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THE WAR-MADE EMPIRES AND THE MARTIAL RACES OF THE WESTERN WORLD.

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War is one of the functions which modern States have been created to fulfil, and apart from which it is impossible to understand their structure. The needs, the ambitions, the fears of war have laid a strong hand on the history of mankind; they have embedded themselves into the framework of society and have left a mark, far deeper than is commonly supposed, on the characters and psychological tendencies of all modern men—and women—even the most pacific. For this reason the abolition of war, as one of the occupations of States, would have a range of consequences so vast that it is almost impossible to measure them. This in general most of us would acknowledge. We need no reminding that universal peace would make an immense difference to human life, both corporate and individual. But perhaps we have not fully considered *what* precisely the difference would be, nor *how far* it would extend. We are so deeply occupied with the problem of excising war from the world, of the means and instruments by which this is to be accomplished, that we seldom pause to investigate the profound effects upon those vital centres of society into which war has struck its roots. When consideration is given to these things, we shall find that the abolition of war resembles what is known in surgery as a capital operation, which it may be necessary to undertake, but which cannot be undertaken without danger to life. The abolition of war is only too apt to commend itself to us as a safe operation. In reality it is an immensely perilous opera-

tion, and the peril is fully as great as any in which war itself has ever involved mankind. There may be strong reasons why we should run the risk of a measure so drastic; and yet it would be folly to run it without clear knowledge of what we are about.

The present article is an attempt to call attention to this aspect of the matter, which, so far, has hardly received the attention it deserves. I shall endeavour to indicate the nature of the social changes which the abolition of war would involve. I shall contend that they point to nothing less than the break-up of that form of human society which is represented by the existing great empires of the world. This form, I believe, is not due to "biological necessity," but has been acquired by Western civilisation in the course of its long and warlike history.

The penetration of war into the structure of modern society is so deep that it cannot be interfered with to any degree without in the same degree interfering with innumerable other things as well. In interfering with war—as, for example, by diminishing the occasions for its outbreak, by rendering it more difficult, or by placing its control in the hands of a new authority such as a League of Nations—you interfere at the same time with the functions of existing governments, with the political systems behind them, with a complex mass of economic conditions, with the aims, character, and temper of vast populations, all of which have grown to be what they now are in close connection with the needs of making war. If your interference runs the length of abolishing war for good and all, you will at the same time abolish for good and all a multitude of forces which are now immensely active in government, in industrial economy, and in human character; you will liberate a multitude of other forces which are now held under restraint, some of them forces that work for good, others of a more doubtful nature; and the result of all this will certainly be radical and, it may be, revolutionary.

In the eyes of many persons this result will immensely strengthen the case for the abolition of war, since the break-up of the present form of human society is precisely what they desire. They desire it, of course, in the belief that new and better forms of human association and co-operation would arise out of the ruins of the old order. On this matter I wish to express no opinion, leaving it an open question. It is enough for the present that we should realise what we are about when we propose the abolition of war, and frankly face the consequences. War is not a mere ugly excrescence which can be

cut away from the main body of society without affecting its vital organisation. Nor are "military systems" something detachable from the nations which have adopted them, so that you could destroy the system and leave the nation untouched —which seems to be the notion of many persons at the present time, who are continually declaring that our aim in this war is to destroy militarism but not to interfere with the German people. No more effective way of interfering with the German people could be devised than that of destroying militarism, for militarism is the nerve of the national life. No wonder that Herr Michaelis, who doubtless has often read the above statement about "destroying militarism but not interfering with Germany" in the speeches of our statesmen, declared the other day to the Main Committee of the Reichstag, "the war aims of our enemies clearly prove their desire to annihilate us." In this Herr Michaelis shows that he is frankly facing the consequences of the abolition of war—no matter by what means—as one of the occupations in which Germany will be allowed to indulge herself hereafter; it is, indeed, one of the few points at which German statesmen have shown more foresight than their adversaries. The consequence would be, most assuredly, the complete break-up of that form of human society which is represented by modern Germany. At the same time, the Chancellor seems to betray a certain want of perspicacity in assuming that Germany would be the only State to break up if militarism, and all that it implies, were rooted out of the earth. Doubtless she would be the first to point the moral. But she would not be the last. The whole fabric of Western civilisation would be involved. This has not been constructed for sustaining a life of universal peace, and before it could be adapted to such a life would have to undergo profound changes of structure.

We call this "turning our swords into ploughshares," and the metaphor suggests that it will be a simple operation. Certainly, if the task should be no harder than the rapid turning of ploughshares into swords which has been going on of late, it should not prove beyond the wit of man. But history shows us that the ploughshares of the modern world have been forged of carefully chosen material which permitted of their rapid conversion into the finer temper of swords. It may not be quite so easy to reconvert these weapons to their original form. Ploughshares, as we have recently seen, can easily be made into good swords, but it does not follow that swords can easily be made into good ploughshares. At all events we must remember that it is a sword, and not a

mass of crude iron, that has to be so converted. Nor is it an obsolete weapon fetched down from some old armoury where it has gathered the rust of ages. It is sharp and burnished, and before it can be melted in the fire must be torn from hands that have been trained to use it and that hold it tightly grasped. Moreover, it is wet with the blood of the recently slain.

But the question whether this vast reconstruction can be effected and, if so, how best it can be effected, may well be left aside for the moment. Enough if I can convince the reader that militarism cannot be destroyed and war abolished without involving social changes which are immense and even staggering.

It we take a broad view of the present conflict in the vast scale of its operations, and in the ardour, courage, devotion, and efficiency with which they are carried on by the belligerents, we can hardly escape the conclusion that the civilised States of the modern world possess immense aptitudes for war both in the form of their organisation and in the character of their inhabitants. A conflict on this scale and of this kind would have been clearly impossible had war been something alien either to the political constitutions of the Western World or to the ethos of its peoples. An unmartial age, or civilisation, could never have produced such a spectacle. Had war been merely forced upon us by some unkindly fate or power acting in opposition to the moral and political bent of the races concerned, there would have been failure to respond to the summons. There has been no failure anywhere. Instantly in some cases, more slowly in others, the nations of the modern world have risen up in their might to answer the call of the trumpet. In a shorter time than the boldest would have dared to predict the vast machineries of peace have been converted into the vast machineries of war, and millions of peaceful civilians turned into formidable fighting men. The least military of modern States—the American Republic—is showing itself thoroughly martial. However true it may be therefore, and I believe it is profoundly true, that all the civilised peoples of the modern world love peace and desire it, it is no less true that these same peoples possess a highly developed genius for war. Both truths need to be kept steadily in mind and viewed in their bearing upon one another by those who are seeking, by one means or another, to ensure lasting peace for mankind.

The explanation is not far to seek. In the first place, we have to remember that all the great States of the modern

world are, in a deep and true sense, *war-made*. In saying this I do not overlook the multitude of other causes—economic, intellectual—which have entered into the process of their growth or creation. But when all these are allowed for, it still remains true that without the part which war has contributed to their history not one of these great States, as we now know them, would have its present character; not one of them, indeed, would be in existence. It is true that their history is not to be written in terms of "battles and sieges" exclusively; but neither could it be written if the battles and sieges were left out of account. It is well to emphasise the "social" side of the history of the British Empire or of the United States; but we must not forget that without war there would have been no British Empire, no United States to write history about. This holds of all the States of the modern world. In differing degrees, but always in a degree sufficiently great to constitute an essential factor, war has made them what they are. War has determined their boundaries either directly by conquest, or indirectly by negotiations, which, however, had in view the adjustment of military pressures or the interchange of military opportunities. Nor is the process of peaceable fusion, by which small States have been combined in large ones, to be explained without the same reference. These fusions have been partly due in some cases, wholly due in others, to the need of forming powerful combinations for defence, for aggression, or for both. Should it ever happen that all the existing States of the world were to form a single federation for the purpose of keeping the peace, the result would be wholly different in its nature from the partial fusions which have taken place in the past; for these have always had a reference to a state of things where peace was not assured, but, on the contrary, war expected or at least possible. While not exaggerating, therefore, the part which war has played in making the great States what they are, there remains an important sense in which every one of them can be described as war-made.

In the same sense, and with the same qualification, they have been throughout their history war-maintained. No doubt if war had never been practised by mankind the earth might still be divided up into "States," and peopled—perhaps more happily peopled—by communities of one kind or another, but not one of the States whose relations constitute the problems of our present international politics would have maintained itself on the scene. They have remained because they were able to protect themselves, or because they had

powerful neighbours who could protect them, by force of arms. When therefore we talk of "England," of "America," of "Germany," of "France," and of the rest, we do well to remind ourselves that we are dealing not merely with peoples who happen to desire peace at the present moment, but with States which, historically, have been both war-made and war-maintained. Remembering this, it is not difficult to understand the genius for war, and the readiness in adapting their state machinery to war, which the belligerent nations are now displaying; and that in spite of the fact, equally apparent, that "all the peoples love peace and desire it."

I believe that in our studies of modern history, which have grown somewhat contemptuous of "battles and sieges," and more inclined to dwell on economic and intellectual causes, most of us may be justly charged with having overlooked the immense influence on internal growth of the facts I have described above. It has not been sufficiently noted how profoundly the course of evolution in modern communities has been modified by the necessity in which these communities have found themselves, or believed themselves to be, of having to maintain their existence by the sword. When the matter is closely examined it will be found that this necessity has left its mark upon the growth of every social and political institution, even upon those which seem at first sight to be wholly unconnected with war. It has penetrated into every fibre of social organisation, and caused the whole frame of society to develop characters which are totally different from what would have been in a world where war was not a contingency to be reckoned with. Two instances shall be mentioned, which may stand as typical of a hundred which might easily be collected.

Our system of taxation is mainly a war product, and that not only in the sense that it is a legacy from the wars of the past, but in the further sense that it is adjusted to the possible wars of the future. The maxim of "no taxation without representation" is somewhat of a fiction. We are taxed thus and thus because the revenue of the country has to adapt itself to certain international dangers which are far removed from popular control, because we have to pay the interests on war debts contracted by our ancestors, and be ready for wars in which we or our children may be involved—because, in short, we have to find the money for carrying on an empire which is war-made and war-maintained. I am not referring only to the exceptional burdens of the present moment. If at any time during the last hundred years the question had

been raised, "Why are we taxed thus and thus, why is it necessary to spend so much on armaments and so little on other things?" the answer would have been found not in the needs of peace, but in the needs of war. And since the activities of the State in promoting the interests of peace—education and housing, for example—are limited by the call upon its resources for the needs of war, we may see from this example alone how profoundly the growth of social structure has been checked or modified by the causes aforesaid.

Our entire industrial system points the same moral in another way. At first sight it might seem as though the economic processes of producing and distributing wealth have nothing to do with war. But a moment's consideration shows that both production and distribution have taken courses which would never have been taken in a world devoted to peace. A war-making form of society is bound to be a wealth-making form, and quantity is bound to take precedence of quality. Vast reserves of wealth must be created to meet the cost of military expenditure, and any form of culture which is contemptuous of "money" and attends exclusively to plain living and high thinking is clearly impossible for the mass of the people. Communities that practise war as it is carried on under modern conditions cannot escape the necessity of laying up for themselves treasures on the earth, and that on an enormous scale. And the more wealth such a community produces the more it will need to spend on protecting its riches from robbery at the hands of conquering or predatory powers. Hence in war-making or war-threatened States there is a continual and increasing pressure towards those forms of economic organisation which lead to the maximum production of wealth. There is an intimate connection, more intimate than is commonly discerned, between the war aims or the war fears of governments on the one hand, and the great towns with their smoking chimneys, their highly developed industries, their dense populations of wage-earners, on the other. On a first inspection the life of one of these great industrial centres, in normal times, seems to have nothing to do with war, or even to be a force making exclusively for peace; but a wide survey will show us that the production of wealth as carried on in such places, and the social conditions to which it gives rise, are very closely related to war, and would never have come to be what they are apart from the needs which war has created. As to distribution, it is pretty evident that, so long as States have to provide for these emergencies, distribution will always tend to take that

form which leaves the wealth distributed most easily got at to meet the requirements of war taxation. A rich or middling class easily assessed, a leisured class to supply officers for the fighting forces, and a numerous population whose status is such that men can easily be recruited as private soldiers—these, broadly speaking, are the conditions best adapted for meeting the emergencies of States that have to maintain their existence by war. These conditions, it will be found, provide the general limits within which the system of distribution has grown, and from which it can never escape so long as war emergencies have to be faced. Stated in the broadest and briefest terms, the economic influence of war is that it controls industrial development by the necessity, which may arise at any moment, of having to convert the wealth of the nation into the commissariat of the fighting forces. In countries like Germany, where the war aims of the State are openly avowed, the action of these conditions is manifest. In countries like our own or America, where war aims are not, as a rule, direct, but contingent on those entertained by other nations, their action is more obscure; but they are operative and vital.

I do not mean that these considerations supply the conscious motives of the government, of the ruling classes, or of the masses of the electorate. They seldom do so. In social history the forces from which main tendencies arise are often precisely those which enter least into the conscious motives of anybody, and are the least observed and the least talked about by statesmen, by political philosophers, and by the common citizens. Of this nature has been the necessity, always present, always urgent, but seldom demonstrative, of having to adjust the process of democratic growth to a multitude of external strains and pressures which have their origin in the war aims and in the war relations of war-made empires. In our own country no single cause counts for more in explaining both the points at which we have arrived, *and the points at which we have failed to arrive*, after nearly a century of democratic progress. Nor is the great American Republic to be treated as an exception to the rule. It is not merely that she is war-made in the sense that she has gained her independence and maintained her unity, when it was internally threatened, by war; though these are facts of great importance. There is something more. Her long-continued isolation from European politics, with its logical sequel in the Munroe Doctrine, and all the consequences to world-history thence resulting, are unintelligible unless we remember that in all this she was seek-

ing to escape from the mesh of war strains and war pressures in which the rest of the civilised world had become involved. In a world generally peaceful there would have been no Munroe Doctrine, no isolated America, and the social history of the Republic, and consequently of the whole world, would have been very different from what it has been. All of which, though self-evident, is easily and frequently forgotten.

A further question awaits us. If it be true, in the sense indicated, that war has made the great empires of the world, we have now to ask, *Who made the wars?*

Our first impulse is to catch at the simple answer that, as it was the wars that made the empires, so, reciprocally, it was the empires that made the wars.

But this answer is obviously subject to large qualifications. A whole people may go to war, or, as now, a group of peoples, but it does not follow that any one of these peoples nor all of them together set the war agoing. As every student of history is well aware, the peoples of the civilised world have had very little direct control in these matters; and many thoughtful persons have been led to conclude, not without good reason, that so long as war remains a chief occupation of States, they will never be able to get control of them. Leaving aside this latter speculation, it remains true as a matter of fact that war hitherto has been a situation which the peoples have had to *accept*, when they were led into it or forced into it by the operation of causes over which they have had little control. It has been the work of dynasties, governments, ruling classes, statesmen, chancellors who, whether or no they can claim to represent the people in other matters, have never represented them at *this point*, but have acted as the agents, or sometimes the tools, of a system into which popular control has never penetrated—and, as some think, never can penetrate. We have also to remember, as showing how little the peoples of the world have to do with this matter, that even when the majority of the governments are democratic and pacific the action of one non-pacific and autocratic government may plunge the whole lot into war against their will.

To be sure, the peoples cannot evade their share of responsibility, even were it only for having rulers who are able to act in this manner, though it is difficult to see how any one of them could escape from the system which gives them such rulers, unless all the peoples concerned made a combined effort to get rid of it—which in the present state of international relations it is impossible for them to do. And again we may say they are responsible for their own martial

aptitudes which, in spite of the general love of peace, are highly developed and extraordinarily vigorous, as the present state of the world clearly shows; without which aptitudes, to supply them with immense fighting forces, it would be impossible for rulers to make war. But notwithstanding all this, when the question is raised, How could the people have prevented this, or any other of the great wars of history? it must be confessed that the answer is not easy to find. The Kaiser might have prevented it by acting honourably, or someone else might have prevented it by acting dishonourably, but the German people could not prevent it, nor could the British. We get a truer view of the actual state of the case if we think of the German, the British, and all the other peoples concerned as held fast in the mesh of a system that was being operated by agents or agencies over which they had no effective control And thus it has been with all the wars by which the great empires of the world have been made.

This, if taken in conjunction with what has gone before, leads to a highly important conclusion. *The great empires of the world, to whatever degree they have been war-made, are not creations of the popular will.* What then will happen should the time ever come when democracy, wedded to universal peace, is called upon to take charge of these vast legacies of territory, population, and wealth which have been created by a system so alien to itself?

We are accustomed to say that "the British people have made the British Empire." And there are a dozen senses in which this is obviously true; so obviously, indeed, that I shall excuse myself the task of enumerating them. But there is one sense in which it is profoundly false. No act of the popular will has ever decreed the boundaries of the British Empire. By no manner of means can you bring home to the people responsibility for the fact that at the present moment every Briton belongs to a community which includes one-fifth of the total of mankind, and claims territory in every portion of the globe. You may say, indeed, that unless we were a conquering race, and had the qualities good or bad which enabled us to conquer, such an empire would not have come into existence, and that we are therefore responsible in the sense that every man and nation is responsible for its own character. But even so I do not see how the people can be held responsible for *conquering on precisely this scale.* A conquering race might have been content with an empire very much less; or, like the Germans, it might have aspired to one very much greater. Powers over which the people had no control have evidently

been at work creating opportunities for its conquering aptitudes, and determining the scale on which at any given moment they should operate. And when the matter is examined more in detail we find that at no step in the growth of this vast empire did the initiative lie with the popular will. So far as the *people* are concerned (but not otherwise) the empire is more correctly described by Seeley as having grown in a fit of absence of mind. The empire may be self-governed; but it is not a direct product of self-government; it has never been voted into existence. And the same is true with little qualification of every one of the great empires now in being. They are not creations of the popular will of their respective inhabitants. It is not the peoples who have willed them into being on their present scale. The peoples have accepted them, but in the sense indicated they have not made them.

But, it will be said, man is a social being, and these vast empires supporting populations to be counted in scores or hundreds of millions are, after all, nothing but the expression and the necessary outcome of his social nature. As to this argument, I can only say that it contains one of the greatest fallacies — and there are many of them — now current in political philosophy. Unquestionably man is a social being, and the only life that is worth his living, or that he can live, is community-life. But to conclude from this that his social nature requires for its satisfaction community-life on the scale represented by the enormous political aggregate of a modern State such as Russia or the German Empire is a wholly unwarrantable inference. It is worthy of note that the doctrine of the social nature of man—of which the modern sing-song about "the individual and the State" is a vacant echo—was elaborated by Aristotle at a time when these enormous aggregates were not merely non-existent, but when they could not even be conceived or imagined. The State which Aristotle regarded as best fitted to develop the social nature of man was of such a size that all the inhabitants could listen simultaneously to the living voice of an orator—a description with which the modern State, despite the telegraph and the gramophone, has very little in common. Just because the State is a human product, and not a machine, all quantitative differences within it—such as increase of population — are ultimately converted into qualitative differences, so that by making the State big enough you can wholly change the essential character which it had when it was small. To argue therefore as though the social efficiency of the individual citizen increased in direct proportion to the size of the com-

munity of which he happens to be a member, has surely no warrant either in history or in reason. Indeed, the individual citizen, who is one in a hundred million, instead of finding that the opportunities for his social nature are a hundred times as great as they would be in a community of one million, finds on the contrary that he is almost reduced to impotence, that he is of next to no account, in regard to every question that affects the policy of a mass so enormous. Nor has any device been invented (though we are often deluded into thinking it has), by combining votes or otherwise, which really alters his condition. For these devices have all ended in the party or faction system under which the combined votes of one section are held in check or paralysed by the combined votes of others, so that, in the upshot, the control of the total mass slips out of the hands of all the sections and is left to the management of forces which are in reality irresponsible to the people. To our first proposition, therefore, that the popular will has not created the modern empires, we may now add a second—that the popular will has never controlled them. Nor is there any reason to believe it will ever succeed in doing this so long as the empires in question remain subject to the menace of war.

Let us now throw ourselves forward in imagination to the time when the present war shall have ended war by establishing a League of Nations for the purpose of maintaining or enforcing the general peace; and let the question be raised—What, under these conditions, would be the fate of the war-made empires of the Western world?

To deal with this question fully the various empires would have to be considered one by one and the differences carefully weighed. We should find them, in the main, differences in the degree of rapidity with which the consequences worked themselves out. As to Germany, the Germany I mean that has been welded of blood and iron, she would certainly disappear —for reasons already given: her occupation, which is war, would be gone. The same applies to Austria, and to the military satellites of the Central Powers. As to Russia, present events provide a sufficiently eloquent hint of what might be expected. As to France, Italy, and the United States, the situation would be much more complex. Enough to say that the disappearance of the military systems in Germany, Austria, and Russia would react profoundly on the internal structure of every one of them, not excepting the United States. And in general it needs no argument to prove that the removal, perhaps the sudden removal, of the whole system of external

strains and pressures out of which wars have hitherto arisen, would release everywhere a multitude of forces now held under restraint, and be followed everywhere by internal consequences of the most startling character.

To deal with the question *seriatim* is, however, far beyond the compass of my present undertaking, and I shall therefore restrict myself to an illustrative instance.

For a long time past a movement has been on foot for removing the ignorance of the British public in regard to the Empire, for increasing knowledge of its history, its geography, its races, of what it stands for, and how it has come to be what it is. It is generally assumed that the result of this knowledge will be an imperial patriotism resolved to maintain the Empire at all costs. And this unquestionably would be the result if we suppose that the present international situation, which involves the Empire in the constant danger of war, is to be maintained. But in the case we are supposing this danger is to be removed —the League of Nations will see to that. There will be no question of defending the Empire at all costs, for the simple reason that nobody will be allowed to attack it, and the imperial patriotism which takes that form will be a superfluous virtue. Indeed, if we suppose the British public resolved to maintain the Empire (just as it is) at all costs, it is obvious that Great Britain would be unfitted to form part of the League of Nations; for it is precisely that spirit, exhibited by any one of the great States, which disturbs the peace of the world, and which it will be the first duty of the League to suppress wherever it arises, and if need be to suppress by force. Nor is there much reason to suppose that knowledge of the Empire would, *under the new conditions*, promote the desire to maintain it at all costs. It might conceivably lead in an opposite direction. The knowledge that the Empire had been built up by the blood and treasure of our fathers is not the only lesson we should learn. We should learn also that it has been built up for the purpose of creating a bulwark for the liberty of nations in a world where liberty was threatened by the predatory designs of conquering powers. But by hypothesis this threat would have vanished. Thanks to the League of Nations, liberty would have nothing to fear from conquering powers. Under these circumstances, is it not clear that whatever sentimental or economic reasons might remain for maintaining the British Empire at all costs, the chief military reason would lose its cogency?

This may be best illustrated by an imaginary, but by no means impossible, concrete case.

Under present conditions one of the strongest arguments for our retaining India is that our abandonment of that country would leave it a prey to the internal strife of the various races by which it is inhabited, and that, in the confusion thence resulting, it would become the certain prey of one or other of the great military powers. But under the rule of a League of Nations neither of these things could happen. It would be the duty of the League to prevent the races of India from flying at one another's throats; and even if they did so, any lurking ambitions to conquer India from outside, by Russia or Japan, for example, would be automatically checked. What then would happen if the demand were to arise, in any quarter, for the surrender of its government to the native races? Such a demand on the one hand would be in harmony with the principle on which we may suppose the League to be founded—that of giving the widest scope to self-government, of allowing every race to develop its own life in its own way. On the other hand, one powerful reason which now induces us to resist such a demand—that of the danger to India itself—would no longer be in force. Is it not obvious, therefore, that the case for the independence of India would wear a totally different aspect from that which it wears at the present moment? The same considerations would apply, *mutatis mutandis,* to all the overseas dominions of the Crown. It would no longer be possible to plead, for example, that an independent Australia would lie at the mercy of the German or any other fleet, for the fleets in question would be rendered impotent for such a purpose by the authority of the League. I do not say that all the reasons in favour of the imperial unity would be rendered invalid, but the military reason would be cancelled at a stroke. Nor do I say that the Empire would immediately begin to break up. But one of the main forces which now prevent it breaking up would cease to be operative. Centrifugal tendencies would be harder to resist.

As to the effect of the new conditions on reforming tendencies at home and in the colonies, there is a wide field for speculation. But I cannot believe that the effect would be favourable on the whole to imperialism, though there are economic arguments in its favour which would still have weight in many quarters. It is more than probable that the notion, which used to be so common, of the Empire as a "dead weight about the neck of domestic reform," would gain considerably in power when once it had become apparent that the military reasons for defending the Empire were no longer in force. There would be a tendency to disentangle the domestic

problems from their imperial setting; and imperial considerations whenever they were found to be a check on reforming movements at home, would be discharged without any grave fear of the consequences. This would weaken the centripetal forces and strengthen the centrifugal.

But there is a further consideration of yet greater import, the full weight of which will not be felt, or not generally felt, until the League of Nations makes its first experiment in keeping the peace. When that happens, and perhaps not till then, it will be brought home to the peoples of the great empires that there is something in their past history, and in their present character as the result of their past history, which makes it exceedingly difficult for every one of them to play the part of a guardian of the peace. I say for every one of them; but there is one great State, the American Republic, for which the difficulty would be less formidable, and which is on that account the least unfitted to be a peace-keeper among the nations. War, as I have said, has had its part in her history, but wars of conquest have been rare. The others have been conquering Powers.

Perhaps the meaning can best be made clear by pointing out the curiously inconsistent position—indeed, the absurd position—in which the great empires would find themselves on the first occasion on which the League of Nations had to exercise its authority in preventing some small nation—*e.g.* Bulgaria—from embarking on a war of conquest. For it must be remembered that not all the small nations of the world are content to remain small for ever. Some of them would gladly grow great at the expense of their weaker neighbours—would, in fact, "live their own life and achieve their own development" precisely in that way, if they were suffered to do so. In addition to which there is the problem of renascent races (*e.g.* the Arabs) to be dealt with, which involves that means will have to be found for giving legitimate scope to their ambitions without disturbing the world's peace.

Suppose, then, some small but virile and martial race shows signs of making war upon its decadent neighbours and has to be restrained by the powers at the command of the League of Nations. Would not the following questions immediately arise—not only in the mind of the small race in question, but in the conscience of every great empire engaged with the others in keeping the peace:—

On what principle or by what right can great nations which themselves have grown great by war forbid other nations which are now small to grow great in the same

manner? Are all national ambitions which involve development by conquest to be condemned as unlawful? If so, how can any one of the great States justify its own existence, to say nothing of its own right to sit as judge? Every one of these was once a small State, and if the prohibition of war which it now seeks to enforce on existing small States had been applied to itself, would never have grown into a great one.

May not this be compared to the case of a number of millionaires who, having made immense fortunes by questionable methods, now combine for the purpose of condemning those methods, and preventing others adopting them, *but at the same time retain the fortunes which those methods have enabled them to accumulate*? Would not the millionaires in question be expected to surrender their fortunes before proceeding to the prohibition of the methods by which they were created? In the same manner, could any of the Great Powers consistently take part in enforcing the rule of "no development by war" and at the same time assert the right to maintain its own possessions intact? If so, what would be the legitimate comment of small nations on these proceedings? Are these nations to be protected from war only on the condition of their being willing to remain small for ever?

How would it be possible to establish a system of international right, or of international morality, upon that basis? How would small but vigorous and growing races regard an arrangement which promised them protection from war on terms which so clearly condemned the past practice of their protectors? Would it not be very much as if the millionaires were to say to the small traders, "We will protect you from competition, but only on condition that you remain content with your present profits, and abstain from the methods which created our own"?

Here I think we encounter the chief difficulty which besets the proposal to maintain an organisation or league, for keeping the peace, out of the material provided by the war-made empires and the martial races of the modern world. Such an organisation might indeed be formed, but its continued existence would be impossible if its policy were combined with a determination on the part of all the Great Powers concerned to retain their present possessions intact. But there are reasons for believing—and some of them have been already indicated—that if peace were guaranteed, by what means soever, this determination would be considerably impaired. There would be a tendency to the break-up of great empires, and therewith a vast change in social structure all over the

world. As things now are, all other considerations have ultimately to bow to the supreme necessity, rightly or wrongly acknowledged by them all, of maintaining their integrity as the fighting units which their history has made them. As things would be under the rule of universal peace, reasonably secure, this necessity would vanish; and with its disappearance there would be a general landslide of social and economic conditions, entailing consequences so vast that the boldest imagination shrinks from the task of measuring them. One can only describe them in general terms as a break-up of the present form of society. The problem then awaiting humanity would be that of finding new forms of association and co-operation different from, and it is to be hoped more beneficial than those we have inherited from the fighting ages of the past. There is no reason to think that this is impossible. It may be simpler than it looks at first sight. At all events, it should be frankly faced by those who hope or believe that the present war "will end war."

On the psychological side must be set the likelihood that the reign of peace between nations would lead to a general decline of the *spirit of combativeness*, and to the gradual disappearance of a vast array of human characteristics of which it is the source. This will be reckoned a loss or gain according to the value we assign to combativeness as a factor in the development of character. In either alternative it would be a social change of the first magnitude. For the combative spirit, which is in large measure a legacy or deposit left by ages of war, has invaded every department of our life. It has created a varied body of secondary interests, arising from the *amour propre*, the reputations, the personal advancement of the combatants, which often obscure the primary objects striven for and divert the strife into new channels. It has entered deeply into politics and keeps the party system lively and vigorous. It is active in all the realms of opinion, not excepting philosophy. It plays a noteworthy part in economic competition. It has much to do with the struggle between Labour and Capital, imparting to this something of the ardour, the excitement, the romance of a pitched battle. It sustains the war of minds in which social reformers of all schools are perpetually engaged with one another and with the champions of established order. Nothing is hid from the heat of it. It warms the theologian as he studies the New Testament, and makes the pacifist as pugnacious as his adversary. They call the fray "polemics" or "controversy"; but

they enter it with the zest of an Irishman going to the fair, and each enjoys it after his kind. In all these things we display our martial quality; they declare us the children of our fathers; they reveal the rock from which we were hewn and the hole of the pit where we were digged; they are reminders of battles long ago, echoes borne down from ages of war. Surely it is impossible to imagine a series of changes more profound than would follow from a general decline of this all-pervasive characteristic. Immense powers would be put out of commission; a thousand habits would drop away; well-paid occupations would be gone; many august persons would become superfluous; our manners would be transformed; our morals revolutionised. It would be a world's wonder.

Whether all this would spell improvement or the reverse is too large a question to be here discussed. This only needs to be said: as a negative change, as the mere subtraction of one powerful spring of action from among the rest which actuate human life, the decline of the combative spirit contains no great promise of good. But if the change is not negative but positive, if as combativeness goes out good temper comes in, so that men stand on better terms with one another and take a kindlier view of each other's merits, then this change alone will open the way for new forms of human association, in which the social nature of man may find a more generous satisfaction than it has ever found as yet in the war-made empires of the world.

Thus on every ground, political, economic, psychological, and moral, the abolition of war stands for one of the greatest changes in human life that could be undertaken, or even imagined. Broadly speaking, nothing would be left as it was. If we abolish war we pull out the linch-pin of empire, we alter the basis of all national groupings, we give a new goal to industrial endeavour, we deny a field of exercise to one of the most active among the acquired characteristics of mankind. Changes of this magnitude may be necessary in a world which has lost its way. But it cannot be wise to incur them blindly.

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PEACE—AND WHAT THEN?

THE COUNTESS OF WARWICK.

That the world war will come to an end is as certain as that this morning's dawn will pale the stars. But the hope that there shall be no more strife in the world can only be realised if every thinking man and woman will endeavour to work actively for its fulfilment. The wounds of mighty nations still bleed; this earth or a great part of it is in mourning; hatred stalks the highways and the byways, nor is there any lack of the forces that feed it. We have before us the choice of two paths, the one moving by way of bitter speech and provocative action to some fresh outbreak of world-wide strife, the other stretching by way of restraint, moderation, goodwill, and self-effacement towards the realms of Universal Peace. I do not deliberately choose to write in metaphors: to me these paths are real things, no less actual than the garden path I trod only a few hours ago.

Once again the world stands at the parting of the ways, and much wicked or senseless action is going to be inculcated in the name of patriotism. In its guise the victors will be urged to demand the full price of victory, to consider what the other side would have done had it chanced to be victorious, to deal with vengeance in the name of justice, to uphold scorn and hatred as though they were factors in world progress, to oppose toleration, pity, and forgiveness as though at best the vicious virtues of the weak. For fear of persecution and misrepresentation many of us will refrain from following the plain dictates of our conscience; we shall make the mistake of believing that punishment for what has passed is of more importance than careful preparation for what is to come. Nations repudiate so many Christian doctrines for the sake of war, that by the time peace returns they are ill prepared to turn their poor remains of Christianity

to account in welcoming it. All nations are apt to regard moral law as an institution for peaceful times and uneventful seasons. When on a sudden they are called upon to deal with an after-war situation in the light of the higher morality, they are at once in gravest difficulty because they have relinquished or actually thrown away the only lamp that can illumine their darkness. They are handling forces that are beyond man's unaided power to guide. Christianity, freedom, constitutional rights, personal liberty—all have paid tribute to the Gods of War, and in so doing have lost a part of their proper value, their currency has become degraded. Let us be quite honest with ourselves: we are little better fitted to make peace after a long period of war than we were to make war after so many years of peace. We have the will to put a period to strife, but we lack the proper state of mind in which to enter upon the task. War is like a fever. The sufferer can struggle and strive, he can even exhibit great strength while it is upon him, but as soon as remedies take effect and the temperature comes running down, he is weak to helplessness.

To those of us who are unabashed Internationalists there is no lure in patriotism. A man is not in our eyes an Englishman, German, Russian, or Turk as much as he is a kindred soul; one sent to this earth to find snatches of happiness in the midst of suffering and then to die, having contributed, in some fashion beyond our knowing, his tiny atom of support towards the appointed work of creation, much as the coral insect helps to build the reef. Man was sent to do this work and, as I see things, for no other purpose. It was not a part of the great design—at least not as we can understand it by the use of such faculties as we possess—that he should bow his head to Kaiser or King, that he should perish untimely in quarrels not of his making, or that the corner of the globe that first held his speck of life should determine for him his friends and his enemies long before he had learned to love the one or hate the other. Such has been his lot for years beyond reckoning; but we have learned to know that these things should not be, that they can only continue at our grave peril. We know enough of our own helplessness in the face of life to understand that each of us needs his brother's love and help. Our only gift towards the remaking of the world that enmity has shattered is our consciousness of brotherhood, our desire to enjoy the goodwill of others and to give them of our own.

Unfortunately the division of the world into kingdoms, and the conflicting interests and ambitions of rulers, have not only kept mankind apart in the past, so helping to

make war possible, but are also seeking to keep mankind apart now, and thereby hindering the reconciliation of those who have fought without a personal quarrel. The people of a country that has known war desire peace. The ruler whose prestige has suffered, whose possessions are curtailed, whose influence has been shattered, desires war. To him it is little more than another throw of the dice, and he is urged to the throwing by all the traditions of his family and office. If it should prove fortunate, his position is retrieved; should it fail, he is no worse off than he was. For those around the throne, the statesmen, and in a greater degree the soldiers, unsuccessful war is at worst the unfortunate prelude to victory. Your soldier is almost as temperamental an optimist as your financier. The rank and file of life that pay with life and limb, with family and fortune, for the bloody game of kings and diplomats, has learned obedience, it is as the performing lion in the hands of the trainer. Hypnotised, mesmerised, drugged, no longer conscious of its strength or how to use it, the lion obeys orders.

It follows then from the wilfulness of kings and the subservience of subjects that the defeated ruler wishes to inflame the passions of his people, to persuade them that they were betrayed and must await the first chance of vengeance; while the victorious ruler, anxious to obtain the full price of victory, affects to see the hand of Providence behind his triumphant legions, and will even go so far as to admit that, failing Divine help, he could not have given his people victory. The fashion in which rulers associate themselves with the Divinity tends to become grotesque. But the people are not quite sane in moments of great national upheaval and excitement, and, while they are accustomed in such seasons to entrust their favourite newspaper with the task of thinking for them, they are not averse from the suggestion that Providence fights under their ruler's banners. Newspapers depend upon government officials for news and favourable treatment, their proprietors and even editors receive or may hope to receive some reward for supporting what is established and criticising what is new, for being staunch to the old régime and preaching the danger of logic applied to sacrosanct matters. It follows then that the view-point of the rulers of victorious and defeated countries, and the view-point offered to the semi-intelligent reading public, on both sides is identical. It encourages hostility in thought when hostile action is perforce at an end; it emphasises patriotism and re-defines the arbitrary boundaries of States;

it strives by every manner of means to keep the people of the world from becoming sufficiently friendly one with another to realise that they need have no grounds of quarrel, no occasion to think or do evil. This is the plain truth, nor will mere denial alter it. In our last war with the Transvaal every arrangement was made, as a matter of course, to perpetuate the feud and give rancour permanence. Happily, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman had vision and insight, and, amid cries of terror from every reactionary in the country, he dressed South Africa's wounds with oil instead of using the vitriol that all his political opponents recommended. He did not remove all the bitterness of defeat and loss, but he mitigated it to such an extent that we enjoy the affectionate loyalty of all South Africa to-day. It was a master-stroke of policy, and was opposed tooth and nail by false prophets of disaster.

What then, we may wonder, will be the opposition to a policy of appeasement on the enormous scale demanded by world war, and what will be the forces that will oppose a movement calculated to carry the conduct of all affairs that make for war beyond the control of kings, chancellors, ambassadors, and ambitious soldiers? The moral courage required to present such a programme, and still more the moral force required to carry it out, could hardly be overestimated. And let us remember again that some of our moral assets have suffered grave diminution by the long debauch of war.

"But," I seem to hear many a moderate-minded reader exclaim, "consider the enemy's crimes, consider the systematic violation of the world's conscience, the depths of infamy sounded for the first time since the summer of 1914. Poison in new and vile forms, assassination, desolation passing the needs of war, destruction on a scale unparalleled, war against women and children, violence and rapine. Can we be asked to regard the men who have done these things as anything save outcasts?"

Reparation, restitution, guarantees—these are, we have been told, what the lawyers call the *trinoda necessitas*. Even in the height of war responsible statesmen were not heard to suggest that the passions it engenders should survive it, far less that they should be eternal, as some would make them. Let there be impartial inquiries into all evil done, and let justice be satisfied by those who are at present in charge of state destinies; but let us, the people of all countries, bear in mind that "War is Hell," and that if we bring hell to earth we must suffer accordingly. Then let us remember that war is

not made by the men who actually wage it, by exposing the frail human body to the shattering shocks of cannon, bomb, and bullet, but by potentates whom most of the fighters have never seen. Let us remember that men are trained to subordinate all their instincts in order to obey, and that in the vast majority of cases the people who wrought evil were not those who devised it. If, as we hope, we have a higher standard of ethics than that of the people against whom we have fought, our worthiest aim must be to raise them to our level and not to degrade ourselves to theirs. I am presuming, merely for the sake of argument, that every outrage has been against us and that every report to the contrary is false; that we, throughout the heat and burden of war, have borne on every field and every sea the white flower of a blameless life. This large concession I advance merely for the sake of argument; it involves a theory I am not prepared to defend. If we have much to forgive and nothing for which we need forgiveness, it is still well that we should be generous to a fault. For in the long-run it is only love and brotherhood that can save the world, and certainly hatred, however we may dignify it with the adjective righteous, which is of course a mere blasphemy in such a connection, cannot help us or others.

There is much that each enemy power has recorded against another to impress his own civilian population and neutrals; there is much that each belligerent has placed to the credit of his enemy, though there is none to proclaim it to the world. Heroism is not limited to the soldiers of one country, nor is any army free from a leaven of criminals, from men in whom the sleeping brute-beast is wakened by the thunder of the battlefield. War raises man to the heights or brings him down to the depths; the finest physical courage may be near neighbour to the greatest moral cowardice. I do not say that the worst that has been urged against the enemy is not founded upon fact, I merely say that the best to be said about the enemy has not been recorded by any belligerent. Let us civilians await a wider knowledge, and in the meantime let us inquire whether and how far our soldier friends hate the enemy. I think this inquiry holds surprises for the non-combatants all Europe over. It will be said, and with justice, that the mental attitude of fighting men one to the other is not a safe indication for us, for soldiering is a profession with its own special attitude towards legalised and systematic destruction of human life. But if I want the people of every European country to forgive even where they cannot forget, it is because one and all are the victims of a system that has filled their lives with

sorrow, because only by recognising that the system and not the individual is the enemy can they win in the war that must be waged against war and war-makers. There is hardly a sorrow that has visited one nation and has not appeared in some guise before another. Degrees of horror there may have been, but the trail of desolation is everywhere. Suffering is the common ground of union, sorrow may prove the great reconciler. If the mother of one country mourns her children killed by the enemy, she knows that another woman whom she will never see is mourning those whom her own sons destroyed. Each will understand that these lads slew to order, that there was no quarrel between them, no real ill-will. From this knowledge will come the question why, and soon all the people will understand that the world at the bidding of its rulers has made a terrible and tragic blunder, and that only by acknowledging the brotherhood of man the world over can its repetition be avoided.

It may be asked whether any movement towards real international friendship can survive the knowledge that the perpetrators of the worst outrages go unpunished, and my reply is that their punishment will be as great and may be greater than they can bear. The unprincipled, barbarous men who minister to the weakness of rulers can only justify themselves by waging successful wars, and nothing but success can condone, even in the eyes of their fellow-countrymen, the evil that they do. To have waged at terrific cost a war that is not successful, to find the reins of authority plucked from their hands, to see themselves revealed before all eyes for what they are, and to know that there is neither place nor power left to them—all this is punishment enough, readily to be understood by those of us who have known men in and out of power, and have studied them dispassionately. To go down to history merely as the unscrupulous traducers or destroyers of an empire, this is infamy sufficient, particularly to those whose love of humanity is limited to the comparatively small section born under the same flag as themselves. Above all, the greatest punishment that the years can inflict upon those who sought to thrive by evil is the sight of the nations that were to have been kept asunder united by friendship—united beyond all the powers of severance possessed by diplomacy and those who influence or direct it.

We have to remember that without complete reconciliation there can be no perfect peace. It is for the people of all belligerent countries to think out this question for themselves, and, if they are wise, to accept no lead from newspapers.

When the nations can replace fear and hatred by love and confidence, who can make them fight again? If, on the contrary, they are unable or unwilling to do so, where are the elements of peace? Supposing you and I should be of opinion that the wrongs we have suffered do not permit us either to forget or forgive, shall we remain of this mind when we realise that upon our decision may rest the future of the children who are still too young to fight, when we understand that unless we can break the meshes of hatred and ill-will they will in their turn become entangled in them? It is not of ourselves, of our passion and of our just hatreds (if hatred can ever be just), that we have to think, but of those who still walk in innocence and believe that the world was made for beauty, for happiness, and for love. We do not wish to confess to these that because of our unburied antagonisms there must be further misery in the world, that because we have eaten the sourest of grapes our children's teeth shall be set on edge. Let us remember that it is almost impossible for the people of one nation to understand the way in which their opponents looked upon war; in all probability every country was taught and believed that its quarrel was absolutely just, and that it could not, in face of the clamant needs of the hour, have done aught else. The European system of diplomacy does nothing to make the hidden plain, or the crooked straight; we may believe, but the foundations of belief are no more than the faith that is in us, and that faith is made easier by the evil force that says to us "My country right or wrong." What more than this kind of patriotism, carried to its logical end, was the German invasion of Belgium? As a fetich patriotism is allowed to stand above the moral law, but in all countries the tendency of patriotism is the same. It is, if one may vary the famous Johnsonian dictum, the last refuge of the crowned heads.

Does any serious Christian, who has not parted company with modesty, believe that in the eyes of the Creator the people of one country are more dear, more favoured, more worthy than the people of another? Are we not all moving very slowly, very awkwardly, and with a varying measure of success, towards the higher standards of conduct that we see, however dimly, as a goal to which our endeavours must needs be turned? It is because I think we are that I feel the supreme importance of raising the backward nations—when we have discovered beyond all possibility of doubt that we are in advance of them in fact and not merely in theory. The civilisation that lags behind our own is to be encouraged, not despised, and the

spirit that informs all progress must be the belief in human brotherhood, the recognition that man is a thinking animal now and not properly a fighting one.

Above all, fighting is an utterly inconclusive means of deciding a quarrel. A great general may give victory to a bad cause, the accidental discovery of some new and deadly form of destruction may decide a campaign in the face of right and justice. Belgium, standing as far as it could stand outside the orbit of political ambition and intrigue, was the victim of brutal force; other countries have suffered since in like fashion. The full history of their suffering, the true story of man's inhumanity to man, eludes us still. There is not, there can be no moral future for the perpetrators of events such as this, and the world must now choose between the moral and physical forces that rule human destinies and decide which it will follow. To the full extent that we are sane there can be no question about the decision. And yet that decision must remain ineffective if we are to limit our interests and duties to the space within the boundaries controlled by the sovereign power.

Whatever the acts of rulers when hostilities end, whatever the interpretation on either side of the words restitution, reparation, guarantees, the people themselves must not be misled thereby. Their responsibility for these decisions is merely theoretical, and neither those who nominally inflict nor those who nominally suffer punishment should regard the procedure as something that expresses the ill-will of one people towards another. A victor has emerged from the deadly struggle. *Væ victis!* It is for the nations, as nations, to see that in future there is neither victor nor vanquished, that relations rendering war as impossible as it is evil are established by common consent. Once a war starts the people are silent; they do but suffer and pay. But united one with the other in the bonds of international amity, they can see to it that there are no wars, and that every statesman who deliberately seeks to promote one and is caught in the act suffers the extreme penalty. Let the people remember that no war, *however successful*, has any benefit for them commensurate with the sacrifices entailed, and that the few who do benefit are for the most part those who pay no price and run no personal risk. Let them remember that in the days when the seeds of ill-will fall upon stony ground the days of the war-maker will be numbered, and he will no longer go to and fro on the earth seeking whom he may devour. Then it will be apparent to all that only unity of purpose can help a world that its rulers are clearly unable to save from destruction.

I have read in accounts of fighting on sea and in air how airships eager to avoid detection, or men-of-war bent upon escape, have thrown out masses of smoke to create sufficient fog to screen them from hostile eyes. The mis-rulers of the destinies of Europe are most assuredly going to do something of the same kind. As soon as the people realise the full significance of war and see in a true light the schemers who brought it about, the most of our rulers will find their occupation gone. They will shrink at nothing to keep the truth obscured. At their command is all the authority of every country at present constituted, all the sentiments of the comfortable classes, all the patriotism of the mis-informed, all honours, awards, ribbons, stars, jewels, decorations, title precedence, and the other gawds for which so many people, otherwise sane, will sell their souls. Another force that calls itself religion without being in any way religious will also be well to the front, and all will be engaged in a conspiracy to deceive the average man and the average woman. It is a very ancient story, the game has been played over and over again in the past, and it has reconciled many millions to the horrors of war, the more so because when the old, old trick is being performed with skill and seriousness war is over, an enormous tension has been relaxed, people are no longer in their mood of criticism and discontent. They are so happy to know the burdens are removed that they accept dictation, listen to the familiar platitudes, and are persuaded readily to believe that if they won it is because they are God's chosen people, and that if they lost they have been betrayed and must start at once to organise for revenge. There is always the hope that a new invention, a fresh alliance, the misfortune of an old enemy, may give the chance for which the defeated yearn and wait. Are we justified in believing that we have outgrown the condition in which we were receptive to influences that are a permanent menace to civilisation? I believe we are. Let it be confessed quite frankly that internationalism went all to pieces on its first great trial in August 1914; the workmen of all countries flocked to their respective flags and forgot the claims of humanity in the call of patriotism. How many millions of fine men would have been alive to-day if they had taken a different decision, how many cities had remained standing, how much of the world's wealth left for social development! I think that the workers who remain will have realised the truth by now.

FRANCES EVELYN WARWICK.

THE PEACEABLE HABITS OF PRIMITIVE COMMUNITIES.

AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE GOLDEN AGE.

W. J. PERRY.

MANKIND is deeply attached to the past. At all times and in all places, the doings of their fellows have possessed, for human beings, an absorbing interest. A Dyak of Borneo, squatting after supper round the fire and listening to the tales of bygone days and the doings of his ancestors, and a modern child listening to a similar story under the guise of a fairy-tale, possess this interest in common with the profoundest student of human society. In the past the preservation of historical records was generally a task upon which much care and time were bestowed, and in modern days students spend time, labour, and money on the study of the languages, customs, and beliefs of the peoples and nations of antiquity who made these records, in the hope of understanding what manner of men they were who lived and moved and had their being in those far-off days.

In consequence of this universal attachment to the past, records and tales are handed down among all peoples from generation to generation, so that there has gradually accumulated a vast mass of material, literary and oral, which varies enormously in value as historical narrative. This mass is so great as to occupy the lives of many students with the task of sifting and appraising it. But, although the existence among the peoples of the earth of copious quantities of lore is a matter of common knowledge, no general agreement has yet been reached by students concerning the historical value of these stories. Many are, beyond doubt, fictitious. No one pretends that St George killed a dragon, for no traces of such an animal have ever been found. Only the most unsophisticated child

would believe that Jack really climbed up into a world in the sky by means of a beanstalk. Although tales such as these have originated somewhere and can be studied with great profit by students of folk-lore, yet they have no value as historical narratives. On the other hand, no doubt can be cast upon the veracity of many traditions, verified as they have been by the work of students, prominent among whom are the explorers and excavators who have revealed civilisations which have previously only been known to us through the records of the past.

As time proceeds and knowledge accumulates, it becomes possible to obtain common agreement as to the significance of more and more tales, to determine whether they are historically correct or purely imaginary, or whether they are compounded —a blend of truth and fiction. There can be no doubt that the general trend of research is to show that the number of tales which contain historical information is much greater than was formerly supposed. Tradition and myth merge imperceptibly into each other, with a vague boundary zone over which the former is constantly encroaching, thereby extending our knowledge of the past history of the human race. At present it is difficult to set a limit to this encroachment. For the success which has attended the efforts of students in the past gives reason for the hope that it may be possible in the course of time to gain historical knowledge of remote events, and to build up a history of peoples who have no written records.

Ever since records have been made, men have been occupied with the endeavour to form a picture of the distant past. Many peoples have preserved accounts of their earliest condition. These accounts are generally involved in obscurity, for they often tell of ages when beings called gods lived on the earth in intercourse with men; and students have often been led thereby to conclude that they are wholly fictitious, for, according to the current definitions of religion, gods are beings of whom we have no direct sensual knowledge. But some of these tales, in addition to recounting the doings of gods, profess to portray the social conditions of the earliest forms of human society, and therefore, although they may be partly unhistorical, it is not possible to dismiss them summarily. It may be that the mythological wrappings enclose a kernel of historical truth.

Some of these tales show a remarkable tendency to claim that there was a time when sin and strife were unknown, that men were once peaceful and innocent, until by some mischance war and misery came into their lives. The story of the Garden

of Eden tells of such an age. But the details of this story are so improbable that it is difficult to know how to determine its value as an historical narrative. Few will believe that a serpent spoke, or that the act of eating an apple worked a psychological revolution in the minds of the first ancestors of the human race. The endeavour to determine the historical value of this and similar stories from a consideration of such details would probably be fruitless, for it would lead into the maze of comparative mythology, with its bewildering variety of interpretation and speculation. A more hopeful method is to seek for that account of the earliest stages of human society which is least cumbered with unhistorical detail, for an exposition of the case which is capable of direct demonstration or refutation. Fortunately, such a simple, straightforward account exists. It is, moreover, the earliest of which we have knowledge, and therefore constitutes, for that reason, a suitable subject for study. Hesiod, in his *Works and Days*, recounts the story of the Ages of Man:—

"And if thou wilt, yet another tale will I build for thee, well and cunningly, and do thou lay it to thy heart: how from one seed sprang gods and mortal men. First of all, a golden race of mortal men did the immortal dwellers in Olympus fashion. These lived in the time of Kronos when he was king in Heaven. Like gods they lived, having a soul unknowing sorrow, apart from toil and travail. Neither were they subject to miserable eld, but ever the same in hand and foot, they took their pleasure in festival apart from all evil. And they died as overcome with sleep. All good things were theirs. The bounteous earth bare fruit for them of her own will, in plenty and without stint. And they in peace and quiet lived on their lands with many good things, rich in flocks and dear to the blessed gods. But since this race was hidden in the earth, Spirits they are by the will of mighty Zeus: good Spirits, on earth, keepers of mortal men: who watch over dooms and the sinful works of men, faring everywhere over the earth, clothed in mist: givers of wealth. Even this kingly privilege is theirs.

"Then next the dwellers in Olympus created a far inferior race, a race of silver, nowise like to the golden race in body or in mind. For a hundred years the child grew up by his good mother's side, playing in utter childishness within his home. But when he grew to manhood and came to the full measure of age, for but a little space they lived and in sorrow by reason of their foolishness. For they could not refrain from sinning the one against the other, neither would they

worship the deathless gods, nor do sacrifice on the holy altars of the Blessed Ones, as in the manner of men wheresoever they dwell. Wherefore Zeus in anger put them away, because they gave not honour to the blessed gods who dwell in Olympus. Now since this race was hidden in the earth, they beneath the earth are called blessed mortals: of lower rank, yet they too have their honours.

"Then Zeus the Father created a third race of mortal men, a race of bronze, begotten of the Meliai, terrible and strong: whose delight was in the dolorous works of Ares and in insolence. Bread they ate not, but souls they had stubborn of adamant, unapproachable: great was their might and invincible the arms that grew from their shoulders on stout frames. Of bronze was their armour, of bronze their dwellings, with bronze they wrought. Black iron was not yet. These by their own hands slain went down to the dark house of chill Hades, nameless. And black Death slew them, for all that they were mighty, and they left the bright light of the sun.

"Now when this race also was hidden in the earth, yet a fourth race did Zeus the Son of Kronos create upon the bounteous earth, a juster race and better, a godlike race of hero men who are called demigods, the earlier race upon the boundless earth. And them did evil war and dread battle slay, some at seven-gated Thebes, the land of Kadmos, fighting for the flocks of Oidipodes: some when war had brought them in ships across the great gulf of the sea to Troy for the sake of fair-tressed Helen. There did the issue of death cover them about. But Zeus the Father, the Son of Kronos, gave them a life and an abode apart from men, and established them at the ends of the earth afar from the deathless gods: among them is Kronos king. And they with soul untouched of sorrow dwell in the Islands of the Blest by deep eddying Okeanos, happy heroes, for whom the bounteous earth beareth honey-sweet fruit fresh thrice a year.

"I would then that I lived not among the fifth race of men, but either had died before or had been born afterward. For now verily is a race of iron. Neither by day shall they ever cease from weariness and woe, neither in the night from wasting, and sore cares shall the gods give them. Howbeit even for them shall good be mingled with evil. But this race also of mortal men shall Zeus destroy when they shall have hoary temples at their birth. Father shall not be like to his children, neither the children like unto the father: neither shall guest to host, nor friend to friend, nor brother to brother be dear as aforetime: and they shall give no honour to their

swiftly-ageing parents, and shall chide them with words of bitter speech, sinful men, knowing not the fear of the gods. These will not return to their aged parents the price of their nurture: but might shall be right, and one shall sack the other's city. Neither shall there be any respect of the oath abiding or of the just or of the good: rather shall they honour the doer of evil and the man of insolence. Right shall lie in might of hand, and Reverence shall be no more: the bad shall wrong the better man, speaking crooked words and abetting them with an oath. Envy, brawling, rejoicing in evil, of hateful countenance, shall follow all men to their sorrow."[1]

Hesiod's exposition is remarkable, for it associates changes in the behaviour of men with successive stages in the development of human culture. As the latter advances, the former degenerates from the peaceful innocence and morality of the Golden to the cruel and immoral conduct of the Iron Age. Ignorant of any theories of evolution from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher, Hesiod states roundly that the Iron Age is not to be regarded as good and beautiful, but as something to be avoided—a bad phase that will pass away when men are born with hoary temples. He is correct in his succession of ages, for archæological research has revealed the existence in Greece of an age characterised by the use of bronze, at the end of which came the age of the heroes who fought at Troy, which age was in turn followed by another in which iron came into general use. These ages are the effects of migrations into Greece of successive waves of people using bronze and iron implements. Hesiod was also right when he states that men formerly had no metal implements at all, for it is well known that man lingered for an indefinite time in the Stone Age before he discovered the use of metals. But, although Hesiod was correct in the naming of the last three ages, his designations "golden" and "silver" for the first two ages are probably symbolical, intended to compare the moral worth of the dwellers in those times with the values of metals and to complete the sequence.

Hesiod therefore has proposed a definite problem, which should be capable of solution: Was the age when men were ignorant of the use of metals, and had not learned to cultivate the ground, one of peace and moral behaviour on the part of mankind?

The study of the early periods of human history has advanced so rapidly during the past half-century that it is

[1] Hesiod, *The Poems and Fragments*. Translated by A. W. Mair, Oxford, 1908, pp. 4–8.

possible to picture with a fair degree of accuracy the lives of early man.

Let us turn to the results of modern research into the Stone Age. Prof. Sollas has summed up, in his book on *Ancient Hunters and their Modern Representatives*,[1] our knowledge of the cultures associated with rough stone implements. It is possible to divide the early Stone Age, when only rough stone implements were made and agriculture was unknown, into periods, which are characterised by the form and nature of the flint implements and weapons used. These periods, from the earliest onwards, are the Mesvinian, Strepyan, Chellean, Acheulean, Mousterian, Aurignacian, Solutrian, and Magdelanian, so named after the localities in which typical remains were first discovered. Prof. Sollas says that, according to M. Commont, there is not, in the first four periods, a single implement which can be regarded as a weapon. They are all flat scrapers, which suggests that these people were concerned mainly with the preparing of food and other household occupations. They may have made wooden spears, the use of which weapons would follow from the fact that hunted animals must be killed from a distance. But the absence of stone weapons for striking suggests that no fighting took place in those times, for men who knew the use of sharp stones for scraping and cutting would be just as likely to make stone striking weapons, if they needed them.

Weapons appear in the Mousterian period in the form of stone lance-heads, but it is not possible to say whether they were for fighting or for hunting. The main development, however, of the Stone Age industry is in the direction of the invention and improvement of implements for household purposes, and this constitutes a sign of the real preoccupations of these peoples. The art of the Aurignacian age affords an additional reason for concluding that the people of the Stone Age were peaceful. The Aurignacian people painted on the walls of their caves pictures of the animals they hunted. This suggests that their attention and interest were fixed upon hunting, and that they painted what interested them. Moreover, these paintings are elaborate, and years would be needed for their completion. Men who lived in a state of constant warfare would have neither the time nor the inclination to devote themselves to such work.

The evidence therefore, as far as it goes, is in favour of the conclusion that the most primitive people of whom we have information were peaceful.

[1] London, 1911, pp. 112, 116, 125, 134, 136, 245 *et seq.*, 364, 380, 382.

Thus far does our knowledge of the Stone Age take us. Other direct evidence concerning the habits of prehistoric man we cannot have, but indirect evidence is available. For many peoples on the earth are still in the stage of culture when men live by hunting, fishing, and on fruits, and are ignorant of the use or working of metals. An examination of the habits and customs of hunting peoples will therefore afford valuable evidence concerning those of their prehistoric forerunners.

I propose to conduct an examination into the cultures of these hunting peoples by the method of quoting the words of field-workers, travellers, and others, so as to place the opinions of independent workers before the reader, and thereby to avoid any suspicion of a desire on my part to mould the evidence.

Hunting peoples are lower in culture than any others. As a rule, they live in communities of relatives, with no social classes, and holding property in common. They have no houses, but live in the open, or in rock shelters, or under wind-screens of branches and leaves. Some go entirely nude. Several of them do not dispose of their dead in any way, but simply cover them with leaves and go away to some other place to live, returning sometimes after some years. No metals are worked, and agriculture is unknown.

In some cases these peoples, or parts of them, have adopted customs from neighbouring peoples, but in the majority of cases they have the culture just sketched out.[1]

The Veddas of Ceylon, together with some jungle tribes of South India, are the remnants of the pre-Dravidian and pre-Aryan populations of India. They live in rock shelters in communities of relatives, and each community has its own hunting-grounds, over the boundaries of which members of other communities rarely, if ever, trespass. They are quite peaceful. Prof. and Mrs Seligman state that they are "extremely courteous and merry . . . and in the main have retained their old virtues of truthfulness, chastity, and courtesy." Each Vedda "readily helps all other members of his own community and shares any game he may kill or honey he may take" with the rest. The Veddas are strictly monogamous, and exhibit great marital fidelity. The authors quote Bailey: "Their constancy to their wives is a very remarkable trait in their character in a country where conjugal fidelity is certainly not classed as the highest of domestic virtues.

[1] I shall at some future time discuss these cultural influences, for they afford important evidence in support of the thesis of this article.

Infidelity, whether in the husband or the wife, appears to be unknown. . . ." They say also that, "In every respect the women appear to be treated as the equals of the men: they eat the same food; indeed, when we gave presents of food the men seemed usually to give the women and children their share first. . . . Veddas are affectionate and indulgent parents."[1]

Several hunting peoples in the Malay Peninsula and East Indian Archipelago are the representatives of the earliest stocks that are known to have inhabited this region. There are negrito peoples, such as the Semang of the Malay Peninsula, the Andamanese, and the negritos of the Philippines: peoples allied physically to the Veddas, such as the Sakai of the Malay Peninsula and the Toala of Celebes: people allied to the Malays, such as the Jakun of the Malay Peninsula and the Kubu of Sumatra: and peoples of "Indonesian" stock, such as the Punan of Borneo. All these hunting peoples are unwarlike. The negrito Semang, who, in their wild state, live in a condition of social equality with communal property, are said to be happy-go-lucky, cheery little hunters. They are monogamous, and the tie is strictly observed. The Andamanese have no wars. One division has set fights, but fighting is generally confined to revenge for bloodshed. Personal quarrels are soon forgotten and forgiven. They are strictly monogamous, and are said formerly to have been virtuous, modest, and frank. Some of the negritos of the Philippines have learned head-hunting from their neighbours. They are described as indolent, timid, and peaceful.

The Sakai of the Malay Peninsula are mainly hunters. They have no war or intertribal fighting, and are said to be simple, kind-hearted, upright, truthful, and scrupulously just. They are generally monogamous, but some of them have adopted polygyny.

The Jakun are largely hunters. They are quite inoffensive, good-natured, mild, excellent in temper, innocent, contented, liberal, and generous. They never steal. They are fairly strict monogamists, and observe great post-matrimonial fidelity. Skeat and Blagden say that they are far superior morally to the peoples who threaten to absorb them.[2]

The Kubu of Sumatra, another people allied to the Malays, are quite peaceful by nature, being shy and timid. They are monogamous. The elders settle disputes and impose punish-

[1] Seligman, C. G. and B. Z., *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911, pp. 37, 44, 66, 87, 88.

[2] Skeat and Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, pp. 79, 118, 342, 523, 528, 534, 559, 560; Haddon, *Races of Man*, 71, 73.

ments for offences. Until a few years ago these people wore no clothing.[1]

Messrs Hose and M'Dougall have given us an account of the Punan—one group of the hunting peoples of Borneo. In the course of a long official experience Dr Hose has come to know and admire these people, and I venture to quote freely from his description of their conduct and habits.

Their general culture is similar to that outlined: no classes; communal property; no agriculture or pottery; no houses. "The Punan is a likeable person, rich in good qualities and innocent of vices. He never slays or attacks men of other tribes wantonly; he never seeks or takes a head, for his customs do not demand it; and he never goes upon the warpath, except when occasionally he joins a war-party of some other tribe in order to facilitate the avenging of blood. But he will defend himself and his family pluckily, if he is attacked and has no choice of flight. . . . Fighting between Punans, whether of the same or of different communities, is very rare; the only instances known to us are a few in which Punans have been incited by men of other tribes to join in an attack upon their fellows."

The Punan wander about in bands of relatives, numbering from forty to sixty. One of the elder men is the leader, but "his sway is a very mild one; he dispenses no substantial punishment; public opinion and tradition seem to be the sole and sufficient sanction of conduct among these Arcadian bands of gentle wary wanderers. . . . Harmony and mutual help are the rule within the family circle, as well as throughout the larger community; the men generally treat their wives and children with all kindness, and the women perform their duties cheerfully and willingly . . . each shares with all members of the group whatever food, whether vegetable or animal, he may procure by skill or good fortune." Marriage is monogamous and for life.

Hose and M'Dougall remark: "Those who are accustomed to all the complex comforts and resources of civilisation, and to whom all these resources hardly suffice to make tolerable the responsibility and labour of the rearing of a family, can hardly fail to be filled with wonder at the thought of these gentle savages bearing and rearing large families of healthy, well-mannered children in the damp jungle, without so much as a permanent shelter above their heads."[2]

[1] Forbes, *A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago*, London, 1885, pp. 232 *et seq.*

[2] Hose and M'Dougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, vol. ii. pp. 180 *et seq.*

In such sympathetic words do the authors describe the Punan in what is certainly one of the most charming chapters on savage life that has ever been written.

Another hunting people is found in the Aru Islands, west of New Guinea. They have no classes, are ignorant of agriculture and metal-working, and are quite peaceful.[1]

Hunting races exist in Siberia. Ratzel says that "by far the greater number of testimonies to the character of the Hyperboreans are favourable. Honourable, good-tempered, inoffensive is the praise given by the Russians to nearly all the peoples of Northern Asia. It is doubly strong if we consider the mass of wickedness with which for some decades the deportation of criminals from Russia has been leavening the whole mass. Russian hunters say that only in cases of extreme necessity will an Orochone touch the store of provisions that a hunter has left for his own use. Middendorf asks with surprise, "Whence comes such exemplary honesty among these poor starving wretches?" And one may well say that the history of Arctic travel would have a far larger list of disasters to show but for the effective help and open-handed assistance of the Hyperborean races. Their way of life is an admirable teacher of the social virtues. The Samoyedes are good-tempered and peaceful: the Chuckchis live in a state of the greatest unanimity: the Ostiak of the Ob have retained a great part of their childlike good-temper, their contentedness and honesty: "But all are united by a certain cheery composure, far removed from the melancholy imagined in them by those who meditated on their life under the inspiration of civilised nerves."[2]

The Eskimo live together in harmony. Warfare and fighting are unknown to them.[3] They have no word for "war," and they do not scold or swear. Children are kindly treated and are well-behaved and quiet. The women are on a footing of equality with the men: no contract is settled until ratified by them; and not even the shortest trip is taken without their advice. Social grades are unknown, and property is communal. The Eskimo live throughout the long winter months in small groups, housed in one building, the number of people in one house sometimes reaching to nearly sixty. In a typical case, fifty-eight persons, eight families in all, lived in a single

[1] Riedel, *Sluik- en kroeshaarige rassen tussehen Selebes en Papua,* 'Gravenhage, 1886, p. 270.

[2] Ratzel, *History of Mankind,* vol. ii. pp. 211 *et seq.*; Haddon, *op. cit.*, pp. 54, 55.

[3] Except in some cases when they have come under foreign influence.

room which formed the house. The room was twenty-eight feet long and fifteen feet broad. A ledge five feet wide ran down one wall, and was partitioned off into cubicles for the families. These people lived for the whole winter without a breach of the peace.

If an Eskimo is offended with another, he composes a song to set forth his grievance. When it is finished, he invites everyone, including the offender, to hear it. If the audience approves of the song, the complainant is considered to have justified himself; if not, he is supposed to have been punished. If an Eskimo should lose or break some article that he has borrowed, the owner usually comforts him. If the owner shows resentment, he remains quite calm, for the Eskimo consider that only one person need be annoyed at a time.[1]

South of the Eskimo live the Athapascan Déné, who, with the exception of some branches who have come into contact with the coastal peoples, wander about in bands with no chiefs. They have no religion in the ordinary sense of the term, and yet they rank high in all moral qualities except courage. They never resort to arms, but, in the case of a conflict, opponents lay aside their knives and wrestle with each other, grasping each other's hair. Their folk-tales show that "their lives were moral and well-regulated: that deep shame and disgrace followed a lapse from virtue in the married and unmarried of both sexes. The praise and enjoyment of virtue, self-discipline, and abstinence in young men is no less clearly brought out; whilst the respect and consideration paid by the young everywhere to their elders affords an example that more advanced races might with profit copy."

South and west of the Déné live the Salish. Those on the coast have social classes and are warlike to a small extent; but the inland branches live in small communities of hunters. They were formerly "well-regulated, peace-loving, and virtuous people, whose existence was far from being squalid or miserable." Father de Smet says that "the beau-ideal of the Indian character, uncontaminated by contact with the whites,

[1] E. W. Nelson, "The Eskimo about Bering Strait," *18th Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnography*, 1896–7, pt. i., pp. 292, 294, 304–6.

Boas, *6th Ann. Rep. Bur. Am. Eth.*, 1884–5, p. 566; *Bull. Am. Mus.*, xv. i., 1901, p. 116.

Reclus, *The Ocean*, pp. 134, 419.

Gordon, G. B., "Notes on the Western Eskimo," *Trans. Dep. Arch., Univ. Penn.*, vol. ii. pt. i., 1906.

Rink, *Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo*, London, 1875, p. 10.

Wood, Walter, "Arctic America," in *Customs of the World*, pt. xxiv. p. 925.

is found among them. What is most pleasing to the stranger is to see their simplicity, united with sweetness and innocence, keep step with the most perfect dignity and modesty of deportment. The gross vices which dishonour the red man on the frontiers are utterly unknown among them. They are honest to simplicity. The Hudson's Bay Company during forty years that it has been trading in furs with them has never been able to perceive that the smallest object has been stolen from them. The agent takes his furs down to Colville every spring, and does not return before autumn. During his absence the store is confided to the care of an Indian, who trades in the name of the company, and on the return of the agent renders him a most exact account of the trust. The store often remains without anyone to watch it, the door unlocked and unbolted, and the goods are never stolen. The Indians go in and out, help themselves to what they want, and always scrupulously leave, in place of whatever article they take, its exact value."[1]

The eastern Algonquian peoples of Canada, north of the St Lawrence, were formerly, as a rule, peaceful. The Ojibwa, for example, were divided into two branches. Whilst the southern division, who were partly agricultural, were very warlike, the northern Ojibwa, called Chippewas, were generally mild and harmless, little disposed to make war upon other tribes.[2]

The Beothuks, the former inhabitants of Newfoundland, were harmless and tractable, mild and gentle in disposition, with strong family affection, and great love for children.[3]

In pre-Columbian times the United States were occupied for the greater part by peoples who had a warlike organisation, and sometimes hereditary chiefs, who made pottery, worked metals, and grew maize. But certain unwarlike peoples live in the United States. Prominent among them are the Paiute of Nevada, Utah, and Arizona, who generally wander about in small bands. They are very low in culture, not making pottery or practising agriculture. "As a rule they are peaceful, moral, and industrious, and are highly commended for their good qualities by those who have had the best opportunities for judging. While apparently not so bright in intellect as the prairie tribes, they appear to possess more solidity of character, and have steadily resisted the vices of civilisation."[4]

[1] Hill-Tout, C., *British North America*, London, 1907, pp. 43 *et seq.*, 164, 252.

[2] *Archæological Report*, 1905, p. 79. [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 118–9.

[4] *Handbook of American Indians*, art. "Paiute."

Professor Kroeber of California University says that "from the time of the first settlement of California, its Indians have been described as both more primitive and more peaceful than the majority of the natives of North America." But, at the same time, contact with higher cultures has caused them to acquire certain bad qualities.[1]

The peoples of Tierra del Fuego are said to be affectionate, but very undemonstrative. Parental and filial affection exist, as is shown by the care taken of children and the deference paid to parents. Although quite nude, they are modest. They are generous and share with each other. Lying is allowed, but a murderer is banned. The different groups are hostile, and occasional rows occur in which one or more men may be killed. But in the same group friends interpose to pacify the disputants.[2]

There is good reason to believe that the aborigines of Australia and Tasmania are not so low in culture as is commonly supposed. But, in spite of this, war, in the proper sense of the term, is unknown in Australia. Intertribal feuds originate in some offence such as killing by magic or violence, and these are settled by duels. These judicial combats usually end in reconciliation.[3]

It is difficult to obtain any clear impression concerning the condition of the aborigines of Tasmania before the arrival of Europeans. The bulk of the evidence collected by Ling Roth suggests that they were peaceful as a whole, but that some tribes, who had more elaborate weapons, were warlike to a certain extent. The first Europeans were received in a friendly manner, and war between them and the aborigines only occurred after some time. Those who first saw them describe them as peaceful and possessed of engaging manners. Captain Cook says that they "had little of that fierce or wild appearance common to people in their situation; but, on the contrary, seemed mild and cheerful, without reserve or jealousy of strangers." The early French explorers had friendly intercourse with them, and formed favourable impressions of them. Péron describes them as "lively, frolicsome, and mischievous . . . the sweet confidence which the inhabitants had in us; the affectionate proof of goodwill which they lavished upon us, the sincerity of their demonstrations, the frankness of their

[1] Kroeber, *Types of Indian Culture in California*, University of California Publications, Am. Arch. and Ethn., vol. ii. No. 3, p. 81.

[2] Hyales et Deniker, *Mission scient. du Cap Horn*, 1882–3, Paris, 1891, pp. 237 *et seq.*, 373.

[3] Thomas, N. W., *The Natives of Australia*, London, 1906, p. 154.

manners, and the touching ingenuousness of their caresses, all concurred in developing in us feelings of most tender interest."

The Tasmanians were not given to theft. They were not monogamous. The men are said by some to have treated the women kindly, but Péron says that the women were treated badly. They were extremely fond of children.

The Tasmanians responded to good treatment. They respected the farms of their white friends, and never, while killing and torturing others, touched their wives or children. But they were treacherous, aggressive, ungrateful, and cruel towards those who had treated them badly. Their methods of punishing offences and quarrelling were extraordinary. If anyone offended against the tribe, he was made to stand while spears were thrown at him. By adroit movements of the body he endeavoured to avoid them. Or else he was put on the branch of a tree while the others jeered or pointed at him. One tribe while quarrelling did not indulge in pugilistic encounters, "but the parties approached one another face to face, and, folding their arms across their breasts, shake their heads (which occasionally come into contact) in each other's faces, uttering at the same time the most vociferous and angry expressions, until one or other of them is exhausted, or his feelings of anger subside."

Quarrels among men of the same tribe were sometimes settled by the waddy. The opponents meet in a duel, in which each receives a blow on his head and then returns the blow: and thus they proceed until one gives in.[1]

During the past two thousand years Africa has been so overrun by warlike peoples that one is apt to forget that formerly conditions were different. The most warlike peoples south of the Sahara are comparatively modern. The Zulu and Matabele owe their warlike organisation to European influence: the Masai only began to move southward and develop their warlike organisation a few decades ago: and the pastoral aristocracies of the Bantu peoples are descended from immigrants and retain traditions of the arrival of their ancestors.

Only when these layers are stripped off do we see what was the early condition of things in Africa. Authorities agree that formerly Africa south of the Great Lakes and the Congo was peopled, if at all, by the Bushmen, whose hunting-grounds probably reached to East Africa.

[1] Ling Roth, *The Aborigines of Tasmania,* Halifax, 1890, pp. 2 *et seq.,* 24, 28 *et seq.,* 31 *et seq.,* 44 *et seq.,* 51 *et seq.*

Over this vast region these pygmy hunters wandered, leaving in caves signs of their occupation in the shape of wonderful paintings or carvings. The Congo basin and the Great Lake region was probably formerly inhabited only by negrito people: the negroes lived further north; and the North African region was peopled by members of the Brown Race which was so widespread in former times.

Both the Bushmen and the negritos are hunters. The Bushmen in their former state appear never to have been aggressive. Their oldest paintings represent chiefly hunting scenes and dances. "They appear never to have had great wars against each other; sudden quarrels among rival huntsmen, ending in lively skirmishes, which owing to their nimbleness and presence of mind caused little damage to life or limb, appear to have been the extent of their individual or tribal differences. Even an habitually quarrelsome man was not tolerated amongst them; he became an intolerable nuisance, and his own friends assisted in putting the obnoxious individual on one side; while their very enemies acknowledge them to have been, when left to themselves, a merry, cheerful race."[1]

The negrito peoples live on friendly terms with their negro neighbours. They are said to be markedly intelligent, innately musical, and cunning, revengeful, and suspicious in character. They never steal. Sir Harry Johnston speaks of "their merry, impish ways; their little songs, their little dances; their mischievous pranks; unseen, spiteful vengeance; quick gratitude; and prompt return for kindness."[2]

The opinions quoted agree unanimously in ascribing to hunting peoples a peaceful conduct, both as individuals and in communities; and the descriptions of the various peoples are so similar in essentials that many of them could be interchanged without alteration. It is not possible to ascribe this peaceful behaviour to the influences of race or environment, for the survey has included the most diverse racial stocks, and has ranged from Arctic regions to the Equator. Nor is it due to any innate incapacity for fighting on the part of these peoples, for some of them have been so persecuted by other peoples that they have become warlike. The Bushmen were driven out from their hunting-grounds by Europeans; and the cruelty with which they were treated changed their attitude from one of friendliness to one of relentless ferocity:

[1] Stow, G. W., *The Native Races of South Africa*, London, 1905, p. 38.

[2] Keane, A. H., *Man, Past and Present*, p. 120; Sir H. Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate*, London, 1902, pp. 576–7.

the Apache Indians were friendly until the perfidy and cruelty of the Mormons and other settlers produced in them an attitude of hostility. Again, one branch of a people can be peaceful while the other is warlike, as in the cases of the Ojibwa, Déné, Salish, and Eskimo.

The inference is that hunting peoples not only have a standard type of culture, but they possess also an uniform mode of behaviour which is associated with it more or less intimately. And the evidence gives us no reason to believe that hunting peoples, as a whole, have ever been anything but peaceful.

So, on the basis of a combination of the knowledge which the accounts of the hunting peoples gives us, with the evidence obtained from the consideration of the Stone Age peoples, it is possible to ascribe a peaceful mode of behaviour to peoples, whether historic or prehistoric, in the hunting stage of culture.

Hesiod was thought by the Greeks to be omniscient;[1] it is therefore not adding to his reputation to credit him with an important generalisation which is entirely in accordance with the known facts. It is further to be noted that he does not attempt to account for the changes which human behaviour undergoes as time goes on. He says that the Bronze Age people were created subsequently to those of the Silver Age; in other words, that they were strangers to Greece who brought in the use of bronze and warfare. The origin of warfare must be sought, if we follow Hesiod, elsewhere. And in seeking for the solution of the problem it is to be noted that mankind can be divided into two classes: peoples who use metals and are agriculturists, and those who are hunters and ignorant of metal-working. Since the second group consists of people who are peaceful, it follows that warfare and personal combat have sprung up among some people or peoples who, originally peaceful, became warlike either previously or subsequently to discovering the use of metals and agriculture.

No causal relationship exists between warfare and the use of metals: there is no more reason why, other things being equal, warfare should exist among people using metals rather than among people using stone implements. This definite relationship between two independent cultural elements suggests that they became linked up in one centre and spread thence: for it is against all probability that, if warfare began independently in several places, it should invariably be associated with the use of metals and with agriculture or stock-breeding.

[1] Waltz, P., *Hésiode et son poème moral,* Paris, 1906, p. 69, n. 1.

In view of the absence of any intrinsic connection between the use of metals and warfare, the cause of the latter must be sought in some other cultural change which took place in the community or communities where metals were first discovered.

The opinions of independent authorities adduced in this article not only afford valuable support for the contention that men were originally peaceful: they constitute in addition a body of evidence which has a direct bearing upon the study of the moral development of mankind. Not only are hunting peoples peaceful, but they also resemble the people of the Golden Age in living moral lives: respect is paid to parents and elders; personal violence is absent; the marriage tie is sacred; theft and lying are unknown. It is impossible to call this behaviour "unmoral," for it is upheld with the authority and sanction of public opinion and tradition. The example of the hunting peoples therefore shows that it is possible for communities of human beings to live in accordance with the moral code of the Commandments: Honour thy father and mother; Thou shalt do no murder; Thou shalt not commit adultery; Thou shalt not steal; Thou shalt not bear false witness; Thou shalt not covet.

This conduct contrasts strongly with that of the Iron Age, of which it can be said with Hesiod that "might shall be right, and one shall sack another's city. Neither shall there be any respect of the oath abiding or of the just or of the good: rather shall they honour the doer of evil and the man of insolence. Right shall lie in might of hand, and Reverence shall be no more: the bad shall wrong the better man, speaking crooked words and abetting them with an oath."

Warfare, immorality, vice, polygyny, slavery, and the subjection of women seem to be absent among hunting peoples in their pure state. What interpretation is to be put upon the contrast in conduct between them and ourselves? Is our Iron Age, in spite of the manifold social evils of our civilisation, in spite of violence, cruelty, deceit, envy, and our wholesale violations of the Commandments, really superior to the Golden Age, with its simple moral lives and sexual equality? In wealth and knowledge it is, but in morality it is not. Are different moral standards the necessary concomitants of civilisation, and is the highest good of man not to be sought in truth, justice, peace, chastity?

Some say, Yes. Of late years a school of thinkers has called the Christian code Utopian and impracticable in an age of strife and stress. Only by warfare, they say, with its attendant horrors, can man be purged of evil and rise to higher

things. "Love the short peace rather than the long, and look upon peace as a preparation for fresh wars," is an ideal which has moulded the lives and destinies of millions of Europeans. "What matter," say they, "if we disregard the oath abiding, speaking crooked words and abetting them with an oath, if the result is to the advantage of our country? Might is right, in spite of its cruelty and hardship."

In the eyes of such men the hunting peoples of the earth are to be pitied, not admired. For they must be degenerate or lack virility, if they do not come up to a military standard of efficiency.

Or are we to conclude that the moral code of the Commandments represents an ideal that is to be cherished: that truth, justice, reverence, chastity are the priceless things of life? If so, the fact that a Golden Age has existed is of supreme importance to mankind: for it shows that man is capable in certain circumstances of moral behaviour. Accordingly, that civilisation which causes him to act in immoral and cruel ways is, in that respect, a tragedy.

Is the tragedy inevitable? Is it possible that mankind could possess all the blessings of civilisation without its curses, that with all its material resources men could live the moral lives of the simple Veddas and Punan?

Perhaps so. But the question can only be answered when the problem of the development of the Metal Ages has been solved and the causes of the introduction of warfare, cruelty, and vice have been discovered. It may be that the course of development of society has been inevitable, that only a return to the cultural condition of the hunting stage could make us capable of behaviour similar to that of the hunting peoples. On the other hand, it may be that the change of behaviour characteristic of the Metal Ages is due to causes which can be removed; that our civilisation is pathological in condition, a vast social organism suffering from a cancer that must be removed before amelioration can be hoped for.

At certain times great crises overtake civilisation, and nations stand at the parting of the ways. Opportunities are given to men to take decisions that will influence for good or evil the destinies of generations to come. We at the present day are living in such circumstances. During the coming years the minds of those who desire the betterment of humanity will be directed towards the problems of social reconstruction which, it is to be hoped, will be faced with the energy needed for their solution. Chief among these problems is that of preventing the recurrence of such cataclysms as that which has

lately overtaken us: the outpouring of the blood of millions for aims, and on account of quarrels, which are not of their seeking. The horrors of war should direct the attention of men towards the problem of prevention. Cause and effect rule in the minds of men as in the world around us, and only a clear understanding of the social circumstances in which war exists will serve to render the state of affairs such as we live in impossible in the future. If those whose duty it is to take the fateful decisions do not do so with a just appreciation of the essential facts of the problem with which they will have to deal, damage may be done to civilisation which will take generations to efface.

This is one reason why the problem of the Golden Age is of such importance. The determination of the real nature of man, his innate tendencies, whether for good or evil, is a matter that concerns us all. The genius of Hesiod has given to the world an account of the progress of human society which, stripped of its poetic ornament, is a statement of fact of the highest importance. It is the first attempt to correlate human behaviour with material progress, and we cannot do better than begin where he left off, without any *a priori* notions concerning the essential superiority of our civilisation over any other, and examine without prejudice the circumstances of the inauguration of those cultural changes which have been so fateful to mankind. By taking up the torch and following the trail opened up by the clear-headed Greek thinker into the darkness, we shall probably be rewarded by gaining new and juster conceptions of the nature of the social conditions of our times. We shall probably acquire a more dignified conception of human nature, and shall perhaps be led to realise the essential unity of the human race, the brotherhood of man, which is so often ignored by scientists and statesmen alike; and, finally, we may be enabled to unravel some of the tangled skein of causes which influence our behaviour, both as individuals and in communities, and to understand how the righteousness to which we all aspire may be attained.

W. J. PERRY.

POCKLINGTON.

WAR AS MEDICINE.

G. F. BRIDGE, M.A.

"War is Hell," said the American General Sherman, with a soldier's bluntness and brevity. "War," says the present Master of Balliol, "is an intellectual awakener and a moral tonic. It stirs men to think, and thinking is what we most lack in England. It creates a conscious unity of feeling which is the atmosphere needed for a new start. It purges away old strifes and sectional aims, and raises us a while into a higher and purer air. It helps us to recapture some of the lofty and intense patriotism of the ancient world."[1]

If war confers all these benefits upon us, we clearly ought gladly to endure its hell for the sake of them. And that a moral and intellectual awakening is a frequent result of war, it is impossible to deny. Especially is this true of modern warfare, and especially is it true of the defeated side. Jena was the beginning of new life for Prussia, Sedan the beginning of new life for France. If we and the French got little good out of the Crimean War, the Russians got much, as they did also out of the Japanese War. The one was followed by the emancipation of the serfs, and the other by the institution of the Duma. In our own history, it is true, war has not been hitherto a powerful agency for good. But this seems to be due to the fact that none of our modern wars, except possibly the struggle against Spain in the late sixteenth century, have been really national wars, or have called forth any national effort comparable to those of France in 1792 or Prussia in 1813. The Dutch wars were due to trade rivalry and concerned mainly the trading classes. The wars of the eighteenth century, even when vital English interests were at stake, were carried on by small standing armies, assisted by foreign mercenaries, and the general body of the nation had

[1] Address in *The Empire and the Future*, p. 43.

nothing to do but pay taxes and look on. Even the Peninsular War—the greatest, noblest, and most successful of our modern struggles—excited for long but little interest, and met with but shabby support; the ultimate victory was due to the tenacity of a small group of statesmen, the backing of one political party, and, above all, the genius, heroism, and patience of one solitary figure. But in this war all is different. The whole body of people, with a few insignificant exceptions, is in it. Every one of us is part and parcel of the struggle. It is rare to meet anyone who is not doing something to help. In former times there were those who took an active share in the war, and those who did not. To-day the distinction has vanished; the second class has disappeared; the spirit of war has spread, not merely to the shell factory and the dockyard, but to every home, every school, and every kitchen-garden.

Hence the war has been a great moral benefit. It has, as the Master says, "raised us into a higher and purer air." It has made party and sectional aims look petty; we have achieved something like agreement over parliamentary reform and female suffrage, and the prospects of agreement over Ireland are at least fairer than they have ever been. The war enabled both the French and Russians to strike a great blow for temperance, and it may help us to do the same. But these things, valuable as they are, are not the most important moral results of warfare. What is a far greater spiritual fact is that tens of thousands of people, men and women, who yesterday were thinking of nothing but their own livelihood, their own interests, or their own pleasures, are to-day bending at least a large portion of their thoughts and energies towards the accomplishment of work for the State or for others. And this is a condition of mind which war alone can produce, so far as the average man is concerned. In peace the average man lives for himself, or for himself and his family. Beyond that he rarely gets; in the majority of cases, beyond that he cannot get, because the maintenance of himself and his household taxes his strength to the full. For those who have leisure, no doubt, there are various forms of public service and philanthropy open, but many do not feel competent to take any part in these, and many more prefer the pursuit of pleasure or of wealth. Nor do they incur much censure for this; for spending their lives in the pursuit of wealth—indeed, none at all. Civilised life is too well ordered to give much opportunity for courage or self-sacrifice. Accidents in mine or on railway, shipwrecks, earthquakes, fires, epidemics, all of which afford such splendid scope for devotion and heroism, are of rare occurrence; nine men out

of ten spend their whole lives without the experience of any one of them. Protection from injury is being relegated more and more to persons appointed for that purpose; the police have for generations saved us from the necessity of defending ourselves or our neighbours; there are firemen for the fire, ambulances for the injured, parish nurses for the sick. Occasions for self-sacrifice are rare; to many a man none ever comes. And so our virtues in peace are of a somewhat humble and drab description. We do not look for more in a man than that he be industrious, honest, law-abiding, and a respectable husband and father. And then suddenly comes war, and lifts us out of and beyond ourselves, gives us a cause to work and suffer for wholly detached from ourselves, and puts not only pleasure and interest, but home and family, into the second place.

The stimulating moral influence of the war has not been confined to one side. It has probably been felt in Germany as much as in England, though it has had a debasing influence also in Germany from which we hope at least that this country is free. Indeed, the stimulating effect of that international rivalry of which war is the final expression was evident in Germany before the war broke out. The teaching of the Government and of a good many professors, publicists, and philosophers was that the first duty of every German was to work for the greatness of Germany. The doctrine may have been preached in an exaggerated form (Germany is the classic land of exaggeration, especially in art and thought), and may have developed some detestable aspects; but it is impossible to deny that to the individual it was a moral force, because it set before him an end which was not himself nor anything connected with himself. Bernhardi's teaching may have had its baneful side, but in its strong appeal for the subordination of individual comfort, interest, and gain to a great cause it reminds us not a little of the teaching of the prophets and saints. The fact seems to be that to-day patriotism is, next after the family affections, the most potent power in the world making for altruism. Other great causes—social reform, philanthropy, education, the betterment of the savage—touch only the few, but this touches everybody. It has the force and the universality that religious feeling once had. Men of quite ordinary moral calibre become fired with passion and capable of heroic deeds when their country is in question. It would be much more reasonable and much more worthy of humanity, say some, if the mass could be fired by the passion for social reform. Maybe; but the hard fact remains that whole nations

have again and again been roused by the trumpet-call of war to fling off sloth and put on their harness, whilst rare indeed have been the occasions when, as in the France of 1790, a passionate feeling of brotherhood has swept through a whole country.

Add to this that it seems that to be a good soldier is as high a pitch of virtue as can be attained by a large proportion of humanity. The work of the clergyman, the teacher, and the doctor may be nobler than that of the fighter, but those who are capable of being clergymen, teachers, or doctors are but a very small minority of the race. The soldier may rank far below the social worker or the philanthropist, but those who are fit to be social workers or philanthropists are few indeed. But most men can be good soldiers. The duties of a soldier are clear and simple, and he lives in an atmosphere which helps him to accomplish them. He is fortified by the traditions of his regiment, the comradeship of his equals, and the authority of his superiors. When he is like to fail, discipline and honour combine to save him. Yet he has to live for duty only at the time. His work is hard, but he must not revolt against it, though he may grumble as much as he likes; his pay is small, and his hours sometimes very long, but he must not strike for better conditions. It is, as Ruskin said, because he puts his duty first and the reward of it second, that we honour the soldier. To most of us this is a moral ascent. All our lives we have been putting the reward first, and thinking of the work only as the troublesome preliminary condition of the reward. And next after the work comes the comrade. The soldier has to live very close to his fellows. The army is a great school of mutual forbearance and helpfulness. It is to the workman in some sort what public school and university are to the rich man's son. He is forced to be continually thinking of the comfort of the others and of the good of the community. To many this too must be a moral ascent.

The power of war as a goad to strenuous action depends, no doubt, largely on a man's belief in the rightness of his cause; but then it must be remembered that men who do not believe that their country is right in a quarrel with another nation are rare. Nor is this so unreasonable as might at first sight appear. The right and wrong of international disputes are not to be always easily decided. One of the great errors of the pacifist lies in imagining that every war has been due to human folly or wickedness on one side or the other, or both. This is by no means so. No doubt there have been many wars for the blood spilt in which one of the combatants may justly be condemned. We need not hesitate to brand as

bloodguilty, despots—be they French, Prussian, or Russian—who have attacked their neighbours in order to add to their dominions. We have no doubt that Henry V.'s invasion of France was indefensible, however splendid be the halo that a great poet has wreathed around it. Few historians have had anything to say in defence of Walpole's war against Spain or the first Afghan War. But in many other cases it is hard to give a verdict against either side. Who were right in the Wars of Religion—the men who fought for the unity of the Church, or the men who fought for national independence? We cannot deny even to Philip II. the possession of a conscience, nor refuse to admit that he was a more sincerely religious man than Henry of Navarre, Frederick the Great, or, probably, Elizabeth, however much we detest persecution and admire toleration. Who, again, were right in the war that grew out of the French Revolution—the men who fought for liberty, or the men who fought for order? Which are we to condemn for bloodguiltiness—the despots who made war to save Europe from anarchy, or the revolutionists who made war to rescue Europe from tyranny? As men we may give our sympathy without hesitation, but as jurymen we are bound to hesitate. Even in the case of wars for national independence, it is not always easy to pronounce a judicial decision. The cause of Italy against Austria in 1859 looked plain enough. Can anything be more unjustifiable than for one nation to hold a large part of another in subjection? Yet the law of Europe was on the side of Austria. Milan and Venice had been handed over to her by the general agreement of the Powers in 1815. She could appeal with perfect justice to treaties made and signed, and those who condemn her have to go behind the treaties and urge that there are rights of humanity which no treaty can barter away and rights of nationality which no convention can affect. Yet these rights were unrecognised in 1815, and only gradually received recognition during the next half-century. The struggle between Austria and Italy was at bottom a struggle between an old principle of government, which had been recognised throughout Europe and for centuries had offended no ethical sentiment, and a new principle of government, which appealed at first to the sentiment of the few and only gradually took possession of the many. In passing, one cannot help remarking that a Hague Tribunal, acting as an International Court of Law, could hardly have done otherwise than give a verdict for Austria.

It is the same conflict between the old and the new which

lies at the root of all civil wars which have been anything else than mere disputes between factions or the struggles of some individuals or some class for power. The parliamentary opposition to Charles I. began, no doubt, with resistance to what were deemed innovations and breaches of ancient law, but it derived its main strength from new conceptions of religion and the relations of the State to religion which conflicted with the traditional principles of the Church of England. The War of American Independence—which was to all intents and purposes a civil war—was a conflict between the old ideas of the function of colonies in the scheme of the universe and the new ideas. The Southern States of America who fought to maintain slavery were fighting for an institution which had been accepted generally by the world not very long before. In all these cases, however much our sympathy may be on one side, it is impossible to condemn the other as guilty of having caused needless bloodshed. In each case what we see is the clash of contending principles, neither of which is wholly indefensible, or the conflict of opposing ideals, each of which might find some support from reasonable and high-principled men.

From the record of the past we may infer that in the future also there will be great wars springing from the conflict between old and new ideas, which are both entitled to respect. It is this consideration which makes it so extremely difficult to devise or imagine any human machinery which would put a stop to war. The pacifist is justified in pointing to the triumphs of diplomacy and arbitration, to Anglo-Russian problems solved, Africa partitioned, disputes with France and the United States settled by the use of tongue and pen alone. He may urge that the present struggle could have been warded off by the use of the same weapons, had Germany been willing. But he cannot foresee from what sources future wars will arise, and therefore he cannot frame institutions to prevent them. Who in the year 1500 foresaw that half a century later men would be killing one another because they disagreed about the dogmas of the Christian faith? Who in 1763, when Europe had rest from the struggles of dynasties, guessed that thirty years later the dynasties would be at war with a national movement of unparalleled conviction, intensity, and power? For aught we know, there may be wars in the future arising from gigantic social upheavals or unimagined conflicts of Europe and Asia. Nations may be so profoundly possessed by great ideals that they will be ready to defy the world in their support. A united Europe may make demands upon its

members which seem reasonable now, but may a century hence be detestable to the changed ethical sense of humanity. Governments and the law which Governments administer is usually behind popular feeling. Or abstract right may be in conflict with national conviction. There is a stratum of instincts in most men and women lying, as it were, below the upper crust of reason and knowledge—a stratum which no argument can reach, instincts which neither education nor even religion can do much to modify. We have had proof enough of their existence in recent years. When the orbits of two communities which are swayed by such instincts meet, no arbitrament save that of the sword seems humanly possible.

It is when the parties in civil wars have had ethical convictions behind them that those wars have been moral stimulants and the nursing-mothers of heroes. Under such circumstances war has brought to the front, not what was worst in the nation, as the pacifist is fond of telling us that war is apt to do, but what was best. Civil strife may do much harm. It may "break the converse of the wise," cause the loss of many lives, shatter the happiness of many homes, spread destruction through a smiling land, but it is some set-off against these calamities that it raises human effort, endurance, public spirit, and power of self-sacrifice to a pitch rarely attained in peace.

The age of Hampden, Falkland, and Cromwell was the heroic age of English history, and public virtue was perhaps never, in any age or state, on a higher level. The French Revolution, amidst all its horrors, gave evidence probably of more passion for social justice, more progress towards social justice, and more of the spirit of human brotherhood than any other event in the world's history. The Americans may boast how they subdued nature, planted the wilderness throughout half a continent, and raised cities which vie with those of the old world, but they look back to two wars as their greatest achievements. Trade and commerce are fine things, but men, however much they may love them, feel the need of proving that they can rise above them. Money is good, but to have the chance of showing that you can treat it as dross is good also.

War is the final test of conviction. To be willing to suffer and die for a cause is an incontestable proof of sincere belief, and perhaps in most cases the only incontestable proof, unless another be added which is its usual concomitant, namely, the willingness to make others suffer and die, though this we can accept only when we know that it proceeds from the right

motive. And this belief that nothing but readiness to suffer and inflict suffering, to kill and be killed, can produce the conviction that a body of men or women are really in earnest, lies at the root of some recent developments in politics which have caused much bewilderment. For will the man who shrinks from all suggestion of violence tell me how I am to prove the intensity of my conviction? I can talk on platforms, write to the newspapers, applaud at political meetings, and drop papers into ballot-boxes, but these things will prove nothing. They require little effort and demand no sacrifice. I am merely offering to the cause that which costs me nothing. To go from London to York on my hands and knees would, I fear, excite only ridicule. If someone argues that no proof of intensity of conviction is required, and that political questions should be settled by weight of argument only, the answer is that those who possess power are not morally bound to part with any of it to those who show no active desire to share it. For the endowment of a powerless class with power must be based on one of two reasons—either their own benefit or the benefit of the community; and we cannot suppose that either of these ends will be furthered by giving power to those who show no strong conviction that a share of power is their due. And it is the same with freedom. If the Ruritanian is kept under the heel of the Turk, we can hardly demand that other nations should ask for his deliverance, and if it is refused spend blood and treasure in achieving it, unless he himself shows he is in earnest about it. And how in the last resort can he show that he is in earnest, except by being willing to kill and be killed? With what other proof of earnestness will other people be so satisfied that they too will be willing to kill and be killed?

It would seem that we cannot look forward with confidence to the abolition of war, and perhaps it is well for us that we cannot. We are hardly fit yet for the unbroken reign of peace. Perhaps we are not yet sufficiently evolved. The effect of the total absence of conflict is to make us cold, soft, lazy, and pleasure-loving much more than to make us gentle and amiable. True, there are the struggles of politics and the rivalries of commerce, but who has ever been heard to call politics or commerce a school of discipline and self-sacrifice? Maybe after all there is some truth in Treitschke's much-criticised saying: "The living God will see to it that war constantly returns as a dreadful medicine for the human race."

G. F. BRIDGE.

Gerrard's Cross.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THEOLOGY.

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The exigencies of the war are creating a demand for reconstruction in almost every department of human thought and life, and will undoubtedly require some very marked changes in the presentation of religion. Theology, however, has always shown itself very sensitive to contemporary movements of thought, and any reconstruction which is likely to take place will only be a further development of a process already going on. The rise of the critico-historical method, the new emphasis on psychology, the study of comparative religion, and the changed relations between religion and science, have already been responsible for new developments in theology of a very fruitful kind. Upon this process the war has broken in, and has created new demands, which will require a very definite response. It has also revealed certain conditions which are bound greatly to modify the intellectual presentation of religion in the future. The familiar and reiterated cry for more reality, vague as it is, does represent a certain sense of need, and will require a closer correspondence between profession and life. To many minds, also, such questions as the providential order of the universe, the problem of sin and evil, the work of redemption, and the hope of the future have come home with new urgency, and will need to be dealt with more frankly and sympathetically by those who speak in the name of religion. At the same time, the drafting together of great masses of men in the army and in munition centres has given an unique opportunity of discovering their religious position and needs—with some very remarkable results. Experienced observers bear witness to the fact that the number of those who have any vital connection with religious institutions is extremely small, and that the great majority of

them show extraordinary ignorance even of the elements of the Christian faith. At the same time, they display many of the fruits of their half-forgotten Christian training, and possess a group loyalty and a group morality of a really remarkable kind. The whole situation as thus revealed is one which presents a very serious challenge to the Christian Church. It indicates a lamentable failure to deliver her message to the world in a really intelligible form, and it seems to demand in the future a much greater frankness and simplicity in setting forth these things which are most surely believed.

Any attempt at reconstruction must begin with a full recognition of the results achieved by the historical criticism of the Scriptures. It is extraordinary that at this time of day so many people should still be struggling with the familiar difficulties caused by the old and uncritical handling of the Scriptures, and especially of the Old Testament. It is also very interesting to note how clearly the war has brought out the fact that many so-called Christian people are still living in the twilight of hebraism, or even paganism, rather than in the full light of Christian truth. It is necessary to make very plain the fact that the Bible is a library rather than a book; that it represents a very gradual development of the idea of God culminating in the Word made flesh; and that it is to be read always in strict relation to the needs, circumstances, and mental and spiritual condition of those for whom and by whom the books composing it were first written. Now that we are delivered from our old bondage to German critical methods and ideals, it is to be hoped that greater attention will be given to the more sober and more scholarly treatment of the Scriptures by English writers, and that some of the prejudice against these newer views may therefore be modified. There is great need for clear and patient teaching on this subject, and it will surely have its reward.

Along with this, and as a consequence of it, is to be set the need for a more modern treatment of the doctrines of revelation and inspiration. We have perhaps suffered in the past from a too purely subjective point of view, and the emphasis laid on experience has sometimes been overdone. Religion is not simply the creation of the human consciousness. It is no doubt a great thing to have it acknowledged that man is fundamentally a religious animal and at his best capable of spiritual experience of the highest kind. But the function of his experience is to verify rather than to create; and apart from belief in the objectivity of the Divine word and action, experience will be blind and meaningless. That God speaks to

men as they are able to bear it, and that His word is suited to their capacity and condition, is one of those things on which greater stress must be laid. This carries with it the fact that inspiration belongs to man rather than to things, and we may well turn from the idea of inspired books or writings, which belong to a fetishistic stage of religion, to that of the inspired man to whom the breath of the Almighty giveth understanding, and who is able to declare to others what God has revealed to him in such terms as they are capable of receiving, whether in the spoken or the written word.

These, however, are preliminary considerations: we turn now to some of the more urgent problems in regard to which a clear theological restatement is required. In his very interesting but very inadequate book, *God the Invisible King*, Mr H. G. Wells has been building better than he knew. He has thrown a strong light on the present situation and its needs; but in his attempt to meet them he has shown extraordinary ignorance of the real inwardness of Christianity. It is certainly a grave reflection on the Churches, and on their mode of delivering their message, that such a book should be possible and that it should be welcomed as it has been. It is only one among many indications of the imperative need that there is to Christianise theology. In the past, theology has tended to start from philosophical propositions rather than from the data of history and experience. Take, for example, the familiar arguments for the being of God—ontological, cosmological, teleological, and the like. At their best, and stated in their most modern form, these can only carry us a very little way. They may help us to understand that the universe points to the universality of mind; that there is a cause in things and an order; but neither separately nor combined do they give us a coherent idea of God. Indeed, the modern man does not seem to be concerned to argue about God, or to put any trust in so-called proofs of His existence. He is rather inclined to take God for granted; and here religious teachers would probably be wise to meet him on his own ground, and to help him to work out the hypothesis with which he starts. Even in religion we have to apply the pragmatic test, to ask whether our theory works, and to judge by fruits and values. For the future, a great deal will depend on whether Christians have the courage of their convictions. The Christian idea of God, set forth in personal and ethical rather than in metaphysical terms, is our best, and indeed our only possible, starting-point. To see the universe as a realm of ends the ruling motive and principle of which is love, will go a long

way to the solution of some of our most obvious difficulties. On such an assumption the universe is still only in the making, and is for man a sphere of moral discipline. If we really believe in the love of God, and are prepared to carry out the belief to its logical conclusion, we shall certainly not be without an answer to the crying needs of the time. We shall remember that God's love is a holy love which is often "three parts pain," that its end is righteousness, that it has its supreme expression in a cross, and that it seeks the lost until it is found. Such a love in God has as its counterpart an answering love on the part of man, not only for God whom he hath not seen, but for his brother whom he hath seen. The bearing of this on all social and national human relations will need to be made clear in the future in a far more thorough and practical fashion than has ever been the case as yet. To the Christian it is true that we only know God in Christ; and if we are to present Christianity to the world in its full majesty, we must not hesitate to impart this knowledge, with all its spiritual and ethical implications. In other words, the theology of the future must be practical, and we must be ready to submit the Christian conception of God to the test of experiment.

This brings us at once to the question of the person of Christ. Here it is necessary to reckon with the work of those both in Germany and in this country (*e.g.* Drews, Kalthoff, and J. M. Robertson) who have denied the historicity of the Gospel story, and would substitute a Christ-myth for the historical person of our Lord. They have perhaps done good service in compelling attention to the historical problem, with the result, largely through the efforts of those who are known as Liberal Christians, that the historicity of the Gospel story is now practically assured. No one need hesitate to accept the picture drawn in the Gospels as one that in its main features is true to life, and it will probably be necessary to emphasise somewhat strongly in the future the fact that what we learn there of the teaching, character, and work of Jesus can be accepted as historically true. It is from this point of view also that we must approach the problem of His person. It was the total impression produced by the story of Jesus Christ in the Gospels and in the tradition of the early Church that led to the earliest efforts to formulate theories of His person. These were at first cast in forms proper to the time and largely moulded by controversy. What happened at Nicæa was entirely characteristic of the age and circumstances, and had an importance of its own in determining the future thought of the Church. Something much more than the question of a

diphthong was at stake. The same may be said of Chalcedon and of later attempts to formulate theories of the divinity of Jesus Christ. But about all these efforts two things need to be remembered: first, they are rather attempts to impose upon, or discover in, the story of Jesus Christ certain ideas as to what divinity ought to be and mean; secondly, while true and relevant for their own day, none of these theories can ever be entirely satisfying to modern minds. We shall need to reverse the familiar process and derive our conception of the divinity of Jesus from the study of His human life, and to frame it in those personal and psychological terms which are suited to the present time. It is on the perfection of His human character, the depth and reality of His consciousness of God, and the work that He accomplished for man, that we must base our appreciation of His person and life. His teaching about God throws light also on His own personality. His conception of the Divine Fatherhood, His own attitude of mind in prayer, and His complete surrender of His will and identification of Himself with the Father's ends, are all crucial in determining the nature of His person and His relation with God. It will also need to be more clearly recognised that belief in the divinity of Christ does not depend on ability to repeat the Creeds, but on that practical homage which consists in doing His will and making Him "the master light of all our seeing."

Further, in the process of Christianising theology it will be necessary to formulate afresh and carry out in practice the teaching and work of Jesus Christ with regard to man, sin, redemption, the Kingdom of Heaven, and the life to come. His estimate of man is quite as revolutionary as His idea of God. To Him all men and women were alike precious; He read them always in the light of their higher possibilities, and, even though they might be lost, He regarded them as capable of being saved. There is something in this human nature of ours that recalls the image of God, and is in itself sufficiently great and sufficiently valuable to justify any sacrifice in order to save it from destruction. If the Churches could revise their whole attitude to mankind in the light of the teaching of Jesus Christ, and insist upon the sacredness of personality and the duty of caring for the bodies as well as the souls of men and women as things precious in the sight of God, they would come much nearer the Christian ideal.

One conclusion of this lofty conception of human nature is a correspondingly keen sense of sin which permeates the teaching of Jesus Christ. To Him sin is something more than

sins. It is deeply rooted in human life, and involves the setting up of self over against God. There is nothing here of theories of original sin, and still less of original depravity; but there is recognition of the consciousness of freedom and the fact of choice, with all the terrible consequences that follow from the choice of evil rather than good. All the teaching of Jesus in regard to the grace and mercy of God only intensifies the sinfulness of sin, and gives an altogether natural colour to His insistence on repentance as the first step in the Christian life. We have heard a great deal of late in this country about repentance, but it may be doubted whether any adequate idea of it has been attained, and it certainly does not seem to have been very widely practised. It should never be forgotten that repentance is far more than remorse, that it involves a change of heart and a new direction of the intention and the will (μετάνοια). The chief instrument in attaining it is the goodness of God, and it is not to be forced by fear. The circumstances of the war have brought vividly home to the consciences of most thoughtful people a new sense of the horror and reality of sin. There is an opportunity now for very plain speaking on the subject and for fresh presentation of the call to penitence. The old easy belief in the permanence of progress has been rudely shaken, and men are demanding a theology more in accordance with the dreadful facts.

The redemption which Jesus Christ came into the world to accomplish has its source also in the love of God, and this again needs to be set forth in the clearest and most unmistakable terms. As Dr Dale used to say, "we must get back the word 'grace' into our theology." It will not be easy; for there is something in the idea of a free grace against which human pride revolts. As Ruskin once wrote, "the root of almost every schism and heresy from which the Christian Church has ever suffered has been the effort of men to earn rather than to receive their salvation: and the reason that preaching is so commonly ineffectual is that it calls on men oftener to work for God than to behold God working for them." This is entirely true and pertinent; but at the same time there is no doubt that, in the hour of its need, human nature is only too ready to welcome the free gift of grace. It is only when the danger and peril of sin are fully recognised that the need for salvation is felt and welcome accorded to it as a boon rather than a wage. We have here a rich evangelical experience behind us from the days of the Apostle Paul onwards. To him the glory of the Christian redemption lay in the fact

that God had done for him in Christ what he had long striven to do and failed to do for himself. A light and shallow view of man's sin and need will always make the Christian doctrine of redemption otiose, but here again the war is making possible the deeper and truer conception. Those who realise that they are now being suffered to go about their work in peace because others are willing to die for their sakes and in order to maintain their security, are likely to recognise here a principle which is deeply embedded in the story of the work of Jesus Christ. No one who ever knew a mother's care would be inclined to quibble at the meaning of vicarious sacrifice. It is one of the deepest and most wonderful things in human nature, and it is seen raised to the highest power in the work of God through the death of His Son. In the sobered and stricken world which we may expect in the future, no religious appeal is likely to count for much that does not recognise these facts, and we shall need a theology of atonement that can at least bring the facts home and make them intelligible in all their bearings.

Closely allied with the work of salvation is the doctrine of the Kingdom of God and of the last things. The importance of the teaching of the Kingdom in the Gospels is now fully recognised, but it has not yet taken hold of the Christian Church as it should have done. It has wide social and ethical implications which need to be emphasised with all their practical consequences. In this direction also the effect of the war will be to give a very great impetus towards, and to create a real demand for, an applied Christianity in terms of the Kingdom of Heaven. The same may be said with regard to the future life. It is pathetic to read of men and women everywhere turning to spiritualists, mediums, crystal-gazers, and the like for some assurance as to the future of those they have loved and lost. That they should do so is a serious indictment of the teaching of the Christian Church. It is surely not enough to demonstrate to men and women the fact of post-existence ; it is on the character of that existence that everything really depends. Nothing will here prove so helpful as insistence upon the very nature of God. If this universe represents His mind and is built upon a reasonable plan, it is impossible to believe that men are simply made to die. Still more, if He is a God of love and cares for His creatures, then it is true that neither life nor death can separate men from His love. There is here light sufficient to penetrate even the deep darkness of the grave. In a time like the present, arguments for the immortality of the soul will not help

men and women nearly so much as the witness of a living faith in a living God.

Generally speaking, then, it may be said that the theology of the past has tended to lay too much stress on the merely intellectual presentation of the faith. That is always necessary and useful, but it has its limitations. Religion is something more than a form of words. It is a force, a dynamic, as real and as effective as any of the material forces with which we are familiar. This was obvious enough in the early days of Christianity, and has been equally obvious in every revival movement since then. The task of the theologian is to translate this force into intelligent and intelligible speech. The need for this to-day is as great as it ever was, but in order to meet it theology must leave its academic seclusion and come down into the market-place. There is much truth in the old saying, "Pectus facit theologum." It needs to be made good by a sympathetic appreciation and living experience of the Gospel which is "the power of God unto salvation" on the part of all those who seek to expound it.

It would also seem to be necessary to provide men and women with a new philosophy of faith. Much of the present distress arises from sheer inability to believe. So many of us want to contain the universe within our own horizon, and rule out whatever we cannot grasp or understand. We interpret faith as an intellectual attitude and overlook its practical bearings. Whereas it is nothing if not an act of committal, a working theory or hypothesis which can be made good by practice and experience. Without the very definite attitude of surrender and self-suppression which faith involves, it is very hard to see how men can ever attain to religious assurance and peace. And, again, the task of theology is surely to make this possible—not merely to provide a solution to intellectual and spiritual puzzles, or to defend a theistic view of the universe, but rather to make religion the reality and the power in human lives that it ought to be. If religion is one of the greatest factors in human progress, then theology, or the interpretation of religion, is one of the most important subjects with which thinking people have to do. It is a subject of perennial interest; and if the new situation created by the war can compel a closer study and a more frank exposition of it, it will be all to the good. Only, it must be dealt with as a living thing, with entire freedom from prejudice and a single eye to the truth.

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THE INCARNATION AND MODERN THOUGHT.

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IN all ages of the Church, Christian thought has gravitated towards the question of the relationship between our Divine Lord and the world He came to save. The question derives unique importance from two beliefs inherent in the Christian consciousness. Christ is not merely *a* man amongst other men, but He is Man in a more absolute and exalted sense: His Humanity is the germ, and the crown, of a new humanity in which all who believe in Him participate: "the first-born amongst the children of God," "in whom we have life." Again, He is not only Man, but God revealing Himself in our human nature, and coming amongst us that He might invest us with a share in the Divine Life. At once God and Man, Christ is the link between the creation and the Creator: through Him and *in* Him God and mankind are reconciled in an eternal harmony and friendship.

This belief has been at the root of Christian consciousness since the beginning of Christianity: out of it, we may say, Christianity has grown.

It was inevitable that, as the Christian mind began to reflect on itself, the relationship of Christ to the Godhead on the one side, and to mankind on the other, should become the central point of speculation. Equally inevitable is it that as the world goes on, and different modes of thought come into prominence, the intellectual problem suggested by this fundamental belief should require a further or new elucidation in order to satisfy the inquiring mind: not that the belief rests upon its rational elucidation, but because the human mind quite naturally seeks a rational understanding of what it believes, or of what is proposed for its belief. Thus we get what has been named the "substance" theology of the Greek

Fathers; the juristic theology of the Latin Fathers and mediæval schoolmen—though in fact the mediæval schoolmen sought to combine both Patristic methods; and an attempt in recent years to construct a theology based on psychology.

There is no reason at all why we should not have various theological systems if we bear in mind the distinction between Faith (which is the substance of the Christian consciousness) and theological speculation (which is the attempt to give a rational explanation of the Faith). In fact, the changing condition of human thought must necessarily produce new speculative systems of theology if religious thought is to have any influence in the world.

At the present day the psychological method is that which seems to find most favour amongst independent thinkers. Briefly put, it seeks the rational elucidation of the mystery of Christ in the spiritual experience of mankind: it seeks to interpret the Divine life and purpose of our Lord "not in terms of substance but of Spirit—that is, of Will," taking "Will" to signify "the entire active Personality."[1] This is, of course, in harmony with the prevalent mode of thought which regards life not as static but as dynamic. Life is a spiritual force or activity: its highest expression, so far as it comes within our own experience, is the human personality: in personality (the whole active consciousness of man), therefore, we are to seek the rational interpretation of the Christ-life.

Such is the thesis which Mr William Temple has attempted to elaborate in his essay on "The Divinity of Christ" in the volume of essays entitled *Foundations*, and in his latest book, *Mens Creatrix*.

He takes as his starting-point the Johannine declaration that Christ is the Logos, or World-Principle, by whom and in whom all things have their being. But the Logos of St John's Gospel is God and not the impersonal world-principle of the Stoics: He is the Logos made manifest in a human life and fully revealed in *a* Person, Jesus Christ. From this "fact" of Christian belief, two conclusions follow. If the Logos is fully revealed in a Person, He cannot be merely an impersonal World-Principle indwelling in the physical world as the source or motive of its active life: as is the Logos of the Stoics or the World-Principle of many modern philosophers.[2] The Logos manifested in Christ comes into the

[1] W. Temple, "The Divinity of Christ," in *Foundations*, pp. 247–248: "Will is not part of him [man], it is just himself as a moral (or indeed 'active') being."

[2] "What we all instinctively believe in to-day is not, perhaps, God, but only a World-Principle, the Logos of the Stoics."—*Foundations*, p. 243.

world from outside it: He is "sent by the Father." The second conclusion is, that since Christ is the World-Principle, His life must be regarded "as something more than an isolated event in past history." He must explain all life, or rather the Divine purpose running through the world's life, and moreover His Personality must somehow include all mankind.[1] In other words, He must be at the same time the revelation of the Divine Will which creates and governs our life, and the revelation of the purpose which animates the world's life.

We are faced, then, with two speculative problems calling for a rational explanation: the identity of Christ with the Godhead, and the inclusiveness of mankind in the Person of Christ. The explanation, as we have said, is to be found in our experience of the active human personality. It may be as well at once to point out that Mr Temple disclaims the possibility of our arriving at any absolute or entirely satisfactory solution of these questions; at least "until philosophy has provided us with a final account of Personality, both human and divine." Until then, "we must expect to have recourse to paradox if the fulness of truth of such a theme is to be stated."[2] Nevertheless, he thinks it may be possible to make some real advance by following the line of thought which he indicates.

Working, then, on the basis of our knowledge of personality, a distinction is made between Will (that is, the entire active personality) and Purpose, which is the content of Will. "Christ's Will as a subjective function is not the Father's Will; but the content of the Wills—the Purpose—is the same. Christ is not the Father; but Christ and the Father are One. What we see Christ doing, and desiring, that, we thereby know, the Father does and desires. He is the Man whose will is united with God's. He is thus the first-fruits of Creation—the first response from the Creation to the love of the Creator. But because He is this, He is the perfect expression of the Divine in terms of human life. There are not two Gods, but in Christ we see God, Christ is identically God: the whole content of His being—His thought, feeling, and purpose—is also that of God."[3]

So, too, when we come to the inclusiveness of mankind in the Person of Christ, this inclusiveness is wrought when "we freely will His purpose." Our will is not identical with His: but the purpose of His Will—its full content—is our proper purpose. His purpose ought to be ours, and will be ours when we attain to the perfect life to which we are destined.

[1] *Foundations*, pp. 245–246. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 248–249. [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 248–249.

Christ's purpose therefore includes the world's purpose in Himself, and we become one with His purpose by freely willing it. To some extent this purpose of the Christ-life is already in the world, inherent in its very constitution, otherwise there could never have been any true, spiritually-progressive life in the world: this is implied in the fact that Christ is the Logos "by whom and in whom all things are made": but it is only in Christ that this proper world-purpose is fully and clearly revealed.

From this point of view, Christ may be regarded as the central fact of creation drawing all things to Himself, since in Him alone is revealed the full purpose of man's life: yet drawing the world to Himself as the perfect fulfilment, in His revealed life amongst us, of the imperfect striving towards the divine which is in human nature, just because the world has its being in and by the power of the Divine Logos, and thus in its constructive life is a manifestation of the Logos which is Christ. And thus the Incarnation becomes the supreme fact in history, giving to the world's history its true interpretation.

It is with the historical significance of the Incarnation that Mr Temple concerns himself in *Mens Creatrix*. "When Christ was born," he says, "the history of the world seemed to have worked itself out."[1] In philosophy, in art, in constructive politics and the quest for the moral Good, it had done its best, and had failed to find a satisfying permanent solution of the problem of life. Then Christ came, and in the revelation of His life the world got a new start. The explanation lies in a twofold aspect of the Christ-life: it came as a new and comprehensive manifestation of the true purpose of the world, and as an influence acting on the world from without. Of itself, the world could get no further: it required the infusion of a new principle, or motive power. That was given by the action of the personality of Christ as the manifestation of Divine Love, which is the supreme law and purpose of creation. In the working out of this thesis, *Mens Creatrix* leaves much to be desired in the way of clearness and logical unity. The book suffers from the fact, confessed by the author, that it was written at various times and odd moments rescued from a busy life. The main portion of the book is taken up with an endeavour to show why it was that the human mind, apart from Christ, failed of its ultimate goal—the perfect human life. All human activity is an endeavour to realise the full content of human personality or of Will (that is, the active personality).

[1] *Mens Creatrix*, p. 311.

Man cannot rest "content with his finitude"; he is always stretching out towards the infinite. That is the secret of the restless desire for knowledge; of the ecstatic enjoyment of art, in which time and space seem obliterated; of the impulse towards social unity, which makes the individual subordinate himself to the community. In this stretching out towards infinitude, the active personality may be said to realise itself: it is the Will grasping at the world-purpose which moulds the world's life; "the impulse of Self-Transcendence," "the determination to get beyond one's mere particularity (though we can never leave it behind) and apprehend the Whole, and our place in it, and dependence on it."[1] But as it is grasped by the world, apart from Christ, the whole or absolute appears "only as the physical world and the perfected —or rather the mutually self-perfecting—society of spirits." But if the values realised in this society of intelligences "come into being, and pass out of it almost daily, and if this flux is all that can be said at all, then our society and the world of values make up no whole at all, and again the effort towards the whole is stultified. Somehow, that whole must be supra-temporal, and hold within itself all the values realised in all the ages."[2] And thus the need of Christ the Divine Logos is postulated as the *terminus ad quem* of all human endeavour to realise the world-purpose. Christ in His relation to the world is, so to speak, the absolute Divine world-purpose, in whom all the values of life exist, not in separate and changing particularities of time, but in a supra-temporal personal unity. But that tells us only one side of the relationship. For whilst the world by the constitution of its life or purpose is drawn towards Christ, Christ is sent to the world to impart to it that supreme unity of life which is in Himself. He is the unifying principle in the world; unifying it with God, and with itself. But this unity—consistently with the idea of personality, upon which it is based—is not an identity of nature or of Will, but of purpose, in which all separate personal Wills find their content: in other words, it is a unity of love. The world becomes one with God when its Will is united with God's Will in the love of the Divine purpose or life; it becomes one in itself when all separate individual Wills are united in love of the common purpose of life in mankind: but as the Purpose of the Divine Life and the Purpose of the world's life are known to us only in Christ, it is through our love of Christ that we come to the love of God, and of mankind: He is the revelation of the Love which unites us to

[1] *Mens Creatrix*, p. 85. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 85–86.

God and the world at large. And He is not merely the revelation of this Love: He is the active Principle which imparts this love to us, since only in Him does it exist in an absolute character, in virtue of the Incarnation. Christ's work therefore in the world is to bring the world into unity with God, and with itself, not merely by manifesting the Truth of Life, but by imparting a new principle of activity to the world—the activity of the Divine Love which is in Himself: and this realisation in the world of the Christ-love—which is the supreme utterance of the world's purpose—is the work of the Holy Spirit. In one sense the Incarnation took place only that the advent of "the Spirit" might be possible: since the Spirit "is the operation of God through the revelation of Himself in intelligible form."[1] At any rate, with the advent of the Holy Spirit the Divine Purpose of the world begins to be realised as a fulfilment of the Divine Love made manifest in the Incarnation.

From this point of view, therefore, the mission of the Incarnation (if I may use the phrase) is to reveal and to effect a world-life in which all human activity and endeavour shall be dominated by that ultimate character and activity of personality which is love; that is to say, of course, love in the highest significance of the word as the state or activity of the Will in union with God and man through the apprehension of the Divine Purpose of life. As means to the effective apprehension of this Purpose, knowledge, art, politics, and all other activities of the human mind have their value: but they derive their ultimate value from the Divine Love manifested in Christ, which alone solves the problem of the world's life.

What, then, we have to look for in the world as an effect of the Incarnation is a progressive solidarity of human life founded in the recognition of free personality, and governed by the life revealed in Christ. This is the meaning of the Christian Church, Christ's Kingdom on earth. So far this Kingdom of Christ, according to Mr Temple, has been but imperfectly realised. The world, even the Christian world, is not one; and the Christian community is yet far from the full realisation of the Christ-life as the life of its members. At

[1] *Mens Creatrix*, p. 320. Mr Temple in this passage seems to conceive of the Holy Ghost as proceeding from the Incarnate Logos: and his words imply that without the Incarnation there would be no Holy Spirit. This is but one instance of his tendency to slip into definitely unorthodox language. He evidently, however, recognises the unorthodoxy of his words taken as they stand; for he appends as a footnote: "This is not all that is to be said, but it is true as far as it goes." From the point of view of Catholic orthodoxy, it really is not true as far as it goes, without a qualifying phrase.

this point Mr Temple reverts to a favourite theme—the ideal of Church and State as the two expressions of the manifestation of the Divine Logos in the world. The State is the heir of ancient Greece, with its ideal of the political community as an expression of the moral nature of man; the Church is the heir of ancient Palestine, with its religious and theocratic ideal of the community. Christendom, as distinct from the Church, represents the fusion of these two ideas. Hitherto the history of Christendom "has consisted in the reciprocal influence of its two constituent factors, the Universal Church and the National State";[1] and the failure hitherto to bring these two factors into harmonious relations is the main cause of the divisions into which Christendom has fallen. Mr Temple's ideal is that of the free State within the free Church: the Church ruling over all within its own spiritual sphere; but the State to be free in its own secular sphere. The State, it would seem, is the expression of the working of the Divine Logos in the moral striving of the world towards the Christ-life, which it is the function of the Church to impart to the world in every stage of its progress.[2] Only thus will Christ's Kingdom on earth be realised: a Kingdom which will hold within itself all the world's life and activity gathered together in the bond of that love which Christ came to manifest to men.

Such, as I understand it, is the line of thought expounded in *Mens Creatrix.* Everyone will admit that it is a line of thought full of suggestiveness, and one which appeals to our present-day mode of thinking: and as such one may accept it as a helpful contribution to Christological speculation, without accepting particular conclusions to which Mr Temple commits himself. I imagine it is a line of thought which will require to be dealt with and worked out, if theology is to become as vital an element in the thought of to-day as it was in the days of the early mediæval schoolmen, or of the Fathers of the early Church.

But there are certain danger-points which, as it seems to me, Mr Temple has not sufficiently heeded; and which, if overlooked, will bring this new method of theological thought into collision not merely with theological thinkers of older schools, but with the historic Belief of the Christian Church.

The first danger-point is indicated by Mr Temple's attitude towards the theological thought of the Fathers and mediæval

[1] *Mens Creatrix*, p. 327.

[2] At least, that is what I incline to think is Mr Temple's idea, though he does not state it in so many words.

schoolmen. Their mode of thought, he says in effect, was fundamentally wrong: it was either materialistic, and therefore incapable of dealing with so spiritual a problem as that of the Incarnation; or it was juristic, and therefore failed to appreciate the deeper moral values of Christ's life.[1] Now, it is quite conceivable that a "psychology theology" may be more intelligible to many minds at the present day than is the "substance theology" of the Fathers. But the denial that Logical Realism is valid as an interpretation of the mystery of Christ's life as it comes within our knowledge, can only be upheld if we deny that Logical Realism has any value in the interpretation of any form of life which we know. Without any undue worship of Aristotle, one may assume that he was not a fool. And if the Greek Fathers took the static view of life rather than the dynamic—is it certain that the static view does not represent one aspect of life, which the dynamic view is apt to overlook? For instance, the whole Christian Belief rests upon the truth (as the Church holds it) that God and creation can never be fused: that the human can never be identically one with the divine. To the new psychology-philosophy, which regards life as a perpetual flux, this is one of the "hard sayings" of Christian Belief. Mr Temple himself, though usually careful to safeguard his words against a pantheistic interpretation, at times falls into expressions which suggest pantheism rather than the historic faith of Christendom.[2] But my objection at this point is not so much theological as philosophical. Does the dynamic theory of life explain the whole of life? Is not the physical world an expression of the spiritual world; and may not a Realist philosophy, expressing itself in physical terms, reach to the truth of life as surely as a philosophy which expresses itself in terms of Will? If, on the one hand, Logical Realism has a tendency towards a materialistic view of life, has not the new "psychology-philosophy" a tendency to ignore that aspect of life which is expressed in physical reality? And in ignoring that aspect—or any aspect—of life, may not a "psychological theology" fail in its rational explanation of the Christian Belief in Christ? Philosophers are perhaps constitutionally intolerant of each other: but philosophic intolerance is apt to be disastrous when brought into theology. At the very best, philosophic speculation on the deeper mysteries of life—whether human or divine—can give us but inadequate explanations. But a theology run in the interest of a psychologist

[1] Vide *Foundations*, pp. 223 *seq.*
[2] E.g. *Foundations*, pp. 224–225.

or idealist or realist philosophy is apt to become schismatical in the sphere of Christian thought.

Another danger-point is this: The modern mind tends to lay stress upon the spiritual and moral values of our Lord's life as the manifestation of the Divine Purpose in creation, rather than upon the atoning value of His suffering and death; it is apt to regard the world's life as spiritual progression, and to ignore the fact of sin. Perhaps in the past the optimism of the Gospel has been obscured at times by a one-sided emphasis upon man's sinfulness, and the significance of the Resurrection in the world's life has been too much lost sight of in the presentment of Calvary. Protestantism to-day is suffering from a reaction against the pessimism of the Puritans. But no theology which minimises the part played in the world's actual life by sin on the one hand, and by the Atonement on the other, can be said fully to represent the Christian consciousness as we find it in the Gospel and the Pauline epistles, and in the tradition of the saints. In fact, the reconstructive force of Christianity in man's practical life has, in all ages, derived its motive power from the recognition of sin and the redemptive character of our Lord's suffering and death. For that reason the Latin Fathers and most of the mediæval schoolmen were content to take the Atonement as the starting-point in their statement of Christology. *Qui propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem descendit de cœlis*—was the belief from which they started: emphasis being laid upon the "fact": *propter nostram salutem.* Duns Scotus, when he propounded the theory that the Incarnation would have taken place even had there been no sin and no need of atonement, distributed the emphasis more evenly over the whole statement of the motive of our Lord's coming amongst us; and thus linked up the Latin mind, mainly preoccupied with the Redemptive feature of Christ's life, with the Greek mind, mainly preoccupied with the Incarnation as a manifestation of the Divine Life in creation. Undoubtedly the Christological thought of the Greek Fathers and of Duns Scotus suggests a reconstruction of human life in the light of the Christian Faith, which in its sublimity is intellectually persuasive, and to many minds morally helpful: it points to a Divine Purpose and unity in the world's life, eminently satisfying to the inquiring mind; it invests Nature with a sacramental value, and helps one to realise more fully that God created the world in His own image. Thus a vista of life is opened out in which all created existence and activity finds itself at one in its original constitution with the Divine Purpose of the Creator.

But the Christian soul in its more intensive moments of self-knowledge has always found itself to a greater or less extent outside this vision of life; it is conscious that it is not in line with the Divine Purpose in which the world, as seen in this vision, was created. There is the fact of sin (explain it as one will), which stands between it and God. To ignore this fact of Christian consciousness, and to proceed on one's way as though it were not there, is unreal, and to live in a fool's paradise; to minimise it in any scheme of theology is to set a false line of conduct. The immediate practical problem of the Christian life is, therefore, the breaking down of the barrier between man and God, and consequently the vision of the *Christus Consummator* must come to us in the vision of the *Christus Redemptor*.

In Mr Temple's "restatement" sin is acknowledged, and the Christ's life and death are presented as the victory over sin. Yet it may be doubted whether his theory of the redemption would satisfy those who are conscious in themselves of the practical problem implied in "conversion." Sin, as he explains it, though there is much to be said in favour of his explanation, is not the ugly thing against which a St Augustine revolted. One feels that, somehow, Mr Temple finds it an inconvenient intrusion into his optimistic view of the world's life. He is too sincere not to grapple with the difficulty; but his explanation fails to be convincing when brought into relation with the acknowledged experience of the world. Sin, as he explains it, is not the shattering of the world's life in God, which Christ came to restore: it is rather a something inherent in the very constitution of creation, but which the world is gradually to shed as it approaches perfection. It is, in fact, a condition of the world's progress, since without it man would not realise his freedom: he must battle with sin in order to attain true liberty. Not that any individual man must actually sin before he becomes free: but sin must be there in the world for him to conquer.[1] At first sight one might think that Mr Temple has confused temptation with sin; but he seems to imply more than a liability to temptation in the original constitution of human nature. Evil is there as "a necessary means to the greatest good that the nature—not of things, but—of Good itself makes possible." Now, this may be a very fair deduction from our actual experience of the world about us; but it does not answer to the Christian Belief, as expressed by St Paul, that all things are to be *restored* in Christ, and not merely fulfilled. And, after all, it

[1] *Mens Creatrix*, pp. 261 *seq.*

is by the historic Christian Belief in Christ that theology is to be tested, not merely by our experience of human life itself. Christian theology has to face the fact—as Christian Belief holds it to be—that there has been a deliberate surrender to evil on the part of mankind, which has cut across the line of natural progress towards the fulfilment of the Divine Purpose in the world, and that the problem of life is not merely one of progress, but of reconstruction or restoration. Only when this is recognised can we understand the Christian optimism expressed in St John's Gospel.

One who was not a theologian, but just a saint, achieved in his own spiritual life that harmony of what has been called the Johannine point of view and the Pauline, which is necessary for any adequate presentment of the *Christus Consummator*. To St Francis of Assisi all created life was as a sacrament of God. He did not express his love of Man and Nature in terms of the Logos philosophy, but he intuitively acknowledged the created world as a manifestation of the Divine Logos, and revered it as such. He did not formulate his belief in the Incarnation in the precise scholastic formula of Duns Scotus, yet it is clear that for him the Creation has its ultimate explanation in the Incarnate Word. That, perhaps, is the secret why he appeals to many minds at the present day in spite of his asceticism which of itself would repel them. At the same time, no saint more fully entered into St Paul's consciousness of sin and of Christ's victory over sin by the Cross. Francis the singer of the "Canticle of Brother Sun" is, at one and the same time, the Francis of the Stigmata of Christ's Passion; and it was his compelling utterance of the value of the Cross which made the joyous humanism of his life a convincing witness to his own time of the reality of the Christ of Christian Faith. Somehow, Mr Temple's exposition of the Atonement misses just that "convincingness" of the Divine Love which is conveyed in St Paul's appeal: "He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant . . . He humbled Himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross."

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THE INDIAN POETRY OF DEVOTION.

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What is known as the religion of *bhakti*, while it was probably a very ancient element in the religious life of India, first begins to loom out of the Indian darkness with a discernible outline and an audible voice of its own about the twelfth century of the Christian era. From that time onward we perceive it exercising a remarkable popular influence in nearly every province of the land, and creating saints, and often poets, whose names and messages have become widely familiar in the various vernaculars in which they taught and wrote. It is a personal religion rendered to a personal god; it uses the language of the people; it is addressed directly to the heart, and is often strongly emotional; and it usually expresses itself in poetry and singing. The character of this religious movement varies somewhat in different parts of the country. At times the gusts of its emotion have swept its followers away in an orgy of sensualism. Often it is on the whole pure, noble, and earnest. There is, however, almost always, even in its purest expressions, an admixture of superstitious and idolatrous elements. Further, there are almost always, behind it, exercising upon it varying degrees of influence, the great governing Hindu ideas of *karma* and transmigration, of *māya* (illusion) and monism. The tyranny of these thoughts is never wholly cast off, though in the stress of emotion they may sometimes be forgotten for a while. The variations in type of the different *bhakti* schools are due no doubt partly to the character and legendary associations of the god who is worshipped, partly to the characteristics of the people among whom the particular cult arose—Bengalis or Tamils or Marathas; partly also, probably, to the character of the founder of the particular school, Kabīr or Caitanya, for example, and the influences under

which he himself may have come. We have not the materials at our disposal to assess the value of the various factors that have gone to the making of these diverse types of religious thought and feeling.

The most striking and moving thing about all those saints and poets is the strength and manifest sincerity of their desire to draw near to God. Perhaps this is all the stronger because it is a reaction and a revolt from the barren doctrines of the orthodox teachers. Those made a desert and called it God. These men of devotion pant for the living God as the hart panteth for the water brooks. It is true that "the gods approve the depth and not the tumult of the soul," but there is a very poignant appeal in this tumult and outcry of desiring souls. Their hearts are disquieted within them, but they hope in God. Surely those who have so sought Him cannot have altogether failed to find Him.

These saints appear in various provinces of India at intervals throughout the period from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century,—the same period during which Europe was stirring and awaking from the long sleep of the Middle Ages. There were Rāmānanda and Kabīr and Tulsidās in the North; Caitanya in the East; Jñāneśvar, Nāmdev, and Tukārām in the West; and, earliest of all, Manikkavāsagar in the South. Rāmānanda and Nāmdev arose about the time when Tauler was preaching in Strasburg and Wyckliffe in England. Caitanya and Luther seem to have been as nearly as possible contemporaries. Tukārām was born in the same year as Milton, the last great spokesman of the Protestant Reformation. It is the faith of these saints of the East, as of their contemporaries of the West, that God, who is very far off, and "whose name is unutterable," has drawn near to men. He has come near by some means of grace,—for the thought of the divine grace is common to most of them,—whether by an *avatāra* or theophany, or by means of a *guru* or religious teacher, or even by the medium of the divine name. The place of the *guru* in all this group of cults is a very high and venerable one, a place sometimes even higher, or at least dearer, to the worshipper than that of the god himself. "Without the *guru*," says Nānak, "none has found God." Jñāneśvar invokes the grace of the *guru* as the mother of the seeker, tender, loving, condescending. Behind all the thought of the *bhakti* school is the idea of God as a being lifted high above the world, as One in relation with whom the worshipper has need of a mediator, if this One, so remote and strange and perhaps super-personal, is to be brought down to the level

of our common lives. They all agree in the confession of Tulsidās, "The worship of the impersonal laid no hold of my heart." They do not want *mokṣa*, or absorption in unconscious *Brāhman.* "So dear the path of *bhakti*," says Jñāneśvar, "they despise the great Release." The "path of *bhakti*" is the way that leads to loving fellowship with a personal God. Through all their poems echoes their cry to such a One to come to them, and when they find him near at hand they experience peace. "Your Lord is near," says Kabīr, "yet you are climbing the palm tree to seek him." "When I lie down, I lie prostrate at his feet."

We shall not dwell upon the extravagances of this school, as seen, for example, in Caitanya and the Vallabhas, for it is not fair to judge of any movement by its extreme representatives. Emotional violence takes the form of hysteria in the case of the former teacher and his followers, and of sensuality in the case of the latter. The climax of this *bhakti* is the *mādhura rasa*, in which "the votary serves Kriṣṇa as a lover offering his or her own person" (Caitanya-caṛit-amrit). The symbol that is here made use of to describe the relation of God and His worshippers, that of the bridegroom and the bride, has always been a favourite one with the intenser type of mystics in the West, even as in the East. But in the case of Bernard and Ruysbroeck and Rutherford, the fact that these spiritual nuptials are with Christ makes it impossible that there shall be harboured in this connection any gross or sensual thought. By his presence in it the symbol, as Miss Underhill says, is "anointed and ordained to a holy office," it is pre-eminently, and always, realised as "the betrothal of a pure virgin unto Christ." But further it is not in harmony with the teaching of the Christian Scriptures, though the usage of so many Christian saints has sanctioned it, to speak of the individual worshipper as the bride of Christ. His bride is His Church. At the very time when Caitanya was proclaiming his *mādhurya*, Luther was denouncing those who thought of love to Christ as "an interchange of sensuous tenderness." It is the product of a faith that trusts Him as the Saviour, and "in this faith," he says, "we are all one Bride, one Christian Church of this Bridegroom, Christ."

We may fairly take the Marāṭha saints as representative of the best elements in this *bhakti* movement. They do not betray its extragavances, while at the same time they possess those qualities of earnestness and sincerity which give the movement so much value as testifying to the depth of India's religious desire. There are three among them who are out-

standing in their influence—Jñāneśvar, Nāmdev, and Tukārām. Jñāneśvar was a Brāhman, Nāmdev a tailor, and Tukārām a Śudra shopkeeper dealing in grain. It is maintained by some scholars of authority that the *bhakti* movement in its origin was a revolt from Brāhman dominance, and that its founders, far back in pre-Christian days, were Kṣatriyas. It is impossible to determine with certainty how far this may have been the case, but no doubt the dominant Vedant doctrine, against which the *bhakti* movement was to some extent at least a reaction, was largely Brāhmanical and aristocratic. It used the Sanscrit language, and was in the hands mainly of Brāhman teachers. The *bhakti mārga*, or "way of devotion," appealed, on the other hand, to the simple heart, which, however, might quite well be a Brāhman heart,—it was democratic, and made use for the most part of the vernaculars. It is probably significant that while Jñāneśvar was a Brāhman, his father had been outcasted for returning to the life of a householder after having become a *sannyāsi*, or one who has renounced the world. The isolation and contempt which resulted proved so intolerable that both his parents committed suicide, leaving four orphans, who were despised as "*sannyāsi's* children." All the four, three brothers and a sister, are reverenced as saints and poets in Mahārāṣṭra. Two of the popular legends related of Jñāneśvar seem to point also to his having been opposed to the established religious order and the practices of *yoga*, often no more than magic tricks, by which the religious leaders kept their authority over the people. On one occasion he is said to have confounded his Brāhman persecutors by making a buffalo recite a verse of the Vedas, which Brāhmans only have a right to do. The other tale relates how once a powerful teacher of the time, an adept in *yoga*, named Chāngdev, came to visit him in a fashion meant to impress the heretic. He was accompanied by a multitude of disciples, and rode on a tiger, with a snake for a whip. But Jñāneśvar was equal to the occasion. He made a wall on which he happened to be seated his horse, and went out to meet the great man riding upon it.

Both Nāmdev and Tukārām, and probably also Jñāneśvar, were devotees of Viṭhobā, whose temple at Paṇḍharpur is the chief centre of this type of worship in the Marāṭha country. Viṭhobā is identified with Kṛiṣṇa, but it is a reputable Kṛiṣṇa, the husband of Rukhmini, not the lover of Rādha. Jñāneśvar's chief poem, a Marathi commentary on the Gītā, was completed ten years before the close of the thirteenth century; Nāmdev lived probably about a century after him, and Tukārām more

than a century later still. Tukārām is described as a most unworldly person, so occupied with *kirtans* or religious song services that his family was often in serious difficulties. A story that is told of him agrees well with the gentle spirit that his poems reveal. He was set by the owner of some fields to keep watch over them and drive the birds from the corn. But Tukārām could not bear to deprive those whom, like St Francis of Assisi, he might have called his little sisters of their food. And so when the owner returned at the end of a month his crops were hopelessly ruined. Tukārām is said, like the others, to have suffered persecution at the hands of the Brāhmans. He is popularly believed to have been translated to Vaikuṇṭha (heaven) in the year 1649.

Of the three poets, the one who has learning and knowledge of the philosophical systems is Jñāneśvar. Jñāneśvar's influence, says Mr Justice M. G. Ranade, "has been very great, greater than that of any other Marāṭha *sādhu* except Tukārām. . . . Jñāneśvar," he goes on, "appeals to the pantheistic tendencies of our people's intellect, while the charm of Tukārām and Nāmdev and others lies in their appeal to the heart and in the subjective truth of the experiences felt by them in common with all who are religious by nature." His name is joined with that of his great popular successor in the songs of the simple people who go in multitudes on pilgrimage to Paṇḍharpur chanting the refrain, "Jñānobā, Tukārām." His is no doubt mainly an influence on the thought of Mahārāṣṭra. It is Tukārām who has the heart and the ear of the common people. Both Nāmdev and Tukārām write *abhangs*, brief lyrical utterances, seldom extending to more than a dozen or twenty lines. They seldom trouble with theory. They would both agree to say with Nāmdev, "I am weary with enquiry, so I throw myself on thy mercy."

Jñāneśvar's religious attitude is more complex and difficult to define than that of the other two saints. In his heart he is undoubtedly a theist, but at the same time his intellect again and again compels him to bow to the proud claims of the *advaita* doctrine. This is an ambiguity that is characteristic of Indian religion from the age of the Upaniṣads until to-day, and it brings a discord into their thinking, as it must have brought a division into their lives, which makes an estimate of their teaching peculiarly baffling to the student. Jñāneśvar sets forth on one page as high a doctrine of *advaita* as ever Pantheist conceived, and on the next he reflects, "When the language of dualism ceases, if one were to say that one alone remaineth, who is to bear witness to it?"

Here is how he describes the bliss of the *bhakta* and his peace with God:

> "Dancing they sing my praises; surely not
> For them rites of atonement,—nay, I wot,
> Sin's very name's forgot.
>
> Thus by the praises of my name they slay
> The world's distress; hark, how it echoes gay
> With happy holiday.
>
> The same to them the monarch or his thrall,
> The high or low,—themselves alike to all
> A place of festival."

Both Nāmdev and Tukārām are poets of a different kind, little troubled by ultimate problems, and occupied mainly with the heart's needs. They share, as nearly every Indian does, in certain presuppositions as to life and God which colour their thought almost without their knowing it. They cannot free themselves from that philosophical or quasi-philosophical inheritance which is the very warp and woof of all Indian religion. This makes it possible for interpreters of Tukārām to claim him for both the theistic and the purely monistic doctrine. One authority maintains that he began as a theist, but towards the close of his life took refuge in the safe harbour of *advaitism*. However that may be, it may be claimed that the preciousness of the message of these two singers consists solely in the fact that they utter with simple sincerity a cry of the heart for God. Each of them is a *vox clamantis in deserto*, and as long as the soul of man is reckoned precious, these human documents will be of worth as testifying to its unquenchable longing for the living God.

It is true that God is represented to them both by a shapeless idol in an obscure Deccan village and that the grossness of Hindu mythology and the superstition of animistic religion are never far away from their thoughts, and yet again and again there breaks forth from them the authentic call of man's unquenchable desire, "O that I knew where I might find Him." Through them both there sounds a sad music that tells of the sense of incompleteness, of the anguish of separation. The ever-recurring refrain of their songs is such an appeal as this of Nāmdev, so direct, so poignant:

> "Why dost thou leave me suffering?
> O haste and come, my God and king.
>
> I die unless thou succour bring.
> O haste and come, my God and king.

To help me is a trifling thing.
Yet thou must haste, my God and king.

O come. (How Nāma's clamours ring!)
O haste and come, my God and king."

Another *abhang* of this poet shows how the thoughts of God that had somehow gathered about Viṭhobā drew and charmed their hearts:

"O God, my cry comes up to thee,—
How sad a cry is it!
What is this tragic destiny
That Fate for me has writ?

Wherefore, O Hṛiṣikeś, dost thou
So lightly pass me by?
To whom, to whom but to thee now
Can I lift up my cry?

As chiming anklets sweetly ring,
So rings thy name abroad;
To human spirits hungering
Thou givest peace with God.

Thou on thy shoulders carrying
All the world's load of care,—
To thee 'tis such a little thing
My trouble too to bear!

Ah, Pāndurang, thy hand withhold.
My mother dear thou art.
Thy Nāma, waxing very bold,
Casts him upon thy heart."

According to the legend, a remarkable change came over Nāmdev's life and teaching when he, by the advice of a wise potter, took to himself as *guru* a man called Visoba Khechar. The potter, tapping Nāmdev on the head with his finger as though he was testing his own pots, told him that, because he had no *guru*, he was *kaccha*, half baked. It is characteristic of all this school to lay great stress on the need of a spiritual preceptor, who to them is a kind of mediator between them and God. The *guru* in this case seems, if we may trust the tale, to have taught Nāmdev a more philosophical, and probably *advaitist*, view of things, leading him beyond idolatry, but not into the presence of the living God.

It is difficult when we turn to Tukārām to do justice to the abundance and the intensity of his expressions of need and of desire. One *abhang* may be quoted to illustrate what might be illustrated by hundreds. In it he has gathered together a

series of the symbols of this heart-hunger that they all again and again make use of.

"To the child how dull the Fair
If his mother be not there.

So my heart apart from thee,
O thou Lord of Paṇḍharī.

Chatak[1] turns from stream and lake;
Only rain his thirst can slake.

How the lotus all the night
Dreameth, dreameth of the light!

As the stream to fishes thou,—
As is to the calf the cow.

To a faithful wife how dear
Tidings of her lord to hear.

How a miser's heart is set
On the wealth he hopes to get!

Such, says Tukā, such am I.
But for thee I'd surely die."

These cries of desire are the most prominent characteristic of the work of Nāmdev and Tukārām, and their repeated utterance gives a certain touching monotony to their poems. The note of praise and of attainment is not absent, but it is far less prominent than in the Hebrew singers, though the dark barrier of a sense of sin does not lower above them as it does above the saints of Israel. They believe at the same time that man's need summons God with a compulsion that His compassion cannot resist. They are very bold in their argument from their own hearts to His. So even the more metaphysical Jñāneśvar, in language that recalls some of the daring utterances of the mediæval mystics, says of Arjuṇa that he is worthy of even greater praise than his master Kṛiṣṇa, for "he is a vessel into which has been poured the good fortune of the three worlds." This is so, for Arjuṇa is he "for love of whom the Formless himself has descended taking form"; he is he "for whom he who is perfect, lacking nothing, longs and yearns." "He to whom even Indra cannot attain in a thousand births, submits himself to Arjuṇa in a fashion past all telling." Such is the power of love in drawing to itself the heart of God Himself. A greater audacity declares that man's sin even is,

[1] A bird said to have a hole in its throat, so that it can only drink water falling from the sky.

as the mediæval theologian described the Fall, a *felix culpa*, for it constrains God to save.

> "How couldst thou e'er have cleansèd me,
> But for my sinful plight?
> So first come I, and then thy grace,
> O Mercy infinite!
>
> The magic stone was nothing worth
> Till iron brought it fame.
> Did no one by the Wish Tree wish,
> Whence would it get its name?"

That is a claim that could be paralleled in the writings of the Christian mystics from Eckhart to William Blake, but its audacity has no precedent in the deeper experience of such saints as St Paul and St John. It may be due as much to an imperfect conscience of sin, the result of pantheistic pre-suppositions in their thought, as to the courage of love. More frequent and more admirable is their trust in the gracious character of Him whom they are feeling after, and whom they dare to conjecture by their own hearts' testimony. "I was satisfied with getting so much," says Maharṣi Debendra Nath Tagore, "but He was not content with giving so little." That is a sentence, as Miss Underhill says, "that would have been golden on the lips of St Augustine himself," and it expresses the confidence in God's mercy that again and again flames up in the darkness from the hearts of those saints.

This insurgence of the heart is all the more resolute and daring because they believe that God is beyond the power of their minds to know. "I cannot understand; I love," is their testimony. This is an attitude that has often been found among Christians, especially among Christian mystics, but it is a very insecure attitude, as many examples testify. The faith that turns its back upon the reason is not likely long to control the will. It is, however, the best that the saints of "the times of that ignorance" could attain, and it often finds beautiful expression in Tukārām. For him and those like him to turn away from the reasonings of the schools is to turn away from desert places to green pastures. They rejoice in the discovery of a heart in the universe where they had been taught that there was none.

> "Thy nature is beyond the grasp
> Of human speech or thought;
> So love I've made the measure rod
> By which I can be taught.

Thus with the measure rod of love
  I mete the Infinite.
In sooth to measure Him there is
  No other means so fit.

Not Yoga's power, nor sacrifice,
  Nor fierce austerity,
Nor yet the strength of thought profound
  Hath ever found out Thee.

And so, says Tukā, graciously,
  O Keshav, take, we pray,
Love's service that with simple hearts
  Before thy feet we lay."

Again:

"Thy greatness none can comprehend,
  All dumb the Vedas are;
Forspent the powers of mortal mind,—
  They cannot climb so far.
How can I compass him whose light
  Illumes both sun and star?

The serpent of a thousand tongues
  Cannot tell all thy praise;
Then how poor I? Thy children we,
  Mother of loving ways.
Within the shadow of thy grace,
  Ah, hide us, Tukā says."

He often contrasts other ways with this way of *bhakti*, the simple path of tenderness and peace.

"Diverse men's ways as are their vanities.
Distract not thou thy mind to follow these.
Cling to the faith that thou hast learned, the love
That, coming, filled thee with its fragrances.

For Hari's worship is a mother,—rest
It is and peace, shade for the weariest."

The most frequent mood of these poets, at least of Tukārām, is one of desire rather than of satisfaction; they long for rather than experience peace. There is nothing, I think one may say, of the note of triumph which is the note of the New Testament. They seem to dwell for the most part in what the mystics call the "dark night of the soul," the experience of desolation and bereavement. One reason for that no doubt is, that they are still haunted by the thought that God is most to be found by the breaking of the ties of affection, that the journey to Him is a solitary pilgrimage, "a flight of the lonely soul to the lonely God."

"Lo, in the empty world apart
  I hearken, waiting thy footfall."

At the same time it would be untrue to say that a sense of the need of the world is altogether absent from their religion. Jñāneśvar speaks of the purpose of his writing his poem as being to "save the world." One *abhang* of Tukārām certainly expresses a keen sense of men's need and its claim upon him.

> "For men's saving I make known
> These devices,—this alone
> My delight.
>
> Can my heart unmovèd be
> When before my eyes I see
> Drowning men.
>
> I shall see them with my eyes
> When their plight they realise
> At the last."

But this note is very rarely struck, and it cannot be denied that the sense of the world's need of saving did not lie heavy on the hearts of those saints. We see this in the total absence from their religion, as expressed in these poems, though they so often pray for themselves, of prayer for others. "Tukārām's end," says Professor Patwardhan, "was individual, the peace and beatific rest of his own restless soul." The ideal of sainthood is a life of *aequanimitas*, a passive contemplation that looks upon all alike, unmoved in every circumstance. Jñāneśvar describes the saint thus:

> "A lamp is he shining with steadfast light,—
> Not shining to the stranger dark as night
> While to the household bright.
>
> As trees whose shadows on their planter fall
> Or on who hews them down,—so he to all
> Alike impartial.
>
> His heart, O Arjuna, no bias knows;
> On all an equal aspect he bestows,
> Friends let them be or foes."

That is not at all events the Christian ideal. That even path is not the path of love and sacrifice. The only service of others that these saints seem to realise as a duty is that which the *guru* performs when, as Jñāneśvar says, "he lights the lamp of knowledge in the temple of the heart of holy men." They believe that the call of their souls' need constrains God; but the call of the need of sinful and suffering men appears to awake a very faint echo in their own hearts. It is not that these hearts are not tender, but that Christ has not entered them with His revelation of what love is.

Of those cries from the depths of their loneliness three examples may be given, all from Tukārām.

THE SUPPLIANT.

" How can I know the right,—
So helpless I,—
Since thou thy face hast hid from me,
O thou most high?

I call and call again
At thy high gate.
None hears me; empty is thy house
And desolate.

Ah, if before thy door
A guest appear,
Thou'lt speak to him some fitting word
Some word of cheer.

Such kindness, holy Lord,
Becometh thee,
And I, says Tukā, nay, I'm not
Bad utterly."

WAITING.

" With hand on head before thy door
I sit and wait in vain.
Along the path to Paṇḍharī
My heart and eyes I strain.

When shall I look upon my Lord?
When shall I see him come?
Of all the passing days and hours
I count the heavy sum.

With watching long my eyelids throb,
My limbs with sore distress,
But my impatient heart forgets
My body's weariness.

Sleep is no longer sweet to me;
I care not for my bed;
Forgotten are my home and wife;
All thirst and hunger fled.

Says Tukā, Blest shall be the day,—
Ah, soon may it betide!—
When one shall come from Paṇḍharī
To summon me his bride."

MOTHER VIṬHOBĀ.

" Ah, Pāndurang, if, as men say,
A sea of love thou art,
Then wherefore dost thou so delay?
O take me to thy heart!

I cry for thee as for the hind
The faun makes sore lament;—
Nowhere its mother it can find,
With thirst and hunger spent.

With milk of love, ah, suckle me
At thy abounding breast!
O Mother, haste; in thee, in thee
My sad heart findeth rest!"

It is noticeable how often by these poets God's love is not only compared to a mother's, but he is himself directly called a mother. This is a manner of describing the divine tenderness which is not unknown among Christians to-day, though many would shrink from it as too suggestive of the merely soft and sentimental. To the Indian poets there is perhaps another suggestion in the comparison. The worship of the "Mothers" has always been among the grossest forms of popular superstition. How far those associations mingle with Tukārām's fervent expressions of affection we cannot say, but there is little doubt that even on his lips it is an imperfectly moralised relationship.

The goal of attainment that is before these *bhaktas* or devout worshippers is what is called in the language of the mystics the "unitive way." Of course they do not desire heaven, for heaven is only a place of temporary enjoyment for a soul still bound by desire, still in the mesh of *saṃsāra* or re-birth. The attainment of liberation from that bondage and absorption in the Absolute One (*mokṣa*) has the respectful admiration of their minds, but their hearts know of something that they account better. It is true that they sometimes waver in their choice.

"Calm is life's crown; all other joy beside
Is only pain.
Hold thou it fast, thou shalt, whate'er betide,
The further shore attain.

When passions rage and we are wrung with woe
And sore distress,
Comes calm and then (yea, Tukā knows it) lo!
The fever vanishes."

That is the Stoic virtue ἀταραξία, and Tukārām's passionate heart could seldom so control its ardours as to be content with that. It is the way of love he mostly follows, and it leads elsewhere. He calls it Brahma sometimes, but it is a strange Brahma surely, not that of the Upaniṣads.

"The learned in Brahma I shall make to long
With new desire; those once so safe and strong,
Set free, I bring back glad to bondage. Lo,
They are made one with Brahma by a song.

God is their debtor now. O glad release!
I'll bid the weary pilgrim take his ease.
The proud ascetic may forget his pride.
Away with offerings and charities!

By love and true devotion, life's high goal,
I'll help men to attain,—yea, Brahma's soul."

This that is "Brahma's soul" is not, then, a condition of absorption; it is a condition of perfect fellowship and of the harmony of love. As Jñāneśvar expresses it by the lips of Kṛiṣṇa:

"Within their minds as in a scabbard I,
The All-indweller, lie.

Therefore their love waxes unceasingly,—
These great-souled ones; not the least rift can be
Betwixt their hearts and me."

Of the spirit of tranquillity and joy that the sense of this attainment sometimes produces in Tukārām two examples may be given.

He Leadeth Me.

"Holding my hand thou leadest me,
My comrade everywhere.
As I go on and lean on thee,
My burden thou dost bear.

If as I go in my distress
I frantic words should say,
Thou settest right my foolishness,
And tak'st my shame away.

Thus thou to me new hope dost send,
A new world bringest in;
Now know I every man a friend,
And all I meet my kin.

So like a happy child I play
In thy dear world, O God,
And everywhere,—I, Tukā, say,—
Thy bliss is spread abroad."

Love's Captive.

"Bound with cords of love I go,
By Hari captive led,
Mind and speech and body, lo,
To him surrenderèd.

> He shall rule my life, for he
> Is all compassionate;
> His is sole authority,
> And we his will await."

It would be easy to point out defects in these expressions of a sincere and intense devotion. Some have been already indicated. It is beautiful but, as it has often proved in the case of similar mysticisms in the West, ineffectual. It ends in vague raptures; it does not lead to action and service. It is this that gives to so much of mysticism what one of its critics calls its "enormous monotony." In regard to all religious feeling, as Phillips Brooks has said, "we must ask of it its parentage and its offspring." Nevertheless the presence of these deep movements of the soul of India furnishes an immense encouragement to the Christian evangelist. They have in them the promise and potency of Christ. They confirm the old saying, "The root in every man in Christ"; and we may test in those in whom this spirit dwells the rest of the saying, "It is watered with His blood." So watered, to what may it not grow, to what plant of renown?

NICOL MACNICOL.

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE LAST THREE YEARS.

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The structural principle of the American Government is democracy. The most characteristic feature of American society is democratic equality. The truth of Jefferson's declaration is still manifest after almost a century and a half of the asseveration and application of its sublime platitudes. The political philosophy which is taught in the academic class-room, as well as accepted in the clubs with knowledge and in labour-union halls without knowledge, is democratic. Religion, which is still a dominant force, recognises the democratic fact and rule, not only in the dissenting Congregational Churches of New England orthodoxy and Unitarianism, but also in the republican Presbyterian and monarchical Episcopal Churches. The growth of agnosticism and of impersonal or personal pantheism intimates that ignorance of the spiritual infinities is equally common and equally influential or powerless among all classes of mind and all kinds of conscience and of will. The current inclination to depreciate the past, or even to cut oneself free from the great forces of Hellenism and of Roman law and imperialism, to live only in the present and to feel only the power and the promise of the recent and the modern, is an outcropping of the spirit of democracy. Individualism—an individualism which is one of the results of the French Revolution transplanted into the rich soil of American life,—passing over into Socialism by leaps and bounds, represents the spread of the same conquering movement, a movement of the growth and the meaning of which American people are still largely ignorant. The wiping out of political party lines, or rather the mingling and commingling of partisan principles, ideals, and methods, helps to carry forward the democratic atmosphere and feeling. The physical well-being of the

people—a well-being which is embodied in a tight roof over the head, a fat pigeon in the pot, a warm hearthstone for one's feet, and a shirt on the back—illustrates and helps forward the great political and social cause.

It may also be true that the geographical situation of America contributes to the same results. The present of America largely, and the future comprehensively, lies in the vast section between the Alleghenies and the Rockies, a plateau of 2000 miles in width, drained by the Mississippi and the Missouri, in which the topographical variations are hardly discernible to the human eye: levels geographical promote levels social. The similarities in dress, in manners, in habits of life, in scales of income and of expenditure, are at once causes and results of similarities in government, in feelings, and in intellect. Neither can it be doubted that the swiftness of transportation of persons and of goods, of ideas by post, by telegraph, and by telephone—a swiftness which is impossible to realise—has helped forward the movement of a democracy united and triumphant. The education of the people, supported out of the public chest, beginning with the kindergarten, continuing through intermediate and high schools, and ending with the undergraduate college or the professional school of law, of medicine, of theology, of architecture, of journalism, and of other professions, tends to create a nation in which the majority rules without irritating arrogance and the minority submits without humiliation, and always in the hope of soon becoming the commanding majority itself. Mysticism, a sense of the infinities and the immensities and the eternities, interpreted in terms of the emotions, is still a strong though a limited force in American life; and mysticism results in essential democracy through the elimination of the accidents and incidents of ordinary time and of space. The race spirit, furthermore, is strong in cosmopolitan America, and the race spirit spells democracy.

It was into the bosoms and business of such a democratic nation, numbering 100,000,000 persons, that of an August morning of the year 1914 were thrust the tidings of the long-prophesied European war. For three years these tidings have with each sunrise and sunset continued.

This thrusting of world-shaking news into the American mind has been done on the whole with fullness and fairness. The journals of each day, of the great cities at least, for the first three years have given first place to war news. Special correspondents have contributed general interpretations, and the organised press associations have given the best news

service which has ever been rendered in a time of war. Such service has been the chief source of the people's information and the chief material for their resulting judgment and feeling.

In this triennium these judgments and feeling have suffered fundamental changes. The first impression—more a sentiment than an idea—was one of surprise. Out of a national calm which the assassination of the Austrian Archduke only briefly and superficially interrupted came forth astonishment and confusion. Following the feeling of surprise emerged inquiries: "Why? What is it all about?" For Europe is very far off from America. Germany, Austria, Russia, and all Balkan provinces are remote from the thinking and knowledge of the ordinary citizen. Diplomatic relations play a small part in the judgment and emotion of the American man. For the first months this surprise and inquiry continued. It was of course accented by the invasion of Belgium and the advance toward Paris of the German armies. These emotions were succeeded by those of horror—horror in which surprise and astonishment too had their part. For it soon was made evident that the world was dealing with a Power not only of unexampled might but also of unexampled ruthlessness. The Bismarckian principle of force was being applied without the Bismarckian emphasis upon the imponderables and the invisibles. The *Lusitania* was the culmination, and the approval of the German Government of the sinking was if possible a further culmination of the proof of personal ruthlessness and of national iniquity. The sense of horror was followed by a conviction that Germany was willing to descend to a depth of national sin and of international crime which had formerly seemed unthinkable.

For it has been impossible for the American mind to understand or for the American heart at all to appreciate the destruction which the German armies were inflicting on defenceless communities and individuals, or to realise in either intellect or conscience the support which the German Government, either positively or passively, was giving to the perpetration of such outrages. Perhaps the Armenian and Syrian deportations and massacres moved the American soul more deeply than any other devastation. For the relationship between Armenia and Syria through the Protestant missions is intimate. Thousands of members, too, of both nations are found living and working in the larger towns of America.

The feeling of surprise, of inquiry, of irritation, of horror, thus grew into antagonism. From the first days the question had frequently been asked, "Shall we get into it?" For two

years and more it seemed clear that the Government was determined to do all that it could to keep us out of it. So strong was the impression made on the people that the Government should keep out, that President Wilson and his advisers were condemned by many people for undue conservatism or indifference. But, on the other hand, one of the causes contributing to President Wilson's re-election was the cry, "He has kept us out of the war." But such a judgment was, I believe, more common with the less thoughtful part of the people. Gradually, however, in the last month of the last year and in the first months of 1917, antagonism hardened, and with the hardening was made bitter. The U-boat campaign, the revelations of the plotting in Mexico, the conspiracy to attack the United States on its southern boundary from Mexican soil, and to wrest some part of American soil for the benefit of Mexico and Germany, brought all feelings to a head. No Government at all worthy could do otherwise than was done: a state of war was declared to exist. To this declaration the American people at once gave and have continued to give an unexampled unity of support. No war has ever been entered into which so commands the hearty and general support of the whole body of the American people as does the present. The number of dissenters in the Spanish War of 1898, the number of Copperheads and of peace-at-any-price men in the Civil War, the number of doubters in the Mexican War of 1846, the number of opponents in the War of 1812, and the number of loyalists who fought against the colonists in the Revolutionary War of 1776–83 was far greater in each instance than the number of disloyalists in the present unspeakably greater struggle.

These changes have gone on among a people which it is difficult to interpret with an exactness or conclusiveness which would seem just and impartial. In a superficial zone American society is primarily emotional and secondarily intellectual. Going a little more deeply beneath the surface, American society is perhaps equally emotional and intellectual. Probing a little deeper, this same society reverts to its primary state of being more largely emotional than intellectual. If one should be allowed to go a bit further in the analysis, I think it would be found that the people is largely intellectual. The American feels before he thinks, at least in any large way. When the first flash of feeling has vanished somewhat, he reflects; having reflected, he finds his meditations react upon his feelings, and that his feelings often absorb his thought. How often have I seen bodies, both large and small, of men

educated and intellectual swept away by great floods of feeling! But beneath such conditions, which cover the largest share of the people, are found dwelling a small body of men whose feelings play a small part in their personal organisation or activity, who are chiefly forces and agents intellectual.

With all these sections and zones of American society the democratic movement has in the period under review gained, and gained in common with its spread throughout the world. The sublime sentiments of Lincoln regarding government of and for and by the people, spoken under unlike conditions and in diverse phrases, have never been more often repeated or made to connote richer or more inspiring meanings. In the United States, as elsewhere, democracy never goes backward, and usually advances. This increasing power belongs, in my judgment, rather more to the educated classes than to other sections. The evidence for this opinion lies in the eagerness of these higher classes, as found in the colleges and universities, to respond to the call for service, military and naval. The response has been quite as prompt and enthusiastic as it was in the Civil War, which of course came unspeakably nearer home. Not a few colleges have lost or are to lose one-half of their students in the next academic years. Football fields and baseball diamonds have become drill-grounds, dormitories, barracks, gymnasiums, armouries, and commons messes. Such enthusiasm and response are what was expected, and even demanded, by faculties and trustees. To the democratic State educational institutions are in debt for their existence. When the State is menaced they therefore should, and do, leap to her defence.

Among the middle classes, and especially in that part which might be called the lower half of the third estate, I do not believe the democratic sentiment has in recent years strengthened. A domestic and an individualistic, centrifugal movement has progressed. Its members, in their prosperity and comfortableness, are more inclined to ask, "What have we to do with Europe? Its problems and its difficulties and wars are not our concern. What, too, has America done for us that we should sacrifice for her? Have we not earned all that we have got?"

My reason for such judgment lies in the apathy under which the people seem to rest, and in the slowness with which they have responded to the call for enlistments in the army and navy made by the President. In a proper democracy the call for volunteers should be promptly and fully answered, and answered with overflowing enthusiasm, answered with a

sense of privilege and of joyous entrance into an opportunity. The answer has been made with slowness and with indifference. In a proper democracy conscription should not be necessary. But conscription is necessary, and is now in the process of making. The democratic system has not furnished America with a proper number of volunteer soldiers. The army is largely a conscript army. Perhaps, however, one who would differ with me would say that democracies are not made to fight, and that martial standards do not form the proper test to apply to a democracy.

In this democratic condition, however, there is occurring a movement which has deep meaning for the present, and ultimately may have deeper meaning, for America and for the world. This movement is Socialism. Of the manifold definitions of Socialism, let me, in order to be clear, accept that definition which interprets Socialism as being a method of government in which the State performs functions for the individual which formerly he performed for himself. Under this definition, in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the war and in the three years succeeding, Socialism has moved with tremendous strides, and was never moving more rapidly than at this moment. The transportation business is perhaps the more comprehensive field. The railroads have in the last month been largely commandeered by the Government. In its parcels post it has become the rival of the express companies. The owning and running of ships cover a similar field on water. The business of insuring the lives of its soldiers is a function formerly given over to the insurance societies. It has gone into the coal business in reference to the regulation of prices. It has for a generation or more been in the banking business through its system of national banks, but recently it has taken a much larger and more controlling hand in what is known as its Federal Reserve system. In part, and only in part, these measures are war measures, and by most would be confessed necessary. Their political function and place following the close of the war covers a more serious question, which thoughtful minds are already considering.

In all the thinking and discussion of these years, of course, the great arch-enemy has occupied the largest place. The public opinion about Germany has passed through several sea changes, and also, one may be suffered to add, several land changes also. The opinion, too, differs in different strata of the cosmopoliton population. For two and a half years the Germans living in America, either German-born or of German parentage, sympa-

thised with their home people. This sympathy was voiced in many ways, the newspaper being the chief method. The German press of the United States is a many-voiced organ. The daily journals published in New York, Chicago, Cincinnati, Milwaukee, and other cities have not less than a million readers. The sinking of the *Lusitania* was regarded by them as a legitimate war measure. The victories of Germany have constantly been received with satisfaction and the victories of the Allies with depreciation. Their recent utterances have been less sympathetic, but the sympathy is still felt if not so fully expressed. Though the press is an exponent of public opinion, yet I do believe that the Germans who have chosen America as their home are more loyal to the country of their adoption than their papers intimate. Before the declaration of war was made, the Governor of New York said to me that three of the outstanding German citizens of the State offered, in case of a declaration of war between Germany and the United States, to raise a regiment of their own German citizens to fight against Germany. In general the loyalty of the German population can be counted upon, and yet, be it said, not with that full sense of enthusiasm which would belong to the native American citizen.

It should also be added that on the part of most Americans is entertained no feeling of revenge against Germany. Of course, the outrages perpetrated by Germany in Belgium, in Poland, and by its consent in Syria, Armenia, and other parts, have created the deepest emotion of horror. Yet there prevails no desire for reprisal. The feeling is one of pity for the outraged and of desire to give relief, and of pity also that a nation could so far forget herself as to be guilty of such devastation. In the first years thoughtful men made a careful discrimination between the Germany of Kant, of Schiller, and of Goethe, and the Germany of Bismarck, of the present Kaiser, and of their entourage; but as the years have passed it has become evident that the German people, either through misinformation or misinterpretation or ignorance or timidity, have stood with their Government in this war. Under this solidarity of judgment and of emotion the feeling of sympathy with and of regard for the Teutonic peoples has distinctly and greatly lessened. It may be added that their boastfulness has on the whole awakened the sense of the ridiculous, and also the sense of the psychological inquiry regarding the origin and prevalence of such unique boastfulness and bumptiousness among an educated and thoughtful people.

Although no feeling of revenge prevails, yet deep antagonism

does prevail which has taken on a minor form of more or less extreme silliness. The special form I have in mind is the elimination of the teaching of German and of the courses in German literature from schools and colleges. For many years German has been the most popular of all foreign languages in academic curricula. The beginning of this popularity occurred about forty years ago, and it has increased with each decade. But at the present time in the public schools of many cities it is proposed to eliminate the language as a subject of study. In the colleges the courses will still be given, but probably with considerable curtailment.

The opinion, however, is common that in one respect at least the United States was justified in going to rather extreme measures in retaliation. This respect relates, not to the U-boat warfare or to Belgian outrages, but to the representation of Germany in the United States. The suspicions for a long time entertained have now been proved to be true. A propaganda for their people was on neutral American territory constantly and powerfully carried on by the official representatives of the German Empire. The promotion was done not only through money, but by methods deceitful, surreptitious, and insidious, by the destruction of property, by stratagem which caused the innocent to suffer with the presumed guilty, and by violence resulting in the loss of life. It was all a nasty business done in the name of a great Power on neutral territory. The revelations made since the recall of the German Ambassador add to its perfidy. Yet it was carried on with such clumsiness that it failed of its supreme purpose. Its chief result was to madden the American people and to unite them in the support of a declaration of war.

The opinion of the American people has been formed not only in regard to movements, diplomatic measures, and with the doctrines of rights and duties, but also in regard to personalities. Of all personalities engaged in the great affair, no one has commanded the attention of thoughtful people more constantly or more affectionately than Lord Bryce. For Lord Bryce, more commonly spoken of as Mr Bryce, holds the deep respect and regard of the American nation. This feeling arises from general causes which create the regard and respect of all, but also from two special reasons: his service as ambassador, and his book, *The American Commonwealth.* His ambassadorship is interpreted in no narrowly diplomatic sense, but rather as a great friendship, educational and personal. He touched American life on many sides, and touched it only to enlighten, to enlarge, to enrich. The student found in the author of *The*

Holy Roman Empire and in the Oxford Regius Professor of Civil Law a sympathetic teacher. The Congressman found in the author of *The American Commonwealth* a statesman who understood his own American problems quite as well as himself. The lawyer found in the writer of the *Studies in History and Jurisprudence* a mind rich, inquisitive, and suggestive. The manufacturer and the merchant throughout the country discovered in Mr Bryce an interpreter whose questions reached far down into surprising detail and upward into inductions to which they had given little or no heed. Mr Bryce was indeed our great British friend; his presence was always most grateful and his speech quickening and inspiring. He once said to me he had spoken in every State of the American Union, excepting only two or three.

At the beginning of the war the figure of Sir Edward Grey, as he then was, emerged for the first time to the ordinary American mind. From this mind he has, for the time being at least, vanished. But the impression made in those first eventful days is to last. This impression is, that no man ever laboured with greater earnestness, or with a heartiness more sincere or with a laboriousness more intense, in the promotion of the great end of peace. Not only the White Book, but every other Book when properly read, furnishes proof of the judgment.

The American judgment of two other great Englishmen has also been made plain. The two can for my purpose be bracketed—Mr Asquith and Mr Lloyd George. Of Mr Asquith the opinion has heightened in respect to his ability as a thoughtful statesman. It has fallen in respect to his ability as an executive. His ship is built, it is believed, to sail the broad and calm seas of statesmanship, a ship bearing rich cargoes, but one unable to breast swift and strong tides and hard storms, or to escape shoals and rocks such as it has met in these years. His retirement was inevitable. But, on the contrary, his successor is regarded as of a very unlike type. Mr Lloyd George has come to be thought of as a statesman especially called to an increasingly lofty duty. This duty he interprets with a certain narrowness not belonging to his predecessor, but also with a fearlessness and a force which were quite foreign to Mr Asquith. Joshua succeeded Moses in the command of the chosen people. Although less great than the legislator, Joshua did what Moses could not do—he brought Israel into the promised land.

Concerning the two most outstanding Germans of the present or the last generation American opinion has also

suffered a change. Regarding Bismarck the change lies in rather a deepening of opinion than in alteration. The regard for his prescience has become greater. This prescience was manifest in his willingness not to demand the uttermost farthing of either blood, or treasure, or territory of the defeated foe, as of France in 1871, or of Austria in 1866. If his counsel had been followed in 1871, the present war might have been avoided at least for a time. But also the judgment has become confirmed that Bismarck is one of the ultimate causes of the present crisis. Through his insistence on making German welfare an ethical and political standard, he served to intoxicate the German mind with the notion of Germany's present and future greatness. His argument that what is good for Germany is good for all, what is bad for Germany is essentially bad, what is right for Germany is fundamentally right and what is wrong fundamentally wrong, established a standard and a test which allowed and quickened the breaking of treaties, the forging of telegrams, and the declaration of war. His interpretation of Germany has helped the nation to sell its soul for a mess of pottage, fiery, liquid, red. Be it added, too, it is going to lose the pottage as well as, for the time being, its soul.

In the half-seen background is always discerned by the American the sinister and helmeted figure of the Kaiser. In America, before his reign began and immediately after, there was felt a special prejudice against him, based partly on his treatment of his English mother and partly on his outstanding peculiarities. These peculiarities, it was believed by many, might bring his reign to a sudden end by his confinement in a sanitary Schloss. But as the years and the decades have passed it has become evident that he was making himself more and more a master of his own will and of the will of others. His protestations that he was the peace-lord of the world came to be received with constantly increasing confidence. The marvellous commercial and industrial progress of the nation was due, at least in part, it was recognised, to his encouragement and initiative. It was also reasoned that the industrial and financial place which Germany had secured and was pretty sure to enlarge would prevent the Kaiser from entering into a great war.

The circumstances attending the outbreak of the war and the conditions of its waging have completely altered these interpretations. The heart and mind of the American people now are convinced that the real author and the real continuing force of the war is the Kaiser himself. Tales of the dominant

influence of the war party and of his Majesty's reluctance in yielding to the pleadings and arguments of the war party have been received from time to time, but they have not served to becloud the real point of responsibility. The falsehoods of the military and civil authorities regarding affairs in Belgium and Poland and France have not for a moment beguiled the American people into the belief that these excesses could not have been avoided by a word from the throne. Journal after journal in American cities has printed indictments against him which would be sufficient to consign not a single guilty criminal, but a whole Prussian division, to everlasting punishment.

If one looks below the surface, the reason for the Kaiser's waging such a war by such methods lies in the Bismarckian formula touching Teutonic supremacy and the betterment for the world which is sure to result from such supremacy.

The judgment of the American people regarding certain personalities both in Germany and England becomes yet more emphatic when one considers the opinion which is entertained in America regarding England's share in the great undertaking. About the year 1893, on the anniversary of Perry's victory on Lake Erie, I heard a leading lawyer of a leading American city, with bravado in voice and manner, declare, "We have licked England twice, and we can do it again." It was of course a cheap piece of swashbuckling. That lawyer would not say now what he said then. He would not have made the remark on any anniversary of Perry's victory in the past decade. For the feeling of America toward England has shown a distinct decline of antagonism and a distinct increase of sympathy. The causes of the change have been general, belonging to commerce, to industry, to literature. The causes have been also in no small part personal. The presence of Lord Bryce on the one side, and on the other of Lowell and Hay and Choate, have proved the source of sympathetic interpretations and ties. But out of the war, even before the public declaration against Germany, a sense of peculiar oneness had taken the place of antagonism or of indifference. The uniting is now quite complete, for not only is America fighting with Great Britain for the world of democracy, but it is now plainly seen that Great Britain was fighting the battle of the world for democracy, not only world-wide, but also American. That thin, wavering, unconquerable red line in France and Flanders of October 1914 was what stood between not only a democratic and an autocratic world,

but also what stood between a democratic America and a Germanised America. Great Britain fought the American battle in France in the summer months of 1914. If in 1776 and the years following Great Britain committed sins and follies against the American colonies, she has now made an atonement full and complete. The troops of George V. in France undid what the troops of George III. were guilty of in America a hundred and fifty years before.

Before America's formal entrance, as well as after, the war struck a fundamental note in the character of the community and of the individual. That note is a religious one. For man is not only naturally religious, as a Church father said: he is also unconquerably religious. A crisis like the present flings the individual in thought and feeling back upon the infinite, the eternal, the universal. In the possibility that he may lose his body, man, the soldier, is inclined to ask whether he will keep his soul or whether he has a soul at all worth keeping. In the probability that someone of those dear to him will not return with peace, he inquires whether he will see his Pilot face to face. "What is worth struggling for, what is worth living for, what is worth dying for?" is his persistent question. Individualism is tabooed, selfishness made impossible, the will to live shameless. That truth is the worthiest object of one's thought, duty of one's endeavour, righteousness of one's struggle, honour of one's allegiance, and service of one's sacrifice, become inspiring sentiments and thrilling rallying-cries. In my city of Cleveland was recently held a meeting of more than three hundred of its chief business men. The assembly was a recognition of the raising in a week by voluntary offerings of more than four and a half million dollars for the Red Cross. A dozen brief addresses were made by merchants and manufacturers. The note prevailing in these speeches was a spiritual one: it was the note of God and of God's world, of the individual's and the race's duty to the Divine Person and to His creatures. The note thus struck is general and deep in the American character.

The formal Church recognises this spiritual movement, but not fully; but in recognising it, is not always able to adjust itself to these spiritual demands. The river of God is so full of water that the stream has overflowed its common banks of thinking and of devotional expression. The American Church has no personality like Phillips Brooks or Henry Ward Beecher to quicken and to direct its feelings. It is a personality and not a creed, be the creed never so wide or true, it is a personality not an organisation, be that

organisation never so historic or complete, which is demanded by the heart of a nation in a national crisis.

In this spiritual and other experience through which America is now passing, even slight reflection brings to consciousness a sense of the reserve strength of the people. A population of 100,000,000 should of course have vast strength held in reserve, although one at once acknowledges that India's population is threefold and China's fourfold greater than America's. Mere numbers may constitute not strength but weakness. But this population, living under a stable republican government, with material property of uncounted billions and means of augmenting this property each year by an amount which most nations do not possess as their entire wealth, resting on a stable history of three hundred years, a people orderly, religious, intelligent, loyal to high ideals, has great forces in reserve. These forces are quite as much moral as they are physical. This fact of reserve helps to explain the indifference of many Americans to evils in their body politic and in their individual soul—evils which seem to a foreigner rather menacing. The Americans, however, know that these evils—and they are free to confess that they are evils—are slight in comparison with the strength and virtue inherent and structural in American society. They also are willing to acknowledge that these evils they can remove whenever they make up their mind or their will to. This sense of reserve, moreover, may have close metaphysical relation with the self-restraint of the nation which has characterised its dealings with Germany during these last three years.

This consciousness of reserve power has possibly some bearing on a question which, in the opinion of but a few, is still awaiting decision: the question whether the evidence afforded by the war is for or against the value of great standing armies. America and England have not maintained great bodies of troops ready for service, yet in six months Kitchener's mob was converted into a fine fighting machine. In a scarcely longer period America will convert a million raw recruits into a compact, well-disciplined, well-equipped, victorious force — a force, which joining other forces, will help to conquer Germany's long-standing millions. On the whole, given a nation of physical resources and of intellectual and administrative resourcefulness, the evidence, even on the martial side, is against the policy of maintaining vast armies in times of peace.

In this struggle, as in other fundamental movements, have

emerged two opposing tendencies: I refer to the individualistic and the racial or cosmopolitan. In the later part of this three-year period has sprung up with special vigour a movement for what is called Americanisation. The movement embodies a desire to transmute all the members of all these diverse nationalities into Americans. The fire beneath the melting-pot, always burning, has in these last days received fresh fuel. The importance of mobilising all forces in the prosecution of the war has become recognised; therefore, not "America for the Americans" is the accepted doctrine—that is a too narrow interpretation,—but "All Americans" is the slogan. Not only is the campaign to naturalise foreigners, but also and more the endeavour is to inspire them with the spirit of America, to acquaint them with American history, to instruct them in American traditions, and above all else to teach them to speak, to write, to think the American language, which, thank God, is the English tongue.

Yet, while this movement for Americanisation has been going on, there has also progressed a world-tendency: a tendency to think in terms of the world and of all history. It is a tendency not only for the races, but also, and more, for the race. We have realised that above all nations is humanity. We have come to appreciate the truth that we must think in world-terms. We have learned that no nation either liveth or dieth to itself. We have been taught to believe that the suffering of one finally becomes the loss of all, and the gain of one is the gain of all, and the gain of all is the advantage of each. We have now come to understand, as we had not understood, that the world's sorrows are America's griefs, the world's burdens America's weights, the world's degradations America's shame, the world's hopes America's assurances, and the world's victories—which are sure to be won—are America's triumphs.

CHARLES F. THWING.

CLEVELAND.

DOCTORS, LAWYERS, AND PARSONS.

AN ESSAY IN RECONSTRUCTION.

THE RIGHT REVEREND BISHOP HAMILTON BAYNES.

I WAS recently asked to address the Birmingham University Graduates' Club after one of their monthly dinners. As most of the members belong to one of the three faculties—Medicine, Law, Theology,—I put down the title above as the subject of my paper. I did so for several reasons. (1) I was pressed for a title before I had time to consider; (2) I thought the subject would have a personal appeal to the audience; and (3) if the worst came to the worst I knew a great many stories about these three classes which might suit an after-dinner speech. But, as I came nearer to the time, I felt that the gravity of the days through which we are passing precluded at all events the last alternative. It seemed to me, further, that while there had been much trenchant criticism of leaders in Church and State as to their failure to avert the horrors of war, we now needed something less negative—not criticism but principles of reconstruction; and that therefore it might not be unprofitable to consider the contribution which each of these professions might be looked to to make towards a new and better social life after the war.

And so, meditating on the essential foundations of civilised society and the principles which might guide us to a wise reconstruction and a regenerated world, I was, not unnaturally, recalled to Plato's immortal Dialogue, the *Republic*, and the following pages are the substance of what I said.

It will be remembered that Plato, in the person of Socrates, sets out to answer the question, "What is Justice?" or, as we might express it in modern equivalent, "What is Right?" And first, after a little preliminary skirmishing over the conventional aphoristic definitions of justice by the poets, we have the answer of the Sophist, Thrasymachus. And as we recall it we

are suddenly aware that Thrasymachus has revived in modern Germany, and that both in manner and matter he is reproduced in Treitschke and Bernhardi. In *manner*, for he too comes with the rattling scabbard and blustering denunciations of what he is pleased to consider cant and hypocrisy. And, brushing these aside, he gives his plain answer to the question, "What is Right?" And in the *matter* of that answer as well as in the manner of it we have modern Germany anticipated, for he says that Might is Right, and Justice is the Interest of the Stronger. That is the German answer. Germany has a strong sense of the need of law and order. That is what underlies the talk about the German Kultur which it is her mission to give to the world. It means the reign of German precision—of the drill-sergeant and the schoolmaster and the professor; but this Kultur is to be imposed by an external authority on a docile world—a world made docile by the mailed fist and the shining armour. Germany insists, moreover, that there can be no law where there is no force to compel obedience, and that therefore the talk of international law is cant and hypocrisy, because there is no international power to enforce its commands. So, with Thrasymachus, she insists that Might is Right, and Justice is the Interest of the Stronger—of the Imperial State, the essence of which is the will to power. Do you realise that that is the logical and inevitable product of a theory of society which has largely prevailed, which was common to such opposite schools of thought as that represented by Hobbes on the one side and Rousseau on the other? Both these are alike in starting with the idea that first you have free and independent individuals, clothed with natural rights—rights, that is, to anything they can lay their hands on. But this state of nature, they allow, is but short-lived. It is soon discovered that the world is not big enough for these most exigeant individuals, with their unlimited rights. Their several claims come into conflict with each other. There is competition and strife, and the state of nature passes into a state of war, and life becomes dangerous and intolerable for the majority. It is to provide a solution for this problem that the organised State arises. Men come to a mutual agreement to limit their own and respect their neighbours' rights. And this social contract is alleged to be the basis of the State.

If this theory were true, several things would follow. First, it would be obvious that the State is an artificial not a natural creation—an afterthought, a makeshift, a compromise. Secondly, it would be plain that the State is a second best: that no one would choose it if he could do without it, because

it is a restraint upon his freedom and a limitation of his natural rights. So it follows that the less of government we can do with, the better for us all. We must jealously and severely limit the function of the State to the mimimum of mere police duties—to safeguard life and property. So "Laissez faire" will be our motto, and with the Manchester School we shall leave everything else to the unrestrained operation of the beneficent laws of supply and demand. And thirdly, it follows that the State is not an end in itself, but a mere means to an end, and that end is the individual's safety and happiness. If, therefore, the individual finds himself able to dispense with this particular means and to secure the safety and happiness which, *ex hypothesi*, are the end he aimed at in agreeing to the social contract, there is nothing, according to this theory, which can be urged against him if he withdraws from the contract into which he had entered and seeks his safety and happiness in his own way. If, for instance, a man finds himself possessed of such physical power and mental astuteness that he can make other men serve his interests and so secure the position of a tyrant, become a superman, there is no moral objection according to this theory to his doing so. He can secure a sufficient amount of law and order to prevent a relapse into chaos and anarchy. And so Justice will be obedience to Law, and Law will be, as Thrasymachus argues, the Interest of the Stronger, and Might will be Right.

With Thrasymachus, Socrates adopts the maxim, "Answer a fool according to his folly," and he proceeds, in a way which our legal brethren will understand, to cross-examine him and make him contradict himself, until he has knocked the bottom out of his formula of Justice as the Interest of the Stronger.

Glaucon and Adeimantus, the two noble brothers, are, however, not satisfied with this method. They desire something more than a verbal victory. They want to be really clear what Justice is, and that it is really better than Injustice, whatever may be the outward consequences. And so, in order to be quite sure that Justice is good for its own sake and not merely for its worldly rewards, they describe the perfectly successful rogue who is able to maintain an appearance and reputation of Justice, and so secure all the rewards which the world attaches to it, while retaining also the gains of Injustice; and then they paint the opposite picture of the good man who is thought by the world to be a bad man, and who receives none of the rewards of virtue, but is clothed in his righteousness alone—the wonderful picture which has often seemed a real Messianic prophecy. The picture is so beautiful that,

familiar as it is to most readers, I may be pardoned if I quote it as translated by Jowett:

"'At his side (that is, at the side of the unjust man who successfully poses as just) let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity, being, as Æschylus says, and not seeming. There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honoured and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of Justice or for the sake of honours and rewards: therefore let him be clothed in Justice only, and have no other covering. Let him be the best of men, and be esteemed to be the worst: then let us see whether his virtue is proof against infamy and its consequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of his death: being just and seeming to be unjust. Then when both have reached the uttermost extreme, the one of Justice and the other of Injustice, let judgment be given which of them is the happier of the two.'

"'Heavens, my dear Glaucon,' I said, 'how energetically you polish them up for the decision, first one and then the other, as if they were two statues.'

"'I do my best,' he said. And now that we know what they are like, there is no difficulty in tracing out the sort of life which awaits either of them. But, as you may think the description of this a little too coarse, I will ask you to fancy, Socrates, that the words which follow are not mine. Let me put them into the mouths of the eulogists of Injustice. They will tell you that the just man who is thought unjust will be scourged, racked, bound, will have his eyes burnt out; and at last, after suffering every kind of evil, he will be crucified (or impaled)."

Socrates is amazed at the genius of the two sons of Ariston—that they are able to state the argument for Injustice so well, and yet are not persuaded by their own argument. And he shrinks from the great and solemn task that is laid upon him. "For I am," he says, "in a strait between two: on the one hand, I feel my own inability to maintain the cause of Justice; and yet, on the other hand, I cannot refuse to help, for I fear there may be a sin, when Justice is evil spoken of, in standing by and failing to offer help or succour while breath or speech remain in me."

So he promises to do his best. But he says "the search for Justice would be no easy one and would require very good eyes." So he suggests that they should use big letters. "Suppose," he says, a "short-sighted person had been requested to read small letters a long way off; and someone else told him that he has seen the very same letters elsewhere written

on a larger scale—that would be thought a rare piece of good fortune."

By the large letters he means that he will examine the State before examining the individual. And it is only a playful way of saying that you cannot understand human nature when you consider it in isolation; that an independent individual is as unnatural a thing as a broken branch or a severed limb. That is just what we have seen is the fault of Hobbes and Rousseau. They pictured as the starting-point isolated, free, and independent individuals. We know of none such. The people we do know do not come into the world independent and self-sufficient and clothed in natural rights. They come into the world very weak and dependent and clothed with nothing at all—or rather we may say, if we look at the matter more closely, clothed with a very precious raiment of Duty and Obligation. For they owe everything to their parents and to those who came before them. They are debtors for their food, their clothing, their housing, and everything they need and have, to their father and mother. Much more than this, in the spiritual sphere they owe to the society into which they are born the ideas, the customs, the laws by which their lives are surrounded and safeguarded, and even the language in which these ideas and laws are expressed. All this great heritage into which they are born is the measure of their obligation.

So it is obvious that we can only read the meaning of Justice or Morality in the "big letters" of the State.

Plato therefore proceeds to investigate the genesis of the State, or rather to reconstruct his Republic. And he founds it upon a very different and much more fruitful principle than the "Social Contract" of Rousseau. That theory has, by the way, been already put forward by Glaucon and Adeimantus when they were propounding the world's theory that Injustice is really more profitable than Justice. Plato's suggestion is that society is really founded on our want of *αὐτάρκεια*: that is to say, on the fact that no one of us is self-sufficient in his individual personality—that we all need others. And he first considers this want of *αὐτάρκεια* on the material plane. We need each other's help for the physical necessities of life. We cannot all be farmers, builders, and tailors; so the State begins with the principle of the Division of Labour. But so far we have not got much higher than the Social Contract theory; because if that were all the meaning of the State, it would still be merely a means to an end, and that end the supply to the individual of his bodily wants.

When Socrates has gone through all the catalogue of trades that will be required to provide his citizens with the good things of life, he ends up by saying, "With such a diet they may be expected to live in peace to a good old age, and bequeath a similar life to their children after them."

"'Yes, Socrates,' says Glaucon; 'and if you were making a city of pigs, how else would you feed the beasts?'

"'But what would you have, Glaucon?' I replied.

"'Why, he said, 'you should give them the proprieties of life. People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas and dine off tables, and they should have sauces and sweets in the modern fashion.'"

Do you notice the paradoxical and ironical way in which Socrates passes to the higher and spiritual plane? If we are to be something more than a city of pigs, we must have luxuries. Has it occurred to you, gentlemen, that when we require sauce with our fish, and sugar with our pudding, and coffee and cigars after dinner, we are asserting our spiritual nature? And yet it is so. The animals do not demand cigarettes. In these things we are no longer mechanically responding to a physical instinct. We are making the satisfaction of our senses a matter of *thought*. It is in virtue of our unique faculty of self-consciousness, because we are able to stand outside ourselves and review our physical states and picture ourselves as reproducing and heightening the pleasures which experience has taught us attend the satisfaction of our appetites, that we invent these luxuries. It is only in virtue of our divine faculty of self-conscious choice that we are capable of becoming gluttons or drunkards. We impute no sin to the animal. For the distinctive character of sin is that we are exploiting the power of a god on the finite satisfactions of sense. It is only because we are the sons of God that the suggestion to turn stones to bread becomes a temptation.

And further, as we pass upwards from the trades which provide for our animal wants to the professions which deal with the higher side of human nature, do you realise that we professional gentlemen—Doctors, Lawyers, Parsons—are ourselves luxuries? From the point of view of political economy that is what we are. The working man who asks us if we ever do a day's work (meaning manual work), and, if we admit the soft impeachment, calls us parasites, is quite within the truth. We are not supplying the means of life, and in as far as we are non-producers we are parasites on those who are producers. Only, the workman, when he makes this charge, fails to ask the further question—What is life for? We do

not live and work merely that we may live and work, but that we may then, when our bodies have been fed, proceed to feed our minds and souls. As Aristotle said, the *summum bonum* is not τὸ ζῆν but τό εὐ ζῆν.

So Plato now enlarges his State to find room for the luxuries of life. "Now I understand," says Socrates. "You would have me consider not only how a State, but how a luxurious State, is to be created. I am certainly of opinion that the true and healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have described. But if you wish to see the State in a fever, I have no objection. For I suppose many will be dissatisfied with the simpler way of life. They will be for adding sofas and tables and other furniture; also dainties, and perfumes, and incense, and courtesans and cakes; and the arts of the painter and the embroiderer will have to be set in motion."

And then follows a whole list of other arts and crafts, including "tutors and nurses, wet and dry, tirewomen and barbers, confectioners and cooks."

And here, gentlemen of the Medical Faculty, you will notice how you come in with the cooks and confectioners. For, says Socrates, "living in this way, we shall have much greater need of physicians than before." In his first draft of his Republic there is no mention of Doctors. They are not among the necessities of life. There is an idyllic picture of the simple peasant community—the people who are satisfied with the elemental needs of food, clothing, and houses. In fact, Plato is never quite free from the suspicion that civilisation is something of a disease; and always behind the luxuries and vagaries and restlessness and embroidery and flamboyancy of Athens he has the vision of the stern simplicity and ascetic discipline of Sparta. Here is the picture of the austerely simple community as first described: "They will work in summer stripped and barefoot, and in winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed on barley and wheat, baking the wheat and kneading the flour, making noble puddings and loaves; themselves reclining on beds of yew or myrtle boughs. And they and their children will feast, wearing garlands on their heads and having the praises of the gods on their lips, dwelling together in unity, and having a care that their families do not exceed their means; and with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace to a good old age and bequeath a similar life to their children after them."

So until the luxuries come in, there is no need for the Doctors. There is no disease, and when death comes to them

in a good old age they have no wish for artificial methods of prolonging a weary existence so as to make them a burden to themselves and others. And that, after all, is the theory of the Highland girl to whom, when her mother died, the doctor said, "Why did ye no send for me, Maggie?" and she replied, "Ah weel, doctor, we just thocht we wad let her dee a natural death."

And the Lawyers are also associated with the Doctors as being the products of a State which has passed from its primitive simplicity to a luxurious civilisation.

"When intemperance and diseases multiply in a State," says Socrates, "halls of justice and medicine are always being opened; and the arts of the Doctor and the Lawyer begin to give themselves airs, finding how keen is the interest which not only the slaves but the freemen of a city take about them.

"And yet what greater proof can there be of a bad and disgraceful state of education than this, that not only the meaner classes and the artisans are in need of the high skill of physicians and judges, but also those who would pretend to have had a liberal education? Is it not disgraceful that a man should have to go abroad for his law and physic, because he has none of his own at home, and must therefore surrender himself into the hands of others?"

Plato goes on to describe the man who becomes a lifelong litigant, passing his days always in the courts, either as a plaintiff or defendant, fancying himself a master of cunning, taking every crooked turn, wriggling in and out of every hole, bending like a withy, and getting out of the way of justice; and all for what?—in order to gain small points not worth mentioning, not knowing that so to order his life as to be able to do without a nodding judge is a far higher and nobler sort of thing.

And as with the Lawyers so with the Doctors: "'Well,' I said, 'and to require the help of medicine, not when a wound has to be cured, or on occasion of epidemic, but just because, by their lives of indolence and luxury, men fill themselves with waters and winds, as if their bodies were a marsh, compelling the ingenious sons of Asclepius to find names for diseases, such as flatulence and catarrh: is not this too a disgrace?'"

He quotes the good old days of Homer when a man who was wounded drinks a posset of Pramnian wine besprinkled with flour and grated cheese, which are certainly rather inflammatory, and yet the sons of Asclepius do not blame the damsel who gives him the drink or rebuke Patroclus who is treating the case; and why? Because they have no use for valetudinarian methods—they know that a man has got a

work to do and has no time to spend his life thinking about his health.

"When a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough-and ready-cure, an emetic or a purge or a cautery or the knife. And if anyone tells him that he must go through a course of dietetics, and swathe and swaddle his head, and all that sort of thing, he replies that he has no time to be ill, and that he sees no good in a life which is spent in nursing his disease to the neglect of his ordinary calling; and therefore, bidding good-bye to this sort of physician, he resumes his customary diet, and either gets well and does his business, or if his constitution fails he dies and has no more trouble.

"So the sons of Asclepius would have nothing to do with unhealthy and intemperate subjects, whose lives were of no use to themselves or others, and though they were rich as Midas the sons of Asclepius would have declined to attend them."

But there is another profession which comes in along with the introduction of luxuries into the State. We have seen that luxuries are due to our higher nature, but represent the perversion of our higher nature—the human spirit gone wrong, exploiting its divine powers in the interest of the flesh. "If thou be the son of God, command that these stones be made bread." When the human spirit tries to satisfy its infinite cravings with finite satisfactions the inevitable result is the fever of an insatiable desire (represented in mythology by the thirst of Tantalus) seeking to reach the infinite by an endless addition of finites. The result is insatiable greed and avarice and ambition. And as the supply of material goods is limited, and the more I have the less there is for my neighbours, we come to wars and the profession of the soldier.

Here, then, we come to our present and urgent problem, and to the grave and searching questions that have been put to our several faculties as to what we have to contribute towards a better world in the future.

Plato does not give us any direct guidance towards a solution of the problem of war. But if war comes from the perversion of our spiritual nature to finite ends, the solution must lie along the lines of the rich development and the full emancipation of that higher nature. And this emancipation is described by Plato in the case of the one highest class in his State, viz. the φύλακες, the guardians and governors of his Republic, who are to find God and salvation by a life of stern discipline (almost like that of a monastery) and by a perfect system of education, until they reach the central fact of life

and the Universe—the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, or, as we might put it, "the Kingdom of God and His righteousness."

But here for a time we part company with Plato, for Plato had his limitations—limitations inevitable in his age and country, limitations especially in two directions:—(1) He does not rise above the Greek conception of the State as a city. The Greek had no conception of any State which is too large for the free citizens to be able to meet in the *ekklesia* for the management of their political concerns. And therefore he accepts as inevitable the prospect of wars with those outside. (2) Democracy to him suggests mob rule and the prevalence of all that is wanting in sweetness and light. Even Athens, which claims to be a democracy, was in reality an aristocracy, because the free citizens alone had a voice in the government, and they were a minority—the manual labour was done by a vast slave population who had no share in politics. And even Athens was too democratic for Plato. He turned, as we have seen, with wistful eyes to the more disciplined and military political system of Sparta. And this aristocratic tendency was inevitable in one who thought that the true State could only be where philosophers were kings and where philosophy was a matter of pure intellect and dialectic.

It remained for one greater than Plato to say, "I thank thee, O Father, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them unto babes"; and for his disciple to write to neighbouring Corinth, "Jews ask for signs and Greeks seek after wisdom: but we preach Christ crucified, unto Jews a stumbling-block and unto Greeks foolishness."

It was that little "word of the Cross" which was to appeal, as Plato's ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ could not, not merely to the philosopher but to man as man, because it appealed to the heart and not merely to the head. It was this that laid the foundation of true democracy and brought within reach of every man the spiritual αὐτάρκεια which he lacked, and disclosed the vision —far off, indeed, but sure—of international concord and the abolition of war, not in a world State, but in the Kingdom not *of* this world and yet *in* it—the New Jerusalem, the Paradise Regained, in which is the Tree of Life whose leaves are "for the healing of nations."

In the light of this revelation, and of the new illumination which it sheds on the relation of man to man and nation to nation, let us go back to the two opposing theories—that of Thrasymachus and that of Socrates, or, as I have ventured to suggest, that of Germany and that of England. The one is that

Might is Right and Morality is the Interest of the Stronger; the other is the want of *αὐτάρκεια* first in the individual and then in each of the social circles in which human life is organised, so far as those circles are regarded as exclusive and final.

The one theory—that of Might is Right, or the State as the Will to Power—says, "The Christian law is love: thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. This law has no significance in the relations of one State to another, because it would lead to a conflict of duties."[1]

Let us see how the other theory answers this. We begin with the small social circle of the Family. It is in the home that we learn our first lessons of social duty and unselfish life. But does the family provide us with full spiritual *αὐτάρκεια*? Can we stop there and close our hearts to other families, and say the Christian law has no significance in the relations of one family to another because it would lead to a conflict of duties? On the contrary, we say that a man who thinks only of his own family becomes narrow and proud and selfish. When the first lessons in duty and unselfishness have been learnt in the small circle of the family they must find expression and exercise in wider circles beyond, in the relations of one family to another; and the best and most loving families will be just the ones which will send out their boys and girls to work and care for less fortunate families in social work of clubs and institutes. And the father who has done his duty best at home will be the best man to be a city councillor, to practise in the larger circle the lessons which he has learnt in the smaller. And, so far from leading to a conflict of duties, this love of other families will react on his love for his own. His own household will be saved from the narrowness and selfishness which would otherwise corrupt even its own internal harmony; it just needs the consecration and ennobling of this wider duty to redeem itself from pride and exclusiveness. And as a matter of history families did quarrel—like the Scottish clans —until they found unity and common interests in the wider life and interest of the State.

Passing from the family, then, take another social complex —the Trades Union or Guild. Here a new and wider sphere opens out of social duty and fellowship. But has it *αὐτάρκεια*? Must a man stop there because wider loyalties would lead to conflict of duties? This is a case in point, for too often we have seen men adopt that view, and with the result that a Trades Union, instead of being merely a friendly society linking men in fellowship as members of a trade, has become a fighting

[1] Bernhardi.

unit in conflict with both employers and consumers. But the war has shown us a more excellent way. It has made both Trades Unions and Employers' Federations suddenly aware that they are partners in a wider concern, and it is just in the wider circle of the State and its claim to their loyalty that old antagonisms have for the time at least been laid aside. Then we come to the City as a still wider social circle beyond the family and the guild. It creates a common interest and loyalty, knitting together in fellowship the smaller circles which it encloses. Does this supply the spiritual *αὐτάρκεια* which we are in search of? Once again, "if we draw a circle premature, heedless of far gain"—if we say that we cannot look beyond our own city because it would lead to a conflict of duties,—the result is that our local patriotism becomes a vulgar and provincial thing. And here again we have examples both in ancient Greece and in mediæval Italy of the wars of cities until the time came when a wider circle of social duty claimed their common allegiance and knit them together in a new and wider enthusiasm as fellow-members of a nation or a state. So we pass to the State, and here it is that Bernhardi tells us that we must exclude the Christian law because it would lead to a conflict of duties. Well, we Englishmen have long been engaged in an interesting experiment. We are working out something new in history. For what is called the British Empire is not an empire at all: it is a voluntary federation of sister States. There is no coercion—no law of force to hold the separate parts if they wish to separate. Whatever law there is, is a law not imposed by an external authority, but the self-imposed restraint of the parts, the registration of a common fellowship and common interests and a common ideal arrived at spontaneously and without coercion.

Yes, it may be said, but it is just that sense of common interest and those links of race and tradition that make this federation possible. But between sovereign States of Europe there is no such bond. To answer that objection would need a whole historical essay. I shall try to show presently that there always has been and that there still is, though it be as yet only in germ, the consciousness among the nations of Europe of a Respublica Christiana. It has been ruthlessly destroyed for the time being by the reversion to the unchristian and heathen principles of Germany which we are discussing. But the question is, Does Nationality in itself supply the *αὐτάρκεια* which we seek? And the answer is that, just as in the smaller circles, if we limit ourselves to our own country—if we limit the operation of the Christian law of love—we

suffer. Our patriotism becomes a narrow and vainglorious Jingoism. And to redeem our loyalty from such a fate we need here, as before, the ideal of a still larger unity; and the truest patriot is the man who says, "I love England because I believe that England is not an end in itself but a means to a still larger and grander end. I love England because I believe that God has raised up my country to take its part along with other great countries, each contributing its social gifts and graces, in the great work of uplifting the lower races of the earth and linking all of them with ourselves in a world-wide federation—not a world State, but a world fellowship; and that is not far from our Christian vision of a Kingdom of God."

Following, then, the clue which Plato has given us in his foundation principle that society is founded on the want of spiritual *αὐτάρκεια*, we are led on to the idea of a world-wide international law, not as something arbitrarily imposed by an external authority and maintained by military power, but as an essential need of human nature as it develops and as it surmounts one boundary after another. It is in the evolution of this craving for fellowship and justice and righteousness along with liberty that the hope of the world for the future lies.

It is with this spiritual evolution that we professional men—Doctors, Lawyers, and Parsons—have to do. "Doctors!" you will say. "No, surely that is a slip, for they have to do with body, not the soul." And yet if that were so—if you had only to do with the physical plane, the animal nature—then Plato's criticism of your profession would be convincing, then a system of Kill and Cure would be the best. But we are none of us, I think, prepared to accept Plato's method of dealing with the Doctors; and why? It is because of the infinite worth of the human spirit that it is well worth while to call in your skill, even in the case of the invalids whom Plato would leave to die. For it is often under the discipline of pain and suffering that the choicest flowers of the soul blossom. Some of the highest lessons, some of the most inspiring visions, which have been vouchsafed to me have come from sick-beds. And more and more we are learning that you cannot separate soul and body by a hard-and-fast line of demarcation. So I still claim the Doctors as having their part in this spiritual development on which the solution of our problems depends.

And the Lawyers—it is surely your function to keep before men the conception of Law as the ever-advancing record of the victories and attainments of the common conscience of the nation or the race; to show that law is not the

arbitrary dictation of the ruler, but the embodiment of those principles of righteousness which have won their way to general acceptance; to repudiate the German doctrine that law is based upon force, and show that it is based upon conscience. The common conscience is ever progressing, ever spontaneously responding to new ideals of what is right and true, ever gaining new territory, ever carrying brotherly consideration for the rights of others into new areas of life. It is the work of Law to consolidate, to organise, to entrench by means of the statute-book the gains which conscience and the brotherly instincts of civilised men have achieved. You cannot legislate in advance of public opinion, but Law comes in to secure the territory which the common conscience has occupied—to provide that there shall be no retreat beyond that point, that so much at least of brotherly consideration for others shall be an irreducible minimum. So all sections of your profession—whether it be the work of the legislator in making the laws, or the work of the judge in administering them, or the work of the barrister or solicitor in interpreting and explaining them—are the custodians of a very sacred and precious inheritance which enshrines the long results of the perpetual warfare of the spirit of man, the spirit of love and fellowship, against the enemies of the soul, the evil hosts of selfishness and brute force and tyranny and chaos.

And finally, what of the Clergy? Well, if the lawyers are the sappers who entrench and organise the ground already won by the common conscience, then the whole Church is the infantry who have to win the ground, and the clergy are the platoon and company commanders whose business it is to climb the parapet and lead the attack—to go forward across that no-man's-land with its corpses and its shell-craters and its chaos, the land that has not yet been occupied by the common conscience, where mammon-worship and worldliness and selfish competition and chaos prevail. To follow the lead of such men as Maurice and Kingsley, Westcott and Gore, proclaiming that man shall not live by bread alone, and that the real goal of life is to seek first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness. No doubt the call has often been a voice crying in the wilderness; but the Church is not the clergy, and salvation depends not only on the voice that cries but on the ears that hear. But even if too often it has been a "vox clamantis in deserto," yet beyond the desert lies the Promised Land. And that Promised Land is more and more coming into view. For along with the growing spirit of nationalism, which tends to remove grounds of quarrel by gathering

together into contented groups men of common kindred and common traditions and common interests and aspirations, there has been a steadily growing spirit of Internationalism, urged on by the conscious want of αὐτάρκεια in even the most united and happy nation—a yearning for brotherhood and fellowship and the recognition of a Respublica Christiana. It found expression before the Reformation, feebly as yet, in the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire. It was put back by the disintegrating forces of the Renascence and the Reformation, by their over-emphasis on individual freedom. But it found expression once again a hundred years ago in the Holy Alliance. That, it is true, ended in failure, though it was glorious in its conception. The reasons for its failure are now clear enough. (They are well pointed out by Professor Ramsay Muir in his book *Nationalism and Internationalism.*) But the sentiment did not die. It found expression in the Geneva Convention and again in the Hague Conferences. And the Concert of Europe, though for the moment we are aware rather of its failures than its successes, was a real recognition of the common conscience. And the reason of its failure has now become as clear as daylight. It was because there was in it the disloyal nation which was more and more turning away from Christian principles to the worship of Might as Right and the heathen principles of Treitschke and Bernhardi. But the war has revealed that treachery to the common conscience, and given the world an object-lesson which it will never forget of the results of ruthlessness and barbarism and "frightfulness" to which it leads.

When that evil dream has passed away the Promised Land will shine out clearer than ever. And we should be fainthearted not to believe that the growth of the Christian conscience after this relapse into heathenism will be assured, and that there will be, more than ever before, a united resolve to have done for ever with the brutal stupidity of war and to let the Spirit of Christ prevail, and to demand from all Christian nations devoted loyalty to the sacredness of International Law as the very condition of admission into the Respublica Christiana. It will be our part as lawyers and Churchmen to cultivate the same reverent devotion to the law of nations as Socrates (to quote Plato once more) felt for the laws of Athens. You remember the final scene in his prison when he was waiting for the poison cup. His friend Crito came to tell him that all arrangements had been made to secure his escape. And Socrates refused. All his life he had been teaching men the glory of citizenship and the sacred-

ness of law. And was he now at the last, in order to save his own skin, to betray the laws to which he had plighted his troth? He pictures the remonstrance of the laws to such disloyalty. "'Listen to us, Socrates,' he hears them say, 'listen to us who have brought you up. Think not of life and children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world beyond. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as Crito bids. Now you depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim not of the laws but of men. But if you go forth returning evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom you ought least to wrong, that is to say, yourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with you while you live, and our brethren, the laws of the world beyond, will receive you as an enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito.'

"This is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say, is humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I know that anything more which you may say will be in vain. Yet speak if you have anything to say.

"*Crito.* I have nothing to say, Socrates.

"*Socrates.* Leave me, then, to follow whithersoever God leads."

When Christian nations have learnt that sort of reverence for the international laws, that sort of devout loyalty to the unenforced decisions of the international tribunal, we shall be "not far from the Kingdom of Heaven," not far from that City of God with the vision of which the Bible closes: "in the light of which the nations shall walk, and into which the kings of the earth shall bring their glory."

A. HAMILTON BAYNES.

BIRMINGHAM.

ARE THE ANGLICAN MODERNISTS HONEST?

PROFESSOR PERCY GARDNER.

A FEW years ago, when Dr Paget, then Bishop of Oxford, was consulted by one of his clergy as to the force of Modernism in the English Church, he replied that it did not exist there. No one, I think, would now give such an answer. Bishop Gore, Dr Paget's successor, wrote in 1914, in regard to the modernising party, that it consisted of a "group of men, no less good and great than the Jesuits, no less zealous in a good cause, but like them led on in a special atmosphere to adopt a position and maintain a claim which, looked at in the light of common morality, proves utterly unjustifiable."[1] I think that this comparison with the Jesuits is on both sides unfair. The Modernists are a very small and feeble body compared to the Jesuits, and in missionary zeal incomparably inferior to them. But they are as a rule transparently honest. It is, indeed, their love of truth and straightforwardness which has brought them into collision with the strong conventional element in the Church.

There are many others, besides the present Bishop of Oxford, who misapprehend the Modernist position. I propose in this paper, first, briefly to define that position, and then to defend the Modernists from the charge of insincerity.

I

The term Modernist is unsatisfactory enough. It was brought into vogue by the Papal Encyclical *Pascendi* in 1907, in which the supposed views of a party in the Roman Church are reduced with great skill to a system. Agnosticism in philosophy and the critical treatment of history are set forth as

[1] *The Basis of Anglican Fellowship*, p. 25.

the basis of a scheme of belief or disbelief which probably was never in its entirety held by anyone, but which serves very well as a mark for the Papal arrows. The difficulty is to find another term which will take the place of "Modernism." Almost all the names of parties or schools of thought, including the name Christian, are the inventions of opponents; and if they come into general use, they soon lose their opprobrious character. I do not think that the advanced party in the English Church objects to being called Modernist.

This Modernist party bears but a moderate amount of resemblance to the Broad Church of the last century. In the last generation the breadth was largely emotional and common-sense, mere generosity of spirit and a love of liberty. At present it is based upon evolution in science and critical method in history. The party is thoroughly attached to the English Church and to the main principles of Christianity; but it demands that those principles shall be reconsidered in the light of growing knowledge, and re-stated in a way suited to the intellectual conditions of the age. But while many of the clergy of various groups would in words accede to this demand, the Modernist really means what he says. He does not take the traditional views and customs of the Church and try to dovetail them in with the position of some mediatising school of science or history, but really launches out into the ocean of intellectual exploration, determined to find a farther shore.

It has been well pointed out, in a recent number of the *Modern Churchman*, that the modernising party in the English Church consists of two wings, which may be called the Liberal Protestant and the Modernist Catholic. Among all the Churches it is probable that only the English Church is broad enough to find room for tendencies so diverse. But the English Church is at once Catholic and Reformed, has strong affinity at the one pole with Rome and at the other with Geneva. And the mentality of English Churchmen is so diverse, that the light of experience and reality, falling upon them, urges them in various directions.

The Liberal Protestant starts from the Evangelical point of view, the point of view of individual religion, the religion of experience and the divine grace. He still feels at heart that here one grasps the reality of spiritual things, that God and man are in actual contact, and that through such contact man can rise into eternal life. His Gospel is that of Jesus in the Synoptists as interpreted by liberal theologians. But he is unable to take the Bible as his predecessors had taken

it, as the very Word of God. And he is unable to think of the Christian religion as a purely supernatural thing brought into the world at a definite moment in static form and valid for all time.

The Catholic Modernist has another conception of religion, which is for him ecclesiastical and historical, and is mystical and sacramental rather than individually ethical. But while he retains something of the mediæval feeling as to the sanctity of the Church and the sacredness of the Sacraments, he is unable to retain the non-historic static character of Catholic doctrine. He is dominated by the new spirit of history and of evolution, and sees the necessity that in every age the Church should put her beliefs into a new setting and regard them in another light. His position is [1] "that of a man who accepts the application of the strictest critical methods, both to the Old and New Testament and to the origins of Christianity, and the results which follow such application, but does not see any reason to modify his attitude to that method of interpreting Christianity which has, or seems to have, the sanction of Catholic antiquity." "His belief in a Catholic Church, with definite authority, with an ordered ministry, with valid sacraments, with power to bind and to loose, remains intact."

The Catholic Modernist naturally made his first appearance in the Roman fold, and for a little while he loomed large there. But the Papal Curia is nothing if not an organised authority, and it was at once placed in the dilemma that it must either accept the Modernist view or else crush Modernism. It cannot surprise us that it chose the second alternative; and as the Modernists were few, strong only in the ranks of the intellectual, they were easily crushed.

Catholic Modernists are making their appearance in the English Church in ever greater force; and as there is here no Papal discipline to crush them, they may well have a future. The Liberal Protestants, on the other hand, are no new feature, but carry on the line of the Broad Church of the last century, of Jowett and Stanley, Arnold and Robertson.

It is of the essence of Modernism in all its forms to take an evolutional view of Church history and of doctrine. It does not regard Christianity as a system revealed once for all to men and fixed for all time, but as a principle of life and progress, embodied first of all in the life and teaching of the Founder of Christianity, and after His death setting forth under the guidance of His Spirit in a ceaseless campaign against sin and materialism in the world, gradually assimilating and turning to

[1] *Modern Churchman,* vi. p. 156.

its own use all that in the heathen world was capable of such transmutation, but sometimes failing in assimilating power, and falling under the dominion of unworthy influences.

Critical study of history has produced among Modernists an indisposition to accept, or at all events to put any stress on, the miraculous narratives in the Gospels, and there is a clear perception that from the very first there was progress and alteration in Christianity. The New Testament is not homogeneous. The Gospel of Galilee grew and changed with the disappearance and exaltation of Christ. The teaching of St Paul and of the Fourth Gospel is a clear modification of the original teaching. In a word, early Christianity is not static and miraculous, but dynamic and evolutional. It is clear that such views do not diminish but increase one's veneration for the Church as a Divine institution ; but different views may be held as to the faithfulness of the Church to her continuous inspiration, and as to the need for changes to make her a better exponent of the undying and ever-working spirit of Christianity.

The question arises whether such views can be honestly held by clergy and laity in the Church of England.

II

It is a remarkable thing that whereas it is loyalty to truth which lies at the roots of the Christianity of Modernist Churchmen, and has given rise to what are commonly regarded as their heresies, yet no charge is more often brought against them than that of want of veracity. It is said that they sign statements which they do not believe to be true, and that they repeat in church formulæ which they can only repeat with disingenuous mental reservations. Some reply to these charges is forced upon us.

I remember a discussion of the question carried on many years ago between Professor Henry Sidgwick on the one side, who attacked the Broad Church clergy, and Dr Rashdall on the other, who defended them. Recently Bishop Gore has spoken of this controversy, and ranged himself on the side of Sidgwick.[1] To me the disputants seemed well matched, and each from his own point of view made out an excellent case. But Sidgwick showed less than his usual power of entering into the views of an opponent, and was not at home in doctrinal questions. We may appeal from both disputants to a

[1] H. Sidgwick, *Practical Ethics*, 1898; *cf.* C. Gore, *The Basis of Anglican Fellowship*, p. 11.

man who perhaps was as noted for fanaticism of veracity as anyone who ever lived, John Stuart Mill, who decides that it is honest for men to remain in the Church "so long as they are able to accept its articles and confessions in any sense, or with any interpretation, consistent with common honesty, whether it be the generally received interpretation or not." It seems to me that this verdict may be accepted as final by the most sensitive conscience.

A more recent pronouncement by another fanatic of veracity is to the same effect. It is by Mr Donald Hankey in a book of most transparent honesty. The right procedure, he says, "is to take full advantage of the liberty that is allowed within the Church. It is, I am convinced, by using the freedom of the Church to pursue our ideals that we shall both avoid the pitfalls of separation and commend our ideas to the Church."[1]

We may, however, limit somewhat more closely the charge of insincerity; for the specific complaint brought against Modernists, notably in the work of Bishop Gore, already cited, is that they do not accept certain clauses in the Creed in an allowable way. The two clauses especially selected are that which asserts the Virginal birth of the Founder of Christianity, and that which asserts the resurrection of the body. These clauses, according to the accusers, are of the essence of the faith of the Church, and they must be held literally, and not in any transposed or symbolic interpretation.

In the first place, this is to put the Creeds in a place in which they are not put by the Prayer Book. It is true that Article VIII. says that the three Creeds (including the Athanasian) ought thoroughly to be received and believed. But on what ground? Not because they were formulated by certain Councils or Synods and accepted by the Church, but because they "may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture." But all modern scholars are agreed that the doctrine of the Trinity (to go no further) as set forth in the Creeds is only to be found in rudimentary form in Scripture. And we are unable in modern times to treat the Scriptures thus as an unit and a final court of appeal. The fact is that High Churchmen now regard the Creeds as sacred, not because they can be proved from Scripture, but because they have the authority of the Church. But this is not the attitude of the Prayer Book. "The Church," it holds, must not "ordain anything that is contrary to God's word written." "General Councils may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things

[1] *Faith or Fear*, pp. 31–33.

pertaining to God." To put the Creeds in the place of the Bible as the tests of orthodoxy is completely to upset the teaching of the Prayer Book.

But it is said, at all events the clergyman repeats the Creed constantly with his people, and he has no right to repeat it in a non-natural sense. But the Creed is a common, not an individual, confession. It is true that the English Church begins the formula with "I believe," while the Eastern Church begins "We believe." But it is really the expression of the general belief. We may say boldly that none of those who repeat even the (so-called) Apostles' Creed accept the whole of it literally. Such phrases as "He descended into hell (Hades)," and "He sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty," require in the opinion of everyone fresh interpretation, though they were taken as expressions of literal fact when the Creeds were drawn up. In the same way it is legitimate to attach a meaning other than the literal one to such phrases as "conceived by the Holy Ghost," and "I believe in the resurrection of the body." And we can find fresh and more spiritual interpretations without going beyond the New Testament. The Lucan phrase, "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee: wherefore also that which is to be born shall be called holy, the Son of God," implies no physical miracle, and it is very doubtful if it was meant to do so. And as to the resurrection of the body, whether that of Jesus Christ or that of His followers, St Paul held a doctrine very different from that of the first disciples and that embodied in the Fourth Article. Surely the Pauline belief is not heretical?

It is a matter much to be regretted, but it is nevertheless true, that in the English Church we are accustomed—far too much accustomed—to hear and to repeat phrases which we do not regard as any literal expression of our beliefs.

In the Communion Service we express our adherence to the custom of observing the Jewish Sabbath, and to the Jewish condemnation of the arts of painting and sculpture. Some of the Psalms which we sing contain phrases which it is much to be hoped we do not take literally. Some of the prayers for the King have to be interpreted as meaning not the King but the authorities of the State. To pass by all these conventionalities and to come down on a non-literal interpretation of some clauses in the Creeds is not really honest.

If I were thinking of taking orders I should be far more strongly repelled by the dislike to reading in Church some of the lessons from the Old Testament, the morality of which is

indefensible, than by the fear of having to interpret broadly some of the phrases of the Creeds.

The fact is that the popular view of the insincerity of the Modernists tells against the whole Church of England. A Church which is alive and not fossilised is obliged to take one of two courses as regards its formulæ: either it must from time to time revise them, or it must allow licence in their interpretation. The Church of England, perhaps unfortunately, has scarcely any means of taking the first alternative. So cumbrous is the machinery of revision, so innumerable are the facilities offered to obstructives, that, as everyone knows, any alterations, save as regards lesser matters, are practically almost impossible. It would be a blessed thing if the Church could gain more power of action by the formation of a really representative government, even if that power were used with very moderate wisdom.[1] But we must take the facts as they stand. And if we embrace the membership of the English Church as being on the whole an invaluable institution, we must love it for what it is, and not only for what it might become. Change in formularies being so extremely difficult, there arises an irresistible need for full freedom in interpreting them. And such freedom has been generally allowed. The disadvantage which it involves is a too great convention in the worship of the Church, a force of conservatism in the face of any attempt at a larger life. And the great advantage which it allows is freedom in the growth of fresh schools of religious thought. When such a school arises the old bottles are stretched, but not necessarily burst.

Thus in recent years there has prevailed among the clergy far greater breadth and liberty in the study of the Bible, especially of the Old Testament. The Jewish sacred books are generally regarded, not in the static light, in which they are presented in the Articles, as a standard of religious belief, but as a record of a progressive revelation to the Jewish people, leading up to, and in a measure foreshadowing, Christianity. Again, some of the doctrines of the Calvinist scheme of theology presented in the Articles are now by the clergy generally either given up, or at all events greatly modified. Doctrines and practices too hastily set aside at the Reformation are making their way in clerical circles, and it is found that their acceptance is not inconsistent with the use of the Prayer Book. How far in these changes there is good or evil we cannot

[1] This was written before the recent proposals for the reform of the constitution of the Church were put forth. While not regarding those proposals as quite satisfactory, I should be sorry if they came to nothing.

now consider. The point is that there is liberty, and that liberty is very valuable as saving the Church from a gray and uniform formality. But such liberty cannot be granted to other schools in the Church and denied only to the broader school.

The ordinary citizen is so used to this liberty in some aspects that he does not notice it. But when he comes to a liberty which is newer and less popular, he is apt to be shocked. But he has only to become accustomed to it to tolerate it with other forms of freedom.

III

There is a further objection which demands respectful treatment. It will be said: "The ordinary Christian, the man of moderate education, does not share your intellectual difficulties, nor approach your standpoint. This man has a way of judging the presentations of religion brought before him, not from the side of intellect but from that of practice. What he judges by is the life, not the creed; and he cares little what a man professes so long as he shows the Christian virtues in practice. Why then disturb him by parading difficulties as to the Christian creeds, which only make him think that Christianity is not true? After all, Christianity from the first has been the religion of the poor and humble. Your intellectualism bids fair to rob the poor of it."

The answer is twofold. In the first place, it is not true to say that the uneducated are not troubled by intellectual difficulties. Their intellectual atmosphere is in the long run determined by the thought of universities and schools. They move slowly in these matters, but they move, and necessarily in the direction in which they are led. At the present moment the first chapters of Genesis keep many from Christianity, because they think that Christians must accept them as historic, and even an elementary education shows them that they are not historic.

And we have it on excellent authority that in the popular mind some of the miracles of the New Testament now stand in line with those of the Old Testament. Not the miracles of healing, for in recent times faith-healing in many diseases has become a familiar fact in Europe and America. But such marvels as the feeding of the multitudes or the withering of the barren fig-tree dwell in the minds of intelligent artisans, and many who are not intelligent; and when they are told, by such authorities as the Bishop of London, that unless they

believe that such things really took place they cannot be Christians, they accept the dilemma and take the wrong alternative.

This is put very clearly and convincingly in the recently published book called *Faith or Fear*. Mr Hankey (the "Student in Arms" of the *Spectator*) there shows clearly how the mind of the ordinary soldier in the trenches is repelled and estranged, when he feels an impulse towards Christian profession, by the non-natural miraculous background which is often set before him as essential to Christian belief. He is greatly attracted by the figure of the Founder of Christianity, he is willing boldly to take a place among those who have sworn fidelity to Him, and to fight on His side against vice and materialism. Even the Sacraments of Christianity appeal to his emotions, and seem to be the door leading to a better life. But when he has (on baptism) to express his belief in some of the traditional views of Christianity, such as the historicity of the Virgin-birth and the resurrection of the flesh, he is strongly repelled, and can only accept these tenets with mental reservations. Mr Hankey was a man who knew what he was talking about, and had much experience of the ways of thinking of the ordinary man in England, in France, in Australia: his testimony is of the greatest value, and cannot be lightly thrust aside. The fact is, that a man who has had very little education, but has mingled freely with his kind, often has a far keener and more correct sense of the drift in the intellectual world than has the clergyman, who in his training in a theological college has often learned to take fanciful and unnatural views of history and the principles of evidence.

And in the second place, the working religion of the poorer classes, in the northern countries of Europe if not in the southern countries, is practically quite independent of any miraculous basis of belief. I have often listened to preachers addressing a poor congregation, and have generally found that the whole source of their influence, the reason why they make an impression, is that they speak of religious experience, of things which they themselves have felt and known. Probably most of them would, if asked, say that they accepted the miraculous element in the Gospels, and naturally, because they take them as a whole and do not distinguish. But it is not on the miracles of nineteen centuries ago that they base their appeal, but on sin and its forgiveness by God, on present spiritual help vouchsafed in time of trouble, on the need and the assurance of salvation. The peasantry in southern and eastern Europe do believe in a miraculous Christianity; but

they carry out the belief logically, and expect miraculous help from Virgin or saint in attaining whatever they may happen to desire. Their religion has good elements; but surely few Englishmen would wish their countrymen to go back from a more to a less spiritual religion? It is painful when religious teachers who might know the depth and vividness of the religious experience of tens of thousands of men and women in the cottages of England and Scotland speak with admiration and even envy of the trust in Sacraments of the French peasant, or of the Russian soldier's unwavering belief in the virtue of the image which he carries in his bosom. Not that I would condemn such honest superstition. Let the Russian answer to his own master; but it is not thus that English people in the course of our noble history for centuries past have thought of religion.

In the body of Christ the hand cannot say to the eye, I have no need of thee. Various schools of thought must work together for the efficiency of the whole. Over and over again, in the past history of the English Church, an outcry has been raised against the utterances of the broader school, and the demand has been made that they should quit the communion. They have felt that it would be wrong to comply with the demand: and they were justified. To confine ourselves to the last century, what would have been the result if Maurice and Arnold, Jowett and Stanley, had given up the communion of the English Church? Would not the Church in our day have been weaker and poorer? In the same way the Broad Churchmen of the twentieth century have a duty to the Church of the twenty-first century. They have an honourable and a necessary part to play in the Church, to preserve it from intellectual poverty and practical retrogression. Just as High Churchmen have a duty in insisting on the value of historic continuity and corporate Church life, and Low Churchmen in dwelling on the reality of divine grace and the need of a new heart, so Broad Churchmen have a duty to continue the adaptation of the Church to modern intellectual conditions, to carry on the labours of such Churchmen as Clement of Alexandria, Thomas Aquinas, Colet, Erasmus, and a host of others, the working of whose influence in the present is so profound that we often fail to recognise it.

P. GARDNER.

Oxford.

THE SCIENTIFIC WORLD AND DR MERCIER.

A REPLY.

SIR OLIVER LODGE.

DR MERCIER'S vigour as a controversialist has several times already interested and amused the readers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL. He is now looking about for some other foe worthy of his prowess, and, having descried in me what he thinks to be an attitude of antagonism or even contempt to the scientific world, he turns his horns in my direction. But I avoid the charge, for, though I have said things about orthodox science, I have never felt any spirit of antagonism or hostility to my scientific brethren of the Royal Society. And I believe that the friendly feeling is reciprocated. Assuredly I hope so; for I have nothing but admiration and fellow-feeling for workers in science. So Dr Mercier's accusation and his wrath come to me as a surprise.

But, I ask myself, is he really angry, or is he trying to work up some artificial indignation? He paws the ground and champs and snorts in the arena, but the picador is in the gallery watching the performance, and is not aware of having done anything to irritate him; but he evidently wishes to feel irritated, and so vents his rage upon anything red that he can see. There is a sentence on page 382 of my article in the April 1917 number of the HIBBERT JOURNAL which annoys Dr Mercier; but I do not know why. It is one about "the lever of custom, use, and wont": he reads into it a libel against scientific men. But I have looked up the context and find it perfectly harmless. I am saying that we all think some things natural and easy, while others are portentous and difficult; and that the things which seem natural seem so because we have grown accustomed to them, though we do not really understand them any better than things which are rarer.

Instead of being offensive, it is a sort of platitude. Yet Dr Mercier makes much play with it.

His object apparently is to defend the scientific world from my "attacks" and what he calls my "sneers." He complains that I have attacked scientific men in general for not examining certain phenomena. But that certainly is an exaggeration of my intention. I have from time to time expressly said that I do not expect everybody to investigate everything, nor do I ask busy students to leave their work and take up a new research. No; what I have occasionally complained of is that a few men of science, and still more some of their followers, deny the truth of certain things which they have not investigated, and about which they know nothing. They think they know quite enough; but that is only because they despise the subject so intensely that they will not give it a fair chance. If they let it alone, as a biologist lets astronomy alone, no one has any ground for complaint: but if a man, whatever his other credentials, denies that there are any fixed stars worth studying, because he has seen stars visibly scooting to destruction; if he ridicules the use of a telescope because his own eye or his own microscope tells him all that a rational being need know; if he holds that prying into out-of-the-way things leads to insanity;—then, though I hope I have never sneered, I have at times remonstrated, and have virtually asked such men either to examine the things carefully without prejudice or else hold their peace.

In so far as an expert psychiatrist warns feeble-minded people from dabbling in unusual mental peculiarities, he is entirely within his rights, and I for one am with him. But I sometimes wonder whether an alienist is not liable to detect too widely the prevalence of feeble-mindedness. Stupidity may be plentiful enough, but the man in the street is usually fairly proof against anything savouring of the unusual or the imaginary: neither insanity nor genius seems to come his way. It is not necessary to be a scientific or even an educated person to be gifted with robust common-sense; and there seems no need to warn healthy people from a subject of general interest, or from gaining first-hand experience of truths of singular importance to humanity. A certain number of unbalanced and over-emotional people do dabble in the subject, and these I would try to discourage. Dr Mercier's article may serve as a bogle to frighten them with. Another set of unbalanced people who ought to know better get into pulpits and shout "devilry"; but these I fear his article will encourage: they will probably be grateful to him for providing them with an

instrument of excommunication more widely potent than their own. But in this connection an old *Punch* cartoon occurs to me, in which a Papal legate, holding up a sheet-and-turnip-lantern sort of "bull" labelled "Excommunication," tries to frighten Napoleon III.; who, seated at his ease, and twirling his moustache, smiles "*C'est bien drôle.*"

What I want to do is to help to put the subject on a solid and sensible basis for future generations to study, to understand, and to use. The truth as I am learning to regard it is that incarnate and discarnate humanity is all one family, that the screen between the materialised and the immaterial variety is of a sensory and material and temporary order, and that communication through the veil is even now occasionally possible. If this or something like it be not a truth but a delusion, then indeed the hard things said of us are more than justified; but if it be a truth, then it is as much worth knowing, and gradually with due precaution making use of, as any other branch of natural knowledge.

Dr Mercier says truly that some inklings of the fact, and some practices based upon it, have been familiar to every part of the human race from time immemorial; and he intimates that we might have made more use of this fact as a support for our thesis. I know; and Mr Andrew Lang, who was at one time President of the Society for Psychical Research, used to say the same. But, as I used to tell him, he was an historian and a student of folk-lore; he had a right to deal with such data, I had none. If I read any folk-lore, as I occasionally do for amusement, I realise that it is customary to record everything, however preposterous and absurd, without apology or compunction, to treat it all as grist to the mill, and never to raise the question whether any of it can by any possibility be true, or what kind of foundation even its absurdities may have. Yet I may respectfully inquire concerning those legends in which Dr Mercier seems so well informed,—is there not likely to be any spark of truth in the midst of the mass? Does he think that with all that smoke there is no fire?

Andrew Lang was impressed with the similarity of the asserted occurrences, in widely different parts of the earth's surface, and at widely different times, with what we were describing as having come under observation to-day. And I think that the coincidences are impressive. Dr Mercier adduces them because he wishes to relegate the whole, both past and future, to the dustbin of superstition; I, on the other hand, rather expect some competent student to rake among

the ashes of that dustbin and discover that we had thrown away too readily a certain amount of valuable commodity.

Meanwhile, this is not a mode of approaching current every-day fact which my training or instinct enables me to make use of. Nor do I think it helpful to attempt to sift the grain from the chaff until after a much closer study of present-day produce enables us more readily to discriminate one from the other. My duty is to examine the material which comes my way to-day, and if I find anything of value to say so. If by so chortling I appear to be calling to all other scratchers in the farmyard of nature to leave their patch and come and look at mine—it is not that I really want to interrupt them, but a little momentary enthusiasm is surely pardonable. The alternative would be, I suppose, to lie low and say nothing; but it is contrary to the scientific or indeed the human instinct not to publish the result of a search, even though it be only a lost coin that has been discovered after much sweeping.

Dr Mercier has a forcible style, and perhaps does not weigh his words when he says that I am "conducting a raging, tearing propagandism." It reminds me of a shout of the conductor to the driver of an omnibus, wherein, after a prolonged wait, a mild old gentleman ventured to say, "Conductor, do you think that we might be moving on?" "Drive on, Bill; here's a hold gent a-cussing and swearing like anything!"

As to novelty, I have constantly pointed out that things in nature cannot be really new—it is only attention to them that is new; and facts deeply rooted in humanity cannot be new even in that sense, though the attention hitherto devoted to them may have been more of a superstitious than of a scientific order. So they may come out new into the light of science. I claim for them no other novelty.

A little time ago a certain group of people said to me, "Produce your proofs." I had already produced some; I have now produced more. Now they appear to say, "Take us to the facts and convince us," well knowing that they do not mean to be convinced. But it is not my function to act as showman. The facts are there, if they care to seek them; they lie as open to them as to me. If they seek, they will find: if they resolutely close their eyes, the loss is theirs. Their prejudice against our statements is born of a resolute certainty, either that they are not true, or that our interpretation of them is wholly wrong and muddle-headed. Well, for the present we must agree to differ.

OLIVER LODGE.

BIRMINGHAM, *July* 1917.

TELEPATHY AS INTERPRETING CHRIST.

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THIS paper attempts an interpretation of the Christ life and the doctrine of the Resurrection from the side of that recent science of nature which investigates the facts of telepathy or thought-transference.

If the universe is a continuous whole and the two realms of nature and grace, earth and heaven, are the unequal hemispheres of All Being, the upper and nether web woven without seam from the top throughout of the garment of God, then a knowledge of either region will be interpretative of the other, heavenly fact will be the true significance of earthly, and human fact will inform us of divine. That is why a fresh discovery of natural law involves a revision of theologies and, if needful, a reïnterpretation.

This present age has brought us such a fresh discovery. The intercourse between one human consciousness and another by some manner of communication which is not conveyed by any known action of the senses, such as language or physical signalling, has become an ascertained law of nature. It may be possible to find men of respected judgment who will not yet admit this, for I have myself encountered such denial. But so did eminent intellectuals in the days of Galileo deny that earth was round. We may here pass the opinion by.

The fact, then, which we call at present by the inadequate names of telepathy and thought-transference must cause us to rethink our theologies and to rewrite, at least for our own private use, the foundation of our doctrines. In particular, the doctrine which confesses Jesus Christ as the God-Man, and declares a Manhood taken into God by the act of the Incarnation.

What do we understand by the credal formula that "Our Lord Jesus Christ is God and Man . . . not two but one Christ . . . by taking of the Manhood into God"? Can we under-

stand anything while we only say "the Manhood"? That word names a thought, not a thing: there is nowhere a Manhood in this universe; there are only Men. If we say "the Man Jesus was taken into God," we name a thought to which there corresponds a thing. And this surely is the belief of a Christian, that a Man, once known to men as Jesus of Nazareth, is now "taken into God."

But what is this, to be taken into God? What it *is*, no one can say: Godhead is a fact beyond reach of a human intelligence. What it can be thought to be, a believer may attempt to put into words. For myself, I can find no other words to measure my own apprehension of the Divinity of Jesus attained by His death and resurrection (we speak here, be it carefully noted, not of the pre-existent Word, but of Jesus, Son of Mary) than that the Man who, in His sensible existence, was limited by space and time conditions, became upon the event of His death eternal and infinite, as God is eternal and infinite. If any brother Christian can enlarge my conception I shall gratefully accept the enlargement. But till then these attributes of timelessness and boundless range cover all I am able to image to myself of the Being of the Man Jesus, when "taken into God." They cover all the less abstract properties of the Godhead which we define as power, wisdom, love. The Glorified Manhood is infinite in the exercise of those attributes, has become all-powerful, all-knowing, all-loving: in that way He is One with God; like God, He can know all things and all men that are, can do all things He wills, can unite to Himself in love all creatures capable of being loved.

With this understanding of the Man taken into God I come to study the action of the divine Christ which we call the redemption of mankind. This action can be intelligible to us only so far as it is the action of the Man who is in God. As Jesus of Nazareth revealed what can be known of the Father, so Jesus the Glorified does on men what is done by the Father. By the operation of powers which are human but infinite in range, He redeems the souls of mortals. Among powers that are human is this Telepathy, and it promises to prove the most potent of them. I shall expect that telepathy, when its nature has been better explored, will be found to be the most effective of the hitherto known instruments by which the Son of God makes Himself the Life of men, causes them to live unto God.

What, then, is telepathy that it should possess such effectiveness as a means of our salvation?

I must be succinct at the risk of being obscure. Telepathy is a specific function of human life, of human life at its highest. Life at all grades is for me an interchange of selfhood, a mutual impartment of forces, qualities, substances between two living things or between a living thing and an environment, an interpenetration of a creature and its Creator. Christ's own word for it was, "Ye abide in me, and I in you." Of such vital interchanges telepathic interchange is the most vital, the most charged with life, being the mutual penetration of two consciousnesses, the reciprocal transference of thoughts and purposes. Neither telepathy nor thought-transference are adequate descriptions: telepathy, "experience of the distant," suggests that the recipient of a motion is only passive, while thought-transference suggests that the initiating mind is only active. I assume what cannot with our present knowledge be demonstrated, but which all analogy binds me to believe, that the sender and the receiver of a telepathic message are both of them agent and patient at once in the act, just as all life is a mutual activity, even when it is the life unto God, which is the mutuality of human faith and divine grace.

If the Manhood of the Son of Man survived the event of mortal death, and now works His work on men by the proper faculties of manhood, one might deductively argue that this human faculty which is beyond others spiritual, the power of communicating that highest thought and purest action which we call faith, would be the instrument by which Jesus now carries on the work of redemption. The conclusion, however, might be somewhat barren of religious helpfulness, and we must seek to show inductively that telepathy is that instrument.

Let me divide the history of Redemption for the purpose of examination into its stages. There is the Ministry, where we ought to find the telepathic action clearly verified; the Descent, when "He went and preached to the spirits in prison"; the Forty Days; and All the Days which have followed the Ascension.

I. *The Ministry.*—Can we discover in the record a power in Jesus to transfer His thought or His will to disciples?

The transference of thought may be divided into thought-reading and thought-writing. The former is distinctly testified. Jesus "perceived their thoughts," "knew their thoughts," "knew what was in man," "knew who should betray Him." From the Fourth Gospel, which, whatever question there is of its historicity, represents a Christian tradition of such a power in Jesus, we can cite the signal instances of Nathanael under the fig-tree and the Samaritan woman at the well.

Thought-writing—that is, a transference in which the initiative is with Jesus—is not a fact which lends itself so easily to the notice of history. But when the Baptist exclaims enigmatically, "Behold the Lamb of God," or witnesses a descent of the Spirit after the baptism, I offer as cause a reflection of a vision in the mind of Jesus upon the mind of John. I would suggest a like cause of the vision on the Mount; the Transfiguration was an event in the soul of Christ which shaped itself on the mirror of a disciple's consciousness. Humbler examples are the traces of what we used to call "magnetic" influence on simple men. "He teacheth with authority," "never man spake like this man," "he set his face to go to Jerusalem" and it cast a fear on those who watched Him. Then the persons on whom the Person of Jesus worked most effect were not the wise and learned, but the babes—poor men, ill-taught men, outcast men and women. That is, His appeal was not to the "intellectuals" but the "instinctives," the classes, especially the last, the women-sinners, in whom we find the psychic sensibility more common at this day.

The transference of will has a fuller indication. All the healings and conversions illustrate this. The cures are conspicuously operations of the will of Jesus upon the will of the recipient. And they are telepathic operations though worked in contact with the patient. Between person and person in whatever bodily proximity there is the dividing interval of individual personality; the space-measurement of that interval has no importance, any more than in the silent intercourse of two minds across a hearthrug. Also there are the incidents of cure at a distance—the centurion's servant, the Syrophœnician's daughter. A telepathy of the will in Jesus seems to me past question.

But I call a far more potent evidence, which I will call the telepathy of sacrifice. We have thought to explain Christ's work on His contemporaries by the preaching, the miracles, the example; and we have felt they inadequately bear the weight. It is because they are parts of the whole fact and do not between them compose that whole, or even carry the essence of the fact. That fact is the sacrifice of obedience, offered in every hour of life by the Spirit of Jesus, consummated in the hour of the final passion. The force of that inward sacrifice was a virtue that went out of Him: its stroke fell in vibrations carried by speech or act or look or gesture upon the soul of disciples, and there by their response of will the sacrifice to the Father repeated itself. This was the fact of their redemption. The propagation of the faith was wrought

by a telepathy of the Son of Man, the human and still mortal Jesus.

My theory will be strongly accredited if it can appear that the law of faith-propagation is the same for the Christ and the Christian. It is not too much for the disciple to be as the Master in this. One notes how the mere presence of the pure in spirit, the single-minded, can by some virtue going out of it neutralise the selfish emotions in those in contact with it. An historic and signal instance is that of the woman whom a countryman called " the Christ of France." The achievement of Joan the Maid has for its account the thought- and will-transference of her inward self-sacrifice, her whole " obedience to the heavenly vision." French fighting men, beaten out of all heart of fight by the dominance of English bowmen, saw the vision of victory because she saw it, and took heart of grace to win.

II. What do we say of the second stage, of which Jesus meditated, "A little while and ye shall not see me"? We can say no more of it than He: "ye shall not see me," for I shall be in Hades, the Unseen. Two thoughts, however, occur to me as not unworthy to be expressed. One is a small matter, yet of an interest. I am told by those who study closely the alleged communications from the discarnate, of intimations that there is sometimes a period after death of a sleep or withdrawal of consciousness, as if human nature needed an interval of repose between a life and a life. The Three Days withdrawal to the Unseen of the Saviour touches with some credibility this still doubtful result of psychic inquiry. The other, if it has reality, is a great matter. Hades the Unseen is an uncharted region; but we know of it this, that the Christ went there, and all men have gone there at death, and ourselves and our dear ones will go. Then those who die are now in a place where the Christ was—and is: the world unseen, that is, the whole of being which is beyond the range of human senses. Behind the curtain, beyond the horizon of sight, all is a blank to us except for the dubious featurings of the scene which some of us believe they begin recently to discern. But Jesus is there and our dead are there: and whoever of us has a heart of care over the doubtful doom of friends who depart this life, but not, to our assurance, "in the faith and fear," may find no little comfort in the speculation that a brother, who has failed of redemption here, may receive there a renewed opportunity of contact and converse with the Christ, and of the faith-transference by which His personality saved men in this visible world and may in that invisible become a saviour still to the

yet unsaved. Comfort we one another with this word: He, Jesus, descended into Hades.

III. *The Forty Days.*—The problem of the Appearances—how Jesus was raised and with what body He came—is one of such overwhelming difficulty and its solution so momentous, that one cannot tread on this most sacred ground without some fear of offence, if one treads with any confidence. But the hardihood with which some believers assert their own theory of a "physical resurrection" calls for an answering firmness in anyone whom that theory discontents as impossible for those who think things out. The account of the Resurrection fact at which my own thinkings have arrived is most incomplete as to the point in controversy known as the Empty Tomb. About the fate of Christ's mortal remains I have nothing but guesses. But as to the Appearances I am left with no doubt at all. An Appearance was the recognition of the Person of Jesus by the person of the disciple who could aver, "I have seen the Lord." In the language of such philosophy of ultimate fact as I am able to frame for myself, it was an act of life between Christ and the man, by which the one lived unto the Other, the disciple to the Christ, the Christ to him. By an act of life I mean, as I began by saying, the interpenetration of two consciousnesses, the self-interchange of a person and a person. The highest mode known to us in which this interchange is effected I have already claimed to be telepathy, the interpenetration of two minds or two wills. The reunion, then, of the personality of the crucified and buried Jesus with the personalities of His disciples was brought about by that law of being which in its highest purely human manifestations we call telepathy. The word has not the dignity which reverence desires for this most sacred of all purposes, and one must ask indulgence for its employment on the plea that we have as yet no better word to serve us.

Among the new facts of our human nature and its powers to which psychic inquiry has given a solid reality is that of the phantasm of a man dead or dying which appears to his living friend. Here is a fact in nature, which may conciliate attention to my conception of the Appearances. This phantasm is a telepathic incident, and if telepathy be what I understand, an act of union between two personalities, I shall claim this seeing of the "wraith" as an actual presence of the one person to the other. Consciousness is person, or at least is the utmost we know of personality: thought and will, which make up consciousness, are the constituents of a personal being, and no other element can we distinguish there. If, then, two

persons are mutually conscious one of the other, each is present to the other. Bodily or local presence is mechanical proximity, not personal contact; for such presence can be unconscious on both sides, and it is consciousness that makes personality. Accordingly, the appearance of a wraith, if it occurs at or near the time of the death, is to my understanding the result and the declaration of a presence to one another of the seen and the seer. These may be distant, locally, one from the other, as England from the Antipodes; they are as really in close personal contact as when Jesus said, "It is I myself," and "then were the disciples glad, seeing the Lord."

The case, then, of a dying or dead man appearing in phantasm to a living friend, which is a telepathic effect of such intensity that the consciousness of a presence realises itself in an act of visual sense, seems to me to be of the same order as the appearances of Jesus to disciples. The natural law which is the cause of the one is the cause of the other; the human power which makes the wraith possible is the power in Christ's humanity by which He was able to make Himself known to these witnesses. The two facts are energies of the same order: the difference is in the degrees of intensity and of persistence. Christ's appearance was unique, as His whole human personality was unique. No phantasm of the dead has approached in distinctness the vision of Jesus Risen; still less can the duration of the mutual consciousness in the Forty Days be paralleled. What is of incomparably more convincing significance, no "presence" of dead to living except that of Jesus to the disciples has perpetuated itself in human history. The story of the Church might be called the story of how "in all the days" humankind has "seen the Lord." The phantasm of the wraith is but a momentary, frail, dubious flicker of a vitality in the personal being, which in the Person of the Son of Man burned with a fire of life self-evident and unconsumed.

This hypothesis that the Resurrection fact was a unique example of the working of the telepathic function in human personalities is commended to us as a *vera causa*: it fulfils that requirement of scientific reasoning. This thing does exist in nature, a power in a conscious being to be present to another conscious being without local contiguity or any action of body as we commonly understand body. That common understanding, however, needs most drastic revision. Most people think with the disciple Thomas, but without his justification at that stage of the evidence presented, that a body must be a solid, verifiable by resistance to touch. If

instead of this we define body as the means of communion between persons of the same natural order, or, as I prefer, the *fact* of such communion (eye, ear, tongue, hand, foot being merely the fact that one man can live a life of intercourse and interdependence with other men), we can satisfy ourselves that the Risen Jesus most truly had a body, if we are satisfied that He and the mortals were able to have such intercourse, whether or no by help on both sides of precisely the same organs as those used for intercourse in the fleshly life. They saw and heard one the other, they came together, they could if they would verify their existence by touch; they had mutual recognition and the self-interchange of thought and will: and this is all that could be effected if the eye and ear and other organs of Jesus had been the same instruments as those of the men. The Risen Master, then, was there in the body as really as the witnesses. It was not the body of the tomb: it was the body of Jesus, ***His*** body, ***His*** instrument of personal communion with His brethren in the flesh; a thing which the crucified and buried body, even if restored to its old functional powers, could not have been, since no fleshly nerve of sight and hearing and movement would have served Jesus when His person was in the flesh no longer. His body must be different now, if there was to be in the changed situation of the immortal and the mortal persons the same communion still. The more the Master's body changed, the more could He to His disciples remain the same.

One must, however, remember that to the simpler believer, unused to analyse his ideas, this account of things may be unconvincing because unappreciable. *Difficile est de scientiis inscienter loqui* applies to the highest science. Our course must be to persuade him that what he is desiring is proof not of the corporeal presence of Christ, but of the real presence. If Jesus really was there in the upper room, then how the Dead was raised and with what body He had come are questions which do not press for answer; our faith has all that faith requires. The empty tomb, the grave-clothes, the wound-prints that offered themselves to touch, may be problems that are not soluble, but are problems that may rest unsolved and not haunt us with disquieting of beliefs.

IV. For there is the Presence "in all the days" to be verified, failing which no verification of Presence in the Forty Days will make our assurance sure. The Christian affirms Jesus to be alive on the ground that he has experience of his own that He is alive. To that experience one may make appeal in a reasoning concerning the Christ, though the appeal

must not in its terms be particular. Of this witness in all the days to the Resurrection of the Church's Founder two things only shall here be said in support of the hypothesis that the telepathic fact is the clearest interpretation yet available of the Christ-fact in its relation to man's spiritual fortune.

(1) The first is, that between the experience of the first witnesses and that of the later Church, which seem to be things of disparate orders, there is a bridge. It is the experience of Paul.

Paul, who made the claim, "I have seen the Lord Jesus," does not appear to have seen Him with his eyes. There was a vision at Damascus gate, but all he saw was a light: the recognition of Jesus was through the ear. "Who art thou?" "I am Jesus." Yet Paul was confident that he had been a witness of the Resurrection, and qualified by it to be an apostle no whit behind any. This witnessing, then, of Paul was not through the eye but through the more intellectual and less physical organ, the ear. One understands how this was inevitably the medium of communion. The mortal figure of the Nazarene was, it seems, unknown to this Sanhedrist, and the mind of the witness could therefore not effect a recognition of the bodily presence. The *thoughts* of Jesus were well known to him: this side of His personality therefore could be recognised on the contact of the mind and the mind. That contact of the two persons was able to create an audition, though not a vision. This is the deep importance of the witness of Saul the Pharisee; it mediates the transition from the faith of the first disciples to the faith of the latest; the "wonderful conversion" has been the hinge on which has swung the revolution of Christianity from a sentient and spiritual intelligence of Christ to a spiritual and intellectual, from knowledge of an historic and temporal resurrection of man to the knowledge of a timeless and spaceless victory of life over death in the person of Christ Jesus.

And may one not think that the true wonder of the "wonderful conversion" lies in the opportuneness of time and manner of the occurrence? It is the link between direct witness to the historic Christ and our knowledge by the report of witnesses. The strength of a chain is in the weakest link; and just where is the weakest link in the Church tradition, at the junction of the apostolic and the post-apostolic age, comes the faith in the Risen Lord of this disciple, the most potent personality of men Christian, perhaps of men at all; the believer who so trusted his soul-experience of a Son of God revealed in him as the Nazarene whom

he was persecuting, that he built upon it his own personal life of unexampled faithfulness, and upon that life the vast structure of an ever-growing Church.

But this vision of Paul in which he saw the Lord Jesus, with what name can we fit it that shall give it for a modern intelligence its just place and meaning in the content of our whole of knowledge? It is the supreme instance in history of a thought-transference between heaven and earth: the wonderful conversion is the Great Telepathism.

There let us close. "Blessed are they," said He himself, "who have not seen and yet have believed." Blessed, may we say, are they who have neither seen, nor even have heard, as Paul did hear that once, but yet believe. Here is a matter which one hesitates to dissect in precise, specific, illustrating terms: it is the soul-experience by which a disciple may in "all the days" see the Lord. But with our fellows in that faith we will dare to claim that no nearer guess can be framed at the essential nature of that experience than the guess ventured here. That intercourse with Jesus who died and is alive which has been asserted by individuals in any Christian time has been an act of life between the believer's person and the Person of the divine-human Master. There has been effected the interchange of selfhoods, the mutual penetration and indwelling of a man's full being and the Manhood which now inhabits the whole of existence, both the spiritual and the fleshly sphere. The verification of the Real Presence, what some would call the "objective existence" of the Christ who was and who is Jesus, lies in this—that the believer's attempt at union with this Divine One has attained the union, his will to live unto Christ Jesus has brought life to pass in him. He knows that his soul lives by all the proofs of living, by the peace, power, enlightenment, joy which are the constituent elements of the health of soul, as they are of the health of all living things. He has life in himself: but life can only be created between two personalities. Therefore that Other is there. Has not this disciple, then, seen the Lord?

But what name for this act of seeing penetrates the veiled fact so deeply as the word which research into the natural laws of mind has yielded to this generation? The highest function of man's vitality at the verge where knowledge halts and *omnia exeunt in mysterium* is the transference of the energy of soul. The word Telepathy is, till we can better it, the human name for the divine-human fact of faith in Christ.

JOHN HUNTLEY SKRINE.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"PRACTICAL RELIGION."

(*Hibbert Journal,* July 1917, p. 572.)

I.

Dr Beattie Crozier has a little confused his authors. The views about the family he ascribes (incessantly) to me are to be found in the *Republic*, a work by a popular Greek writer.

H. G. Wells.

II.

I must apologise to Mr H. G. Wells for having unintentionally misrepresented him in the remarks I made on his view of Socialism and the Family in the last *Hibbert Journal.* I there said that, if I remembered rightly, his scheme was "to take away all children from their own mothers after infancy, transport them all alike into huge caravanseries in each district, and let them be brought up there by *other* children's mothers—or, better still, by superior persons who have not yet been mothers!"

My attention having been called to this misrepresentation, I found on re-reading his books after many years that what he did say definitely was to be found in his pamphlet on "Socialism and the Family" (page 30), published in 1908, where he says, "Socialism in fact means the State-insured and State-sustained family. The private-adventure family must vanish before Socialism, just as the old water-works of private enterprise, or the old gas company. They are incompatible with it."

On page 57 of the same pamphlet he says that "Socialism says boldly the State is the Over-Parent and the Outer-Parent."

And again, on the same page, he says that "The children people bring into the world can be no more their private concern entirely than the disease germs they disseminate, or the noises a man makes in a thin-floored flat."

Now, where I went wrong, quite unconsciously, was in saying that Mr Wells would take their children away from their mothers at a certain age.

For I find that on page 58 of the same pamphlet he says definitely, "Under the State she will control her child's upbringing"—and then leaves it uncertain whether the control will be entirely by the mother or with the husband as a partner. He goes on to say, "That is a matter of detail upon which opinion may vary and does very largely among Socialists" (page 59). It must, therefore, have been some other group who had said that they would take the children away from their mothers at a certain age, on the ground that if they or their husbands were one or both drunkards or ne'er-do-wells, they would either pamper, neglect, or be cruel to them, and so make them bad citizens. And Mr Wells in his books, I notice, is very justly concerned mainly about the coming generations of children. Whether the children, in these cases at least, would be better or not if taken away from their parents altogether, rather than have their homes raided periodically by flights of bureaucratic inspectors descending on them, is an open question which does not concern me here. My point is to apologise to Mr Wells frankly and sincerely for having misrepresented him on the particular position mentioned above, to which he attaches much importance. John Beattie Crozier.

The Hibbert Journal presents its apologies to Mr Wells for having allowed a misrepresentation of his view on the point above mentioned to pass. It is clear that he has not expressed the view attributed to him.—Editor.

"THE NEW RELIGION."

(*Hibbert Journal,* July 1917, p. 561.)

That the world we live in is peopled by some fifteen hundred million human beings, of whom the majority are fools, most of us are prepared to admit. And if the greatest happiness of the greatest number is to be our goal, it follows that the happiness of all these fools has to be provided for. Accordingly we find art, philosophy, science, and religion all adapting themselves to the requirements of the fool, or, as he prefers naturally to be called, the "plain man."

A good many of the fifteen hundred millions are at death-grips in Flanders or elsewhere just now, and Science is assiduously helping them alternately to mar and to mend one another's bodies, while Religion as patiently reminds them that they have souls as well as bodies, souls stamped (we are audacious enough to repeat it) with the Image of God, which no science can mar or destroy.

The Reconstructionists will still have the old type of human being to provide for. Whether the elect minority who are not fools will accept the New Religion sketched, or rather outlined with an impressionist brush, by the Countess of Warwick I am in no position to state, but I do venture to submit that it is not a religion for which the "plain man" will have any use.

I am not "out" to defend the Established Church of England, or the Nonconformist churches to which, as I note with pleasure, Lady Warwick yields a modicum of praise. She draws a sharp distinction between State

and Free Churches, but after all they represent the same religion, and if "the Chapel has a wide-eyed and courageous ministry," and "has not hesitated to tell the truth," that fact alone gives ground for hope that the old religion will survive the present crisis. Truth is strong and will prevail.

With almost all that the Countess has to say regarding the social evils that cry to Heaven for remedy and redress under the very eyes of our church-goers I am in sympathetic accord. She is very stern in her denunciation of the churches which "continue to fail with a quiet mind" to remove these evils, but I am not prepared to say that she is too stern. The word "failure" presupposes some sort of effort however, and I do maintain that the churches have made a real if feeble effort to right the terrible wrongs in our midst. I acknowledge frankly and with shame that these efforts have been inadequate, intermittent, and too often unsuccessful.

When, however, Lady Warwick offers us instead of the existing churches a new religion ignoring theology and founded upon material service, I ask her first, on what bedrock will she lay her foundation, and, secondly, in what is the superstructure to consist? Oriental cosmogony placed the world on the back of an elephant, and the elephant on a tortoise, but it provided no foothold for its tortoise. If Lady Warwick can find no rock on which to rest her foundation of social service, the "plain men" for whom I plead will not venture within the precincts of her temple in the air. Your human fool has method in his madness; with all his simplicity he is a canny fellow. I contend that the old religion is not played out; as an instrument for "mending this old world" it has not proved itself a failure. The day after I had read the Countess of Warwick's article I went to see a crippled consumptive, who lay in a lonely lodging, earning a shilling or two by her needle. When her cruel disease first incapacitated her for service she had asked her stepmother to give her a home, and had been refused and advised to earn a living by selling matches, "as many cripples do." A little later, while in hospital, her few belongings had been annexed by a sister-in-law. Hers was a pitiful case, but her face brightened as she explained that she had a friend —a poor girl, one of a family of eight, of whom one member was a chronic invalid. "She is coming to take me to her home for a visit," she added, "though they can ill afford it. When she writes to me, she signs herself 'Your sister in Christ.'" It is a trivial enough story, typical of hundreds of similar cases, but somehow it recalled to my mind this demand for a new cult which is to have no theology and no glad tidings. Is Lady Warwick quite sure that we need another religion? As a stimulus to material service alone, what fault has she to find with the old one? It is true that its first Commandment invites man to love the Lord his God, but the second, its corollary, is like unto it, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."

It is quite impossible, is it not, to conceive of that callous stepmother and that unscrupulous sister-in-law voluntarily leaving the cult of Mammon to worship in the priestless temple of social service? It is not impossible (for the miracle has been wrought again and again) to conceive of them drawn by the dynamic of Personal Love and Sacrifice into the self-renouncing sisterhood of those who by bearing one another's burdens fulfil the law of Christ.

I submit that the old religion, far from being a pitiful failure, still

offers a remedy, which has never been fully and fairly tested, for all the wounds and bruises and putrefying sores of this weary world. Until Lady Warwick can substitute something purer and nobler, the poor dazed fools and sinners to whom it is still a light shining in darkness will not turn their eyes from its guiding gleam to gaze after illusive and unstable will-o'-the-wisps.

The Way of the Cross is steep and rugged. The churches, collectively and individually, have strayed from it again and again along smoother bypaths of self-indulgence. But the old path alone winds steadily upward toward the goal which Lady Warwick seeks. "A high-way shall be there and a way, and it shall be called, The way of holiness. The way-faring men though fools, shall not err therein."

D. S. Batley.

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SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

PROFESSOR J. EDWIN CREIGHTON has not published many books, but he is well known to the philosophical world through the thoughtful and suggestive articles he has from time to time contributed to philosophical periodicals. In his honour and in commemoration of his twenty-five years' service at Cornell University an interesting volume of *Philosophical Essays*, of which Professor G. Holland Sabine is the editor, by former students in the Sage School, has just been issued (New York: Macmillan, 1917). In a Preface, written with much feeling, President Schurman describes the great power Professor Creighton has been as a teacher and intellectual leader. "For him the supreme aim and business of life has been growth in knowledge and thought, and the stimulation of thinking in his students." The Essays before us fully bear out that testimony. Though none of them are strikingly original, they are all honest attempts to wrestle with specific problems, and evince an independence of judgment of which any teacher might be proud to have laid the foundation. Professor Ernest Albee opens the volume with a paper on "The Confusion of Categories in Spinoza's *Ethics*," the main object of which is to show the incompatibility of the view of Substance as ultimate logical ground and that of a world in *some* sense determined *in infinitum*, of the view of logical and that of causal necessity, of the view of psycho-physical parallelism and that of moral freedom. Miss K. E. Gilbert writes on "Hegel's Criticism of Spinoza," and tries to refute Hegel's estimate of Spinoza's ethical system as applicable only to a realm of appearance by bringing out the more concrete aspect of Spinoza's philosophy. Another historical essay is that by the editor, Professor Sabine, on "Rationalism in Hume's Philosophy." He argues that it is not true to say that Hume's philosophy was empiricism, pure and simple. The heritage of Cartesian rationalism, in the emasculated form given it by Locke, is discernible throughout, and limits at every turn the fruitfulness of the empirical principles. Professor G. Watts Cunningham deals with "Coherence as Organisation," and maintains that if the coherence theory is to be saved, the transcendental principle of unity within experience, called "thought" or "reason," must be brought definitely into touch with the concrete situations in which it is supposed to function, and must be so defined as to imply an intelligible view of the temporal order. In short, coherence must be so construed as to place the emphasis on organisation of ends rather than upon mere abstract logical consistency. In an able article on "Time and the Logic of

Monistic Idealism," Professor J. A. Leighton contends that there can be no reality which does not traffic in time, no timeless being or beings; that it is absurd to suppose time and process to have had beginnings, since beginnings imply temporal antecedents, and therefore equally absurd to suppose a surcease of temporal process; that the movement of reality towards fuller, richer individuality is inexplicable, unless we suppose that a plurality of discrete elements (many *individua*), entering into a multitude of transactions with each other, give rise to further temporally discrete, and therefore novel, entities in the ceaseless dynamic process of actuality. Professor Leighton announces a forthcoming work, which will be awaited with much interest, where these positions will be presented in detail. Mr Alfred H. Jones discusses "The Revolt against Dualism," and finds the significance of the "new realism" to consist solely in the fact of its being such a revolt. To refute the notion that mind and matter are substances, it has committed itself to an image no less concrete and picturable, that of discrete neutral states; and this static and atomistic notion is far too crude a tool to serve in the erection of a complex monistic metaphysics. There are several papers on psychological themes. Professor E. C. Wilm writes on "Selfhood," and holds that by self-consciousness ought to be meant merely the felt togetherness, the continuity, of any present experience with the other constituents of the conscious stream. An important subject is handled by Professor J. Wallace Baird, "The Rôle of Intent in Mental Functioning." The author gives an account of the recent experimental research that has established the paramount influence of purpose or intent or point of view in determining and directing mental processes. Psychologically, however, the fundamental problem is to ascertain the mechanism by means of which this "intentional" influence is exerted, and here, unfortunately, Professor Baird has little to suggest. The problem is, undoubtedly, one of the pressing problems in modern-day psychology.

The ninth volume of the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, edited by Dr James Hastings (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1917), contains many articles of philosophical interest. I notice, first, that by Dr J. Ellis McTaggart on "Personality." Dr McTaggart starts by taking the terms "self" and "person" as equivalent (a questionable procedure), and forthwith lays down the proposition that "the quality of personality is known to me because I have perception, in the strict sense of the word, of one being which possesses the quality, namely, myself. Each of us, he maintains, perceives himself, and by "perception" he means here, he tells us, the awareness of what Russell calls "particulars," or sense-data in a large sense. These are all of them "substances"; and, since we can be aware of them only when they exist, perception is always awareness of the existent. Perception, then, as thus conceived, is identified with "knowledge by acquaintance"; and it is assumed that whatever we know must be known either by "acquaintance" or "description." It is shown that the self cannot be known by "description," so that the conclusion follows that, if known at all, it must be known by "acquaintance," or be perceived. To my mind the argument illustrates once more the false analysis involved in instituting the antithesis between "acquaintance" and "description." The author's whole contention is based upon that slippery foundation. Dr McTaggart fails altogether, it seems to me, to dispose of the case of those who dispute the alleged *direct* apprehension of self, or the doctrine

of an "inner sense." He admits that "to have a state and to perceive it are two utterly different things." He admits, also, that, in order to be known in the way he supposes, the self must become an object of knowledge to itself. What reason, however, is there, he asks, for holding that a self cannot be its own object, remaining all the time the self which has the object? There appears, he answers, to be no reason whatever. But there *is* a reason, and a reason, moreover, which has been repeatedly urged, namely, that the very nature of what we call awareness prevents the possibility of *its* being presented, and that just what is specifically characteristic of it must needs evade presentation in the fashion of object, in the fashion, that is to say, of matter that can be observed. At the end of his article Dr McTaggart has some pertinent things to say about the impossibility of any part of any self belonging also to any other self, and argues, I think with much force, against the view that man is a part of God. Dr James Iverach's contribution on "Perception" deserves consideration alongside of what Dr McTaggart has written. Dr Iverach offers some acute criticism of current views on the nature of presentation, and insists, as I venture to think with ample justification, that the cognitive process is of one piece from beginning to end, that it is no more possible to divide it into separate phases, such as those of perceiving and thinking, than it is to partition off the mind into separate faculties. Two valuable articles—on "Negation" and "Order"—appear from the pen of the late Josiah Royce. When logically analysed, Professor Royce urges, order turns out to be something that would be inconceivable and incomprehensible to us unless we had the idea which is expressed by the term "negation." Thus negation, which is always also something intensely positive, not only aids us in giving order to life, and in finding order in the world, but logically determines the very essence of order. Mr James Turner deals with "Ontology," and discusses, under that head, the relation of reality and knowledge, forms of being, and being as a unity. He argues that, accepting, as we must, the reality of the particular elements, with their incompleteness and unsatisfactoriness, we are precluded from any easy acquiescence in a complete and perfect whole already present. I agree; but when he goes on to contend that we must regard the whole as being itself a developing system, I can only say that the difficulties in the way of working out the conception seem to me no less formidable than those against the conception he rejects. We have yet to learn the great lesson of Kant's critique of ontology that categories applicable to parts of reality evince their inadequacy when applied to reality in its entirety. Mr J. W. Scott's treatment of "Neo-Hegelianism" is full of suggestive reflexion and judicious criticism. As compared with Hegel's *Phenomenology*, the later idealists, he points out, are not greatly impatient to see the ultimate, divine order of the world. They are content to know that some such order exists and is the ultimate truth of things, so that there is substantiation for the ultimate hypothesis of religion. The Neo-Hegelian writers are interested, he thinks, in the incidents of the dialectical process and also in its ultimate outcome, but they are not specially interested in its cohesion. And he instances Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. But one is inclined to question the justice of describing Bradley as Hegelian. Under the head of "Philosophy" a number of useful articles appear, tracing the development of philosophical thought in different nations of the world Professor H. B. Alexander leads off with an article on "Primitive Philosophy," Buddhist Philosophy is dealt

with by L. de la Vallée Poussin, Chinese by A. Forke, Egyptian by A. H. Gardiner, Greek by P. Shorey (much too briefly, by the way, to allow of satisfactory workmanship), Iranian by L. C. Casartelli, Japanese by M. Anesaki, Jewish by H. Malter, Muslim by T. J. de Boer, and Roman by P. Shorey. Mr R. D. Hicks has an article on the "Peripatetics," and follows the history of the school in its three stages: (*a*) that of the earlier Peripatetics to the death of Strato (270 B.C.), (*b*) that of the decline from Strato to Andronicus (70 B.C.), (*c*) that of the last three centuries (*c.* 70 B.C.–A.D. 230).

In the same volume of Hastings's *Encyclopædia* there is a long, important, and very helpful treatment of "Neo-Platonism" by Dean W. R. Inge. He unfolds at length the main principles of the philosophy of Plotinus, and more shortly the doctrines of Proclus. An interesting section at the end of the article is devoted to considering the influence of Neo-Platonism on Christianity. "Modern historians of philosophy," says Dean Inge, "have generally shirked the trouble of reading Plotinus—with the result that more blunders are current about his philosophy than any other system, ancient or modern." Within the last few days there has been published the first volume of an English translation of the text which will do something to repair the neglect of which Dean Inge complains: *Plotinus: The Ethical Treatises*, translated from the Greek by Stephen Mackenna, vol. i. (London: P. Lee Warner, Publisher to the Medici Society, 1917). The volume contains a translation of the nine books of the first Ennead, to which is prefixed a translation of Porphyry's Life of Plotinus and Account of His Work. A Bibliography is added, together with some Notes on the Terminology. And the volume concludes with a translation of the passages from Plotinus selected by Ritter and Preller in the 1864 edition of their well-known work. Another translation which we are particularly glad to welcome is that by Professor G. M. Stratton of the *De Sensibus* of Theophrastus: *Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1917). Professor Stratton has written a full and very interesting Introduction on "Theophrastus as Psychologist of Sense Perception," and there follows the Greek text, substantially that of Diels, with the English version on the opposite page. The translation seems to be very carefully and conscientiously done. The translator has been fortunate enough to obtain from Professor A. E. Taylor a running comment and criticism on the whole. Some useful and interesting Notes are added. "For a knowledge of Greek psychology before Plato," say Dr Stratton, "we are indebted to Theophrastus far more than to all the other ancient authorities combined." He admits that this claim may seem extravagant; but, in any case, a genuine service has been rendered to psychologists by making easily accessible to them this important treatise. It may perhaps be worth mentioning that a translation of the περὶ φυτῶν ἱστορία has recently been added to the Loeb Classical Library. The translation is by Sir Arthur Hort: *Theophrastus, Enquiry into Plants, and Minor Works on Odours and Weather Signs*, 2 vols. (London: Heinemann, 1916).

Mr C. Delisle Burns has written a very readable and useful little book, *Greek Ideals: A Study of Social Life* (London: Bell & Sons, 1917), which deserves to be widely known. The ideals he is concerned with are mainly moral ideals, and the period he is chiefly referring to is the Athens of the fifth century. Greek social life, especially on its religious side, he regards

as being more like mediæval life than like either the life of savages or the life of modern men. No doubt; but is it not a mistake to institute any such comparison at all? We shall never understand the age of Pericles until we realise it was, in truth, very *unlike* the life of mediæval times. In all their ideals, sociability is, Mr Burns thinks, the most prominent of Greek characteristics. In a way this may be so, but as a general statement it amounts surely to very little. Greek sociability was, at any rate, very different from the sociability of the convent or the cloister. A good account is given of the great festivals of the Anthesteria, the Panathenaia, the Dionysia, and the Eleusinia, and the manner is indicated in which the Athenian religion prepared a moral atmosphere capable of affording a place for the serenity and calm of a Socrates. I think it unfortunate that Mr Burns accepts so readily the view of Socrates outlined by Burnet and Taylor. One is far from wishing to discredit the valuable work of these scholars, but it is altogether premature to speak of their theory as "proved." And to represent the opposite theory as implying that "Plato developed a metaphysic out of the ethics and crude hints of a Socrates such as Xenophon describes" is utterly misleading. No competent scholar has ever advanced such a hypothesis. That certainly is not the alternative to believing that the Ideal theory of the *Phaedo* is of Socratic origin.

In laying down Miss May Sinclair's volume, *A Defence of Idealism: Some Questions and Conclusions* (London: Macmillan, 1917), most readers will, I imagine, experience a feeling of disappointment. The book contains some epigrammatic writing, and now and again some clever criticism, and yet as a whole it must be confessed that it does not carry conviction nor materially add to the discussion of the themes with which it deals. At the beginning we are at once plunged into some racy talk about "fashionable philosophies," "robust philosophies," philosophies that have been "the vogue in Mayfair for a whole season," and the like; one hears of new and old idealisms, of new and old realisms, of pragmatic humanism and vitalism, of pan-psychism and animism, and a huge host of kindred entities, all duly honoured with capitals, until one wonders what then has become of "philosophy," which like every other science has surely a province of its own, and is as little to be identified with these nostrums as is physics to be identified with the theory of a perfect fluid or biology with Weismannism. The one key which Miss Sinclair apparently thinks capable of unlocking all the mysteries of the world is that which she variously describes as Self, or Spirit, or Unity of Consciousness. But there is no magic in the mere conception of unity to draw from the universe its last secret. "Spirit," we are told, is that which "can be supposed to do things." It is "that which thinks, and wills, and energises in one undivided act." Alas, no light whatever is thrown upon the "function" of unity of consciousness, as a condition of knowledge, by thus assimilating it to the active exercise of an energy by the subject, an exercise which presupposes the very features you are professing to explain, and which must, therefore, in the long run, present itself as a merely blank form of conjunction. The most interesting part of the book is the long treatment of Mr Russell's atomism. Here Miss Sinclair often seems to be on the verge of pressing home some effective criticisms. But, somehow, they never get pressed home, and the discussion thins out into vague generalities.

The essays and lectures which Dr Bernard Bosanquet has gathered

together under the title of *Social and International Ideals* (London: Macmillan, 1917)—"Studies in Patriotism," as he calls them—form a valuable addition to the literature which the events of the present time are calling forth. Such topics as "Atomism in History," "The Quest of the Real Thing," "True and False Idealism," "The Function of the State in promoting the Unity of Mankind," are handled with the care and discrimination which we expect in a work of Dr Bosanquet's. The conception of patriotism as one with the social ideal, and of both as representing our best ideas of humanity and our devotion to their service, is, he tells us, the spirit that connects together the studies which are here collected. "The simple doctrine which they repeat in various forms or applications is that nothing can guide us right but a genuine devotion to the great eternal values, and that if we can succeed in clearing the vision of these from confusion and caricature, and applying it as a criterion in all social relations, we shall not go far wrong either in our life within the community or in our international behaviour."

An extremely important and original piece of analysis is carried out by Professor J. B. Baillie in his article "On the Nature of Memory-Knowledge" (*Mind*, July 1917). The reality to which we ultimately refer in judgments asserting "I remember this or that" is, Dr Baillie contends, our one individual experience, which is identical throughout the changes and which unites them all. Every time I judge that this or that happened in my experience I am affirming the continuity of my individual experience, and point to certain parts of it which have made up its content. Memory-judgments always have a *specific* object as their content, and this is selected by attention from the variety of content making up the continuity of our experience—an operation closely analogous to what takes place in our perception of the external world. When account is taken of memory-judgments, it becomes evident that objectivity cannot be interpreted solely in terms of universal, *i.e.* common, experience. For the object of memory does not transcend individual experience, and yet it is none the less an object on that account. It transcends our conscious present, and that of itself is perhaps enough to constitute it an object. If, however, to this be added the characteristic that the object of memory remains the same and is found to be the same after repeated changes in our individual experience, then it seems indeed absurd to deny to the object of memory the quality of objective reality which all matters of fact possess. The neglect of this wider significance of the term "object" is, it is maintained, a serious defect in certain well-known theories of knowledge. It is overlooked that the repetition by an individual of his own experience is even in principle not really different from the process of constituting an object by intercourse between several minds, on which the sole stress is laid by these theories. In the same number of *Mind*, Mr S. Radhakrishnan asks the question "Is Bergson's Philosophy Monistic?" and pertinently criticises Bergson's account of matter. Intellectuality and materiality, Bergson urges, arise together. The genesis of intellect and the genesis of matter are correlative. And yet he is emphatic in contending that life even in its origins found matter confronting it. How then can matter both have a beginning prior to evolution to set it going and be itself a late product of evolution?

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REVIEWS

The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy. By A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, LL.D.—Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917.—Pp. xvi + 423.

In these Gifford Lectures, delivered at Aberdeen University in 1912 and 1913, Professor Pringle-Pattison has made a valuable contribution to natural theology and metaphysics. Gifford Lecturers have chosen a great variety of methods in the treatment of their subject. Some have given us an outline of the history of philosophy, leading up to a statement of their own position; others have written metaphysical treatises, dealing with the subject as a whole or in some of its aspects; while others again have in the main expounded natural religions, natural science, religion in literature, anthropology, archæology, and other subjects having rather a remote relation to natural theology and metaphysics. Professor Pringle-Pattison has adopted a distinctive method, which he describes in his preface as one of "construction through criticism." When, as at present, "contemporary discussion on the fundamental questions of philosophy and religion is peculiarly active, the necessity is almost imposed upon a writer of defining his own position by reference to divergent views and other forms of statement. And I venture to think that the value of his work is thereby increased; for only by such mutual criticism, and the resulting definition of the points of difference, can we advance towards a common understanding." Accordingly, though his book is both historical and critical, the history and the criticism are merely the material and the tools which he uses in a gradual process of construction. Such a method has, of course, the defects of its qualities. It cannot yield the logical symmetry, the detailed argument, and the elaborate discussion of objections and difficulties to which we are accustomed in a metaphysical treatise. Yet the method, as Professor Pringle-Pattison uses it, has the high merit of illuminating and developing, as in a dialogue with men of the past and the present, a group of supreme ideas. Having all the interest of exploration, it leaves the reader asking for more and inclined to fresh thinking of his own.

In the first series of ten lectures Professor Pringle-Pattison lays the main foundations of his own position, following the method which I have indicated. He shows that "the idea of intrinsic value or worth, which Kant found in his analysis of moral experience, has been of determining influence upon the modern discussion of man's place in the scheme of things, thus shaping the view taken of the ultimate character of the Universe." In particular the duel between Naturalism and Idealism in the latter half of the nineteenth century had its chief interest in the problem of the reality of our highest values and ideals. Naturalism regards human values as unreal in comparison with the phenomena of physics and chemistry. They are treated as apparent, illusive, epiphenomenal or subjective. Idealism for the most part regards them as real and objective; but in some of its forms it fails to offer a satisfactory ground for establishing their reality. Professor Pringle-Pattison holds that "the vindication of human values

can only become effective and convincing when accompanied by the demonstration that the conclusions of Naturalism rest on a misinterpretation of the character of the scientific theories on which it founds—that Naturalism, in short, in spite of its claims to exclusive reality, is no more than the substantiation of an abstraction or of a fragment that can exist only as an element in a larger whole." The difficulties of Naturalism begin in the field of biology, "for the development of biology as an independent science has demonstrated the insufficiency of purely mechanical conceptions to describe even the most elementary facts of life." The recognition that the organism is a self-conserving system or a self-maintaining individual involves the recognition of teleology or purpose in organic life, which is impossible on the theory of Naturalism. Yet there is no breach of continuity between mechanism and life, for the principle of continuity does not "imply a reduction of all the facts of experience to the dead level of a single type." Continuity of process is quite consistent with the emergence of real differences, and both are involved in a real evolution. "What we have to deal with is the continuous manifestation of a single Power, whose full nature cannot be identified with the initial stage of the evolutionary process, but can only be learned from the course of the process as a whole, and most fully from its final stages." In this statement we have the first adumbration of the main thesis of the lectures, that the Universe is the self-revelation of God through Nature and Man. There is no chasm between nature and man. Nature is not a completed system, of which man is a spectator *ab extra*; but man is organic to nature and nature is organic to man. Man is rooted in nature, "so that the rational intelligence which characterises him appears as the culmination of a continuous process of immanent development." "The sentient, and, still more, the rational being appears as the goal towards which Nature is working, namely, the development of an organ by which she may become conscious of herself and enter into the joy of her own being."

This very imperfect, meagre, and dogmatic statement of some of the main conclusions at which Professor Pringle-Pattison arrives in the first series of his lectures can, of course, give no idea of the critical and sympathetic discussion of the most important modern theories of the subject, through which he gradually builds and consolidates his position, summarised by him in the phrases "God as immanent—the divine as revealed in the structure and system of finite experience," or "the reality of appearances." In the first half of the second series of lectures he develops this position and clears it from misconceptions in an elaborate and penetrating discussion of the views of Mr Bradley and Mr Bosanquet. He agrees with their fundamental contention that "the nature of reality can only mean the systematic structure discernible in its appearances, and that this must furnish us with our ultimate criterion of value"; but he criticises acutely the way in which Mr Bradley applies the principle of non-contradiction, inclusiveness, and harmony as the criterion of reality. "It is only when applied to specific experience that the principle of non-contradiction or of internal coherence becomes more than an empty formula, and as soon as it is so applied it receives its character from the concrete material in which it works itself out." "Hence it is an inversion of the true philosophic method to try to define the Absolute on the basis of the empty principle, and from that definition to reason *down* to the various phases of our actual experience and to 'condemn' its most

characteristic features, root and branch, as 'irrational appearance' and 'illusion.' The only possible result of such a procedure is exemplified in Mr Bradley's actual conclusion, namely, that in the Absolute everything is somehow reconciled, but inasmuch as we know not how, none of the predicates drawn even from our highest experiences are applicable in this ultimate reference." Mr Bosanquet, on the other hand, "in general follows, as if instinctively, the path *from* finite experience *to* the Absolute, tracing the organisation of the real wholes in which, in the concrete material of life, the empty form realises itself, and seeking, by critical use of the data thus obtained, to reach some positive determination of the nature of the ultimate Whole." Mr Bradley, however, extends the principle of non-contradiction and inclusiveness in its logical form by introducing, as an alternative form, the satisfaction of our whole being. And in his *Essays on Truth and Reality*, he says that the assumption that what satisfies us is real is an assumption "tolerable only when we hold that the Universe is substantially one with each of us, and actually as a whole, feels and wills and knows itself within us." This, as Professor Pringle-Pattison shows, is equivalent to his own view that man is organic to the world, and the world is organic to man, "completing itself in him, and manifestly coming to life and expression in his experience." This, however, involves the assumption of "the essential greatness of man and the infinite nature of the values revealed in his life. Without this absolute judgment of value, how could we argue, how could we *convince ourselves* that, in our estimates, it is not we who judge as finite particulars, but Reality affirming, through us, its inmost nature?"

A discussion of the problem of the Ideal and the Actual, with special reference to the proofs of the existence of God, ends in the view that the Ideal is the infinite present in the finite, and leads to a consideration of "the *status* of the finite individual," mainly in the light of Mr Bosanquet's treatment of the subject. That the finite self cannot exist or be known in isolation, but can exist only in vital relation to an objective system of reason and an objective world of ethical observance, from which it receives its content, that it exists as an organ or element of the Universe or of the Absolute, and that the central interest of the Universe is the making of souls, are positions which Professor Pringle-Pattison and Mr Bosanquet hold in common. The main difference between them lies in their divergent views as to the relation of the finite self or individual to the Absolute. Mr Bosanquet holds that finite selves or souls have what he calls "formal distinctness, consisting in the impossibility that one finite centre of experiences should possess, as its own immediate experience, the immediate experience of another." But he regards this distinctness as relatively unimportant in comparison with the identity of content in all selves, the extent of which varies indefinitely as between different selves, "large numbers of consciousnesses being completely coincident for the greater proportion of their range." "There is no rule as to how far 'persons' can overlap in their contents. Often a little change of quality in feeling, it seems, would all but bring them into one. It is impotence, and no mysterious limitation, that keeps them apart. At their strongest they become confluent, and we see how they might be wholly so." The finite self is an element in the Absolute; but it is not a member of the Absolute, a standing differentiation of the Absolute. Its essence is its content, and its life is to expand and ultimately to be absorbed in the Absolute, to

which it brings its own contribution. On the other hand, Professor Pringle-Pattison, accepting the position that individuality is ultimately a matter of content, points out that form is the structure and organisation of the content. Individuals are thus formally distinct, because they are really different wholes of content. "Every individual is a unique nature, a little world of content which, as to its ingredients, the tempering of the elements and the systematic structure of the whole, constitutes an expression or focalisation of the Universe which is nowhere exactly repeated." Selves are not merely elements of Reality, but members or incarnations of the Absolute.

The fundamental point of difference between the two views lies, as Professor Pringle-Pattison says, in the question whether finite individuals possess a substantive or an adjectival mode of being. The basis of Mr Bosanquet's view, as stated by him in his *Logic*, is the contention that the only ultimate subject of predication is "the one true individual Real," all finite individuals being "in ultimate analysis connexions of content within the real individual to which they belong," and of which they are therefore "ultimately predicates." He contends therefore that the finite individual is not a substance in the Spinozistic sense, not "wholly independent and self-subsistent," not a "true individual," not, in short, the Absolute. This, of course, in undeniable. But Professor Pringle-Pattison's contention is that finite individuals "must be taken as substances in the Aristotelian sense of πρώτη οὐσία, that which cannot stand in a judgment as predicate or attribute of anything else, the individual thing or being, in short, of which we predicate the universals which constitute its nature." The adjectival theory of the finite is simply the denial of the doctrine of ultimately self-subsistent, independent, and unrelated reals—a denial with which Professor Pringle-Pattison has no quarrel. And he contends that "the whole conception of blending and merging, as applied to finite individuals, depends on the failure to recognise that every real individual must possess a substantival existence in the Aristotelian sense." "The self or subject is not to be conceived as an entity over and above the content, or as a point of bare existence to which the content is, as it were, attached, or even as an eye placed in position over against its objects, to pass them in review. The unity of the subject simply expresses the peculiar organisation or systematisation of the content. But it is not simply the unity which a systematic whole of content might possess *as an object* or for a spectator. Its content, in Professor Bosanquet's phrase, has 'come alive'; it has become a unity for itself, a subject. That is, in very general terms, what we mean by a finite centre, a soul or, in its highest form, a self."

The origin of such finite centres, having real differences and a measure of independence, is the only fact to which we can fitly apply the term creation. "From the side of the Absolute, the meaning of the finite process must lie in the creation of a world of individual spirits," "beings capable of spiritual response, which enrich thereby the life from which they spring. Only for and in such beings does the Absolute take on the lineaments of God." The idea of creation has obvious difficulties, which are discussed at length in the sixteenth lecture. In popular thought creation is a special act or event that took place once upon a time, "an incident in God's existence, and the product stands somehow independently outside Him and goes by itself; so that His relation to the subsequent unfolding of the cosmic drama is at most that of an interested spectator."

"Such a conception of creation belongs to the same circle of ideas as the waving of a magician's wand." But "thinkers, both Christian and non-Christian, have insisted that creation must be regarded as an eternal act, an act grounded in the divine nature; and, therefore, if we are to use the language of time, coeval with the divine existence." The Christian doctrine of creation out of nothing was directed against the Greek view of the eternity of matter. It is the denial that the world was merely shaped by God out of a pre-existing material. Although early Christian thinkers regarded creation as an act of bare will, and the world as a mere external effect, "the direct ethico-religious relation of man to God, which was the essential characteristic of the new religion, made it impossible to treat the divine and the human simply on the footing of cause and effect." Hence Origen declared the doctrine of "an eternal creation, which, as the continual product of the changeless divine will, becomes an expression of the divine nature, rather than the outcome of will in the sense of choice," and he applied this conception primarily to the world of free spirits. Similarly Mr Bosanquet, while treating the whole universe as organically one, regards the material world fundamentally as that "through which spirit attains incarnation," the instrument, as it were, through which the only creation, that of minds, is worked out. Thus "the idea of creation tends to pass into that of manifestation, the revelation in and to finite spirits of the infinite riches of the divine life." "God becomes an abstraction if separated from the universe of his manifestation, just as the finite subjects have no independent subsistence outside of the universal Life which mediates itself to them in a world of objects."

Having suggested in a previous lecture that the world of finite individuals may well constitute the End of the Absolute, Professor Pringle-Pattison proceeds to consider whether End or Purpose can be attributed to the Absolute, and if so, in what sense. "The idea of Purpose, as we meet it in experience, appears to imply (1) desire for an as yet non-existent state of affairs, (2) the conception of a plan for bringing the desired state of affairs into existence by appropriate means, (3) the act of will proper, which realises or carries out this plan." This being in general the nature of purpose in the experience of finite individuals, what features in it must be discarded if purpose or end is to be attributed to the Absolute? The modern theory of organic development tends to coincide with the ideal outlined by Kant—"the systematic unity of nature," conceived as "complete teleological unity." "When we analyse our real meaning in the light of Kant's suggestion, we see clearly that, in attributing purposiveness to the Universe or any lesser whole, what we are concerned about is the character of the reality in question and not the pre-existence of a plan of it in anybody's mind. A teleological view of the universe means the belief that reality is a significant whole," as opposed to the mechanical theory, which regards reality as a mere aggregate or collocation of independent facts. The idea of a preconceived plan and the conception of contrivance or skill in overcoming difficulties, implying the separation of means and end, must therefore be discarded. Similarly the view of the universe as a significant whole, considered in relation to teleology in the sense of "aiming at the unfulfilled," precludes the separation of beginning and end. Neither the end nor the beginning must be taken in abstraction. "The end must not be severed from the process of its realisation." But the idea of Purpose or End, divested of its finite incidents, tends to pass into that of Value. "It

is the character of the whole which we have in view—not the historical fact of its having been purposed, but its nature as something worthy of being purposed, something fit to be the End of a Perfect Being." Purpose and Value, however, imply conation and satisfaction, and something must remain to represent these in the Absolute, if it is not to be merely "a timeless system of abstract truth." "So far as the ideas of process and ultimate achievement embody the conception of effort—nay, of *difficulty*—they may be accepted as truer to the Great Fact of the Universe than the language even of a philosopher like Hegel when he speaks of the Absolute Life as the eternal play of love with itself. *If the finite world means anything to God*, the ideas of activity and purpose are indispensable."

Purpose, as implying the future or the "not-yet," is apparently, however, a temporal category, which it is difficult to apply to the universe as a whole. It thus becomes necessary to discuss the problem of the ultimate reality or unreality of time. Most arguments regarding the temporal and the eternal are based on the conception of absolute or mathematical time, which is "the abstraction of mere succession." But Professor Pringle-Pattison shows that "our primitive and basal experience of time is characterised by a togetherness of parts or elements which lifts us above the aspect of mere succession." "The experience of succession itself would be impossible if the successive items were not apprehended *together* as stages of a single process, parts within a single whole of duration. In the compresence which is thus an essential feature of our consciousness of time we therefore already realise, though doubtless on an infinitesimal scale, the nature of an eternal consciousness." Time, again, is not "an element in which consciousness passes, or a procession which passes before consciousness; it is simply the abstract form of the living movement which constitutes the reality of conscious life." "Purposive activity is the concrete reality, of which time is merely the abstract form. Time is the abstraction of unachieved purpose or of purpose on the way to achievement." And "the eternal view of a time-process is not the view of all its stages simultaneously, but the view of them as elements or members of a completed purpose." This is illustrated by the analogy of a great drama, in which everything that happens is organic to the whole. If we read or see it, without any previous knowledge of the end or the course of action, the end is gradually disclosed to us—divined by us—as we proceed. This represents our human, finite attitude towards the future. On the other hand, to the author, reading or seeing his own play, the perception of the meaning of the whole as articulated in the individual incidents is present from the outset. This is "perhaps the nearest analogue we have to the divine apprehension of the temporal." Thus "the time-process is retained in the Absolute and yet transcended. Retained in some form it must be, if our life experience is not to be deprived of all meaning and value." "Time seems one with the existence of the finite; and although the experience and the relations of time must be represented in the infinite experience, this must be in a way which transcends our human perspective."

In contrast with this view, according to which "time is an aspect of facts *within* the universe," Professor Pringle-Pattison discusses the theory supposed to be involved in M. Bergson's creative evolution, of a growing universe, or what William James and other Pluralists describe as an "unfinished universe." Agreeing with M. Bergson as to the influence of the spatialised idea of time (or conceptual time), as distinct from the continu-

ous, flowing real time, "in producing the peculiar illusion of determination which represents us as the slaves of our own past, figured as a kind of external destiny," he contends that M. Bergson is under the same spatial illusion when he comes to deal with the future. "Reality," says M. Bergson, "appears as a ceaseless upspringing of something new." "The future appears as expanding the present: it was not therefore contained in the present in the form of a represented end." Such statements are true of the phenomenal process as it appears to a finite spectator or to an agent engaged in the process. The consequent cannot be predicted from its apparent antecedents. "The stream *is* constantly found rising above its source, despite the adage, for only so can any real advance be accounted for." But this advance "takes place in the finite evolving subject, or from the point of view of such a subject, not from the point of view of the whole, as if the 'expansion and transcendence of its own being' in unforeseen directions represented the experience of the Absolute itself." M. Bergson's insistence on "radical contingency in progress, incommensurability between what goes before and what follows," is an attempt to escape from the spatial illusion which, in regard to the past, he has destroyed, but which he seems still to retain in reference to the future. "We live and act only in the present; and every action has its own reality, and, in the case of conscious action, its own freedom, just as the divine activity which sustains and guides the world is to be thought of as the expression of a present mind and will, not as the consequence of past decrees which bind God himself like a fate." "If, as M. Bergson says, we act now with our whole past, and yet are free, why should this be otherwise in the future, when what is now present will constitute part of the past which we carry with us?"

In his final lecture, after discussing various Pluralist theories, including those of Dr Rashdall, Dr McTaggart, and William James, Professor Pringle-Pattison, through a consideration of the problem of evil and suffering, indicates the defects of the traditional theism, and the direction in which he thinks that it must be transformed, if we are to reach any credible theory of the relations of God and man. The traditional idea of God he describes as "a fusion of the primitive monarchical ideal with Aristotle's conception of the Eternal Thinker." However different these conceptions may be, they have in common the idea of a self-centred life and a consequent aloofness from the world. In spite of the deeper view of the nature of God contained in the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, "the God of popular Christian theology is still the far-off, self-involved, abstractly perfect and eternally blessed God of pure Monotheism." "The secret of Christianity, the new interpretation of life by which it conquered the world," was "the lesson of self-sacrifice, of life for others, precisely through which, nevertheless, the truest and intensest realisation of the self was to be attained." If this is the deepest insight into human life, it must be recognised as the open secret of the universe—"No God, or Absolute, existing in solitary bliss and perfection, but a God who lives in the perpetual giving of himself, who shares the life of his finite creatures, bearing in and with them the whole burden of their finitude, their sinful wanderings and sorrows, and the suffering without which they cannot be made perfect."

Professor Pringle-Pattison's method of exploration and gradual advance by means of a critical sifting of practically all the important speculations on his subject in modern philosophy and theology makes his book a rich

and concrete discussion, in which the threads of analysis are closely interwoven without losing definiteness. It moves towards its end with the cumulative power of a growing idea, proceeding from a basis of greater or less agreement with other thinkers to develop the finest and most important distinctions. In the use he makes of the principles of continuity of process and the emergence of real differences, in his insistence on the reality of appearances and his account of the finite individual in relation to the Absolute, in his treatment of the idea of creation and his elucidation of teleology as a cosmic principle, Professor Pringle-Pattison has made an illuminating advance in the study and discussion of his subject. He writes with the felicity of expression and illustration which we are accustomed to expect from him, and the reading of his book is a genuine pleasure. But its comprehensiveness and the close texture of its discussions have made it a difficult book to review at any ordinary length, and I have found it necessary to confine myself to indicating, in what I am afraid is a very imperfect selection and summary, its scope and the main lines of its argument. R. Latta.

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Personality: Lectures delivered in America. By Sir Rabindranath Tagore. London: Macmillan, 1917.

These pages contain six lectures on life grouped together under the heading "Personality." The appropriateness of the title is not immediately obvious, yet it is well chosen. The reader who succeeds in entering at all into the spirit of these discussions will not fail to see that in all of them the author is saying something about where the true life of personality lies. His ruling conception is clearly not the familiar one. Little place is given to those manifestations of personality which we mostly have in view when *we* use the term "personal," as, for instance, when we speak of the personal touch or the personal note in a man's work. The author is as far as possible from identifying personality with that in a man which is peculiar and exclusive. Personality is not that which breaks out in the foibles and eccentricities of an individual. The sentiment which finds expression in such familiar phrases as the right to be oneself, the right to call one's soul one's own, and the like, is not unknown to our author. But it receives an interpretation at his hands vastly different from what it bears on the lips of a typical Western child of emancipation. In one interesting little autobiographical passage we are told what a discovery it was to the author when he realised what to live one's own life meant. "Living one's own life in truth," he says, "is living the life of all the world" (p. 134). And in that phrase we have pretty much the focus of his vision. The lectures are greatly taken up with the task of showing what is personal in man and in the universe. The universe *is* a person. It has a soul. "The West," says the author in his opening lecture, "may believe in the soul of Man, but she does not really believe that the Universe has soul. Yet this is the belief of the East." The idea is to be taken literally. It is not metaphor. The world is quite another thing than the mechanical object which common-sense and science have seen in it. It can appear to us in the garb of a personality. That in us which sees it

thus is our personality. And the testimony of "personality" to the nature of the world is true—as true as that of science. We quote a passage from the second lecture. The author cites a piece of his own poetry and adds the comments of "Science" upon it:

> "'The night is like a dark child just born of her mother day.
> Millions of stars crowding round its cradle watch it,
> Standing still, afraid lest it should wake up.'

I am ready," says the author, "to go on in this strain, but I am interrupted by Science laughing at me. She takes objection to my statement that the stars are standing still" (p. 41). But the poet will not let Science browbeat him out of these visions. That were to let intellect dictate to personality, and personality hears the music of the world as literally and authentically as intellect sees its prose.

"The prosody of the stars can be explained in the classroom by diagrams, but the poetry of the stars is the silent meeting of soul with soul at the confluence of the light and the dark, when the infinite prints its kiss on the forehead of the finite, when we can hear the music of the great I AM pealing from the grand organ of creation through its countless reeds in endless harmony" (p. 59).

Besides the first lecture, "What is Art?" and the second, "The World of Personality"—the one from which we have just been quoting—the book contains other three, which develop the same conception in various ways. They are entitled "The Second Birth," "Meditation," and "Woman." A chapter is also included giving an account of the school at Bolpur, Bengal, where the author has dared to put the principles of his teaching to the severe test of educating youth upon them. The school too, it might be said, is designed to create an atmosphere in which the same conception will flourish. It is to evoke personality, conceived as that in the individual which corresponds to and which apprehends the soul-side of the universe. In no wise is it to develop personality in the sense of encouraging the individual to nurse his pet eccentricities, or in the sense of teaching him to pursue little hole-and-corner interests all his own. The ideal of the school is that of the schools of ancient India planted in solitary places, where students might meditate on the deepest truths of the soul and learn, in the author's words, "to grow in sympathy with all creation and in communion with the Supreme Being."[1] Its aim is to draw forth that in the individual which responds to all the world, and the very physical environment of the school is designed to further that end.

Not every popular author is a great man, nor is every popular philosophy of life a great philosophy; but there is a point of view from which anything which has achieved much contemporary fame repays study. As satisfying a public taste it reveals something of the public mind. Whatever may be thought of Tagore's philosophy, the fact is that his writings are being read. The fact cannot be ignored. If it could be, criticism of him might be made easy. This Indian poet and thinker is full of the spirit of his own land. Nothing could be easier than to cull the mystical passages from his pages and proceed to bring down upon him all the stock criticisms of mysticism. But he is not the man to attack with blank shot. He gives

[1] Quoted from the introduction to a book by W. W. Pearson on *The Bolpur School of Rabindranath Tagore*, Macmillan, 1917.

us more serious work to do. The very sale of his books proves that he is attracting us. And if we are to estimate the whole literary phenomenon which his work presents, we must take account of the fact of his vogue and the questions which arise out of it. What are we finding in this kind of work? Is it really there, or are we only reading it in? And if it is, does it meet any want of ours which rightly demands to be met, or release anything in us which greatly needs liberation?

These questions presuppose a belief that the writer we are studying is in contact with something which may turn out to be greater than his expression of it and may demand to be taken seriously. It is hard to resist such a conviction, however hard it may also be to justify it, within the limits of a review.

We do not believe that it is only by his strange Eastern imagery that this author attracts, or by his immaculate English. Both of these may have helped him to win an entrance to our affections, but more goes to the making of his permanent charm than can possibly be attributed to a style or a technique. He has a message. All his sentiments and sayings and all his verses are informed with a point of view, one which is so intimately part of them that they could not exist without it; so that when we yield to the grace and charm of them, we equally succumb to it. This point of view is possibly of importance to us; and in this, if it is so, will lie the simple explanation of the popularity amongst us, of the expression which Tagore has given to it. For we are not always aware of what it is in us that is being appealed to by a thing we like.

What is that point of view? It is one to which the West too has given halting expression, which it has not been able to live up to, but which is perhaps less out of keeping with what is permanent in Western life than it has sometimes seemed to be.

Tagore is in the first place a poet, and it is difficult to obtain a rendering of his mental standpoint except in poetical flashes. A work with which he presented his English readers four years ago, however, —and of which the present book is pretty much a continuation—gives what is really a philosophy of life, though it expressly disclaims that title. It mediates for us that "ancient spirit of India," which inspired the sacred books of the Indian people, which formed the atmosphere of the author's own early upbringing, and which furnished his poetic impulse with material and inspiration. The result reminds one on every page of another philosophy of life which has been familiar to students in this country chiefly in the shape given to it by Green and Nettleship and their co-workers and following. Tagore presents an idealism hardly distinguished from theirs except by a certain accentuation of the mystical side of thought, inseparable from his Eastern birth and training. It might plausibly be held that that Western philosophy missed being adequate to the life of the West, that it missed expressing the needful for it, through the lack of something which the East (if this that Tagore is giving us be anything like the East) is fitted to supply.

A single phrase may be quoted from that earlier work as suggesting, perhaps as well as any short expression can, what Tagore has to teach that it is highly needful for us to know, and that the idealistic philosophy just referred to did not really succeed in teaching us. Speaking of India and the first Aryan races who spread themselves over that vast land of forests and of the influence exercised upon their spiritual nature by this wide

dwelling-place of theirs, he says, "The circumstances of forest life did not overcome man's mind, and did not enfeeble the current of his energies, but only gave them a particular direction. Having been in constant contact with the living growth of nature, man's mind was free from the desire to extend his dominion by erecting boundary walls around his acquisitions. *His aim was not to acquire but to realise.*"[1]

Now "self-realisation" was the keynote also of that Western philosophy with which we have compared the present author's. But he is content to say simply "realisation." Just as he has chosen "Personality" for the title of the present work, so he chose "Realisation" as a title for the earlier one—"The realisation of life" being the nearest English equivalent of the Bengali "Sādhanā," which was the true title of the work. In doing this he teaches our philosophy a little lesson in simplicity. It may very well be that he also brings it into closer touch with the real needs of the life it sprang from, needs hitherto unseen but becoming gradually more manifest. "Not only to acquire," he would say, "is life's secret, but to realise." In other words, "Acquire if you will, but in the name of all you hold good and dear do not, in your eagerness to acquire, lose the power to realise your acquisitions."

In these last words, obviously, we are paraphrasing Tagore. The hortatory vein is far from him. But this message is in him; and it constitutes a text which could, if anyone chose to elaborate it, evolve itself into a terrific indictment of Western life. In the pages of this Journal some nine years ago another Eastern writer made something like a beginning of such an indictment. He pointed out what he described as "The miscarriage of life in the West." The gravamen of his charge was just this, of our inability to *realise.* We never rest. We rush from acquisition to acquisition, killing our whole power to enter into our possessions, material or spiritual, and enjoy them.

This lack of balance in our life, this want of poise, our endless need to be *working* and incapacity simply to *be*, is what is rebuked by writing like Tagore's. Our own idealistic philosophy, too, has had its word to say in the same profound matter; but it has remained a dead letter, and it was perhaps in the nature of the case that it should be so. That philosophy, apparently, could not find its way to the absolute (it could not be idealistic, in other words) without losing hold of real difference, that is to say, without losing its hold of what the life it sprang from could *recognise* as difference. With the pioneers of the Romantic Movement amongst whom our own classical philosophic idealism arose, life itself was sweeping through the floodgates of a renascence. The essence of life was then felt to be progress. It is inevitable at such a season that instead of dwelling on the stable, the eternal, and the accomplished, men should be intoxicated with the sense of advancing, that their motto should be movement,

> "Forward, forward, let us range,
> Let the great world spin for ever down the ringing grooves of change."

Idealism is unavoidably in a difficulty at such a time in mediating between that "eternal" with which it can never dispense, and the change and movement wherein the real value and zest of life are felt to lie. That is why Hegel broke from Schelling, with his absolute "like the night in which all cows were black." That is why Hegel himself has never been

[1] Italics the reviewer's.

able to convince his readers that he escaped the very fault he saw in Schelling. All idealism which is great and serious is committed to a view of life with some sort of finality about it. And life itself, wherever strong currents in it are setting towards change, is too conscious of the need of variety, too full of the joy of adventure, to put up with such an interpretation of itself at the hands of any philosopher. So long as idealism cannot renounce the eternal—and it cannot, any more than religion can—the problem will be left to it, how vindicate time and change, and progress and choice, in a real and satisfying sense, and yet maintain your hold upon eternal life? How shall the life lived *sub specie æternitatis* be induced to satisfy the creature? How shall the joy of having the End in possession be induced to furnish the joy of the movement thereto? In regard to this difficulty it may well be that there is still light for us in the East. Many are the ways in which Idealism has sought to bring together these opposite poles of its chart of life. All these ways will probably be found reducible at the last to the one contention that difference is real. Here is where this Eastern "realisation of life" is so full of potential value. Much as it has been blamed for swamping difference, it appears really, in the hands of its greatest exponents, to have set itself precisely to find how to accentuate difference, so far as that can be done without losing the all-important aspect of finality. At any rate as presented by the brilliant Indian who speaks to us in this volume, the spirit of the East is precisely the spirit which would reduce to an art the preserving of the sense of difference within a life whose fundamental note is peace. J. W. Scott.

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Teoria e Storia della Storiografia. Vol. IV. of the *Filosofia dello Spirito.* By Benedetto Croce.—Laterza, Bari, 1917.—Pp. vi+292.

A new book, on a literary or a philosophical theme, by the indefatigable Senator Benedetto Croce is neither so rare nor so occasional as to rouse special interest, but the announcement about a year ago that a fourth volume of the "Philosophy of Mind" was in preparation seemed to mark a coming event of the very first philosophical importance. At the same time it must have raised in the minds of those who have studied Croce's philosophy not only a natural curiosity, but some rather puzzling speculations. The three volumes which contain his æsthetic, his logical, and his ethical theory do not present a system of philosophy in the old sense of that term, but they are certainly systematic. They claim not only to give an exhaustive account of all the modes of mental activity, but by virtue of a principle to exclude the possibility that there are other modes. There are four modes in which Mind manifests activity, and more than these there cannot be, because "four" is not here the arithmetical number, and therefore a merely arbitrary figure, indicating the result of an empirical search, and the discovery of modes up to date: it is the distinction of four moments within one single, unitary, spiritual process. It is the twofold degree of a twofold activity. Mind is a theoretical activity or knowing, and a practical activity or acting, and acting depends upon knowing. Knowing is the creating of æsthetic and logical value, and logic depends on æsthetic; acting is the creating of economic and ethical value, and ethics

depends on economics. In the conclusion of the *Filosofia della Pratica* accordingly we read, "With the philosophy of practice we bring to an end the exposition we had set out to give of the Philosophy of Mind; and at the same time we bring to an end the exposition of the whole of philosophy, because Mind (*lo Spirito*) is all reality." The announcement after this of a fourth volume on the theory and history of history could not therefore but leave one wondering whether the philosopher had discovered some new realm of Mind, unaccountably, or at least unexpectedly, excluded from his exposition of the four moments.

The mystery, so far as there is a mystery, is cleared up in the short preface, in which Croce tells us that the volume, though entitled the fourth of the "Philosophy of Mind," is not to be regarded as forming a new systematic part. It is an amplification and further investigation of the theory of History already set forth in certain chapters of the Logic. But he then significantly adds, "the problem of historical comprehension is that towards which all my inquiries lead, in regard to the modes of Mind, to their distinction and unity, to their truly concrete life which is development and history, and to the historical thought which is the self-consciousness of this life."

Except for its appearance as an integral part of the *Filosofia dello Spirito* the book is not new. It consists of papers previously read to Academies and published in Proceedings and Reviews, and it has also already appeared in German under the title *Zur Theorie und Geschichte der Historiographie* (Tübingen, Mohr, 1915). There is an addition to the present volume, however, of three short but important essays, inserted as appendices to the first or theoretical part. These also have been previously published in the Italian Review, *La Critica*. The volume conforms in its general plan with the other volumes in the series. It is divided into two parts, the first presenting the theory of the subject and the second the history. It will be convenient in this notice to keep the two parts distinct, but they are parts of a unitary scheme. Not the least attractive feature of Croce's method is the opening of the subject with a full statement of his own theory, so that the reader has this before him in all the subsequent review and criticism of other theories. The history is not a mere adjunct to the theory, nor extrinsic to it, intended merely to illustrate it or mark the various unsuccessful attempts to attain it. The history is the theory itself in its development, the mode of Mind in its conscious, active, unfolding and realisation.

In general terms, Croce's theory is that history is identical with philosophy and philosophy with history, and the distinction implied by philosophers who speak of a philosophy of history is based on false concepts alike of history and of philosophy. Applied to our ordinary everyday notions it means that what we are accustomed to call historical events, meaning events which are past and completely determined, and of which there now exist only the bare chronicles, are not history. They only become history by acquiring present interest, they are only real so far as they are themselves present. True history, therefore, is contemporaneous or present history. The idea that events, devoid of any present reality, purely abstract facts of a determined past, exist in their own right is due to and an instance of the ineradicable illusion of the human mind which finds its most persistent philosophical expression in the various forms of the notion of the thing in itself. The consequence of this

illusion is that Mind which is immanent reality comes to be regarded as merely a transcendent reality, and over against it stands existence as something of which we are vaguely conscious as a mystical background of experience (*mysticismo*) or else as a mere name for the unknowable (*agnosticismo*).

The best way to understand the theory is to analyse a concrete instance. I who write and you who read lived through the month of July 1914. What do we mean when we now think of that month as history? It is at once clear that we may regard it in two aspects—as a series of events absolutely determined in time and place, ended, fixed and unalterable, and also as wholly and essentially contemporaneous. As past, we say that it is what it was; we suppose that it has left its more or less imperfect record in the shape of documents and traditions which will furnish materials for future historians to present to future generations a connected and more or less veracious narrative. As present, we are not now experiencing it in the sense of living through it, but it is bound up with and an intimate part of our whole present experience. Croce's theory is that history is always and essentially contemporaneous and present in this last meaning, and that the idea of a history which we can regard as complete and independent of the present, existing in its own right and possessing only an external interest, is a pure abstraction, and, like all abstractions when taken for concrete reality, a false or seeming thing.

This will seem to most of us to cut clean across our accepted notion of what history is. Present interest seems to us no part of the historicity of the historical fact. Rather it appears as a more or less idle and curious attitude toward dead fact. It may have value for present action by guiding us, inspiring us, or warning us, but it is a purely external value so far as the present action is concerned. History seems to present to the historian a body of fact absolute in its nature but varying infinitely in the degree of its recoverability—recoverability of past existence being essentially the historian's task. History, therefore, appears analogous in every respect to the science of nature, which, moreover, is often only distinguished from it as "natural" history. The generally accepted notion of the historian's task is summed up in the maxims of Taine: *First collect the facts, then trace out the causes.* Croce challenges this notion by the uncompromising denial that there exist for history any facts in the sense of something purely external, or any causes such as those which by a convenient fiction we introduce into physical science. All historical facts are facts of mind, spiritual facts, and spring directly from the development of the activity of mind, spiritual activity. History is the act of thought, and the act of thought is the consciousness, or rather the self-consciousness, which arises out of the act of life as knowledge of life.

"Even could our eagerness be rewarded by having offered to us all the infinite particulars of infinite history, it would still be necessary for us to disencumber our mind of them, to forget them and fix on that particular alone which could respond to a problem, and constitute for us living and active, that is, contemporaneous, history. And it is precisely this that Mind in its development performs, because there is no fact which is not known in the act which accomplishes it, thanks to the consciousness which in the unity of Mind is continually generated on action; and there is no fact which does not come to be cast out of mind at once or later, save that it is recalled, as we say when speaking of the dead history which

by the work of life is made to re-live, the past which by means of the present is re-made present."

"At every instant each of us knows and forgets far the greater part of his thoughts and actions (and woe to us were it otherwise, we should then only live by laboriously calculating our minimal motives!); we do not cast out of mind, but keep and use as long as we have need of them, those thoughts and feelings which mark memorable crises, or concern problems which lie still open on our future. And many times to our astonishment we find ourselves witnessing the resurrection within us of feelings and thoughts we had believed irrevocable. This is as much as to say that at every instant we know all the history we are concerned to know, and that of what remains we possess no means of knowing it while it does not concern us, or we shall possess the means when it does" (p. 44).

History, therefore, in Croce's view is the most concrete and the most universal form in which the activity of Mind is presented. But Mind (*lo Spirito*) in its concrete and universal activity is the subject-matter of philosophy. Hence the task of the true historian is identical with that of the true philosopher. It is not, however, without protest that such a view is at all likely to find acceptance. It comes into direct conflict with what we are accustomed to regard as the historian's task. Herodotus and Thucydides may be philosophers; but in so describing them we feel that we are using the term philosopher in a different meaning from the specific sense in which we apply it to Plato and Aristotle. Croce would of course acknowledge the difference, but he would regard it as formal rather than material. The true distinction is between poets and philosophers, those who treat reality imaginatively and those who treat it conceptually. Every man is by his nature both poet and philosopher; individual minds and individual writers are distinguished by the emphasis or preponderance of the one mode over the other. What, then, is the historian's task? Is it to preserve for us dry chronicles, to test documents and examine them with critical skill, in order to present to us the events they record in their naked verisimilitude? Or is it to use documents and traditions as the basis of an ideal reconstruction, to give a present interest to the past by weaving events into an epic? Or is it to give moral direction to present social and political life by setting forth the principles and laws which govern political action? All of these views are at some time held, and each can bring famous historical examples in its support. The true historian, however, is not a mere chronicler, nor a poet, nor a rhetorician; his task is one with that of the philosopher, namely, to interpret living, active Mind in its concrete, all-embracing reality.

The concept of a philosophy of history stands as the antithesis of this theory. Croce regards it as the last form, or rather as the last refuge, of a transcendent theory of Mind, a theory which is familiar in the mythology of Christianity. To the Christian historian-philosopher there is one central event for which all anterior history is an evangelical preparation and all subsequent history an evangelical propagation. In Hegel "Philosophy of History" takes a more conceptual form in the notion of a self-realisation of Mind in history, the gradual conquest by the Idea through history of the self-consciousness of freedom. Croce criticises this as false immanence, the true immanence being the concept of history as itself the expression of Mind, or as Mind expressing itself.

The logical outcome of this doctrine of the identity of philosophy with

history, so far as it concerns philosophy, is that there is no "fundamental problem," that is, no metaphysical problem, of Mind and reality, but only the problem of Mind itself, that is, of reality, in its living, self-developing, activity. This is given full expression in the third appendix, entitled "Philosophy and Methodology," and has already called forth rigorous protest, to which Croce has replied in a recent number of *La Critica.*

The second part of the treatise, the history of history, constitutes by itself, and independently of the light it throws on the theory, a striking and also a very delightful study. It may be read for its own sake. I shall be surprised if it does not come to be ranked as one of the choicest specimens of Croce's historical and literary critical skill. It is a historical sketch which endeavours simply, and without artifice, and without doing violence to facts, to show the organic and progressive evolution of historical thinking from the Greeks down to our own time. The periods into which it falls are named the Græco-Roman, the Medieval, the Renascence, the Enlightenment, and the Positivistic. An English writer would probably, I imagine, name the last the Naturalistic. Croce's idea is not that these periods represent exclusive or particular forms of the concept of history; every age has its history and its philosophy in the complete form which its conditions require, but each represents a certain emphasis on a particular aspect of the one problem.

In concluding this notice I will give one quotation to show Croce's attitude toward that view of history and philosophy which seems to many of us to-day to be one of the chief intellectual causes of the present disaster which is threatening our whole civilisation—I mean the Pan-Germanism founded on a supposed Philosophy of History. It is the more interesting because Croce suffered among us for a long time the reproach of pro-Germanism on account of the part he took in the controversy as to the policy of his country before Italy entered the war. In discussing "Philosophies of History" and showing how under the colour of an exalted philosophy personal historical leanings and animosities towards a particular person, or church, or people, or state, or race penetrate into history, he proceeds: "And in this way was invented the Germanic idea, the idea that the Germans are the crown and perfection of human kind, of purest Aryan descent, the elect people, one day again to make the march to the East. From time to time their semi-absolute monarchy has been held up as the absolute form of the State, their speculative Lutheranism as the absolute form of religions, with many other like follies, causing German vanity to weigh oppressively on the peoples of Europe and even on the whole world, and in such way making the world pay heavily for the benefit of the new philosophy which Germany had given it" (p. 260).

The book closes on the same note. "'Bis hierher ist das Bewusstsein gekommen,' said Hegel at the end of his lectures on the 'Philosophy of History.' He had no right to say it, because the development he had traced from unconsciousness of freedom to its full consciousness in the German world and in the system of absolute idealism had attained its goal and admitted no further advance. But we who have now overcome the abstractness of Hegelianism can say it in very truth."

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Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity. By F. Legge, F.S.A.—Two vols. Pp. lxiii + 202, ix + 425.—Cambridge University Press, 1915.

ONCE more we are invited to survey generally the religious movements which accompanied the rise of Christianity. And of course, when we accept this invitation, the great work of Renan suggests itself to us. *The Origins of Christianity* displayed a delicate historical sense supported by sound scholarship, and—added to these—a susceptibility to the beautiful, without which, as we shall see, scholarship itself is blind. No one, therefore, with this precedent before him can complain if an inevitable comparison is drawn between each new work in this field and the work already so well done. The reader, therefore, who wishes to get the full value out of the volumes before us will do well to fit them into the historical and geographical frame which has been elaborated with such skill by the great French scholar. For Renan was both a historian and a geographer. English readers should not forget that he anticipated Sir William Ramsay in holding that Paul's letter to the Galatians was addressed to the cities of Southern Galatia, a theory not without importance for our understanding of the religious life of the uplands of Asia Minor.

Let us at once acknowledge, not without gratitude, that Mr Legge justifies the publication of these two large volumes. He has accumulated and arranged a vast amount of material, much of it quite recently ascertained and some of it drawn from sources difficult of access. And although it is not always possible to follow him in the inferences which he draws, his work throughout is characterised by accuracy of scholarship and lucidity of expression. He has produced, therefore, an excellent book of reference, and in such a shape that it is available not only for the trained student but also for the general reader.

In drawing his conclusions, however, he shows a certain confidence—confidence which scientific method scarcely allows. He professes to be still at the stage beyond which Lord Bacon failed to advance. Our longstanding English tradition, that the mere accumulation of facts will disclose their own interpretation, has rarely received a more emphatic utterance than by the author in his preface. But perhaps if we try to disentangle and even to supplement the clues which Mr Legge himself furnishes, we may trace in this field the operation of those general ideas which, under the leadership of Lord Bacon, we are inclined to overlook.

For no mere accumulation of facts would have enabled our author to formulate those sweeping generalisations which are not altogether lacking here. In fact, the rate at which we progress to large conclusions rather surprises us after the comfortable suggestion that we were going to allow the facts to carry us along. But perhaps the confidence which facts inspire in our English mind expresses itself precisely in the jump towards conclusions which, after all, is the most flagrant example of disloyalty to facts. In thus taking a preliminary survey of the ground, I find that it is not so much Mr Legge as the authorities whom he sometimes follows who are to blame, as will now appear.

The book begins with an estimate of the work of Alexander, in which he is credited with having united the whole civilised world under a single head. We might agree with this estimate, but that the gracious figures of Buddha and Confucius bring before our eyes the Far East not wholly unillumined. Perhaps we had better say that Alexander united the world that looks eastward from the mountain ranges of the Balkan peninsula to

the Indus and its tributaries. Next to Alexander, in importance for the development of a world-religion, comes, we are told, Ptolemy I., who conceived the idea of uniting Greek and Egyptian religion in the common worship of Serapis. But there scarcely seems enough evidence for regarding Ptolemy as a religious reformer, and we shall do better if we follow the more cautious judgment expressed by Professor Mahaffy, who treats the king's patronage of an old Egyptian cult as a matter of local policy intended merely to bring together the Greek and Egyptian elements in the population of the newly founded Alexandria.

How is it that Mr Legge has attached such great and—in my own opinion—excessive weight to the influence of Egyptian religion upon Greek ideas? We have anticipated the answer to this question. He has been unduly influenced by certain scholars whose work does not inspire in others the confidence which Mr Legge extends to them. He leaves the realm of verified fact when with Monsieur Foucart he refers the Dionysiac worships of Athens to the influence of Osiris, or when he explains the cosmogony of Basilides by Egyptian and other pagan beliefs (ii. 93).

How is it that the application of the comparative method, not only in this case, but throughout the whole sphere of the study of religions, has brought along with it confusion leading to serious error? The explanation is simple: the comparative method can only furnish resemblances. It must be supplemented by special investigations if we seek to trace relations of cause and effect in any given case. Probably the greatest contribution to the history of religion which has been made with the help of the comparative method is to be found in our increased knowledge of folklore. The epoch-making collections of Mannhardt (who is not mentioned by our author) were brilliantly interpreted by Sir James Frazer, and their scope vastly extended. Mr Legge's omission to take account of this point of view finds a strange outcome (p. 43): folklore is credited with having furnished Sir James Frazer "with too *philosophical an idea*" for the sixth century B.C. And this leads me to emphasise another omission of Mr Legge. In spite of the repeated warnings of St Paul, of Irenæus, of Hippolytus, he declines to make allowance for the definite hostility which existed between certain schools of Greek philosophy and certain tendencies in the Church. The Roman stoics who combined their special tenets with the worship of Jupiter (whom they regarded as Zeus) furnished a living expression for the Roman religious spirit. Roman literature from Ennius to Julian bears witness to a reverence for Zeus scarcely less general than that felt by the Greeks themselves. To begin very early, it was in the name of Zeus that the Cretans and after them the Dorians spread their conquests. And when, at the time which falls under our author's survey, the poets and philosophers attributed to Zeus many of the attributes which Christian theology discerns in God, we must regard this not as the decline but as the culmination of the primitive view of Zeus. Signor Ferrabino in *Kalypso* has taught us to find the richest development of classical myth when it comes closest to human life, whether in the Greek drama with its religious implications or in the novel. And it is by a similar test that we must measure the value of those Egyptian and allied legends of which Mr Legge attempts to trace the history. Only so far as, with the help of thinkers and poets, the crude materials furnished by folklore are raised to a spiritual level, do we enter upon the history of religion in its highest, and therefore its truest meaning.

After all, the comparative method in its various developments can only bring us to an external and superficial knowledge by showing how far one thing is like another. If, however, we seek to trace a touch of religious genius however slight in the complex traditions of the past, it can only be brought to view by a sympathetic discernment of what is within. There is scarcely, for example, a more curious chapter in the history of scholarship than the failure of students of the *Pistis Sophia* to recognise the beauty of the *Odes of Solomon*, which lurked there waiting to be recognised. Mr Legge's readers find themselves occupied with the mythology of the Ophites, when all the time the *Pistis Sophia* is a manual of instruction for baptism, and is not only, therefore, a document of the first importance for the early history of the Church in Alexandria, but is also lit up by gleams of real beauty.

In view of the importance of the *Pistis Sophia* for our whole subject, a little further consideration will not be out of place. The clue to the meaning of the book appears at once in the date, the fifteenth day of the month Tybi, on which, we are told, Jesus on the Mount of Olives is enveloped in light so brilliant that his disciples were unable to see him. This was the day of the year on which, according to Basilides, a Christian leader in Alexandria, Jesus, was both baptised and born; four days later, indeed, than January 6th, the date observed in the early Church for the joint celebration of the birth and baptism. For not until the fourth century was the celebration of the birth separated by the institution of Christmas from the celebration of the baptism. The identification of the birth and the baptism found expression in the "Western" reading of the Gospel: "This day I have begotten thee" (Luke iii. 22), a reading which apparently was also found in the primitive gospel of Matthew (Matt. iii. 17). In order, therefore, to enter into the feelings with which the baptism was regarded in large areas of the early Church, we must imagine the festival of Christmas to be supplemented by another festival of the baptism scarcely less great, and observed with like solemnity. Having thus corrected our point of view, we may go on with our inquiry. The *Pistis Sophia* prescribes for the neophyte before his baptism twelve stages of penitence, each with its proper penitential psalm and, as a comment on each psalm, a hymn to be recited by the penitent.[1] These hymns culminate in actual quotations from the *Odes of Solomon*, which are more important for the reader of this strange work than all the mythological explanations with which Mr Legge supplies him. "The Light is a garland for my head . . . But I shall not perish, for the Light is with me, and I shall be also with the Light." Again: "Thy countenance was with me, keeping me in Thy grace . . . Thou hast set candles upon my right hand and upon my left, so that nothing about me is without light." We are carried back to the baptismal hymn of which St Paul has left a too brief quotation: "Sleeper awake, arise from the dead, and Christ shall shine upon thee."

The theory of the world which Basilides taught was in closer contact with Paul's theory than with the Ophite and other fancies which Mr Legge enumerates. Paul, in face with the evil of the world, referred it to the God of this age, a being variously described in the New Testament as "the prince of this world," or "Beelzebub," or "Satan." The Lord's Prayer itself bears witness to this fundamental conception of the primitive Church by speaking of God as the Father who is in Heaven, as though His

[1] The Bishop of Ossory has rightly pointed out that the *Odes of Solomon*, with which the *Pistis Sophia* shows acquaintance, were so used, ii. 157.

abode was not everywhere upon earth. Basilides, therefore, with a wildness of exegesis not greater than that which Paul sometimes displays, drew his theories not from pagan sources but from Scripture. Let us take an instructive example. He read the well-known saying in Proverbs thus: "The beginning of wisdom was the terror of God," the Ruler of this world being alarmed when there arose a being more noble than himself. The origin of wisdom, described in this pictorial manner, is the foundation of the strange genealogies which are ascribed to Basilides and Valentinus. Behind all these genealogies, however, was the Nameless, whom Basilides seems to have found in the prologue to the Fourth Gospel: "Apart from Him there was Nothing"—that is, the undetermined origin of all. This interpretation, strange as at first sight it may seem, arose from a genuine attempt to solve the mystery of the world.

We thus find the Fourth Gospel made the subject of commentary in Alexandria from the beginning of the second century by writers who certainly regarded themselves as within the Church. Hence I cannot agree with Mr Legge when he describes the followers of Basilides and Valentinus as rivals of the Church, to which in fact they belonged, and of which they expressed, in part, the thought. The mode of thought which we have been considering was ultimately merged into the general mind of the Church, and has left its mark upon the creeds. But while it lasted it was predominant to an extent which is only now becoming recognised, and the revisers of the Greek New Testament who produced in the fourth century the text which is so skilfully presented by Westcott and Hort, were compelled by the circumstances of the case to do violence to the older tradition which is represented not only by the "Western" manuscripts but also by uncanonical gospels such as that of Peter.

Mr Legge, however, has made a more striking omission than any to which reference has been made. He says nothing of the *Poemandres*, which, under Egyptian names, provides us in its thirteenth chapter with a commentary upon the *Pistis Sophia*. The title of the chapter—"Secret Teaching on the Mountain about Regeneration"—is illuminating enough after what has already been said. In the *Poemandres* a Christian teacher instructs the gods of Egypt, Hermes and Thoth. This symbolism is historically true and must be maintained against all writers who, like Mr Legge, derive the speculations of early Christian thinkers from an Egyptian original. I attempted to indicate the problem of the *Poemandres* in 1904.[1] It is unfortunate that Reitzenstein's work of the same date should have escaped Mr Legge's notice. For Reitzenstein, in his commentary on the *Poemandres*, attempted—with an equipment inferior indeed to that of Mr Legge—to reconstruct a religious community occupied with Egyptian gnosticism and, strange to say, using the *Poemandres* as its Bible.[2]

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On the Threshold of the Unseen. By Sir William F. Barrett, F.R.S. Kegan Paul, 1917.

Strange indeed are the workings of the human mind in regard to the supernatural! To believe that occurrences take place which are not in

[1] *Journal of Theological Studies*, 1904, 395 ff. [2] *Ibid.*, 1907, 635.

the natural and everyday order of things, but are incursions from an unseen world—a world of intelligence and purpose—has been for ages a master passion of mankind, and is so still. Tales of the supernatural have been fervently believed upon hearsay evidence removed from the event by many links of tradition and long periods of time. Every religion, except Buddhism, has been cradled in wonder; and even Buddhism has had to assume the halo of the supernatural before it could conquer the East. It might have been expected, then, that in modern times, when Science, which has destroyed and rebuilt a universe, had brought its methods to bear on the evidences of an unseen world, and had declared through many authoritative voices that they were genuine and conclusive, mankind would eagerly welcome the verdict and adjust itself to the facts revealed. But nothing of the kind has taken place. Crookes, Lodge, Lombroso, Richet, Wallace, the author of the work before us, and many other distinguished and well-trained observers have both collected and sifted evidence, and have told us of what they themselves have actually witnessed under conditions apparently incompatible with any kind of deception. The things to which they have borne witness are as well established as any fact in history, and far better than any of the miracles of religions for the faith in which men have lived and died. Yet, speaking broadly, it may be said that they have not appreciably affected the thought of mankind. If there is any reliance to be placed on human evidence, then Sir William Crookes and his friends and family repeatedly saw a human-seeming figure equipped with lungs and heart and all the usual organs created out of empty air by some mysterious power of an entranced medium and resolved into the invisible again. The story is told in his *Researches in Spiritualism.* Yet about this occurrence even Sir William Barrett says he must reserve his opinion,—apparently on the sole ground of its hopeless incredibility. He has himself, however, recorded out of his own observation things intrinsically as marvellous—for, after all, if one once gets beyond the boundary of natural law, one thing is as credible as another. The following narrative refers to sittings with two friends (neither of them a professional medium) undertaken by the author in Ireland:

"On one occasion, only Mr L., Miss L., and myself being present, loud raps, which quite startled me, were given on the table at which we sat, and when I asked the unseen visitor to rap the number of fingers I held open, my hand being held out of sight and the opened fingers unseen by anyone, the correct number was rapped out; this was done twice. Knocks came in answer to my request when we had all removed our hands and withdrew a short distance from the table.

"Whilst the hands and feet of all were clearly visible and no one touching the table, it sidled about in an uneasy manner. It was a four-legged table, some 4 feet square, and heavy. In obedience to my request, first the two legs nearest me and then the two hinder legs rose 8 or 10 inches completely off the ground, and thus remained for a few moments; not a person touched the table the whole time. I withdrew my chair further, and the table then moved towards me—Mr and Miss L. not touching the table at all; finally, the table came up to the armchair in which I sat and imprisoned me in my seat. When thus under my very nose the table rose repeatedly, and enabled me to make perfectly sure, by the evidence of touch, that it was quite off the ground, and that no human being had any part in this or the other movements."

At another sitting with a different circle:

"The table of its own accord now turned upside down, no one touching it, and I tried to lift it off the ground; but it could not be stirred, it appeared screwed down to the floor. At my request all the sitters' clasped hands had been kept raised above their heads. . . ."

Are we to "reserve our opinion" about that? The fact is that most of us do so, until we see for ourselves, and sometimes even then. Sir William Barrett, however, though he disclaims any personal power to evoke these manifestations of the occult, has both seen things for himself and has studied the subject with all the resources of a mind familiar both with physical science and with philosophic thought, and his case for the supernormality of the phenomena discussed is overwhelming.

These phenomena fall into three classes. First, we have odd occurrences such as noises and shiftings of objects which attend in some unexplained fashion on certain individuals—mediums, psychics, or whatever we choose to call them. An interesting case is that of the child called Florrie, who could produce raps on small objects held at a distance from her in the author's hand—the slight jar of each rap being distinctly felt by him. Such are also the well-attested occurrences of what is called the *Poltergeist* order, which are only slightly touched upon in this book. Next we have evidence of an intelligence directing these manifestations—an intelligence acting from some sphere outside the normal capacity of the medium, yet moving strictly within the medium's own range of ideas and expression, if not of knowledge. If the medium is a child it speaks as a child—if a religious but narrow-minded woman it utters the platitudes appropriate to that character. We appear in these cases to be witnessing a sort of reverberation from the unseen of the medium's personality. Finally, we have a certain number of cases where the responding intelligence appears to be in possession of information quite outside the normal range of the medium's mind or that of any person taking part in the sitting. A good example is that of a communication professing to be made by Sir Hugh Lane about the manner of his death to two Dublin friends who were at the time quite unaware that he had sailed on the *Lusitania*, or that the ship had been torpedoed. It is from cases of this kind that evidence of the survival of personal identity after death is supposed to be obtained. It is, however, precisely here that the evidence is weakest. It is a suspicious circumstance that the nearer we get to something really conclusive, the more obscure and scanty does the evidence become. Thus, in the elaborate records of messages from F. W. Myers with which members of the Society for Psychical Research are familiar, we find long and eloquent communications, full of literary and classical allusions, very good stuff and very like Myers, but a total failure on the part of the supposed Myers to give the contents of a sealed message left with friends before his death with the intention that it should be revealed afterwards as evidence of his identity. Never, I believe, has any medium succeeded with this test of the sealed message, though it has often been tried. In other cases, however, some striking results have certainly been obtained. One of these is related by Sir William Barrett. A young officer killed in the war purported to give to a relative instructions that his pearl tie-pin was to be given to his fiancée. No one knew the name of the lady, which was given, nor even the fact that he had been engaged, nor that he possessed a pearl pin, and the whole message was thought to be fictitious. But six months later it was discovered by the officer's will, sent over by the War Office, that the lady did really exist, that he had been secretly engaged to her, and a pearl tie-pin was found among his effects. The message, it may be mentioned, was recorded at the time and could not have been an *ex post facto* deliverance.

Thus responses do, as we have said, occasionally show information naccessible to the medium, but the word information must be strictly qualified—it is information, not thought, and it is information about ublunary things alone; for no one can take seriously the many reports which come through about the conditions of the future life—reports reflecting, as a rule, the cheap and vulgar religiosity of the medium. There is certainly a remarkable exception to this rule in the very striking and beautiful account of the dawning of the spiritual world on the earthly, quoted here and in another work by Sir William Barrett (pp. 195–6). Nor can we deny a certain originality to the revelation offered us by "Raymond" in Sir Oliver Lodge's book, that the next world is built up out of the bad smells of this. But on the whole we seem to get in this field of inquiry precisely what the medium has to give us and no more. Of anything like a new spiritual wisdom there is never a trace. Does this not suggest an answer to the problem why spiritualism has not proved more acceptable as a response to man's craving for commerce with the unseen? Is it not because this craving is at bottom concerned with far other things than lost property or sealed messages or even the well-being of those dear to us? Is it not really the longing to catch some ray of divine light, to learn some ethic based on a wider and profounder vision, to feel ourselves even for a moment in communion with a love and a wisdom loftier than those of earth? This is just what spiritualism has entirely failed to give. Sir William Barrett has said nothing truer, wiser, nor more fit to be laid to heart by all inquirers into this region than when he tells us in the preface to this book that "none will find in automatic writing, or other spiritualistic phenomena, the channel for the 'communion of saints,' which is independent of material agency and attained only in stillness and serenity of soul." For this we must go to the old sources and travel the old roads—there are no short-cuts through the mediums' consulting rooms.

It does, nevertheless, seem to be clearly established, by the investigations the author and other eminent men who have concerned themselves with e question, that some power exists which is capable of displaying itself n a manner contrary to all the known laws of Nature, and behind which there is an intelligence which is not the common and normal intelligence of man as he exists in the body upon earth. It seems impossible for any reasonable man to dispute the case for further study, philosophic and scientific, of the evidence so far collected, and admirably presented in the volume here reviewed.

T. W. Rolleston.

London.

Community: a Sociological Study: being an attempt to set out the Nature and Fundamental Laws of Social Life. By R. M. Maciver.—Macmillan, 1917.

As the sub-title indicates, this book is an attempt to state the gener- laws derived from the many subsidiary studies of social life in re- politics, economics, psychology, and the rest. The attempt is on successful, and where it seems to fail the deficiency is due to th material which has been accumulated in special studies by authors seldom taken any large view of social life in its entirety. Dr M

done valuable service not only in providing us with a summary analysis of acquired results, but also in reminding the specialist of the immense value of a wide outlook. He means by the word Community "any area of common life, village or town or district of country" within which the common life has "some characteristic of its own such that the frontiers of the area have some meaning." The other terms, Association (as organised society) or State, which is only one form of community, are carefully defined: and definition, though seemingly an abstract operation, is really of the first importance in so indefinite a subject as the study of society. For we need to be clear about the distinctions between the different groupings within social life. The State is still the most important form of social life, but Dr Maciver rejects the neo-Hegelian subordination of all social life to the State. He uses the word "State" in the definite sense in which it appears in bluebooks and common speech, and not in the vaguer phraseology of philosophy. Citizenship, he says, cannot and should not absorb all social interests. After an excellent analysis of the main structure of social life, communal development is discussed. Here ethical criteria are of importance, and the ideas of reaction or decadence are given precision. The false idea of nations as "dying" is admirably refuted; and the conception of a law of communal mortality is rejected. Within the general laws of development are economic or quasi-economic laws such as that of the specialisation of interests. And there is also a law of contact between community and its environment. All these are dealt with in a manner which is admirably clear and persuasive; and appendices follow which give a criticism of the neo-Hegelian identification of society and State, of the institution of war, and of the idea of heredity. The book therefore marks a stage in the development of thought on social life. For we have passed beyond the early generalisations of Comte and the "middle period" of statistics and the recording of customs, into the third stage of analysis and critical estimates.

The author disarms criticism by acknowledging that the subject is too vast for any adequate survey to be made in the present state of our knowledge. The subject is new in the sense that, although in fact the *Republic* of Plato deals with it, the immense quantity of detailed knowledge we now possess makes it necessary to begin again. We have masses of information as to primitive peoples, historical developments, and modern administration or economic structure. And one misses in Dr Maciver's book the reference to detail. It would perhaps have been a more impressive book if the reader could feel while he turned its pages that he was never far from the common life of every day. For there are various functions, for example, which the State now performs which are not mentioned; and the conflict of allegiance to different forms of community is not adequately expressed. But we cannot fairly regard these as deficiencies in a summary. The proportion is well preserved and the general ideas are clear; there is an obvious acquaintance with the way in which life is now lived, and a no less obvious impatience with the old orthodoxies of social philosophy as expounded by commentators on Greek literature. On the whole, therefore, Maciver's book is completely successful, and we can only wish that he continue to do good service in analysing still further the tendencies of political and economic life.

C. Delisle Burns.

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THE

HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE REIGN OF NONSENSE IN THE WORLD, IN THE STATE, AND IN HUMAN LIFE.

PRINCE EUGÈNE TROUBETZKOY,
Professor of the Philosophy of Law in the University of Moscow.

I.

[The reader is asked to note and remember that what follows is the *first part* o f Prince Troubetzkoy's argument. The arrived from Moscow too late to be translated and uded entire in the present issue, most of which had gone ress.

In the second part, to appear in the next issue of the Hibbert Journal, Prince Troubetzkoy's philosophy restores the meaning of life, which a critical analysis has so completely undermined in the part here given. In order that the reader may not be left with a purely negative result, but have a clue to the positive construction which is to follow, it has been deemed advisable to print the first passage of the second part at the end of the present article.

Writing of the positive sequel, to be given in the April number, Prince Troubetzkoy makes the following remarks in a letter to the editor: "You will find in it an exposition of the fundamental principles of my whole conception, philosophic and religious, of the meaning of life, which conception is an apology for Christianity against the doubts of an irreligious consciousness. . . . At the moment it is *irreligion* which seems to triumph in Russia. But I should be sorry if the English reader were to rest under the gloomy impression of so deceitful an appearance. The momentary triumph of mili-

tant atheism in our political and social life is only one of those temptations or trials which seem to deepen and reinforce the religious spirit. I doubt not that the future of my country belongs to religion."—EDITOR.]

PAIN and suffering, whence come the *vanity* of life, are the true point of departure for every inquiry into the *meaning* of life. The meaning we seek in life is not revealed in the immediate facts of our daily experience, all of which seem a witness to the contrary—to nonsense, to no meaning. And every impartial solution of our problem must reckon with this testimony. We must begin by examining these facts of experience, which seem to render futile every attempt to find in life any reasonable significance whatsoever.

Since men began to reflect upon life they have always represented the life which has no meaning as a vicious circle. 'Tis an effort which never reaches its end, returning to the point of departure and going round incessantly. Both in pagan and Christian thought the idea of life as nonsense finds frequent and eloquent expression in the imagery of hell. Ixion the king, turning his fiery wheel through all eternity, the sieve of the Danaïds, the torment of Tantalus, the punishment of Sisyphus, the endless repetition of the same task—this, with the Greeks, was the image of an absolutely meaningless life. In Christian thought analogous images abound. Swedenborg, for instance, had a vision of the torments of Calvin condemned to write his work on predestination through the æons of eternity. No sooner has he written a page than it falls over a precipice, and Calvin has to begin again. The whole life of hell is nothing but eternal repetition, an effort without a purpose and without an end. In other words, it is the life of vanishing ghosts, destruction itself being a mere illusion, moving ever in a vicious circle. It is the worm that dieth not and the fire that is not quenched — two forces which destroy for ever, but without ever completing the process of destruction. A serpent biting its tail is the accurate symbol of this meaningless rotation.

To say that this endless process of going round is nothing but a product of the imagination would be untrue. Hell is easily found, lightly hidden under the thin surface of the life that goes on under our eyes. A penetrating eye may see it beneath the phenomena of the daily round. That is why we find at the base of all pessimism, religious and philosophic, this same intuition of a vicious circle, which summarises for the pessimist the whole evolution of the world. Alike

among the pessimistic religions of India, the teachings of Heraclitus and Plato concerning the endlessly repeated movement of a false reality, the ideas of Schopenhauer or Nietzsche concerning the eternal cycles (*der ewige Wiederkehr*), we encounter the same theme over and over again: the entire secular process is nothing but infinite rotation, everlasting repetition, the same thing produced and reproduced—an effort which is powerless to create anything new under the sun. In *The Brothers Karamasoff* of Dostoïevsky there is an admirable expression of this thought. The devil is speaking. "You are always thinking of the earth as it exists to-day," says the devil to Jean Karamasoff. "Well, the earth exactly as it now is has been repeated millions of times in the past; each time it perished, disintegrated, turned into dust and decomposed: after that a fresh nebula was formed, then a comet, a new solar system, a new earth. The whole of this evolution has been repeated times without end, and always precisely in the same manner down to the minutest details. One is bored to death to think of it."

In this world-picture, as Dostoïevsky conceives it, it is no longer hell but the whole universe which is represented as a Sisyphean labour doomed never to end.

Even when we are thinking only of dead matter this endless return of things upon themselves produces an impression of ennui. Age after age the tides of the Abyss flow back and forth; evolution revolves in its senseless cycles; the stars form and dissolve and form again; and last of all there is the heavy earth spinning like a top on its axis—could aught be more wearisome? But when we detach our thought from the *material* aspect and raise our eyes to the *living* world, it is no longer mere boredom that we experience—it is a far more dolorous feeling; for now we are obsessed with the poignant thought of a total failure—a measureless effort which never succeeds and goes on repeating itself in vain. Nor is it merely the absence of purpose we see. We see a purpose, but a purpose that comes to nought. We thought life had a meaning; and, lo! it has none—the idea of meaning is itself an illusion. In the life of all animated beings everything *tends* to some kind of goal; all *seems* conformed to an end. Well, when we see that the tendency comes to nothing, and that life too, life in its entirety, always repeats the same vicious circle, spinning on its axis like any stupid top—then it is that we are overcome with a loathing for life. The repetition in the higher scale of existence of the senseless process that prevails in the lower—there is *suffering* in the thought of it.

In the height of summer have we not all seen forests and gardens in which every tree was stripped bare of its foliage? It is the deadly work of caterpillars. In the spring they issue from their eggs, which were laid in autumn, creep along the branches and devour the leaves. Having done their work of destruction, they turn into cocoons, from which in course of time white butterflies come forth. These creatures, dancing in the air, have one moment of joy—a moment of love. Immediately afterwards they die in the pain of bringing forth their progeny, using their dead bodies, like clothes, to cover their eggs, which they deposit in the earth. Next spring we see the caterpillars again, and they repeat their programme of climbing, devouring, taking wings, loving, dying. Cocoons, butterflies, caterpillars; cocoons, butterflies, caterpillars; and so on for ever and ever, world without end. Such in briefest shorthand is the form in which, one way or another, all the life upon this earth goes round and round. In Russia we have a prayer for the dead which provides the exact formula of this incessant passage of life unto death: "Thou camest from the dust, and thither thou shalt return." It is death, the inexorable doom of life, that confines it within the vicious circle, that compels us to undergo this eternal revolution, fast bound in an existence where coming to be and ceasing to be follow on each other's heels for ever and a day. Every life struggles to rise above the earth like the butterfly, only to fall back, without hope of respite, and be blended with the dust. The wings that bear it upwards are a cheat of the imagination, doomed to disappear as swiftly as they came.

This perpetual interchange of dying generations, this idiotic succession of births and deaths—is it *life* in the true sense of the word? What brings the utter vanity of it into plainest relief is the appearance it bears of being designed for an end. *For the end to which all living beings are conformed is the very end they never attain—the conservation of their life.* No life can be conserved; for all that live inevitably die. In the first place, each individual dies; while, as to the life of the species which survives it, what is this but the accumulation of the individual deaths? That is not life; it is a cheat which apes the airs of life. Add to this that even the cheat can only sustain itself by perpetual struggle for existence. The essential condition for the conservation of any life is the destruction of many other lives. That the caterpillars may live, the garden must die. The vicious circle of each single life is only kept going at the cost of the neighbouring circle, for all are mutually exclusive. What is most vicious in this "bad

infinite" is precisely the inexorable necessity which all living beings are under of devouring one another, without any hope that hunger will ever be satisfied. 'Tis the same sun which gives heat and light to all creatures; in one way or another every form of life reproduces the solar cycle, keeps pace with the periodic return of death in winter and rebirth in spring. But, warmed by the heat of its rays, they revive only in order that their bloody strife may be renewed, each making war with the rest to win "the best place in the sun"; and in doing so they keep up the "bad infinite," continually propagating violence and death.

As we watch the animal kingdom rising step by step to higher orders of being, this impression of the vanity of existence, which affronts our intelligence, becomes more and more painful to contemplate. When at the last step of the ladder we come to man, the pain of watching an animal world in perpetual torment deepens to the point of becoming intolerable; for it blends with the sense an outraged dignity. Then it is that we feel ourselves on the brink of despair, for we are watching the ruin of the noblest thing in the world. Wearied by the spectacle of nonsensical futility which animal life presents, the eye seeks a point of rest; and it is to man, crown of the creation, that we fondly look for the full enjoyment and the realisation of our dream. Behold him, then, deliberately reproducing in his own existence all the atrocious villainies of every lower order of life—repeating the vegetation of the plant and all that is most repulsive in the world of brutes; crawling on the earth and abasing himself in its dust; outdoing the beasts of prey in cruelty; and finally becoming the incarnate denial of all that is sacred in the world. Then, to end all, he dies!

What we now experience is no longer the mere absence of rational meaning, no longer the disappointment of failing to reach the goal; it is something far more excruciating. We see our whole life laid bare to derision; we see the meaning of life, for which we were in search, transformed into an object of mockery. Not a meaning but a *caricature of all meaning* is what confronts us, both in the life of the individual man and in the life of the race. This it is which fills the soul with horror.

Again and again as we look round on human life we are confronted with the nonsense of the universal spinning-top. There is a profound remark in Dostoïevsky's *Souvenirs d'une maison morte.* The author asserts that the interminable and senseless repetition of a never-varying task is a cruel mockery

of human worth. For example, nothing would inflict a deeper hurt on a *man* than to make him carry, without respite and for no purpose, a heap of sand from one place to another. Now, what makes human life so atrociously cruel is that its general features recall this kind of occupation in all its futility and harmfulness. What is the life of a factory hand? It is devoted to the endless repetition of a single movement which follows and copies the uniform movement of steam-driven machinery. What fills the life of a minor employé in the Post Office? It is the interminable reproduction of the same gesture—signing the receipts for registered letters. Add to these examples that of a lift-attendant in a big hotel: his life consists in going up and down perpetually between one floor and another. Place these examples together and you will have the impression of an unutterable sadness; you will see that the general existence of man has a humiliating likeness to the rotation of a squirrel in a wheel-cage. Some sort of circular movement there is which every human life reproduces in periodic returns. The life of the farmer, who sows and reaps in order that he may go on sowing and reaping, follows in the wake of the solar cycle. In the life of the factory hand the "vicious circle" is determined by the revolutions of a wheel. The life of a State employé revolves in like manner with the enormous administrative mechanism in which it plays the part of a cog. Helpless in the general top-spinning, man himself spins along with it, turning and turning he knows not why or wherefore. The difference between the man and the squirrel is merely this—man's *intelligence*, which reveals his humiliation to himself, and his *heart*, which suffers the agony of it.

Watch attentively the life of the human being who is before you. Mark the joy of the girl in the Post Office when you address her by her name; or of the lift-boy when you speak of his family or of his village. See the avidity with which he devours his penny-dreadful, or any line of print he can lay his hands on, if he has a moment for reading between the endless up-and-down of his machine. It is enough to reveal the sadness of life in all its depth! These two beings we are speaking of would be *human individuals*, would have a personal life of their own. Instead of that they are numbers, units in a mass. The one has become a machine that writes; the other, the companion of a machine that goes up and down. His human heart is in revolt against his slavery; he seeks to break his fetters by reading his penny-dreadful. And this reveals to him another life which perhaps in its turn is no less illusory and meaningless than his own.

I shall be told that all these wearisome occupations, which slay personality and put the mark of vanity on human life, have nothing to do with the essential content of existence. This, surely, it will be said, is not life in the true sense of the term, but merely the effort men make to procure the means of living. Well, to that I have an answer. In the first place, the preoccupation of men with the means of living absorbs their energies to such a degree that the majority of them have no time to think of what they are living for. And then, I would ask, of what nature is the "end" which compels us to undergo this endless search for the means of attaining it? 'Tis the bare necessity of eating and drinking, of winning our daily bread and that of our children—that and always that! We must keep up this hollow life which is for ever dying; we must battle with death, and that without the least hope of winning a definite victory, since, sooner or later, death will undo whatever we have done! Ever the same vicious circle—the biological law of waste and repair! This it is that moves the wheels of human life. This is the "end" for which the mighty engine goes spinning round. And in the midst thereof is Man, the discrowned monarch of the world; Man himself with his aspirations, dreams and desires.

It is the *slavery* of our spirit that here affronts us; it is the *dependence* of our will, thought, and feeling, held in bondage by the inexorable necessity of a biological law. When life is thus made intolerable to us we seek distractions; for it is our shame and humiliation that we must needs *forget*. And for that end the enchantments of poetry, of painting and music, are at our disposal, and all the wisdom of philosophy to boot. But do we find in these things the magic word we need—the liberating word that will break the fetters of the soul?

Alas! alas! this beauty and wisdom are, nearly always, as powerless to win us liberty of spirit as is the penny-dreadful of the lift-boy. This art which turns the vanity of life to poetry, or which lacks the force to rise above it, is but a new reproduction of life's everlasting illusion. It is, once more, the beauty of the wings which for a few moments turn the loathsome grub into a charming butterfly. It is the same with that kind of philosophy, the most widely current in every age, for which the vanity of life is an idol. Here also what we find is not the elevation of the spirit above the realm of its bondage, but a long series of monuments to our servitude.

Any day we may observe some specimen, or rather some caricature, of the fallen spirit of man.

Who of us has not experienced a feeling of revolt, nay, of

deep suffering, on hearing an orchestra playing in a restaurant? This music, which comes to us impregnated with the odour of roast meat—is it not a manifestation of platitude and banality pushed to their last extremes? The musicians with their white cravats, performing the melodies of the café-chantant—do they not inspire us with more pity than the clowns of the circus? It is not difficult to grasp the cause. The music, turned into a concomitant of digestion, is one of the liveliest expressions we could have of the slavery of our souls. To eat and to drink—that is the essential thing in this world. The heavenly music is but a piquant sauce which gives a relish to the process of assimilating our food. Such is the sad moral of the scene. If biological law is everything in life, if there is nothing that can rise above its level—then to that level must music and art at last come down. No more fitting place, then, than a restaurant could be found wherein music and art may fulfil their mission! And is there not a philosophy whose work in like manner is to play a subdued accompaniment to human appetite? Its mission is absolutely the same as that of the Roumanian Band performing airs while we are eating our lunch.

Add if you will that this banquet of flesh-eating revellers expresses the triumph of man in the struggle for existence. To render it possible, blood must have flowed in streams; for in the vicious circle of the biological world no life can be conserved save at the cost of other lives; the victory of the one betokens the death of the other. "Woe to the vanquished!" is the true biological principle. But in the world-wide war of "all against all" it is not only the lower orders of life that fall victims to the higher: it involves the destruction of innumerable human lives as well. In the life-structure of nations, as in that of the beasts of prey, everything is adapted to meet the needs of the same bloody strife, so that the law of combat for life holds sway over the human race just as it does over the lower ranks of the animal world. This subordination of our *collective life* to the law of the brute nature, this conversion of naked biologism into the principle of international relations, is, of all the manifestations in which the slavery of the human spirit betrays itself, by far the most arresting.

Here we behold a deeply tragic collision between the thirst that is in man, and is essential to his nature, for a meaning in life, and the power of nonsense which reigns in the universe. This thirst is closely bound up with the faith that man is the appointed instrument of the meaning

sought: whence arises our belief in his absolute worth. His worth is an illusion if human life is incapable of becoming the organ of a universal meaning.

And is not this incapacity our precise condition? Does not the collective life of mankind—the life of the State—seem incompatible with the absolute worth of the individual? Does it not render the notion chimerical? Consider. On one side we hear the potent call to love our neighbour; on the other the call to a pitiless conflict—for are not the peoples, one and all, armed to the teeth to exterminate each other? We see man struggling to break the vicious circle of battle for life, the sublime effort of his love taking wings that it may rise from the dust of the earth; and immediately we are met by a new illustration of the powerlessness of the effort. It is the State which now seizes him in its grasp; it is the State which, in periodic return, flings him back to the principle from which he strove to escape, and cries in his ears, "All that thou hast and art *is for war*!"

The whole life of man is passed in the State; there is no spot on earth where one can escape from its power. To provide for its own defence the State has need of *all* the forces of man; hence its claim to commandeer the *whole man*—all his aspirations, all his thoughts. It makes the individual its tool, thereby confirming by its authority the biological law which masters his spirit.

Material goods, territories, frontiers, and other "advantages"—these are ever the issues at stake in the strife of nations. Hence it is the way of the State to erect these things into absolute values; its heart is set on economic interests, and to them accordingly it subordinates the life of the spirit. Deeds of sublime heroism, disinterested love of country, the sacrifice of human lives by millions and millions—all these to the State are *means*. When one State exacts these sacrifices in order that it may enrich itself by damage done to another, then it is that the want of all proportion between what the State gives us in material reward, and what it makes us pay in spiritual loss, becomes as plain as the day. For what is here sacrificed to material gain—the soul of man—far exceeds in value all revenues, frontiers, and realms; it is of all things in the world the most precious. Yet even so we have not touched the worst feature in the life of the State. The greatest danger of all is the tendency of the State to corrupt and deprave the spirit of the individuals composing it.

It is not only our *virtues* that are in bondage to the State: it has need of human *vice* as well. It cannot dispense with spies; it buys man's conscience and turns it to profit. To penetrate the diplomatic secrets of its neighbours it avails itself of the wiles of prostitutes and of every species of blackguard. Moreover, its own subjects must be made into perfect instruments of war, without pity for the men of another race, unscrupulous and ready to sacrifice all morality to "the needs of the State." The State demands that *itself* shall be the final criterion of human conduct, and for this reason it will recognise no value to be higher than its own, not even that of the human soul, not even the intrinsic worth of man.

It is not difficult to picture to oneself what the consequences would be if the absolutism of the State were to win a definite triumph. We should see the State transformed into a terrestrial divinity; and that would be the final victory of the powers of nonsense. And then the vicious circle in which human life revolves would complete its round in a last achievement—*the total ruin of Man.*

Remember that, as things now are, man with all his culture is but a cog on the wheel of an enormous mechanism, which has *war* for its final and absolute end. Is not that tantamount to saying that *man exists no longer*, that the human being has parted with the essential value which marks him off from the brute, and that in consequence the very word "humanity" has lost all meaning whatsoever? This *value* which he has lost is man's distinctive possession. It is nothing less than the very revelation of the meaning of life which the world expects from him, from his lofty heart and his clear mind. What, then, becomes of their revelation? Do we not see it vanish like a ghost? The appearance of man on this earth, we may now say, has made no difference whatever to the natural order. In spite of him the world remains what it has ever been—a chaos of unbridled forces which battle for life, and in so doing spread death abroad. Instead of putting a term to this welter of blood and strife, he has erected it into the law of his existence and perfected the means by which it may be carried on, and made an offering to it of all the powers of his spirit. Behold, then, the final end of all human progress, the ultimate content of all human culture. It is WAR!

There is no question here of a remote danger which threatens us in the future. It is in our own days that the nonsense of life thus displays itself naked and unashamed, in all the depth of its absurdity, so that our "culture" seems no more

than the meretricious ornament or the docile instrument of a life that is bloodthirsty and wicked through and through.

At the end of the story one knows not whether the world, which maintains such a life, is to be called human or bestial. As for man himself, the question, "To be or not to be?" faces him squarely; for the very idea of "man" is inseparable from the idea of a supra-biological principle, of which he is the appointed representative before the universe. What makes man man, what gives distinctive meaning to the word "human," is precisely his power to rise above the law of blood and strife—at least among his own kind.

Well, then, do we not see our fair dream of peace—even in the narrow sense of the word—vanishing like any other illusion? Does peace exist even in normal times? Is the thing we call peace more than a mere armistice, or—worse than that—*war in disguise*; a state of things in which everything is subordinated to war, as the distant end which the whole structure of society has in view? Formerly we used to talk of "industry" as the instrument of *pacific* progress. But now this dream also is shattered. We see that industry plays a double rôle. *It is both the instrument and the incentive of war.*

Whatever Herbert Spencer may say to the contrary, *industry is warlike.* From industry, and from industry alone, comes the demand for new outlets, new markets, new means of communication, and their inevitable sequel—new acquisitions of territory. Each step in the progress of industry creates fresh instruments of war, and, in so doing, offers new temptations to war-makers. Is not the State to profit by its technical superiority over a neighbour whose industry is less developed?

On the one hand—war for the sake of industry: on the other—industry for the sake of war. Such is the contradiction which the life of nations presents. In this there is nothing more than a slightly complicated version of the vicious biological circle.

Perpetual war is the condition of all living beings. All fight to live and live to fight. In everything that lives the means is being changed incessantly into the end and the end into the means. This universal spectacle of an ever-vanishing end is what makes men believe in the nothingness of *all* ends and, in the sequel, in the absence from life of any reasonable meaning whatsoever. When we consider human life in this way, as an interminable series of interchanging means and ends, the spectacle fills us with despair and becomes appalling. If *man* is such as this, his spirit utterly powerless to raise him

above the emptiness and horror of the animal kingdom—what then must the *universe* be? To what end is cosmic evolution moving? All this life which rises step by step from the beast to man—that too is impotent effort, that too is the road to nowhere.

It follows that there is no progress, no movement of ascent in the world. There is only the swirling eddy; and the face of man is the *mask* of a beast. From the moment that war is seen to be the end which every social structure has to serve, there is no aspect of life that can claim to be neutral to it. The life of the spirit, no less than the life of the body, has to be commandeered. Creative thought, the efforts of the will, exploits and virtues—all are but arms to be mobilised for offence and defence. Their destination is—to give force to the peoples when the hour shall strike for slaughtering one another. When all is said and done, the highest developments of the human spirit are no more than the perfect fruit of the biological process whose inevitable end is—death.

At this last point we observe a fresh transformation of the underlying bestiality. It passes on to another plane of existence *and becomes the principle of the spiritual life itself.* For now it is no longer a question of the animal life becoming spiritual; it is the spiritual life which stamps itself with the mark of the beast. In this new transformation there is something which inspires dismay. We feel in it the very blackness of the pit.

It is no vain fancy which, in every religion, has peopled hell with beings of mixed nature—half human, half beast. These strange human shapes with their bird's feet, their horns and their tails, have expressed, in many ages, the same idea—that man is incapable of rising above the level of the beast. The realm of the spirit bears the imprint of the bestial nature. Thus, after all, the beast is the essence of the man, which he can never put off. Thus, after all, the whole universe is a kingdom of darkness. There, driven hither and thither by tempestuous wind, these monstrous beings flock and fly—parodies, half man, half beast, caricatures of humanity, mocking its nature and declaring it to be a lie. If human beings are no more than devils, who make a hell of life, then "man" is but an empty word and a make-believe.

Biologism, pushed to its last issue, turns naturally and almost imperceptibly into Satanism. When the evil which reigns in nature has the effrontery to spiritualise itself, when the law of the struggle for existence ceases to be a simple fact and is raised into the rule and principle of all conduct, the

resemblance between human life and hell may be read at a glance. Behold these great States armed from head to foot, bristling with fury in their mutual antagonism, and periodically shedding each other's blood in streams! The monsters of the slime have risen from their antediluvian graves! These *Leviathans,* these demoniac shapes, which hurl themselves upon each other—what language do they speak but that of hell? "Man" is a vanishing ghost. The being who really lives is the ichthyosaurus, the ourang-outang, made perfect in its kind by evolution; and life is their infernal dance.

For man a direct return to the beast nature is hardly possible. Let him resemble the beast as he may, he yet keeps a distinctive mark which separates him from it. *This is his liberty.* If he falls back to the brute level, his fall is never a necessity or inevitable consequence of his nature. It will be a *free* reproduction of the beast, an idolatry, which turns the lower life into a principle and a rule of conduct. His fall, therefore, is an act contrary to human nature; and that is why it is so frightful.

Nor is it only the horrors of war which discover the beast in man. Every manifestation of the slavery of his spirit, every experience of his dependence on the lower nature, produces just the same effect. On certain occasions we may observe the spirit that is in a man displayed all at once in his countenance; and then his fall seems to us merely an instance of degeneration. On many human faces this is quite clearly reflected. We see the expression of a sheep, or of a pig which is being fattened. But there is something worse than that.

Have we never seen on a human countenance the plain marks of a *wolf* in disguise?

And, again, you may see in man the evil eye of a bird of prey. Or it is the voluptuous air of the satyr that holds you fascinated: the loathsome smile of the creature, and the sickly glaze of his little eyes, make you suspect that he has a tail curled up under his coat. Then it is that loathing and horror possess you: for you see clearly that the circle of biology has become a circle of hell. Such is the impression produced on us by the unnatural vices of men; for example, by the monstrous cruelty which finds a voluptuous pleasure in the infliction of torture, or in dealing wounds to a man's self-respect. There are other vices which fill us with a kind of mystic fear. There are vices of a religious kind—especially those which are parodies of divine worship and the elevation of the soul. When we hear mention of voluptuous orgies in certain religious sects, or offences against nature

committed by clergymen, it seems as though the vision of hell had materialised. For what we now see is not pure absurdity. It is the meaning of the world turned upside down, caricatured and mocked. When the spirit of man plunges into this abyss, the vicious circle of the meaningless life is made perfect. The fiery wheel of Ixion is no longer an image of fancy. It is present in the life we are now living.

TROUBETZKOY.

Moscow.

The Opening Passage of the Second Article.

When this analysis is pushed to its limit we discover a paradox in the very fact that we have this intuition of the unmeaningness of life. This intuition is itself a witness to the contrary. For it proves to us that there is something outside and beyond this nonsense. There is an element which has no part nor lot in the meaningless life and is not carried along in its stream. *This is our consciousness.*

The world lacks meaning. Yes, but I *know* it is so. I *conceive* the vanity of existence; which means that consciousness itself does not partake of the vanity, but *condemns it*, and is beyond it. I see the torrent of senseless life passing before me; but this "I" who so judge it, this consciousness which views it and knows it for what it is, is a reality opposed to it, and absolutely different in nature. The being who is conscious of vanity discovers himself in the very fact of his being so conscious. He is outside the vicious circle.

Were my thought itself carried along as part of the torrent of meaningless life, then it would never separate itself from the stream nor be conscious of the kind of fact before it: such a consciousness would be impossible without a point of support outside the vanity of the world.

THE SOUL AS IT IS, AND HOW TO DEAL WITH IT.

PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY.

I.

In Tolstoy's novel, *The Cossacks*, there is a scene where a man swimming is shot dead and drifts to the shore, while his slayer swims over the flooded river to get to him and crouches down exhausted at his side. There the two lie, looking almost the same. But one is full of a turmoil of desires and aspirations, mingled feelings of pride and misery; and the other is dead. And the only sign of difference is a light steam rising from the body of the living man.

So small a sign, and yet all the difference that can be!

A distinguished anthropologist, Dr Elliot Smith, has suggested to us the kind of speculation that would go on in the mind of a primitive man if he found a dead body preserved, as it might be, for instance, in the dry Egyptian sand —the phenomenon that led up to the practice of embalmment. What is wrong with that body in the sand? What is it that it lacks? It does not breathe. There is no breath in it; that is the first thing that strikes our Egyptian; so he gives it breath as best he can, burning incense under its nostrils, so that the breath may enter in, warm like the breath of the living, and fragrant to correct the smell of the corpse. Again, it is all dry, there is no blood in it: and our Egyptian knows that the blood is the life, because he has seen wounded men die as their blood ebbed away. So he pours libations of blood into the grave, that the dead may get their life agair Some of us will remember the weird passage in *Odyssey*. where Odysseus sees the ghosts of the departed, like p wind made visible, as it were; ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον, "a breath . image," and no more; with no life nor power of though. .. they have drunk the blood that he has poured out for them.

If you start thus from the dead body, it seems as if the life or soul lay in some breath or spirit that has departed. Most of our words for the soul show that origin. The word "soul" itself is of doubtful derivation; but "ghost" means "breath," "spirit" means breath. In Latin *spiritus* and *animus* and *anima* are simply breath or wind; in Greek ψυχή is wind, and πνεῦμα breath, and θυμός smoke or vapour. All the words are metaphors; naturally and inevitably so. For whenever mankind notices a new fact and wants to find a name for it, he must needs search about for something like it among the facts he already knows and has names for. The new fact does not come with a name ready written upon it.

The word "life," oddly enough, means "body." I think that comes from another line of thought, in which mankind, when trying to express the thing we call soul or life, started not from the dead body but from a dream-image or phantom. A dream-image, a shape seen in hallucination, a reflection in water or a looking-glass: what is wrong with them, and how are they lacking in the life of the living? Why, they are like those ghosts in Homer. There is "a breath and an image," but no heart or blood or solidity. They are not real. If they could drink of blood and grow solid, if they could get themselves a body, that would be life.

Another mode of thought which started from the dream-image conceived that that image itself was the soul or life; that it moved out of the body in sleep, and sometimes in waking time; moved out and drifted far away at its will and pleasure, with always the possible danger of losing its way and not being able to return to the body. That mode of thought explains the curious pictures in ancient times of the soul as a little human being, sometimes with wings and sometimes without, who lives inside the ordinary body and keeps it alive. There is a common phrase in Homer describing death: "the life left the bones." The word for life there is *thumos*, the word that means smoke or vapour; but the old vase-paintings which depict that kind of death show not a smoke but a beautiful little winged human figure springing out from the body as it falls, and rising heavenward.

II.

hat does all this amount to? What conclusion can aw from these stumbling efforts of instinctive man to scribe or name or depict this thing within us, which no man has ever seen or heard or touched, and yet which makes the

greatest of all differences, the difference between the living and the dead?

I think we can conclude just thus much, that there is something really there, and that man's powers of thought and language, trained as they are on the experience of the material world, have been unable to define or comprehend it. Our modern phraseology is practically all derived from the Greeks, and the Greeks went on using metaphors to the end. If the indescribable thing was not a breath or a wind, then it was a spark of fire; but not ordinary fire, which destroys and perishes; rather the celestial fire of which the stars are made, the stars which neither consume nor are consumed. Or is it a fragment, as it were, of God Himself prisoned in our earthly material, imperfect because fragmentary, yet in some way akin to the Most High? No need to trouble with further attempts at such description; the main result that remains from these broken speculations, on which the world has been living ever since, is the profound conviction of Greek philosophy that man, in some unexplained way, consists of two parts, of which one is living and one dead. "What art thou?" said the Emperor Marcus Aurelius to himself. "*A little soul carrying a corpse.*"

Plato, the earliest author who discusses and supports with argument the great doctrine that the soul is immortal—that the soul is life, and therefore cannot die—is fond of metaphors about the soul. He is unconsciously founding a new science, that "science of the soul" which we call psychology. His first division of the soul is a very fruitful and interesting one. How is it that the soul shows itself in action? In other words, how is it that a man shows he is really alive? There are three ways, says Plato, desire, and anger and reason; or—since it is hard to get words simple and large enough to express the Greek, by lusting, fighting and thinking. There are things it craves for, and things it hates and rejects; but above the craving and rejecting there is a power of judging, of distinguishing between good and evil and shaping its own course. This power, which he calls reason and we moderns mostly call "will," is the very soul itself. The lusting and fighting, though they may serve the soul, and are forms of life, are mere functions of the live body. A man's soul, he says in another fine passage, is like a charioteer upon a chariot with two horses. One of the horses is sluggish, lazy, tending always downward; the other fierce, but of generous nature and full of courage; and the man who drives them has to master the two of them, keep them abreast, and above all

choose for himself the path he means them to take. The charioteer is the real soul.

"*A little soul carrying a corpse*": what is there wrong about that description, or rather, what would be wrong with it if it were ever meant to be literally and exactly true? It is that it separates the body and soul too sharply. That is the mistake in all these primitive conceptions with which we have been dealing, and consequently in a great deal of our own current language, which of course is descended, as all language is, from the philosophy of earlier times. If you have a lump of hot iron, the thought of primitive man will probably regard it as made up of two separate things, heat and a lump of iron. Just as we have certain pictures by savages—and I believe also by children—in which an angry man is shown by drawing first a man, and second his anger, seated inside him or sticking out of his head. Just as in primitive poetry, a man constantly holds conversations with his own heart or his own thought, as if it was a separate thing. It was another Greek philosopher, Aristotle, who cleared that matter up. You meet angry men, not first anger and then men; you meet live persons, not first a life or soul and then a body which it is carrying about. But with that passing caution against possible misunderstanding we shall find it simpler to use the ordinary language, and speak as if the body and the breath or soul inside it were entirely different things.

"A little soul carrying a corpse": the modern writer who has made that old Stoic phrase most clear to the average reader is, I think, M. Bergson. To him man consists of a body which is so much matter, governed by the law of gravitation and all the other laws of dead matter, governed also by the laws of biology or animate matter; and a soul or will—Plato's charioteer—which is free and moves of itself. How the will can be free, of course, is one of those problems which no one can satisfactorily explain. It seems impossible to understand how it can be free; yet almost more impossible to imagine that it is not free. It is an old problem, perhaps an eternal one. But M. Bergson's special contribution to it, if I understand him aright, is this.

The body is of course subject to mechanical and biological law. Throw it up in the air, it will fall down again. Hit it hard enough, it will break. Starve it, and it will suffer and die. And the exact strain necessary in each case can, within limits, be calculated. Furthermore, for much the greater part of life the will—that is, the man himself—acts automatically, like a machine. He is given bad coffee for breakfast, and he gets

cross. He sees his omnibus just going, and he runs. He sees in one advertisement that X's boot polish is the best, and on another that Y's boot polish is the best, and he accepts both statements. He does not criticise or assert himself. He follows steadily the line of least resistance. The charioteer is asleep, and the two horses jog along without waking him.

But, says M. Bergson, you will sometimes find that when you expect him to follow the line of least resistance he just does not. The charioteer awakes. He can resist, he can choose; he is after all a live and free thing in the midst of a dead world, capable of acting against the pressure of matter, against pain, and against his own desires.

Whether this doctrine is exactly true or not, I do not pretend to judge; but it certainly is fruitful. It is just what one feels in one's ordinary experience: a constant tendency to behave like dead matter, to fall into habits, to become by slow degrees—as the ancients put it—"a chained slave." You are chained by your own standard of comfort; by your conception of what is necessary for you; by your meal-times and the conventions you live among; by the things that you always say or always do or always have. Bergson has for middle-aged men added a new terror to life. He makes you watch yourself becoming mechanical; moving in conformity to outside stimulus; growing more and more dependent on your surroundings—as if the little soul carrying the corpse had found it too heavy and was letting it lie, or perhaps roll, while the soul itself fell half asleep. Fortunately from time to time it wakes, and when it does wake its strength is amazing. A friend of mine wrote to me from amid the heaviest fighting on the Somme, describing the strange impression he received from that awful experience of the utter difference between man's soul and body; the body is so weak and frail a stuff, so easily broken, scattered, torn to rags, or trodden indistinguishably into mire; and the soul so resolute, so untouched and unconquerable.

III.

Untouched and unconquerable: those, I think, were my friend's words, and that was the impression which he received. The German shells and bombs and bullets tore men's bodies to pieces without any trouble, but they could not touch the men's souls or change their will. I do not wonder that he received that impression. Yet, is the impression absolutely true? Can we really, without qualification, believe the common, comfortable doctrine that persecution always fails, that the

blood of martyrs is always the seed of the Church, that the soul is really unconquerable? The average man does not believe it, much less the ordinary tyrant. In every country he treats such doctrines as mere sentiment, and is perfectly confident that if you give him a free hand with rifle, bayonet, and cat-o'-nine-tails he can stamp out any inconvenient doctrine which puts its trust in nothing more substantial than the soul of man. And I fear the tyrant is not always wrong. Why are there no Protestants in Spain? Not because of the persuasiveness of Spanish theology, but because the Spanish Inquisition did its work. Why are there no descendants of the Albigenses in France? Because they were massacred.

No. We must not delude ourselves into believing that the path of the human soul or conscience when protesting against the world is a safe path, or a path that must in the end lead to victory. It is neither. It leads for certain through suffering and humiliation; and it may also, it may ultimately, end in defeat. There is no certainty for the protesting soul anywhere; except the certainty of a great uncertainty, of a great battle of unknown issue, in which the odds are by no means as they appear. The big battalions of the world on one side, and the one little soul or group of souls on the other—they are not so unevenly matched after all. The little soul starts indeed with one great handicap against it—it has first to carry its own corpse, and then fight. But if it can do that, if it can get comparatively free from that burden and those entangling chains, get rid of desire and ambition, and hatred and even anger, and think of nothing but what it wills as right, then it is, I will not say unconquerable, but one of the most formidable fighting forces that exist upon this earth.

The doctrine that the persecutor is always defeated and the martyr always triumphant is, I think, little more than mere comfort-seeking, a bye-form of the common vulgar worship of success. We can give great strings of names belonging to the martyrs who were successful, who, whether living or dead, eventually won their causes, and are honoured with books and statues by a grateful posterity. But what of the martyrs who have failed — who beat against iron bars, and suffered and were conquered, who appealed from unjust judges and found no listeners, who died deserted and disapproved by their own people, and have left behind them no name or memorial? How many Belgians, and Serbs, and Poles, how many brave followers of Liebknecht in Germany itself, have been murdered in silence for obeying their con-

sciences, and their memory perhaps blasted by a false official statement, so that even their example does not live? In ancient Athens there was, beside the ordinary altars of worship, an altar to the Unknown God. There ought to be in our hearts, whenever we think with worship and gratitude of the great men who have been deliverers or helpers of the human race, an altar to the unknown martyrs who have suffered for the right and failed.

IV.

But let us stop a moment. When the soul of man thus stands up against the world, is it necessarily always in the right? Because a man holds a belief so firmly that he will submit to prison and death rather than forswear it, does it follow that the belief is true? Obviously not in the least. In every great moral conflict of history you have had martyrs on both sides. Christians and Pagans, Arians and Trinitarians, Catholics and Protestants, have killed each other and died themselves for their respective beliefs, and more particularly for those particular parts of them which most directly contradicted the beliefs of the other side. Martyrs are not always right. Indeed, I am not sure that if you took the whole faith for which a particular martyr suffers—the whole mass of passionate beliefs by which he is really at the time actuated—I am not sure you would not find that martyrs were almost always considerably wrong. A man does not usually reach the point where he is willing to die for a cause without getting his passions strongly interwoven with his beliefs; and when a belief is mixed with passion, as we all know, it is almost certain to deviate from truth. If you ever wish, as we all sometimes do, to punish someone who differs from you, and to go on punishing him till he agrees with you, it is no good arguing that your victim is not a martyr because he is wrong or even wicked in his beliefs; a great many martyrs have been wrong, and their persecutors have always thought them both wrong and wicked. It is still more irrelevant to condemn the martyr for being inconsistent: for two reasons. First, there is no person known to history, neither priest nor philosopher, nor statesman, nor even mathematician, who has yet succeeded in building a complete theory of life which has no inconsistencies in it. The best we can do is to be consistent in some little corner of life, or in dealing with some immediate practical problem. And further, it would be absurd to say

that a man must not take any step until he had made sure that the whole of his life was consistent with it. If a man wants to behave in some respect better than he has behaved before, it is practically certain that the new and better part of his life will not be consistent with all the other parts of it which he is not attending to. To reproach such a man for inconsistency is equivalent to asking him to remain always at the lowest level of which he is capable—though as a matter of fact he would not attain consistency even then.

You must not be surprised then at a martyr being wrong, and you must not dream of expecting him to be in all of his beliefs consistent.

What can you expect of him, then? I think all you can expect is sincerity of belief and purity of motive. If he is a fool, if he is prejudiced, if he is muddle-headed, if he is misled, if he is exasperating, even if he has certain grave faults of character in other respects, he can still be a martyr, and be entitled to a martyr's reward. But if he is insincere, if he is lying; if, when professing to suffer for the right and the truth, he is really seeking his own advantage, and saying things which he does not believe, then he is done for; there is nothing more to be said about him; he is not a martyr, but a mere ordinary humbug. And no doubt one of the troubles of a Government which has to deal with people who of set purpose and principle defy a particular law, is to make out which are martyrs and which humbugs. And this is a matter of more consequence than may at first appear. For it is a very dangerous thing to allow people by mere cunning and obstinacy and self-advertisement in breaking the law to rise into public fame and to undermine that fabric of mutual agreement which holds society together; a nation in which any well-organised rebels could safely defy the law would soon almost cease to be a free nation. And, on the other hand, a nation in which the Government seems to be forcing men into sin against their conscience, so that good people instinctively respect the prisoner and condemn the judge, has already ceased to be a free nation. You remember the old words of Gamaliel: "Lest haply ye be found to be fighting against God." It is a serious thing for any organ of material power to be found fighting against the human soul.

V.

Let me take a present-day instance of this battle between a soul and a Government, a very curious instance, because it is almost impossible without more knowledge than most people in England possess to say who was wrong and who right.

About the year 1889 a young Indian student, called Mohandar Karamchand Gandhi, came to England to study law. He was rich and clever, of a cultivated family, gentle and modest in his manner. He dressed and behaved like other people. There was nothing particular about him to show that he had already taken a Jain vow to abstain from wine, from flesh, and from sexual intercourse. He took his degrees and became a successful lawyer in Bombay, but he cared more for religion than law. Gradually his asceticism increased. He gave away all his money to good causes except the meagrest allowance. He took vows of poverty. He ceased to practise at the law because his religion—a mysticism which seems to be as closely related to Christianity as it is to any traditional Indian religion—forbade him to take part in a system which tried to do right by violence. When I met him in England, in 1914, he ate, I believe, only rice, and drank only water, and slept on the floor; and his wife, who seemed to be his companion in everything, lived in the same way. His conversation was that of a cultivated and well-read man with a certain indefinable suggestion of saintliness. His patriotism, which is combined with an enthusiastic support of England against Germany, is interwoven with his religion, and aims at the moral regeneration of India on the lines of Indian thought, with no barriers between one Indian and another, and to the exclusion as far as possible of the influence of the West, with its industrial slavery, its material civilisation, its money-worship, and its wars. (I am merely stating this view, of course, not either criticising it or suggesting that it is right.)

Oriental peoples, perhaps owing to causes connected with their form of civilisation, are apt to be enormously influenced by great saintliness of character when they see it. Like all great masses of ignorant people, however, they need some very plain and simple test to assure them that their hero is really a saint and not a humbug, and the test they habitually apply is that of self-denial. Take vows of poverty, live on rice and water, and they will listen to your preaching, as several of our missionaries have found; come to them eating and drinking and dressed in expensive European clothes—and

they feel differently. It is far from a perfect test, but there is something in it. At any rate I am told that Gandhi's influence in India is now enormous, almost equal to that of his friend the late Mr Gokhale.

And now for the battle. In South Africa there are some 150,000 Indians, chiefly in Natal; and the South African Government, feeling that the colour question in its territories was quite sufficiently difficult already, determined to prevent the immigration of any more Indians, and if possible to expel those who were already there. This last could not be done. It violated a treaty; it was opposed by Natal, where much of the industry depended on Indian labour; and it was objected to by the Indian Government and the Home Government. Then began a long struggle. The whites of South Africa determined to make life in South Africa undesirable, if not for all Indians, at least for all Indians above the coolie class. Indians were specially taxed, were made to register in a degrading way; they were classed with negroes, their thumb-prints were taken by the police as if they were criminals. If, owing to the scruples of the Government, the law was in any case too lenient, patriotic mobs undertook to remedy the defect. Quite early in the struggle the Indians in South Africa asked Mr Gandhi to come and help them. He came as a barrister in 1893; he was forbidden to plead. He proved his right to plead; he won his case against the Asiatic Exclusion Act on grounds of constitutional law, and returned to India. The relief which the Indians had expected was not realised. Gandhi came again in 1895. He was mobbed and nearly killed at Durban. I will not tell in detail how he settled down eventually in South Africa as a leader and counsellor to his people; how he founded a settlement in the country outside Durban, where the workers should live directly on the land, and all be bound by a vow of poverty. For many years he was engaged in constant passive resistance to the Government and constant efforts to raise and ennoble the inward life of the Indian community. But he was unlike other strikers or resisters in this: that mostly the resister takes advantage of any difficulty of the Government in order to press his claim the harder. Gandhi, when the Government was in any difficulty that he thought serious, always relaxed his resistance and offered his help. In 1899 came the Boer war; Gandhi immediately organised an Indian Red Cross unit. There was a popular movement for refusing it and treating it as seditious. But it was needed. The soldiers wanted it. And it served through the war, and was mentioned in despatches, and

thanked publicly for its skilful work and courage under fire. In 1904 there was an outbreak of plague in Johannesburg, and Gandhi had a private hospital opened before the public authorities had begun to act. In 1906 there was a Native rebellion in Natal: Gandhi raised and personally led a corps of stretcher-bearers, whose work seems to have proved particularly dangerous and painful. Gandhi was thanked by the Governor in Natal—and shortly afterwards thrown into jail in Johannesburg. Lastly, in 1913, when he was being repeatedly imprisoned, among criminals of the lowest class, and his followers were in jail to the number of 2500, in the very midst of the general strike of Indians in the Transvaal and Natal there occurred the sudden and dangerous railway strike which endangered for the time the very existence of organised society in South Africa. From the ordinary agitator's point of view the game was in Gandhi's hands. He had only to strike his hardest. Instead he gave orders for his people to resume work till the Government should be safe again. I cannot say how often he was imprisoned, how often mobbed and assaulted, or what pains were taken to mortify and humiliate him in public. But by 1913 the Indian case had been taken up by Lord Hardinge and the Government of India. An Imperial Commission reported in his favour on most of the points at issue, and an Act was passed according to the Commission's recommendations, entitled the Indian Relief Act.

My sketch is very imperfect; but the story forms an extraordinary illustration of a contest which was won, or practically won, by a policy of doing no wrong, committing no violence, but simply enduring all the punishment the other side could inflict until they became weary and ashamed of punishing. A battle of the unaided human soul against overwhelming material force, and it ends by the units of material force gradually deserting their own banners and coming round to the side of the soul!

Persons in power should be very careful how they deal with a man who cares nothing for sensual pleasure, nothing for riches, nothing for comfort or praise or promotion, but is simply determined to do what he believes to be right. He is a dangerous and uncomfortable enemy—because his body, which you can always conquer, gives you so little purchase upon his soul.

VI.

In Gandhi's case the solution of the strife between him and the Government was particularly difficult, because he was not content to be let alone. He thought it his duty, God helping him, to compel a Government backed by the vast majority of the nation to change their policy. And no Government could yield, or ought to yield, to such coercion. The best it could do was probably somewhere near that which, by the advice of General Smuts, it eventually did propose to do: to purge its policy as far as possible of all elements which were not essential to its own conviction and which did particular violence to the convictions of others.

In the next case I wish to lay before you the issue is much simpler. It is the case of the persecution of an Englishman of saintly life, Stephen Hobhouse. I say deliberately of saintly life, and I say no more; not for a moment that his views are right, or his theory of life socially convenient, or his example one that should be followed. As we have noticed before, it often happens that the saints are wrong and the children of this world right; but they are not often right when they begin treating the saints as criminals.

Stephen Hobhouse began life as the son of rich parents; he was a scholar of Eton, afterwards a scholar of Balliol; he won First Class Honours in Moderations, and Second Class Honours in Greats, after which he obtained a post in the Board of Education. He was rich and well connected; he was clever and successful, and had every prospect of a brilliant career. But from early life he had a conscience more exacting than the consciences of most of us. He was religious with a touch of mysticism. He wanted to follow Christ. He eventually formulated the goal at which he aimed as "self-identification with the oppressed." To help the poor and suffering was not enough; he must be one with the poor and suffering. He could not do this as a rich man. So he began by renouncing his position as heir to his father's estate, and stripping himself of the prospect of inherited wealth. He had, I think, already joined the Quakers, and was a regular speaker in their meeting-house. (They have no ordained ministers.) He went with his wife, who shares his religion, to live in a workman's flat in Hoxton, and the two spent all their time in social work—that is, in ministering to the poor and in the effort towards "self-identification with the oppressed." Their life, I need hardly say, was abstemious to the point of asceticism. Let me give one small illustration.

A friend of mine calling on Mrs Stephen Hobhouse the other day noticed a clothes-line hanging across the room and asked some question about it. It appeared that when they first moved into the flat, living of course without a servant, Mrs Hobhouse sent her washing out to a laundry. The work of suddenly living without a servant was, for two delicate people, hard enough. But they noticed that the families living round them did not send their washing out; they did it at home in the living-room. "Self-identification with the oppressed" pointed the road clearly, and they tied the clothes-line across the living-room and did the washing at home.

Stephen Hobhouse had been a Quaker, and a Quaker of the strictest sort, for ten years before 1914. He had had experience of a previous war; for during the war in the Balkans he had resigned his post in the Board of Education, and gone to Constantinople to nurse the refugees of various nations who were lying, largely untended, in the mosques, particularly in the mosque of St Sophia. Of his work there I know only by hearsay, but the stories of it sound like stories of St Francis. Creeds and religious organisations clash against one another; but true saintliness, the quality of the soul that has really mastered the corpse it carries, is much the same in all religions, and breaks the barriers of creeds. Stephen's interpreter, a pious Moslem, who was accustomed probably to think of all Christians as dogs, felt the spirit that radiated from this Christian, and the two used to pray together to the same God.

The present war came and was followed by conscription, embodied in an Act which gave complete exemption to those who on conscientious grounds, however mistaken, refused to take part in slaying their fellow-men. If conscription was necessary, as I am inclined to think it was, that was a generous Act, and one worthy of the traditions of English tolerance. It was well known that Stephen Hobhouse, as a strict Quaker, considered it a sin to partake in war, and there was not the smallest glimmer of a doubt to be cast on the sincerity of his objection.

By an act of deliberate and purposeful injustice his tribunal disallowed his conscientious objection and sent him to the army. He did not appeal against the sentence, because many of his friends and fellow-Quakers were already being sent to prison, and "self-identification with the oppressed" forbade his deserting them. He refused to obey military orders. He was court-martialled and sentenced to various military punishments, culminating in 112 days' hard labour. When that was over he

was taken out and the order repeated; of course he still disobeyed, and is now undergoing two years' hard labour. The renewed sentences bring with them conditions more severe than those of continuous penal servitude.

And one point more. Every one interested in prison reform knows that one of the most severe strains upon human nature involved in prison life is the eternal silence—one of the most severe and, many people hold, the most corrupting and injurious to mind and character next to solitary confinement itself. In every prison the rule of silence is apt to be somehow evaded. It is a thing which human nature in the long run will not bear, and by hook or by crook, by sundry unedifying artifices, the prisoners do manage to snatch a few words of conversation with one another from day to day. Stephen Hobhouse at first did talk by these secret methods, then he decided that it was wrong. He writes to his wife: "The very night of thy last visit I was smitten with a sense of shame for the habits of concealment verging on deception which this life seems to force on all of us. For a fortnight I wrestled day and night with this feeling. . . . It seemed so hard to give up the only outward ways of expressing love." He confessed to the governor that he had been breaking the rule of silence, and refused to promise to obey it in the future. And the result is that, in order to make sure he does not break that rule, and at the same time to avoid the constant repetition of special punishments, this man is in solitary confinement for the indefinite future.

I believe in this case that the Government has broken the law. I am certain that the original sentence of the tribunal was wrong. But for the moment I am dealing with another aspect of this case. Apart from the rightness or wrongness of the prisoner's views about war, apart from the technical legality or illegality of the Government's action, you have here a deliberate conflict between the massed power of Government and the soul of one righteous man. There are about a thousand men in the same position.

I do not know who will win. I make no prophecy. It is quite easy for a huge engine like the War Office to crush any one man's body, to destroy his reason by perpetual solitude, or put an end to his life. But I do not think that a Government which sets out to prosecute its saints is a wise or a generous Government; I do not think a nation which cannot live in peace with its saints is a very healthy or high-minded nation.

VII.

I have not attempted to answer the question with which we started, to define what the soul is or what life is, or where the difference comes between the mere physical life that makes a man move his limbs and desire his food, and the soul itself or central guiding principle, which the ancients called reason and the moderns think of as will. The question is perhaps still beyond human powers of analysis. I have only tried to consider with the help of examples the actual working of the soul in shaping a man's life, and sometimes bringing him into conflict not only with his own apparent interest, but with the general stream of will in the society around him. And I have tried, first, to suggest that a wise ruler will be very circumspect, a conscientious ruler will be very tender, before challenging the lowliest of human souls to battle on the soul's own ground, or setting about the task of compelling the humblest of his subjects by torment and violence to do that which he definitely believes to be wrong. So much for action between man and man. And secondly, within our own hearts, I would say that the main lesson to each man of us is to see that his own soul does not die. It will sometimes stagger under the weight of the corpse it carries; that is inevitable. Only let it not fall into the power of the corpse. The weight of dead matter seems, at times like the present, to increase upon us. Our whole being is dulled. We do more and more things because we are driven, fewer and fewer because we choose them and love them; we cease even to suffer as we should suffer, or to pity as we should pity. In our own great war we tend to forget what we ourselves owe to the higher causes for which our friends have died as martyrs, to forget because the deaths are by now so common and the martyrdom has lasted so long. We tend to shrink from the higher emotions because they are difficult, to sink into the round of lower and more commonplace emotions because they make less disturbance in our daily business. The power of death is abroad over the world. It has taken lives innumerable, and better lives than ours. Let those of us whose bodily life is still spared make sure that the soul within us shall not die.

GILBERT MURRAY.

OXFORD.

THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE, AND MUTUAL AID.[1]

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WHEN a new idea is to be given to the world, the extent of its popularity depends, in a great measure, on the form in which it is expressed. If long sentences and many words are used, it will spread slowly; if, on the other hand, a single word, or a short pithy phrase, is sufficient, the idea in a short time will, as it were, be carried on wings and propagated in every direction.

This has been the case with the idea "*The Struggle for Existence.*" The expressions "*Struggle for Existence,*" "*Lutte pour l'existence,*" "*Kampf um das Dasein,*" "*Strijd voor het bestaan*" are repeated by thousands and thousands of people, and thus the conception of which they are the bearers is spread about everywhere.

Nevertheless, from this a great danger arises: in proportion to the extent that the winged phrase spreads itself, it is interpreted more and more in its limited and literal sense. The ideas and considerations, by which the conception is explained, penetrate with more difficulty into the minds of people, and linger a longer time on the way. Consequently the phrase may often misrepresent the reality, because it has been taken out of its context. This appears to be the case with "*The Struggle for Existence.*" Countless persons imagine that these words mean merely a sanguinary warfare, in which living beings try to destroy each other; and, at the same time, they think of a fight between two wild beasts for the possession of their prey—or something of the kind.

This imperfect and one-sided representation has now been

[1] Translated from the Dutch by Agnes Fiddes.

carried over into the sphere of the social sciences, and gives rise there to all kinds of inferences which rest on a false basis, and do all the more harm because they appear to be drawn from a natural-science source, and are thus, as it were, clothed with a scientific authority to which they have no claim.

In this article I propose, in the first place, to investigate what the words "*Struggle for Existence*" really mean.

It is a well-known fact that, generally speaking, every living being produces very many germs, and by far the most of them perish, so that only a few escape destruction and arrive at full growth.

Let us take an apple-tree as an example, and let us suppose that such a tree produced, each year for ten consecutive years, 100 apples, and that every apple contained only two seeds (pips). A simple calculation shows that the number of seeds produced in ten years amounts to 2000. Our tree *can*, therefore, in ten years' time, give being to 2000 new trees. If we now go on to suppose that the 2000 trees, twenty years later, in their turn, each produce 2000 new trees, we are brought to the conclusion that, from a single tree, in the course of less than half a century, $2000 \times 2000 = 4,000,000$ trees *can* spring forth. If we continue our calculation, we find that, after a few centuries, the descendants of a single tree would be numerous enough to cover the whole globe.

This is equally true of all living things; and indeed it would not be difficult to name thousands and thousands of different species that are more fruitful than the apple-tree. For example, the number of eggs that a cod produces in one year is estimated at from 5–9 millions, the eggs of a carp at 200,000, and so on. On the other hand, we find that the total number of living things of all kinds on our earth since time immemorial has not noticeably increased. From this it may be concluded that, on the whole, the place of every individual is filled by a single individual of the following generation; all the remaining individuals perish in their earlier or later lifetime—before they have reached maturity.

As, now, every individual gives being to numerous other individuals, we must consider it as proved that a tremendous destruction of living things takes place in nature. Every living thing tries to secure itself against destruction, and struggles against the causes of extermination by which it is continually threatened. This is "*The Struggle for Existence.*"

The question now is, What are the causes of destruction, and in what way is the struggle carried on. An answer to this can only be found by the observation of facts, by the diligent investigation of a sufficient number of particular cases.

Let us look first at the vegetable kingdom. At this time of year (the end of September), at the commencement of harvest, the leaves of the trees begin to change colour and fall off. The boughs that, in a few weeks, will be totally leafless, bear already in their ends and along their sides numerous buds in which already lie the leaves and flowers which will open out in the coming spring. It is only necessary, for example, to examine the buds of our fruit-trees to discover in them the tender germs of the millions of fresh green leaves and snow-white flowers with which our orchards will be adorned in April and May of next year. During the winter the existence of these small tender parts will be threatened by rain and wind, snow and frost; in what way will they be secured against destruction? In other words, in what way will they carry on "*The Struggle for Existence*"?

The buds in which the tender leaves and flowers lie are each provided with an envelope, which consists of several overlapping scales which form, as it were, protective mantles. The scales are impregnated with a cork-like material, which is waterproof, and thus protects the enclosed parts from the harmful action of snow, rain, and mist. And, besides, the buds are, at least in many species, smeared over with a kind of *resin*, with the result that the rain that reaches them rolls off in drops instead of penetrating into them. Between the scales are thin layers of air, which are completely enclosed and immovable, and thus form a *bad conductor of heat*. In this way sudden changes of temperature,[1] which would be very dangerous for the plants, are only transmitted slowly to the contents of the buds. Lastly, the tender inside portions are, in many species, covered with a layer of down, which also forms a protective envelope.

The tender young flowers and leaves are armed with the necessary tools, or weapons, in order that they may, during six months, fight against their enemy—in this case the rough and cold winter. Not a single little leaf, not one tiny flower, can withdraw with impunity from this prolonged struggle; pitiless is the law that ordains the strife. *But*—such a struggle is

[1] For example, the sudden increase in the warmth caused by the rays of the sun after frost.

quite a different affair from a deadly combat between two beasts of prey. Here not a single living thing is harmed or destroyed by the combatants; the enemies they fight against are the lifeless forces of nature. The beast of prey is in this case the bleak winter.

Let us now glance at the life of plants that grow in a dry place—for example, in a desert. Here the plant is menaced thoughout its whole existence by the want of water. For it the struggle for self-preservation is particularly hard and difficult, because want of water means withering and death.

In the deserts—for example, in the Sahara, where water is very scarce, where sometimes months pass between two consecutive showers of rain—the life of the plant depends almost entirely on the presence of water. There the vegetation is scanty; the plants, for the most part, grow at great distances from each other, so that, in this case, the question of want of space does not arise. The temperature is high enough to allow of the most luxuriant vegetation, the rays of the torrid sun give light in abundance to the vegetable kingdom. The air is pure, and almost everywhere the ground contains materials for food in sufficient quantity to provide for the needs of the plants. Water alone is lacking. At every place where water is present there exists an *oasis* with a flourishing vegetation. It has even been found possible—as, for example, by the boring of wells of springing water—to make new oases in places where from time immemorial the ground has been dry and unfruitful.

Highly instructive is the story of the means which the plants of the desert employ to secure themselves against withering up, because we observe here an astonishing diversity which teaches us that Nature understands the art of reaching the same goal by widely different ways.

Many desert plants send their roots deep into the ground so that they can obtain the necessary fluid from the deep-lying wells of water. Many species whose stems only rise a few inches above the ground are provided with roots which penetrate in a perpendicular direction five to six yards deep into the ground. Indeed, in some cases, roots have been dug out from a much greater depth—from twenty to twenty-five yards. Other plants are provided with safes or storerooms in which they, at favourable opportunities, lay up a certain quantity of water. The leaves of *Mesembryanthemum cristallinum*, for example, bear countless little bladders, which swell up after a shower of rain and are filled with water, making the plant look as if it were sown with brilliant pearls. Afterwards, when

the plant is again exposed to the withering rays of the sun, one sees the bladders gradually shrink, the water which they contain is sucked in by the plant, and it lives for weeks on the stock it has stored up.

Other species are provided with organs by which they can draw in the vapours with which the air in some parts of the desert and at some times of the year is laden. For example, the leaves of *Reaumuria hirtella* are provided with thousands of microscopic glands which secrete salt-crystals. By day the plant is covered with a pale grey crust of salt; in the early morning, after a misty night, it is heavily laden with drops of water which the salt has drawn in, and which look like dewdrops. This water is sucked in by the plant, and the salt dries up again till the next night. It can be proved, by experiment, that the secreted salt is really indispensable for the preservation of the plant: if the crust of salt is brushed off, the plant withers in a few days. A remarkable case is met with in another desert plant, namely *Diplotaxis Harra*. When the dry ground on which it grows happens to be watered by a shower of rain, this plant forms in a single night a circle of little roots, which, originating at the foot of the stem, creep over the ground, like rays, all round the plant, in order to suck in with all speed as much as possible of the water that has fallen. Afterwards the ground dries up again, the little roots die away, but the plant is provided with a fresh store of water, which promotes its growth.

From these few examples we see again that the "struggle for existence" may be something totally different from a fight between living beings. The deep tap-roots, the bladders of water, the salt crystals, the ephemeral circle of roots, which we have already mentioned, are *weapons* with which the plants can carry on the struggle with an inanimate foe, who is quite as dangerous as a beast of prey.

When one says that no living thing can avoid the struggle, that every living thing that cannot fight is doomed to destruction, he speaks the truth. If, however, by this he means that the struggle is carried on by the injury or destroying of other beings, then he distorts the truth, because he is making a general rule out of a special case.

Now, let us take some illustrations from the animal kingdom. Many kinds of animals who pass the winter in northern regions are provided with a warm coat of hair, so that they can maintain a struggle against the cold. In many cases, even, moulting takes place twice annually—so that the coat of hair is always suitable for the time of year. In the

spring the warm winter hairy coat is exchanged for a lighter summer covering; in the autumn the summer hairs fall out, and in their place comes a new winter fur.

Twice a year we see thousands of birds of passage fly past, who are escaping from the inclement season of the year and are travelling to a milder region where they will pass the months of winter. Woe to the bird that is not strong enough to migrate! It will perish during the winter. By this struggle which it carries on for self-preservation, not a single living being is harmed.

The building of nests, the lining of them with down, are also means of combating the cold, which threatens the existence of the yet unfeathered young.

It may be objected at this point that I have, as yet, spoken exclusively of the strife against inanimate nature, and that I have kept silence over the struggle between living beings.

One can indeed come to the conclusion, after a superficial examination, that animate nature is an immense battlefield, where nothing is to be seen but mutual destruction. One thinks of birds of prey who hunt gulls—of gulls who feed on fishes—of fishes who themselves swallow worms and other small creatures. Our imaginations are impressed by such a spectacle, and we repeat, without reflection, the winged words "*The Struggle for Existence.*"

As we gain deeper knowledge of plants and animals, we become increasingly aware of facts that teach us that between living things there are other relations than those merely of robbery and strife. Even in those cases where a living being is seemingly providing for its own safety by the destruction of another, we often find, after a more attentive examination, something totally different from destruction.

It is, for example, known that many trees produce sweet, juicy fruits. Such fruits as, for example, grapes, service-berries, currants, etc., are visited by all kinds of birds, who feed on them. Here, apparently, the birds behave as enemies of the plants, stealing and devouring their fruits. In reality they do the plant an important service: without their agency the fruits would simply fall to the ground. The seeds which they contain would consequently lie close together, and the next year numerous young plants would shoot up in a small extent of ground, and therefore impede each other's growth and be destroyed from want of room. Instead of this the fruits are brought away by the birds, the pulp is digested, and afterwards the seeds are scattered and propagated far and wide, sometimes

at a great distance from the mother plant. Without the co-operation of the birds the further existence of the species would be endangered.[1] This is an example of *mutual aid*: the plant supplies the bird with food, and in return the bird undertakes the sowing of the seeds of the plant.

We find another highly remarkable and striking example of mutual aid in the life of flowers. Most flowers diffuse abroad pleasant odours and produce a sweet liquid—namely, honey. Thousands of insects of different kinds, especially bees and butterflies, visit the flowers and feed on the honey secreted by them. Flowers and flower-visiting insects have become, on the whole, indispensable to each other. It is an established fact that a flower produces no seed if the pollen from the anthers is not brought to the pistil. Now the pollen is deprived of organs of locomotion, and cannot move from place to place; without outside assistance it cannot fulfil its vocation. The insects that fly from one flower to another, seeking honey, come inevitably into contact with the anthers, and consequently are powdered with the pollen; they come also in contact with the sticky pistils, which now are able to take hold of the grains of pollen and hold them fast. One can show, without difficulty, that the agency of insects is here indispensable; many flowers (for example, willows, lilies, pinks, the columbine, monks-hood, clover, the bindweed, etc.) remain quite unfruitful or bear very little seed if their flowers are covered with muslin. Thereby the entrance of insects is prevented, and the flowers wither and fall off.[2]

Large volumes have been written about animals who devour each other, and about the brutal and sanguinary scenes which Nature presents to our view. We have been told that strife is a law of Nature, and those who try to obtain wealth and power by trampling upon others—or stand and look on with folded arms—find in this so-called law a scientific excuse for their mode of acting or for their indifference. But large volumes can also be written about mutual aid in Nature, and here scenes are displayed which turn away the mind from the everlasting devouring, destroying, and oppressing. The most beautiful products of animate Nature, the flowers, which dis-

[1] Thanks to this co-operation, seeds of plants can be brought to places otherwise inaccessible—for example, to buildings, rocks, etc. One sees sometimes, on a high tower, a shrub—for example, an elder—establish itself and grow up, while its roots are driven in between the clefts in the stones. The seed from which the elder has sprouted is brought to the tower by a bird.

[2] Here the fertilisation of flowers by insects has been treated of in general. It is unnecessary to take peculiar cases and exceptions into consideration in this article.

play their splendour over the whole face of the globe, are instruments of mutual aid. Here I have only spoken of two examples chosen from the countless cases which Nature shows us of peaceful co-operation, and already it should be possible for us to come to the conclusion that mutual aid, just as much as destructive strife, is a law of Nature.

But one should not think of this as a case of antinomy, of strife between two laws or principles. Through deeper consideration we come to the knowledge of one principle—*work for existence.*

The beast of prey that pursues another creature to obtain food for itself—the bull that uses its horns to ward off the attack of the beast of prey—the tree that protects its tender buds from the rough wintry weather by means of impenetrable scales—the desert plant that sends its roots deep into the ground till it reaches the well-water—the flower that attracts the bees and the butterflies and buys their co-operation by the production of sweet-smelling stuffs and honey—the bee that builds honeycombs in the hollow trunk of a tree and collects honey for its young;—they all *work* for self-preservation or for the preservation of their offspring.

No living being may neglect this *work* with impunity; this is the law of Nature. Here is now the true scientific meaning of the expression "*The Struggle for Existence.*"

Man, also, is unable to dissociate himself from this law; he, also, obeys the compulsion to carry out this *work*. Nature teaches him that the work can be done in hundreds of different ways. Which example shall he follow? Will he let himself be misled by the saying "*The Struggle for Existence*," which teaches him to know only one way of obeying the law of Nature? or will he go for advice to Science, which by patient analysis divides compound things into their constituent parts, which will bring him to the universal, indivisible principles of the laws of Nature, and at the same time make him acquainted with the endless varieties of ways in which such laws may be applied?

The great importance of mutual aid in animate Nature is especially evident when we come to know the organic theory of societies.

The basis of this theory is the idea that a human society can be compared to a living being. This idea is often discussed in modern works on sociology.

At the first glance this seems strange; immediately the question arises how anyone can have come to compare two

things which are seemingly so very unlike one another, and, further, what is the use of this comparison, and whether there is anything more in it than a play of the imagination.

We shall therefore try to find out whether in the construction and manner of life of an animal or plant we can discover anything that can be compared with a human society and social phenomena.

We must first get to know the real signification of the word *society*. We can give the following definition of it: a human society is a body of people between whom there exist some relations. We give here to the term *relations* a very wide meaning; for example, mutual aid, co-operation in order to reach the same common end, alliance against a common foe, mutual influence in general. The definition we have given really means that in order to form a society it is not sufficient that a certain number of people find themselves in each other's neighbourhood. So long as no relations exist, so long as they remain quite strange to each other, there is a *crowd*, not a society.

We return now to our subject, and we choose for our first example one of the simplest of living things we can find—namely, *Pleurococcus vulgaris*. This is a plant from the group of the Algæ which is found everywhere, and on the bark of trees lives in the form of a green layer, especially in damp places and after long-continued rain. When we examine with the microscope a small portion of this green layer, which comes away very easily, we see that it consists of countless little round bodies. These are very small; their diameter is about $\frac{1}{50}$ millimetre. Each little body is provided with a thin outside wall; the inside consists of a living substance called *protoplasm*. The *protoplasm* is a colourless semi-liquid stuff, which looks very like white of egg and is the real basis of life. In the protoplasm we perceive a roundish colourless body, the *nucleus* (*kernel*), and different green bodies, the *chlorophyll bodies*. Nucleus and chlorophyll are, just as much as the protoplasm, living parts. They may be considered as subdivisions of the protoplasm.

Such a little body is a living being, a plant. One may compare it to a small room where the living substance is lodged. One calls it, therefore, a cell; and as the whole plant consists here of a single cell, it is named *one-celled*.

The one-celled plant displays the principal phenomena which characterise life. It takes in water and food; it discards certain substances; it grows; it can secure itself against some dangers—it can, for example, make its outer wall thicker

when it is threatened with withering up, as in dry weather; it can multiply itself. It is not the place here to enlarge on these different phenomena; for our purpose it is sufficient to know that all this has been incontestably proved, and by experiments can be proved over and over again. Only the last point—namely, the multiplication—deserves particularly our attention.

The multiplication occurs by a so-called division. First the nucleus separates in two; between the two daughter-nuclei there is produced now, in the protoplasm, a wall or partition by which the room, or cell, is divided into two cells. The two young cells, or daughter-cells, which originate in this way may remain for a time in contact with each other. Nevertheless, they are merely touching. Soon they come away from each other; they round themselves off and soon live completely independent. Between the two one-celled plants or individuals which come into being by the division of one individual, no relations exist; in other words, they have no influence whatever upon each other. Each individual can now, in the same manner, divide itself into two; these again may give being to four individuals; and so on. By consecutive divisions thousands come to exist; they form a *crowd* on the bark of the tree. If, now, one of those one-celled plants is brought by the wind or any other accidental cause on to another tree, it can by consecutive divisions give being to a new multitude.

One knows a very great number of one-celled beings,[1] some belonging to the animal and some to the vegetable kingdom. They show great variety as regards size, form, way of life, etc. But all are built on the same plan; all originate from a single independent cell. The descendants of an individual may remain united as a crowd, they never form a society.

The examination of a second example will teach us in what way there comes to be a closer union in a living being. It is again to the group of the Algæ that we go for an example—namely, to the *Spirogyra*. This plant, which may be seen in abundance in our ponds and ditches, presents itself as a very thin, delicate thread: when examined under the microscope it appears that this thread consists of a row of cylindrical cells which follow each other in regular order. In every cell we perceive the parts as in a *Pleurococcus* cell—namely, an exterior wall, protoplasm, a nucleus, and chlorphyll bodies.

[1] Examples: yeast; *Noctiluca miliaris*, which brings about the phosphorescence of the sea; etc.

In what way does such a thread originate? A *Spirogyra* thread consists, in the beginning, of a single cell—the germ-cell or *spore*, which in the main points resembles a *Pleurococcus* cell, and should be regarded as a one-celled plant. The germ-cell or spore lengthens itself, taking meanwhile a cylindrical form, and divides in two in the same way as a *Pleurococcus* cell.

The partition wall is placed across, so that there come to be two cylindrical cells which are together the same length as the first cell. While in *Pleurococeus* the two new individuals or daughter-cells soon separate from each other, in *Spirogyra* they remain attached each to each. The two daughter-cells grow lengthwise, and soon they in their turn divide into two, so that there are now four cells, which remain attached to each other and form a thread-like body. And so it goes on: through successive divisions, followed always by increase of the daughter-cells, there come to be 8, 16 . . . cells or individuals, and the whole thread may be several inches long. Here we have a *pluricellular* plant—that is to say, a plant that is formed by the union of a certain number of one-celled individuals, precisely as if many *Pleurococcus* cells were attached together. Between the cells, nevertheless, there exist no real relations; every cell lives quite independently of the others. The group of cells is still a multitude, wherein we nevertheless perceive a faint trace of the social bond—namely, the attachment. The bond may be broken without danger; the cells may come away from each other and live on independently, apparently without suffering any damage.

A third plant from the group of the Algæ—namely, *Ulothrix*—shows to us clearly social relations. This plant is, like *Spirogyra*, a very small thread-like pluricellular alga, formed from successive divisions of a single original germ-cell. But, while *Spirogyra* is an unattached, drifting plant, which has no need of a support, *Ulothrix* clings to some submerged object—for instance, to a stone—and remains firmly fixed during its whole life. It happens in this way: the cell that is at one of the two ends of the *Ulothrix*-thread contains no chlorophyll, and differs in this respect from all the other cells; it is also longer than the others, and possesses, besides, the power of clinging fast to any solid object with which it may come in contact. As soon as it attaches itself, it holds the whole thread also fixed; it might be called the root-cell. The many-celled plant can now be swayed here and there by the currents of water, but cannot move from the place.

Here we have a *society*: between the various individuals

or cells of which it is made up, relations exist: the root-cell, in fact, influences all the other cells, since she holds the whole thread in place. Between the different individuals there exists mutual aid: the root-cell does a service to her sister-cells by undertaking to keep the whole system firmly attached, but she is deprived of chlorophyll, and in consequence is not in a condition to provide herself with nourishment, while the rest of the cells contain chlorophyll and thus have the power to take in raw food and work it up. The green cells now extend to the colourless cell a part of the food they have worked up, and so provide for her maintenance. The mutual aid that here takes place causes *division of labour*. The whole plant must attach itself to some fixed object and must feed itself; from the number of individuals of which it consists, one is given the duty of keeping the plant fixed—the others have to attend to the food. The division of the work brings about *dissimilarity* or *differentiation*. All the cells of the *Ulothrix* are originally the same; they are sister-cells springing from one mother-cell. Yet, while in *Spirogyra* the similarity continues—because all one-celled individuals have exactly the same mode of life,—in *Ulothrix* we see one of the sister-cells *adapting* herself to a special duty—namely, holding the plant fixed—and in consequence being *modified* as regards form, contents, and size, while the other sister-cells are *adapted* for the business of providing the food, and *differ* from the first, especially in regard to the chlorophyll. *Mutual aid, division of labour, suitability* for special duties, *dissimilarity* or *differentiation*, are phenomena which go hand in hand. And in consequence there comes to be *mutual dependence*: the root-cell depends on her sister-cells for food, and in return her sister-cells depend on her for the advantages of a state of stability.

As we have said before, *Ulothrix* shows the commonest social phenomena in their simplest form. *Ulothrix*, like a human society, consists of a union of individuals, each similar to a one-celled *Pleurococcus* individual. In a human society we see, just as in *Ulothrix*, mutual aid, division of labour, adaptability to work of many kinds, dissimilarity, viz. differentiation, and mutual dependence. This is so very obvious, that it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it.

The phenomena with which we have become acquainted in *Ulothrix* we find again in all many-celled beings, animals and plants. Every many-celled being—for example, an oak, or a plant of wheat, or a bird, etc.—comes from a single cell, which we call the germ-cell, or egg. The first cell now undergoes successive divisions, and thus gives being to 2, 4, 8, 16, up

to millions of cells or one-celled individuals, which remain united, and between whom social relations arise, as we have seen in *Ulothrix*. The society of cells presents itself as a living unity, as a single individual. With the help of the microscope we can nevertheless distinguish the component cells and, as it were, study them one by one. So we find—for example, in an oak—first, cells which form the leaves: these cells contain chlorophyll, and are given the duty principally of working up the food; second, cells which form roots, and are given the duty of establishing the plant firmly in the ground and supplying it with water and food; third, cells which form the outer layer of the bark, and have the duty of protecting the inner parts of the stem from rain, snow, etc. And so on. The different parts of the plant are dependent on each other. If, for example, a leaf is detached from the other parts, the cells which it consists of die, because it is separated from the root-cells, which supply it with necessary water.

A bird's egg[1] is a cell, which through successive divisions becomes a society, which presents itself to us in the shape of a bird.

By a long series of gradual transitions we can ascend by degrees from the simplest creatures—for example, *Pleurococcus*, *Spirogyra*, *Ulothrix*—to the most complex—for example, the higher animals and plants.

In the long series of societies of one-celled beings which we thus come to know we perceive an endless variety, even as in the human societies, which show us all imaginable transitions from wild savage tribes, consisting of a small number of individuals and where the social relations are very simple, to the highly differentiated and cultured peoples of Europe.

The study of the inner economy of the many-celled beings brings us, moreover, to the discovery of other social phenomena on which we cannot enlarge in this brief article—for example, the formation and employment of capital. We know, also, many-celled beings the component parts (that is to say, the cells) of which have different origins, belong to different races, and nevertheless can so completely amalgamate that, in the end, they have attained a perfect union. Among others, this is the case with the *Lichens*.

The few facts which I have brought forward suffice, already, to make clear what the exact meaning is of the comparison between human societies and many-celled beings. The

[1] The yolk.

question is now whether this comparison affords anything except an opportunity for making ingenious speculations.

A single moment's consideration suffices to show what a strong light the study of the many-celled organisms may throw on our knowledge of social phenomena. When we investigate the social relations between the cells, we work with the calm mind of a student of nature: we are not guided, indeed, by preconceived ideas. We seek the truth impartially, and we remain impartial, because we personally have no connection with the things which we study. The discovery of the truth is our only object.

After we have attended *this* school for some time, we have not only learned that the relations between living beings are governed by natural rules and laws, which also make their influence felt in human societies, but we have, moreover, learned the art of observing with the same calm mind the human society of which we ourselves form a part. We are no longer in the habit of allowing our spirit to be led by the short-sighted concern for our own personal desires or by the programme of the political party to which we belong, of which we have very often become members at a time of life when we did not even know the meaning of the terms "society" and "social phenomena." The blindness which is the consequence of all this disappears as we gain more and more a love of truth.

The organic theory of society, the bases of which we have tried to explain in a few words, is still very young. It will demand infinitely long study and much scientific work in order to bring it to its full development. Already one can foresee that new truths will take the place of many a prejudice, of many an agelong idea.

We have already seen that the *Struggle for Existence* in the literal sense is one of the ways in which *Work for Existence* can be fulfilled. We have also seen that the law of Nature which enjoins us to work for self-preservation can be fulfilled in another way than by a struggle—namely, by *mutual aid.* It cannot be denied that the struggle for existence, in the literal sense, is carried on everywhere in Nature. We have nevertheless fixed our attention on phenomena—for example, the fertilising of flowers by insects—in which it appears that mutual aid also takes an important place in Nature. Lastly, we have shown that the higher living beings—namely, all many-celled animals and plants—are societies of one-celled beings which are so closely bound together by mutual aid that they grow into a whole which presents itself as a living unity. A

many-celled being is unthinkable without mutual aid. If living beings knew no other way of providing for their self-preservation than by struggling against each other, only microscopic one-celled beings would exist. The large plants and animals would never have appeared on the earth.

The importance of the struggle for existence has for long been insisted on. It appears from what we have here said that the consequences of mutual aid may perhaps be more important still.

In what way shall a man obey the law of Nature and fulfil the work for his self-preservation?

The answer lies to our hand. Every human being is a member of the society. The society has come to be what it is by mutual aid among its members: otherwise it would only be a crowd—that is to say, a disconnected herd. As soon as one member of the society wages war against his fellow-members, the society itself is brought into a state of confusion, and the disorder which thus arises is harmful to all its members and to himself also. His own interests compel him to avoid strife where it is possible, and on the other hand to seek safety in mutual aid.

History, as it is usually taught, fixes our attention chiefly on the struggles which through the centuries have been carried on between the societies or nations and between the members of the same nation. It displays for us pictures of continual foreign wars and civil wars—that is to say, of phenomena which deprive societies of health and obstruct their progress. And thus many people imagine that struggling and fighting have been inevitable in history, and must remain so.

If one refers to higher moral principles to show the wickedness of this, immediately comes the answer in the phrase "*The Struggle for Existence.*"

Science is called upon to excuse deeds which deprive the societies of health. Thus we get false ideas, and Science is slandered. We continually see members of the society striving to obtain wealth by annexing the fruit of other people's work, either by stealing or by cheating, instead of getting riches for themselves in a peaceable way. If complaint about this is made, then the reply is that fighting is a law of Nature, and that all endeavours to prevent it are idle. Science, on the other hand, shows us the desert plant, which sends her roots deep into the ground to procure the necessary water, without harming any other living being; she shows us the honey-bee, who gathers treasures which are her reward for the services she renders to the flowers. Science goes for

advice to Nature, in order to find out how the human societies may be healed—and men refer to her as the reason for rejecting the means of cure!

We see a brutal strife break out between different nations about the possession of a tract of land. There are some who tell us that those who have declared war are obeying a law of Nature, or a social law, and that one must not interfere; sometimes people in their blindness go the length of declaring, in the name of Science, that such a war is good for civilisation, on the principle that the extermination of the weak promotes progress!!! Science again points to the desert plant, and calculates that the millions of money and the human lives that have been sacrificed in the strife are sufficient to produce streams of water in the wilderness, from the dry ground of which treasures would arise much greater than those that have been the cause of strife.

We see political parties wage a bitter strife, and employ all kinds of cunning and dishonourable means, to further their ends; and thus the society in whose midst the strife is carried on is brought into confusion—to the great loss of all its members. The parties, even those who have the noblest programme, lose sight of the fact that mutual aid is one of the foundations of social progress, and that they, by their violent fighting, have inflicted evil on the society and in consequence make the attainment of their ideal impossible.

The Flemish Movement itself has not been wise enough to avoid such errors. The Flamingants have devoted too much of their strength to their struggle, properly so-called, and have done too little to extend the influence of the Flemish Movement by the spread of knowledge in the tongue of the Netherlands. If we had brought within reach of the Flemings during the last thirty years the fifteen hundred to two thousand books which have annually appeared in our language, we should have rendered an invaluable service to the Flemish people, by the spread of knowledge; and in return we should, much more than now, have won the respect and gratitude of the Flemings, and even of many of our opponents. That which we now must extort would have come of itself.

Every time one goes for advice to Science one is urged on to a glorious future, and over and over again one is afterwards discouraged by people who scarcely know of the existence of modern science, and have learned nothing of it but a few phrases. People come and say to us, *Man is what he is*, and that it is vain to try to change him.

One can argue for ever over the laws of morality, and this

has been done for centuries. But one fact is incontestable: the ideals which modern Science places before us agree, in the main points, with the longing for something higher that for centuries has risen from the hearts of mankind.

Even out of the catacombs of old Rome arose the longing for peace, equality, and justice. The Roman Emperors and other rulers had the words *pax, æquitas, justitia* stamped over and over again on their coins and medals, and thus sent into the farthest corner of their dominions the promise that the wish of the people should be satisfied.

We may hope and trust that Science will teach us the art of attaining the ideal of humanity. It can overcome all difficulties by untiring labour.

J. MACLEOD.

THE RESTORATION OF PALESTINE.

M. J. LANDA.

ARMAGEDDON was incomplete until Mr Balfour's letter to Lord Rothschild of Nov. 2, 1917, promising on behalf of the British Government, and obviously on behalf of the whole Entente, the best endeavours to facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. It would have been one of the greatest fiascos of history were the war which is to re-establish civilisation and promulgate a new charter of humanity not to include this tardy act of justice to the oldest of the small nations; one, moreover, that has suffered most, even in the present war, and claims, in addition, to be the pioneer race in the struggle for liberty, celebrating by its annual festival of the Passover not merely the deliverance of its own people from Egypt, but the first blow for freedom for all mankind. The pronouncement, ranking with utterances that are epoch-making, was made at a dramatic moment with concomitants of the utmost significance. The British troops, after a check that had held them up for months at Gaza, had entered the Holy Land, a Rothschild falling in the struggle to fertilise with his blood the land of his ancestors, in which his family ever manifested the deepest interest, and to answer the anti-Semitic sneer made just previously that no Rothschild had ever risked a square inch of his skin to re-establish the Jews in Palestine. The Jewish Regiment (officially the 38th Royal Fusiliers) had just been formed, in the face of the bitterest opposition on the part of leading members of the Anglo-Jewish community, and drawing a promise from the Minister of War that it was intended for service in Palestine. Its nucleus was composed of men of the Zion Mule Corps, the hastily drilled refugees from Palestine, Russians mostly, who had worked on the land in the Jewish colonies and had gathered in Alexandria—a body of men whose deeds in Gallipoli had roused the Jewish imagination as nothing had done for centuries. The Jews of

America and of Russia were stirred by this creation of a Jewish unit, which, but for the protests of the sensitive communal leaders here, would have been distinguished by its badge, the Shield of David, but which, at any rate, organised its camp with a Saturday Sabbath and *kosher* food: America would have sent thousands of recruits had permission been given: Germany saw in its formation the definite menace to its ally, Turkey, which had been the stumbling-block to the Entente in the East.

The British declaration was no mere opportunist move to gain the sympathy of the Jews. That was not needed, for Jewish sacrifice in the war on behalf of the Allies has already been conspicuous. Mr Balfour's letter was the result of patient negotiations with the Zionists. The Zionism of to-day is a young movement, dating from Dr Theodor Herzl's call for a political regeneration of the Jews in 1896; but its inspiration goes back to the Dispersion, is embodied in the daily prayers, and had many forerunners. Jews and non-Jews in various lands and at different times had put forward the suggestion: it would have been strange had history been a blank in this direction. And it is not in the least surprising that Herzl, an Austrian journalist and playwright in Paris, who had drifted away from Judaism to be recalled by the anti-Semitism of the Dreyfus case, should find himself unconsciously plagiarising the suggestions of Moses Hess, a German Socialist, in his *Rome and Jerusalem* (1862), and of Dr Leo Pinsker, a Russian-Jewish physician, in his *Auto-Emancipation* (1881). But even these two writers were anticipated by an Englishman, the Rev. A. G. H. Hollingsworth, vicar of Stowmarket, in 1852, unknown to them, and to most people, indeed, to this very day. Mr Hollingsworth's pamphlet was almost a prophetic vision of the Basle Congress programme of the Herzl movement, advocating a legally assured home for the Jews in Palestine under the guarantee of the Great Powers. Mr Hollingsworth, moreover, proposed a British Protectorate, with a railway from Jerusalem to Lahore to shorten the journey to India by a thousand miles and safeguard the overland route.

Cradled in the fiercest opposition from pious and lax Jews alike, Herzl's bold project nevertheless made extraordinary progress, stirring the Jewish consciousness to the depths, giving it new life and meaning by its democratic appeal and its repudiation of the cherished principle of philanthropy on which modern Jewish existence was largely based. Under philanthropy the *Chovevi Zion* (Lovers of Zion) movement,

begotten of Pinsker, languished despite its adherents the world over; and a practical Palestinian colonisation scheme, nervously begun in 1870 and stimulated eight years later by the interest of the Earl of Shaftesbury and Laurence Oliphant, met with disaster owing to the impoverishment of the land due to criminal Turkish neglect and the archaic methods of Arab cultivators, and subsequently became demoralised after Baron Edmond de Rothschild had nobly come to the rescue. Fierce internecine strife, the outcome of denationalised and deracialised factions, seemingly irreconcilable religious differences, and persistent opposition on the part of those who saw in Herzlism a dangerous game of international politics by men excluded from citizen rights and socially and professionally ostracised in various lands, could not, however, stem the progress of Zionism. Nor did the secession of Zangwill, who had been the first to encourage Herzl and gain him a hearing in England, where he first delivered his message, mar its advance. Impatient with the delay caused by Abdul Hamid's tactics, Zangwill took advantage of the generous offer of the British Government, made spontaneously by Mr Chamberlain in 1903, of territory in East Africa, cleaved the movement in twain, and founded the Jewish Territorial Organisation (the J.T.O.), with the object of establishing a Jewish settlement as a temporary expedient elsewhere. But East Africa proved impracticable, Cyrenaica impossible—both regions being declared unsuitable by scientific expeditions; while Mesopotamia, a third suggestion, failed to rouse any enthusiasm.

Zangwill secured the adhesion of prominent English Jews who remained callously unresponsive to Herzl's clarion call: British sympathy, evinced also in negotiations opened in 1898 with regard to the El-Arish, was gratefully recognised, but only Palestine appealed to the vast masses, as Herzl himself promptly discovered when his first proposal was indeterminate and suggested the Argentine as an alternative. A foul Russian blow against Zionism, Plehve's prohibition of the movement in Russia in 1903, only served to intensify the reawakened Jewish longing. Real strength lay in renaissance—the inspiration given to artists and craftsmen and litterateurs to produce work which could not fail to impress even the opponents. Amidst all the strife, the work of education, the revival of Hebrew, the Holy Language, as a living tongue, and of a more scientific colonisation went on; the faithful were ceaseless in propaganda, and gained the adherence of the young intellectuals. This underlying tenacity overcame the shock

of Herzl's death in 1904 at the early age of forty-four, a martyr to the cause, crushed under the weight of contention, and carried it safely through the Turkish revolution, when a new hope was shattered by the Chauvinism of the Young Turks, who intimated at once that Zionism was virtually sedition. That prompt declaration, made by Parliamentary delegates who visited England in 1909 and spoke truculently at Jewish meetings to which they were invited, prevented the holding of a Congress at Constantinople, which would have been a graver blunder than the Congress of London in 1900 that failed lamentably in its hope of gaining the assistance of the Anglo-Jewish leaders.

Turkey's entry into the war brought renewed troubles, the expulsion of the colonists and the persecution of those who remained. The Russian revolution, by freeing, ostensibly, millions of Jews, raised the cry on the part of those who can still see in Zionism only a philanthropic objective, that it was no longer necessary, since the end of persecution in Russia, and probably in Rumania also, would remove the main excuse for settling the persecuted in Palestine. But the Zionists pinned their faith to the Entente, gaining, by negotiations conducted by Nahum Sokolow, the real intellectual leader of the movement, and Dr Weizmann, a brilliant Russian-Jewish chemist in the service of the British Government, the sympathy of the Pope and the British pronouncement.

What does it mean? A new dispensation for the Jews and manifold advantages for the rest of the world in the restoration of Palestine as a centre of culture and a land of productivity. Of that there is not the slightest doubt. True, amid the chorus of approval aroused by Mr Balfour's letter, the snarl of the anti-Semite has been heard: the Jews are an impossible agricultural people, the Holy Land derelict terrain beyond reclamation. Which proves that anti-Semitism is arrested development, a relic of ancient savagery, buttressed by fond mediæval memories of those who regard democracy as the root of all evil, and fostered by a modern pseudo-scientific spirit which is a cowardly denial of the rights of human progress superimposed on Chauvinism and a complete misunderstanding of the teachings of religion by its claim to lustful privilege. For the anti-Semites never learn. Let the facts speak.

Profiting by their first failures and assisted by Zionist organisations, the Jewish colonists set to work to revive the fertility of Palestine by modern scientific cultivation. Old roads were reconstructed, new ones laid down. Eucalyptus plantations metamorphosed hygienic conditions by the removal

of stagnant fever pools, and gained for the tree the name "Sedjer-et-Yahud" (Jews' tree) by the grateful Arabs; chemical manures have revived the soil and enriched it to a remarkable degree; irrigation, by means of gas and oil-motor pumps, has worked wonders in the orange and lemon groves; the introduction of microbe cultures is ridding the land of the rats which ravaged the cereal crops and the insects that devastated the fruit-trees. The regenerated earth has responded with abundance. Where the Arabs produced wheat and barley to the value of £1, the Jews produce to the value of £2 and £3 per acre, and even more; instead of 350 boxes of oranges, an acre now yields as many as 750 boxes; the output of the vineyards has also been doubled—from £6 to £7 per acre to an average of £12 to £13; the cows of the felaheen give an average of 130 to 160 gallons of milk per annum, those of the Jewish colonists about 440 gallons! Thirty per cent. of the wines exported *via* Jaffa come from the Jewish colonies in the neighbourhood, and oranges and wine constitute half the total exports from the port. And be it remembered, the Jewish plantations are many of them young and not yet fully productive. Land has become enhanced in value from 72s. per acre in 1890 to £36. About 1880 the land of the Petach Tikvah colony (founded in 1878) contributed a few paltry pounds to the revenue; in 1912 the sum was £3400 from part only.

Furthermore, the quality of the produce is exceptionally high. Jaffa oranges bring the best prices in English and other markets; Palestinian tomatoes put all others out of countenance, even those of the Riviera or the Marseilles markets; Haifa sesame brings a higher return than any other at Hamburg; the hard wheat of the country is considered the best for macaroni in Italy and France; and experiments at the Government stations in California have proved white and black grapes from Palestine—and by no means the finest produced—to be the best of 1300 varieties tested in ten years. The Jewish Agricultural Experiment Station, founded and maintained by American Jews, in the colony of Zichron Jacob at Atlit, near Haifa, has isolated a new form of sesame which yields more than double the quantity of sesame ordinarily grown; it has created new species of cereals which show an amazing power of resistance to the sirocco, has acclimatised a table grape ripening three weeks earlier than any other, has improved the spineless cactus which it is expected will supply valuable fodder for cattle, has discovered a new method of growing the mulberry tree so as to bring forth its leaves

earlier, and is cultivating over forty varieties of plants designed to keep the Mediterranean dunes from shifting, thereby removing one of the main obstacles to agriculture along the coast. In 1912 the colonists sent a graduate of the horticultural school to the United States in order to study the best methods practised in California, Florida, and Texas, and they have provided skilled cultivators to Arabs desirous of improving their land.

Concurrently with this agricultural revival, the Jews have introduced other improvements. A Jewish Health Bureau in Jerusalem is conducting a campaign to stamp out trachoma and other eye diseases; suburbs and townlets have been built on model European lines, object-lessons in cleanliness and hygiene; the colonists have organised rural police and watchmen for the colonies, a service of which non-Jews have gladly availed themselves, the Turkish Government having neglected the duty of providing protection; they have established oilworks, begun a building industry and the manufacture of cement-stones; and schools have been opened for ordinary education and for the teaching of home industries. And, what may most surprise the anti-Semites, one of whose cardinal principles of faith is that the Jew has been specially created as a parasite and a middleman, is that the export trade for the agricultural products of the Jewish colonies is almost entirely in the hands of the producers themselves and not of agents.

These are but the outlines, not the full details, of Jewish activity and versatility in Palestine under the stimulus of Zionism and the practical impulse of its institutions, the National Fund, the Colonial Trust, the Palestine Land Development Company, and kindred organisations. They are an earnest of what can be done by a rejuvenated and liberated people inspired by the hope of its never-forgotten past and the ideals which it has ever cherished of national restoration in a land that it has proved can still be made to flow with milk and honey. It is resurrection they seek to achieve, not exploitation of a neglected country. That is a point of the utmost importance, for, assuming the non-existence of Zionism, Palestine, after the war, will offer allurements to concessionists, company promoters, and all their myrmidons. Zionism will save Palestine from the parasites of progress, for there is much to exploit. The Dead Sea and Hasbeya produce asphalt of superior quality; there are numerous beds of phosphates throughout Transjordania, notably near Es-Salt. The water of the Dead Sea contains nearly twenty-five per cent. of salt deposits rich in potassium and bromides. There is oil, too, in the district.

In Sidon there are iron ore, coal, and yellow ochre. Chalk deposits exist in the mountains and in the Jordan valley. There are great possibilities in the cultivation of the sugar-cane, which thrives on the coastal plain and the Jordan valley; in tobacco-growing, which should lead to a flourishing cigarette industry; and in the extraction of olive oil. The Jordan valley, too, is declared by experts to be suitable for cotton-growing, while the differences of level of the river afford a ready means of motive power. With the settlement of a happy Jewish population industries will be developed naturally and rapidly, for none will throw themselves with such zest and devotion into labour as they will. No other people can bring to the task that sense of love which the Jews can—a feeling that has already expressed itself in the idealism of their hopes, and will be intensified by their complete emancipation and apotheosis.

And not only will the Jews benefit by the moral regeneration. The restoration of Jewry is bound to react on other peoples, on the whole world. For their case is unique, the event unparalleled, in very truth a fulfilment of prophecy. Palestine is bound up with Christianity and Mohammedanism, to both of which Judaism gave birth. Is it naught to the millions of these two great religions that reparation should at last be made to a people who have suffered as the Jews have done for two thousand years? Surely the restoration of Palestine must have its message for Christian and Moslem the world over. What true Christian and Moslem will fail to rejoice at the rectification of centuries of wrong, at the removal of a stigma which has inflicted untold misery on a people who would seem to have been accursed for inventing God? The Jews ask for nothing more than to be permitted to live in peace to develop their own culture and worship in their own fashion. They seek no conquests, commercial or spiritual. They have never denied Heaven to others. It is a first principle of their faith that the Almighty is the possession of all peoples. They have presented Him freely and gladly to the human race to be worshipped as each sect dictates. They seek no converts. It is no part of their doctrine that only through Judaism can salvation be found. "The righteous of all peoples shall share in the Kingdom of Heaven," declares the Talmud, and there is no specification that there is but one path.

The Jews have no ambition for the creation of a new State which will enter into the political competition of the nations. A legally assured home is all they demand: the form of government never offered an insoluble problem, and has been

simplified by the British declaration, which may be taken to imply a Protectorate, with such autonomy as is feasible for its needs, and in consonance with the traditions of the British Empire. No dominion is sought over the Jews who will remain outside, no allegiance will be expected that will raise problems of citizenship. The Jews are more deeply concerned in the establishment of a university in Jerusalem, a project which had begun to take shape before the outbreak of war, and had aroused the greatest enthusiasm experienced in the Zionist movement when decided upon at the Congress in Vienna in 1912. Even anti-Zionists applaud that project. The possibilities in that direction have been abundantly evidenced by the success of the Bezalel School of Arts and Crafts in Jerusalem, the Technical School at Haifa, the Hebrew Gymnasium at Jaffa, and the Agricultural Experiment Station.

Obstacles there may be to the complete fruition of Zionist aims. Intolerance is not swept away by a great war, nor disposed of by a stroke of the diplomatic pen, even when used by the statesmanship of the British Empire and its Allies when victory is assured and peace declared. Nervous folk and prejudiced there will be to raise the cry of fear on behalf of the holy places of Christendom. But their future will be secured—that is certain; and, whatever the form of the guarantee, the Jews, with their agonised cry through the centuries for tolerance and justice, will be in honour bound at the peril of their very existence to respect them to the utmost. Anti-Semitism will not be stifled; for some of its devotees, indeed, a concentrated Jewry will offer a fruitful field for the exercise of their spleen. But anti-Semitism has little hope in the future. It must pass with the Prussian spirit, which is but an expanded form of the same hatred. Treitschke was as much the parent of modern anti-Semitism as he was of the spirit that willed the war. Democracy, which must succeed if the world is to remain possible for mankind, will see to it that all artificial aids to bitterness have no place in the future commonwealth.

It is true that the Jews themselves are not united. What people are? National unity is a fetish. It has proved unattainable even in the face of calamity in the greatest war in history. And by what right are the Jews, whom the world has done its utmost to divide and degrade, expected to be the only people on earth one and indivisible? Recent events, however, have proved that the future of the Jews, like that of all peoples, lies in the extermination of privilege and prescriptive

rights, especially those which have been usurped. Jewry—Anglo-Jewry, at any rate; and, its small total notwithstanding, it is the most potent force in Jewry to-day—has had its period of travail in this war. Side by side with the spirit of revolution in the general community, a revolt has taken place in the Anglo-Jewry. Zionism was the immediate cause. Kaiserism, in the guise of an uncalled-for manifesto issued in the name of the Conjoint Committee of the Board of Deputies (the communal Parliament, which is invested with certain rights for the observance of English law) and the Anglo-Jewish Association (which may be termed the Jewish missionary body responsible for the welfare of the unfortunate Jews in persecuted lands), denounced Zionism and reaped the whirlwind. Nemesis was swift. The Deputies deposed their aged president, Mr D. L. Alexander, K.C., and terminated the existence of the Conjoint Committee. The future government of Anglo-Jewry is in the melting-pot; every organisation is demanding a pronouncement on Zionism in the light of Mr Balfour's declaration. That may be of small consequence to the outside public, but the possibilities are none the less infinite.

Already the anti-Zionists are showing fight. A newly organised League of British Jews, with Major Lionel de Rothschild, M.P., as president, and Lord Swaythling and Sir Philip Magnus, M.P., as vice-presidents, declares its objects as follows:

1. To uphold the status of British subjects professing the Jewish religion.
2. To resist the allegation that Jews constitute a separate political nationality.
3. To facilitate the settlement in Palestine of such Jews as may desire to make Palestine their home.

If the League meets with any success it means cleavage, for the first object trenches on the prerogative of the Board of Deputies (of which Sir Stuart Samuel, Lord Swaythling's cousin, has now become the president), while the third is the province of Zionism (one of the heads of which is Lord Rothschild, cousin of Major Lionel de Rothschild). Mr Claude Montefiore's establishment of the Jewish Religious Union was schism. By philanthropic effort, however, the Union is still linked to the community, which stands just where it did before the opening of the Union's synagogue. The same thing may happen with respect to the League. But should it, in the exercise of objects 1 and 3, come into conflict with the Board of Deputies and the Zionists, there will be trouble, emphasised by object No. 2.

That is based on the stupid contention recently put forth that the emancipation of the Jews in this country was an implied contract under which they abandoned all claims to separate nationality. It is an ingenuous rather than an ingenious plea, inasmuch as the Jews, whatever individual members of the faith may feel, are invariably termed a nation by non-Jews, and were referred to as such in the debates in Parliament during the long struggle for emancipation without any suggestion that they would ever be aught else, even when possessed of full political and civil rights. In the light of No. 2, No. 3 is seditious, but it had perforce to be included in the constitution as a concession to the Prayer Book and in deference to the British Government's pronouncement.

A tussle in the community is bound to ensue if the League gains any strength and undertakes some form of activity, which presumably it will. And then? Two or three things will happen. The League may find no reason for existence, become passive, finally moribund. It may be driven against its will to activity, owing to resentment—Lord Swaythling has already come into conflict with the Federation of (East End) Synagogues, of which he is president—and may, in individual instances, go to the extreme of withholding its support from communal institutions, as is even now happening in connection with appeals by the Jewish Regiment's Comforts Committee. That would engender bitterness, with serious consequences reacting on both parties. It would accentuate differences, and by widening the gulf provide the fillip to that which may reasonably be deduced to be incipient in the movement—a desire to eliminate the Zionist passages in the Liturgy. Inevitably this would accelerate the drift from Judaism. Domestic upheaval would accompany any attempt to tamper with the ritual, for there are members of the League keen on the preservation of Judaism; but it would be fatuous to deny that many to whom the movement will appeal will be the indifferentists who seek the slackest tie to the faith. The retort to this, of course, is that Zionism has in its ranks those who have virtually no Judaism, including individuals who have married out of the faith. That cannot be gainsaid, but the spirit of Zionism is positive and intensive, that of anti-Zionism must now be definitely negative on the part of all but a select few, and will inevitably tend to be cumulative. The revival of Hebrew with its auxiliary studies is revealing new beauties in the old faith, and is bound in a restored Palestine to facilitate obedience to the Mosaic ordinances—a difficulty causative of drift at present—and, concomitantly, furnish those

Jews remaining outside, obviously the majority, with that spiritual centre which will strengthen observance in all who are anxious to remain loyal.

And so the new aspect of Zionism has brought the Jews to the parting of the ways. Anti-Zionists may find themselves sooner or later in the position of having to decide between the Nationalism they profess and the Jewish Nationalism which must become to them anti-nationalism. The decision can only be taken on the religion, for Jewish Nationalism and Judaism are inextricably interwoven, and to the majority are indistinguishable. They may hesitate and linger, as many do now, leaving it to their children or their grandchildren to take the definite step, often with their approval, sometimes with their tacit consent, and frequently with a philosophic content that the secession will eventuate in any case. Zionism and Judaism have no fear. Jews have always lost numbers of their children, often some of the best, with curious persistence on the part of non-Jews, and even Jews, to regard the lost ones as still of the faithful. Witness the case of Beaconsfield, whose baptism at the age of thirteen did not save him from the posthumous "taunt."

The Jews are still a chosen race; the process of selection continues by the clipping of its fraying fringes. And whatever may be urged by the anti-Zionists, the dominant fact remains. Zionism means practical concentration, which must lead naturally to preservation, and even intensification, which will counteract any laxity; for wherever Jews are gathered and united by their ideals—and Zionism is the only means that has been and can be discovered by which this combination of idealism and realism can be maintained in the face of the factors in modern civilisation that disintegrate religions—there will be Judaism. Their career as outcasts with the badge of sufferance will come to an end; Palestine will cease to be a land of dilapidated tombs and shabby mendicants, and become repopulated by tillers of the soil. It will take its place in the commonwealth of nations commensurate with the importance of its geographical position, a link and a highway between East and West, as it was intended to be. It will be inhabited by a vigorous and progressive people, who will bring the civilisation from the West, as in days of old they brought light to the world from the East. And Palestine for the Jews is not a gift. They have paid the price long ago; they are paying it again to-day in the war.

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THE OLD TESTAMENT AND ITS ETHICAL TEACHING.

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The Old Testament is coming in to-day for a certain amount of somewhat hasty criticism and condemnation. But it is its ethical teaching and injunctions which have usually to bear the heaviest and sharpest attack. It can hardly be denied that the Old Testament reached and taught the doctrine of One God. But as to the moral character of that God, and as to the morality taught by his messengers and servants—well, too often the idea seems to be that we have got beyond these altogether, or that our highest moral conceptions come from quite other sources than the Old Testament. It is ideas or implications of this kind which it is desirable, I think, to examine with some care.

The depreciation of the Old Testament seems to be generally carried out in two main ways. First, emphasis is laid upon its most primitive, or, at any rate, upon its least ethical elements, and these are then regarded as characteristic of the whole. Secondly, the best things in it are either given a cheapening interpretation, or they are simply ignored.

The Old Testament is made to stand for certain unsatisfactory, inadequate, or unethical sentiments and ideas, examples of which can undoubtedly be found in it, but which are contradicted by, or are in antagonism to, other sentiments and other ideas that are no less within it than the first. Both the New Testament and the Old Testament are regarded as homogeneous, but whereas the former is spoken of as if its religion and its morality were all on the level of its best things, the homogeneity of the latter is degraded to the level of its worst.

The Old Testament *does* contain the law of the "talio"—an eye for an eye. a tooth for a tooth; it *does* contain impreca-

tions upon the enemies of Israel, or of the pious in Israel; it *does* declare that God visits the sins of the fathers upon the children; it does say that he "hated" Esau; it *does* describe the awful punishments which he inflicts, or will inflict, upon his foes. And, doubtless, this catalogue of religious and moral inadequacies and anachronisms could easily be enlarged.

But these things are not the only teachings of the Old Testament, any more than the dull, obscure, or indecent passages in Shakespeare are the only things to be found in all his works.

But how far are they the characteristic things? How far are they the things which predominate? How far have they been the influential things?

There is a certain tendency to put down the religious and ethical faults and sins of Europe, whether in the present or the past, to the account of the Old Testament; its religious and ethical virtues to the account of the New. Such a tendency is clearly unhistorical. It would, however, be beyond my knowledge and power to attempt a more just and accurate apportionment (if indeed the division be practicable). And, again, it may sometimes happen that in the same persons good and bad are closely commingled, and that for both one of the two Testaments is predominatingly responsible. The "fierceness" of the Puritans may not be the only quality which they owe to the Old Testament, just as the awful cruelties of the Inquisition may not be the only quality which they owe to the New.

It is unfair and ungracious when the lower elements of a religious document are emphasised instead of the higher. It is churlish if "what does the Lord require of thee, but to do justice and to love mercy" is forgotten, and if "thou shalt not suffer a sorcerer to live" is remembered. It is no less churlish if the grim dualism of the Fourth Gospel, or "I come to bring a sword," or the "everlasting fire," or "the devil" and "the goats," are remembered, and the great and noble things in the Gospels are ignored. It is true that, in a certain sense, each book must accept its responsibility. Huge masses of evil and misery are directly traceable to the New Testament as well as huge masses of happiness and good. In a certain sense the book is equally responsible for both. So, too, with the good and evil results of the Hebrew Scriptures. But when we judge the books objectively, and assess them at their true value, we must, to a large extent, forget, or temporarily withdraw from our purview, the results of the books, and appraise them for what they truly are.

Yet the question how far the lower and primitive things in the Old Testament are the characteristic and predominant things still remains over. Suppose there is, in very truth, a little very good and pure and permanent material in the Old Testament, but suppose that all this is a small and vanishing quantity in comparison with its cruelties, its imprecations, its "eye for an eye," its particularism and its narrowness; should we not be justified in regarding these inferior qualities as predominating, and styling them the characteristic features of the entire book?

Something depends on whether the excellences—whatever their bulk as written—seem occasional and adventitious, the flash of an isolated genius, not followed up and imitated, without influence upon the main stock or line of development, or whether they are of the very essence of the whole, its life and its spirit, informing the entire history and nature, and giving to them their type and peculiarity. In the second case we may justly regard them as the essential characteristics of the whole. Now the excellences of the Old Testament are undoubtedly of this second kind. They are not casual, disconnected, occasional. They are organically connected with the entire development, bone of its bone, spirit of its spirit. The ethical monotheism of the prophets is reproduced in the Law and the Psalter and the Wisdom Literature. The virtues of justice and compassion are the keynotes of the growing morality. The cruelties and the imprecations are, as it were, the hard opposing matter which the true spirit of the religion has not yet been able fully to overcome and to destroy.

That is one main reason why bulk does not determine the matter. Count up all the "good" sentences in the Old Testament, and suppose they come to x. Count up all the "bad" sentences, and suppose they come to x plus y. The matter is not thus so easily and arithmetically settled. The bad are not thereby proved to be the characteristic features of the whole. For the essence of the whole story and of the literature, the true nature and final worth of the religion, lie in the excellences and not in the defects. So we might say that the true Wordsworth—the Wordsworth that counts, the poet Wordsworth—is contained in much less than half the words which he wrote. It is the "good" which is characteristic of him, not the poor and the feeble and the bad.

But these more general reflections do not exhaust the subject. There are certain further special features both of Old Testament excellences and of Old Testament defects

which should be carefully remembered. The defects or evils are partly primitive; the Good had to work, or did work, upon a hard and intractable material. It is this hard and intractable material—the stiff-necked people—which makes the result all the more striking and strange. It seems to make the presence and working of the Divine Spirit all the more conclusive and irresistible. The native Hebrew nature does not appear to be very attractive or delightful soil for the inspiration of God. A good part of the "bad" of the Old Testament; a good deal of that which we now justly regard as obsolete, or imperfect, or superseded, or disagreeable, or false, or even immoral, we may regard as "primitive." It is the stubborn subsoil, which has not yet been transformed and overcome.

But not all the defects are primitive. Some of the defects appear quite as strongly, or sometimes more strongly, and with fresh developments and guises, in later than in earlier documents. Now as regards many of these defects we may justly say that they are the defects of qualities. This is a very important matter, and should never be forgotten. Take, for instance, the awful cruelties ordered in Deuteronomy to be applied to the Canaanites. Or take the horrible slaughters which are threatened by Ezekiel against the idolaters at the "Messianic" age and the final judgment. These things are the defects of a consuming passion for righteousness, for the service of the One God, for purity, for holiness. Or, again, take the "evil" examples of the doctrines of retribution and tit for tat. These things are the exaggerated and perverted results of a desire for justice. A finer justice would undoubtedly condemn them. But they are not merely and sheerly evil. They are rather imperfect and mistaken expressions of good: the aim is good, but the means are bad. The bad means are not justified because of the good end, but they are partially explained.

Next we may, I think, observe that the imperfections and evils of the Old Testament, though many in number, if we count the written verses, are not really so many, if we count the kinds. Fierceness, false conceptions or applications of justice, particularism—these are the three main kinds, and in each case the essential "good" doctrines of the Old Testament,—its true creations and its veritable line of development—contradict, and are in antagonism to, the imperfections and the evils. "The Lord, the Lord, merciful and gracious God"—a fundamental and essential doctrine, if ever there is one at all—contradicts the fierceness and the cruelty. So do the love

and the pity, so do the justice and the compassion, which we are so constantly bidden to show to "neighbour" and to "stranger" (who these are, and what are their limitations, we will deal with later on). The righteousness and mercy which we are to practise and to love are in opposition to the "tit-for-tat" retribution and requital. The doctrine of the One God, creator and lord of the spirits of all flesh, good to all, whose mercy is over all his works, is in flagrant contradiction to the "narrowness" and "particularism." We must interpret the election of Israel, not in terms of favouritism and partiality, but according to the highest doctrine of the Servant passages in the Babylonian Isaiah. Here, too, the Old Testament supplies the corrective to its own imperfections. The doctrine of the chosen people is not in itself immoral. But it has to be interpreted to mean not favouritism and presents, but pain, discipline, and service. Thus the excellences are once more shown to be the essential, the positive, the permanent, things in the Old Testament. They are the things which really count, which make the book what it is, which give to it its value and its meaning, which stamp it with a peculiar and precious character, which seem to reveal in it the finger and the spirit of God.

I have made free admissions about the defects and imperfections. Though they are limited in kinds, I have allowed that there are many examples of each kind. But an impartial verdict will, I believe, also have to allow and admit that the excellences are neither few in kinds nor in examples. On the purely ethical side do we always adequately remember what and how many these excellences are? If the *best* moral teachings, the *best* moral injunctions, and the *best* moral ideals of the Old Testament were carried out and fully realised, what a paradise this earth would be! Clean hands and pure hearts: outward and inward truth: fidelity even "to his own hurt": justice, compassion, purity, peace. And in conjunction with the subject-matter of the excellences, we may fairly take the point that our own civilisation seems to rest upon, and to demand, just these Old Testament ideals. The moral principles which we hold highest are the very principles which underlie, or are exemplified by, the best Old Testament injunctions, maxims, and aspirations. In some respects there has been a certain reversion to Old Testament ideals in quite modern times. For in one important point the Old Testament needs supplementing by the doctrine which grew up between the Old Testament and the New—the doctrine which is as important to the Rabbis as it is to the authors of the Epistles

and the Gospels—I mean the doctrine of the resurrection and the future life. But all the more keen, therefore, is the Old Testament on a good and holy earth, an earthly society of justice and compassion and love. And is not the best temper of our own time determined that, whatever may be in store for men after their deaths, we will seek to make this earth a better dwelling-place for them during their lives? The Kingdom of God is to be realised upon earth as well as in heaven. It is worth while, it is right, it is desirable, to renovate and transform earth, as well as to expect and look forward to heaven. But this renovation or transforming of earth is an Old Testament ideal.

And how is it to be achieved? Should not we, too, say by the two or three Old Testament virtues of justice, compassion, and lovingkindness? And are not these virtues the moving forces of the best Old Testament morality?

Think how they possessed the prophets, how they informed the prophetic religion. Justice, mercy, lovingkindness: these are the prophetic ideals. Social justice and social lovingkindness: the prophets set in motion a passion for these excellences, which found expression in the Law, the Psalter, and the Wisdom Literature, and, later on, in the Rabbinic teachings as well. The best spirits in Israel showed a genius for social morality, they set going a passion for righteousness, which was so finely expressed by Amos when he said, "Let justice roll down as waters, and righteousness as a perpetual stream."

Justice and compassion meet and mingle in lovingkindness and love. The desire for justice and compassion spring from, and stimulate, a certain spirit of fraternity, of humanity. Do we, then, find fraternity and humanity in the best utterances of the Old Testament? Yes, certainly; not, indeed, perfectly expressed, but on the road, and even far along it. I do not mean humanity as a mere synonym of compassion, but I mean humanity even in the broader sense of a respect for man as man. It is not yet perfect; it meets with difficulties; it is confronted with prejudices, "defects of qualities," old established institutions, and inherited hatreds. But yet it grows, and the ideas and the injunctions which it generates are easily capable of enlargement and purification. Think, first of all, of the respect demanded for the old, the deaf, and the blind. Think of the charity inculcated to be shown to the widow and the orphan. Think of the tremendous sympathy exhibited by the prophets, and reflected in the Law and in the Proverbs, for the oppressed and the poor. No castes.

"The rich and the poor meet together: the Lord is the maker of them all."

It may be said: but what of the fact that the Law, posterior to the prophets as, taken as a whole, it is, yet recognised slavery? It did. But so far as Israelite slaves were concerned, it did what it could to soften and alleviate their lot. It did what it could to turn their slavery into something better and less permanent. Bondmen as they were in Egypt, the Israelites are bidden, for that very reason, to be pitiful themselves towards the helpless, the wretched and the poor. The fruit and flower of Old Testament are seen in the thirty-first chapter of Job. Speaking of his slave, he says, "Did not he that made me in the womb make him? And did not One fashion us in the womb?" We have only to push Old Testament teaching to its full limits, to develop it along its own best lines, to reveal all that is implied in it, and slavery—whether from the point of view of religion or of morality—stands equally condemned.

But the caviller has a reply. "Israelite slaves," he answers, with something of a sneering stress upon the adjective. Over them, truly, the Israelites are not to rule "with rigour." But what of the gentile and the foreigner?

I will come to that. First, however, let us realise the position within the community itself. I contend that the ideal there is one of loving fraternity. "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart." "Thou shalt not avenge nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people." The same ideal is expressed in the Wisdom Literature. "Love covers all sins." In conjunction with the repeated insistence upon justice and pity, the famous command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," deserves the fullest attention. At all events "neighbour" includes all the "children of thy people," whether rich or poor, bond or free.

Was the ideal reached? Surely not. What ideal has ever been reached? But it is there. The imprecatory psalms continually violate the command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," but the command stands unsullied none the less.

Yet it has been assailed on two sides. Its alleged limitation to the Israelite, on the one hand, its alleged exclusion of the enemy, upon the other.

The excellence and purity of Old Testament morality have been depreciated and assailed, in order to exalt thereby the excellence and originality of the New Testament, and because of the well-known attack in the Sermon on the Mount. Jesus

is there alleged to have said that "neighbour" excluded "enemy." The Law, or, at any rate, the older teaching, with which Jesus contrasts his own, is alleged to have bidden the Israelite to love his neighbour, but to hate his enemy. His enemy, therefore, is not his neighbour.

As to how far Jew and Christian have in practice "loved" their enemies and sought their good, I have no special information. I should be ready to hold that honours are easy. I know no evidence which leads me to believe that Jews have either exceeded, or fallen short of, the measure of hate which throughout the ages has been shown and felt by Christians. I have no evidence to show that Christians have loved their enemies many fractions more or less than Jews have loved them. But the question is not one of practice: it is one of ideal and command, however greatly the command may be neglected, however completely the infirmity of human nature may have rendered it a dead and idle letter.

There is no doubt that if the statement in Matthew was actually made by Jesus, it either does not mean what it appears to mean, or Jesus was guilty of a rhetorical exaggeration. There is no injunction in the Law, or elsewhere in the Old Testament, stating, "Thou shalt hate thy enemy." What makes the matter worse, and the misstatement still graver, is that Jesus is obviously not thinking here of any contrast between Israelite and gentile. He is speaking of the Israelite only, and to the Israelite only. The foreigner is not within his thoughts, any more than he would be to a village preacher to-day. The people whom he is concerned with, the people whom he wants to make kindly and loving to each other, are the people who are in constant contact with each other: the villagers of Galilee are to love one another; the Israelite is to love all his neighbours, even if these neighbours are his enemies. If Jesus had been thinking of the enemies of Israel, and not of private enemies, he would have said so. For all his other injunctions in the same chapter relate to private and individual morality, and not to national morality. If the injunction as to enemies had been intended to allude to anything so startling as the love of Israel's enemies, if this injunction, unlike all the others, had related to national and not to individual morality, he would surely have expressed himself more clearly. Whether the historic Jesus would have asked his disciples to love the gentile is capable of argument. There is a good deal to be said both for and against. What seems clear is that in this particular passage and in this particular injunction he is not thinking of the foreigner at all.

As regards, then, the Israelite enemy, there is no command in the Old Testament that he is to be hated. But is there any command that he is to be loved? No, there is not. And I am far from approving those criticisms of modern Jewish writers who, instead of admiring the command, "Thou shalt *love* thine enemy," depreciate and condemn it. It would be foolish to deny that Matthew v. 44–48 and Luke vi. 27, 28 are among the noblest specimens of human ethics, among the finest of human ideals and commands. But what *is* the love of enemies? How is it to be shown? I do not suppose that Jesus meant that we are to feel for our enemies the same kind of feeling that we feel for our wives, our children, and our friends. The Jewish critics are doubtless right when they say that to ask for such a feeling would be absurd and undesirable. But, as so often when critics of one religion attack the injunctions and ideals of another, the Jewish critics set up a ninepin in order to knock it down. It is an easy and delightful entertainment, but of dubious utility. Jesus, I am sure, was thinking of something which *is* practicable. And the explanation of the "love" demanded is best given in the simple words: "do good to them that hate you." And so far as feelings are concerned, we *can* avoid the desire of revenge, we *can* avoid delight when the enemy falls into misfortune. Now love of this practical kind, and the quenching of feelings of this undesirable sort, are both demanded by the Old Testament itself. Therefore, as regards the enemy—still be it remembered the private enemy of the individual—there is no difference between the morality of the Old Testament and the New. Both are noble. The New confirms, deepens, rounds off, and sums up (in grand and impressive words) the teaching of the Old.

It is well to recall the passages. In the oldest of the Pentateuchal Codes we have the ordinances: "If thou meet thine enemy's ox or his ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again. If thou see the ass of him that hates thee lying under his burden, thou shalt surely help to loosen it." Then in the later Code: "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart. Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people." These laws produce in the Wisdom Literature the following effects: "Say not thou I will recompense evil." "Rejoice not when thine enemy falls." "Say not, I will do so to him as he has done to me; I will render to the man according to his work." "If thine enemy be hungry, give him bread to eat; if he be thirsty, give him water to drink." And among the terrible sins, of which Job solemnly

declares himself guiltless, is this: "If I rejoiced at the destruction of him that hates me; or lifted up myself when evil found him." Surely this teaching is on the same lines, and points in the same direction, as the teaching of Jesus. The second is the culmination of the first. So here, too, the foundations of our present ideals, and much of their embodiment, are to be found in the pages of the Hebrew Bible.

But what about the alleged narrowness and particularism? Well, I do not maintain that every moral excellence is found, or equally conspicuous, in the Old Testament. I fully admit that narrowness and particularism frequently disfigure it. But it must not be forgotten that they are in contradiction (as I have already hinted) to Old Testament monotheism, to the doctrine that God is One, that he is good to all, and that his mercy is over all his works. They are in contradiction to the doctrine of man, and not merely the Israelite, being created in the divine image. They are in contradiction to the doctrine that the object of Israel's election is to disseminate throughout the world the knowledge of God. They are in contradiction to the highest Messianic ideal. We can use the Old Testament to confute the Old Testament, the broad to confute the narrow, the universal hope to confute the particularist desires.

We may freely allow that the universalism which we now cherish is largely due to two influences over and above Old Testament monotheism. One is the teaching of St Paul; the other is the teaching of the Stoics. But neither Paul nor the Stoics could have wrought what they did for Europe without the monotheism of the Jews.

Admitting, then, a measure of particularism in Old Testament teaching, have we also to admit that if the Old Testament did not teach the Israelite to hate his private and personal enemy, it did teach him to hate the enemy of his nation and his God? Or even worse: Did it teach him only to love his brother Israelite, but to regard every non-Israelite as an enemy and to hate him?

To go anything like as far as this second assertion would be, I think, very unfair. There is no doubt that there was much hatred of the idolater and of the oppressor. And there is also no doubt that the idolater, as, to the Christian, the heretic, was looked upon as the enemy of God. So was the oppressor of Israel: he, too, was God's enemy as well as Israel's.

All this is doubtless the great infirmity of the Old Testament, just as the ready way in which the enemies of Jesus, and, in the Fourth Gospel, the Jews, are relegated to

destruction, devil and hell, is the great infirmity of the New Testament. There is glass in both our houses: we had far better not throw stones at one another.

The real reason why Christian critics are so painfully anxious to show up the limitations of the Old Testament injunction, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," is to leave more space for the originality of Jesus. It is a nuisance that the injunction, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," is in the Old Testament at all. For if "neighbour" meant everybody, what more would be left for Jesus to say? Therefore it is most important to show that "neighbour" most emphatically did *not* mean everybody, and that the lawgiver spoke with conscious and most intentional limitation. And, on the other hand, it is most important to show that when Jesus uses or quotes the injunction, he *does* mean everybody, and that he *always* has the gentile in his mind as well as the Jew. Thus even Professor Kent —a distinguished and admirable American scholar—observes with regard to Leviticus xix. 17–18, "In these laws which relate to inner motives and feelings, the Hebrew lawgivers almost attain to the New Testament ideal. In the brief command in Leviticus xix. 18b, Jesus found the epitome of all Old Testament legislation regarding man's duty to his fellow-men. He, however, raised it above its narrower Israelitish setting and made it of universal application." To emphasise this Israelite setting, Professor Kent translates the first part of Leviticus xix. 18, "Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear a grudge against the members of thy race," just as he translates Leviticus xix. 17a, "Thou shalt not hate thy fellow-countryman in thy heart." It may, however, be questioned whether the "i" is not dotted, and the "t" is not crossed, too sharply. I do not for a moment intend to imply that by any of the words he used the legislator meant to include the alien or the non-Israelite. But I also believe that he did not mean consciously and definitely to exclude them. There was not, as might, I think, be almost gathered from Professor Kent's renderings, a sort of intended implication: "Remember, I say, thy fellow-countryman and the members of thy race. I do not say, and I even consciously exclude, the non-Israelite. Him you need not love: him, indeed, you may hate!" That would, I think, be going too far. The non-Israelite was not in the legislator's mind one way or the other, any more than when a Christian preacher, in ordinary times, bids his congregation to love one another, he is either consciously including, or consciously excluding, the Mahommedan and

the Jew. He is not thinking of them one way or the other. It is quite enough for him, and for the ordinary, practical purposes of life it is quite enough for them, if his hearers love the people with whom they habitually come in contact. And these, in 99 cases out of 100, are neither Mahommedans nor Jews.

Assuming, however, that the injunction to love one's neighbour as oneself did not consciously include, if it did not intentionally exclude, the non-Israelite and the foreigner (and this assumption would, I think, be correct), the Pentateuchal law, nevertheless, did itself make some progress in the universalistic direction. An interesting use is made in Deuteronomy of the sojourn in Egypt, during which ill-treatment was received by the Israelites at the hands of the Egyptians. We get here a very significant instance of an inverted "talio," a moralised and topsy-turvy tit for tat. Here, again, we can enlarge a principle which, as regards the Ammonite and the Moabite, the lawgivers failed to apply or make use of themselves. "Thou shalt not abhor an Egyptian, for thou wast a stranger in his land." "A stranger in his land." The Hebrew word is *Ger*, and the laws about the *Gerim* constitute an important feature of all the Codes. Thus in the oldest Code we have the order: "Thou shalt not oppress a stranger: for ye know the heart of a stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt." In Deuteronomy we are told that God loves the stranger; "love ye, therefore, the stranger: for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt." The later "Holiness" Code takes the same line. "The stranger that dwells with you shall be unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself: for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt."

Certainly, then, the limitation to love only the fellow-countrymen was, to some extent, at any rate, broken through!

But who was the "stranger"? The law to love him is not wholly pleasing to those who wish to depreciate the morality of the Old Testament. Hence they are at pains to point out that the stranger is, in no wise, the mere foreigner, any casual gentile or non-Israelite, but strictly and solely the resident alien, the man who had left his own tribe or people, and taken up his residence in, and put himself under the protection of, Israel. The *Ger* and the *Nochri* (foreigner) are sharply distinguished from each other.

All this is perfectly true. The *Ger* is *not* the foreigner: he *is* the resident alien. It is for him that the latest Codes declare that there is to be the same law as for the native born.

Yet he need not, unless he wish, fully adopt the religion of his adopted land, and thus, unless he submitted to circumcision, he could not "eat the passover" (Exodus xii. 45, 48). It is, therefore, true enough that the famous laws of Deuteronomy x. 19 and Leviticus xix. 34 should really be rendered thus: "Love ye, therefore, the resident alien, for ye were resident aliens in the land of Egypt." "The resident alien that dwells with you shall be unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself: for ye were resident aliens in the land of Egypt."

Is the value of the law or its morality much diminished? Perhaps, somewhat. But not greatly. For, after all, the resident alien was not of the same blood or race as the Israelite: he was *not* a fellow-countryman. And, secondly, he *was* the sort of foreigner with whom (as I suppose) the Israelite came most frequently into contact. He was the foreigner whose kind treatment was of real practical importance. He was the foreigner who was under the protection of no foreign Power: who had given up his allegiance to his own tribe or nation, the protection of which he therefore no longer continued to enjoy.

Surely even for us Europeans or Americans to-day the injunction, "Love ye, therefore, the resident alien," is by no means superfluous. For us, too, is not he sometimes the most uncomfortable, the most real, the most vividly present, the most awkward, of all foreigners? It is pretty easy to love the Tartar and the Tibetan; but how about the Negro? And it is odd that they who are at greatest pains to point out the sad deficiencies of the Old Testament in its limitation of love to the resident alien, are often those who most conspicuously violate that Law, the moral level of which they consider themselves to have so far exceeded and passed beyond! "One Law for the native born and the resident alien. Ye shall love him as yourselves." Then how about the Jew? Is he not the *Ger*? Has he not come to seek protection and hospitality, and taken up his permanent abode, in the land of his adoption? Let us, then, by all means universalise Old Testament morality still further, but let us first of all seek to live up to it as it stands!

The Old Testament does not contain everything in religion which we have, and prize, and want, to-day. But it does contain the main things. As regards both religion and morality it does seem, with curious felicity and genius, to have fastened upon, discovered, and joined together (not always by any means in a perfect or fully developed form) the main, great, practical things, from which further progress and

development become possible and could be effected. On the whole, too, it avoided the things which impeded such progress and such development. Its defects are pretty easily shed; its qualities are definite, practical, and capable of expansion.

Its monotheism reveals to us at once its strength and its limitations. We do not go to the Old Testament for any theory or speculation as to the nature of God and of his relation to the world. The metaphysical difficulties in its own conception of God do not disturb it for a moment: it leaves them unnoticed. So we must get over them or explain them, or accept them, as best we can, with other help from other sources. But what it does do is to give us in its conception of God a peculiar combination of religion and morality. It has given us the sublime doctrine of One God, above and beyond the world, yet "near" the world, the world's creator, ruler, sustainer, its wisdom and its Spirit. But it has given us this doctrine, not as a key to knowledge, but as the secret of righteousness. For the essence of its doctrine is not so much that God is One as that he is good; that he is perfect in righteousness and compassion; that he cares for his creation; that he is holy. This is a conception of God which is of value for human life, for human action, for human goodness. This is a conception, the defects of which, as presented to us in its various stages of development, can be removed, but the comforts and sweetness of which abide. And this is a conception which makes for righteousness and love, because the service of this righteousness and loving God is declared by the purest Old Testament genius to reside in acts of righteousness and love towards man. Hence it is that this genius—the Old Testament genius—is neither purely religious nor purely ethical, but is essentially and emphatically a peculiar and special combination both of morality and of religion.

To have vitally connected morality with the doctrine of One God, and to have vitally connected the service of that One God with morality—this is the glory of the Old Testament. It riveted religion and morality together both for God and for man. Man cannot do without forms and institutions and outward embodiments; and there is plenty of them in the Old Testament. But to put them for ever in their proper place, which, again, means to unite morality and religion together, we have the simple, yet profound and far-reaching, doctrine of the prophets. "I desire love and not sacrifice." "Let justice roll down like water." "What does the Lord require of thee but to do justly and to love compassion?"

And the lesson was learnt; though sometimes clouded and ignored, it was never wholly forgotten. The community knew at bottom that the sacrifice of God was a broken spirit; it knew that the true fast was to deal bread to the hungry; it knew that forgiveness was only vouchsafed to the wicked when they turned from their evil way; and to remind itself of these truths it incorporated the fifty-first psalm and the fifty-eighth chapter of Isaiah and the book of Jonah in the liturgy of its outward and ceremonial Atonement Day.

It is a common criticism upon Old Testament morality and religion to speak of its eudæmonism, its stress upon outward well-being ("prosperity is the blessing of the Old Testament"), its coarse doctrine of reward and punishment. And I fully admit that a certain purification is here necessary. There is a measure of truth in the criticism. We need to supplement and correct Old Testament teaching in these respects with the idealism of the Platonic philosophy and the Stoics. That is true. But if we are out to find all the good we can in the Old Testament instead of all the temporary, the obsolete, or the evil, we shall perceive that behind the defects there lurks a truth, a truth in which we place our hope and confidence even to-day. That truth is the justified union of happiness and righteousness. We not only ought to do justly and to love mercy; but through justice and mercy and brotherly love human society becomes happier and more prosperous. It is in every sense worth while to be just. The increase of justice makes for increase of human well-being. And human well-being is itself worth while. The life of a just society is good: worth having and living. The "outwardness" of the Old Testament is part of its hopefulness. Do we not need, and feed upon, that hopefulness even to-day?

We may notice too in the Old Testament a certain excellent sanity and balance. And yet in the prophets, at any rate, there is no lack of enthusiasm and ardour. We may observe this balance in the choice of the two fundamental virtues—justice and compassion. Justice, and again, justice: excellent; and surely the democracy of to-day echoes the cry. But justice alone will not suffice: there will always be room for those virtues of the heart—mercy, pity, compassion. Justice and pity are combined in love. Or again, putting an already mentioned truth another way, we must love and serve God, and we must allot time, and devote actions, to his exclusive service (for us, public worship, private prayer). But the chief field of his love and his service lies in *moral* action. The

service of man is the best service of God. This idea we have learnt from the Old Testament.

Another idea, too, there is which was elaborated by the Rabbis, but which goes back, by adequate implication, to Old Testament sources. It connects with Old Testament hopefulness, and with the good side of Old Testament "materialism" and "earthliness." Between the close of the Old Testament and the beginning of the New Testament period there was incorporated into Judaism the doctrine of the future life. But that doctrine in its Jewish forms did not lead to the depreciation of earthly life. It only gave to the Old Testament high evaluation of earthly life a securer basis. It added to the right attachment to earthly life a right detachment, and, perhaps too, I should also say, to right enjoyment a right asceticism.

Now it is this right and high evaluation of human life which is suggested, and even taught, by the Hebrew Scriptures. Life is sanctified. We are to be holy, as life's Source and Giver is holy. Hence, first, a concern and respect for human life, wanting, as other Old Testament excellences are wanting, in Greek morality. Infanticide, the exposure of children, would be abhorrent to the Judaism of the Law. Abortion would also be repudiated. Again, we see in Old Testament morality a growing respect for chastity. Very significant for the Old Testament sense of cleanliness and of purity is its stern prohibition of unnatural offences. When we recall the wide prevalence of these offences in the East and in Greece, and the tentative and inadequate way in which even the best teachers of Greece (and not all of these teachers) condemned them, we may, I think, justly regard Israel's attitude towards these horrors as both a moral and a religious inspiration. The "natural" is not condemned outright, for earthly life is not bad, but good. It is to be enjoyed; it is to continue. Not celibacy is the ideal, but marriage and family life. The spirit is to sanctify the flesh. To eat and drink are the fundamental gifts of God. Eat, then, and drink as befits a creature who can worship the divine Bestower—with gladness, with self-control, with a word of thanks and of blessing. I do not say that all these ideas are explicit in the Old Testament; still less do I say that in Old Testament times they were always acted up to. But I do say that they are implicit in the trend of the best Old Testament teaching, and that (as I may, perhaps, add here) they were largely drawn out and made explicit by the Rabbis.

The curious and inseparable commixture of morality and

religion in Old Testament ideals is further seen in the conception of holiness. It is true that holiness was not yet perfectly moralised. It had an outward, as well as an inward, signification. But the inward and ethical element predominated in the highest minds. Nevertheless, the injunction "be holy" means something more, something deeper, than the injunction "be good," just as the holy God means something more than the good God. What is this something more? It is not easy to say, but I think that this something more is just that thrill, that fervour, that touch of purity, reverence, and awe, in which a morality that depends upon, and reaches up to, a perfect and adorable God differs from a morality (however exalted) which is without him. And in this conception of holiness, and in this injunction to Israel to be holy, the idea was started, so fruitful and so spiritual, of the true Imitation of God. So of this idea, too, we may find the beginnings in the Old Testament, just as we may also find that conception of God, which keeps God and man apart, and yet brings them together, which denies the "essential unity of the divine and the human," and yet bids man imitate, so far as man can, the inimitable perfections of the Divine. Man can never become divine, but he can draw nearer and nearer unto God.

This improvement and development of man is but another way of expressing the doctrine of the Messiah and the Messianic age. In the forms in which we find this doctrine expressed in the pages of the Old Testament it is obsolete and outworn. But it can still appeal to us. It expresses the worth-whileness of human effort, it justifies a right attachment to the world and to earthly life, it helps us in our hopefulness for the future of society and of man. It is no longer adequate to bear the full burden of evil: it must be supplemented by another hope, more intimate and more personal. But the prophet's faith stimulates and strengthens our own. The vision of a fuller justice, a wider knowledge (both of the human and the divine), a deeper righteousness—that is our vision still. And with these there is united the vision of a fairer and a more lasting peace. "They shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." In that vision the ideals of religion and of democracy are commingled.

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MORALITY AND CONVENTION.

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IT is now well understood that an attack upon what is called "conventional morality" supplies by far the most popular *motif* for a modern novel or a modern drama. Except in the hands of the highest artists this literary craft has been almost mechanised. Nine times out of ten the nature of the *dénouement* can be predicted from the opening scenes or the opening chapters. The author takes some principle upon which reputable persons are in the habit of acting, some law of life which is preached from orthodox pulpits and enjoined in orthodox education. Perhaps it is the maxim that theft must not be excused by the pressure of want, or that crime will be prevented by making punishment inexorable, or that marriage should be held a permanent bond irrespective of changing preference in those who have contracted it. With a little ingenuity one can draw a situation where rigid adherence to such rules has proved excruciatingly painful. The thief is shown as a good fellow at heart; like one of Fielding's winsome highwaymen, he has been more sinned against than sinning, the victim of savage economic forces, driven frantic by the distress of a starving family, robbing only those who will never miss what he has taken, and sentenced, we may be sure, by a magistrate who is pharisaically religious. The passion-driven homicide is presented as born in a slum, depraved not through his own will but through a vicious and irresistible environment, yet preserving withal some roots of natural virtue which need only a moral sunlight in which to spring up, responsive to the touch of generosity but relapsing under penal treatment into a sullen defiance. Some ill-assorted union, where the mistake of an hour has become the bondage of a life, is made to develop before us into incurable misery, a curse to both the partners and a menace to the future of

their children. The suggested inference is that society in such matters is partly stupid and partly dishonest; stupid because it does not see the need for a far more elastic code, in which the essence of justice will be kept but its forms will vary with circumstance; dishonest because it

> "Compounds for sins it is inclined to
> By damning those it has no mind to."

It is to be feared that a great deal of the widespread interest in these problems is without much promise for their solution. We go to see *The Sins of Society*, expecting the same sort of pleasurable excitement that Evangelical old ladies used to get from a passage in church about the horrors of Hell. There is a piquant charm in seeing our neighbours, particularly our most respectable neighbours, exposed as being "at bottom hypocrites." To be sure, each of us knows that he is in his own degree responsible if the public conscience is depraved. But he thinks that his share has been small, and he does not feel the reproach as personal, any more than he feels personally ashamed during a sermon on original sin, or personally affronted when "the age" is called frivolous and superficial. He may even get out of it a heightened self-esteem. For, while others are merely *exhibiting* moral inconsistency, has not he, with the help of the novelist or the dramatist, reached an exceptional insight into the matter, and become able on occasion to point out its grossness?

There are, of course, far more creditable reasons for the moral restlessness in question. Those who applaud Mr Galsworthy's *Justice* or Mr Bayard Veiller's *Within the Law* are often among the most thoughtful and serious of the public. One thing that moves them is just this: such plays give a very welcome, and probably a quite just assurance, that human nature is a far better thing than the stern old school believed. It is a generous impulse which makes us dwell upon extenuating circumstances, which makes us long to believe a criminal less black than he has been painted. Chivalry waits to take up the cause of the under dog. The gallery bursts into plaudits at the unmasking of the prosecutor, at the revelation that in his own whitewashed way he is a worse villain than the poor wretch whom he would send to jail. Thus the successful drama at present is one that presents human character as much more uniform than our ancestors supposed. It seeks to establish a sort of moral equality, even if it must level down rather than levelling up, and the democratic sentiment is at once conciliated. We like to feel that if the secrets of all hearts were disclosed,

accuser, accused, judge, and jurymen would not be so very different; that, in short, as the old lines have it,

> "There is so much good in the worst of us,
> And so much bad in the best of us,
> That it ill becomes any one of us
> To look down on the rest of us."

Now, I am far from minimising the educative value which belongs to these artistic presentations when they are skilfully and earnestly executed. Much genuine concern is abroad about social injustices and how to remedy them. And the authors of imaginative literature, especially since *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, have held a sort of prescriptive right to operate thus upon the conscience of the public. It is probable that in no other way could the poignancy of a situation be brought home with such general effectiveness. Statistics and speeches about prison discipline might reach a few; but Charles Reade's *Never Too Late to Mend* could raise the multitude to a white heat of indignation. Bentham's assault upon the delays of Chancery became at once understood when everybody in England was reading *Bleak House*. And while superior persons say that the Novel with a Purpose is bad Art, few of us agree with them when we have sampled those novels which quite obviously had no purpose.

But it is one thing to welcome the great reforms which have been achieved in this way, and quite another to endorse a principle which has by degrees insinuated itself into the mind of the man in the street, and which pretends to be the underlying moral which the history of such reforms has involved. It has become widely maintained that enlightened people must think out all problems of conduct from the foundation, that wisdom here begins in contempt of the past, and that in every sphere it is not only legitimate but even obligatory to "get away from convention." There is another side to this, which is very clearly and very painfully understood by those who have considered what this cry of moral emancipation has meant in the family ethics of the Western States. Its conspicuous monument there is in the records of the Divorce Court. On the general principle of which this is but a single outcome I wish to offer some remarks.

I.

Those who speak with scorn of conventional morality seem to have before their minds a sort of unnatural perversion, a system which did not grow but was rather manufactured, a code either imposed by senseless authority from without or invented with more or less sinister purpose from within.

They think of it as, at the best, unreflective prejudice; at the worst, a deliberate pretence under which one part of society makes pariahs of another part. The blame for this imposture is placed upon some order which the critic specially dislikes—the clergy, the aristocrats, the capitalists. Just now an intellectual circle of unique refinement specialises in derision of the middle class, to whose moral notions the epithet "smug" is applied with great success. As a kind of new spice to the jaded critical appetite, writers like Dr Oscar Levy issue an ethical brochure in dainty blue binding, fit to adorn the table of a boudoir in the *siècle Louis Quatorze*; the contents are to the effect that what men have so far called evil they should begin with Nietzsche to rename good, and that lordly as distinct from slavish morals will follow in the wake of this verbal improvement. If such be not a satisfying assault upon Convention, we must be hard to please.

In contrast to such a view I should like to offer a humble defence on behalf of traduced mankind. I believe that the common conscience is often far more intelligent and far more sincere than the judgment of these critics; that where it goes wrong they are, as a rule, much too ignorant of its structure to put it right; that what society needs is, not seldom, an extra endowment of moral obstinacy—the sort of obstinacy which makes many a poor invalid, though acutely conscious that he is ill, turn away in fear from the raw medical youth who brings out of his pocket some fiery drug to dose him or some ghastly implement to operate upon him.

Nine-tenths of the theoretical attacks upon Convention turn upon an ambiguity in the word. They are attacks upon a phantasm, and if imposture has been at work at all it has appeared mainly in the skill with which our critics first falsify the pedigree of common morals and then hold up the poor progeny to contempt. "Convention" means agreement, and hence ought to imply freedom of choice. It even suggests an element of caprice; for the more capricious a choice has been, the more appropriate do we regard the epithet "conventional" as applied to the arrangement which has been its outcome. Thus we speak of the conventional procedure of law, but not of the conventional processes of digestion, for the latter are imposed by necessity, while the former—though they are at least believed to have a basis in reason—might within very wide limits have been varied by human preference. Most fitting of all is the use of the word when we have before us such a scheme as the alphabet or a scientific nomenclature; for although even these are not wholly arbitrary, they come as

close as we can get to a sheer creation of will, a product whose value consists in its general acceptance, and which, if it had been otherwise constructed, would have been equally serviceable provided it were adopted with equal unanimity. No doubt philologists can prove that in giving the name parabola to a particular curve, and the name kinetic to a particular sort of energy, we were not quite free agents choosing at random. They can also prove that not every alphabet is as good as every other—that the English alphabet, for example, is both redundant and defective,—and hence that even literary symbolism has its normative laws. But this serves to enforce rather than to discredit my point. Just in that degree in which the use of words or letters has been prescribed to us, language is not truly conventional: it is natural.

When we bring the word, charged with such significance, into the sphere of the moral life, it at once begins to confuse our thinking. "Most of our ideas about right and wrong are conventional," say the novelists. On the contrary, it is very hard indeed to find any of those ideas to which we can accurately apply such an epithet. They are for the most part the workings of unconscious reason. The modern Communist, I suppose, will stigmatise as conventional most of our received notions about property. But, unless he is deluded by the unhistorical fancies of a French Jacobin, he will have to confess that from the beginning of time every man has been granted a right to the exclusive possession of some things, and that, while no primitive conference of the species settled which these were to be, their progressive assignment and delimitation have followed lines which may have been wrong but which at least were not arbitrary. They were laid down under the pressure of social needs and feelings. I for one am ready to admit that they were often laid down amiss, and that many of them are amiss still. But the fault did not lie in subservience to "Convention" and in omitting to appeal to "Nature." For in the same sense in which Nature authenticates, let us say, the right to life, she authenticates that order by which life in society may expand. Few will claim that each person as such has an indefeasible right to live. The hangman, although we may call him, in the abusive sense, a conventional institution, is in a truer sense a genuinely natural one. He is an official who, not through wanton cruelty, still less from stupid caprice, but for purposes that are deemed socially urgent, has been appointed and is maintained. Whether we should keep him depends on what we think of these purposes, and of his effectiveness for carrying them out.

As we come to a conclusion on the matter we are framing another piece of conventional morals, which perhaps a century hence novelists will revile under the same delirious motto, "Back to Nature." Whether a Trust should retain its immense profits which it has secured by holding the public to ransom depends likewise upon social considerations. The gradually formed sentiment on such things which, we are told, it is essential to shake, is thus no mere adhesion to prejudice. It is crystallised experience. If it could be so shaken as to have its whole basis destroyed—and unfortunately it cannot,—the new structure would be built upon the same sort of principles, for mankind has no other. Anthropologists speak of the "cake of custom," and dilletante dabblers in anthropology suppose this to be a wholly scornful phrase. The truth is that humanity has a past as well as individuals, and in each case it is equally reckless and impossible to begin *de novo*. It was not with a view to progress, but with a view to an indefinite halt, that Penelope unravelled each night what she had knitted by day. This of course was a very different thing from repairing the dropped stitches. To return to our previous figure, the cake of custom may be improved by baking a better cake, not by simply restoring the ingredients to their separate receptacles. If the critics to whom I refer were right, no cake however palatable and nutritious could be other than illegitimate, simply because it has attained a certain firmness and consistency.

For what they seem really to mean is that moral ideas should always be fluid. We are to keep an open mind. We are to accept nothing unless we have ourselves sifted it, discovered its basis in reason, pruned away all that the inner light reveals as excrescences or inconsistencies. And we are *all* to do this, for the appeal of fiction and drama is to the widest public. American girls are to weigh very carefully whether their grandmothers' teaching has not been antiquated since the publication of *The Woman Who Did*. Perhaps Ibsen has better ideas about guilt than those of the New Testament; let the storekeeper at the corner of the street go to-night to the theatre to find out. None of us must be too sure about the Golden Rule until we have overhauled it again in presence of *Zarathustra*. Anyone who refuses to regard such matters as still open to debate is a bigot of Convention! To speak thus is surely to turn breadth of mind into burlesque. We may be willing for new geographical truth without welcoming an unbiassed discussion on the rotundity of the earth. He is not a physiological obscurantist who cannot spare time for reargu-

ing the circulation of the blood. And no more foolish cynicism has ever appeared than that which refuses to see a moral as well as an intellectual progress, or pretends a need for rooting up afresh all notions of right and wrong in each successive age. There are "conventions" of morality which are as sure as the conventions of Euclid, although in each case the word is a hideous misnomer.

II.

One form which our question often assumes is as to the prevalence of what is called "moral cant." But beyond a general agreement that cant is a very bad thing, we are much at a loss to define it with precision. Carlyle was the great exposer of this sort of criminality, and he often seems to mean that we cant every time we repeat a principle which we have taken over uncritically from someone else. We are in evil case indeed if we are to be reprobated for so inevitable a practice. On the other hand, if we are to believe Mr R. H. Hutton, the worst cant of all is when we pretend to original judgment upon that which we have had neither the time nor the means to investigate, that which, if we hold it or if we repudiate it, must be held or repudiated upon such disreputable tradition. Mr Hutton is even bold enough to turn the tables upon the great denouncer of Sham, and to tell us that when Carlyle said of Sterling "His soul pulsed auroras," *that* was cant. If we are dishonest in cherishing a view for which we cannot give reasons,[1] and if we are similarly obliged to make sure that all our views and actions cohere together, the man of integrity has yet to be born. Mr F. H. Bradley, for example, has tried very hard and very long, and with an intellectual instrument of quite unusual power, to thus harmonise the dicta of conscience. He says it cannot be done—a judgment from which the present writer begs leave to dissent. But if a man in diffidence of his own insight chooses the authority which he thinks most likely to be right, is he to be called a hypocrite because the oracle guides him in a blundering and inconsistent way? Or if, with a very questionable trust in himself, he tries to come to independent decisions, but finds, as he is sure to

[1] *Cf.* Miss Julia Wedgwood's very acute criticism upon Carlyle that his attack on cant was really directed against the spirit of the eighteenth century rather than of the nineteenth, against the time when adherence to "formulas" was thought to be the necessary safeguard against "enthusiasm." "In truth the danger of our time lies in the very opposite direction from an insincere echo of other people's opinions, rather in a hasty and exaggerated expression of our own beliefs" (*Nineteenth Century Teachers and other Essays*, p. 166).

find, that encrusted prejudice has masqueraded before him as rational conviction, and that the principle which he acted on in all sincerity a week ago will have to be denied in the light of to-day's conscience, must he condemn himself as not only a fool but a rogue? If everyone who fails to do what Mr Bradley calls impossible is not only to be despised as a muddle-head, but reviled as dishonest, where, pray, is the man whose own level gives him the right to be supercilious? And if we really deserve all the bad names which have been applied to us for doing what we could not help, do we poor creatures resemble anyone so much as the child in *Little Dorrit* who had to spend Sunday staring in horror at a tract headed "Why are you going to Perdition?"

The truth seems to be that the charge of hypocrisy is bandied to and fro with deplorable recklessness. A clergyman preaches on Sunday against the deceitfulness of riches, against luxurious living, or against the wholesale waste of leisure time. He is found to have married an heiress, to drive a five-thousand-dollar automobile, and to be overfond of billiards. We know what he is called. And those who call him so can triumphantly prove that his conduct will not square with his theory. But we also know that among the first to "expose" him will be those whose professions when they are at their best equally contradict their practice when it is at its worst. In neither case can we argue that because a man speaks better than he acts his words must be insincere. Perhaps he is addressing himself not less than others, and he is at least not singular in having an ideal to which he does not adequately respond. Nor would it improve him if he made the two harmonise by levelling down, by pitching his aims low enough to be sure that he would never miss them. The boast of being "at all events no hypocrite" is among the most shameless forms of posing which this censorious age has evolved. For it has erected into a sort of virtue the attitude of mind in which one cannot be made ashamed of himself, but insists with real dishonesty that all are equally bad—the attitude of Byron's Conrad:

> "He knew himself a villain, but he deem'd
> The rest no better than the thing he seem'd;
> And scorned the best as hypocrites who hid
> Those deeds the bolder spirits plainly did."

Dickens made merry over the ancient and loyal burgh of Muggleton because the inhabitants had presented at diverse times one thousand four hundred and twenty petitions against the continuance of slavery abroad, and an equal number against any interference with the factory system at home;

again because it had petitioned sixty-eight times for permitting the sale of church benefices, and eighty-six times for the abolition of Sunday trading in the streets. But while this lends itself to wit, one may doubt whether the Muggletonians were so very depraved. Probably they were far indeed from conscious and deliberate deceivers. The error may well have been one of head rather than of heart.

For it is not always wickedness, it is often mere stupidity, that leads to such moral incoherences. We do something because it is prescribed to us by conscience, and we omit to do something else which falls under just the same principle because we are not intelligent enough to appreciate the sweep of our own rule. No doubt graft is theft, as any man of enlightened moral sense can see. But not everyone who sells his vote can justly be called a thief. Whether he is or not depends on the clearness of his mind. Countless persons would accept a ten-dollar bill from a party agent at the polling booth who could be admitted with safety behind a storekeeper's counter when the till was open. And there does not seem to be the least question that every one of us, if his practice were scrutinised with sufficient insight, could be proved similarly at fault. It is of the first consequence that such insight should be brought to bear. On it, more than on anything else, social progress seems to depend. But let us not make ourselves absurd by rhetorical declamation to which no one will attend, just because everyone feels it to be unjust. If such harsh censure is to be passed, let us at least wait for the man who can show that he does not himself fall beneath it.

It may be replied, however, that the thing blamed is not that contradictoriness which even the most patient thinking can hardly avoid, but the ready acceptance, without any thought at all, of what is a mere code of fashion in the circle to which we belong. It is refusal to face personal responsibility for distinguishing good from evil. In this sense the present writer is so far from opposition to such a view that he has elsewhere called for a reinstatement of the old science of Casuistry.[1] The problems of conduct are vastly more intricate than commonsense believes, and by referring them to intelligent first principles a great deal could be done to improve the prevalent moral judgments. Moreover, unless someone thus breaks away from tradition, society will have no nerve of progress. But the problem is, by whom, and within what limits, this re-scrutiny should be carried out.

[1] *Cf.* "The Need for a Modern Casuistry," *International Journal of Ethics,* July 1914.

III.

When one's eye catches the phrase "freedom from conventional morals" upon the page of a modern novel, one knows just what to expect. The hero or heroine is considering the propriety of an elopement with someone else's wife or husband. And the reflections in store for us are about the difference between living and merely existing, the holy impulses of love as contrasted with ceremonial law, natural affinity *versus* the dead hand of a contract, etc. The great mass of our decent citizens turn from this in disgust. This is not because they could state in any cogent way the grounds upon which the permanent marriage obligation rests. If they tried to do so, in the immense majority of cases they would advance some principle which our novelist could at once show to be inconsistent. His dialectical victory would be complete. Their reasoning would stand condemned as contradicting itself at a dozen points. And it is assuredly not their reasoning that prescribes their feeling. Shall we call them on this account crass, bigoted, hypocritical? And shall we call the fast society woman who devours these green-backs as they come out, and whose mind is fully open to any speculation (provided it be sufficiently disreputable) which they may contain, intelligent, broad, sincere? I think not.

And why is it that all of us, except the very young either in years or in intellect, thus take the side of obscurantism? It is because we know that the task of reshaping a moral code is extremely intricate, and that neither the society woman nor the novelist who encourages her has appreciated the pitfalls that lie in the way. Quite apart from the merits of the particular problem, she has cast off allegiance to a guide that would in most of the concerns of life lead her wisely, and she has put her trust in a private judgment that even when honestly exercised will be precarious, and to whose dishonest exercise there will be overwhelming temptation. So far as her example extends, she is breaking down that authority which is the main support for the great mass of mankind in questions of conduct. And she is inciting to trust in an autonomous faculty which not one in a thousand possesses to such a degree as will make it reliable. As Burke said in another reference: "We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his private stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and ages."[1]

[1] *Reflections.*

If, then, the conventions are the moral anchor to which alone most of us may safely commit ourselves, do we leave any room at all for innovation and progress? Would not our argument defend the Hindoo widow in the practice of suttee, and condemn as presumptuous any who should break away from a custom with such old prestige? The problem is the time-honoured one of "drawing a line," and to those who ask me where I mean to stop in prohibiting originality, I might retort by asking where they mean to stop in encouraging lawlessness. But dialectical retorts are not the concern of this paper, and it seems possible to meet the objection in a more profitable way.

There is a striking but I fear a sadly "undemocratic" passage in one of Coleridge's *Lay Sermons* where he gives notice that what he has to say is not intended for "a promiscuous audience." It is directed *ad clerum*, that is, "in the old and wide sense of the word, to men of clerkly acquirements, of whatever profession." Coleridge warns off those who feed their minds on either the circulating library or the periodical press; "a reading public" is, he says, "as strange a phrase as ever forced a splenetic smile on the staid countenance of meditation. . . . From a popular philosophy and a philosophic populace, good sense deliver us!" No doubt this was the exaggerated fear of public discussion which events in France had occasioned, and which had been practically expressed in the Gagging Acts of Sidmouth and Castlereagh. But does it not contain an element of truth? Is there not, or at least ought there not to be, a clerkly class—in the universities, in the Churches, among men of education and letters—who will lead the public in the moral not less than in the scientific sphere, and who will feel the responsibility of reconsidering and rediscussing with one another the basal problems of life, without thrusting each half-baked speculation upon the man in the street? As Coleridge elsewhere says, there is a class which ought to walk in the light of knowledge, and there is another which must lay hold upon the skirts of custom. New ideas in moral as in all other thinking must arise in one stratum and filter to the rest. That the utmost freedom of reflection about conduct should be encouraged among those who are equal to such an enterprise is obvious. But is it not equally obvious that such enigmas should be presented to the masses only at a stage when some fairly settled solution can accompany them, not at a stage when they could be obtruded only to confuse? In other provinces the expert appeals to his colleagues; not until they are persuaded does his new doctrine enter into the thought of the general public. Why should it

be otherwise with those suggested innovations by which, if they should turn out wrong, the public will be affected in a specially disastrous way, and which, even if they should turn out right, must above all others be gradually proclaimed? If scientific thinking applies to morals at all, the arena of the newspaper press is the last in which it should be prosecuted. It seems to me that among the missions which we urgently require, not the least is a mission to our "advanced thinkers," adjuring them to bethink themselves of their responsibility to the plain man, to forecast what is likely to be the net result from launching some convulsive speculation about conduct through a green-backed novel or a problem play, and to refrain from seducing the simple through their vanity into "unconventional" reflection which will be as foolish as it will be demoralising.

Writers of fiction had at one time a very different and a very much truer insight. In particular the women novelists who are now sneered at and neglected as mid-Victorian saw in the problem of conduct what is now so lamentably hidden from their successors. When *Jane Eyre* appeared in 1847 it was looked upon as daring both by its authoress and by her readers. And the defence which was offered for it took the astonishing form of insistence that morality is one thing and convention another! Events in the literary world have moved fast since then. For the lesson of *Jane Eyre* is undoubtedly this, that the rules of conduct which accumulating experience has slowly evolved are not only a sacred but an indispensable safeguard against the gusts of feeling and the specious impulses of "Nature." The whole burden of Charlotte Brontë's message there is summed up in the passage where the heroine refuses to be a casuist, and where she casts from her just that insidious advice to be independent which, we are now told, is the protection against "hypocrisy":—

"Laws and principles are not for the times when there is no temptation; they are for such moments as this, when body and soul rise in mutiny against their rigour; stringent are they, inviolate they shall be. If at my individual convenience I might break them, what would be their worth? They have a worth—as I have always believed; and if I cannot believe it now, it is because I am insane, quite insane; with my veins running fire, and my heart beating faster than I can count its throbs. Preconceived opinions, foregone determinations, are all I have at this hour to stand by: there I plant my foot."

There is the philosophy of Convention in a nutshell.

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PAUL AND PLATO.

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THE question of Paul's relations with Hellenism has long been a subject of controversy. We are presented with widely divergent views, ranging from one extreme according to which Paul was a Greek philosopher who completely transformed Christianity by giving it a Greek dress, to the other extreme according to which he was a Pharisee pure and simple, with little or no acquaintance with Greek thought. What does stand out clearly is that Paul, like any other man, brought to his interpretation of Christianity forms of thought and methods of reasoning which through the influence of education and environment had become second nature to him in his pre-Christian days. He could do no other than give expression to his new experiences by means of the categories of his ordinary thinking. And when we come to examine these categories we are forcibly reminded that Paul was a Pharisee of the Dispersion. He was a Hellenist by birth, a Pharisee by education. The author of the Acts of the Apostles puts into his mouth these words: "I am a Jew, a native of Tarsus in Cilicia, brought up in this city, trained at the feet of Gamaliel in the strict system of our ancestral law." In his own letters he speaks with pride of his genuine Jewish descent, and informs us that his parents were strict Jews of the tribe of Benjamin. His youthful home then was in Tarsus, and his second or real home in Jerusalem, whither he came as a student of the law, and where he enjoyed the confidence and esteem of the ecclesiastical authorities. Tarsus became his home once more at a later period, when he was thinking his way through the implications of his new relation to Christ before taking up his work at Antioch. On *a priori* grounds, therefore, we should expect Greece and Judea to co-operate in the make-up of his mind.

This double influence is recognised by most modern students of Paul, though there is wide divergence of opinion as to the respective weights to be attached to the two factors. On the one hand, Sabatier allows very little to the influence of Hellenism. He finds no evidence that Paul was acquainted with Greek culture. He probably came to Jerusalem as a boy and was brought up in the strictest school of rabbinical scholarship. Phariseeism is the one determinant of his thinking. Even his rejection of the law and consequent universalising of the Gospel spring not from Greek cosmopolitanism but from his own experience as a Pharisee—the bitter experience of failure to satisfy conscience in the endeavour to respond completely to the demands of the law, contrasted with the victorious sense of achievement that came to him through the grace of God in Christ. Like his master, Paul is a Jew, and follows Him afar off.

On the other hand, Pfleiderer lays stress upon the Greek factor. He does not of course suggest that Paul is a product of the Greek schools, or even that he had studied Greek philosophy at first hand. He holds that Paul was influenced indirectly by Greek thought, especially in the form presented by the Hellenistic Judaism of Alexandria. He regards the Book of Wisdom as an important source of Pauline theology. In its general outline this conclusion seems to be sound. Paul is not a professional philosopher; his methods of argumentation are neither Platonic nor Aristotelian, but rabbinic. He never escapes from his Jewish training. Nevertheless, the marks of affinity with Greek thought are too precise to be accidental. Benjamin Jowett's essay upon the kinship of ideas between Paul and his Alexandrian contemporary Philo is not without significance on this point. He shows how close is the resemblance of thought between the Christian Apostle and the Jewish Platonist, and suggests the conclusion that the Judaism of the Dispersion was already deeply tinctured with Greek ideas, and was even influencing the orthodox Judaism of Jerusalem in the same direction.

We must therefore concede to Paul some measure of Greek culture, however indirect, in spite of the rigidly Jewish character of his upbringing. Tarsus was characteristically a Greek town, a typical representative of the mixed civilisation of the age. World currents met at the capital of Cilicia and influenced each other in innumerable ways. The city stood upon one of the great highways of commerce, and marked the frontier of the two great commercial languages of the time—Greek and Aramaic. It constituted the Gentile world on a

small scale. It was there that Paul learned to become a Jew among Jews and a Gentile among Gentiles; for as a native of Tarsus he understood them both. He was brought up in a Jewish household ruled by the strict standards of national orthodoxy; for him there was no question of compromise with heathen customs. He grew up an enthusiastic patriot, a Jew to his finger-tips, a despiser of the Greeks as outside "the commonwealth of Israel and strangers from the covenants of promise." Nevertheless, he could not escape the influence of the culture that he despised. For one thing, he learned the Greek language, and a language, as Wrede reminds us, "is never a merely formal thing; imperceptibly it carries and imparts ideas."[1] The use of the Greek tongue involved a subtle permeation of his mind by Greek conceptions and Greek ways of looking at things. It is impossible to prove that Paul was familiar with Greek literature in the strict sense. The two or three quotations from classical writers which diligent search discovers in the letters and speeches of Paul may after all be mere tags of the market-place with which the man in the street is familiar without knowing anything at all of their origin. (*Pace* Moulton, *Egyptian Rubbish-Heaps*, pp. 66–7.) In like manner Paul betrays little if any acquaintance with the writings of the Greek philosophers. Yet there is an extraordinary resemblance between some of his fundamental thoughts and those of Plato. Still, the resemblance is not of a kind to suggest direct contact. Its real significance lies in its revelation of the way in which the subtle influence of Greek ways of thinking had pervaded the mind of Paul; and further, it enables us to understand how readily his great ideas could be appreciated by a Greek audience. On the whole, it is reasonable to assume that Paul's Greek environment at Tarsus, and on his missionary journeys at a later period, had familiarised him with the modes of thought common in the schools, both through his intercourse with educated men and through the natural tendency on the part of the dominant scientific and philosophic ideas of any age to find their way sooner or later into the common stock of notions of the man in the street. Every man who moves about in the world tends to pick up phrases and ideas that spring out of current modes of thought, however little disposed, or even incapable, he may be of studying the great thinkers at first hand. Hence we can readily understand how a much-travelled native of Tarsus, though a Jew by education, might come to be strongly influenced by Greek thought.

[1] *Paul*, Eng. trans., p. 2.

Hence while it would be a grave mistake to ignore the fact that the fundamentals of Paul's thinking are Jewish and rabbinic, and that Jerusalem is mainly responsible for his religious and intellectual make-up, it is impossible to shut one's eyes to his manifest kinship with the Greek thinkers. Johannes Weiss holds that a difference between Paul and Jesus of deep significance is implied by the fact that while Jesus was born of country-folk in Galilee, Paul grew up in an important Hellenistic city subject to the influences of the Græco-Roman civilisation. "His metaphors and similes are drawn from other sources than those of Jesus."[1] It is the life of the Greek city and not of the open fields that furnishes him with his images and illustrations. "And this fact," says Weiss, "is symptomatic of a profound underlying divergence. . . . His vocabulary contains a large number of ideas entirely Greek and only explicable as the product of Greek culture, which are never used by Jesus. . . . The thought and expression of Jesus are concrete, popular, and plastic as compared with the abstract terms constantly used by Paul; these, as being the products of a completed system of thought, themselves influenced the thought of the speaker who used them. Such terms as πνευματικός, ψυχικός, σαρκικός point to profound anthropological and psychological thought; a theory of religious perception is presupposed by the phrase νοούμενα καθορᾶται in Romans i. 20 (The invisible things of God are 'clearly seen' (καθορᾶται), being perceived (νοούμενα) through the things that are made). The use of νοῦς, Romans vii. 23, 25 (I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my *mind*. . . . So then I myself with the *mind* obey the law of God), and in particular the concept of conscience (συνείδησις), Romans ii. 15 *et al.*, presupposes accurate consideration of psychological questions. In 1 Cor. xi. 14 Paul appeals to φύσις (Doth not nature itself teach you?). In 1 Cor. vii. 35 he uses the word ἀπερισπάστως ("without distraction"), used often by Epictetus. He speaks of θειότης and θεότης, and makes αφθαρσία (incorruption), ἀίδιον (eternal), and ἀόρατον (invisible) the characteristic signs of the idea of God; he uses such delicate distinctions as μορφή (form—essential qualities) and σχῆμα (fashion—mathematical qualities or shape), μεταμορφοῦσθαι (transform) and μετασχηματίζεσθαι (fashion)." *Cf.* Phil. ii. 6–8, "Who being in the form (μορφῇ) of God . . . took the form (μορφὴν) of a slave . . . and being found in fashion (σχήματι) as a man"; Romans xii. 2, "And be not conformed (συσχηματίζεσθε) to this world, but be ye transformed (μεταμορφοῦσθε) by the renewing of your mind"; 2 Cor.

[1] *Paul und Jesus*, Eng. trans., pp. 59–60.

iii. 18, "But we all . . . reflecting as in a mirror the glory of the Lord, are transformed (μεταμορφούμεθα) into the same image." *Cf.* 2 Cor. xi. 13, 14, 15, "Such men are false apostles . . . fashioning themselves (μετασχηματιζόμενοι) into apostles of Christ . . . even Satan fashioneth himself (μετασχηματίζεται) into an angel of light . . . his ministers also fashion themselves (μετασχηματίζονται) as ministers of righteousness"; also 1 Cor. iv. 6, "These things have I figured forth (μετεσχημάτισα) in regard to myself and Apollos." *Cf.* also the use of μόρφωσις to denote "essential form" in Romans ii. 20, "Having in the law the form (μόρφωσιν) of knowledge and of truth." Weiss concludes with the observation that a man who could make such distinctions "possessed a mind of very different character from that of the Galilean prophet and speaker in parables."

Here and elsewhere in Paul we have constant echoes of the thought of the Stoa, however popular in form. The affinity between Paul's ethics and the teachings of the Stoics has often been insisted upon. And in this regard it is not without significance that Tarsus was an important centre of the Stoic philosophy. Dr Estlin Carpenter (*Phases of Early Christianity*, p. 305) points out further that the author of Acts ascribes to Paul in his speeches at Lystra and at Athens the argument from natural religion in common use in the Stoic schools. (Acts xiv. 15–17, "Turn from these vain things unto the living God, who made the heaven, and the earth, and the sea, and all that in them is: who in the generations gone by suffered all the nations to walk in their own ways. And yet he left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave us from heaven rains and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness"; Acts xvii. 24–25, "The God that made the world and all things therein, he, being Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands; neither is he served with men's hands, as though he needed anything, seeing he himself giveth to all life, and breath, and all things: and he made of one blood every nation of men," etc.) In this second passage Paul teaches the Stoic doctrines of the elevation of God above every want in sublime self-sufficiency, and of the unity of human nature. And it is noteworthy that it is in this passage that quotations from Stoic poets are attributed to Paul by the writer of the Acts. Possibly we have no right to build any argument upon words which are not indisputably Paul's; but even when we confine ourselves to the genuine Pauline letters, as Weiss does, we find that, in spite of Paul's contempt for the world's wisdom and his regard for the foolish things that put the professional teachers to shame, he cannot

escape from his own culture, and has to use philosophical terms now and then.

If there are affinities between Paul and the Stoa, there are also affinities no less clearly marked between Paul and the Academy. In his Gifford Lectures, 1904–6, the late James Adam pointed out not a few of these affinities, but in such a way as not to draw the attention which they deserved. Benjamin Jowett had already brought out the affinities between Paul and the Jewish Platonist Philo; bnt the general question has been so little treated, that it may be worth our while to gather together the scattered references of James Adam and add a few further illustrations of the community of mind between Paul and Plato. I am not concerned to argue that the parallelism implies direct borrowing. My only wish is to exhibit the correspondence between some of the leading ideas of Paul and those of Plato, with a view to the better understanding of both these great thinkers. The two greatest figures of the ancient world, Socrates and Jesus, have been so often compared and contrasted, that it would seem to be a most natural proceeding to bring together and compare their two great interpreters, Plato and Paul.

(1) *The Nature of Reality.*—Plato finds the real criterion in thought and not in sense. Individual things presented in sense impression, in spite of many likenesses, are endlessly diverse. No two tables, *e.g.*, are absolutely alike. Tables are alike in so far as they possess a common quality which we may call tabularity, but in detail they may differ within the widest limits. In like manner two just acts, while sharing the common quality of justice, may yet be very different from each other. Tabularity and justice are ideas, and differ from the particulars in which they are manifested in that they are always the same, changeless and self-identical. They are also ideals which are only partially realised in particulars. An individual table always falls short of our ideal of what a table ought to be. An individual just act never quite realises the absolute standard of justice. We are therefore face to face with two worlds: (1) the world of particulars—many, changing, unstable, and imperfect; (2) the world of ideas, or general principles—working towards unity, changeless and perfect. The world of ideas is the more real, inasmuch as the mind can find rest only in unity, changelessness, and perfection. The world of particulars, the world of sense and time, in which nothing abides and nothing is perfect of its kind, must contain an element of unreality. It presents us with dim shadows and imperfect suggestions of the real world.

Reality itself is invisible, perfect, and eternal. We find it not in sense but in thought.

Thus the ideal world is sharply separated from the sensible world, and acquires a transcendent existence of its own. Ideas, *i.e.* general notions and abstractions like Table and Justice, are not merely mental facts; they are real existences in a supernal world, a world which is accessible only to intelligence, a world of which the world of sense is but a poor fleeting image. The soul that is in quest of truth must turn its back upon the visible and press forward to the eternal and unchangeable realities "yonder." In them alone will it find fulfilment.

This ideal world of Plato has its Christian parallel in a heaven which is above the world, beyond the region of time and sense, eternally the same, perfect in all its conditions, and where alone the soul can find true blessedness. And here the language of Paul sounds like an echo of Plato: "For now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face."[1] Here we have the Platonic Parable of the Cave in a nutshell. The things of time and sense are but shadows or reflections of the true. To come face to face with truth we must look away from the transitory particulars of the visible world to the things which are eternal. "While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal."[2] According to Plato, the whole object of philosophy is to convert the soul from the life of sense to the life of truth, to make the soul look upwards, to lead it from things seen to things unseen, in order that we may "set our minds on things immortal and divine." Even so Paul expresses the significance of the awakened life. "If therefore ye be risen with Christ, seek the things which are above, where Christ sitteth on the right hand of God. Set your mind on the things which are above, not on the things which are upon the earth" (Col. iii. 1–2). It is the ideal and not the sensible which is the object of the soul's enlightened endeavour. Wherefore says Plato, "We will ever cleave to the upward path and follow after righteousness and wisdom." For Paul and Plato alike, the soul's true aim is to be realised by turning one's back upon earthly things and reaching out to the heavenly, the ideal, the invisible, the divine. "For flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God" (1 Cor. xv. 50).

(2) *The Divine Indwelling.*—With Plato, all ideals are

[1] 1 Cor. xiii. 12. [2] 2 Cor. iv. 18.

real existences, eternally present in the supernal world, dimly shadowed forth in the phenomena of the lower world. Among them is the idea of righteousness, which is not merely a norm or standard of righteous acts, but in some sense a divine being who is the source and cause of all righteous acts. In the Fourth Gospel and in Paul, the person of Christ occupies the position of the Platonic Idea of Righteousness. Philosophy becomes religion in the assertion that the divine ideal has actually found embodiment in all its completeness in this lower sphere. "The Word became flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory full of grace and truth." In one supreme instance the divine ideal which is eternally real invaded our lower world for its renewal and regeneration. After the Resurrection, Christ once more ascended to the celestial world, whence He rules in the hearts of those who know Him through His temporal manifestation. The eternal Christ, the norm and source of divine righteousness in men, is the Christian parallel to the Platonic Idea of Righteousness. He is the Idea; individual Christians are the Particulars in whom the Idea is more or less dimly realised.

It is instructive, therefore, to compare the terms used by Plato to describe the relationship between the Ideas and the Particulars which represent them in the world of sense with the terms used in the New Testament to describe the relationship between the believing soul and Christ, its divine Ideal. The most common terms used by Plato are: *κοινωνία* (fellowship or communion), *μέθεξις* (participation), and *παρουσία* (presence). The Particular has "communion" with the Idea, and "participates" in it. The Idea again is somehow "present," however incompletely, in the Particular. Now let us compare the language of Paul, 1 Cor. i. 9, "Ye were called into the fellowship (*κοινωνίαν*) of his Son Jesus Christ our Lord"; Eph. iii. 6, "The Gentiles are fellow-heirs and fellow-members of the body, and fellow-partakers (*συμμέτοχα*) of the promise in Christ Jesus through the Gospel." So in Phil. iii. 10 Paul speaks of his own identification with Christ as a "fellowship" (*κοινωνίαν*) in His sufferings. These are but fragmentary hints in Paul. Elsewhere in the New Testament such language is more frequent. 2 Peter i. 4, "That ye . . . may become partakers (*κοινωνοὶ*) of the divine nature"; 1 John i. 3, "Our fellowship (*κοινωνίαν*) is with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ"; Hebrews vi. 4, "Those who were once enlightened, and tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers (*μετόχους*) of the Holy Ghost"; iii. 1, "Partakers

(μέτοχοι) of a heavenly calling." In all these passages the general idea is that of a participation or communion of the individual soul in or with the divine. *Cf. Phædrus*, 253 A, "As far as man can participate (μετασχεῖν) in God."

The word παρουσία ("presence"), which Plato also uses to express the relation between Idea and Particular, has a special sense in the New Testament. It usually refers to the second coming of Christ. But both in Plato and the New Testament the word signifies the presence of the Infinite in the Finite. In Plato it suggests a partial, incomplete manifestation of the eternal in the visible; in the New Testament it looks forward to the complete realisation of the divine ideal in the kingdom of God on earth. Further, if the relation between the Idea and the Particular is one of communication or participation, then we may say both that the Particular is in the Idea, and that the Idea is in the Particular. Plato lays the greater stress upon the immanence of the Idea in the Particular, though since the Ideas alone are perfect and truly real, they also transcend the Particulars. In the language of Paul, both sides of this relationship find a place. He can speak both of the soul being "in Christ" (ἐν Χριστῷ) and of Christ being "in us." The Pauline ἐν Χριστῷ has its parallel in Plato's description of the inspired man as ἐνθεός. He is in God, and God is in him.

Again, the Idea is the cause of the Particular. The phenomenal table has its origin in the celestial table, which alone makes it what it is. Similarly it is the presence of the Idea of Righteousness in the soul, which produces righteous acts in us. The indwelling of divine virtue produces character. So in the New Testament it is the indwelling Christ who produces Christian life. Apart from him the divine life is not in us. *Cf.* Col. i. 27, "Christ in you, the hope of glory"; Gal. ii. 20, "I live, and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me"; Gal. iv. 19, "I am again in travail until Christ be formed in you"; Phil. ii. 13, "It is God who worketh in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure." The Johannine writings are full of the immanence of Christ. "I am in my Father, and ye in me, and I in you" (John xiv. 20). "Greater is he that is in you than he that is in the world" (1 John iv. 4).

(3) *The Cosmic Christ.*—This life-giving principle that Paul identifies with Christ does not reside merely in the soul of the believer. Just as Plato's world of ideas constitutes the immanent reality of all that is, so in Paul (and in the Fourth Gospel) Christ is the immanent life and truth of all things. He

has a cosmic significance which goes far beyond His creative operation in human lives. The entire universe, organic and inorganic, has its source and significance in Christ, "who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation; for in him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers; all things have been created through him, and unto him; and he is before all things, and in him all things consist" (Col. i. 16–17). In this passage Paul introduces us to a celestial hierarchy ranging from powers through principalities, dominions, and thrones to Christ, who is head over all the celestial region as Creator of the lower ranks of Divine agencies and rulers. So at the head of Plato's invisible world, as its author and source, and, therefore, mediately through the lower ranks of Ideas, author and source of the visible world as well, stands the supreme Idea, the Idea of Good, which is the final explanation of all things. It is the eternal and unchanging goodness, which is called in the *Timæos* the "Maker and Father of all," supreme over all that is, the source alike of knowledge and of existence, the Alpha and Omega of all things. *Cf.* Paul, Eph. iv. 6, "The one God and Father of all, who is over all (sovereignty), and through all (instrumentality), and in you all (immanence)." In Pauline language the Idea of Good is "the first-born of all creation, for in Him (or It) were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible (*i.e.* the world of Sense) and things invisible (*i.e.* the world of Ideas)." So in Eph. i. 20–21, "And he made him to sit at his right hand in the heavenly places, far above all rule, and authority, and power, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come. And he put all things in subjection under his feet." Here is the true parallel in Platonic metaphysic to the Pauline Christ. The Idea of Good is God in His creative activity in the world.

But again, the Idea of Good is not merely the efficient cause of the world, visible and invisible, but also its final cause. It is the end towards which all things are striving, however blindly and feebly. The whole significance of creation lies in a destined manifestation of the Idea of Good, becoming ever more and more complete. The Good is defined in the *Repub.* as "that which every soul pursues, and with a view to it performs all actions, divining its existence though perplexed and unable adequately to grasp its nature." Nor is the Good merely the final purpose of human life. Towards this highest end

not only man but the whole of Nature ceaselessly aspires, or, in Pauline language, "the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together" (Romans viii. 22). So in Eph. i. 10 Christ is presented as the final cause of creation. "The dispensation of the fulness of the times" is "to sum up all things in Christ, the things in the heavens and the things upon the earth." God's final purpose will be fulfilled when all things are brought together into the unity of Christ when He "shall have abolished all rule and authority and power" (1 Cor. xv. 24). "Then cometh the end, when he shall deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father . . . that God may be all in all" (1 Cor. xv. 28).

Thus the Good, according to Plato, or Christ, according to Paul, is the goal of human action, the ideal towards which men should strive. And this ideal is not only transcendent but also immanent. It is the power that works in the world in opposition to all that is evil. In turning towards It (or Him) and receiving It into his soul, man becomes a fellow-worker with God in establishing the Good and dethroning the Evil. Cf. *Laws*, x. 906 A, "For as we acknowledge the world to be full of many goods and also evils, and of more evils than goods, there is, we affirm, an immortal conflict going on among us, which requires marvellous watchfulness; and in that conflict the gods and demons are our allies." Like Paul, Plato conceives of morality under the figure of a conflict, desperate but hopeful, inasmuch as we have the divine resources on our side (*cf.* the Christian warrior in Ephesians vi. 10–18). But the outlook of Paul is wider and more hopeful than that of Plato. In Romans viii. 21 Paul looks to the final regeneration through Christ of all things, including the material universe: "The creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God." Plato's optimism could not soar so high as that; for with him evil is inseparably bound up with the visible and the material. Evil can never utterly perish, but must always remain to haunt our mortal nature and this present world (*Thœatetus*, 176 A). The Ideal can never be wholly realised in the Particular, but stands apart from it, the object of ceaseless aspiration and endeavour. Nevertheless, in virtue of its immanence in the Particular the Idea is always in process of being realised in proportion as the Particular approximates to it. And that after all, is the practical attitude of Paul. "I count not myself yet to have apprehended; but one thing I do, forgetting the things which are behind, and stretching forward

to the things which are before, I press on toward the goal unto the prize of the upward calling of God in Christ Jesus" (Phil. iii. 13–14). "Let us therefore as many as be perfect be thus minded." Perfection from the Christian point of view is not the complete achievement—which, as Plato would suggest, may be impossible under earthly conditions—but the resolute endeavour. It is a process towards an ideal which is always beyond, rather than a static attainment.

(4) *Psychology.*—Both in Paul and Plato we have the familiar tripartite division of human nature into νοῦς (Reason), ψυχή (Soul), and σῶμα (Body). In the development of the functions of these three factors there is much affinity between the two thinkers. According to Plato there is in every human soul an element which proceeds from God Himself. This is νοῦς or Reason, which alone is truly divine and therefore immortal. (Cf. *Tim.*, 90 A; *Repub.*, vii. 518 C, 540 A, 611 E.) Moreover, it is this divine reason in us which makes us truly human. To acknowledge its supremacy is to realise our essential nature; to renounce it for the things of sense is to be false to ourselves and to miss the end of life. We realise our immortality here and now by following the life of reason.

This immortal divine principle in men dwells in a perishable body which is fashioned out of the various elements of the material universe. This body is animated by a life principle or soul (ψυχή) which perishes with it, and which is the centre of certain dire and irresistible affections which lead us astray. Thus there is a sharp distinction between reason on the one side, which links us on to the divine, and the irrational passions on the other side, which belong to the animal soul and link us on to the lower or bestial creation. Compounded as we are of divine and bestial, the lower nature drags us down to earth, imprisons us in the fetters of sense, holds us in the dark cave of ignorance, and keeps us back from following the upward path to truth. It is the object of education to emancipate us from bondage to the lower nature by securing the supremacy of the rational nature.

In like manner Paul sharply contrasts the higher and lower natures in men and represents them as being in continual strife. In referring to the higher divine element in human nature he sometimes uses the Platonic term νοῦς. *Cf.* Romans vii. 23–25, "I see a different law in my members warring against the law of my mind (νοός) and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members. So then, I myself with the mind (τῷ νοΐ) serve the law of God; but with the flesh the

law of sin." More often, however, Paul gives explicit recognition to the divine character of the higher nature by the use of the term πνεῦμα. The πνεῦμα of man corresponds to the πνεῦμα of God, *i.e.* the Divine Spirit, and is therefore fitted to become the vehicle of God's operation in us. It is in virtue of our possession of πνεῦμα that a divine indwelling in us is possible; for the πνεῦμα in us is what it is by reason of its derivation from God. Over against the πνεῦμα, Paul designates the lower nature by means of the term "flesh" (σάρξ). Sometimes the lower nature is associated with ψυχή, as in Plato (the merely animal life as distinct from the higher life of the intellect or spirit). *Cf.* the contrast between πνευματικὸς, a person in whom the higher life of the πνεῦμα has been quickened and made dominant, and ψυχικός, one in whom the merely animal nature is supreme. The σάρξ is simply the material envelope of the ψυχή, and together they constitute the sensuous nature, which acts as a drag upon the πνεῦμα and threatens to subdue it altogether. Thus, as with Plato, the higher and the lower natures, the divine and the sensual, πνεῦμα and σάρξ, are in downright antagonism. *Cf.* Gal. v. 17, "The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh; for these are contrary the one to the other." Hence just as Plato attributes evil to the σῶμα, so Paul attributes it to the σάρξ, the material of which the σῶμα is constructed. The difference here is accounted for by Paul's Jewish education and sympathies. "Flesh" is a familiar Old Testament word often used with a certain pathetic suggestion of human weakness and creaturely frailty: "All flesh is grass, and the goodliness thereof is as the flower of the field." It brings out the idea of the transcience and instability of human life. But neither in the Old Testament nor in the Gospels do we find the "flesh" associated with sin, as its cause. The notion probably came to Paul from Greece through the channels of Alexandrian Judaism. The conception of the body as the seat of the lower nature is Platonic and Philonic. Paul accepts the thought, but combines it with Hebrew terminology. The Jewish term "flesh" takes the place of the Greek term "body," and thus acquires a deeper and more direful meaning than in the Old Testament. It stands not merely for creaturely weakness over against the might of God, but for enmity against the holiness of God. Nevertheless, with Paul, the body or flesh itself is not the source of sin so much as its vehicle or instrument. For the body is a temple of the Holy Ghost when brought into due subjection to the πνεῦμα. The body may be used for God as a living sacrifice, well pleasing to God. Hence

there is nothing Manichæan in Paul's attitude to the body or the flesh. The point is that sin springs out of man's lower nature, and has to be subdued by his higher nature reinforced by the Divine Spirit. The conflict has to be fought out in the body, the temporary tabernacle which we share with the brutes that perish, and which gives the lower nature its chance to assert itself. Thus Paul is able to include in his list of works of the flesh in Gal. v. 19, not merely the gross bodily appetites, but also "idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, jealousies, wraths, factions, divisions, heresies, and envyings," which spring from a nature at war with the Spirit, but hardly from sensuality in the strict sense. It is in a mystic sense that the word σάρξ is used to cover not only sensuality but also selfishness and worldliness in general. It is the business of the Christian to drive out the sin that establishes itself in his lower nature. But he is to mend the flesh rather than to end it.

Nevertheless, it remains true that Paul chimes in with the ascetic note in the ethics of Plato. The body has to be treated with strictness and severity. It is a real enemy to be buffeted and kept under. Plato took over the Orphic and Pythagorean view of the body as the prison-house of the soul. It is the aim of philosophy to free the higher nature from its bondage by turning it from the things of sense to the invisible world, accessible only to reason, the eye of the soul. Hence "the soul of him who truly loves wisdom withholds herself from pleasure and desires and pains and fears as far as he can" (*Phædo*, 83 A). Self-indulgence binds the fetters more firmly about us. Hence a certain Stoic ἀπαθία is part of the programme of emancipation. The true philosopher will mortify the body for the sake of the soul. His whole life will be a μελέτη θανάτου, a rehearsal of death, a *meditatio mortis.* For, after all, what men call death is really the separation of the soul from the body, and therefore its release from the prison-house into the life of freedom. Truly regarded, death is more accurately to be described as life; it is the awakening, the resurrection of the soul, its flight to the invisible world to which it truly belongs. In the *Gorgias*, Plato quotes with approval the Orphic doctrine of σῶμα σῆμα, life in the body is life in a tomb. *Cf.* 492 E, 493 A, "I should not be surprised if Euripides speaks truly when he says 'Who knows whether life is death, and death life?' So that in reality perhaps we are in a state of death. I myself once heard one of the wise men (? Orphic teacher) say that in the present life we are dead, and the body is our tomb." Hence the philosopher who seeks to separate his soul from his body here and now by following

reason instead of sense, is practising or rehearsing death; he is anticipating that release from the prison-house which ought truly to be called life. He dies daily in order that he may live. Thus Plato's practical rule of conduct is practically identical with that of Paul in Gal. v. 24, "Crucify the flesh with the passions and the lusts thereof." Paul also speaks of the body sometimes as a sort of prison. *Cf.* 2 Cor. v. 1–2, 4, "The earthly house of our tabernacle . . . in which we groan, longing to be clothed upon with our habitation which is from heaven . . . for indeed we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened." In heaven we are to have a more fitting habitation, "not made with hands, eternal." So also verses 6 and 8, "Whilst we are at home in the body we are absent from the Lord . . . and are willing rather to be absent from the body and to be at home with the Lord." So Romans vii. 24, "Who shall deliver me from this body of death?" Paul's doctrine of necrosis has, then, obvious affinities with Plato's μελέτη θανάτου. *Cf.* Col. iii. 5, "Mortify (νεκρώσατε) therefore your members which are upon the earth." Romans viii. 12–13, "So then, brethren, we are debtors, not to the flesh, to live after the flesh; for if ye live after the flesh, ye must die; but if by the Spirit ye mortify (θανατοῦτε) the deeds of the body, ye shall live." Both with Paul and Plato, "death" is our entombment in the flesh; it means living after the flesh, obedience to the law of the lower nature; while "life" is emancipation from the flesh brought about by the mortifying, the slaying of its deeds by the Spirit; it means obedience to the law of righteousness and reason. In Paul, however, there is an element which makes all the difference between a philosophy and a religion. In dying to the flesh, we are crucified with Christ; in living by the Spirit, we are risen with Christ. The *fons et origo* of this emancipated or risen life is the divine human personality in whom we live by crucifying the flesh with Him.

(5) *The Realism of General Ideas.*[1]—With Plato the general or universal is the true reality of which the individual and particular is but a faint adumbration infected with illusion and unreality. Here again the thought of Paul runs so far parallel to that of Plato that we fail to catch its significance without a resolute attempt to think of reality in terms of the universal. Paul's doctrine of the flesh and its condemnation by the Cross turns upon it. What Paul has in view is not the separate and distinct bodies of individual men, but the flesh as such, flesh in general, in which all men share. We think only of particular bodies as real. But with Paul,

[1] *Cf.* J. Weiss, *Christ, the Beginnings of Dogma*, Eng. trans., pp. 104 *seq.*

the flesh in a universal sense, the Platonic Idea, is no mere abstraction, but a powerful reality affecting all human life and dragging down all individual men who share in it in virtue of their corporeality. That is how Paul conceives of sin as a universal power which rules the whole sphere of fleshly organisation. It is with this thought in his mind that Paul, according to Johannes Weiss, can speak of the death of Christ as vanquishing sin once for all. *Cf.* Romans viii. 3, "What the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God, sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh." The death on the Cross is the condemnation of sin because it is the complete and final demonstration of God's victory over the power of sin in the flesh of man. For the death on the Cross is not the annihilation of Christ; it is the flesh that dies, whilst the eternal Son of God lives on triumphantly. He was "raised for our justification" (Rom. iv. 25). But this could only become a victory over the flesh for all men, if the flesh that hung upon the Cross was not the flesh of an individual man but flesh in general. Flesh in its universality was put to death on the Cross, and thus the whole living organism which is the instrument of sin received its death-blow. With the flesh of Christ, all flesh is doomed to death, and with it the sin which lurks therein. Henceforth those who are united with Christ are freed from the dominion of fleshly sin, which has been condemned and executed once for all.

The same realism of general ideas appears in the elaborate parallelism of Adam and Christ in Romans v. It is the contrast between the old and the new humanity universalised and summed up in each case in a representative individual. *Cf.* v. 12, "As through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin; so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned." Paul is not here introducing a new idea. He is taking as granted the doctrine of Adam as the source of man's sin and death. It is derived not from the Old Testament but from Alexandrian Judaism. Paul says that all have sinned, and this universal racial act is brought into connection with the first sin. The whole race sinned in the sin of Adam. His act was the act of humanity as such, and not the act of an individual. This of course is quite in line with Jewish conceptions of the solidarity of the family and of the race. *Cf.* Hebrews vii. 9, "Levi paid tithes to Melchizedek in Abraham." All descendants are somehow present in the person of their ancestor and share his acts. Hence the whole race is present in Adam and shares his sin. Adam thus stands for humanity

as such. His significance is universal rather than individual. The whole race has sinned aud justly incurred the condemnation of God. Paul's argument turns upon his view of sin as a racial act. It does not depend upon the historicity of Genesis iii. It remains valid from Paul's point of view even when the Garden of Eden has disappeared in the fogs and mists of mythology. Its real weakness for us lies in its indifference to the claims of individuality. In spite of its Jewish setting the argument derives its force from something closely akin to Platonic idealism. The individual is lost in the race. It is humanity as such, symbolised in Adam, and not the individual man, who is the real existent and responsible for sin. Individuals share in the guilt of humanity as its members or representatives. Humanity as such is prior to the individual.

Universal humanity is thus creative of individual humanity. And if the lower nature is universalised in Adam, the higher is universalised in Christ. Thus we have a new head of the race, a new representative humanity, creative of a higher type of individual, in the Incarnate Lord. The parallelism between the two is worked out with careful elaboration in Paul. Romans v. 15 *seq.*, "For if by the trespass of the one the many died, much more did the grace of God and the gift by the grace of the one man, Jesus Christ, abound unto the many. . . . The judgment came of one unto condemnation, but the free gift came of many trespasses unto justification. For if, by the trespass of the one, death reigned through the one; much more shall they . . . reign in life through the one, even Jesus Christ. So then as through one trespass the judgment came unto all men to condemnation; even so through one act of righteousness the free gift came unto all men unto justification of life. For as through one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, even so through the obedience of the one shall the many be made righteous . . . where sin abounded, grace did abound more exceedingly; that, as sin reigned in death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life." *Cf.* also 1 Cor. xv. 21–22, "For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive." Both the sin of Adam and the self-offering of Christ are racial acts; they are universal and not individual; they are expressions of humanity as such; and that is why they extend their effects to every man; the second cancelling the first, and restoring mankind to the divine ideal which had been destroyed through sin.

(6) *Redemption and its Consummation.*—The process of emancipation is described by Plato as an ἐπάνοδος, an ascent of the soul into the realm of Being, a lifting of the eyes on high, a θέα τῶν ἄνω, a "contemplation of the things that are above." So speaks Paul in Col. iii. 1–2, "If then ye were raised together with Christ, seek the things that are above, where Christ is seated on the right hand of God. Set your mind on the things that are above, not on the things that are upon the earth. For ye died, and your life is hid with Christ in God." At other times Plato describes the process as one of purgation or purification; the soul is cleansed from the defilement of the body and its senses, it is lightened of the weights which drag it downwards to earth (*cf.* Hebrews xii. 1, "laying aside every weight and the sin that doth so easily beset us"). Elsewhere it is a process of deliverance (λύσις), a release from chains, a redemption, a quickening and reilluminining of the spiritual vision. The educational process is described in the *Republic* (vii. 518 C) as a περιαγωγή or "conversion" of the soul. The eye of the soul is turned from darkness to light. *Cf.* Acts xxvi. 18, "Unto whom I send thee, to open their eyes, that they may turn from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God." The soul must pass from a day which is night to the true day. Nor is this merely an intellectual process. The whole character is concerned in it. It is a process of sanctification which extends to the whole soul. T. H. Green tells us that, according to Paul, conversion is the birth in us "of a new intellectual consciousness which transforms the will and is the source of a new moral life."[1] It is a new wisdom, a wisdom of God, increasingly revealed to the τελείοι, a wisdom that is foolishness to the natural man, a wisdom that must be spiritually judged (1 Cor. ii. 6 *seq.*). It is a shining into the heart of the light of the knowledge of the glory of God (2 Cor. iv. 6). In this process, according to Plato, the whole personality is transformed as the light of truth shines ever more clearly into the soul. The "inner man," as he calls it with Paul (cf. *Repub.*, ix. 589 A, with Rom. vii. 22, Eph. iii. 16), is renewed unto knowledge after the Idea of Good or God, until, so far as human nature permits, the assimilation with God is complete (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν). The significant difference in Paul is the Incarnation. The Ideal has descended once for all in all its completeness into human life; human nature has itself been raised to a higher level, and therein lies the hope of assimilation.

[1] Quoted by Sanday and Headlam, *Romans*, p. 165.

Plato's religion consists in a passionate uplifting of the soul towards the realm of perfection to which it really belongs. There is an element of mysticism in the process. It is incapable of complete rational expression. Hence, like Paul, Plato turns to the Mysteries for analogies and imagery by means of which to shadow forth the spiritual realities by which he lives. In the *Phædrus* (247 C) the account of the "region above the heavens" (ὑπερουράνιος τόπος) is full of reminiscence of the Eleusinian rites. For the initiate, the Idea becomes the food or τροπή of the soul. *Cf.* Hebrews vi. 4, John vi. 48, 56; but more especially Paul in 1 Cor. x. 16–17, "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ? For we, being many, are one bread, and one body; for we are all partakers of that one bread." The sacramental aspect of the higher life is not wanting in Plato. Further, in the *Symposium*, the whole movement is summed up in Love. Love is the intermediary between God and man, linking together finite and infinite in a common life. Love is both the desire for beauty and the search for wisdom, for "wisdom itself is a thing most beautiful": it is both φιλόκαλος and φιλόσοφος. Thus the impulse towards truth, which is the inner movement towards philosophy and leads us on to the contemplation of ideal beauty, is Love in its highest expression. The divine part of the soul unites itself in marriage with the ultimate object of all desire and all thought, and only then finds its true life. So, for Paul, the symbol of marriage is the most fitting analogy to express the relationship of the believing soul to the divine (1 Cor. vi. 17), "He that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit." But with Paul the intellectual aspect of Love is subordinated to its practical aspect as a rule of life. Neither knowledge, nor wisdom, nor anything else can take the place of Love as the continuous outpouring of the life which has attained to God in Christ.

This survey of the teaching of Paul and Plato reveals not a little affinity between these two great minds. I do not suggest that Paul was a Platonist or borrowed his leading ideas from the founder of the Academy. Many of the coincidences which I have brought forward may appear superficial; very often, no doubt, they can be explained as merely accidental approximations of Greek and Hebrew thought. Still, the general result should be (1) to suggest that the indirect influence of Greek thought on the mind of Paul was greater than is often supposed; and (2) to lead to a deeper realisation

of the religious significance of Plato's teaching. The religious affinities between Paul the theologian of the primitive Church, and Plato the theologian of the Greek schools, will explain the powerful attraction exercised by Plato upon Christian thinkers in every age, and will help us to understand how it was that heathenism in its final struggle with Christianity was able to moralise and spiritualise itself and set up a powerful rival to the New Testament under the inspiration of Plato. But the Church by claiming Plato for itself was able to cut away the ground from under the feet of its Neo-Platonist opponents and to attract to itself all that was serious and spiritual in heathenism. And it was the more able to do that because of the very real affinities between the thought of Plato and the New Testament. The Christianity that conquered the Empire was a Christianity that had a right to claim that it was the completion and consummation of the higher spiritual aspirations of Greece no less than of Israel. And in that regard Plato may just as truly be considered a herald of Jesus as the prophets of the Old Testament. Both in Athens and in Judea, though in very different shape, there was the same earnest expectation of the coming of the eternal into the midst of time and of the fulfilment of the aspirations of humanity in a new divine order. "Now, in Christ Jesus, ye who sometimes were far off are made nigh by the blood of Christ. For he is our peace, who hath made both one, and hath broken down the middle wall of partition between us . . . to make in himself of twain one new man, so making peace; and that he might reconcile both unto God in one body by the cross. . . . For through him we both have access by one Spirit unto the Father" (Eph. ii. 13–18).

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CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLES AND THE WAR SETTLEMENT.

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MUCH has been said upon the application of Christianity to the war, but very little upon the relation of Christianity to the reform in international order, which is our main object in the war.

Public thought, when we were swept into the conflict, naturally turned to the justification for our taking part in it, and this was found in the breach of treaty by Germany in invading Belgium. We dwelt on the hopes of drastic punishment for aggression and the enthronement of public right. An important series of religious "Papers for War Time" was issued in London, and another series in Edinburgh.

There followed a second period, one of disappointment as to the military situation, growing absorption in the new revelations of frightfulness, and disillusion as to the feasibility of ideal schemes.

We are now in the third period, when facts are being more closely faced, and feasible plans for reconstruction of international machinery have not only been launched but soberly adopted by the Allies. War is viewed as aimed at certain terms, not at victory for its own sake.

But the problems of the settlement are not being discussed by Christian writers, as the national duty was discussed in the first six months of the war. I was lately startled by hearing a well-known preacher remark: "The great danger is that Christian principles should be imported into the settlement." The influence of air-raids and submarine war has been such that the witness of Christianity in regard to international relations has no interest for a section of the Church. Lord Melbourne resented the intrusion of religion into what he called the sacred sphere of private life; to-day it is public life

which many people desire to guard from intrusion—public life in its widest form, viz. the international sphere.

Two questions regarding the war must present themselves in the main to Christians. The first is, "Ought Christians in any circumstances to fight?" On that we are nearly all agreed. But if we are prepared to regard war as in some cases Christian, a second question arises, "What ought we to fight for?" This is commonly discussed as if it had little reference to moral principles. Yet, if Christianity has any bearing on public life, our ideal of international relations must be submitted to the Christian test. And since we cannot separate our view of the international settlement from the terms for which we are fighting, we are led at once to review our ideas of war aims and immediate war policy.

For this purpose let us make three assumptions:—

1. That force for defence is justifiable.

2. That Christianity has something special to say on international relations. It is not a mere question of what international relations we ought to advocate, what view is sound—that is to say, as dictated by common sense, humanity, and reason. We are probably agreed that on many questions Christian teaching has something special to offer, in addition to principles which are generally adopted outside the avowedly Christian world.

3. That if there are Christian principles involved, it is our duty to act on them. We do not agree with those who say in despair that Christianity is meant for an ideal world and cannot be applied now. We agree with the Bishop of Hereford in his view of the difficulty of introducing morals into high politics. We also agree with him that introduced they must be.

The politician who is not a theological student can do no more than take the Christian law in its simple form and endeavour to apply it to the practical problems with which he has some acquaintance.

Let us think, then, of the obvious ideals of Christianity: altruism to all, respect for all equally, magnanimity, faith. It is in reality to Christianity that we owe the idea of the human family as a whole. Judaism, while upholding the notion of the Ruler of the Universe, supported in practice views which appear to us to retain a tribal element and to teach that Jehovah fought especially on the side of the Jews.

It is more debatable whether the idea of nationality and the defence of it by force have any special sanction in Christian

teaching. But some light is thrown on the subject by the Christian view of the value of human life, involving as it does the ideas of equality and of the value of human development. National feeling is often an incentive to mental and cultural development. But we shall all agree with the truth made famous by Miss Cavell: "Nationalism is not enough." On this point I cannot do better than recall what has been said by some great authorities.

Bishop Gore, in *The Religion of the Church*, says: "Each nation has a vocation and a divine right to exist. In the recent memory of Israel, when our Lord came, the Maccabees had been their national heroes, who had fought for their national existence when it was threatened, and had waged a great war of self-defence. Every patriotic Israelite gloried in them. There is not the slightest reason to think that our Lord would have repudiated them; and though He made it evident that political independence was not now the vocation of Israel, there is no reason to think He would have forbidden a nation, which had received the faith He came to impart, to defend its boundaries against invaders or assist in defending some other nation. Our Lord does indeed repudiate pride and corporate selfishness, and requires us to love our neighbours as ourselves. This is to repudiate a great deal that has paraded itself as patriotism in human history. But there is a true patriotism which believes in the divine purpose for each nation, and cannot, for the sake of all, allow the insolent aggression of others upon its legitimate liberty. It seems to me idle to argue, from what our Lord says about personal submission to injuries, that He would have refused to allow a man to defend either his wife and children or his country."

Mazzini goes further: "War, like death, is sacred; but only when, like death, it opens the gates to a holier life, to a higher ideal. I hail the glorious emancipating battles of humanity, from Marathon down to our own Lignano, without which our municipal liberties would have been crushed in the bud; from those which won religious liberty for the half of Europe, down to those which, in our own time, summoned Greece from her grave of two thousand years to a second life; the blood baptisms of mankind to a great mission, to be fulfilled only through martyrdom."

Mazzini safeguarded himself, however, by adding: "War, whenever not sanctified by a principle inscribed on its flag, is a crime—the foulest of crimes: soldiers, whenever they are not the armed apostles of progressive life and liberty, are nothing but wretched, irrational, hired cutthroats. And for such a

war there may be momentary triumphs; never the beautiful rainbow of lasting heroic victory."

If altruism towards all, reliance on spirit, justice, equality as members of a universal family—if these are the fundamental principles to have in view, let us turn to the practical question, "Are we fighting for them?" At one point, at all events, and that a conspicuous one, we are.

The chief element of an international order must in practice be a scheme for settling differences by improved treaties of arbitration, and for preventing war either by force or economic boycott. The use of force is objected to by some. But those who think that Christianity does not preclude force for defence will naturally approve of force in this connection. Only those who disapprove of every policeman are at liberty to object to international force on principle. Christianity surely demands the utmost effort from every one of its followers, in the work of popularising the idea of ordered internationalism. Some idealists prefer the idea of splendid isolation. Can this be Christian? It appears to be a case where Christianity throws additional light on the solution arrived at by pure reason. Reason may say, "Yes." Christianity answers, "No."

On this subject our aims seem in accord with Christianity. In September 1914, Mr Asquith advocated a new international order after the war: "The substitution for force, for the clash of competing ambitions, for groupings and alliances, and a precarious equipoise . . . of a real European partnership, based on the recognition of equal right, and established and enforced by a common will." He quoted Mr Gladstone: "The greatest triumph of our time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics." Mr Lloyd George has strongly endorsed this view. In January of this year he said: "The best security for peace will be that nations will band themselves together to punish the first peace-breaker. In the armouries of Europe every weapon will be a sword of justice. In the government of men every army will be the constabulary of peace." The new departure of the foreign policy of the U.S.A. in the direction of internationalism is clearly expressed in the following significant words of President Wilson: "The world is no longer divided into little circles of interest. The world no longer consists of neighbourhoods. The whole is linked together in a common life and interest such as humanity never saw before, and the starting of wars can never again be a private and individual matter for nations."

Apart from this definite idea of a real Concert of the Powers, there were certainly embodied in the early months of the war many lofty ideas in the popular outlook on the struggle. Among the keenest supporters of a fight to the finish were those who before August 1914 had been most hostile to warlike theories. When they found themselves faced by the great fact of the invasion of Belgium—a deliberate breach of the treaty guaranteeing her neutrality—they forthwith became the most convinced supporters of the war. Their nature compelled them to base their attitude on deep convictions, and in order to justify it they were obliged to regard the enemy as virtually equivalent to the Spirit of Evil, embodied as a military system.

Much of this conviction has no doubt become blurred; but, on the other hand, the practical idea of a community of nations has grown more definite, and the Allies have officially pledged their support to the plan of a combination to prevent war. For this we are mainly indebted to President Wilson. We may regard it as a serious and genuine aim with the more confidence because America's influence is secured through her entry into the war and also because the principle has been formally adopted by the German Government.

But we must apply the test of Christian ideas to other war aims also. Let us be optimistic, as Christianity enjoins, and consider our alleged aims only in their more serious and concrete form. The main proposal advanced, according to Ministerial statements, is the destruction of the power of German militarism. This is a vague phrase, but we know its chief implications. They are, firstly, to inflict a great military defeat designed to make the German people desert their militarist idol by showing them that its feet are made of clay; and, secondly, to weaken the power of the military clique, if it retains control after the war. This latter object is to be effected by taking from Germany advantages from which she derives men or means: firstly, by depriving her of colonial spheres which give her a military and economic advantage; secondly, by the curtailment of German foreign trade for an indefinite period of peace time, after the settlement; and, thirdly, by diminishing the territory of the Central Powers—in Germany, by the loss of the iron-fields of Alsace-Lorraine; in Austria, where we have avowed our desire to secure the grant of independence to nations subordinate to her; and in Turkey.

These proposals are relevant to our subject, because they are aimed at securing a good settlement. Our concern is to

obtain a settlement which accords with Christian ideas of international stability and well-being.

What has Christianity to say to these aims? Take first the matter of the colonies. It is sincerely held by many people that our policy is dictated by humane regard to the natives. On this point the voice of reliable authorities appears to me to be uncertain. Things are now said about German treatment of the natives which were said, even by the same writers, about government by Belgians and even about British rule. We are now told that the whole campaign against Belgian atrocities was based on prejudice and fabricated reports. What is needed is further light on the record of Germany, and other Powers also, before the war. It must be admitted that the claim to deprive Germany of colonies is not a sincere claim based solely on our Christian duty to the natives.

There is another aspect of the matter which appears to involve a Christian principle, namely, that of justice and equality of opportunity. Supposing that the four great nations of Europe have colonising capacity, and that the idea of the white man's burden is not ignoble, on what Christian principle can we advocate the exclusion from the colonial sphere of any one of these Powers? The German Empire, developing late in history, had a small share. The earlier activities of England, France, and Russia, and the difficulty of redistribution, made it inevitable that the Germans should fare worse than the rest. But this, in a larger view of justice, would rather dictate that the available material for satisfying Germany's legitimate aspirations should be used to that end, *e.g.* in regard to Morocco and the Turkish dominions. This principle was not followed before the war, and German war-mongers pointed to the disregard of it. It would, at all events, be no remedy to carry the mistake further. The only possible justification for such a course would be the view that the Germans do not belong to the human family of progressive peoples, but to an order of beings which is best treated by subordination. This is often argued, and it is held also that, in practice, the home-loving German people, once deprived of material for colonial ambition, would cease to feel that ambition. This, however, is not a question to examine when we are seeking to limit ourselves to problems of Christianity. It belongs rather to the field of reason and common sense.

With regard to the proposal to diminish German trade artificially by a protective union against the Central Powers, the idea of impoverishment implies that the economic development of a powerful nation, and of a large section of the world's

resources, shall not be as great as it might be, and this involves waste. I suppose that most of us feel that there is something immoral about waste of any kind.

We come now to the territorial proposals.

The question of Alsace-Lorraine rouses feelings so intense that an appeal to Christianity is resented. An historical reference may be permitted. In 1870 Mr Gladstone urged the Germans to demand neutralisation. He wrote thus: "The most fatal and in their sequel most gigantic errors of men are also the most excusable and the least gratuitous. They are committed when a strong impetus of right carries them up to a certain point, and a residue of that impetus, drawn from the contact with human passion and infirmity, pushes them beyond it. They vault into the saddle; they fall on the other side. The instance most commonly present to my mind is the error of England in entering the Revolutionary War in 1793. Slow sometimes to go in, she is slower yet to come out; and if she had then held her hand, the course of the Revolution and the fate of Europe would in all likelihood have been widely different. There might have been no Napoleon. There might have been no Sedan."

Another factor in the Allies' war aims—the desire to break up Austria-Hungary—is supported by a kind of idealism. There is a school of thought, favoured by Liberals as well as Jingoes, which dwells on the need of political freedom for the South Slavs, the Bohemians, and the unredeemed portions of the Rumanian and Italian peoples, as well as the Poles. We may admit that if the frontiers of Europe were at our disposal, without any price to pay, the value of political independence might, for cultural purposes, be considerable, if independence could be maintained. But the price to be set against this gain is obviously stupendous. It is the loss of life, involving bereavement to a number of persons, so great as to be even comparable with the population of a whole small nation; not to speak of the material losses and the deterioration of character produced in many ways by prolonged and embittered war.

We must also admit that the idealism adduced is not so sincere as we could wish. It will not be denied that if Austria was neutral or anti-German, we should feel no enthusiasm for the liberation of the nations which compose that Empire, even if we could liberate them without the cost of war.

Calm speculation about drawing ideal frontiers implies a disregard of the nature of war which is not consistent either with sympathy for pain or a high valuation of life. One of

the inherent evils of war is that its successful prosecution demands a conspiracy to conceal the ugly side. It is a point of honour for soldiers and all at the front, including war correspondents, to belittle the suffering. Few people have the imagination to be concerned about foreign relief funds in peace time. In war the mind is so occupied with other things that a still smaller fraction can picture the dressing-stations at the front. Even for those of us who have seen war at close quarters it is difficult enough to remember the truth.

Taking the test of Christianity in its simplest form, I suppose we can imagine that Christ would, as Bishop Gore says, have approved of fighting for defence against an invading empire. But it is going much further to say that He would approve a war of political liberation to obtain a freedom not already enjoyed. It is going a great deal further still to urge that war would have been justified by Christ for the sake of liberating a people not suffering from personal cruelty or damage, for the sake of political independence.

Many of us can imagine that He would not only have sanctioned force used by a father to defend his children, but would have used force Himself to defend an injured person. Perhaps, on this ground, we may regard a revolt as justified against a government which is an organised system of personal injury. We may fairly regard, for instance, the Turkish Government as an organised system of injustice based on the fear of violent death by intermittent massacre; but when we are dealing with Austria, it seems impossible to maintain that we ought to make war upon her in order to carry out the dictates of the Gospel. Before 1914, nobody would have maintained this. When the war began there was a natural feeling that, having faced the arbitrament of fighting, the political liberation of the peoples in Austria did not involve the cost of extra sacrifices. This is a misleading view, because the liberation would require continued sacrifices as great as if it involved the commencement of a war.

The only other ground in which we can discover a Christian basis for the anti-Austrian policy is that the weakening of Germany, by any possible expedient, is a measure of defence against future German aggression. This is similar to the theory which has been called that of "preventive war"—the forestalling of an attack which has not occurred and is not immediately imminent. Moralists justified our entering the war on the ground that Belgium should be aided in defending herself. But the average citizen, talking to his friends, said that we could not stay out of the

war, because, if we did, "it would be our turn next." We may have been right in regarding our action as defensive for ourselves as well as for Belgium and France. But if Belgium, France, Russia, Rumania, and Serbia are restored, the defensive motive in tearing up Austria (especially when its effect is highly problematical) is far too remote for us to feel that in the light of conscience it can be justified by our religion, whatever may be the judgment of reason.

There remains the strategic and moral question of Turkey. We have liberated large parts of Turkey, including the most suffering provinces, the Armenian Highlands. We ought to liberate others, and then secure decent government for the non-Turkish minorities of Asia Minor, if the cost is not greater than the gain. It is said that rebellion is justified if it succeeds, *i.e.* that there is a balance of gain. We must be careful to balance the gain in every case, and for the Christian it must be a gain in actual cessation of injury to persons, not to political ideals.

When we come to our demand for restoration of Germany's conquests, we are on quite different and much stronger ground.

The right and duty of defence involve the prevention of successful aggression, and therefore imply the restoration of the lands conquered by the enemy everywhere. But beyond that point acquisitions by either side are in the main based on the theory of punishment, vengeance, or the value of subordination.

The duty of punishment is an idea very hard to analyse. It is attractive. It has fortified many who otherwise suffered from doubt. A particular friend of mine, who volunteered when the war began, found life wretched till his platoon came upon evidence of German cruelty to the wounded. The idea of righteous punishment made life at the front far happier right up to the day when he was killed. The idea is in our blood. Reason seems at first to support it, but Christianity condemns it. Public opinion is tending to agree with Christianity. Its magnanimity is in line with the new penological theories adopted in the management of prisons. The Allies rely on the moral effect in Germany of a crushing military defeat. They think that if the idol is seen to have feet of clay, its worship will be abandoned in Germany. This is a question not only of psychological science, but also of moral and Christian principle. It may be true that a certain type of mind is reduced to a chastened condition by painful disaster and humiliation even when it is not conscious of the justice of

its punishment. This at least is the theory on which punitive expeditions against weak races are defended, and it is by this means that prestige is maintained in varying degree by all Empires, both in Africa and Asia. It appears (at all events on the surface) to be supported by experience, and it may conceivably apply to the Germans; but it rests on the contention that the people to be so managed are of a specially low type, and not a people with whom our relations can be governed by the maxim that we should see to the clearness of our own eyesight before clearing that of the other party. But some great authorities like Sir George Grey, who defeated the Maoris, have disputed its validity. We cannot see our way easily at this point. It can only be said that our judgment must somehow be reconciled with the peculiar stress laid by Christ on the need of an optimistic regard and respect for human nature everywhere. We cannot picture Him expressing the pessimistic view. He showed his sympathy with the Roman official, the Syrophenician woman, and with the outcast. He was angry with those who were given to despising.

To summarise our conclusions, the concrete plans for making Mitteleuropa peaceable are military humiliation and the deprivation of territory, of colonial empire, and of trade. The first is eminently ideal, but far different ideas govern the latter proposals: one psychological, aimed at discrediting the German war-lords in the eyes of the German people; the other materialistic. It is assumed that Germany will in future be aggressive, and must therefore be kept poor.

These theories seem to conflict with Christian ideals. In the first place, in view of the military situation and the greatness of the sacrifices required to achieve them, they probably imply a high degree of indifference to the evils of strife and loss of life. Secondly, they advance an idea of punishment which assumes that the Germans made an aggressive war in defiance of their own sense of justice. It assumes that they ought to have felt their position before the war to be just, and that it is not our business to examine, closely and impartially, their point of view on colonial and other matters. This question is fundamental to our prevalent attitude on the war. It is most difficult to discuss, because it involves inquiry into pre-war history, which is distasteful to us. If one thing is more clear than another, in regard to the Christian attitude upon defects of others, it is that self-examination should not be neglected. In this case, if we do not neglect it we certainly must admit that there were grounds for honest and decent Germans to feel a keen sense of injustice in regard to colonial

spheres. So that the psychological effect of punishment would probably not be as we expect.

On this point we may gain some light from the judgment of non-Europeans. The well-known American writer Cosmos says: "To conquer the militaristic ideal, as represented for the moment by Prussian policy, will not be enough to ensure a durable peace. The spirit and the point of view which manifest themselves in militarism, in the subordination of civil to military authority and policy, and in the setting of right below might, must be driven out of the hearts and minds of men. . . . A durable peace, then, depends upon the victory of the Allies in the present war and upon the establishment in public policy of the principles for which they are contending. It depends upon a withholding of all acts of vengeance and reprisal, and the just and statesmanlike application to each specific problem that arises for settlement of the principles for which the war is being fought. . . . It depends upon the exaltation of the idea of justice not only between men within a nation, but as between nations themselves; for durable peace is a by-product of justice."

The conclusion arrived at by attempting to be Christian may be very different from that which most of us have held in practice; but Christianity has probably brought us, as usual, to the same point as we should have reached by reliance on common sense.

The magnanimity which is so characteristic of the Sermon on the Mount dictates probably the same course as the acutest wisdom of an enlightened diplomacy. An example of this fact was furnished by the submission to arbitration of the Alabama dispute. The gist of the matter is furnished by Mr Gladstone's words in the House of Commons (June 16, 1880): "Although we may think the sentence (of the arbiters of the Alabama case) was harsh in its extent and unjust in its basis, we regard the fine imposed on this country as dust in the balance compared with the moral value of the example set when these two great nations of England and America, which are among the most fiery and the most jealous in the world with regard to anything that touches national honour, went in peace and concord before a judicial tribunal to dispose of these painful differences, rather than resort to the arbitrament of the sword." It is probably true that if the opposition to arbitration had succeeded, America would not now be our Ally, for bad blood breeds worse blood.

To return from practice to theory, there is a factor in Christianity, governing and colouring all its laws, which is

difficult to put into ethical form—the principle that human affairs must be viewed from the standpoint of spirit. It is best expressed by the Bishop of Oxford when he writes: "We have at this moment a grand opportunity for proclaiming afresh the true spirit of Christian morality, the gospel of human life. The appalling strife of nations which is drenching in blood so large a part of the world, the threatening strife of classes, and many other symptoms of disease in modern life, have produced a widespread disillusionment as to the possibilities of any civilisation which is based on competitive selfishness, whether it be the selfishness of individuals, of classes, or of nations. Men are yearning for some adequate and stable basis of human fellowship. And it is this that Christianity offers them. Its ethics are frankly supernatural: for it is only by the help of motives and forces drawn from beyond the world that men can subdue their selfish lusts and appetites and become fit for fellowship."

NOEL BUXTON.

A PLEA FOR ARCHÆOLOGY AMONG THE CLERGY.

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It is the fashion to laugh at archæologists as "dryasdusts," who find their pleasure in poking about to see what they can discover in the ash-heaps of the past, and I fear the old spirit which led Dickens to ridicule archæology in the persons of Pickwick and the Pickwick Club is not altogether extinct. Not that I would for a moment deny that there are still to be found some archæologists who are too much imbued with the spirit of the dilettanti and the mere collector for collecting's sake, though I fancy not many exist to-day who deserve to be caricatured as the proud discoverers of an inscribed stone supposed to bear some ancient writing, which, however, turned out, when deciphered, to be only a modern boy's attempt to cut the letters—BILL STUMPS HIS MARK!

But what exactly is archæology? It is the science—and I use the word advisedly—which, even more than history, differentiates man from the animal. "We look before and after, and sigh for what is not," and by paying attention to the past we are enabled to prepare for the future. The bee and the ant were as perfect when the wise man bade the sluggard betake himself to the ant for instruction, or to the bee, as the Septuagint has it, as they are to-day; but to advance, to progress, is the prerogative of man, and it is as we "rise on stepping-stones of our dead selves"—and of our dead past—"to higher things" that any progress is possible. Archæology is not history, because it has nothing to do with the rise and fall of nations or of dynasties, or with the achievements of the world's great men, the mighty conquerors, the crowned villains, the politicians, the statesmen, the philosophers, or with the struggles of peoples.

What, then, is archæology? It is the science which begins where geology ends, and extends, roughly, to within a hundred years of the present date. It covers all that is known of primitive man, all the remains of ancient nations and of ancient civilisations that have been recovered from the lap of earth by the spade of the patient explorer, and all that has to do with the life of man in all ages—his abodes, his weapons, ornaments, folklore, beliefs, idols, shrines, temples, churches, in one word, his culture, which must not be confounded with the German notion of "Kultur"—in every succeeding generation of his occupation of the earth. It is indeed a vast science; no single individual can master the whole of it. But it is true of archæology, as of other sciences, that everyone should know something of it as a whole and everything of some definite part or division; *i.e.* with a good general knowledge of it as one of the great kingdoms in the empire of science each student must, according to his own idiosyncrasies, be content to specialise in some distinct province of the great domain.

Take a glance at prehistoric archæology. In old days, not so very remote either, when creation was supposed to begin about six thousand years ago, there was not much scope for such a department of science. But now! How different the outlook! Think of the stages of man's development from the dim prehistoric past down to historic times! See him advancing from the Ages of Stone into the Age of Bronze and then to the Iron Age, till we find ourselves arriving on the threshold of history! And these ages continue at every period of man's long career in different parts of the earth, and are each of them found existing to-day, so that the archæologist is able to judge of the characteristics of primitive man by the labours of the anthropologist who studies the primitive peoples as they exist to-day. For example, the peoples of Northern Europe were still in the Neolithic Age when the Mediterranean peoples were in the Bronze Age and the peoples of Egypt and Chaldea had advanced to the Age of Iron; the inhabitants of the South Sea islands were in the Stone Age when first discovered; and many tribes in Africa, the Esquimaux, the natives of Australia, and others, are more or less so to-day.

I mentioned the Neolithic Age. This is the second of the two great periods into which the Stone Age subdivides. The first, known as the Palæolithic, extends immeasurably behind, and has in recent years been classified by the labours of French and Belgian cave-explorers, to say nothing of our own, into a number of well-defined periods which, commencing

with the River-Drift, take us to the confines of the Tertiary and man's earliest efforts at shaping an implement, which are known as eoliths.

Had I been writing a few years ago—even so lately as 1901, when the first volumes of the Victoria County Histories were being published—I should have been content to speak of the Palæolithic and Neolithic Ages as the subdivisions of the Stone Age; and with regard to the former I should have spoken of the Drift and Cave Periods as well-marked divisions, and I should have indicated whether any particular find belonged to the one or the other, as was done by Sir John Evans, Lord Avebury, and their contemporaries; but that is not sufficient to-day. When Sir John Evans and Lord Avebury wrote, the question was still agitated as to whether it was justifiable to speak of pre-glacial man, or whether the existence of man on the earth was altogether post-glacial. It is now known that in Western Europe there have been no less than four glacial periods, with more or less warm inter-glacial periods when the ice retired, and in each of these man is found, while the Eolithic period—if eoliths are indeed evidence of human workmanship, as I see no reason to doubt—ascends to the first Glacial Period, immediately after the Pliocene.

Each phase of man's existence is marked by characteristic and unmistakable forms of implements, which, together with the human remains accompanying them, enable a classification to be made and the special type of man to be distinguished.

The classification has been modified from time to time as knowledge of the conditions and of early man has enlarged, but it has been chiefly in the direction of increasing the number of subdivisions.

The earliest was that of Mortillet, which was followed by those of Piette and Hoernes; those accepted to-day are described by Professor Obermaier in *Der Mensch der Vorzeit*, by Professor J. Bayer in "La Chronologie des Temps Quaterniens" (*Report of the Geneva Congress of Prehistoric Archæology*, 1912, vol. i.), and by Dr Buttel-Reepen in *Der Urmensch vor und während der Eiszeit in Europa*; the latter is that which I shall follow here, as being the most complete and comprehensive. ("Fas est et ab hoste doceri," says the old tag; so I consider no apology is needed even in this time of war for depending on an enemy where scientific data are concerned!)

Working forwards from the earliest times we find:—Im-

mediately succeeding the Pliocene comes the first, or Günz, Glacial Period, in which lived the Heidelberg man, and eoliths are found; the first Inter-Glacial Period, extending to one hundred thousand years, is marked by the Reutelian and Mesvinian cultures of Professor Rutot. It may be observed here that the time required from the Günz Glacial Period to the commencement of the Neolithic Age is reckoned by Buttel-Reepen at from half a million to a million and a half years. With this Professor Keith's calculation (*The Antiquity of Man*) largely agrees.

In the second, or Mindel, Glacial Period the mammoth appears. The second Inter-Glacial Period, extending from two to three hundred thousand years, is marked by the Strepyian (Rutot), the Chellean, the Acheulian, and the Moustierian cultures (Boucher de Perthes and his successors in France); then lived Neanderthal Man, along with the mammoth, the cave-bear, and the *Elephas antiquus*. These continued to exist during the third, or Riss, Glacial Period, which was also marked by the Moustierian culture, and this continued into the third Inter-Glacial Period. Down to this culture of Le Moustier we have to deal with what were formerly known chiefly as drift implements; from this time onwards we have to deal with the so-called cave implements.

The third Inter-Glacial Period, lasting some one hundred thousand years, is marked by the latest Moustierian, the Aurignacian, and the Solutrian cultures; then lived the Grimaldi, the Aurignac, and the Cro-magnon races of man, accompanied by the *Rhinoceros tichorhinus* and the horse.

The fourth, or Würm, Glacial Period is marked by the latest Solutrian, the Magdalenian, and the Azilian types of culture; the Cro-magnon race of reindeer-hunters continues, accompanied by the mammoth, rhinoceros, reindeer, and stag, of which the Magdalenian people have left us a magnificent series of representations on bone and ivory, as well as of the bison (which then abounded on the plains, as in later days it did on the prairies of North America), in frescoes and drawings on the ceilings and walls of the caves of Altamira and Alpera in Spain, and elsewhere. Following on the passing away of the ice after the Würm Glacial Period comes the Alluvial, or present, Age, and the Neolithic and all succeeding periods in the life of man; and we may very well be living now in another inter-glacial period, as some geologists think.

It will at once be seen what a bearing this recognition of the antiquity of man has upon the story of early man as it is told us in Genesis, and all attempts at reconciling the accounts

are worse than futile. What, then, are we to do? We must take what science teaches us as representing the facts of the case, and the story in Genesis as representing the efforts of the early poets and thinkers of Israel to arrive at an understanding of the world and man as these presented themselves to them. Sin and suffering had to be accounted for, and they did it in the way that best suited their own simple minds and those of their hearers. No doubt their account was largely based on stories long current in Chaldæa; but under the guidance, as we may surely believe, of the Spirit of God, they transformed the tales that had come down to them, and changed the crude polytheism of Babylonia into the vehicle of a monotheistic faith, and so rendered them capable of conveying high moral teaching which, under the form of allegories, should be suitable for every age. Surely it is good that the clergy, and all religious teachers, should know this, and should cease to teach as historical facts the stories of the creation, the fall of man, the flood, the tower of Babel, and such like, just as, in astronomy, we have ceased to teach that the sun, moon, and stars revolve round a fixed earth in the centre of the Universe, and no longer endeavour to compress the vast succession of geologic periods into six thousand years!

So the clergyman, if he knows, as he should know, something of the facts stated above, and is also sufficiently a scholar, though it may be with little or no knowledge of Hebrew, to have laid hold in some measure of the results of the critical investigation of the Old Testament, and if he is wise—such a man, I say, will not trouble his people with any questions about J. and E., JE., D., and P., and suchlike, but he will say something like this: In Gen. ii. 4–iv. we have the tales of the storytellers of old Israel as they were edited and written down in the century before the time of Hezekiah and the destruction of Samaria; in these they attempted to account for the state of the world and of mankind as they knew them, by the legendary vision of a Golden Age in the past, when the first man lived in innocence in a beautiful garden with its mysterious trees and mystic rivers, a conception brought from Babylonia: which happy condition was lost by an act of disobedience such as is always possible for every child of man when he comes to know the difference between right and wrong, is free to choose, and the wrong seems pleasant and to be desired. Then he will go back to the first chapter, and will show how this was written during the exile in Babylon, and placed as an introduction to the Hexateuch when it was published by Ezra; with this as a foundation he will be able to

show that the week of creation is derived from the Babylonian seven-day week, and is the fruit of reflection—the work of the philosopher rather than the poet. He will then be able to suggest that, in learning the summary of the law known as the Ten Commandments, it would be well to substitute the reasons given for keeping the Fourth Commandment in Deuteronomy for that given in Exodus, as being not only consistent with the facts but more in harmony with the morality of the Christian faith. This is merely an illustration of the kind of teaching that should be given in this twentieth century; in like manner the stories of the flood, of the tower of Babel, and the rest, may be adapted to modern needs.

We may note, in passing, how much more sublime, and more capable of being harmonised with the teachings of science, are the pictures of creation drawn by one of Israel's greatest poets in the 38th chapter of the Book of Job, and by one of the writers of the Wisdom literature in the 8th chapter of the Book of Proverbs, than is the calculated and somewhat jejune statement of the priestly writer of Gen. i.

The weapons and implements of Palæolithic man were in the first instance rough, but eminently suited for the uses for which they were intended, and they show marked improvements as time goes on; nothing more beautiful in the working of flint is to be seen anywhere than the shouldered blades and exquisitely cut laurel-leaf points of Solutré, the long sharp blades of La Madeleine, or the pygmy artefacts of Tardenois: he was a hunter, and, especially in the period of La Madeleine, towards the end of the age, as I have already mentioned, an artist of striking and indeed extraordinary ability. In this connection I might be allowed to refer to my book on *Prehistoric Archæology and the Old Testament*, pp. 96–108; the most concise summary of the achievements of man during this period is to be found in the Presidential Address delivered before the British Association at Newcastle in 1916 by Sir Arthur Evans, P.S.A., etc., whose archæological labours and discoveries in Crete and elsewhere are nothing less than epoch-making.

Sir Arthur points out how recent discoveries have placed the evolution of human art and appliances in the last Quaternary Period on a far higher level than had even been suspected previously.

"In their most developed stage, as illustrated by the bulk of the figures in the Cave of Altamira itself, and others in France and Spain, these primeval frescoes display not only a consummate mastery of natural design, but an extraordinary

technical resource. In single animals the tints, composed of red and yellow ochre and charcoal, are varied from black to dark and ruddy brown or brilliant orange, and so by fine gradations to paler nuances. Outlines and details are brought out by white incised lines, and the artists availed themselves with great skill of the reliefs afforded by convexities of the rock surface. But the greatest marvel of all," continues Sir Arthur, "is that such polychrome masterpieces as the bisons, standing and couchant, or with limbs huddled together, of the Altamira Cave, were executed on the ceilings of inner vaults and galleries where the light of day has never penetrated." The same feeling of wonder assails those who, like the present writer, have been privileged to visit the Tombs of the Kings in Egypt; in these, as is well known, are to be seen galleries and chambers to which "the light of day has never penetrated," in which the electric light now illumines beautiful frescoes on walls and ceilings, executed, of course, in the conventional Egyptian style; and the problem in both cases is alike: How was the work carried out?—the only difference being that the Egyptian drawings were executed at a definite historic period, some three thousand or four thousand years ago, while the paintings we have been describing were earlier by some twenty millennia or more, and are the natural embodiments and living representatives of the objects depicted. For a full account of this wonderful phase of art in the Magdalenian Period we must refer the reader to Sir Arthur Evans's graphic pages, merely noting that "in the culminating phase of this art we even find impressionist works," such as "the galloping herds of horses from the Chaumont Grotto, depicting the leader in each case in front of his troop, and its serried line—straight as that of a well-drilled battalion—in perspective rendering. The whole must be taken to be a faithful memory sketch of an exciting episode in prairie life."

Magdalenian man also excelled in bone- and ivory-carving, as stated above. If anyone would realise of what he was capable, it is only necessary to consult books dealing with the period where reproductions of his work may be seen. Many of the originals are in the British Museum; one example only has been found in Britain—a drawing of a horse's head on bone found in the Cresswell Cave in Derbyshire.

In the Neolithic Age, with the introduction of agriculture and a more settled life, this artistic ability disappears, and any drawings there are are more like the early efforts of children than anything else; but, on the other hand, the weapons and implements are much more highly finished and in many cases

polished: some of the arrow-heads are beautiful little weapons, and well worthy of the use to which they were put in the Middle Ages, when those that happened to be found were called "elfin darts" and set in gold to be used as charms or amulets. It is often supposed that an Age of Copper succeeded to the Stone Ages, but this is doubtful in the historic lands of the East and Europe; the native Indians round Lake Superior used virgin copper, and do still, and the Mexicans were using copper when first discovered. But the metal was too soft for most practical purposes, and a great advance was made when by using an alloy of tin with the copper the Age of Bronze was inaugurated. The finest culture of the Bronze Age is that known as the Mycenean in the Mediterranean lands; Homer's heroes were Bronze Age warriors, and the civilisation described by him is characteristic of the time. To this succeeded—I am speaking now only of Europe—the prehistoric Age of Iron, of which the cemeteries at Halstadt and La Têne, the latter being the later, are characteristic; and thence we arrive at the historic Age of Iron, and are in the full light of history.

In Britain the successive races who occupied the country may be thus described:—Modern man, as Professor Keith has shown, goes back to Pleistocene times, *i.e.* to quite the beginning of the Palæolithic Age; but two types which did not persist are also found—the *Eoanthropus Dawsonii*, in Sussex, which goes right back to the Tertiary, and, on the Continent, Neanderthal man, with his receding forehead and prognathic jaw, giving him a very simian appearance, though, from his weapons and implements, he is proved to have had man's brain and no mean capacities. He dies out after the Moustierian period; no remains of his skeleton have been found in Britain, but artefacts of his manufacture exist showing that he must have been here. The type of Palæolithic man in Britain, whom we may consider to be in some sense our ancestors, is represented to-day by the Eskimos. Neolithic man belongs to the Iberian race; he was long-headed, with dark hair, short and squat in stature, and is represented to-day by the Berbers in North Africa, the Basques in the Pyrenees, and by a pronounced strain among ourselves, especially in South Wales. The first Celtic invaders, the Goidels, represented to-day by the Erse, the Manx, and the Gael, inaugurated the Bronze Age; and the prehistoric Iron Age, with its beautiful (so-called) Late-Celtic ornamentation upon weapons and jewellery, was the fruit of the second Celtic invasion, when the Brythons, known later as Britons, arrived on our shores.

For many reasons the tribe that occupied what is now East Anglia, the Iceni, are considered by most competent authorities to have belonged to the Goidelic branch of the Celtic race.

Palæolithic implements have been found in the Cromer Forest bed in connection with the mammoth and other extinct animals; fine Neolithic and Bronze Age celts have been found along the line of the Peddar's Way on Massingham Heath and at Anmer; and a very fine set of horse-trappings belonging to the prehistoric Iron Age was found not long ago at Saham Toney, near Watton.

Now, it may be said that a knowledge of all this is hardly even necessary, certainly not essential, to the clergy; but considering that examples of each succeeding age may be found in our own country, it is surely well that they should not be wholly ignorant of it! It is good for a clergyman to know something about the archæology of Biblical lands as he studies his Bible—something of the marvellous revelations of the spade in Assyria, Babylonia, and Egypt, something of the wonderful discoveries of Sir Arthur Evans in Crete and of Mycenean and Bronze Age civilisation, something of classical Greek, and Roman antiquities; but still more is it good and necessary, ay, even essential, that he should know something of the antiquities of his own country, if he would be a wise guide to his people.

Palæolithic remains must usually be dug for;[1] Neolithic remains may be found on the surface almost anywhere.[2] How interesting to walk along such an ancient road as the Peddar's Way, for example, and realise that it was first a track-way of our Neolithic, Iberian, ancestors, then a trade route in Bronze Age times, until finally it became a Roman road and resounded with the tramp of the legions marching to guard the Saxon shore at the great camp of Branodunum, Brancaster! How still more interesting and important, not to say essential, is it that the incumbent of a parish like Castleacre should know something of its antiquities and history! There we have the great earthworks, probably Neolithic-Iberian — at any rate Icenian—a Roman camp, a pagan Anglian cemetery, the great Norman castle, and the glorious priory: how inspiring the atmosphere of its storied past![3]

Thus we arrive at that section of archæology in which most

[1] Except in some localities where they lie on the surface, as in Norfolk, on Brandon Heath, Icklingham, etc.

[2] Our own county is particularly rich in specimens of both periods.

[3] See my *Guide to Castleacre*, 2nd ed., 1913, 6d. net.

clergy, if they specialise at all, will be inclined to do so, more particularly that which deals with what may be called Ecclesiastics. Here let us take architecture. Am I wrong in saying that it is essential that a parish priest should at least know the difference between Norman, Early English, Decorated, and Perpendicular architecture, and should be familiar with the distinguishing characteristics of each style? What lamentable mistakes would have been avoided in so-called restoration if only the priest had known what should be done and what left undone! Take my own church at East Rudham: there a fine Perpendicular church, with remains of its Norman, Early English, and Decorated precursors, was ruined in its restoration, and the ancient arcades dividing the nave from the north and south aisles replaced by a banal "restoration" which spoils the whole interior of the church. Take, again, such a church as that at Castle Rising: there the interior is largely spoilt, the original Norman west front has been to a considerable extent damaged, and the south porch replaced by a modern replica whose only merit is that it could never be mistaken for the original! So have hundreds—I might almost say thousands—of our ancient parish churches been spoilt, and their teaching for posterity ruined, by the well-meant but injudicious efforts of the "restorers" of the nineteenth century.

Think, again, of the wealth of ecclesiastical architecture there is to be studied in our ancient abbeys and other monastic buildings scattered over the length and breadth of our land! Fortunately, these are not likely to suffer from restoration, and can be studied as time and weather have passed them down to us. Think of the Cluniac Priory of Castleacre—one of the glories of Norfolk—an almost pure example of the Norman style at its best, where the uniquely beautiful west front is hardly spoilt by the insertion of the great Perpendicular window in the fifteenth century. Think of Binham, with its beautiful Transitional west front and Norman nave. Then, for examples of the Early English style at its best take the magnificent series of Cistercian abbeys in Yorkshire—Fountains, Roche, Rievaulx, and others—and note the stern repression and heaven-aspiring grandeur of the work of these Puritans of the Mediæval Church. There are no buildings wholly Decorated or Perpendicular, because the erection of church edifices was mostly carried out before their day; but fine examples of both styles, incorporated in earlier buildings, are to be found almost everywhere. Good specimens of Decorated work are to be seen at Elsing,

Snettisham,[1] and Buxton Lammas; and everyone is familiar with the splendid series of Perpendicular churches—the fruit of fifteenth-century prosperity, when Norfolk held the place in English social economy which Lancashire holds to-day—to be seen throughout our county, among which Sall and Cawston, St Peter Mancroft, Norwich, Cromer and Fakenham, and the Marshland churches hold the palm.[2]

If a man wishes to specialise in some smaller sphere, there are the details of the furniture of the church to be considered—the font, the screen, the altar and reredos, the church plate, the monuments, the brasses: the points of interest are countless. Take the font: the modern article is mostly tasteless and insipid; not so with the ancient examples, with which so many of our parish churches are enriched. Here, again, each several style finds its exemplars in our county; and how wide the fields opened up to him who will confine his interest to these! Omitting reference to later fonts, such as those representing the Seven Sacraments, of which fine instances may be seen at East Dereham and Little Walsingham, take the splendid series of Norman fonts in north-west Norfolk—at Toftrees, Sculthorpe, Castle Rising, Burnham Deepdale, to mention only some of them. The student asks whence was the ornamentation upon them derived; and as he pursues his investigations, and finds himself carried further and further back into the past, he discovers that the scrolls and spirals connect with the art of the Celtic and Irish manuscripts, and through these with the art of prehistoric Crete and Mycenæ, with Egypt and the Bronze Age; while the grotesque figures with which many of them are adorned connect with Scandinavia and the art of the Viking Age.[3]

I have only mentioned these as illustrations: the list might be greatly enlarged. Equally fascinating are the other subjects I have spoken of, and the wide range of study which is laid open to the earnest investigator cannot be imagined until it is

[1] Of Snettisham Church Mr F. Bond says: "Of village churches, in spaciousness and height, and in beauty of proportion, the noble church of Snettisham is almost unrivalled" (*op. cit. inf.*, p. 133).

[2] Consult Prior, *A History of Gothic Art in England*; and F. Bond, *Gothic Architecture in England*.

This latter work is devoted to a demonstration of the evolutionary process in architecture, showing how each successive style develops naturally from the preceding.

As marking the difference of racial attributes, note that when English architecture passes from Decorated to Perpendicular, French art runs to Flamboyant, *e.g.* Amiens Cathedral, Sens, Troyes, Auxerre, and many another.

[3] See my monograph on "Norman Fonts in North-West Norfolk," *Transactions of the Norfolk and Norwich Archæological Society*, vol. xiv. pp. 97–124.

realised. The ramifications are countless and the lines diverge in endless directions.[1]

Now for an illustration of practical usefulness, which will perhaps carry more weight in days such as ours, and which, if its truth were understood, might serve to bring together far-sundered parties in the Church: I refer to the controversy with respect to vestments which caused so much heart-burning and bad feeling in the latter part of the last century. The Ornaments rubric is notoriously obscure, and as patient of diametrically opposite interpretations as the recent letter of President Wilson![2] On the one hand, we are told by High Churchmen that the rubric enjoins, or at least permits, the use of vestments; on the other, we are assured by Low Churchmen that they are forbidden; and each party insists the more strongly on its own point of view, the more strongly the one believes and the other rejects the doctrine of the "Real Presence." But from the archæological point of view both are equally at fault: the vestments have no relation to doctrine, however much the notion may have been imported: they are merely the survival in the Church of the ordinary dress of the people in the early days of Christianity, in much the same way as the use of the Latin tongue survived in the Church down to the Reformation and survives to-day in the Roman communion. I am not here concerned with the truth of the doctrine—the only matter I am concerned with is to point out that the use or non-use of vestments has nothing to do with the question. The space at my disposal forbids my bringing forward proofs of my statement; the argument has been once for all demonstrated by Dean Stanley in his well-known book on *Christian Institutions*, pp. 148–175. If the matter is once understood in this way, forthwith *cadit quæstio* as far as this particular point of controversy is concerned; the significance of vestments has been *read in*, as is so often the case, in other and perhaps even more important questions. The doctrine may be true or not; this is a matter for study and research: originally the use of the Eucharistic vestments had nothing to do with it.

It may perhaps be interesting if I mention the derivation

[1] Here, too, mention may be made of "graffiti"—a little-known subject on which there is a most interesting article in the *Norwich Diocesan Gazette*, January 1917. These graffiti are inscriptions, sometimes by the master-builder, sometimes by visitors, on the walls of the building.

[2] This refers to the *then* "recent" letter of President Wilson, in which he seemed to say that little distinction could be drawn between the aims of the two sets of belligerents—before he, and America with him, took the splendid stand they have since done by joining England and her Allies.

and original purpose of some of these as given by Dean Stanley. The gentleman and the peasant in the first century were alike ignorant of coat, waistcoat, or trousers. Their most important garment was the shirt, camisia or chemise, which, from its white colour, was called alba—hence albe; and in its most refined examples was called dalmatica, from its place of manufacture, Dalmatia—hence the dalmatic. In later times this shirt, which must perhaps always have been worn over some thicker garment next the skin, was drawn over the fur coat, sheepskin, or pelisse; hence the barbarous name of superpellicium or surplice. This is the latest of ecclesiastical vestments. The cassock and the chasuble are both derived from the overcoat or casula—a slang name, meaning a little house, from *casa*, as we call a hat a tile; and coat, or cote, is simply cottage—something to protect the individual or the family from the weather. The cassock retains the shape of a garment to be worn; the chasuble that of the blanket, with a hole in the middle through which the head was passed, like the South American poncho. The stole, which in Greek is just another name for the overcoat, came in the ninth century to be used for the orarium, or handkerchief for blowing the nose or wiping the sweat off the face. These handkerchiefs, on state occasions, were used as ribbons, streamers, or scarves; hence their adoption by the deacons who had little else to distinguish them. Thus the "vestments" were just the secular dress of the people in the early days of the Church. How early the transition from secular to sacred use took place, it is difficult to determine; but it was gradually and by unequal steps, until at last in the Middle Ages the surplice, from being the frock over the fur coat, became the emblem of imputed righteousness, and the ponchos and waterproofs of the Roman peasants and labourers became emblems of sacrifice, priesthood, Real Presence, and so on.

Since writing the above I have met with a passage in Canon Dalton's monumental work on Ottery St Mary, Devon, which I may be permitted to quote, as it gives what may be considered the latest and most reasoned opinion on the subject:—"As regards the apparel of the secular clergy, it was at this period" (the mid-fourteenth century) "in England the same in shape and cut as that worn by an ordinary and sober-minded layman. (Cp. *The Ancestor*, v. 101.) Even the mass-vestments themselves, the chasuble and albe, it is now agreed were evolved from the pænula (φαινόλης)—an immense cloak, sleeveless, and without any opening in front, and the sleeved and girded tunic (*alba tunica talaris*), the ordinary costume of a

well-to-do Roman citizen of the first and second centuries. The chasuble was not only worn by the celebrant, but by all who assisted at the altar service, up to the end of the sixth century—deacons, subdeacons, and collets. It was still worn by the deacon and subdeacon between Septuagesima and Maundy Thursday and in Advent, except on Vigils and Ember days, according to the Sarum Customs in the fourteenth and succeeding centuries. The dress of the clergy therefore even at mass was originally identical with the dress of a Roman civilian of the time who had some position. No distinctive vestment as to shape was set apart for exclusive use of the Christian minister, even in the most solemn part of divine worship, during at least the first four centuries of the Christian era. What was worn was, however, always to be fair and comely, not mean and sordid. Then, as the old cut gradually passed out of use in the world, it was retained in the churches. Ecclesiastical conservatism would retard such changes as far as they concerned the dress worn at divine service: small differences would spring into existence between everyday dress and the dress of the ministrant that was kept in the vestry; and those differences, at first hardly perceptible, would increase as the process went on, till the two styles of costume became sharply distinguished from one another, and the one would become ever hallowed more and more with a multitude of sacred memories and associations. (Duchesne, *Christian Worship*, ch. xi.) From the historical standpoint, then, the Eucharistic vestments are one of the most valuable heirlooms that the Church possesses: that they are retained and used by the whole of Catholic Christendom, East and West, is a public external witness to the age, continuity, and universality of the Church: and it is their natural origin which gives them their real value. Clergy still stand at the altar in the same habit as they did at the beginning, in the costume which St Paul (2 Tim. iv. 13; Acts xx. 7) and the other apostles wore as citizens of the world-wide Roman Empire. The chasuble may thus be regarded as a visible token of the inherent unity of the Church and of the universality of her mission." (Dalton, *The Collegiate Church of Ottery St Mary*: being the Ordinacio et Statuta Ecclesie Sancte Marie de Ottery, Exon. Diocesis, A.D. 1338, 1339; pp. 195–6.) The passage quoted is from the author's note on Statutum lvii., "De habitu presbiterorum," which extends from p. 194 to p. 203.

Surely it will be admitted that such knowledge as this is essential, and the man who possesses it is likely to be a better parish priest than one who has it not!

Then there is all the wealth of what may be called secular archæology—the mediæval castles and mansions, their furniture, the armour and weapons of the knights and squires, and the fashions in dress of both sexes from Roman and Saxon times downwards; heraldry, which is a huge and absorbing subject by itself; household appurtenances, objects of art, jewellery, china, and pottery, etc.—the list is endless, and he must be a dull man who cannot find something to interest him as the long catalogue is unrolled! None of these things, you say, are essential; but I think I shall not be very wrong if I maintain that they really are so, inasmuch as everything that tends to enlarge the mind and broaden the outlook is so far essential to one whose office it is to teach and widen the capacities of those whom he would fain guide to a higher level of culture. Take, for an illustration, the evolution of the castle from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries and the beginnings and improvement of the private mansion from then onwards: how fortunate the parish and the priest where such examples of early Renaissance art are to be found as may be seen in the Rectory at Great Snoring and the Hall at East Barsham, two of the finest specimens of work of the time of Henry VII., with the beautiful terra-cotta ornamentation introduced by Torrigiano and the Italian artists who accompanied him![1] If the parish priest understands these things and can interest his people in them, I say it is all the better for him and for them, and may therefore, without exaggeration, be considered essential to his usefulness. Or, again, when one of his parishioners brings him a flint implement or a bit of pottery which he has found in the course of his daily toil, how his respect for the spiritual guide will be enhanced if he can tell him something about the "things" and the people who made them—*that* is a Neolithic scraper; *this* is a piece of Roman pottery, Samian or Upchurch or Castor ware, as the case may be; and *that*, again, is a portion of a Bronze Age or a Saxon burial-urn!

Hence I submit my thesis with all boldness—that a knowledge of archæology is essential to the clergy; and I hope it may have the effect of awakening slightly contemptuous brethren to a sense of the wonders that surround them.

H. J. DUKINFIELD ASTLEY.

[1] Make this the foundation of a study of Renaissance architecture, with its later developments: Tudor and Jacobean mansions, Wren's churches; eighteenth-century Palladian—Somerset House, Houghton Hall, Norfolk, etc. Note the beautiful late seventeenth-century Custom-house at Lynn. Consult Gotch, *Early Renaissance Architecture*, and Blomfield, *Renaissance Architecture*.

PREACHING AFTER THE WAR.[1]

The Rev. JOSEPH WOOD.

Quite lately there has been a wordy, not to say violent, discussion in several newspapers on the question, "What is Wrong with our Churches?" The Church, like Hamlet's world, is out of joint, and there are numerous ecclesiastical Hamlets about who, unlike Shakespeare's hero, are prepared with a plan or prescription for setting right the Church. But as with the world out of joint so with the Church, it is a job too big for any of us. The best contribution we can make is to set our little selves in order and do faithfully our allotted task. As our allotted and chosen task is chiefly preaching, it will be well to consider what opportunities our sphere may open to us when we face the new conditions of the new world on which we shall enter after the war, and what kind of preaching will then be effective. Preaching is the speciality of our vocation; on that we have to concentrate, to that giving our best powers. For when fault is found with the Church, it is chiefly the sermon that bears the brunt of the world's criticism. What, then, are we learning as preachers from the great awful experiences of the war? What will be the demands on the pulpit after the war? How will the message of the pulpit be affected by the new conditions of the new time? In the vast work of reconstruction that will then be in process, how far will the methods of the pulpit undergo change?

To the consideration of these questions at the present time two objections are raised. One affirms that it will not be a new world at all after the war; that human nature will be just the same as before; that we shall soon settle down to the old life, and the old habits, the old ambitions, the old competitions; the old ideals will return upon us, shorn it may be of some of their features, but essentially the same. Alas,

[1] A paper read at a gathering of ministers.

if that be the case! For unless we enter upon a different civilisation, a different social order, a different idea of the values of life, the war will have been fought in vain, its agony and bloody sweat prove a sheer waste. Our men have not fought and bled and died to keep our country as it was. A second objection is akin to the first. It is urged that to these questions about the pulpit in the future, as to so many other aspects of life, no answer can now be given, since we know not what kind of a world will be left to us after the war, nor what will be our condition, nor the condition of our churches or of our civilisation when peace is declared. Until we know just where we are, it is idle speculating on just what we shall say or do. At the present moment we can hardly see a step before us. The longest-sighted admit themselves short-sighted. We do not know where we shall live, nor what our income will be, nor what will be the demands of the State, nor to what extent we shall be crippled and burdened. We do not know what companions will be at our side; our vision is blurred by events greater than ourselves. There is a sense in which each one of us is drifting. We think about much that has sustained and enriched our life in the past, and say, "Shall we ever be ourselves again?" The effect of this uncertainty cannot but be great. The immediate result with some is a disinclination to make any preparation for the future, letting things slide until the sound of the guns cease and the blood-red harvest of war is over. From that feeble conclusion most of us are saved by the emergence from the wild welter of certain facts and truths which, hitherto much obscured, are now clearly seen in their commanding reality. Some of these facts and truths are specially the preacher's concern, and demand his consideration as soon as they come into view. Had they not been obscured, had they been fully recognised in the past, this war would never have happened. It is time for the Church to mend its ways. When the serious and level-headed are busy with schemes of reconstruction—financial, industrial, educational, social, and political; when the Government finds it necessary to appoint a Special Commission to deal with after-war problems, it would be folly and unpardonable neglect on the part of the Church to refrain from considering its place and work, its methods and plans, until the new time is upon us.

A well-known clerical contributor to the *Manchester Guardian* recently told us that if there is to be a revival of religion there must first of all be a revival in the pulpit. The writer goes on: "Preaching is so sacred and solemn a thing, that once it falls below the level of prophetic vision and passionate

sincerity it becomes worse than useless. There is some reason for thinking that many churches are gospel-hardened. They have listened to the message so often, that it has become to them a tale of little meaning—a narcotic rather than a trumpet-call. If there is to be any real revival of religion among us, it must surely begin in the pulpit." Our critic points to three things needed if the pulpit is to be an effectual instrument of revival: "1. There is need for a frank and fearless exposition of the Bible in the light of all that the best critical methods can teach. 2. There is need for an ethical gospel—the definite application of Christian law to life. 3. There is need for preaching Christ—not for speculating about Him, but for companioning with Him, and catching tone, temper, spirit, and ideals from Him." Now, while all this is emphatically true, it is also true that the pulpit of the future will have other important needs which must be taken into account.

A remark by Dr Crothers, a distinguished American preacher, indicates my line of argument: "We sometimes think of the teacher as a lawgiver, and of the learner as one who with docility receives what is graciously given. But the law to be understood and obeyed in all education is *the law of the learner's mind, and not that of the teacher.*" So in preaching, the law to be understood and obeyed is that of the hearer's mind, and not that of the preacher. For example, it is of more importance to consider what will move and interest the mind of a congregation than what interests and moves the mind of the preacher. Something of the psychology of a congregation must be studied. Preachers are too apt to be considering *subjects* for sermons rather than the listeners. Preachers in their studies are naturally interested in many and diverse subjects, but it does not follow that their congregations will be interested in them. It is true there will be no powerful, profitable preaching unless the preacher himself is deeply, vitally interested in his subject; but not all subjects in which he is interested will be interesting to his people. We are to be fishers of men, not of subjects. If we had been more interested in men and loved subjects only as instruments of good for men, it would have been better, and we should have more to show for all our labour under the sun. I am sure that in the coming time we preachers must consider more earnestly than in the past the mind of the congregation, its point of view, its experience, its limits, its possibilities. Mark what has happened to our preachers at the front. With crowds of Tommies before them they have had to discard almost all their old methods. The common soldier has presented them with a new problem—how

to touch the minds of men who are daily confronting all the agonies, horrors, fears, shocks of the battlefield, and who have become familiar with the great book of Life and Death. They have had to look at their message from the point of view of rough, careless, ignorant, and often blaspheming men, who are yet brave to heroism, cheerful beyond belief, self-sacrificing unto death. They have had to get inside the mind of Tommy, to study his mentality, to find out what interests him, to make religion attractive to him. The men in Y.M.C.A. huts have a rough-and-ready way of dealing with the dull preacher—they get up and walk out. And why is the preacher dull? Generally because he does not understand the mind and outlook and feeling of his audience. He is outside their world. In the most beautiful book yet written about the war, *A Student in Arms*, its author, Lieutenant Hankey, tells us how at the university it was his intention to become a clergyman. But he felt that to be a useful clergyman he ought to know much more concerning the life of the common people, their condition, habits, hopes and sorrows, their environment, and their way of looking at things, than he had the slightest chance of learning either at the university or in his own social circle. So before taking Orders he settled down in the East End of London that he might if possible come to understand the mind and outlook of the working man. When the war broke out, instead of accepting the commission offered he enlisted as a private, if so be he might by living side by side with the raw, rough recruit learn to know him and to win his confidence. No wonder that afterwards he became as the "beloved captain" of his own book. It would be well if all who preach could go through a similar experience. They would find that some actual, first-hand knowledge of business life, some real acquaintance with the trials, temptations, hopes, fears, and work of men in the world help them not a little. The complaint of many men about the preacher is that he knows little or nothing of life—the life of men in their various callings and professions. Some years ago a young, devout, and earnest minister came in much distress of mind to consult a wise senior about his failure in the pulpit. He worked hard at his sermons, but the people were not interested. He kept up his studies and read diligently, yet he could not win or keep the attention of his hearers. The congregation was falling off; instead of coming to church, men stayed at home, sauntering in their gardens or reading the latest novel. What could he do? The senior asked, "Well, what did you preach about last Sunday morn-

ing?"—"Oh! a subject I had long meditated, the differences between the Pauline and Johannine theologies." The senior smiled and surprised the young man by his next question, "Do you ever read the *Times*' money article?"—"No," replied the other man in astonishment. The senior went on, "Do you know the price of cotton last week?"—"No" (the place was Liverpool).—"Do you know what your people are thinking and planning as they go to and from business all the week?"—"No."—"My dear boy, how can you expect your people to be interested in what you say on Sunday if you are not interested in what they do on Monday? Take my advice, and at the head of your studies place the study not of Man with a capital M, but of men. Try to look at your work with their mind, consider the vocation of the preacher from the point of view not of subjects but of living, burdened, ambitious men, immersed in a thousand cares and difficulties, now elated and now depressed. Get inside their minds, and you will find your sermons taking on a new tone and quivering with new life." It was golden advice.

The war has made us familiar with unexpected features in the mentality of the common soldier. More than that, it has revealed to us as in a sudden blaze of light the same features in the whole nation. What are they? Briefly, they are the saving features and qualities of human life, the noble features of all exalted life. Three things, three divine things, have come out under the pressure of the nation's peril, as invisible writing comes out under the application of heat. First, what was it before conscription led three millions of our young men to rush to the colours and fling themselves heart and soul into the war? Love of fighting? Pursuit of glory? Hunger for excitement? Not at all. Surely it was nothing less than a sense of duty, the imperative of duty which they must obey. A divine compulsion came upon them. It was duty, duty to one's country, duty to the call of honour, freedom and justice, duty to humanity, more especially to the wronged and oppressed, which made them leave home and country and offer their lives on the altars of self-sacrifice. I do not say they were all conscious of these high motives, but they were there all the same, dim, obscure, and inarticulate in their hearts, yet so powerfully stirring that no other course was possible. Prudence could not restrain them; home ties could not bind them; business prospects could not tempt them; hunger and wounds could not affright them. This must they do, or prove traitors to their best selves. This is why our sons, friends, and brothers went out so bravely to

meet death, and the rest of us steeled our hearts to speed them on to the great ordeal.

A second thing the war has revealed to us, namely, the presence, power, and glory of self-sacrifice in every common heart. Willingly, cheerfully, and without any kind of compulsion save their own inner mandate these millions have gone down into the pit of hell, have suffered that which no tongue and no pen can describe ; many of them lie buried in unknown graves ; others have gone without leaving a trace behind, and more and more are coming back maimed for life. Doubt not that each one had the strong desire to live, but in them it took on the form of a readiness to die for a great cause. Why did they do it ? They felt that this personal sacrifice was the only way of loyalty to their own souls and loyalty to the "beloved community." They gave their life-blood gladly because that was the only way of their country's salvation. They may have been mistaken, but it does not diminish the glory of their offering. Many of them, it is true, did not know they were doing a great thing at all. To them it was a very simple thing—just "doing their bit." In reality it was a Christ-like thing, something above the flux of sense and time, eternal, compelling. So the lesson of the Cross has come home to us all with a new emphasis. It is borne in upon us with almost tyrannical force that only by the sacrifice of self is redemption won, either for the individual or the State. The very central principle of Christianity is that which the war has reproclaimed in tongues of fire, teaching us to lift our faces from the earth and behold anew that life is only gained as it is laid down at the command of a Higher than self. That Higher than self may be patriotism, it may be Belgium and its wrongs, it may be an ideal of honour. But in all these cases it is the fundamental thing of true religion :

> "A picket frozen on duty,
> A mother starved for her brood,
> Socrates drinking the hemlock,
> And Jesus on the rood ;
> And the millions who, humble and nameless,
> The strait, hard pathway trod—
> Some of us call it duty,
> And others call it God."

A third discovery, or rediscovery, remains to be briefly noted—the priority of spiritual values as against material. Philosophical materialism received its death-blow long ago at the hands of Martineau, but practical materialism before the war held us, held Germany, in a sense held the world, in its

grip. Things were in the saddle, souls were in the dust. Everyone's ambition was to get on, to make money, to climb higher in the social scale, to win the means of display, luxury, pleasure, excitement. We glorified the millionaire and made him a peer. We scorned the unsuccessful in the struggle for things. That damnable spirit pervaded nearly the whole of society, and even stained our churches.

And now, thank God, we have found that all this goes for nothing when once the soul is touched to fine issues. The war has brought it home to us with irresistible power of conviction. We have seen that what gives its fighting value to an army is its moral. Every general knows it; every corporal knows it. In the last issue everything depends on the temper, the courage, the endurance, the fire and loyalty of the men. Guns, trenches, air-craft, sea-craft, generalship, strategy and tactics would all fail but for the spirit of the men. The truth shines clear in the eyes of all, that not in things but in souls is a nation's true life; that its destiny is controlled not by its wealth, or its armies, or its extent of territory, but by the heroic temper of its people and their faith in Righteousness sitting on the throne of the universe.

Now these three things—the imperative of duty, the glory and saving power of self-sacrifice, the significance of spiritual values or supreme—have been rediscovered by the experiences of the last three years. In them lie the hope of the churches and the future of religion. They *are* religion. Many of the men who exhibited these things did not, it may be, think of them as religion at all. They put the slightest, simplest interpretation on what they did and suffered. They made a jest of death and a mockery of the grave. It all came in the day's work. But we need not be so diffident and dumb. Does anyone really think that where duty ends, where self-sacrifice, courage, loyalty, brotherhood, and cheerfulness end, that *then* religion begins? Such things are the very stuff and fibre of religion.

All this should, and must, affect our preaching. We are to revivify these things, to insist on these spiritual values more earnestly, and less upon intellectual assurance; we are to trust more to the note of persuasion than the logic of reasoning. What has been called the winning, wooing note has been sadly lacking in our pulpits. To understand by the head is one thing; the "understanding heart" is quite another. The appeal needed is not so much to logic as to the will, conscience, affections, and the sense of honourable manhood. It must be the appeal not of minor things, but of the great things of the soul and life. Our topics must be of large

human things with a large utterance, the great utterance of great truths, the great enforcement of great duties. It is true we may plunder all creation for topics, but only as they minister to ethical and spiritual values. The pulpit has been given too much to argument, too much to the subtleties, too much to the ingenious treatment of small topics. Matthew Arnold's advice to a poet is here to the point: "I counsel him to choose for his subjects great actions. . . . It is a pity that power should be wasted, and that the poet should be compelled to *impart* interest and force to his subject instead of *receiving* them from it, and thereby doubling his impressiveness. There is an immortal strength in the stories of great actions." An illustrious preacher of a past generation once reproached his ministerial brethren with the "avoidance of great subjects in the pulpit." The reproach may well be laid at our own doors. Where I differ from this illustrious preacher is in the kind of subjects that are really great. He meant the theological doctrines of creeds, articles, and confessions of faith—the fall of man, original sin, the personality of the Holy Ghost, substitutionary atonement, miracles, etc. These, however, are not really great subjects of religion and the religious life. They are interesting, they exercise the intellect, they give play to great argumentation, but they do not touch the conscience, the heart, the will of the man in the street, nor of the soldier in the trenches. We have trusted too much to argument. We have been too often like Omar:

> "Myself when young did eagerly frequent
> Doctor and Saint, and heard great Argument
> About it and about: but evermore
> Came out by the same Door as in I went."

We have been keen controversialists, and now, before the stupendous tragedy of the war, controversy is as dead as Dickens's famous door-nail. The man in the Y.M.C.A. hut doesn't care a straw about the affirmation or the denial of the Trinity. Discourses on the fall of man or the flames of hell sound to him like the rattling of dried peas in a bladder. The great matters of life and experience are quite otherwise. If you ask what are they, listen to St Paul: "Love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, fidelity, meekness, temperance." What a divine catalogue! Or again: "Whatsoever things are true, just, pure, lovely, and of good report." What greater subjects for the pulpit can be found than the Beatitudes or the parables of the Gospel? They open the door we have been so reluctant to open, the door of personal appeal. It is

the note of appeal along the line of affection, conscience, and experience which must accompany our preaching. It will not do, as too often in the past, to fling down a statement with this sort of inference, "There it is, my friends; take it or leave it; my responsibility is over." There must also be the accent of invitation, the warmth of concern, the compelling persuasion men feel when the preacher himself thrills to the sense of God and himself bears and carries the sorrows of his people, sharing the burden the Master bears in bringing many sons to glory.

Then, and only then, shall we see dawning the great day of the Church. Intellectual truth is much; it is borne to us on every wind that blows. We need not be anxious for its advent; it streams in for us through every window of the house of life. What we need is to recapture the secret of spiritual values, the transfiguring power of the winning goodness which the Lord and Master of all goodwill displayed when the common people heard Him gladly.

JOSEPH WOOD.

CROWBOROUGH.

1517–1917:

A RETROSPECT AND AN ANTICIPATION.

THE REV. RICHARD ROBERTS, M.A.,
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THE Protestant Reformation had many aspects, and its meaning is not to be captured into a happy phrase or two. But before everything else it was a revival of religion, and it is on the side of its original religious significance that its historical consequences have been most important. That it completed the dismemberment of the Holy Roman Empire and inaugurated the modern tradition of the national State—pregnant as that was both of weal and of woe to the world—was not of so much moment as that it affirmed a spiritual principle which reached to the springs of life, and which has since determined the course of human affairs in other spheres than the religious. Like every other revival of religion, the Reformation was provoked by the prevalence of ecclesiastical corruption and incompetency; but at that moment, to condemn corruption was to assail authority. It was from this necessity that the positive principle of the Reformation emerged, and it took shape as a doctrine of personal autonomy and independence in matters of faith. It emancipated the individual soul from the dehumanising submission exacted by a hypertrophied authority; and though presently it set up a new form of authority (destined in time to sterilise the religious impulse as effectually as did the old), it could not arrest the new energy it had liberated. That went on its way, overflowing into regions not contemplated by the Protestant fathers. The new doctrine had come to stay; first appearing as a religious fact and a religious power, it grew into a fact and a power over the whole life of man. The essential history of the modern world is the history of the fortunes of this principle of individualism in its application to human affairs. In this history there are two main strands.

I. Newman's lectures on the Turks are worth re-reading to-day, partly for their bearing upon the Turkish problem, but chiefly for their philosophy of history. He starts out with the antithesis that "barbarous nations live in a common imagination," while "the civilised States live in a common object of sense." The process of civilisation is the passage of society from the state in which it is held together by a common devotion to an object of the imagination—a totem, a religious tradition, a myth, or what not—to that state in which it is held together by a common devotion to some object of sense. But this passage is effected by the exercise of the reasoning and analytical faculties of the mind, quickened by the very fact of men living together. Reason turns upon "the object of the imagination" which forms the social basis, analyses it, seeks a rational ground for it, and, failing in this endeavour, turns away from it. "Nor," says Newman, "will man be satisfied until he ultimately reaches those objects which are as much within his own handling as the reasoning apparatus itself. Hence it is that the civilised States ever tend to substitute objects of sense for the objects of the imagination as the basis of their existence." To put it summarily, civilisation passes through three stages—the first of faith, the second of analysis and scepticism, the third of materialism. But Newman failed to perceive, or at least to state, that no civilisation has ever been known to pass through this third stage and to survive it. This has been well pointed out by Edward Carpenter. When "the object of sense" has superseded "the object of imagination," then that civilisation has reached its term. The rest is a history of relapse into barbarism or of extinction. "Where there is no vision, the people perish."

There is ample and impressive historical authentication of Newman's theory—certainly enough to justify us in using it as a working hypothesis for the interpretation of the post-Reformation period. The period began as the age of faith; the soul, emancipated, standing on its own feet in its new-found freedom, sets out to make good its franchise of the unseen. A new world of possibility and power had been opened out before it, and something of the bound and the exuberance of primitive Christianity returned. But an age of scepticism set in. The new spiritual world of independence and freedom was subjected to the cold analysis of sharpened intellects; and between the English Deists, the German Rationalists, and the French Encyclopædists, the accepted religious synthesis was discredited; the principle of individualism was divested of its religious habit—and this was

so thoroughly done that, despite the Evangelical Revival of the eighteenth century, the door was opened to the age of materialism.[1]

The later eighteenth century saw the Industrial Revolution, the transition from the small manufacturer to the large-scale production made possible by the inventions of Watt, Hargreaves, and Crompton; and this movement was dominated by the prevailing individualistic tradition. From this grew industrial competition, with its theoretic justification in the doctrines of the Manchester School. We now reach "the objects of sense" with a vengeance. The economic motive became paramount, and it has become the tritest of commonplaces to call the nineteenth century an age of materialism. Imperialism and, later, financial imperialism became the regulative interests in the wider affairs of the world. "The Almighty Dollar" was more than an exercise in satire; it epitomised the philosophy of a generation.

The modern world appears therefore to have run through Newman's three ages. *Ex hypothesi*, this inferno of desolation and anguish may be the tragic finale of a civilisation.

II. But there is another strand in the history of the Reformation principle, and it is in this direction that (I believe) our hope for the future may be found. It was not long after men began to realise "the liberty of the Christian man" (to use Luther's phrase), when it became necessary to assert that liberty in the face of the civil magistrate. The first successful beginnings of the modern achievement of political freedom were the result of the Puritan resistance to State-imposed religious practices. The struggle for religious liberty became a struggle for political liberty. The logic of the Reformation principle led at length to the demand for its application in the secular region; and this was the leaven working through Geneva and Rousseau that produced the intellectual origins of the French Revolution. Mazzini was right when he said that the French Revolution was the political translation of the Protestant Reformation, the affirmation in the political sphere of that liberty which the Protestant fathers affirmed in the religious. This was the second great turning-point in modern history; the inauguration of the era of democracy, with its corollaries of Catholic and Jewish emancipation, the extension of the franchise, the abolition of negro slavery, and the like. But it is evident that the native human need is not

[1] The same point as is made here is involved in the description of this second age as the *sæculum rationalisticum*, and of the following as the *sæculum realisticum*.

met either by religious or political liberty, or by both together; for some time there has been growing a demand for the extension of the principle into another region, namely, the economic. This has expressed itself in the Socialist and Syndicalist movements; and it has undoubtedly gathered much reinforcement from the unsettlement produced by the war. The Reformation abolished the vested interests of a religious caste; the French Revolution abolished the vested interests of a political caste; the next step will be the abolition of the vested interests of an economic caste—the plutocracy, the money power. Religious liberty was affirmed as against privilege resting upon an alleged monopoly of grace; political liberty as against privilege resting upon inheritance; the coming revolution is the affirmation of liberty as against privilege resting upon property.

This movement has indeed passed beyond the stage of speculation. The Russian Revolution may well turn out to be the third great turning-point in modern history, the first act in the drama of economic emancipation. What has happened in Russia is not an old-time political revolution. The overthrow of the Tsar and the old order was no more than an incident in the overthrow of economic privilege, and for the first time a disinherited class has gained an ascendency over not alone an aristocracy, but a bourgeoisie as well. A proletariat is in possession, and it is a new thing in the world. The ideal of political equality has been gathered up into an ideal of economic equality. What, then, does this mean for the world? The wars of religion came to an end long ago; this war bids fair to be the last of politico-dynastic wars. Are we then on the verge of a period of economic war, in which the old vertical divisions of nationality will be replaced by the new horizontal division of class?

It may be. At bottom, the struggle for liberty has been a struggle to broaden the basis of human fellowship, to break down sundering barriers of privilege and monopoly. Luther fought to bring the disinherited *layman* into his own; the French Revolution brought the disinherited *citizen* into his own. But it is neither as layman nor as citizen that the disinherited man of to-day regards himself, but as a wage-slave, a working man denied a fair share of the fruits of his industry. His interest in religion and politics is overshadowed by this one conviction. Like the plutocrat, he is a child of his age; he too is governed by the economic motive. His thought of an enlarged social basis is bound up with drastic dealings with property; and if this state of mind continues,

it is difficult to see how the future can be saved from violence.

New wars or a new religious synthesis—these seem to be the alternatives before us. We may take some comfort from the fact that the coming change has begun in Russia, a land where the religious impulse is still vital and powerful; and there is some evidence that behind the swift overturn of the old order was the energy of an enlarged social vision informed and quickened by a profound religious faith—a faith, here as elsewhere, owing little to the official Church, but fostered and nurtured in humble and obscure by-ways. It is not without its significance that Russia has produced in Lyof Tolstoi—with all his defects and limitations—the greatest religious figure of our age; and Dostoievsky, in whom the essential Russian spirit becomes more clearly vocal than in perhaps any other writer, describes the Russian destiny as that "of revealing to the world her own Russian Christ, whom as yet the people know not." "There lies, I believe," (he goes on) "the inmost essence of our vast impending contribution to civilisation whereby we shall awaken the European peoples; there lies the inmost core of our exuberant and intense existence that is to be." Perhaps, when the clouds have passed, we shall see behind the New Russia a new energising vision of Christ, of "Christ in the other man," a redeeming, recreating perception of that ultimate social unity which we sometimes call the Kingdom of God, but which is also the Kingdom of Man.

Who knows that 1917, which is in one sense the end of the historical period of which the Reformation was the starting-point, may not be the birth-time of the principle of a new Reformation? The age that is passing has been great and memorable in the achievement of freedom; perhaps its death-agonies are the birth-pangs of another principle of life, without which freedom can never be perfect. The Rights of Man are not to be fully realised except as they are seen to be the rights of the other man. The banner of the old order bore the splendid word Freedom; the banner of the new shall bear the twin legend Freedom and Fellowship. And perhaps the Church may be redeemed by the gift of a new prophetic word, a new evangelism which will call men to bind their brethren to themselves in a living comradeship—where there is neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free—with the same passion, the same urgency as in times past it has called them to flee from the wrath to come.

RICHARD ROBERTS.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"THE WAR-MADE EMPIRES."

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1917, p. 1.)

In his article Dr Jacks deals some ugly knocks at the project of a League of Nations. Following on the reasoning which proves how deeply war is embedded in the life of nations and in the very fibres of their growth and being, the question is raised as to the operation of such a League, assuming that it succeeds in its object of preventing war, and one very awkward difficulty is pointed out with regard to great war-made Powers *ex hypothesi* preventing little States like Bulgaria from developing through warfare as they themselves have developed.

But is not this all a fancy picture? I maintain that we have no warrant for assuming that the League will be successful in stopping war; certainly not in the coercive fashion which the writer seems to contemplate, as if it could or would interpose with automatic regularity to thwart entirely just national aspirations after expansion or rectification of frontier or the like. The League will no doubt aim at diminishing the frequency of wars: that is its *raison d'être*; but there is such a thing as a success which is only partial and yet is far removed from failure. The evils resulting from its action which Dr Jacks foresees are those which would result from a machine-like inhibition harshly applied to the natural growth-movements of young nations. But the League will exist for the very purpose of providing for these movements betimes; finding scope and elbow-room long before the questions, such as would threaten to arise if they are neglected, become acute. The causes of every great war are of long standing, and fairly obvious to any attentive observer. They can be taken in hand by such a body as the League, and dealt with by process of carefully thought-out readjustments, which though giving opportune relief to one nationality shall not inflict injustice on another. Doubtless no two of us will anticipate exactly the same amount of success from the influence of the League, because we differ in manifold variations from each other in tendency to sanguine or melancholy forecasts. Yet not many would affirm that the long-continued horror of Turkish misrule in South-Eastern

Europe would have subsisted as we have known it, had there been in existence a confederacy of all the great nations of the world inspired by the purpose of mitigating such evils, and many of them removed from all entanglement in the political issues involved. Granted that the Concert of Europe was a feeble and disunited power: how could it be otherwise when honeycombed by jealousies and torn with selfish aims? But the League will include mighty nations with no selfish aims except the one purpose of preventing the explosive forces from acting, by opening the valve in time.

But the chief argument for the League is not based on a shallow and sanguine anticipation of success. Probably it would fail again and again in preventing war. But it could not fail to be an educative force in international life. The perpetual reminder that the welfare not of this or that people but of all mankind is committed to its charge would exert a sanative influence on the pinched and turbid ideals of national policy. After all, progress consists far more in what men strive for than in what they achieve: and as long as the League existed at all, mankind would be trying for something like peace in place of strife, and instead of suspicion for mutual understanding.

Dr Jacks' strictures are the obverse of those ordinarily heard. Most people deride the League as certain to be ineffective. The Principal anticipates for it invariable success, to be attended, however, by immeasurable mischief—the mischief which comes to the wheat when the tares sown among it are rudely and prematurely torn up. The two points of view are not easily reconciled; but probably the former is nearer the truth than the latter.

There remains one observation to be made. All who forecast failure to the League's efforts should put before themselves clearly and decisively the prospect before us if there is no League. It will be found that every single difficulty which confronts civilisation is intensified to an almost unlimited extent if no such controlling power is established: if, that is, the mutual jealousies of nations "on the grab" are allowed to operate in all their old untrammelled malignity: if Germany, for instance, sets to work to recover her strength and trusts once more "to wrong and robbery" along with ceaseless intrigue to break up adverse alliances. The situation is incredibly complex, and we are compassed about with pitfalls innumerable: nor will any sane man presume to prophesy. Yet it may safely be said that if we in our vast want of faith abandon all attempt at jointly pressing forwards towards the right, all chance of avoiding the uttermost horrors of internecine warfare disappear into the nether gloom. Whether or no we expect success, there can be no doubt that the attempt should be made: else we renounce a great and salutary hope. E. Lyttelton.

London.

"SIR OLIVER LODGE AND THE SCIENTIFIC WORLD": A REJOINDER.

(*Hibbert Journal,* October 1917, p. 129.)

Sir Oliver Lodge completely misses the points at issue. My charges against him were three:—First, that his accusations against the scientific world were groundless; second, that his discoveries and novelties are not

new, but very old; third, that his facts are not facts, but interpretations of facts.

1. He now tones down his accusations. He says I have exaggerated his intention. I may have exaggerated his intention, but I did not exaggerate his assertions. I quoted them *verbatim et literatim et punctuatim*, and I showed that he is totally and entirely mistaken. I may have exaggerated his intention, but, if I did, it was because his words expressed more than his intention. He now explains that his charge is made, not against the scientific world in general, but against a few men of science, and still more against some of their followers. He repeats his accusation, but restricts its scope. He says that these unnamed men of science and their followers think they know quite enough. How does he know what they think? He can know it only by what they say. Why does he not quote their words? How are we to know that he is not in this, as in other things, mistaking for a fact the interpretation that he puts upon a fact?

2. Whether he withdraws or reasserts his claim to having discovered a novelty I do not know, but I do know that he puts into my mouth words that I have not used, and expressions directly contrary to what I hold. I have never spoken of the "fact" that "incarnate and discarnate humanity is all one family, that the screen between the materialised and the immaterial variety is of a sensory and material and temporary order," etc. etc. If I were to speak of these things in this way I should speak of them as facts, not as a fact; but I trust I have a better appreciation of the difference between a fact and an inference than ever to use the word fact, either in the singular, or in the plural, in such a connection.

He asks me whether there is not likely to be a spark of truth in the midst of some of the older legends of witchcraft and magic. I think there probably is truth in some of the facts. I do not think there is truth in the interpretations. I think it is true, for instance, that Mr Mompesson and his family did hear sounds resembling the beating of a drum: I do not think it true that the drum was beaten by the devil; but as Sir Oliver Lodge makes no distinction between a fact and its interpretation, it is unlikely that he will appreciate the difference.

3. To my third charge, that Sir Oliver Lodge constantly confuses fact with the interpretation that he chooses to place upon fact, he makes no answer at all. He does not attempt any defence, and judgment goes by default. So far from defending himself, he does not even mend his ways, but gives us new examples of the old confusion. For instance, he reads into my article the expression of anger, wrath, irritation, and rage, but there is nothing in that article to justify this interpretation. It is purely imaginary.

When he says he has produced proofs and more proofs, he fails to make that distinction between proof and evidence that I have drawn very carefully in my book on *Spiritualism and Sir Oliver Lodge*. Just as what he calls facts are really interpretations of fact, so what he calls proofs are only evidence; that is to say, they are compatible with his explanation, but they are compatible with other explanations also. He has not adduced proof until he has adduced a fact which is compatible with no other explanation than his own. If he had adduced proof, he would not need to complain of the obscurantism of the scientific world. That world would be converted.

May I be excused for inquiring who Sir Oliver Lodge's mysterious antagonists are? He complains "of a few men of science, and still more some of their followers," of "such men," of "a certain group of people," and he repeats with even additional emphasis his accusation of obscurantism against them. "They do not mean to be convinced"; "if they resolutely close their eyes, the loss is theirs"; "Their prejudice is born of a resolute certainty." Who are these miscreants? and what have they said? Does what they have said bear out Sir Oliver Lodge's interpretation of their thoughts? Or is this another confusion between fact and interpretation of fact—another unjustifiable assumption?

Finally, Sir Oliver Lodge suggests that I do not weigh my words: I submit that he himself affords the best proof that I do weigh my words very carefully. If I did not, so keen and experienced a controversialist as he is would certainly have made a more effective reply than he has made. He calls it a reply: he does not venture to call it an answer.

Chas. Mercier.

SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

The Rev. Professor JAMES MOFFATT, D.D.

Steadily as a clock ticking in a thunderstorm, Dr Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* goes on amid wars and the rumours of wars. The ninth volume ("Mundas to Phrygians"), which has been just published, happens to contain fewer of the short articles on ethical topics than usual —and some of these, *e.g.* "Peace" and "Peevishness," are scrappy—but, on the other hand, it embraces several subjects which are fully treated by a company of scholars, *e.g.* Music, Mysteries, Names, Ordeal, Persecution, and Personification. In the article on Nature (210*b*) a reference should have been added to R. H. Hutton's essay on "The Poetry of the Old Testament," which is quite relevant to the argument; and in the introductory section to the admirable article on "Old Age," the tendency, which has been occasionally felt in the *Encyclopædia*, to smother the strictly ethical or religious investigation under a mass of ethnological data might have been corrected by an examination of views such as those of Newman, for example, who was curiously sceptical about the possibility of remaining a saint in old age, or of Voltaire; Mr Starbuck's treatment of the "psychological" aspects tends to neglect what is vital to such an *Encyclopædia*.[1] Otherwise, the composite article is full of information and well arranged. The same praise is due to the article on Mysticism in ten sections. At the very outset, Dr Rufus Jones—who, by the way, does not get elbow-room in discussing Protestant Mysticism—endeavours to steer a course through this foggy logic by confining the term "mysticism" to "the theologico-metaphysical doctrine of the soul's possible union with Absolute Reality, *i.e.* with God." When he comes (89) to the New Testament mysticism, he applies this to the experience of Jesus, the cardinal feature of which is alleged to be "its consciousness of correspondence with a personal heart and will, constituting the essence of that unseen realm," to which it is completely adjusted. This position is practically that occupied by Mr J. A. Robertson in his recent book, *The Spiritual Pilgrimage of Jesus* (J. Clarke), which is a finely conceived attempt to study the vocation and filial consciousness of Jesus on the basis of the Gospel records. One

[1] Mr Woodhouse says that beyond a few pages in Mahaffy, the subject of old age among the Greeks "has apparently not been treated, except by way of mere reference." But Mr Livingstone has treated it freshly in his charming volume on *The Greek Genius* (pp. 132 f.).

of the most instructive sections in the article on Mysticism is that by Professor Grass of Dorpat on the Russian mystics[1]; it opens up a field which is not familiar to most European students of the subject. He points out that "mysticism, in the sense of a mystical theory, does not exist in the Russian Church," and that the periodic waves of mystical influence from Western Europe have usually set up a mysticism which tended to be heretical. In this connexion, two articles by Russian ladies in *The Constructive Quarterly* (June 1917) on "Saint Lore in the East," and G. Millet's important study of "La Religion Orthodoxe et les Hérésies chez les Yougoslaves," in the *Revue de l'histoire des religions* (1917, pp. 277 f.), are worth notice. Dean Inge's compact and competent article on "Neo-platonism" forms an admirable introduction or pendant to the "Mysticism" article; it whets one's appetite for his forthcoming Gifford lectures.

Since the article on Nietzsche was written, Dr Neville Figgis' study has appeared, and the article on Newman could not refer to Dr Cadman's estimate or to the recently published letters (*Correspondence of John Henry Newman with John Keble and Others*: Longmans, 1917). But neither article really suffers on this account. Mr Havelock Ellis knows his Nietzsche, and the main criticism one would pass upon Professor Coleman's appreciation of Newman is that it gives too much space to the praise of his style and too little to a real analysis of character, especially in view of the unanswerable verdict passed by men like Hort upon his so-called "saintliness." Dr Hastings has kept the balance by assigning the "Holy Office" of the Inquisition to Father Thurston, and the "Papacy" to Mr Fawkes; the latter writer, in a second article on "Persecution" (p. 754), answers unawares some of Father Thurston's apologetic pleas for the Inquisition. It will be convenient, however, to take the various groups of articles in this volume of the *Encyclopædia* as starting-points for our survey of theological literature during the past six months.

The exigencies of the alphabet bring us less than usual upon the Old Testament; Canon Box's well-balanced essay on the Pharisees and Professor Macalister's study of the Philistines[2] are almost all the material in this department, and both are what we would expect from such authorities. Outside the *Encyclopædia* there is not much to chronicle at all in the region of Old Testament criticism. But America sends two useful manuals of introduction, Dr Creelman's *Introduction to the Old Testament Chronologically Arranged* (Macmillans) and Dr H. T. Fowler's *Origin and Growth of the Hebrew Religion* (Cambridge). "The Cambridge Bible" issues two volumes, *Ezra and Nehemiah*, by T. W. Crafer, and *Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi*, by Dr Barnes. Dr Barnes also contributes to the *Expositor* for October a study of Ezekiel xxxvii. 1–14, in which he ingeniously suggests that this plea for faith in a national restoration and revival presupposes a real hope that individuals will rise again. It is only a hope, but "a hope is a stronger power than an article of a formal creed"; the argument of Ezekiel is held to be that if the Jews hope for a resurrection of the departed, they had no reason to hesitate about expecting a

[1] He has not mentioned, in his bibliography, Michel Herbigny's *Un Newman Russe: Vladimir Soloviev* (Paris 1911), a fascinating study of this Russian Churchman.

[2] Professor Macalister insists that no attempt to vindicate the use of "Philistine" in the Genesis stories of Abimelech is successful. Abimelech was a Semitic chief, not a Philistine.

national regeneration. M. Paul Humbert has published his inaugural lecture at the University of Neuchâtel on *Un héraut de la justice, Amos* (Lausanne); he refuses to believe that the optimistic conclusion of ix. 8–15 is authentic, and draws a vivid picture of Amos and his age.[1] An equally penetrating study, from the pen of a first-rate scholar, is Mr W. A. L. Elmslie's *Studies in Life from Jewish Proverbs* (J. Clarke), an appreciation of the religious and ethical ideas in the Hebrew Wisdom literature. Although its range is wider, we may note in this connexion Professor G. A. Barton's manual on *The Religions of the World* (Cambridge). Like his fellow-American, Dr G. F. Moore, Dr Barton has won his reputation primarily in Semitic studies, but he wields a critical method in dealing with the wide subject of comparative religion. An outlying point of interest is discussed by Father Cuthbert Lattey in his article on "The Diadochi and the Rise of King-Worship" (*English Historical Review*, July, pp. 321–334), in which he controverts Mr Bevan's depreciation of Egyptian influence (*Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, iv. 524), and argues that the cult of the dead monarch as divine rose when Alexander's body was brought to Alexandria in the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus II.

The New Testament[2] articles happen to be almost as few. Mr Nourse's short study of the Parables is good as far as it goes, but it does not enter into the really difficult problems discussed, *e.g.* by Buzy in his *Introduction aux Paraboles Évangéliques* (1912), and recently in his article on "Enseignements paraboliques" (*Revue Biblique*, 1917, pp. 168–207). The longer article on Paul is a clear and independent summary by the late Professor Allan Menzies. Dr Menzies incidentally agrees with those who place Philippians in the earlier Cæsarean imprisonment of the Apostle. He refuses to accept the Pastoral epistles, unlike their most recent editor, Mr E. F. Browne, in the "Westminster Commentaries" (Methuen); Mr Browne's notes are of more critical value than his introduction. On the theology of Paul, we have an essay by Mr B. S. Easton on "The Pauline Theology and Hellenism" (*American Journal of Theology*, July), and a monograph has been devoted by Dr W. H. P. Hatch to *The Pauline Idea of Faith* (Harvard Press), which is of true value, and goes much deeper than mere etymology; there is also a study of "St Paul's Doctrine of the Resurrection" in Dr J. H. Bernard's *Studia Sacra* (Hodder & Stoughton), a volume of essays in the main reprinted from periodical literature, but Dr Bernard's most important pages are given to the doctrine of early Christian baptism, especially in connexion with the Descent to Hades. He argues, for example, that the Greek text of Matt. xvi. 18 is corrupt, that "the gates of Hades" should read "the rivers (or storms) of Hades," and that the following saying, "I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven" is an independent sentence. One of the interesting features in his book is the attempt to trace a comparison between baptism and the Descent of Christ into Hades, throughout early Christian literature. Finally, we have to chronicle, in the New Testament department, *The New Archeological Discoveries* (Funk & Wagnalls), an illustrated, popular handbook by Dr C. M. Cobern to the bearing of recent discoveries upon the New Testament and early Church life. Dr Cobern has brought together a mass

[1] A more conservative estimate of Amos' prophecies is given by Louis Desnoyers in the *Revue Biblique* (pp. 218–246).

[2] Mr S. M. Cooke's article on "Nazirites" touches the New Testament (p. 260), but it fails to take account of Champlin Burrage's pamphlet on "Nazareth" (Oxford, 1914).

of scattered information, and his pages summarise what readers would otherwise have to seek far and wide. Together with this we have received the concluding volume of Dr E. A. Abbott's exhaustive series upon the Gospels, *The Founding of the New Kingdom* (Cambridge), which covers Mark ix.–xvi. Dr Abbott is to be congratulated on having carried through his great task with undiminished zeal and care; there is not a volume of his series from which the New Testament student has not much to learn, and we do not need his modest apology to remind us that these pages of laborious, subtle exegesis are meant to throw light on far more than the mere words of the Gospels. "It is quite right," as he says, "to study the words of the Gospels with all possible care, honesty, and diligence, but the student's object should always be to reach the Word through the words. Small indeed would then seem many of the differences that divide churches and theologians."

In a short article on "Nomism," Professor Eugène Ehrhardt distinguishes true and spurious legalism in religion—a much-needed distinction; he also notes how "the Reformers, in reviving the Pauline doctrine of justification through faith, and in substituting for the distinction between precepts and counsels the idea of a vocation which, while individualising the law, rescued it from the atomism of the casuists, struck at the very foundations of spurious legalism." This point is urged by Mr W. J. M'Glothlin in an article on Luther's doctrine of good works (*American Journal of Theology*, October 1917). He shows how Luther enlarged the sense and scope of good works in religion, how it widened from the formal, ecclesiastical connotation to "include practically all the actions of life, when these are performed in the religious spirit." This re-definition was controlled by the new and deeper meaning attached by Luther to faith, which alone gave significance to good works. In the same magazine Mr J. W. Buckham analyses Luther's preparation for modern theology along the lines of his Christocentric and experimental theology, a theology which conserved ethical integrity; the defects of Luther's theology, its exaggerated supernaturalism, as shown in his belief in the devil, its determinism, and its individualism, are the survivals of his Roman Catholic inheritance, from which even he was unable to break quite away. Mr Buckham appreciates the vital impulse of Luther's faith, and in this respect he is at one with the penetrating writer of an article in the *Times Literary Supplement* for 1st November. This writer exposes the unhistorical and narrow spirit of Professor Grisar's comments upon Luther's impassioned writing. "Professor Grisar can only notice the lack of correspondence with the regular ecclesiastical order. He is like a man standing by a volcano with a Kew thermometer in his hand, and exclaiming from moment to moment, 'Most excessive temperature!' Streams of lava are pouring before his feet, and he is aghast at the inconvenience and impropriety of the very bowels of nature being thus exposed. Luther appears in his pages as a highly irregular theologian; but it never occurs to him to think that the irregularity can be due to unnatural regularity of the Roman order." The article is one of those which make the *Times Literary Supplement* indispensable to any serious student, not only of the literature but of the deeper historical and religious currents of the day.

This volume of the *Encyclopædia* is exceptionally rich in articles on Church history. Thus Dr A. J. Maclean writes not only on the liturgical aspects of Ordination, but on Nestorianism; he puts in a good word for Cyril

of Alexandria as "having seized the real point of the controversy," and one would be glad to believe it, for Cyril's bearing is not saintly, whatever his insight may have been. Mr Parsons writes sensibly on "Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism"; Mr T. A. Lacey's study of Augustine falls to be added to his bibliography, but its results would not affect his main arguments.[1] The Paulicians and the Novatianists are safe in the hands of Professor C. A. Scott and Dr E. W. Watson. Dr. R. S. Franks has a brief note on "Passibility and Impassibility"—a topic discussed by Dr H. M. Relton in an article on "Patripassianism" (*Church Quarterly Review*, July, pp. 235 f.), which not only analyses the defective theology of that early Christian movement, but essays to re-state the truth underneath it, viz. "that not God's Impassibility but His Passibility is the central truth of His inmost Nature revealed in the Calvary Sacrifice." Out of the other articles in this department we have only space to notice Dr Adeney's on "Nonconformity," a clear statement which is historical rather than analytic. Two recent books supplement his summary. One is Mr Alexander Gordon's *Freedom after Ejection* (Manchester University Press); the sub-title is "A Review (1690–1692) of Presbyterian and Congregational Nonconformity in England and Wales." Mr Gordon has made a real contribution, in this volume, to our knowledge of the inner conditions of the period. The other book is a collection of lectures on *The Religious History of New England* (Harvard University Press). Professor Platner describes the Congregationalism which was the dominant Church probity of New England. Then follow sketches of the other Churches and religious movements. It used to be said that America's religious history has three phases: first, the metaphysical, then the ethical, then the æsthetic. The ethical coincided with the acute liberalisation of Christianity which is called New England Unitarianism, and Professor Fenn describes this. The Baptists, Quakers, Episcopalians, Methodists, and even the Universalists and Swedenborgians are successively handled, each by one competent to judge. Dr Rufus Jones candidly admits that the Quakers "have not known how to grow and expand with the growing world. They have shown a tendency to be over-interested in themselves." And this type of comment is typical of nearly all the writers. They are sympathetic, but generally dispassionate; they record the story of the past, but they read it in the light of the dominant theological ideas which inspired each movement. The reader will share the regret of the essayists that they could not get any Roman Catholic to lecture on his denomination. As it is, however, the volume is a comprehensive and suggestive review of the subject, which was much needed. JAMES MOFFATT.

[1] With Dr F. R. Tennant's article on "Original Sin" we may bracket Arnold Reymond's discussion, in *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* (pp. 136 f.), of "Le problème du mal et l'apologétique de Gaston Frommel."

REVIEWS

Problems of the Self: An Essay Based on the Shaw Lectures given in the University of Edinburgh, March 1914. By John Laird, M.A., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the Queen's University of Belfast.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1917.—Pp. xiii + 375.

Let it be stated at once that Professor Laird has produced an interesting, serious, and capable study of the difficult problems of the self. The book is not one to be neglected, and not one to be read in idle hours. Though its chief conclusions may carry conviction to but a few minds, the discussion throughout is alive and stimulating. In spite of not infrequent digressions, the book is well ordered, and well written; and although many of its numerous illustrations are more remarkable for their cleverness than for their illustrative value, they certainly add to the general readableness of the volume.

The plan of treatment is clear, and may be briefly summarised. In a short Introduction, which emphasises the importance and interest of the problems to be studied, the author adopts the view that "any account of the nature of the self must begin with an analysis of experiences" (p. 13). By "experience" he understands definitely *acts* of knowing, or striving, or instances of feeling. He thus attempts to determine "what experiences are" (ch. ii), and to show how far they provide the clue to the nature of the self. Then follow discussions of the relation of experiences to the body, and of various views which accord primacy of importance to feeling, willing, or knowing respectively (chs. iii–viii). Having argued that no one of these views contains the whole truth, Professor Laird, in what is probably the most important chapter of the present work, considers how the various experiences may be related together so as to form a "unity and continuity" (ch. ix). The question next dealt with is, "How is such unity rendered possible?" (ch. x), and this is succeeded by a study of multiple personality, and of the light possibly thrown by the latter on the question of the limits of the self (ch. xi). Finally, reference to a unity of experience has often suggested the existence of a soul which perhaps possesses, and perhaps *is*, this unity. Thus, in the end, the essay leads far away from the realms of psychology, and states its author's belief concerning the substantiality of the soul (chs. xii–xiii). Throughout there is, of course, much exposition and criticism of theories of historical and current interest which have been put forward by other writers. Professor Laird's work, however, is by no

means chiefly destructive, and his criticism of opposing doctrines is always subsidiary in importance to the positive arguments which he advances in favour of his own views.

With all this, the book remains disappointing; and, leaving aside discussion of a large number of interesting points that might be raised, I will attempt to set forth some of the reasons for the disappointment.

Trouble arises at the very beginning. Professor Laird, in his attempt to determine "What are experiences?" states perfectly clearly that the subject-matter of psychology consists of "acts," that of such acts many are cognitive, and that the "being" of a cognitive act is "to be a mode of reference to an object." This, he says, may all be discovered by introspection, and accordingly he turns to consider the possibility and character of introspection. His view amounts to the position that in introspection we have absolutely direct and immediate knowledge. At any rate, this is irresistibly suggested by the use he makes of reliance upon introspection, though obviously his admission that introspection is a "species of cognition" (p. 24) and his general analysis of cognition hardly entitle him to this conclusion. When an act is known, the knowing and what is known may, he thinks, be strictly contemporaneous, and both may be parts of the same complex. Even if we admit these highly disputable and difficult points, it is hard to see that anything relevant follows. The utmost that it can mean is that introspection is directed upon a special class of objects, not that it is a completely peculiar kind of knowing. But Professor Laird frequently seems to employ reference to introspection as if the second of these conclusions were implied. That is to say, he seems often to assume, in the course of his argument, that anything which is known by introspection must *be* as it is known. This, however, is precisely the point that might be contested. A few instances may be given.

Professor Laird remarks (p. 31) that "every act of cognition has its being as a mode of reference to an object. But it is a mode of reference having a distinct quality, and the quality of the act can be discovered by introspection." He proceeds as if any quality so discovered must veritably be a quality of the act referred to. Again, when he discusses the view that experiences may consist of changes in the central nervous system, the final clinching of his argument is: "It is futile to argue that experiences are acts of the brain. . . . Introspection reveals a new world, and not merely new features in the old world" (p. 195). Hence, one supposes, there must *be* a "new world." Once more: "By self-cognition I mean simply the knowledge which we can obtain of ourselves by introspection . . . " (p. 207); and then: "If we are aware of ourselves as a unity, we must really be a unity; if we are aware of a previous act of self-cognition as a part of this unity, it must really be such a part, and not anything else." And in the last chapter of all, on "The Soul": "Introspection shows us the kind of being which the soul is"; and, "Experiences are real, and they are as they appear to careful introspection."

This, however, is all most highly illegitimate. Professor Laird gives no reasons for placing introspection in so exalted a position. In point of fact, an act as known is not a scrap more "mental" than a sense datum as known, and the same applies to feeling, if this can be known at all. When we say that introspection is "direct," we do not thereby advance the slightest ground for regarding its deliverance as even relatively infallible. Under no conditions whatsoever does it appear that the statement, "so-

and-so is known," can be held in the smallest degree to justify the further assertion, "so-and-so is what it seems."

I have devoted considerable attention to this point, because it seems to be of fundamental importance for much of what Professor Laird has to say. Leaving other questions of great interest, such as the odd use of "internal sense" to indicate knowledge of bodily sensations, the treatment of desire as feeling, and the ambiguity in the use of terms, according to which feeling is now said to involve a reference to an object—which seems true—and now to *be* a reference to an object—which appears false—I wish to consider briefly the discussion concerning the unity and continuity of the self, and what follows from this. Here Professor Laird comes upon really central problems. He has been assuming all along that "psychical experiences are parts of the self"; he now definitely attempts to determine what sort of a whole this self must be. Taking as unit the specious present, Professor Laird remarks that introspection reveals a number of experiences related together. Here, then, we are held to get "a fragmentary glimpse of the self" (p. 215). Moreover, we can at once assume that "the general type of unity which is found at any moment of its (*i.e.* the self's) existence pervades its whole life" (*l.c.*). The glimpse of the self, then, is only a glimpse of a part of the self; nevertheless the whole self is of the same nature as the part. Here the author turns to a skilful exposition of Kant's deduction of the synthetic unity of apperception, and to an interesting, though somewhat irrelevant, consideration of the view that every logical judgment has for its subject the whole of reality; but returns to his own positive doctrines in urging that the unity and continuity of the self are cognitive, affective, and conative, and in the statement, "if we wish some general descriptive formula for this cognitive unity of the mind, it is best to say that the cognitive process is essentially logical" (p. 232). By this apparently no more is meant than that cognitive acts are connected together into series. But clearly the important point here is precisely what sort of connexion is indicated. Concerning this Professor Laird has little to say. It is not clear whether one experience is to be regarded as somehow implying another, or whether one is causally dependent on another, or whether all that is required is that they should be, in some vague way, together. The connexion may differ in some respects in different cases, for "the unity of the cognitive self as a whole is looser than that of particular series of cognitive processes within it," and the same is true of continuity (p. 235). It would be interesting to know just how a loose unity differs from a close one, and how loose a unity may be while yet it remains a unity. The suggestion apparently is that cognitive unity displays a positive correlation with restriction of object. This, however, seems to involve a confusion between what is cognised—the "material" of an act, as the author once calls it—and the act itself. That two acts, say, are directed upon the same object or topic, does not seem to me to render it in any way clear that they constitute a closer unity than that subsisting between two acts which are directed upon quite different objects. If we assume that experiences are parts of the self, we still cannot get any light whatever on the kind and degree of unity thus involved by considering the nature of that to which the experiences refer. Professor Laird's discussion of multiple personality does not help him at all. The unity

and continuity in question, according to his view, ought to concern solely the nature of the relation subsisting between experiences or acts. Why should acts the contents of which are inconsistent be less closely connected than acts whose contents harmonise? Similarly, it is in no sense the fact that feelings or strivings cluster around a particular object that determines the degree of closeness of their unity. When considerations of this kind are kept in mind, it may be seen that quite probably multiple personality, whatever may be the practical problems to which it gives rise, has no particular philosophical significance.

In the final event it appears that Professor Laird believes in a particular, existent, substantial soul. He is admirably clear as to what he means by this; still one gets the idea that it is meant to provide a basis for the unity of the self. It is hard to see, however, that anything more is achieved than a reassertion of such unity, made more emphatic by the frequent use of phrases such as "distinctive unity," "very close and distinctive unity," and the like. "The soul . . .," it is said, "is a unity of experiences; and there must be a soul, because it is a part of the being of any experience to form part of such a unity."

This final statement appears to me to be reached only by way of a tissue of assumptions. We assume that experiences can be known. The knowing and the known, however, are never identical. In the case in point, both are experiences. We assume, then, that both are parts of a single complex. The complex also may be known, and appears as a unity of experiences. Therefore there must veritably be just that unity of experiences. Therefore experiences, being known as parts of a unity of experience, must really *be* parts of such a unity; and in fact they could not "be" at all were they not such parts. The unity of experience, however, is known as peculiarly close and distinctive. Consequently it must really be so, and in this character may well be called a self. Hence there is a self, which is a unity of experiences.

Expressed in so crude a way all this appears hardly convincing. Yet I think Professor Laird would find it difficult to prove that it is not along some such course that his argument really travels. For its final achievement, then, the book remains somewhat disappointing. But for its work by the way it deserves a warm welcome, and any reader who gives to it careful attention will be likely to lay it down in the end satisfied that the time spent in its study has been well occupied.

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A Defence of Idealism: Some Questions and Conclusions. By May Sinclair. London: Macmillan & Co., 1917.

Until the appearance of this book the writer of it was known to the world chiefly as a novelist,—a novelist, however, as it would now appear, who has been keeping a watch upon what has been transpiring in the fields of psychology and metaphysics, and biding her time for an entry. She has now come in, and not without some bustle. In fact, her descent into the arena has been something of a swoop. The quiet circles of philosophy

are by no means immune from such incidents. They almost seem to be a recurrent phenomenon. Think, *e.g.*, of the stir made by *Appearance and Reality*, or by *The Riddles of the Sphinx* and all its noisy sequel. One of the writer's many charms is that she comes, or thinks she comes, with something old. She even makes a little apology for it. "It does look like a personal misfortune or perversity that, when there are lots of other philosophies to choose from, you should happen to hit on the one that has just had a tremendous innings, and is now in process of being bowled out" (Preface). But she frankly stands in to defend "that nineteenth-century Monism" which its chief opponents regard as already "a pseudo-philosophy of the past."

But she bustles—we are afraid this must be said—all through: bustles, and a little bewilders. It is not that her thought is shallow; it is simply that it is incorrigibly diverting and extraordinarily rapid. We conceive her mind as of the type which is always at another person's point long before he is there himself. She knows very well where her problem lies. Her opening chapters, for example, are clearly a quest for the self. Where is it, and what is it? But she asks so quickly, runs through the various suggestions so rapidly, that she hardly lets the reader have time to look about him. Samuel Butler does not help, nearly irresistible as his panpsychism is. He leaves you no self. "And without a self, over and above the organism, over and above memory, the whole series of past memories and past experiences is unthinkable" (p. 26). Bergson is no better. Mr M'Dougall with his animism seems more hopeful; but he is not. He indeed brings us a great way nearer the elusive "unity of consciousness." His interaction theory at least makes an end of the psycho-physical parallelists. But neither does he get us there. One can see nothing within which his interacting soul and body interact; nothing within which souls interact with one another. The animist is not serious with the unity of the soul; he lets the interacting body break into it. If he were serious with it he could only preserve it through some device of mere correspondence; and with that he is "back among the parallel-liners" again. Once duly hustled through these authorities, the reader is suddenly shot into a domain of "ultimate psychological questions," out of which he is promptly shot once more into a company of "ultimate metaphysical questions"; and there are, at length, the "questions" referred to in the author's subtitle. Such is the type of book: much haste, very great brilliance, such a thing, occasionally, as a mistake; but not, we venture to think, any shallowness.

What is the "Idealism" the writer has had at heart in this book? A theory, so far as we have been able to gather, according to which, in the first place, selfhood shall be real. One shall have a self, be a self, and that in earnest; one shall have the appurtenances of individuality—an arm to strike, a heart to feel, a will to dare and to do. But a theory which yet will allow us to think of the infinite All as a unity wrapping us round, involving in some mysterious way both us and that against which we fight. Clearly, the author is at least looking for a self. She parts with her hero, Butler, very reluctantly, and only because he cannot give her one. On the other hand, equally clearly, she will have reality a unity—Monism. Reality shall not be two; or many. Not two, whether the two never touch—Parallelism; or whether they intermix—Animism; and not many, either as Pragmatism has it, or as Humanism has it, or as the New Realism has it

(pp. 128 ff.). And the "ultimate metaphysical questions" are simply the one question whether or not such Monism is to be had.

A robust sense of the inevitableness of individuality runs through the book from beginning to end, and is the most obvious thing in it. But a much rarer sense also runs through the book, as it were, beneath the other. It is the sense of unity—the thing hinted at, for example, in the following passage, written apropos of the Pragmatists: "They deny that the craving for unity is a universal craving, or even a legitimate hunger. They do not feel it; no good Pragmatist could feel it; the vast majority of mankind are born utterly without it: therefore it is clear that it is by no means a universal need. They do not go quite as far as to say that it doesn't exist, since certain absurd people do feel it; but they let you see that they regard the sincerity of these people as more dubious than their absurdity" (p. 148). Not the most casual reader will fail to see here in which category the author recognises her own place. The author is of those who know the hunger for unity. And the fact that there is amongst us at the present time a certain revival of mysticism suggests very naturally that she could do worse than guide her reader and herself thitherwards. The appetite in question is so precisely what Mysticism is out to satisfy. And at the end of her book she does this with admirable discrimination.

For there is mysticism and mysticism. There is a mysticism, she says, which lies ahead of us, and one that lies behind. The power which induces the mystic state can work in two ways. It "can evoke the instincts and memories of states past and forgotten. It can also invoke the instinct and the premonition of a state not yet attained. It cannot create ultimate reality, or the perception of it. But it would seem that it can create a state in which for moments of most uncertain duration ultimate reality can be discerned" (p. 301). It is true that "in Western mysticism—above all, in Catholic mysticism—the lower and the higher forms of suggestion alternate, and there is a dreadful tendency for the lower form to hold the field." Nevertheless, there is, in the author's view, such a thing as a mystic certainty which one may safely take as genuine revelation. She finds it not only in all religious experience but also everywhere else. "Every poet, every painter, every musician knows the shock of contact with reality." So also does the lover, except when he drops to the sensual level. And so most of all does the hero, in "the exquisite and incredible assurance . . . that comes to him when he faces death for the first time" (p. 302).

It is the clearness with which our author discerns the two directions which mysticism may take, that leads her to attach the significance she does to the work of the Indian poet, Tagore. He stands magnificently upon the higher plane. "When Sir Rabindranath Tagore was over here, in the years before the war, he told us that the destiny of the East was to spiritualise the West." Miss Sinclair would probably accept this statement in all its breadth, letting "the West" stand simply for Western life as a whole. But at any rate she clearly sees and convincingly shows the superior spirituality of Eastern to Western mysticism. The mysticism of the East, as seen in Tagore, is quiet; that of the West is restless and tormented. "For, as we have seen, the language of the Catholic mystic is often the language of sensuous, almost sensual, emotion." In these Bengali songs, on the contrary, there is serenity, and purely human serenity at that. What you find in the *Gitanjali* is not the crudity of passion, but

"the soul and the heart" of it: "its secret and invisible things, small and great; all in it that is superb, inviolate, undying; all that is lowly and most fragile; its impalpable and incommunicable moods, its evanescences, its dreams, its subtleties, its reticences and courtesies; its fears and delicate shames." She quotes, *e.g.*, "I asked nothing from thee; I uttered not my name to thine ear. When thou tookest thy leave, I stood silent" (p. 113). In such a passage as this, our author sees the passion of the expectant soul; but no querulousness, no grossness of expectation, no unrest.

The sympathetic reader will probably not fail to discern something of the sense of "a spirit home at last" in this warm appreciation of the higher mysticism, and of Tagore. Yet a question may arise as to the legitimacy of taking us aside in this way, in almost the very last chapter, and, after so much valiant argument about reality, simply whispering to us that reality is in point of fact found *here*, that it is nothing more nor less than the thing met with when the soul becomes great and fine and discriminative, in the true moment of mystic vision. This will perhaps strike some as questionable philosophy. If so, they will be relieved to find that it strikes the author herself in the same way—an "outrageous loading of the dice," as she frankly calls it in the Preface. Yet this penultimate chapter is in fact only a beautiful lapse. It is perfectly clear throughout the book that the writer has no real desire to have her monism on easy terms; or to have her view of reality "passed" on the mere grounds of its beauty. She has extracted it by dint of argument from many sources —pragmatic, humanistic, panpsychic. Accordingly, when she meets Mr Bertrand Russell, very incarnation though he is of the antithesis of all her views, and armed to the teeth with the most formidable logic that has appeared since Idealism's own, she is in no mood to turn her back or take refuge in a "mystic certainty." She goes up to him sparring. And though it is impossible to enter into any of her arguments here, it would be unpardonable to omit to say what a charming controversialist she is. We cannot promise the reader that he will see very clearly how the house of philosophy stands when she has done her work upon it. But at any rate the vigour of her dialectical passes, her keenness in pursuit, her merciless eagerness when she has an opponent on the run, and again her transparent anxiety to fight fair, her perfect candour, the winsomeness of her own sudden surrenders, to say nothing of the stock of outrageous metaphors managed in perfect taste, the love of the concrete, and the reluctance, almost incapacity, to present an argument which is not at the same time a picture, will conspire to provide, for anyone who cares for it, at least some philosophic entertainment. Only, her cleverness is repeatedly on the verge of becoming embarrassing—embarrassing to her reader, embarrassing to herself. She hits like lightning, and cannot see anything to hit but she must hit it; until one almost wonders whether she has not hit too much, and whether she herself quite knows what she has done in the heat of the game. Her blows would be telling, were they co-ordinated—that is clear enough. But again, that is just the trouble. Would that she had tried to reduce her various defences of Idealism to their bearings on one another! It is perhaps the misfortune of the work that it did not begin its apologia for Idealism by tackling the most formidable foe first; it is such a different proposition, meeting other people with the principles which serve against

Mr Russell, to meeting Mr Russell with the principles which serve against other people. From various indications, one traces in her discussion of the New Realists the marks of its being an afterthought; it is a very brilliant sudden sally, rather than the outcome of years of study. And indeed, if one were forced to offer a criticism of the work as a whole, it would be just this: that the book is not, to all appearance, the ripe result of a life study. The fact that it suggests such a criticism is very real praise; and we think it does suggest it. No doubt the brilliant author would grow tired of philosophy long before she had given a lifetime to it. And that is perhaps the world's gain. But at the same time, as we feel compelled to think, it is philosophy's loss.

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The Will to Freedom; or, The Gospel of Nietzsche and the Gospel of Christ. By John Neville Figgis, D.D., Litt.D.—London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1917.

Dr Figgis has written a stimulating book. One might, possibly, have been inclined to feel that Nietzsche had already been discussed *ad nauseam*, but, after a few pages, one is carried along by the infectious enthusiasm of the present writer. The volume consists of lectures which were delivered in Lake Forest College, Illinois, in May 1915. It is published in the series of the Bross Library, which is, perhaps, best known in this country as including Prof. Royce's work on *The Sources of Religious Insight.* The author is careful to inform us that his interest in the subject is not due to the war, and he does not discuss to what extent Nietzsche is a creator, as well as a prophet, of the modern German mind.

The main interest is in Nietzsche as an assailant of Christianity, as the subtitle indicates. Comte, Mill, Huxley, and Matthew Arnold, whilst attacking the supernatural element in religion, never dreamed that they were undermining the ethical ideal of Christianity. But "nous avons changé tout cela," and Nietzsche is the typical protagonist in this new and more radical onslaught on Christianity, which suffers hardly a single specifically Christian value to remain as it was. For whereas Gambetta said, "Le cléricalisme c'est l'ennemi," Nietzsche says, "Le moralisme c'est l'ennemi." His inconsistency is great, and, probably, no two persons will be in precise agreement as to the significance of the Übermensch. "His picture of our holy religion is a caricature with hardly an element of likeness. His system, so far as he has a system, may seem childish. Yet Nietzsche remains. We shall always return to him; and the Alpine clearness of the air he breathes braces, like his own Engadin." Besides this, "bitter though he be, violent, one-sided, blasphemous, perverse, vain, he never commits the unpardonable sin—he is never dull." Did not Nietzsche declare, in one of his letters, that the world might attack or despise, but could not ignore him? Dr Figgis, therefore, makes no apology for devoting these three hundred pages to a critical and, to some extent, an appreciative examination of his teaching. Copious extracts from Nietzsche's works are embodied in the text. They are chosen with well-informed discrimination, and materially enhance the value of the book. "For Nietzsche can be

judged only by himself. Books about him crystallise into death the flaming soul which speaks in him."

The volume begins with a sympathetic description of "Friedrich Nietzsche: The Man." The pathos of the story is well brought out—the early days spent in the Lutheran manse, the recoil from the ultra-orthodox standpoint and spirit of those good Christians of Naumburg, the desperate rebellion against everything held in reverence amongst respectable people, the tragic loneliness of soul, the final gloom of insanity, and the removal of the patient to the old home to be tended by his mother. "It is a pathetic picture: the pious Christian lady, old-fashioned and tender, spending her last years as nurse of the son who had attacked with a violence before unknown everything she held dear. It is the irony of fate that such care as he enjoyed had been condemned by Nietzsche as a cockering up of the weak and useless." Frau Förster-Nietzsche's biography of her brother is our chief means of understanding him, but it must be read with caution, and supplemented by his own letters. These have, hitherto, been too little known in this country, and we are grateful for the considerable citations from them in the footnotes.

In the second chapter, "The Gospel of Nietzsche" is discussed. For it is a religion, rather than a philosophy or even an ethic, that he preached. True, there is neither God nor Universe in the strict sense, but the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence justifies a certain reverence. Dr Figgis does well to emphasise this doctrine, which has been rather neglected by Nietzsche's disciples. The master himself declares it to be the central doctrine of Zarathustra. The Universe is described, in *The Will to Power*, as "a circular movement which has already repeated itself an infinite number of times, and which plays its game to all eternity." This doctrine, Dr Figgis points out, serves three purposes. It gives an element of eternity to every act, and thus provides a mystical attitude of reverence. It allows a sort of immortality, while keeping clear of all faith in an unseen world. It gives the right to formulate a new canon of ethics, akin to that of Kant, for Nietzsche might say, "Act as though your action were to be eternally repeated."

Religion, however, implies, not only reverence, but also redemption; and Dr Figgis believes that "the doctrine of Nietzsche, no less than that of Christ, or of Buddha, is a doctrine of redemption and deliverance. Nietzsche believes that man, especially European man, is in evil case. He preaches that he must be delivered from this. He holds that this needs a radical change of nature. It is a 'new creature' that is needed." The author commends Nietzsche's eloquent inculcation of heroism. Courage is the one virtue which is not repudiated, and the emphasis laid upon this quality makes up to some extent for the contempt of all the rest. There is something specifically Christian, says Dr Figgis, in the insistence that it is richness of experience that makes life noble, and that suffering is irrelevant.

The whole gospel, however, as Dr Figgis points out, is vitiated by radical inconsistencies. Nietzsche is intensely personal, and lays stress on the importance of securing strong individuals. But, in a system which forcibly reminds one of the eternal flux of Heracleitus, it is difficult to find room for such individuals. All is becoming. "Es giebt weder Geist, noch Vernunft, noch Denken, noch Bewusstsein, noch Seele, noch Wille, noch Wahrheit." Individuals are, therefore, as Dr Figgis remarks, "the

mere soap-bubbles blown for the nonce by the will to power; the superman is only the largest and most highly coloured soap-bubble." There is, again, the inconsistency of vehemently repudiating in theory all ethical valuations, and afterwards reinstating them in practice. Nietzsche's condemnation of degeneracy would have no sting in it unless he implicitly allowed a certain moral standard.

In the chapter on "Nietzsche and Christianity" the author quotes, among other samples, the particularly exaggerated passage in *Antichrist*, where the prophet calls Christianity "the one great curse, the one great intrinsic depravity." Dr Figgis argues that Nietzsche's attitude is based upon an essental misunderstanding, and makes use of the opportunity to dwell upon a few distinctive features of the Christian religion. In fact, one reader, at least, believes that the chief impression left by the book will be that the study of Nietzsche is mainly valuable as bringing out, by way of contrast, a few of the more striking qualities of Christianity. Against Nietzsche's charge that Christianity is nihilism, it is maintained that, really, it is the most courageous and optimistic force in the world to-day. Again, instead of making love to consist merely in sympathy with suffering, as Nietzsche maintains, Christianity refuses to assert that all war is to be condemned. And in reply to the attack on Christianity as hostile to culture, the great Gothic cathedrals are referred to as probably the noblest material treasure of mankind. The Christian aristocracy of saints—"a royal nation, a peculiar people"—is adequate, without pursuing the wild speculation of the Superman; and, to meet Nietzsche's demand for a life beyond good and evil, we have in Christianity a religion which, most emphatically, is not a code, but a spirit.

Another chapter is devoted to Nietzsche's characteristic claim to be supremely original. Here Dr Figgis quotes M. Fouillée with approval: "Mix Greek sophistry and Greek scepticism with the naturalism of Hobbes and the monism of Schopenhauer corrected with the paradoxes of Rousseau and of Diderot, and the result will be the philosophy of Zarathustra." Nietzsche, in fact, is very much indebted to certain writers from whom be believed himself to be wide apart as the poles. The influence of Kant is traced, and Dr Figgis thinks that "it is doubtful whether Nietzsche would have hit on the symbol *Superman*, had not his imagination been fired by *The Origin of Species*."

There is a delightful chapter on "The Charm of Nietzsche." The beauty of his style will be acknowledged even by those who are repelled by his megalomania. His kaleidoscopic imagery, as Dr Figgis remarks, is particularly attractive in these days of flashlight and electric movement. His strongest appeal is, however, to those convinced adherents of the naturalistic view of the world who are conscious of the chilling discomfort of their own hypothesis, and are glad to hear the voice of a prophet who, without any taint of orthodoxy, promises, by his will to freedom, to deliver his disciples from the tyranny, not only of the Heaven above, but also of the merciless earth beneath. He softens the asperity of naturalism by giving it a romantic expression. Dr Figgis is right in maintaining that the charm of light-heartedness stands for much. Irresponsible youths, and even more young women glad to be free of tradition, and, one may add, those who are wild with the madness of war, will hail him as a prophet. It seems inconceivable that his influence will be considerable upon serious thinkers.

The concluding chapter, on "The Danger of Nietzsche," makes one regret that the author, delivering the lectures in a country which was then neutral, did not feel at liberty to discuss the place of the prophet in the present outburst of barbarism. Whatever may be Nietzsche's significance in the future history of European culture, one thing is clear—chapter and verse could be cited by his adherents to justify almost any conceivable atrocity. J. OLIVER STEPHENS.

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Organism and Environment as Illustrated by the Physiology of Breathing. By John S. Haldane, M.D., LL.D., F.R.S.—New Haven: Yale University Press.—London: Oxford University Press.—Pp. xi+138. 1917.

WE are accustomed to think of philosophers and scientists as belonging to two distinct classes of seekers after truth. The method, the interest, and the ideal of philosophy seem so different from those of science that the union of the two in the same worker and in the same work strikes us in the light of an anomaly. In any case, it is rare that any single person is found able to conduct original scientific investigations of extreme delicacy under modern laboratory conditions, and at the same time to propound on the evidence of those investigations metaphysical principles of primary importance in philosophy. Dr Haldane has done this, and he has done more than this. He has shown us how bad metaphysics may spoil physics and condemn the best intentioned research to sterility, and that it behoves the scientist, if he would ensure success even in the circumscribed field of his special study, to be above all things a philosopher. This means that the only true way to success in science, however detached and independent may seem the special subject-matter of investigation, is to study the part not as atomic but as organic, not to conceive the whole as an aggregation of parts but to conceive parts as deriving their meaning from their organic inclusion in the whole. This principle is especially important in biology, the science of the organic, for the parts of an organism do not exist merely as parts.

It may be objected, however, that to require of a scientific investigator that he shall also be a philosopher, using the term in its technical and not in its merely popular meaning, is to increase rather than to reduce his liability to error. A contemporary philosopher recently put forward as a definition of philosophy that it is the science of things the truth of which we cannot know. In any case, we must allow that a philosophy may be false, and it would go hardly with the scientific worker if a false philosophical theory should be held to invalidate his experiments. This is not our meaning. What is meant is that great scientific work, work like that of Charles Darwin, proceeds the more surely the more it is governed throughout by a philosophy which continually seeks the significance of the minutest fact it singles out for study in the whole from which it has been detached.

Dr Haldane has been for many years the champion of the opposition to the prevailing, and for a long time generally accepted, mechanistic theory in physiology. He gave expression to the most uncompromising dissent from it at the meeting of the British Association in Dundee in 1911,

when it received its crowning glorification in the Presidential Address of Dr Schäfer. But while rejecting mechanism, Dr Haldane finds the alternative theory offered by neo-vitalism equally unacceptable. The new vitalism is for him in no more satisfactory case than the old. It fashions a hypothetical existence for which there is neither a practical nor a theoretical necessity. His own theory is a negation of both mechanism and vitalism, and he suggests that, if it must have a name, we should call it "organicism." I hope we shall not. We do not want a distinctive name, with the inevitable consequence of a new battle-cry. I hope rather that we shall recognise that Dr Haldane's theory is nothing more and nothing less than the general principle of philosophy brought to interpret the particular problem of organic life.

I shall best explain what Dr Haldane's theory is by reference to a familiar fact. We are all acquainted with the clinical thermometer. It has become the most ready instrument for gauging the state of our health. It indicates the exact fraction over 98° Fahrenheit which is the constant internal temperature of the individual in health. This temperature is kept constant throughout life, and the slightest variation from the normal shows that something is disturbing the equilibrium, to restore which extremely delicate processes, involving, it may be, the function of many and diverse organs, are at work. We have become so used to the observation of this one indicator that, though it only concerns one particular normal constant, we have come to accept that normality as significant of our whole condition. Dr Haldane's theory is that the maintenance of the normal is the essential factor in physiological process, and that everything else, structural or functional, is subordinate. The investigation of the important physiological activities all reveal regulating processes of extraordinary delicacy and complication, the purpose of which is to establish and maintain a constancy of the internal environment amidst the continual variations of the external environment. We cannot (and it is here that the theory comes into direct conflict with the mechanistic theory) base the explanation on the structure of the organs, for the constancy is not dependent on the structure but the structure on the constancy.

Dr Haldane has been engaged for a long time on an extended, varied, and extremely delicate experimental research into the physiology of breathing. The results he has obtained are very surprising, but what impresses him most is that they prove that the mechanistic hypothesis in physiology is quite untenable. It is not merely that the mechanistic hypothesis fails to explain the phenomena—the vitalists have insisted on this,—it is that it shows a complete misapprehension of the essential nature of the phenomena.

We have always been taught to regard the organs concerned with breathing as the very type of a perfect mechanical structure, contrived to bring about by automatic action, once it is set in motion, a continual exchange between the purifying and renovating gases of the atmosphere and the waste gaseous impurities of the organism. By the rhythmic alternations of inspiration and expiration oxygen is brought from without and the blood-stream is conducted from within to a thin membrane through which by chemical action the exchange can be effected. The whole and the only vital condition of this has seemed to be the functioning of definite co-ordinated systems of muscular fibres controlled from a nerve centre located in the medulla. Except this vital condition, there has

seemed to be an exact equivalence of action and reaction between the organism and its environment. Dr Haldane has now discovered that the muscular control is subject to a regulating process of excessive refinement, designed to maintain a constant composition of the alveolar air—that is, of the deep layer of air in the lungs which is not drawn in or expelled when we breathe. If the proportion of CO_2 in this alveolar layer varies infinitesimally from the normal there is an immediate adjustment of the rate of breathing—at the limit suspending respiration altogether—until the normal constant is restored. But further still, and even more astonishing, this "normal" depends upon another "normal," for the composition varies with the variation of atmospheric pressure. At high altitudes, therefore, not merely does the organism need to adjust itself to the attenuated air and the consequent scarcity of oxygen, but the proportion of CO_2 alters its "normal." This curious discovery led to further investigation which resulted in the discovery of yet another "normal," on which the variations in the other constants depend. This new discovery was that there is a "normal" of the hydrogen ion concentration of the blood, due to a constant adjustment infinitesimal in its range and only revealed by the most delicate electrical apparatus.

This, then, is the distinctive note of what Dr Haldane names the "New Physiology." Unlike the old physiology, which sought to deduce function from structure, it seeks to discover the constant in every organic process and to determine what in regard to it is the normal. Its success is illustrated in many other processes besides that of breathing, the special subject of this book. One case is peculiarly instructive as showing how entirely subordinate in the life of the organism is structure. Structure, indeed, at times appears as simply an *ad hoc* device to support process, and in its manufacture the organism uses or discards the matter or stuff at its disposal according to its need. The case in point which illustrates this in the most remarkable way is the series of experiments dealing with bleeding, which Dr Haldane performed. The quantity as also the consistency of the blood in the organism is constant, and it is found impossible by transfusion to increase it or by bleeding to decrease it, for the organism immediately reacts to an access or diminution. In the one case it gets rid of the surplus by means of the excretory glands, in the other it manufactures new blood to replace the loss. And what is still more strange is, that when the experiments are repeated in the same patient the recovery is found to be every time more rapid. So long as life continues the normal is maintained. If the means of restoration fail, life is no longer possible; but the structure is only the means, not the end, of life.

It is clear, then, that the mechanistic hypothesis breaks down before the new physiology as completely as the old atomic theory breaks down before the new electrical theory of matter. According to the mechanistic hypothesis, the fundamental fact underlying the phenomena of life is the instability of carbon compounds. It is to the growing complexity of these and to their property of intercepting the degrading energy of the solar system that the evolution of living forms is due. The new physiology clearly shows us that the order of existence is the exact converse of this. It is physiological process which avails itself of the unstable carbon compounds, and it is not these which give rise to living process, they are entirely subordinate to it. But if there be

obvious ground for rejecting mechanism, why does Dr Haldane also reject vitalism? Simply because, in his view, the facts he has investigated require no such hypothesis as that of an entelechy or soul, distinct from the living process, and whose rôle it is to direct and control it. Equally gratuitous he thinks is the older idea of a *vis viva* as a specific form of energy. There is no evidence whatever that such entities exist. Life is itself ultimate in the meaning that it cannot be expressed or defined in terms of any reality other than itself.

Here, then, we reach Dr Haldane's philosophical position. This essential nature of the physiological process is one and identical with the principle of thought, consciousness, mind. It introduces us to the inmost heart of real existence. The nature of life does not depend on some matter or stuff of which it is an adjective, nor on some particular structure of which it is a function, it depends on the maintenance of identical form in ever-changing matter. This confronting of a varying external environment with a persisting internal constant is the principle of life in whatever form we meet it,—in the lowliest biological form or in the highest form of self-conscious mind.

In his former book Dr Haldane named this principle personality. There is no better word to express the kind of reality life is, for personality is, in the realm of mind, the active maintenance of a constant amid continuous change. The difficulty, however, in using the term in this connection is that it seems like proposing to simplify one problem by substituting for it another and more difficult one. The problems of the self are among the most obstinate in philosophy. At the close of his book Dr Haldane suggests that his idea is most completely expressed in the concept of God, employing that concept in its full Hegelian meaning as the Absolute. There is much to commend this, but the chief objection to it is, in my view, that we are thereby flung into all the controversy which still rages round the antithetical ideas of transcendence and immanence. Is not the most expressive term that which Dr Haldane himself adopts and emphasises—life? Life is metaphysically ultimate, and logically universal, in the sense that all difference falls within it, and yet it is fully concrete in every individual subject of experience.

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The Organisation of Thought, Educational and Scientific. By A. N. Whitehead, Sc.D., F.R.S.—London: Williams & Norgate, 1917. Pp. vii+228.

In this volume Professor Whitehead has gathered together five addresses delivered to various educational bodies; two papers on the philosophy of science, originally read to the British Association and the Aristotelian Society; and an essay on the same subject now for the first time published.

It is far from evident *a priori* that such a collection—ranging from a speech at the prize-distribution of a Polytechnic to a study of the recondite theory of relativity in physics—would have sufficient unity in its diversity to make a genuine book. A reader ill acquainted with Professor Whitehead might be forgiven for suspecting something analogous to the "literary remains" of a defunct author which are sometimes pre-

served by the mistaken piety of his surviving friends. The many who do know Professor Whitehead, whether as the co-author of the abstruse *Principia Mathematica* or as sole begetter of the popular but equally wonderful little *Introduction to Mathematics*, will have no such misgivings. They will expect what they will find: an exposition, delightfully lucid, full of wit and *verve*, candid, penetrating, and broad, of a doctrine of intellectual and cultural progress which, in the language of the French epigram, is seen more clearly to be the same the more it changes, from chapter to chapter, the form in which it is clothed.

Of the five educational addresses, three were given originally to the Mathematical Association and one to the educational section of the International Congress on Mathematics. They were recognised by those who heard them as communications of singular value to the teachers for whom they were in the first instance intended. It is the more necessary, therefore, to insist that their interest and importance extend far beyond the problems of mathematical instruction. They contain a sane and balanced doctrine of education and cultural values which, if widely studied, would do much to give stability and coherence to the shifting and conflicting currents of present-day opinion.

The first of the three philosophical essays has supplied the title for the whole book. It contains a simple account of the main logical principles that have been worked out in detail by the author and Mr. Russell, and will therefore be welcomed by students who still find the "propositional function" a dark conception and are at a loss to know what to make of the "theory of types." The reader who possesses a moderate amount of mathematics and physics will also be able to study with much satisfaction and advantage in the last essay Professor Whitehead's masterly analysis of the principle of relativity, which has such profound significance for the philosophical theory of space and time. But he will, perhaps, be still more grateful for the new article on "The Anatomy of some Scientific Ideas," if only because it gives a characteristically clear and interesting account of the author's fascinating doctrine of space-points and time-points regarded as "convergent sets of enclosure-objects." This doctrine, which no student of the criticism of science and mathematics can afford to neglect, has been for some time discussed among the philosophers who have become acquainted with it, but is now, we believe, for the first time expounded in English. T. P. Nunn.

London.

The Jesus of History. By T. R. Glover.—Student Christian Movement, 93–94 Chancery Lane, W.C., 1917.

Although this book deals with perhaps the most well-worn of all subjects, it possesses a special interest. It is a book symbolic of an important aspect of the religious tendency of to-day. It is written by a man who presumably stands within the "orthodox" fold; it is addressed mainly to the members of the "orthodox" Student Christian Movement, and contains a foreword by the Archbishop of Canterbury; and yet it may be safely asserted that had it appeared half a century ago it would have been banned by the Evangelical world much in the same way as *Ecce Homo* was banned. It affords another item of evidence of the onward movement

of religious thought of which so many people appear to be naïvely unconscious, but which to those of us who have keenly followed the liberal religious advance of the last half-century is of profound interest and significance.

In order to show how, as regards the life and work of Jesus, the chief points of controversy which by the last and former generations were deemed crucial are fast moving away into quite a backward position, we have only to compare the official statements of the Churches on such "fundamental" doctrines as the Incarnation, the Atonement, and the Resurrection, also the statements of the New Testament, with the way these matters are handled by Mr Glover. We look in vain for such well-worn phrases as "the blood of Christ," "sacrifice" and "ransom" for sin, "redemption from the curse of the law." Without quoting such ancient documents as the Shorter Catechism or the Articles of the Church of England (though they are still in force), the following statement will be found in the modern Evangelical Free Church Catechism of 1898: "By offering Himself a sacrifice without blemish unto God, He fulfilled the requirements of Divine Holiness, atoned for all our sins, and broke the power of Sin." Now, in the book under notice these fundamental beliefs, to doubt or gainsay which would have incurred through all the centuries all the pains and penalties of heresy, are either not referred to or are slurred over in the lightest possible manner, and in the author's treatment of them their original and plain meaning is absolutely emasculated.

The great doctrines of the Incarnation and Redemption are only to be found in the book in such vague expressions as the following: "This, in plain English, is after all the idea of Incarnation—friendship and identification." "Does not what we mean by the Incarnation imply putting everything in the long run on the individual, quickened into new life by a new relation with God and taught a new love of men by Jesus himself?"

We turn with interest to the chapter on "The Choice of the Cross" to see what our author has to say on this vital point. But all the elaborate doctrines of St Paul and the Church universal are ignored, and in their place we only get such general statements as: "It is borne in upon him that only by the Cross can he interpret God, make God real to us, and bring us to the very heart of God. The Cross is the outcome of his deepest mind. . . . It was his love of men and women and his faith in God that took him there." "He chose the Cross; and in choosing it, Christians have always felt, he revealed God." Here again are statements, doubtless quite true, but surely most "dangerous" to put before evangelical students: "To explain Jesus, his friends and contemporaries spoke of him as the Logos, the Sacrifice, 'Christ our Passover,' the Messiah, and so forth. Of these terms not one is intelligible to us to-day without a commentary." "It is probably true that all our current explanations of the work of Christ in Redemption have in them too large an element of metaphor and simile."

Again, when we look to find our author's view on the great question of the Fatherhood of Jesus, what do we find? Strange to say, there is absolute silence.

Then as regards the Resurrection. St Paul says, "If Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins." And that a real physical Resurrection was understood by the Church through the ages is clearly shown by the Fourth Article of the Church of England: "Christ did truly rise again from death, and took again His body, with flesh,

bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of Man's nature." Now let us hear Mr Glover: "The Resurrection is, to the historian, not very clear in its details. But is it the detail or the central fact that matters?" What a strange utterance for a historian! It leads to the question, if the physical fact (the so-called "detail") is disbelieved, what "central fact" is there left? After obviously throwing doubt on the historical character of the physical Resurrection, our author goes on to say: "Something happened, so tremendous and so vital that it changed not only the character of the movement and the men, but with them the whole history of the world." This statement from an able historian and professor of history is really astonishing. Having undermined the foundation, how can such a superstructure stand!

The writer of this notice has no fault whatever to find with the liberal views of Mr Glover. Long ago, from the strictest "orthodox" position he reached that of Mr Glover and went far beyond it; but what he feels is needed in the present day is more candour, more plain speaking, less of that subtle reserve, that disingenuous compromise, of which the religious atmosphere of to-day is so full. If Mr Glover disbelieves in the Virgin Birth, in the salvation of mankind by the sacrifice of the Cross, in the physical Resurrection, why can he not say so? Many earnest souls, many inquiring minds, the Christian students appealed to, must be eager to know what they are really to believe. They look for guidance and light to those who, like Mr Glover, are deeply versed in these subjects, which have played so great a part in the life of the Christian Church through the past centuries. They eagerly look up to them, and need more than vague generalities, more than the calm shelving of matters that they must know have been in the past, and still are for very many to-day, vital and crucial topics. Many are calling out to know where we stand. Only some twenty years ago the Free Christian Church refused to admit Unitarians into their body, not deeming them to be "Christians"; but here is a book expressing views substantially Unitarian, put forth, it is presumed, by an orthodox writer for the benefit of orthodox students.

There is something more to be done than to find flaws in this book. In very many respects, by its admirable qualities, it disarms adverse criticism. The style is excellent; a beautiful spirit in the author is shown throughout; a fertile imagination wisely exercised supplies many apt and charming touches to the short and simple narratives. Instance the story of the woman with the ointment. Many minute traits in the life and teaching of the Master are brought out with great skill and originality. Here are a few out of many wise and pithy statements: "Men and women are never pawns with him. He does not think of them in masses. The masses appeal to him, but that is because he sees the individual all the time. 'I have prayed for *thee*.'" "Jesus is remarkable for his omission to devise machinery or organisation for the accomplishment of his ends. The tares are left to grow with the wheat, as if Jesus trusted the wheat a good deal more than we do." "Religious truth is not reached by demonstrations. The quiet familiarity with the deep, true things of life, till on a sudden they are transfigured in the light of God, and truth is a new and glowing thing, independent of arguments and the strange evidence of thaumaturgy—this is the normal way; and Jesus holds by it."

Having quoted a few passages out of many from an author who speaks with so much wisdom and sound sense, such exaggerated expressions

as the following come as a surprise: "This incredible idea, this incredible truth, of God in Christ . . . Think of it. It takes your breath away. If that is true, does not the whole plan of my life fall to pieces—my whole scheme of things for the world, my whole body of intellectual conceptions?" "All the philosophy of mankind has been re-thought in the light of the central experience of Jesus Christ." "It is only in Jesus that we realise man—only in him that we grasp what human depravity really is, the real meaning and implications of human sin." And the effect of want of balance shown in these phrases of exaggeration is seen in the reactive tendency to institute harsh comparisons derogatory to other great men—Plutarch, Marcus Aurelius, Clement of Alexandria, Sophocles, Heine.

We still wait for one who, with all the learning, the skill, the spiritual insight, and the literary charm displayed by Mr Glover, will also, without the bias either of orthodoxy or heterodoxy, present to us a true picture of the life and teaching of this most rare and beautiful character, pointing out the flaws and failings as well as the glories of deed and thought and speech. We want a portrait drawn in true perspective, not in a dazzling haze of untempered glory, the inheritance of nineteen centuries of unreasoning adoration. The subject will not suffer by this—quite the contrary; and to us all and to the cause of religion it will be an enormous gain.

P. E. Vizard.

London.

The Religion and Theology of Paul. By W. Morgan, D.D., Professor of Systematic Theology and Apologetics in Queen's Theological College, Kingston, Canada.—Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1917. Pp. x + 272.

Dr Morgan's book is a trenchant and terse monograph on the Pauline theology, perhaps the ablest monograph on the subject in any language, and certainly the ablest in English. I say "the Pauline Theology" deliberately, for in spite of the title, the writer's main interest is theological. He is too careful a thinker, of course, to treat the theology as an abstraction. A couple of passages are sufficient to prove this. One is the paragraph on pp. 173–174, in which he argues that the Apostle's gnosis springs not from speculation but "from a religious experience of altogether extraordinary range and depth. Of Hellenistic gnosis too it can be said that it was not without its root in experience. But here the experience had in it comparatively little that was either religiously or ethically profound. In the main it was one of the transitoriness and worthlessness of man's earthly existence, and of an ecstatic and ascetic liberation from the fetters of sense. If these elements are not altogether foreign to the piety of the Apostle, they are far from constituting its pith and marrow. Into his experience there entered something infinitely greater—a feeling for the guilt and tyranny of sin, a discovery of the sin-forgiving grace of God, an inward revolution that made the doing of God's will the law and impulse of his being. Paul's gnosis is the instrument of such an experience, and receives from it what is highest in its content. And the Apostle's experience conducts us back to a second great reality in which his gnosis is anchored—the Person of Jesus Christ. In the Hermetic writings νοῦς or Mind plays substantially the same part as the risen Christ in the gnosis of Paul. But compared with the latter

what a pale and empty abstraction it is!" The other passage is the fine closing paragraph of the book, which insists that the vital force of the Epistles is not their theology, but their faith and hope and love, a religion generated by contact with the great reality of the historical life of Jesus. Nevertheless, Dr Morgan concentrates his attention more on the theology than on the religion. It would not be unfair to say that he interests the reader in proving that Paul's answers are no longer tenable rather than in showing how Paul's questions have still to be put by the Christian soul. This is one feature which differentiates his book from Professor Gardner's. It is a scientific and even a severe exposition of Paulinism from the historical or genetic rather than from the religious point of view.

Only those who have not followed the newer developments of Pauline study will be taken aback by some of Dr Morgan's arguments; only those who have kept abreast of such developments will be able to appreciate the balance of judgment which he displays. This quality may be tested at several crucial points.

On the vexed question of the Hellenistic and the Jewish factors in the Apostle's theology he shows sound and independent judgment; thus he notes the Hellenistic factor in the doctrine of the flesh, but declines to admit it in the doctrine of the Spirit, though he recognises in it a source of the Apostle's faith-mysticism. At the same time, one would have liked to see a fuller recognition of Paul's rabbinical debt, and one is also inclined to query some statements in this connection. For example, it is misleading to say that Paul "leaves no place for the freedom of the will" (p. 19). Again, Paul leaves out any connection between the Spirit and the world of nature, so that it is hardly accurate to say that, "comparing the early Christian conception with that of the Old Testament, the only observable difference is that in the former the working of the Spirit is more exclusively identified with phenomena of an ecstatic character" (p. 22). "To Judaism angel-worship is foreign" (p. 47) is a statement which needs some qualification, unless Judaism is to be identified with the religion of the Old Testament period. But such abatements do not affect the value of Dr Morgan's general position. The discussion of the Apostle's Christology in relation to creation (*e.g.* pp. 61 ff.) is a first-rate instance of good judgment in handling the problem of Hellenistic influence.

The same holds true of the pages upon the relation between Paul and Jesus. The influence of Jesus upon Paul's ethic is crisply argued; "in faith and love and hope Master and Apostle are one." Paul differs from Jesus in introducing a speculative reconstruction of the person of the Lord, but for this there was a historical reason. The whole of the last chapter is a challenging and clarifying piece of work, even for those who might be disposed to find more "Christology" in the teaching of Jesus Himself than Dr Morgan allows.

On the mystery-religions his position is not extreme. It is from them that the Apostle drew his mysticism, but in drawing it out he transformed it to a large extent, suffusing it "with the ethical spirit of Hebrew piety." Dr Morgan offers one suggestive remark in this connection. "Mysticism was not introduced into the Church by Paul. He found it already established, and in a form, if we may judge from his references to it in Rom. vii., but too like that which prevailed outside. That he baptized it into Christianity, made of it something genuinely Christian, must be judged one of his greatest achievements."

The importance assigned to the mystery-religions as a factor in the religious development of Paul's theology is so large, that the reader almost expects Dr Morgan to follow some recent critics in using this to prove that Paul was a thorough-going sacramentarian. It is another proof of his independence that he refuses to draw this conclusion. Unlike Professor Lake, he is not afraid to speak of "symbols." He is not always exact in his language. For example, to say that "for the Apostle every other aspect of baptism is practically swallowed up in this, that it is a rite of regeneration" (p. 210), is to convey an erroneous impression. Paul never speaks of baptism as regeneration. That is Johannine, not Pauline. But in the main he is surely right in insisting that "baptism is no more than a graphic symbol" of the real thing, of the vital union with Christ, of the mystical union which is not organically bound up with any ritual act. So with regard to the Lord's Supper. Paul "does not teach that the Supper is the medium through which the soul's mystical union with the exalted Christ or the fellowship of believers with one another is sustained." The entire chapter on the Church and the Sacraments is a provocative piece of work. It has the charm of unexpectedness, and the fact that it runs counter to the arguments and inferences of scholars who often share Dr Morgan's critical presuppositions makes it all the more stimulating. It is doubtful if he succeeds in proving his case against a "hyperphysical" conception of the Eucharist, but his statement will need to be reckoned with. The interpretation of "not discerning the Lord's body," for example, is quite ingenious.

The general plan of the book is as follows. The first part discusses the Redeemer and his Redemption in six chapters; the second consists of nine chapters upon the life in salvation. On the whole, this is probably as coherent a method as is attainable under the circumstances. It has the disadvantage of relegating the eschatology to the end, although, as Dr Morgan sees, the theology rose out of an apocalyptic view of the world-order, and really was pivoted on eschatology from first to last. The words "till he come" in the Eucharist passage, for example, indicate one of the features which lift Paul's conception of the Supper clean away from any similar rite in the mystery-religions. But the Pauline theology is the expression of Paul's mind as he views Christianity from different angles and with different interests, the differences being mainly due to the variety of practical questions raised in and by his churches. The experience underlying them was a unity, and it is a mere matter of adjustment to determine the order in which the successive phases shall be discussed. Dr Morgan's method has at any rate the merit of beginning and ending with the person of Jesus Christ, and that, for Paul, was fundamental.

We congratulate Dr Morgan on producing, and we congratulate ourselves on possessing, a volume of such ability and insight and strength upon Paulinism. In justice to himself he might avoid a word like "automatically," of which he is too fond in speaking of Christ's experience reproducing itself in the believer; and "pneumatic" is a horrid expression, suggesting bicycle tyres rather than religious phenomena. But such lapses are minor and infrequent. The style is sharp and clear as a rule. It suits an argument which is carried through by an author who has evidently thought out his positions, and who states them with uncompromising vigour.

James Moffatt.

Glasgow.

THE

HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE MEANING OF LIFE, AND OF THE WORLD, REVEALED BY THE CROSS.

PRINCE EUGENE TROUBETZKOY.[1]

[In the previous article Prince Troubetzkoy argues that human life, as it unfolds under our eyes in history and daily experience, reveals no meaning whatsoever. It is a meaningless circle, a movement from death unto death, attended throughout by suffering, but suffering without purpose or aim. The life of man in the modern State does not alter these conditions: it repeats them in a more disastrous form, and on a more extended scale. Nor does Nature reveal anything different. Viewing the world in this manner, we receive the impression of a reign of nonsense or no-meaning, an impression which becomes appalling in virtue of the suffering involved. Progress is an illusion, since every advance inevitably returns to the point of departure and ends in death.

[1] As indicating Prince Troubetzkoy's position in the religious world of Russia it may be mentioned that, according to the Moscow correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* (February 21, 1918), it was Prince Troubetzkoy who presented the report on the recent separation of Church and State to the great Church Council held in that city while the Bolshevik revolution was in progress outside. "The atmosphere," says the correspondent, "suddenly changed and a thrill ran through the assembly as the tall figure of Prince Troubetzkoy appeared at the reading-desk. In a strong voice he read the reply to the Bolshevik decree." At the conclusion "the whole Council rose and, turning to the altar, sang—a great choir of men's voices—the beautiful prayer to the unsleeping Virgin sung on the Festival of the Assumption."

That the reader may not have to wait another three months for the conclusion of Prince Troubetzkoy's argument, we have summarised the intervening portion, the whole article being too long for insertion in a single issue.—Editor.

But in all this we are taking a partial view of the facts. Our time-experience, which we have followed in the aforesaid estimate, is "unilateral," and needs to be supplemented or "crossed" by another line of inquiry. That a meaningless world is not the final truth is clearly indicated by the fact that we consciously recognise it as such and condemn it as evil. The discovery of the nonsense of the world would not have been possible to us unless we were aware of a meaning in life which we perceive to be contradicted by the senseless spectacle before us. Were we merely the victims of the vicious circle of existence we should neither recognise it as vicious nor lament our condition as its victims. But we do recognise its viciousness; we do lament our condition; and this clearly proves the presence of some element in our nature which is above the reign of nonsense and opposed to it. Let us, then, follow up the clue afforded by the *attitude of condemnation* in which we regard the senseless revolutions of the natural world. May it not be that man in becoming the *judge* of the natural world declares himself, at the same time, the *prophet* of a better?

Before following this clue to its final outcome in the doctrine of the Cross, Prince Troubetzkoy lays it down that any solution must frankly face the evil of the world and do full justice to the fact of suffering. There must be no running away from evil, no attempt to cover it up by giving it a new name—for example, by calling it "illusion." Suffering is not to be explained away; nor is there any mode of escaping from it which does not lead to a life equally meaningless with that from which we have escaped. It is true that our condemnation of the evil inherent in the natural world proclaims us the heirs of a higher; but if we follow the upward line thus indicated, and seek a life in spiritual regions beyond the reach of terrestrial evil, our procedure again becomes "unilateral," and we shall find in the end that we have accomplished nothing.

To enforce this argument Prince Troubetzkoy examines the religions of ancient Greece and of India, the first of which follows the "horizontal" line of the natural life, the second the "vertical" line of spiritual aspiration; both therefore being "unilateral" and each neglecting the partial truth on which the other is based. The end of the Greek religions is sensuality and intoxication; the end of the Indian is absorption in Nirvana—another name for death. So far as deliverance from evil is concerned the result is failure in both religions. The one leaves the spirit of man fettered in a world of nonsense and acutely conscious of its miseries—and it is to this that every form of naturalism must inevitably come. The other, which

illustrates the failure of pure supernaturalism in all its forms, leaves the world of suffering behind it, and therefore effects nothing; for the world of suffering thus abandoned remains a fact in being, a perpetual cancer in the universe, an absurdity in the scheme of things. This is not altered by calling it illusion; for that only leaves us asking why such a horrible illusion exists. Neither line—earthly nor heavenly, horizontal nor vertical—if exclusively followed can ever bring us to the solution we seek.

It is clear, then, that in order to find the meaning of life we must go *through* the world of suffering and not *round* it. Our attempt will succeed only if two conditions are fulfilled. In the first place, it must reveal a principle by which suffering is *both* accepted and conquered: in other words, it must issue in a doctrine of *victory*. In the second place, the doctrine must apply not to man alone, *but to the whole animate creation*. This, as we have seen, is equally involved with man in the vicious circle of existence; it "groaneth and travaileth" together with man under the reign of suffering and nonsense.

Prince Troubetzkoy now returns to the conception of the Cross, using it, at first, as a symbol or image, to prepare the mind of the reader for the argument which is to follow. The Cross reminds us that the meaning of life is to be sought neither along the horizontal line whose ends rest on the earth, nor along the vertical line which rises to the heavens, *but at the point or focus where the two lines intersect*. The same thought is suggested by the growth of a tree. "A tree which grows upwards to the light, and at the same time spreads its branches outward in lines parallel to the earth, provides the true image of an intersection which takes place in the life of every spirit. Indeed, every human life rests upon a cross. . . . And there is a cosmic cross which repeats the architecture of human life. . . . Beyond these two lines [the upward and the outward] there are no other main roads for life—all the others are side-tracks from these. If it should turn out that life reveals its fullness of meaning precisely at the point where earth and heaven thus meet and cross, then the Cross will be the symbol of our final victory. As a fact of immediate experience the Cross is the way of death. It remains to be seen whether it may become the principle of life. Such is the exact formula of our problem."

From this point we take up the text of the article.]

The person of Jesus Christ is the central idea of Christianity and the most precious object of its faith. Whence

arises the *unique* value of this idea? Is it as the preacher of an elevated morality that Jesus is dear to his followers? Plainly not. The love of God and of one's neighbour, compassion for every living creature, have been preached with much eloquence by other religions; not in these things shall we find the distinctive feature of the religion of Christ. What renders it unique is its *conception of salvation* personified in one who was both divine and human—in Jesus. It is the idea of the God-man.

The perfect union of the divine and the human has been in all ages the object of every religion; for the essence of all religious need lies in the ardent desire of the human spirit to partake of the fullness of the life of God. In Christianity alone does this need find a complete and unconditional satisfaction. To convince ourselves of this, we have only to compare Christianity with the others.

Do we find man united to God in the anthropomorphic religions of the pagan world? We do not. In place of union we have absorption of the divine by the human; the gods of Olympus are human beings endowed with divine proportions. Here man is not united with God but *confused* with him.

What, then, shall we say of the religions of India? Again there is no union, but—in contrast to anthropomorphism—the human is now absorbed in the divine. What is offered us as union with God is the complete disappearance of our concrete and manifold personalities. In these cults man and the world, instead of uniting with God, fall into the abyss of nothing, while what remains is the abstract and impersonal unity of the Absolute.

With one sole exception, all the religions present the union of God and man in a defective form: either the two sides remain separate, or there is absorption of one into the other. The sole exception is Christianity—which finds the perfect union of the two, without fusion and without separation, in the person of Jesus—the God-man.

God does not part from his divinity in uniting himself to the creature; he preserves the fullness of his being distinct from that of every creature. On the other hand, man has not to lose his humanity; he has not to abandon his life or his human personality in order that he may be one with God. Such is the infinitely precious revelation in the Christian idea of the God-man. Divinity and humanity remain intact in their closest union; nay, it is only by becoming one with God that man reaches the fullness of his human existence, since

it is only by that union that he can recover the wholeness, the integrity, of his life, which has been broken up by sin and death.

The created world issues at last in the perfect man who has reached the fullness of the life of God and become Man-in-God. There is no other possible mode of escape from the vicious circle of the universe.

That circle, as we have seen, is the form of a life which for ever fails to reach its goal, and in its failure returns incessantly to the point of its departure. But from the moment when the fullness of God is *for ever* united with the life of man, the vicious circle exists no more: it is definitely broken through. We behold the final end of our existence: and we behold it realised and therefore realisable. For what form can Truth take, what form can the Good take, beyond that of the fullness of the life of God, thus communicated to his creatures?

Nor is it man alone, but the whole created universe, that is thus united to God. For the Gospel (preached to *every creature*, Mk. xvi. 15) declares that the grace of God is imparted, through the God-man, to all degrees in the scale of being, so that every created thing is clothed with a divine significance. Thus the evolution of the entire world is no longer an endless repetition—a bad infinite. It, too, has an end which is realised—the fullness of eternal life imparted to everything that is. The secular process, which goes on under our eyes, is no longer a meaningless rotation. On the contrary, we find in it a double movement of ascent and progress, which go on simultaneously, each following its own line, but crossing as they advance towards the goal of their final meaning. By the union of the two principles at their point of intersection God becomes man and man becomes the son of God, his whole life receiving a divine animation through the blessed power of the Cross. Thus a divine character is imparted to both principles of our nature—to the outward, which moves in the plane of our earthly existence, and to the upward, which lifts us into higher regions.

As long as there is separation between man and God, both lines of movement end, equally, in ruin; cut off from the source of life, death is the inevitable termination of all our activity in either direction. But from the moment that God descends to earth to carry the cross of our mortality he becomes the universal fountain of life. We find him everywhere; in the upper regions of heaven, to which our spirit seeks to rise; and here below, in the forms of his terrestrial apparition.

Since God is everywhere, all the roads of life lead to the one absolute and final end—the life that is eternal; and by that they are explained and justified.

Thus the circle of life loses its vicious character. The triumph of the crucified puts a final term to the otherwise interminable periodicity of life and death. Jesus died and rose again *once for all*, and by this he is distinguished from the pagan deities who die and rise again at regular intervals. In Christ the very law of the periodicity of death is abolished; for in him mankind, and all living nature with mankind, have revived *once for all.*

From this we may gather how it is that the earthly appearance of Jesus Christ gives a complete and definitive answer to the question of the meaning of the world. For what is the most striking proof that the world has no meaning? It is the impression we receive of the struggle for existence, the spectacle of universal carnage, erected by science into a necessary law of life. Were we to confine ourselves to the spectacle before us, we should need no further proof that iniquity reigns supreme upon the earth. Nor is there any way of overthrowing these proofs save by a unique revelation of the justice and significance of the world. This revelation, by which the former evidence is overthrown, is afforded by the free self-sacrifice of the God-man and by his resurrection.

For iniquity is the reign of egoism, and living beings, as they devour each other, show in their cruelty and death that they are separate from God, the source of life. If such a source exists, the creature can become reunited with it on one condition only, that of the complete sacrifice of egoism; that is, by a self-abnegation which surrenders self to God—the will to renounce all individual desires, to live only in the life of God, and to become its receptacle and its instrument. In a word, the absolute self-sacrifice is the form in which the union of the world with God will be first manifested.

This sacrifice is the work of Jesus upon earth, whereby his human nature reveals its complete and perfect union with God. By his *absolute obedience* the God-man is distinct from man on the purely human level, and by his complete self-abnegation he is the mediator of eternal life to the world.

What is effected by this absolute sacrifice is not merely a great moral achievement; it is a total transformation of the meaning of life, the beginning of a revolution in the whole cosmic order. Up to this point pure egoism has been the principle of every living organism, and the struggle for existence has been its inexorable law. A human being, who *renounces*

life for the love of God, brings into existence by his act a new *principle* of life itself.

Naturally enough, the author of this revolution becomes the object of the world's hatred. Evil, finding its throne cast down, must needs make a last despairing effort to retrieve its power: the violent death of Jesus follows, therefore, as the necessary reaction of hatred against his gospel of self-surrender and the love of God. None the less, the free sacrifice of the human will in Jesus is the manifestation of an absolute truth, which is the beginning and principle of the final victory of life.

If God is life eternal, the source and principle of every life, it follows that death is possible only as the consequence of a rupture between God and the world; of a fall of the latter from its right relation to God. Death is the inevitable lot of every thing which is detached from him, and of every life which separates itself from his. To this separation an end is put, and perfect union re-established between God and the creature, by the absolute sacrifice, in which the separated life returns to its eternal source and is born again. The renunciation by the God-man of the separated life whose end is death becomes the recovery of eternal life, over which death has no power.

And since eternal life is the fullness of life, in which there is no death, it follows that it is not a *part* only of man which is born again in the divine plenitude—*it is the whole man, body and soul.* The resurrection of Jesus is the necessary consequence of the death that has conquered death. The whole forms an indestructible logical chain—the life of the God-man, his suffering, his death and his resurrection. It is the universal logic of the meaning of life. If God is life absolute, how else could he appear in the world than as the principle of a life which communicates itself universally to every being, a love which wills that everything shall be filled with its own fullness? *There is no other way in which perfect love and perfect life can be revealed.*

Such are the signs whereby we may recognise a revelation of the meaning of the whole world in the appearance of Jesus in its midst. But man would have been unable either to seek this truth or to find it, in any external event or phenomenon, unless he had had some key to it in the previous intimations of his own spirit. The outward revelation is confirmed by the inward, which is immediately given in the soul.

The Witness of the Outward Line.

In the discovery of this truth the two lines of life are united and bound together. Their union is the essence of Christianity.

It would be wrong to affirm that the essence of Christianity can be expressed as an ideal which transcends our present life. Its essential feature is, indeed, altogether different; for it rises beyond the opposition of above and below, of far and near. The "good news" brought to us by the Gospel of the Incarnate Word is that the farthest has become the nearest; that there are no dark gulfs in the earthly life which remain unilluminated to their depths by the light of a universal meaning.

Thus it is not the suffering of a world abandoned by God which is the central motive of Christianity. On the contrary, it is the joy in which all this suffering is finally transfigured—*the joy of resurrection.*

This joy streams into all the manifold circles of life, from the highest to the lowest regions of conscious existence.

The outward and the upward lines of life form, by their intersection, an inseparable whole. Hence it is that as the line of earthly life moves outward in its own plane it feels within it the breath of that spirit which soars upward to heaven. Because the *outward* growth of life's branches is at the same time lifted *upwards* in the growth of its main stem, we are vividly conscious of the *reality* of this second movement, so that the earthly and heavenly are blended in one, and we know that there is no wall of division between the two spheres of our being.

Conceiving our life in this manner, the material evolution of the world becomes the incarnation and the expression of a spiritual meaning, of a divine event which is actually in process of coming to pass. No longer, for example, do we think of the earth's movement round the sun as a meaningless rotation: we think of it as preparing the conditions which enable life to rise to its sublimest height; we see the whole creation saturated in sunlight. Not in vain are the heavens starred with innumerable fires. They speak to us of worlds to which they give life and being, warming them with their heat, brightening them with their beams. And the end to which all these lives are moving, of every flower that blooms, of every bird that sings, is also the central principle of the entire evolution of the universe—the embodied Word of God. For the purpose of the whole is nothing other than the incarnation of the divine, the participation of the created in the

eternal life of the uncreated, of which the God-man is the perfect revelation.

The triumph of life shown forth in the resurrection of Jesus is the beginning of a general resurrection, in which all Nature participates with man. This is the logical and necessary development of its universal meaning. If God be indeed the end of all existence, he must needs fill all things with his being. If God is love, his arms are round the entire universe, and there is no creature anywhere unloved by him.

Whatsoever receives the life of God is born again, the inferior ranks of the creation no less than man. The part of man is to be the mediator of this universal salvation. Through his mediation it is that the power, which abolishes death and raises every creature into newness of life, penetrates the world. Such is the next step in the logic of the universal meaning imparted to life by Christian truth. We recognise its authenticity in the fullness of the satisfaction which it brings to every living being.

One may recall the words of the Apostle Paul:[1] "So then the creation is waiting with ardour and anxiety for the revelation of the sons of God. For the creation has been made subject to vanity, not of its own choice, but by reason of him who subjected it—with the hope that it, too, will be made free from the bondage of corruption, so that it may have its part in the liberty of the glory of the children of God. For we know that, to this day, the entire creation groans and travails in the pangs of childbirth."

Here we have presented the only possible escape from the vicious circle of life, and, at the same time, the meaning which justifies the entire process of evolution. First, there is the development of life—the gradual transition from inanimate matter to the plant, from the plant to the animal, from the animal to man; all of which is accomplished with difficulty and immense suffering — an unbroken tale of anguish and recurrent death, endlessly repeated, and ending always in the "bondage of corruption"—that is, by the return of life to the earth whence it came. Then comes the liberating word of the Gospel, which puts an end to this bondage and gives freedom to every creature.

So long as the highest summit of evolution is hidden from our gaze, the entire process seems pure vanity. But when it is revealed our nightmare vanishes; the glory of the resurrection, seen as in a lightning flash, floods the mind; and the

[1] We translate literally the form in which Prince Troubetzkoy cites this passage (Rom. viii. 19–22).

vision, in which we behold for a moment the future glory of the whole creation, becomes a fountain of infinite joy. So the apostle declares that "the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed to usward." . . .

The idea of a world-salvation in which every created thing has its share, and all are gathered together round the figure of man, the messenger of the good news—this idea is found in many Christian monuments, and most of all in the imagery which depicts the lives of the Greek and Russian saints. A characteristic trait, constantly repeated in their biographies, is the picture of the wild beasts coming to receive their food from the hands of the saint. And always the same interpretation is given: the recovery of the true relation between men and animals as they exist in paradise. In the biography of one of these Russian saints we are told that there is nothing strange in the spectacle of wild beasts suddenly become tame; for all Nature yields to the chosen of the Spirit, as it yielded to Adam before his sin. We find the same idea in many of the great masterpieces of Greek and Russian iconography. . . .

To an abstract spiritualism, which despises the bodily life, this idea is just as foreign as it is to the grossest materialism. The idea of a world-resurrection carries within it the complete rehabilitation of matter. The world to come is not a world from which the body has disappeared: it is a world in which the body is transfigured, a state of impending glory for the body, a glimpse of which is given us in the familiar words of the Gospel: "He was transfigured before them: his countenance shone as the sun, and his garments became white as the light." Following this text the iconography of the Eastern Church represents the state of blessedness not as a reign of disembodied spirit, but as the perfect embodiment of the divine, in which the flesh becomes the transparent and luminous expression of the soul.

This conception of a new earth, replacing the earth as we know it, is one of the most precious tenets of the Christian faith; through it the whole natural world has the meaning it would otherwise lack. For example, in the earth as perceived by our senses, the relation between ourselves and the sun is purely external. . . . But in the final state of the world it becomes an inward relation. There all life becomes luminous, like the garments of the Saviour on the Mount of Tabor. There the joy, which the sun pours over field and forest, receives its true meaning. There we behold the final reason for all these glorious manifestations of the power of

light—the audacious flight of the lark soaring straight to heaven; the varied symphony of the singing birds; the shining colours of poetry and imagination. These colours shown in a world that passes away are *real* reflections from the incomparable splendour of an eternal beauty which passes not away. As a foretaste of the transfiguration and resurrection of the entire universe, the beauty and the light of earth have their justification.

The Witness of the Upward Line.

What we have said above of the outward line of life applies equally to the upward. An examination of this will confirm our conclusion that the two lines disclose their meaning at the point where they cross.

How came it to pass that the mighty effort of the religious consciousness of India led to no success? How is it that the Beyond, to which it rises, is empty and dead? Simply because it is the ascent of the intellect alone. It is abstract thought which rises to heaven: *earth has no share in the movement.* In rising thus *beyond* the earth, thought leaves it *behind.* It has neither the colours nor the forms to provide it with images of the Beyond. Colours, forms, images are mere phantoms; varied apparitions of a mirage (*maïa*), which the spirit must cast off. Our life is a mirage, from which we can be delivered only by complete detachment from life. No wonder that a mode of thought which thus cuts itself away from *life* becomes thereby *dead* and abstract: that the upper region to which it rises is utterly void.

Widely different is the procedure of Christianity. Here the earth is not under a curse; it has been delivered from the curse by the sacrifice of the Cross, and by the Resurrection. The gulf between earth and heaven is done away; earth rises to heaven step by step, and in the joy of the effort the creature has a foretaste of its celestial home. Thus it is that the earth beneath is everywhere lit up by reflected lights from the heaven above. They are reflections of the divine idea of the creation, which Plato compares to the images of natural objects reflected in the water.

Since the forms of earthly beauty are of this nature, the soul may safely love them: they are light as the spirit, and have nothing in them to impede or paralyse our flight to highest heaven. The forms and colours of earth are the perfect symbols, nay, the images, of a world beyond, which descends

into this world and is there embodied. It is no empty Nirvana which is disclosed to Christian faith. It is a heaven of visible objects in endless variety of form and colour. Why not? God himself, incarnate on the earth, has made all forms and colours divine. Why, then, should our attempts to form *images* of the spiritual world be deemed profane? . . .

Protestant theologians, to whom the symbols of religious imagery suggest materialism, are fatally wrong. Spirit can never become a real power in our life until our whole being takes part in its upward movement—our feeling, our imagination, our heart. And how can feeling and imagination join in if form and colour are to be forbidden? What point of support can they ever find in the aridities of abstract thought? Will the heart of man ever burn with love for "nirvana," or for the "unity without multiplicity" of the Brahmans? Empty the world of its concrete and individual realities, and you will find in the end that the soul itself has also disappeared.

The Hindu heaven is death; the Christian heaven is life; life peopled with images that kindle the heart—to begin with. God himself, who has thrown heaven open to every creature. The ascension of Christ provides a perfect image of this upward movement, of man and of the whole creation, to its final home in God. Every corner of earth is filled with the reality of the Incarnate Word: hence its power to raise itself to heaven. The two lines of life are united in one.

Thus we reach our solution of the problem of life. Our human life, united in one inseparable whole with the life of God, displays at all points a clear meaning. Not in vain, then, are the revolutions of the great wheels; not in vain do we bear the burden of the daily toil, which is to preserve the life of man and ameliorate his lot. Sooner or later the captive will be free; his life is not tied to a single spot, it "prepares the way of the Lord," and in the great world-resurrection his crooked paths will become straight. Life is worth the pain of being lived; it holds within it infinite values for which suffering and sacrifice are not too high a price to pay.

This conception gives a positive value to life in every form, even to the process of periodic return to the point of departure. In the endless succession of new births, whereby it resists the forces of destruction and death, life displays an unconquerable faith. It has the assurance of final victory within itself; and the assurance is not vain. The fugitive triumph of spring, yearly repeated, is the herald of a triumph which shall not pass away. Here Christianity does not deny the fragmentary truth

of the Dionysiac cult, though it sees clearly the underlying error. Christianity has its Easter festival, the greatest of all its festivals, to celebrate the eternal spring. This, like every other beauty of the world below, is the Christian foretaste of imperishable beauty hereafter. In such manner does the Christian faith restore the joy of life.

Recognising the relative truth of the religious ideas of Hellenism, on the one hand, Christianity does full justice, on the other, to the dreaming spirit of the religions of India. The Cross is the synthesis of the two tendencies, each of which, taken alone, is a one-sided expression of the truth. For Christianity the *joy* of eternal life is the end of all: but the way to reach it is the way of sacrifice, of painful self-denial, of resignation to suffering, without which the soul cannot rise to the Beyond.

TROUBETZKOY.

Moscow.

SHELLEY'S INTERPRETATION OF CHRIST AND HIS TEACHING.

The Late STOPFORD A. BROOKE.

There is a remarkable fragment of an "Essay on Christianity," by Shelley, which gives his view of Jesus Christ and of his teaching, and I would draw attention to it, especially in its relation to modern criticism and modern theology on the religious position and aims of Christ. The essay is full of noteworthy things, and it bears, independent of the prose style which is his own, the unmistakable stamp of Shelley's character and imagination.

It is, in truth, the attempt to carry out a direct and long-cherished intention. In the notes on *Queen Mab*, he speaks of Christ as "in the foremost list of those true heroes who died for humanity." In a sub-note to this, he expresses an after-thought which reverses his judgment in the text with regard to the objects of Jesus, but this after-thought he so completely laid aside, that he told Trelawny it was his desire to write a life of Christ which should revoke it. It seems to me that this fragment was an attempt to carry out that intention, and that it took the form of an essay because, as he said to Trelawny, he found the materials for a life of Christ, from his point of view, inadequate.

I do not know on what grounds the essay is put so early in Shelley's life as 1815 by Mr Rossetti. I should be inclined from internal evidence, and especially from certain of its phrases analogous to expressions in his later poems, to place it at least four years later, but internal evidence is always shaky evidence. Still, it does exist, and I shall want a good deal of proof to make me believe that this essay was written only two years after the publication of *Queen Mab*.

Again, the great admiration it expresses for the character

of Jesus may be contrasted with a letter of Shelley's in 1822, in which these words occur:

> "I differ from Moore in thinking Christianity useful to the world; no man of sense can think it true. I agree with him that the doctrines of the French and material philosophy are as false as they are pernicious, but still they are better than Christianity, inasmuch as anarchy is better than despotism."

Shelley succeeds in that sentence in hitting all round, but in striking at Christianity he does not mean to strike at Christ. His blow is directed against the popular and orthodox form of Christianity, as corrupted by churches into a despotism, and not against the doctrine and practice of Christ himself. He makes this distinction himself, even in the notes to *Queen Mab*; and the main drift of this essay is to vindicate Christ and his teaching from the perversions imposed on them. He declares that the time has arrived when these perversions are no longer tenable, when we can put them aside and ask ourselves what it was that Jesus really taught. And looking straight at Christ and his life, he finds that the true drift of his teaching is in direct opposition to the greater number of the doctrines taught in his name.

Alas, the time had not arrived! Nor has it yet arrived, though many forward steps have been made towards it. There are still doctrines preached about God which make him into the Demon whom Shelley hated, which, by filling him with a Revenge which they call Justice, mingle up his character with that attributed to Satan. There are still schemes of doctrine which make him into the hater of men, which represent him as the author of eternal hell—that intolerable falsehood which has been the deadliest curse of human kind,—which makes him the supporter of tyrants, oppressors, and of aristocracies. There are still representations of the teaching of Jesus which make him Deity, and take him away from us as our brother-man, which destroy or ignore the high socialism of his life, and by making his birth, his history, and all that he did supernatural, place him outside of the pale of knowledge.

It is only when he is freed from these false garments that we can see him as he is. I have said this for many years, and preached another Christ from that of the theologians. Shelley said it, as we shall see, more than ninety years ago; and there is no more remarkable vindication of Jesus from the orthodox view of him, and no more remarkable anticipation of

the position Jesus will take in the future, than this essay of Shelley's.

He is speaking of the biographers of Christ—and he speaks, in blaming them for what they have, out of their own minds, imputed to Jesus, of all those also who from generation to generation have perverted his character and made him the supporter of the panic fears and superstitions which Shelley maintains he hated and used all his faith and reason to oppose. In spite, he says, of all the misrepresentations Jesus Christ has suffered from, enough remains to show that he is the enemy of oppression and falsehood, that he is the advocate of equal justice, that he is disposed to sanction neither bloodshed nor deceit, under whatever pretences their practice may be vindicated. We discover that he was a "man of meek and majestic demeanour, calm in danger, of natural and simple thought and habits, beloved to adoration by his adherents; unmoved, solemn, severe," "of miraculous dignity and simplicity of character," "of invincible gentleness and benignity," who represented to mankind a God of Universal Love.

The essay is written, however, from the point of view of an agnostic, as we should call Shelley to-day. And I say this to guard Shelley from being mistaken. There are passages in this essay which seem to go very far towards an expression of a settled belief in a Divine Being and in Immortality, and in a battle between powers of good and evil beyond this earth. But we must always take care not to make too much of the phrases of Shelley. His custom was, when he had to state the opinion of another,—as, for example, in this essay on Christ—to put himself aside, and to write as if the real holder of the opinion was writing; and this is often puzzling. And it is made more puzzling by his way of becoming emotionalised as he wrote, even by opinions with which he disagreed, if they happened to be noble or imaginative. For the moment, then, he speaks as if they were personal, and throws around them an emotion which their transient passage through his mind has created. In many places in this essay he is swept away, in describing the views of Christ concerning God and Immortality to speak of them as if they were his own, and he actually uses expressions about them in prose which are borrowed from his own poetry. We must remember, then, that such expressions mean no more than that he was moved by the beauty of the ideas Christ had concerning God and Immortality, and that he could not help ornamenting them and feeling them as his own, for a time, with a poet's ready sympathy. Take this passage. One would say that it positively asserted the

existence of God, and of God with a will which he exercises upon us:

"We live, and move, and think; but we are not the creators of our own origin and existence. We are not the arbiters of every motion of our own complicated nature; we are not the masters of our own imaginations and moods of mental being. There is a Power by which we are surrounded, like the atmosphere in which some motionless lyre is suspended, which visits with its breath our silent chords at will."

"This power is God; and those who have seen God have, in the period of their purer and more perfect nature, been harmonised by their own will to so exquisite a consentaneity of power as to give forth divinest melody when the breath of universal being sweeps over their frame."

That is a strong passage for a man whom the world called an atheist to have written. It would be strong for a modern agnostic to write. But we have no business to assume from it that Shelley expresses in it—as I should like to assume—his settled thought. He is either saying what he thought Jesus thought about God, or he is carried away by the splendour of the speculation into emotional poetry. For he did not by any means always think that—the existence of a Being who acted on us was a matter he held in suspension. But while I would not make too much of expressions used in this essay concerning matters of faith, there is no necessity for this caution when we come to what he says of Jesus Christ. For here, he speaks of Christ as an historical character and as a man, and of the teaching which belonged naturally to such a character;—and he subjects the history and the character to rational criticism.

And first—with regard to the criticism. He gives up, as we do, a good deal of the history; he doubts, as we do, "that Jesus said many things imputed to him in the four Gospels"; he dwells on the fact that "there is no written record of Jesus by himself, and that the information we have is imperfect and obscure." "Yet," he says, "sufficiently clear indications are left by which we can discover the genuine character of Christ." And having found that character, "we can put aside," he continues, "as inventions many things which he is reported to have said, and which contradict his character, and corrupt the simplicity of his truth." And then he gives an example, which, though he is in error,—for the phrase was used by St Paul—yet explains fully what he means. "For instance," he says, "it is utterly incredible that Christ should say that if you hate your enemy you would find it to your

account to return good for evil, since by such a temporary oblivion of vengeance you would heap coals of fire on his head. Where such contradictions occur, a favourable construction is warranted by the rule of criticism which forbids all narrowness in judging of the actions of a man who has acted a large part in the world. We ought to form a general opinion of his character and doctrine, and refer to this whole the distinct portions of action and speech by which they are diversified."

The phrase is an old Jewish proverb, and does not bear the meaning Shelley imposes on it. It only means that if you return good for evil you will waken in your injurer a burning sorrow for what he has done, and lead him to love you in the end.

At the time Shelley wrote thus his words would be considered dreadful infidelity, for, of course, they imply that there is no such thing as a plenary inspiration of the Scriptures. But now, all is changed—and that which was gross infidelity in Shelley has been a common thing for years past among persons whom no one in their senses accuses of being actual infidels. A reverent historical criticism has been applied to the history of the Gospels. It is one of our most serious labours to clear away from the image of Jesus the legendary elements added to his story, to find out what was added to his teaching by the composers of the Gospels, to isolate his real doings and sayings from those which contradict his character—and it is profoundly interesting to find Shelley, ninety years ago, laying down quietly in his room the laws by which modern scholars, who count themselves Christians, have striven to get a clear image of Jesus Christ. This is the prophetic power of the poet, dreaming of things to be.

Then he applies himself to consider the symbolic and poetic phrases of Jesus, and to contradict those persons who take them literally, and make them, literally taken, the ground of an attack on the wisdom of Jesus—such phrases as, "Blessed are the poor"; "If a man smite you on the one cheek, turn to him the other"; "Take no thought for the morrow." No intelligent man, who had realised the character of Christ, or the poetic method of his teaching, would join in such an attack, and Shelley, infidel as he was called, did the very contrary. He quotes, for example, "Take no thought for the morrow," and says, "If we would profit by the wisdom of a sublime and poetical mind, we must beware of the vulgar error of interpreting literally every expression it employs. Nothing can be more remote from truth than the literal construction of such expressions. Jesus Christ is here

simply exposing, with the passionate rhetoric of enthusiastic love towards all human beings, the miseries and mischiefs of the system which makes all things subservient to the subsistence of the material frame of man." It would be well if those who are continually attacking the sayings of Jesus would remember the warning of Shelley, and his view that they are partakers of a vulgar error. It would be well if they could form the most distant acquaintance with the poetical temper of a prophet's mind. It would be well, if by some slight reading of Oriental books, they could have a vague knowledge only of the way that Orientals speak. It would be well if they would accustom themselves a little to ideas and not only to their forms. It would be well, if that were not too much to ask, that they tried at least to comprehend the way that Genius speaks—and then we should have less of the absurdities of literal interpretation which have been forced on the sayings of Jesus. But the sayings will last for ever—just because they are couched in a manner which these literalising persons cannot or will not comprehend.

Lastly, on these critical questions, Shelley put aside all discussion on the nature and existence of the miracles. "The supposition," he says, "of their falsehood or truth would not modify in any degree the hues of the picture of Christ which is attempted to be delineated. To judge truly of the moral or philosophical character of Socrates, it is not necessary to determine the question of the familiar spirit which it is supposed he believed attended on him." The character of Jesus remained the same to Shelley whether the miracles were true or not. Nay, Shelley goes further, and declares that Jesus himself did not believe in miraculous interference. "The doctrine," he says, "of what some fanatics have termed a peculiar Providence—that is, of some Power beyond and superior to that which ordinarily guides the operation of the Universe, interfering to punish the vicious and reward the virtuous—is explicitly denied by Jesus Christ." Thus, while Shelley put aside the supernatural, the character of Jesus remained to him equally loving and majestic.

Again, that is what we have come to. We have seen that the miraculous elements in the Gospels belong to the time in which they were written. They have no existence for us at all. And, when they are left out, Jesus Christ remains, not indeed Deity, but loving humanity; not a weaker power in the history of the human race, but a stronger power. To bind him up with miracle is to enfeeble his influence, and, as knowledge goes on, to lessen its expansion.

So far for the critical part of this essay. What else is contained in it, I will bring together under one question—*What was the teaching of Christ, according to Shelley's reading of the Gospels?*

First, Jesus taught concerning God that he was a universal Being, differing from man and from the mind of man, the overruling Spirit of all the energy and wisdom included in the circle of existing things, the collective energy of the moral and material world; the Power from whom the streams of all that is excellent flow, which models as they pass all the elements of this mixed universe to the most pure and perfect shape it belongs to their nature to assume; the source of Love, the merciful and benignant Power, who desired not the death of a sinner and made his sun to shine on the just and unjust, the fountain of all goodness, the eternal enemy of pain and evil, the uniform and unchanging motive of the salutary operations of the material world.

"This mighty Being Christ declared the pure in heart should see." This is how Shelley explains that. It is curious to hear Shelley as a sermon-writer, but here that strange spirit plays the part:—

> "Blessed are those who have preserved eternal sanctity of soul; who are conscious of no secret deceit; who are the same in act as they are in desire; who conceal no thought, no tendencies of thought, from their own conscience; who are faithful and sincere witnesses, before the tribunal of their own judgments, of all that passes within their mind. Such as these shall see God."

Having thus said what God was to Christ,—and it is curious that he does not dwell on the word Father—Shelley goes on to say what he was not. It has been often said to me, when I have said that Christ never taught the doctrine of everlasting punishment, that I have read into his sayings what I wish to be true of him; that I throw back on Christ the more tolerant morality of our own time. Well, Shelley says precisely the same thing, and he cannot be said to hold a brief for the Christian side. He is indignant with the notion that Christ taught any doctrine of vengeance of this kind on the part of God. He calls it "a monstrous calumny which impostors have dared to advance against the mild and gentle author of the just sentiment of love your enemies that you may be the sons of your Heavenly Father, who makes his sun to shine on the good and evil and his rain to fall on the just and the unjust—against the whole tenor of his doctrines and his life, overflowing with benevolence and forbearance and compassion."

Shelley was one of the first who saw that the whole character of Jesus forbade such a conception of God. Men call this justice, he says, but Jesus summoned his whole resources of persuasion to oppose this doctrine of avenging justice. Love your enemy, bless them that curse you; such, Christ said, was the practice of God, and such must you imitate if you will be the children of God. "Hell, then, was not the conception of the daring mind of Christ." On the contrary, this hideous doctrine of retaliation, the panic fears and hateful superstitions of which have enslaved men in all ages, Christ, according to Shelley, stood against to the death. Even the evil power which Shelley thought had dominion in this world, and which he believed that Jesus believed in, was doomed,

Christ asserted that, Shelley said, and Shelley asserted it for himself; and the passage in which he paints Christ's doctrine of Immortality, and of the utter overthrow of evil beyond the grave, is written with such emotion and fire and admiration, that we half persuade ourselves that, at least while he wrote it, the poet in him believed it. He did not do more than hope it to be true, but, borne away by the "heart-moving and lovely thought," as he calls it, of Jesus, he himself carries it on for the moment.

Then he breaks forth into a denunciation of the whole doctrine that injury is always to be avenged. He paints the horrors which the world has suffered from the duty of retaliation; and he shows how mankind, transmitting from generation to generation the legacy of accumulating vengeances, have not failed to attribute to the Universal Cause a character analogous to their own. "A God of wrath and revenge such as Christianity has too often pictured, is not the creation of Jesus, but of the hatreds of man. Against this superstition," he says, which destroyed men, and blackened the character of God, "Jesus protested with earnest eloquence." He showed a different God from this dreadful Being. He told his disciples to be perfect in love as their Father in heaven was perfect. He proclaimed his belief that human perfection as well as divine required the refraining from revenge in any shape whatever, and especially when it was called justice.

Having laid all this down, Shelley goes on to dwell on all that Jesus said, and on his position towards the teachers of this retaliation as a part of the character of God. "Jesus Christ," he says, "proceeds to qualify and finally to abrogate the system of the Jewish Law. He

descants upon its insufficiency as a code of moral conduct, and absolutely selects the law of retaliation as an instance of the absurdity and immorality of its institutions. The conclusion of the speech is in a strain of the most daring and impassioned speculation. He seems emboldened to declare in public the utmost singularity of his faith. He tramples on all received opinions, on all the cherished luxuries and superstitions of mankind. He bids them cast away the claims of custom and blind faith by which they have been encompassed from the very cradle of their being, and receive the imitator and minister of the Universal God."

Then from that saying of "Be ye perfect as your Father is perfect," Shelley infers that Jesus taught that the perfection of the divine and human character was the same. "The abstract perfection of the human character is the type of the actual perfection of the divine." And no truer thing can possibly be said of the teaching of Christ. "I and the Father are one." I, a man, am at one with the Father. This is what I am ceaselessly trying to teach as the very root of the doctrine of Jesus. He said it, not as God, but as a man—not for himself alone, but for all mankind. "We and the Father are one." And the poet saw that truth in Jesus, as we see it now. Indeed, it is the very foundation of all the doctrine of Christ; the ground of personal and social religion; the ground of all human associations and their duties; the ground of the rights of man and of their liberty, equality, and fraternity; the ground of their happiness and their immortality. It is the one saying we should inscribe on the banner of human progress: "We and the Father are one." It is a wonderful thing that Shelley saw this so many years ago, and saw it in the teaching of Jesus Christ.

Lastly, Shelley turns to the social aspect of the teaching of Jesus, and he comprises it in one word—*The equality of mankind.* He quotes the sermon at Nazareth. "The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me," etc. "This is an enunciation," he says, "of all that Plato and Diogenes have speculated on, the equality of mankind." But, in Christ's idea, as Shelley thought, this equality, which took in not only a community of thoughts and feelings, but also of external possessions, was not to be established by force, nor by enactment, but by the growth of love among mankind, by a sacrifice of the desires of the flesh, by a contempt of outward wealth and power, by a just subordination of all material comforts and inventions to the needs of the mind and the grandeur of the soul. In proportion to the love existing among men, will be the community of

property and power, but not till the love is universal, is there any use in enacting that community. There will, however, come a time when this ideal shall be reached, when all artificial distinctions of nations, societies, families, and religions will perish, for they deny the duty humanity imposes on us of doing every possible good to every person under whatever denomination we comprehend him.

But this cannot be while men enslave themselves to the gratification of chiefly physical wants. The mental wants are infinite, the physical few, but the latter have been put first; and more than half the worship given to power and fame and gold is given, not because they help man to educate his spiritual powers, but because they contribute to the pleasing of the meaner wants of human nature, and lead men, that they may indulge all their desires, to enslave their fellow-man for their own advantage. Before, then, men can be equal, they must learn to prefer a simple life, to make of the earthly things not the end of human life, but means to a higher end, and to trust in God who knoweth we have need of these things. These were the views of Jesus, in the opinion of Shelley. If men followed them, Shelley thought, they would grow wise, and as they grew wise in life and love, the inequalities of society, and the necessity of government, which is the badge of their depravity, would disappear.

It is a good time far in the future, for government cannot be done away with till universal love prevail. But it will arrive at last — and mankind shall be perfect. "To the accomplishment of such mighty hopes," Shelley said, "the views of Jesus Christ extended; such did he believe to be the tendency of his doctrines—the abolition of artificial distinctions among mankind so far as the love which it becomes all human beings to bear to one another, and the knowledge of truth from which that love cannot fail to be produced, avail to their destruction."

These, then, in Shelley's opinion, were the social views of Jesus Christ, but always including in them the repudiation of force as a means of attaining them. His opinion with regard to Christ's social views—put forward so many years ago when it was sacrilege in the eyes of the Church—is becoming more and more the opinion of those who are struggling towards a higher state of society. They abjure the greater part of the orthodox Christianity which has been laid as a heavy cross on the shoulders of Jesus, and on which he has been crucified afresh, but they choose the Man Christ Jesus as their Friend and Guide, and follow the life he urged, and the life he led.

They proclaim Christ's sayings in the face of a world given to amusement, seeking for more than daily bread, piling up wealth by making many poor, and having no belief in the Brotherhood of men because they have no belief in the Fatherhood of God. And Shelley, whom the world called anti-Christian, stands with them in this—and he says that he stands by Christ.

Indeed, there is no more magnificent embodiment of the noblest doctrine of Jesus on these matters—even to the redemption of the world by faithful suffering in the cause of truth and love—than the *Prometheus Unbound*; which the more we know and love the better for us. The character of Prometheus is partly built on the character of Christ. His moral position towards mankind, and towards Jupiter, is the position of Christ towards suffering man, and towards the powers of the world, who crucified Jesus because he would not yield to their policy and their priestcraft, nor back up their power, exercised for their own advantage over the bodies and souls of men. The means of Prometheus are the means of Jesus—nothing but enduring love. His triumph is the triumph of perfect Love, which brings about the regeneration of the whole world of man and the freedom and the glory and beauty of the world of Nature—a new Heaven and a new Earth. It is the very faith of Jesus concerning the future translated into another form, and this essay on Christianity proclaims that Shelley thought it was the faith of Jesus. All that he says Jesus held concerning the equality of man and the proper means of attaining it are described and declared in magnificent song in the *Prometheus*. To accuse Shelley of violence is to accuse Tolstoi of violence. Both desire the same things, but desire them in the same way. Both repudiate, with Jesus, the use of any force for their winning, except the forces of stern rejection of wrong-doing—of love, of forgiveness, of endurance, in trust in the certainty of the victory of everlasting love. I close with the closing lines of the *Prometheus*, which embody this view:

> "To suffer woes which Hope thinks infinite,
> To forgive wrongs darker than death and night,
> To defy Power which seems omnipotent,
> To love and bear—to hope, till hope creates
> From its own wreck the thing it contemplates;
> Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent.
> This, like thy glory, Titan, is to be
> Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free;
> This is alone life, joy, Empire, Victory."

STOPFORD A. BROOKE.

STOPFORD BROOKE.[1]

G. K. CHESTERTON.

It is a commonplace, but a relevant one, that the *Life and Letters of Stopford Brooke*, as offered to us by Mr L. P. Jacks, has at least all the advantages belonging to the treatment of one literary man by another; the letters are by a man who could write; the life is by a man who can write about him. One need not have any of that extreme reverence for writing which is seldom (in the moderately intelligent) consistent with the constant practice of it, to see that this has its advantages when set side by side with some stilted epitaphs by pious relatives and some stuffy trivialities by the less honest sort of book-maker. Stopford Brooke was much more than a literary man; and Mr Jacks is much more than his biographer; and this gives the book a sense of enlargement and even liberty particularly appropriate to the subject. For if there is one note that is certainly left vibrating after any contact with Brooke, it is that virile note which has no name but liberty. It simplified, and perhaps over-simplified, both his politics and his theology. It was conspicuous in the very gesture, as it were, of his farewell to the Church of England; which was much more like that of a man bursting out of a net, anyhow, than that of the ordinary schismatic who severs a particular string, or rather splits a particular hair. It was present, of course, in his revolutionary sympathies in social matters; and especially in his splendid and then almost solitary protest against the brutal obscurantism that covered and excused the modern oppression of Ireland. It was equally present in his lightest literary exercises; in much in his poetry which many would have called merely pagan. He was, in an exact and rather exceptional sense, a Liberal, a champion of liberty; and all the more of a Liberal for being always something of an aristocrat.

[1] *The Life and Letters of Stopford Brooke.* By L. P. Jacks. Two vols. John Murray.

He came of a good lineage of Irish gentry which had been English at the time of the seventeenth-century settlements; and the creed of his family, like that of most Irish Protestant families, seems to have been what the Irish Catholics call black, and its most moderate critic will be disposed to call grey. But the spirit of the Irish squires, the riders and the drinkers and the duellists, must have been much stronger in him, and perhaps in them, than the rather negative religion which unfortunately cut them off from the populace of their native land. In the very style and stature of the man there was something that might have belonged to such full-blooded gentlemen; something that recalled the phrase in Wilson's *Noctes*, about a Scotch aristocrat and eccentric, that there are only one or two men who are really entitled to have a manner. Brooke certainly had a manner, and even a mannerism; which those who did not understand it sometimes mistook for an affectation. In one sense, especially, Mr Jacks's book enlarges our sense of this side of him, a side at once antiquated and emancipated. His letters, as compared with his literary work, show him as much more humorous and hearty, especially hearty in his expressions of hatred. I do not mean merely his denunciations of things he must in any case have disapproved, such as that yellow fever of the Yellow Book epoch, through which he lived with impatient optimism.

"O how tiresome these poets, whose Goddess is decay, are to me. They turn the world into a Lazaretto, and it isn't anything of the kind. They are too lifeless to celebrate Life, too weak to write of anything but weakness, and their weakness makes their cruelty. Feeding on disease, they deepen their own disease. And the more it deepens, the more active, like a heap of writhing worms, becomes their self-contemplation. So they are wholly lost souls in this world. They will find themselves again hereafter, and will be spanked into life by the four Winds of the Spirit—a painful business for them, but the Gods won't have Decay and Death in the Universe of the Spirit."

Or this, about the somewhat superficial and somewhat sickly social idealism that was a veneer of the same period; and which treated the most healthy immorality so much more harshly than it treated the most unhealthy immoralism.

"I should like to be able to write a tragedy on Parnell's career. It is the one supreme tragic subject I have come across in my life. B. O'Brien said to me some time ago—I never forgot what you said to me shortly after Parnell's last fight and death,—'This is the tragedy of Coriolanus reversed.'

For my part I loath the conduct of the Non Cons at that crisis. Had I been Gladstone I had fought them. As to the Irish—it is quite true that they 'flung their leader to the wolves.' But Parnell himself did the wrong thing. Had he retired for six months and let the Hugh P. Hughes' bay out all their slaver, he would have come back stronger than ever, and in a far better position. Yet, since he chose to fight, I would have fought with him, wrong or right."

There are many such passages, especially on the second of the two subjects; for about Ireland he was not only chivalrous but extremely shrewd; as when he implies that all Irishmen are Home Rulers, especially the Unionists. They like the Union, not because it is a Union, but because they fancy it allows them to rule at home. But it is not of such utterances, in which his convictions were clearly engaged and his moral emotions brought to the surface, that I write at the moment; but of a certain lively tone running through the letters, and generally absent from the literature, which would alone have made the letters themselves a thing worth publishing.

Stopford Brooke, to one who only knew him as a public man, seemed to be pre-eminently an artist, and even, so to speak, a decorative artist. He was an artist to the Pre-Raphaelite epoch and atmosphere, though not of the Pre-Raphaelite technical method and maxims: he had something in common with Ruskin and much more with William Morris. I remember a sermon of his I heard as a boy, about the virtues as beautiful women, held captive in a castle, which was exactly like a good decorative poem by William Morris. And in most of his published work he preserved this decorative order and dignity; the occasional irony was deliberately softened, and the rhetoric, though openly rhetorical, was always something that can only be called responsible. What is fresh to us in most of the letters which Mr Jacks publishes is a certain happy and humorous prejudice and a fine slap-dash way of stating it. The contrast is almost as great as that between the private crotchets of Tennyson and the blank verse of *The Idylls of the King*. There are few traces of a Morris wallpaper in the passage in which he describes two young ladies as "a brace of hippopotami"; however symmetrical, and therefore in a sense decorative, the double image might appear. There is no touch of Tennysonian blank verse in the allusion to another large class of ladies, who "purr" in such a manner that "dynamite is the only thing for them." There is even an exhilarating escape from Victorian liberality in his description of the fat

and offensive Jews "larding the earth" at the German health resort. Possibly all this went no further than a passionate hatred of ugliness; but I think he would have maintained that such an instinct really went very far; and was one of the instincts which for him pointed towards the ideal. He agreed with his countryman Mr Yeats in one determining line of his poetry: "For the wrong of unsightly things is a wrong too deep to be told."

In all this certainly Brooke was more of an artist than of what is called a thinker; and Mr Jacks does not deny that even his creed was perhaps too like the creation of a poet. There were, as Mr Jacks admits, logical gaps in it he hardly tried to fill, and answers to it he hardly troubled to answer. Brooke can be criticised along such lines; but even here the criticism may easily be exaggerated. To depict his creed as a mere cloud, or reason as a thing he rejected as mere rubbish, is a view that may be sharply corrected by two very important reminders. The first of these is very practical indeed. Stopford Brooke paid at least one strictly intellectual and independent tribute to the logical character of a creed. He walked out of a front door into the street because he did not believe it. He showed the Church of England the same rational respect in leaving it as Newman showed in leaving it. He might have stayed comfortably where he was, if he had really cared nothing for reason; but he saw, as Newman and all fine spirits have seen, that in this reason is the same as honour. It is equally true, for those who will think of it, that in this reason is the same as dogma. And vague as Brooke's vision may have seemed to many, it was at least more scientific than some that have been offered us, by men who are supposed to specialise in science. At least his Invisible King did fulfil the logical definition by being a King. He was not trumpeted as a King with elaborate proclamations declaring that he could not rule; which has been the new departure in religion of a man whose scientific lucidity is supposed to have been trained on dynamos and diagrams. But there is a second sense in which we may easily exaggerate the irrationality of Brooke's rather romantic creed, especially in comparison with those later and pragmatical forms of scepticism, which are avowedly much more irrational, if they are much less romantic.

It is true that Stopford Brooke was more of a poet than a philosopher; and in this sense it is true that he was sometimes less than logical; as well as being, like all poets, more than logical. Mr Jacks does not dehumanise his subject by seeking to deny this cloudy quality at the edges, as it were,

of some of Brooke's ideas. But, for all that, Brooke was more logical than many modern progressives who would be ready to criticise his illogicality. It is generally they, and not he, who are troubled about many things, and especially about many quite incompatible things; and who cannot see how single and simple was his own vision of the one thing needful, or at any rate of the one thing needful to him. We might put the truth briefly, but too abruptly, by saying that he was at least logical in being anti-logical. But we can put it more temperately and truly by saying that if he was not very logical he was very consistent. We might even say that he was not only consistent but complete. A certain process came in him to a very splendid and stately consummation, which may almost be called perfection. And most of those who criticise it simply confuse it with something entirely different.

The truth is, that there were two totally different "liberal" movements in theology. Indeed, they were two flatly contrary and mutually destructive movements. Brooke was all his life the friend of one and the foe of the other; and he was at least more logical than those who try to be the friends of both. Such people are only, of course, the snobs of the spiritual world; who extend the reign of mere fashion from hats to heads. But, like so many who are merely fashionable, they are influential; and their influence is found in fields beyond the theological. We find such a man wavering between the opposites of Socialism and Anarchism; apparently thinking it unimportant whether the State is made impotent or omnipotent so long as it is not left normal. We see such a person swaying gently from side to side, with a volume of Tolstoy in one pocket and a volume of Nietzsche in the other; undecided whether he will be meek under provocation or murderous without provocation. Liberal theology offers us the same image of Issachar; the highly philosophical ass who stoops between two burdens. That nineteenth-century process which we may call, according to our opinions, the emancipation or emasculation of the Christian tradition, really consisted of two processes which though parallel in time were opposite in direction. It is an under-statement of the contradiction to say that one was optimist and the other pessimist. It would be truer to say that one was trying, by touch after touch, to make our picture of God better, while the other was trying, by touch after touch, to make it worse. But the fairer way of putting it would be something like this: that in all ages, even in purely rational ages like the eighteenth

century, certain men (and those probably the wisest) have seen the goodness of God to be a part of natural religion, or a first principle like the brotherhood of men; and that since the eighteenth century specialised in humanitarian virtues, these deists or theists have specialised in emphasising the humanitarian goodness in the goodness of God. Again, if we put it less impartially and more sympathetically, that is, more as Brooke would have put it, we should say: "Be ye perfect even as your Father in Heaven is perfect, and especially perfect in realising His perfection; leave nothing that is imperfect, and in that sense nothing even that is mysterious, in a portrait which it is your duty to make as beautiful as it can conceivably be." Or we might summarise such a philosophy by saying that while man as a sinner may not deserve mercy, man as a thinker does deserve a merciful God. To neglect this is not to prostrate ourselves but to pull down our ideal; and it is wrong to lower our ideal by an inch. Now it was held by Brooke and by many other good and thoughtful men that certain Christian traditions, especially about wrath and judgment, did thus diminish the divinity of the divine. I shall not discuss here how far I agree with them; for, indeed, I both agree and disagree; I think their protest combined a healthy mutiny against the more recent Calvinistic, with a certain misconception of the more remote Catholic, tradition. The point here is that Brooke's objection to these things was not in the least sceptical, but was purely devotional. The more humane parts of theology were not something that might be left when he had destroyed the cruder parts; they were what destroyed it. He dismissed the supernatural things in which he could not believe, because he could not reconcile them with the supernatural things in which he did believe; not because he could not reconcile them with the natural things which he could see. For him, it was not that the existence of heaven was clearer than the existence of hell. It was that hell does not exist because heaven does exist. It was no "halfway" position; and the sceptics or bigots who would have said so would have been entirely wrong. On the contrary, it was a very extreme position; only the bigots might not unreasonably have called it extremely optimistic; while the sceptics might not unreasonably have called it extremely credulous. He had a dogma; and was rightly and refreshingly dogmatic about it. It was a dogma that drove directly contrary to the whole "stream of tendency" of the times, in so far as it was a tendency to a sad scepticism about the authorship of existence. This is

where he differed from many supposed to be in touch with him, who moved along the lines of Matthew Arnold or the worshippers of an Unknown God. I remember hearing him say in a sermon: "Mankind will always need a theology; and not merely a daily temper of sweet reasonableness." An opponent might plausibly retort that Brooke seemed to rely rather on a temper of sweet unreasonableness. But the retort would be unfair; he did not merely rely on a temper, but on a truth; or what he passionately believed to be a truth. How he arrived at that truth is another matter; but he had to arrive at it; it was a truth outside himself, if it was also (as the opponent would say) a truth outside his experience. It might be said that he arrived at it by an intuition so overwhelming that it could only be called an inspiration. He himself sometimes said, with characteristic boldness, one might almost say with characteristic bravado, that he simply arrived at it by emotion. But I think it would be strictly correct to say simply that he arrived at it by faith. And a more orthodox critic would in a sense be satisfied with this; for he will himself be at once silenced and justified.

The point here, however, is that while Brooke was thus perfecting a portrait of Divine Fatherhood, much of what was called liberal theology and religious criticism was doing exactly the opposite. It was, at the least, helping the agnostic to draw a curtain across the portrait; even when it was not helping the atheist to paint it out. This, and no notion of the idealisation of the theistic idea, was behind most of the progressive abandonment of miracle and inspiration. It threw doubts on the traditional deity because he was "a magnified and non-natural man"; not because he had been represented as a merciless and non-moral man. Indeed, this more sceptical school itself tended to describe him, if not as a man of iron, at least as a man in an iron mask:

> "One thing, not more, we know
> He bade what is be so."

Of this nineteenth-century tendency, as Mr Jacks very clearly shows, Brooke never had the faintest trace; he seemed almost miraculously immune from it. He did almost automatically accept from the science of his day certain limits laid on history, but this was a thing quite apart from his personal revolt; just as he did automatically accept from the political fashion of his day the whitewashing of Prussia, though anybody more completely the contrary of a Prussian could hardly be found even

among Irishmen. Mr Jacks himself, by the way, notes very shrewdly that it is a complete misconception of Brooke to suppose that because he went to Germany for a time, he ever went to German philosophy for his own liberal theology. Mr Jacks observes, with almost grim humour, that Brooke was much more interested in the new German artillery than he seems ever to have been in any new German metaphysics. It was a preference worthy of an Irishman and a man of sense; two things more often combined than some appear to suppose. But, in any case, anyone who admired Brooke must have found it worthy and characteristic of him. He would in the nature of things have been indifferent to the liberal theology of Germany, for two reasons at least. First, that the Lutheran emancipation of our day was wholly destructive, and was dimly groping towards the substitution of inhuman nature for a human God. And all that, as has been seen, went by Brooke like wind; if he could not have his perfect God he would have none. He would not cut the Creator according to the Cosmos, like the coat according to the cloth. And second, because if he was unduly indifferent to logic, he was at least completely indifferent to bad logic.

It may fairly be said, therefore, that if he was not a systematic theologian like Newman or Martineau, he was the very reverse of a mere modernist or mere pragmatist or a mere progressive. He believed in progress, as one believes in a positive creed: but he believed in progress in spite of the progressives. Other men may have vaguely admired him merely for being emancipated; but he himself, passionately as he loved liberty, would not have given a penny for a world of liberty if it were not a world of love. Indeed, he never cared to use the former except to affirm the latter; and he affirmed it, so far as it went, in a way always quite as definite, and sometimes quite as detailed, as the Athanasian Creed. Since he knew so clearly what he wanted to retain and what he wanted to reject, it is unfair to class him with the confused sceptics who felt so comfortable when they were criticising orthodoxy that they did not care whether they criticised it for being too black or too white, too optimist or too pessimist. Only the muddlement of modernity could have set men scrubbing at a statue, without being sure whether they wanted to clean an image or obliterate an idol. But Brooke was quite sure. He saw his ideal as one sees a statue, with the eyes of an artist rather than a man of science; but he saw the statue as clearly as if it had been carved for a Greek god.

The truth is, I fancy, that the spirit and power of Stopford Brooke were something quite separate from the schools with which he seemed connected by the accidents of contemporary life; and were more like the influence exercised on his followers by some poet such as Walt Whitman. "This is no book; who touches this touches a man." Men were moved not by his arguments but by his disdain of argument; not by his words or works but quite literally by his faith. He proved his invisible food by being fed. But this very fact of faith absolute and aboriginal was also connected with something else about him, any attempted description of which may sound like a disparagement, though it is more truly an appreciation. A man who thus steps out is spoken of as one beginning a movement; but I think he is more often ending one. He is a conclusion, if it be in the sense of a completion. It is the paradox of such a position that while it always points towards progress, it cannot itself progress. Walt Whitman called with uproarious spiritual hospitality for "Pioneers, O Pioneers." But, as a matter of fact, nobody can pioneer along Whitman's path any further than Whitman went. His affirmations are too absolute to be developed; and too simple to be extended. It is impossible to conceive a spiritual successor to Whitman; for I do not take seriously the mere writers of irregular verse, who have done nothing but try to copy his one great technical blunder. So Stopford Brooke took one great stride into what seemed to him to be freedom; but it is not easy to see how a second Brooke could take a second step to anywhere in particular. He could step into Agnosticism, of course; but that is stepping away from the Fatherhood of God and not towards it. Mr Jacks himself, who has more rights than one to be regarded as Brooke's natural heir and representative, is a man who writes with real originality on a very large number of topics; but I do not think he would claim to have made Brooke's religion any more original than it originally was. Speaking myself with the profoundest respect, and even the profoundest reverence, I think there is no path that way. It would really seem (and again I speak personally and even tentatively) that the self-renewal and recurrent life of traditional religion has actually been due to that complexity of which many of its loftiest critics have complained. It was, I fancy, precisely because the old creed had many doctrines, and many of which the use was long dormant, that the perpetual play of old and new produced a new moral life, as the difference of sex produces a new physical life. The modern idealist simplifies a creed so that it can be simplified no further; and, beyond

that, progress implies a parthenogenesis, so to speak, which seems seldom to occur in the world of ideas. I can only express my meaning under a image which may sound like a doctrinal reproach, but which I really mean only as an approximate allegory. In this sense there was something symbolic in the fact that the Unitarian theologians have looked up, with incomparable clearness and nobility of worship, to a veritable and perfect Father; but one that had no Son.

Stopford Brooke stands on a peak; but he stands on a precipice. He stood and stands securely; but beyond him there is no step, save into the void which he most deeply disdained. He still looks down into it with that scornful smile which I have seen when, with a sweep of his hand, he would put all modern scepticism and pessimism behind him; with that reposeful irony which sounded once when I heard him sum up the latest philosophies in a stern parody of the song of Bethlehem; "Glory to Annihilation in the Abyss; and on earth—strife." Something sustained him, like a saint upon a column, just above that chasm in a sort of radiant contempt; and I think that he would never have fainted or fallen, if he had stood there through the revolutions of ages.

G. K. CHESTERTON.

GROUND FOR HOPE.

F. S. MARVIN.

WHENEVER we turn from questions of race or international politics—still more of war—to those other matters which we consider under the title of morality or philosophy or, in the highest form, of religion, we seem to pass from the circumference of human relations and enter the heart or centre of the sphere. So far as we believe that man's reason is essentially the same whatever his race, or nation, or place of habitation on the globe, so far we must believe that the nearer we come to purely rational things, the stronger will be his sense of a world-relation, a community of being. Any man's religion may, of course, subserve a national exclusiveness or self-seeking; every man's morality will be more or less imperfect. But in so far as it is rational it will resemble the religion and morality of other men, for these things are essentially social. They arise from the intercourse of men together, and do not involve any necessary independence or hostility of groups. Reason itself is impersonal, and sympathy, though it weakens with wider and wider extension, seems to have no impassable limit; and we hope to show that in the course of human evolution both the ideal of a universal social good and our halting steps towards its realisation have advanced in the direction which our reason demands. If we think of human relations as a vast, but not perfectly homogeneous, sphere, with a central fire of reason and sympathy at the core, we may in history trace a gradual though irregular permeation of the whole mass by rays both of heat and light.

A study of this process is the most enlightening, indeed the only feasible, way of approaching the infinite complexities of human relations, especially in the sphere of culture, ethics, and religion.

At what stage in history does this sense of a rational community become conscious in mankind? This is the

crucial point. For it is not until the conditions and purpose of our life are consciously presented to our minds, individually or collectively, that any rapid or notable advance takes place. Indeed, as rational beings can we even speak of moral progress until we have individually willed, or a national reform until it has been demanded and deliberately achieved, or scientific advance until we are conscious of a nearer approach to the truth? Hence, though mankind was from the first akin, even at one, in the fundamental features of mind and body, we cannot speak of mankind as a conscious whole until long after the dawn of history. There were no world-relations in culture, ethics, and religion in prehistoric times, though man made his stone implements with singular unanimity, and had similar dreams of the world around him. Such a world-relation, if the word can be used at all, would be a uniformity and not a community among mankind.

We are led, in fact, for the historical genesis of the world-idea to the centre of culture and religion which grew up round the Mediterranean between the second and first millennium before our present era. Here a combination of circumstances—geographical, racial, social, personal—finally set in motion a train of causes, universal in their tendency, though it might seem accidental in their concurrence, which have led to what we know as Western civilisation, now for good or evil encircling the globe. It is necessary for any comprehension of the sequel to analyse, however briefly, this stupendous generalisation.

In neighbouring lands to the Mediterranean basin there had been for many ages before the outburst of Western culture great centres of civilised life, where stores of orderly tradition, of wealth and skill, of the raw material for science, had been accumulating for generations. Egypt, Babylonia, the Cretan Empire were the leading members in this as yet unconscious partnership. Great rivers, a friendly and practicable sea, facilitated intercourse and the exchange of ideas. Into this fertile area there burst three racial or national units which were destined, each in its way, to implant something, to give a lasting and developing turn to a well-prepared and favourable environment. These were the Greeks, the Romans, and the Hebrews. Each of these—we simplify to the limit—contributed something of universal bearing, something essential to the growth of that world-idea of mankind of which we are in quest. The Greek contributed the root-ideas of science, art, and philosophy; the Roman, of law and government on a large scale; the Jew—with whom for this purpose we neces-

sarily include the earliest Christians,—the idea of a moral religion applicable to all mankind. These facts when realised are seen to be the most important truths which history has to teach us: they ensure for all time the study in some form of Greek and Roman civilisation and of Christian origins. They put for us, and ultimately for all mankind, the services and achievements of these peoples on another plane from those of any other. The Greek, by his initiation of science, especially of mathematical science, laid the foundations of the most perfect type of human unity, the fabric of science which knows no difference of person or race, and by his philosophical spirit he knit up into universal systems both Roman law and Jewish theology. The Roman, by his spirit of practical order,—as universal in its kind as the Greek spirit of order in the intellectual sphere—actually created the united area in which Western civilisation has been developed; and within that area has perpetuated the principles and tradition of social and political organisation. The Christian transformation of the Jewish tradition added in the same area another element of even more potent force. The moral fervour of the prophets now became a gospel which was to be preached by its believers to all mankind.

It will be seen that from these three sources a threefold path was opened at the beginning of the Christian era to a world-order of a progressive kind—the path of knowledge, the path of law, and the path of religion. The pursuit, and the more and more perfect synthesis of the three, is the task which has occupied the vanguard of mankind ever since, and occupies us now. We shall first consider the nature and the growth of the great ideals appropriate to a world-order which arose from this fusion; then shortly indicate how far they appear to have been realised, or to be in course of realisation, since their advent; and, lastly, show how the greatest and dominant conception in human world-relations—that of humanity as an organic and progressive unity—brings harmony into the regions of culture, morality, and religion.

The two greatest social ideas which we can trace directly to the contact of Greek, Roman, and Christian thought are those of humanity and of progress, and it is extremely instructive to examine the origin and history of the words in which they are embodied. We notice, in the first place, that "humanity" is a Latin word, in spite of the fact that Greek has supplied us with nearly all the general words in science. All the "ologies" are Greek, but the two words—"humanity" and "progress"—conveying the capital conceptions of social

life, are Latin;—Latin after the permeation of Greek thought in the Roman world. "Humanus" and "humanitas," from which our words and all the cognate words in the Romance languages are derived, are specially significant. Cicero, the typical representative of the fusion of Greek thought and Roman government, gave the words their widest currency and their best Greco-Roman meaning. A hundred years before we see the word *humanus* beginning to grow into its full stature in the plays of Terence, who was an African slave, liberated in Rome, and spending his life in writing Latin plays, largely on Greek models. The most famous of all Latin phrases which have contributed to define and popularise "humanity" in the sense of sympathy and general interest, comes from him, the famous "homo sum; humani nil a me alienum puto." But Cicero carried the idea further, and in abundant passages stamped permanently the meaning of "humanitas" as the qualities of human nature generally, always understood in its better sense; "Magna est vis humanitatis," and, in a condemnatory sense, a man "humanitatis expers," *i.e.* without the feelings of sympathy and refinement common to human nature in a civilised community.

But it will be noted that all these uses of the word "humanity" fall short of the full meaning, or series of meanings, which the word has acquired since the West became Christian, and still more since ancient art and knowledge were rediscovered in the West, and a new birth of science, with allied industries and world-communications, has transformed the world. With each step the word "humanity," and the ideas which it covers, have taken fresh and richer colours. We have to wait till after the spread of Christianity before the Latin word "humanitas" is used in the sense which appeals specially to us in this discussion, of "mankind as one community throughout the world." Minucius Felix, a country gentleman of general culture, one of the earliest apologists for Christianity, seems to be the first to furnish an example. At the beginning of the seventeenth century "humanité" appears in common usage approaching its modern sense, and side by side with it the companion word "progrès." Thus all the great writers of classical French—Molière, Bossuet, Descartes, as well as their kindred spirits, such as Bacon, in our own and other countries of the West—speak of "humanity"; and at the end of the eighteenth century, through the philosophers and pioneers of the Revolution, the conception gained the glow of hope and of achievement which it has never lost since, even in our moments of deepest gloom.

A detailed study of both these words, as indicating the development of the conceptions which they convey, would be of the highest interest as a finger-post in history. For our present purpose "humanity" is the more valuable, as it arises from that sense of community, which is the world-relation in morality and religion, and its actual meanings are a living history of all the thought and movement which have gone to build it up. It is the abstract of all the qualities which distinguish man from other animals, and as he is the noblest, this abstract becomes an epitome of man's better nature. But man's better nature is only developed by association with his fellows: hence "humanity" comes to signify that association of men by which their higher qualities have been promoted. Thinking thus of mankind, in Pascal's words, as of one man living and learning and growing through the ages, we endow him with those best things which have been slowly blossoming here and there upon our stock. We think, perhaps, first of humanity in the simplest sense, as kindliness and sympathy, in which, in fact, all other human qualities have their root. And next to that we place his growing knowledge, which, though not the primordial link, is yet in its evolution the most perfect example of human co-operation. In each of these fundamental aspects humanity, or man in the collective sense, is what he is by virtue of association; and our mind then springs forward to the contemplation of this illimitable collective power and knowledge used, unreservedly and of set purpose, to promote the highest ends of the whole being and all its members.

Such is the ideal of humanity, arising, as we have seen, from historical factors built on a foundation of the firmest elements in human nature. We view it here as the world-relation of mankind in ethics and religion, and looking backward its growth is not difficult to trace. Looking forward, we believe and hope according to our courage and our confidence. This, however, is no part of our present discussion. What we have now to do is to consider in briefest summary how far, since the first completion of the idea, the world has moved to realise what seems so clearly its destiny. The seventeenth century is the point from which we may start this transcendent calculation and draw our balance-sheet. Bacon and Descartes at the beginning of that century first express clearly the ideas which we, with fuller content, have still in mind when we speak of a progressive humanity. They and their compeers were the first who could have discussed the question with us on equal terms. They had behind them the rediscovered Greece and Rome of the Renascence. They knew the Christian

faith, and they were inspired and exalted by the prospects opened up by the new science, its power over nature and its promise to men. This was three hundred years ago, and we are now in the throes of the greatest practical contradiction of the ideal of humanity which humanity has ever seen.

It may appear irrelevant to inquire how far the ideal has been approached, and seems still further unapproachable; but it is not so in the case of an ideal to be realised, however gradually, in the process of time and by human action. It is an ideal for this world, and it arose in men's minds from steps already taken towards the end proposed. If it could be shown that since the full conception had been reached no appreciable advance had been made towards realising it, our faith would soon begin to fail; the ideal would remain, but as a beautiful vision, a work of art once executed but never to be repeated, mankind's celestial symphony, a perfect drama but not to be performed on earth.

Such must be the haunting dread of thousands of the finest spirits; and when the Poet Laureate apostrophises the Spirit of Man and bids us gird on our sword and fight till "Beauty, truth, and love in man are one," many will wonder what meaning such words can ever have in a world like this, except to small and secluded groups of sheltered lives.

Let us, in attempting an answer, be careful to limit the range of our inquiry to matters on which some degree of certainty is possible. We will not, for instance, ask whether within the last three hundred years men have on the average become better morally, or more artistic, or even happier. We will ask, rather, for evidence that men have in that period of modern history become more united, better able to use their combined forces to a common end of social good, and whether on the whole they have so used their powers. If this appears to be the case, then in a practical sense the ideal of humanity is brought nearer, and world-relations on the mechanical side are favourable to the increase of the common elements in ethics and religion.

Thus limited, the inquiry can surely lead only to one answer. In the period which has elapsed since men began to dream of a united mankind subduing nature for the common good, the world has grown one in a degree never approached before, and wealth and power and knowledge have increased beyond all previous experience. It is the West, the product of that threefold elaboration sketched above, which has done these things. Western men, the children of Greco-Roman and Christian ancestry, have trodden every part of the earth's

surface and knit up the continents by the machinery of their art and science. It is their energy and pertinacity and skill which have built up these stores of wealth and industry, the thriving cities and the crowded ports. It is they who have traced the ocean routes and explored the resources of land and sea. And though this activity may appear to touch but the surface of life and leave untouched the deeper and the higher things to which man's soul responds, it would be a gross fallacy to treat it as merely superficial or merely mechanical. The co-operation of all Western nations is concerned, not merely in the scientific foundations which are the work of man's collective genius in its purest form, but also in the applications and the fruit which are so deeply tainted by selfishness and national crime. The colossal wealth, the world-wide trade, the mechanical constructions of engineering art are also evidence—to the plain man the most apparent—of the growth of co-operation not only between individual thinkers but between all nations without distinction of national interests. We may aim at "capturing" the trade of rival nations for a special end, but the trade itself is evidence of a community of interest and of action which underlies the rivalry and will outlast it.

At every step in this development of the West since the Renascence the good and evil in man's expansive activities and their effects have been inextricably mixed. Well if we can, with conviction and with full allowance for the adverse counts, declare that the unification of the world has been for the general good!

The settlement of the New World is, perhaps, the best typical example. Just as Prince Henry of Spain had been a Crusader, and above all a discoverer, but did not disdain the "fine cargoes of black slaves" from the Guinea coast, so Columbus carried among his followers religion, adventure, science, cruelty, and greed, in one ship. And if our judgment of the general course of Western expansion is to follow the case of Columbus and the New World, there can be no doubt of the issue. We condemn whole-heartedly particular acts, we believe that the whole might have been immeasurably better executed, but we know that the net result is an incalculable gain to mankind, that nothing since the incorporation of the West by Rome and Christianity has done so much to make actual the human ideal as the settlement of the New World, and above all of the United States. Something like this must indeed be the conclusion of any honest mind that attempts to survey the whole field of Western activity in the last three

hundred years, and the conclusion contains within it the germs of a dangerous laxity of principle in dealing with particular breaches of the laws of humanity in current action. "We do not excuse this," says the Bethmann-Hollweg of to-day, "but the ultimate result will justify it." But history cannot be used in this way to cover contemplated immorality in the future. We judge as impartially as may be the general results of great movements in the past, but we condemn particular iniquities which occurred in their course; we do not believe that such iniquities were necessary to the attainment of the good, and we oppose the perpetration of similar actions when they come within the scope of our own volition in the future.

As we come nearer to our own days we may trace amid the complexities of modern relations a more widely accepted ideal of right conduct in dealings between groups of fellow-men; and this, we think, may be maintained confidently in spite of the horrors which we have seen going on under our own eyes. Such a declaration as that of the Brussels Conference of 1889 would have been inconceivable at any time before the French Revolution. The Revolution put at their highest point the common claims of every man and every race or nation to just and humane treatment at the hands of the rest. It put, too, at the highest the hopes of human advancement by collective action. Our subsequent task has been to think out more closely the historical and psychological bases of these claims, and to devise in detail the best measures for ensuring the advance. The Brussels Conference for dealing with the slave trade in Africa and cognate questions affecting the welfare of the natives, was a conspicuous example of success in bringing Western nations together to agree on a duty and arrange joint measures to carry it out. Its General Act is an admirable summary of the true ideal of humanity in face of the human problems which Africa presented for solution, and, in spite of Congo atrocities, it has not been fruitless, and will remain a standard for the right collective action of stronger and more advanced peoples in dealing with their weaker brethren. France had been the first to abolish the slave trade by national act; England suggested this conference which the German Emperor had led up to by the conference of 1884. The General Act declares that the purpose of the Powers was "to put an end to the crimes and devastations engendered by the traffic in African slaves, to protect effectively the aboriginal populations of Africa, to ensure for that vast continent the benefits of peace and civilisation."

Of public international acts this was the most striking example of the triumph of a disinterested ideal: but innumerable currents indicated the same convergence of purpose. Not only in pure science, but in all forms of activity, the nations had within the nineteenth century entered into a co-operation which bespoke the consciousness of common needs and a partnership in common efforts. The work of the medieval Church in a spiritual sphere was being renewed on still wider lines, and science and social good were inspiring countless joint organisations for research, propaganda, healing, social reform, education, international union. So great was the multiplication of these agencies that at least two bureaux had been opened, shortly before the war, to correlate the various international associations, to keep a register for the guide of the individual inquirer, and to bring the kindred bodies into touch. The centres for these meeting-places of associations were very properly fixed at Brussels and The Hague.

It seems in fact indisputable that, in spite of armaments and the chafing of hostile undercurrents, the world was actually more nearly one in the summer of 1914 than it had ever been before.[1] Some prophets and more hopeful minds may even see in the genesis of the war itself another proof of human solidarity and augur that the issue must be a further step in the same direction. England and her allies in various degrees are now more closely bound than they have ever been to the European ideal, and the inevitable trend of events will rally the New World, and especially the United States, to that point of view, whatever may be her action in the immediate future. The war was, as we know, entered into on our part to maintain this ideal, and defend it against the encroachments of a national ambition that refused to recognise it, either in the form of an international undertaking or of a general conference to preserve peace. When he argued in diplomatic language for twelve fateful days in July and August of 1914, Sir Edward Grey was urging on behalf of all Europe the claims of humanity, and the answer was an appeal to force and the Uebermensch.

The record of history must therefore be read as a clear vindication of the hopes of the Renascence, though with a far heavier cost than the men of the Renascence would have thought possible. Such is the verdict also when we take shorter though sufficient periods for our survey. The ideas of the Revolution have largely triumphed, but who among its pioneers would have foreseen the Terrors and the wars of

[1] See Miss Constance Smith's article in *The Unity of Western Civilisation.*

Napoleon? Prussia has grown strong and unified Germany, but by a blood-stained course which the heroes of its War of Liberation would have shrunk from with horror. The religion of humanity survives and is permeating all forms of thought, but infinitely more slowly than its great prophet dreamt and in a world far removed from the Utopia of his vision. As we are concerned here with the greatest of all generalisations, we must be content with the slowest progress. The greatest philosophers since the Revolution, Kant and Hegel as well as Comte, have seen in the working out of the same humanitarian ideal the best hope for progress and a stable order. We accept, therefore, the hopeful and well-grounded estimate which one of our own living thinkers has just given of the realisation of this ideal since they proclaimed it: "Ethically as well as physically, humanity is becoming one; one, not by the suppression of differences or the mechanical arrangement of lifeless parts, but by a widened consciousness of obligation, a more sensitive response to the claims of justice, a greater forbearance towards differences of type, a more enlightened conception of human purpose."[1]

It remains to consider how this ideal of a progressive humanity—the only form in which we can present the world-relation to our minds in this connexion—is specially related to culture, morality, and religion.

Culture we shall understand in broad sense of all the influences, especially the systematic, which go to form the education of the individual.

Understood in this wide and only true sense, education becomes the process by which each new member is admitted to the full fellowship of the society to which he belongs, and it will thus vary and grow with the growth of the society itself. Looking back for a moment to the earlier stages by which the ideal of humanity was reached, we see that the typical Greek education, that provided by the sophists in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., was primarily an intellectual one, aiming at giving the young the elements of all the knowledge of the time and enabling him to use his own powers to the best effect in a Greek community of self-governing men. The Roman republican system, like the Spartan, was a soldierly and civic one, training the youth in obedience and sacrifice for the State. The medieval training was partly soldierly, necessitated by an age of fighting and political disorder, but typically theological, training the clergy and their class in the doctrine and discipline on which the Church was based. At

[1] L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, new ed., 1916.

the Renascence, when the church doors were thrown open and the elements of classical lore began to mingle with Church doctrine and the new life surging around, a confusion of aims set in which has never been completely harmonised to our own time. It reflects the conflict of ideas which has prevailed in adult minds for the last three or four hundred years. But it would be a superficial view which did not see below the confusion into a growing unity and order which is forming steadily beneath. And here, again, may be discerned, unless our whole reading of history is at fault, the ideal of humanity reconciling the rival claims of the "humanities" and science, the best of the past with the hopes of the future. No one can doubt this who examines carefully and with reflection the debates which are constantly being raised, and with special vehemence at the present moment, into the relative virtues of the various "subjects" in the educational curriculum. Three lines of thought divide the disputants, and other considerations have practically disappeared. There are those who would lay most stress on history, languages, and literature, and this for the purpose of putting the pupil's mind in contact with the best minds of the past and of other countries, and teaching him how he has become the Englishman and European that he is. The second class would concentrate on "science," *i.e.* the laws of nature and of life which man has partly discovered and partly made, especially in modern times. And the third class would make their object a training for life itself, the knowledge and practice of those things which will best enable the young to live a life prosperous in itself and useful to others. Is it not clear that in the ideal of humanity, as we have traced it,—not a vague aspiration but a solid and continuous growth of man's collective being—we find the true solution of contradictions which are more in detail and in application than in principle or substance? Each view is by itself irrefragable, because it is an aspect of this complete ideal. History and science and service make the whole, and they are inseparable. Our educational problem does not in fact lie here, but in the practical problems of fitting this ideal with its complex and constantly growing content to the exiguous capacity of a working-day and a half-working boy.

This ideal of education and these problems connected with it are common to the Western world; and as the West spreads its power they gradually affect the whole of mankind. The only resistance or counterpoise of any strength is in the East, and, since the modernisation of Japan, mainly in China and India. In the other continents the coloured

races, either by absorption or subjection, have been brought into the main current, and the attitude of the Western man at his best is in these cases one of benevolent tutelage. But in the Far East it is still otherwise, and the problems here of the world-relation of different cultures goes deeper than anything we have found to comment on in European history. The impressions of one of the latest travellers in the East,[1] who specially applied his mind to this question, will be found of high value. They confirm strongly the view taken in these pages, and in some respects go beyond it. Mr Lowes Dickinson approaches the problem with marked sympathy for the Eastern mind, so far as it is as yet detached from the mechanical and scientific development of the West. He is himself profoundly conscious of Western imperfections. He found, especially in India, a type of mind and culture antithetical to our own—a mind to which temporal evolution and achievement of mankind counted for nought or worse than nought, a mind which aimed at abstraction from these things, at their annihilation for the spirit. This is, of course, a form of mysticism with which certain religious and philosophical tendencies at home have some affinity. To Mr Dickinson it is the characteristic mark of the Hindu, the Chinaman being by comparison almost a Western. But in spite of this view, which contains much truth, Mr Dickinson concludes as follows: "I look, therefore, for a redress of the balance in the West, not directly to the importation of ideals from the East, but to a reaction prompted by its own sense of its excesses on the side of activity. And, on the other hand, I expect the East to follow us, whether it like it or no, into all these excesses, and go right through, not round, all that we have been through, on its way to a higher phase of civilisation. In short, I believe that the renewal of art, of contemplation, of religion, will arise in the West of its own impulse, and that the East will lose what remains of its achievement in these directions and become as materialistic as the West before it can recover a new and genuine spiritual life."

If that be so—and it is the view of a writer singularly well fitted to see the strength of Eastern thought in the religious sense and harmonise it with the West,—we must conclude that the responsibility of the West is even greater than we should have otherwise supposed. We have, then, nothing but ourselves to mediate between us and the future. It is for us, then, alone and in the first place, to achieve

[1] Lowes Dickinson, *Report to the Kahn Trustees*, 1913.

unity in our own household and afterwards proceed to preach it to the world. It is for us who have instilled this virus of progress into the human race, to heal our own disorders and give a clear and comprehensive purpose to mankind.

We take, however, Mr Dickinson's conclusion as an extreme statement of the case. It cannot be thought inevitable that all the East, communities of immemorial stability and culture like the Chinese, or of intense spiritual religion such as the Hindu, should lose this character by the spread of Western civilisation, if rightly guarded. Nor is there any compelling reason to make us believe that one community cannot learn from another without imitating its mistakes. We certainly all educate our own children with other hopes.

A recent writer, in summing up a discussion on the subject, which we have been able here to touch only too briefly, concludes that there is a unity in education, but "it is the unity of the countless and varied flowers that carpet the meadows in spring, the unity of the common spirit of life which animates them all."[1] Such a unity there is, and it would be an evil hand or a cruel fate which would obliterate it. But if we substitute for the "common spirit of life" the "common spirit of humanity," we gain a fresh idea and fresh force, without losing the vigour of life which belongs to us all. For in human life we are dealing not only with free and varied expression, which is the feature of all living nature, but with something which is growing as a whole together in a direction which its past life reveals; above all, we are dealing with something which we are making ourselves all the time. And on its proper lines of growth we shall have it as we want it, if we want it strongly and persistently enough.

The case of universal ethics is simpler, if we treat it on the same lines. For in ethics the social end is dominant from the first, and the ultimate conception which our reason calls for is the social good of all, which is the ideal of humanity looked at from another point of view as the end and sanction of our actions. It is unnecessary to labour the point, as it is obvious as soon as our reason is allowed to face the problem without bias.

The same principle which is obviously sufficient in the case both of feelings and actions which we call good, is also applicable in the case of rights, and is equally strong between nations and between individuals. In the case of rights we are able to make an advance beyond the pure altruism of Comte to something equally consistent with the supremacy of the human

[1] J. W. Headlam in *The Unity of Western Civilisation.*

ideal, but more fully thought out and applicable to political difficulties as well as personal morals. It may be useful for education and in private morals to teach and to hold that "l'homme n'a nul droit qu'à faire son devoir." But rights can certainly not be driven from the political sphere, and they are themselves easily reconcilable with the notion of a universal social good. "The admission of rights to free life and other goods on the part of any man logically implies the conception of all men as forming one society in which each individual has some service to render, one organism in which each has a function to fulfil. There must be a possible common good of human society as a whole."[1]

Thus, on analysis, humanity is seen to be the necessary basis not only of a good will and the sentiment of brotherhood, but also of justice, which is the reconciliation of rights.

The moralisation of politics, which must be the goal both nationally and internationally, proceeds with easier and quicker steps within each nation than without, although the conception of all nations as members of a family or social organism co-operating to the common good is as easy to grasp in theory as that of all individuals as forming one society. It is, in fact, theoretically easier to realise, though incomparably more difficult in practice. But the difficulty arises at least as much in the formation of stable and sufficiently homogeneous nations as in getting them to co-operate when formed. The better organisation of the individual states is an indispensable condition of better international relations. Given this, and the spread of an ideal of humanity in the moral and religious sphere, the hope expressed in Kant's *Perpetual Peace*, and by all subsequent reformers who have dwelt on the problem,[2] of the steady triumph of international law resting on the consent of independent states, may still be ours.

But the need of an ultimate foundation in a moral and religious ideal will have been obvious to all readers who have followed the argument so far. Any conception which has the depth and generality which we have traced in the ideal of humanity is religious, and its bearing on all the older religious conceptions of the West would be the subject for a treatise of profound interest and stimulus. Transformation rather than destruction would be its leading note. One of the most penetrating, most sceptical, and most modern of ancient thinkers made the following apostrophe to the divine,

[1] J. H. Green, *Principles of Political Obligation.*

[2] Frederic Seebohm, *Friends' Quarterly Review*, April 1916 (written 1862).

using the old Greek name of Zeus, which came originally from the sky:

> "Thou deep Base of the World, thou high Throne
> Above the World, whoe'er thou art, unknown
> And hard of surmise, Chain of things that be
> Or Reason of our reason."

Great as we feel this to be, truly as it expresses the two streams of our deepest thought, we are yet conscious that it is remote from us in the realm of feeling. The passion of Christianity has entered in since then, and with it the first sketch of the conception of humanity. Science has enlightened the gloom of the Greek's theology, and a closer-knit world of men has given it sympathy and hope. Our religion now, however we phrase it, is warmer, brighter, and more enduring. Our beliefs in the origins and course of things will vary, and perhaps must always vary, but they have acquired for ever a link and a foundation in the slowly developing thought and the united ultimate destiny of all mankind. We have realised our upspringing from immemorial roots of primeval awe-compelling love and inextinguishable hope. These have grown up together through the ages, and have survived the countless blots and abortions of ignorance and savagery. They will surmount this last and most terrible obstruction. The belief in the essential reasonableness and goodness of mankind will in the end prevail. To this we are born, and only thus can we face the future.

F. S. MARVIN.

BERKHAMSTED.

PROSPECTS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION AFTER THE WAR.

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UNKNOWN to most, the writer of the Hebrew Psalm cxxxix. has given a good definition of a liberal education :

> "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence?
> "If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there.
> "If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea ;
> "Even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me."[1]

The glorious verses represent freedom of the mind. The picture is of the mind entering into wide realms of observation, passing into and through zones of experience, coming to know and to feel relationships, and appreciative of and responsive to deep and diverse contrasts. The mind is made to appear in its liberty either as the bird on the wing in the air, or as the fish of firm fin in the sea.

Education is called liberal because it is a liberator. It constitutes freedom. It gives to the mind a sense of being at home in any proper society, and it offers to the mind a citizenship in every clime. Liberal education stands as a cause of the international mind. It creates a mind free from parochialism and provincialism. Liberal education stands for knowledge. But the knowledge is a sense of appreciation rather than a weighing of simple facts. Yet the mind is unwilling not to understand things as they are. For it does appreciate accuracy. In the subject of history, the man of liberal education would not suffer inaccuracy in a statement of facts. Yet he would be intensely eager to point out the relation of these facts.

[1] Ps. cxxxix. 7–10.

In the subject of economics, he would seek to understand phenomena as separate and definite pieces of knowledge. Yet he would also, and possibly more devotedly, seek to relate these phenomena to each other and to all forms of knowledge —scientific, linguistic, philosophic, æsthetic. In the sciences—chemical, biological, geological, physical—the man of liberal education would emphasise the importance of seeing things as they are, and of making computations. But he would also devote himself to knowing the relations existing between chemistry and physics, between geology and biology, between biology and physics, between geology and chemistry. In the subject of logic, he would know the worth of the familiar forms of the syllogism. He might even know the doggerel which has come down to us from the schoolmen. But he would be yet more interested in the logical process as a method of the working of the human mind. In literature, he would know the methods and the motives of the schools of writing, and the limitations of the periods and zones. But he would be more deeply concerned with poetry and essay, with drama and history, as the noblest expositions of the imagination and the heart of man.

Liberal education is fittingly contrasted with what is called an education for efficiency. Efficiency is interpreted in terms material. It represents values that can be seen, heard, touched. It stands for weights and measures. Its tools and signs are yardsticks and balances. It embodies the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes and the pride of life, temporal and physical. It represents a civilisation which makes for life's material comforts, for life's material splendours, for life's material forces, conditions, causes, results, and rewards.

Let there be no depreciation of a material civilisation. Let its place be properly and fully recognised. But let it be said, once and for all, that the education of efficiency, resulting in a civilisation material, is in and of itself not a liberal education. It is not a setting free of the human mind. It does not grow wings. It makes no relationships.

I have written of a liberal education as a form and definition of the intellect. Such an interpretation is true, but it is also open to the charge of being narrow. For a liberal education belongs to man as a willing and ethical being, of affections and appreciations, of duties to be done, of rights to be enjoyed, of choices, significant and truthful, to be made. A liberal education is to purify the heart, not simply for the vision of God, as intimates one of the greatest of the beatitudes, but also as a power of seeing all things.

A liberal education is to give strength to the will that the choices, which the enlightened intellect may distinguish and point out, may be grasped firmly. A liberal education is to ennoble and enlarge the moral nature, that the door of character may justly swing on its four-hinged virtues. A liberal education is to give dignity and appreciation to the ethical faculty, that man may not be a stranger and a foreigner in a world of beauty, of song, of picture, of architecture, and of poetry. A liberal education is to give aspiration and faith to the religious nature of man, that the eternities and the immensities may minister to him, not only as a subject of this world, but also as a citizen of the universe. For an illustration of a character, formed under training quite unlike the modern, but which was essentially, in heart and will and character, a liberal education, I turn to the far-off picture which Xenophon gives of Cyrus. For Xenophon speaks not only of his wisdom and presence of mind, but also of his magnanimity and generosity, his considerateness, his helpfulness, and his courage; not only of his power as a tactician, but also of his humanity, his nobility, amiability, and sympathy; not only of his strength of intellect in managing affairs, military, commercial, and governmental, but also of his faith in the gods and of his belief in the immortality of the soul.

In passing it may also be said that the difficulty with the German nation in the last score of years, and at the present time, in respect to a definition and appreciation of a liberal education, has arisen by reason of the failure of professor and of student to interpret a liberal education as being more than intellectual. The German university has come to understand and to encourage, at least to a large degree, the intellectual side. It has given us knowledge. It has weighed the facts. It has sought to relate fact to fact, and truth to truth. It has come to understand the syllogistic art. But it has failed utterly to be responsive to the ethical and religious relations of knowledge. It has failed utterly to appreciate the humane application of intellectual truth. It has not brought its knowledge into the heart! Its concepts have not gone down into the feelings and the emotions. It has grown the bones of intellectual culture and power. But it has not increased and augmented the life or heart, the ethical feelings and appreciations belonging to the individual and the people. It has made a Frankenstein, and a Frankenstein is a monster.

Such an education as I have thus sought, and feebly, to interpret is hard to create and to maintain in any society of whatever origin or constitution. But it is especially hard

to create and maintain in a new society. For in a new society the elemental material forces and facts have a place rather primary. Forests are to be felled, fields to be cultivated, roads to be laid out, houses to be built, streams to be dammed, wells to be dug, potatoes and wheat to be raised, cotton and woollen factories to be built. These simple material forces are first to be created and used. The time, the strength, and the opportunity remaining for the fostering of a liberal education are slight. The honour due to the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay in founding Harvard College within less than a score of years of the landing of the Englishmen on their shores becomes, in the light of this interpretation, one of the wonders of modern history.

The whole modern world is essentially a new physical world. The forces, chemical, electric, physical, that have been discovered, interpreted, and applied, have made this old world of ours a new world. And all this has been done, or largely done, within a hundred years. The application of steam to the transportation of personal property on sea and land; the invention of agricultural machinery; the discoveries of electricity, and the applications of electricity to sending words, the human voice, light and heat, both with and without wire; the discovery of the Bessemer process, and of other processes, of making steel; the use of steel in the structure of buildings; the discovery of the phonograph, and the use of the forces that go to make up the moving picture; the use of the armoured warship and of the submarine and of the air machine—have made this old world of ours, within a single lifetime, a new world.

In this new world the cause of liberal education has inevitably suffered. We have been so interested in and concerned with facts that we have lacked strength to see and to point out the meaning of facts, or to do the duty which the significance of facts might reveal. Our civilisation rather has been material, physical.

I cannot but believe that this material condition is to receive special emphasis in the decades that shall follow the war. The physical world is still to be upon us. The process of discovery and the application of the results of discovery of nature's forces is to continue. As iron ships have in a generation supplanted the wooden, as the steel ships have supplanted the iron, as the steam railroad train has supplanted the stage-coach, and as electric trains have supplanted the steam, so also air machines may supplant electric forces. In economics, too, a subject which is a bridge between the world material and

the world intellectual in its content, the great principles of free trade and of production will undergo re-examination. The doctrines of industrialism and commercialism will be recast. For better or for worse, socialism will occupy a large and perhaps the largest part of the thinking of the human brain. The contrasts of poverty and of wealth, of opportunity and of limitation, may not become greater, but they will certainly become more significant. The whole world—material, economic, intellectual, physical—will apparently be flung into the melting-pot, and in the melting-pot it may become a seething mass, so fierce will be the fires of man's underlying and under-burning desires.

Under such a condition there is reason to fear that the cause of liberal education will be obliged to fight for its very existence. The impression easily comes to prevail that a liberal education does not amount to much anyway. For, it will be said, that forces material and forces purely mental have been the chief powers in the present human overthrow. German university professors, who ought to have weighed evidence and examined facts, and reached the proper conclusions, based on principles and not on *ipse-dixit*, have been voluntary or involuntary liars. It will be said that culture has been sunk into kultur, and that this people, thus victimised, whose education Matthew Arnold clearly interpreted and warmly commended to his countrymen, have proved to be Huns. "If this be the result of a liberal education, we will have none of it," says the American. "If this be the conclusion of the whole aim of university training, we will convert our libraries into munition factories, our dormitories into barracks, our commons into messes. We will commission our professors as major-generals and our instructors as chiefs of ordnance."

It may, of course, be argued that the trouble is not with German education itself, even of the liberal type, but with the nature of that education. Its intellectual content was admirable, its purpose devilish. "Give us," says the liberalist, "the content, eliminate the hellish purpose, give us the right interpretation, and we will still keep the world true to liberalism, classical and scholarly, as well as political and civil." The argument is sound and should be urged. Yet, however persuasive the presentation, it is to be feared that an impression of narrowness and of hellishness will still prevail in some minds and wills.

The cause of liberal education, following the close of the war, will also be obliged to meet the condition of diminished

demand for members of several of the chief professions. The demand for architects and for physicians will, in my judgment, be increased rather than diminished. New structures should be built, and old ones and damaged ones repaired. Humanity, too, will be crippled and enfeebled, needing all hygienic services. The demand, however, for lawyers, for clergymen, will decline. The doorway to these two professional educations has been through the liberal college. The decline in demand will create a decline of interest in the great instruments and condition of liberal learning. Of course it may be said that if there be a decline in demand, there also would be a decline in the number of men who can meet the demand. The loss of men, the great, the outstanding men, has been tremendous. The best were the first to respond to the call to the colours, and the best have fallen. The number of such men who are found in the list of writers is astounding. Take, for instance, the names of the poets who have fallen. The bare list of them gives a sense of chokiness. First and foremost is Rupert Brooke, whose poetry, of singular beauty and vigour, shows the quickening and the inspiring influence of the great war on English verse. His name may be followed by that of Julian Grenfell, about whose life and poetry it has been said that "there is something of the spiritual Titan"; Viscount Andrew John Stewart, of whom those outside his family and friends knew little until the great conflict gave wings to his thought; Charles Hamilton Sorley, who was killed about a month after Stewart, a youth of twenty-one, one of the youngest of the poets, whose verse, filling but one small volume, mutely testifies to the great loss to mankind in the premature silencing of his song; Robert Sterling, by whom in dying was won the fame which in times of peace might have been long in coming; H. Rex Freston, whose thought has been moved by the war into expression of undying words; Alan Seeger, a gift from among the poets of America, whose poems, and diary and letters, published since his death, have given him in the heart of England a place which rivals that held by Rupert Brooke; Alexander Gordon Cowie, only twenty-two, but already a writer of poems of great beauty; Alfred Victor Radcliffe, a poet and a critic, a lover of nature, whose poetry shows both delicacy and vigour; Brian Brooke, who gave up his life in the first day's advance in the battle of the Somme, as did also W. N. Hodgson, another poet; Leslie Coulson, of great promise; and many others. This list of names, gathered by one of my colleagues, Mr Walter Graham, is its own threnody.

But this loss is simply an intimation of the loss suffered among physicians and lawyers, and architects and other men of liberal sympathies and callings. Each name seems to be a stone in Valhalla. In another field, too, the cause of liberal learning will suffer, and suffer direfully, because of the scarcity of men, a scarcity caused not simply by the direct ravages of the war, but also because of the great financial rewards belonging to a life of research spent in industrialism. An American teacher, Julius Stieglitz, President of the American Chemical Society, in an address to his associates given at Boston, in September 1917, said:

"Unless prompt measures are taken, we shall witness in a few years such a dearth of first-class tried material for professorships, that second-rate men will be placed where the national welfare needs the best we have, and third- and fourth-rate men will be occupying positions in which we should have young men of the highest promise in the period in which they are reaching full maturity. Indeed, it is greatly to be feared that even now we are witnessing a gradual lowering of standards. It would be futile to appeal to our industries not to call the men they need, although in the not distant future they will suffer most severely from the situation which is developing, if the present tendency remain unchecked."

Yet notwithstanding all these sad and sinister interpretations, it is to be said that humanity has a certain way of repairing its damages and of doing away with the ravages wrought upon and by itself. Like the forests losing their first growth, there springs up a second one, which perhaps may be not so large and lusty as the first, but which also serves great uses. Within a hundred years, and sometimes a lesser period, the damage wrought is apparently largely overcome. The intellectual condition is akin. It may be even better than that which originally obtained, or which might have obtained. The half-century which has elapsed since the close of the Civil War in America was a sad half-century for the Southern States which were devastated and whose social constitution was changed by the war. But the close of the fifty years gives America a higher stage of development than that which obtained in the year 1861. One believes that the cause of liberal learning cannot, and shall not, enter into a decline that shall prove to be permanent.

The disorganisation to which I have already referred will not apply to the general community only. It will belong also to the cause of liberal learning itself. The staid and orderly processes, which have characterised the content and the pro-

gress of liberal learning in the past, will be maintained only with great difficulty. Its content may become narrow and made thin. Signs of such disorganisation are found in such a statement as was recently made by the president of an American college to its graduates. The President of Tufts College, speaking to the alumni living in Boston, said:

"Our present courses of instruction must be changed, and our enjoyment of the blessings of peace must be suspended. Our courses in history must concentrate attention on the present; our instruction in economics must busy itself with the vital problems of the day; our courses in biology must develop around the activity of the human body in health, in adversity, and in disease. Our courses in geology and mineralogy should leave the palæozoic and move up to the fuel, steel, and copper problems of now. Our French should prepare for the mud of Flanders; our German, for the quick understanding of the inventions of the enemy. Our mathematics should be used for a specific purpose; it is not a time for pure mathematics, pure science, pure art, or purity in any subjective form. It is a time when, in order to save these and many other precious things, we have to get into the grim work of war."

Yet the disorganisation of the American community and of the cause of liberal learning itself is to be accompanied by at least one mighty conservative uniting and codifying force. This force is found in the closer political union of Great Britain, France, and the United States. This union is sure to have a fundamental influence on the higher education in the newer nation.

At least three distinct periods in American education, as effected by foreign influences, are easily distinguished. The first, of course, was the English. The English was succeeded by the French, which, beginning soon after the close of the Revolutionary War, ended with the earlier decades of the nineteenth century. The French period, in turn, was followed by the German, which, beginning not far from 1830, continued down to the beginning of the twentieth century. Aside from the severance wrought in August 1914, the influence of the German university over the American was, in the first years of the twentieth century, subsiding. But for threescore years and ten that influence was regnant. It has now, however, ended, and ended not to be resumed.

The higher education in America will at once return to its earlier allegiance. Yet the influence, exerted by Oxford and Cambridge and the Sorbonne, will not, in my judgment, become prevailing. But it will be pervasive. The new forces

of the Rhodes scholarships have come to America, and will continue. The interruption of the present appointments will prove to be only temporary. The effect of the Rhodes men returning to America has been scholarly, humanising, and has extended throughout the country. The presence of these men has served to eliminate the German point of view, and to cast out a certain narrowness of scholarship which is liable to belong to forces of purely American origin and advancement. Even if the Rhodes scholars have not persisted in academic work,—and about one-half have not persisted—yet their influence has tended towards the adoption of high scholastic ideals and towards the incorporation into our American system of high educational measures. Yet it is to be confessed that the number of Rhodes men who return to teach is not large in proportion to the whole constituency of an academic faculty. The Americans who go to Oxford and Cambridge, at their own charges, will never be large.

A similar condition, *mutatis mutandis*, will obtain in respect to France. The American student should go to France for studies other than the Romance tongue and literatures. But the present outlook is not auspicious.

It is also to be said that the effect wrought by the exchange professorships is good as far as it goes. But it never goes very far. These effects have their chief value in their by-products, rather than in their direct results. They serve to create an atmosphere of good feeling, not only academic, but also more international. After all, the scholarly work done in the university must ultimately and largely depend upon the regular incumbents.

In general, it is to be said, and said strongly, that the closer political union and fellowship of the three great nations is to prove to be a steadying and uplifting force in maintaining the higher intellectual and scholarly standards of the newest of the three peoples.

But in the years immediately following the war, and in the subsequent decades, liberal education, in order to maintain itself, and even to increase its force, should, in my judgment, give special heed to certain great, constant factors and elements of its learning. Among them I name history, literature, philosophy, and religion.

It is the tendency in a new country and in this new world of ours to live in, and to appreciate only, the present. Humanity is so little inclined to gather up experiences! It repeats its mistake. It learns no lessons, or it learns them very feebly. Its progress is slow. History, therefore, has, or

should have, a special meaning. Its records of the past should prove to be present-day pamphlets. It should have a meaning for the years in which one lives similar to that which Grote said he wanted his history of Greece to have for his England.

The worth of history as an element of liberal learning for the future becomes the more significant because of the enlarged interpretation and the more facile method of the historian. History, it is commonplace to say, has ceased to be largely political, and has become social. It has come to touch the bosoms and the business of men, as well as their cabinets and their coalitions. It has come to interpret Pope's line, in which one might make the change and say "that the proper history of mankind is man." This method becomes also the more pregnant with meaning if one thinks of history as the daily newspaper, only enlarged and filled with evidences more carefully arranged, atmospheres and conditions more thoroughly weighed and appreciated, conclusions more logically thought out. At its worst, the newspaper is quite as bad as anything can be. At its best, the newspaper is a moving history, and becomes material for lasting values.

In passage after passage of Burke, the worth of history is intimated. In his *Reflections* he says: "In history a great volume is enrolled for our instruction, drawing the materials of future wisdom from the past errors and infirmities of mankind."[1] And again, he says history "is a great improver of the understanding, by showing both men and affairs in a great variety of views. From this source much political wisdom may be learned,—that is, may be learned as habit, not as precept,—and as an exercise to strengthen the mind, as furnishing materials to enlarge and enrich it."[2]

The philosophical and political biographer of Edmund Burke has, in a moving passage, indicated the same great interpretation. In the formal document by which John Morley transferred Lord Acton's library to the University of Cambridge, he said: "The very sight of this vast and ordered array in all departments, tongues, and times, of the history of civilised governments, the growth of faith and institutions, the fluctuating movements of human thought, of the struggle of churches and creeds, the diverse types of great civil and ecclesiastical governors, the diverse ideals of States—all this will be to the ardent scholar a powerful stimulus to

[1] *Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke* (Little, Brown & Co.), vol. iii. p. 418.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. iv. p. 468.

thought."[1] Such is to be the worth of history in the human reconstruction.

In the worth of literature as a means for the reconstruction of ravaged humanity, one easily calls to mind its cosmopolitan character. It is not a little singular, and it is most impressive, that the four poems which would, by common consent, be accepted as the four greatest poems, are written in four different tongues. To this consummation the Greek contributes majesty, the Latin sweetness, the Italian beauty, and the English strength. The unlikeness in language is no more unlike than the division in the periods of time which separates the age of Homer from the century of Milton.

In this remaking German literature will have its place. In a time yet more reflective than the present, we ought to, and we shall, be able to restore to ourselves the greatest works of at least four of the greatest minds which God has given to the world, Schiller, Goethe, Kant, and Lessing, of whom, let me add, Kant has the richest meaning to many men.[2]

The cause of liberal learning above all else should not neglect philosophy. For philosophy is the essence of sciences. It is the fundamental truth and the elemental truths which underlie every science and every form of learning. Beginning with man, it seeks to show man in relationships. It is as broad as man's widest thinking, as deep as man's profoundest reflection, as high as his boldest imagination. In it are included your logic, and your psychology, your epistomology, your all. It is divided and trichotomised as is proper. But in any one of its several forms, in all of its applications, it represents the supreme field and the most powerful force of liberal learning. It is the science of principles. It is the understanding of methods. It is wisdom in the abstract, and wisdom applied. In philo-

[1] Viscount Morley's *Recollections*, vol. i. p. 232.

[2] It may not be unfitting for me to quote verses written by Charles Hamilton Sorley, who laid down his life in this struggle, in which he says to Germany:

"You are blind like us. Your hurt no man designed,
And no man claimed the conquest of your land.
But gropers both through fields of thought confined
We stumble and we do not understand.
You only saw your future bigly planned,
And we, the tapering paths of our own mind.
And in each other's dearest ways we stand,
And hiss and hate. And the blind fight the blind.
When it is peace, then we may view again
With new-won eyes each other's truer form
And wonder: Grown more loving-kind and warm,
We'll grasp firm hands and laugh at the old pain,
When it is peace. But until peace, the storm,
The darkness and the thunder and the rain."

sophy the human spirit will find the truth of its individuality as embodied in Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*, and also it will find the equally important truth of Kant's categorical imperative. Personal character devoted to duty under the force of love will be the guiding star of humanity.

Perhaps I have used too strong words in thus characterising philosophy. For these phrases, some would say, ought to be reserved for religion. Religion is, in turn, to be a chief force, and perhaps the chiefest, in the reconstruction of mankind and in the promotion of liberal scholarship. And what is religion?

Religion stands for the incarnation of the Divine Being. It represents God on the earth. It gives intimations of the infinite, the eternal, the universal. It stands for that spirit in man which differentiates him both from things and from brutes. Religion takes on the divine forms of truth, of duty, of widest, highest relations. It calls to its service prophets who proclaim its truths, priests who minister at its altars, scholars who read and interpret its holy books. The progress of pure religion means the progress of the community. The regress of pure religion means the declining of the community. The college gives itself to the education of men who shall be prophets true, priests devout and devoted, scholars wise. It realises that, if the oracles be dumb, if the priesthood be corrupt, if the altar-fires are impure, or the scripture false, the whole community suffers in the degradation of mind, of conscience, of conduct, and of life. It recognises that if it can have a share in the education of the saints and prophets, it is giving a sky to the life of the community, a sense of infinity in the midst of its minute finites, and a God to a world living in the lust of the flesh and of the eyes.

Religion, thus interpreted, is to become the mightiest force in the rebuilding of man. Intimations of its power are already appearing in the turning of the hearts of the French nation unto its fundamental truths and its deepest consolations.

To this quartette of great subjects, history, literature, philosophy, religion, and in the use of the elements of these great subjects, liberal education, in the decades following the close of the war, should especially address itself. No other forces are comparable to these. They are not only the *summa bona*, but they are also the *fortissima bona*. They represent the past: for they gather up the past most completely. They represent the present: for they draw and embody the forces which constitute the modern world. They are at once the powers and the materials, the humanities and the humanity, and even the divinity which shall shape our ends. Because

they represent the eternal spirit of humanity of the past, they shall make the eternal spirit of humanity in the future.

But in securing these unimaginable results, there is one supreme force to which attention should be given, and that is the force of the teacher himself. It is the force which Socrates was, and which many a leader of humanity, in the twenty-five hundred years that have passed since the greatest of Greeks drank the hemlock, has incarnated. The teacher is himself the great force in education, liberal or other. And in the teacher, be it at once said, two forces are pre-eminent—personality and truth. The two forces and elements ought to be combined in every teacher, and, as they are combined fittingly and in greatest relationships, is determined the worth of the teacher. If personality be lacking, even if truth be present, the result is weakness, ineffectiveness. If truth be lacking, falseness and error prevailing, the stronger and the more impressive the personality, the greater and the more lamentable is the evil resulting.

Truth may be found in the book. "Veritas," written across the open pages of three volumes is the shield of the oldest American college. But the results of such a volume is not teaching. It is only when truth is incarnated in and poured out by the person, impressed by the person upon other personalities, is there teaching. Thence results life. One of the favourite figures of Socrates was that he was a "midwife." It is more easy for humanity to learn and to feel truth than to secure great personalities. But when, to the calling of the teacher, one can summon men of great personality in which are found enthusiasm, faith, hope, resolution, love for men, the kindling of self-sacrifice, the moral value of high religion, the resoluteness of the noblest aims—the cause of liberal education is not only made safe, but also becomes aggressive, and bears the assurance of ultimate and complete triumph.

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THE DOCTRINE OF A FINITE GOD IN WAR-TIME THOUGHT.

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One of the by-products of the Great War—whether it be a partial compensation for the horrors of the conflict, or only another evidence of world-derangement — has been an intensification of interest in the problem of evil. That problem is, of course, essentially unaltered by the tremendous accident of world-war or world-peace. Indeed, the mere multitude of instances of evil is logically irrelevant; for any one instance of sin or of suffering is sufficient by itself to make out a *prima facie* case against the hypothesis of omnipotent goodness. But most men, so long as they have beheld or suffered only customary ills, have been content to repeat the traditional formulas and explanations without troubling themselves overmuch as to their meaning or validity. John Stuart Mill's eloquent protest against this complacent optimism has, for the most part, remained unheeded. To be sure, tornadoes, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, the ravages of epidemics, the injustices of heredity, the red "tooth and claw" of Nature, have been disconcerting features in an otherwise attractive world; but these "evils" have aroused in most men only a languid interest, which has been easily lulled to rest again by a few phrases about the difficulty of the problem and the limitations of the human intellect.

For traditional theology has always deplored the too great assertiveness of the human "reason," and has avoided evident conclusions of its own logic by appealing to the authority of the Church and of the Bible. And even the "new theology," though ostensibly independent of any external authority, has never taken the problem of evil very seriously; but, seeking a truce with all-conquering physical science, has been content,

for the most part, to be a mere doctrine of the "divine immanence." In this the "new theology" has only been following the lead, though with a lag of a decade or two, of the dominant philosophy of the period; for the majority of the reputable philosophers of the nineteenth century were committed to some form of idealistic monism. Now, according to this dominant monism, of which the late Professor Josiah Royce may be taken as a typical exponent, the God of our traditional theology is to be identified with the Absolute, who is described as the all-inclusive experience, the all-embracing mind. The error and suffering and sin of our finite lives are then all due to the fragmentariness of our experience; and, when taken up into the infinite completeness of the Universal Self, all these imperfections of existence are required to constitute the perfection of the Whole. We, as fragments of the Absolute, may be victims of misfortune, unhappy, discontented, sinful. But the Absolute is perfectly good; and, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, everything that is, is exactly as it ought to be.

In the present generation, however, realistic and pluralistic tendencies have reasserted themselves. Thus, even before the outbreak of the present war, the intellectual atmosphere of the world was changing. Readers of the *Will to Believe* and the *Pluralistic Universe* will recall William James's insistence that the "only God worthy of the name must be finite." Dr Hastings Rashdall's conception of a limited God, of a God who is "not the Absolute," is a manifestation of a similar tendency in recent English philosophy. Mr George Bernard Shaw, too, has championed the idea of a God who is "engaged in a great struggle to produce something higher and better"; as "making all manner of experiments" before finally succeeding in the creation of man. And, finally, the potent influence of M. Bergson has tended in the same direction; for although he has consistently refused to identify his *élan vital* with the Deity, his system includes the thought of an opposition between the principle of life and progress and what he calls "inert matter"; and although matter is nevertheless supposed to be in some sense a product of the *élan vital*, life is inevitably hampered and hindered by it. Consequently, although M. Bergson has not yet given us a theology, a Bergsonian theology must needs be dualistic.

The doctrine of a "finite God" is not, then, a mere passing fad, the invention of two or three capricious minds; nor is its present vogue to be regarded as wholly due to the war. What the war has done has been to accelerate a movement of thought

that was already under way; and the war may thus be the occasion for a profound change in our conventional idea of God. It is true that in the past theology has not been greatly influenced in the long run by passing fashions in philosophy, and also that the traditional idea of God as Infinite, Eternal, Immutable, Omniscient, Omnipotent, etc., has survived other wars, which have been as wicked and as disastrous to those affected by them as this war. Indeed, there is some ground for believing that men have frequently been so overwhelmed by disaster as to have no heart for rigorous thinking, and that wars and natural calamities, instead of producing intellectual revolt, have tended rather to send men back to their beads—to make them less disposed than before to question traditional statements of doctrine. And this may be the outcome of the present period of disaster also. But one circumstance points to a different conclusion: never before in Christian lands has there been so numerous a public emancipated wholly or in part from the authority of Church and Scripture, and ready to welcome unconventional winds of doctrine.

At any rate, the contemplation of the horrors of the Great War has undoubtedly prepared many earnest minds to look with favour upon certain recent presentations of the doctrine of a finite God. I refer especially to the recent books of Mr H. G. Wells, and to a less-known but even more significant book by Mr E. H. Reeman, entitled, *Do We Need a New Idea of God?*[1] Both of these writers are valiant protagonists of the general thesis that the apparent dualism of good and evil is not *merely* apparent, that the world-struggle is a struggle in which every good will, and therefore God himself, must be thought to have a genuine part. Yet, in my judgment, both have done some disservice to the general doctrine by confusing it with other, and quite distinct, tendencies of contemporary religious thought, or by adding to it redundancies of their own devising. And it would be very unfortunate if the claims of finitism, or dualism, in theology should be prejudged in consequence of our liking or dislike for any of the particular forms in which the general doctrine has been clothed, or for any logically distinct tenets that have happened to be associated with it.

I.

In his statement of the fundamental problem Mr Reeman is perfectly clear, and his argument appears to me to be

[1] George W. Jacobs & Company, Philadelphia, 1917.

entirely sound. "It seems to me," he says, "that the present circumstances of life, the hard facts as we know them and as they directly affect us, force us to one of four conclusions: Either God is good, but not omnipotent—that is, loves the good, and wants to further it, but is just about as helpless to sweep evil away at one stroke as we ourselves are; or that God is omnipotent, but not good—that is, has the power to destroy evil from the face of the earth, but not the will; or, again, what we call good is not the real good as God sees it (which would mean, of course, that all our notions about good and evil are entirely mistaken and that we are quite in the dark as to what real goodness actually is); or, fourthly, that God has no concern with mankind and no interest in what happens to us." "Since I cannot escape the idea of God," continues Mr Reeman, "and am compelled to believe that in the main humanity is not mistaken in its ideas of goodness, and since I cannot believe that a God exists who is indifferent to creation and the interests of mankind, I am forced to the one conclusion left, namely, that God is now actually doing the best He can. . . . I believe that if God could end such things as the horrors of war and destroy the world's evil to-morrow, He would."

The reasoning is sufficiently cogent. Unless we are willing to throw overboard all our logic and all our ethical convictions, we cannot, in the presence of the tragedies of human experience, reconcile the idea of omnipotence with that of universal benevolence. However, I can imagine that many a mind will object to the apparent superficiality of the discussion of the divine omnipotence as it is carried on by such men as Wells and Reeman, or even by John Stuart Mill; for these writers have largely ignored the subtleties to be found in the conventional treatises on theology. And it ought to be borne in mind that the masters of theology have never approved the popular notion of omnipotence as the *ability to do anything that might be mentioned.* It may be profitable, therefore, for us to approach the problem from a slightly different angle, and, instead of inquiring whether God can be both omnipotent and good, to ask how we must *define* the term "omnipotence" in order to be able to say without logical absurdity that the Omnipotent One is also perfectly good. If Wells and Reeman may be permitted to *re*-define the word "God," then one who wishes to retain the traditional phraseology may be permitted to *re*-define the word "omnipotence." It is indeed in this direction that theology has always moved, when, instead of evading the logical difficulty by appealing to Scripture or by

denying the competency of the human intellect, it has sought to face the issue with any degree of seriousness.

If, then, we wish to retain the *word* "omnipotence," we must limit the conception in at least three ways:

1. *The Logical Limitation.* This has been recognised by all theologians. God's omnipotence does not mean that he is able to "actualise a contradiction."[1]

2. *The Ethical Limitation.* Ethical distinctions do not depend upon the will of the Omnipotent One. In other words, good and evil, right and wrong, are not *arbitrary* conceptions.

3. *The Temporal Limitation.* In addition to the logical and the ethical limitation of the divine omnipotence, the theological dualist recognises a *physical* or temporal limitation. Having limited the Almighty by the law of contradiction and by the law of love, we must also limit him by the law of time. Events do not take place arbitrarily. Nature has no mercy; makes no exceptions; does not turn aside to avoid running over anyone. But to say that events take place in accordance with law is equivalent to the proposition that the temporal order of events is fixed. God does not, so far as we can see, and therefore, we infer, he cannot, interrupt or change this order. His purposes are not accomplished *instanter*, but in the course of a process.

It is not enough to recognise the temporal or physical limitation as a *self*-limitation, unless, indeed, we are prepared to hold that for God the world-order is only a gigantic *game*. The dualist maintains that this limitation is absolute, that is to say, not of God's choosing. If God could end the Great War, he would do so. If by occasional changes in the order of natural events he could preserve innocent lives and prevent unhappiness, such changes would certainly be made. If he could secure the ends for which he is striving at a lower cost of human pain, that is to say, in a shorter time, the time would surely be shortened. In other words, unless the temporal limitation is absolute, God is not good. For, assuming God to be good, he would not have limited himself in this way had he not been compelled to do so by some ulterior necessity; and "ulterior necessity" is only another name for a limitation that is absolute and inevitable.

Men have tried to avoid this conclusion in various ways; but, in general, we may say that the traditional theodicy, from Plotinus to the present, has sought to avoid the necessity of admitting a genuine physical or temporal limita-

[1] Thomas Aquinas says: "Sub omnipotentia dei non cadit aliquid quod contradictionem implicat" (*Summa Theol.*, xxv. 4).

tion of omnipotence by making the most of the logical limitation. The argument is, briefly, that the evils of the world, the hard facts of life, are the condition of the possibility of the highest good. Sometimes this highest good has been conceived to be the realisation of a *plenum formarum*, the achievement of the greatest possible *variety* of being. This would, of course, be a complete solution of the problem of evil, since nothing that is—as the pains of the unhappy, the sins of the wicked, or the delusions of the insane—could be dispensed with, without taking away from the perfection of the whole. This justification of the existence of evil has, however, two fatal defects: it would give us a merely *static* world, in which there would be no possibility of moral achievement; and its fundamental assumption runs counter to our moral perceptions, since mere variety of being, as such, is not good.

Usually, however, when evil is "explained" as the necessary condition of the highest good, this highest good is conceived to be some form of virtue or "good will," as courage, patience, industry, fidelity, etc. The chief difficulty with this theory of good and evil is that, while it is manifestly true that many forms of virtue would be impossible in a world which was wholly free from suffering and sin, it is far from evident that all evils can be rationalised in this way. Not to mention other evils that defy complete rationalisation, what shall we say of insanity, that terrible affliction so prevalent in the stress and strain of modern civilised life? How can there be moral development where the mind itself is disordered or destroyed? Or how can the delusions of the poor unfortunates whom we shut up in our asylums be supposed to contribute to the moral improvement of the rest of us, or to the achievement of the highest good of the universe?

Let us then place side by side the hypothesis of a God whose power is infinite (except for the logical and ethical limitations spoken of above) and that of a God whose power is limited by necessities beyond his control. Let us face the issue between these rival hypotheses objectively, in the spirit of scientific impartiality which we should expect of a physicist who is deciding between rival theories of light or of sound. What must the verdict be? I submit that the hypothesis of a God of limited power, considered merely as a hypothesis put forth to explain the facts of experience, is more satisfactory than its rival. It conflicts with none of the facts; it harmonises with all; while, at best, its rival accounts for only some of them. For it is important that we bear in mind that,

so far as there is a genuine compensation for evil, it may find as full recognition in the dualist theodicy as in that of the believer in omnipotent goodness. That is to say, we may admit the fact of compensation, while in no case acknowledging an obligation to hold that the compensation is complete.

In addition to this theoretical advantage, the dualist or finitist hypothesis has the practical advantage over its rival that it gives men a field for genuine co-operation in the cosmic struggle. To be sure, even according to the rival theory, there is a struggle; but it is a factitious struggle. There is an air of unreality about it. Instead of being, so to say, an affair of real life, it is only an improving game, or a difficult problem set for us by the cosmic Schoolmaster—a problem, moreover, which need not have been set in just this way, and to which the Schoolmaster already possesses the solution. And here we ought to point out a curious inconsistency in the conception of a Goodness that is absolutely omnipotent. While insisting that the highest kind of goodness is the goodness which finds its occasion and manifestation in struggle, this hypothesis implicitly denies this sort of goodness to *God*; but if we say that God enters genuinely into the experience of struggle, then this difference between the sort of goodness ascribed to God and the ideal goodness of man disappears, and all men of good will have a powerful motive for action in the thought that, in engaging in the struggle, they are co-operating with, and imitating, God himself.

If, now, it be objected that the doctrine of a finite God gives us no assurance of *victory* in the contest with evil, two things ought to be said in reply: (1) If the omnipotence theory, as is maintained, gives us the assurance of victory, it at the same time takes away all meaning from the idea of victory; for, if evil is a necessary condition of the good, then evil must always exist as it exists now, and the notion of an eventual overcoming of evil is an illusion. And (2) it is at least as easy to believe in the existence of a Good Will which, while not infinite in power, still possesses *sufficient* power to assure the ultimate salvation of the world, as it is to believe in a Good Will that is omnipotent. It is, of course, true, as has been pointed by critics of Mr Wells,[1] that the finite God has failed to take a hand in human affairs at various times of crisis when he might perhaps have been expected to do so. Men complain that God has not revealed a "cure for cancer"; that he has not in critical moments of history at least whispered counsels of wisdom and love into the ears of impressionable

[1] For example, by Mr William Archer, *God and Mr Wells*, 1917.

men. It is undeniable that these things constitute an intellectual difficulty for the doctrine of a finite God. But the difficulty is even more serious for the doctrine of omnipotent goodness; for the believer in the finite God may always reply to such objections that God has not done thus and so for the simple reason that he *could* not; or, at least, that he could not without hindering the achievement of his greater purposes.

II.

The dualist hypothesis is, then, more satisfactory than its rival, both as a theory in accordance with which to explain the facts of experience, and as a philosophy of everyday life. As I have already remarked, however, there is danger lest the general doctrine be rejected, not on account of its own demerits, but by reason of doctrines associated with it by some of its recent defenders.

Thus Mr Wells manifests a curious atavistic preference for the analogy of *kingship* rather than that of *fatherhood* in describing his conception of God. This is, of course, only a personal idiosyncrasy, and not a necessary part of the doctrine. Mr Wells assumes that when the Christian speaks of a Heavenly Father he is necessarily thinking of the First Person of the Trinity. As a matter of fact, when the average Christian prays, "Our Father, who art in heaven," the Person whom he is addressing resembles Mr Wells's "God in our hearts" much more than he does the "Veiled Being" or the "Father" of Nicene orthodoxy. More important points of Mr Wells's doctrine which do not seem to be logically implied by the doctrine of a finite God are these: (1) his conception of the portion or portions of reality not included in or controlled by the finite God as a "Veiled Being"; and (2) his description of God as a "synthesis" of the worthy elements of humanity.

1. The theological dualist need not approve the suggestion of *personification* contained in the notion of the "Veiled Being." Having broken with the monistic tradition in differentiating between the "God of the heart" and the "Veiled Being," there is no need to assume that this Veiled Being, that is to say, the universe as distinguished from the finite God, is *one*. In this residual portion of reality, for aught we know, there may be *beings*, but no Being. The circumstance that the monistic prejudice has found expression in the convenient word "universe" is, of course, no justification of that prejudice. If, however, we make the monistic assumption, and if we make the further assumption that the

ultimate One is a Person, then the sense of mystery presses on us, and the notion of a "veil" becomes pertinent. But the mystery is really created by our assumptions. In other words, it is only when we allow ourselves to assume that the irrationalities and ethical enormities of existence are *intended*, or consciously willed, by someone that the world becomes a mystery.

But there is no necessity for supposing that every event or particular change of relation is intended. Watch a labourer as he loads sand upon a wagon. Two grains of sand may be side by side in the bank from which they are taken, but may find their way to opposite ends of the box of the wagon, or *vice versa*. The labourer intended to throw the shovelful of sand on the wagon; but he did not intend that any particular grain should be thrown to any particular place, or that one of any two given grains should be farther forward or to one side than the other. Thus, even within a purposive event—the motion of the shovelful of sand—we have a multitude of non-purposive events—the definite motions of the particular grains. Not only is it thus possible to think of unintended events which are included within, or associated with, an intended event, but we can conceive of events which are absolutely unintended. Observe also that the conceivability of unintended events does not imply *indeterminism*. An undetermined event is, of course, unintended; but an unintended event, for example the particular motion of one of our grains, need not be undetermined.

If events are not intended, there need be no mystery about them; they simply *occur*; just as *being* is not mysterious, but simply *is*; for there is no necessity for assuming any "ultimate of existence," any Reality behind the particular reals of the universe. Mr Wells himself tells us that it is not necessary to think of the "Veiled Being" as either "benevolent or malignant." I should like to add that it is not necessary to think of it as *a Being*, since the portion of reality which is *not God* need not be regarded as a unity; nor yet as *veiled*, inasmuch as there is no *a priori* reason for believing that our knowledge of this residual part of reality is any less (in proportion to what is to be known) than that of ourselves or of the "God of the heart."

2. While affirming that his God is a genuine person, Mr Wells describes him as intimately bound up with the life of humanity. He is the "undying human memory, the increasing human will." He is that "greater being of the species, that vine, of which we are the branches." He is

the "soul of the species, many faceted indeed, . . . nevertheless a soul like our own." Many passages of a similar import might be quoted, in which, after making all possible allowance for metaphor and rhapsody, we seem to be told that the God of Mr Wells is to be considered as in some sense including, and, indeed, as constituted by, the worthy elements of humanity.

Thus interpreted, the conception bears a certain degree of resemblance to that of the monistic Absolute. The Absolute, too, is a Person who includes, and is constituted by, elements that belong to the constitution of other persons. Unlike the "God of the heart," however, the Absolute is *all*-inclusive. A brief reference to some of the difficulties in the conception of the Absolute may help us to form an opinion as to the logical possibility or impossibility of Mr Wells's God. In his recent presidential address on "Some Conditions of Progress in Philosophical Inquiry," Professor Lovejoy has pointed out that Royce's Absolute depends for its logical possibility upon an affirmative answer to each of the following questions: (1) "Is the compounding, without loss or alteration, of many individuated or personal experiences, having 'centres' of their own, into a single comprehensive personal experience, conceivable?" (2) "Is the literal inclusion of a genuine temporal succession in a non-successive total conceivable without contradiction?" and (3) "Is an actually realised or presented infinite aggregate conceivable without contradiction?"[1]

Now Mr Wells's conception has the advantage over that of Royce that it does not involve the two last of these three logical difficulties. His God is finite, and enjoys a genuine temporal experience. But the first difficulty remains. From one point of view, it is true, even this difficulty is less serious in the case of the finite God than in that of the Absolute. For the Absolute is supposed to have even such experiences as fear and curiosity, which, in fact, are conditioned by the very limitation of the mind that has them. Nevertheless, the general difficulty of the "compounding of consciousness" remains. And the illustrations which Mr Wells adduces of syntheses which are more than mere aggregates do not seem to me to relieve the difficulty. In all the cases to which he refers us the *essentia* of the synthesis is a peculiar kind of *organisation*. It is this that differentiates the temple, the man, the regiment, or England, from its constituents. And it is precisely the conceivability of the sort of organisation of personal elements which would be required to constitute a "synthetic person" that is very doubtful.

[1] *Do We Need a New Idea of God?* p. 79.

Here, again, Mr Wells encumbers the general dualistic view with a conception which is no necessary part of it. For the theological dualist may hold to the existence of a divine Person who is as separate and distinct from men as each one of us is from every other.

III.

Turning now to the work of Mr Reeman, it seems important in his case also to disentangle the principal thesis —that God is not omnipotent, and therefore takes a genuine part in the struggle for the good—from certain views with which he has associated it. Mr Reeman's purpose in writing his book is to re-establish the power of religion by re-defining the conception of Deity. In this transformation of the idea of God, although the author himself does not always keep them distinct, two main elements seem distinguishable. In the first place, he argues against the doctrine of omnipotence, as we have already seen, and insists that in a world such as ours no perfectly good will can be all-powerful; in the second place, he argues against the conception of a "transcendent" God, of a God who "intervenes," and contends for the doctrine of the "divine immanence," for the conception of a God who in some sense (but here his treatment is vague to the point of bewilderment) is *one* with man and with the universe.

In concluding that God is immanent rather than transcendent, Mr Reeman is influenced by two logical motives. One of these is the analogy of political democracy. Again and again he recurs to the point that our idea of God must be formulated in the light of the "democratic outreach." "Challenge the theory of the divine right of kings," he says, "and at one and the same time you challenge the whole fundamental monarchic conception, whether applied to God or to man. . . . It follows that the American nation and constitution is history's most tremendous challenge to the thought of God as Almighty King." This argument, if valid, would of course bear with equal force against the conception of a transcendent heavenly Father. But is the argument valid? I cannot think it so. For, in the first place, it appears curiously arbitrary to reason from political to theological democracy, as Mr Reeman has done. Why, indeed, should our theology follow our politics? In the second place, Mr Reeman has not sufficiently considered the rôle of the *leader* and the expert even in a democracy. Democracy does not dispense with "rulers" and "guides," but

merely insists upon choosing them wherever they may be found, instead of accepting such as are provided by birth. In other words, there is no reason to believe that democracy will ever dispense with the *executive.*

The other logical motive for Mr Reeman's insistence that God must be thought of as immanent is his sympathy with modern science. Again and again he assails the notion of a divine being who *intervenes.* Science, he affirms, has left no room for the activity of such a being. Mr Reeman finds his immanent Deity by identifying God with the "Life-Force." "There is good evidence," he tells us, "for assuming the existence back of all phenomena of a universal Life-Force which is the inner essence of all evolving life. . . . This universal Life-Force is presumably the actuality men have in mind when they speak of God."[1]

Curiously enough, Mr Wells, too, has a section on the Life-Force; but his dictum is that "the Life-Force is not God." And, as it seems to me, we must recognise serious difficulties in the doctrine that God is the Life-Force. First of all, there are familiar objections against hypostatising the notion of *force.* Karl Pearson, for example, insists that a force is not an objective entity, but merely "an arbitrary conceptual measure of motion."[2] Furthermore, one desires to know, supposing the Life-Force to be an objectively real somewhat, whether it is to be conceived as a *person.* For many philosophers have maintained that the will or *élan* behind phenomena need not be regarded as conscious; that the purposiveness of the world may be thought of after the analogy of instinct rather than of rational contrivance. Mr Reeman, however, gives us no light on this point.

If, now, we permit our author to ignore these initial difficulties, a further question presses for an answer. How much is to be included in the Life-Force? There are some sentences in which it seems to be the sum of all the energies of the universe—to be equivalent to Spencer's "infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed"; and Mr Reeman's idea of God would be identical with that of John Fiske. Again, the term *Life*-Force would itself suggest a limitation of the concept to the forces which make for the production of living organisms, in contradistinction from forces such as gravity or chemical attraction, which are operative also in the inanimate realm. Once more, certain passages of the book imply that the Life-Force is neither the sum of all forces, nor yet the sum

[1] *Do We Need a New Idea of God?* p. 104.
[2] *Grammar of Science,* 1911, p. 332.

of all the forces which produce *life*, but rather the force which produces the *good* of life or of the universe.

This last meaning of Life-Force is required by all these passages which speak of a *struggle* in which God takes part. For if the term were understood in the first sense, the struggle would be a civil war. The Life-Force would be divided against itself, and could not be said to take sides. If the term be understood in the second sense, as the sum of all the forces which produce life, the notion of a struggle does indeed become significant; for one may then think of a struggle between life and the inanimate universe—a struggle in which the goal of the Life-Force might be that conjectured by Lester F. Ward: namely, to change as large an amount of matter as possible from the inanimate to the animate and organised form.[1] Thus we might have a genuine struggle of the Life-Force against its inanimate environment—of the Bergsonian *élan vital* against "inert matter." But this, I take it, is hardly the sort of struggle which Mr Reeman has in mind. His God is a God who is interested, not only in life, but in a worthy life. Among other things, his God is interested in Democracy. But, if we think of the Life-Force as the sum-totality of all the forces that are producing life, we are confronted by the difficulty that this Life-Force produces the bacilli of tuberculosis as well as the beneficent forms of life; it produces Napoleons as well as Washingtons. In fine, if the Life-Force is to be the God of the struggle, and if the struggle is to be conceived in ethical terms, then by the Life-Force we can mean only those impulses, desires, tendencies, urges, or out-reaches (whichever name we prefer) which make for the accomplishment of good ends. Thus interpreted, Mr Reeman's God is very similar to the God of Mr Wells, except that Mr Reeman leaves open a possibility that Mr Wells seems to ignore—the possibility that Good Will may be wider than humanity.

IV.

A word in regard to terminology may here be in order. For the most part, in deference to established usage, I have used the term "dualism" to denote the doctrine defended in this article. Unfortunately, to many minds the word "dualism" will suggest a parallelism of good and evil principles or persons, and may therefore be misleading. Accordingly, I have now and then made use of the phrase "theological finitism" as an alternative expression. For if, following the example of

[1] *Pure Sociology*, p. 114.

William James, we speak of our doctrine as the doctrine of a "finite God," the question of the nature of the rest of the universe is left open. We may then think of the Other which resists the good in the cosmic struggle as an Ahriman or otherwise-named personal spirit of evil; or, as a Will that is from our point of view neither good nor bad; or, we may hold that the events not controlled by good will are simply not intended occurrences; or, finally, to mention a view suggested by Mr Archer, we may prefer to combine the two last theories, and to assume the existence both of an original matter and of an "Elder Power," who is the author of consciousness but not of matter. Again, the finite God may be further defined as a Person; or "God" may be a name for all that is good in humanity; or we may simply mean by "God" the Good Will of the Universe, leaving it undecided whether there is good will other than, or higher than, human.

No doubt the idea of a God who is finite will seem paradoxical and unsatisfying to many minds, who have enjoyed the emotional reverberations aroused by the notions of *infinity* and *omnipotence*; but this emotional loss will be more than offset by the superior religious and practical value of the idea of a God who genuinely takes part in the temporal business and moral struggle of mankind.

R. H. DOTTERER.

THE BOOK OF JONAH.

Sir PHILIP MAGNUS, Bt., M.P.

Few parts of the Biblical canon have been the subject of more diverse criticism than the four chapters that form the Book of Jonah. The reasons are not far to seek. It touches many facts in history without having any strong claim to be historical; it is included among the prophetical writings without containing anything in the nature of a prophecy; whilst the narrative is closely connected with an incident which defies any rational explanation, and is assumed by many commentators to have some deeply hidden meaning.

The criticism to which the book has been subjected centres round such questions as the date of its composition, the personality of its chief figure, the position and circumstances of the threatened city, and the miracle of the fish. The book differs also from other prophetic books included in the canon, in that it describes incidents in the life of Jonah whilst affording no indication of its having been written by Jonah himself.

The most interesting chapter of the book is undoubtedly the second chapter, which contains a psalm or prayer of a highly religious character, and the legend of the fish that swallowed Jonah; and it is in connection with that legend or miracle that the book is best known to the ordinary reader. Indeed, one cannot think of the book without having in one's mind the remarkable fate that overtook Jonah after he had been thrown into the sea. The book, however, apart from the story, is full of historical interest in connection with the mission of Jonah and with what is now known of the city of Nineveh.

In the comments I venture to offer on some of the many matters of controversy which the book suggests, I must disclaim any direct acquaintance with original sources of

information on the subjects referred to in the book. My reading has been limited to some of the more recent commentaries of scholars who have published in separate books, or as articles in biblical and other cyclopædias, the results of their researches. My information, therefore, is distinctly second-hand. It has, however, seemed to me desirable as introductory to my comments, which deal more particularly with the contents of Chapter II., to refer generally to the apparent aim and purpose of the book and to some of its historical allusions, in order that my criticism of that chapter may be the better understood.

As regards the personality of Jonah, the only other place where his name is mentioned is in the Second Book of Kings (xiv. 25), where, as in the book that bears his name, he is described as a prophet, the son of Amittai of Gath-hepher in Zebulun. There can be little doubt that the hero of the Book of Jonah is identical with the prophet of the Second Book of Kings. It would seem that it was a part of Jonah's mission, as indeed of that of other prophets, to warn the people of the consequences of wrong-doing, and further to foretell the punishment which would befall them if they failed to return from their evil ways. The Book of Jonah opens with the divine command that he should pronounce a decree against the people of Nineveh, a command which conflicted with his conscientious disbelief in the fulfilment of that decree. He appears to have been morally convinced that events would falsify his predictions of evil, and that if he obeyed the summons he had received, his reputation as a true prophet would suffer accordingly. His firm faith in the divine mercy, in the permanence of good, and in the sure recovery of mankind from transient phases of wrong-doing stood in his way, and made him an unwilling messenger of misfortune, inclining him to prefer even death to the painful duty of prophesying evil tidings which he could not possibly bring himself to believe would ever come to pass. It is only so that we can explain his reluctance, as indicated by the author of the book, to obey the call to prophesy against Nineveh, and his attempt to flee from the presence of the Lord which was supposed to be specially manifested in the Holy City.

This ancient belief in God's presence being manifested more directly in Jerusalem than elsewhere explains the deep-seated attachment of the Jewish people to the city, a loyalty which through many centuries was closely associated with the practice of their religion. Around the city all the great battles of the

Judæans were fought. The Temple was long regarded as exclusively the habitation of the Lord. As stated in the Second Book of Chronicles (iii. 11), the place chosen by Solomon for the erection of the Temple was Mount Moriah, "where the Lord appeared unto David his father." The close connection of God's presence with the Temple is explicitly stated in Solomon's dedicatory prayer: "I have built an house of habitation for thee, and a place for thy dwelling for ever" (2 Chron. vi. 2). Solomon, who was wiser than his people, had a truer idea of God's omnipresence, as is shown in the words: "But will God in very deed dwell with men on the earth? Behold, heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee; how much less this house which I have builded" (*ibid.*, vi. 18). Nevertheless, throughout the whole period of the national life of the Jews, throughout all the vicissitudes of the people's history and the changes that befell the Holy City, the Jews clung to the belief that in Jerusalem especially was manifested the presence of the Lord. Other rival shrines were built at Shechem and at Alexandria; but to none was attached the same sanctity as to the Temple on Mount Moriah. The patriotism of the Jews was not so much a genuine love of country, seeing that Palestine was inhabited by other peoples with whom they were frequently at war, as a fervent and unquenchable religious devotion to the city which was believed to be the dwelling-place of God. This belief was even anticipated in the song of Moses:

> "Thou shalt bring them and plant them in the mountain of thine inheritance,
> The place, O Lord, which thou hast made for thee to dwell in,
> The sanctuary, O Lord, which thy hands have established"
> (Exod. xv. 17),

and the same belief would seem to have been held by the author of the Book of Jonah, although the final chapter of the book indicates a truer conception of God's relation to mankind.

Gradually through the teaching of the prophets, the popular idea of the Divine Being was widened and spiritualised; but the education of the people was a slow process, attended by frequent back-slidings. The loyal and sacred devotion of the people to the city of Jerusalem was not confined to the times of the Bible. It has been maintained through all subsequent ages, and was expressed in the common form of greeting, "Next year in Jerusalem." Even to this day, on the eve of the festival of Passover, which commemorates the delivery of the people from Egypt and their journey through the desert—the birthplace of their religion,—the domestic service read in

orthodox households contains a prayer for the speedy rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem, where divine service according to the old rites and ceremonies may be renewed. It is this that gives such deep significance to the words of the Psalmist: "If I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not Jerusalem to my chief joy" (Ps. cxxxvii. 6), and a fuller meaning to the statement, "And Jonah rose to flee to Tarshish from the presence of the Lord."

Critics are not agreed as to the locality of Tarshish. It was well known for the strength of its ships (Ps. xlviii. 7; Isa. ii. 16). Tarshish is generally supposed to be in Spain. Josephus connects it with Tarsus in Cilicia, whilst others identify it with Carthage.

Jonah's mission as described in the Second Book of Kings was somewhat different from that against Nineveh. Israel at the time therein indicated was in sad straits. During the greater part of the reign of Jeroboam II. idolatry prevailed in the land of Israel, and the king failed to repress it. He had acted unwisely if not sinfully, and, according to the scripture, "the Lord saw the affliction of Israel that it was very bitter" (2 Kings xiv. 26). It would seem that Jonah, whose admonitions and advice had already influenced the king, was sent to remind the people of their evil ways, but at the same time to foretell their deliverance from the enemies who threatened them. The text is not very clear, but sufficiently indicates that, at some time during the reign of Jeroboam, Israel was saved and the kingdom was raised to a degree of prosperity to which it never subsequently attained.

It is significant that the word Jonah (יונה) is the Hebrew for "a dove," and the name may have had some reference to the prophet's love of peace; and the fact that he is stated to be the son of Amittai directs our attention to the word אמת (*emet*), *Truth*, and suggests that he belonged to that band of prophets on whose vaticination full reliance could be placed, and that, as a prophet of truth, he was the more deeply distressed at being called upon to make pronouncements, the fulfilment of which he doubted.

As regards the date of the Book of Jonah, it is probable that it was compiled some years after the events which it records. All the evidence goes to show that it was not written by the prophet himself, and in this respect it differs from other prophetic books included in the canon. The reference to Nineveh, however, gives to the book a historical significance, and helps to fix a date to Jonah's mission.

Whatever view we may take as to the historical value of

the contents of the book, the researches of Layard and others have brought to light many facts concerning the ancient city of Nineveh, which fills so important a place in the narrative. It is now generally accepted that the Nineveh described in the book occupied an extensive site in the triangle between the river Tigris and the Upper Zab, opposite the modern city, Mosul, situated about 200 miles north of Baghdad. The site of the city was first fixed in 1820, and in 1845 Layard began his extensive work of exploration. As a result of his researches it is now known that the city proper did not occupy more than three square miles; but the city described by Jonah as a "great city," the circumference, or more likely the diameter, of which was a "three days' journey," included within its boundaries several villages or suburbs. This explains the reference in the book to the large number of inhabitants, many of whom were ignorant peasants, not knowing their right hand from their left; as also the allusion to the herds of cattle which would have fed on the pasture-land surrounding these smaller towns and villages. The prophet Nahum, who lived about the year 714 B.C., has well described the glory of the city and the terrible straits to which it was soon to be reduced. He speaks of its merchants who "were more numerous than the stars of heaven"; and no description could be more graphic than his picture of the city preparing for the coming siege: "The chariots rage in the streets, they jostle one against another in the broad ways: their appearance is like torches, they run like the lightnings" (Nah. ii. 4)—a description that might have been written of the traffic in the streets of many a modern city nearer home.

Nineveh is mentioned in an inscription of a king of Lagash in Babylonia as early as 2900 B.C., and this fact is of interest as showing that there existed a Babylonian colony in Assyria at a very early date. For many years Nineveh was the residential city of the kings of Assyria, of which country it was the capital about the year 1700 B.C. It did not, however, permanently remain the capital. It had rivals in Asshur and in other cities which, during many centuries, shared that distinction. The glories of Nineveh were temporarily revived by Sennacherib about 700 B.C., and the city was destroyed by fire in the year 607 B.C., after the complete overthrow of the Assyrian power in the year 625 B.C. These dates, therefore, may be taken as subsequent to the events described in the Book of Jonah. Indeed, according to Layard, the king of Nineveh mentioned in the book was Pul, who lived somewhere about 750 B.C., or 150 years before the city was finally

destroyed. Kalisch, in his comprehensive and detailed commentary on the book,[1] states that "Nineveh still existed and flourished for 200 years or more after the days of the prophet."

It is noteworthy that the proper names in the Book of Jonah seem to have some connection with the contents. I have already referred to the meaning of the words Jonah and Amittai. It may be a little far-fetched, but the name of the city itself might be said to have some reference to the events described. It is supposed to be related to the Aramaic word *nuna*, the equivalent of the Hebrew word *dag*, signifying "fish." The connection may be accidental or the derivation may be incorrect; but it is quite possible that the whole story is coloured by the meaning of the proper names concerned. If so, it would only be in consonance with many other Biblical narratives.

The questions asked of Jonah by the shipmaster when the storm raged and "the ship was like to be broken": "What is thy country? of what people art thou?" were answered by Jonah in the significant words: "I am a Hebrew, and I fear the Lord, the God of heaven, which hath made the sea and the dry land." Thus simply, Jonah stated his nationality and the God he worshipped—his citizenship and his religion. Henderson,[2] in his interesting preface to the Book of Jonah, explains that as Gath-hepher, "a city of the tribe of Zebulun," is the birthplace of the prophet, "Jonah was an Israelite and not a Jew." This distinction is interesting, for it is clear that Henderson understood by the term "Jew" a native of Judæa, as he could not have supposed that Jonah's religion differed from that of other Israelites. Indeed, it is a fact that in ancient times there existed no distinctive term to indicate the religion of the people of any country in which the State religion was that of the great majority of the inhabitants. This was the case in ancient Greece and Rome and Egypt. Munk,[3] writing of the work of the prophet Samuel, refers to "La religion Mosaïque"—a descriptive term which aptly applies to the religion of the Jews. Throughout their history, however, during the entire period when they constituted a nation, the word "Jew" connoted both nationality and religion. It was only after the return of a section of the people from their captivity in Babylon that the distinction assumed importance. The late Dean Stanley, in his ***History***

[1] *Bible Studies*, part ii. (Longmans.)

[2] *The Twelve Minor Prophets, with a Commentary*, by E. Henderson, D.D. (Hamilton & Co., 1845.)

[3] *Palestine*, p. 257.

of the Jewish Church, points out that after the return, "as the ancient name of 'Hebrew' had given way to the historical name of 'Israel,' so that of Israel gave way to that of Judæan or Jew, . . . and their history henceforth is the history not of Israel but of Judaism."[1] This is true. Even the term "Judæan" ceased to be synonymous with that of "Jew" in its religious sense, seeing that many heathens inhabited Judæa, and that in other parts of Palestine, as also in Babylonia, in Egypt, and elsewhere, numbers of persons had been born and lived who held fast to the Jewish religion. The term "Judæan" can now have no other significance than that of a native of Judæa to whatever form of faith he may belong. It is owing largely to the failure to recognise that the term "Jew" has for many centuries ceased to have a double connotation, and indicates a religious distinction and nothing more, that citizens of the Jewish faith, born and resident in different parts of the world, have been regarded as aliens, and have experienced difficulty in securing for themselves equal rights and privileges with their fellow-citizens. It was the prophet Jeremiah who had given to the families exiled in Babylon the exhortation: "Seek the peace of the city whither ye have been carried away captives"; and the Talmudic teacher Samuel, who taught in Babylonia some seventeen centuries ago,[2] had laid it down as a precept, binding on all Jews throughout all time, that the law of the land where they lived was as binding on them as their own law. Indeed, it was he who first transformed the exhortation of Jeremiah into the religious precept: "The law of the State is a binding law," and thus gave a religious sanction to obedience to the law of the land in which Jews lived and worked. It is of great interest, therefore, that Jonah, in his answer to the shipmaster, so clearly distinguished between his religion and his nationality.

I have now to consider the miraculous events described in the opening and closing verses of Chapter II. of the Hebrew text. The incident here described has given to the book its main interest, and has made the fate of Jonah and the whole episode a household word. Indeed, the Book of Jonah which, apart from its story of the fish, is of some historical interest and contains many moral lessons, is generally, I might almost

[1] Vol. iii. p. 91.

[2] This teacher, known also as Mar-Samuel, added much to the then existing knowledge of medicine and astronomy. Educated in Judæa, his home was in Nahardea, and it was he who said "that he was as well acquainted with the ways of the heavens as with the streets of Nahardea" (Graetz, *History of the Jews*, vol. ii. p. 526).

say universally, associated with this wonderful legend. During many centuries the commentators of this book have tried to explain the miracle of Jonah remaining in the belly of a fish for three days and three nights, and of escaping alive therefrom. The explanations have been numerous and varied. Many Jewish writers regard the story as an allegory, and the entire book as a Midrash; and it has been suggested that the book is a section from the Midrash of the Book of Kings mentioned in 2 Chron. xxiv. 27. We are even told by some commentators that the particular fish that swallowed Jonah was created at the beginning of the world for the express purpose which it fulfilled; and among the many attempts that have been made to explain the inexplicable, it has been declared that the fish had so large a mouth and throat that Jonah experienced no difficulty in passing in and out. Other commentators of a more rationalistic turn of mind, in their endeavour to prove the possibility of every detail of the narrative, have stated, as a zoological fact, that certain sharks exist which are known to be able to devour a man whole. But even that statement hardly suffices to explain the sequel —that Jonah was vomited forth alive from the monster's jaws after three days' residence in its inward parts. Very many Christian commentators, in a truly religious spirit, accept the story as evidence of a miracle which does not require nor admit of explanation. Some see in it a symbol and token of resurrection and immortality. We read in the Gospel of St Matthew that "As Jonah was three days and three nights in the whale's belly, so shall the Son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth." Luther, on the other hand, openly doubts the possibility of the story, and regards it as fiction or a fairy tale. Many Greek legends are quoted as the foundation on which the Hebrew writer built up his story. Some analogy is even suggested between the story of Jonah and of Elijah, as given in 1 Kings xix., who, resting under the shade of a juniper tree, cried aloud, "It is enough; now, O Lord, take my life," and who afterwards fasted on Mount Horeb forty days and nights.

These are but a few instances of the varied explanations which have been offered by different critics of Jonah's miraculous history.

Apart from the difficulty of suggesting any rational explanation of this episode in Jonah's life, we are confronted with the further difficulty of reconciling the legend as a whole with the words of the psalm which forms so large a part of the second chapter of the book. As a fact, they cannot be reconciled.

Some critics, accordingly, have not hesitated to assert that the entire psalm, including verses 3 to 10, is a late addition to the original text. Others endeavour to connect the psalm more closely with the story by transposing some of the verses. For instance, we are told that verse 1 of the Hebrew text, "Then Jonah prayed unto the Lord God out of the fish's belly," was originally followed by the last verse, "And the Lord spake unto the fish, and it vomited out Jonah upon the dry land." The apparent contradiction of verse 6, in which Jonah cries, "The waters compassed me about, . . . the weeds were wrapped about my head," with his position at the time within the body of the fish, as indicated in verse 1, is thus in part avoided, by proposing that the prayer should follow and not precede the verse describing deliverance.

Many critics admit that extraneous matters had been added at various times, and to this opinion I incline.

Dr Karl Budde, the author of the article on this subject in the *Jewish Cyclopædia,* clearly states that "the popular story suggests that extraneous matter had been added here, or that such additions were transferred from the Massoretic text from MSS. going more and more into detail." He further says: "The psalm was in any case added to the original composition later." No sufficient evidence is adduced for this statement; and whilst admitting that additions have been made, I am not prepared to accept the conclusion that the psalm is out of place, or that it does not form part of the original text.

The explanation of the miracle of the fish is not the only part of the narrative that troubles the critics. There is also the difficulty of the proclamation of the king published through Nineveh saying: "Let neither man nor beast, herd nor flock, taste anything; let them not feed, nor drink water: but let man and beast be covered with sackcloth, and cry mightily unto God." Why expect the beasts of the field, innocent as they must be of man's wrong-doing, to abstain from food and to be clad in sackcloth? This close association of man and beast in the penitential decree does not strike me as being necessarily more than the hyperbolic expression of the urgent necessity of universal repentance, and of the return of all wrong-doers from their evil ways. The inclusion of the animal world in some of the laws relating to man is not out of harmony with the general spirit of many biblical enactments, as seen in the commandments and in other ordinances of the Mosaic code.

I need scarcely say the incident of the gourd has not escaped criticism. Opinions differ as to the particular plant to which the Hebrew word "kikayon" refers. The LXX and Syriac versions favour the translation "gourd," and Niebuhr observes that the Jews and Christians of the town of Mosul, which stands opposite the site of ancient Nineveh, maintain that the tree was a sort of gourd. Others assert that it was the *ricinus* or *castor-oil* plant, the leaves of which are known to be very large, and they refer, in confirmation of this view, to the kik-oil (שמן קיק) (*shemen kik*) prepared from the seeds of the ricinus. There is no known plant which possesses the exact properties assigned to the kikayon; but some allowance must be made for poetic licence, so long as the idea conveyed is not in itself absurd, or does not conflict too obviously with common experience. There are commentators who meet this difficulty by suggesting that the mention of the "gourd" is a later interpolation, and solve it by asserting that the verses referring to the sudden growth and decay of the plant should be omitted from the book. But the failure to explain a difficult passage is rarely obviated by the suggestion to omit it, and such criticism carries no weight unless it can be shown that the passage is altogether out of harmony with the context, and that the narrative in no way suffers, but is distinctly improved and made more coherent, by the omission.

No one can have studied, even cursorily, the numerous commentaries on the contents of this book by learned Christian and Jewish writers, without realising that the legend of the fish has been generally accepted as an essential part of the narrative. In this admission the critics are in agreement with the ordinary reader. Indeed, of such absorbing importance is the legend, that in the words of a very recent writer,[1] it might almost be said, "that the sea-monster swallowed the commentators as well as the prophet." It is, however, on this generally accepted view that I desire to comment. It is admitted by nearly all critics that the book was written long after the principal event described, viz. the fall of Nineveh; that much extraneous matter has been added at different times; that the whole atmosphere of the book is distinctly legendary. But so far as I have been able to discover, none of the commentators, certainly none of those whom I have been able to consult, has suggested that the story of the fish has been one of these later additions. It

[1] *The Literature of the Old Testament*, Dr G. T. Mason.

has, however, been suggested by certain German critics that the author of the book, in framing his narrative, was prompted by the words of the hymn to introduce the incident of the great fish.[1]

Great ingenuity has been shown in the endeavour to reconcile the psalm and prayer of Chapter II. with the legend of the fish, on which it is generally thought that the entire narrative hinges. Some writers, as I have stated, propose to vary the sequence of the verses; others, recognising that parts of the psalm cannot be reconciled with what they regard as the main incident of the book, boldly propose to omit it. Others, again, accepting the story as evidence of a divine miracle, see in it prophetic allusions of deep religious meaning. But none, so far as I have discovered, has ventured to contend that the purpose of the book is rendered more intelligible; that its moral and religious lessons are brought into clearer light; or that, as a consecutive narrative of events, it is complete, if all reference to the legend of the fish is omitted from its pages. Nevertheless, it will, I think, be seen, that by accepting the theory that the incident of the fish is part of the extraneous matter, added at a later date by some scribe, eager to offer his own explanation of Jonah's escape from drowning, the main difficulties of interpretation which have perplexed so many learned critics are removed. That the legend of the fish formed no part of the original text, and is in no way essential to the full understanding of the sequence of events to which the book refers, offers, in my opinion, the best explanation of the difficulty that has baffled the efforts of so many wise men to solve.

The internal evidence supports this view. The Book of Jonah consists of four chapters and contains forty-eight verses. Of these forty-eight verses, the story of the fish occupies less than *three*, and is baldly stated in twenty-five Hebrew words. If we omit these words, no variation is needed in the sequence of the verses of the psalm; there is no real break in the history, no void which the least intelligent of readers is unable to supply. On the other hand, by the omission of these words, many of the difficulties and apparent inconsistencies which critics have failed to explain are at once removed, and the moral and religious lessons which the book suggests, fully justifying its inclusion in the biblical canon, stand out far more clearly when freed from the disturbing effect of the suggested miracle, which makes so large a claim on the reader's limited capacity of belief.

[1] Kalisch, *Bible Studies*, part ii.

The references to the legend of the fish are found in Chapter II., verse 1, of the Hebrew text, corresponding to verse 17, Chapter I., of the English authorised version; in the next succeeding verse; and in the final verse of Chapter II. in both texts.

If we omit the twenty-five words to which I have referred, the text then reads as follows:—

> "So they took up Jonah, and cast him forth into the sea; and the sea ceased from her raging.
> "Then the men feared the Lord exceedingly, and offered a sacrifice unto the Lord and made vows."
> "And Jonah prayed unto the Lord his God and said: I cried out of mine affliction unto the Lord, and he heard me. From the depth of the abyss I cried, and thou didst hear my voice.
> "For thou hadst cast me into the deep, in the heart of the seas; and the stream surrounded me; all thy billows and thy waves passed over me," . . . and so on.

It should be noted that the word מבטן (*mibbeten*), which the English version renders "from the belly," used in connection with שאול, "the abyss," is more correctly translated "from the depths." The word has a much wider significance than "belly," and is not used, as may be seen, for the belly of the fish in what I regard as the interpolated passage. The scribe who, according to my contention, inserted in the text the story of the fish, used the more familiar and distinctive word במעי (*bim'e*), which, in the plural number, as found in the text, has a special anatomical significance equivalent to the *bowels* or *inward paths*, as, for instance, in Psalm lxxi. 6, ממעי אמי (*mimm'e immi*). The fact that the Hebrew word employed in the story in reference to the fish is not the same as that found in the passage from the prayer, although identically translated, seems to corroborate the view here expressed as to the extraneous origin of the story. I may further point out that the word מעא in the singular, as the equivalent of בטן, does not occur in the Hebrew Bible, although it may be found in the Aramaic version. Rashi, in his commentary, clinging to the authenticity of the legend, and in order to make the meaning clearer, adds the words, מבטן הדג כשאול לי, "From the belly of the fish which was like Sheol (or Hades) to me."

The more thoroughly we examine the wording of the prayer or psalm in Chapter II. of the book, the more proofs multiply in support of the criticism I am offering.

As a song of thanksgiving uttered by a man who, after having been thrown into the sea, was cast ashore alive, no words could express in more picturesque or descriptive

language the painful experience of the sufferer, nor the terrible position from which he had been delivered. The psalm, as already stated, does not contain a single word suggestive of the legend that Jonah was swallowed by a fish. On the other hand, it is replete with words and phrases which are wholly inconsistent with such a fable. Consider verse 5:

> "The waters compassed me about even to the soul: the depths surrounded me, weeds were wrapped about my head."

Such words are unintelligible if supposed to be uttered by a man from the inside of an animal. They are the vivid expression of the sensations of one who, when the waves had passed over him, when his soul fainted within him, before losing consciousness, had cried unto the Lord and was rescued.

"My prayer came unto thee, unto thy holy temple," he exclaims; and as he shakes himself free from the water and the weeds, his heart brimming over with gratitude, he declares:

> "I will sacrifice to thee with the voice of thanksgiving; I will pay that which I have vowed. Salvation is of the Lord."

So ended Jonah's hymn of praise and prayer when, still mindful of his sufferings, he found himself on the dry land.

It may be urged that the story of the fish fills a certain hiatus between the act of the mariners in throwing Jonah into the sea and his being cast upon the shore alive, and affords the missing explanation of the manner of his deliverance. So it does. It was because a blank appeared to be left in the original text that an imaginative scribe saw his opportunity of inventing a miraculous story to connect more closely Chapters I. and II. of the book. But was it necessary? The boatmen were evidently not far from the shore when they cast out Jonah. "They rowed hard," we are told, "to reach the dry land," which must certainly have been in sight, "but they could not." The surf was too strong for them. But it was by no means impossible for a man struggling in the waters to be washed ashore by the force of the waves that surrounded him. Jonah's prayer:

> "I cried by reason of my affliction unto the Lord, and he heard me;
> Out of the depths of the abyss I called, and thou didst hear my voice,"

tells its own tale of deliverance. It is to no intervention of a material fish, but to the spiritual influence of his God, that he ascribes his rescue. To God, and to God alone, he tendered thanks.

> "I went down to the bottom of the mountains" (he cried),
> "Yet, hast thou brought up my life from corruption, O Lord my God."

And then he concludes this deeply religious song of prayer and praise and gratitude with the expression of his unbroken belief: "Salvation is of the Lord."

Read in connection with this psalm, everyone must realise how incongruous and childlike appears this prosaic story of the fish, and how ill it accords with the piety and religious fervour of Jonah's prayer. The legend, by its concrete presentation and sheer incredibility, diverts our thoughts from the consideration of the high moral character of Jonah, who, as a prophet of truth, had the courage and the honesty to confess to the shipmaster who questioned him, that he had fled before the Lord, because his inclination conflicted with his duty, and that it was on his account that the storm had broken upon the ship with such destructive fury.

My criticism, if correct, would completely dissociate the fable of the fish from the contents of a book which is replete with moral lessons of the highest value. It removes many difficulties which everyone must recognise, and which scores of commentators in all ages have endeavoured, in different ways, to explain. It effectually disposes of such crude attempts at reconciliation of conflicting passages as those of the critics who would eliminate from the book the exquisite psalm in Chapter II., which gives to the work its great religious value. I feel certain that, whenever and wherever this prophetic work is read aloud in any place of worship, the lessons it suggests would gain in impressiveness and in their appeal to the worshipper, by omitting the twenty-five words which tell the story of the fish—a legend which, I am convinced, was added at a later period to the original text by some ingenious scribe.

It is no part of my purpose to indicate with any fullness the import of those moral lessons to which I have referred. That is the work of the preacher. Here I would only further draw attention to the far-reaching influence of the Jewish prophet, extending to alien and distant nations.

That Jonah, a prophet of Israel, should have been summoned to preach to the people of Nineveh, a city far removed from the confines of Palestine, and to show to them that the divine mercy extends to all mankind irrespective of race or creed, is in itself a valuable world-lesson pointing to the universality of the religious spirit embodied in the Old Testament.

PHILIP MAGNUS.

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WHAT SHALL WE CALL BEAUTIFUL?

A PRACTICAL VIEW OF ÆSTHETICS.[1]

W. R. LETHABY.

All the questions about sight and delight are extremely difficult. It is a trite truth that we have never really seen a thing—a tree, for instance,—but only partial aspects of many trees. Even these partial aspects are conditioned by our relations in time and space. They are images which arise between the object, tree, and you, the observer. If, for instance, the seasons were hurried up and became a thousand times quicker, we should see our tree bud, spread out its leaves, and fade in an afternoon—it would gush out like a fountain into green and be gone. It is changing all the time now, but we don't see it. Again, if it were magnified several thousand times, its solidity would dissolve into a vague fog form. Its colour, green, is partly in the leaves, partly in the light, but mostly in our eyes. What, apart from our ways of apprehending it, can a tree be, the thing in itself? All we know of it is struck out by the contact of a "thing" and our senses. "Tree" is not objective or subjective.

Turning from such "material" and "tangible" objects to our generalised ideas on the aspects which possess the qualities that we call Beauty, we find that the phenomena are con-

[1] We may best get a general statement on æsthetics from the excellent article in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. In its original Greek form it means what has to do with sense perception as a source of knowledge. Its limitation to that part of our sense perceptions which we know as the contemplative enjoyment of beauty is due to A. G. Baumgarten. . . . By pure contemplation is to be understood that manner of regarding objects of sense perception, and more particularly sights and sounds, which is entirely motived by the pleasure of the act itself. . . . Æsthetic pleasure is pure enjoyment. . . . Æsthetic enjoyment is clearly marked off from practical life. . . . It seeks one or more regulative principles which may help us to distinguish a real from an apparent æsthetic value, and to set the higher and more perfect illustrations of beauty above the lower and less perfect.

ditioned by a great number of still more complex and confusing factors. They involve many questions in regard to what we see, what we think we see, when we see, and who does the seeing. Doubtless the executioner thought of his fine new rack, "That is a beauty"; but what did the executee think?

Beauty, we may at least say, is not objective or subjective: it arises in our contemplation of exciting objects. Mr Clive Bell says that what is common to beautiful works of art is "significant form," but does not sufficiently explain of what the forms are to be significant. Miss Jane Harrison would amend it to emotional, but it is not clear as to who is to feel the emotion or what kind it should be. In London at this minute, who is the instructed and competent observer whom we will trust to tell us about the emotional significance of form?

The best corrective I know to this sort of thing is Mr A. J. Balfour's "Criticism of Beauty," although it seems to me a little disappointing in stopping short of expressing positive views. He makes it clear, however, that what pleases one age and one stage of culture does not necessarily please another, and that at this time there is no agreement between competent observers. Was there ever, indeed, so great anarchy? Mr Balfour a while plays with the subject, and leaves it in the air: he demonstrates that nothing can be proved of beauty; yet nevertheless it moves. Having shown that there is no agreement as to what people think beautiful, a philosopher might at least have made his own attempt to put a valuable content into the word. Not so did Plato conduct his argument in his "Criticism of Justice," and exactly the same treatment might be applied to every valuable word in the dictionary if the philosopher cared. What is Justice? What is Liberty? What is Truth? What is Honour? Honour at least is a notion which is good for Boy Scouts. I foresee a time when we shall have to write every second word in "quotes." At the end, however, Mr Balfour finely says that our admiration should be even as our loves, which I suppose implies that we *should* admire the highest when we see it. Yet he objects that in much of Ruskin's work "æsthetics, theology, and morals are inextricably intertwined," and then admits for himself "some mystical reference to first and final causes." Why, then, was Ruskin wrong in considering the question as a complete man rather than as one who merely wanted his nerves art-tickled?

The æsthetic problem is wrongly set out. To the question, "What gives man æsthetic delight?" there is no general answer. The question must be, "What should give him æsthetic delight here and now?" To which the prompt answer is, "That which

is good for him and for the society in which he lives to think beautiful." That which it is good for people to think Justice *is* Justice. It is as silly and dangerous to set up a theory of enjoyment in art without inquiry as to where it will lead, as to set up a science of the delights of drugs and drams. Plato saw all that. Indeed, this æsthetic of art as enjoyment is as thin as a theory of manners apart from conduct—it is mere superficial etiquette. With its concern with "taste," it is no better than a cookery book. Æsthetic delight in drinks, even in food, is dangerously subject to disease; and unrelated æsthetic delight in art leads straight to the plague and destruction. A nervous, irritated, city-dwelling generation is especially, of course, subject to such æsthetic diseases. Most of our artists are trained in abstract "Art," without any ballasting teaching as to what it is all about. They pass through the forcing-houses of competitive schools and exhibitions, and are maddened by ignorant writers who have to provide penny lines in the halfpenny press. Our men have splendid ability and earnestness, but society, after having trained them for a time, refuses to employ them in any rational way and leaves them to live by their wits. Is there any wonder that art, thus acquired and practised, sometimes turns sour and makes the artist see emerald green?

There is in fact a brown-bread and dewy-morning ideal of beauty, and a late champagne-supper ideal. Who could say which was the right one were it not for Necessity's "You must"? We have to love the health ideal, or cease to exist. Necessity is not only the Mother of Invention, but of all the other children too. At least it is certain that some of the common people must be persuaded that plain food and normal health are beautiful, or we could not carry on; and it is really a mistake of the late-supper gentry to say so much about their raptures. Necessity forces on us the view that—Beauty is the expression of health. There was a Greek proverb quoted by Plato with strong approval thus: "That is, and ever will be, the best of sayings, that *the useful is the noble and the hurtful is the base.*"

We so readily assume that our customs of looking through crowded collections of oil-paintings in paltry gilt frames once a year, and of listening to concert-hall music being "performed" once a month, are in the very nature of the cosmic order, that it may be hard to imagine extensions of æsthetic rapture beyond the orbit of our experience. However, may I put the case for what I will call a Smell Concert? You are to imagine a large domical hall, with circling plush seats

and the "play of lights," palms and all that; then scent fountains gush forth and incense from swaying censers, first thin and fine, then full gales of oriental spicery . . . and so on; fill out the brilliant occasion from the daily press. Would not this be æsthetic? Why should we recoil from it as trivial and enervating, as luxury without life, if the æsthetic account of art-thrills is valid and right?

The whole theory of Fine Art and æsthetic delights apart from purposes and ends had as distinct a historical birth-time as the modern doctrine of the Will to Power. Aristotle, the first of those who knew in physics, was affected in the arts by the current thought of the Hellenistic decadence which, in a slow, lovely decline, had been going on for a century. The art history of his time had been precisely the emergence of a free and luxurious art practised for delight: yet, notwithstanding, it is a marvel how justly and sternly the great master thought on the matter; his one mistake seems to have been to consider free delight in the arts at all. It left just enough room for the flies to settle on. Plato refused to allow any such nonsense.

It is one of Mr Balfour's ideas that the essentials of art can best be studied in music, as there it can most readily be "isolated from utility":—the same old desire of watertighting phenomena; the wish to study the life of the fish out of the water. First, the experts split off "art" from work and utility, and then they split off "fine art" from commoner stuff, and then they are ready for æsthetics, by isolating their emotions of delight. Even the first step, the isolation from work of an element called art, is fatal to both work and art—it is isolating life from the body. It is, I believe, flatly opposed to reason and right that the art which can be most completely isolated from service—this is said to be music—can best be questioned for the constant characteristics of art. Just the reverse is true: first examine facts where art is inseparable from service; there you will find plain data for a just theory in obscurer regions. But is music essentially a free art, any more than the rest? What assumptions philosophers will swallow! Music was developed, as a matter of fact, as an emotional stimulus to practical ends: as work stimulus, war stimulus, religious stimulus, and national stimulus. Is not this "utility"? The obvious fact is that the springs of music are with life, work, and purpose, and this "isolating" of it into a "fine art" has dried the sources up. I was glad later to find that here I had been in agreement with the view expressed by A. Della Seta in his important *Religion and Art* (1914). Don't the connoisseurs

really know that all the music we can hear now is an echo and that Pan is sleeping? Bring back music to noble use; it will quickly revive and we shall have a national art once more.

"Virtue is the strong stem of human nature, and music is the blossoming of virtue" (Confucius).

As with the man who inquired whether he had yet attained wisdom, so with anxiety about enjoying beauty, the answer must ever be, "It might have been, if you had not thought about it." Beauty has to come by the way.

Fine art has been differentiated from what I shall call work-art, less because of its status than because Aristotle, writing at the time when such ideas were being worked out towards their doom, thought that certain arts were free of utility. Architecture was not a "fine art" because it was too much conditioned by needs, Croce, however, is disposed, I think rightly, to deny the old-fashioned distinction altogether.

Fine art equals free art; but even so it is only as free as language, it is not free to be nonsensical or to spread disease. This freer art (I cannot admit free) is best conceived, indeed, as another form of language, and we might almost say that fine art equals speech art. From the beginning (whenever that was) men practised different means of communication. Speech, writing, acting, dancing, music, painting, sculpture are all means of telling, informing, preaching. Music will say some valuable things which common talking will not. It is not an artificial thing, it was from the beginning. Then, again, writing and painting are closely related, and it is not usually realised that painting is the older art. Writing was shorthand painting, and the letters were "pictographs."

Drawing, painting, and sculpture will say many things much more powerfully and accurately than all the talking; they are a necessary means of communication, and were so from the earliest times. Like the other languages of words and music, they may in all sorts of ways say all sorts of things. They may be immature but have true strength and nobility, or they may be dazzlingly clever yet silly and weakening, just like a printed book. A well-painted picture or a clever piece of music may form a centre of health or a culture of disease. How shall we know? For one thing, we must base our judgment on wider ground than our individual likings and amusement; all must be judged as for the community. Artists, like everybody else, live by common service; they are cooked for and clothed, and laundresses do their washing. They, too, must be persuaded to work for the common good in return.

Art is many things—service, record, and stimulus: it is not only a question of high genius; genius is produced as the crest of a great wave rising from gifted communities, and without the flood of common work-art you cannot have the crest of genius. This common art, which is the thing of importance—as freer arts will be formed out of it—is concerned with all the ordinary things of life: laying the breakfast table, cleaning the doorstep, tidying the railway station, lighting the High Street.

Much writing about art, oversplashed with purple and with paradox, seems to have entirely confused ordinary people. When the critics have divided up this common principle of good quality in work into Fine Art, Decorative Art, Architectural Art, Art at the Mayfair Galleries, and the Art of Mr Smith, the next step is to put it all aside as too mysterious and technical, and to turn it over to specialists who say they know all about it.

Modern writers try to separate the emotional aspects from the bases which are their necessary support, but in its history the word Art has meant Workmanship. The outward expression of work-art cannot be separated from a residuum of merely brute labour without beating down labour to slavery and giving over free art to speedy disease and dissolution. Writers on æsthetics have not sufficiently recognised that Art is *service* before it is delight; it is *labour* as well as emotion; it is *substance* as well as expression. What they say is here and there true enough in its way, but it is a way that leads to destruction; it is concerned with appearances rather than conduct. For philosophers seriously to discuss the pure lyricism of Art can only help to turn it towards hysteria. "This will kill that," as Victor Hugo said. Beauty is the flowering of labour and service. There are things so beautiful, indeed, that you must always pretend you don't see them, and notice them out of the corner of your eye, as you see a linnet on a nest.

Our simple ideas about beauty and the workman's expression of pleasure in his work have been ground to dust under contradictory theories of Æsthetics. Some books on this sweetest, simplest thing, Beauty, might make the animals glad that they have never learnt to read. Beauty comes like breathing; its problems are solved in the doing of true work. St Paul must have felt a like difficulty with over-systematic discussions about Faith. "What I mean by Faith"—he seems to say in a famous passage—"is Everything." Art too is everything that was ever rightly done, made, or expressed.

By Art we live and move and have our being, and if the nation has not Art it will perish everlastingly. Art is activity, cleanliness, tidiness, order, gaiety, serenity, mastery. Art is the right way of doing right things; and the evidence thereof is Beauty. Beauty is a necessary function of fitness and rightness; it is one of the few great things which sustain the spirit of communities. Beauty is the "substance" of things done, as Faith is the substance of things hoped for.

In the days before us we shall need to make use of all the sources of life we can draw on—a sense of Historical Continuity, Love of the Land, National Spirit, Reverence for Home, Civic Patriotism, and Recognition of Beauty. That country must be the greatest which has the most to love. We have heaps of teachers, philosophers, politicians, and economists, but few there be who understand that no nation can last without Beauty. Without refreshment of spirit the people must become brittle, wither and fail.

Modern æsthetic thinkers—saving for some sectional inquiries—fall into much the same fallacy as do the economists of supposing that "we are the people." Is it not at once obvious that a doctrine of beauty common to Esquimaux and Hottentots, Greeks, Mediævals, and ourselves, cannot be "formulated"? What they really have in mind, for the most part, is a theory suitable for modern picture exhibitions and the music of the Queen's Hall. In the main it is æsthetics for dealers—a philosophy for Piccadilly and Regent Street.

The Italian thinker, Benedetto Croce, has perhaps made the most mark of recent writers on æsthetics in his series of works dealing with the "Philosophy of the Spirit." He conceives of the Spirit acting through three or four vital activities, by the Will, by Logic and Science, and by Æsthetic Appreciation. In these the Spirit moves intuitively, Beauty being "pure lyricism."

This view has been adopted by Mr Clutton-Brock in *The Ultimate Belief* (1916), a very interesting little book. Here we are told of right, truth, and beauty that:—

"These three desires and these alone are desires of the Spirit; and they differ from all our other desires in that they are to be pursued for their own sake" (p. 20).

"Unless I value truth for its own sake, I cannot discover truth. Unless I value beauty for its own sake, I cannot see or hear or in any way experience beauty" (p. 27).

"We exercise an æsthetic judgment about all things which we know to be different from our moral or intellectual judgments" (p. 65).

"Æsthetic value is distinct in itself from practical value" (p. 69).

This seems so nearly a return to the German doctrine of Art for Art's sake as to make me very doubtful, or rather to make me sure in opposition to the statement; yet the author's intentions are obviously most trustworthy, and it is important that something very like the doctrine should be got into the minds of the people. Truly the activities of the Spirit must flow out in goodness, in the search for truth and the apprehension of beauty. As a result of system-making, however, Mr Clutton-Brock seems to me to be led into overstatement. For example:—

> "The æsthetic value can be clearly distinguished from the value of utility. We have an extreme æsthetic value for some things, such as music, which have no utility, nor have they any moral or intellectual value" (p. 69).

This is as arguable as anything else, but the theory will in practice be found a robe which will cover curiously free forms of Art, and will be taken to sanction even "Blastism."

Did Mr Clutton-Brock not feel doubts when Croce cleared the ground of Plato, Ruskin, and Tolstoy? The idea that our faculties should be developed in the good, the true, and the beautiful is, of course, as sound as old; but the activity towards Beauty should rather be conceived as directed to service, production, creation, than to æsthetic enjoyment or contemplation. The view is too static—"possessive rather than creative." Then, the doctrine of free activity is, I believe, bad for Art itself, whose strength is in service: "free activity" is a "heady wine," as Lord Roberts said of "the Will to Power." Approaching the subject on my lines, I seem to see our dear mistake of watertighting; and I don't even feel sure that the three categories must be exhaustive. The scheme is a little like the old question, "Animal, vegetable, or mineral?" Are not the desires towards activity and creative energy and the regulative impulses manifestations of Spirit? The three are either too few or too many. Or it should be added—these three are one. Croce, indeed, seems to incline to allow a fourth division, the economic. Mr Clutton-Brock, I should say, gives all I want if he would allow one of his phrases to be extended all round: speaking of knowledge, he says, "without it the moral activity loses its sense of direction." I want to add of the æsthetic activity that, without like supervision, it loses its sense of direction. It is the direction that counts in the long run. No one has ever proved that any form of æsthetic activity has more right to a free existence than the enjoyment of snuff-taking, or gaming, which are also modes of æsthetic enjoyment.

The search for knowledge is no more a "free activity" than delight in beauty; the subject matter of science, as Tolstoy said, being infinite, the searcher must select. Science has selected bombs. All "facts" are not truths; there is a scale of values.

Recently, new material on the origins of Art has been brought to light—or rather, new light has been brought to old material—in caves occupied by prehistoric peoples, the rock roofs of which are covered by forceful paintings, tens of thousands of years old, of animals of the chase. The general view is that they were painted for magical purposes rather than for enjoyment. Then Capart, in an excellent study of the earliest Egyptian Art, showed that even patterns had quite a different origin from "the futile pleasure in decoration." Again, Della Seta, in considering Art as it developed historically, comes to the conclusion that there was little or no "free activity" about it: rather was it religious, magical, and utilitarian, as stone-age men conceived utility:—

> "Art profane in origin, born to satisfy the æsthetic taste which seeks for expression rather than for the utility of its products, even if this be a spiritual utility, is inconceivable, and has never existed."

Of music he says—

> "No branch of art has so detached itself from its utilitarian character."

To one, however, who holds that all sound work is Art, it is manifestly impossible to accept della Seta's identification of Art with religion: that is, with religion as ordinarily conceived; I, as may be evident, hold that good work is a prime factor in right religion. His treatise, however, is an excellent account of Art as it has existed in fact. A still more rigorous examination of the origins of some phases of Art has lately been published by Professor Ridgeway (*The Drama*, etc., 1916). Mankind sought to win the favour of the dead by offerings and dances, and "tragedy arose out of these dramatic dances." Writers, instead of seeking for the origin of the drama by the historical method, have approached "from the *a priori* standpoint of pure æsthetics. . . . The study of art is almost invariably based on *a priori* assumptions."

It may now be held as proved that Art was everywhere developed for what were supposed to be utilitarian purposes. Yet Croce and most of the writers on æsthetics assume that the appreciation of art is mainly a matter of a special intuitive "feeling." All that should be admitted is the possibility, under conditions, of some little æsthetic feeling. Our judgment acts so quickly in summing up a complex subject matter, that it may

seem an intuition, but it is a very extended intuition. This "feeling" for Art is, so to say, the Art-conscience, and has to be instructed by reason and experience. Beauty can only be thought of as an "æsthetic" whole for purposes of "philosophy"! Practically and truly, it is something quite different. Beauty is not the thing in itself, but the idea of beauty arises in us; "us" being infinitely varying individuals. The modern feeling for beauty in Art, as it exists in any given case, is likely to include perception and estimates of:—

(1) Service value, worth, desirability. (2) Fitness for purpose. (3) Skill of the maker. (4) Economy of means to ends, concentration, intensity. (5) Completeness, order, unity, magnitude. (6) Insight into essential character. (7) Freshness, health, life, growth, movement. (8) Sympathy with the mind of the maker, approval, wonder. (9) Religious and patriotic values, as liking our own people and landscape. (10) Personal associations, ownership, etc. (11) Reputation—the same work, when proved to be by Michel Angelo, seems better than when it was thought to be by Vasari. (12) Relation to historical development—very important: an excellent "modern Gothic" church is worthless. (13) Scarcity and other accidents, the fashion of the moment, strangeness, etc. (14) Then there are factors like pleasure in form relations and colour, a sense of rhythm and "lyricism." I have been told by visitors to Japan that the people seem to possess a rhythmical sense lost by Western people; they even walk rhythmically. I suppose, however, that this is a natural expression of race health. Again, there seems to be a natural delight in imitation and the awaking of recollection. (15) Further, there are other ideas of luxury, sex-attraction, and all sorts of borderlands, intoxications, diseases, and perversions. There is also, doubtless, some sediment of the ancient feeling of the magic of Art.

Through such a labyrinth the modern man has to see his way in arriving at his æsthetic judgments. Our appreciation of any work of Art can hardly be anything else than the sum of stimulus to us resulting from such factors as these, which come to us as understanding, contentment, approval, wonder. Beauty may be sought as an absolute, but it is always found as the resultant of a group of relations. Our sense of beauty is the overflow of delight from that which we think lovable. In free æsthetics, the delight may either be healthy or harmful. We have to see to it that what we decide to call beauty is health-giving. What I elect to call beautiful is my reading in work of evidence that the people producing it were healthy all round and noble. I have not proved my case, of course;

what case is ever proved? But I have suggested that it is not necessary to believe the æsthetic writers—at least, I have shown that I don't believe much of them myself.

Æsthetic "intuitions" are not in any case the frank desires of a child; they are the rapid judgments of an experienced man. As in a conversation our instant answer leaps out from the very sum of ourselves, our temperament, knowledge, and convictions; so in the argument before any work of Art our responses spring from no special æsthetic faculty, but from all our loves and loathings. The current theories of æsthetics have been elaborated and re-elaborated, cycle on epicycle, for the most part by word-philosophers. I don't suppose that Herr Baumgarten had any special knowledge of the laws of craftsmanship; his theories were doubtless argued down from the pure idea. We have perhaps not sufficiently recognised how much of German thinking is frankly of the nature of a scholastic thesis. I should like, however, here to quote a passage of common sense from Dr Michaelis, one of the greatest of archæologists:—

> "It does not appear right to me—though these may be unwelcome reflections—to appreciate in a work of art only the form and colour and to declare the content more or less indifferent. At least this cannot be the case in regard to ancient art. The Greek painter Nicias observed that the subject formed a part of painting. Ancient art knows as little as ancient life of an absolute mastery of form. The Athenians only considered the person perfect who combined beauty with an inner efficiency. The form is only the robe which the content creates for itself. Content and form are inseparable and one. It is their relation which determines the value of a work of art. May the young not pass unheeded these warnings of a veteran!"

"Warnings": there is something significant here.

Ruskin speaks of the "mental expression" of Art, and this is much the best thing to look for.

Morris, again, says of Ruskin:—

> "Ethical and political considerations have never been absent from his criticism of art; and in my opinion it is just this part of his work which has had the most enduring and beneficent effect. . . . Ruskin has let a flood of daylight into the cloud of sham technical twaddle which was once the whole substance of art criticism."

This was written towards the end of his life; in one of his earliest utterances he said that the purpose of Art, as of other rational activities, was to make men wiser and better.

Again, this passage from Mr Stephen Reynolds' *A Poor Man's House* is worth a shelf of most books on æsthetics:—

> "I am inclined to think that the taste of the poor, the uneducated, is on the right lines, though undeveloped, whilst the taste of the educated

consists of beautifully developed wrongness, an exquisite secession from reality. . . . Degenerates love narcotics: their meats must be strange: they are afraid of the greatest things of life—the commonplace. Much culture has debilitated them. Rank life would kill them—or save them."

It would be well for our own thinking if we returned to the older meaning given to "æsthetic." I find by accident in H. Morley's *English Writers* that the British schoolman Erigena made use, a thousand years ago, of the word *æsthesis* in the sense of perception, a feminine quality complementary to *nous*. In any case we need firm definitions of all these slippery words. Anything will do to think with if it is only made firm. "Art," it seems to me, is right activity and work, especially complete and noble workmanship. Beauty in Art is the evidence of high humanity in work. Appreciation of Beauty should be one with our judgment of essential quality; there should be an instant recognition of what is noble and what is base. The sense of Beauty is the work-conscience.

It may be granted that colours, sounds, scents, and even touch, will induce states of consciousness approximating to hypnosis and intoxication. If this field is specially marked off for æsthetics, well and good—or rather, well and bad; but the limitations should be very clearly stated, and it must be recognised that such forms of emotion are subject to diseases which are very dangerously contagious. Again, it should be foreseen that if the laws governing the production of free beauty could be discovered and written in a book, the possibility of its further existence in any high degree would thereby be abolished. No one could care for beauty produced by formulæ. True revealing expressions must always be unconscious. That which becomes known passes into the realm of science.

Whenever the tide flows towards a better and saner form of civilisation, the preoccupation of philosophers with the narrow, vague, and betraying theories of æsthetics, as generally conceived, will make way for a philosophy of right labour. Education for enjoyment will be superseded by education for fine forms of production. Right doing and living will necessarily flow into noble types and beautiful forms. Here, too, those who work the will shall know the doctrine.

W. R. LETHABY.

LONDON.

PALESTINE AND JEWISH NATIONALITY.

A REPLY.

ISRAEL ABRAHAMS.

"It is true that the Jews themselves are not united," says my friend Mr M. J. Landa, in his able article on the "Restoration of Palestine." This statement must have come with all the force of a new revelation to those who know current Jewish opinion exclusively from the newspapers. The latter, to put it quite dispassionately, have not been conspicuously successful in informing their readers. They have somehow contrived to convey the impression that the Jews are practically unanimous in favour of nationalistic aspirations. This is far from the truth.

Mr Landa's frank recognition of the facts is therefore all to the good. It can be of no real advantage to anyone to ignore the convictions of a section of Jewish opinion, a section negligible neither for quantity nor quality. Mr Landa does not ignore the section, but he underrates it. He refers to the League of British Jews, but the League by no means includes all who are determined, in the words of the League, "to resist the allegation that Jews constitute a separate political nationality." Many who share this determination are not yet convinced of the necessity of the League. But the conviction is growing that some organisation is required to give the only effective answer to such monstrous libels as the Petrograd correspondent of the *Morning Post* repeats so recently as February 7. Here we find revived the legend of a secret world-wide "government of the great nation of the Jewry." The organisation, moreover, is necessary in order to maintain the only theory of nationality which logically justifies the claim of Jews to equality of status among fellow-citizens throughout the world. It is above all necessary, as the firm witness to the truth, that the bond which unites Jews of various

nationalities is first and last the bond of a common religion. The members of the League are British subjects, whether by birth or naturalisation. The members are, moreover, limited to those "professing the Jewish religion." British citizenship and adhesion to the Jewish religion are the qualifications of membership of the League. And though the necessity of the League is not yet realised by all the friends of its aims, yet its progress has been remarkable. A writer in the *Zionist Review* has recently spoken of the "isolation of the few die-hards of the League of British Jews." But what is the fact? Announced while Jews were under the immediate glamour of Mr Balfour's declaration, when some who had previously stood outside the Zionist circle were, like Las Cases, in the case of Napoleon, "vanquished by glory"; ignored by the general, and bitterly opposed by the Jewish press—nevertheless, the League has long passed its record of a thousand members. And prominent among them are the Presidents of the extreme orthodox Federation of Synagogues, the moderately conservative United Synagogue, Berkeley Street Reform Synagogue, and the liberal synagogue of the Jewish Religious Union. Thus the League represents all sections of Jews who are British by nationality and Jews by religion.

Before considering further what the grounds of objection to Zionistic pretensions are, a word must be said as to what the grounds of objection are not. Mr Landa draws a brilliant picture of the future of Palestine. That the dream may be more than fulfilled is the hope of almost all Jews. There are extreme anti-Zionists who are utterly indifferent to Palestine. These are few, and they do but share the first thoughts of the founder of modern Zionism. With him interest in Palestine was an afterthought. Nay, the first effect of Dr Herzl's movement was the violent interruption of activity towards the restoration of Palestine. The pioneer work of colonisation in Palestine was accomplished by those who had no political aims whatever. The present colonies are almost entirely settlements made before Dr Herzl appeared on the scene. If there are now in being colonies which may serve as a foundation for further progress, and justify a reasonable hope in it, these favourable conditions exist, not because, but in spite, of the politicians. And just as political Zionism did not initiate the colonies, so the work of Palestinian regeneration will not be left to it as a monopoly. The League of British Jews has clearly stated its interest in the subject, though Mr Landa warns the League off from this as "the province of Zionism." Again, most important

of all, the great and successful efforts to introduce a better system of education into Palestine were made by those who devoted their time, their energies, and their means to the beneficent enterprise before modern Zionism was born. Among the first practical steps taken from London, when General Allenby occupied Jerusalem, was the request by the Anglo-Jewish Association for permission to reopen its famous Evelina School in that city. In all well-considered undertakings for the bettering of agricultural, industrial, and educational conditions in Palestine there will be no lack of support from those Jews who refuse to bend the knee to the false idol of a "Jewish nationality."

To secure the regeneration of Palestine, to utilise to the limits of its gracious possibilities the generous promise of the British Government, the main requirement is the conferment on all settlers in Palestine of the same full rights which are enjoyed by the citizens of all free States. The Zionist formula is far more ambitious in a narrow sense, far less inspiring in the wider sense. So far as Jews are concerned, the intrusion of the idea of a "Jewish nationality" confuses the local issue while it endangers the wider issue. One cannot blame Lord Robert Cecil for cabling to America on December 15 last that General Allenby's capture of Jerusalem would "help to give a local habitation for that deep national feeling of the Jews, which in all ages and in all countries has survived so many vicissitudes." This is not the place to enter into the history of the olden Jewish aspirations. But Dr Emil G. Hirsch, using the military imagery of the hour, gives the true, if over-forcibly expressed, answer: "To claim that modern nationalism is the heir of the old Jewish Zionism is arrogant camouflage." This "modern nationalism" is the most extraordinary instance of assimilation which the Jews have ever experienced. The olden Jewish hope was a very complex idea, but though it included some elements which can be compared with the modern notion of nationality, it was mainly an idea far remote from that notion. It was an intensely religious idea. It was an aspiration less for the return of Israel to Palestine than for the return of God to His Temple. Mr Landa refers to the Zionism of the orthodox Prayer Book of the Synagogue. But that Zionism is a hope for the restoration of Israel indeed, but under Messianic auspices, with the leadership of the offspring of David. The most poignant of these passages in the liturgy refer to the rebuilding of the Temple and the reinstitution of the sacrifices. The other day the streets of London saw a so-called

Jewish flag adorned with the "shield of David"; but the Zionists are silent as to the scion of the Davidic house. The ancient Temple site is covered by a shrine of Islam, and this shrine is justly enough to be left undisturbed. In sooth, we have a new Zionism from which Zion is left out! The "deep national feeling of the Jews" which survived the ages has little enough to do with the modern notion of nationalism. And there is another point. The Zionism of the Prayer Book is a passionate cry for the restoration of all the Jews, not of a small percentage. Thus many orthodox Jews who hold to the traditional Zionism, and many liberal Jews who have reinterpreted the ideal into quite other terms, are agreed in refusing to recognise in the neo-Zionistic programme the fulfilment of an ancient and hallowed hope.

The whole crux of the matter may be said to be just the fact that so small a minority of Jews can be expected to settle in Palestine. Addressing the meeting held to acclaim Mr Balfour's letter, the Right Hon. Herbert Samuel admitted this. "The Jews scattered in other countries of the world must probably always remain the great majority of the Jewish race." This is why the Palestinian question cannot be entirely local. There cannot be in Palestine anything approaching a Jewish State. For the adjective and the noun are incompatible. If it be Jewish, it cannot be a State; if it be a State, it cannot be Jewish. And this argument is not affected if the new régime is to be called by some name other than a State. Modern governments cannot be founded on religious or racial privilege or exclusiveness. Everyone is agreed on this point. Mr Landa thinks that the "form of government never offered an insoluble problem." Among the minor eccentricities of the problem is the appeal made to the British Government, by an important American Jewish newspaper, to protect Palestine from the socialistic aspirations of the Poalê Zion. Mr Landa also conceives of a Protectorate, "with such autonomy as is feasible for its needs, and in consonance with the traditions of the British Empire." Then it would not be a *Jewish* autonomy. Then why talk of a Jewish "national home," with all the political implications of the term nationality? The only nationality would be that of the State or Protectorate; it would not be Jewish in any sense. The term nationality must be accurately used, as it is used in modern terminology, to imply primarily a political concept. The Zionist formula, adopted in the declaration, speaks, however, of "a national home for the Jewish people."

Not, be it noted, for such Jews as settle in Palestine, but for the Jews. But the Jews of the world have neither need nor desire for a new national home. They have already their national homes in the nations of which they are citizens. What the Jews claim is just the right to an equal national home in the nations of which they form part. This claim has been very largely won. No Jew in an emancipated nation is without a national home, which he loves with a depth and fullness of devoted affection that leaves no room in his soul for any other national home. "A Jewish nation in Palestine would not be my nation," said a great American Jew the other day. Another, the United States ex-Ambassador to Turkey, Mr H. Morgenthau, a man by no means unfriendly to the real good of Palestine, has just proclaimed, "I am one hundred per cent. American." And, similarly, every British Jew proclaims himself one hundred per cent. British.

The successful intrusion of the idea of "Jewish nationality" could not but prejudice, not necessarily at once but in the long run, the national status of the Jews throughout the world. Jews could not have it both ways. They could not base their status in Palestine on one theory of nationality, and then claim equality in the world on an altogether inconsistent theory. If there is to be any autonomy in Palestine, it must be Palestinian not Jewish autonomy. As regards all other countries, the claim of the Jews to national equality is then securely founded on the complete identification of the Jews everywhere with the nationality of the land of which they are fully emancipated citizens. The protest of the League is on record. The very fact that at this exciting juncture a strong body of British Jews has made this protest on behalf of true principles of nationality will be a lasting service to humanity at large and to the Jewish communities in particular, which are still struggling for political rights. Judaism will be saved also by the refusal to merge it in nationalism. Some Zionists, it is true, are "nationalists" because they believe that a "Jewish State" would preserve Judaism. How it is to do so they have no idea. The Saturday Sabbath, to take the strongest argument adduced, could be more easily observed in a Jewish settlement. But that has long been possible in the colonies and cities of the Holy Land.

There is no need of a Jewish State to effect what has already been effected without a State. Nay, a State-enforced Saturday observance would be far less desirable than a voluntarily-imposed observance. The regulation of the religious life

by force of law must tend to injure religion by emphasising its legal aspects. Nor is it necessary to do more than allude to the overwhelming perplexities which must meet any attempts on the one hand to maintain, or on the other hand to ignore, certain features of the ancient law.

And how is the existence of Jewish settlements, whether dependent or autonomous, in which—to keep to our specific instance—the Saturday Sabbath is generally observed to affect the great masses of Jews who are bound to live outside those settlements as citizens in various nations? The economic causes which affect Jewish life in the world will continue unchecked. "Zionism," says Mr Landa, "means practical concentration, which must lead naturally to preservation." But concentration is just what is not practical. Disobedience to "the Mosaic ordinances" is "causative of drift at present." How is the drift to be affected by the Palestine settlement? It almost seems as if some Zionists have formed a fantastic picture of a vicarious Utopia. Others besides Zionists have shared this vision. If somewhere there is a community of Jews "faithful" to Judaism, then the Judaism of the rest of the world matters less. It has been gravely urged on liberal Jews that they ought to turn Zionists in their own interest. For there would be less objection to reform if there existed a steadfast home of orthodoxy. But, on the other hand, most Zionists repudiate this notion of an orthodox régime. When they talk of a "Jewish centre" they do not speak in terms of religion. Unlike Mr Landa, they use every word but Judaism in describing their notion of this "centre." Unhappily they fail to see that they are destroying all the possible fruitfulness of the "centre" idea by railing it within "national" bars. To begin with, they fall at once, as everyone must eventually fall when they use the word "national," into political implications. "Palestine will take its place in the commonwealth of nations commensurate with the importance of its geographical position, a link and a highway between East and West." A "highway," yes. Palestine has been the highway to all the great military expeditions of Assyrians, of Alexander, of Ptolemies, of Romans, of Napoleon, of the present war. The very importance of its geographical position must inevitably involve it in the quarrels and ambitions of the nations. Palestine is no link between East and West. It has been a perennial bone of contention. Most conspicuously was this the case when the Jews really constituted a nation in the ancient world.

The future tranquillity of Palestine may almost be said to depend upon its no longer being regarded as a highway

between East and West. The less its part in the eyes of the world, the more its opportunity to be itself. The limelight will not make for natural posture, but for posing. But of this a word will be said later. For the present we are concerned with the political phase of the "highway" conception. In the past it was fatal. All Jews are wishful, indeed, that hope may triumph over experience, and that such a settlement may be effected, under the beneficent ægis of England, that the disastrous past will not repeat itself. It is none the less pitiful that such political considerations perforce thrust themselves into prominence so soon as the concept of nationality is gratuitously allowed to invade the Jewish outlook.

The same injury is done by that more plausible, but not less ill-founded, variety of the "national" idea which would fain express itself as a "spiritual centre," as a "cultural homeland," as a "focus of the Jewish theory of life." Taking these and similar phrases as a whole, they are an attempt to evade the term "Judaism." Mr Landa does not make this mistake, but one cannot be perturbed by his notion of a centre which requires him curtly to dismiss the liberal Jewish movement as "schism." By the way, in the interest of accuracy, one must demur to his description of the Jewish Religious Union as established by Mr Claude G. Montefiore. The latter was and is a leading power in that Union, but it was not founded by any individual. It was the outcome of a widely-felt need, and had an organic relation to the great liberal movements in Judaism all over the world. A main source of Zionistic misconceptions is just this incapacity to gauge the actual religious conditions in Jewry. Yet these conditions are the key to the situation. There was in process, just when the war broke out, a strong religious revival both on the liberal and conservative wings. One may hazard the prophecy that, when peace returns, the practical attempt to realise Zionistic nationalism will so expose its futility as a solution of the Jewish question, that Judaism will come to its own again, and some of the immense enthusiasm wasted on nationalism will be more usefully applied to the reinforcement of religion. Mr Landa, indeed, seems inclined to rule out of Judaism all who are not nationalists. And here it may be well to point out that the present writer recognises that Mr Landa is not the official spokesman of Zionism, any more than he himself is the official spokesman of the League. To return to the "centre" idea. It is mostly associated with the various descriptions of the "Jewish spirit" in terms from which Judaism is either entirely excluded or given a subordinate place. These descriptions are

vague gropings for a substitute to Judaism, which seems to this type of Zionists to have exhausted its specific originality. There is a feverish hunt after a new note; a not ignoble belief that out of a revived national life will emerge something worth while. It is a leap in the dark. The impulse to the leap is undoubtedly strengthened on the one hand by the dazzling effects of the new nationalisms of Europe, and on the other by the temporary eclipse of the humanistic ideals. Resenting the criticisms of anti-Semites, irritated by the patronising tolerance of many who do not belong to that lurid class, the nationalists see a line of escape in the foundation of a State which shall compel the world's admiration. As though such a withdrawal of a small minority would stop the attacks on the majority to whom no such escape is open! And of course it is no escape at all. It is a sheer evasion. Logically, it is a fallacy arising out of two illusions: the one, that the nationalisms of the present hour have finally overthrown the humanism of the mid-Victorian era; the other, that religion in general or Judaism in particular has spent itself. The Jew must always stand, as Jew, for humanism; the Jew can never, as Jew, allow himself to be assailed by misgivings as to the abiding power of religion. Certainly he will not work out his salvation by taking the line of least resistance, by a disastrous withdrawal from the harder to the easier solution. Easy solutions are rarely sound.

There might have been some value in the idea of a "spiritual centre" in Palestine had not the nationalisation of the idea threatened it with barrenness. There could never be anything of the nature of a central spiritual control, for such a control would be repudiated by Jews as a dangerous anachronism. Take, however, the scheme for founding a University. Mr Landa refers to the enthusiasm with which the proposal was received by the Zionist Congress in 1912. "Even anti-Zionists applaud the project." Surely Mr Landa might have gone further. The present writer was author of the article which brought the project anew before the readers of the official Zionist organ well before 1912. But it soon became apparent that the Zionists aimed not at a Jewish but at a national University. They were anxious for a secular experiment rather than desirous of fostering a spiritual tradition. The literature, the thought, the religion, and to some extent the life of Judaism might conceivably be promoted in a University. For all these things have aspects which bring them within the scope of Jewish learning. But the nationalist fanatics refused even to call the proposed institution Jewish;

they really wanted to teach chemistry in Hebrew. For local needs a scientific University is undoubtedly desirable, and if a Palestinian nationality is to be created, then such a local University might conceivably also be national. But just in proportion as it becomes national it ceases to be Jewish. It is quite obvious that a central Academy devoted to Jewish studies if founded at all must be founded independently of, or at least with the guidance of others besides, the Zionists. Many Jews who have no sympathy with nationalistic ambitions would co-operate in the establishment of what has been aptly called a new Yeshibah at Jabneh. It was at that place, quite close to the Mediterranean coast, a place some few miles south of Joppa, that Johanan, son of Zaccai, installed his Yeshibah or College at the moment when the Romans were battering at the walls of Jerusalem. Is not the contrast exquisitely grotesque? Jabneh became a centre because nationality was going; Jerusalem may fail to be a centre because nationality has come.

The most plausible argument for Zionism of the nationalistic type was the hope held out that an end would be put to anti-Semitism. In Dr Herzl's case there was a firm conviction that such a consummation was sure. There was a certain species of compensation. If the Jewish State which Dr Herzl advocated grew out of anti-Semitism, it was fitting that its foundation should give anti-Semitism its death-blow. But the Zionists now admit that the expectation is vain. One after another, their spokesmen tell us that they do not expect, in Mr Landa's words, that anti-Semitism will be stifled. And this after a surrender to the anti-Semitic theory of nationality! We pointed out to Dr Herzl that anti-Semitism was rampant in the ancient world while the Jews were still a nation. But he was unmoved. He, and later Zionists have followed his example, was unwise and weak enough to urge Jews to confess themselves a nation because so many non-Jews allege this to be the fact. It is the part of Jews to dispel, not to acquiesce in, this allegation. Well, when Dr Herzl was confronted with the serious objection that he was surrendering to anti-Semitism without any prospect of thereby drawing the serpent's fangs, he gaily rejoined: "The initial steps towards the execution of my plan would stop anti-Semitism at once and for ever." We have seen the initial steps, and anti-Semitism is as virulent as ever. Fraternisation with the enemy has not even secured an armistice! The League does not expect the easy victory over anti-Semitism which Dr Herzl expected. But the League at all events has not thrown down its arms.

Nor can its arms be laid lightly down. The Zionists are anticipating the fruits of victory; others know that there is still a battle forward. The Jews of Poland and Roumania have yet to win national rights in those countries, and they can only succeed under the auspices of that theory of nationality for which Israel has manfully striven since Europe emerged from medieval conceptions of the State. Nationality is a political term, defined by law. Even so intimate a phrase as "British *descent*" has just been interpreted by Mr Justice Neville to mean no more than this: that "parents and grandparents on both sides must be British subjects" (*Times*, Law Report, January 17, 1918). The status of "British subject" is more easily acquired. Jews have maintained this view ever since Europe gave them the opportunity. Their religion has nothing to do with nationality; their nationality has nothing to do with religion. The one is a legal, the other a spiritual, concept. The bond between Jews of various nationalities is religious, based on the possession of the same spiritual ideals, tested and proved by a common religious history and experience. The Gaon Saadiah, a thousand years ago, used the memorable words, "Our people is not a people except by virtue of its religion." The sad thing is that the Zionists are making it more difficult for this position to be logically maintained. With unparalleled recklessness they are using language which may hereafter be turned against that great mass of Jews who must always live outside Palestine, citizens of various nations, united only in a religious brotherhood.

Hence arises the manifest obligation on such an organisation as the League to leave no room for equivocation. Jews are differentiated by religion, and by religion only, from their Christian fellow-citizens. The late Chief Rabbi, a determined opponent of non-religious Zionism, put the case unanswerably by the crucial instance of conversion. If a British subject professing the Christian religion joins the Synagogue, or a British subject professing the Jewish religion joins the Church, in neither case does the change of religion touch national status. Eligibility to serve as Rabbi or Bishop is affected, but not eligibility to serve the State in any secular office. And so the British Jew, like his Christian fellow-nationalist, has no other nationality, no other national life or ideals, than the nationality and ideals of the land of which both are equally citizens.

All this is so elementary that one ought to apologise for asserting it. But at this crisis, when the turmoil of war is raising so many issues, when in particular the Palestine settle-

ment is being complicated and prejudiced by false assertions as to the nationality of the Jews, it becomes imperative to restate the principle which has been won by a long struggle for justice. Every British Jew desires to see the fullest use made of the friendly overtures of our Government. But that use must not be made at the expense of what Jews have won so hardly and hold so dear. Many Zionists assert the same theory of nationality which is here maintained. The unofficial conferences now in progress may, as indeed all must hope, result in reunion, if this theory is put forward by all Jews with undivided front, and in absolutely unequivocal terms. In that case the function of the League would have been fulfilled.

Anyhow, let it not be thought that the League stands alone in its religious definition of the differentiation which Judaism implies.

"Your Committee, therefore, recommends that the Conference reaffirm its traditional position that the essence of Israel as a priest-people consists in its religious consciousness and in the sense of consecration to God and his service to the world. And that, therefore, we must and do look with disfavour upon any and every unreligious or anti-religious interpretation of Judaism and of Israel's mission in the world."

This resolution was passed by a majority of more than 3 to 1 at the last assembly of the *Central Conference of American Rabbis* (vol. xxvii., 1917, p. 141). Nor is this the ideal of liberals only. Long ago this same view was put forward by orthodox exponents of Judaism.

"If every Jew should be a silent example and teacher of universal righteousness and universal love—if thus the dispersed of Israel should show themselves everywhere on earth the glorious priests of God and pure humanity, if our lives were a perfect reflection of our precepts—what a mighty engine we would constitute for propelling mankind to the final goal of all human education! . . . When such an ideal and such a mission await us, can we still lament our fate?"

The quotation is derived from the *Nineteen Letters* written the best part of a century ago by S. R. Hirsch, the refounder of modern Jewish orthodoxy. It is confirmed by the splendid utterance of another notable orthodox leader, Michael Sachs, whose famous oration on the New Zion ought to be translated at this juncture and circulated far and wide. Zionism, says Mr Landa, is positive, anti-Zionism almost definitely negative. The Jews who refuse to interpret their religion nationally are, on the contrary, animated by the most positive ideal imaginable. On the other hand, they are moved by great civic devotion to their country; they are imbued with an intense desire to serve

it; they aspire to share all the burdens and the privileges of its citizenship. They can conceive no other country as theirs, they can substitute no other service for its service, no other patriotism has a meaning for them.

And they feel, on the other hand, that their religion is dignified and deepened by civic freedom, that it is more capable of expressing itself the less it is repressed by the fetter of sectarian nationality. Civic emancipation has invariably meant religious emancipation. There has been, again and again, under the sunshine of equality, a finer and a richer growth of Judaism. The Jew shows himself at his best precisely in such an environment. The appeal of their religion on the one hand, and the call to the great world work on the other, are a benign influence on their own lives, and a stimulus to prove themselves a force for the general good.

Certainly, as Mr Landa says, Judaism seeks no proselytes. But in the higher sense it may make them. Early in the Christian era, Eleazar, son of Pedath, urged that Israel was scattered among the nations the better to work out God's purpose of drawing the world to Him. "I will scatter the people among the nations," says the first-century author of the Apocalypse of Baruch, "that they may do good to the nations" (i. 4). The modern Jews are conscious, indeed, that they have fallen far below their duty to the world; they are conscious of their degrading lapses from their duty to themselves. Above all, they realise how tempting it is to evade the difficult though honourable function of witnessing to God. But if they have little ground for self-laudation, they have even less justification for the despair which shuts the eyes of many nationalists to the wider hope. For, though the anodyne may be more palatable than the tonic, though the way backward be easier than the march forward, yet in their heart of hearts all Jews know that, if they will but renew their confidence in God, He will lead them, and all mankind with them, from strength to strength, until they come eventually unto Zion, and all flesh reach together the radiant presence of the Father.

I. ABRAHAMS.

CAMBRIDGE.

ERASMUS AT LOUVAIN.

PROFESSOR FOSTER WATSON.

THE city of Louvain, which in our own day has been the victim of the most ruthless militarism, hard to parallel in the history of the world, was, in the first quarter of the sixteenth century, the arena of a great intellectual campaign against a twofold militarism—a lust of conquest in both the material world and the spiritual. On the one hand, the self-aggrandising political leader and, on the other, the obscurantist theologian threatened to suffocate the new life of awakening Europe.

Desiderius Erasmus, the arch-enemy of this enslaving reaction, came to Louvain, a stronghold of religious orthodoxy, in July 1517. He came with his reputation already established and in itself a challenge. At this time fifty-one years of age, he had begun his humanist studies at twenty-eight. Between that age and forty-three—his span of preparatory personal education — he had had to divide his time between private teaching, literary work, the pursuit of patrons, and study. Always he studied, whether in France, in England, or in Italy. He wrote almost as fast as he studied.

Between the age of forty-four and forty-eight years he had been in England, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, though apparently he was chiefly engaged in teaching Greek at Queen's College, where his pupils were fit though few. Whilst at Cambridge he prepared the text of the first published Greek New Testament, which he strikingly and significantly called the *Novum Instrumentum*. He translated the Greek into Latin. Further, in later years, he published texts of the early Greek and Latin Fathers of the Church, and thus sought to bring the texts of Christian documents into line with those of the classics. The searching, critical, and rational temper of the scholar was exercised on the credentials of Christianity. If historical religion were worth having (and to Erasmus it was of infinite worth), it

called for even more labour on the sources of its texts, and, if anything, for a more rational criticism than could be claimed for the other classics. Erasmus attempted to break down the fetish-distinction between sacred and secular, as when he claimed, to the confusion of rigid sabbatarians, that "Every day is the Sabbath or the Lord's Day." He did not so much destroy distinctions by a process of levelling down as levelling up, not dethroning the saints of the Calendar but raising up noble heathen to places beside them. Reading Plato, he could hardly restrain himself from crying, "Sancte Socrates, ora pro nobis!"

As Professor of Divinity absorbed in the new study of Greek, as Editor of the Greek text of the New Testament, the publication of which was perhaps in its full significance the most definite literary division-mark between the Middle Ages and modern times, there is no wonder that Erasmus was regarded as a dangerous innovator. Nevertheless, we read of his presence at an orthodox dinner-party at the house of the conservative Dorpius, and he reports of Louvain that theological matters are proceeding with less than their wonted thorniness; he even dreams that he may actually be co-opted to the faculty of theology. But in this hope he was mistaken.

Hard upon the intolerant *non possumus* attitude of entrenched authority in the Church there entered a new and even more ominous factor in the situation, the militarism of an aggressive revolutionary movement. On the 31st of October of this same memorable year, 1517, Luther launched his theological bolt by affixing his ninety-five theses to the church door at Wittenberg. The Louvain theologians, impatient of anything that could not be comprised under a clean-cut classification, identified Erasmus with Luther, even suggesting that the great humanist was the writer of some of the pamphlets and treatises with which Luther and his friends were inundating Germany and adjoining countries. This supposition infuriated Erasmus. He believed that Luther and his friends were implicitly, if not explicitly, opposed to the cause of humanist scholarship, for which he cared far more than for the inquiry into the validity of the speculative dogmas of theological revolutionists. The Lutherans were astounded at him, for they had counted on the sympathy of the fierce satirist. Albert Dürer, the painter, wrote plaintively in his *Journal* (entirely misunderstanding Erasmus), after hearing a false report of Luther's death, in 1521, "Oh Erasmus, where art thou? Defend the truth [*i.e.* of Luther]: *obtain the martyr's crown.*"

Perhaps nowhere was the conflict between the Lutherans and the old type of theologians so full of the deadliest acrimony as at Louvain during Erasmus's residence there, and the humanist-scholar was in conflict with both parties. At no point were the two opposing groups in unity, except in their mingled fear and hope of him. For hate him as they would, he was the intellectual giant; he stood high above them all.

Accordingly, Erasmus's mentality and personality have come down to modern times distorted by the fierce cross-lights of the Louvain controversy. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was traditionally supposed that either he was a disguised Lutheran with a taste for scandal-mongering in the good cause, as shown, it might be said, in the *Colloquia*, or that if he were not a Lutheran he ought to have been one, as if the theological Erasmus were the complete Erasmus. To both Catholics and Protestants, contemporaneously and afterwards, whatever exploitation for controversial purposes was made of his brilliant literary writings, as a *man*, he was suspect; and posterity is too often invited to judge him in the perspective of dogmatic colour-blindness of the past.

Yet in a careful and open-minded study of his life and writings, the real Erasmus emerges, not a mere iconoclast (a great iconoclast he certainly is), but also as a great constructive genius; the Louvain period was marked by some of his greatest positive assertions. He believed with conviction that the greatest possible instrument to be used against the tyranny of blind force in all its forms was the trained human mind set free from the *idols* of ignorance, prejudice, and above all from the infection of corporate dementia.

To Erasmus human progress was equally endangered by the purblind monk on the one hand, and on the other, the devouring eagle-eyed military autocrat. Those critics who called him a coward overlooked the astonishing courage of his heroic attack on the militarism of contemporary monarchs like Henry VIII. and Charles V. What Erasmus worked for was the sanity of a clear open outlook on life, and for that he would rely upon a sound cultural education. The problem before him was: How can culture be made to permeate all specialism? In Erasmus's day, amongst academic people, theology was the most distinctive and obsessing form of specialism, just as science-specialism is most outstanding to-day. But there is, however, this difference: to-day, the science-specialist meets the humanist half-way, as Matthew Arnold hoped that he would. The humanism of Professor A. N. Whitehead, the mathematician, in his *Organisation of*

Thought, is near in spirit to that of Professor Burnet, the Greek scholar, in his *Higher Education and the War*. Neither the best mathematicians, nor the best natural scientists, nor even the best theologians, to-day, are removed to such a distance in the bases of their thought as not to be on speaking terms with the humanism of Erasmus, if we allow for some differences in points of emphasis due to four hundred years of thought. In a sense, men of science, letters, and the plastic arts are all humanists now. The one predominant obsession of non-humanist specialism at the present time is that of military aggressiveness. The danger of the latter form of specialism—involving atrophy in all truly progressive directions—was as obvious to Erasmus in his day as to us living in the midst of the greatest war in history. In fact, Erasmus is more passionately stirred by the aggressive madness of princes than by the hide-bound tyranny of the most intolerant of religious reactionaries. To him politics as well as theology must be clarified by humanist culture.

In the suggested solution of the problem as to how specialism might be humanised or vitalised by culture we really encounter Erasmus's great constructive work, his most significant achievement. His constructive views in politics and religion are to be found in the *Enchiridion Militis Christiani*, in the *Institutio Principis Christiani*, in the *Querela Pacis*, and in his *Ratio Veræ Theologiæ*, all of them closely connected with his Louvain life. They take the reader into another world from that of the trenchant satires of the *Encomium Moriæ* and the *Colloquia*. And, again, besides his work as a writer on the practical side, we have his directive influence on the new humanist "College of the Three Languages" at Louvain.

No characteristic of Erasmus, in his Louvain period, is more prominent (not even the magnetic attraction of plunging into the theological whirlpool) than his determination to oppose princely militarism with all his strength. Almost imperiously he made the demand on Henry VIII., Charles V., Francis I., and the Pope, to cease their military aggressions. "The people build cities, while the madness of princes destroys them" were his well-known words—and what an unconscious prophecy for the doomed city of Louvain herself! as we think on it to-day. It was from Louvain that Erasmus issued, through his indefatigable friend, the publisher, Marten, editions of those anti-militarist pamphlets which earlier had been too quietly lodged in the Adages, viz. the *Scarabæus*, *Sileni Alcibiades*, and the *Bellum*. The *Institutio Principis*

Christiani was first published at Louvain. In it Erasmus boldly advised the young Charles as to the duties of a prince, "If you, as a prince, levy taxes as of right, see to it that you *first* pay *your* taxes to the people. . . . If you cannot defend your kingdom without acting against justice, without shedding much human blood, without inflicting injury on religion, *rather lay down your crown*." The chief of Erasmus's treatises against war is the *Querela Pacis* (the "Complaint of Peace"), first published in 1516 at Basle, but reissued from Louvain in 1518, in which Peace is personified as a disconsolate wanderer on the face of the earth, everywhere "despised and rejected of men." The most scathing denunciations of the military ambitions of princes fill the book, and Erasmus despairingly laments that the complaint of peace should rather be her epitaph, "so dead and buried she seems."

Thus Erasmus was as deeply involved, at Louvain, in high politics, as in high theology; and this side of his activity needs to be brought prominently into the perspective. *Mutatis mutandis*, in politics as in theology, we are confronted with the philosophical question: Is education a part of politics, or, are politics a part of education? Erasmus appears to take the latter view. The political truths of national welfare can and should be taught. The principle of arbitration as an alternative for war was vividly present to Erasmus's mind, and he supported the current project for a congress of the Kings of England and France and of the Emperor, proposed, at that time, to be held at Cambrai, with objects that we now associate with the Conferences at the Hague.

We are not left to conjecture as to the view of the humanists with regard to the directive power of education in promoting the cause of true political science. Humanist culture was to permeate politics equally with theology. Juan Luis Vives, a Spaniard by birth, a lecturer at Louvain, disciple and intimate friend of and co-worker with Erasmus, wrote definitely on the part education ought to play in the dissemination of political and social science, and it cannot be doubted that his views were shared by Erasmus and by Sir Thomas More. Vives maintained that the king should be the intellectual leader of his people as distinctly as he is their military commander (a real possibility in the cases of Henry VIII. of England and Francis I. of France, who grievously gambled away their unique opportunities on a purely material stake). By the national organisation of education, Vives contended, youth of the realm should be educated "as skilled goldsmiths are trained to use the Lydian stone" *to determine the value of the*

factors in life which we should seek or avoid, e.g. money, possessions, friends, honours, nobility, dignity, sovereignty, physique, pleasure, erudition, morality and religion; and not to confound great things with small—in short, the study of ethical perspectives, a line of study also overwhelmingly important in our own days of democratic evolution. These practical suggestions were put forward by Vives in a Bruges letter of October, 1525, to King Henry VIII. of England. We may well believe that they were opinions formed in the Louvain period (1517–1521) when the young Spaniard and Erasmus were companions there. We in our day ought to beware of the fallacy that the farther we get away from the classical humanists the more likely we are to adapt our reconstruction of education to what is truly of practical worth in life.

Whether theology—that other great form of specialism—is to be subsumed under the concept of culture, or culture under that of theology, is a philosophical question we need not raise here. Erasmus made it abundantly clear that, in his opinion, a sound cultural education was the real salvation of the theologian. The Greek text of the New Testament would give theologians a new instrument for finding theological truth, but it needed the well-trained mind to use that instrument wisely and effectively. The problem of the right training of the mind brought Erasmus to the general question of education, and here he is constructive on broad lines; indeed, he is pre-eminently an educational prophet.

In the first place, he attacks the practical question of the status of the teaching profession. Education would never become a regenerative force without the right human agency. He insists on the inherent dignity of the profession, at a time when, as he says, "teachers are, as a rule, a shabby, broken-down set of men, sometimes hardly in their senses. So mean the place, so miserable the pittance, you would say that pigs were being reared there and not that respectable folk's children were being taught." He declares that "no one serves the commonwealth better than the moulder of unformed boyhood, provided the teacher be learned and good." He rises even higher in his estimate of the teacher's influence: "To be a schoolmaster is next to being a king." To a schoolmaster at Ghent he wrote: "Go on preparing youth in the best learning." By "best learning" he made it clear that he would avoid the merely utilitarian type—the particular danger of reforms in that period as well as in our own. Yet, with all his reverence for the classics, mere gerund-grinding and book-

learning were far from comprising his concept of education; indeed, it is training for life that he has in view, otherwise culture could never illumine religion and politics, and learning itself might be merely one more watertight compartment in a purely mechanised intellectual self-satisfied cosmos.

As a matter of fact Erasmus places educational aims in their order of practical importance: piety he puts first of all; and only second the *liberal studies*—providing a richness of intellectual range and a power of intellectual discipline—the paradise of the humanist in which the emancipated mind of man breathed the fine air of classic perfection; thirdly, he places instruction in the common duties of life, the commonplace being lifted into a truer perspective; and fourthly, but with an emphasis far beyond that of our own day, he calls for the cultivation of good manners, the fine essence of these other aims working outwards in all the various human relations of the individual human being with his fellows. Such was the broad cultural scheme of Erasmus, contrasting with the self-centredness and mental parochialism of a narrow educational specialisation, military, theological or political.

Erasmus arrived in Louvain, as already emphasised, in July 1517, and a few months afterwards came the one great opportunity of his life to test his power of carrying into effect the organisation of humanism, so as to train within the limits of an endowment young men for theological, political, social, and educational needs. A rich diplomat of Flanders, Jerome Busleiden, left money to found a college for the teaching of the "Three Languages"—Latin, Greek, Hebrew. Erasmus induced the executors of the will to establish the new college at Louvain, and he himself became the unofficial director of the new institution. He had the royal gift of power of selection of the men best fitted for special work. For the teaching of Latin, he chose Adrian Barland, the enthusiastic exponent of the method of teaching Latin conversationally, who also organised the acting of Latin plays by the students. When called upon to appoint Barland's successor, Erasmus chose Conrad Goclenius, a professor whose devotion to teaching work was so exceptional that Erasmus could even pardon his publishing so little, in days when the greatest aim of scholars was to add something to "good letters."

The appointment of a teacher of Hebrew involved greater difficulty, for before coming to Louvain Erasmus himself had seriously pointed out what seemed to him the real danger of a restoration of Hebrew learning, viz. a possible revival of Judaism as against Christianity. His disinterested love of

sound scholarship, however, determined him to appoint a Jew, Matthew Adrianus, who was obviously the best man for the post. This overcoming of his own prejudices to promote humanist ideals is a striking instance of his large-mindedness.

But the humanist centre of gravity was the teaching of Greek. To this study Erasmus had devoted the best years of his own life. "The one thing I know by experience," said he, "is that we cannot achieve anything in any kind of literature without Greek." No appointment could, in his view, be more responsible than that of the Professor of Greek. He wrote to a Greek refugee teacher in Rome, John Andrew Lascaris (the teacher of the most famous contemporary Greek scholar, Guillaume Budé), begging him to send for the new chair a cultivated native Greek, who would give to his students the pure pronunciation of his native idiom. Even to-day, when the linguistic side of Greek teaching has become highly developed, the idea of the appointment of native Greeks for teaching Greek has not received much educational consideration. However, the letter to Lascaris did not bring a reply in time, and the best available northern scholar, Rutger Rescius, was appointed. One of Rescius' students, Nicholas Clenard, afterwards produced a Greek grammar, which has been the basis of all the later textbooks on the subject. Ultimately Rescius succeeded the great publisher Marten in the direction of the Louvain printing press, and he helped conspicuously in the diffusion of Greek authors. Thus with a small endowment, and small teaching staff, the College of the Three Languages under the directive influence of Erasmus, in spite of the opposition of the theologians, flourished and brought forward the new aims. The freshness and stimulating power of the material of study, and the clear mental discipline involved, made the institution an invaluable factor in the development of that educational progress. Louvain, it is well known, began in the following age to produce pioneers of knowledge, literary and scientific.

We have interesting, not to say remarkable, corroborative evidence of the stimulating mental atmosphere of Louvain in the next generation. When that noble "Apostle of the north of England," Bernard Gilpin, was just beginning his work as a parish priest, he became unsettled in his theological views. He sought advice from his uncle, Bishop Tunstall. "Go abroad," said the bishop; "spend a year or two in communication with the ablest men of either side, and study for yourself." We are told that Gilpin made his headquarters at Louvain for a long period, with this object in view. The choice of Louvain

speaks volumes for the Erasmian tradition of open-mindedness, for what Erasmus had helped to achieve educationally.

In spite of the theological buzzing that surrounded him, Erasmus is not to be judged by posterity from the theological standpoint; his was the supreme passion for the transfiguring power of humanism, a passion which made him the teacher of teachers and the leader—not of crowds but of the leaders. He was the philosopher-prince of his time in education, and through the centuries he has remained the one great "cosmopolitan educationist." The real spirit of Erasmus in promoting the transfusion of the humanist culture into divinity came to its own most markedly in the rational theology of the next century. It is reflected in the piety, joined with broad humanist conceptions of religion, of John Hales, William Chillingworth, Benjamin Whichcote, Henry More, and Jeremy Taylor. These great men were, in England, the intellectual descendants of Erasmus as well as of Plato, and the Erasmian tradition has been the best tradition of the broader section of the English Church ever since. During Erasmus's life-time, in numbers of adherents, in popular reputation, and in apparent forcefulness, Luther was the great creative success of his age—Erasmus the man of negatives. But Erasmus prepared the way for gradual organic development of the best modern spirit of intellectual emancipation. In politics it has not realised itself even yet. The masses of the body politic in England are to-day neither specialised nor humanised. Yet Erasmus's spirit speaks clearly in the best utterances of the Church to-day, as when the Bishop of Oxford, discussing Religion in Public Schools, recently declared, "An immense evil is the confusion between reverence and faith and a credulity which makes it a virtue not to enquire, and discourages the free life of the intellect. The Christian religion is totally without obscurantism and loves light for its own sake, coming from whatsoever quarter."

This pronouncement is substantially the position advocated by Erasmus four hundred years ago. Moreover, he explicitly appealed for a similar humanist spirit in politics, and particularly in international relations. The historical irony is manifest in recalling the fact that it was from Louvain that Erasmus advocated his noble humanism. With the added pathos of that city's unspeakable tragedy, the spirit of Erasmus's humanism will appeal, in the future, more irresistibly than ever to the minds and hearts of men.

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PRAYERS IN TIME OF WAR.

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It is an admitted drawback to extempore prayer as against an established liturgy that, though more likely to attract attention, it is apter to stimulate a critical frame of mind which is antagonistic to devotion, and this as much by its mere strangeness as by its natural inferiority in style and substance. The same characteristics both for good and evil attend prayers composed for the war in comparison with those to which we are more accustomed. All attend to them, few approve them, and to some they are scarcely endurable. As I happen myself to have heard chiefly those used with more or less authority in congregations of the Church of England, I shall illustrate my reflections from them, supposing them to be not very different from those in use elsewhere. It is gratefully to be granted that many of these prayers are noble in spirit and, by a laudable study of our old biblical and liturgical language, dignified in tone. It would be hard to cavil at petitions to the God who turneth even the wrath of man to his praise, and is afflicted in the afflictions of his people, that the issues of the war may be overruled for his glory and the enlargement of his kingdom, and that he would prosper all counsels which make for the restoration of a rightful and abiding peace, so that the nations of the world may be united in a former fellowship for the promotion of his glory and the good of all mankind. We ought certainly to pray for the sick and wounded, whether our own or of the enemy, and commend to the mercy of God those who fall in the service of their country. It will hurt none of us to ask for courage and loyalty, tranquillity and self-control, that we may accomplish that which is given us to do and endure that which is given us to bear; that our sailors and soldiers may be inspired with courage and endurance, with gentleness in victory and patience in reverses; or that those to whom is committed the government of our nation may be granted at

this time special gifts of wisdom and understanding, of counsel and strength, that, upholding what is right and following what is true, they may obey God's holy will and follow his divine purpose.

But we are fortunate if we escape requests more questionable both in expression and in spirit, which inevitably arouse the most controversial questions as to God's governance of the world and the right uses of prayer. Is it wise emphatically to explain to children that they are to pray because "our enemies would destroy our beautiful country, kill our strongest men and take all our money away"; or that when the Psalmist says, "They have burnt up all the houses of God in the land, they murder the widow and the stranger, and put the fatherless to death," he is describing exactly the conduct of the enemy? Petitions for a complete and speedy victory, for the removal of friction among our Allies, for steadiness in face of the long-continued strain, for protection from the snares and assaults of the enemy, for the return of Russia to a full alliance, are all apt for one reason or another to repel many from congregational devotion.

And yet, never is congregational prayer more salutary than in time of war. On whatever occasion we find ourselves practically conjoined with our fellows, it becomes peculiarly our duty to connect ourselves with them in the spirit; the very exaggeration of excitability in crowds, both for violence and for cowardice, is a temptation which makes united prayer the more necessary. If emotions are magnified by sharing, in so much greater need do they stand of the purifying criticism which comes of sharing them openly in God's sight, of laying them, as the saying is, before him. When we are joined in our enthusiasm or despondency with many or all of our associates, then we are most likely to be beset by intolerance, anger, thoughtlessness, and most in want of the heart-searchings of honest prayer. Party, country, church: to what crimes, as well as heroisms, have they not persuaded men who singly would have been innocent of both? Yet such motives when viewed in the proportions of eternity, seen as in God's sight, will certainly not suffer as against their worst enemy, our selfishness; they will indeed be purged of the selfish elements of pride and avarice and rivalry which are their curse.

We need not go to our slums or prisons, nor even to our music-halls and newspapers, we need scarcely look at our chance companions on a journey or in any public place, to learn that it is not our country as it is which can inspire

our reverence or devotion; it will be enough to look at ourselves. If patriotism is not mere pack-hunger or pack-panic, it is an ideal, and if an ideal is not to be a mere dream, it must at least find a common expression of devotion and determination. The emotional influence of the joint act of prayer is for some minds a very great one, and it may be used for two purposes: both to purify in that way our natural enthusiasms, and also to transcend our differences and hostilities. We ought to pray not only for our enemies, but with them as well as with our friends. Sometimes enmity would come to seem pitifully ridiculous in the process; but if the conviction of divergent ideals and of the duty to prosecute them should honestly persist, then that unrealised medieval ideal, now more hopeless than ever, is the right one: to partake the sacrament with your enemy before killing or being killed. If the prayers read in our parliament could again be universally attended, and could become for the first time sincere, our debates might be more honest and less acrimonious. Prayers in time of war should remind us that we have a brotherhood both in the humanity by which offences must needs come, and in the divinity that can forgive them.

Probably few will dispute that in prayer peace should preoccupy us more than victory, and, if the Pharisee and the publican be remembered, our own shortcomings more than those of the enemy. But each of these precepts raises a more disputable question of its own. Ought we to pray for victory at all? And can we honestly regard war in general or such reverses and hardships as we suffer as a punishment for our misdeeds?

The simplest spirit in which we could pray for victory would be as for something very desirable to ourselves of which the exact opposite was as desirable to an equal number of enemies, so that the result would depend partly upon a conflict of prayers corresponding to the material conflict on which it also in part depended.

But a very slight advance in reflection makes it clear that the only fit objects of prayer are things absolutely good and not merely desirable by an individual or party. All that could be said for the simple asking of favours is that, when coupled with a submission to God's will, it really involves a reconsideration of our desires in that higher light, and is at least better than the formal repetition upon Sundays of spiritual requests which bear small relation to our weekday efforts.

But the proviso of our victory being God's will really leads us to the second spirit in which we may pray for it, as for something certainly just or beneficial to mankind at large. At this stage it would be proper to emphasise that the victory we pray for is less our own than that of the side which deserves it or will make the best use of it, however we may be convinced that this is ourselves. Even here we are faced by many difficulties, of which the most obvious is that we cannot pretend to tell what is ultimately good for ourselves, still less for the world; we are really reduced to the simple petition that the will of God, who knows our necessities before we ask and our ignorance in asking, may be done. And of this the value must lie not so much in its influence on the course of events as in the adjustment of our will towards them.

It may be said that if we know so much that we feel bound in duty to pursue certain ends, either as just or as beneficial, at any sacrifice, then we know enough to pray for their achievement. But this scarcely seems to follow. We cannot refrain from acting in accordance with what knowledge we possess, and in acting we come into conflict with other men whom we may have no reason to think better informed or better disposed than ourselves. Our prayers are addressed to God.

It is sometimes urged that as men's prosperity is allowed by God to be partly proportioned to their effort, it may also be in part dependent on their prayers. But here, again, the analogy has difficulties. Since we are left free agents, efforts may admittedly be immoral, and that they are successful is no proof that they ought to have been made. It would be a paralysing thought that on our knees, however misguided, we were always taken at our word; yet if, on the other hand, only what is right and truly good for us be granted, even Plato's prayer becomes superfluous: "Grant us the good whether we ask for it or not, but keep evil from us though we pray for it." And if it be allowed that the fulfilment of our prayers might often be disastrous, it remains to ask what, so far as we can tell, is the effect of praying.

Apart from the professors of "Christian Science," most of those who pray for material benefits confine their petitions to ends capable of being brought about by some natural course, and do not neglect the activities which may contribute to their achievement. Many would pray against childlessness but few to bear children in virginity; or for long life but not for perpetual youth. Not many who pray for victory are

ready either to forgo the physical means of securing it or to make clear to themselves in what proportions they trust to God and to dry powder. Again, though he who wills the end wills the means to that end, there is a certain obscurity of thought in our manner of praying the end, but making no mention of the means which, however legitimately, we are all the time taking as the sole method of securing it. We pray that a plague may be stayed, but not for the discovery of its microbe; for those in peril on the sea, but not for the perfection of shipbuilding; for speedy victory, but not that we may invent a more poisonous gas or the enemy be quickly reduced to famine.

When we meet with greater consistency in this matter the effect upon us is apt to be shocking. The painter Haydon was convinced, if ever man was, of a great mission, for which he made great sacrifices, and his journal is full of prayers, obviously sincere, both for noble ends and for the material means of securing them: to redeem his country's art, to paint the greatest crucifixion in the world, for fifty pounds. To pray for all of these, if for any, was logical, since he could not paint in prison; but how lamentable is the contrast with the maxim of Epictetus, to pray only for divine things free from fleshly or earthly circumstance, the prayer of Socrates for such wealth as a temperate man alone can bear with, or that of Cleanthes: "Let folly be dispersed from our hearts, that we may repay thee the honours wherewith thou hast honoured us, singing praise of thy works for ever as becometh the children of men."

On a survey of all such inconsistencies it seems hard to justify prayer for any material ends. No doubt confidence is an asset upon the battlefield as on the sick-bed, and the belief that you have sold yourself to the devil for success or won God over to your side is one that prudent doctors or generals have often sought to inculcate. But it may also lead to a foolish security, and, in any case, such uses of prayer hardly commend themselves to the religious mind.

The great thing, no doubt, is to pray in earnest at all, for almost as soon as we do this, really raising ourselves into God's presence and striving in spirit and in truth to mean what we ask and to realise his will to hear us, we find ourselves unable to give any content to that will, which we pray should be done on earth as it is in heaven, other than a purely spiritual one. We can pray to be brave but not victors, moderate in our use of wealth, but not even moderately wealthy, to love our fellows but not to enjoy their love. Prayer becomes a demand upon

that divine spirit, to which no man is quite a stranger, and which any man may make at home, for deeds and thoughts of unselfishness, of energy and love; at once a striving for its vision of eternal peace and truth, and a petition for strength to maintain in every act that vision by the life of peace and truth, the life of God the Creator and Saviour of the world.

Such should be our prayers for ourselves. Before discussing what place the world should have in them, in what sense we can pray for God's kingdom to come, I should like to consider the truth of the view that our troubles are the consequences of our misdeeds.

The crudest sense in which the penitential war service is sometimes understood is only another form of the prayer for victory with the added grossness of an inducement to hear it. We may no longer be able to believe that "A gift prevails over gods, as well as reverend kings," but the idea that they may be won over by importunity in sackcloth and ashes has not entirely vanished. The notion of perpetual prayer conducted by relays of clergy suggests the mechanical praying-mill of the East, and contrition is not always free from a sense of favours to come. Certainly to obey is better than sacrifice, but it does not differ in kind if our only motive is that "Whoso doeth the will of the gods, to him they gladly hearken."

Candidly regarding the world as we know it, we must admit that prosperity is not proportioned to merit; the wicked flourish like a green bay-tree and the children of the righteous are seen begging their bread; the rain falls upon the just and upon the unjust, nor are the towers of Siloam respecters of persons. As regards justice, we can say that many innocent persons have suffered the extremity of ill-fortune, and, in respect of mere beneficence, we have no ground for supposing that the course of history has made more for the happiness of our race than any other possible course. Indeed, if we were fatalistic optimists, the spring of effort would be broken. Even the inward peace of a quiet conscience does not seem to go by desert; if we take two contemporaries whose temperaments have been very fully displayed to us, it can hardly be doubted that, of Cowper and Horace Walpole, the better was not the happier man.

We may fetch a cold and curious comfort from the speculation that though individual lives are not conformed to our ideas of desert, the affairs of nations are governed in accordance either with their merits or their potential service to the world. But though the uncertainty of the event here gives a greater

scope to conjecture, the evidence is all the other way; and even were the assumption more generally plausible, it would be far from confirming the hypothesis it is intended to support. We cannot think of God as a careless or incompetent ruler who must be content to secure his people's welfare in the gross and write off individual failures. If one innocent man ever suffered, if one event ever happened that would have caused more happiness by being otherwise, then we are assured that neither the greatest happiness of the greatest number, nor happiness in proportion to merit, is the sole divine purpose in the world. We do not hear of any good man, it is not recorded of Christ himself, that by prayer or by virtue he was immune from the pains of mind and body which our humanity inherits; but only that they encountered them with patience, and, for the sake of others, gladly.

All this is no argument for God's indifference or carelessness; not a sparrow falls to the ground without his heeding, though many sparrows fall. It is an argument that, wholesome as it may be to dwell on our shortcomings, we cannot regard them as necessarily the cause of our sufferings, and that the true object of prayer is not prosperity or success. The only particular object for which we can in quietness and confidence petition is that which we are certain is symmetrical to the will of God, but which he has to some extent left in our own power; the harmony of our wills in love and cheerfulness to life as it comes, a life never of passive happiness but of endurance, sacrifice, and victory mingled with defeat. "Lead me, O God, and I will follow," said Epictetus, "willingly if I am wise, but if not willingly, I must still follow"; and it may be asked, if this is the outcome of Christianity, how it differs from Stoical indifference or Epicurean despair, which, holds indeed, that there are gods, but that they are careless of mankind, savouring a halcyon tranquillity untroubled by the turmoil of our region. But there is all the difference in tone and feeling between the mockery or silence of Lucretius and the prayer which expects as little to bend or evade inscrutable providence, but makes known its wants with confidence to a loving Father, no spectator of our sufferings, but entering into our world to heal us by his stripes, and by his indwelling in every one of us, preferring a life of sorrow and death to an effortless and serene perfection. "Teach us, good Lord," was the prayer of Ignatius of Loyola, "to serve thee as thou deservest; to give and not to count the cost; to fight and not to heed the wounds; to toil and not to seek

for rest; to labour and not to ask for any reward save that of knowing that we do thy will."

True prayer is the "true philosophy," at once a practising how to die and a contemplation of all time and existence, or, rather, it is our measure of immortality, the contemplation of God who draws all things to himself by love. It is called by the early fathers a commerce or mingling with God and was held by the Neoplatonists to raise the soul to communion with him. "It is the life of the divine spirits and of godlike and happy men, a liberation from all earthly concerns, a life unaccompanied by human pleasures, and a flight of the alone to the alone." "*E la sua voluntade è la nostra pace.*" Only by such prayer may we also in heart and mind thither ascend and with him continually dwell.

Prayer, indeed, ought to aim at transcending the desire for victory. It is not so much that the petition for the daily bread we hunger after, or for the removal of the cup we dread, need pedantically be stifled, but that they must be taken up and finally absorbed by something wider and deeper, something in the end more eternally quenching to our immortal thirst than any earthly waters:

> "No thanks he breathed, he proffered no request,
> Rapt into still communion that transcends
> The imperfect offices of prayer and praise,
> His mind was a thanksgiving to the power
> That made him, it was blessedness and love."

The surest step to the reinstatement of prayer would be the recognition of this its proper sphere. Being unable to believe at bottom that life can ever be free from evil, we have grown half-hearted in the merely palliative prayer that the evil day should be put off, or should not come with some particular horror; that we might be delivered from plague, pestilence, and famine, or that there might be peace in our own time. The world, as we can conceive it, will always be full of suffering: of loss, of disillusion, of sordid cares and enmities, of wrecked ideals, and of unavailing love. A man cannot live long without weariness and disappointment, both in himself and others; he cannot live much longer without sickness, solitude, and decay; and in the end he must die. And even for this space he could hardly bear to live if he truly realised the pains so plentifully, and as it often seems ingeniously, devised by nature for men and animals alike: the slow cruelty of disease and starvation, or the sordid and life-long squalor which are the lot of most mankind.

In a time which we are apt to think one of unprecedented calamity, it is well to remember that these things have always been so, and that all the progress whose arrest we lament held no very immediate promise of their cure. We have set our prayers, both for ourselves and others, too much on earthly things, and have forgotten that if suffering and imperfection were unknown, there would be no room for the more heavenly things of sacrifice and effective love.

I do not think that on reflection we really desire such a fairyland. When we think we do, what we really long for is a world always a little better than this of ours; not an unthinkable void with no resisting medium against which our wings might beat, but a world of clearer and serener air, where our flight would be more swift and steady; or, in truth, our aspiration is for stronger wings and a more constant heart to carry us against the tempest and above the cloud of our own familiar region.

We have tried too little to enter into the mind of God in prayer, and so, by love rising above distance and division, and triumphing over chance and time, to share in the divine victory of suffering without despondence and death without despair, which merges our vicissitudes in the deeper pity and the wider joy of God.

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BIRMINGHAM MYSTICS OF THE MID-VICTORIAN ERA.

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BIRMINGHAM in the middle of the nineteenth century was hardly the place in which one would have expected to find the pearl of mysticism. It was then a prosperous manufacturing town of 225,000 inhabitants, belonging for the most part to the comfortable middle class, markedly Radical in politics, and thoroughly progressive and up to date in everything that concerned trade and industry. Lamps, medals, bedsteads, steel pens, chandeliers were being manufactured on every hand by small employers who had themselves been workmen a year or two before. The ecclesiastical life of the community was as vigorous as the industrial. The Church of England, having been bereft of Church Rates in 1842, was bending its energies to the erecting of ten new places of worship by means of voluntary contributions; the Wesleyan Methodists were showing a characteristic form of activity in the raising of a Centenary Fund of £2600. It was the period when the fine shaggy head, mellifluous voice, and plain, old-fashioned gospel of John Angel James were drawing large congregations to Carrs Lane Church; and when that popular and eloquent preacher, George Dawson, was persuading his fellow-townsmen to adopt the Free Libraries Act of 1850, and gathering from many quarters to his Cave of Adullam—shall we call it?—all who were distressed or had a grievance, theologically or ecclesiastically. As for the Roman Catholics, they had just erected a cathedral of Pugin Gothic within the city, at the opening of which High Mass was celebrated, with great pomp and magnificence, by the Archbishop of Trèves, the Bishops of Tournai and Chalons, assisted by eleven other bishops and a hundred and twenty priests, in the presence of the Catholic nobility of the neighbourhood and a crowded congregation.

Here indeed was a challenge openly thrown down in the very citadel of Radical, ultra-Protestant Nonconformity. No wonder the very stones of the street cried out against it. On a certain November morning in 1850 the pavements were found to have been chalked with indignant protests—"No Popery." "A curse on all priests." "Catholics are the ruin of every country."

I.

Such was the state of Birmingham when there arrived in it a young man of twenty-seven named ROBERT ALFRED VAUGHAN, who had been called to undertake the pastorate of Ebenezer Congregational Church, Steelhouse Lane. A distinguished career already lay behind him. When not yet twenty years of age he had taken his B.A. degree in London University with Classical Honours. He had subsequently studied in Halle under Tholuck, and had travelled extensively in Scotland and in Italy. In the matter of literary achievement there stood to his credit a volume of poems published in his twenty-first year, and two learned articles on Origen and Schleiermacher, the former of which Sir James Stephen considered mature enough to have been written by his grandfather.

Young Vaughan bore his honours lightly. He was a modest and unassuming person, charming in manner, amiable in disposition, and gifted with the power of attracting everyone by his engaging conversation and hearty, contagious laughter. The late Dr J. B. Paton, of Nottingham, then a student at Spring Hill College, Birmingham, testifies to the ease and fluency of speech, the rhythm and copiousness of language, the restraint of passion, the simplicity and spirituality of theme, and above all the seraphic glow of facial expression, with which Vaughan preached Sunday after Sunday. By great good fortune the young minister found that he was blessed with one of those ideal congregations—there are not a few of them in Nonconformity—which do not impose upon their pastor too great a burden of attendance on committee meetings or other wholly unprofitable business, and which know how to distinguish between faithful pastoral visitation and what Vaughan himself called the "perambulatory dissipation" of going from house to house on needless errands. The result was that he was free to devote himself to his books, to flee the world in order that he might serve the world, to retire to the lonely watch-tower of his little study and pour out his soul in the raptures, confessions, and self-upbraidings of his private diary,

or sit up far into the night reading his favourite authors, Plotinus, Dionysius, Eckhart, Jacob Boehme, Suso, Teresa, Fénelon, and Madame Guyon.

The fruit of these studies was seen in the book which bears his name, and by which he is now chiefly remembered, Vaughan's *Hours with the Mystics.* There are many weaknesses in the volume. It is marred by discursiveness, over-embellishment, and a tendency to cheap sarcasm and even caricature of the types of mysticism with which he was out of sympathy. Also, its fabric of pseudo-Socratic dialogue soon becomes very wearisome to the reader. Who wishes to discover the deep things of God by means of the familiar conversation of three gentlemen who sit chatting together over their wine and walnuts! Yet the author may be pardoned if, in breaking entirely new ground, and introducing so novel a subject as the history of Christian mysticism to the English public, he felt that something must be done to stimulate and enliven his reader's imagination. The marvel to-day is that a work of such magnitude, involving the widest and most painstaking research in the Latin, Greek, Italian, Dutch, Spanish, and Old German languages, and revealing such powers of philosophic grasp, critical acumen, penetrating analysis, and swift generalisation, should have been written by a busy Nonconformist city minister between the ages of twenty-seven and thirty-three.

Vaughan is a good representative of evangelical mysticism. Dean Inge has recently remarked that one of the most attractive characteristics of evangelical piety is its intense fervour of devotion to the person, and especially to the passion, of our Lord. This was remarkably evidenced in Vaughan. He had none of that mysticism which claims to attain to essential union with God by a more direct and living way than that of justifying faith in the atoning merits of a crucified Redeemer. His one longing was to lose himself in Christ, and to be built up into Him as a living stone, anyhow and anywhere, "whether near the foundation, dark, beneath the ground, in affliction and obscurity; or nearer one of the glorious pinnacles, in the sunshine and light of men. . . . O my God! how manifold are Thy mercies! Draw me nearer to Thyself and keep me there!"

II.

In the same year in which Vaughan entered Birmingham, a meditative youth of sixteen was apprenticed to his father's

business in Newmarket Street. JOHN HENRY SHORTHOUSE never took kindly to commercial pursuits. Letters written from his office were frequently headed "The Hole," Newmarket Street, and though he continued his connection with the firm till almost the end of his life, he was permitted, first by an indulgent father and then by an equally indulgent brother, to enjoy a holiday as often as he liked, and for as long as he might desire. What Shorthouse loved best of all was to lie on his back on a hillside during some long, lazy summer afternoon and "feel God near," as he himself put it, in the slowly fleeting clouds as they drifted over him. Or he would dream the time away reading in Tennyson's *Lotus Eaters*, or repeating aloud Longfellow's poem on *The Seaweed* to the accompanying music of the waves of the seashore. By reason of a physical defect of stammering, Shorthouse was precluded from mingling much with his fellow-citizens. He therefore, when business was over, withdrew to the privacy of home life, and buried himself among his books, poring over those treasures which he chiefly loved, the English Caroline divines of the seventeenth century.

Thus it came about that out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth sweetness. It is one of the marvels of our literary history that a Birmingham business man, of the mid-Victorian era, who had never enjoyed any special educational advantages, who had no leisure for literary pursuits save when his day's work was done, and who was of all things in the world a manufacturer of *vitriol*, should have written such a book as *John Inglesant*. We are told of a lady who refused to believe anything so absurd. "Vitriol!" she exclaimed, "vitriol! why, he ought to have been a manufacturer of *attar of roses*!" The fact remains, however, that *John Inglesant* was written by a manufacturer of vitriol, and that few more exquisitely fragrant books have been given to the world. Shorthouse himself has informed us that the chief object of the work was "to promote culture at the expense of fanaticism," and also "to depict spiritual life and growth as not exclusively the possession of the Puritan and the Ascetic." In this he has entirely succeeded. To read *John Inglesant* is to stroll through an enchanted garden of seventeenth-century mysticism and romance.

Shorthouse was born into the religious atmosphere of the Society of Friends, and he was early initiated into the secrets of Quaker simplicity, Quaker godliness, Quaker restfulness and peace, and Quaker comfort. In his twenty-seventh year, however, he joined the Church of England, on the ground that

Quaker doctrine insufficiently recognised the importance of the "whole glorious system" of Church sacraments and ordinances, and man's insistent need of ceremony and symbol in the expression and support of his religious life. Yet Shorthouse was at heart a nature-sacramentalist, and believed that *all* fair natural objects might communicate to us the influence of the Divine Spirit. He was greatly enamoured of the idea set forth in Plato's *Symposium*, that the Infinite Spirit seeks to enter human life, not only through definitely religious channels, but through "festivals and dances and sacrifices, bringing mildness and peace . . . the giver of happy life, of tenderness, of grace, of longing, and of regret"; and he wrote to Matthew Arnold, the acknowledged prophet of sweetness and light, urging him to come forward as the champion and apostle of this wider gospel. The mysticism of Shorthouse was thus really the semi-pagan, semi-pantheistic mysticism of Walter Pater, the mysticism of the artistic temperament, which rejoices in the magnificence and profusion of outward nature, vibrates to every appeal of sweet music, fair statuary, or delicious perfumes, and finds in them all but fitful gleams and faint suggestions of the still more refined enchantments of a transcendent and supersensuous world. To him the "idea of Christ" was quite enough for faith, apart from any certainty as to His actual Incarnation or Resurrection, and if an agnostic felt genuinely helped by this "idea of Christ," whatever his reasons for rejecting the historic creed might be, he was, in Shorthouse's opinion, fully entitled to take part with him in the communion service of his parish church.

There is an interesting, though rather curt, reference to the author of *Hours with the Mystics* in one of the letters of J. H. Shorthouse. "I know little of Vaughan," he wrote, "but should not recommend him. He is a Dissenter, and I am sure that none such can, properly, grasp the synthesis which unites the Catholic and the mystic." Nor did the Romanist fare any better at his hands. "I never reason with Catholics; they live in a fairy land of their own . . . not to say a fool's paradise." "The Church of Rome is hopelessly narrow and sectarian, the germ of all dissenting sects." Shorthouse was a true son of the Church of England. Though first of all fed and watered by Quakerism, the real roots of his piety were in Andrewes, Laud, Herbert, and above all in Keble, with whose nature-sacramentalism he was in fullest sympathy. Always he was haunted by the thought of "the Christian Mythos: Eternal Truth manifested in Phenomena." "I can only suppose," he once wrote to Professor Knight, "that I have been so happy

as to become for a moment the mouthpiece of one or other of those eternal truths of that eternal song which, coming down through the generations, as Plato says, from the heart of the Divine Love, is caught up now and again by one and another, who is but the string upon which the notes are played."

III.

Had either Vaughan or Shorthouse happened to be walking down Alcester Street in Birmingham in 1850, he might have met a strange, tall, thin, ascetic-looking figure, with a far-away look in his keen, penetrating eyes, and a lofty serenity and aloofness marking his whole demeanour. No one could doubt who the stranger was; it was JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, lately arrived in Birmingham, and bearing with him a Papal Brief for the establishment of a new Oratory in Edgbaston. Newman was then in his fiftieth year. The long and painful travail of his Anglican career had been recently concluded; he had passed through his novitiate at Oscott, Milan, and Rome; and he was now to begin his great and self-imposed task of seeking to win over apostate England to allegiance to the Roman see. The work was to prove very heavy—heavier, more wearing, more disappointing than he had ever dreamed; and already, on entering it, he felt himself an old man. Everywhere he was suspect, held at arm's length, kept out in the cold even by his co-religionists. Those were the days in which he was shouldering the huge burden of the Achilli trial, and the attempt to establish a Catholic University in Ireland, and vainly spending his strength in fighting the invisible giants of British prejudice, British hostility, British apathy of indifference.

Who can ever hope to solve the mystery of Newman? His was, indeed, an "open" secret, like that of great Nature herself, yet one that is all the more baffling and elusive on that account. At first we think that Newman's is a simple mind, it is so candid, naïve, ingenuous in some of its moods. But soon we find that we are wholly lost in the labyrinthine mazes of his complex personality. A doughty champion in the arena of party strife, yet all the while a child, a dreamer, an idealist, dwelling in a realm remote; one who scorned and despised the world, yet was shrewdly conversant with all its ways, and deft in using it as a tool to suit his purposes; apostle of modernism, yet a leader of obscurantism and reaction; genuine believer in the liquefaction of the blood of St Januarius, yet author of books from which Huxley undertook to compile a primer on

infidelity; the most introspective of men, yet spending his life in searching for authority without rather than within; intellectually hard, cold, glittering and analytical one moment, the next meltingly sweet, rapturously adoring, womanlike in tenderness; at all times master of a style the most sinuous and supple ever known—it is impossible to bring into one focus the many changing aspects of his mind and character.

There are two marked elements in his mysticism, however, to which attention may be directed. In the first place, his was essentially a Catholic or ecclesiastical form of mysticism, a mysticism inspired by the spell and glamour of the Church. Newman would have felt himself naked, or shivering in rags, in the bare Nonconformity of Vaughan. He could not have endured the "idea of Christ" or the green-field sacramentalism of Shorthouse. No, what his soul craved was a Church that should have all the authentic Catholic notes of unity, authority, and above all *sanctity*, a Church which should exercise its sacred functions by authorised delegation from the Apostles themselves, and which should show forth Jesus Christ worthily, and with all due magnificence, in the supreme sacrament of the altar. Having found such a Church, as he thought, Newman was able to give unbounded scope to his mystical intuitions, and splendidly rich and gorgeous those intuitions were. The Holy Catholic Church was in very deed to him a supernatural society, a Divine creation, the spouse of God, the bride of Christ, the mother of all Saints, the favoured yet awful home of the Holy Ghost, peerless in beauty, the channel of every grace, the only bestower of sanctity and immortality, bosom of repose and sanctuary from the world, the guarantor of blessedness and the peace of heaven.

From another point of view, however, the chief characteristic of Newman's mysticism was not its catholicism, but its individualism. Surrounded though he always believed himself to be by an innumerable company of saints and angels in the universal Church, Newman was nevertheless essentially a lonely voyager over the troubled sea of life. From his earlier evangelical days he inherited a feeling that there were "two, and two only, luminously self-evident beings" in the entire universe, himself and his Creator, and that consciousness never left him. He had the true mystic's sense of the presence of God everywhere. Like a man groping in the dark, he felt himself ever contending with invisible and ghostly enemies. Yet always, 'mid the encircling gloom, there was the kindly light, sent to direct his steps o'er moor and fen. And whither that light conducted him his true home was. Newman was a

genuine pilgrim of eternity. His was a spirit that chafed and fretted in this darkness, and longed to return to that everlasting Source of light and life and love from which it came. *Ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem* are the words which are inscribed on the tablet erected to his memory in Edgbaston. None better could have been chosen to describe the whole tendency of his restless and aspiring spirit.

IV.

It is very widely felt that one of the results of the present war is likely to be a revival of mystical religion. Disillusioned as to the promised benefits of a purely material civilisation, weary of mere formality and barren externalism in the life of the Church, and greatly in need of comfort and consolation, men, it is held, may be expected to feel after God, if haply they may find Him, in some more immediate and self-evidencing experience of Divine Reality. If this should be the case, it is probable that, in the future as in the past, closer fellowship with God will take many forms. Mysticism—if we may use the term not in the sense of the loss of separate personality through oneness with and absorption in the Divine, but in the more general signification of the soul's whole-hearted self-identification with the transcendental world, however it may be conceived—is not the monopoly of any one section of the Church of Christ, nor is it necessarily bound up with any stereotyped system of belief. Mysticism has the chameleon-like quality of taking on the colour, so to speak, of any background of ideas with which it may be associated. It is that authentic voice of the Holy Ghost which every man hears in his own tongue. It is the wine of divine life, which suits any chalice into which it may be poured.

If that be so, we may reasonably expect, in any mystical revival, a recurrence of each of the types above described. We shall always have the evangelical type of mysticism, which sees no possibility of union with God save through a personal act of justifying faith in the one redeeming Deed of an atoning, reigning, and sanctifying Lord. We shall also have a Catholic or ecclesiastical type of mysticism, which, by assiduous attendance at the ceremonies of the holy altar, seeks to attain to the almost dizzy rapture of eucharistic oneness with Jesus Christ, by assisting in the partaking of His blessed Body, broken and so made available for us in the supreme moment of His most pure longing and holy obedience and everlasting love. We shall also have the contribution of nature-mysticism, which

feels the sacrament of the altar too cramped and limited an expression of the all-pervading symbolism of art and nature and human life. Finally, we shall certainly have quietist or Quaker mysticism, in which the soul dispenses with sacraments altogether, closes its eyes even to the symbolism of nature and of art, and sinks into itself from thought to thought.

There is no reason why these various types should quarrel with one another. Each is partial and incomplete without the rest. Only together can they be perfected into one. The Evangelical has to learn from the Catholic how much may be gained when we are surrounded and upheld on every side by the common tradition of the universal Church, as expressed in ancient symbol and holy rite. The Catholic has to learn from the Evangelical and from the Quaker that full communion with God may be enjoyed, even though sacraments themselves should be laid aside. Both should learn from the Nature-mystic that God's most real sacramental presence is not confined to consecrated bread and wine, nor yet to any group of dedicated souls, but gleams mysteriously from everything that He has made. What is surely right is that each type should be loyal to its historic heritage and spiritual ideal, while remaining tolerant and sympathetic towards those which differ from it. Only *together* do the many-hued rays of spiritual religion make up the pure and unsullied radiance of eternal Truth.

In any case, it is the mystical element in all religious types which alone preserves them from corruption and decay. Without it, evangelical orthodoxy becomes dry scholasticism, nature-sacramentalism becomes bleak rationalism or materialism, Catholic piety becomes barren ceremonialism. Moreover, it is in this inner mystic realm that all the various types find common ground. On the surface we differ; in the depths we are agreed. In the porch we wrangle; in the inner shrine we bow. Shorthouse, Vaughan, and Newman lived at the same time and in the same city, but it is unlikely that they ever met. Probably they never tried to meet: indeed they were too far separated in years to do so. Yet, had an interview been possible, when they were in the fullness of their powers, what would have taken place? Doubtless, when the three were closeted together, Newman would immediately have dominated the little company. He was a giant, where the other two were dwarfs. Newman had more true sanctity than either Vaughan or Shorthouse. His religious life was far more loftily austere and passionately ascetic. He knew more than they did of the prolonged and bitter warfare between flesh and spirit, and the alternate pangs and raptures of inward holiness.

Had the three fallen to controversial disputation on questions of Church history, or theological dogma, or ecclesiastical polity, we know quite well what would have happened. Invisible barriers of misunderstanding and even prejudice would have risen up between them. The Roman Catholic, the Anglican, the Nonconformist, would immediately have displaced the saint, the mystic, the lover of Christ Jesus; and they would have misjudged, even if they did not unchurch, each other.

But if, instead of disputing, they had betaken themselves to prayer, and bent the knee together in repeating a collect of St Chrysostom or St Augustine, then they would have been one. Yes, and we may be sure that they are one now, in that world where purblind earthly seekers after truth see no longer darkly, but face to face. "Adversaries agree together," wrote Newman himself in one of the finest passages of his *Parochial and Plain Sermons*,—"Adversaries agree together directly they are dead, if they have lived and walked in the Holy Ghost. . . . In the world of spirits there is no difference of parties. It is our plain duty indeed here, to contend even for the details of the Truth, according to our light; and surely there is a Truth in spite of the discordance of opinions. But that Truth is at length simply discerned by the spirits of the just; human additions, human institutions, human enactments enter not with them into the unseen state. . . . [There] the harmonies combine and fill the temple, while discords and imperfections die away."

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SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

In the midst though we are of the most gigantic war of all history, the peaceful pursuit of science and philosophy continues with unabated zeal and vigour. The extent to which philosophical reflection has progressed in Germany and Austria since August 1914 we have no means of determining; but certainly in England, France, Italy, and America the progress has been steady and persistent, and those who foretold a barrenness or cessation of speculative effort have proved to be unreliable prophets. During the last few months a surprising amount of valuable original work has appeared from the press. The new volume of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (N.S., vol. xvii.; London: Williams and Norgate, 1917) shows how varied have been the fields of inquiry in which investigation has been carried on. Participating in the lively discussion which took place in Trinity College one quiet Sunday afternoon last June, when Cambridge was in the glory of her summer beauty, upon the question: "Are the Materials of Sense Affections of the Mind?" it was difficult to believe "the whole wide world was not at peace, and all men's hearts at rest," except indeed those that were troubled by the diverging views of the five papers here collected together. The volume opens with the Address of the President, Dr H. Wildon Carr, on "The Problem of Recognition." He contends that recognition is the mark of our past experience which a present novel sense-presentation bears, this mark being immediately apprehended as part of the presentation and not inferred from it. It is the resultant of learning by experience—the process by which the mind incorporates and assimilates what has gone before. Recognition may be either intelligent or instinctive, but both are of the same nature. The mind itself is an organisation of experience. All past experience has not only contributed to it but is incorporated within it, giving it character and individuality; and new sentient experience can only enter by receiving the mould or mark of this organisation. Dr Bernard Bosanquet follows with a paper on "The Function of the State in Promoting the Unity of Mankind." He argues that the ultimate end of man is, if we avoid religious phraseology, which would probably furnish the truest expression of it, the best life; and that the State is the power which, as the organ of a community, has the function of maintaining the external conditions, called rights, necessary to the best life. Professor

A. N. Whitehead contributes a very able piece of work on "The Organisation of Thought," in which he tries to trace the way in which from the crude data of sense we arrive at "the neat, trim, tidy, exact world" which is the goal of scientific reflection. Mr C. D. Broad writes on "Hume's Theory of the Credibility of Miracles," maintaining that Hume, with his views of induction, had no right to say that no possible evidence *could* make it reasonable to suppose that a miraculous exception to some law of nature had taken place. Two important discussions of value are included in the volume—one by Mr F. C. Bartlett, who contends that neither in the rudimentary attribution of value, nor in the developed value-judgment, is anything of necessity, in all cases, assumed or asserted with respect to existence; and the other by Mr W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, who thinks that every individual is himself and for himself that ideal spectator or critic to whose intelligence, will, and taste, true value is indissolubly related. Professor Lloyd Morgan's suggestive treatment of "Fact and Truth" is full of acute observations and distinctions. He differentiates (*a*) truth in the structure of the knowable world, which perhaps may never be known by us, but which is there all the same, (*b*) truth in the structure of the sphere of knowledge, the leading characteristic of which is consistency, and (*c*) truth as correspondence of the structure in the sphere of knowledge to the structure of the knowable sphere. The present writer contributes a paper on "The Basis of Critical Realism" in which he attempts to show that when the act of cognition is rightly described, it affords no ground for refusing to recognise the secondary qualities as veritably properties of material things. The view is developed in opposition to the way of regarding "minds" and "things" characteristic of the so-called "new realism." Two valuable historical articles should be mentioned—one on Malebranche by Mr Morris Ginsberg, and the other on Plotinus by Dean Inge. Finally, in addition to the symposium already mentioned, there is an interesting symposium on "The Ethical Principles of Social Reconstruction," opened by Dr L. P. Jacks, and in which Mr G. Bernard Shaw, Mr C. Delisle Burns, and Miss H. D. Oakeley took part. The volume as a whole is a good index of current philosophical thought, and ought to be widely known by those desirous of following the tendencies of modern reflection.

Professor J. S. Mackenzie has produced an exceedingly useful and suggestive book, *Elements of Constructive Philosophy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1917), which will be of considerable help to university students and to a wide circle of readers. It is written from the standpoint of Hegelian idealism, but the author has been largely influenced, he tells us, by the writings of the "New Realists," who seem to him to have done much towards clearing away the remnants of the subjective bias by which especially English philosophy has been perverted. The treatise is divided into three books. The first is concerned with the general problems of knowledge—showing the way "From Doubt to Belief," according to the sub-title,—and in it the nature and implications of belief, the import of judgment, the laws of thought, and the relation of truth and reality are dealt with. Special stress is here laid on the conception of objective order that lies in the nature of things, and a chapter is devoted to the more fundamental modes of order. The second book is occupied with some special aspects of the universe as known—"From Nature to Spirit,"—and

here qualitative and quantitative conceptions, causation, the unity of consciousness, social unity, and the problems of value, freedom, and personality fall to be considered. The third book deals with the universe as a whole—"From Chaos to Cosmos,"—and the possibility of regarding the universe as a completely ordered system is discussed. Professor Mackenzie inclines to the view that the number of existing things, as well as the number of real universals, kinds, orders, categories, or other ultimate determinations, is definite and limited; and that the infinity of the whole consists only in its rounded completeness. Written from a very different standpoint—that, namely, of the rational principles embodied in the teaching of St Thomas Aquinas and the other masters of the traditional Aristotelian Scholasticism,—Dr P. Coffey's elaborate treatise in two volumes, *Epistemology, or The Theory of Knowledge* (London: Longmans, 1917), deserves recognition as an able and acute consideration of the whole range of questions at present in the foreground of philosophical discussion. For purposes of criticism, the author confines himself, and I think he was well advised in doing so, chiefly to the Kantian system, because most modern idealist theories draw their inspiration either directly or indirectly from the three *Kritiken*, and here he makes free use of Mr H. A. Prichard's well-known work. To the present writer most of Dr Coffey's objections to idealism seem relevant and sound. He points out, for instance, the fallacy involved in the argument that whatever is an object of cognition must be immanent in the conscious subject in the sense of being a determination or modification of the latter. It is one thing to say that a reality, in order to be known, must be relative to a knower; it is quite another thing to say that a reality, in order to be real, must likewise be relative to a knower. Dr Coffey holds that all the sense qualities alike are *extramental* and are real characteristics of a domain of reality which exists independently of the perceiver's mind. And he maintains that although there are "universal" *thought*-objects—that is to say, aspects of reality, apprehended through concepts and used as predicates in judgments—there are no "universal" realities. Whatever is real, whatever actually exists or can exist, is individual. A thoughtful and, in many ways, a stimulating volume has reached us from the pen of Professor D. H. Parker, of Michigan, entitled *The Self and Nature* (Harvard University Press, 1917). Professor Parker propounds a view of the solidarity of minds, not as being parts of one mind, the Absolute, but as being connected by means of an intervening sense material. The empirical physical world is conceived by him to consist of masses of sense elements functionally related among themselves, and, above all, to one part of themselves, bodies. A mind may be said to comprise two parts—the self and the content with which the self is in contact. The self is a complex of interwoven activities—acts of desiring, feeling, thinking, etc.; the content is the complex of things of which the self is aware. There is a contact of the self with things which are no part of it; with these it makes a whole from which all things which it cannot at the moment find are excluded. The self is in immediate contact with sense elements which are a true part of nature, and these sense elements, in connection with others beyond the individual's own mind, but continuous with them, brings him into indirect touch with all other minds. All minds overlap with nature and through nature with one another. And the forces of nature are to be thought of as strivings or impulses which are attached to the sense materials they determine in exactly as immediate a

fashion as our own impulses are attached to our bodies. Thus, indirectly, through the sense elements, they and we form a single whole.

No more careful, thorough, and, in every respect, admirable piece of critical work has appeared for a long time than that of Professor James Gibson on *Locke's Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1917). Professor Gibson has written once for all *the* book on Locke, and has furnished everything that a conscientious student of the *Essay* requires for mastering its contents. The first half of the volume is devoted to an exposition of Locke's doctrine—an exposition which while studiously fair and bent upon bringing out the full force of the philosopher's meaning is yet judiciously critical in pointing to the difficulties and inconsistencies inherent in the lines of thought pursued. The second part deals with the relations of Locke's doctrine to Scholasticism, to the Cartesian and the contemporary English philosophy, and to the systems of Leibniz and Kant. It is pointed out that the Kantian theory is dominated throughout by the antithesis between the abstract universal and a mere manifold of sense impressions, whereas in Locke's more naïf view, the need of a *tertium quid* to mediate between sense and thought does not exist, since their functions have not been set over against each other in this absolute way. One is bound to confess that, as compared with Professor Gibson's painstaking thoroughness, the Princeton University Lectures on *Platonism* by Mr P. Elmer More (Princeton University Press, 1917) create an unfavourable impression. The writer tells us that his purpose has been to lay the foundation for a series of studies on the origins and early environment of Christianity and on such more modern movements as the English revival of philosophic religion in the seventeenth century and the rise of romanticism in the eighteenth, for he is of opinion that behind all these movements the strongest single influence has been the perilous spirit of liberation brought into the world by the disciple of Socrates. But he traverses the Platonic dialogues with seven-league boots and settles difficult and perplexing questions of interpretation in an off-hand and confident way. His main thesis appears to be that the Ideas were for Plato primarily ethical in their nature, imaginative projections of the facts of the moral consciousness. Hence, the varying terms which Plato gives to their operation. "They are always, as products of the imagination, objective entities, separate (χωριστά) from the world of phenomena and from the soul itself, but at one time he may speak of them as patterns (παραδείγματα), laid up in heaven or in some undefined region, to which we look as models to mould our conduct by, or, at another time, he may speak of them as visitants to the soul, neither exactly corporeal nor yet incorporeal, by whose presence (παρουσία) we possess the qualities of which they are the substance, or, more vaguely still, as mere forces (δυνάμεις) that play upon us and make us what we are." One can only say that if this be Platonism, Plato has been a much overrated man.

Mr Bertrand Russell's *Mysticism and Logic, and other Essays* (London: Longmans, 1918) will be welcomed by many readers. The essay which gives its title to the book originally appeared in the *Hibbert Journal*. "The Free Man's Worship" and "The Study of Mathematics" were included in a former collection. But philosophical students will be glad to have the essay on "The Relation of Sense-data to Physics," which has been difficult to procure, as also the address to the Manchester Philosophical Society on

"The Ultimate Constituents of Matter." Mr Douglas Ainslie has translated the second volume of Benedetto Croce's *Filosofia dello Spirito*, under the title *Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept* (London: Macmillan, 1917). In many respects this may be said to be Croce's greatest work. Croce himself describes it as an attempt to exhibit the significance of the concrete universal and of the concrete individual, as a vindication of the Aristotelian *scientia est de universalibus* and of Campanella's *scientia est de singularibus*. The empty generalisations and fictitious riches which are thus removed from philosophy appear, he tells us, to be more than amply compensated for by the restitution to it of its own riches, *of the whole of history*, not only that known as human but that known as history of nature. We trust that the appearance of the work in English will secure for it the attention it merits in this country. Dr H. Wildon Carr's new book on *The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce* (London: Macmillan, 1917), which is reviewed by Professor J. A. Smith in this number of the *Hibbert Journal*, will serve as an admirable guide to the study of Croce's speculative system.

Dr James Drever's *Instinct in Man* (Cambridge University Press, 1917) is an interesting study of a difficult and embarrassing department of psychology. Two of the early chapters are devoted to a sketch of the history of the subject from Hobbes to Darwin and Weismann; and the body of the work is taken up with a discussion of recent views—those, namely, of Bergson, Lloyd Morgan, Myers, Stout, and M'Dougall. The author develops a theory of his own, that instinct is conscious impulse when and so far as it is not itself determined by previous experience, but only determined in experience, while itself determining experience, in conjunction with the nature of objects or situations determining experience as sensation. Particularly worthy of consideration is his treatment of the nature of the cognitive element in instinct.

Two articles in *Mind* deserve special attention. The one is Mr W. E. Johnson's extremely suggestive "Analysis of Thinking" (Jan. 1918). Mr Johnson introduces a useful term when he describes the different ways of thinking about an object as difference in our *characterising* of this object. The distinction and connection between substantive and adjective corresponds to, and in his view *explains*, the distinction and connection between particular and universal. Ultimately a universal means an adjective that may characterise a particular, and a particular means a substantive that may be characterised by a universal. The Aristotelian dictum that the universal exists, not apart from, but *in* the particular, he interprets to mean that the adjective exists, not apart from, but as *characterising* its substantive; to which he would add that the substantive exists, not apart from, but as *characterised* by its adjective. The other article to which I allude is that of Professor J. Laird on "Recollection, Association, and Memory" (Oct. 1917). It is an attempt to interpret the facts of recollection and memory in accordance with the principles of the "new realism." Professor Laird maintains that memory is direct acquaintance with past events themselves, and that if the events appear to be poorer and feebler when recalled than on their original occurrence, the explanation is that lapse of time makes our grip of them less secure. I confess the argument of the paper does not seem to me convincing, but it is a valiant effort to meet the difficulties with which the "new realism" is here confronted.

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REVIEWS

Immortality: An Essay in Discovery co-ordinating Scientific, Psychical, and Biblical Research. By Burnett H. Streeter, A. Clutton-Brock, C. W. Emmet, J. A. Hadfield, the Author of *Pro Christo et Ecclesia.* —London: Macmillan & Co., 1917.—Pp. xiv+380.

Co-operation in dealing with religious problems has recently been much in evidence. On this method it is not easy to secure unity and consistency, and there is apt to be overlapping. But it has the merit of showing us how various minds approach the subject, as well as the different points they are disposed to emphasise. In this case the danger of lack of unity has been minimised by previous conferences and discussions. In the Introduction by Canon Streeter we are told that the essayists are not all competent to speak with authority on every subject treated, and some things said by one writer would have been said with a different emphasis by another, still "the book is put forward on the corporate responsibility of all the contributors," and "presents a connected train of thought and a coherent point of view." A perusal of the book confirms the statement; and while some of the essays are better than others, the discussion never falls below an adequate level, and is uniformly well conducted.

Mr Clutton-Brock is responsible for a short contribution at the beginning entitled "Presuppositions and Prejudgments," and later in the volume for an essay "A Dream of Heaven." He likes to put things strongly and vividly, and some of his points are important. He rightly insists that what is of value is not processes, but persons: the salvation of an abstraction called the race is without value if persons are sacrificed to it. But some of Mr Clutton-Brock's statements are not convincing. He objects to the denial of immortality to animals—and here Canon Streeter is in sympathy with him. When the latter suggests that animals may somehow achieve personality, one wonders on what grounds he says so. The difficulty of course is, that man's special claim to immortality lies in the fact that he is a self-conscious centre of interest and value; and one cannot affirm this of the lower creatures. Mr. Clutton-Brock's assertion that the individual wishes to survive needs qualification; and in his justifiable repudiation of the mechanical conception of the universe he does not note the most cogent reason for its rejection—its abstractness and its inadequacy. In his "Dream of Heaven" he objects to the conventional heaven where men "are made good by losing their character," and asks if any of us are "fit for a life without the struggle for life." He

seems to hold that the future life is a coming to our true home by getting rid of the phantoms and unrealities of this world, by escaping from the tyranny of the past, by losing all status and beginning afresh. It is a mistake, he says, to suppose God punishes us in this world or the other, which may be good news for some. On the whole, the essay is neither very profound nor very impressive. Salvation is more than deliverance from unreality: it is deliverance from sin. Continuity between the future life and the present is ethically necessary; and liberation from the sinful past must come through an inner process of suffering which spells moral retribution.

Dr Hadfield's essay on "Mind and Brain" can be heartily commended. It is lucid, well expressed, and well informed, and at points is effectively illustrated from the writer's hospital experience. One finds little to criticise in it. It would have been well if the author could have dealt with the theory of psycho-physical parallelism, which is important in this connexion. The reference on pp. 68–9 to Dr McDougall's explanation of how memory is facilitated by the presence of meaning seems to miss the point. For it is not the volitional aspect of memory that McDougall is emphasising so much as the need of postulating psychical dispositions over and above cerebral traces. And perhaps Dr Hadfield might have strengthened his general argument by showing how function determines structure in organic development. The essay is excellently adapted for its purpose.

From the pen of Canon Streeter come two essays: "The Resurrection of the Dead," and "Life in the World to Come." In the former Mr Streeter begins by urging that, if God is personal and Father, the conservation of value will be a principle of the universe: not our achievement, but divine Love is the guarantee of our survival. In one aspect, he points out, the resurrection of the dead was a protest against the ghost-theory of Sheol. It was associated with the cruder ideas of Apocalyptic, but these were implicitly rejected by Christ. He refers to the Pauline conception of the spiritual body as a body adapted to the life of the spirit, and suggests the capacity of the soul to build up an organism to meet its new needs. The material identity of the present and the future body is properly rejected. As to the resurrection of Christ, Canon Streeter would interpret it in the light of Christ's own teaching and that of Paul: on the details of the accounts left us of the resurrection he feels too much confidence should not be placed. The essay is an able and a broad-minded one. But I think the author, when he is considering the relation of space and time to the future life, treats the Kantian theory with too much respect; and his own suggestion that space may be necessary to individuality certainly requires explanation.

Canon Streeter's other paper, on "Life in the World to Come," is meant to be a "tentative suggestion for a solution." With some things in it most people will agree, as when he lays stress on the need of progress in the world to come, while also confessing that there must be "something unrealised and unguessed at" in the future life. Nor will reasonable persons quarrel with his assertion, that the old conceptions of Heaven and Hell "are intellectually discredited, even at the level of education which the Elementary School has made universal." If I were to criticise, it would be on the score that the writer appears to attach too little weight to the transcendent aspect of the life hereafter. His suggestion that in the life

to come the soul may have free movement from world to world carries over into the next life too much of the imagery of this life; and the same may be said of the notion that a future life which excluded kindly humour would be unsatisfactory! Nevertheless Canon Streeter is quite aware of the defects of popular theology. He says truly that "one of the reasons why so few people are interested in the Heaven of popular theology is that the picture it presents to the imagination of the life of the blessed suggests a life of unbroken monotony." And his idea is at least suggestive, that a growing knowledge of the world to come will issue from a fuller realisation of the kingdom of God on earth.

In his paper on the "Bible and Hell" Mr Emmet gives a scholarly and helpful review of the evidence. He believes that the traditional teaching of the Church on this matter has been a source of widespread revolt against Christianity: it is therefore obligatory to consider carefully the passages in Scripture on which the Church's eschatology is based. Mr Emmet has not much difficulty in showing that the doctrine of eternal punishment in Hell has not such definite warrant in the Bible as was once believed. With a single exception, no passage in the Old Testament teaches the punishment of the wicked after death. The notion, however, is prominent in Apocalyptic literature. In the New Testament the doctrine is found in 2 Peter, Jude, and Revelation, but these fall into line with the Apocalyptic books. It is also distinctly present in Matthew, where, however, the phrase "æonian fire" means only age-long, without necessarily implying eternal duration. The passage Matt. xxiv. 31 ff.—one of the strongest evidences for the traditional view—is apocalyptic in colouring; and while Mr Emmet thinks the parable may go back to Jesus, a good deal in the phraseology is a modification of his original words. In the Græco-Roman world the key to the right interpretation of the apocalyptic element in Scripture had been lost, and this helps to explain the development of the idea of Hell. Mr Emmet of course recognises that the main objection to eternal punishment is the moral objection. Any tolerable view of the fate of the wicked must, he admits, "go beyond the explicit teaching of the New Testament." As to the difficulty he finds in believing in the annihilation of any personality, plainly much depends on whether a personality may cease to become a centre of value or not.

The three last essays are by the author of *Pro Christo et Ecclesia.* The first of these is on "The Good and Evil of Spiritualism." In many respects this is a very good paper, critical but quite free of prejudice. Miss Dougall points out that spiritualistic phenomena can generally be explained by telepathy, or by sub-conscious activity, or in some cases by clairvoyance. Interesting examples are given to show that the source of the medium's knowledge is often telepathic impression from the inquirer. Yet the writer is not unsympathetic. She does not think the devotion of many truth-loving people to spiritualism can be explained "unless they had some true experience which cast a glamour of apparent truth over much that was false." Few at least will disagree with the writer that there is a case for dispassionate investigation. But the assertion that the real cause of the hold of spiritualism is the Church's failure "to realise in practice the meaning of the communion of saints" is more than doubtful. The tendency to spiritualism and occultism is widespread, and it has its roots in primitive beliefs and practices. Throughout Miss Dougall seems to assume that the activity of discarnate spirits is possible or even probable. Yet

a good deal might be said for the view that a discarnate spirit is an abstraction, and spiritual activity always implies an organism of some kind. That pure disembodied spirits may exist ought not to be tacitly assumed.

The last essay is on "The Undiscovered Country." It is not, we are told, the mere fact of survival about which people are concerned. The writer expects some greater assurance about the future to come by "confidence of prayer and travail of thought." As to the causes of disappointment about the answer to prayer she remarks: "God could not give us what we want, if He gave us what we think we want." I should rather say that people as a rule are not mistaken about their wants, but that they often want what would not satisfy or be good for them. Miss Dougall believes that with increasing knowledge of God, He will give us increasing knowledge about our dead. This can only be verified by experience. But I think we should remember Immortality is primarily an ethical postulate; and the postulate cannot be made to yield any knowledge about the character and content of the future life. And for men who only "see through a glass darkly," the last word on this matter will be said by faith. There is one point on which Miss Dougall insists at the close of her suggestive paper, and it is true and important. We do not exalt God by supposing human personalities are somehow absorbed in Him. The goal which is sought in Immortality is rather a growing definition of the self through fellowship with God and other selves.

Within the limits which the authors have set to themselves, their work is a serious and helpful contribution to a great problem. Yet one regrets that the philosophical side of the subject remains so much in the background. No discussion of Immortality can be complete which neglects the philosophical aspect of the question. But the book is a symptom of fresh interest in an old theme, and also of the decay of some time-honoured prejudices.

George Galloway.

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The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce: The Problem of Art and History. By H. Wildon Carr.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1917. Pp. x+215.

For some years past the attention of English students of the movements of philosophic thought has been more and more drawn in the direction of Italy. It had for long been evident that the hegemony in philosophy had passed away from Germany, and new light and inspiration were sought elsewhere—in France or America, or, by some adventurous spirits, as far afield as Russia. It did not at first occur to anyone even to explore the possibilities of Italy. That curious figure Thomas Davidson had indeed at a time preached that the truth was to be found in the works of Rosmini, but his call was in vain. Through Höffding we had learned of Roberto Ardigò, but again without any quickening of interest in what appeared a not peculiarly striking variety of Positivism. At the suggestion of Mr Bosanquet we had examined the attempt of Varisco to work out an idealistic interpretation of reality. The names of other Italian writers, such as Aliotta, had become familiar to us, and reviews of Italian treatises began more frequently to appear in *Mind.* The mathematical

and logical theories of Peano and his school had been introduced to us by Mr Russell and others. To the omnivorous reading of Professor Taylor we owe other hints and clues to the importance of Italian philosophic work, and an allusion to Croce's novel theory of Art had been made by Mr Balfour in his Romanes lecture at Oxford. But the interest aroused was not very widespread; it was curious rather than sanguine, it was diffuse and undirected, and but feebly competed with that excited by the originality of M. Bergson and the literary skill with which he presented facet after facet of his doctrine.

Of late, however, there has been a change. To our surprise our roving eye has been attracted past Milan and Padua and Rome to the south of Italy, which we had—at least most of us—supposed to be sunk in profound philosophic slumber. We had forgotten that there was one at least of the sources of Scholasticism or revived Aristotelianism, we had forgotten St Thomas Aquinas, Campanella, Bruno, Vico, and we had misjudged the important neo-Hegelian movement at the modern University of Naples by connecting it solely with the rigid, and indeed extravagant, orthodoxy of Vera. We were quite unprepared to find there any new thing in philosophy, and incredulous when its existence was reported to us. Yet the conviction began to grow that there perhaps was to be found the most promising germ of new philosophic life in Europe.

Dr Carr, whose eyes are wide awake to descry the signs of the times, and whose gifts are specially adapted to introduce new ideas to a wider public than that to which most philosophical writers in this country appeal, has in his present work done for Croce what he had done for Bergson. He has taken great pains to familiarise himself with the leading ideas of his author, sets them forth clearly and often with felicitous illustration, and skilfully conducts his reader on a first visit to the many-chambered edifice of Croce's system. He is sparing in criticism, though he does not conceal difficulties and hints at reserves. It is an admirable introduction to the further and more detailed study of Croce's views, and those who share his estimate of the importance of those views must be grateful to him for his lucid and attractive exposition of them. His work is of value not only to beginners, but also to those who have attempted to rearrange for their own use the material distributed over the many volumes, papers, and articles in which these views were originally set forth. It is no light task to epitomise so vast a contribution to thought, and to do so with so much justice and sense of proportion as Dr Carr has done, even with the assistance of the manuscript epitome of his philosophical doctrine which Croce himself furnished to the author. The present reviewer, who desires to take this occasion to acknowledge the help and light which he has for many years derived from Croce's works—a debt beyond repayment, and for which no gratitude can be enough—has no hesitation in testifying to the understanding faithfulness of Dr Carr's exposition. It is for the present not Dr Carr's aim to furnish a critical estimate, and still less a technical examination, of Croce's doctrines, and it is to be hoped he may be moved to continue his studies in this direction; and assuredly such an endeavour would be welcome, one may venture to predict, to Croce himself, and certainly would be valuable to the more advanced students of his works. The knowledge of Italian is not as yet so general among such students that such aid as Dr Carr's can be spared, and there is much to be regretted in the form in which other-

wise Croce's most important works have been presented to the English readers (though there are exceptions, such as the translation by Mr Collingwood of the book on the Philosophy of Vico).

This is not the occasion to attempt even in outline an account of Croce's system, but a few general remarks may be added which may perhaps serve to increase the interest which Dr Carr's book will tend to excite and foster. Croce's philosophy is one which has sprung out of the needs of life, and especially of his own life. It is singular in respect of the fact that that life has been the life not of a man of action (out of which a formal philosophy has rarely arisen), nor the life of a man of science (which was more commonly the case in earlier times), but the life of an industrious and erudite historian. Even his interest in Art—which led him to present his general views first in relation to a theory of Art—is incidental to that. The first paper in which he made his "esordii negli studî filosofici" was significantly entitled *La storia ridotta sotto il concetto generale dell' Arte*, and the last part of his *Filosofia dello Spirito* (published in 1917) returns to his first love and crowns the exposition of his system with a *Teoria e storia della storiographia*. Doubtless he has many other interests, as many other influences than that of his assiduous practice of historical investigation have contributed to mould his mind, but the concern with the problems which arise insistently before the thoughtful historian is continuous and dominant. It is this which gives the special accent of modernity to this philosophy, for the forms of philosophic problem dictated by the perplexities of the physical scientist begin to wear a somewhat old-fashioned air. In these days it is the puzzles that spring from the reflective contemplation of the vast and moving drama of history that press most urgently for an answer—a change of which we are all more or less conscious. In comparison even the philosophy of Bergson appears a little belated. It is necessary to stress this because of the generous readiness with which Croce himself always avows his indebtedness to his historical predecessors. The mistake is only too likely to be made that his original contribution is a mere restatement in altered language of Hegelianism. That would be not merely an error, but a downright perversion of the truth. What is true is that he claims—and with justice—to stand in the great catholic succession of "Idealism," while at the same time to have developed the vital germ to new and vigorous life by a genuine spiritual evolution. His thought is original without being eccentric or isolated. No one who is not ashamed to confess that he has learned from Hegel has more drastically cut away dead branches from the living stock, or shown so little regard for pedantic orthodoxy. His system is his own, the fruit of his own wide experience, and the creation of his own laborious thought. It is full of novelties and paradoxes which arrest and challenge. And above all, it is a living and growing thing.

For the purposes of exposition he has given it the form of a system, and for that we cannot be too grateful. But this does not mean that its evolution is at an end, and that the vital process is over and has deposited its results in a dead rigidity. Nor does the many-sided polemic mean that he is defending a mass of foregone conclusions. We can trace a constant change of view (*elle a bon changé sur la route*), but the change has proceeded without breaks or jumps. He has never pretermitted criticism of his own results, and in submitting them to others he presents them with no claim

to finality, but as instruments for their use in further labour. He does not conceal the magnitude of these changes, nor hesitate to acknowledge that under the stimulation of friends like Gentile he has overcome prejudices and renounced errors.

What first attracted attention in this country was his theory of art, and Dr Carr has done wisely to begin his exposition with that. But it is not the whole nor the main nor the central part of his philosophy. What dominates and vitalises the whole is the doctrine that mind or spirit is the sole and whole Real. That leads straight to his fundamental doctrine of the unity of philosophy and history, and from that to his many innovations in logic, ethics, and economics. We do wrong to each of his surprising theories in these fields if we isolate them from their context, and indeed, so divorced, they become severally unintelligible. Against this disturbing and misleading separation Dr Carr's survey supplies us with a remedy. He enables us to discount the influence of the angle of approach and guides us to the centre from which the parts fall into their proper perspective and proportion, revealing the principles of architecture which have governed the structure of the system.

If one may venture a word of criticism of Croce's whole position, it would be one which seems at times to pierce through Dr Carr's account. It is that Croce is apt to lay too much emphasis upon certain hard-and-fast distinctions—a malady (if it is a malady) incident to his beautifully clear and orderly mind—to a degree which seems to imperil the unity of the mind or spirit itself. Is the quaternity of the forms or grades of mind more than a device of exposition, most potently useful or commodious in the economy of mind, yet not ultimate, but requiring further "deduction"? The insistence upon the "autonomy" of art and philosophy, of economics and ethics, yea, even of theory and practice, is most valuable (for the distinctions in all three cases have been most fatally blurred), but is the *dominium eminens* of mind not thereby rather thrust into the background? Does "the unity of the spirit" not too often appear (when it appears at all) as a *deus ex machina*? And does not the interrelation of its "forms" have too much the guise of that between the parts of an aggregate? Co-operation is repeatedly insisted upon, but is co-operation possible except upon a basis of identity? This criticism is urged in no spirit of antagonism, but in the hope that the problem will attract the attention of the profound and powerful mind whose thought has suggested it. The slowly acquired conviction, of which Croce himself has informed us, of the identity of philosophy and history seems to point to renewed meditation on just this problem, and much that transpires in the last volume of the *Filosofia dello Spirito*, while in appearance threatening the "tidiness" of the old distinctions, gives hope that a revision, which will not demolish but will justify and reinstate, is not too much to hope for. In the meantime most of us have much to learn from what we have, and to those who, under Dr Carr's guidance, make their first acquaintance with Croce's thought as it stands, there can be safely promised much advance in clearness of mind—at least the opportunity of deliverance for many Idola of the market-place and the theatre.

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Christianity in History: A Study of Religious Development. By J. Vernon Bartlet and A. J. Carlyle.—London: Macmillan, 1917.—Pp. xix+613.

"Ce retour continuel de la pensée théologique au passé, pour s'y vivifier, a le grand avantage d'assurer la continuité de l'enseignement."—Louis Saltet.

The indebtedness of primitive Christianity to the Jewish Church cannot be questioned. The Christian Church accepted the Jewish Scriptures as divinely inspired, and retained, with modifications, the Jewish idea of God and of His relation to the world. Dr Bartlet is in no way anxious to disparage Judaism in order to endow Christianity with an originality it cannot justly lay claim to. When the Christian religion was transplanted to Greek soil, the influence of Greek philosophic ideas became supreme in the development of Nicene doctrine. The author frankly admits this. Later, when the Roman mind was captivated by Christianity, it unified and petrified church worship and organisation in the interests of uniformity, and at the same time put an end to the free development of Christian thought. This is also lucidly shown in the volume. Dr Carlyle adds that when Christianity spread into Teutonic countries it was further modified in the direction of nationalism under the influence of the Teutonic type of mind. Thus modern Christianity is the product of the combined influence of four types of mind differing in temper and habits of thought.

The authors survey the whole period of Christian history in a scientific spirit; they exhibit a judgment that is remarkably free from prejudice, and have produced a work that is a notable addition to English theological literature.

Nearly a century ago the Tübingen School insisted on bringing Church dogmas to the bar of psychology, and on interpreting Christian traditions in the light of the general history of the race. Since those days the science of the comparative study of religion, then in its infancy, has made great progress, and has strengthened, rather than weakened, the standpoint of this school. The difference between a scientific re-interpretation of Christianity and the so-called orthodoxy of the old type will be clearly seen by a perusal of this volume. The "sweet reasonableness" of the book is one of the signs of the times, and cannot fail to appeal to fair-minded readers. It will help to mould religious thought in the direction of liberalism. External authority, whether it be that of an infallible book or of an infallible Church, has failed to solve the problems involved in the Christian religion. What Dr Bartlet says of the Jewish Law as "given as a temporary method of discipline until, through self-knowledge, man should be ready for closer union with God" (p. 62) is applicable to external authority in religion. Primitive Christianity, however, had something which was peculiarly its own. This specific possession was obscured the greater the distance which separated it from its Founder became. It is necessary to go back to Jesus in order to take up anew the fundamental truth of his religion. The author explains the distinctive message of Jesus. He made the possession of a "filial attitude" of the soul towards God the essence of religion.

By his adoption of the title "the Son of Man," Jesus sought to emphasise his meaning; for this title, which he borrowed from Jewish Apocalyptic writings, signified for him a sense of oneness with mankind, and *ipso facto* with God. It meant humanity at the highest level of its spiritual develop-

ment, and at that level the sense of "sonship" to God is the chief feature of the religious consciousness. "Son of Man" and "Son of God" are two aspects of the same consciousness. The first, however, implies frailty and limitation, inseparable from humanity; the latter implies "authority." Jesus, in his teaching, made his own consciousness typical. His followers could enter with him into the Kingdom, the fundamental principle of which was a "sense of oneness with men and with God." The Kingdom "had come" in the person of Jesus in virtue of this consciousness, and it would continue "to come" in so far as the "filial spirit" possessed men and controlled their life. He took over into his religion the Hebrew idea of God as "personal" and "active," and it was this idea, enriched with the idea of Fatherhood, that gave to human "personality" its supreme value. Man as the child of the Heavenly Father is destined to become perfect like the Father, and all interests must be subordinated to his well-being. Religion is true in so far as it awakens man to a sense of his sonship to God and of his brotherhood to men, and enables him to realise the high ideal implied in his humanity. Jesus clothed the title "Son of Man" with the rôle of the "suffering servant" of the second Isaiah, and he succeeded in making his followers accept the "new type of Messiah," although they for a long time expected the "old type of Kingdom" (p. 43).

This exposition is attractive, though many theologians will be unwilling to accept as final the appeal to the religious consciousness of Jesus to solve the problem of his "person." In our opinion Dr Bartlet is right in making psychology the final court of appeal on this question. He overlooks the fact that in one account in the Second Gospel Jesus is made to hesitate as to identifying himself with "the Son of Man" until his trial at Jerusalem, and that he sought to prevent others who ventured to do so from making it known. This suggests that there was a development in Jesus' Messianic consciousness throughout his ministry. Dr Bartlet attaches no importance to the New Testament miracles as evidence of the divine origin of Christianity. The Epistles of Paul, the Hebrews, and the Johannine writings are regarded as emphasising the same central truth in different ways. Paul has been misunderstood, it is argued. The righteousness he so frequently speaks of meant for him "real rightness of soul and of outward conduct." He makes the "filial spirit" the essence of his gospel. His conversion signified the difference between his Jewish consciousness of God and His law as external, and his new sense of God as within him. The change was wrought by the "Son of God" revealed in him, or, in other words, by his discovery that the filial relationship to God reconciles the soul to God, assures him of divine forgiveness, and awakens in him a moral enthusiasm that overcomes his tendency to sin.

Dr Bartlet's analysis of Paul's religious consciousness is full, and it has an element of freshness in it. The influence of Paul on the future of Christianity was immense, that of Jesus alone being greater. Paul brought out clearly the universal nature of the Gospel, and, in the author's view, neither his legalistic method of interpreting the Gospel, nor his mysticism, when viewed in the light of his experience, is a sufficient reason for basing on his teaching the doctrine of the Atonement as developed in Church theology, nor the sacerdotal theory of the Eucharist as the medium of grace. On this latter point Dr Bartlet differs from Dr Kirsopp Lake, who admits that Roman Catholicism interprets Paul aright, but argues that Paul borrowed his idea from the mystery religion of Greece (*Earlier*

Epistles of Paul). Dr Bartlet, however, enables us to link our own religious experience to that of the New Testament writers, and at the same time to accept fully the guidance offered us by modern knowledge.

The key to the Nicene theology is the Logos-idea of Hellenistic thought. To the Greek mind God signified an Absolute, and an Absence of Activity. The Logos was evolved to relate Him to the world. When the Church writers identified the Christ of the New Testament with the Logos, the emphasis was removed from the "experimental" to the "theoretical" aspect of religion, greatly to its disadvantage. In Dr Bartlet's opinion, the Trinity as a dogma of the Church was not fully evolved before the fifth century. He does not, however, regard Arianism as representing primitive Christianity better than Athanasianism. The main thesis of Athanasius (*ὁ λόγος ἐνηνθρώπησιν ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν*) is, nevertheless, a Greek, and not a Christian idea.

The section on Episcopacy, Sacraments, and Church Government is interesting. The influence of the Synagogue on the Church is analysed, and it is admitted that Paganism also exerted some influence. In the opinion of the writer of these notes the extent to which Paganism modified Church thought and practice was much greater than is allowed in this volume. Saint-Yves errs on the other side when he writes: "L'église du Seigneur, qui est aussi la communauté des saints, a remplacé . . . la cité de Zeus par laquelle les stoïciens exprimaient la communauté des sages. Mais l'une continue l'autre." Christianity, throughout, claimed to be the only true religion, but it developed by borrowing Greek ideas to explain its Christ, and Roman methods to rule its organisations.

The difficult Middle Ages and the growth of Canon Law are dealt with by the expert hand of Dr Carlyle. His treatment is, however, too brief to do full justice to the contending schools of thought in that period. Tridentine and Reformation theology is clearly although very briefly reviewed, and the reader will find modern views discussed. More detailed account of the difference between the teaching of the Greek Church and that of the Roman Church as to the Eucharist would add to the value of the work.

One is rather surprised to find such men as Hübmaier, Roger Williams, John Milton, Priestley, Channing, Tolstoi, T. H. Green, and the Cairds passed over in silence. Mention is made of the Presbyterians adopting the policy of a non-subscribing "trust deed," but no explanation is offered of why they did so. The history of Christianity in the United States of America is not touched upon.

The book leaves a salutary impression. The authors are satisfied with the faith that rests on the belief that "the truly human is divine," that accepts the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, that makes the freedom of man and his well-being the supreme ideal of service, and that sanctifies service, however humble, which issues from disinterested love for God and man.

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Priest of the Ideal. By Stephen Graham.—London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. vi+404. 1917.

This is a book which will please the mystic, exasperate the man of science, and at times bewilder the ordinary novel-reader—not in respect to the plot, which is simplicity itself, but in respect to the ideas which it contains, which are often unconventional and certainly in the narrow sense unorthodox. Therein lies, perhaps, the chief charm, or at least attraction, of the book to those of an inquiring mind. It offers a new vision of things, suggests intimations of the subtle spiritual influences at work to-day, and sets forth a creed at once novel and yet as old as the hills, or at least as the Sermon on the Mount. It may not always be successful in revealing the new Shechinah, but the inspiration is there, the new afflatus is there, even if it blows at times somewhat fitfully and in an uncertain fashion.

Washington King, an American, comes over to England with a view of buying up religious antiquities of all sorts and kinds. America, rich in everything that concerns this world's goods, is lacking in spiritual background, and Washington King, as the head of a syndicate representing three billion dollars, is open to purchase anything, from a minor cathedral to a sanctuary door-knocker. He becomes acquainted with an Englishman, Richard Hampden, who stands for a new spirit in the English Church, and together they make a pilgrimage round the English holy places, beginning with Glastonbury, the cradle of English Christianity, and passing thence through Ireland, Iona, and Holy Island to Durham and York, "the full midday" of mediæval Christian England. The two pilgrims are animated with a very different spirit. Hampden is anxious to see if the renaissance of spiritual wonder and reverence has reached these places; Washington King is on the look-out to buy up anything in the way of what may be called back numbers or remainders among our numerous and often little appreciated ancient monuments and antiquities. The pilgrimage is one of the most successful parts of the book. As one might expect, Stephen Graham makes an admirable cicerone, and recalls again and again the subtle *religio loci* of each of these "landmarks" in the history of Christian England. From time to time Hampden, who is a lay preacher, delivers sermons which are often very beautiful. That on sanctuaries is specially to be commended. A sanctuary may be the House of God, Christ Himself, a woman's love, prayers, or "even a beautiful poem like *Innisfree*." Hampden discusses the old practice of sanctuary, of "shielding criminals from their just doom" by allowing them to take refuge in church—intolerable, as he ironically hints, to our current ideas of justice. And yet, perhaps, Becket, standing up for the Church and its milder *régime* for the treatment of clerical criminals, was not so far from the proper way of dealing with all criminals, lay and clerical alike, as Henry II. and his bloody statutes of Clarendon. We are beginning to-day at last to learn that justice without mercy and the possibility of redemption is a singularly onesided, not to say lopsided, ideal. It may cure the wrong, but it leaves the wrongdoer in a state of permanent inferiority and therefore a perpetual source of future danger; whereas if we cured the wrongdoer, then there would be few wrongs left to right.

In the same sermon occurs the following remarkable passage, which

may be quoted as a sign of the Zeitgeist and the representation of the idea of the Matriarchy in its most extreme form:—

"In England we have left out of our religious expression the beautiful image of the Virgin. And in vain. Man kneels to woman and woman kneels to God. The womanly is the highest revelation of beauty in love. At the last the male will disappear and there will be only the spiritual feminine, the bride of Christ!"

Sometimes Stephen Graham himself puts on the surplice and preaches on the meaning of England, which is really a poetical sketch of the history of the English Church. But generally he prefers to speak through the mouth of Hampden. Another point of view is represented by Griffiths, the Nonconformist preacher who believes in historical Christianity of the progressive type. Griffiths maintains that first there was the abomination of Rome. No! says Hampden. First there was Christ—rightly beginning with the positive and not the negative conception. He adds, "That old ship of State of yours is a ramshackle concern," thereby indicating the growing feeling in many quarters that the excessive cult of the State as representing temporal power has already passed its apogee.

After York the two pilgrims part company. Washington King goes to London and enlists the services of a multi-millionaire proprietor of newspapers named Poldu, who, in return for gigantic advertisements of his mission, booms Washington King, and later on attacks and rends him when he finds the public turning against him. In the end, King gives up his materialist quest with that "real generous enthusiasm which is so bright a quality of his countrymen," and volunteers for service in a Canadian regiment. Meanwhile, the book concentrates more and more round Hampden, who is gradually revealed as the *porte-parole* of a new evangel. Many beautiful and striking things are said by him, and yet the final effect, in spite of many fine sayings, is not completely satisfying. It is always dangerous to put on the stage a Napoleon, Shakespeare, or Buddha, or any great imaginative character.

Here are some of the memorabilia of Hampden:—

(1) "I am trying to make life more beautiful by redeeming the common things, by finding out what lovely things we have lost or forgotten, by reinterpreting symbols and emblems which have become dead. . . . I want . . . to open the eyes of those who cannot see spiritual things, and to unseal the ears of those who cannot hear the music that is always going on." (2) "Men are in Christ: in Him, in his love, in His soul. . . . There is no *many* men and women, there is only *one*." (A remarkable restatement of a doctrine common alike to the great Christian and Hindoo mystics.) (3) "The Church insists on *I and my Father* are one, and forgets or wilfully omits the equal truth that *I and my brothers* are one." (The spirit of Eastern solidarity so necessary to counterpoise Western individuality.) (4) Hampden's prayer: "Reclaim . . . reinterpret . . . come again upon earth, *be born in someone again*, be in me . . . work the miracles again. . . . Redeem once more—England . . . and all of us." (5) "Some places have mystical names. . . . If God in heaven called Washington King by his mystical name, his heart would stop, as the spirit left the house. . . . If you love a woman, you whisper her real name and you are in her presence." (6) "Keep the impure and the drunken and the meretricious and dishonest, at least, *in the Church*." (7) "It is a delusion to think we are all separate individuals with separate destinies. We are all ultimately one flesh and one spirit: Hell has gone for ever, unless hell is that condition in which individuals persist in asking to have separate destinies." (8) Hampden "used to hope he was going on after death to fuller and fuller personal realisation of God"; and, believing in reincarnation, he wrote, "Now I know that the chances are all the human race to one man that if I am born again I shall reappear as one of the least in the kingdom. . . . I may reappear as someone whom it might be possible for me to despise now." (9) "Christ lived and died to show one, not to show us, to be an infinite series of ambitious personalities. . . . Mankind adds up to unity." (10) "'Tis the wish of all the earth . . .

to live to the utter glory of God." (11) "We are not slaves . . . I hold myself free for Divine adventure." (12) "The pool is he who receives and gives not. The river is he who, though he always gives, yet does not dry up and is fed miraculously from above." (13) "If the Spirit of Truth feels and cares, it glories in being expressed in our daily life." (14) "That which hangs on your walls is reflected in your souls." (15) "Collecting is the beginning of decay; self-expression the beginning of new life." (16) "Christ did not do miracles so much as live miraculously." (17) "If my neighbour, my near one, is at fault, I must be also; if he ails, then am I also unwell." (18) "It is the spiritual life which like a flower throws a marvellous blossom into the visible world, but has a mysterious secret life of the spirit in the dark earth. About you is a wonderful world of nature beckoning you, enticing you to *become*." (Surely in these two phrases we have the thought that lies deepest in some of the great masters of the poetry of nature.) (19) "Ye are to look *creatively* on men." (20) "God can only be found through the beautiful and the suffering." (21) "Thousands are working for peace, for European peace, for universal peace, for everlasting peace, but not for peace in a human heart, not for the rule of love in individual lives." (22) "The visible Church stands in the way of spiritual consciousness. . . . The sects are too exclusive. Christ Himself could not pass the strict examination of the Roman; He would not perhaps be at home among the Baptists; He would grow cold listening to the way we worship Him in the Church of England." (23) "All men are wounded and at odds to-day, because of the sense of separation."

Perhaps these stray texts may illustrate as well as anything else the fact that the *Priest of the Ideal* is above all a pioneer book, with all the qualities and some of the defects of such works. Our age is tired of the purely negative, critical, and fissiparous type of mind whose logical outcome is that organised orgy of destruction known as the present war. It longs for something that is positive, synthetic, catholic, and makes for unity. If we understand Stephen Graham's message aright, it is that men should rather try to interpret and understand than to judge and condemn. For understanding leads to love, but judgment to division. In any case, the solemn excommunication of ideas is as much an anachronism as the old ecclesiastical anathema. As a matter of fact, ideas cannot be excommunicated. All we can do is to ban or banish them from our narrow little circle. They will go on existing if they are true, for, if we cannot exist without ideas, they can certainly exist without us.

CLOUDESLEY BRERETON.

LONDON.

EDITORIAL ANNOUNCEMENT.

WITH deep regret the Editor has to inform his readers that under present conditions it is impossible to obtain sufficient paper to maintain the size of the Journal and to meet the demands of its large circulation. A first reduction in the number of pages was made some time ago, after due announcement, and it was hoped that this would be sufficient to tide us over the difficult period. But further restrictions have been imposed, and it is again necessary to appeal to the goodwill and patience of our constituency. On the very first opportunity we shall restore the Journal to its original size, and present the same type and the same quality of paper as that with which it first appeared sixteen years ago. We shall endeavour to meet our difficulties with the interests of the reader constantly in view, our first object being to maintain the intrinsic qualities of the matter we have to offer him. By severe economy of space, and by typographical arrangements, the actual reduction of the matter presented will be much less than would appear from a counting of pages. This applies in particular to the articles, of which we hope to continue publishing in each issue about the same number as heretofore. How long these restrictions may be necessary it is of course impossible to foresee. It is unfortunate that they should have to be faced at a moment when thought is exceptionally active on subjects that fall within our province, and when the supply of matter at our command is both copious and varied. But we must make the best of the inevitable, and hope that our readers will accept the difficulties of the situation in the same spirit. They belong to the common burden of the times.



THE

HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS.

SIR ROLAND K. WILSON, BART.

Of the many schemes of reconstruction after the war, the greater part relate to internal social reform; but there are two others, quite as keenly discussed, and quite as necessary to be discussed, which relate to our external policy. It has been usual to treat them quite independently of each other, owing probably to the fact that they commend themselves specially to thinkers of different types; and those who are most enthusiastic about one are apt to be lukewarm about the other.

A "League of Nations" is the favourite ideal of those who hold with Edith Cavell that "patriotism is not enough"; whose chief preoccupation is with the best means of preventing the recurrence of war and minimising the necessity for warlike preparations; and who are quite willing to submit the claims of their own country to an international tribunal if other nations will do the same.

"The Commonwealth of Nations," on the other hand, as meaning a closer union than exists at present, and on more equal terms, between Great Britain and her five semi-independent "Dominions," is advocated by Mr Curtis in the "Round Table" series of papers, with the avowed object of making the dominant white population of the polyglot British Empire better able to hold their own against any probable combination of foreign Powers, or against any insubordination on the part of the subject races within the Empire; in short, to be as far as possible independent of the good-will of the rest of the world.

It seems worth while to inquire how far these two ideals are compatible, and, if and so far as they are incompatible, which ought to give way to the other.

Much lip service has been given, both in the press and in Parliament, to the principle of a League of Nations to be constituted immediately after the war, and as a part of the settlement; but there has been no approach, so far, to general agreement as to the form it should take. The least ambitious scheme, propounded before the war by an American statesman,[1] is limited to constituting an international tribunal prepared to hear and determine all "justiciable" disputes that may be submitted to it, and to getting as many Powers as possible to pledge themselves by treaty to resort to that tribunal, and to abide by its award, instead of going to war; leaving those who refuse to be brought to reason, if possible, by the force of public opinion, and leaving to chance, without any definite provision, the application in the last resort of some form of coercive action. At the other extreme we have that eminent Socialist and anti-Imperialist, Mr J. A. Hobson,[2] who will not be satisfied by anything short of a pledge by every national Government to place a specified contingent at the disposal of an international executive, which is to be responsible to an international parliament, composed of elected representatives of all civilised States, great or small, in some rough proportion to population; the mode of election to be prescribed by each nation for its own representatives, but the author's strong wish being that it should be generally democratic, and that they should at all events not be mere nominees of their respective Foreign Offices. Between these extremes come the various proposals of Mr Lowes Dickinson, Sir F. Pollock, Lord Bryce, Lord Parker, and others.

Now, whichever of these schemes any one of us may happen to prefer, and whichever may ultimately be tried, it will hardly be disputed that the working out of it in practice must be a matter of extreme delicacy, and that success will be impossible without a very large measure of general good-will. The crux of the problem, therefore, is to discover the political arrangements which will be best adapted to maximise this general good-will and to counteract the impulses which are constantly driving men and nations into attitudes of antagonism. What has history, and especially modern history, to teach us on this subject?

It is common knowledge that in all the European wars in

[1] Ex-President Taft.

[2] *Towards International Government*, p. 175.

which England has played a part since the Peace of Westphalia (1648) a very influential, if not predominant, motive has been the maintenance of the Balance of Power—in other words, preventing any one Power from acquiring such a superiority as to be able to impose its will on all the rest. Cromwell's alliance with France against Spain is an apparent exception, due perhaps to imperfect information as to the internal weakness of the latter Power and the growing strength of the former, coupled with the fact that France was at that time the less uncompromisingly and intolerantly Catholic of the two. In the wars of William III. and Anne the overweening power of France was unmistakably the provocative cause of coalitions which had little to recommend them on the score of natural sympathy. The same motive is clearly traceable in the anti-French wars of our two first Georges, first in conjunction with Austria against Prussia, and then with Prussia against Austria; our partners being changed, but our real enemy being always France. Then comes a brief period during which, in consequence of the victorious ministry of the elder Pitt, England rather than France is the object of general dread and jealousy, and the American revolt is eagerly seized upon as giving an opportunity for a coalition against her, which is sufficiently successful to remove all serious danger from that quarter, leaving the field clear for such minor intrigues and quarrels as fill up the interval between 1782 and 1792. Then, as the result of the Revolution, France becomes once more the *bête noire* of Europe, and with better reason than ever before, coming actually within measurable distance of something like universal dominion, and only pushed back within her old frontiers by twenty-three years of continuous fighting on the part of England, and intermittent coalitions of the jarring Continental States. In spite of the leading part played by England in this titanic struggle, and the very considerable gains accruing to her in the final settlement, we did not at this time become in our turn the object of general dread, or the target of hostile coalitions. Our naval supremacy did not conflict with any ambitions which any Continental Power had yet begun to cherish, and was so effectually counterbalanced by the smallness of our army that the Balance of Power was not appreciably affected.

The next European bugbear was Russia. German writers got into the way of comparing their disunited Fatherland with Greece on the eve of absorption by Macedonian militarism, and we on our part allowed ourselves to be flustered into the senseless and disastrous Affghan War of 1840 by quite

imaginary alarms for the safety of our Indian Empire. Then, when the prestige of the Northern Colossus had been shattered in the Crimean War, France once more, with another Napoleon at her head, came to be regarded as the chief menace to the sacrosanct Balance. That fear, inspired not so much by any real evidence of superior strength as by the restlessness of the Imperial adventurer, was skilfully exploited by Bismarck in furtherance of his schemes for the forcible unification of Germany under Prussian hegemony; and his object was so completely attained by the war of 1870–71, that from that time forward Germany, with Austria as her semi-dependent partner, began slowly to fill the stage as the chief object of dread and jealousy. The process was slow, because each of the other great Powers cherished aims which brought it into more immediate conflict with one of the others than with Germany; and so long as Bismarck was at the helm he took the fullest advantage of this fact by secretly stimulating the ambition of each in turn, while posing as the "honest broker." In England, especially, Russophobia continued to be the dominant obsession down to the Russo-Japanese War, only partly mitigated during the two Gladstonian administrations; while the unwise eagerness of the French for colonial expansion brought us more frequently into diplomatic embroilments with them than with the Germans. So long as Queen Victoria lived, her natural pro-German sympathies worked in the same direction. At one moment, during the Boer War, we ourselves were actually pointed at as the chief disturbers of the Balance of Power, and nothing but the irreconcilable disagreement over Alsace-Lorraine prevented a Franco-German coalition against us. Only from 1904 was it generally recognised that from Germany, if anywhere, would come the next bid for universal dominion.

That bid, as we continue to hope, and as we must assume for the purpose of this discussion, is not going to be made good. But will the nations therefore cease to think in terms of Balance of Power? I fear not. With or without a formal League of Nations, it is inevitable that, if one Power is conspicuously stronger than the others, it should be in the first instance the object of special anxiety and suspicion, only to be allayed, if at all, by persistent manifestation of a peaceable and unselfish disposition. And in calculating relative strength for this purpose account will have to be taken, not only of the range of formal sovereignty, but of "spheres of influence." The smaller States, however nominally independent, and even if proportionally represented as such in an International Congress, will generally be led by racial affinity, or

economic dependence, or love, or fear, to lean on one of their big neighbours rather than another, and to vote and act accordingly. There will be a tendency, which humanitarian influences will have a hard struggle to overcome, for the three or four next largest States to combine against what we may call the super-State simply in order to reduce its power, without much regard for the merits of any particular dispute in which it may happen to be engaged; and this is just as likely to be attempted through the machinery of an international council and an international tribunal as outside of them. There is much truth in what Baron Sonnino said in the Italian Parliament on February 23, 1918: "A certain equilibrium of strength is an essential condition for the sincere constitution and the practical efficacy of the League of Nations. If one or two States should have a great preponderance everywhere, there would be no guarantee that they would not arbitrarily impose their will on the entire world."

Now, supposing this estimate of human motives to be anything like the truth, and the war to have been victoriously concluded on some such terms as those outlined by President Wilson, where shall we stand? One has only to consult *Whitaker* to see that, if area and population were the only things that counted, the British Empire would be at the present moment incomparably the greatest power on the planet—"occupying about one-quarter of the surface, and its population exceeding one-quarter of the estimated number of the human race." The next in point of area was, until the recent break-up, Russia, but smaller by rather more than one-third; next to Russia, but a very long way behind, France with her dependencies and China (nearly equal). In population the only empire coming anywhere near us is China, with its conjectural 325 millions. If area and population under the same nominal allegiance had been the only determining factors in ranking "Powers" according to *power*, we should have been already before the war by far the worst offenders against the "Balance" principle. That we were never very seriously regarded in that light was partly due to our policy of free trade and the open door, but still more to the fact that it seemed to foreign critics quite an open question how much of this vast aggregate should be counted on the *plus* and how much on the *minus* side in the event of war: whether, for instance, the 315 millions of India would require a stronger European force on the spot to prevent them from rebelling than the native forces that we should be able to utilise for foreign service; whether South Africa would be on our side

or against us; whether Nationalist Ireland would consider England's difficulty to be her opportunity; and whether Australia and Canada would be sufficiently interested in a quarrel not of their making to put forth any serious effort on our behalf.

Taking note of, and, as it turned out, overestimating, these elements of weakness, the Prussian war-party seems to have been less influenced by fear of our attacking them than by hopes of being able to prick the pretentious bubble and to help themselves out of its fragments, pitting their youthful vigour against our supposed senility and decadence. This mistake is not likely to be made a second time; it is more likely, supposing the war to end in the defeat of the Central Empires, that the tendency will be, for some time to come, rather to overrate the intrinsic strength and cohesion of our so-called Empire, and to overlook the large part played by good fortune and German brutality in preventing its disruption.

Moreover, it looks as though, in spite of all disclaimers, however emphatic and sincere, of imperialistic ambitions, certain not inconsiderable additions to the unwieldy aggregate were going to be forced upon us by circumstances beyond our control. Even the Inter-allied Labour Delegates, with the best will in the world, could not see their way to any practical application of the "no annexation" formula in either Asia or Africa. The futility of their alternative suggestion, that backward races, unfit to govern themselves, should be governed by an International Commission, must be manifest to anyone at all accustomed to political thinking. History does not supply us with a complete experiment on such lines; but the partial experiments that have been tried—the Macedonian Commission of 1908, the dual control of Egypt by England and France (1876–1882), and that of Persia by England and Russia (1907)—fully confirm the homely wisdom expressed in the proverb about too many cooks. The adjustment of specific disputes by a supernational authority—a task which most of us are trying hard, with but moderate success, to persuade ourselves to believe possible—would be mere child's-play compared with that of actually governing large backward countries through a Commission of mixed nationality in such a way as at once to secure the proper development of their resources and to protect the natives against oppression. There is no half-way house in such cases between leaving native rule, or misrule, severely alone and giving an international mandate to some one protecting Power, as was done practically in the cases of Egypt and Morocco.

Considerations of humanity, as well as pressure from our South African "fellow-subjects," will veto restitution of German possessions on that continent. We might ask France to take charge of Togoland and the Cameroons; but as regards the South-West and East colonies, the choice must lie between direct government from Downing Street and Afrikander government from Pretoria; in either case possibly, though not very probably, qualified by an international guarantee of certain broad principles of administration. And so with those provinces of Asiatic Turkey which, by the admission of even the Labour delegates, cannot without inhumanity be handed back to their recent oppressors. Local autonomy may here be practicable, but hardly without some measure of European protection and supervision, which, for the reason above indicated, should be confided by international mandate, or tacit acquiescence, to some one Power for each province; and after the best use has been made of France, Italy, and Greece, we shall hardly be able to escape some share of the common burden.

As the result of these changes, and of the temporary eclipse of Russia, our "Empire" will stand forth more than ever as, superficially, by far the greatest on the globe. It may not be really so powerful, for offence or defence, as the more compact American Republic, or even as enlarged France or curtailed Germany; but it will have the outward appearance of being so, and will be proportionately a mark for envy and suspicion, unless special measures are taken to allay such feelings. What measures can be taken for this purpose? There are, of course, many details of administration which will afford opportunities for the manifestation of a brotherly, humanitarian spirit, but this by itself will barely suffice; and for this reason I make bold to suggest, well knowing what an explosive region of sentiment I shall be entering, a much more drastic system of national self-denial.

The policy for which I ask serious consideration is this: that whenever circumstances are thought to compel an expansion of British dominion in one direction, an effort should be made to balance it by withdrawal of control in some other direction. I do not mean that the two transactions must exactly synchronise. The right season for each must depend on its own conditions: the one on the manifest need of the proposed new subjects for our tutelage; the other on the ripening of capacity for self-government in an old dependency, as the result of long familiarity with British methods and ideals. Take India, for instance. Thoughtful politicians are

at present divided in opinion as to whether the time is near or remote when it will be safe and beneficial to commit the government of that vast Empire, or of any part of it, entirely to native hands. Weighty arguments are adduced on both sides. Advocates of early emancipation can point to the high level of capacity displayed by a limited number of Indians in commerce, in the legal and medical professions, in literature and science, and (what is more directly to the purpose) in every administrative post open to them, including the highest post of all in native States; the many inconveniences inseparable from government by a handful of officials who are aliens in the fullest sense of the term, not only born and bred on the other side of the globe, but keeping their families there, and returning thither as soon as they have earned their pensions; the further inconvenience of the last word in every matter of importance resting with a Secretary of State who has never (with one recent exception) set foot in India at all. On the other side it is still possible to argue, with considerable though diminishing force, that these educated Indians, the only available successors of the present British rulers, are "a microscopic minority" among the enormous and heterogeneous mass of illiterates, speaking 147 different dialects, and with few traditions of any unit of self-government larger than the village, and to infer from this that the withdrawal of British control would be the signal for such an orgy of anarchy as we are now witnessing in Russia. Apart from the consideration above hinted at, perhaps most of us might be inclined to the policy of indefinite postponement; but in case of anything like an even balance of other factors, the scale ought surely to be turned by the hope of contributing to the peace of the world by the addition to the number of approximately equal States. If we once grant the possibility of an independent Indian Empire holding together and making some approach to Western standards of good government, we must also recognise that its entrance into the League of Nations would contribute both negatively and positively to the stability and efficiency of that body. Negatively, because such an act of renunciation on the part of Great Britain would go far towards rectifying the balance of power, and allaying the jealous feelings that any new extension, however just and beneficent, would otherwise provoke. Positively, by bringing to the International Congress a fresh point of view, and by increasing the number of approximately equal members, whose collective judgment it would thereby become more difficult for any single Power to mislead or defy. That India is not ripe for democracy, most people will agree.

That independence must necessarily wait till democracy is practicable, and that no form of indigenous government can be devised which would fit the conditions as well as government from Downing Street, are negative propositions much less easy to prove. Let us leave it at that, and proceed to another class of cases presenting very different features, namely, that of our five "Dominions," which are already independent with respect to nearly everything except questions of peace and war.

Mr Curtis, in his two quaintly named books, *The Commonwealth of Nations* and *The Problem of the Commonwealth*, has shown convincingly that we are now at the parting of the ways, and that the choice lies between complete separation and closer union on a footing of equality; the latter alternative implying that the United Kingdom, no less than the Dominions, will have to sacrifice some part of its present independence as the price of membership in a greater whole. His view has been to that extent endorsed by most of our leading statesmen; and though the details of his scheme have been freely criticised, and that part of it which would have made the Dominions co-partners with the Mother Country in the government of India is not likely to survive the storm of indignation that it aroused in that quarter, no one, so far as I know, has been bold enough to express a preference for the alternative of separation. That this should be the case during the present war crisis is entirely natural. Close and cordial union is the first condition of success in the all-important business of the hour, and the premature contemplation of possible future contingencies in which its perpetuation as a formal bond might be more harmful than helpful would be rightly deprecated as inopportune, unless there were a danger of some irreparable step in the contrary sense being taken without due consideration under the impulse of the moment. If a man and woman have been drawn into close intimacy by some stress of emotion and call for joint effort, as where a life precious to both of them has been at stake, it may be a kindly (though unwelcome) act to warn them, before that transient phase of sentiment is clinched by marriage, of some impediment that they would have deemed prohibitive in a cooler moment. Similarly, it should not be deemed inconsistent with the fullest appreciation of that union which has been our strength in the present crisis to set down in black and white, for calm consideration when the war tension has relaxed, certain reasons for preferring, as a permanent arrangement, the completest independence consistent with common membership of the larger brotherhood

of nations to any form of Imperial Federation, and to deprecate in the meantime any hasty committal in the opposite direction.

I start from the proposition that peace and righteousness, not peace alone and at any price—not such a peace as may exist between master and slave,—is the proper aim of all political thinking. And I accept as a corollary to that proposition the duty of encouraging to the utmost among well-disposed nations the habit of combining to put Might on the side of Right in any quarrel that may arise. I have already given some reasons for thinking that the effective working, either of a formal League of Nations with supernational authority, or of spontaneous combinations *ad hoc* when the need arises, will depend very largely on the number of participating States of which the size and strength approximate to equality. If there be two or three Powers vastly superior to the rest, each expected to speak as with one voice in the General Council, the representation of diverse interests will be very imperfect, and the collective decision, on whatever principle the votes are counted, will command comparatively little respect.

It was very well for Mr Asquith to declare, at the outset of the war, that we were fighting for the rights of small States; but there is no getting over the fact that both abnormally large and abnormally small States are a source of danger, somewhat analogous to that arising from extremes of wealth and poverty within each State. While violent absorption of existing small States by their big neighbours is by all means to be resisted, and while instances may possibly be found in which the creation of a new independent State of less than normal size may seem to be demanded by the peculiar history of some hitherto subject community, the general rule of international policy should be to favour all voluntary arrangements for combining unduly small into medium-sized political units. Serbia and Montenegro, Belgium and Holland, may serve as examples.

The objection of insufficient magnitude will not, however, apply to the Australian Commonwealth, nor to Canada, nor to South Africa; still less if it should be deemed expedient that on separation Australia should take charge of New Guinea and some of the Pacific islands, and the South Africans of what was known as German South-West Africa. It may perhaps be thought to apply to New Zealand and to Newfoundland; and those colonies might reasonably be invited to choose between union with Australia and Canada respectively, and remaining in their present relation to Great Britain.

Assuming the gain to international equilibrium, and thereby to the world at large, from these separations to have been established, it only remains to consider the probable loss or gain to the Mother Country and to the ex-dependencies respectively.

But here it may be well to state expressly that the present argument has nothing to do with the highly ingenious and interesting speculation mooted in the HIBBERT JOURNAL for October 1917, as to the probable effect of permanently eliminating war (supposing such a thing possible) on the cohesion of the existing war-made and man-made Empires. My own preference of amicable separation as the alternative to close and equal federation in the case of "nations" (Mr Curtis's phrase) so distant, so fully developed, and so well able to stand alone, as are Australia, Canada, and South Africa, is in no way conditional on other Powers ceasing to be "fighting units," nor does it imply any expectation or desire that Great Britain should forthwith cease to be a fighting unit. I advocate it, not as a possible final outcome of a completely successful League of Nations, but as the first step, involving more apparent than real sacrifice on our part, towards diffusing among civilised peoples that atmosphere of comparative moderation and goodwill without which the proposed attempt, in any case enormously difficult, will be absolutely impossible.

For the Mother Country there will be a certain diminution of prestige, against which may be set a corresponding diminution in the feelings of envy and spite which the enormous extent, and *apparent* strength, of the Empire as enlarged after and in consequence of the war would be calculated to provoke. The diminution of *real* strength is not so easy to estimate, because we have no arithmetical calculus for the psychological factors involved. It may no doubt be possible, when this war is finished, to set a money value on the assistance afforded to us from first to last by the Dominions; but how to weigh the probable amount of assistance to be obtained from them, as units in Mr Curtis's *Commonwealth of Nations*, for any future war (for or against which they will certainly have had an opportunity of voting, but for that very reason may feel sore at being outvoted), against the chances of their intervention on our side as independent allies, or as fellow-members of the same international super-State? All we can say is, that, assuming the separation to have been effected, as here proposed, in an entirely amicable spirit, and on the further assumption (which it will be for our post-war statesmen to

make good) that in the next war our cause will be one that will commend itself to all well-disposed nations, we shall have stronger reasons for expecting from them, than we had this time for expecting from the United States, either active support or a very benevolent neutrality. If the war is one to enforce the judgment of a League of Nations actually in being, we shall not only have their pledged co-operation in the actual conflict, but we probably shall have had their separately counted votes in the preliminary proceedings.

Even apart from the chances of spontaneous aid from her ex-dependencies, I see no reason to doubt that the intrinsic strength of the Mother Country will still be fully adequate to all legitimate demands on her as one of the great Powers; that we shall be able to play an honourable and useful part in any formal or informal League of Nations, or, failing the establishment of such a League, to defend our homeland and our dependencies against any one Power, and to retain sufficient command of the sea to prevent ourselves from being starved into submission. I say deliberately "any one Power," because I hold that henceforth it will be a crime against humanity, so long as there is any reasonable hope of effective international solidarity, for a single State to aim at placing itself in a position to defy a combination of other States. The two-Power standard may still be right and proper for our navy, but only on condition that this maritime superiority is balanced by the modest scale of our military establishment.

In speaking of the United Kingdom, it will perhaps be safer, while the political future of Ireland is in the melting-pot, to think of it as limited to Great Britain. It is deplorable that it should be so. The geographical and other conditions which have led all of us to approve the more than semi-independence already enjoyed by the overseas Dominions, and some of us to regard with equanimity the possible severance of the remaining links, have no application to Ireland. Geography points strongly to a union nearly if not quite as close as that between England and Scotland, while the deep-seated traditional antagonisms within the sister island forbid any but the faintest hopes of internal harmony and social progress being achieved through either autonomy of the colonial pattern or complete independence. But we must be prepared for the possibility of being forced to grant either one or the other, as the only way of escape from the still more hateful alternative of having permanently to hold down the sister island by force.

If for these reasons we provisionally leave Ireland out of

the account, we have in Great Britain, as constituting the heart of the Empire, a population of about forty-one millions, concentrated on an area of not quite ninety thousand square miles. That will represent about two-thirds of the population and rather less than half the area of the German Empire as reduced by the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine. As compared with France, including Alsace-Lorraine, it will be about the same in point of population, considerably less than half in area. How we shall compare with Russia and Austria-Hungary it is impossible to say until we know the result of the civil war in the former country, and of the international settlement as affecting the latter. But in the distribution of power in the New Europe, so far as it can be at present forecasted, there is nothing to indicate that our relative position will be weaker than before. If, as we must continue to hope, a solution of the Irish problem is found which will be consistent with a union of hearts as well as of forces, the above estimate will be altered in our favour to an extent more than proportionate to the actual difference of area and population.

As for the United States of America, with their hundred million population and their continental area of nearly three million square miles, and their still unexhausted possibilities of internal growth, unless their national character is surprisingly changed through their participation in this war, neither the New Europe generally nor Great Britain in particular will have much cause to worry about their size and potential strength. Forcible annexation of an independent Canada is even more unthinkable than would be an attack upon it while still a member of the British Empire. Voluntary incorporation will become less likely in proportion as civilised people generally learn to think internationally, and to realise the advantage of approximate equality of States for the smooth working of a League of Nations. But it is even more unlikely that if it does take place it will be motived by any aggressive intentions as against Europe, and it will be no more our business than that of any other European State to raise objection.

Where we stand to gain most of all by the separation is in being able to dissociate ourselves from any quarrels in which either Australians or South Africans may be involved in consequence of the somewhat illiberal views at present prevailing in those quarters on the subject of non-European immigrants. To us of the Mother Country it would be a great advantage to be able in this way to simplify our diplomacy. Would it be any real disadvantage to the colonials? I think not. It might, for instance, well prove a blessing in disguise to the

Australians to be so far thrown on their own resources as to be forced to reconsider their "White Australia" policy, to be more careful to cultivate amicable relations with Japan and other Powers affected by it, and at the same time to realise the importance, in view of possible conflicts, of filling up as quickly as possible, without excessive regard to race or colour, the wide vacant spaces of the fifth continent.

The conclusion to which all this points is that, if we sincerely desire for our country the blessing of the peace-makers, combined with that of those who hunger and thirst after righteousness, our first step should be to disarm jealousy, and set a much-needed example of self-denial, by contracting rather than extending the red line wherever that can be done without betraying any weak peoples who need and desire our protection; and in particular by encouraging (though by no means compelling) the "Dominions" to take upon themselves the full responsibilities of independent nationhood, limited only by (1) the impalpable bonds of old association with the Mother Country, and (2) by such new ties as both mother and daughters may succeed in forming with the larger brotherhood (or cousinhood) of civilised, justice-loving States. The necessity for at once labouring for peace and preparing for war in their own way, and primarily on their own responsibility, will bring out whatever aptitudes for high statesmanship they may possess much better than mere representation by delegates in an assembly sitting at Westminster; while it will by no means preclude a fairly confident anticipation that in case of an unprovoked attack they will have not only material help from the Mother Country, but her influence as a European Power in bringing about such a general combination against the aggressor as that which we are now witnessing.

The Round Table ideal has a certain nobility of its own, but, at least as seen through the present writer's spectacles, it pales before the larger hope here outlined; and whole-hearted devotion to both will be found, if not a logical, a psychological impossibility.

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NATIONALISM, INTERNATIONALISM, AND SUPERNATIONALISM.

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During the last century, ever since the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the principle of Nationality has occupied a joint throne with the dogma of Liberalism. Neither commands to-day unquestioning obedience. Liberalism, as interpreted by the disciples of Bentham, has landed us, so men are apt to assert, in social and economic anarchy at home. Nationalism, finding its apotheosis in the sovereignty of the absolute State, has similarly conduced to anarchy abroad. Be the indictment against Liberalism and Nationalism flimsy or substantial, there can be no question that the suspicion is widely entertained. But the fashionable revolt against the orthodox doctrines of the nineteenth century is tending towards a further paradox. Men seek to redress the evils arising from the doctrine of *laisser-faire* by invoking in domestic affairs the assistance of the State; in the field of international politics they seek to restrain the omnipotence of the State by infringing its sovereign rights, and by erecting a supernational authority. But the paradox is superficial rather than substantial. In both cases men are feeling after a corrective to unrestrained individualism. In both, they invoke the intervention of authority. The authority must, however, derive not from the will of the ruler, but from the assent of the governed. The State, if it is to be vested with large powers for the restraint of the individual citizen, must rest upon a democratic basis. The supernational authority, if admitted at all, must be the organ of a League not of autocrats, but of peoples.

Ideas such as these, inchoate and indefinite though they be, are widely diffused. How far they are likely to assume material shape, how far, if they do, they will assist or retard the reconstruction of a shattered civilisation, are questions

which cannot be pursued. The prevalence of such speculations is a sufficiently impressive phenomenon. It seems to point to the passing of one era in world-politics, and to the inauguration of a new one.

Experience forbids the supposition that, after an upheaval such as in these last years we have witnessed, a settlement can be reached merely by a restoration of the *status quo ante bellum*. The diplomatists who in 1814 assembled at Vienna made a valiant attempt to eradicate the doctrines bequeathed to Europe by the French Revolution; to obliterate all traces of the havoc wrought by the conquests of Napoleon; to set up again landmarks that had been thrown down; to restore duchies and kingdoms for the cadets of ruling dynasties; delimit frontiers and to distribute territory. But the scourge which Napoleon had applied to the ancient Europe had not been wholly destructive. His personal ambitions were those of a vulgar conqueror, but the results of his conquests were in several cases, notably in Italy and Germany, palpably and happily constructive. German nationalism and Italian nationalism alike owe an immense debt to the ruthlessness of Napoleon. The diplomatists of Vienna strove to set back the hands of the clock, and to make things seem as though they had not been. But they strove in vain.

As a consequence of this failure the diplomatists who effected the resettlement of Europe in 1815 have fared ill at the hands of historical critics. But it is essential to a fair judgment to remember that, while the critics have only had to deal with the diplomatists, the diplomatists had to deal with the facts. And the facts of the situation by which they were confronted were unusually awkward.

It is commonly asserted and believed that the authors of the settlement of 1815 were actuated by an exclusive deference to the claims of dynasties; that they clung to the outworn dogmas of the eighteenth century, and sought only to restore the Balance of Power. There is much evidence to support this contention, but it does not contain the whole truth. Down to 1814 the statesmen of the coalition had one supreme end in view: the overthrow of the Napoleonic Empire, if not necessarily the dethronement of Napoleon. To attain that end many treaties were concluded, and many obligations were incurred. To guard his flank against Napoleon in 1812 the Czar Alexander had been compelled by the Treaty of Abo to promise Norway to Sweden; by the Treaty of Kolisch (February 1813) he had undertaken that Prussia should be restored to a position not less territorially favourable than that

which she had occupied before the disastrous Treaty of Tilsit; by the Treaty of Töplitz (September 1813) Austria had received a promise that she should recover the territories she had held prior to 1805, and the independence of the confederates of the Rhine had been guaranteed; and so on. It had also been agreed that Belgium should be united with Holland, that Venetia and part of Lombardy should go to the Emperor of Austria in compensation for the loss of the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium), and that Genoa should be handed over to the kingdom of Sardinia. In each of these cases substantial arguments could be advanced in favour of the proposed arrangement; moreover, these bargains represented the price which had to be paid for the continued solidarity of the alliance against Napoleon. The diplomatists who in the autumn of 1814 assembled round the council-board at Vienna could neither ignore the arrangements nor repudiate them. Their hands were tied. And however little we may like the ultimate results of their labours, this much may be said on behalf of the diplomatists: they got rid of Napoleon and they secured to Europe forty years of peace. Little trace of their hard work can now be discerned upon the map of Europe. The *morcellement* of Italy has given place to unity; Norway and Belgium have taken their places among the sovereign States; Alsace and Lorraine, retained, thanks to the good offices of Wellington, by France in 1815, have been retaken by Germany; and Venetia, torn in 1814 from the side of Italy, has at last taken its place in the unified kingdom. But only in part. Bismarck made his bargain with Italy in 1866, but his pledges were fulfilled with a niggardly hand: the Trentino remained in the hands of the Habsburgs; Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia are still unredeemed; the problem of the Adriatic is still, therefore, unsolved. The problem of Poland, of all the problems which confronted the diplomatists at Vienna perhaps the most difficult, has also defied every attempt to solve it. Equally insoluble, it would seem, is a problem to which little heed was paid in 1815—the problem as to the future of the Balkan peninsula, and of the other territories which have formed part of the Ottoman Empire alike in Europe, Africa, and Asia.

These questions are, however, mainly territorial. They may be solved, so simple folk suppose, by the application of a formula—the principle of "self-determination." The formula is attractive. but its application is not easy. Much must depend upon the selection of the unit. To whom is the right of "self-determination" to be conceded? To the Genoese, for example, or to the Italians? To the Trentini or to the

Tyrolese? To the Czechs or the Austrians? To Britons or Welshmen? To the people of Ireland or the people of Ulster? But even if we may hope to find a solution for territorial problems, even if we can satisfy the claims of nationalities, there will still remain problems of even larger import.

One such problem was forced into prominence by the immediate antecedents of the present war. Are solemn treaties to be regarded as mere "scraps of paper"? Is their observance to be merely a matter of international convenience? Is there such a thing as "public law" in Europe? Who is to enforce the fulfilment of contracts between State and State? Where may we look for the "sanctions" of international law? "The time will come when treaties shall be more than truces, when it will again be possible for them to be observed with that religious faith, that sacred inviolability, on which depends the reputation, the strength, and the preservation of empires." So ran the preamble to the Treaty of Kalisch concluded, as we have seen, between Russia and Prussia in 1813. A hundred years have passed, but the hopes held out in the preamble have not yet been realised. Treaties are still regarded, in some quarters, as no more than truces, and in no sense entitled to "sacred inviolability."

Can it ever be otherwise so long as the sovereignty of independent nations is regarded as the last word in international politics? Is not "anarchy" the inevitable consequence of unrestricted nationalism, the exaltation of the doctrine of State rights? "Every State has its right to exist, acquired by history, and it follows the lines of evolution prescribed for it by nature and history. But the State-will, which has found a vehicle in a firmly-compacted fabric, is above all else a *striving for power* (*Machtstreben*). Hence the nations are obliged to try issues with each other (*sich mit einander abzufinden*). Their co-existence is an eternal battle, in which only the efficient nation can stand upright and the supreme interest of the State is to maintain itself."[1] Thus a distinguished German historian. The theologian's language is not dissimilar: "The continuous interaction of nations (*der Prozess der Völker unter einander*) is war, and that will never be otherwise, as things are ordered in this world."[2] Granted the premises, it is difficult to detect any flaw in the reasoning.

[1] Paul Herra, Professor of History at Leipzig, *Weltpolitik und Weltkatastrophe, 1890–1915*, p. 12

[2] Dr Feine, *Kreuz-Zeitung* for June 17, 1915. Both these passages are quoted by Mr Edwyn Bevan, *The Method in the Madness*, pp. 36, 37

In what direction, then, must we seek a way of escape? The Germans have no doubt as to the answer. A world-peace will be attained by the German sword; the Empire of the Hohenzollern will bring to the world a repose such as it has never known since the dissolution of the empire of the Cæsars. The last and greatest of the Ghibellines, the true heir of "the Holy Roman Empire of the German people," shall succeed where Hohenstaufen and Luxemburgs failed, and shall realise the ideal at once of Dante and of Machiavelli. The claim appears to us to be absurd and extravagant; yet it were folly to ignore the grain of idealism contained in the bushel of bombastic chaff. "The world will be healed by being Germanised." Such was the promise of one of the greatest of German historians in August 1914. That the Germanic heaven can be reached only after much tribulation may be true; but it is irrelevant. The world must be purged as by fire; but ultimately it will win through Purgatory to Paradise. Such is the Teutonic solution of a problem admittedly obstinate and baffling.

Though baffling, the problem is not new; it is unprecedented only in its proportions. On a smaller scale it confronted the statesmen and thinkers of mediæval Italy. The greatest of those thinkers wrestled with it both in poetry and prose. In the *De Monarchia* we have an attempt to solve it. That the great Ghibelline poet, "weary of the endless strife of princes and cities, of the factions within every city against each other, seeing municipal freedom, the only mitigation of turbulence, vanish with the rise of domestic tyrants"[1]—that Dante should look to a revival of the power of the world Empire of Rome, in the person of a German Prince, was natural enough. The Guelphs could bring no peace to a distracted Italy. In its temporal mission the Papacy had lamentably failed. Where Pope had failed, Emperor might succeed. In the *De Monarchia* we have, therefore, an elaborate argument for an empire or world-power. The first requisite for the attainment of the goal of human civilisation is peace. "In quietness the individual grows perfect in knowledge and in wisdom; clearly, then, it is in the quiet or tranquillity of peace that society as a whole is best fitted for its proper work which may be called divine"; and for the attainment of world-peace "there must be a monarchy or empire." Independent sovereignties are inconsistent with the maintenance of peace: "between any two princes, one of whom is in no way subject to the other, contention may arise, either through their own fault or that

[1] Bryce, *Holy Roman Empire*, p. 265.

of their subjects. Wherefore, there must needs be judgment between them. And since the one may not take cognisance of what concerns the other, the one not being subject to the other (for a peer has no rule over his peer), there must needs be a third, of wider jurisdiction, who has princedom over both; hence the necessity for a world-empire." The Roman Empire was, therefore, ordained of God to secure tranquillity to mankind; the Emperors were the servants of their people; in subjecting the world to itself the Roman people attained to empire by right, and that right was established and revealed by God-given victory in arms. Under that Empire, at the zenith of the Augustan monarchy, Christ himself chose to be born. But Christ sanctioned the authority of that Empire not only by his birth, but by his death, accepting as judicially valid the sentence of Pontius Pilate. Nor did the subsequent institution of the Church impair the prior authority of the Empire. Church and Empire were alike ordained of God; both were dependent upon God; neither was subordinate to the other; each was in its several sphere supreme: the supreme Pontiff in the spiritual sphere was ordained "to lead the human race in accordance with things revealed to life eternal"; the Emperor in the secular sphere was ordained "to guide humanity to temporal felicity in accordance with the teachings of philosophy."

Such, in brief, is the argument of Dante's famous treatise. The summary, however rapid and rough, will suffice to show how readily the argument, devised as an apology for a Luxemburg Emperor, lends itself to the ambitions of the Hohenzollern. The divine right of the Augustan Empire was transmitted, through the Roman Pontiff, to the Holy Roman Empire of the Othos, the Hohenstaufen, and Habsburgs; and from thence it has descended, morally, if not juridically, to the Hohenzollern Emperors of modern Germany. To the Hohenzollern it will fall, by the judgment of the God of battles (cf. *De Monarchia*, book ii. c. viii.), to restore to a distracted world the blessings of perpetual peace—peace attained by the German sword.

Is this a legitimate inference from the argument of the *De Monarchia*? That it contains a superficial plausibility cannot be denied. But the inference is neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Go back to the argument of Dante. For the well-being of the world the first prerequisite is justice; the most dangerous enemy to justice is cupidity; "when the will is not pure from all cupidity, even though justice be present, yet she is not absolutely there in the glow of her purity."

To execute justice the ruler must empty himself of all selfish ambitions, and must "render to each what is his due," and must render it in the spirit of Christian charity. Only in a monarch can this be looked for (bk. i. c. xi.). It is clear, then, that Dante's imperialism, as one of the best of modern commentators has pointed out, "does not mean the supremacy of one nation over others, but the existence of a supreme law which can hold all national passions in check."[1] Deeply penetrated by the teaching of Aristotle, and adopting, like his master, the teleological method, Dante defines things by their end or purpose (τέλος). God has created nothing in vain. The goal of human civilisation is the realising of all the potentialities of the human mind. This realisation demands the harmonious development and co-operation of the several members of the universal body politic; for such co-operation peace is essential, and for the attainment of peace there must be "one guiding or ruling power. And this is what we mean by monarchy or empire" (i. 5). Monarchy, then, is necessary for the well-being of the world.

Rome supplied the need. The harmonious co-operation of the several members of the universal body politic was secured through the supremacy of law. The Roman law, as Dr Wicksteed comments, "is the supreme instrument for the regulation of the earthly affairs of men"; but it is powerless without an efficient executive. To this thought Dante frequently recurs in the *Purgatorio*.

> Che val, perchè ti racconciasse il freno
> Giustiniano, se la silla è ista?
> Senz' esso fora la vergogna meno.
> (vi. 88.)
>
> . . . .
>
> Le Leggi son, ma chi pon mano ad esse?
> Nullo: però che il pastor che precede
> ruminar può, ma non ha l' unghie fesse.
>
> . . . .
>
> Soleva Roma, che il buon mondo feo,
> due soli aver, che l' una e l' altra strada
> facean vedere, e del mondo e di Deo.
> (xvi. 88, 106.)

Only under the reign of law can the world enjoy true liberty. But whence may we look for the return of the *Saturnia regna*? Where shall justice be enthroned? Such questions make a direct and special appeal to the heart and

[1] Dr P. H. Wicksteed, *Latin Works of Dante*, note to *De Monarchia*, i. x. (p. 149).

conscience of mankind to-day. The conviction deepens that if the blood so freely offered upon the altars of patriotism and of humanity is not to have been poured out in vain, some means must be found for the re-establishment of the reign of law; the world must not be allowed to relapse into the condition of anarchy in which, as many hold, the present conflict has its origin. The quest is not an easy one; but it is being pursued with ardour. In the United States of America there has been established "A League to Enforce Peace." In this country the principle of a "League of Nations" commands an increasing number of influential and thoughtful adherents. Such movements may at least be taken as symptomatic of a conviction that mere nationalism will not solve the problem of humanity; that "wheresoever contention may arise, there must needs be judgment"; that to pronounce judgment there must be a supreme tribunal, and that a supreme tribunal demands a sovereign prince.

But sovereignty, as Hobbes perceived and insisted, need not be vested in an individual. The Great Leviathan may take the form of a Commonwealth. But whatever the form, the end is the same: the maintenance of security and the enforcement of covenants; and "covenants without the sword are but words." For the enforcement of covenants, throughout a large part of the civilised world, and to the maintenance of peace, there has been no more effective guarantee in world-history than that provided by the British Empire. And never has this truth been more clearly perceived or more emphatically proclaimed than by a soldier-statesmen who once bore arms against us. "People talk," said General Smuts, "about a league of nations and international government, but the only successful experiment in international government that has ever been made is the British Empire, founded on principles which appeal to the highest political ideals of mankind."[1] And elsewhere: "This ideal of an organised free co-operative basis for the future Society of Nations, which would have appeared chimerical before the war, is so no longer, though many generations will elapse before it will be in full working order. The interesting point is that in the . . . British Commonwealth of Nations this transition from the old legislative idea of political sovereignty based on force, to the new social idea of constitutional freedom, based on consent, has been gradually evolving for more than a century. . . . As the Roman ideas guided European civilisation for almost two thousand years, so the newer ideas embedded in the British constitutional and colonial

[1] *War Time Speeches*, p. 13.

system may, when carried to their full development, guide the future civilisation for ages to come."[1]

It may seem a far cry from Dante to General Smuts, from the *De Monarchia* to the British Commonwealth, yet the transition is less abrupt than would superficially appear. The great Florentine poet beheld with agonised soul an Italy distracted by faction and war. The tragedy of mediæval Italy is re-enacted on an infinitely larger stage before the eyes of mankind to-day. How to evolve order out of the chaos, how to make impossible for the future a recurrence of the catastrophe, how to rebuild upon the ruins of a shattered civilisation a more stately and more stable edifice—this is the problem upon which, for many years to come, the best thought of the best minds must needs be concentrated.

The questions thus formulated are not new. Ever since the dawn of internationalism inaugurated the era of international war, they have presented themselves with obstinate recurrence at the end of each great war-period in the history of Europe. During the first of these war-periods—the sixteenth century—the contest for supremacy lay between a recently unified France and the great Austro-Spanish Empire of the Habsburgs. At the end of the century, Henri IV. of France, or it may be his great minister Sully, drafted the famous "Design" which was discovered and given to the world more than a century later by the French Abbé de St Pierre. Henri IV. in his "Design" put forward the idea of Western Europe as a peaceful confederacy of free States. There was to be a Council to arbitrate in international disputes, though one of the main sources of such disputes was to be removed by securing mutual toleration for the three principal creeds: Catholic, Calvinist, and Lutheran. The supreme Council or Senate was to consist of sixty-four plenipotentiaries representing the fifteen confederate States of Europe, and it was to be competent to decide all disputes arising between the component States and to determine all matters of common import.

The "Great Design" of Henri IV. has been the forerunner of innumerable peace projects, and most of them have followed the lines which he was the first to lay down. Long before it was published Hugo Grotius had made, by the publication of his famous treatise, *De Jure Pacis et Belli* (1625), a serious attempt to lay the foundations of a system of international law. The Dutch jurist was deeply impressed by the havoc wrought by the prolonged struggle between Spain and the

[1] *War Time Speeches*, p. vii.

United Netherlands and by the earlier stages of the Thirty Years' War, and he sought to mitigate the horrors brought upon Europe owing to the break-up of the mediæval unities and to the emergence of an international system, by the formulation of a body of international law. His work has had a profound influence upon the thought and even upon the practice of modern Europe. Sir James Mackintosh, indeed, goes so far as to affirm that Grotius "produced a work which we may now indeed justly deem imperfect, but which is perhaps the most complete that the world has yet owed at so early a stage in the progress of any science to the genius and learning of one man." In the system of Grotius there was, however, one fatal shortcoming: it provided no sanction for enforcement of the precepts of international law. The lack of any such sanction has hitherto impeded progress in the science which Grotius founded. There is to-day a general and a grim determination that it shall impede it no longer.

During the latter half of the seventeenth century the arch-disturber of the peace of Europe was Louis XIV. of France. Towards the close of his reign, in the year when his last great war came to a conclusion, a notable contribution was made to pacificist literature by a distinguished French ecclesiastic. The Abbé de Saint-Pierre acted as secretary to the Abbé de Polignac during the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the Treaty of Utrecht, and it was at Utrecht that he published his famous *Projet de traité pour rendre la paix perpétuelle.* The details of the scheme formulated by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre do not differ widely from those which distinguished the "Great Design" of Henri IV. It is, however, noteworthy that the Abbé proposed that the Congress which was to act as the organ of the European Confederation should define the cases which would involve offending States being put under the ban of the Confederate Powers, and that the Powers should enter into a mutual compact to take common action against any State so banned, until the offender should have submitted to the common will. Neither the project of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre nor Kant's still more famous essay on *Perpetual Peace* (1795) was destined to bear immediate fruit. Kant laid down two "definitive articles": (i.) that the civil constitution of each State was to be democratic; and (ii.) that "the law of nations should be founded on a federation of free States." He repudiated, therefore, the idea of a universal Empire to which the argument of Dante's *De Monarchia* had seemed to point. "Nature wills it otherwise: Nature brings about union, not by the awakening of competitive forces, but

through the equilibrium of these forces in their most active rivalry."

When Kant published his *Perpetual Peace*, Europe was in the third year of a war destined to last almost without interruption for another twenty years. Nine years later (1804) the Czar Alexander I. despatched his friend Nikolai Nikolaievich Novosiltsov on a special mission to England to lay before Pitt the Czar's scheme for the reconstitution of the European polity upon the lines of a great Christian Republic. The ideas then adumbrated took practical shape, eleven years later, in the famous "Holy Alliance."

To that experiment in the organisation of peace something less than justice was done by contemporary statesmen; and it has fared—until quite lately—little better at the hands of critical historians. Lord Castlereagh, to whom enthusiasm of any kind was unintelligible, regarded the whole project as a "sublime piece of mysticism and nonsense," and was led to doubt the sanity of the Czar. Canning with less justification questioned his sincerity. The character of Alexander was, as a fact, curiously compounded of shrewd ambition and spiritual exaltation, but there is little reason to doubt that he was, in 1815, sincerely anxious to inaugurate a *régime* of peace and righteousness in the European polity. He believed, under the circumstances not unreasonably, that this end could be best attained by a league of sovereigns pledged to conduct international affairs according to the plain precepts of the gospel of Christ.

The primary object of the league was the maintenance of peace in Europe. The experiment failed, not from lack of a "sanction," but because the peace of Europe was threatened, or appeared to the sovereigns to be threatened, by outbreaks of domestic revolution. How were these outbreaks to be dealt with? The King of Naples, himself a member of the league, appealed to his confederates for help against his own rebellious subjects. That assistance was readily given, and Austria was entrusted with the congenial task of suppressing the revolutionary outbreak in Southern Italy. Great Britain, through the mouth of Castlereagh, entered a vigorous protest against this interference in the domestic concerns of individual States. "England," said her Foreign Minister, "stands pledged to uphold the territorial arrangements established at the Congress of Vienna. The invasion of weaker States by a stronger State for the purposes of conquest would demand our immediate interference. But with the internal affairs of each separate State we have nothing to do." The doctrine

thus laid down by Castlereagh was in itself unexceptionable; it was adopted, in terms, by Canning and Palmerston, and took its place among the canons of English diplomacy. But the distinction which he drew was difficult to maintain. Even by Canning, still more by Palmerston, the principle of non-intervention was more honoured in the breach than in the observance. Where did "internal affairs" end and external relations begin? The Holy Allies had already found it difficult to draw the line, and from Troppau (1820) they published a famous Protocol couched in the following terms: "States which have undergone a change of government due to revolution, the results of which threaten other States, *ipso facto* cease to be members of the European alliance. . . . If owing to such alterations immediate danger threatens other States, the Powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty State into the bosom of the Great Alliance."

The terms of this document should be closely scrutinised by all those who desire to see the formation of a League of Nations. The Troppau Protocol emanated from a League of Kings, absolute rulers of their several States; but is it possible, *mutatis mutandis*, to controvert the principle which the Holy Allies affirmed? Assume that after the present war a League of Peace is formed; it is, we understand, to be a league of peoples, of self-governing democracies. Assume that a monarchical *coup d'état* is successfully carried out in one of the States adhering to the League, and that the results of the *coup d'état* are such as to threaten the security or independence of another member of the League. Will it not be incumbent upon the executive of the League to declare the State, whose government has been revolutionised in an absolutist direction, excommunicate? Will not the League be called upon to bring back the "guilty State" "by peaceful means, or if need be by arms," into the bosom of the League of Nations? But, if so, what becomes of the belauded principle of non-intervention? Will not the League of the Peoples find itself confronted by a difficulty precisely parallel with that which confronted the League of Autocrats at Troppau? Is there not a serious danger that the League of Peace will founder upon the self-same rock which proved fatal to the high hopes and laudable endeavours of the Holy Allies?

Whatever the answer to these questions may be, it were the part of mere prejudice to deny that the Holy Alliance represented in its inception a genuine and sincere experiment in the organisation of peace. It is a misfortune that the

Alliance should have been deflected from its original purpose by the dominating influence of Metternich, and that in consequence the generous aspiration of its founder should have been obscured. *Corruptio optimi pessima.* The Holy Alliance quickly degenerated into a league of despots bent upon eliminating from the body-politic of Europe the last traces of the revolutionary virus with which it had been inoculated by France. But autocracy was not of the essence of the experiment; nor was it the cause of its failure. The rock upon which the vessel foundered would have rendered the navigation difficult whether the vessel had been manned by autocrats or by democrats. Experienced pilots like Castlereagh were well aware of the rocks ahead when the vessel was launched, though his perception of the dangers likely to be encountered upon the voyage may well have been quickened by his knowledge of the navigators. For him as for other contemporary critics it was not easy to judge of the prospects of the Holy Alliance apart from the personality of the Holy Allies. A later generation may view the whole episode with more detachment, and therefore in more accurate perspective.

But whatever the ultimate judgment may be, it will not be denied that the history of the experiment is of peculiar significance at a time when the world has been again plunged by the blood-lust of a single Power into a devastating war, and when men are again most anxiously and gravely canvassing the possibility of avoiding a recurrence of similar cataclysms in the future; and, in particular, when projects of a League of Peace are in the air.

There is indeed a consensus of opinion that if the present war should end without a serious and sustained effort for the better organisation of peace, the bankruptcy of modern statesmanship would stand confessed. Under these circumstances the thoughts of men tend to recur to first principles. How did man originally emerge from that state of perpetual war which, as philosophers have taught, was his primitive condition? He emerged, so we have learnt on the same authority, by the conclusion of a mutual covenant.

The doctrine of a Social Compact as enunciated by Hooker and Milton and Hobbes may have been unhistorical: contract, as Maine contended, may be the goal rather than the origin of civil society; but the doctrine, true or false, played an important and indeed decisive part in more than one of the great crises of modern history. Developed and interpreted by Locke, it provided a philosophical apology for the aristocratic

revolution of 1688 in England; enlarged and applied by the genius of Rousseau, it supplied a formula for the democratic revolution in France. Historically false, it was nevertheless philosophically valid, and politically it served to ease several difficult situations.

Nor is its utility exhausted. Serviceable as a solvent of domestic problems, it may be destined to an even more important function. The theory of contract may yet supply the solution of the international problem. For the last few centuries we have regarded the Sovereign State as the final stage in the evolution of European society, as the last word in political philosophy. But the doctrine of State sovereignty has landed us in anarchy. It is clearly necessary to reconsider the validity of the premises from which many of our most cherished deductions have been drawn. Among these is the hitherto accepted basis of international relations. The experience of the last four years has proved that in the sphere of international politics our boasted advance is almost wholly illusory. No one ever imagined that the same sort of sanctity attached to international agreements as to municipal laws. The absence of a common superior forbade the supposition. On the other hand, it was unimaginable that solemn treaties would be regarded as mere "scraps of paper" to be torn up at the first moment when such a process suited the convenience of any one of the signatories. It was hoped, by the more sanguine, that the rapid progress of international arbitration would render a war between leading Powers almost impossible; and even the less sanguine supposed that if war should break out it would be conducted with due regard to the rules, framed in the interests of humanity and embodied in a series of international conventions, such as those concluded at Geneva in 1864 and 1868 and at St Petersburg in 1867. But these hopes have been destroyed, these suppositions have been falsified, by the hard and hideous realities of the present contest. The forces of barbarism have been unchained; the boasted achievements of science have been turned to the destruction of civilisation.

Again we are fain to ask: where is the path of escape? To the rule of force there would seem to be only one alternative: the reign of law, and the consequent enforcement of contracts. Within the sphere of municipal government we have learnt that without law there can be no true liberty. Destroy the sanction of law, and we shall all be flung back into the state of nature imagined by Hobbes, where the life of man is "nasty, brutish, and short." For the individual citizen, then,

law is not the antithesis but the complement of liberty. Can law also secure liberty to nations? This much at least is certain: that if brute force is to supply the only cement of the European edifice, small States, if not small nations, are doomed to extinction. In a real European Commonwealth, resting upon the sanction of law, they may still find a place.

A further question remains. Assume the promulgation of an international code: assume the establishment of a social compact between independent States. *Quis custodiet custodes?* Who will guarantee the observance of treaties and the fulfilment of contracts? Clearly this task must be confided to a supernational authority. The mere erection of such an authority would imply the limitation of absolute State sovereignty; such a limitation could, as things are, only result from voluntary renunciation. Are the peoples of the world ready for such an act of abnegation? Further, even if, under the stress of discipline and suffering, their minds are attuned to such a break with the traditions of the recent past, have they reached such a point in the development of an international public opinion as to justify a reasonable hope that they would, even to their own national detriment, persist in well-doing? No quixotic impulse begotten of the contemplation of the misery of a war-ridden world will suffice to sustain an altruistic resolution. Nothing save the continuously exerted pressure of a changed public opinion will avail. No one but a cynic would say a word which could retard the change; but it is the part of prudence to recognise that such a change must be gradual and will probably be slow. When the *Projet de paix perpétuelle* of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre was submitted to Cardinal Fleury, the Cardinal is said to have observed laconically: "Admirable; save for one omission: I find no provision for sending missionaries to convert the heart of princes." The observation, though perhaps cynical, indicates succinctly a line of argument which it were folly to ignore. Before the consummation, devoutly to be wished for, can be reached, there must be among the nations a real change of heart; there must, in the language of the Christian ethic, be "repentance"; the whole world must "repent" in sackcloth and ashes. Without such a change of heart the erection of the elaborate machinery of supernationalism would be a vain and delusive enterprise; given a change of heart, the machinery might prove to be superfluous.

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CHRISTUS MILITANS.

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THE doctrine of non-resistance as an essential element of the teaching of Jesus shows its incompatibility with a historical judgment of his character and mission most plainly when its advocates confront the problem of his acceptance of the rôle and title of "the Christ." At Cæsarea Philippi Jesus by a deliberate act exchanged his former career of teacher and healer, proclaiming the glad tidings of peace among the lowly yet friendly people of Galilee, for that of leader in national and international affairs. For to go up to Jerusalem assuming the name and office of "the Christ," however religiously interpreted, was nothing less than to embark on the treacherous and stormy rapids of messianistic agitation. Scarcely anything could be more foreign to the work of a religious teacher such as Jesus' precepts and example had thus far shown him to be. Prophet and rabbi he had been called, successor to the Baptist, Elias redivivus, the restorer of the tribes in the Great Repentance. But none but the insane had ever ventured to call him the Christ. His preaching of the kingdom had left his own personality wholly out of account, and but for his own act it might have so continued.

It was the distinctive doctrine of Pharisaism to inculcate complete withdrawal from the political field, leaving to God (or as Josephus in Grecised phrase defines it, to "Providence" —*μοῖρα*) the bringing about of His own kingdom at His own time and in His own way. Pharisaism required only a scrupulous obedience to God's law, while waiting for Him to act. Now if Jesus approved this submissive quietism, why did he leave the fields in which the good seed of the gospel of peace was already covering the barren soil with new verdure of promise, to engage in mortal combat at Jerusalem with the rival powers of Sadducean hierocracy and Roman domination?

The question why Jesus took this fateful step has not been solved by modern interpreters who conceive of him wholly as a man of words rather than of action—not merely unworldly, but altogether other-worldly. That critic is anything but a *historical* interpreter who seeks to obliterate such small traces of really political action on the Master's part as have been permitted to remain by ancient evangelists; for the ancient interpreter was supremely concerned to prove in the face of suspicious imperial powers that the violent act of Pilate had been utterly without justification in the conduct of Jesus. The problem remains equally unsolved by that school of "eschatological" criticism now so much in vogue, which attempts an explanation by attributing to the framer of the Parables of the Kingdom and the Sermon on the Mount a mental attitude compounded in equal parts of the fanaticism of the apocalyptists and the megalomania of the false Christs described by Josephus and Celsus.[1] It can only be solved by a more critical and historical interpretation of the Gospels themselves; and it is important that it should be solved, for the interest of the question is not academic but present and vital. This generation is at death-grips with embattled Powers which seek to renew with a more ruthless barbarity the militaristic world-empires of Babylon and Rome. They avow a predaceous philosophy, and reinforce systematic cruelty with the resources of modern science. Are we or are we not loyal to the true teaching and example of Jesus that was called *Christ* when we take up arms in defence of the oppressed, the robbed and slaughtered weaker nation; when we fight for a universal kingdom of God, a democracy of all free peoples, an enduring peace founded not on violence but on justice, and goodwill? Did non-resistent Luxembourg set the truly Christlike example, or was it martyred Belgium resisting unto blood?

It is true that at Cæsarea Philippi Jesus was a fugitive in exile, his work in Galilee broken up by collusion of his secret foes, the synagogue authorities, with the court party which hung to the skirts of the murderer of the Baptist. From the time when Antipas' suspicion was awakened by the news that his victim had found a greater than he to take up his work, there was no more safety for Jesus in Galilee. The

[1] Celsus asserts as of his personal experience in Palestine and Phœnicia (Origen, *Adv. Cels.*, vii. 8 f.): "These (*gœtæ*) are wont to say, each for himself, 'I am God'; 'I am the Servant (παῖς) of God'; or 'I am the Spirit of God. I am come because the world is perishing, and you, O men, are perishing for your iniquities. But I wish to save you, and you shall see me returning with heavenly power. Blessed is he who does me homage. On all the rest I will send down eternal fire.'"

plots of Pharisees with Herodians could perhaps be foiled for a time; but after open collision with the "scribes who came down from Jerusalem," Jesus had been driven out. His public career as preacher and healer was henceforth at an end, so far as Galilee, his most fertile mission-field, was concerned. This doubtless had its effect in shaping the future direction of his work. Like the imprisonment of John, it might well serve Jesus as the summons to a new phase of his activity; but it cannot have altered his fundamental apprehension of his calling. It was occasion rather than cause of the new departure.

The ministry of teaching need not have been discontinued if Jesus had not chosen. Of this all the evangelists assure us. Other fields were still open. Perea still offered opportunity for works of healing and proclamation of the glad tidings of peace, as our oldest evangelist is careful to inform us, though of actual record of such Perean service his pages are almost destitute. Luke would even add Samaria, though again the record fails to attest the fact. The fourth evangelist opens the widest vista of all. In his closing scene of the public ministry he makes the soul-crisis of Jesus to have been the choice between martyrdom in Jerusalem and further service in the white fields of the Græco-Roman world, reaped but a few years later by the Apostle Paul. The delegation of Greeks who wait upon him through the mediation of Philip and Andrew (disciples with Greek names from the Hellenistic city of Bethsaida-Julias) receive as their only answer: "The hour is come, that the Son of Man should be glorified. Except a grain of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth by itself alone: but if it die, it beareth much fruit."[1] At this point the fourth evangelist inserts Jesus' summons to the disciples to follow, which the earlier evangelists record on occasion of the fateful decision of Cæsarea Philippi: "He that loveth his life loseth it; and he that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal." Thereafter follows the scene of soul-agony and strengthening from heaven which parallels the Synoptic story of Gethsemane, closing with Jesus' self-dedication to the death of the cross. The group of sayings and scenes at the Feast of Dedication, the festival of those who had given their lives for the nation, forms a characteristic Johannine combination of the teaching-values of the parallel Synoptic anecdotes. In its opening and closing scenes alike it sets forth with utmost clearness the open-eyed, deliberate nature of Jesus' choice between the alternative

[1] John xii. 20-36.

careers of teacher and of messianic deliverer. For, closed as might be the ministry of teaching for the time being among his own people, almost unlimited opportunities were now offered if Jesus would but "go unto the dispersion which are among the Greeks and teach the Greeks." The fourth evangelist, who never aims at mere record of fact but at interpretation of truth, proves here his insight into the real significance of the alternatives when Jesus chose the way of the cross.

The great question was: Why and in what sense did Jesus assume the title "the Christ"? To this question the fourth evangelist devotes that closing section of his story of the ministry which is located in and near Jerusalem "at the feast of dedication." In answer to the demand, "If thou art the Christ, tell us plainly," he relates the parable of the Good Shepherd[1] who lays down his life in defence of the sheep. Thereafter follows the raising of Lazarus with its teaching concerning the Resurrection, and the section concludes with Jesus withdrawing temporarily from the plots of the priesthood against his life, while Caiaphas unconsciously defines the significance of his redemptive death in the memorable saying: "It is expedient for you that one man should die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not." One hardly needs the evangelist's added comment that the words which thus fell from the high-priest's lips were prophetic "that Jesus would die for the nation, and not for the nation only, but that he might also gather together into one the children of God that are scattered abroad."

These closing words of the evangelist throw light both backward and forward upon his literary design. They explain the utterance placed in the mouth of the Good Shepherd in announcing the commandment received from his Father to lay down his life for the sheep (x. 18): "Other sheep I have which are not of this fold: them also I must bring, and they shall obey my voice; and there shall be one flock, one Shepherd." They explain also Jesus' answer to the invitation of the Greeks in xii. 32–34. The "lifting up of the Son of Man" is to be a rallying signal to the scattered sons of God. His cross is to be the Isaian ensign of God set up for the peoples.[2] For here again the evangelist inserts his comment,

[1] On the editorial displacement and reconstruction of Jn. x. 1–18, see the writer's *Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate*, pp. 492–493, and Hibbert Journal, xv. 2 (Jan. 1917), pp. 256–278, *s.v.* "The Festival of Lives given for the Nation in Jewish and Christian Faith," p. 257.

[2] Is. xlix. 22.

explaining the enigmatic utterance as "signifying by what manner of death (Jesus) should die." Jesus is to him the Davidic "shepherd of the sheep" promised by Ezekiel,[1] but the shepherd's immediate task is not so much to defend the flock against the "evil beasts" as to gather the scattered and bleeding remnant into one.

The fourth evangelist is doubtless spiritually debtor to Paul in thinking of the cross as the agency for abolishing the middle wall of partition between Jew and Gentile (even the law of ordinances which was against us), and for making of the twain one, by affording access in one Spirit unto the Father. But he is more deeply debtor to his Synoptic predecessors in the representation of Jesus as the Good Shepherd, who not only delivers the flock as David did out of the paw of the lion and the bear, but seeks out and gathers the scattered remnant.

The outline narrative of Mark concludes the record of the Galilean ministry with a companion scene to that of the farewell supper in Jerusalem. By the symbolism both of its detailed ritual order and of the ensuing narrative of Jesus' walking on the sea, the story of the loaves broken to the Galilean multitude may easily be seen to prefigure the lesson of the Eucharist. We may regard its setting at the close of the Galilean ministry as having a similar significance, because the lesson the apostolic Church found in the broken bread was the "gathering together of the elect." Their liturgy began:

> "As this broken bread was scattered upon the mountains and being gathered together became one (loaf), so may thy Church be gathered together from the ends of the earth into thy kingdom." [2]

Therefore it is most appropriate that the preliminary description in Mark of the scene of the miracle should describe how Jesus when he came forth and saw the great multitude "had compassion on them because they were as sheep not having a shepherd."[3]

It is clearly the purpose of the fourth evangelist, in depicting Jesus as the Good Shepherd that layeth down his life for the sheep, to answer "plainly" the question whether and in what sense Jesus claims to be "the Christ." The contrast with the hireling, whose own the sheep are not, who "beholdeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep and fleeth,

[1] Ezek. xxxiv. 23ff.

[2] *Didachê*, ix.

[3] Mk. vi. 34. In the adaptation of Mt. ix. 36 we have the additional clause reminiscent of Ezek. xxxiv., "distressed and scattered as sheep not having a shepherd."

and the wolf snatcheth them and scattereth them," is the contrast so exquisitely developed in Ezekiel's great indictment of the shepherds of Israel. Ezekiel contrasts the hirelings leaving Jehovah's flock to be torn and scattered by beasts of prey, with the true shepherd of the house of David by whom God

"will seek that which was lost, and bring again that which was driven away, and bind up that which was broken. . . . And I will make with them a covenant of peace, and will cause evil beasts to cease out of the land. And they shall know that I am Jehovah, when I have broken the bars of their yoke, and have delivered them out of the hand of those that made bondmen of them." [1]

The commandment which in the fourth Gospel the Good Shepherd has received of his Father, to lay down his life and take it again, is to accomplish this gathering of the flock of God.

It is worth while to bring this culminating Johannine parable of the Good Shepherd into its true perspective, comparing it not merely with that of Ezekiel, but also with the brief antecedent employment of the figure in Synoptic tradition, for the sake of understanding the whole Johannine group whose scene is the Feast of Dedication. Appreciation of the group as a whole, but especially of the introductory parable, will enable us to perceive how such a profound interpreter of the Spirit of Jesus as the Ephesian evangelist explained his Master's entrance upon the stormy and dangerous career of the *political* deliverer of Israel. For this is the great problem that *must* be explained. Turn and twist as he might before the relentless alternative of supreme and undivided allegiance to Cæsar or to Christ, the primitive Christian was compelled at last to recognise that ultimately the two are irreconcilable. The time may be long in coming, but, if Jesus be *the Christ*, sooner or later allegiance to him will bring men into conflict with political powers that are based on principles diametrically opposed to his.

The world to-day is driven at the bayonet's point to the ancient martyr's alternative. Either we have, or we have not, a higher loyalty which refuses to recognise the dominion of might over right, and stops at no sacrifice for the kingdom of God. If we have it, we shall sanctify in our hearts Christ as Lord, and defy the menace of the world.[2] We shall own him as a real though an invisible king, whose law may forbid what world-rulers demand, and demand what they forbid.

[1] Ezek. xxxiv. 16–25 in abstract. The whole chapter should be compared with John x. 7–15.

[2] 1 Pet. iii. 14f; *cf.* Is. viii. 12f.

If we have it not, we shall acquiesce in the doctrine of a non-moral state, whose command, even if it call for the most inhuman crime, must be both obeyed and excused as required by imperial interest. Loyalty will demand resistance. It may be active or passive as conditions may require. Non-resistance will be disloyalty to the kingdom and the King.

Like every other evangelist, the Johannine writer puts off to the utmost the irrepressible conflict. To the utmost all our Gospels minimise the significance of Jesus' forcible intervention in the temple to suppress the abuses tolerated (if not joined in) by its legitimate custodians the Zadokite priesthood, commanding a Levite police under a "captain of the temple." As the fourth evangelist takes pains to specify that Jesus' only weapon was a "whip of small cords," so modern interpreters vie with ancient recorders of the story to make it appear that the driving out of the traders from the temple was not really a *coup d'état*, not even strictly a *coup de main*. All this is legitimate if it aims to prove that Jesus apprehended as one of the chief perils to which his cause was exposed a stampeding of his following into the camp of Zealot nationalism. Jesus certainly did deprecate resort to the sword. Nevertheless, the records are explicit that he rested on the support of the multitude, and that the legitimist authorities yielded only because overawed, protesting while they yielded against his claim of authority "from heaven." Other reasons are found by modern interpreters why Jesus so soon after shared the fate of those who had engaged in insurrection against the Roman control. But such attempts, ancient or modern, overlook the vital point. Jesus might or might not excite the hostility of the Sadducean hierocracy by his doctrine; he was really obnoxious to them as a messianistic agitator, as the fourth evangelist clearly sees.[1] To be rid of him trial and condemnation under Jewish law were worse than useless. Jesus had committed one overt act of rebellion against legal authority, relying on popular support. Other charges before Pilate would have been ridiculed. Roman control would and did yield to the plea that the safety of the State was concerned. Jesus was crucified as "King of the Jews," and denied it not. Other charges were mere dust in the eyes of the people. The real reason why he suffered the penalty of the cross was because the time had come, as come it still ultimately must for every uncompromising devotee of the kingdom of God, when the interests of that kingdom ran counter to those of the established political order. In planning

[1] Jn. xi. 48.

to purify the temple Jesus chose the issue with utmost care. He avoided conflict with Roman authority, with which as yet he had no quarrel, as scrupulously as could the most pacifistic Pharisee; for the precincts of the temple, where he would assert his authority "from heaven," were free Judean soil, where Rome herself relinquished the *jus gladii* into the hands of the successors of the Maccabean priest-kings. Jesus directed his revolt at an abuse so glaring, so hateful to every right-minded Jew, as to command instant and overwhelming popular support, thereby averting bloodshed; since even the temple police would be overawed. At the same time, the nature of the object aimed at was too purely religious to awaken the turbulent spirit of the mob. To make God's house a place of prayer—this was an aim so far removed from those of mere political ambition as to guard against the chief peril of all, the danger lest his movement of religious reform should be caught up on the heady current of Zealot nationalism and swept beyond control. So wisely and far-sightedly did Jesus plan, when he set his face steadfastly to go up to Jerusalem and there at the Passover unfurl the banner of the Son of David.

The challenge was accepted both by the hierocracy and by Roman power, as Jesus had foreseen it would be. It led, after the briefest interval of indecision, to the cross, whose imminence he had also foreseen. But it also led to the rallying to his standard of every loyal devotee of the kingdom both in Israel and among those who were "scattered abroad." Whether foreseen or not, the setting up of that cross did become an ensign to the nations, a summons to every believer in the return of Jehovah to His people, that they might behold and flow together unto Zion.

Looking back through the perspective of the evangelists' interpretations at Jesus' symbolic self-declaration in the temple,[1] we can see that there is truth in the Johannine picture of Jesus

[1] The prophetic symbolism of Jesus' act in purifying the temple—and prophetic symbolism was of course its controlling motive—can best be made apparent to Occidental minds by the following Talmudic parable interpreting the prophecy of Malachi (Mal. i. 6–14; iii. 1–12), which demands purification of temple and ritual as the condition of Jehovah's return. The parable is a comment on the name "Tent of Witness" applied to the tabernacle in Exodus (*Ex. rabbi,* c. 51), and answers the taunt that Israel is a wife forsaken (Is. xlix. 14; l. 1): "A king was angry with his wife and forsook her. The neighbours declared, 'He will not return.' Then the king sent word to her, 'Cleanse my palace, and on such and such a day I will return to thee.' He came, and was reconciled to her. Therefore is the sanctuary called the 'Tent of Witness.' It is a witness to the Gentiles that God is no longer wroth."

avowing himself "plainly" as the Davidic Good Shepherd. He does indeed lay down his life for the sheep, though not so much in their defence as to rally a flock already scattered. He advances to the cross in the conviction that if the Son of Man should be thus lifted up, he would "draw all men unto him." To the fourth evangelist, as to Ezekiel, whose imagery he adopts, the "gathering together" of the scattered, oppressed, and bleeding flock of God constitutes the supreme emergency of the time.

As we have seen, the note is not alien to Synoptic tradition. It is already sounded in that description of Jesus' attitude toward the multitude which prefaces Mark's description of the Galilean Eucharist, the farewell supper before taking up the way of the cross. It appears again in the prediction at the farewell supper: "It is written 'I will smite the Shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered abroad,' but after I am raised up I will go before you (as a shepherd leading the flock) into Galilee."[1] This promise of leadership is also reflected in the interpretation made in the primitive Church of the outstretched arms of Jesus on the cross. This was regarded as a symbol of that "gathering together of the elect" which, to apocalyptic thought, was the one great preliminary work antecedent to God's intervening salvation. Surely this feeling, that the object of Jesus in assuming a national leadership whose almost inevitable result would be the cross, was to furnish a rallying-point for the scattered children of God comes at least as near the truth as many modern explanations.

Jesus was keenly alive to the danger that his cause and following might be swept into the vortex of political strife and ambition. The anecdote of his crushing rebuke to Peter immediately after welcoming that ardent disciple's proffer of the title "the Messiah," "the Christ of God," is proof, if proof were needed. If he undertook the perilous rôle in any sense, the chief peril was that it would be perverted to the narrow nationalistic aim of the Zealot patriot. To consent to undertake it, and at the same time keep his following clear from every taint of violence savouring not the things of God but the things of men—this was the most difficult element of the problem. For while present conditions made resort to the sword both folly and wickedness, Jesus did not conceal from himself the inevitable ultimate conflict when duty to the kingdom of God might require more than the opposition of non-resistance. In hospitable Galilee an apostle's equipment had required "neither purse, nor wallet nor shoes"; but far

[1] Mk. xiv. 27–28, quoting Zech. xiii. 7.

different conditions were at hand, in which it would behoove the gospel messenger to sell his garment rather than go unprovided with a sword. Two swords Jesus counted to be enough for protection against the hired assassins of "the hissing brood of Annas," and, as the event proved, even these two were an encumbrance. Peter's one ill-aimed blow only made the situation worse, and drew forth the rebuke: "Put up thy sword into the sheath. They that take the sword shall perish by the sword." What soldiers hampered by orders so contradictory could be expected to stand their ground?

And yet the orders are not contradictory. Force is to be used—when nothing but force can avail. A time would come —sooner or later it was sure to come—when shepherds of the flock would find themselves face to face with the alternative either of resistance to the utmost, as when the stripling David went forth in defence of his sheep against the lion and the bear, or else of cowardly desertion of the weak. Duty will then be determined by the need, in free loyalty to the interests of the kingdom. It may be to gather the flock; it may be to defend it. The shepherd who when he sees the wolf coming interposes no more effectual bar to its bloody attack than soothing words, may be excused if his heart is better than his head, but his example is not commendable. In practical result his action must be classed with that of the "hireling, whose own the sheep are not, who, when he seeth the wolf coming, leaveth the sheep and fleeth, and the wolf snatcheth the sheep and scattereth them."

The trust committed to Christendom to-day is the interest of God's kingdom; and the one commandment is faithfulness. The time for resistance, even with the sword, was within the horizon of Jesus' foresight; but the flock had first to be gathered before it could be defended. When Peter raised his futile weapon against the servant of the high priest, it was no time to smite. But the time might come later. Peter was not disarmed. His sword was only returned to its sheath to await the predicted day of need.

Centuries of merely imitative loyalty have made it difficult for Christian sentiment to adjust itself to the idea of a militant Christ. Because under the conditions of Jesus' time the great danger was a rash and premature grasping of the sword, whereas the true interest of the kingdom, to which he dedicated every faculty and power, demanded another type of martyrdom, Christians who have never learned the breadth and liberty of Christian obedience cannot think of him as their leader in armed warfare, even when the opposing powers make a

covenant with hell, openly avowing its gospel that "justice is the interest of the stronger," and joining in the ancient hymn of hate:—

> "Let us oppress the righteous poor,
> Let us not spare the widow,
> Nor reverence the gray hairs of the aged,
> But let our strength be to us a law of righteousness;
> For that which is weak stands convicted of uselessness."[1]

But the oriental shepherd is not unarmed. He is expected to defend as well as guide his flock. He not only leads them in green pastures and beside still waters, but protects them with "rod" (*i.e.* club) and staff when they pass through the valley of the shadow of death. Thanks to this strong defence, they "fear no evil," till at last a table is spread before them "in the presence of their enemies."

For a full generation the missionaries of Occidental Christendom have preached a gospel of meek forbearance to nations subject to the unspeakable barbarity of the Turk. Increasing progress, civilisation, culture, prosperity, as it widened the gap between Armenian enlightenment and the indolent barbarism of Turkish masters served only to make them a readier prey for successive massacres deliberately incited by the Government. In the ripeness of his plans for world-conquest the Teuton became the ally of the Turk, and Armenian massacres were increased to an unheard-of scale of magnitude and atrocity. Organised and systematic *Schrecklichkeit*, and the deportation plan, were now added to the simple Turkish idea of stimulating the greed and brutality of barbarous neighbours by the offer of licence to massacre. Extermination now began with the butchery of the males of military age singled out by careful selection. Afterwards followed pillage and rapine wreaked unhindered upon the helpless masses of old men, women, and children, till the slaughtered victims were numbered by the million, and half the earliest of Christian nations had been exterminated. A pitiful remnant escaped across the Russian border to a brief protection under the mighty shadow of the Caucasus. Among these fugitives were a little group who, under the leadership of American missionaries not palsied by a sentimental pacifism, had organised a hasty resistance. Refusing the preliminary Teuton-Turkish demand to surrender their arms, and gathering

[1] Wisd. of Sol., ii. 10–11. With the Platonised development of the Isaian picture of the suffering servant of Jehovah in Wisd. ii. 12, iii. 9, compare Plato, *Rep.*, xi. 361. *Rep.*, i. 343–346, may well be compared with the parable of the Good Shepherd.

in the mission compound such primitive weapons and supplies as haste allowed, they had fought off the German-led bands of human wolves till way was made across the border both for themselves and thousands of their helpless dependents. And now comes the news of the Kaiser's reward for the faithfulness of Enver and Talaat. Germany demands from helpless Russia as the price of peace the surrender to the Turk (!) of Russian Armenia and the Caucasus. For the massacre of a million helpless subjects the Kaiser's ally is to be rewarded by unrestricted opportunity to complete the extermination of two ancient Christian peoples!

The treaty of Brest-Litovsk was a treaty with hirelings, whose own the sheep were not. The Christian Armenians and Georgians have been thrown by the Bolsheviki to the Teuton-Turkish wolves only to gain time for Russia to reap the full benefit of their gospel of anarchism. But the abandoned flock have found leaders of their own. The stand of the Armenian mission compound is to be repeated. Arms and munitions have been improvised. The strength of the everlasting hills is about them. And stronger even than these is the power within, the resolution nerved by forty years of national martyrdom and by faith in the God of righteousness. Will any Occidental missionary now volunteer to preach non-resistant pacifism to the remnant of the Armenian race? Some may; for the folly of religious fanaticism, sacrificing devotion on the altar of unreasoning sentiment, has not even yet learned the lesson of that medieval horror, the Children's Crusade. But if so, let the preacher of non-resistant pacifism realise that his act will be no other in effect than that of the hireling, who flees before the wolf, while good shepherds are laying down their lives for the sheep.

Christian imagination is reluctant (and rightly so) to picture what the action of Jesus might have been in the great days of those Maccabean heroes Judas and Simon and John and Eleazar, from whom his own brothers, his chosen disciples, and his closest friends, were named. When it was a question of Hellenistic *Kultur* against the kingdom of God, when Antiochus the "God-manifest" struck at Israel's law, its national hope, its freedom to worship God, a handful of Jewish heroes fled to the mountains and ultimately "turned to flight armies of aliens." If Jesus had lived in the days when Judas Maccabæus took up the sword that the religion of Jehovah and the hope of His kingdom might not perish from the earth, would he have stood with them? Or would he have taken his part with that group of non-resistants, of no less real though

blindly infatuated devotion, who allowed themselves to be cut down by the foe rather than lift a weapon on the Sabbath day?[1]

The struggle for God's kingdom against the incarnate powers of darkness has its period of preparation and integration; it has also its period of warfare. Christian imagination seeks its parallels for the work of the Prince of Peace in the alleviations of the horrors of war rather than in its deeds of heroic conflict. And justly so. The work of the saving, reconciling Christ can only admit resort to violence as an extreme and last resort. Christian sentiment does well to turn to the work of the Red Cross and the Red Triangle for such poor evidences of the influence of Christ as may be gleaned in a war whose creators make it their deliberate policy that it shall exceed the past in ruthless barbarism and bestiality of conduct by as much as it exceeds in magnitude. It is natural and right when we seek to recall some of its Christ-like deeds that we should think first of an Edith Cavell, and only second of a Captain Fryatt, driving his unarmed passenger boat head-on against the submarine. But that deed also was Christ-like, though in a different sense. The difference and the likeness are both apparent in a story for which the present writer can give no other evidence than hearsay, but which may well be true.

Seated behind his pilot on their relatively slow-moving plane a British aerial observer had obtained negatives of the utmost importance. Returning at top speed with the secret of the enemy's batteries registered on the precious plates, the pair found themselves pursued by a swift hostile battleplane. Resistance meant destruction before their task was done. Only the most desperate efforts to speed their flight could save their message to the guns. Coats, instruments, everything save the negatives, were flung to the ground to lighten ship and gain the necessary yards to the goal. As they swept over no-man's land the pilot felt a sudden leap of the "ship." It was a final, a successful lightening of the load by the voluntary sacrifice of the observer's life.

How, then, when the plates were developed and their costly secret put in the gunners' hands? Did the observer's men prove their loyalty by non-resistance—by wholesale suicide in literal imitation of their lost leader; or by serving the guns? The battery spoke their answer. His spirit nerved every arm, and, thanks to his sacrifice, every shell found its mark.

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[1] 1 Macc. ii. 29–38.

THE IRRELEVANCE OF CHRISTIANITY AND WAR.

CHARLES MERCIER, M.D.

A CHRISTIAN prelate, or indeed a Christian ecclesiastic of any rank, endeavouring to reconcile the practice of war with the precepts of Christianity, presents a spectacle that is far from edifying. He sets himself the task of reconciling the savagery, the brutality, the cruelty, the rage, the hate, the systematic murder, mutilation, and torturing that are necessary parts or adjuncts of war, with the precepts, Love one another; Love is of God; Have peace with one another; Be affectioned with brotherly love; Let brotherly love continue; Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you; This is my commandment, that ye love one another; Love is the fulfilling of the law; Recompense to no man evil for evil; Resist not evil; Unto him that smiteth thee on one cheek offer also the other, and him that taketh away thy cloak, forbid him not to take thy coat also; The kingdom of God is peace. In short, Christianity is the religion of Love: how is it to be reconciled to the practice of war?

Yet in such a war as we are now engaged in, it is manifest that all that makes life worth living is at stake. If we tamely submit to the domination of Germany, we become slaves, and slaves to brutal masters who will ride rough-shod over us, and keep us in poverty and misery all our days. The example of Zabern shows us what we are to expect. Not only will our lives be at the mercy of a merciless military caste, but we must submit to humiliation and degradation that is incompatible with manhood. We shall become not only slaves, but beasts of burden. Well and good; if it is to be so, it must be so. The teaching of Christ and of his immediate successors provides no exception, and is expressed without qualification, admits of

no escape. Resist not evil. Unto him that smiteth thee on one cheek offer also the other.

But if we submit to the German yoke, we not only submit to humiliation and degradation past all bearing: we also render ourselves the instruments of evil, by which all the ills that we ourselves shall suffer will be inflicted upon others also. The example of Alsace and Lorraine shows us what we are to expect. We shall be used as cannon-fodder to assist in imposing upon others that yoke of brutality and cruelty to which we shall have submitted ourselves. Is this compatible with Christian morality? Is this consistent with the religion of Love? Is this in accordance with the precept that we are to follow not evil but good?

Faced with these dilemmas, the preacher usually has recourse to an unconvincing sophistry; or he tortures the words of the text into meanings that they will not bear; or he assumes an acquaintance that is scarcely warrantable with the intention of the Almighty. In either case, he fails to convince. In either case, he leaves upon our minds the uncomfortable impression that in this supreme emergency the Christian morality is found wanting; that it is a counsel of perfection, suitable, perhaps, to a world in which everyone would adopt it in practice as well as in mere lip-service, but quite unadapted to the world as we know it, in which there are not only Christians, but also Kaisers and their satellites, men without ruth or truth, without the morality of either Christian or pagan, without the bowels even of the savage—mere brute beasts in glittering uniforms. This is the uneasy feeling left in our minds by the rather clumsy sophistries of our reverend, very reverend, and right reverend preceptors. Is this embarrassment inevitable? In plain words, is the Christian morality at fault; and must it be qualified and supplemented before it can safely be accepted as a guide to conduct? As a matter of fact, we do undoubtedly qualify and supplement it in applying it to such a state of things as now exists; but need we do so? Do we apprehend it aright, or is there not some miscalculation, something left out of our consideration, something that plainly should be read into it before we accept it as a universal rule of life? I think there is; and I think that if we take this element into our consideration, the discrepancy will disappear, our embarrassment will be relieved, and we may still accept, without any need of sophistical interpretation, the Christian morality as taught by its Founder.

The comparative study of religions shows us that every religion includes various factors, some necessary, and some

merely adjuvant; some prominent and explicitly avowed, others, perhaps equally important, but understood and accepted without being formulated. It is probable that every religion begins with a theory, more or less complete and intelligible, of the constitution and origin of the cosmos. It teaches its votaries how the world came into existence, how it reached its present constitution, and how it is ruled and governed by a spiritual Being or beings. It teaches a ritual of worship of this Being or beings. It inculcates certain articles of faith with respect to him or them; and, what concerns us in the present connection, every religion that reaches a certain stage of elaboration formulates a rule of life—or rather, a code of rules to which the conduct of its votaries is to conform. For the present purpose, we may disregard the other factors and concentrate our attention on this last. This is especially the case with the Christian religion. As taught by its Founder, it is primarily and mainly a rule of life. The enormous accretion of dogma that has clustered about it and been attached to it is the work of subsequent minds and subsequent hands, beginning with the apostle Paul. He it was who first utilised the Greek subtlety to introduce mysticism and dogma into the simple faith in God as a loving Father, and the simple rule of life, Love one another, that were taught by the Founder of Christianity. The religion that goes under the name of Christianity is better entitled to the name of Paulism, for the huge structure of dogmatic theology that has been superimposed upon the simple teaching of Christ owes its origin to Paul, and has been built up and elaborated by his followers rather than by those of Christ himself. Christianity properly so-called, Christianity as inculcated by its Founder, is mainly a rule of life; it is an exhortation to action of a certain description; it is a guide to conduct; and it is as such that we must consider it if we are to understand aright its bearing upon war.

Human conduct, as I have shown in my book on the subject, is divisible into three great and primary realms: conduct that serves the interest and contributes to the preservation and welfare of the acting individual alone; conduct that serves the interest and contributes to the preservation and welfare of the race to which the acting individual belongs; and conduct that serves the interest and contributes to the preservation and welfare of the society, whether village community, tribe, nation, or empire, of which the individual forms a constituent part. There are three primary realms of conduct, and for each of them religion prescribes certain rules; but its

precepts are by no means equally distributed over them all, and the reason is clear. As at present constituted, mankind needs little stimulus to induce him to pay regard to his own interests and welfare. He may and does need guidance, and the Jewish religion furnishes him in the Pentateuch with minute instructions in the matters of diet and cleanliness, and the Moslem religion also furnishes guidance in these matters: but he needs no stimulus to act in what he believes to be his own interest, and stimulus in this direction is not furnished by any religion, least of all by Christianity. On the contrary, both the Jewish and, following it, the Christian religion use personal and selfish interest as a stimulus to conduct of a higher order. Both Jew and Christian are frankly exhorted to observe the second, third, and fifth commandments on the ground of personal and selfish interest. We may put selfish conduct out of consideration.

Conduct that affects the continuation of the race—racial conduct, as I have called it—has always been a matter of solicitude to religion, and not least to the Jewish and Christian religions. The exhortations of Leviticus are largely devoted to this topic. The celibacy enforced upon the clergy of the Roman Catholic and some other religions is an instance in point; and the solicitude of the Christian religion with respect to the sanctity of the marriage tie illustrates the same tendency, with which, however, we are not now concerned.

It is with respect to social conduct, to the conduct of man as a member of a social body, to his conduct as a social unit, that religion as a rule of life is most concerned; and in this realm, conduct falls into two great divisions: first, the conduct of each member of a society towards his fellows in the same society; and second, the conduct of the society as a whole, and of each member of a society, towards outsiders—towards other societies, other communities, tribes, nations, and empires, and towards the members of them. It is the regulation of conduct in its social realm with which religion is mainly concerned; and the regulations with respect to the internal relations of the society, with respect to the conduct of every man towards his fellows, stand upon a footing different from those which regulate the external relations of the society — that is to say, its action and demeanour towards other societies, other tribes, nations, and empires, and their constituent members. The regulation of the conduct of each individual member of a society towards his fellow-members of that society is the realm of Morality. The regulation of the conduct of the whole society, and of its individual members, towards foreign social

bodies is the realm of Patriotism. Both realms are included in the scope of Ethics, but within the comprehension of Ethics they constitute different and distinct divisions, not to be confounded.

In the Decalogue, the Jewish religion laid down the fundamental principles of morality that should regulate the conduct of men and women within the same society towards one another, and formulated a code of rules that has been adopted by Christianity. Christ reviewed these rules, and revised them in the direction of greater stringency, carrying his prohibitions beyond actual conduct to the evil motives and desires that might prompt to immoral conduct. Moreover, to the mere prohibition of evil conduct, that is to say, of conduct injurious to others, which was the sole concern of the Decalogue, he added exhortations to active beneficence—a mode of conduct not altogether ignored in the Mosaic dispensation, but not in the Mosaic regulation receiving anything approaching to the prominence and importance that were given to it by the teaching of Christ.

But the fundamental difference between the Jewish and the Christian religion is that the Jewish religion paid as much attention to the Patriotic realm of social conduct as to the Moral realm, while the teaching of Christ is restricted solely to Morality—that is to say, to the conduct towards members of the same society—and completely ignores Patriotic conduct. It is true that the admonitions of the Decalogue itself refer only to matters of worship and to the regulation of conduct between man and man within the same social body; but outside the Decalogue, the Pentateuch is permeated and saturated with patriotic admonition, and the whole history of the Jews is a history of the paramount influence of religion upon patriotic conduct—that is, upon the conduct that is to be pursued, not between man and man, but between tribe and tribe, nation and nation. The laws of war are formulated. Rules of international law are laid down. The relations to be observed between the Jewish nation and neighbouring nations are prescribed. The methods of treating the conquered are formulated in minute detail. Their religion prescribed when and with whom to go to war, when and with whom to remain at peace. It commanded them how to treat the conquered. They were to exterminate utterly this tribe; to massacre all the males and matrons of that, but to save the virgins; to burn the gods of the conquered; to save the enemy's fruit trees, even though they may be needed to form ramparts against a besieged town. Religion prescribed what booty might be

taken from a conquered enemy and what might not. The whole of the patriotic conduct of the Jews was subject to religious ordinances, and was a matter of solicitude and regulation by the Jewish religion.

The Christian religion is marked by a total absence of reference to patriotic conduct. As a rule of life, it regulates that conduct only that men pursue towards one another within the bounds of their common society. With respect to patriotic conduct, to the conduct of the society as a whole towards other societies, the Christian religion is silent. It says not one word of the duty that every man owes to his society in defending it against external foes. It is true that Christianity prescribes that we shall love our enemies, shall pray for them, shall not resist them, shall return good for the evil that they may do to us; and since modern usage tends to restrict the word "enemy" to the meaning of public enemy, the enemy nation with which we are at war, this admonition is held to apply to the public enemy, certainly in addition to the private enemy, and to some extent in substitution for the private enemy. But this is a blunder, and a very serious blunder. It is this blunder that vitiates the practice as well as the doctrine of the Quakers, who are in other respects more consistent and faithful in following the precepts of Christ than any other sect of those who profess and call themselves Christians. The teaching of Christ never has the smallest reference to patriotic conduct as here defined. It never makes the slightest reference to the way that we ought to behave towards the public enemy. It has been held to do so, but, except by Quakers, the tenet has never been followed in practice, and it has been rightly disregarded, for it is utterly erroneous. There is nothing in the teaching of Christ to forbid warfare.

The reason of this hiatus in the Christian scheme of ethics is apparent on a moment's consideration, just as the reason for the penetration by patriotic fervour of the Jewish religion is apparent. At the time of the promulgation of their ethical code by Moses, the Israelites were a fighting people. They began as a landless people, and had to make good their place in the sun; and this could be done only by dispossessing by force of arms the tribes already settled on the land. War was necessary to their existence. Aggressive war was necessary to their existence. Only by aggressive warfare, by dispossessing the rightful owners of their land, could the wandering tribe of Israelites ever hope to obtain settled means of subsistence and become a nation. The first duty of the tribe itself, and the first duty of every member of the tribe to the tribe, was to fight for

the tribe. The whole tribe was a fighting force, and its religion, the guardian of the society that professed it, of necessity devoted a large share of its attention and its admonition to fostering the fighting spirit and formulating the rules that were to govern patriotic conduct.

The circumstances in which Christianity arose were antithetically different. It arose under the protective ægis of the *pax Romana.* The whole of the known world was at peace. Not only was the world at peace, but there was in it no need and no room for patriotism in the sense in which I use the word —for such patriotism as animated the Jews in their invasion of Palestine, and their subsequent campaigns. There was no room for a patriotism that inspired antagonism to other realms, for at that time there was to all intents and purposes no other nation to be an object of antagonism. Rome dominated the whole of the known world. The whole of the countries bordering the Mediterranean and constituting the world as then known were subject to the single dominion and formed parts of the single empire of Rome. Frontier skirmishes, and even frontier campaigns, there were, no doubt—against the Gauls in the West, the Persians in the East, the nomadic Semites and Negroes in the South, and the Dacians in the North; but these frontier incidents no more disturbed the stability or endangered the fabric of imperial Rome than the incursions of the Afridis or the Pathans on the north-west frontier of India endanger the British Empire. A shepherd or a carpenter of Palestine would no more be stirred to patriotic fervour by news of an incursion of Gauls into a distant province of the Roman Empire, even if the news ever reached him, than a Canadian farmer of to-day is stirred by the news, if the news should reach him, of an incursion of the Mad Mahdi into the Soudan. Whatever rule of life Christ taught was intended to bear immediate fruit, to be adopted as a rule of life by those to whom he preached; and it could never have occurred to him to inculcate a rule of life adapted to circumstances that did not exist, that had scarcely existed within living memory, and that gave no sign of ever existing again. We might as well expect a Cingalese gardener to teach the precautions to be taken against frost, or an Esquimaux mother to warn her children against the dangers of street traffic. The patriotic virtues were not inculcated in the teaching of Christ, it is true, but neither were they deprecated. The evil that was not to be resisted, the violence that was not to be retaliated, were civil evil and civil violence, not the evil or violence of war. The enemy that was to be forgiven and loved was the private enemy, the member of the same society,

who was violating the common rule of morality that forbade trespass against another member of that society—not the public enemy who menaced the existence of the society and the welfare of all its members. The peace in which every man was enjoined to live was the internal peace, the *pax Romana* that shadowed the whole Roman world with its beneficent rule. There was no admonition for the empire as a whole to live at peace with its external neighbours, or to pursue a policy of non-resistance, meekness, and forbearance towards them, for the very existence of such external neighbours can scarcely have been known to the Founder of Christianity; and if their existence was perchance known, they were too remote to enter into consideration in teaching that was intended to influence immediately the lives of the simple denizens of Palestine, the poor and needy to whom his preaching was directed. All our knowledge of the time and circumstances in which Christ preached his gospel goes to show that this gospel never contemplated the possibility of what we now call external politics, and never made any reference, direct or indirect, to that realm of social conduct that I call patriotic. Even the local and limited patriotism of Jew against Gentile was never referred to or regarded, and by the immediate successors of Christ was repudiated.

Hence, when latter-day Christians apply the precepts of Christ to the conditions of warfare and strife between nations, they are applying to one set of circumstances precepts that were intended to fit another and very different set of circumstances, and have no reference or application whatever to the circumstances to which they are now applied. It is much as if they should take an admonition, given before clocks were invented, to observe time by the dial, as a prohibition against looking at the clock. Indeed, some of the applications of Christ's teaching are quite as grotesque as this.

But, it may be said, although Christ never did contemplate a state of warfare, or teach what our conduct ought to be in circumstances of warfare, yet ought we not to absorb the spirit of his teaching so as to apply it in circumstances that it is true he never contemplated, but that yet should be governed by the same general principles? The inquiry is plausible, and within limits is legitimate; but it is one that, while admitting of a general answer in the affirmative, it would be extremely dangerous to answer affirmatively in individual cases. Nothing is more utterly baseless, nothing is more futile, than to affirm positively that anyone would have done this or that in circumstances of which he had no knowledge, and that are unlike any

of which he did not know. We are frequently told by wiseacres that Chatham, or Napoleon, or Gladstone, or some historic character of very decided opinions and actions, would, if he had been living now, have taken this or that view, have said or done this or that. Nothing could be more gratuitous, nothing more futile. We do not in the least know what these historic personages would have thought, said, or done, in circumstances that in fact they never had to deal with; and if it is foolish and futile to speculate as to the view and acts of such men, who lived so near our own time, and were part and parcel of our own civilisation, how much more foolish and futile is it not to speculate as to what Christ would have thought, said, or done! We do not know, and we must be content to confess that we do not know, and to remain in ignorance. If anyone chooses to speculate, there is no law to prevent him; but anyone who attempts to dogmatise merely holds himself up to ridicule. Wars that are prompted by reasons condemned by Christ—wars of covetousness, wars of ambition, wars of aggression—we may well conjecture would, as inconsistent with his fundamental principles, have been condemned by him if he had ever uttered any precepts concerning war; but that he would have condemned a defensive war, a war against barbarity, cruelty, lust of dominion and lust of every kind, falsehood, treachery, and brutality, there is not a shadow of a shade of evidence, and anyone who asserts that Christ's teaching is opposed to such a war asserts what he cannot know, and makes himself ridiculous.

Christian prelates, Roman Catholic priests, clergy of the Established Church, and Nonconformist ministers may therefore with clear consciences preach a crusade against the German; ay, and moreover they may with clear consciences take part in it. No precept of Christ's forbids them to do so. Christ is completely silent on the subject, and their logical course is, failing guidance from him, to fall back upon the teaching of the Old Testament, in which they will find, I need not say, ample justification and strenuous encouragement to fight to the death the votaries of a false religion, and bring to the dust that "good old German god" that is as like the God of the Christians as Juggernaut, or Dewanee, the goddess of the Thugs. Prelates, priests, and ministers may unite with a clear conscience in singing with fervour the opening verses of the sixty-eighth Psalm—ay, and in acting upon their inspiration.

CHARLES MERCIER.

THE MEANING OF PAIN.[1]

PRINCE EUGÈNE TROUBETZKOY.

We have seen that the way to fullness of life, in which alone life's meaning is to be sought, lies through suffering and the Cross. This being the Christian philosophy of life, must we not say that it involves a paradox than which a greater could not be conceived? Does not the Cross, thus universally interpreted, become in our day what it was among the contemporaries of St Paul—"foolishness" to some and a "stumbling-block" to others? Why should these incredible sufferings be repeated incessantly? Why should this extremity of pain be the uniform and inevitable lot of that which is best and noblest in the world?

To Dostoiewsky, who had plumbed the depths of doubt to the very uttermost, the most formidable challenge to religious faith lay in the sufferings of innocent children. And yet, great as this difficulty most assuredly is, how light a thing it seems when compared with the "foolishness of the Cross"! What argument can ever convince us that in a God-made world the last extremes of suffering are reserved, by the nature of things, for the perfect, for the divine, for the God-in-man? If pain and death are the peculiar lot of the highest and best, of the life which has reached its divinest level, what further proof do we need that life, indeed, is nonsense?

A complete answer to this question would require the context of an entire philosophical system. The problem of why evil should be present at all in a divinely created world is involved, and nothing short of a theodicy would exhaust the answer. The outline only can be presented here.[2]

[1] This forms the conclusion of Prince Troubetzkoy's article on "The Meaning of Life," the first and second portions of which were published in the January and April issues (1918) of the Hibbert Journal.

[2] The articles published in the Hibbert Journal are the summary of a much longer work which the author proposes to publish in Russian.—*Author's note.*

There is a text in the Gospel which gives us a clue. "A woman when she is in travail hath sorrow, because her hour is come; but when she is delivered of the child she remembereth no more the anguish for joy that a man is born into the world." At first sight this answer of the Gospel cannot but strike us as defective. The psychological fact that the *feeling* of pain is presently followed by a yet more vivid feeling of joy does not furnish a justification of the pain that came first. Every pain ends, no doubt, by being forgotten: but the subsequent oblivion into which it passes makes it none the less a real evil while it is in actual existence. The one condition on which pain can be justified is that we discern in its nature a profound unity with the Absolute Good. This implies that the full meaning of life must embrace and penetrate the very depths of pain.

That such a unity exists is attested by our experience in moments of spiritual exaltation. Every man who has *wept for joy* knows what this means. These tears, unknown to those who are strangers to the depths of pain, express, in one and the same act, both the beatitude to which we have attained and the bitterness we have endured in the process. That the two states of the soul are inseparable; that joy at its highest is nothing else than pain at its worst transforming itself into a sublimer substance—there is nothing to which our inner life bears a deeper witness.

The explanation of this fact may perhaps appear to us from the analysis of pain itself. What is the state of the soul to which this name is given? It is the feeling of an obstacle encountered by the will to live, of an external pressure which paralyses our effort, of an internal division in our being, a premonition of the death by which life is always threatened: in general, a feeling of privation—the negative effect of failure to reach the fullness of life. For the fullness of life, poured into all things, is the very meaning of the world; happiness is the sense of possessing it; and pain, pure pain, is the sense of its absence. The whole suffering of the world is thus the measure of its distance from the fullness of the life divine, source of all the life that is. Hence the cry of Jesus, bearing on the Cross the weight of the world's sorrows, "My *God*, my *God*, why hast thou forsaken me?"

In these words we find a formula of perfect exactitude for the inner meaning of pain. The spirit of man cannot raise itself to the plenitude of Eternal Life until his whole being has trembled through and through at the horror of a world abandoned *by God*. The heart cannot burn with love nor surrender

itself to God until it has sunk down under the ineffable sadness of the thought, and experienced the full agony of its rupture with the vanity of life. Hence the intimate bond, in the Christian life, between joy and grief—the Easter that follows the Passion. Truly there is no more dangerous error than that of believing it possible to attain happiness by going *round* the Cross. This is a widespread delusion, against which the words of Jesus warn us—"The Son of Man must suffer many things and be set at nought"—words spoken immediately after his transfiguration. They indicate that the way which leads us to the transfigured universe is pain—and pain the greatest that can be endured. Nor is it difficult to understand that the cosmic resurrection, in which the whole creation is to be glorified, must needs pass through this stage of extreme agony; for the world cannot reach its goal until it has completely broken away from the charm of a life in which we stand under "bondage to sin."

One of the greatest obstacles which detain the spirit of man in its upward movement to the goal is precisely this charm—the false appearance of fullness of life presented by material well-being. Luxury, comfort, satisfied appetite, the deceitfulness of the beauty which is a mere passing show—these are the elements of the mirage by which the soul of man is enchanted and put to sleep. A man whose heart is in these things has no difficulty in remaining blind to all that is beyond them. Hence it is that suffering and catastrophe, in destroying the illusions of this terrestrial paradise, contribute to the awakening of the human spirit. Just as, on the one hand, the life of comfort and possession is apt to issue in a practical materialism of the grossest type, so, on the other, the greatest achievements of man in the realms of religion, art, and philosophy oftenest occur in catastrophic periods of calamity and crime. The ineffable beauty of the divine idea was revealed to Plato when the fratricidal struggle of the Peloponnesian War showed him the life of his times as a naked lie. Saint Augustine beheld his vision of the city of God, hovering in splendour just above the earthly city, while the power of Rome, captured by Alaric, was crumbling under his eyes. The creations of Fra Beato, incomparable revelations in painting of the heart of religion, were contemporary with Cæsare Borgia and the other heroes of Machiavelli—men who were veritable incarnations of evil on the earth.

These coincidences, and many others of the same kind, are not accidental. The times which bring the richest revelations of the meaning of this world are necessarily those which furnish

also the greatest temptations, the hardest trials, the bitterest sufferings, that thereby the spirit of man may be awakened to the truth that is close at hand. The Gospel declares that immediately before the last and fullest revelation dawns upon the spirit there shall be "great tribulation, such as hath not been from the beginning of the world until now, no, nor ever shall be."

The truth that grief and joy, when pushed to their last extremes, pass into each other and become one is admirably expressed in a popular hymn sung by wandering poets—a kind of religious troubadours, often blind beggars—in the villages of Russia. It is called "the Song of the Book of the Dove"—the legend of a wonderful scroll containing the final revelations and the supreme mysteries of the Holy Spirit. This book suddenly falls at the foot of the Cross from the dark cloud which is spread over Golgotha.

This juxtaposition of darkness and light—the black tumult of the heavens surrounding the Crucified and the revelation which suddenly bursts forth from the heart of the storm—is a vivid and adequate image of the cosmic significance of the pain of the Cross. The whole world is athirst for the Absolute Good; this is the hidden and ultimate motive of every existence whatsoever. As all bodies are attracted to one centre, so by an immutable law is every living creature impelled to seek the fullness of life; our search for a meaning in life proceeds from the same motive. But now that we have found the meaning—found it in the universal truth symbolised by the pain of the Cross—can we say that our desire is really satisfied? Would it not seem rather that the evolution of the world, in reaching an end such as this, extinguishes the last vestige of our hope. For the Divine is *dead* upon the Cross. God has finally passed out of the world. There is no longer a centre, an end, a reason for anything. That which makes the world a living whole exists no more; there is none to call the children round the hearth, none to constitute the great world-family. Hence the blackness and the storm that gather round the Crucified. Universal destruction is imminent; the earth trembles, the rocks are broken in pieces; all the lights of heaven go out; there is darkness over the land; God, man and Nature are overthrown.

This is no passing event of history enacted long ago. We have seen that the meaning of the Cross is imbedded in every life. Golgotha is always a fact of the present: at every moment of history the human crucifies the Divine and the Divine carries the Cross of the human. Everywhere and

always the power of hatred is with us—the denial of God, the cause of universal destruction, of lights darkened, of foundations overthrown, of storm, confusion and chaos.

If we accept the "foolishness of the Cross" as the true end of life, the final outcome of history and of the world, does it not seem as though the light of the sun were extinguished, as though the living colours of the present were blotted out, as though joy were no more? If life has no meaning, if the Divine has died and will never rise again, our very existence is a miserable lie. All is false: the sun itself, whose light and heat give birth to a life which is all illusion; the song of joy is a discord; and what shall we say of human love which serves only to perpetuate an existence so meaningless? Even thought deludes us, for its whole content is the mere pretence of truth. And if all is false that the world has to offer, do we not feel the earth tremble under our feet? The darkness of Golgotha, the earthquake, and the storm are the image of these things.

Either universal darkness or universal light—such is the dilemma of the Cross. And to this "the Song of the Dove" presents its answer of faith. It pierces the darkened firmament and then, at the very moment when the storm is at its height and all things about to crumble into dust, it finds a point of support beyond and grasps the principle which triumphs over chaos and reconstructs the shattered world. The power of the Spirit recovers the lost meaning of life. The good news of the resurrection rekindles the lights that had gone out.

We see "the Book of the Dove" surrounded by all the great ones of the earth, and they question David on the mysteries that are within:

> Whence comes the light of noonday?
> What is the birthplace of the dawn
> And of the shining moon?
> What is the force that gives their brilliance to the stars
> And pours forth the countless drops of the rain?

David answers:

> It is the Christ, Lord of heaven,
> Who causes the dayspring to come forth.
> The splendour of the sun—
> 'Tis the light of his countenance;
> The dawn—the flashing of his raiment;
> The shining moon—the reflection of his love;
> The darkness of night—the depth of his thought;
> The drops of rain—his tears;
> The gusts of wind—his sighs.

In the naïveté of this peasant song do we not recognise the insight of genius—the wisdom that is hidden from the wise and prudent and revealed unto babes? How different from our own experience—beginning painfully in doubt, passing on through the weary struggles of thought and always hovering on the border-line between hope and despair! May we not envy the serenity and candour of "the Book of the Dove"? How clear its vision of the source of light! How well it understands why the sun is splendid and the stars are beautiful! How true its reading of the secret of the wind! How near it reaches to the thought of God, deep-hidden in the night! It is the voice of Eternal Truth that speaks to us in these simple words.

We have nothing to fear. The vanities of our life are passing shadows cast by the Universal Light. These shadows are not the object of our faith. We rest in the Light—"which shines in the darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not."

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Moscow.

SINCERITY, NOT POLICY, THE FIRST NEED OF THE CHURCHES.

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"Toleration is a herb of spontaneous growth in the soil of indifference. And by this all religions may agree together. But that were not a natural union produced by the active heat of the spirit, but a confusion rather, arising from the want of it; not a knitting together, but a freezing together."—COLERIDGE: *Aids to Reflection.*

I.

A HUNDRED voices are telling us that unless Christianity adopts this or that shape in the world of to-day, it will "lose its hold." This is not merely a message from the secular press or the secular platform. The phrase is resounding in ecclesiastical courts. It appears in the denominational weekly. It is not unknown in diocesan addresses by bishops, and in moderatorial pronouncements at General Assemblies. Probably most of those who use it have in view what is quite admirable. They mean that study must be expended on the needs and circumstances of the age, especially of an age with such novel problems as the present. But I apprehend that some at least of those who are warning the Church above all things to keep her hold have before them a piece of very degrading policy, a policy which is false to the conception of the Church's nature, a policy by their attitude towards which it will before long be easy to distinguish between the Churches that are to live and the Churches that are to die.

We are told, for example, that certain currents of popular feeling cannot be safely antagonised, and that certain waves of enthusiasm should be turned with skill to religious advantage. But we are not shown at the same time, what often sadly requires to be shown, that the currents spoken of are such as

can be conscientiously countenanced by the Church, or that the enthusiasms have any affinity with that Faith which it is her mission to nourish. It is supposed to be a truism that she must be "patriotic," must lead national sentiment and bless national banners. Otherwise patriots will repudiate her. Must a Berlin theologian, then, devise some new exegesis of the Sermon on the Mount which will make it endorse the submarine campaign against non-combatants, and a Paris archbishop extract justification for reprisals from St Paul's teaching about revenge? Dr von Harnack, it appears, and Dr Dryander have risen to the occasion in this matter of tactics; but most of us think that the degree to which the Lutheran Church at present repels a German "patriot" is no bad measure of that Church's vitality. Again, the discreet tell us that care must be taken lest, on the one hand, men of wealth come to identify the Christian religion with the assault on property, and, on the other, lest the masses find it committed to the guardianship of privilege. Would it not be better that we should ask ourselves in all earnestness what it is that the Christian spirit enjoins in the province of capital and labour, rather than trim our sails with an infinite knowingness in the way that will avoid "giving offence" to either side? We understand the clerical sycophant in a fashionable city pulpit. And we understand the class called by Dean Inge "clerical demagogues, who think more of the unemployed than of the unconverted." They are alike the representatives of policy. Advanced thought, we hear, must not be annoyed by a too obstinate conservatism, but the old-fashioned must at the same time be reassured of unchanging fidelity to the Faith of the past. It would have a sounder ring if we were enjoined to follow truth, refusing with that grand old monk in *Hypatia* to "consider where the argument leads"; "if it be true, let it lead where it will, for it leads where God wills." The commercial spirit, it is said, must be conciliated by evidence of a readiness to progress in method with the progressing times. Publicity has so established itself in business, that business men demand a gospel which will advertise. Highly paid choirs, organ recitals, bright and brief services, must be used to attract those for whom the bare Galilean message has grown stale, but whom musical entertainments may still prove potent to allure. It would surely be worth asking whether even success in competition with the opera and the music-hall is not too dearly bought, and whether such a Church is not open to the reproach, *propter vitam vivendi perdere causas.* He who can suggest how these agencies and these precautions

may be most cunningly combined is said in many quarters to have the talent for "leadership and vision." In the present welter of world affairs the situation threatens to grow worse. The various prophets, of all Christian creeds and of none—community reformers, agnostic socialists, writers of the problem novel and the problem drama,—are taking advantage of the excited state of the public mind. They are alike pouring their counsel into the ears of a sorely hectored Church as to what she must do and must not do in that coming time whose needs they one and all so confidently yet so discordantly foresee.

As a rule such suggestions come to us accompanied by the assurance that they merely indicate a mode of improving the machinery, that of course the essential message must remain unchanged, but that it is in serious danger of losing all its appeal to the men of our time just for want of a little tact, a little *savoir faire*, a little insight into altering social conditions, on the part of those who have that message to deliver. This attitude is often genuine, and the advice it prompts is often wise. But there are times, not a few, when it is the reverse, and the disguise not hard to see through. What we hear, for instance, is frequently to the effect that the whole heart must be taken out of the old Christian gospel if the modern man is to remain in nominal allegiance to it. Or again, that the masses will have no more to say to religion unless the Church will forthwith give up her concern with worlds unseen, devote herself wholly to the material amelioration of mankind, and step forth as a protagonist of advanced Socialism in the Class Struggle. Or that in the matter of marriage she must unreservedly acquiesce in whatever extended facilities for divorce a secular legislature may decide to allow, on pain of being forsaken by the progressive people of the Pacific seaboard. Between these extremes there is plainly room for a multitude of intermediate attitudes, and one may be pardoned the suspicion that a great many of our advisers have in mind a change of substance, though they cover it with an apologetic phrase about mere alteration of method. Most of those who propound the question "How shall the Church retain her influence?" have in some degree lost grip upon what the Church is here for at all.

For, unless the spirit of the great Christian ages was profoundly mistaken, she is not here to devise tactics, and when she thinks most about keeping her hold it is an ominous sign that her hold would be well lost. The men of the past did not think of themselves as social machinery but as witnesses for truth, and they believed that social achievement

of the grandest kind would follow as a consequence if they kept the single purpose of diffusing such truth throughout the world. They had been entrusted, they thought, with a divine message. They knew that it might fail, that the candlestick might be removed out of its place, but they were sure that if so the cause would be lack of faith and not lack of strategy. They were open to persuasion, those old leaders. They could be convinced that in some respect they had misconceived their prophetic burden, that it had implications they had failed to draw, that it was even requisite to revise their whole idea of its content. Again and again, through blood and tears, they turned their backs upon their own and their ancestor's spiritual past, rescued what they thought to be the true Evangel from its corruptions, and set forth to proclaim a new call. If our present-day critics have in mind that the time is come for another of these reformations, those who believe in the ceaseless guidance into all truth dare not refuse to hear what they have to say. But if what they mean to tell us is a counsel of expediency, advice that we should become spiritual eclectics, looking out for the most effective amalgam of Christian and non-Christian elements, even as a politician constructs an artful "platform," keeping a sharp eye on the social tendencies that are strong, a constant readiness to pare and trim that we may get help from this or that auxiliary of worldly prudence, conceding this point to fashion because it is fashionable and that to new philosophies because they are new, then we must say with plainness that this can be a plan only for those who have lost faith in the divine warrant, who are disbelievers in the potency of truth, and who are in consequence recreant to their Lord.[1]

II.

It is not difficult to illustrate the foregoing argument both from the record of the past and from the experience of the present. Moreover, some crucial cases have emerged during the war, and assuredly some trying applications of the principle are in store for us when the war shall have concluded.

The English bishops voted as a solid block in the House of Lords against the abolition of the slave trade. The southern clergy of the United States were among the most

[1] Compare the aphorism of Whately, "It makes all the difference whether we put truth in the first or in the second place," with the sagacious warning of the University preacher, depicted in Newman's *Loss and Gain,* "The fault lies not in holding dogmas but in insisting on them."

bitter and the most influential opponents of Abraham Lincoln. The Church in both nations must remember to her shame that it was a few high-minded laymen who had to take the lead in drawing this so obvious corollary from Christian ethics. It is good for us to turn back occasionally to those old sermons about "what God and Nature have decreed and stamped by the difference of colour," about the pathetic case of the "widow with a few strong slaves as her sole legacy," about the curse of Ham and the judgment that a servant of servants should he be unto his brethren. Some of the men who spoke so may have really believed that they were interpreting the New Testament as they saw it. But it is safe to say that most of them were simply catering to an infamous social tradition. And how many sermons to-day, for example against the practice of lynching, are contrived with a like intent? How many elegant pulpit contributions to the problem of capital and labour proceed from just the same sort of anxiety as led Seneca—that prototype of a latitudinarian divine—to aim at standing well with truth and not ill with Nero? When a preacher, after some outrage in Texas or South Carolina, begins his address with profuse apologies to "the racial instinct" and profuse allowance for "extreme provocation," or when an English Dean speaks of a Trust or a Strike in a style which will offend no one because it will mean almost nothing, we are in presence of just the same accommodating temper, just the same disbelief in an authoritative message. The acknowledged timidity of the pulpit before the powers that be, whether such power is wielded by the selfish capitalist or the rancorous masses, is at bottom but an apostate secularism, a cynical reliance that discretion rather than wisdom will be justified of her children.

But the greatest example of all is furnished by war. Mr Joseph M'Cabe says that the present *débâcle* of Europe signifies the bankruptcy of religion. It is not difficult for the Church to coin more or less telling rejoinders to such a charge. The rationalist press told us not long ago that intellect is incompatible with faith, and held up agnostic Germany as an example. To-day we hear that faith is now seen to be quite compatible with barbarism, and religious Germany is indicated as the proof of it. Clearly they cannot have the matter both ways round at once. And most of our preachers are insisting that Christianity has not been shown a failure because it has never been fairly tried, that it is the want of religion and not its presence which should be held accountable for the horrors we have seen. Quite so. But *why* has no fair trial been

made during nineteen centuries? Has the New Testament ethic in that time been genuinely preached? Have the nations of Europe had set before them in anything like a faithful or adequate way that view of war which so obviously follows for him who has even begun to understand the Sermon on the Mount? The writer of this article is no pacifist, nor has he the slightest doubt that the Allied Powers in the great struggle are fully justified by the truest reading of New Testament morality. But for the situation which made necessary so desperate a choice the Christian Church as a whole must be held heavily to blame.

Our rhetoric has long exhausted itself in denouncing the German Court chaplains and German theological professors. But the fault, although it may be theirs chiefly, is not theirs alone. For within recent times the different countries have been brought very near to one another in the interchange of thought. The German theologian and the British theologian and the American theologian have met at innumerable Conferences, have lectured at one another's universities, have read one another's books, and controverted one another's opinions. All the time they must have been aware that a ghastly propaganda of national selfishness and international immoralism was being carried on under their eyes. All the time they must have known that the legitimacy, if not the expediency, of wars of aggression was being dangled in alluring forms before the passionate nature of mankind. If Nietzsche and Treitschke and the rest were not familiar to those who had our spiritual well-being in charge, we have reason to complain of our guardians. Would it have been too much to expect that amid the incessant pamphleteering against one another upon the strata of the Pentateuch, or the relative date of Law and Prophets, some time might have been given to a combined campaign against those who were sapping the foundations of Christianity itself? Amid the Conferences upon dogma might there not have been an occasional Symposium upon conduct?

Instead of this, what we heard was a stray voice here and there to which hardly anyone paid the slightest attention. Now and then some insignificant person would bestow an ineffectual compliment upon the good intentions of the Hague Tribunal, and a sigh would be heaved over the "hopeless idealism" of Count Tolstoy by some theologian of the sort that Browning had in mind:

> The courtly Christian, not so much St Paul
> As a saint of Cæsar's household.[1]

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[1] *The Ring and the Book*, ii.

As Lord Morley has so aptly said in another reference, there would be "some sagacious silliness about recognising the limits of the practicable in politics, and seeing the necessity of adapting theories to facts."[1] Often we were admonished that in Germany there was a public spirit, a devotion to Fatherland, which might indeed, unless wisely controlled, have some element of risk for the rest of Europe, but that the sacrifice there of individual interest upon the altar of the State was such as we would all profit by imitating. Which of our religious representatives—exchange professors and the like—had the courage to call German Imperialism a doctrine of devils, and to call it so while there was still time to make Christendom resound to this as a warning, not re-echo it as a dirge? Which of them called a halt to meticulous discussions about a passage in Hosea, or about the relation of priest to Levite in Deuteronomy, or about the authorship of Second Peter, until a settlement should be effected of the prior issue about the abrogation of the Golden Rule? Is it not a disgrace that during the last four years our divines have been awakening to a tendency of which overwhelming evidence was long before available, but upon which until too late so few of them had a word to say that was commensurate with the urgency of the occasion? A new gospel was being preached by those upon whom, far more than upon any heresiarch of doctrine, the Church should have pronounced her anathema. But the Church seemed to have lost nerve to anathematise anything. She had no longer the gift of a holy wrath. The unpreparedness of statesmen for the horror that was to come was not half so culpable as that reckless benediction upon "patriotism" and "martial glory" and "imperial idea" by which the Churches everywhere contributed to make such horror possible through disguising the character which produced it.

III.

Those who advise the Church to be tactfully compromising often speak of the dilemma in which she is just now placed, of the modern forces which menace her, of the rivals by which her influence is disputed, and of the good judgment which will be shown by preserving even a half allegiance rather than provoking a radical hostility. They ask, was she not actually bidden thus to cherish the wisdom of the serpent as well as the harmlessness of the dove?

To use the bait of men's more questionable impulses that

[1] *On Compromise*, p. 33.

we may allure them "in the end" towards higher things; in short, to attempt the Christianising of the world by guile, means surely no slight abatement of the apostolic tradition. It is perhaps not amiss to compare those who believe in it to the militant missionary in *The Cloister and the Hearth*, who inveigled Moslems with fair promises to Istamboul, baptised them in a body by force, and when the so-called converts continued to invoke Mohammed chuckled "at their simplicity in fancying themselves still infidels." It will be a poor achievement indeed, even when measured by such a singular calculus of profit and loss, to have maintained the Church's hold by pitching her ideals low enough to ensure their general welcome, and to have purchased a languid acquiescence in her forms or her creed by cutting the very nerve of her life.

And have we really become so faithless as to suppose that herein lies even the ignoble prospect of "success"? Does history teach us that the ages of compromise have been ages of triumph, that a reckless and an heroic sincerity has commonly failed of its reward? Looking back over the last hundred years we can discern at least two great movements of spiritual rejuvenescence, movements in which policy was forgotten, the warnings of a worldly prudence were despised, the risk of all things was cheerfully faced in simple-minded devotion to the truth as it was seen. One of these movements bid fair to wreck the Anglican communion in the years that followed 1834. The other shattered the Scottish Kirk to fragments in 1843. Each was declared at the time to spring from rashness, from *intransigeance*; to be, in short, a capital error in ecclesiastical statesmanship. They differed from each other in a hundred ways, but they were alike in a burning sincerity and a reckless martyrdom. Their story is written for our instruction on whom the ends of the world are come. For, as we look back upon them, we learn above all this that among those counsellors whom the Church would do well to distrust not the least dangerous is the class of the "fearful."

Whatever else we may say about the results of English Tractarianism, it was beyond doubt the initiation of a new and a tremendous energy in the English Church. And whether we judge the men by whom it was led to have been misguided or to have been inspired, we cannot dispute that what they had mainly in view was to abolish a dishonourable pandering to the spirit of their age, and to reassert, at whatever consequences, what they took to be the purity of the Church's faith and life. In those years it was the judgment of the

most competent observers, of the friendly and of the unfriendly alike, that the national power of the Establishment was gone. It was a "belt that had slipped off the driving wheel of the country." But the timid urged that by a dexterous bending to the storm some fragments might yet be saved. The angry Reform Government might be conciliated, the unruly new thought might be disarmed by timely concessions. German liberal theology would have to be at least winked at in a dean or a bishop, not because the Church had seriously decided that such opinions were either true in themselves or tolerable within her pale, but because the current latitudinarianism was too influential to be opposed. The old authoritative Anglican formulæ should not be reconsidered,—that would be too dangerous—but policy directed that less emphasis should for the moment be laid upon them. The old teaching about the sacraments, about tradition, about the historic episcopate, might remain, provided it was not indiscreetly pushed upon a public which the Reform Act had made irritable. One eye was to be kept on truth, but only one. The other was to be occupied with the mood of the Nonconformists, of the *Edinburgh Review*, of the London University, of Lord Brougham. Truth, in short, must go for the time into hiding, like Charles II. during the Commonwealth, and await a more friendly moment when it would be safe to come out. One recalls a mordant aphorism of Carlyle, "It is wonderful how long the rotten will hold together, if you don't handle it roughly."

Newman and his friends took a different view. To them soundness was soundness and rottenness was rottenness, and the sooner the issue was joined the better. If the Church's position was false, by all means let her change it, but let the change be deliberate, fearless, a thing achieved in the light of day, not a thing blundered into tactically and in the dark. Instead of blunting the edge of the conflict, let it be sharpened to the finest point. And if the proposed reform turned out to be no reform but an apostasy, let it not be played with but exposed, however great might be the secular forces which were united to promote it.

The present writer, a Presbyterian by creed and a psychologist by profession, will not be suspected of intellectual sympathy with *Tracts for the Times.* But he sympathises with them on a better ground than that of intellect. And when the Tractarians did not flinch before their last great step, he does homage to their reckless fidelity to the light that was in them. They went, but not until their example had infused into Anglicanism the life and vigour which was not cunningly

contrived to preserve its "hold," but by which as a matter of history that hold has been incalculably strengthened.

In 1846 Newman was received into the Roman Church. He was followed thither by the group whom Dr Roland Williams in *Essays and Reviews* sorrowfully described as "our lost ones." At just the same time there was in progress in the rugged land north of the Tweed a spiritual movement whose leaders would have called those Roman neophytes by the bitter name of perverts, and who would in turn have been despised by them as heretical and schismatic. No Round Table could have been capacious enough to bring together Chalmers and Newman, Ward and Guthrie. Yet they were united by a surer bond than any which Round Table Conferences disclose. On that level which is deeper than discussion can reach they were at one in a great loyalty and a great antagonism. They shared, though they knew it not, in a glorious conception of the Church, and in a noble indignation for the Church's sake against those by whom she was being betrayed. They believed alike that she was neither a hireling of the civil power nor an auxiliary to national refinement, neither a soothing influence over public discontents nor a moral prop to government and police; that her life depended not on the funds which Parliament might vote nor on the worldly allies who might be won over through prejudice; not on the tactics by which opponents might be appeased, current whims exploited, and popular enthusiasms pressed into a sham religious reinforcement. Far other convictions were in the minds of the "Free Churchmen" of 1843 and of the "Romanisers" of 1846. Far different was the call which bade them forsake their country and their kindred and their fathers' house. In ways they were dissimilar—so *very* dissimilar—they alike believed themselves the custodians of a trust from Him who had no need of any man's strategy. It was theirs to go straight forward, not disobedient to their heavenly vision, and the consequences were in higher hands. Whatever such men may say of one another, however impenetrable to their own eyes may be the partition walls which separate them, they have partaken of the same spiritual meat, and have touched their lips with the same wine of remembrance.

About the tumult of ecclesiastical manœuvrings, and the thin sagacities of ecclesiastical statesmanship, from time to time a voice rings out in this old tone of heroic assurance. In the end it is the only tone that arrests the ear and quickens the pulse of mankind. If it should finally die away, all substitutes are but sounding brass. When we are told, for

example, that the Church in Wales will be "utterly ruined" by the loss of her temporalities, we wonder if it was really by them that she had come to live. When we hear that whatever law the State may enact on matters that touch the very heart of morals, this the Church must register and execute in docile submission, we ask in despair unto what end she has been appointed a witness. When her creed is held on such terms that she dare not alter it in obedience to her expanding insight into truth until Jews and Agnostics have had their say in Parliament upon the things which are vital and the things which are subsidiary in the Faith once delivered to the saints, we can but repeat the amazed question of St Paul, "Unto what, then, were ye baptised?" But we are still not without tokens of a truer spirit. It is their presence under such diverse forms which can give a real meaning to the word Catholicity. Every Church has still its prophets, who have not lost grip upon their high commission, and by whatever name they describe themselves they are partakers of a single priesthood. The Anglican may be right or wrong about the justice of a particular interference with endowments, but if he is worthy of his name he will never be unnerved by what in such a field the State may do or may forbear, for it is nowise there that his anchor is cast, and he knows that in real things the gates of hell shall not prevail. The Papacy may be wise or it may be unwise in judging the terms of marriage and the legitimacy of divorce; but its majestic refusal to be cowed by any secular Parliament or any secular Court is but the keeping of that which has been committed to the Church. Those Scottish Presbyterians may or may not have been discreet when, fifteen years ago, they went, like their ancestors of the Disruption, into penury, rather than concede that what their Lord had founded was a business corporation with articles upon which a company lawyer might adjudicate. But at least they put it beyond dispute that to them the Church is still the Bride of Christ, not the concubine of Cæsar. Here, we may not unfairly say, is the *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiæ.* It is by the negation of this spirit that those may be known to whom, whatever pietistic phrases they employ, the Church has ceased to mean what is vital. It is by its possession that the true kindred may recognise one another. Other interests may be buttressed by prudence. The Pillar and Ground of Truth must stand by its own solidity.

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THE ETHICS OF IMMORTAL REWARD.

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THE eager interest in the question of human immortality which is so characteristic of the present day has, naturally, many sides to it. The thought of the time tends to keep so much to concrete paths that its preoccupation with the empirical evidence for survival is inevitable. This "argument from history," as Henry More used to call it, has recently been supported by such an extensive array of apparently relevant evidence that many who formerly doubted are now inclined to suspend, if not to revise, their decision. But if the more speculative evidence in favour of immortality seems to be just a little *démodé* in these days, its eclipse is not likely to be more than temporary. After all, even if survival had been proved to the hilt, the probable length of the survival would still be a matter for argument. If the earliest conclusive proof of survival were derived from the continued identity of persons recently deceased, the world would have to wait far too long for evidence showing that this survival even approached the immortality which the imagination conceives. Mankind would choose the shorter and more promising road of speculative argument if only because most human beings prefer to do their thinking in a hurry.

The majority of these speculative arguments, however, make but little appeal to the modern mind. Few writers at the present day even consider the mediæval proof of "natural immortality." They do not care whether the soul is or is not a simple substance without parts. They are heedless of the important inference that it cannot therefore be dissolved into its constituent elements, and so that it must remain undisturbed in its simplicity unless the God who created it chooses to undo his handiwork and annihilate it altogether. Indeed,

the only speculative argument which even begins to inspire conviction is the "moral argument." And although most philosophers are candid enough to admit that the moral argument, so far from being a demonstration, is only a set of considerations which, at the best, incline without necessitating, they still maintain, not unreasonably, that this inclination is neither fanciful nor irrational.

The strength of the moral argument lies in two circumstances. In the first place, it appeals to something deeper than mere sentiment. In the second place, it gives its support, most readily and naturally, to the doctrine of *personal* immortality. Certainly, the argument is quite baseless without the assumption that part, at least, of the intrinsic character of the universe is its accordance with certain supreme moral ends; and there are many who are shy of such assumptions. On the other hand, the belief that worth and righteousness must count in the very heart of things is so natural from many points of view, and so inevitable from some, that it must be treated with all seriousness.

Again, if moral ends are thus supreme in the universe, it is wholly illegitimate to seek to remove the argument from the moral plane, and to transform it into some transcendent doctrine of super-morality. The very homeliness of the moral argument supports it. It is reasonable to maintain that one of the chief presuppositions of the possibility of a moral world is the existence of responsible individual persons whose life is not wholly fleeting and perishing, and who are neither the retainers nor the adjectives of anything else. Therefore, if the moral ends of a moral universe always require the existence of responsible moral agents, it would seem that, if there is immortality, this immortality must be personal, and that it is very doubtful whether these requisites could be secured without immortality.

It is true that the conclusiveness of this argument seems to be enormously weakened, *prima facie*, by the reflection that its conditions would be fulfilled by a permanent succession of moral beings, as well as by the unending continuance of the same moral beings. The argument requires that there should always be some moral beings who struggle, fall, and attain. It gives no information concerning which beings do so. On the other hand, there is only one set of moral beings whose existence is certainly known, and that is the human race on this planet. Thus it is relevant and important to point out that the race of man has only a precarious tenure of the earth, that it is probable that all organic life in the world must cease

after a few millions of years, and that, long before this remote period has come, a change of temperature may lead inevitably to the sterility of the human species. If so, what guarantee is there for the stability of the moral universe? And even apart from that, is the pitifully inadequate span which the blind fury's abhorred shears permits to most of mankind really all that a moral universe requires?

The moral argument therefore deserves careful consideration. It has two principal forms, and in the present writer's opinion only one of them is capable of bearing critical scrutiny. This conclusion, as is common in such cases, is less important than the reasons for it. None the less, the conclusion, together with its applications, is also important if it is true.

On the whole it is legitimate to argue that anything which has the capacities of a moral being should, in equity, have full and free scope to exercise these capacities. If moral beings do not receive a fair and, speaking broadly, an equal chance, the righteousness of the universe must be very seriously impugned. Certainly, this argument raises almost as many problems as it solves. If human beings are by nature not merely diverse but also unequal in capacity, then this initial inequality might seem to be at least as unjust as any of the hardest buffets of fate. If, despite appearances, they are really equal in capacity, or if their unequal capacities are equally essential to the cosmos, then the difficulties are still very notable. An average man, we may say, might with training become an efficient lawyer, physician, or legislator; a reasonably good mechanic, preacher, or tailor; and so on without end. Does the righteousness of the universe require that everyone should have an opportunity of working each of these several capacities to its limit, and is each capacity capable of infinite development? No one, except perhaps a theosophist, would undertake to answer these and similar questions with any pretence to reasoned assurance. Indeed, the only feasible answer is that they are difficulties of application rather than of principle, and that no one can be fairly requested to settle the domestic details of the universe for all future time. On the whole this answer seems sufficient in view of the character of the objection.

Unfortunately, this form of the moral argument is usually and most unhappily conjoined with another form of it which is much less legitimate. The situation, indeed, is full of paradox, as a reference to contemporary journalism will show. A recent writer in *The Times*, for example, in the course of a very able essay disguised as a review, maintains that there is

a curious inconsistency in the attitude of most reflective men to the problem of the existence of hell. Most men, he tells us, deny the theory that the justification of punishment consists merely in the fact that it is either reformative or else a means to public security. They believe that righteousness and goodness are intrinsically admirable, and that the violation of them requires to be vindicated in punishment. But when they come to consider whether there is or is not a place of torment they forget these excellent principles. Their conscience recoils; and they argue that there ought not to be any such place, since the damned are not damned for their own good, or for the good of anyone else. They are not even damned *ad majorem Dei gloriam.*

If this inconsistency is really prevalent it provides a very instructive comment upon the connection between the moral argument for immortality and the ethical problem of reward and punishment. Even if it is not prevalent, the mere fact that it sometimes occurs suggests the need for a serious inquiry into the bearing of the theory of reward and punishment in this connection. And that, of course, is the second and most usual form of the moral argument for immortality.

No doubt, the reviewer's facts may be disputed. We may well believe that the inconsistency occurs so seldom as to be negligible, and consequently that the mention of it is but an instance of what Sir Thomas Browne calls a reason of the golden tooth "whereof much dispute was made and at last proved an imposture." Indeed, it is very improbable that the inconsistency, when it occurs, is so flagrant as the reviewer supposes. In the first place, even if it be admitted that most men deny the ethical sufficiency of the reformative and of the deterrent theories of justice, taken together, it is much more disputable whether they are prepared to substitute any definitive theory of their own. They feel instinctively that any such theory would probably be too crude to be tenable. In the second place, the plain man's repugnance to the doctrine that there is a hell is probably due, not to the fact that he denies that the wicked should be punished after death as well as before it, but to the fact that he considers this everlasting punishment disproportionate to the offence. He does not object to the notion of purgatory on ethical grounds. He does object to the notion of hell.

The sequel will show how far and on what principles this notion of proportionate punishment can be justified. Meanwhile it is sufficient to remark that these two considerations

raise all the important issues on this question, and consequently that each should be considered at some length.

All the world has heard of the saying that the theory which sees no other justification in punishment than the security of society is nothing but the morality of a band of robbers. So it is. But there is a very significant difference, since the community (or the state, or whatever body inflicts the punishment) may have a very different moral status from that of a band of robbers. The means can scarcely be appraised without reference to the end. If punishment is merely a means, and that is the essence of the theory, then its justification depends wholly upon its adequacy as a means and upon the value of the end for which it is the instrument.

If punishment is not merely a means, what is the alternative? The only contrary hypothesis which is not palpably inadequate is the suggestion that punishment is the expression of righteous anger or moralised resentment. The violation of intrinsic worth, dignity, or integrity, it is held, *ought* to inspire resentment, and punishment is the appropriate fruit of this resentment, when primitive, hasty feeling has been duly subordinated to the requirements of morality.

This theory looks plausible, and it has very great importance for the history of morals or of jurisprudence. But, in itself, it is unworkable and unsound.

The law of anger demands a life for an eye, and a life for a tooth. This savage and indiscriminate vengeance, however, is disastrous to the community. Accordingly the limitation of vengeance is one of the cardinal requirements of any enduring society, and the famous *lex talionis* limits the vengeance by substituting an apparently simple and very primitive proportion in the penalty. Indeed, the only important argument in favour of the theory of moralised resentment is the fact that the *lex talionis* should ever have appeared to be equitable, and that it still carries a certain weight with uncritical common sense. A little reflection, however, shows how absurd it is. The law proclaims, in effect, that wanton injury should always be doubled but should never be trebled or quadrupled. Those who are prepared to argue that any absurdity which has been commonly believed is therefore true may still be ready to assent to this doctrine. Others are bound to choose a less heroic hypothesis. Thirty days for a tooth is just as equitable a penalty as a molar for a molar or an incisor for an incisor.

The theory of moralised resentment, in a word, is compatible with any system of penalties whatsoever. It is compatible, for instance, with the view that every transgression should have

the same penalty, or even that every sin should have an unlimited penalty, as in the doctrine of the Westminster divines that "every sin deserves God's wrath and curse, both in this life and that which is to come." But the theory is also fully consistent with the view that no transgression, in itself, deserves any punishment at all; and this, surely, is the construction which ought to be put upon it. Righteous anger is one thing, punishment is another thing; and the second need not and should not follow from the first. There ought to be righteous anger for wrongdoing, but why should this righteous anger be translated into acts which hurt, degrade, and destroy? It is a horrible thing to cause pain. It is as bad or worse to curtail a man's freedom or to put him to death. Indeed, there can be no justification for these acts except the virtue of necessity. The one principle that justifies punishment is the great moral principle which none but sophists deny—the principle that it is always right to do evil if that is the only way by which greater good can arise.

In view of this conclusion the argument that the theory of moralised resentment cannot assign the fitting degree of any punishment becomes comparatively insignificant. This contention, however, ought also to have some weight; and consequently it is fair to remark that the necessities of society do not merely require some system of punishment, but also that they can, within certain broad and fluctuating limits, determine approximately the degree of punishment which is likely to be required. Perhaps omniscience itself could not fix the scale precisely for all cases under all circumstances. Certainly a judge who has to apply a determinate rule to the infinitely various complexities of individual instances could not. But still it is possible to affirm with certainty that the death penalty in cases of sheep stealing or orchard robbing is not required in the present state of European society, and that many of the penalties in time of war or civil commotion must be far more rigorous than in time of peace. A retributive theory of punishment could not affirm even this.

Indeed, there seems to be only one serious objection to this line of argument. If punishment is a mere means, reward must also be merely a means; and if penalties are justified by the necessities of society, so the reward of the wicked is justified if a bribe or other reward is in fact the best means of furthering the general welfare. This consequence is very paradoxical and very shocking to many admirably balanced persons. It may be expedient, they admit, to reward a man for wrongdoing if, for instance, this reward placates him sufficiently to keep him

out of mischief. But they demur to the statement that it can ever be *right*. Can it ever be right to give office (or the emoluments of office) to a traitor or to a malevolent critic in order to buy his silence or to tie his hands?

For the moment the problem may be left here, and the second question attacked. Why is the notion of hell morally repugnant to most people and the notion of purgatory not?

The plain man would say that the notion of hell is repugnant to him because the punishment is disproportionate to the offence, because the lost soul has no chance of hope or pardon, and because this eternal welter of suffering leads to no good end. The reverse is true of purgatory. The character of the punishment in hell or elsewhere may, of course, be left out of account since it does not affect the argument.

It would seem that the plain man is right in his second reason and in his third, but wrong in his first. As we have seen, there is no such thing as an equitable proportion between penalty and offence, and so there cannot be an inequitable disproportion. And whatever holds of punishment holds, *mutatis mutandis*, of reward. If the eternal misery of the wicked (or their transient misery) is neither just nor unjust in itself but is reprehensible only on the ground that it is unnecessary for the well-being of the whole, then the eternal blessedness of the righteous is neither just nor unjust in itself; and so for any other reward. This principle seems very clear. Its applications, however, are both intricate and interesting.

The plain man's attitude on the question, to be frank, is somewhat confused. He prefers, very properly, not to lay emphasis on the notion of happiness as a reward of virtue. The thing is not quite respectable. It looks like a bribe to be virtuous, and it is clear that virtue ought to be its own sufficient inducement. Blessedness should be *ipsa virtus* and not *virtutis præmium.* On the other hand, most of us have frequently heard the argument that it would pay to be wicked if happiness were not the consequence of virtue. This remarkable piece of reasoning hazily combines two principles: the first that happiness is the only thing worth having; the second that man, being naturally depraved, will rather do evil for its own sake than good for its own sake. The forbidden things are the things that are really worth while.

Again, there are ten men who argue that there must be another world to redress the unjust balance of this, for one man who desires to pursue this contention to its logical consequences. The argument presupposes that there is a due proportion between virtue and happiness on the one hand and

between vice and pain on the other. The consequence should be that if any man in this life has received less than the measure of happiness which his virtue deserves he ought to receive more than his due share in the next life, and that if the balance is right then he has no claim to immortality at all. Moreover, if all life is eternal life, the whole argument loses its force. Both the happiness and the unhappiness of this life must be utterly negligible in comparison with the happiness and unhappiness of the next, and consequently the balance in this life is not worth considering.

These difficulties and inconsistencies, in so far as they are not caused by mere inadvertence or stupidity, are direct consequences of the mistaken notion that there is an inherently just proportion between virtue and reward, and they are not materially lessened in this particular by substituting "intrinsic fitness" for numerical proportion. The plain man's stubborn repugnance to the view that it can ever be right to bribe or to reward guilt has no better warrant. To choose a trivial instance, it is clear that there are two ways of making a sulky child less sulky. The rod is one means and sugar-candy is another. But many believe that there is an intrinsic suitableness about the rod which is absent from the sugar-candy. And in more serious instances, as we have seen, common sense maintains that rewards and punishments cannot merely be means, since this doctrine implies the consequence that guilt should be rewarded whenever that is the best way of promoting the general welfare.

There are, of course, very good reasons of expediency why guilt should generally be punished and virtue generally rewarded. Reward is an incentive, whether we are honest enough to admit the fact to ourselves or not. And punishment is certainly a deterrent. If a boy is given sugar-candy whenever he is sulky, then, provided that his appetite for sugar-candy remains undiminished, it will pay him to be sulky as often as he can. If a malevolent critic is rewarded with office, then it must needs be that a whole army of malevolent critics will arise. But this, equally of course, is no answer to the argument that it is intrinsically unjust to reward them. The only possible and the sufficient answer to that argument is that it is not intrinsically unjust because no reward is intrinsically either just or unjust.

This question is sometimes argued on other grounds, principally of a psychological character. The radical defect of the foregoing reasoning, it may be said, lies in the assumption that the relation between reward and virtue, or between

punishment and vice, is of an external kind. In fact, there is an internal psychological connection which cannot be neglected simply because it is necessarily and always present. The Greeks were right when they maintained that virtue consists in the due performance of function. The due performance of function implies happiness, its abuse entails misery. When Spinoza said that the devil could not exist because he would be an impossibly miserable being, he merely expressed an obvious truth in a striking way.

A very little reflection, however, shows the inadequacy of this argument. Speaking broadly, there is certainly a *de facto* connection between pleasure and efficiency. But moral virtue is not the same thing as efficiency by any means, and it is not peculiarly connected with happiness. A successful burglar, even if he is not a Raffles or an Arsène Lupin, must be very efficient in his own profession. He is bound to have pleasurable excitement in plenty, and many a chuckle when he eludes the police. If he is troubled with qualms of conscience, that, in itself, is a source of weakness and inefficiency. If, as in Defoe's naïve tale of *Colonel Jack*, his troubles arise principally from fear of detection, the cause of his unhappiness should be sought in his relations to society and not in any psychological law of his own being. Contrariwise, if we are to believe modern problem-plays and psycho-analysts, the virtuous repression of natural desires and impulses is the most potent and the most frequent cause of neurotic misery.

It is reasonable, no doubt, to hold that the blessedness of virtue and the joys of vice are not the same pleasures, and that the pain which the just man suffers for righteousness' sake is not truly comparable to the wretchedness and despair of the malefactor. But granting that pleasures differ in this way, it remains the fact that they can be weighed in the scales against one another and against pains. If this were not so it would be quite impossible to regard rewards and punishments as motives of any kind. Accordingly the above argument is not very seriously affected by the consideration that pleasures and pains differ intrinsically. It is a moot point whether the roses and raptures of vice are really preferable as pleasures to the lilies and languor of virtue. A man can only say that *he* prefers the one to the other. He is probably a biassed judge, but that he cannot help.

Accordingly the connection between moral virtue and happiness must be very largely an extrinsic one, and with the collapse of this support the whole structure of the moral argument in terms of reward and punishment seems to subside in

hopeless ruin. Does it follow, therefore, that there is no justification whatever for this very ancient and almost ineradicable way of regarding these matters?

By no means. What is required is a complete reinterpretation of the answer. Since we do not know what degree of reward or punishment is required for the moral purposes of the cosmos, and, indeed, do not know that any degree is required, it is impossible to argue the question on these lines; and, as has been shown, there can be no valid argument in terms of the inherent justice of punishment or reward. On the other hand, happiness is good and pain is bad. Consequently, the more happiness there is, and the less pain, the better the universe will be. Virtue is not the only good thing, nor vice the only evil thing. Certainly, if the world as we find it is a fair sample of the whole universe, then the universe is not an ideal place. But there are grounds for hoping that what we now find is not a fair sample, and even for believing that the world itself will improve as the centuries advance. Be that as it may, there is no morality in demanding wretchedness for the wicked just because they are wicked, or in claiming happiness as the appropriate wages of virtue, either in this life or after it. If the just are immortal, so are the unjust. The universe would be better if all were just. It would also be better if no one were miserable.

This conclusion has a direct bearing upon the problem of evil as it is seen in connection with this present life. There is no injustice in the fact that "streams will not curb their pride, the just man not to entomb." On the contrary, this sort of impartiality, sometimes miscalled indifference, is precisely what ought to occur in a moral universe. The universe should not take sides in this way unless it has to. There is no evidence that the moral ends of the universe are not strong and stable enough to dispense with reward and punishment; and it is better to think that they are.

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A FORGOTTEN PROPHET: DAVID URQUHART.

GERTRUDE ROBINSON.

Born ten years before the Battle of Waterloo on his family estate in the Scottish Highlands, David Urquhart started life with that fiercest form of aristocracy, Scottish pride of race; and an aristocrat he remained to the day of his death. But, thanks to his cosmopolitan education, his interest in commerce, his close and intimate friendship with men of the working classes on his Foreign Affairs Committees, the aristocratic spirit he had inherited was counterbalanced by a democratic conscience, which he acquired, and which was none the less true and sincere because he was and always remained a monarchist. His knowledge of the East taught him the respect and courtesy due from one man to another irrespective of class distinctions, and a dramatic incident of his early manhood, which took place then, roused into vigorous life a passion for justice which upheld him through years of almost hopeless struggle against national and social injustice and immorality.

For David Urquhart was a crusader first and foremost. It is true that he was many other things as well. A diplomatist too honest for the diplomatic world of his day; a politician of too lofty aims to succeed in politics; a philosopher who rose above the barren intellectuality and utilitarianism of the utilitarian school of his day, though Jeremy Bentham was a friend of his impressionable youth; an author whose writings, in spite of the careless diction which too often mars them, rose sometimes to heights of poetic beauty; a prophet who fifty years ago foretold the woes that have fallen upon us to-day. But all these noble qualities were burnt to a white heat in the furnace of his passion for the re-establishment of justice in the world. That is the key which unlocks all the chambers of a mind full of interests and gifts. That is the torch which lights all the secret recesses of a personality at

once complex and contradictory. That was the one dream, the one hope of his life. For that he spent money recklessly, lavishly, heedless not only of his own future, but, later on, of that of his children. For that he laboured night and day in spite of sufferings which were a "baptism of pain." For that, with a nature affectionate and sensitive to an almost inconceivable degree, he put aside the natural desire of a man for a home and human love till his fiftieth year, and after his marriage offered, not himself alone, but the wife to whom he was devoted, a willing sacrifice to the cause.

Few people have been so misjudged. David Urquhart was said to be a "megalomaniac." His unceasing hostility and opposition to Lord Palmerston was the result of "disappointed ambition." The political aim of a man who loathed parties was to form a party that should be called after his own name. He, the bitterest foe of Russia, was in her pay; or, if he was not, his friends were. All his convictions were the result of insensate vanity, of wounded pride, of mad extravagance.

On the other hand, men of all classes, of all shades of religious and political opinions, of all nations, and of all grades of intellect were attracted to him. But in all these there were a certain nobility and simplicity, which enabled them to recognise the same nobility in his freedom from self-seeking, his absolute justice, the sincerity and purity of his character through all the many and conspicuous faults that marred it—his extravagance, his sometimes apparent and sometimes real egoism, and his overbearing manner, which alienated many who would have been his friends and gave to his enemies very serious occasions of scandal.

His influence was by no means confined to the men of his own country. Alone almost of Englishmen he was admitted to intimacy with the Turks. He might live in a Mahommedan house, eat at a Mahommedan table, receive the "Temena" or Mussulman greeting. It was no secret that he might, while still a young man, had he chosen, have remained in Turkey as confidential adviser to the Sultan. The Circassians, that simple and noble race of men, who trusted in English honour and English arms until they were driven from their mountain fastnesses by Russia's desire for dominion, offered to make him their chief. "Daoud Bey" they called him, and in the East "Daoud Bey" was a name to conjure with to the last year of his life, when, sick almost to death, he travelled through Egypt "en prince," with a guard of honour sent by the Khedive.

A Protestant to the last, in spite of his conviction that the Papacy "was the only moral force in Europe," he won and

kept the whole-hearted respect of prominent Catholic ecclesiastics—German, Italian, and French, as well as English. So great an impression did he make on the Papal Legate Cappacini in 1843, that Pope Gregory XVI. summoned him to the Vatican to confer with him about the foundation of a diplomatic College in Rome. Père Gratry, M. le Play, Père Roh the General of the Jesuits, Cardinal Franchi, Cardinal of Propaganda, the Bishop of Geneva, the famous Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, were on terms of friendship, in some cases of intimacy, with him.

"God has inspired you with very just ideas on the greatest of subjects," said Pius IX. to him at a private audience. And yet the majority of English statesmen were either entirely indifferent or actively hostile to him. There were notable exceptions. As quite a young man, on his return from Constantinople, he was high in the favour and confidence of William IV. Disraeli recognised his greatness, as he recognised Disraeli's possibilities, and there was a great and striking unanimity in their points of view. Lord Ponsonby, who was at least partly responsible for the wreck of his diplomatic career in 1837, became reconciled to him after years of estrangement, and admitted that he had been right from the beginning, and that he alone could save England.

The barrier between Urquhart and the statesmen of his time is due very largely to his unremitting and intense hostility to Russia. By his enemies this hostility was sneered at as a form of monomania; even by many disposed to sympathise with him his politics were deemed unsound because he proposed to humble Russia by the exaltation of Turkey.

In 1834 Urquhart published his pamphlet *Turkey and her Resources*, showing the military and commercial strength of that country, with its rich lands and free trade: where the hearth was the factory; where every citizen had the right to wear the sword, to be wielded, however, in the cause of right and justice alone. The knowledge he had gained of her people and her commerce enabled him to draw up his commercial treaty, whose object was to encourage trade between Great Britain and Turkey with her rich supplies of corn and oil. That this commercial treaty was so altered as to defeat the end he had in view he was doubtless right in putting down to Russian intrigue; and he pointed out with great clearness to the working classes of England that the dearness of their food was due to Russian astuteness and English—particularly Palmerstonian—complacency.

How far he was right in regarding every political move in

Europe as due to the machinations of the Russian Cabinet this is no place to inquire. We must remember, however, that not only had the Russian foreign policy since Peter I. been entirely one of domination, however tortuous its methods; that her Foreign Ministers, unlike those of the rest of Europe, were quite independent of political parties; but that, however we may account for it, within one hundred and fifty years the Russian power had advanced with frightening rapidity.[1] At the time of the Crimean War she was one thousand miles nearer Teheran, seven hundred miles nearer Paris and Berlin, six hundred miles nearer Stockholm, five hundred miles nearer Constantinople, than she had been at the death of the Czar Peter. Urquhart was not alone in his bitter mistrust of Russia. The Poles looked upon her as their undoing, Turkey was like a fly helpless in her web, and M. Thiers looked forward with dismal prognostications to the time "when the Russian Colossus, with one foot in the Dardanelles and the other in the Sound, will make the whole world his slave and liberty will have fled to America." Urquhart, in the concentration of his mind on Russia, did not lay enough stress on the growing power of Prussia. The separation of the Duchies he regarded not so much as a rung, set by Bismarck, in the ladder of Prussia's rise to power, but as the result of Russian machination.

M. Behrens, who helped him in his commercial investigations, gives a remarkable instance of Urquhart's almost supernatural prevision. "We were walking along the Elbe conversing upon the state of England and Mr Urquhart's then accomplished career in the East. We sat down on an eminence to enjoy the view, and Mr Urquhart asked me the name of the country spread out before us. I said, 'Holstein.' He exclaimed with great excitement, 'Is that Holstein?' and interrupting our conversation, he remained with his gaze intently fixed upon it. I was surprised, and at last answered, and said to him, 'That is Holstein you see, not Timbuctoo.' He turned upon me and said, 'Yes, Holstein! and I was thinking of the day when that name would ring through Europe.' I was desirous to know what all this meant, and he then told me a great deal about the Oldenburg line, the renunciations of Peter, and a number of other antiquated matters, which really did appear to me as much connected with the nineteenth century as the stories of Charlemagne

[1] See *Opinions of the Press on the Eastern Question*, 1836, p. 216; *England, France, Russia, and Turkey*, by Sir John M'Neill, p. 344; "Diplomacy of Russia," from *British and Foreign Review*.

and Barbarossa. I had for a moment misgivings as to whether or not his head had been turned and I said to myself, 'How extraordinary that a man should understand as he does commercial matters and the East and England, and yet become wild whenever he can bring in Russia!' But when the insurrection came in the Duchies, and then the mediations, and then the interminable fightings, about no one knew what, until in came the Russian protocols and reservations, I remembered those words, and often mentioned them: I found that it was I, not he, that had been mad. And I came to be considered a prophet at Hamburg by recollecting what he had told me a dozen years before.'"

And his prophecy of the results of the German Zollverein we have seen fulfilled in our day.

"At midnight on January 1, 1834," he says, "the barriers between sixteen states were knocked down. . . . Sixteen states are added to the Prussian system and agglomerated around her disjointed and unconnected territory. . . . It will make Germany indeed one, but that unity will, we fear, be no less disastrous to the parts of which it is composed than to the general interests of the European community of which it is a member.

". . . From the moment that Prussia collects and distributes the revenues she places herself, not in the position of a feudal lord, whose revenue was received from his vassals, but in the position of a proprietor, who distributes the means of subsistence to his agents and dependents. . . . Prussian custom-house collectors, her roads, weights, measures, coins, extended throughout the twenty-five millions now composing the union, will soon be followed by her laws, by State papers, State loans, and finally by conscription; and even at this moment, were the peace of Europe to be disturbed, the federation would fly to arms at the bidding of Prussia, assemble under her banners, be paid by her from the common treasury, and obey her generals."

In denouncing the folly of the Crimean War, Urquhart foretold, not that Russia would suffer from it, but that, whether she lost or won, it would be a step on the downward path to Turkey. The Declaration of Paris proved to France, in the war of 1870–71, what he had said in 1860 it would prove, in the event of a war with Prussia—dire disaster.[1]

[1] It fell out as he had said when France's fleet, the second in Europe, ranged the seas helpless against the swarms of neutral merchantmen which were trading with Germany, while the German fleet was smugly tucked away in the harbour of Kiel.

This prophetic power of his, Urquhart himself called "the power of being right." There was nothing supernatural or extraordinary about it. It was simply the result of a system.

He differed from other men, he would have said, simply in this: his determination to be always right. It was within the power of every man to be right, and therefore his duty. "He could not," he said, "believe in a God, unless he could believe that a man had in himself this power of being right. A man can be right, therefore he must be right, or he is not a man." No allowance is made in the Urquhart philosophy for human weakness. The standard he set for himself he set for others also, without distinction of person, class, or sex. Such an evidence of trust and respect accounts in part for the honour and devotion he met with from his friends of every class, princes and working men alike, in spite of the harshness, even violence, with which he often treated them. Urquhart's treatment of his friends is one of the most problematic things connected with his surprising career. "It was," he said, "the result of his method of working on men." Starting from the axiom that it is within the power and duty of every man to be right, he asks, "'Why then are they not right?' Because their eyes are blinded by self-love. Men of this corrupt age prefer seeming right to being right. They are furious when they are shown to be wrong: their self-love is hurt." Therefore David Urquhart's first object was to kill the self-love in those who were possible disciples, and so enable them to see themselves as he had once seen himself. In other words, he believed he could effect nothing without a real conversion or new birth. To this end he often at first so infuriated men by his scathing and contemptuous language that they left him, determined to have no more to do with him. But he says that, thinking over his words calmly, they invariably found out that he was right, and if they had sufficient courage and truth in them they returned to him and were won. This was the way he won the Chartists; and later on Socialists and Atheists, who came to scoff, were drawn into his net by being shown, as one of them afterwards said, "that they had never been right in their lives."

This was the first step: the second was the development of a conscience in public affairs. Man was born part of a community. He could not live to himself. If wrong was done by the State to which he belonged, he could not say, "The Government has done this," and think no more about it. "You have done it," said Urquhart, "and you will be punished in this world and the next." When national injustice

is done, who suffers? Each individual in the State sooner or later, and the working man first of all, for he is bound to his country and cannot get away from it. And yet people go on thinking that they can be right while the nation of which they are a part is wrong. They do this because they hide their responsibility under an abstraction and say, "The State does this or that," not "I and my fellow-countrymen do this or that." This brings us to the third part of Urquhart's system, the cultivation of a right judgment, the first and most important part of which was the right use of words. "Men suppose that their reason has authority over words. But it happens that words, in return, exercise power over reason," says Francis Bacon. The way to prevent a fact being understood and realised is to clothe it in abstract terms, to enunciate it under a general proposition, to use some term that is so common and yet so loose that it really conveys a false meaning to the minds of people who think they understand it. Political and philosophical language is full of such terms. Urquhart applied the Socratic method to show their emptiness to all who used them.

The last and most important of all the means of being right was the acquisition of real first-hand knowledge—not someone's opinions, not loose and inaccurate information, but real knowledge. This means hard and self-denying labour; but such labour is everyone's duty, especially in the things that concern the government of his country, which it is the constant concern of all politicians to keep from him, especially in relation to foreign affairs.

Urquhart's system in brief was this: a man to be right must first cast aside the self he received from his age, and must set his true self to work at the acquisition of knowledge and self-discipline, striving all the time against allowing himself to be infected by the modern spirit and public opinion; and when he was himself instructed, he must teach others.

The pursuit of this method was as painful and uphill for the master as for the disciples. If the treatment meted out, in their training, to men who were devoting life and substance to the great cause seems almost like cruelty, David Urquhart himself spent sleepless nights over their education. But he never flinched in what he conceived to be his duty. "One living soul," he says, "is to me the universe." "My striving for your soul," he writes to a lady, whom he had convicted of want of intellectual sincerity, "is to get it clear-sighted and upright. It cannot be the last unless it is the first, for at every second of time, with an active mind such as

yours, the slightest flaw in an intellectual operation gives a foothold for self-love. My life, alas! is spent in watching these operations. There is scarcely a friend I have, from whom the letter I receive may not be the last. I can retain them only by putting them beyond the reach of error and failure, for in that their self-love is offended by being told that they may have been wrong. And yet this alone is the condition on which I can hold intercourse with my fellow-creatures."

This crushing of self-love, "the entire abnegation of self," as he expresses it, was essential for every man among his followers. The little band was leading a forlorn hope. Hitherto their acquaintance with public questions had consisted in floating on the top of a public frenzy aided by an assenting Government. Joined to his company, however, they were "struggling against the stream." "There were no passions to be worked on, only right to be maintained." No man could put his hand to the plough, not only without a perfect abnegation of every selfish end, but also without entire knowledge of the matter in hand. The aim of the ploughing was nothing less than the casting down of the evil of injustice and public immorality which was enthroned in the world, and which found its complete expression in unjust war, and whose most perfect incarnation was Russia.

His followers must not only *be*, they must *know*. To that end they must labour, to that end they must study. They must spare themselves no toil or trouble. He who said this practised what he preached. His labour was incessant. "There is nothing in the whole world," he says, "equal in my eyes to one man being always perfect, always able to convict, always indignant against wrong, whose mind ever occupies the judgment seat, who, in word, is—judgment. That God created us for this is evident in our being the reverse; for what pushes each into the mire is the desire to appear to be right, that disposition which we familiarly designate among ourselves as self-love. Now this is the sure effect of failing to *be* right. Such an aspiration planted in the breast of all (as well as the necessary faculties themselves) show that being right is the end for which we were created. Here too lies the evidence of immortality revealed in man himself, the greatest of all revelations."

"Those only who see are honest. Those only can hope who work. Forget yourself. That is the first condition of good greatness and of real enjoyment."

If Urquhart had been asked to explain his moral point of

departure he would doubtless have cited his extensive and sympathetic knowledge of the East. He went to Turkey from Greece, and was at first most unfavourably impressed respecting the character of Eastern countries by the Turkish Government and people in particular.

It was after six years' work and experience that he felt forced to change his opinions. Obviously, he was qualified to form a judgment about Eastern life. It is the moral aspect of that judgment which affects us here. David Urquhart considered he had been convicted by a Mussulman of the crime of murder in unjust war, and that he had learnt from Mussulmans the first principles, unknown in Europe, of cleanliness, courtesy, self-denial, and sincere speech.

"If I take this musket unblessed of God, then I take it of the devil," said a simple Mussulman soldier, explaining why he and his companions had allowed themselves to be driven out of a redoubt, without firing a shot, by Russian soldiers. War had not been declared by the Fetva, therefore to fight would have been murder. A Christian might do such a thing, a Mussulman never. Urquhart, whose own hands were reddened with the blood of men with whom his country was not at war (he had fought against the Turks in the Greek war of independence), was brought up short against an overwhelming sense of guilt. "I would gladly have given myself up to justice had there been a tribunal to deal with such cases," he said, speaking years afterwards of the occurrence. The result of that speech of the Mussulman soldier was that he gave himself up to a lifelong struggle to re-establish the cause of law and justice between nation and nation.

This first lesson was followed by others, for it must be remembered that the Turkey he studied was not the Turkey of Constantinople, but the Turkey of the country villages unspoiled by European civilisation. The veil of European convention fell from his eyes. The mist of European language and ideas fell from his mind. He saw that there is something better than so-called progress, and that is stationariness, when the latter means "the free right to property of every man, and equality of all men before the law." When the *status quo* is good, man, especially the Eastern, mistrusts all departure from it. Again, if government in the East is despotism, it is frank despotism, not legal tyranny; "men are not exasperated by the conversion into law, through the decisions of an accidental and numerical majority, of opinions they repudiate." It was in the East that Urquhart learnt the effect of manner and words on character. He saw a country where all classes

mix together in closest relationship, without familiarity on the one side, without haughtiness on the other; where the master addressed his servant in terms of respect and affection without fear of loss of dignity, because a common rule of respect and courtesy, unquestioned and irrefragable, governed all intercourse. Children brought up under that *régime* were neither cowed nor unruly. They were treated with respect and yielded obedience. He saw social intercourse free from the idle chatter and flippancy of European society, because politeness forbade anyone to speak unless he had something to say, and because it was the height of bad manners to tell anyone what he already knew. He found cleanliness carried to a pitch unknown in Europe, for the bath, as among the Romans, really carried away the impurities of the skin, and even the hands must be washed by clean water being poured over them. And lastly, he saw a state of society where an excuse was the worst of bad form, where a man must either prove himself right or admit himself wrong. "In short," as he said towards the end of his life, "he found a state of society in which all the ceremonies of the Catholic Church in her most solemn act of worship are part of the daily life of the people: the ablutions, the prayer of the priest[1] when censing the altar, the reverential postures of the ministers, not only towards God, but towards each other, and finally the ceremonial and ancient form of salutation given under the very eye of God made Man."

David Urquhart's own ethical and religious position is very difficult to define. At first sight almost all his characteristics seem opposed to those which we are inclined to consider as distinctively Christian.

There is hardly anything that we can recognise as humility or dependence upon God. The fate of nations depends entirely on the conduct of those who compose them. National catastrophe is always the direct result of stupidity or wrongdoing—the wrong-doing of every individual in the nation. Providence has committed to man the care and governance of the nation. On man is the responsibility. Man will profit if he does his task with wisdom, knowledge, and diligence. Man will suffer for carelessness, ignorance, and folly. Man's first duty is to be right. On the other hand, Urquhart says that "the only end of his existence is to serve God, which service consists in being just, that is, having a right judgment in all things." In a letter to an unbeliever he declares, "I am daily

[1] "Pone, Domine, custodiam ori meo et ostium circumstantiæ labiis meis: ut non declinet cor meum in verba malitiæ ad excusandas excusationes in peccatis."

and hourly engaged in the endeavour to lead the life of a Christian, that is, to be right in 'all things,' including the minutest operation of the mind and perception of the senses." He maintained that most so-called Christians were not Christians, that England could not be called a Christian country. "To know a Christian," he says, "there is the simplest of rules, which is also a Divine commandment: it is, 'By their fruits ye shall know them.' You must surely know that in this land there are no longer Christians, and without Christians how can there be Christianity? . . . If there were among the missionaries a single Christian, he would not be found in China or Hindoostan, but in England denouncing a race of malefactors and calling them to repentance."

There can be no doubt of the depth and absolute sincerity of his religious convictions. They are manifest in every action of his life. His religious history is a singular one. Brought up by a clever and original mother, whose piety took the form of extreme evangelicanism, his education threw him for nearly the whole of his young life into contact with Catholics in foreign schools.

No strong impression seems, however, to have been made upon him till he came under the influence of Cæsar Malan of Geneva. Under the spell of this famous Calvinistic teacher and his friends the latent Calvinism Urquhart had inherited from his forebears burst forth in the youth of fifteen. He went about from village to village with Malan's "missionaries" denouncing the Catholic religion as Anti-Christ, setting forth the Gospel, and desiring "nothing so much as to become one of that zealous band who had given up all to spread the pure Word of God in the dark places of the earth," *i.e.* in the Catholic cantons of Switzerland! "Constance," he says, "is so much under the curse for the burning of John Huss that there is scarcely one Christian known of in the town!" But even under the strong Calvinistic influence his natural instinct for right action comes out. "How curious is fate!" he wrote to his mother in 1820; "we cannot pass, I really believe, a thousandth part of a hand-breadth of our chain. Not that I think we are blindly to follow without consideration; we must make use of our judgment and do all for the best. That is our part, and things will only be blessed to us so far as we act after these principles, but still our allotted part will be the unchangeable same. For the determination of the Almighty is unchangeable."

In order to break the Malan influence, Mrs Urquhart sent David to travel in Spain with a tutor.

We have little means of knowing how his inner self developed amidst the strenuous activities of his early manhood, which extended from engineering work as an operative at Woolwich Arsenal to the diplomatic service.

At the susceptible age of seventeen he began an intimate friendship with Jeremy Bentham, in whose affections from that time "our David," as he always speaks of him in writing to his mother, held a high place. That the old sage appreciated fully his unusual mental endowment is evident in a letter answering one of Mrs Urquhart's in 1830: "David has for years been better able to judge for himself than anyone at such a distance" (he was then in Greece) "can judge for him. The advice I submit to you is to leave the matter altogether to himself, accompanied with information of the utmost you are able to do or obtain for him in the way of money."

Probably close friendship with the old Utilitarian developed Urquhart's strong sense of the place of law in morality. Perhaps he unconsciously absorbed from him that belief in and dependence upon reason, that scornful contempt for stupidity or loose thought, that characterised him all his life. There was always about him a clear-cut hardness and a secure superiority that recall Bentham and his school.

His real spiritual awakening Urquhart dates from the rebuke given to him by the Mussulman soldier at a time when, fortunately, he says, "I was young enough for the sense of shame not to be extinguished, and not having passed through the ordinary routine of education, nor having learnt to sneer at what is different to ourselves. . . . I found for the first time the perception of a human being." It is on the "perception of a human being" that David Urquhart afterwards takes his stand. "It is merely the natural law which makes men men, and not beasts, that I ask you to observe," he says.

Her position as a great lawgiver and disciplinarian attracted him nearly all his life to the Catholic Church. But the attraction was on the intellectual side; nothing is left to feeling, and this accounts for the curious sense of aridity with which, in spite of our admiration, Urquhart's life and writings fill us. Even his wife with all her evangelical piety did not touch him there. After his marriage there is more devout reference to Holy Scripture, there are more quotations from the sayings of our Lord and His Apostles; but to the end of his life Urquhart remained apparently aloof from human passions, human weakness; the homely and comfortable things that surround other men's public work had no place in his. We miss in him the gracious play of feeling, of sympathy, the

delicate light and shade that make some great men like pleasant green hills, down which the streams bubble, on which flocks feed and lambs play, and that shelter in their folds little dwellings, whose blue smoke rises into the blue heavens. Urquhart was rather like a clean-cut rock, alone, inaccessible, unsmiling, unaffected by rain or sunshine, yet all the while bearing in nooks and crannies flowery treasures for those who knew where to look, touching memories, unexpected tendernesses and sensitive affections.

So David Urquhart, to most men of his time, stood strange, uncompromising, unadorned, the preacher of righteousness that comes by the works of the law in an age which preferred to believe only in such righteousness as could be had without works. For these were the days when English statesmen could openly avow that International Law was no concern of theirs; they were the days when capitalists grew rich on the labours of babes, who were put to work as soon as they could totter, while Pharisees of the school of Hannah More were preaching to the poor their duty of submission and respect to their betters.

The love of international and national justice was dead. The one had been slowly dying since the Peace of Westphalia; the other had received its death-blow when, at the demolition of the monasteries, lands which had kept many in contentment were seized to enrich those whom the King wished to honour.

And the nations were blindly content with this state of things. To arouse them a seer was wanted. That seer David Urquhart undoubtedly was. But he was the voice of one crying in the wilderness. Like Jeremiah, he stood and cried aloud to the inhabitants of Europe. He told them of their iniquities, of which they were filling up the measure. He told them of the woe that would come upon them: nothing short of a universal catastrophe which would involve the whole of Europe. And who can say to-day that he was not a true prophet? "I see as clearly with the eye of the mind as others do with the eye of the body," he said. We must remember that he belonged by birth to that mysterious race of the Celt which, for whatever reason, possesses psychic sight. The veil which hides realities from them is wont to be thin. In Urquhart it scarcely existed.

He had that true and delicate perception of evil, and strong (almost physical) loathing of it, which we are accustomed to associate with the saints and mystics of the Catholic Church. Of such we hear how they faint in the presence of sin; how they can see into the heart of the sinner; how the sight of one

venial sin is to them torment unspeakable. Now, at first sight Urquhart seems to have little in common with a Catholic saint. We look in vain for the shrinking from notice, the dependence on Divine help, the rapt states of prayer, the patience, meekness, and outward humility that seem inseparable from the saintly character. But, looking more closely, there is more likeness than appears at first sight. The crucifixion of self is the unique sign of the saintly life. "I die daily," says St Paul. To kill self-love is the first step in Urquhart's training of his disciples. The entire abnegation of self is his own ideal. "Be ye therefore perfect" is the standard set before the saint. "To be a Christian is to be right in all things," says Urquhart. But with him there is no harshness towards himself and leniency towards others. He exacts from others what he exacts from himself. And there lies the secret both of his power and his failure—his power with the few, his failure with the many. For it is only the few who are what Professor James calls the twice-born, and one of these was Urquhart. He had been born again and washed and made whole; he never returned to his wallowing in the mire. Having seen, like the souls in Plato's myth, one of the attributes of God, His eternal righteousness and justice, with the clear vision of the mystic, he could never again take man's counterfeits and call them righteousness and justice. To him they were always base and evil, even the least noxious of them, and he counted them as sin. And to him there was no such thing as venial sin. "I do not understand good," he says; "I only understand evil. I know I must resist sin in myself, and evil in others." He saw this with his whole being, and he did it to the death.

It may, of course, be said with some appearance of truth that Urquhart has been proved a negligible quantity in the world of affairs, that it is forty years since he died, and that he seems to have had little or no effect on the thought or statecraft of his country. Nevertheless, it is true that those ideas of his, that made him "plough a lone furrow" in the middle of last century, have either been proved sound and true by political events, or are to-day being preached and advocated by the more advanced school of politicians. They will doubtless be the practical politics of to-morrow. "If the Union of Democratic Control wants a really respectable spiritual ancestor, let it take David Urquhart," said a young journalist the other day. And if its aim be true "democratic control," from whom could it more reasonably claim descent than from the man who spent his life in denouncing secret

treaties and dragging the dark deeds of Cabinets into the light of day?

His constantly reiterated warning that Europe was on the brink of a great catastrophe, in which her boasted civilisation might go down in flaming ruin, only expresses the feeling which shadowed all thoughtful and sensitive minds in those months of lurid calm before the war-cloud burst.

His was the gift of prophecy born of knowledge and vision. Amongst the many instances of its exercise we may take three, which especially touch us to-day: the wrongs of Ireland and their consequences, the weakness and probable fate of Russia, and the disastrous consequences that were bound to follow the Declaration of Paris.

On these points in particular it has been left for us of this generation to see how true a prophet and how sagacious a statesman was David Urquhart. In 1847 he wrote a long letter to a member of the Conservative party on the subject of what was then known as the "Repeal of the Union," in which he concludes his argument by these words: "This is my case: I submit that I have proved that Ireland was unjustly deprived of her Parliament, and the Treaty of Union is void,[1] and that it is expedient for us to grant what it is unjust for us to withhold. If we persist at once in our present measures and our refusal, the time will come when she will be enabled to wrest from our weakness and embarrassment what she would now gladly owe to our generosity. The present difficulty you may now perhaps get over, but the circumstances remain. At present we are at peace. Call up the image of war, and consider the back door to England that you have opened in Ireland."

Are not these words justified to-day, when every man taken from the Western front is a menace to our freedom, and yet an army must be kept in Ireland, not so much for her protection against the enemy, but for our own against her?

In another particular, too, have events proved Urquhart right: *i.e.* in the real and essential weakness of Russia. "Russia," he said, "is an image with feet of clay." As a military Power he maintained that she was worthless. Turkey could defeat her in two years, if Turkey were allowed her way untrammelled by Western diplomacy. But Russia, weak in fighting strength, was strong in diplomacy. There no European Cabinet could match her: she used them like pawns to win her games. But given a time when it should be a

[1] Because it had been violated by the suppression of the Exchequer and its barons.

question of sheer force, when diplomacy should avail no longer, she would fall either by outward pressure or inward corruption. "There are two ideas afloat about Russia," he said in 1862; "one is that she is powerful, another that she is miserably weak. The former is believed by the nations of the world, the latter by diplomatists. Never was the Russian Cabinet so near perfect success, never was it so near absolute destruction. It is menaced by dangers that may at any moment destroy it, if a man can be found for the occasion."

The occasion has proved to be European war.

But in nothing has Urquhart been more completely justified than in his unsparing and ceaseless denunciations of the wickedness and folly of the Declaration of Paris. It was wicked because it was an attempt to break through the Law of Nations in the name of civilisation and humanity. It was foolish because on that law and on that law alone rested the safety of England.

In 1860 there appeared a series of articles in the *Free Press*[1] pointing out the many attempts since 1800 to break the maritime power of England, not by establishing an open league against her, but by endeavouring to set up an abstract principle which they called the "liberty of the seas."

Thanks, however, to her own determination and that of the United States to maintain the Law of Nations, nothing irretrievably disastrous happened until 1856, when the plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers met at the Paris Conference, and without authority from their Governments drew up this new code of maritime law, "this piece of extra-national legislation," as Urquhart called it. It was passed over almost unnoticed except by a few statesmen, but Urquhart never ceased to cry aloud its dangers to the chief maritime Powers of Europe, France and England.

"England," he declared in a fine rhetorical passage, "England is enormous wealth. England is a glorious field of distinction. England is India. England is the Northern region of America. England is a great many ships of war and great stores of guns and munitions. England is the carrying trade of the world. England is unbounded coal measures. England is a constellation of colonies, dotted over the world. And under the Declaration of Paris this England is defence-

[1] A weekly newspaper published by Urquhart. It was edited by C. D. Collet, well known to the social reformers of his day as secretary to the "Society for the Repeal of the Stamp-duty on Newspapers." The *Free Press* was the journal of the Foreign Affairs Committees; it continued to exist from 1855 to 1877, but in 1866 it took the name of *The Diplomatic Review*.

less. England's only defence is her power of attacking her foes. The sea is her defence; if not, it is her prison."

"If ever England is involved in a great war," he constantly said, "she is lost unless the Declaration of Paris is rescinded. She will be fighting with her right hand tied behind her back."

His prophecy has been abundantly justified. At the beginning of this war the Declaration of London, whereby, in 1877, all the signatory Powers, except France, declared themselves bound by the Declaration of Paris, was set aside.

His words, moreover, have lately received unexpected support. During the last year there appeared in the *Nineteenth Century* a series of articles on maritime law and the Declaration of Paris[1] which might have been written by Urquhart himself, so completely are they in accord with his mind and thought, so thoroughly is the whole question withdrawn from the narrow limits of national limits and expediency and based on the wide and deep foundations of the Law of Nations. For it was there that Urquhart, in all his statecraft, ever took his stand. All through his life he placed before him as his ideal the philosopher statesman of Plato's perfect State. In the possibility of the existence of that State he never lost faith, though he lived in a country wherein "no politician was honest, nor was there any champion of truth, at whose side the people might fight and be saved."[2]

He ever chose the "greatest work"; for him there was no "hiding behind the hedge in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving rain hurried along."[2] He turned his "eyes upwards and downwards; looking first at absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human copy; mingling and tempering the various elements of life into the image of a man."[2] And as he strove that the nations might conform to laws higher than the laws of Plato's ideal State, even the laws of the kingdom of God on earth, so he wrought that men should conform themselves to an image greater than that which "Homer calls the form and likeness of God," even the image of the Just Man made perfect—the Son of God manifest in the world.

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[1] By Sir Francis Piggott, Chief-Justice of Hong-Kong, 1905–1912.
[2] Plato's *Republic*, bk. vi., Jowett's translation.

THE REALITY OF GOD.

A WARTIME QUESTION.

PRINCIPAL FORSYTH.

I.

In our attempts to discuss the nature of God it might be well to cease using the old and wayworn language of substance and its attributes. For it removes us into a speculative region where we may wander without end, as we have no guide either in direct revelation or in experience. We might well follow here the modern trend, refusing to think that it is a decadence, and greeting it as an advance. We might speak accordingly not of attributes and substance but of values and reality. For such categories bring us to contact with a God of personal energy and not of Brahmanical repose; with a God whose energy has both the purpose of a holy Kingdom and the motive of a holy love; who, therefore, comes out to meet our experience and our need, and does not simply wait to be inquired of by our thought. We have a God who takes, by His search for us, all the initiative also of our search for Him. We seek because we have been found. We love Him because He first loved us. We know as we are known. We think His thought after Him. We have a Reality who comes knocking at our door, and even sits to sup with us amid the concrete values of life. He does not inhabit a storm-free centre of abstract substance with attributes playing round it; nor is His great miracle, in the new creation of us which is at the centre of our worship, a change of substance within attributes that are still there, and still at work, ignorant of the new proprietor. That were too Antinomian.

For Christians, Christ has the compendious value of God. That is, all values we hold divine are focussed, are latent, in Him. He produces on us the effect of God. But it is

impossible for us to stop there without changing Christianity into a religion which has ceased to be creative and become but impressionist. What is the eternal, the objective, value of these values and impressions from Christ, which means so much subjectively for us? How are we sure they are not illusions? How do we pass from the one world to another? Many are suggesting to-day that there is no such passage, that we are victims of auto-suggestion. How do we reach and rest on a reality within our impressions? What is their value to God? What is the relation of the Christ we revere to God? Can we say in any sense that God Himself died? How do we pass from Christ, as value for us, to God as the absolute reality of us and all things? How ascend from subjective experience to objective faith? How, for instance, can our personal experience of Christ and His effect on history warrant a faith in what must be beyond every mere stage of experience—the actual and final consummation in history of the Kingdom of God? How shall we know that the love so intense, so moving, in Christ is equally eternal, that it has power adequate to its passion, that it may not one far day succumb to some dark but mightier fate behind all? Is that love of His the love omnipotent? Can it for ever overcome the last death that works in the Universe? Is it through Him identical with the last reality? Is it enough for us that He so felt it? Is the intensity of His conviction but the greatest of aids to our wish to believe the same? Is our faith but a smaller replica of His? Or did He *do* something which is not merely His witness to love's eternity, but the act which secures it by beating down, in principle and in advance, every Satan under the feet of God? Was the Cross the real act and cosmic victory of love eternal?

This is not a piece of academic theology. It is the last question of the religion of the hour, when evil is loose as it never was before in our time, and when the religious consciousness has taken a form to which the theological phrasing of it that carried the old heroisms has ceased to appeal. The questions I have put represent the modern form of the problem which the Cross has to answer. It is not so much question about the satisfying of divine justice, or the revelation of divine love, but about the securing of righteous love as the holy and absolute kingdom, as at once the final destiny and the last ground of all history and all things. The revelation we need is not simply, God is love: it is the invincibility of that love by any other power that might rise against it; it is its ultimacy as the last reality. That is, to put it in an old

way which Mr Wells has made current for many, Is the kingship of God a limited monarchy, or is He the Master of every Fate? No answer is really Christian till it establish God's absolute reign as holy love. That is the Christian interior and principle of Christ's death. It is love's destruction of the last enemy, which enemy is something more than our mere mortality. Or can we put it in another modern form? Where is the religious *Authority* within the religious value? How should the love of Christ constrain us absolutely?

To that question there is no answer in the way of demonstrative thought. No process of thought can give us this certainty or security, no movement of the idea reverberating in our mind. For that were to rationalise God amid an age which has reached one of our best values in the conviction that life is at once too great and free to be explained by any rational process alone, or any movement of an idea. The answer to the last question of religion must be a religious answer. Our religion is not an assent to a noetic answer. The answer must be in the religious sphere, in the inner nature of a religious experience autonomous though not isolated and independent. The religious life is of all the forms of life most autonomous. Its principle is in itself; it is not applied from without it, from a process of thought which gives leave for faith. Only the religious understand religion. To rationalise it and to idealise it are equally inadequate. The thing that eludes such treatment is the very thing that makes the religious life what it chiefly is, what it is distinctively. The rational treatment of spiritual reality is like that treatment of the Bible which lays it out in schemes—mapping the Bible instead of mining in it—mapping the Bible that covers a developing millennium of history and opens the depths of Eternity. It is what might be called the topiary treatment whether of faith or Scripture, which lays them out in beds, trims them to artificial shapes, and makes a lifeless peacock out of a living tree. The result may be a curiosity rather than a piety.

Christianity is the religion of moral redemption, and its story is the evolution of a new creation pouring from a historic point. Its characteristic thing, its divine thing, is its dealing at this point with the distress, the tragedy, of human sin. But sin is a thing absolutely irrational. By its very nature it is incapable of explanation—not only beyond it but alien to it. Therefore that which masters sin is likewise so at the core. Redemption is as extra-rational as sin is. Forgiveness, which for Christian faith founds all, is not a rational process. The element of freedom in both free sin and free grace makes them

intractable to scientific system. Their relation is not to the mechanism of nature but to its vaster organic life and destiny. The intractability lies in their nature and quality, and not only in method or degree. The freedom in history has nothing analogous in nature. It is *sui generis.* In a word, we cannot believe in the God of Christ except by a miracle, whose prelude in the course of evolution is the emergence of moral freedom. We believe by the kind of miracle that is involved in moral action and is not primarily defined by its relation to mechanical law; which may recombine mechanical laws but does not break or suspend them; which is provided for in the total organism of nature's life and not prescribed by nature's machinery. We believe by that in miracle which lifts it above mere mystery or riddle; by that new and original element in personality which must consummate in *action*; by that which defies research, as the will's creative freedom does, because it transcends, like nothing else, the idea of mere spiritual immanence and its *process*, and carries our experience beyond impression to regeneration. It is the experience not of an impressive power but of the new creator. We hold Christ to be God because He does on us what God alone can do—He forgives in His own right. That miracle of experience changes our mere impression to contact with reality. The ground of the step is what some would call no ground: it is a moral miracle. In all consciousness, indeed, there is the *mystery* which is one basis of miracle. How does contact produce consciousness, or at least stir it? How do I come to feel as I do when the tip of my finger meets with any energy the point of a pin? Who can say? But mystery is not miracle; which we do not meet till we enter the region of such action as culminates in a new life and not merely a new way of living.

It is by such a miracle of experience that we pass from Christ's value to God's reality, and find the one in the other. No rational account can be given of that step, which is the greatest the soul can take. Indeed, all real belief in a God of holy love is miraculous. All action of the *Holy* Spirit is miraculous. The humblest man's faith is miraculous according as it is real. That is the region where the whole miracle question must begin to be solved—the region of the Kingdom of God. All the miracles of creation and providence run up to the historic miracle of salvation into that Kingdom. And it is in that idea, which ruled Christ from first to last and from height to depth, that we must start to command the idea of miracle. We cannot wait to go through the miracle

of conversion till we have adjusted the possibility of miracle to the lower level of natural law. We do not believe in God because we believe in miracles; to believe in miracles we must first believe in God and His kingship—believe, that is, really, religiously, personally. Personal religion is miraculous religion. It is by a miracle we pass from death to life, which is the nature of Christian faith—at least in the classic cases, where its true genius is to be sought. Everything produced in us by the Holy Spirit is produced by miracle. The Spirit of God acts plentifully without miracle; Pilate had that power. But miracle is the world of the Holy Spirit. If personal faith in Christ's redemption depended on believing the miracles, then we should have to start from some satisfactory adjustment of the miracles to natural law or scientific intelligence, and go on, in the strength of that belief, to believe in a revelation so guaranteed. But that is exploded apologetic. There is no adjustment of miracle to natural law which is so satisfactory as science that we could build religion upon it. We must begin at the other, the religious end. The secret of God's miracles is with them that fear Him. It is in the religious experience, and in its experience as action and not only emotion, that the true nature of miracle is to be found. It is in an experience of action between God and us which breaks the chain of moral causation and the fatality of our past. It is in the experience of God as cause, and more than cause, as will, surmounting and even reversing cause. The key to the miracles we can examine is the miracle we have undergone. "Miracles which used to be the foundation of apologetic became in time only its crutch, and now they are its crux." It takes all our faith in the miracle of salvation to believe the miracles of the Saviour.

If it is asked how we pass from subjective miracle to objective, the answer is that we do so in an experience which is not a flash of subjective sensibility and wonder, but a response in kind to God's moral gift of a new creation. There is a certain analogy in our sense of will power, which we transfer to construe the action on us of a real external world. Only, in our sense of forgiveness the action is far more intimate, certain, and real. For sin is sin against an absolute holiness; hence the action of its forgiveness on us is not that of an objective power only (like the external world) but of the absolute One, with all the reality of the moral and holy. I read in a review of Professor Percy Gardner's new book on the *Evolution of Doctrine*, that what theology

needs most is to be *psychologised.* Is that not a mistake? Psychology is a science, and science can give no reality, but only values. It cannot give revelation. What is most needed by both theology and religion is to be *moralised.*

All real belief in a holy God is miraculous. The whole maintenance of the deepest spiritual life is, unless we only float in a mystic sea. It rests not only on spiritual mystery, but, at last, on moral miracle. The facts that serve us here are not evidential but sacramental. They do not clear things up; they break open and give access to a new world with new dominants. Their impressive value in us becomes, in moral depths beyond our psychology, the vehicle of reality from beyond us. The fact Jesus becomes the Son of God in power —not simply as throned in heaven, but as new creative within life; not in royal power, abstract and spectacular, at the switchboard of the moral Universe in a distant heaven, but in power which remakes me within. He remakes me, not by a royal fiat from His far heaven, but by becoming in my thought and reason the real conative power, active purpose, and effectual call. The new Creator "liveth in me." He becomes, not the object of my thought or even worship, but its energy and its very quality. We have the mind of Christ. We think Christ's creative thoughts. That is the miracle of Paul's inspiration as he himself understood and believed it (1 Cor. ii. 16: "I think the thoughts of Christ"). Such was the apostolic thinking that created the Church, and the new Humanity of which the Church is the earnest.

The miracle which lifts experience into faith is the advanced stage, not of the mystery which makes our nature spiritual, but of the miracle that makes our will free. It is evangelical in its nature more than mystical. It belongs to the region of our sin rather than our sensibility, of our forgiveness more than our hunger for God. For saving faith is an act of reciprocal wills. It is an act meeting act. However deeply mystic or deeply moved it may be in the immediate form of experience in which it transpires, it is, at its core, an act of spiritual will. Such is the psychology of it; which must rest on a metaphysic of its own kind, a metaphysic of ethics, not of substance but of subject. And in a mysticism it may float, also of its own kind—the mysticism of conscience, of the Kingdom of God and its righteousness, of our mystically moral Redemption into that Kingdom, of our holy salvation.

So also, if we put the matter in the terms of the last authority, that is experienced before it is admitted. It is a visitation and not a verdict. It comes home, it is not "con-

cluded." And it does not come home in a mystic experience so much as in a moral, in a region of reciprocal action, in which God makes Himself ours, and we respond by making ourselves His. It can be but owned, not explained. Its corporate value must come home to each; we cannot impose it on any. It is not a matter of deeper intuition but of new life, new action, or new creation. The only foundation for Christian authority is nothing that appeals to people of culture as such. It is the evangelical experience. It is Christ as Redeemer. The only external authority really valuable is that which flows from such faith, serves it, and is owned by it. The evangelical experience of the gift of eternal life in forgiveness is the middle point between the extremes of Rome and rationalism; and it is there the Christian centre of gravity falls. Not that the experience is prescribed for every Christian soul, but that it is the classic and distinctive Christian experience, giving the principle for those by whom the question of authority is studied and is acute. It is the experience characteristic and distinctive of the corporate consciousness of the Church of the true saints, whether of the canonical or not.

II.

As a matter of fact the access of the Christian soul to reality has been a religious access. It has been in a historical and experimental way through Jesus Christ, especially as crucified. For the moment I am not stopping to argue whether this is an illusion or not. I am only dealing with it as a matter of fact, attractive as would be a discussion of the merits of the case. The Church, though it has done much in the way of philosophical underpinning to its position, has not founded it so, nor rested there. And I submit that current thought is not doing full justice to that historic fact as carrying the widest, the most influential, and the most permanent society on earth. The soul of the Church (and it is the nucleus of the New Humanity) has been made and stayed on the conviction, however won, that it is Christ's conquest of death in connection with guilt that plants the soul on practical reality, grounds mankind for eternity on God's Kingdom, and saves faith from the collapse of old values in the most dreadful calamities of time. It was in this power that Augustine wrote his *City of God* amid the wreck of the Empire and the sack of Rome by the northern barbarians. But all that could only be if it was the soul's belief that Christ in His death and resurrection

not only surmounted in heroism but exploited for righteousness eternal a calamity and a crime the greatest that history could present or Eternity feel. The Church took that measure of the Cross, and it has produced its effect on the world by doing so. It held (rightly or wrongly) that man's treatment of the holy Son of God, coming for his blessing in what God's holiness saw to be his last distress and knew to be His own deepest wound, was a greater moral enormity than anything man could do on man, or nation on nation. Faith went down to the last moral reality, to the last reality of all, in a way to see that the issue of that event settled all spiritual values, all moral issues, all human sin, all historic conflict, in principle and in advance for ever.

I venture to suggest that that is the question still, and it should be kept in the front in all our discussions about the reconstruction either of the Church, or its belief, or its message. If such a war as this do not make us face reality, what will? What is the relation of Christ and His moral victory to the reality laid bare by the dreadful moral situation of our own time, and especially to its revelation of evil? It is not denied by any that Christ's life was a moral victory. And it was the moral victory of a soul which was something more than a mere saint. It could not have affected the world as it has done if it had been merely the self-conquest of an individual piety or genius. It was more than the message of a passing prophet, or the visitation of a spiritual splendour. Its significance was historic, universal, radical, creative, for the moral soul. It was the crisis of the world's righteousness and the world's fate. What, then, is its bearing on the present crisis, which is now moral even more than political or historic, and bound up with a world righteousness far more than a diplomatic situation? *Was* the death of Christ a greater event, a more appalling moral tragedy, than the present war? To say so will seem to many but a pulpit extravagance. And yet the Church at least cannot shrink from saying it without making a present of its faith to our common hours, our common sense, the spirit of the age, or the principle of the world. The Church's faith may not survive this dreadful trial; but if it do, it can only be if the extravagance is not merely believed, but taken as the foundation of belief, the residual reality from the evaluation of all values.

But it is a conviction which rational evidence cannot carry. It involves a moral miracle. If we eke out the defect of logic by mysticism, which goes no further than wonder, we do

not do justice to the element of miracle, which is equally an element in all religions; for mysticism is not action. I mean not only that what is believed is such a moral miracle—God's forgiveness of *such* enemies—but also that the belief in it is such a miracle in its nature. Faith delightedly believes in miracles, being itself miraculous. This is not the refuge of impotence, the asylum of ignorance. It is action—the elenchus of the last religion, the logic or method of the unseen (Heb. ii.), the action of the moral will in its last crisis and committal. It is only by a miracle that we could believe the fundamental miracle of the world, the paradox of the recreated soul, of a life by death, of seeing the invisible. It is by this *saltus* that we solve Plato's riddle and pass from his shadows to his realities. We are turned round, converted in the cave; we do not just advance into the light. It is not a mere matter of education, as Plato solved it. That would make faith but a branch of religious culture (which is the German heresy) and not a moral crisis. God has broken in and roused men to break out. The new life, because it is moral, is *per saltum* without being *salex*. If the Cross of Christ was what the Church exists by believing it to be, the greatest of all moral miracles, then that belief is *ejusdem generis*. It is an act of faith, miraculous in the humblest and simplest believer who is sure that Christ is as real a presence to him as if two thousand years were not,—little as he may realise that it is so, or that his faith is a "function" and not a mere sequel of Christ's resurrection. Again, I am not arguing the merits of the case, but rather indicating the magnitude of it. And I am humbly urging on the Church especially that its discussion should be duly ample and deep. It cannot be settled by the journalistic touch, or the engaging *causerie*. It draws on the whole volume of the consciousness of the Church on the one hand, or of Humanity and its tragedy on the other. And the fly in the ointment is rarely so unpleasant as when charming essays or talks on the character of Christ are blotched by repeated jibes at the theology of His action by amateurs in that line. Christianity does not rest on the teaching of Christ but on His Cross, which is to His precept as creator is to prophet.

III.

Apart from the Church's interpretation of Christ's death, this war is the greatest crisis of the world righteousness that history has known. If we who believe that we stand for that

righteousness as our last and inmost cause were defeated, could we go on to believe in a righteous God in and over all history? It is very doubtful. Of course, there is nothing more tenacious than religious belief, and the public in a mass might long go on with the old creed and worship. But it would slowly have the heart taken out of it, as for many, that heart has long been gone. Those who penetrate things, and whose unbelief is of the radical kind, could say more than they had said before. And they would gnaw away the public belief in due course. Revelation would be unequal to question. We should be reduced—the thin to Mr Wells's limited God, the thorough to Mr Hardy's "It"—to "the Great Foresightless," to "the Inadvertent Mind," to the "Spirit of the sinister and ironic," with an undertone of all the "Pities," hoping against hope that the Grand Force might become conscious and compassionate at last.

Unless—unless power were given the prophets of the Church to reach and convey, as the certainty of the moral world, that the Cross of Christ still leads the generations on, that it was at its heart a vaster crisis for history than the present, that its value lay nearer reality; nay, that it was the last moral crisis of the world truly real, and that it was, within all the values we feel in it, the final victory of the God of love holy and eternal, the real establishment in a slow history of His endless kingship against every Fate. This, of course, the Church might be unable to do in due force. It might remain so entangled, not in the past but in the amoral controversies, creeds, traditions, and sentimentalisms of the past, as to lose the penetration of the moral soul, and the *Holy* Spirit's discernment of the time. It might keep cultivating the note of piety, spirituality, and facile love till it lost all answer on a world-scale to the note of righteousness which ruled Christ; till its truncated mind called the seers, with sneers, the court chaplains of a commonwealth of sectaries. But any Church and any theology worth keeping is the moralised Church or theology which can commend itself to the soul broken by the moral problem of a whole civilisation wrecked, and a whole world in international collapse.

That is the situation the Church and its beliefs is challenged to meet to-day. It is not at last the challenge of the havenots, nor of the comfortables, nor of the savants, nor of the æsthetes. It is the challenge of the whole moral situation. If the Church, handling the greatest moral act in history, declares it to be the moral act final and decisive for a whole historic world, then it must make it relevant not merely to the spirit of the age, *nimium lubricus adspici*, but to the supreme historic junctures, and especially that juncture in which we live, and

where our faith is tried for its life. The Church, escaping from the old jurisms and philosophemes which served their day, must return to construe its charter and trust, not in the light of the ages when theologians were lawyers or metaphysicians, but by Christ's own purpose of the historic Kingdom of God, which ruled His every word and deed, and chiefly ruled His last and greatest deed of all. It must commend its Gospel as it came home to the chief apostle—as the practical revelation and establishment of God's righteousness. Can it retranslate the old power of its Cross into these terms, as moral as they are modern? In the Kingdom of God and its righteousness as established there, can it find the last reality both of its own creed and of human destiny? It is not new values we most need, it is nothing so impressionist, but, within them all, the last reality and its power of regeneration. Amid the broken pitchers of old values it must show the light of the real powers. It must adjust its fundamental belief and address its creative Gospel to the moral problem of the historic hour, both between nations and within them. That is a problem which all men feel but few can gauge. It is not a problem in theology as apologetic, but of theology as a moral Gospel. It is not a curious theology we need, nor a scholarly construction, but an evangelical theodicy as the only theodicy there is. The old evangelicalism is dead; is the new powerless to be born? Mere civilisations end in moral crisis always; can we find at a creative point in time that reality and power which seem to fade in the evolutionary career? Is the Church's real capital an historic crisis that transcends all the crises of the career, and reclaims them for a regenerate realm of God which they go to enrich and glorify? Is the Cross of Christ, beyond all the values it has for individuals or stages, the insertion into history of a world where the real is the moral raised to the power of the holy? Does all history with its struggle for righteousness turn at last on the issue of righteousness at that historic point? Does the Church realise that it does? I am speaking of the Church's realisation of its own fontal belief. Can it commend that faith to a moral world, to a public world where love takes the form not of kindness but of righteousness or even judgment, and where righteousness is a greater passion than ever before in history, a world which feels as never before the friction between an ideal ethic and a kind of progress which has been really suppressed war? Or has the Church lost the element which makes the Gospel the salvation of nations and the glory of societies as well as souls? Has it the power to draw from its Cross and drive into the world

such a faith in a moral, righteous, and holy consummation of history as can survive what seems the last dereliction, and pluck the flower of public salvation out of the nettle of the last social danger? Can it relate the Cross of God's righteousness, which it calls the greatest thing in history, to the greatest moral crisis of history and the greatest challenge to belief? Germany is that challenge, as being not only the enemy of Christianity but its betrayer from within. Can the theology which "places" Judas in providence so place Germany, and enable us to believe that such a Satan which wills the evil still works the good? For the living generation that is the supreme challenge which the public situation offers to Christian faith. Never mind for the moment the cause of the trouble; can it be made to serve the Kingdom of God (John ix. 3)? Is it true, as the Church says, that there has been a historic judgment still greater, which, already effected, works out in a swaying history, and carries the eternal secret of a new-creating reality? Can the Church so say that as to make men feel that it is true? As the old values subside, do they leave upstanding clear the last reality as the Saviour whose passing sacraments they were? Can the Church, by moral miracle, transubstantiate to the soul, within all the accidents of time, the reality of an Eternity as holy as it is kind, and as kind as it is fair? Can it make good to the world a religion of emotional thought, not only crystallising on a moral core but created by that moral regeneration which more feel we need than are sure we have?

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ALBERTUS MAGNUS AS PHILOSOPHER.

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To most persons, even among the highly educated, the name of Albertus Magnus is, as Maurice in his treatment of mediæval philosophy remarked, still "surrounded with a traditional haze." For that, it must be said, the great historians of philosophy are—with the exceptions of Hauréau and Erdmann—much to blame. They have usually disposed of him in a few general statements, leaving no sort of definite and abiding impression upon the mind. But, alike in himself and as the master of Aquinas, Albertus deserves much better consideration. As Erdmann has said, "an undeserved superiority" is "often assigned" to Aquinas "by philosophical writers" over his master, Albertus Magnus. Milman called him "the most illustrious of the Schoolmen"; but merely to think highly of Albertus as one of the Schoolmen is not at all to realise how truly and characteristically he was a philosopher. He came under the spell of all the great philosophical disciplines—logic, psychology, metaphysics, and ethics. His erudition was prodigious, though his knowledge of the history of philosophy was strangely defective. His works treat *de omni re scibili et non scibili.* This *Doctor Universalis* of the thirteenth century makes an inspiring figure as, in his many-sidedness, he takes up into himself all the knowledge of his time, and stands side by side with Roger Bacon—who had certainly no title to belittle him—in energetic espousal of the new science of his age. He had a steady sense—rare in his time — of the real and the true. Draper's account of the scientific acquirements of Albertus in his *Intellectual Development in Europe* (vol. ii. p. 153) is of the most imperfect character. The men who have made so much of the historic warfare of science with theology had no eye for phenomena like the splendid scientific spirit displayed by this great Dominican, whose interest lay so much in physics.

That interest was, of course, due to the influence of Aristotle's *Physics*, which, in the main, he followed. But his own scientific initiative has not gone without acknowledgment by Humboldt. Albertus stood strongly for observation, experiment, induction; he had an inborn faculty for intimate communication with nature, and more than one of his theories made for progress in more than one of the many natural sciences with which he was familiar. It is quite a mistake, though a common one, to suppose Roger Bacon to be the only experimental philosopher or experience advocate of that time; and Albertus, in his *Physics*, expressly says that "a principle which does not agree with experimental knowledge (*experimentali cognitioni*) acquired by the senses, is no principle but rather the opposite." The necessity of experience, then, as a criterion of truth in natural science, is expressly laid down by Albertus, and Roger Bacon himself did little more in his discussion of experimental science. The scientific writings of Albertus were no mere commentaries, as is often imagined, on Aristotle, but were largely based on personal observation and experiment. His recognition of experience is largely evident in his treatise on Animals, which has much that is merely curious. Stress on experience is also present in the treatise on Vegetables and Plants, where the philosopher in Albertus comes out in his saying that matters affecting particular plants are for curiosity rather than philosophy, "for philosophy cannot deal with particulars." Albertus had, however, the fault of his time—shared not less by Roger Bacon—of a too great credulity at times. If Dante followed Aquinas in theology, he was prone to be influenced in physics by Albertus, though that is not meant to imply that Aquinas also did not here influence him. Albertus is duly honoured as the master of Aquinas in the *Paradiso*, x. 98. In his cosmological reasonings Albertus on occasion vigorously opposed the whole tribe of Arabian philosophers, as *e.g.* on the animation of the heavens, to which Albertus, like a good scholastic, was adverse; the heavenly bodies were to him inanimate and insensible, the instruments of intelligent motion. On the Averroist doctrine that the heavenly bodies are individuals of the same species, Albertus sided with Avicenna against it. He had an intuitive faculty of rising from the contemplation of the spectacle of creation to its eternal, immutable essence.

Logic was for Albertus the science by which we attain to all knowledge, or advance from the known to knowledge of the unknown. Albertus held logic to be a preparation for

science, but not itself properly science. On the great question of universals, the combining power of the many-sided Albertus was able to allay existing strife; to him they are *ante res*, as original types in the Divine Mind; they are *in rebus*, as their common nature, being present in the particular; and they are *post res*, as abstractions from things, or as deduced by our minds from individual things—otherwise, as concepts. He thus seems to make a considerable approach to conceptualism, but aims to show realism, nominalism, and conceptualism to be different aspects of one and the same truth. All philosophy was, in his view, either physical or mathematical or metaphysical. Physics for him came first, and the mathematical or purely intellectual came after, leaving the sphere of the absolute or the divine last of all. If Albertus gave full interest to nature-knowledge, he was fully conscious of the difference between such world-science and theology, which latter was for him *scientia de his quæ ad salutem pertinent*. Theology was then called "divine science." This was, I think with Thomassin and Gratry, a Platonic influence, due to Patristic example, notwithstanding the influence of Aristotle for five centuries. For Plato had finely emphasised our *sense of the divine* (see the *Timæus*, 89 and 90; also *Republic*, 548E and 549B). It was forced upon Albertus to consider what was or was not science, and whether there was a science of method. He had not merely Aristotle to consider, with the organic whole into which Aristotle has wrought everything, but was confronted with the ingenious interpretations of the Arabian philosophers, whose speculations indeed were the forerunner of Scholasticism. And even Aristotle had to receive such emendation as would satisfy the Christian point of view, *e.g.* as to the eternity or the creation of the world, which latter Albertus supported. As a philosopher, Albertus was clearly conscious that thought, as shaped by Aristotle and the Arabians, was not in accord with some of the great specific Christian doctrines. He realised the distinctness of philosophy and theology in view of the distinction then existent between natural and revealed religion. His aim was to avoid contradiction, however, between them, and he did not hesitate to employ dialectic method in pursuance of his aim. His plan was to rail off doctrines so mysterious as the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Resurrection, from the processes of philosophical speculation, under the idea that they could not be brought within the category of things knowable by reason. Not, of course, that they were contrary to reason, but that they were above it. "Ex lumine

quidem connaturali non elevatur ad scientiam Trinitatis et Incarnationis et Resurrectionis." The human soul, he thinks, can only know that of which it has the principle within itself. I think Albertus was open to criticism in this railing off revealed doctrines from the realm of the rational. They may not, it is true, be comprehensible to a certain narrow, arid intellectualism, but they are rational as truly as they are ethical. It is not a question of rational and non-rational; it is a question of reason sufficiently growing, enlarging, becoming spiritualised. If any revelation has been made to men, it is on grounds of reason alone that the philosopher has convinced himself that such revelation has been made. Only where such reason ends can faith be said to begin, for it is, as Pascal felt able to represent, the highest intellectual act. But reason does not end with the fact of revelation, but also judges within the sphere of its contents. What revelation brings to us belongs to God's personality, in which resides Absolute Reason, and what is so revealed must clearly fall within the domain or system of reason. Reason is one, and is never a kingdom divided against itself. This, of course, is not to make the finite reason of the individual include the Absolute Reason, but it is to make reason everywhere one and the same. I think Albertus came short in not claiming for the principle of reason—clarified and spiritualised as you will—the universal range or sweep which inherently belongs to it. But the whole theological movement of the Middle Ages oscillated between the formula of intelligence that seeks faith (*intellectus quærens fidem*), and this other formula, faith that seeks intelligence (*fides quærens intellectum*). And what I mean to suggest is that Albertus might have pressed reason or intellect (*intellectus quærens fidem*) further towards conviction or the demand for it, though it might not be able to form or produce it. Attempts are sometimes made in our own day to rail off the revealed or Christian from the rational, but they are no more defensible than that of Albertus Magnus. Nor is it necessary, in every sense, to say, with Albertus, that the revelation of Christian mysteries is above reason, though not contrary to it. Reason is not incapable of discerning the fact that, though there may be much in the nature of God which we cannot know, there is yet nothing in His Being that is of the nature of self-contradiction. There can be no revelation of a mystery—in other words, no truth—which is not, in some sort, capable of being construed in terms of reason or thought. Nor should it be forgotten that reason or thought, with the postulates involved in it, is also a revelation of God, Kant's defect of faith in

reason notwithstanding. Whatever elements of the transcendent may be involved, there is nothing which is contrary to reason, nothing which is, in that sense, above it. Albertus claims, of course, all that philosophy knows by "natural light" as valid for theology, but thinks revelation must decide where philosophy cannot. Maimonides, in whom culminated Jewish mediæval thought—then a branch of Arabian speculation—was among those who here influenced him. He maintains his independence, however, and does not hesitate on occasion to oppose Averroës and Avicebron, great as the influence of Averroës then was. It was in the exercise of this independent spirit too, that he, *e.g.*, substituted the notion of Infinite Being for that of Prime Mover, and put forward the doctrine of personal immortality, as Avicenna more strangely had done. His synthetic views of the universe, indeed, anticipated those of Aquinas. In all these respects Albertus paved the way for the great Aquinas, and history has been anything but just to the merits of Albertus in this connection. It is always a pleasure to amend or correct such misjudgments of history, and the task that so falls to one's hand is not of so infrequent character as might be thought or wished. It is not, however, meant to suggest that we have any perfect Albertine philosophic synthesis, for there were traditional and Neo-Platonic-Arabian influences that interfered with this building up a completely organic synthesis. But at least he skilfully brought together and manipulated the sum of knowledge already acquired, and gave to his age an immense intellectual thrust forward.

Holding, metaphysically, to the theory of form and matter, Albertus thinks that substances call for a *fundamentum* in respect of their form. Albertus takes substance to denote the first and chief division of reality—the primal cause of all other existents. 'Tis an all-existing essence, out of which things spring, and without which they were not. Substance is pure and simple being: such being is true, and a necessity of thought. In Albert's second use of the term substance, it becomes the first of predicables, including, as such, the highest sort or species of things, taken in a collective sense outside God. Substance, in this view, is the common substrate of all forms, not to be confounded with matter itself. It is that which represents, in all things outside God, the office of the form-receiving, individualising principle. There is, however, a certain lack of clearness in his detailed treatment of it as the principle of individuation, due to his dealing with something as substance which does not separately exist, but is only a

principle for self-subsistence. The third Albertinian sense of the substance concept makes it the first subject. It is this alone which can properly be called subject, the individual thing —*hoc aliquid*—which is determinable as this or that essence by means of the limitations of space and matter. 'Tis of it all predicables or marks of essence may be affirmed, together with that first predicable of which I have already spoken. But to it also adhere contingent individualising accidents or properties. Quality is to Albertus accident of a kind that "completes and perfects substances in existence and in activity" (*accidens complens ac perficiens substantiam tam in existendo quam in operando*). Albertus, like Aquinas and some other noted scholastic philosophers, held a real distinction to exist between the concept of essence and the concept of existence, though the one does not exist without the other. He emphasised the metaphysical idea of God as a necessary Being, in whom pure Being and determinate Nature or essence are identical. And it may be noted that Albertus is credited with having incorporated into philosophical terminology such terms as entitas, idealis, principium sui, ex prioribus, ex posterioribus, radicalis (R. Eucken, *Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie*, Leipzig, 1879, p. 68). I may quote in this connection a Dutch writer, Dr P. H. Ritter, who, in an important metaphysical work, remarks: "First in the Middle Ages arose a sure language usage. To prove 'ex prioribus' means, with Albertus Magnus, to prove from grounds: 'ex posterioribus,' to prove from consequences." And he proceeds to give examples illustrative of the difference (*Schets eener critische Geschiedenis van het Substantiebegrip in die nieuwere Wijsbegeerte*, Leiden, 1906, p. 269). Epistemologically, Albertus thinks we make diverse declarations of being, and come to know its nature more exactly and distinctly through comparison of these declarations.

Ethically, Albertus seeks a sound theory in the freedom of man; he holds by the sovereign good, to which all things tend; but his ideas concerning the good have a Neo-Platonist tincture about them. Conscience is to Albertus the law—the highest law—of reason. He says, "in singulis viribus manet aliquid rectum," a rectitude which has not been destroyed by original sin. Albertus distinguished the moral disposition (συντήρησις) from the habitual exercise of it (*conscientia*). To the scholastic philosopher, *habitus* meant the acquired or accidental mode of being (like Aristotle's ἕξις), which carries a more or less stable or permanent quality or character. To Albertus *synteresis* meant the highest will and reason *habitus*, a view shared by Alexander of Hales and Durandus. Not all

scholastic philosophers understood it in this sense: some, like Bonaventura, emphasising the will *habitus*; others, like Aquinas, laying stress on the reason *habitus*. These statements have sometimes been made too absolutely, as when, in German philosophical literature at least, it has been occasionally asserted, of both these examples, that their emphasis was wholly on the one element—a statement not strictly correct in either case, but only preponderatingly true or proper. Nor has the meaning of *conscientia*, as used by the scholastic philosophers, been always correctly given. They meant by it an activity (*actus*), especially the activity of applying the moral principles of the *synteresis*—which has no particular *potentia*—to particular concrete acts or cases. This in contrast to the habitualism of *synteresis* as readiness, or what in German is suitably styled *Fertigkeit*. It is interesting to note that *synteresis* was less firmly conceived by Melanchthon, who, in a certain sense, disapproved the term *synteresis*, but who yet, like Albertus, thought conscience a *syllogismus practicus in intellectu*, and had, in fact, little wish to take exception to the scholastic doctrine of the conscience. It may be noted, in the present connection, that touching the ideal ends of the State, Albertus took a eudæmonistic view.

Psychologically, Albertus holds the soul to be the substantial form of the body, but there could be no organic unity in his views here, seeing that there mingled with Aristotelian elements other psychological elements and ideas derived from Augustinian and Arabian sources. The soul is, for him, an entelechy of the body. The psychology of Albertus, so far as derived from Aristotle and the Arabian commentators, was worse in its form than in its ground: it viewed the being of man in its entirety as a unity, form and matter therein being mutually correlative: it was thus marked by a certain largeness and rationality of view, not unfavourable to the scientific aspects of the study. Intelligence was, for Albertus, constitutive of the soul: the soul was a separate form from the body; intelligence was thus held by him to be independent of the body. In thus making intelligence so separate a thing that the soul was no longer, in virtue of it, the form of body, there was a departure from Aristotle, who always regards the soul as the form of the body. On the problem of sense-perception, Albertus, not content with the psychological treatment of the subject, pursued a physical line of inquiry as to the relation of sensation to the sensible thing. But he reached a more transcendental view than was then prevalent, inasmuch as he held a non-physical cause—the mind itself—

to be concerned in the fact of sensation. That is to say, Albertus held to something in sensation beyond mere passivity, and was more idealistic in tendency than Aristotle, to whom the sensible thing was the primary cause of sensation. On lower matters, Albertus held touch to imply a plurality of senses. Man, to Albertus, is intellect, so far as he becomes truly man. Albertus, like the Arabian philosophers, was inclined to connect individuality with the body or matter, as representing existence in its divided state in the world. It goes without saying that this was an extremely defective and unsatisfactory mode of conceiving individuality, one of the subjects on which modern thought has made decided advances. For we now connect individuality with the mind or the self in its unity, incommunicableness, completeness, and spirituality. But I do not mean to imply that in the fact of individuality our physical organisation is not more or less concerned—and that is so far in the line of Albertus—as the late Professor Stokes emphasised. For there is a sense, no doubt, in which individuality is deeper than thought, and wider than will, but on that I am not now called to dwell. The highest state or stage of life open to men consists, for Albertus, in participation of the Divine nature or being, and this is attained through knowledge. Albertus even thinks it possible to touch or reach God with the understanding (*attingere Deum intellectu*), even though it is not thereby possible to comprehend Him. His high notion of the pure intellect is seen in the fact that through it alone can that union with God be effected which is the soul's aim. In his opuscule *De Adhærendo Deo*, Albertus expressly says that the end of all exercises is to reach rest in God by pure intellect (*per purissimum intellectum*), freed of all sensible distractions and phantasms. He thinks it possible in this life to realise higher perfection by oneness of the soul, with all its powers and strength, with God (*unus fiat spiritus cum eo*). The way of such spiritual ascent is by the mode of interior contemplation, and Albertus strongly insists that, in order to this, the mind must be freed of all regard to things sensible and external: in short, the world, friends, and all sensible objects and considerations, past, present, and future. It must be remembered that pseudo-Dionysius had, long before, in his work on Mystical theology, strongly affirmed not only this laying aside the things of sense, but the things of intellect, yea, sense and intellect themselves—in fact, the things which are not, and the things which are. But Albertus has his own distinctive mode of presentation, though he was not alone in calling men to leave the body and fix their gaze upon "the

uncreated light." In this interior ascent of Albertus, the soul transcends itself and rises to God (*veraciter ad Deum ascendit*). This emphasis on pure intellect, as the means of spiritual ascent, would not find much favour in a time like our own, in which there is much unwise depreciation of reason or intellect. But it should be remembered that, as Barth pointed out, all antiquity had in the end resolved religion into knowledge, rational, intuitive, or revealed. Also, it seems to me that much of the prejudice against his emphasis on knowledge and intellect would be misplaced or mistaken. For it is quite evident that the mind is not conceived by Albertus in such a bare, abstractly intellectual manner as might be supposed, apart from co-operation of the will and the affections. For we find him expressly conditioning upon will (as, *e.g.*, in these terms: *si voluntas adsit bona, et Deo in intellectu pure conformis et unita fuerit*, and again, *tantum per bonam voluntatem in intellectu sis mente cum Deo intra te unitus*). Indeed, it seems to me striking and meritorious that Albertus should have been able to write of the good will, so many centuries before Kant, in these terms:—"Nothing richer can be offered to God than a good will; for the good will is the originator of all good, and is the mother of all virtues: whosoever begins that good will has secured all the help he needs for living well." Nor are the affections overlooked when, in speaking of the transformation of the soul and its wireless messages of emotion, he says it can neither think nor understand nor love (*nec amare*) save as in and of God. True there were regions in which the Schoolmen indulged too freely the intellectually abstract, but union of the soul of man with the Divinity is not a sphere where we should be too ready to credit them with such a tendency, or we may easily do them great injustice.

To the scholastic philosophers, intellect was an immaterial faculty of knowing, while will was an appetitive faculty illumined by intellect. Reason was to them intellect itself; it was to them intelligence in respect of the true, and it was reason with regard to its power of seeing. The intellect or *pars rationalis* of the human soul was to Albertus something that did not change, and was not dependent upon matter. The spiritual ascent described by Albertus is different enough from the mystical union or ecstasy figured by Plotinus, whose thought, be it said, had neither connection with, or real parallels in, Indian philosophy; that of Albertus is a much more spiritually perceptive, rational, and intelligible process. There is here no positing of the good as superior to intelligence; nor is there any Plotinian refusal to attribute Being to

the One, lest a relation should be established between Him and derivative beings. The thought of Albertus is also widely differentiated from the abstractness and dialectic subtlety of Proclus, in whom participitation in the Good is apt to be a rarefied and impalpable affair. Albertus had his philosophy shaped and moulded, no doubt, by the Arabian metaphysicians, but the inquiry remains whether his teaching as to Divine union was due to any independent speculations of theirs, or—as its ideas have been said to be distinctively Indian—had come from India to the West. As to the former supposition, the scholastic philosophers certainly neither approved nor adopted the philosophical synthesis of the Arabian philosophers, and I have already noticed the polemical attitude of Albertus towards the Arabian philosopher, Averroës, and the Jewish philosopher, Avicebron. The genius of Albertus had no need to lean in any such manner or degree on the Arabian and Jewish philosophers, the study of whose thought is a deal less impressive than that of Albertus. And as to the latter, the alleged distinctively Indian character of the ideas of the soul's union with God, I am not inclined to lay too much stress on the hypothesis of their distinctively Indian character, in the absence of clearer evidence that Albertus had been so greatly influenced by it. This is not to deny the contact of Indian thought with Greece from the time of Alexander, nor the admittedly difficult character of the point involved. It would not be surprising that some knowledge of Indian ideas should have reached Albertus, seeing that Schopenhauer thinks "a drop of Indian wisdom may have reached Erigena" much earlier—through Dionysius the Areopagite, he opines, "in a roundabout way unknown to us." But so far as any coincidences of thought can be said to exist—and I am far from denying certain striking resemblances of thought and idea in India—there must have been many such parallels in the West. Albertus says his philosophy is Gentile philosophy, a perfectly natural thing to do in days when Jewish, no less than Arabian, philosophers were in evidence, but he claims it to be also Christian, and there does not seem to be sufficiently convincing reason for supposing that the Gentile philosophy so referred to was so remote in source as India. No one, I think, who knows and realises the material at the command of Albertus, from Proclus, with his stress on intellect, on inwardness, and the need of self-purification, and the Christianised Neo-Platonism of pseudo-Dionysius, with the strange amalgam of his theism, his teaching on Divine Union, on the super-intelligible nature of Deity, and on God as principle and end

of all things, onwards through pantheistic and other influences from the ninth to the twelfth century, will feel quite so much need of Indian hypothesis as has been suggested. Indian analogue of the forcing of the secret of Deity through ascetic perseverance—Brahmanic attempt to raise the soul in contemplation or by self-surrender to the height of the non-individual, if not the impersonal—such things wear a certain similarity, but come, I think, far behind, in some other respects, the teaching of Albertus, austere though it is in the present connection. And if lower Indian ground be taken, it would not be an easy thing to make one's self believe that the teachings of Albertus on Divine Union were a mere derivative from the Indian consciousness of the unity of all existence, and its sense of man's inherence in the whole scheme of things. However, the matter does not seem one for dogmatism in either direction, as, even if Albertus knew or was influenced by Indian ideas, he was well able to work out his own independent lines of thought or presentation on Divine union. Of course, Albertus does not think we can, in our spiritual ascent by interior contemplation, so raise ourselves apart from the evidences or suggestions of higher or absolute perfection offered by the world. Says Albertus: "All creatures cry out to us that there is a God; for the beauties of the world bear witness to a supreme beauty, its sweets to a supreme sweetness, its highest to a higher than all, its pure to purity itself." But the distinction of the Creator and the creature is strongly affirmed by Albertus, as it had been by pseudo-Dionysius. Albertus improves upon Aristotle's notion of pure actuality with the concept of infinitude, it should also be said. These positions, however, do not keep Albertus from favouring an emanative doctrine (*causatio univoca*) of Creation, though he will not have an emanation of souls; nor do they keep him from holding to an universal intervention of Deity in Nature's course, while upholding natural causes as limitations of His working. It does not seem possible, however, to hold Albertus quite untinged by pantheistic influence, in view of his notion of an emanation of all things as gradually descending from God. For he held Creation to be directly derived from the Being of God; not, like Aquinas, more guardedly, from the active will of God, which, as Thought, issues in creative work. The services rendered to theism by Albertus were, for all that, undoubtedly great, and deserve more explicit acknowledgment than they have almost ever received. It was a merit, also too often overlooked, in Albertus and other scholastic philosophers, that they thought universally, not in the merely individual or

egocentric fashion of certain subsequent mystical thinkers. This was in Albertus greatly due to his maintenance of his position as a philosopher, and not a mere exponent of any ecclesiastical system of thought, for which his cast of thought was too universal. But it is, of course, impossible, since the Copernican revolution in philosophy effected by Kant, whereby the centre of the philosophical universe became changed from the object to the knowing subject, for us to reach the universal in the purely Albertinian way. But no interest in the subject—and no tendencies to make the mind a kingdom in itself—must keep us from passing out to seek a knowledge of the world which shall be universal. For, after all, the critical method of Kant was just meant to lead us off from merely abstract thinking, and to set our thought in relation to the real world—the world of objects. And, as a matter of fact, the outer world and our inner life always stand in close and intimate correlation. In this connection the words of the Spanish philosopher, Balmez, which I slightly abridge, are of decided interest: "As one accepts a real truth, the most uncontested, most certain, fact, it remains sterile if *ideal* truths do not fecundate it. I exist, I think, I feel: these are particular, contingent facts, entirely isolated from everything but themselves, and their existence is a matter of indifference to the world of ideas." "To acquire scientific value, these facts must become objective, or, being submitted to reflection, must be impregnated by the mind with the light which it lends to necessary truths" (*Philosophie fondamentale*, bk. i. chaps. vi.-vii.).

The work of Albertus was, in its totality, a brilliant accomplishment, in which the Scholastic Rationality was maintained with the worthiness of a philosopher. No mere religious philosopher was he, but one whose philosophising—as logician, metaphysician, psychologist, and ethicist—bore that universalistic character which is everywhere and always the mark of true philosophy.

JAMES LINDSAY.

IRVINE, AYRSHIRE.

THE HEREFORD APPOINTMENT.

Professor KIRSOPP LAKE.

According to the scanty information which has reached America, the consecration of Dr Henson to the See of Hereford has raised in an acute form the question of the position of the Creeds in the National Church.

There is nothing more important to Liberal churchmen than this question, and I would therefore ask to be allowed to state at least one form of the Liberal position.

The articles of the Church base the claim of the Creed entirely on its derivation from Scripture. When the Thirty-nine Articles were written, Scripture was supposed to be infallible, but it has been shown by investigations of now more than a century to contain mistakes. All scholars recognise that the narrative of Scripture is evidence, not proof. It is, therefore, impossible to concede to the Creed an infallibility denied to the Scriptures on which it is based. If an event is not proved by an intelligent examination of Scripture, it is not rendered certain by its mention in the Creed.

Nor is it possible to say that though the Creed is not infallible, it is nevertheless right. The Apostles' Creed, for instance, contains a clear statement of belief in the resurrection of the flesh, for the phrase "resurrection of the body" in the English version means this, as is shown by the Greek and Latin originals, more faithfully represented in the Baptismal service than in the Morning and Evening services. Yet that a belief in the resurrection of the flesh is untenable is admitted, for instance, by the Bishop of Oxford, who says, in *The Creed of the Christian*, p. 105: "The substance of the spiritual body will surely be, we suppose, as much more fine and delicate than our present body as the ether is more fine and delicate than common matter." To any ordinary intelligence this is to deny, not to affirm, the meaning of the Creed.

These facts of the fallibility of the Creed, and its error in

places, raise, of course, difficult problems; but I had supposed that Liberals at least agreed on the impossibility of accepting the Creed *e mente auctoris.* It is, therefore, a great shock to find Dr Henson stating that he accepts the Creed *ex animo*, and that it is dishonourable to do otherwise. Dr Henson has been so generally regarded as a typical Liberal in ecclesiastic matters, that it is incumbent on all Liberals who dissent from him to say so at once, and prevent his action from shutting the door of the National Church in the face of honest and intelligent inability to accept the creed as it stands. We are, I think, entitled to put to Dr Henson the following question:—"When you say that you accept the Creed *ex animo*, do you mean that you accept it in the literal sense in which it was intended by the churchmen who formulated it, or that you accept it with a figurative explanation?" I have always understood, both from his public utterances and from private conversation, that Dr Henson supports the right of members of the Church of England to doubt the Virgin Birth, and the physical Resurrection, and to interpret the Creed "figuratively." Until he denies this, I shall continue to think that in accepting the Archbishop's challenge, he meant that he believes the Creed *ex animo*, but figuratively, by an extension of the attenuating process applied to the resurrection of the flesh by the Bishop of Oxford.

This "figurative" method of interpretation is followed by many clergy; they make no secret of their position, they are generally understood, possibly they are right, and certainly they are honest. But I cannot believe that this is what the ordinary man means when he confirms belief by adding *ex animo* to his statement; he means to emphasise, not to qualify his assent. If no further statement is asked from Dr Henson by Liberals, they will appear in the eyes of the world to acquiesce in the position that they accept the Creeds neither figuratively nor as milestones marking the still unfinished progress of the Church, but as authoritative formulæ. Or else they will be open to the taunt that in their Latinity *ex animo* is synonymous with *cum grano salis.*

Moreover, another type of Liberal is undoubtedly unchurched and stigmatised as dishonourable by Dr Henson, and, as one of this type, I venture to state our position. We would say that the "figurative" method is popular and legitimate, but, none the less, a mistake. By it anything can be made to mean anything. The true position is that we do *not* accept the Creed *ex animo*, because it represents not our mind but that of a generation which, however great it may

have been, was nevertheless mistaken in its view of the interpretation and authority of the Scriptures on which the Creed is based. As a matter of Church discipline and custom we recite the Creed in our liturgical services, but we desire either to see it dropped or preserved merely as a monument of the history of the Church. It is in this last sense that we accept it. It was intended as a bulwark against forms of wrong thinking which, though now dead, were once dangerous; as historians we understand and value this monument of ancient battles. We are not gnostics, and are on the side of orthodoxy against gnosticism. But the churchmen of those days were not infallible; nor can the summary of their arguments control by authority the controversies of the present. We refuse either to make the words of the Creed mean what historically they cannot mean, or to accept the position that old answers are sufficient for new questions. Science and criticism have introduced new problems. We deny that the Church, on any subject, or in any direction, is unable to modify, or even to reverse, its view when new evidence is brought forward. To bring forward that evidence, to explain its meaning, and at the same time to remain in the Church, is at once the duty and the privilege of those churchmen who have devoted their lives to scholarship. We claim complete liberty to discuss facts in the light of evidence and literature in the light of criticism. We believe that we have a right to remain in the Church of our fathers, and to try to make its opinions correspond with truth, so far as it is given us to see the truth.

I trust that Liberals in England will not accept the situation too meekly. They have always been far too ready to sacrifice each other in order to appease popular Christianity and reactionary ecclesiasticism, and to make concessions from the rigid statement of their opinions for the sake of a delusive peace. It is a most mistaken policy, by which they gain nothing—not even their own souls. There is nothing more important than that Liberals should stay in the Church, say what they think, fight for their right to do both, and not be bamboozled out of their position either by a protest from the Bishop of Oxford, who explains away part of the Creed and ascribes infallibility to the rest, or by the *obiter dictum* of a Liberal who, in a most difficult position, has been led to use an unfortunate phrase.

KIRSOPP LAKE.

Harvard University.

SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.D.

THEOLOGIANS are generally blamed for being too ready to catch up theories of current philosophy, and the blame is sometimes just. It is remarkable, therefore, to find them upbraided with the neglect of Bergson's philosophy, especially when one thinks of the use made by several theologians of the Frenchman's views. This charge is levelled, however, by Professor F. H. Foster in the *American Journal of Theology* for April. He desires to call the attention of theological circles to "some theistic implicates of Bergson's philosophy," such as the view of God as a progressing being, instead of a static deity. Professor Foster thinks Bergson will eventually "identify the Vital Impulse directly with God," and points out how the imperfections of the world necessitate a retreat from the theory of a changeless deity. The article does not show much acquaintance, however, with the inner meaning of Christian theology; any elements which are here noted as requiring to be learned from Bergsoniauism have been long familiar to trained theologians, and it is only against a rigid view of the Absolute that the writer's protests have any weight.

In Old Testament theology we have an attractive, fairly free treatment of the subject by an American lady, Professor Laura H. Wild. Her *Evolution of the Hebrew People* (Scribners) does not err on the side of conventional deference to the scripture. An Oxford contemporary of Mr Asquith says that when the ex-Premier used to read the lessons in Balliol chapel "he always seemed to be arguing with the sacred writers, and to be conscious of getting the best of it." I do not mean to suggest that this superior air characterises Professor Wild's pages; she is too good a historian to slip into such an error. But the detachment of her method is refreshing, and, from the point of view of the reader, it has the merit of stimulating attention. As outspoken, in another sense, is Professor Kennett's study of "The Conflict between Priestly and Prophetic Ideas in the Church of Israel" (*Interpreter*, January 1918). He regards the reformation of Josiah as a compromise; the king did not and could not act upon the radical prophetic claim, recently voiced by Jeremiah, which abjured sacrifice entirely. "To forbid sacrifice entirely . . . would have subjected the loyalty of Jerusalem to a breaking strain; and without the loyalty of his capital Josiah would have been powerless." So he did his best to purify and regulate sacrifice. Like all time-serving compromises,

this project was useful in its day, however much it displeased the rigid fanatics. But the prophetic protest against sacrifice, as a means of propitiating an angry deity, did not die out, even after Nehemiah and Ezra; it survived till it was ratified by Jesus Christ.

Two details of O.T. exegesis may be noted. Mr M. H. Farbridge, of Manchester University, proposes to explain Ps. xxix. 6 in the light of Assyrian symbolism; he thinks that the poet had in mind the representations of Ramman, the Assyrian thunder-god, and that he portrays Jahweh as "seated on a chariot drawn along by a young bull. In one hand he holds his forked lightning, in another an axe. As he rides along over the storm, he strikes the cedars of Lebanon with his axe, and as they sway to and fro they call to the poet's mind the picture of the galloping bull which is drawing his chariot along." That is, instead of reading "he maketh them to skip," we should translate "he maketh them to gallop along." In the *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* (1917, 231 f.) M. Auguste Gampert attacks the difficulty of the number in 1 Kings vi. 1, where the temple of Solomon is said to have been begun in the 480th year after the exodus. He thinks the generations (12×40) are calculated by the editor on the basis of the high priests, and that the gloss "appartient à la période littéraire qui part du Deutéronomiste pour aboutir au code sacerdotal, et même au delà, dans la même tendance."

Dr M. R. James has done students a true service by translating into English for the first time the *Biblical Antiquities of Philo* (S.P.C.K.). An edition of this important book, erroneously assigned to Philo, has been wanted for long, and it is now possible to use it easily, as a piece of evidence for Jewish feeling after 70 A.D. The volume is one of the most welcome in the excellent series of "Translations of Early Documents," which Canon Box and Dr Oesterley are editing for the purpose of throwing light upon the origins of Christianity. In this connection, Dr Marmorstein's discovery (*Jewish Quarterly Review*, 1918, 367 f.) of a small fragment of the Visions of Ezekiel is important. The book was known to Nicephorus, but all traces of it had vanished. Dr Marmorstein assigns the Visions to the early gaonic period of Jewish mysticism. He prints the text, with a translation and critical commentary. Turning back to the canonical prophet, we find Professor Emery Barnes (*Expositor*, February 1918) arguing that the first three verses of Ezekiel are not only genuine, but the prophet's apologia for his prophecies, and that all suspicions about the integrity or authenticity of the passage fall to the ground whenever we recognise that he is defending himself against more or less implied criticisms. Professor A. C. Welch (*Expositor*, March 1918) offers a study of Zech. i. 7–vi. 8, as a series of visions which are not only a unity but "the outcome of close meditation and deliberate artistic purpose," the prophet's aim being, like that of John the Baptist later, to prepare a penitent people for the approaching intervention of God in their affairs. Professor R. D. Wilson's *Studies in the Book of Daniel* (Putnam) may be described as a scholarly attempt to set back critical progress on the book of Daniel. The volume is the first of a trio, and treats of the historical element in Daniel, with special reference to the objections not only of Farrar but of Driver. Though the leading contention of the book may be unacceptable, there are many incidental data to be picked up from Professor Wilson's pages, particularly in the realm of Assyriology. In a note (*Revue de l'histoire des religions*, lxvi. 129–130), M. G. Huet admits that he was too strong in

saying that the Greek term *paidarion* must mean "a child," in the story of Daniel and Susanna; but he adheres to his view that Daniel was represented, in that romance, as a wise child—"réellement un enfant." That is, he was younger even than would appear from Shylock's hasty praise of "O wise young judge!" Mr E. B. Hooper's *Daniel and the Maccabees* (C. W. Daniel) is a brief, scholarly restatement of the accepted position on the book of Daniel, which maintains the essential theory antagonised by Professor Wilson. Some practical deductions from biblical criticism of the Old Testament prophets are crisply drawn by Mr N. E. Egerton Swann in his *Hebrew Prophets and the Church* (Humphrey Milford).

Dr R. M. Pope has issued *An Introduction to Early Church History* (Macmillan), which draws, in brief, popular outline, the relation of the early Church to the Roman Empire during the first three centuries. In *Essays on the Early History of the Church and the Ministry* (Macmillan), edited by the late Dr H. B. Swete, six Anglican scholars traverse this difficult field of research with real competence. All of them have already written on the subject, and the student will know Dr Armitage Robinson's views on the Didachê, for example, or Mr C. H. Turner's attitude to the evidence of Clemens Romanus. The latter's essay on "Apostolic Succession" is perhaps the most important and thorough in the volume, though Mr Brightman's pages on "Terms of Communion, and the Ministration of the Sacrament" are a valuable complement. The plan of the volume confines it to historical investigation, but this does not prevent the essayists from drawing dogmatic inferences now and then. It is impossible here to discuss the crucial questions raised by the essayists. Repeatedly they raise problems which are debated hotly by historical students. But the volume as a whole is a stimulating restatement of the general thesis of apostolic succession and its implicates. One is sorry to find that a book like Dr T. M. Lindsay's monograph is ignored, but in the main the essayists have succeeded in avoiding provinciality; their aim has been to put forward historical data, and for the most part the reader finds that this aim has been conscientiously followed. One of the most interesting features of the book is the revelation of the change in attitude and perspective which has passed over the whole subject during the last quarter of a century. Dr Swete and his collaborators have done a valuable service by bringing this out, consciously and unconsciously. A broader conception of the episcopate is represented by Dr A. J. Carlyle, in his paper on the "Historic Episcopate" (*Contemporary Review*, March 1918), with a view to practical, present-day problems. He reminds his readers that the bishop was chosen by the community, and represented the community. "The episcopal government of the Church was not an autocratic or absolute government, but was that of one who was chosen by the people and clergy of the diocese, and who administered his diocese with the synodical authority of the clergy and also of the laity." The start and cause of such an episcopacy has been already outlined by Dr Carlyle in the volume which, from his own pen and from that of Dr Vernon Bartlet, has been reviewed in this Journal (April, pp. 507 f.). Dr J. P. Whitney's *The Episcopate and the Reformation* (Robert Scott) is a plea for the retention of episcopacy, and the revival of its powers, as the lesson taught by the Reformation. Dr Whitney sees in the English episcopacy the safeguard against individualism among Protestants and autocratic Papal claims; but he

isolates the problem, and does not take into account the other elements of the situation, such as the lay-factor in democratic Christian communities. The vigour possible to a Church which has no organised episcopate is revealed in the pages of Mr David Woodside's *The Soul of a Scottish Church* (Edinburgh). Mr Woodside does the valuable service of writing, from inside knowledge, upon the features and functions of the United Presbyterian Church in Scotland, tracing its rise and elucidating its principles. Discussions of episcopacy in the South are apt to be provincial because they ignore the phenomena of religious life in non-episcopal Churches, and those who desire to take a broad, historical survey will be none the worse of looking into Mr Woodside's pages to discover the missionary and theological advances which have been and still are being made beyond the episcopal pale. Mr R. W. Pounder's *Clergy and Laity* (Elliot Stock) is nearer to Dr Carlyle's position than to Professor Whitney's. He examines the history of the early Church, with special reference to the laity, and does not spare the sacerdotal bias which, since Cyprian, has, in his judgment, weakened the Church by depressing the rights of the laity.

Dr F. W. Bussell's stout red volume on *Religious Thought and Heresy in the Middle Ages* (Robert Scott) covers more than its title promises. There are over two hundred pages, for example, on Hindustan and the religions of Further Asia, aud four complementary essays, the last of which discusses the Papacy and the modern State. The main thesis of the book is a study of mediæval religion in its social motives and methods. Heresy is viewed as the recrudescence of anti-social, pre-Christian ideas, which were irreconcilable with the claims of a monistic Church. The thesis is not unfamiliar, and in working it out Dr Bussell often presents suggestive hints about religion in general; but the form of the book is unwieldy, and the difficulty of estimating his proofs and materials is aggravated by the lack of a proper index.

Dr Bussell touches more than once the problems of theology proper, but his subject determines an approach which is more often institutional than doctrinal. The absorbing interest of the two volumes issued by Mr R. S. Franks as *A History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ* (Hodder & Stoughton), on the other hand, is doctrinal. Ecclesiastical decisions and data enter into the problem, naturally, and Dr Franks arranges these with clearness and fairness. But he is not submerged by them. Hitherto the student has had to be content with Dorner and Thomasius. Now the English reader is able to refer to a work in his own language which is adequate and reliable.

In the *Constructive Quarterly* (December 1917) Dr Van Veldhuizen of Groningen offers a suggestive study of "The Ethical Element in St Matthew." He dates the gospel about 80 A.D. It may be due to the translation, or to unfamiliarity with the nuances of a foreign tongue, but to describe Matthew as "moving and fussing about" in his gospel is not a happy turn of expression. Dr Van Veldhuizen's meaning is plain, however. He wishes to bring out the apologetic and didactic element in the gospel. In the *American Journal of Theology* (January 1918, pp. 101 f.) Mr J. Hugh Michael restates the case for the lament over Jerusalem in Matt. xxiii. 37–39 being a quotation from a lost Jewish book of Wisdom. An equally unconventional view of the "Son of Man" passages is proposed by Dr Warschauer in the *Holborn Review* for January (pp. 39–54). He argues that Jesus only became gradually conscious of all that

was implied in his messianic consciousness; which is credible enough. But it is less plausible to add that when he referred to the coming of the Son of Man, in passages like Matt. x. 23 and xii. 28, he was not directly referring to himself. Such passages, it is held, "afford a glimpse of an intermediate stage, where Jesus, without identifying himself as yet with the Messiah, already claims a certain solidarity with that glorious Personage." This speculation does not seem very fruitful. A sounder examination of the whole subject is given in Mr W. Manson's book on *Christ's View of the Kingdom of God* (J. Clarke). Mr Manson deals soberly and convincingly with the apocalyptic element of the problem, and his pages are a reliable clue to the mazes of the problem. He has contributed an excellent survey of the situation, which is based on a patient exegesis of the gospels and on a good knowledge of Jewish apocalyptic. Along with this we may notice Dr James Drummond's two volumes of expositions and studies on *The Way of Life* (Lindsey Press), which are characterised by ripe scholarship and spiritual insight into the teaching of the gospels.

Two admirable synopses of the gospels come to us from America. One is by Dr Burton and Professor Goodspeed, a *Harmony of the Synoptic Gospels for Historical and Critical Study* (Scribners). This is not the first synopsis in which Dr Burton has had a hand; it is an excellent, mature text-book. Simultaneously Dr H. B. Sharman has issued his *Records of the Life of Jesus* (G. K. Doran), on a different plan. Dr Sharman includes the Fourth Gospel. At first sight this may not seem an advantage, for Husk rather spoiled the lucidity of his well-known *Synopse* in its latest edition by adding the Johannine to the Synoptic material. Dr Sharman, however, does not mix up the two strata, and the result is a book which is not only handsome in form but novel in arrangement. The two synopses do not clash. There is room for both, and there ought to be a welcome for both in serious circles. Professor E. J. Goodspeed, of Chicago University, has laid students of the gospels under a real obligation by transcribing and editing two Greek cursive manuscripts, *The Haskell Gospels* and *The Harvard Gospels* (Chicago University Press), and by issuing them in a cheap, convenient form.

Dr H. Latimer Jackson's *The Problem of the Fourth Gospel* (Cambridge University Press) reflects the average critical position of scholarship on the book—that is, in circles which are not bound to the Apostolic authorship. The book shows an extensive knowledge of foreign opinion on the subject. In this respect it is in sharp contrast to Professor C. C. Torrey's monograph on *The Composition and Date of Acts* (Harvard University Press). Professor Torrey begins by saying that he has found small profit or sense in the source-criticism of his predecessors, and proceeds upon his way with scanty notice of them. His own view is decidedly stimulating. It is not a novel idea, of course, that the earlier part of Acts rests on Aramaic sources, but the theory of a single source underneath the first fifteen chapters has never before been worked out with such ability. Professor Torrey links his view to the theory that the Lucan books were published early in the seventh decade of the first century—which he does not succeed in rendering any more tenable than others before him. On other points, linguistic and literary, he lays himself open to criticism. But this is one of the contributions to Biblical criticism which do not end with themselves; the method is so fruitful, and the general argument so

convincing, that Dr Torrey will lead, rather than be left behind, in the future investigation of the book of Acts.

The tide of war leaves its water-marks even in this department of literature, and they are visible in two recent books upon the Epistle to the Philippians: Dr A. T. Robertson's volume of studies (*Paul's Joy in Christ*, Revell), and the edition of the Epistle which Dr Maurice Jones has contributed to the *Westminster Commentaries* (Methuen). Dr Robertson's preface argues that Philippians shows us "in clear outline, not only Paul's Joy in Life, but his Joy in Death, a message sorely needed by many stricken hearts during these dreadful days of war." Dr Jones also confesses that he has found steady comfort in writing his commentary under the calamity of war, and adds that he "can imagine no more effective mental or spiritual tonic and no more powerful incitement to patience, courage, and joy, however gloomy and depressing the outlook may be, than the study of this letter, with its vivid picture of the characteristic cheerfulness and unquenchable joy of the great Apostle, though a violent death might be looming in the near future, and life, at best, had little to offer him but labour and sorrow." Critical questions are, naturally, more prominent in the pages of Dr Jones than in Dr Robertson's practical lectures, though the latter are based on a careful study of the original. Both writers set aside the recent attempt to place Philippians in an Ephesian captivity of the Apostle. The arguments against this are stated fairly and lucidly by Dr Jones in his introduction. He also denies that the famous passage in the second chapter affords any support to such a kenotic theory as that advocated by the Bishop of Oxford. In their different ways, both of these books contribute to the intelligent interpretation of the Epistle by people who have little or no command of Greek. A similar service is rendered by Rev. W. Martin's volume on *St Paul's Ethical Teaching* (Humphreys), which addresses itself to the practical efficiency of the Apostle's teaching for modern conduct. Mr Martin does not trouble himself or his readers with the technique of criticism, but he contrives to face some questions which are being asked by the ordinary reader of the Bible. On the theology of Paulinism proper, we may chronicle one or two contributions, *e.g.* Professor Warfield's paper on the opening address of Romans (*Expositor*, February 1918), in which he argues, against Bousset, that it was fundamental for Paul to preach the two natures of Jesus Christ.

JAMES MOFFATT.

REVIEWS

Recollections. By John Viscount Morley, O.M.—London: Macmillan & Co. Two vols. 1917.

This book has already been read by tens of thousands with intense interest; it will probably be regarded later on as the best document we possess on the personalities of literature and politics in the latter part of the nineteenth century. It is written by one who was himself a leading figure in both spheres, and knew well most of the other leaders; who was editor for fifteen years of a foremost Review; who travelled both in Europe and America and met there many other men of note. Short of being Prime Minister, there was nothing wanting to make Lord Morley's position perfect for surveying the actors and movements of his time.

We propose in these pages to comment rather on the literary and philosophical aspects of the book, as the newspaper reviews have dealt more particularly with the political. His literary interests, also, are Lord Morley's first acquirement in life and his most abiding possession. His father, the Yorkshire surgeon "of good repute," gave him in the early years at Blackburn his love of books. The doctor would carry with him a pocket Virgil, Racine, and Byron as he walked among his weaver patients on the hillsides. (One would like a return of the doctors of to-day who carry poets of three languages in their pockets.) The foreign tongues, we are told, Dr Morley had taught himself. From this at one end of Lord Morley's life we pass to the charming and moving epilogue at the close, wherein the author's mind, as he walks with his dog over a Surrey upland, one late Sunday afternoon, is crossed by reminiscences of Dante, Gray, Byron, Chateaubriand, Emily Bronté, Tennyson, Myers, Goethe, and many more. It is a mind of keen sensibility, wide response, and faithful friendships; but not primarily political, and little constructive in any sense.

The editorship of the *Fortnightly* from 1867 to 1882 was the main episode in the literary life, as Home Rule and the association with Gladstone from 1885 to 1894 was the main episode in the political. The *Fortnightly* had been started in 1865 as the organ of advanced opinion, and George Henry Lewes had been its first editor. He held the post for two years and passed on from it to philosophy. Morley succeeded, through the influence of Cotter Morison, held it for fifteen years, and passed on to politics. It was during this period unquestionably the most brilliant and influential monthly magazine we ever had. True to the principles of its founders and the mental attitude of its new editor and his friends, it remained the leading organ of Rationalism in England—"Rationalism without chill" our author tells us. When we remember that the regular contributors comprised Meredith, Arnold, Pater, and Rossetti, as well as Huxley, Lewes, and Leslie Stephen, we may well grant that the cheery qualification is deserved. The reproach of revolutionary free-thought which

was sometimes hurled at the Review or its editor was never merited, never more than the outcry of ignorant and timid men. Such people thought that Frederic Harrison's defence of the Trades Unions, or Morley's own plea for a national system of education, struck at the root of English freedom and social order. The editor himself now tells us that the new-found doctrine of evolution gave the Review and its contributors such unity as they possessed. It was within a decade of the publication of *The Origin of Species* when Morley assumed the helm, and evolution was being used as the master-key to open every lock. Bagehot used it for political problems, Huxley for biology, Lewes and Spencer for questions of social life and thought. But the editor himself remained mainly on the critical side, nearest of kin to another of his contributors, Leslie Stephen, the literary critic and friend of the eighteenth century.

Those who would carry their survey of the progress of thought in England a little further and a little deeper than these *Recollections* go, will do well to turn from the *Fortnightly* pages of the latter part of 1877 to another scene which was being enacted in Balliol chapel at the same time. That half-year of the Review was distinguished, Lord Morley tells us, for the persistence and strength of its attacks either on theology as a whole or on some generally accepted article of theological belief. It was precisely at that moment that T. H. Green was preaching the second of his famous sermons on religion, the one entitled "Faith," which contains the essence of his teaching, the thoughts which he threw out for the reconciliation of the contending parties. "You know," he told his undergraduate audience, men who were to take the lead ten years later in public life and thought, "that the air is full of the conflict between science and religion. Both sides are but exhibiting different aspects of the same human spirit. The scientific impulse on the one side, and the faith that worketh by love on the other, are both essential. A religion which would assert divine causation for natural phenomena is not exactly false, but really unmeaning. On the other hand, science itself is a witness to the reality of the spiritual, as it implies a rational self-consciousness always stretching out to learn more and to attain a higher degree of spiritual being. It is this principle within him by which man projects himself into a better future; and his best is God." This was the argument in brief, and its great importance consists in the fact that it provided parallel lines on which a new religious construction might run side by side with the old beliefs, both tending to the same goal of human betterment. The Positivist might go on one line and the Christian on another. Both implied faith, effort, and self-sacrifice. It was the turning-point in English religious thought in the second half of the century.

Lord Morley does not travel on either of these routes, though he tells us again and again how near he was to the former; and to this fact partly it is due that a cloud of sadness hangs over the life-record, deepening into gloom towards the close. The war is to him wholly tragic, not to be spoken of,—the failure of statesmanship, the issue of a diplomacy which has duped governments and turned "the whole world over with blood and tears to a strange Witches' Sabbath." Hence the outlook is entirely retrospective and almost entirely personal, and there is no hint or hope that even the unthinkable horrors of the moment may be the birth-pangs of a better order. Another great Victorian, who foresaw Armageddon seventy-five years ago, had a robuster faith. Tennyson in the familiar lines of

"Locksley Hall," which the war has deservedly revived, foresaw the world "plunging thro' the thunder-storm," heard the very aeroplanes "grappling in the central blue" and raining their ghastly dew upon the earth. But beyond it all was the federation of the world, the "common sense of most holding a fretful realm in awe," and the ringing watchword of "Forward."

In these *Recollections*, however, we are only bidden to think that "cheerful past" need not be abolished from our tablets; and let us be grateful to one who has done so much to enrich them. The enrichment which these volumes afford is of a manifold kind. There is foremost the example of a man who through all the vicissitudes of a long, strenuous, and most varied life clung faithfully to his intellectual interests and found in them a source of unfailing comfort and refreshment. When over fifty he began to learn Lucretius by heart, fifty lines at a time. "This took me just about half an hour, I can mend this before long. Feel as if the process of mental renovation would now soon begin. A glorious morning." So all through there is a harvest not only of intellectual interest and mental effort, but of sound literary and historical judgment. The special quality of the latter is due not so much to a strongly individual standpoint, as to the early environment which formed the writer's mind, that circle of "rationalists without chill." This collective stamp, corrected by the critic's own fine sensibility and love of measure, gives the judgments their tone and their permanent value. His suggested emendation of the great revolutionary motto of "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" into "Freedom, Justice, and Pity" is a good example of the temper both in its strength and in its weakness.

There is no substantial change of mental attitude all through the record. The agnostic remains agnostic still, with an added mellowness and kindliness of temper. No one is mentioned except for praise, and the heartiness and intimacy of the two leading friendships are one of the most pleasing features in the book. On the literary side George Meredith and on the political Chamberlain take these places, and the pictures given add both to our knowledge and our esteem in each case. Gladstone stood too far apart in many ways to be a comrade. Chamberlain was an ideal friend on the political side, each supplying what the other needed; and the tragedy of the book, extending of course far beyond the two friends themselves, was that fate drove them asunder.

The portrait of Meredith in the fourth chapter is the most attractive and exhilarating thing Lord Morley gives us. He was ten years Morley's senior, and took him by the hand when he came to London to try his fortunes in 1864. Meredith had just established his fame both as a novelist and a poet by *Richard Feverel* and *Modern Love.* He must have been the most inspiring of companions to a young beginner in literature: as full of talk as Carlyle and tenfold more genial, a vigorous, healthy man, loving nature more than books, but eager to admire all the best that had been said as well as done in the world. Morley was to him young Roland "fighting for poor humankind." He encouraged and set him on his way, and remained his friend to the end of his life. The last meeting recorded was in the winter of 1905, when Meredith was an invalid at Box Hill, but talked as admirably as ever. Lord Morley obtained special permission that the riband of the Order of Merit should be brought down to him from London. Four years after he acted as one of the three trustees in his will.

While this is the best full-length portrait in the book, almost every other page is brightened by some well-known figure from the world of thought and public life, painted in gracious and telling colours. Mill, Huxley, Spencer, Froude, Arnold, Acton, Browning, George Eliot, Victor Hugo, Mazzini, Renan, Taine, Walt Whitman: these are but a few of the men of note as writers who find a place. With most of them Lord Morley had frequent and familiar intercourse, and of all there is a just and kindly judgment. Often a racy saying illumines the picture, as when Froude is described as "fond of Truth in his own way, but too ready to snatch her by the hair of the head."

This ready sympathy and breadth of appreciation accord well with the guiding principles which the author tells us have directed his life; they are no doubt largely due to the steady patience with which he has endeavoured all through to fit his practice to his principles. These principles he traces in an early chapter to the teaching of the Positivist school, with which he was then closely associated. Fifty years ago he was introduced by English friends to the leader of Positivism in France, a man who seemed to those who met him to recall the force of the best oral teachers whom we know by repute, who had something of the vigour of Johnson, the stimulus of Socrates, the lively interest of Diderot. From Pierre Laffitte, Lord Morley tells us, he gained the key and direction of his French studies—and he gained also a greater thing, the conception of history as an ordered progress, and not merely a "succession of epidemic fevers." Into this vast order he strove to place in due relations the various truths and often conflicting events which met him in his studies. It was Comte and his followers who taught him the generous recognition which he always cultivated of all who, with whatever imperfections of doctrine or even of conduct, contributed materially to the work of human improvement; and this became his "golden rule of historic and literary admeasurement."

This golden rule has had two signal and beautiful expressions in his life. The first was the only answer that he ever gave as a parliamentary candidate to a question as to his religious opinions. "Religion," he then said—it was to the workers on the Tyne—"has many dialects, many diverse complexions, but it has one true voice, the voice of human pity, of mercy, of patient justice, and to that voice your candidate, to the best of his knowledge and belief, has always done all he could to listen."

The second and more complete expression is the book before us. In gratitude and respect we may well take down again from the shelf the little book on *Compromise* published in 1874, the one of his books which has been translated into German. The England around us is indeed far removed from what he then described. It is no longer sunk in the comfortable apathy which he deplored. It is strained tight on the bow and thrills at the discharge of the greatest bolt that ever sped on the national cause, now happily at one with the cause of all mankind. But the lessons which he then taught us, of clear thinking and honest speaking, of keeping one's own ends pure and striving unceasingly for them while treating with tolerance and courtesy those who advance towards the same goal from other camps,—these things are as true and necessary now as when he first uttered them. And better than many prophets, his practice has always enforced his precepts.

F. S. Marvin.

Berkhamsted.

Evolution in Christian Doctrine. By Percy Gardner, Litt.D., F.B.A. London: Williams & Norgate, 1918.—Pp. ix + 421.

READERS who a few years ago felt their theological convictions disturbed in the volumes of Harnack, Loisy, and Tyrrell will, on taking up this book, repeat in a measure the experience. It suggests those writings, for, being like them confessedly modernist, it covers much the same ground. Its title at once reminds us of Newman's *Development of Christian Doctrine*, but the two books are different in several ways—in motive, subject-matter, and especially in the conception of development. The idea of evolution was in its "swaddling-clothes" when in 1845, fourteen years before the appearance of Darwin's epoch-making book, *The Origin of Species*, Newman wrote his celebrated work. The chief problem Newman proposed to himself, as is well known, was to explain and justify the accretions, or the *addenda*, as the word is, which in the course of centuries were grafted on the stock of primitive belief. Dogmas and practices incorporated in late history into the body of early belief seemed to violate the canonical *semper eadem.* How then could the faith first delivered and the subsequent additions be reconciled? The supposed solution is found in the principle of development, which in Newman is no other than a process of explication, a dialectical unfolding of truths implied in the original "Idea," a process, to use Tyrrell's phrase, of "unpacking a portmanteau." Development in this sense was familiar to the Scholastic dialecticians, and is reflected in De Maistre's *Du Pape* and Möhler's *Symbolik.* In short, it is a logical development. But development or evolution in the correct, Darwinian sense is biological, and "progresses by an inner force in the direction of complexity, adaptation to surroundings, and higher functions." This scientific conception is the one adopted by the present author.

Professor Gardner writes from within the Anglican Church, and as a member of the "Churchmen's Union," an organisation which stands for the newer Anglican Liberalism, though of course he does not commit his brethren to all he says in the book. He claims to be a link between the old Broad Church party of Maurice and Kingsley and the Modernism of Tyrrell and Loisy. An amalgam of some things in both would likely yield what may be called the new Anglican Liberalism, which has its foundation in philosophy and psychology, and "is based upon evolution in science and critical method in history."

This new school makes a demand, to which the present work is presumably in part an answer, "that the great truths of the Christian religion shall be considered afresh in the light of growing knowledge, and re-stated in a way suitable to the intellectual conditions of the age" (Preface). As a name for the school he identifies himself with, he chooses modernist, discarding the time-worn "broad" and "liberal." Anglicans some years ago fought shy of the name modernism, because of its questionable associations in other quarters, the Romish Church, to wit, and because it savoured of heresy. Indeed, when the modernism of Loisy and Tyrrell lay crushed under the sledge-hammer of the Encyclical *Pascendi*, it was thought the name and what it stood for were done for irretrievably; but it did not give up the ghost, and one fails to see how it ever can, inasmuch as there is no stopping the progress of human thinking. Mrs Partington will in vain try to stop the Atlantic tide with her mop. The adoption of the once forbidden term in this book proves, then, that we are moving on.

As modernist, therefore, this book deals in a clear, vigorous, and scholarly way with many of the problems usually found in works of that class. The author's object is "to sketch the nature of the permanent and the evolutional in the historic course of Christian belief . . . in the hope of justifying what may be called modernist views, showing that the line of progress may be carried further without giving up the main principles of Christianity or being unfaithful to the Christian spirit" (p. 1). That is, in brief, he attempts the reconciliation and the synthesis of the abiding and the variable, the eternal and the progressive, in Christian faith. Whether a quite satisfactory synthesis is at all possible is difficult to say—perhaps a *modus vivendi* is all we can hope for; the present age, anyhow, is insistently asking for some sort of reconciliation of the antithesis.

That the mentality of the Nicene age is not ours, and that we can no longer express in a genuine sense our religious needs and aspirations in terms then made classic, is now a commonplace. If there is to be no investigation and progress in religious matters as we see is the case in scientific, there is no better hope for Christian theology than to "be left high and dry, a wreck on the shore of the intellectual ocean" (p. 20). This or something like it has been said before, and, observing the warning, orthodox thinkers not a few have done somewhat in the way of investigation and progress, but have stopped short on the way, restrained probably by what Professor Gardner calls "agnostic conservatism." Modernists, on the other hand, loyal to science and history, and trying at the same time to be loyal to the abiding in Christianity, not to mention the Church, have carried their inquiries and criticisms to such limits that what is left after the process is not only much less than, but also very different from, the Christianity traditionally professed, and believed in. The following words suggest how a thoroughgoing modernist may get to work on a reconstruction up to date: "The best way for the reaffirmation of the beliefs and principles which lie at the roots of Christian faith is not to abandon the love of veracity, but to transfer our loyalty in part from scientific to symbolic or ethical truth, to transplant the fundamental assumptions of Christianity from the field of history to the higher realm of ideas. . . . This is the essence of the modernist movement" (pp. 144, 145). By the use of this convenient prescription, quite a number of things are possible—indeed, one might say, anything.

Of the few doctrines which the author reviews, naturally the most important is "The Evolutional Doctrine of Christ" in the fourth chapter. This has always been the crux of evolutionist theologians. Not many years since, some of these theologians, despite the contradiction, while treating theology on the lines of evolution, left out of their system the doctrine of Christ. Professor Gardner as a consistent modernist includes it. He is careful to disavow Unitarianism, a charge frequently levelled at Liberal Churchmen. A feature about the Christology here is that the miraculous element is almost nil; not that the author denies miracles *in toto*, but he maintains that they have no satisfactory evidence to support them. Hence the virginal birth and the physical resurrection of Jesus are set aside for lack of trustworthy evidence. Indeed, their acceptance would be a "confession of bankruptcy" (p. 43). But Jesus does not end his career in the tomb. In some way "the Spirit of Christ perpetuates him in the souls of men," as is taught by St Paul and the Fourth Gospel (post-Pauline). "The Church is an expansion of the personality of Jesus, and an extension of his Incarna-

tion" (p. 107). Each individual Christian takes part in the Incarnation. The author sees in Jesus a "collective personality"—a truth not new to psychology, and which seems like the Christian counterpart of the philosophic "personal idealism." Looking at this picture of Christ, an orthodox believer, a member of the "cataclysmic" order, might well utter the words of the Magdalene: "They have taken away the Lord."

In a brief review one can hardly do justice to the book, any more than the limited compass of the book itself, for which the author apologises, could do justice to the subject. The work is one which every fair-minded person will and ought to read, whatever he may think of its conclusions. It is a thought-provoking book, and reveals the sincere and painstaking efforts of a seeker after the truth. JAMES EVANS.

BIRMINGHAM.

The Rise of the Christian Religion. By C. F. Nolloth, M.A., D.Litt. London: Macmillan, 1917.

THE field of New Testament criticism has been in recent years the happy hunting-ground of eccentric persons. Learned professors have easily outdistanced the most ardent and least instructed of the Pietists in mutilating texts and running ideas to death. Scholars have become advocates, without the justification and often without the wit of the barrister, and a long-suffering public has been puzzled, deceived, or bored. Happily there are signs of a return to better ways, and the interesting volume before us ought to facilitate that desirable process. For Dr Nolloth, by his exact scholarship, wide knowledge, and well-balanced judgment, is in the line of the best tradition of English scholarship. It is a pleasure to meet with a book of this sort, which attempts neither to dazzle nor shock nor puzzle, and which certainly ought not to disappoint or weary anyone who wishes to know more of the origin and meaning of the greatest event in history.

With a due sense of the magnitude of his task the author has wisely surrendered the impossible ideal of completeness in favour of a plain recital of salient facts and features. He has not, however, unnecessarily restricted his outlook, nor arbitrarily limited the data. His subject connects itself with every department of thought, and here the mere specialist is hopelessly incompetent.

It is not unlikely that the author will appear to many too conservative. His treatment, for example, of the Christian sources is not very revolutionary. The Gospel of Mark is placed about A.D. 50, Matthew's Gospel a little later, and Luke's before A.D. 60, while contemporary Aramaic documents in the form of shorthand notes are thought to have been incorporated into the works of both Matthew and Mark. The Fourth Gospel is held to have been written by the Apostle John, and its general historicity is ably vindicated. The Acts of the Apostles must be placed no later than A.D. 62, and was composed by Luke. 2 Thessalonians, Ephesians, and the Pastoral Epistles are held to be substantially Pauline, and the authenticity of 1 Thessalonians, Colossians, Philemon, and Philippians, as well as 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, and Romans, is considered certain. The authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews is left where Origen left it: "who wrote the

Epistle, in truth, God knows." James and Jude are assigned to brethren of the Lord. 1 Peter is authentic. And the Apocalypse may be by the author of the Fourth Gospel.

The wise conservatism of Dr Nolloth manifests itself also in his desire to appreciate to the full the wisdom of the ancients. In dealing with the Preparation for Christianity, if the writer errs at all it is in making præ-Christian thought too Christian. Although some of the contrasts between Christianity and Stoicism are well brought out, so keen is Dr Nolloth's appreciation of the good points of the latter, that the reader may be tempted to forget that the two systems are diametrically opposed; that the stern, despairing, self-centred moralism of the Stoic is the antipodes of the joyous, hopeful, loving self-abandonment of the Christian. Christianity had become largely stoicised when representative Christians from the third century onwards could speak even of Seneca as "sæpe noster."

And as regards the sense of dependence on the Divine which characterised Roman religion, is it not necessary also to remember the restricted area of that dependence? In confining it to the external goods of life, Horace and Cicero and other typical Romans emphasised the chasm which separated Roman religion from an ethical faith such as Christianity.

And what is the precise meaning of the word "Preparation" now so commonly used in this connection? Is "Preparation" exclusively or even chiefly anticipation? Were men longing to welcome the world's Redeemer in proportion to the number of moral precepts or philosophical truths which they had made their own? Jewish law and Greek philosophy were no doubt occasionally schoolmasters to bring men to Christ; but the Pharisees and Athenians were not noted for the number of converts they contributed to the rising Church.

The least convincing chapter is the one on the sacraments, and—to mention one point in particular—the Pauline view of baptism. In face of 1 Corinthians i. 14–17, it is extremely difficult to believe that the Apostle Paul regarded the rite of baptism as of first importance. Such a view, indeed, would be in conflict with the general tenor of the Apostle's thinking, with the meagreness and illustrative character of his references to the rite, and with his own express statements. And the force of his solemn asseveration in the Corinthian passage cannot be explained away. When he thanked God he had baptised only a few Corinthian Christians, it may have been, as Dr Nolloth says, because on that account the grounds of suspicion that he had baptised in his own name were reduced. But can we imagine him saying the same thing with regard to the preaching of the Gospel? Though his conduct might give rise to misunderstanding and his message prove the savour of death, he would not desist. In season and out of season he preached, and no possible occasions of stumbling deterred him. He was willing to abstain from baptising, just as he was willing to become a vegetarian, for the sake of his converts; but he would not abstain from preaching, though the heavens might fall. We have also his own express declaration that baptism was not included in his commission. It would be strange if he, the greatest of the founders, organisers, and guardians of the churches, should have received no commission from Christ to administer a sacrament which was "vital for the existence and continuance" of the religious life, and equally strange if so momentous an act required no commission. A man could not preach unless he was "sent," but apparently anyone could baptise. Paul himself, uncommissioned as he was, sometimes

administered the rite, and he shows no anxiety in writing to any of the churches to secure its due observance. Even the Pastoral Epistles, which were written that "the man of God might be thoroughly furnished unto every good work," contain no instructions on this subject, and the solitary reference in Titus is, like the rest elsewhere, merely illustrative. Paul's object seems to have been to lead men's thoughts away from the outward act to the true baptism of Christ, which, like the "circumcision of Christ," was "made without hands." If there is "transmuted" eschatology in the New Testament—and I think with Dr Nolloth that there is—I am certain there is "transmuted" baptism.

The treatment of baptism recalls an earlier chapter in the book, where the relation between the Divine and human is carefully considered. Here it is maintained that the fact of the Incarnation shows that "the human order is not alien to the Divine," but that "the nature of man is akin to that of God." Even in man's fallen state "some glimpses of the Divine are to be seen." Have we not here a sufficient foundation for an ethical rather than quasi-physical or metaphysical treatment of the new birth? One would have thought that, if man is by nature akin to God, what is needed is not a constitutional change, but a moral renovation. The new creation is a radical transformation of character and disposition, not the impartation of a mysterious "nature," which is to serve as the foundation upon which the moral creation may be erected. But Dr Nolloth is not of this opinion. Though the soul of man is, as Tertullian said, "naturally" Christian, it must be changed. There must be a correspondence, says Dr Nolloth, of "nature" with the life of the Kingdom of God. "The chief emphasis (of the teaching concerning the new birth in the third chapter of John) is laid upon the necessity of an entire change, not of character or disposition, but of nature." So the non-moral sacramentarianism of an inconsistent Carthaginian theology is discovered in the Fourth Gospel.

The chapter on Miracles and History is one of the best in the book. A non-miraculous explanation of the rise of Christianity is impossible, because it would be unnatural, if Nature is understood as the sum-total of things. Miracles are only improbable—though I think Dr Nolloth does not express it quite in this way—if we take a sectional view of the universe. Even the fractional cross-sections of the scientist are from his own point of view inexplicable, or at least not yet explained. He walks by faith, not by sight. A genuine theist ought not to stumble at the miraculous. For him the fixity and regularity of Nature's laws is not a limitation of Divine omnipotence, but a concession to human needs. It would be very inconvenient if men, who have to acquire their knowledge by laborious methods of experiment, could not reckon on the repetition of observed sequences; but there is no reason to suppose that higher orders of intelligence are thus restricted, still less that God Himself can only learn by experience and act by precedent. But to return to our author, "we must allow God the freedom to act in His own world in a manner which is not that of His ordinary working, and which may, on occasion, be something wholly unique, as in the Incarnation itself."

This conviction that the Incarnation was a unique event determines the character and form of the book. It accounts for the large place given to doctrinal discussion in a professedly historical work. All merely historical, in the sense of "scientific," treatment is impossible if the origin and power of Christianity are to be found elsewhere than in the ordinary

sphere of human activity. But "scientific" in a larger sense such treatment may be, and historical such method of treatment must be, if Christianity is an irruption of the Divine into the human sphere in an unexampled way. In starting from this presupposition and working out his theme Dr Nolloth raises a great variety of interesting questions, which must be left unnoticed here. Moderation is perhaps the word which best characterises the attitude he assumes towards controversial issues. Some problems no doubt remain unsolved, but they have not been raised in vain if the reader is encouraged to attack them in the same spirit as the author of this carefully written book. H. H. SCULLARD.

LONDON.

A Short History of England. By G. K. Chesterton. London: Chatto & Windus, 1917.

MR CHESTERTON leaves us with rather a sombre impression of the course of English history. We move up to the Middle Ages, and down from them, until now at last we are in danger of falling into the slough of the servile state. And, if this is to be the end of it all, Mr Chesterton, to judge by his concluding words, seems ready like Job to curse his God and die. The Roman Empire, the Roman Church, the Crusades, the Monasteries, and the Guilds: all these are marks of the upward path. These and the spirit that informed them he associates with the free and happy life of the people, so far as it achieved freedom and happiness. Merry England is mediæval England. Then, with the destruction of the monasteries and the breaking up of the guilds, the bad times are with us. What is greatest in the Elizabethan age is but the swan-song of mediævalism. For the rest, the people are robbed of their common lands and common liberties. They are exploited by their masters and employers. The party-system masquerades as popular government. Humanism is never really human, never a real part of the life of the people. And then, in the end, the Barbarian, who has been lurking on the fringes of civilisation, gives us our system of so-called popular education, our social legislation and the Insurance Act; and, by stepping over the borders of Belgium, gives us that final challenge, on our reply to which, in arms and in spirit, it depends whether we are to win the way to our salvation.

Such are the impressions we get from Mr Chesterton's history; and it is indeed less a history than a series of impressions of certain causes and movements in history; and they are impressions strongly coloured by his prepossessions, his dislikes and enthusiasms. He is very severe on so-called popular histories, which, he claims, are nearly without exception written against the people. He is particularly severe on John Richard Green. But if we want to read the story of the English people there is no doubt at all to which historian we must go. We get a fuller impression of the life of the people from a few pages of Green than from the whole of Mr Chesterton. Green emphasises what Mr Chesterton would deny, the importance of our Teutonic kinship, and, in later days, of Puritan England. This is the chief part of his offence; but we are afraid that on both points history is with the older historian. Mr Chesterton makes much of the period of the Roman occupation of

Britain, but his mind seems to turn from the consideration for how little this counted in the subsequent history of England, how these times passed away like a tale that is told. We tread, it is true, on the fragments of Roman pavements, which is an inspiring reflection for Mr Chesterton. But we have also trodden on the Pitdown skull, a reflection that would not appeal to him at all. Of the scanty fragments of Roman writers bearing on our history, it is not what we can get from Cæsar's account of Britain, but what we can get from Tacitus's *Germania*, that is of prime interest and importance. And this, again, is a reflection which, we fancy, would not appeal to Mr Chesterton. Rome and the spirit of Rome are so powerful with him, and he writes on the theme himself with such power and sympathy, that he deserves the title of Defender of the Faith, if ever champion did. But it must be claimed that Teutonic kinship counts for more than he will allow. Let us console ourselves, and endeavour to console him, with the thought that there was the Germany of the folk-tales, of the great philosophers, scholars, and composers, before we came again to the Germany of the Hun.

Mr Chesterton strikes out something of a new path in the importance he attaches to popular legends and stories. "Arthur is more real than Alfred," and we must go back to Becket from the *Canterbury Tales*. He has a congenial task here, and writes on the theme like the poet he is; and if Arthur is not more real to us than Alfred, that is partly the fault of the *Ballad of the White Horse*. But, after all, we may doubt whether he has made good his point that historians have neglected legends, or whether we shall have to change our conception of events in virtue of Mr Chesterton's pleas. Legends must be dissected to provide history. Legends live for Mr Chesterton, and he dislikes vivisection. It is difficult to keep the just path between scepticism and credulity. Mr Chesterton's sympathies lead him to be credulous, and we may appreciate the poet but doubt the historian. He writes:—

"Scientific research for the last few years has worked steadily in the direction of confirming and not dissipating the legends of the populace. To take only the obvious instance, modern excavators with modern spades have found a solid stone labyrinth in Crete, like that associated with the minotaur, which was conceived as being as cloudy a fable as the chimæra. To most people this would have seemed quite as frantic as finding the roots of Jack's beanstalk or the skeletons in Bluebeard's cupboards, yet it is simply the fact."

Precisely; and that is just the trouble with Mr Chesterton, that he seems ready to swallow whole minotaurs. And it is a trouble we feel all the way through, that he is so sure of his verdicts that he persuades himself all too easily that the facts justify them. He is somewhat self-willed in his acceptance and rejection of evidence. History hardly allows the licence he gives himself: as, for instance, in his presentation of the issue between Henry II. and Becket. Time, as Aristotle observed in another connection, is the best discoverer of these things; and time and the labours of historians have put things in proportions that cannot be so easily disturbed. Mr Chesterton deplores the sacking of the monasteries and the guilds. We may all join with him in his condemnation as we would in condemning the many other acts of violence in our history. But when he says that the outrage takes all its common meaning from the assertion that the guilds were probably not at their best, we are inclined to demur. "Simply to

say," he tells us, "that the guilds declined, is about as true as saying that Cæsar quietly declined from purely natural causes at the foot of the statue of Pompey." Agreed; but we are dealing with two different questions: the sacking of the guilds and the murder of Cæsar on the one hand, and the decline of the guilds and the arrest of Cæsarism on the other. It is with regard to the second, and questions of this type, that we most want to go to history for an answer. Mr Chesterton condemns the onslaught on institutions that were fostered by the mediæval Church. He is, as befits the champion of such a cause, quite pontifical in his condemnation. But we may feel at times that he is pronouncing sentence for murder when he should be holding an inquest for suicide. There is a good deal of both, no doubt, in much that has passed away in history. But perhaps George Meredith's "We are betrayed by what is false within," echoing Plato's prognostications of the fall of his ideal state, covers the case best. This is what we feel most when history is most allowed to speak for itself, as it is in the greatest and most detached of all historians, who, almost, we may think, without realising it, made his account of the disaster of the Syracusan expedition turn his history into tragedy and convey the moral which the author would never proclaim for himself.

Mr Chesterton speaks of his history, "finished hastily enough amid the necessities of an enormous national crisis." We also feel that it is written under the influence of the passions, albeit righteous passions, engendered by the war. Which of us can escape them? Which of us indeed should? But we may be pretty sure that history will rewrite much of the history that is written in these times. Mr Chesterton says at the end:—

"If they [the English people], continue to move only with the dead momentum of the social discipline which we learnt from Germany, there is nothing before us but what Mr Belloc, the discoverer of this great sociological drift, has called the Servile State."

This is altogether too much for us, too much of an *argumentum ad tempus.* We would go a very long way with Mr Chesterton in his strictures on the oppressions and exploitations of these later days. But there are other things too to be taken into account; and there must be much, both good and bad, the trend of which is hidden from us. How can we claim that we have got the hang of it all? The historian must speak with a doubtful voice. We would welcome the aid of all who can minister to a state diseased; but we would deny the power of any physician, Mr Belloc or another, to pronounce so comprehensive a diagnosis.

But, while we may differ from Mr Chesterton in so much, it is pleasant to admit that his book is most excellent reading. It is a great thing that a man of such high inspiration and such high ideals should go afresh to history and make it fresh again for us. However much we may seek to quarrel with him as a historian, in the region which Matthew Arnold calls that of "moral ideas" we have no quarrel with him at all. In a number of things Mr Chesterton can tell us—no one better—what is wrong and what is right with the world. He may not convince us of the case of which he is himself so desperately sure. We may not regard the landscape as he does; but we are grateful for those flashes of his that have lighted it up for us. And much there is for which we may be grateful without taking exception at all. We might note particularly his eloquent words on Nelson, his just reflections on the revolt of the American colonies, and his account of Cobbett and his cause. He tells us of the English rioters:—

"They also put the oppressive agent of some landlord in a cart and escorted him round the country merely to exhibit his horrible personality to heaven and earth. Afterwards they let him go, which marks perhaps, for good or evil, a certain national modification of the movement. There is something very typical of an English revolution in having the tumbril without the guillotine."

This last sentence is one of the best things Mr Chesterton has written. It is almost a short history of England. LAWRENCE SOLOMON.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

Church and State in England to the Death of Queen Anne. By Henry Melvill Gwatkin, D.D., late Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History, Cambridge.—London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1917.

THIS is certainly a remarkable book, yet some will rise from it with a still stronger conviction that the man himself was greater than any of his books. Few scholars of this or the last generation have equalled Professor Gwatkin in whole-hearted and disinterested love of learning. His whole life was a sermon on that text from Jerome, beloved of John of Salisbury: "Ama scientiam scripturarum et carnis vitia non amabis."

The present book deals briefly, often epigrammatically, with political as well as ecclesiastical history; and, in some periods, the emphasis falls rather on the former factor. This alone would suffice to differentiate it from other Church histories; and it also differs from nearly all in the boldness of its generalisations. Professor Gwatkin's vast range of reading, and his exceptional memory, sustained him in such flights as few others could attempt, and fewer still could risk with success. No doubt his wider generalisations will not carry universal consent; that would have been impossible in the nature of things, especially in the present state of medieval Church studies. The book will find less approval from Roman Catholics or Anglo-Catholics than from readers who adopt the term "Protestant" as frankly as Professor Gwatkin does. Yet we doubt whether any careful reader, however different his ordinary standpoint may be, can fail to react to the stimulus of this book. Again and again we have been reminded, in reading it, of a writer whom the author would have been the last to imitate consciously—of Jules Michelet. In both cases the prepossessions, where they exist, are frankly admitted and frankly shown. Both show the same fundamental love of truth, and the same anxiety to find some good even in the men and the movements which they condemn most emphatically. Neither, at his boldest, lends himself to the suspicion of wilful paradox; in both cases we have a mind richly stored, indefatigable in meditation, individual in outlook, and speaking out with the instinctive frankness of a born teacher. In spite of Michelet's grim determination that the English dogs should not get the best of it, he is perhaps better appreciated here than in any land outside his own. Those who most definitely repudiate some of his final verdicts are among those who find him most stimulating and suggestive; and we shall not be surprised if Professor Gwatkin's book commands more serious attention among thoughtful Roman Catholics than works of writers who would shrink from the term "Protestant."

Here and there the author's epigrammatic brevity obscures his

meaning; these chapters, after all, were originally lectures, and the printed word sometimes leaves doubt where the living word would have left none. There are, again, a number of small misprints of the kind which is almost inevitable when an author is not spared to see his own work through the press. One exploded theory, that of the origin of parishes, is pointed out by the editor in his preface; it would have been more useful to the public if he had clearly expressed his correction in a footnote, since the Report of the Archbishops' Committee on Church and State, to which he vaguely refers us for the "almost official recognition" of the newer theory, is not a document which historical scholars are likely ever to recognise as authoritative, and the Committee itself warns us against any such misconception (p. 5, note), even if the Report had dealt with the subject more clearly than it has done. After all, Ulrich Stutz has summarised the latest theory briefly enough on p. 15 of the *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeige* for 1904—that parishes were founded not by bishops *qua* bishops, but by private proprietors of many ranks and kinds, who built churches on their own estates and controlled the tithes and the patronage more or less completely; in other words, that the parish church is not an episcopal creation, but an institution evolved from the ancient Germanic custom of private temples. It would have been far more in accordance with Professor Gwatkin's own method to put this clearly in a footnote to p. 17 of his book, than to refer us vaguely to the "almost official" authority of a compilation which, from the strict point of view of historical scholarship, owes most of its extrinsic value to the fact that the Master of Balliol had a hand in it. For, it must be repeated, the conspicuous merit of Professor Gwatkin's book, side by side with its learning, is its originality—the originality of a man who always read and thought for himself, with the most conscientious sincerity, under the eye of "the God of all History," to borrow that phrase of his own which ought to live as long as our language lasts. To deal with it in detail would be to reopen some historical discussion every half-dozen pages. We might ask, for instance, why Professor Gwatkin judges the morality of Henry I. so severely when William of Malmesbury pleads for him so frankly and, to the average reader, so convincingly. But Professor Gwatkin had a clear conception of Henry in his own mind; this he expresses with epigrammatic terseness, and the reader sees before him a character lifelike in any case, if not photographically correct. Most disputable, perhaps, but certainly most original and vivid, are the chapters dealing with Henry VIII. to Elizabeth: the whole story has the unity and the stately march of a Greek tragedy. It is long since we have had any book on the subject so stimulating: it will probably be long before we have another.

G. G. Coulton.

Great Shelford, Cambridge.

W. E. Ford: a Biography. By J. D. Beresford and Kenneth Richmond. 8vo, pp. 310.—London: Collins.

Some of the later novelists, notably Meredith and Conrad, have elaborated the method of giving different facets of some of their main personages from the varying points of view of the characters themselves. Mr J. D. Beresford and Mr Kenneth Richmond have adopted this artifice to pro-

duce a more or less stereoscopic view of W. E. Ford, the biography of a philosophic schoolmaster; Mr Beresford giving us a series of snapshots, while Mr Richmond's sketch is rather of the nature of a continuous cinema. The result on the whole is a success, though whether W. E. Ford actually lived is clouded with a doubt, and some of his ideas are somewhat elusive. An unkind critic might, perhaps, put it down to the Bergsonian doctrines to which the authors attempt, with considerable success, to hitch their educational theories.

Mr Beresford strikes the keynote of the book at its opening. Civilisation is passing from a negative to a positive attitude towards God, and from a morality that depends on repression to one that depends on the liberation of impulse. This impulse is identified with the primitive urge towards life and development, which takes the form of a will to expression, *not* a will to power.

Coming to education, Mr Beresford summarises Ford's doctrine, of the road to knowledge consisting not so much in the memorising of facts as in the understanding and *relating* of facts, in the presentation of education as a synthesising and unifying agency. At the same time he hints that the probable weak spot in the system was its refusal to prepare pupils for practical life. According to Mr Beresford, the War of 1914 marks the final failure of the Christian principle of suppression. (Surely it were fairer to early Christianity to add the epithet mediæval!) He adds the interesting corollary: "It is useless for us to love our enemies, if we must first learn to hate ourselves"—a provocative remark, but apparently in keeping with the doctrine of self-expression. It is further illustrated by one of Ford's remarks to Mr Beresford: "*You* must be God, I can't"; and also by another of his sayings: "If it is ourselves that come through, and not the Universal behind us." Perhaps a truer conception is the paradox, which indeed is in keeping with Mr Beresford's doctrine but attempts to go further, that we should love ourselves for the divine that is in us, and hate ourselves for the human. The two writers seem to fail to distinguish sufficiently the vital from the spiritual plane. This may possibly account for the curious remark that Ford was an *a priorist* in living who knew less about himself than he did about many of his friends. He refused to let his thoughts about himself "crystallise." He was a "selfless" rather than an "unselfish" character. Have we here an attempt to incarnate the flux and indeterminateness of the Bergsonian *élan vital*?

Mr Richmond next takes up his parable, or rather portraiture. Ford was the son of a civil engineer who attempted to grow up with his child (a somewhat rare occurrence in this country). After an unsuccessful trial of those "artificial orphanages" known as the preparatory and public school, father and son applied themselves to the task of the self-education of the latter. His learning was incidental and sporadic, but his thirst for knowledge was unquenched and unquenchable. The competitive system in vogue turned his thoughts away from business. So he took to schoolmastering. This was followed by a love adventure, which was not so much a falling in love as an exploration of fundamental emotions and relations, the quest of both parties concerned being not so much desire as a correlation of mind and outlook. Religion came into the inquiry. How far did the material express the spiritual, and how far did the spiritual justify the material? For "the spiritual outlook could have neither vitality nor breadth till it had condescended to tussle with the grossest and

grimiest facts of man's material existence"; and again, "No explanation of bodily things was worth looking at that did not take into account their symbolic and their sacramental aspect." Marriage, it was decided, "was a mutual declaration of independence in interdependence," and sex must be brought into proportion with the other demands of Nature, with the caveat added that every magnetic attraction does not spell marriage. From incompatibility of outlook the parties separated, and education once more came to the front; education, according to Ford, being of no earthly use "until you've got a sound circle of happiness to start with," and happiness consists in being able to give—an extremely pregnant phrase that we can only cite and pass on.

Finally, Ford started a co-education school with the atmosphere of a household. Tables and chairs took the place of that modern form of the stocks—desks. The ideal of self-rule was substituted for a code of regulations. Children were encouraged to surpass themselves and not one another. A regular technique of praise was invented, which practically corresponded to a scientific record of public opinion. Subjects were taught, not so much for their content as for their humanistic potentialities. Scripture was utilised as the story of the development of a sense of right; geography and history, treated as a single subject, explained the interrelation between the environment of man and his reactions. Subjects were linked together and duly subordinated to the central aim, which was to enable the child to exist and express his will at every turn; or, if we may paraphrase it, to go on creating his own world, while co-ordinating it with those of others—that birthright of which so many children are so early robbed. Ford was able to dispense with punishment, through his success in allying himself with the higher nature of the pupils and keeping steadfastly before them the idea of reparation, or making good.

In spite of all these merits, Ford was unable to persuade the bulk of the parents to allow their children to stay on after fourteen. The main cause, as already indicated, seems plain. The common instinct of the parents revolted against a schooling that merely gave the child an intelligent apprehension of certain sides of the universe. They demanded, and they demanded rightly, that the school should also be a preparation for livelihood. Possibly their demand was commercial and materialistic, but rightly understood it need not have been such, once it had been impressed on the pupil that his calling should not be a mere avocation but a vocation. It is strange that Ford, who saw so plainly the symbolic and sacramental side of things, should not have seen we shall never spiritualise the world of business and industry till we have rediscovered and taught in the schools its spiritual and sacramental side.

Mr Beresford concludes with a second innings on the philosophy of Ford. He suggests for it as a name Vitalism or Idealistic Monism. For him, thanks to Bergson, poetry takes up the torch where logic falters. Right and wrong are apparently only − or + degrees of resistance to the immoral primitive urge, evil a temporary impediment. For Ford, consciousness was a universal property of matter, with reciprocity—whether in the form of love or electrical response or chemical affinity—as the unifying agency; the fundamental aim being the realisation of consciousness.

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

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