survival, how can it aid except by originating and guiding conduct?

It is quite clear that Mr Elliot does not himself believe the doctrine he says he believes, and no doubt thinks he believes, for his conduct does not harmonise with it. For why did he write the article that I am now answering, an article containing arguments that I have answered before, that Mr Elliot repeats as if they had never been answered, and that no doubt he will repeat again? He says he wrote it to influence the public, by which he means to act upon their minds. How? By their reading of it. But why should they read it? The only conceivable cause of their reading it is that they are interested in the subject; and interest is an attitude of mind. Reading is in part a bodily act: it is a phase of conduct. Mr Elliot, therefore, in writing the article, counted on that very power of mind to guide and control conduct which he denies.

Mr Elliot will, I am afraid, be annoyed by this reply. It will rouse his antagonism. Conclusive as its arguments are, he may even try to answer them, and to answer them will be a phase of conduct. A written answer can be made only by bodily movements; and to what will these movements be due? What will be the cause of them? They will be due to his *feelings* of annoyance and antagonism. They will be due to his *feeling* of chagrin at the demolition of his pet hypothesis. If he does not reply, to what will his abstention—his conduct in abstaining—be due? To the quiescence of his cerebral molecules? Not a bit of it. It will be due to the *knowledge* that he has no answer worth making. It will be because he is *ashamed* to repeat for the third time his twice-refuted arguments. In short, his conduct will be determined by his mind.

If, however, he should make up his mind—his mind, I say—to reply, I trust he will address himself to the question at issue, which is not whether we can conceive, or imagine, or understand, or picture to ourselves by means of billiard

balls and so forth *by what means* the mind acts upon the brain, but is *whether or not* the mind acts upon the brain. Whether or not we can understand or imagine the *modus operandi* of the action is beside the point. It is irrelevant. It has nothing to do with the case.

Mr Elliot's peroration about the expanding sphere of knowledge is very nicely put. I have heard it before, however; in fact, I used it myself some five-and-thirty years ago, when I was still in the stage, in which Mr Elliot lingers so long, of believing in mechanism, and fancying that what I could not conceive could not exist. The luminous sphere of knowledge does expand, it is true; but there is this peculiarity about it, that when we get quite to the boundary we find ourselves confronted by a metaphysical barrier that is quite impenetrable, but that nevertheless we contrive to surmount. Does matter exist? Berkeley proved that it does not, but confessed that we cannot help believing that it does, and acting as if it did. Do causes exist? Hume said that they do not, but acknowledged that we cannot help believing that they do, and acting as if they did. Does force exist? Professor Pearson says it does not, but nevertheless cannot help believing that it does, and acting as if it did. Does mind act upon matter? Mr Elliot denies it, but cannot help believing it, and acting as if it did. Speech was acquired by man in order that he might deny his beliefs; and therefore we estimate his beliefs, not by what he says, but by what he does. The test is conduct; and, judged by this test, it is indisputable that Mr Elliot does believe that mind acts on the brain, however honestly he may think that he does not believe it.

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PARKSTONE, DORSET.

THE HUMAN MIND *VERSUS* THE GERMAN MIND.

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SOME years ago, in one of our northern New England States, at the close of a ministerial convention the presiding officer called upon a stranger who had been present during its sessions for a few remarks. In response the "visiting member," after expressing his interest in all the proceedings of the convention, added, however, that there was one question which he desired permission to ask. "Brother Moderator," said he, "I have heard frequent reference made to what is, or is not, 'suited to the Vermont mind.' But I should like to be informed, in what respect does the Vermont mind differ from the human mind?"

It was a time of heated and even bitter theological controversy, and the resolutions passed by the majority in this theological conclave had been with a view to *standardise* the doctrine and the discipline of a religious denomination of churches with hundreds of thousands of members. The event proved that the attempt was not successful. Even the very day on which the convention—so the story runs—ended its sessions, one of its members was asked by a layman prominent as a judge and belonging to one of the churches of the same denomination, as to what the action of the convention had been. On his being told, "We have settled everything," ecclesiastical assurance was flustered by the judicial answer:

"Indeed! and have you settled me?" Nor was it long before those who had thus assumed to interpret and control the views of others found themselves in a decided and forsaken minority. Their mind had, temporarily and much to its own disadvantage, differed from the human mind.

Similar attempts to standardise thought characterise all of man's intellectual and social development. Indeed, it might be contended that constant attempts and sequent failures of this kind are essential to all such development. For unless numbers of individuals come somehow to think substantially alike, how shall theological creeds, schools of philosophy, and political platforms be enacted and emended; social customs be initiated and made to prevail; and great national issues set forth and contended for, whether by peaceful or warlike means? To act together, men must, within certain rather narrow limits, think alike. To elicit the emotions and the control of will, thought must be more or less standardised. But error in matters of fact, the warping of passion, the sinister influence of selfishness, dimness of spiritual vision, afflict all human effort at the standardising of thought. And, fortunately, there is always a minority—though it may be indiscernibly small—of protesters, a remnant of seers, by whom the sanity of the multitude may be in time secured.

So much of general disquisition does not seem, however, satisfactorily to account for the case we now have in mind. This is the case of modern Germany in its conduct of the present war. Its success in standardising the thought of the people lies back of, and accounts for, its success in unifying action, so much of the latter as has thus far been attained. To me this seems the most stupendous and antecedently incredible example of a nation brought to think in a way to which, for its veracity and sanity, the rest of the thought of the civilised world gives only the scantiest credit, or no credit at all, to be adduced from all human history. With regard to themselves, their merits, their relations to other Governments and peoples, the right and

wrong of their behaviour, modern Germany does not think of itself as pretty much all the rest of the world thinks of it, in all these regards. To-day the German mind is at wide variance, is at desperate odds, with the human mind. It appears as either superhuman or below the human. It is not in accord with the standards supplied by the great majority of civilised and conspicuously thought-directed mankind.

So seemingly sudden, and so thoroughly complete, has been this process of standardising the thought of the millions of a great and enlightened nation, that it calls for something more than the ordinary in the way of an explanation of the causes determining the evolution of national life. The civilised world has stood aghast at the immorality of much of the conduct of Germany. But in truth this conduct follows by logical necessity from, and its particular and concrete measures are in the main justifiable by, the standards of thought so firmly fixed in the minds of both its Government and its people. Granted the veracity of the thought, the atrocity of the conduct largely if not completely disappears. But the thought is more rank in its absurdity, both as to its premisses and its conclusions, than is the conduct in its immorality. So that the man who is sound in mind and morals feels compelled to say: "If so you really think, I will try to condone your immorality; but on no account will I think your thoughts after you."

There are also special reasons existing in the very mind of modern Germany why such a complete standardising of thought in contrast with, if not in violation of, all contemporary thought seems the more amazing. The fact itself is in apparent violation of an underlying principle of all development of thought. For Germany has until lately enjoyed — and surely not altogether unjustly — an almost exceptional reputation for the development of intellectual activity. But in general such activity leads to freedom of thought. Freedom of thought tends to differentiation, not to identification, or even to the stricter and more invulnerable

standardising of thought. Freedom of thought is opposed rather than favourable to the standardising of thought. Modern Germany is proud—and here again not altogether unjustly—of its superiority to all other nations for its thorough and compelling system of education, and for the peculiarly excellent form of culture which this education has developed in the nation at large. But all genuine education emphasises the development of the individual in the culture and control of his own judgment, both in the processes and as respects the conclusions at which the judgment arrives. Genuine culture develops men of individual initiative, independence of mind, and courage and skill in investigating and testing every kind of truth. And, in fact, while the culture of modern Germany has been distinguished by exceedingly few —almost no—names great in philosophy, art, or literature, and scarcely its due proportion of names great in the highest forms of scientific discovery or practical invention, it has had flourishing the greatest variety of opinions on all questions of Biblical criticism, historical and scientific fact, philosophical and theological truth. How shall we account, then, for this miracle of a universal, unquestioning, and in practical ways cowardly, *political* orthodoxy.

In this country the educated classes awoke with a shock of surprise at the discovery how completely the thought of the German nation had been united and confirmed in the holding of certain questionable and, to others, ridiculous assumptions and absurd and unmanly conclusions. That the Teutons excelled all others in their admirable race characteristics; that Germanic *Kultur* was far and away superior to every other form of national culture; that the institutions of modern Germany were adapted to be spread—if need be by force—over German colonies, over the rest of Europe, and perhaps later over the whole of the world; that the State, that is, Germany's form of the State, is an institution inherently superior to all moral principles other than its own aggrandisement;—these assumptions, and their corollaries,

and the rules of conduct that could be logically evolved from them, seemed to be taken for granted by the mind of the nation as the expression of its most fundamental and self-evident truths. But not one of them presented itself to the mind of America as a thought to be taken without a critical examination. Indeed, taken together, and as justifying the action which quickly followed, they seemed like the thought of a nation gone mad.

But at first these symptoms of mental insanity were not credited by those in this country who had been hitherto best acquainted with the mind of Germany. It is now nearly a year since the manifesto "To THE CIVILISED WORLD" by the celebrated ninety-three "representatives of German science and art" was discussed in a club of which the writer is a member. Of the twenty present, all but one or two had some good reason for sympathy with the manifesto. Two had married German wives; one was under appointment as German exchange-professor; the greater number had spent years of study in Germany and remembered with respect and affection their German teachers and university acquaintances and chums; all but one had many friends in Germany among the leaders of thought. With all these reasons for sympathy, and, as arising out of sympathy in intellectual lines, reasons for agreement in thought, there was only one of the twenty whose mind accorded, even in a somewhat guarded manner, with the mind of these ninety-three leaders of the science and art of modern Germany. But what was quite as remarkable, and even more by way of increasing the difficulty of this problem in the standardising of a nation's thought, was this. Not one of this score of representatives of American science and art could bring himself to believe that the nearly five-score men who claimed to speak "as representatives of German science and art" did really express the thoughtfully prepared mind of the German nation —Government and people as well. For, were there not in Germany several millions of voters who had repeatedly declared

themselves to be of a quite different mind; and millions more of the German people who had seemed hitherto quite incapable of being so suddenly changed in the temper of their thoughts? The puzzle was, then, twofold. How could this manifesto, although put forward by the leaders of the nation's thought, truthfully represent that thought? And if it did so represent Germany's thought, how could the German mind differ so conspicuously from the American mind?

During the past year many efforts have been made—some subtile and skilful, but others crude and blundering—to set before the leaders of thought in the United States and before the whole body of the thoughtful among the people, the mind of Germany in relation to the origins, issues, motives, and methods of waging this most horrid war. But a rather detailed and very carefully and sagaciously conducted investigation, made some months ago, showed that in academic circles, including not only "institutions of general learning" but also schools of theology and law, not more than about six per cent of the professors and instructors could be counted as even mildly pro-German; though, as one of this class said: "I think a good many of us feel a good deal of sympathy personally with the German people, and a deep sense of indebtedness to German scholars, whom we are very glad to count as our friends." This toll of academic opinions was taken before the horror of the *Lusitania*, before the alleged atrocities of the German armies in Belgium and France had been credibly established; and yet longer before the more atrocious wholesale murders of Armenians by the Turks—which must be credited largely, if indirectly, to German influence—had been revealed, or even perpetrated. Since Germany has set its standards of thought into the dreadful reality of practical life, and has evinced "pragmatically" the depth to which it has fallen away from all the political and social ideals which we had thought to be somewhat securely won by centuries of experiment with the methods of violence and bloodshed, the percentage of the leaders of

thought in this country who can think with approbation, not to say pleasurable complaisance, Germany's thoughts after the German pattern, has notably diminished. Probably the percentage of the people who can accomplish such a feat is not greater, even if it be so large.

And now, after more than a year of experience of strain and sorrow, which has had no parallel for magnitude since the world began, pretty much the whole civilised world has come to discern more clearly what *really is* the mind of modern Germany as expressed in the war. Every month has made it more and more clear that the war *is* an expression of the mind of the German nation, rather than of any particular class merely. Yet to the rest of the civilised world the assumptions of this "standardised thought" seem far enough from self-evident, and some of them seem absurd; the arguments seem inconclusive, and not a few of them silly; and most of the conclusions seem not simply false but, ethically considered, abominable. How has it come about that the German mind has got so far separated from the human mind?

The sincerity of belief with which practically the entire German nation clings to the standards of thought that are peculiarly its own, and the devotion to duty with which the sacrifices called for by the defence of this standard are endured, must be admitted at the outset, if any true explanation of this miracle of estrangement from the rest of mankind is to be attained. If "Germany above all" has now become Germany against all, this is because the thought of Germany as *rightfully* above all, and *in duty bound* to place itself, in fact, above all, has so mastered the thought and gripped the consciences of the nation as to engage it, and hitherto hold it firm, in a life-and-death struggle with its foes. And yet pretty much all the world outside of Germany's immediate influence agrees that in thought and morals the nation is sadly wrong, sure at last to fail disastrously, and to be punished deservedly. The problem involves us all in a quite inextricable way.

How *has* the mind of modern Germany come to differ in

such a startling and radical way from the great majority of the rest of civilised man? The answer must go back in history to the beginnings of the Prussian race. For by consent of all, both those who look on approvingly from the inside point of view and those who look on from the outside and disapprovingly, modern Germany has become thoroughly Prussianised. This is the confession or the boast of the self-understanding Germans themselves. It is also the concurrent testimony of all observers.

Now the Prussians have always, since they first became known to recorded history, been of a mind marked by certain strong racial characteristics. I am well aware that the very phrase "racial characteristics" is calculated in some quarters to occasion emotions of dubiety, in others of contempt. Nor are we disposed to deny that there is such a universal and compulsory form of mental working as may properly be dubbed "the human mind, the mind of all the races." But we are equally unable to deny that the conceptions which seem self-evident to some individuals and races seem not at all so to other individuals and races; and that the mental processes by which different individuals and races arrive at conclusions, and the formulas which they employ to state those conclusions, may be somewhat dubiously and loosely, and yet on the whole justifiably, classified under different heads. For example—and perhaps this is the most notable and incontestable of examples—there is an "Oriental mind." It is a human mind which, however, exhibits certain marked characteristics in its manner of discovering and standardising its thoughts on matters political and social, as well as, more especially, its views of the gods and of the universe of things and men. This mind has a keen insight into hidden or unobvious analogies; but it has little regard for scientific inductions made and tested by a rigid and restricted observation of facts. It reasons in figures of speech, but with scanty respect for the formulas of the Aristotelian formal logic. In its own way it appreciates and vindicates truths that are too

apt to escape the mind of the Occident. It has led the world in its apprehension of certain philosophical insights and religious mysteries, and in the sentiments and practices that respond to these insights and mysteries.

There is also a certain standardising of thought which may be called characteristic of the Latin races. It is embodied in romantic art and the Romance languages. It has dominated the social and political and religious development of Southern Europe. And there is an Anglo-Saxon mind, which we who are of that mind are perhaps too apt to think is the only thoroughly sane way of the working of the human mind. Hence, perhaps, the British characteristic of a kind of quiet contempt for the other human minds that have not standardised their thought in the British way — especially on matters political, social, and religious. Hence, perhaps, the British tolerance without sympathy, and the British skill in governing other races well, but without eliciting their warmest and most human affections.

But there is a very marked type of a Prussian mind. And this Prussian mind has been marked by identically the same strong racial characteristics from the very beginning of its history. For centuries it was a temper rather than a thought, an habitual and unquestioningly authorised way of doing things. Only in comparatively recent times has this Prussian mind definitely standardised itself in the form of theory, and of national ideals, and methods of realising ideals, which justify themselves—or at least aim to do so—as logically legitimate deductions from the parent theory.

How shall we describe this Prussian mind in its incipient and earlier stages of formation, when, as yet, it was more a racial instinct, a blind impulse, a pressure (*Drang*) toward a destiny that was strongly felt as pressure but not clearly comprehended in thought or seized as a motive, conscientiously approved, by an enlightened purpose? The answer is, I think, not difficult; nor are the sources for the correct answer especially obscure. The characteristic of the Prussian mind

has always been that of a passionate and immoderate Will. The typical Prussian has always been a man who drives toward the accomplishment of his ends by the use of all necessary force (and quite too often, alas! much unnecessary violence), without heeding the refinements of humane sentiment or the moderation of a truly cultured reason. This, I say, always has been and still is the fundamental characteristic of the Prussian mind. It was characteristic of the Teutonic "robber knights" who, while they won the country to Christianity (*sic*), divided its land among themselves and promptly began to exterminate each other in the attempt of each one by fire and sword to subject the others to *his* will. It was characteristic of the first of the Hohenzollerns when by fire and sword they reduced the rebellious knights and "created an absolutely centralised State ruled by the sword." It has been characteristic of the Hohenzollerns even since. Prussia's most Christian order of knights was known as the "Knights of the Sword." All the growth of Prussia was made by enforcing upon others the will of its powerful rulers; and for the enforcing of that will there have seldom been any scruples about a prompt resort to methods of craft and violence. The keynote of the Prussian traditional thought as to the way to found, to conduct, and to aggrandise the body social and political, is sounded every time the present ruler virtually declares: "Such is *my will*; and the army is mine to *enforce* it. For is not my will the expression for the nation, as the wills of my glorified ancestors have been, of the Divine Will?" (*N.B.* It is Will, and not Reason or Love, as the choicest essence of Divinity, which is appealed to in this way.)

Now it is true that all great modern states and empires have arisen on a basis of internal disorders and almost ceaseless strife with neighbouring or invading tribes. But in Europe, and certainly also in America, no other modern nation retains, to the same extent, the same confident use of a forceful will, unrestrained by tenderness of humane feeling, unrefined by

scruples of conscience or delicacy of æsthetic ideals, and unchecked by moderation from considerations of reasonable limits in the conduct of all human affairs.

The era of blind unconscious will has been superseded in a Prussianised Germany by a definite standardising of thought in the form of a theory from which one may, more or less logically, reason to conclusions that justify the expressions of the same will. But this is, both for the individual and for the race, the natural order of mental development. It is not already standardised thoughts which chiefly govern the resolutions, emotions, and practical activities of men. The fact is, the rather, that desires, sentiments, and deeds already accomplished get themselves, by experiment with them, thrown into forms of thought which may serve to explain and justify these more fundamental and less consciously purposeful activities. In the living experience of individuals and of multitudes, the spring of passion, the drive of desire, the wish or the will to have it so, if not, more rarely, some divinely promoted flash of insight, suggests the thought; and then, by what little it knows of strict logical procedure, the mind attempts to justify, modify, or condemn the thought.

Now modern Prussianised Germany has rendered this homage to its own hereditary and characteristic passionate, unsentimental, immoderate Will. It has standardised the appropriate corresponding thought in a conception of the ideal State, and in an elaborate theory as to what this State ought to be and ought to do. It has given to this abstract conception the spiritual qualities of a mystical, but at the same time very substantial and concretely efficient, "Over-Soul." To this Will all "majesty and might" are with awe, if not in any true spirit of reverence, "duly ascribed." To its Over-Soul belongs the inherent right to set aside all the covenants, pleas for justice and mercy, all the rules which have come to be considered as morally binding upon the consciences of civilised man. This truly "terrific ego," this non-moral Source of a "higher morality," this lawless Will which has now come to the con-

sciousness of its divinely imparted right to enforce obedience from all to its own will, is enthroned as the guiding genius of modern Germany. The *Hochgeborene* among the nation's rapidly increasing population, the officer in its army and navy and civil service, are encouraged or commanded to be imitators of this same terrific ego. And, being imbued and inspired by this conception of an Over-Soul, the professors in the universities and the children in the common schools have been learning to know how great a thing it is just to be a Prussianised German, and to think and act accordingly.

For it must be understood that modern Germany has not attained to this miracle of the standardising of its national thought about itself, about its relations to others, and about its destiny to be realised through an improved and enlarged but still characteristically Prussian *Weltpolitik*, without passing through two generations of painstaking education. And the aim and the method of the education imparted by the State have been made to correspond to the conception of the State in which the Prussian will had given form to thought. The mind of Prussianised Germany has been stimulated to freedom of thought, especially in all ways which should give a greater practical efficiency to the State, and should contribute to its aggrandisement and elevation in the esteem of other nations; but it has not been left free to dispute the thought of the State about itself, or free to abridge the exercise of those practical rights and duties which followed logically from the conception itself.

Frederick the Great was in his own person, so far as any individual person could well be, the embodiment of a passionate and determined will, guided by a crafty intellect, but not swerved from its purpose by æsthetical sentiments or ethical scruples. All his royal life he acted according to the principles which we have described as lying latent in the character of the Prussian mind. The thought of this mind he formulated more definitely in the writings of his later years. Reflection now revealed to him more clearly the standards to which his policy

had conformed less consciously hitherto. The Prussian State was a political whole which must win territory, and grow in population and wealth, by its own mighty will to live, and by all needed force and craft ever to live more abundantly. The nation was a "terrific ego," always in arms; and for it "every advantageous war was a good war." The characteristics of the race and of its ruling house were concretely personified in Frederick the Great. But in standardising his thought Frederick the Great did not get much beyond Machiavelli; he had not *arrived* at the conception of an ideal Over-Soul; he had not elaborated the theory that the World is—not Reason or Goodness immanent and enthroned, but just blind Will.

Essentially the same conception of the State, as a passionate Will, embodied in a governing autocracy and having the right and the duty to realise itself by methods of "blood and iron," was the frankly avowed guide of Bismarck and of those who, with him, inaugurated and built up the modern German Empire after the Prussian pattern. In the initiation and the conduct of the present war also, Germany, both Government and people, thinks of itself as Prussia has thought of itself from the beginning of Prussian history down to the present hour.

It is not necessary to trace in detail the expansion of the Germanic conception of the State, the thought which the nation has standardised in so marvellous perfection, under the influences of philosophy, poetry, and the various forms of science and art. The World is Will; the only spring and guide of reasonable conduct is the "will to live"; the "Overman" is the man who, by his might of will, raises himself to a place of pre-eminence above the laws of current conventions and ordinary morality; the right of control from the rulers of the nation, and the duties of obedience from the people of the nation, are without limit external or superior to the Will of the Over-Soul, which is the idealised nation itself: these and similar doctrines have been promulgated by academic circles and spread far and wide among all classes of the people. Stated beyond all possi-

bility of mistaking its sinister meaning, such is the political philosophy which has been growing in influence for the last fifty years in modern Germany. This is summed up by Treitschke at the beginning of his book *Politik*: "It will always redound to the glory of Machiavelli that he has placed the State on a solid foundation, and that he has freed the State and its morality from the moral precepts taught by the Church, but especially because he has been the first to teach: 'The State is Power.'" From this standardised conception of the State follows logically the defence of the recent treatment of Belgium. For if the Over-Soul has no morality, is not a moral agent, and cannot be bound by principles of honour, what is more obvious than Treitschke's conclusion concerning the sacredness of treaties? "Every State," says he, "reserves to itself the right of judging as to the extent of its treaty obligations."

But political philosophy, when expounded only in technical form, cannot be made to convince of its truthfulness, or inspire with the glow of patriotism, the great multitude of the people; therefore, to the standardising of the same thought the poetry of modern Germany has been largely consecrated. Even as long ago as 1842 Heine foresaw into what a monster of passionate and unscrupulous Will this Prussian infant in time might be destined to grow:

> "Germany's still a little child,
> But he's nursed by the sun though tender;
> He is not suckled on soothing milk,
> But on flames of burning splendour.
>
> One grows apace on such a diet,
> It fires the blood from languor;
> Ye neighbours' children, have a care
> This urchin how ye anger."

Education has converted this spirit of Jingoism into a solemn consecration to a supreme duty. The "terrific ego" is in childhood inspired with the devotion of a Christian martyr. The Prussianised German child can scarcely more

than lisp before he begins singing military songs, and playing the war game with skilfully prepared toys. He is taught to declare with gusto:

> "Full soon shall I be lying low
> With many a comrade true."

But that will be all right, since such is my duty, joyfully to be performed at any time. For

> "I have given all I have and am,
> My heart, my head, my hand,
> To you for which I like and love,
> My dear old Fatherland."

Now there is something splendid about this utter devotion to an ideal, something which reminds us of the much and justly praised Bushido of the Japanese *samurai* or of the mediæval knight. But alas! in Germany, as in modern nations generally but even more abundantly, this devotion has been prostituted to the uses of covetous hearts and hands itching for material spoils won by no matter how much violation of others' rights, and at the cost of no matter how much violence and expenditure of "blood and iron." Thus prostituted and enforced by aristocrats and professors upon clodhoppers and babes, how ridiculous, and yet how pathetic! And how appalling is the misuse of the divine gift of human reason which can not only plan and execute, in the heat of conflict and under orders, the horrors of the *Lusitania* and the murder of Nurse Cavell, but can coolly justify, with elaborations of a perverted intellect, the grounds of such atrocities! Worse than the deed, and more hopeless of cure, is the mind that can construct, and confide in, this kind of argument.

More astonishing than the feat of standardising thought as represented by modern Germany's conception of its superior Self are not a few of the particular claims and conclusions (in certain instances most amusing) derived from this conception by what the prevailing German mind seems to regard as valid processes of reasoning. We have almost rubbed our

eyes sore in amazement at the utterances in Germany and in this country of the German press. We knew that the press of Germany was subsidised and controlled by the Government. We knew that many of the Germans in this country were striving hard to keep up, in themselves and in their children, respect and affection for the friends, the language, the art, and the institutions of the Fatherland. But how could any influences make minds to order that should reason and discourse with so little respect for their readers' intelligence and common sense? Surely there must be some queer "kinks" in the working of the unregenerate German mind.

There are two minor characteristics of the Prussianised German mind which seem to me to afford help in the psychological solution of such questions as those raised just above. They are a deficiency in the sense of humour and a lack of a certain kind of what is sometimes called "common sense." It is no new discovery in literary criticism that the comic thought of modern Germany, whether expressed in words or in pictorial form, is for the most part devoid of the delicacy of the French and of the kindliness of the English. But, to quote a fine characterisation from a modern English writer: "Your sense of humour, that delicate percipience of proportion, that subrident check on impulse, that touch of the divine fellowship, is a thing of mellower growth. It is a solvent and not an excitant. It does not stimulate to sublime effort; but it can cool raging passion. It can take the salt from tears, the bitterness from judgment, the keenness from despair." That the typical Prussian is capable of being stimulated to "sublime effort," and of accomplishing many praiseworthy and glorious deeds in this way, the history of Prussia through all its past, and the history which is to-day being made by a Prussianised Germany, evinces abundantly. At the same time there is less and less evidence, whether in words or in conduct, of that delicate "percipience of proportion, that subrident check on impulse, that touch of the divine fellowship" with human frailty, which

result from "the mellower growth" of the sense of humour. Raging passion shows no sign of cooling; the impulse to the boast and strut of conscious superiority is not much checked by the dawning awareness of how ridiculous its indulgence makes one in the eyes of others; and no acknowledgment of self-pity for one's own frailties or of pity for the frailties of others appears as yet, to take the saltness from tears, the bitterness from judgment, the keenness from the fear of the approaching shadow of despair.

If by that vague phrase "common sense" we mean practical efficiency and shrewdness and promptitude in seizing opportunity, probably no nation can compete with modern Germany on equal terms. Germany's rivals in trade, and her enemies in the present war, would have been much better off with respect to their preparedness and their accomplishments if they had possessed a larger fraction of the "common sense" of modern Prussianised Germany. For, as all can now see, modern Germany is no longer the land of Goethe, Beethoven, and Kant, but the successful champion of organised practical efficiency.

But sometimes we take a more spiritual view of the ordinary and often much-despised collection of mental qualities called "common sense." Then it becomes a certain way of judging and acting that has regard to other and higher qualities of human nature than those necessary for a so-called "practical efficiency." Then the individual, or the collection of individuals, which has an exaggerated sense of its own importance and value in this big Universe, is known to show a mortal lack of common sense. Then a certain deep humility before both God and mankind at large, and a more proportionate estimate of values, seems demanded by the minimum of common sense. Yes, then faith in the ideals of the spirit and calm confidence in their triumph, even after long and weary centuries of depression and defeat, seem not denied to the most ordinary common sense. Such a collection of qualities certainly is not conspicuously prevalent and controlling in the

mind of modern Prussianised Germany. But human history, when taken in the large and generous way, shows that *this sort* of common sense, with its clearer sight of the final issues, and its tendency to moderation, has its own great value in contributing to practical efficiency. And, doubtless, history will renew its endeavour to teach the same truth to individuals and to nations, over and over again.

But Prussianised Germany is very young, and, being young, is very raw through lack of the chastening of experience in its more recent past. And its standardised thought has been pragmatically sanctioned in the mind of modern Germany. Verily, it has *worked* very successfully. It has bound a multitude of small and jealous and conflicting principalities into a great and powerful Empire. It has made a poor people, relatively devoid of commerce and manufactures, and even of agriculture on a magnificent scale, into a rich and mighty nation, the admired and dreaded competitors of all others for the world's trade and productive energies. It has made a weak State the most powerful in the world as respects its army, and next to the most powerful as respects its fleet. No wonder, then, that it has full "pragmatic sanction" in the minds and hearts of the overwhelming majority of its people.

And we shall be guilty of no unintelligible, not to say unpardonable, paradox if we say that this miracle of an achievement in standardising the thought of a nation has been not a little aided by the way in which it has *failed to work*. For an important part—perhaps the most important part—of this thought is its *Weltpolitik*. The world-policy of modern Prussianised Germany had become a mind, and a comprehensive and unscrupulous propaganda, to embrace and hold fast all men and women of German blood, to retain their loyalty, and to use them, backed up by force when the opportune time came, and if the open or concealed wiles of diplomacy did not avail, for the strengthening and spread of the nation's standardised thought. Now, of course, in this way the mind of Germany came into a condition of distrust

and resentment with the mind of the rest of mankind. For no people are so very ready to confess their great inferiority to others when it is proclaimed aloud and "rubbed into" them in numerous irritating ways. And the Teutonic propaganda, like the Prussian mind, has rather uniformly shown itself in many irritating ways. Again, few people are so consciously weak as graciously to bow to the behests of a passionate will, however directed by a keen and scientifical turn of intellect, if unrestrained by moral considerations and untempered by tact and good sense.

And, in fact, the mind of Prussianised Germany has everywhere failed to commend itself by the way it has worked, outside of Germany itself. Everywhere they have gone, the Germans have failed to establish the German mind in anything like fair competition with the mind of the peoples among whom they have gone. This is true, even among peoples like Hungary, whose Government is as truly autocratic as that of Germany itself. In countries under so different a government as that of the United States, they have either concealed or abandoned the Prussian manners and Prussian mind, or they have become objects of suspicion and dislike. For somewhat similar reasons have the German attempts at colonisation been uniformly distinct failures, so far as the conversion of other minds to the German type has been concerned.

This failure to work, instead of operating to induce to some changes the standardised thought of Prussianised Germany, has only filled with increased rage and jealousy its Prussian type of a passionate and immoderate Will. Its confidence in the veracity and sanity of this, its national mind, seems hitherto undiminished. Its dutiful worship of a non-moral conception of an Over-Soul appears, in spite of whatever suffering and losses it may have brought, as intense as ever. Undiminished hate, unsweetened jealousy, continue to widen the separation between the mind of a Prussianised Germany and the mind of a civilised world.

After the war is over, and its issues have been settled into

a state of relative permanency, what will the result be as affecting this difference between the mind of one people and the human mind? If this standardised thought of a State whose right is might, whose head is a divinely appointed war-lord, whose army is its glory, and its chief end its own aggrandisement, wins in battle, will the world's mind be won over to the characteristic thought of the Prussian mind? It should be so if this type of pragmatic philosophy is true philosophy for the State to espouse. But if the thought fails in the end to lead to victory those who have put their faith in it, will modern Germany conform its mind, as to its own place and rights and destiny, more nearly to the judgments of the mind of civilised man? Who can tell? Not he whose final test of truth in social, political, and international matters is the issue of a battle or of a series of battles. We may condemn the unpreparedness of the Allies, and admire the practical efficiency of their enemy, but we are not converts to any form of pragmatism that could, in any event, induce us to bring our mind into deference to the mind of a Prussianised Germany. Nor do we believe that the issue of this war, or of any series of wars, will convince the advancing mind of civilised man that the "State is Power," that Might is Right, and Right not mightier than any amount of civil and military power; or that there are not higher and worthier qualities of the individual and of the nation than scholastic learning, scientific attainments, and practical efficiency.

Therefore at the last the mind of a Prussianised Germany will have to adapt itself to the better mind of civilised man. Another standard of thought will have to displace that which now guides and controls this passionate Will to live and grow.

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THE DEFINITE FAILURE OF CHRISTIANITY, AND HOW IT MIGHT BE RETRIEVED.

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What Christianity has definitely failed to do, after nineteen centuries of trial, is to redeem human life from the worst of its evils. The Christianity which has failed is Christianity as it has prevailed up to date, a Christianity founded on the apotheosis of suffering and the multitude of doctrines associated therewith. But there is another Christianity, or at least another religion, founded on the cult of joy, and unburdened with any doctrines which have to be "harmonised with science," for it is in harmony with science from the first. This deeper Christianity, or religion, has neither failed nor succeeded—for the simple reason that, unlike the form that has failed, it has never been fairly tried. The proposal of this paper is that it should be given a trial forthwith. It may be that the only way which could lead mankind to this new Christianity, with its promise of success, was the Via Dolorosa of the old Christianity with its long record of failure, now definitely stamped as final by the war. The war has given the signal that the day of the negative is closed. The hour has struck for the positive to arise.

Anyone who notes carefully how Christians have accounted for the war cannot fail to be puzzled by the complacency

with which they have accepted it, and the indignation with which they have repudiated the suggestion that they ought to have averted it. Not only do many of them avow, without a shadow of shame, that they were utterly helpless to turn the human energies which it is absorbing into other channels, but they call it a Divine providence for purging Europe of her iniquities.

But what purification can be wrought by the commission of unexampled crimes on an unprecedented scale, and by the slaughter of all the noblest youths among the peoples who are at issue with one another? When the Germans invaded Poland many of the peasants burnt themselves alive, in their miserable huts, in order that they might not fall into the hands of "the devils in grey." Myriads of old men and women and children like themselves had been murdered, or maimed, or robbed of everything which made life desirable. What was there to hope for? Even God had forsaken them. Their picture, "the Heart of the Heart of Poland," to adore which, only for five minutes, they had made many and many a weary pilgrimage to the little shrine at Czenstochowa, had been wrenched from its frame; and in its place there now hung a portrait of the Kaiser to which brethren of theirs had been made to bow down. Prayer was of no avail, and human aid there was none which could deliver them from the doom that threatened them; and as the hungry flames devoured them they counted themselves happy to have escaped the more awful fires that were reddening the horizon, and to become deaf for ever to the unceasing thunder that grew louder and louder as the glare mounted and waxed and blotted out the sky.

The anguish of these villagers constitutes only one drop in the ocean of misery to which the fighting has given rise. No one who really cared for the sufferers and was determined to promote the welfare of the peoples of Europe could see any good whatever in the tortures they have endured, or in the atrocious deeds which have occasioned these. The war is an

unmixed and unqualified evil; and there is no Christian, sanctify it as he may now it has taken place, who would not have prevented it had he understood the temper of the nations who are engaging in it, and known how to utilise this for beneficent purposes. Inasmuch as they have displayed no such understanding and energy and ingenuity, Christians must charge themselves with definite failure to make their religion efficacious—failure, too, in the province of activity that is peculiar to them. It is in the immaterial region of ideas that religious people ought to be strong and efficient. Their vocation consists in creating and maintaining a system of ideas that excludes hatred and malice and all uncharitableness. Their peace and goodwill ought to pervade the world irresistibly like sunshine; and they ought to make their universe of genial and robust thoughts so attractive that even outlaws of the German stamp feel its charm, and wish and strive to be both in it and of it; and there is no doubt that if, within the last forty years, they had spent a third of the trouble and cleverness on producing such an atmosphere that the nations of Europe have devoted to the science and art of war, no human heart could have entertained any of the brutality by which men are discrediting civilisation to-day.

The apology that many Christian leaders make for their failure is that the responsibility belongs to their followers. "We have piped unto you," they cry to the people, "and ye have not danced; we have mourned to you, and ye have not wept." They claim that they have preached the word faithfully, and that their congregations have heard and understood it, but are too selfish and weak-willed to act upon it. How to move the will to follow the good counsel that is given at church is the great problem which the pastor is always trying to solve. This way of asking himself the question shows that he has not grasped the psychology of his task. This he could learn by observing how discipline is maintained in smaller communities than those that come within the clergyman's jurisdiction. If he studied the

government of a school, for instance, he would find that the staff secured the fulfilment of their wishes by bringing about a fine public spirit, not by pointing out moral delinquencies and telling the children to be good, thereby suggesting that wrong-doing is a recognised part of what goes on in the classrooms and playgrounds. The will is not an entity which can act by itself out of relation to the contents of the mind as a whole. It is merely the momentum which those contents acquire as they become systematised.

Since conduct is initiated and guided not by single ideas, or by a mysterious kind of homunculus called the Will, but by many trains and clusters of ideas, it is evident that if men systematically shut all thoughts of enmity out of their minds and cultivated benevolence until it became the mental atmosphere in which everyone lived and moved and had his being, they would no longer bring disease and wars and famines and other miseries into existence. Hitherto men have lived largely in a pain economy, and all the older religions have actually commanded them to do so. Before man had achieved any mastery over nature he was overawed by the forces against which he had to contend to keep his frail body alive. He was afraid to believe generously and unreservedly in happiness, for he always found that if he did, unexpected and crushing disappointments fell to his lot. He therefore fancied that the gods were jealous of him, and that for every enjoyment he had some penance must be performed. Surrounded on all sides by fearful enemies, animate and inanimate, he was totally unable to form the conception of conquering nature and reconciling all men to himself. He not only accepted the evils that menaced him from day to day, but worshipped them and invented many a foolish proverb about them, such as "Troubles never come singly," or "Man is born to trouble as the sparks fly upward." The religions of the world all counselled man to take this helpless attitude towards inexorable fate; and the priest, who, like all other specialists, has always known but little about his own

professional motives, has encouraged everyone to assume it because their weakness drove the people to the sanctuary. Hence the opposition that the Church has offered, from time to time, to progress and enlightenment. The clergy believed in misery, and thought that crucifixions improved human nature; and they deemed it sacrilege for a man to take his destiny into his own hands. Similarly, doctors of medicine used to think that illness was a divine discipline. They never attempted to prevent infection, and they regarded surgical operations as an impious interference with the dispensations of God. Before the time of Florence Nightingale the wounded were left, as a rule, to die untended on the field of battle; and to this day there are physicians who consider it wicked to analyse the mind of a neurotic patient in order to remove anxieties and obsessions of which, they imagine, he ought to rid himself by exercising self-control; while the general public still regard certain maladies, particularly those which attack children, as unavoidable, and take no pains to adopt either preventives of or remedies for many small infirmities that circumscribe their activities and diminish their happiness. But now that they have achieved such things as the discovery of anæsthetics and antiseptics and the making of the Baghtche Tunnel and the Panama Canal, men are beginning to acquire a sense of power that has enabled them to form the bold conception of a happiness instead of a pain economy. What is there to prevent artificers who have wrought such miracles from recognising that everyone has a vocation and a place in the community that no one else can fill, and that no one need ever go through any part of his life without being loved and appreciated, and having all his virtues and talents fully developed? Nothing but old, very old superstitions about the necessity of disease and war and over-population and pauperism and other afflictions to which the world has become accustomed. A thorough belief in universal happiness would dispel these nightmares with magic rapidity.

What the religionists of to-day have to do to make this ideal effective is, to leave enmities and complaints alone and give their whole energy to the promotion of charity and good-will. They must imbue the minds of all men with peace and bonhomie and cheerfulness, and with hope for every living creature that exists now or ever will exist in the future. They must aim not at the greatest happiness of the greatest number, but at the greatest happiness of everyone; and they must never for a moment consider this enterprise extravagant. The war has opened up vast regions to the imagination. The Italian Alpini are occupying mountain peaks which not even a chamois or a mule can reach. They track out paths, on the face of the cliffs, along which they carry large quantities of food and munitions; and amid the ice and fog and snow they will make themselves at home, for weeks together, not only prosecuting the dire business of war, but also playing merrily at laying out streets and gardens, and living as ordinary civilians. In another theatre of the war there is a wonderful hospital for resting tired and slightly wounded men. The buildings comprise a church, a playhouse, and a library; a chiropody, a dental, and an ophthalmic department; a tailor's, a barber's, a tinsmith's, and a carpenter's shop, and various other establishments, every one of which forms a trade in itself of no mean dimensions. To men whose faith is equal to achievements like these "all things are possible"; and the war has proved that such workers are to be counted actually by the million. There is nothing Utopian, therefore, in the suggestion that a movement for bringing about the well-being of everybody in the world should now be started. The men and women who have carried on the war have only to be convinced of the necessity, the possibility, and the desirability of joy for everyone, and they will make it a reality.

When martinets argue that joy, if one has much of it, is demoralising, they are assuming that one man's good is bought, necessarily, at the expense of another's. But a closer study of individuals than even psychologists have yet attempted

would show that everyone is very different from everyone else. Each can fill some niche that no one else could occupy so well; and there need be no competition, between either individuals or nations, which involves envy on the one hand and self-sacrifice on the other. To find the particular work and the social position that suits any given man or woman is not so difficult as it seems, for ambitions are limited by experience. An artisan who maintained himself, his wife and five children, on wages amounting to 30s. a week was asked, once, under what circumstances he would be perfectly happy; and his answer was, "If I had my present income all the year round and were never out of work." Few people like being removed from the environment with which they are familiar; and if, by a royal decree, perfect freedom to choose his own way of life could be granted to everyone, the proclamation would not make the ploughman wish to be a barrister, or the cheesemonger to be a physician, a member of parliament, or a dignitary of the Church. If consulting psychologists were employed at the Labour Exchanges and industrial methods of supplying the wants of the population were modified in favour of less mechanical and competitive ones, it would not be at all impossible for everyone to obtain employment which gave him full satisfaction. The clergy could foster this contentment by telling stories to their people about fine workmen like William Morris and Mr Edward Carpenter, by showing how work faithfully done benefits the community, and by cultivating in their parishioners the æsthetic pleasure that everyone feels, to a certain extent, in seeing others happy and prosperous. To set the actions of the individual in their big social framework is an important part of the clergyman's duties to-day. It is the vision of themselves as members of a great and heroic society which has enabled women munition makers to acquire strength and skill which only men possessed before, and youths to learn military arts in two or three months which no one has mastered, hitherto, in less than two or three years. "They

never had to be told twice," a serjeant-major said of his recruits. "They got the idea at the first jump. They WANTED to be good soldiers. They never broke bounds, and they never got drunk, and they never groused; and they could hold their rifles on the third day."

That spirit the workers will need when they again have to face unemployment and privation after enjoying the extravagantly high wages that the war has brought them; and the minister it is who ought to be inculcating that patriotism and saving the country from civil war. If, years ago, he had brought home to the people their responsibility for each other's happiness, public spirit would have become so powerful that statesmen, journalists, and trade-unionists could not have postponed the interests of the nation to their personal concerns in the day of the greatest peril that men have ever had to confront; and if his efforts had been international, the war could not have occurred. Sins against the happiness of anyone whomsoever kindle resentments that recoil on the offender, at any rate indirectly, by corrupting the society to which he belongs. So far from being demoralising, joy is a power which can make a brotherhood of all the nations of the earth. Repression fosters brutality, and sorrow is unsocial; but joy can give all men a share in the fellowship of humanity.

In order to make universal joy possible, Christians must elaborate machinery for the expression of love as vast and intricate as that which Germany has contrived for the expression of hate; and they must be careful to bring that country within the scope of its operations. The day on which Bismarck said, "Leave your enemies nothing but their eyes to weep with," was one of the days on which the Germans definitely renounced Christianity. In a really Christian country a statesman who expressed such a sentiment as that would be dismissed, in consequence of it, at once. It is a mistake to ignore a savage pronouncement of that kind. A single word of hatred, like a single word of kindness, has a significance, both historical and prospective, that is far greater than the occasion

on which it was uttered. It belongs to a wide circle of ideas which add themselves up and arrange themselves into constellations; and these, in time, acquire tremendous power.

A sudden orientation of one's thoughts which appears to change one's nature is not uncommon. A woman who is wrapt up in some profession which requires narrow specialisation of an intellectual character may forget all about it and become a first-rate nurse if a relative becomes ill and requires her care; and, having once taken the step, she does not turn back, and does not regard her new labours as distasteful or unsuited to her powers. Likewise the soldier, having identified himself with the army, braves the storm of battle whatever his occupation may have been before his country was threatened by the enemy, because that now is his work. He envisages himself as the hero who faces danger without flinching. He belongs to the dreary trench and the ghastly battlefield, and they to him; and to run away from them would be to forsake himself.

These facts ought to be a solace to any clergyman who doubts that he possesses the power to make and preserve and continually renew a system of wholesome thoughts, for others as well as for himself, into which evil intentions cannot enter. Merely changing the point of view from which his parishioners regard themselves and the rest of the world can effect antipodean alterations in their character. The biologist would say that such changes can be wrought only by modifications of the germ plasm; and these, of course, are in the making for many generations. But the sociologists and psychologists know better. They have seen the stolid, steady German become an excitable hysteric within a single generation merely because of the orientation of his thoughts in the direction of self-aggrandisement; and within the same period they have witnessed the transformation of the French from levity and cynicism to zeal and faith, by means of generous internationalism and republican freedom. The "Aryan" race of the one and the "Latin temperament" of the other have had

very little to do with the characteristics which they have evidenced in the war. Social tradition and the spirit of the times are more determinate influences in the making of character than heredity. The miners of South Wales were unpatriotic in the nation's hour of need because the notion that they were under no obligation to anyone but themselves was a faith of long standing with them. A man of good family will not lie and cheat, because he thinks of himself and his ancestors and descendants as folk who never do such things, not because he is intrinsically superior to liars and cheats. Honest, hard-working bread-winners refrain from stealing, not because they have a strong will, but because that expedient for getting what they want is completely out of the range of their thoughts. Crime has a history and geography which merit careful study from sociologists. There are certain areas in which the same sort of crime is committed over and over again. The inhabitants have heard of it many a time. It was well known among their forefathers, and they have met people who have been imprisoned for it. Hence that particular way of giving vent to their ill-humour will probably occur to them when they are in a wayward mood; and they will perpetuate the tradition of the neighbourhood through the impulse to imitate others with whom they have much in common, rather than from a native inclination to evil-doing. Thus crimes of all kinds are rarest in Cardiganshire; offences against property are commonest in Monmouthshire; violations of chastity in Huntingdonshire, Dorsetshire, Berkshire, and Lincolnshire; and cattle-maiming in Staffordshire, in which, when it was a border county, disabling a neighbour's cows and horses was no doubt regarded as a fine exploit. The succession of actions that constitute a man's life are like the sounds that follow one another in a piece of music. They are all arranged according to a design which works itself out in a time-sequence, and the keynote of which may have been sounded centuries ago. If the keynote is changed the whole tune will be different; but in any case thoughts and actions order themselves in systematic

formations, and never take place at random. Thus an immodest woman can seldom be reclaimed, because the first time she made herself cheap to a man she saw herself as part of a world of shame in which men and women degrade each other every day. The clergyman cannot be too zealous in making all men see themselves as part of a world of love in which coarse pleasures and unkind acts have no place; in which everyone is wanted and everyone has a vocation; and in which there is no one who is not pleased to serve and be served by the community.

The task is more formidable to-day than it was before the war, for now men find themselves participating in a society of nations, in one of which it is said that the State owes no obligations to either God or man. When the *Orduna* was torpedoed the Germans congratulated themselves on having refrained from firing at her until after she was ordered to stop; and when the crew and passengers of the *Ancona* were struggling, terror-stricken, with the cruel waves, the enemy bombarded them and their lifeboats without mercy. Shooting civilians, killing the wounded, attacking hospitals, destroying works of art and committing other outrages that even savages, in times gone by, have been too noble to perpetrate, are now everyday occurrences. By showing all the world that such deeds are possible the Germans have done incalculable harm. If they are to undo this, men of God must not deceive themselves into the belief that the war is doing Europe good. As Lord Courtney has demonstrated, the result has been to lower the standard of civilisation, jeopardise freedom, diminish the trustworthiness of law, and stir up hostile feeling among neutrals as well as belligerents. Every psychologist would tell the optimists that the recent exhibitions of murderous fury is bound to have a degrading effect that will strike deep and spread far. To wipe this out religious folk will have to exercise their strength and intelligence to the uttermost for decades to come. And they must not set to work in the grim, duteous German fashion.

They must give up the missionary spirit, and relinquish the notion that they are the sole custodians of something fine and precious which they must impose on other people. The cleverest man in the kingdom has much to learn from the most stupid; and there is not a single human being who is not gifted with some virtue or talent or charm that nature has bestowed on no one else in the same measure. For that reason it is a pity that Christians describe Jesus as a perfect man. They do not know what they mean by perfection, divine or human, because they have never had experience of anyone who has all the powers and graces that imagination can bring together into one splendid whole; and that ideal is apt to become a barren formula which makes them dissatisfied with the good qualities of the men and women with whom they come in contact. All are perfect in their own way, though all have strict limitations; but for the most part they are the more interesting and lovable for the inequalities of their gifts and acquirements. If the pastor wishes to disseminate a religion of love, he should not speak to the people professionally, in the language of the Bible. He should put the message of Christ into their own tongue and make a liberal use of works of art, pictorial, musical, and literary. He must share Mr Arnold Bennett's admiration of the unpoetic Midlander, Mr A. C. Benson's of the academic intellectual, Mr Stephen Reynolds' of the fisherfolk, Mr Robert Lynd's of the Irish, Miss Betham-Edwards's of the French, Lord Haldane's of the Germans, Mr George Hall's of the gypsies, whose acquaintance he cultivates because he likes them, not because he thinks that his Church can improve them. The clergyman should see all men as they appear to those who love and study them. No sermon and no Bible reading could give any congregation so keen a sense of fellowship with the Russians as Mr Stephen Graham conveys in his *Russia and the World*, or with the working folk of England as Mr Wilfred Wilson Gibson brings home even to unimaginative minds in his *Daily Bread*.

After the war religious leaders might establish an international university in every country, and a theatre and lecture hall in every important town in the world, where such works could be read aloud and all sorts of other devices could be put into operation for promoting pleasure in, and curiosity about, the character and customs of all the nations. In Germany there are hundreds of thousands of people who will not give a moment's thought to English work of any description. They could hardly keep up this ludicrous contempt if international institutions for good-humoured social intercourse were established in their midst. These might eventually lead them, the militarists *par excellence*, to contrive civil uses for aircraft; hold international pageants every year in schools and municipalities; found societies for employing discoverers and inventors in the constructive service of humanity; send adventurers like the reformatory boys and other delinquents who have won distinction in the war on expeditions involving dangerous enterprises; slacken the furious industrial competition of the day by supporting handicrafts and keeping population within the bounds of decent subsistence; and adopt other positive peace measures which hitherto they have scorned. They might even prevail on themselves to give sociology a place among their college faculties, much though the Kaiser hates that science. For all such pacifist work men of prayer ought now to be making preparations.

The academic part of it is of special importance. Had our men of science and learning given as much attention to living persons as to ancient civilisations, they might have averted the worst war of all time. They would have known that Germany was bent on rapine, and could have engineered as extensive a propaganda to counteract her designs as she has carried out, with no stint of energy or money or intelligence, for twenty or thirty years, in order to crush other nations. But the good people have always lacked subtlety, and been so mild and had so few ideas that they have

never understood wickedness, and have been helpless against the machinations of evil-doers. Magnificent though their work has been among the wounded and the bereaved, the clergy, during the war, have been unenterprising. Their efforts to curb the ferocity of the combatants have been futile; and many of them have been giving their minds to mere professionalisms instead of to the wants, mental and physical, of the afflicted peoples, whose wrongs they have been able to think of only in terms of their own office and importance. One prelate has declared that the war is a sermon preached to mankind by God, whose "sermons, on crucial occasions, are long and deeply theological"; and another, "with great hesitation," has deprecated prayer for victory on the part of the Entente Allies, although he believes their cause to be just, on the ground that such action is forbidden in "the 7th Section of the authorised form."

If it is to have influence in the future, the Church will have to solve the moral problems of the age. The clergy ought to raise a loud and ceaseless clamour against the manufacture, on the part of any nation whatsoever, of a single additional instrument of destruction. If they fear that, were nations like Germany and England to lay down their arms, uncivilised tribes would eventually conquer the "superior" races, let them win the hearts of the untamed folks by healing the sick and housing the poor in the dark places of the earth, and bringing such enlightenment to the ignorant savage as he needs and is ready for.

It is the positive part of the Christian's programme, however, that is all-important; and the work consists, for the most part, in constructing and maintaining a circle of ideas within which the will to make war cannot arise. The man of God ought to make the beauty of charity and peace an abiding vision among the peoples against which they will feel that they cannot sin. If a minister, with artistic emphases and reticences, were to describe the Gallipoli peninsula in its native condition and as it looked when the battle-storm had

swept over it, no one who listened to him would prefer war to peace; and if he showed how men of splendid physique wrestled in agony against the gas-fumes at Ypres, and then made a word-picture of, say, Mr George Dewar's woodman, endowed with magnificent health and living a wholesome life, of which integrity and contentment were the natural outcome, his audience would admire the latter so much that they could never sanction any policy which would engender grief, sickness, and deformity.

At the end of *The Achievement*, Mr Temple Thurston, in a passage of rare beauty, shows the reader what his artist-hero had lived and died for. The picture was full of warm, rich, golden sunshine that enveloped the spectator, subdued every sense to repose, and thrilled him with the very spirit of romance. Through the blinding haze of light he caught a glimpse, now and then, of a river spinning its thread of silver through broad, luxuriant meadows. But anon the glint of the water would disappear. The grass and the trees and the flowers, which the sunshine suggested rather than revealed, would likewise vanish, and he would see and feel nothing but the light—light undimmed by a single shadow, falling round him in glory, soft as a cloud, yet brilliant as the sun itself. Some such enchantment, some such relief from care and effort and anxiety, some such vision of loveliness made perfect, every religious service, in every temple, ought to bring to those who go there to get rid of sordid desires and spur themselves to noble action. To give joy such as that to the multitudes would be "an achievement to have striven for indeed."

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IS CHRISTIANITY PRACTICABLE?

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Two friends were recently conversing about the war. "I do not know how I can go on living," said one. "It seems to me as if I had lost God out of my world." "Strange," answered the other; "it seems to me as if I had just found Him."

These two sentences picture in dramatic contrast the extraordinary variety of judgment which has been called forth by the events of the past year. But widely as they differ, they have this in common, that they are moral judgments. They phrase the issue which the war has raised in terms of the ideal, and the answers given, whether pessimistic or the reverse, are religious answers.

It is always so in times of crisis. We still recall the tense emotion with which the first news of the loss of the *Titanic* was received. When it was known that the loss of life had been great, those who had friends on board asked themselves anxiously whether their own dear ones were included in this latest toll of the sea. But there was one question which was asked over and over again with an even greater insistence: "How did they meet their supreme crisis when it came? If die they must, did they die nobly? When the story is fully told will it be found that the tragedy of the *Titanic* was a glorious tragedy adding new lustre to humanity, leaving memories of pride and thanksgiving, or was the catastrophe moral as well as physical, a defeat of spirit as well as a destruction of life?"

In some such mood men have met this new and greater catastrophe. They have shrunk back appalled from the

colossal loss of life and waste of capital which the war has brought. But they have been conscious of a danger even greater in what it may mean for the life of the spirit. Amid all questions which have been brought to the surface—questions economic, racial, political—the moral question has claimed the centre of attention. What will the war mean for the higher life of man? Are we on the eve of a permanent relapse into barbarism, or are we witnessing the birth-throes of a new and higher social order?

To every thoughtful man this question is of interest, but to the Christian it comes home with peculiar closeness. For Christianity in all its forms believes in a moral government of God in which all nations and races are included, and judges all experience, social and individual alike, in its bearing upon this supreme issue. It is not strange then that in every country of Christendom, those which are at war and those which are participants only by their sympathy, men are asking themselves what bearing the events we are witnessing will have upon the religion to which they owe allegiance. How far has the Christian claim been confirmed, how far disproved, by the war? Of the two judgments quoted at the beginning of this article, tested by the Christian standard, which has most evidence on its side?

I do not propose in the present article to attempt an answer to this question. For that the time is not yet ripe, nor the evidence all in. But there is a preliminary inquiry which needs to be made, and that is as to the principles from which the question must be approached and the standards by which, when the issue comes to final judgment, the test must be made.

There are two different angles from which the question as to the practicability of the Christian religion may be approached. It may be approached from the point of view of the individual, or it may be approached from the point of view of society. We may ask how far Christianity is a practicable religion for the individual man and woman;

whether it offers a reasonable creed, a satisfying object of worship, a worthy ideal of conduct, and motives adequate to ensure its realisation; or we may ask whether Christianity is socially practicable, a religion which in such a world as this, with its complex relationships, economic, social, and political, we may reasonably expect to become the accepted standard for the common faith and life of man.

It makes a great difference in which of these two senses we understand our question. From the point of view of the individual, few would be found to deny the practicability of Christianity, for the evidence to the contrary is accessible on every hand. There are men and women all the world over who believe in the Christian God, accept the Christian standard, and realise that standard in their own personal conduct to a remarkable degree. They are unselfish, trustful, brotherly, forgiving, hopeful, pure. They face calamity with courage, sin with repentance, opportunity with consecration, and persecution with self-control. They may be mistaken in their belief, and their hope may be destined to disappointment, but no one can deny that, so far as their personal experience is concerned, Christianity has proved and is still proving itself not only a practicable but a satisfying and ennobling religion.

For men of this type the war has introduced no essentially new element into their religious experience. It has immensely deepened and intensified it. It has provided a new challenge for faith, a new opportunity for service, but it has not made it appreciably harder to believe in God. Indeed, for many it has become far easier, for the very shattering of earthly ideals and the new revelation of the transitoriness of material possessions has served to set in clearer perspective the unseen reality, and removed, as it were, a veil which seemed to hang between them and God. For many it has meant a readjustment of standards and a reinforcement of the tendency present in every religion which, like Christianity, makes much of personality, and emphasises the sacredness of the individual,

to postpone the consummation from this life to another. Where so many of the young and the strong have been cut off in the flower of their youth, it cannot be but that immortality should acquire a new and more vivid meaning. But this too is not a new faith, only the re-emphasis in a new setting of what has been present in Christianity from the first.

But with the other phase of the question it is different. When we ask whether Christianity is socially practicable, we ask whether the standards which have been accepted and in a measure realised by selected individuals here and there, are valid for the race as a whole; whether nations and the rival classes within each nation whose dealings one with another are now conducted on purely selfish principles, may be expected to abandon their present rivalry in favour of the more generous and inclusive methods advocated by Christ.

For such a question the war is of momentous significance. For war in the boldness of its affirmation of the supremacy of self-interest as between social groups is in its essence the denial of Christianity. If war, and what war means, is a permanent social necessity, then Christianity in the sense in which we are interested in it here is socially impracticable, and our question must be answered in the negative.

There are many thoughtful people who believe that this is the case. Regretfully but none the less explicitly and with full consciousness of the significance of their action they have abandoned any hope that the principles and ideals which inspire the life of the best Christians can ever be made dominant in the life of society as a whole. They look upon the interpretation of Christianity which has been so much in evidence in the last generation as a spirit of brotherhood and tolerance which was gradually to leaven society as a whole—which, indeed, was actually leavening it so rapidly and so successfully as to make war in any such sense and on any such scale as it had been known in the past morally impossible—they look, I repeat, upon such a conception as this, a conception made familiar to us by the liberal theology of the last thirty years,

as a delusion, beautiful, if you will, as any dream of an ideal social state is beautiful, but wholly unrelated to the matter-of-fact world in which we live, and full of danger, as all unreality is dangerous which blinds men's eyes to the perils of the existing situation, and leaves them unprepared to meet it.

And it cannot be denied that there is much to be said in support of this view. Tested by each one of its cardinal principles, Christianity seems hopelessly to have broken down. Whatever else one may or may not include in Christianity, this at least it has meant to those who have accepted it in the past: the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, redemption through Christ, the leadership of the Church. And yet how unreal and far away seems each of these when measured by the grim realities of the present! How can one speak of the fatherhood of God in any universal and all-embracing sense in the light of the terrible calamities which have fallen upon so many innocent sufferers all over the round world? How can one believe in the goodness of God when one contemplates this unexampled harvest of agony, of bitterness, and of death? How the whole dilemma that in every age has haunted the imagination of man, the dilemma: either God would not, and then He is not good, or He could not, and then He is not in control,—how this dilemma has been sharpened until it seems as if it could not be evaded. For the individual here and there, the man of strong faith and heroic courage, it may be possible now as in the past to fight one's way through the storms of doubt up into the clear skies of faith, but for the world at large, surely if what we see is to be the measure of the future, it is vain to talk of the fatherhood of God with any expectation of being believed.

The case is still more disheartening when we pass to the second great article of the Christian faith, the brotherhood of man. For what we seem to see to-day is a colossal denial on the part of that part of the human race which has been longest under the influence of Christ, and which alone definitely calls itself Christian, of this central and cardinal conviction. What-

ever else Christianity may or may not be, it is an international religion. It began as a protest against the doctrine which identified the Kingdom of God with any single nation. It broke the barrier between Greek and Jew, and proclaimed the coming of a new social order which should include both. But now we see the revival in the most brutal form of the very barriers which it was the mission of Christ to break down. The outstanding factor in the situation is the factor of race; the final unit, it is declared over and over again, must be the nation. The Christian claim to reach beyond the individual life and prescribe laws for the State is explicitly repudiated, not simply by politicians and by statesmen, but by Christian theologians who tell us that Christianity has to do purely with the life of the individual, that the unselfishness which it prescribes and the sacrifices which it inculcates are valid only for private persons within the limits of the present life. As for the State itself, that is the ultimate unit, knowing no law but that of its own existence and recognising no authority, human or divine, which has the right to ask of it the self-abnegation which is the supreme law of the individual Christian.

Nor is it otherwise with the third great Christian tenet, that of redemption through Christ. Characteristic of Christianity as an individual experience is the consciousness of the forgiveness of sins, humility in the presence of the holy God, penitence because of the memory of past wrongdoing, sympathy with others who are involved in the same legacy of sin and are heirs to the same blessing of redemption. The willingness to forgive as one has been forgiven, to bear and to forbear, to think no evil, to trust where one cannot see—all these qualities so characteristic of the finest Christian experience,—where shall we look for them to-day in this world of suspicion, enmity, and hate? How can we believe in the social practicability of the Christian religion when we find each of the warring nations self-righteously justifying itself and attributing all responsibility for this world tragedy to its opponents? What concord is there between the spirit of

Christ and the pride and self-satisfaction that are the dominant notes of the age in which we live?

And if it be said that these are but local and transitory symptoms, the evidence of a world-spirit which for the moment has slipped its leash and run wild without control, that within organised Christianity at least we may count on a protest against these unchristian tendencies and the reaffirmation in the face of a challenging world of the great ideals and principles of which we have been speaking—we face this further and most discouraging fact of the all but complete abnegation of leadership on the part of the Christian Church. In every country that is now at war we find the forces of organised religion mobilised with army and navy in defence of the particular contention of the State in question. The consciousness of world citizenship so characteristic of the Church of Christ in its great days is for the moment eclipsed, and one wonders whether it will ever be possible to revive it.

It is, indeed, a discouraging outlook, and it is not to be wondered at that many should be discouraged and accept the negative conclusion. But it is never wise to pass hasty judgment, and it may be found that a more careful review will reveal other facts not mentioned in our catalogue, and bring to light principles which will put the old facts in a new setting and give them a new significance.

What then are the principles by which the practicability of any mode of life must be tested? I will mention four: (1) In estimating its success or failure it must be judged by its own claim and not by some standard imported from without. (2) Where it is a question of a process we must take account of the entire period of the development and not merely of a cross-section artificially selected. (3) In the case of a far-reaching social phenomenon like Christianity, which touches life on all sides and is in process of constant reaction with its environment, we must not identify the religion whose practicability is in question with the ecclesiastical organisation which at best imperfectly expresses it. Finally, in disproving any

conclusion it is not enough to point out its difficulties. We must face the alternatives, and show that they involve no difficulty as great or even greater.

When we apply these principles to our estimate of the present situation we shall be led to temper the severity of our judgment. Christianity, whether as a programme for the individual or for society, has never promised itself an easy victory. It has been a militant religion, recognising evil as a present fact of far-reaching ramifications and insidious power. The ideal which it holds forth is not of a gradual unfolding taking place automatically and inevitably as the flower swells and ripens under the sun, but a conquest over enemies who need to be subdued by an effort of the will, and whose resistance, even when successfully overcome, will leave its scars behind. As pictured in the New Testament, Christianity is a religion of triumph indeed, but a triumph of those who have come through great tribulation, martyrs and heroes as well as saints.

This is so even in the life of the individual? The great characters which Christianity has formed have been formed through struggle, and there have been times in the life of each when they were tempted to despair of success. What should we have said of Augustine if we had tried to write his life before his conversion, or of Jerry M'Auley when he was still a drunkard reeling in his cups? When we say that Christianity is a practicable religion for the individual we mean that, in spite of personal failure and sin, the motives which Christianity commands and the inspiration which it supplies have proved sufficient in the case of a multitude of men and women to overcome the opposing forces of pride, self-will, and envy, and to produce characters rounded, harmonious, and complete.

How much more necessary is it to avoid hasty judgments when we consider the social practicability of the Christian religion? For here we have to do with a process which instead of being complete in a few score years is to be measured by millenniums. To say that Christianity is socially practicable is not to say that it is possible to-day or to-morrow or even

in the next generation to realise the Christian ideal in society, —but that the realisation of this ideal ought to be the aim toward which social effort should be directed, and by the success or failure of which social progress should be measured. No doubt a long process of education will be necessary. No doubt while the education is incomplete and men who have accepted the Christian standard face those who either know it not or who as yet reject it, compromises will be inevitable as they are inevitable to-day in the life of the individual who yet imperfectly apprehends or at least imperfectly realises the Christian ideal. But just as little as the fact of such compromises makes us despair of the practicability of Christianity for the individual or leads us to abandon the Christian test of character in favour of one less rigorous and exacting, ought the presence of these social compromises and failures to lead us to abandon our hope in the social practicability of Christianity, provided only we can be assured that the direction of social progress is toward rather than away from the Christian ideal. It is not the fact that we have hitherto failed to realise the Christian social ideal that should discourage us, but the abandonment of the attempt, and still more the theoretical justification of this abandonment on the part of those who in their private life still call themselves Christians.

Once more, no attempt to measure the resources at the command of Christianity in its world campaign can be adequate which ignores the Christianity outside the Church. As little as the spirit of any people can be measured by the state of its contemporary institutions, as little as the moral resources of a city or a state can be estimated by the utterances of the politicians who at the moment may be in control of the offices, can the spirit of Christianity find adequate expression in the deliverances of its official leaders, or its aspirations be limited to the programme which at the moment may command the assent of ecclesiastical authority. Organisations are proverbially conservative. They are the precipitate of the moral victories of the past. Permanence is their ideal rather than

progress—the thing that has been rather than the thing that is to be. It is not therefore by the official utterances of a religion, valuable and precious as these may be in their conservation of the spiritual inheritance of the past, that we are to estimate the lines of its future development. Rather must we gain our clue to this in the strivings and hopes of the forward-looking, whether within the organisation or without—the men and women who feel within them the spirit of the new age and voice the ideals which will find expression in the institutions of the future. The significant thing for the estimate of present-day Christianity is not the fact that the official leadership of the Church has for the moment broken down; that in each of the warring nations the ecclesiastical authorities have taken their cue from the utterances of their respective governments, and with little or no criticism accepted the official point of view as their own—but that in every nation multitudes of earnest spirits have found this easy acquiescence spiritually unsatisfying and are trying in their own way as private persons to express a more catholic and comprehensive ideal.

Once more, it is not enough to reject any conclusion on account of its difficulties. We must consider the alternative. There are difficulties no doubt in assuming the social practicability of the Christian religion, but are there no difficulties in assuming the contrary? What those difficulties may be has been brought home to the consciousness of mankind with a vividness unexampled in history by the events of the past sixteen months. This war with all its horrors is the direct result of the fact that a group of men temporarily in control of the policy of the leading European nations, and backed by a public sentiment sufficiently strong to make them face the risks of their belief, have deliberately accepted the thesis of the social impracticability of Christianity. When the war is over and the questions of reconstruction are to be faced, this question will have to be answered by those responsible for the terms of peace: whether the philosophy which underlies the

diplomacy of the past two generations is still to control, or whether from the mere point of view of human prudence and reason, if from no higher ground, it may not prove wise to try a different method? If the former alternative shall prevail, we know what to expect. After a breathing space, longer or shorter, there will be a renewal of what we have been experiencing in Europe on a scale as much more portentous and terrible than what we now see, as the forces which in the meantime modern science shall have evoked will be vaster and more appalling. Nor is this all. With the rapid education of the great peoples of the remoter East, it is already certain that in a time longer or shorter, but distinctly measurable, these unnumbered millions of men, hitherto largely aloof or quiescent so far as the Western world is concerned, will be drawn into the vortex and increase by their new reserves of power the terror of the impending cataclysm. As the world grows smaller and the distance draws near, the refuges which in the past have sheltered neutral and peace-loving nations from the storms of war will grow fewer and at last disappear altogether, and the extent and duration of the contests that will succeed one another from generation to generation in dreadful and monotonous succession be measured only by the resources of humanity as a whole.

Such then is the alternative which we face if Christianity be not socially practicable. And the question fairly arises whether it is not as reasonable to suppose that the influences which within individual communities and states have gradually substituted the methods of co-operation and of law for those of armed force, may not find advocates ingenious enough to apply them to the new situation when once the magnitude of its issues has been faced.

More is at stake than appears on the surface. It is one thing to postpone the coming of the Kingdom of God, to realise that in a process so complex and many-sided, involving so many different generations and races, requiring for its consummation an education so painstaking and long-continued,

generations and ages may have to pass before the consummation which is desired is reached; it is one thing—while the process is incomplete—to regard each struggle for a better social order, each new experience or tragedy following the failure of the old as one more step in the forward march, one more object-lesson in God's great training-school of brotherhood,—and quite another to see in the entire attempt to realise the ideal of brotherhood among men a gigantic self-delusion destined from the start to inevitable failure, and to be content for oneself with a purely individualistic and self-centred faith. I do not say that life will not be possible with such an outlook. I do not say that religion in some form will not survive. We know that religion has an inexhaustible vitality and manifests itself in the most forbidding environment and the most unexpected forms, but I do say that for the thoughtful man more will be involved in such an issue than the failure of Christianity as a social scheme. Even for the individual it is hard to see how Christianity can any longer appear a practicable religion if by Christianity we mean the religion which accepts the principles of Jesus as its standard of faith and life. The man who believes in the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man may indeed postpone the coming of the social consummation. He may push it into a remote future or shift it to another world. But there is one thing which he cannot do without the surrender of his most vital faith, and that is to abandon it altogether. Deceive ourselves as we may, try to hide it from ourselves as we will, the individual and the social gospel belong together, and one cannot permanently survive the shipwreck of the other.

It is in the light of such considerations that we have to approach our problem and measure the arguments which make for or against the social practicability of the Christian religion.

There are three different tests which we may apply to the Christian claim to offer a practicable social programme. We may test it first by its diagnosis of the existing situation;

secondly, by the remedy it offers; and thirdly, by the resources at its command.

And first of the diagnosis. If the Christian claim be justified, how shall we account for the present situation? The Christian answer is entirely simple and definite. It is because, as a matter of fact, the Christian principle has not been applied.

I do not mean this simply in the sense in which it is true of our individual failures that our accomplishment falls below our endeavour. I mean that no serious attempt has as yet been made to apply the principle at all. The energies of Christians have as a rule been confined to dealing with individual lives, and the problems of organised society either ignored altogether or dealt with on principles of temporary expediency or of deliberate selfishness.

It is not difficult to understand historically how this has come to pass. When Christianity was born no one anticipated the long duration of human history. It was expected that Christ would come again within the lifetime of men then living in order to establish His kingdom upon earth and to realise the social ideas of justice, brotherhood, and love. And when this expectation was disappointed and men faced the prospect of a period of waiting indefinitely long, the old habits of thought still persisted and the social consummation unattainable or at least unrealised here was awaited in the undiscovered country that lay beyond death. In the meantime the energies of Christians found sufficient outlet in the preparation of the individual for the life after death and the winning of new candidates for the citizenship of the future kingdom.

So there grew up a conception of Christianity which, while it still cherished the social ideal and phrased its faith in terms of social fellowship, was yet in principle largely self-centred and individualistic.

But there is a still more fundamental cause for the failure of Christians in the past to apply the principles of their religion to the organisation of society, and that is the general ignorance of the laws of social life. At no point is the revolution in our

habits of thought, which has been brought about by modern science, more far-reaching than in our conception of the nature of human society. We realise, as it has never been possible to realise it before, the extraordinary variety and intimacy of the ties that unite individuals one with another, not only in their economic but in their intellectual and moral life. We realise that in order to influence an individual effectively it is not enough to appeal to him directly. We must attack his environment and change the forces which enter into the making of his personality.

And with this new insight modern science has given us new power. It has marvellously increased our resources, it has multiplied in ways that stagger the imagination the wires that reach from one man to another, and created the machinery that for the first time has made it possible to mobilise all the resources of the nations and make millions of men act with the precision and effectiveness of one.

This is something new under the sun. Here is a new power put into the hands of man which he has never had before, a power which may be used for good or for evil, for co-operation or for war. The leaders of the Church, trained in the habits of the older individualism, concerned primarily with the forces of the inner life, have been slower to discover the existence of this power than men who have been trained in another philosophy and are working for other ends.

This is the true significance of what we see to-day. We are witnessing the mobilisation of humanity for common action on a scale and with an effectiveness never possible before, but a mobilisation the purpose of which is destruction, and its inspiration distrust, suspicion, and fear. And the reason is the same which accounts for every failure of Christianity in the past, the fact that for the time the forces of selfishness have gained control of the springs of activity, and the principles of love, of trust, and of service have been discarded as impracticable and ineffective.

But if this be the diagnosis, the remedy is plain. It is the

replacement of the present methods of social control by those which are sincerely and genuinely Christian. What is needed is a change of administration, the substitution not only of new methods but of new ideals.

To understand the true significance of this proposal it is only necessary to compare it for the moment with the peace propaganda in its older and more superficial form. This propaganda attacked war directly as in itself the supreme evil, and made peace as such its single and exclusive aim. But war is, after all, only a symptom, and no remedy which deals with symptoms alone can effect a complete cure. War, as we have learned only too clearly from the events of the past months, is the result of a mental attitude of suspicion, enmity, and distrust which have in turn been engendered by centuries of social wrong. A peace that involved the continuance of these sentiments and the perpetuation of these wrongs would be as unstable as it would be unsatisfying. The true remedy lies deeper in the removal of the causes of enmity, and this is possible only through the practice in national and international as well as in individual relations of the Christian principles of co-operation, sympathy, and service.

Is it possible to attempt this with any hope of success? This brings us to the last of the three considerations which enter into the solution of our problem, namely, the resources which are at the command of Christianity for the realisation of its ideals.

It is here that we face our most formidable difficulty. There are many who accept the Christian ideal as inherently worthy and satisfying who will agree with us that the world would be a pleasanter and more wholesome place if it could be realised in fact; nay, who go further and admit that there is no inherent obstacle in the way of its realisation but the old obstacles of human ignorance and selfishness on which in every age the ideal has suffered shipwreck, but who yet believe with regret that these obstacles are insuperable, and man must remain to the end, with a few rare exceptions all

the more striking because of the extent of the contrast, the short-sighted, self-centred creature that he has always been. To such the war has brought new confirmation of an old scepticism and made Christianity and politics—understanding by that term the life of men in organised society—more than ever a contradiction in terms.

And yet it is possible to draw quite a different conclusion from the events of the past few months. Of all the marvels of this marvellous year, none has been more wonderful than its revelation of the unsuspected moral reserves of humanity. The virtues that we had thought the prerogative of the few, courage, consecration, self-sacrifice, faith, are found to be the common heritage. We had heard that the days of heroism were past for ever, that men were engrossed in money-getting and money-spending, blind to spiritual reality and deaf to the appeal of the ideal, and we have witnessed a rebirth of idealism on a scale more stupendous than any that history records. We have seen the nations give of their best and dearest without a murmur—mothers their sons, wives their husbands, young men their lives, parents their homes. We have seen an entire people offer its country on the altar of freedom, and with the sight there has come to us a new realisation of the moral greatness of humanity and a new realisation of its immortal destiny. We know now what we had often been told but had scarcely dared to believe, that of all the powers that inspire human action and command human loyalty there is none comparable in the range of its influence to an ideal.

And if it be said that this is just the tragedy and despair of the situation, that idealism has proved so lamentably false a guide, that the causes which have called forth loyalty and evoked sacrifice have been narrow and selfish causes, the ideals of nationalism and of militarism, the answer is that this is true only in appearance. It is because these causes have stolen the garments of Christianity and masquerade as the servants of world-wide brotherhood and peace that they have gained the whole-hearted allegiance of the peoples. Nothing

is more striking in the whole situation, nothing more full of hope for the future, than the fact that the old glorification of war for war's sake has been so largely discredited. Each nation claims to be fighting in self-defence; each nation declares itself to be the servant of international brotherhood and peace, not simply to justify its claim as against its opponents, but because on no other ground could it retain the allegiance of its own citizens. The Christian virus has penetrated too far; the Christian ideal has struck its roots too deep to make the ethics of Odin or of Thor satisfying to any modern people.

What we lack most of all is leadership—leadership far-sighted and statesmanlike enough to organise the misguided and separated idealisms of the different warring nations into an idealism truly Christian in its conception of the end to be desired and the method to be followed in attaining it.

Here is the supreme opportunity of the Christian Church: to become in fact what in theory it professes to be, the representative and spokesman of the spiritual unity of the race. Already a beginning has been made; already we find movements, such as the Student Volunteer movement and the Foreign Missionary enterprise, in which the internationalism implicit in Christianity has found clear and self-conscious expression. There are men and women to-day in every warring country who feel their unity in purpose and sympathy with their fellow-Christians, with whom, for the time being, through no fault of their own, they are at strife; who can make their own the noble words of Siegmund Schultze, the leader of the peace movement in Germany,[1] who when reproached for his efforts to bring about a better understanding between England and Germany in the years before the war, answered, that if he had to live the last years over he would work for the same cause more whole-heartedly than ever. But these individuals are still isolated and unrelated. These movements have hitherto been content to cultivate their own

[1] *Die Eiche*, January 1915, p. 2.

special section of the one great field without reference to what was being undertaken by their neighbours. What is needed to-day is organisation: the conscious co-operation of all who believe in the essential unity of the race, whether they chance to be inside the ranks of organised Christianity, or whether, like the brave minority of Socialists who have dared to uphold the cause of humanity against nationalism under the most imperialistic of all the warring governments, they find their pulpit in the secularist press.[1] What is needed, I repeat, is the conscious co-operation of all, of whatever name or race, who believe that humanity is greater than any of its parts, in those common tasks of interpretation and reconstruction which must be discharged if Christianity is ever to become in fact the world-power it has always professed to be.

Only when this attempt has been made, only when the Christian ideal has been applied to the world problems which now confront us with the same intelligence, the same persistence, and the same resourcefulness which have been shown in marshalling the forces of the different nations now at war, only when the opportunity which Christ's service offers and the sacrifices it requires have been presented with the same confidence of response with which the lesser causes have made their claim,—in a word, only when with wide vision and full consciousness of all that the task implies, the leaders of the Christian cause give themselves to the work of making society as a whole Christian, shall we be in a position to give an adequate answer to the question which we have been considering in this article.

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[1] "Let us understand, then, that we are not merely Germans, French, or Russians, but that we are all men, that all the peoples are of the same blood, and that they have no right to kill one another, but that they ought to love and help one another. Such is Christianity, humane conduct. Man does not belong to one nation only; he belongs to humanity."—(Suppressed editorial of *Vorwärts*, quoted in *The Survey*, August 21, 1915.)

THE INCOMPETENCE OF THE MERE SCHOLAR TO INTERPRET CHRISTIANITY.

PROFESSOR E. ARMITAGE.

As the price goes mounting up in our straining arithmetic, and we try to sum up what this war is costing the world in life, in brain, in treasure, we are staggered by every effort to think out any adequate compensation for it all. Talk of indemnities, to be paid in silver and gold by any one land to any others, is as much an offence to the reason as to the heart. There must be some vaster recompense, some fuller and richer, or an irreparable blow has been dealt to mankind. Our thoughts are driven to take a higher range, until perhaps we say that it can only be in some deep replenishing of the springs of life in men, some uplifting of ideals, some wide purging of human affections and aims, that this recompense can be made ours.

History teaches us how deeply here one age may differ from another. There have been elect epochs of the spirit, eras of greatness and worth, as there have been ages that we pronounce poor and mean. The wind bloweth where it listeth through the centuries; we still hear the sound thereof as we turn back through their records, and perhaps we learn that, though we cannot fully say whence it came or whither it goeth, we can nevertheless say that often it gathered head in times of widespread sorrow and even dismay. Has sorrow ever stood closer to the world than it does to-day:

has dismay ever so overwhelmingly threatened proud nations? And is it not fitting that serious men, and in particular that Christian men, should look for a new heaven and a new earth to redress the balance of the shattered one before their eyes?

Heaven has been shattered as plainly as earth in the course of this war, if by heaven we are to mean that rule of mercy and truth which Jesus taught, and if we are to consider the course taken by the great nation that framed this war and that has given to it its main features. Christian men will say that it cannot be built up again save as such shattering blows are met, and as men lift up afresh from the ruins those ideals which mailed hands have sought for ever to strike down. That those hands should have been lifted to deal such blows has been a cruel surprise to the world, and most cruelly of all did that surprise fall upon those of us whose duties, as teachers and preachers of the Christian religion, had brought them into touch with the work of German theologians. At the outset of this war we were confronted by what seemed to us a grievous moral failure on the part of a body of scholars who had guided and enriched our Christian studies for half our lives. Perhaps nothing in the course of it has shocked us so much as those *Open Letters* which were addressed to us as Christian ministers and theologians by an important group of the professors of Germany. As we read with amazed eyes the list of signatories and found in it one honoured and beloved name after another, we said in bitterness of spirit, "We are wounded in the house of our friends." And it seemed to us that a hurt was thus brought—not to us alone—but to the very cause of Christ in the earth, for here, as we thought, was Europe in all its parade of Christian attainment and boast of ancient churches and sacred schools of learning plunged in a war which was deliberately guided by one of the combatants along lines of dishonour and outrage, so that the very savages of equatorial Africa might well cry shame on Christendom; and when we turned to those

teachers whom we had so deeply trusted to join hands with us to stay this plague, we found to our distress that they turned upon us with denunciations and joined themselves wholeheartedly to statesmen and princes who seemed to us to be putting Christ to open shame.

Here was indeed a sudden trouble planted amidst all those Christian activities and Christian studies from which we had hoped for great results. For what, after all, is the good of these stores of Christian knowledge and this perfected method of literary and historic investigation if the wise man is to become a fool at the finish and the scribe a derision?

But we could not end here, for there necessarily arose questions affecting our own practice. We cannot refuse, in the light of this painful experience, to ask ourselves whether we have not for a long time been trying to do very much what the Germans have done in our studies of Christianity and in the pursuit of biblical scholarship? England has been behindhand here, as she is behindhand in several other important branches of learning. But she has a wonderful way of overtaking her arrears, and we have lived in recent decades through a time of great intellectual advance, and have witnessed a period of university building such as has had no parallel since the twelfth century.

The bearing of this fact upon the Free Churches of the country and their theological thinking is close. To-day every one of the Congregational Colleges in the country, to name only one of the denominations, is linked in with the eager intellectual life of one or other of this widened group of British Universities, and their ministers breathe in the formative years of their college course the large air of an unbiassed loyalty to truth.

Now this is all very well, and we are glad to have it so; but, as I just stated, we have lately had a very disturbing experience. We can scarcely hope to beat the Germans in pure scholarship, whilst in the methods of critical procedure they show themselves past-masters. Their learning and their

acumen have alike impressed us, and they cannot deny that Englishmen have done them a generous homage. But for all that a moment has come when their acumen and their learning seems to us to have issued in a disastrous failure, and we are saying to ourselves with a new emphasis that scholarship can never be enough by itself for a true apprehension of the things of Christ, but that there must be an experimental knowledge of those things as well, or the keenest scholarship will miscarry.

Of course we have known this all along, and we cannot allow the grave defection at this moment of a distinguished group of scholars to lead us to desire any less earnestly than before the growth of sound scholarship among us. We often say that in the spiritual ancestry of English Nonconformists there stands a ministry as distinguished for its learning as for its godliness, and we build the sepulchres of those forebears in stately editions of the Puritan Divines, even though we may then relegate them to the undisturbed serenity of our top shelves! We never quite forget them, though we seldom take them down; *there* they are, and they diffuse a general confidence in our ranks! We feel that we have sound scholars behind us if ever we are called to meet our ecclesiastical enemies in the gate! Those men, moreover, were College men and did their work in the happy years which preceded the conversion in Stuart days of our national universities into Anglican seminaries. That work bears the mark of the trained hand.

We must never allow ourselves to forget how closely the story of evangelical religion throughout Europe stands related to the universities, and that when we name Wycliff and Luther, Erasmus, Calvin, and Huss, we are naming great College dons as well as great Christian Reformers; whilst if we come further down the stream and consider the Evangelical Revival of the eighteenth century, we are carried into undergraduates' rooms in Oxford Colleges to see there a little group of students who are turning again to the neglected

Word of God and seeking to learn afresh the method of holy living.

Neither is it open to us to hold that this connection between scholarly study on the one hand and a revived Christianity on the other was fortuitous, and that the great reformers of Christianity in Europe and in our own country might just as well have come from the ranks of merchants or of men guiding the plough. This might have been the case were Christianity our name for any strong spiritual emotion or any resolute endeavour to pursue goodness, but thus to employ the term is to empty it of all that from the first has been cardinal to it, and of all that has told of what has given the Christian religion unique value and constraining power. The reason why the great revivals of evangelical Christianity have sprung so frequently out of the studies of scholars has been that it was those scholars who opened again the forgotten records, and came afresh for themselves into the spiritual perception of that amazing miracle, the living and eternal Word, as they pored over the text inscribed on the faded vellum sheets. It was to them as where Italian artists have portrayed St Jerome or St Dominic bending in austere cells over the open Gospels, when suddenly there appeared before them in the flesh, with His baby feet resting upon the page, the Holy Child Himself.

The reason why we stand in such need of sound scholarship is that our Christian life directly roots itself in concrete historical events which it behoves us intelligently to understand. For a religion thus to be rooted is to be exposed to the gravest perils, and to be beset by continual difficulty. The eighteenth century scouted the idea that true religion could ever be in that position, that Eternity could thus hinge on Time, and the supply of man's deepest spiritual needs be entrusted to the hazards of conflicting testimony. It called for a reasonable faith in the sense of one which the Right Reason in every man would at once acknowledge, and for a truth which should be manifestly true in the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world.

It was a foolish call, however sincerely made. It is as impossible for man to tear himself out of the stream of time and history as to leap from his own shadow. All that he is, as well as all that he has, is rooted there. The Right Reason that the eighteenth century spoke of so complacently, as being the unaltering endowment of man, was soon to be shown to have a history of change and adaptation as indisputable as that traced in any plant or animal form. Moral and religious conceptions that approved themselves as right and reasonable to an earlier time came later to appear barbarous, so that unless a religion laid its appeal to some other side of human nature than the rational and the conceptual, it was inevitable that it would be outgrown. It was the strength of Christianity that it did this, and that its appeal to the later generations of men, set as they were in the ever-changing circumstances of advancing time, came garbed in time, and in all the accidents of concrete history. Such a religion may not very well accord with our careful systems, but we must joyfully own that it infinitely transcends them, and that these records in which the careful student marks defects come clad in a power that moves us to the centre of our being. They have moved the world as no other records ever did: they are doing so more deeply and more widely to-day than ever before.

But for all that, the Christian Church must not nourish any false security. The record of the career of Christianity in the centuries behind us is well calculated to fill us with anxiety. For it is no story of a steadily brightening day that we find there, but one rather that tells how soon dark and ominous clouds rose in the morning sky, and how persistently they remained there. It tells of perversions of the truth, and often of the growth of superstition and spiritual ignorance, and though there may be much in our outlook to-day to inspire both gratitude and confidence, there is also much to make us grave.

As biblical students we owe a great debt to Germany, and it would be dangerous at an hour like this to express any

hasty judgment upon German methods and their results. We are aware how easy it is to make mistakes in such things; but still I think that Germany's best friends have long felt that there is something sadly to seek in the religious state of that country, and that a new Reformation is badly overdue there—a Reformation in holy joy and power, which shall once more make the land break forth into song as it did in Luther's day. It cannot but appear a bitter irony if Theology flourishes while Religion declines.

But, after all, we have not to do with Germany so much as with ourselves. The matter concerns our own practice and our own methods. How are we to guard the precious substance of the Gospel of which we believe that we have been put in charge? History seems only too clearly to show that it may be lost. Something else may take its place, something lacking all its power and stripped of its great promise. The salt of the Gospel may lose its savour until it is fit only to be cast out and trodden under foot of man. How then shall we prove ourselves faithful custodians of that which has been committed to us; how shall we guard the savour of the salt?

It is about the Christian religion that we are primarily concerned, not about Christian theology. The latter must ever remain ancillary, deriving from the former, and remaining subject to it. Excepting as a man is spiritually rooted in the religion, he can make nothing but blunders in the theology; it will degenerate into a metaphysics groping a blind way through the unknown. Whilst, therefore, the Christian student can never turn away from the Christian records, it is only as being indeed a Christian that he is competent to handle them. It would be a serious mistake to believe that a man might reach the kernel of Christian truth by following any mere "inward light," no matter how pure it may seem. His spirit and conscience must be brought into the school of Christ and illumined by Him, or the inward light may prove a will-o'-the-wisp luring the

traveller to his doom. And, on the other hand, we are continually warned of the perils that beset men who suppose that they have in the New Testament Scriptures a body of documents which will reveal their true significance to an unbiassed scrutiny in the dry light of the reason, and that all that is required is to unravel the knots and bring out of the tangled skein a plain unvarnished tale of the historical facts.

Are we not to-day in a position to say that this will never be done? The study of the documents does not become easier as time goes on. I wish to speak modestly here, for this is not a subject which it has been my duty to handle, but may I not safely say that when anybody turns to a recent Introduction to the New Testament, he finds that the critics are still sadly out on such questions as those of the date and authorship of the books? When I was a student at Cambridge our great College don, Dr Lightfoot, was seeking to recover the genuineness of many of the epistles bearing Paul's name from the ravages which Ferdinand Baur had made, and there seemed to be growing up a conservative tradition of great promise. To-day both Lightfoot and Baur are left behind, so that Professor Peake can say that the outstanding feature of modern criticism lies in the general break alike with the Tübingen theory and the Lightfoot tradition. Baur had been willing still to credit Paul with the four chief epistles, but to-day the school of Van Manen, and the writers in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, refuse to leave even a single New Testament writing to its traditional author. But Van Manen does at any rate still believe in the historicity of Jesus Christ, as also that there really was such a person as Paul, even though he is clear that all that conception of Jesus which the so-called Pauline epistles set forth is a posthumous thing, the creation at earliest of the second century. But we all know that we have yet bolder critics than Van Manen amongst us. One and another of them are to-day writing to deny altogether the historical existence of

Jesus, and to argue that the confusion that besets our records results from the literary device familiar to antiquity of artificially creating a central figure to whom the new teaching might be ascribed.

Now perhaps we are ready, with Professor Peake, to speak of such conclusions as being the very "delirium of hypercriticism." But we are not helped by strong language, and we want to know whether this, or anything like this, is to be regarded as the legitimate conclusion of a biblical scholarship which dares to be thorough. If it be so, then I think that the Church Catholic throughout the world will say that Protestantism and its scholarship are in a parlous state, and it will be felt vain for us to reply that we have proceeded with the utmost care from step to step and from denial to denial. The answer will be that in that case it becomes clear that our whole method must be vicious.

The Christian Church which thus criticises the critic is persuaded that he is making his wide negations because he has not the proper evidence before him. He is merely handling sundry historical notes that have been left by writers and by communities regarding a great experience which was theirs, and without a share in which nobody may hope to understand what they have written. He is a man blind from birth who is found denying all reality to vision on the score of the inconsistent things said in his hearing by people who say they see. It is in vain that he protests that he has gone about his task with absolute honesty and only reached his conclusions as being forced upon him by the confusions of the witnesses: all his protestations count for nothing when it is learnt that he himself is blind.

The question that is anterior to all others in weighing the evidences upon which a spiritual religion rests, concerns the man himself who is weighing them. It is not a question of his honesty merely, or his diligence, or his intelligence, but of his firsthand knowledge of such experiences as lie behind the records before him. The student who never gets beneath the

mere historian's account of the Buddha and of Buddhism, or again of Mahomet and Islam, and who personally knows nothing of that deep stirring of heart and conscience which moved the early bands of their disciples, is incompetent to weigh the true evidences of those religions. He is an outsider, and his conclusions do not reach to the core of the matter. Kant powerfully insisted that religion is a practical idea of the reason, colouring all experiences and shaping conviction. It takes into its service the activity of the mind, which it constrains to furnish an adequate account of its motives and its hopes. Critics who would treat Christianity as a rational theology are apt to miss the evidences which belong to it as a practical and positive force; they are chargeable with grave onesidedness; they have forgotten the truth expressed in the old definition of religion: "Religio est modus Deum cognoscendi et colendi." Except as the practical impulses are found along with the intellectual, no justice will be done to the Christian facts: the ideas formed about them will, as Spinoza said, be confused except as they are viewed in their regulation of a spiritual life. Such recent disciples in Germany of Schleiermacher as Hermann and Kaftan have taught that religion is not a form of world-knowledge, but is the fear of God, and lies in the free surrender of a self-conscious moral personality to the overtures of divine grace. Faith is at once its nature and its power.

Is the present not a time when liberally minded men must feel themselves called to ask afresh what the real import is of their biblical studies? There can be no more question at this present time than at any other of their duty to carry on those studies with fearless honesty, but the present may be a fitting time for a clearer discernment than is often ours that the only issue of these studies that can satisfy the purpose with which they entered upon them will be a religious one, and never a purely literary or historical one. It is in the order of religion, and of personal religion, and not of science, that we face the fact of the historical Jesus, and of

the claim that it makes upon us. All critical examination of its historicity is incidental, and it is nugatory except as it subserves the directly religious decision. The man who approaches it in any other spirit toys with it, and he will inevitably fail, for he has not the necessary equipment for his task. His historical studies can at best but bring him up against the convictions and asseverations of religious men in the past, and he has not the key to them. This is not to say that there is no room for stringent historical criticism. On the contrary, the history is there, and its records should therefore be critically searched; but if they are to be searched to any purpose, it must be by men who can recognise realities when they are before them.

The question of moment in all our study of the Christian documents is therefore never a historical one, though historical ones come in. It is never a curious inquiry into the authentic value of records of the life and death of Jesus Christ, but always the intensely practical question: "Have I here before me my very Lord and Master, and do I yield to His claim?" It is true, as already said, that all assent to that question will imply the acceptance of a real historical Jesus Christ, but that acceptance will be one resting upon evidence that is gauged by religious standards not less directly than by purely critical ones: amongst other things it will include the religious testimony of those who since Christ's day on earth have yielded to His claim.

Do not let the sensitively honest student say that this is to mix up fancies with facts, or at any rate to mix up purely subjective facts with the purely objective ones which it is our business to examine. We are all philosophers nowadays, and we all know in our reflective moods that there are no such things as purely objective facts that we can talk about. Facts are always phenomena so far as we are concerned, and when we try to understand phenomena—appearances—we cannot leave out the person to whom they appear. We can never *leave ourselves out* when facing anything that we call a fact,

and least of all when facing religious facts. How could we hope to do so when facing the personal call which sounds through the Christian documents?

Supposing we were for a moment to imagine that the aim of New Testament scholarship had been fully realised, that all the hard critical questions were answered, and that competent judges assured us that we could now say for certain when and where this man Jesus was born and was brought up, what he really said and what he did, and knew all the circumstances of his end: *should we be very much nearer our goal*? Should we be much further on *religiously*? On the contrary, *all would still be left to do*! For what would have been here given us save a *Jesus after the flesh*, and what should save us from turning away from him in contempt, as did the Jews of old?

It is of importance in this moment of what we deem to be a spiritual break-down in our German teachers to realise afresh the incompetence of the New Testament scholar for his task if he have no inward knowledge of the Lord, no "spiritual experience" of the meaning of Christianity. Granted this experience, and the whole attitude of the scholar changes towards the difficulties which the records present; for the truth is that his judgments proceed, as all judgments must of necessity proceed, from an evidence to which the judge himself furnishes something. He is a man who in inner experience has known the Lord, and this knowledge becomes a master-key by which he opens many a closed door that confronts him.

Those of us too who would not pretend to be scholars, but who may claim some such first-hand experience as that here referred to, must give to it proper weight in the counsels of our minds. It is true that we may shrink from doing so, for we are keenly alive to the dangers of self-deception, and we should have wished that we might ourselves be left quite outside the argument and be allowed to settle it on strictly objective grounds. *It is not permissible for us thus to shrink. Faith must have the courage of its convictions*, and Faith is not

to be called credulity where it is the utterance of a spiritual experience which persists, and which deepens, under all the tests which life brings against it. It thus ranks itself within the true order of Realities, as that order can alone have either value or meaning for men.

It has always been upon these spiritual foundations that the Christian religion has been planted. We should not be true to the historical facts if we said that the New Testament was the rock on which the Early Church rested. That rock was Christ as inwardly apprehended by His followers. These witnesses, whom the critics charge with confusion, were in no confusion here. They declared that they had handled something, tasted something: Christ had been to their souls the very Word of Life, and they lived as transformed men in His presence. All things had been made new to them, and they new to all things.

When in course of time the New Testament came, it came unclothed in any literary form or unity, and without any editorial supervision. Its gospels were not scientific biography, but tracts written to persuade readers; and its epistles were the messages in which the preacher besought men to be reconciled to God through Jesus Christ.

It should not be supposed that a finer scholarship, a juster criticism, can ever in the future alter the terms on which men will receive Christ unto salvation through the Scriptures, for it were vain to imagine that the literary and historical evidence will ever be so marshalled as that unspiritual men will be constrained to own His claims. *The act of faith must ever be a venture of the soul.* The man who will be a Christian must ever come forth at the call of Christ from all earthly securities, and dare to follow whithersoever He leads.

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THE WARLIKE CONTEXT OF THE GOSPELS.

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THE Gospels are a fact in no way open to dispute. Whether they were written in the time of the Apostles or in a later age, whether the story they tell is strictly accurate or wholly imaginary, or how much of it is to be accepted as true and what parts dismissed as due to misunderstanding or lapse of memory or the influence of legend—these are questions which do not touch the great fact that the Gospels exist and are accepted as genuine and authentic by almost all Christian communities.

Moreover, it is a fact that the central figure about which they are concerned is Jesus of Nazareth. Worshipped as "the only-begotten Son of God," reverenced as establishing in his person the divine ideal of Perfect Man, honoured as the greatest of inspired teachers, or set aside as imperfect and even unreal, it will still remain that he is to-day a living influence, controlling, consoling, inspiring, prevailing in the thoughts and lives of men and exercising an authority in the councils of nations which may be disobeyed but is seldom disowned.

Hence the importance of the questions: What do the Gospels teach about War? What would Jesus teach if he were in our midst to-day?

To answer these questions it is not necessary to enter upon a criticism of the Gospels, or to engage on the task, by so "many taken in hand," from Luke's day till now, of delineating

anew the portrait of the Master, distinguishing the legendary and historical and interpreting what is doubtful and obscure in the record. Historical criticism as an art is of late date and has little effect upon public opinion. Even commentaries are read only by students or by a few intelligent and devout of the unlearned. It is the Books themselves as they have come down to us, the sayings of the Christ they have preserved, which contain such potency of persuasion and command that though men will wrest their meaning to accommodate it to their desires, they will not venture to make light of them.

These four booklets then — these, judged by influence on mankind, the greatest of all books—this mighty peasant Preacher of whom they tell—what have they, what has He, to say about the rights and wrongs of war?

We may not answer according to our own prepossessions and make the sense of words suit what we would have them say. We have only the letter to fall back on, but we must understand it as it was when it was living, and to do so it must live for us. We must "know Christ after the flesh"; we must realise the circumstances in which he was placed, must know of what sort were the people to whom he spoke; and we must take his teaching as a whole and not rely upon single sentences as if they were sacramental formulas.

Let us consider, then, first the character of Jesus as revealed to us in the Gospels. "The child grew," it is said, "becoming full of wisdom." He "advanced in wisdom and in favour with God and man" (Luke ii. 40, 52). He developed as any other gifted child responsive to its environment. "Son of God" all who call themselves Christians confess him, but differ widely as possible as to the meaning of the title. "Son of man" we all of us know him for, and as such subject to human conditions in mind and body alike, "in all points as we are" (Hebrews iv. 15).

"It is become natural to all Jews," writes Josephus in his defence of the race against Greek calumniators, "immediately and from their very birth to revere our sacred books and to

hold fast by them, and if need be willingly to die for them." These books, containing all the literature of Israel, its law and history and sacred poems and prophecy, Jesus would begin to hear about as soon as he could understand, and his infant lips were taught to frame the Shimâ, twice a day repeated by every pious Jew: "Hear, O Israel, Yahweh our God, Yahweh is one, etc." (Deut. vi. 4–7). They were the first Hebrew words he knew; but at the synagogue school which he would have attended while yet he was a little boy he learnt to read the difficult script of the sacred rolls, so that at twelve years of age he could argue with the learned Rabbis of Jerusalem, and later in the synagogue at Nazareth find the passage he wanted and read and interpret in the popular Aramaic, so that "many hearing him were astonished." How profoundly must this early knowledge and matured study of the Scriptures and of the Scriptures alone—for of science and history and letters he could have learnt nothing from any other source—have moulded his thought and penetrated his soul! What we call the Old Testament, what he had learnt as the Word of God, must have lived in him. "The word became flesh" in his life and personality.

But the Old Testament is a Book of War. There Jesus will have read of the great exploit of Abraham, how, when Lot his nephew was taken captive, he armed his three hundred and eighteen servants and pursued the four kings and came upon them by night and smote them and put them to flight, and recovered all the goods and Lot and the women and the people, and was blest by "the priest of the most high God" on his return (Genesis xiv. 16). Familiar to him from infancy will have been the story of the great deliverance from the hosts of Pharaoh, and the song of Moses on the shore strewn with the corpses of the enemy. "The Lord is a man of war: Yahweh is his name." Early too will he have heard of Joshua, after whom he was called, how all day long he fought with Amalek in the plain, while on the hill above Moses held aloft the rod of God, supported on either hand by Aaron and Hur, until the

sun went down and the victory was won; how, after the death of Moses, to him was committed the leadership of Israel, and at the crisis of conquest, before the city of Jericho there appeared to him as a man with sword drawn in his hand the "captain of the Lord's host" to assure him of success, and the walls of Jericho fell before the blast of the trumpets, and "the people went up into the city and utterly destroyed all that was in it."

"The time would fail to tell" the long record of war and heroic deeds which were to the Hebrew child his family history, and all the history he learnt or could care to know—"of Gideon and Barak, and Samson and Jephtha, of David also, and Samuel and the prophets, who subdued kingdoms, obtained promises, waxed valiant in fight, turned to flight the armies of the invaders." Was it not the constant theme of many a psalm chanted in the synagogue service, and learnt before yet it could be read, that all the triumphs of Israel were the works of God? "We have heard with our ears, O God, our fathers have told us, what work thou didst in their days in the times of old." It was He "who smote great kings and gave their land for an heritage unto Israel"; and the refrain at every memory of conquest or deliverance is "for his mercy endureth for ever." It is to Him that the warrior ascribes his strength and skill, "who teacheth my hands to war and my fingers to fight."

It is difficult, even for those who have been brought up to revere the Bible as the Word of God, to realise what the Old Testament meant to the pious Jew of the time of Jesus. It was not only the whole of Sacred Scripture, it was the whole of "letters" (John vii. 15). It was the story of the world from "the evening and the morning" which succeeded the first dawn of light, down to that great day of the Lord when "judgment will be given to the people of the saints and they will possess the kingdom which is everlasting" (Daniel vii.) The Book, itself inspired, was the continual inspiration of the race to which it belonged. The record of a glorious past, it

contained the precious assurance of a more glorious and ever-abiding future.

And all this stirring story of his forefathers, this story of judgment and mercy, of triumph and disaster—how vividly must Jesus have realised it when, as a youth, he gazed from the brow above Nazareth over the great plain whose "every name and every scene is full of meaning to him"! To the right lies Mount Carmel, where the great prophet alone contended against the four hundred and fifty of the prophets of Baal and prevailed against them. Over there to the front of the Samarian hills is Hadadrimmon, where Josiah was defeated and slain at the first charge of the Egyptian army. To the east is Mount Tabor, where Deborah met Barak with his warriors and saw before them the host of Canaan, and "the stars in their courses fought against Sisera," so that he fled and fell, and "Israel prospered and prevailed against the king of Canaan until they had destroyed him." Further east in Mount Gilboa, where Saul, defeated and despairing, slew himself. There too the scene of the triumph of Gideon and his three hundred selected men over the host of the Midianites.

For "the valley of Megiddo was the natural road from the coast to the east; and there the never-ending battle between light and darkness, between good and evil, was still being fought, as it had been in the past and would be in the future."[1]

Nor could he have been unmindful of that future as he stood there, his soul filled and quickened with memories of the past. Was there not promise in his Book of a great deliverer, a prophet like to Moses, a king of David's line, a warrior who alone should tread the winepress of the wrath of God and overthrow all the world's tyrants and subdue the nations, and, "glorious in his apparel, travelling in the greatness of his strength," manifest himself to his people, "I that speak in righteousness, mighty to save"?

Conscious even from his twelfth year of a high calling,

[1] See Sir W. M. Ramsay, *The Education of Christ.*

that he must be about his Father's business, how must the hopes inspired by prophet and psalmist have stirred his heart! All the more because the times were very evil, and the people of God, "heirs of the promise," were in subjection to the heathen, and oppression and discontent and rebellion were rife in the land.

Till his thirtieth year he bided the call of God, nurturing in lonely nights of prayer the great hope which ever burnt within his heart; and then came word that a prophet had risen in Israel, one like Elijah, clothed with a camel's skin, and with a leathern girdle about his loins, and he drew all manner of people to him in the wilderness, and to all he preached the glad tidings that "the kingdom of heaven is at hand." The call had come! Jesus went and was baptised with others into the company of the kingdom, himself needing not to repent, but associating himself publicly with those "looking for the consolation of Israel." Then he faced his new life to which he was born again. He offered himself to God; but what was it God would have of him? In the solitude of the wilderness, as he afterwards told his disciples by way of parable, he confronted the tempter within, who took advantage of his heroism of soul, of his unshakable faith in God, of his perfect devotion, to lead him into temptation. He had heard how, while he was yet a babe, one Judas had risen in revolt but "he perished, and all as many as obeyed him were dispersed." Might it not be that Judas failed first in the faith which can remove mountains? The leader of revolt, "who drew away much people after him," had, before the day was spent, to face the question of food. "Whence should we have so much bread in the wilderness to feed so great a multitude?" Would not God supply the need, He who bid Moses speak to the rock, and "the water came out abundantly, and people drank and their beasts also." Was it not the cry of unbelief, "Can he give bread also? can he provide flesh for his people?" Let him try now. "Command these stones become bread." But Jesus put the thought away. His mission

to feed men with the Word of God, lacking which no miracle would avail them.

Again, if he started, one unarmed man against the world, to proclaim boldly the kingdom of heaven, the end of heathen rule, would not the angels of God have charge over him? Should he not trust himself to Him whose clear call he had heard in baptism? No. Such was not God's way, that men should court peril and trust Him to escape it. "Be ye wise as serpents," he said afterwards to his disciples. He had learnt the lesson himself first; "giving none offence in anything, neither to the Jew nor to the Gentile," as Paul phrases the maxim and twice writes it to the Corinthians.

Then there surged over his soul the last, the mightiest temptation. If indeed God had called him, would fulfil in him the promises of the kingdom, then was it his high destiny to be Lord of the nations. Descendant of David, in him should the vision of the Psalmist be realised, and "all kings fall down before him, all nations serve him, his dominion extend from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth." And all not for his own glory, but for God! "For he shall deliver the needy when he crieth, the poor also and him that hath no helper. In his days shall the righteous flourish, and there shall be abundance of peace as long as the moon endureth" (Ps. lxxii.) Was ever such ambition, so limitless, so august, so tender, so godlike, conceived of human soul? He saw "all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them"—they were his!—his to right every wrong, to break in pieces the oppressor, to establish righteousness and peace for ever! His on one condition: "If thou wilt fall down and worship me." If thou wilt forget "the Most High who ruleth in the kingdom of men and giveth it to whomsoever he will"; if thou wouldst, like the Prince of Tyre in his glory, "lift up thy heart and say, I am a God, I sit in the seat of God, though thou art a man and not God." He realises the horror of the temptation: "Get thee hence, Satan, for thou

shalt worship the Lord thy God and him only shalt thou serve." He has overcome once and for all. Henceforth the way he chooses to "rest in the Lord, wait patiently for him." He is confident as ever of the kingdom, but "of that day and hour knoweth no one, not even the angels of heaven," and 'twere impiety to think to force God to declare Himself by rash reliance on His intervention.

So tempted and triumphant he returns to his native Galilee, and soon as the cry of John is silenced in the wilderness he lifts up his voice in town and village of the thickly peopled province, and again is heard "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." But he brought this message to men who were as eager to receive as they were slow to understand and sure to pervert it, and the publication of it needed the utmost care and prudence by reason both of hearers and of enemies.

Of the Galileans in the time of Jesus much has been written, and we can only touch briefly on a few aspects of the subject. "They were," writes Josephus, who was at one time governor of the province, "men inured to war, nor hath the country ever been destitute of great numbers of them." There, too, says Dr Cheyne, "the hope of the Messiah burnt more brightly than anywhere else in Palestine." Such were the people who every time they went in or out of town were reminded by the seat of the tax-gatherer that they were subject to the foreigner, and the very coins they paid what was exacted of them bore an image forbidden by their law and the superscription of the Cæsar. This subjection was a source of intense irritation, kept sore by this continual reminder of it. Even if the rule of Rome had been just and mild, had the governors been as incorruptible as they were capable, were the charges of "violence, robbery, oppression, illegal executions, and never-ending most grievous cruelty" made against Pilate false or exaggerated, or did they, so far as true, apply to no other than himself, still the very fact of heathen domination would have been galling beyond measure to a proud and

fanatical race, assured that they were the peculiar and chosen people, and that the sovereignty of the world was promised to them by God. All grievances, moreover, all wrongs endured, such as that "of the Galileans whose blood Pilate had mingled with their sacrifices," were constantly urged on the minds of the people by the followers of Judas, "who said that God would not help them unless they joined together and set about great exploits and did not grow weary in carrying them out. These men," adds Josephus, "have an unconquerable attachment to liberty and say that God is their only Ruler and Lord." And for this faith "they were ready to suffer any manner of death, nor heed the death of relatives and friends, nor can fear of this kind make them call any man Lord." Patriots or fanatics, by whichever name we ought to call them, zealots as they were called earlier, and assassins or "men of the knife" when later disaster drove them to desperation, they were "a great army, and the infection of their teaching spread specially among the younger sort, who were very zealous for it."

Now these zealous young men would be among the first to gather to the new prophet, who had appeared among them "preaching the good news of the kingdom," and so we find among the twelve whom he chose to be with him and whom he might send out to preach, one who is expressly designated as "the Cananæan," which is Aramaic for "zealot," as Luke has it. To two others, John, "*the disciple whom Jesus loved*," and his brother James, Jesus, with the intuition of character which was one of the great qualities conspicuously fitting him for leadership, not without humour too, gives the name Boanerges, sons of thunder, or it may be of wrath, a name which they justified later on, when, in excess of zeal and fullness of faith, they would fain have called down fire from heaven to consume the Samaritans who did not welcome their Master. As to Peter, upon whom Jesus would rely as upon a rock, surely all we know of him confirms the judgment implied in the name. He is only a man, fails in the extremity of trial, overcome by fear; the flesh proves itself weak, but how fervent is the spirit

and strong almost to the last! "If I must die with thee I will not deny thee," there speaks the real man, leader of his fellow-disciples in the same confession. "Now," said Jesus, just before his betrayal, "he that hath no sword let him sell his garment and buy one." It may be, he foresaw an attempt to assassinate him and so end his work, as Loisy interprets the saying, or we may prefer with Professor Burkitt to think it "all a piece of ironical foreboding, a tender and melancholy playfulness," which the disciples were incapable of understanding. What is certain is that Peter had already provided himself with a sword and did not shrink from using it, though the attacking party proved to be an armed band against whom defence was useless. It was only when Jesus himself forbade resistance that "they all fled," but Peter "followed him afar off." Note, moreover, that it is just these three, Peter and "his partners," who were first to follow Jesus and taken before the others into his confidence.

Obviously of those whom we know best it may be affirmed that they were just the men who would have easily been won over to the zealots; and how many among the multitudes who thronged and pressed upon him must there have been like-minded with these men, who would argue among themselves, "This is the Prophet who is to come into the world," and would conclude that if he held back they must "take him by force and make him king" (John vi. 15). To such it was, "sheep without a shepherd," driven to and fro, expectant of one who should lead them and eager to do his bidding, that Jesus "came into Galilee preaching, The time is fulfilled and the kingdom of God is at hand." It was news which, wrongly apprehended, would have kindled the flame of insurrection throughout the land; and Jesus must have known it and desired above all to prevent his hearers rushing headlong on the path to national ruin, misled by his preaching. "In quietness and confidence"—quietness in the present, whatever the provocation to revolt, confidence in the future, lay now as of old the strength of Israel; and therefore the "sermon,"

which has for its text the brief proclamation of the kingdom, is throughout a counsel of quietness, patience, submission, a caution against the impatience and presumption which would hasten God on and take vengeance out of His hands. The blessedness of poverty, meekness, pity; of suffering contempt and injury for righteousness' sake; of submission to violence and fraud even to the extent of inviting further outrage; of leaving the morrow to take care of itself—such are some of the topics of this sermon, the most impressive ever spoken. Similar sayings are found elsewhere in the Gospels, notably about poverty: "If thou wouldst be perfect, go, sell whatsoever thou hast and give to the poor, and come follow me." "Lo, we have left all and followed thee," says Peter. The reply is differently given. Matthew has it: "When the Son of man shall sit upon the throne of his glory, ye shall sit upon twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." With such a prospect in view, of what account were worldly goods? Wise and blessed who left all to follow the Christ.

Up to this day, and perhaps to-day more than ever before, the most diligent efforts are made to reconcile this teaching of Jesus with the avowed belief and deliberate conduct of the best of Christians, approved as it is by the Christian Churches in general. But all these earnest and ingenious attempts proceed on the supposition that the sayings which are collected in this discourse or are scattered in the Gospels were uttered as it were in the air, addressed to all mankind irrespective of their circumstances and condition, are binding on us free men as on the subject folk of Galilee. Jesus, it is tacitly assumed, did not consider his audience, their special temptations and wrongs, their ardent belief, kindled anew by his own words, that the kingdom of God was at hand, and the great danger that they would be incited to assure its coming by feeble violence on behalf of it. Yet surely it is only just to any speaker to take into account the state of mind of those to whom he addresses himself.

To men who should be on the watch, knowing not at what

hour the great manifestation would come to mark the end of the old order and the institution of a new age, all the precepts of Jesus in their bare literalism would commend themselves as reasonable, however difficult they might be in practice. It was simply true, and blessed were the poor and meek, all who suffered for the sake of righteousness, about to be gloriously vindicated. The glory of the coming kingdom of heaven is the background in the light of which the Gospels must be read if we would understand them and him of whom they tell.

It is constantly assumed that Jesus was specially distinguished in all the milder virtues, "meek and lowly were his ways"; but this is a view of his character founded on a few striking sayings and not justified by the story as a whole. It is written that he looked "round about *with anger*" on those who watched whether he would heal on the Sabbath, and "he was moved *to indignation*" when the disciples kept the little children from him. There is nothing of mildness in his action when he drove the buyers and sellers out of the temple precincts, nor in his denunciations of the Scribes and Pharisees, fierce and repeated as they are; in the parables in which he sets forth with relentless severity the doom of the unmerciful servant, of the guest who had not on the wedding garment, of the unfruitful tree, the unprofitable steward, of the husbandmen who slew their lord's son and heir. And though the words of the Prophet, "He was led as a lamb to the slaughter," are applied to him, it is not meekness but dignity which strikes us most in the record of his conduct, whether before the High Priest or the Governor. Very bold his confession before the hostile Sanhedrim, when the High Priest puts to him the question, on the answer to which his fate depends, "Art thou the Christ?" "And Jesus said, I am, and ye shall see the Son of man sitting at the right hand of power and coming in the clouds of heaven." Nor otherwise his answer to Pilate: "Thou sayest it. I am a king"; and when Pilate would extort some show of deference from him by reminding him of the power of life and death the Governor possessed over

him, how defiant is the reply, "Thou couldst have no power at all against me except it were given thee from above."

And this side of the character of Jesus was fully recognised by those who after his death carried his gospel to the nations, as indeed it has been by all the Christian Churches ever since. They told of one who endured contradiction and the cross, who was despised and rejected of men, who bid the weary and heavy-laden come to him, because he was meek and lowly in heart, and, taking example of him, they would find rest, who took little children up in his arms, and spoke kindly words to the woman from whose touch the respectable shrank. But they also told of this same Jesus, now "sat down on the right hand of God, expecting till his enemies be made the footstool of his feet," how in that dread day of his coming "with power and great glory," as he had himself foretold, "all the tribes of the earth would mourn because of him," and the great and the strong of men hide themselves in caves and call upon the rocks and mountains to fall upon them and "hide them from the wrath" of him who on earth of old time seemed gentle as "a lamb" (Rev. vi. 15, 17). And one who perhaps of all men knew him best, "the disciple whom Jesus loved and who lay upon his breast at the Last Supper," had he not seen him in vision of the last days, as Rider on the white horse, his eyes as a flame of fire and his garment sprinkled with the blood of his foes, leading the armies of heaven to the great last battle for God? Nor were they who first told of the humiliation and the triumph of the Christ, nor the millions who since have read the story and accepted it in humble faith, conscious of any inconsistency between the lineaments of the Jesus of the Gospels and this vision of heaven's champion, fierce to avenge the wrongs of a groaning world and mighty to establish on its ruins a kingdom of peace and righteousness. Rather did the one complete the other and together present the image of the Messiah of the prophets, the hope of all nations, the Saviour of Israel and of mankind.

Nor need we, whatever be our views of the authenticity

and credibility of the sacred story, strive to tone down the portrait and adapt it to our ideal of what the Christ ought to be. Rather shall we cherish the belief in a Christ who was gentle and strong, serious and sociable, bold and humble, one "eaten up" with zeal for God, yet prudent and considerate for others, capable of anger and of pity, of scorn and tenderness, confident of divine mission and of ultimate triumph, yet prepared to stoop to the uttermost of humiliation and worst of deaths—a perfect, a whole man.

And this Christ, did he stand forth out of the dim and distant past and appear in England to-day, find us not a people weary and heavy-laden under a foreign yoke which no effort could relieve us of, but as yet strong and free and brave, at war with all our resources of men and money for the cause of God and right, would he not bid us call to mind the exhortation of Jehovah to another Jesus, on the borders of the promised land, "Have not I commanded thee?" Resolve on war: came it not from noblest motives? "Be strong therefore and of good courage; be not afraid, neither be thou dismayed; for the Lord thy God is with thee?" (Joshua i. 9).

The radiant background of the Gospel story has faded with time, but the words and deeds of Jesus shine with a splendour, strong and vivid, which increases as the ages pass. Some are for special conditions and circumstances, some for all men of all times. We must needs understand if we would value them aright.

CHARLES HARGROVE.

LONDON.

QUALITY *VERSUS* QUANTITY AS THE STANDARD OF INDUSTRY AND LIFE.

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In a previous article I discussed the province of the Arts and Crafts in a Mechanical Society. I want now to put, and if possible answer, this question: "Is the quantitative standard in our industrialism essential to the maintenance of life?" By the quantitative standard we mean the system of factory industry whereby goods are turned out by mechanical power under competitive conditions and without reference to quality. The objective is marketing and profit.

The customary and superficial answer to the question is Yes. How, it is asked, could we feed, house, and clothe our vast industrial populations if our factories were not running? They exist by virtue of the quantitative standard. Their methods are bulk methods, and it is only possible by means of bulk methods to maintain an industrial population. If the qualitative standard of the artist or the ancient guild were applied to modern production and everything made in the best or the most beautiful way, if hand work were employed in lieu of machine work wherever imagination and fancy could bring the artist's personal expression to bear on the work, most of the population would starve. They would be unclad, unhoused, without the essentials of life. Qualitative conditions may serve an aristocracy: the democracy has no use for them.

Almost as superficial is it to say No, and to justify this by pointing to China and India. Here, it is urged, are great populations where qualitative conditions prevail as against the

quantitative standard of Western industrialism, and yet here the people do not perish. The structure of their society has so far been proof against the introduction of Western methods; and in any case it has evolved its own economy, enabling it to maintain life not without dignity and beauty.

Now, while these two answers are each unconvincing—the first because it assumes the permanence of existing conditions, the second because it ignores the fact of modern mechanical industry—the real answer, which is also No, does not yet admit of proof. It has to make good in experience. The No is in our belief. If the new right and wrong, the new industrial ethics I have been pleading for, are sound, then the answer and its proof lie in our democratic faith. The workman, the producer, demands a finer life because he is conscious of the need of it. What it is he will find out by degrees—he is feeling his way to it; but the finer life he must have because it is part of his democratic idealism. And this finer life does not consist in the mere accumulation of material things.

The best way of finding out whether he really feels this or not is to look within, to try and discover what the workmen themselves are actually thinking and feeling. There are very few men who, when the case is put to them as one of personal experience—the right and wrong in their own craft or line of work,—will not plump for the right. Put it to them as an abstract proposition, and apart from the element of profit, and they will instinctively apply the ethical test. I once knew two workmen, the one connected with the book trade and the other a coppersmith. Their houses were of the usual London artisan type, each filled with the machine-made stuff that goes to furnish life; but the one had hanging in his parlour, in lieu of the usual machine-made adornments, some reproductions of Morris and Burne-Jones; the other had on his hob, in lieu of the usual cheap ironmongery, a good copper kettle. The one knew nothing about copper ware, the other nothing about typography. To each I put my question of standard: was the quantitative product

necessary—the shoddy wall decoration, the cheap hardware? I got the same reply: "Why should I waste my money on that trash?" The one had picked up on his bookstall the knowledge that a Morris and Burne-Jones cut was good stuff; the other, from his craft, that a copper kettle has, as he said, "twenty times the life one of them tin things they cozen my missus into buying."

The thesis that cheap goods make cheap men, at times a very convenient cry, is only partially true. It is true in cases where a deadening and continuous occupation, in which the worker has no interest, stupefies him; or where a gradual reduction of standard in quality throughout a workshop brings with it a reduction in wages and the standard of life; but there are always modifying conditions. A shortening of hours, sound trade-union regulations, good education, healthy surroundings—all these may counteract. The way out, the solution to our difficulty, lies in a wiser, sounder organisation. I do not mean an organisation in the German manner of the State militant; nor yet do I mean organisation as individualists or socialists in England or America see it; but organisation towards a finer life. We have to reconstruct—perhaps the better word is construct—the life of democracy. This reconstruction must be based on the new industrial ethics.

Whenever we free ourselves of party cries, be they Liberal, Conservative, Socialist, or Labour, we get back to plain right and wrong; we return to a conscious moral purpose. It is well in those matters every now and again to go back to fundamentals, the words of the Greek writers, the cardinal points of history, the simple dicta of the New Testament. When we do so, what do we find? The war has led us to see again many of those things in their right perspective. We get, for instance, the plain, straightforward opinion of Americans on the sinking of the *Lusitania*, or the supplying of munitions for profit on a vast scale to the belligerents—so different this from the attitude of their Government, acting within its rights under international law.

Or again, we get a curious similarity of opinion on first principles between our own democracy and the great Greek writers. Take as an illustration the principles of John Burns's Housing and Town Planning Act—its attempt at building up cleaner, healthier cities—and Aristotle's axioms on the laying out of towns. The two first requisites, says the Greek, are sun and water—you must aim at health and life. Cities must be so ordered as to secure those things. Next, a city that has an autocratic government must be planned differently from a city that is oligarchical, or that is democratic—the democratic city demands its own conditions. Yet how many modern industrial cities can we not point to where those first principles are ignored! But the democracy knows what it needs, and one of its present needs is to apply the fundamental principles to its great new discovery of mechanical power.

Similarly the new ethics are daily taking firmer hold, finding expression in the life of the people quite apart from established religious organisations. "It is a paradox to pretend," says the Navvy of the Dead End, "that the thing called Christianity was what the Carpenter of Galilee lived and died to establish. The Church allows a criminal commercial system to continue, and wastes its time trying to save the souls of the victims of that system. Christianity preaches contentment to the wage-slaves, and hob-nobs with the slave-drivers; therefore the Church is a betrayer of the people. The Church soothes those who are robbed and never condemns the robber, who is usually a pillar of Christianity." That is what the workmen, the labourers, the producers for the most part think, and that is why the new ethic in industry is theirs to determine. It is they and not the Churches who are determining it, and the new State, in which the qualitative standard, whether in men or in goods, is to be the dominant factor, as opposed to the competitive State based on quantitative standards and the cheapening of men and goods, will be determined by them.

Perhaps the greatest change of heart that has come to the

democracy in the last twenty-five years is our change in relation to crimes of property. For long we have been puzzled by the fact that the judiciary often take one view, and the people—the average men and women who come to the law courts—take another. Galsworthy's play *The Silver Box* deals with the problem. When we read such a book—and it is a great book—as Ives's work on the penal code, the fact comes home to us; more so even when we read over again Charles Dickens's *Great Expectations.* It is hard for us now to understand the attitude of Pip towards the convict, or the desire of the convict to make a "gentleman" of Pip. Were Shaw or Wells to try such a literary effect it would be inartistic because too hopelessly unreal, but it was not so in Dickens's day. We have evolved a broader attitude towards crimes of property. It has been left for the Fabian socialists to find the economic formula, the justification for the new attitude. But it exists, and no doubt we owe it largely to poets and dreamers, men like Charles Dickens, that it has come about. They have helped to bring the Christ up to date.

What is it that maintains life, and where does the real wealth lie? That is the question which the ordinary man or woman is perpetually asking. The question is an instinctive attempt to readjust values. And here again the war has brought no end of such readjustments. Look, for instance, at the immense volume of helpful service among women in nursing, housewifery, productive work with the needle, or labour in the fields, which the war has suddenly set free. We have made innumerable discoveries of buried wealth which on ordinary economic postulates was non-existent. Similarly have we destroyed great quantities of foolish stuff that may have had value in exchange, but was not, and never could become, wealth.

To answer our question whether the quantitative standard is essential to the maintenance of life we have among other things to give up measuring wealth in terms of money. The expression of wealth in terms of money hypnotises men,

whether they be bankers valuing securities, or trade unionists estimating wages. It often makes them see false; it makes them miss what is the real wealth. And this money obsession runs through everything, affects all our standards. Perhaps one of the most disastrous examples of it is the working of our English Education Act. At this moment there are County Councils in England who are closing schools to make up for the wastage of the war. They are throwing away the real wealth in their districts. Why? Because they cannot see it as real wealth, but persist in measuring it according to the money grants they receive from the Exchequer. Their argument runs thus: "These schools receive the necessary grants—let us continue them; those schools no longer pay because the grants are reduced—therefore let us close them."

All of us who have studied the "vital budgets" of workmen know well enough how the workman and his wife often hold the same fallacious view. They measure wealth in wages. But subconsciously the greater aim—the aim for the qualitative standard—is there. A decent home and proper surroundings in town or country—these are among the vital things, and high wages do not necessarily bring these things. Where the infant mortality of the well-planned garden cities or suburbs of Letchworth, Bournville, and Port Sunlight is 4·8, 5·7, and 8·1 respectively, that of the old ill-planned industrial centres, Sheffield, Merthyr Tydvil, Bethnal Green, is 21·1, 21·12, 25. Such figures tell their own tale. Indeed, the workman who has always had his mind fixed on the money wage is more apt to miss the real wealth. His view is warped by the quantitative standard, and much of what he acquires is waste for him and waste for the community. I could give hundreds of examples, but one was forced on my attention the other day. A labourer in my village had spent a substantial part of his wages in buying a patent food for his baby, though the wife was nursing it. The mother naturally began to lose her milk. When the patent food was surreptitiously abstracted the mother's milk returned, but the man was angry, because,

having paid a high price for the food, he wanted the child to consume it. He measured in wages. It was impossible to get him to see that the real wealth lay in the woman's breast, and not in the quantitative produce of the factory. The curse of the patent food is fairly universal wherever factory conditions prevail; it might be taken as symbolical of the whole quantitative process. We are perpetually throwing away the real thing, the vital thing, the quality, for the multitude of things that are artificially forced upon us.

Once we apply the ethical principle to our mechanical production, seek the right and wrong of it, aim at quality because it is right, we shall begin to concentrate upon the vital rather than upon the saleable things. We shall find our point of view change with regard to competitive labour, and the cheapening of human life which results from this competition. We shall find the ethical principle a good test. It will crystallise the shining points of the new life.

Professor Patrick Geddes, writing of the old ethics and the old industrial order, and comparing them with those of the new order that is to be, says of the former: "We make it our prime endeavour to dig up coals, to run machinery, to produce cheap cotton, to clothe cheap people, to get up more coals to run more machinery, and so on; and all essentially towards 'extending markets.' The whole has been organised upon a basis of primary poverty and of secondary poverty, relieved by a stratum of moderate well-being, and enlivened by a few prizes, and comparatively rare fortunes—the latter chiefly estimated in gold, and after death." We whose business is production, who hold the new ethics and ask to be given a hand at applying them to the new order, say: "Let these 'cheap' luxuries grow dearer, let the 'dear' and good luxuries grow cheaper, and the whole balance of life will be changed from ugliness to beauty, from quantity to standard, from squalor and waste to simplicity and grandeur." I once heard a workman say at a public meeting: "Wait till we producers once get hold of Industry, and we shall not only say how

much we shall be paid for our work, but what we shall or shall not work at."

The quantitative methods of industry reckon without the force of this enthusiasm. They waste it, and it is wasteful accordingly. They ignore the motive of joy and reckon only with the motives of greed and hunger. They ignore creative enthusiasm in the average man. Few things give one such hope and confidence in the future as the joyousness—the motive of joy—shown by the British Tommy in the War. What is the secret of this? It is not only that he believes in his cause, and, having shaken off his Puritanism, that he has made up his mind joyously to win. It is also because he is so glad to be quit of the monotony of his industrial occupation. I have read innumerable letters from the front to prove the truth of this. He believes in the new, he disbelieves in the old ethics of industry. All that is needed is to define and make them clear, and we shall do this when the new life of peace comes. At least that is our hope.

The distinction between the old and the new industrialism, between the militant bourgeoisie that is passing and the pacifist democracy that is coming, has never been better illustrated than by the two petitions presented some months ago to the German Chancellor by the employers on the one hand and the Socialists on the other, as to the permanent annexation of Belgium by Germany. They involve the whole question of the quantitative standard. The former—the petition of the employers—rested on the hypothesis of militarist expansion, the forcing of markets by the State as an ever-broadening and aggressive organism. But the latter did not accept the hypothesis of the former. It built on other data, held other ethics. We need not call them Christian—the German Socialists would probably be the last themselves to do this,—but their basic pacifism had in it something of the Sermon on the Mount which was withheld from their employers.

It is interesting to compare with these German forecasts

and hopes the attitude of our own commercial jingoes, the men who hold the old industrial ethics, perfected by Germany, and which she has sought to rivet upon the world by means of her great commercial empire—forcing markets at the point of the sword. This is how our English jingoes put it—I quote from the engineering correspondent of one of the leading daily papers: "One tremendously important fact emerges out of the first year of the war. When we have utterly crushed Germany, as assuredly will be the case, the world's engineering trade will be in but two hands—those of ourselves and America. We shall once more become the workshop of the world. All the war-devastated countries will look to us to supply their immense engineering requirements—their new railways, bridges, steel buildings, factory equipment, electric power stations, tramway systems, gas and steam engines, to mention but a few of an endless list. And—here is the important thing—we shall be in a position to meet the world's demand, thanks entirely to our participation in the world-war. If our factories were as they were a year ago we should be quite incapable of meeting the enormous demand. Our loss would have been America's gain. But the vast changes in our engineering works that have perforce had to be made during the past year of war give us every chance of profiting by the trade that will come with the signing of the treaty of peace. A man of broad views, the Minister of Munitions, we may be sure, sees something more in the twenty-six vast national munition factories that are being built in various engineering centres throughout the country than a capacity to produce such a superabundance of shell as will inevitably crush the enemy. He sees in these admirably equipped factories the opportunity for trade development at present undreamed of as soon as the war is over. Here truly is a wonderful vision of which the first year of the war gives us a glimpse!"

A veritable vision of Behemoth! Fortunately the writer sees it only from the point of view of the profiteer. For him it does not matter what we produce and sell, as long as we

go on producing and selling. The one "Bernhardtist" having "utterly crushed" the other, the old commercial game of ever-unfolding markets shall begin again. Fortunately also he had not reckoned with labour, nor the desire the war has brought mankind for meeting other than the mere material wants.

"Lo now, his strength is in his loins, and his force is in the navel of his belly.

"He moveth his tail like a cedar: the sinews of his stones are wrapped together.

"His bones are as strong pieces of brass: his bones are like bars of iron."

Essentially the vision of a man who sees the world as mechanical power, without any particular objective. Behemoth is a stupid beast, and though for the moment "he is the chief of the ways of God: he that made him can make his sword to approach unto him."

The consistent following of the quantitative standard has led us into war, and war, as Professor Geddes says in the same passage above quoted, "is but a generalising of the current theory of competition as the essential factor of the progress of life. For if competition be, as we are told, the life of trade, competition must also be the trade of life." And so "the social mind . . . is becoming characterised and dominated by an ever-deepening state of diffused and habitual fear." This fear lurks in the wastefulness of industry, the instability of the financial system, and the physical slackness, the unfitness, of our great industrial centres. Not without vision did Karl Liebknecht in his denunciation of the war from the point of view of German labour say in the Reichstag in December 1914: "This war, desired by none of the peoples concerned, has not broken out in behalf of the welfare of the German people or any other. It is an imperialistic war, a war for the capitalistic domination of important regions for the placing of industrial and banking capital. . . . My protest is against the war, against those who are responsible for it, against those who direct it; it is against the capitalist policy which gave it birth; it is against the capitalist objects pursued by it, against the plans of annexation, against the violation of the neutrality of

Belgium and Luxemburg, against military dictatorship, against the total oblivion of social and political duties of which the Government and the ruling classes are still to-day guilty."

This is where the quantitative standard has led us. Is it really essential to the maintenance of life? As I have said, the answer lies not in our experience but in our belief.

The aim of the quantitative standard is marketing and profit. If, however, as a result of our newer ethics in industry, marketing assumes again its right function of placing the goods where they are needed, profit will be eliminated. Where there is a sound organisation for the benefit of the community, and the interest of the individual is not considered before that of the community, there is no longer any place for private profit. "Profit"—the thing which comes first—is the pull that somebody else gets who is not the producer. If the principle be accepted for which we producers plead—that there shall be a discrimination, a finding out as to the right and wrong in all mechanical production,—if it be made a part of the new ethics, the standardisable will be divided from the non-standardisable industries, and vast imaginative forces will be freed for new creation. The control of production once placed in the hands of the producers, the element of profit is eliminated.

This in effect is what labour movements half-heartedly, often insincerely, aim at: half-heartedly, because their leaders so often hold the bourgeois and competitive view of life; insincerely, because they so often sacrifice the reality for some momentary or sectional gain. My own concern as an architect has had to do mainly with the human, personal, individual things—with the great standardisable industries I have been less concerned; but the qualitative principle can be applied to both, and, whether we are concerned with the one or the other, we producers want to be allowed to control our own production, and not to have it directed for us by financiers, bankers, lawyers, exploiters, or those who are concerned with "profit"—the thing which comes first: we are interested in the thing itself.

There are many ways of looking at this great question; the answer comes to us from many quarters. The quantitative standard is not essential to life; but another illustration might be given, and that, most significantly, from Germany. What is the secret of the success and the failure of Germany in the War? The two are curiously interwoven—a study of her history makes them clear: want of political unity on the one hand, the greatness of her civic tradition on the other. The first has brought that blindness to the psychology of other nations. It has developed the blatant, half-barbarous imperialism that has harnessed the masses to a war of conquest. The other is an infinitely finer thing—the real greatness of Germany, from which we in England and America have so much to learn. The German civic tradition is among the great constructive forces of modern progress. Here we have cities that have consciously and deliberately taken over the aristocratic tradition of the eighteenth and seventeenth centuries, as in the case of Carlsruhe, Munich, Mannheim, Frankfort. In Germany we find cities that own themselves—where 80 per cent. of the real estate, as in the case of Ulm, is held by the city. The property of the prince has in a sense become the property of the community. Communal ownership is not, as so often with us, checked and marred by a hundred private monopolies and interests. States, like individuals, when one sense atrophies —when they go blind, for instance, or deaf,—develop other sometimes finer perceptions. Germany's loss in political freedom, her blindness to the evolution of her neighbours, has brought a finer civic tradition within herself.

If we now apply our theory of the intelligent control of mechanical power in the interest of the community to this finer civic tradition, does it not help us to find the key to our problem? Does it not help us see how the quantitative may gradually make way for the qualitative standard in industry? The war, indeed, has carried us far on in this direction. Basic mechanism shall be under the control and used for the benefit of the community. That is the prime lesson of the War.

And in peace? By the State if it be of the state type—postal, telegraphic, telephonic, a railway system, national harbours, etc.; and by the city if it be of the civic type—circular saws, the mechanism of building operations, the lesser forms of power in small shops, land, quarries, water, air, the breathing space at the backs of houses, parks, open spaces.

And this right understanding of the city and the great civic tradition inevitably leads us to the Arts and that discrimination between the right and wrong in mechanism that they imply. In the Arts *is* the qualitative standard. Basic mechanism shall be under control, and all things that are matters of personal and human creation shall be free of the mechanical incubus. Perhaps it will be for the city to determine how the division shall be made, for in the city the Arts are near at home; they imply the finer life of the citizen, his greater cleanliness, intelligence, behaviour—in short, civilisation.

In a well-planned and finely-administered city, where the right and wrong of mechanism is understood, there is no place for the quantitative standard of industry; it is no longer found to be essential to life.

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RELIGION IN RUSSIA TO-DAY.

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THE Oriental Orthodox Church—for the designation "Greek Church" is really a misnomer—has a history which perhaps means more to it in its actual consciousness of to-day, and particularly to that branch known as the Russian Church, than is the case with any other branch of Christendom. To Jerusalem, the cradle of Christianity, there succeeded in ecclesiastical importance Constantinople, the centre from which Northern Europe was evangelised. When Constantinople fell to the Turks in 1453, the deposit of the Oriental Orthodox Church was committed to a country that had been Christian since the tenth century, where it has since been preserved with an affection and in a purity that are both vivid elements in the modern Russian religious consciousness. Perhaps it is in the Oriental Orthodox Church that we can see the best contemporaneous representative of the Early Christian Church of the first three centuries. At any rate, it has conserved without alteration the teaching of the Apostles and the decrees of the seven Ecumenical Councils.

The greatest event in the history of this Oriental Orthodox Church was the schism with Rome under the Patriarch Photius in the ninth century. Hereby, in the thought of the cultured Orthodox Russian, it was saved from the spiritual despotism and the dogmatic and disciplinary innovations of its rival, from those alterations of doctrine and waywardness in morals that produced the fruitful protest of the sixteenth century, from celibacy of the priesthood with its attendant

evils, from the sacrilegious commerce in indulgences, from the horrors of an Inquisition, from the baneful might of excommunication. The Oriental Orthodox Church has never monopolised the Holy Scriptures for its profit, nor proclaimed that to it alone belonged the right to present them to the faith of its people. It places their authority above all else; it calls upon its members to find within those pages their daily food and sustenance. "To be the pure reflection of the Word of God,"—says Boissard, attempting to show the standpoint of the Russian Church,—"that is, for every Church, to participate in its infallibility."[1] Broken up to-day into more than a dozen different bodies and transformed in a certain measure, it still stands firmly upon its ancient foundations, and will stand. To traverse afresh the course of the ages, fixing our attentive gaze upon ancient Kiev, mother of all the towns of Russia, or on the Holy City of Moscow, the principal centre of orthodoxy; to contemplate with admiration mingled with respect the noble traits of pastors such as Cyril, Nikon, Philip Martyr, Hermogenes, and Philaret, or of pious ascetics such as were Anthony, Theodosius, Sergius, and Sozimus, or of princes like Vladimir Monomachus, Alexander Nevsky, and Michael Romanov; or yet of countless martyrs and confessors, both men and women, of every age and condition,—to do all this provides not merely an entrancing story, but is necessary to the complete understanding of what one sees in the Russian Church of to-day. But that, after all, the actual expression of the religious consciousness, is the principal thing to understand; for religious Russia, direct though her contact be with the past, and proud of it as she always will be, does not altogether live there, as so many seem to think. "There is no book on the Russian Church," wrote one of her most distinguished sons to me in answer to an inquiry; "there is no book on the Russian Church, because our Church cannot be discussed in a book. Better than from any book will you understand it if you go to such a religious centre as the

[1] L. Boissard, *L'Eglise de Russie*, p. x.

Troitzko-Sergievskaya Lavra (a famous pilgrim-frequented monastery near Moscow) or the Kiev Petcherskaya (the oldest and most highly revered monastery in Russia) and others, especially on the great festivals, or even if you go to our churches, particularly in Lent."

In endeavouring to bring out that which the Russian Church means to the best of her people and what they hope for from her, I do not know that it is possible to do better than attempt to reproduce parts of conversations to which I certainly owe much. The speaker is now an old man, and a layman holding high office in connection with the Holy Synod. He began by correcting wrong impressions. "You must know," he said, "that the Emperor is the protector, but not the head, of the Russian Greek Church. The head of the Church is our Lord." In his development of this point I came to see that the views of the Oriental Orthodox Church and of the United Free Church of Scotland were practically one, and that the opinion ordinarily held in this country of the relation of the Emperor to the Russian Church would be blasphemy to the true orthodox believer. "That is the great distinction between us and the Romans," continued my friend. "There is no necessity to have a head of the Church upon earth when we have such a Head in heaven. Again, the Greek Church is the dominating Church, but it is not the State Church. We do not use the term 'State Church,' because we have not the thing. We speak about the *Gospodstvoyustchaya Tzerkov*—the 'dominating,' the predominant Church. But in that description there is nothing juridical, simply a statement of fact."

Of these talks, of which I had two or three, what lingers chiefly in my memory were animated passages in which he strove to show what in great measure we had lost. And it is just here that the Russian Church has most to teach us, owing to the deep mysticism of her most devoted sons, the ingrained certainty in practically every Russian mind that there is a great deal more in the world than shall ever be compassed by

measuring rod or test tube, the unremitting sureness that we are wrapped about by a spiritual world which is the real world. "Ah, the Communion of Saints," said my friend; "how real and precious that is to us, to-day more than ever! I think that you have just a little lost the sense of it in Protestantism, and that the spiritual world perhaps seems more remote to you than it is to us. The living and most patent example and proof of the vitality amongst us of this feeling of the nearness of the spiritual world are the periodical beatification and canonisation of new saints." On inquiry as to who were the most remarkable of those to whom the hearts of believers had thus gone out, the following names were given amongst others:—St Mitrophane of Voronesh, who lived under Peter the Great and was canonised in the reign of Nicholas I. in the fifth decade of last century; St Tikhon of Zadonsk in the province of Voronesh, who lived under Catherine in the second half of the eighteenth century and was canonised fifty years ago; and more recently, during the present Emperor's reign in 1903, St Seraphim of Sarov, in the government of Tamboff (died 1833), who is said to have foretold the present war.

It is probable that to many Western minds all this represents but so much superstition. Such a hasty judgment would be of the same qualitative value as superstition. It was impossible not to proceed further in inquiry as to process. "The rules," continued my informant, "under which such canonisations take place are severe. A register is made of any cures and miracles: they are written down and kept by the local clergy. If these occur in striking numbers or in an unusual degree, the local clergy apply to the Holy Synod for canonisation. But parallel to this outward working of miracles an inward movement is going on. People who hold those saints in veneration go to their tombs and pray for the soul of the saint, asking our Lord that his soul should be blessed. This is done during many years: the believers continue to hold those requiems (*panichida*). The fact that so many come and do this through long years assures the higher clergy of the veneration in which

this man is held. These two circumstances eventually determine the Holy Synod to make a strict examination on their own account. A commission is then appointed whose business is to make thorough investigation and ascertain that there is nothing in the way of fraud. An *advocatus diaboli* is given the fullest rein, and only after the most critical investigation and full discussion is the decision made. Thus we ensure that there is no fabrication of saints. It is quite possible that one day Father John of Kronstadt will be canonised: men and women never cease to pray at his tomb." So he spoke. I do not know if St Mitrophane actually did this or that, or whether any proportion of the stories of St Seraphim are true, but I do know that in the Russia of to-day there is a great belief that God is working in the world both through His servants who still remain and through those whom He has taken to Himself. There is an attitude of expectancy, a sense of wonder, in the Russian mind. He believes in God with a working belief, and looks for signs of His activity in the world; and just as to the expectant shepherds watching by their flocks angels appeared, so to the humble, believing Russian peasant come great certainties of God. We do not expect, and so we do not receive. We are too sure that we know exactly what kind of a world it is in which we find ourselves, and vision dies amongst us. It is just here that our Ally has a message and a mission to the world.

Further, they realise how close they are to Protestant Britain even with that long history of separation. "Have you not often considered," continued my friend, "that what is common to all forms of the Christian faith is ninety-nine per cent., and what is different is but one per cent.? Is it not"—and here he leaned forward earnestly,—"you will excuse me, but I feel it so—is it not the hand of the Devil himself that makes trifles appear in our eyes as important matters, and puts serious differences between us and Rome, when the importance of union is so much greater than any or all of our differences? We understand the Protestant opposition to

Rome: Rome has deserved it. We only feel our regret that Protestants as a whole in the time of Hus did not renew their memory of the fact that there exists another old Church. Hus, indeed, tried to bring about such a reunion, sending his friend Jeronym of Prague to Russia with a view to bringing his own people back to the Greek Church. Rome seceded from us. Protestantism stands on the basis of the Holy Scriptures, but has lost the tradition, whereas we have both. We are descended from the Church of the Ecumenical Councils."

Then he continued: "Inter-ecclesiastical history is much more important than inter-national history, because the life of nations is limited to this earth, whereas a Church is a body constituted both on earth and in heaven. I often think about the question of reunion. It will come first between the Greek Church and Protestantism, not between Rome and the Greek Church. Churches like the Anglican Church and the Greek Church have more psychological affinity with one another than with Rome. Rome is based on subordination, whereas the Eastern Church is based on co-ordination. The Church of Rome is a monarchy and a despotism, whereas the Greek Church is a federation of fourteen different Churches, a sort of ecclesiastical republic. In this matter of union no Church should be asked to cede something to the other. They must endeavour to recognise one another as perfectly orthodox, as true, *i.e.*, to Scripture and to the spirit of the teachings of the seven Ecumenical Councils.

"Humanity has been—is—going through awful experiences. Is not this a miracle, that the German philosophy and the whole German spirit have brought that country under the sway of Beelzebub? Yet in our land there is a great revival of religious interest to-day. Russia was under the French influence of Voltaire till 1812: then in a struggle Napoleon was vanquished and the result was a widespread religious movement. We were again becoming materialistic when the Japanese war and the revolution after the war shook us from our spiritual torpor, and the religious life of the

nation was quickened. The same is happening at the present moment. From the court to the peasant's hut a spiritual movement is in progress."

If now the question be asked, How is this religious consciousness expressing itself in Russia to-day? I do not think that the answer will be found to differ so very much from the kind of answer that could be truly given in connection with our own country. The religious life of Russia has assuredly been deepened by the war. Men are face to face with the realities of life and death in a degree that compels them to think. The needs of the hour are driving men and women to pray. Far more people are seen in the churches. I recollect in particular a service in the Temple of the Redeemer in Moscow, one of the most beautiful churches in all Russia. It is a church of the people, and was crowded. What impressed me was the very large number of men, particularly of wounded soldiers. They must have outnumbered the women worshippers by nearly ten to one, and it was just an ordinary service. Then again there has been a remarkable development of interest in the consideration of religious questions. Public lectures have been given by men like Professor Prince Eugene Trubetzkoy, Professor Bulgakoff, and Nikolai Berdyaev dealing with various aspects of the political and spiritual present and future of Russia: for the two are one there in a degree in which that is true of no other country in the world. These lectures have been attended by crowded audiences, and listened to with an almost strained interest. The demand for religious literature has also greatly increased, although it is mainly satisfied by the sale of the older Russian classics. Yet in one quarter I learned that "the translation of a book called *The Ideal Life*, by a Mr Henry Drummond," was especially treasured by those who knew it. Religious conversation has also become much more frequent and natural in drawing-room and trench alike. Such subjects were never very far at any time from the speculative, questing Russian mind: to-day it is no exaggeration to say that they dominate it. Have we a minister of

state who, in discussing the future of a city which was the cradle of Christianity to his people, and therefore regarded with quite a peculiar longing by them, would or could say, "We are a religious people, and I believe that in our branch of the Greek Church there has been preserved a real religious life, whereas the other branches of the Greek Church have become somewhat barren and dogmatic, content with that external crust of things which has been very much for the Greek Church what the Latin theology has been for the Church of the West"; or in discussing the future of a country would say, as part of his political point of view, "Russia does not want Palestine for herself. Such an attitude is really distinctive of Russia. She could not be imagined as wanting it for herself. Christ's redemption is for all the world"? Similarly, at the other end of the social scale, religious and political thought blend in the peasant mind, with the former element as the determinative one, nor do I know any more exquisite expression of the fact than in an incident related by Prince Trubetzkoy in one of the lectures referred to above. It opens avowedly with a discussion of what Constantinople as expressed in the Church of St Sophia has meant and means to Russia, but passes quickly into the larger thought of what Sophia, the wisdom of God in His purpose of the redemption of humanity, has meant to the world. The whole theme is developed with the haunting mysticism of the Russian mind, and his endeavour is to show how this thought of the salvation of the world through the power of Christ is, as it always has been, close to the heart of the Russian people. "It is no matter for surprise," he says—and this poor translation can give little impression of the beauty of the original,—"it is no matter for surprise that the soul of our people was from the earliest times united to the idea of St Sophia with the greatest hope and with the greatest joy, and it would be vain to think that the deepest sense of this idea can be understood only by intelligent and educated people. On the contrary, for the very highly educated this idea is especially

hard to understand: it is much nearer to the life-understanding of our people. As proof of this take the following personal reminiscence. Four years ago I returned to Russia from a long foreign journey through Constantinople. In the morning in the mosque of St Sophia they showed me on the wall the imprint of the bloody hand of the Sultan who spilled the Christian blood in this greatest of the orthodox cathedrals on the very day of the taking of Constantinople. Having killed the worshippers who came there for safety, he wiped his hand on the column, and this bloody imprint is shown there still. Immediately after this visit I went on board a Russian steamer going to Odessa from Palestine, and at once found myself in a familiar atmosphere. On the deck there was gathered a very large group of Russian peasants—pilgrims returning from the Holy Land to their homes. Tired with the long journey, badly dressed and hungry, they were drinking water with hard bread, they were finishing their simple everyday toilet, they were listening, reclining, to tales about Constantinople. They were listening to tales about its churches and, of course, about the bloody Sultan and about the streams of Christian blood which, during more than five centuries, periodically were spilled in this once Christian kingdom. I cannot convey to you how deeply I was moved by what I saw. I saw my own country in Constantinople. There on the mountain had just disappeared the Holy Sophia lighted by the sun, and here before me on the deck was a real Russian village; and at the moment when our boat gently moved along the Bosphorus with its mosques and minarets, the whole crowd firmly and solemnly but, I do not know why, in a subdued voice, sang 'Christ is Risen' (*i.e.* the Easter hymn of the Greek Church). How deep and long-developed was the instinct which I heard in this singing, and how much of soul understanding there was in it! What other answer could they find in their souls but this to what they heard about the cathedral, about the Turks who defiled it, and of the long-continued persecutions of the nation over

whom they ruled? What other answer could they find in their souls in such a country, except this, except their joy in the thought of a common resurrection for all people and for all nations? I do not know whether they understood their answer. For me it is unimportant whether the peasants thought or not about the cathedral itself—it is of Holy Sophia that they were singing. It is important that in their singing the real Sophia was understood so as no single philosopher or theologian could express it. The peasants who sang 'Christ is Risen' could scarcely interpret very well what they understood. But in their religious feeling there was far more than any deep understanding. They understood the ferocious Turkish power under which the blood of persecuted peoples flowed: they saw (in their soul) the whole humanity joined in the joy of the Holy Resurrection, but at the same time they felt that they could not express this joy, this hope, which always lives in the soul of the people, now, in the centre of the Turkish power, except with a subdued voice, because so long as this power exists and the temper produced by it, Sophia is still far from us; she is in a different sphere. But the time will come when heaven will descend to earth, and the eternal idea of humanity will be realised; then this hymn will sound loud and powerful—this hymn which now you hear in a subdued tone. I think no other proof seems necessary that Sophia lives in the soul of our people. But in order to see and to feel her reality, it is necessary to experience that which these peasants on the steamer felt, and about which they sang."

Is it at all remarkable that amongst such a people there should be signs of a great religious awakening, none the less wonderful that it is going on so quietly that perhaps as yet the mass of the people know little about it? One of the Foreign Bible Societies has distributed over three and a half million portions and gospels amongst the soldiers since the beginning of the war. They were sent by the Imperial supply trains to the front, and on the opening page may be found the following inscription: "This book is given by His

Imperial Highness the Tzarevitch Alexei Nikolaevitch, presented by a Sunday School scholar in America." Already those who have concerned themselves with the organisation and direction of this distribution have become aware of its issue in a movement which is ultimately due, as one of them said to me, "to no human means: it is nothing less than the Spirit of God moving amongst the people." Through letters from the soldiers they learn how in a hospital one has taught his fellows to sing a grace before meals, whilst in a trench the others have gathered round the only member of their company who happened to get an Evangile, and he reads aloud to them. Yet I do not wish to give any one-sided impression. There is no assemblage in any country to-day, whether camp or commune, where the words of the prophet are not as true as when they were written: "Many shall purify themselves, and make themselves white, and be refined: but the wicked shall do wickedly: and none of the wicked shall understand: but they that be wise shall understand.[1]"

It is interesting to note that a movement is going on amongst the Greek clergy themselves which, if it continues to progress, will provide a very sympathetic atmosphere for the furtherance of the awakening already described. The movement is not new, and it is confined as yet to very few comparatively, but it is the beginning of a line of advance that history shows cannot be ultimately checked. Already in 1905 there had come into existence a group of priests who were called Priest Renewers (*Svyaschenniki obnovlentzie*). They also published a project for a reformed parish life. In those times the universal cry of the clergy was that the parish life should be renewed. The Holy Synod worked out a scheme for the Duma on this matter. But the project was not considered to be satisfactory either for the Government or for the clergy, and it did not pass. Briefly put, the parish was to be converted into a church,—the parish, that is to say, in the sense of a certain congregation of the people who have no right to

[1] Dan. xii. 10.

manage the affairs of their own congregation, the minister (priest) doing all this for the bishop, while the people did not discuss their own needs or conditions. A church, on the other hand, would be a group of people who elect their own minister and manage their own affairs by their own discussion and vote.

The most distinguished representative of this reforming and regenerating movement in the Orthodox Church to-day is Andreas, Bishop of Ufa. He wants the Church free from officialdom. *Svoboda*, freedom, the rallying call of the revolutionaries of 1905, is his catchword. He is especially anxious about the reform of the parochial system, considering that it must be carried out under any circumstances. In Russia the parish priests are elected by the bishops, and the election is confirmed by the Holy Synod. The local clergy, that is to say, are appointed without any reference or regard to the wishes of the people. To Andreas' mind, such a system is obsolete. The parishes, he says, must be reformed on the principle of election of the priests by the people, and with a certain autonomy granted to every parish in relation to national interests like education, etc. "We bishops must surrender this right of election to the churches." Again, in the activities of the Holy Synod the determining voice is that of the Procurator, the lay member, and he is really there to give expression to the wishes of the Imperial Protector of the Church. "Now," say Andreas and his co-thinkers, amongst whom may be numbered Bishop Nikon of Krasnoyarsk and Demetrius of Tauria (Crimea), "this is not canonical. In the early days of the reign of Peter the Great and previously, the Patriarch was free from the bureaucracy, but that great Emperor established the collegium of bishops, and abolished the Patriarchate, replacing it by the Synod, and instituting the office of Procurator. We must return to the older arrangement." When to this we can add that he speaks against the exercise of any kind of intolerance, we can surely look forward to a day of great things in the Greek Church.

The religious condition of the Greek Orthodox Church is,

then, indeed promising. Amongst her priests are many in whom there is a longing for the revival and redemption of religious life generally. Amongst her people there are brotherhoods or unions of zealous orthodox souls who gather in special houses, listen to the preaching of particular priests, and sing evangelical hymns. And when we further consider the definite situation produced by such a step as the prohibition of vodka, we see how, taken in conjunction with this religious temper of her people, yet greater and farther-reaching results may be achieved in this already admirable land. The liquor-traffic reform has left the Russian Government with a concrete yet difficult problem. Vodka and the public-houses have been taken from the people, but little has been done to provide them with good pastimes and reasonable and useful entertainment. The Ministry of the Interior attempted to supply the lack by a project to build People's Palaces in every city. The scheme was submitted to the Council of Ministers by Mons. Maklakoff, a recent Minister of the Interior, but the Council framed a remarkable resolution to the effect that this question cannot be settled merely by building special People's Palaces with cheap entertainments, but that there must also be educational and religious means applied to this end. Under the former are envisaged lecture-halls, libraries, and special evening classes for the village people. With regard to religious means, the Council in a delicate way indicated to the Holy Synod that they are bound to bring certain spiritual influences to bear upon the people, and to provide them with a high religious influence that will fill their lives. It is quite certain that after the war all these questions will be raised and discussed, and a new movement inaugurated amongst the Orthodox Greek Church and the people generally.

Hitherto we have dealt with the Orthodox Church. But *raskol*, or dissent, and religious fragmentation generally, has been as characteristic of Russia as of our own country. It testifies indeed to a certain vitality of religious life, but we believe that we are entering a period when the centrifugal

tendencies of the past will be replaced by movements that are centripetal. It is so in Russia to-day. Of the various dissenting bodies, the Old Believers are the most important, of whom there are more than twelve millions, living mostly on the Volga and in Central Russia generally. Their origin goes back to the second half of the seventeenth century, and was in part a protest against the issue of corrected texts of the religious books initiated by the Patriarch Nikon. The most aggressive points of difference between them and the Orthodox Church lie, however, in such futilities of ritual as making the sign of the Cross with two fingers instead of with three, or leading the church processions of their clergy "according to the sun" instead of "against the sun." They are intensely literalistic—practically fetichists—in their attitude to the Scriptures, and there is a great development of ritual in their services. On the other hand, their communities choose their own priests, and they have their own bishops, archbishops, and metropolitan uninterfered with by the Holy Synod; that is to say, they have already secured many of the conditions which Andreas of Ufa desiderates for the Orthodox Church. There is little doubt that a reunion of the Old Believers with the Orthodox Church will come. Already some who look for a great future for their beloved Church, regenerated and transformed, are planning in their minds a local council at which the first steps of this movement will be inaugurated. If the men to whom will be given the direction of such a work include those who have the penetration to say, as one of them said to me, "It is easier to fight with our national enemies than with our prejudices," we can be certain that the thing will be done. And when this is done and as the movement grows, we may see things even yet more wonderful. Such at any rate are the dreams of those who love their Church in Russia. "I am very *pravoslavny* (orthodox) myself," writes one of the most devoted of her sons to me, "and I have no doubt of the universal importance of the Russian Church, but you will see this better in the

future. The immediacy of her influence on Russian life depends largely upon our 'intelligent' society; the more quickly they give up their religious indifference, the sooner will that influence be felt. If her spiritual resurrection shall be as fully accomplished as we expect it after such a world-convulsion, then the power of the Russian Church will show itself visibly even on the surface of Russian life."

It will have been observed that throughout this description of religion in Russia to-day there have been expressions of hope and belief in a regenerated and revitalised Church on the part of those who have supplied us with our subject-matter; nor are they unaware of how all this alone can come. When, however, we still consider such a movement on its purely human side, we cannot altogether refuse to recognise what may be done, and indeed for that matter has been done, for Russia by other bodies, dissenters also, who have no historical connection with the Eastern Orthodox Church. Under the ukaz of 17th April 1905 the right was given to all subjects who so desired to separate from the Orthodox Church. Of this "Charter of Tolerance" great advantage was taken. Again, the ukaz of 17th October 1906 gave the right to all dissenters to form their own religious associations, and have their own churches and ministers. It also gave them important personal rights: under it they became individuals before the law. A Church could now found chapels, schools, and other institutions, and own its property. Protected by these laws, dissenters were able to spread their activities throughout Russia. Further, under the political manifesto of October 1905—"The Charter of the Constitution,"—concerned with the constitution of Russian life generally and granting the Duma, etc., dissenters along with the Russian population as a whole acquired a certain liberty of the press: they had now the right to publish their own books and periodicals. How great the contrast was with the condition of affairs previous to 1905 can only be appreciated by those who knew the country before and after. Previous to that year dissenters could not

separate officially from the Orthodox Church: such separation was considered to be a crime. The dissenter in this narrower sense of the term, whatever he was, was described in his passport as belonging to the Orthodox Church. The man who announced his separation was tried and sent to Siberia or to Transcaucasia. Any kind of propaganda—preaching, speaking about evangelical religion—was considered a crime. There were no meeting-houses or institutions; no periodicals might be published. All sacred songs were written out on paper, with the exception of certain editions which were issued in the time of Pashkoff in the closing year of the reign of Alexander II. Meetings were arranged in a secret way in Petrograd, with small numbers, and held in private homes and lodgings.

From 1905 onwards, accordingly, there has been a great change. One immediate result was that a great many people who had separated from the Orthodox Church, though described as orthodox upon their passports, applied for separation. In some cases they tried to gather into communities and associations and obtain recognition from the Government as a new association. Some of these bodies have founded their own schools and philanthropic institutions, hold their own conferences, publish their own periodicals, tracts, and hymn-books. Now these bodies, although small, cannot have failed to exert some influence upon the activities of the Orthodox Church. Till 1890, for example, there was hardly any preaching in the Orthodox Church: since then, preaching has greatly increased, due to the influence exerted on the people by the preaching of Stundists and other dissenters. There is a law of spiritual induction whereby energetic conditions prevalent in one body can influence other bodies in the vicinity without actual contact. It is impossible to estimate how far these other bodies may thus react on the "predominant" body, but it is certain that by the Charter of Tolerance Russia permitted the development of a spirit that will eventually work throughout the country for good.

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EDINBURGH.

NATIONALISM AND COSMOPOLITANISM.

A STUDY OF PAST EFFORTS AND PRESENT TENDENCIES.

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AMONG the master influences of the nineteenth century none was more powerful than the idea of Nationality. Greece, Italy, Hungary, and Germany illustrate its triumph; Poland, Bohemia, the Balkan Principalities, and Ireland its partial failure. The cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century was discredited and forgotten, or remembered only as a graceful and futile accompaniment of the *ancien régîme*. But the present world-war, supervening on long years of a crude and embittered nationalism, has disposed us to revise our estimate of the cosmopolitan spirit. A brief survey of the working of these two principles in the past may perhaps enable us better to understand their relative importance for the future of civilisation.

I.

Cosmopolitanism, of course, does not date only from the eighteenth century; the origin of the idea may be traced back beyond the Roman Empire to the Hellenistic world. But it was in the Pax Romana that it found its most conspicuous avatar. Under the Antonines an inhabitant of York or London, of Lyons or Cordova, of Antioch, Carthage, or Alexandria, was also the possessor of a wider franchise, a Civis

Romanus, the citizen of no mean city, a true cosmopolite. By the administration of the law, by the rites of the official religion, by the growing use of the Latin language (at least in the west), by the establishment of schools of rhetoric, the Roman culture diffused itself rapidly over the provinces. It found visible expression in a stately and uniform style of architecture, in temples and basilicas, in aqueducts and amphitheatres and the villas of the wealthy. The excellence of the military roads, the frequency of the posts, the freedom of commerce within the Empire, all tended to obliterate national distinctions. The threatened danger from the Barbarians outside, possibly also from the world of slaves within, only served to throw into greater relief the beneficent order of the Imperial system. Nevertheless this order, so splendidly imposing on the material side, lacked the essential bond of a true spiritual unity. It was a congeries of exhausted states ruled by an efficient but expensive bureaucracy. Unfortunately the expenses and the resulting taxation continued to grow while the efficiency degenerated, until even the material advantages of the system became more than questionable. But when these bonds of interest were snapped there was no link of a generous loyalty to hold the provinces together; neither was there any vigour left in them of independent life on which the State could rely in her hour of peril. When the Barbarians arrived they found no national spirit to resist them, except in Britain, the least Romanised of the provinces. What had been a convenience of government during Rome's prosperity proved a fatal weakness in her decline. Thus the first great experiment in cosmopolitanism failed because it had been too exclusively successful.

II.

Rome fell, but her legend was immortal; above the welter and confusion of the dark age there floated a vision splendid of the ancient order; memories of "that Imperial palace

whence he came" haunted the mind of mediæval man, a nostalgia and an aspiration. From Charlemagne onwards successive dynasties of German princes strove to interpret and exploit this feeling, to reconcile the already divergent nations in the Holy Roman Empire. But it was not by that shadowy and pathetic simulacrum that the fissiparous tendencies of the new Europe were to be overcome. In vain did jurists elaborate their codes, in vain did Dante fulminate in his *Commedia* or theorise in the *De Monarchia*; whatever even of temporary success the Feudal Empire achieved was only during its short periods of willing subordination to another principle.

When the Barbarians had overthrown the Empire they found themselves confronted with a further power claiming a yet more august authority, obeyed with a more passionate devotion, invulnerable, invincible, the Imperium in Imperio of the Catholic Church. Because her kingdom was not of this world she did not resist the territorial ambitions of the conquerors; because her kingdom was *in* this world she could not be indifferent to the task imposed on her by the new conditions. The history of the Latin Church in the dark ages has often been written, but even yet full justice has hardly been done to her magnificent services in Christianising and recivilising Europe.

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries the Church reaps the reward of her age-long effort; it is she, rather than the German Kaisers, who stands forth as the true heir of the ancient Empire, at once the organ and the symbol of a great supernational society. The Roman Pontiff, universal Bishop, Vicar of Christ, Vicegerent of God on earth, is acknowledged everywhere, except in the Byzantine and Mahometan dominions, as the supreme arbiter of human affairs. A new cosmopolis has been established, the Civitas Dei embodied in Catholic Christendom. It may be objected that this mediæval structure, like an eastern city, though fair and stately when viewed from a distance, on a closer inspection leaves much to be

desired. In material civilisation the new Europe was immeasurably inferior to the old; politically her union was a very imperfect thing; the Church's authority was often inadequate to suppress even private war; intercourse between the different countries was restricted and precarious, commerce almost non-existent; barriers of language, of prejudice, of suspicion isolated the peoples; Jacques Bonhomme and Piers Plowman were sundered by life and habit more than by the estranging sea. All this is true, yet hardly the whole truth. The spiritual unity of the Middle Age may sometimes elude our vision, just as the blessedness of its poverty is not always plain to our more prosperous era. Those ignorant peasants, separated by so much, yet knew themselves for members of one mystic commonwealth. They were sharers in a common faith, in a common hope—and fear!—often thrilled, as in the Crusades, by a common passion, kneeling at the same altar, one in many lands, they heard the same prayers chanted in the same sacred language; whether in France or England, in Germany or Scotland, their outlook on the world, on time and eternity, was essentially the same. Nor was their physical isolation so complete as is often supposed. The Church by her pilgrimages and jubilees acted as a popular tourist agency; the great religious houses afforded a rude but sufficient hospitality to the pious traveller; all roads led to Rome; a vast network of pilgrim-ways to the various shrines, as, for instance, to S. Thomas of Canterbury, covered Europe. For the frequency of pilgrimages at this period the only modern counterparts are Holy Russia and Islam. Islam, indeed, with its spiritual unity amid racial and political diversity, offers a curious parallel with mediæval Christendom.

Another powerful solvent of particularism was the university. Paris, Bologna, Oxford, with their thousands of students drawn from every country, produced a learned class singularly emancipated from national prejudice; the Lingua Franca of scholastic Latin was a universal language beyond the dreams of Esperanto; the wandering scholar disputing his

way from one university town to another nowhere felt himself in a foreign land; the republic of learning was as wide as Christendom. Other instances might be given, the common ideal of chivalry, for example, in the higher classes, but enough has been said to show how, in spite of material obstacles and divergences, the peoples of Europe during the Middle Age were united in a true cosmopolitanism of the spirit. And this unity was not obtained, as in the Roman Empire, at the expense of nationality; while it lasted, the mediæval system, with all its imperfections, seemed, like one of its own cathedrals, to combine the utmost freedom and diversity of detail in one splendid and mysterious harmony.

III.

It were tempting to inquire whether, with a little more wisdom and good fortune, this mediæval world-order might not, in its essential features and subject to necessary modifications, have continued unbroken into the modern era, and thus the history of Europe have followed a humaner and more tranquil course. But speculation as to might-have-beens is proverbially idle; it is only too easy to see the strength, if not the inevitability, of the forces making for disruption. The sanction of the Church's authority was largely superstitious, and when from various causes this superstition was dispelled, or rather took a different form, the reverence for her decrees was correspondingly weakened. She was, moreover, no longer sure of herself nor of her own position; a series of events dating from before the Great Schism had transformed her from an umpire into a combatant, intriguing and fighting for her own hand by methods at least as unscrupulous as those of any secular prince. Meanwhile, the European states had been advancing in the pride and consciousness of distinct nationhood and were already less and less inclined to endure any limitation of their independence when the Reformation finally shattered the religious and with it what remained of the political unity of Christendom. The abortive scheme

of Henry IV. for a universal peace itself shows how far the minds of statesmen in his day had moved from the mediæval standpoint.

One exception to the prevailing nationalism of these centuries deserves a passing notice, the Humanist movement of the Renaissance. For the old Civitas Dei it offered a new Civitas Humana of polite letters and scholarship with Ciceronian Latin for its universal language. But its members were only a minority of intellectuals out of touch with the people and possessing little immediate influence on events. The abiding contribution of the Humanists was more indirect and immeasurably more important; half unconsciously they had taken the first step towards the great modern *Aufklärung*, the substitution of reason for authority as the court of final appeal in human affairs.

Speaking generally, the period under consideration, from the thirteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century, despite the Humanist movement and the growth of commerce, despite also the development of diplomacy and the noble attempt by Grotius to formulate an international law in his treatise *De Jure Belli et Pacis* (1625), shows an increasing preponderance of the nationalist over the cosmopolitan spirit.

IV.

But a new influence was soon to arrest this growth of moral separation. The prestige of the Grand Monarque, the splendours of Versailles, the social character of the French people and of their generous and humane literature, had cast a spell over men's minds; a process of peaceful penetration set in which continued without a check for the greater part of the eighteenth century. During the seventy years from the Treaty of Utrecht to the eve of the Revolution French manners and taste were everywhere paramount; French had replaced Latin as the language of diplomacy and of polite society; a veneer of French culture was spread over the grossness of the German princedoms and the semi-barbarism of

the Russian Court. France, though defeated in arms, had made the spiritual conquest of Europe.

An interesting and important consequence followed. This universal vogue of France reacted upon her literature, rendering it more hospitable to foreign ideas at the very time when it had become a unique medium for their diffusion. The thought of Europe was pooled and issued in a monster French edition. Voltaire in his *Lettres Anglaises* and other works gave a Continental currency to our English speculators. The theories of the physiocrats and of Adam Smith, of Spinoza and Newton, were discussed on the Neva and the Spree as eagerly as on the Seine. A new orthodoxy of "Reason" arose to confront the old orthodoxy of Faith; unhistorical and *a priori* in temper, it maintained, as against the doctrine of original sin, the natural goodness of man, attributing his errors and misfortunes to the sinister agency of priest and tyrant. Of this pre-Comtist religion of humanity, appearing first under the veil of Deism, Bayle had been the half-unconscious forerunner, Voltaire and Diderot were the chief evangelists, Rousseau the fervent but disconcerting prophet, while Grimm was the reverential scribe of its Acts of the Philosophers. The movement was far from being merely intellectual; indignant anger at oppression, as in Voltaire's championship of the family of Calas, projects for a universal peace like that of the Abbé de St Pierre, emotional sympathy with the poor and simple as in Rousseau, pity, humanity, sensibility, sentimentalism, everywhere characterised it; even the young Frederick, with the enthusiastic approval of Voltaire, published an "Anti-Machiavel" reprobating the conscienceless statecraft of the past. Thus proclaimed with its message of hope and light—and novelty!—the philosophic evangel found ready hearers among the cultivated in every country. The old barriers of superstition and prejudice seemed broken down; to be a *philosophe* was to be a citizen of an ideal world sharing in a common language, creed, and emotion.

It is easy to be wise after the event and show how the

baseless fabric of this Utopian vision must vanish before the revolutionary tempest. It is easy to condemn it as at once superficial and insincere; insincere because many of its disciples, like Frederick, who never allowed his humanitarianism to interfere with business, only paid it an eloquent lip-service, while others, alarmed at the unforeseen consequences of their theories, hurriedly recanted them and with all the bitterness of renegades fought against their former principles; superficial because it never reached the masses of the people, the peasantry of France and England, the serfs of Russia and Prussia—because, in a word, its elect were only an *élite* of fine society. As if other causes had not their time-servers! As if any new faith had penetrated all ranks simultaneously! The movement, in fact, was neither insincere nor superficial, nor was its influence both during the Revolutionary period and after so negligible as has been supposed. Its failure, in so far as it failed at all, was due to two causes: (1) It was premature; the Europe of the *ancien régîme* was too worm-eaten with abuses to admit of renovation without catastrophe. (2) It was also too one-sided; in its devotion to the cosmopolitan idea it ignored the deep and growing instinct of nationalism.

V.

Considered in its bearing on the present inquiry, the Revolution offers a curious paradox; arising in a glow of cosmopolitan enthusiasm, it rapidly became the generator and forcing-house of an intenser nationalism. Its immediate objects, the reform of French finance and the abolition of aristocratic privilege, had evoked a universal sympathy; throughout Europe the fall of the Bastille had been hailed as a victory for humanity; generous hearts in every country, our own Wordsworth for example, had rejoiced at the good news; the peoples that sat in darkness had seen a great light and the star of that Epiphany shone over Paris. For a too brief moment it almost seemed as if the dreams of philosophic

idealists had come true and a new world was to arise free from the shackles and separations of the past, united by the spiritual bond of the Revolutionary creed with its three great articles of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. For a moment only; partly through the excesses of the French themselves, partly through the alarms of the other monarchies, France was invaded. Instantly the revolution changed its character; with "*La Patrie* in danger!" for their battle-cry the nationalism of the French was kindled to fever-heat. Henceforth the wars of the Republic became more and more wars of mere conquest, culminating in the naked supremacy of Napoleon. The effect was naturally to stimulate the growth of national self-consciousness in the peoples of oppressed and subjugated Europe. France and French ideas, so long synonymous with freedom, were now become the sign and seal of foreign despotism. The principle of nationality, quickened and intensified by misfortune, was thus intimately associated with the principle of liberty. Internationalism and cosmopolitanism had become suspect.

But if it was by the help of nationalist ardour that the allied powers overthrew Napoleon, the European Settlement at Vienna and afterwards the Holy Alliance effectually disillusionised the patriots. The gravamen of the charge against the absolutist governments from 1815 to 1848 was that they had first used the generous enthusiasm of the peoples and then betrayed it. In the political rearrangement national rights and sentiment had been cynically ignored; Poland was repartitioned, Italy given up to Austria and her vassal princes, Belgium compelled to a forced union with Holland, Germany weakened and divided by Austrian and Prussian rivalry: and nearly everywhere these anti-national dispositions were maintained by a system of ruthless repression. The natural consequence ensued; the twin aspirations of Nationality and Liberty were fused in a yet closer union. Nor was this all; sympathy with one another's wrongs begat among the democratic parties a new sense of solidarity between the peoples.

This was strikingly exemplified by the wave of revolution that swept over Europe in 1848; it was as though the nations had now but one heart, one purpose. Idealists might again be excused for believing that the day of Liberty and Brotherhood had dawned at last.

One important factor of this mid-nineteenth century upheaval has yet to be mentioned, the recently awakened class-consciousness of the proletariate. But if the emergence of a "fourth estate" (quite different in aim from the old *tiers étât*), with its dream of a universal social millennium for the workers, largely accounted for the initial successes and ubiquitous character of the revolution, it was also mainly responsible for its undoing. Too many interests were threatened by the new principle; "property" took fright; the bourgeois classes, repenting of their rashness, began to look for a "saviour of society." He was easily found; in France his name was Louis Napoleon, in Germany it was Bismarck. To the latter cannot be denied the unhappy distinction of having once more estranged Nationality and Liberty, of having exorcised out of his own people and almost out of Europe for a season the generous cosmopolitan spirit.

VI.

The present generation succeeded to the *damnosa hæreditas* of the Bismarckian era. Armed to the teeth and hating one another the more for the crushing burdens imposed by their fears, the nations continued to glare mutual defiance from behind their fortified frontiers; if certain powers drew closer together their friendship did but seem to emphasise their hostility to a rival group. What possible issue was there but a world-war? So it seems to us now, when the prophets of peace are discredited for their blindness and alarmists of the *Si vis pacem para bellum* school commended for their foresight. Yet the event was not so certain nor the inference so plain as many to-day suppose. For in spite of militarism, in spite of national jealousies, a new spirit of cosmopolitanism

was beginning profoundly to influence the world. What Rome had been to the Empire, what the Church had been to the Middle Age, that and more had Western civilisation come to mean to the modern European. A new orthodoxy was arising and imposing itself on all the advanced races. In ministerial pronouncements, in the language of the press, in the conversation of private life, its formularies were quoted, its authority recognised; even when such professions were insincere their employment was none the less a tribute to their general acceptance. If the use of a common shibboleth could unite the nations, never had the prospects of union been more hopeful.

The fundamental article of the new creed was the solidarity of human interests: only by the denial or obscuring of this could the triumph of cosmopolitanism be retarded. The tragedy of our civilisation lies in the capture and perversion, or the calumniating as by some malignant Iago, of the reconciling agencies which were the principal organs of its action. Foremost among these was international commerce; increasing *pari passu* with industrial development, it seemed destined gradually to bring about a true commonwealth of the nations bound to one another by reciprocal benefits. How this hope was thwarted is a familiar story; the Free Trade doctrines of the Manchester School were denounced as a cunning device for securing to this country a British lion's share of the profits; hostile tariffs and tariff wars, gigantic cartels of protected industries, scrambles for preferential markets outside Europe, embittered the relations of the great producing countries. International commerce, belying its early promise, has brought not peace but a sword.

The parallel case of international finance is too complicated for discussion here; it may, however, be pointed out that although by nature essentially cosmopolitan, since "capital has no country," although further its prosperity was so bound up with the cause of peace that the slightest war rumour was enough to depress every Bourse in Europe, yet so forgetful

was finance of its true interest that it allowed itself to become the willing accomplice of the rival governments in providing the means for their disastrous armament policy.

Again, much had been hoped from the growing power and international sympathies of organised labour; war had been often denounced by its leaders as an anti-social expedient of the upper classes to evade reform. In a democratic age there seemed a reasonable hope that an opinion so widely held among the workers of every country would ultimately prevail over the suspicions and animosities of the governments. Yet last year the German Social Democrats, the most important labour party in the world, meekly bowing to the will of their supreme War Lord, shouldered their rifles to march against their comrades, the socialists and syndicalists of the French proletariate. Another instance is supplied by the newspaper press. Whether we consider it, as in Germany, subsidised and "tuned" to the advocacy of any policy whatsoever, blowing hot or cold at the inspiration of the government, or, as in England and elsewhere, the prey of conscienceless syndicates intent only on circulation and profits, the story is one of progressive degradation; what should have given utterance to the better mind of the peoples, and by so doing have still further strengthened that better mind and instructed it, has, with some honourable exceptions, become the mouthpiece of national vanity and prejudice, the advocate too often of secret and sinister interests, nearly always a sower of suspicion, a fomenter of strife.

What of the more ideal agencies that have been so conspicuous in our time? What of religion, of philosophy and science, of history and literature, of education? Each of these is by nature a unifying influence; the common object of them all is the service of man by the gift of truth. A recent writer,[1] for instance, sees in the contributions of the different races to scientific discovery a proof and a prophecy of this growing unity. Yet it were easy to show, did space permit,

[1] Mr F. S. Marvin, in the HIBBERT JOURNAL, January 1915.

how they all, even religion, have been prostituted to a baser purpose and enlisted as enemies of peace. And although one category of international effort, that represented by the Hague Conferences, is free from this reproach, can it be said that even there the success has been more than academic? The few restraints they ventured to impose have been broken by our present enemies in their war frenzy "as a thread of tow is broken when it toucheth the fire."

Thus a survey of the numerous reconciling influences, both material and ideal, from which so much had been expected, might seem to yield the depressing answer that at the best they were nugatory, at the worst capable of being transformed into poisoned weapons; that *homo homini lupus* was still the true reality, our common civilisation the great illusion.

VII.

Yet the foregoing pages will have been written in vain if such is the final impression. For, however momentarily obscured by ignorance or passion, the great basal fact of human solidarity, which is the discovery of the last hundred years, is bound with the diffusion of knowledge to receive an increasing recognition. The reconciling forces may be distorted or thwarted for a season but not for ever; new organs for their expression will be evolved, and the old organs restored to their proper function. From the agony of Europe the national idea will emerge, strengthened indeed, but also purified of its baser accretions; and the cosmopolitan idea will be welcomed as its necessary complement and condition. The time will come when even the present war will be seen to have been only a brief and sanguinary interlude, a temporary set-back to an overwhelming stream of tendency.

R. H. LAW.

PENRITH.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"THE STEWARDSHIP OF FAITH."[1]

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1915, p. 200.)

Dr Scott Holland's criticism of Dr Lake's *Stewardship of Faith*, in the *Hibbert Journal* for October last, will naturally attract attention. Though quite kindly and fair, it is written with great warmth and energy; and the writer evidently thinks that he is bringing a fatal indictment not only against the book he is criticising, but against the whole school of Biblical critics to which Dr Lake belongs. In fact, he challenges them much as Goliath challenged David.

I hold no brief for Dr Lake. In the first place, he is quite capable of defending himself; and in the second place, I do not agree with several of his views: on some points I agree rather with his critic than with him. I think that Dr Lake goes too far with Schweitzer in making eschatology the governing condition of all the Synoptic teaching. And it seems very probable that Dr Holland is right in saying that Jesus did foresee and speak of his own death, though the language in which he spoke of it cannot have been so clear and explicit as the Synoptists represent, or the death would not have taken the apostles so completely by surprise. I am unwilling to attribute to the apostles the extreme stupidity for which Dr Holland gives them credit.

But the whole gravamen of Dr Holland's criticism falls on views which are shared by all the historic school of theology; and here some reply seems necessary. Dr Lake had sketched the stages by which the earliest Christian beliefs were developed into the Pauline creed. His critic denies that there were such stages: "we are not in presence of two separate stages; the two are contemporaneous." Here we reach the root of the matter. If Dr Holland is right, there is no such thing as an early history of Christianity, for history implies succession of ideas, and in early Christianity there was not succession.

[1] As Dr Scott Holland's criticism of Professor Lake's book was originally written as an article, the rule that reviews of books are not open to discussion is in this instance set aside.—Editor.

Dr Holland's main contention is as follows:—The earliest documents of Christian literature which have come down to us are the Pauline Epistles. They precede even the Synoptic Gospels. But when we examine these Epistles we find them full of a most exalted doctrine of Christ as the source of the Christian life and inspiration. Dr Holland rightly insists that nothing could exceed the vehemence and enthusiasm with which St Paul asserts the dependence of the Church on the risen and exalted Saviour. His theology is completely Christocentric.

Hence Dr Holland infers that "Christianity enters on the scene in this form, with this belief already there." He tries to do away with the distinction between the teaching of St Paul and that of the apostles at Jerusalem—a distinction sufficiently insisted upon, one would think, by St Paul himself.

But though the Synoptic Gospels are later in the date of their redaction than the Pauline Epistles, yet in the opinion of critics in general, both conservative and advanced, they are based on traditions, and even on documents, much nearer to the sources. They give us a clear notion of the impression which Jesus made on his contemporaries. And though the character of Christianity began to develop immediately after the Crucifixion, yet we see from the earlier chapters of Acts that it changed at first but slowly. One cannot regard the Pentecostal speech of St Peter recorded in Acts ii. as strictly authentic; but it certainly shows us what kind of preaching went on in Jerusalem in the very early days. "Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved by God unto you by mighty works and wonders and signs . . . ye by the hand of lawless men did crucify and slay: whom God raised up, having loosed the pangs of death. . . . Being therefore by the right hand of God exalted . . . he hath poured forth this which ye see and hear. . . . God hath made him both Lord and Messiah." The great question in the minds of the Apostles was whether Jesus was the promised Messiah. This is also the ruling idea in the writings of the Synoptists, who record the deeds and words of their Lord in narratives which show a conception of his being, quite different from that of St Paul. It was, as St Paul repeatedly asserts, his own personal religious experience which made his teaching of as great value as that of the original apostles. The epistle which is ascribed to St James is sufficient to show how far from the acceptance of Pauline views were many Jewish Christians.

Dr Holland's account of the Synoptists is made up of two entirely different views, which he does not reconcile. In one passage (p. 209) he puts together all the passages in them in which the Saviour is represented as making a personal claim and emphasising his unique relation to the Heavenly Father. That there are such passages cannot be denied; but we reflect that our Synoptic Gospels in their present shape are at least a generation later than the Crucifixion, and that the authors of them exercised, as a diatessaron will clearly show, a very free hand in adapting and modifying tradition; and further that often a very slight modification of a few words would entirely change the drift

of a sentence; and so it becomes impossible to be sure that we have the very words of the Saviour. That he was conscious of an unique relation to the Father in Heaven is clear: how he spoke of that relation we can only judge in a measure.

But almost on the next page Dr Holland gives a very different account of the Evangelists, maintaining that though they held the Pauline doctrines on the subject of Christology, yet they were content to write their histories without showing them. "St Luke," he writes, "most assuredly held the strong creed of his master (St Paul) as we have it in the Epistles to the Romans and the Corinthians. He had never been taught any other Gospel. Yet, holding this with heart and soul, he is satisfied to write his Gospel without letting his creed peep through." Why he should have prevented his creed from peeping through, if it was the creed universally recognised by Christians, and fully justified by the visible and audible facts of the Saviour's life, Dr Holland does not in the present paper clearly explain. But in another paper, which he published in 1909,[1] he tries to show that the motive of the Synoptic Gospels, and even of the Fourth, was a reaction against docetism. In order to combat the tendency to refine away the facts of the great biography, "they delight, now, in going back to the old facts just as they were, when they understood none of them. They show Jesus rigidly circumscribed within narrow local limits, living as a Jew would live, occupied with a Jew's questions, held within Jewish associations and horizons, bounded by a Jew's experiences."

Certainly I cannot here discuss this theory. I can only try to show that the basis on which it is erected is not historic. This especially appears in what Dr Holland says in regard to the Third Gospel.

It is indeed probable, though not certain, that Luke, the friend of St Paul, was the author of the Third Gospel and Acts. But it certainly cannot be said that he had not been taught any Gospel but the Pauline. He asserts in his proem that he was acquainted with many versions of the Master's life, and we know him to have used Mark and other sources in which the view is not Pauline. In the early chapters of Acts he gives us an illuminating account of the pre-Pauline church. It does not appear that he was himself a complete adherent of the Pauline theology. For it is remarkable that in the speeches which he writes for St Paul the distinctively Pauline doctrines are absent. As Dr Moffatt wisely observes, "It cannot be too often and too emphatically denied that because an early Christian formed one of Paul's coterie, he must therefore have assimilated the apostle's entire theological system."

But, asks Dr Holland, "How did the body which already held the creed which is the familiar background of St Paul's early epistles find itself satisfied by the presentation of our Lord embodied in the Synoptic tradition?" The difficulty is merely one invented by Dr Holland, and does not trouble the evolutional historian. The fact is that the Synoptic views and the Pauline views were adapted to different surroundings and

[1] *Hibbert Journal*: Supplement, p. 127.

satisfied different schools of thought. The Church at Jerusalem and Rome and elsewhere did not easily or at once accept the Pauline views. And that the Synoptic Gospels did not altogether satisfy the Paulines is proved by the notable fact that an Ephesian disciple of St Paul composed a fourth or spiritual Gospel to supplement them, in which he transposed to a loftier and more spiritual level the events visible and audible of the Master's life. It is, in fact, the Fourth Evangelist who most fully adopts the process mentioned by Dr Holland by which the disciples threw back, out of their experience, something into the language of their Master. The result is a Gospel admirably adapted to the needs of the growing Church, a wonderful embodiment of the Christian spirit; but a narrative unhistorical, on the whole, though probably resting in parts on a historic tradition.

Dr Holland insists that the Pauline doctrine cannot be later than the Synoptic, because they existed together in the churches founded by St Paul. This last statement is in some degree true. The Synoptic view is the earlier, but of course the traditions on which the Gospels were built went on in the time of St Paul. Pauline and Johannine views went side by side with the traditions, which in the church at Jerusalem were strongly entrenched. And it was only by degrees that St Paul's influence pervaded even his own churches in Greece and Asia. But what happened then is what has been happening ever since, and still is common. The primitive Gospels were read in a transformed and symbolic sense. Even when the Gospels were written as we have them, a certain amount of transposition had taken place, which we can trace clearly enough in a diatessaron. A few stray phrases, such as that very notable passage about the Father having committed all things to the Son, have crept into our text; but they are obvious patches in the garment. And in an uncritical age it was easy to read the text of the Gospels in a non-natural way, and to put into it a meaning which was new. If we allow that this proceeding is natural, it does not justify us in reducing the whole early history of Christianity to a pathless morass.

PERCY GARDNER.

OXFORD.

"THE WARFARE OF MORAL IDEALS."

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1915, pp. 43–64.)

THERE is, possibly, much to be said for the part that force has played in human usage. Perhaps it has been too much overlooked, or neglected completely, in former estimates of the elements that have moulded our civilisation. Still, there is such a thing as over-emphasis, or a one-sided emphasis, as I believe to be the case in this article, "The Warfare of Moral Ideals," by Professor E. B. M'Gilvary. It may be possible that standards of right and wrong have been established by force. These

standards certainly vary, not only in different lands, but within the same community, and they have been imposed sometimes by means of physical force. There are some who maintain that our "morality," in its narrower sense, was imposed by the monks, when they had the right to threaten, terrify, and punish in their hands. "The will of the stronger formed the basis of the new justice," says Professor M'Gilvary. "In course of time the sentiments of the community became adjusted to the new order of things, ideas of what was right were moulded upon the practice which had come to prevail, and what a short time before was fought as an intolerable infringement is now regarded by most people as a self-evidencing right." "Might made right." Professor M'Gilvary says that, however, the might of the sword and the gun is not the only might. "Read the Hebrew prophets and note how effectively they wielded the lashing tongue." Saul of Tarsus "aroused æsthetic repugnance." "His method was disgust." "The moral judgment injects poison into the winged words it lets fly. It does not describe—it damns." These, then, are apparently the only two ways in which moral ideals or standards have been established in the world. A great deal of these kinds of forces has been used to impose the ideals of the strong upon others. But, after all is said and done, is it force that has been the real cause of their establishment? It is not always true that the conquered settle down in time to the ways and methods and practices of the conquerors. Four hundred years of Turkish might did not succeed in destroying the hopes and ideals of the people of the Balkans, or of the Armenians, nor did it make their conduct and practice acceptable to their subjects, or cause them to be accepted as a standard of right. Before the standards of the conquerors are accepted by the conquered, they must bring with them to the conquered a tolerable amount of satisfaction, a fairly comfortable way of living together, practically equal to the satisfaction and comfort they enjoyed in the old days. If the satisfaction is greater than in the old days, all the better; there is then an enduring peace, and a willing acceptance of the new standards. This it is, in my opinion, that constitutes the great difference between the might of England and the might of the Turk and his allies. It is because the might of England has worked satisfaction throughout her Empire that her sons, from all parts, are ready to shed their blood and expend their treasure on her behalf. The Empire is largely satisfied that it enjoys more liberty and greater security under British rule than under any other—even if it enjoyed independence. England has not deprived a single nation of its language or its religion, scarcely a single custom and local organisation. England's imperialism is no longer the brutal desire to crush the feeble, but rather the ambition to raise them to her own level, respecting, as a rule, even their own moral standards. There are other methods of obtaining acceptance for our ideals than that of the sword or of scolding. There is such a thing as the attraction and fascination of the beautiful. Then scolding is not effective for very long.

Judging by the fact that the scolding of the prophets was continuous and prolonged, its effect did not seem to be altogether satisfactory: their people seemed to be a very unbendable, unreformable race. Paul, we know, used the opposite method, the winning way, far more effectively than that of the scold. He revealed the beauty of his ideal to the world. And this was the method of Christians for many generations after his time. As Tertullian, in comparing the Christian with the pagan philosophers, says: "Their pompous glitter of words has not made the tithe of disciples that our lives have done"—talking of the beauty of patience and courage in face of death. And did not the embodiment of might once say to, or concerning, the personification of meekness and love, "Thou hast conquered, O Galilean"? When we see the best, in the flesh, it seems "far better than we had ever deemed it." The Editor of the *Hibbert Journal* has said of Edith Cavell's martyrdom, "We have seen them measuring their strength against each other! And who can doubt that victory lay with the Best? The slain woman has conquered! The blow which the Worst dealt at the Best has recoiled, as such blows ever recoil, upon its authors, and hastened the day when the evil cause shall perish for ever."

There is more than one way—more than two ways—of establishing our moral ideals.

E. D. Priestley Evans.

Bury.

"THE WAR: A QUAKER APOLOGIA."

(*Hibbert Journal,* October 1915, p. 123.)

Mr Graham's apologia leaves out of account a large number of the Society of Friends whose position with regard to war is very different from his own, and who have never—either before or since this war broke out—subscribed to the doctrine that no war can ever be right.

His position is a strange one. He claims that "Friends can take no part in war" because—I hardly like to quote the words—"to do so would foul the Christ within, would desecrate the inward personality." At the same time he has never denied that under the circumstances our country was right to go to war in August 1914. Such a position is quite untenable for some of us. We believe that aggressive war is criminal; that war in general is a barbarous method of settling differences between nations, which, when the world is ripe for it, will drop away as other forms of strife have done; and that, in the meantime, world-peace is an ideal to "travel towards," and evil must be resisted with all the force we have, physical as well as spiritual.

Mr Graham sees the difficulty that would arise if "a serious fraction of the nation" should hold his opinions, but dismisses it by saying that "many other things would, however, be different then." One of the "many other things" would have to be Germany.

The danger to the nation of only an insignificant fraction who do not recognise that there is such a thing as unrighteous peace, is only too apparent. For instance, Mr Graham says: "It may be well for the nation that there is a nucleus of watchful people, not touched by the gadfly of war, ready to put in an oar whenever there is the remotest chance of peace. If we can accelerate it by a single day, we may save our country three millions of money and a thousand lives." But what if the "oar" put in too soon were to delay instead of accelerate, and so incur the terrible responsibility of adding to the sacrifice of money and lives?

It is unprofitable to discuss the arguments deduced from the New Testament. Mr Graham himself says that "Gospels and Epistles were written to meet immediate needs; and under the Roman Peace war was far away and not in question." It is the same with Christ's own example. He did not defend himself—we worship him for it; but that does not absolve us from what may be *our* sacred duty under different circumstances.

Mr Graham allows that "Friends do not follow Tolstoy in his objection to all force, and therefore to all government," and goes on to say that "Friends believe in the police, and in all analogous uses of force. But we do not believe that foreign nations are a criminal population, nor that war works the ends of justice. The whole spirit of war is the denial of law. But it is too rough and vague a treatment of so complex a moral issue to confuse war as a special and unique form of force, with force in general. . . . This lumping together of such diverse things leads us nowhere in ethics. One might as justly identify the taking of all business risks with speculative gambling, because they are connected by a series of steps each a more dubious transaction than the last; or we might as truly call all wage-earning servitude, from the skilled trade unionist or domestic cook to the coolie labourer." At the same time he "lumps together" defensive and offensive war, which seem to some of us "diverse things" wider apart than business risks and gambling, and as "complex a moral issue" as that between military force and force in general. (The oft-repeated argument that offensive becomes defensive war to armies in the field does not blind us to this issue.)

The early Friends were able to draw a distinction (*vide* Isaac Pennington's *Somewhat Spoken to a Weighty Question concerning Magistrates' Protection of the Innocent* referred to by Mr Graham). So also, I believe, were our grandfathers at the time of the Napoleonic menace, and so have been, and are, many well-known Quakers of our own day—thinkers, workers for peace, lovers of their fellow-men.

We may differ as to the means by which world peace may be attained, and as to what may hinder it; but we are united in longing for it, and in honouring those who are ready to die for it, whether on the battlefield or at home.

JULIET M. GODLEE.

LONDON, W.

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

I CONCLUDED the last Survey with a notice of a small volume on Nietzsche. I may perhaps suitably commence this by referring to two articles dealing with aspects of Nietzsche's doctrine from the pen of Dr William M. Salter. The first is entitled "Nietzsche on the Problem of Reality" (*Mind*, Oct. 1915). Here Dr Salter shows that according to Nietzsche neither the world of ordinary common-sense experience nor the world of natural science can be said to be real. There is, in Nietzsche's view, no reason for supposing that our images of a tree, of a stone, of water, etc., faithfully represent things outside of us. Such images are creations of our own, in response to stimuli that come to us; but the outer world itself, from which the stimuli are said to come, is born after the effect, of which it is assumed to be the cause. In like manner, the ultimate, indivisible, unalterable atoms of the physicist are pure inventions, as are also "forces" in the mechanical sense, and the laws they are thought to obey; they are all of them a convenient basis for reckoning, and not actually discovering them, we create them. "Things," "objects," "subjects," "substance," "ego," "matter,"—these are metaphysical entities of the populace; people want something permanent, and this is the way they secure it: but such entities are fictitious. Practical need plays a large part in determining all our beliefs. Nietzsche, indeed, was of opinion that knowledge, in the strict sense, may not be desirable for most of us, that the world as we picture it and conceive it under the stress of life's needs may be better than the world as it actually is, and that our ignorance, even a will to ignorance, may be expedient for us. The arguments just mentioned might seem to lead to solipsism, but, on other grounds, Nietzsche was enabled to escape from that pitfall. He advanced, then, the hypothesis that the world in its real being was made up, not of things, substances, subjects, atoms, spatial quantities, and movements, but of centres of power, more or less conflicting and struggling with one another. Each of these, being a will to power, must be conceived as seeking to prevail, and as only being prevented by others that seek to do the same. Thus, each would estimate all that is outside from its own standpoint, and, to the extent it was conscious, would build up a world accordingly—images, concepts, categories, and the rest. Each centre of force would then be real and for it its created world would

be real, and this may be what and all that reality means. Nietzsche's metaphysic might be described, in short, as Pluralistic Voluntarism; he did not, in his later period at least, adopt Schopenhauer's conception of one Primal Will or *Urwille*. The second article is on "Nietzsche's Superman" (*Journ. of Phil.*, xii. 16, Aug. 5, 1915). By "superman," Nietzsche, it is contended, understood man as he might be—not another species, but our very human flesh and blood transfigured. Instead of natural selection (which he thought often favoured the weak), he advocated conscious, human selection in the direction of individuals of maximum power as the true method of development. We must, he urged, observe nature and history and note in what way striking results had been reached unconsciously and perhaps clumsily and by slow degrees in the past; then, taking things into our own hands, we must see if the results we aim at could not be reached in a similar way, only more surely and with less waste of time and energy. Taken together, the two articles present a clear and careful account of the main conceptions of Nietzsche's thinking.

In 1907 the late Professor E. S. Beesly brought out a volume of essays contributed by Dr J. H. Bridges, the well-known Positivist, to the *Positivist Review* during the last thirteen years of his life (1893–1906). They were concerned not with the passing topics of the day, but with the fundamental principles of Positivism. Under the title of *Illustrations of Positivism* (London: Watts & Co., 1915), a new edition of this work, edited by Mr H. Gordon Jones, has just been issued. The essays have now been classified in accordance with the nature of their subject-matter, and there have been added a number of posthumous papers by Dr Bridges, many of which were originally delivered as lectures or addresses. The essays are well worth preserving. They are here classified under the general heads of Science, Philosophy, Religion, Politics, and Miscellanea. The philosophical essays are mainly concerned with Comte's doctrine of order and progress in science and with Herbert Spencer's theory of evolution, which the author is at pains to contrast with the theory of Comte. Dr Bridges offers, for example, some acute criticism of Spencer's principle that the condition of homogeneity is a condition of unstable equilibrium. He contends that so far from this being supported by the facts, the whole science of chemistry seems to show that heterogeneous matter is, on the whole, less stable than homogeneous. Binary compounds, he points out, are less stable than elements, and more stable than quaternary compounds. The consideration of this question suggests, however, a further and larger one, namely, how far is the conception of evolution rightly applicable to the inorganic world? Dealing with Huxley's attack on Positivism, Dr Bridges thinks that Huxley shared the suspicion of the academic world that the new science of sociology, of which Comte more truly than anyone else may be regarded as the founder, would not merely exercise a directing influence over scientific specialism, but would tend to discourage it altogether, and that this suspicion lay at the root of the extreme bitterness with which Huxley always spoke and wrote

of Positivism. Nevertheless, Huxley's later teaching in the Romanes Lecture, that we should neither imitate the cosmic process nor run away from it, but combat it, defines exactly the Positivist attitude.

Professor G. T. Ladd's interesting little work, *What Should I Believe?* (London: Longmans & Co., 1915), in which an inquiry is made into the nature, grounds, and value of the faiths of science, society, morals, and religion, presents a position markedly antithetical to the Positivism of Dr Bridges. Professor Ladd attempts in the first place to describe the elements of the mental attitude of belief so as to distinguish it, on the one hand, from knowledge, and, on the other hand, from mere opinion. He emphasises the extreme complexity of the state of mind called belief, and indicates the psychological factors of which it is constituted. The world of sense and of the forms and laws which the intellect constructs on a basis of sense-perception is interpenetrated by another sort of world in which those sentiments and practical demands of the mind that concern the invisible and the ideal have their peculiar influence. The latter is the world of the things believed in rather than known. Its grounds or causes lie in the constitution of the individual and of the race. The forms, the beliefs themselves, are more akin to instinct and to intuition than to scientific formulæ, but by reflection they may be made increasingly more reasonable; and the nature of belief lends no support to pragmatism or to Bergson's theory of intuition as a distinct and superior kind of mental functioning for the attainment of truth. The central thought of Professor Ladd's book is reached in the chapter entitled "Lesser and Greater Beliefs," in which an attempt is made to discriminate between beliefs that are trivial and those which are of supreme importance and value. Only those beliefs and faiths are truly great which belong to the substance of the self and which depend upon a valid conception of the constitution, course in development, and final issues, of personal life. The "greater beliefs" must be appealed to in every effort to vindicate the power of the intellect to penetrate into, and to interpret, the experience of objective reality. This process of penetrating and interpreting is throughout a species of personifying, culminating in the scientific faith in the rational unity of nature and in the religious belief in one rational Will. Great stress is laid by Professor Ladd on the conception of personality, and readers of his book would do well to consider many of the points urged by Mr R. M. McIver in an extremely able and lucid article on "Personality and the Suprapersonal" (*Phil. R.*, Sept. 1915). Starting from the axiom that ultimate values are personal values, Mr McIver proceeds to examine the view that we can think of a system of persons as a person, a system of organisms as an organism, a system of minds as a mind. The identification is, he argues, in every case fallacious. It is just as if we were to think of an army as itself a soldier, or a constellation as itself a star. He insists that it is a logical impossibility for the unity attained through the co-ordination of like objects of any kind to be itself of the same

character as the unity of each of the objects so co-ordinated. If any microcosms were just miniatures of any macrocosm, then that macrocosm would not bind together, and could not be the unity of these microcosms. A system of persons can no more be a person than a system of planets can be a planet, or a system of triangles a triangle. Whilst it is possible that a greater spirit may enclose or control the minds or spirits which alone we know, it is not possible that it should be the synthesis of these unless in fact their meaning, their individuality, their distinct existence, is denied. And that is why Hegelians cannot avoid "transmuting" or "merging" the self in the absolute. They want to make the totality or universality or synthesis of mind or spirit at the same time *an* absolute mind or spirit, *the* absolute mind or spirit; and the two conceptions are incompatible.

A very valuable and useful paper for those who are not mathematicians is contributed to *Mind* (Oct. 1915) by Mr C. D. Broad upon the subject "What do we mean by the question: Is our space Euclidean?" The distinction between space and matter on the one hand and time and events on the other implies, it is maintained (*a*) that space and time are not themselves in time, that geometrical and temporal relations are eternal, and that the only thing which changes in motion is the relation of material points to geometrical points; (*b*) that space and time cannot be conceived as capable of causal action on matter, and must, therefore, be conceived as homogeneous, *i.e.* as not having qualities at certain points or moments different from what they have at other points or moments. By *our* space in the above question we mean, not the private perceptual spaces of any one of us, but the spaces of physics so constructed as to deal consistently with most of the data of waking sight and touch in most people on the general plan of distinguishing space and matter, and attributing to space the qualities just specified. The question, is our space Euclidean? means then, can we, subject to the conditions indicated, construct a system of physics which assumes Euclidean geometry for space, and enables us to deal consistently and adequately with all the data that scientists agree are most worthy to be taken into account? The only way to answer this question is to try to construct such a system of physics. If it can be done, space is Euclidean; if it can not be done, space may not be Euclidean. Mr Broad urges in this connection three considerations: (*a*) It is notoriously very difficult to prove a negative; (*b*) all the alleged particular crucial experiments, such as measurements of stellar triangles, of parallax, etc., are quite wide of the mark; (*c*) if it be decided that our space is Euclidean, that will not in any way prove it to be not also non-Euclidean.

Writing on "The Determination of Human Ends" (*Phil. R.*, Nov. 1915), Professor A. K. Rogers maintains that our aims are set for us not by events, or by law, but by ourselves. So far from being in the grip of a law of progress, imposed from without, progress itself depends upon new and untried expressions of creative spontaneity occurring in individuals. The essential nature of an ideal is to be found in the characteristics (*a*) that it has still to be realised, and so is a novel element so far as factual

experience is concerned, and (*b*) that it goes back for motivation to a personal demand. Its force depends, not on the individual finding it true, but on the individual's insistence that it shall be true. Professor Wilbur M. Urban's article "On Intolerables: A Study in the Logic of Valuation" (*Phil. R.*, Sept. 1915) contains much that is suggestive and interesting. If by "intolerable" be understood intolerable for some sensibility, then there would seem to be no limits to what our sensibility may find tolerable. Transvaluation of values seems to be in this sense practically unlimited. Again, the facts constrain us to recognise that there is no value the opposite of which cannot be affirmed. That which is intolerable to the ethical consciousness may be tolerable from the æsthetic or scientific point of view. But there is, it is maintained, good reason for believing that a distinction between sensibility and valuation is justified by the facts, that in this sense a distinction may be drawn between an æsthetic imagination and a genuine contemplation of situations, and that for the latter there *are* situations which are genuinely intolerable, intolerable *überhaupt*. Can we, then, assert the truth of any proposition about the world because we find the contemplation of its opposite intolerable? There is a considerable body of philosophical thought that holds to the principle that "reality must be ultimately valuable," or must "conserve values," and rests the truth of this principle upon the intolerability of the opposite. And Professor Urban argues that if actual volition (and valuation) is the realisation of values in the world of existents, the possibility of such valuation presupposes that reality in its structure does not contradict the essential constitution of values. If, for instance, the principles of degree and of the "maximisation of value" lie in the very nature of value as such, then a world in which the opposite were true, a world in which there were really no higher or lower and in which increase of value were impossible, would be in very truth an intolerable world.

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THEOLOGY.

The Rev. Professor JAMES MOFFATT, D.D., D.Litt.

In a sketch of the theology underlying the Acts of the Apostles (*American Journal of Theology*, October 1915, pp. 489–508), Professor Kirsopp Lake points to the twofold tendency in this representation of apostolic thought. On the one hand, Jesus was conceived as Lord rather than as the hero of the traditional Messianic doctrine who was to fulfil Israel's hope in the future. Dr Lake has been evidently influenced by Bousset[1] here, in holding that "the original Messianic doctrine, with its centre in the Hope of

[1] Paul Wernle's critique of Bousset's *Kyrios Christos*, in the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* (1915) is a searching series of counter-questions, which reinforce the doubts already expressed in this country as well as in France upon the stability of Bousset's view.

Israel for the future, is swallowed up in the Hellenistic acceptance of Jesus as the Lord, ruling in the present." He adds that the corollary is the prominence of the *ecclesia* as the community or people of God, endowed with the spirit of the Lord, rather than the eschatological belief in the Kingdom. This is obviously true, and it is one of the developments which are reflected in Paulinism. Dr Lake, however, thinks that Paul and Acts represent two lines of development rather than two points on the same line of development. This would require closer proof and fuller argument than the limits of his interesting paper have permitted. For example, to argue that Luke is more advanced than Paul because the latter "would certainly have made use of" the Lucan interpretation of the Isaianic Servant of the Lord "to support his soteriological arguments," is to open up a complicated problem. Paul's silence on "the Son of Man" conception makes one hesitate to draw inferences like this. The characteristics of Paulinism, in relation to the teaching of Jesus, rather than to the primitive apostolic ideas, are discussed in Mr W. D. Reid's *Jesus the Christ and Paul the Apostle* (London: A. Brown & Sons), which "embraces a study of the apostle in all his relations with the Master." It is impossible in 140 pages to treat so large a subject fully, and Mr Reid often does no more than state or sketch phases of this problem. But his notes will guide students to the rich mass of contemporary criticism, and his conclusion is sane, viz. that Jesus, not Paul, is the founder of the Christian religion. Dr H. A. A. Kennedy, in *The Expository Times* (October, pp. 8–13), suggests that Paul's sense of his apostolic authority and commission enables us to interpret allusions in the epistles to his personal rectitude, spiritual insight and power, and right to be served and obeyed by his churches. Dr Granger's paper on "The Style of St Paul" (*Expositor*, October, pp. 326–340) deals with the philosophy or mental outlook suggested by the apostle's style, especially with the note of the forward look in life. On the other hand, the external development of the Pauline mission enters into Mr R. A. Aytoun's *City Centres of Early Christianity* (Hodder & Stoughton), an attractive account of the main cities which focussed early Christianity, and of the types of faith which they represented. Mr Aytoun not only treats older centres like Antioch, Ephesus, Carthage, Edessa, and Rome, but Iona and Lindisfarne. This method of handling early Church history has many advantages, provided that one recollects that a city, *e.g.*, like Alexandria is no more equivalent to Egypt than Paris is to France, and also provided that the various provinces are treated, as far as possible, in a chronological order. Mr Aytoun has caught the salient features of the cities with much success, and his book will be a useful popular introduction to the ramified spread of the faith.

With regard to special points in the theology and epistles of Paul, we may note that in *The Constructive Quarterly* (September 1915) Père Lagrange enumerates, as "some points recently gained in the study of the Epistle to the Romans," the date (winter of 56 or of 57 A.D.), the predominantly Gentile-Christian character of the Roman Church, and the

fact that Romans is a letter rather than a treatise. M. Goguël's "L'énigme de la seconde épître aux Thessaloniciens" (*Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, 1915, pp. 248-272) accepts the authenticity of the epistle, and discusses the various theories which seek to account for the apparent lack of any organic connection between the two Thessalonian epistles; M. Goguël rejects Harnack's idea that the second letter was sent to the Jewish Christian group in the local church, but he is unable to suggest any definite theory himself, beyond the rather improbable hypothesis that Second Thessalonians may have been originally sent to the adjoining church of Berea, and that the title was changed by mistake when the Pauline canon was drawn up! Bishop Chase (*Journal of Theological Studies*, Oct. 1915, pp. 60-65) conjectures that the difficult sentence in 2 Cor. iii. 17 originally ran thus: ὁ δὲ Κύριος τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν· οὗ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα κυριεύει, ἐλευθερία. But κυριεύειν is not used absolutely by Paul elsewhere. A theological exposition of Ephesians is offered by Dr Scott Lidgett in *God in Christ Jesus* (Kelly). It is an epistle which naturally bulks largely in any account of the idea of the Holy Spirit, such as Principal Rees has furnished in *The Holy Spirit in Thought and Experience* (Duckworth). This well-arranged handbook covers the successive phases of doctrinal speculation, and estimates the relative importance attached to it throughout the course of Christianity. Dr Rees abstains from offering a positive, dogmatic statement, but points out the difficulty of distinguishing in Paulinism between Christ and the Spirit.

Several volumes have appeared upon historical theology, in the stricter sense of the term. English study of Pascal has been so scanty during recent years that a special interest attaches to Mr H. F. Stewart's Hulsean Lectures on *The Holiness of Pascal* (Cambridge University Press). Like Madame Duclaux, in her chapter on Pascal in *The French Ideal*, Mr Stewart shows the influence exerted by M. F. Strowski's researches; he lays stress on the fact that Pascal never belonged to the inner circle of Port Royal, and that he remained a mathematician and a man of the great world. The contention that Pascal was unjust in his interpretation of Jesuit motives is more disputable. But Mr Stewart makes out a good case for mercy and truth as Pascal's distinctively "saintly" characteristics. The lectures are written out of a full knowledge of the subject, and with considerable acuteness; their value is enhanced by a series of notes and references. There is a freshness in the attempt to exhibit the modern saint as a scientific man, a controversialist, and an apologist, and Mr Stewart's little book is decidedly welcome, not only on that account but for its lucid presentation of the Jansenist position. To estimate Pascal adequately, a critic ought to know theology thoroughly, especially the theology of Pascal's age and Church. This was what made H. Petitot's French study of Pascal, in 1911, so serviceable a work, and it is one of the advantages which Mr Stewart possesses for his task. Mr E. M. Hulme's *History of the Renaissance: the Protestant Revolution and the Catholic Reformation in*

Continental Europe (Allen & Unwin) is a large, semi-popular volume, which sketches the broader aspects of the phase without entering into detail upon the theological issues. Dr D. S. Schaff's study of *John Huss* (Allen & Unwin) comes appropriately in 1915, five hundred years after the martyrdom of the great reformer. It is a thorough, historical appreciation, which needed to be done by a competent hand. Some years ago we had the letters of Huss rendered into English by Dr R. Martin Pope, and Dr Schaff has accompanied his study of Huss by a translation of *The Church* (same publisher), which, it is claimed, introduces this treatise for the first time to English readers; the *De Ecclesia* is significant rather than theologically important,[1] but the practical force of the work makes up for its lack of originality, and historically it is a document which counts in any estimate of the early fifteenth century. Mr S. L. Ollard's *Short History of the Oxford Movement* (Mowbrays) is a eulogistic chronicle, which leaves the reader still regretful that Mr W. J. Copland never wrote the story of Newman and his followers. But, so far as it goes, it is readable and apparently accurate; the author is able, at any rate, to correct some errors of detail in his predecessors. A large amount of attention is paid to the impulse which the movement gave to ceremonial ritual, although the theological basis of the ceremonies is not elucidated. There are several good photographs. The self-sacrifice and devotion of the leaders is properly praised, but the enthusiasm of the writer prevents him from doing justice to the criticisms passed upon the movement, criticisms which history has in several cases ratified. One of the bright stories is the mobbing of Archbishop Harley in the streets of Canterbury, which "afforded an occasion for a display of his characteristic meekness; for when his chaplain complained that a dead cat had been flung into the carriage, the archbishop replied that he should be thankful it was not a live one" (p. 6).

The genetic problems of theology and religion are handled often in a way that reminds one of what Bunyan said about the Council of the Devil in the *Holy War*: "nothing that was in its primitive state was at all amazing to them." The main source of amazement to theorists about early religion is that other theorists disagree with them. We feel this in Dr Emile Durkheim's *Formes Élémentaires de la Vie Religieuse* (1912), which has now appeared in English (*The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*: Allen & Unwin). Religion, according to Dr Durkheim, "is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church all those who adhere to them." This social and collective origin would not be denied nowadays by any serious thinker. The real difficulty is to trace it to its primitive form, and Dr Durkheim claims that this is totemism,

[1] The position of Huss is also discussed by M. Lagarde in *The Latin Church in the Middle Ages*, a new volume of the *International Theological Library* (Edinburgh T. & T. Clark).

which he estimates very differently from Sir J. G. Frazer. If it is the totem of a clan which determines those beliefs and practices, and if this represents religion—not, as Sir J. G. Frazer thinks, magic,—then some conception of the universe must be found in totemism. It is not easy to find this, even with Dr Durkheim's aid; and a further difficulty is raised by the need of attributing to the primitive mind conceptions of a diffused energy or immaterial substance, on which, embodied in the clan, the individual depends. The general theory is more acceptable than the particular proof led from an analysis of Australian totemism; magic seems earlier than the generalisations which Dr Durkheim posits, and many will doubt whether he is justified in holding religion, in any definite sense of the term, to be so fundamental for the origin of social habit as his theory requires. But Dr Durkheim's book contains much more than conjectural reconstructions of religion in the Australian savage's intellect.

Dr H. M. Hughes' *The Theology of Experience* (Kelly) draws attention to the need of studying and developing the individual's experience within the Church on the basis of God's word; it is the work of a scholar who is alive to the needs of the day. Still, experience cannot be isolated from dogma or from the Church; there is experience and experience, and to have forced this on the mind of the reader is a particular merit of Mr A. E. J. Rawlinson's *Dogma, Fact, and Experience* (Macmillan). The book suffers from too ambitious a title, and the five short essays which compose its contents raise rather than settle their problems; but its temper is pleasant, and its outlook is wide. He begins by protesting rightly against the identification of religion with a "religious sense" or temperament, which unduly narrows "experience"; then he goes off, somewhat suddenly, to a discussion of the issues underlying modernism, *i.e.* of the relation between dogma and history; a long chapter on the Resurrection follows, cautious, fair, but Westcottian and inconclusive; the fourth essay attempts to define the religious significance of the eschatology of the gospel for the present age of faith; the last chapter discusses "Clerical Veracity," or the ethical problems raised by clergymen of the Anglican Church assenting to articles and creeds which in private, as scholars, they cannot accept literally or entirely. On the last point Mr Rawlinson pleads, with characteristic charity and sense, "that the ethical question should be dropped as an uncharitable irrelevance, and the ecclesiastical question shelved on the ground that it is inexpedient at the present time to press it, until the theological question, which is the really important issue, has been faced and considered upon its merits, and until a more general agreement has been reached with regard to it than can be said to exist among Christian scholars and thinkers at the moment." In a shilling primer, *Some Thoughts on Catholic Apologetic* (London, The Manresa Press), Mr E. I. Watkin lays down a much more rigid line for the benefit of Roman readers. His summary of seven tendencies in present-day thought will illustrate his position:—"Modern Thought is Dynamic and Particular: Catholic Thought is Static and Universal. Modern Thought is Vague: Catholic

Thought is Exact and Definite. Modern Thought is Relative and Phenomenal: Catholic Thought is Absolute and Noumenal. Modern Thought is dominated by the Concept of Necessity: Catholicism teaches Miracles and Freewill. Modern Thought unifies excessively: Catholicism recognises, where necessary, a Plurality of Causes. Modern Thought exaggerates Liberty: Catholicism is Authoritarian. Modern Thought is Anti-ascetic: Catholicism Ascetic." Among the practical methods of interpreting this "Catholic" scheme to an unregenerate age, Mr Watkin mentions with special emphasis the drama, and longs for "a Catholic Ibsen"; even the opera is expected to help.

Finally, we have to chronicle some contributions to the interpretation of Old Testament poetry. In *The Journal of Theological Studies* (July, pp.491 f.) Mr A. Guillaume investigates the beginning of David's lament on Saul and Jonathan, examines the Hebrew text in the light of the Greek versions, and proposes to read as follows:—

"And David lamented with this lamentation over Saul and over Jonathan his son. And he said:

For instruction (To) the sons of Judah. (Set to) female voices.
Behold it is written in the book of Jashar.
'How are the mighty fallen!
Slain by the bow is the beauty of Israel!'"

In *The Expository Times* (November, pp. 90–91) Mr T. H. Weir renders the opening of Psalm cxxi. thus: "I will lift up mine eyes to the hills in order to see from whence my help cometh," and justifies his rendering. "The lifting up of the eyes to the hills is itself equivalent to looking about to see." Rudolf Kittel's *Die Psalmen Israel's nach dem Versmass der Urschrift verdeutscht* (Leipzig, Deichert) is substantially a reprint of the translation underlying his edition of the Psalter. Upon the other hand, Mr C. H. S. Godwin's *The Anglican Proper Psalms* (Cambridge and London) contains "critical and exegetical notes on obscure and corrupt passages in the Hebrew text, in the light of modern knowledge." It presupposes some knowledge of Hebrew, is sceptical of metrical criteria as aids to the discovery of the original text, and generally adopts what may be described as a conservative attitude on critical questions. The monograph shows careful study and has some ingenious and interesting suggestions; *e.g.*, for "presumptuous sins," in Ps. xix. 14, Mr Godwin substitutes "those who defy God's authority"; he thinks the author of Ps. xxxii., which he refuses to accept as composite, was "a God-fearing farmer living in Babylonia or Assyria before or after the deportations, who suffered much from the overflow of the Tigris, and who dreaded daily even greater calamities"; in Ps. cxxx. 4, he thinks that both Kirkpatrick and Bacthgen have missed the real meaning, which is that unless God pardoned men they would all be destroyed, and so none would be left to render Him the homage of loyal service.

JAMES MOFFATT.

A SOCIAL SURVEY.

TOWARDS RECONSTRUCTION.

THE most elaborate treatment of one of many questions of the moment that has appeared in English since the war began is *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, by a Diplomatist, edited by Lord Courtney of Penwith (Clarendon Press, 12s. 6d. net). The value of the book is increased by the fact that, with the exception of the preface, it was written before the war began. The author has first-hand knowledge of the Near East, and, although an experienced journalist, he has not succumbed to what Lord Courtney justly calls "the asphyxiating influence of the Chancelleries." The keynote of the book is admirably stated at the outset: "A foreign policy that has no weight of public opinion behind it has to get its force from strong action and the momentum that results therefrom, and it must take its direction from traditional formulæ, from popular passion, or from interested influences. The British citizen who thinks diplomacy a mystery beyond him, and the American citizen who thinks it a mummery beneath him, are only right in so far as they themselves have made it so. International politics will suffer as much through being cut off from the common sense and conscience of citizens, and committed entirely to professionals, as do municipal politics." The conclusion of a lucid and weighty argument must also be quoted: "It has been shown that by allowing a region in Europe to remain in a condition of endemic war Europe has been exposed to epidemics of war; and it is suggested that the best precaution against the danger is an immediate inoculation of the governments of Europe with a strong dose of democratic diplomacy." Mr Arthur Ponsonby, in *Democracy and Diplomacy* (Methuen, 2s. 6d. net), pleads clearly and without violence or bitterness for the application of the democratic principle to foreign no less than to domestic affairs. The main planks in Mr Ponsonby's platform are that the British consular and diplomatic service is altogether inadequate to twentieth-century needs, and that the public ignorance of foreign affairs, even of those in which our own interests are most profoundly involved, must at all costs be removed. Mr H. M. Hyndman, in *The Future of Democracy* (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 2s. 6d. net.), maintains that the element of nationality must always be taken into account in any attempt to

reorganise the faculties of civilised men. Improved education, technical and physical, cheap transport, and a citizen army are other proposals for which he will get more sympathy than he would have done before the war. Lastly, and especially in view of the period succeeding the war, it will be well to reflect upon his blunt reminder, in the chapter on British trade: "A nation which is organised for efficiency will always in the long run beat a nation which leaves things to chance, however imperfect and even detestable the government of the more efficient nation may be."

Vladimir Soloviev, Russia's "most original and essentially Slavonic thinker," as Dr Hagberg Wright calls him in a biographical notice to *War, Progress, and the End of History* (London, University of London Press: Hodder & Stoughton, 2s. 6d. net), at last appears in an English dress. This volume, one of many from the same pen, represents his last and final conclusions on the evolution and future of the race. War is only a part of the general problem of fighting evil in a world where God's kingdom cannot be realised, and where union with the All-one can only be realised by the co-operation of Christians of all persuasions, leagued against those who think of this world as the only kingdom of God. A quaint feature of the book is the author's suggestion, so vigorous is his hatred of the doctrine of non-resistance, that Tolstoy is a forerunner of Antichrist, but this somewhat startling idea in no wise detracts from the absorbing interest of the volume.

The historian of the future, the psychologist, and the general student will find some at least of the data from which it will be their task to sift the truth in a collection of books about the war, published during the war, which is being made by the Library of Political Science, at the London School of Economics, Clare Market, W.C. The collection is meant to include not only books in all languages, but pamphlets, reports, posters, and other documents.

In *Some Aspects of the Woman's Movement*, edited by Miss Zoe Fairfield (Student Christian Movement, 93 Chancery Lane, W.C., 2s. 6d. net), the various stages of what may be called the woman's movement—educational, economic, moral, political—are tested by the touchstone of Christian principle. The gist of the argument may perhaps be summed up in the plea that "the recognition of the supreme value of the individual human soul is the keynote of the Christian Ethic as of the Woman's Movement, and the condition of the modern world constitutes a call for the fuller understanding and application of this truth." The reconsideration of our general educational standards in the British Empire will necessitate a fresh study of principles and methods.

The Rev. W. Temple's Presidential Address to the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Workers' Educational Association (published by the Association at 14 Red Lion Square, London, W.C.) has been issued as a penny tract. "The whole problem of our future," he says, "is a problem of education; for by education we mean not mere schooling, but the whole

process of developing those qualities which distinguish a man from a brute or a machine—the disciplining of intelligence, the quickening of imagination, the widening of sympathy. Education in full measure for all our people—that is the first need; that is the only basis for true progress; that is the only way to win from this war the result which shall be fully worth the price. We need to insist on this. In the universal cry for economy there will be, as indeed there is already, a demand for reduction in the expenditure on education. Nothing could be more disastrous. From the merely economic point of view such a policy is suicidal. Education is the most profitable of all investments for a nation's capital. . . . But it is as plain as anything can be that there is no capital so precious to a nation as the brains and character of its citizens, and, therefore, no investment so profitable as that which may bring brains and character to their full development. England has not hitherto believed in education; but if this war has not created such a belief we have lost half its meaning."

Young scholars will now have the opportunity under skilled guidance of learning how we came to be what we are. Mr Stanley Leathes gives us a most informing and interesting account of British social development in early and mediæval times in *The People in the Making* (Heinemann, 2s. 6d. net), the first of a series to be published under the general title "The People of England." *A Primer of London Citizenship*, by Frederick Swann, with preface by Sir Laurence Gomme (Longmans, 2s. net), is an extremely clear, concise, and easily digested account of London government, with suggestions for future reforms. We could wish that this little manual, the very model of what such a text-book should be, were taken as an example by the educational authorities of all our large towns, which in another generation might have become what towns ought to be at this stage of the world's history. *Cities in Evolution*, by Professor Patrick Geddes (Williams & Norgate, 7s. 6d. net) points out that town-planning, if it is to be effective, implies an accurate diagnosis of the evils which it is desired to cure, and that so far the town-planners are neither sufficiently observant of the ills which are to be remedied nor of the boundless possibilities of future developments. Mr Geddes therefore recommends civic surveys which should take account not only of streets, squares, buildings, and physical matters generally, but of the people, their psychology, their social activities, and their general development. Other practical mystics are telling us that this power of vision must be exercised in rural no less than in urban civic activities. *Better Business: A Quarterly Journal of Agricultural and Industrial Co-operation* (edited at the Co-operative Reference Library, Dublin, and published by Maunsel & Co., 1s. net) is a new journal, the first number of which appeared in October last, and which will still further explain and extend the fertile ideas of the remarkably successful Irish rural revival, chiefly associated with the names of Sir Horace Plunkett and "A. E." In an article, "How to Protect Ourselves from the Peace which Threatens Us," Mr Russell ("A. E."), with the directness of the man of genius that he is, calls us to notice, what

unfortunately has hitherto been very insufficiently recognised, that "the countryman is really the long-lost brother of the townsman. Their interests are truly the interests of one family. It is only bad industrial organisation which has set them apart." Mr George Radford, in *The State as Farmer, or the Future of Agriculture in England* (Smith, Elder & Co., 2s. 6d. net), pleads that all the learning and ability we can compass should be applied to the land for its due working and management, and shows various practical methods of applying intelligence to the raising of fruit, vegetables, cereals, poultry, and cattle. A welcome sign of the desire to apply science to agriculture is *The Spirit of the Soil*, by G. D. Knox (Constable, 2s. 6d. net), an account of Professor W. B. Bottomley's experiments with bacterised peat. The description of these experiments is clear and intelligible to the mere layman, and ought therefore to be easily understood by the farmers and gardeners, who, if they adopt Professor Bottomley's methods, should, it is claimed, be able to increase their yield to an extraordinary extent. But only the experts, whether of the field or of the laboratory, dare venture to offer an opinion on so technical a matter.

SOCIAL SERVICE.

Practicable Socialism, a new series of papers by the late Canon Barnett and Mrs Barnett (Longmans, 6s. net), in the main deals with reforms which have not yet been achieved. As Canon and Mrs Barnett were so frequently in the right before, when most people thought they were in the wrong—the late Canon used whimsically to say that he had spent a lifetime giving people what they did not want,—critics will probably be more chary of pronouncing judgment than they were thirty years ago. The authors urge the need of education for all, in the highest and widest sense; of recreation, and training in the right use of it; of profound changes in industrial conditions, but all informed by the religious spirit. No less interesting than the above volume is *Twenty Years at Hull House* (Chicago), by Miss Jane Addams (Macmillan, 2s. net), which is a very welcome visitor in a cheap reprint. Hull House, like Toynbee Hall, is a remarkable example of the power of personality, conspicuous alike for what it has accomplished in the face of incredible difficulties and for the inspiration which it has afforded to scores of public workers, who imbibed there a first training in social service. Mr Seebohm Rowntree, in "Home Problems after the War" (*Contemporary Review*, October 1915), predicts that industry will pass through three stages of serious trade dislocation, feverish trade activity, and prolonged trade depression. As means of meeting these problems he suggests the provision of working-class houses, the afforestation and reclamation of waste lands, the making of new roads, the clearance of slum areas, increased business efficiency, and better education. As he well reminds us, "the world is poorer, not only by the vast wealth that it has flung away in the international struggle, but by the wealth it has failed to produce." The

need for the most drastic economy, national and private, is advocated in *War and Self-Denial* (J. M. Dent & Sons, 2d. net), by Mr Hartley Withers. "Saving is a thing that we can all do, except the very poorest. We can all cut off or cut down alcohol, or tea, or coffee, or tobacco, or buying new clothes, or travelling for pleasure, or going to theatres, or keeping unnecessary servants, or calling in unnecessary doctors to prescribe for imaginary complaints. . . . At present the only things we can afford to spend money on are health and understanding and victory." The worst example of unprofitable expenditure is the huge sum spent annually on alcoholic liquors. All the more welcome to public workers and to thoughtful citizens generally should be the appearance in a fifth and enlarged edition of *Alcohol and the Human Body* (Macmillan & Co., 1s. net), by Sir Victor Horsley and Dr Mary Sturge, an unanswerable statement of the case against alcoholism. Other ways of conserving and increasing energy are described in *English Public Health Administration*, by B. G. Bannington, with introduction by Graham Wallas (P. S. King, 7s. 6d. net). The author, who has an unusually wide experience as a practical administrator, provides a clear and concise survey of public health administration, intended to meet the needs whether of officials or of students or of elected persons. A melancholy interests attaches to *Old Age Pensions*, by H. S. Hoare (P. S. King, 3s. 6d. net), the author of which, an able public servant and promising student, was killed in Flanders in August last. It is a practical account of the actual working and ascertained results of the Old Age Pension Scheme, with some criticism of its demerits and suggestions for improvement.

The present position of women, from the industrial point of view, and the outlook for the future utilisation of women's labour, have been recently carefully studied. *The Work of Educated Women in Horticulture and Agriculture*, by Mrs Roland Wilkins (Women's Farm and Garden Union, Queen Anne's Chambers, Westminster, 1s. net), shows that though practically no women of this class are able to keep themselves entirely by farming or market gardening, many who prefer a country to a town occupation are able to supplement a small income and have the advantages of an outdoor life.

Women in Modern Industry, by B. L. Hutchins, with a chapter by J. J. Mallon (G. Bell & Sons, 4s. 6d. net), is an impartial study by an unusually well-equipped student of the present position and future prospects of the industrial woman. "The working woman . . . is painfully, though perhaps for the most part unconsciously, working her way upwards out of a more or less servile condition of poverty and ignorance into a relatively civilised state, existing at present in a merely rudimentary form." And the working woman must, in the author's view, form and direct her own working-class organisations, and thus work out her own economic salvation. *Married Women's Work*, edited by Miss Clementina Black (Bell & Sons, 2s. 6d. net), is the report of an inquiry instituted by the Women's Industrial Council. The unhappiest class, according to this

investigation, are the women who are driven into the labour market through the insufficiency of their husbands' earnings. It would, therefore, follow as a consequence that the problem of such cases would be solved, partially at least, by doing away with the chronic underpayment of men. *Maternity: Letters from Working Women collected by the Women's Co-operative Guild*, with a preface by the Rt. Hon. Herbert Samuel, M.P. (G. Bell & Sons, 2s. 6d. net), is the first-hand testimony of 160 working-class mothers, in reply to a questionnaire, with regard to their maternal experiences, and the appalling results due to neglect, ignorance, or insufficient means. As the Women's Co-operative Guild is not surpassed in native intelligence by any body of women in the country, and as the writers of these letters have all held office in it, which means that they are of outstanding ability among their fellows, it is clear that the condition of affairs among women who are poorer or less intelligent must be infinitely worse. Moreover, for the most part this suffering and waste of life is preventable, and therefore ought to be prevented. The whole subject of infant mortality has been reconsidered in a volume (under that title) by H. T. Ashby (Cambridge University Press, 10s. 6d. net), which details the rate and distribution of infant mortality; the general causes, such as poverty, ignorance, improper feeding; special causes, whether wholly or partially preventable or not preventable; and the methods by which infant mortality can be lowered.

How to deal in a just and humane way with another class of children is shown in *Justice and the Child*, by Douglas Pepler (Constable & Co., 3s. 6d. net). Every year more than 45,000 offences are committed against children, and over 30,000 children commit offences. Mr Pepler deals with the administered child and our duty to him, bringing into his survey the work of remand homes, juvenile courts, and after-care committees. That these youthful offenders, if wisely handled and given a fair opportunity, may become not merely worthy, but valuable citizens, we can now assert on the highest official authority. The last Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Reformatory and Industrial Schools in Great Britain records the fact that (up to March 31) 530 boys educated in reformatory schools had been killed in action, 49 died of wounds, 13 died from sickness, and 1530 had been wounded. Twenty had been mentioned in despatches, 25 awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal, 8 have been given commissions, and 3 had won the Victoria Cross. Similar testimony, and of a still more moving kind, is borne in *My Police Court Friends with the Colours*, by Mr Robert Holmes, a highly esteemed police-court missionary and probation officer (Blackwood & Sons, 2s. net). This little volume, one of the most pathetic that the war has produced, is a series of biographies of 72 out of 1267 former clients of a devoted counsellor and friend, who have served the Empire in some perilous situation, whether as mine-sweepers, or as members of the Royal Naval Division, or as soldiers in the trenches.

R. P. FARLEY.

REVIEWS.

Mutual Influence: a Re-view of Religion.—By Sir F. Younghusband.—London: Williams & Norgate.—Pp. xiv+144.

After the war—what are we going to do about religion?

During the war we are evidently going to talk about it a great deal, and we have already begun to ask the kind of questions about it which we have only just ceased asking about the Kaiser. What were we going to do about *him*? Were we going to hang him, or where could we shut him up, and how much per annum should we allow him to live upon?

As with the Kaiser, so perhaps with religion—a great deal may be found to depend on how the war ends. I regret to observe, therefore, that Sir F. Younghusband has already hanged religion outright, and has established a virile young republic called "Mutual Influence," in which the principal ministerial offices are divided between Sir O. Lodge and Mr F. H. Bradley, Herbert Spencer and Mr James Ward, Nietzsche and Mr William James; while the programme to which this sinister coalition is committed is a neck-or-nothing support of an "Unseen Power" "making for good," which is now each of us and now all of us, here the Gospel and there the world, to-day the Hague Convention and to-morrow the *Lusitania*, but always on "a long sweep of vision" *good.*

Sir F. Younghusband is a great traveller, and the "long sweep of vision" is his proper right. He has travelled far, and he has always taken with him not merely very good eyes but a very good head. He writes with effect, and inspires that confidence which should never be grudged to men who speak of ideals out of a more than ordinary experience of what we call real life. He believes it to be not possible for a man who has seen the world as far and as near as he himself has to rest satisfied—if he is honest and competent—with the traditional Christianity. He believes that the war will shake the creeds. In the faith of the next generation there can be no room for a personal God who governs, either more unscrupulously than Bethmann-Hollweg or more improvidently than Mr Asquith. Nor will the next generation tolerate in an Archbishop of Canterbury the naïve doctrine that God made the world and the Devil made the war.

But the next generation will insist on believing in something. It must move to some other music than the ding-dong of negation. Sir F. Younghusband having dethroned God and the angels for making the

war, or for not stopping it, or for trying to throw the blame on the Devil, wishes to commend to the worship of the world what I take to be a very old friend of many of us, whom he introduces to us as "the Unseen Power" which "makes for good." It is no good quarrelling about names. Surely we saw an altar to this god as we passed on our way to the Areopagus? Surely we encountered him but a little while ago in the salon of Matthew Arnold, who, in the airy fashion of one who habitually kept such company, spoke of him as "the Eternal who makes for righteousness"? Is he not first cousin to the Unknowable and the "Unbewusst"? Is he not the same of whom Mr Bradley somewhere in an apologetic footnote says that he "calls him God because he does not know what the devil he is"? Indeed, he is so old a friend, men have turned to him (and from him) so often in confused and sceptical ages, that I feel at liberty to ask Sir F. Younghusband if he can guarantee his credentials. Is he quite sure that he "makes for good"? Sir F. Younghusband has here not the infirmity of a doubt. It is an "observed fact of experience," he says, and he is ready to stake upon it the reputation of an eminent explorer. And when I ask him whether he is aware that (quite apart from all the other ruin and bloodshed of human history) within the last twelve months something like twelve millions of men have been killed or maimed, and that weekly we are blowing into the air an amount of wealth sufficient, if used wisely, to replace the shame of the London slums with clean homes—I find that he knows all this; indeed, this was what he was going to talk about. It is quite all right, if one will only cultivate a "long sweep of vision." "For there never was a war," he says (p. 90), "in which each nation was more absolutely convinced that it was fighting for the right." The Germans are just as much convinced of it as we are; and so "good must in the end eventuate." Comfort ye my people: cry to them that the English are convinced that A is A, and the Germans are convinced that A is B, and so there will in the end "eventuate" the proposition that A is A—or, if not, it will simply mean that one side is better equipped with high explosive shell than the other. Sir F. Younghusband nowhere attempts to define "good." If he will concede to me that good is that to which there attaches the greatest quantity of high explosive shell, I will concede to him that "good" will probably "eventuate" from this war, and that, as an "observed fact," his "Unseen Power" normally makes in this direction.

Meantime, I hate to be deluded. What this war means for religion I have no idea, and I am not going to pretend that I have. I am aware of a number of gentlemen fighting against a crowd of cads, and I very much hope that the gentlemen will win. But I have no vision of any "Unseen Power" which sides with the gentlemen or "makes for" their victory. If the cads win, history will of course call *them* gentlemen—for history has a long sweep of vision,—and philosophy (which can always say "I told you so") will pronounce that good has "eventuated." A few of

us, who never did so before, will begin to believe in the Archbishop and the Devil.

And Sir F. Younghusband? His book is so wholly genuine, and reflects so plainly a temperament at once strong and sincere—if the cads win, I do not believe that his book will satisfy him. It is all very well to try and see in "long sweeps." But a "long sweep" of two thousand years has not instructed us why a certain tower in the gospel fell upon unoffending men: and I do not want to wait two thousand years for the explanation of the ruins of Louvain or the death of my friend. I hold no brief for Christianity, and I feel with Sir F. Younghusband that its repute, even with the classes that respected it most, has been deeply compromised by the war. Yet I like it on the whole better than the worship of Sir F. Younghusband's Unseen Power manifesting itself for good in "long sweeps."

After the war, end how it will, we shall, many of us, want more religion than we can find; many of us will find that we have more religion than we know what to do with. Meanwhile, it is strange how small a creed suffices for men who face death daily. "May the great God whom I worship grant to my country, and for the benefit of Europe in general, a great and glorious victory: and may no misconduct of anyone tarnish it. And may humanity after victory be the predominant feature in the British Fleet. For myself individually, I commit my life to Him who made me; and may His blessing light upon my endeavours for serving my country faithfully. To Him I resign myself, and the just cause which is entrusted to me. Amen." That is Nelson, Nelson before Trafalgar, "Nelson in his bright boyish way," as Stevenson calls it. Is not that enough said for the whole Empire about religion and the war?

H. W. Garrod.

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Vital Problems of Religion.—By Rev. J. R. Cohu.—London: T. & T. Clark, 1914.

This book is so good that one wishes it had been made better. My singing-master once pulled me up sharply at a slight inaccuracy in the rendering of a fine familiar song, and said, "You cannot afford to make the slightest mistake in a song that everybody knows." Mr Cohu sullies his title-page with an inaccurate translation of St Augustine; on p. 69 he misquotes Mrs Browning, and twice over (pp. 85, 240) he misquotes one of her husband's most famous lines. This is no carping criticism; there is a certain lack of precision noticeable in not a few places where subjects of common knowledge are dealt with; and these are the more to be regretted because they mar an otherwise admirable exposition of the liberal point of view in theology. The distinction between "inorganic Nature" and "organic" should not be perpetuated in a book which

professes to be abreast of modern scientific thought. Mr Cohu speaks of "inert matter," and in almost the same breath says that "matter is not really matter"; and after asserting that "in Nature we have a realm of inert matter *plus* a realm of organic life," he tells us that Nature is an organic whole, not reflecting that the term "plus" is entirely inaccurate in reference to the parts of an organic whole. He confines the security of the "reign of law" to inorganic Nature, and misstates the fundamental hypothesis of Science as the uniformity of Nature, instead of the unity of Nature. Within that unity, so far as observed, Science discovers many uniformities, and her formulæ for these are the so-called laws; she observes uniformities in "organic Nature," also, which to that extent, therefore, is under the "reign of law." Psychology has its laws as well as astronomy; and, as Bergson reminds us, the presence of "disorder" in any observed area of life may simply be the presence there of an order whose law we have not yet discovered. On p. 106 we are told that an "objective fact" is one from which the "subjective element has been entirely eliminated"; on p. 120 we are told that "the only objective facts we know are our own sensations and thoughts." On p. 135 we are told that self-consciousness is the "fundamental note of personality"; on p. 155 we are told that our "larger self" is subconscious. On p. 92 the alleged objection of the scientist that "your God is only yourself written large" is greeted with scorn; but on p. 108 it is confessed "we project our own personality into the reality outside us, anthropomorphise it, read into the external world what we have already found in ourselves. We so stamp our personality upon it that in a sense we create what we find in it."

These inaccuracies and incompatibilities of statement, occurring as they do in the matrix of common current knowledge upon which the particular teaching of the book is based, should be eliminated. Apart from these blemishes, Mr Cohu's work is excellently done. He is an exponent of what is popularly known as liberal theology; "no essential change is needed either in God or man to make them perfectly at one"; "our so-called fall was a necessary moment in the transition from the stage of animal natural innocence to the far higher stage of the birth of a moral sense"; "revelation is the unveiling of man to himself, and therefore of God at the same time"; "we no longer give a geographical interpretation to such articles as 'He descended in hell; He ascended into heaven'"; "the love of God, the forgiveness of our sins, was not affected by Jesus' life or death, but it was revealed in Him." He is also a liberal churchman; he knows the place and value of institutional authority, but boldly claims "I have rights of my own"; he knows the importance of dogmas in their place, and he knows their place—"the mischief began," he says, "when the Church declared these dogmas to be articles of faith signed, sealed, and delivered for all time; and, worst of all, made creeds and dogmas the mechanical test of a man's rightness of heart."

These positions are stated with admirable clearness, with many a

pungent and memorable phrase, and with all the force of sincerity and fervour of conviction.

Mr Cohu's two guiding thoughts—at bottom they are one—are the soul's "self-directivity," and that "our personality is God's personality welling up in us." This directivity might almost be described as Bergson's "élan vital" become conscious of itself in man, though the word implies a definitely determined goal which the brilliant French philosopher would probably not admit. Or it might be described as the pressure of the Whole energising in the Part; or as the Ideal—which is never, save by projection, an outside fact—developing in the Actual. Several lines of modern thought appear to converge on this hypothesis; it may be questioned, however, whether Mr Cohu is right in speaking of "directivity" as a gift which every man has in his possession to use if he would. Our freedom—for it comes to this—may be potential, but it is rarely actual; it is attainable, but multitudes pass out of mortal life without ever knowing it. This directivity corresponds somewhat to Eucken's "centre of independent spiritual life," which lifts the human being who wins it to the status of a person; but not all human individuals are human persons, by any means.

EDWARD LEWIS.

KNOWLE.

Zeus: a Study in Ancient Religion.—By Arthur Bernard Cook.—Vol. I.: Zeus, God of the Bright Sky.—Cambridge, 1914.

MR COOK's elaborate and learned articles in the *Classical Review* and elsewhere have prepared the way for his *magnum opus*; and now we have in this volume the first instalment of the work itself. It may be said at once that it shows the wide and varied erudition, the laborious and systematic accumulation of facts, the ingenious marshalling of an unwieldy mass of evidence, and the honest and impartial criticism of theories, both his own and other peoples, which the author has led us to expect. Any criticism of such a book is very difficult, unless it is as detailed as the work itself. If certain doubts and queries are here expressed, this is not in disparagement of the qualities of the book, but in accordance with the high standard they demand. The volume will, in the first place, be most useful as a great storehouse of facts about the conception and worship of Zeus, and other kindred subjects. Its value in this respect is greatly enhanced by the very complete series of illustrations from ancient monuments—no less than 42 plates and 569 figures in the text. Some of these are familiar or are reproduced from other works; but many are either new or inaccessible, and their collection opens a most welcome supplement to the text. And the very full indices, of 100 pages, compiled by Mrs Cook, add greatly to the usefulness of the work. But such a book cannot be treated as a mere catalogue, or even a classified catalogue, of facts about Zeus. It presents a more or less continuous argument, and maintains a theory, to the

support of which the evidence is subordinated. Thus it becomes more readable and easier to follow; but at the same time it becomes open to the possibility of differences of opinion which affect its whole arrangement. And the author's intellectual honesty leads him more than once, after enumerating evidence in favour of a certain hypothesis, to express a doubt which affects its relevance to the question under discussion. A quaint example occurs when, after mentioning "the three-coloured cow" as a lunar symbol, he quotes and reproduces a Cretan hydria with "Zeus as a three-coloured bull bearing Europe across the sea," and then adds, "but the coloration is here a matter of Ionian technique, not of Cretan mythology." Mr Cook, of course, knows and points out that there is here merely an accidental coincidence. But it is to be feared that a reader not familiar with Ionian vases will be more impressed by the coincidence than by the warning that it has no significance. There is really something analogous in the discussion—most interesting and valuable in itself—of Zeus in relation to the Sun, which occupies about three-quarters of the whole volume; for Mr Cook himself points out that, whatever sun-gods of various oriental or other foreign cults were called Zeus by later Greek writers, "it must be steadily borne in mind that genuine Hellenic religion never identified Zeus with sun or moon or star." The inclusion of much of this matter seems to be due to the author's being convinced—as he himself says, by Dr Farnell—"that the unity of an ancient god consisted less in his nature than in his name." The importance of a name is of course great; but it may easily be exaggerated; and in the case of such foreign gods as Zeus Ammon of the Oasis or Zeus Adad of Syria, it may be doubted whether anything but confusion can result from their being equated to the Hellenic Zeus. The two cases just quoted are not of course on the same level; for Zeus Ammon had a considerable vogue in Greece at all times, while Zeus Adad is known only to later syncretism. Apart, however, from what is almost the accident of the application to them of the name of Zeus, there seems no more reason for their inclusion than for that of the European Sky-god, for whom Mr Cook has now abandoned his search. The reasons for this abandonment surely apply almost equally to the various sky- or sun-gods with whom so much of the present volume is taken up. Many of the studies of these gods and their ritual are excellent; but they do not help us much to understand the character and worship of the Hellenic Zeus. Perhaps the weakest link in the chain is that on which the whole treatment hangs—"the evolution of Zeus from Sky to Sky-god," and the deduction of his other functions from this fundamental conception. Here the philological evidence is perhaps the strongest. But it certainly does not suffice to show that, in Greek religion, Zeus was ever thought of as the sky. Certain epithets and aspects of Zeus certainly suggest that he was sometimes regarded as the Sky-god; but why should other aspects, such as that of King or Father or even Oak-god, be deduced from this? Is not this another form of the old error of mythologists, who seek too often to apply a single key to the solution of complex and various problems, whether

that key be found in the solar myth, in philology, in ancestor worship, or any of the other theories that have from time to time dominated mythological conjecture? A complicated system like the religion of Zeus can be traced to many sources, to many strata of cultural development, to varying psychological conditions; and it seems unprofitable at the present stage of our knowledge to discuss which source is the predominant one, still less to derive all from a common origin. There is always a temptation to adopt some such theory, if only in order to provide a thread on which to string an otherwise chaotic mass of facts.

But, apart from this somewhat doubtful theory, the various studies that have been affiliated to it are admirable examples of thorough and scholarly investigation; those, for instance, on the solar wheel and the solar disk, the ram and the bull as solar animals, or the labyrinth and the maze. There is, however, a tendency here and there to exaggerate the value of late evidence, when it happens to fit the author's theories. Thus the blue nimbus or blue globe, found in Italian wall-paintings, can hardly give any indication of the original nature of the Hellenic Zeus; and examples of a statue or statuette set up on a pedestal beside an altar are common in the case of many other gods beside Zeus, and can hardly be called survivals of an aniconic pillar-cult. Such instances are, however, exceptional; as a rule the evidence has been severely criticised. If in the second volume, promised as already far advanced in preparation, Mr Cook keeps up the high standard he has here established, he will not only have erected a monument to his own ingenuity and thoroughness, but will have made a contribution to the study of ancient religion which all future investigators will find to be a store of well-classified evidence and of illuminating suggestions.

E. A. Gardner.

University College, London.

Science and Religion: the Rational and the Supra-rational.—An Address delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Alumni in New York.—Pp. 75.

The New Infinite and the Old Theology.—Pp. 117.—Both by Cassius J. Keyser, Ph.D., LL.D., Adrain Professor of Mathematics in Columbia University. — New Haven: Yale University Press. — London: Humphry Milford, Oxford University Press.

The common purpose of these little books is to re-examine in the light of modern mathematical conceptions certain stock objections against the fundamental ideas of theology. In the first volume the author begins by rebutting the familiar contentions that religion deals essentially with "the unchartered region of human experience" (Gilbert Murray), and that it is, therefore, doomed to extinction as knowledge expands (Shotwell). He then proceeds to develop the doctrine that religion is the reaction of our nature to entities that lie outside of the series of possible objects

of man's understanding and bound it, just as, in mathematics, a "limit" may lie outside of and bound an infinite series of ordered terms. He supports this view by appealing to the analogous relation of certain objects of the understanding to objects of sense. Just as perceptual experience gives us no instance of a really rigid solid yet "points to" the concept of rigidity which is its limit in the supra-sensual sphere of *entia rationis*, so (he argues) rational objects in their turn "point to" entities in a supra-rational sphere of being. In the second work he seeks to show that most of the criticism directed against the attributes assigned to these supra-rational entities loses its cogency when confronted with the results of modern investigations into the nature of infinite numbers. For instance, the "rationalist" rejects the Athanasian concept of the Trinity on the ground that it is incompatible with the axiom that the whole must be greater than a part; yet there is now nothing more certain than that the number of terms in part of an infinite collection is exactly the same as the number of terms in the whole.

There is no doubt that clear knowledge about infinite numbers may be usefully applied far beyond the bounds of technical mathematics; for example, if Mr Bradley had possessed it, certain famous chapters of his *Appearance and Reality* would not have been written, or would at least have been written very differently. It may gladly he admitted, therefore, that Professor Keyser has performed a real service to theology and to the thousands of educated people who, without pretending to be theologians, are yet anxious to know that religious faith may be justified at the bar of reason. The essence of this service consists in his reminder that a theological concept is not necessarily absurd simply because it contradicts the numerical properties of a *finite* collection. For its nature may be such that, if it is to submit to analogies with number at all, these analogies should be drawn from the very different province of *infinite* collections. Nevertheless it is doubtful if he has avoided altogether the common error of this kind of apologetics: namely, that of pursuing analogies too far. Thus, in dealing (pp. 21 *et seq.* of the second book) with the dilemma that either man is not free or God is not omniscient, the author asks his readers to imagine the dignity of knowing past, present, and future events to be parcelled out, as it were in atoms of dignity, to all the points of space. Taking the present and past to be represented, at any moment, by the part of space enclosed within a certain limited sphere, he concludes that, since the number of points of the sphere is identical with the number of points of the whole of unlimited space, the dignity of knowledge confined to the past and present is equal to the dignity of omniscience. But this argument proves equally conclusively that the divine knowledge is no greater in dignity than my knowledge of what has taken place in my study during the last minute; for there are just as many moments in a minute as in the whole backward and abysm of time. It is evident, therefore, that there is something wrong with the analogy. The error consists, apparently, in an illegitimate application of

the properties of number. As Professor Keyser, of course, knows quite well, though the number of points in a part of space is equal to the number of points in the whole, yet the part is inferior to the whole in what Mr Bertrand Russell calls "magnitude of divisibility." If dignity of knowledge has characteristics analogous with those of space, "magnitude of divisibility" is surely the relevant property, not the fact that space is an infinite collection of atomic points.

In his first book (pp. 65 *et seq.*) a well-known logical paradox (of which the ancient "All Cretans are liars" is the most familiar example) is used to prove that "the universe regarded as a class of all things does not belong to the content of the rational domain." The author's use of this argument illustrates another danger to which apologetics based on analogy are liable; for, as Messrs Whitehead and Russell appear to have shown in their *Principia Mathematica*, paradoxes of this class may, by a suitable theory of "logical types," be reconciled after all with common sense.

In spite, however, of defects which no work of this kind seems able to avoid, the little volumes may be commended to the layman who is prepared to value them less for their positive conclusions than because they will justify him in rejecting certain common prejudices. For they come from a sound mathematician, and are written in a style which, though rather strenuously eloquent, is both clear and interesting.

T. Percy Nunn.

London.

The Gospel Miracles.—By J. R. Illingworth, M.A., D.D.—London: Macmillan, 1915.

It is difficult to review the work of a writer from whom one formerly learnt much, but whose point of view one has outgrown. The difficulty becomes almost prohibitive when the writer is a friend newly mourned, and when his work has been put into the hands of the Great Reviewer. Yet there is nothing that we would say of him which need now be left unsaid. Many of us must always be grateful to the philosopher of the *Lux Mundi* school for bridging over the gap between philosophy and Christianity at a time when we knew little of either. It was inevitable that, as we studied one or the other more deeply, Dr Illingworth's apologetic should seem less satisfying. But it never became useless, or unedifying. It was not an error to be expunged. It remained as a permanent element in our thought, when mixed with other elements of which its author had not taken full account.

Dr Illingworth's position had not appreciably changed during the years that passed after the publication of *Lux Mundi*. One therefore hardly expected his last contribution to the miracle-controversy (an old problem, indeed, but one whose urgency depends upon the new form in which it is presented) to satisfy the modern generation. It is written with the

culture and charm which always characterised Dr Illingworth's books. Its charitable calm is scarcely ruffled by irritation with critics whose method and point of view the author did not wholly understand. It has a sunset touch about it, as of the last protest of the Old Theology against the New. But although it has value as a reminder of considerations which cannot be ignored, it fails to meet the difficulties which modern Christians feel about miracles, and therefore offers no satisfactory solution of the problem.

The book is not a systematic treatment of the subject of miracles, but an essay expounding a single line of argument. It is "an attempt to vindicate the occurrence of the Gospel miracles as being intrinsically congruous with the Incarnation, considered as the great enfranchisement of human life by its delivery from the slavery of sin" (p. v). The aspect of the Incarnation which Dr Illingworth constantly emphasises is its newness. "Jesus Christ was a new fact in human history . . . what might be called, by a biological metaphor, a new species of man" (p. 20). "A new force entered into human history with the advent of Jesus Christ, inaugurating a new epoch in the development of man" (p. 22). And he sees in this newness not only God's answer to man's need of a new start in the struggle against sin, but also the sanction of the belief that Christ's earthly appearance was accompanied by new physical phenomena, viz. miracles.

It will be seen at once that this is an *a priori* argument, and that everything depends upon the validity of its first assumption, as to the "newness" of the Incarnation. But this "newness" is never defined. The few sentences in which Dr Illingworth supports it by "Scriptural proof" (p. 21) show little consciousness of the difficult and far-reaching problems raised by modern criticism. Biological metaphors (p. 22) do not really explain anything. No one, it is true, who has read the Gospels, and understood the Christian experience, can deny that a new religious inspiration came into the world through the life and death of Jesus. But it is a long step from this to the assumption that this newness was so revolutionary as to upset not only the laws of spiritual experience (as hitherto understood) but also those of the physical world.

Indeed, in his use of this *a priori* argument, Dr Illingworth obviously proves too much. "To the extent," he says, "that Jesus Christ was a new being in the world . . . it will be obvious that we cannot criticise Him by the light of any canons drawn from the ordinary experience of ordinary humanity" (p. 24). He infers from this that the ordinary arguments against miracles break down in this unique case, and that what would be incredible elsewhere is possible, and indeed probable, in the life of Jesus. But the only fair inference from his assumption is that we cannot tell what might or might not happen in such a life. Miracles are no more likely than anything else. The "newness" of Jesus baffles all *a priori* experience. We are therefore driven, by Dr Illingworth's own principles, to the choice between complete agnosticism as to the facts of the Gospel, or a thorough study of the historical evidence.

It is to be feared that Dr Illingworth, quite unconsciously, recommends the former alternative. For he lays down conditions as to the study of the Gospels which empty it of almost all its historical value. On the one hand, "as the future cannot be scientifically predicted, neither can the past be critically reconstructed by application of the current categories of to-day" (p. 169); and "it may be questioned whether it be ever really possible 'to go behind the narratives that have come down to us, and to apply to them the standards of our own age, which in the treatment of evidence are more exacting'" (p. 180). On the other hand, the Christian "can never approach the Gospels in the detached spirit of an archæologist, seeking to reconstruct from its recorded fragments an historical character of the past; but only with the view of gaining deeper insight into the present personality upon which his daily life depends" (p. 115). Surely this would be nonsense, and Dr Illingworth would have been the first to admit it, in the case of any other of the thousands of biographies with which historians have to deal. It may also be added that there are hundreds of these in which the miraculous element can be, and is, as a matter of course, eliminated without damage to the historical elements which remain (p. 115). Why, then, does Dr Illingworth argue so in this one case? Because he starts from an assumption as to the nature of the Incarnation which abrogates all the laws of historical science, and makes the historical study of the Gospels a mere waste of time. It is true that, as a concession to the fashion of the age, he admits historical considerations in dealing with the Resurrection and the Virgin Birth. But the evidence in the former case "is unquestionably strong" only "if once the reasonableness of miracle be recognised"; whilst the latter "by its very nature must rest upon the slenderest of human evidence" (p. 61). But the whole tendency of the book is to subordinate history to dogma, the study of what the Incarnation was to the assumption of what it must have been.

The fact is that the large party in the Church for whom Dr Illingworth spoke is more interested in tradition than in truth. It feels the power and attractiveness of a belief which has long been held: it is not attracted by fresh ventures of faith, or by the further pursuit of truth. The danger of this attitude is lest the Incarnation, the Resurrection, the Virgin Birth, and the other turning-points of the Creed, should become mere phrases, which are treasured all the more tenaciously because they have ceased to bear any intelligible meaning. To the younger generation this attitude is impossible. They do not deny the value of that Christian atmosphere in which the Gospel facts and doctrines have been enshrined. But they cannot let it stifle free investigation, whether of the historical nature of the facts, or of the religious value of the doctrines.

There are subsidiary points of great merit and interest in Dr Illingworth's book to which we might call attention; but it seemed most profitable to expand and to criticise his central argument; for it is upon this that the author insists, and yet it is this which the reader will find least satisfactory.

It is sad to think that we shall have no more books from one who, whatever his subject, treated it with rare spirituality and breadth of mind, and, however much he differed from other writers, never failed in fairness and Christian charity. J. M. THOMPSON.

OXFORD.

The Ephesian Gospel.—By Percy Gardner, Litt.D., F.B.A.—London: Williams & Norgate, 1915.—Pp. xi+358.

THIS new volume in the Crown Theological Library is in every way to be welcomed. Coming from the pen of its distinguished author it was sure to be lucid and interesting. It is more. It is a study of the Fourth Gospel, delightful to read, and on the whole convincing. After reading it one might be forgiven for doubting whether a radically different interpretation could ever hold the field again. In spite of all that has been written on its attractive subject there was room for this study, which, as we are informed, "is intended not for scholars, who can consult the great specialists, but for ordinary persons of good education." It is almost superfluous for the author to assure us of what is apparent on almost every page, that "these views have not been formed hastily, or with a view to support ready-made theories, but have grown out of my studies in literary and religious history."

On the whole, I can cordially accept most of the opinions here advanced, but there are a number of details which I find myself questioning.

For one thing, I find myself wondering whether too much is not ascribed to the influence of St Paul as an individual. "Pauline" is a convenient adjective to describe a certain aspect of Christian teaching, an aspect which is conspicuous in the Johannine Gospel. Of this aspect St Paul was the most conspicuous advocate, but are we to suppose that Christianity at the present day would be so very different from what it is if St Paul had never lived? The great themes of that apostle's letters—the problem of justification, the question of the admission of Gentiles to the Church—would have demanded consideration sooner or later, and the principles on which a decision was reached were latent from the first in the teaching of the Founder. "Pauline" Christianity is a view of Christian principles which was not peculiar to the leader after whom it happens to be named.

Just as Professor Gardner argues that the introduction of the Logos doctrine into the prologue of our Gospel does not prove a direct dependence upon Philo, but only the prevalence of a certain school of philosophic thought in Ephesus, so I should argue that the "Pauline" cast of the Gospel does not prove a direct dependence on St Paul, but only the prevalence in Ephesus of the school of Christian thought which for convenience' sake is now labelled with that name. The date of the Gospel is long posterior to that of St Paul's labours in Ephesus.

Again, I cannot help questioning whether Professor Gardner is not, in the greater part of his book, too positive in his decision as to the authorship. For my own part, I think he is right, but I am not sure that anyone has the authority to be quite so certain. When he writes, "That he [the author of the Gospel] was John the son of Zebedee is so improbable that we may regard this view as set aside," one cannot but remember the eminent scholars who have held the contrary opinion. Lightfoot, Westcott, Salmon, Zahn, may be discounted as apologists, but they were not babes in criticism; and immense weight was added to their conclusions by the accession to their side of that most unlikely adherent, Dr Drummond.

It is curious, by the way, that while Professor Gardner cites Loisy's *Quatrième Évangile*, he ignores Dr Drummond's *Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, which emanated from his own Oxford in the same year, 1903. Not that I suppose he is ignorant of this work, but it so happens that all the literature he names is recent, and nearly all of it on one side. Almost at the end of the volume he modifies the positiveness of his statement: "I do not wish to speak too dogmatically, since I know that many good critics still hold to the Johannine origin, and the historic exactness, of this Gospel."

The fact seems to be that the evidence presents itself differently accordingly as it is approached. "The external evidence is all on one side," wrote Dr Drummond; and if one approaches the question with a study of the external evidence, and then goes on to the internal, the latter may easily be taken to support the former. If, on the other hand, one first studies the Gospel itself under the guidance of modern liberal theology as represented say by Professor Gardner, the difficulty of ascribing it to the son of Zebedee is great. And then one begins to ask, What is the exact value of the external evidence? A long chain of tradition adds nothing to the strength of the first links, and the internal evidence is satisfied if we can bring ourselves to believe that the external evidence allows us to ascribe the Gospel not directly to John, but to a disciple of his. "I am convinced," writes Professor Gardner, " . . . that we shall be obliged to allow that though the Fourth Gospel contains valuable historic material, yet what is its main treasure, the speeches of our Lord contained in it, belongs not to the lifetime of the Founder, but to the early experience of the Church." This is undoubtedly the tendency of the latest studies of this sublime work, and it is probably correct. Nevertheless, there must be many genuine utterances of the Lord enshrined in the long discourses which are so much at variance with the sayings in the Synoptics. The theory advocated in the volume before us is practically identical with Matthew Arnold's, which, if I mistake not (I am writing from memory), was revived some years ago by Professor Burkitt, with the remark that Matthew Arnold was far better equipped for the rôle of Biblical critic than most people realise. This being so, it is pertinent to add that this, the most eminent of our literary critics, would not allow that the First Epistle of St John could have proceeded from the same writer as the Gospel.

Professor Gardner assumes the identity of authorship, and is probably justified in so doing.

The Apocalypse is naturally assumed not to be from the same pen. But here I feel that a good cause is supported by one or two bad arguments. It seems to me a mistake to revive the Tübingen argument from those "which say they are apostles, and are not," and those "which say they are Jews, and are not," as though these phrases were aimed against St Paul and his adherents. The Apocalypse no doubt is representative rather of the Jewish section of the Church, but the proof does not even partially lie in these particular texts, which are quite remarkably Pauline. It was Paul who denounced false apostles amongst the Corinthians, and it was Paul who declared that the true Israelites are those who have the faith of Abraham. Our author even brings out this latter point in another part of his book, but nevertheless he misreads, as I think, these passages in the Revelation. Nor can I agree that the remarkable attribution of hostility to "the Jews" in this Gospel "cannot come from the Apostle John, nor any of the apostles." This oft-repeated argument leaves out of account the effect of long-continued residence in a foreign land. Something very like it has been witnessed lately in the writings of one or two Englishmen domiciled for many years in Germany. Another error, occurring here only in a passing allusion, is the repetition from previous writers of the statement that the Fourth Gospel contains only seven miracles. It is true that, apart from the Resurrection narratives, only seven are related in detail; but six verses in the sixth chapter are devoted to an eighth miracle, the walking on the water. If this be reckoned in, the number seven can be retained only by accounting chap. xxi. an appendix; but Professor Gardner treats it as an integral part of the Gospel. I question, too, whether it is necessary to see a direct contradiction between the account of the giving of the Spirit in John xx. and that in Acts ii. Why should they not be complementary to one another? More seriously do I take exception to the suggestion "that for the Evangelist this descent of the Spirit [at the baptism] and its abiding on Jesus was the occasion on which the Divine Logos was united to the human Jesus, and thereafter took the place of His natural soul." Without going further into the matter, one is forced to ask, What then, in the view of the Evangelist, became of the natural soul? Did it cease to exist?

But enough of objections. There are indeed others which I had noted, but space does not admit of going into them all. Nor does it admit of discussing the many interesting points which arise. How far should we be carried if we entered on a consideration of the *Christology* of the Gospel, to which a whole chapter is devoted, bringing in a contrast with the Kenosis doctrine of St Paul! Other important chapters are on the *Sacraments* and *Miracle*. And as Professor Gardner begins by placing the Gospel in its environment at Ephesus, so he concludes by seeking to find its place in the thought of the present day. This chapter on "The Gospel and Modernity" is perhaps the most valuable in the book.

Personally, while grateful for the work as a whole, I should like to thank the author especially for his reiterated insistence on the reality of inspiration. For many people it appears to be impossible to distinguish between inspiration and infallibility. "Un livre inspiré est un miracle," wrote Renan, and he thought that the discovery of a single error in the Bible was sufficient to overthrow all belief in its divine origin. Hence his secession from the Church and his abandonment of Christianity. It is a far cry now back to Renan, but comparatively only the other day Professor Harnack (if it is permissible now to refer to a German!) was dwelling on the intolerable burden of an inspired volume of a thousand pages. An inspired original, he asserts, is untranslatable; more, it requires an inspired tribunal for its interpretation: "Inspiration und ein heiliges Auslegungstribunal gehören notwendig zusammen." If such men can hold such opinions, is it any wonder that critics are often accused of destroying the authority of the Bible and undermining the religious faith of the masses? Professor Percy Gardner's *Ephesian Gospel* will not be read by the man in the street, but it will help to the diffusion of the knowledge that liberal views in theology are consistent with a real belief in inspiration and a real hold on vital spiritual religion. I will go further, and say that many times they are the outgrowth of precisely these two conditions.

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Symbiogenesis, the Universal Law of Progressive Evolution.—By Hermann Reinheimer.—London: Knapp, Drewett & Sons, Ltd., 1915. —Pp. xxiii+425. 8vo.

The interdependence of organic beings, the balance of life, is almost as great a commonplace as the balance of power among nations. It has long been realised that the increase of material for life is due mainly to the formative powers of green organisms; and that others all obtain their food from these either directly by parasitism or indirectly by consuming and assimilating the substances that they have formed. Our author has endeavoured to give greater precision to this idea by developing a comparison between the economics of communities and those of the organism, speaking of "the wider bio-economic form of co-operation which underlies evolution and unites all organisms in one vast web of life—in a veritable organic 'civilisation.'

"The various kinds of labour and of mutual services performed by organisms of all classes have their definite (quasi-economic) value in this organic civilisation. In the course of the development of this civilisation, capital—physiological as well as mercantile—is constantly being created, and consists in both cases of accumulated values both of food reserves or surplus and auspicious or profitable capacities and trade relations. The

incessant storing up of labour in the form of capital, and the continuous exchange of surpluses, are indeed as indispensable to the preservation and the progress of the organic world as to that of the body politic" (pp. xii–xiv).

"Symbiosis is more than a mere casual and isolated biological phenomenon: it is in reality the most fundamental and universal order or law of life. So much so is this the case that I claim the great principle underlying all creative life, all progressive evolution, to be that of 'symbiogenesis,' *i.e.* the mutual production and symbiotic utilisation of biological values by the united and correlated efforts of organisms of all descriptions" (p. lxv). "It is a well-known saying of Aristotle that the city exists for the sake of its good citizens; and I would apply it to the biological society, which also exists for its 'good' citizens—those organisms, namely, which, by symbiotic endeavour, at once earn the right of biological citizenship and contribute to the welfare, permanence, and progress of their 'society.'

"The relations normally obtained by *feeding* [the italics here are mine, M. H.] are definitely regulated by a fundamental biological requirement or law, viz. that of reciprocity, or, more widely stated, that of symbiogenesis. By symbiogenesis I mean the production and increase of values throughout organic life by means of a symbiotic principle of co-operation or reciprocity between different organs of the individual but evolved and complex body, as well as between different organisms in a species, or different species, genera, orders, etc., even in the last and most fundamental way between plant and animal in the web of life. By the term symbiosis I refer to that obvious phenomenon of co-operation of parts and organisms as they occur, while by symbiogenesis I mean the principle underlying such symbiosis, and indeed all instances of mutuality in the progressive transmutation of biological values generally" (pp. 15–17).

A thesis to which the author attaches vital importance is that "good" citizens of the organic community are those which, if they do not manufacture their own food plant-fashion, at least confine themselves to "love foods," as he terms them—that is, the excess of reserves provided by plants directly for reproduction, or for purposes accessory to it. Such love-foods are nuts, cereals, the flesh of fruits, honey, etc.; inconsistently, I note that he in one place includes *cabbage*, which is composed not of the reproductive reserves, but of the vital vegetative and constructive organs of the plant. The flesh of fruits is, we might almost say, manufactured by the plant for the express benefit of fruit-eating animals; but the reserves of the seeds which he includes are necessary to the life of the next generation, and in the case of nuts constitute an essential part of the new organism.

The moral view implicit in the phrases "good citizens," "love-foods" runs through the book; flesh-eaters come in for reprobation only one degree less than parasites. But the author has failed to realise how largely the beings that he bans bulk in the population of the globe. The animals of the ocean, after deducting a small fringe of shore-dwellers that browse

on seaweeds, consist of essentially animal-feeders, down to those that feed, not on "love-foods," the surplus reserves of plants, but on the plant units, mostly diatoms, in their totality. Passing to the peoples of the air, the insects and the birds, an enormous number are carnivorous wholly or partially. Among insects, again, why should we consider the nut-weevil, the wax- and fruit-moths, better citizens than the countless ravagers of the leaves and roots of plants? Among birds it is hard to find any species of supposed vegetarian habits that is not as keen for an animal titbit as are our domestic poultry, naïvely supposed by the vegetarian ignorance of their true habits to be exclusively graminivorous.

Similar considerations are applicable to our closest allies, the mammals. Of the vegetarian, the majority browse on the living leaves and bark of herbs and trees. Squirrels do not disdain insects, and consume as much bark as acorns: apes eat fat maggots, eggs, and even nestlings when they can get them. The diet recommended by our author is impossible of attainment to man in the wilder regions of the earth, and indeed is only procurable under our own skies, thanks to that complex system of commerce that brings to our shores and distributes within the realm the varied produce of the whole globe. We would commend the "votary of the simple life" to consult, side by side with the food-lists of Savage's or Mapleton's, some good handbook of economic geography, and ask himself at what cost of complex culture and distribution the simplicity of his diet is obtained.

Reinheimer naturally enough dwells on the dangers of defective nitrogen metabolism: but every mode of life has its inherent dangers—*les défauts de ses qualités.* I have never possessed a horse, but have noted how much oftener such feeders after our author's heart have interfered with those of my friends who have owned them by illness at the wrong moment—far more frequent, as it appeared, than the illnesses of the carnivorous cats or dogs of their households.

When one discounts from the outset the foundations of a book, one may fail in the patience required to do justice to the good features of the superstructure. Naturally, to me our author's admiration for Samuel Butler counts for much righteousness: yet I have failed to read through his book consecutively and penetratingly—at any other time I should have written "durchgehends." For this I may apologise on the ground that I am often unable to seize rapidly the line of reasoning in paragraphs full of inserts, whether by a pair of dashes or by the less irritating enclosure in parentheses. I note in three consecutive sentences (p. 243) the first has a parenthesis and a "viz."; the second has a parenthesis, an "*i.e.*," and a second parenthesis; the third has an "*i.e.*"

Our author has not shirked difficulties; he has endeavoured to strengthen his presentment by discussions in which Herbert Spencer's views on bionomics are expounded and criticised; but I have found the exposition harder than the somewhat "stiff" original, and much of the criticism has failed to approve itself. Thus, with reference to Spencer's discussion of reproduction of the organism from its fragments, and admission

that polarity in this connection "is but a name for something of which we are ignorant—a name for a hypothetical property which as much needs explanation as that which it is used to explain," our author's comment runs: "I have already defined polarity as biodynamic character, a definition which meets the case of 'regeneration and integrity' because of the implied incipient individuality." I do not see how this definition can be squared with the etymological and habitual use of the word to denote differentiation in respect of an axial line. It would have been better to drop polarity here and stick to "biodynamic character." I admit, however, that Spencer is no easy matter to expound, and when Reinheimer has had easier material his exposition has been more satisfactory. Richet's work on anaphylaxy is well abstracted, and well utilised for the advancement of the theses. But Reinheimer's candour is admirable when he quotes the poisonous character of strawberries to some forms of life, considering that the flesh of the strawberry might be taken as the very prototype of a "love-food." Reinheimer adopts the Hering-Butler view of hereditary memory, and Eimer's belief in orthogenesis, the tendency of variation to take place, not at random, but in definite directions.

A warm-hearted chapter on Science and Democracy closes the book: for the antibiotic struggle for existence he would have us substitute "peaceful endeavour"; for the pessimism of Huxley, in his Romanes Lecture, the optimism of Rousseau. If we are unable to say that we rise from the book with concurrence in the views of the author, we have at least the consolation of having made the acquaintance of an amiable, studious, and conscientious thinker.

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Theological Room.—By Hubert Handley, M.A.—London: Constable & Co., 1914.

ALL who wish to understand the heart of the liberalising movement in the Church of England ought to read this collection of articles and papers. The title-page contains a quotation from Tyrrell's writings, in which, having had no ministerial experience of Anglicanism, he takes an exaggerated view of its tolerance. No doubt the external conditions are far stricter in Rome, especially for priests; but, apart from persecution and delation, it is a question of conscience and intellectual adjustment in the one communion as in the other. There is the further difference that, whereas an Anglican clergyman is expected to express his views and position, the liberal thinker in the Roman priesthood feels no obligation to do this, but can always shelter himself behind the impersonal official teaching of his Church. The collision occurs only when a man such as Tyrrell feels that he has a message of which he must deliver his soul.

Mr Handley is in perfect good faith, but this does not blind him to

the practical difficulties of his position, which he has experienced most fully. On p. 88 he thus summarises that experience:—

"Finally, and in brief, in the Church of England the Liberal clergyman is clerically unpopular, is subjected, at the hands of his fellow-clergy, to quiet, conscientious, immutable repugnance and depreciation. His chief trials are loneliness and the antipathy of good men. His peculiar hope is that he is serving them in spite of themselves; that he is saving for his detractors their religion; that for many an English Christian home he is breaking the shock of startling critical disclosures; that he is bearing the critical cross ahead for the sake of his fellow-pilgrims."

One of the great charms of this book is its candour and self-disclosure, of which the above is an example. Another is the reality and fervour of its religious spirit, which renders nugatory the charge of any necessary connection existing between dryness and unorthodoxy. The record of twenty years' work at St Thomas's disposes of another common error about the Broad Church school of clergy, that they are less forward than others in parochial activities. It is for this avowed purpose, in fact, that the author inserts it—a purpose which carries its own justification with it. Somehow or other an impression has gone abroad that it is the High-Church clergy only who are the workers. They have doubtless set the pace, and have numbered in their ranks some remarkably devoted men. Yet the results of their labours have been sadly disproportionate to the efforts expended. It is a common delusion, as the writer points out on p. 91, that they have succeeded in winning the working men; though he too shares in that delusion so far as a well-known Church is concerned, whose motto, graven on its porch, that it was built for Christ's poor, is in singular contrast with the eclectic character of its congregation.

Yet, in its many Protean forms, High Anglicanism is, and will probably long continue to be, the ruling power in the Church of England. At the same time, it is really this party, and not the Liberal, which has no logical standing in that Church. It shares with Rome the principle of dogmatic Traditionalism, a principle which makes it the first duty of a Church to teach "the truth," *i.e.* a body of correlated dogmatic propositions, taken absolutely (not "symbolically," which may mean little or nothing). The Church of England has failed to do this, while the Church of Rome carries out the programme. The Church of England suffers diversity and latitude of doctrine in her teaching body, which is fatal, on the face of it, to any such intellectualist claim, amounting, as it does, in certain typical instances, to the affirmation and denial of the same proposition.

The intellectualist position, depending, as it does, on assumptions which will not bear criticism, is an impossible one, but at least it is carried out logically and consistently by Rome.

On the other hand, Broad Churchmen, such as Mr Handley, are perfectly within their rights, when so much "room" has been yielded, in asking, like the famous Oliver, for more. If, for example, the principle of the symbolic interpretation of Dogma has been conceded in the case of two or three articles of the Creed, there can be no logic or consistency in

denying the application of this principle to the whole, or the greater part, as Mr Handley argues against the Bishop of Oxford (Dr Gore) in his Appendix to chapter viii. How far that principle is itself defensible, or can be consistently maintained, is a distinct and separate question.

It can hardly be said that all is well with a Church in which such vital and radical questions are thus compromised and evaded. It is unfair both to teachers and taught. It would be a great loss to the Church of England if such men as Mr Handley were precluded from entering her ministry. Yet there can be hardly any doubt that the difficulties, which he tells us were raised before his own ordination, would still be held as an impediment by most bishops (p. 149, etc.). And the training of young clerics has hardly been improved, from this point of view, by the seminary system which now prevails (pp. 57–8). The university-trained clergy were not so deeply affected by theological narrowness of outlook. Yet, even at Oxford, between the seventies and eighties, as the author points out in his second chapter, the growing ideas of young men were cramped and overshadowed by clerical obscurantism. The reviewer could add examples from his own experience. To mention only one :—When the late revered Bishop of Lincoln was giving addresses to young men who contemplated entering the ministry, he warned them, on one occasion, against the teaching of Dr Colenso, and observed that, in his own case, he had been rendered proof against his arguments by prayer.

A Church which deliberately warps the minds of the young, even with the best intentions, is, to say the least, not doing its duty. It either tends to make them narrow bigots, or imposes upon them the difficult task of finding their own way out of the tangle of antiquated philosophy and more than doubtful history, of which theology is so largely composed. The time is fast approaching when the pretence that verbal formulas can be revelatory of divine and absolute truth, or that it is immoral to disbelieve them, must take its place in the already long list of outworn and exploded superstitions.

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THE

HIBBERT JOURNAL

AN INTERIM RELIGION.

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THERE is a peace of God that passeth understanding; and there is a strife of God which passeth understanding no less. Religion is privy to the secret of both, but has no hold on either until the other is also within its grasp. Apart from the peace of God, the strife of God has neither motive nor end; apart from the strife, peace is a slumber of the soul.

Fatally defective is that view of religion which regards it as solely concerned with the possession and enjoyment of peace. It has taken a false measure both of the facts of the world and the nature of the soul. Equally defective and not less fatal is the opposite view, that the Lord is a man of war. Both are one-sided and corrupting; they are seen to be so by their moral fruits. The fruit of the first is Britain as she was before the war, full of idle dreams and discontent. The fruit of the second is Germany as she was then and is now.

There is a good pacifism and a bad. There is a good militarism and a bad. Britain, before the war, was deeply wounded by bad pacifism, whose ideal is the undisturbed enjoyment of the good things of life. Germany remains the victim of bad militarism, whose ideal is the domination of force. Both ideals are false and poisonous.

Bad militarism and bad pacifism are natural enemies: the one is the beast of prey and the other is the quarry. Good

militarism and good pacifism are in league for a common object, which is the education of men and nations. Their nature is not to fight one another, but to make war *together* on the bad varieties of each.

The true warrior is the best exponent of peace; and the true pacifist is the only man who has grasped the necessity and high meaning of war. It is the same man playing different parts; the noblest men and the noblest nations invariably play them both. The mere pacifist, on the other hand, is the worst enemy of peace, because he degrades its nature; the mere militarist is the worst exponent of war, because he fights without a moral aim.

Religion alternates between the preaching of peace and the preaching of war; nor could it preach the one unless it preached the other also. Let anyone who doubts this try the experiment of expurgating the Bible in the interests either of war or peace. That the Bible would be wholly misrepresented by a collection of its warlike passages will scarcely be doubted. But a collection of its pacific passages would be equally misleading. The same holds of any one of its parts. A pacifist Psalter would do no less violence to the spirit of Hebrew religion than would an anthology of the fighting Psalms so dear to the Ironsides. "I will lay me down in peace, for thou, Lord, makest me dwell in safety": "Blessed be the Lord my rock who teacheth my hands to war and my fingers to fight." These sayings do not contradict each other; they explain each other. In the New Testament, also, peace and war[1] are interdependent. The "non-resistance" sayings of Christ, torn out of the context of a life which resisted evil to the uttermost, would be meaningless. In St Paul there is the same paradox, the same truth. His "peace and joy in the Holy Ghost" is an empty abstraction unless we remember those "weapons of our warfare, which are mighty before God to the casting down of strong holds." All these

[1] *Not* the kind of war which ends in making speeches and leaves a man with his skin whole and the breath in his body—for more speeches.

were both pacifists and fighters, and their effectiveness in the one part is the measure of their effectiveness in the other. The movement between peace and war is the "diastole and systole" of the religious heart.

The religion of peace cannot hold its ground unless it is prepared, when occasion arises, to transform itself into the religion of strife. That such occasions do arise is a fact written large in all moral experience. They are the moments, familiar I suppose to most of us, when a man must say to his soul, "Fight *now*, fight to the uttermost, resisting, it may be, even unto blood, or peace shall never visit thee any more." They occur to communities also, but at rarer intervals. They are the moments when nations and empires are put to the test; when they must prove, by the tenor of their response, what vocation they have in the moral order of the world, or whether they have any vocation at all. When this happens religion uncovers its other face. The peace of God which passeth understanding summons its partner in the education of the soul—the strife of God which passeth understanding also.

My thesis is that such an occasion is before our country and our Allies at the present moment. By the action of our opponents this conflict has been raised, *for us*, to the highest level. Not by making war—which in the abstract is no crime—but by the aim and method of their warfare they have identified their cause with naked evil, thereby giving the war such a character that all who oppose them become, in the act, defenders of the Right.

Far be it from me to say that we as a nation are better fitted than others to play that part. There is nothing in our history, nothing in our national character, to suggest that we, and we alone, are the chosen champions of the Good. The part falls to us from the conditions of the conflict as the enemy has determined them. Whether or no we are worthy to play it our conduct must decide: enough that it has fallen to us; enough that the war is become, through the act of the enemy, a phase of the Eternal Conflict, and that no doubt remains on

which side we stand. Once let that be fully realised and our strength will be doubled; our power to endure unto the end will become a certainty. For the prosecution of the war will be thenceforward a religious act.

Such it is rapidly becoming: but it was not so at the first. Through the long months of the war our national psychology has been moving onwards from dim and uncertain beginnings to a clear and definite climax. It is still too early in the day to tell the story in full, for the end is not yet. But enough has been revealed to show that we are in the presence of a genuine spiritual drama played out in the soul of a nation. Only as a drama can the story be fitly told; and so one day it will be—when the dramatist arises who can handle such a theme. All that can here be attempted is to indicate, with the failings incident to the vision of an individual, some of the periods and turning-points of this remarkable history.

Since the outbreak of the present war it has been found necessary to write many books, pamphlets, and articles to explain to the British people what they are fighting for. I say it has been found *necessary*; and this necessity is not altogether to the discredit of the British. Only a people which, having lost its self-respect, had grown incapable of respecting others could have penetrated the aims of Germany offhand. The British, though far from innocent, are not that kind of people.

It may be said without extravagance that the British long ago acquired enough decency as a people to take decency for granted in the other peoples whom they regarded as their partners in the work of civilisation. This may have been imprudent, but it was not disgraceful. When a man of seemingly high character, an honoured neighbour of long standing, turns violator and attacks the decent woman who lives next door, what wonder if at the first she fails to understand the object of her assailant? There is a moment of bewilderment, of incredulity, of

inability to grasp the situation, before she can realise her peril. A like interval of moral unpreparedness prevented the full plain truth from dawning on many of our countrymen during the early stages of the war. And therefore it was necessary for our statesmen, our publicists, our thinkers, and some of our preachers, to tell us, and again to tell us, what we were fighting for. It was to our damage as a belligerent that all this was necessary; but was it not also something to our credit as a people?

I admit that we ought to have known that the rulers of Germany were preparing to attack us. We ought to have known that the final objective of their ambitions was to overthrow the Empire and to seize the spoils. We are much to blame that we had to wait for the outbreak of war before discovering that Germany, as represented by its Government, is a predatory Power. We were amply warned. But even if we had known our danger—as Lord Roberts knew it, as Mr Blatchford knew it—and even if we had made ready to defend our national existence, we should still have been unprepared for *this* war, such as it has turned out to be. We should still have had to wait for the discovery that behind the attack on the British Empire lay a deeper design, which was nothing less than the overthrow of the moral foundation on which Western civilisation has been built up. By individual writers in Germany this object had indeed been clearly avowed. Under the guise of a new philosophy of the State they had sought to revive that foul ambition of barbarism which prompts a nation to build up its own greatness on the ruin and abasement of its neighbours. But their utterances were treated, not unnaturally, as the ravings of madmen. That the Government of any civilised Power should identify itself with such an aim was inconceivable. What man in his senses could foresee, or be expected to foresee, that Germany, with the approval of her intellectuals, would deliberately plunge the world into war in the name of a creed so transparently insane? Nobody knew, moreover, or could have known that

she was ready to base her conduct in war on a code of ethics which has never yet been acknowledged by man, nor practised anywhere, unless it be in the nethermost pit. Nobody knew, and nobody would have believed, no matter how great the evidence, that the rulers of an enlightened people, backed by divines and professors of morality, were capable of resolving to impose this ethic by force of arms and make it the basis of a new "civilisation." Yet such we now know to be the fact. Germany herself has revealed it, by word[1] and by deed. For this nobody was prepared, or could be prepared. It is a new thing under the sun.

Naturally we were slow to understand the situation with which we had to deal. There was a considerable number of Britons—the present writer was one of them—who owed, and were never ashamed to confess, a vast intellectual debt to Germany. The humblest worker among the things of the spirit was a sharer in that debt. To all such it seemed impossible that in any final sense Germany could be the foe even of our own nation. The quarrel was on the surface. It was the fruit of an intoxication, a fit of temporary insanity; and we knew, or thought we knew, enough of the better mind of Germany to feel confident that this would presently reassert itself and right reason prevail. We remembered our German friends. For many months a feeling of unreality restrained us. It caused us to make reservations, perhaps unspoken reservations, to the doctrine that we were wholly in the right and our enemies wholly in the wrong. We entered into the fight, but we entered with a certain reluctance of the spirit. We gave our sons to the armies; but our hearts protested against it as a hideous necessity, and we said to one another, "Alas! alas!" To many of us it was no joyful sacrifice, for the cause that demanded it was not perfectly self-evident, but

[1] For evidence on this point see the next article, by Mr E. W. Hallifax, on "The Self-revelation of Germany." See also the article by Herr Harden printed at the end.

a thing to be argued and decided by a balance of considerations. At certain points, to be sure, the situation admitted of no debate, except by sophists. Such was the violation of Belgium, the immediate *casus belli*, which was clearly a crime, and a crime of the first magnitude, if anything in this world ever was. But the total quarrel, as developed from that point, was immense and complicated; it embraced questions which have been encumbered with controversy since men and nations began to reflect on their conduct: so that to many minds, which were just as well as patriotic, the war presented itself not as a clear-cut opposition of right and wrong but as a conflict of two opposing rights. There was thus a problematic element in the situation: some said so without disguise, risking the danger; while a far greater number who felt the problem, prudently, and wisely as it has turned out, held their peace. Let it be confessed without shame, but rather with pride, that for a long period the mind of serious and thoughtful people, though pledged to the struggle, was not perfectly at ease with itself. The will which carried them on fell short, by a little, of being the will of the whole man, of the whole nation. *Something* was holding them back—it may have been no more than a lingering scruple, but powerful enough in its cumulative effect to prevent the tide of the nation's energy and resolution from reaching the fullness of its flood. The time was yet to come when the last scruple could be flung to the winds; when the man of goodwill could boldly and finally turn his back on the paradox of his position and joyfully offer himself, body, soul, and spirit, to the service of the Cause.

Had the Germans been as subtle as some imagine them they would have masked their purpose, even though the wearing of the mask had put them under the necessity, so irksome to them, of fighting clean. They would have kept good men in England incredulous, bewildered, and careless until it was too late to recover the lost ground. They would have reserved their crimes for the last act of the drama. But

they did otherwise. They began in Belgium with an orgy of treachery, cruelty, and bestiality such as the modern world has never seen. Amid the plaudits of their intellectuals they shattered the monuments of a civilisation nobler than their own. They sank the *Lusitania* and bombarded defenceless towns on the English coast, and their professors and divines said "Well done." They stood by, apparently approving, while their allies, the Turks, murdered a million Armenians in cold blood. Little by little the truth was dawning upon us. Little by little: for the fact was so monstrous and incredible that repeated demonstrations left us like men struggling with a bad dream. Some still refused to believe. They kept on repeating the old legend: "This is not the true Germany, but some false usurper of her name."

Then they killed Nurse Cavell. Measured by the scale of the general bloodshed and brutality this was a little thing. But its moral significance was immense. It drove the lesson home—"the little more" that was needed to render our illumination complete. It was the key to Germany's policy of crushing the weak. It awoke our sluggish imagination. It was a summary revelation of the whole meaning of Germany's part in this war, clear as the sun in heaven, the sophistries by which it was defended only serving to put the final seal to our conviction that the work we have to resist and overthrow is, from first to last, the devil's. And much has happened since which repeats the same tale.

By a few people the legend of a true and a false Germany is still repeated, and will be to the end: but it counts no longer as a moral factor in the struggle. Whether or no a better Germany exist, the fact remains that it has failed to appear, failed to make its voice heard on the stage of this conflict. It has capitulated to the Germany which made the war, which has prosecuted the war with calculated disregard of human rights, which killed Nurse Cavell. The "true Germany" may now vindicate its own character if it can. The vindication is no longer any part of our business. For

us the only Germany that now exists is the Germany whose nature is expressed by deeds such as these, and whose aim in the war, as avowed by herself, is the synonym for that which stands accursed in the eyes of humanity. By what means she has forced her better mind to acquiesce in these things matters not now. Enough that she has done it. The character in which she challenges the world is one she has chosen for herself. Be it unto her even as she wills!

Thus at last the eyes of the doubting have been fully opened and we recognise what it is that calls us to battle. It is *naked evil*, shorn of the trappings which disguise it with the appearance of Good. It is no longer Germany, whom it were childish to hate, but a power behind her which has made her its victim and tool; a power we do hate, and must hate so long as we continue to be men and are capable of loving its opposite. We know what we are fighting against, and we know what we are fighting for. Knowing it, we make our resolution. Our cities are turned into arsenals; our peaceful country becomes a camp; in every town and village we see the preparations and the wreckage of war—and the conscience of the nation cries out, "So be it, and so let it be, till the work is done!"

If there is a being who, on receiving the challenge of evil, refuses to fight, that being has forgotten his nature. Not all the forces of the world are man's coadjutors or his fellows: one of them is his opposite and enemy, and it is precisely in exercising resistance to its opposition that man comes most fully to himself. By the innermost definition of his nature he is a fighter *against evil.* I say a fighter, and mean it literally. With naked evil there is no other way. Reason and persuasion are out of the question, for the essence of evil is that it refuses to hear reason and cannot be reasoned with. He who thinks otherwise is in danger of missing his human vocation. By leaving things to right themselves, or by trusting to the power of persuasive words, he may even betray the cause for which man came into the world.

Name it as you will, there is a power which is not amenable to peaceable entreaty, to the persuasions of reason, to the influence of noble character or personality. Christ encountered it when he faced the tempter, when Judas betrayed him for thirty pieces of silver, when the mob crucified him instead of Barabbas. Nurse Cavell encountered it in the men who slew her. It exists in nature; it enters into man, and there are times when it dominates his will. At the present moment it has found an exponent in the policy and deeds of the German Government, and, above all, in the reasons given by Germans both for the policy and the deeds. The Zeppelins which kill our women and children are its messengers, and we might as well reason with the bursting bomb as with the power that sent it forth.

Such is evil. It is that which declares its own nature by the terms in which it challenges its opposite. It is an ultimatum and a bribe; a threat of destruction to them that resist and a promise of the kingdoms of the world to them that bow down. Mingled with good it is often hard to recognise; but when pure and unadulterated no man can mistake it for anything else, for it is simply the opposite of himself and declares itself as such. Here is an unmistakable sample:—

HYMN OF THE GERMAN SWORD.[1]

"It is no duty of mine to be either just or compassionate; it suffices that I am sanctified by my exalted mission, and that I blind the eyes of my enemies with such streams of tears as shall make the proudest of them cringe in terror under the vault of heaven.

"I have slaughtered the old and the sorrowful; I have struck off the breasts of women; and I have run through the body of children who gazed at me with the eyes of the wounded lion.

"Day after day I ride aloft on the shadowy horse in the valley of cypresses; and as I ride I draw forth the life blood from every enemy's son that dares to dispute my path.

"It is meet and right that I should cry aloud my pride, for am I not the flaming messenger of the Lord Almighty?

[1] I found this in the *Pall Mall Gazette* for 7th Oct. 1915. The Berne correspondent of that paper states that "the composition appeared in Leipzig a week or so ago, and has already run into half a dozen editions." Further inquiries have confirmed its genuineness.

"Germany is so far above and beyond all the other nations that all the rest of the earth, be they who they may, should feel themselves well done by when they are allowed to fight with the dogs for the crumbs that fall from her table.

"When Germany the divine is happy, then the rest of the world basks in smiles; but when Germany suffers, God in person is rent with anguish, and, wrathful and avenging, He turns all the waters into rivers of blood."

If that is not evil, the genuine brew of hell, then no such thing as evil exists. To take it otherwise is to abolish the distinction between evil and good, and to leave us utterly indifferent whether the German or any other "sword" dominates the world.

Thanks to utterances such as this, of which there have been many, and to a long succession of deeds to correspond, our last hesitations have vanished. Our interpretation of Germany—the Germany with which we have to do—is clear and irrevocable. We admit her greatness. We are not blind to her military achievements. We recognise the organisation and driving power. But these only serve to stamp more clearly the character of the foe that threatens us. They are precisely what we should have to expect if the forces arrayed against us were the armies of the enemy of mankind, whoever or whatever that may be.

If there are any who still hesitate while yet believing that religion involves the assertion of the will against this enemy, I would venture to ask them this question: When, if not *now*, do they propose to begin? What clearer summons to show their faith by their works do they expect to receive than that which is calling to them at the present moment? What greater enormities of human conduct are they waiting for? What stronger proof do they want that the hour when the soul must put on its armour has arrived? If we cannot hear the summons in the present event, is any event conceivable in which we should hear it? Surely we may answer: If not *now*—never!

When Bunyan's Pilgrim encountered Apollyon in the Valley of Humiliation he might have argued thus: "This

person looks uncommonly like the Evil One. But what if, in so naming him, I am merely yielding to the biassed judgment of a belligerent? It may be that, for all his black looks, my opponent is a very worthy gentleman. Obviously he so regards himself. Obviously, also, he has a very low opinion of me. What if his opinion of me is nearer the truth than mine of him? Say what you will, he is an active, enterprising, ingenious fellow. Perhaps I shall be well advised in waiting for some blacker apparition than this before drawing my sword."

So Christian might have mused, if time had been given him. But time would not have been given; for, long before his musings could be concluded, Apollyon would have hewn him to pieces. And Christian would have deserved his fate.

From now onwards till the work be finished nothing else really matters. At last we understand the Cause, and we know that if this is defeated life would be intolerable. No sacrifice can be too great to avert the disaster; no period of endurance can be too long; no strain on our tenacity can be too severe. We throw everything into the scale: our wealth to the last penny; the treasures of Empire; the garnered fruits of progress; the last ounce of mental and moral energy; the loss of our noblest and best; our own lives as a matter of course. For we are fighting against an enemy whose triumph would be the defeat of our souls; and the vow has been vowed that he shall not prevail.

That is now the religion of an ever-growing multitude of men and women throughout the Empire—the expression of the supreme duty; and what nobler thing can religion ever be? It is a religion which no doubts assail; and into which a man can pour the full flood of the soul's energy without one hesitation. Not often is it given to a great nation to see before it a commanding duty which shines as clear as the day. Our response to it is the resurrection of the national soul—long asleep.

I write with deliberation when I say that we are fighting hell. What hell has meant to the vulgar concerns us not; but all that hell has ever meant to minds conversant with the tragedy of life is represented, embodied, realised in the power that we are fighting to-day. Cruelty and treachery are only the superficial manifestations of its nature. The essence lies in the directing mind. Beginning with a doctrine which subtly confuses the distinction between right and wrong, it grows, through ever bolder perversions, into a State-philosophy in which right and wrong are *transposed*, and moral reason turned into an instrument for the advocacy and justification of crime. This is the very Genius of the Pit; the spirit which proves every object of desire save the worst to be illusion; the parent of all sophistries and lies; the arch-enemy of mankind, doubly dangerous by its appeal to something intensely active in human nature everywhere, but held under restraint wherever man has learnt to know himself. Once let this spirit prevail, and there is an end to the hopes of the world. Its victory is the defeat of all that the ages have struggled to accomplish.

The religion of calmer times—the religion of love and peace—is not endangered by this temporary transformation into something of sterner quality. Rather will it be invigorated and revived; it will be shorn of the empty verbalisms that obscure its essence; it will return, enriched and ennobled, to every son of man who held not back when the call went forth to come to the help of the Lord against the mighty. There is a new wisdom growing in these Islands: not the wisdom which arises from union merely, for men may be united in evil as well as in good, but the wisdom which arises in union for the highest of aims; the wisdom born *simultaneously* in millions of hearts when a nation resolves to die rather than suffer the wrong to prevail. By this wisdom all our creeds and professions will hereafter be tested. The only people who will have a right in the coming years to preach the gospel of love and peace will be those who can give a good answer

when the question is asked: "What were you doing in the Great Day?"

Let us, then, have no more complaining of our lot! Let us thank God that, since the great trial was to come, *we* are alive to share its actual perils and possible glories. It will be a glad thought hereafter to all of us who survive that we were found worthy to stand in the breach—that the trial came to us and not to our posterity. Welcome the hour which tests the manhood of this nation to the uttermost! Welcome the call to show ourselves worthy of the great inheritance our fathers have bequeathed to us! Welcome the opportunity of proving the words we have so often uttered, that there are things dearer than life! Welcome the summons which brings us face to face with the business for which men were created!

How poor is the life to which that summons never comes! How demoralised the life whose highest service to the things of the spirit has consisted in their profession and their eulogy! Doubtless there are occasions which give an individual man, in the course of his normal experience, many an opening for practising the self-surrenders of the spirit. But now the occasion is offered to a whole nation all at once. That is a different and rarer thing; and out of it there arise revelations, revivals, resurrections, new births of the soul.

In the period preceding the war we were drifting away from all these splendid possibilities. We were growing unworthy of our mighty Empire, whose profound significance we had so long ignored. It was there for our benefit, for our glory, for our enrichment—so too many of us thought. Seldom did we pause to reflect that to no nation, however proud its history, are such trusts continued unless it can prove itself worthy to fulfil them.

I can imagine nothing worse for my native land than another century of such a life as we were living before the war. Before the end of it we should have gone to pieces, and it would have needed no attack from without to lay our Empire in ruins. A shock was necessary to bring us to our senses and to send our

quacks to the right-about. It came in a form for which we were ill prepared. It has come, and how good a thing it is to see so many proofs that the spirit which can answer the summons is not dead! Many of us feared it was. But now our fears have vanished, and we see the dawning of a better day, not for ourselves alone, but for all mankind.

L. P. JACKS.

OXFORD.

TRANSLATION OF HERR HARDEN'S ARTICLE IN "NEW YORK TIMES," DECEMBER 6, 1914.

"Cease the pitiful attempts to excuse Germany's action. No longer wail to strangers, who do not care to hear you, telling them how dear to us were the smiles of peace we had smeared like rouge upon our lips, and how deeply we regret in our hearts that the treachery of conspirators dragged us unwilling into a forced war. . . . That national selfishness does not seem a duty to you, but a sin, is something you must conceal from foreign eyes. . . . Cease also, you popular writers, the degraded scolding of enemies that does not emanate from passion but from greedy hankering for the applause of the masses, and which continually nauseates us amid the piety of this hour. That our statesmen failed to discover and foil shrewd plans of deception is no reason why we may hoist the flag of most pious morality. Not as weak-willed blunderers have we undertaken the fearful risk of this war. We wanted it. Because we had to wish it and could wish it. May the Teuton Devil throttle those whiners whose pleas for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours of lofty experience! We do not stand, and shall not place ourselves, before the court of Europe. Germany strikes. If it conquers new realms for its genius, the priesthood of all the gods will sing songs of praise to the good war. . . . We are waging this war not in order to punish those who have sinned, nor in order to free enslaved peoples and thereafter to comfort ourselves with the unselfish and useless consciousness of our own righteousness. We wage it from the lofty point of view and with the conviction that Germany, as a result of her achievements and in proportion to them, is justified in asking, and must obtain, wider room on earth for development and for working out the possibilities that are in her. The Powers from whom she forced her ascendency, in spite of themselves, still live, and some of them have recovered from the weakening she gave them. . . . Now strikes the hour of Germany's rising power.

"Not only for the territories that are to feed their children and grandchildren is this warrior host now battling, but also for the conquering

triumph of the German genius, for the forces of sentiment that rise from Goethe and Beethoven and Bismarck and Schiller and Kant and Kleist, working on throughout time and eternity. . . . In order that that spirit might conquer we were obliged to forge the mightiest weapons for it. . . . The fashioning of such weapons was possible only because millions of industrious persons, with untiring and unremitting labours, transformed the poor Germany into the rich Germany, which was then able *to prepare and conduct the war as a great industry*. . . . To be 'unassailable'—to exchange the soul of a Viking for that of a New Yorker, that of the quick pike for that of the lazy carp whose fat back grows moss-covered in a dangerless pond—that must never become the wish of a German. And for the securing of more comfortable frontier protection only a madman would risk the life that is flourishing in power and wealth. Now we know what the war is for: not for French, Polish, Ruthenian, Lettish territories; not for billions of money; not in order to dive headlong after the war into the pool of emotions and then allow the chilled body to rust in the twilight dusk of the Deliverer of Races. No! To hoist the storm flag of the empire on the narrow channel that opens and locks the road into the ocean."

THE SELF-REVELATION OF THE GERMAN WAR-PARTY BEFORE THE WAR.

A PENDANT TO "J'ACCUSE."

E. W. HALLIFAX.

THE most complete and crushing *ex post facto* indictment of Germany and Austria that has been formulated was published last spring in Lausanne—and from a German pen. With merciless persistency and acuteness the author of *J'Accuse* unravels the web of fiction, distortion, and suppression which German and Austrian diplomacy wove round its plot to bring about the world-war, and succeeded at least in deluding a large part, if not the majority, of the German nation. For the delusion of a defensive war was beyond doubt necessary even in the degenerate Germany of to-day, in order to still the surviving conscience and weld the whole people into one. "In writings and speeches at home," says the accuser, "we preach the policy of world-power, of conquest and world-dominion—of course among the initiated only: to the unenlightened populace and to foreign countries we are the victims of aggression, of surprise attack, of treacherous foes." On the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg falls the main weight of the accusation, for he it was "who, driven from above and below, lent himself as the tool of the inciters to war, covered the irresponsible with his responsibility, undertook the shameful task of representing the long-prepared war of aggression to his nation and the world as a defensive war, who

by this lie let loose the most terrible disaster that has ever fallen upon our planet, and dealt his country, whether victor or vanquished, wounds that cannot be healed for generations."

But there had not been wanting in Germany even before the war men who perceived the dangerous character of the influences that were at work, and raised warning voices against the war-crusade that was being preached. Such, among the books which appeared in 1913, were the anonymous *German World-Policy without War* and Professor Dr Nippold's *German Chauvinism*. The *ante factum* indictment of the latter volume and the evidence, alluded to by the author of *J'Accuse*, which it adduces, throw a searchlight on the mind of Germany during the period 1912–1914, and form a striking pendant and supplement to the reasoning of that remarkable book. To English readers who have not access to the original some account of it may therefore be of interest.

German Chauvinism, one of a series of publications of the "Union for the Promotion of International Understanding," consists mainly of a selection, from a mass of material "which would fill volumes," of 109 closely printed pages taken from reports of speeches and newspaper articles dealing with the coming war. In his preface Dr Nippold remarks: "There is no doubt that chauvinism has prodigiously increased in Germany, especially in the last decade. This fact strikes those most who have lived a considerable number of years abroad and now return to Germany. Many Germans in this position have expressed to me their surprise at the fundamental change which has taken place in the soul of the German people in recent years. I too can state that I was astonished at this psychological change when after many years I returned to Germany." The author then allows the war party to reveal themselves in their own speeches and writings, some specimens of which are printed below, and sums up the evidence in a concluding essay, of which, except where actual quotations are indicated, the following is a condensed paraphrase:—

The chauvinism or fanatical nationalism of which these

pages give proof not only combines exaggerated self-exaltation with contempt and hostility for foreign nations, thus relapsing into the barbarian notions of antiquity, but, supported by Pan-German ambitions on the one side and the agitation of the Armaments League on the other, it glorifies war as an end in itself and incites the German people to war in a way that a few years ago would have been considered impossible. Still worse, a deliberate system is revealed, whose object is by every means, whether it be distortion of facts or malicious calumny, to win over the nation and if possible the Government to the aims of the chauvinists. These people, who dislike a long peace no matter whether a reason for war exists or not, are systematically educating the German people to desire war, teaching it that it needs war, and endeavouring in any event to bring war about. They begin by inculcating the longing for war in the youth of the nation as the thing most to be desired in life (see specimen extract 1), and work upon the students in the universities, whilst such organisations as the Pan-German Union and the Armaments League seek to gain the present generation. The quintessence of their teaching is that a European war is not merely an eventuality against which it is necessary to be prepared, but a necessity, which in its own interests should be a cause of rejoicing to the German people. The method employed is to set up as an unimpeachable dogma the inevitableness of a war and then to urge that the time most favourable to Germany should be chosen, in other words, that Germany should bring about war when it best suits her, and above all as soon as possible. The German people are believed to be ready, not as of old for a merely defensive war with compelling cause, but for an aggressive war without cause. No longer is it a question of *Si vis pacem, para bellum*, because German national interests require a war; and then too, what a pity if the splendidly prepared army should be put to no use!

If it is asked to what extent these ideas have been adopted and assimilated by the nation at large, the answer is that,

whilst the claim of the chauvinists to have the whole nation behind them is false, a great part of the German people has already been infected; and unless the systematic efforts, the arrogant claims and misrepresentations of the chauvinists are opposed, there is a danger that this movement will gain the upper hand in the near future. The driving forces in this direction are, as the extracts show, organisations like the Pan-German Union and the Armaments League; the nationalistic press; generals such as Keim, Liebert, Bernhardi, Eichhorn, Wrochem, and others who meddle with politics; and politicians like Harden, Bassermann, and their fellows. "When the political situation has cooled down, and causes of war cannot be discerned on the European horizon, they fan the war-flame artificially. And they are never so much in their element as when the political situation seems in any way critical, as has frequently happened in recent months. But they would at no time admit that real material for a conflict was wanting. In the absence of any other material as an incitement, the chauvinism in other countries has to serve the purpose. . . . Incidents are of course exploited to the full and exaggerated, no matter whether they are important or not."

Many of these chauvinists have lost all touch with modern civilisation, and indeed with any kind of reality. "Morality and right are conceptions which, as they admit, have little value for them. They set them aside just as they do all the other results that humanity has achieved. . . . Consciously or unconsciously, these gentlemen preach to the German nation nothing else than barbarism, the mediæval right of the strongest, as the sole object worth striving for. For what else is it when a predatory war is urged upon the German people, when with this grand purpose it is pressed simply to disregard international law and the limits which morality imposes?"

"That the Pan-German political visionaries are out for the acquisition of colonial territory suits these war-generals excellently, but they regard it only as means to an end. . . .

For, according to their theory, however many colonies Germany acquired, it would need another war after a few decades, since the nation would once more be in danger of moral degeneration. War is to them merely a normal institution in the life of nations, and not simply a means of solving great conflicts to which recourse is had only in case of real necessity. . . . They brand as weak what is said by governments as to defensive war and the world's need of peace. Whilst other chauvinists at least assume a war to be forced upon Germany—although in fact no one wants to force a war on Germany, this idea being part of the means of suggestion employed by the Pan-Germans—the war-generals have no need of this motive. They are fully prepared to force a war on others." The war-spirit may be necessary for officers, but it is quite a different thing when every method of demagogy is employed in order to impregnate the rest of the population with it. "Even before the Armaments League" (founded with enthusiasm on January 28, 1912), "the Germans were considered a more military nation than any other. . . . Every department of life is made contemptible in the eyes of the unfortunate populace except the art of war. What is international law? It is 'bosh.' What is the effect of modern commerce, trade, industry, science, and technical enterprise? They merely enervate the German people and estrange it from its proper goal, war. All callings are worthless that do not directly or indirectly serve to educate for war. . . . War is represented by these people as the highest good instead of a necessary evil.[1] . . . They have reached what is the sheer negation of civilisation. . . . Their goal could only be attained by creating in the people the mood that must necessarily lead to war, and then approaching the Government and proving that the German people wants war."

Bismarck hated military interference with politics, and

[1] *War as the Creator and Maintainer of States,* by the editor of the *Politisch-anthropologische Revue,* concedes the blessings of peace as to a certain extent supplementing war.

would have kept in their proper place the very men who try to exploit his name. One must hope that the eyes of the nation will very soon be opened to the peril. Efforts are made to draw a fictitious parallel between 1813 and 1913, but whereas in 1813 the German people had to fight for all it held sacred, "there is a total absence of any real material for a dispute that need lead to war between Germany and the Powers of the Triple Entente. . . . Germany is far more threatened to-day with danger from itself than from abroad. The Balkan War seemed at last to give the lovers of war their longed-for opportunity. Now they are the more disappointed that even this occasion, which seemed to hold the last great material for a European conflict, has apparently passed by without one." In a footnote the author adds: "Political divergences are more rife to-day within each of the two groups of Powers than outside. The chief opposition lies between Russia and England, between Austria and Italy. Germany is in the agreeable position of having, since the Morocco question was settled, practically no interests that conflict with the Powers of the Triple Entente. At the worst, therefore, it can only be involved in political complications through Austria, by the opposition between Austria and Russia." The fantastic plans of the chauvinists cannot fail to bring them into conflict with any Government that is faithful to its duty and conscious of it responsibility, but they fix their hopes on the Crown Prince.[1] "They have become a national peril. Keim plays a more fateful part than any other man in Germany." Sir Max Wächter writes in the *Deutsche Revue* of May 1913: "The ill-will against England is so great in Germany that the masses would have greeted the outbreak of war in 1911 with enthusiasm. Fortunately, the Government refused to be carried away by the passions of

[1] *Germany under Arms*, by the Crown Prince (1913), added fuel to the fire. "Refreshing as a fresh breeze," says the *Reichsbote*; "but only for a manful German breast that sees a better time dawning; for as the Crown Prince, so, Heaven be praised! thinks the whole youth of Germany."

the masses. The danger is that on another occasion it may not be able to withstand the popular will, and may begin a war with England in order to save its own existence. The prejudices against England are artificially produced."

Dr Nippold finds grave reason for concern in the fact that these preachers of war have secured so numerous a public, and one so ready to give ear to and blindly to follow them, and that their influence is extending over ever-widening circles. Especially are the educated classes infected, and that this infection is general is proved by the small number of the younger historians who have escaped it.

Among the less intelligent classes there are countless others who derive the infection from their newspaper or the talk of the beer-table, where judgments are pronounced with a confidence which is in inverse ratio to the speaker's knowledge of foreign politics, a subject the masses are wholly ignorant of. "Many people are in the hands of the chauvinists without even knowing it, and denounce the French chauvinists. To these simple minds what they are told about attempts to isolate Germany seems self-evident." Thus large sections of the people accept the assertions of the chauvinists as gospel, and suffer from what we may call the fear of ghosts, political weak nerves or hysteria. "And so we are confronted with the extraordinary fact that the populace by thousands applauds the war-generals who want to plunge it into war. . . . As a consequence, perhaps there is in no country so much talk of war to-day as in Germany. One has the feeling that the atmosphere is pregnant with war. . . . Those who are thus infected refuse to believe that Germany is not in danger."

The political as distinct from the moral danger which threatens from these influences becomes grave as soon as they have the power to affect the decisions of the Government. This may soon come about under the pretence that the chauvinists represent and are identical with the nation. Further, they do mischief abroad and are taken as typical of German feeling, thus earning for Germany the reputation of

being the chief disturber of European peace. "But this is certain. If there is anything that could really endanger the German Empire, it is solely and exclusively the chauvinistic movement and the risk of its gaining the upper hand. This, and not the Triple Entente, is the enemy of Germany. . . . Chauvinism is a political danger against which the country cannot be warned with sufficient speed and energy."

The wanton incitement to an unnecessary and avoidable war is evidence of barbarism, is a crime against humanity and the State, which the State should repress before incurable harm has been caused. "It were a sad case if Germany should lull itself with the feeling of its own peaceableness until some day, to its own astonishment, it is forced to convince itself of the contrary. To combat chauvinism has become a political necessity, and the peace of Europe, as well as the undisturbed conduct of foreign policy, depends as much on this being done as on the state of armaments." All nations need to undertake this task.

How is the sudden growth of chauvinism in Germany to be explained? The nation has failed to see the new and great international tasks in which since its union it has been called upon to share. Its gaze has been turned backward to the deeds which founded the Empire instead of forward to its mission in co-operation with other nations, which mission, together with internal development, would have offered a worthy field for the energies of a rising state. "Conscious of its strength, it has yearned for great deeds, and missing the true ideal has given ear to those whose ideal is war. The 'deed' about which the chauvinistic papers are always writing, what is it but 'a gay and festive war,' equivalent to a predatory expedition? Such a predatory policy may have been an ideal of the Middle Ages, but it is one for which there is not and never will be room in the modern civilised world." But Germany disregarded the tasks in behalf of civilisation which called for her help, and even set herself in opposition to them, *e.g.* to the labours of the Hague Conferences. With

the catchword "internationalism" she thrust them away. For her feeling of nationhood was too youthful, and she feared it might suffer harm. "Thus Germany failed to recognise the true goal, . . . and threw herself into the arms of the chauvinists who preach . . . war, notwithstanding that to-day the interests which the nations possess in common far prepondêrate, and that national tasks have therefore no need of war for their fulfilment." This is shown even for those who advocate an "expansion-policy" in the recent publication, *German World-Policy without War.*

Thus does a German, more than a year before the outbreak of war, describe the efforts made in Germany to provoke a war. That Dr Nippold and the members of his society do not stand alone in their fears and warnings is shown by sixteen extracts in which other writers, and such journals as the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, the *Vossische Zeitung*, and the *Strassburger Neue Zeitung*, bear similar witness. Thus Herr von Gerlach writes in the *Welt am Montag*: "Such were the howls that ran through the Pan-German Press. A chauvinistic French paper that chose to collect and publish the abuse of France by *Die Post*, the *Deutsche Zeitung*, the *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, the *Deutsche Tages-Zeitung*, etc., could supply abundant nourishment for the hatred of Germany existing in certain French circles."

An article in *März* by Ludwig Thoma, entitled "Poisoners," on March 29, 1913, tells the same tale:—For a moment quiet reigns after the furious strife, and calm voices are heard declaring the instigation to war of the last few weeks to be criminal folly. In reality the noise is all about nothing. The German and French Governments are agreed about the questions in dispute (viz. the Lunéville and Nancy incidents); both swear they are armed only for defence; the two peoples have no cause of quarrel nor any intention of adventuring their lives and their well-being in war. Whence then the distrust, rage, hatred, the shrieks and threats? Not from events, deeds, or desires of conquest. No! render to the

chauvinistic Press its due. It has conquered. This is its work. A public speech is incomplete without an allusion to the time when we must stake all we hold dear. Interest in scientific inventions is concentrated on them as means of destruction, and is shown by calculating how many hundredweights of dynamite can be hurled down by a Zeppelin. "Everything is poisoned, and this we owe to the nationalistic Press. Honour to whom honour is due." It should be noted that the 110 militant extracts, taken from nearly fifty different newspapers, are selected by Dr Nippold from thousands of speeches and articles of similar tenor. He adds that the worst of them are far exceeded in warlike tone by many recent pamphlets, of which only the titles are quoted: e.g. *The End of France in 19??: a Forecast.*

But these hundred and odd pages of documents throw many interesting side-lights with which our author, in pursuit of his main theme, is not concerned. Extract 2 is typical of many bitter attacks upon the German Government, which both in purpose and performance lags so far behind the truculent megalomaniacs; and, whilst the Kaiser is not spared, the Chancellor and the Foreign Office are again and again charged with the ruin, by their nerveless pacific policy, of German greatness and German hopes. That they avoided war in the Morocco crisis of 1911 will never be forgiven to von Bethmann Hollweg and the then Foreign Minister, von Kiderlen Wächter; and despite the excellent compensation in Congo territory obtained from France, so large a proportion of the nation were converted to the belief that Germany had been defeated and wronged by England and France that there can be little doubt that those events were the chief immediate cause of the present war, and that it was practically determined upon at that time. We read that "the fearful rebuff respecting Morocco revealed all Germany's military powerlessness"; that "the German nation will not endure another such indignity," and "must not again submit to English dictation." And the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* of January 12, 1912,

declares that "future historians will date the origin of the next Franco-German war from the signing of this ill-fated Morocco-Congo compact, which, according to the unctuous sermon of the Chancellor, was to be a bond of peace." "O miracle of friendship wrought at Agadir!" wrote a contributor to the *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten* three months later, "one of thy authors, Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter, will soon, in an official sense, be no more. But thy official protector, Herr von Bethmann, still 'guides,' as it is said, German policy, and yesterday justified an insufficient army bill. Against the 'new spirit' of France we need our old spirit, the spirit of the chancellorship of glorious memory. And *therefore* we need among other things—*new men.*"

Speaking in the Reichstag on the international situation in April 1913, von Bethmann declared that the new French army bill meant no kind of threat to Germany, and that the mass of the French people loved peace. "With England we are on the best footing, we have gone hand in hand with her in the present crisis, and in spite of Great Britain's membership of the Triple Entente, it is very advisable to aim at a peaceful agreement with the British Empire in the future. The language of the British statesmen is altogether conciliatory and peaceable." (Compare the same speaker's words about England and France eighteen months later!) But what has *Die Post* to say to such a speech? "The Imperial Chancellor may have been forced by his position to such a declaration. He has to consider the sensitiveness of foreign Powers; he must reckon with the parties in the Reichstag, and must not allow himself any expressions which could be interpreted as signs of warlike intentions. But for the German people it is by no means salutary or advisable that it should become habituated to the visions of peace which the Chancellor's speech conjured up."

"Can the authorities wonder," writes the *Deutsche Tages-Zeitung* of April 28, 1913, "if a lamentable despondency spreads among the people because they again and again see

the Government dominated by its aversion to responsibility and conflict? Everyone in Germany has long since ceased to believe Government circles capable of remembering their duty and striking out the only path of policy that can lead to the goal. But if the guardians of the Empire fail them, the people themselves must become guardians of their destiny, and men like Gneisenau and Nettlebeck, Arndt and Blücher must arise once more." For a leader of creative genius the German nation is the material *par excellence* with which to accomplish impossibilities. "Give it an Alexander," cries *Die Post*, "and it would take the world off its hinges." But it must be armed not for defence but for offence, since the offensive alone guarantees victory.

Still greater is the hostility and contempt displayed towards all efforts to promote international peace and good-will, and the pæans sung to war as the great and sole cure for all German woes prepare us for the angry sarcasm which greeted the Berne Conference of French Députés and Members of the Reichstag in 1913, especially the thirty Germans who attended; for the attacks on the Hague Conference; for the sneers at the peace-advocate, Frau Bertha von Suttner; and for the condemnation of the whole of the pacific movement as a danger to Germany, and in particular of the declaration in favour of peace by 140 Protestant clergymen.

General Keim, the parent and president of the Armaments League (its mission, we are told, is to obtain recognition of the truth that, if peace does not bring the new territory needed by Germany, there remains no alternative but war), preaches hatred as "a necessary part of valour." Amid the "tumultuous applause of his adherents" he avows it himself "for all whom he regards as his country's enemies," and desires to see it instilled into every German boy and girl. And "just as some people everywhere see white mice, so," says Herr von Gerlach, "does General Keim see everywhere 'enemies of the German nation.'" But the place of honour as the mark

for malicious invention is held in turn by France and England. The *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten* assures its readers that France wrecked the attempts at an understanding between England and Germany which might have resulted in the limitation of naval programmes, lest Germany should thus have been able to increase her army; whilst, according to the *Deutsche Tages-Zeitung*, England's purpose in fanning the war-spirit in France (where it depends on the hope of securing allies) and encouraging her to strengthen her army is to force Germany to greater expenditure on her army, so that she may thus be hindered in developing her navy.

"The English neighbour" (an alternative title being "Our late cousins") is considered to be "most dangerous when he wears the mask of a friend," and "the best remedy against his evil desires is the mailed fist."

"For a number of years we in Germany have accustomed ourselves to see in England our chief adversary," and "since the Morocco affair it is clear that England purposes to take the first opportunity to destroy our fleet." Such remarks occur *passim* in the speeches delivered at meetings of the Armaments League and Pan-German Union.

All the trouble comes of course from French "Revanche" and from England's jealousy of her German rival and her envy of German progress and trade, the hoary fable which has proved such a trump card in manipulating public opinion in Germany, for "England is panting to cast down Michael, who towers aloft in every economic sphere, before a stronger fleet renders him too powerful." And the *Reichsbote* of January 7, 1913, having declared that the craving for peace among wide strata of the people "enrages the old combatants of 1866 and 1870, when it was a joy to live," continues: "There is no doubt that there is a war party in England which systematically works for a conflict with Germany, and that the most representative men belong to it." The construction of naval bases at Rosyth and Dundee, and the concentration of the fleet in the North Sea, are facts "in the face of which no

sensible German will trust English advances of friendship. Incurable optimists and visionaries who seek an understanding with England are urgently advised to study English policy in the light of history. Perhaps they will thus learn that as England acted towards Holland, Portugal, Spain, France, Denmark, so she will act towards her German rival as soon as the European situation and a weakening of our war-strength permit it." Even a man in Bassermann's position does not scruple to say (vide *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 6, 1913) that England would have begun a war in Prince Bülow's time had it not been for the strength of the German navy.

Mr Norman Angell's efforts in Germany met with worse than the world's proverbial reward. They are "deliberate English attempts to delude" (vide *Allgemeiner Beobachter* of June 1, 1913) . . . "to catch ignorant simpletons under the garb of science. Happily this paid agent of the English Peace Society was vigorously snubbed in several university towns. . . . In the selfish interests of that smart and cunning Albion which is never at a loss for means of deception, he distils cosmopolitan poison into susceptible hearts. He deceives his audience in order to appease their justified displeasure at the throttling of German oversea trade. . . . German export circles desire a market for their goods which is covered by the German Eagle—such a market as the English colonies—and they declare Angell's hypocrisies to be the proverbial mendacity of English policy, which should excite admiration for its skill rather than moral indignation. Therefore it behoves us at last to cease making friends, and our new Ambassador in London to desist from his shallow speeches of reconciliation. England's present disposition for peace springs from the fear of having to sacrifice her pitiable expeditionary force on behalf of France, and of being unable to provide any further troops to quell insurgent India and Egypt. . . . As the diplomatists fail us the army must come to our help, and as its equipment has long been insufficient we must sacrifice milliards. To such a point have we been brought by our political innocence,

which Angell is now so childishly trying to exploit. But the web of lies is rent in pieces, and scarcely a beginning has been made towards an understanding."

If we except the acquisition of colonies, the "positive aims" for which the Pan-Germans clamour are studiously vague and undefined. We learn, however, that Bismarck's policy "repels by its entire disregard of England's and even of Turkey's position relatively to Germany," and as the embodiment of his opinion that "Germany had in 1870 attained all she needed"; and *Die Post* enumerates the following further demands of the national will: "The strengthening of our position in Central Europe; the final settlement with England and France; the energetic protection of Germans abroad; the acquisition of bases for our fleet; and the development of our striking power in proportion to the growth of hostile forces."

Was the recent treachery of Bulgaria the new and surprising thing that it seemed? Not at least to the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*, which, under the heading "A Beautiful Dream," wrote on February 9, 1913: "*If the Balkan policy of Franz and Ferdinand had been realised by the joint action of German and Austrian arms, it should have been an epoch-making settlement of the reckoning between Germanism and Slavism.* Yes, alas! a beautiful dream, whose phantasms under the influence of ultramontane hashisch have befooled wide circles of German expansionists."

I have excluded quotations from Bernhardi as unnecessary, and have restricted the choice of others to points passed over in Dr Nippold's summary.

These extracts are evidence only of what was openly preached and how much the German nation was allowed to know. They include references to voluntary subscriptions raised for the building of Zeppelins and for the air-service; but the gauge which they supply is a minimum, not a maximum gauge. Behind them, we may be sure, much was going on. Schemes and decisions were maturing, the secret of which was guarded by a powerful inner circle. It was possible to live

in Germany in 1910 and 1912 without being conscious, unless one read certain (mostly North-German) newspapers, that anything unusual was afoot. It was not possible to overlook the growth of arrogance and the increased jealousy of England by which the minds of otherwise well-meaning Germans were being warped and poisoned.

For many years there has been accumulating in Germany all the material for an Anglo-German conflict, and no one acquainted with that country could fail to see that England's peace and security turned on the question which set of influences would gain the upper hand. The widespread indignation, excited by the Pan-Germans, which followed the supposed failure of the Morocco venture of 1911, was, in German phrase, water for their mill. The *Tägliche Rundschau* of May 23, 1913, boasted that a sudden change had occurred. The military demands of those who had been stigmatised as chauvinists or super-patriots, and had even been reproved by the Federal Council, were all at once officially adopted, and were approved by political parties which six months before had been indignant at them. In short, those who had condemned what they called chauvinism became themselves chauvinists. "A long time ago," writes the French senator M. Reinach, "the Abbé Wetterlé, an Alsatian deputy to the Reichstag, told me that there was not a single project of the Pan-Germans that the Emperor had not ended by adopting." It seems probable that their triumph had been achieved and the resolve for war taken by the close of 1912 or early in 1913, but that it was known only to the initiated. Meanwhile the popular mind was excited and prepared for war in every possible way, and a favourable opportunity was awaited of representing to the nation that the war was forced upon Germany (*aufgezwungen*), the term by which the wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870 are invariably described. A contributor to the *Leipziger Tageblatt* of December 31, 1912, writes: "Prophecies that were not baseless or superstitious have long since stamped the year 1913 as a critical one, and

events and prospects in world-politics have taken such a shape that the hour draws nearer and nearer when accounts must be settled between England and Germany, or there must be an honest *rapprochement* in which Germany receives the rights that are her due, and can satisfy the compelling needs of imperial expansion." On January 1, 1913, in an article headed "The Turn of the Year: the Turning-Point of Fate?" *Die Post* wonders whether 1913 is to be a year of blood, and believes that things have developed to such a point that "they await only the cue that Fate may give." Can it be doubted that the Kaiser's Scandinavian holiday in July 1914 was a mere blind to conceal the plot from his own nation, the train having previously been completely laid for war and the Austrian Note, as Baron von Wangenheim, the German ambassador at Constantinople, confided to the Italian ambassador on July 15, would be the case, having been so worded as to render war inevitable? Many confirmatory facts (*e.g.* the accumulation of ammunition in Syria early in 1914, the discovery of secret orders issued months before the outbreak of war) are already familiar.

With the aid of the captured Government the Pan-German faction accomplished in the last days of July 1914 the capture of the remnant of the nation. How completely it has mastered both, recent history makes all too plain.

E. W. HALLIFAX.

MILL HILL.

EXTRACT 1.

From the *Jungdeutschland Post*, a weekly periodical for the Youth of Germany, published by the League of Young Germany. No. 4, January 25, 1913. "War," by Otto von Gottberg.

"Honour and duty teach even us Germans and Christians that the souls of the dead and the living are without rest until a contest has ended with the victory and triumph of our arms. . . . Therefore war is the sublimest and most sacred expression of human action. It affords opportunity of sacrificing the highest possessions for one's brethren according to God's command, and bestows eternal life on the brave. We see this when

we go on Sunday to the military church of our town. From our hymn-books our eyes fall involuntarily on tablets on the walls. Above long, long lists of names are the words: 'These died the hero's death with God for King and Fatherland.' Let us desire each Sunday to be registered some day upon those tablets. Then we shall live for ever and be envied centuries hence. . . . For us too the great and joyous hour of conflict will one day strike. . . . Into the street where we walk to-day with merry chatter and laughter there will soon fall, still moist, a printed sheet, and from the lips of the first German who reads it there will burst strong and confident: 'A call like echoing thunder sounds.' A genuine battle-choral is this song, and yet it is thrilled through with the German's exultant joy in war and heroic death. . . . Yes, that will be a great and glad hour, which we may secretly wish for ourselves. The wish for war when uttered aloud often becomes vain boasting and ludicrous rattling of the sword. But deep and still in the German heart there must live joy in war and a longing for war, because we have enemies enough, and victory comes only to a nation that with music and song goes to war as to a festival. Honour to our lord and ruler who unweariedly guards the world's peace, because he one day has to give account before God's throne not only for Germany's power, honour, and renown, but for every drop of blood shed at his bidding. On his shoulders the anxieties of a conflict will rest with terrific responsibility. We, however, may at his call seize our weapons with light and glad hearts and rejoice in the war. Let us then laugh with all our might at the old women in men's clothes who fear war and therefore bewail it as dreadful and hateful. No! War is grand. Its august greatness lifts men's hearts high above earthly and commonplace things.

"For us too such hours are waiting. We will meet them with the manly knowledge that it is grander and nobler after they have passed to live for ever on the Roll of Honour in the church than to die a nameless and common death in our beds. On the world's round ant-heap we are of importance only as members of a community, of a fatherland. What becomes of us must and ought to be indifferent to us. Thus did our fathers think, who were able to create the Empire only because, along with the resolute will for victory and death, they carried with them to battle their firm, pious faith. A soldier's song tells us how they conceived of their heaven and their reward. Up there in the Hall of Clouds are seated hero Frederick, hero Blücher, the men of the deed (but not the stay-at-homes who want to make us dislike war). The great Kaiser, his Moltke, his Roon, his Bismarck are there. And when a battle is fought on the earth with German weapons, and the faithful slain mount to heaven, a lance-corporal from Potsdam calls out the guard. Old Fritz leaps from his golden chair, gives the order to present arms, and in imperious tones harangues the kings and heroes: 'Attention, gentlemen! Heroes too are they whom I now introduce, and at their head the King's Grenadiers.'

"Such be Young Germany's Kingdom of Heaven. Thus let it yearn to knock at our Lord God's door."

EXTRACT 2.

"Psychiatry and Politics," by Medizinalrat Dr Fuchs. *Die Post*, January 28, 1912.

"When Frederick the Great saw that more powerful opponents were preparing to destroy him, he struck first without waiting for the fatal blow. In the Germany of to-day no one capable of forming an estimate doubts that the Triple Entente is preparing to destroy us. We all know blood will flow to a certainty, and more blood the longer we wait. But few dare to advise imitating the example of Frederick the Great. And no one dares the deed itself. Why? . . .

"Again, what men stand out most prominently in the history of the nation? Whom does the beating heart of Germans clasp with the most passionate affection? Is it Goethe, Schiller, Wagner, Marx? Oh no! But Barbarossa, the great Frederick, Blücher, Moltke, Bismarck—the hard men of blood! They who sacrificed thousands of lives, it is to them that the tenderest feeling, a truly adoring gratitude, streams forth from the soul of the nation. Because they did what we ought to do now. Because they were braver, more glad in responsibility than any other. But at the present time middle-class morality is bound to condemn all those great ones, for the man of the people guards nothing more anxiously than his morality—and yet his most sacred awe does homage to the Titans of the deed of blood.

"All this conclusively proves that the German possesses sufficient keenness of vision to perceive the stern demand of the times, and honour, national imagination, and instinct enough to venerate force personified and to recognise the drawn sword as the instrument of the situation. And yet our people fail to apply this practically. Every individual knows, the whole nation feels that attack alone affords deliverance, and yet the cry for attack is not heard. It dies away in mutterings around the beer-tables. This defensive attitude is suicidal. Peace denotes not only shame but ruin. This truth too is known to many and felt perhaps by all. And yet! And yet!"

The North German League had an impulsive force, "which was Bismarck (the young Bismarck! In his later days he erred grievously by becoming a pacifist)."

"The German people will not awake to deeds until its fleet or perhaps Wilhelmshaven has been treacherously shattered, preferably on a Christmas night withal. Then, yes, then when it is too late, in its wildness, confusion, and rage it will try to take action." . . . The policy of the Hohenzollerns has been fluctuating and uncertain, "but from time to time there arose a miraculous man who forced and drove the inert mass. . . . These geniuses never evaded a deed of necessity, never committed the weak-nerved and weak-minded error of treating a war otherwise than any other move in the political game of chess. The bloodshed of war was for those God-sent men

merely a by-product, the by-product of a necessity, a duty. . . . The German nation has never failed its leader. But where is the man to-day who will again drag the nation over the threshold into the arena which it secretly longs for? The gladiator who refuses to fight becomes the victim. And Germany is as surely doomed to decay as is the fish which lets itself drift, as the sword is doomed to rust in damp and idleness. . . . If once again a deliverer is to come to us, one who, like all the great, fears not the number of the slain nor the brand of infamy, he must come soon. But in him we should have borrowed a soul, we should look upon the product of a forcing-house, an unnatural psychological development. The normal thing for Germany is ruin."

Die Post, commenting on the article, "which without reserve lays its finger on open wounds and shows at what boundless pessimism men of strong national feeling have arrived," considers "the author is absolutely right in what he says of aggressive war, waged to forestall the enemy" (the so-called "Präventivkrieg"). . . . "If speaking generally we deem war and the greatest national effort a people is capable of making to be in the interest of our people, it is merely because we consider it to be the only means that can still save us as a nation from the physical and psychical enervation and debility to which we are doomed." . . . The German people cannot resist the corrupting influences of a long peace. . . . "If it would learn in time what it is and means to be German . . . the poet's word would be near fulfilment, that some day Germanism should prove the world's cure."

Extract 3.

Addressing a meeting of the Pan-German Union at Munich, General Keim said: "The fundamental error of all our policy hitherto has been that the eternal principle 'Politics are the Will to Power' has been lost sight of. The predominating conception has been that it is the highest statesmanship under all circumstances to make operative the will to peace. That is very pretty from the standpoint of the moralist, Christian, and middle-class citizen; but history everywhere teaches that the only nations that have vigorously asserted themselves in the world are those which have put the will to power before the simple will to peace."

In an article on April 12, 1913, *Der Tag* wrote: "War will one day speak the decisive word, and then no previous consideration for peace will avail as an excuse. When weighed against war, everything else, including talk about a good conscience, about right, about humanity, about the world's peace and the sacrifices of the German people, ceases to count."

GERMAN PATRIOTISM.

THE REV. LORD WILLIAM GASCOYNE-CECIL.

ONE of the difficult problems that the war has brought before us is the question of patriotism. Before the war, with that self-complaisance which was so characteristic of the mental attitude of the time, patriotism was a virtue recommended without any qualification—a man could not be too patriotic.

Then comes the war. And Germany, which we had always regarded as a well-ordered country, civilised and humane, giving an example to other countries by social legislation; from which we had taken our pension and insurance schemes, and whose guidance we had followed in theology and biblical criticism, changes as by magic into a demon who disregards all humanity and whose methods of war are the very extreme of barbarism. And we ask ourselves what has changed Germany. We are assured by competent informants that German children have been taught from their youth up to think of Germany as the greatest country in the world, to sing that they would gladly give all for her, to cry "Germany over all"—in fact, to be patriotic with all the thoroughness and method that German character can give. And one of the doctrines of this patriotism has been, that as long as an action benefited one's own country it did not matter how cruel, how mean, how barbarous such an action might be. And so a white flag might be misused to give German arms a victory; towns might be burnt on any flimsy pretext to secure the position of the German army; cathedrals might be bom-

barded if there was even the remotest chance of their being used as places from which to direct artillery fire against German troops; treaties were of no avail if they were not consonant with German interests—they were mere scraps of paper: all this and much more was the result of German patriotism. But—and this was the essential point—we learnt that however barbarous the behaviour of the Germans might be, however false and treacherous, they were most faithful to their own country, and multitudes died like heroes for Germany.

The behaviour of Germany to Belgium brought into prominence the difficulties of this German view of patriotism, for it seemed natural to conclude that, if patriotism was a virtue so highly esteemed in Germany, Belgian patriotism would meet with sympathetic treatment at the hands of the Germans and, the moment that military exigencies permitted, Germany would reward the patriotism of the Belgians as many a loyal enemy has done in past history. But what was a virtue in Germany was a sin in Belgium. The stauncher the defence, the more loyal to their own country, the severer was the punishment meted out by the German admirers of patriotism. One looked in vain for those generous words which the victor can so easily pronounce to the vanquished, those words so wise in their magnanimity. But no, the Belgian receives nothing but cruelty, slander, and humiliation; his patriotism is, to the German mind, the vilest of sins.

Here apparently is where Germany stands: patriotism is a virtue in Germany and a vice anywhere else.

It is idle to waste time demolishing the German view of patriotism: the thing must be wrong that is so inconsistent, and its effects must be disastrous to the whole civilised world, as indeed they have been, for, animated by this view of patriotism, there is no crime from which the rulers of Germany would shrink, there is no lie which they would not weave to conceal such a crime; the misery that this view of patriotism has caused far exceeds the misery that proceeds from all other views put together; it has desolated Europe and ruined

the world. In fact, all nations feel that, unless Germany is crushed, life in Europe will be impossible. How can we have a life in common when those with whom we live may, under the influence of this passion, be treacherously murdered? How can we again welcome Germans into our country, while we fear that they are planning to destroy our homes and families? And so it is not surprising that everyone should say that Germany must be crushed.

But I would suggest that the danger does not come from the German, but from the German view of patriotism. If the danger came from the German, he would have borne a worse character in the many countries in which he has lived. By now there would have been anti-German societies in every country. But the individual German seemed a very ordinary type of man, industrious, fairly acute, methodical, obedient, with a tendency to drunkenness, and perhaps of late years to sensuality. If in peace time he had been the demon he appears to be in this war, we should never have welcomed him in our homes; besides which, Germany would never have attained to any power; for cruelty, dishonesty, and rapacity would break up any country. The real danger lies in this, that it is only under the influence of the doctrine of patriotism that Germans show these diabolical characteristics, and the people are constantly deceived in their estimate of them; they welcome them as guests and treat them as well as they treat their fellow-countrymen, only to discover that under the stimulus of so-called patriotism these quite inoffensive people develop into dangerous barbarians.

It will be more helpful to try to consider our own doctrine of patriotism, and in that consideration to distinguish it from that of Germany—for after all there is a real danger of the Allies defeating the Germans and yet being conquered by German thought; many times in history has it happened that the vanquished and not the victor has dominated the intellectual position.

Patriotism is the quality which gives cohesion. It involves

the sacrifice of self for the community, and it therefore produces unity and strength. So far its definition is easy. The difficulty arises when we begin to consider to what community patriotism refers, for attachment towards the smaller unit must often mean detachment from the greater. The German definition is simple: patriotism attaches a man to the empire to which he belongs, it must not be made to apply to either a lesser or a bigger unit. A Saxon who esteemed the interests of Saxony before those of Germany would be esteemed unpatriotic. A German who esteemed the interests of Europe before those of Germany would be equally unpatriotic. Clearly such limits as these are arbitrary and must, even to a German mind, on occasion seem absurd. If, for instance, Germany were dismembered and a portion of that Empire were put under France or Russia, would it be the duty of the Germans living in those districts to transfer their affection, with the civil power, to Russia or France?—surely no. But then why should not an Alsatian or a Holsteiner or a Pole as a patriot be disloyal to Germany? I can conceive no answer to that difficulty unless the German, like the savage Gaul, throws his sword into the scale and says might is right.

But for us, we want some reason why we should prefer one unit above another. Why am I as an inhabitant of Hertfordshire not to say that I consider the interests of Hertfordshire more important than those of England? Or why should a Canadian be regarded as a traitor because he prefers the interests of the Continent of America to those of the British Empire? It is as easy to condemn people for being unpatriotic as it is difficult to define the reason why patriotism should attach itself to one unit of organisation more than to another. To say that I will die to see my parish greater than the next parish would make everybody laugh; to say that I will die so that my county should be greater, more prosperous than the next county would make people smile; to say that I would die to make England, Ireland, or Wales, as the case might be, greater than the other constituent parts of the

United Kingdom would make some people look shocked and others take off their hats. Again, to say that I am ready to die for the British Empire would be received with acclamation; but if I go a step further and say that we ought to die for Western civilisation, the look of shocked astonishment would return on my friends' faces. Yet am I to be driven to say, on the other hand, as the Germans are saying, that empires are divine institutions?

After all, the whole of this idea is comparatively new, which makes the precedents of past ages more difficult to use. Patriotism, it is true, was a Roman virtue, but it disappeared as completely as the Roman toga and was replaced by the virtue of loyalty; and loyalty in the feudal scheme, if one accepted its premises, had a very sound and reasonable foundation. The king was commissioned by God, and all the chief lords swore allegiance to the king, so that not only was a definite appeal to religion made, but each individual was held by his own solemn promise.

All through the feudal ages, therefore, patriotism lay dormant; one finds the *patria* mentioned as part of the classic phrases of the monkish writer, but if anyone had acted on what we now call patriotism and had, for instance, fought against his liege lord because by marriage the fee was passed to a foreigner, he would have been accused of high treason and suffered the penalty of being either beheaded or hung, drawn, and quartered, according to his rank.

This contempt for patriotism comes into prominence in the monkish chronicles of the middle ages, where dates are reckoned from the Conquest. A true patriot ought to have been ashamed of the fact that the English were conquered and subjugated, but they had no such sentiment; the French kings were their lords not only by conquest but by descent, and therefore they were quite happy. There was none of that modern craving for a nation to be the unity. The theory of loyalty had great advantages over the theory of patriotism; it was complete; it guided the governed in every relation of

life—from the villein to the king, all had someone to whom they should be loyal. God was over all the world, the Pope his vicegerent ruling over Christendom, which was divided in its turn among kings and princes, with the Emperor in some way their superior; under the kings came the lords, and so on down to the villein. The idea was beautifully complete and did not, like the modern virtue of patriotism, guide a man only in his relation to one unit of government, namely, the nation. So the theory of loyalty not only permitted but legalised international action. Kings were heads of departments in God's great system of government, and were naturally bound by the laws of their Divine Superior. Stubbs points out, in one of his lectures, that the characteristic of wars in that period was that they were always to establish a legal claim; of course this was very often the most flimsy pretext, still it did give hope to the world that wars would be abolished and the relations between states regulated by some system of law which would be efficacious because its sanctions were not only supernatural but also those of public opinion. The Renaissance with its return to Roman thought brought in the old idea of patriotism, and gradually the old patriotism ousted loyalty. In some ways no doubt this was a blessing to mankind; it did away with the idea that countries were the private property of the king, and taught that the obligation of the citizen was to the nation, not to the king, or, to use the older phrase, to the commonwealth. But it introduced a very difficult and dangerous element between nations. The essential unity of mankind has now no legal recognition. Each nation is an independent unit, there is nothing higher; there is in the legal theory of our international law no common point to which all eyes can turn, and co-operation among nations has no basis in sentiment. The process of change from loyalty to patriotism is slow—to this day our soldiers are sworn not to defend England but to obey the King; but on the other hand the change in the relation of governments to governments has been much quicker. After the Reformation no one respects

the idea of Christendom; the Empire of Christ rapidly disappears and nothing takes its place, Convenience compels us to have common relations; the improvements in the means of communication make those relations more and more intimate, with the result that we have a great deal of common international action; international congresses meet on every conceivable subject; the world is governed by one system of finance; citizens from all countries freely go from one country to another. In fact, from the material point of view the world was becoming one vast conglomeration of states, and those who think the world is governed by materialistic considerations began to prophesy that war was at an end; all that was needed was a court to settle the relations between various nations, and consequently arrangements were made at the Hague to secure such a system of arbitration. But the whole thing breaks down because man is not governed really by material interests; he is essentially governed by sentiment, and there is now no common unity to which sentiment can attach. Christendom is dead, and there is nothing in its place. There is pan-Germanism, pan-Slavism, and many another "pan," but these only prove sources of division; there is no pan-humanism, and this utter absence of a sentiment round which mankind can group itself is peculiarly marked in Germany. In the Allied countries there is a certain amount of belief in a common humanity, very often illogical, but of great value as the foundation of a future unity; it is illogical because of its limitations, we may kill men but we must not kill women and children—the adjective innocent is inserted here, innocent women and children, which implies that all men are guilty. Many English people have doubts whether it is right to kill people in certain ways: we may starve women and children to death by a blockade, but common humanity forbids blowing them up with a bomb; we must crush Germany so that she will never be able to attack the Allies again, but if you suggest for a moment that the women and children should be killed so that there will be no future for Germany, you will find that

the sentiment of common humanity, in England at any rate, is very nearly as strong as the sentiment of patriotism. It may be illogical, it may be unpractical, but it is the germ of higher things. But at present it labours under two great disadvantages which render it nearly useless: the first is, it has no authority in Germany, and though probably the old ideas of Christendom linger on more than we are disposed to allow at the present time, in theory a German may only love Germany. The German Government does not believe in common humanity; Belgians, Serbians have no rights, they are not Germans, so they must suffer. The other disadvantage is, this sentiment is so limited; it is true common humanity forbids soldiers doing certain things when war is declared, but it allows statesmen to take actions which must inevitably lead to war. We may so manage the affairs of the State, if we can, that we ruin the inhabitants of another and friendly State, so long as we benefit the inhabitants of our own. So, when the MacKinley Tariff was passed, not even the most conscientious American would allow that he had sinned against the industrials of Europe. But if the Western had taken any action against the Eastern States of America which hindered their industries, the whole opinion of the country would have been agog with demonstrations of the wickedness of such an action. The difference being that, owing to the sentiment of nationalism, all Americans are bound together in a common unity, and anyone who takes any action to break that unity is unpatriotic; but there is no common sentiment between the States of the world, there is in sentiment no United States of the world. So the sentiment of common humanity, while it still softens warfare, is not strong enough to prevent war; and at the present time Western civilisation has come to this impasse, that all material considerations point to a closer unity, it would profit everybody, but that unity is rendered impossible because of the distorted view of patriotism of which the chief exponents both in theory and practice are members of

the German nation. And against that false sentiment of patriotism at present there is no unity to which the virtue of cohesion can be attached. The only ray of light comes from the action of the Allies. With all the disasters that are around us one bright point emerges: the conception of patriotism among the Allies has not proved a disruptive force, as might well have occurred. At the beginning of the war there was an obvious danger that each country would fight for her own hand. But partially under the feeling of horror which German inhumanity begot, partially under the influence of a higher ideal which floats mistily before many minds, a wonderful unity manifested itself among the Allies. When Rheims Cathedral was bombarded, Englishmen felt as they would have felt if an English cathedral had suffered; nobody asked if the Library at Louvain was Belgian; and if the Allies are successful in this war it will be largely because they have been able to develop the spirit of cohesion, unnamed at present, but far above patriotism, which enables them to meet and overcome the disruptive and barbaric influence of German paganism.

One difficulty is to give this new virtue a name. To call it internationalism would be to sully it with all the class hatred which modern socialism has introduced into that word. To speak of it as love of humanity is to be open to obvious misconstruction. To call it Christian feeling would be a misnomer, for, although influenced by Christian faith, it affects a wider area than organised Christianity does at present. Yet this higher patriotism is a virtue which should be cultivated, extolled, hymned by our poets, taught in our schools. This higher patriotism is far from being opposed to the love of country, rather by completing the idea it renders it more logical; for not only are we in danger of losing all idea of patriotism through the disgust all men must feel at the deformed German representation of that virtue, but there is this further danger, that the great truth of the essential brotherhood of nations may be recommended by somebody like the socialists, and after these

troubles a war-sick world may turn to the socialists as the only body who taught the brotherhood of nations when German patriotism was covering the world with blood, and thus the reputation the socialists may win would be a great danger afterwards.

The Christian Church should therefore try to inculcate true patriotism. True patriotism is but one rung on the ladder love sets up between complete barbarism and complete unity. The first rung of that ladder is self-love—a man without self-love is but an animal; but that self-love leads to a higher love, the love of family, and from that higher point of view self-love becomes a vice; the selfish father who neglects his family does wrong, though it is the same self-love that prevented him as an individual becoming a mere animal. Again, the love of family must be passed and a higher rung of the ladder reached. The man who loves his town or province more than his family is deemed a good citizen, a benefactor to his town; and from this high point of view family love is a temptation and often proves so, for it tempts a man to use his position in province or town to put members of his family in lucrative posts, till it justifies the witty Frenchman in saying, "Ces pères de famille sont capables de tout." But there is yet another and a higher rung, the man who loves his country; and from this higher view-point the love of province or town in turn becomes an evil, and one from which nearly every country has suffered; call it parochialism, provincialism, or nationalism, it is all the same; the error consists in preferring the part to the whole. Where this vice is common the nation's hand is palsied, the door of its defence is unlatched; mighty indeed is the united nation.

But is the mighty nation united in its strength the end? Is there no higher ideal? Is man created only to form himself into mighty nations which, fully armed, aim ever at each other's destruction? No, a thousand times no; this is the view of German patriotism; it is this ill-developed ideal, which has not grown with the growing world, which now makes this

world a place of blood and tears. If this is the end, all progress is impossible; and if this German patriotism conquers England, why then, though we still be termed England, we shall be but another miserable Germany.

There is yet a higher ideal, one which the Allies touch but which Germany cannot reach, which sees an essential unity in mankind—the highest rung on our ladder of love; and from that height we can dominate not only the worlds of men but the world of things, for by international co-operation thought and knowledge are enlarged. All science, all philosophy, lies like some fair land at our feet; art, music, and poetry show their full beauty from that height, and Christianity its wonderful truth, for from the top of our ladder of love we can perceive the wisdom of the maxim that all men are brothers, and though we be divided into states, self-governing and independent, we are bound together by a thousand ties, not alone of commerce and finance and material self-interest, but of thought and art and above all of religion. The world craves for a religion which will convince men of the brotherhood of all, that will bind people to peace, not by the flimsy ties of treaty nor by the meretricious bonds of gold and common interest, or even by the heavy fetters of fear, but by a common love. That religion was once taught, taught by the Man of Nazareth, but, alas! we have forgotten it.

WILLIAM GASCOYNE-CECIL.

HATFIELD.

THE APOCALYPSE OF WAR.

> Though love repine, and reason chafe,
> There came a voice without reply,
> "'Tis man's perdition to be safe,
> When for the truth he ought to die."—EMERSON.

IT is perhaps too much to expect at a time of national danger that belligerent advocates on either side should be capable of that mental detachment from their own position in the conflict without which an intelligent interpretation of facts and events is impossible. But few could have anticipated beforehand that the war literature of the belligerent nations could have provided such a revelation of mental perversity, raw passion, and the pathetic intellectual incompetence of human beings to understand themselves and one another.

It is easier to explain than to excuse this infirmity of moral and intellectual judgment. Not the least important of the effects produced by mutual respect and unconstrained intercourse between civilised nations is that one nation involuntarily helps another to look at itself impartially, to see itself as others see it. So subtle is this influence that one nation almost seems to hold up before another the mirror wherein it sees clearly reflected the form and features of its own behaviour. By a simple mental transition one nation seems thus to become the keeper of another's conscience, for the nation which holds the mirror seems to be furnishing the standard of self-judgment. Hence the loss of mutual respect at once confounds the moral judgment of both nations: neither can see itself aright, and neither can see correctly the linea-

ments of the other's life. Deprived of the only means of taking an impartial and therefore accurate view of its own motives and ways, the result is inevitable. Each falls back on its own prejudices, impulses, and passions, which, because they suddenly become prominent through their intensity and the bitterness of disappointment with the nation formerly held in respect, assume all the importance of a trustworthy criterion of right and wrong. Left to itself, each follows the primal laws of self-interest and self-preservation, and drifts helplessly under the forces of its separate instincts. Rational appreciation of conduct thus becomes almost impossible, for reason implies a common or universal court of appeal. Not merely can each not understand the other, it cannot understand itself, for the foundation of all understanding has been shattered. There need be no surprise, therefore, that so much reasoning on questions of national conduct seems perverse, distorted, and almost insane in its procedure, for reasoning has become a mere pretence. It seems to formulate ideas in a connected order, but its purpose is not to convey the truth but to support primitive passions and instincts, whose very nature lies outside all reasoning whatsoever. And the tragedy of the situation almost borders on comedy when we find that what each puts forward as a reasonable form of criticism, or again of defence, is regarded by the other with amazement, as deliberate self-sophistication and transparent absurdity. To this pass has the evolution of the intellect of civilised man brought the inhabitants of Europe.

While this position of helpless moral confusion seems thus in a manner inevitable, it is worth noting that the result is indirectly a remarkable proof of the extent to which the German and the British nations had become mentally interdependent during these last years of peaceful intercourse. On our own side, Germany had stood for enterprise and conspicuous success in many of the higher interests that concern the welfare of nations. Its industrial prosperity had compelled not merely admiration but fear, and had led to a reconsidera-

tion of our own industrial methods, and in part to a reluctant adoption of those of the rival nation—in other words, an adaptation of our minds to the German point of view. In technical and theoretical knowledge German schools and places of learning were in certain quarters, rightly or wrongly, looked upon with such respect that ignorance on our part of their contributions came to be considered a reproach, acquaintance with them a recommendation—another form in which the German mind and its procedure permeated still more profoundly our own. Our peaceful rivalry with Germany was but another means of making ourselves dependent upon it for approval and appreciation. In all these complex ways, and in others equally important, our mind had become interwoven with that of Germany. What then but mental perturbation, moral disorder, and intellectual confusion could be expected to ensue when suddenly the foundations of mutual respect were undermined, and both we and they were left entirely to our own spiritual resources and in our judgments had none to consider but ourselves?

Were it not that even many of those who write with comparative sanity on the situation reiterate without question the assertion that a state of war is hideous and a monstrous outrage on "civilisation," one might pass it by as the utterance of petulant stupidity. When we remember that even a century ago war was accepted as a normal condition of the existence of separate states, that there was not a decade during last century without war somewhere in Europe, and that this country in particular has been more often engaged in war during the last hundred years than any other nation in Europe, the assumption that such a statement is self-evident becomes an absurd hypocrisy. What is really meant is that a war which we did not directly initiate is detestable to us, and a war which is waged actually on our ancient frontiers is a horrible outrage on the peaceful stability of our daily life. To suppose, because peace happens to suit us, that war must be a monster is surely the acme of childish credulity. The spirit of conflict is no respecter of

persons and states, and is not to be denied its right out of consideration for our domestic securities. That we can resent its intrusion is but a proof of our absorbing satisfaction in the fleeting moment, in the life of the senses, in our comforts and earthly enjoyments, an indication of our blindness to the operation of the unseen forces which can as readily break out in storm as rock us to sleep. We have been so long accustomed during the last generation to treat human society as a playground of opportunity and chance for individual adventure, the open field for a free career, that we have come to imagine the life of a nation to be the one exception to the rule of cosmic order, the one region where human caprice can prevail, the one domain which we have entirely under our hands to make or mar as we please. Such influence has this idea that we find men asking whether the war was "inevitable": as if anything in human life could be inevitable till it happened, or could not be inevitable after it had happened; as if the movement of a whole nation's life were comparable to the incidental action of an individual will, or could be deflected this way and that by the finger of some political agent.

There can be no surprise that people whose mental attitude is controlled by these narrow prejudices and puerile prepossessions are unable to reconcile themselves intelligently to the situation, and only succeed in lashing into incoherent fury the passions of those who are even less reflective. Their standards of judgment are mean and contemptible, and "great thinkers" who seek to interpret the upheaval by the aid of such standards can only bring forward arguments which are little better than a mixture of pedantic babble and childish whining. They are like querulous holiday-makers on the slopes of a slumbering volcano, whose eruption has deprived them of their usual pleasure-ground.

Let us once for all accept the elementary proposition that stupendous events have corresponding causes, and we shall then begin to understand what has taken place and what it

involves. The first step is to grasp the fact that warfare has been and is still a universal and an inevitable operation in the life-history of states. It is not a "biological necessity," for the simple reason that there is nothing in animal life which is at all comparable to the compact co-ordination of a human community. Herds of animals do not fight with herds of other animals, either the same in kind or different in kind. The capacity for orderly and systematic destruction of one group of organised beings by another group is the special endowment of the highest species of living creatures on the globe. And man undertakes this because war is in its essence a supreme moral necessity, a necessity so great that he can consecrate his endeavours by the vows of religion.

The mental perplexity of those who are unable to reconcile themselves to the "horrors of war" arises on the one hand from an unconscious or conscious assumption that warfare is a mere recrudescence of animal brutality or crude savagery, and on the other from the feeling that somehow they must find a moral justification for participating in it. Obviously, these two points of view are diametrically opposed. No possible moral justification can be given for sharing in an orgy of savagery. And all such moral reasons are convicted from the outset of either unconscious insincerity or sheer intellectual dishonesty. For if warfare is really brutality or savagery, it is impossible to justify it from the standpoint of any level of morality; if it can be so justified, it is impossible to treat warfare as a brutal or savage form of enterprise. One has no difficulty in finding the secret of the argumentative legerdemain of so many who have written on the war, when their procedure is thus controlled by contradictions from the start. It is curious, too, that these moralisers should even think it worth while to give good reasons for bad conduct, if their primary assumption regarding war be accurate. The instincts of savages require no reasons to support them, any more than the doings of beasts. All we can say of one or the other is summed up in the pathetic formula, "biological necessity." Those who regard war as

brutality are openly accepting the fundamental proposition of the Bernhardi school.[1]

This search for a moral justification for sharing in what is described as a brutal struggle betrays even through its inherent hypocrisy an acknowledgment that warfare is not outside the pale of the moral life; that, on the contrary, it must be somehow fitted into morality, and must be shown to have "moral principles" behind it. Only when this is brought to light can we dissipate the insincerity and perplexity of mind which distort all clear judgment on the event. War is nothing but a special case of the general condition of sustaining the kinship and fellowship of men in a community in which the essence of morality consists, and which is the most enduring and most precious part of man's earthly existence. That general condition, as has long been recognised, is that physical life has only value when it exists for and advances the good life, and the good life is that found in a definite community. The mere physical existence of man is by itself of no more value than a blade of grass or an electric current: it only becomes valuable when it is moralised, when it helps to realise human community. And once the good life is established, once community of human beings becomes an historical fact, there is absolutely no element in human nature, or for that matter in organic or inorganic nature, which cannot be turned to account and become incorporated into the scheme of human welfare. Nor is there anything in human nature which cannot be made to yield up its contribution in any form that is required to sustain this chief end. Physical life and all material resources are but means to human welfare, and must be subordinated, nay sacrificed, to its interests. And this is precisely what we see on a great scale in warfare. Blood is spilt and treasure spent

[1] There is a certain amount of comedy as well as cunning in the Bernhardi formula: comedy, in that it amounts to saying, "Let us show the superiority of our Kulturstaat over all others—by becoming like the wild beasts"; cunning, in that the formula forestalls moral criticism by putting the action of such a state on a plane where moral categories cannot apply because they are irrelevant.

to defend and secure the greatest good we know—community with those who by inheritance and age-long fellowship have become the nearest to us of human kind. In peaceful times we wear out physical life gradually on its behalf, and in so doing maintain it: in time of war we offer up on its behalf physical life all at once. Both ways are possible, because physical life is of temporal significance, and thus may be lengthened or shortened; and both are equally moral, for the end of both is the same; and both are equally necessary as long as the life of one community is more precious to the individual than that of another.[1] There is thus nothing at all unique or wonderful in the state of war or in the demands which war makes on the individual. It is part and parcel of the moral order of a community.

The shuddering horror with which the war is regarded in so many quarters is no proof of devotion to the "higher civilisation," still less does it show a deepened interest in moral well-being. It is an open confession of reluctance to accept the whole burden of the moral life. There is no great merit in doing a duty which will bring its reward in a tangible form to ourselves. The sincerity of our belief in moral values is only tested when morality demands from us the uttermost we can give and without clear prospect of personal return. Physical existence is just such a demand. Rather than admit it, however, many describe such a surrender as heroic or exceptional, and try to excuse themselves from accepting the duty on the ground that no one has a duty to be a hero or an exception. But no amount of reasoning, be it ever so learned, can be other than sophistry which seeks to establish the "absurdity" or "immorality" of such a supreme claim on our will. For at heart it implies nothing less than a rooted distrust of the very principle of morality, an admission that morality, for all

[1] It is on the interpretation of this last clause that the various theories of pacificism turn. I stand by the historical fact of separate communities of men; this is all that is required to justify my point. The recognition that communities may be large or small does not alter the argument—and speculation as to the future seems worthless.

our talk, is not to be taken seriously but with a certain reservation. In a word, the rejection of the ordeal of war rests on profound moral insincerity and hypocrisy. We cannot hold that morality should dominate all our natural instincts if we are prepared to throw over morality altogether for the instinct which impels us to cling to physical life. Morality cannot be a serious business if we can desert it merely to save our skins. It is ludicrous to hold ourselves bound by moral commands if we are at liberty to treat these with contempt whenever they imperil our bodily safety. It is mere cant to speak of moral ends as "sacred," when we consider them inferior to the life of animate existence. If a man will desert and abandon all he professes to value, the "best" included, in order to preserve his bare existence, morality is not merely contemptible, it is a fool's business. It is but an ingenious scheme of ridiculous conventions and worse than ridiculous restraints, and has no lasting place in the constitution of human nature. These are the only alternatives:—either moral well-being can control the resources of human life to the uttermost, in which case we can keep back nothing but must give up everything to maintain the best we know; or morality is of no more serious importance to man than the sighing of the wind through the trees, the play of light on a soap-bubble, or the self-imposed grotesque evolutions of a harlequin at life's Vanity Fair. Those who look upon war, actual or possible, as an inseparable factor in the life of a community adopt the first alternative: those who bewail and shrink in horror from a life-and-death struggle, in their heart of hearts accept the second.

It is surely a curious commentary on our commercialised civilisation that the "abomination of war" should have been so widely accepted as an obvious presupposition of controversy during these last months. The success of the pacifists in our midst is indeed explicable, if as the result of our material prosperity we have lost sight of any other meaning in the term "good" except "goods" or something "good to eat."

What a triumph for political economy, the science which has had a *succès de nécessité*, perhaps for the reason that like necessity it knows no law!

The only immovable basis for participating in the fight, and the only sufficient justification for doing so, is the maintenance of that intimate and precious fellowship with one another which, by all its manifold agencies, has made of us a definite community out of the raw material of human nature, and has established us at length, with a peculiar plan of human life all our own and a definite scheme of moral purposes, amongst the singular congeries of beings forming the human species. By this community we stand or fall as individuals; for its scheme of human life physical existence must at all times be surrendered. War, actual and possible, is always the highest price a community must pay for the possession of its own ideals, as death is the last and highest price we must pay for the privilege of living at all. And the price is the highest, because the thing to be paid for is the highest we care for; while, on the other hand, it would have been impossible to pay that price did not flesh and blood derive their own value from the ends which demand their surrender in the time of need. We think the sacrifice of life in the day of battle makes precious our ideals; 'tis our ideals that make physical life worthy to be called a sacrifice. And how the very act of giving life to maintain our best reveals to us, as nothing else can, the greatness of our heritage, gives a new glory to our traditions, throws into high relief the enduring purposes which make us what we are and what we would be! Citizenship in common is suddenly seen to be the priceless possession of human life, deeper than all its divisions, greater than all self-interest, strong enough to bind all classes, wide enough to embrace and keep all our human distinctions. The insignificant duties of life receive a new meaning when life is given for the highest duty of all. Familiar terms like honesty and justice, kindness and courage, generosity and self-denial, become charged with a new value and animated with an intenser

vitality when they are found to be worth the bitterest trial that flesh and blood can endure. The sensuous comforts of the days of peace, the routine satisfactions of everyday existence, become even suspect unless they minister to or are under the control of the vaster ends of good citizenship. In a word, war, by bringing men close to the realities of life and death, lays bare before our eyes the unseen foundations of our human society and gives a new sense of the enduring realities of the moral life.

War, therefore, needs an apology as little as does peace. The one condition can be as healthy for a community as the other.[1] That war is inherently evil and peace inherently good can be defended neither in principle nor in fact. If war is radically evil, why do our good people pray for success in it? Does prosperity in evil turn evil into good? Destruction is as necessary as construction; disintegration of all that is finite is as necessary as its production. The world is too full of energy to allow any institution to overstay its welcome and become too sure of itself. No nation is healthy when its watch-towers are allowed to crumble. It must always be alert in the defensive when it is not actually on the offensive, if it is to be really alive to its supreme moral interests. Diplomacy is an instrument of compromise and is useless when unsupported by guns and ammunition. Nor is there any vitally important moral distinction between the defensive and offensive attitude or between defensive and offensive warfare: for a defensive attitude is a standing challenge to offensive hostilities, and is meant to be nothing else. The defender always thinks the aggressor wrong, and the aggressor always regards the defender as latently hostile, *i.e.* potentially offensive, in spite of his apparent inactivity. Moreover, the difference between an offensive and a defensive war is merely

[1] Peace and war are indeed purely relative terms. A nation may be at peace with other nations and internally discordant to the verge of strife: it may be at war with other nations, and internally at peace. It is safe to say that in our own country there has been a greater sense of peace since the war than for some years previously. The suffragettes alone, to mention one source of trouble, had made life almost unendurable before the war began.

that between advancing the interests of a community further and keeping hold of what has been gained. The history of healthy nations is a perpetual oscillation between these two.

If we are really superior to Germany, we must show this on the field of battle, for that is the only superiority relevant to the present issue. We cannot possibly claim the superiority of a privileged place among the nations, or expect our place to remain unchallenged if an opportunity occurs to dispute it. Humanity has succeeded well before we appeared on the scene, and doubtless another nation can arise and stand for "freedom" as gallantly as we have done.[1] We are in the stream of the world's history, and must accept the conditions of historical contingency whereby things come to pass and pass away. Our nation is a great event in the life-history of humanity; but let us not forget that events are happenings, and what arrives on the stage may be required to leave it. Who are we that our existence should not be disputed by another nation? A temple stands by the principle of gravitation; by this same principle an earthquake rocks and crumples its foundations. It may be grotesque arrogance on the part of another nation to challenge our existence; but it is less than the arrogance of those who consider their position to be beyond dispute, who disdain the challenge as an outrageous insult, and who, in overweening pride of place, consider their existence indispensable to the purposes of God in heaven or of man on earth.[2]

[1] It is absurd for any nation to claim to stand solely for human freedom. There are all sorts of freedom, and every civilised nation thinks its own freedom the best.

[2] It need hardly be said that nothing in the above argument justifies the position of unbridled "militarism." War is only civilised and justified morally when it is adopted as a last resort or in the interests of the rights and obligations (treaties, etc.) which constitute the life and well-being of a community. Militarism, on the contrary, puts war in the forefront of the programme or aims of a community. Hence the barbaric savagery of the German methods of warfare. The distinction between civilised nations and barbarians lies largely in whether war is regarded as a last resort or a first step in the interest of self-maintenance.

Not merely will the war teach us—and is now teaching us—the realities supporting the moral life of a community, and a truer perspective for the future that lies ahead, it has also shaken the religious life of Europe to its foundations as it has not been shaken for four hundred years. This is inevitable. Religion is inseparable from what, for man, is an issue of life and death. The earthly struggle becomes an ectype of a heavenly Armageddon. Already many old convictions have turned to pale illusions; and much curious material for reflection has been offered to the impartial spectator. It was proposed very early in a great newspaper that "faith" should be "mobilised":[1] a dignitary of the Church of England urged the exercise of Christian charity towards the enemy even while doing our utmost to destroy him: another deplored the admixture of hate in our struggle for existence and advised the cultivation of the love that works no evil towards a foe, whom we are seeking to blow to pieces to prevent our own destruction. A Government department welcomed and advertised the assistance guaranteed to our armies by an African potentate who proposed to pray to Allah for the success of our Christian country. A German religious newspaper urged the clergy to institute a moratorium of Christianity, while the protestant King of Prussia assured the Mohammedans he was a follower of the Prophet.

More interesting, however, is the manner in which the war has disclosed the illusoriness of certain commonly accepted views of Christianity. It had been held that the essence of Christianity consisted in accepting the doctrines that God is Love, and that man should love his fellow: the realisation of

[1] In the next column of the same newspaper a writer urged the "mobilisation of science." Certainly war does bring together old enemies in face of a common foe! It never seems to have occurred to anyone to suggest a mobilisation of our sense of humour.

But surely we might have been spared such prayers as that of the eminent Scottish divine who desired that "this diabolical war might be a means of salvation to individuals and to the nation"! Or is it that the Devil is not such a bad fellow after all, and will in an emergency lend a hand in the salvation of mankind?

these was supposed to dispense with and even to abrogate all other doctrines and laws of human relationship. The war has made rude havoc of these notions, as every honest mind admits. For it is transparently impossible to conduct a war under the sanction or support of such abstract religious doctrines. It is impossible for one man to introduce his bayonet into the body of another in the name of the love of God.[1] There is more consistency of mind and more common sense in the language usually ascribed to Private Atkins when he hurls himself on his foe. Nor is it possible in the name of the love of God or of man to pray for victory; for if God loves both sides equally, we cannot ask that one side should be destroyed any more than the other: indeed the proper attitude of love would be to pray for the victory of the other side just because they are our enemies! If we think defeat is for their "ultimate good," it would doubtless be for our "ultimate good" likewise: and since neither side can say which is better, the proximate good of victory or the ultimate good of defeat, both sides are reduced to silence on the issue of the conflict. There is in short no escape from the plain man's conclusion: if Christianity is essentially a religion of love, the war could never have arisen between Christian nations, and cannot be carried on under the name of Christianity. There must clearly be something else or something more in Christianity than love in this sense, if Christianity is to hold any further sway over mankind. It is certain that nations will always fight with one another; and if Christianity can find no place for warfare, so much the worse for Christianity. Indeed we should be bound to conclude that after about two thousand years Christianity has had no serious influence on the nations at all; for wars have been inseparable from the development of Europe. But in point of fact the mistake has been in identifying Christianity with this flimsy abstract sentimentalism. No one sincerely and

[1] To say the Germans are not Christians will not help us out of the quandary: but in any case such a statement would be only as true or as absurd as the statement of the Germans that we are not Christians.

practically believed this doctrine even in time of peace, and no nation could carry on its affairs for a day if it adopted as its ruling principle a love which dispenses with justice and the other conditions of social well-being: the doctrine is hostile to all genuine morality. The war has merely proved its futility by a crucial test, and has proved, what was plain to any open mind from the first, that love can only be the consummation of moral conditions, not a substitute for them. The love of man involves inevitably suffering and pain, restraint and violence, blood and tears; the love of God must embrace the horrors of destruction and the terrors of the tomb.

It had been maintained that the sacrifice made by the Founder of Christianity was an unique act undergone for all mankind, and rendering other men capable of performing deeds of sacrifice. A few months of the war changed the trend of this hardly-used doctrine, and compelled even the most conventional of the clergy to admit that such sacrifice is a familiar and an universal necessity of spiritual life. It was seen that even rude-natured men with no Christian profession undergo the last sacrifice cheerfully and without any sense of doing what is wonderful or exceptionally meritorious.

Four hundred years ago a section of religious men in Europe introduced the novel idea that a man should be allowed to save his own soul even at the expense if necessary of the unity of Christendom. This was to inaugurate a new era of "religious freedom"—the "right of private judgment" in matters religious. After these four centuries of experiment with this anarchical principle, the protestant nations of Europe have not a single rallying-point, much less a common temple towards which to draw the religious life of Christendom. Nor is there to be found at this hour of greatest spiritual trial a central court of appeal to judge or mediate between them. And inevitably so; for disruption is of the essence of protestantism, and disruption has marked its course all along from the tragic days of the Teutonic Hebrew priest of Wittenberg to the comic epoch of Kikuyu. It has merely consecrated national

and individual prejudices and peculiarities, and sacrificed the unity of a great religion to the precious vagaries of private opinion. It has not even the concentration of Mohammedanism with which to support its "missionary enterprise." There is a grim dramatic fitness that at this late hour the nation which inaugurated the strange doctrine of the rights of the natural man to his own supernatural privileges should have proposed to establish by the sword of steel that unity of Western civilisation which it prevented from being secured by the sword of the spirit.

Paganism has never been really eradicated from Europe: the old gods refuse to give place to the new; and the heart of man remains still moved profoundly by the ancestral religious beliefs that haunted his tribe long before the Apostle to the Gentiles appeared on the scene. Not the least important or the least interesting of the results which may be expected when the dust of the present conflict is laid is the new form or formulation to be assumed by the spiritual religion of the future. Not for a thousand years has the human spirit had such an opportunity to loosen its bonds and rise to the measure of its stature. That Europe will remain much longer in tutelage to Hebrew religious teachers is unlikely. They have doubtless taught much that cannot well pass away; but also much that should never have been entertained. The ivy of Hebrew tradition has too long strangled the tree of life planted in the garden of Gethsemane. It may be that the chief purpose which has so mysteriously bound together the destinies of England and India may prove to be, not to increase the material wealth of Britain nor to introduce alien Western institutions amongst the Indian peoples, but to bring the Jordan to the Ganges, to blend the religion of Palestine with the profound religious thought of India, and thus restore and even recreate the religious life of the Western world. The West was awakened by the light from the East in centuries far away; it may well be reawakened by a newer light from the same source of illumination. Nations are some-

times born in war; more often they are born again. Europe broke away from its ideal some four hundred years ago, and since then it drifted, it knew not whither, till it cared not where. The cathedral of its middle age was exchanged for the factory of these latest days. And now the "triumph of man over nature," the commercialising of human life and thought, has done its utmost—and it has failed. The industrial renaissance of humanity in the nineteenth century has ended in the smoke of howitzer shells. Man in becoming master over nature has neglected the greater task of becoming master of himself and his highest concerns. In the rediscovery of the supreme importance of these, lies the next stage of his development. The war has put a period to his attempt to raise himself by the forces of nature: it reveals the need to raise himself by the forces of spiritual life.

VENI CREATOR SPIRITUS!

THE AUTHOR OF "PRO CHRISTO ET ECCLESIA."

THERE lies before our religious organisations an important decision. A rumour that a great spiritual awakening is at hand has gone forth. Faith—speaking in the hearts of those who pray day and night for the comforting of the world—Faith has whispered it. Hope in the hearts of watchmen who, looking out on the desolation of Christendom, see no hope but in the righteousness of God—Hope has whispered it. Love, clasping in her arms the wounded and the bereaved, the famine-stricken and the oppressed—Love, looking forward to the lean years that are to come and listening to the cry of the babes that are yet unborn—Love, looking adoringly upward to the face of the all-Father—Love has whispered it. What then ought the representatives of our religion to do? What is a spiritual revival, and how ought they to prepare for it?

We remember Ezekiel's vision of the valley in which a multitude had been slain, and time and the weather had bleached the bones of the dead men who had fallen in heaps. "The valley was full of bones, very dry." And the Lord said unto Ezekiel: "Prophesy unto the Spirit . . . come from the four winds, O Spirit, and breathe upon these slain, that they may live. So I prophesied as he commanded me, and the Spirit came into them and they lived, an exceeding great army."

In the England of to-day we can hear, if we turn in the right direction, a small Babel of the voices of those that, in some

official capacity, represent the churches. Some, in reverent tones, are saying wise things; and many are talking more easily about "running the revival"; and some say, "What the revival will do depends upon who is in charge of the movement"; and some say, "It ought to be kept on purely spiritual lines to avoid social or political complications." Let us for a moment picture our busy parish clergy or nonconformist ministry in Ezekiel's place—trying to "take charge" of the Spirit that came upon the four winds, trying to "run the revival" of the bleached bones, trying to curb the great army of reanimated men, lest they should disturb the *status quo* of the nation!

Again and again the Hebrew prophets depict the coming of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of the human multitude, and the results are seen in a change of material as well as of moral conditions. Ezekiel does not omit to explain with some exactness what the Spirit of the Lord does for people whom it animates. "Ye shall be clean: from all your filthiness and from all your idols I will cleanse you. A new heart I will give you . . . and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall dwell in the land that I gave to your fathers." From Isaiah we have a typical passage: "The palaces shall be forsaken; the multitude of the city shall be left; the forts and towers shall be dens for ever, a joy of wild asses, a pasture of flocks, until the Spirit be poured upon us . . . then judgment shall dwell in the wilderness and righteousness in fertile fields . . . and my people shall dwell in peaceable habitations and sure dwellings."

It would certainly seem to the onlooker to-day that if indeed there is a God in the world, transcendent and immanent, and if, on the morrow of this bitter war, He should send forth some special reinforcement of His power into the hearts of exhausted nations, this would be manifested in a movement whose strength no one class of men could control or direct, and whose blessed and far-reaching results no man could foresee. But if we have faith to expect this revival,

we are certainly bound to think to the best of our ability whether there are not some things that can be foreseen and prepared for.

If we look to the past of Christendom and see what it is that we have called religious revivals, we shall observe that some of these have been great psychical excitements, from which no lasting beneficial result has accrued, and which cannot therefore be considered awakenings of the Divine Spirit. It does not follow that a true awakening will not be accompanied by psychical excitement and, at first, by crude and disconcerting manifestations. What then will be its distinguishing characteristic? The author of the poem of creation says: "Earth was without form and void; darkness upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." The result of this movement was an orderly creative process. Both science and religion tell us that the most salient characteristic of the creation, which in our creeds we declare to be the manifestation of God's power, is order. The mark, then, of a revival of true religion would be an impulse in the multitudes toward order. But the affairs of our English humanity are not in order. Folly, ignorance, vice, crime are with us, and the consequent foul material conditions which they create, which again react to bemire men's souls. These are the elements from which our social disorder springs. An impulse towards order will lead men to seek a life which leaves no room for these. In revivals of the past where the results give evidence of a real awakening, the push toward order in the hearts of those awakened never leaped at first to what are often called "purely spiritual" desires. The awakened man begins, as the mind of the child must always begin, with the thing that most opposes him in the concrete present which is both material and spiritual—the first-felt need for the better ordering of his life. In periods when men lived in terror that God would visit their sins upon them by misfortunes here and hell-fire hereafter, the most pressing need was a sense of security in which to reorganise their daily

life. The push of the Spirit towards order demanded that the confusion of terrified thoughts should cease. This desire for security was a desire for better material conditions, because the Hell they pictured was material. There are many stages in the religious life; self-knowledge and spiritual trouble concerning sin must be part of that life; but men must enter the Kingdom as little children, and seek first from God what seems to them the prime necessity of a better life, whether material or otherwise. In England to-day a revival will not drive the mass of men into terror of God or of His punishments; they do not believe that terrors and misfortunes are good for men, and would rather believe that God does not exist than that He is the source of these. What then would be their first impulse on feeling the push of the Spirit of order in the present confusion of social life? Would not men and women begin to desire to be better parents, better husbands and wives, better workers, to get into better relations with employers or employees, without servility or the yielding of any just claim to rights that would affect their fellows and their children? They would desire also to be better citizens, and to build up a better state. These desires would be at first vague, wordless, a yearning perhaps with a great sense of helplessness, and would be accompanied by a desire, also inarticulate, for help—a help greater than man could give—and a readiness to worship the source of help, if only help could be found. In this stage it is clear that the organised religion could help greatly, but it may only hinder.

Thus we have come upon the truth contained in such phrases as "running a revival," and "being in charge of the movement." In religion, as in other branches of knowledge, civilised man differs from the savage in being able to draw upon the experience of the ages; and the child of the slum or of the smart set, of the labourer's hovel or the money-lender's parlour, the denizen of many a huge factory district or shoddy suburb, feeling this stir in his deepest nature, may in England to-day know very little more of the religious

experience of the past than does the primitive savage. But he is not in the environment of the savage. Organised religion in England has much, very much, to offer to the ignorant touched by a desire for something better than they have known and yearning for help greater than man can give. The Church could, if it would, teach them how to attain it. This would be the Church's great opportunity: is it prepared?

The masses, touched by God's Spirit, would also have something to teach the Church. In our religious accumulations from the past we have what is evil as well as good. Wrong standards of value, wrong points of view, have caused us for generations to call some right things wrong, and some wrong things right; and the "tradition of the elders," against which our Lord protested, is still rife amongst us. The main difference between the sinner or ignorant person and the religious person, when they both feel the touch of the Divine Spirit, is that the first knows that he must count all his previous gains as loss if he would win the new life to which he is inwardly urged, and the other does not realise that, if he did so, all that was worth having would be given back to him, or would, in fact, remain his, because, as St Paul says, all real things are his, as "he is Christ's, and Christ is God's." In hugging what he has, the religious teacher hugs stubble as well as gold; and because the stubble is bulky and fills his arms, he loses the gold that would take its place. His very ideals fall short of positive good. He believes in God, but would measure His love and limit love's power by his own limitations; consequently, what organised religion would now offer to the masses, if they were ready to turn to God, would contain evil as well as good, and would lack—alas! how can any of us even imagine how much it would lack? For the Church has not experienced what St Paul calls "the fullness of him that filleth all in all."

It is evidently, then, a very serious question whether a Spirit-filled multitude would not press on before the organised Church, attaining more quickly a deeper spiritual insight. We

have high authority for the belief that sinners—*i.e.* those who have not conformed to the accepted moral and religious standards—may go into the Kingdom of God before the righteous—*i.e.* those who conform to them. The sinner is not weighted down with the accepted but imperfect standard; he can run unimpeded to the higher standard inspired by God. But it is clear that if the righteous also ran as lightly, he would go with a wealth of experience and a strength of character that would enrich not only himself but all those who embraced the higher life. Will the righteous cast aside every weight and run as quickly? This leads to another question: Have we any glimpse of what this higher life might be?

If we turn to find St Paul's mind upon this matter, when he is trying to explain to the newly converted community at Corinth what they may expect as the work of the Spirit which has come to dwell in them, and attempts painstakingly to enumerate the gifts of the Spirit which he expects to be divided amongst them—wisdom, knowledge, faith, spiritual insight, as well as the power to do wonderful works—we find that he himself is rapt away by inspiration, and gives sudden utterance to the matchless song extolling the supreme gift of the Spirit—the brotherly love that fulfils because it transcends the moral law. If the masses to-day were touched with the splendid inspiration of a true charity or brotherly love, what should we do with them? Where in the Prayer Book of the National Church can be found any simple, strong, straightforward voicing of the desire of the poor to make better homes for their families, and to live more affectionately and nobly in those homes, to get into more brotherly industrial relations with their employers, to be more responsible citizens, and to produce a more equal political and social order? If to-day our churches and cathedrals were full of men and women with their hearts big with desire to pray for these things, a readiness to fall down and worship the Giver of all good, what words out of this, the only authorised book, could they use which they would recognise as making all their wants

known unto God? Or picture the same crowd in some rich nonconformist place of worship where the privileged and ultra-respectable classes pay high rents for pews in which to worship a god whose best blessings are hoarded wealth and the respectability of which all men speak well. Who in such a place could honestly interpret the deep sighing of the poor and point them to the true God? Few of us, whether in church or chapel, are prepared to-day for the invasion of our churches by the "poor" in any temper of mind. If they were animated by the inward urge of fresh energy and responsibility for the common good, would not such an invasion be even more appalling to us? Our churches stand very empty, but that is not our greatest misfortune. It is that so many who are in them are keen to cry to the poor that they must not seek to better their conditions, that "the Kingdom of God is not eating and drinking, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost," while they eat and drink to their fill of the best every day, not only material food, but of the feast of beauty and of knowledge, and of all worldly delight, and will not face the fact that more than half the brethren of their own nation—the brethren for whom Christ died—are destroyed by their meat (Rom. xiv. 15, 17).

Nor is it only those whom we call the poor who would appal us. A spiritual awakening of the nation would produce real innovations of thought and feeling which at first would be manifested crudely in literature and art, in a new sense of vocation in all and sundry of the laity, an indifference to time-serving and money-making—all which would be sorely disconcerting to those who mistake tidiness for order. The majority of religious instructors to-day are quite satisfied with a world of thought full of false ideas, if only they are kept neatly in pigeon-holes—satisfied that most men should be compelled to do work for which God has given them no aptitude, if only they work in neat ranks and classes—satisfied that the human débris should be swept up and cast out. How will these meet the innovations of the Spirit? Will

they not be apt to fight against them tooth and nail? What is to be done to prepare us lest haply we be found to fight against God?

It is happily from the heart of the Church itself that the urgent call to a true preparation comes. Of some of the greatest of our leaders, young at heart, of many of the more scholarly of our clergy, young in years, it may truly be said that they are up and "crying in the wilderness, Make straight the way of the Lord." I give one or two suggestions typical of the thought of this school: they are quotations from the letters of a young Anglican, now a chaplain with the forces abroad.

"We desire the descent of the Holy Spirit, but what were the preconditions of Pentecost? Perhaps a hundred and twenty people continued steadfastly in prayer for ten days, men and women who knew intimately the teaching of Jesus, and had no doubt of God's will to give, beyond any previously known measure, forgiveness, power to persuade, health to the sick and feeble. We need a Conference designed to pull out every stop on the organ of prayer, to rediscover the living doctrine of God the Holy Ghost, that we may reinstate Him as the motive power in the Church. Would not spiritual revival cost acts of prayer by groups of men and women, long, corporate, undiverted by works or preaching, great watersheds of spiritual insight?"

Again: "The chaotic sequence of subjects from many pulpits, sermons filled with moral exhortations and not with revelation of the knowledge of God, leave the laity vague, open to every attack of doubt. I was at school from seven to nineteen, and never remember hearing vocation of the secular life preached, and only one crumb of intelligent apologetics!"

Again he says: "I cannot get away from the impression that if, instead of picking individual young Christians out of their natural surroundings, and preparing them in a rather bookish little confirmation course, and staging them like chrysanthemums at their first ceremonious Communion—if,

instead of this, we led gradually through natural ordinary happy club fellowship (none the less natural because shot through with the spiritual) to the naturalness of the next stage —our fellowship being joined by His—we might awake the heart-idea of communion with a power which would never be lost. Thus, would not Holy Communion cease to be an abstruse rite in unwonted English, attained to by people in their fifteenth year, its meaning unapprehended, and become the next term in natural human fellowship—simply the meeting with and feeding upon Him whose perfection is not a reason for distance but an attraction? This would also apply to a group of men, whether troops or fellow-workmen, as soon as they turned the direction of their fellowship to include God because they preferred it to."

There are, roughly speaking, three courses which the representatives of our religious organisations may take. They may disregard the rumour that a great religious awakening is at hand and neglect to make the effort which belief would involve. What then? The awakening of the people to higher desires would come all the same, but the quickened multitude, revolted by the neglect of the churches, would form an opposing body. The social revolution would take place all the same, and, availing itself of this opposition, would be the more sinister.

Again, the churches may receive the rumour with hope, and go about with great diligence and self-sacrifice to work up such psychological conditions among the people as will prepare them to be moved and excited, for a time at least, by some great combined missionary effort, which shall seek, not only to evoke the power of the Spirit in the hearts of the multitude, but also to direct and control it. What then? The undoubted goodwill of such an effort must give salutary help, in the first stage of an awakening, to the stirred but still inarticulate multitude. But the movement of the people, if really of God, would soon cut for itself channels of new social and religious experience; and it is not probable

that a mission begun in a desire to control the new life would end by opposing it. God is no doubt willing to provide new bottles for new wine, but He will provide them only by means of the consecrated service of those who, by their knowledge and experience, are best fitted for the task. If such service is not consecrated to this particular end, what will be the result? Have we not then authority for the belief that even the wine of God, the power of the Spirit, may be spilled and wasted?

Again, the Churches may receive this great hope with faith and prayer, and organise their preparations with one end in view, that of helping both clergy and religious laity to hold up their empty cups for Heaven to fill, that they may have the Divine Brotherliness to offer when the awakening comes and be sensitive to the further leading of the Spirit. If this last course be adopted, then we cannot have too careful organisation of the forces of the Church, for they may achieve the best and the most that it is possible for human effort to achieve.

THE LOVE OF GOD OUR HOPE OF IMMORTALITY.[1]

THE REV. W. TEMPLE, M.A.

THE hope of immortality falls within the province alike of religion and of philosophy. It will make my subsequent procedure more intelligible if at the outset I distinguish with some little care between the two. Philosophy is the attempt to reach an understanding of experience. It may be called the science of the sciences. It takes the results of all departmental studies and tries to exhibit them as forming one single system, just as these separate sciences themselves try to exhibit the facts which they study as united in coherent systems. Philosophy has no presuppositions or assumptions, except the validity of reason (or, to put it otherwise, the rationality of the universe). Philosophy assumes the competence of reason—not necessarily your reason or mine, but reason when free from all distraction of impulse—to grasp the world as a whole. It begins with experience, and may include within that all which we can mean by "religious experience"; it may even give to this the chief place among the various forms of experience; but it begins with human experience and tries to make sense of that. If it reaches a belief in God at all, its God is the conclusion of an inferential process; His Nature is conceived in whatever way the form of philosophy in question finds necessary in order to make

[1] This article originated in the invitation to the author to deliver the Drew Memorial Lecture for 1915.

Him the solution of its perplexities. He may be a Person, or an Impersonal Absolute, or Union of all Opposites—whichever will meet the facts from which the philosophy set out.

But religion is not a discovery of man at all. It is indeed an attitude of man's heart and mind and will; but it is an attitude towards a God, or something put in the place of a God, who (or which) is supposed to exist independently of our attitude. In particular, Christianity is either sheer illusion, or else it is the self-revelation of God. The religious man believes in God quite independently of philosophic reasons for doing so; he believes in God because he has a conviction that God has taken hold of him. Consequently, in theology, which is the science of religion, God is not the conclusion but the starting-point. It does not argue to a First Cause or a Master-Designer or any other such conclusion; it breaks in upon our habitual experience—"Thus saith the Lord." It does not say that as nature, in the form of human nature, possesses conscience, therefore the Infinite Ground of nature must be moral; it says that God has issued orders, and man's duty is therefore to obey. If the religion is one of fear, it may be something far inferior to naked ethics; but if it is of love, then it is far superior. Anyhow, it starts with God, whose Being and Nature are its primary certainties; it goes on to show, so far as it can, that God, as He has revealed Himself, is indeed the solution of our problems. In the language of the old-fashioned Euclid, philosophy attempts a problem—to construct a conception of God equal to the universe; theology attempts a theorem—to show that our God is equal to the universe.

Now, it is abundantly clear that a perfect theology and a perfect philosophy would coincide. There can only be one truth. And it is one of the great glories of Christianity that it has fully recognised this. It insists that the Life of Christ is an act of God; Christ did not emerge out of the circumstances of His time; He is not just the supreme achievement

of man in his search for God; He is God Himself, "who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven." And yet He is also, in perfect manifestation, the Eternal Wisdom of God, which was in the beginning with God, and apart from which there hath never a thing happened. He is that which philosophers would have found if they could have collected the whole universe of facts and reasoned with perfect cogency concerning them.

But while theology and philosophy are ideally identical in result, though not in process, it is equally plain that they are not at all identical in their present stage of development. Philosophy working inwards from the circumference, and theology working outwards from the centre, have not yet met, at least in such a way as to present a single system whose combination of comprehensiveness and coherence supplies a guarantee of its truth. The Christian who is also in any degree a philosopher will not claim that by reason he can irrefragably establish his faith; indeed, it is possible that his search may lead him to nothing but perplexity, from which he saves himself only by falling back upon his unreasoned convictions, which come to him from the authority of the saints or from his own specifically religious experience. In the same way his theology may fail to give a satisfying account of empirical facts—of this war, for example, and all its horrors; but he still believes that by loyalty to his central conviction he will find his way through the maze at last. We live by faith and not by sight.

Now, my contention is that Immortality is a truth of theology and not of philosophy, that is to say, that we find valid ground for belief in it only in a religious conviction which philosophy as yet cannot demonstrate, and do not find such ground in either metaphysics, the science of reality as such, or psychology, the science of the soul. Our hope is truly grounded only in a conviction about God which is borne in upon us by religious experience.

Having by now, as I hope, made clear the two possible

starting-points, let us proceed to inquire how far the philosophic method carries us with regard to the immortality of the soul. Manifestly there can be no general treatment of the subject; there is no general view which we can say that philosophy in all its forms supports. We must take certain sample philosophies. It will in this case, as in nearly all others, be convenient to begin with Plato, who usually grasps the problem with greater clearness than other men, and whose failures are as illuminating as other men's success.

It would appear from the *Apology* that Socrates was an agnostic on this subject; to die may be to pass to a better life or it may be to pass into nothingness; he is only sure it cannot be a passage to anything evil, for "it is not possible that evil should happen to a good man in life or in death, nor is his welfare neglected by the gods" (40*c*–41*c*). In the *Phædo*, however, the doctrine of immortality is asserted and defended. Let us attend to the various arguments which Plato advances on behalf of it. (1) The first is this: All things that have opposites are generated out of those opposites; greater from less, sleep from waking, death from life, and—we may infer by analogy—life from death; our souls therefore must have existed in Hades before our birth in order to be born into life (70*d*–72*a*). [In passing, we notice that Plato thus assumes life before birth and life after death to stand and fall together; what he is really concerned with is the capacity of the soul to exist independently of the body.] This rather unconvincing argument from analogy is reinforced by the insistence that, if there is no return from death to life, then, inasmuch as all that lives passes into death, a time must come when life is extinct and the whole universe is dead, which Plato regards as inconceivable (72*b*, *c*). [Here we must note that the permanence of life is assumed, but, still more important, the possibility of new creation is not even contemplated; in the *Republic* it is even more definitely excluded (611*a*).]

(2) The second argument is purely Platonic; it is con-

cerned with his doctrine that Knowledge is Recollection. We never saw perfect equality or perfect straightness; yet we have the thought of them. How did we acquire it? It must be because we saw them in a life before birth, and the approximately straight lines, the approximately equal magnitudes, which we see in this physical world, revive the recollection of the ideal which before birth we had apprehended. So the soul must have existed before birth to have received that apprehension (72*d*–77*a*). "But this does not prove that the soul continues to exist after death." Yes, it does if we combine it with what was said above about the generation of opposites from opposites (76*c*–77*d*).

(3) A brief dialectical argument is here introduced to controvert the notion that the soul may at death be dissolved into its parts. The soul is simple, and therefore indissoluble. But Plato's own grasp of the unity of the soul was at this stage less complete and less well grounded than in later times (77*e*–81*c*).

(4) That Plato attached only small importance to this argument is shown by the fact that Cebes, one of the interlocutors, admits that Socrates has proved the soul to be longer-lived than the body, but not that it is eternal; and unless it is eternal, it may perish at any occasion of death, even though it has previously survived both death and birth many times, and indeed may in any one life or period of incarnation perish before its body—just as a man outlives many coats, but his last coat outlives him (86*e*–88*b*).

This draws from Socrates what is at this stage Plato's last argument on the subject. We noticed before that opposites arise from one another: the great becomes small, the hot becomes cold, and so forth. But the opposite ideas do not pass into one another; for instance, greatness does not become smallness, nor does heat become chill. Further, entities whose nature it is to possess one idea, never admit the opposite; snow cannot become hot, nor fire become cold. Now, it is the function of the soul to make alive; for life and

death are distinguished by the presence or absence of soul; in other words, the soul as such possesses life, and therefore cannot admit death. The soul, therefore, is deathless and imperishable (102*d*–106*d*).

That is, in the *Phædo*, Plato's final argument. It is plain that it has no cogency. It does indeed prove that there cannot be a dead soul; the soul cannot be, and be dead, any more than the fire can be, and be cold. But the fire may go out; and Plato has not proved that the soul cannot go out, and altogether cease to exist. He establishes that the soul is, in one sense, deathless (*ἀθάνατον*, 105*e*), but this sense is such as to make illegitimate his further conclusion that, if deathless, it must be imperishable (*ἀνώλεθρον*, 106*c*).

I have spent time on the arguments of this dialogue because they show the kind of difficulty under which the whole subject labours when handled from the philosophic point of view, but also because Plato points unerringly to the vital matter when he says that what we need is not a proof of mere survival but of the eternity of the soul. Survival for a limited period only postpones the evil, and utterly fails to safeguard the interests, whether ethical or sentimental, which cause men to care for immortality.

It is also interesting that in this very dialogue almost any reader feels that Plato trusts more to the actual behaviour of Socrates at the moment of death than to his arguments just before, to produce conviction. Crito asks how Socrates wishes to be buried. "How you like," says Socrates, "if you can catch me. But I am going away." He will not wait till the last possible moment to drink the hemlock. As the chill creeps up his body, he uncovers his face and says to Crito: "I owe Asclepius a cock; pay the debt; don't forget." The cock was the offering of poor men to Asclepius, the god of healing, which they presented on recovery from an illness. Socrates died poor, for he had taken no fees such as the Sophists required; so it is only the poor man's offering that

he can make. But his death is a recovery and involves some offering to the god of healing; he is recovering from the fitful fever of life.

In the *Republic* he has another argument. Nothing perishes but by its own evil or disease; if a man dies of poison, the poison does indeed kill the body, but only by first throwing it out of gear, and introducing into it disease of its own. But the disease or evil of the soul is injustice; and injustice manifestly does not kill the soul, for it may coexist with great vitality (608*d*–611*c*).

Plato never repeated the arguments for immortality which he elaborated in the *Phædo* and the *Republic*. But in the *Phædrus*, a dialogue of about the same date as the *Republic*, he has an argument of wholly different kind. Here he argues that because the soul is the source of its own movement, or in other words is essential activity and does not only become active through communicated impulse from without, it has in itself the principle of eternal life. But it is doubtful whether the argument is intended to prove the eternity of every individual soul as such, or only that of the spiritual principle in the universe. It is true that it is only fully valid as applied to the latter. And this seems to have been recognised by Plato himself, for in the *Timæus* he has come round to the point of view which in this lecture I desire to urge, namely, that the soul is not immortal in its own right, but has immortality conferred upon it by God; in fact, Plato at the last seems himself to regard immortality as a doctrine not of philosophy but of theology.

It will be remembered that in this dialogue he comes very near to the Christian doctrine of creation. He is attempting to explain the origin of the world; God, he says, is good, and therefore free from all jealousy; consequently He desired that there should be as many beings as possible to share His perfection (29*e*). Upon the spiritual beings whom He thus creates He confers the eternity which belongs of right to Him alone (41*a*, *b*). You will see how close this is to the Christian

doctrine that God is Love, and created a universe on which to lavish His love.

It is perhaps worth while to note in passing that Aristotle, whose main argument for the existence of God is really identical with that of Plato in the *Phædrus* for the eternity of soul, believed in the eternity of spirit, but not in the immortality of human individuals.

Along that line there is scarcely any possibility of advance. I skip over the centuries and come to Kant, who regards immortality as unproved by pure reason, but established by practical reason. The argument is substantially this: In man there is a categorical imperative, which is plainly of the nature of Reason; but this is in itself unreasonable, unless there be a future life in which the Supreme Good, manifestly unattainable here, may be realised, and unless there be a God who will ensure that realisation. But I had better quote the actual words.

"The realisation of the *summum bonum* in the world is the necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law. But in this will the *perfect accordance* of the mind with the moral law is the supreme condition of the *summum bonum.* This then must be possible, as well as its object, since it is contained in the command to promote the latter. Now, the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law is *holiness*, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence. Since, nevertheless, it is required as practically necessary, it can only be found in a *progress in infinitum* towards that perfect accordance, and on the principles of pure practical reason it is necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our will.

"Now, this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an *endless* duration of the *existence* and personality of the same rational being (which is called the immortality of the soul). The *summum bonum*, then, practically is only possible on the supposition of the immortality of the soul; consequently this immortality, being inseparably connected

with the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason (by which I mean a *theoretical* proposition, not demonstrable as such, but which is an inseparable result of an unconditioned *a priori* practical law)."[1]

And again:

"In the foregoing analysis the moral law led to a practical problem which is prescribed by pure reason alone, without the aid of any sensible motives, namely, that of the necessary completeness of the first and principal element of the *summum bonum*, viz. Morality; and as this can be perfectly solved only in eternity, to the postulate of *immortality*. The same law must also lead us to affirm the possibility of the second element of the *summum bonum*, viz. Happiness proportioned to that morality, and this on grounds as disinterested as before, and solely from impartial reason; that is, it must lead to the supposition of the existence of a cause adequate to this effect; in other words, it must postulate the *existence of God*, as the necessary condition of the possibility of the *summum bonum* (an object of the will which is necessarily connected with the moral legislation of pure reason). . . . The postulate of the possibility of the *highest derived good* (the best world) is likewise the postulate of the reality of a *highest original good*, that is to say, of the existence of God. Now it was seen to be a duty for us to promote the *summum bonum*; consequently it is not merely allowable, but it is a necessity connected with duty as a requisite, that we should presuppose the possibility of this *summum bonum*; and as this is possible only on condition of the existence of God, it inseparably connects the supposition of this with duty; that is, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God."[2]

This argument is, to my mind at least, hopelessly unconvincing. No doubt my conscience implies a perfect righteousness in things which only the existence of God and the truth of immortality make possible. But may not conscience be a

[1] *Crit. of Pract. Reason*, bk. ii., ch. ii., § iv., trans. Abbott.
[2] *Ibid.*, § v.

splendid freak after all? And may not the Supreme Power be one which, like Mr Bradley's *Absolute*, at one stage of its development, is capable of taking pleasure in the futilities of human endeavour and gave us consciences in order to have the fun of watching men strive after an unattainable virtue? I am not saying that I think reason is on this side; on the contrary, I think the weight of reason is on the other side; but it never approaches demonstration, even that moral demonstration which Kant believes himself to have exhibited. I cannot see that the obligation of duty is affected one way or the other by our answer to the question, Can it be perfectly fulfilled? If, as Huxley feared, the universe is against us and we are to be crushed like flies on the wheel, the nobility of duty remains just where it was; if die we must, let us die like heroes. No doubt our actual devotion to duty would be much weakened by such a conviction; but the ethical obligation, from which Kant argues, is unaffected by it,

In particular, I am convinced that Kant's whole line of thought leads nowhere at all unless it is to a God of love; but if God is Love, He must have declared His love, for it is the nature of love to declare itself. Were it not for the life of Christ, I should be constrained to say, like Cleon in the poem—

> Zeus has not yet revealed it, and, alas!
> He must have done so were it possible.

But if God has made a declaration of His own Nature, and therein has declared it to be Love, then let us start from there.

The mention of Huxley above reminds us that there is another argument to be drawn from human morals than that which Kant draws,—the argument to which Huxley pointed unconsciously, though he never offered it himself. It is that human nature is, after all, part of Nature, and that, if a sense of moral values can arise in human nature at all, the ultimate ground of nature as a whole must be such as to account for this, and therefore also such as to

give warrant to the moral judgment. This argument appears to me very strong, far stronger than the Kantian inference that our sense of obligation implies the possibility of complete moral attainment. It still does not reach demonstration, because the hypothesis of a demonic creator taking pleasure in our ineffectual strivings cannot on this ground be absolutely ruled out; nor, perhaps, "absolutely" upon any ground at all. But the weight of reason seems to be quite plainly upon the side of the inferences just indicated. The trouble, however, is that nothing except love is really adequate to meet the demands of this argument; and, again, love if real must make itself known. It is only when this line of philosophic inquiry finds itself met and supported by the fact of the Incarnation that it becomes intellectually satisfactory.

I would also mention in passing the argument developed by Royce, who has elaborated a particular form of absolutism which differs from most others in that it makes "will" rather than "intellect" the unifying principle. The argument here is that each individual soul is the expression or embodiment of a divine moral purpose; but it is the nature of such purposes that they are endless; there is no possible achievement in which they reach a final satisfaction. Consequently, each soul must be immortal in order to fulfil that destiny for which it exists. My trouble here is with the dogma that every moral purpose is endless. It seems to me that there are lives which, so far as we can tell, have reached completeness, sometimes in a short space of time, like "the lily of a day" in Ben Jonson's poem, sometimes in great length of years. Paradoxically, it is just these whose annihilation would be felt as the greatest loss to the universe; yet I do not feel that we can claim that as expressions of moral purpose they are incomplete. Royce's argument would seem to me to suggest that the more perfect any character is, the less ground there is to expect its survival of death—a kind of inverted doctrine of conditional immortality.

One other line of inquiry deserves mention, that which generally goes under the name of "Psychical Research." This method is a very difficult one, because there are so few people who are able to pursue it with scientific detachment. Most people approach the evidence with a strong inclination either to believe or to disbelieve, and very commonly their bias increases as they attend to the subject. Also it is clear that no number of communications from the world beyond could possibly prove the universality of survival. We naturally infer that if any individuals survive then all must do so. But it is to be remembered that the argument from analogy, in cases where all circumstances except the basis of the analogy are unknown, can never constitute real probability. Further, it would seem impossible to establish beyond doubt the reality of the communications. It is always conceivable that they are due to subconscious suggestion, very often assisted by telepathy between those conducting the inquiry. Still, I confess that my personal judgment would be to the effect that this line of research has distinctly added to the evidence for belief in immortality, so far as that evidence can ever be found by scientific inquiry.

The net result then is, that all demands to establish the doctrine of Immortality by what at the outset I described as the "philosophic" method are bound to fail; they may point to the doctrine, but never with sufficient clearness to ensure conviction.

When we turn to the theological method everything is different. This method, for Christians at least, begins with the Love of God revealed in Christ. The argument is then so simple that many people think it impertinent to advance it in support of a conclusion about which so elaborate a controversy has been raised, for it is simply this:—God is Love; all love is individual—(a love to humanity which is not a love of men separately and individually is, as we all know, a hypocrisy); but Almighty Love will not allow itself to be robbed of what it loves; God will not let His children perish.

That is the whole thing. It is after all the one argument that our Lord Himself employs. God is a God of individuals, of Abraham, of Isaac, of Jacob—so the Jews had always known Him; and He is not a God of the dead but of the living.

As soon then as we have trust in the Love of God, we have secured the belief in Immortality. Problems remain for the intellect concerning the endlessness of time and all that goes with that, but no such perplexity can ever create a doubt in the mind which believes, not because it sees how each part of its belief fits into the systematic whole, but because it trusts in the Love of the Omnipotent. We can quite rightly try to unravel the problems, but it is more a matter of speculative interest than of vital concern. The basis of our faith is quite independent of the solution of these problems. And if this is true we see at once why so little is made known concerning the life beyond. If we could know how our friends in the other world are occupied, what is the quality of their joy or the form of their service, this would tend to take our attention from the Creator to the creature; but our confidence in the continued life of our friends is itself based upon our trust in the Love of God, and therefore just at the times when we are most anxious about them we are most completely thrown back upon Him.

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A DEFENCE OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM.

HUGH ELLIOT.

I.

BEFORE setting up any exposition of scientific materialism, it is necessary to clear the ground of the prejudices and misconceptions which have grown so luxuriously around that doctrine. The purpose of the present paper is therefore limited to the removal of misunderstandings which block the way: the defence of scientific materialism against the missiles flung at it in a time of thoughtlessness and emotionalism. A subsequent paper will attempt a brief exposition of the doctrine itself. The missiles come in the main from three directions:—(1) from popular slander and ignorance; (2) from instructed philosophic opinion, as represented by M. Bergson in the HIBBERT JOURNAL for April 1915, and by Dr H. Wildon Carr in the *Quest* for April 1916 (of which he has most kindly sent me an advance proof); (3) from Dr Charles Mercier in the HIBBERT JOURNAL of last January.

The first accusation to be met is that materialism is responsible for the war. The charge is manifestly absurd. In the first place, the Germans are the most confirmed idealists on the face of the earth: England is the classic land of materialism. There never has existed in Germany a materialistic thinker of the first rank, comparable, for instance, with Hobbes. And in science, the great advances

towards materialism in the biological sciences have come almost wholly from England. *Per contra*, the peculiarly German philosophies are such as Hegel's, the extreme negation of materialism. Shall I be reminded of Nietzsche? The sentiments of Nietzsche were neither German nor materialistic. As regards the latter point, his philosophy is in parts very highly repugnant to any form of materialistic thought. As regards the former, he considered that, of all loathsome objects on the earth, Germans were the most loathsome; and he thought further that the highest civilisation in Europe was that of France. Nietzsche has been almost universally misunderstood by journalists, who very rarely indeed have thought of looking into his works. But I am not concerned to defend him here, because, as I have already observed, he is not a materialist.

Then it is said that the materialistic doctrine of natural selection or survival of the fittest is responsible for the present war. Again it must be pointed out that this doctrine is peculiarly English; moreover, it cannot by any twisting be made to bear the interpretation placed upon it. Natural selection is at the most a physical and not a moral law. It describes what occurs in nature; it does not set up any moral injunction for us to obey. Admitting (as I cannot help doing) that war is and has been a very important factor in natural selection, I may point out that disease has been a still more important factor; and if we advocate war on biological grounds, we must still more strongly advocate the extension of disease. If natural selection is a moral law, then we have no business to live in houses or wear clothes or shelter ourselves in any way from the rigours of nature. The whole of civilisation is an attempt to suspend the crude operation of natural selection. It is not our duty to preserve the raw conditions of our environment; our whole purpose is to alter those conditions into harmony with our own constitutions.

The truth—seemingly so obvious—that natural selection offers no justification whatever for war is further shown by the

fact that the leading evolutionists have commonly been very strongly inclined to peace. As an instance, I may mention that Darwin, Huxley, Wallace, and Spencer were all members of the committee for the prosecution of Governor Eyre. Their anti-military opinions went to such extreme lengths as to involve them, even in an anti-military age, in a widespread temporary unpopularity. And as for Spencer, the philosopher of evolution, his hatred of war was scarcely less than that of his Quaker forebears. The ten volumes of his *Philosophy* devote more space to an attack upon war and upon militarism, than they do even to the advocacy of evolution. In a comparison of philosophy with politics, I shall doubtless be accused of bathos; but nevertheless I must affirm that materialists in history have commonly been the republican-socialist element of philosophers, and, like their political analogues, warmly opposed to every form of militarism.

And now supposing I wished to reverse the charge against materialists, many facts are at hand which would enable me to do so. Need I recall the doctrines of the idealist Fichte? It is said that the savage state of public opinion in Germany before the war was due more to Treitschke than to any other single individual. Now, it is not sufficiently known that Treitschke took his philosophy from Hegel. He says himself that Hegel was "the first real political personality amongst German philosophers." And Mr W. Harbutt Dawson, a distinguished authority, also states that Treitschke "bases his theories of State organisation, purpose, and function upon the political philosophy of Hegel." That is to say, if the war is traceable to any form of philosophy, it must be to that philosopher who of all others is most abhorrent to the materialistic as to the scientific mind.

It is not my purpose, however, to make party capital out of the political follies of idealist philosophers. If many journalists and a few metaphysicians have not scrupled to associate materialism with the gross brutalities of Prussian militarism, I at all events shall not follow them by reflect-

ing the accusation with double force upon their own heads. For the truth is that militarism and war are *not* due to any form of philosophy. They are not a mere aberration of thought; they are the total negation of thought. The psychological characteristics of all mobs are an intensification of emotion, combined with a suppression of intellect. Their activities spring, not from rational motives, but from *idées fixes*. Europe is now dominated by an *idée fixe*; philosophy (even that of Hegel) has nothing at all to do with it. We have to do, not with any of the higher manifestations of thought, but with what the journalists call "elemental" passions of the human mind.

Probably it will already have been remarked that I have confused two meanings of materialism—the ethical and the scientific. It is indeed to some extent true that the name "materialism" has undergone a degradation comparable to that which has overtaken the name "Epicureanism." It is recognised that the so-called ethical "Epicurean" is altogether a misnomer and quite inapplicable to any of the teachings of Epicurus. So it may be urged that the epithet "materialistic" has now acquired connotations which completely separate it from the philosophy of materialism. If indeed the errors I have indicated arise merely from a misuse of *words*, having no significance as regards *things*, then perhaps it would be a waste of time to expose them. But this is not the case; not only journalists but philosophers have described the present war as brought on by materialism in the true philosophic sense. I have in mind particularly M. Bergson and my friend Dr Wildon Carr. *Corruptio optimi pessima.* These gentlemen cannot like the journalists set up the plea of ignorance. To one of my school it would almost seem that they have called in aid the popular enthusiasm for the purpose of discrediting a philosophy which they dislike, and which their metaphysical weapons have failed to destroy.

M. Bergson describes the present war as a conflict

between life and matter. To a mind free from theories, it would appear that there is life and matter on both sides. The Germans are quite as much alive as ourselves, and we fight them with the same material weapons that they use against us. But M. Bergson has always detected a hidden contrast between life and matter: he has always ranged himself on the side of "life" and against the side of "matter." He now finds Europe divided into two warring camps, and himself in the midst of one of these camps. And he forthwith proceeds to hoist the banner of "life" over that camp in which he is planted, while referring to the opposite camp under the opprobrious title of "matter." He appears to regard war as though it were a branch of metaphysics: he cannot escape from the obsession of "creative evolution." On the one side, he says, there is force spread out on the surface; on the other there is force in the depths. On one side, mechanism, the manufactured article which cannot repair its own injuries; on the other, life, the power of creation which makes and remakes itself at every instant. In plain language, the Germans had an army prepared for such a war as this; the British had no such army, but proceeded to create one. By this creative activity they become entitled to the appellation of "life"; and the material readiness of the enemy justifies their classi fication as matter. If the British had been equally prepared with a huge conscript army, they would presumably have also ranked as matter. Their title to the appellation of "life" rests upon their unpreparedness for a land war. Had they foreseen the contingency of this war, as the Germans foresaw it, they would not have been the representatives of "life." They are privileged to fly this banner purely by reason of their lack of foresight, or sudden change of mind as to their correct policy when war broke out. And now that they have embarked, contrary to their previous policy, in large military undertakings, it is purely to material superiority that their efforts are directed. They hope to

conquer the Germans by the aid of soldiers and of guns: they do not fight with "spirit" but with "matter"; they endeavour to bring more soldiers into the field than the Germans, and to accumulate a greater quantity of munitions. And on all sides they now agree that they will never be caught unprepared again. In any future war, they will take care to be on the side of "matter" from the start, leaving the glories of "life" to those who are stupid enough to trust in them.

The point is hardly worth labouring. If M. Bergson had had the misfortune to be born a German, it can scarcely be doubted that he would have seen in the intense patriotism and self-sacrificing spirit of that country a beautiful expression of "life"; and he would equally have seen in the British accumulation of men and munitions a desperate effort of matter to overcome "life." The analogy is forced out of all recognition. Cannot M. Bergson realise that there may be other antitheses in nature than those of life and matter? Or is it merely his grotesque way of differentiating right from wrong? He thinks he can count upon popular sentiment to let the analogy pass. Matter is gross and crude by comparison with life (so he must have argued to himself). The Germans are gross and crude as compared with the British. Hence the Germans are for "matter," and the British are for "life." Surely no one (he imagines) will object to the materialists (his enemies) being classified as Germans, for both are objects of repugnance. Well, *I* object with all the force and conviction in my power. I regard it as an attempt to raise prejudice in philosophy against a set of views struggling painfully for recognition. Not only is such a comparison unjust and untrue, but it is in the last degree unchivalrous towards a small school of thought, who for the most part regard Prussianism with an even greater loathing than himself.

It is a source of great regret to me that Dr Wildon Carr should have endorsed this particular perversion of the French philosopher. "There is no reason," he says, "why even the

mechanist should not accept this conflict between life and matter as a fact." Yes, there are two reasons. The first is that the whole conception of an antagonism between life and matter appears to the mechanist a false view of natural processes. The second is that, if the antithesis were genuine, the present application of it is erroneous. Later he gives away Bergson's philosophy altogether; for he tells us that according to this philosophy "war is inherent in the fundamental concept of vital activity; it springs from the first principle of existence; but the war is between life and matter, not between rival material forms." Are we to understand that all wars, then, represent a struggle between life and matter? Supposing there were to occur so calamitous a misfortune as a war between England and France, M. Bergson would doubtless be of the opinion that England represented matter and France life. Dr Wildon Carr would probably hold the opposite opinion. To both gentlemen I would suggest the undesirability of importing patriotism into philosophy. You will have the mob on your side for the moment, but mobs are shifty allies; and it would surely be wise to keep for philosophy the things that belong to philosophy, and not mix up your theories with the passions or morals of civic life. Dr Wildon Carr mournfully declares that war "seems to crush philosophy." It is an unhappy truth; but does not the fault partly lie with philosophers themselves?

Finally, I have to deal with the attack upon mechanism by Dr Mercier in the last number of this Journal. Dr Mercier is a gentleman with whom I have already come in collision, firstly in the pages of *Bedrock*, and secondly in those of *Science Progress*. On his first entry into *Bedrock*, Dr Mercier's thesis was that the mechanist-vitalist controversy was insoluble. He posed as an agnostic; though strangely enough his agnosticism took the form of a furious onslaught on a series of mechanistic articles which I had published in that Review. In so far as he endeavoured to show the ignorance of philosophy in the presence of this problem, the article failed; but

in so far as he endeavoured to establish his own personal ignorance with regard to it, it succeeded to an extent that he could hardly have anticipated. But Dr Mercier has now changed his mind, and advocates a completely vitalistic theory. Signs of the coming change were evident in a second article by Dr Mercier in *Bedrock*; and with the publication of that article *Bedrock* expired, and has never appeared again. Nothing daunted, Dr Mercier next turned up in *Science Progress*; but a purely scientific audience could hardly be expected to favour his views, and he now apparently hopes for better fortune in the HIBBERT. His effort is directed towards the criticism of my article entitled "A Survey of the Problem of Vitalism" in *Science Progress* of January 1915. It is quite unnecessary for me to answer it formally; anyone requiring an answer need only read my original essay which it professes to criticise.

Nevertheless I am glad to take Dr Mercier's article as an illustration of the perversions and misunderstanding to which all materialistic theories are subjected at the hands even of those who should know better; and I earnestly ask the reader's attention to its leading features. He says that I concentrate my attack "upon the thesis that mind can and does act upon matter—that, in short, our conduct is impelled by motive and guided by reason." Here is the initial misunderstanding. No one but a lunatic could deny that conduct is impelled by motive and guided by reason. The question at issue is, what are motive and reason? To what extent are they materialistic manifestations? Can they be rendered in purely physiological terms? In describing them physiologically, you do not abolish them. Dr Mercier then enforces his "argument" by an illustration; he says that I myself could not have written that article without the aid of mind and intelligence. Such an admission must have been painful for him to make; but it was necessary in the interests of his theory to make it, and he has sugared it down by the insertion of numerous uncomplimentary epithets, which indeed occupy a larger portion of the illustration than the illustration itself.

Omitting these epithets, he writes as follows:—"In marshalling his [my] arguments, which . . . the expression of . . . intelligence, . . ., Mr Elliot was directed by his own mental processes; he was reasoning, . . ., but still . . . he was reasoning; and if he had had no mind at all, he could no more have written the article than a tree could have written it." This argument forcibly brings before my mind the argument often used by common people for proving the existence of a God. "Do you not see the trees and flowers and animals adapted to their environment? How could such things exist if they were not created and preserved by a God?" So Dr Mercier calls my own writings to witness, and asks how such writings could be produced except by the agency (he does not say of a God) but of an active and intelligent mind. To all of which the reply is that the whole discussion is as to the nature of that mind. I only deny its existence as a separate spiritual entity; I affirm that it is identical with certain cerebral processes. Dr Mercier appears to consider that no cerebral processes, however glorified or complex, could produce such writings as my own. He calls in a supernatural entity as the only method of accounting for the production of such writings. Flattered though I am, I think his conclusion is false; for he has never at any time advanced any argument to show that cerebral processes cannot achieve the results which he attributes to a spiritual being.

I pass on now to the next "argument." In my previous article, perceiving that vitalism would be extinct if once vitalists could be got to recognise its implications, I attempted to make the matter clear by an analogy. Under the mechanistic theory every bodily movement results from a series of physico-chemical antecedents, which may be analysed down to the movements of atoms or molecules. If there is spiritual intervention, such intervention must take the form of deflecting a molecule from the path which it would pursue if it were controlled only by material forces. So much, I presume, no one will deny. I then introduced the analogy of a billiard-

table. Without going into details, I compared the action of vitalism to that of a ball which should begin moving of its own accord, without any physical or material cause whatever; or otherwise, to that of a ball already in motion which should *without the aid of any external impressed force* change its direction of motion at a right angle. Vitalism requires us to believe that the molecules behave in this way, contrary to their material nature. Now, I have no objection to the hypothesis that such an event *may* occur. All I want is to force vitalists to realise what their theory implies. I wrote, in fact, that "I do not for a moment suggest that the mechanists regard such an analogy as destructive to vitalism. It is indeed only cited that we may have a clear idea of the implications of the vitalistic theory: to see vitalism at work, in short." My belief was that the conception of a billiard-ball—or, if you prefer, a cannon-ball in full motion—being suddenly diverted at right angles *without material cause* was so impossible to frame, that it would at the least compel vitalists to recognise the overwhelming difficulties we see in their theory. Dr Mercier now accepts the illustration, and shows "how easily it can be turned against" me. He says I have forgotten the magnet under the billiard-table! the hidden magnet, like the mind, really causes the erratic motion of the ball. But is Dr Mercier unaware that magnetic attraction is a material force, dealt with in the science of physics? Have I not pointed out time after time that the whole essence of the analogy is in the exclusion of material forces? My argument to the vitalists was in effect this: "You cannot conceive the motion of a ball, without the assumption of a material force": to which Dr Mercier replies by invoking a material force to explain the movement. Has he not overwhelmingly, though unwittingly, justified my belief that, in order to conceive new motion in a ball, you have to postulate a material force? Dr Mercier postulates just such a force to assist him to an explanation. May I not, then, conclude that he feels incompetent to explain it without a material force? And that

is the whole case of mechanism. It is plain enough that Dr Mercier does not yet recognise the astounding implications of vitalism. Will this slip help him to do so? The termination of Dr Mercier's discussion of this analogy is somewhat pathetic: he "hopes to hear no more of this analogy." I am not surprised at this pious hope: I am sorry I have been unable to realise it.

From "argument" I turn now to misrepresentation. Several quotations from my article placed by Dr Mercier within inverted commas as emanating from me, were taken from my statements of my adversaries' views. Describing their arguments, I wrote as follows: "*If* the mechanistic theory is true, then (it is said) there can be no such thing as moral responsibility, and we are landed in a doctrine of fatalism." That is what *they* say, not what I say. And I immediately replied to their argument as follows: "To this it is replied, firstly, that moral responsibility is not in the slightest degree affected by the theory; secondly, that fatalism is not found by experience to flow from mechanistic beliefs, but, on the other hand, that it is found to flow from the intensely spiritualistic systems of various Eastern races; thirdly, that even if both accusations were correct instead of being incorrect, they would still remain altogether irrelevant to the point at issue."

Now notice how Dr Mercier treats me here. He cites as though it were my view: "*If* the mechanistic theory is true, then there is no such thing as moral responsibility, and we are landed in a doctrine of fatalism." He omits, without indicating any omission, my qualifying words "(it is said)," which showed that the passage was taken as representative of my opponents. And he continues: "Mr Elliot, I find can notice those of my arguments which he thinks he can answer, though he ignores those he cannot answer. His answer to this argument is that a true theory is not falsified by having results that we deplore." What decent language is adequate to repudiate so monstrous a perversion? Dr

Mercier omits completely all reference to my replies (1) and (2), in which I emphatically deny the statement about moral responsibility. He mentions only (3), in which I refer to the results which would follow if it were true. He represents as mine a hostile statement which I only introduced for the purpose of warmly denying. He omits my denial; and in that very sentence he has the incredible audacity to accuse me of ignoring some of his arguments. The bankruptcy of Dr Mercier's arguments is the only explanation of this resort to misrepresentation.

Nor does it stand alone. Here is another. Dr Mercier cites from my former article the following sentence: "If we want to know by what process a man performs a certain act, the proper scientific method is to look inside him and see." And Dr Mercier then proceeds to entertain his readers as follows: "Really! Does Mr Elliot suppose that if he split a man's head open he would see the mind at work? Does he suppose that he would be able to ascertain, by actual observation, whether the mind does or does not act upon the brain? Does he suppose," etc., etc. Will the reader believe that in my article the passage cited from me was followed by another in which I wrote as follows: "It is, however, unfortunately the case that we are not yet able to settle the question by immediate observation. Cerebral processes are so immeasurably complex that it may still be some time before physiology can entirely analyse them." It might indeed be thought that the sense of the original statement was sufficiently obvious to dispense with this last qualification. But it needs nothing short of a chisel to open Dr Mercier's mind to any unwelcome view.

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"EDUCATION HAS SAVED THE STATE": IS IT THE STATE THAT HAS SAVED EDUCATION?

SIR ROLAND K. WILSON, BART.

THE remark above quoted was made by Dr Sadler, Vice-Chancellor of Leeds University, in a striking article which appeared in the *Teachers' World* of 1st September 1915, and elicited a chorus of applause from the leading newspapers. It is perhaps still premature at the time of writing[1] to assume that our State has been saved, though we all of us hope, and most of us expect, that it is going to be. But, put in the general form, "If and so far as any State is saved, it is saved by education," it is not only true but a truism, provided education is understood in a sufficiently large sense, as the action of mind on mind, in school or out of school. A State can only be saved by the moral qualities of its members, and moral qualities can only be developed by the mutual interaction of minds. Even if we lay stress on heredity as the chief factor in character, that only pushes the matter a little further back, and puts us on inquiry as to the education of the ancestors.

But the general tenor of the article in which the sentence occurs shows that when Dr Sadler spoke of education having saved the State he was thinking of the direct influence of professional teachers on the younger members of the present generation, and his practical aim was to deprecate any stinting

[1] That is, November 1915.

of public expenditure on these professional teachers. He is too fair-minded to claim the whole credit for the State as educator. He speaks in general terms of "the young men trained in our elementary and secondary schools, many of them graduates of the old and new Universities"; and when he reminds us that "the education which makes the best sort of Englishman and Englishwoman can never be a cheap education," and pleads that "it is more necessary than ever to maintain and increase its many-sided efficiency," the education which he contemplates as the future sheet-anchor of our national fortunes is to be "wisely planned, and administered with sympathy and imagination, and generously aided from public *and private* funds." His is, however, one of a series of articles arranged for by the *Teachers' World* for the express purpose of combating "the grave danger that recommendations may be made to the Treasury which would deprive the newer Universities, Education Committees, and other bodies of the financial help necessary for the efficient discharge of their important duties." And he is one of four Vice-Chancellors who have put forth a joint manifesto to that effect, reproduced in the *Times* of 5th October 1915. This renders it important to scrutinise rather closely the claims put forward on behalf of the State to the lion's share of the credit for whatever is admirable in the bearing of our young men and women in the present crisis.

It will hardly be disputed that, broadly speaking, the greatest sacrifices have been made, and the heaviest responsibilities have been shouldered, by the sons of well-to-do parents, educated in our great public schools, with or without further training in one or other of our old Universities. An assertion by Sir Leo Chiozza Money in the *Times* of 4th September 1915, to the effect that the middle classes have not contributed their fair share as compared with the working classes, stands, so far as my reading goes, entirely alone, and I am at a loss to imagine what evidence there can be for it. Even if the numerical proportions are in favour of the latter, these will

not represent the "fair share" of each class, because, in addition to the personal risk common to both, there is, as a rule, an economic sacrifice on the part of the middle-class man to which there is nothing corresponding in the case of the weekly wage-earner. So far, then, as the former class is concerned, the credit due to the State is limited to its having from time to time corrected by legislation or administrative action some of the worst abuses connected with ancient endowments.

It is equally indisputable that for the noble part played by the women of the upper and middle classes, so far as is traceable to definite educational advantages, we have chiefly to thank institutions receiving no aid from the State; either purely private adventure schools, or self-supporting corporate institutions such as the Girls' Public Day-School Company and the women's colleges at Oxford and Cambridge. We must not indeed forget the new rate-supported county schools for both girls and boys; but they have been so short a time at work that they can only account for the achievements of the youngest section of the poorer half of the middle class.

The special claim of the new subsidised Universities, supported with much ability by the four Vice-Chancellors above mentioned, is that through the training imparted by them in pure and applied science to chemists, doctors, dentists, mechanical and electrical engineers, etc., they "have been in a position to render very important (in some respects vital) service to the State during the war." I know of no reason for doubting the validity of this claim; and what it points to is that any reasonable theory of State functions must include provision at the public expense for the training of such experts as the business of the State requires, *if, and only if*, the open market, *plus* the voluntary zeal of persons interested in the diffusion of knowledge, cannot be relied on for a steady and adequate supply. But neither do I know any reason for supposing that these two resources would not have sufficed if the State had from the first (1) abstained from subsidising teachers of pure and applied science in these Universities and elsewhere, and

(2) exercised due foresight in making known in good time its own probable demands. I see no reason for doubting that the wealth and enterprise of the great industrial North would, in the absence of State aid, have sooner or later created and maintained Universities as fully equipped in all respects as are Leeds, Manchester, Sheffield, Liverpool, and Birmingham at the present moment.

There is of course an immediate saving of time, when an effective majority, strong enough to overcome any probable resistance, has made up its mind that a certain thing ought to be done, in compelling all alike to contribute; but to let the unpersuadable minority alone, and to start in a more modest way with the voluntary contributions of the majority, trusting that experience of the utility of the work will evoke increased liberality in the future, will generally produce in the long run an economically better as well as a juster result; because it then rests with the managers, at every stage of the undertaking, to sustain and increase the zeal of contributors by satisfying them that the money has been well expended. The sensibility of public bodies to the opinions of individual taxpayers concerning each one of many branches of expenditure is much less direct and acute.

Hence, if the plea is to be sustained that the education which has saved the State was itself provided by the State, it must rest mainly on the influence exerted by the State-provided and State-controlled elementary schools on scholars drawn for the most part from the weekly-wage-earning class, and attending school between the ages of five and fourteen; some, however, beginning earlier, and some continuing later. Subject to this last exception, it may be said generally that there was an interval of at least three years between leaving school and enlistment, and this interval was spent, as a rule, in some industrial employment. *Prima facie* it would seem probable that the educative influence of those intervening years told more powerfully, for good or evil, on the behaviour of these young men in the day of supreme trial than the earlier

formal instruction, much of which they would have had time to forget. But waiving the point of comparative importance, and admitting that the eight or nine years of schooling must certainly count for something considerable, what are we to say of the joint product?

Much, certainly, that is good. The ready response to the appeal for recruits, even allowing for the unprecedentedly favourable terms offered, shows that ability to read and write, and the kind of things generally read, have rendered it easier than before to send through the masses of our people a thrill of generous sentiment, to fire their imaginations by telling them of grievous wrongs done to other nations than our own, and to turn the sentiment so roused into the channel of resolute practical action. Nothing in the least like it was or could have been achieved a century ago, in the time of the great French war. Our navy was then manned in the lower ranks by the pressgang, in the higher by jobbery; the rank-and-file of our small army by crimping and cajolery, the higher grades by jobbery *plus* purchase of commissions. Jane Austen's novels are sufficient evidence of the prevailing apathy in good country society, in the very class in which patriotic enthusiasm might be expected to be strongest, and is in fact strongest at the present time. Whatever the cause, the growth since 1800 of State-consciousness, of all-pervading sensitiveness to whatever touches any part of the body politic, is even more remarkable than the growth in numbers and wealth. And among contributory causes, together with railways, telegraphs, penny postage, and democratic institutions, the multiplication of schools must certainly rank high, though possibly not quite so high as the National Union of Teachers would be disposed to put it.

But there is another side to the picture. The war has brought out grave deficiencies, if not among those in the fighting line, concerning whom we cannot expect to know the whole truth while the censorship is in force, yet certainly among the larger number who from choice or necessity remain at

home; and these deficiencies imply correspondingly serious limitations to the moral influence of the State-provided elementary schools. It has rightly been noted as remarkable that, whereas in the war zones the relations between officers and men have been excellent, there has been at home incessant friction between employers and employed, which no sense of common duty to the Fatherland has been able to allay. Whatever difficulty there may be in apportioning the blame between the two contending parties, few even of the warmest friends of the workers have attempted to defend the unseasonable strikes and the wilful slackings which have so seriously delayed the production of indispensable war material. And among the women of the same classes the enforced separation from their husbands who have enlisted, combined with an unusual command of money and leisure, have in too many instances presented temptations which their training had not prepared them to resist. If it is true that the consumption of intoxicants, even allowing for the increased price, has gone up by two millions since the beginning of the war, at a time when the importance of saving against the lean years certain to follow should have been manifest, this does not look as if education had done much for thrift and self-control among the wage-earners. In default of evidence to the contrary, just in so far as the State-provided and State-aided schools may be credited with the fine qualities displayed by some sections of the working classes, must they be debited with the shortcomings of other sections, or of the same sections under different conditions.

In the case of the men, it seems possible to trace a specific connection between the sort of unpatriotic behaviour above-noticed and certain characteristics of State education which are hardly avoidable without entailing still worse consequences, so long as the whole system depends on the coercive power of the State. I refer to the absence of any direct and systematic inculcation of civic duty and the elements of social economy. In Germany, or at all events in Prussia,

the reigning sovereign has seen to it that the worship of the State, as embodied in the Hohenzollern dynasty, and a Pan-Germanist view of history and international relations, shall be systematically inculcated in all schools, whether primary or secondary. We can see quite clearly the wrongness of this method, and are less likely than ever to imitate it after recent experiences. We have not used, and shall not use, the State-paid schoolmaster as an agent for instilling blind obedience to the powers that be, or blatant jingoism, or wilfully partial views of history. But in rightly steering clear of this rock, have we succeeded, or is it likely that we ever shall succeed, in escaping the minor but still very serious evil of allowing the young people to leave school without having their attention directed at all to social and civic duties?

On the other hand, supposing State interference in the shape of compulsory taxation for educational purposes, and compulsory attendance in State-provided schools, to be eliminated, no dilemma of this kind need arise. In schools supported by churches and other voluntary associations the motives for laying stress on moral instruction of some kind would be of the strongest. There would doubtless be great diversity not only of methods but of principles. In some schools Socialism or Syndicalism would be openly taught, in others perhaps pure Quakerism, and in a good many rank Protectionism and militarism; but only to the extent that the votaries of these (to me) objectionable principles were both able and willing to back their opinions with their money. The tune would be called jointly by those who paid the piper and by the dancers, *i.e.* the parents, who would be free to send their children to any school or to no school, so long as there was no evidence of gross and scandalous neglect. Right or wrong, civic principles would be zealously inculcated in accordance with some fairly definite theory held in common by the patrons of the school, and approved, or at least not strongly disapproved, by the parents. There would be a healthy competition, in which all the teachers would be

stimulated to give out their best from their several points of view, and in which we should probably find—unless Englishmen are fundamentally irrational—a tendency towards the gradual toning down of extravagant opinions on debatable subjects, concurrently with a keener spirit of inquiry on the part of the scholars.

I am not writing as an educationist, but as a student of political philosophy, and I have had few opportunities of learning at first hand how the subject of social and civic duty is actually handled in our Council schools. But I have studied carefully the two important volumes edited by Dr Sadler (1908) on *Moral Instruction and Training in Schools*, at home and abroad, and from them I gather that the differences of opinion among experienced teachers as to the matter and method of moral instruction are so numerous, and go so deep, as to strain to the utmost the editor's wonderful hopefulness and versatility in the effort to convince himself that a way can and must be found to make room for them all under the wide umbrella of the State.

The contradictions inherent in every form of State education are not brought out so clearly in this land of compromise as in France, Belgium, and Ireland.

In France there has been going on more or less since 1882, and more definitely since 1886, one of the boldest educational experiments ever tried: that of providing for a nation of which the immense majority are, at least nominally, Catholics, a complete system of secular instruction, including the teaching of morals, without any mention of religion. The Reports of Messrs Harrold Johnson and Edmund Harvey (1907), written in full sympathy with the undertaking, could not say more than that Frenchmen were grappling very earnestly with the enormous difficulties of the task, and that they need not despair of ultimate success; while the Catholic reporters, as was natural, painted in the darkest colours the results thus far apparent. From other sources we learn that the State-paid teachers can by no means be relied on to carry out unquestion-

ingly the views of the central Government, but are banded together in a Union even more self-assertive than our N.U.T. to dictate terms as to their own salaries and privileges. Meanwhile the priests, thrown on their own resources by the separation of Church and State, exert themselves vigorously to maintain their influence by banding together in voluntary societies the boys and girls as they leave the elementary schools; and the Protestant churches aim at a like result in a somewhat different way.

Of Belgium, as he saw it seven or eight years before the German occupation, Sir James Yoxall reported that in respect of moral and religious teaching it was a "land of combat," where there was little prospect of national accord. "A powerful political party and a dominant Church control the State and govern the country, but adherents of other parties, imbued with anti-ecclesiastical feeling, are supreme in the local administration of most of the cities and towns." One practical result was that the children either got moral instruction based on, and entirely subordinated to, Catholic theology, or no moral instruction at all; another, that the Government did not dare to make primary education compulsory.

As to Ireland, where education is provided and directed by a Government which is regarded by the Catholic majority as alien, and which tries in consequence to minimise offence by an attitude of strict religious neutrality, Mr Stephen Gwynn, a Catholic Nationalist but not a bigot, pronounces the system a total failure. "No ordinary person in Ireland contemplates the possibility of teaching morality apart from religion; and by religion is meant emphatically this or that particular creed." . . . "The colourless and merely scholastic ideals of the Queen's Colleges, and the huge examining machinery known as the Royal University, typify in their total lack of moral influences all that is worst in the educational system under which Ireland labours." He notices that "the State puts a schoolmaster into a schoolhouse, without adequate provision for himself,

without adequate provision either for building or for the upkeep of building (*sic*); it bids him keep it clean, but pays no servant either to wash or sweep." But he omits to give the explanation, which was brought out some years ago in Parliamentary debate, that the local ratepayers are so hostile to the principle of these national schools that they will not pay anything towards keeping them up. It was rightly pleaded that it would be unreasonable to expect the central Government to defray the whole expense out of funds provided in larger part by Englishmen and Scotchmen; but this only shows the essential unreasonableness of a policy which lands us in such a dilemma.

As in France, so in Ireland, it is claimed by the Catholics that the most truly educational work is done by religious societies entirely unaided by the State, whose teachers give of their best on terms so unremunerative to themselves that no schools run on commercial lines, nothing in short but an unlimited State purse, can possibly compete with them; and they do this simply for the sake of the moral influence thus acquired. Those non-Catholics who deem that no sincerity and no zeal can enable teaching based on false premises to build up characters of all-round excellence, ought surely to ask themselves whether they would not have a better chance of diffusing what they hold to be sounder views by flinging away the crutches of State aid and State patronage, and looking exclusively to the voluntary contributions of those sharing their respective ideals.

Of Germany enough has been said already.

Has the elementary teacher freer scope for character-moulding in England, where no religious (or anti-religious) sect possesses anything like undisputed predominance; where "simple Biblical teaching" is the rule in all, or nearly all, the State-provided schools; and where the teaching in by far the larger portion of the remainder is based on the Church of England Catechism, a seventeenth-century by-product of the Elizabethan compromise between Calvinism and Catholicism?

Of the numerous testimonies of experienced teachers collected by Dr Sadler, very few express unqualified approval of either basis. The lady who reports upon the Welsh schools says that it is becoming more common for teachers to object for various reasons to teach Scripture, but that nevertheless the great majority, especially of women teachers, are decidedly opposed to any teaching of morality apart from religion.

Not only must the system of compromise and enforced reserve directly interfere with the teacher's giving out the best that is in him, but it must weaken the power of the training college to put into him the best that might be put into him during his studentship. Confessedly the undenominational training colleges on their present footing are a very weak spot in our system, and their weakness is explainable by the fact that, beyond the mere acquisition of knowledge and the technique of pedagogy, there is no definite common ideal which is, or can be, held up before the students. The nation having no common ideal, it is impossible to set up anything of the kind in a tax-supported institution without doing violence to the sentiments of the taxpayers who cherish widely different ideals.

In this connection Lord Cromer's article in the October number of the *Nineteenth Century and After* deserves attention. While he has no fear of the German ideal of power-worship and war-worship finding acceptance in this country, he does see some danger of excess in the opposite direction of ultra-pacifism and premature internationalism at the expense of healthy nationalism, not certainly in the great public schools patronised by the rich, but in the elementary schools under Government control. He hears it commonly said, and is disposed to believe, that this is the prevailing trend of opinion among elementary schoolmasters, and he complains that the central authorities seem to speak with bated breath of the teaching of patriotism in their latest Code of Regulations, and in their "suggestions for the teaching of history."

But what else could he expect—nay, what ought he to desire—than that in a free country the public authorities should speak with bated breath, if at all, when laying down the law as to what an expert educator is to say, or not to say, concerning subjects about which public opinion is sharply divided? What he ought to desire is that the Government should leave public opinion free to shape itself without interference, and should concentrate its efforts on making the State truly worthy of the confidence and devotion of its citizens.

The conclusion to which all these facts point is, I submit, that the sort of education which has saved, and is saving, our State, in so far as it can be said to be in a state of salvation, is something very different from the pabulum supplied through Council schools at the expense of the rates and taxes. Boy Scouts, Church Lads' Brigades, Salvation Army, Church Army, Young Men's (and Young Women's) Christian Associations, Trade Unions, Co-operative Societies, political and social clubs: these and such-like institutions, together with the steady external pressure of an increasingly just and humane legal system, ought, if I am not mistaken, to be credited with by far the largest share in such improvement as has taken place in the social and civic side of the national character.

As for the development of individual efficiency, beginning with mastery of the "three R's," the share to be credited to State education may well be considerably larger, since it is by that aim that the selection and training of teachers, and the methods of inspection, have been mainly governed. But even here the rigidity almost inseparable from State management has proved again and again an impediment to progress. Even if we look simply to the turning out of men and women who will be worth good wages in whatever trade or vocation they select, it would seem, judging from the complaints of employers, that the foundation laid in the Council schools has hitherto left a good deal to be desired.

Supposing this view or anything like it to be accepted, we shall approach in a very different spirit from that of Lord

Haldane and Dr Sadler the difficult problem of economies in civil service expenditure during and after the war. Caring quite as much as they do for education in the wider sense of the term, we shall think more of the free mutual action of adult minds on each other, and of so improving our political institutions, our laws and our social conventions, as to facilitate such action to the utmost; and less, comparatively, of the formal, time-table instruction of young people within the four walls of a schoolroom. But we shall value the latter also very highly, and for that very reason we shall confidently expect that it will be more and more highly valued by parents for their own children, and by philanthropists and evangelists of all kinds for other people's children, in proportion as the interchange of thought among adults becomes more active, and in proportion as better laws lead to a better distribution of wealth, to a closer adjustment of rewards to services, and to the multiplication of individuals combining healthful activity with time to think. Inspired by such hopes, we shall cast about for the best means of effecting a gradual transition from State-provided and State-aided schools and colleges to a richly diversified multitude of voluntary institutions, State-controlled only in the sense in which all human activities are, or should be, so as to be prevented from injuring the community.

We shall of course be met with the difficulty that the same unprecedented national impoverishment which imperatively dictates retrenchment of national expenditure will also have a tendency to dry up the springs of private munificence. But to this it may be answered that such voluntary contributions as are forthcoming will go very much further than the same amount levied compulsorily and administered by public bodies under Acts of Parliament and Whitehall regulations. Each educational association, religious or other, having its own definite ideal, will be worked by managers agreed in principle, and will spend no money on commissions of inquiry, and very little on inspections and statistics. The whole machinery of compulsion being scrapped, another large item

in the present Budget will disappear. Plain living, it may be hoped, will be more in fashion than now through all ranks of society; and if so, competent teachers may be able to accept lower salaries without loss of dignity, especially as the work will more often than now be a real labour of love.

All this, however, is rather idle guesswork, so small is the chance of any such radical change of policy being effected during the period immediately following the war. It may be somewhat less idle to inquire whether any measure can be suggested within the range of practical politics which would combine the economies rendered necessary by the war with encouragement to religious and other voluntary associations to take over some clearly defined portion of the responsibility now borne by the State.

One way would be to adopt the programme of the Secular Education League, but to develop it on lines not perhaps contemplated by the bulk of its members. They, I fancy, would propose to keep the time-table much as it is at present, throwing upon the State-paid teachers full responsibility for the moral instruction of the children, while debarring them from appeals to religious sanctions, and leaving to the Churches, for definite religious instruction, only the hours which are now at the free disposal of the children or their parents. The subject being thus officially treated as an unimportant extra, would almost inevitably come to be taught in amateurish fashion to tired and apathetic scholars, and the classes, whether held in the schoolroom or elsewhere, would as a rule compare very unfavourably with those conducted by the regular State-paid teachers. In order to give a fair chance to the Churches, it would be necessary to cut down the official school hours by at least half, to renounce all pretension of imparting a complete education at the public expense, and to guarantee nothing more than a sound elementary training in industrial habits, and in a few simple, manifestly useful, and uncontroversial branches of knowledge. By arranging that some of the children should attend the State school only in the morning, and the others

only in the afternoon, each teacher might earn the same salary for the same amount of work as before, and either the staff might be reduced by half, or the much-needed reform of diminution in the size of the classes might be effected without increase of cost.

Another way would be to draw the line where John Stuart Mill drew it, between primary and secondary education, and to abandon the comparatively recent policy of subsidising and organising the latter. This, unlike the other, could not be carried out at one stroke. But with time and patience all legitimate expectations based on the present system might be satisfied; and the keen sense of the importance of education, which has now happily become the rule rather than the exception among all classes except the lowest, is surely a sufficient guarantee that good teachers would not suffer in purse or dignity beyond bearing their proportionate share in the temporary impoverishment of the whole community.

When the question is no longer, "Must we, who want this improvement, pay for it ourselves, or can't we manage to squeeze it out of Government?" the real worth of the proposed improvement will be more carefully scrutinised in the first instance; but when it has stood the test, the money will be forthcoming.

So at least things should work, if only our *post bellum* statesmen have the gift of seeing the national life steadily and whole. As to that I must confess I am not over-sanguine. Championship of the libertarian conception of the province of the State is not a profitable business from the vote-catching, still less from the office-seeking, point of view. All the more necessary is it for those whom circumstances place out of the reach of vote-catching and office-seeking temptations to do what in them lies towards compelling attention to that aspect of the matter which is most in danger of being overlooked.

ROLAND K. WILSON.

MADAME MONTESSORI AND MR HOLMES AS EDUCATIONAL REFORMERS.[1]

MRS CLEMENT WEBB.

WE expect educationalists to be optimists, but Mr Holmes and Dr Montessori are optimistic to a degree that is startling. Mr Holmes asks us to believe that worldliness, egoism, sensuality, with the secondary vices whose name is legion, the "fosterbrood of externalism," can be stamped out of the coming generations if the "tragedy" of our present systems of education gives way to "what might be" in their stead. "What might be" is a system of education (or, as Mr Holmes prefers to call it, of "growth-craft") which should be able to develop the ideal type of man, and which, in fact, under a teacher whom he calls Egeria, was beginning to develop such true human characters instead of the very imperfect and faulty specimens of what we, in our ignorance, are pleased to call human nature. And Dr Montessori quotes a countryman of her own: "He who fights for the reconstruction of methods in education and instruction fights for human regeneration," while what she has proved, she tells us, in her own schools offers her "the greatest hope for human redemption through education."

This tremendous claim is the more surprising that much of what Dr Montessori and Mr Holmes describe as existing in the schools respectively of their making and of their discovery

[1] *What Is and What Might Be*, by Edmund Holmes; Constable & Co. *The Tragedy of Education*. *The Montessori Method*, Heinemann. *A Montessori Mother*, Constable.

may be seen any day in this country, notably in girls' secondary public schools. But these reformers include all our past educational efforts, systems, and methods under sin that the grace of their educational gospel may the more abound.

"Western education, based on complete distrust of the child's nature [!], makes it its business to encroach persistently and systematically on the freedom which is indispensable to healthy growth: . . . the damming back of the whole stream of the child's natural energies is the beginning and end of discipline and order." . . . "His blindness, his helplessness, his all-round incapacity are postulated at every turn. . . . Not his reasoning faculties only, but also the whole range of his perceptive faculties—his imagination, his sympathy, his feeling for beauty, his sense of rhythm, his quasi-scientific curiosity, his constructive instinct—are starved by being forbidden to exercise themselves except within the narrowest possible limits . . . by being treated as parts of a machinery which can be controlled in all its details by its driver, instead of as the organs of a living soul."[1] And Dr Montessori's criticism of education as she has found it, is: "Scholastic slavery which has for its speciality the repression of will-power and force of character."

Mr Holmes and Dr Montessori have been singularly unfortunate in their experience. But we may offer them the consolatory assurance that if they will visit some hundred or so of girls' secondary public day schools they will find things far otherwise. Indeed, so much of what Mr Holmes describes as having been a revelation to him in his "Utopian School"[2] may be found any day in such schools as by itself to convince one that the training of children to be gay, joyous, and conscientious citizens of a commonwealth of their own will not reform the world. For a quarter of a century and more, schools which possess the characteristics of Mr Holmes's model school have been sending out girls devoted to all the

[1] *The Tragedy of Education.*

[2] See *What Is and What Might Be.*

life of their schools, to all the best ideals that inspired them, and carrying with them as a possession for all their future life some real appreciation of the "things that matter," and possibly also a wider and more liberal intellectual outlook, a broader conception of their responsibilities and duties in the world, than their grandmothers possessed. Yet these girls have not necessarily or generally a stronger sense of duty nor any less tendency to what Mr Holmes calls "externalism" than their grandmothers, who were educated under the older and more "dogmatic" régime. And despite much depressing experience that many of us have probably had in elementary schools, it is strange that, in the face of so much that is cheering and happy, so unrelievedly gloomy a picture could have been drawn to-day.

The explanation of Mr Holmes's gloomy view of all education as it is—as well as of his optimism for the future—lies in his view of the mistaken beliefs which he holds have underlain all our systems and all our efforts. Mme. Montessori does not state explicitly the same view, but I think it is implicitly contained in her book.

All our theories of, all our efforts at, education have, Mr Holmes tells us, been founded on one colossal error, viz. the belief in original sin. "The tragedy of Education has now widened out into the tragedy of human life. If man has made a mess of life, if he is a worldling, an egoist, a sensualist, if he is stupid and foolish and ignorant, a reason for this seems forthcoming. For he has made and is still making a mess of his own upbringing. . . . We have but to look around us in order to convince ourselves that sensuality, drunkenness, ill-temper, selfishness, vanity, greed, dishonesty, class jealousy and hatred, national jealousy and hatred, are widespread and persistent evils which are responsible for much of the misery that afflicts mankind. Why is this so? Has it always been so? Does it admit of a remedy? Or is it rooted in the nature of things? We have been authoritatively taught to regard ourselves as miserable sinners and to lay the blame of our short-

comings on nature. We have been taught that we were born bad. . . . It would be strange if man, alone among living things, were born bad, seeing that every other animal and every plant is born good, in the sense that it has within itself all the potencies of ultimate perfection—the perfection of its own type and kind. So universal is this rule that in the absence of evidence to the contrary I must assume that it applies to man. And whatever theology may say, no evidence to the contrary is forthcoming. To say that, because grown-up men and women behave badly, therefore man is born bad, is as though we were to blame Nature for the impurity of a polluted river, forgetting that it had flowed pure and would always flow pure from its fountain-head. If we would know what we are by nature, we must get nearer to the fountain-head, we must study the child."[1]

Now, to these statements made by Mr Holmes, with their implications, the lie must at once be categorically and emphatically given. The only truth they possess is that of the half-truth which is the worst of all lies. We have not been taught, nor have we as a race believed, nor has theology told us, that we were born bad and that there is no more to be said. If we have been told that "we are by nature the children of wrath," we were also told that we were "made in the image of God." It is untrue to suggest that in the sense in which he presumably uses the word "nature" (though Mr Holmes seems somewhat indifferent to the notorious ambiguity of the term) those are not natural causes which make a tree grow crooked or blight a bloom or cause two blossoms to grow together. Moreover, it is utterly misleading, when talking of man's moral nature, to draw conclusions from analogies taken from the non-moral creation.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Mr Holmes's attempts to explain on his own theories the development of evil are singularly unconvincing.

"If each man in turn is born good, the process of growth

[1] *The Tragedy of Education*, ch. iii.

and self-realisation . . . must needs make him continuously better. . . . The desire to grow . . . to realise his true self, is strong . . . in every child of man. In infancy it is a desire for the preservation and expansion of the physical self and . . . is . . . uncompromisingly selfish. . . . As the little child grows older the desire to grow becomes a desire for self-aggrandisement; and though in this stage it may give rise to much vanity and selfishness, it is in the main a healthy tendency. But when in the course of time the average, ordinary, surface self—the self with which we are all only too familiar—has been fully evolved and firmly established, the day may come when, owing to adverse conditions, the growth of the soul will be arrested and the ordinary self will come to be regarded as the true self, as the self which the man may henceforth accept and rest in, as the self in virtue of which he is what he is. Should the desire for self-aggrandisement survive that day, the door is thrown open to selfishness of a malignant type and to general demoralisation."[1]

It would really seem more hopeful to start with original sin which must be battled against from childhood, rather than with the "average, ordinary, surface self" which must be "fully evolved and firmly established" before the soul apparently can have a chance of meeting it face to face in order to prevent the man regarding his ordinary self as his true self. At least he has the advantage of knowing where he is with Original Sin!

But it must be confessed that Mr Holmes's thought is hard to grasp and his meaning may easily be misunderstood.

Now, some of Dr Montessori's and of Mr Holmes's educational theories are, I believe, false just because they depend for their value on this principle, explicitly taught by Mr Holmes and implicitly by Mme. Montessori—that human nature, unless some untoward *external* influence is brought to bear, can and will develop completely "good." Others which are compatible with a belief in the presence of

[1] *What Is and What Might Be.*

an infinite capacity for good co-existently with an inherent capacity for evil, though often open to not a little criticism, have much real value.

The nature as well as the similarity of their educational views is illustrated by a story which Mme. Montessori first tells, and which Dr Holmes quotes as a sort of text to his book *The Tragedy of Education.*

Dr Montessori tells how she once saw in the Pincian Gardens a baby boy intent on shovelling gravel into a little pail. As his nurse could not persuade him to leave his task and come home, she herself filled the pail with gravel and put it and him together into the perambulator, "with the firm conviction she had given him what he wanted." The child cried in protest; for what he really, if unconsciously, desired, says Dr Montessori, was to "co-ordinate his voluntary actions; to exercise his muscles by lifting; to train his eye to estimate distances; to exercise his intelligence in the reasoning connected with the undertaking; to stimulate his will-power by deciding his own actions; while she who loved him, believing that his aim was to possess some pebbles, made him wretched."

Whether or no these two educationalists think the baby should have been allowed to remain where he was indefinitely, they do not say; it would seem so. At all events, the first necessity, the *sine qua non* of all methods, is, we are told, complete liberty for the child physically and morally. The child must do entirely as he chooses, provided only he is taught that his pleasure must not be at the expense of others. A wayward child must not be reproved or punished. If not really ill, he should merely be placed to play by himself and be treated with extra consideration and tenderness, till, tired of his own company, he returns to play with his schoolfellows.

Again, says Mme. Montessori, we make the great mistake of demanding obedience from little children, pretending that a forced voluntary action exists; we find children very disobedient, and are in despair because we try by prayers, orders, or violence to get what is in reality too difficult, even

impossible, to get. We think that the child's will must be broken, that it is good for him to give up his will to that of adults. Thus there grows up childish timidity, a moral malady acquired by a will which could not develop. Children should rather be trained by right exercises unconsciously to educate their will-power at the same time as they are training their physical and mental capacities; and later on obedience, which is "natural" in older children, will be easy to those who have thus learned by self-discipline *how* to obey. As an instance of perfect discipline developed by such methods Mr Holmes tells how once, in "Utopia," Egeria, arriving by some accident an hour late at her school, found all the children had set themselves to work by the time-table. Mme. Montessori, after describing the happy absorption of her little pupils in their work, and the way in which four-year-old children carry tureens of soup and trays laden with glasses of water without any mishap, and their attentive service of their little schoolfellows at dinner, says: "If we try to think of parallels in the life of adults, we are reminded of the phenomena of conversion, of the superhuman heightening of the strength of martyrs and apostles, of the constancy of missionaries, of the obedience of monks. Nothing else in the world except such things is on a spiritual height equal to the discipline of the Children's Houses" (!!).

Now, the habit of mind which represses the self-expression and constant activity of the little child simply because it is troublesome to the adult, and that administers sharp rebuke for actions unfortunate in result but not really "naughty" in the child, is of course not uncommon. And even educated and devoted mothers will fall into the mistake of so constantly giving orders to do or not to do this or that to their little ones, that without unnatural and unhealthy repression the children cannot check their impulses and desires, and so contract an unfortunate habit of disobedience. But most intelligent teachers and mothers know that these are mistaken methods, and it is no new gospel that tells us so. It is

doubtless excellent that children should, while concentrating themselves on tasks that please them, be also learning self-mastery; and it is useful that we should be reminded that a little child cannot with advantage to itself be constrained to exercise itself on a distasteful task, and that directly it ceases to work voluntarily the exercise is bad for it. The very same sort of exercises with hooks and eyes which form part of Mme. Montessori's methods for children were, when lately found to be demanded of children as a means of assisting the family budget, condemned, and rightly, as child-labour of the worst kind.

But, valuable as it undoubtedly is to educate the power of self-control physically and indirectly, that will never be enough. If we believe that every child will learn to recognise in himself a law of sin warring against the law of his mind, we cannot too soon insist on the categorical imperative, "Thou shalt and thou shalt not." It is misleading to suggest that, because in concentrating himself on doing an exercise he delights in a child is training his will, he is *therefore* training his will not to do evil (the greatest criminals may, and often must, be men of real self-control and will-power); while it is absurd to compare the happy self-devotion of children to the fulfilment of tasks which, as Dr Montessori points out, satisfy all their developing capacities, with the struggles of adolescent or mature men and women to sacrifice their human impulses and desires to what they feel to be a higher and a divine command. The wayward child in the Children's House who is isolated but petted may very soon forget his naughtiness; but why does Dr Montessori think that it profits him to ignore entirely the fact that waywardness is wrong? The child knows it, and very soon he knows that his elders are aware of it also; then why ignore the fact? If the method pursued by Dr Montessori succeeds in disguising the fact from him, such success is a condemnation of the method.

All through their writings Mr Holmes and Dr Montessori appear to think that happy obedience, happy easy discipline in

the discharge of lessons and duties all congenial to the child, is a proof of the power to do what is uncongenial. It is not so. That a school may be, and should be, a place where boys and girls obey willingly—where they learn happily to govern themselves—is not of course questioned; and there are, as was said above, many such schools in this country. But there are other aspects of this desirable state of affairs. Are our reformers quite sure that children develop so much more "naturally" in such a school than in an unregenerated school?

To begin with, we must take into account the effect of a corporate life, of an atmosphere which envelops each child alike, of suggestion acting on a number of children together. And the sort of discipline that Dr Montessori and Mr Holmes describe, though it is one which the children maintain voluntarily themselves and not one enforced by drills or threats against their will, is the result of a kind of suggestion with which young children—and girls often up to an advanced age—very readily fall in, but which acts less happily with older and abler children, and less successfully with boys than with girls. Now Mr Holmes's Utopian school was one in which few if any of the pupils were over fourteen, and, as he says, they were not clever or exceptional, and therefore they were more receptive and less critical. The present writer knew well a school wonderfully like Mr Holmes's description of his Utopian school, and it also had an age limit of fourteen. The exact incident described by Mr Holmes as illustrating the perfect discipline among the Utopians might any day have occurred in this school, and many similar sort of incidents did occur. But among the older and abler girls one detected a certain uneasiness, a tendency to revolt against the atmosphere of the school.

We do not think Mr Holmes gives—I wonder whether in dealing with older children Dr Montessori would give—due weight to the development of critical and self-conscious instincts in older and abler children, to the reticence, reserve, and shyness of self-disclosure which really often find relief in

those very mechanical methods of teaching which we congratulate ourselves on having to a large extent outgrown. Thus abler children over a certain age often become uncomfortably aware of the genial, friendly atmosphere of their school, and some of them take refuge from their self-consciousness in the adoption of a manner which may be described not seldom as sullen and defiant. An understanding teacher may see through this, and often help to steer the boy or girl through these difficult years, but such children will not and cannot be as the Utopians under Mr Holmes's Egeria. Again, the self-consciousness which makes boys, as a rule, wish to shirk the observation of their masters, often makes girls, sometimes unconsciously, seek that of their mistresses, and helps them to produce in the school the happy atmosphere of glad self-discipline. Such an atmosphere and such a discipline have their value, but it is very easy to exaggerate that value, and I think Mr Holmes and Dr Montessori both tend to do so.

It is these general principles of education and discipline which I feel most demand attention, because they are intimately bound up with a belief and theory with which I am in complete disagreement; but probably it is the more detailed methods—at least in the case of the Montessori system—which attract the most notice.

All educationalists are in danger of becoming slaves to their methods. The present writer has a vivid recollection of a "criticism lesson" in a training college which shall be nameless. The mistress of method—a clever young woman—at the close of the lesson said that the teacher had made one fatal error; and the audience of students sat anxious and alert while she led up with impressive eloquence to the disclosure. It came: "The teacher gave her class a piece of information"! Most of us have had occasion when listening to lessons given by some conscientious young teachers to wish they had never heard of the heuristic method. And we think some "Montessori mothers" who yield to the sudden temptation to button their little child's shoe will feel they have committed the

unpardonable sin in education. Mme. Montessori lays great stress on the exercises for the senses of touch and sight, and her insistence on the fact that up to a certain age the child perceives more accurately through the sense of touch than that of sight is well worth remembering, and lends great interest to her methods of teaching to write and read. At the same time, we cannot help feeling that all the elaborate devices for training these senses—the hooking, buttoning, and lacing frames for teaching the processes of the toilet, the elaborate frames with insets of wood of different sorts—are a trifle superfluous. A child can practise on his own boots or shoes without a buttoning frame; a little niece of the present writer's could perform practically the whole of her toilet at three and a quarter years; and even if the acquisition of complete facility is somewhat more delayed without the aid of the buttoning and lacing frames, at least it comes without the introduction of artificial as opposed to "natural" methods, which should please some theorists.

A good deal, in fact, of what Dr Montessori lays stress on may be seen, and is seen, in many sensible, simple, we might say commonplace, homes. It is possible that her long experience with defective children left her unprepared for some of the characteristics of normal ones; or is it that the study of children for pedagogic reasons is so minute that a sense of proportion—one might almost say common sense—tends to disappear? Whatever the reason, Dr Montessori frequently professes herself astonished with characteristics, delightful indeed, but familiar to us in children, and attributes these to the "greatness of the human soul," till now hidden from her. There are several instances of this, but one on which Dr Montessori herself lays much stress is the lesson in silence. She regards the complete, "fascinated" silence which the children observe when hushed by lower and lower voiced suggestion as full of spiritual significance. But anyone who has by saying "Hush!" in the right manner brought an eager look followed by one of abstraction into a child's face, or who,

like the present writer, has fallen back with unfailing success upon a "silence game," played much as Mme. Montessori describes it, to quiet noisy children in a play centre, will think that, whatever the psychological explanation, the phenomena have less spiritual import than she believes.

But her methods of teaching to write and read are not open to such criticism, and are very interesting and valuable in their suggestiveness; for by utilising the tactile exercises she helps children to write, and write well, at a very early age. And the fact, to which she draws attention, that the recognising of letters and words is not the same as reading, and that a child can, while still very young, learn to do the former and so be prepared to read without effort, is, we fancy, not always taken sufficient advantage of, if indeed it is fully recognised at all.

The methods for the training of the senses of hearing and smelling Mme. Montessori has elaborated less; her suggestions here seem to us very much less valuable. She thinks that "when we have produced a vibratory education of the whole body"—(what does this phrase exactly mean?)—"through wisely selected sounds, giving a peace which pervades the very fibres of his being, then" (she believes) "these young bodies would be sensitive to crude noises, and the children would come to cease from making ugly and disordered noises." Such sensitiveness would be a great misfortune to the possessors of it. One other criticism must be made on Mme. Montessori's teaching as regards the education of the senses. Speaking of the need of supplying aids to purity, she says: "Æsthetic and moral education are closely related to this sensory education. Multiply the sensations and develop the capacity of appreciating fine differences in stimuli, and we *refine* the sensibility and multiply man's pleasures . . . there must be a fineness of the senses if we are to appreciate harmony. The æsthetic harmony of nature is lost upon him who has coarse senses . . . from the enjoyment of gross pleasures vicious habits very often spring. . . ." Now, while admitting at once that vice is often

associated with a lack of power to appreciate any but coarse and sensual forms of excitement, one feels that only the over-optimism that underlies Dr Montessori's system, as it does Mr Holmes's, can make her apparently blind to the fact that with the refinement of the æsthetic senses we multiply the channels of temptation, and that vice is as often associated with æsthetic development as with the lack of it. Æsthetic development is a good to be desired, but Dr Montessori's method offers no real hope of greater resistance to vice in the coming generation.

It is well that reformers should arise not only to prove that we are not merely stagnating, but also to cause us to reconsider our systems; and these two reformers have made useful suggestions as to the desirability of leaving children more alone and freer, as well as regards some special methods. But let us beware of all and every educationalist when he comes to us offering hope for the reform of humanity through any system, any methods. There is but one way of salvation, and from that Mr Holmes deliberately, and Dr Montessori, it seems to me also, in reality, turn away. They are Utopians because they are "of this world" while they believe they are combating "this-worldliness." If education is to make boys and girls hate the evil and choose the good, it will not succeed in this greatest of all tasks simply by surrounding them with an environment in which good things are attractive and delightful, in which they are always happy, always occupied—and profitably occupied—in congenial tasks, and in which irritating conditions such as stimulate discontent or jealousy are absent.

The older belief that punishment and correction, unpleasant and uninteresting tasks unintelligently pursued, were *of themselves* desirable may be said to have disappeared, and no one wishes to recall the methods it fostered. But the moral outlook under that system was more hopeful than under that which these optimists uphold. There was real value in many old methods, including even the application of the rod, in the

accurate learning of syntax and of unpalatable lessons with but little reason to the child beyond the fact that his teacher said he ought to learn them. Under the older systems children at least realised that duty would call always with a stern voice; they knew that the right course often was and would be the harder alternative.

If the coming generations are to be stronger and better than our forefathers, if they are to care less than this generation for the things that may be classed under "externalism," to fall less a prey to sins of the flesh, they must be trained from childhood not only to love the good but to hate the evil; and that they may do this they must know from the first that temper, waywardness, and disobedience are moral and not only physical evils; they must be taught to endure hardness consciously and not merely unconsciously, and that in the fight for the best and highest there must first be self-conquest.

This ideal could be upheld in a schoolroom with fixed seats and the rest of the things which are anathema to many of our reformers. It will never be taught in the Utopian schools of Dr Holmes's dream, nor is there anything to show that the Montessori schools will uphold it. Those who feel within themselves and face steadily around them the power of evil know that it can be overcome only by a power without us greater than ourselves; and if we put our trust in systems of education which do not teach that truth, or in the goodness of human nature which those systems have but to develop, to overcome that evil, we are doomed to failure and defeat, to a tragedy far more real and infinitely more terrible than the most pessimistic critics of the past can disclose as having befallen previous generations of a race, assuredly never perfect, but great precisely in the consciousness of its own intrinsic imperfection.

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THE PLAIN MAN'S RELIGION IN THE MIDDLE AGES.

G. G. COULTON.

SINCE all civilisation is a matter of comparison, and since every criticism of the past is by implication a criticism of our own age also, it is most important to make up our minds as to the real place of the Middle Ages in human evolution. *A priori*, all believers in human progress would expect the period to be better than antiquity, and worse than our own time. But we may not write history like this; we must check *a priori* considerations at every point by recorded facts; and, while surviving records have led some men to conclude that the Middle Ages were actually inferior to antiquity, others again believe that they were, on the whole, superior even to modern times. Very few would care to go back to them, but many argue, either explicitly or implicitly, that an age in which religion dominated all society was necessarily a greater age than this of ours; and that, however much we may have gained in many ways, we have lost, and are still losing, the Pearl of Price. Newman was one of the few who have dared to put this boldly and uncompromisingly; but very many seem to reason implicitly from some such premises, and still more seem to halt between two opinions. For the study of medieval history, therefore, one of the first requisites is to face this question, and to decide it as far as possible for ourselves. Medieval Europe accepted one single creed and one set of religious forms; was it, so far, more developed or less developed than we?

Now, if we are to be quite frank here, we must begin by being frank with ourselves. In religion, as in most other things, are not we ourselves far more influenced by current practice than by current theory? Do we not too often pay lip-homage to the ideal, and practical homage to the average standard of life around us? And which of us has not recognised his own human nature in those wild words of Adam Lindsay Gordon, who had been trained under the Calvinism still common fifty years ago, who had broken away from it, and who summed up his future hopes in a single line: "The chances are, I go where most men go." In most cases, it may be said that ninety-nine points of our religion are matters of heredity or environment, while only the hundredth point is conscious and characteristic. But it is precisely the conscious and the characteristic that is worth our study; for, as Professor William James has put it, though there may be very little difference between one man and another, it is just that little which is of paramount importance. And, though the actual amount of difference has often been very much exaggerated, there was something very characteristic about medieval religion, as compared with classical times on the one hand and the twentieth century on the other—about religion as conceived in the mind of the average medieval man.

We can mark it best, perhaps, by going back a long way first. Gibbon sneers at Tertullian's boast that a Christian mechanic could give an answer to problems which had puzzled the wisest heads of antiquity. But is not Gibbon's criticism a rather dangerous half-truth? From a wider point of view, must we not count it a real step forward in civilisation that the artisan should seriously attempt to answer these questions at all? Christianity certainly brought in this new spirit; and the spirit is all-important. The belief in a crucified carpenter —the conviction that the highest triumph may be begotten of the completest earthly failure—did, as a matter of fact, take more men out of themselves, and took them further out of themselves, than anything else since the dawn of history. We

may see this best by taking a really striking example of later Pagan culture, like Marcus Aurelius. When Marcus Aurelius quotes, "The Poet hath said, 'Dear city of Cecrops,'" and adds to himself, "but wilt not thou say (rather), 'O dear City of God!'" we feel no surprise that those words should have been written a century and a half after Christ. They might have fallen in the most natural way in the world from the mouth of Tertullian's artisan; it is in a pagan book that they come upon us with such startling force: so far, Tertullian's boast is justified. Lord Chesterfield reminds us that the first and foremost requisite for the art of pleasing is the wish to please. Similarly many philosophers, from Socrates, through Roger Bacon and Descartes down to Darwin, have taught us that the first and foremost requisite for knowledge is the wish to know; that (to put it into very modern terms) the mind is like a photographic camera, and even the enormous variations of power or delicacy between one instrument and another are secondary to the question whether the instrument is being turned in the actual direction of the object, and is being steadily focussed upon that object. What the medieval mind did was to focus itself in a practical spirit upon inquiries which, hitherto, had been mainly academic. Multitudes were now convinced that they had souls to save, and that salvation was the most practical aim of every human being; even the driest treatises of scholastic philosophy are inspired by that final aim. Even those who think that the Middle Ages went as far wrong here as they went in alchemy and astrology, must still recognise this historical fact in itself. And, one-sided as this mental impulse was, it is difficult to imagine any other impulse living through the barbarian invasions. The study of the mechanical and physical sciences, which had attained to such an almost modern development in Alexandria, proved quite unable to survive. Salvation, then, was the one practical study of the Middle Ages; and different minds pursued it according to their several bents. At the top of the scale, from

St Augustine down to St Bernard and Nicholas of Cusa, really great men strove to reconcile the intensest pursuit of personal salvation with the highest altruism and the widest human outlook. At the bottom of the scale, of course, the jostle for salvation was gross and frankly immoral. The vulgar caught inevitably at what was least defensible in the official religion—not only its relic-worship, which became as materialistic as any savage magic, but also the static idea of salvation, the theory held even by the most spiritual Christians, that the one thing of importance was the last moment before death—that this, for good or for evil, could outweigh a whole life which had gone before it. Hence the frequent fights of saints with devils on their very death-bed. In the Middle Ages, as in later Puritanism, we find both extremes; on the one hand, a man going through life with the serene conviction that he was earmarked by God's mercy for final salvation; on the other hand, an equally good or better man trembling for his fate as long as he had physical strength left to think at all. While the very best felt like this, the vulgar naturally fell into grosser materialism. I do not think that mere callous inhumanity can account for one of the strangest phenomena of the later Middle Ages—the systematic denial of the last church rites to condemned criminals, against which great churchmen often fulminated in vain. In modern Sicily, among the poorest classes, an executed criminal is a saint. Pitré has noted that men pray "in the name of the holy gallows-birds." This is perfectly logical. The crowd has seen a man publicly executed after partaking of the holy wafer, which would not be given to him unless he had just confessed and been absolved. His soul is, at that moment, unquestionably on the right side of the balance; next moment he is launched into eternity. By all ecclesiastical logic you are more certain of that man's final salvation, after due purification in purgatory, than of the most saintly liver whose last moments had been less convincing; therefore the Sicilian vulgar pray for help to the souls of the holy gallows-birds. It is difficult not to read this backwards

into the refusal of sacraments to the medieval gallows-bird. The thing is perfectly logical; nothing could have saved the population from it but faith—reasonable faith as distinguished from credulity.

There never has been an age of faith, in this sense, and there never will be. Reasonable faith implies the highest tension of the human faculties—the determination on the one hand neither to contradict nor to overlook anything that reason can decide for us; and, on the other hand, the full stretch of our imagination to anticipate reason, to find living significance amidst the mass of what would otherwise be mere detached observations. This will be exceptional in every age. The Middle Ages were not Ages of Faith in the sense of holding firmly to certain dogmas with *all* their faculties; in the sense of proving all things and holding fast only to that which was good. It is usual and convenient to call them the Ages of Faith; it would be more accurate to call them the Ages of Acquiescence.

This acquiescence was enormously facilitated, of course, by the thoroughness with which Roman Catholicism had adopted the idea and discipline of an imperial State religion. The hierarchy was so exactly modelled upon the imperial bureaucracy that an ecclesiastical map of France before 1789 is practically a political map of Roman Gaul. There was therefore an enormous concrete element in medieval religion, and naturally the ordinary mind clings to the concrete. A great many medieval religious ideas grew up from below, and were only adopted and defended by the theologians after the official church, having attempted in vain to eradicate them, had determined to adopt them and make the best of them. The more abstract dogmas, inherited from the early ages of Christian discussion—the Greek ages, tinged with Greek philosophy,—these more abstract dogmas never seem to have influenced the popular mind very much. We may say of them, as Dr Johnson said of the free-will controversy, "All theory is against freedom of the will, all experience for it." In

the Middle Ages, even more than now, the ordinary mind was influenced infinitely less by current theory than by current practice; "the chances are I go where most men go."

But the acquiescence was unquestionably enormously greater than now; and we can perhaps arrive at the clearest idea by taking complete acquiescence as the general rule, and noting the main exceptions, whether intellectual or voluntary; whether because people misunderstood, or because they knowingly rebelled.

At the lowest end of the scale come the coarse and glaring exceptions; the men who were temperamentally irreligious, and in whom the current beliefs were only just strong enough to lend point to their blasphemy. The case of William Rufus is well-known; his refusal to amend his ways after a serious illness, and his answer to the remonstrances of Bishop Gundulf of Rochester: "By the Holy Face of Lucca, God shall never have me good for all the evil that He hath brought upon me!" Medieval preachers, especially in Italy, bear frequent testimony to the subtle and deliberate blasphemies which disappointed gamesters would excogitate from the distinctive tenets of the Roman Catholic faith; to their exquisite outrages heaped upon the Virgin Mary; and to the fury with which they would turn upon the statues of Christ or His saints, breaking off a hand or a nose in revenge for their disappointment.

Infidelity proper, however, was a great deal more common in the Middle Ages than is generally supposed. We find it just below the surface in the most unexpected places. Of Perugino, whose pictures certainly are more refined and spiritual than the average, Vasari tells us that he never could get any belief in God into that hard head of his. We may roughly divide medieval scepticism into three classes: (1) Academic scepticism, the centre of which was at Paris. (2) Political scepticism, the disbelief of men like the Emperor Frederick II., whose policy was anti-papal and anti-clerical, and who therefore were under every temptation to attack the

foundations of current orthodoxy. (3) There was also a great deal of scepticism, generally more or less involuntary, among clergy and laity. In the nature of the case, it would be impossible to prove this exhaustively by documentary evidence; but frequently, and in the most unexpected places, we come across scattered hints whose wider significance is unmistakable. One of the best-known instances is in Joinville (§ 46); still more illuminating is an autobiographical fragment from Johann Busch, a contemporary of Thomas à Kempis and a member of the same religious Congregation. Busch, who became a fairly learned man, and a monastic reformer of remarkable tact and energy, thus describes his own noviciate in the years 1418–19 (ed. K. Grube, p. 395). He had come to the monastery from a model religious school as a model scholar of seventeen; and he writes: "How many temptations I suffered in that noviciate, especially concerning the Catholic faith, is known only to God, to whom all things are open. For God was so great and glorious in my heart, that I could not believe Him to have put on our flesh and to have walked upon this earth in such poverty and lowliness. When therefore the Gospels were read in Refectory, I thought within myself, 'the Evangelists do all they can to praise that man,' and then my heart would cry out within me, 'Thou knowest, it is not true that this Jesus is God.' Yet then I said in my heart, 'I will die for the truth of Christ's divinity.' Then would my heart cry again, 'Thou wilt die for it, yet shalt thou see that it is a thing of naught.' And seeing that our father St Augustine, and other doctors of the first four centuries, wrote and preached that this Jesus was God, then I thought within myself, 'how strange, that such wise men should fall into such folly as to dare to assert of this man, whom they never saw, that He is God!' Yet, notwithstanding all these temptations, I was all the while a good and true Catholic. But God Almighty suffered me thus to be tempted, because my experience enabled me, in after times, to free many others who were buffeted with the same temptations." Busch's

contemporary, St Bernardino of Siena, who had perhaps heard more confessions than any man then living, gives the same report of his experience. He says, "There are very many who, though leading exemplary lives, are grievously troubled concerning many articles of the Faith" (*De. Ev. Aet.*, Opp. ed. De La Haye, ii. 37). Other slighter indications entirely bear out this testimony as to the wide diffusion of involuntary scepticism. Moreover, in proportion as we draw nearer to the sixteenth century we get increasing evidence of a more voluntary popular scepticism. The author of *Piers Plowman*, who had lived through the Black Death and the other terrible visitations of the later fourteenth century, complains of the frequency with which the dogmas of the Church were now criticised by the man in the street (c. xii., 35 ff. and 101 ff.):—

> "Now is the manner at meat, when the minstrels are still,
> The lewd against the learned of holy lore dispute."

He gives detailed instances, and adds:—

> "Such motives they move, these masters in their glory,
> And maken men to misbelieve that muse upon their words."

Moreover, the author is himself an example of the spirit whose excesses he deplores. He is one of several fourteenth-century writers who try to escape from the hard saying of the Church that all Pagans and Jews, even the best of them, must be damned. This humanitarian (and, to that extent, anti-dogmatic) leaven had long been working; kindly minds among the common folk had long sought every possible outlet from this terrible Calvinism of medieval doctrine. More than a century earlier, the great Franciscan mission-preacher, Berthold of Regensburg, shows us the efforts of the popular mind in this direction. Some men insisted that souls would become clinkered by perpetual roasting, so that hell-fire would have no further hold upon them. Others argued that God, in pity for his own handiwork, would finally give the sinner a comfortable refuge even under Satan's nose (*Predigten*, ed. Pfeiffer, i. 386). Dante, again, shows traces of this revolt of human kindness, when he exalts

Ripheus to heaven, and dares to put the excommunicated Manfred in purgatory, adding "the priestly curse doth not so utterly destroy, but that a green shoot of hope may spring up from the blasted trunk." And perhaps the most interesting of all is that old woman whom Joinville's friend Brother Yves met in the streets of Acre, bearing a chafing-dish of live charcoal in her right hand, and a flask of water in her left, and saying that she meant to burn up Paradise with the one, and quench hell-fire with the other, so that no man thenceforth might do right for the hope of heaven or for the fear of hell, but only for the pure love of God, who is so worthy and can do for us what is best (§ 445).

I need not further labour the point that much of medieval faith was simply passive acquiescence, and that the attempt to grasp at a living faith, to understand as well as to believe, was often unsettling alike to the simple and to the learned mind. We may find the reason for this general passivity in the overwhelming pressure of a highly organised hierarchy—the strongest organisation in all medieval society. There was a tendency to forgive everything in the flock so long as it was acquiescent, and therefore the mass of the flock tended more and more to leave religion in the hands of the professionals, and to restrict its own share to the narrowest and most mechanical routine. The layfolk understood even less of the Mass than an ordinary village congregation does in modern France or Italy; they often failed to follow the service even in its vaguest outlines. The Burgomasters of Strasburg regularly heard lawsuits in their official pew in the Cathedral during daily mass; and it was one of St Louis's titles to sanctity that he very seldom suffered a minister to come and talk with him at this time, "except occasionally after the Gospel had been said."[1] During the sermon, as Berthold of Regensburg and St. Bernardino show us, there was a running fire of conversation, and even of definite interruptions. The

[1] Dacheux, *Geiler de Kaysersberg*, p. 67; *Acta Sanct. Bolland*, Aug. V. *Vita II.*, c. iii. § 38.

ignorance of the Bible text, not only on the part of the laity, but also on that of the clergy, is difficult to exaggerate.[1]

And this dissociation of ceremony and spirit, this dualism, was to an enormous extent encouraged by the hierarchy itself. Those who wished to communicate too frequently were constantly discouraged by the clergy. Anything like weekly communion was very rare indeed among the laity; the few who desired it could very rarely obtain it. Again, it is significant that the word *conversion*, in the religious sense, is almost entirely confined to monks. It is very rare indeed to meet with it in Bunyan's or Baxter's sense. To enter a monastery was to be "converted"; this is the sense the word bears even in Canon Law. The more personal devotions of the later Middle Ages were intimately bound up with popular mysticism; they were to a large extent unsacerdotal, though not antisacerdotal; and here, as usually in the history of religion, we find mysticism stimulating free thought. Popular mysticism was one of the main currents in the stream which led to the Reformation.

I have emphasised the routine character of most medieval religion; but we must fairly remind ourselves how much of all civilisation is routine. All progress seems to follow the same rough formula: first, conscious effort, successful or unsuccessful; then what seems most successful becomes habitual and subconscious; lastly, the subconscious becomes even instinctive. The formalism of medieval religion must not blind us to the fact (which seems to me almost indisputable) that these forms were in general healthy and beneficent. The most hypocritical sinner among the clergy testified by his hypocrisy to what all clergy were supposed to be, and very many really were. The laziest and most useless priest did still form one link in a vast network of activities, and mainly beneficent activities. The remotest parish or ecclesiastical district was more or less directly linked up with the Pope;

[1] I have dealt in some detail with this subject in the seventh of my *Medieval Studies*: "Religious Education before the Reformation."

and the Papacy was not only by far the longest succession of sovereigns, but also by far the most disinterested. With all their faults, the Popes bore witness to an ideal which was more altruistic, more universal, more modern, than that of the temporal rulers of the Middle Ages. Moreover, amid all their lapses and infidelities, the Popes did, on the whole, work for that ideal more consistently than kings and princes worked for theirs; there was more continuity of policy in the Papacy than in any other European state. We may look upon the gradual submergence of this system by modern civilisation as a consummation not only inevitable, but much to be desired; yet still we ought not to forget that many peaks now submerged did, in the Middle Ages, stand high above the average level of human thought and conduct.

Moreover, it is very difficult to see how the world could have got on, after the break-up of the Roman Empire, without some such routine. We can scarcely exaggerate the cumulative effect of the unselfish thoughts and higher aspirations which cling round the very walls of a church. The common, uneducated man who says *Our Father* there regularly, even with only a small fragment of his mind, and without consciously counting up the myriads of the past with whom those words put him into direct communion—the man who regularly says those two words *Our Father* is, even by this routine, made more conscious of the brotherhood of man than by almost anything else in the very dull course of his life, except, no doubt, by the direct action of his family affections, if he has a family. Even the many gross minds of the Middle Ages to whom the Devil was almost a greater reality than God, had at least advanced a little step beyond the aboriginal savage who has little or no power of conceiving anything but the tangible and the visible.

A French scientist, not without malice, recently took home a little phial of holy water from the stoup of the nearest church, and found in it, under the microscope, an extraordinary number and variety of bacilli. But, after all, an idea is as

great a reality as a bacillus; civilisation has to count as seriously with the one as with the other; and both are almost equally invisible to the uneducated multitude. Is it an exaggeration to say that there are as many ideas hanging about a church as there are bacilli? that even the commonest man may thus pick up one or two ideas which he probably would never have picked up in any other way? and, if this is to some extent true even in our age of board-schools, is it not a hundred times truer of the Middle Ages?

However, with all that can be said for the value of routine, historical fact compels us to place the religion of the ordinary medieval man in just that intermediate position which in logic we should have anticipated. It was an enormous advance to take religion so seriously as the early Christians took it, and to organise it so democratically as it was organised at first. But the religious democracy, in self-defence, became more and more of a despotism; formulas stiffened until they lost a great part of their meaning: the new became old, and this old became the enemy of all other novelties; over against the thousand beneficent activities of the Church we must put the thousand cases in which she forcibly suppressed other beneficent activities: in short, the development of mankind since the Reformation has not only been necessary—it is not only a fact which we have to face—but it is part of a world-process to which we must do homage. And we shall best and most sympathetically study our ancestors of the Middle Ages in the light of these facts and of this world-process. We shall know them best if we regard them not as men who enjoyed higher privileges which they were unable to transmit to us, but as men who struggled hard to become what we (if only we will) may be—who struggled hard and pathetically, and were held back partly through fear of the Great Unknown, but still more by positive physical obstacles, which have since been swept away by printing and steam.

G. G. COULTON.

GREAT SHELFORD, CAMBRIDGE.

PROLEGOMENA TO AN ESSAY ON MIRACLES.

THE REV. F. W. ORDE-WARD.

Nullum miraculum, O quantum miraculum.

God governs the world still, as He always has, by Illusion. When we proceed to examine this assertion, it is not as dreadful as it sounds at first hearing to uneducated ears. Never at any time of the earth's history were men prepared or even able to accept the entire truth about any subject. It had always to be local, temporary, particular, according to the time and place and people and their necessities. "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now." Had our Lord given His disciples or contemporaries more than imperfect and relative truths, He would have spoken in vain. He was obliged to adopt the principle of accommodation, and adjust His teaching to the language and thought of His age. Accordingly, He gave them incomplete statements, simple presentations of simple facts. As the reporter can never report beyond his own level, so any period is absolutely unable to receive much more than the period has learned: it may and does, when the required teacher arrives, take in a little more, but only a little. God adapts His revelations precisely in this way—milk for babes, meat for men. The final word, the complete word, never was and never will be and never can be spoken on earth. St Anthony would have preached to minnows as minnows and not as whales. God never left Himself without a witness, but the witnesses are always partial. The truth had

to be mixed with more or less picturesque matter, painted on a background of allegory and proverb and parable; it was at the utmost a half truth or quarter truth, and associated with symbolical and legendary subjects which appealed to the popular imagination and did not overtax the understanding. It could always be called Illusion, it could never be considered Delusion. The error in it was the human element, the verity was the Divine portion. It is as certain as anything can be that only thus at first could the truth be represented, through a glass darkly and as it were riddling-wise. Early races were taught exactly as we teach children, through the vehicle of fairy tales and by a kind of object-lesson or kindergarten machinery. The light was depicted through a veil more or less luminous and transparent, the *milieu* of universal Maya or Illusion. By such definite indefiniteness were the profound doctrines of free-will, immortality, God's Fatherhood, the Vicarious Sacrifice of an ever-suffering God dimly shadowed forth to prophet and poet, teacher and preacher and priest. The eternal offering of Christ, for ever crucified, for ever dying and rising again, the Divinity of man and the Humanity of God, could not be otherwise proclaimed. They might be suggested, intimated, partially revealed in various ways, but it was impossible to explain them in logical syllogisms. By metaphysical conundrums, through the union of opposites, by bold affirmations and yet bolder negations, they entered into temporary configurations. By the brutality of mere facts (so called) and mere laws (so called) court philosophers and court theologians like Harnack and Eucken would have conveyed no useful information. The reason is but one way, and that the worst way of imparting knowledge, when the reason stands alone. The emotions must be first touched and the imagination captured. Or rather the appeal was bound to be to the whole man and not a part, and this the last developed, not to the purely intellectual powers, divorced from all that gave them life and colour and point and force and meaning. "God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets

by divers portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in His Son." The human spirit in God spoke to the Divine spirit in man, deep called to deep, in the sole manner possible. By dream and vision, by adumbration and broad outlines, from the misty mountain peak and the unfathomable abyss, came flashes of glorious mystery, the incommunicable ultimates were darkly communicated and as darkly apprehended. But still God went on teaching man, and man went on slowly and dully learning line upon line, line upon line, here a little and there a little.

But the avenues of learning were by no means confined to those already mentioned. There remains the most important of all, the one natural and inevitable and universal pathway to Truth—namely, Miracles. We in the twentieth century have a very great deal to learn about these. We often hear people, raw smatterers, declare that Science has shown the utter impossibility of Miracles. But the reverse is rather the case. No true Science has any *a priori* objections to them, the Science that cultivates the open mind and open door. On the contrary, it is always ready to examine the pretensions of Miracles, and many of its protagonists have accepted them in principle. Only mere *littérateurs* like Matthew Arnold and quack "scientists" would dream of condemning them beforehand, and set out in the light (or darkness) of a foregone conclusion to examine them, with the whole case prejudged. They stand on their merits, on the evidence external and internal, and must be treated accordingly. Should the premisses established appear to be sound, Science will be obliged to define a Miracle, as it would define Chance or any unusual occurrence, as an undiscovered law. Universal inductions are, by the conditions involved, absolutely impracticable. We are at the present, even now, acquainted but with the merest fringe of "facts" and "laws" in the cosmos which keep perpetually changing and compelling us to reshuffle our cards, in the presence of new and enormously

extended combinations. We have apparently fixed on an impregnable basis a certain "law," on the strength of certain alleged "facts" to-day, and then to-morrow fresh facts emerge above the horizon and oblige us to enlarge our scheme or synthesis and re-state the old syllogism with fresh terms that lead to fresh inferences. The immortality of a day is gone

> "And we hear the sound of the sexton's tread,
> As he goes to the grave to bury his dead."

Many of the certainties of Science rank with those of racing and cricket and nobody takes them seriously, least of all the true men of Science who know that at the best they are but working hypotheses. The indissoluble atom, for instance, has gone the way of all the old hasty and hoary assumptions, and it may very well happen, before long, that the admirable electron will follow its example. The old notions of space and time having been successfully challenged by Science and superseded by the "Principle of Relativity." The great mathematicians have accomplished this. And so Science, instead of disputing the probability or improbability of Miracles, should be the very first to welcome them, and test them as it does any new element. Presumptions undoubtedly are more in their favour than against them. The veriest smatterer in science at any rate knows this—that it abounds in seeming contradictions and impossibilities. And yet the incongruities that might be antecedently dismissed as things or processes that do not happen, prove in the end to be positive events. There are many great teachers of biology and chemistry who would readily agree with the theologians, and say with them *credo quia impossibile.* Because both Science and theology start and must start with unverified and unverifiable assumptions. We begin in both with faith and not with reason. No one but a sciolist should inquire if Miracles are true. That is not the question to be asked—indeed, it is no real question at all. We have seen that God has been compelled, by the conditions of the case, by the exigencies of the situation, to govern the world by Illusion,

i.e. by the presentation of only partial truths, because nothing more could be understood. And we have shown that it could not conceivably have been otherwise. Granted such and such materials, such and such a state of mind, such and such a degree of knowledge, and the inexorable results followed. Particular antecedents involved particular consequences, as a simple sum in mathematics or a simple syllogism in logic. Miracles happened, and Miracles were bound to happen, because they were the appropriate events in a world that breathed a miraculous atmosphere. History proves, if it proves anything, that the belief was general. Miracles were true to the time and to the people, as they are still to those multitudes who even now live in the same time. They were not supernatural incidents, because they occurred regularly or irregularly in Nature, and for the same reason they could not be contra-natural or even preternatural. They were simply the clash of the material and the spiritual elements, adjusting and re-adjusting their respective claims and endeavouring to shake down into some sort of working agreement—if indeed the material and the spiritual were not two sides of one and the same thing. We have even now but faintly scratched the surface of the world, we have an infinitude to learn and yet more an infinitude to unlearn. It is of small moment whether Miracles were true or false when everyone accepted them and believed in them. At any rate, they produced the impression of truth, and millions of souls lived and died by them. What better and stronger criterion could we find? Miracles were true to history, true to human nature, true to the requirements of the time, and the Divine Reign of Illusion—not Delusion. What further, what fairer, provision could anyone demand? Of course, no Miracle ever was or ever could be entirely and absolutely, objectively and subjectively, true. Though, as we have seen and said before, we have no right to press that point; it would be stupid and unscientific to do so. Miracles were and are all parts of the Great Illusion of the Divine Government, but none the less real and inspiring on that account.

They contained and contain the measure of truth fitted for the time, no more and no less.

Men in the old days, when religion rightly entered into every department and detail of life, really lived, because they walked by faith and not by sight. Nobody ever did great things by the rule of reason alone. Nobody ever saved his soul or his brother, or went to heaven by a formula or because $2+2=4$. Rather on the ground of the paradox $2+2=5$ or more. We do not live in a logical world. And, whatever God may be, assuming that God is something more than a pious theological fiction, His work and His words suggest Him to be the very opposite of logical—*θεὸς οὐ γεωμετρεῖ.* The inconsequences of Nature strike us most: that the sweet produces the bitter and the bitter the sweet, the like produces the unlike, and the part is greater than the whole. That there are among us even now men and women possessed of miraculous powers will only be doubted by the ignorant and the stupid and the perverse, who profess to believe the evidence of the senses and no more—though this is the very last thing that Science would believe. Their maxim, *nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, exists but as an exploded fallacy. And some day, as Christ said, we shall be able to work greater Miracles than He did. When that day arrives, we shall think but little of the power. To work a Miracle will be no more than to make a mud pie. The transformations of character on the moral and spiritual plane are immeasurably grander than Miracles on the physical plane. The quickening of a dead soul ranks higher than the quickening of a dead body. Miracles of healing have lasted as long as the world, and they stand in a class by themselves. They occur every day, as any doctor can testify. And the Miracles that seem to violate the laws of Nature only contradict our very limited knowledge of Nature and its laws. It has been objected that they prove nothing, and the same may be said of *Paradise Lost* and *Hamlet* and any great work of art. But that should assuredly not count against them.

Christ's wonderful works were deeds of mercy, and signs that spirit was greater than matter. He invariably taught by Illusion and the Law of Accommodation, as He said again and again. We read more than once: He did not many mighty works there (in particular places) because of their unbelief. He was limited by His materials, by the medium in which He acted, by the time and the place and the people and the atmosphere.

If, in support of a certain doctrine, a man declared that to prove its truth he would turn a stick into a stone, he would prove nothing of the kind, but if successful he would only prove himself to be an expert juggler. All that Christ proved by His Miracles was the power of spirit over matter, the transcendence of faith and love. This is not an age of faith, though unquestionably of credulity, and men of Science are not the least offenders; men who swallow the most absurd and preposterous explanations of Miracles, which are often much harder to believe than the Miracles themselves. When we cannot classify an event or an action, and cannot place it under a particular category, we feel disposed to call it a Miracle. But Science reveals more and more the infinite possibilities of mere matter, which seems to be encroaching on the domains of mind or spirit. Indeed, it seems as clear as such an obscure subject can be, that mind or spirit amounts almost to everything and matter to nothing. True Science has dissolved all the solidities and fixities and substantialities of matter and re-solved them into invisible and impalpable activities. Without the slightest intention of so doing, it heaps Miracle on Miracle, especially in the nervous system, "the seat of multitudinous synapses or intervals." And the magical transformations without name and without number, that take place in the laboratory of the body and in the cortex of the brain, are infinitely greater than any physical Miracles recorded in the Gospels. How the inorganic becomes organic, the inanimate animate, the unconscious conscious, might well paralyse with awe any thoughtful observer. The real wonder is that the

New Testament contains so few and most of them such simple Miracles. We should reasonably have expected many more. *Omnia denique in miracula exeunt, atque ex miraculis incipiunt.* The few selected and recorded appear to be but types or specimens of far larger classes. In fact, nobody, not even the greatest experts and authorities and specialists, knows everything about anything. The deeper we probe into Nature's secrets, the deeper the darkness and the mystery. "Verily, Thou art a God that hidest Thyself, O God of Israel the Saviour." And it is the mystery that saves us. The more we follow and are able to interpret the curves of life, and the intensiveness that produces the extensiveness of the different phenomena, the more we are stupefied by what Newman calls God's "adorable mysteriousness." What is life in its thousand thousand forms? It stands out as something inscrutable and inexplicable and unintelligible at the last, it begins and ends in mystery and miracle. The philosophaster and the scientist or the sham professor of science want to reduce all to mechanical agencies and material facts, though matter really no longer exists, but phenomena refuse to be so crudely and cursorily treated. These men want to cut and square everything down to the sort and size of their particular theories. They refuse to leave any vacancy, any unknown or unnamed places on their maps. If it cannot be done fairly, it must be done somehow, whether by force or fraud. There are no empty corners or crosses in their world. And there stands Christ crucified for ever. If the facts will not come into line, so much the worse for the facts. They will make immediately an arbitrary and imaginary alignment. Were there no mysteries, there would be no margin for wonders, no infinite plus. Alas, many are the wand-bearers, but few the mystæ.

We need not agree with Gibbon when he wrote: "To the politician all religions are equally useful, to the populace equally true, and to the philosopher equally false." While, on the other hand, Plutarch said it was harder to doubt than to believe. And yet there is a common ground, on which

the champions of Miracles and the opponents of Miracles may well meet and join hands. But we want more criticism and not less criticism, if it is only the right kind of criticism, just as we all suffer fools gladly if they only talk the right kind of nonsense. And the common ground is that of Illusion —not Delusion, or partial and relative truth. If men of science and metaphysicians would but have the courage of their innermost convictions, they would confess with the mystic there is no verity to be attained except in the union of opposites and in results that we cannot explain and yet must believe. Every religion contains violent contradictions, insoluble antinomies, that yet adjust themselves in worship. *Solvuntur vivendo.* Miracles are just the unexplored continents of thought, into which we are slowly penetrating. Who would care to dwell for a moment in a world where everything was obvious and open and explicable according to cut-and-dried rules? It would not be life at all, but death of the most horrible kind! The Miracles and mysteries that confront us everywhere give the charm and colour and surprise, the blue sky, that make work and play possible and desirable. And a God who could be explained, or quantified by the logician among other predicates, would be no God for us. The very sparrows would peck at Him. A God who could be proved would have no churches and no worshippers —certainly not the men of Science. And a God who did not work Miracles would fail in His chief function, of exciting wonder and awe, interest and inspiration. It would be terrible to know everything—like the *Daily Mail* and the modern schoolgirl!

Nullum miraculum, O quantum miraculum.

F. W. ORDE-WARD.

EASTBOURNE.

"THE EMPTY PURSE."

A MEREDITHIAN STUDY FOR THE TIMES.

REV. JAMES MOFFATT, D.D., D.LITT.

BY "the empty purse" I do not mean the exchequer of any nation at war. It is the title of a long poem which George Meredith published in 1892, and which I propose to analyse, not so much for the sake of its literary qualities as in order to bring out the argument and the ideas. I have been often asked for help of this kind by teachers who discover in some of their more intelligent pupils among the higher forms an interest in Meredith's poetry which feels for something more than artistic structure and rhythm. *The Empty Purse* is not important on that score. It has gleams of genuine poetry now and then, especially in the last two pages, but it is not poetry; it is disfigured by recondite allusions and pedantic classical references,[1] it moves jerkily, and it rarely sustains a high note of expression. Meredith is said to have confessed that it was not poetry, but that he chose verse in order to express certain ideas for which he could not find adequate outlets in his novels —a puzzling statement, for several of the criticisms upon luxury, education, and social reform, which are the theme of *The Empty Purse*, had been, and others were to be, reflected in the novels. Perhaps he meant that he did not see his way to make a hero in fiction out of a youth who had squandered his heritage. He humorously declines elsewhere to hitch another tract to the prodigal son of the New Testament parable, but in

[1] These are explained in Mr Trevelyan's indispensable annotated edition of the poetical works (London: Constable & Company, 1912).

effect this is exactly what he has done in *The Empty Purse.* Its sub-title is, "A sermon to our later prodigal son." The sermon is unconventional enough—a word on the mischievous effects of luxury. Goldsmith had touched this point in *The Deserted Village*, but the touch was slight and did not wreck the poetry. Meredith crushes a psychological and social argument into his verse, and both suffer in the process. But the argument is so trenchant and daring that it is worth while to straighten out the lines of his economic and educational philosophy.

He had already played with the phrase, "the empty purse," in the nineteenth chapter of *The Adventures of Harry Richmond*, where the hero is speaking of his father and himself at the end of their resources. "Our purse was at its lowest ebb; he suggested no means of replenishing it, and I thought of none. He had heard that it was possible to live in Paris upon next to nothing with very great luxury, so we tried it. . . . 'The poet is perhaps, on the whole, more exhilarating than the alderman,' he said. These were the respective names given by him to the empty purse and the full purse." In the poem, however, Meredith makes the empty purse a moralist, not a poet. The hero is a fashionable youth, who has emptied his pockets and wasted a large fortune in riotous living. His purse is as thin as the skin sloughed by a serpent and left hanging on a whin-bush. Look back, says Meredith, and consider what has brought you to this sorry plight.

> "Let memory lead thee back
> To where waves Morning her fleur-de-lys
> Unflushed at the front of the roseate door
> Unopened yet."

He had been the heir of an aristocratic family, petted and pampered from his birth. He had been accustomed to have his wishes and his very whims gratified, and so this spoiled child of wealth passed on to manhood. "The worshipped small body had aims." They were not at first entirely material. Dreams and ideals visited him in the days of his youth.

Romance dawned on him through woman, "sheaf of the wonders of life," till, like Richard Feverel, he had an experience of the world's mystery through the other sex, and perceived the existence of beauty and chivalry.[1] But he had been brought up badly. A great scholar once remarked that he thought the saddest words of the Old Testament were: "Even the youths shall faint and be weary, and the young men shall utterly fall." The hero of *The Empty Purse* utterly fell from his early dream and ideal, and he fell because he had been trained to think himself superior to other people[2] and entitled to gratify his desires at any cost to others. This false view of life proved his undoing. His command of money enabled him, unfortunately, to indulge the sensuous, selfish appetites which lie so near to the ideal conception of woman.

> "Thereanon the keen passions clapped wing,
> Fixed eye, and the world was prey."

Woman especially became his prey. Meredith describes how this youth regarded her with the same hideous desires as Lord Fleetwood in *The Amazing Marriage* or as Heriot in *The Adventures of Harry Richmond* (chap. lv., "His talk of women still suggested the hawk with the downy feathers of the last little plucked bird sticking to his beak").

[1] Meredith marks this in a later novel (*Lord Ormont and his Aminta*, chap. iv.) as a dangerous stage. "It is the special peril of the young lover of life, that an inflammability to beauty in women is in a breath intense with him. He is, in truth, a thinly-sealed volcano of an imperishable ancient father, and has it in him to be the multitudinously-amorous of the mythologic Jove. Give him head, he can be civilisation's devil."

[2] Meredith had already noted this in the second chapter of *The Egoist*. "He had received the domestic education of a prince. Little princes abound in a land of heaped riches. . . . As they are bound in no personal duty to the State, each is for himself, with full present and, what is more, luxurious prospective leisure for the practice of that allegiance. . . . The little prince's education teaches him that he is other than you." The hero of *The Empty Purse* received the same insidious training.

> "Away over heaven the young heart flew,
> And caught many lustres, till someone said
> (Or was it the thought into hearing grew?)
> *Not thou as commoner men!*"

But Sir Willoughby Patterne never treated women as the hero of the poem did.

> "And O the grace of his air,
> As he at the goblet sips,
> A centre of girdles loosed,
> With their grisly label Sold!"

Only, as his mentor points out to him frankly, he did not realise that he was a centre of adulation not for his own sake but for the sake of his money. He was courted and flattered because he was rich, and for no other reason. Also, this self-indulgence meant the gradual decay of his soul; as he waxed gross, his nature became "hollow, more hollow at core." It was the transmigration of this "nation's elect" into a beast, glutting his appetites because in his folly he knew no higher aim.

Now, in the loss of his money, his soul has a chance. It is a hard blow, but it may bring him to his senses. The youth may free himself from the bestial power of gold and become a "man" at last. Meredith appeals to him to overcome his "disgust of the sermon in rhyme" and listen to the plain truth about his opportunity of life on the terms of Nature.

First of all, he will have to work for his living. That will be good for him; it will teach him that he is not superior to the common discipline which falls to the sons of earth. Hitherto his inherited wealth has walled him out from wholesome contact with the elementary laws and duties of life. He has interpreted life from an unnatural position, and the result has been a misconception of the world.

> "What blinkers are they who look
> From the state of the prince or the millionaire!
> They see but the fish they attract."

Poverty will do him the rough but healthy service of shattering these artificial relations to his fellow-men, and putting him in a position from which he can understand human nature better, through kinship and co-operation.

One of his temptations will be to wax cynical over human nature. Meredith warns him against this besetting sin of those who have fared as he has, and who use their ex-

perience of flattering false friends and of loose women[1] to draw up a verdict against humanity in general. You have no business to cast anathemas "upon Providence, women, the world"; you only know some lower types of men and women, and after all you are yourself to blame. Meredith has no sympathy with the misanthropy of a Timon of Athens, and he is careful to lay stress on his favourite idea that cynicism is a deadly sin against humanity. When you are stripped of your wealth and its narrowing influences, he tells the youth, you may learn what human nature really is; but that knowledge will not come automatically, and it will never come if you slip into the easy habit of maligning your fellow-men, as though the specimens you have had the misfortune to meet were representative. A man is not necessarily the better for losing his money. He may retain, even in poverty, a stubborn belief in money still. His regret may be, not for what selfish luxury has made of him, but for the opportunities of indulgence that he has lost. Misfortune may have only taught him to denounce or bewail the ingratitude and shallowness of his fellow-creatures. In that case, his purse has been emptied in vain. He must see to it, Meredith argues, that in losing his money he does not lose faith in humanity; his main regret must be not for the empty purse but for the life which has been almost emptied of manliness and comradeship.

But you are at liberty to blame the absurd social system under which you were brought up:

> "grandmotherly Laws
> Giving rivers of gold to our young,
> In the days of their hungers impure."

Meredith is willing to make this allowance for his reprobate.

[1] "Thou wilt spare us the cynical pout
At humanity: sign of a nature bechurled . . .
Thy knowledge of women might be surpassed."

Compare *Lord Ormont and his Aminta* (chap. xii.): "His ejaculation 'Women!' was, as he knew, merely ignorance roaring behind a mask of sarcasm."

It is never wholesome for a man who has gone wrong to lay the blame wholly or primarily on his environment; he must begin by acknowledging his personal responsibility:

> "Relate what things thou legally didst
> For the Archseducer of flesh."

But once this is done, a man may be allowed to trace the directions in which false ideals and foolish habits current in his age have warped his career. Meredith holds that his hero ought to speak out on this factor of the rake's progress, not to excuse himself but to secure some readjustment of the situation. You must not, he says, be content to pick yourself out of the gutter. You must not rail against society for having put a gutter across the rich youth's path. You must do what you can to get that gutter removed. This is the theme of *The Empty Purse*; Meredith summons his prodigal to social service, and encourages him with the thought that his dearly bought experience may be turned to the business of cleaning and straightening the social environment for the benefit of the next generation.

The "grandmotherly Laws" are those which permit men to amass large fortunes and property—"with little regard to the creatures they squeezed"[1]—and to bequeath these to their children. What Meredith has in mind is the modern reverence for property, especially in the form of money. He criticises this passion for wealth and for the transmission of wealth as a subtle form of greed, which is anti-social; better for society at

[1] In *Celt and Saxon* (chap. xv.) a wealthy Englishman is described, who made a large fortune; but, Meredith adds, no one said anything about his "dependence upon the conjoint labour of his fellows to push him to his elevation. As little did they think of foretelling a day, generations hence, when the empty heirs of his fellows might prefer a modest claim (confused in statement) to compensation against the estate he bequeathed: for such prophecy as that would have hinted at a tenderness for the mass to the detriment of the individual, and such tenderness as that is an element of our religion, not the drift of our teaching." The words "an element of our religion" echo the saying in *The Empty Purse* that "crowds of illogical Christians, no doubt," occupy the position of the wealthy who shut themselves away from the needs and claims of the common people.

large, better for the men themselves,[1] certainly better for their children, if such wealth were distributed. Hardly anywhere else has Meredith attacked capitalism so bluntly. He does not give any clear exposition of the reform which he would like to see initiated. It is impossible from his pages to make out what form of modern socialism tallies with his ideal. The one fact about which he is explicit is the criminal folly of permitting great possessions to come into the hands of inexperienced young men at an age when the majority of them are practically certain to waste their money and themselves.[2] It is his conviction of this which prompts him to strike at the modern fetish of Property. The progress of society from the ethics of the savage should make it clear that a change of this kind is the next step to be taken towards the light.[3]

He recognises that it is an unpopular crusade. You will be howled at and cursed, especially by the press ("though Journals be guns"), for venturing to propose a reform of this kind. Never mind. Take ridicule and opposition manfully, in the hope of scouring the house of Life for the next generation. These laws of private property need to be civilised in the interests of human brotherhood; and as for the anger excited by proposals of reform—why, that is

> "The portion of them who civilise,
> Who speak the word novel and true."

To endure such denunciation will purify your own nature, as nothing else can.

[1] You must teach the plutocrat,

> "How for his giving, the more he will get;
> For trusting his fellows, leave friends round his sons."

[2] "In the hands of a young man, wealth is an invitation to devilry" (*The Amazing Marriage*, chap. xix.).

[3] A clear exposition of Meredith's objection to property may be found in Edward Carpenter's paper on "Civilisation" (*Civilisation: Its Cause and Cure*), which argues that the growth of private property tends to draw man apart from Nature, from his fellow-men, and from his real self. Or, in his paper on "Private Property" in *England's Ideal*. Either of these is a useful prose comment on *The Empty Purse*.

> "The young generation! ah, there is the child
> Of our souls down the Ages! to bleed for it proof
> That souls we have."

And souls to-day mean brain, the possession of democratic convictions, the refusal to let precedents and traditions fetter progress. "Let brain democratic be king of the host." Just as the organising genius of Rome drove roads across the forests and marshes of Britain, so the inspiring force of progress to-day comes from a steady brain, which sees ahead the needs of the next generation and drives through any obstacle to meet them. This, says Meredith, ought to nerve you to face ridicule and opposition from "the senile lords in a parchment sky," as he designates lawyers and political upholders of the *status quo.*

The penitent prodigal must, therefore, ally himself with the progressive cause of social democracy; that is his one chance of salvation. Once he was

> "A Conservative youth, who the cream-bowl skimmed,
> Desiring affairs to be left as they are."

Now, he must take "Youth's natural place in the fray," as a young reformer or, in Meredith's phrase, "a Tentative,"

> "A Tentative, combating Peace,
> Our lullaby word for decay."

This recalls a happy retort of J. K. Stephen, four years earlier. Meredith seems to have asked him what the dickens he expected to come to, if he started as a Tory. Stephen inserted in his short-lived weekly paper, *The Reflector*, the following advertisement: "The gentleman who recently asked a younger man what the dickens he expected to come to, if he started in life as a Tory, is referred to the precedent of Mr Gladstone." If Meredith could have assumed that all young Tories would evolve on these lines, he might have been reconciled to a Tory start for young men, but evidently he did not feel justified in making such an assumption.

At this point he introduces a characteristic warning against violence and exaggeration in the new propaganda. Those who head such a revolutionary movement are apt to be unjust to

the opposite side; they are tempted to forget that it is brain which must prevail, and that they serve the cause best if they take pains to understand the case of their opponents, and thus to convince them. The progressive cause does not rest simply on warm sentiment, but on reason; it is based on a rational idea of the world's purpose, and it is not helped by violence.

> "There will come an immediate decree
> In thy mind for the opposite party's decease,
> If he bends not an instant knee.
> Expunge it."

Remember, says Meredith, that those who take the Conservative side are not necessarily knaves.[1] The old aristocratic party had their virtues and their part to play in the advance of society. Respect their dislike of change; it is intelligible in the light of what they had to come through. "There are those whom we push from the path with respect," men who in their day were not all wrong, and who have won the very ground from which you seek to advance. The Radical cannot afford to disregard history; rightly understood, the past encourages him for the future.[2] Meredith pours contempt on the rhetorical demagogue who appeals noisily to the passions of the crowd, who reviles his opponents indiscriminately, who sees only what is before his eyes and therefore fails to see it truly, who is perhaps sincere but certainly overheated.[3] Wisdom is not produced by this furious frenzy. "Take eloquence," said a Frenchman—Paul Verlaine, I think—"and wring its neck." If that is good advice for a preacher, it is

[1] The best illustration is the character-sketch of Romfrey in *Beauchamp's Career*, which shows how Meredith, for all his Radical sympathies, could do justice to the qualities of the Conservative aristocrat.

[2] This idea is worked out in the poem *Foresight and Patience*.

[3] He had urged this in 1865, in a letter of remonstrance and advice to Captain Maxse: "You presume to declare yourself as if, perceiving a system to be faulty, it was an imperative duty to explode every shred of it to the winds. . . . You speak, my dear Fred, of the deepest questions of life? They are to be thought over very long and very carefully before they are fought over." In *The Empty Purse* this becomes—

> "Giants to slay
> Demand knowing eyes in their Jack."

good for a social reformer, provided that we define eloquence as rhetoric in Meredith's sense of the term, the blowing of hot steam from an empty or a narrow brain. He wanted his young prodigal to push fearlessly against abuses, but he foresaw the danger of generous feeling evaporating in disorderly agitation or in noisy declamation. "With rhetoric loose, can we check man's brute?" We cannot, he replies. Such methods mark intoxication for the mob, not sanity; they denote a reversion to the savage level, whereas what is wanted for democratic progress is balanced wisdom, which shows its strength by moderation, by a sense even of humour, and by a comprehensive appreciation of the problem. The impulses of a reformer may be unselfish, but if they are mere impulses they become sour and narrow. Test your argument by this: "Is it accepted of Song?" He does not mean that genuine democratic principles must be capable of being made the theme of an oratorio or of being put into verse, but that they must preserve the moderation and harmony which are the marks of true wisdom, as opposed to violence and one-sidedness which spell weakness in the Liberal as well as in the Conservative party. Wild statements indicate a lack of fundamental brain-work, and therefore a defective sense of "justice, whose voice is a melody clear." Without justice, nothing can be produced which will be of value to the next generation. But, as Meredith was keen enough to recognise, it is possible to be extremely unjust in pleading for justice. He had already touched this truth in the pages of *Beauchamp's Career*, and he was to reiterate it soon in one of the most penetrating passages in *Lord Ormant and his Aminta*—the well-known discussion in the seventeenth chapter on the frequent inferiority of eminent persons to "the people we call common," in point of large wisdom and openness of mind ("Unless we have the sense of justice abroad like a common air, there's no peace, and no steady advance. But these humble people had it"). His sheer sympathy with reformers of the social order leads him to insist on the value of a just mind, as he sends

out the hero of *The Empty Purse* to his crusade. Nothing is to be gained by exciting mob-passions or by developing a vendetta of class against class. The effective reformer will equip himself with a historical appreciation of the world's purpose and take broad views of the present situation; instead of allowing himself to wax blindly furious against the opposition of his own day, he will recognise that this must be handled with a firmness which cannot afford to weaken itself by irritation or exaggeration. He will apply his mind to the problem of which this opposition is a symptom, and the diagnosis will make him generous without abating his determination to eradicate the disease. To cut yourself off from your fellows in a fury of impatience, says Meredith, may be very showy, but it is a barren method. Nothing comes of the showy, imposing, and noisy agitation which at this stage of progress ignores the supreme importance of a grasp of facts and a devotion to ideas.

The sustaining passion of the reformer, who realises the tides of social progress welling up to him through the past generations, is the thought of the next generation, the sense of unselfish responsibility for the welfare of the race as represented in those who are coming after him.

> "Keep the young generations in hail,
> And bequeath them no tumbled house."

Instead of the egotistical life you once led, refuse to think of yourself, even of your personal immortality, and be content to promote the interests of those who follow you on earth. That is Nature's inspiring lesson for the individual.[1] Fulfil her law, and you will understand and experience what Life in this world really means. Let your sad experience nerve you to save others from the same plague of dangerous wealth. Expiate your share in these "grandmotherly Laws" by agitating for their repeal in the interests of the community, and as

[1] The individual is only "a dot or stop" in the sentence which is being spelled out through the ages; he must not claim to be more.

you agitate remember two things. One is, don't be afraid of repeating. Give variations on the same idea;

"Iterate, iterate, harp on the trite."

The other is, don't lose your temper. History is one of the means which impart this flexibility of mind to the reformer. "Our preacher to win is the supple in stiff"—that is, the man who has imagination enough to be persuasive and who can bend in order to gain his point, instead of thinking that convictions are to be rammed home by force of lung power and a disregard of prejudices. You must always argue "in measure, with bearing polite"—as Beauchamp[1] sometimes failed to do.

Meredith has now finished his appeal for the progressive movement as a career for the prodigal who desires to make something of his remaining years and strength. He concludes by assuring the youth that there is a fine future on earth for men, if only they can be brought to recognise that wealth is not a monopoly of the few, but intended by Nature for the common good of all.

"By my faith, there is feasting to come,
Not the less, when our Earth we have seen
Beneath and on surface, her deeds and designs:
Who gives us the man-loving Nazarene,
The martyrs, the poets, the corn, and the vines.
By my faith in the head, she has wonders in loom;
Revelations, delights."

When money is viewed as the means to attain luxuries for oneself, it proves the great separator. When it is regarded as something better than this, better than a private possession to

[1] "The sense that he was left unaided to the task of bending his tough uncle, combined with his appreciation of the righteousness of the task to embitter him and set him on a pedestal, from which he descended at every sign of an opportunity for striking, and to which he retired continually baffled and wrathful, in isolation" (*Beauchamp's Career*, chap. xxxviii.). That is partly what Meredith means in the words which I have ventured to italicise in the above quotation—"by my faith in the head." The healthy motive of hope for the progressive cause must be in a reasoned sense of the relation between the individual and society; and unless this is held fast, the reformer is in danger of becoming not only embittered, and therefore ineffective, but pessimistic in face of contemporary opposition.

be hoarded for oneself or for that extension of oneself which is called one's family, when the true pleasures of the world are sought and found in brotherly living and mutual service, then two refreshing results follow. One is, a deliverance from the selfish strife of classes and parties. The real meaning of the world is seen to lie in

> "Glad eyes, frank hands, and a fellowship real:
> And laughter on lips, as the birds' outburst
> At the flooding of light. No robbery then,
> The feast, nor a robber's abode the home."

Which is what William Morris sung in more melodious stanzas and mediæval prose. The other outcome is a closer intimacy with Nature, which for Meredith as for Wordsworth means human nature as well as the universe of outward things. Once we are sensitive to the divine presence in mankind, not simply in our own class but in men as men, "we feel deep to Earth at her heart," and through comradeship with them enter further into the meaning of our world.

So Meredith dismisses his young friend to the career of serving and reforming his age. He admits it is not a romantic business. It means steady labour and a strain. But he can give two counsels for the road. One is a piece of advice which he had already put into the prose of Dr Shrapnel, that ardent social democrat (in the twenty-ninth chapter of *Beauchamp's Career*).[1]

> "If courage should falter, 'tis wholesome to kneel.
> Remember that well, for[2] the secret with some,
> Who pray for no gift, but have cleansing in prayer,
> And free from impurities tower-like stand."

Some natures, he means, will be the better for this instinctive communion with the Eternal, which purges them from self-regard. But, for all natures, life will furnish homely joys, and these are the best refreshment. It is not luxuries but the

[1] "Take this, my Beauchamp, for the good in prayer, that it makes us repose on the unknown with confidence, makes us flexible to change, makes us ready for revolution—for life then! . . . Prayer is the recognition of laws," and so on.

[2] For it is.

common, simple interests of existence that provide us with a zest for the day's work. A religious man, who knew his Bible, would clinch this truth, especially in our martial days, with the Psalmist's words:

> "He shall drink of the brook in the way,
> Therefore shall he lift up the head,"

and continue his victorious pursuit of the foe. But Meredith was not fond of quoting the Bible, and he did not write *The Empty Purse* in wartime. He takes a parable [1] from the cart-horse, slaking his thirst at a trough by the road, his nostrils widening at every draught of the simple food. That, says Meredith, is a reminder of the sources from which the worker can hope to refresh himself as he plods forward. As he serves this Earth and asks for nothing better than what is common to all, he will not fail to be invigorated from time to time. The moral sustainments of life are not recondite, and they are invariably provided for those who do not shun the dusty high-road of their duty.

JAMES MOFFATT.

[1] Three years later he told a correspondent (*Letters,* vol. ii. p. 478), "I have lived long enough to see that our chief agoniser and thwarter is impatience. One of the prettiest spectacles to me is a costermonger's donkey going blithely at the trot. Our maxim should be, merry in harness—while we have to serve."

THE TYRANNY OF BENEFACTORS.

MARY WILKENS HOYT.

THE longing to tyrannise would seem to be a phase of the impulse to self-realisation, and "the will to power" a force not less strong in human nature than "the will to live." The desire to dominate may manifest itself in a variety of forms; but it is probably most dangerous when it masquerades under its most plausible disguise, and appears as benevolence itself. We resist or despise the man who displays his love of mastery by torturing his slaves, by robbing his dependants, or by flaunting in purple and fine linen; but how may we defend ourselves from him who sacrifices himself for our good, and spends his life striving to force us to think and to do what he knows will make us better and happier? The tyranny of love, the most subtle of all tyrannies, seems to have been born into the world with Christianity. The Pagan religions, having no suspicion that a man should be his brother's keeper, did not persecute one another; but the Christian Church was compelled to force men to be saved; an inquisitor, for instance, who loved his neighbours as he loved himself, who knew the true God and the one way of salvation, dared not permit others to imperil their souls by listening to heresy, and must needs crush out all beginnings of independent and dangerous thought The Golden Rule has seldom been interpreted by Christianity as meaning "Thou shalt let thy neighbour alone even as thou wouldst thyself be let alone."

It seemed for a time, indeed, as if all the world would be

compelled to become of one mind, those who differed having no way of escape from the pressure of the tyranny of the community; but suddenly there was revealed beyond the seas a new world where those who chose to endure the hardship of the wilderness rather than to deny the god within the breast could find space to establish their own religion and try their own experiments in worship. We, looking back to the seventeenth century, see that England was the weaker for many years because she attempted to regulate the church services for all Englishmen, that France has never, perhaps, recovered from the loss of her Huguenots. But the world at large was not made poorer by the destruction of some precious thing, for the new ideas grew strong in the new land and make part of our life to-day. We, however, are in a more perilous state than were our ancestors, for the world has again grown small. All the earth has, apparently, been discovered and taken possession of and connected with all the rest of the earth by telegraph and telephone, and no place has been left where ideas cast out by the majority can betake themselves and live out their discredited lives in peace—until some day they, in their turn, win over the majority and begin to give laws to the world. What shall we do, then, to make sure that we shall not impoverish ourselves by forbidding people whose thoughts are not our thoughts to try their own experiments in living and, possibly, discover for us something to make life even more desirable? In the old days men felt assurance only concerning spiritual truth and tried to save only the souls of their friends. It is easy for us now to insist that a man's soul is his own and that he should be left to settle his spiritual affairs with God. No longer confident about our own salvation, we are willing, at last, to let other people save themselves—if they can. The truth that we profess to know to-day is scientific and social truth, and it is over men's bodies and "businesses" that we are setting up our safeguards; we, who see most clearly that our forefathers were wrong in attempting to regulate men's

beliefs, never doubt that we are right in striving to regulate our neighbours' conduct and to allow each man only so much freedom as will enable him to do what we know is best for him. Mankind is slow to learn that "liberty is a good to be improved and not an evil to be lessened. It is not only a private blessing of the first order, but the vital spring and energy of the state itself, which has just so much life and vigour as there is liberty in it."

The problem is the more difficult because, as Burke also pointed out, "The *extreme* of liberty (which is its abstract perfection but its real fault) obtains nowhere, nor ought to obtain anywhere. . . . Liberty must be limited in order to be possessed." Life itself, even in the biological sense, involves adjustment; the forms of things, M. Bergson tells us, are the result of the struggle of the life-force to come to terms with brute matter. The forms of our society, the institutions, the laws that are the basis of our life to-day, are the outcome of social forces struggling, each of them, for mastery, striving to dominate, held in check only by other forces strong enough to offer resistance. It is evident to all, moreover, that one class has, for a long period, held the balance of power and has made laws to suit its needs, that our society has been arranged so that he who has may keep and may even increase his possessions.

A dominant class, however, can remain dominant only if it finds itself face to face with no other class strong enough to dispute its supremacy. But, in our time, as is attested by the passing of various laws directed against trusts and monopolies, there has grown into existence a class strong enough to contest the rule of the capitalist. That class is known by the name of the "mass of the people," and we are all joyously shouting that soon *The People* will be absolutely powerful, able to make their will the undisputed law of the land. "All free men feel that the only tolerable condition of Government is Democracy. No such man will tolerate the compulsory direction of his actions by any temporal authority save the

general will of his fellow-citizens. . . . Democracy means Government by the General Will. That is to say, it means that such laws as the mass of the population approves are passed and enforced, while such laws as are obnoxious to the mass of the population are rejected." The largest "mass," however, must be composed of individual units, each one of which, presumably, has opinions and desires of its own; but no one seems to doubt that, if the majority of my countrymen wish to bring to pass what I find bad in itself, I shall be perfectly satisfied in the knowledge that I have my world against me. It might seem that such a position by reason of its loneliness would be less endurable than the situation of the man who stood with his fellow-townsmen against his over-lord. "Everyone must admit," said a German to me some years ago, "that arbitration is foolish. The best way, of course, is to fight it out; then you know who is the stronger and are satisfied." And when, in the *Place de la Concorde* I saw Strasburg with the funeral wreaths at her feet, I realised how perfect is the satisfaction of feeling that another country is the stronger. The human race has never found it possible to accept the logic of force; the heart of Euripides was moved by the appeal of the ambassadors of Melos against the power of Athens just as our hearts are moved by the protest of Belgium against the might of Germany.

He who rejoices to be governed by the majority must be convinced that the mass of the people will infallibly desire what is best for the community. And yet history seems to show that to democracies, conspicuous ability in the individual has been peculiarly obnoxious. To hate what is superior to ourselves, to attempt "l'égalisation . . . sur le type le plus bas," we, the People, have seemed prone when, in the past, we have had an opportunity to make our approvals and disapprovals felt. The Athenians, Swift reminds us, impeached Miltiades, Aristides, Themistocles, Pericles, and Alcibiades, and prepared for Athens a long age of mediocrity which was her death. "Thus was the most powerful commonwealth of all Greece

utterly destroyed by that rash, jealous and inconstant humour of the People, which was never satisfied to see a general either victorious or unfortunate: such ill judges, as well as rewarders, have Popular Assemblies been of those who best deserved from them."

Nor do we appear to excel the Athenians in magnanimity of spirit; it is impossible to follow any important political campaign and to fail to be convinced that we also hate what is greater than we. "This is our biggest man; let us heave a brick at him to show him we are as good as he is." The artisan class, especially, is supposed to hold "the opinion that bad workmen ought to receive the same wages as good, and that no one ought to be allowed . . . to earn by superior skill and industry more than others can without it." If every man is really the equal of every other, if the products of all labour are actually equal in value, then no man's time is more precious than that of another, and from all men should be exacted the same amount of manual labour. On such a supposition is based the socialistic scheme set forth in "The Great State," the description of a community in which it is "infamous . . . to possess more property than some very small amount, or any income not earned by manual labour." The citizens of "The Great State" are contented and healthy; each works five hours a day in producing food and clothes for the community, and spends the remaining hours in rest and the cultivation of his æsthetic nature. And then, life having been arranged upon a system of equal distribution of so-called disagreeable work, Sir Ray Lankester tells us that if new truth is to be discovered, a body of men especially gifted and carefully trained must be set apart to carry on investigations; Mr Roger Fry declares that no man can paint pictures if he must be interrupted every day by other work, and offers as a solution the suggestion that the world has, perhaps, no need of new pictures; and Mr G. R. Stirling Taylor holds out to architects the hope of refuge in some craftsman's guild from the banal decisions of the multitude.

But I, who am no genius, think that, if I had lived when Michael Angelo was alive, I should best have served my world by sitting ten hours over my loom and leaving him free to create *Night and Morning* and the *Cumæan Sibyl*; and that a state would have been mad which required of Sir Isaac Newton, who, absorbed in his *Principia*, felt no hunger nor thirst nor need of sleep, the same number of hours of manual labour it required of men who can think of nothing more amusing to do in their leisure hours than to sit drinking and smoking in their clubs. It is idle to talk of equality; some of us have ideas, but most of us, even if we are given precisely the same opportunities for development, cannot think anything that the people about us do not think. No one who has taught for a day a class of children, however carefully selected with a view to homogeneity, can fail to believe in such, possibly undesirable, phenomena as diversities of gifts, and grades of ability. If, because of false and flattering assumptions of equality in power and in value, we make a world where genius cannot exercise its functions, we shall bequeath to the future no such legacy as we have received from the past.

Let us suppose, however, that we, the People, are purged of all hateful passions; that when we contemplate what is greater than we, we feel, instead of envy, only a deep delight; then we shall believe that in expressing our wills, we are giving voice to the purest "general will" of the State, and we shall but the more complacently exercise the lust for tyranny which, existing in every individual, does not die out when the individual becomes a portion of the mass. We shall strive to save the bodies and the morals of our neighbours, just as the inquisitors strove to save the souls of our ancestors, and as the captains of finance have striven to save the prosperity of the nation. But are we sure that, at this moment, we can know what are the very best ways of life? We are inclined, for instance, to show little tenderness to those who own property; reacting from the legislation of the age that is passing, we make laws that will

take away from him that hath and will give to him that hath not. Meanwhile we forget that the poorest of us is possessed of comforts and conveniences that, in Queen Elizabeth's day, would have been impossible of attainment by the Queen herself; and that our life has reached its present standard largely because the rich have been able to adopt new fads that chanced to take their fancy. If no one could have tried the experiment of bringing water into his house in pipes and running it into his tub by a turn of the faucet, could you and I who are poor have taken our cold baths this morning? A few years ago the automobile was a luxury for the millionaire; to-day people of moderate means own their own cars; in another decade perhaps the very poor will have come into possession and the problem of over-crowded cities will have been solved. We are filling our statute books with laws to protect the bodies of the people. And yet one sometimes wonders if we are quite certain of all our premises. Are the anti-vaccinationists, for instance, entirely wrong? Do we know that we have not conquered small-pox by improved ways of life, and that virus introduced into a living organism leaves no harmful results? If a government health service had never permitted Christian Science to lift its head, should we know so much as we know to-day about the psychic element in nervous disorders? Concerning one matter almost all the creators of ideal commonwealths appear to agree—in Utopia, in Lilliput, in all well-governed lands, no man has the responsibility of his children; the State charges itself with the care of its future citizens. But how can a State be sure that it will have future citizens to rear? Why should people care to have children? Does not a man chiefly desire to leave a son who will be "like his father, only more fortunate"? Does he not care for the child primarily because it "brings forward-looking thoughts"? And if he is forced to let his child be moulded after some pattern hateful to him, will he care to be the father of the child?

Doubtless everyone wishes his body to be an effective machine; but we are told that there is scarcely a step from the delicate nervous adjustment that means genius to the over-excitement that produces insanity; if, from the beginning of time, we had understood the breeding of perfectly healthy animals, should we have lost Homer and Dante and Shakespeare? Desiring that every man shall live, we run the risk of creating a world where nothing can be produced that makes life really desirable; wishing you to be healthy, I may take from you the 'immediate jewel of your soul' for which you care to live at all. Shall the Puritan close our theatres because he thinks we should be stronger if we went to bed at sunset and got up at sunrise? The world is to-day a fine place because of those who have poured out their blood like water for honour, for virtue, for beauty: that would be but a poor land indeed where every man would give all that he hath for his physical life.

That a State is composed of various forces struggling together for some *modus vivendi*, that the State is in danger when one class has complete mastery and can crush out all forms of life save its own, has, in the past, been recognised by the framers of constitutions. Some mechanism has been invented to perform in the social system the function which, in the body, M. Bergson attributes to the conscious intelligence; there has been some device for holding back action, for providing time for indetermination while many possibilities were considered and free play was given to the opinion of the minority so that it, too, might influence the final decision. And not the least dangerous of the signs of the times is the growing impatience with all that checks the instantaneous realisation of the will of the "mass of the population"; "on a osé, pour la première fois, conserver au peuple son droit de souveraineté, celui de n'obéir qu'à des lois dont le mode de formation—si elle est confiée à des représentants—ait été légitimé par son approbation immédiate, dont—si elles blessent ses droits ou ses intérêts—il puisse toujours obtenir la réforme

par un acte régulier de sa volonté souveraine." Convinced that if we had been able in the past to exercise our "sovereign will," we should now have no problems of poverty and of crime, we are seeking to legislate away all the evils of the world. In America, taking little advantage of the opportunity for local diversity afforded by our federal system, we seek to "standardise" all State legislation, or better yet, to extend the powers of the central government so that it may save all local communities the labour of regulating their own lives. Everyone who sees an evil and thinks he sees a remedy is rushing to Washington to put through his national equal-suffrage bill and his national divorce bill and his national child-labour bill. Thus we shall give perfect laws to all the States and, setting aside their prerogatives, force them into what we know is the best way of life. And we forget that communities, forbidden to make their own laws, become skilful in inventing methods of annulling laws that they do not care to enforce, that Navigation Acts and Fifteenth Amendments have occasionally been set at naught. A community that may not work out its own problems, try its own experiments, find out for itself what is the best way of life, can scarcely be called a free member of a free country. "The citizenship of the ancient civilised State was destroyed just in so far as the feudal military system crushed out civic life, and the feudal or territorial units of justice were in turn crushed out by the centralisation of justice as the bigger States of Europe came to birth in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries." And yet, when the question is so large that the world can understand, when the matter at issue concerns the right of one nation to dominate the civilisation of another, the world is not slow to respond. A hundred years ago Europe refused to accept Freedom from France; to-day she refuses to accept *Kultur* from Germany. Who can doubt that the victory of the Allies will mean the fresh assertion of the doctrine of Liberty upon which we in America believe our existence to be based, the doctrine that each nation, however

small she may be, has the right to develop her own civilisation in her own way and to live the life that she may choose for herself? But of what avail is the agony and the out-pouring of blood if each nation, freed from foreign tyranny, raises up one class of its people to enslave the others and to crush out all ways of life that seem undesirable to those who happen to be the majority?

"Every new opinion, at the starting, is precisely in a minority of one." And by means of those rare and lonely souls who have been able to see that a way of life utterly different from that of their fellows might be the more beautiful way, has the world been fashioned into a place of delight for all of us. But society has hated such disturbers of its peace, has asserted a deep-rooted belief in homogeneity and mediocrity by crucifying them or sending them the draught of hemlock. What precious ideas have been lost to us, ideas that would have made the world fairer for ever, we shall never know; the power of social forces, like the power of other forces, can be determined only by giving them free play of action. May it not be worth our while, perhaps, to encourage as much as possible all varieties of living so that we may have an opportunity to test and to judge and finally to adopt what seems to us the best? When we study biological life, we establish experiment stations and pay trained investigators to search into the habits of algæ and the fertilisation of ferns. We need not pay for the establishment of experiment stations in social life; men are only too eager to try out their own ideas: we need simply to keep ourselves away from them and not restrain them by the passing of laws to make them all into men like ourselves. How beautiful the world to come may be if, for once, we should try the experiment of not hating all ways that are not our ways; if we should see to it that, for social life at least, "les portes de l'avenir restent grandes ouvertes"!

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DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under special circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"THE STEWARDSHIP OF FAITH" AND CANON SCOTT HOLLAND.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1915, p. 200.)

It is not as a rule expedient to answer reviews. A writer is not often capable of judging the justice of criticisms brought upon his own book, and it is wiser for him to put them on one side and think about them instead of attempting an answer. But Canon Scott Holland's review of *The Stewardship of Faith* seems to demand some reply, because it is much more than a review. He has not merely criticised various statements in my book, but has set forth his own view of Christianity in a manner which ought to give rise to discussion and was probably intended to do so. I shall therefore attempt in a few paragraphs to attack his positive statements while avoiding or leaving to others any discussion of his criticism of secondary details in my own book, not because I wish to ignore his criticisms, but because the real point of interest would be obscured by their discussion.

Canon Scott Holland's own view of the main problems of Early Christianity, and of the points with which any solution must reckon seriously, is that from the very beginning Christians held the same view of Jesus as is found in the Pauline Epistles. This is, according to him, the earliest known and the normative kind of Christianity, and we cannot account for its existence unless we believe that a completely new element was introduced into human life at the time of Jesus, so that, as he says, history was cloven in twain by the coming of the Lord. Since that time, and in consequence of their attachment to their Lord, men have obtained a new life which is different from that of other people, and they have done so by means of the Sacrament of Baptism, which was instituted for that purpose by Jesus.

I desire to point out quite briefly that this position is untenable. The first part is not true to the facts of history, so far as we can ascertain them by the ordinary methods of investigation into the past; and the second part is not confirmed by the observation of the facts of life in common experience.

The central point of the first part of Canon Scott Holland's argument

is that Paulinism is the only form of Early Christianity for which we have documentary witness: "The original and earliest documents," he says, "are the earlier Epistles of St Paul. These report it in the form in which it won its way to be a religion. If we want to read its evidence in the historical order, we must begin with the Epistles to the Thessalonians, the Corinthians, the Galatians, the Romans. That is the Christianity which converted the world."

This statement is surely misleading: it fails to distinguish between the date of documents and the date of the events described in them.

It is true that the earliest documents of Christianity are the Pauline Epistles, but it is not true that there are no documents representing an earlier type of Christianity. It may be true that this is the Christianity which converted the world, but it is not true that it is the Christianity preached by Jesus. The epistle which Canon Scott Holland selects as the earliest is 1 Thessalonians, which was written about 50 A.D. The contention of all modern criticism, except of the extreme Dutch school, is that the Gospel of Mark, and, less completely, the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, give a trustworthy picture of Christianity as it was in the time of Jesus, and that the Acts give us a fairly good but somewhat generalised picture of it as it was in Jerusalem in the period immediately following. These documents were written later than the Pauline Epistles, but they represent an earlier period.

Do they show that Christianity at this earlier period was the same as that of the Pauline Epistles? On this point Canon Scott Holland's opinion is not entirely different from that of other critics, and I will willingly adopt his language. Speaking of the Gospel of Luke and of Acts he says that the Pauline creed does not even "peep through." That is, I should have thought, a slight exaggeration, but it is substantially correct, and I submit that there is therefore *prima facie* reason for saying that the first task of criticism is not, as Canon Scott Holland urges, to explain the existence of Pauline Christianity, but to explain the existence of the Synoptic Gospels. His own treatment can scarcely be regarded as an explanation. He states that "St Luke, whom we accept as the writer of the Third Gospel and of the Acts,[1] most assuredly held the strong creed of his Master, as we have it in the Epistles to the Romans and the Corinthians. He had never been taught any other gospel. Yet, holding this with heart and soul, he is satisfied to write his Gospel without letting his creed peep through; and he enjoys reporting the early speeches of St Peter in the Acts without any feeling of their inadequacy."

How does he know this? Apart from the Gospels and Acts, we have no evidence whatever as to Luke's creed; but in these books themselves we have some evidence as to Luke's purpose in writing, for the Evangelist states himself that he wrote in order that Theophilus might know the

[1] Let me issue a *caveat* against the assumption that the writer of the Gospel and Acts was quite certainly a companion of St Paul. I must not stop to argue the point, but it seems to me to be far from settled.

certainty of the things in which he had been instructed (Luke i. 3). According to the hypothesis of the Regius Professor these things must have been the Pauline Creed, for there was no other; but I submit that a criticism which is content boldly to chronicle its belief that though this creed was that of Paul, and though Luke wrote in order to confirm it, it nevertheless was not allowed to "peep through," reduces either St Luke or itself to an absurdity. To picture Luke as an ardent Paulinist, enjoying the task of reporting the inadequate speeches of St Peter, is a stroke of literary imagination, but scarcely of historical insight. It is not I or any other modern critic that the Regius Professor has to face when he says that "a criticism which makes them" (*i.e.* the Synoptic Gospels and the Epistles) "separate and separable stages has surrendered its task": it is the Evangelists who are against him. The critics did not write the Synoptic Gospels, and it is these—not modern books of criticism—in which the Pauline creed, *teste Professore Regio*, does not "peep through."

The truth is that, so far from the separation between the Epistles and the Synoptic Gospels being the foolish act of critics, it is a fact the proper explanation of which is the main problem of the historical criticism of the Apostolic Age.

In the attempt to state and to deal with this problem, critics have made considerable progress in the last ten or fifteen years. Drede's *Jesus*, Joh. Weiss's *Die Predigt Jesu*, and Bousset's *Kyrios Christos* have been the centres of a series of disputes which form a connected whole, and have the highest constructive value for the historian. They have made it increasingly plain that Jesus preached the coming of the Kingdom, and that he believed and his disciples believed, either before or after the Resurrection, that he was, or was to be, the Messiah. They regarded him with the honour and reverence due to the Messiah. He was, or would be, the head of the Kingdom. Through him they learnt more about the Kingdom, and more about the conduct required from them. Some students (and apparently the Regius Professor and myself are here in agreement) would add that the special type of Messiah with which he identified himself was that found in the books of Enoch. He was the "Son of Man, whom God has prepared for himself." It is submitted by critics who accept this, that, doubtful as other details may be, it is enough to account for the devotion of disciples, and that, however difficult it may be for us to believe such propositions, it was not difficult for Jews.[1]

It is a very distorted statement of this position which I endeavoured to explain in my book, to say that I can "see nothing in the life and career of Jesus to account for the phenomenon that we have described." I see a great deal, and I fail to understand how the Regius Professor can sum up my description of the matter by saying, "How, if he meant so little, did his believers come to think that he meant so much?" To the Jewish

[1] The influence which belief has on character and conduct is in proportion to its intensity, not to its intellectual correctness; though its intellectual correctness, and not the intensity with which it is held, is the final factor in deciding on its ultimate value.

mind no one could mean more than is claimed for Jesus in the Gospel of Mark, namely, that although he did not himself announce it to the multitude, he was in point of fact the Enochian Son of Man, the Messiah. To the mind of a Jew this was the Great Name, the giving of which to the Son of Man is described in the Book of Enoch.

It is not here that there is difficulty in understanding the course of events. There is, indeed, a real problem in reconstructing the development from this to the point of view in the Pauline Epistles, and still more to that in the Fourth Gospel. Is St Paul a step on the way to Johannine thought, or do Pauline and Johannine thought arise separately? These are undoubted problems not at present fully solved; and yet, difficult though they may be, it seems to me probable that the influence of Greek thought and the transformation of Jewish thought into Greek expressions will ultimately prove an adequate explanation. The real difficulty, which I invite the Regius Professor to face, is contained in his own recognition that Jesus looked on himself as the Enochian Son of Man. The books of Enoch represent a definite view of the universe. They account for the existence of sin and disease by the action of devils who are the ghosts of the giants who perished in the flood. The Son of Man has the function of finally restoring the world to its lost happiness and acting as judge. He is part of the scheme; and it is impossible to keep the figure of the Son of Man while abandoning its background. Can it be denied that giants, demons, and Son of Man are all part of an Enochian scheme, and that this scheme was just as much wrong as the pre-Copernican astronomy was wrong? It dealt with facts which are real, but it explained them in a manner which was inadequate. The result of saying that Jesus identified himself with the Enochian Son of Man is to admit that he identified himself with a Jewish delusion. I think that that is the case, and it seems to me that the Regius Professor really does so too—though no doubt unconsciously—unless he is prepared to argue that the Enochian scheme of things is not a Jewish delusion, in which case we must agree to differ, for I do not propose to waste time in disproving the Book of Enoch.

Moreover, if we accept the Enochian Son of Man theory we are obliged to accept it not merely with all the claims which it makes but also with the limitations which it accepts. Now, however great may have been the position assigned by Jewish thought to the Enochian Son of Man, no Jew would ever have suggested, as Canon Scott Holland does for Jesus, that the Enochian Son of Man "was the sole and paramount reality that filled heaven and earth." The Son of Man was the greatest of created beings, but not "what God is to the soul of man." If, therefore, Jesus was claiming to be the Enochian Son of Man, he was claiming considerably less for himself than Canon Scott Holland claims for him. It is, of course, true that Canon Scott Holland is making claims similar to those which were made by St Paul and by later Christians; but before he can make them appear entirely satisfactory, he will have to satisfy a large number of people who think that there is something inherently improbable in making

claims for the founder of a religion which the founder himself did not make, even although the history of religions teaches us that this is exactly what disciples have done in every religion known to research.

It is because I realised some years ago the impossibility of basing on the historic Jesus pictured in the Synoptic Gospels a Christianity able to command a hearing from the next generation, and nevertheless the equal impossibility of reasonably claiming that the basis of Christianity is a theory as to the nature of Jesus which Jesus did not hold himself, that I was driven to reconsider the true importance, not only of the historic Jesus, but also of historic Christianity, and especially of the Catholic doctrine of the Logos, as to which I said a great deal in my book, though Canon Scott Holland does not mention it. If, however, he had paid more attention to this doctrine he would scarcely have allowed himself to write, "Since that moment (*i.e.* the Resurrection), He (*i.e.* apparently, the "Person of Jesus Christ") is the actual Force that is making God the Father manifest on earth." *Since that moment!* and not before it? Perhaps the Regius Professor will explain. Am I wrong in thinking that in orthodox Catholic doctrine the Person—the ὑπόσταοις—who is the Lord of Christians, is the Logos who became Jesus, not Jesus who became the Logos?

The phrase last quoted from Canon Scott Holland is unfortunately typical of an attitude which seems to be willing to stake the whole case for Christianity on statements which are contrary to experience or reason. But in attacking this attitude I do not wish to argue about a phrase which may have been a slip of the pen. There are two points, going far beyond phrases, in which Canon Scott Holland makes assertions which are contrary to all observation and experience.

In the first place, he says that Christianity means that at a certain moment a personality "smote in upon the human story with a force that clove that story in twain and created the epoch round which all after-history turns." Now, if that means anything it means a great deal. It means that human nature has been different since the coming of Christ, and I submit that that contention is self-evidently untrue. Human nature is probably undergoing a process of secular improvement, but it is evidently not different to any great extent from what it was in the days before Christ. If Christianity on the intellectual side means that people are to believe that human nature as found in a Christian after Christ is different from ordinary human nature before the time of Christ, it will soon cease to obtain a hearing from those who know anything of history.

In the second place, Canon Scott Holland bases a great deal on the assumption that Jesus instituted a regenerative baptism which was essentially different from that of John. I do not think that there are any sound arguments which will support this contention of Canon Scott Holland, and if it prove necessary I should be delighted to discuss this point at length. But for the moment I pass that by, because the one point which I wish to make is that it is a simple fact of observation that Christian baptism as we have it now does not regenerate the baptised person.

Regeneration is a fact; and regenerate men and women are to be found now, just as well as in the past. But they are not confined to the ranks of the baptised: they are to be found in probably a larger percentage among Quakers than in any other community,—I would have said Christian community, but as I understand Canon Scott Holland to confine the word Christian to the baptised I refrain from doing so. On the other hand, the unregenerate are not confined to the ranks of the unbaptised—there are thousands of unregenerate baptised persons. Indeed, the obviousness of this fact is the reason why the mass of educated persons throughout the world is turning more and more away from the orthodox position defended by Canon Scott Holland; for baptism, on his theory, ought to make a difference to men, and it does not do so. Take two infants, baptise one and not the other, and if you forget which it was there is no probability that you will be able to tell afterwards from the character of their lives. The only way of telling whether anyone has been baptised is by consulting the evidence of the baptismal register; if Canon Scott Holland were right, it would be possible to tell by consulting the evidence of character.

The reason why I am anxious to oppose the Regius Professor is not desire for dialectical advantage, but because in resting the case for Christianity on propositions as to the Historic Jesus and the first disciples which cannot be defended by the evidence of the Synoptic Gospels, and on statements as to the effect of Christianity and Christian rites which cannot be defended by the evidence of observation, he is doing the cause of Christianity irreparable damage. Nevertheless, after so much negation let me end by stating what I believe to be fundamental, and much of which I think that the Regius Professor and I share in common. I believe that Christianity is the recognition and service of God in the world, in society, and in man. I can see, or I think that I see, the evidence that God was in Christ: for my own purposes, though not for preaching to the untheological world, I find that Logos is the word which denotes and counts most exactly what I mean by God in the world. But I will not accept as final any theory which limits the manifestation of the Logos to the Historic Jesus, or to the Christian religion; nor is the best tradition of Catholic orthodoxy, which means clear thinking, in favour of such a theory. I am sure that the Faith which overcame the world was Faith in the Logos, the Eternal Son of God, not a limiting identification of the Logos with the Historic Jesus. That remains: the form of its expression is transient. As to the Historic Jesus, what we have to say depends on evidence, and it is not wise to go beyond it. As to the Logos, what we have to say depends also on evidence, though of a different kind, for it is the evidence of no one man and no single generation, but of the great company of witnesses who in every age have known something of the greatness of God, and have given their testimony, as best they might, in the inadequate language of human limitations.

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"IS CHRISTIANITY PRACTICABLE?"

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1916, p. 335.)

Prof. W. Adams Brown says on page 339 of the January issue of the *Hibbert Journal*: "How can one speak of the fatherhood of God in any universal and all-embracing sense in the light of the terrible calamities which have fallen upon so many innocent sufferers all over the round world? How can one believe in the goodness of God when one contemplates this unexampled harvest of agony, of bitterness, and of death? How the whole dilemma that in every age has haunted the imagination of man, the dilemma: either God would not, and then He is not good, or He could not, and then He is not in control—how this dilemma has been sharpened until it seems as if it could not be evaded."

This takes us to the heart of the matter for serious people to-day; for they are asking not only, "Is Christianity practicable?" but, "Is Religion possible?" If, as a celebrated Wesleyan Professor said recently, "all real religion is an attempt to make the world intelligible to its inhabitants," then thousands feel to-day that the old religion has failed, and that this universe needs a new interpretation which shall square with the ugly facts that face them to-day. The individual doubter can perhaps be brushed aside, but a gigantic evil compels millions to doubt, and clamours for an explanation. In the North, the millions are asking what is the good of prayer, of intercession; things go on just as before. The thousands are saying: "Here in this vast crime God could not help interfering if He had any heart, even as much goodness as any human being. He is, therefore, either not good, or else He is not powerful enough—not capable of interfering." The charge of criminality is preferred against the Deity in a way it has never, perhaps, been before. The world is demanding a new interpretation—a War Theology, if you like. And some are finding a way out of the old dilemma by admitting the goodness and might of the Creative Life, which no one can deny exists; but they absolve It or Him from blame only by believing that He is *unconscious*, and knows nothing of those conscious emanations from Him, any more than we know everything that our own offspring does. Our lives are largely unconscious; we do a great number of things automatically and instinctively; we walk even better when we do not think about it, when we do it unconsciously, than when we do think. So some think that "God" can work effectively, and does so, unconsciously, as one in a trance or a dream; for consciousness is born only of pain and suffering, as far as we know, and we fail to see how the Creative Life can suffer without a nervous system. He seems more like a Solipsist, as the babe is before it becomes aware, through pain, of the world around it; it lives in a world of its own. Most men have worshipped a God who is Love, the God who is a Spirit, if they have worshipped at all. But has not the cause of all their theological difficulties been due to the fact that they have made the Love they worship inhere in a sort of semi-material Being, a Creative

Life, of which we know nothing except in connection with a material world, and by attributing to that Life consciousness. We have believed that this semi-material Being knows what is going on; we have said it is all-good, all-wise, all-mighty. Have not our difficulties arisen because we have attributed to this Being these qualities, and placed thereby a burden upon Him, or our idea of Him, greater than He or it can bear?

This great cataclysm is compelling men into great changes of thought and belief and outlook. The new beliefs that may come may not be so soothing, bright, or cheering as the old, and will in turn, without any doubt, raise other difficulties; but the greatest difficulty at present, and which they know not how to get over, is the difficulty of the criminality or else the utter helplessness of "God." "A truth that disheartens," says Maeterlinck, "because it is true, is still of far more value than the most stimulating of falsehoods." Some believe it is possible to make Love their God, to worship a God who is Spirit, and thereby profess a religion that is purely spiritual without linking it with the material. It may necessitate changes in our hymns and prayers, but these should not prove insuperable.

E. D. Priestley Evans.

"THE WAR: A QUAKER APOLOGIA."

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1915, p. 123.)

Lady Godlee is hard to please. She thinks it "unprofitable" to discuss the peace arguments deduced from the New Testament. I explained clearly that I only did so because my opponents persisted in attack on that ground; but when I use the more durable and universal side of my case, arguing from the ruin which war works in the soul, she "hardly likes to quote" my words. But if I may not use either authority or intuition as an argument I am certainly in a hard case.

It is not denied that the views which I expounded are those officially and renewedly supported by the Friends' Yearly Meeting, by the central Executive and the county meetings of the Society, and that they are generally held by those on whom the burden of the Society's service rests. But like every other body, we have on the fringe of the Society many who are there from tradition or from reasons of taste and sentiment, whose attendance at meeting is irregular or non-existent, and who do not work much in the Society's activities. From this class chiefly come the dissentients, for whom Lady Godlee speaks, though there are a few notable exceptions. They are often most admirable people, but they are in other ways not very good Quakers.

I did not "subscribe to the doctrine that no war can ever be right," though the statement must be very near the truth. But, when writing carefully, I always shrink from absolute and universal statements of any kind in ethics. Conduct is far too complicated for easy generalisations. It is enough to meet the practical crises which arise. On the other hand, it is

said by Lady Godlee that I have never denied that, under the circumstances, our country was right to go to war in August 1914. The point which I have, with much labour, tried to make in my article, but which seems to have been missed, is that whilst the nation acted up to its lights, and therefore from its own point of view did right at that time, we Friends, acting up to our lights, do not find it right to agree with that action. As to the abstract rightness of the act, apart from the actors, if an act can be so considered, we must regard this war as the culminating outcome of a whole series of wrong thoughts and deeds. Our earnest concern is that it may not be followed by an equal crop of the same, as all wars have been followed hitherto.

I said that if a serious fraction of the nation should hold my opinions, such a change in view would in all probability be held in other countries as well, and that the pressure of this public opinion on both sides would probably have prevented the war altogether; so that it was not necessary for me to be reminded that "Germany would have to be different." That was my case. I am told that there may be an unrighteous peace. There are many things that are unrighteous in time of peace, as in time of war, but it would be extremely difficult and would imply an extraordinary strain of the historical imagination to realise any unrighteousness in putting an end to any war. It is conceivable that it might be impolitic, but surely it could not be unrighteous to stop the flow of evil and ruin.

I believe that the distinction between offensive and defensive war is elusive, because almost always the difference is a matter of degree. In balance-of-power wars like this, both sides are offensive and both are defensive. Only the Belgians can plead a purely defensive attitude. France wants the provinces conquered by Louis XIV. and taken back by Germany in 1870. We have conquered Egypt, and to keep it made a bargain with France to keep Germany out of Morocco. Russia, behind Servia, was as dangerous to Austria as Austria to Russia. And so forth through years of deceptive and selfish diplomacy. The aggressive wickedness of the German Government is believed by her deluded people to be heroic self-defence.

I confess I had expected replies from militant theologians more aggressive than Lady Godlee's gentle demurrer from the outlying regions of our own Society.

JOHN W. GRAHAM.

DALTON HALL, MANCHESTER.

"CAN THE MERE SCHOLAR INTERPRET CHRISTIANITY?"

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1916, p. 353.)

THE article by Professor Armitage upon this subject urges that, if a man accept Christ as his Lord and Master, he implies there was an historical Jesus. As one who has ventured to write a brochure on the subject,

throwing doubt on the historicity of Jesus, a brochure which Professor Armitage has kindly read, allow me to say that this conclusion of this article cannot really be upheld. It is true that "a New Testament scholar is incompetent if he have no *inward* knowledge of the Lord," but that inward knowledge does not imply that the Lord was ever a man on earth.

It is possible for Egyptians to read records of Osiris and accept him as Lord, yet Osiris never was a man on earth.

The Swiss accepted William Tell in some ways as a Master, and were angry when it was first shown that he never lived, but was an imaginary, ideal, patriotic archer (see *Ency. Brit.*).

As a matter of fact, the soul does not need a man on earth. It needs God, and Christian hymns are devotionally used not about a man on earth, but about the ever-present divine life, symbolised by such a story of a man on earth. Thus the hymn, "Fierce raged the tempest o'er the deep," seems to be of a man on earth; but when the soul comes to its devotion it sings (in the last verse):

> "So, when our life is clouded o'er,
> And storm-winds drift us from the shore,
> Say, lest *we* sink to rise no more,
> 'Peace, be still.'"

In other words, it is not a literal past storm that the soul cares about at all. It is the present inward storm of passion or of trouble. An educated Christian does not want a man who stills a storm. Storms are good things, which restore the balance of nature. The soul does not want a man at all. The Greeks worshipped Dionysus, as if he had been a man, but they personified and projected the Life-force which they felt. The Christians personified and projected the Lord-force which they felt.

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"THE DEFINITE FAILURE OF CHRISTIANITY, AND HOW IT MIGHT BE RETRIEVED."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1916, pp. 320–334.)

The authoress has a short and easy method for effecting the rehabilitation of the Christian community. But one fails to see how any reform can be secured by the means which she advocates.

Why is the life of joy, so effective in evoking the blessings of peace and goodwill, not universally realised? Miss Robinson seems to think that it could be ushered in with ease, as by the wave of a magician's wand. Surely it is plain that in a world of moral order there cannot be real and lasting joy except on the condition that there is high character in man. To what extent is that condition fulfilled? Not to speak of those whose action is glaringly culpable, there are very many whose course of life is

shaped by practical materialism, who are gaining the world perhaps, but are losing the soul. Far from being filled with joy, these are necessarily discontented with the results. Even when there is an honest endeavour to improve and to "follow the gleam," a struggle is inevitable: deep-rooted habit creates trouble, and the ideal which is envisaged mounts ever higher; such person is subjected to the Divine discipline of pain. What of the untold number of cases where there is no serious attempt to rise above the low level? Will any conceivable presentation of religion lead the individuals concerned to experience true joy? No; Dante, whose *Commedia* as a whole is a vindication of the moral order, briefly sets forth the relation of cause and effect in this matter when he speaks of the "bellezze eterne" as open to the view and reception of finite spirits, but adds:

> "E l' occhio vostro pure a terra mira;
> Onde vi batte Chi tutto discerne."

On the other hand, this condition which is beyond all comparison the most essential for the attainment of joy is not emphasised by the writer of the article as its importance demands; at most it is once or twice hinted at. It cannot be said that it is assumed as a matter of course: as soon as it is recognised, the whole contention of the article falls to the ground; it must then be admitted that joy cannot prevail to the extent which is desired while things remain otherwise as they now are. Strange, when the lessons of psychology are again and again enforced in the article, that Miss Robinson should be so far out in ethics.

The faults of the clergy may be fully acknowledged; but when all has been said on that point, we have touched only the fringe of the subject. The clergy are not responsible for the environment of pain, at least as regards the main extent of it. They find it; they seek to understand it and the present necessity for it; as they cope with it they have not connived at it: they have no more delight in it than a physician has in the disease which he combats. They labour for the production of health in the soul and for the joy of health, and they make use of approved, well-tried means, eschewing the quackery which promises everything, but from the manifest nature of the case can accomplish nothing. To-day as a body they inculcate no black-faced Puritanism, but initiate and support schemes that promise to brighten men's worldly lot. Only they know that it is no kindness to people to lead them to seek their sufficiency in externals.

Whatever the predominant feeling of our people had been before the war, that calamity could not have been averted by that feeling. Though every individual among our forty millions had been filled with joy to the top of his bent, the war, for the reasons which we all know, was unavoidable. If the world too were fully Christianised, with the exception of one great nation, and if the latter insisted on war, then war there must be. The outbreak of it, or of this present war, does not prove Christianity a failure. We can actually speak of great success for Christianity in our land; though there is of course enormous need for more. Have we not been

struck by the very numerous cases of heroism among our countrymen in the field, whose life has been willingly sacrificed for righteousness' sake? And how many thousands of heroic sufferers there are, too, who mourn at home! Let us recall the saying of Christ, "Every branch that beareth fruit, he purgeth it that it may bring forth more fruit." The branch in our land is shown to be sounder, far more fruitful of the highest Christian virtue, that of worthy endurance of the cross even to death, than we could have believed before the war: a vast multitude of people in the country have been of the stuff of martyrs. Is that failure? And we have proof over the wide Empire that the Christian leaven has not been spreading for nothing: priceless benefits, especially justice and liberty for all, have been conferred throughout its bounds, benefits which are in line with the gifts of the Gospel and are a preparation for its fullest blessings. No people have done so much as our own in recent times for the spread of religion and righteousness on the earth. The British might perhaps without presumption be compared to ancient Israel in this respect; the preparatory work of Israel having been intensive, and that of the English again more extensive.

In such circumstances we may venture to think that fuller life is now offered and is in prospect for the dwellers in our land; that a good branch is now purged, pruned by the sharp steel, with much promise for its future. To speak of failure is in effect to dishonour the illustrious, mighty dead, and to be ungrateful to them and to many like them who survive. It is to be ungrateful to God who wrought such great things in them, and who has done so much through our countrymen in far-scattered regions of the earth. It is unwise too from the worldly point of view: it is to face the future with a sense of weakness only, instead of a sense of power from well-grounded hope in God. For if we must write down "definite failure" for Christianity after these nineteen centuries, can there be confident hope of success for it in the twentieth?

What is proved by the war to be a failure is practical materialism and the worship of natural science. Among the Germans we see the cultivation of physical science carried to its highest pitch, and science together with its material results regarded as the *summum bonum*. We see too what comes of this—the sinking of a nation to the lowest depth of degradation. Philosophy has long ago exposed the error in reference to science; and religion, though speaking often to deaf ears, has condemned the corresponding practice. But the war is an object-lesson on these themes which the masses can fully appreciate. A more effective enforcement of Christian teaching by implication could scarcely be imagined. True, the vast amount that requires to be done to secure general acceptance of the spiritual ideal might well seem fitted to take away one's breath. However, the way is open to a generation that has got beyond high and dry doctrine. All things considered, there is much reason to "thank God and take courage."

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Aberdeen.

REVIEWS.

1. *The Faith and the War.*—A Series of Essays, by Members of the Churchmen's Union and Others, on the Religious Difficulties aroused by the Present Condition of the World.—Edited by F. J. Foakes-Jackson, D.D.—Macmillan & Co., London, 1915.

2. *The War and Religion.*—By Alfred Loisy.—Translated by Arthur Galton.—B. H. Blackwell, Oxford, 1915.

Not till the war is over shall we fully realise how deeply it has affected our religious attitude and our interpretation of the history of Christianity. Such a volume as the collection of essays on *The Faith and the War* is, however, not only valuable in its stimulation of the thought which ought to be active in the time of greatest stress, with its rare opportunities of insight, it also meets a profound need in many for whom the problems dealt with are heavily adding to the sorrow of the hour. We are drawing, as is pointed out in more than one of the essays, to the tempestuous close of an age in history, and, in Professor Percy Gardner's words, "to every Christian the question comes home—'Is Christianity a failure? . . . Is it only a stage in human history?'"

In the first essay (by Professor Gardner), and the two that follow, the question takes the form of a consideration of the subject of Providence, in relation to the "individual" and to "history," and in its "universal aspect." Perhaps the most definite conclusion expressed on the theoretic question, whether "the progress of knowledge and the experience of the world compel us to accede to the pessimistic doctrine that all things are governed by chance" (as Professor Gardner puts it), is that given in Miss Alice Gardner's treatment of the subject of "Providence in History," though by her the belief in Providence is more precisely explained as "belief in a Divine control over human affairs." The doctrine of an over-ruling Providence, she concludes, "has not been discerned in history, but brought in to interpret it"; but "it always has been, and must be for many, the form in which it is most easy to realise the thought of God." This essay, however, brings out well the degradation of the providential theory seen in the worship of success, which has been one aspect of the modern tendency to clothe the idea of progress in the body of materialism.

All three essays have a strong practical interest, and with this interest is connected the most significant theological conception present in them, as also in the fourth essay, by Canon Rashdall, on "The Problem of Evil"

—viz. that the notion of "Omnipotence" must be in some way qualified. Thus Professor Gardner speaks of the "self-limitation of Deity"; Dr Foakes-Jackson of "a multiplicity of forces," which "contributed to produce the state of the world as we know it"; Canon Rashdall of an "original limitation of power" in the Deity, "evil being necessary as a means to good." For, acceptable as this doctrine may be theoretically, as a means of escape from the intolerable ethical and logical problem of the ordering of the world, as known to us, by Omnipotence, it is also practically inspiring in its applications. As stated by Canon Rashdall, "the world with the good we can do is better than without." Or, as Mr F. H. Bradley puts the point (though not as his own view), "To help a God in his struggle, more or less doubtful, and blind with resisting evil, is no inferior task. And if the issue were taken as uncertain, or even if the end were known to be God's indubitable defeat and our inevitable disaster, our religion would have risen thereby, and would have attained to the extreme of heroism" (*Essays on Truth and Reality*—"God and the Absolute.") This, of course, would go far beyond the position of the volume before us. "A Power of absolute goodness ultimately will prevail," observes Dr Foakes-Jackson; and, in Canon Rashdall's view, God, in causing the forces of evil as means to good, caused them as "conscious of power to overcome them." How we are to understand the conception of self-limitation of a Power which is omnipotent, is a question the consideration of which is outside both the limits of this review and the competence of the reviewer. Some light is thrown on the meaning of "Omnipotens" in the letter of Professor A. E. Taylor, quoted in the Introduction. The word is a literal translation of παντοκράτωρ, and the Hebrew word for which this is used as equivalent (in the Prophets) may be taken to signify "All-ruling," in the sense of "having supreme might over all things."

Canon Rashdall's philosophical study of the "Problem of Evil" further develops a position the main principles of which are already known to his readers, in the foundation of Theism on idealistic reflection, together with the validity of the moral judgment, and leads up to the brilliant central essays by the Dean of St Paul's and Professor Taylor.

Dr Inge begins by demonstrating the fallaciousness of certain propositions, often assumed to be incontrovertible. The idea of progress, for instance, was far from unknown to the Greeks, though the deepest view of antiquity was the belief that the life of the universe is in cycles. And further, if we look at the facts without prejudice we shall see that modern science leads to a similar view, and does not really admit progress to be characteristic of the universe. "Progress is a rare accident in the physical world." Here Dr Inge's approach to the subject of "Hope, Temporal and Eternal," bears a striking analogy with Professor Taylor's prolegomena to his argument for personal immortality. The latter also finds it necessary to remove false hopes, since he is concerned to show that there can be no conservation of spiritual values without conservation of personal life. Thus as by the one writer the vanity of the scientific hope for humanity, so by

the other the insecurity of the absolutist philosopher's faith is demonstrated. Survival in our work and the memories of others is of no avail, since natural science contemplates the ultimate extinction of all human life. "The universe," says Professor Taylor, "does not make provision for the permanent existence of the spiritual values fashioned by noble human creative activity." This removal of an ill-founded optimism is especially required at present. For it seems evident that amongst the causes of the deep disillusionment of the time is the fact that the faith in progress had become an essential part of the mental fabric with which the Christian attitude appeared to be bound up. The shock which shatters the one—and for many the most important—element tends to destroy the whole fabric. In the essay on "Hope," Dr Inge having laid bare the really pessimistic tendencies to which modern science leads, proceeds to base a stronger hope on the philosophical and religious foundation of reality as spiritual. It was the confusion of time with eternity which induced the notion of an automatic law of progress. We are still not far from barbarism, but when a crisis like the present brings the fact to light, "it is no wonder that faith and hope should be engulfed in the pit which seems to have swallowed up their sister virtue." The final conclusion emerges that our hope must be a hope which recognises that, as members of a material universe,

> "We are such stuff
> As dreams are made of"

—though Dr Inge stops before this point, in his quotation from Prospero.

The reasoning on which Professor Taylor grounds his belief in individual immortality is of great dialectic subtlety, since, whilst rejecting the old metaphysical proofs, he nevertheless argues logically from an application of the postulate that the universe is rational. The nerve of the argument is the contention that a universe in which values form the most real part of experience must give them ultimate validity if it is rational. The conclusion seems incontestable, if this premise is granted. And to the permanence of the highest human values, personal immortality is essential.

Mr Burrough's chapter on "Faith and Reality" follows well on the preceding. It is a philosophical argument for the existence of a spiritual reality, personal in character, of which the main steps are as follows:—(1) The proof that faith is exercised in every apprehension of that which we regard as real; (2) the most real is the ideal, which we both discover and also help to create; (3) since spiritual reality depends for its recognition on consciousness and will, it cannot itself be impersonal. The problems raised by the war do not loom very large in this essay. The essays on "War and the Ethics of the New Testament," and "What is a Christian Nation?" may be considered together in so far as the question for both is the ethics of service of the State in war. Thus Mr Emmet's argument against taking the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount in their literal application (which proceeds for the most part on

fairly familiar lines) is reinforced by Canon Glazebrook's logical criticism of the doctrine of the State as person. This in his view is fallacious, especially at the point at which the morality of war comes in. Thus the absurdity of the proposition "England must not resist evil" is evidence of the abuse of personification, and the individual citizen has no right to sacrifice others to his own doctrine of non-resistance. Both articles, then, justify war in a good cause, and there are various similarities between the positions of the two, especially in the stress they lay on the sterner aspects of Christ's treaching. The idea, however, that war is inseparable from human conditions is emphatically rejected by Mr Emmet.

It will be convenient at this point to refer to M. Loisy's little book. *The War and Religion.* For the problem which is really the greatest raised by him, or perhaps anyone, in connection with the relation of the war to Christianity, is, though not directly met, yet somewhat relieved in the treatment of the future of the Christian moral ideal by the Dean of Durham, whose essay concludes the series in *The Faith and the War.* This problem concerns not the perfection of the Christian ideal, but the insignificance of its influence through history, in the light of its tremendous sanctions. The difficulty is not very present in many of the essays, and the Dean of St Paul's observation that it is not our religion but we that have failed seems to leave it untouched. The question for M. Loisy, as he describes it at the conclusion of his very lucid and vivid statement of the origin of the war, is "has Christianity passed over the world like a happy dream of immortality, without leaving a trace of that law of love which it vaunted as peculiarly its own"? and his own answer appears to be, Yes, it has passed, but the law of love will remain, not being dependent on Christianity. It will endure in that "moral notion of humanity, of human solidarity, which gives to human life a meaning the grandeur of which cannot be exaggerated." Thus M. Loisy now writes from a standpoint outside Christianity, and this book of course shows deeper traces of the shock to religious faith caused by the war than any essay in the other volume. It is impressive in the poignancy of its pathos, as well as the keen logic of the survey of the attitude of the churches. The letter addressed to the German court chaplain by M. Babut of Nîmes, in its inconsistent attempt to maintain patriotism together with the universalism of the Gospels, is taken as text for the argument that Christianity is incompatible with the ideals that are now part of the best spirit of man. The conclusion to which M. Loisy would lead is that the religious notion of humanity is sufficient as an ideal, but that there is a personality of nations as well as individuals, of nations, each acknowledging the right of others to develop its own individuality, since for each human being his country is "the shrine of his humanity." This revival of the religion of humanity, in a qualified and perhaps more spiritual form, will not seem very effectual to minds convinced by Dr Inge's and Professor Taylor's demonstrations of the vanity of hope in the future of the human race. There are some striking reflections in M. Loisy's review of the history of

the churches, and his criticism of the standpoint of the present Pope is especially interesting in the analysis of the difference which may become incompatibility, between impartiality and neutrality.

"The great moral forces of the past" in his view influence our present conditions no longer, and in conflict with many other observers he denies that there is in connection with the war any religious revival except of the religion of country. We may turn to Dr Hensley Henson's essay on "The Church of England after the War" with the question whether he has any way of meeting what seems to be the core of M. Loisy's disenchantment, the apparent failure of Christianity as a moral force. The Dean goes far towards admitting the failure of the churches, but he dexterously uses the conclusion of present failure as the premise of an argument for future triumph. For the failure and its terrible practical results have driven men back upon first principles, and demonstrated that there is "no tolerable alternative to those the Gospel offers." Thus it is just because the ideal has not had sufficient force in the past that it will have a new force in the future. The main contention of the essay is that since the real line between the combatants is between those who accept and those who reject Christian morality, Christianity will henceforth be judged chiefly in its moral expression, and will therefore be more closely held to the Person of the Founder. It seems to be implied that the age which has known the horrors of the present strife will at length be capable of applying the spirit of the Man of Sorrows. This prophetic essay, with its sustained hopefulness, forms a fitting termination to a series of studies which is certainly remarkable for the amount of thought condensed into one volume, and of singular interest.

HILDA D. OAKELEY.

PASSMORE EDWARDS SETTLEMENT, LONDON.

War from a Quaker Point of View.—By John W. Graham, M.A.—London: Headley Brothers.

THE horrors and anxieties of the present war have, so far as this country is concerned, from the beginning been aggravated by the stream of pacificist literature with which the nation has been deluged. The justice of the British cause has been impugned; the lawfulness of the most righteous war has been denied; the titanic task of raising the new armies has been rendered still more difficult by assertions of the essential sinfulness of military service; resistance, in support of the doctrine of non-resistance, has been threatened on a gigantic and organised scale, in case the Government find it necessary to enforce compulsory enlistment.

The pacificist literature is of varying degrees of perniciousness. Some of it is innocuous by reason of its palpable absurdity; as, for example, Miss Maude Royden's *The Great Adventure*, a martyr-nation fantasy in which it is contended that if Britain "had disarmed in the first week

of August 1914 there would have been no war," or Mr Norman Angell's *Quaker Contribution to Peace*, in which the writer shows that he is obsessed by even greater illusions than those that afflicted him before the outbreak of the struggle for which he had done so much to unprepare us.

At the other extreme are the manifestos of the No-Conscription Fellowship and the Independent Labour Party, which go beyond the tolerable limits of seditious conspiracy—manifestos which would long ago have been suppressed by any Government that had not contracted the inveterate habit of continuing to "wait and see" until disaster is inevitable.

Midway between these two extremes comes the book at present under review. It is a well-written and moderate statement of the pacificist case, marked by evident sincerity and earnestness. It endeavours to be reasonable and convincing; and if it does not succeed, its failure is due to the hopeless weakness of the cause which it defends rather than to any lack of literary skill on the part of the advocate. It is entitled *War from a Quaker Point of View*; but the question may well be raised at the outset whether the title is justified. For many Quakers, to their enduring honour, recognising the magnitude of the issues at stake in the present war, have thrown themselves as combatants into the struggle, as their predecessors did into the English Civil War of the seventeenth century, the American War of Independence of the eighteenth century, and the War of North and South for the emancipation of slaves in the nineteenth century. It could, indeed, easily be shown, both from precedent and precept, that Quakers with no less a claim than Mr Graham's to speak in the name of the Society of Friends have taken a very different view of war from the one here set forth. In fact Mr Graham himself quotes one of them, viz. Isaac Penington, a contemporary and friend of George Fox, a man who he admits was "always a leading spokesman for the Society." Penington, a chaplain in the New Model Army and an ardent advocate of military resistance to "Babylon," wrote: "I speak not against any magistrates or peoples defending themselves against foreign invasions, or making use of the sword to suppress the violent and evil-doers within their borders; for this the present state of things may and doth require." One could not desire a sounder or saner statement of the Christian case for war as a possible last resort of justice in the existing conditions of this imperfect world. What if this is the authentic—as it certainly is the primitive and original—doctrine of war from a Quaker point of view? It is not, however, the doctrine of Mr Graham and the pacificists, and the pacificist doctrine of Mr Graham is what we have to examine, so far as it is possible to do so within the narrow limits of a review. Mr Graham's case against a Christian participation in war is based on (1) the Bible; (2) the testimony and practice of the Early Church; (3) the witness and experience of a number of pacificist sects during many ages; and (4) the guidance of the Inner Light. Each of these grounds must be rapidly surveyed.

I. The Bible.

The pious pacificist treats the Bible in a very cavalier manner. He ignores, rejects, or explains away whatever in it does not suit his purpose, and he exalts the small fragment that remains to a position of supreme and exclusive authority. The Old Testament throughout recognises war as one of the awful instruments of divine justice, and describes Jehovah as a God of Battles. Hence the Old Testament is dismissed as a record of an immature stage of ethical development; as though in any stage of man's moral progress whatsoever God could have sanctioned and enjoined what is essentially and eternally wicked! The New Testament accepts generally in respect of war the standards of the Old; it ranks among the heroes of faith those Old Testament warriors who "waxed valiant in fight and put to flight the armies of the aliens"; it nowhere condemns war; it enjoins obedience to, and payment of taxes demanded by, the military Empire of Rome; it tells of the reception of centurions within the limits of the Church without in any way suggesting that their occupation was incompatible with Christian discipleship; it employs the figures and emblems of war in its teachings with no hint of disapproval. All these awkward facts, and others akin to them, the pacificist explains away by a variety of ingenious but disingenuous sophistries. He lays special stress, however, upon the teaching and example of Christ; but even these do not always please him. For instance, the unwelcome passage, "He that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one," has to be got rid of by being attributed in part "to the Evangelist, not to our Lord." Similarly, the damaging story of Christ's use of force to cleanse the Temple has at all costs to be divested of its obvious significance. It is, however, the Sermon on the Mount that is the pacificist's great stand-by. The injunction seems so clear: "Resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." Even here, nevertheless, the unhappy pacificist encounters difficulties. For the Sermon on the Mount not only inculcates non-resistance: it also enjoins giving to all who ask, and lending without any expectation of return; it forbids the laying up of treasure, or the taking thought for the morrow; it condemns both judge and litigant in courts of law. Now, however peaceful Quakers may be, no one can deny that they number among their leading representatives many successful bankers and business men who habitually violate most of the commands of the Sermon on the Mount taken literally. "No honest interpreter," Mr Graham is constrained to admit, "can pretend that in daily life we even begin to obey literally such commands as to give to everyone who asks us and to lend freely without security. We are aware that that would be wrong; it would soon reduce society to confusion and ourselves [horrible catastrophe!] to poverty." True; but what an admission! Commands of Christ to be judged by the standards of common sense, and to be rejected on the ground of inexpediency! What possible reply can a pacificist who makes such an admission give to an opponent who contends on the same ground that

refusal to resist aggressive evil by physical force also "would be wrong," and that it too "would soon reduce society to confusion and ourselves to poverty," and indeed to something much worse than poverty? Certainly he can make no reply based on the authority of the Sermon on the Mount. The Biblical basis of pacificism, in short, vanishes away under the pacificist's own canons of criticism. If Mr Graham argues that in rejecting the letter of Scripture he is exalting the spirit, it is enough to say that he misinterprets the spirit as fatally as he mutilates the letter. The purpose of the religion of the Bible is not peace, but righteousness. It proclaims implacable war upon iniquity. It seeks, it is true, to win sinners by gentle means from the error of their ways. But it recognises the fact that there are some who cannot be won, and that there are devils beyond the reach of even the Divine love. To such it threatens everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and it shrinks from no means within the range of omnipotence which may be necessary to achieve the final victory of good over evil. Pacificism gets no support from the Bible properly interpreted.

II. The Early Church.

The primitive Christian communities for some time held themselves aloof from the world. They were possessed of the firm conviction that the return of their Lord and the end of the age were at hand. Hence they took no interest in terrestrial affairs. They divided up and dispersed their wealth; they lived the communistic life; they practised literally the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount (which itself had been compiled under the influence of the great eschatological illusion); they withdrew from all share in the civil administration, and *a fortiori* the military defence, of the Roman Empire. This Second-Adventist error was not the only source of weakness and disaster to the nascent Christian societies; they became deeply infected with the poison of the Manichæan heresy, which taught the inherent evil of matter, the necessary antagonism between physical and moral force, and the emancipation of the believer from the restraints of all law. It is this pestilent Oriental venom, which has persistently lingered like an ineradicable leprosy in the fair body of the Church, that has been the germ from which the pacificist heresy—in common with many other antinomian and anarchic heresies—has developed in all ages of Christian history. Mr Graham propounds the view that the first Christian age was the purest. This is a strange doctrine for one who believes in progressive revelation and in the continual illumination of the inner light. Its falsity, moreover, is very obvious to any who take the trouble to study the damnatory evidence of St Paul's Epistles and the Revelation of St John. The early Christians had many things to learn, and among the most important were: (1) that the earth was likely to exist for some considerable time; (2) that the Roman Empire, and not the New Jerusalem, was the polity under which they would have to order their lives; (3) that if they wished to fulfil the will of God and aid in the establishment of the ideal kingdom of righteousness, they would be compelled to abandon their isolation

and to take their places in the service of the State. Hence before the close of the second century of the Christian era we find Christians holding civil offices and fulfilling their duties in the imperial armies. Catholic doctrine accompanied and confirmed Christian practice. All the great Fathers of the Church from Athanasius to Aquinas recognised the rightfulness of the Christian man's participation in the work of government, and the lawfulness of his entry into the military service, and even into the righteous wars which the work of government entailed. The heresy of pacificism died out, save in the writings of a few eccentrics like Tertullian and Lactantius, and in the doctrines of a few decadent and schismatic Gnostic sects.

III. The Pacificist Sects.

The pacificist succession through the Christian ages appears an extremely ominous one to those who are acquainted with the outlines of ecclesiastical history. Mr Graham dismisses it with judicious brevity on pp. 32–34 of his book. Mr W. E. Wilson in his volume on *Christ and War* incautiously devotes a long section to it (pp. 75–102) under the suggestive title, "Voices in the Wilderness." The chief members of the motley procession, apart from the Quakers themselves, are the Cathari, the Paterines, the Waldenses, the Franciscan Tertiaries, the Moravians, the Anabaptists, the Family of Love, and the Russian Doukhobors. What an array! Most of them—certainly all the early sects, the Cathari, Paterines, and Waldenses—were eruptions of the Manichæan virus. They developed wild absurdities of doctrine; they tended to sink into antinomian abysses of moral corruption, and they died out more or less speedily amid the contempt and execration of mankind. The Tertiaries and the Moravians were neither of them rigidly pacificist, and they endured in proportion as they accommodated themselves to the Catholic tradition. The sixteenth-century Anabaptists, by reason of their excesses in Münster at the time of the Reformation, have left a name that is an offence in the nostrils of posterity. The Family of Love in the seventeenth century was accused of living up to the full height of its title. The Russian Doukhobors, expelled from their own country, are with us in Canada at the present moment. Mr Wilson admits that they "reject all human governments, and have refused in some cases to obey the useful and benevolent regulations of the Canadian authorities." He expects, however, optimistically, that "their views on the matter will in course of time be modified." Meanwhile we are left to infer, quite correctly as it happens, that they are a pestilential nuisance to the Canadian administration.

The Quakers, of course, have a much better reputation and record. They have for the most part accepted the Catholic interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount, and have applied Christian principles in the light of consecrated commonsense. Pacificism, as we have seen, was no part of the earliest Quaker testimony. It was only after the militant Puritanism of Cromwell had failed that George Fox discovered in Reading gaol that militancy is wrong. During the subsequent centuries, strong as has been

the Quaker influence in favour of peace, the saner and nobler among the leaders of the Friends have recognised in each great crisis, when moral issues have been at stake, that there are evils greater than war, and that Christian choice in this probationary sphere may sometimes be limited to an acceptance, as a religious duty, of war as the less of two evils. The Quaker efforts to apply pacificism in practice—particularly the Holy Experiment in Pennsylvania, continued for some seventy years—excite sympathetic interest. Although they all broke down or were abandoned, even when (as in Pennsylvania, which enjoyed the military protection of Britain) conditions were most favourable, they certainly succeeded in demonstrating that gentleness and conciliation can accomplish much more than is usually supposed. Their failure was due, however, to their own inherent weakness, and not, as the pacificist prefers to believe, to evil influence from without.

IV. The Inner Light.

The pacificist, it thus appears, gets very little comfort or support from the Bible, the Fathers, or Church history. He is driven back ultimately upon the Inner Light—that is to say, upon an assertion of his own personal opinion against every religious and political authority whatsoever. Mr Graham calls himself a Christian; but he is a Christian only so long as Christ agrees with him. He calls himself a Socialist and a Democrat; but he is really an extreme Individualist and an Anarchist. His political theory is as chaotic and inconsistent as his theology. Although professing, I say, to be a Socialist, instead of exalting the State as the agent of the general will, and "a beneficent organ of co-operation," he has the effrontery to describe it as an "intruder" if it deals with matters with which conscience also deals, and to resent its "interference," like any devotee of Herbert Spencer. Similarly, as a Democrat he exclaims, "In this country we are the governing order," and he looks forward to democratic control of foreign affairs to produce peace. But while he is resolute to claim a share in democracy's sovereign control of others, he will not admit democracy's right to control himself in matters that touch "the sensitive places of the inward man." He definitely asserts that if our present democratic Government, in its dire need, orders compulsory military service, he will refuse to obey. This, of course, is not democracy at all; it is treason and anarchy. Such hopeless muddleheadedness and inconsistency would be incredible, were it not typical of the whole pacificist class to which Mr Graham belongs. In Mr Graham's case, however, it is rendered the more conspicuous by the admissions and concessions which he weakly and illogically makes. He admits (1) that force has "a place in human affairs"; (2) that police protection is right and necessary; (3) that it is not possible to lay down "any general theory as to the unlawfulness of war"; (4) that "what is wrong for us may be right for the Cabinet"—in other words, that there is no such thing as absolute right and wrong at all; (5) that the army and navy could not be disbanded at the present moment; and (6) that pacificists may consistently with their principles pay war taxes, and

enjoy the protection of the non-pacificists who fortunately exist. This last amazing proposition is supported (p. 75) by four sophistical reasons which the feeblest dialectician could sweep away like chaff. One asks what smallest remnant of respectable pacificist argument is left? The answer is: None at all.

It would be possible to take many other propositions in this book and to subject them to destructive analysis. But I have already devoted to the work more attention than intrinsically it deserves. My apology for the length of my review is that Mr Graham stands for a class, not numerous perhaps, but noisy, insistent, and dangerous. Hence it is necessary to examine the false doctrine that they are disseminating, in order to combat it and stamp it out. I hope that I have said enough to show what is the pabulum on which the No-Conscription conspiracy is being nourished, and whence comes the rank mist of heresy and treason that the deluded sheep of the Fellowship of Reconciliation are made to draw.

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Marlborough, and other Poems.—By Charles Hamilton Sorley, late of Marlborough College, sometime Captain in the Suffolk Regiment.—Cambridge: University Press, 1916.—Pp. 106.

The fate that often awaits youthful poems, even those of a Tennyson, will not lay its devastating hand upon this little volume which the Cambridge University Press has issued in so tasteful and appropriate a form. It is true that had the author lived he would hardly have been likely to have published its contents—not, at least, all of them, and none without careful revision. For an author is usually ruthless with his own early productions, and this author would probably have revealed that trait to the full. Yet it is very far indeed from being the fact that the poems exhibit only the promise of what might have been. Many of them strike a note of rare beauty and sweetness, and cannot fail to make their appeal to minds of varying temperaments. But more. This volume, as it stands, will, like the volumes of Rupert Brooke, afford convincing demonstration of what England is sacrificing in this war,—lives that would have shaped the thought and feeling of our country in the first half of the present century. It will bear testimony also to the type of men who, when the bolt fell in August 1914, hesitated not in offering their services to the nation. Never, certainly, in any previous war has the British army been composed, even proportionately, of soldiers such as these—men whose interest lay in the peaceful pursuit of literature, science, and art, and to whom the horrors and brutality of the battlefield must be distasteful beyond measure. When, for example, from any scene of conflict, has ever before a letter been penned

like that in verse which Captain Sorley, only three months before his death, sent to a friend at home? It is thus gracefully described by the recipient:

"From far away there comes a Voice
Singing its song across the sea—
A song to make man's heart rejoice—
Of Marlborough and the Odyssey.

A voice that sings of Now and Then,
Of minstrel joys and tiny towns,
Of flowing thyme and fighting men,
Of Sparta's sands and Marlborough's Downs."

Charles Hamilton Sorley was killed in action on the Western Front on the 13th of October last, in his twenty-first year. Since 1900 his home had been in Cambridge. From September 1908 to December 1913 he was at Marlborough. His love of Marlborough was true and deep, and it calls forth several poems that will be treasured at the school as those of Kennedy are treasured at Charterhouse and those of Johnson at Winchester. The poem from which the volume takes its name, written apparently in Germany before the outbreak of the war, is beautiful from beginning to end, and tells of the influence wrought upon him by the scenes of his boyhood wanderings.

"I, who have walked along her downs in dreams,
And known her tenderness, and felt her might,
And sometimes by her meadows and her streams
Have drunk deep-storied secrets of delight,

Have had my moments there, when I have been
Unwittingly aware of something more,
Some beautiful aspect, that I had seen
With mute unspeculative eyes before."

On leaving Marlborough, he was elected to a scholarship at University College, Oxford. Would the haunts of the "Scholar Gipsy"—the "stripling Thames at Bab-lock-hithe," or "above Godstow Bridge, when hay-time's here in June"—have had for him the attraction of "East Kennet Church at Evening," standing crown-like against the hills, or the Vale and fields upon which, from Liddington, the man from Coate "looked down and wondered and was wise"?

He had a heart in tune with nature and her "goings-on," this Marlborough boy—wild nature, perhaps, he cared for most in those school-days: "the winds, the flocking birds' full cry, the trees that toss, the downs that move." Throughout the book there is a spirit of healthy optimism,—not the comfortable optimism that smooths away all difficulties, but the optimism which rests on the implicit assurance that the resources of a human soul are sufficient for the tasks imposed upon it. "The strong and sweeping joy of day, the sensible and dear delight of life" he knew; and it would have been proof against that temper of languid world-weariness which was penetrating undergraduate circles prior to the advent of the crisis through which we are now passing. Here and there, as might be

expected, he raises the standard of revolt. For instance, in a pretty little poem, entitled "What you Will," after expressing doubt as to whether it can seem brave or could be in the long run well to enslave or hedge about the youthful spirit, he adds, in lines that must have been inspired by a well-known speech of Brand's,—

"I only know
That when I have a son of mine,
He shan't be made to droop and pine,
Bound down and forced by rule and rod
To serve a God who is no God.
But I'll put custom on the shelf
And make him find his God himself.
Perhaps he'll find him in a tree,
Some hollow trunk, where you can see.
Perhaps the daisies in the sod
Will open out and show him God.
Or will he meet him in the roar
Of breakers as they beat the shore?
Or in the spiky stars that shine?
Or in the rain (where I found mine)?"

When brought face to face with war and death, there is quiet dignity and courage in his reflections. In the sonnet "To Germany," there is no particle of bluster or of racial pride; on the contrary, there is a generous recognition of blindness on the part of each of the combatants. "Gropers both through fields of thought confined we stumble and we do not understand." But

"When it is peace, then we may view again
With new-won eyes, each other's truer form
And wonder. Grown more loving-kind and warm,
We'll grasp firm hands and laugh at the old pain."

The two sonnets on death, written shortly after his arrival in France, show a calm reserve of strength and a hopefulness of outlook that will win response from many anxious hearts. He does not say what Nettleship said, that death "does not count," but he is convinced that it counts not for any triumph over, or any defeat of, life.

"And this we know: Death is not Life effete,
Life crushed, the broken pail. We who have seen
So marvellous things know well the end not yet.

Victor and vanquished are a-one in death:
Coward and brave: friend, foe. Ghosts do not say,
'Come, what was your record when you drew breath?'
But a big blot has hid each yesterday
So poor, so manifestly incomplete,
And your bright Promise, withered long and sped,
Is touched, stirs, rises, opens and grows sweet
And blossoms, and is you, when you are dead."

It was a noble confidence with which, on the stricken field, to greet the Unseen, and, on its account alone, we are grateful that the work of a true poet has been given to the world.

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The Religious Quest of India: Indian Theism.—By Nicol Macnicol, M.A., D.Litt.—Pp. xvi+292.

The Heart of Jainism.—By Mrs Sinclair Stevenson, M.A., Sc.D.—Pp. xxiv +336.—Oxford University Press, 1915.

These two volumes belong to a series the aim of which is to describe the religious and ethical developments of Indian thought and life. Its endeavour is to set the practical side of each system in living relation to the beliefs and the literature, to trace out "the age-long quest of the Indian spirit for religious truth and power," and to place each form of Indian religion by the side of Christianity in such a way that the relationship between them may stand out clearly. It is "an honest and careful attempt to bring the religions of India into comparison with the religion which to-day is their only possible rival, and to which they largely owe their present noticeable and significant revival." A twofold value of the series may be readily granted. The volumes will be valued by those who are proposing to enter the Indian mission-field; it is of the utmost importance —as is pointed out by the editors (Messrs J. N. Farquhar and H. D. Griswold)—that the existing faiths should be studied sympathetically, with a view to discern not merely their weakness, but also that which has enabled them to survive and to gain adherents. In addition to this, the series is a welcome contribution at an age when the problems of religion have become increasingly urgent and complex; and the purely objective science of religion, taking religious phenomena as the manifestation of genuine feelings and cravings, endeavours, by comparative, historical, psychological and other inquiries, to understand something of the nature and vicissitudes of religious and related thought. The Indian religions have an interest of their own, quite apart from the fact that Imperial responsibilities should lead us to realise their significance, for not only can they be traced through a long line of history, but the coexistence of a great variety of types provides valuable material for the deeper study of religious development. At a time when the "noticeable and significant revival" in religion is by no means confined to India, and when religion is almost everywhere confronted by a more stringent examination of fundamental principles, it is distinctly useful to have these works by competent writers who possess a first-hand acquaintance with their subject.

Dr Macnicol's volume deals with Indian Theism from the Vedic to the Mohammedan period. He passes each period under review, surveying in turn the material in the Rig-Veda, the later popular religion, the Upanishads, Buddhism, and so forth, down to the new elements introduced by Kabir and Nanak (Sikh religion). These surveys, with chapters on the Siva cult and the Shakta sect, are followed by a brief estimate of the evidence as regards the main theological ideas. A good chapter ("Criticism and Appreciation") discusses the character of Indian Theism with special reference to Christianity; and among a number of appendices special

mention should be made of a careful discussion of the alleged indebtedness of Indian Theism to Christian influence. The volume is full of instructive matter, and is singularly fair and unprejudiced. Dr Macnicol has a sound grasp of the general study of religions, and he has greatly enhanced the value of his work by his many illuminating references to Jewish, Greek, and Western thought. As an authoritative contribution to the Theistic and related systems of non-Christian belief the book merits close attention.

The second volume of the series, *The Heart of Jainism*, covers a small field, but Mrs Stevenson has, more completely than has hitherto been done, collected in a handy form all the necessary evidence for the study of this not unimportant sect. Jainism dates back to the remarkable religious movements in and about the sixth century B.C., when its founder Mahavira, and his later contemporary Gautama (the founder of Buddhism), rose up against the authority of the Veda scriptures and the Brahman priests. While Buddhism has left the peninsula, Jainism survives with over a million adherents, mainly bankers and wealthy traders, whose tenets have many features of religious and philosophical interest. Mrs Stevenson presents historical sketches of the general development of Jainism; the founder, his predecessors and his disciples, and the vicissitudes of the chief sects. The philosophical and theological ideas and beliefs are next fully described. Accounts are given of the usual life of the average Jaina, the characteristic features of the asceticism, the ordinary popular religious customs, the mythology, architecture, and literature. Finally, a chapter sums up the main aspects of Jainism from the point of view of Christianity. An introduction by the Rev. Dr G. P. Taylor draws attention, *inter alia*, to the important fact that the technical terms in modern Jainism do not always possess the meaning they once had. Altogether the volume is a most informing one, and Mrs Stevenson, who has had every opportunity of learning Jainism "from within," places the student of religions in her debt.

The two volumes, owing to their subject-matter, are so closely interrelated that they may be conveniently handled together. They deal with different aspects of the fundamental ideas in the Indian religions and are mutually illustrative for the light they throw upon types of Indian mentality. These are not properly understood until the essential doctrines have been grasped—the doctrines touching rebirth and transmigration, and the influence of man's behaviour upon his subsequent incarnation. While the Occidental mind is characteristically active and practical, and tends to ignore the question of life after death, often treating it indeed as an arguable one; the Oriental, on the other hand, starts with the conviction of persistence as a postulate, and his problem is how to escape rebirth or make it endurable. Whereas we generally tend to regard religion as something that deals with life, death, and immortality, the Eastern outlook tends to regard religion as the specialised treatment of accepted facts. In other words, the study of Indian religions emphasises

the otherwise authenticated view that religion handles in a distinctive manner data which, in a non-religious form, are part and parcel of the conscious or subconscious postulates of ordinary life and thought.

The initial problem in the development of Indian religion concerns the Rig-Veda, and Dr Macnicol well brings out the relatively lofty ideas and the marked tendency to monotheism exemplified in the cult of the Vedic god Varuna. The conceptions of Varuna and the principle of *rita*, or order, in the universe, stand in striking contrast to the later post-Vedic period where, instead of the foreshadowing of an ethical theism, we have the supremacy of Indra, "a god nearer to the comprehension of the common man and appealing more to his crude instincts." Little light can be thrown upon the reason for this remarkable decline, and henceforth we find varieties of thought more related to one another than to the majestic writings of the Rig-Veda. There is henceforth a common soil with lower popular religious ideas of the usual familiar animistic character, and these again and again leave their influence upon the more individualistic movements which spring up in their midst. Especially is this noticeable in Jainism, which, as Mrs Stevenson observes, has stood in very close relationship with Hinduism. To the animistic tendencies correspond what Dr Macnicol styles a "radical pantheism," and this in its turn is only another phase of what otherwise shows itself in mystical tendencies sometimes of extreme character.

In the land where the spiritual side of life outweighs the material, the doctrines of transmigration and of *Karma* are the key to the religious history. The doctrine that every action automatically brings its results, good or bad, the consequences of which bind man to a rebirth, and in a shape that depends upon past behaviour, is the centre of reflection and speculation. It affords an explanation of every illness and catastrophe; and when the luckless victim protests that he has done nothing to deserve the blow, the doctrine of transmigration is supplemented by theories of "illusion" or of "ignorance" to explain his inability to remember a prior iniquitous existence. *Karma*, in fact, is of fundamental importance throughout; it affects the question of the reality of a God, the extent of divine power and freedom, it strikes at the root of free will, and it shapes all discussion of immortality. In the nature of the case, these volumes pay special attention to *Karma* in the light of Christian belief; this is one of their chief merits. To free oneself from the burdens of *Karma*, there are typical "roads"—the road of works, *i.e.* the way of rite and oblation, established and guarded by Brahman hierarchy, and the road of knowledge, which reached relief by intuition: and if we except the orthodox priestly system, the outlets man found were either in ascetic brotherhoods, as exemplified in Buddhism and Jainism, or in those theistic tendencies which range from mysticism to pantheism.

Not only are Buddhism and Jainism contemporary with a religious awakening from China to Greece and Palestine, but one of the most spiritual of theistic developments dates from a time shortly before and after the

Christian era. The Bhagavadgita, the New Testament of Hinduism, has points of contact with Christianity which, however, as Dr Macnicol observes, may be accidental. But none the less he is impressed by the coincidence (p. 85), and those who would see some deeper significance in it may notice among the various individual theistic reforming efforts those of about 1500 A.D., the age of Luther (viz. Vallabhacarya, Kabir, Caitanya, Nanak). It is instructive to perceive that there is a certain similarity in the reforming ideas—democratic, anti-sacerdotal, and anti-caste, and proselytising; they give rise in due time to schools, and these split up, and sometimes deteriorate. While Rama and Krishna, from being human heroes, become incarnations of Vishnu, Buddha in turn becomes the centre of a cult, and the founder of Jainism, if not deified, is more than venerated. Reflection upon Buddha gave rise to a peculiar "docetic" heresy, and it is interesting to observe that the Calvinists and Arminians had their counterpart in the "cat" and "monkey" doctrines of divine grace—the former maintaining that the worshipper is carried passively to his goal, like the kitten in the mouth of the cat; whereas the latter claimed that man must be co-operant with God, clinging to Him as the young of the monkey do to their mother (Macnicol, p. 110).

Noteworthy, too, is the tendency of the mystical developments to pass into an erotic theism, and thence into an absolute surrender, with lamentable results; while, on the other hand, asceticism fosters magical practices, and the possession of superior knowledge leads to the attribution or claim of occult powers. Throughout there are similar typical transitions. The asceticism of the Jaina is remarkable; the ethical ideals reach a lofty standard. But Mrs Stevenson testifies that there is a dissatisfaction with the religion; it is felt to be external, impersonal, and unreal (p. 290). The asceticism is carried to such lengths that it is forbidden to rejoice in beauty, or to indulge in overfondness for a person or thing (pp. 126 *seq.*, 135). The logical outcome is abstinence from food; by committing suicide all action is avoided, and the effects of *Karma* are diminished (p. 143). The ascetic ideals thus made for self-stultification and the elimination of personality, and Mrs Stevenson remarks upon the apathy of the Jaina during the famines that have from time to time devastated India (p. 179). The goal desired is negative and unethical, a state of passive and passionless beatitude, a climax which stands in contrast to the Buddhist teaching that the Bhodisattva should renounce the bliss of *Nirvana* in order to deliver suffering men. But although theoretically *Karma* spells fatalism, the Jaina strongly repudiate this (p. 58). It is taught that "merit" will counteract the evil effects of *Karma*, a solution which may be compared with the teaching of the Bhagavadgita that motiveless work is the highest (Macnicol, pp. 82, 202 *seq.*, 219, 239). The theistic tendencies, to be sure, find another escape for man, but the problem of God's relation to *Karma* always remains the crowning difficulty (*op. cit.*, pp. 82, 108, 147 *seq.*, 208). The problem of reconciling the existence of a Supreme God with an automatically effective *Karma* is thus the Indian counterpart of the Western

problem of co-ordinating theism with the conception of the uniformity of natural law (p. 226).

Two difficulties confront the future of Indian religion: the state of intellectual or rather philosophical thought, and the conception of divine personality. To the latter of these Dr Macnicol's volume brings much valuable though rather scattered evidence, from which one gains the impression that the ideas of personal deity are strongest among the common people, and that only the gods of popular worship have retained any definite personal outline. The demand for a personalised worship, coupled with the doctrine of an "unknowable" god (pp. 140, 149, 174), would seem to have favoured the belief in material incarnations (*e.g.* p. 212), or in the elevation of conspicuous individuals into mediators (*e.g.* p. 142). And as regards the standard of thought, it is instructive to compare the early half-theistic, half-philosophical gropings with the curious features that distinguish the atheistic philosophy of the Jaina. Upon the latter Mrs Stevenson's volume is most informing. The system is remarkably materialistic; bodiless beings cannot be prayed to, and *Karma* must have some shape, because formless things can do no harm (pp. 169, 175, 242 *seq.*). Even the emotions are strangely materialised (p. 102 *seq.*). One of the greatest offences being the killing of life—the aim is not so much to save life, as to refrain from destroying—the category of *jiva* (the living) attracts most attention, and a great deal of thought has been devoted to working out theories of living things, the lowest rank being held by stones! Jaina animism is, in fact, a most interesting phenomenon; and it is worthy of fuller study as an example of pre-scientific theorising. It may be added that Mrs Stevenson, in agreement with Dr Jacobi, regards the animistic traits as proof of the great antiquity of Jainism (pp. 89, 94, n. 4). This is inconclusive; for although Jainism may be of ancient inception, the character of the popular ideas (especially chap. xiii.), and the fact that the Jaina are Indians before they philosophise, suggests that the philosophy is only a particular shaping of the current animistic thought. In the same way, superstitious beliefs and practices in Christian lands are not due to the fact that certain people had savage or half-savage ancestors; superstition and religion represent differing forms of the same fundamental psychical tendencies; and when one passes from "comparative religion" to "comparative philosophy," it is not difficult to trace certain essential similarities due to the common psychological nature of all men and to the fact that men are human beings before they become theologians or metaphysicians. The specially interesting feature of Indian thought is that it enables us to fill up some of the gaps between the most rudimentary and the most elevated ways of thinking, and to realise how much depends upon the extent to which the effort is made to adjust conflicting experiences, and to co-ordinate the manifold aspects of life and thought.

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Indian Thought Past and Present.—By R. W. Frazer, LL.B., C.E., I.C.S. (Ret.).—Pp. 340.—London, Unwin, 1915.

THE author, well known for his *Literary History of India*, and as an authoritative writer on Indian intellectual life and thought, here furnishes a valuable account of those aspects of religious and philosophical reflection which have influenced the aspirations, the beliefs, and the social ideas of all thinking and orthodox Hindus. That this is a timely volume needs no saying. India has struck the imagination by her loyalty, her sacrifices, and her spontaneous recognition of the elementary principles for which the Empire stands and fights. Any work that will help the East and the West to understand each other is welcome; the more especially as India, in common with other lands, has become conscious of the movement of thought and the existence of problems that depend upon the future development of thought. It is a fundamental principle of Empire that in India, to quote Queen Victoria's words, "none be in any wise favoured, none molested or disquieted by reason of their Religious Faith or Observances"; and Mr Frazer scrupulously confines himself to the most objective survey of the field. But he does not hesitate to notice here and there the points of contact between Indian and European philosophy, with results that are interesting and suggestive for both. Indeed, the problems of reconstruction in India cannot be kept isolated from those elsewhere, where there is the keenest realisation of the conflict between new knowledge, ideas, and aspirations, on the one hand, and, on the other, bodies of belief and practice which can be traced back ultimately to conditions of thought very different from those of to-day. In fact, Mr Frazer's book gains in significance when we observe that the modern prevailing religious uncertainty is the climax of a lengthy development, the beginnings of which are found in India in the Vedas; while Europe can claim its spiritual and religious home in Rome, Greece, and the lands of the Bible. It is to be observed, therefore, that while Indian, Christian, Jewish, and Mohammedan constructive ideals will almost invariably go back in each case to the extant forms of early orthodox literature, the "comparative method" of investigation illustrated by Mr Frazer here—and again by Dr Macnicol in his *Indian Theism*—strikes more widely and deeply, and points to the necessity of determining and examining in the first instance the principles and factors that lie beneath the orthodox literature and other sources. For in an age of free and confident inquiry it is very important to ascertain, by the deeper comparative and historical treatment of bodies of thought, *why* the "orthodox" remains orthodox, *why* the "unorthodox" has been left outside, and *what* has been the influence of the latter upon the former. An age that claims to be enlightened and rational will sooner or later realise that by the side of the possibilities of development there are the numerous proofs of the limitations of man, and nothing is gained by merely condemning or deploring the features to which we happen to object, and which have a way of manifesting themselves

persistently. To some more scientific examination of man's world of religious and other thought Mr Frazer's volume is a helpful contribution.

The book is illustrated with some thirty photographs of gods, temples, etc., and the material is so arranged as to lead from the old orthodox works up to the modern conditions—Hinduism, the past and present position of women, the present situation in Indian thought. In this way the reader can appreciate the strength of the old hereditary currents of thought and belief that have given birth to the Eastern conceptions of the Universe; and he is in a position to realise more distinctly the effect of the conflict of the streams, as the tide of Western thought flowed over and penetrated the East. Mr Frazer's own view is apparently indicated in the publishers' account of the book, which describes as one of its aims to show that "the hasty introduction of a higher civilisation sometimes leads to disastrous reaction which might well be avoided in the best interests of the Empire." Touching this rather pessimistic note it may be sufficient to remark that essentially the same duties confront us and also other peoples (*e.g.* the United States) wheresoever the older and newer streams of thought come together; and no one who will take a "long view" of the history of thought can doubt that the results are largely inevitable, that the problems which have arisen through past development of thought will be simplified by its further development, and that what mind can destroy —because of its dissatisfaction,—it can reconstruct—when it finds contentment. After all, Mr Frazer himself is able to show that the "higher civilisation" has helped to remove many serious abuses (pp. 248, 295, 300 *seq.*, 308 *seq.*); and consequently we must take the bad with the good. Undoubtedly, family and social bonds are said to have weakened, and ethical considerations in matters of life have deteriorated (pp. 303, 326). While, on the one hand, danger is feared in the loosening of the bonds of social, family, and caste usages, and in the declining respect for the Brahmans and for the authority of the old orthodox writings; there are eager efforts, on the other hand, to build up a new social and spiritual life on the basis of the Vedas and Vedanta (pp. 309, 314 *seq.*). An instructive paragraph on the monastery of the national Arya Samāj brotherhood at Hardwar illustrates the desire to combine the study of the traditional authorities with the most modern scientific methods (p. 323). One is naturally reminded of the widespread efforts—outside India—to establish a Neo-Scholasticism. Both are experiments the results of which will be watched with the greatest interest. Sometimes new and old ideas successfully blend, sometimes there are dismal failures—we need a "science" based on the current mental sciences to investigate processes for which there is abundant material and which are vital for all endeavours to "reconstruct" present conditions.

India has keen ideas of individualism, of the brotherhood of man, and of a national career. She has claimed independence of thought and a willingness "to absorb the best of those outside intellectual truths and spiritual ideals with which she was brought into contact, so long as they did not

necessitate an abandonment of her own traditional modes of thought." Not only this, but Hinduism "claims that it is established on a basis of philosophic reasoning which has not been shaken by any modern system of Western metaphysical thought" (pp. 10, 194). The situation has recently become more interesting owing to the fact that Benares will have a Hindu University with faculties in Arts, Sciences, Law, Oriental Studies, and Theology (pp. 1, 196 *seq.*). Hinduism itself is extraordinarily catholic (pp. 188 *seq.*. 307); and its catholicity corresponds to the great variety of types of population, some notion of which can be gained by observing the numerous marriage customs (p. 274). It is the modern form of a very ancient religion; it can trace itself back to the Vedic age, and find there its two great deities, Siva (Rudra) and Vishnu. These are personal gods who "in their grace await the salvation of those who serve with loving faith and devotion . . . [a] religious phase of thought [which] has been the abiding faith of India from even before the Christian era" (p. 208). The mass of the people took no part either in Vedic sacrifices or in Brahmanic philosophical speculations; they had their own local and tribal cults, and these Brahmanism was obliged to recognise and to make legitimate. Consequently, Hinduism displays a fusion of varying and conflicting tendencies. It passes from polytheism and theism to pantheism, thence to spiritual idealism; sometimes God is a personal God and the creator of a real world, and sometimes He has transfused himself "into the whole Universe in an all-absorbing pantheism which then fades away in the idea of the unreality of everything" (pp. 66, 209 *seq.*). The mystical intuition of the Unity underlying all things issues in one direction in a theosophy, and in the other in a philosophy; and the Hinduism of to-day comprises two diverging views, both resting upon the interpretations of the Vedanta, and both supplying its philosophical basis. It is said that 75 per cent. of Brahman teachers adhere to the monistic teachings of Sankaracarya and 15 per cent to the so-called dualism of Ramanuja. The former, the second great champion of Brahmanism (*circ.* A.D. 800), overthrew the remnants of Buddhism by his doctrines of the illusion and the unreality of the world. But "the inquiring mind of India demanded a philosophic basis on which to rest its worship of a personal God, and its love and devotion and faith in the saving grace of that God." Brahmanism therefore found its third champion in Ramanuja (*circ.* 1100), the defender of the theistic position, which, even if it can claim only the small minority of the intellectual class, is more in harmony with the popular tendencies.

Buddhism arose at a period of decline in Brahmanism; it passed into a popular religion, mingled with Hinduism, and gave birth to schools of Buddhist philosophy (p. 180 *seq.*). Sankara's aim was to prove that the doctrines of Buddhism were opposed to the entire revelation of Vedic scriptures, and he refuted its pessimism by teaching that only the spiritual exists. While Buddha, looking at the real, lost sight of the spiritual, Sankara, gazing solely at the spiritual, lost sight of the real, which faded away. All phenomena, all appearances, are merely illusions; they not only

veil the true Unity of the Universe, making it appear as diversity—they also veil the spiritual Unity of Brahman, which the ignorant view as a personal Creator or Lord (pp. 79, 85). Such a theory could hardly satisfy the popular mind, and accordingly he distinguishes a higher and a lower knowledge. There is, first, a higher metaphysical knowledge of an unconditioned Brahman, pure subject of thought, or abstract consciousness; the Supreme is pure knowledge without any outside object of knowledge. And, secondly, there is a lower or exoteric knowledge of a Lord as a source of creation. The higher knowledge can come only by long discipline; and, according to Sankara, "as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not hold on undisturbed" (p. 99). Just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper awakes, so, only when man awakens from the dream of an empirical world, can he pierce the veil of Maya and reach the haven of rest. Then does the soul gain the highest knowledge of the spiritual oneness of all things; and just as rivers lose their identity and individuality on passing into the sea, so the soul loses its individuality on its becoming merged into Brahman. Here the individual can have no knowledge of any ego or self, nor can there be any reality in the world of appearances. Such a system, based upon the refusal to accept the evidence of the senses, led to a natural retort. When the Vijnanavadin Buddhists argued that all is impermanent, and that even thought has no momentary continuity, the answer came: if all is ceaseless flux, "before thou didst finish uttering thy words and meanings, thy understanding must have passed away; what revelation of truth or virtue can there be in such teaching?" (p. 182). So, too, Sankara appears to establish the whole of his doctrine of illusion upon evidence which is itself illusion, and he has to meet this criticism. This he does by wholeheartedly accepting the objection. The conclusion is "just what we assume," and he quotes from the Upanishads the declaration that when true knowledge arises, "a father is not a father, a mother not a mother, the worlds not worlds, the gods not gods, the Vedas not Vedas" (p. 94). The criticism and the reply are worth noticing as examples of the stage reached in Indian philosophy. Very instructive also is the way in which Meykandar, of the thirteenth century, transcends the conflicting abstractions of Buddha and Sankara by teaching that the mind becomes that with which it identifies itself most: spiritual if it identifies itself with the spiritual, realistic if it identifies itself with the real (p. 145). Such a recognition deserves a place in the logic of religious and philosophical theory; it can be placed by the side of the words of Porphyry, "Like is known only by like, and the condition of all knowledge is that the subject should become like to the object," and of the Cambridge Platonist, John Smith, "Such as men themselves are, such will God Himself seem to them to be."

A point to which Mr Frazer pays some attention, but which deserves fuller elaboration, is the actual transition in thought from the cosmogony

of the Vedas to the "philosophy" of the Upanishads (p. 51). Professor G. F. Moore, *History of Religions*, vol. i., in an admirable and concise survey of the religions of India, makes this useful comment upon the Upanishads: the teachers "go straight at the ultimate problems of metaphysics—the nature of reality, the relation of appearance and reality and of the many to the one. The thinkers came to these questions from the mythological cosmogonic speculations of their predecessors; *their thinking, like that of the earliest Greek philosophers, is often half-mythical; they express themselves in mythical or ritualistic terms*" (p. 272). The words I have italicised appear to state a fact of very great importance for the development of conceptual thought. The tendency to unify experience appears in the Vedas—which are an advance even upon Neo-Babylonian speculation (Moore, p. 242); but we are in the realm of personification, and this is of some significance for Sankara's theory of unreality. The unreality of the world needs an explanation; but the old thinkers, though they could lay their finger upon facts, were necessarily influenced entirely by the *façon de penser* of their age. To Sankara unreality is due to a sort of principle of cosmic ignorance; and just as speech had once been personified as a female deity, now Maya, "illusion," is a feminine abstract principle. In Vedic mythology Maya itself was applied to an occult power, which was variously good or bad according as it was employed by gods or demons (pp. 88 *seq.*). The old term has undergone development, and, while the ordinary mind will personify its agencies, the philosopher, more accustomed to abstract thinking, has reified. Hence we have a misleading reification, Maya, which ultimately reflects real data of human experience, but as a reification is able to confuse and impede the further development of thought much in the same way that we ourselves are hindered by such half-analysed terms as "natural selection" and many others.

Mr Frazer well compares Maya, the reified source of illusion, to the "deceitful demon" which Descartes imagined as the cause of the unreal things as presented to the senses. He has also noticed several other resemblances and differences between Eastern and Western philosophical thought. The subject merits fuller inquiry for its bearing upon the general structure of the mind and the way in which mind handles its experiences under the influence of the current modes of thought. Indian thought is of a mystical and pantheistic character; it is essentially "undifferentiated"; and it is possible to see how the beginnings of what we call "science" in Greek thought have allowed a specialisation of concepts, which has developed further up to the present age with its excessive specialisation unprotected by any unifying synthesis of a religious or philosophical character. The old Indian psychology is penetrating, profound, and astonishing for its wealth, but to the Western mind the inadequacy and weakness of the concepts are obvious. It is the imperfections of the "tools of thought" which so strongly impress us, though it is only right to admit that our own "tools" are sadly defective. Early

thought is relatively far more undifferentiated than our own non-specialistic thought; and this permits considerable range of interpretation and makes it difficult to determine precisely what some old writer had in his mind when he uses words which to our more differentiated minds admit of different interpretations. The child who asks, "Is this true?" is unable to differentiate as we can—if need be—between what is true to human nature and true to history; and the problems that confront the student of the Old Testament reappear in the study of old religions and philosophies. Indian thought is rich and many-sided; but it goes back essentially to a pre-scientific stage of development. On the other hand, Western thought, with all its science, cannot yet point to any satisfactory synthesis that does justice to the demands of heart and head. In the problems that lie before us East and West can be mutually helpful; for the important fact—which is not recognised by the super-scientist or the super-intellectualist—is that the average individual, West or East, simply will *not* accept any body of ideas or thought which does not meet certain psychical wants and tendencies. *This* is what Democracy means for all, both in the East and in the West. Man has developed wonderfully in human history; thought can develop further; but the objective study of civilisations and religions proves that there are conditions, and these should be investigated and determined by an age that claims to be rational and scientific.

STANLEY A. COOK.

CAMBRIDGE.

THE

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A DISCOURSE ON WAR.

THE LATE STOPFORD A. BROOKE.

(THE following discourse was written by Mr Brooke in December 1905. It is published in the *Hibbert Journal* (with the permission of Mr Brooke's literary executors) not only as a characteristic utterance of its author but for its foreshadowing of present conditions. He had intended its publication shortly before his death in March of this year. With the exception of one passage indicated by him for omission he left the MS unrevised.—EDITOR).

To fight in defence of one's home, of that which we have won by our own labour, of our love, and of our honour, is a primary instinct in human nature. It comes down to us from the brutes; and linked to it, I cannot tell why, is a sense of keen pleasure, eagerness and exaltation. We cannot get rid of this hereditary passion. It is universal; as acute in the civilised as in the savage, but in the civilised man brought into bounds, controlled and limited in a hundred ways by the rights of the whole body of men and women to whom we belong. But however limited, the instinct of fighting remains, and its pleasure; and to do away with it altogether is beyond our power. It is as well, when we think about war, and discuss its evil or its good, to recognise this primary fact. It makes war often necessary. In spite of the attendant horrors it brings men into war, and continues them in it. Its existence is the foundation on which the hideous temple of mere Militarism is built up in an Empire. Without its existence such militarism would not last a day. These two elements—lying at the root of what we call war—the defence of our lives, our goods and our loves—and a certain physical and spiritual pleasure in fighting for its own sake, seem on the

whole good and carry with them good results. The pleasure of fighting is spiritualised by the fortitude it requires, by the contempt of death it engenders, by the intelligence it awakens, trains and demands, by the quickness which must accompany it, and by the courage and endurance it develops and establishes in the character. Fighting has its evil extreme when it becomes in battle a mere thirst of blood or an intoxication of destruction, when men, as they say, "see red," but there are extremes in all things, and chiefly in things originally good, and we cannot throw away the good, because it may be carried into evil. This element in war is to be accepted and educated, not, as some say, eradicated. Indeed, it cannot be eradicated, but it may be ennobled.

Then there is the defence, by fighting, of all we justly and naturally hold dear against those who would deprive us of home, of our women and children, of the land we have tilled; of the welfare we have upbuilt from generation to generation; of liberty, of honour, of all that makes and keeps a nation great. Part of that descends to us from the animals who die for their young brood and fight for their loves, but the chief part of it is derived from the slow growth in humanity of the noble ideas which arise out of the development of individuality and collectivism in mankind, of all that exalts the soul of the person and the soul of the State. To fight to the death for these great possessions, to feel that it is honour to die for them and dishonour to retreat from them, to give up everything material for them, to war for them to the last man, is just, true and righteous war, and there is not a thought or a passion connected with it which does not exalt and ennoble, not only the persons and the nation which wage it, but the whole body also of humanity to whom the great tradition of this defence is handed down, and whom the memory of it inspires, teaches and ennobles.

For such defence a nation should be ready, should be taught and trained. There is not a man in this country, from the lowest to the highest, who should not feel it his duty to be prepared for a war of defence, and who should not be enabled by the State to obtain such preparation as would enable him to be of some use if that unhappy event should occur. Nothing but good arises from such a preparation or from such a war. What we defend is good—home, womanhood, civil and religious liberty, love, honour, the great tradition of the past, the hopes of the future, law, beauty, national existence. All the ideas linked to these things are spiritual; ideal and real; and so are their emotions. In preparing for their defence, and in defending them in battle,

the finest powers in human nature are awakened, trained, and developed—powers which are applicable to, and of the greatest use in, all the arts and works of peace—fortitude, endurance, courage, gentleness to the weak, good manners, a high sense of honour, quickness of intelligence, presence of mind, love of country, sacrifice of selfish desires for the sake of the nation, joyfulness in risking life and wealth for the ideas by which the nation lives, a deep sense of mutual citizenship, and not the least, a disciplined obedience.

These are things and powers which are strengthened by the preparation for a war of defence, and developed in the course of such a war. With them a nation is great, and its influence on mankind just and of an exalting power. Without them the wealthiest nation is not great, and its influence on mankind is degrading. With them war is ennobling, without them it is debasing and ends in villainy.

A defensive war implies offensive war. Defence presupposes aggression. Nearly all the good results which accompany and follow a war of defence are absent from a war of aggression, because it is rooted in evil as fully as the other is rooted in good. Offensive war springs straight out of covetousness, and out of the envy, jealousy or hatred which are the legitimate children of covetousness. Kings, priesthoods, the rich classes who want to be more rich, speculators, contractors, aristocracies who desire to expend the superfluous people who endanger their supremacy, republican ministers who thirst for what they think glory—these, hungering for more power, more wealth, more of the earth, more of poor human souls to exploit, to use up and subdue to their greedy will; envious of the welfare of other nations, jealous of their success, hating them because their peace and liberty dim their own evil splendour, these open out and declare war to satisfy their covetousness, to slake that idiotic thirst in which covetousness ends—the thirst of conquest for the sake of conquest.

Such a war is the worst of sins; and the men who begin it, or carry it on, are, though all the world proclaim their glory, the vilest and the meanest of sinners. The coarsest criminals that labour in our prisons are white as wool in comparison with the black villainy of these men; all of whom should be solemnly judged and put to death by the human race. They exhaust, disease, corrupt, torture and destroy the whole body, soul and spirit of humanity. No words can be too strong to condemn them and their methods, to reprove and denounce their militarism, and the evil it does to the soul of their people; even when they are not at actual war. And there is no one who

knows the inconceivable misery, agony and horror of war, helped as it is by science to inflict the worst it can on guiltless humanity, who is not filled with indignation and wrath with the causers of such a war, wrath which is speechless with passion, but which, accumulating in the hearts of men, will finally destroy the social systems which permit, and even glorify such wars, and such conquerors. The best guard against such wars being imposed upon a nation by its ruling classes is that the people, who do not love war for its own sake, should be entirely free, and represent their will in free assemblies. But even the people, hounded on by an excitable or venal press, or themselves greedy of excitement, false glory, or of plunder, may be filled with the thirst of aggressive war. When that takes place we may be sure that behind its senseless cry there is covetousness, selfish greed of some kind, low and accursed speculation, and with that, total recklessness of the sacrifice of the people, who are used as mere counters in the game. We may talk and preach peace as we please. There will be no peace on earth till we get covetousness out of the heart of the world, till, one and all, we feel that the desire of earthly power and of accumulating wealth are desires which inevitably lead to division, strife and wicked wars, and which, even if the nation wins the war, devour, when they have defiled, the goodness and the strength of a people.

Then, again, there are wars which are waged, not for conquest, or for the defence of our country and all that means, but for ideas whose healthy existence is necessary for the progress, even the life of humanity—great causes to which every man who has a soul willingly dedicates his life, his wealth, his powers. The love of them is the love of man. There are many of such causes, such ideas, and their forms vary according to the conditions of the nation or the society in which they do their work. But there are but very few of them which may not be brought under the old Whig motto. "We stand for civil and religious liberty all over the world. All the ideas which oppose it are our foes, all that maintain it are our allies and friends." To fight for the causes contained in those words is to fight for the existence of humanity. We may fight for them in many ways, by speaking, writing, by living for their principles, by dying for them without going into the mortal battle of iron war. But sometimes, driven by greed, policy or pride, or from positive love of evil things, a king, an emperor, corrupt officialdom, a priesthood, or a people set themselves in arms to maintain the cause of evil, to secure by battle an evil right to enslave the souls or the

bodies of those they wish to use as chattels, for the sake of wealth, power, or their own religion. Then those who maintain the liberty of the soul to worship God in their own way, and the liberty of the individual to live his own life, are forced into arms to defend these rights. In so doing, they are obliged to face all the horrors of war and to wage it to the bitter end, but they are guiltless, nay, they are fighting not only their own battle, but that of the whole of the human race. Such a war was the great struggle between the North and the South in America, a war which settled for ever the question of slavery as an institution on which a nation can deliberately build its state. There is plenty of unconfessed, unjust slavery in existence, but the right of a people to keep, by public law, outside of its citizenship a vast body of slaves was then and there declared, in its last citadel, to be a deadly wrong to the human race, and then and there destroyed. It was a pity it had to be done by war, accompanied by all its miseries, but in the present state and beliefs of society I do not see that it could have been done in any other way; nor indeed, when such questions arise in which the fortune of all humanity is at stake, do I see in the future any other way of settling the matter, until evil pride and covetous desires of power and wealth at the expense of others have been wrought out of the soul of nations and their rulers. If these fly to arms to get their evil way, those they attack must oppose them in arms under the present conditions of the world of men.

Wherever such a strife between false and true ideas exists, supposing we are not involved—what are we to do? Well, we are bound to take the side of liberty, justice, and love. When any evil power violates shamelessly the principles of government on which the progress of mankind depends, we have no right to be silent or inactive. We must speak, we must openly declare on whose side we stand. But that, we say, is equivalent to intervention, and we risk a war. But what if we do? There are times, I hold, in history, when war must be risked if a nation is to retain its greatness of mind, its position as a supporter, not only of its own interests, but of the vaster interests of mankind. When the rulers of any nation deliberately assail the liberties of other peoples, persecute, torture, and slay by force those who withstand against their aggression, it is our duty to take sides openly against them, to protest publicly by the voice of the government against them, to hold them up to the shame of mankind, to have no friendship with them, and to back up our words by action, if necessary, even at the risk of war.

The doctrine of non-intervention is a good doctrine, but not when carried into so great an extreme that a nation remains silent and inactive face to face with deliberate crime, of the deepest dye, wrought against justice, liberty, pity, and human nature, against the whole progress of the human race. No people which does not take an open stand in behalf of civil and religious liberty, not only within its own borders, but also over the whole world, which does not proclaim that it owes a duty to mankind and the vast causes of mankind, as well as to itself, can remain great. It is then on the path to decay, and if it do not repent, to death. I trust the time will come when all those nations, East and West, who love freedom and justice and the tolerance of thought will ally themselves together not only for their own interests, but for those of humanity, and will say—fearing no war, for their united power will be overwhelming—to the governments who violate liberty, justice, and pity, "This must cease; reform yourselves or stand your trial before the tribunal of mankind to receive judgment." Of that I do not despair; and that alone, as things are now, would put an end to war.

But for that, there is one thing above all necessary, and it seems, as things go in society, more and more difficult to gain. It is the uprooting of covetousness, national and personal —covetousness of power over the bodies or souls of men, covetousness of wealth for itself, for the power it gives or for the luxury it brings, covetousness of what earth calls glory, and heaven degradation. That is the tap-root of all quarrels, schisms, divisions, wars in personal, social, national lives. It is our first business, if we wish to live at peace, to cast it out of our personal souls with abhorrence. It is a nation's first business, if it wish to be at peace in itself, and to make for peace in the world, to cast it out of its soul, and to govern against it at every point of its laws at home, and its policy abroad. Then we have laid deep the foundation of peace, and of a peace which will not grow into war; as that false peace is certain to do, which, while it sits at home, lives in covetousness. Every day of such a peace sows the seeds of war. "What can we do?" some may say. "In these great matters a private person can do nothing." "Yes, you can," I answer: "look to your own lives. Build them on this saying, 'Take heed and beware of covetousness, for a man's life consisteth not in the things which he possesseth.' Every man or woman who resists the desires which want to have more than is enough, and steadfastly repels them, has driven one nail at least into the coffin of public war; and were all to resist and

repel in this fashion, war would be no more, and peace would lose its evils."

The same principles apply in the great social war which is waged all over the world, not by physical force but by fraud, by legalised fraud, between those who have more than they need and those who have less than they need. That war never ceases. Neither truce nor peace ever diminishes its pains, its sorrows, and its cruelty. In countries which are free it is less vicious than in those that are not free; there are many efforts in such countries made to modify its pains. But even in such countries its battle is incessant, especially in great towns, and its sorrows and slaughters terrible. When we hear of the miseries of such a great war as that lately waged between Japan and Russia, our heart is sick with wrath and pity. But we have only a vague pity and indignation for those who suffer life-long misery, who are slowly slain, whose bodies are year by year worn out by over-labour, whose souls are left untrained and uncomforted for want of any leisure, who do not possess what they ought to possess of the common necessaries of life, who are practically enslaved, whose wage is not a living wage, whose labour does not receive a just return, and whose war against the injustice and pitilessness and enslavement of their condition is, even in free countries, much more in unfree countries, all but a hopeless war, in which they get all the wounds and all the sorrow.

This is the great war of the world. A thousand thousand more than perished on the blood-stained plains of Manchuria perished this year in this war of wealth and labour, and even more miserably; and with them perished, not only men, but women and children in great hopelessness and pain. In this country this war is not so cruel as it is in despotic lands, and we escape the worst fruits of it. What these fruits are we saw more than a hundred years ago in the Revolution in France, when all the old and wicked society was broken up in darkness, blood, and terror. That was the warning of the world.

Let England, let all the nations of the earth take warning! We are ourselves at this present moment in danger. In spite of all the efforts men of just and good will are making, the richer and more comfortable classes in this country, and their idle society, are becoming too fond of ill-got wealth, too luxurious, too reckless in wasteful expenditure, too idle, too immoral, too thoughtless of the duties of citizenship, too gambling, too much the slaves of appetite, not to wake in the minds of the poor, the unemployed, and the better class of

workmen, an indignation, wrath, and sense of injustice which will not long be silent or inactive, and which, taken up by the scum of the towns, may breed violent riot, plunder, and destruction. We are not so far from that as we imagine. Let Parliament look to this! Above all, let a rich and careless society mend its ways and learn its duties!

Of this terrible social and universal war, covetousness is also the root. That is as plain as the sun in the sky. If you want to lessen the pains of this war, to bring about a peace to it, to establish a juster, freer, nobler social state, purge, I repeat, your own soul, set free your life, from covetousness of every kind; and then you will be able by speech and action to unite yourself with all those who are striving to redeem society from the curse of this war, and to establish, however far away, another social state in which this war shall be no more. That is, and is to be, the hope, the faith, the enthusiasm of the future world. Live in, and for, that hope, abide in the faith of it, and let every act, thought, and emotion of your life catch the fire of its enthusiasm. Then England may grow young again. New art, new literature, new politics, new business will be born, and science will no longer minister to the destruction but to the health and betterment of men.

All these wars are but parts of the great universal war which is hourly waged between the force of the life and spirit of Christ and the life and spirit of the world, and which are symbolically represented, with astonishing genius, in the story of the Temptation in the Wilderness. It is the contest between covetousness which desires everything for one's self, and love which desires to give all it has to others. It is the contest between the material and the spiritual aim of life. It is the contest between luxury and simplicity of life, between making a show and being content to love and to hide the doings of love. It is the contest between force and fraud for the sake of wealth and power and their glory, and the hatred of these things when they are won by evil means, that is, by means which violate justice and love. It is the contest between the worship of God and the worship of the Devil, between the crown of careless comfort and the Crown of the Cross. This is the great war of which all the wars of the world are children. It has been set in array since the beginning of humanity upon this earth. The whole history of mankind is the history of that war. Through its vicissitudes, battles, truces, treaties, its various developments in various states, humanity is being evolved to its far-off conclusion of perfection in the peace of love's activity and of love's creation.

THE SPIRITUAL ALLIANCE OF RUSSIA AND ENGLAND.

HAROLD BEGBIE.

When I was in Petrograd at the beginning of the present year I had the honour of a long conversation with M. Serg. Sazonoff, the Emperor of Russia's minister for foreign affairs. We discussed certain aspects of the War for a few minutes, and then by way of literature (M. Sazonoff is a profound admirer of Dostoieffsky) found our way to religion. For nearly an hour we discussed nothing else.

Something that M. Sazonoff said to me in this conversation has haunted my thoughts ever since, and has been a subject of discussion between my friends and myself on many occasions. He said to me that while there are many sinners in Russia, many and great sinners, all are Christians; and he asked me with a smile if I understood what he meant. I replied to this question with the saying of Carlyle that the greatest of sins is to be conscious of none, and M. Sazonoff nodded his head as if satisfied that I understood him.

But when I came to speak of this conversation among certain of my Russian friends in Petrograd who fell under the influence of the late Lord Radstock in 1874, I found that my enthusiasm for the religion of Russia was met by warnings and by active criticism. I was told that the greatest disaster which could befall the Russian nation would be a conviction that their religion of love, which pays so little attention to conduct, is worthy to be called Christian. I was begged to use what influence I might have to bring the moral earnestness of England into Russian life, and to emphasise with all my force the weakness of Russia in its neglect of conduct.

On the other hand, when I spoke of my conversation with M. Sazonoff to Englishmen who have lived for many years in

Russia, I found them as enthusiastic as myself for the Russian Christ. They spoke of the beauty of Russian character, of its freedom from narrowness and intolerance, of its excessive kindness and indulgence, of its poetry and imagination, of its sensitiveness to love and loveliness, and of its boundless faith in the tender fatherhood of God. Those of them who had been in the trenches told me most moving stories of love and gentleness among the Russian soldiers, and those who have studied peasant life described to me the extraordinary kindness and sweetness which characterise the Russian people.

I was urged by these English to do all in my power to get the Russian view of religion into England. It was pointed out to me that our emphasis on conduct has impoverished the religion of Christ, and that we have lost in our eagerness to be good the realisation that our one necessity is to love with all our heart, and with all our mind, and with all our soul. In our hands are the tables of stone; in the heart of Russia the spirit of Christ.

Now, since an alliance between Russia and Great Britain would be the world's surest guarantee of peace, and since no alliance can be anything but a political makeshift which is not founded upon spiritual sympathy, it is of very great importance that we should give our attention to this matter of the Russian and the Anglican idea of religion, and see how far it is possible for the two nations to worship at the same altar.

Before proceeding to this inquiry I should like to say that M. Sazonoff insisted that friendship between Russia and Great Britain is a matter of natural affinity. Not once in our conversation did he refer to political interests. All his life he has worked for an understanding with England, and never once has he wavered in his conviction that an alliance of the two countries is in the destiny of world politics. He loves English character and English life. By no means an ardent Liberal, he nevertheless feels for the Liberalism of England an immense respect. Our moral earnestness is at once his admiration and his envy. He sees in us a nation which has managed to combine with enormous commercial activity the graces and refinements of civilised life. His repugnance for the German is a spiritual disgust. His enthusiasm for the Englishman is a spiritual affection.

M. Sazonoff, let me explain, is first and foremost a religious man. Only a stern sense of duty has kept him at the Foreign Office. Just before the outbreak of war he was meditating retirement to his house in the country, a house which he had

bought lately, and which was one of the first places in Russia to fall under the desecrating Vandalism of the advancing Germans. He is a man who goes little into society, and who loves silence and repose. He is something of a mystic. Married to a woman whom he adores, but who has given him no child, Serge Sazonoff is most happy when he is farthest away from cities and closest to the simple joys and unruffled peace of domestic life. He loves the fields and the woods and the rivers of Russia. Pushkin has filled the sky for him with inexhaustible beauty, and Dostoieffsky has given for him in the eyes of every child the appeal of the angels. He is tired of diplomacy, the machinations of which he has always despised; and if he could see the purpose of his life consummated he would immediately appeal to his Sovereign for release from the public service.

He said to me: "The future is clear. After the War our two countries will be soonest on their feet — you with sea-power; we with a hundred million people living on the land. Remember what has happened in Russia. These hundred million peasants, many of whom own their own land, find themselves rich and healthy. The money they spent on vodka they are now saving, and the surplus wheat which they sent to Germany in order to have more money for buying vodka they are now eating themselves. The result is, we have a people who are strong, and a people who have tasted the pleasure of poverty. The Russian nation is now sober, healthy, and industrious. It is a revolution."

If there are those in Great Britain who feel a political antipathy for Russia, and who cannot see how our two countries can ever be brought into a working brotherhood, let me say to them that no nation in the world (and this will bring me naturally to religion) is so essentially democratic as Russia. We in England have the forms of democracy; in Russia they have the spirit. We in England have a constitution, a habeas corpus, a democratic justiciary, and an individual freedom which is so great as to seem almost dangerous. These are good things, things of which we may be justly proud and for which we should be deeply grateful; but they are mixed up with an iron separation of the classes, with a degree of snobbery unequalled in any other people, and with divisions between capital and labour which are a menace to national security. In Russia, on the other hand, the lowliest peasant stands unabashed in the presence of his Emperor, whom God has made his Little Father; master and servant are like friends; officer and soldier are like brothers; and the whole

people feels itself to be a fraternity blessed, guarded, and loved by a Father in heaven. We have only the forms of democracy because we are spelled by materialism. Russia has the spirit of democracy because its supreme conviction is the existence of God.

Let us now examine the question of religion, and see how far it is possible for the two nations to establish a permanent because a spiritual alliance.

It has been said by a Russian that the Roman Church is Petrine, the Protestant Church Pauline, and the Orthodox Church Johannine. That is to say, while Rome has insisted upon obedience to authority, and Protestantism has insisted upon moral earnestness, the Orthodox Church has troubled only about love. To the Russian, love of God is the first and last necessity. So overwhelming is the supremacy of this love that a man may live almost as he pleases so long as he never ceases to adore the Fatherhood of God and to rely upon the mercy and forgiveness of Christ. To be moral does not seem to most of them a matter of any great importance. They see in morality, indeed, a snare and a danger. That way lies Pharisaism. A man must never think that he is pleasing God by denying himself this or that, by resisting temptation, or by following the instructions of the priest. He can only please God by loving God, and only by loving God can he hope to enter heaven.

In this way you may see in the room of a courtesan an ikon hanging in the corner, or see a well-known drunkard kneel and cross himself before an altar on a railway station, or see people whose lives you know to be immoral in other ways entering a church at all hours of the day to prostrate themselves before a holy picture.

Now, a fool can object very easily that such a religion as this is dangerous; and my Russian friends, who are by no means fools, can see very clearly in how sad a degree it lacks the strengthening rigour of moral earnestness; but do we not see, also, how dangerous is our religion of conduct, and how sadly it lacks the beautifying inspiration of implicit love?

The courtesan in Russia says her prayers and goes to church. The young man in England who once falls into sin feels that it would be hypocritical to go to the altar. The one never questions the existence of God, never ceases to feel her urgent need for His mercy and forgiveness; the other believes in God only so long as he himself is moral, and ceases to think of Him almost as soon as his resistance to sin breaks down. We are afraid of hypocrisy in England. In Russia they

hardly know what it means. Our satirists are never so active and never so bitter as when they have a hypocrite to deal with. In Russia satire of a bitter kind is unknown. In England we almost rejoice when we have a rogue to expose. In Russia they rejoice only in love.

The existence of the hypocrite in England is due to our rigid code of morals. We hate a man who is better than ourselves. In Russia those who attempt to live like Christ are called holy men and are venerated by high and low. In England we call them either hypocrites or cranks. We do not believe heartily in disinterested goodness. We are tempted to think that no man is really so convinced of God's existence that the things of this life have no value and no attraction for him. God remains for most of us a rather improbable hypothesis. We acknowledge the chance that there is a life beyond death, and we see the practical value of "religious instruction"; but we have only suspicion and sneers for the man who would transcend the code of respectability. I imagine that the religious people in this country would be unspeakably shocked, and the ungodly inexpressibly amused, if some person in our midst, notorious for evil conduct, suddenly took to attending church. For we cannot bear that a man should even change his opinions.

The danger of the Russian religion is nothing like so great as ours. For a man who loves God is at least on a road, however long, which leads to sinlessness. So long as his face is always steadily in the direction of God's Perfectness, so long as his heart is never empty of hunger and thirst after love, he must, sooner or later, emerge from the shadow and suffering of sin. For love is development. But a man who has his entire mind occupied by faithful allegiance to a moral code, who is for ever conscious of struggle within himself, who in his effort to satisfy the demands of his own conscience almost forgets the overshadowing and unconquerable love of the Eternal—such a man is for ever in danger, just as he is never at peace.

In England we have on all sides of us the most splendid examples of Evangelical devotion. You can visit no city or town, and few villages, where monuments of this devotion are not to be found. A chief glory of the Victorian reign was this enthusiasm for works of charity. Men and women gave enormous fortunes and devoted their lives to religious philanthropy. The whole country was organised for goodness. To this day there are any number of charitable institutions administering very considerable sums of money and directing

an ingenious machinery of religious propaganda from one end of the country to the other. But no man who knows the cities and towns of Great Britain can say with truth that the result of all this work is commensurate with its effort and expense. We may be a little better for it: if you like, we may be a great deal better for it; but we are farther than ever from that which alone can make us really beautiful and really strong, faith in a living God.

In Russia, where there is scarcely any philanthropy, there is this universal faith in God. The chief building in every village is the church, and some of these churches, even where the peasants are poorest, blaze with richness and beauty. You may find more devotion and more worship in a village where the priest is drunken and immoral than in a village where the priest is a social reformer. The priest, indeed, has little or nothing to do with the religiousness of the people. Prince Alexis Obolensky, a brilliant Procurator of the Holy Synod, told me that peasants will sometimes kick a priest out of a drunken sleep, calling him Little Pig, and force him to put on his vestments and go through the ritual of the altar. They regard a really holy priest, of whom there are many, with a veneration which amounts almost to awe; but the ordinary priest is just a person whose office is necessary to public worship. He is made to do his duty whether he likes it or not.

There is, of course, a great deal of superstition in the religion of Russia, and it may be argued, as Russian socialists contend, that education will destroy the Church. But this argument implies that education ended in those travesties of Darwin which are making their way into some of the Russian universities. Education, of course, has not come to an end; and what knowledge we possess deepens the conviction that behind the appearance of this vast and visible universe is a spiritual reality, approach to which is the only rational explanation and object of evolution. We must hope, then, that by the time the schoolmaster is abroad in Russia he will have something more to impart than those negations which paralyse in weak minds the religious instinct. He may, and I hope he will, impart such knowledge as will destroy superstitions which degrade the mind; but he will also, I think, have such knowledge to impart as will give real meaning and divine significance to those superstitions which help and dignify the soul. He will not be able, of this I am certain, to destroy in Russian character the root of love, and, after all, this is all that matters. The Russian will still look with wonder at the

sky, still feel brotherhood for all mankind, and still find in Christ the perfection of his own human nature.

In one of his most interesting letters, written in the year 1869 from the city of Florence, Dostoieffsky spoke to his friend Strachov of Russia's ultimate destiny:

> I am not quite sure that Danilevsky will dwell *with sufficient emphasis* upon what is the inmost essence, and the ultimate destiny of the Russian nation: namely, that Russia must reveal to the world her own Russian Christ, whom as yet the peoples know not, and who is rooted in our native Orthodox faith. *There* lies, as I believe, the inmost essence of our vast impending contribution to civilization, whereby we shall awaken the European peoples; there lies the inmost core of our exuberant and intense existence that is to be.

This is the vast impending contribution of Russia to civilisation, and we, who are so near to Russia in human sympathy, must prepare ourselves to receive it. We must be, in the first place, willing to learn. We must not think that our Protestantism, or our effort to wear the vestments of Rome as if they belonged to us, is the end of religious development. We must begin with individual humility, proceed to national humility, and then open wide the doors of our souls to receive the light of heaven from whatever corner of this world it may stream upon our darkness. We are as yet far from the truth. Our compromises have accomplished nothing. Our political turmoil has only added to our confusion. We are not a nation of brothers. We do not love God more than ourselves. We do not believe that Christ is the Light of the World. Some crying this thing, and some crying that, divided against ourselves, plunging first here and then there in the general darkness, we advance farther and farther into the wilderness of materialism, farther and farther away from the simplicities of faith. It is for most of us a choice between a Creed which we have ceased to believe, and a scepticism whose influence is entirely on the side of materialism.

If, as I firmly believe, we have much to learn from Russia, we for our part have something to give Russia in exchange. Our moral earnestness is all that Russia lacks to make her glorious, just as Russia's spiritual tenderness is all we lack to make us amiable. We must endeavour, while we open our hearts to the Russian Christ, to inspire in Russia something of our moral earnestness. We must set ourselves both to give and to receive, the one completing the other. And we can give, without offence, by developing our commercial relations with Russia and manifesting in all these relations a scrupulous fairness and an unswerving honesty. M. Sazonoff told me of

a town in Russia which is called Hughes-town in honour of an Englishman who settled in that locality during the last century, built up a great business employing 15,000 people, and spent his whole life, he and his family, in ministering to the social needs of his workpeople. It was in answer to the petition of the inhabitants that the name of the town was changed as a memorial to this good and kindly Englishman. In no country in the world is the response to genuine kindness so spontaneous and so affectionate as in Russia; and there, awaiting the English capitalist, is not only the riches of a vast country over-ready to be developed, but the loyalty and love of a most endearing people. Not through our priests, but through our merchants and our literature can we best give to the Russian people that sense of the value of conduct which has done so much in the evolution of our race.

And in order to receive from Russia the inmost essence of her vast impending contribution to civilisation, we must make a more serious effort than has yet been attempted to seize the ultimate realities of the Christian faith. This means a revolution as regards the Anglican Church. Whether the leaders of that Church are ready for a revolution I do not know; I suspect they are not; but that the laity are ready and eager for such a revolution I do not doubt. More and more do men see in the conservatism of the Church the timidity of a half-faith and the active fear of the unconvinced. No longer is the recital of the Creed accompanied by a raising of the sword from its scabbard, but rather with mental reservations and with misgivings for the future. Our dogmas have ceased to express the faith behind the actions of our lives, and have become the entrenchments of our guilty intellects. We profess to believe what we do not believe in the hope that help will be forthcoming before the next onslaught of the enemy. We see on every side of us the invasion of materialism, and we seek to stay that cruel flow with the wreckage of those dogmas already overthrown by it. Instead of accepting the negations of science and converting them into the central affirmations of religion, we take refuge in tradition, even with the ruins of Rome before our eyes. This will not serve for the conquest of the world.

To receive from Russia that which she has to give us we need only the two great commandments of Christ—love of God, and love of our neighbour. But this love must be real, active, generous, and the very centre of our existence. With such a love in our hearts, everything else in the region of dogma may be left to the individual, and would be left to the

individual wherever this love is truly supreme. It cannot matter in the smallest degree what a man thinks about theology if in his life he is conscious above everything else of love for God and love for his fellow-man. Instead of beginning with dogma we must begin with love.

A distinguished Japanese writer, who for over thirty years has been a Christian, told me the other day how essential it is that Christianity should be presented to the East with as little miracle and as little dogma as possible. "Our religion," he said, "is full of legends and fairy-tales; when Christianity is presented by the dogmatists our people refuse it, saying it is no use to change one fairy-tale for another. But," he added, "when Christianity is presented as an escape from superstition and legend, it is gratefully accepted by the enlightened. For myself," he added, "it is enough that God has always been present in this world, has always guided mankind, and in the Person of Christ made to humanity the fullest revelation of His character." He spoke with confidence of the 500,000 Christians in Japan, and said that he had no doubt whatever of the ultimate triumph of liberal Christianity.

He told me a story which may be taken as a parable. An English missionary came to him one day and said, "I want you to promise me something; I want you to promise that you will give up smoking, because smoking is an offence to believers." My friend replied, "Well, I will think about it. But I want you to promise me something. I want you to promise that you will take to smoking, because not to smoke is an offence to unbelievers." He told me that he himself had taken to smoking in the first instance simply to remove from the minds of those he desired to convert any feeling that Christianity was a cold, hard, or inhibiting religion.

There is no need for us to try and make Christianity an easy religion. On the authority of its founder it is easy. Instead of offering it to mankind as a hard and difficult alternative to damnation, we must offer it, as Christ offered it, as a simplification of the universe and a solution of the ills of human life. Christianity when it ceases to be good news ceases to be Christianity. It is a release from care, a consolation in sorrow, a reason for the highest and most satisfying life. And its foundational commandments are love of God and love of our fellow-men.

With this simple faith in our hearts and this tremendous love in our lives, we shall be ready to receive from Russia that which she has to give us of divine wisdom.

In *The Self-Discovery of Russia*, a most illuminating book, Professor Simpson says on p. 183:—

> There is an attitude of expectancy, a sense of wonder, in the Russian mind. He believes in God with a working belief, and looks for signs of His activity in the world; and just as to the expectant shepherds watching by their flocks angels appeared, so to the humble believing Russian peasant come great certainties of God. We do not expect, and so we do not receive. We are too sure that we know exactly what kind of a world it is in which we find ourselves, and vision dies amongst us. It is just here that our Ally has a message and a mission to the world.

The superstitions of the Orthodox Church are very little different from the superstitions of the Latin Church. It is not those superstitions which have given to the Russian Christ His exceeding beauty and His resistless attraction, but the heart and centre and inmost reality of those superstitions, which is love. The Russian loves God with the love of a little child. That is the radiant and continuing centre of Russian life. And it is in communion with this spirit of love that we of the Anglo-Saxon race can alone enter into a permanent alliance with the Russian nation. We must love God and love our fellow-men. With England shifting her emphasis to love, and Russia taking into her emphasis on love England's insistence upon moral rectitude, there will grow up at either end of Europe a power for righteousness such as the world has not yet seen.

HAROLD BEGBIE.

GERMAN WAR SERMONS.[1]

A. SHADWELL.

SOCIOLOGICAL inquirers and observers of national thought and character among foreign peoples seldom look to the pulpit for any assistance in their studies. Apparently they think sermons and services so stereotyped and conventional or so obsolete that nothing is to be learnt from them. It is a mistake. However overlaid with conventionality the religious element may be, however secondary to material and intellectual influences it may appear to be, it always remains a solid power; latent perhaps, or quiescent and less noticeable than the showy movements of the day, but far more real and lasting. There is always something to be learnt from it, and in judging national character it should never be left out of account. Otherwise the observer is likely to go wrong. I say this from experience. I have made many comparative studies in different countries and have generally taken this element into account. I have made a practice of attending services and listening to sermons, and I have always learnt something. But my worst misjudgments have come from underrating the religious factor in national life and taking it too little into account.

But if this study is an aid to knowledge in ordinary times,

[1] Kriegs-Predigten im Dom zu Schwerin. Gehalten von Gerhard Tolzien Domprediger. (Friedrich Bahn. Schwerin i. Mecklb., 1915.)

Passionspredigten in der Kriegszeit. (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Göttingen, 1915.)

Selig sind die Toten. Fünfzehn Kriegspredigten zum Gedächtnis der Gefallenen. (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Göttingen, 1915.)

Offenbarungen des Kriegs. Zwölf Predigten. (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Göttingen, 1915.)

Um Volk und Vaterland. Siebenbürgische Kriegspredigten von D. Adolf Schullerus. (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Göttingen, 1915.)

Neujahr 1916 im Feld. Neujahrs-Predigt für meine Krieger-Gemeinde in der 5. Landwehr-Division. Von Feld-Divisionspfarrer C. Eisenberg. (Marburg, 1916.)

much more is it one in war for obvious reasons. For in a great national upheaval and catastrophe the deeper springs of human nature are stirred, as they are in the individual by pain, grief, or fear. Men are then moved in the mass to more earnest things and reveal a side of their character usually hidden or obscured. They become more real, for good or evil. They show more clearly than at other times how much—or how little—hold the moral law and high ideals have over them. And these find their most complete expression in religious exercises. If one could attend the services in a fair number of German churches now, one would learn more about the German people and their true frame of mind than by visiting the cafés and restaurants of Berlin or Munich, to which the numerous neutrals who tell us all about it in the newspapers seem to confine their attention. One cannot do that, but one can learn something from the sermons preached to ordinary congregations. They reveal the mind of the preacher and what he thinks it good for his congregation to hear. And we may be quite sure that the words spoken in Church represent the highest ethical level of which the people are capable. They embody the ideal set before the people, and one which is judged to be not so high above their heads but that they can take it in and profit by it in some measure.

A few extracts from German war sermons have been published in the English papers and have made the worst possible impression. One hopes that no such sermons have been preached here. Mr. Philip Snowden wrote to me about them that he could find twenty English ones just as bad to every German one quoted; but when I asked him to refer me, not to twenty for each German one, but to an equal number of English ones he only sent me some half-dozen quotations from a Socialist newspaper, which did not bear out his allegation. Some of them were discreditable utterances to come from the pulpit, but the worst was far above the level of the German ones. The striking feature of the latter was the pleasure and satisfaction expressed at the suffering and loss of life caused to Germany's enemies, including the civilians. These German pastors positively revelled in slaughter and suffering, and taught their flocks that it was the duty of German soldiers to strike without mercy, to kill, burn, and destroy. An attempt was made to deny the authenticity of these citations, but the corrected version offered was rather worse than the original.

I am afraid that those sermons were preached, and no doubt were intended to suit the taste of the congregation.

But how far they are typical is another question. They were obviously selected for their piquancy as particularly violent specimens; but for that very reason they must not be held to be typical; though in all probability others of a similar character have been preached. Extracts of this kind should always be accepted with a reservation against generalising from them. Newspaper correspondents residing in foreign countries pick out the most piquant tit-bits to send to their journals. And generally the references to their own country which they select as most appetising to their readers are abusive. The result is a mutual interchange of offensive and irritating matter which is constantly served up to the public and stimulates international ill-will. This practice is mainly responsible for the remarkable fact, which is not otherwise explained, that wars tend to become more and more people's wars, and that the present prodigious struggle is above all others a people's war. The sense of nationality, heightened by newspapers at home, is wounded, and smouldering animosities are inflamed by a steady interchange of pin-pricks inflicted by the selected items which are sent from abroad by "our own foreign correspondents." Experienced and well-informed readers know how to discount these despatches, but the general public do not. Modern wars are caused less by "secret diplomacy" than by newspaper publicity, and the exceptionally violent feelings excited in the present war are mainly due to the same agency. Each side hears all the bad —and much that never was—of the other, with nothing good to set against it. There will be no peace or goodwill among the nations so long as this practice continues, and it is to be noted that its systematic development after the war is being advocated in Germany (*Daily Chronicle*, May 30).

These considerations have a double bearing on my subject. They suggest the desirability of a wider survey of German pulpit utterances, which I am about to offer, and at the same time they explain some points which I shall have to notice.

The publications enumerated at the head of this article contain about fifty sermons preached by some thirty German clergymen at different times and in different churches during last year. The last on the list is one preached on New Year's Day of this year to the 5th Landwehr Division by the military chaplain. They have not been selected by me; they have come into my hands by chance, and I do not know how far they are representative of German pulpit teaching in general. I can only take them for what they are worth, but they cover sufficient ground to be worth something. Three of the volumes are edited by the

same hand, Pastor Licentiate E. Rolffs, of Osnabrück, who has also edited several other collections. The idea which has guided his selection is indicated in the prefatory notices and borne out by a couple of his own sermons. His aim is to utilise the experiences of the war for the better understanding of the Holy Scriptures. He would make the war "the interpreter of the Bible" and draw from it lessons which may raise forgotten truths into convictions, throw new light on old teachings and revivify religious life. This ideal obviously determines the general character of the sermons selected and accounts for the prominence of some points to which I shall presently refer. But there is a wide variety of subject, thought and expression. His contributors appear to be ordinary Lutheran parish ministers occupying no special or official positions, though known by repute no doubt as good preachers.

Two other volumes are of a different character. One is a set of twelve sermons by Gerhard Tolzien, who occupies an official position as appointed preacher to Schwerin Cathedral. He is evidently a man of standing and a popular preacher. He refers to congregations of a thousand persons. There is a court tone about his sermons which is entirely absent from those previously mentioned, and his denunciations of the enemy are much more violent. One sees the official in him. The second volume referred to is a set of Transylvanian war sermons by D. Adolf Schullerus, Vicar of Hermannstadt. This is of particular interest because it represents the German Evangelical Church in Hungary. The Transylvanian Saxons form a German settlement of ancient date. They are natives of Hungary and subjects of the Hungarian Crown, but thorough Germans in other respects. This double connexion with the Central Powers puts them in a peculiar position and lends the utterances of the Vicar of Hermannstadt, who occupies an important place in the community, a colour of their own. Like the Cathedral preacher at Schwerin he is something of a courtier and speaks of the Hapsburgs, who are his liege lords, very much as his colleague does of the Hohenzollerns. No flattery seems too gross to offer to either, but the Hungarian divine has a better subject, in the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, for a sermon on the origin of the war and the justice of the national cause, than the German preacher. In Hungary, too, the arch-enemy is Russia, not England; and this makes a certain difference. Herr Schullerus is careful to lay stress on the devotion of his flock to Hungary as their fatherland and on the duty of defending king and country, but the virtues which he claims for

them are essentially German virtues, and the great cause for which they are fighting is, once more, the inevitable Kultur, which is alien to the Magyars and cordially detested by them. It is worth noting that the strain, anxiety, and privation caused by the war are more strongly emphasised in the Hermannstadt sermons than in the German ones. And in this connexion a little bit of war news comes out. In February 1915 the second division of the Austro-Hungarian Landsturm were called up, and this brought the number of men under arms up to one-fourth of the total male population of all ages.

Passing on to deal with the sermons as a whole, I would first observe that a large proportion of them are quite unexceptionable in tone. They deal with such subjects as death, sacrifice, duty, faith, kindness, and so on, without any reference to the enemy or any polemics at all. Even Herr Tolzien, who is the most bellicose of all the preachers, has some four or five sermons out of twelve of this character. Nor is any disposition shown to exult in slaughter or to gloat over the victims of German arms. The nearest approach to this mood is an observation of Herr Tolzien on the overthrowing of giants, in reference to the political monster reared by England and Russia out of barbed wire and a network of lies. (He gets his metaphors a little mixed in his vehemence.) "David," he says, "brought Goliath to the ground, and a torpedo the *Lusitania*." This is pretty bad from the pulpit, but we must remember that the German people all implicitly believe what they are told and they were told that the *Lusitania* was armed. To this day they regard her as a gigantic cruiser, just as they still quote the speech which Mr Burns never delivered; and in that light the comparison with David and Goliath is not so wildly inappropriate.

This is the nearest approach to ferocity that I have been able to find, and the same popular preacher also makes the most definite descent into political polemics, though it must be said in justice that he does it awkwardly enough.

This occurs in a sermon which is finely conceived and contains some fine passages as well as some extraordinary banalities. It was preached on the second Sunday in Advent last year, and the text was the passage in the Epistle to the Romans in which St Paul speaks of the God of patience and consolation and of hope. After some admirable remarks on patience, in which the preacher even counsels patience in judging the enemy (which he does not practise himself), and condemns poems of revenge which urge unappeasable hate, he goes on to speak of consolation in a similar strain. God, he says, not

only desires us to exercise patience with each other, and so give consolation, but He exercises patience Himself, and so gives us consolation. That is to say, since we know that He has patience the mere thought that He is there is consolation. Then he suddenly breaks off into the following absurd bathos :—

> England has her heavy hours now that we are "marching on Egypt" (quoted from a war song). I do not believe that it is any consolation to her that Grey is still there. It seems to be not so. Neither does it seem as though France in her need finds any consolation in the fact that her President is there. Nor has a heathen ever found consolation in his gods although he may really believe they are there. . . . But I believe it is a consolation to us that we have our Kaiser. If in the enemy's camp they are all already dissatisfied with their leaders, we grow more and more content. Our Kaiser, etc., etc.

After this incongruous outburst he abruptly returns to his proper theme and speaks of the consolation to be found in God. The whole passage reads as though it had been interpolated by order. We may be sure that the all-comprehending eye of the higher powers in Germany does not lose sight of the pulpit as a popular influence in inculcating correct views about themselves and the enemy. The reference to "Grey" is typical. The Germans have been taught to regard poor Sir Edward Grey in a light so ludicrously wide of the truth that we can hardly believe any one seriously accepts it. But the legend is repeated too naïvely to leave any doubt that it is firmly and honestly believed. The credulity of an ignorant people, bred to accept authority unquestioningly, seems to have no bounds. To them our Foreign Secretary is the very figure of evil personified. He is a dark, scheming, powerful personage, equally unscrupulous and astute, the Mephistopheles of diplomacy; he controls the policy of the United Kingdom, leads the other Allied Powers by the nose, and lives only for the destruction of Germany. Such is the picture sketched by authority, filled in by industrious pamphleteers, obediently reproduced by the newspapers, and implicitly accepted by the people. So we have him mentioned from the pulpit as the prop and stay of the British people. Herr Tolzien could not have made the reference he did, even to please his superiors, if he had known how ludicrous it is.

Broadly speaking, the implicit acceptance of the orthodox official version of the war is the most constant feature of these sermons when they touch upon it. The war is always a purely defensive one, forced on Germany against her will. A few quotations will show the attitude. Pastor Schian, whose

sermons are conspicuously high-minded and moderate in tone towards the enemy, discusses the question in the following passages. He is preaching on war time as a time of suffering, of service, and of sowing. Speaking of service he refers to Nietzsche and the charge against the Germans of being Nietzsche's people. They know Nietzsche, he says, so far as they know him at all, mainly as the prophet of the principle of ruling in opposition to the principle of serving; and he asks on which side they really stand. Are they disciples of Nietzsche or of Jesus? They are waging war and doing nothing else. Can warfare be serving? Is there not an irreconcilable contradiction between serving Jesus and waging war? He gives the following answer:—

> Our enemies maintain that the German people want to subjugate Europe, and that an intolerable pressure has been for years exercised by Germany on the whole Continent. From this pressure they are bound to free themselves. If that were so we should now be, with all the service we are rendering, the assistants of a policy of force. But we know that what they say is untrue. We are fighting not for rule but for our life. Germany has not drawn the sword to curtail the rights of any one; she plunged into war to preserve her own possessions. This aim of war may truly stand before the eye of God. But can it also stand before the serving Jesus? It may be legitimate self-assertion, enforced self-defence; but is it service? When nations engage in sanguinary strife must not Jesus always veil His head, He who came not to be served but to serve and give His life a ransom for many?

He answers the question by contending that the nation as a whole is serving its members by protecting the frontier population and ensuring its safety. But beyond this he suggests that they are also serving other nations—

> Those who, like us, have suffered and are suffering under England's sea-rule. Those who are threatened by Russia's insatiable ambition. Those who have always painfully felt English arrogance and French fanaticism. Yes, perhaps we even serve the enemy themselves. Perhaps the English people will at last be taught by this war no longer to regard themselves as the measure of all things. Perhaps French vanity will at last find correction. Perhaps we are so serving the enemy peoples that they will henceforth recognise that they have put their trust in the wrong men. I only want to put all this out in a tentative way. And we must in no case be led thereby to forget that we too as a nation need correction. To want to correct others and leave oneself uncorrected, that is Pharisaism. We are serving also our own correction.

This is the most temperately expressed judgment of Germany's enemies that I have been able to find. It embodies the stereotyped view of the vices of England, Russia, and France against which Germany is honourably waging a

defensive war; but they are stated in the briefest terms, without rancour, and no attempt is made to rub them in or to pose the Germans as models of righteousness. Herr Tolzien is much more one-sided and expansive. He has a rather absurd sermon on Joseph and his brethren, in which Germany is cast for Joseph, and the Allies, but especially England, for the brethren. A lengthy parallel is drawn between the story of Joseph and the war.

"You thought evil against me." It is almost the same story. Because Germany was a finer and nobler nation than the others, distinguished by its strength as though preferred by fate; because it began to take a ruling position among the nations; because it began in the course of time to wear a better coat than the rest, a Joseph among his brethren—hence the envy, especially in England, growing to hatred and a conspiracy to murder. Here as there the same "entente" to the annihilation of the one; here as there the same sin against kinship by bargaining with coloured people and heathens in order to deliver up to them a blood-relation and co-religionist; here as there the same harshness against young hearts and grey hairs; here as there the same cruel aims; the military slaughter of German men and youths, the economic starvation of German children and old folk; and, above all, here as there money, money playing the same final rôle. When the German conquers Belgium and Poland, the first thing that he does is to raise agriculture, commerce, and industry to immediate prosperity; gain and welfare for the new subjects cling to the soles of his feet. But our enemies declared that when they came into the land they would destroy every factory, lay waste every field, blow up every savings bank—the same pit as Joseph's, the same Midianite wilderness for Germany too.

The reader can readily imagine the complacency with which the parallel is followed up and Germany pictured as Joseph turning the tables on his brethren and loading them with benefits. This is poor stuff from the pulpit, but it clearly reveals the popular version of affairs presented to the German public—the wickedness of Germany's enemies, the spotless purity of her own conduct.

Herr Schullerus denounces the enemy more directly without using any scriptural analogy.

Who are our enemies? What is their aim in forcing conflict upon us? The Serbs—their objective is a national-political end, the State-unity of their race. I will say no more of that here. But how have they sought to attain it? By secret plotting, by fostering high treason, and by murder. The Russians—they put forward the protection of their racial brethren. But their means are lies and deception. The Tsar's word promises peace; his statesmen protest friendship on their word of honour. And meanwhile everything is prepared for a blow. France—for years past they have played there, in a way which can only be described in their own language as frivolous, with the thought of a war of revenge, they have stoked up hate and fury against the German Empire. Yet when the

decisive question Yes or No was posed to them they hesitated, sought vain outlets, and found themselves, half-willing, half-reluctant, driven into the fire, which has now surprised them.—England:—with envy the Briton has watched the brilliant rising of the new German Empire, has with ill-concealed rage recognised in his German kinsman a more successful competitor for the control of commerce and of the sea, and incapable of carrying the competition to a conclusion by his own strength, has waited for an opportunity to fall on him from behind. Malice, lies, criminal levity, unconcealed envy; that is what has kept Europe for years in uneasy tension. Year by year it has increased the danger of war until at last a spark has set fire to one point and now the world is in flames. On the opposite side stands the moral force, which must raise itself in elementary might against malice, lies, levity, and envy—the Truth!

And so on. Most of this is the common form of German pamphlets and newspapers; but there are two or three indiscreetly divergent points which rather weaken the German argument. He puts away the question of Serbia's rights in silence; admits that France was driven into war and that Germany was competing for the control of the sea. Still more significant perhaps is the omission of the darling German theory that England got up the whole thing.

Other preachers who allude more briefly and dispassionately to the cause of war all assume that the necessity was forced on Germany in self-defence, and emphasise the good conscience with which she is fighting. Nor is it possible to doubt their good faith. They are, for the most part, simple-minded men who speak from conviction. If they secretly thought otherwise they would probably not be allowed to say it, and certainly not in print; but they could be silent. Their utterances on the point seem to me one more proof, and a striking one, of the permeation of the German people with the views which the authorities wish them to hold.

It is due to their perfect docility in accepting what they are told and the masterly manipulation of the publicity machine by the German Government. The issue of the German edited version of the diplomatic correspondence, with tell-tale documents omitted, was a masterpiece of deception. It has had an influence which cannot be measured. The documentary evidence in favour of the official theory of the war which it furnished must have convinced many who might have doubted, particularly among the educated classes. These German clergymen, whose sermons we are examining, are very different from the professors and pamphleteers whose theme is *Deutschland über Alles* sung in all possible keys. The latter extol the merits of everything German even more loudly than they

denounce the defects and vices of her miserable enemies. There are for them no flaws in German virtue of mind, body, and soul. But the sermons are cast in a different mould. The note of self-satisfaction and self-righteousness is not altogether absent from them, but it is far less conspicuous than the note of self-criticism. This is indeed their most remarkable feature in my opinion; but I will quote some passages to enable the reader to judge for himself.

Pastor Foerster devotes a whole sermon to the general demoralisation of the German people before the war. He plunges straight into this unpalatable theme:

> One of the ugliest phenomena of our German life before the war was undoubtedly the mammon-worship prevailing in all circles. It was the painful accompaniment of the prosperity which the German people have achieved in the last decades. A poor nation, which barely covered its own needs by agriculture and paid its State officials and officers salaries proverbially known throughout Europe for their modesty, developed into one which by manufacture and commerce won a large place in the world's market, and year by year gathered accumulating wealth. The transformation proceeded too rapidly not to have a corrupting effect on the public mind. The old simplicity and frugality were replaced in the upper classes by a luxury which was not even in good taste. Social life, still impressively intellectual in Goethe's time, became constantly more materialistic and elegant, the claims on enjoyment ever more unrestrained and dissolute. Wealth seemed to many the most important and indeed the only desirable aim in life. We have not infrequently seen it cover a multitude of sins. We have seen odious methods of winning it readily indulged in by those who have known how to use them successfully with no excess of scruples. We have seen mere possession accorded an influence and treated with a respect which character and wisdom can only gain by laborious efforts. The converse side was a deep distrust among the masses, and here too an unwholesome though more pardonable over-rating of money, as though the aim of improving the economic position justified setting aside all considerations of the common weal, the conditions of international competition in industry, and the maintenance of family life. . . .
>
> But I will not proceed any further with these generalities. Rather will I put the question—Who among us feels quite free from guilt in this matter? Who dares to say with a clear conscience that he has firmly opposed this dance round the golden calf? . . . Let us then strike ourselves on the breast and confess that we have all sinned, that none of us has been free from the spell. We will not except those present here, but will one and all, old and young, man and wife, rich and poor, admit our guilt.

The exordium may sound a little overstrained and rhetorical, but the sermon in which it occurs is a reasoned and plain-spoken discourse, obviously sincere. And others strike the same note. Even our friend Tolzien denounces the love of money in Germany and its demoralising influence.

We must earnestly admit that not only has money served us but that we have served money; that we have not only lived on our money as its master but for money as its lover; or even that we have been lived on by money as its slave. It is true, of course, that there are still ideals for which we have lived—profession and work, wife and child, art and science. But—have not the ideals among us really been starved? What, for instance, has become of the ideal of Germanism, internal unity? Has there not been a fierce driving of class against class? And is not the cause of it that every one has lived only for himself and his own pocket?

The strife of parties and classes is not infrequently mentioned by war pamphleteers, but they do not ascribe it to a general demoralisation. Conduct during the war is the subject of equally plain speaking from the pulpit. A striking sermon by Pastor Dörrfuss on "We and the Others" denounces self-righteousness on this ground with great effect. He accepts the full case against the enemy, and especially England, whom he accuses of being devoid of all conscience and ethical considerations, and he emphasises the clear conscience of the Germans. They have, he avers, just cause for anger against the enemy: but he warns them against carrying it too far. He cannot allow "*Gott strafe England!*" or bring himself to utter it.

It is an exceedingly dangerous thing to summon God's chastising justice. Must not God, if he be altogether just, begin by exercising His chastising justice on precisely those who have called for it? But woe to us if God dealt with us wholly after the measure of his chastising justice! We will pass over the time before the war. But how much evasion of sacrifice, how much miserable self-seeking, how much levity, how much license and immorality still pervade our people in spite of all improvement! It is God's grace and mercy that we want, not his chastising justice. Then we must not call on it for others either.

Pastor Oculi takes a similar line. He is preaching on driving out evil spirits, and suggests that the storm of war is in a sense a driving out of devils on a great scale.

Only we must understand it aright. We hear and talk a great deal about the diabolical forces, the evil spirits, which are at work among our enemies, in the pious English, the frivolous French, the savage Russians. But do not let us forget ourselves. Just as the prophet (Jeremiah) was bidden to hold out the cup of judgment, but first of all to the people of Jerusalem, so must we submit ourselves honestly and straightforwardly to the divine judgment, recognise and fight against the evil spirits that plague us, and open our hearts to the good spirit from above, who will cleanse and heal us. We speak constantly of the great hour of Fate which has struck for our nation. And rightly. But do we really understand the secret of it? Our fate and future do not depend on whether our frontiers are enlarged or diminished, or on how the European balance may hereafter

be regulated, but mainly and essentially on whether our souls and the soul of the nation let themselves be cleansed and filled with the holy spirit of God, which now sweeps abroad over the land and through our hearts; whether we conquer and drive out the evil spirits within us and steadfastly so remain in that state.

He goes on to enumerate some of the evil spirits. One is the German love of drink, of which he says that a hospital orderly at the front had lately written: "One might almost say that French wines have done our troops more hurt than French shells." Another is the spirit of impurity and immorality "which slinks by night and even in war fixes its claws in the flower of our people." A third is the worship of Mammon, "which does not rest amid the common stress and suffering, but still thinks of usury and getting rich instead of sacrifice and the law—each for all and all for each."

I do not wish to lengthen these extracts unnecessarily, but the same line of thought is pursued independently by so many preachers that it becomes impressive by repetition, and the effect can only be conveyed by accumulated evidence. I will therefore give a few more quotations.

War reveals the hearts of men, and the heart of man is a mixture of good and evil. . . . How faithful men can be, how self-sacrificing, how devotedly brave! The mightiest, the best, the noblest in human nature is revealed. And the worst in human nature is revealed. We hear of things that make us think men must be beasts. We hear of uncharitableness of which we could hardly have believed men capable. We hear of common theft, of bestial lust, of shameless levity, of unfaithfulness among men in the enemy's country, of unfaithfulness and lasciviousness among wives and girls at home. We hear of brutal conduct by soldiers, of boasting, of cowardice—how shall I name it all? (Ritzhaupt).

There is still much self-seeking among us which must be burnt out and eradicated by love. From large and small towns we hear that many are daily seen feasting as though there were no war, willing to perform and to look on at lewd plays full of double-edged jokes as though Death had made no round among us, and turned so many homes into homes of mourning. Certainly cheerfulness has its claims even in serious times, but luxury and wantonness are contrary to the love we owe our brave men out there and the mourners at home (Simons).

Why are men fighting in East and West? Merely that one side may conquer and the other fall, that we may in the end knock out so many milliards of indemnity, or that our industry and our colonial policy may make a new advance, or that we may wrest from England her world dominion? So long as we see nothing in it but war objects, so long as we fail to realise that the highest moral values are at stake in this wrestling of the nations, and that unless we emerge from the strife a morally and religiously renewed people the streams of blood have flowed in vain and the countless sacrifice of life has gone for nothing—so long as we do not see this we are spiritually blind (Schönhuth).

It is clear from all this that the German Protestant clergy have seized upon the war as a great opportunity for re-affirming the moral law and re-establishing the authority of religious teaching, which has been driven more and more into the background by the growth of materialism and rationalism. They have a long score to settle on their own account with the forces of irreligion which have been fostered, as they always are, by material prosperity, and have gained a rapidly increasing hold on the German people. This background naturally inclines them to see in war the chastising hand of God, and stimulates their zeal in lashing the national vices. Nevertheless they are perfectly sincere and have ample ground for their denunciations. The corruption of morals and manners in modern Germany has for some time been generally admitted, and is, indeed, undeniable. No nation has ever yet been able to withstand the demoralising influence of prosperity, but the Germans have shown themselves extraordinarily susceptible to it.

At the same time, these pulpit utterances must not be read as indicating any revolt against the national regime or any weakening about the war. On the contrary the preachers insist on the necessity of fighting it out, holding on to the last, and suffering all things to win. There is an interesting sermon on Militarism and Christianity by Pastor Lueken, who boldly faces the argument of Germany's enemies that they are only fighting against Prussian militarism and have no quarrel otherwise with Germany, which would, they argue, be better without it. His text is the story of the centurion of Capernaum. (It is worthy of note that at least five-sixths of the texts are from the New Testament, and many of them from the Epistles.) The preacher uses the story very skilfully to show that military service and Christianity both inculcate and demand the same virtues; he asserts the perfect union of military and intellectual Germany, which are complementary to each other, and maintains that the war has taught them how much they owe to the condemned Prussian militarism. But by militarism he means only military service and discipline, and he assumes, as they all do, that the war is defensive. He ignores militarism in the aggressive sense which is implied when we speak of it.

Now it seems to me that, taken broadly as a whole, these sermons reveal a stratum of thought and feeling in Germany which is not apparent from newspapers and other publications. How deep or broad it may be we cannot tell, but according to my experience there is a great deal more of it than appears on the surface. The German clergy have not been preaching to empty churches during the war. And the essential feature of

this stratum of thought is its maintenance of the moral law and the claims of conscience. It does not admit that might is right or *Not kennt kein Gebot.* The German authorities and newspapers have paid it a silent tribute by the immense pains they have taken to manipulate the evidence both as to the cause and the conduct of the war in such a way as to present the German case not merely in a favourable light but as absolutely flawless, and the conduct of the enemy as incredibly vile and base. It may be said, perhaps, that our own do the same on this side. It is not so; but if it were, we have the neutrals to decide, and their verdict is unmistakable. I cannot but see in the spirit of self-examination and high ideals running through these sermons the potential elements of a strong moral revulsion when the facts, which cannot be concealed for ever even in Germany, become known. Ethical principles will come into their own again when Force has visibly broken down, but not before.

A. SHADWELL.

RICHMOND.

EDUCATION AND HUMANISM.

PROFESSOR ALEXANDER DARROCH,

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JAMES MILL, discussing the subject of education a hundred years ago, under national conditions similar to those which at present prevail, declared that the chief aim of education should be to endeavour to train up our boys and girls to be instruments for the promotion of happiness both to themselves and to others; and to secure this end, we require, he asserts, on the mental and moral side, to train up the young to be intelligent—not merely to possess such and such an amount of knowledge, but also to be able to apply the knowledge gained to the relatively new problems and conditions of life that for ever arise. The second quality desirable, according to Mill, is "temperance" in the ancient usage of the term, viz.:—to secure that the youth of the country shall be self-disciplined, in the sense that they have gained a mastery over the instincts and passions of their nature, and are able to subordinate them, whenever their pursuit is antagonistic to their own real happiness, or to the common good. Moreover, these qualities are desirable and ought to be possessed by all,—by poor and by rich—by the talented as well as the untalented. For, no Nation or State can be in a healthy condition, unless intelligence and temperance (in Mill's sense) permeate the whole community. And Mill is just as clear and as emphatic on the necessity for the care of the physical. One remark must here suffice: "A good diet," he declares, "is a necessary part of a good education." For, "In the great body of the people all education is impotent without it."[1]

But, what I wish to emphasise in this connection is that Mill and all the early Utilitarians look at education from the

[1] Article on Education, *Ency. Brit.* (5th edition).

human point of view, just as in their State policy they aim at the securing of a happy and contented people. They are quite certain, that unless there is a certain standard of economic well-being diffused throughout the community; that unless amongst all classes of the nation there is a certain degree of intelligence; and unless you have a temperate or disciplined people, there can be no stability within the State, as there can be no real or genuine human progress. And I often wonder, if, for a decade or two, we ceased our discussions of questions of curricula, and bent our energies to the training up of our boys and girls to be intelligent and self-controlled, whether many of the problems which now perplex our modern world would not disappear. One lesson a long and varied experience has taught me, is that no course of study in itself produces intelligence. Men, to-day even, as in the time of Robert Burns, may enter a University "stirks and come out asses."

But the particular thesis that I wish to lay down, and eventually to prove, is that education has gradually departed from the human point of view, and that as it has become nationalised, and especially since it has become centrally controlled, it has become dehumanised, and that this has been entirely due to certain prevailing national ideals, as to wherein the power and greatness of a State consists.

On the other hand, what must be insisted upon, is, that if, after the frenzy of war has exhausted itself, the self-same ideals as now prevail are to continue and to dominate the policies of the great European nations, no lasting or permanent peace is possible; and, as a further consequence, no so-called improvement in our education can have permanent effects, since its aims are directed towards objects of a non-human character.

The development of this particular national ideal in Germany, and the organisation of education to promote its furtherance, furnishes the best example of this modern tendency, although it must be remembered that it pervades, more or less, all European countries, and is beginning likewise to affect the policies of the two great nations of the East. But, before illustrating from the example of Germany this wrong direction of national policy and national education, let me say a word or two further about Mill's contentions. I do so, in order to bring out that we must consider the question of education as a whole, and that the formal educational agencies of society are only one of the many sets of factors; and, perhaps, not the most important in the determination of the character and the conduct of a people. Mill includes amongst the other agencies of education—the influences of

home; of the social group to which an individual by birth or by choice belongs; as well as the influences of the political institutions under which he lives. All these affect the education of the youth. All, moreover, have their source and root in current social and national ideals.

Since the time when Mill wrote, one of these influences has increased greatly. In early life, each of us becomes a member of some particular trade or professional group, and, during the most formative periods of our lives, we, partly by suggestion, and partly by imitation, gradually adopt the principles and the outlook of the group to which we belong. This grouping, moreover, is not merely the division and antagonism between the labourer, on the one hand, and the capitalist, on the other, but the division and antagonism now extends between one industrial or professional group and another. So powerful are these group interests, that even the fear of national disaster has not been sufficient to keep them in check. During the War strikes have not been uncommon. Disputes between one trade group and another have also not been absent. Do the advocates of further and better technical education delude themselves into the belief that by this means *and this means alone* any permanent human improvement is possible? Do they imagine that the nation can be really mighty and stable within itself, so long as we allow millions of people to live under slum conditions,—under conditions in which it is impossible for children to grow up physically fit, and under moral conditions which stamp their character upon the mind of the child, which no after school education can ever efface? Do they imagine that we shall produce a happy, a contented, and a stable society, by increasing the technical efficiency of the worker, whilst we leave untouched the relations of the classes within the community? Do they really believe that we shall abolish war without, and still continue to believe that war within the community is a normal and essential characteristic, and that, without it, progress would be impossible.

The competitive or emulous spirit which incites an individual, or a group, or a nation to produce a better article, or to do something better than has been previously produced or done, is the essential factor in all human progress; real competition of this character ennobles the individual, since it draws forth all his energies, and utilises as motive forces the higher instincts of his nature; moreover, it is a bond of union, not of disunion, amongst men, since it arouses their admiration, and not their envy, or jealousy, or greed. But,

when competition takes the form of furthering one's own narrow self-interest at whatever cost and by whatever means, then it is not a force that makes for human good, as assuredly it is the source of all disputes and of all contests: it becomes a disintegrating force, and is not a factor in real progress. When, moreover, it becomes a conscious and deliberately applied principle of national policy, then in so far, and to such an extent, as this principle prevails, the State or Nation has become an unmoral and unprogressive factor in civilisation. Now, the prevalence of this principle, with all its consequences, is the main cause of the present outbreak, as it was one of the main causes of the industrial unrest which prevailed in Europe before the War. And Germany alone of the nations of Europe has deliberately adopted this unmoral form of competition as a principle of national policy.

The national ideals of Germany, and of Prussia in particular, at the beginning of the nineteenth century differ widely from those which prevailed at the beginning of the twentieth, and this gradual decline is due, both in her national and educational policy, to a gradual departure from the human point of view in politics and in education—to the measuring of the progress of the State, not in terms of human happiness and human welfare, but in terms of material wealth,—by the amount of her exports and in the extent of her markets; and by the substitution of the good of a hypostatised State, for the good of the individual members of the State.

Let me, as briefly and as succinctly as possible, compare these two ideals. The earlier ideal is set clearly forth in the writings of Fichte, the philosopher, who, in reality, was the founder of Modern Germany in its earliest and best days. When Fichte wrote, Prussia lay at the feet of Napoleon and the spirit of the people had sunk to the lowest ebb, but he saw clearly that Prussia could regain her position and become a great power only through the bringing about of a united Germany, and by the establishment of a national system of education. For, Fichte believed and laid down, that it is only by the improved education of a people that the main defects of civil, social, and family life can be corrected, and a better future assured to posterity; that the destiny of a people depends mainly on the education of its youth; and that the nation which throughout its members possesses the most varied and thorough education will, at the same time, be the happiest and the most powerful. Further, in the nationalisation of education, the State must undertake the furtherance of all

human and social interests, interests in Art, in Music, in Literature, as well as the Economic. Moreover, Fichte condemned the theory that the chief aim of the State is to become a great industrial and financial organisation, as he also condemns the older view that the State exists for the benefit of a privileged class. For the latter theory tends to the neglect of the education of the common people; the former, to the view that each should have only the education which fits him to become an efficient member of a State organised for economic purposes, and for the means for its defence. The first fruits of the new policy was the establishment of the University of Berlin. From that time onwards Prussia and the other German States have undertaken the organisation of education in all its branches, Elementary, Secondary, Technical, and University, with a conscious and definite aim in view, and more or less under autocratic control. This older, and wider, and higher ideal of education has, moreover, never actually disappeared from German thought, but, in the course of time, the economic and military aims of education have become dominant, and have been directed not so much to the securing of the welfare and the happiness of the people, as to the increasing of the economic and military prestige of a hypostatised State.

In contrast, we may note, that in Great Britain there has never been any such definite or conscious direction of our educational agencies, and we also have not yet come to any conclusion as to whether autocratic or democratic control of education, or the union of both, is the best means for furthering the educational interests of the country. How this is to be remedied is a problem. But two positions must here be laid down. We can no longer afford to muddle through in education; there must be a conscious direction of all our educational agencies and activities to remedy the many defects in our economic and in our social organisation; and we must clearly realise and set before us the aims which we intend to achieve by means of the educational agencies. In the second place, there cannot be such conscious direction, as there can be no thorough organisation of the means of education, unless there exists some ultimate controlling authority, representative both of the democratic and autocratic principles present in every constitutional State.

But since the time of Bismarck, and more especially during the past twenty years, the national and educational ideals of Germany have undergone a remarkable change. She has directed all her national and educational energies mainly to

the increase of material wealth, and this, not so much in order to augment the welfare or the happiness of the whole body of the people, as in order to maintain and to extend her military and naval forces; and along with this has grown up in the minds of the people, partly as the result of three short and successful wars, and partly by direct and indirect teaching, the belief that the success of the country economically has been obtained and preserved by the power of her military forces. Moreover, the Germans have placed "thoroughness" or "efficiency" in the forefront as the one saving virtue; and have taught that this thoroughness is justified, whatever means may be adopted, either in economic competition or in actual warfare, so long as in the long run the aims of Germany may be accomplished. Her creed—her exhortation to those who direct her policies has been, and still is, to

> . . . "Cast pride and shame away,
> Let honour gild the world's eventless day,
> Shrink not from change, and shudder not at crime,
> Leave lies to rattle in the sieve of time!
> Then whatsoe'er your work-day garments stain,
> Of me a wedding-garment shall you gain,
> No God shall dare cry out at, when at last
> Your time of ignorance is overpast." [1]

For, the love of Germany not only justifies, but, sanctifies all. And the tragedy behind this point of view is, that, both in industrial competition and in actual warfare, men tend to be looked upon as "cogs to roll along the great machines of trade and war." This whole position is so obvious—it is being exemplified from day to day in the actual conduct of the war. The rulers of Germany place no value on individual human life, whether the lives of their enemies or of their own people, so long as they may attain the end of saving their own power. Moreover, as no nation can live by itself alone, hence during the past twenty years, because Germany has devoted a large part of her surplus wealth to the production of armaments, and to the increase of her military forces; so, in like manner, as a consequence, the other great nations, at the peril of the loss of their independence, have had to follow her example, and in order to secure the means for this increase, new sources of economic gain must be found, and we have witnessed, in order to accomplish this end, to take but one example, the gradual exploitation of those parts of Africa which possess sources of economic value. This again is too obvious and too well known to be further commented on. Moreover, just in

[1] W. Morris, *Love is Enough.*

so far as this surplus wealth has been devoted to purposes of a non-human character, then, to the same extent, has human welfare and human happiness suffered. Further, the demand for greater scientific and technical efficiency on the part of the worker is based to a large extent on similar grounds. For, if in the future this insane race for armaments and military power is to continue, then the contest will result in the victory of the nation which can devote the largest amount of surplus wealth to this purpose, and other things being equal, or, approximately so, the nation which is the most efficiently and thoroughly organised for the economic fight will tend to secure the greater amount of surplus wealth, and so survive. Put in this way, the whole irrational and non-human character of such national and educational ideals is worthy only of madmen; nevertheless, this ideal underlies the thought of many men at the present time from Lord Haldane and Mr Hughes downwards.

No one believes more strongly than I do in the better scientific and technical training of the worker. We need to reorganise our technical colleges, and ensure them freedom for development. We require to secure that these colleges shall be placed in such a financial position that the work of scientific research shall be carried out with the sole aims of furthering knowledge, and of bettering and cheapening the technical processes of manufacture. No one again can desire more strongly than I to see the education of the worker in this country improved and put on a better basis than exists at present. But scientific and technical education alone will never save a nation; and whether it be a good or a bad thing depends upon the nature of the end to which scientific and technical efficiency is a means. The spread of scientific knowledge and its better application to technical processes is a good when it develops the intelligence of the worker, and when it incites an interest in the work for its own sake; it is a further good when it is directed to increase and to make less costly the utilities of life, for in so doing we are bettering human welfare; above all, it is a good when it is directed towards the production of permanent values, whether embodied in the shape of beautiful cities or buildings or other things. Generally it is a good when it is directed to the production of social values, but not otherwise.

What, in addition to scientific education, Europe needs above all in the future is a liberal education—an education which will free men's minds from all narrow, petty, and national interests, and make us each and all realise that we are the heirs of a common civilisation, and that the only contest in

which the European nations may rightly engage is the never-ceasing war between Good and Evil. Moreover, scientific and technical education in itself and by itself alone is not and never can be a moral and spiritual regenerating force. "I consider," writes Cardinal Newman, in discussing this subject in the early forties of last century, "that intrinsically excellent and noble as are scientific pursuits, and worthy of a place in a liberal education, and fruitful in temporal benefits to the community, still they are not and cannot be *the instrument* of an ethical training; that Physics do not supply a basis, but only materials for religious sentiment; that knowledge does but occupy, does not form the mind; and that "apprehension of the unseen is the only known principle capable of subduing moral evil, educating the multitude, and organising society."[1] And in somewhat similar terms an anonymous writer in a recent number of the *Hibbert Journal* sums up the result of present-day events and forecasts the problem of the future. "The industrial renaissance," he declares, "of humanity in the nineteenth century has ended in the smoke of howitzer shells. Man, in becoming master over nature, has neglected the greater task of becoming master of himself and his highest concerns. In the rediscovery of the supreme importance of these lies the next stage of his development. The war has put a period to his attempt to raise himself by the forces of nature: it reveals the need to raise himself by the forces of spiritual life." And this truth echoes from many a soul bereaved, and from many a heart broken in every part of this war-stricken Europe. Thank God, the future policies and ideals of Europe will not be determined by the middle-aged who perforce remain at home, but by the young men who have witnessed and experienced all the horrors of war carried on with all the resources and devilries of modern scientific knowledge.

And so, in conclusion, what direction education shall take in the future depends entirely upon whether material or spiritual forces are to prevail; whether the nations of Europe are to direct their energies to aims of a non-human character, or whether, having through the awful experiences of the war seen the error of their ways, they are to direct their energies to the elevation, the purifying, and the ennobling of human lives.

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[1] Newman's *The Tamworth Reading Room.*

THE EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT.

Walk with precision . . . buying up the opportunity.
St Paul to the Ephesians, v. 15.

The best laws will be of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and education in the spirit of the Polity.
Aristotle: *Politics,* v. 9. 12.

THE following pages do not contain a sermon, nor am I licensed to preach. But it seems convenient for once to borrow the ecclesiastical method of basing certain reflections upon a particular text—or rather upon two texts.

It is a commonplace to affirm that the present is a testing time for nations, for institutions, for social and political systems and for individual characters.

Not least is it a testing time for the ideals and methods of national education. The whole educational system is summarily challenged to justify its existence or temporarily to give way and permit those who are engaged in the educational service to devote their activities to work which, for the moment, is more indispensable to the State. Thus the continuity of the tradition of national education seems, at the moment, in considerable jeopardy: more particularly those branches of national education which less obviously subserve immediate and utilitarian purposes. The cause of education, especially higher education, is undeniably threatened, partly on the ground of preoccupation and partly on that of economy. It is perhaps expedient, therefore, that one who time and again has demonstrated his ardent sympathy with both these pleas, who has neglected no opportunity of preaching the supreme duty of national concentration upon the objects of the war, of the hardly inferior duty of rigid economy, both personal and national, should prefer a modest claim on behalf of the maintenance of educational continuity.

It will not, because it cannot, be denied that of all the problems which this country has to face, the largest and most insistent is that of education. I am fundamentally opposed to what I suppose to be the aims of those who urge the desirability of more democratic control of foreign policy; chiefly because I do not wish to be embroiled in perpetual wars. But every one must agree that among all classes of the nation, and more particularly among the governing masses, it is politically vital that there should be a more intelligent and more continuous apprehension of the main currents of diplomacy and foreign affairs; that there should be a real grasp upon Economic principles and a sound knowledge of the working of political institutions, in other countries as well as in our own. Lacking these things we are in real danger of losing all the carefully garnered fruits of a struggle painfully prolonged for a thousand years; we are in real danger of losing our place as a nation in world-politics; above all we are in imminent peril of such a violent dislocation in the industrial world as would threaten the whole fabric of our civilisation. These dangers can be averted by education, and, using the term in the broadest sense, by education alone.

It is, however, unnecessary to labour a commonplace. What I am concerned to demonstrate is not the need for higher education, but the unique opportunity which is now opening before it.

That opportunity arises from the conjunction of many circumstances and the simultaneous operation of many forces, moral, political and intellectual.

Firstly, as it seems to me, from the unusual plasticity of men's minds. A phrase which is perpetually on the lips seems to be partly the cause, partly the consequence of this plasticity. "Nothing," we are constantly reminded, "is going to be the same after the war." Least of all, it is suggested, shall we ourselves be the same. Such is the potency of reiteration that people begin to accept the assertion as axiomatic. Thus insensibly their minds are prepared for the reception of new ideas. To say that the mind of the average man presents a *tabula rasa* would obviously be an exaggeration. But it is undeniably true that the teacher, using the word in its broadest signification to include the preacher, the publicist, the journalist, the political leader, in short all, in fine, who take it upon themselves to inform and exhort, to guide the mind and conscience of young or old, has got an exceptional opportunity. If he cannot write upon a perfectly clean slate, he can appeal

to minds which have been rendered, by current events and the prevailing atmosphere, unusually plastic.

But the opportunity comes not only from intellectual plasticity but from moral responsiveness. Men's minds are open, and their hearts are touched. It is the proverbial function of Tragedy to purify the emotions by means of terror and pity. Never, in the history of man, has there been a Tragedy enacted on a scale so colossal as during the last two years. The hearts of men of many nations are bowed in a common sorrow. They sorrow not indeed as men without hope; they hope that the Tragedy which they witness or in which they play their part may be the prelude to a new Heaven upon earth. But, for the time, they suffer in the anguish of sacrifices willingly endured and of hopes tragically disappointed. History teaches us to beware of the recoil from this attitude of tension. The Black Death of the fourteenth century was not the only visitation which has been followed and even accompanied by an orgy of immorality. But this is, in fact, only another manifestation of the same phenomenon. A moral unsettlement provides the opportunity for the teacher. If it be neglected the last state will unquestionably be much worse than the first.

He has the opportunity, again, which comes from a readjustment of the standard of values. Once more we are on the verge of the elaboration of a commonplace. Everyone agrees that during the last two years people have been readjusting comparative values; discriminating, on a new basis, between the things which really matter and those which do not; in short, evolving a true critical faculty. For the basis of all criticism is comparison. This war has done more to encourage the comparative study of Politics than all the text-books ever written. Men whose ideas were formerly wholly insular are now quick to compare national ideals and national institutions. Much of the comparison is, of course, quite superficial; nevertheless, it may prove to be the beginning of wisdom. It is probably the best starting-point, for example, for the study of foreign history, hitherto scandalously neglected in this country. No tolerably inquisitive person can get very far in the comparative study of political institutions without wanting to know what has led to the divergent development of national polities; and nothing but history can tell him. The study, let us say, of the Holy Roman Empire or the age of Louis XIV. is apt to be regarded by utilitarian educationists as too remote from actualities to justify inclusion in a "bread and butter" curriculum. But their prejudice

against such subjects is dissipated when it is perceived that a knowledge of them is essential to an understanding of the national psychology of the Germans or the political evolution of France. In no department of national life may the application of the comparative method be expected to yield more fruitful results than in that of education.

Recent events have illustrated with extraordinary vividness the truth of Aristotle's views on the education of the citizen. The aim of education must, as he perceived, be primarily political; the educational system must be designed to preserve the State in its integrity and purity by forming a particular type of character. "That which most contributes to the permanent stability of the Polity is the adaptation of education to the form of Government." We begin to perceive with what thoroughness this principle has been assimilated in Germany and with what skill and ingenuity it has been applied in their educational system. No other modern State has shown itself anything like so deferential to the Aristotelian precepts, with the result that there is a consistency and coherence in the political life of Germany such as cannot elsewhere be found. In a unique measure Germany has succeeded in bringing her scheme of education into relation with her scheme of life. There, as Mr Edmond Holmes has said,[1] "there is no break of gauge in the life of the citizen." On the contrary, she has fearlessly "applied to her manhood the coercive discipline and dogmatic pressure" which in this country we associate only with the training of the young. In Germany the child is father to the soldier and grandfather to the citizen. In schoolroom, in barracks, in the carefully controlled life of the city and the State, the German citizen is subject to discipline literally from the cradle to the grave.

How does the English scheme of education compare in this particular respect with that of Germany? How far are the young trained in the spirit of our Polity? To this question Mr Holmes returns an answer which is far from reassuring. He insists that we have divorced our scheme of education from our ideal of life; that during the period of school life we imitate the German in applying "dogmatic pressure and coercive discipline," and then at the end of the prescribed period turn the citizen adrift in a society which is still dominated by the principles of *laisser-faire*. We must not stay to inquire whether our social and economic and political system can still be accurately described by the Physiocratic formula; it is more pertinent to our main theme to consider whether

[1] In a most illuminating paper in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, October 1915.

the divorce between our scheme of education and our political ideal is so complete as Mr Holmes would seem to suggest. In reference to the public elementary school, Mr Holmes's diagnosis is probably accurate. At any rate the present writer would not be bold enough to question it. But as regards the education of the youth of the upper classes in the great public schools and universities, I submit, with all deference, that Mr Holmes's impeachment cannot be sustained. The English polity is infused with a twofold spirit: that of *liberty* and *individuality*. Anything which tends to the repression of individual liberty or to the attainment of a drab uniformity is regarded as anathema. No two schools, no two colleges are exactly alike. They conform to a general type, but each has an ἦθος of its own. That ἦθος is impressed upon the alumni: but it is impressed not by authority but by public opinion; the whole atmosphere is essentially, in this sense, democratic. At school, at the University, in the larger life of the State, the Englishman is a unit in a self-governing community. Where, then, does Mr Holmes detect the "break of gauge" which in the English system he deplores? To the German precisian our educational system doubtless appears disorderly, anomalous, even chaotic. But so does our political constitution; so does the loose and apparently haphazard connection between the mother-country and the Dominions and Dependencies. Now those outlying parts of the Empire are, to a large extent, governed and administered by men who have been subjected in youth to the peculiar discipline of our public schools and Universities, and they bring to the performance of their varied and responsible tasks precisely those qualities which our educational system or the lack of it is calculated to develop. How then can it be maintained that we are less obedient than the Germans to the Aristotelian precept; that our scheme of education is not conceived "in the spirit of the Polity"?

We are thus brought, by an easy transition, to the second of the outstanding principles in Aristotle's educational theory: character rather than knowledge is the true end and criterion of education; it is the will even more than the intellect which has to be trained and developed. In this respect we may, without pharisaism, feel and express the conviction that the English system has not failed to respond to the supreme test. The ordeal through which we are passing has undoubtedly revealed many shortcomings; it has proved us to be—what no one outside this country ever doubted—in some respects a stupid people; it has shown us to be

extraordinarily devoid of that foresight which is engendered by the scientific spirit; grievously lacking, too, in actual scientific knowledge, and more particularly in the applicability of science to industry and war; it has, in fine, demonstrated that we have, in full measure, the defects of our qualities. Nor have we escaped the penalties of prosperity. We have been carelessly resting upon our oars forgetful of the truth that each generation has to row the race afresh; that the victory of yesterday affords no guarantee of victory tomorrow. Thus we have permitted ourselves, careless of the spirit and attentive only to the letter of the teaching of Adam Smith, to be deprived of those cardinal industries on which others depend; we have preferred money to wealth; the superficial prosperity of the moment to permanent welfare and essential security.

Nevertheless, there does seem to be some ground for the conviction that, despite many shortcomings, moral and intellectual, the heart of the nation is sound, and that in preferring character to knowledge we have been faithful to the Aristotelian precept.

Can the same be said of our enemies? It is, perhaps, safer to judge ourselves than them; to attempt to analyse our own deficiencies rather than theirs. Yet it would be affectation to ignore the accumulating evidence of the effect of the German educational system upon German national character. It is impossible to resist the conclusion that under the Prussian hegemony that character has exhibited profound modification and grievous deterioration.

Without placing undue reliance upon sensational "revelations" of the moral obliquities of our enemies, we cannot refuse credence to the official statistics of criminality in Germany, and they are sufficiently appalling to justify the very remarkable prediction uttered by Madame Montessori just three years ago. "Europe," said that great educationist in 1913, "is riding for a fall. A type of education which tends to develop the power of the intellect while omitting the systematic education of the character and the heart constitutes a menace to the whole of Europe, and the blow will fall with terrific force." The blow has fallen; and there is every justification for attributing the callous brutalities of which the Germans have been found guilty — the horrors which accompanied the violation of Belgian neutrality, the repeated attacks upon non-combatants, the unspeakable cruelties which to the end of time will be associated with the name of Wittenberg — to a perverted system of education.

There is no hypocrisy in saying that these things have been a bitter disappointment especially to those of us who thought we knew Germany and the Germans. More particularly have we been disappointed in the attitude of the German 'intellectuals.' To them we did look confidently, though perhaps unreasonably, for some repudiation of crimes which have not merely disgusted the present enemies of Germany but have profoundly shocked the moral conscience of mankind. No one can accuse the Germans, as a nation, of having neglected the cultivation of the intellect; it is proved to demonstration that they have not been equally regardful of the training of character.

In Aristotle's scheme of education there was, however, a third element. It was to be not only political and moral, but physical. Nor have the Germans been unmindful of the claims of γυμναστική. They have brought to physical training the same scientific precision which has marked their training of the intellect. Not Aristotle himself had laid down his rules with greater explicitness and exactness. How does their theory —and Aristotle's—differ from our own? Nowhere are the characteristic excellences and deficiencies of the two systems better exemplified. Like most other things in England γυμναστική is haphazard and apparently unorganised. But here again, half-unconsciously perhaps, we have preferred character-forming to scientific muscular development. Gymnastics have been relatively neglected in England as compared with "games" and "games" have been encouraged as much from the moral as from the physical side. To "play the game" has been held up as the ideal of political as of social life; to learn to give and take, to command and obey, to subordinate the interests of the individual to those of the "side"—these are the lessons, which it has been the special function of "games" to inculcate. From the point of view of mere physical development a scientific system of drill and gymnastics may be vastly superior to cricket, football, or rowing; but the educative value of the latter is incomparably greater. Thinking primarily of the former, Aristotle was doubtless right to insist that the training of the body should not be simultaneous with that of the mind; since, as he urged, "the labour of the body impedes the mind, and the labour of the mind the body." Looked upon rather as a moral element in the training of the young, it is equally natural that the modern educationist should prefer that the mental and physical discipline should be concurrent.

Still, even though it seems necessary to insist upon the superiority of the English view over that of the ancient Greek

or the modern German, the teaching of Aristotle is not without a pertinent warning for ourselves. There is some ground for the apprehension that among Englishmen of the upper classes, athletics have been permitted to usurp too much time, and far too much attention. Aristotle urged that athletics should never be regarded as an end in themselves, but should be kept in a strictly subordinate place in the general curriculum.

If pursued for their own sake, they were apt either to degenerate into professionalism, or, as at Sparta, to defeat their own end. "Of those States which in our own day seem to take the greatest care of children, some aim at producing in them an athletic habit, but they only injure their forms and stunt their growth. . . . Education, as we have often repeated, should not be directed to this or to any other single end. And even if we suppose the Spartans to be right in their end, they do not attain it. To-day they are beaten both in war and gymnastic exercises."[1]

Athletics, then, must be pursued with moderation, not to the point of professional excellence. Music and drawing are in a similar category. Like athletics they are essential elements in a liberal education. Both are indispensable to the appreciation of art; an appreciation of art is essential to the full enjoyment of cultured leisure. Music and drawing must be taught, but not to such a point that the pupil may be tempted to become a professional artist or a professional musician, for professionalism is inconsistent with the performance of the duties of citizenship, or with the life of contemplation, in short with all the higher activities.

At this point we seem to diverge widely from the theory of Aristotle. In the modern Polity there are many mansions; the whole structure of the modern State, social, political and economic, rests upon the principle of the differentiation of function; there is, moreover, a tendency to regard every indispensable function as equally honourable. Politics and Philosophy annually pay homage at the shrine of Fine Art; class vies with class in paying deference to manual labour. The "leisure" extolled by Aristotle is regarded as synonymous with the idleness which is the concomitant of inherited wealth. The democracy which Aristotle had in view was far other than our own. Yet, despite the wide differences which make comparisons difficult; despite a fundamental change in conditioning circumstances, the teaching of Aristotle can never become obsolete; it can never be a superfluous exercise to bring our own practice to the test of his principles, or to consider

[1] *Politics*, viii. 4.

whether, *mutatis mutandis*, our methods are superior or inferior to his.

I submit that the English educational system does on the whole respond successfully to this exacting test. It is, generally speaking, conceived in the spirit of the Polity; it regards character rather than knowledge as its end, and it keeps the teaching of special crafts and particular professions in due subordination to the idea of a liberal and humane education.

One point of supreme importance remains to be considered. The foregoing remarks have had regard mainly, if not exclusively, to the education of those who have constituted until recently the governing classes in this country. With the records of our Universities and Public Schools before him not the most obdurate cynic can deny that during the present ordeal the system has reacted favourably to the test imposed upon it. But these institutions educate only a small fraction of those who are now responsible for the government and the defence of the nation and the Empire. Other classes besides those which have been educated in characteristic English fashion have given proof of a temper not less stubborn, of a spirit not less fine.

But with many outstanding excellences all classes have exhibited characteristic deficiencies. We have been curiously slow in awakening to a sense of the titanic proportions of the struggle in which we are involved; to an appreciation of the full extent of the sacrifices it must entail;—in a word, we have lacked both knowledge and imagination. On the one hand we have paid an excessive deference to misplaced and ill-timed individualism, and on the other have shown ourselves inept in the collective organisation. Some things, confided, like the railways, to expert management have been admirably done; others have shown that a maximum of extravagance is quite compatible with a minimum of efficiency. The administration, in fine, has been in geological phraseology full of "pockets."

I conclude with an abrupt question. Can we, as a nation and an Empire, learn the lessons which the great ordeal is well calculated to teach? The problem is essentially a problem of education. Have we enough collective wisdom to solve it? Plainly, the opportunity is ours. Have we the sense to buy it up?

The first and most imperative lesson that we have to learn is that of national unity. It is humiliating to confess, but it would be dangerous affectation to deny, that in this respect we have fallen short of the example both of our allies and our

enemies. France, democratic and republican, Germany, autocratic and monarchical, have alike exhibited a degree of social solidarity to which we cannot pretend. It may be objected that the solidarity of the Germans is mechanical; the result of pressure from above. The same cannot be said of France, or even of Russia, and too much may be made of it even in the case of Germany. It is due far more to the pervasive influence of an educational system devised with a single eye to the preservation of a particular type of Polity, and to the inculcation of a definite ideal. That ideal we Englishmen believe to be perverted and that Polity to be unsound. But we cannot fail to acknowledge the success which has attended an educational effort which has never for an instant been relaxed during the last hundred years. Military and educational reorganisation have always in Prussia gone hand in hand. The school and the barracks are but two departments of one institution. When Napoleon at Jena and Auerstadt levelled with the ground the fabric of the Frederician polity, it was Humboldt and Fichte, no less than Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, Stein and Hardenberg, by whom it was reconstructed. The German people have imbibed with characteristic thoroughness the lessons taught by the Prussian schoolmaster. Their social solidarity rests not only upon the habit of obedience to a common superior, but upon the intellectual acceptance of a common ideal.

Confronted by the proverb *fas est ab hoste doceri*, we may turn to France. The French ideal is widely different from that of Germany, but it is not less passionately pursued; and the nation is equally united in the pursuit of it. The ideal is embodied in the revolutionary motto: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. That motto, as a brilliant Frenchman has well said, "does not pretend to be a description of the present state of things in the French Republic, nor even a command to be enforced at once. It is the ever receding summit of a long and steep ascent, every step of which has to be won by an effort and a struggle." Liberty is to-day imperilled for France only by the assault of an external enemy. In repelling that assault France has attained a degree of unity almost inconceivable.

How stands the matter with us? As regards the war and the imperative duty of waging it with all the resources we can command to a definitely successful issue, there is, I believe, a steadily increasing solidarity of opinion. The pacificist minority is small in numbers and negligible in all else. But except on the single issue of the war no close observer can entertain any

complacent assurance as to social solidarity. On the contrary the horizon seems to be composed of lowering and threatening clouds. There was an ugly temper abroad before the outbreak of the war; and I cannot find any evidence that the events of the war have dissipated or even appeased it. There is indeed too much reason to apprehend that the dislocation of the industrial system, the frenzied offers of extravagant wages in State-controlled establishments, the tremendous experiments in collectivist organisation, the repeated concessions made to "labour" with the laudable purpose of maintaining national unity in the face of the enemy, will tend in the long run to accentuate difficulties, and will leave behind a sheaf of economic and social problems which it will take a generation or more to disentangle. To argue this proposition in detail would carry me far beyond the limits, and indeed beyond the thesis, of this paper. One illustration must suffice. The Government has had a severe tussle with the engineers on the question of the "dilution" of labour. Both sides were right in regarding the point as crucial. The Trade Union was fighting for a principle which is vital to its efficiency and even its continued existence on established lines. The Government could not, in the interests of the State or indeed of the European alliance, possibly submit to any avoidable restriction of output. A compromise has been reached. Trade Union regulations have been suspended by consent *for the duration of the war.* But does any sane person suppose that, after the conclusion of peace, we can really revert to the *status quo ante bellum.* The principle of a limitation upon output is admittedly criminal in war; is it defensible in peace? Many other questions have been raised by the war, in relation to industry and labour, which cannot be so easily answered in theory: other problems have emerged which in practice it will be not less difficult to solve.

I refer to them here only to enforce the leading thesis of this paper. The problem is fundamentally one of education. I have argued that the present educational system is not, as regards the classes educated in the Public Schools and Universities, out of harmony with the spirit of the Polity. But those classes no longer control the destinies of the State. The supreme problem which lies ahead, and which in its significance entirely overshadows all other problems, and embraces them, is how we can devise for the governing masses a scheme of education which, in fundamentals, shall conduce to the preservation of the Polity, and to the conservation of the ideals for which it stands.

This is the opportunity — the greatest which has ever opened before those who are responsible for national education. Are they prepared to buy it up? Never was there greater need to walk not as fools but circumspectly, to think clearly, and to act courageously. All classes of society will be compelled not only to make sacrifices, which under the stress of high emotion is comparatively easy, but, what is infinitely more difficult, to lay aside prejudices.

The experience of the past warns us to be prepared, when the present tyranny is overpast, for some reaction mental, moral, and economic. The severe tension of the Puritan regime was followed by the moral lassitude of the Restoration; the unprecedented industrial activity which prevailed during the Napoleonic wars was succeeded, after Waterloo, by a period of economic dislocation and commercial and agricultural depression. We may or may not be able, by taking thought for the morrow, to avoid a repetition of similar experiences in the aftermath of the present war. We shall not avoid them by sitting contentedly with folded hands, and by reiterating complacently that with the coming of peace all will be well. The hands and minds of our administrators are full; their attention is for the moment rightly concentrated upon the attainment of one supreme object. It is for the people themselves to work out their own salvation; to find a solution for the problems which are before and indeed upon them. Is there any chance that they will do it? Are they even conscious that there is a problem to be solved? Would they be warned in time even if one rose from the dead?

These questions perhaps none can answer; least of all I. But at least I can reiterate my conviction, not carelessly or lightly reached, that never before has education had such an opportunity in England; at least I can renew my earnest appeal that the "time may be redeemed," that the opportunity may be bought up.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT.

OXFORD.

THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIENCE.

PRINCIPAL W. B. SELBIE.

IT was quite in accordance with the best traditions of English statesmanship that the Military Service Act should make some provision for the conscientious objector. Without it the Act would have been imperfect and might not have commended itself to public opinion as it has done. At the same time the provision in question has caused difficulties of its own and has raised in an acute form a problem which is as old as philosophy. It was perhaps inevitable that the onus of deciding what constitutes a legitimate conscientious objection should be thrown on the tribunals. But the task set them was almost an impossible one, and though they have in most cases honestly tried to grapple with it, they can hardly be said to have the right kind of qualifications for the work. In the absence of any very definite instructions each tribunal has been a law unto itself and has been compelled to adopt such rough and ready criteria as lay to its hand. On the whole the practical results have not been so bad as might have been expected, and so far as the applicants are concerned, probably a rough kind of justice has been done. There have been some hard cases, and the plea of conscience has often been turned to ridicule and brought into contempt. The attitude of the newspapers, and of the more unthinking public, has left much to be desired, and has evidenced a confusion of thought and a lack of discrimination which may have very serious ethical consequences. Ardent patriots have brushed aside scruples of conscience as insincere, or have settled the matter to their own satisfaction with the gibe, "Conscience doth make cowards of us all." Now it is quite true that among those who put forward the plea of conscience there may be cowards, shirkers, and vexatious persons, but no one who has any real acquaintance with the circumstances can pretend that these are

anything but a small minority. Most of the conscientious objectors are worthy of all respect, and have taken their stand reluctantly and from the very highest motives. The fact remains, however, that there is widespread confusion of thought, in which the objectors themselves seem to share, as to the meaning, functions, and authority of conscience, which greatly needs to be cleared up.

The question at issue is not the freedom of the conscience. That, we may hope, is not seriously threatened. It took a long fight in this country to secure "liberty for tender consciences," but the fight has been fought and won. The preservation of this liberty has become with most people an accepted religious principle, and even those who are most inclined to Prussian methods are hardly prepared to curtail it. The real difficulty is with conscience itself, and until that is cleared up the confusion will remain. To the student of moral philosophy the difficulty is an old and familiar one. Are we to regard conscience as the authentic voice of God, an inward monitor authoritative and irresistible, making the individual in whom and to whom it speaks a law unto himself and lifting him beyond the reach of any human restraints? Or, on the other hand, are we to regard conscience as but one department of human knowledge, and like others fallible and needing to be reinforced or corrected in the individual by the collective conscience of his race or class? Between these two extremes, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, lie other possible variations. The fact that historical justification can be found for most of them only adds to the complexity of the subject.

The term conscience really belongs to Christian philosophy. Pagan thinkers did not get much further than a consciousness (*conscientia*, *συνείδησις*) of the moral worth of a man's acts and states based on some external commandment or sanction. With Plato and the Stoics this was generally expressed in terms of reason. Actions were right or wrong because rational or irrational. Reason was the chief court of appeal, and morality was largely prudential. Christianity created a new morality, not merely by introducing a higher and inward ethical standard, but by its constant reference to the spiritual world as over against the world of sense. Conscience thus became something more than a knowledge of right and wrong. It gained an emotional expression and a spiritual authority. It was the voice of God in the soul, and as such had paramount claims to obedience. As Abelard expressed it, in Christianity the *lex naturalis* became the law of God, and the knowledge of this law comes to men in conscience. The classic

interpretation of the Christian or Theistic position is to be found in Bishop Butler and in Kant. Butler argues that conscience is that principle in man "by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions." It involves therefore "judgment, direction, superintendency." "This is a constituent part of the idea, *i.e.* of the faculty itself; and to preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength as it has right, had it power as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world."[1] Kant, like Butler, regards conscience as native and original in man. He can no more escape it than he can his shadow. It is morally infallible, for we cannot speak of an erring conscience, though we may speak of one neglected or disobeyed. It is an internal tribunal before which a man's thoughts "accuse or excuse one another." The peculiarity of it is that a man finds himself compelled by his reason to treat the dictates of his conscience as though they were the commands of another person. He feels that he cannot be himself both accused and judge. "Now this other may be an actual or a merely ideal person which reason frames to itself. Such an idealised person (the authorised judge of conscience) must be one who knows the heart: for the tribunal is set up in the inward part of man: at the same time he must also be all obliging, that is, must be or be conceived as a person in respect of whom all duties are to be regarded as his commands: since conscience is the inward judge of all free actions. Now, since such a moral being must at the same time possess all power (in heaven and earth), since otherwise he could not give his commands their proper effect (which the office of judge necessarily requires), and since such a moral being possessing power over all is called God, hence conscience must be conceived as the subjective principle of a responsibility for one's deeds before God; nay, this latter concept is contained (though it be only obscurely) in every moral consciousness."[2]

This conception of conscience as the faculty of judging between right and wrong, God given and therefore authoritative, has for long held the field. But it belongs to a type of faculty psychology which has now been generally abandoned, and it needs revision in the light of the familiar considerations brought forward by evolutionary ethics. Without going so far as to assert that conscience is the product of education or environment or both, we may admit that it cannot remain uninfluenced by them. Our moral consciousness, like every

[1] Cf. Sermon i. 7 and Sermon ii. 19.
[2] *Jugendlehre*, p. 293. Quoted in Kant's *Theory of Ethics*, Abbott, p. 321.

other human faculty, has been subject to growth and education, and the power of moral judgment varies in different individuals. It is possible to err in morals, and even those who claim objective validity for moral judgments do not imply thereby the infallibility of any individual conscience. The fact is that conscience is not simple, but complex. It involves intellectual, emotional, and volitional acts and states. It is therefore best understood, not by discussions as to its origin or validity, but by the way in which it conceives and works towards those moral ends with which it is concerned. The question of conscience is therefore bound up with that of personality. Personality, again, is inconceivable apart from the ends and purposes it exists to work out, and these, in so far as they are moral, are the concern of conscience. As Professor Royce says: "To have a conscience, then, is to have a cause, to unify your life by means of an ideal determined by this cause, and to compare the ideal and the life. If this analysis is right, your conscience is simply that ideal of life which constitutes your moral personality. In having your conscience you become aware of your plan of being yourself and nobody else."[1]

Broadly speaking, therefore, conscience may be regarded as that active principle of the personality which in face of two or more possible alternatives tells a man that he ought to choose one of them as being most in conformity with the moral law or with the moral end of his being. Definitions of this kind, however, do little or nothing to solve the real problem of conscience. It is true that theories of its origin do not affect its power or validity. But the question still remains as to how far it can be taken as a sure guide of conduct, and in this respect the fact that conscience has been subject to the law of development, and that its moral judgments vary at different times and in different individuals, is one that must be taken into account. It is the consciousness of this that has led men to seek a moral law outside themselves and having objective validity apart from their thought or expression of it. In other words, in its highest form conscience seems to involve a reference to God, and to regard human ideas of right and duty as but reflections (and possibly mistaken reflections) of a Divine Law. As Dr Rashdall has said, "Apart from faith in a perfectly righteous God whose commands are, however imperfectly, revealed in the individual conscience, we can find no really valid reason why the individual should act on his own sense of what is intrinsically right even when he finds himself an 'Athanasius contra mundum,'

[1] *Philosophy of Loyalty*, p. 175.

and when his own personal likings and inclinations and interests are on the side of the world."[1] Here again, however, we have to admit the difficulty which arises once we grant the possibility of a mistaken interpretation of God's will. In the case of a religious man when he hears a definite "Thus saith the Lord," his duty is clear. But what if he is in error as to the Divine voice? That is a possibility which can never be excluded. The history of religious experience makes it plain that there have been men endowed with special powers of discerning the will of God for their own time and needs. They have been regarded as recipients of a Divine revelation. But not even these can be held to have been always infallible in their moral judgments. Neither they nor their modern counterparts are beyond the reach of Cromwell's warning, "Think it possible that you may be mistaken."

The matter is further complicated by the fact that English legal or quasi-legal usage has given to the terms conscience and conscientious a meaning which tends to obscure their higher ethical and spiritual significance. For example, courts established in this country to do the work now done by County Courts were originally called Courts of Conscience. A "conscience clause" is a term for a provision in an Act of Parliament whereby persons who have religious scruples may avoid observance of the Act, and the same kind of way of escape for conscientious objectors is provided in some Acts where no question of religion is concerned. The most notorious instance of this is in connection with the Vaccination Acts, where it is provided that a man may escape vaccination for his child if he declares a conscientious objection. Here is no case of religious scruple. The man objects to vaccination because he thinks it may be physically dangerous to his child. He has a right to his opinion, but it seems a rather unwarrantable tenderness for individual liberty which will allow him (and he is often an ignorant and prejudiced person) to have his way in the face of expert medical opinion, and to the possible danger of the whole community. In such a matter the use of the word conscientious can mean nothing more than "strongly felt" or "sincere." Incidentally also the action of the legislature in these cases would seem to dispose of John Stuart Mill's familiar contention that liberty of opinion does not carry with it liberty of action. The law expressly provides that a man shall be allowed to act in accordance with his own opinions in the cases indicated. It would be well, however, if the use of the term conscience could always be confined to cases where

[1] *Philosophy and Religion*, p. 75.

there is reference to some higher sanction than that of sentiment, expediency, self-interest, or even strong conviction. Where a man can plead a genuine religious conviction, a sense of duty which is to him "stern daughter of the voice of God," he is on unassailable ground. He may be mistaken, but for him the law thus given is absolute, and he dare not disobey. It is only this kind of religious conviction that should be dignified with the name of conscience, and that deserves the reverence which conscience should always receive. Anything less than this is but a private opinion which cannot have the same binding force or the same claim to respect.

We return now to the case of the conscientious objector to military service, and would discuss it afresh in the light of the foregoing. Here the confusion caused by the loose use of the term conscience is obvious. Men have appeared before the tribunals putting their conscientious objection along with other pleas, such as political views, domestic or business circumstances. The answer given to them has been the obvious one, viz. that if they intend to plead their conscience no other reason is necessary or relevant. Conscience should override every other claim, and cannot be rightly urged as one among many. In other cases, again, the conscientious objection has been so urged as to suggest that it means nothing more than a sincere and strongly felt dislike for war on humanitarian grounds. Here again the term conscientious is a misnomer. The feeling in question has no profound religious sanction and therefore no binding force.

We may confine ourselves, then, for the purposes of this discussion to those objectors who urge the plea of conscience on strictly religious grounds. Besides members of the Society of Friends there are many sincerely religious men to whom war is a violation of God's will. They believe that the Christian religion forbids them to take part in it, that they are under a Divine command not to kill their fellows, and that even the use of force is a violation of the spirit of Christianity. The conscience that speaks to them thus they regard as the voice of God in their souls, and, in their estimation, its claims override those of the State and of society. Their duty is plain and they can do no other. Of the sincerity of these men there can be no question. They are ready to make any sacrifice rather than disobey the still small voice within. They have every right to hold these views, and the State is willing that they should be allowed to act up to them. Attempts to browbeat or coerce them are as unworthy as they are useless. But the question remains, Are they right?

and is the conscience to which they appeal an infallible guide? Here the first point to be noted is that the matter is one on which there is a conflict of consciences. There are other men equally conscientious, equally devoted to the Christian ideal, and equally convinced that war is an evil and unchristian thing, who nevertheless take an opposite view of their duty and go forth cheerfully to kill and to be killed. Here then is a contradiction which can only be resolved by a further exploration of the question at issue. The warning of Prof. T. H. Green is very much to the point. He says: "Perplexity of conscience, properly so called, seems always to arise from conflict between differing formulae for expressing the ideal of Good in human conduct, or between different institutions for furthering its realisation, which have alike obtained authority over men's minds without being intrinsically entitled to more than a partial or relative obedience: or from the incompatibility of some such formula or institution, on the one side, with some moral impulse of the individual on the other, which is really an impulse towards the attainment of human perfection, but cannot adjust itself to the recognised rules and established institutions. From the perplexities thus occasioned we must distinguish those that arise from difficulty in the analysis of circumstances or in the forecast of the effects of actions. These are to be met, no doubt, by exercise of the intellect, but by its exercise rather in the investigation of matters of fact than by that reflection upon ideas which is properly called philosophy."[1] We have to recognise then that the question at issue is not merely the liberty and authority of conscience, but the content of the commands or prohibitions which conscience gives. These have to be estimated by such means as are available to us before we can allow conscience to erect them into universal laws. To put the matter as succinctly as possible, it may be urged that the conscientious objectors, as we know them to-day, are in grave error on the following points.

(1) They interpret the teaching of Jesus Christ in the letter rather than in the spirit, with the result that the ethical ideal He set up is both narrowed and lowered.

(2) They regard love as the ruling principle of Christian morals, to the practical exclusion of holiness and righteousness. Hence their conception of love tends to become a mere abstract sentiment and to dispense with social justice.

(3) Their view of Christianity is too pronouncedly in-

[1] Cf. *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 342.

dividualist. Granted that the teaching of Christ gives a new value to the individual soul, it does not separate the individual from the community, but rather intensifies his obligation to it. No man liveth unto himself; it is his first duty to hold himself at the disposal of the common welfare.

(4) They set an altogether exaggerated value on physical life, and they seem to estimate good in exclusively materialist terms. To those who understand spiritual values, the death of the body is not the last disaster, nor is a condition of peaceful prosperity the highest good. There are much worse things than war, and it is sad indeed "propter vitam vivendi perdere causas."

(5) They have a curiously Manichæan conception of physical force. Force is not in itself an evil. Like all other material things, in the hands of spiritual beings it may be either good or evil according to the ends for which it is used.

(6) They fail to understand that, under the conditions of this modern life, the moral alternatives presented to us are very seldom those of pure good and pure evil. It is generally a case of a choice between evils—the greater or the less. Of this the present war is a conspicuous instance.

Finally, their interpretation of Christianity seems to involve a low view of sin and of the meaning and appeal of the Cross of Christ. Considerations like these need to be firmly pressed upon those who plead their Christian conscience as a reason for refusing to take any part in the war. It must be done in the interests of those who, equally conscientious, equally devoted to the Christian ideal, and equally hating all that is involved in war, determined to take the moral risks and threw themselves into the strife. Theirs surely is the better part, and in their generous and unquestioning self-sacrifice is something morally greater than the attitude of careful scrupulosity. When this descends to the point of declining the humanitarian service of the Red Cross lest men should be saved to fight again, it argues a hopeless loss of moral perspective. Indeed it is just lack of perspective that afflicts most of the cases under discussion. Many of them are young men, eager, enthusiastic, deeply religious, but with an exaggerated sense of personal values, and a rather restricted horizon. Their attitude is academic, and their virtue of the cloistered and fugitive kind. They see the impact of the situation on themselves and their ideas, to the exclusion of its wider aspects, and its bearing on society and the Kingdom of God.

No doubt it is of such stuff that martyrs are made; and when they plead that it is by the conscientious resistance of

individuals to the will of the State that all our liberties have been won, we will not gainsay them. There are no doubt limits to the right of the State over the individual, just as there are to the right of the individual to refuse the service of the State while enjoying its protection. There is a great fight for liberty going on at the present time, and its real champions are in the trenches. They, too, have consciences worthy of respect, and where consciences conflict the balance would seem to incline to those who put the service of others before all personal considerations and ideals. As a modern writer has said,[1] "A commonwealth can only survive if the sense of justice and the spirit of service are high among its citizens. If they are selfish, or intolerant, or idle, and put their own personal class or sectional interests before those of the community, there immediately arises that state of affairs which the Prussian takes to be normal and in which the establishment of a single predominant will is in fact the only way of restoring unity and order. The most classic example of the process is the decline of the Roman Republic into the empire of Augustus. The stability of a commonwealth, therefore, rests upon the honesty, fairplay, and sense of public responsibility of its own citizens and on nothing else. The principle of its life is the Christian spirit of devotion to duty and the active service of the rest of the community."

There is no doubt that one of the requirements of the present situation is a closer adjustment and deeper understanding of the relations between the individual and the community. It must be made quite clear, however, that nothing can be allowed to minimise the sense of personal responsibility, or to destroy the influence which conscientious conviction rightly exercises. What seems to be needed is some means of educating consciences, of broadening the basis of the ethical ideal, and of delivering men from a too exclusively individualist outlook. If the appeal is to Christianity, then full weight must be given to the social implications of the teaching of Jesus Christ. It is true that the modern world owes a great debt to the Christian emphasis on the individual. The Protestantism of the Protestant religion is not perhaps a very lovely thing, but it had its work to do, and the world would have been a poorer and weaker place without it. But it certainly represented only one side of the Christian faith. No value that we can put on the individual can absolve him from his duty to lose his life in order that he may save it, to forget himself in the service and for the sake of others. In this

[1] *The Round Table,* May 1916.

world we are bound each to each by ties that we cannot break without grave injury both to ourselves and others. However much we may keep aloof, we are involved in the sins and follies of the society to which we belong, and to the redemption of that society we are, as Christians, irrevocably pledged. We cannot live unto ourselves or separate ourselves from our fellow-men, and to attempt to do so in the name of our own sense of right or duty to God is merely to misunderstand the essential obligations of our faith. If it be asked: Is there then to be no limit to our self-sacrifice, is the good of others to outweigh every other consideration? then we can only point in answer to the example of One who died that men might live. A religion which cultivates first the habit of thinking and acting for others has in it more of the spirit of Christ than one which cultivates only the individual soul, as though there were nothing in the universe but itself and God. That we can only save our souls by losing them is a much bigger proposition than is generally understood.

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THE CHRISTIAN IDEAL AND ITS REALISATION.

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(1) It is at all times hard to do one's duty; he who knows the better part, through weakness or wilfulness so often and so easily chooses the worse. But what is not so commonly acknowledged is that it is hard to know what is the duty even when and where the willingness to do it is present. Many lives are ruled by tradition and convention and fall into a moral routine and commonplace, and in such lives the moral problem will not press for solution. There are a few men, however, who want to live the moral life at *first hand*; they desire the guidance and warrant of conscience for all their acts; and unless their life is cast in monotonous circumstances, frequent will be the occasions when they must seek to know before they can strive to do. What is true of the individual is true of society. Public opinion and popular sentiment for the most part move in ruts; but now and then come crises in national history when the common conscience is shaken out of its ruts. The Christian nations are at present passing through a period of moral unsettlement. The ancient landmarks have been removed; the new frontiers of obligation and responsibility have not yet been fixed. The Social Problem had thrown down its challenge to the Christian conscience; and it was beginning to meet its claims. But a more serious menace to the Christian ideal is now upon us in the War, which has turned the Europe which was becoming an armed camp into a bloody battlefield.

(2) The Christian Churches have, for the most part without any hesitation, or it would even seem much consideration, given their approval and support to the national cause: and some of those speaking in their name seem even prepared to abandon

Christian principles whenever they come into conflict with patriotic impulses. Some who have felt compelled, though with much regret and keen disappointment, to find a justification for the war without abandoning the august authority of the Christian ideal are full of doubt and fear lest the common conscience should in its approval and support go beyond the limits that the Christian spirit can allow. They find a difficulty in so stating this case as to avoid moral peril in defining moral duty. A few there are (and even if we do not share their view, we must honour their consistency) who cannot bring themselves to admit that war is in any circumstances legitimate for a people claiming the Christian name; and who argue that if God wills that this nation be saved He can save it without the use of arms, and that if God's will be its defeat it is only Christian to submit to His decree. When there is so great difference of opinion as to the realisation of the Christian ideal in the present situation, it is well for us to raise the final question, What is the Christian ideal as to its nature? and what are the conditions of its realisation?

I.

(1) In dealing with Christian morality it is wise to use all the help that *Scientific Ethics* can give us. One of the fundamental problems of ethics is the nature of the moral end: is it a *law*, or is it a *good*? Can morality be adequately dealt with as the observance of law, or must it also be regarded as the attainment of a Good? Kant, who in his teaching about the categorical imperative took the former view, was compelled to recognise the truth in the latter, when he sought to show how God as the moral power is a postulate of the practical reason, since it is reasonable to expect that the desire for happiness and the duty of holiness will, if not in this, yet in another life be reconciled. The former may be called the *static*, while the latter is the *dynamic* point of view. The former looked back to a Garden of Eden, in which man possessed an original perfection, which, lost by sin, he must try to recover by obedience to the commands of conscience. The latter looks forward to a goal of human history towards which mankind is moving with bewildering slowness, at each stage of the course achieving a relative but not an absolute goodness as the result of the previous and the condition of the subsequent development. The former view tends to be *individualist*, to regard each man as possessing in his own nature the moral law which claims his obedience. The latter view is

collectivist, as it regards each man as a member of a society, the progress of which conditions even more than it is conditioned by his individual development.

(2) The *Collectivist dynamic* view needs to be defended against two objections which at once suggest themselves. On the one hand it may appear that morality is reduced from being an end in itself to being only a means towards an end beyond itself; and on the other that there is no absolute goodness, but only a goodness relative to time and place. (i.) As regards the first objection, it would be valid if the Good which is conceived as the goal of human history were health or happiness, power or wealth, or some other object of human desire and effort than the aspiration of the moral man in the measure of his morality to be good. We may hope that the consummation of human progress will include man's mastery over nature, the development in the fullest degree of each man's personal capacity, the formation of a society in which individual rights and duties shall be harmonised with the common ends; but what has to be insisted on is that all these goods must be conceived as subordinate to the goodness of each and all as the Good. Goodness is never a means towards an end not in itself but beyond itself, the Good, for all goodness is already the partial realisation in history of that Good. (ii.) As regards the second objection, it is a challenge not of an ethical theory, but of historical reality as far as our thought can interpret it. It is not the philosophy which declares that *all stands*, but the philosophy which maintains that *all flows*, which is nearer actuality. The category of Evolution which is being applied in all realms of knowledge to the whole range of reality is not an intellectual fashion of the hour, although some forms of its application may prove to have only a temporary validity; but is a necessary mode of thought, without which it is now difficult for us to understand how human knowledge could so long do its work, and with which we hope to make the Universe still more intelligible. If morality is subject to evolution—in other words, if it is progressive—it cannot at any stage of its development be absolute, but must be relative. But does this necessarily, as is sometimes supposed, lessen its authority? Surely not, for if it is the highest demand of individual obedience to this common purpose, not only practicable but even conceivable at that stage, no more valid moral obligation can be required. Relative though it may be to the stage of development, it is absolute for the conscience which has reached only that stage. Further, its authority is reinforced both by the past and the future as well as the present. As the consequent

of man's moral progress up to that stage, the thought and toil of the past generations which have gone to its making witness on its behalf; and as the condition of the clearer vision of the Good which the future will bring, the future generations to whom will fall the task of further advancement summon each man to be true to the trust thus committed to him. If in the sphere of religion we believe in a progressive revelation of God, in the sphere of morality we can believe in a progressive realisation of the Good.

(3) Behind these two objections there lies, however, the final problem of all philosophy, the relation of the temporal to the eternal, the finite to the infinite, man to God. Why does the temporal not reproduce the eternal at once in its wholeness, and not in a gradual progress from less to more adequate manifestation? Why does the Finite only so partially reflect the Infinite? Why does man not at once know and become like to God in perfection? In other words, why is the revelation of God to man, and the realisation of goodness in man, both aspects of one process of God in man, historical? Mysticism tries to solve this problem by a *tour de force*: it tries to fly in an ecstatic moment from the temporal to the eternal, the finite to the infinite, man to God. But the problem of the Universe cannot be solved either theoretically or practically by ignoring differences in unity; the One and the Many are not finally reconciled in the vision of the seer, or the exaltation of the saint. We do not make the divine more real by treating the human as illusion, we do not grasp the eternal more firmly by dealing with the temporal as null and void. The common road of religion and morality alike demands the recognition of the reality of the temporal as of the eternal, of the finite as of the infinite, of man as of God. And so we cannot escape the insistent problem of the relation of the One to the Many. We must again press the question, Why is God known thus, why does man come thus to God?

(4) If we indulge in speculation we may argue that the *static* view of God Himself is mistaken, and that we ought to take a *dynamic*. God is not state but process, not nature but purpose; our theology should be a teleology rather than an ontology. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity, if speculatively construed, involves unity moving to difference, and difference returning to unity. But returning from these giddy heights to the safer plain, it would appear as if evolution were the necessary condition of the manifestation of God in man, as if the finite could not recognise and realise the Infinite unless the Eternal showed Himself and worked His will in the

temporal. God must stoop to man that man may be lifted up to God. We may conjecture as we will what a Universe might be, perfect from the beginning and not progressing towards perfection as its end; but that imagination would have no relation to reality. The Universe as we know it, is one in which there is not the fact but the hope of perfection.

(5) We must not undervalue the *process* because it is not yet the *product*. God is revealed in the progress of mankind, if not absolutely, yet relatively to the receptivity of man for Him. The static view of morality is not altogether contradicted by the dynamic. The individual who claims that in conscience, the law within, God speaks to him and he must obey is not under an illusion, as God is in the process as He will be in the product of evolution. The error of the static view is simply this, that it does not recognise sufficiently that the individual conscience does not immediately and finally reproduce the purpose of God. Very largely the individual conscience is but an echo of the moral development of the society on which it depends, and its voice is not the last word on duty; it is dependent on society and relative to the development of that society. We must recognise, however, that the individual conscience is to some extent independent and absolute. For, on the one hand, in every society there are moral sages and seers who do advance in their moral insight beyond their fellows, and are the means of moral enlightenment to others. Through them progress is secured in social standards and customs. On the other hand, their moral knowledge is not merely human discovery, it is divine revelation. God speaks to them and through them His progressive word to men. Since morality is relative to the total conditions of life for any society, it might be supposed that there would be only endless confusion. There is great variety: what in one society is approved is in another condemned; and yet not only do we find amid differences resemblances which are not borrowings, but general principles emerge amid varying traditions and customs. It is the perfection of the one God which in "divers portions and divers manners" is being revealed in the moral progress of mankind. Conscience has authority, but its testimony is dependent on and relative to social progress as well as derived at last from God.

(6) We have no good reason to assume that even in a sinless world there would have been no evolution; but there can be no doubt that the evolution has been affected as regards both its rate and course by sin. Man's moral insight has been lessened no less than his moral power by sin. The revelation

of God cannot be only perfective, but must be punitive, corrective, and redemptive. The redemptive purpose of God does not contradict but completes the punitive and corrective; and it does not supersede it when the human conditions do not allow its fulfilment. Those remain under law with its restraints and penalties who have not, in the receptivity of faith, come under grace. While the punitive and corrective method of God in dealing with man's sin is not His last word, it is His word; and law is preparatory for grace, and must reign until the sceptre passes to grace. If in the Cross of Christ, as most evangelical Christians believe, there is no less justice than mercy conjoined in propitiatory grace, where mercy cannot yet be shown justice still reigns. The importance of these considerations will appear in the sequel in which we deal with the conditions of the realisation of the Christian ideal; but at this stage of the discussion what concerns us primarily is that the moral progress of mankind, in which God reveals His nature and realises His purpose, is both retarded and often diverted by the presence and influence of sin.

II.

(1) The relevance of this general consideration of the moral problem will appear in the discussion of the Christian ideal to which we turn. And the first consideration which must here be offered is this, that the Christian ideal properly interpreted and understood has much closer affinity with the dynamic than with the static view of ethics. (i.) The supreme example which Jesus gave was the perfection of God, not as an impersonal law, but as a loving, merciful, and helpful will. That will He brought into human history as the Kingdom of God. Without entering into the discussion of the recent differences of opinion about the nature of the Kingdom of God, or the conditions of its coming to earth, as that would be irrelevant to our present purpose, we may note that it is a divine purpose which is to find realisation on earth, and men are to seek and strive for the Kingdom not as a law to be obeyed, but as a good to be gained, including blessedness as well as holiness. In so far as any law is assigned to the citizens of the Kingdom, it is no legal code of rules to be observed—it is an inward principle to be expressed, an inward disposition to be realised. Absolute love to God and equal love to self and neighbour is not a legal system, but a personal purpose to be fulfilled harmoniously in the three relations.

To treat Jesus as another Moses, and each of His sayings as legislation, is to misunderstand the *ethos* of His revelation of God. (ii.) When we turn to Paul it becomes even more obvious that Christian morality is not legal, and by its source and example in the grace of Christ cannot be legal. Paul aimed at emancipation, not only of Gentiles from Jewish law, but of believers as such from law. If in his practical exhortations the legal standpoint again and again appears, it must be remembered that the transition from the life under law to the life under grace is not all at once effected; and in so far as even a believer does not rise to the life under grace he must needs remain in the life under law. But the outward commandment is meant to become an inward motive, purpose, disposition. Those who are Christ's, in the measure in which they are Christ's have His Spirit, His own life, active and victorious in them. This immanence of Christ in the believer as the source of his new life is sometimes represented as a personal participation in the moral experience of Christ, crucifixion unto sin and resurrection unto the life for God with Him. This new life has the laws of its own self-development, conditions which must be observed that it may show all its vigour in transforming the character marred by sin and conforming it unto the likeness of Christ Himself. But this is not a legal code to be observed; and legalism is not Christian. (iii.) This process is not conceived as completed in this earthly life. We are saved by hope. The renewal in holiness is not only gradual but incomplete here. And what gives moral and religious value to the future life is that not only will there be a clearer vision of Christ in His glory, but also as a consequence of it a closer resemblance to Him: "Now the Lord is that Spirit: and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord" (2 Cor. iii. 17, 18). The process thus begun here is continued hereafter: "It doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is" (1 John iii. 2). The future life is not a reward of obedience to a law now, but the continuing and completion of a vital process here begun, there ended. (iv.) While the hope of a speedy and sudden coming of Christ in power dominates the thought and life of the Apostolic Age, and this hope is based on and justified by the teaching of Jesus Himself, yet the conception of growth which is recognised in regard to the individual is not altogether absent in respect to the Kingdom of God, the universal divine

purpose. In the twin parables of the mustard seed and the leaven the companion ideas of gradual expansion and pervasion are taught. The treatment by Paul of the "woman" and the "slave" question shows that the Christian principle of spiritual equality could not at once be fully applied; and so illustrates the law of evolution as applicable also to the realisation of the Christian ideal.

(2) If the Christian ideal is to find only gradual realisation in human history, we must distinguish two elements in it—its permanent and universal principles and its temporary and local applications. If in morals as in religion the eternal is being revealed in the temporal, and the infinite in the finite, these two aspects must always be recognised. As each age and each land has its own peculiar conditions under which the Christian ideal is to be realised, that the application of these principles may be valid and effective, it must vary according to time and place. (i.) While Jesus spoke the words of eternal life He yet addressed Himself to His own people and His own time; and we must distinguish His principles from His precepts. As it is impossible for us to reproduce the conditions in which Jesus lived, so it would be impracticable for us to attempt a literal observance of His particular precepts. Without admitting that, as He was teaching with the keen expectation of a speedy and sudden advent of the supermundane Kingdom of God, even His principles constitute an *interim ethik*, as some modern scholars hold, we must acknowledge that there is much in His teaching that is adapted to the particular circumstances of His disciples as messengers of His Gospel in a hostile and thus persecuting world. The particular illustrations of the contrast between the old law of the Jews and the new life in Him were adapted to His disciples in view of the circumstances under which their mission was to be discharged. The instances He gives of non-resistance of evil, great as is their value as showing what the Christian spirit is, cannot claim validity as rules of conduct for Christians under all circumstances. Jesus is in no way concerned with the functions of the State in asserting law and maintaining order, or with the responsibility of Christians as citizens in a free State in regard to the discharge of these functions. The directions He gave the Twelve on their first mission are so obviously local and temporary in their character that it is only an evidence of the inability of Christendom to understand Him that these should have been claimed as defining a higher order of Christian living. While in His teaching about divorce He affirmed the principle of the indissolubility of marriage

according to the divine intention, He admitted the justification of the law of Moses in regard to divorce because of the hardness of men's hearts. Even in a society nominally Christian it may be impracticable to conform the common law for believers and unbelievers alike to the Christian ideal. It must be emphatically asserted that Jesus did not legislate for human society generally, or even for the Christian community, in all lands and ages. Had He done so, Christianity would have suffered from the irremediable defect of Islam, which, because Mahommed did legislate in details and invest all his rules with divine authority, finds itself bound by the fetters of the conditions and customs (including slavery and polygamy) of Arab society. (ii.) We must maintain the same distinction as regards the doctrine and practice of the Apostolic Age. It is not necessary for us to depreciate the voluntary practical communism of the primitive Jerusalem community on the ground that it was economically unsound, as there is no evidence that any other arrangement was then practicable, or that the subsequent poverty was due to any extravagant waste of resources, or that it was due to a fanatical unworldliness in view of the Parousia—we should appreciate rather the generosity and disinterestedness that brotherly love inspired; and nevertheless it would be folly to maintain that Christian society must always and everywhere be so constituted. While in the reasons Paul gives for the restrictions of the liberty of women there is somewhat more of the Jewish rabbi than the Christian apostle, yet who can doubt that, the conditions of Gentile society as regards sex relations being what they were, he showed a heavenly wisdom as well as an earthly prudence in the rules for their conduct which he laid down. We do not challenge his authority as the apostle of Christ in ignoring these rules, while seeking to be as wise and as prudent as he was in applying the principle of the equality of both sexes in Christ Jesus. Paul's teaching in regard to slavery is another instance of the application of the Christian principle so as to adapt it to the existing conditions. The New Testament confirms and does not contradict the modern scientific view of *ethics in evolution.*

(3) Three objections to this point of view may be urged. In *the first place*, it may be objected that it is an attempt to evade the severity of the Christian moral demand; in *the second place*, it may be urged that we can have no security that what we set aside as temporary and local application is not permanent and universal principle; and in *the third place*, the danger of allowing our morality as Christians to be deter-

mined not by Christ but by social tradition or convention may be insisted on. (i.) The first difficulty is to be met not by the Christian placing himself more under law, but by his letting his inmost life be more and more dominated by grace. The gratitude which the grace of God in Christ awakens will be the motive of so whole-hearted and single-minded a consecration to Christ, that not as little but as great an obedience as possible will be rendered. The true order of Augustine's famous sayings must be recognised. The *da quod jubes* must come before the *jube quod vis.* The consecrated Christian thinker is a moralist, and not a casuist: his intention is to discover not the minimum demand Christ makes, but the maximum service the Christian can render. Laxity of Christian life is to be corrected not by more law, but more love. It is surprising how constantly Christian thought and life reverts to legalism, the restraint of an outward commandment instead of the constraint of an inward devotion: yet grace can give what law cannot get. (ii.) The second difficulty is not as insurmountable as it seems; and it is one which cannot in any case be altogether avoided. He would be a doctrinaire indeed who would claim that all the precepts and customs of Jesus and His apostles must be kept by all Christians always and everywhere. As has been said, even the advocate of verbal inspiration is a higher critic, and the more dangerous that there is no method in the exercise of his judgment of the Scriptures. A temporary and local form must be admitted as well as a permanent and a universal content alike of doctrine and practice. If we cannot but discriminate, it is well that we should bring as wide knowledge and as trained judgment to the task as possible. A knowledge of the evolution of morals in human history gives us a moral insight which enables us to discover principles in precepts and customs. While the world's history is by no means the world's infallible judgment, as not the evil alone has perished and the good alone been preserved, yet an enlightened conscience can and does discriminate what should pass and what should abide. On the one hand there is needed the heavenly wisdom which will apprehend and appreciate all that the Christian ideal involves; and on the other the earthly prudence which, knowing all the conditions, economic, social, and political, will determine what are the applications necessary and practicable at any time or place. This is a task which, however difficult, cannot be escaped. (iii.) The third difficulty is one that must be recognised; but it will be removed if the other two are overcome. Given the effective Christian motive and the adequate Christian judgment,

conformity to tradition and convention in morals will be avoided. The apostle's exhortation, however, needs to be ever borne in mind: "Be not conformed to this world; but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect will of God" (Rom. xii. 2). For it is not only the evil in the world that is to be avoided, but even the good in it is to be excelled. The Christian ideal to which the Church is called to witness, and for the realisation of which it is required to work, must be in advance of the best moral thought of any land or people. Jesus' requirement of His disciples, *mutatis mutandis*, still holds good: "Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. v. 20). The Christian in his consecration to Christ will seek to do not as little but as much as he can for the furtherance of the Kingdom of God; he will exercise both wisdom and prudence so that in serving the Lord he may to the utmost use the opportunity (κυρίῳ and καῖρῳ are alternative readings in Rom. xii. 11); and he will accordingly not follow the world's ways even in goodness, but as the agent of God's will he will lead men on to larger claims and loftier duties.

III.

(1) While the Christian Church is the witness to and the worker for the Christian ideal in morals, it must not be forgotten that its primary task is the preaching of the Gospel of grace; and it must always relate its morals to its faith. Its ideal is not offered, and cannot be offered, as a code of laws for a society unredeemed and unregenerate, as what it demands grace alone can render. The attempt of the Christian Church to legislate, as in the matter of marriage and divorce, for human society generally, instead of striving for the salvation of the men and women who constitute it, is, to use a homely phrase, to put the cart before the horse. The Sermon on the Mount is too good for human nature's daily food, but not too good for the human nature which has been renewed by the Spirit of God. Christ does not bind on men's shoulders heavy burdens grievous to be borne, but makes yokes easy and burdens light by His enabling grace, for He is not a Legislator, but a Saviour; and the Christian Church would have served mankind better had it been more concerned to save than to rule. The spread of Christian faith is the condition for the growth of Christian morals.

(2) This does not mean, however, that for the Christian the ideal is not authoritative, nor that he should not try to make its influence felt even among those who are not yet Christian. (i.) The believer himself is called to be a saint, and to strive by the use of all the grace available to become as fully and speedily a saint as he can. Only laxity can result from the too common assumption that, because the ideal is so lofty and large, it need not now enter into practical consideration, but may be postponed as practicable only in a future life. It is the ideal as interpreted by Christian wisdom and prudence which has this immediate claim. Theoretical expositions, which ignore the present conditions of its application, can only bewilder and discourage by making obviously impracticable demands. In the interests of Christian holiness it is important that the considerations already advanced as regards the relation of principles to precepts and customs should have due weight given to them, so that it may be seen that a man may be a saint in the world as it now is. (ii.) The Christian in the measure of his saintliness will influence others towards goodness and godliness; and the Christian community may hope, without attempting to force on society the Christian ideal in legislation, to influence public opinion and popular sentiment by its principles. The more fully its own common life realises the Christian ideal the more will it pervade by its influence the society around. That it should bear its witness against social wrongs and for social justice, that it should rebuke sin and commend virtue, that it should test prevalent moral standards and customs by its ideal, is a task from which it must not shrink; but in doing this, it must not leave the even weighter matters undone, the ministry of reconciliation without which the ideal will never become reality.

(3) A much more difficult question emerges when we ask ourselves whether the Christian is bound to treat all men from the standpoint of redemptive love alone. Must he always submit to wrong, or may he resist it? must he always forgive and never punish sin? It is not merely because the present war has given such prominence and urgency to the question that it is here raised, but because it can be regarded as a test question showing whether we interpret the Christian ideal aright. Several considerations must be presented in offering an answer. (i.) As the witness of and worker for the divine purpose of reconciliation the Christian Church must in all its dealings with men show the spirit and follow the purpose of the redemptive love. It is in the world to commend grace,

and not to command law; its mission is to save and not to punish the sinner. When it grasps the sword to inflict, or even to resist, persecution, it forfeits its claim to the guardianship of the arm of the Lord, and places itself among the earthly powers which may perish by the sword they use. The ministers of the Church of Christ seem to me to accept the same responsibility; and it is to me at least a distressing spectacle to see men set apart for the ministry of the Word hastening from the pulpit to the trenches. In a world divided and torn by conflict the representatives of the institution the function of which is to present to the world the Gospel of grace should in word and deed maintain the ministry of reconciliation. Without any literalism or legalism such as has already been shown to be a mistaken method, we may hold that as the circumstances of Christian preachers are similar to those of the disciples, the same principle, although in other historical forms, of non-resistance and non-retaliation is valid for them.

(ii.) The individual Christian is required to cherish the spirit of reconciliation in all his relations with his fellow-men: he must be ready to forgive whenever and wherever love, the supreme desire for another's good, demands forgiveness—that is, the full resumption of the affectionate and beneficent relation which may have been interrupted by the wrong suffered; as far as his own feelings to the wrong-doer are concerned there should never be any hindrance in himself to reconciliation, as soon as that is possible from the changed attitude of the wrong-doer. That does not seem to involve, however, that in all cases he will submit to fraud or force without using such means as are at his command for restraining and repressing wrong and evil. Unless the State, in enforcing law, maintaining order, and repelling aggression from another State, is to be pronounced non-Christian, the Christian must as a citizen accept the responsibility of administering a system which is one of repressive and punitive justice, and not redemptive grace. It would be simply an evasion of the problem for the Christian citizen to say, "I shall accept the security and the protection which the State offers, but I shall not approve or support any of the means which the State employs. I shall reward its services by my indifference or disapproval." If we accept Cæsar's coins we must render to Cæsar the tribute that is his due. And duty to the State, where the Christian is not merely a subject but a citizen, must go beyond paying taxes. The only alternative to accepting a share in the functions of the State is for the Christian deliberately to advocate anarchy as the Christian ideal of the relations of men to one another. If a Christian

must refuse to fight for his country, he must refuse the protection of his life and property the law offers to him.

(iii.) But there is even a higher justification for a Christian's acceptance of the full responsibility of citizenship. In teaching the disciples Jesus was not concerned with the State at all; and it is a perverse interpretation of His words about non-resistance to extend them to the State. As far as His general attitude shows, He accepted the State without any disapproval. Paul makes it quite plain that for him the State could claim divine sanction; and surely our knowledge of human history should convince us that, many and great as have been the crimes of the State, its benefits have been more and greater still. We may accept the State as an agent of the divine providence. But even as repressive and punitive justice the State is included in the divine purpose. We do not truly and fully understand the Cross unless we recognise that grace does not annul but magnifies, it does not destroy but fulfils law, that redemptive love includes as a necessary moment repressive and punitive justice.

(4) This is a consideration of such importance as to deserve fuller treatment. Not only is the element of law included in grace, but the order of law precedes and prepares for grace, and law is not set aside until it is taken up into grace. Law is a tutor who leads to Christ. Law is, and cannot but be, repressive, corrective, and even punitive; and we shut out God from nature and history alike if we do not regard law as a revelation of God as real as, even if subordinate to, grace. We may apply this consideration, in regard to the stages of the fulfilment of God's purpose, to the realisation of the Christian ideal. The State with its punitive justice may be a forerunner of the Christ with His redemptive grace: and when in human relations grace is disregarded and even disowned, it may be necessary for justice, even as punitive, to assert itself. The aim, not only of the Church as a whole, but also of every individual Christian, must be as widely and as soon as possible to introduce the reign of grace; but the pursuit of that object does not exclude, nay, even demands, the exercise of justice, even in repressing and punishing crime. However terrible and wasteful an instrument war is, it seems at present in the relation of nations to one another an inevitable method of asserting justice against the crime of national arrogance and aggression. It can be defended from the Christian standpoint only in so far as it is defensive against a national crime, and not offensive for the advancement of any national ambition.

(5) So regarded, war can never be represented as anything but evil, just as the imprisonment or execution of the individual criminal must be so regarded. We may admire the sacrifice and heroism which war calls forth; but we cannot but regard it as only the lesser of two evils, and as due to the presence and power of sin in human society. If force must be used to restrain and repress violence, it can from the Christian standpoint be so used only in so far and in such ways as may be necessary for this object. Revenge and reprisals are just as unchristian in a nation as would be the hate of a judge against the criminal whom he finds it needful to sentence for his wrong against society. And just as justice seeks to be reformatory as well as punitive, so in the relation of nations must there be the constant endeavour to substitute friendship for force, grace for law. As the Christian Church stands for a higher order, in a time of war it must be on its guard to keep punitive justice strictly within the limits which its sole object allows, and to hold before the nation as its constant and final purpose such a relation to other nations as will admit even in the action of States toward one another as much of the redemptive grace as is possible. Can we maintain that the Christian Churches of Britain have kept as strictly as they should to the narrow path of difficult duty which their responsibility for the realisation of the Christian ideal in the world imposes on them?

(6) This same principle must be recognised in regard to other moral problems which emerge in the realisation of the Christian Ideal in human society. On the one hand, the Christian Church must never surrender the Kingdom of God, the sovereignty of redemptive grace in the world, as the goal of human history; it must always witness to and work for this final purpose in the world which reveals the essential nature of God. On the other hand, it must recognise that its ideal is not a code of laws to be at once enforced on all men. It must recognise that morality is progressive and that its action on human society must be educative. Disciplinary measures may sometimes be necessary at certain stages of development; restraint, rebuke, punishment may even be inevitable. The State may be a helper of the Church in this education of mankind; to it especially belongs the function of repressive or punitive justice, while the Church has as its distinctive testimony the redemptive grace to which at last the entire sovereignty will fall. Meanwhile the Church may approve and support the State in the discharge of its lower function as not only prior to but preparatory for its higher

service of mankind; and that, not on the ground of expediency but of principle, since in the supreme act of God in human history, the Cross of the Lord Jesus Christ, justice has not been annulled but fulfilled by grace, since He in whom men become the righteousness of God was Himself, though knowing no sin, made sin for the redemption of the race.

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LONDON.

RACE SUICIDE.

THE COUNTESS OF WARWICK.

I WAS visiting the north of England in connection with an Industrial Congress, and I called upon a woman whose husband worked in a mine. Her small house was scrupulously clean; she was young, vigorous, swift in thought and movement, and gave me the impression that nothing came into her life in the form of obstacle and surprise without finding her ready to deal with it effectively. She showed me with a certain pride the small collection of books on social subjects bought in second-hand shops by her and her husband. I remember seeing John Stuart Mill, Ruskin, William Morris, Rowntree, Henry George, and many another familiar name. "We have read them together," she told me; "we have educated one another since the time we first met at evening classes." I remarked that her married life seemed to lack one thing only, and that was a family, and I quoted the Eastern aphorism that a house without children is a garden without flowers. She smiled a little sadly, and then I noted how some faint lines about her mouth tightened and hardened, robbing her of a certain charm. "Lady Warwick," she said, "we earn between us by hard work from day to day between four and five pounds a week. It has taken many years to reach that figure, and there is no chance of passing beyond it. What we have endured on the road to this comparative comfort we alone know, and we don't talk about it. But we both believe that the game is not worth the candle. The conditions of life in England are not worth perpetuating, and neither of us would willingly bring children into the world to take their chance and run their horrible risks as we did." She stopped for a moment in order to be sure of her self-control, and then she told me that in her view, though all her heart cried out for little children, sterility was the only protest that

could be made against the cruel conditions of modern life under capitalism. "I know that my husband and I are desirables from the employer's standpoint. We earn far more than we receive, we are temperate, hardworking, punctual, reliable. But when we have settled our rent and rates, clubs and insurances, dressed ourselves, paid tram-fares and bought a few books, there is nothing left but a slender margin that a few months' illness would sweep away. For a week or ten days in the year we may learn that England is not all as hideous as this corner of it, but we shall die without a glimpse of the world beyond and of its treasures that our books tell us about. If we stop to think, our life is full of unsatisfied longings; and though we don't give them free play, we can't ignore them altogether. So we will not produce any more slaves for the capitalist; *and I can tell you that there is not one decently educated young married woman of my acquaintance who is not of the same mind.* You could go into a score of houses known to me in this town alone and find strong, vigorous women whose childlessness is their one possible protest against the existing wage slavery."

Years have passed since in that gloomy little northern town, with its congeries of mean streets looking meaner than ever under the rain, I met the speaker whose name has passed from me. She may well be approaching the time when Nature will confirm her resolve irrevocably, but the memory of that conversation has haunted me with the vision of thousands of lost souls and unhappy lives.

I know now, if I did not know it then, that the music of little voices and the patter of little feet would have brought into that poor worker's life many of the joys for which she sighed in vain. She did not know, nor at that time did I, that obedience to natural law ensures a happiness that is independent of external circumstances, while disobedience brings in its train an ever-growing mental discord and sows the seeds of disease and decay. Statistics can be fascinating friends even though they be formidable acquaintances; they have a rough eloquence of their own that is more effective than honeyed speech.

The birth-rate of England, France, and the United States, associated as it is in all these countries with the death-rate of the newly born, is to me one of the most depressing signs of the times. I cannot help realising that in many cases sterility is not the deliberate protest of the wage slave; it is the selfish protest of the pleasure-seeker, and in a small minority of cases the genuine yet narrow fear of the theorist and his following,

whose enthusiasms have outrun both knowledge and faith. Tolstoy went so far as to say that the man who enjoys association with his wife for any purpose save procreation is guilty of a crime. While many childless women live celibate lives, particularly in America, the great majority do not. In Milton's stately words they "of love and love's delight take freely," as though the Power that rules and guides the world could in the long-run be outwitted by what it has created.

To-day the civilised world is at the parting of the ways. War has riven asunder the ranks of the best and bravest, and has left in the hearts of the survivors so vivid a sense of the horrors of life, that many a man will hesitate to become a father lest his sons have to take their place in time to come on the fields of war, and his daughters chance to be among the dwellers in a conquered city. All classes have been gathered to battle, one and all will feel the responsibility attending the failure of our civilisation. While many will believe they are responding to a high instinct when they elect to follow the line of least resistance and leave the world a little poorer, the cumulative effect of such a decision is positively terrible to contemplate.

There are some lines in *Coriolanus* that might have been addressed not to those who banished him from Rome, but to the women of the world's most highly civilised countries:—

> Have the power still
> To banish your defenders; till at length
> Your ignorance, which finds not till it feels,
> Making not reservation of yourselves,
> Still your own foes, deliver you as most
> Abated captives to some nation
> That won you without blows.

If these lines are really as appropriate as they seem to me, it is because the women of the civilised world and the more leisured section of it are on their trial. There is going to be an unimagined shortage among the best elements of the most highly civilised population, a shortage due in part to the fashion in which responsible women have neglected their duties hitherto. If the pleasure-lovers decline their share of child-bearing on the ground that it robs them of long periods of amusement, and if the finest type of women-workers refuse on the other grounds raised earlier in this paper, what will be the result? There will be a sharp social cleavage; the few clever exploiters will enchain the unfit who are produced so rapidly, we shall develop a small class that governs and a large class that is ruled, all progress will come to an end, while the

conditions obtaining when the industrial era was opened by steam power will be revived with all the attendant horrors in some new and unsuspected guise.

It is well to remember how, following the first trumpet-call of war, our hard-won liberties were stripped from us. Some of my American acquaintances say it is because our free institutions were not very deeply rooted; but I am well convinced that, if the United States were involved, the results would be much the same. War always dethrones liberty, and the nation that can set her up again when peace is restored may be congratulated. As a rule the struggle has to begin all over again, for the State advances claims that are incompatible with any kind of freedom that is worth having. Only the will of the people can gain liberty, and to make that will sufficiently strong and effective it must be expressed by the best human material, the children of the best types. So it seems to me that race suicide, evil at all times, becomes in seasons like this an act of treason, not only to the nation but to civilisation and all those ideals upon which civilisation waits.

In the town to which I referred on the first page of this paper the women who deliberately discarded motherhood might between them have raised a strong company to fight for the rights of the next generation. They were shocked by the recollection of the struggle that brought them beyond the reach of want; had they lost sympathy with those who succumbed by the way? Surely the fate of those who refused to carry on the duty of life is the more tragic.

The faults and failures of life are not a divine dispensation. Providence has placed us in a marvellous world, capable of raising far more than is needed to supply the reasonable wants of one and all. That there are misery, injustice, want, and inequality must not be charged to the account of Providence but to the foolishness and immortal greed of man, who cannot deal equitably with the resources of which he is the trustee. The world waxes richer year by year, for we are gathering the power to increase production and to distribute the surplus of one region to supply the deficiency of the other. It is a very fair and beautiful world, and we need no more than that all should be permitted to share what is produced. To enforce this distribution, to see that it is enjoyed in peace and tranquillity, is the appointed task of a strong and vigorous democracy. The primal duty of women is to give this democracy to the world and keep its strength renewed.

Some may fear that women "condemned to fertility," as

one phrased it in my hearing recently, may be unable to take their part in the struggle for emancipation. But surely motherhood enforces the qualifications of women, justifies their claims, and provides them with the material to train for future triumphs. Olive Schreiner in her magnificent book *Woman and Labour*, in which, however, she wrote of the birth-rate and its incidents without visualising the possibilities of world war, says that some birds have raised the union of the sexes to a far higher level than humanity has reached. The male and the female share the nest building, the incubation and the feeding of the young; and it was impossible for that fine observer to note any difference in the task of the sexes. So it should be with us, and will be when we have developed to a like standard. The labours and responsibilities of the home and the daily work will be a part of the common contract and bond of men and women, and no woman will be disqualified by the fulfilment of her duties in the home more than the man is disqualified by reason of his labours beyond it. We are all conscious of evils that throng the world, we all strive to better them in a degree, few of the most careless fail altogether to be kind in some fashion, however haphazard, but if the women who take life seriously will not only fulfil the commandment to be fruitful and multiply, but will do their best to urge their reluctant sisters, a single generation may avail to restore the balance of sanity, equity, and progress throughout civilisation.

This social disease of race suicide has not been long established. It came into France, I believe, as a result of the law that divides the inheritance of the parents among the children equally; it has crept into England and America chiefly as a product of overmuch luxury and wealth. Apart from the calculated protest against social inequalities, it is due to the methods of life that soften women and make child-bearing a terror. I have been told by my travelled friends, the men and women who have been to the far ends of the earth, that in the lands where women are hardy, healthy, and vigorous, there is no trouble for the mother at these critical times. She recovers her full strength in a few days. At Easton in Essex, where I was born and brought up, and at Warwick, where I have lived so much since my marriage, I have seen that the workers' wives who live frugally and actively are able to rear large families and retain not only their health but their good looks. Casting my memory back, I can recall the time when great families were the rule, and not the exception, among the leisured

classes. The women who entertained in great houses that they administered in every detail brought their six, eight, or ten children into the world and lived long, healthy, happy lives. The modern fashion is of recent date, and now that the war has stirred the heights and depths of human consciousness, the old bad custom should pass for the sake of the world that the madmen of mankind have made desolate. At no period in the history of Western civilisation has it been more necessary for the women who count as factors in world progress to consider their duty and fulfil it to the extreme limit of their power.

I am afraid that all classes suffer in some measure from what the French call *La peur de Vie.* Life tends not only to baffle and confuse, but to terrify. Trust in "Providence" is not what it was or what it should be. We lack the wide vision that can comprehend, however vaguely, "the far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves." We think of ourselves without realising that we are units of the Great World Family, and that if we will do our plain duty we may rest well assured it will involve no responsibility too great for us. In short, we lack moral courage. The man at the helm in mid-ocean steers his appointed course, and does not doubt that he will reach harbour at last. Can we not learn from him?

I think that the need of this moral courage is not less in the United States than here, for they see the influx day by day of the most diverse elements, and know well enough that the genius of rule belongs to the Anglo-Saxon. The negroid element does not forget its duty, and the honest class of immigrant is hardly less prolific. Against all the problems that my American correspondents, and they are many, have set out, there is no surer safeguard than an ever-increasing birth-rate of the best elements.

I have never felt disposed to join in the cry of the Yellow Peril, nor to think well of those who raise it wantonly, but certain facts stand out in a very bright light shed upon them by the war. In the first place, the Allied powers of the Entente have sought the services of both yellow and black races, and have, by so doing, proclaimed the dawn of a new era in which all questions of equality must come to the front. Japan is very wide awake. China is still a slumbering giant. Given sanitary science, and a great gift of organisation, she might rule all Asia. The Berbers, Arabs, and negroid races of Africa have lined our trenches and taken part in our attacks; one and all, to say nothing of the Indian soldiers, have learned

more of war in the past year or so than they had ever known before. They have seen the weakness as well as the strength of the white man.

Black and yellow races alike are extraordinarily prolific; there is among their women no shirking of duty in that regard. Very soon the white man will realise that he cannot maintain his old position unless he is fully prepared to accept responsibilities far greater than those of his forebears. If the rate of his progression falls while that of the other races rises, there can only be one solution in the end, such a solution as Coriolanus speaks of in the scathing lines I have quoted. In short, if the white man's burden is to be borne there must be sufficient white men to bear it. Statesmen will labour in vain, and the friends of progress will strive to no end if the start that the other races have gained is to be increased; and the white women of the world must decide whether or no they are content that not only their own nation but the whole standard of life for which they stand is to be submerged, or whether by a generous interpretation of the duties of motherhood they will enable their people to remain in the future as they have been in the past. We cannot tell what the final harvest of war will amount to, but with the dead, the diseased, and the disabled, it will probably run into ten figures—more than five times the measure of human sacrifice demanded by all the great wars that shook the world from Blenheim to Omdurman. Even these monstrous figures do not tell the whole tale, for there will be among the dead thousands of men whose talent might have developed into genius, and there will be hundreds of thousands of widows left in the full flush of womanhood, with all their possibilities unfulfilled and, in countless cases, beyond the reach of fulfilment. To put it brutally, our civilisation, that stands in bitter need of its best breeding stock, has deliberately slaughtered a very large percentage of it.

This, indeed, is race suicide in its worst form; and just as woman hopes by her emancipation to dam the tide of war, so she must step into the breach and dam the tide of loss. Emancipation will do very little for women if when they have obtained it they find the best elements of the white races increasingly unable to stand the strain imposed by war. They will not forget that the black man's women are bought to tend his land and enable him to live in ease, or that the Mohammedan, in the enforced seclusion of the harem, may share his favours among four lawful wives and as many concubines as his purse can furnish. As the standard of civilisation declines, woman,

by reason of her physical weakness, must pay an ever-increasing penalty; only when it has risen to heights unreached before the war may she hope to come into her own and to realise ambitions that, dormant or active, have been with her through the centuries. The whole question of her future has been brought by the war outside the domain of personal or even national interest; suddenly it has become racial.

Down to a little while ago the solution was not in woman's hands; to-day it belongs to her, she has to decide not only for herself but for all white mankind. It is not too much to say that civilisation as we know it will soon be waiting upon her verdict. If this statement seems too far reaching, if it seems to challenge probability, let those who think so turn to any good history of the world and see for themselves how each civilisation has been overwhelmed as soon as it reached the limits of its efficiency and endurance. In the history of this planet, changes no less sweeping than that which I have indicated have been recorded; the Providence that has one race or colour in its special keeping is but the offspring of our own conceit. The real Providence that dominates the universe treats all the races on their merits. If, and only if, the best types of women will embrace motherhood ardently, bravely content to endure the discomforts and discover for themselves the infinite pleasure, can the world as we know it survive the terrible shock it has received. Even then the recovery will be slow, and the price to be paid will be bitter beyond imagining; but we shall in the end win through, though I who write and you who read may well have settled our account with mortality before the season of full recovery dawns upon a wasted world. Should we fail in our duty, then we must pass as Babylon and Egypt and Rome passed before us, to become no more than mere shadows of a name.

The least among us may dream dreams and see visions. My own dream and my own vision are of woman as the saviour of the race. I see her fruitful womb replenish the wasted ranks, I hear her wise councils making irresistibly attractive the flower-strewn ways of peace. I see the few women who encourage war turning from the error of their ways, and those who have spurned motherhood realising before it is too late the glory of their neglected burden. And I believe, with a faith that nothing can shake, that with these two changes and a wise recognition that the fruits of the earth were intended for us all, not in accordance with our gifts but in the measure of our needs, a new season may come to this distracted earth. Should all the high hopes of our noblest

suffer eclipse, should all the travail of the Christian era be brought to nothingness? I have too much faith in my sex to believe it will let the world perish if the real meaning and significance of its duty can be brought home to it. We have been ill educated, we have been spoilt, we have been corrupted, but for all that there is a certain soundness at the heart of woman. She has not shrunk from the duties she understands; even the lapse from grace that recent years have revealed will not outlive this understanding.

The responsibility for spreading the truth rests upon all who recognise it. There are countless women throughout the world who by sheer force of character can influence their women friends, and have learned that the vital problem of sex is not rightly to be treated as though it were not fit for discussion. They are scattered over all the cities of the world; the cumulative effect of their labours would be immense, irresistible. They might lead in time to the existence in every cabinet of civilised powers of a woman appointed as Minister of Maternity, to devise and carry out plans by which the birth-rate should be increased, and those born into the world should receive a fair opportunity of remaining and thriving in it. A strange suggestion to make in a country that in every branch of administration is so intensely conservative as ours; but needs are even stronger than prejudices, and if in the fulness of time my fancy becomes a fact, it will be no matter for surprise. I am sure that the perils I have outlined are known and feared in the Old World and the New, that they are mentioned in the highest quarters of London, Paris, and Washington, and that the transitional period separating words from deeds must needs be brief, because the problem will not brook delay. Many women will respond without questioning to the call of duty. Some, whose life-struggle can be understood only by those who share it, may ask first that their offspring shall be treated as what they are, state assets, and not abandoned to all the evils of poverty. Others will want to know that they are not raising sons to become the "cannon fodder" of kings and statesmen. In the light of the needs of the white man's world, and the weight of the white man's burden, are even these assurances too much to ask?

FRANCES EVELYN WARWICK.

WARWICK CASTLE.

A MODERN CONFESSION OF FAITH ON JESUS CHRIST.

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(1) WE believe first of all that He lived. This has recently been called in question. It is true that there is no contemporaneous evidence of the fact outside of the New Testament. But Jesus has been proven great enough to authenticate His own existence. No one except Him could have created His Church or portrayed so sublime and yet so human an ideal. There was no one else to sit for such a portrait. No one who worshipped Him would ever have made Him say, "Why callest thou me good?" or have caused Him to quote upon His cross that particular word from the Psalter, "My God, why hast thou forsaken me?" He is both too natural and too unnatural to be a creature of imagination.

(2) Next, we believe that He is a thoroughly human being.

That means, to begin with, that He was born as we are born. This we believe, because Jesus Himself never alludes to any exceptional manner of birth, because the earliest Christian documents contain no allusion to it, and because the Roman Catholics in their doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin have shown us that we must have a supernatural Mother for the Lord, if we are to ascribe to Him a supernatural Father, if we are to get much out of it.

To believe that He is thoroughly human means also that He was a Jew, conditioned in His knowledge by His heredity and environment. We believe that He was ignorant of modern science, that He believed that the sun moved round the earth, that He believed in the Davidic authorship of the Psalter and the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, that He had no idea of the existence of America or of the spread of civilisation, and that He never succeeded in convincing the

disciples that He did not believe in the speedy ending of the world or rather in its entering upon a supernatural period of its history.

(3) Yet, despite the fact that He was of limited education and of lowly condition, that He lived apart from the centres of Jewish culture, that He cared nothing for politics and government, that He lived in the public eye no longer than three years and more probably only one, that He was despised by the most eminent and public-spirited of His nation, and that He died in shame and agony between two common thieves, who like Him had been disturbers of the peace; despite the fact that the fragmentary records of His life are overlaid with the ideas and misapprehensions of His disciples, that we cannot be sure of having a single long sentence as He spoke it, and that no contemporary historian thought Him important enough to mention,—despite these facts, we believe that He has changed the course of the world's history, that He has uplifted a large part of it, that He has been the ultimate source of the strength and the ultimate creator of the ideals of the most cherished characters of the world's subsequent centuries, and that most of these men consciously have drawn their highest inspiration from this Man who walked along the remote and rustic ways of Palestine over 1900 years ago.

(4) We believe, further, that the source of this amazing influence is due to the impression that His personality created upon the men of His age and nation.

(5) We believe, further, that the fundamental impression He made upon those with whom He came into contact was one of transcendent, self-controlled, and self-contained power. He taught as one that had authority; He healed as one who had authority; He prayed as one who had authority; He forgave as one that had authority; He died as one that had authority—authority to lay His life down as a ransom for many. He is the historic Superman, greater than any Superman of the imaginations of men.

(6) We believe that this impression of power was so great that He evoked power in other men. The sick became well; to the weak He gave back their forfeited self-control; the multitudes He made curious and careless of their ordinary occupations; His enemies, formerly disunited and hating one another, He united in one overpowering, furious hatred of Him; His disciples He made eager, confident, conscious of God. Colonel Barré said of William Pitt, "Nobody ever entered his closet who did not come out of it a braver man."

So on an immeasurably higher scale and on a far loftier plane it was with Jesus. No matter what attitude men took toward Him, He brought out their natures with a power not resident therein or not manifest therein before.

(7) We believe that this impression of power that He made upon men was created chiefly in three ways.

First, through His actions. He was strong enough to go forty days without anything except most casual food; throughout crowded days, whether of greatest success, or of sharpest tensest opposition, or of utter and irretrievable disappointment, He but rarely seemed to feel the need of rest or of recuperation; He bore scourging without complaining and for a while thereafter was able to bear a heavy cross; when at His weakest, He refused an opiate.

He had power not only to endure but to transform. He brought strength by His presence into diseased and distraught minds. "Faith in Him" is a sudden consciousness of unsuspected inward resources, mediated through His surprising and sympathetic power. He walked into a multitude gathered to wreak vengeance upon Him and it parted to let Him through; He woke in a storm, and so aware of power about them did frightened sailors become that it seemed to them as if the storm went to sleep; He faced a hungry multitude and gave to it so serenely to eat of the meat that it knew not that the meagrest supply of bread and fish proved sufficient to allay the hunger of a multitude; with a word and a look, He made strangers into friends and sinners into His servants. "Who is this? the wind and sea obey Him"; "with authority He commands even unclean spirits and they obey Him." Wherever He went, Power went out of Him.

But He made this impression of power also through His words. The hand is great, but the voice is nearer the heart of a man.

> God wove a web of loveliness,
> Of clouds and stars and birds,
> But made not anything at all
> So beautiful as words.

"The words I speak, they are spirit and they are life," and that which is common to all His words is their power.

Jesus was not a teacher in the technical sense of that word. He did not aim chiefly at the gradual development of His hearers; He rarely spoke to the same crowd twice; He did not build one conception on another; nearly all His words are *obiter dicta*, words by the way. Matthew has tried to make a discourse, which we call "The Sermon on the Mount," out of

casual scattered sayings, but Luke has betrayed the real facts. Jesus was not thinking of His words; He never preserved any of them. It does not seem as if His disciples were thinking of preserving them either. They were looking forward to glory and to seats on thrones. That we have His words at all is due to their matchless beauty, to their rhythm, and to His early death. So short a time elapsed between their utterance and the cross that they shared in the sacredness of last words and men recalled them lovingly, and clumsily and loyally wrote their beauty down.

Jesus was not a philosopher. He never inquired; He revealed. He was quite unconscious of the necessity of inquiry. He testified that which He knew. He came into the world not to find the truth but to bear witness to it. All things had been given Him by His Father. No one could know Him; that was unnecessary. It was necessary to know the Father, and every one could know the Father by listening to Him.

Jesus was not a debater; He never sought to convince; He never stooped to argue. He spoke and whoever had ears to hear heard; the others were offended in Him, as Jesus anticipated.

Jesus was a prophet, an Israelitish prophet. He skipped the centuries of proverbialists and psalmists and visionaries and reverted to the type of Isaiah and Hosea and Amos and Jeremiah. They delivered their messages in poetic form,—their prophecies are a collection of independent poems. And we can detect in Jesus' sayings the parallelism and rhythm of Hebrew poetry,—the Hebrew substitute for rhyme. He spoke poetic prose—prose something like Whitman's, only simpler, freer, more authoritative. We shall understand Him best if we think of Him as fundamentally a poet. "Our highest Orpheus," says Carlyle, "walked in Judea 1800 years ago; his sphere melody, flowing in wild native tones, took captive the ravished souls of men; and, being, of a truth, sphere melody, still flows and sounds, tho' now with thousandfold accompaniments and rich symphonies, through all our hearts; and modulates and divinely leads them."

His words give the same impression of power, of outflashing, unpremeditated power, as His deeds. He was conscious of standing alone—with God. Most of His greatest words might be called poems of challenge. The Parable of the Prodigal Son was spoken in opposition to the harshness of the Pharisee, painted on the unfaded canvas as the elder brother. The Parable of the Good Samaritan was spoken in rebuke of the

aristocracy of the Sadducees, and the aristocrat goes forever helplessly by on the other side. The Parable of the Pharisee and Publican is a masterly cartoon of a proud man at prayer—at prayer with himself. The vast "I-say-unto-yous" of the fifth of Matthew were spoken to outlaw statutory morality. The Beatitudes are a succession of conscious paradoxes—a deliberate and consequent reversal of the values of the world. He spoke as a sovereign to subjects as yet unborn.

For alone as He felt Himself to be, He had no idea of eventually being alone. Every poet has an instinctive trust in men; otherwise He would argue, orate, persuade, denounce. A poet, Jesus, suggests. He does not analyse a subject; He throws light upon it. He calls up the hearers' powers rather than overpowering them with His. He does not confer worth on men; He recalls their own worth to their minds.

Mark thought Jesus spoke in parables to cover up His meaning from the superficial; but He spoke so, because He spoke of things that never can be uncovered. As Dr Moulton, the student of Early Zoroastrianism, said in his Fernley lecture, "a parable is taken up for a momentary purpose, to illuminate a single point, and put aside for another illustration which is to keep us from forgetting how many facets there are in the jewel of Truth." He did not attempt to teach the Truth—only to point to it. He never inculcated precepts; He opened highways of vision. As Mr Streeter keenly remarks (*Foundations*, p. 107): "A rule necessarily invites a casuistic interpretation; we cannot help asking whether such and such a thing is or is not 'within the meaning of the Act.' But by means of Parable or Paradox, principles can be laid down without this danger. Even the most ingenious could not extract a cut and dried rule as to the comparative claims of family and religion from the saying: 'He that hateth not his father and mother cannot be my disciple.' Yet in the mouth of One who taught a gospel of love, its meaning cannot be misunderstood." So too He never explains God; He simply leaves men praying, "Our Father." He never condescended on the one hand; He never presumed on the other. He only drew water from His own spring and allowed any one who was thirsty to come to Him and drink until the water became in each man a well of water—a private, sacred well—springing up of itself.

Therefore it was that the earlier hearers whispered to each other: "He speaketh as one that hath authority and not as the scribes." Never man spake like Him, because never man had so deep and so unique a well. As Emerson wrote: "The

Chinese books say of Wan Wang, one of their kings, 'From the west, from the east, from the south, and from the north there was not one thought not brought in subjection to him.' This can be more truly said of Jesus than of any mortal. There is nothing in history to parallel the influence of Jesus Christ." Jesus Christ made everything new—whether what He spoke was new or old—because He found it all in His well that He knew was fed from the fountains of life that lay near the throne of God.

But the impression He produced upon many must have been made chiefly by His countenance. Nearer than hand or voice is the eye and the light on the face to a man's very soul—to the effluence of his person. What would we not give to have seen Him turn and look on Peter, to have seen Him look on the young ruler and love him, to have seen Him when He "beheld Satan like lightning fall from heaven," to have shared the furtive glances of the disciples as Jesus walked ahead of them into Jerusalem, "looking amazed and sore-troubled"? It is the light on the face of a man in the hour of death that lets us into the secret place of his soul—not his request that we bring him water. So it seems to me that only a tyro in human intercourse can think of striking the transfiguration from the gospels. If Moses' face shone coming from the mount, think of Jesus' face upon the mount of prayer. The light upon that face explains better than any words of Jesus the light that went forth from Him to lighten the world. For the men who had seen it—the most of them—seemed thereafter careless even about the words. And they saw it best, clearest, in its proper atmosphere, after the body had been laid in the grave. The waves of death could not engulf Him from their sight. He threw them beneath His feet, walking upon them. It was the face of Jesus in resurrection light that re-created the disciples and through them re-created the world. What wonder that if they "had known Him after the flesh they would know Him so no more"? What the vision of the Christ was, how He appeared after His passion "first to Peter, then to the twelve, then to about 500 brethren at once, most of whom remain unto this present, and last of all to" Paul also, we cannot tell, for to us He never appeared before His passion. But it is those supreme moments of human vision that give us the best measure of the power of the Person of Jesus over men.

(8) And we believe further that the impression of authoritative power that Jesus produced upon men was the reflection of His own consciousness of such power.

Our Lord was not astonished when men believed upon Him—as we are when men listen to us—but when they did not. "He marvelled at their unbelief"; "O ye of little faith, how long shall I bear with you?" "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her own brood under her wings, and ye would not!" "He had yet one, a well-beloved Son, Him sent He unto them saying, They will reverence My Son,"—those utterances scattered through the gospels witness the astonishment that our Lord experienced at the stupidity of His countrymen.

And Jesus was conscious of a large periphery of power of which He made no use. He told His disciples that He had deliberately refused to employ His power in the domain of the material, in sensational demonstrations of personal agility and magnetism, in tactful devices to obtain authority over national developments. He who overawed men by His power appeared to Himself as One who had deliberately curtailed His power.

(9) And we believe that this consciousness of power and authority arose in Him, as the gospels and the records of the primitive Church abundantly declare, through an unexpected but impregnable conviction that He was the Messiah, the Prince of the Kingdom of God.

We know the breadth of this conviction. To sit at His right hand and at His left was the highest of human distinctions. Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, Moses and Elijah were citizens of the realm of which He was king.

We know the occasion of this conviction. As He came out of the water of baptism, which assured citizenship in the imminent Kingdom of God, He heard a voice from Heaven, "Thou art My beloved Son; in Thee I am well pleased."

(10) We must now make a reverent adventure into mystery.

Christianity has emphasised and deepened the mystery of personality. It has done so by lifting up a Personality, that masters and subjugates and then enfranchises the personalities that look upon Him. Before that personality, the only adequate statement is Christ's own: "No man knoweth the Son, but the Father." But in religion mystery is not given to be ignored but to be reverently faced. It is well to remember that the most practical Christian books in the world—the epistles of Paul and of John and of Peter and to the Hebrews—are steeped in Christology. A tested way of living like Christ is living with Him.

Jesus, like all other greatest religious leaders, based His authority for leadership upon a definite, datable, experience

which we name a "call." It is probable that Jesus shared with them the conviction that nothing in His former life justified that amazing, gracious, call of God. At any rate, as with Amos or Isaiah, we know little about His life, previous to His Messianic call; of *it* He spoke: of His life previous thereto he was silent. If we follow the implications of these facts, there can be no doubt that an intervention of God, whose Spirit bloweth where it listeth, made Jesus at His baptism, into the Messiah, "the last word of God," the Saviour of the world. Christ would allow no man to call Him good. He evidently felt that His goodness, as His kingliness and His soul, was a gift from God.

On the other hand, however, the God whom Jesus reveals is not arbitrary. God must have dropped the seed of His call into incomparable soil to produce such incomparable fruit. To be the Messiah meant that He had the power to actually usher in the Kingdom, for which all other men only dared to pray and wait. What was there in Him which could support a thought of such unparalleled power, even after it had been revealed to Him by God? The seat of power in man is the will. It must therefore have been the will of Jesus—stronger than iron, sharper than any two-edged sword, proof against all temptation—which supported the thought that He was to usher in the Kingdom of God. We believe that the unique consciousness of power in Jesus arose from a virtually unbroken succession of good choices. We believe He always had taken the higher of two ways of action, always had been guided by the higher motive, or at the very least that He had done so with sufficient regularity and gladness to have come to feel Himself backed by the Universe. Therefore it was that He had always been conscious of the favour of God, in whom His will had become settled into peace. While others had dreaded or even doubted, He trusted and rejoiced. The judge had gradually given way to friend. God and He understood and delighted in each other, much as Father and Child. And so it seems to some of us that when these other men, coming up out of the water of baptism, were made sure thereby of their citizenship in the Kingdom of God and experienced the ecstasy (as have some of us) of the forgiveness of sin, Jesus, coming up from the water, was conscious of no moral change; realised that, unlike others, He had always been assured of being under the rule of God. And when He heard that wondrous voice, "Thou art My beloved Son; in Thee I am well pleased," He knew that His will and God's will were the same. The miracle of Jesus is the moral miracle. Who of us cannot

apprehend it? What power we have felt welling up in us after a refusal to sin! But what a consciousness of power must have been in Him, who, always humble before God, never spoke of His guilt! Yes, the miracle of Jesus is the moral miracle, the root of the uniqueness of Jesus is His moral uniqueness. He saw God in Himself because He was pure in heart. We deliberately declare (with Harnack) that Jesus did not call Himself the Son of God because in an unexplainable moment of ecstasy He believed Himself to be the Messiah, but that He believed that He was the Messiah because He had discovered that He was the Son of God.

(11) And so, finally, we believe that Jesus, because He was the Son of God, is the Saviour of the world.

The consciousness of Saviourhood was implicit in that of Messiahship. In Israel's eyes, the Messiah was there for the sake of the people. To them He was to bring peace and equity, dominion and prosperity. And so Jesus knew that He had come not to be ministered unto but to minister. He was to bring to the people the assurance of God's power and of man's power, of God's satisfaction in man's power, of God's wish for man's power, of God's help and pity, therefore, for man's weakness. To be the Messiah meant that what God was to Him, He desired to be to every one of His people. In His working, He uncovered God's working, in His will, God's will, and what one day would be man's. Through His spotless purity He arrived at our native but forfeited knowledge of the Father, and then once for all made that knowledge the property of mankind. He completed for ever the revelation of the Father's attitude toward man and made for ever possible the highest attitude of man to God.

For God has other words for other worlds.
But for this world the Word of God is Christ.

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SHAKESPERE, THE ENGLISHMAN.[1]

PROFESSOR W. MACNEILE DIXON,
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SINCE pride in nationality exists and springs from the sense that we have a past and a share in that past, that its glories are in some degree our own, pride in Shakespere is a portion of our national pride. Suppose it shown, however, that his English qualities were few, that the texture of his thought had a foreign tone, that his spirit and temper, his ideals and preferences, were akin, let us say, to those of Italy, that he had been captivated by foreign models,—suppose that these or similar sayings which are applicable to some other English writers conveyed the truth about him, does any one believe that he would have become, as he has become, our representative poet? Yet the antithesis of all this, the portrait of Shakespere as the complete Englishman, has never, I think, certainly never in any lively or complete fashion, been painted for us. Let us see how far this portrait has been painted and what remains to be added. What has to be added is the conclusion, if it can be justified, that Shakespere's value to the world consists in his revelation of English qualities, that he is greatest when he most displays those qualities, and owes to them the multitude of his admirers.

He was born, we know, at a happy moment, in the hour, one might almost say, of his country's coming of age, when England had attained her full intellectual stature, and rejoiced in the first flush and vigour of conscious manhood. No longer, north or south, were men Celts or Saxons, Danes or Normans, but thinking the same thoughts, nourishing the same or similar ambitions, they knew themselves to be a united people. Time had been at work, and had brought to the surface the virtues hidden within the constituent races. A

[1] Portion of an address delivered to the Library Association on 5th May 1916.

new type had emerged, everywhere recognised as distinct from the French, or Spanish, or any other. Already at home or abroad, at sea or on shore, there was no mistaking an Englishman. Certainly it was a good fortune to be born when England had just become herself, before foreign influences had told greatly upon her—more herself, perhaps than ever before or since. Shakespere coincides with that good hour; more fortunately still, he was worthy of it. We know, too, that in his youth the country was ablaze with patriotic enthusiasm and poetic fervour. Sailors and adventurers who had fought and voyaged on every sea walked the streets of London with hardly less famous poets and playwrights. In those streets and from living men the great dramatist learnt his art, not in the quiet seclusion of the scholar's study. Shakespere apart, the English drama displays itself in every feature as an English growth, an English creation. For centuries, in the Miracle and Mystery plays a legion of authors had provided the entertainment the people most desired. The drama was a passion in England, and England expressed in no uncertain tones its dramatic tastes and preferences. The country knew its own mind and made an unhesitating choice. Never, probably, in history did the public intervene so definitely, and in defiance of critical advice, to fix a literary type. To English tastes, then, even prejudices, if you will, the characteristics of Elizabethan drama may be directly traced. Shakespere accepted the people's mandate. So far from turning aside to essay a new departure, to teach what scholars urged as far better things, he was content to be an Englishman and to make the best of it. In everything—form, methods, choice of subjects—he displayed a willingness to follow rather than to lead. Treading closely, how closely only the student knows, in the steps of his predecessors, he was borne aloft on a great wave of national effort, like "that third great wave of the sea, which," as the Greek poet says, "rises as high as the stars."

Doubtless what others had done he did better, yet it was his country's wealth he gathered in. He fell heir to the broad acres, the smiling harvest of a vast national estate. How otherwise, we may ask, could he have become the shining mirror which reflects every lineament and feature of the English mind, his country's soul?

Of all this let us remind ourselves, that every day of our lives we employ his coinage, sentences from his ready mint; that he is present with us in all our conversations; that when we say "*as poor as Job*," or "*as sound as a bell*," or "*a trick worth two of that*," or "*to eat the leek*," or "*wear*

one's heart upon one's sleeve," or speak of "*piping times of peace,*" or "*a wild-goose chase,*" or "*metal more attractive,*" or a hundred other familiar turns of phrase, we are quoting Shakespere; that when we feel ourselves most modern and say "*I cannot tell what the dickens his name is,*" we are echoing Mrs Page in *The Merry Wives.* Language itself reveals the soul of a people, and in Shakespere all England blossoms and flowers into words. How large was his debt as a maker of the language to the men and women who spoke it around him, who were his fellow-workers and are not wholly dead! How much of liveliness and nature in his dialogue he owes to racy country words and sayings, snatches of old songs and ballads taken from the lips of tramps and travellers, fragments of rustic wisdom never before printed in a book, pithy sentences from farms and fairs, from pit and green room, from city shops and markets, so that the English face seems to look out upon us from scene after scene, as in that immortal picture of the sheep-shearing in *A Winter's Tale.* And not the human face alone, but that of the countryside, the Cotswold wheat-fields and Warwickshire meadows, the trees and flowers, the birds and beasts of our English Midlands. All this has been chronicled, and what in the eyes of many makes him most an Englishman—his patriotism and the ringing sentences that praise our island home:

This precious stone set in the silver sea.

Through his eyes we find ourselves gazing at England as the Athenian gazed at Athens to become her passionate lovers. A third of all his work, ten complete dramas, cover nearly the whole of English history from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, a majestic chronicle, our national epic. Three hundred years have passed and who has approached it? Poets not a few have praised our country, yet none so well. And when one reads the speeches in which England seems to rouse herself and "shake her invincible locks," the speeches of Gaunt and Falconbridge, all others seem superfluous. None can be worthier of the theme, and none cling more closely to the memory. Carve what you please, these are the masterpieces. Yes, but inspired by what muse? The tenth, an English one; the same that sent Frobisher to Labrador and Drake to the Straits of Magellan.

Not yet, however, have we reached, I think, the secret of his strength. In these aspects of Shakespere consider how much there is to endear him to ourselves, but how little to captivate foreigners. One can hardly fancy that it was

by praises of England he enraptured the world. And what remains, we are told,—his breadth of human knowledge, his piercing yet sympathetic eye for motive and character, his penetrating sagacity,—are the virtues that give him universal currency, and in these he transcends his country and his country's genius. Here we lose our hold upon him, for he outsoars race, ceases to be an Englishman, and becomes a citizen of the world. But is it really so? "How shall a man escape from his ancestors?" Generalisations are dangerous, but I will venture upon one. Great art or great literature are impossible in a nation which is not alive. You look back to the best periods of art and literature and you note half a dozen or a dozen famous names. "These men," you say, "thought, invented, wrote, painted, carved the great things. Their fame is everlasting." But what one should say is rather different. "Here was a moment in history during which this nation was intensely alive, heated, full of interests and energy, in a mental ferment, and these great men uplifted and upheld by their fellow-countrymen, inspired by the national genius, revealed it to mankind." In no other way can one account for the shining groups, the strange starry clusters that arrest the gaze in the firmament of history, the Athenian, the Florentine, the Elizabethan. The excellence of Sophocles is a Greek, of Michael Angelo an Italian, of Shakespere an English excellence. These men gave to the world what they took each from his own country.

Men are born, certainly, in every nation who depart from the prevailing type, Frenchmen and Russians who are not typically French or Russian. Some of our own most celebrated poets are not characteristically English. How absurd it would be, for example, to select Shelley as typical of our favourite point of view, our national way of looking at things. We might with much more confidence put forward Chaucer or Dr Johnson as our mental representative. Can we put Shakespere forward with confidence? Can we say of him, not, as everyone will agree, that he is our most brilliant ambassador, but that he represents something central in us, both our strength and weakness, our national temper and national talents? If anything be certain it is that Shakespere's faults, if one dare speak of his faults, are characteristically English. The romantic critics insist on regarding him as a law to himself, a writer in a class by himself, and as altogether divine and not mortal. Do not let us be carried away by his prodigious endowment to indulge in unmeasured and indiscriminate eulogy. Even family pride will not permit us to claim an archangel as

one of ourselves. It is an open secret that he wrote some works not superlative, not now widely read, that wherever possible he avoided labour, that he was free-and-easy, often hasty and careless, indifferent to form and finish, even at times to consistency. A painstaking dramatist, like his friend Ben Jonson, knew it: Milton, a scrupulous artist, knew it. But do these blemishes make him less English? On the contrary they make him much more so than his critics, reflecting more exactly his country's peculiarities, its literary methods and habits, its essential and prevailing spirit. And if we can say this of his faults, we can, with no less truth, say it of his virtues also. We observe in both the family likeness. However difficult it may be to disentangle from the elements of their common humanity the peculiar qualities of any people, to determine what makes a Russian different from an Italian or a Spaniard from a Dane, theoretically at least once we perceive that they differ it should not be impossible to say how they differ. Like other nations the English have their characteristics. If you ask me to name them, to select the appropriate epithets, I admit that it is a delicate task, but I answer with some assurance, naming, indeed, only a few and these from among our best features, that as a people we are chiefly distinguished by a good-natured tolerance, a reflective humour, a deep-seated humanity. One cannot of course deny these virtues to all other nations, but one may, I think, believe that in the distribution of her gifts, Nature, which has refused us some admirable and desirable things, has dealt generously with us in respect of these qualities. Foreigners, at least, seem to discover them, and their witness in a matter of the kind may be trusted. "There is no country," said a Frenchman of the eighteenth century, the Abbé Prévost, though he had no great opinion of our manners, "where one finds such integrity, such humanity, and such sound notions of honour as among the English." M. Brunetière, again, in our own time, calls attention to our humour as conspicuous, and explains that it springs from our habit of looking at things in an individual or personal fashion. These then, we may take it, are our best possessions though not the best of others. Many and radiant intellectual gifts and graces, to which, however much we might wish it, we can lay no claim, have appeared in the world—the unfailing instinct for beauty, the noble simplicity, the unclouded mind that distinguished the Greeks, the elegance, the lucidity, the singular firmness of vision that no one can miss in our neighbours and allies, the French. In these, as in many other

things, England has been deficient, but those I have named will not, I think, be denied her. Toleration, indeed, for which our countryman Locke so eloquently pleaded in the seventeenth century, is involved in the very idea of freedom, which has always seemed to us the most precious possession of mortals. It is but the reverse of that golden coin, on one side of which is stamped "*Liberty for ourselves*" and on the other "*Liberty for the rest.*" As for humour, if we are to judge from our literature, there is no nation in history which displays this quality in such profusion, richness, and variety as our own. Chaucer and Pope, Addison and Swift, Congreve and Fielding, Sterne and Byron and Dickens—our leading authors are nearly all humourists. Without much gaiety or vivacity, without quickness of wit or fancy, even the most serious of them have a sense of the ludicrous. One seldom, for example, thinks of the poet Gray as a humorous person, yet his friend Walpole tells us that "Gray never wrote anything easily but things of humour: humour was his natural and original turn." "For some reason the ludicrous takes hold," as Hazlitt noticed, "of the English imagination and clings to it with all its ramifications." "We are almost the only people who understand and relish nonsense." Who could have predicted early in history that a people like ourselves possessed in this strange quality so firm an ally and friend? With this weapon of amazing temper, that turns every way, the Englishman keeps guard over his sanity and his soul. This magic blade, dipped in the enchanter's well, has served him in every encounter with the ills that beset humanity. With it he intercepts tedium and combats folly, with it he faces suffering and blunts the edge of horrors, with this shining and invincible sword, as no hour in his history has more convincingly proved than the present, he defies Fate and meets the grim forbidding shapes of wounds and death. Truly a gift of the gods.

And if we add to tolerance and humour a deep-seated humanity as belonging to our essential character, it is not that we assert England to have been wholly guiltless of cruelty or violence, or that we overlook disfiguring episodes in her history. The history of no people is free of such episodes. We may say, nevertheless, that she has never made of violence a law of life, that such things are not representative of the English character but departures from it, and that its disposition mightily inclines the opposite scale, that it leans not merely towards justice, but towards friendliness and good-will and the desire to refrain from injuries. It was said of us by a foreigner as early as the seventeenth century that our character was

"not unlike that of the ancient Romans," and a comparison between England and Rome is, I suppose, obvious and tempting enough. But Emerson, who makes in his *English Traits* a close and friendly, though not in all respects a flattering study of this country, adds a point of difference. "England," he says, "is tender-hearted—Rome was not." A presiding tendency towards humanity, tender-heartedness, if we can truly claim it for ourselves, may not be everything, but for its absence nothing will compensate. And for this reason, if no other, that in this soil the virtues have their firmest root, the virtues upon which depends the future of the world. But you may very properly object: Toleration, humour, humanity—England has no monopoly in them. It is true. If she had such a monopoly we ought to hope that she would speedily part with it. These qualities are certainly to be found among other nations; they are not, however, so highly characteristic of them. You will not easily secure assent for the proposition that they represent, let us say, the collective spirit of ancient Rome, or again, the guiding lights of modern Germany. Rome indisputably had gifts for the world, but not these gifts. Germany, no less indisputably, has virtues, but these are not her characteristic virtues. France, again—and for France our admiration, deep as it has been in the past, must in the future be deeper and more universal—France, the country most esteemed, most beloved throughout the world to-day, brilliant and adorable as she is, can spare to us eminence in these features and remain brilliant and adorable still. Allow, then, that they represent our national temper and are more conspicuous in our literature and history than elsewhere. The argument requires that we have in Shakespere a striking exponent of them. Here we are on easy ground. Does any one question it? Will any one produce from among the great writers of all ages a more unwearied and far-shining representative of these very qualities? Who among them so tolerant, who so humorous, who so humane as Shakespere? M. Jusserand, who calls him "the warm-hearted, the sound and thorough Englishman," goes so far as to say that the lesson he gives us, a rare one in his day, is "summed up in the word *toleration*." And to prove it one need hardly do more than recall from his amazing gallery of portraits those of the least heroic and least virtuous, men and women whose presence in the world appears to add nothing to its power or efficiency, who drift through life without any kind of purpose, who are far from earnest in well-doing, are frowned upon by moralists and found wanting in every civic virtue, who are, to use the

poet's own phrase, "superfluous persons." To say that he tolerates such persons is to employ far too weak a word; he loves them. Their aimless or helpless lives excite in him no indignation or disgust. For fools and simpletons, clowns and knavish loiterers without occupation, he has no contempt, no aversion. They are God's creatures, members of the great human family, who have not merely their place and rights, but add in his eyes to the magnificent richness and diversity, the superb breadth and splendour of the astounding spectacle. The absence of harsh, exacting, censorious tones in his speech, the pleasantness with which he invests it, remind one of the cheerful countenance of the Platonic Socrates, never impatient, untiringly indulgent, gentle, forbearing. At no other healing fount of words can we become so "reconciled," in Goldsmith's words, "to ourselves and to human nature."

But toleration, humour, humanity, English and Shakesperian traits, belong, one feels, every reader feels, not so much to his mental equipment as to his disposition. They are not so much talents as instincts. They do not constitute Shakespere's genius, they are the divine axis around which the fiery wheel of his genius revolves. For—and now we touch the nerve of the matter—no one is loved for his genius, it has in itself no sovereignty over the heart. Scientific or philosophical genius, a genius like that of Newton, for example, awakes our wonder and astonishment, we can follow it only at a great and respectful distance, but Shakespere's takes us along with it; we remain, however poor our accomplishments, within his orbit, in his excellent and sympathetic society. We mount as it were the chariot of genius with him and taste the pleasure of its divine speed; we are given wings, he endows us with his own transcendent power. The more one ponders it the more clearly one perceives that the talent of the poet consists in revealing what we have most at heart, most need of, the things that offer us the most enduring kind of satisfaction. The discovery of Shakespere by the world is, then, nothing more or less than the discovery that it has in him the best exponent of its true needs. Here it finds "winged and singing" the philosophy that it requires, for his spirit is in harmony with the unconscious striving of mankind. Not so much his genius as his disposition marvellously illustrated by his genius has surprised and captured universal attention. His doctrine, compared with those doctrines which have hitherto ruled the world, seems to be angelic, derived from heaven. Plato had great hopes the sun might some day rise upon an earth whose rulers had become

philosophers and whose philosophers rulers. We appear to be still some little distance from the millennium. Perhaps when princes and politicians give their days and nights to the study of Shakespere, we may have sight of it.

How hopeful the future if one were certain that its problems would be studied under these lights of heaven! Toleration, humour, humanity—consider what the lack of these qualities has cost the nations, how desperate is their need of them. In the end the world must be the judge of its own necessities, and will accept or reject the gifts offered to it in accordance with these necessities. Gradually and through much tribulation it comes to a knowledge of itself and its requirements. Nothing is more evident than that it accepts at times gifts which are poisonous, and recovers with painful slowness from their effects. But it recovers, jettisons the dangerous cargo, hoists sail once more and pursues indefatigably the voyage of discovery. At many a port since history began, in the ancient as in the modern world, the ship of human fortune has refreshed its passengers and added to their strength and resources. And only those qualities will be preserved, will survive, we may be sure, which are on the side of the future, which are an augury of things to come. If England has found herself on the side of toleration, humour, humanity, she has found herself on the side of destiny. And if Shakespere be truly her son, her spokesman, the revealing genius of her spirit, we may believe that his reign has hardly yet begun. It was said by Plutarch of the Athens of Pericles that there was a kind of flourishing fairness in it, as if the wonderful works with which he had adorned the city were inhabited by some living spirit, eternally young and fresh, a soul, as it were, which preserved it in good continuing estate. May we not say the same of England and of Shakespere?

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THE PERFECTION OF CHRISTIANITY—A JEWISH COMMENT.

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

No thought is more familiar to readers of Christian theological literature than that Christianity is the "last word" in religious development. It is the perfect, the absolute religion.

Yet, like M. Loisy, many persons have come to believe that there is no absolute religion. Perhaps the reason why I, for one, hold this belief very strongly is because I was brought up in a faith (and still belong to it) the teachers of which habitually believed, and still, I think, believe, that *their* religion, and *not* Christianity, is the perfect and the absolute religion! No idea can be more comic to Christians, or more childish, than that, of all the faiths in the world, *Judaism* should claim to be the absolute religion! For, to all Christian teachers, Judaism is emphatically an imperfect religion, just because it was the historic preparation for Christianity. The one is the seed; the other, the flower. To the earlier immaturity succeeds the beauty of fulfilment. Hardly any Christian theologians read Jewish books. Why should they? But Jewish students often read Christian ones. And it certainly is amusing to find this "absoluteness" and perfection claimed equally by the teachers of either faith.

Has the Jewish claim any reasonableness at all? There are, I fancy, a few people who still believe that the earth is flat. At least I remember some years ago receiving a pamphlet which proved that flatness to the author's entire satisfaction. Is the Jewish claim for the "perfection" or "absoluteness" of Judaism something of the same sort—a mere whimsicality, an eccentric survival, to which not the smallest attention need be paid? Most people will continue to regard it so. Yet I fancy that it has rather more to say for itself than the advocates of the earth's flatness have for their "scientific" eccentricity. But, perhaps,—as M. Loisy would hold—where the Jews have most to say for themselves is in picking holes in the calm self-

confidence of the Christian, just as where the Christians do best is in picking holes in the no less developed imperturbability of the Jew!

What is the Judaism which the Christian teachers regard as "imperfect" and as "preparation"? Obviously it is the Judaism of the Old Testament, or the Judaism of the first century A.D. That Judaism has developed since then along its own lines, that there are many forms of it to-day, that Liberal Judaism is one of these forms,—all this is little realised, and little regarded. Nor is this unnatural. For, after all, the total number of Jews is very small.

The Christianity which Jewish teachers consider so inferior to Judaism is less limited to a book or an age, but nevertheless the New Testament plays in it a very considerable part. To regard Christianity as the religion of the New Testament is perhaps less displeasing to Christians than to regard Judaism as the religion of the Old Testament would be to many Jews. All Liberal Jews, at any rate, would freely and frankly admit much religious imperfection in the Old Testament; it is more doubtful how far even *Liberal* Christians would admit much religious imperfection in the New. Hence, perhaps, it is somewhat more reasonable when Jews try to pin the Christian down to certain painful and inconvenient passages in the New Testament than when Christians adopt the same method with the Old Testament and the Jews.

The superiority which the modern Jew finds in Judaism, or the inadequacies and deterioration which he finds in Christianity, are probably by no means the same as those which were found (in either respect) by his mediæval ancestor. The Liberal Jew is, of course, a pure creation of modern times. And his view of Judaism, even in its very superiorities, would be unintelligible, or if intelligible, abhorrent, to the Jewish contemporaries of Constantine, of Aquinas, and of Luther.

It is obviously impossible to dwell here upon the doctrine of the divine nature. The rigidly Unitarian Jew hardly even understands (this may be freely conceded) the philosophic doctrine of the Trinity. On the other hand, the Trinitarian hardly understands the full meaning of Jewish Unitarianism. On lower levels, it may be, I think, rightly claimed by the Jew that his pure Unitarianism has, for very many generations, kept him free from any kind or sort of idolatry. It has brought the least educated members of his faith into closer intellectual touch with the most educated. It has been a bond which has linked together the wise and the foolish, the

learned and the crowd. The One God, the Father and King, is doubtless conceived differently by the Jewish fool and the Jewish philosopher. But the fool no less than the philosopher is acutely assured that all material allusions in the Hebrew Bible are purely metaphoric. No lovely, but materialising and idolatry-serving, art hinders the fulness of this assurance. The oneness and spirituality of God are common beliefs to every Jew. And this one God is a unity in his character as well as in his being. He is the Father; he is the Ruler; he is the Judge. He punishes and rewards; he heals and forgives: he forgives and loves, above all. There is no Father who is Majesty or Justice; no Son who is Forgiveness and Love. It is one God who is all these: therefore his justice *is* his forgiveness; his forgiveness *is* his justice. His righteousness *is* his love; his love *is* his righteousness. There is no conceivability of conflict between them. All this is familiar truth to every Jew, ignorant or learned. I suppose it has been familiar truth for very many generations.

But I will not pursue this matter further, except to remark that it would be interesting to know how far pure Unitarianism has made it easier for Jews to continue to believe in God, and how far it has prevented half-educated Jews from falling away from their religion. At all events they have been free from crude difficulties such as those involved in pictures of a divine Son "sitting" at the "right hand" of a divine Father, or of a yet third and other divine "person" assuming the form of a dove, and either hovering between the Son and the Father, or coming down upon earth and "overshadowing" a human being, so that the result is the emergence of the Son of God from a virgin womb. From all these difficulties Judaism is free.

Perhaps, too, spirituality in other matters has been easier for Judaism, and has kept its votaries together. Originally, Jews and Christians both believed in the "resurrection of the body," and orthodox Judaism has never had the courage, and has not the courage to-day, to cancel the doctrine of the resurrection from the list of its official dogmas. But it has been easier in Judaism for a bodily resurrection to drop out of sight and mind, because no chapter of divine mythology hinders. In Judaism no God dies and returns to life. No divine being is buried and rises and ascends to the skies. No God in human form escapes from a tomb, eats broiled fish, and is carried up into heaven.

Is it to be wondered at that the Jew sometimes smiles when the religious immaturity of the Old Testament, the

religious perfection of the New Testament, are constantly dinned into his ears? Which is higher, he asks, the conception of the divine being in the "Second Isaiah" and the author of the 139th Psalm, or the conception of him in documents which contain stories of the "overshadowing" and the "dove" and the "broiled fish," or pictures of one divine person "sitting" at the "right hand" of another? He is tempted to think that the old warning of Deuteronomy (iv. 12) might have been remembered to good purpose, for a voice, after all, is less "material" than a dove and a man.

But, then, is not the conception of God in other matters far nobler and more advanced in the New Testament than the Old, in Christianity than in Judaism? Perhaps it is. If, however, the New Testament is the *ne plus ultra* of religious perfection, should it be in *any* respect inferior to the highest of its predecessor? And is the tale of imperfections ended with the dove and the fish? The Jew, at any rate, whether orthodox or liberal, is far from thinking so. And he can put his thoughts into words.

The Gospels are not the whole New Testament. There is also Paul. Well, whatever great and noble things are found in Paul's writings, it is also true that his theology depends upon doctrines, and includes doctrines, which the Jew regards as superseded and inaccurate. It depends upon the "fall" of Adam. It depends upon the conception of a God who had allowed, or had arranged, his world to come to such a desperate pass that only his own Son could save it (or, rather, a part of it) from utter perdition. It includes the doctrine of a God who is not freely accessible, without intercessor or mediation, to the prayers, the worship, the communion, of every human soul. It includes the doctrine that the hope of human immortality is conditional upon the truth of one miraculous and ill-attested tale. And the book which contains the documents that rest upon and include all these doctrines Jews are to regard as perfect! From it there is, and can be, no religious development, just as it stands for, and represents, nothing but religious advance and religious perfection. "O Thou that hearest prayer," exclaims the Jew,—hearest and art near, as the Psalmists knew, without any go-between or intercessor!

But would these difficulties exist, or these qualifications in excellence have to be made, if we think of the New Testament as ending with the Gospels? Even here, when asked to accept those Gospels in the mass as far superior to the best of the Old Testament, the Jew is fain to hesitate. He recalls Micah's uncompromising association of religion with morality.

"What does the Lord require of thee but to do justice, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" And he prefers it to that ominous introduction of belief as a passport to heaven in the bold and unhappy assertion, "he that believes not the Son shall not see life."

The modern Jew is a convinced universalist. Highly repugnant to him is the dualism of the Fourth Gospel: "I pray not for the world. Ye are from beneath. Ye are of your father, the devil." Not so can speak any one who should claim his Jewish allegiance. We may admit that the real Jesus did not speak so. But if we contract perfection still further, and limit it to the Synoptic Gospels, even here the Jew desires his freedom. Even here he is unable to recognise perfection. Even here, no less than with Deuteronomy and Isaiah, he picks, and he chooses, and he *leaves out.* "Broad is the way which leads to destruction: few there be that find life": he denies that with his whole heart and soul. Some Jews may know of the learned and modern explanations of the word "æonian." It may not be the equivalent of everlasting. Yet, even so, they do not call *that* teaching perfect which includes "æonian" fire and "æonian" gnashing of teeth! They do not call *that* teaching perfect which is far from any definite statement that the punishments of God can only be disciplinal, or that no soul which he has made is lost.

Were Amos and Isaiah, however, not ignorant of any blessed life beyond the grave at all? They were. But, at all events, if the rewards of God closed with death, so, mercifully, did the punishments. If they were ignorant of heaven, they were also ignorant of hell. Moreover they were also ignorant of hell's master, the Devil. Is it mere advance which leads from the cleanly monotheism of the Prophets and the Psalmists to the devils and the unclean spirits of the Gospels? We remember the bitter gibe of Wellhausen about the Talmud: "Is not all the teaching of Jesus contained in the Talmud? Yes, and *a great deal more.*" And so too, if far less bitterly, can the Jews say about the New Testament: "Is there not much in the New Testament which deepens and supplements the Old? Yes, and *a great deal more.*" It is "all this more" which they regard, not as an improvement upon the Old Testament, but as a declension and a fall.

I am not here concerned with the purely *ethical* teaching of the Gospels, though on several subjects, as, *e.g.*, divorce, marriage, non-resistance, the relation of to-day to to-morrow, the right attitude to be adopted towards those who differ from you, even Liberal Jews are not prepared to accept it as the *complete* and

final word of morality and of wisdom. They may still prefer the *best* Messianic utterances of the Prophets to the Judgment-pictures of the first century A.D. But all that belongs to another part of the subject. Sufficient let it be to have indicated that as regards the purely religious topics of the nature of God and of his relations to man, here and hereafter, the Jews have their reasons for refusing to see in a faith which seems to commit itself so ardently to the ideas and words of a certain book the perfect and the absolute religion. If, indeed, the principle of *development* is conceded and made use of, and if Christianity becomes the absolute religion by adopting *certain* ideas and words of the New Testament, but also by modifying and abandoning *others*, may not Judaism act in a similar manner in respect of the Old Testament and the Talmud? And is not Liberal Judaism, at any rate, less slavishly bound to adhere to the ideas and words of any person or book than Liberal Christianity? And if it picks holes in the Gospels, can it not also pick flowers from them, and add these fair and noble blooms to those of a (carefully selected) Jewish nosegay? Would not one Jewish flower be thus added to another? Would not all have sprung from a common Jewish soil?

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

LONDON.

JEWISH MYSTICISM.

AN HISTORICAL SURVEY.

THE CHIEF RABBI (Dr J. H. HERTZ).

To some the phrase "Jewish mysticism" may sound like a contradiction in terms. Jewish life and theology are in many quarters still regarded as peculiarly arid and technical. And yet, nowhere has there been a stronger revolt against the limitations of sense and time, nowhere a more ardent yearning for that full and rapturous communion with the Infinite and the Eternal which we call mysticism, than in Israel. Equally mistaken is the view which holds Jewish mysticism to be but a mere echo of similar movements among the nations. Like these, it has its devotional, religious, and nature mystics; but it has also its unique metaphysical school, specifically known as Cabala.

Far better than any formal definition of a term of such weird association as Cabala, or of such wide connotation as Jewish mysticism, will a glance at two mystic teachings, on creation and on the hereafter, introduce us into the heart of our strange and difficult theme.

The root-dilemma that confronted Jewish thinkers was the relation of the Infinite to the finite, of God to the universe. There was, on the one hand, the danger of identifying the two—of raising the creature to the level of the Creator; and on the other hand, if the chasm between the two were held to be unbridgeable, there was the dread of a God-less universe. The whole history of Jewish speculative mysticism or Cabala is an effort to bridge this impassable gulf between transcendent God and visible world. God, say the thirteenth-century Cabalists, is the mystery of mysteries. Only one name may we apply to Him—Infinite, En Sof. He is the great Problem, inaccessible, incomprehensible, unknowable. Being thus unknowable, He is, as far as human perception

is concerned, non-existent. Hence, to make Himself knowable, He had to make Himself perceptible, cognisable, by means of creation. The transition from the infinite to the finite is explained by *tzimtsum* — "self - concentration." At first En Sof filled all space—was all space—He was the All; and then "En Sof contracted Himself in order to leave an empty space for creation." This void He gradually irradiated with an emanation of His Light. This eradiation is called *Divine Will* or *Inscrutable Height.* The first spiritual emanation or manifestation of the En Sof then radiated from itself a second force, and the latter a third, and so on. Each emanation is called a "Sefira," meaning heavenly sphere or creative number. Altogether there are ten such "Sefiroth," each becoming fainter, till the last borders on the realm of darkness. After the first Sefira, the inscrutable Will of God, come *Wisdom* and *Understanding.* The fourth Sefira is *Mercy,* and the fifth *Justice,* resulting in the sixth Sefira—*Harmony.* Then follow *Power, Order,* and *Generation;* which lead to the tenth Sefira — the material universe, the visible *Kingdom of God.* The world is thus not the immediate work of En Sof, but only mediately through the Sefiroth, these ten categories of the Universe, which are variously spoken of as potencies, instruments, or attributes of God. They and the En Sof, however, form one absolute unity, even as the colours of the flame and flame itself are latent in the coal.

Quite a different side of Cabala is seen in its teachings concerning the hereafter. Here we meet with the doctrine of metempsychosis, the transmigration of souls, of which there is not a trace in Bible or Talmud. All souls, we are told, are pre-existent. Each is destined to be subjected to the test whether, after its earthly sojourn, it returns uncontaminated to the Divine Source. If tainted, the soul is doomed to reinhabit a body till through repeated trials its purification is complete. Through the sinfulness of man, causing souls to be born again, the far greater portion of mankind are old souls. New souls rarely come to earth. The Redemption is thereby postponed; for the spiritual completion of the world, the Great Jubilee, can only come with the birth of the Messiah, who is the last in the heavenly storehouse of souls to enter bodily, earthly life. Sin and hell will then disappear, and Satan himself become a good angel, for there is nothing eternal if not on the side of good.

What is the origin, we ask, of this system containing such philosophic profundity, poetry, and religious fervour and yet so fearfully and wonderfully mixed with crass superstition?

It is usually traced back to foreign sources — Babylonian, Zoroastrian, Gnostic, Sufi, or Neo-Platonic. None of these systems, however, could have been more than contributory influences. A full and detailed demonstration of this statement would require a treatise. To take, therefore, only Neo-Platonism, for which alone of all the above systems a case can be made out as the primary source of Jewish speculative mysticism.

Plotinus, the renowned teacher of Neo-Platonism and father of European mysticism, was born in Alexandria in the year 204. At the age of forty he proceeded to Rome, where he preached his new doctrines. But at that same time, similar doctrines, and in a simpler and saner form, were taught at Babylon by Rabh, the founder of the Talmudic Academy of Sura. Rabh, who died in the year 247, only three years after Plotinus began his Neo-Platonic lectures in Rome, considers the elements from which the world was formed, and speaks of the ten divine potencies by which it was created. These are the same in number, content, and even largely in name, as the Sefiroth of the later Cabala. The Infinite God, he taught, contracted (*tzimtsem*) Himself in order to reveal Himself to the finite mind. Here we have *tzimtsum* both in idea and in terminology a millennium before its promulgation in Western Europe. Rabh believed in the sacred powers of numbers and letters. Like all mystics, he attached a deep symbolic meaning to marriage; and life in the hereafter, he held, was not mere passivity, for "there is no rest for the righteous. They ever proceed from strength to strength, in this world and in the world to come," where they rejoice in the radiance of the Divine Presence. Rabh also formulated a distinction between the Divine attributes of Justice and Mercy; and since the Exile, he declares, the Shechinah mourns, and God prays: "Be it my will that in my dealings with my children my mercy overcome my justice." It is no wonder that Rabh, a mystic who could conceive God as praying, is reputed to be the author of some of the sublimest gems in the Jewish Prayer-Book.

This attitude of Rabh towards these questions is but typical of what his fellow-rabbis before and after him have taught, and it is virtually the attitude of the later Cabala. Now, why should we derive Rabh's mysticism from his younger contemporary, Plotinus, instead of recognising the inner connection between his thought and the thoughts which in every generation have permeated the Jewish consciousness? The fact that a folklore belief like the transmigration of souls

in the Cabala is also found in, or taken from, a foreign system is beside the question. Steinschneider has rightly said that the most difficult thing to prove is originality in superstition; and Judaism has never claimed originality in that direction. But it is a libellous fallacy always to represent Jews as intellectual borrowers. Jews have done some lending as well. It is sufficient to point to the law of historical continuity—from which even Cabalists cannot escape—to see that the current view of the Cabala as a parasitic intruder into Jewish thought of the thirteenth century, is radically false. A full-grown intellectual system never breaks in upon the world suddenly as if over-night, or, like Melchisedec, without father, without mother, without descent or beginning of days. And indeed an ever larger number of scholars are at last recognising that Jewish mysticism has its sources in Jewish antiquity; that it develops according to inner laws; and that it runs parallel to and in constant interaction with the other currents of Jewish life.

Its beginnings go back to the Bible. Thus the Book of Psalms is the supreme expression of the soul's yearning towards its Creator. Passages like, "As the hart panteth after the water-brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God!" "Whom have I in heaven but thee? and there is none upon earth that I desire besides thee." "For with thee is the fountain of life, and in thy light do we see light,"—remain for ever unsurpassed in mystic devotional literature. But Jewish mystic speculation as well has its roots in the Bible. The two foci round which such speculation turned for nearly fifteen hundred years were the first chapter of Genesis and the first chapter of Ezekiel. The former gave rise to mystic doctrines of Creation; and the latter dealt with the divine nature, the essence, attributes, and names of the Godhead ("Merkabah").

In post-Biblical times, the first group of men who are known to have devoted themselves to Creation and Merkabah speculations are the Essenes. Both according to Philo and Josephus, they had esoteric writings; and not altogether without reason has the pioneer among modern scholars ascribed some of the most beautiful portions of the Jewish Liturgy to them. In Alexandria, the allegorical explanation of Scripture was the rule, the letter of the law and the law itself being held to be a mere husk to the mystery enshrined in it. Here Philo developed a system of thought which is strikingly analogous to the Cabala. A far more lasting influence was that of the contemporary Palestinian teachers and their disciples. Jochanan b. Zakkai, the rescuer of Judaism from the shipwreck

of the Roman destruction in the year 70, was recognised as Master in Creation and Merkabah mysteries. Akiba, after his early wanderings in the jungle of Gnosticism, busied himself with the question of God's "architect's plans" in the creation of man and the universe. By means of allegorisation he furthermore triumphantly defended the Song of Songs, and secured its admission into the canon. Conceived as a love-dialogue between the Almighty and Israel, or between the Creator and the human soul, this book henceforth becomes a perennial fountain of mystic imagery both within and without the Synagogue. Though the Mishna is the most unmystical of books, the very fact that it is forced to legislate against the public expounding of the opening chapters of Genesis and Ezekiel is clear proof that its generation looked "before and after," brooded over the mysteries antedating creation, and attempted to lift the veil from the "last things," the Judgment Day, and in fact everything inexplicable in the world of nature and spirit.

On the completion of the Talmud and the close of the schools towards the year 500, Jewish thought undergoes a violent change. It ceases altogether to be philosophy, the rule of reason diminishes, and the Jewish imagination celebrates its Saturnalia. Secret works, dealing with dreams, demons, magic and other alien folk-beliefs grafted on the Jewish mind and in turn transformed by it, venture into the light of day. Parallel to this degenerate Haggada is a Symbolic Cabala, according to which each letter, dot, and tittle of the Sacred Writings becomes a counter in a strange game of exegesis. The letters of a word are sometimes considered as mere shorthand notes of an ampler statement (Notarikon), or their numerical values are computed (Gematria). And there are, besides, other curious schemes of letter permutation (Tziruf and At-bash). Some of these go back to Biblical antiquity. Haggadic and Symbolic mysticism again are followed by darker shadows. If the Divine Name—if all Hebrew words, in fact—have magic powers, then the pronouncing or writing of certain magic formulæ should work miracles. Thus arises Practical Cabala, one of the saddest aberrations of the human mind.

Only fragments of this strange mystic literature of the Geonic period (500–900) have come down to us; and we do not know whether they are chapters of one larger work or portions of independent works. We need but mention *The Book of Enoch* and *Palaces*. The patriarch who walked with God "and he was not, for God took him" is in this literature

transformed into Metatron, the highest of angels, the keeper and revealer of celestial mysteries. In fact, Metatron is equivalent to the Logos of Philo, the Memra of the Targums, the Shechinah of the Talmud, or the Sefiroth of the Cabalists. The other work, *Palaces*, is equally exotic in character. By mysterious incantations and rapturous prayer, by fasts and vigils, the soul (it teaches) can for a time be liberated from earthly trammels and in ecstasy see the Great Vision of the Heavenly Court. In these spiritual ascensions we have a Jewish counterpart to the Gnostic journey to Heaven. At times these visions of Heaven and Paradise, these voyages into the underworld, are profoundly poetic and recall the descriptions of Homer, Virgil, and Dante. And, as ever, these mystics write sublime prayers. Apart from prayers, however, their literary remains were frowned upon by contemporary authorities and indignantly repudiated by Maimonides; and they have subjected Rabbinic Judaism to much embarrassment and ridicule at the hands of Karaites and Christians.

By far the most important work in this period is Sefer Yetzirah, *The Book of Creation.* Written in simplest Hebrew, and considered by some as a mere child's primer, and by others as the first treatise on the Hebrew language, it has for a thousand years occupied the attention of philosophers, mystics, and Talmudists, and it is still a sealed book. Tradition attributes its authorship to Rabbi Akiba; nothing definite, however, is known as to its author, age, or country. It is variously regarded as Pythagorean, Essene, Gnostic; and assigned to pre-Christian, Talmudic, and, most often, Geonic times. To Sefer Yetzirah we may well apply the words of William James: "Mystical classics have neither birthday nor native land; their speech antedates language, and they do not grow old."

Its precise meaning is equally obscure. Number and language, standing on the boundary-line between the spiritual and the physical, are declared to be the instruments wherewith the Cosmos, whether in space, time, or the human spirit, was called into existence. The ten abstract numerals, Sefiroth, give the possibility of things: and they represent the Spirit of God; the three primordial substances, air, fire, and water; and the six dimensions of space. The actual process of creation of the material world is then accounted for by language. If we would know the elements of the universe we must learn the elements of language—the twenty-two letters of the Hebrew alphabet. "Twenty-two letters, He drew them, hewed them, combined them; weighed them and interchanged

them, and through them produced all things." Existence is thus but divine thought become articulate.

Both systematic Cabala and mediæval Jewish philosophy have their starting-point in commentaries on Yetzirah. One of the earliest and most important of these expositions is the tenth-century commentary on Yetzirah by Sabbethai Donolo, astronomer, physician, and philosopher, of Oria, Southern Italy. This is the first Jewish book to be written in Europe. There had long been a legend that a learned fugitive from Bagdad came to Lucca, Italy, early in the ninth century, and there taught the secret doctrine to the Kalonymos family; and that this family later, in the year 917, followed the ruler of their city to the Rhine Provinces. The historic accuracy of this account of the transplanting of mystic lore from Asia to Europe has now been established. The German school of Cabala of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is in fact but a continuation of Geonic mysticism. Thus towards the year 800 certain Jewish heretics in Babylon held that God, who was too exalted to have any attributes ascribed to Him, created an angel to rule the world, and to this angel everything must be referred that Scripture recounted of God. This Gnostic heresy of a Chief Angel reappears in German Cabala, which furthermore revels in letter-symbolism, and peoples the whole universe with angels and demons. However, in their devotional productions and ethical outlook the German Cabalists compel our admiration. Witness the well-known hymn attributed to this circle of mystics—"The Hymn of Glory,"—recited in English congregations at the conclusion of every morning service. I shall quote a few stanzas from the version of Mrs Henry Lucas:

Sweet hymns and songs will I indite
To sing of Thee by day and night,
Of Thee who art my soul's delight.

How doth my soul within me yearn
Beneath Thy Shadow to return,
Thy secret mysteries to learn!

Thy glory shall my discourse be,
In images I picture Thee,
Although Thyself I cannot see.

In mystic utterances alone,
By prophet and by seer made known,
Hast Thou Thy radiant glory shown.

My meditation day and night,
May it be pleasant in Thy sight,
For Thou art all my soul's delight.

In the case of Spanish Cabala, no chronicle has come to light to illumine the obscurity that envelops the early history of Jewish mystic speculation in Spain. The first name is that of Solomon Ibn Gabirol in the eleventh century (d. 1058). This prince of synagogue-poets and master-thinker, who under the name of Avicebron is now known to have been such an important influence in mediæval European thought, taught the self-concentration of God and the doctrine of intermediate emanations between God and nature. The first such emanation he called "Ratzon,"—Divine Will, the free creative power of the Absolute, the dynamic overflowing of the fullness of Divine Power. The current of mystic speculation grows stronger in the next century. Parallel with the twelfth century spiritual revival in the Church on the part of men wearied with the barren dialectic of the Schoolmen—when Bonaventura and Bernard of Clairvaux expound the Song of Songs, and David of Dinant studies Gabirol's *Fons Vitæ*—a Jewish mystic movement claiming to be ancient secret tradition, Kabbalah, *the* Tradition, definitely arises in Southern France. But it was not until the thirteenth century, the wonderful century intervening between the death of Moses Maimonides in 1205 and the death of Moses de Leon in 1305—the century of the burning of the Talmud and of the expulsion from England, the century of the Yellow Badge and the martyrdom of Meir of Rothenburg—that the Cabala attained to full metaphysical expression at the hands of Rabbi Azriel of Gerona (d. 1238).

Azriel is one of the important names in Jewish history. From his earliest youth a wandering seeker after mystic teaching, he later undertook to convince philosophical scholars of its surpassing truth. He therefore clothed the doctrines of Cabala in the language of logic; and gathered the scattered elements of mystic thought into a connected and comprehensive speculative system. God, he taught, is the negation of negation; and the universe an eradiation from the En Sof through the ten Sefiroth. Opponents of this novel philosophical doctrine were not wanting who declared this tradition to be young, its writings forged, and its formulæ both hollow and contrary to reason and faith. But the movement constantly gained ground; and when Nachmanides (d. 1270), the famous pupil of Azriel and the leading Talmudist of his age, ranged

himself under its banner, victory was assured. The Torah, according to Nachmanides, is full of Divine Names. It is to him a parable, and the Biblical narrative an adumbration of the whole history of man. Though the share of Nachmanides in the development of Cabala was slight, legend connects his name with the appearance of a work which crystallised all the dreams, fancies, and speculations; absorbed all the currents, tendencies and schools of theosophic speculation during the century; and definitely superseded all previous productions in Cabala. That work is the *The Book of Splendour*, the Zohar. It purports to be the work of Rabbi Simeon ben Yochai, the famous Mishnic teacher of the second century, that had remained hidden for over a thousand years in Palestine. At the time of the arrival of Nachmanides, who had gone to end his days in the Holy Land, it was alleged to have been miraculously discovered, and through his instrumentality transmitted to Europe.

The question of the authorship of the Zohar, like that of Sefer Yetzirah, is one of the cruces of Jewish literature. The authorship by Simeon ben Yochai, or by his immediate disciples, though this is still an article of faith with millions of Jews in Eastern Europe, has from internal evidence long been proved to be untenable. The Zohar explains Spanish words, contains quotations from Gabirol, and mentions the Crusades. The language is ungrammatical Aramaic; some parts of the work display ignorance of Bible, and misunderstanding of, and hostility to Mishna and Talmud. To-day the editorship and part-authorship is variously ascribed to Moses de Leon, to Abraham Abulafia, or to a group of writers, comprising Abulafia and de Leon.

Abraham Abulafia (d. 1291) was an eccentric adventurer and a visionary. Early in life he went to Palestine in search of the lost Ten Tribes. He was not in agreement with the Spanish Cabalists, who appeared to him to preach a Ten-unity instead of the Christian Trinity; and only the German school of mystics, especially their theosophical arithmetic, satisfied him. He held that rigid asceticism — fast, vigil, mystic contemplation, and absolute devotion in prayer—led to prophetic vision and divine revelation. In 1280 he went to Rome to convert the Pope, and he barely escaped being burned at the stake. We find him next in Sicily, announcing the restoration of Israel to take place in 1296, and proclaiming himself the God-sent Messiah and Son of God, who was destined to bring about the reunion of mankind. Abulafia was a child of Spain, the home of religious ecstasy; and of

his age, the time of the Crusades. In him Cabala becomes defiant of all authority and threatens to undermine the very foundations of Jewish law and order. That he was the author of the whole of the Zohar, as was believed some seventy years ago, is out of the question. The letter-symbolism and the anti-Talmudic parts, or those suggestive of a Christian tinge, probably owe their origin to him or his followers.

A far larger share in its production is that of Moses de Leon, born 1250 and died 1305. From a contemporary account we learn that even at the time of his death some believed that Moses de Leon himself wrote the Zohar, and in every century since voices have been raised accusing him of forgery. Dr Jellinek even showed that passages of de Leon's Hebrew writings are repeated in literal Aramaic translation in the Zohar—and that the same misquotations of Scripture occurred in both. However, recent scholarship is less disposed than ever to dogmatise on this subject. The Zohar is certainly not the product of a single author or of a single period, but of many authors, periods, and civilisations. It is more a corpus of mystical lore than a single book. The body of the book is ostensibly a commentary on the Pentateuch, a commentary interrupted by a series of fragments which it incorporates at one time in the margin and at others in the middle of the discourse. Some of these fragments are no doubt very old, embodying mystic Midrashim, cryptic speculations from Geonic and pre-Geonic times, with echoes of Hindu teaching even ; others seem to be nearly a century later than de Leon.

The first impression made on the reader on opening this labyrinthine book without a beginning or an end, is that of incoherence. It is the incoherence of the dream-state, with a certain range of ideas revolving round and round kaleidoscopically. True poetry and wild blasphemy are strangely mingled together; a bold flight to the furthest heights of Deity or a gem of purest and most delicate fancy is followed by a passage of irrational babble—altogether a marvellous mixture of good and evil. It is unnecessary to repeat the account already given of En Sof and of the emanation of the universe, or of the doctrine of transmigration. The connecting link between Deity and the universe is man. He is created in the image of God. But the Zohar also reverses the figure and looks to the form of man, as the highest and sublimest in creation, for the illustration of all Existence. The En Sof, of course, is unknowable, beyond thought and language. But the first manifestation of the Divine it calls *Adam Kadmon*, Original Man or Ideal Man. Man, not the angels, is the object of

creation; the latter belong to a lower realm. Man alone can by his conduct increase, as it were, the power of God, and thus become the collaborator of Divinity. Each prayer is a new force added to the forces of the universe. Sin stops up the channels of grace, and strengthens the powers of evil and destruction. It introduces confusion above and below. It is a cosmic tragedy. The kingdom of evil is sometimes also conceived as surrounding the world of goodness, like the husk (*kelipha*) that surrounds the grain, or the shell the kernel. Every evil influence, and every wicked personality or power in history, is identified with these husks (*keliphoth*). The just man, the man of pure heart and not merely of wise head, is the rock on which the universe is based. A man should so live that at the close of every day he can repeat: "I have not wasted my day,"

The Torah and Commandments have a deeply mystical meaning, but the Law reveals its secrets only to those who love it. Throughout the Torah there is a fourfold truth—literal meaning (*Peshat*), allegorical explanation (*Remez*), homiletical application (*Derush*), and Cabala (*Sod*). "Woe unto the man," says the Zohar, "who asserts that the Torah intends to relate only commonplace things and secular narratives. The narratives of the Torah are its garments. More valuable than the garment is the body which carries it; and more valuable even than that is the soul which animates the body."

The view of life and of the universe in the Zohar is fundamentally optimistic. Prior to the existence of the present world, certain formless worlds issued from the fountain of existence and then vanished, like sparks which fly from a red-hot iron beaten by a hammer and are extinguished as they separate themselves from the burning mass. In contrast to these abortive attempts at creation, the actual world was the best of all possible worlds. But it was its assertion of the dignity of man, its doctrine of immortality made altogether dependent on conduct, as much as its poetical spirit stimulating the imagination and filling the soul with mysterious awe, that conquered the Jewish world for the Zohar. In an incredibly short time a large portion of Jewry placed it on a level with the Bible and Talmud. External disasters favoured its complete triumph. As a result of the expulsion from the Iberian Peninsula, the Spanish refugees carry the Zohar with them to every community in the Dispersion; and for centuries it remains a power dominating the hearts, minds, and lives of the Jewish people. Even in Western countries traces of its influence on liturgy and custom are visible to this day.

In theoretical mysticism no advance is made after the appearance of the Zohar for over two and a half centuries. Towards the middle of the sixteenth century, however, a new school of Cabala arises in Palestine, with its seat in Safed. Its leading spirits are Cordovero and Luria. Moses Cordovero (d. 1570) is the greatest of the systematisers of Jewish mysticism; and his work—*Pardes Rimmonim*—is the exposition of everything that the older Cabala had to say on God, man, and Israel, on the universe and the hereafter. His younger contemporary, Isaac Luria (d. 1572), is an epoch-maker, a Jewish Plotinus and Hegel in one. He mercilessly exposes the insufficiency of the solutions to the problems of creation, freewill, and evil that the Cabala had hitherto offered; and shows that there are even deeper difficulties that are unguessed or, at any rate, untouched by it. His system is highly subjective and his terminology obscure. Thus he speaks of "the breaking of the vessels," *i.e.* the impossibility on the part of the Sefiroth to become real receptacles for the light emitted from Divine grace. They break, thus causing a condition of chaos. This chaos has been intensified by Adam's fall. It is so thorough and so complete that evil contains sparks of good, while the good is never entirely free from sparks of evil. Ours is the World of Husks, of mere appearance or disguises, not of realities; and but for the sparks of the holy and pure scattered in it, it would disappear into nothingness. The elimination of evil and the restoration of the world to Divine goodness, the transformation of the World of Husks into a World of Harmonies, is the great problem of humanity, and especially of Israel. The individual Israelite can help in the work of cosmic redemption by meditations, fasts, ablutions, and vigils. These have a practical, theurgic purpose—Messianism. Due and whole-hearted performance of such ascetic devotions, Luria teaches, hastens—nay, can accomplish Israel's redemption.

The great importance of Messianic movements in Jewish history has not always been understood. Consider that the very year of the appearance of the Zohar—1290—was the year of the expulsion from England, and that this was only the opening of a series of sinister attempts at the annihilation of the Jew culminating in the Cossack butcheries of the seventeenth century. In the darkness of inhumanity, rightlessness, and despair which enveloped Israel during these centuries, the Jewish soul turned more and more to the cheering message of the Cabala, that the coming of the Messiah could be hastened by those who stood in mystic communion with the heavenly

realm. Successive disillusionments only strengthened this unquenchable hope. The leaders of Messianic movements heightened the consciousness of the people, fed their despondent hearts with glorious dreams, and announced the glad tidings when Jewish history would no longer be written in the passive voice. Verily, for this alone these pseudo-Messiahs deserve a place in Jewish history. Among these Cabala-nurtured Messianic pretenders we find apocalyptic visionaries, like Abulafia; Faust-natures, who undertook to storm the gates of redemption, like Joseph della Reina; apostles of repentance, like Luria; and great-hearted lovers of their people, like Solomon Molko. The last-named, a New Christian who had returned to the faith of his fathers, proclaimed the advent of the Messiah; and, as Abulafia before him, he undertook the conversion of the Pope. He fell into the hands of Charles the Fifth, and was burnt at the stake in 1532.

All these, however, are overshadowed by Sabbethai Tsevi, who towards the year 1666 is acclaimed a sort of God-Messiah, as the incarnation of "Adam Kadmon," the first Sefira. A tidal wave of hysteria sweeps over the world's Jewries from Bagdad to Amsterdam, from Poland to the Brazils, and shakes Jewish life to its foundations. He abrogates Jewish laws, institutions, and festivals; and even when he goes over to Mohammedanism, a large portion of his adherents remains loyal to him. They are formally excluded from Judaism; but for over a century the lamentable and pernicious effects of that aberration are felt—even in London, with a crypto-Sabbethian as rabbi of its Sephardic Synagogue (1689–1701). Sabbethai's followers in Salonica, the Donmehs or Jew-Turks, exist to this day. Many people are utterly at a loss to understand the violent revolt against Jewish law and life and morality that marked some sub-sects of this movement. But the phenomenon is not an uncommon one in the history of mysticism. As long as the union with the Divine—"Vergottung"—is merely an ideal, even though a progressive ideal, the mystic considers it his life's task to be transformed into the likeness of the Divine. The result is the ascetic life, marked by self-restraint and holiness. When, however, this union with the Divine "Vergottung," is believed to have been achieved, when the Messiah has come and a new heaven has opened for us, then the mystic often considers himself above such trivial distinctions as right and wrong. There then results libertinism, as with Jacob Frank (d. 1791) and his followers.

The last country to produce a new mystic doctrine was Poland. The late Dr Schechter, in his wonderful essay on

the Chassidim, was the first justly and sympathetically to describe this movement, which is one of the most remarkable in the whole history of religions. Its founder, Israel Baal Shem (d. 1772), round whose life there soon arose a whole mythology, preached humility, joyful trust in God, and enthusiasm in religious life as the whole duty of man. His most famous successors were Nachman Bratzlav, and Sneor Zalman Ladier. Bratzlav (1770–1811), a grandson of Baal Shem, who emphasised the pantheistic views of the founder, was an original fabulist and a true Chassidic "superman" (*Tzaddik*). Ladier (1747–1812) was a profound Talmudist and a deep student of Luria, who placed Chassidism on a metaphysical basis. We may well conclude our survey of Jewish mysticism with these heroes of Chassidism, who nobly reflected some of the highest traits of the Jewish mystic—personality and saintliness, coupled with independent thought.

It only remains for me to speak of the New Learning and the Jewish mystics. Since the days of Raymond Lully (d. 1315) Cabala has had students among the Scholastics and the Humanists. Through Reuchlin (d. 1522) it became a leavening influence in the Reformation age; and Cabalistic ideas can be traced in both Luther and Böhme. Still, until a century ago Cabala was more or less hieroglyphic writing without a key. In the nineteenth century, though Jewish scholars — Franck, Landauer, Jellinek, Joel, Graetz — have accomplished much towards the discovery and elucidation of its literary landmarks, the culture-history of Jewish mysticism has to this day not even been attempted. And as for the attitude of modern scholarship towards the Cabala, that has been, especially among Jewish scholars, one of hostility, and not infrequently of undisguised contempt. Graetz is the chief sinner in this respect. But justice is on the march—even for the Jewish mystics. Granted that the Cabalists did not solve the problems confronting them, because emanation is as much a mystery as creation; granted that Cabala furthermore gave rise to strange doctrines, and that its metaphysics was unfitted for the populace—yet it also liberated many spiritualising forces, and over the earthly existence of a tortured people it spanned the arch of an immense hope. Cabala has been called rabbinical Gnosis. And we may well apply to the Cabalists what W. Anz has said of the Gnostics: "They lacked the strength and weakness of our age—sober and critical intellectualism. Rudderless they followed their fancy and feelings whithersoever these led them, and they were prepared to believe everything that met their spiritual needs." But let

us also remember that fearlessly the Jewish Mystics wrestled, like Jacob of old, with the Divine: who then dare deny them the name of Israel?

We have passed in review only the mountain-peaks in the realm of Jewish mysticism. Enough, however, has been said to show that to ignore Cabala—whether it be its ethico-religious or its metaphysical or human side—is to leave unexplored large portions of the map of Jewish life and thought; that to remain ignorant of Jewish mysticism is largely to fail to grasp one of the distinctive sides of the Jewish genius and one of the greatest driving-forces in Jewish history.

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LONDON.

A DEFENCE OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM.

HUGH ELLIOT.

II.

THE defence of materialism is at all times a thankless and unpopular task. In every age and in every state of civilisation, the sentiments of humanity have leaned towards a "spiritualistic" outlook upon life, and away from a "materialistic" outlook. It has happened in consequence that the main development of philosophy has been on the spiritualistic side; the philosophers who evolved conclusions harmonious to public sentiment have derived a far greater popular support than those who evolved unwelcome conclusions. The latter have been fewer in number, and their works have been comparatively neglected. Materialistic philosophy has grown in an unsuitable soil; and the crudities which it embodied in common with all primitive forms of philosophy have not yet been properly purged from it. The errors of idealism have been gradually eliminated by criticism; while the corresponding errors of materialism have been exultingly cited as destructive of the whole basis of that belief.

Notwithstanding the general repugnance to this philosophy, it has for many years occupied a central position in philosophic controversy. The writings of Bergson, the fashionable philosopher of our century, are in effect a protest against materialism and an attempt to provide an alternative to it. On all sides we have witnessed the growth of systems of thought whose entire purpose is to furnish some alternative to scientific materialism; and the immense importance of that mode of thought is established, less by any overt attempt at defence, than by the very general orientation of rival beliefs with special reference to its destruction. The menacing character of materialism towards our hereditary beliefs is

largely due to the fact that it is no longer a metaphysical system. It has risen up in conjunction with physics, biology, and physiology. Last century it was specially linked up with biology, and succeeded in overthrowing some of the most cherished convictions of the human race. This century it is specially linked up with physiology, and again threatens deep-rooted beliefs which will not be overthrown without a severe struggle.

No wonder materialism is unpopular. But to us, *as philosophers*, the one question of interest is whether it is true. Its consequences to humanity are of no concern to us; for, *as philosophers*, we have before our eyes no other aim or purpose than the discovery and recognition of truth. We may perhaps hold that truth is always bracing and beneficial; we may go so far as to believe that there can be no higher philanthropic aim than the excision of the cancer of human superstition. But these are side issues. We seek the truth; and its bearing upon human welfare may be afterwards debated by the journalists and politicians of metaphysics.

While it is true that materialism is and must always remain unpopular, it is perhaps no exaggeration to affirm that not for a century has its unpopularity reached so high a point as at the present moment. The present decline in the status of science and philosophy is especially apparent in the sphere of materialistic thought. Every one of the sentiments which oppose materialism has been strengthened by the social stress of war. Materialists in the past, in so far as they have been recognised by official philosophy at all, may be said to have occupied the extreme radical left wing of thinking people. Like revolutionary socialists in politics, they have aimed at a total subversion and reconstitution of orthodox systems. Now war has brought about the temporary triumph of authority and orthodoxy. The position of the Church has been immensely strengthened; the authority of the State is impressed upon every citizen in every country of Europe. We have ceased to be individuals; we have become citizens, or rather subjects, whose first concern is to ascertain what the ruling authority desires us to do, and whose second concern is to do it. The whole sphere of authority has become sanctified by the reinforcement of the massive instincts of patriotism and loyalty.

Now, authority is always conservative. The public mind is generations behind the minds of individuals. Authority is but the established expression of the public mind; and for two years past we have learnt that to question the fiat

of authority is treason. Nor can this mental attitude be limited to a single sphere. It spreads to philosophy, to science, to art: in all these departments, disobedience has ceased to be a misdemeanour and has become a felony. Authority is all-powerful. One would have thought that a religion professing peace and love would have suffered from a condition of war and hate; but the strength of religion is founded upon respect for authority, and in accordance as such respect is increased the power of religion is magnified. *Per contra*, the revolutionary forces, whether in science, philosophy, or elsewhere, are paralysed. To some extent we may begin to understand the mind of the middle ages, when dissent from the doctrines of Aristotle was punished with persecution and social degradation, and dissent from the doctrines of the Church led to torture and the inquisition.

The main propositions to which attention must be drawn in an account of scientific materialism are three:—(1) The law of universal causation; (2) the principle of mechanism—*i.e.* the denial of purpose in the universe and all notions of absolute finalism or teleology; (3) the denial that there exists any form of "spiritual" or "mental" entity that cannot be expressed in terms of matter and motion. Of (1) I need say but little; it is, in theory at least, held now by almost everyone, even by those who are unwilling to accept its plainest and most obvious corollaries. Of such corollaries (2) and (3) commonly present the greatest difficulties in logic and philosophy; and it is for that reason alone that they are here named as being of the first importance in the representation of materialistic thought.

In addition to these headings under which materialism may be formulated, we may if we like consider the various shapes in which it appears in different subjects. In Metaphysics, the fundamental issue appears in many forms, as for instance in the historic problem of determinism and free-will. In Astronomy, it was once held that the planets were retained in their orbits by angels; and Copernican materialism was greeted with the usual public hostility. In Physics, also, materialism has absorbed the entire field. In Biology, the problem was disputed last century in the form of evolution *v.* special creation. In Physiology, it now takes the form of mechanism *v.* vitalism.

I have no space here to argue in favour of these doctrines; I propose only to make their meaning clear by illustrations. Firstly, I shall endeavour to illustrate the anti-teleological elements of materialism by a reference to biological science.

At the beginning of last century it was believed, not only that all nature was subservient to man, but that every object and every event was *purposive*, in the sense of being designed with some reference to human life and activity. Thus Bernardin de Saint Pierre accounted for the fact that melons are ribbed, by supposing that it was for the increased facility for family consumption. Man himself was regarded as possessing some ultimate purpose: his life was held to be designed with special reference to future events in some after life. Moreover, all his limbs and organs were naturally considered subservient to a purpose or design. Nothing in nature was looked upon as meaningless. Such indeed is the universal attitude of the common people at the present moment.

One of the earliest doctrines of evolution to be formulated was that of the inheritance of acquired characters. This theory is based upon two propositions: (1) that the exercise of any part, such as a muscle, increases the efficiency of that part by adapted structural modifications; (2) that such modifications are inherited, and hence that the next generation is better adapted to its environment than its predecessor. Of these propositions, the first is now known to be true, and the second to be false. But the point we are here concerned to notice is this, that the theory, though still teleological, is less so than the theory of special creations. We no longer postulate a spiritual power which created every part of the organism for a specific purpose; but we allege that the environment itself has by direct though mechanical action moulded the parts equally for specific purposes. There is an advance towards materialism.

The next advance was in the discovery of natural selection. The extreme advocates of this theory hold that every part of the organism has been adapted to its function by the *indirect* action of the environment. Variations, according to Darwin, occur spontaneously and in any direction. Such variations as are *useful* in the life of the organism lead to its survival and rapid propagation, and these favourable variations thus tend to be perpetuated by inheritance to a far greater extent than unfavourable or indifferent variations. In the end organisms become a vast collection of parts, all of which originally arose by hazard, and all of which have been preserved by their utility. In the theory of natural selection there is a great advance towards materialism. For the theory excludes purpose as regards the *origin* of variations: this is considered as purely blind and haphazard. But the remainder of the

theory is purely teleological: the *preservation* of variations is wholly dependent on their utility. Every part of an organism, therefore, if it has been evolved by natural selection, must have some purpose. If it had no purpose, it could not have evolved.

Further advances towards materialism soon followed. Sir Ray Lankester met various difficulties by the suggestion that certain parts might be of no direct value to the organism; but that the development of those parts was somehow *correlated* with the development of other parts which *were* of value, and which therefore were preserved by natural selection. In this way he allowed for the existence of parts which in themselves neither had nor ever had had any sort of utility to the organism. But if Sir Ray Lankester thus extricated certain structures from the coils of teleology, he did so only by denying the immediate and all-pervasive action of natural selection. Under the extreme theory of natural selection, a purposeless structure is a contradiction in terms.

A still more completely materialistic outlook has been attained in the latest developments of biological science. The Mendelian or genetic school pays no attention whatever to purpose or utility in any structure. Their doctrine is totally unaffected by teleology. Of course it is obvious that most organic structures are purposive; but in the post-Darwinian theories the emphasis is not laid on this point; adaptation is no longer deemed the controlling factor in evolution. On the contrary, attention is mainly fixed on the mechanical factors; the probability of inheritance of any new variation is worked out by the ordinary laws of chance, and is found to conform completely to those laws.

The consummation of materialism is witnessed in other modern theories which have no connection with Mendelian research—as in the writings of Jacques Loeb, or in the last edition of Brehm's *Thierleben.* A single example will suffice to illustrate the change which has come over biological thought. The example I shall select is that of the coloration of humming-birds.

Under the doctrine of special creation, no one would ever have dreamed of denying purpose to such coloration. The most popular explanation would be that God had beautified the humming-bird for the delectation of the human eye and the improvement of the human mind; that the humming-bird was part of the programme for the glorification and beauties of nature.

Under the theory of natural selection, the colours of the

humming-bird are still regarded as purposive. But it is no longer an anthropocentric purpose. It is due to sexual selection, and subserves the continuance of those individuals most well-favoured. And now, still later, there has come a suggestion that altogether discards teleology. It is said that the colours have no biological purpose whatever, but that they are due to the accumulation of excretory products in the feathers —the great quantity of such waste products being due to the intense activity of the bird itself.[1] Whether such a theory is true or false, I do not know. I only wish to illustrate the gradual discarding of teleological theories, and the rising tendency towards materialistic hypotheses.

This tendency might be illustrated in any one of the sciences. In Astronomy, for instance, we have long ago discarded teleology. But we may still remember that the moon was in primitive times supposed to exist for the purpose of providing a light for human beings during the night. I have, however, no space to linger on illustrations which anyone may collect for himself. I pass now to the third proposition of materialism, which denies the existence of any form of spiritual entity that cannot be rendered in terms of matter and motion.

It is here that modern or scientific materialism differs from the crude materialism of the Greeks and of pre-scientific philosophers. Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius, and their disciples believed in the universality of causation; they disbelieved or tended to disbelieve in all doctrines of teleology. But they were not monists; they believed in the existence of spiritual substances such as "the soul"; and their materialism consisted in the proposition that these mysterious entities were composed of matter. Thus Democritus taught that the soul was an aggregation of smooth, round, material particles. The state of philosophy was parallel to the state of religion. The ancients identified their gods with idols of material composition. The supposed hidden forces of nature were to them equally material. All classes of thinkers appeared to agree that there were *two* kinds of existences: one kind being that present to our senses, the other kind being of a more mysterious and intangible character, and including such supposed entities as gods, ghosts, souls, minds, spirits, and hobgoblins of every description. In those days, as in these, the philosophers harboured fewer of this species than the common people, but they all believed in some of them; and the cleavage between

[1] For the humming-bird is unparalleled by any other species of bird for its incessant active movements. Its heart is three times the size of its stomach, when full.

the materialists and idealists of that time concerned the question as to what substance they were made of. They all had their idols, which for the materialists were made of clay, and for the idealists, of some more refined substance fabricated for the purpose.

Now, the modern materialism recognises none of these things. It cuts away the whole basis of the ancient controversy by denying altogether that there are two orders of existences; and in so doing it comes very close indeed to, and will probably in time coincide with, modern idealism. A large number of the hobgoblin genus have been swept away by both groups of thinkers. A few only remain; and, as in this bald account I am touching only on the most recondite parts of materialistic theory, I shall allude merely to that one which presents the greatest inertia — namely, mind.

Berkeley was the first to represent matter in terms of mind; and in so far as he limited himself to that, *every scientific materialist must be a Berkeleyan.* Consciousness is the material of all our knowledge and our feelings. As William James has said in his *Radical Empiricism*, *experiences* constitute for us the sum-total of the universe. Now, Berkeley showed that matter was for us only an *experience* —a feeling—of the same order as any other experience or feeling. Properly understood, this in no way reflects on the *reality* of matter. The sense of reality is itself an experience; all experiences are homogeneous in substance. We say that light *is* a form of ethereal undulation, without in any way detracting from the real existence of light. So, too, we say, and, by the way, with greater truth, that matter is a form of our consciousness, without in any way detracting from the real existence of matter. It may be replied that the reality of matter involves the notion of externality. But that notion is an experience—a feeling—a conscious process; and by the association of a number of raw elements of experience we can constitute matter — the actual, hard, external, coloured objects — without the introduction of any heterogeneous factor whatever. Each of these adjectives, actual, hard, external, coloured, real—each of them is an experience, and an experience only. When such experiences become associated together, we have not an *idea* of matter, but matter itself — endowed with as high a reality as our intellect can conceive.

But if, as I readily admit and affirm, matter can be rendered in terms of mind, then the most elementary logic

requires adhesion to the proposition that at all events *some* mind can be rendered in terms of matter. Dualism is hopelessly condemned; there is no longer any gulf between mind and matter, and I might with equal propriety have entitled this article "A Defence of Scientific Idealism." I have not done so, because materialism appears to be a far more important aspect of the great truth which is otherwise viewed as idealism. We can deal with matter by scientific methods; we can advance along that line; but idealism is sterile and leads to nothing after its own naked truth has been admitted. And now let me approach the subject from the materialistic standpoint.

Physiologists are in the main agreed that animal organisms are immeasurably complex mechanisms. They are automatic in principle, though their vast range of reactions obscures the automatism to a casual or uninformed observer. With a given nervous structure in a given condition at a given moment, the same stimulus will always produce the same effect; it will produce that effect as surely and as fatally as is the case with any other physical or chemical reaction. There is no room for an arbitrary "vital force" which intervenes in the physiological process. The law of physical causation reigns no less supreme in this sphere than in the sphere of astrophysics. And the physiologists have reached this truth by empirical methods. They have attained by the use of observation, experiment, and induction alone the conviction that Descartes derived from deductive considerations of high philosophy. If we attempt to deny it in face of the overwhelming physiological authority supporting it, our denial can only be based on partial motives and on a consciousness that it conflicts with theories we are loth to abandon.

I have repeatedly observed that I am not endeavouring to prove, but merely to state, the theory of scientific materialism. I shall therefore consider physiological mechanism as an established doctrine, and pass on to its implications. To the dualists it presents the overwhelming difficulty that it leaves no place in nature for "mind." Organic nature, like inorganic nature, moves by mechanical forces alone, and no gap is left for the insertion of any spiritual existence or force. Huxley endeavoured to surmount the difficulty by regarding mind as an attenuated sort of aura or shadow, which passively and inertly accompanies certain kinds of cerebral activity, without exerting any active influence whatever: he called it an epiphenomenon. In his true capacity as a physiologist, he knew and most luminously taught that the conduct and every

activity of man would be the same whether this aura was present or not, and in consequence that there were no direct means of learning whether other men were truly conscious or mere complex aggregations of matter and energy. But he failed to observe that the same argument applies to our knowledge of our own personal consciousness. Take two men identical in every detail of matter and energy, but one without and the other with an epiphenomenal consciousness; and ask each whether he has such consciousness or not. *Ex hypothesi* the same answer will be given by both. Their nervous constitutions being identical, they must react by identical answers to the same question. To suppose otherwise is to affirm some intervention of the epiphenomenon in the individual having it, and all such intervention is contrary to hypothesis. If one of them answers "yes" or "no," the other is fatally bound to react by the same answer. If any of us individually believe we have an epiphenomenal consciousness, that belief is no true guide; for it would equally be entertained by another individual materially identical to ourselves, but without the consciousness. Otherwise you would have similar forces acting on similar nervous constitutions with dissimilar results; and the whole theory of physiological mechanism is wrecked. Huxley's theory was the crowning effort to reconcile dualism with physiology. It failed; and we have to throw overboard either the *facts* of physiology, or the *arguments* of dualism. Surely the unbiassed philosopher will not hesitate between the two.

What, then, are we to say as to the position of consciousness in the materialistic system? But one alternative remains, and that is boldly to identify consciousness with cerebral processes, and to say that they are not two things, but one. Instantly all difficulties vanish. *You* say you pursue a certain line of conduct by an act of will; *I* say you pursue it by a combination of material cerebral processes which necessarily issues in that line of conduct. You support your statement by an appeal to immediate experience; I support mine by an appeal to the results of physiological research. Yet, from the moment you identify will with those cerebral processes, the two statements cease to conflict; they are one and the same.

The dualistic superstition is so deeply rooted in philosophy —even our language being based upon it—that any alteration of view is attended with profound difficulties. The reader has probably smiled with pleasure and assent, when I stated that matter may be expressed in terms of mind. He has

probably frowned with annoyance, when I stated the converse truth that mind may be expressed in terms of matter. He has rejoiced when I said that A was equal to B; he has groaned when I went on to infer that B must be equal to A. Possibly visions have come before him of the brain secreting consciousness as the liver secretes bile, or the kidneys urine. But let him have no fear: the doctrine of Vogt is utterly incompatible with *any* view of physiological processes. Perhaps an analogy may help. A candle-flame appears to be a thing; yet it is quite different from matter. You cannot weigh it, nor keep it in a box. Hence the ancients regarded it as an entity or substance of idiopathic (or rather idiophysic) nature—one of the primeval elements, not resolvable into any other. Yet it is now known to be a mere apparition of matter in a certain state, undergoing combustion. The moment the combustive processes cease, the flame ceases. The flame, in so far as it may be called a thing, is not to be identified with material particles, but with material processes. It is the impression set up by those processes. It *is* the processes, in just precisely the same way as mind *is* the cerebral processes. Combustion and oxidation underlie both manifestations.

It has not been possible within so short a space to indicate the materialistic solution of any of the numerous other problems which may occur to the reader. I can do no more than observe that nearly all the difficulties, which may be felt, are due to the deeply ingrained habit of thinking in terms of dualism, and to an inadequate appreciation of the true significance of idealism.

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DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under rare circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

MR ELLIOT'S "DEFENCE OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM."

(*Hibbert Journal,* April 1916, p. 551.)

I CANNOT think that my friend, Mr Hugh Elliot, has made a really philosophic effort to discover the meaning of the doctrine of a war of life and matter and its application to the present conflict. If he had he might still have disagreed profoundly with the view which M. Bergson and I have put forward, but he would not have represented it as the superficial and childish notion he ridicules in his article. Mr Elliot is a materialist, and I gather that this means that he holds that those values which some of us distinguish as spiritual, and which all of us hold in honour, are in their ultimate analysis reducible to, and explicable as, matter and motion. I can assure him that neither M. Bergson nor I would deduce from this that he ought in consistency to be a pro-German, or that opinions like his are responsible for militarism and wars of aggression. Nay, I will go further, and say that the only practical outcome of such views seems to me essentially pacifism, for if all values are material, strife entailing suffering and death is idiotic, peace at any price is better than sure and certain loss. But such harmless views as those of Mr Elliot are not what we have in mind when we speak of the war between life and matter. The philosophy of creative evolution is the doctrine that a force of an essentially spiritual nature is working and expressing itself in and by means of material organisation, and the various organic forms of life, and the progressive development of these forms, mark the achievements of this force. Such is our general doctrine of evolution. From it follows what we describe as war between life and matter. We think it is abundantly illustrated in the history of evolution as we are able to read its broken records. Matter appears to us as an inverse movement to life, or even as a movement opposing life. No sooner has life brought matter under successful control than matter begins itself to control and deaden the life which has organised it. This is what we mean when we distinguish the force on the surface from the force in the depth. Allow us the meta-

phor—we must express our meaning somehow. Now for the application. When we say that Germany is on the side of matter and the allied nations on the side of life, we are referring not to the individual opinions of individual Germans, living or dead, or of individual Frenchmen, or of individual Englishmen, but to the political purpose of Germany,—a Prussian hegemony with its ideal of a *Kultur* stamped by the right of might on the whole world. And when we say that we who are opposing this German purpose with our whole strength are on the side of life, again we are not referring to individual opinions, or making sweeping philosophical generalisations, we are referring to the ideal of national freedom which to us seems the expression of that hidden activity of life working beneath and against the bondage of matter.

No doubt it is open to anyone to claim that Germany's war is conspicuously a case of the vital impulse bursting through material conventions and creating new expression, and probably to many of her philosophers it so appears. There is a conflict of ideas behind the immediate purposes of the contending armies, and the German ideal, like ours, is a spiritual force. I wish to be fair to it, and I try to judge it by the expression her philosophers have given to it, and not by any prejudices for or against scientific materialism. This ideal seems to me expressed in what I have described as the non-morality of the superman, and it furnishes for Germany the whole philosophical meaning and justification of her war. When I call it materialistic or mechanistic it is not to lampoon it, but to call attention to its most striking characteristic, namely, that it sets efficiency, in its narrow economic meaning, above spontaneity and freedom.

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"THE LOVE OF GOD, OUR HOPE OF IMMORTALITY."

(*Hibbert Journal,* April 1916, pp. 538-550.)

Mr Temple finds fault with philosophy because it cannot demonstrate the truth of a future life. Plato's arguments "have no cogency." Kant's "are hopelessly unconvincing." And he thinks that it is in the affirmations of religion, not in the arguments of philosophy, that we must look for proof of immortality. Whether Plato's arguments are cogent or not cannot be argued here. They will appear cogent or otherwise, according as we accept or do not accept the premises from which he argues. It can, however, be briefly shown that Kant's arguments cannot be so lightly dismissed as Mr Temple imagines. Kant held that immortality, as also God and freedom, must be assumed as true if we are to talk of moral obligation and duty. Mr Temple takes a different view. He holds that "even if there be no immortality, if the universe be against us, and we are to be crushed like flies, the ethical obligation from which Kant argues is unaffected by it. Let us die like heroes." In other words, moral obligations would remain as they are even if there were no future life. But is this the case? If I become extinct at death, why should I be heroic and self-sacrificing if I do not wish to be so. Whether I am heroic or not, it will be all the same in the end for me and everyone else. This

life is my all, and why should I spoil it if the final result of my doing so is mere blank negation? To talk of the moral obligation of my being heroic when I feel that my heroism will spoil my life, and when I know that the result of my heroism and spoiled life will be nil, is hopelessly irrational.

If there be no immortality, then it is nothing to me or any one else whether God exists or not. Moral laws cease to be "divine Commands." They are merely human conventions, made by men in order that they may be able to live together. They have no higher sanction. Prudence will urge me to observe these conventions, as my fellow-men will make it unpleasant for me if I do not, but I need obey them only so far as prudence dictates, and I am not guilty of any wrong in disobeying them if I choose to risk punishment, or think I can escape punishment for disobeying them. If it is replied that I am bound to promote the general happiness, and that the general happiness is promoted by my observance of these conventions which are mistakenly called "moral obligations," I may reply, Why should I give up my own happiness in order to promote the happiness of others? I have as much right to my happiness as they have to theirs. How indeed can I be certain that I do promote the general happiness by the sacrifice of my own? How can I be certain that the loss of my own happiness by my self-sacrifice is not greater than the increase of happiness which my self-sacrifice gives others? I cannot be certain of it. And therefore, if I am bound to promote the general happiness, my best plan is to look after my own happiness, of which I can be certain, and consider the happiness of others, only so far as to do so is necessary for my own happiness.

And once more, if there be no immortality, suicide is not wrong. I was not consulted whether I should accept life, and if death be extinction, there can be nothing wrong or foolish in my declining the gift of life if I choose. If life does not seem to me worth living, why should I not anticipate my extinction by a few years if I wish to do so. There is nothing heroic or moral in enduring useless pain, and if I am suffering from a painful and incurable disease, which makes my life a burden to myself and others, then so far from it being wrong, it is only rational that I should put an end to my life. My clinging to life in such a case is not heroic, it is unmanly and selfish. Kant's argument remains unshaken. We must postulate immortality, and with immortality God and freedom, if we are to speak of moral obligations and duty, or, in other words, moral obligations would not remain as they are if "the universe be against us" and if the end of us is that we are "to be crushed like flies." No doubt if death means extinction, any one who likes to "spurn delights and live laborious days" has a perfect right to do so. I may consider him foolish and his life irrational, but I have no right to say he is wrong, if he chooses to live and die "like a hero." But neither has he any right to say that if I do not like the heroic life and refuse to live it I am wrong in my refusal. If I become extinct at death, heroism is mere folly, if I do not like being heroic. *Carpe diem*, and the ἀταραξία of Epicurus would then be the highest wisdom. This little life is our all. Why not then accept what pleasures it offers and cease worrying ourselves or each other? "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."

Mr Temple says that when we leave philosophy and come to religion "everything is different." By which he means, I suppose, that religion can demonstrate the truth of a future life. But is this so? As Mr

Temple truly says, the religious argument for immortality is this: "God is Love, and all love is individual, and Almighty Love will not allow itself to be robbed of what it loves." But is it a self-evident truth that God is Love? Mr Temple will surely admit that it is not, and if so, then the conclusion which is drawn from it is not self-evident either. Neither religion nor philosophy can demonstrate the truth of a future life. It must remain a matter of faith, a splendid hope. The Christian religion asserts a future life—but does not offer a demonstrative proof of its truth. Neither can philosophy demonstrate its truth. It can, however, remove difficulties and show (and this is especially true of the philosophy of Kant) that the Christian belief is a reasonable faith. W. E. P. Cotter.

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"CAN THE MERE SCHOLAR INTERPRET CHRISTIANITY?"

(*Hibbert Journal,* April 1916, p. 645.)

In his note discussing Professor Armitage's article on this subject in the January *Hibbert* Mr Sadler writes: "It is possible for Egyptians to read records of Osiris and accept him as Lord, yet Osiris never was a man on earth. The Swiss accepted William Tell . . . . and were angry when it was first shown that he never lived. . . . The Greeks worshipped Dionysus, as if he had been a man, but they personified and projected the Life-force which they felt." And these statements are used to enforce his argument that our Lord never had any personal human existence, but that "the Christians personified and projected the Lord-force that they felt."

Into the theological question I do not propose to enter, nor do I propose to enter on an argument to prove that the endeavour thus to dispose of our Lord contravenes every canon of historical criticism. The object of this note is merely to enable the readers of the *Hibbert* to realise that the question as regards Osiris, etc., is not closed, and is not so simple as Mr Sadler supposes.

In writing as he does Mr Sadler shows himself a follower of the prevalent Mannhardt-Frazer school, which sees in Osiris, Dionysus, etc., nothing but personified abstractions, spirits of the Corn and of the Vine, gods of vegetation, of the seasons, of the revolving year. Now in Sir J. G. Frazer's *Adonis, Attis and Osiris* it is undeniable that many evidences are brought forward and cogent reasoning is employed to prove the Vegetation theory, as in the rest of *The Golden Bough.* But this is not everything. There is something behind.

In his recent book, *The Dramas and Dramatic Dances of non-European Races*, Professor Wm. Ridgeway brings forward evidence based on a wide induction which is dead against Mr Sadler's statements and which is so conclusive that even Sir J. G. Frazer admits its cogency. Professor Ridgeway shows that the concrete in human life always precedes the abstract, that there must be a Captain Boycott before the verb to boycott, that women first grieved and lamented for the loved child or husband before they sorrowed for mere abstractions, and so *ad infinitum.*

Thus in his *Origin of Greek Tragedy* and in his latest book alike he shows that Dionysus, Osiris, etc., were real men before they became

mere phases of the Vegetation or Year spirit, so much so that in his new edition of *Osiris* Sir J. G. Frazer writes: "The evidence adduced points to the conclusion that under the mythical pall of the glorified Osiris, the god who died and rose again from the dead, there once lay the body of a dead man." The Passion Play of Hassan and Hussein in Persia and India, which is founded on the real sufferings of the sons of Ali, and the dramas and dances of the East, all point to the same conclusion; and in the same way the Miracle Plays and Mysteries of the medieval Church and the decennial celebration of the Passion Play at Ober-Ammergau all bespeak the real existence of Jesus of Nazareth. Thus Professor Ridgeway is justified in writing that those who, like Professor Murray, Miss Harrison, etc., "argue that behind Dionysus there was never any human reality, but that the god was only the result of the group-thinking of his *thiasos* of Satyr *daimons* and Mænads might as well argue that neither Dominic, nor Francis of Assisi, nor Mohammed, nor Christ himself ever existed, but that they are mere 'projections' of the 'group-thinking' of the Dominicans, Franciscans, Mohammedans and Christians respectively."

I might add that Professor Ridgeway writes to me: "I am a believer in William Tell and believe that one day he will be resuscitated. A very good case could be made out on the principles followed by these people against the reality of John Hampden. The statements about him are very meagre. He might be said to be merely a 'projection' of the seventeenth-century Puritan." (See *Origin of Tragedy*, pp. 12, 24 *sq.*; *Dramas*, etc., pp. 51, 61, 119, *et passim.*)

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"WAR FROM THE QUAKER POINT OF VIEW."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1916, p. 653.)

My book under the above title has been subjected by Professor Hearnshaw of King's College, London, to a review so lengthy as to amount to a six-page article, and so misleading that I ask leave for some reply.

The article is written in that elusive emotional manner which characterises the more heated part of the popular press. To describe Mr Norman Angell, for instance, as "obsessed by even greater illusions than those that afflicted him before the outbreak of the struggle for which he had done so much to unprepare us," is hardly in the style of the *Hibbert Journal.*

To take information from a book under review and pass it off as the writer's own is too common a practice to cause resentment, but the trouble comes when it is perverted in the borrowing. For instance, Professor Hearnshaw says that "many Quakers have thrown themselves into the struggle, as their predecessors did into the English Civil War of the seventeenth century, the American War of Independence of the eighteenth century, and the War of North and South for the emancipation of slaves in the nineteenth century." I was extremely anxious in my book not to claim too much uniformity of practice for Friends, and to admit everything that ought to be admitted of exception or of inconsistency, but it appears to be

very dangerous to write with perfect frankness. From two to three hundred young Friends have enlisted in the present war, mostly men whose Quakerism is chiefly inherited and traditional, but to say that our "predecessors"—which is intended to imply the body as a whole—joined in any former wars is absolutely false. So far from throwing themselves into the English Civil War of the seventeenth century, Friends came rapidly out of it. It was in its later stages when Friends arose. I explained in my book that the Society was being formed between 1652 and 1659, and that in the latter year George Fox and the official spokesmen of the Society made their historic statement against all war. This was not the question on which the Society arose; it arose out of a belief in the Indwelling God; and one could not have expected this practical deduction to have been universally reached at any earlier date, almost the earliest at which it could be said that the Society had spread over England.

Professor Hearnshaw tries to exploit a quotation I gave from Isaac Penington, whom he describes in the following astonishing manner: "Penington, a chaplain in the New Model Army and an ardent advocate of military resistance to 'Babylon.'" A man who can write of a Quaker chaplain at all ought to keep silent about Quakerism. Isaac Penington was never in the New Model Army either, in any capacity. He would be likely to turn in his grave if he knew that he had been called a chaplain. He was not "an ardent advocate of military resistance" to anything, least of all to "Babylon," by which he meant the Catholic and Anglican Churches. What he did say was to admit that, at the moment and in the then state of the world, he made no attack upon magistrates for using force against criminals and invaders, but he goes on: "There is a better state which the Lord has already brought some into, and which nations are to expect and travel towards." He contemplates the case of those who "are forbidden by the love and law of God written in their hearts to fight for themselves" even against criminal violence. He says that "fighting is not suitable to a gospel spirit, but to the spirit of the world and the children thereof. The fighting in the gospel is turned inwards against the lusts, and not outward against the creatures." That is, he drew exactly the same distinction I drew very carefully in my book between the duty of the State and that of a pacifist individual. "The primitive and original doctrine of war from a Quaker point of view" is thus exactly what is fully and carefully described in my book, and not something quite different, as my critic asserts.

With regard to the American War of Independence of the eighteenth century, on p. 49 I explained that a small body of "free Quakers," who believed in the war, separated, and for a time possessed a single Meeting House, and shortly died out. They were not our "predecessors."

With regard to the War of North and South, I mentioned briefly the great sufferings of Friends in the South for refusing to fight, which caused the migration of the great body of Friends from South Carolina and Virginia to the Middle West. In the North the conflicting loyalty to negro emancipation and to peace caused some diversity of practice, but the great body of the Society, even then, chose peace, and some, but not all, of those who chose war were disowned.

My book based the testimony against war on intuition, on the Indwelling Voice of God. Professor Hearnshaw naturally, therefore, puts this ground last of four, and when I come to read his words I find: "Mr

Graham calls himself a Christian, but he is a Christian only so long as Christ agrees with him. He calls himself a Socialist and a Democrat, but he is really an extreme Individualist and an Anarchist." I pass over the statement that I am only a limited liability Christian as too cheap for reply. I have never anywhere called myself a Socialist. I always avoid doing so, though having sympathy with many socialistic proposals. The other epithets are simply amusing.

Then follows an attack on my assertion of the supremacy of conscience, which is more like the pages of *John Bull* than anything else. Such epithets as "treason and anarchy," "muddle-headedness and inconsistency," "effrontery," and so forth, are not what one would expect to find in a careful vocabulary. Nor do I know how one replies to this sort of thing. There was, of course, a theological style like this which used to be common in the seventeenth century, and it seems to recur in Professor Hearnshaw's epithets, for instance about the Manichæan heresy. This was one of the many false steps which human thought has made in its pathetic search for truth, namely, to believe in the inherent evil of matter. One ought to treat such attempts to face the problem of evil with tolerant charity. They are, to my mind, no worse than many other errors, for instance the great error in all sacerdotal claims. But the King's College Professor describes Manichæism as "poison," "pestilential oriental venom," "a leprosy in the fair body of the Church," "the Manichæan virus," "antinomian abysses of moral corruption," and so forth. One feels rather thankful to be called nothing worse than a muddle-headed anarchist after that. My reviewer has really nothing to say on the great and central point of the Christian intuition against war, except to describe my arguments as "four sophistical reasons which the feeblest dialectician could sweep away like chaff." This is what he flatters himself by describing as "destructive analysis."

On the scriptural argument Professor Hearnshaw blames me for dismissing the Old Testament "as a record of an immature stage of ethical development; as though in any stage of man's moral progress whatsoever God could have sanctioned and enjoined what is essentially and eternally wicked!" I should not have thought it possible in these days for any writer in the *Hibbert* to object to the Old Testament being regarded as ethically immature, as a stage in man's perception of God; or that anyone would now regard Jewish morality as something which has an eternally divine sanction, or finally, that there is no such thing as progressive morality, that things are not good or bad according to their age and country, but are good and bad "essentially and eternally." One may say without impertinence that it is plain that Mr Hearnshaw is not a professor either of theology or of ethics.

When my reviewer proceeds, "The New Testament accepts generally in respect of war the standards of the Old," one can only refer him to that series of teachings beginning, "Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time," and commend the gospels generally to his study. All the points in his scriptural argument are already fully met in my book, and the same unfairness in the use of points which I carefully grant is manifest here, as in my critic's treatment of Quaker history.

The following statement of New Testament doctrine by Professor Hearnshaw is quite in the line of the Kaiser's religion. "The purpose of the religion of the Bible is not peace, but righteousness. It proclaims

implacable war upon iniquity. It seeks, it is true, to win sinners by gentle means from the error of their ways. But it recognises the fact that there are some who cannot be won, and that there are devils beyond the reach of even the Divine love. To such it threatens everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and it shrinks from no means within the range of omnipotence which may be necessary to achieve the final victory of good over evil." It is not the first time that the Scriptures have been made the texts of war lords, and moral and physical conflict confused.

The argument about the Early Church, which is really one of the strongest on the side of peace, is shirked, in what I find is the usual manner, by ignoring the writings of the pre-Nicæan Fathers. Professor Hearnshaw gets out of it by the rather impertinent remark that "the heresy of pacifism died out, save in the writings of a few eccentrics like Tertullian and Lactantius." The treatment of the mystical sects who, as heretics, throughout history maintained the testimony against war, surely requires, if any subject does, a careful and tender charity. Whether we think of the views of these devoted people as better or worse than those of the Catholic Church, they were brave, tender-spirited, and generally persecuted. It is odd to read, as an ambiguous and headlong paragraph may easily be read to mean, that "they died out more or less speedily amid the contempt and execration of mankind." Does not the writer know that the Waldenses still inhabit valleys north of Turin, that the Moravians are still a strong missionary body whom it is absurd to appear, even through careless writing, to describe as "tending to sink into antinomian abysses of moral corruption," and that the Russian Doukhobors (as Professor Hearnshaw a little further on appears to be aware) are still living in Canada, where—in spite of their eccentricities—they are welcome colonists and not "a pestilential nuisance to the Canadian administration"?

One more error and I have done. Professor Hearnshaw as a historian ought to know that it is not correct to say that the Holy Experiment in Pennsylvania broke down due to its inherent weakness, "even though the conditions were most favourable there, because it enjoyed the military protection of Britain." Many accessible authorities, if he does not accept my book, will explain to him that the Quaker rule in Pennsylvania was compulsorily abandoned through the action of the military party at home at the beginning of the Seven Years' War. The British connection was from the beginning its inherent weakness, was a source of recurring worry, and was finally fatal to it.

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SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

THEOLOGY.

LAWS may be silent *inter arma*, but the voice of the dictionary is still heard in the land. The eighth volume of the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark) extends from "Life" to "Mulla," and the standard of workmanship is well maintained. "Life and Death," "Love," "Magic," "Marriage," "Missions," and "Monasticism" are the six largest articles. The section upon the Christian idea of love, like the article on "Meekness," might have been improved by a closer attention to the New Testament data; the place of love to God, for example, in the teaching of Jesus, is very different from the development of subsequent theology,[1] and the Pauline tendency to grasp it under faith is noticeable, in view of the Johannine change.[2] Christian Monasticism has been entrusted to the competent hand of Dom Cabrol; his article is a model of compression and selection. The bibliography on "Marriage (Christian)" should have included Dr P. T. Forsyth's recent book, and the article on "Life and Death (Christian)," which is too short and vague, omits Dr L. A. Muirhead's *Life and Death in the Old and New Testament.* Professor H. E. Jacobs contributes two brief estimates of "Luther" and "Lutheranism," which, even together, are not allotted half the space assigned to "Lycanthropy." Brandt's account of the Mandæans is good, and will be useful to English readers who cannot or will not look into his German monographs. In fact, so far as this volume goes, the theological articles dealing with church history, *e.g.* "Macedonianism" (Loofs), "Monophysitism" (Krüger), "Monotheletism" (Krüger), and "Montanism" (Lawlor), are perhaps the most satisfactory. Professor D. S. Margoliouth contributes largely to the Muhammadan articles, but the account of Turkish Muhammadanism is written by a German professor at Constantinople; he points out that the Turks have

[1] On p. 647 Professor Grierson observes that the absence of "the note of passionate self-surrender to the love of Christ" separates Milton "not only from Dante, but from a Puritan like Bunyan, an Anglican like Herbert, a Roman like Crashaw, and Vondel, among his contemporaries."

[2] Mr E. G. Gardner has just edited an English version of S. Bernard's "Liber de diligendo Deo" (*The Book of S. Bernard on the Love of God*; Dent, 1916).

contributed comparatively little to the doctrine of their religion, and makes some remarkable admissions about the decline of Islam in the Balkan peninsula, noting, as an instance of the rapid decrease under Christian rulers, the fact that while the Muslims in Thessaly numbered 50,000 out of a total population of 330,000 in 1881, thirty years later they only numbered 3000 out of a total of 381,000. He praises, among popular books, "C. N. E. Eliot, *Turkey in Europe*, new ed., London, 1908." The praise is deserved, but the book is by "Sir Charles Eliot," and it is only fair to remember that, as Sir Charles confessed, the estimate of Islam refers to a period as far back as 1893–98. Dr S. M. Zwemer's *Mohammed or Christ* (Seeley) deals with the Muslim problem from a less objective side; it is a call to Christian propaganda, in view of the present situation.

Dr Hastings has also published the first of two volumes of a *Dictionary of the Apostolic Church* (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark), which is designed to form a sequel to his *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels.* Although it only professes to carry "the history of the Church as far as the end of the first century," the exigencies of the subject often require some discussion of later developments; thus we have articles on the Didachê, Ignatius, the uncanonical Acts and Gospels, and so forth. The bulk of the volume is devoted, however, to the contents of the New Testament outside the Gospels. It is not easy to write freshly upon many of these problems, but, without being invidious, I would mention Professor Kirsopp Lake's article on "The Acts of the Apostles," Dr L. A. Muirhead's study of the Apocalypse, and Dr Sanday's pages on "Inspiration and Revelation." In discussing the apostolic inspiration, Dr Sanday argues that "broadly speaking, it would be true to say that the application of the Old Testament by the apostles shows a deepened grasp of its innermost meaning. . . . But these are instances of their deepened insight generally, and are not different in kind from the Rabbinical theology, which, though often at fault, from time to time shows flashes of great penetration."

Two posthumous volumes on "The History of the Study of Theology" by Dr C. A. Briggs are now issued in Messrs Duckworth's series, "Studies in Theology." Dr Briggs had an encyclopædic interest in theology, and, although it is not easy to invest a résumé like this with sustained interest, the pages of this survey are clear and well-arranged. The first part, on the study of theology by Jesus and the apostles, is the least relevant. It is misleading to say that "there should be no doubt that Jesus was a great student of Jewish theology during the thirty years that preceded His entrance upon His ministry." But the survey improves as it proceeds. The mediæval sections are perhaps the most useful; the modern period, inevitably, is not covered with much thoroughness, although even this section suggests that schools of theology in modern countries do not all justify the American essayist's epigram, that "a divinity school is a place where they investigate poverty and spread agnosticism." Theology is being studied. It can be studied without being scholastic, and it must be studied, unless the training of divinity students is to relapse into a demi-semi-religious form of social instruction—which would be as disastrous for theology as when the study of comparative religion is allowed to become a branch of anthropology. In a frank and charming account of the Biblical school at Jerusalem

(*Revue Biblique*, 1915, pp. 248 f.), R. P. Lagrange argues that it is unfair to charge the school with undue interest in archæology. "Il ne se pouvait que des dominicains, précisément parce qu'ils étaient dominicains et donc théologiens, se contentassent de ce morcelage." "Dans l'Ordre de saint Dominique, l'érudition n'a jamais été la satisfaction d'une curiosité oiseuse, mais a toujours dû être coordonnée à la plus solide théologie, qu'il nous était possible d'établir une cloison étanche entre les recherches scientifiques et notre foi." It is melancholy to think that after quarter of a century this school of theology has been stopped by the anarchy of the Young Turks in Jerusalem. But M. Lagrange's closing sentence is not melancholy. "L'École pratique d'études bibliques a été fermée parce que française, elle renaîtra française."

In the *American Journal of Theology* (81-101, 244-265), Mr A. C. Watson defines religion as "a social attitude towards the non-human environment" in nature or the world with its stretches of life beyond the sensuous; he anticipates and endeavours to meet the objection that it is a contradiction in terms to speak of a social attitude toward a non-social and non-human environment, and claims, among other things, that his thesis offers a working theory of the relation between science and religion, since the relation of science to the same reality is non-social and mechanical. The same problem occurs in M. Clément Besse's acute defence of "Intellectualist Theodicy in France" (*Constructive Quarterly*, 1916, 124-150) against what he regards as the overweening claim of the pragmatists to ignore science and depreciate metaphysic in establishing the religious nexus with God.

Mr James Robertson Cameron's *The Renascence of Jesus* (Hodder & Stoughton) is a glowing and well-informed attempt, by a student of philosophy and art, to estimate the new contributions which Idealism can offer to the conception of Christ; he claims that it is "as imperative for us as for the thinkers of the prime to seek by current formulas of thought a near approach and nearer still to the magnitude of Jesus." Intellectualism is to be held in check by the influence of the arts. A thoroughgoing idealism, on the Kantian basis, which is infused by art and the historical spirit, is advocated as the sole means of appreciating the mystery of self-realisation through self-sacrifice, which Mr Cameron interprets as the divine and human reality embodied in the person of Jesus Christ. The author brings to his task singular qualifications, including artistic sympathies which are not too common among philosophic theologians. Mr Cameron frequently refers with gratitude to Dr E. A. Abbott's volumes, and it is a pleasure to chronicle another part of that indefatigable writer's *Fourfold Gospel* (*The Law of the New Kingdom*), which interprets Mark iv.-viii. in the light of the synoptic tradition and the Johannine parallels. Like the preceding parts, this is full of minute and suggestive exegesis. No student of the gospels can afford to overlook work of this kind. The opening chapter is on the parables of sowing and on parables in general; and in this connection it is worth while noticing an explanation of the parable of the good Samaritan by Mr Jacob Mann in *The Jewish Quarterly Review* (January 1916, 415-422). He regards the parable as a serious indictment of the Sadducees. The priest and Levite avoided the supposed corpse on the road, lest they should be defiled by touching it. But the Pharisees had altered the strict Biblical law about this Levitical impurity (Lev. xxi. 1 f., Num. vi. 7), and held that humanity required

either a priest or a Nazirite to perform the burial of such a corpse; humanity was made a reason for departing from the letter of the Law. The Sadducees, with their objection to Pharisaic tradition and their literal adherence to the Old Testament Law, were against such a relaxation. Consequently, Jesus was attacking the Sadducees in this parable; the conduct of the priest and the Levite exactly corresponded to what Sadducees would have done under the circumstances. The lawyer who tempted Jesus was a Sadducee, not a Pharisee.

Professor H. A. A. Kennedy writes in the *Expository Times* (March, pp. 264-268) on "The Alleged Paulinism of First Peter"; he admits that the author had read Romans, but points out how independent he often is of Paul's cardinal ideas, and concludes that he is "not a disciple of Paul, but an earnest representative of the religious thought of the Early Church to which Paul himself was profoundly indebted." The new edition of *The Epistle of James*, which Professor J. H. Ropes of Harvard contributes to the "International Critical Commentary," is welcome. Even though Mayor has satisfied English readers for nearly a generation, Professor Ropes makes a place for himself among the commentators of to-day. A reliable and scholarly edition. M. H. Coppieters (*Revue Biblique*, 1915, pp. 35 f.) offers fresh proofs for the hypothesis that Jas. iv. 5 echoes the book of Ecclesiastes. "Envy is the tendency of the passions of the corrupted spirit or nature in us"; so he takes the verse. The Scripture which utters this oracle is Ecclesiastes iv. 4.

The question of miracles has elicited fresh statements from the conservative and the advanced schools of thought alike, but little fresh light has been thrown upon the problem. In the *Princeton Theological Review* (April, pp. 202-264) Mr C. W. Hodge reviews some recent discussions, including not only attacks upon the possibility of miracles but inadequate conceptions of miracle by conservative writers, and concludes that a miracle is "a supernatural event . . . due to the immediate activity of God apart from second causes." He distinguishes miracle from other supernatural events, like regeneration, by confining it to the outward world. Canon M'Culloch's article in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* (viii. 676-690) takes a less rigid line. He prefers to think of miracle as a supernatural event which by "its instant suggestion of divine power and goodness" differs from the larger class of such events. He inclines to believe in the tradition of the Virgin-birth, and a careful statement of the evidence in its favour has been issued by Mr G. H. Box (*The Virgin Birth of Jesus*, Isaac Pitman), whose aim is to prove the impossibility of accounting for the rise of the story apart from a basis of fact, and also to vindicate its organic position in the Christian view of the gospel. On the other hand, Dr Abbott reiterates, in the volume already mentioned, his theory of the gospel miracles as symbolic, and Mr C. S. Patton, in the *American Journal of Theology* (1916, pp. 102-110), who shares this attitude, sets himself to explain how the modern preacher ought to deal with miracles. The counsel given is twofold. A preacher who cannot accept the miraculous traditions should not trouble his congregation with the problem of miracles. "His people would not understand him, and they would derive no benefit from his exposition." Next, he ought to preach a living God, and emphasise the continuous orderly witness of nature and history to God. "If he has enough else to preach, nobody will miss his reference to the miracles in which he does not believe. . . . If anyone asks him a

serious question about miracles, he will answer it honestly. But for the most part he will let miracles alone—not, however, because he is afraid of them, but because this is the easiest way to get rid of them. Whatever is seen to be unnecessary drops away of its own accord. What we want is a living God; and to such a God, in our day, nothing could be more unnecessary than miracles."

The study of theology has to mourn the loss of two distinguished writers. Last November, Dr Solomon Schechter died, a modern Jewish scholar who did much to interpret rabbinical thought, both in this country and in America. His *Studies in Judaism* and *Aspects of Rabbinic Theology* were an invaluable aid to outsiders. In May, Dr Allan Menzies died. He succeeded to the chair of Biblical Criticism in St. Andrews University in 1889, after having already taken a foremost part in the liberal movement of theology and biblical criticism. His main contributions, apart from his work as a translator and editor, were commentaries on Mark and Second Corinthians. He combined a love of freedom in theology with a singularly gracious spirit, and many students of theology in this generation, far beyond his class-room, are grateful for his lead and his personal encouragement.

JAMES MOFFATT.

PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

Two distinguished thinkers have recently passed away, and their loss will be felt wherever philosophy is studied. Wilhelm Windelband, who was born in 1848, occupied for many years the chair of Philosophy in Strassburg, and later succeeded Kuno Fischer in Heidelberg. Professor Windelband may not unfairly be said to have been the leader of the Neo-Kantian school in Germany. Philosophy, he regarded, as the critical science of universally valid worths or values. The critical method rested, so he maintained, on the recognition of such universal values,—truth, goodness, beauty,—and of their furnishing the norms for the procedure of the empirical processes of cognition, feeling, and willing. Freedom of will, he held, could only be intelligibly justified from the standpoint of transcendental idealism, according to which the causal relation is not the sole form of real connectedness, and the worth of what is given in conscious experience can be determined from the point of view of a norm of consciousness in general. His acute and original essay on "History and Natural Science" was the prelude to the subsequent development of that important group of inquiries it is now customary to denote as *Werttheorie*. Windelband's volumes on the History of Philosophy, both ancient and modern, are widely known. They are full of careful research and of suggestive criticism, and they are characterised by a grace and lucidity of style which will secure for them a permanent place in the literature of the subject. The death, at the early age of fifty-three, of Oswald Külpe, who occupied latterly the chair of Philosophy in Munich, has likewise deprived mankind of a keen and penetrative intellect at work on the problems of psychological and philosophical science. Just before the outbreak of the war, Professor Külpe delivered an interesting

course of lectures in the University of London, and was welcomed by many of his old pupils. As a psychologist of balanced judgment and of fertile ideas, he gathered round him students from all parts of the world, and in his laboratory, research of great value has been carried out. Külpe combined, in a striking way, the capacities of an original investigator in the field of experimental psychology and of speculative power as a philosophical thinker. His last book, published in 1912, entitled *Die Realisierung: Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Realwissenschaften*, which was to have been followed by other volumes, is an extremely able epistemological inquiry into the nature and validity of perceptive experience.

Naturally philosophic thought has been largely concerned of late with the momentous crisis through which we are now passing. The volume on *Philosophy and War* by Professor Émile Boutroux, which Mr F. Rothwell has translated into English (London: Constable, 1916), will interest a wide circle of readers. Besides the lecture on "Certitude and Truth," recently delivered before the British Academy, it contains a number of essays dealing with German thought and the War, and with the French conception of Nationality. Professor Boutroux argues that force, organisation, and science are the three principles of German culture. Not only in Prussian politicians but in German philosophers there is, he insists, a tendency either to intellectualism, to radical voluntarism, or to a union of these two doctrines. And in practice the elimination of feeling leads to the unrestricted profession of the immoral maxim that the end justifies the means. When ends, like means, depend only on intellect and will, to the exclusion of feeling, then the end best justified is force, and the final word of culture will be the synthesis of power and science. And the logical consequence will be that, for the perfect organisation of the world, there should exist *ein Herrenvolk*, which by its omnipotence will compel the nations it regards as inferior to carry out the part it imposes upon them. In contrast thereto, Professor Boutroux develops the French ideal of nationality as based on the notion of personality, the expression of which in a people is their deliberate resolve to live together and to form a political community. There is also much food for reflection in Baron Friedrich von Hügel's thoughtful volume, *The German Soul* (London: Dent, 1916). The book contains two studies,—one on "Christianity in face of War," and the other on "The German Soul and the Great War." In the latter, Baron von Hügel emphasises the fact that theory, system, *Weltanschauung*, which for the average Englishman is something that instantly puts him ill at ease, is for the German in his very blood. He shows how this characteristic, whilst giving rise to many admirable qualities, leads to the excesses exemplified, for instance, in the Prussian *Real-politik* with its conception and largely its practice of a frankly unmoral statesmanship. Over-systematising—the militarism that would be simultaneously a colonialism—is apparent as a constituent cause of the failure of Germany's colonising policy. It is no accident that England has been a great colonial power whilst not a great military power. Germany is now so formidable a foe because a spirit of sheer money-making and boundless commercialism, which more or less penetrates and vulgarises us all, and which we ourselves rather than they began, has, in the German, found a lodging within an incredibly vehement and concentrated, systematic and visionary soul. The series of essays by the Hon. Bertrand Russell, collected together under the title of *Justice in War-Time* (Chicago and London: Open Court, 1916),

ought to receive careful consideration from those who desire to view the present situation with unprejudiced mind. Mr Russell criticises severely the past actions of our own Foreign Office as well as those of the governments of other nations engaged in the conflict. He pleads with sincerity and fervour for the things that are liable to be wholly forgotten in the excitement of battle. "It is important," he urges, "that peace should come as soon as possible, lest European civilisation should perish out of the world. It is important that, after the peace, the nations should feel that degree of mutual respect which will make co-operation possible. It is important that England, the birthplace of liberty and the home of chivalrous generosity, should adopt in the future a policy worthy of itself, embodying its best, not deviously deceptive towards the hopes of its more humane citizens." Mention should be made of an able little book by Mr C. Delisle Burns on *The Morality of Nations: An Essay on the Theory of Politics* (London: University of London Press, 1915). Mr Burns holds that it is Hegel, and not Treitschke and Nietzsche, whose influence in the matter of State-worship and the Kultur-Staat is most pernicious. Hegel was the official guide for the Prussian bureaucracy, and his philosophy subordinated every portion of social life to the State. Mr Burns argues that state-organisation is based on nationality and exists for bringing groups into contact in spite of local division. The nature of the State can only be understood if account be taken of its relations with other States. All philosophies which even imply that the State is isolated are out of date.

Several important articles bearing on historical systems of philosophy have appeared lately. Mr P. S. Burrell discusses in *Mind* (January and April 1916) "The Plot of Plato's *Republic*." He tries to show that the *Republic* is not a congeries of fragments clumsily put together representing now what "the historical Socrates" said, now what he might have said, now Plato's own doctrines, but that unity of form as well as unity of idea is characteristic of the work throughout. Polemarchus defines justice in such a way as immediately to raise the question whether there is any goodness in justice at all. The moral problem thus assumes the form, "What is the good of justice?" And this in its turn inevitably leads on to the consideration of the fundamental ethical question, "What is the meaning of good?" The object of Book I. is to state the issue, and of the rest of the dialogue to furnish the solution. In a not very convincing treatment of "The *Parmenides* of Plato" (*Phil. R.*, March 1916) Mr Paul E. More maintains that Plato did not mean to direct his argument against the Parmenidean unity itself, but that his aim rather was to tear away from this unity the scaffolding which had been raised about it by the later Eleatics and Megarians, and so to leave it in the form of an obscure intuition, such as it appeared to Parmenides himself, untouched by the rationalism which would petrify it into a logical negation of experience. Mr G. A. Johnston writes on "The Influence of Mathematical Conceptions on Berkeley's Philosophy" (*Mind*, April 1916), and has some interesting things to say of the way in which Berkeley's metaphysical theory of signs and his ethics were affected by mathematical ideas. Mr A. A. Bowman contributes to *Mind* (January 1916) a very thorough and careful inquiry upon "Kant's View of Metaphysics." In view of the position taken in the pre-Critical writings and in the *Lectures on Metaphysic* (published by Heinze in 1894), Mr Bowman concludes (1) that the Criticism of pure reason, issuing in phenomenalism, includes the logical presuppositions of

the latter, and therefore a body of doctrine which, whether it is designated Ontology or Transcendental Analytic, can only be characterised as metaphysical, so that metaphysics is an integral part of Criticism, and (2) that the Criticism of pure reason, as the *Lectures* imply by including this theme, is a part of metaphysics. What Kant summarily denies in the *Critique* is the possibility of a metaphysic along the lines of the dogmatic systems of the past. In a discussion of "Bergson's Doctrine of Intuition" (*Phil. R.*, January 1916), Mr C. A. Bennett maintains that Bergson has made out a case for an intuitive type of knowledge and has indicated its fruitfulness. It is true, also, that analysis and intuition cannot be carried on simultaneously. But it is a mistake to infer, as Bergson is inclined to do, that this temporal alternation involves a total discontinuity. On the contrary, such alternation must have its roots in an underlying bond of connection wherein each movement contributes by correction and supplementation to the life of the other. Intuition without analysis is dumb and empty; analysis without intuition is fragmentary and unfinished. Like the mystical moment everywhere in life, intuition is "a good place to reach, but a bad place to stay at." If it seek to perpetuate itself it becomes the parent of sentimentality, of states of "fusion," which grow less and less articulate and are certainly not freighted with any burden of knowledge.

Two of the articles in the new eighth volume of the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1915) are of special philosophical interest. Professor J. S. Mackenzie contributes the article on "Metaphysics." He takes the subject of metaphysics to be the most fundamental problems of knowledge and reality, and divides his treatment into three parts: (*a*) the general nature of knowledge; (*b*) the conception of reality and its chief applications; and (*c*) the bearings of metaphysics on other subjects, especially ethics and religion. In dealing with knowledge, he starts from the distinctions (1) between experiencing and the experienced, and (2) between immediate and mediate apprehension. This leads to the discussion of various theories of knowledge. Dr Mackenzie points out that the Kantian doctrine with regard to the necessity of recognising some kind of reality as belonging to the more mediate forms of apprehension, as well as to those that are more immediate, prepares the way for "epistemological realism,"—the view, namely, that everything which we in any way cognise has a kind of reality which is not simply to be identified with the fact that it is immediately apprehended at a particular moment. In dealing with "Reality," he urges that constructive metaphysics, as distinguished from *Gegenstandstheorie*, tries to find the way in which the objects of our experience can be regarded as forming a complete cosmos, such that every object has a definite place in the total order. If strictly pressed, the doctrine of New Realism, it is contended, means that we have to be content with the theory of knowledge, supplemented by *Gegenstandstheorie*,—the attempt to distinguish and arrange the different kinds of objects which we apprehend,—and that we are debarred from forming any definite conception of the order which is involved in the whole. The article on "Mind" is written by Professor Josiah Royce, who confines himself to a discussion of the metaphysical theories of mind. He starts by a treatment of perception and conception as fundamental cognitive processes, and proceeds to insist upon the necessity of recognising a third type of cognitive process which he calls "interpretation through comparison of ideas." This third type of cognitive process is, he maintains, of vital

importance when inquiry is made into our knowledge of the existence of various minds and as to what sort of beings minds are. From the point of view of the cognitive process of interpretation mind is, in all cases where it reaches a relatively full and explicit expression, equally definable in terms of two ideas,—the idea of the self, and the idea of a community of selves. For a mind is essentially a being that manifests itself through signs, and the very being of signs consists in their demanding interpretation. The relations of minds are essentially social; so that a world without at least three minds in it,—one to be interpreted, one the interpreter, and the third the one for whom or to whom the first is interpreted—would be a world without any real mind in it at all.

The Donnellan Lectures on *God and Freedom in Human Experience*, by Dr Charles F. D'Arcy, Bishop of Down (London: Arnold, 1915), cover a wide extent of ground, and deal with most of the fundamental problems in the philosophy of religion. Speaking in Dublin, the lecturer appropriately emphasised the greatness of Berkeley, "the only Irishman whose teaching takes its place as a necessary element in the main stream of human thought." Dr D'Arcy claims in these Lectures to be developing Berkeley's fundamental doctrine, and in this attempted development he has evidently been largely influenced by idealism of the Hegelian type. It seems to me, however, that the two systems of thought are radically incompatible and that from Berkeley's premisses there is no road to Hegelian metaphysic. Indeed, I am convinced that the interpretation which is here put upon Berkeley's teaching is, to say the least, misleading. Berkeley did *not* maintain that "there is no element of my subjective life of which I am aware which cannot be turned into an object, and there is no part of the objective world, so far as I apprehend it, which cannot be reduced to subjective elements" (p. 34). On the contrary, he drew a very sharp distinction between *percipere* and *percipi*, between a mode or attribute of the mind and that which was "in the mind" only by way of idea, between the mind which was active and objects which were passive. And although the author's method of establishing idealism is to some extent Berkeley's, it lacks the strength which Berkeley's, in his day, possessed. Apparently Dr D'Arcy would base idealism upon the ground that "every element of the material world when examined is found to be essentially such that it can have no existence except for the consciousness of a knowing mind" (p. 57). And the only reason offered for this tremendous assertion is that "the material world, as we know it, is a complex of sensations, the secondary qualities—colours, sounds, etc.,—and of relations which group these sensations in certain orders—*i.e.* the primary qualities; and both sensations and relations are essentially of such a kind that they can exist only for a knowing subject." But, surely, the very point which requires proof is here simply assumed. Writer after writer, in recent years, has been advancing arguments to show that a material thing is not a complex of sensations, and to refute the contention that relations subsist only for a knowing subject. It will not do, therefore, now to lay down these dogmas as though they were indisputable truths. From the position thus taken up in regard to the experience of a finite mind, a rapid transition, which Berkeley would scarcely have sanctioned, is made to the proposition that the only one way by which the independent existence of the world can be secured is by assuming the existence of "a great world-mind" whose conscious experience gives being to the material

world in all its elements and qualities both primary and secondary, and in whose life and experience we conscious beings share (pp. 79 *sqq.*). Are, then, material objects as they exist for God also complexes of sensations, and, if so, do these complexes of sensations give rise to the other complexes of sensations in us? Dr D'Arcy tells us that his doctrine is not a doctrine of immanence in the ordinary sense; that it is rather a doctrine of transcendence, according to which God in His full reality transcends both the world of material things and the world of finite persons. Just as the fuller reality of our conscious experience transcends the more abstract reality of the material world, so does God, the highest reality, transcend our conscious experience. God is superpersonal, knowing us from within, and including our whole being as we are in ourselves within His being. In the latter part of the volume, the problems of Freedom (dealt with largely on the lines laid down by Bergson), Pain, Evil, and Immortality are handled, and there is an interesting chapter on Mysticism. Man's innate sense of absolute value is, it is maintained, witness of his value to God and the one sure proof of future life.

Attention should be called to an able article by Mr J. W. Scott "On the Competence of Thought in the Sphere of the Higher Life" (*Phil. R.*, Jan. 1916). Mr. Scott sets himself the task of answering the question whether anything which can vindicate itself as intellectually true is able to "do the work of religious truth" among us, whether there is any truth, reached as other convincing truth is reached, to which we can turn and say, "This is precisely what religion has taught, what it has intuited from afar, and has held up to us always, as the ultimate hope of the world."

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REVIEWS.

Jésus Christ.—By L. de Grandmaison.—"Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi Catholique," edited by A. D'Alès.—Paris, G. Beauchesne, 1915.

M. DE GRANDMAISON's article *Jésus Christ* almost entirely fills the eleventh *fascicule* of the *Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi Catholique.* There is much in it to admire. Of the vast literature of the subject M. de Grandmaison seems to have an easy control. Pamphlets and reviews are often at least as significant as elaborate books, and some of the most significant which have been published in England recently have not escaped his attention. He marshals the materials which his vigilant and accomplished scholarship has collected with the skill of an experienced general. The military metaphor is inevitable, for M. de Grandmaison, writing in defence of what he prizes, that is, the traditional view of the Gospel history, is armed to attack and destroy all modernist views of it. If not exactly chivalrous, he is courteous and usually good-tempered, as from the high eminence of one who is on superior ground. It is, indeed, the kind of courtesy that those who differ from him might describe by a less agreeable term. M. de Grandmaison is not so offensive to them as to say that he believes them to be honest: he is not "superior" enough, and in any case he is too well-bred, to do that. But he never seems to regard them as led to their conclusions by the austere desire to see things as they really were and are. He treats them as enemies (they "dare not" reject all miracles, for instance): they are the victims of rationalistic and philosophical prepossessions, which prevent them from seeing things—as the Church saw them in the past and as M. de Grandmaison among many others still sees them.[1]

Though M. de Grandmaison is in highly distinguished company in this method of "apology for the Catholic Faith," I confess to a little surprise that he (a distinguished scholar of a race in whom we think that lucidity and logic are instinctive) does not seem to be conscious of the fact that the charge of prepossessions comes ill from one who is of set purpose and with full consciousness defending a definite prepossession from which many of those he attacks are immune. The champion of the traditional Christian prepossession, at all events, is disqualified from bringing this particular charge against the modernists. It is a shell that does not explode. It

[1] He is specially severe in his criticisms of M. Loisy, whom he regards as one who merely popularises and develops ideas of German origin. On the other hand, in spite of appearances, he does not wish to class with the rationalists "les deux *Lady Margaret Professors* de théologie."

only makes an ugly noise and raises a little dust on no-man's ground. The noise and the dust may be comforting to those who stand by the gunner's side, but the effect it has on the looker-on at a distance—who also we must suppose is meant to be impressed—is to show him that the supplies from which such explosive shells are made are running out. A new pattern is needed and new ingredients. With all my admiration for the learning of M. de Grandmaison, this is what I feel about his apologetic in its entirety. He deals with the whole Gospel history, and unless things happened just as they are told, he will allow the narratives no value (p. 1473). Though he can speak of the Gospels incidentally as "livres de doctrine et d'édification" and allow the evangelists their special interests, yet he assumes the strictest *historicité* of all the narratives. If this great assumption is once made, there is no need of apology: all modernist theories stand self-condemned. And this is really what happens to them in M. de Grandmaison's hands. His article is a fine elaboration of the traditional view, in which, indeed, concessions are made to modern scholarship and knowledge, but none that more than touch the fringe of the convictions of the Church of the past. The careful accumulation of modern views witnesses to the author's industry; but the collection only serves as a tangled background against which to show up the consistency of the traditional portrait of our Lord, His ideas, and His acts. The *historicité* of the Gospels being presupposed and adopted as the criterion of all other views, it cannot be said that they really have a hearing. Judged by this standard of reference, as it is applied by M. de Grandmaison, questions as to our Lord's consciousness, the narratives of His miracles, His conception of the kingdom, are already settled. The Gospels have spoken, *causa est finita*: we have only to piece together the (admittedly) scattered bits of evidence in order to get the perfect mosaic.

Yet, in spite of this overwhelming *præjudicium*, inasmuch as M. de Grandmaison does profess to "answer" modern objections to the traditional position in regard to the three great questions I have mentioned, it is "correct" that a review of his work should indicate some of the points at which, in common with other apologists of distinction, he seems to fail to appreciate rightly the nature of those objections and accordingly fails to do them justice.

(1) As to our Lord's consciousness, M. de Grandmaison thinks that he has no need of a doctrine of *kenosis*, though in his opposition to such a doctrine he is less peremptory than in other cases. The actual terms, very carefully chosen as usual, in which he expresses himself on the subject (§ 194) seem to leave open the possibility of a *concordat*. But when, in rejecting Dr Sanday's theory, he speaks of it as involving the insuperable difficulty that "Jesus was not conscious of being God, though he was God" (§ 196); and when elsewhere (§ 139) he says "ou Jésus était, *et savait qu'il était*, ce qu'il disait être,—ou quel pitoyable illusionné fut-il?" he excludes the only terms of agreement which are possible between the doctrine of the Incarnation and the facts of the Gospel history,[1] as they present themselves to a large number of modern students of the problems with which they teem. No one can fully penetrate into another's consciousness. Much that went to make up our Lord's consciousness is no

[1] The old explanation (the "economy" of our Lord's "manifestation" of Himself), though not abandoned by M. de Grandmaison (*e.g.* § 317), simply draws a theological veil over the facts.

doubt hidden from us as it was hidden from His earliest biographers. But what they tell us does not support M. de Grandmaison's view. Even the Fourth Gospel does not depict our Lord with so clear a consciousness of actually being God in His life on earth as to justify M. de Grandmaison's *dicta* on the subject. Granted that the incomparable theologian who wrote that Gospel sets before us an interpretation of our Lord's significance from which the full Catholic doctrine of the Trinity was an inevitable inference for later theologians, in all the conditions of their intellectual and religious experience: yet not even so does he represent our Lord Himself as being conscious that He was God. The most exalted sayings are capable in their context of other meanings, and they are so imbedded in sayings and acts that reveal so different an estimate of His own position and status relatively to the Father, that it is only our Catholic prepossessions that forbid us to give them their natural force. Theologians, of course, in their elaborated doctrine, have been at pains to find room for the facts which underlie these sayings, but they have always been burdened by the assumption that if our Lord is God, He must have known it in His life as man. They have never allowed for an Incarnation which involved a veiling of the consciousness of the Incarnate Son. Yet narrative after narrative in the Gospels implies such a veiling. Incidents and sayings throughout the whole Life have to receive, as they regularly have received, artificial interpretations before they can be forced into harmony with the great traditional prepossession. The theory that our Lord really thought of Himself as God is not supported by the Gospels even as they stand. They show us a Person conscious of a unique filial relation to God, conscious that the exercise of quasi-Divine functions is entrusted to Him as in some sense the representative of His Father to the world and the medium through whom the Father's purpose is to be fulfilled. They show us a Person consciously enjoying close communion with God and the sense of dependence on Him which is the ground of His settled and habitual (though not always entirely serene) confidence and assurance. They furnish abundant evidence of a Personality and a Life of which, when the later experiences of Christians also are brought to account, the doctrine of the Incarnation offers incomparably the most adequate interpretation. But that He thought of Himself in His lifetime as in any sense "equal with God" they do not even suggest. And defence of the doctrine of the Incarnation which is to be effective, even on the assumption of such *historicité* of the Gospels as M. de Grandmaison claims for them, must take account of the fact that, so far as the evidence of the Gospels goes, exactly what He was was hidden from our Lord Himself during the days of His Flesh. The "subordinationist" elements in the doctrine of the Church, though they struggle feebly for a place in the full philosophical doctrine of the Trinity, are firmly grounded in history. The philosophical synthesis, and the true valuation of the "human" experience (of which the writer to the Hebrews is our only New Testament exponent), are to be found, if at all, by those who recognise in the "coming down" and the being "born of a woman" a *kenosis* of Divine consciousness (at least as the Church has always understood "Divine" consciousness) which lasted through the Life on earth. To maintain the identity of "the Christ of history" with "the Christ of faith"—the Christ of the Creeds with Jesus of Nazareth—it is not necessary to suppose that our Lord in His life on earth knew Himself as the Second Person of the Holy Trinity, or that His

consciousness was the same as the consciousness of the Risen and Ascended Lord who is the centre of Christian faith.

I need hardly add that M. de Grandmaison does not allow for any real development of our Lord's consciousness through the experiences of His life on earth. In consequence he fails to present his subject with the full appeal it makes. It is true that none of the evangelists was concerned to trace that development, though St Luke again and again shows his "psychological" interests by the variations he makes in narratives common to him and St Mark or St Matthew, as well as by his own special additions. Yet "the Jesus of history" surely escapes the apologist who does not admit a large amount of foreshortening in the accounts of the history in the Gospels. But even so, evidence of development remains. Let me take one instance only, as to which M. de Grandmaison is emphatic—the Messianic consciousness. He says (§ 98) it is certain from the Gospels that from the beginning of His ministry Jesus was convinced that He was the Messiah; and many less conservative students of the Gospels have formed the same inference from their evidence. Yet the words of the Voice at the Baptism, as given in St Mark, have probably no Messianic sense.[1] And the narrative of the Temptation, in which we are taken back to a source older than St Luke or St Matthew, if not than St Mark, supports the inference that it was a peculiar consciousness of Sonship, not of Messiahship, that "imposed itself on the thought of Jesus" at this time. Though the "temptations" have commonly been supposed to have meaning only for one who believed himself to be the Messiah, yet the words are never "If thou be the Christ," but always "If thou be the Son of God"; and the narrative gives us, as far as I know, neglected but by no means negligible evidence that it was the sense of His filial relation to God that inspired the early days of our Lord's ministry, and that the "Messianic consciousness" was, as other evidence in the Gospels suggests, a later development in His mind.

(2) As to the narratives of miracles: if M. de Grandmaison's presuppositions are granted, viz. that the narratives are fully historical,[2] there is of course nothing more to be said. Yet when he proceeds to argue that no one would disbelieve them except because of rationalistic and philosophical prepossessions, he enters on an arena in which, with all respect for him and his many allies on this arena, I must venture to say the weakness of his armour becomes apparent. I have already pointed out the futility, indeed the intellectual disingenuity of this kind of assertion (it is not argument). In the matter of miracles, I suppose that every "modernist" began life with a strong prejudice in favour of the historical truth of the narratives of the Gospels. But for this prejudice, which has been implanted in the minds of the children of Christian parents generation after generation, it might well be maintained that belief in such miracles would not have survived as widely as it has. The strength of the prejudice is seen in the readiness with which devout people have accepted the story of "the

[1] See, for example, Dr J. A. Robinson's Note, *St Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians*, p. 230.

[2] He assumes exact diagnosis of diseases, and complete and permanent cures, instantaneously effected by a gesture or a word. He does not consider the significance of the narratives that tell of cures effected with difficulty. And quoting Mark vi. 5, 6 as "il ne peut faire que peu de miracles," he sees in the statement a "mot admirable de l'évangeliste" showing "la *qualité spirituelle et religieuse* de la puissance thaumaturgique du Maître."

Angels of Mons" as one of the proofs that God is on our side in the present war: just as their inability to understand evidence is shown by their refusal to face the fact that the story first appeared in an evening paper, and that the author has told us that it was on his part a work of purely literary imagination.

I do not know whether this story has come to the notice of M. de Grandmaison, or whether he would understand the position of one who holds that the people who believe that a host of angel warriors protected the English soldiers on their retreat from Mons are nearer the real truth of things than are those who do not believe that God has any interest in this war. (As I have said, he seems to hold that the narratives of the Gospels have no evidential value at all, unless the events took place exactly as they are described.) But the wide credence which the story has obtained illustrates the habit of mind which finds in a miraculous intervention (an act of God not effected through human means) the natural explanation of deliverance from imminent danger or satisfaction of an urgent need; and it shows us before our very eyes in the twentieth century, how rapidly such a "miraculous" interpretation of a remarkable event can win currency among religious people and become for them inextricably blended with the historical fact itself.

Nothing can well be more absurd than the word which has gone round lately to the effect that people who disbelieve in miracles are "obsessed by mid-Victorian science." Many of them at least are much more affected by their literary and historical studies—their study of man and the mind of man as shown in history—than by any philosophical or scientific theory of the universe. Many of them are indeed consciously set against any kind of mechanical or deterministic conceptions of the world and life. All the same, it is worth while to point out to M. de Grandmaison and those whom he represents that, though the more fashionable philosophy of the moment and the latest physical theories do not support mechanical or deterministic views of the world-process, neither do they furnish any fresh grounds for belief in the particular miracles narrated in the Gospels, to which exception is most commonly taken. No more does the most advanced medical science and therapeutic of to-day.

M. de Grandmaison will not allow us to pick and choose among these miracles—and so far he is on firmer ground than some apologists; yet the arguments by which he supports these miracles *en bloc* are applicable only to some of them. Other apologists, who admit some measure of discrimination and regard some of the miracles as "better attested" (which means more credible) than others, fail to realise how seriously this discrimination of theirs discredits the witnesses. For the chief problem which all apologists ignore is just the fact that the authors of our Gospels make no such discrimination. They tell us that the bodies of the dead came out of their graves and appeared in Jerusalem after the Resurrection, that a few loaves and fishes were literally multiplied into many, that a fig-tree was withered by a word, that organic diseases were suddenly cured, and that our Lord walked on water, just as straightforwardly and simply as they tell of cures of functional maladies similar to some which are effected to-day, under no kind of religious impulse or suggestion; and they represent them all alike as miracles.

M. de Grandmaison may dismiss as "rationalistic" all the explanations of these miracles that have been suggested; but, as he lays so much stress

on the prepossessions of "modernists," he would have been well advised, I think, to have allowed something also for the prepossessions of the witnesses of the facts and the authors of the narratives, and to have used the narratives chiefly as evidence of the impression our Lord produced.

At all events it is to be regretted that, in giving so much space to the subject, he does not pay attention to some of the chief "objections" that need to be "answered." The conceptions which militate against belief in the miracles of the Gospels are the result of a much wider experience of life and knowledge of phenomena than was possible nineteen centuries ago. There is the fact that what we still like to call the conquest of "Nature" is no conquest at all, but is made up of a long succession of discoveries of the ways in which Nature works, or the forces which are present in the world, and the careful application of these forces and these ways of working to our own purposes. In this respect our progress has depended on our aptitude as pupils of Nature in learning obedience to her ordinary ways. And it is beyond question that the Biblical *data* on which the mediæval philosophy of the universe was largely based impeded this learning. Similarly it is, for example, by ignoring altogether the theory of demonic possession that medical science has made some of its most beneficent advances: microbes, not devils, are the objects of its study; plagues are not stayed but prevented by improved sanitation; remedies are found for the physical ailments of the sinner at least as readily as for those of the saint, immunity can be conferred on the one as on the other: the faith that heals to-day is not necessarily faith in God: in all directions men have been taught not to expect miraculous cures "by the finger of God," but to set their hopes on a growing insight into the ways of Nature and provident measures of prevention.

These are considerations which come from common experience, and influence ordinary people in their attitude to the narratives of miracles in the Gospels. M. de Grandmaison does not deal with them.

Nor does he meet the religious "objections" to miracles which are based on the conviction that physical "laws," so far as they work in the universe, are the expression of God's will and one of His means for the education of the human race: so that to ask to be "miraculously" set free from them is to ask to be released from the very discipline which God in His wisdom has devised for us, and to play truant from the school of life. It is, surely, superficial rather than deep thinking that leads anyone to ascribe such an objection as this to "an unchristian view of God and the world." Where we come nearest to our Lord's own mind on the subject, as in the narrative of the Temptation, it is clear that His settled purpose was to accept fully the ordinary conditions of life in the world and not to look for "miraculous" help to further His mission on earth. And is it possible to vindicate as Christian the conception of the "freedom" of God in the name of which miracles in general are defended, and the argument from miracle to God superseded by the argument from God to miracle? M. de Grandmaison does not use this particular argument: but no less than those who make much of it he seems to look for sure proof of the activity of God in the world only in manifestations which are abnormal and appear to us to be arbitrary and capricious. Yet the "freedom" which the most intelligent Christian Theology asserts of God is not the absolute or unconditioned exercise of power: it is freedom to work out

His purpose for men in and through the constitution which He has given to them and the world in which He has placed them; it is freedom conditioned by this constitution; and the only kind of miracle which would be consonant with this kind of freedom would be one which revealed to men more clearly the real conditions of their life in the world. Dr Westcott fifty years ago firmly repudiated the then prevalent view that our Lord's miracles were proofs of the Revelation, and claimed them rather as parts of it. But he gave no clear answer to the question What is it, then, that they reveal? Save perhaps for some of the cures of disease, do the miracles attributed to our Lord reveal to us the ways in which God actually works in the world, so that we are justified in relying on Him to succour us in our need in similar ways? Do they really help us to understand better the actual conditions, spiritual and physical, under which as long as we are in the world we must live? And if not, what is it that they "reveal"?

These are some of the questions which the modern apologist of the Gospel miracles must meet, if he is to be effective. M. de Grandmaison, by the method he has followed, will only convince those who are already convinced: that is all, I am afraid, that any apology on the lines he has chosen can ever effect.

(3) As to our Lord's conception of the kingdom, M. de Grandmaison acknowledges the services of the "eschatological" school in calling attention to apocalyptic elements in our Lord's teaching which had been unduly neglected, but he is unwilling to give to these elements a permanent value. The reception of the Fourth Gospel perhaps indicates, as he argues, that the Church was not unwilling, at a comparatively early date, to admit a spiritualised conception of the kingdom.[1] But the fact remains that the prevalent and dominant belief of Christians was that the Lord was coming to establish His kingdom on earth, and that this belief is seen in all groups of the writings of the New Testament. While I agree with M. de Grandmaison in the conviction that the "eschatologists" of to-day draw from the facts they have recovered as to early Christian beliefs wrong inferences—some of them as to our Lord's authority in general and others as to the significance and value of His ethical teaching: yet I am sure that the business of the true apologist is not to whittle away those facts, but to correct anything that is inconsistent with them in prevalent conceptions as to the conditions of our Lord's life in the world. A better apology may be found in an estimate of our Lord's consciousness as man nearer to the facts of the Gospel history than M. de Grandmaison's, and a more intelligent appreciation of the meaning of an *Interimsethik* than those who invented the catch-word have formed. The apologist "of the truth of religion" who looks only to the past does but half his work: he must show the value of the beliefs he defends for the present and the future. Our Lord believed that the kingdom of God was to be established on earth, and He showed in imperishable sayings and in all the activities of His life what the kingdom of God on earth and the people in it would be like. And He left to His disciples, His Church, the task of making the world ready for its coming. It is depressing, at this moment of all others, to

[1] The Fourth Gospel has been read by thousands for everyone who has realised that its conception of the Kingdom was *sui generis*, and indeed it is not clear that it is. The answer to Pilate does not mean that, and the Coming of the Spirit does not exclude the Second Coming in the Kingdom.

find an apologist who does not seem to see the immense apologetic value of this great Christian belief and hope, and is still willing to dally with the idea that in some sense or other the kingdom has already come. Is the faith which the Son of Man finds on earth, when He comes, to be found only outside the Church? The Church's own apology for her failure to keep the early ideal alive in the past may be sufficient; but our generation at least is learning to expect of the Church of Christ a more adventurous faith in the possibility of the coming of the kingdom on earth to which He looked forward, and it is learning it in large part from the kind of historical study of the Gospels and of the history of the Church which the Church as a whole does not welcome.

Though I differ profoundly from M. de Grandmaison as to what constitutes a true apologetic of the Faith to-day, I cannot take leave of him in any but the most respectful way. His last main section is headed "Le témoignage du Saint Esprit," and after citing "the witness of the Spirit to the Nazarene" in the experience of Christians generation after generation, he concludes: "Cette grande nuée de témoins, venue des quatre vents, contient des esprits de toute sorte: des savants et des simples, des rudes et des raffinés. Tous confessent que Jésus leur a révélé le Père; tous voient en lui leur Sauveur et leur Dieu." Happily the Spirit leads to this confession by many different paths, and uniformity of belief as to our Lord's consciousness, miracles, and the Kingdom is not needed as a passport.

J. F. Bethune-Baker.

Cambridge.

The Ideals of the Prophets. Sermons by the late S. R. Driver, D.D., Professor of Hebrew and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. Together with a Bibliography of his published writings.—Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1915.—8vo, pp. xii + 239.

Dr Driver died on the 26th of February 1914. He left instructions for a volume of his sermons to be published. This has now been produced, with a prefatory note by Dr George A. Cooke, and with a valuable bibliography of Dr Driver's very numerous publications, compiled by Mr Godfrey R. Driver, Scholar of New College.

The volume contains twenty sermons. They are all based on Old Testament texts, and, except in three cases, all these texts are from the prophets. There is therefore a certain unity of theme. But it is not such a unity as is suggested by the splendid title, "The Ideals of the Prophets." There is not in these sermons any systematic or sustained discussion of the ideals of any prophet; not even of Isaiah, though eight of the sermons are based on texts from Isaiah. Amos, Hosea, and Micah receive no mention. The sermons, in fact, are occasional in their origin. They are mostly brief; their composition belongs to different dates. We think it is a reasonable complaint that the title, chosen we suppose by the editor, does not fairly indicate the character of the book.

But there is a deeper reason why the expectations raised by the title are not satisfied. Dr Driver was a scholar of great courage and candour, who did inestimable service in helping his countrymen to understand their Bible. But he was essentially a philologist, and not a constructive theologian. To philological evidence his mind was always obedient.

Philology implies history, and his acquaintance with Semitic history was deep and extensive. Philology and history can do a great deal for the interpretation of the Old Testament, particularly in the correction of the traditional theories of its composition. But they do not provide the essential clue for the valuation of Old Testament prophecy. And throughout these sermons Dr Driver is haunted by a theological conception of prophecy, and his exposition is hampered again and again by the apologetic problem of the non-fulfilment of so many of the prophetic forecasts. To him the discrepancy between prophecy and its fulfilment is "painful" (p. 87). His scholarship is too profound to allow him to take refuge in a supposed "figurative" intention, or to resort to the exegetical expedient of spiritualising the prophetic imagery so as to make it a prediction, in disguise, of Christianity. Yet the many non-fulfilments seem to him to clamour for explanation. He finds some kind of a way out in the sermon which has the specific title, "The Ideals of the Prophets" (Sermon IX.), and it is in a passage which we believe is the only obscure one in the book. He rightly says that the prophet is "much more than a foreteller": "he is, in a far wider sense, the interpreter of the thoughts of God, the announcer to man of the Divine Will and plan." And he goes on to add, "He is not the less a true prophet because the picture of the future which he draws is sometimes a Divine ideal, rather than the reality which history actually brings with it" (pp. 90, 91). That is to say, the non-fulfilment of prophecy by history is excusable when the picture is a "Divine ideal." This explanation is offered in mitigation of the failure of the Return from the Exile to realise the glowing anticipations of the writers of Isaiah xxxv. and xl.–lx. It is not scholarship but apologetics which impels to this kind of defence of prophecy, and it does justice neither to the prophets nor to God. The natural solution of the difficulty surely is that foretelling is not of the essence of Hebrew prophecy. The prophets were men of extraordinary moral insight and spiritual passion. Their mark upon history is not due to their political sagacity, or to any success in forecasting the events of the future. It is due to their tenacious and undismayed certainty of the moral values and spiritual claims of human life in the pure service of God. These themes are the motives of their ideas and their ideals. They provide us with abundant material for study, for exposition, for admiration. And the preoccupation with the artificial problem of foretelling and fulfilment only obscures our proper appreciation of the prophets' genuine services in the evolution of religious knowledge and the education of the human race.

Within the limits which Dr Driver's conception of prophecy imposes upon him, it will scarcely need saying that these sermons are full of excellent matter. Those who are in the habit of decrying philological study will find here how great a light can be thrown upon difficult passages by the loving study of words, with their shades of meaning and the shades of the shades of meaning. Such expositions as those of Habakkuk ii. 4 (Sermon IV.) and of Psalm cxxxix. (Sermon XVIII.) are beautiful in their clarity and precision. Also, in describing the conditions in which a prophet declared his message Dr Driver displays a rare skill in biting in the historical background and in describing the man in his times.

As a preacher Dr Driver seldom made any appeal to the emotions. These sermons rarely lead up to more than a modest exhortation to give

heed to a prophetic warning, or to rely upon the security of a prophetic word. It may be that for some readers they will seem to be too much concerned with the interpretation of prophetic sentences, and too little with the exhibition of the prophetic principles. But they are based always upon a learning which really illuminates and is never pedantic; their language is uniformly clear; and they are penetrated with a grave and dignified piety. Presumably they are the last contributions which the world will receive from Dr Driver's pen. They will be gladly welcomed by all students of the Old Testament, and with special gratitude by those to whom it was given to hear his living voice and to learn from the living teacher.

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NOTTING HILL GATE, LONDON.

The Unity of Western Civilization.—Essays arranged and edited by F. S. Marvin.—H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1915.—Pp. 315.

INVINCIBLE optimism would appear to be so native to the soul of man, that it was considered necessary to inscribe a solemn admonition to abandon hope even over the gates of Hell. It ought not therefore to occasion surprise to find that, even in the midst of the most extensive and most intensively atrocious of the wars that stain the bloody pages of human history, it is possible to get together a team of distinguished professors to discourse on the unity of civilisation in an amiable and hopeful, though at times rather vague and not altogether relevant, manner. The preface tells us that the fourteen lectures which compose the volume were delivered at the Summer School of the Woodbrooke Settlement near Birmingham in August 1915. In a general way the lecturers seem to belong not so much to the militant writers who wish to stereotype the belligerent attitudes which the situation has forced upon all nations, as to those who recognise the necessity of rendering national patriotism compatible with international intercourse. But they are more guarded than courageous in their statements, and differ considerably among themselves in opinion and style, in the interest and importance of their contribution, thus illustrating how vague and relative a term is the notion of unity they are discussing. Neither do they succeed in showing that Western Civilisation has achieved any very impressive amount of unity either in legislation, science, philosophy, education, commerce, or religion, not infrequently enforcing rather the lesson that, as compared with the Middle Ages, man has in many respects moved backwards. Some of them show symptoms of feeling the political restraints upon free speech (cf. pp. 249, 259): but their tone remains resolutely hopeful. Among the lectures some stand out. Professor Hobhouse, on Science and Philosophy as unifying forces, is refreshingly clear and outspoken. He does not shrink from definitions, and makes bold to say that the Hegelian doctrine of the State's omnipotence "is false to history, false in political theory and mischievous in ethics, but nowhere more false than in relation to the world of thought" (p. 162). It would have been interesting to have had a revision of the "idealist" theory of the State in the light of its consequences from Dr Bosanquet, or from Professor J. A. Smith, who writes merely on the Greco-Roman tradition, and

professes himself a disciple of Croce. Mr J. A. Hobson, on the Political Bases of a World State, is incisive and makes a good point in insisting that "the pressures of civilization have been more and more towards extra-national activities," though governments are "still dominated by foolish and obsolescent rules of a narrowly national economy" and quarrel over "interferences with the free play of economic internationalism" (p. 263). Mr Hartley Withers amusingly illustrates "commerce and finance as international forces," by an economic interpretation of Biblical history in which Solomon's trade balance is analysed, and his wisdom figures as the first recorded example of an "invisible export." But he hardly, perhaps, goes deep enough or treats fully and seriously enough the menace to international trade of States trying to form self-contained and self-sufficing areas, resembling ancient China in its exclusiveness but not in its unaggressiveness. In completeness the programme of the lecturers leaves something to be desired. Besides the absence of a discussion on the theory of the State, which has already been remarked, one finds no paper on Nationality, though "malignant" nationalism, as an American thinker has said, has been a chief cause of the situation, nor any inquiry into the question how far the strict doctrine of national "independence" and "sovereignty" is compatible either with international morality or with a system of permanent alliances. Some of the thorniest obstacles to international "unity," therefore, would appear to be shirked; but we ought no doubt to be grateful for what the authors give us.

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The Way of Martha and the Way of Mary.—By Stephen Graham.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1915.—Pp. 291.

The author tells us in the preface that his book is "an interpretation and a survey of Eastern Christianity and a consideration of ideas at present to the fore in Christianity generally." Through his knowledge of Russia Mr Graham has been led to his conception of the meaning of Eastern Christianity, and the book has, so to speak, a Russian setting. The incidents and the stories with which the author illustrates, or rather through which he brings out, his meaning, are mostly taken from Russian life; and it is the religion of Russia which expresses for him "the way of Mary," as opposed to "the way of Martha," the way of Western Christianity. The book is strikingly written. It consists of a series of chapters which, though apparently disconnected, are held together by a unity of meaning and of purpose that runs through all of them. And it is this inner meaning of the book that makes it of permanent value to students of religious psychology.

Perhaps the best way of approaching *The Way of Martha and the Way of Mary* is by indicating at the outset what it is not. It is not an interpretation or survey of Eastern Christianity in an historical or theological sense. The distinction the author draws between the ecclesiastical Church and the living Church makes it clear that he is not concerned with dogmas or institutions, but with religion as expressed in the whole life of a people. It is not an objective study of Russia. It would be a mistake to look to

the book for a concrete living picture of Russian life. Mr Graham's descriptions of the peasants, of the altruistic family of his friends the V.'s, of the middle-class people who have lost their religion and represent "Russia going wrong," etc., are no doubt true enough, but they are not the whole truth. The peasants are not always crossing themselves and lighting candles and talking of religion; nor do all "Westernised" Russians drink and care for money and vulgar pleasures—as an unwary reader might be led to imagine. So far as the treatment of Russia is concerned, the value of the book lies not in the concrete illustrations, but in the wonderful insight with which some of the essential features of the national character are brought out. The chapter called "The Russian Idea" is a remarkable analysis of what is best in the Russian people—their love for the suffering, their essential honesty, tolerance, and absence of condemnation: all of which exemplify, as Mr Graham puts it, "the love towards the individual and the individual destiny."

The interpretation of Eastern, as opposed to Western, Christianity is extremely interesting and suggestive. But it is written largely from a subjective point of view, and much of it therefore seems arbitrary. The chief difference between East and West is said to be in their attitude to "the world." The way of Mary is the denial of the world, the way of Martha is the acceptance of the world and "trying to make the best of it." The belief of Russian Christianity is that we are but strangers and pilgrims here, that things of this world are as nothing and of no account, that this earthly life is but a preparation, through suffering, for an eternal life which is to come. Hence it does not seek to remove suffering or to reform the world. But the West takes for granted that pain is an evil, and its ideal is to banish suffering; "its work is in the world and its passion is for the realisation of good worldly hopes." It wants to heal the sick, to feed the hungry, to raise the poor. This is the way of Martha. So long as the work of Martha is understood as doing material good, it is bound to fail. It is by spiritual things alone that the world can be saved. Martha's true way is not so much materially to relieve those who suffer as to give them a new outlook on life, to make them see that suffering does not really matter. Thus the two ways are reconciled, and both are seen to be true aspects of Christianity. Martha draws her strength and inspiration from the meditative and mystical way of Mary. "It is that way that speaks triumphantly in the Church. . . . The service of the Church is more than a consecration of duty. It is bearing witness to the Truth, a watching till He come, an expectancy, a getting into position for a great procession. . . . The light of the Church is the light of transfiguration, not the light of the common day." Mary's is the better part. By denying the world, she gains the vision of a higher reality; she stands at the very source of the Everlasting Life. Martha remains "behind" in the world; but so long as she remembers that she is not of it, that this transitory life is not the real life, she too is in communion with the kingdom of Christ. And many of those who live the ordinary life of the world, work, marry, have children, "look longingly towards the wilderness, feeling that perhaps after all the better part is to be found out there."

There is, however, another line of thought running through Mr Graham's book, and it is based, it seems to me, upon a deeper conception than that of denying the world or of viewing this life as a stepping-stone to eternity. "Denial of the world" means splitting the universe in two and rejecting

one-half of it as unreal: "this world is not our world, nor our life the true life." But through his experience of the spiritual life of Russia Mr Graham has been led to the idea of the world as an organic unity, each part of which is eternal and full of meaning. "Nothing is without significance; every man has his part; by his life he divines it and fulfils it. Every common sight or sound is charged with mystery." From this point of view, the way of Mary is not the *better* part, but only one of the ways of giving one's soul to God. "There are thousands of ways. Everyone who is living well has found a way." It is in this recognition of the manifoldness of life that the chief interest and value of the book is to be found. *The Way of Martha and the Way of Mary* is a wonderful presentation in an artistic form of the world viewed *sub specie æternitatis.*

The philosopher's ideal of being "spectator of all time and of all existence" lives in every mind conscious of spiritual realities. We long to escape from the mere succession of moments that replace and expel one another; we feel that the real values cannot pass away. It is to this deepest aspiration of the human soul that Mr Graham gives expression in some of the most beautiful passages of his book. "If we had the poet's eye and the poet's point of view, we could see the *time-that-was* existent now, we could see it glowing and breathing and singing. . . ." "That is the full roll of history—to see the broad eternity in each moment. To see that, is to see the great phantasmagoria, the infinite blending of all shapes and colours, of all the runic and mystic manifestations, which, seen in small, thrill us and puzzle us and perplex us in our mortal lives." Through his description of the Russian churches and services, of the theatre, of the market-place, of the sights of the road, Mr Graham makes one conscious of the world as a great and wonderful unity each part of which is essential to the whole. "We are encompassed about by mystery. Every common sight is a rune, a letter of the Divine alphabet, written upon all earthly things. Man's heart is a temple with many altars, and it is dark to start with, and strange. But it is possible with every ordinary impression of life to light a candle in that church till it is ablaze with lights like the sky."

It is this insistence on the spiritual value of the ordinary things of life, this vision of the world as an eternal *now*, that seems to me to be the true message of Mr Graham's book. NATHALIE A. DUDDINGTON.

LONDON.

Homer and History. By Walter Leaf. London. Macmillan and Co. 1915.

IN its narrower sense the Homeric question has become of late years rather a barren matter of controversy. In its wider application it has been most fruitful. If we must reconcile ourselves to the fact that we may not reasonably look for a precise answer to the question of the authorship of the Homeric poems and of the circumstances in which they were composed, there is ample compensation in the flood of fresh light that has been thrown on the Homeric world by recent discoveries and researches. No one can read Dr Leaf's most penetrating and stimulating study without feeling how greatly the world of Homer is illuminated. The ancient Ægean civilisation, now much more fully revealed to us by what may be literally termed the epoch-making discoveries of Sir Arthur Evans in Crete, forms a prelude to the study of the Homeric age. The last great

period of the Cretan civilisation may be dated to the sixteenth and fifteenth centuries B.C. At that time the Minoan influence had permeated a large part of Greece. Cretan invaders had come to dwell among and exercise a domination over the indigenous population, and the traces of their occupation are seen most notably in the remains at Tiryns and Mykene. The fourteenth and thirteenth centuries are an age of decline in the Minoan civilisation, a period, as Dr Leaf describes it, of turmoil and disaster over the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean. It is in this period that the Achaians come down into Greece from the North and displace the Minoans in their predominance. It is the Achaians who appear in Homer as leading the expedition against Troy, and Dr Leaf contends for the substantial accuracy of the Homeric tradition. He sees in the Achaians an aristocratic caste which assimilated much of the culture of the dispossessed Minoans. Subordinate chiefs, Achilles, Odysseus and the others, under the hegemony of the supreme king Agamemnon, exercised from their strongholds a domination over the much more numerous Pelasgian population of Greece. He deduces most convincingly the causes that must have led the Achaians in their search for expansion, in particular for mercantile expansion, to undertake the expedition against Troy, the fortress that blocked their way to the trade of the Black Sea. But the enterprise exhausted the conquerors as well as the conquered. Of this we have clear enough evidence in the *Odyssey*; and in the Dark Ages, which precede the Greece of the historians, the Achaians as a ruling and once victorious people disappear from our view.

The Achaian regime was glorious but short-lived. When we trace the genealogies of the Homeric heroes backwards and forwards it is not many generations before we find no ancestors or descendants. And the characteristic Olympian religion appears as a superstructure built on the Chthonian worship, which has of late years become the object of so much investigation. Dr Leaf shows us how greatly we may rely on the Homeric poems for the facts of Achaian civilisation, how consistent is the account we get therefrom. His contentions convince us all the more because they are based on a common-sense interpretation of the poems. The impression we get from them is not of a world of make-believe, but of one which for the most part suggests a close adherence to actual history or tradition. Of course a great deal both of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* belongs to the region of poetry or fable. And Dr Leaf discriminates very clearly between the domains of fact and fiction in the poems. He is not guilty of the over-subtlety which seeks to find geographical accuracy when Odysseus enters the region of fairyland. Quite obviously a great part of the *Odyssey* belongs to the world of fable. Or, to take an instance from the *Iliad*, less obvious perhaps but quite as striking, of the distinction between the historian and the poet in Homer. We may believe in the long siege of Troy according to the Homeric tradition. But, as Dr Leaf says, the account we get of the Achaian forces as cut off entirely from their homes and knowing nothing of what is happening in Greece, is clearly the device of the poet to add to the poignancy of the situation. As a matter of fact they were only a few days' journey from their homes, and communications must have been constant. Dr Leaf accepts, however, the main tradition. He writes: "Agamemnon was a real king of Mykene and over-lord of all the Argives; and I am not afraid of the conclusion, however humorously put, that 'Menelaos was a well-known infantry officer with auburn whiskers.'"

There is one great exception to the consistency of the account of the Achaians we get in Homer. This is to be found in the Catalogue of the Greek ships in the Second Book of the *Iliad*. From the rest of Homer we get a clear and consistent impression of the organisation of the Greeks, and, in particular, of the great kingdoms of Peleus, Odysseus, and Agamemnon. The Greek Catalogue gives an account which it is impossible to reconcile with this. A great part of Dr Leaf's book is occupied with an examination of the two traditions. The question has been one of great controversy, but we think that Dr Leaf is entirely successful in making good his contention that the Catalogue lies entirely outside the main Homeric tradition. In the Catalogue we find Greece divided up into a large number of small principalities. Many tribes, cities, and heroes, named in the Catalogue, do not reappear in the *Iliad*; and the organisation is quite different. In the rest of the *Iliad* we find the Achaian chiefs with their followers under the direction of the supreme king Agamemnon. In the Catalogue, Nestor says to Agamemnon, "Separate thy warriors by tribes and clans, that tribe may give aid to tribe and clan to clan." As Dr Leaf writes, "The words show clearly two things: first, the belief that a tribal division was the only rational basis for an army; and secondly, that it was not to be found in Homer. . . . Regarded as tactical advice to a general in the tenth year of the war, they are foolishness; but as an indication of the reasons which prompted the composition of the Catalogue and its introduction into the *Iliad* they are full of instruction. They sum up the Hellenic ideal in contrast to the Achaian; the city-state in contrast to the military despotism."

But it is impossible in a summary to do justice to Dr Leaf's acute treatment of the problems raised by the Catalogue. One last point may be mentioned. He contends that the Greek fleet could never have mustered at Aulis. This famous gathering of the ships at Aulis was invented for the glorification of the Bœotians. Dr Leaf writes, "A practical general, having to deal with an enemy like the Trojans, who seem to have owned no fleet, would aim at assembling his navy within striking distance of his objective, thus avoiding many risks and multiplying his power. An obvious place for such a rendezvous is Lemnos, with its magnificent harbour." He explains, in the preface, that this, "which now has the air of an *ex post facto* prophecy, was in fact printed off as it stands long before the beginning of the war." Events have certainly justified the acumen of Dr Leaf's contentions in this instance. We may anticipate with confidence that subsequent research will justify many other conclusions also at which he arrives in this most interesting book.

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Religion and Reality.—By James Henry Tuckwell.—London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1915.

THIS book is an attempt to reconcile the competing claims of reason and mysticism by means of a certain type of Absolutist philosophy. The writer seeks to show by an analysis of religious experience and of the basis of our intellectual life that the ultimate reality must be the Absolute or the

One in the Many. The introductory chapters are taken up with an inquiry into the meaning and essence of religion. The view of William James that there is no essential principle involved in all the varieties of religious experience is combated. Mr Tuckwell adduces James's exclusive employment of the psychological or empirical method as the reason of his failure to discover any one common element in all types of religious experience. This method by itself is wholly inadequate to the performance of the task assigned. The essence of religion must be sought for "in the deeper bases of our life with which it is the province of metaphysics or transcendental philosophy to deal" (p. 14). Hence the method which we must employ to discover this essence is the *a priori* method, for, unless the ego be investigated, we cannot answer the question, "What is religious experience?" From this it follows that Mr Tuckwell's inquiry is not an anthropological one into the historic origin of creeds and cults, but an inquiry into the actual *motive* which inspired worship. The question to be answered is not, "Under what circumstances did religion arise and develop?" but "What was the impelling power which made the human soul realise its need of religion?" Mr Tuckwell finds, in agreement with certain other thinkers, that the essence of religion is "the quest on the part of the finite mind for the perfection of the Absolute" (p. 27). "Everywhere," he says, "religion arises from man's feeling of need, of weakness, of incompleteness, of limitation, and a consequent impulse to surmount it by union of some kind with beings possessed of powers of life higher than his own, of whom in one way or another he has succeeded in framing to himself some conception" (p. 39). This definition of the essence of religion suggests a certain philosophical theory by means of which the whole universe may be interpreted. At the same time religion and religious experience must not be treated as unique, as belonging exclusively to man, and accordingly Mr Tuckwell proceeds to connect religious experience and its desire for the Perfect with other forms of this striving towards perfection. The third and fourth chapters, "Religion and the Evolutionary Process," involve an excursion into the realm of biology. Mr Tuckwell points out the allied character of religious experience which yearns for the Infinite and the Eternal, and the universal striving of life, the *élan vital* of Bergson. "This *élan* is the really characteristic picture of life as such, whether religious or otherwise" (p. 42). Bergson's use of the phrase "creative evolution" is criticised. "Evolution" does not explain: it only states a fact which itself needs interpretation. We must not overlook the teleological factor which implies a metaphysical standpoint in the interpretation of the evolutionary process. And so Mr Tuckwell finds in the *élan vital* metaphysical implications—"it involves in it, active and everywhere, the Absolute Perfection" (p. 68). And since the Absolute is best revealed in the mystic experience of the religious genius, religion interprets the process of evolution.

The expressions "perfect experience" and "perfect life" as applied to the Absolute have now to be defined. Three characteristics of the Perfect are laid down as necessary: (1) The Perfect must be the All-inclusive. (2) It must be a harmonious experience. Harmony implies the One in the Many, as is found in the unity of the ego amid the manifold of its experiences. (3) It must be immediate, *i.e.* of the nature of feeling rather than thought, since thought, being ideal, is characteristic of all *finite* experience. The problem now arises how this Perfect Experience is to be interpreted.

The solution lies within us. "If we would know ultimate truth and reality we must begin with the knowledge of self" (p. 88). Now, the self as the One in the Many is "something that lives in and through all physical happenings as their source and ground. It is an active developing principle." On this analogy we interpret the universe. The Perfect Self is revealed in all the highest experiences of the race and in the whole process of evolution. If we now ask what relation there is between this Perfect, All-inclusive Self and the finite self, Mr Tuckwell has a ready answer. It is evident, he thinks, that this Perfect Self is not a person. Personality is "necessarily" finite, because it involves other selves over against it. The Absolute cannot be *primus inter pares*. Mr Tuckwell cannot find a place in his philosophy for "the God of popular theology, the God who hears prayer and is a friend to man" (p. 102). The Great Companion is dead! The last chapters deal at considerable length with the problem of experiencing the Perfect; *i.e.* does this experience involve the ultimate extinction of the finite self in the One Universal Self? Mr Tuckwell decides for the negative. Just as the individual can enter into the life of the race without becoming the race, so the finite self can enter into and experience the larger abundant life of the Perfect Self without losing its personal identity. The concluding chapter is devoted to a description of the necessary conditions and accompaniments of this experience.

Mr Tuckwell is most convincing in the earlier chapters, in his criticism, *e.g.*, of certain forms of pragmatism and his reassertion of the rights of reason to interpret Ultimate Reality. But the weakness of his position seems to us to lie in his analysis of self and personality and in their application to the Absolute. Mr Tuckwell distinguishes between self and personality. The latter is the narrower, and implies (1) self-consciousness and (2) exclusion of other selves. He attributes "self" to the Absolute, but not "personality." In the tenth chapter, however, he dwells at length upon the self or transcendental ego as given in memory. Yet surely memory involves self-consciousness! This is the cardinal point in Mr Tuckwell's peculiar Absolutist position, and if it involves a confusion of terms the entire position must be surrendered. For, if personality or self-consciousness be attributed to the Deity, he can no longer be the One in the Many or the Absolute for which Mr Tuckwell contends.

KENNETH DUNBAR.

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The Romanticism of St Francis and other Studies in the Genius of the Franciscans.—By Father Cuthbert, O.S.F.C.—London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1915.—Pp. viii + 274.

FATHER CUTHBERT combines in happy simplicity two qualities which are often found in opposition. He is a diligent scholar and he is an ardent disciple. It was this union which gave special value to his *Life of St Francis*, and has made it the most illuminating study which has been written in English. He knows the sources, and moves with ease among their literary problems; but a taste for documents never weakens his reverence for personality or dims his perception of the living spirit behind the record. His new volume of essays is marked by precisely the same

qualities. The footnotes will satisfy the exacting company of specialists that he is one of their fellowship, while his aim throughout is not so much to establish a fact as to interpret a secret. For him the Franciscan ideal is a matter neither for enlightened criticism nor for sentimental praise. By deliberate choice it is for him part of human nature's daily food, an unfailing source of strength and joy, and everything he writes about it has upon it this illumination of experience. But to turn to the book itself. It consists of four essays—"The Romanticism of St Francis," "St Clare of Assisi," "The Story of the Friars," and "A Modern Friar"—the last an affectionate tribute to Father Alphonsus, the missionary priest and Minister Provincial of the English Province of his Order, who died in 1911. They are all intended to illustrate the ideal of evangelical poverty as it enters into union with different types of character or is modified, but never destroyed in its spiritual essence, by the changing circumstances of civilisation. Father Cuthbert sees that this ideal is creative; had it been simply a negation, like many of the cruder forms of asceticism, it must have perished. It is not merely a doctrine of renouncement, or the worship of sacrifice for the sake of its pain, though men must tread the path of renunciation if they would reach its palace of life. Its language is not the *Dies Irae*, or even the *Stabat Mater*, but The Canticle of the Sun; its symbol, the *Scenum Commercium*, the mystical nuptials of St Francis with the Lady Poverty.

It is Father Cuthbert's aim not only to trace this element of high romance in the life of the Founder himself—an easy and congenial task, but to reveal it as the animating principle of the life of the Order, guiding it through difficulties by some inherent instinct of consistency and supplying it in days of abuse or corruption with an unfailing motive for reform. With all the strictness of his own life the influence of St Francis has always been one of liberation. His genius was not dogmatic but spiritual and creative. Some of his most fruitful work was almost unconscious, and the extreme forms of literalism, which were pushed to fanatical excess by some of the "Spirituals," have no higher claim to be the authentic products of his spirit than that of the small sects of the modern world, with their slavery to the letter of Scripture, to be the only genuine followers of Jesus Christ. In other words, the Order had either to grow or to die, and it possessed the future because it was bound not by a rigid dogma but by a flexible ideal. This position is put with admirable clearness and common sense by Father Cuthbert in the following passage, which deals with the growth of learning and the dangers which beset the path of uneducated preachers:—

"St Francis had unconsciously but effectively given a new impetus to Thought amongst his followers, in giving them a new point of vision and a new view of life. In the normal course of things this led to intellectual inquiry and produced a set of thinkers in the fraternity to whom literary self-expression became a vital necessity; and as naturally these thinkers would become centres of intellectual activity as long as the fraternity was really alive. Moreover, it may be doubted whether any large body of men in normal conditions can maintain a high level of spirituality without a certain intellectual and scholastic training. The mental discipline gained in a sharp struggle for life, whether in the order of the world or in the interior spirit, will more than compensate in spiritual development for lack of school instruction; but the majority of men in ordinary circumstances

are not subjected to this discipline, and unless their minds are stimulated by contest with the thought of other men, they lapse into that mental darkness which atrophies the soul."

The question of rigid poverty in all the externals of life presents a more difficult problem, and Father Cuthbert is far too candid an historian to try and explain away the splendour of some of the conventual churches, like the basilica at Assisi and Santa Croce in Florence; but these were the exception, and he is quite justified in quoting the words of Brever: "Their buildings to the very last retained their primitive, squat, low and meagre proportions." This statement, it should be added, is quite as true of Italy as of England. But differences and growth and various experiments in adaptation there were to be, and once again he warns us against the spiritual blindness which usually accompanies a narrow literalism.

"Modern writers on St Francis," he says, "frequently attempt to represent the Franciscan ideal as bound up with the wattle huts of the Porziuncola or the rude travellers' shelter at Rivo Torto. One might as well demand that the English people should maintain the primitive conditions of the Saxon mark as a proof of the identity of their national existence. We are not then to judge of the fidelity of the Franciscan friars to their original ideal by their adhesion to or departure from this or that external condition which found a place in their life in Umbria in the year 1210. A rigid conformity in such matters might well denote mere mental or spiritual stagnation. But what we may rightly look for is the ideal which underlay the primitive external manifestation. Judged by this principle, I think it may be said that Franciscan history shows a remarkable continuity of mind and purpose threading its way through many vicissitudes and changes."

We have dwelt upon the underlying motive of this book rather than upon its historical detail, because it is this which makes it stimulating and suggestive in no common degree. Of the details a good deal might be said. The study of St Clare, for instance, is a particularly good piece of work, and shows what excellent use can be made of the rather scanty materials. Our one point of serious difference is the tendency on the part of the author to isolate the Franciscan movement from the other movements of "Poverty." Their failure to survive in face of highly organised and powerful persecution does not prove that they were unworthy of a better fate. It is probably true that they had no leader of genius, but their doctrines, which spread over a wide area, and were a source of much embarrassment to the Catholic Church, are known to us chiefly not in the persuasive writings of their own teachers, but through the bitter invective of their foes.

W. H. Drummond.

Hampstead.

A Contribution to the Study of the Psychology of Mrs Piper's Trance Phenomena. Vol. 28 of the Proceedings of the Society of Psychical Research.—By Mrs Henry Sidgwick.—Glasgow: Robert MacLehose & Co., Ltd., 1915.—Pp. xix + 657.

Mrs Piper's trances having now ceased, no psychological abnormality remaining except occasional automatic writing, the time is opportune for

the survey under notice. Leaving aside, for present purposes, the evidential aspect of the case, Mrs Sidgwick analyses the matter and manner of the various communications, with the aim, chiefly, of deciding whether the "controls" are what they claim to be—viz. spirits independent of Mrs Piper—or merely parts of her hypnotic self. Her conclusion is that the latter hypothesis is the true one. The "Dr Phinuit" of Metz could not talk French, or at best only about as much as Mrs Piper herself; "George Eliot" has met Adam Bede in the spiritual world, and evinces no surprise thereat; "Julius Cæsar" purports to engage in the unusual occupation of hunting a lost boy in Mexico—unsuccessfully; the Imperator Band make various slips and practise obvious deceptions suggesting a common denominator, so to speak, which is Mrs Piper's own subliminal consciousness. Mrs Sidgwick admits, indeed emphatically declares, that the trance-matter contains evidence of knowledge which must have been supernormally acquired, and that there is some reason to believe in the operation of discarnate minds; but the action is probably telepathic, from the real personality in the background to the "control" (the Mrs Piper fragment giving the message and sometimes personating the sender) in the foreground.

It is a tenable hypothesis, and many of the facts seem to render it the most acceptable one. There are, however, several difficulties. The most obvious one is that the control's real independent existence is apparently vouched for by the communicators who give good evidence of their identity —*e.g.* George Pelham; but this difficulty is certainly met by assuming that while the evidence comes from the real G. P., it is the personation that does the vouching. A perhaps greater difficulty is that if "Rector" is a fraction of Mrs Piper, and if that fraction could produce the "spear-sphere" cross-correspondence with Mrs Verrall (*Proceedings S.P.R.*, vol. xx.), we seem almost bound to accept such a hypothesis of the powers of incarnate subliminals as will quite well account for the evidence on which, presumably, Mrs Sidgwick bases her acceptance of the hypothesis of telepathy from the dead (pp. 6, 7, 204). Again, although a case is easily made out against the Imperator Band and against Julius Cæsar and Co., it is different with G. P. In this case, as in occasional other instances in the experience of perhaps most investigators, the recognition of friends was so instant, the give-and-take so quick, the flow of evidence so free, the almost complete absence of error so marked, that the personation-plus-telepathy idea seems forced; there is little ground for it in the G. P. facts themselves, and if we apply it to them it is mainly because it seems required in *other* cases—which seems dubious procedure. Replying to this objection of the inadequacy of telepathy, Mrs Sidgwick quite truly says (pp. 82, 319), that "we know very little about the possibilities of telepathic communication"; and, this ignorance admitted, is it not rash to invoke a telepathy so perfect and extensive, without much basis of knowledge? On p. 200, indeed, and in the footnote on p. 320, Mrs Sidgwick admits the possibility of unbroken gradation between telepathy and telergy; and, if this is admitted—if one can merge into the other,—is it not rather dangerous to suppose, in the excellent G. P. case, that this exceptionally good communicator never became a control? The "vouching" difficulty of course arises, but may be explicable in other ways, as Hodgson believed.

The whole problem is excessively thorny and baffling, and it may be that the key lies in some new conception of the relation of mind and body

which we have not yet even glimpsed; or perhaps in a terminology not yet invented. We are almost certainly talking partial nonsense when discussing whether a discarnate spirit is or is not "in" a medium's body. Interaction there is, according to the view of most of us, Mrs Sidgwick included; but to use spatial terms about something which is not material is manifestly improper. Perhaps, then, suspense of judgment is the right thing. Meanwhile, Mrs Sidgwick's laborious and subtle analysis at least serves to show where the difficulties are, and to indicate the alternative hypotheses. And no writer could be more charmingly and humorously aware that the hypothesis to which she inclines may by further investigation be shown to be wrong. So we must "wait and see." J. Arthur Hill.

Bradford.

INDEX.

ARTICLES.

Arts and Handicrafts, Their Province in a Mechanical Society, 95.
Benefactors, The Tyranny of, 627.
Christian Ideal, The, and its Realisation, 735.
Christianity, Is it Practicable? 335.
Christianity, The Definite Failure of, and How it might be Retrieved, 320.
Christianity, The Incompetence of the Mere Scholar to Interpret, 353.
Christianity, The Perfection of,—A Jewish Comment, 778.
Conscience, The Problem of, 725.
Education and Humanism, 705.
Educational Opportunity, The, 713.
"Education has Saved the State," 563.
Facts and Questions before Us, 65.
Faith on Jesus Christ, A Modern Confession of, 760.
"Fight for Right" Movement, 251.
German Patriotism, 501.
German War Literature, Some Recent, 15.
German War-Party before the War, The Self-Revelation of the, 481.
German War Sermons, 691.
Gospels, The Warlike Context of the, 366.
Guilt, Ibsen's Treatment of, 105.
Higher Learning in America, The Effect of the European War upon, 79.
Human Mind, The, *versus* the German Mind, 300.
Immortality, The Love of God our Hope of, 538.

Industry and Life, Quality *versus* Quantity as the Standard of, 380.
Life after Death, Fechner's Theory of, 156.
Materialism, Scientific, A Defence of, I. and II., 551 and 799.
Meredithian Study for the Times, A,—"The Empty Purse," 613.
Middle Ages, The Plain Man's Religion in, 592.
Miracles, Prolegomena to an Essay on, 604.
Montessori, Madame, and Mr Holmes as Educational Reformers, 578.
Moral Ideals, The Warfare of, 43.
Mysticism and Mahomedanism, 167.
Mysticism, Jewish, 784.
Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism, 409.
Race Suicide, 751.
Religion, Against Departmental, 256.
Religion, An Interim, 465.
Religion in Russia To-Day, 393.
Resurrection, The Idea of, 149.
Russia and England, The Spiritual Alliance of, 681.
Shakespeare, the Englishman, 769.
"Theism and Humanism," Mr Balfour's, 268.
Theological Holiday, A,—and After, 1.
Triumph and Tragedy, 135.
Veni Creator Spiritus! 528.
Vitalism, 286.
War, A Discourse on, 673.
War, A German on the, 30.
War, An American Thinker on the, 37.
War, The Apocalypse of, 512.
War, The: A Quaker Apology, 123.
War, The Present, On some Moral Aspects and Issues of, 233.

Alviella, Goblet D', Count, On Some Moral Aspects and Issues of the Present War, 233.
Anon., The Apocalypse of War, 512.
Armitage, E., Prof., The Incompetence of the Mere Scholar to Interpret Christianity, 353.
Ashbee, C. R., The Province of the Arts and Handicrafts in a Mechanical Society, 95.
Quality *versus* Quantity as the Standard of Industry and Life, 380.

Author of "Pro Christo et Ecclesia," Veni Creator Spiritus ! 528.
Begbie, Harold, The Spiritual Alliance of Russia and England, 681.
Brooke, Stopford A., Rev., LL.D., A Discourse on War, 673.
Brown, William Adams, Prof., LL.D., Is Christianity Practicable ? 335.
Bryce, Viscount, Right Hon., O.M., Facts and Questions before Us, 65.
Coulton, G. G., M.A., The Plain Man's Religion in the Middle Ages, 592.
Darroch, A., Prof., Education and Humanism, 705.
Dickinson, G. Lowes, M.A., A German on the War, 30.
Diggle, J. W., Right Rev., Bishop of Carlisle, D.D., Against Departmental Religion, 256.
Dixon, W. Macneile, Prof., M.A., Shakespeare, the Englishman, 769.
Elliot, Hugh, A Defence of Scientific Materialism, I. and II., 551 and 799.
Epstein, M., M.A., Ph.D., Some Recent German War Literature, 15.
Forsyth, P. T., Rev. Principal, D.D., Ibsen's Treatment of Guilt, 105.
Garvie, A. E., Rev. Principal, D.D., The Christian Ideal and its Realisation, 735.
Gascoyne-Cecil, William, Rev. Lord, German Patriotism, 501.
Graham, John W., Principal, M.A., The War: A Quaker Apology, 123.
Hallifax, E. W., The Self-Revelation of the German War-Party before the War: A Pendant to "J'Accuse," 481.
Hargrove, Charles, Rev., D.Litt., The Warlike Context of the Gospels, 366.
Hertz, J. H., Rev. Dr., Chief Rabbi, Jewish Mysticism: An Historical Study, 784.
Hill, J. Arthur, Fechner's Theory of Life after Death, 156.
Hoyt, May Wilkens, The Tyranny of Benefactors, 627.
Jacks, L. P., Rev. Principal, D.D., An Interim Religion, 465.
A Theological Holiday—and After, 1.
Ladd, George T., Prof., LL.D., The Human Mind *versus* the German Mind, 300.
Law, R. H., Rev., M.A., Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism. A Study of Past Efforts and Present Tendencies, 409.
M'Gilvary, E. B., Prof., M.A., The Warfare of Moral Ideals, 43.
Marriott, J. A. R., Prof., M.A., The Educational Opportunity, 713.
Mercier, Charles A., M.D., Vitalism, 286.
Moffatt, James, Rev. Prof., D.D., D.Litt., "The Empty Purse": A Meredithian Study for the Times, 613.
Montefiore, C. G., M.A., The Perfection of Christianity: A Jewish Comment, 778.
Orde-Ward, F. W., Rev., M.A., Prolegomena to an Essay on Miracles, 604.
Pollock, Sir Frederick, Bart., The "Fight for Right" Movement, 251.
Pringle-Pattison, A. Seth, Prof., LL.D., Mr Balfour's "Theism and Humanism," 268.
Robinson, M. E., The Definite Failure of Christianity, and How it might be Retrieved, 320.
Royce, Josiah, Prof., LL.D., On the War, 37.
Selbie, W. B., Rev. Principal, D.D., The Problem of Conscience, 725.

Shadwell, A., German War-Sermons, 691.
Simpson, J. Y., Prof., D.Sc., Religion in Russia To-Day, 393.
Temple, W., Rev., M.A., The Love of God our Hope of Immortality, 538.
Thwaytes, E. C., Late Lieut-Col., Mysticism and Mahomedanism, 167.
Thwing, Charles Franklin, President, The Effect of the European War on Higher Learning in America, 79.
Vernon, Ambrose W., Rev., D.D., A Modern Confession of Faith on Jesus Christ, 760.
Walker, Hugh, Prof., Triumph and Tragedy, 135.
Warwick, Countess of, Race Suicide, 751.
Webb, Mrs Clement, Madame Montessori and Mr Holmes as Educational Reformers, 578.
Widgery, Alban G., M.A., The Idea of Resurrection, 149.
Wilson, Sir Roland K., Bart., "Education has Saved the State," 563.

DISCUSSIONS.

Astley, H. G. D., Rev. Dr, "Can the Mere Scholar Interpret Christianity?" 812.
Carr, H. Wildon, Litt.D., Mr Elliot's "Defence of Scientific Materialism," 809.
Carritt, E. F., "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht," 177.
Cotter, W. E. P., "The Love of God our Hope of Immortality," 810.
Evans, E. D. Priestley, Rev., "Is Christianity Practical?" 643.
"The Warfare of Moral Ideals," 425.
Ferries, G., Rev., D.D., "The Definite Failure of Christianity, and How it might be Retrieved," 646.
Gardner, Percy, Prof., LL.D., "The Stewardship of Faith," 422.
Godlee, Lady J. M., "The War: A Quaker Apologia," 427.
Graham, J. W., Principal, M.A., "The War: A Quaker Apologia," 644.
"War from the Quaker Point of View," 813.
Howe, Henry M., "The Moral Sanction of Force," 177.
Lake, Kirsopp, Rev. Prof., LL.D., "The Stewardship of Faith" and Canon Scott Holland, 637.
Sadler, G. T., M.A., LL.B., "Can the Mere Scholar Interpret Christianity?" 645.
Scullard, H. H., Rev. Prof., D.D., "The Golden Rule," 178.

REVIEWS.

Astley, H. J. Dukinfield, Rev. Dr.—Stanley A. Cook, The Study of Religions, 213.

Bethune-Baker, J. F., Rev. Prof., D.D.—L. de Grandmaison, Jésus Christ, 827.

Carr, H. Wildon, Litt.D.—Benedetto Croce, What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel, 221.

Cook, Stanley A., M.A.—R. W. Frazer, Indian Thought, Past and Present, 667.

Nicol MacNicol, The Religious Quest of India: Indian Theism; and Mrs Sinclair Stevenson, The Heart of Jainism, 662.

Corrance, H. C.—Hubert Handley, Theological Room, 462.

Davis, Valentine D., Rev., B.A.—J. M. Connell, *Editor*, A Book of Devotional Readings from the Literature of Christendom, 228.

Drummond, William, Rev., B.A.—Father Cuthbert, The Romanticism of St Francis, and Other Studies in the Genius of the Franciscans, 843.

Duddington, Mrs Nathalie A., M.A.—Stephen Graham, The Way of Martha and the Way of Mary, 837.

Dunbar, Kenneth, Rev., M.A.—J. Henry Tuckwell, Religion and Reality, 841.

Ffrench, G. E., Rev., B.D.—Percy Gardner, The Ephesian Gospel, 456.

Gardner, E. A., Prof., LL.D.—A. Bernard Cook, Zeus: A Study in Ancient Religion, Vol. I., 449.

Garrod, H. W., M.A.—Sir Francis E. Younghusband, Mutual Influence: A Re-view of Religion, 445.

Granger, Frank, Prof., D.Litt.—J. N. Shearman, The Natural Theology of Evolution, 230.

Hartog, Marcus, Prof.—Hermann Reinheimer, Symbiogenesis, the Universal Law of Progressive Evolution, 459.

Hearnshaw, F. J. C., Prof.—John Graham, War from a Quaker Point of View, 653.

Hicks, G. Dawes, Prof., M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D.—C. Hamilton Sorley, Marlborough, and other Poems, 659.

Hill, J. Arthur.—Mrs Henry Sidgwick, A Contribution to the Study of the Psychology of Mrs Piper's Trance Phenomena, 845.

Holland, H. Scott, Rev. Prof., D.D.—Kirsopp Lake, The Stewardship of Faith, 200.

Lewis, Edward.—J. R. Cohn, Vital Problems of Religion, 447.

Nunn, T. Percy, Prof., D.Sc.—Cassius J. Keyser, Science and Religion: The Rational and the Super-rational; and The New Infinite and the Old Theology, 451.

Oakeley, Hilda D., M.A.—F. J. Foakes-Jackson, *Editor*, The Faith and the War; and Alfred Loisy, The War and Religion, 649.

Schiller, F. C. S., D.Sc.—F. S. Marvin, *Editor*, The Unity of Western Civilisation, 836.

Scullard, H. H., Rev. Prof., D.D.—Herbert A. Giles, Confucianism and its Rivals, 217.

Solomon, Lawrence, M.A.—Walter Leaf, Homer and History, 839.

Thompson, J. M., Rev., M.A.—J. R. Illingworth, The Gospel Miracles, 453.

Wallas, Graham, Prof., Litt.D.—Arthur Christensen, Politics and Crowd Morality, 224.

Weatherall, J. H., Rev., M.A.—S. R. Driver, The Ideals of the Prophets, 834.

SURVEY OF RECENT LITERATURE.

Philosophy.—By Professor G. Dawes Hicks, 180, 429, and 821.

Theology.—By Rev. Dr James Moffatt, 187, 433, and 817.

Social Service.—By R. P. Farley, 193 and 439.

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