





THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

VOL. XVIII.—1919-1920

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

P
Philos
H.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF
RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND
PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

L. P. JACKS, M.A., D.D., LL.D.

AND

G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D.

VOLUME XVIII

OCTOBER 1919—JULY 1920

15-8564
24/1/21.

LONDON
WILLIAMS AND NORGATE

BL
1
H5
v.18



THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

WHY WE ARE DISAPPOINTED.

L. P. JACKS.

I.

THAT the Treaty of Peace has caused a general disappointment hardly admits of dispute. Disappointment is to be read not only in that large section of the press, in all nations, which openly attacks the Treaty as giving us a bad peace, but equally in the other which defends it as giving us a good one. For a peace which requires so much defence and puts so severe a tax on the ingenuity of its defenders is clearly not the kind of peace in which they, any more than their opponents, can find a real satisfaction.

There is reason to suspect that not only the general public but the authors of the Peace themselves are disappointed with the results of their labours. What they think of it in their innermost minds we are not, of course, permitted to know; shining candour is not a mark of modern statesmanship. Even President Wilson, whose superior candour led him, before the Treaty was framed, to lay down the Fourteen Points, has said nothing to indicate that he is greatly satisfied with the result. His appeals, as I read them, take the form of urging us to make the best of a bad job. Much the same may be said of Mr Lloyd George, Lord Robert Cecil, and General Smuts. Mr Lloyd George, defending the Treaty before the House of Commons, presented an elaborate argument to prove that it was just. A really just treaty would have needed no such defence, and the vehemence of Mr George's argument suggests that he was aware of this. Lord Robert Cecil has been apologising for the Treaty ever since it was framed, and a mind like his can hardly be unaware of the implication. As for General Smuts, his reasons for signing the Treaty may be gathered by

anyone who will read between the lines of the appeal he addressed to the public just before leaving for South Africa. He signed because not signing would have been the greater evil—in which, no doubt, he was not alone. In all these utterances we look in vain for a firm belief that the Peace Treaty has been built upon the rock. The most hopeful thing they say to us is that if we take the situation in a right spirit all will come well in the end—a doctrine which holds true of misfortune in general. What we hoped for was a Peace which should help us to take things in the right spirit. A Peace which itself betrays the wrong spirit, and can only be made effective by being taken in the right, leaves us worse off than we were before, and is indeed the thing we dreaded most of all. What civilisation needs in the present state of its affairs is, precisely, an object-lesson in the right spirit, and for six long months our eyes have been turned upon Paris in the hope that it would be forthcoming. Had it been produced, the effect would have been most salutary, not only on international politics but on the social conflicts which are now threatening us with a more disastrous form of war than that from which we have just emerged. The failure to produce it is the summary cause of our disappointment, which grows the more bitter when the authors of the Treaty ask us to redeem its errors by showing “the right spirit.” That is what they should have done themselves. Are we not all growing a little tired of the type of statesmanship which creates “bad jobs,” or allows them to be created, and then appeals to the public to make the best of them?

The reasonableness of our disappointment is of course conditioned by the nature of our previous expectations. So far as these were exaggerated or absurd we have no just cause of complaint. And it must be confessed that the idealism, so plentifully displayed during the war in those who “did their bit” by reconstructing the world from their study chairs, was frequently marked by an extraordinary want of common sense and by ignorance of elementary psychological fact. Indeed it is a remarkable circumstance, and one that goes far to explain our present disappointment, that during the whole course of the war, which has been so scientific in other respects, psychology has been treated with a neglect which is hardly distinguishable from contempt, and this in spite of the fact that it holds the key to every one of the major problems to which the war has given rise. In the early months of the struggle it was a common saying that the Germans were ignorant of psychology. In this there was a measure of truth,

but subsequent events seem to indicate that the charge must now be extended to the whole body of the belligerents. And nowhere has this ignorance of psychology been more apparent than among the idealists, in all countries, who were dreaming of a "new world" that was to come into being through the action of political peacemakers. That a polyglot assembly of statesmen, representing the very traditions that needed reform, would suddenly turn their backs on the habits of thought in which they had been trained was in the highest degree improbable. Yet the whole literature of "reconstruction," so much of which has already become a dead letter, shows abundant evidence of a widespread belief that something of the kind was going to happen. The scantiest acquaintance with the psychology of habit would have convinced us from the first that all expectations resting on such a basis were doomed to disappointment. And, we may add, they deserved the disappointment which they have now incurred.

There were others, again, who staked their hopes on the emergence of a dominating personality; and when President Wilson began his policy of active intervention, many believed they had found their man. But in fairness to President Wilson, and to all others who have failed to manifest the dominating influence expected of them, it should be remembered that the conditions with which they were faced were exceptionally difficult to dominate. It is characteristic of the modern man to clamour for "a great leader," and at the same time to make up his mind not to be "led" by anybody, if he can help it. Hence the difficulty of our times is not so much in finding the leaders as in finding the followers who will consent to be led. A world conference of modern politicians would present this difficulty in its acutest form. We have here to deal with a mass of exceptionally recalcitrant material, and it may well be doubted if human greatness—sacred personalities apart—has ever yet appeared in a form sufficiently potent to "dominate" a complex of wills so various, so self-assertive, so deeply resolved to submit to nobody. When we thought of Mr Wilson as a possible "great man" overpowering the Paris Conference by the vigour of his moral idealism, we ought at the same time to have reckoned up the other great men, or would-be great men, whose consent to a back seat would have to be obtained; and I think we should have found that the total was zero. The trouble arose not from the absence of a great leader, but from the presence of too many candidates for the same position. It was inevitable that they would tend to neutralise each other's personalities, and produce a result which

was not on the level of the "greatness" of any one of them, but a kind of lowest common measure of the greatness of them all. In supposing therefore, as many of us did suppose, that Mr Wilson's greatness would dominate the situation we took account of only one of its factors, ignored the psychological reactions he was certain to encounter, and exposed ourselves once more to a deserved disappointment.

Had unlimited time been at the disposal of Mr Wilson and of his sympathisers, it is possible that he might have effected the conversion of the worldly-minded diplomats who surrounded him. But unlimited time was not at his disposal; the nations were in no mood to brook delay, and an immense chorus of voices was clamouring for a speedy decision. An amount of business inconceivably vast had to be cleared off at high pressure, and most of it was of a kind in which the intrusion of the moral idealist is apt to be resented. It is hard to conceive of an atmosphere more unfavourable to the political prophet, or of conditions in which his rejection could be more confidently predicted. That Mr Wilson was rejected is more than I would venture to say; but he certainly would have been had he refused accommodation to the forces opposed to his principles. All of which might easily have been foreseen had we taken the trouble to read the conditions in psychological terms. When the conflict between old principles and new is hurried to a decision by external pressure, as it was in the present instance, the old invariably get the best of it. Habit is on their side; and international politics are rooted in habits to a degree of which idealists have hardly formed an adequate conception. To suppose, as many of us did, that their force could be broken by a few months of ethical propaganda, or even by the shock and suffering of the war, was a misreading of human nature for which we are paying a just penalty in our present disappointment. We ought to have foreseen that the immensity of the business to be transacted would leave the Conference with no leisure for idealism and in no mood to embark upon moral adventures. We ought to have foreseen that the tendency would be to seek solutions on traditional lines as the easiest way out of the intolerable confusion; that in the process of adjusting a multitude of differences so vast and unmanageable, the ethical movement would be not upwards but downwards, until the ground of agreement was finally reached on the level of the accepted, the habitual, the commonplace. Safety was the watchword of the Conference: its mind worked in terms of safeguards, precautions, penalties, deterrents. Of *peace-making*, which is the most gracious of all the arts, being founded on

charity (as defined by St Paul), it seems to have had no adequate notion. Its thoughts were centred on *peace-keeping*—a rude and negative process which works by means of external restraints, mostly ineffective, on the motives which lead to war. This decline towards the commonplace, as the only possible ground of agreement, is equally apparent in the “justice” of the Peace, which Mr Lloyd George is so anxious to vindicate. Of the higher justice, which is kindred to pity, there is no trace. Agreement was found in the idea of punishment for wrong—the lowest, the least adequate, but the most widely accepted, of the many forms which the conception of justice can assume. All this was to be expected. At least it “will surprise nobody who has ever heard of original sin.”

But while at many points the prevailing disappointment is due to the causes I have mentioned, there remains an important residuum which cannot be so dismissed. Not all the hopes that have been frustrated were foolish. Behind the millennial dreamers who have been so much in evidence during the war, there was and still remains a large body of moderate and sober-minded people whose demands took a much more reasonable form. Fully aware of the enormous difficulties which the best-intentioned statesmanship would have to surmount, these people were far from expecting that the end of the war would be immediately followed by the sudden birth of a new era in politics, morality, religion, or anything else. They knew that the Peace would bear traces of having originated at a passionate moment in the world's history. They knew that from the nature of the case it could not be in all respects a work of pure reason nor of pure morality. They knew that the war, which was giving rise on the one hand to so much noble idealism, was also liberating powerful forces of a contrary nature, and that particular statesmen, however lofty their own motives might be, would not be able to escape wholly from the sinister pressures behind and around them. They knew, moreover, that it was not possible to evolve a perfect working instrument all at once out of so vast a multiplicity of conflicting interests. At all these points moderate men were prepared to allow a generous margin for imperfection and failure. Indeed, when the nature of the business before the Conference became more fully known, it seemed doubtful at times whether the human mind, either singly or collectively, possessed the intellectual powers necessary for dealing with a situation so unimaginably complex and dangerous. Most assuredly they were not forthcoming. It has been a common saying that the men engaged in the Conference were not big enough, either intellectually or

morally, for their work. This, I think, is true; but moderate men have not forgotten that the work in question was on a scale of difficulty beyond any against which human powers have previously had to match themselves. The intellectual powers were out of their depth.

And yet it is precisely in circumstances such as these, when the human entanglement is at its worst, and the mechanical method has broken down, and "policy" has come to the end of its limited tether—it is precisely then that noble minds perceive their opportunity and take it. For, as every psychologist knows, the mechanical method which devises "instruments" for the regulation of motive and desire, and the "policy" upon which these inventions are founded, have at best but a secondary function in human life. Happily the power man has to control his destiny is not confined to the narrow area indicated by such conceptions. Other methods are at his disposal for bringing harmony out of the chaos of wills, and never in the history of the world has a larger opportunity been given for their exercise. These methods will be found described by St Paul in his thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians.

II.

We live in an age when quarrelling has become a chief occupation of mankind. Man is by nature a quarrelsome animal, and "civilisation," far from eradicating this tendency, as under happier auspices it might have done, has on the one hand multiplied the motives to quarrelling, and on the other provided both individuals and communities with new facilities for conducting the business of strife. It has been too commonly assumed that the organisation of society by drawing men more closely together would bring them to likemindedness and to a unitary purpose. And so no doubt it would have done, and may yet do, if men were to organise for the pursuit of any noble aim, for art or beauty, or joy or religion, or the education of the human spirit. On any of these grounds men would inevitably discover their common interest, and a spirit of friendly co-operation would grow up of its own accord. But they have chosen instead to organise for the production and acquisition of material wealth. The rights of property, which are the most dubious and the most provocative of dispute, have become the typical form of human right. By organising on this ground society has taught its members to discover, not their unity, but their differences; and at the same time created means and opportunities for asserting the differ-

ences to the uttermost. Whether the process of "bringing men together" leads to friendship or enmity depends on the purpose in view. If the purpose is the acquisition of wealth, the tendency to quarrel among the seekers will increase with their proximity and with the growing knowledge of each other's designs which proximity brings; in which case it were wiser, in the interests of peace, to keep them as far apart as possible. A miser, for example, is always a solitary person, condemned to isolation by the nature of his calling. He must needs live like a spider if he is to live at all. A guild or league of misers is clearly an impossible conception; and this holds true of miserly communities and miserly civilisations as well as of miserly individuals. They gain nothing in the way of friendship or goodwill by learning to know one another, by meeting one another every day, by reading of each other's doings in the daily papers, or by sitting together at a round table, with telephones at their elbows. On the contrary, the more contact is established between greedy forces the more certain they are to fall out. And thus it is that modern civilisation by increasing contact has developed that quarrelsome spirit, both internecine and international, which has become so marked a feature of the present age, and has found its great expression in the recent war. What then, we may well ask, would be gained by forming a League of Nations if we are still to be faced by the certainty that as they learn to know one another more they will also learn, as covetous nations needs must do, to like one another less?

Surely we were entitled to expect that the collective wisdom of the world's greatest statesmen would pay some regard to these conditions—that they would view their task in its connexions with the general needs of a covetous and strife-ridden age, and do their best to make their work a model of conciliatory method, set as it were at the apex of the world's affairs. Important as it may have been to vindicate the claims of punitive justice, it was infinitely more important to set an example not only to the new States that were being created, but to the factions, class interests, and predatory movements which are everywhere threatening disaster to the fabric of human society. The call for a generous spirit was clear and urgent beyond all else that the occasion demanded. But it was not heeded. With an amazing lack of the sense of proportion, the mind of the peacemakers allowed itself to be dominated by a conception not only without value as a peace-making instrument, but highly dangerous in such a connexion—that namely of justice as it is understood in the Criminal

Courts. A worse starting-point for the work in hand could hardly have been found, and the result has been to produce a model which will not bear imitation. There need be no hesitation in saying that if the model were widely followed in dealing with the many forms of internal strife that now threaten the integrity of States, disaster would be inevitable. Suppose, for example, that the "war" between Labour and Capital were to come to a definite result in the victory of the former, and that victorious Labour in imposing its terms upon vanquished Capital should proceed after the manner of the peacemakers of Paris. The war which was to end war ought surely to have ended in a manner very different from this.

Here it is that we reach the grounds of legitimate disappointment. The heroism with which the war had made us familiar led us to hope that the Peace would display at least some traces of the same quality—and the value of a trace would have been enormous. We look for it in vain, and are left with the impression of an anticlimax to an heroic episode in the history of the world.

III.

Broadly speaking, the Treaty falls into two sections: the first dealing with the League of Nations, and the second with the conquered foe. A third section might be found in the clauses which deal with the creation of new States; but as these are mostly formed out of the territories of the vanquished, the twofold division is sufficient.

The wisdom of including the creation of the League and the imposition of terms on the conquered in a single document has been gravely doubted from the first; and as things have turned out it would seem that the doubt was justified. On one condition only was it possible to effect so difficult a combination—the simple condition that the spirit, motives, and principles applied to the one thing should be in complete harmony with those applied to the other. If justice, faith, reason, and mutual respect were to be the keynote of the League, then passion, mistrust, and fear must not be suffered to influence, still less to dominate, the terms imposed on the conquered foe. The mere suspicion that these motives were active must be avoided at all costs. A degree of mutual confidence among the nations far higher than existed either before the war or at the end of it, had to be created; failing which, it was clear from the outset that no League of Nations, however

ingeniously contrived its "machinery" might be, would have the least chance of success. To create this feeling would have been difficult enough even if the formation of the League had been the only problem before the Conference. It was rendered enormously more difficult by conjunction with the other, in which, from the nature of things, passion and unreason were certain to be clamorous. To provide a common ethos for two objects so disparate in their nature, the first born of a lofty idealism, the second so liable to be swayed by motives of greed and revenge; to accomplish with the one hand a work of reconciliation among the peoples, and with the other to deal out justice to an offender who had become a focus for hatred and been judged in advance; to do both things in such a spirit that each should reinforce its fellow—here was a task to put statesmanship to the test. This was the danger-point of the whole operation. It would have been better, a thousand times better, to forgo nine-tenths of the advantages which custom allows to the victor, and to err greatly on the side of lenience than to commit the contrary error of pressing the victor's rights to their extreme limits. For the effect of taking this latter course could only be to confirm the prevalent belief in the selfishness of nations, a belief absolutely fatal to the project of a League, until some signal act of international generosity has proved it to be false. I do not say that this act would have been easy. It would have required a degree of courage parallel to that displayed by the allied peoples in the darkest days of the war, of which indeed it would have been a noble and fitting consummation. It would have alarmed the timid; it would have angered the rapacious; it would have fluttered the dovescots of journalism; it would have caused a number of eminent persons to be denounced, for nine days, as "pro-Germans"; but it would have laid a solid foundation for the League, and the hearts of the peoples would have leaped for joy. In short, it would have been the beginning of that "new era" which so many have prophesied as the sequel to the war, but which, as things now are, has still to begin.

It has been wisely said that no great or worthy action ever proceeded from the motive of fear. Yet there is reason to believe that fear is intensely active in the minds of the statesmen who now rule mankind. It is a motive that grows with the increase of great possessions. Hence it is that the thing known as "policy" (which I should be sorry to have to define), and international policy most of all, takes more and more the form of creating "safeguards," whose ultimate object is the

protection of material wealth. It is noteworthy, for example, that Mr Lloyd George, when defending the Treaty in the House of Commons, laid much emphasis on the fact that "the world has had a great fright." One by one he pointed out the various "guarantees" provided by the Treaty against the future misconduct of nations; and when he came to the supplementary guarantee, in the compact of Great Britain and the United States to protect France against further attacks from Germany, he justified the whole mass of these precautions by appealing to the frightened state of the world. In this the Prime Minister unconsciously gave the key to the whole Treaty of Peace, and to the policy which has determined its form. It is the product of a thoroughly frightened world. It represents the misgivings, the mistrusts, the dark suspicions, the apprehensions for the morrow, and the consequent incapacity for great action to which Governments are reduced when fear has taken possession of their souls. In the elaboration of its safeguards, its precautions, its guarantees, and, most of all, its penalties, we may read a profound distrust of mankind, of which the focus rests upon Germany and the penumbra extends over the whole body of nations. One is reminded of the man in Mark Twain's story who was afraid of lightning. There was a lightning conductor at every corner of his house; they formed its principal feature; the whole structure bristled with them. At the first thunderstorm the conductors did their duty, attracted the lightning, and the house was wiped out of existence.

IV.

A paper contributed by Lord Robert Cecil to *The League of Nations Journal* for August seems to me to point the same moral. Lord Robert writes: "Marshal Foch told a body of journalists the other day that the secret of victory was to have no doubts. In war he who doubts is lost. The maxim is true of all great enterprises. . . . The conception of the League of Nations is firmly rooted in the faith, the will, the humanity of millions of people, and they may be trusted to insist on such modifications of its structure as will cure its first defects."

This is admirable doctrine, though I cannot help thinking that the application of it is somewhat belated. It should have been preached, and effectively preached, to those who were engaged in drawing up the Treaty of Peace. It is they who should have been told to dismiss their doubts and fears. They

should have been warned against allowing either doubt or fear to become a predominant motive in determining the treatment allotted to the conquered foe, or in framing the measures that were intended to secure the peace of the world. 'Had this been effectively done, the public would have had less difficulty in resisting its doubts at the present moment. At least there would have been fewer doubts to resist. It is not so easy to dismiss them in regard to the working of an instrument which shows so many signs of being itself the creation of a doubting, fearful mind.

Had this propaganda against doubt and fear been launched at the right moment and taken to heart by the assembled statesmen of the world, who needed it far more than the peoples they represent, it is easy to imagine the difference that would have been made in the general form of the Peace. The nature of the terms imposed upon the Central Empires—the chief object of the doubts and fears in question—would have been brought more closely into line with the British tradition in dealing with a conquered foe, which is not based upon fear. The British are by no means averse to punish an enemy, but they have been generally satisfied with the punishment which consists in beating him to his knees on the field of battle, always a terrible form of punishment for a high-spirited nation. This done, our custom has been to regard the demands of punitive justice, to which, as I have said, we are not indifferent, as in the main satisfied. To pursue punishment to the extreme limits which victory renders possible, to cripple the fallen foe so that he cannot rise, to deprive him of his self-respect, to penalise his unborn generations—all this is not only offensive to our dignity as a warrior people, but has come to be regarded, by enlightened statesmen, as opposed to the plainest dictates of common sense, as bad business of the most deplorable kind. Had it been otherwise, the British Empire would never have come into existence. The statesmanship which has built up the Empire has perceived that mankind needs all its resources, economic, intellectual, and moral, for maintaining its footing on the planet, and that the British Empire had everything to lose and nothing to gain by the destruction of any part of the human heritage. Hence its principle has been to enlist the beaten foe, with whatever culture or power he might possess, under its own banners, and not to reduce him to a state of impotence or ruin. This is the principle which many of us hoped would have a modest share in the making of the Peace. It is not that we were affected with tenderness for the Germans, nor that we were indifferent to their repent-

ance. But as Britons, with the history of the Empire behind us, we knew that spoliation was bad business and that any excess of punitive justice would not only fail of its object, but create immense obstacles to the repentance of Germany. And we naturally hoped that our companions in victory would be induced to profit by our experience, especially in regard to the foundation of the League.

When, for example, the Sikhs had been conquered, what we said to them was, in effect, something like this: "You people have proved yourselves good in using a gun. Throw in your lot with us, and we will provide you with a better gun than you have ever used before." That worked extremely well. In like manner we said to the Boers, "You people have shown great qualities. We desire their conservation, and promise you that within the Empire you shall have the widest scope for their exercise." That also has worked well, for the result of it has been—General Smuts. Imagine, then, the difference that would have been made if a similar style, a similar attitude, had been adopted by the peacemakers of Paris to the conquered Germans. "You people," they might have said, "have excellent brains and have proved yourselves capable thinkers. Our terms as conquerors are that these thinking powers of yours, which you have hitherto abused, shall be passed on intact to the service of the society of nations we are now trying to form. We need your intellectual resources for the vast works we have in hand. Your faculty of organisation, your mental thoroughness, your habits of discipline, and all else on which you base your claim to be a cultured nation, are now to enter a new service, where they will be cured of their attendant vices and provided with a higher field of exercise, and become a much-needed contribution in helping the world to bring order out of the chaos which in the evil past you did so much to create."

When we remember the vast number of Generals they have, or recently had, in Germany, it is hardly possible to doubt that at least one of them may have in him the making of another General Smuts. Even if they can produce only one, that one, merely as a thinking force, would be worth more to the League of Nations than the Kaiser's head or another thousand million of indemnity. The gravest charge that can be brought against the Peace is that, for the present at least, it closes the prospect of any such happy event.

I submit, then, that we have just reasons for our disappointment. None the less, let us heed Lord Robert Cecil's advice,

and abstain from nursing our complaints. Thankful that things are not much worse than they are, as they certainly would have been without his presence and that of a few others like him at the Conference, let us resolve, as he bids us, to make the best of a bad job. Our political history has provided many opportunities of practising this virtue in the past; we are indeed far from being novices in this sort of thing. Doubtless we can do it again. In the present instance, however, the "bad job" will not be made the best of until the whole structure of the Peace Treaty as well as its spirit has been fundamentally changed. What form the change must take has, I trust, been sufficiently indicated.

L. P. JACKS.

OXFORD.

IS PROGRESS AN ILLUSION ?

MRS J. W. WOOTTON.

THE word "progress" is in our age perpetually on the lips both of thinkers and of those who retail for popular consumption the adulterated and unadulterated products of thought. The term has taken its rank as a catchword of philosophic and unphilosophic thought, affording renewed inspiration and hope to a world whose failures threaten to leave room for no philosophy but that of cynicism. But the very familiarity of the word "progress" tends to impede precision in its use or comprehension: whilst the odour of approbation associated with the conception of progress is possibly an even greater impediment to a careful scrutiny of the criterion by which the value of progress should be estimated. We can, however, never be too much alive to the necessity for criticism of our accepted ideas; and it is on this ground that a tentative effort is made in what follows to examine into the nature of the current conceptions of progress, and the standard of value appropriate to their measurement in religious terms.

At the outset it is essential to formulate at least a moderately accurate idea of what we are all talking about; to try to divest current conceptions of progress of some of their popular vagueness; to search for the distinctive characteristic of the process dignified by the name of progress; and to distinguish the divers spheres (all usually to some extent implicit in the vulgar use of the word) in which this process is operative.

Elaboration is perhaps by general consent the keynote of progress, whether this elaboration is intellectual or practical. From the intellectual standpoint it is the enlargement of our knowledge of those natural laws, by which apparently the processes of this universe are regulated, that looms large amongst the constituent elements of our conceptions of pro-

gress. And intimately correlated with this is that increasing complexity of human affairs which is the practical expression of our growing knowledge of, and command over, natural forces. Our intellectual development and our efforts to "live up to it" go hand in hand, and are summed up in the term "progress."

The existence of these types of development is a matter of unquestionable fact, admissible without prejudice to the further (and entirely distinct) question of how far, from a religious point of view, the laudatory term of progress is lawfully applicable to them. But it is just this further question which is of vital importance; and before it can be answered we need to make some inquiry into the religious significance of the development of our race. By the theist the expansion of intellectual knowledge is perhaps most simply described as a narrowing of the sphere in which the direct action of divine spirit upon the phenomena of this world is assumed. Between the spiritual first cause and the material effect of which our senses are aware, is interpolated a chain of cause and effect, whose existence is very generally acknowledged, and whose sequence is in some instances partially traceable. The diverse colouring of the human race and the devastations of the tempest are no longer the direct expressions of the Deity's taste and anger. This much appears to be a matter of fact; with the important question of value of which it forms the data an attempt will be made to deal below.

The more external manifestations of progress are akin to the intellectual in their religious bearings. The same phrase—"the interposition of stages"—may, without undue violence, be used to describe the influence of either on the relationship between the theist and his God. The growing complexity of even the simple life; the absorbing interest of the ever-widening sphere of human activities; the imperative demands of modern industrialism; and the increasingly artificial character of social relations—are features of modern existence which interpose themselves between the nakedness of the human spirit and its Creator.

Let us now make an attempt to apply religious categories of value to this twofold process of elaboration. We may leave aside for the moment the question how far we are justified in assuming that along with the elaboration of knowledge and the business of living there is progress also in moral standards and their practical realisation; how far the spread of humanitarian ethics accompanies the development of the

ages; and how far our progress, in diminishing the sum total of human misery, is justified by utilitarian standards. For our present business is primarily with the religious aspects of progress, and only secondarily with its moral and utilitarian features, in so far as these are closely bound up with the former.

Now we have seen that, from the strictly religious point of view, progress presents itself as an interposition of stages between man and his God—if this necessarily inaccurate description of a complicated process be, for brevity's sake, pardonable. It is important to notice that in theory this is no obstacle to a theistic view of the universe. The fact of spiritual causation is not called in question by the growth of "natural" knowledge. Such knowledge is not concerned with speculations as to the ultimately spiritual or materialistic universe, and it may be (and is) enlarged by persons who adhere to either of these hypotheses as to the nature of things. But it does not follow from this that our religious conceptions are not affected by the development of our knowledge of material processes in new directions. On the contrary, we have already seen that the influence of the one upon the other is great. But what it is necessary to emphasise is that the change is one of method and not of principle, and does not affect ultimate hypotheses. Those to whom in their ignorance the universe was the result of spiritual causation will, in their wisdom, still see divine agency operating therein: but operating in modes previously unrecognised.

Full weight must be given to this consideration. But even when all possible allowance has been made for the fact that in theory the growth neither of knowledge nor of civilisation can destroy or create (although it can modify) a spiritual view of the universe, we still need to ask ourselves whether in practice the importance of these forces is equally great; whether in our habitual emphasis (with its implicit laudation) on the facts of our progress, we are ignoring attendant circumstances which are practically dangerous to a religious conception of things. Like many perils, this danger is only grave so long as it is not given due recognition. No one would to-day seriously propose to retain the world in deliberate ignorance, and few would even check the growth of economic civilisation, in order to avoid possible injury to religious conceptions too frail to sustain rude shocks inflicted by these forces. It may, however, be none the less true that our valuation of progress is, religiously speaking, faulty; and that some of the energy which we now devote to applauding

our own development might well be directed towards protection against the accidental dangers of the process.

Further, there can be little question that to the minds of most of us the interpretation of cause and effect, and the complexity of life, which are the characteristics of progress to-day—however much they may in theory leave unimpaired that direct contact of the human and divine spirit which is the fundamental postulate of all religion—yet present a formidable obstacle to this in practice. If, however, we believe that some spark of the divine fire glows in the human breast, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that this communion is the most important fact of existence. Or (to change the metaphor and mingle the words of Plato and Paul), if we believe the doctrine of *σῶμα σῆμα*, the corollary is our duty to die daily and escape from the body of this death. The acceptance of these beliefs has, therefore, necessarily an important influence on our valuation of whatever tends to impede the directness of the contact of the human spirit and the divine.

“It was doubtless intended,” says Bishop Butler,¹ “that life should be very much a pursuit to the gross of mankind”; but he goes on to deplore that “this is carried so much further than is reasonable.” And it seems necessary from time to time to reaffirm that life may become too much of a pursuit, to the detriment of the exercise of those divine privileges which are the heritage of persons believing themselves to be the children of God. It is not now necessary to affirm this for the first time; the danger has been perpetual; and in the different ages of history it has assumed different forms. The German mystical movement, it has been suggested, was an attempt to remedy one manifestation of the peril. “The tendency of the mediæval Church, with its over-use of sacerdotal and saintly mediation, had been to exaggerate the distance between God and man. Hence the significance of the mystical movement,” which, as the same writer has previously observed, “consisted in emphasising the intimacy and immediacy of the union between the soul and God.”² The distance between God and man is increased in our age not so much by sacerdotalism as by the routes along which progress has travelled; and the same corrective, namely increased stress on the “intimacy and immediacy of the union between the soul and God,” seems to be imperatively demanded to-day. No doubt this intimate union is mystical in its nature; but

¹ *Sermons at the Rolls*, No. XIII.

² Illingworth, *Personality, Human and Divine* (Macmillan, 1913 ed.), pp. 16, 17.

so long as attempts to strengthen it are confined to schools of thought calling themselves mystical, their effectiveness will be restricted. For it seems unfortunate that the practice of a direct and constant communion between man and his Creator, which, on a religious hypothesis, is at once the most primitive and the most important of human functions, should be confined to schools designated by a term so much associated with exceptional religious experience as the word "mystical." We need, perhaps, now to emphasise that, in spite of the growing complexity of life, in spite of the interpolation of stages which intellectual development tends to effect between God and man, the power to leap direct over the intervening processes of nature to the source of things is still the prerogative of the human spirit in virtue of its affinity with the divine—a prerogative which belongs to humanity as such, and is in no sense of an exceptional nature. It has never been suggested that this distance between man and God presents any obstacle to the divine partner in the communion of man and his Creator; and, in so far as man is *φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον ἀλλὰ οὐράνιον*, he shares, in virtue of his very divinity, the power to triumph over the most elaborate chain of cause and effect and the most engrossing circumstances of his material existence. If, however, we emphasise only the non-religious aspects of progress apart from its bearings on the fundamental element of religion, we are in danger of diverting what might be the means also of a progressive manifestation of the spiritual nature of mankind into an instrument for the degradation of this nature. As man progresses in wisdom and understanding, he should become more, and not less, akin to his Creator: so that this progress, rightly interpreted, should be an influence potent to intensify the intimacy of his communion with infinite spirit. But the right interpretation is the essence of the whole matter.

Let us now criticise progress from a fresh point of view, and revert to the question, reserved above, of the moral and utilitarian aspects of progress. Here we are on ground more disputable at any rate than that occupied by those who assert only this fact of intellectual and practical progress. Moral progress, indeed, is generally acknowledged with pride: although from time to time we hear salutary reminders that our merits in this respect are easily exaggerated. The refined vices of civilisation, the greed and selfishness of industrialism, escape the eye more readily than the conspicuous absence of barbaric offences. And, further, we need to listen to the voices of those prophets crying in the wilderness, to whom whatever moral

progress we achieve is but a partial mitigation of a senseless process of development, of itself in nowise tending to lighten the bitter lot of the dwellers upon earth. "We forget that every new comfort is a new necessity, a new source of discontent and unhappiness, and leaves the relative proportion of happiness and misery unaffected. Thrust out at one place, the tide of sorrow breaks in at another; *expellas furca tamen usque recurret*. . . . Shall progress ever wipe away the tears from all eyes? Shall it ever extinguish love and pride and ambition and all the griefs attendant in their train? Is it enough to give a man bread for his belly, and instruction for his brain? Prolong life as it will, can progress conquer death, with its terrors for the dying, its tears for the surviving? . . . And even given the attainment of its facile dreams, can progress postpone the day when mankind shall be blotted off the face of a universe that will go its way as if he had never been?"¹

On this view there is no utilitarian justification for progress. And if there is such a force as the growth of humanitarianism, or moral progress of any kind, then this serves but as a palliative of the mass of human sorrow, which no scientific or material progress can diminish. We may admit that this view is one-sided; but, in the face of our customary laudation of this same scientific and material progress, can we afford wholly to ignore its force?

And do we not indeed need to keep a watch on the course of our development, and to beware lest we bequeath to the future, generation by generation, a material and intellectual heritage with which they are spiritually unable to cope? "Thought is always in arrear of life,"² and the religious development of our personality, to our shame, lags perhaps behind both. And so long as we neglect to emphasise the importance of religious progress keeping pace with its secular counterpart, is not our conception of the standard of value, by which the latter is to be estimated, liable to become grossly distorted?

It is further possible that we need not only to examine the value of the concrete manifestations of progress, but also to revise our conception of the progressive process itself, by a continual effort to place ourselves outside the time-process in which we are confined, and which modifies all our thought. It is impossible to think away the conception of progress as a temporal process—however difficult we find the image of a final and blessed generation, reaping where innumerable predecessors have sown in blood and tears, to reconcile with a

¹ Tyrrell, *Christianity at the Cross-Roads*, pp. 120, 121.

² Illingworth, *Personality, Human and Divine*, p. 4.

religious view of the absolute value of individual personalities, irrespective of time. Nor, if we ascribe purpose to the God-head (a conception which seems a universal characteristic of religion), is it easy to escape the ludicrous picture of infinite mind confined within the categories of finite time. No doubt the difficulty is inherent in our nature and circumstances. But is it therefore any the less incumbent upon us to submit our valuation of progress as a temporal process to a searching examination in the light of such extra-temporal conceptions as we can formulate? If we accept the religious view of the Deity as the supreme manifestation of Personality, it is difficult to avoid concluding that the value of all time is to him equal; and the compromise (due to the insistent demand for purposiveness in the Deity) which represents this Personality as a "Spiritual Being, to whom all time has a value, and to whom therefore, in some sense, all time is present, *but for whom the future is always the governing element in time*"¹ [the value of the past being supposed to be determined by the future] is surely hardly satisfactory. Now, if our personality is an image of this supreme Personality, does it not follow that the more this image approximates to its divine original, the more we should ourselves regard all time as present, and beware of overvaluing, in the name of progress, a particular moment in the time-process? The approximation is, of course, very imperfect; and so long as we live and move and have our being largely within the time-process, our conceptions are (and probably ought to be) modified by this circumstance. But may it not be none the less desirable to submit our valuation of temporal progress to the best approach to an extra-temporal criterion that we can conceive, lest in our tendency to accept even the spiritual value of progress as axiomatic, we be led into a one-sided exaggeration, which is in contradiction of the true nature of our personality?

Against any and all of these possible errors in our valuation of progress, there are perhaps safeguards in certain aspects of Christianity. Consider first the danger that intellectual progress and the elaboration of civilisation may obstruct the direct contact of the spirit of man and his Creator. This contact is probably seen to perfection in the life of Christ; and those who accept this life as the pattern of religious and moral excellence under earthly conditions can scarcely ignore the consistency and intensity of the religious communion which

¹ Temple, *The Nature of Personality*, p. 78; cf. also p. 67. The italics are mine.

we cannot but suppose to have been the source of the peculiar virtue of that life. And any attempt to reproduce under modern conditions the spirit permeating the life of the Founder of Christianity which ignores, or fails to give supreme emphasis to, the importance of this communion stands condemned as inadequate. A candid interpretation by Christian peoples of the spirit of their Founder would be an immense safeguard against the danger that the course of progress should separate mankind from its God, and impede the exercise of that human function which, upon a spiritual view of the world's order, is the most important activity of our personality. And it is perhaps worth while to notice that this is true without reference to the question whether the life of Jesus was an Incarnation, in a sense other than that in which this term is applicable to every human spirit. So long as Christians simply attempt to embody in the thought and practice of every age the principles exhibited in the life of Christ, these principles will provide a potent correction to faulty valuations of progress, giving, as they do, the first place in human activity to the maintenance of a perfect relationship with a divine Father. Both to those who do and to those who do not accept the doctrine of the Incarnation as it is commonly understood by professing Christians, there is a sense in which it is legitimate to speak of Jesus Christ as the first-fruits of our race; inasmuch as the possibilities of human personality are in Him revealed in a manner very generally acknowledged to be unique. It is, therefore, a wide appeal which the life of Christ may make, as a standard by which to judge how far the not specifically religious aspects of progress have encroached upon the spiritual functions of humanity.

Secondly, there is in Christianity that which should prevent a tendency to immerse ourselves in the process of time, and to overvalue the later stages of that process. Christianity is one of the great historical religions, and a respect for historical origins is in some sense a safeguard against the light estimation of the past which seems to accompany rapid intellectual progress. But very much more important than this are the circumstances in which Christianity took its rise, and the categories in which apparently the thought of its Founder moved. It seems reasonably clear that Christ Himself anticipated an early end to the earthly order—an expectation which for Him and for the early Christians rendered the valuation of long-continued progress in temporal conditions irrelevant. The apocalyptic nature of Christian thought has,

of course, subsequently been immensely modified ; but is it not possible that the emphasis laid by the Founder of Christianity upon the other-worldly nature of His message, and the absence of reference by Him to the course and value of progress in this world, are elements of permanent value for the just appreciation of the progress of our race as it has actually resulted? Is it not possible that we have attempted to read Christianity into our conception of temporal progress, rather than to judge this process of development by standards on which the apocalyptic nature of early Christian thought has itself some light to throw?

To place ourselves in a position rightly to assess the value of the whole conception of temporal progress; to formulate a just criticism of the spiritual aspects of those forms of progress which we have seen to be most clearly associated with the current usage of the word; and to weigh the reality of progress in human morality or human happiness—these are problems which admit of no easy solution. One method of attacking them is to deny the theistic hypothesis of the universe, from which alone they emanate. Those who adopt this course are not called upon to attempt to evaluate progress from a religious standpoint. They solve these problems by denying their existence. Those, however, to whom the hypothesis on which such a solution is based is repugnant are bound sooner or later to face the problem of a religious valuation of progress. It may be that Christianity has contributions to make towards their solution in some such ways as those outlined above. Or it may be that it is impossible for us to attain a truly religious estimation of temporal progress, either in its essence or in its particular manifestations. In any case, it is the aim of this paper to suggest problems rather than to attempt the harder task of their solution.

BARBARA WOOTTON.

CAMBRIDGE.

HUMANISM : AN EXPERIMENT IN RELIGION.

SIR ROLAND K. WILSON, BART.

PROBABLY the majority of well-educated, well-conducted people in the most advanced parts of Christendom have been brought up to think, and continue to think, with Paley, that without belief in a future state of rewards and punishments it would hardly be worth anyone's while to be good ; and to think with St Paul that faith in the risen Jesus, the future Judge of all mankind, is the only sure guarantee of pardon and bliss in that future state.

A lively sensation was caused in religious circles some fifteen years ago by a novel entitled *When it was Dark*, wherein a general collapse of morality follows upon the alleged discovery, in the course of excavations in Palestine, of a document purporting to be a confession by Joseph of Arimathea that he had secretly removed the body of Jesus from its first resting-place : suggesting, of course, the inference that the whole story of the Resurrection was a fiction. When the forgery is exposed, Faith revives, and the normal average of good behaviour is restored.

But even a James Martineau, thoroughly emancipated from subservience to Scripture and Church tradition, cannot find any rational basis for morality except on the hypothesis of an indefinite survival of personality. "If death gives final discharge to both the sinner and the saint, Conscience has told more lies than it has ever called to their account."

The late Henry Sidgwick, a high authority on Ethics, and one of the best and wisest of men, felt so keenly this difficulty that he devoted his best energies during his later years to "Psychical Research" for proofs of actual communication between the living and the dead ; though his incorruptible intellectual honesty prevented him from ever claiming that such proofs had been found.

With Martineau belief in a life after death was inseparable from belief in the power and goodness of God, as a Supreme Mind responsive to finite minds, and working out through the ages some rational purpose with respect to them; and it was not till he considered himself to have established the latter that he went on to press for acceptance of the former as a corollary. That it is quite possible, though rather unusual, to hold one of these beliefs without the other, I know from experience, this having been my own state of mind for over thirty years, and also from the case of Francis Newman, who, in a pamphlet entitled *Palinodia*, published in 1886, towards the close of his life, retracted the view of immortality maintained in his *Hebrew Theism*, without in any way weakening his belief in a personal God, to be worshipped and prayed to as "the Father of all our spirits."

Having for a long time shared the views of that devout and fearless thinker, I have of late felt myself less and less able to affirm with any confidence the existence of any supreme mind behind the visible universe; and while it seems to me highly improbable that man, the dominant species in this little planet, is the only, or the highest, kind of intelligent being anywhere existing throughout infinite space, I take it that any such non-human, or super-human, intelligences must in practice be ignored as if they were non-existent, unless and until it is shown that we can in some way influence or be influenced by them.

To me, as probably to most people who have been religiously brought up, the conclusion was a most unwelcome one. Whoever it was—I rather think it was the late W. K. Clifford—who uttered the bitter cry, "The Great Companion is dead!" only expressed with exceptional force a by no means exceptional feeling.

Those whose intellectual conscience has compelled them to take the plunge, as well as the few who, like J. S. Mill, were brought up from childhood to reject the beliefs in question, are variously known as Positivists, Agnostics, or Secularists, or (more simply but more offensively) *Atheists*. The use of this last term is apt to be resented and repudiated; and not without reason, if it is meant to imply a positive and confident denial of the existence of any superhuman intelligence in the universe. Personally, I have no objection to be ticketed with any of the other three labels, unless the first is understood to commit me to the entire creed of Auguste Comte. Least of all need anyone be ashamed of the name Agnostic, applied to himself by Huxley and adopted by Leslie

Stephen. But the term Humanism seems the aptest to express the constructive affirmation, taken from one of the manifestoes of the Union of Ethical Societies, that "moral ideas and the moral life are not necessarily dependent on beliefs as to the ultimate nature of things, and as to a life after death." That this is what we mean by it should be clearly understood, because there are at least two other meanings with which it might be confused.

The "Humanists" of the Renaissance, from whom is derived the title "Literæ Humaniores" for the course of classical studies at Oxford, would certainly have been burnt instead of being patronised by a Pope, had they dared to affirm our principle. They were not generally remarkable for moral enthusiasm, and their only connection with such a movement as ours is that, by reviving the study of pre-Christian art and literature, they applied a solvent to the hide-bound dogmatism and scholasticism hitherto dominant, and thus started an intellectual ferment whose working through four centuries has at last produced an environment in which our Ethical Humanism is possible.

Somewhat closer to our meaning of Humanism is that which has been to some extent popularised by Dr Schiller of Oxford, who makes it almost synonymous with the term Pragmatism, first brought into vogue by the late Professor William James of Harvard, to express the view that absolute truth, uncoloured by personal emotions, desires, and idiosyncrasies, is not for human beings, and that the only test of one general proposition being relatively truer than another is that it works better in its application to human needs. As applied to religion the pragmatic, or humanistic, claim is, according to Dr Schiller, that "to those who will take the first step and *will to believe* an encouraging amount of appropriate verification will follow." And among the general propositions which he "*wills to believe*" because he cannot get on without them are (1) that there is a moral order of the universe—in other words, that good is always tending to prevail over evil; and (2) that there is a future life, because otherwise the moral order of the universe would be obviously imperfect.

Our Humanism is so far necessarily pragmatist that it cannot well refuse to take up the challenge here implied.

The great French thinker, Renan, says somewhere, "Man is by nature so poor a creature that he is only good when he dreams; he requires illusions to make him do what he ought to do for love of the good." Unless we can disprove this dictum by personal experience so far as we are individually

concerned, I suppose we had better force ourselves, if possible, to dream the Christian dream in one or other of its forms. It cannot be denied that history in general, and especially the Christian history which Renan did so much to elucidate, lends considerable support to his opinion. There can be little doubt—

- (1) That the Founder himself shared the mistaken belief of his time in demoniac possession as the cause of most diseases, and explained in this way most of the cures that he succeeded in effecting.
- (2) That the followers whom he gathered round him in his lifetime were attracted quite as much by his fame as a wonder-worker and exorcist as by the beauty of his moral teaching and his lovable personality.
- (3) That the revival of the movement after his crucifixion was due to belief in his bodily resurrection, which was probably an illusion.
- (4) That its persistence in the face of intermittent persecution during the two following centuries (after which it had acquired an independent *raison d'être* in the social benefits of Church fellowship) was largely due to faith in his recorded promises of an early Second Coming in power and glory, which promises were never fulfilled.

The record of illusions as to ascertainable matters of fact, cherished by the bulk of professing Christians all through the Middle Ages and down to the present time, as inseparable from the dogmas which were and are to them the only valid sanction of morality, might of course be indefinitely extended.

Belief in the spiritual (and also, according to some, the material) benefit coming from prayer addressed to a Supreme Being, personal and responsive, with or without recourse to the mediation of Jesus Christ, stands on a very different footing. We cannot lightly brush aside the mass of testimony as to felt personal experience, voiced poetically by Tennyson and Myers amongst many others:—

“More things are wrought by prayer
Than this world dreams of.”

“Speak to Him, then, for He hears, and spirit with spirit shall meet.
Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.”

“He that has felt the spirit of the Highest
Cannot confound, nor doubt Him, nor deny;
Yea, with one voice, O world, though thou deniest,
Stand thou on *that* side, for on *this* am I.”

When we recall that beautiful sentence in one of Martineau's "Ten Services," "Age after age the living seek Thee, and find that of Thy faithfulness there is no end," we feel that we are up against a great fact of psychology, however that fact may be explained.

And yet, in spite of all this, the old story will persist in recurring to our minds of the ancient Greek who saw in the Temple of Poseidon the votive offerings of those who had been saved from shipwreck, and asked the custodian for a list of those who had made similar vows and were drowned. I suspect that a pretty long list might be made of unquestionably devout and prayerful individuals who, whether or not they made shipwreck of their own souls, unquestionably made shipwreck of the social interests entrusted to their keeping. It might be headed by at least three English monarchs: Edward the Confessor, Henry VI., and "Bloody Mary."

Even more important, however, than the number of those who prayed and were not saved is the question as to the proportion of unbelievers who were, or are, so far as an outsider can judge, in as healthy a spiritual state as the most pious and prayerful of their neighbours. The same question arises as to unbelievers in personal immortality, who, as we have seen, may or may not be praying Theists; though the converse case, of belief in a future life without belief in a loving and righteous Deity, supposed to correct in this way the apparent miscarriages of justice in this world, seems hardly conceivable, unless possibly as an outcome of psychical research.

There is surely a duty incumbent on those of us who are not satisfied with the affirmative answers to either or both of these questions, and who can afford to take the risk, to do our bit towards their solution by testing in our own persons the possibility of living worthily without illusions. As against those, on the one hand, who urge that the experiment should not be tried because the world has already had sufficient experience of its futility it should suffice to call attention to the now fairly numerous biographies of eminent freethinkers who have died within the last half-century, for the most part written lovingly from intimate acquaintance, and proving conclusively that they deserved to be loved and revered (*e.g.* J. S. Mill, Bradlaugh, Huxley, H. Sidgwick, Leslie Stephen). And we must be either very young, or very unfortunate in our social environment, if we cannot count, among our less distinguished personal acquaintances, many examples of cheerful persistence in well-doing, unsustained by any sort of theological crutch.

Those, on the other hand, if there are any such, who would object to describe Humanism as an experiment on the ground that its success is already demonstrated, should be reminded of the very different scale on which the triumphs of the Gospel have been displayed, as compared with any regenerating influence that the whole aggregate of non-Theists, whether called Positivists, Secularists, Agnostics, or Humanists, has up to now been able to exercise; and to the grave misgivings as to the rationality of his position which so thoroughly honest a sceptic, and so high an authority on ethics, as the late Henry Sidgwick, could never, even to the end of his blameless life, entirely shake off.

Yes, Humanism is, and is likely to be for a long time to come, an *experiment* needing very careful handling and much courage and wisdom in its votaries, in order to give it a fair chance of success. And I think we may also venture to call it, without any undue straining of accepted terminology, an experiment in *religion*. Of the various meanings given to that term in Murray's *English Dictionary*, the fifth is as follows—really three distinct but cognate meanings: "Recognition on the part of man of some higher unseen Power as having control of his destiny, and as being entitled to obedience, reverence, and worship; the general mental and moral attitude resulting from this belief, with reference to its effect on the individual or the community; personal or general acceptance of this feeling as a standard of spiritual and practical life."

Personally, I acknowledge nothing, because I know nothing, higher than the real but invisible influence of good men and women, past and present. Whether or not there is any Supreme Mind behind that collective influence; whether or not the dead (as we call them) are consciously exerting any influence now, or are conscious of the influence indirectly derived from their past earthly careers; the collective influence is there, and may be said, in an immaterial but very real sense, to control my destiny.

On my susceptibility to this influence, to which the Scriptural term "Holy Spirit" would not be inappropriate, depends very largely my good or bad conduct. On the amenability of my fellow-men to that influence depends my chance of receiving support in any conflict with the ever-threatening forces of evil. Only in a very limited sense can I, or anyone, say with Henley:—

"I am the Master of my fate,
I am the Captain of my soul."

Conversely, it is true that to some, though to an infinitesimally

small extent, I am the master of the fate of other souls, because I cannot fail to contribute something, however small, to the collective influences which for good or evil sway their future. If anyone chooses to say that habitual meditation on this great fact of human solidarity, followed by appropriate manifestations in word and act, is not a religion, and that it is wrong to speak of Humanism as an experiment in religion, I shall not quarrel with him, so long as he is willing that the experiment, under whatever name, should have a fair trial. But one essential condition is that as much trouble be taken to secure concentration of mind and self-discipline as is demanded by the great dominant religions. The Christian yoke is not easy, whatever Jesus may have said, until it was made so by habitual submission; neither can we expect the yoke of Humanism to be easy at the first start.

The task before us is not so much to devise new sanctions in place of those that we have abandoned, as to intensify those natural ones which have always been recognised, but which have been overshadowed by the more imposing, but less reliable, sanctions of theology. For instance, in order to supply the place of the consolations and the stimulus connected with personal survival after death, two simple precepts, already acted on by good people everywhere, must be promoted from the second to the first place in our scheme of thought, whenever we are tempted to think that the shortness and uncertainty of life make it hardly worth while to live nobly :—

- (1) To cultivate to the utmost an unselfish interest in the welfare of those who are likely to survive us.
- (2) Constantly to strive, by contemplation and imitation, to absorb into ourselves and to reproduce, the best qualities of those who have passed on, or who may pass on, into the unknown before us.

Every thoughtfully framed private will, and every large reconstruction scheme of our statesmen, is an example of the first, as the war-memorials now being everywhere discussed are of the second. But they take on quite a new importance after other-worldly beliefs have been abandoned, like the moon after sunset. A more truly appropriate metaphor would be the gas and electric lighting on which we had to depend through the last dull and sunless winter; for to triumph by human artifice and human mutual aid over the apparent hostility and blundering of nature is surely a high enough aspiration for such a creature as man knows himself to be in his waking and sober moments, however far below the infinities that he can dream of.

I think it must be admitted that in a purely Humanistic society there would be some changes in our estimate of moral values ; but I see no reason to suppose that the changes would on the whole be for the worse. For one thing, when the expectation of personal immortality is discarded, common sense suggests that the highest practicable aim is not *self-realisation* but *self-expression*. Self-realisation, so far as distinguishable from self-expression, becomes rather ridiculous as a life-aim, if the Self must be annihilated within a few decades, and may disappear at any moment. Not what we possess, materially, intellectually, or spiritually, but what we are able to transmit, becomes the important thing. The transmission may be simply physical, as in the begetting of children ; or intellectual, as by teaching ; or spiritual, by diffusing an atmosphere of good will. It may be all these three combined, as in the ideal parent ; or only the two latter (one or other usually predominating), as in such glorious celibates as Newton, Ruskin, and Florence Nightingale ; but it seems likely that, on the whole, parenthood will be more keenly desired than now.

A Humanist society will be slow to pronounce the suicide, as such, either lunatic or criminal ; it will at all events talk no nonsense about "rushing unbidden into the presence of his Creator." If it condemns at all, it will be on the ground of some exceptional circumstance rendering the act a dereliction of duty. In general, the sentiments evoked will be (1) regret that the nature of things, or the fault of somebody, or it may be his own fault, had made life seem to him no longer worth living ; and (2) resolve to see what can be done to make such failures rarer in future.

Again, whatever view of marriage and divorce may ultimately commend itself to such a society, it will certainly not be determined by reported sayings of Christ, or quotations from St Paul's Epistles.

Many other possible changes, consequent on a purely human and social view of life, may be suggested ; but, after all, the vital question which each must answer for himself is, whether the outlook, after all illusions have been discarded, is really too depressing for the good life to be practicable ; whether, in short, we are among those of whom Renan would have said that they are only good while they are dreaming. If that is our case, we may perhaps be excused for shutting out the light as long as we can, and our braver neighbours may perhaps be well advised to avoid disturbing our dreams ; unless indeed the illusion should prompt us to some flagrantly foolish and anti-social action, as when President Kruger objected to

measures for the destruction of locusts because "the Almighty must surely have known what He was about when He sent them."

The founder of the Salvation Army is reported to have claimed that "he had never said himself, nor authorised a single officer to say on his behalf, one single word which would make the task harder for any living soul who was doing his best to bless his fellows"; and that is a good rule for Humanists also. But, on the other hand, there is surely an opening for a signal service to be rendered to mankind by anyone, learned or unlearned, clever or simple, who will just resolve, without bravado of any kind, to test thoroughly and openly the possibilities of a good life without theology. Some risk of course there must be, as in every great experiment—risk of social penalties, of alienation of dear friends, or, worst of all, of drying up of the soul, and loss of spiritual energy; but not the risk with which some votaries of the old religion try to frighten the unbeliever; not the anger of an offended God. For surely no Deity whom any right-minded person could bring himself to worship, nor any with whom the sweet name of Father could conceivably be associated, could sink so far below the average standard of human justice and mercy as to punish by torments after death an honest attempt to solve the riddle which he himself had chosen to set us. *If* there is no future life, there will be nothing to lose; if there is a future life, we shall be none the worse for not having reckoned on it beforehand.

Faith is indispensable, for Humanism as for every other religion, but not as a substitute for knowledge; rather in the sense of willingness to take risks for a worthy object, where certainty is unattainable; also in the sense of loyalty to the principle of human brotherhood, even where the price to be paid in personal suffering is not a matter of risk but of certainty.

The result of such an experiment may be something quite different from what we expected; it may be purely negative; but even then we shall have done something to make the map of life larger and clearer for those who are to come after us. As Mr Lowes Dickinson puts it: "Columbus had faith: what he discovered was not what he dreamed; but if he had not dreamed he would have discovered nothing." What faith in a geographical hypothesis was to Columbus, faith in the spiritual hypothesis of salvation without theology may be to us.

ROLAND K. WILSON.

TIME, ETERNITY, AND GOD.

LESLIE J. WALKER, S.J., M.A.

IT was a first principle with the great Greek thinker whose philosophy nowadays appears to be gradually regaining a lost popularity, that the truth about the universe is embodied in the language of common sense. That this should be so seems paradoxical when we reflect upon the strange vagaries in which common sense has indulged in the past: how it was wont to regard a round world flat and to twirl an imaginary sun round a stationary earth, not to speak of other enormities such as its credulous acceptance of imaginary monsters and mythical gods who wandered at large on the face of the earth to the discomfiture of unfortunate man. Nevertheless I propose to follow the counsel of Aristotle and to base the following discussion of Time and Eternity on common-sense beliefs.

The beliefs of common sense, if they be the *dicta* of a really *common* sense and not the speculative idiosyncrasies of the few, are the product of our human faculties in their natural and normal exercise. If these beliefs are untrustworthy, then, what ground have we for supposing that human thought is less likely to err when engaged upon the more abstract problems of philosophy and science? and what hope consequently can we have of ever solving the mysteries of the universe or answering the numerous riddles with which it is for ever perplexing our curiously enquiring minds? Common sense may err, but its mistakes seldom secure general acceptance, and, when they do, are never wholly erroneous. It is sometimes misled by an innate fondness for a human point of view which it forgets to allow for, as in the case of the relative motion of sun and earth. But this, some would say, is a happy fault and one to be cultivated. In any case it were wiser on the part of the philosopher to respect the beliefs of common sense and to seek to explain, to reconcile, to connect and to systematise

them, rather than to devote his philosophical energy and speculative genius to their utter subversion and ruin. Being desirous therefore of philosophising wisely I shall endeavour in the following pages to adhere as closely as possible to the Aristotelian principle; and after translating the language of common sense into the more technical phraseology of the metaphysician, shall attempt to show the relation of the temporal to the eternal, and to solve one or two of the problems connected therewith.

Now the ordinary individual whom one meets in the drawing-room, the club-house, and the market-place, though he may not be aware of the fact, really knows a good deal about Time, and *per contra* something about Eternity. He knows, for instance, that time is divided into longer and shorter periods, into years, weeks, days, hours, etc.; and also that you can "mark time" and "beat time" and "play out time." Time for him, in fact, is a mode of measurement by which he marks off and divides up his experience into parts, though in reality the parts are continuous and pass one into the other. He has some idea, too, of that which time measures, for when he speaks of the "march of time" as steady and inexorable, he is really thinking of the course of events in the real world which he is powerless to hinder or recall. Time is the measure of changes which are real and objective. It implies a something that is altered and a something that remains the same, a something that lasts and a something that ceases to be. But in order to measure time, or a series of events in time, we need a unit; and for this purpose we select some regular form of motion—the beat of a pendulum, or the swing of an escapement wheel, the alternation of night and day, or the revolution of the earth round the sun. Thus, for the ordinary man, as for Aristotle, Time is the measurement of change according to a constantly recurring "before" and "after."

The common-sense notion of Eternity is more vague and inaccurate. We imagine it as a sort of straightened-out time in which the "before" and the "after" are indefinitely extended; and though this way of picturing eternity contains an element of truth, it is, as we shall see, very far from adequate. We are right, however, in predicating eternity of that which has neither beginning nor end, and in refusing to predicate it of anything within this finite world. We are right, too, in regarding it as something which cannot be measured, not because it is too big or too long, but because it is somehow different from time; and yet not altogether different since the temporal must be a far-off imitation and manifestation of the eternal.


But further than this common sense does not carry us, and when we try to go further seeming contradictions at once arise. We know that what is present to-day will be past to-morrow; but why and how? We know that our consciousness is restricted to the immediate present, but what about persons with second sight, and prophets, and disembodied spirits and angels? It seems to be a fact that these abnormal and ultra-human beings know the future much better than we do. Yet how can this be if the future is not determinate, and how can it be determinate if man is free? To know a thing truly is to know it as it is. How then can the future be known which as yet is not at all? In its causes, perhaps? But, if a man is free, his actions have no cause, or at any rate no adequate cause, in their antecedents. Still God at least must know the future, otherwise His knowledge will not be infinite, and He will be subject to change like ourselves. Again, since God is eternal, what He knows must be eternally true. Once true always true, as we say. Yet it is not true now that Cæsar is crossing the Rubicon, though it was true, and it is still true that he was.

Problems such as these, which crop up in abundance as soon as we try to think out rationally and connectedly the relation of past and future events to our present finite consciousness, and of time to the eternal consciousness of God, seem to belie at first sight the trustworthiness of common sense and to lead us into hopeless contradiction. And there are philosophers who, in consequence of this, have come to the conclusion that time and change and the other characteristics which we attribute to reality, are merely appearances or symbolic predicates which man invents in order to straighten out his chaotic experience and to reduce it to some kind of order, but which in no way correspond to anything real and objective.

This sceptical attitude I cannot regard as justifiable; for it is possible, I think, to reconcile the apparently incompatible *dicta* of common sense, if only we determine precisely what they mean. And in order to do this, though it is doubtless a bold venture to attempt to illustrate ideas so abstract as those of Time and Eternity by the aid of a diagram drawn in spatial terms, for the nonce I am willing to be bold. The diagram is not intended, be it noted, strictly to *express* or to *represent* Time and Eternity. It is merely a rough picture, the contemplation of which may enable us to fix our ideas and so, in so far as we are able, to think of Time and Eternity as they really are. And after all, if God is truly one, the finite spaces and times through which He manifests Himself to us cannot be

altogether and absolutely different, so that underlying our diagram which translates, as it were, time into space, there may be a faint shadow of a fundamental truth.

Let us, then, picture this finite material world of ours as a cylinder, the closed ends of which denote its beginning and its end, the length its duration in time, any given section its extension or volume,—the two dimensions of the section standing diagrammatically for the three dimensions of space. Now take any section (A) immediately contiguous to two other sections (a' , a''); and let the first stand for the present moment, and the sections a' , a'' , immediately preceding and following, respectively for the moment that has just passed and the moment that is just about to come. By these two sections our normal consciousness is bounded. We cannot suddenly jump out of the section in which we are and place ourselves in another. Other sections we have already passed through, but of these we are not directly conscious now. The past we know only



through memory and by means of inference; the future by inference alone. Thus, if we represent our whole life on earth by a line (a' , a'') our present experience will be merely a fraction of that line. But it will be a fraction, and not a mere point. That of which we are conscious is extended and continuous in time as well as in space. Just as we take in our immediate surroundings at a glance, though their extent may be considerable, so we are conscious of a *continuum* in time, which includes the just coming as well as the just come, the just going as well as the here and now. Explain it how you will, our immediate consciousness is not of punctual and static being but of continuous happenings. One takes in together, so to speak, the successive parts of the spoken or written sentence; one hears in a single auditory act of perception the “tick” and the “tack” of the clock, or the several notes of a bar of music; one perceives as a whole successive stages in a movement of the body or in the motion of an external object. The present moment for the psychologist means not the timeless instant of the mathematician, but an act which has duration and in which is apprehended an object or event that has

duration. Indeed, if an act of perception were merely of an instant, the consciousness of change, and consequently all idea of time and of permanence or change in time, would be impossible; just as it would be impossible to perceive extension if each act of perception took in merely an unextended point.

Yet although our immediate experience, both in space and time, is not of a point, but of something extended, its extension, especially in time, is finite in the extreme. Past experiences for us exist only as a memory in which they are recalled, and future experiences as yet exist not at all. This, however, is not of the nature of experience, but merely of the nature of *our* experience, which does not extend beyond the sections of our cylinder immediately preceding and following that in which, for the moment, we are. It is conceivable that we might have been constructed otherwise. The "specious present" of our immediate experience might have been more extended, so that we should have been able to take in many sections of our cylinder perhaps in one and the same act, as we appear to do when we reflect on the past. Indeed it would seem that this "specious present" does vary somewhat in different individuals, and even in the same individual at different times. For psychological experiment has shown that there is a variation in the maximum number of beats that can be perceived as a totality, and again in the length of time over which a series of beats may be extended, so that the number of the beats may be recognised and compared with that of another series without counting. While conversely a person suffering from aphasia or under the influence of hashisch forgets the beginning of a sentence before the end is reached, and cannot recognise a word if it be presented letter by letter.

Our specious present, therefore, not only has duration, but—if the above data have been correctly interpreted—is variable. May it not be possible, then, that in second sight, and such-like phenomena of a natural or a supernatural type, the "specious present" is extended even to future events? And may it not also be that angels and disembodied souls have a "specious present" far more extensive than ours, and so are able to witness, and in some cases to foresee, events that take place in this world? If, as most Christians believe, it is possible to communicate with spirits and to solicit their prayers and even their intervention, they must know somehow or other what is going on here below. And, if this is so, may it not be that they know it by direct experience, not of the strictly perceptual type—for they have no senses, or at any rate

no organs of sense—but, as Scotus says, intuitional in character? The hypothesis is at any rate suggestive; and though unverifiable and fraught with so many difficulties that I cannot here discuss it, it bears upon another question which I must discuss, viz. the relation of present to future and past, and the knowledge which God has of all three.

To return then to our cylinder. The life of a human being upon this earth, and indeed the duration of any corporeal existent whatsoever, must be represented by a line (*e.g.* a^o , a^n), the length of which must be short as compared with that of the cylinder itself, since the extent of its existence is indefinitely less than that of the universe, though the latter also is finite. We must imagine then that the cylinder is made up of a vast number of lines, very much as a rope is made up of innumerable strands or threads, each line or thread representing the life of some animate being, or the duration of some corporeal existent, and all of them lying wholly within the cylinder. But how shall we represent God? Being infinite, and His life not having parts or admitting any kind of succession, we cannot represent Him by a line either within or without the cylinder. In so far, therefore, as it is possible to represent the infinite at all in terms of a finite diagram, we must suppose that God surrounds the cylinder on all sides, and permeates it through and through; and in this way it will be easy to imagine how past, present, and future events, as represented in the sections of our cylinder, are present to Him at once. God is not confined, as we are, between two sections, and so does not perceive first one small fraction and then another of the world's existence. Hence He does not have to infer the past and the future from the present as we do; but sees them all at once. The cylinder is present to Him as a whole, past, present and future existence, *tota simul*. Though God possesses *eminenter* all the perfections that belong to us, His life is essentially different from ours; and the eternity which we predicate of that life, though in some respects analogous to time, is in reality something which altogether surpasses all temporal perfections.

Eternity is sometimes defined as the duration of permanent existence, without beginning or end, and without successive phases of existence, But it is better defined with Boethius perhaps as *interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio*,—the possession of life without beginning or end in its fulness, and all-together. At any rate this definition is more to our present purpose; for it brings out the all-togetherness of an eternal life, and hence implies that God who is eternal, knows.

at once and all together the events that occur successively in our finite universe. And it is precisely in this, the *tota simul* of eternity, that the difficulty lies when we try to explain the relation of eternity to time. For if God knows all things *tota simul*, He knows events which as yet are not, and knows them, too, directly, and in themselves; and this seems to involve us in a contradiction. Let us, however, examine the statements that are alleged to be incompatible, and see whether, when we have really got at what they mean, they still prove to be contradictory.

We affirm (1) that God knows all the events of our finite universe, past, present and future, at once and as they are in themselves; which, expressed in terms of our diagram, is equivalent to saying that the whole cylinder and every part and section of it is present to God *tota simul* as something really and actually existing. It means, in other words, not only that God sees at once and in the self-same act Cæsar crossing the Rubicon, our present Parliament at loggerheads over a revolutionary Budget, and the destruction of the British Empire by a fleet of German Zeppelins (supposing that such a catastrophe is destined to take place, which God forbid!);¹ but also that each of these three events, though they belong to different sections of our cylinder, are equally actual and real. Or, as a recent writer of some note and of unimpeachable orthodoxy has expressed it, it means that "all and each of the successive events which happen in this world are co-existent with the whole of eternity considered in itself," *i.e.* are co-existent with God, and therefore can be present to Him and known by Him *tota simul*.

Thus there is no ambiguity about our first statement. Whatever we may think of its truth, its meaning is as clear as daylight. It is from the second statement that the difficulty arises. For we affirm (2) that past events, such as Cæsar's crossing of the Rubicon, and future events, such as the establishment of a German world-empire by means of airships, have at the present moment neither actuality nor existence. The one has ceased to exist altogether, and the other as yet has not begun. In short, apart from God, we and our contemporaries are the only real and actual existents. And whereas this statement is strictly relative, we insist upon misinterpreting it in an absolute sense. Hence the apparent contradiction.

¹ The Editor will bear me out in saying that these words were actually written in the year 1909. If the reader prefers an event which is future from our present point of view, he might substitute for Germany's attempt at world dominion the government of England by a Labour ministry.

Here, then, lies the source of the difficulty which we experience when we try to think out clearly the relation of God's knowledge to events that take place in time. Past and future are not real and actual *now*; therefore, we say, they cannot be real and actual at all. But in denying that past and future are real and actual, we forget that we are speaking relative to our present consciousness, *i.e.* to that section of the cylinder in which we for a moment happen to be. To assert that Cæsar, or better perhaps Cæsar's body, does not exist, means nothing more than that it does not exist contemporaneously with us, that it does not belong to our section of the cylinder, that it does not act upon or influence us directly, that it is not among those things of which we have immediate experience or might have immediate experience if our consciousness were not limited spatially as well as temporally. The line which would represent Cæsar's body in our diagram does not pass through our section of the cylinder: hence the existence of that body is not real and actual for us. But its existence is as real and actual as that of our own bodies in the sections through which it does pass;¹ nor is there any sense in denying the reality of Cæsar's existence except in relation to some other period of time, usually present time, to which its existence does not extend. Similarly a future event, such as the subjection of all Europe to the German Emperor² or the establishment of a completely socialistic state, is not real and actual for us, because in our section of the cylinder it does not exist. But in the section to which it belongs (if such there be) it is as real as any present event; and were we outside the cylinder, as God is, or were our present consciousness extended as in some abnormal cases it seems to be, we should see German supremacy and socialistic states established in Europe (assuming that such is its destiny), just as we see now monarchies or republics and a balance of power; though we should not see them existing at the same time as what we now call present events any more than, when we reflect, we see ourselves as schoolboys and grown men at the same time.³

The difficulty we feel in thinking of past and future events as really existing is due to the fact that a reference to present time lurks in the very terms by which we seek to express our thoughts. We fancy that we are using terms absolutely, but in reality we are not. "Ing" and "is" and "are" and "does" all suggest the present moment *hic et nunc*, and from this reference

¹ D. T. in *Metap.*, vi, 3, p. 445.

² See footnote, p. 42.

³ Cf. S. Thomas in *Arist., De Interp.*, lect. 14. "Contra Gen.," i. c. 66.

to present time it is almost impossible completely to abstract.¹ Hence our ungenerous reluctance to concede to past and future events a reality which we ourselves possess, and the readiness with which we thoughtlessly reject as absurd and impossible the claim that the past and the future are as real as what we call the present.

A further difficulty may be raised from a slightly different point of view, the solution of which may help to clear up one or two points that still remain obscure. The objection may be put as follows. The whole of our created cosmos and every part of it is *ex hypothesi* co-existent with God. But things that are co-existent with the same thing are co-existent with one another. Each part of the universe therefore is co-existent with every other part; and hence either time is an illusion or else our hypothesis is false.

It is clear, however, that there is ambiguity in the term "to co-exist." When we speak of the world co-existing with God, we are not using the term "to co-exist" in the same sense as we are when we speak of the parts of the world co-existing with one another. In the first case there is question of the relation of created existents, which are in time, to God whose existence is absolute and out of time; and in the second case there is question only of the relation of finite created existents, all of which are in time, to one another. The two statements, therefore, are not parallel. Co-existence when predicated of a creature in relation to God means simply that both God and the creature exist, though it implies doubtless that the existence of the creature is wholly dependent upon the existence of God and would not belong to the creature at all except for the creative act of God. But co-existence when predicated of finite things in relation to one another means more than that they each and all exist; it means that they exist at one and the same time, that they belong to the same period or moment of the world's existence, and to the same section of our cylinder. To affirm then that all created things co-exist with God does not imply that they co-exist with one another. For in making the statement we prescind altogether from time, since God, to whom the existence of creatures is referred, is not in time. Our statement is, in short, merely a somewhat ambiguous way of stating the fact that all

¹ This difficulty is peculiarly characteristic of the English language. A Frenchman, finding a skull on (say) the field of Waterloo, might say, "*Il reste ici depuis un siècle*"; a German, "*Er liegt hier seit hundert Jahren*"; and an Italian, "*Esso giace qui da un secolo*"; but an Englishman would have to say, "That skull *has lain* here for a century."

finite beings are the product of a single creative act and are present *tota simul* to the consciousness of God.

The difficulty might be urged, however, by arguing that what is *tota simul* for God must be *tota simul* in itself, or that what is the product of an eternal act must itself be eternal; and *prima facie* the argument is plausible enough. But once again if we reflect what in each case our premiss means we shall see that the conclusions are false. Each premiss in fact really contains two statements. It affirms (1) that God knows all things and creates all things, and (2) it tells us something about the way in which God knows and creates, viz. eternally or *tota simul*. But the way in which God creates must not be confused with what He creates, nor the way in which He knows with what He knows. Hence if the statement that the world eternally exists be only another way of saying that the God eternally creates, it is true; but false, if it signify that eternity is a property of what is created. For eternity, as we have seen, is strictly predicable only of a life which is altogether infinite. It is more than mere unlimited duration: it implies something positive which is all-perfect and *tota simul*. Eternity in God is no more like the duration of finite things than His immensity is like their extension. For though both extension and duration manifest divine attributes and therefore resemble them in some sort of way, the resemblance does not imply anything strictly common, but is merely analogous. Eternity therefore and all-togetherness are predicable only of God, and describe a mode of existence and knowledge which is peculiar to Him. He alone *is* eternal. He alone knows all things *tota simul*. And His acts, since they are not really distinct from His essence, partake of its mode of existence. The act of creation cannot indeed be described as necessary; because so to describe it would imply that the infinite has need of the finite, which is a contradiction. Nevertheless it is eternal, and what it produces it produces *tota simul*. But *what* it produces is neither eternal nor *tota simul*; for God neither does, nor could He, reproduce Himself in all His perfections, since this again would imply a contradiction, the thing produced being at once absolute and yet dependent.

The universe, then, is finite, and finite in every respect. It is produced by an eternal act, and manifests in some degree the eternity of God, but it is not itself eternal. Its duration and the duration of all its parts is finite, and so too are all its other perfections. It does not exist *tota simul*, nor do any of the beings of which it is made up exist *tota simul*, nor any of them know things *tota simul* as God does. True, each

created being comprises a multitude of differences in a unity of ground, or holds together a multitude of accidents in its unity of substance; and each created consciousness which apprehends the many in the one also to this extent has a life which is *tota simul*. Nay, further, some of the creatures of this world, perhaps, when released from their corporeal bodies and enjoying the beatific vision, will attain to knowledge which approximates more closely still to the all-togetherness of God's knowledge. Indeed, this way of conceiving eternal life seems to me far more adequate than that which conceives it as a happy state of existence *which lasts for ever*. For it is not in the negation of a limit to its duration that eternal life consists, but in a positive transformation of the character of this present life by the vision of God, which elicits from those who enjoy it acts of knowledge and love, and in so doing enables them to realise to the full the perfections of their nature. The life of the blessed in heaven is not a temporal life from which the end has been taken away, but an eternal life in the true sense of a life which is *tota simul*, though not in the same full and perfect sense that God's life is *tota simul*. Creatures, however, as they exist in this world, are very far removed from this state of perfection. Not only is the many which they apprehend or bring to unity, finite in number, and the one in which they apprehend or unite it finite in nature, but so far from existing all-together, what they know one moment they forget the next, what they gain one day they lose the day following. Life on earth can only be sustained by a constant succession of acts, and the perfections of man, if realised at all, are only realised by a slow and laborious process. In short, the created universe, though it exists *tota simul* for God, in that He creates and knows it in one and the selfsame act, is in itself as far removed from an existence *tota simul* as it well could be while yet manifesting at all the nature of Him from whom it proceeds. But precisely because and in so far as it is a manifestation of the reality and actuality of God, a partial reproduction of His infinite perfections, and, one might almost say, a finite God incarnate, it is real and actual in any and every period of its existence and in this sense co-exists with God upon whom it is wholly dependent for all that it is and for all that happens in it.

Thus, if we would only think out carefully the real meaning of our common-sense beliefs, not only should we find that our notion of eternity and time are not contradictory, but the mystery in which our temporal existence seems to be involved would also be cleared up to some extent at least. We wonder

how the future can be determinate and yet man be free. And the answer is simply that it can be because it is. A future event is determinate because there it is, existing at some period or other of the world's duration and always present to the mind of God.¹ It is there in one of the sections of our cylinder, not indeed in the one in which our present existence is represented, but none the less really there; for it is among the things which God knows and eternally creates. And man is free in spite of this. In fact, his freedom has nothing whatever to do with the matter. He is free, not because his future actions are indeterminate, but because they are not wholly determined by their antecedents. His freedom implies that he is to some extent his own master, that sometimes he may act in this way or that, or not act at all, as he pleases. But what he does freely in the present, the future, or the past is a fact; and a fact which God knows from all eternity, because there it is before Him at some time or other and in some section or other of the world's existence, the act of man's free choice to which He, God, from all eternity is giving His concursus. Freedom, therefore, and complete determination in the sense in which we say that the future is completely determinate, are not incompatible; for while complete determination—or better, perhaps, determinateness—is predicated of each section of our cylinder considered in isolation, no section in which an act of free choice exists is completely determined if we consider it in causal relation to that which precedes.

The value of the conception of the relation of time and eternity which I have outlined above, in that it both harmonises common-sense beliefs and at the same time throws some light on the problems of vital importance, can hardly be disputed. But in its favour we may also claim that it has a moral or pragmatic value by no means inconsiderable. For if, as I have suggested, when released from the trammels of time in which our specious present is limited to the "just here" and "the just going," we become cognisant of our whole life, and possibly in some fashion of the whole of the created universe, it is a matter of supreme moment that we should so order our lives, while yet such ordering is within our power, that when we look upon that life as it really is we may not be ashamed of it in the sight of God, and of our fellow-men. Every action we perform is real, and will ever remain real, never ceasing to be, except in relation to the present moment, while yet we are in time and in process of change. Man is not a being whose actions last but for a moment and then are gone

¹ Cf. D. T., *De Interp.*, *loc. cit.*

and done with for ever. His whole life is real, and he is what he is during that life. And some day when his consciousness no longer comes and goes, as it does at present, but simply is, he will see his life as God sees it ; not indeed he alone, but his friends and his enemies, those whom he respects and from whom he hides his secret sins, and those whom he despises. According as he has lived well or ill on this earth, or according as he has by penance set right, or in the hardness of his heart refused to set right, what had gone wrong while yet his character was plastic and change a possibility, so will he appear to himself, and so will he be for all eternity.

This in fact is, I take it, what we mean when in popular language we say that all our actions are "recorded in the book of life," and will be laid bare at the General Judgment. So that once more common-sense belief and the doctrines of Christianity find philosophical expression in the conception of the universe as something real in each and all its parts, and as something which, though not itself eternal, nevertheless is eternally the product of God's creative act. One obstacle alone hinders us from appreciating the value of this view at once explanatory and pragmatic: the obstinacy with which we persist in asking questions that have no meaning, and the delight we feel in interpreting as absolute what has only a relative significance. Yet every objection that can be urged against the existence of the time-series as a whole is just as fatal, or as little fatal, to this view as it is to the view that the time-series exists bit by bit. For if the time-series as a whole is not real, we must draw the line somewhere. Some of it at least must be real. We cannot, however, identify what is real with the present moment, since in the present moment, however short it may be, there is duration and change, a "before" and an "after," a past and a present; and if past and present can be equally real when they are close together, why not when they are far apart? Thus to restrict the real to that which *is* but for a moment and yet includes a past and a present, is irrational. While if we exclude from the present moment all duration, then the whole has no duration, and to speak of the duration of anything whatsoever that is finite is to speak humanwise of what is mere appearance. It would seem, then, that to think of the world as wholly real, as well in what we call the past and future as in what we call present, relative to our transient and momentary consciousness, is not only a possible way of thinking out the nature of existence in time and its relation to eternity, but is the only way of doing so consistently.

L. J. WALKER.

A NEW BIRTH FOR EDUCATION.

PROFESSOR W. CALDWELL,

Head of the Department of Philosophy, McGill University, Montreal.

THE point of view of this article is that of a Britisher who still believes (who does not?) in the destiny of his country in spite of the great changes that have come over both England herself and the Empire situation generally. His supreme anxiety at the present moment (like that of many of his countrymen who have lived abroad and in the New World) is that all that general amateurishness, all that leisure-class and "drift" outlook upon life and the world, all that traditional irrationalism and insular prejudice so long characteristic of our national attitude and our public policy should become a thing of the past.

Of the Oxford classical philosophy to be associated as a kind of high-water mark, as the "finishing touch," of the Renaissance-like learning of our past English academic system, an Oxford *confrère* of mine, upon whose work in the renovation of philosophy I have written in a recent book upon *Pragmatism and Idealism*, wrote a year before the War:—

"The aim of this training is to instil into the best minds the country produces an adamant conviction that philosophy has made no progress since Aristotle. It costs about £50,000 a year, but on the whole it is singularly successful. Its effect upon capable minds possessed of common sense is to produce *that contempt for pure intellect* [italics mine] which distinguishes the English nation from all others, and ensures the practical success of administrators [in a dozen different realms—politics, education, the public services, the Indian Civil, and so on] by an examination so gloriously irrelevant to their future duties, that since the lamentable demise of the Chinese system it may boast to be the most antiquated in the world."¹

Now I want to be extremely careful in any comments I may make on this statement, and on some of the things it

¹ Dr F. C. S. Schiller, in his Preface to *Pragmatism* (D. L. Murray).

suggests. I do not intend to make too much, for example, of the severe criticisms that have been made in recent years by representative men upon our traditional school and university system. Defective as this has undoubtedly been in the past, the classical culture of our secondary schools, if broadened by social history and by classics other than those merely of Greece and Rome, is something that cannot possibly be dispensed with as part of the educational equipment of our future leaders and thinkers. It by no means follows, however, that it is the best thing, either for character or for intellect, for the majority of the youth either of England or of any other country.

Then I am outspokenly against any sudden rupture with the past, any reform of things like the schools and the churches, that does not recognise the part played for centuries in Europe and elsewhere by Humanism and Christian tradition. Continuity of the right kind, continuity with all that has been won in the past, is a most important thing to-day, with all the extremes of Bolshevism and of radicalism before our eyes in so many places. Nor am I writing as if the British public were worrying very much about the modernity, or the efficiency, of the training still supplied to the upper classes, to the privileged few. Having had their day, these people may safely be left, as it were, to their own devices, to the care of their own real interests. So pressing is the great social question of the times that it is impossible to proceed as directly as some would wish even with the education of the working classes. The general conditions of industry, of health, of housing, of land settlement, have all to be attended to first, as the King suggested in a speech early in the year. Not schools and courses of lectures and new text-books and new teachers are the first requirement of the young workmen of to-day, but "better and shorter hours of labour and less harassing conditions of employment and the guarantee of reasonable security of livelihood," according to the finding of a committee on Adult Education over which the Master of Balliol, Mr A. L. Smith, presided.

The point upon which I really desire to lay emphasis is rather that never before in our history was the character of our highest, or our socially approved ("official"), education a matter of greater moment. It is this that determines in the end all subsidiary social and educational schemes, and all ways of looking at these, and the kind of men to whom they are entrusted.

"It is by no means improbable that prior to the War our diplomatic and ministerial conduct of foreign affairs blundered because so many of our diplomatists had qualified for public service mainly on a knowledge of Latin and Greek, of ancient Roman and Greek history, of inapplicable

mathematics, of Aristotle's logic, of eighteenth-century metaphysic, and other subjects which had really no bearing at all, or very little, on European, Asiatic, and American problems of the present day. Our generals and most of our officers had similarly passed into the Army through Sandhurst or Woolwich, also on a classical education. Very few of these could speak French intelligently, or understand it when spoken, or read it when written. In military strategy they were a hundred years behind Germany. They had no knowledge of chemistry, very little knowledge of Africa and Africans, and scarcely any knowledge of the geography of Flanders or of the Balkan Peninsula. They knew nothing about the hygiene of food and the prevention of disease among their men, little, or nothing, of carpentry, meteorology and other sciences which play a great part in modern warfare. There was a complete misunderstanding regarding many questions, historical, geographical, ethnological, at the Board of Agriculture. In short, we were crippled by a bad education in regard to the things which really matter in the twentieth century."¹

"The ministers of advanced middle age, or actual old age, who governed us had all been educated on the same model—respect for the classics, great contempt for modern history, geography, ethnology, botany, zoology, chemistry, meteorology, hygiene, trade and practical questions of transport.

"They had learnt nothing about the history of our colonies, little or nothing about the history of Asia, or Africa, or America, Russia, Scandinavia, Turkey or the Balkan States. Their French was generally so bad that it was useless to them unless they learned it all over again in middle age." [There were] "exceptions of course to this ribaldry," [one of them being] "the late Lord Salisbury, but I remember the difficulty he met with in inducing the Treasury to sanction any expenditure on the Flora of Tropical Africa, which has since been of such enormous importance to British commerce."²

As for these saving exceptions, the important thing, the humiliating thing for us to remember, is that these exceptional persons have not always, but rarely perhaps, been produced or developed by our conventional educational system. They have either (like Lloyd George) never been under it at all, or like Kitchener and Cecil Rhodes they have followed out their own individuality and initiative in spite of it.

A similar arraignment to the foregoing may be found in a recent letter to the parents of boys at one of the leading schools in England, signed by Avebury, Jellicoe, Desborough, and other persons of prominence. In this letter it is said: "The writers wish to point out that a classical training in public schools is for the average boy a deplorable waste of time, and that it is the public-school boy who is doing so splendidly both as a man and a soldier who suffers a severe and unnecessary handicap both in the military and the com-

¹ "The Truth about the War," Sir Harry Johnston, in the *Review of Reviews*, August 1916.

² *Ibid.*

mercial professions compared with our enemies and our trade competitors."

Of course, against all this kind of thing there are still to be found, in the magazines and elsewhere, the comments and the expressed self-satisfaction of different interested parties who are telling us that the results of the War have shown that the old training was, after all, "a fine thing in its way, producing the best results in the world in the way of character and self-reliance and resources—results written large [too] in first-rate work done all over the world, as well at home." The proper answer to such an attitude is that character and self-reliance and resources and so on are rendered infinitely more effective by real knowledge and real competence, and that we certainly paid, and made others pay, far too heavy a price for such remnants of our otherwise admirable national character as have perhaps survived the ordeal of the War. So far in fact from our being entitled to plume ourselves on the results of our national culture, it is evident, I think, that some of the finest British war literature, along with the story of some of "our heroic follies," shows up in quite a pathetic way the comparative incompetence and the culpable surprise and helplessness of many of our finest Englishmen—firstly, in the world of affairs, in which the common man of all countries has lived for centuries (and which Continentals and Americans know better than we do); and then, secondly, in the higher worlds of the politics of nations, of education, of social construction (or reconstruction), and so on. Mr E. Carpenter, the well-known author of *Civilisation, its Cause and Cure*, in reflecting, recently, in *My Days are Dream Days*, on the futility and the emptiness of English undergraduate life in the middle of the last century [in *Sinister Street* Compton Mackenzie shows up a similar emptiness in recent years; as does Ian Hay, in the public schools, in *The Lighter Side of School Life*], significantly notices that there were at least two very great things that were never taught in anything like a fundamental way at the great universities—"union with nature" and "union with humanity." There were, of course, both at the schools and the universities, individuals who did stand for the need of these two great things, but they were again the exception that proves the rule.

The great objection from the national and the international point of view to our *social-culture* system was that there was underlying it, or behind it, no philosophy of education and citizenship that harmonised the supposedly cultural with the utilitarian and the practical, the older "humanitarian" with the

newer "vocational" or "social-service" conception of education. It had no ethical note as such, no really human note about character or manhood. It did not rise beyond a conventional, or class, conception of country, of the grand old name of gentleman, of the Empire. The latter it took to be in the main a place for Englishmen of the conventional type, of the conventional qualifications, in spite of the fact that the overseas dominions have been built up in the main not by public-school men (these have often to begin their life all over again) but by men and women whose place in the old country was somewhere in the middle, or the humbler, classes. And the educational programme that the established social system handed on, through the clergy, the members of Parliament, the magistrates, and the classically and "sport"-trained public-school masters, to the common people was such as to confirm the latter, too, in the idea of that stupid separation between "knowing" and "doing," between "information" and active work, between an educated "smattering" and the real work of life, between "preparation" for life and life itself.

It is precisely the notoriously compromise or patch-work character of the common school education of our country that has led the majority of our people to think of education as forced "information" about so many abstract things, instead of, what it really is, the ability to understand and to use the common environment, and the capacity to *reconstruct* it in the light of human purpose. A great deal, unfortunately, of the educational stimulus infused into the working classes, even by such well-meant movements as the older University Extension system or the more recent Workers' Educational Association, was still practically the old "information" kind, the induced desire to get at books and theories and "discussions," instead of the capacity to apprehend the facts and needs of the lives of the British people of the twentieth century. No wonder that parents and employers even to-day, with all the imperative calls of the moment for better education, resent, to some extent, the idea of more time and more money (for "more teachers") to be spent on the same information and acquisition kind of education, or even on the "continuation" and the industrial education training which we are attempting to-day.

The working-class education indeed that has descended upon our people, after a series of battles with fate, and with the superior and the established classes, has produced—as a recent writer has put it—not a body of moderately contented workers, of men and women who recognise the place and the stake they have in the life of their country, but a generation

of half-educated people, of "talkers" and "theorists," of discontented and ill-united masses, with "votes" indeed and "freedom," but with no more knowledge of government and of the real needs of England than is represented to them on the outside by the forensic debates and the party politics of our parliamentarians and the speeches of ignorant labour leaders. They do not know what they really want, or what they really need, these workers of to-day, because (like their former masters and superiors) they have had no fundamental education in the wants of men as men, in the real rights and duties of citizenship, and because they know next to nothing of the life of the world outside these Islands of ours. Lacking as were their schools in the playground opportunities and the self-government system of the public schools—how were they, these toilers, to get even the minimal notion of generous living and of public service acquired by the boys of the better classes? Neither on the lower nor on the upper levels of our social system, in short, was there anything like adequate provision for the real subject-matter of education, the unfolding of the common life. Nor did we attain in either case to the production or the development of that broad citizenship that is the end of education.

What is required, then, in Britain to-day—along, of course, with the extensive development of the public common-school system that is being contemplated at present—is such a thorough revision of our secondary education system as would bring our whole national instruction to the stage of efficiency embodied in the school and university system of France. Some of the features of the French system that we might emulate with advantage are, first, the thorough training along modern lines of the future teachers and leaders of France in schools in which the sciences and modern geography, social history, political economy, and sociology are all put on the same footing with the humanities and the classics, and in which the classics themselves (including the classics of France) are studied as much on the historical and the sociological side as on the merely literary and philological. Then there is the thoroughgoing harmony that exists between the work of the sixteen French provincial universities and that of the great University of Paris. The latter is, indeed, one of the wonderful institutions of the world. It preserves somehow all the true links with the past (with the Middle Ages even), while exercising its moulding and determining influence on the world of to-day and to-morrow. And there is also in France an admirable organisation of all grades and stages of school and academic

instruction secured by the public examination system and by the Normal School system that draft all graduates and qualified persons into those parts of the educational world where they are best fitted to serve France and themselves.

An important thing for us to note in connection with France and her educational system is that at this very moment, with all that willingness to learn and all that eagerness to change for the better that characterises her entire life, America is already (through some of her foremost professors) drawing the attention of her students everywhere to the advantages of French universities for graduate and professional study. A magnificent volume has just been published there, *Science and Literature in France*, by a company of American scholars under the direction of that foremost American legal authority and teacher, Dean John Henry Wigmore, of the North-Western University. We know how Germanised America had become some twenty-five years ago in the matter of the higher academic teaching—how nearly all her best professors had been in Germany and secured degrees and diplomas there, and how the German *Seminar* and specialised research system had become her approved method of advanced study. Having now, as it were, used Germany for all that she could learn from her, and having developed a great independent university life of her own, and having become completely convinced of the errors of the intellectualism and the scientific materialism of Germany, it is only natural that America should be looking elsewhere for a newer “spiritual home” to which she may send her youth, for the studies of their maturer years. The lesson for us is obvious. And if we do not take it, and seek at this late date, and after our bitter experiences, to adapt our university life to the needs of the modern world—as America began to do years ago,—we shall fail not only in our duty to our own youth and to the future of our country, but we shall fail to attract to our shores our just proportion of the American and foreign students who will now be going abroad for advanced and specialised study. But here, as usual, our needs and our possibilities have altogether outrun our existing institutions and our existing theories.

In America, of course, education has for long been practically the religion of the country, the one thing in which everybody believed, and for which everybody was prepared to make sacrifices. This is only natural when we think of the endless different racial stocks of her population, of the ten million coloured people, and of the Bolshevism of the hour. By far

the greatest single civilising agency of the country is the local (city or district) high school, with its dissemination of that modern civic and cultural education that America believes to be essential for all who would become more than mere artisans and mere bread-winners. One of the things that impressed me most, while a professor in America, was the extent to which the well-to-do in any community believed in the local high school, rather than in some one of the fashionable, semi-English boarding schools of the Eastern States, as the proper place for their sons to learn to become American citizens—the highest ambition of all in the United States.

There are some features of our Canadian educational life that may be of interest to people in the old land. In our Montreal high schools, for example, the majority of boys—such has been their training in self-help, independence, the use of opportunity—seem to know already in school the line of life in which they think they can be of most service to themselves and their country. And Canadian boys in general are just as keen as American boys for their life-work. They have grown up in a country that has been Americanised in a hundred ways, so far as the efficiency of life is concerned. The up-to-date way of doing things is to be found everywhere, from the farm and the country store to the dock and the railway and the bank and the lawyer's office. Our Applied Science Faculty at M'Gill University is larger in the numbers of its students than the Faculty of Arts and Letters. And so, too, is the combined Faculty of Agriculture and Education and Domestic Science. And the Liberal Arts Faculty, after the first two years, has now become largely a gateway, or approach, to the different professions—medicine, law, science, business, and so on. All Canadian boys, too, it might be pointed out, have received something of that education with nature of the lack of which we saw Mr Edward Carpenter complaining above. The most of them get in early life that training in out-of-door life, in service, in activities that the boy scout of to-day is receiving in many different countries. They could make their way through a city, or a country, or perhaps even round a battlefield. Nearly all Canadian college men, too, take on, for three or four months in summer, jobs of a practical and useful and educative character, acting as pursers, hotel clerks, paymasters, teachers, country parsons, prospectors, managers, and so on. One is really ashamed, now, to think of our long loafing holidays as boys in the old country, for which fond, believing parents incurred much needless and useless expense.

It would be a good thing at the present parting of the ways

in our country, when people are even talking (quoting Locke and Rousseau and others) about everyone mastering a trade or definite calling, if our secondary schools could so reorganise their programmes that technical and professional and public-service capacity, instead of the old supposed culture of the amateur, could be the determining consideration in the teaching and the guiding of pupils. Only those, for example, should be led on to the higher literary culture for whom this pursuit is an obvious privilege, while the great majority of pupils in all schools and colleges should be taught and guided along the lines of useful and self-supporting careers. Cultural and liberalising studies, especially civics and practical ethics, can, and should, be introduced at the appropriate stages in the training of all pupils. And just as mathematics is fittingly taken up when a boy requires to measure things scientifically, and Latin after the Roman contribution to civilisation has been taken up, so the school discipline itself can, in any school, be made the natural means, or occasion, for engendering in the mind of the young serious and intelligent convictions regarding the social and ethical relations of human beings generally, and the foundations of government, law, and order. Our regional high schools, too, and all public schools should be so organised and equipped as to be true fostering and sifting agencies for the pupils of different aptitudes and capacities and for the training of all in the elements of citizenship. And the average boy should always (as in America) contemplate business and a work of the world, the service of men, as his natural calling. There is in business scope and opportunity for talent and genius, even of the highest order. Plato, as we know, contemplated, in his *Republic*, a thorough sifting and testing of the youth of the better classes, after a preliminary physical and "musical" training, from the point of view both of individual capacity and of possible service to the State.

One of the many reasons of the pre-war supremacy of America in nearly all practical matters, and in the new business, in enterprise generally, in the application of theory to practice, in the realms of practical politics, in philanthropy, education, church life, was the fact that for many years the best brains of all her colleges had been going into business—so great has been there the reward and stimulus in this direction. This phase of things always greatly impressed us resident Britishers, with our many memories of the stupid old contempt of our University men, and of our society people, for "trade" and business, and of our amateurish way of doing nearly everything, and of the endless numbers of our friends who idled away their time at

the universities. I admit at once that business is not an end in itself, and that the United States and Canada have both of them the problem to-day of getting back somehow into the world of education the best brains and the best characters of their respective countries. But the lesson to us British people, from America and Canada, of the adequacy of the common life and the common activity as the natural sphere for all the culture and the learning a man may acquire is obvious.

Since writing the foregoing, I have noticed the growing probability that Oxford may abolish Greek as a compulsory entrance subject. This would be a decision of far-reaching importance to Oxford herself, to Britain generally, and to the entire English-speaking world. It would help to kill officially in British schools, and in British society, the already waning supremacy, the supposed and unchallenged superiority, of the leisure-class, or the classical-culture, educational ideal, *as an ideal for everybody, women included*. It would do more than any one thing to introduce at Oxford and elsewhere a great many higher and truly liberalising studies that do not depend for their successful prosecution on an elaborate Latin and Greek foundation. It would help therefore, too, in the near future to bring to our schools and colleges our due proportion of American and of foreign students. And most important of all, perhaps, it would tend to cut away much of the ground from the imagination of those people (I have met them even in Canada) who keep insinuating that there will soon be a reaction in England after the subsidence of all this present "efficiency" and "reconstruction" talk. There can be no such reaction when the cultural system to which it might seek to attach itself has been rendered impossible by Oxford herself. Never again will we have in England, in anything like a nationally harmful form, the quasi-Greek or the quasi-classical belief (on the part of a small, superior class) in a supposed radical difference between "liberal" knowledge and "useful" knowledge, between the outlook of a "free" or "educated" man and that of a practical man, or producer, or worker—as if an educated man should not also be practical or productive!

And yet, despite the new culture that has arisen out of the science and the technic of modern times, and despite the emergence across the horizon of us all of the great question of the living conditions of the masses of our fellow-men, there are still, here and there, belated people writing and speaking as if the education of to-morrow meant a choice between the supposedly cultural and the supposedly useful, between general training and vocational training, between thinking and doing.

Instead of acting thus, they ought to be doing all they can to bring about a way of looking at things that will cause us all to regard this foolish and mistaken distinction as but a survival from times when the spiritual freedom and the equality of men as men, as citizens, had not been discovered and acted upon. In America, as I have often expressed it, there is no recognised, or recognisable, distinction between the culture of a scholar, or an artist, and that of large-minded worker, or man of affairs, any more than there is there a fixed distinction between a gentleman and a plain man, for every American plain man may be a gentleman. And there is in America no leisure or superior class as such. Everyone there must express his culture in socially constructive terms. He must do something with it, or be suspected (and rightly) of having none.

What we need most, then, in our country (and the signs of the times all point to our getting it), instead of the pseudo-classical and leisure-class outlook of the past, is a dynamic philosophy of education that will connect it with the "life-impulse" about which so much is being said to-day, with the feeling for more life, and for a better life for all. There is indeed no culture either of the mind, or of the soul, or of the hand, apart from the daily demonstrated capacity to do something useful and valuable for society, or the world in which we live. And this is true even if, in accordance with best thought of the time, we proclaim personality itself to be the one aim and end of all education and of all social polity. For personality can express itself only in social and personal terms, only in and among persons. The "realisation of our ideal," as a well-known English Hegelian, Professor Mackenzie, put it years ago, "seems to demand a society." On a continued apprehension, then, of the organic and intimate relation that exists between the cultural and the useful, between general training and special, or vocational, training, depends our entire future well-being so far as both our national thought and our national action are concerned. The war itself began this great work of nationalising, or "generalising," the work and the service of every individual citizen, of showing to him and making him feel his value to the community as a whole. And when a man sees the general, or the social, and the personal value of what he is doing he becomes a "free" man and a citizen, a "cultured" man, a man whose personality and whose work are "born again" of the "spirit."

As many men have recently been seeing and saying, it was the painful "rift" or opposition that existed for decades between the things we Victorians thought we knew (we did

not really know them, for we were amateurs, not scholars—even in Latin and Greek) and the things we ought to have known, that was the worst feature of our British nineteenth-century “culture.” And we simply cannot keep up this dualism, or opposition, in the era upon which we have entered without going under, for we are all “workers” now. And with the right sort of ideas, and the right ethical start in our education, we may all indeed be “gentlemen.”

If there is one great lesson that may be learnt from the widespread social unrest and the general dispersiveness of the times, it is that an ethical education of the youth and of the workers of all countries—an education in self-knowledge, in intelligent and voluntary, and unselfish, co-operation in the complex work of the world, in right social habits, in the control of “wants” and desires, in true satisfaction, in true ambition—is at least as important an element in education and citizenship as either the new “efficiency” or the old general culture. And the problem of introducing this ethical factor is in a sense the immediate concern of the Protestant and the so-called “free” schools of our Western world.

There are many important related topics that might be profitably taken up here—the needed educational changes in the training of girls and women, for example, for the gap between a lettered education and “life” has no doubt been even greater, for a generation or two, in the case of “educated” women than in that of university-trained men and boys. And we repeat that nothing that has been said here assails the necessity of a sound classical education for the real leaders and thinkers of any country. Only, such a classical education must be far more “sociological” than it has been—more connected with a knowledge of the social conditions of societies, both ancient and modern. Then, again, it is time that by the requisite broadening and vitalising of our entire educational system we should as a people put an end to that stupid contempt for intellect and expert qualifications that has so long been a disgrace to our country—with our amateurish and sport conceptions of the life of the “free” man, or the gentleman. And if space permitted I might try to show, point by point, the utter inadequacy of that spurious fusion that existed in many of the books of our classically trained, but really ignorant, school-philosophers, of an imperfectly understood Aristotle, and an imperfectly understood British *laissez-faire* philosophy, and a misunderstood Hegelian philosophy of history.

W. CALDWELL.

WILFRID WARD.

PROFESSOR HERBERT L. STEWART,

Dalhousie University, Halifax, N.S.

IN the national crisis of 1916 few had either the leisure or the heart to dwell much upon those losses which concerned only the literary and the speculative world. Otherwise, far deeper interest and far keener regret would have been aroused by the passing of one who was among the last links with the Victorian age of criticism. Wilfrid Ward made no pretence to be a great man, but he was greater than he knew, and he has left us more that is of value than many upon whom wider attention was directed and warmer encomiums were pronounced. It is usual to speak of Stanley's *Life of Arnold* as a biographical masterpiece, but one may well doubt whether it was as fine a performance in its kind as Ward's *Life of Newman*. And as Newman was a figure so much more commanding than Arnold, so much more significant in the evolution of the English Church, so much more influential upon religious development in many Churches, his adequate portraiture is a far greater gift to posterity. The record of the Catholic Revival has been sketched by various pens, and it is trite to say that such a movement in order to be understood must be studied from within as well as from without. No Englishman writing from within has brought to the task a delicacy of touch equal to that of Ward, an insight that is so sympathetic into the mind of opponents not less than the mind of friends, a truer union of loyalty to his own ideal and fairness towards those whose ideal could never be his. When we add to this the fact that he was the son of perhaps the fieriest among all the fiery converts who began to "pass over" in 1845, that in his mature years he departed widely from his father's personal attitude though without forgetting for a moment his devotion to Rome, and that he has expounded to us with perfect candour the whole case as it afterwards appeared to a highly cultivated man

mixing daily in the agnostic circles of science and literature, we must find in Ward's career materials for both historical and psychological study which we cannot afford to neglect.

He chose for one of his most interesting books the title, *Problems and Persons*. If he had called it *Persons and Problems*, as he called another volume *Men and Matters*, he would have revealed still more intimately the order of his own thought. For it was through contact with great, or at least with notable, men that the large issues were defined for him. The grand contrast between a religious and a secular theory of life was the one enduring object of his reflection. He never ceased to picture its successive historical forms, to inquire into the meaning and the causes of each variation it underwent, to speculate upon its future, and to study its bearing upon the other social or intellectual interests of mankind. But he approached all this less by the abstract way of ideas than by the concrete way of personalities. It was in the persistent effort to understand and compare the thinking of such varied minds as those of Tennyson and Henry Sidgwick, of Wiseman and John Stuart Mill, of Ernest Renan and Mr Arthur Balfour, that he learned his priceless gospel of charity. One should add that he learned this without suffering at the same time that paralysis of independent conviction to which the over-charitable are so often exposed. His generous understanding of another man's thought never degenerated into a habit of genteel indifference between views that were in irreconcilable conflict. Ward was among those who have fulfilled that old prediction by Lord Morley that men who become alive to the inexpressible magnitude of philosophic questions will find elegant Pyrrhonism impossible and light-hearted neutrality most unendurable.¹ Choice between the great spiritual alternatives he could never dare to minimise, however sympathetic he might feel towards any honest thinker who resolutely identified himself with either side. For he had not so learned the lesson of the great Cardinal whose life and work were his constant study for forty years. Indeed, few writers of our time have done more than Ward to discountenance that peace-giving motto of *nil admirari*, and that genial mood of the philosopher disillusioned about the possibilities of attaining truth, for which Anatole France has made himself so deceptively attractive a champion to the learned.

Thus his literary achievement may be viewed in two ways, and we owe him a double debt. He undertook to draw the lineaments of four remarkable men, whose careers are of

¹ *On Compromise*, p. 130.

profound though by no means of equal interest—his own father W. G. Ward, Cardinal Wiseman, the poet Aubrey de Vere, and Cardinal Newman. He has drawn these with great skill and great vividness, keeping his personal judgments strictly in the background, and aiming above all to make us intimately acquainted with the men themselves. What he did for these four he has done in a slighter degree and with an avowedly critical purpose for many others, such as Disraeli, Cardinal Vaughan, Huxley, Tennyson, R. H. Hutton. Here and there fault must be found with his criticism, for though his power of detaching himself from bias was remarkably high it was by no means perfect. One's suspicion is aroused, for example, by his enormous estimate of mental quality in the late George Wyndham as we compare it with his almost contemptuous references to Gladstone, or by his kindly appreciativeness for Disraeli side by side with his bitter depreciation of Renan, or by the paramount place he assigns to Newman as a philosopher when we recall his disparagement of John Stuart Mill. It would indeed be unjust to say of Ward that his prejudices misled him in criticism as far as they misled Carlyle, or that he did not valiantly struggle against his prepossessions where the sage of Chelsea let his prepossessions carry him whither they would. Nothing in *Problems and Persons* or *Ten Personal Studies* is to be compared with the folly of that wretched judgment that "Gladstone is on the whole the contemptiblest man I know of," or that senseless sneer at the author of the *Novum Organum* that the unfrocked Lord Chancellor went away "to augment the sciences, as if from the like of him the sciences had any augmentation to expect." But in spite of himself, Ward was misled by the same sort of causes which worked upon Carlyle. We meet in him with the same resolve to seek evidence that those whom he morally disapproved were intellectually weak, the same exaggeration of intellectual grasp in those whom he morally revered.

Yet we must not complain if we find in him a fault from which hardly any biographer is exempt, and Ward yielded to it far less than most. Indeed, those who in contemporary literature care chiefly for "Lives" will search long for a better guide in the province which he has covered, or for more convincing pictures than those which he has placed in his biographic gallery. It is probable that many of us as we read his books of this type will, like him, be introduced through the study of men to the study of matters, and will find his numerous essays on deep problems a not less rewarding field.

Especially in one deep matter that was his lifelong concern it would be hard to refer those who read only English to any exposition of equal or even of comparable value. For everyone must admit that before the appearance of Ward's books the thought of the best minds in the Church of Rome was being poorly explained to Protestant readers in England, and that it remained for very many a subject ill understood. They knew, indeed, through bitter controversialists, two widely separated schools of Catholicism: the Ultramontane school that seemed struggling in vain to bring back the days of Hildebrand, and the Modernist school that seemed eager for a new type of freethinking, whose day had not yet definitely dawned in any Church of the Christian world. Each of these schools presented something of a puzzle, especially to evangelical members of the State Church. The average Protestant read such a paper as that of Gladstone entitled *The Vatican Decrees and Civil Allegiance*, only to lay it down wondering, naturally enough, what Cardinal Cullen meant by professing to be a loyal subject of the King. He turned to the literature of the Inopportunist on the Definition of Infallibility, and kept asking himself, not less naturally, what Lord Acton can possibly have meant by professing a Catholicism purer than that of the Pope. The position of a mediating school might, indeed, have been gathered from the works of Newman, but the prejudice against a renegade long kept those works under suspicion, and some could not forget the warning of writers like Charles Kingsley to be on their guard against a "barbed arrow" that might enter their spiritual vitals before they knew. Scarcely anyone belonging to Newman's school under the Roman obedience seemed concerned either to make clear the faith that was in him to the world of English Protestantism, or to address himself to such a world in language that would be sympathetically appreciated or even patiently examined. This is the task which Ward made his own, and which he fulfilled with magnificent success.

He knew well how urgent it was, how important not only for those with deep concern about religion, but for those with a mere speculative interest in interpreting the currents of contemporary thought. Probably he would have explained the lack of men to undertake this work as the last sad reminder of the old days when his co-religionists had been looked upon by others, and had come to look upon themselves, as a *gens lucifuga* in English society. But for his own part he had abjured for ever that spirit of loneliness. He loved

England with an unquenchable love. Proud of English tradition, believing intensely in English ideals, aflame with English patriotism, he could speak with rare effectiveness to the men of his race and of his time. His first literary venture was in 1882, when he plunged into the great debate that had become so acrimonious in the closing seventies. A few still among us are old enough to recall that heated atmosphere, so stifling to moderate people of all opinions, when bewildering panic on one side and scornful triumph on the other were stirred by the very name of "Evolution." Ward's first essay bore the title, *The Wish to Believe*. It contained, like so many of his later discussions, the well-known argument grounded upon those limits of science which the new term "Agnosticism" had set in such strong relief, and the plea for retaining those convictions, which we may admit to be intellectually unprovable, but which have been found to lie at the very root of the highest values of mankind. The line of thought suggests to us, curiously enough, that which has become so familiar since Ward's distinguished namesake wrote *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. A study so rational without being rationalistic, by one so loyal to Rome yet so well aware of the strength of modern unbelief, was a notable event, and was the harbinger of much still to come from the same vigorous pen. It may well have been a surprise to those who looked upon the spirit of free religious inquiry and of keen alertness to developing science as a peculiar mark of the Protestant Churches and of those few insurgent folk, nominally under the Roman obedience, but really Protestants or freethinkers at heart.

For young Ward was no vacillating adherent of his own communion. An anecdote of his early life is significant of the attitude with which his career began. He tells us in *Ten Personal Studies* how he was a student in Rome during the last years of Pius IX., at a time when affection towards the aged pontiff had deepened as he drew near his end, and how in the little circle of the Collegio Inglese resentment was then proportionately keener against the sovereign who had laid sacrilegious hand upon the Papal States. The carriage of Victor Emmanuel was gazed at when it passed through the streets as if it had contained the authentic figure of the Antichrist. But the King, having gained his main purpose, was sagacious enough to conciliate the clergy by every means in his power, and nothing pleased him more than to be saluted out of doors by anyone in ecclesiastical or semi-ecclesiastical dress. Ward and his companions used to make a special

point of getting near the royal carriage, striking a posture that seemed preliminary to an act of deference, and, as soon as the impetuous King lifted his own hat in reply, complimenting him with a stony stare. The story is very human, and very illuminating about the cross currents of Roman society at the time. Such juvenile snubbing of monarchs is exactly what might have been expected from the son of the fierce Ultramontane, to whom all the thrones of the world were as nought when compared with the Chair of Peter. But a time came when his father's influence counted less, and Wilfrid Ward in his maturity belonged to the school of Catholicism that accepts a *fait accompli*, sees Providence in its calamities, and prefers planning for the future to repining against the past.

A chief purpose of his life became that of furthering the great movement towards peace in a divided Christian world. As he put it himself, he would "interpret the extremes to each other." He was convinced, indeed, like Comte and Huxley and Lord Morley and many others, that the great conflict of principle is between Agnosticism and Catholicism, that the Protestant compromise is a mere clouding of the issue, and that the clear-headed amongst those who still cherish a religion of private judgment will be forced in the end either backward to Rome or forward to unbelief. But the reader will search Ward's books in vain for one rancorous phrase about those Reformed Churches whose position he thought so demonstrably illogical and indefensible. Cardinal Vaughan once laughed at the men in Anglican orders as "shivering in their insular isolation," and we have known Protestant theologians who were not ashamed to gloat over such a book as Mr Joseph M'Cabe's *Decay of the Church of Rome*. Such sectarian bitterness when the cause of religion itself was in such deadly peril, such desire to make capital out of the weakness of one's allies rather than present a united front to the common enemy of all, was as distasteful to Ward when he saw it in the one religious camp as when he saw it in the other. Throughout life he felt himself a soldier of the Church Militant, never forgetting that the grand army had many different companies, or that those who were not against him were on his side. He rejoiced, of course, as often as reinforcements were added to the one battalion which he thought securely embattled against the assaults of secularism. Like a skilful strategist, he welcomed the abandoning of ground by those who could no longer defend it, and the concentration of force on points that could really be held. But nothing was more repugnant to his nature than to make the division more

acute between those who shared, however imperfectly, the same great faith; and nothing else was quite so dear to him as the hope that the Roman and Protestant communions might come to see how much more precious is the conviction that unites them than the dogmatic formulæ by which they are separated.

He was always mindful, indeed, of the immense difficulties that bar the way. He understood well that mordant comment by Newman on Pusey, that the author of the once famous *eirenicon* was unlike the Greek warrior who wreathed his sword in myrtle, for he had discharged his olive branch from a catapult! And Ward's own discernment was far too deep to be misled by the plausible suggestion with which our round table conferences resound, that the Churches are to come together by forgetting all about their characteristic differences in doctrine. When the *Constructive Quarterly* was launched, it laid just two obligations upon those who should write for it: "First, that the Faith and Work and Thought of each Communion shall be presented in its absolute integrity, including and not avoiding differences; Second, that no attack with polemical aims shall be made on others." These words might stand as Ward's own programme for promoting Christian co-operation, and it showed rare insight on the part of the editor to select him as a herald in the first issue of the magazine. For this is surely the programme of all who have at length come to see that it is not in doctrinal coincidences, however surprisingly numerous we may find them, that the spring of unity is to be hoped for, and who feel that he who expects it there has gone out to seek the living among the dead. Formulæ may be in words identical, and yet different in every respect which matters, through differences of the intellectual and spiritual setting into which they are received. If the outcome of our attempted theoretical *rapprochements* has so far been humiliatingly small, one way to put the reason is perhaps this: such dwelling upon the "common element" of doctrine conveys to each Church that her own distinctive things, the things that have historically been at the root of her life and movement, are so much religious deadwood, so many formal hindrances which need to be swept away if the active principle is to have free scope. Each Church separately knows how far this is from being the case, and turns aside in sorrowful disappointment from these prospects of reunion through a greatest common measure or a least common multiple. Ward saw this long ago, and never wearied of insisting upon it. He quotes with much

approval a remark by Tennyson, that "you must choose in religion between bigotry and flabbiness." Yet how sweetly reasonable he has made us see a "bigot" may be at heart! And he touches the very kernel of the matter in a memorable sentence of his own: "In point of fact, the very beliefs held in common have their edge and force in individual believers as parts of the different living systems in which they are found."

The brief but very interesting and very discerning memoir by his widow will no doubt be followed in time by a biography adequate to the subject, and we should be more than satisfied if it is the work of one who has learned from Ward himself how biographies should be written. We shall look forward to hearing much about other points of interest—about his notable services to literature, for example, in his editorship of the *Dublin Review*, and the high capacity which elicited so general a protest from the literary world when his resignation of that editorship was rumoured. And we shall, perhaps, hear more of his political views in the troubled time through which his country passed, although we already know enough to make our reflection lively and suggestive. In politics as in religion Ward was a Conservative, chairman for a time of his party association in his own constituency, and, like the Oxford leaders to whose teaching he owed most, deeply alarmed by the democratic developments of his period. He shared Newman's feeling about O'Connell, and remained a zealous opponent of each scheme for Irish Home Rule. What his feelings must have been when he heard his Unionist friends base their objection on the ground that "it would mean *Rome Rule*," we need not particularly conjecture. If he had thought that it would mean anything of this kind, would not his conscience have forced him to support it? But he knew too much of history, and of the ominous *Los von Rom* which he had seen stimulated all over Europe by the advance of local self-government. So he had no option but to join with men who on many a platform insulted the cause he had most at heart, because what mattered to him was the success of a policy rather than the rhetoric by which its success was obtained, and, as for some strange oratorical or journalistic associates with whom he found himself, he could reflect that their cause was good though they knew not what they said. This may be defensible politics, but it might have made his father turn in his grave. In a situation somewhat similar William George Ward withdrew his name from an election committee in the Isle of Wight, though it was acting for a

candidate whom he continued to support. His letter of explanation contained this very significant passage: "But still the fact remains that your method of forwarding Sir Charles Locock's interest has been one which I most profoundly disapprove; while your reasons for opposing his antagonist stand out in extreme and most curious contrast to my own. I could not, therefore, without incurring misconstruction, allow my name to remain on his committee." Whether Wilfrid Ward was equally vigilant in the contests of his own division the present writer cannot tell. But we all know the nature of the anti-Home Rule campaign throughout England.

This perhaps would not have been worth mentioning if it did not suggest a rather striking feature in his whole line of thought. If a critic were disposed to be severe, the point against him upon which it would be easiest to dwell is just that *strategic* attitude to great problems, in which we have already recognised some obvious merits, but which lent itself so readily to no less obvious corruption. For the sake of clearness it will be best to present this in its most unfavourable light, as an advocate might make the most of a case, indicating afterwards the qualifications by which a harsh judgment should be tempered.

A subject upon which he often wrote, and about which he constantly thought, was the relation of unchanging dogma to a changing world. He discussed it under such titles as *The Rigidity of Rome*, or *The Conservative Genius of the Church*. Developing the suggestion of this last phrase, he insists again and again that "authority" has it in charge to protect the *depositum fidei* against rash, ill-considered novelties in doctrine; that at times it may be needful to offer sheer resistance to that which afterwards reveals within itself some element of value; that the first movements of advance in the Church must thus originate with thinkers who have not the ultimate responsibility of administration; and that it is the problem of successive popes to judge just when an innovation is to be rejected as evil, when it is to be deferred as doubtful, and when it is to be assimilated as good. Abundant examples are offered from such cases as the Gnosticism of the second century and the Aristotelianism of the twelfth; the work of St Thomas Aquinas is cited as a typical pattern of conservative progress; and the analogy between Harnack's *Dogmengeschichte* and Newman's *Essay on Development* is worked out with Ward's usual ingenuity. In one of his latest books he has added to these a new and perhaps a more illuminating

parallel. He compares the action of the supreme pontiff in regard to Modernism with Mr Balfour's method of delay when challenged during his Premiership by the Tariff Reformers. The pages of this journal are no place for party politics, and one need not discuss whether Mr Balfour's Government in 1903 is more complimented by comparison with the Roman Curia, or the Roman Curia by comparison with Mr Balfour's Government. It seems a perilous similitude, and angry repudiation might be anticipated on behalf of each interest in turn. But the point of importance for us here is Ward's curious way of viewing the Church's problem as one of mere management, the capable steering of a ship between rocks on either side, the attaining—in short—of a practical result in the governing of men, rather than single-eyed devotion to truth as it reveals itself.

This is an attitude which strikes us again and again in his studies of the great ecclesiastics, both past and present. When he wrote about St Thomas, was he fascinated most by what fascinates so many, the grand mediæval synthesis which drew together the threads of diverse thinking, and set the model of that architectonic genius in which our twentieth century has still much to learn from the thirteenth? Was he not more interested to depict the skill with which the influence of Abelard and the influence of St Bernard were so used to soften each other, that "our great Imperial Church"—as he loved to call it—might have room alike for the mystic and the schoolman? Perhaps we see the same temper in his glowing eulogy upon that dexterous pontiff, Leo XIII., and in the apologies, which so many thought had a note of reluctance, for the narrow yet resolutely candid Pius X. One cannot help suspecting that it inspired the vehemence of his criticism upon those who promoted the Vatican Decrees, for his quarrel with the Council of 1870 was not that it asserted dogma which was untrue but that it provoked controversy which was at the moment inopportune.¹ Even in his account of his great hero, did he not emphasise less the thoroughgoing straightforwardness which prompted Newman's secession from the Church of his youth than the spirit of "ecclesiastical

¹ Cf. Ward's complaint about writers like M. Gaume: "In a similar spirit of emphasising what was likely to irritate the modern world, a whole treatise of four hundred pages was devoted by him to Holy Water" (*William George Ward and the Catholic Revival*, p. 120). One cannot help feeling a measure of sympathy with M. Gaume's defence: "Nous ne convertirons pas ni Mazzini ni Garibaldi. . . . Vous qui êtes plus puissants que nous, vous l'avez tenté: avez-vous réussi? Vos beaux discours, vos savants écrits, vos protestations, vos superbes articles, ont-ils retardé même une heure le progrès de la révolution?"

statesmanship" which he strove to advance in the Church of his old age?

Filial piety, indeed, made Ward write with reverence of his own father's defiant recklessness towards a policy of discretion, but we cannot forget how others who fought by that father's side were less mercifully treated by the son for the very same fault of impolitic churchmanship. Is not this the clue to the astonishingly acrid tone of his last article on Manning, where he speaks almost with exultation about the failure of the many Ultramontane educational schemes in which the Cardinal was perhaps undiplomatic, but undoubtedly faithful both to Ward's creed and to his own, and has so little to say of those high social services to the "submerged tenth" by which Manning did so much to convince the world again of a truth which both Wiseman and Vaughan gave it some excuse to forget, namely, that a prince of the Church can be a champion of the poor? The most obvious token of the same point of view is in one of Ward's latest public efforts, his contribution to the debate on Modernism. "I entreated the Tyrrells and the Loisy's," he wrote, "to show such practicalness and moderation as would make authority regard them as friends." What if the Tyrrells and the Loisy's had in mind to cement their friendship less with "authority" than with truth? Nothing, indeed, as much melancholy historic precedent has shown us, would have been easier for these men than to keep themselves safe by methods of compromise, just as nothing would have been easier than for Newman to make up his peace with the Anglican bishops in 1845. And there are those who would have applauded both steps. Ernest Renan once asked the world to recognise the priest who dissembles his convictions as a high pattern of sainthood. "The humble Catholic priest, surrounded by timid and narrow-minded souls, must remain silent. Oh, how many close-mouthed tombs about our village churches hide similar poetic reticence and angelic silence! Will ever those whose duty it is to speak equal after all in merit those who in secret cherished and restrained the doubts known only to God?"

Ward was a very different thinker from Renan, and it would be both unjust and absurd to look upon them as enjoining the same sort of religious conservatism. For the one believed, what the other totally denied, that the Most High has established a living oracle on earth for the perpetual guidance of human souls. If this has been done, no doubt we should subordinate every other interest in defending the super-

natural custodian of the *depositum fidei*. The whole case is altered if we can assume this, and our criticism may be repelled as resting in the end upon our Protestant dissent from the pretensions of Rome. So long as Tyrrell and Loisy accepted the same fundamental authority, it was legitimate for Ward to invoke it against them and to demand their allegiance. What the whole dispute brings home to us is the impassable character of the gulf which Modernism sought to bridge. What it reveals to us about Ward is not so much his logical dexterity, which we knew to be great, and of which this is a conspicuous instance, as the length to which he was prepared to go for a cause whose need for such suppression of candour might have wakened him to its weakness. The present writer and those who may think with him dare not allow the gratitude they feel to this distinguished man of letters, and the loss which they mourn in his removal when at the very plenitude of his power, to make them disguise their deep disagreement with this aspect of his teaching. For to them it is both inherently incredible and historically without a shred of evidence that any organisation of men on earth has been invested with the awful prerogative which Ward acknowledged in the visible Church. To us priesthood and power of the keys and spiritual rulership and apostolic succession have a profound archaeological interest; but when we think of such terms in relation to our own age they constitute no more than a tale full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. We respect and even admire the enthusiasm of those who judge quite otherwise and resolutely act on the tremendous dogmas which they believe to be true. But we may not be false to our own truth, such as it is, or affect to find in the sedulous subordinating of thought to external control anything else than a betrayal of our birthright. We cannot see the task of the Church of God as it relates itself to honest inquiry in these strange times as akin to that of a political Cabinet controlling anarchic discontent, or to that of a perplexed Premier worried by those who preach an "unauthorised programme." Not this—as Carlyle would have said, "something quite other than this"—seems to us the problem of Christianity at the present hour. Nor can we share in any degree the hope that through a restored submissiveness to spiritual direction from any oracle on earth our poor world, struggling through the mists which now encompass it, will win back its vision of the light that never was on sea or land. But would that those who must teach us how Christendom shall be rebuilt on the foundation of a faith at once strong and free may exhibit an earnestness

and a thoroughness like the spirit of Wilfrid Ward for a faith whose strength we believe to have waned and whose freedom we see under subjection. Would, too, that they may learn from men like him not to despair, even amid the resurgent paganism that oppresses us and the discordant Christendom that disappoints us, of a coming day when the enterprise of Julian the Apostate shall cease to be tried afresh, and God shall have finally turned again the captivity of Zion.

HERBERT L. STEWART.

HALIFAX, NOVA SCOTIA.

BYRON'S "CAIN."

THE LATE STOPFORD BROOKE.

IT was made an accusation against Byron's *Cain* when it was published, that it would "give great scandal and offence to pious persons in general, and be the means of suggesting the most painful doubts and distressing perplexities to hundreds of minds that might never otherwise have been exposed to such dangerous disturbance," that the whole argument is directed against the goodness and power of the Deity and against the reasonableness of religion in general, and no answer is attempted, that this "argumentative blasphemy forms the staple of the piece."

And these phrases, which are Jeffrey's and studiously moderate from him, were as nothing to the storm of wrath which it evoked. The clergy were almost in mass against it, and the denunciation was so hot that its results have so far lasted to this time, that among those who know Byron's poems well, there are many who had never read *Cain*. He defended it by saying that "Lucifer and Cain must speak in character, and that Milton had done much the same"; but though that is true, Jeffrey's reply that "the whole argument—an elaborate and specious one—is directed against the reasonableness of religion" disposes of that defence. It is plain enough that Byron meant to express his hatred of certain doctrines concerning the action of God and the Origin of Evil, and that his hatred of the doctrines was all the deeper because he believed in them. He intended to make Lucifer and Cain have the best of the argument. If he had not believed in them, if he had said, "These things are lies," he might have had a better defence. He might have said, "I do not attack the goodness and power of God, but the false doctrines concerning His goodness and power that men have made, and I draw the legitimate conclusion of these doctrines that I may show how abhorrent they are to the conscience and the affections! What-

soever is denied by these cannot be true of God, who gave us Conscience and Love. I do not attack the reasonableness of religion, but the frightful unreasonableness of that which is called religion; and I attempt no reply to the speeches of Lucifer and Cain, because, on their premisses, which are those of a certain theology, there is no reply to their statements. The God represented by this theology is a God whom it is natural to man to fear and hate. It is not God, then, nor religion, I attack, but a cruel theology which demoralises God and man, whose children in men's hearts are rebellion and despair. Nor do I rashly give scandal and offence to pious persons, or suggest painful doubts. If they are pious, much harm will not be done to them; if they have true faith, they will not be much pained with doubt; but I hold that the doctrines which I represent in their deformity are a scandal and offence to the whole of Christianity, that they place a stumbling-block in the way of thousands of men and women, so that they are driven, like Cain, to company with Lucifer rather than with God, and that the pain and misery they cause in those whom they have deprived of all belief, and driven either to wretchedness of unclean living, or to the chill and lonely morality which is without God, is infinitely greater in quantity and in quality than any suffering or scandal which pious persons may feel, whose piety will soon heal their wounds. I do not want to raise doubts, to shock the calm of faith, to distress people at ease in Zion—it is a cruelty I would not willingly practise: but there are doctrines which make the religious few who are chosen and secure very comfortable indeed at the price of the misery of thousands who are told by the comfortable that they are damned. These doctrines are a libel upon God, and are spreading a corruption of religion which is all the more subtle and dangerous because it is loudly claimed to be religious. It is right, then, to neglect the pain a few must suffer for the sake of the salvation of the many, and one of the ways a poet like myself must act is not by argument against these views, but by an imaginative representation of their deformity, so that the whole force of emotion, from spirit, conscience, and heart, may be roused against them, and they be cast out of the Temple of Mankind."

That might have been Byron's defence, though, had he made it, he would have put it in more powerful phrases, and would not have allowed any element of gentleness into it. But he could not make that defence; he could not deny the doctrines. Therefore, there *was* an element of evil in this

attack that he made; for it accepted the view that the Source of all Good was evil, and when it had proved Him evil, was content to leave the question there. It never occurred to him—he was thinking so much of his own anger and pain—to say that he was denying, *not* God, *but* a false idol which man had made out of Him; that when he attacked this theology, it was to defend religion. The evil of Byron's work was that it cast out devils and put no divine thing in their place. It gave nothing to the soul to reverence and love, and that is even worse than reverencing and loving unworthy things. For it is the reverence and love that we want, and not so much that the views held should be absolutely right of tone. *Both* are best, but if we have love, we shall make good even out of views which seem not good. But if we have no love or reverence left, then the truest views are useless, even poison to us. We make evil out of them. And this is the fault of all those who to-day spend their time in doing nothing but taking away old beliefs without giving anything in their place. The result is vividly put by Christ, the result of having made an empty soul. "The unclean spirit, when he goeth out of a man, passeth through waterless places, seeking rest, and findeth it not. Then he saith, I will return into my house whence I came out; and when he is come, he findeth it empty, swept, and garnished. Then goeth he, and taketh with himself seven other spirits more evil than himself, and they enter in and dwell there: and the last state of that man becometh worse than the first" (Matt. xii. 43-45).

That was the evil side of Byron's work in theological matters. The good side was that his work was another of those influences which tended to revolutionise theology, to make the existing views of God seem more and more unfit for a time when universal ideas on the subject of man in social and political realms called loudly for analogous views in religion. It is very well for Jeffrey to complain that discussion of the question of the origin of evil is the province of philosophy, not of poetry, and that it is unfair to advance views which, by appealing solely to emotion, cannot be met in fair argument. He may complain, but the fact remains that religion is a matter which belongs chiefly to the emotions, and that the proper arguments to use on questions which pertain to it are arguments addressed to the emotions. These are the only arguments that tell in the long run. Poetry then does all this kind of work far better than philosophy, and is quite a legitimate sphere in which to conduct it. Of course, it may be answered that arguments mainly addressed to emotion are worthless in

comparison with those addressed to the understanding, All I have to reply is that at least they have more result in matters of religion than those which belong to the understanding; that the fact is that, in the history of humanity, religious questions and movements have been settled by the one and not by the other; that such arguments which appeal to emotion are in the sphere of religion, that those which appeal to the understanding alone are not in its sphere; that in our personal life, if we desire to know and love God, and man as His child, we actually do take more count of a statement which satisfies our ideal than we do of a hundred statements which satisfy our understanding. So far as religion is concerned—and indeed in all matters except those which can be demonstrated: that is, in three-fourths of human life—the understanding is a poor guide; and the deification of it that prevails at present is one of the most melancholy misfortunes of society. Byron did more to overthrow, in his passionate wrath with them, the evil views of God as the Omnipresent Tyrant, and of original sin as the evil He had inflicted upon mankind, in order to get men into His power that He might torment them, than was done by all the labours of philosophical theologians.

I turn now to the doctrines themselves in which he believed, and which he hated. The first was the doctrine of fatalism, as contained in the view that God was a Sovereign Power that could do as He pleased; that He had pleased to let all men sin in one; that He chose some to be saved for His own glory, and settled that the rest should be damned, also for His own glory.

Whatever subtleties of argument may be used with regard to the sovereignty of God, the result of that doctrine is fatalism. "I am lost," one man says. "I am saved," another says. "Nothing I can do, one way or another, changes the irreversible decree."

That was the first doctrine Byron held, and it was eminently capable of poetical development. It was in itself a poetic subject; and has always, though in various forms, been a mother of poetry. The Greek held that there was an Inexorable Destiny, beyond the limited movements of humanity, even beyond the gods, which could not be altered by prayer or effort. And in the struggle of the will of man against this outward destiny, and in either the crushing of the hero, while his will continued unsubdued, or in the gradual leading of the hero (through suffering) to attain peace by acquiescence in destiny, consisted the elements of that Greek tragedy in which we find the greatest poetry of the world. We have

but to change a few things, and we have precisely the same elements for poetical treatment in the fatalism of Calvinism, the same dread destiny, only here it is called the Will of God, the same unavailing struggle, the same leading of the chosen into acquiescence and peace, the same reprobation of the unchosen, and the same blind anger and ruin of the lost. These are elements which inevitably awaken passion, and in imaginative and creative minds that passion, whether it be wrath, or despair, fear or fierce resolve, makes poetry. The emotions are so strong that they call forth the language of emotion; men of genius have that language ready to hand, and its highest form is poetry.

But there are two classes of poets who have worked on this idea of necessity, of a fate allotted to men which they cannot escape. There is, first, the poet who is not personally made angry and despairing by it. It becomes with him, as with Sophocles and Shakespeare, the ground-work on which he displays the labour and sorrow of idealised humanity. These are the great poets who, capable of feeling all they paint, feel it only up to the point at which perfect representation of it is possible, and are not so swept away themselves by any emotion as to become personal poets. They feel the doctrine of destiny in relation to others, but they do not feel it in relation to themselves, probably because they enter so much into the thought of mankind in relation to fate that they never enter into it themselves at all. It is quite different when we come to inferior men, on whom the doctrine of fate has a personal influence, whose lives it dominates. We have two examples of this in English poets. One is Cowper, the other Byron. On both it acted differently, in both it produced poetry and the emotion which is the source of poetry. Cowper felt himself doomed by the fateful will of God to eternal ruin. Here is the poem in which, at the beginning of his poetic life, he expressed his despair and agony. It is human feeling at its most tragic height. No one can read it without sharing in its passion. No one who hears will deny that this doctrine is the cause of poetry.

“Hatred and vengeance,—my eternal portion
Scarce can endure delay of execution—
Wait with impatient readiness to seize my
Soul in a moment.

“Damned below Judas, more abhorred than he was,
Who for a few pence sold his holy Master!
Twice betrayed Jesus me, the last delinquent,
Deems the profanest.

"Man disavows, and Deity disowns me,—
Hell might afford my miseries a shelter;
Therefore, Hell keeps her ever hungry mouths all
Bolted against me.

"Hard lot! encompassed with a thousand dangers,
Weary, faint, trembling with a thousand terrors,
I'm called, if vanquished! to receive a sentence
Worse than Abiram's.

"Him the vindictive rod of angry Justice
Sent quick and howling to the centre headlong;
I, fed with judgment, in a fleshy tomb, am
Buried above ground."

These awful Sapphics, and the equally awful poem of the *Castaway* at the end of his poetic life, are examples of the fierce poetry the doctrine of irreversible fate produces. For the emotions of despair—and those were Cowper's—at their height and in their vicissitudes are alike the causes of poetry. The position became still more poetical in another way when Cowper, believing himself doomed by the will of God, acquiesced in that will, and bent in reverence before it, and resolved, though God had willed his eternal ruin, that he would not deviate from goodness, so far as his destiny would permit! In throwing that feeling into verse, he produced some of his noblest poetry. Indeed, no one can help feeling the tragic nobility of the situation. The inexorable fate. The man conscious of the waiting thunder. The despair—yet the acquiescence.

Byron, believing the same doctrine, met it in a wholly different manner. It woke in him bitter resentment. Byron's indignation was entirely selfish. He was angry because he was himself set apart for ruin; he had no moral feeling about the doctrine, and he did not care how it influenced man. Nor on the whole did he think the doctrine in itself immoral. God had a right to do this kind of thing if He pleased, but it gave Byron also the right, not to acquiesce like Cowper, but to express his wrath, to despise his fellow-men, to heap upon all things his scorn. He was doomed. What mattered what he said? God had condemned him; and since that was so, he would, when he liked, mock at God. This position, viewed from the outside, is not by any means so poetical or so tragic as Cowper's. Byron does not bear nobly the burden of his belief, he makes no effort against fate, he does not try to make the best of it, he does not keep his free will clear as long as he can; he is not Prometheus or Œdipus, but one who sinks, effortless, and overwhelmed, borne over the cataract.

Another tragic thing in his position is the waste of splendid powers, and the pity that it kindles.

The other theological doctrine that Byron held was that of original sin. It is a doctrine which has a fascination for some poets. Of course, you know that it takes many forms; but we need to think of only two of them, for those two underlie all the work of two poets—of Browning, and of Byron. The first I look at is the view which Browning accepts, "That original sin is not any kind of guilt, but a failure, an imperfection, a minus quantity in human nature, by which our intellect, our imagination, our affections, conscience, and spiritual information are limited. So that when they strive to get beyond their barriers, to bring anything on earth to perfection, they break down into failure. But the failure on earth is to tell us that our life must not find satisfaction on earth, but shall find in a better land perfection and victory among perfect things."

This is not the view of Byron, but it is clearly capable of poetical treatment. Nay, it is itself poetical. It creates thought, and the thought is of that kind that gives birth to strong and imaginative emotion. Let me mark the position clearly. You will see what a mighty subject it is for verse, with a thousand side issues which take in vast ranges of human act, and half of human feeling. God has determinately made us imperfect, with a fault in our nature, whereby the intellect cannot grasp the substance of half that it conceives, nor language enshrine the fancies that escape us, nor the hand realise the visions the artist sees, nor the mind ripen instincts it is half conscious of, nor any inspiration of youth fulfil itself, nor even the senses thrill with the fullness of the joy they only touch to find it gone. Who that cares for Browning's poetry does not know that this conception is at the root of it all, even almost to wearisome iteration? "For this is our fate," he thinks, "to be disturbed for ever by spiritual touches which bid us ceaselessly aspire beyond the barriers which darkly close us in; and yet when we strive to realise our aspiration in knowledge, beauty, pleasure, to find ourselves beaten back from the barrier into failure, bitterly conscious that we can never attain our hope on earth, but driven by the very bitterness to look beyond the earth, and at last to feel that in this very failure is our best success, that what we aspired to be, and were not, comforts us, that the only thing which is real ruin, having in it unutterable woe and disgrace for our immortal nature, is success on earth and contentment with success, is finding all we want and desiring no more." To succeed at all we must work within

our limitations, but woe to the man who, having worked within them, does not feel the gadfly sting which urges him for ever on, a wanderer to a higher land. He will be a brute, and not a man. But having this faulty, imperfect nature, and having God as builder and Father of our life, and having from Him these

" Fallings from us, vanishings,
High instincts at which our mortal nature
Doth tremble . . . "

what follows?—that, if we do not mistake God's meaning and in resolving to aspire no longer find contentment here; that if we do not take the world and ask no more; that if, on the contrary, we take our failures here as the pledge of infinite beauty, knowledge, and love which wait for us in God, and pass undismayed and striving from failure to failure;—then that He is bound to make the faulty faultless, the imperfect perfect, that He will amend the flaws, and mould the clay to the finished cup. He will complete not only the man's work, which the world sees, but also all the dreams and hopes, and air-built castles of imagined good and loveliness which only came and went and died like a breath on polished silver. Thus, at the close of Abt Vogler's musings:—

" Therefore to whom turn I but to Thee, the ineffable Name?
Builder and maker, Thou, of houses not made with hands!
What, have fear of change from Thee, who art ever the same?
Doubt that Thy power can fill the heart that Thy power expands?
There shall never be one lost good! What was, shall live as before;
The evil is null, is nought; is silence implying sound;
What was good, shall be good, with, for evil, so much good more;
On the earth the broken arc, in the heaven a perfect round."

This is the conclusion Browning brings forth from his doctrine of original sin; and on the working out of it the whole of his poetry is built.

It draws after it, you see, all the emotion which a poet feels, face to face with the general problem of human faultiness and its meaning, and its answer—face to face with all the multitudinous varieties of human failure,—and with these, all the profounder emotions which arise, when he sees, glancing through the gloom of the original imperfection, like fireflies through a cypress grove in Italy, the flashes, the gleams, of the perfection which will be wrought out of the imperfection, of the eternal good, the eternal beauty, which every half-sin, and every half-failure, prophesy.

This, then, is a cause of poetry.

Byron did not hold that view of original sin, but he held

another, and that other underlies all his serious poetry. It was a ghastly view, the Augustinian theory that when Adam sinned, his sin, with all its consequences, was handed down to all his descendants, imputed to them by God; so that men were under the condemnation of God, and everlasting ruin their fitting portion, not only for the wrong they did consciously, but for the evil nature they had received from their first parent. Infants, then, who could neither think or speak, were the children of the devil. In this vile and abominable doctrine he believed, while he hated it. While he rebelled against it, he accepted it.

“Our life is a false nature: 'tis not in
The harmony of things,—this hard decree,—
This ineradicable taint of sin,
This boundless upas, this all-blasting tree,
Whose root is earth, whose leaves and branches be
The skies which rain their plagues on men like dew—
Disease, death, bondage—all the woes we see,
And worse, the woes we see not, which throb through
The immedicable soul, with heart-aches ever new.”

Childe Harold.

This was his view, and one might rashly call it not poetical. But the conception itself has an awful tragedy in it, for we see a mighty Being pavilioned in mystery, irresponsible in power, whom none dare question, none approach to, who claims to be believed as good, yet seems to do evil. And He has created a lovely world, and in it allowed a race of noble creatures to live and work and think and feel, and to do all passionately. And the first of these that He made, He made in joy and innocence, but allowed them the free will to sin, without the strength to resist. And they sinned. And so awful was the one guilt that God said it shall be reckoned as guilt to all the millions which shall come from them; “My world is cursed, My humanity is ruined. In one brief hour eternal wrong has been wrought. Eternal evil is born. I shall choose and save a few; but for the rest there is no hope. I abandon them for endless eternities to fear and hate, and self-despair, and deepening impurity.”

It is a hateful doctrine. But hateful as it is, no one can deny its poetic sublimity, the horror and the pity of a great tragedy. And as such Byron saw it and conceived it, represented man as overwhelmed by it, as resisting it, mourning for it, and mocking at it.

And more, it was the source of poetical subjects. It brought in its train insoluble problems in which imagination could never weary of wandering, where she found, too, that

which multiplied the more it was consumed. How was it that He whom we were bound to think of as goodness we were forced to think of as evil? Why was that which we felt to be goodness in man most often the path by which he found evil? Was immortality, for which man blindly longed, with a longing which seemed to him the most noble of things within him, his greatest curse, his greatest wrong, for so would be surely an immortality which can be his only that he might more certainly taste the gall of evil for ever, and with the evil have pain for ever? Are not these things and many more creative of poetry? Let Dante and Milton answer!

Lastly, with all these tragic questions—each a source of poetic emotion—came yet one more dreadful thought. It was the thought of a world steeped in sorrow to the lips. There, year after year, the earth was filled with the misery of unspeakable failures. There was the vision of the pale rider pitilessly slaying, and of those he slew passing into a merciless hell. There was the vision of Time, the dark destroyer, overwhelming memories, passions, hopes, faiths, love, all the glory which was only born to flash and perish. There was the vision of the whole world sick and wearied, yet battling on, in courage that might make a pagan god repent, but which had no power to move the Christian God.

How they got it out of the teaching of Jesus, none can tell. It is a vision born of all that is most evil in the heart of man. Yet, in its untheological aspect, seen only as a subject for art, it is poetical to its depths, and creative of poetry. He who saw this might well look on mankind as Kent looked on Lear, the "foolish, fond old man," and cry in thought to which none could give form in prose:—

"Vex not his ghost; O, let him pass! he hates him much
That would upon the rack of this tough world
Stretch him out longer. . . .
He but usurped his life."

This was the vision and the thought of Byron. Its fitting representation was in poetry. He believed in it, and he abhorred it; and the whole drama of *Cain* is dedicated to his faith and his abhorrence.

The drama is an indictment of the doctrine of Calvinistic fatalism and the Augustinian doctrine of original sin, an indictment charged with abhorrence of them, and yet bearing in it proof—a proof confirmed by the rest of Byron's poetry—that he could not get rid of them, could not deny them. The

indictment, then, is all the more powerful. It is a man rebelling against his own belief.

It opens with a service of thanksgiving to God in which all join but Cain. He is silent in sullen indignation, in hidden misery. "Hast thou nought to thank God for?" "No," he answers. "Dost thou not live?" asks Adam. "Must I not die?" replies Cain, touching on one root of his misery. "Why didst thou not pluck the tree of life, and so have been able to defy God?" And Eve starts back in dismay, and, warning him, begs him to be content with that which is. As if he could! What use to bid such souls to be content? One does not say to the sea driven by the wind, "Be calm." Of all the things said by pious persons who have natural faith to those who are naturally sceptical that is the most frequent, the most irritating, and the most foolish. And it is founded on the worst of errors a teacher can commit in religious education, "the opinion that scepticism is a crime," an opinion, however, which is a logical inference from the low Church theory of theology.

Then Cain, left alone, breaks out:—

"Life! Toil! and wherefore should I toil?—Because
 My father could not keep his place in Eden.
 What had *I* done in this?—I was unborn:
 I sought not to be born; nor love the state
 To which that birth has brought me. Why did he
 Yield to the serpent and the woman? or,
 Yielding, why suffer? What was there in this?
 The tree was planted, and why not for him?
 If not, why place him near it, where it grew,
 The fairest in the centre?—They have but
 One answer to all questions,—'Twas His will
 And *He* is good.' How know I that? Because
 He is all-powerful, must All-Good too follow?
 I judge but by the fruits—and they are bitter—
 Which I must feed on for a fault not mine."

How well we know it! "God is an irresponsible monarch. His will—and not right—makes His only law. We have no right to question it, though it seems wholly unjust. Our goodness is absolute submission, even to that which seems evil. Though it appears unjust that we should be condemned as guilty for guilt not ours, but Adam's, we are yet to call it just!" What wonder that, holding this, men have asked, "Is power necessarily good? Are we to bend to mere might, and not right?" What wonder if men ask, "Why was I born? I did not ask to be brought into this suffering, and I will not bear it patiently. There is nothing to love in all that is told me, and I am miserable because I cannot love."

What wonder that thousands, in horror and anger, believing that this is a true representation of God, rush into infidelity, atheism, anything! For everything in more than half of mankind contends against such doctrines, and rightly so, I think. And there are only two things possible for those who believe in God, who do not become atheists: either to find another and nobler theology, or to become like Cain, like Byron—an outcast, and a rebel against their own belief.

And observe, it is by no means the worst, but those whom we would call the best material of mankind who feel thus. Byron has a right instinct in making Cain originally a lovable and noble character. Cain honours his father, he loves Abel, he worships the beauty and the character of his wife. To him Adah is all the world, and should her beauty perish he would love her still. He feels his superiority to Lucifer in that he can love. The chief horror of the doctrine of original sin to him, of the curse his father sends down, is the misery which his descendants will suffer. Adam, Eve, Abel, do not think of mankind—Cain does. He loves life and hates death as its cessation, and yet would die could he save posterity from his own suffering. He loves all that is beautiful, he lingers round the gates of Eden to catch the loveliness of Paradise. The loveliness of ether and its worlds wakens in him thoughts not unworthy of his immortality. So he might see their beauty nearer he is content to die. His eyes fill with pleasant tears as he sees the indescribable setting of the sun, his heart floats softly into the clouds and listens happily to the song of birds as the day dies behind the gates of Eden. He loses self in all that is beautiful and good. He will not believe in eternal evil, for he thirsts for good. He cannot believe that God Himself is happy since He is the Maker of those doomed to an immortality of unhappiness. In all a noble, true, and lovable soul.

And it is all these things in him, all that is clearly good in him, which rebels against the doctrine he is represented as believing: "That God's might makes His right to do what He will with man, for no end but His own glory," and "that He permitted a sin which entails on those who did *not* commit it eternal evil."

How has this, then, been answered; and this: that what is good is that which rebels? The dogmatic answer comes: "That these things are not good at all, that there is no spark of good in the unregenerate man, that these things called good are only splendid sins."

I call that detestable and evil teaching. Nothing is worse

than to look at good and call it evil. It is the sin against the Holy Ghost, and the only excuse is that it is taught in order to support a religious theory, and there is nothing which blinds like a religious theory. We are robbed of every standard of right and wrong when, for the sake of a dogma, a good thing is called a splendid sin! What *can* one expect in the case of thousands as the result of this teaching, but that which follows it continually—immorality, often crime. It drives men into hatred of God, and hatred of life; and the worst of it is that in proportion as men are kind, just, loving, ready to believe, true to themselves, if at the same time they are aspiring, is the effect of them more ruinous. The great horror of such men is the horror of Cain. First, the horror of finding that which is called goodness, evil; and the misery (so unutterable to many) of the departure of the power of loving God. They are in the power of a mighty Being who does not love them, whom they, in turn, will not love; whom they feel they ought not to love. It is slavery, and they resent it. Yet they long to love God, and it is dreadful not to be able to love Him. Secondly, the horror of the unredeemable misery which is coming upon all mankind, and the worse misery of seeing it, and knowing that God has caused it without any remedial aim, only to make His power known, or what is called, in this connection, His justice, so that now, it is miserable not only not to love God, but also to be compelled to hate Him.

See how this appears in Cain's speech to his children:—

“ My little Enoch ! and his lisping sister !
 Could I but deem them happy, I would half
 Forget—but it can never be forgotten
 Through thrice a thousand generations—*never*
 Shall men love the remembrance of the man
 Who sowed the seed of evil and mankind,
 In the same hour ! They plucked the tree of science
 And sin—and, not content with their own sorrow,
 Begot *me—thee*—and all the few that are,
 And all the unnumbered and innumerable
 Multitudes, myriads—millions—which may be,
 To inherit agonies accumulated
 By ages !—and *I* must be the sire of such things !”

It is the cry of thousands on whom tradition has imposed a doctrine which strips God of morality, but which they cannot—so strong is tradition on them—deny as religion.

Under these circumstances ruin comes to such a soul, and Byron, continuing his indictment, shows how it comes.

Cain is a soul made to know God, loving, and desiring good, forced by the morality of his own heart, in conflict

with certain representations of God, to haughty rebellion against God, forced, where he ought most to love, to scorn and hate, turned devilish by having God made into a devil. For the highest love of the heart there is no channel left. What is the result? It is that not being able to love God, having nothing to employ the spirit upon, the whole man turns with a burning thirst to seek in the intellectual realm alone its food and its life. It is the natural and sorrowful end to which men are driven when they are deprived by bad theology of the power of loving God.

It is curious to see how Byron, who loved intellectual life, has treated this condition. It is curious to find that he makes knowledge, deprived of love, one of the factors in the ruin and crime of Cain. The result of knowledge, when love of God has vanished, is, in Byron's view, overwhelming pride, which resents all interference, which produces hatred of piety, and scorn of it, and, through both, deadly crime. The whole talk of Lucifer (in a long discussion with Cain—far too polemical to be poetical) is so couched and arranged by Byron that we see that he holds that science, without love, means increased moral weakness, increased power of doing wrong. For Lucifer mocks and gibes all through, not only at love of God, but at all human love, at Cain's love for Adah and his children, at his affection for Adam and Abel, as if as long as love lasted in Cain he could not have power. And there is nothing finer in the play than the way in which when no love of God is left in Cain's heart, yet his human affections do battle against the tempter and almost baffle his object. But the evil has been done. If love has not been crushed, it has been overwhelmed in the excitement of new knowledge, and Cain returns, having lived years in a few hours, thrilling with wild passion, in which there has been no emotion of the heart, except that of deepened indignation against a cruel God, and of consuming anger at his own fate. All reverence, gentleness, gratitude, humility, sense of sin has perished in him, all faith and love and hope. The one black upas of his belief in an inherited sin poisons the whole of life.

"Little deems our young blooming sleeper there,
The germs of an eternal misery
To myriads is within him! better 'twere
I snatch'd him in his sleep, and dash'd him 'gainst
The rocks, then let him live to ——

'Twere better that he ceased to live, than give
Life to so much of sorrow as he must
Endure, and, harder still, bequeath."

And full of this, his soul on fire with wrath, and full of new excitement,—“ I have seen,” he says,

“ the dead,
The Immortal—the Unbounded—the Omnipotent—
The overpowering mysteries of space—
The innumerable worlds that were and are—
A whirlwind of such overwhelming things,
Suns, moons, and earths, upon their loud-voiced spheres
Singing in thunder round me, as have made me
Unfit for mortal converse : leave me, Abel.”

Thus excited, he returns and finds again the sad, dull, apathetic, pious life ; thus indignant, he returns and finds Abel, the representative of the men who feel no difficulty, no doubt, but move along in unquestioning faith and submission, and he cannot endure it. It tortures him ; and when his offering is rejected, and Abel's is accepted, his fury breaks out, and he wishes to avenge himself on God by hurling Abel's altar to the ground. Abel interferes in defence of God's altar. Cain, maddened, threatens his life ; Abel answers that he loves God far more than life, and in a moment of maniacal fury, Cain strikes him down.

“ Then take thy love unto thy God,
Since He loves lives.”

It is done in a moment of impulse, but it is done because there has been nothing left to revere, nothing left to love ; because when pride and hate and scorn are alone left in the soul, they multiply, till in their seething passion, all things are lashed to passion, and the smallest touch of opposition to the pride, and the smallest grain of anger, swell in a moment into murder.

Let those look to it who teach doctrines which take goodness and love out of God, and out of the heart of man, and let them ask themselves what they are doing.

Cain is alone with the dead, and Zillah, hearing the heavy fall, comes in, sees Abel dead, and runs out crying :—

“ Father !—Eve !—
Adah !—come hither ! Death is in the world !”

Cain answers :—

“ And who hath brought him there ? I—who abhor
The name of Death so deeply . . . ”

So he reaches the last knowledge, the knowledge of death. And it is not joy, but terror and woe and despair ; and he who broke his heart for ignorance, breaks it now for knowledge. The fate which doomed him from his birth, that chose him for ruin, the inward subtle curse of inherited sin, in spite of all the native goodness in the man, have worked their way, and he

is lost. God's will, His sovereign will to destroy him, is done. That is how Byron represents it, and it is a ghastly comment on the doctrines. Nor does he leave this theory of original sin without its further evil developed. Once it has broken out of its citadel into the open, once it has realised itself in form, the results of belief in it leap to life in the others, induced like madness from one to the other. Adam, seeing the corpse, turns fiercely on his wife :—

“Woman, behold the serpent's work, and thine !”

Eve, losing motherhood for Cain in a passion of motherhood for Abel, denies her womanhood and curses with a hideous curse her eldest son. These are the fiery brood of the incarnate sin, and below on earth are the results, the speechless despair of Zillah's grief, and, incarnadining earth, the blood of Abel crying for vengeance—evil inevitable, hopeless evil, doomed to go on, doubling itself for ever. *This*, this then is the result of the day when all the Sons of God shouted for joy. For in Byron's picture there is no hope, no alleviation, no picturing of the good side. It is all misery and wrong, and the one faint allusion in the previous part of the poem to a redeemer is put aside almost contemptuously.

“*Adah*. How know we that some such atonement, one day,
May not redeem our race.

Cain. By sacrificing
The harmless for the guilty? What atonement
Were there? Why—*we* are innocent; what have we
Done, that we must be victims for a deed
Before our birth, or need have victims to
Atone for this mysterious, nameless sin—
If it be such a sin to seek for knowledge?”

Another count in the indictment.

In all the scene there is only one bright spot. It is the love of *Adah*, who is saved by her love of *Cain*. The sin does not touch her—she has the talisman against it; and her unbroken, clinging affection is the single ray of hope that lights the scene. No tenderness is greater, and it is the more tender for the guilt and terror, than that which she has in her heart, when, with her child, she goes forth, not weeping, for her office is to dry tears, not to shed them, into the wilderness with the ruined man.

It is Byron's way of showing where the remedy lies for all the woes of earth.

And now, what of *Cain* himself? How does Byron treat the problem of crime? What effect has the sin on the criminal? This is a question he answers unconsciously in *Cain*, consciously

in *Manfred*, and the unconscious answer is curiously different from the other. In *Cain* we plainly see that the crime has done good, or that which will be a far-off good to the man. In *Manfred* it is, and it does evil. In *Cain* we see that it will be followed by healing repentance: in *Manfred* it is followed by consuming remorse. *Manfred* is the clearly conceived, consciously accepted view of Byron with regard to the result of crime; but in *Cain* he writes, as it were, out of himself. He rises above himself to express higher truths than he was aware of—to contradict, in fact, by that which his inspiration as a poet makes him say, the belief that there are any who cannot be redeemed. We are made to feel that Cain is to be saved from himself, from his pride, from his lovelessness, from his false scorn of life. No sooner has he slain Abel than he is awakened to another world, to reality.

“I am awake at last—a dreary dream
Had maddened me.”

His crime has made life real, he is conscious of his true self, and of the real aspect of the world, because he is for the first time conscious of his own soul. Before, he had been conscious of his intellect, and its desires—a dreary dream—of home love, and the passions of human nature. Now, for the first time, through the gate of crime, he breaks into the spiritual world, the real, actual world, and finds himself touching realities, touching them in an awful manner, but yet knowing that they are the only true substantial things, that he has been living, as we all live, till we get into the Infinite, in shadows, in things like dreams.

“I am awake at last.”

That is a curious end for Byron to reach, as it were unconsciously; but, strange as it is, Byron is right to fact, and it is sin that awakens half of the persons in the world, and unless men are brutalised or hypocrites, a great crime does the same. “This is a vision,” cried Cain, as he looks on the dead, “else I am become a native of another and worse world.”

Yes, he has become a native of another world, but not necessarily a worse world. Cain knew death, but in knowing death he gained the still more awful knowledge of what human life really was, a grim battlefield, not of the intellect with the forces of nature, but of the eternal soul with evil. To him it was a peaceless knowledge, an intensity of restlessness, for he reached it, not through victory over evil, but through evil having mastered him; but it was knowledge of life, and in that knowledge the horror of death, which had troubled him while he only lived as in a dream, passed away.

Life—this overwhelming reality, this dread consciousness of being—this sense of the vast relations of being to eternal laws—this massive weight of duty, this awfulness of the punishment which violated duty brings with it—this vast eternity of thought, so infinitely vaster than all the universe he had seen—this is the inconceivable reality. And his one cry is, "Let me escape, let me die, let me take Abel's place." Yes, we long for death when we are wakened in this way—the terrible way of sin and shame—to the reality of life, and we cry out in our cowardice for death. But God does not give death *then*. We must go through with life, once we know it.

But Byron is right, the terror of death is gone when a man awakens to the true meaning of life, whether he awakens to it through being the victor or the victim of evil. And better such a waking, however won, even through crime, than the previous dream, for at least we know what we are, and do not imagine that we are only intellect, or only matter; better too, even the waking of Cain to peaceless wandering, but conscious of his soul, than the loveless pursuit of knowledge in which the heart is killed, and the spirit paralysed. For the former is nearer redemption than the latter; the former has touched reality: the latter, though it boasts of living among real things, has spent its life among phantoms; and before it can be brought to true life and manhood must recognise that the things of the understanding alone are by themselves dreams with which a dreamer plays.

Mark, too, how Byron makes Cain find God, or at least come to some knowledge of His character, through his crime. Before it, in the invocation at the sacrifice, in all the talk with Lucifer he has evidently never conceived God as anything more than a hypothesis, who may have something to do with him, but with whom he can have little or nothing in common. Listen to this close of the invocation:—

"If a shrine without victim,
 And altar without gore, may win Thy favour,
 Look on it! And for him who dresseth it,
 He is—such as Thou mad'st him; and seeks nothing
 Which must be won by kneeling: if he's evil,
 Strike him! Thou are omnipotent, and may'st—
 For what can he oppose? If he be good,
 Strike him, or spare him, as Thou wilt! since all
 Rests upon Thee; and good and evil seem
 To have no power themselves, save in Thy will;
 And whether thou be good or ill I know not,
 Not being omnipotent, nor fit to judge
 Omnipotence, but merely to endure
 Its mandate; which thus far I have endured."

Not a single note in it that there is any vital relation between man and God; but when the murder is committed, in the agony of his soul, then a different cry goes up—the old familiar cry of the agonised heart to its natural Master:—

“Stir—stir—nay, only stir!
Why, so—that’s well!—thou breath’st! breathe upon me!
Oh, God! Oh, God!”

Before, it has been war, rebellion against cold and cruel Omnipotence. Now, it is at last the confession of a broken, humbled heart that God has the right to punish and forgive sin, and He can only have that right from innate goodness. He asks that God may take his life and give it to Abel; he speaks to Abel’s spirit, saying,

“if *thou* see’st what *I* am,
I think thou wilt forgive him, whom his God
Can ne’er forgive, nor his own soul.”

That is a different note indeed from that of cold and fierce rebellion against a loveless Power. And with this personal knowledge of God, as having to do with him, as the rightful Lord of his soul, the clear sense of the difference between right and wrong, the sense of sin, the submission to punishment as just, arise in his heart. He who goes quietly into the wilderness, thinking that the four rivers could not cleanse his soul, with heaven and earth darkened round him, is very different from him who went, indignant, hard, with that pride in his own absolute right which leads to crime, into space with Lucifer: a changed being, because a conscious moral being, and as such, for the first time, though he knows it not, capable of redemption.

And Byron, always unconsciously, I think, makes us see that. For Cain has recovered love. Love is won in a terrible birth out of too late remorse.

“What shall I say to him?” he breaks forth, seeing Abel dead before him. “What shall I call him?”

“My brother! No:
He will not answer to that name; for brethren
Smite not each other. Yet—yet—speak to me.
O, for a word more of that gentle voice,
That I may bear to hear mine own again!”

Hark to that piteous cry at the end!—in it perishes self-concentration.

Pride, the old pride—anger, the old anger—recurs for a moment when the angel reproaches him.

“After the fall too soon was I begotten—
Ere yet my mother’s mind subsided from

The serpent, and my sire still mourned for Eden.
That which I am, I am; I did not seek
For life, nor did I make myself."

There are the old cries—but they do not last. What are these theological problems in face of this piteous sight? How can he speak of them when his heart is breaking. What is the knowledge of these things to this wild emotion in which he feels that he knows himself at last?—dreary dreams: let them go. "But could I"—see how love takes the upper hand—"but could I

"With my own death redeem him from the dust—
And why not so? let him return to-day,
And I lie ghastly! So shall be restored
By God the life to him He loved . . ."

What is that? It is the birth of self-sacrifice.

In that the whole heart is softened. Listen to these tendernesses of the heart that follow. Will my boy bear to look on me? The recognition of Abel's character, the exquisite thought that Abel at heart will forgive, the retrospect of memory, the pity for that which might have been, and that he had himself shattered; the awful question—born of a broken heart,—What place for me?

"*Adah.* He's gone. Let us go forth.
I hear our little Enoch cry within
Our bower.

Cain. Ah, little knows he what he weeps for
And I who have shed blood cannot shed tears!
All the four rivers would not cleanse my soul.
Think'st thou my boy will bear to look on me?

Adah. If I thought that he would not, I would——

Cain. No,
No more of threats, we have had too many of them.
Go to our children. I will follow thee.

Oh, thou dead
And everlasting witness! whose unsinking
Blood darkens earth and heaven! what thou *now* art
I know not! but if *thou* see'st what *I* am,
I think thou wilt forgive him, whom his God
Can ne'er forgive, nor his own soul.—Farewell!

O Earth, Earth!

For all the fruits thou hast rendered to me, I
Give thee back this.—Now for the wilderness.

Adah. Lead! thou shalt be my guide, and may our God
Be thine! Now let us carry forth our children.

Cain. And *he* who lieth there was childless. I
Have dried the fountain of a gentle race.
O Abel!

Adah. Peace be with him!

Cam.

But with *me*!"

This is not a soul to which redemption is impossible.

It is the old strange problem of what is called in theology the Fall of Man, though the true problem is not that which theologians mean when they talk of the Fall. The real problem is that the knowledge of good as good is only reached by us through wrong—wrong done by ourselves, or done by others in the past; that, if we are to be saved from self, there is for many of us no way of salvation open till we have learnt our selfishness to be selfishness by some miserable exercise of it, as Cain learnt to love by slaying Abel. It is a strange world.

Sin is the cloudy porch which opens into the Temple of Good; and if we do not sin ourselves, others have sinned for us, that we might know good as good. Yet, if we sin with that intention of finding good, if we do not contend with sin, we do not enter into good, but into deeper evil.

Some time or another, it will be explained. Meantime, it suffices me to know that unless these things were so, unless we had to reach good through the exhaustion of evil, through battle against it, there would be no such thing as humanity in the universe—and that would be indeed a pity.

Moreover, we are not left to sin and crime. Out of it arises growth, development, all the results of the battle of the soul with wrong. The very darkest crime has results which destroy the doctrine of ineradicable sin. Cain was made peaceless, but with the peacelessness he came to himself, knew himself and God, life, and eternity. Cain slew his brother, for he did not love; but when he slew him, love awoke to a higher life.

And when we come to ourselves in some great misery like this, and forget our isolation, then in the woe and wonder we find ourselves with God, and out of our heart rushes the cry, "I will arise and go to my Father."

What, then, is God's answer? Not that which the heartless theologian gives who thinks that God is such a one as himself; not "Thou art lost from all eternity, depart to endless misery"; not "Thou art doomed by another's sin to ruin—take thy ruin"; but this: "And his father saw him yet a long way off, and ran and fell on his neck, and kissed him, and said, This my son was dead, and is alive again."

And so it was with Cain! If Abel forgave, shall not God forgive?

JEWISH APOCALYPTIC AND THE MYSTERIES.

PROFESSOR E. J. PRICE,

United College, Bradford.

THE Hellenistic period, ushered in by the conquests of Alexander the Great, was marked by decisive changes in the sphere of religion, due to world-movements of thought which arose from the clash of European and Asiatic ideas. These movements produced characteristic results among all the nations who formed the environment of pre-Christian Judaism. It was an age of intellectual and spiritual fusion. The barrier between the races disappeared; the nations began to use a common speech, and this led to a great interchange of ideas. Similar thoughts and motives began to operate everywhere; religions began to mingle with one another and to approximate to a common type; and this type is so characteristic that it has received the special name "Hellenistic," a term which connotes an amalgam of Greek and Oriental ideas.

How far did Judaism participate in this significant religious movement? Did the Jewish spirit of exclusiveness operate as an impenetrable barrier against all contemporary influences? Official Judaism, of course, since the Maccabean age, had pursued the ideal of complete racial insularity. But as Bousset¹ points out, the approach between Jewry and the surrounding nations which had been going on in the pre-Maccabean age could not be simply recalled, nor could its consequences be obliterated. Moreover, the Diaspora was in close touch with the conditions of the heathen world, and in the midst of alien peoples could not fail to feel the stirrings of the new religious influences. But the two elements in Judaism, that of Palestine and Babylon on the one side and that of the Diaspora on the other, never parted company; they continued to act and react

¹ *Religion des Judentums*, pp. 540 seq.

upon each other. "Circumstances were stronger than the most powerful will in this period. Judaism might be as exclusive as it wished, nevertheless alien matter was forcing its way through every pore: Greek language, Greek knowledge and thought, Babylonian astronomy, Babylonian (Egyptian) magic, and much beside. With the air in which it lived, Judaism was breathing it in." At any rate, in popular Judaism as represented by Apocalyptic, as distinct from official Judaism as represented by the schools, we can trace not a little affinity with the world-movements of the age. It is not too much to claim that in Apocalyptic we have a parallel phenomenon to that of the Hellenistic Mystery religions.

The later Mysteries arose upon the ruins of the older national faiths. New questions were pressing to the front, requiring for their solution a philosophy of religion and of history for which the State cults were hopelessly inadequate. These new questions emerged from a new estimation of the individual in the life of religion. They were concerned with profound problems of life itself, the meaning and origin of evil, the significance of death, and the nature of the world-process. Solutions were sought in alliance with esoteric cults, local or foreign, whose impressive rituals were capable of interpretation as symbolic presentations of eternal truth. Thus each newly discovered or transplanted cult constituted a revelation of supreme interest to the individual who was perplexed by the deeper questions of life. The note of the new religious outlook was individualism. Religion was no longer supremely a matter of the State, but was developed in private coterie consisting of individuals who were held together by a common faith and a common hope. Platonic anthropology combined with Oriental astrology and nature-myths furnished a philosophy of religion according to which the human soul is essentially divine and has its home in heaven; but being imprisoned in the material world, it is under the dominion of the astral powers who hold it in the grip of Destiny (*εἰμαρμένη*). The problem is how to escape from this realm of death into life. The solution is found in a divine-human Saviour whose myth tells how he escaped from the sphere of Destiny into the world of life, and thus opened a path for all who are united with him in mystic sacrament. Thus the Hellenistic world was covered with an immense variety of secret brotherhoods or Mystery Unions each with its own Saviour-God and its own jealously-guarded sacraments. In form, at least, these brotherhoods were universalistic. They appealed to individuals of every race without distinction, offering happiness and security

in this life, but above all in the life to come, to all who are ready and worthy to become initiated into their secrets. They possessed two features which exercised a powerful attraction: the promise of protection against evil spirits in this life, and the guarantee of a life beyond the grave.

The Hellenistic period was just as decisive for the development of Judaism as it was for that of the surrounding religions. Ever since the Exile religion had been becoming more and more a matter of individual piety. Mere birth as a Jew was no longer any guarantee of participation in the privileges of the chosen race. The relation of the individual towards God becomes all-important, and comes to depend more and more upon a personal piety achieved through whole-hearted obedience to the Thorah. Judaism was on its way towards becoming a Church; the characteristic expression of its religious life was to be found no longer in the Temple but in the Synagogue. Side by side with the sacrificial cult, and tending increasingly to thrust it into the background, there arose the Synagogue assembly for common prayer and praise, for edification and instruction in personal piety. It appealed to the individual on purely religious grounds, and showed him how to claim for his own the precious promises of the Thorah. The leadership in religious life was passing from the priesthood to a lay order of theologians and expounders of Scripture. The Thorah was taking the place of the Altar. Side by side with the old distinction between the Jew and the Gentile appeared a new distinction between the pious and the godless Jew. And as a corollary to this individualistic tendency there came an incipient movement towards universalism; if a godless Jew can forfeit his share in the Covenant, a pious Gentile can become a partaker in it. Thus, especially in the Diaspora, individual Gentiles here and there attached themselves to the Synagogue and became more or less identified with those to whom the promises belonged. Diaspora Judaism was on its way towards becoming a message for the world.

Thus in Judaism as in Hellenism, there was a loosening of the fetters which bound religion to the national life and a new emphasis upon the religious worth and responsibility of the individual. And here again the new note finds its characteristic expression in eschatology. In place of the old naïve belief in recompense in this life—a belief which had been dashed to pieces on the hard facts of experience—arises the belief in a recompense beyond the grave. Here the individual feels himself to be crushed beneath the burden of fate; but now the vision is widened to include a future life. The

thought of resurrection and judgment makes it appeal to the conscience here and now. The claims of the Torah are enforced by the conviction that the individual must appear before the judgment-seat of God to give account of his deeds in this earthly life. And whether the wicked have any share in the future or not, the triumphant conviction emerges that for the pious the Day of Judgment is the beginning of everlasting blessedness. And again, in Judaism as in Hellenism, this belief in a future life unites itself with a philosophy of history, which is intended to solve the dark riddles which perplex the mind of the pious—the origin of evil, its course and its destruction, the plan and method of God's government of the world, and how at last all is to be brought to harmony and blessedness. And in connection with this there is a certain dualistic temper. Faith in the one omnipotent God is as dominant as ever, but God has become more remote from the life of every day. Intermediate beings thrust themselves between God and men, and some of these beings are wicked; they rule this present world, and the evil powers with the devil at their head have secured a dominion in the lives of men which involves the race in misery and wickedness. And life itself would be intolerable were it not for the conviction that the end of this present age is near at hand. Yet a little while and God will come, either Himself or through His Deputy, and make an end once for all of every evil power and renew the world in righteousness and peace. Thus Jewish thought and religious development move in the same direction as Hellenistic. National religion is breaking down. Religion is becoming at once individualistic and universalistic. Piety becomes a personal matter, and religion must satisfy the claims of the individual to have a life of his own. At the same time piety takes on a sombre hue. Life in this present time is under the sway of hostile forces, and it is only by the hope and promise of a more blessed future beyond the grave that religion can awaken a response in the hearts of men.

A further common feature in the newer developments of religion on Jewish and Hellenistic soil may be noted, viz. the re-emergence of popular mythology. Primitive superstitions, long outgrown by the cultured classes and thrust into the background by higher conceptions, continue to live in the soul of the people. They are never completely rooted out. In times of crisis, when a higher faith goes to pieces and more adequate ideas have not yet been worked out completely, the older superstitions are apt to rise once more to the surface and gain credence just because of their strangeness and the glamour

of their antiquity. And here again Judaism and Hellenism exhibit the same tendency. The Mystery mythology has its roots partly in indigenous superstition, and partly in alien borrowings. Late Judaism is deeply penetrated with beliefs which go back to a primitive time and yet have left little trace in the Old Testament. The belief in demons, *e.g.*, long suppressed by the exalted monotheism of the prophets and surviving only in the superstitions of the lower classes, becomes once more a respectable element in the faith of high and low alike. Both in Hellenism and in Judaism salvation is largely concerned with protection against demonic agencies.

Thus Judaism and the religions of the Hellenistic world furnish parallel phenomena. Similar stirrings of religious thought are finding expression in similar ways. And if the Mystery religions form the characteristic outcome of these tendencies in the Hellenistic world, it is in Apocalyptic that the corresponding Jewish movement receives its most clearly marked formulation. For it was the work of the Apocalyptists to mark out the lines of development in Jewish doctrine. Bousset declares that the nearest approach to the Jewish "Church" in contemporary paganism was provided by the Mystery Unions. We can supplement that statement with another, *viz.* that the nearest approach to the Mystery ideas on Jewish soil was provided by Apocalyptic. We have here two contemporary movements, the one Jewish and the other pagan. In their general features they have much in common; they are respectively the response of Judaism and the response of paganism to the religious individualism of the age consequent upon the challenge presented to ancient faiths by a new order of things. Everywhere there is the same movement from the religion of the State to the religion of the Church; everywhere new questions are being asked and new demands are being made. And the most urgent of these demands was for some solution of the problem of death. And each in its own way, Jewish Apocalyptic and heathen Mystery religion sought to respond to the demand. Each looked to the life beyond the grave and assured the pious of a blessed immortality, in the one case by sacramental union with the divine, in the other by being raised up in the body by the mighty hand of God.

It will be instructive, therefore, to note in detail some of the points of resemblance between these two great contemporary movements.

(1) *The Dualistic Salvation*—The Mystery conception rests upon a dualism. There are two worlds, the higher world of

spirit and the lower world of matter. This Platonic conception is combined with astrological notions. This lower world is under the sway of astral powers whose influence becomes a kind of Fate or Destiny (*είμαρμένη*), which confronts the individual at every turn. It is the sphere of sin and misery and death. How is the soul to escape from this iron Destiny to the higher world of spiritual freedom and eternal life? The Mystery solves the problem with its myth of the *θεός σωτήρ*, who himself descended into this lower world from the realm of spirit and, having become imprisoned in it, broke the fetters that bound him and passed from death into life. He becomes the pioneer in the way of escape from the lower world, and the whole object of the ritual is to produce a mystic experience of union with the Divine Redeemer; and from this experience there arises the certainty that those who share the life of the God also share his victory over Destiny and over Death. They pass from the lower sphere into the higher, which is the true home of the spirit.

In like manner Jewish Apocalyptic rests upon a dualistic conception of two worlds, a lower and a higher, "this" world and the world "to come." This present world is corrupt because of evil forces that are at work in it; it is under the sway of demons, more or less hostile to God. The future world is the perfect world, to be ushered in by the complete victory of God and His worshippers over all the powers of evil. And again, just as the Mystery myth undertakes to explain how this lower world came into being and how man came to be imprisoned in it, so Apocalyptic has its myths which account for the origin of evil in the world. Hellenistic mythology has recourse to a creation myth. Spirit descends from its supernal home to bring order into the material chaos. But its well-intentioned efforts only lead to its own imprisonment in the material; that is why the spirit of man is in bondage in the lower world. This cosmogonic myth is linked on to a Nature myth of the death and resurrection of a divine Redeemer. Judaism, on account of its rigid monotheism and its clear conception of the omnipotence of God as Source of all, is precluded from accounting for the evil of the world as due to the nature of matter. Hence Apocalyptic falls back upon the idea of fallen angels. The myth takes two forms:—(1) The Saga of Genesis vi, which tells of the sons of God who formed unions with the daughters of men, becomes the theme of fruitful speculation. From these unnatural unions came forth a progeny of evil spirits who are the causes of all misery in the human world, the instigators of idolatry, and the tempters to sin. Or (2) the

rebellion is carried further back to an actual revolt in heaven. The disobedient angels being cast out of heaven dwell in the lower spaces and revenge themselves upon man by dragging him into misfortune and sin. Thus the present world is under the control of evil forces whence proceed the oppression of Israel at the hands of heathen foes, as well as the personal misfortunes of the devout. The difference between the Mystery conception and that of Apocalyptic at this point is characteristic. Greek cosmogony rests upon a metaphysical dualism. The dualism of Apocalyptic is not metaphysical, but ethical.

A further difference between Apocalyptic and the Mysteries is to be seen in the fact that Apocalyptic is primarily eschatological. Salvation has not been wrought out already, but belongs to the future. God's plan of deliverance can only be realised when the evil powers which now control the world, Satan and his host and the heathen powers who act as their instruments, have been destroyed. This present world will itself be annihilated, and the world to come will descend in all its perfection out of heaven. For the Mysteries on the other hand, the other world already exists here and now, and we enter it by sharing the death and resurrection of the Saviour-God. The Mysteries teach a present deliverance, Apocalyptic a future one. But in each case the conception springs out of the same deep sense of the world's need for God. Heathenism and Judaism alike are becoming more keenly alive to sin as an ultimate fact, an ever-present and intolerable burden on the soul. The world itself is God-forsaken; but whereas in the Mysteries the hope of deliverance rests upon a divine act accomplished already in the past, in Apocalyptic the dominion of evil spirits is only for a time; God has not finally surrendered His control, and will, in the fullness of time, in the near future indeed, drive out his enemies and rule once more in the might of holiness.

(2) *The Supernatural Salvation.*—The Mystery myth explains why the world is evil, and rests upon the assumption that there is no escape from it except by the intervention of a Divine being. The θεός σωτήρ descends into our region and victoriously opens a way out for us. United with Him in sacramental experience, we share His victory and ascend with Him into the supernal realm. We die to this present world, or, in other words, break the fetters which bind us to it, and enter the world of the spirit. And although this ascent to the true home of the soul is only consummated at death, we can live in the joy and the freedom of it here and now. The power of evil has been broken once for all. We are under the protec-

tion of the Saviour-God who guards us from the demons who harass the lives of men.

Ancient Hebrew piety had sought a solution for the evils of life in this present world. But the hard realities of experience had steadily crushed the naïve optimism which assumes that the good and evil of this life are meted out in accordance with moral desert. The evils of life are not remedied here and now. The pious depart in shameful death while the wicked prosper. Apocalyptic seeks a new solution on supernatural lines. The pious are pointed away from the misery of this present age to the blessedness of the age to come, and taught to expect reward and punishment not here and now, but in the Great Judgment which is to usher in the new order of things. The key to the riddle of life is to be found in the Mystery of the world-process understood as a great drama whose motive is the age-long conflict of God with the hosts of evil. The drama will soon be played out; the last act has already begun. Almighty God has set bounds to this age in which the evil spirits rule, and ere long will intervene finally for their destruction. Thus the pious find their solace in the thought of the great Vindication and of the blessedness that God will bring when He renews the world. True, the vindication was in the first place that of Israel against his oppressors and only secondarily that of the righteous against the wicked. Yet, as Bousset points out, in spite of its particularistic and national limitations, the new world for which the pious is bidden to hope is a stage higher than this present world. God is more active in it, and His will is more immediately accomplished. Thus Apocalyptic, like the Mysteries, points to a supernatural salvation and elicits a frame of mind which is at home in the invisible world and can afford to despise this present world-order. Already by anticipation the devout soul enjoys the blessedness of this higher life. It is nourished on an idealism that runs parallel to that of popular Platonism. Hence, "however sultry and suffocating the atmosphere of Apocalyptic piety, there is here and there the stirring of a breath from that higher pure world."¹ Its God is a Saviour-God, who breaks the power of this present evil and opens the way into a world of blessedness and peace.

(3) *The Divine Mediator*—The central conception of the Mystery cult is that of the dying and risen God who becomes the Saviour of those who share His experience in the mystic ritual. There were many different cults, each with its own special *θεὸς σωτήρ*, regarded as the representative of the supreme

¹ Bousset, *Religion des Judentums*, p. 241.

divine power. These cults were not exclusive to the extent of denying each other's gods. Each recognised the rest, but claimed that its own was the "more excellent way." But the supreme deity of the Jew could never take a place side by side with Serapis, Dionysus, Attis, and the rest as one among many saviour-gods. He stands alone, without peer or rival. Nevertheless, even Judaism begins to feel the need of a divine mediator on closer terms with mankind than the transcendent God. Hence arises the doctrine of angels as the subordinate agents or ministers of God. The angels of revelation especially become divine mediators. An angel plays the same part in conducting the Apocalyptic seer through the regions of heaven as Hermes plays in the Egyptian Mysteries. But it is more especially in connection with the doctrine of the Messiah that the idea of a divine mediator becomes prominent. Apocalyptic is not necessarily bound up with a Messianic doctrine, yet it is in Apocalyptic that the most exalted conceptions of the Messiah find expression. Instead of an earthly king or conqueror we begin to hear of a heavenly Messiah who exists already, and indeed has existed from the very beginning, and is waiting to be revealed to men. In due time He is to come from heaven to accomplish the salvation of His people. It is His function, as mediator between God and men, to reveal or to accomplish the process of deliverance. Instead of Attis or Dionysus we have the "Son of Man" who is to come on the clouds of heaven and to secure the earth as the inheritance of His people. Bousset even admits the possibility that the conception of a suffering and risen mediator may have exercised a certain influence in Apocalyptic circles, and that the Messianic title "Son of Man" may be connected with the widespread Hellenistic myth of the Primeval Man, whose death and resurrection are symbolic of his descent from the spiritual world into the world of matter, his imprisonment in the latter, and his release and exaltation. But there is no sort of proof of any influence of the cult of a dead and risen God upon Judaism, Apocalyptic or other. The rigid monotheism of the Jew could not tolerate any such plurality of divine beings. The most it could accept was a semi-divine Messiah, strictly subordinate to God, the first of His creatures in nature and in rank, and at last to be revealed as the agent of God's purposes in regard to His people. And the way to share in the blessedness of His salvation lay not through mystic sacrament, but through moral obedience to the Law.

This last point introduces us to an important and significant difference in principle between Apocalyptic and Mystery con-

ceptions. The difference may be summed up in the phrases "Salvation by deification" and "Salvation by obedience." In the Mystery the initiate becomes united with his God; he can say "I am Thou, and Thou art I." The whole object of the ritual is to secure this sense of identification with the God. But this metaphysical or mystical identification with God is wholly alien to Jewish piety. The gulf between the divine and the human cannot be so lightly crossed. Personality remains, both on the divine and on the human side, an impenetrable barrier. The only identification that is possible between man and God is a moral one. Not by becoming God, but by free acceptance of His will as expressed in the Torah, does the pious secure his share in the divine salvation. Apocalyptic is true to the ethical genius of Hebrew religion, and so far represents a higher stage of religious development than the Mystery religions with their naturalistic and less ethical conceptions of salvation. Thus while in Apocalyptic and the Mysteries alike, the new life is bound up with a special relation between the devout and the divine mediator, in Apocalyptic it is predominately a moral relation, while in the Mysteries it is predominately a sacramental one.

It is here that we come upon the most radical difference between Judaism and the surrounding religions. "Jewish religion knew no realistic sacrament; no symbol containing in itself and conveying to the worshipper the divine nature or essence. The kind of presence it sought and found through religious rites was a conscious union with God in the sphere of will, or even of mystic experience, felt to be due to God's own action in grace or loving-kindness. It was simply an enhancement of the abiding relation of the holy or consecrated soul with God as Spirit."¹ According to Rabbinic teaching, circumcision sanctifies, and it is precisely this sanctification which marks off the Jew from the rest of the world in the sight of God. There is no salvation without it; it is the sign of the covenant, and in virtue of its observance Israel is the people of the covenant. Circumcision is meritorious in the sight of God.² It involves a change of religious status, not a change of nature. The temper of Judaism was not friendly to sacramental conceptions. We find sacraments in the strict sense only in non-official circles, like that of the Essenes; ordinary representative Jewish piety had no use for them. Nevertheless, it is significant that in the sphere of Apocalyptic we do here and there come upon hints of sacramental doctrine.

¹ Bartlet and Carlyle, *Christianity in History*, pp. 148-9.

² See Oesterley and Box, *Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*, p. 409.

In the Slavonic Book of Enoch (xxii. 8) we read that Michael is commanded to anoint the seer with oil before he enters the highest heaven, and this oil sacrament makes him a partaker in the new celestial body of glory. We are also told (lvi. 2) that he who is anointed with celestial oil is filled with the celestial nature, and no longer partakes of earthly food. Hence the one tree that grows in Paradise is an olive tree.¹ In 2 (4) Esdras xiv., 39 *seq.*, the seer drinks a miraculous beverage and at once becomes divinely inspired to dictate the lost books of Scripture. These are isolated hints in Apocalyptic; their very infrequency goes to show that the piety of the Synagogue is too sober to need the support of sacraments.²

But to return to the main point. In regard to the doctrine of the Divine Mediator, Bacon³ holds that in pre-Christian Apocalyptic circles Ps. lxxviii. 18–21 had already received an interpretation in terms of an avatar doctrine, which was on all fours with the Mystery myth. The theme of this great song of triumph is the God of Israel as the victorious deliverer of His people. "Thou hast ascended on high, thou hast led captivity captive; thou hast received gifts for men; yea, for the rebellious also, that the Lord God might dwell among them. Blessed be the Lord, who daily loadeth us with benefits, even the God of our salvation. He that is our God is the God of salvation; and unto God the Lord belong the issues from death." Whether consciously or not, the Psalmist is employing the literary figures of the triumph of the mythological *θεὸς σωτήρ*. Hence his words readily lend themselves to a Mystery interpretation according to which God, who is described as a Saviour-God who vanquishes death, plays the part of a *θεὸς σωτήρ* of the Mysteries, descending from heaven in order that He may deliver captive mankind, and then reascending in victory. Paul quotes the passage in Ephesians iv. 9, and points out that the mention of an ascent into heaven implies a previous descent. He explains the passage to mean that God in Christ descended into the lower world, and then ascended on high once more, leading a train of redeemed captives. Bacon connects with this the quotation in Ephesians v. 14 from an unknown Apocalyptic writing: "Awake, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and the Messiah shall shine upon thee"; and also

¹ It is possible that an oil sacrament is presupposed in the Epistle of James, v. 14.

² Bousset, *Religion des Judéens*, p. 230.

³ *Story of St Paul*, pp. 338–9, 356–61.

the Apocalyptic fragment quoted by Justin Martyr and Ir n us, and connected by both with Ps. lxxviii. 18: "The Lord God remembered His dead people Israel who lay in their graves, and He descended to preach to them His own salvation." It is argued that here we have evidence that Paul is dependent upon an Apocalyptic source for his interpretation of the psalm. Jewish Apocalyptists, not content with explaining the psalm as applying to Moses as the Targum does, interpreted it of God Himself, who, in the person of His Messiah, would descend to His dead people Israel, raise them into life again, deliver the nation from its oppressors, and distribute to it the spoils of its conquerors. Thus in Apocalyptic circles we get a kind of avatar doctrine based upon Ps. lxxviii. God is spoken of as coming down to deliver His people and raise them from the dead. In the hands of the writer of 1 Peter this Apocalyptic conception becomes the basis of a Christian doctrine of the Descent into Hell. In the Christian Apocalypse known as the Vision of Isaiah, Christ descends from the highest heaven, assuming in each of the seven heavens as He descends the form of its denizens, so as not to be recognised, but ascends again in His full glory to the great amazement of the angels who were ignorant of His descent.¹ If Bacon's reconstruction of an Apocalyptic avatar doctrine from these fragments is correct, we have here a curious example of close affinity between Mystery and Apocalyptic ideas. But in the absence of direct evidence before Paul, it would seem hazardous to lay too much stress upon it.

(4) *Ecstatic Experience*.—Visions and raptures, whether artificially stimulated or arising naturally under the stress of strong religious emotion, play an important part in the Mysteries. This is clear from the description by Apuleius of the Isis Mystery, and especially his brief account of the final experience. "I approached the confines of death, even to the threshold of Proserpine, and after that I was ravished through all the elements I returned to my proper place; about midnight I saw the sun brightly shine, I saw likewise the Gods of the upper and lower worlds, before whom I presented myself and worshipped them." In ecstasy the Myst e comes face to face with God and enjoys the blissful sense of union with Him. In characteristically different way, more grotesque as to its form and yet more sober as to its essence, the Apocalyptic seer receives his revelation in ecstasy. He is lifted up into the

¹ So in Babylonian legend, as Ishtar descends into Hades she divests herself of successive garments at each of the seven portals.

heavens, and led by an angel through the seven celestial regions one after the other; he sees the various orders of angels and is instructed as to their functions; he is told the history of the wicked spirits whose activity in the world is responsible for all its evil; he converses with archangels and is instructed in the plan of salvation; finally, he comes into the very presence of the Most High and hears His voice. These descriptions are often bizarre and coarsely material, but the underlying conception of the possibility of the soul being rapt away from the body into heaven and there hearing divine secrets, is curiously parallel to the ecstatic conceptions of the Mysteries. In both cases the Mystæ is allowed to enter the celestial sphere and there receives divine disclosures.

Moreover, both in the Mysteries and in the Apocalyptic the Mystic prepares himself for the ecstatic experience by ascetic exercises and invocations (*cf.* Apoc. Abraham ix., 2 Esdras ix. 24, 26; Ascension of Isaiah ii. 11; Daniel x. 2, 3). Abraham is instructed by Jaol regarding the formula to be used against Azazel, and is further taught to recite before God the heavenly song or invocation which reads almost like a Mystery hymn.

Bacon holds that the "vision" in Apocalyptic is merely a literary device, but the testimony of Paul in 2 Cor. xii. 1 *f.*, and the fact that similar ecstatic experiences are reported of certain Rabbis at the end of the first century A.D., should put us on our guard against such sweeping statements. Kennedy¹ lays stress upon the recurrence of primitive ecstatic phenomena in the case of Ezekiel, and points out that later Apocalyptic lies in the direct descent from Ezekiel. "The descriptions of visions and of the circumstances and conditions in which they occurred are associated with great names of the past, and often embellished and elaborated in more or less formal way. But there is evidence throughout that the writers had personal and intimate knowledge of ecstatic conditions which they ascribe to the influence of the Spirit." This is substantially the judgment of Bousset, who holds that real subjective experiences lie behind much that is contained in the Apocalyptic visions. "These Apocalyptists have seen visions and dreamed dreams; they have seen angel-figures and heard angel-voices; they have conversed with celestial beings; they have been rapt into Paradise (whether in the body or out of it they know not) and heavenly secrets have been disclosed to them."²

¹ *St Paul and the Mystery Religions*, pp. 33 *ff.*

² *Op. cit.*, p. 244.

Here, again, Apocalypse and Mystery represent parallel phenomena in the region of pneumatic experience. The ascent of the soul into the higher world was a widespread Hellenistic conception. The process was accompanied by a gradual purification as the soul passed through the various spheres. In Apocalyptic this notion of purification finds expression in the idea of heavenly garments reserved for the pious. Michael is bidden by God to take from Enoch his earthly robe and to clothe him with the garment of God's glory. In Apoc. Abraham xiii. the heavenly garment of Azazel is taken from him and reserved for Abraham while the latter's mortality is transferred to Azazel. In the Ascension of Isaiah the seer is unable to ascend to the highest heaven until his garment has been brought to him. As he ascends through the seven heavens he is gradually transformed and becomes like an angel. In the highest heaven he sees the crowns and the garments which are reserved for the righteous. Doubtless the idea was originally realistic, but has been spiritualised and has come to mean the spiritual bodies in which the righteous will be clothed in heaven. There is a curious parallel to this notion of garments reserved for the pious in Apuleius, who tells us that the garment used in the initiation is kept for him in the Temple until he requires it again.

Jewish piety as a whole rejects the ecstatic mode of access to the secrets of heaven. Ecstatic phenomena remain isolated and fortuitous within the total compass of Jewish experience. In spite of the Apocalyptic claim to mystic revelation, the conviction prevails that the age of the Spirit is past, that there is no longer any prophet or revelation, and shall not be again until the last days when God pours out His Spirit upon all flesh. Apocalyptic mysticism pursues its own course apart from the main stream of Jewish piety.

(5) *Conception of Gnosis.*—Each Mystery Union had its esoteric tradition, a secret revelation which claimed to solve the riddles of life and death, the nature and constitution of man, his heavenly origin, his fall and bondage, and his salvation. These revelations were linked on to some ancient name, that of some hero-god of popular myth who for the salvation of men unfolded these secrets to faithful men to be handed on by them to those who were worthy to receive them. In precisely the same way the Apocalyptic writers claim to be revealers of secrets, and link on their revelation to one or other of the saints and heroes of old time, especially such as were notably approved of God and were manifestly endowed with His Spirit, e.g. Abraham, Moses, Enoch, Isaiah, and

Ezra. Some of these, *e.g.* Moses and Enoch, were traditionally supposed to have been taken up to heaven without dying, while Old Testament narrative and popular tradition furnished accounts of revelations to these chosen ones, which could form the basis of more detailed expositions of heavenly secrets. The seer, convinced that the divine purpose for Israel and for the world had been revealed to him, discloses the secret to his contemporaries. The revelation is put forth under the name of an ancient man of God, partly because certain revelations were attributed to him in tradition, and partly because of the current belief that the age of revelation is long past. The material includes all sorts of current tradition gathered from many sources, but through it all there breathes the invincible spirit of hope born in the soul of the seer who seeks to console his brethren in the dark hour by raising their thoughts to the higher world where the Redeemer lives and reigns. These new hopes of resurrection, of recompense beyond the grave, of Messianic judgment, and the ultimate triumph of Israel in the new age, mark a new era in the history of Judaism. The new truths are accepted as mysterious revelations put forth in secret writings; the primitive truth long hidden from the eyes of men is at last disclosed. It comes as a sort of Gnosis whose guarantee lies in its mysterious origin, its antiquity, and its direct mediation of heavenly truth through the souls of favoured men of old time who made the ascent into heaven and heard the plans of God Himself described.

The Mystery conception seems to be hinted at here and there. In the book of Enoch, the fallen angels, and especially Azazel, are represented as having brought ruin on the earth by teaching men the use of magic, astrology, and science. *Cf.* ix. 6: "See what Azazel hath done, how he hath taught all unrighteousness on earth and revealed the secret things which were wrought in heaven." In like manner the Apocalypse of Abraham (xiv.) speaks of Azazel as having scattered over the earth the secrets of heaven and rebelled against the Mighty One. He is, so to speak, a disloyal initiate who has divulged the holy secrets. Therefore his garment is taken from him and given to Abraham.

(6) *Final Destiny*.—Both Apocalyptic and the Mysteries, as we have seen, look beyond this present life to a blessed future which is the eternal heritage of the pious soul. In the future life the soul attains its real destiny in a higher order of being. Moreover, participation in this future life depends upon a miraculous change; according to the Mysteries, the change is accomplished here and now in the Spirit, and is

consummated at death; according to Apocalyptic, it is a change which affects the body, and is only accomplished after death. In other words, in Hellenistic religion we have a doctrine of immortality, according to which death, for the devout, means the freeing of the soul from the prison-house of the body; but this conception had little currency in Judaism, and although here and there the Apocalyptic writers teach that the dead pass immediately to the heavenly Paradise or to the underworld of Azazel, the predominant teaching is that of a resurrection of the body which takes place when the new world is inaugurated by God or His Messiah. Normally it is the old body which rises again, but in the Apocalypse of Baruch, as in the Hermetic writings, the soul takes on a new and glorified body in the future life. Thus, both in Apocalyptic and in the Mysteries, piety is supported by the thought of an invisible eternal future, void of suffering and death. The present world has become hopelessly corrupt; it is in the grip of an iron destiny; but beyond lies the glorious and blessed future where God rules supreme.

Further, both Mysteries and Apocalyptic attach certain conditions to their offer of eternal life. In Apocalyptic it is the faithful only, above all the faithful of the chosen nation, who share the glorious future; in the Mysteries it is only those who are united with the *θεὸς σωτήρ* who are assured of eternal life with Him; the one offers its message to the Jew, assuring him of his share in the future glory as a reward for faithfulness to the Torah and consequent moral union with God, here and now; the other offers its message to men of every race, assuring them of escape from the world of mortality by sacramental union with the Godhead here and now. In either case the individual must make his choice, a choice that is pregnant with destiny. The appeal is to the individual will. It is true that in Apocalyptic the note of individualism tended to be repressed by the predominance of the national hope. The lordship of Israel remained an essential feature in the new age. The thought of the world-judgment, which was to usher in the new order, did not succeed in emancipating itself from Chauvinistic ideas. Heaven and earth are to be reconstructed in the interests of Palestine. Nevertheless, in spite of the confusion between ethical and national distinctions, and the tendency to identify the contrast between Jew and heathen, with the contrast between the good and the wicked, Apocalyptic piety nourished a sense of ethical responsibility.¹ It brought the individual face to face with the judgment of

¹ Bousset, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-1.

God. It taught that it is a fearful thing to have to appear before the judgment-seat of God. Its highest aim was to secure the righteousness that shall be of avail before the Almighty. Apocalyptic is thus distinguished from the Mysteries by its ethical fervour. On the other hand, the Mysteries went beyond Apocalyptic in seeking to abolish all national barriers and to offer a common salvation to all alike, Greek and barbarian, bond and free. What was needed was a union of Jewish ethic with the universalism of the Mysteries. The two elements were taken up and carried to a higher plane by Christianity.

Finally, we may note in this connection the significance of the conception of faith. In the Mysteries, the conception of faith was scarcely worked out or even prominent. Nevertheless, they did set before men the choice of life and death, of accepting or rejecting the proffered salvation. The possible initiate had at least to decide for or against the mystic ritual. He was not compelled to undergo it, or to accept its revelation. He could refuse to become initiated—if he chose to take the risk. We are not surprised, then, to find that Philo, who in his thought and experience has so much that is akin to the mystic cults, makes much of the significance of faith in the life of piety. But it was not merely in Alexandria, but also in Palestine, that faith began to play an important part in religious thought and speech. In the Book of Enoch the root of the sin of the rulers of men is their unbelief. In the Apocalypse of Baruch faith is understood as subjection to God and to His law. In 2 Esdras faith appears either as the complement of works or even as their substitute in securing salvation. These hints at a doctrine of faith form part of the religious individualism which was at work both in Apocalyptic and in the Mystery cults. But just as the sacrament obscured the real nature of faith in the case of the Mysteries, so the legal piety of Judaism hampered its clear recognition of the place of faith in the religious life. And both had to give place to the deeper conception of the free surrender of the loving soul to the loving God, who gives to His children all that is needful for salvation, *i.e.* not only a blessed immortality, but also a moral insight and power hitherto unexampled. It remained for Paul to transcend both legalism and sacramentalism by means of his marvellously fruitful conception of the faith that works by love.

It remains to indicate quite briefly two deductions that are to be drawn from this comparison of the parallel phenomena of Apocalyptic and the Mystery cults. (1) Since both

were directed to the same religious needs, and operated with similar conceptions, we can understand why it was that a world propaganda, originating in Jewish soil, could appeal to the Hellenistic world; with all their differences there was sufficient common ground to render Apocalyptic ideas intelligible to a religious environment that was penetrated with the conceptions of the Mystery cults. Apocalyptic Christianity was not quite so alien to the Hellenistic mind as is often supposed. (2) In estimating the points of contact between Paul and the Mystery religions, we must have due regard to the Apocalyptic background of his thought; conceptions which appear to be derived from the Mystery cults may really have their roots in Paul's Apocalyptic Judaism. Standing between the two, he seeks to make them mutually intelligible on the basis of their common elements, and if he uses Mystery language in addressing people who are familiar with Mystery conceptions, we must not overlook the fact that his own approach to those conceptions lay along the line of Apocalyptic. That fact may often have an important bearing in regard to the interpretation of doubtful expressions. In any case we are wrong to divide Paul into two, and speak of Paul's Judaism and Paul's Hellenism as two irreconcilable elements in the mental and spiritual make-up of the great Apostle. The fact of the matter was that the great conceptions which he brought to the interpretation of his Christian experience were already present, both in Judaism and in Hellenism; the form, no doubt, was different in the two spheres, but at bottom the likeness was sufficiently close to make it possible to translate the ideas of the one into the phraseology of the other. And perhaps that is one of the greatest services that Paul could render to the religion that was destined to embrace both Jew and Hellenist in a common faith.

E. J. PRICE.

BRADFORD.

INDUSTRIAL UNREST.

A PLEA FOR NATIONAL GUILDS.

J. WILSON HARPER, D.D.

I.

NATIONAL GUILDS are not only a possible but also an adequate substitute for the existing wage-earning system. The conception of Guilds is not quite new; for they are very ancient institutions. They were common in Greece and Rome. They were approved by Plato in his *Republic*, and Xenophon describes Socrates as regulating them with a view to all members enjoying equality. Boissier, in his *Le Religion Romaine*, limits their influence to a narrow range, but Dr Hatch,¹ on the other hand, shows that they were very numerous and were most useful federations. There were, he says, literary, athletic, dramatic, and labour Guilds, such as dyers, shoemakers, tanners, carpenters, potters, and even rag-gatherers. They did not, however, exist for defence like Trade Unions to-day, but for mutual fellowship. They were, as is well known, revived in mediæval times, and the Guilds which then existed were trade institutions. But the proposed National Guilds, while animated by the same spirit of brotherhood which characterised Greek, Roman, and mediæval federations, will be industrial institutions, and will effect radical changes in industrial conditions under which all workers now labour.

II.

Before attempting a description of these Guilds it is necessary to make a brief reference to what is their justification. This is found not only in the industrial unrest of the day,

¹ See his *Bampton Lectures*, p. 26; and *The Organisation of the Early Christian Churches*, pp. 26-28.

which cannot always give an account of itself, yet demands a solution, but chiefly in the results of recent economic investigations. These results make industrial changes possibilities, justify attempts at reconstruction, and also supply good reasons for mutual co-operation on a large scale within the industrial province, which is an essential "note" of National Guilds.

Examine for a moment the wide field into which economists now enter, and the new questions which they now also raise. Let it be remembered that industry, and to a large extent the conditions under which it is carried on, are the expressions of the economic ideas which for the time are entertained. Economic thought reproduces itself in commerce sometimes slowly, at other times more rapidly, but always in the long run with unfailing certainty. Theory here as elsewhere precedes practice. That which is held from an economic point of view to be legitimate and beneficial is ultimately applied in the market-place. Economic reflection and its results are indeed sooner or later translated into industrial action. No one can stop the operations of this law of economic life. Many industrial uprisings, which are vitalised by the workmen's sense of what is both on moral and economic grounds due to them, would be easily explained if this law were kept in view.

Now, economists have travelled far since Adam Smith's day. The master will never be forgotten; but he, at best, only reflected in his economic writings the light which shone in his own time. Dr Thomas Chalmers, whose invaluable economic pronouncements are still inexcusably neglected by the Church which he brilliantly served; John Ruskin, the first to enunciate a reasonable theory of value; and Professor Marshall, the most distinguished of living economists—have all enormously widened the economic field, and raised new questions with which economic science must deal. Endeavouring to throw light upon not only "the economic man," but upon man, simply as such, with all his potentialities, they take account of both moral factors and spiritual values. They not only ask, How is money made? and under what conditions is it accumulated? but also, How is it spent? and what is due to those by whose labour it is mainly made? Thus, they raise ethico-economic issues.

But economists following in their steps have also recently discussed such questions as, What is the place which personality holds in industrial service, and what is due to it? Granted that personality counts, can labour be treated as a mere commodity which is bought and sold at a market price?

What is the economic justification and validity of the Wage-Fund with its postulates: first, that a certain sum is set aside for wages, and that inequalities arise in its distribution because it cannot be increased; and next, that mere subsistence is enough for the workman, without means for leisure and mental improvement? Must not precedence and a place be given to ethics over economics, and that again over politics, if a rational and scientific interpretation is to be offered respecting industry and social life? To what extent are rent and interest legitimate? By whom should reserves of labour, to meet emergencies, be supported—by masters, or workmen, or the State? And, to what purpose—to the relief of taxation, or that of local rates, or to the further remuneration of labour—should any surplus be devoted after the employer has remunerated himself for his personal service, the capital invested in his business, and the risks incurred in carrying on his works? Add to these questions the dissatisfaction which prevails among tens of thousands of workmen with the conditions under which they labour, and the loud claim which they make for a share in the products of their toil, and it will at once be seen what justification there is for a large constructive measure like that of National Guilds.

The answer returned to these questions, which are far wider than those raised by the older economists, is also much more human than the same economists ever entertained respecting any issues which they discussed. It is also favourable to large industrial changes. The justice which will be done to labour is, however, the true vindication and recommendation of National Guilds. That such justice is necessary, in the interests of both working men and a harmonious social life, is fully recognised by the Whitley, the Archbishops', and the Gorton Trustees' Committees. These Committees would never have been appointed had there not been on the part of great multitudes a demand for the justice due to toilers. And, what is perhaps still more important to observe, the several Reports of these Committees would never have been prepared, nor would the elaborate proposals which they contain have ever been offered to the public, had there not been a revolution of economic ideas silently going on, the resultant of thoughtful and patient investigation of the content of the economic province.

The Whitley Report is perhaps, from a purely industrial point of view, the one which invites most attention. It is tentative and experimental, but it is also constructive. Its proposals of National and District Industrial Councils within

which there will be "representatives of the management and of the workers employed" express the Committee's solution of the present industrial unrest. But the Report also offers many practical suggestions, and attempts to reconcile differences as between the interests of masters and those of workmen. It lays, for instance, upon these Councils the duty of seeing that workmen obtain "a share in the increased prosperity of industry"; that they have a small interest or share in the National Trusts; and that they are free to invoke, when they judge it necessary, State intervention and compulsory arbitration.

But when the Report is patiently analysed, the utmost which it promises is that the conditions under which at present labour is placed will be greatly improved. It does not propose a radical change in these conditions themselves. It gives no guarantee that the joint-control of industries will be effective. It has much to say about such control, but fails to show how it will be operative. Managers, it may be assumed, will always be on the side of employers when interests clash; and even Trade Unions, as at present constituted, will not be strong enough to cope with these managers, *plus* the influence of employers. And, when the Report temptingly invites the Councils to take a part in regulating production, keeping in view the state of the market, and to assist in securing "such selling prices as will afford a reasonable remuneration to both employers and employed," it only the more deeply roots the present wage-system in refined selfishness.

The mere adjustment of wages, and the improvement of the present conditions of labour are not enough to solve the industrial problem. Much more is needed; and, as has just been shown, economic science justifies a much larger change. This is the reason why many well-informed economists now advocate the establishment of National Guilds. They frankly admit that the Whitley Report promises great improvements, but they also clearly perceive that it only marks a stage of advance, and should be used not as a final settlement, but, at best, as a preparation for National Guilds. Perhaps unintentionally, but none the less actually, it is such a preparation; for it gives to workmen "a determination and observance of the conditions under which their work is carried on." It thus marks the invasion of a province hitherto sacred to employers alone; but if the industrial problem is ever to be solved, a still greater encroachment upon the province of employers is a necessity. This encroachment must, indeed, go on until

all labour and its products are under the control of National Guilds.

III.

As an outline of the justification for these Guilds has been submitted, a description of them is next offered. The following are the main features:—

1. It is proposed that all workers—skilled and unskilled, administrative and technical, scientific and manual—be members of Guilds. Thus, the antagonism which often arises between skilled and unskilled labour will be obviated. Interests will be common, and bind all together. It is not intended, nor is it even suggested, that any workman will be forced to enter the Guilds. The benefits which they confer will be the only inducement used; and, as in the case of Trade Unions, membership will be valued on account of the good which the Guilds will secure to all who belong to them.

2. The Guilds will take under control and superintendence all labour and its products. The industries of the country will then be carried on, not for personal profit or gain but for the common benefit of all in the State; and, what deserves special attention, a new social order will be established within which there will be leisure for mental development, and conditions favourable to moral progress, and the realisation of spiritual values.

3. Charging themselves with the duty of controlling labour, the Guilds will also remunerate it according to the services rendered. Wage-earning will cease, but pay will be given to all workers whether they labour in the counting-house, or field, or factory. It may be argued that to distinguish between wages and pay is to make a difference where none exists. But the two terms carry with them unlike connotations. No person ever speaks of wages as given in the army and navy, but always of *pay*; and this word connotes a higher status than that implied by *wage*. It is long since Ruskin, in his economic work *Unto This Last*, pointed out the distinction between the two terms. Honour, he said, is accorded to the soldier because of the dangers he encounters in rendering service, not to an employer, but to King and Country; and for his disinterested national service he receives *pay*. The same higher connotation should be applied to industry, and the industrial slate wiped clean of the terms *wages* and *hands*, which are at present applied to workmen whose labour is counted as nothing higher than a marketable commodity.

The Guilds will hold themselves responsible for the

material comfort of all workmen who belong to their membership. They will do this whether the men be actually at work or not. Old age, sickness, and other legitimate causes might prevent some from working, but they would nevertheless be supported. Thus, poverty would to a large extent be eliminated. Drastic measures would, however, be taken to deal effectively with the lazy and malingerers. No one can do this better than the workmen themselves; for, if the great mass of them toil, they would take means to prevent schemers going scot-free.

4. In another department the Guilds will exercise a special function. They will give to each worker a definite place, and determine the conditions under which he labours. They will, for instance, through carefully selected committees, appoint managers and foremen, the workmen being, as experience shows, the best judges as to who should receive promotion, and be entrusted with authority. Under this system friction will be largely obviated. It is not, however, claimed that the delicate task of assigning a place to each workman, and appointing the management, will be discharged easily. Time will be needed in order to make good working arrangements; but Co-operative Societies have already solved the question of management, and have shown the compatibility of management and manual labour.

5. The Guilds will take under their control all that pertains to commerce. They will purchase raw material, manufacture it into finished articles, and distribute these articles among consumers at prices which exclude profiteering. Productive Co-operative Societies at the present time offer an example and illustration on a small scale of what the Guilds will undertake on a large scale. These Societies purchase raw material and work it into articles which are supplied to distributing agencies. They are only yet in their infancy, but they have already done good work. National Guilds are, however, much more than Productive Co-operative Societies; for, in the latter, the wage-system still obtains, whereas it is the design of the Guilds to abolish that system and entirely to eliminate profiteering, which is the bane of industrial life, and the fruitful cause of much injustice.

It may be objected that Guilds cannot undertake commercial enterprises; but, as showing how far public opinion has travelled towards such an undertaking, Sir Eric Geddes, a member of the Government, addressing the National Alliance of Employers and Employed on 28th January 1919, offered the suggestion, since, as he said, "industry was upset," that

Trade Unions should take over one of the factories owned by the Government, which was now selling them, "run it for themselves, and sell the products." Personally, he declared, he would welcome the experiment, and he was quite sure that the Government would "look sympathetically upon any such proposal." This, as will be shown in a moment, is not how the Guilds intend to proceed, but the mere fact that this suggestion was made by a responsible member of the Government is significant, and is a clear indication that public opinion is tending towards national control of labour and its products.

6. Every industry will have its own Guild, but all the Guilds will be closely related to each other, and also form one National Guild, directly under the ægis of the State. There will likewise be a Guild Congress, consisting of representatives from all the Guilds in order to secure unity of action and discuss all questions which bear upon industry. This Congress or Industrial Council will sit permanently.

7. Within the Guilds the only power which members will absolutely possess and use is the economic. Politics or political parties will not be their concern, though as citizens they will exercise all their political rights, and charge themselves with the duty of seeing that the Government keeps within its own province, and does not even attempt the discharge of any industrial functions. And, herein, it should be carefully noted, National Guilds differ from State Socialism. They will, indeed, be a mediating influence between State Socialism and Syndicalism. Under them, as just indicated, the State will have nothing to do with trade transactions, but will provide for the workers entire industrial autonomy.

For a long time many persons, indeed almost all who could not resist the acceptance of socialistic ideas, were inclined, under the influence of Continental writers, and especially of Karl Marx, to believe that there was no other solution of the social question than that the State should have absolute control of all means of production, exchange, and distribution. But, for my part, I distinguish between the *spirit* of Socialism, which authorities like Bishop Westcott, Mr Kirkup, and Professor Graham hold to be Christian, and its possible manifestations. I maintain that it is contrary to the teachings of history, and quite unphilosophical, to tie or even attempt to tie down the spirit to any one manifestation, and say that alone is Socialism. Recent events have shown the need for caution lest too hasty and indefensible conclusion be reached; for State Socialism has not been a success. Germany

attempted it, and failed. And, even during the Great War when our own Government took over many industries, the door was opened wide for the most unblushing profiteering perhaps ever witnessed. The interests of workers and consumers can only be secured when industry is under the control of all those who are engaged in it. This is industrial democracy of which State Socialism is the antithesis, and negation. National Guilds will make for complete industrial autonomy, and that because they are really the expression of democratic principles applied to industry, and through industry to social betterment.

8. National Guilds will not isolate the State, but will be in cordial co-operation and will work in partnership with it, both having a common object in view. On the one side, land and industrial machinery used by the Guilds will be the property of the State, which will hold them as trustee; and on the other, the State will have a claim to a substitute for economic rent. The Guilds will meet this claim. Its payment will be a first charge on production. The Guilds will thus operate within their own economic province, and will not at any time, or for any reason, combine against the State or consumers. In that way lies Syndicalism, which makes everything of labour and nothing of the State.

Such are the more prominent features of National Guilds. There are many details to which no reference has been made; but sufficient has been stated to show how they will bring labour and its products under democratic control; how they will solve the problem of distress due to inability to work either from old age or sickness; and also how they will prove themselves to a large extent a solvent of social unrest. In the industrial turmoil of the day, when many are casting about for a remedy of social ills, they are worthy of consideration as embodying a positive and constructive measure. It is not, however, claimed that they can be brought into full operation at once. The process towards their establishment will be necessarily gradual. But if they be accepted as a practical working measure, the agencies for their realisation will soon be forthcoming.

IV.

The crux of the Guild proposals lies in the question, How will the State become possessor of land and industrial machinery? This is the old question that is always raised when Socialism in any form is propounded, and many answers

have been returned to it. The Fabian Society trusts to "the dissemination of knowledge as to the individual and society for the emancipation of land and industrial capital from individual and class ownership, and the investing of them in the community for the general benefit." Some propose the gradual increased taxation of land and industrial capital until all are in the hands of the State. Some, again, rely upon the work of voluntary associations *plus* State aid in order to secure land and machinery. Others, holding that the landed property of almost all Europe was originally obtained by gifts of kings or by simple appropriation, contend that it should revert to the State, compensation being given in a sum of money equal to "the estimated value of the interest of the present owners and the heir."¹ Most of those in favour of land nationalisation also hold that industrial capital should be taken over by the State, compensation for it being given. Compensation would indeed be a big undertaking, but it is not without an historical parallel. The abolition of slavery was at one time thought impossible because of the large sum of money which would be required to compensate slave-owners. But the money was found, and slaves were freed. National resources since that time have enormously increased; and to give reasonable compensation for land and machinery may not be relatively so great an undertaking as many imagine.

But however this may be, it is manifest that some solution must be found for the industrial unrest of the day. So far back as the year 1889 I wrote that "Associated labour with collective capital should do the work that is now done by private capital and wage labour."² I am not aware that anyone at that time urged the adoption of National Guilds as they are now advocated. The thoughts and projects of social reformers then ran in the direction of State Socialism. But now wiser and more feasible proposals hold the field; and now also it is clearly recognised that the dangers of Syndicalism must be avoided, and that, while workmen hold control of labour and its products, the State must be in partnership with federated labour, and discharge its own political duties.

Apart from National Guilds there is at present no other definite and concrete proposal made for the realisation of industrial autonomy and self-government. There is much vague talk respecting social propaganda, but no clear declaration as to the agency or agencies which should be employed to attain to industrial democracy. Meanwhile the whole labour

¹ The Dean of Wells in *Cont. Rev.*, November 1889.

² See my *Foundations of Society*, p. 260.

world lies in the hands of employers, and is at their mercy. Even the ably conducted Conservative journal the *Saturday Review* acknowledges the harsh and unjustifiable actions of employers, who, it says, "take good care that it is the consumer who has to pay for their troubles" by putting up the price of articles "out of all proportion to the extra cost of production"; and it contends "that the active factors of production, management, and labour, must have a larger authority in the control and a larger share in the rewards of industry."¹ *The Statist*, too, is bold enough to say that "our whole system of production is bad from beginning to end," and to question the right of those under it "who make much wealth during their lifetime to leave superabundant fortunes to their children."² And, still more boldly, it says that "the whole land of the country should be used economically, and not be kept for the delectation of exceptionally rich persons." "All," it continues, "should work who are able," and if anyone tries "to escape work by emigrating, then the source of his wealth in this country ought to be seized."

These statements are cited to show that it is not only working men who complain of the present system of production, but also responsible leaders of public opinion. The industrial unrest of the day is clamant, and there are few who are so deaf as not to hear the loud cry for redress. It is claimed for National Guilds that under them the extremes of dire poverty and superfluous riches would be obviated; that the cruel operations of "the iron law of wages" and the needless severity of treatment to which workmen are subjected would cease; and that a solution would be found for the industrial problem which is exercising the best minds in the country, and is as persistent as it is serious. And it may be finally claimed for these Guilds that they are "workable" and have an industrial "meaning," the two conditions which, in the judgment of pragmatists like the late Professor William James and Dr Schiller, are essential to the acceptance and working out of any scheme.

But manifestly, before the industrial ideal is reached, a new spirit must be introduced into the conduct of industry, and moral factors, hitherto latent, must be brought into active play. It is here that the *Archbishops' Report on Christianity and Industrial Problems* and the *Statement* issued by ten representative Churches are useful. The former is of exceptional value. For, besides making an illuminating historical survey

¹ *The Saturday Review*, 25th January 1919.

² *The Statist*, 25th January 1919.

of early and mediæval Churchmen's pronouncements on Christian morals, it deals with present-day industrial problems in the light of Christian ethics. It points out, among other things, that Christianity is not satisfied with merely enunciating abstract ethical principles, but sets up a workable high standard of moral life, and "has a social Gospel which the Church should preach," and which is "applicable even in the complex circumstances of modern industrial communities"; that in its teaching, so far as moral requirements are implied, no distinction is made between individual and social ethics, between personal conduct and social relations, between what one owes to oneself and to society; that it emphasises the sacredness of personality and the individual's claims which should be recognised in industrial life, while at the same time it insists upon detachment from material possessions; that the application of its high ethics to social evils is always more or less a disquieting process, but must not on that account be omitted, for the rooting-out of industrial wrongs is necessarily such a disturbing process; and that it is not a sign or proof of more tolerant views and a broader mind to endure and say nothing about the existing industrial order with all its injustice than it is to lift up one's voice against it, and "to work for a revolution."

The new spirit for the better conduct of industry is thus found in the moral requirements of Christianity; and it may be said at once that were the sovereignty of justice, the winsome power of love, and the beneficent influence of self-sacrifice, as these are described and enforced by Christianity, applied to industry a wholesome revolution of the greatest magnitude would take place. Under the present industrial system there is little or no room for these fine moral qualities. They are simply left out of account. "Business is business," and the race is often to the most acute and sharp-witted who harbour the fewest scruples. There is to-day a widespread movement both in England and Scotland towards a new national rededication. "The bearing of the Gospel message," to use the words of the Archbishops' Report, "on the industrial problems of the day" should be a co-extensive step with that of personal dedication. In this way the members of the Church would prove to workmen that they were as much interested in their welfare as in their well-being.

Taught by the Great War, and forced by the industrial unrest of the day to re-examine the ethico-economic foundations of industrial life, an ever-increasing number of persons are getting rid of insular views and narrow prejudices, and are

now more or less clearly perceiving the unity of life with all its spiritual, moral, and industrial implications. When one deals with the sciences of human life one cannot separate ethics from certain psychological postulates, nor again economics from ethics, nor any one of these from high spiritual values and the common material affairs of man's daily life. Christianity fully recognises this unity, and throws its clear searching light upon the whole life of man, leaving nothing untouched, not even his smallest material needs. The very hairs of his head are numbered. Its moral teachings are meant for life, and are the most potent influence in life; and such is their beneficence when obedience is rendered to them either in the home or factory, in national or international life, that a new social order takes the place where formerly social evils ruled and reigned.

J. WILSON HARPER.

EDINBURGH.

TIME AND PLACE IN PRACTICAL POLITICS.

ERNEST A. JELF,

Master of the Supreme Court.

PHILOSOPHERS from Aristotle to Bergson have debated deep problems relating to the essential nature of time and place: but comparatively little thought has ever been given to the effect which considerations of time and place habitually have upon practical politics.

And yet upon reflection it will appear that the views which men form upon questions of time and place are very often indeed the unseen but determining factors in their attitude to the political questions of their day. It follows from this, if it be true, that it is of the first importance to discover the principle involved in forming a right opinion upon these questions of time and place.

The old controversy which separates the individualist from the socialist hangs upon the question of time. How long are we to look forward? Granted that "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" is to be considered, the question still arises—the greatest number *of whom*? Of persons now alive? of all persons who may be alive hereafter? or how otherwise? If we knew that the world must come to an end in a month, there would be little objection to the most extreme views as to the distribution of property. "Take, for instance," says Lord Leverhulme, "the crude Henry George theories that to abolish all property in land by confiscating the rents received from land, and the more recent suggestions of others that to abolish all ownership in capital by confiscating all interest and profits on capital would abolish property, and this wealth, when shared in by all equally, would bring about the millennium. These proposals are shown up in all their grotesque absurdity when we examine the figures, for we then find that their product, on pre-war basis, would, if divided equally, be under elevenpence

per head per day for each man, woman, and child in the United Kingdom. So that equality or uniformity of wealth is clearly no way to abolish poverty.”¹ But if we knew that the world must come to an end in a month, an equal distribution of wealth would give ample provision for everybody, and Lord Leverhulme’s difficulty would disappear. Indeed, if this world were only to last six years, many of the views of the modern socialists might prevail without absurdity—for the evils which their opponents predict as the consequence of adopting them would not attach in such a period. The most formidable argument which strikers who have no merits can offer to the Government is really this: “This strike may ruin the country, but it cannot ruin it in *our* time. The country’s wealth will not be so *quickly* exhausted.” Such an argument may be, and is, immoral; but if the strikers persist in it, their position is hard to shake. But now suppose, upon the other hand, that we are to look forward for many thousand years—it may well be that the extreme views of individualists are correct: the Poor Law and the Factory Acts may well be disastrous errors, and the strictest rules of political economy, worked out in a school of hard necessity by the law of the survival of the fittest, may prove that the unalleviated tyranny of competition would cause least suffering in the long run. We do not forget that there is a school of thought which suggests that all morality, political as well as ethical, is founded upon the principle of so acting as to promote the survival of the human race, and that there is no other right or wrong about anything. It is a little difficult to see how such reasoning could be maintained if it became clear, as it might become clear any day by the aid of astronomy and the other natural sciences, that only a definite number of years of human life upon this earth remain—especially to those who believe in the immortality of the human soul. One thing, however, if our main argument be sound, is clear. This school of thought leads logically to the purest individualism.

Test any of the debated questions arising between labour and capital by this argument, and it will be seen that the amount of future time contemplated is the real matter of difference.

And yet the politicians who argue upon these matters hardly ever mention the matter of time at all, in so much that we doubt very much whether they have a principle about it in their minds upon which to base their conclusions.

But the lawyer, who ever thinks much more precisely than

¹ *The Six-Hour Day and other Industrial Questions*, p. 9.

the politician, has long since evolved a principle. He has often to meet a question very similar in essence to the questions which we have put to ourselves. For how long ahead may the owner of property dispose of it according to his wish? And the answer is perfectly definite: "For a life or lives in being and twenty-one years afterwards." That fixes the period to a day. And it is based upon a principle inherent in human life. We have some reasonable anticipation as to what is likely to be wise in the future for those whom we know as now alive and for their children until they come of age. But, obviously, when those children have arrived at years of discretion, the circumstances may have altered and they will be able to judge far better for themselves.

Is this principle applicable to political theory? If not, what principle is better? Our point is that it will immensely clarify thought, and therefore assist a wise and just decision, if some principle can be arrived at in the matter of the time to be contemplated ahead when devising political schemes. And if opponents are to be convinced, the reason for the fixing of the time must be clearly set forth.

Time may be a delusion, or a mode of thought, or what you please. But it is at least the practical condition of our existence. Shelley said, "I am chained to Time, and cannot thence depart."

Again, as to place. Herodotus relates of the Medes and Persians that "they honour that nation most of all which lives next to themselves, and the second second, and every other nation on the same principle, and they honour least those that live furthest from themselves." "For they consider themselves to be the best of men, and think that those that are furthest from themselves must be the worst."¹

The law of the Medes and Persians altereth not. The proximity of things makes all the difference in the way in which a man is affected. A tidal wave in Japan may sweep away twenty thousand persons, but a railway accident in France which killed one thousand persons would affect us far more. So would twenty persons drowned in the county, or two persons run over at our own gate, or a single person seriously wounded in our own house.

For whose happiness is the statesman legislating? For the happiness of the greatest number in what geographical area? On the answer to this question will hinge over and over again the questions which divide Conservatives from Liberals.

When Lord Rosebery was Prime Minister he poured

¹ Book i. p. 134.

derision in one of his speeches upon a correspondent who had suggested that a particular course ought to be pursued—it was in relation to the “Bulgarian atrocities”—even though the result should be to break up the British Empire. “Sir,” he said, “I do not propose to be a party to the breaking up of the British Empire.” Few will be found to disagree with him: but the unnamed correspondent was only an unusually honest exponent of views which are in substance widely held.

Is the ordinary member of Parliament a trustee for his constituents, for the island, for the Empire, or for the world? From his speeches in the House of Commons it would often be difficult to guess. He habitually glozes the matter over. Yet test him by any foreign or imperial matter, and you will find in nine cases out of ten that, from the answer which he might give but has not given as to the geographical area whose interests he represents, the rest of his argument follows as a matter of course.

There is no such ambiguity about the lawyer. The first question which a Court of Law will ask is, “Whom do you represent?” And the principle is equally precise—that all parties interested have a right to be before the Court, and justice must be done impartially *according to* the particular interest of each.

Is the same principle to prevail in politics? If not, what is a better principle? But above all things let us know where we stand. Let us know whose happiness we are considering in every new scheme which we debate in relation to the geographical area as well as in relation to the time under contemplation.

There are many different attitudes possible between that expressed by the words, “There is no world without Verona walls,” and that which perpetually dreams of “the federation of the world.”

It is not, then, enough to ask the why and wherefore of things: we must ask the when and where of them as well.

E. A. JELF.

REGROUPED RELIGION.

A HIGH CHURCHMAN'S VIEW.

THE REV. R. LL. LANGFORD-JAMES, D.D.

PEACE has been signed at Versailles. Peace at home is not yet, and the lessons of 1815 may suggest that it is not yet to be expected. The crying need is for strong, united forces which can prepare the way powerfully, persuasively, compellingly, for the ultimate peace of the world. And of all the forces that ought to count, the Christian Church ought to count for most, the Church of the Prince of Peace. Yet at this most important and anxious time it looks as though it were just the Church which is going to fail us. The state of unrest, disturbance, strife within the Church is a disaster of capital magnitude. Yet the debates in Convocation disclose it, and the action of certain bishops against Benediction on the one hand and the exchange of pulpits on the other. It is imperative that a remedy should be sought, and sought speedily. The remedy of some is the remedy of an Established Church which shall be so inclusive as to exclude none. Is this likely to be a hopeful solution? Is, in the first place, an Established Church axiomatic? And, if so, is it reasonable to hope that the Catholic oil and the Protestant water shall ever mix satisfactorily? Or would it not be more profitable to recognise frankly fundamental differences, and provide that the oil shall do its specific work undeterred by water, and the water do its work untainted by oil? Further, the oil and the water are to be found in most modern denominations. It is suggested here that they be decently decanted into separate flagons. Is it an unreasonable suggestion?

But first as to the need, or desirability, of an Established Church at all. The establishment of a Church—that is, the special recognition by the State of a particular religion, or of a particular form of a particular religion—is not necessarily an

evil. On the contrary, granted that one particular religion, or one particular form of that religion, is universally recognised to be true by the citizens of a State; granted, too, that the State as well as the Church is a divine institution, and recognises itself as such—then an Established Church may easily be the highest boon it has in its power to confer upon its citizens. It is the duty of the State to promote the welfare of its citizens in every way open to it. No wise ruler will neglect to provide for the souls of his people. It is not his province to organise religion for them; but it is his province to make what provision he can for such organisation. And if it is open to him to employ the services of but one organisation approved of by the consciences of all his subjects, then happy is his lot, and great will be his desire to show it favour and to further its work.

To those who still believe in the Holy Scriptures, and even in the Old Testament section of them, the theocratic State Church of ancient Israel presents the best instance in support of the above thesis, because the completest. It is an instance of a fully established Church, imposing its will upon the whole nation, with the fullest sanction of the State. It is an instance, too, of a State wholly intolerant of any other religion for its subjects, and, in theory at any rate, ruthlessly suppressing all other forms of religion within its borders, in the avowed interests of its citizens. It was able to do so because of the consent of the people, which meant mainly, in those days, the consent of the rulers. In absolutist times this was the only consent which could count. It was not otherwise that Christianity became the established religion of the Roman Empire. Once Constantine was converted to it, and recognised it as the only true religion, then the logic of his position bade him give it an exclusive preference and sanction, in the highest interests of his subjects.

Nor was it otherwise that the Christian religion became established in this country. English kings were converted to the Catholic faith, and the Catholic religion became the sole recognised religion of England. The people readily gave their consent to it and adopted it as their own. No other form of Christianity had yet emerged in the country. Religion was recognised on all sides as the highest good, and the Catholic Church as its sole teacher. So the establishment of the Church became at once easy and a supreme duty. Much has been written about the "persecution" of mediæval heretics, the Lollards and so on, which deeper erudition and more sympathetic thought should have made it impossible to write.

The ages of the past have too often been treated subjectively and not objectively. That is, the ideas common to, and proper to, the present age have been used as the touchstone of judgment upon past ages possessed, and necessarily possessed, of no such ideas. In autocratic times the autocrat is bound to provide the best for his people, according to his lights. Even democracy cannot go beyond its lights. And the power of the autocrat is conditioned, in the last resort, by the consent of his people, as is the power of any government to-day. If he fails signally to gain their consent, and the matter is judged of sufficient importance to call for more than passive opposition, then the result is rebellion. The Reformation in England called out five such rebellions. They were not successful, it is true, but they deprived the sovereigns who imposed the Reformation on the Church and the people of all moral right in its imposition. And the Church, suffering under *force majeure*, was saved from complicity in its iniquities, and from ultimate responsibility for it.

But an institution may be good and profitable in one age and evil and unprofitable in another. Thus pap is the sole stuff for babes, but it is unsatisfying and irrelevant for grown-up people, save when they are sick. What was a boon to ancient Israel and to the England of Henry V. may easily prove to be a bane to England in the altered circumstances of the twentieth century. Autocracy, and the presence of a master for "supervision," is the only possible thing in a private school, where young gentlemen of tender years do congregate. In a public school the rule of the prefect mitigates complete autocracy, though it is still aristocratic, lacking the consent of a popular election. But the modern State is grown up and out of leading strings, and democracy is in full possession. The sole credit which the Reformation in England can reasonably claim is that it did dimly recognise the religious rights of individuals. It is true that the dimness was great. Differences in religious opinion were only recognised so far as they could be, albeit uncomfortably, included in a national and fully established Church. Any which could not be were *ipso facto* penalised. For an Established Church, from its very nature, cannot be tolerant. With true English inconsistency and want of logic, the Established Church was forced into the self-stultification of tolerance by a series of Acts such as the Toleration Act, the abolition of the Corporation and Test Acts, and the Roman Catholic Emancipation Act, which confirmed the growingly democratic citizen in his increasingly recognised rights, while it rendered the Established Church

more and more an anachronism and an absurdity. Properly speaking it always has been that, from the very moment that the right of the citizens to differences in religion was first recognised. The attempt to include such differences in one system, by the clumsy expedient of forcing them to a compromise instead of letting them be completely true to their own divergent principles, was rightly doomed to failure from its very inception.

In a modern democratic State the right of the individual citizen to freedom of choice in religion is completely recognised. This freedom is conditioned solely by the avoidance of practices which could occasion serious public scandal to other citizens, as, for example, the practice of polygamy encouraged, in theory at any rate, by Mormonism. Of course, if a modern State could be found whose citizens universally gave consent to one particular form of religion as true, then an Established Church would still be a possibility and a boon. And much the same would be the case in the instance of a modern State where the overwhelming majority of the nation was of one form of religion by free consent, provided that the religious rights of the minority were respected. It is undoubtedly a boon to the State, as we have already pointed out, to be able to recognise religion as fully as possible, and this recognition is best, most conveniently, and most impressively secured by the employment of some one organisation. Provided that the minority is not oppressed, there could be no hardship in their acquiescing in the State securing this boon for at least the great majority of its citizens.

But this boon can only be secured, in such a case, at the sacrifice of the completest freedom for religious opinion as such, because no one set of opinions was specially favoured, and, in the case of a large minority differing from the established religion, the mere fact of establishment constitutes necessarily a severe handicap for the minority by bestowing upon the majority an adventitious prestige. In the case of a modern State, such as England of the present day, where religious opinion is markedly divided, the only fair form of establishment would be establishment all round, the equal recognition of every form of religion which could prove itself sufficiently organised to be an important factor in the religious life of the nation. This has been attempted in Holland. But even so, the State recognition does not go far enough. For it stops short at the Christian religion, and there are, in this country at any rate, also Mohammedans, Buddhists, and perhaps Hindus, of sufficient numbers and importance to claim special recognition.

The only other solution, in a modern State such as ours, is to recognise all forms of religion, within the limits already indicated, in the sense of extending toleration to them and permitting their exercise without favouring any. Where anything like a corporate expression of national religion has become an impossibility, then, in equity, all attempt at manufacturing one should be given up. Everyone should enjoy the completest religious freedom possible, coupled with the completest liberty of religious association and combination, while no form of religion should be more favoured than any other.

And "everyone," should include the Sovereign. At a time when the Church was really and truly the nation organised for religious purposes, it was reasonable to demand that the Sovereign should be of the same religion as his people. Where religious opinion has become divided, especially where it is seriously divided, then it is no longer reasonable to demand this. It is a burden that should be put upon the conscience of no man, that he should conform to any particular faith as the condition of holding any particular civil office. The abolition of the Test Act secured this liberty for all other officers of the State, completed as it was by the Catholic Emancipation Act. It is an anomaly, and a hideous one, that the Sovereign should still be so bound. If he wished to be crowned king by "General" Booth, why should he not be? If he wished to worship at Westminster Cathedral, again why should he not? Once grant complete religious liberty and equality for all subjects of the realm, then where would be the sense of continuing this disability in the case of the Sovereign, who, after all, has a soul and a conscience like the rest of us?

If prayers must be said (as one hopes they must) before Parliament begins its deliberations, then why cannot the Speaker say them? It is quite within the competence of laymen to say prayers. If it is thought good to include spiritual persons in the legislature, then why are the Bishops of the Church of England to have the monopoly? Why not secure this end by granting every denomination of sufficient size the right to send representatives to the Upper House? The State would still be able to recognise religion in this way. It is totally unable on any equitable principle to recognise it in the way it does at present, by choosing to extend its special recognition to one particular religious denomination.

If, under some circumstances, it is right and profitable for the State to "establish" religion, it cannot be wrong for the State also to subsidise religion. Once again we draw our

clearest instance and sanction from the ancient Church of Israel, with its provision for the tribe of Levi. Some modern States, such as Holland and Belgium, and (until 1906) France, have followed this precedent, while favouring no one form of religion. In fact, concurrent endowment was a general solution of the religious difficulty in most European States before the war.

Much more plainly, then, can it be the duty of the State to extend protection to the benefactions of the pious left for religious purposes. The questions of establishment and endowment are two questions, and not one. But in this country there is a very practical connection between them, owing to the fact of the Reformation. Where a religious body has suffered no change, then its claim to its ancient endowments passes without question, and there is no occasion for the State to step in. Where there has been a change, and two parties claim to be the real representatives of the religious body, and so also claim the continued enjoyment of its endowments, it is only the State which can settle the matter. Again, where the object for which an endowment is left is not being, or cannot be, any longer fulfilled, then there is again a case for State intervention. No one would dispute this power and right of the State, and everyone would admit that the State, as the protector of property, has the right to a final say in the disposition of all property. The State has even the right to confiscate property quite arbitrarily, but any State which did so would be basing itself on force and not on equity. And we have the right to look for equitable and not merely forceful action on the part of the State. Otherwise our faith in the State is shaken, and a rebellious spirit engendered which can be of no profit to any government. For no government can afford to offend the moral sense, and one hopes that no enlightened modern government would ever attempt to do so.

Two of the most conspicuous instances of equitable intervention on the part of the State in recent times were the work of the Charity Commissioners in overhauling the ancient endowments of the universities, and making fresh arrangements about them, and the action of the State in the case of the "Wee Frees" in Scotland. The "Wee Frees" were undoubtedly "the old original firm." They were in a conspicuous minority in refusing combination with the United Presbyterians. They therefore claimed the whole of the Free Church property, on the ground that the majority were innovating, as undoubtedly they were. They proved themselves

conspicuously incapable of carrying on the great bulk of the work which the Free Church property was meant to promote. An impasse arose, and no one could adjudicate on the matter except the State, which made an equitable and sensible arrangement—as it had every right to do, and as it alone could do.

Let us now look briefly into the case of the pre-Reformation endowments of the Church of England. They were left by the faithful in the past for two purposes: (1) for the securing of continual prayers for the souls of the donors and their successors, (2) for the continued support of religion in this country. The Church to which they were left was in full communion with the Holy See, and in full possession of the faith and practice of the Catholic Church. No other possibility of Church government was dreamed of, in the West at any rate, at the time, and no other form of faith than the Catholic Faith was known. That is to say, the donors had no effective choice. If they wished to support religion, there was only one channel through which they could do so.

In course of time the State not only recognised changes in the Church, but forced them upon the Church. The State compelled separation from the Holy See and sent to the scaffold those who, like Cardinal Fisher and Sir Thomas More, refused compliance. This was a rough enough argument, and compliance gained by such arguments and others like them is no moral compliance at all. Further, the State forced upon the Church a service-book which made it practically impossible to carry out one condition of the ancient benefactions, the saying of Masses for the repose of the souls of the donors. The State, too, forced upon the Church a minimising of her ancient Faith, in order that heretics might be included within her fold and the National Church preserved. Owing to the action of the State and enforced compliance on the part of a crippled Church, changes were introduced into the national religion, but there still remained one National Church as the official representative of the religion of Christ in this country, fully established and recognised by the State. Naturally, the State confirmed the Church in her ancient endowments. The Church of England has the fullest legal right to her ancient endowments. No one disputes this. But has she still a moral right?

The fullest possible weight should be given to the fact that the Church was rendered powerless to carry out all the original intentions of her pious benefactors, by the action upon her of *force majeure* brutally applied. One can, and

should, give the fullest measure of admiration to the courage of the Henrican martyrs, to Cardinal Fisher, Sir Thomas More, the Carthusians, and such men. But their opposition was not effective. Their followers were unable to continue the provision of religion for the people of this country. The only institution which could do so at all was still the National Church. No doubt it did it badly, without question it fell on evil days. But any religion that was provided at all was provided by it, and has always continued to be so provided. The inclusion of heretics within its pale, and their virtual occupation of the whole ground within it for many a long year, was no fault of the National Church. It did its best, poor as that best may have been. And it alone effectively occupied the ground.

But the very inclusion of different elements in the National Church paved the way for the religious liberty which is one of the chief and most precious possessions of the national life in modern times. Slowly, strangely, and uncomfortably this liberty came to maturity. The new conditions of the National Church contained in themselves the pregnant seeds of its own decay and supersession as an institution. Its terms of communion were early felt to be arbitrary and unsatisfactory. Principles born within it were pushed to their logical conclusions and underwent the penalty of ejection from its fold and dispossession of its goods. Can such dispossession be defended on moral grounds?

If we take the line of refusing to the State the moral right to change the circumstances of the Church so much at the Reformation that the wishes of the pious benefactors could be superseded in their desire for (1) the provision of Masses for their souls, (2) the continued provision of the Catholic religion as they understood it, then the matter must be put right in the only way that it can be. The pre-Reformation endowments must be handed over to those who are in a position to carry out the wishes of the donors, and to those only. That is to say, their enjoyment must be assured to Catholics alone. But if this is done, then is stress to be laid upon communion with Rome or upon lack of change in faith? The modern Roman Catholic body in England is undoubtedly in communion with Rome; but it teaches two things as "of faith"—the Immaculate Conception of our Lady and the Infallibility of the Pope—which were not so taught to and held by the mediæval benefactors. There have been these changes. Catholics in the English Church, though lacking outward communion with the Holy See, teach and

hold what the mediæval Church taught and held. But neither Roman Catholics nor Catholics in the English Church could effectively occupy the whole ground. It would be the case of the "Wee Frees" over again. So this solution may be dismissed as impracticable, whatever may be said for its justice. But once we have dismissed this we are forced to fall back upon the intention of the donors to provide for the continuance of religion in England. It was precisely on this count that the endowments were continued to the Reformed Church by the State. But inasmuch as the National Church has not, as reformed, been composed only of those who are Catholic in belief but also of the adherents of Protestantism, then we are debarred from specifying this religion which is to be continued as merely the Catholic religion.

And whatever one may say about the appropriateness of the action of the State in the sixteenth century, one cannot in modern days defend the right of the State to make arbitrary distinctions in religion between its subjects, to say "This religion is better than that," unless the people themselves say so.

But the National Church is not the only institution which now exists in this country for the continuance of religion. We may say, if we care to, that the Church of England is the nearest approach to the Church of the donors, that at any rate it is nearer to it than any Protestant sect could be. True, we claim to have (and, naturally, one believes we are right in claiming to have) valid Orders and Sacraments. We have retained most of the old order and arrangements of the Church. But in face of our actual history, of our neglect, universal in the not too remote past, wide-spread even now, of the plainest intentions of the Church, we shall be wise if we do not press distinctions too heavily. If we are called upon to give up our exclusive possession of the ancient endowments of religion in this country, and to share them with others who are also teaching religion, then do let us recognise the fairness and equity of the proposal. One has been shocked sometimes not only at the readiness with which those in authority among us will snatch at an argument from continuity on Church Defence platforms which they fail conspicuously to feel the force of in the case of poor priests who are trying to exhibit a real continuity in their parishes, but also at the enthusiasm with which endowments are defended as contrasted with the lukewarmness of defence of the religion of the Catholic Church.

And can it be said that the possession of our endowments has been an unmixed blessing to the Church? On the contrary, if one looks at the question fairly and squarely, their

possession would appear to account more than most things for the failure of the Established Church which recent events have made so painfully obvious. Take the reports of the chaplains from the Front, not only their official reports, but also the books they have written, and you find out how great is this failure. Here has been collected together, as never before, the flower of the manhood of this country. It is a time when, of all times, religious expression is required. If a man is hourly facing death, he needs to be able to address his God. What has been found to be the case? Simply this, that religion, or at least conscious religion with the power of expression in prayer, is practically non-existent. There is heroism in plenty, the spirit of sacrifice in plenty, many splendid qualities have exhibited themselves, countless noble deeds have been done. But when it comes to religious expression, to the articulation of the soul, the contrast is painful in its inadequacy and jejunity. And this is not only true of the men in the ranks, it is true of the officers also. A French priest, very friendly and coming in close touch with many of our officers, remarks in a book he has written that they are splendid but that they are really pagan, and that they seem to "stand outside" religion altogether. Why this result? Partly because, owing to the action of the State in the first place those long centuries ago, the Church of England has no real unity of faith and practice. Partly, and mainly, because the financial heritage of the past has unduly lightened present obligation, and made membership of the Established Church in far too many instances a mere name and form. The very security of our endowments has tended to build a wall of sloth round the clergy and of apathy round the laity. In no need of making our way, with little necessity of justifying our existence, we have turned out the most exiguously trained ministry in the Western religious world, doing, on the whole, the least work, and praying, on the whole, the fewest prayers. There are, of course, brilliant exceptions, and things are not nearly so bad now as they have been. But they are bad enough, in all conscience. And too easily has a patient laity tolerated the feebleness and inefficiency of our ministrations to them. They get them for nothing, in so many instances, and it does not do to look a gift-horse in the mouth. There is another side, of course, but the result is the same. In far too many places the endowment is so exiguous that the parish priest must be possessed of a private fortune in order to be able to undertake the work. This does not look like over-endowment. But, as a fact, it is the result of the

habit of looking to the endowments of the past to provide the ministry of the present. The parishioners of Poorchurch naturally do not see why they should have to provide themselves with a parson when their neighbours of Richtown are under no such necessity. More than that, the Rector of Richtown also provides the parish with three assistant priests—or, as the saying is, “keeps three curates,” as though one should say “keeps three horses.”

This modern form of simony has infected the whole of our Communion. One meets its effects even in the colonies. New families coming out from England do not understand at first the novel fact that they must pay for their religion there as for every other good and valuable thing. This has had an adverse effect on the fortunes of the Church. For instance, in one important city in the colonies with which one is personally familiar, the Presbyterians, Baptists, and Wesleyans all had their permanent chapels built while the Church itself, which was long first on the field, had to content itself with an iron building. And even the very Bishops of the Province practically all had to be men of some means, or they could not have done the work of their sees on the miserable pittance which was all the Church could provide for them, with the help, even then, of a grant from home. And yet this is no poor, small colony, but a rich one.

All this is not to say that *some* endowment is not a help to religious work. Other disastrous effects too commonly follow where such work is entirely dependent on the present alms of the faithful—especially in a “comprehensive” system—such as the strong temptation to the pastor to play to the gallery and to please the people for the sake of self. But certainly we have no good reason to be pleased with the results of an excessive dependence on the endowments of the past for carrying on the work of the Church. The power of the purse is not wholly evil, and where it encourages efficiency in the ministry and keenness in the laity it is not only a great but a beneficent power.

We began by admitting that the “establishment” of religion, where it can be had, is a boon. The clearer the recognition that can be given by the State to religion the better. The more strongly organised the religion of a country is, the greater is its power for good. The splitting up of the religious forces of this country into small units has been a fearful evil for the cause of religion. Perhaps it has been a necessary step towards the attainment of religious freedom. But that freedom has now been purchased, and it is high time

to be concerned once again for the most forceful and effective presentment of a religious front. It goes without saying that a wholly united front would be the most effective presentment of all. But it is hopeless to expect to attain to this, at any rate at the first stage. The more practical way is to encourage the formation of large, homogeneous groups, and to get smaller groups to combine and to merge themselves into a larger unity.

This merging process is already going on quite satisfactorily before our eyes, though with a slowness which is irritating to those who are keen and who realise the crying need of the times, in the case of the Free Churches. Some results have already been attained, as in the case of the amalgamation of the Free Church of Scotland with the United Presbyterians. There has also been the formation of the Free Church Council and frequent expressions of a desire for greater unity among the Protestant sects. The Kikuyu Conference in Africa was an example of this, as also the movement towards Protestant reunion in Canada.

Is it, then, suggested that a large united Protestant group should be set off against a united Church of England, with the Roman Catholics as a third group? This would at any rate attain something. The drawback to such a division is that the Church of England does not represent a real unity, and never has since the Reformation. For the Reformation attempted the impossible task of embracing in one system two sets of people whose religious principles were totally divergent, inasmuch as they rested upon two totally different and mutually exclusive bases. There were those who adhered to the Church on the Catholic basis of the acceptance of her teaching as authoritative and as representative of an historical position, she being still, that is, what she had always claimed to be, a part of the Catholic Church, whose voice must be listened to and obeyed. There were others who based themselves on the Protestant standpoint of private judgment, and who regarded the Church of England as sufficiently in line with foreign Protestantism to meet their requirements; granted a blind eye for much that she enjoined and the lively hope of further improvement for her in a Protestant direction. It would be easy to multiply subdivisions of these two groups in the present day. But in the main the subdivisions will ultimately fall into the same two groups: those who lay stress upon the Catholic position of the English Church; and those who lay stress upon the fact that it has been reformed, and who hope for still greater liberty of reform without undue reference to the past. In any vital and radical reconstruction or regrouping of the

religious forces of this country, then, it would be impossible to continue to consider the Church of England as representing a unity in itself. More, it would be the most signal service that could be rendered to the Church of England if all artificial and adventitious aids to a false and deceptive appearance of unity were removed, and the two sides in her could be set free to work out their several principles to their just and logical conclusion. Such a regrouping of the religious forces of the country would, it is contended, be a great boon to it, enabling these forces to work more enthusiastically and therefore more potently together, and subserving more fully the cause of sincerity. With every wish in the world to "as far as in us lies live peaceably with all men," it is ultimately impossible for the advocate of authority as the basis of religion to pretend to approve of the advocate of free thought as its true basis, and for the advocate of free thought to approve of the position of the advocate of authority. The desire for Christian comity may serve to blur differences. But they exist, and they are vitally important. And the main result of blurring them is to obscure the value and importance of truth itself. In the interests of truth and sincerity such blurring should no longer be encouraged. For the present burdened age clamours for the truth, the brutal, naked truth, and not for pretty speeches. Nor should it be encouraged in the interests of those who are to be ministered to. They have the right to know where they are, and they have the right to continuity of teaching and to plainness and complete honesty in instruction.

The way, then, should be made abundantly easy for regrouping. No temptations should be encouraged which could hinder it. What is it precisely that has welded these two incongruous sections in the National Church into the semblance of unity for so long? If the question be considered honestly, temperately, and without prejudice or sentimentality, it will be found mainly to consist in the links forged by the fact of common establishment and a common share in the ancient endowments. One is only saying, after all, what Archbishop Temple said when he declared that disestablishment of the Church of England would quickly be followed by dissolution. The force of old association, of simply being in a thing, is a very powerful force. If there is the danger of great loss in leaving it, then it takes a bold man to face that loss. And there is always the fear of leaving points of vantage to the sole possession of the other side. Why, it is asked, should it be my side which is to go and not the other? Why leave them the prestige and the possessions to abuse? Why should not the others

go out into the wilderness and leave the Church free for the faithful? Such considerations need dealing with and removing. Neither side should be asked to make the unwelcome trip.

Again, it is not only a matter for the clergy. It touches the laity too, even, if anything, more intimately. The familiarity with an established order of things is not easily or readily exchanged for the plunge of faith into an order of things which has yet to be established. An old and loved building, with its wealth of associations, is not readily abandoned for one that is new and whose associations are yet to seek. Such potent bonds also need consideration.

Suppose after Peace is settled a government keenly bent on the reconstruction of the country in all its forces. Suppose such a government to have learnt its lesson duly, that strong situations need strong and radical, albeit wise and far-sighted, methods. Is it too wild a flight of fancy to imagine such a government calling together the heads of the religious bodies in this country, asking them how far they can get together, inquiring how the religious forces of this country can best be distributed and developed, what sacrifices each can make, what united action can be taken, either all together or in groups? Is such a thing wildly impossible? One is not, of course, suggesting interference with religious liberty, but only the sincere disposition on the part of the State to be helpful where its help can be given. Is it beyond the wit of man or of governments to deal with the religious situation in such an equitable way as to be reasonably fair to all, to oppress no man's conscience, to impinge upon no man's just rights, but to be able to facilitate the regrouping which would be beneficial, without penalising anyone? The rise of Protestantism in Germany and in Hungary witnessed the possibility of some arrangement for the transference of buildings and other property to meet the new religious need. Would it be beyond the wit of the government of this country to devise some scheme whereby the Catholic section of the Church of England might remain in undisturbed possession of such churches as All Saints', Margaret Street, St Cuthbert's, Kensington, and St Alban's, Holborn; while the Protestant section equally retained such churches as All Souls', Langham Place, and St Paul's, Onslow Square, assuming that a regrouping commended itself to the conscience of the English Church? It would seem to be not impossible to conceive such a plan as feasible. But a regrouping, to be effective, would need not to stop there. It would be no real strength to the religion of the nation merely to create two new groups

instead of one. There would need to be a more comprehensive plan than that, a plan which would plainly contemplate the organisation of much larger and wider groups, whether on the Catholic side or the Protestant, and the provision for the transference of buildings and property, either immediately or in the future, to such wider groups. A really effective scheme would embrace not only the present National Church, but the whole nation on its religious side. There must be no "dispossessed" in the scheme if it can be helped. The tenure of property would need to be made duly elastic and transfer made easy, whether of churches or chapels, according to the wishes of those who worship in them. One is no parliamentary lawyer, and anything like details of such a scheme one would be totally unable to supply. And, indeed, it is not our task, which is merely to point out the advantage of such a plan, if it could be brought about, in the interests of the religious sincerity and efficiency of the nation. Why should material factors, such as buildings and endowments, be allowed to stand so much in the way as they do? No doubt we need security and fixity of tenure, and the avoidance of anything like a gamble in such things. But, on the other hand, we do need more elasticity. Is it really impossible of attainment? It is for the lawyers to say. But it is the nation that pays the lawyers. And the will of the people is the ultimate factor.

It may be said, "This is all very well for London or some large town, but what of the villages? And what of the cathedrals?" As regards the villages, there is already a sufficiency, and more, in most villages, of buildings built for religious purposes, and the thing to avoid is the necessity for building more. One is supposing, as one has said, a general survey of all the religious forces of the country, and a fair distribution of the ancient endowments, including the buildings, given to the upkeep of religion. One is also supposing the encouragement of the formation of two main groups, Catholic and Protestant. One might also have to provide for a third, which would still continue to call itself "Church of England." Perhaps that is likely. It would complicate the problem, but it would have to be equitably provided for. It would be likely to live in isolation, embodying the exclusiveness of the present Establishment. It might even, quite likely, at first, hold many within its fold. But the forces of more vital religions with which it would be surrounded would be likely to ensure it a short life and a rapidly dwindling membership as the years went on and the great new experiment approved itself to the religious sense of the nation. It

would feel the loss of the dreaded "extremist" on both sides, and would be likely to perish from sheer dullness. Still, at first it might be rather numerous, and it would have to have full provision made for it.

Then there would probably be also a fourth group, composed of the Roman Catholic body. If so, that would also have to be provided for. But is it quite certain that no terms would be found possible between this group and the Catholic group we have already indicated? That cannot be predicated one way or the other. One could only hope and pray that the Catholic forces in this country might not show less willingness to cohere than the Protestant forces are already doing. One could say no more. Only, the less groups the more chance the scheme would have of success. In any case it would not be very likely that all the groups would be represented in every village, or that in many cases a grouping of contiguous villages would not meet the case sufficiently.

And the cathedrals? Here again the principle of equitable division would come in. For one thing, the seats of the various bishops, or superintendents, or whatever they were, need not all be in the same city as now, and most dioceses at present contain other churches which could quite well serve as cathedrals. No doubt many sentimental regrets would have to be rigorously suppressed. But such regrets are not worthy to stand in the way of any scheme which could prove itself capable of being of signal service to the religious life of the nation and could remove all reasonable feeling of unfairness of treatment from every religious group. Granted good-will all round, a strong sense of brotherhood, a mighty sense of justice, and an even mightier sense of the needs of the nation, and then wonders, even miracles, can be worked.

Such miracles need to be worked in all departments of the national life. "The old order changeth, yielding place to new." The upheaval is great, the change is rapid, the urgent cry is for far-sighted, deep-principled action. The above represents the result of many years' anxious pondering. An eminent ecclesiastical lawyer pronounces it his opinion that such a scheme would not prove unassimilable by English procedure. If so, it can claim to be an immediately practicable scheme.

R. LANGFORD-JAMES.

SHALL WE REMAIN IN THE CHURCH?

A LAYMAN'S VIEW.

PROFESSOR DURANT DRAKE,

Vassar College, New York.

THE habit of churchgoing is on the wane. Naturally enough, since men are modifying so many of the beliefs to which most of the Churches demand allegiance. Even if the Liberal is welcomed by the Church, he is likely to be little helped or inspired; dogmas which are preposterous to his mind are thrust at him as though it were a sin not to profess them. Even the spiritual truth that might feed his soul is offered to him in ways he cannot accept. The whole atmosphere is apt to be stifling and oppressive; the Church seems hopelessly behind the times, and the attitude of the best people towards it is largely, as Emerson said, "a hope and a waiting."

But there is another passage of Emerson's which may well be pondered. "Be not betrayed into undervaluing the churches which annoy you by their bigoted claims. . . . I agree with them more than I disagree. I agree with their heart and motive; my discontent is with their limitations and surface and language. Their statement is grown as fabulous as Dante's *Inferno*. Their purpose is as real as Dante's sentiment and hatred of vice." Little as existing Churches often avail to help the aspiring soul, stale and narrow and uninspired as are many of their preachers, bigoted and form-ridden as are many of their members, the Church is in potentiality and not seldom in actuality the most potent for good of all human institutions.

From some points of view a new Church, not calling itself Christian or encumbered with any load of tradition and superstition, would seem best to suit our needs. The Ethical Culture Society, unfortunate in the coldness of its name, but numbering among its members not a few earnest and spiritual men, is one attempt to supply the need. The Fellowship, organised

some years ago in Los Angeles, and since carried into a number of cities, has a happier name and is arousing considerable enthusiasm. The so-called Positivist Church (Religion of Humanity) in England, the Union pour l'Action Morale in France—these are examples of the new organisations that have sprung up to take the place of the Christian Church. Bare they may seem and lacking in all the atmosphere of a Church long established and endeared to the hearts of men. But that would mend itself in time; associations would gather, enthusiasm would grow with numbers, and traditions arise.

It sometimes happens that a new Church, because it answers more exactly to the existing needs of men, can do more than one that has become petrified in old forms and has ceased to represent living impulses. It does not thrust the skeletons of ancient beliefs upon men; and by putting its truth in fresh and contemporary language it may touch new springs of emotion in them and reveal heights which they had not before glimpsed.

Mr Henry Sturt of Oxford, in his book *The Idea of a Free Church*, makes an eloquent plea for such a brand-new organisation. It is possible that this century may see the founding of many new Churches upon the basis of freedom of belief. But, after all, what a sad duplication of resources, what wastefulness of human effort, it would be! There are far too many organisations in the field already; if only they could all be persuaded to join forces, and make the basis of their united communion broad enough for every earnest and aspiring man and woman to feel at home in it, immeasurably more could be accomplished. The Christian Church, with her splendid historic background, her hold on the affections of the people—still very great in spite of the widespread chafing at her creeds,—with her loyalty to the commanding personality of the prophet-martyr Christ, has a momentum and a prestige that increase tenfold her power and usefulness.

It takes a happy inspiration and a peculiar combination of circumstances to launch successfully a new religion. Especially is this so if the new religion is not to be floated upon false hopes and supernatural glories. Religion is a natural growth, not a made-to-order article; the great spiritual seers—as Buddha, Christ, Luther—have been but reformers of pre-existing religions, and have retained more than they inaugurated. It is possible that a rational religion might be artificially built up and propagated, as an artificial and rational language might be—Esperanto is making some headway. But continuity counts for a great deal, and the old familiar languages

and religions have the advantage. The likelihood is that if Christianity should remain stubbornly unprogressive the larger proportion of the population would cease to have any religion.

For many reasons it is earnestly to be hoped that the Christian Church will realise its opportunity and so alter its teaching as to become the Church of the future. It has—to mention one—the inestimable advantage of an already widespread and powerful organisation, large endowments, schools of the ministry, thousands of church buildings throughout the country. It would be an economic waste of considerable magnitude to leave the old church buildings to become gradually emptier and emptier and duplicate the expenditures that have produced such valuable property.

But more than that, the Christian Church has a stirring history behind it, a wealth of associations, a noble roll-call of heroes and martyrs, all that appeals to the imagination and to the heart. It has forms and ceremonies, grown impressive through long use, that can be adapted for the future. It has, in spite of considerable lack of touch with modern thought, a deep hold on the affections of the people; it inspires an instinctive reverence and awe. It has already at hand formed habits of churchgoing, meetings for prayer and Christian endeavour, everything that cultivates the religious life. All that it needs is to drop, like an outgrown shell, its obsolete dogmas and its irritating dogmatism.

We reckon our calendar from the birth of Christ: Christmas is our chief holiday. The Christian pulpit is the place, among Aryan peoples, from which to teach ideals and spiritualise life. The Christian Church will persist, whether it oppose scientific teaching or no; it has too much momentum behind it, it is too splendid, too deep-rooted in our civilisation, to die. The only safeguard against its pernicious and choking influence upon the spread of sound ideas of life lies in its liberalisation. A new Church would give spiritual help to a small class of the enlightened, but would leave the old Church still to oppress the minds of the many; we should have the same sorry spectacle of a great and venerable institution offering food for the spirit but opposing the spread of knowledge.

If, then, the Christian Church has the best vantage-point from which to work, the immediate need is to make prevalent that interpretation of Christianity which shall enable it to draw all earnest men to its fold and unite them in a task that requires our utmost and united efforts. Let us who have hesitated as to our duty boldly proclaim ourselves Christians: not sceptics, for we do not doubt the importance of Christian

ideals; not infidels, if we are not unfaithful to those ideals; not opponents of Christianity, for he alone really opposes Christianity who teaches worldliness, licence, self-indulgence. We who read with discriminating eyes the ancient pages of Scripture can find inspiration there as well as those whose religion depends on their misunderstanding them. We who see with the clearer vision of modern historical research the noble figure of Jesus can acknowledge him as our Master no less reverently than those who read their mediæval dogmas into his teaching and personality. We who love the Christian Church, whose hearts are naturally loyal to her symbols, carrying on the spiritual warfare that she has so long waged, should keep our home within her sanctuary and call ourselves by the great name—Christian.

Man needs not only religion—he needs *a* religion. Our religion will be none the less a rational and universally human religion from having a local habitation and a name. It may well be that a man cannot find in the churches near him any inspiration, any new breadth of vision or insight into his problems; that is his misfortune. But it may also be his opportunity. Let him heartily enter some church, give of his own ardour and experience, and help make it the source of power it should be. The good that he can do may seem infinitesimal, and not worth the waste of time and the irksome attendance at a service with which he is only half in sympathy. It is like the duty to vote, which by so many busy men is neglected because one ballot more or less among the thousands counts so little. But elections are lost that way; and churches are lost, are given over to the narrow-minded and illiberal, dwindle in number, lose their effectiveness. And so those of the community who are not fortunate in their home influences grow up with practically no training in the duties of life, no thought and no interest in spiritual things.

No matter, then, if churchgoing appear a burden and a hardship, if it give us little meat for our souls; no matter if we feel at times in a false position and seem to stand for beliefs we cannot hold: these are small sacrifices for so great an end. Let us check our impatience at the ignorance, the narrowness, the dogmatism that we find there; let us give of our knowledge and enthusiasm, and join humbly with all those, whatever their belief, who strive for the spirit of Christ and seek to live the Christian life. For these things are incomparably more important than those other things; all who believe in that spirit and that life are our brothers, and what we have in common is far greater than our differences. If we go, not

in the critical spirit, or merely seeking to get something for ourselves, but because we sympathise with those who are striving to live purely, and wish for fellowship with them, because we wish to give our mite of strength and influence to what is, after all, the greatest force in the world for righteousness, and to help in the making of it more and more such a force—if we go in this spirit, we shall hardly fail to be the better for it ourselves.

We may recall the words of Mill: “If all were to desert the Church who put a large and liberal construction on its terms of communion, or who would wish to see those terms widened, the national provision for religious teaching and worship would be left utterly to those who take the narrowest, the most literal, and purely textual view of the formularies. Therefore, if it were not an impertinence in me to tender advice in such a matter, I should say, let all who conscientiously can remain in the Church. A Church is far more easily improved from within than from without.”

A lady once told Huxley that, as she did not believe the Athanasian Creed, she had got up and left church when the minister began to read it. “Now, Mr Huxley, don't you think I was quite right to mark my disapproval?” “My dear lady,” said Huxley, “I should as soon think of rising and leaving your table because I disapproved of one of the entrées.”

If the Church is not to be more and more a force for reaction and stupidity, if it is not to continue the decay which in many quarters seems to be begun, if it is to develop along the liberal lines that are in many other quarters being manifested, if it is going to be anything like the power for good it might be in the world, we must not desert it in this time of stress. We owe it to the future—if there seems to be no present good to be attained—to stay by it, and not to leave it to the ultra-conservative and bigoted. The Church is as necessary an institution as the school or the public library. If it is not what it ought to be, it is for us to keep working until we make it what it ought to be.

One of many contemporary expressions of this spirit may be found in an article contributed anonymously to the *Outlook* a year or two ago by a worker in St George's Church, New York City. “I am,” the writer says, “or at least I try to be, a man. To that end I endeavour to be courageous, truthful, and considerate of others. At St George's and in its work I find an atmosphere which stimulates me in this effort and helps me to refurbish ideals which are tarnished by the acid gases that are constantly generated by the struggle for

existence. . . . The theories of the Church with regard to the supernatural or the transcendental interest me not at all. I regard the Christian Church in its entirety, including both Catholics and Protestants, as the most beneficent organisation society has yet devised for the promotion of altruism and morality. I feel that St George's is the most virile and congenial arm of that organisation with which I have come in contact. I am conscious that it helps me as I have stated, and that it inspires me with a desire to help others.

"I am therefore glad to do what I can in my humble way to forward the work in which St George's is engaged, and feel it a privilege to attend its services, although I am not confirmed, do not go to Communion, and would be guilty of intellectual hypocrisy if I repeated the Creed or joined in the petitions and declarations of the Prayer Book.

"I am writing this because my observation leads me to believe that many other laymen feel as I do in regard to questions of theology. . . . Such men no longer identify themselves with the Church, and are leaving it in large numbers, because they feel that they will be hypocritical and so regarded if they join in the work of an organisation that professes to believe some theories which they cannot accept.

"These same men are nevertheless anxious to do good, to help their fellow-men, and to live clean, honest, and healthful lives.

"To such men I would say that . . . a literal acceptance of its creeds and theology has become impossible for most people. They need not, however, be thereby deterred from joining in its humanitarian work if they think that it is worth while. No suspicion of hypocrisy will rest upon them for so doing."

It is not, however, merely for the sake of those whom we can help through the Church, or for the sake of the Church itself, but for our own sakes. Religion tends to languish in those to whom the traditional dogmatic expression of it has become impossible. Such persons are much too ready to acquiesce in isolation as a necessary result of their opinions. "It is surely a weakness, when we are not pressed for our opinions, to make so much of them to other people, or to ourselves, as to be excluded or to exclude ourselves from joining in a common activity, the spirit of which we inwardly reverence and would gladly make our own, while in separation we are almost certain to lose it."¹

It is a critical time for religion. Fact and illusion have

¹ T. H. Green, *Faith*.

been so long intertwined, religion has come to be so closely associated with particular world-views, that the decay of the latter threatens to involve the decay of the former also. Now, if ever, must we cling firmly to the great and ultimate realities of life. Let each man who has moved away from the traditional doctrines be zealous that he fail not in his life: rather let his righteousness exceed that of these others; let him be sterner with himself, more instant and inflexible in denying his lower nature, in refusing to give way to self-indulgence or greed; that all may see that clearness of sight and fervour of heart are not incompatible. Let it be seen that the danger to religion lies not in any change of beliefs, but in that sluggish indifference which may consort with any belief, that worldliness and pleasure-seeking to which we are more and more tempted by the very advance and betterment of our material civilisation.

Let the pessimism and vulgarity that flaunt themselves in our literature be branded for what they are, not the unfortunate result of irreligion, but irreligion itself. Let the finger of condemnation be pointed at the rake, the trifler, the unscrupulous merchant, the dirty politician. Let every man in his private and in his public life keep clean and honest and upright; let him not relax his moral vigour or be afraid of hard work, of poverty, or of pain; let him not become effeminate, luxury-loving, immersed in selfish ease. The Church stands there to tell us that there is something higher and better than ourselves to live for, something unspeakably great and worthy of our utmost endeavours and our entire allegiance: that we can rise above our own petty failures and disappointments in the thought of serving, at however humble a post, in the greatest of all causes—of which all worthy causes, all good work, and every loving deed form a living part,—the service of humanity, which is the service of God. And in that service, according to the measure of our devotion, we shall find peace.

The future of the Church should be to us all a matter of grave anxiety. Will the reactionary forces win the day and the Church stand opposed to the intellectual enlightenment which science is forcing upon the world? If so, her doom is sounded. She will undoubtedly persist, with recurrent revivals of ardour, into the indefinite future. But she will cease gradually to be a vital force in the world: and meanwhile, for a long time, the unhappy conflict of ideals, between intellectual honesty and spiritual fervour, will continue to tear the hearts of earnest men and divide their allegiance. Worst of all, until men succeed in building upon a rational foundation a great new religion, and until it attains the prestige of numbers and

of age, there will be increasing danger of irreligion, of every form of licence and excess. If, on the other hand, the Church will but admit freely the new knowledge of our times, realise her true function as guardian not of the cosmological ideas but of the moral ideals of mankind, and maintain more and more vigorously her inspiring and wisely repressive influence over conduct, we may look for the time when all men of good-will shall re-enter her fold and Christendom shall again be a name synonymous with "the Western World."

This is surely one of the most momentous issues of our times. It is momentous in that the outcome will affect the intellectual status of the generations yet unborn, will decide whether their minds shall be filled with theological fictions or with scientific verities. It is far more momentous in that it will affect the religious life of those generations. If "orthodoxy," even in some modified and expurgated form, wins the day in the Churches, more and more men will be driven from them, and the likelihood is that a large proportion of mankind for an indefinite time to come will be without that moral impetus which a great organised Church can impart.

The Church of the future must present the great duties of life free from dogmatism and doubtful assertion, must give us those truths which are grounded in the very nature and conditions of human life unmixed with what is unproved or irrational. Will the Christian Church do this for us, will it adapt itself to man's clearing intellectual horizon and maintain its spiritual leadership, or must we henceforth seek elsewhere our guidance and inspiration? Are its progressive and liberal tendencies going to win the day, or will the forces of conservatism and reaction prove the stronger? That is the great religious question of the near future. The Christian Church is engaged in a struggle to the death between the forces that make for such a liberalisation of religion and those that make for reaction. On the outcome of this struggle depend our hopes—whether we, and our descendants, may come to her for our guidance and inspiration, or whether we must look elsewhere.

The present situation is far from satisfactory. But there are many hopeful signs. If the Church shall finally come to walk hand in hand with science, it may bring wisdom into religion and religion into everyday work in a degree unknown hitherto. From this alliance should spring types of spiritual life larger and finer than those which the old faith, so sweet but so narrow, could engender. A Church that based its teaching wholly upon indubitable facts and a rational concep-

tion of the universe could become in fullest degree the inspiration and guide of humanity. The Christian Church could be the rallying-place in the fight against all forms of evil, the joy and consolation of all those who long to forget their own petty lives in something finer and larger. Here could the lonely of heart find welcome and fellowship, the ignorant and groping find counsel and direction from wisdom and experience. As in the early Christian era, so again the Church's triumphs would be our triumph and her life our life; to her we would gladly give our strength and in her service realise the meaning of our common brotherhood.

Some of the Christian Churches are rapidly approaching this ideal. But there are strong forces at work for a narrower interpretation of religion. It is a crucial epoch in the history of Christianity. If the Church fails to rise to its opportunity and make the necessary readjustment, there is yet long strife and bitterness before us, and the union of earnest men against the powers of darkness will be long delayed. A Christianity such as we have described has never yet been realised on earth—who knows how it might transform the world! Has the Christian Church vitality and power of growth enough to meet its opportunity, or will its potentialities remain undeveloped and its prestige count more and more on the side of reaction and division? The future of religion among us hangs in the balance, and with it, in no inconsiderable degree, the future of humanity.

DURANT DRAKE.

VASSAR COLLEGE, POUGHKEEPSIE, N.Y.

MOTHER ENGLAND.

EDWARD M. CHAPMAN,

New London, Conn.

THERE is challenge in the title. The writer will be reminded that multitudes in America trace descent from the races of Continental Europe, Africa, or Asia, and that considerable groups have come from Canada and Mexico. The Irish-Americans will, of course, hold up hands of horror that any American should feel kindly toward Britain. Considerable numbers, even of the native-born, with several generations of native-born before them, will boggle at the words. Why?

The question has been debated often and at length. The memory of ancient feuds, the ill-told history of two wars, the old-time condescension of occasional British visitors and the bumptiousness of frequent American tourists, an identity of language which has made it easy for each people to feel the pin-pricks of the other, a similarity of institutions and customs which invites comparison, and an intellectual kinship which brings an equally high spirit to the maintenance of each side in every Anglo-American controversy, all enter into the account. Yet, despite these things, the feeling of kinship persists. In times of peace a cousinly jealousy may colour international relation and reference. Irish propaganda in season and out of season no doubt has its effect; though it has of late been so overdone as to invite reaction. But let Britain be really threatened, and the true American is conscious that the threat concerns him. So long as this involves only her outward show of wealth or prestige, he will remain philosophical enough; but let it reach to the fundamentals of government or the ideals of law and freedom, and he perceives it to concern him very deeply. Enough of the old bad tendency to twist the British Lion's tail remains to lead cheap rhetoricians in Congress and the Press to make capital out of it. But the rank and file of thinking men know that

America cannot be indifferent to Britain's welfare, and that the world would be not merely ineffably poorer but vastly more difficult for the United States if foes within or without should wreck the Empire.

Then, too, the eagerness of America not merely to claim the notes and appurtenances of an old civilisation, but to have them all in an original rather than a derivative form, tends to mar the amenities of international esteem. It is said that, in the days when there was still a frontier, a certain Texas town organised itself as it thought completely. But it was suddenly found to lack a cemetery; whereupon the inhabitants, touched in their new-born civic pride, promptly shot a man and started one. The reams of good paper spoiled by nonsense in behalf of a "Great American Novel" that shall owe nothing to British, French, or German experience; the more or less hysterical pleas for American music, American poetry, and a school of distinctively American art, all sound this note of provincialism. America's contributions to art and letters are secure enough; and those of the future, we may be sure, will vastly outweigh those of the past. But to belittle Emerson, Hawthorne, or Lowell as "Victorian," and to exalt Whitman by contrast as "American," is to falsify our weights and measures. True literature abjures this pettiness. The great interpreters of life have never despised the experience of other men. Their sympathy with it has been a chief element in their own world-wide appeal. No British provincialism kept Shakespeare from adapting the tragedies of Greece, Rome, or Scandinavia to his own purposes; nor did Milton fancy that he was the less an English poet because he took so much of the setting of his mighty epic from a Hebrew source. What one may call chauvinist literature, whether bumptious or merely exclusive, is, like most inbred things, doomed to shallowness and debility.

The free man with a true freeman's outlook, can afford to avail himself of the experience and leadership of others, and is all the better qualified to make his own contribution to the common fund of the world's knowledge when he does so. However it may be with ordinary talent, Genius has an international quality that refuses to recognise the custom-house.

Now, the American boy who is at all thoughtful and observant, and who is privileged to enjoy any education worthy of the name, cannot go far without feeling the intimacy of his English heritage. He remembers, for instance, the evening on which he was advanced to the dignity of sitting up until nine o'clock—and it was to hear his father

read aloud the opening chapters of *Martin Chuzzlewit*. Sleep was heavy upon his eyelids before the appointed hour; but the memory of the mighty wind which, roaring through the streets of a little Wiltshire village, prostrated Mr Pecksniff at his own front door, is woven into life's warp and woof. "How eminently middle-class! How completely Victorian!" cries the critic, viewing this picture of a family by its fireside, listening to Dickens; and then follows the customary outburst against his tendency to sentimentalise, to write bad blank verse in the form of prose, to exaggerate his characterisation to the point of burlesque—in short, to "slop over" generally. The specific charges may be allowed, but not the general indictment. To "slop over" is the prerogative of little, half-filled, wide-mouthed, and easily agitated vessels. Dickens was none of these. He ran over, no doubt; but it was from superabundance of matter, from sheer excess of vitality, spilling enough good stuff in the process to have made the fortune of many a little story-teller of later days.

"This, then, was a household that aped English ways and moulded itself upon an old-world pattern," pursues the critic. It was nothing of the sort. The family had a certain stability owing to generations of residence in America, and some resultant traditions, of course. Several of this boy's forebears had, indeed, fought side by side with Englishmen in the Colonial wars, but others had just as sturdily borne arms against them in 1776 and 1812. They were highly independent Americans; but they were intelligent enough to recognise the fact that the treasures of a great language and a great history were common to both peoples, and that to deprive children of this heritage for partisan or provincial reasons was to display not independence but mere schismatic truculence. The note of exclusiveness in literature is always a little childish, and literature itself which aims at breaking up traditions or challenging the validity of man's deeper experiences, instead of trying to depict and interpret these in terms of power and beauty, though it may win a momentary hearing, is doomed to a life as brief as it is hectic.

So when this same boy attended town-meeting and listened to his elders arguing and deciding questions of local government, he was interested to observe that these plain Americans seemed to be perpetuating the great institutions of freedom which history showed him to have been possessed by Englishmen in higher degree and for a longer time than by any other people in the world. Indeed, his observation went further. He grew to admire both the manner and matter of the

discussions upon roads and schools. These plain farmers and merchants might drop into a vernacular that left something to be desired grammatically when they were on their ordinary business; but when they rose to address their fellows on public affairs the best of them showed a quiet dignity of bearing and a gift of speech that were impressive. The speech was very far from being rude and ungrammatical. It was often a trifle old-fashioned, as though touched by the influence of the Bible and the elder English essayists; but it was beautifully clear, restrained, and cogent. Though these men never formulated any philosophy of public speech, they shrank instinctively from all that was turgid or pretentious. Speech must have dignity and simplicity; it must be as pungent as possible; and it must be *ad rem*—always *ad rem*. Of course, bombast and self-display found their way into such public meetings; but they were quickly appraised at their true worth. The hifalutin orator had his hearing, and was remembered—though only to be quoted with a smile. Altogether these debates were a considerable means of education to a youth in the formative period.

Some years later he chanced to spend several days in the House of Commons—in the Speaker's Gallery for the most part, but with an interlude "under the Gallery," and so practically, though not technically, upon the floor of the House. He heard various debates, ranging from matters of urgent imperial moment to questions of parliamentary procedure; and as it went on, he was impressed by the fact that there was a marked resemblance between the best speaking in this historic chamber and that in his native town-hall. He did not lose sight of the gulfs of experience that separated the trained Parliamentarian from the plain citizen; nor did he shut his eyes to the presence of occasional fustian and pretence in both places; but the kinship in taste, in manner and effect, was, as he thought, manifest.

So when from time to time he visited a court of law and noted its paraphernalia for getting as clear and unbiassed testimony as possible from witnesses and the submission of this to a jury, he was once more conscious of standing in the line of English descent. He could not shut his eyes to certain infelicities and occasional inequities in this system. But when it failed to function properly the failure generally worked to the advantage of the accused; the criminal occasionally escaped, but the innocent were scarce ever condemned or so treated as to feel themselves the object of tyranny. And this attitude toward an accused man appeared to him to be

part of a heritage of freedom for the sake of which men of English blood had gone far and borne much. In spite of all that mere professional tactics and the irresponsible pettefogger could occasionally do to pervert its means, the ends of justice were substantially served as men of English ideals, speech, and experience had been made to feel was right. The whole great fabric of the common law administered in all quarters of the globe wherever men of English blood had found their way appealed to him as an endeavour to apply the general principles of fairplay and the lessons of human experience in other days to the difficult art of living together to-day. This is not to deny the tendency of all procedure to encrust itself and harden into relative inefficiency; but it is to assert that men of English race in the old world and the new alike, have confessed their confidence in sound sense, ripe experience, and mutual good-will, as affording a practicable road through life's tangles. The "Yea" which these men have uttered to life has been something more than a swelling word accompanied by a theatrical gesture. It has had purpose behind it, and essential good-will has spoken through it.

Emerson once remarked that the English were heavy at the fine arts but adroit at the coarse, and cited in illustration their machinery, their ships, and the tasks to which they set these. With a difference, the saying applies to America, and the difference is very much that which might exist between mother and child. Big and so-called practical tasks have long engrossed us in America; they were indeed thrust upon us by the circumstances of our settlement and phenomenal growth. Things had to be done that required practical ingenuity; they were big things; and they must needs be done swiftly. The same utilitarian urge was upon us that developed the Manchester School of Political Economy and made Victorian England the workshop of the world. In England it had evolved the steam engine, invented and perfected spinning machinery, brought coal and iron into profitable conjunction, and built ships that carried steel and cotton to the earth's ends. In America the task presented a different phase. A continent must need be subdued; vast spaces must first be explored, then spanned by a practicable way, then settled. One of the greatest of civil wars had to be fought to determine the stability of the national government and affirm the validity of its principles. These were mighty practical tasks; but so big and urgent as to invite an era of swiftness and mere facility. Much building was

done that seemed bound to fall down in a decade or two, and a critical world contrasted the solidity of England's accomplishment with the superficiality of America's. Too often, however, they mistook the scaffold for the edifice and the preface for the book. It was not only inevitable in practice, but it was not altogether undesirable in theory that this first attack upon the American problem should be somewhat experimental and bring but partial results. An era of far more substantial and worthy achievement is following it.

The really lamentable thing about all this was, of course, the waste involved. But it is here that the kinship between the two peoples appears in a new light. Both trust the pragmatic method. They learn by doing, and often learn by doing very ill. "At the beginning of each war, England has had to seek in blood the knowledge necessary to secure success," once observed a clear-eyed and friendly American student of her history. He might have said the same of his own people. The remark that the English are a warlike rather than a military nation has application on both sides of the sea. Though the charmers of "preparedness" charm never so wisely, they are not likely to convert men of English or American blood to the gospel of militarism. But neither can the nations that love war (if any such be left) hide from themselves the enormous gifts of these peoples for swift adaptation of their resources to the needs of war, if war need be. The North blundered in the Virginian Peninsula, at Fredericksburg, and at Chancellorsville, as England blundered at Gallipoli; but only to belt its armour tighter, to grip its sword more firmly, to take counsel of its mistakes, and to win after all. Neither England nor America was ready as their foes were; but their swift, even if wasteful, preparation under circumstances of the greatest stress will long serve as a warning to militarism of the peril involved in rousing the great free peoples. It is true that they are often accused of putting too much faith in their ability "to muddle through"; and their self-reliance in this respect has passed into a proverb. Until very recently America's fiscal system (or lack of it) was an invitation to financial disaster, and to-day she is annually raising and spending sums reaching far into the billions without any systematic budget. It is both pitiful and stupid, as was our long-time lack of any adequate parcels post, and as is our present failure to regulate our expenditure of forest products. We are true children of a short-sighted but practical mother in these particulars. The needed thing, plain as a pikestaff to discerning eyes for a

generation, is seen at last by Congress or by Parliament, and "steps are taken"—in many cases too late. Meantime, our fertility in practical devices keeps us going and rescues us from half the privation invited by our blunders.

A recent writer upon English and American tool builders¹ has noted the fertility of the French in certain mechanical ideas and their extraordinary skill in building beautiful models; while the Germans have shown great ability in adapting practical and "going" machines or tools to new purposes, sometimes beneficent, and, of late, too often devilish. As early as 1569, for instance, there was a French screw-cutting lathe; by 1740 France had developed the use of gears instead of ropes for it, and by 1772 the slide rest was evidently in use; but it was the Englishman, Henry Maudslay, who with his successors gave this device such development as made it fundamental in great new enterprises. The man in the street has but a very partial realisation of the place which the manufacture of machine tools holds in the progress of industry. England has won pre-eminence through the inventions of a long line of great mechanics from Wilkinson of Bersham to Sir Joseph Whitworth. It remained for America, in her development of guns and gun-making machinery, to evolve the principle of interchangeable parts which is now so widely and swiftly applied to the manufacture of machines as diverse as watches and automobiles; and in her building of cotton machinery to develop at the same time the American general machine tool. This whole story of mechanical and industrial evolution is like a chapter in family development. More than a trace of rivalry runs through it; jealousy and hostile criticism mar it; the American inclines to think the British device awkward, and the Briton contemns the American tool as flimsy; but all the time each is profoundly influencing and learning from the other. The American is the thinner-skinned and more easily irritated by this experience; but the reason is to be sought not, as is often asserted, in the Englishman's self-satisfaction, but rather in the fact that England has so generally found her keenest critics among her most loyal children that she has become indurated to the critic from abroad. Nothing that the American can say counts for much in comparison with her own unsparing pens and voices. Poets from Crabbe to William Watson, novelists like Dickens, Kingsley, and Gissing, publicists like Mill, and prophetic preachers like Ruskin and Carlyle have

¹ *English and American Tool Builders*, by Joseph Wickham Roe, Yale University Press, 1916.

gained half their hearing because, speaking as Britain's loyal sons, they have so unsparingly revealed and rebuked their mother's sins. Of course, Britain has been restive under this treatment; but she has none the less listened and in a very large degree heeded. Boastful in some sense the Englishman occasionally is; but, as Mr Galsworthy has recently pointed out, he is quite as often heard in criticism as in praise of things English; so that upon the whole the tone of both press and public speech is probably more wholesome and candid in Great Britain than in any country in the world.

The Germans tried to set the fashion of calling the English "hypocrites," and with some success, but this is like the American fashion of claiming that the Briton has no sense of humour. I have even found relatively intelligent Americans who would not admit *Punch* to the list of humorous journals—and this in the heyday of Sir Henry Lucy, whose "Diary of Toby, M.P." was probably the best sustained and cleverest chapter in serio-comic journalism that the world has ever seen. It is always in order to ask this critical American who doubts British capacity to make or take a joke where the world's honest comedy has come from; and, indeed, whether he himself has ever laughed more heartily or more innocently than with Dickens and De Morgan, or, on a plane of broader farce, with Jacobs or the Grossmiths or Harry Lauder. The mathematical creator of *Alice* has for two generations delighted all who were children in age or in heart. Scarce any reformer on the platform ever tickled so many American risibles as J. B. Gough; Mr Chesterton's paradoxes sometimes achieve a Gargantuan effect; Sir James Barrie has swayed uncounted multitudes to smiles as well as tears; and even Mr Shaw is admitted to show now and then a gleam of humour—although he maintains (and the writer thinks with justice) that his audiences usually laugh in the wrong place. All this is to leave on one side the higher and more recondite humour which Meredith discussed and sometimes illustrated. It says nothing of the delights of Cowper's letters or Lamb's essays, of Edward FitzGerald writing to Fanny Kemble, or Freeman forgetting the Normans while addressing "Johnny" Green. Carlyle's grim smile at one end of the scale can no more be neglected than Sir W. S. Gilbert's *Bab Ballads* at the other; and even Mr "Walt" Mason, who, in his Kansas home, has for years been grinding out newspaper paragraphs in burlesque verse disguised as prose, and whose humour might commonly be regarded as

completely American, so broad and farcical is it, is said to have been born a British subject.

The charge of hypocrisy is so easy to make, and, because it reaches to inner and hidden motives, necessarily so difficult to refute, that it naturally becomes a first resource of nations whose plans have met with English obstacles. The German outcry against British "egoism" and insincerity in the early days of the war almost succeeded in reaching the plane of humour. It was but an echo, however, of a similar charge made in Napoleon's day. Mr Hardy, in his *Dynasts*, has put it into the mouth of Decrès speaking to Napoleon:—

“ . . . A certain sort of bravery
Some people have—to wit, this same Lord Nelson—
Which is but fatuous faith in one's own star
Swoln to the very verge of childishness
(Smugly disguised as putting trust in God,
A habit with these English folk); whereby
A headstrong blindness to contingencies
Carries the actor on and serves him well
In some nice issues clearer sight would mar.”

No doubt England has had her share of self-seeking and insincere leaders; no doubt she, like other nations, has sometimes played fast and loose with the great name of Liberty; yet the fact remains that, as diplomacy and statesmanship go, she has generally said what she meant and done what she said. Peel rather than Disraeli represents her in the long run. Cromwell, in a memorable letter, once told those who had charge of military affairs that he must have men who would put conscience into what they did. He got them; and no shouting of "Hypocrite" by their adversaries served to lessen their efficiency or dull the edge of their swords. England has been fortunate beyond most nations in the service of men in high places who put conscience into what they did. One does not need to be an uncritical admirer of Mr Gladstone to feel the justice of the tribute once paid to him: "You have so lived and wrought as to keep the soul alive in England." Lord Morley has recorded the words, and has himself furnished another illustration of them. So in varying degree among statesmen of high rank did both the Pitts, Burke, Peel, Clarendon, and, in our own time, Viscount Grey.

Among men who have held secondary place in government and party councils it is doubtful if any nation can show a nobler list than that which includes Romilly, Lord Althorp, the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury, Lord Hartington

(as Americans will always remember him), John Bright, Lord Selborne, and Viscount Bryce among its members. The Englishman will smile at what must seem to him this heterogeneous assembly of names. They are little more than a random selection from a multitude of those who have given character to British statesmanship. Blameless they were not; or always consistent. It may be admitted further that the foresight and general intelligence of leaders like Althorp and Hartington was rather ordinary than eminent. But they had integrity, and they were capable of sacrifice for the sake of principle. They probably would have shrunk from admitting that they put conscience into what they did. The phrase might have savoured of cant then. It sounds (*horribile dictu*) "Victorian" now. But the fact stands; and it is significant of much that has given Britain her rightful place of influence in the councils of the world. In no other great legislative body is the plea to conscience based on the principles of truth and justice less likely to be openly made, or if made, more certain to be received with doubt, if not with ironical laughter, than in the House of Commons. In no great legislative body is it so sure ultimately to make its way and bring results. Wilberforce fighting the Slave Trade, Romilly reforming the Penal Code, Ashley pleading for the Ten Hour Bill, all illustrate my contention from the records of yesterday. To-day in the midst of social revolution the same process goes on—lamely, to be sure, or it would not be English, yet so certainly as to comfort the American onlooker with the assurance that here he is watching progress that will not invite reaction. He may smile or shake an anxious head at England's ineradicable tendency "to muddle through." In his heart he knows that when she has solved her problem he will be forced, as so often before, to go to school to her experience.

EDWARD M. CHAPMAN.

NEW LONDON, CONN.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"THE FETTER ON PROTESTANTISM."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1919, p. 694.)

IN Mr W. Garrett Horder's interesting article on "The Fetter on Protestantism," he directs attention to a very important matter which affects the laity. He says, "Protestantism, in spite of its boast of having the right of private judgment, has allowed itself to be fettered to a Book," and the drift of his argument is that we should be guided more by the spirit which is in us than by the letter of the Book itself, which has led many ordinary people into serious mental difficulties concerning religion.

These difficulties are very real to those who feel them, and they command the sympathy of all earnest thinkers; but it is possible that they may be caused by a habit of what may be called superficial, as contrasted with careful and attentive, reading of the Bible, together with reading into its pages preconceived ideas which really are not in it.

A question I wish to discuss is this, Why do so many good and thoughtful laymen object to religion and cease to make any profession of it? That they do so is a fact, deplored by all members of the Church, which has come into prominence in the present day. If they were evil livers who wanted to escape from the restraints imposed on them by it, their position could be easily explained; but those to whom I refer are persons who object to religion, as it exists, because, as they say, there are things in the Bible to which they cannot assent, as they have been discovered by science to be untrue, and there are other things in it which shock their moral sense, some being unjust and some unclean, so that they cannot approve of them. To any who have felt these difficulties, even though they have held on to the religion in which they have been brought up, I offer some thoughts which may steady their faith and remove their mental objections.

The Reformation was brought about by the revolt of men's minds against the teaching and the practice of the Church which had claimed to be the sole authority to which all were bound to submit both in doctrine and secular education. The Bible, which had been recently

translated into English, was being read by the people for the first time. Men discovered that many doctrines, hitherto accepted as true, were not found in the Bible. And when Galileo discovered that the earth moved, whereas the Pope pronounced officially that it stood so fast that it could not be moved, the first open breach was made between the teaching of the Church and the discoveries of science.

The Reformers decided to reject the claim of the Church to be the one infallible teacher, and to accept the Bible as their own infallible guide. Christendom thus fell into two divisions separated by two distinct principles.

Those who remained in the Church of Rome believed all that the Church taught, and, so recently as 1870, they crowned the edifice of their religion by proclaiming belief in the personal infallibility of the Pope as an article of faith, necessary for salvation.

On the other hand, all Protestant denominations took the Bible as their guide, accepting the Creeds, not on the authority of the Church, but on the ground that every statement in them could be proved to be true by warrant of the Holy Scriptures. They believed that the writers of every book in them, and every word in each book were so inspired by God that they were all as infallible as the Pope claimed to be, so that each single text, taken by itself out of its context, could prove the truth of a doctrine, whether that doctrine was referred to in the context or not. This belief was held firmly by all down to the days of our grandfathers, or even our fathers. The only Bible with which they were acquainted was the translation known as the Authorised Version. When it was made in the reign of King James the First, learned men had not access to many ancient documents; and as learning had made great advances since then, it was decided, late in the nineteenth century, that a new translation of the Bible should be issued in the English language, which is known as the Revised Version. In it large alterations of the Authorised Version were made. The committee which published it did not claim any infallibility, and it was evident that the former committee, though doing their best, had made many obvious mistakes. These, however, were mostly verbal, and did not in any way detract from the historical truthfulness of the Book, considered as a whole. In the Revised Version we have as near an approach to what the writers said as any translation is likely to attain.

Now that we have got it, the next question is, How are we to use it? The first thing we have to do is to read it—not as we read a novel, skipping the pages which we think are uninteresting, but studying it carefully and intelligently. If we do so, we discover many facts of which we may not have been aware. First, that the books of the Old Testament were written as history, the history of man's search after God through long centuries, man searching for light and spiritual knowledge. His ideas about God were at first crude and primitive. They are recorded just as they were. If it be said that they are not Christian conceptions, of course they are not. If man had invented Christianity from the first, there would have been no need for Christ's revelation of God the Father. But these early gropings are valuable evidence that the revelation of God to man was progressive. Our Lord indicated this when He said, "It has been said by them of old time" so-and-so, "but I say unto you"—and then He gave the better and higher commandment.

With this thought always present in our minds, we can read the Old

Testament history with deep interest and without any offence to our moral judgment. The customs of each age were reflected in the religious feelings of that age, and before we condemn former ages as being very ignorant and unmerciful, let us remember that Daniel's praise of the glory which God gave Nebuchadnezzar, "Whom he would he slew, and whom he would he kept alive," was accepted as a divine right by Christian nations until comparatively recent times. It was the right of every autocrat. The elect few got all the good things of life, while the downtrodden masses of the people were considered to be of no importance. This feeling was crystallised in the doctrine of particular election and redemption; those who believed it were the people who were always well off in this world, they belonged to the elect class. The moral difficulty of that doctrine originated not in the Bible, but in the visible hard facts of social distinctions.

Now let us turn to consider difficulties arising out of the supposed opposition between the statements in the Bible and the recent discoveries of science. As it takes two to make a fight, there cannot be a fight of mutual opposition, because the Bible makes no claim to be a text-book of science applying to all ages. Each book in the Bible reflects the secular knowledge of the age in which it was written, and even so, if we read it carefully, we shall find that in some cases those ancient writers knew more about facts than our immediate forefathers did.

Let me take one instance concerning the recent discoveries of the existence of prehistoric man. We who are middle-aged or elderly were brought up in the belief that Adam was the first human being, and great was the shock felt by many when geologists proclaimed the fact that human remains had been found, buried in strata of the earth, which were deposited thousands upon thousands of years ago. The cry went up that science required us to believe that the Bible was all wrong, and that if we believed what science said, we must reject the Bible. No such fright was necessary, for the fact was that we had read the Bible carelessly, without noticing what is written on the very face of its pages. This was because we were blinded by old prejudices, having been brought up under the traditional views of our forefathers. All knew that there were three stages in the evolution of man's inventions: the Stone Age, in which sharp stones, chiefly flints, were used as implements; the Bronze Age, when man had discovered how to fuse copper and tin, thus making hard bronze; and the third, the Iron Age, when his knowledge had advanced to the smelting of iron out of the red earth known as iron ore. But it was supposed by all that Adam lived long before these ages. Now the Bible states that Adam was a tiller of the garden of Eden. Abel was a keeper of domesticated sheep. Cain was a tiller of the ground, and, being banished from Eden, he feared that everyone who met him would kill him. He travelled to the land of Nod, and found there a woman whom he took to wife. There also he built a city, obviously by the help of labourers, and built to provide houses for inhabitants. Jabal dwelt in tents and kept cattle; Jubal made harps and organs; and Tubal Cain was an artificer in brass and iron.

These men all lived in the time of Adam, for after the record of their works and habits of life we read that Eve had a son whom she named Seth. These facts show that, according to the statements of the Bible, Adam lived when civilisation was far advanced. The natural conclusion to be drawn is that Adam is represented as the ancestor of civilised man, and

that the existence of prehistoric man is freely admitted and implied on the very face of the narrative. Where, then, is the fancied opposition between the Bible and the discoveries made by science? On the contrary, we know that the discoveries made by antiquaries have been the main cause of the overthrow of the theories advanced by the German critics, whose motive, confessed by themselves, in cutting up the Bible into small pieces of purely human origin, was that when they had destroyed the authority of the Bible they might set mankind free from the bondage of dogma—that is, from the restraint imposed on men by the Christian religion. The geologists and the antiquaries have done more than any other class of men to demonstrate that our religion is founded, not on rejected myths, but on the bed-rock of solid historical truth.

For this reason we ought to study the Old Testament with thoughtful and careful earnestness, being assured that all truth has nothing to fear from the closest investigation. It shows us that there has been in the counsels of God a long preparation before, in the fullness of time, Christ came into the world to reveal to mankind the glory of the Fatherhood of God, the splendour of the divine life of unselfishness and self-sacrifice, as opposed to the greed and selfishness of the world, and to give to all who believe in Him and who follow in His footsteps the assurance of a spiritual life beyond the grave. If we feel difficulties about the nature of that life and the survival of our bodily remains after death, in which nearly everyone until recent years believed, we have only to study carefully St Paul's statements in the fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, in which he says that there are two bodies: the natural body in which we live now, and the spiritual body which will be given to us after death. Of our earthly bodies falling into corruption he says, "that flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." Concerning our spiritual bodies, he tells the Philippians that we may look forward in faith and joyful hope: "We look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall change the body of our humiliation, that it may be fashioned like unto His glorious body, according to the working whereby He is able even to subdue all things unto Himself."

CHARLES T. OVENDEN.

ST PATRICK'S DEANERY, DUBLIN.

"A LIBERAL CHURCHMAN'S ALLEGIANCE TO THE CREEDS."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1919, p. 716.)

I HAVE read with cordial agreement Dr Hatch's essay in the *Hibbert Journal* for July. But it scarcely touches a practical question which presses rather heavily upon me. During five months—December 1918 to May 1919—I was engaged in lecturing to Canadian soldiers on "Citizenship and Social Problems from a Christian point of view." As a result of my experiences it was borne in upon me that the Christian Creeds have no vital connection with the life or thought of the vast majority of men, whether private soldiers or officers. This experience concurs with that of most, perhaps all, of the chaplains who have written on this topic.

The conclusion thus reached led naturally to the question, What is the value of the continual recitation of the Creed in our churches? The language of the Nicene Creed is much more difficult than we of the clergy realise; and so many of the phrases in the Apostles' Creed convey no meaning to the majority of people, that even its recitation has, I am convinced, become a meaningless patter, devoid of edification.

This in itself is an evil. But further, this recitation of the Apostles' or the Nicene Creed stands in the way of the introduction of some kind of statement of Christian faith and *life*, that might be arresting. I enclose a copy of such Creed as I have in mind, which I copied several years ago from the *New York Outlook*.

I have yet another difficulty about the frequent recitation of the Creeds. The period in which we are living must be thought of as a new age, and as different from the Reformation period as that was from the Mediæval. Now, what is the essential point in which the Christianity of to-day differs from that of the Reformation period? My answer to that question, submitted, I trust, with due modesty, is that in our present-day Christianity we have abandoned the dogmatic test of a Christian. We think of Christianity in terms of Life and Spirit. It is "the mind of Christ" we stress, and the spirit of a man's life.

But the custom of repeating Creeds which tend to reduce Christianity to consent or assent to a series of historical, metaphysical, or theological statements must support the notion still strong in the minds of most people that the Church puts dogma before life, and holds that Christianity as taught by the Church is something quite other than the mind or spirit of Christ applied to life.

It is for these reasons, quite apart from the question of historical fact, that I regard the Creeds as antiquated.

I would therefore plead that, whilst they be left in our Prayer Books and recited on special occasions, some other brief statement of Christian faith and life, which shall be vitally related to men's actual lives, be composed, published, and used.

A CREED FOR THE TIMES.

(From the *New York Outlook*.)

"I believe in one God, present in nature as law, in science as truth, in art as beauty, in history as justice, in society as sympathy, in conscience as duty, and supremely in Christ as our highest ideal.

"I believe in the Bible as the expression of God's will through man; in prayer as the devotion of man's will to God; and in the Church as the fellowship of those who try to do God's will in the world.

"I believe in worship as the highest inspiration to work; in sacrifice as the price we must pay to make right what is wrong; in salvation as growth out of selfishness into service; in eternal life as the survival of what loves and is lovable in each individual; and in judgment as the obvious fact that the condition of the gentle, the generous, the modest, the pure, and the true is always and everywhere preferable to that of the cruel, the sensual, the mean, the proud, and the false."

HERBERT SYMONDS.

CHRIST CHURCH CATHEDRAL, MONTREAL.

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

THE Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society, the Psychological Society, and the *Mind* Association, which took place at Bedford College in July last, was a success beyond all expectation. Never probably before in this country has there been anything like the number of people there assembled for the discussion of intricate philosophical issues. The papers that were discussed are published in a supplementary volume of the Aristotelian Society's *Proceedings*, under the title of *Problems of Science and Philosophy* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1919). One of the symposia the volume contains—that on the question “Can Individual Minds be included in the Mind of God?”—bears directly on fundamental theological conceptions, and the divergent views put forward by Dean Rashdall, Professor J. H. Muirhead, Dr F. C. S. Schiller, and Dr C. F. D'Arcy (the new Archbishop of Dublin) ought to receive from theologians careful consideration. Professor Muirhead and Dr D'Arcy reply to the question in the affirmative, Dean Rashdall and Dr Schiller, in the negative. Professor Muirhead appeals to the notion of purpose and to the unity which is effected by that kind of sharing which is only possible for minds—the sharing of a common meaning,—to illustrate what he would understand by “inclusion” in the present context. A purpose is a universal, and the purposes of individuals, in so far as they are harmonised, are, he maintains, included in the organic system of purposes which can only be real in so far as they are the purposes of a supreme mind. His argument seems to me, I confess, entirely to miss Dean Rashdall's point. As I understand it, Dean Rashdall's contention was that, while it is perfectly possible for one mind to share in the truths and meanings which another mind is sharing in, yet such truths and meanings do not constitute the *existence* of either the one mind or the other; and that, if by a mind be meant an *existent* mental life, it is unintelligible to talk of one mind including another. For, as an existent entity, a mind consists of a stream of events or processes of consciousness, that may be and are cognisant of other events or processes, but can never *be* or *include* the latter. Assuming, then, God to be, as religious thought invariably implies, an existent being, and not merely a system of truth, the otherness of God's mind to all other minds must be accepted as an inevitable consequence, because “that otherness belongs not to the limitations of consciousness but to its ‘esse.’” I think, indeed, that Dean Rashdall weakened his case by speaking of “a universal knowing or willing”;

but upon that his two critics are silent. Surely, his argument required him to say, that, although what is known and, in a sense, what is willed, may be universal, knowing and willing, as such, never can be universal. Nor should I shrink from admitting, what the argument clearly implies, that a "universal mind," if by that be meant an existent mind, is a contradiction in terms. Dr D'Arcy, for example, tries to defend the notion of "a universal unity, a spiritual whole, in which every life has a sphere and function." He sets out from the position that the material world, so far as it is known to me, is a portion of my experience (a woefully treacherous mode of expression), and that my mind, or self, in its experience of the material world, acts the part of a unifier. And he uses this as an analogy of the way in which God may be conceived as unifying the multiplicity of the spiritual world and including within Himself all individual selves. But, one may ask, in what precise sense can my individual self be said to unify the world of my experience? The "world of my experience" consists, at the present moment, of the houses, shops, colleges, gardens, boat-houses, undergraduates, dons, etc., etc., which together go to form the university town of Cambridge. Now, in a manner, no doubt, my mind may be said to unify my "ideas" (if, for the sake of brevity, I may employ that ambiguous term) of these entities, but in what conceivable way can it be said to unify these entities themselves? Dr D'Arcy insists, however, that it is the real world I know and not my own "ideas." And I protest that with the unification of this "real world" of Cambridge my mind has had no more to do than to discover and discern it, if, indeed, it has contrived to do so much as that. In short, we have here, again, the very confusion between knowledge and existence that Dean Rashdall was concerned to expose. To urge that existence cannot be separated from content is, again, beside the point. There cannot, it is true, be an act of knowing apart from a content known; but it follows not at all that the existence of what is known must needs be identical with the existence of the act of knowing it. On one matter there will, I think, be general agreement with Dr D'Arcy: arguments drawn from telepathy and "dissociations of personality" are, in this context, totally irrelevant. For there is nothing in these phenomena themselves, apart from certain crude interpretations of them, tending in the slightest degree to show that one mind, *as an existent*, can include another mind, *as an existent*. The epistemological discussion on "Is there 'Knowledge by Acquaintance'?" was opened by the present writer. I tried to show that there are not two essentially different modes of knowing; that the functions of discriminating, comparing, and relating which are admittedly fundamental in every developed act of judgment are likewise involved, though no doubt in an extremely rudimentary form, in even the vaguest awareness of any object whatsoever; and that if by "acquaintance" be meant, as unquestionably has sometimes been meant, bare acceptance of what is given, there is no such thing as "acquaintance." Dr G. E. Moore, the author of the second paper, was prepared to admit it may be the case that "the logical independence of acquaintance from knowledge about" cannot be sustained. But he insisted that what is primarily meant by "acquaintance" is either the relation of subject to object, or one particular variety of that relation, and that, so understood, "acquaintance" is, of course, an indisputable fact. Miss Beatrice Edgell maintained that the relation of subject and object is not a cognitive relation at all, and ought not to be interpreted as a relation of knower to

object known. Mr C. D. Broad would distinguish between "acquaintance" and "knowledge by acquaintance." The former, he thinks, is probably not knowledge, even though it may be called cognitive on account of its intimate connection with the latter. To the other symposium—that on "Time, Space, and Material"—there are six contributors, four of them well-known men of science, and two representatives of Bergson's philosophy, Mrs Adrian Stephen and Professor H. Wildon Carr. An opportunity is thus afforded for comparing Bergson's doctrines with the conceptions towards which physical science is tending. Bergson holds, so Mrs Stephen asserts, that material is the ultimate datum of science, that space is a form which science imposes upon its objects, and that science cannot deal with time. Professor Whitehead, on the other hand, maintains that science starts with a temporal slab of nature, or a "duration," and that it gets at its ultimate data by analysis of this complex whole. Within any whole of "duration," parts may be discriminated, which parts may be described as "events"; and events have to one another the two fundamental relations of "extension" (the common root of extension in time and extension in space) and "cogredience" (absolute spatial position in space). Space and time *are* then, according to this view, ultimate data of science. Not only so. Besides "events," nature exhibits entities which are constantly repeated, and to which the name of "objects" may be given. A mere passage of events without objects is, Professor Whitehead argues, a pure abstraction. Various types of objects may be distinguished—sense objects, perceptual objects, physical objects, and scientific objects; and, in the present stage of science, electrons are the ultimate scientific objects—the material,—which endow the events in which they are located with a qualitative character. Probably the most significant thing in Professor Nicholson's paper is his repudiation of the notion that our sense of effort has any bearing on the atomic phenomena with which physics is concerned. The quantum theory of Planck is, he points out, largely devoted to the suppression of force as a fundamental datum.

I should like, in connection with what I have just said, to call attention to a book which, although published apparently at the end of 1916, has only just reached me from America—Professor John E. Boodin's *A Realistic Universe* (New York: Macmillan & Co.). The reader who is not deterred by the rhapsodical introduction will find in the pages that follow a good deal of genuine hard thinking. The author chooses to christen the position he expounds "pragmatic realism"; and, if the title is justified, the "pragmatism" is certainly of a saner type than I have hitherto chanced to light upon. "It is not for philosophy," he tells us, "to make a world in accordance with its prejudices, but to make clear the constitution of the world as we find it." Accordingly, he tries to decipher the nature of reality as it presents itself to reflective treatment. In it he discovers five attributes, as he calls them, adopting Spinoza's term—five independent variables, or *summa genera* of differences irreducible to aspects of each other. These are stuff or energy, time, space, consciousness, and form. Energy, not substance, is the stuff of the universe; substances are mere abstractions of the relative uniformities and constancies which we observe in the stream of processes. The assemblage of properties which constitutes matter must be taken for what it is known-as in specific energy systems. Science deals with these special systems and their characteristics, and takes for granted the fact of transition from one system to another—the

transition, for example, from material systems to mental systems. Our knowing the forms and properties of systems in no way constitutes their existence; the qualities of things arise from things being in concrete contexts, and if such qualities can be discriminated in objects we must regard them as real. Stuff can be observed directly; the other attributes can only be observed through the difference they make to the stuff-structure of the world. Time makes the difference of transformation, space that of translation; time is responsible for passing away and novelty, space for the free mobility or externality of centres of energy. Consciousness, as an attribute, is not to be confounded with mind, as an existent process; consciousness is an ultimate fact, a constant in the universe, though depending upon certain conditions—mental activities, that is to say—for its manifestation. It makes to reality the difference of awareness. Finally, form, as an attribute, is the basis of direction and validity in the flux of change; it supplies to reality standards, norms, order. Professor Boodin has followed an interesting and tempting line of speculation; but at the end he stands before a formidable problem, to which I hope he will some day return—the problem, namely, as to how these attributes are so inter-related that they together constitute a coherent universe.

Dr J. S. Haldane's volume, *The New Physiology and Other Addresses* (London: Griffin & Co., 1919), is of special value just now as giving a clear and lucid exposition of the reasons which have induced a scientific investigator of great resource and skill to reject the "orthodox creed" that physico-chemical explanations are sufficient to account for the behaviour of living organisms. Dr Haldane refers to the processes of nutrition, secretion, growth, reproduction, and, more particularly, respiration, over which his own brilliant researches have thrown a flood of light, to illustrate his thesis that "the attempt to analyse living organisms into physical and chemical mechanism is probably the most colossal failure in the whole history of modern science." Quite as unsparingly, however, he repudiates the doctrine of vitalism, even in its more refined forms—the "entelechy" of Driesch and the *élan vital* of Bergson,—as equally unavailing. "We neither need, nor will have," he says, "any ghosts in physiology." "The new physiology," as he views it, works with the fundamental conception of the living organism—an organism the life of which may, in a sense, be said to be the sum of its activities, yet whose activities can only be grasped individually as activities of a whole. Incidentally, Dr Haldane throws out the striking suggestion that a living organism might conceivably be regarded as one huge unstable chemical molecule, with the proviso, however, that phenomena of fundamental significance are clearly revealed in living organisms, which have not hitherto been revealed in the study of inorganic processes, though perhaps they are beginning to come into view in recent work on the constitution of atoms. Philosophically, Dr Haldane is, I gather, in sympathy with the line of thought pursued by Viscount Haldane in his address to the British Academy on "The Doctrine of Degrees in Knowledge, Truth, and Reality" (London: Milford, 1919); and one is reminded of their early joint article on "The Relation of Philosophy to Science," published thirty-six years ago in *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, dedicated to the memory of T. H. Green.

In the last number of *Mind* (July 1919) there are two articles of unusual interest. The one is the first part of Professor James Ward's "Lecture Notes," as he calls them on "Sense-Knowledge." Professor

Ward holds that, while we are justified in regarding the progress from sense-knowledge to thought-knowledge as a continuous progress, yet the difference between sense and understanding, when at length the latter is fully developed, is unmistakable. The simplest statements that express only what is sensibly apprehended are exemplified by so-called existential, impersonal, or subjectless propositions. Knowledge may be said to start with the bare awareness of something "there"—an awareness which we, by reflection upon it, may express in the form of the mere affirmation of existence, "something is." So soon as this bare "It *is*" becomes to some extent differentiated we get the state of awareness exemplified in impersonal propositions, e.g., "It rains" or "It blows." The "It" refers not to a definite something, but rather to the environment as a whole, within which the change of which the subject becomes dimly conscious occurs. But one has got here to recognise that while the *apprehension* of change is essential to any experience at all, the *conception* of change is another and much later attainment. Genetically these propositions of sense-knowledge are inchoate judgments, essential to, but not sufficient for, thought-knowledge, and Dr Ward proceeds to show how, in demonstrative propositions, a further advance in differentiation is made. The other article to which I refer is that by Mr H. A. Prichard on "Professor John Cook Wilson." Mr Prichard makes manifest how great a loss philosophy sustained by the death of Cook Wilson some three years ago, and excites the hope that now the war is over the publication of his Lectures may not long be delayed. In his early days Cook Wilson accepted more or less the idealism then dominant, but in later years he abandoned the position, and Mr Prichard quotes, from a letter written in 1904, a passage in which the root fallacy of this way of thinking is acutely exposed. In all inquiries into the nature of knowing we are liable, Cook Wilson points out, to a certain illusion due to the circumstance that, while we have here to do with the relation of subject and object, we try to express and explain the various aspects of this relation in our ordinary categories, which are all of them categories based on the relation of object and object. Thus we come to think of knowing as the doing of something, and hence require a something to which something is done and a something in which it is done. When, however, we reflect, we can see that the very idea of knowledge is incompatible with any such *action* upon, or *suffering* in, the object known. "You can no more act upon the object in knowing than you can 'please the Dean and Chapter by stroking the dome of St Paul's.'" If we "do anything to" anything in knowing, it is obviously not done to the object known. As bearing upon the same problem, attention may be called to a thoughtful paper by Professor A. K. Rogers, of Yale University, on "Essence and Existence" (*Phil. R.*, May 1919). The writer holds that the "character" of an object is not an existent, just because existence is left out of account in thinking of its bare descriptive features, and that in interpreting the relation of cognition we have to "embody" essences not in things merely, but also in the knowledge of things, since otherwise their presence there is ultimately unintelligible. In perception, then, the situation appears to be this: A sensation is actually there as an existent psychical fact, though the subject is not aware of its being so at the time, and does not refer the sensation to the thing. But, like the object, the sensation also has certain "characters," or an essence; and as, in viewing an object, we can ignore the object's existence in favour of its qualities, so, in having a sensation, it is possible

that without any reference whatever to the fact *that* we have it, or its existence, our attention may automatically be held by certain special "characters" attaching to it which we then use for interpreting the extra-experiential object in the existence of which on other grounds we have reason to believe.

Mr C. E. M. Joad, in his *Essays in Common-sense Philosophy* (London: Headley, 1919), attacks several of the perennial problems of speculation with independence and boldness, and what he has written will at least stimulate reflection. The world, he thinks, presents to the plain man the appearance, not of a systematised whole, but of an aggregate of different things without structure or design, and it seems to him that this *is* the world's real nature. He tries, then, to draw the outlines of a form of realism that will do no violence to the plain man's convictions. The nature of perception, the meaning of truth, the status of universals, and the theory of the State are the main topics of the book, and in respect to all of them definite conclusions are propounded. In dealing with perception, I think the author is right in maintaining that the object perceived is the real thing, and not any *tertium quid* that arises in and through the act of perceiving, although I do not know why he supposes that the view I have put forward, which he says resembles his own, is founded upon the writings of Meinong, who, as a matter of fact, holds a totally different view. I agree, too, with the emphasis Mr Joad lays upon discrimination as the very essence of the perceiving activity. But on two important points I am not in accord with him. I do not think that any excitation of the nervous system is "conveyed by purely neural processes to the mind, and passes into consciousness" (p. 29). On the contrary, I see no reason for thinking that the mind can be excited as a sensory organ can be, and no stimulation, so far as I can discover, ever does "pass into consciousness." And I regard it as an error to speak of what in perception we become aware of as "the stimuli" (p. 28). In vision, for example, the stimuli are vibratory motions that form no part whatever of the content apprehended. I am inclined, indeed, to go to the extent of asserting generally that those factors in the object which give rise to stimulation in the sense-organs never are the factors which enter into the content apprehended. In reference to the problem of truth, Mr Joad proposes a modification of the correspondence theory which it is hard to understand; the correspondence, he urges, is not between judgment and external fact, but between judgment and perception, as parts of the mind. Surely, truth is a property of *what is judged*, and not a property of the act of judging. And if a judgment is true when it corresponds with what is perceived, does not that involve that perception is infallible, which is precisely what it has been contended is not the case? Mr Joad offers a spirited defence of the Platonic theory of universals, but he seems to think that the trouble is to discover the conditions which regulate the manifestation of the *εἶδος* in a particular sensible object, whereas I imagine the real trouble is to give any intelligible meaning to such "manifestation" at all. And why does he persist in saying that according to Plato "concepts are the only real existences," when, as he rightly points out (p. 110), Plato emphatically rejects the view that the *εἶδη* are merely *νοήματα*? But in matters of history there are many inaccuracies in the book that need correction.

Two publications from India call for mention. Mr Shishirkumar Maitra's translation of Ludwig Stein's work, *Die Philosophischen Strömungen der*

Gegenwart, under the title of *Philosophical Currents of the Present Day* (2 vols., 1918 and 1919, Calcutta: University Press), will be useful to those who do not read German, but the translation never loses the character of a translation and needs drastic revision. And although for certain reasons Stein's book is interesting, it is doubtful whether it is of enough importance to be translated. Mr G. R. Malkani's little monograph on *The Problem of Nothing* (Amalner: Indian Institute of Philosophy, 1918) deserves to be known in England on account of the light it throws upon Indian modes of thought. The writer criticises Bergson's treatment of the idea of "Nothing," and argues that Bergson must either admit the reality of the matter or else admit that the *élan vital* has nothing to endure against, nothing to press against, nothing wherein to create, so that, in that case, the idea of "nothing" cannot be said to be a pseudo-idea. As against Bergson, he urges that "reality as meaning" is a higher conception than "reality as creative," because the latter must be limited, and will, therefore, always have a "not" attaching to it, while the former as a whole can have no "not" attaching to it. In connection with Mr Malkani's pamphlet reference should be made to G. Bréhier's article on "L'idée du néant et le problème de l'origine radicale dans le néo-platonisme grec" (*Rev. de Métaphysique*, July-Aug. 1919), which gathers together a great deal of instructive historical material. The second part of Mr S. Radhakrishnan's article on "Bergson and Absolute Idealism" appears in the July issue of *Mind*. The author tries to show that the objection repeatedly urged against absolute idealism that it gives freedom to God or the whole and not to man holds against Bergson's philosophy also.

Professor John Watson's treatise on *The State in Peace and War* (Glasgow: MacLehose, 1919) is an attempt to follow the evolution of political ideas from the origin of the City-State to the rise of the modern Nation-State, and to give a concise statement of the true principle of the latter. The point of view of the author coincides almost entirely with that of Dr Bosanquet. The State is regarded as existing for the establishment of the external conditions under which the highest human life may be carried on. Professor Watson shows the groundlessness of the attempt to trace back to Hegel the doctrines that lay at the basis of the ruthless conduct of the late war. For Hegel it was *will*, not *force*, that binds together the distinct elements of the State, and he would certainly not have admitted the atrocious doctrine that a State is above all morality and may do whatever it pleases irrespective of the claims of other States. Above and beyond the State there was for him the Spirit of the world, which is also the divine Spirit.

G. DAWES HICKS.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

REVIEWS.

The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge: An Epistemological Inquiry. By N. O. Lossky, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Petrograd. Authorised Translation by Nathalie A. Duddington, M.A., with a Preface by Professor G. Dawes Hicks.—Macmillan & Co., London, 1919.—Pp. xxix + 420.

THIS is said to be the first Russian philosophical book to be translated into English. If so, the issue of the adventure would seem to be of the happiest. We have here a book wholly companionable. A translator appears to have been found who, for one thing, knows how to give an English dress to a foreign work. No strained meaning or jarring construction anywhere mars these attractively printed pages; and a delicate sense for the values of English words accompanies and delights the reader all through. Beyond this, the work itself is at once intrinsically important and simply written. No instructed reader will fail to recognise that all the problems are here; touched, too, with that indefinable light by which the whole arena of old controversies becomes re-illuminated for us; so much so, that to attempt any exhaustive estimate of its findings would almost be like making up a final account with modern philosophy. Our task here will be, firstly, to try to indicate the author's whereabouts, making as clear as possible the particular angle at which he makes his incision into the ancient problem of the universe; and then briefly to point out one direction which criticism of his standpoint may be expected to take, or from which, at least, further light might with justice be awaited. Our criticism, though largely a mark of interrogation, may be a decided one enough; for in the treatise as a whole, amid a vast amount of reasoning which is luminously clear, it would seem as though there remained something dusky and apparently unfinished about the exact bearing of the main view, upon two central subjects, that of error and that of the nature of universals.

The author takes it that the starting-point of philosophy consists in investigating the fact of knowing. We must *know*. Any metaphysical story of the universe which leaves knowledge impossible stands self-condemned. The central and ultimate philosophical discipline is epistemology, not metaphysics.

In addressing the question, "What is it, then, to know?" the author follows the plan of first contrasting what the unsophisticated human mind thinks in the matter, with what the philosophers by their laboured explanations have brought us to; and then asking how philosophy has come to this pass. In the case of at least two types of past thought,

rationalism and empiricism, he shows that their ending is absurd because their beginnings were wrong. He suggests a different beginning; and this develops (Chapter iii.) into a first sketch of his own view. He then goes on to investigate how the correction of those two philosophies—pre-Kantian systems, both—which he has just suggested, compares with the correction which Kant offered, and which his nineteenth-century successors continued to offer. He derives from the study further confirmation of his own suggested standpoint. He then goes on to Part II. of the book, where he develops his standpoint independently. The method of exposition is unusual, and rather striking. The author's handling of past philosophies as he goes along, gives him all the advantage of a subsidiary plot. The effect of it is that, whilst primarily engaged explaining the development of classical thought, and interesting his reader in that, he is yet giving himself the opportunity of always meeting his own thesis again, as it were by surprise, at every turn of the road which his exposition pursues. As a result, the simple standpoint which is central to his own system gets itself firmly fixed in the reader's mind, all the while that it is growing richer and deeper as the author gradually discloses its bearing upon point after point in the successive historical or contemporary philosophies which he passes in review. This sort of repetition is high literary art, and there were risks in essaying it. The author has taken these risks, and it would take a hardy critic to say he has not made a success of it. He has accomplished an altogether rare thing: he has made of a profound book a piece of remarkably easy reading.

To turn now to the standpoint advocated. It consists essentially in a bold simplification of the teaching of Kant; a simplification which, by cutting out Kant's phenomenalism, will enable the author, as he hopes, to escape the whole subjective-idealist trend of modern philosophy, and thereby leave it possible still to believe what the ordinary mind never doubts is true—viz., that "our knowledge really does penetrate to the essence of things." The contrary view rests, in the author's opinion, on nothing better than an assumption; and the main purpose of his exposition of past systems of thought is to reveal this assumption lying at the root of them.

The Critical Philosophy, it is maintained, need not be accepted further than as regards its general underlying idea, the idea underlying Kant's analysis of the world of experience, the doctrine that, in knowledge, there is involved a sort of conceptual framework into which a sensuous material is received. Kant has indeed made out this. He has rightly seen the organic connexion between the conceptual "skeleton" of experience and its sensuous part. But the other half of Kant's position need not be accepted. He has not proved that the skeleton is "in us." He has assumed that. And he has got himself, in consequence, into an impasse; into a philosophical view so narrow, that no one could ever have accepted it had it always appeared in its nakedness. "The oppressive poverty of Kant's view of the world does not strike the reader simply because it is too overwhelming to be realised" (p. 126).

Let us look at the Kantian view. The conceptual skeleton, according to Kant, is "in us." It is nothing else but our activity in synthesising certain data of sense; data otherwise raw, unorganised and dead; data which, in their dead state, are all that the world *directly* gives us. In ourselves, and not in the world, lies that living organisation of its parts, that time-flow, in

its events, which we think we see outside us. The life of the world is thus taken over into us. Thus transplanted it loses practically all its character. All the unique and mysterious operations of Nature are reduced to that paltry activity of the Understanding "which groups sensations together according to definite rules." This is the poverty spoken of. "The waves break against the cliffs of the seashore; the leaves rustle and flutter in the wind; a vulture dashes headlong from the sky and seizes a peacefully cooing dove—but there is not, in truth, the slightest trace of activity present in any of these phenomena." All that is actual, here, is our synthesising of sense data. The only reason why the followers of Kant do not "draw back from the thought" of all this, is that they don't really believe it. They say that they only know presentations. But "unconsciously following the truth, they mean by presentation the world of actual existence." What they see, data and inter-connections alike, they implicitly take to be things in themselves.

The implicit belief in actual existence constitutes the simple truth which the author now wants to bring into the open and stand by. Is there any objection, he would ask, to assuming that what is within my knowledge when I am knowing is simply the world of actual existence? Why should not all that my knowledge finds in that world really be in it; not made by me, but purely revealed to me? To Kant, a great deal of the world—the whole plexus of universal relationships, time, space, unity, causality and the like—are merely a variegated activity in us; and not so variegated either. What is the need for supposing that these things are anything so far-fetched? Why should not they be but the binding filaments of the objective world as they seem to be, and as genuinely "given" as are the data they bind? And why think that the data themselves are anything except actual things? Why, in a word, should man not be admitted into the very presence of reality in all his knowing, sensuous and rational alike? What drove Kant to a contrary view was nothing better than an assumption which he made, which he shared with the very schools he criticised, which he never examined, and which won't hold; the assumption, namely, that there exist, as important conditions of knowledge, a self and a not-self over against each other, and a relation between them, namely, the influence of the not-self upon the self. Nothing in the facts of knowing, says the author, necessitates this. And if we take all the facts of knowing together, we find that they positively do not permit of it.

Looking freshly at the cases of knowing with which we are familiar two points emerge every time, clearly. (a) My knowledge is of something. (b) The something falls within my knowledge—to speak of knowing what fell outside that sphere would be nonsense. Further, to know this something is to discriminate and compare it. Knowledge is an experience compared with other experiences. Knowledge is a process of differentiating. "If on a hot summer noon I walk leisurely along a river bank covered with luxurious vegetation and do not think of anything, do not wish for anything, lose my personality, so to speak, and become one with Nature, then nothing specific exists for me—all things are merged into one vague powerful stream of life. Suddenly, however, a splash in the water attracts my attention, and the intellectual process of discriminating begins. The mirror-like surface of the water, the green banks, the reeds near the shore,—all begin to grow distinct from one another. And there is no end to this process. . . . As I go on discriminating, everything becomes more distinct,

the formless acquires form, the vague becomes definite." This process of differentiating is knowledge (pp. 225-226). There is no reason to take the patient in this operation—the thing discriminated—to be anything except just the object itself. "I contend that the experience that is being compared is the object apprehended." It is neither a copy of it (as in Pre-Kantian Rationalism) nor a symbol for it (as in Empiricism of the school of Locke). "But if it be an experience, it cannot, surely, be the actual external object?" Why not? I may not perhaps be able to decide about that which I discriminate and compare, whether it is within my body or outside of it—where is the smell of the rose, for example?—but potentially external, of a surety, is everything which I discriminate and compare with its context. It is external in the sense that it is not 'mine'; as the process of discriminating it is 'mine.' On the contrary, it is 'given to me.' This applies to everything whatever that I truly know, be it sensation, outer object, relation, or what it may. It comes before me as something not made by me, but found or discovered. Whatever that may be which is being discriminated, there will always be 'in the knowledge' a qualitatively felt distinction between part that is 'mine' and part that is 'given to me'; and what is known has always the 'given' quality. Yet to say this is not at all to prejudice the question whether the 'given' which I met with is intra-organic or extra-organic. This difference between experiences holds; and by merely attaching the name "an experience" to the patient in the discriminating operation, nothing whatever is decided about the question upon which side of the line it falls. Now to allow the object thus to enter knowledge *in propria persona*; and, conversely, to recognise all that I discover and discriminate as equally directly known; this is only to recognise a condition essential to the possibility of knowledge, which the ordinary mind never doubts. And the charge which the author has to bring against Kant is that of rendering his own undertaking impossible, through having given up this simple position.

Having accepted as axiomatic a self and a world estranged from each other (his initial desertion of the ordinary mind's point of view), Kant gave himself the task of showing how real knowledge is possible; that is, knowledge possessing universal and necessary validity. And he could see no way except by tying up the self to a phenomenal world which was not the real one, and then explaining how the former was a "construction" of ours, out of a material consisting of the effects of the real world upon our sensibility. Kant fails to prove this position (pp. 112 ff.), and the position turns out, upon closer examination, to have been an impossible one from the beginning (pp. 124 ff.). Kant's system was an answer to the scepticism of Hume. Hume had restricted our reliable knowledge to what was actually given in sense, and relegated all that was over and above that to the limbo of error. He had banished such a relation as causality, for instance, from the realm of the real. Kant's great service is to have met this with a demonstration that such relations are a pre-condition of there being even a given-in-sense. Hume, in thinking to derive causality from experience, was thus attempting the absurd. He was trying to make experience bring about the pre-condition of its own possibility. Still, to show that x is the pre-condition of experience is one thing: to show that it is a "construction" of ours is quite another.

It will not escape the attentive student, here, that much of Mr Bertrand

Russell's writing is in this same spirit. To him, too, universals are not derivable from particulars. Knowledge of the latter rather presupposes knowledge of the former. And to him, too, this is quite a different thing from saying that they are a "construction" of ours. Such is the general attitude adopted, e.g. in *Problems of Philosophy*. Yet Russell is not in the least on all-fours with Lossky.

But to return. Kant only assumes that such things as causality, etc., are a "construction of our understanding," and assumes it without trying the other hypothesis, namely, that the non-sensuous skeleton of experience may be "given to me" along with, and in precisely the same way as, the sensuous material of it. And his alternative to this is not one that will work. Kant can never establish, upon his own basis, even the quasi-objectivity which his phenomenal world is supposed to have. How a mere congeries of sensuous affections of ours can, through the instrumentality of an activity of ordering them which is also ours, be transformed into something that is not ours but arises upon us and announces itself as something "given to" us, is more than Kant can ever properly explain. In point of fact, it was not a case of our ordering our sense affections at all. It was a case of direct contact on our part—intuitive contact—with actual things in an order which is *theirs* (pp. 107–158). An independent, sensuous-supersensuous reality, possessed of an order of its own, and falling within our knowledge, is what we have to do with throughout. We know this reality directly. Such is the "intuitive basis of knowledge." It remains for the author to try how the suggestion will work against the problems that are agitating philosophy. Such is the business of Part II., much the most difficult portion, as may be imagined, of the book.

The above simple account of our knowledge of the real must, if it is to work, provide us with a theory which is able to show when judgments are true or valid. For this, of course, is what knowledge of the real is. It is true or valid judgments. Now, our author thinks he can give such an account of these as will show what Kant set out to show and failed; namely, how we can anticipate experience, how we can make valid *a priori* and synthetic judgments, or, in other language, how we can have certainty about the world we are in. The reason (developed in chapter vi.) is that those judgments which yield new truth to us, synthetic judgments so called, have all got an analytic side; and thus do, in so far, implicate the entire universe in their allegations. This appears from the way in which a judgment arises. What is the subject judged? The subject of such a judgment as "This man resembles my brother" is not, says the author—speaking quite in the vein of Bradley and Bosanquet—comprised within the four corners of the explicit idea to which the predicate is attached. There was a whole background of reality behind the splash in the water, for example, which roused the noon-dreamer to a judgment, as he paced peacefully along the bank of the broad river. There is a whole background of reality behind the subject of every judgment, of which the explicit "this man" or "that splash" is but the illuminated point; a background which might be indefinitely further discriminated as "the splash out there," "the splash on the smooth water-surface out there, with the green sedge grass behind and the reeds," etc., or "this tall man," "this tall, thin, pale-looking man in grey," etc. The subject of every judgment is all that, and it can be extended as far as we please. The judgment, therefore, is always analytic if you take in not merely the

explicit idea which stands as the subject, but the whole which it indicates as well. That whole is, in the end, the universe in its entirety; so that in making the judgment you are implicating the whole universe in *something*, and you are doing so with all the certainty of the given—the certainty of the resemblance which you see, or of the splash which you see, before your eyes (pp. 225-240).

But how *can* there be anything certain about the universe as a whole—anything, that is to say, as certain as the resemblance I see between this man and my brother? Our author would answer that so much can be seen to lie in the very nature of the case, assuming the intuitive basis of knowledge; assuming, in other words, that there is nothing between our knowing and the real. This is discussed in Chapter vii. under the title "The Necessity, Self-identity, and Universality of Truth." The root of the matter is that any true judgment, being a direct dealing with reality, is tell-tale of reality. This holds equally whether it be a judgment of perception that is in question, "This man resembles my brother," or such a judgment as "two and two are four." Betrayed in it are the features of the real. If I take a ramble through the garden and come in and report that the rose-bush in the round bed has flowers out to-day, this, as a true judgment, confronts me with three features: (a) necessity—it is a necessarily true statement in view of the evidence; (b) self-identity—it is true not now only but now and always; (c) universality—it is true not for me only but for me and all others. These features of my true knowledge are actual features of the real. It is the real I am seeing when knowing; and these features are what I see. A judgment of perception like this may refer, no doubt, to a quite temporary and trivial collocation of facts—a bush with roses on it which may be withered to-morrow. Yet there is more in it. Every such judgment, in bringing the particular and evanescent under our notice, inevitably also discloses the edge of the universal and eternal. That is why knowledge must be independent of the limits of space and time; or at least as independent as to make the past and the distant capable of being present, in the sense of coming within the compass of my present knowledge. It may be hard to see how space and time can have this capacity. Epistemology is not, however, bound to teach metaphysics how to explain this. It simply takes its stand on the fact that on any contrary theory, knowledge even of that theory would be impossible.

Here again the parallel with the position of Mr Russell readily occurs to the mind, although his theories are not dealt with by Professor Lossky, nor is his name ever mentioned, so far as we have observed, in the book. With him, too, knowledge is in a sense independent of the limits of space and time, in that we have knowledge of timeless universals. And, so far as universals are involved in it, he might even say that we get a glimpse of the eternal in ordinary empirical judgments about fact. But this capacity of our knowing does not, to him, prescribe to us any task of so explaining space and time that they shall be seen to be capable of being in any way telescoped into the present. And for a quite simple reason. To him, in the empirical judgment, the eternal and the temporary, if present together, are merely side by side. The one can slip out of the other, as you might pull a straw from a corn-sheaf. In any case, whichever of them be inconsistent, both Russell and Lossky accept, with apparently different results, a species of real-presence doctrine in regard to universals. And it is on this, in Lossky's view, that we take our stand when we want to see how a

scientist can make a judgment which holds true of millions of unseen cases elsewhere in the world, on the strength simply of what is now before him, inside the walls of his private laboratory. The threads which run throughout the universe are actually here and with the scientist, and he is seeing them. This is the source of our ability to pass *a priori* synthetic judgments, and so be sure of the sort of world we are in.

Thus the author reaches his view of inference, as against the orthodox empirical doctrine of it (chapter ix.). Empiricism of the usual particularist type (Mill, etc.) cannot show how inference becomes an intelligible and justifiable procedure. It assumes that reason is proceeding from knowledge of what certain particular observed events have been in the past to what certain other, not yet observed, events are going to be in the future. This is professing knowledge of what is presumed to lie outside the bounds of knowledge. Nothing of that future now is. Hence the procedure is invalid. The only condition upon which you can argue from the present to it is that it be in the present, that the filaments which run all through things be visible in what is now before me. And this is Professor Lossky's view. What is needed is a universalistic empiricism (one of the author's names for his own teaching), an empiricism which supposes our direct intuitive contact, in knowledge, with universals and particulars alike.

In the above sketch we have by no means touched on all the ramifications of Professor Lossky's comprehensive argument. But what we have said will at least show at how many points the problem of current philosophy is touched by his theory; and his touch is so incisive and so infallibly aimed that it is difficult, as we have said, to make anything like a final estimate of his view. Whereabouts, then, in the many mansions of present and past philosophy does the view belong? Professor Dawes Hicks, in the Preface which he contributes to the volume, affiliates the system to the idealisms; and ventures the suggestion, not without some justification, that it has affinities with the form of idealism represented in this country by such a teacher as Sir Henry Jones. There can be no doubt, however, that it will be hailed by those who rejoice in the name of realists as a realism. And not without good grounds. Professor Lossky is at least so far in tune with the spirit of his century as to be anxious to do the realistic standpoint justice, and even to work in the realistic spirit. If he is seeking an idealism at all, it is an idealism deeper-founded in reality than the airy thing which the nineteenth century was apparently able to be content with. And yet if Professor Lossky's view has, in the end, to take rank with the systems of Russell and Moore, we make bold to say that it will be because the author has failed of his ambition. And our interrogation mark falls to be entered just at a recurrent point where the system appears to us to be at least in some danger of thus failing of its own purpose.

The point could be brought out in several ways, but one way would be to ask what kind of place the author would accord to the idea which plays so large a part in such teaching as that of the Cairds and Sir Henry Jones—derived, of course, from the post-Kantians—that knowledge is a function of the universe itself, as it rises to self-consciousness through the instrumentality of rational beings? Of course it is a metaphysical question; and Professor Lossky in this book wishes to leave metaphysics aside and content himself with showing what that "knowledge" is which any metaphysical story of the universe must leave possible. But in the course of

determining knowledge he finds it impossible to continue to regard the universals it contains as a "construction" of ours, and parts company with Kant on that cardinal point. We would ask, Are they not at least a "construction" of the Absolute, and of us as living in the Absolute; and is that not required for their performance of their function as knowledge?

We confess to a suspicion that unless some such truth is recognised by it, the system will not march. The universals will not do their work. Our intuition of universals is insisted on. How is any good to come of that, in the way of making knowledge possible? We can have knowledge beyond the moment. We can know future and past. The question is, How? The reason assigned in this treatise would appear to be, that in the present moment of experience we apprehend the actual filaments which run through all the rest of reality. Authentically apprehending them, we net the whole. Is this a necessary consequence? Mr Russell, too, sees the filaments, but in his case the water all runs through the net. There is no such certainty about facts (except such as are actually before our eyes) as there is about axiomatic truths. We see the framework of things, with him as with Professor Lossky. But the things all fall through the frame; the flesh drops from the skeleton. Now Professor Lossky strenuously denies that this is so. Even the necessity of the Law of Contradiction itself is at bottom a "real" necessity. Still, his exposition of the link between the two seems to us the unfinished joint in his armour. We do not understand how he glides from the statement that the universal is real to the statement that it "includes" the particulars. This is not enough if the latter lie dead in its bosom. We shall not then be knowing them in knowing it.

And we cannot but connect this with the author's doctrine of error. Professor Lossky's criterion of truth is curiously subjective. The truth passively compels us, he says; and error is where we have been active and done something to the facts. We are constrained to the truth, and it is error when we feel that what we are taking for the real is partly of "our own" making—it comes to me with the mark "mine"—"my work." These, however, are surely but the ear-marks of truth and error, the signs which warn us when we are in the presence of the one and when of the other. Obviously, we ought to have a more articulate theory of the objective difference between what gives us the one feeling and what gives us the other. *What* compels us? And *what* comes before us as "ours" or as made by ourselves?

Is it possible that the author's theory of universals and his doctrine of appearance and error are calling out for the same emendation, or development? Do we not need to see a little more clearly just how the universal "contains" its particulars, and how they, with the life that is in themselves, synthesise themselves into it? Do we not need somehow to see how the myriads of imperfect appearances build themselves up into fully articulated reality? A successful account of either universals or error is a successful account of both; and it would, we venture to suggest, show us the universal as at once an actively *self*-constructing thing and in the very same moment (up to the limit of our apprehension of it) a construction of ours; none the less our construction for its being the Absolute's.

There is no doubt an immeasurable difference between the swoop of the vulture from the sky and any paltry "synthetic activity" of ours, putting

in order certain "sense-data"; and there is every reason to sympathise with Professor Lossky's deep æsthetic sense of the poverty of the system which would equate the former to the latter. But we venture to think the latter is a life too, however poor and bloodless; and unless the universals we are said to "intuit" be really universals which it (our synthetic activity) *enacts*; unless the Time-spirit who weaves the garment of God does a bit of his weaving—however paltry a fragment—through a construction of universals on the part of man which is their revelation of themselves to him; unless the difference between our intellectual life and the life of the Absolute, however stupendous, be at root of just the same sort as our difference from one another, it seems profitless merely to insist that universals are real, and are genuinely empirically found. Appearances must actively organise themselves into a reality which contains them all; and that self-organisation on their part must be identically ours—or rather must be us—up to the limit of our spiritual development.

We are far from convinced that Professor Lossky will not be able to fill up this lacuna, as it appears to us to be, in his system. And its presence (real or apparent) only lends added force to the hope expressed by the writer of the Introductory Preface, that the author may soon find occasion to unburden himself of the metaphysic which seems to lie as yet concealed in his mind, and to be destined to amplify and bear out what he has here set before us as the demands of epistemology.

J. W. SCOTT.

THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

L'Énergie Spirituelle: Essais et Conférences. By Henri Bergson.—
Paris: Alcan, 1919.—Pp. 227.

A NEW book by M. Bergson is an important event, and this is a new book although everything in it is old matter. The lectures and essays it contains extend over the period of the thirteen years preceding the war, the earliest being dated 1901 and the latest 1913. Two of the lectures—the Huxley Lecture and the Presidential Address to the Society for Psychical Research—were originally delivered in England and have only been published previously in English journals. The first of these, which is also the first in the volume, appeared in this Journal under the title of "Life and Consciousness" in October 1911, and it has since been included by Sir Oliver Lodge in his volume of *Huxley Memorial Lectures*, published in 1914. The lecture "Le Rêve," the fourth in the volume, delivered in 1901, has also appeared in an English translation in a small book entitled *Dreams*, published by B. W. Huebsch in America and by Fisher Unwin in England. The remaining lectures and essays, though they have appeared in French periodicals, will probably be entirely new to most readers, both here and in France, for they have long been practically impossible to obtain. M. Bergson has not, however, been content simply to collect and republish his important papers in chronological order and in their original form: he has carefully revised them in every case and in parts has rewritten them, and above all he has arranged them with the distinct and expressed intention of presenting a philosophical doctrine. The present volume is only the first part of this work. In it he has designed to bring together

those of his studies which bear on his theory of the nature of psychical reality. Another volume is in preparation, a large part of which will be new matter, and which will contain those studies more especially related to his theory of philosophical method. An English translation of this book is already in the press and will be published shortly by Macmillan & Co. under the title of *Mind-Energy*. M. Bergson is writing a special introduction to it. The English volume will not simply be an authorised translation, but in the literal sense an English version, in which author and translator are collaborating, and in which the author accepts the *ipsissima verba* of the translation.

To come now to the special subject-matter of the volume, I am not sure that it will not rank with students of Bergson's philosophy as the most important and essential of all his works for the thorough insight it affords into fundamental doctrine and working principle. It lacks of necessity the finish and symmetry and the sustained, continuous argument of the three philosophical treatises, but just as the sketches and studies of a great artist are more enlightening to the art student than the finished picture, so in this book we are privileged to see the philosopher in the "phrontisterion," to know what he is striving to express and how he sets to work to express it.

Bergson's central idea has perhaps never been so clearly expressed as in the Presidential Address to the Society for Psychical Research, the third chapter in this volume, and renamed "Fantômes des Vivants." That idea is that the reality or activity (the two terms are with Bergson practically synonymous), within which we are acting centres, is of inconceivable richness, overwhelming and embarrassing in its illimitable wealth, and that efficiency is entirely dependent on contrivances and artifices which enable us to limit our outlook upon it and to shut out and exclude and be absolutely disinterested in whatever would distract us from action, in continuous attention to which our life consists. Our range of activity is a selection formed not by the number and power of our discriminating organs but by the inhibiting mechanisms which make us oblivious or totally ignorant of all but that which it concerns us to know. The application of this to psychical research is deeply interesting. Bergson is particularly impressed with the idea of the possibility of telepathic communication between mind and mind, and he has evidently followed for many years with absorbing interest the experiments and investigations of phenomena which appear to support the thesis. But his interest is far removed from any credulity consequent on a personal craving for occult experience; it is based on a reasoned and rational theory of the nature of psychical reality and a keen desire to examine critically any facts which appear to support, modify, or disprove it. The theory is that, just as in physical science we have found it necessary to discard the static concept of matter as stuff and replace it with the dynamic concept of energy, to conceive the reality of the physical universe by the notion of an energy which is latent when it is not kinetic, so in regard to psychical science we must conceive the reality not as a mind-stuff but as a mind-energy. There is also this in addition when we consider the two orders of reality, that our organisation for action has evolved an attitude of attention to life, one condition of which is the inhibition of our view of this psychical reality. The fact that normally we have no experience of telepathic communication does not prove that it cannot exist, for it may be that normality is constituted by a contrivance which inhibits telepathy. In

such case, however, it will be only rarely and in very special circumstances that a derangement of the mechanism may give to the trained observer the opportunity to catch a glimpse of this ever-present but apparently strange reality. I have dealt at some length with this particular point because it seems to me to occupy a very central position in Bergson's philosophy, and it illustrates what is meant by mind-energy. "L'énergie spirituelle" is not what we ordinarily call mental energy or mental activity, meaning the exercise of thought or the force of will or emotion; it means that mind-energy is, and mind-stuff is not, reconcilable with the theory of selection by suppression or inhibition.

The essay which applies this principle with the most brilliant dialectical skill, and which moreover illustrates Bergson's scrupulous care and attention to minute detail in his search for significant facts, is the one entitled "Le Souvenir du présent ou la fausse Reconnaissance." The inclusion of this research—it is much more than a simple essay—will by psychologists certainly, and probably by philosophers generally, be regarded as giving to this volume its most distinctive feature. The phenomenon which is the subject of this research is not an uncommon one—many people have told me they have known at times in their ordinary experience a condition closely resembling it,—though all the cases in which the symptoms are strongly marked and the records of which are of scientific value have been patients under treatment for mental disorder, derangement, or defect. The symptom is that the patient experiences a kind of bewilderment due to the fact that he seems to be living over again a remembered experience, and though he feels he knows it has happened before he experiences it as actual present-sense experience now. Not that, as in true memory, the present experience recalls a familiar past experience resembling the present, but that the identical present is past. He seems to be remembering what he is perceiving while he is still perceiving it. To Bergson this is a very significant phenomenon. In *Matière et Mémoire* he had criticised the theory that memory is a faint perception preserved somehow in the cells or fibres of the brain, and had put forward in its place the theory that memory is the fundamental fact in mental life, and that perception is wholly dependent upon it. Here, then, there is a case in which memory instead of seeming to lag behind perception is actually simultaneous with it, if not indeed in advance of it. Bergson's theory is that memory and perception, different in kind from one another, are really formed at one and the same moment at the focus of living activity where the past is pressing on the future and the progressing action is forming itself. Our normal attitude of attention to life keeps us forward-looking and inhibits the memory as it is formed from intruding on consciousness and distracting the mind. When the mechanism which effects this inhibition is deranged we may have the symptom of false recognition, *i.e.* a memory of the present in place of the normal memory of the past.

The most metaphysical of the essays is the last in the volume. It is entitled "Le Cerveau et la Pensée." It is a paper originally read at the International Congress of Philosophy at Geneva in 1904. On that occasion it was remarkable for the astonishment it caused rather than for the criticism it evoked. It attacked the then very widely accepted hypothesis of parallelism, but it criticised the notion of parallelism rather than the hypothesis, contending that it was a contradictory notion made possible by a metaphysical illusion. It was due to our employment of two completely

different systems of notation, realism and idealism, and by a kind of unconscious legerdemain slipping from one into the other.

There is another study which will be new to most readers, and which is also of fundamental importance for the complete understanding of Bergson's philosophy, the essay entitled "L'Effort intellectuelle." The intellectual effort which Bergson here submits to analysis, and the significance of which he sets himself the task of interpreting, is the feeling of mental strain we experience, together with the definite direction of mental activity we follow, when we try to recall a recollection—for example, a name which will not come back to us, or the detailed circumstances of some event vaguely remembered. Bergson's theory is that our memory is always present with us in its entirety, is always accompanying our activity, and that the intellectual effort is directed towards releasing the mind from the preventive contrivances which exclude it from consciousness. The effort does not directly seek out and drag forth the recollection, but removes the hindrances which block it.

The first essay, "La Conscience et la Vie," is in effect an admirable epitome of Bergson's whole conception of the task and method of philosophy. It is characterised by the lucidity and wealth of imagery which make his writing so attractive. The second, "L'Âme et le Corps," a lecture delivered in 1912, will recall to those who had the privilege of attending them, the lectures at University College on "The Nature of the Soul" delivered about the same time. The main points of the argument developed in those lectures are epitomised in this essay. The fourth, entitled "Le Rêve," is in some respects the most remarkable of all. A lecture delivered in 1901, long before Freud's *Traumdeutung* had attracted the attention which has led to the important recent development of the subject, and quite independently of the standpoint and purpose of that work, it impresses us by its extraordinary originality and suggestiveness.

The present volume and the one which is to follow were both in preparation when the war interrupted M. Bergson's work. During the war this work was set entirely aside, together with the interrupted Gifford Lectures and the regular courses at the Collège de France, in order that he might devote all his wonderful energy to the service of his country in its hour of need. This book therefore is the first result of the peace and the herald of Bergson's return to his most congenial occupation. There can be little doubt of the welcome it will receive.

H. WILDON CARR.

KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON.

Syndicalism and Philosophical Realism. By J. W. Scott.

London: A. & C. Black, 1919.—215 pp.

MR SCOTT describes his book as a study in the correlation of contemporary social tendencies. The description is perfectly exact: and it maps out an important inquiry to which it was fitting that so capable a philosopher as Mr Scott should set his hand. He considers two of the most powerful currents in contemporary thought—Syndicalism as a doctrine of practice, Realism as a philosophical theory,—and asks whither they are tending. His conclusion, in a word, is that they are tending in the same direction, and that they *must* do so since they have a common inspiration.

It is not difficult to disengage the elements in our present situation which attracted Mr Scott's attention. He was impressed by the circumstances that on the one hand the Syndicalist movement, as represented by certain of its leaders, claimed Bergson as its philosophical sponsor, and, on the other, that some of Mr Bertrand Russell's proposals for social reconstruction pointed unmistakably in the direction of Syndicalism. Here, then, was a double coincidence, and a natural query for the reflective mind whether it was anything more. Is Sorel right in his view that the practical outcome of Bergson's philosophy is Syndicalism? If so, what is it in Bergson that leads to Syndicalism? And is it possible, in spite of the apparent wide dissimilarity in method and spirit between Bergson and Russell, that the very same thing is in Russell too, and that it is *that* which leads him to put forward the practical proposals which he does?

These are Mr Scott's questions. He discerns at once in all three doctrines a common element which looks as if it might furnish a clue to the answer. If one compares the attitude of the three philosophers to Reason, a striking resemblance emerges. Bergson and Sorel manifestly depreciate it as a creative instrument. Russell, a strenuous enough Rationalist in some directions, suspects the validity of almost all historical rational constructions of experience. And all three agree that in some respects, at least, it would be well to hand over to simpler, or at any rate more "direct," modes of apprehension the work which, in the past, men had believed to be appropriate to Reason.

Primâ facie, there is a strong case. Yet, there is not yet enough to establish Mr Scott's contention. Distrust of Reason may be a fact about all three doctrines. But is it *the* fact? Is it the thing which gives to each of the doctrines its inner coherence as well as its similarity to the others? If not, then their resemblance is still a more or less accidental and external fact, and there need be no real affinity of principle between them.

Mr Scott, I think, is quite clear on this point. At least, that is what I take to be the motive of the further analysis to which he subjects both Bergson and Russell, and which yields him a proof of their substantial identity of attitude. Bergson and Russell, Mr Scott finds, are at one in adopting a Realist attitude to the world, an attitude of acquiescence in the "given," the belief that in getting at *les données immédiates*, at what is immediately delivered to consciousness before consciousness has done any work upon it at all, we are getting at reality and truth. The outcome in Bergson is "devotion to the incalculable given will." In Russell it is the "narrowing" of the range of Reason's activity to the few things which may be held to be given to the mind as they really are. Now, incalculability of end and narrowness of means are precisely the characteristics which distinguish Syndicalism from orthodox Socialism. Syndicalism, therefore, is just Socialism turned Realist, Socialism distrusting Reason, and accepting, without any idealising gloss or transformation, the "given." And the theoretical basis of its revolt is Realist philosophy.

That is Mr Scott's thesis. There is in his book no overt judgment on the validity of this Realist attitude. He is content to point to the facts and give his reading of them. But there is an implied judgment—appearing most plainly in his brief criticism of Russell. And because of this implied judgment, it can hardly happen that his whole method of argument will escape challenge. It is evident enough that, to Mr Scott, Realism is based on a certain *ignavia*—whether properly to be called intellectual or

moral it is hard to say,—a certain timorousness in facing the results of the full constructive effort of Reason, and a consequent inclination to limit our interpretation of Reality to just that rather small and neutral sphere where certainties seem to be within our reach. Hence it may be held that Mr Scott's discussion of Realism is inspired by his desire to attribute a motive rather than to ascertain whether or not it is a valid, or perhaps the only valid, philosophical attitude. It is quite certainly true that Mr Scott's discussion hardly touches this latter fundamental issue. There is nothing, I think, in his work to rebut the Realist's answer that whatever motives we are pleased to ascribe to him, his is the only fruitful method in science, and therefore—however little it may leave to philosophy—the only method which philosophy is entitled to use. On the other hand, I do not think that such a criticism touches the substantial point in Mr Scott's essay. The truth of his presentation of the contemporary situation would not be seriously impaired even if his judgment on it were held to be wrong. The crucial question for the estimation of his book is simply whether Mr Scott's account of the three doctrines is accurate; that is to say, whether or not, in tracking an apparent similarity in their practical consequences back to a fundamental community of principle, he distorts or simplifies the doctrines in any essential way.

This is a very exacting test. No doubt, adherents of each of the three schools will not find it impossible to discover some misunderstanding or misstatement of their own particular faiths. I will only say here that, so far as the philosophers are concerned, Mr Scott seems to me to have substantially made out his case. His case, of course, implies no criticism of Russell's consistency: for Russell has adopted the Realist method with the most complete understanding of its philosophical implications. Bergson, on the other hand, appears to slip into the same attitude in spite of his idealist prepossessions. But it seems clear that by his reduction of the intellect to the instrument of one particular conative development of life, and therefore by his exclusion of it from any central function, Bergson has opened the way to the view that in relation to some, and perhaps most, of man's fundamental interests, the true attitude is the elimination of construction and acquiescence in the given. I think, then, that Mr Scott is right in finding in Bergson the same Realist attitude as is consciously adopted by Russell.

I feel less assured of his characterisation of Syndicalism. He appears to attach too much importance to Sorel. Sorel is, of course, thoroughly anti-rationalist, and Mr Scott has no difficulty in showing his affinity with Bergson. But Sorel is not Syndicalism, and perhaps represents no great section of Syndicalist opinion. Syndicalism—in its pure form the proposal for Trade Union ownership and control of all the means of production, and now diluted in various ways—is as rationalist a doctrine as any that agitates the minds of men. Its scheme for the organisation of society is articulated with quite unusual precision, and, whatever we may think of it, it is intended to be and is capable of quite rational discussion and criticism. It is true, of course, that Syndicalism is more conspicuously associated with methods of violence than other Socialist theories. Yet it need not necessarily be so—except in the sense that Syndicalists, being aware that they propose further-reaching changes in the social order than are implied in State Socialism, expect to incur sterner opposition and prepare themselves to meet it. In any case, violence is always regarded as a means to

a definitely conceived end, not as either a character of the end itself or as a condition of that specially illuminating intuition in which the perception of the end is born.

Mr Scott is not indifferent to the danger that he may be relying over-much on Sorel. He tries to discount that possibility by showing that the logic of the utterances of other leaders of the same or allied schools (*e.g.* Mr Cole) is identical with Sorel's. I hardly think, however, he is successful here. Mr Cole no doubt often writes for the express purpose of maintaining the militant spirit of Labour organisations; and very likely he often says, quite in the fashion of Sorel, that the main thing is to get on with the fight. But there were recently many occasions when responsible enough people said that the first thing to do was to defeat the Germans; and that it was time enough, when we had done that, to make plans for the future of the world. Yet some of them at least had quite clear notions about what they intended to make of the world when the Germans had been beaten, and thought it important to beat them only because that was an essential condition of the realisation of their ends. I grant that it is a sign of weakness in any leader when he appeals merely to fighting passions, without trying to elucidate the cause in which he enlists them. Still, it does not prove him a disciple of Sorel's. In view, therefore, of the detailed account which Mr Cole can give of his Guild society, I cannot discover any good ground for making that inference in his case and not in the case of Cabinet Ministers.

The sum of the matter is that I doubt if the connection which Mr Scott sees between Syndicalism and Realist-Intuitionism is significant of the essential nature of the former in the same degree as the connection which he makes between the two different exponents of the philosophic doctrine is significant of their genuine community of spirit. Yet even so, Mr Scott's argument appears to me to carry a good deal of substance. I do not think he has chosen the right designation for the forces which he discerns to be at work in the Labour movement; nor do I think that they are so strong, either in this country or abroad, as he estimates. But that there are such forces, that they affect Syndicalism perhaps more directly than other forms of Socialist thought, and that in our present political and cultural situation they may easily become powerful, seems to me indisputable. And if that is true, then Mr Scott has advanced good grounds for holding that one important favourable cultural circumstance is the mode of Bergson.

I should like to end this notice by recording my strong impression of the great philosophical merit of Mr Scott's book. He shows admirable power of taking into account every side of a very complex position, unusual insight into the currents of thought and practice, and an accomplished gift of lucid and felicitous exposition.

H. J. W. HETHERINGTON.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

The Science of Power. By Benjamin Kidd.—London: Methuen, 1918.

THIS book opens with a vigorous denunciation which is fully justified; it closes with a forecast which is a chimera. The denunciation runs through three great strophes, unfolding the combative, selfish, and pagan

spirit which animates politics, diplomacy, economics, and social life under the sway of "the fighting male." Nearly a quarter of a century ago Mr Benjamin Kidd wrote his *Social Evolution*, a book which proved him to be an original thinker. In 1902 he published *Principles of Western Civilisation*. These and other previous books have paved the way for an increasingly large audience. This latest book, *The Science of Power*, has thus roused the deepest attention, for it has come when hope is catching the clearest note of a new world. Mr Kidd is triumphantly encouraging. He is precisely the man to help to take away the national reproach of being impermeable to ideas. Substantially he urges not only that nationally "we needs must love the highest when we see it," but that we can carry the highest into effect with more certainty than is ordinarily imagined. The stupendous potentiality of civilisation as distinct from barbarism consists in its cultural or collective heredity imposed on the rising generation under suitable conditions. The most important element in this, viz. the idealisms of mind and spirit conveyed to the young of each generation, *under the influence of the social passion*, is absolutely limitless in its effect. *The power which is represented thereby is capable of creating a new world in the lifetime of a generation.*

His *leit-motif* is, indeed, that the moral evolution (as he conceives it) of mankind has been disastrously retarded and set back by the fallacious application of the Darwinian hypothesis to human affairs. Darwinian evolution is the evolution of the animal; and to assume its validity for the human race is to leave out of account what is most characteristic of man—his moral nature. To affirm, in the case of mankind, the law of "the survival of the fittest"—that is to say, of the fittest to survive in a struggle for life—is to affirm in other words the principle that "might is right"; and it is to the influence of Darwin's theory that we owe a great impetus given to militarism on the Continent, and in England to the doctrine of unrestricted free competition in the economic order. And it is, moreover, to the hold which this same theory has taken on the popular mind that we owe in a large measure the almost savage determination of the extreme left wing of Labour to carry to its ultimate conclusion the class war which is to bring Capitalism to its knees. Militarism, Manchesterism, and advanced Syndicalism are all variants on the leading theme of the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest. Mr Benjamin Kidd, whose present book has been published since his death, was a convinced evolutionist, but by no means a convinced Darwinian. Spencer, Galton, Pearson, Bateson, Haeckel, Nietzsche, and Bernhardt are arraigned and condemned. These writers hold in common that progress is to be achieved by physiological laws through self-interest and inborn heredity. Against this our author lays down, as a basic principle, that the new and better future will come about, not by arguments of reason, but by the power of emotion; not by any inborn heredity, but by the collective pressure of the social environment; not by self-seeking, but by self-sacrifice; not by the pursuit of present advantage, but by the allurements of an ideal attainable in a more or less distant future; not by the "fighting male," but by the far-seeing vision and world-wide influence of the female.

Apart from his tacit assumption that Christianity is but a stage in the process of natural moral evolution, the book affords much food for not unprofitable thought and reflection. "Under our eyes," he says,

“with confused details of the transition spread before us from day to day in the events of the leading countries of the earth, we see the curtain rising upon an entirely new order of the world. . . . We are undoubtedly living in the West in the opening stages of a revolution the like of which has never been experienced in history. We are witnessing the emergence of causes and the marshalling and leaguings of forces utterly unknown to text-books. They will make history for a thousand years to come.”

Mr Kidd holds solemnly that in the female mind alone does there exist that supreme emotional ideal which will prove sufficient to induce society to work in one generation for the resulting benefit of the next and of those that follow. He puts little value on the intellect, and bases his hopes for the future welfare of mankind on woman's power of sacrificing herself for the advantage of generations unborn. Is there any likelihood? Will women give to the service of mankind such treasure of emotional ideals as will be a substitute for even the poor thinking which men have devoted to it?

A great distinction is to be drawn, Mr Kidd bids us mark, between the evolution of individual development and that of social organisation. The law of the interests of self in the struggle for survival applies solely to the individual stage of human evolution. The individual tends to assimilate all the qualities which contribute to his efficiency as a means to his own self-interest. But in the higher or social stage of human evolution the fittest are those who develop qualities making for collective efficiency; and this attitude involves the most efficient self-sacrifices for the common good. Altruistic progress can be effected, and can only be effected, through social inheritance. For God is not a patent medicine, bottled up and bearing a particular chemist's label, but a life-giving force to be taken into a man's life by sacrifice through the emotions and will and intellect.

CLAUDE C. H. WILLIAMSON.

SOUTH LAMBETH, S.W.

Pauline Meditations. By James Drummond, M.A., LL.D., Litt.D. With Memorial Introduction by Edith Drummond and Professor G. Dawes Hicks.—London: The Lindsey Press, 1919—Pp. lxii + 312.

ALL those who admired the work of the late Principal Drummond, or had come to regard him as one of the great English Christians of our time, will take up this book expectantly and lay it down with unmixed gratitude. Unconsciously by himself, consciously and lovingly by two others, a picture of his mind has been drawn which we cannot soon forget, and which deserves to be known widely for its beauty and wisdom.

Dr Drummond's life extended from 1835 to 1918. He was born in Dublin, studied at Trinity College there, and afterwards, in theology, at Manchester New College, London, and served for ten years in the active ministry in Manchester. In 1869 he began to teach in his old college as a lecturer on Biblical and Historical Theology, becoming in 1885 Principal as successor to Dr Martineau, and leaving London for Oxford in 1889 on the transference of the College thither. In 1906 he retired from his post. It is easy to set down these dates, but they stand for a plenitude of scholarly work and high spiritual power over his associates that must always be rare.

From the first he was a lover of nature—the mountains and the sea. His passion for the grandeur of mountain scenery was intense to the last, and traces of it are frequent in his writing. In other ways, too, his life was made *aus einem Gusse* and kept its initial quality on to the end, for “the glowing faith of his boyhood, which accepted whole-heartedly the leadership of Christ,” continued to burn and shine in manhood and age. In college days, it appears, there was an intense spiritual struggle which the calm strength of his later trust made almost incredible to those who knew him. Of his early preaching Professor C. H. Herford has written that “he spoke as one rapt into the very presence of divine things, and able from that vantage-ground to see into the very depths and lay bare the secrets of all the souls before him.” These words will not seem too strong to those who know his book of sermons issued in 1869 under the title *Spiritual Religion*. Withal he was very human.¹ Happiness radiated from his presence. Gaiety, humility, faith, mystic vision, learning, insight—all were his, to be drawn on freely by his friends.

“We cannot hope to meet again in this world,” writes Professor Dawes Hicks, “the counterpart of that mind, so scrupulously careful and exact where care and exactness were essential for sound judgment, and yet so firm and unhesitating when assured of a truth, however opposed that truth might be to the views of those with whom he would fain have been in accord.” His ideal of freedom in theology had a noble width very unlike the narrow or rigid intellectualism that has often, not always with justice, been charged upon “advanced” thought. All his works, the *Philo Judæus*, the *Fourth Gospel*, the Hibbert Lectures of 1894, the *Studies in Christian Doctrine* of 1908, are in an unusual degree contributions to insight. They reveal what Professor Dawes Hicks has well called a combination of originality and “sweet reasonableness,” very refreshing to all who have too often to read new views which are foolish, or expositions of Christianity so utterly rational as to be hardly worth believing.

“The earnest desire to penetrate into the consciousness of Christ,” we are here told, “was the animating motive of Dr Drummond’s strenuous labours as a theologian.” This may partly explain his distrust of metaphysical speculation in theology. And yet he was ready enough to say that philosophy may rightly be *used* by the theologian to clear the ground of philosophical objections, or to adjust the Christian mind to the categories of modern thought. Though a good servant, it is a bad master. No one, he held, can understand Christ’s teaching who does not share the belief that “as an integral part of the divine scheme of things, each individual soul has, as such, a perfectly infinite value.” The specific thing in Christianity is a “sense of sonship” which we owe to Jesus, and to realise which in our own life is the last and highest point of religious attainment. Dr Drummond was a mystic, and yet he has spoken with impressive force—repeatedly, indeed, in this volume—of the perils of mystical isolation. *Solus cum solo* is but half the truth. “It is not good for the soul’s health,” he writes, “to live always in an unpeopled immensity, and yield nothing to the human fellowship in which our lot has been cast” (p. 186). We cannot feel a debt to Jesus without feeling ourselves debtors also to all who have drawn life from Him; on the other hand, to be one with them is real contact with Christ. As Professor Dawes Hicks puts it in a fine passage which has caught the very spirit of his teacher: “In

¹ The book includes a fine portrait.

the experience of sonship Christians feel themselves to be in touch with the personality of Him who was the first-born of many brothers. . . . Only a superficial and mechanical theory of human nature would throw obstacles in the way of a faith in the continual presence of Christ with our humanity, not only as the remembered exemplar of an incarnation of God in man which is continually happening, but as an actually living 'quickening spirit' that may be the light of our seeing and impart to us the strength and peace of filial devotion" (pp. lvii-lviii).

These studies in Pauline religion are devotional and contemplative, not filled with controversial questions. Behind them lies a ripe scholarship hidden by the living fibre of religious thought, like the bones in a man's hand. It is striking, and yet after all not wonderful, to see this modern thinker in such deep agreement with the Apostle. "To him," says Mr W. H. Drummond in the Preface, "St Paul was always the passionate Christian soul, and the Epistles owed their unfading fascination to the experience of recovered fellowship with God which they at once interpret and enshrine." Nothing that touched St Paul's life to the quick, Dr Drummond felt, can be quite obsolete for us. This is true even of the most unlikely subjects. Anyone who has had his ear to the ground throughout the war, and has listened to what inquiring spirits in the army have to say, will concur in the view that, "if we reach the spiritual foundations of belief, we may find that even the question of predestination pierces to the central forces of our being, and affects our entire view of life and its duties" (p. 51).

Among the themes treated of, these may be named specially: Paul as a preacher, Reconciliation, Salvation by Grace, 'The Veil upon the Heart, The Unity of the Spirit, The Root of Christian Morality, Paul's Knowledge of Jesus. What is given in each case is less a creative argument than a persuasive and ennobling meditation, set forth in a kind of writing that convinces by its pure sincerity and charms by its mixture of poetry and mellow grace. Dr Drummond raises the mind because he is not always intent on doing so, but looks at some great truth, and lets it speak through him. "If only a man can tell what he has seen and heard in moments when prayer has most completely lifted him out of himself, wherever his words fall they will be words of eternal life," he writes, unaware that we can say, *de te fabula narratur*. We are never vexed by long or superfluous disquisitions on points that matter little; it is the ultimate things that stand in the foreground always. Certain people—and Dr Drummond belongs to the small company—are able so to put truth, even doctrinal truth, that all Christians will agree, and be gladdened and strengthened by their agreement. And one reason for this is that to mystic depth and inwardness, often thrilling in its passionate touch, he joins a singularly clear sight for historic fact and moral issues. This gives such weight to his judgment that we are content to have him on our side.

Though seldom speaking of the war, he writes in its presence, setting out timeless truth which is always in season and bears on every experience. His is an optimistic reed, in the sense that the world is God's world, whatever hold evil may have got upon it. As he puts it, "Some of the most characteristic tendencies of the present age, however they may be opposed to the forms in which the Christian effort first expressed itself, are in reality legitimate developments of that effort, and, instead of being attacks on the spirit of Christ, are but the strugglings of that spirit to

clothe itself in a finer organism" (p. 20). It is surely uplifting to hear this wise and elevated spirit make the avowal: "I believe that the really dominant ideas of religious men are nearer one another than they have been for ages. . . . As men turn more and more to the Lord, and become more deeply conscious of His Spirit within themselves, the veil which hides them from one another will drop away" (p. 103). Such free and glad assurance of a good time coming is always easier for those who can say, as is said here in words which, in meaning, might have come from Luther: "Faith in Christ is not a disputable belief that He was this or that, but a confident perception of the divinity of His love, of the righteousness of God which shone forth in His words and deeds" (p. 40). Or, as he writes elsewhere: "The Spirit of Life in Christ Jesus is the essential thing for ourselves and for all mankind" (p. 167).

Dr Drummond was a theologian, in type none too common, whose supreme interest was immediate communion with God. This gives to his writing its vital tone and aids him to speak to hearers so various in a fashion which ignores the doctrinal frontiers. The eagle flying through the sky is not troubled how to cross the rivers, and those to whom God is first and last escape from many a dogmatic obstacle by rising to a great height. "Having acquired the habit of seizing the spirit while we allow the intellectual form from which we dissent to drop easily away, we shall derive religious nourishment from the prophets and saints of every school" (p. 79).

Let me conclude with a brief anthology of sentences that carry something of the book's quality. "That love which is ready to bear stripes and scorn is the one power by which the ills of mankind can be healed" (p. 97). "It was the publicans and sinners who hung, with kindling wonder and hope, upon the words of Christ, while the irreproachable leaders of religion crucified Him" (p. 98). "Thus God 'condemned sin in the flesh'; that is, passed sentence against sin within the limits of that very element in which its power seemed to reside" (p. 149). "I am content to leave such a question to science, so long as it does not deny the reality of present facts, or mutilate the higher attributes of the mind in order to adapt them to the supposed meanness of their origin" (p. 157). "Evil thoughts are overcome, not by direct attack, but by thinking of what is good" (p. 163). "It is well to be released from groundless prejudices and mistaken opinions, and yet it is a dreary thing to emerge from the warmth and haze of prejudice, which at least gave us a feeling of wonder and awe, into a clear, cold light which shows us nothing to revere" (p. 165). "It is thus that the way of the cross is the way of emancipation even for the intellect; for it liberates from all the by-ends which so often lead men into error" (p. 172). "The Church, in fact, has offered no very serious opposition to science; but it has combined all its forces to crush theological progress, and it is by theologians, that is by men with deep and clearly formed religious convictions, that the battle of intellectual liberty has been fought and won" (p. 297). "The perfect Christian is more than a disciple of Jesus. He is bound to Him by a communion of spirit, and, being ruled by the same law of love, is penetrated with the same inward life. Christ lives within him" (p. 209).

In presence of such thought, the walls between Christian communions give way, and we are all one in the wide fellowship of faithful souls.

H. R. MACKINTOSH.

The Undying Fire. By H. G. Wells.—London: Cassell, 1919.—Pp. 253.

THE problem of Divine justice is the main subject of the Old Testament, from the question of Abraham, "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" to the latest of the Psalms. It must be the most insistent of all problems to a people who, like the Jews, were inclined to accept the current valuation of good and evil fortune, and looked to the Deity to vindicate His power and reveal His will by distributing temporal rewards and punishments among those who obeyed or disobeyed His laws. The conflict of faith with experience never ceased to trouble the Jews. They tried every possible expedient to reconcile them. The good man who is afflicted may be a secret sinner. The family, not the individual, may be the unit. The whole nation, not the family, may be the unit. Justice is done, not immediately, but in the long run; the mills of God grind slowly. The righteous man may be chastened for his good. His sufferings may atone for the sins of others. Or, lastly (and this belief was singularly slow in taking root among the Jews), justice may be done in a future life.

The book of Job is a dramatic poem in which most of these solutions of the problem are propounded, and one of them is explicitly rejected. Misfortune is not always a punishment, and does not prove that the sufferer is guilty before God. But two new thoughts are brought into prominence. First, the scheme of creation has a wider scope than to provide rewards and punishments for individuals; and we are more worthily employed in contemplating the wonders and beauties of the natural order than in dunning the Almighty to settle our private accounts. Secondly, there is a real mystery in God's dealings with men, and the Creator is more displeased by shallow, petty, and uncharitable attempts to solve it than by the bitter demands for an explanation which the sufferer pours out from his deeply wounded soul.

Mr Wells has modernised the poem in a book which will give keen pleasure to all who enjoy a good debate. He follows his model by attempting no complete solution of the problem, and by ending with a restoration of the sufferer to the *status quo*, which in neither case is meant to settle the questions raised. The story is slightly sketched, and the interest centres in the speeches of Job and his three unsympathetic visitors. Parts of the book show Mr Wells at his best; and we see nothing in it of Mr Wells at his worst. The indictment against the natural order, in which the arguments for a dysteleology seem at least as strong as those for beneficent design, is admirably drawn out, with the help of the most recent science. Mr Wells, through the mouth of his Job, sees only one thing in the world which is without qualification good, and that is the Spirit of God energising in the hearts of men to conquer the manifold evils of the world. The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation is, he says, a symbol of the entrance of God Himself into the strife between good and evil in the world, and of the "undying fire" which is no mere effort of the human will, but is the actual operation of the Divine within man. This view of life brings the author closer to Christian orthodoxy than any of his earlier speculations. It does not agree well with the hypothesis of a limited, struggling God, which attracted him in some of his recent publications; for the Supreme Being cannot be merely one of the two principals in a duel; He must be above the battle, as well as engaged in it. The conflict is only real when set before an eternal background; the

struggle is the prize, just because reality is a realm of absolute and eternal values. Mr Wells does not say this; but it follows really from the doctrine of the incarnate and indwelling God which he now accepts.

The book is, in my opinion, by far the best of this eminent novelist's excursions into theology. A course of independent thinking has at last brought him to an understanding of the Catholic faith.

W. R. INGE.

THE DEANERY, ST PAUL'S, LONDON.

The Message of the Gospel to the Twentieth Century. By the Rev. R. W. Corbet, M.A., Author of *Letters from a Mystic of the Present Day*, etc.—London: Elliott Stock, 1919.

Those who knew Mr Corbet and are familiar with his mind will find no difficulties in this little book. For them its pages will be illuminated by the memory of a radiant and unique personality. Fellowship with him gave them a new insight into the meaning of life, and his example was to them sufficient and conclusive evidence of the value and truthfulness of the spirit that animated him. He lived just long enough to correct the first proof. Had time allowed, further correction in punctuation and order of words might have made the meaning in some places clearer. The fact that the book is in the form of letters to a friend of long standing indicates that no formal dogmatic statement is intended, no treatise in Theology, but rather thoughts that lived and moved in the writer's soul, generated by intuition and formed more by converse with fellow-men than by literary tradition.

My object is to call attention to the book on the chance that some thereby may read it and allow it to speak for itself. Its classification would come under the heading of Christian Mysticism. The word "mysticism," as commonly used to-day, only emphasises the present confusion of thought. It is often dismissed as connoting all that is vague and impractical, or as merely denoting the obvious fact that investigation into the human mind leads beyond the reach of sense-perception. Or, again, it is commonly thought that the mystic is one who has a peculiar faculty bestowed upon him that is denied to others. Such a conception is to build life on magic. If the word is to stand for anything and not to be discarded, it might be worth considering what it does stand for. It has many forms. There is, *e.g.*, nature-mysticism, metaphysical mysticism, ecclesiastical mysticism, etc. What can we say of Christian Mysticism?

Mr Corbet was convinced, with many others, that the Christian community in becoming an "ecclesia" lost its first freshness and vigour, lapsed from its high estate of inspiration, which was to be through the lives and influence of its members a call to the world to a new way of life, and submitted to the domination of the world-spirit. Hence its present impotence, and the urge of the need for all to reconsider the foundation of their belief. The world-war has revealed that customs, conventions, orthodoxies, and doctrines, being but human expedients, cannot be fundamental. The only rock on which if a man build no experiences, however poignant, can shatter his habitation, must be the conviction that his life is for ever centred in God, as the only Reality, "of whom and through whom and to whom are all things." The whole purpose of essential

Christianity, so the Christian mystic declares, is to make clear to men that this is so, and to disclose to them the way in which God, the living Creative Spirit, is ever guiding men into real knowledge. Such knowledge is not merely "throwing about" or "acquaintance with," but actual living union in heart and mind and will with the parental life and spirit that is divine.

Such knowledge, in our author's view, is the gift of God, acceptable to all who have become conscious of the need of a new insight into Reality. The possibility of the attainment of such immediate and sure knowledge depends on the value that anyone gives to spiritual intuition as being an integral part of the human mind or soul; the attainment depends on the earnestness and single-heartedness with which the intimations of such intuitions are trusted and followed. The mystic is intent on the cultivation of the intuitional or receptive element as indispensable for the full expression of personality. He leaves the criticism of his effort to the judgment of his fellows.

The Christian world is agreed that Jesus of Nazareth is the most arresting figure in history. Orthodoxy accepts this as a theory, and passes on, content to have built and to preserve a mausoleum in his memory; the Christian mystic remains arrested, and devotes himself to the study of the significance of the phenomenon. His is no static object of worship. As was the case with the first disciples, he is led through the attractiveness of the historic Jesus to the vision of the unity of life, of which every individual is a creation and expression, and is further fired by the expectancy of and self-surrender to the same Spirit of Wisdom, Power, and Sympathy that energised in and formed the character of his teacher, friend, and Lord. It is the fellowship of such experience, all too crudely stated, that forms the true apostolic succession, for which has been substituted the mechanical notion of a gift magically imparted.

In the "vision and experience" of our author the dualism that is native to the ordinary understanding is transcended; for the Life of man *is* the life of God. God is the Life of the universe, and God-in-Christ is the revealer and perfecter in every man of his true Being, which is called the Sonship.

Least further attempted elucidation should obscure the "message" of the book, we end with a citation from its closing words:

"The Call has now come to Christendom to die to mechanical interpretations of the Gospel, and to rise to interpretations which are spiritual, inspired with redemptive power. The Call extends to all regions of human activity, spiritual, mental, and practical, with the assurance that in the clear recognition of the Divine Sonship of men, and of the Indwelling Presence in their spiritual being of the Lord and Giver of Life, men will find the inspiring Wisdom, Motive, and Power they require for dealing with the claims of religion, philosophy, and all aspects of human activity."

C. R. SHAW STEWART.

LONDON.

The Coming Free Catholicism. By Rev. R. W. Peck.
London: Allen & Unwin, 1918.

THOSE who dream of a speedy union of the Anglican and Free Churches in this country on the basis of the Establishment and Episcopacy are

living in fantasy. There are the majority of Free Church men and women to be reckoned with. Yet the efforts on the part of some Free Church leaders to make explicit the Catholicity that is at the heart of Non-conformity indicates a will to surrender that is begotten of weariness. For the Free Churches are Catholic. Division is an accident. Reverence for the common man, for woman, and for the little child is their very life-blood. The endeavour to express this Catholicity finds various expression. The Rev. R. J. Campbell made some essays in this direction before vanishing into Anglicanism. The Rev. W. E. Orchard and an elect following plays with ritualism. Now the Oxford Movement has found its exponent within the Free Churches, and we are asked to capture the future by copying the past.

The Rev. W. G. Peck, who is a Free Church minister, is convinced that the Free Churches must go on pilgrimage. The goal is not the city of God. The first need is to achieve a Catholicism that accepts and uses all the dogmas, traditions, and practices of Rome. This must needs be expressed apart from Rome, but its purpose is to impress both Roman and Anglican Catholicism that the Free Churches have a Church-consciousness, and capacity to become all that the great historical Churches have been. Dissent is doomed unless it ceases to be dissent. The Protestant Reformation was a tragedy. It has now exhausted itself by its guessings at truth. Rome has kept the truth, and "Catholicism is the only possible atmosphere in which orthodoxy can be conveyed to the twentieth century." As another prophet of to-day (Mr Shakespeare), he insists that the Free Churches are destined to collapse—unless his panacea is accepted. It is surprising how much thought varies in reference to ecclesiastical matters. William Allingham, the friend of many who represented what was best in Mediævalism, could see no meaning in the Oxford Movement. "Does all this about Oxford and the Fathers, etc., etc., really matter?" he asks. Mr Peck discerns in this the revival of real religion—the river that is bringing refreshment to the Free Churches and the world. His is a surprising programme. Modernism has honeycombed the Free Churches, and the only remedy is a return to the dogmas kept alive by Rome. Some of her doctrines and theologies may need to be revised. And there will be need to retain the freedom of which Modernism is the expression, though a mistaken expression, because it denies orthodoxy. With the dogmas must return the old discarded theories of the priesthood, the Mass, confession, penance, and invocation of saints; the use of images and incense, cross and crucifix; the architecture, vestments, and ritual of Rome. This is the goal. It must be sought and found, or the Free Churches will perish. This means the revival of Mediævalism. It is regarded as the same thing as a revival of Christianity. Mr Peck is a disciple of G. K. Chesterton. He imagines that when bishops were warriors and occupied the places of statesmen, when the Pontiff at Rome and the occupant of the throne of the Holy Roman Empire kept the world spiritual, when England was merry and there was no dissent, nor wrong, nor disturbance—then all the world was a paradise. But why did the people revolt against this happy concurrence of events? Or if this reign of religion made revolt necessary and inevitable, how shall we find salvation in going back to the atmosphere and conditions of those times?

It is easy to criticise the Free Churches. They deserve it and need it. Mr Peck wants a Church that wins the natural man. Yet he is impatient

because there is imperfect human nature in the Free Churches. Perhaps he would agree with Mr Chesterton that the Free Churches are impossible. Their progress ends at a precipice—they provide no thoroughfare through the world. If this is so, to confess and return is the only way. Mr Peck emphasises the fact that the Church is an organism. It is, however, difficult to separate his aspirations from a theory of salvation by organisation. And salvation does not come that way. Organisation must be the expression of life, or it becomes non-effective. The expression of a world-consciousness must be by a mission to penetrate the world with the good news of God. Whether this of necessity goes with clerical dress, the revival of priestism, symbolism, the confessional, and all the other developments and extravagances of Catholicism, so called, is, to say the least, doubtful. Mr Peck is sincere. But he dreams a fond and foolish dream if he imagines that this way will lead far those who have tasted freedom. Its acceptance would mean the dissidence of dissent indeed. Protestantism has something to learn from Rome. Yet Rome is impossible; for Rome is not Catholic. The Church—one, holy, catholic—has never existed in history. It has always been an ideal. What Mark Rutherford says concerning the individual is true concerning the Churches: "We cannot bring ourselves into a unity. The time is yet to come when we shall live by a faith which is a harmony of all our faculties. A glimpse was caught of such a faith nineteen centuries ago in Galilee, but it has vanished." It will dawn again, but not by going back to discarded bonds.

J. C. MANTRIPP.

LEICESTER.

Studies in Japanese Buddhism. By August K. Reischauer.—New York and London: The Macmillan Company, 1919.

If one could judge a nation by its religion, one would have no hesitation in saying that the Japanese are a topsy-turvy race; because present-day Buddhism is a maze in which one gets almost lost in spite of Dr Reischauer's guiding thread. And this is not to decry the present book, for although it is a little too technical, in parts, for the general reader, nevertheless it is a well-written guide to the study of Japanese Buddhism from both an historical and a practical aspect.

The author commences his study by an outline of the history of pre-Buddhist India, and then goes on to describe the birth and early life of Gautama, and it is not long before we are witnessing the creation and growth of his ethical system. It is here that Dr Reischauer formulates the question: Was Gautama (or Buddha) an atheist? He thinks not, but admits that the Buddha's view, while it did not deny, did not take any great account of, the God-idea. This the author follows up with the remark that "the weakness of the Gautama's religion is . . . in thinking that religion is possible without having some positive ideas as to the great problems of God, the soul and its eternal destiny."

He soon passes from this biography of the founder to trace for us the progress and transition of Buddhism through China, and thence to Japan. He depicts the various ways in which the original religion has been corrupted. All religions are of course liable to corruption; but Buddhism seems to have been particularly unfortunate in this respect; indeed, some of the sects described by the author can hardly be called Buddhist at all.

Their religion is a strange mixture of Confucianism, Christianity, and Buddhism, with a predominating feature of ancestor-worship. As an instance of the corruption which Gautama's ethical system suffered, and so became nothing more nor less than an ingenious ritual, the following method of attaining enlightenment by sitting in meditation may be cited: "There are two ways of sitting: full cross-legged sitting, and half cross-legged sitting. According to the former way, you must put the right foot . . ." This is a long way from the original Buddhism, which in spite of its shortcomings was at least a practical philosophy of life and not a meaningless ceremonial.

The effect of Buddhism on Japanese art is also considered. The author is of opinion that the introduction of Gautama's religion into Japan had a very beneficial effect upon all her arts, and particularly calls attention to the cultured verse of the Golden Age of Poetry. The chapter on the Ethics of Buddhism is of great interest, as is also the one containing extracts from the Buddhist's scriptures; but in the space of a short review one dare not commence to write on such a vast problem as that of Ethics.

Some attempt has also been made by the author to describe the Japanese idea of Nirvana; but here he is working under great difficulties: the Japanese themselves are at variance on this subject. Some Japanese assert that Nirvana is a series of heavens, some that it is complete annihilation, and some that it signifies reincarnation. At any rate, it is one of the great questions which Gautama left open; and it is on this account that so many diverse opinions are held.

The history and philosophy of the "pessimistic religion" is a big subject to cover in a work of one volume; but Dr Reischauer may be said to have given us a very able and sympathetic study.

WILLIAM JOHNSON.

NOTTINGHAM.

Evolution and the Doctrine of the Trinity. By Stewart A. M'Dowall.
Cambridge: University Press, 1918.—Pp. 258.

MR M'DOWALL is an apologist. A Christian teacher who believes himself to be orthodox, he sets out to show that Christian doctrine can consist with the latest utterances of science and philosophy, and is, indeed, largely confirmed thereby. This book continues the argument of two earlier books—*Evolution and the Need of Atonement* and *Evolution and Spiritual Life*. In the former, Mr M'Dowall proffered a demonstration that, for sound thought, "a teleological interpretation of the evolutionary process" is a necessity: in the other, he left us with Theism and with the fascinating but delusive presentation of an Eternal Love which is "of necessity externally creative in order that it may realise its self-abnegating nature through other beings who may enter into and share the perfect experience." In the book now before us, Mr M'Dowall addresses himself to the doctrine of the Trinity. It is a book of careful thought and frank discussion, and gives much evidence of a philosophical equipment and capacity which cannot be called inadequate. But it is also a book of endless repetition and duplication. No doubt Mr M'Dowall intended to make himself clear: he has succeeded in making himself wearisome. Moreover, intending clearness, he has achieved obscurity; for his repetitions and duplications are not precise. When he goes over some old ground, he does not say

precisely what he said before. This makes his meaning very uncertain, and the uncertainty extends to statements that are vital and to arguments that are cardinal. The present reviewer has read the book carefully three times, and still does not feel quite sure that he has apprehended the writer's meaning accurately.

(1) The doctrine that "Eternal Love is of necessity externally creative" is taken from one of Mr M'Dowall's earlier books, but it plays so large a part in this book, and is so closely connected with Mr M'Dowall's account of the Incarnation, that one may be pardoned for pausing at it before passing on to the writer's main thesis.

Love is of necessity "externally" creative. If this be true, Mr M'Dowall has made for himself a pre-eminent name, for even the greatest of misleaders, Hegel, became mythological when he faced the problem posed by the existence of finite particulars. But is it true? It is true if self-abnegation be an essential note of Love, but in that case the Triune God is not the Absolute. An orthodox theologian would tell us that the nature of the Triune God completely fulfils our conception of the Absolute. God, he would say, is Perfect Love, not in virtue of His relation to the world, but *in se* and *per se*—in the perfect communion and intercourse between the Three Persons in the Absolute Unity. Now, it is quite certain that the Love which is mutual between those Three, though wholly and perfectly selfless, does not involve the least self-abnegation. So, if self-abnegation be an indispensable note of Perfect Love, the Love which subsists in the Triune God is not perfect. Indeed, the argument compels us to say more than this, for if self-abnegation be essential in Love, the Love which subsists in the Triune God is not, *in se*, Love at all, but becomes Love only in and through "external" creation. Mr M'Dowall agrees with this, and is willing to accept the suggestion which, of necessity, instantly follows: "External creation must be an eternal process." In that case, however, the Absolute is not the Triune God, but the Triune God *plus* the universe of finite existence. Obviously, such an Absolute would not be unitary, for it would involve, not one sole principle of being, but at least two such principles—the *ratio essendi* of the Eternal God, and the *ratio essendi* of the coeternal but not consubstantial world.

Mr M'Dowall, we think, has made a mistake at the very outset. Love, no doubt, is always a perfectly selfless outflowing of the self, but when it involves self-abnegation it does so, not in virtue of its own nature, but as a consequence of some extrinsic limitations. Now, the extrinsic limitations of a thing cannot be explained by the nature of the thing. Therefore, if "external" creation have its ground in some divine self-abnegation, the explanation of it must include something other than the Divine Love, for Love *in se* is not self-abnegating, and becomes so only because of some constraint from without.

If all this be true, Mr M'Dowall's explanation of the finite universe is a failure. And this failure is vital, for Mr M'Dowall's doctrine of creation is the ground and very substance of his teleology, and if this be taken away the splendid cosmology of his book—and it *is* splendid—falls to the ground like a house of cards.

(2) Let us, however, place ourselves, as a reviewer must or should, at Mr M'Dowall's point of view. The world of finite particulars, then, has its ground—Mr M'Dowall consistently prefers "ground" to "cause"—in the eternal creativeness of Eternal Love. The next question that arises is

this: What is God's relation to the world of finite being? Mr M'Dowall tells us that God, who is transcendent, is also immanent. But what does Mr M'Dowall mean by immanence? To be quite frank, I do not know. Mr M'Dowall explicitly rejects pantheism, and is perfectly sure that God's relation to the world is not that of a box to its contents. Neither is he satisfied with the immanence of spirit in body. He prefers the immanence of purpose in work. This, however, does not seem to be immanence at all—at least not the immanence which has lately become prominent on those broad marches where orthodoxy lapses unconsciously into heresy. And it does not seem to suffice for Mr M'Dowall's own thought. For instance, he repeatedly tells us that the finite world, and whatever experience be in it, are God's experience. In fact, God's self-abnegation seems to consist precisely in this—in His condescension to a lower form of experience. This seems to mean that the experience of the Immanent God is an experience of existing as finite things exist. It is, however, obvious that an artist's experience—even if we permit ourselves to think (fallaciously) that his creative purpose makes him immanent in his work—is not and cannot be an experience of existing as his work exists. Yet it is difficult not to believe that the attribution to God of a creaturely experience, and therefore of a creaturely mode of existence, is not an essential part and note of Mr M'Dowall's thought. For instance, he calls creation the "first kenosis." If, for an explanation of this, we turn to his account of the "second kenosis," the Incarnation, we find that kenosis means an actual descent of the Godhead into finite existence. Indeed, Mr M'Dowall's account of the "second kenosis" seems to make the Incarnation a "conversion of the Godhead into flesh." If, then, the first kenosis be also an entry into finite existence, the immanence of God in the world is *not* like the immanence of man in his work, and creaturely things are God, as pantheists say, even though God be more than the creatures.

Mr M'Dowall's apologetic rôle makes it worth while to note in passing his strange conception that when the Second Person in the Trinity became Incarnate, He ceased to be immanent in the world in His proper Person. Mr M'Dowall's account of the Incarnation suggests that the kenosis of the Word at the Incarnation amounted to a stepping-down from the Holy Trinity, so that, after the Incarnation, only two bare witness in Heaven. We wonder what Mr M'Dowall makes of St Paul's words—"in whom all things consist."

(3) Let us now turn to Mr M'Dowall's account of the Trinity. He begins with a "brief" but sufficient "*résumé* of the doctrine as usually held by the Church." "The Christian doctrine of the Godhead is, then, that It is Three in One and One in Three. The One God exists in the Unity of perfect Love, yet there are three hypostases in Him." These three hypostases are not attributes, nor aspects, nor *personæ* (masks). "In fact," says Mr M'Dowall, "the word hypostasis has undergone many changes in the exact shade of its meaning. Originally it denoted simply the idea of *reality*. In Stoic philosophy it was equivalent to *οὐσία*. At the time of the Council of Nicæa it lay rather more than midway between *mode* and *person*, inclining to the latter." This amounts to an admission that the Nicene Fathers, had they apprehended our modern conception of personality, would not have described the Three Hypostases as Three Persons, and an excellent modern book on the doctrine of the Trinity in the New Testament—just published by the eminent French Jesuit, Father Lebreton—suggests that

this attitude of mind continues to be characteristic of the orthodox tradition. Yet Mr M'Dowall says: "I propose to use the terms hypostasis and person as almost interchangeable. . . . In the modern sense a person is a complete self-identity, fundamentally different from all others; conscious of others; with his own peculiar experience, yet able to share the experience of others. . . . In this sense the Godhead is Three Persons." Now, let it be granted that the last sentence is true, and that Mr M'Dowall has demonstrated the truth of it,—what has he gained for orthodox apologetic by demonstrating a personal complexity in the Godhead which is *not* the complexity propounded by the orthodox tradition? This question Mr M'Dowall does not answer, nor does anything he says enable us to answer it for him.

(4) But, once more, let us put ourselves at Mr M'Dowall's point of view. The Three Hypostases are personal in the modern sense of that word. What leads Mr M'Dowall to say this? His analysis of Personality. He points us to cognition, conation, feeling—the three indispensable coefficients (he thinks) in all personality whether human or divine. Now—this should be noted carefully—Mr M'Dowall does not contend that the coexistence of these three factors constitutes a Trinity in Unity. Even if he did, the contention would not help him, for it could not give him more than a complexity in the unity of one personality, whereas the term of his apologetic interest is the tri-personal form of the sole Godhead. Nevertheless, from these three factors in personality Mr M'Dowall does in fact reach the conclusion that Personality, whether in God or man, is essentially a unity of three Persons. How does he do this? He begins by pointing out that not one of these three coefficients in personality, as we know them in man, ever acts *purely*; each, when active, involves, to a greater or less degree, the two others. Therefore, says Mr M'Dowall, each is a person! The three factors, taken separately, are *not* persons—they are merely coefficients in personality,—but because the three always act together, each *is* a person. There is sophistry somewhere.

And even if there be no sophistry, it seems very hard to show that the alternating personalities in man—they are never coexistent, for man does only one thing at a time—are generically identical with the coeternal Persons in the Godhead. If personality be personally complex in the way for which Mr M'Dowall contends, the structure of it is *not* the structure of the Divine Trinity. What, then, has Mr M'Dowall gained by his long argument?

ARTHUR BOUTWOOD.

LONDON.

Obiter Scripta. By Frederic Harrison.—London :
Chapman & Hall, 1919.

IN a letter of December 1917 Mr Frederic Harrison wrote: "In January 1918 the *Fortnightly Review* will have a miscellaneous article of mine on the Situation, the Future, Books, and Men. I have been a contributor to the *Fortnightly Review* from its first number, May 1865, *i.e.* for fifty-three years. And my first important article—*Westminster Review*—'Neo-Christianity,' a name I invented, was in 1860."

The articles contributed by Mr Harrison to the *Fortnightly Review* during 1918 are now included in the volume *Obiter Scripta*. This collection of miscellanies cannot but prove attractive to readers of the

Hibbert Journal, for it provides plenty of wise comment on Religion, Theology, and Philosophy. To begin with Religion. Here are a few extracts from Mr Harrison's letters, which will represent his prevailing attitude under this head. Many years ago he wrote: "The Theologian's dreams of future life are to me as inhuman as they are irrational. Listen not to the voice of the tempter who is Satan, not Christ." And in another letter: "They will say I am *Papa ipso papalior*. The incident at end was a speech of Sir J. Knowles to Cardinal Manning at a big Catholic reception. The Prelates shuddered. I smiled deprecating assent. We are the true Catholics. God and Heaven are the dreams of sectaries, not of Catholics." And this more recently: "If 'something higher,' 'invisible things,' the Platonic 'empyrean' is your own state of mind, you should study my article on *The Unseen* in the *Positivist Review* for March. As I say, it is 'Christian Agnosticism.' They say, 'the invisible,' because they are timid sceptics, and disbelieve the creeds—but are afraid to say so."

Be it noted, however, that in the letter from which the last of these quotations was taken we come upon the "religious" reservation *D.V.* That is to say (and his letters generally attest the fact), the author's looks are not always "downward bent"; sometimes at least, if I may quote Milton again, they are "looks commercing with the skies." For example, in a letter of November 1918, referring to his volume *On Society*, he writes: "The book is deeply Christian, and biblical in a modernist sense." And the following occurs in *Obiter Scripta*. Dealing with the *Religio Grammatici* of Professor Gilbert Murray, he objects to the author's definition of religion as that which offers man an escape from the prison of the present, a means of salvation from the terror to come, or deliverance from the body. And he adds: "I believe that a fanatical Calvinist can talk like this, that his religion is the contemplation of the glory of Heaven and fear of the horrors of Hell. But, surely, all modern and rational ideas of religion mean the faith and the resolution to do one's work in the world in accordance with the moral and spiritual purposes of a righteous life, and in continuous communion of soul with those of a like mind who are working out their duty in the eye and with the help of Providence."

Now, the word *Providence* in the above, with its capital letter, seems to admit that religion neither begins nor ends with that *Humanity* which the author is popularly supposed to have exalted to the position of Deity. Again, on another page of *Obiter Scripta* he writes: "Plunge deep into other-world mysteries, ye men of science, in defiance of *data*, logic and demonstration. Imagination has no need of facts." But facts, we must add, have need of imagination; and in one of his letters Mr Harrison assures us that "the one thing that *lives* on is the higher literature"; and in another he confesses that in "these cruel times" he has one resource, he "can still read and enjoy great poetry." Perilous indeed, we may add, are facts without imagination; they are not only a danger, they are also an evil. Even in the twentieth century we cannot live on fact alone; but we can look *at* facts till we forget to look *beyond* them, till like Tennyson's "man of science" we have

"An eye well-practised in nature, a spirit bounded and poor";

and we have all heard of the fact-worshipper who would "botanise upon his mother's grave"; to whom

“A primrose by the river’s brim
 Dicotyledon was to him,
 ’Twas this—and nothing more !”

and with that we are accustomed to contrast the higher philosophic mind (in which category I place Frederic Harrison):

“To me the meanest flower that blows can give
 Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears”;

and equally well known is that other attitude of the seeker after truth, who strives to “look through Nature up to Nature’s God.”

We must not therefore take Mr Harrison too seriously when he writes: “I have been reading Plato; what mystical stuff it is”; nor when in one of his published works he asserts: “The Earth is a *fact*. The World is a *fact*. Humanity is a *fact*. Together they include all the facts of which we have scientific evidence, things about which no rational person doubts or disputes.” For what, let us now ask, are the facts about facts? If facts are stubborn things, it is chiefly because we cannot be sure of them. All physical questions have metaphysical issues, and where fact finishes, other and grander truths may begin. “There is grandeur in this view of nature,” said Darwin himself, as he recognised the further evolution of ideal from real. But again, what is *real*? Huxley, I believe, was of opinion that all we can be sure of is the fact of consciousness or thought, but that the thoughts themselves are probably fallacious. It would be but a step from this to add that if our thoughts are probably fallacious, the thought that we are thinking may itself be fallacious:

“And ’tis your *I Am*’s crowning act
 To stutter *I am not*.”

No, nothing really firm has been come to as yet, not even by the pragmatist

“Who plants his footstep on the seeming fact
 And knows his tree by the fruit, careless, I think,
 To moralise the soil or search the root
 Or grasp the vanishing flower.”

For there is a use beyond utility, and the emotion aroused by a flower is finer and nobler than the senses that batten on the fruit. With a purpose something like this a modern thinker puts to us the question: “May it not be only for the sake of the dreams that visit it, that the world of reality has any value for us?” What then remains? Neither dogmatic assertion nor dogmatic denial, but an open mind. “There is a superstition,” says Bacon, “in avoiding superstition”; if the man of fact should challenge us with his dictum: *Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit prius in sensu*, there is no reason whatever why we should not take up the challenge by merely reversing the hypothesis, as thus: *Nihil est in sensu quod non fuerit prius in intellectu*. From this it is but a step further to conclude that until the case has been clearly made out for an arrogant pessimism, each man has a right to a reverent optimism—such as is not infrequently reflected even in the pages of the author before us: “An immense regeneration of soul in mankind as a whole—a new world, moral, spiritual, and intellectual. . . . I take a back seat, and look on at the glorious new world that opens.”

On the great scale, at any rate, there is room for this reverent optimism, "for all is balanced in the Infinite Sun." On the other hand, we still see through a glass darkly; we must still view the impartial whole with a partial eye; and many of us will be disposed to share Mr Harrison's doubts about the future. Altogether, his forecast is a somewhat gloomy one. Under the head of social ethics, for example, he writes to me in a recent letter: "I have no faith in labour, which is tending to Bolshevism." Here is struck the keynote of the many sane and eloquent passages on sociology that are to be found in these *Obiter Scripta*: "We are in the mid-stream of Democracy, as a kind of national creed . . . governments . . . are swept away day after day by small local class insurrections. Why so? Because any sort of concentration of authority, national or governmental, offends the democratic genius. It portends and looks like tyranny. Any collective authority violates the law of equality—sacred equality! . . . The futilities of this assumption were never more pernicious than in the present crisis . . . in a revolutionary epoch, such as that which has now broken in upon our civilisation, the very basis of parliamentary government has been undermined." The danger is not altogether new; we have always had in our midst the element of "wild hearts and feeble wings that every sophister can lime"; nor altogether new is the remedy proposed by the author of *Obiter Scripta*, for the poet I have just been quoting thus continues:

"Neither hide the ray
From those, not blind, who wait for day
Tho' sitting girt with doubtful light."

But Mr Harrison's remedy of moral and spiritual education dates back half a century; it begins, indeed, with the very foundation of Positivism; as he says to me in a recent letter: "I have wondered why the critics . . . did not notice how much higher and more possible is our *moral Socialism* than is the immoral grub called Socialism, of which the prophets are Lenin and Trotsky." And on p. 55 of the present volume he writes: "Nor is he (Mr Mallock) at all hostile to the merits and promises of a true and noble Socialism as he would understand it. All he asks is that the Utopia of a new and social industry must be preceded by a deep improvement in our education and culture, and by a reformation of morality, thought, and religion. I come to this from a different point of view from that of Mr Mallock; but I find him in agreement with much that I have taught for forty years. In my book *Order and Progress*, 1875 and 1917, I showed the fallacy of any 'pure'—*i.e.* abstract—Democracy being even possible, much less desirable." And the passage that follows contains the noble words which were quoted above: "In my *Moral and Religious Socialism* (1891), now re-issued in my *National and Social Problems* (1908), I urged that the re-organisation of society, in the interest of the masses of manual workers, could be brought about only after an immense regeneration of soul in mankind as a whole—a new world, moral, spiritual, and intellectual."

Education, by all means; but we must see to it that the education is of the right kind, a growing

"Not alone in power
And knowledge, but by year and hour
In reverence and in charity."

Under this head Mr Harrison puts Germany before us as an object-lesson: "They are themselves the living perverters of truth, the authorised distorters of reason. I once tried to get my old friend Professor Brentano to see the gulf into which Professortum was plunging their pupils. Alas! he only wondered that one whom he had known on the side of justice to the weak and the oppressed could have so fallen from grace as to doubt the justice of German claims. No! The whole intellectual system of German education has been so bewitched by subtlety and self-conceit that nothing can unteach them but such a lesson as the Russian imperialism has brought on itself and its people."

I am not sure that I agree with Mr Harrison where he argues that to teach patriotism is the first essential of education: "Other great nations do this. The religious teaching of Germans is—Germany! In French schools they teach French history. We have seen what 'France' means to every French man and woman; their training in patriotism is hardly less than that of the German, and it has not been so deeply perverted. In the United States the Republic is the basis of school education. . . . In our school system, Country is a blank page between the Catechism and the Multiplication Table." To this I would reply that the latent patriotism which springs into a dauntless and deathless existence when our people are threatened by a common danger wants no teaching; nor does the love of fatherland in Britons who have left the parent shore; it is the patriotism of peace that is lacking amongst us, and for this we might invent some better term. Should it be—at a venture—*Commonwelfareism*? And further: such a term suggests a virtue that only begins at home, and does not end until "each shall find his own in all men's good." And if that consummation is still in a distant future, let us nevertheless—in the words of the same noble poet—"dream our dream to-day." But from this dream we are rudely awakened, if we listen to Mr Harrison's latest on the "situation" and the "future." I will quote from recent letters: "I have a feeling that it may be the last I may ever see of the sea, and of old England [D.V.], soon to be submerged in Bolshevist chaos." "A retreat in which one can cease to think of the ever-deepening clouds of confusion, ruin, madness, and even blood, which hang over our doomed England—now plunging into its vortex of arrogance and folly. *Finis Britannicæ.*"

MORTON LUCE.

WESTON-SUPER-MARE.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE BOLSHEVIST UTOPIA AND THE RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA.

PRINCE EUGÈNE TROUBETZKOY.

[DURING the last year and a half the Editor has made several attempts, without result, to get into communication with Prince Eugène Troubetzkoy, Professor of Law in the University of Moscow, whose former articles (January and April 1918) will be remembered by readers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL. Early in November a letter was received from him, together with the MS. of the following article, conveying the welcome news that he was in safety on September 12. Unfortunately the packet had been opened and the MS. immersed in some fluid which had caused the ink to run over the pages and obliterated many portions of the script. At first it was thought impossible to decipher the MS., but repeated efforts have resulted in the recovery of most of it. By the use of various devices it has been found possible in some passages, otherwise obliterated, to trace the scratches made by the point of the pen on the surface of the paper. Readings that are conjectural will be indicated by square brackets. In a few places all efforts to read the text have failed.

In his letter to the Editor, which is undamaged, Prince Troubetzkoy says: "Je vous envoie un article auquel je tiens beaucoup, car c'est la philosophie de notre drame, notre catastrophe, et notre résurrection nationale. . . . Il y'a presque un an que j'ai du m'enfuir de Moscou pour ne pas être arrêté par les bolcheviks."]

THE civil war which is now going on in Russia is accompanied by a spiritual conflict not less determined and portentous. For the Bolshevists, it is well known, the only question at

stake is that of realising a certain political and social programme of human relationships. Their programme is merely a particular application of the materialist conception of life, erected into a dogma and proclaimed as the fundamental principle of all human society. It is not surprising, therefore, that Bolshevism has for its adversary a religious movement, which is now becoming a powerful effort of the whole nation to recover its soul.

The materialist conception of which I speak is in no sense original. The doctrine of Bolshevism is merely a transformation of Marxism adapted to the [business] of revolution and consequently [distorted] and falsified. The doctrine of Marx, I need hardly say, is an explanation in materialistic terms of the historical evolution of society. Socialism is there represented as the final result of a long historical process, a result due to arrive in a future more or less distant and uncertain. To transform this scientific socialism into a programme of revolutionary action, it has been found necessary to give it a violent twist. This Bolshevism has done by substituting *immediate revolution* for the *evolution* preached by Marx. For him materialism is mainly one of the means for explaining history. For Lenin and his adepts it is primarily a law of action, the principle not alone of what *is* but of what *ought to be*.

One of the most striking characteristics of Bolshevism is its pronounced hatred of religion, and of Christianity most of all. To the Bolshevik, Christianity is not merely the [theory] of a mode of life different from his own; it is an enemy to be persecuted and wiped out of existence.

To understand this is not difficult. The tendency of the Christian religion to hold before the believer an ideal of a life beyond death is diametrically opposed to the ideal of Bolshevism, which tempts the masses by promising *the immediate realisation of the earthly paradise*. From that point of view Christianity is not only a false conception of life; it is an obstacle to the realisation of the Communist ideal. It detaches souls from the objects of sense and diverts them from the struggle to get the good things of this life. According to the Bolshevik formula, "religion is opium for the people," and serves as a tool of capitalist domination.

In contrast with religion, Bolshevism is first and foremost the practical denial of the spiritual. The Bolsheviks flatly refuse to admit the existence of any spiritual bond between man and man. For them economic and material interests constitute the only social nexus: they recognise no other.

This is the source of their whole conception of human society. [The love of country,] for example, is a lying and hypocritical pretence which is used to "mask" the interests of the dominant classes. The "nation" is a mere spectre which must vanish, an empty prejudice; for the national bond is a spiritual bond, and therefore wholly factitious. From their point of view the only *real* bond between men is the material—that is to say, the economic. Material interests divide men into classes, and they are the only divisions to be taken account of. Hence the Bolshevists recognise no "nations" save the "rich" and the "poor." As there is no other bond which can unite these two "nations" into one social whole, their relations must be [regulated] exclusively by the zoological principle revealed in the struggle for existence.

On this showing, considerations of *justice* have nothing to do with the claim of the proletariat to be the sole possessor of all material goods. That claim rests solely and exclusively on the right of the strongest. According to the Bolshevists, therefore, it is not [social] justice [of one kind or another] that emerges from the strife of classes: it is simply the right of the big fishes to swallow the little ones. Formerly the capitalists had the advantage of this right: now it is the turn of the proletariat. Nor must this right of the wild beast to his prey be limited by any humanitarian qualification. The strife of classes, as they conceive it, is to be in all respects as cruel and implacable as the struggle for existence among the animals; that is to say, it can only be terminated by the complete extermination of one or the other of the combatants.

All the typical features of Bolshevist society are derived as logical consequences from the fundamental principle just described. Why, for example, does manual work hold the privileged position? Why is it much more highly remunerated than intellectual work? Why are the intellectuals ill-treated and persecuted? The answer is simple. The natural consequence of the denial of the spiritual bond is that intellectual forces are held in contempt. Among the Bolsheviks the worth of a man is estimated solely in terms of the material force that he represents. This valuation is in complete harmony with the common notion that the only "true work" is bodily work. The cult of "masses" and the contempt for the individual personality which characterise Bolshevism [proceed] from the same source.

Another consequence of the materialist conception of society is the Bolshevist method of treating the family. Since there is no spiritual bond between the two sexes, there can be

no *constant* relation. The rule is therefore that men and women can change their partners as often as they wish. The [authorities] in certain provinces have even proclaimed "the nationalisation" of women, that is, the abolition of any private and exclusive right to possess a wife even for a limited period, on the ground that women are the "property of all." [The same with] the children. A powerful current of opinion among the Bolshevists is urging that children must be taken from their parents in order that the State may give them an education on true materialistic lines. Attempts have been made to carry out these ideas. In certain communes some hundreds of children were "nationalised," that is, taken from their parents and placed in public institutions.

In short, the feature most characteristic of Bolshevism is to be found in the practical method it adopts for the realisation of its Utopia. This method is the armed conflict of classes, *war to the death against all who possess*. And this, from the standpoint of a consistent materialism, is, beyond all doubt, the one certain means of causing the strongest to prevail.

We now know something of the appalling consequences. The dream of the earthly paradise, to be brought into being by civil war, becomes instantly the reality of hell let loose. The war of classes has shown itself incapable of founding a new social order. On the other hand, it has shattered the very foundations of human society in any form whatsoever. For society is before all else a state of *peace* among the individuals and the classes of which it is composed.

What the Bolshevik adventure has demonstrated once for all is this—the total incapacity of materialist [doctrine] to give men peace of any kind. The present condition of Russia may be described in two formulæ of Hobbes, which were also born in a time of civil war: *Bellum omnium contra omnes*, and, *Homo homini lupus est*.

This is the sober truth. The civil war in Russia has become literally "a war of all against all"; for it has penetrated to the interior of every town and every village.

"The war of the poor against the rich" is indeed a formula which seems simple enough at first sight. But life is infinitely more complicated than any formula. What is "a poor man," and what is "a rich man"? These are vague and indeterminate conceptions, for "riches" and "poverty" are clearly *relative* things. A man who has two waistcoats for his body or two horses for his plough is "rich" in comparison with another who has only one. At what point, then, can the war of the poor against the rich be stopped? In Russia we have

the sad experience that no barrier or limit can be set to this conflict. At the beginning of the revolution there was war between the peasants and the proprietors of the great estates; then came war between the poorest peasants and the peasants who were better off; then war between the towns and the rural populations to get possession of corn; then internecine strife between the workmen in the towns. Here too the distinction is drawn between "poor workers," who are the privileged members of the Bolshevist State, and the workers without the qualification "poor," the latter being an object of hatred and envy to the former. The "poor worker" who to-day improves his condition by his labour runs the risk of being classed, to-morrow, with the "rich" or the "bourgeois," and consequently exposed to the attacks of his "fellow-citizens."

It is matter of common knowledge that every person in Russia to whom the term "rich" or "bourgeois" can be attached is completely outside the protection of the law. He is marked "an enemy of the people" and remains without defence against pillage and murder. The Bolshevist State is a society in which the least increase of individual prosperity attracts to itself the jealous regards of innumerable eyes. The instant a man raises himself even above the level of mendicancy he is instantly suspected, denounced, and followed up. Thenceforward he has neither right nor security.

Such a régime is fatal to production of every kind and prolific of [hatred]. The peasant who thought he would become a rich man by appropriating the land of the neighbouring estates, sows no more corn than is strictly necessary for the support of his family, knowing for certain that any surplus in his harvest will be taken from him or "requisitioned" for next to nothing. The best policy for the unhappy man is obviously to produce as little as possible. Besides which, there is another way in which he can ameliorate his lot during the rest of the year. He has only to inscribe his name in a "committee of poor men," spy on any who remain at work, denounce them as "bourgeois," and forthwith take his share in the fruit of their labours.

Bolshevist Russia is a country where men have virtually ceased to work. Consequently almost everything needful is lacking—corn, fuel for the factories and railways, clothing, boots. The factories close down; the trains crawl along. There are railways on which trains run no more. The civil war, and the uncertainty of the morrow, have killed productive activity. [In place of] the old barriers between classes, hatred

and envy have raised new ones. New social antagonisms have come into being, in particular that between the town and the village, which now stand for opposing camps. The peasant refuses to sell the produce of his harvest to the town, for the paper money in which he is paid is worth almost nothing, and is useless in any case, for there is nothing to buy with it. The consequence is that in order to procure bread the town invades the country with detachments of soldiers who requisition the bread by force and pillage the peasantry. Naturally, the town workman, who does not work, is an object of hatred to the peasant whom he deprives of the whole means of livelihood. On the other hand, the workman detests the "greedy peasant" who leaves him to die of hunger.

This state of things is becoming insupportable for the masses. In the country there are fresh outbreaks every day. The peasant, realising that he has been tricked by empty promises, becomes ferocious and kills the Bolshevik officers. These functionaries are sometimes burnt alive, or buried alive. These revolts are ruthlessly repressed. Thousands are hanged or shot; blood is being shed like water. Villages are burnt ten or a dozen at a time. Meanwhile the popular hatred of the Bolsheviks rises every day. No sooner is the fire stamped out in one place than it breaks forth in another.

Such are the practical effects of the materialistic dream of Bolshevism. The facts I have described are not accidental, they are the necessary consequences of its fundamental principle. To set up material interest as the only social bond is to destroy society, for the simple reason that it makes the material interest of each individual of more value than society itself. The sacrifice of one's life or of any other individual interest becomes absurd if there is nothing higher than the interest in question. A pack of wolves gathered for hunting in common, and then tearing each other to pieces when no more prey is to be found, furnishes an exact image of a society where the advantage or the appetite of each member has become the sole law of conduct. A community of human beings cannot exist on these terms. The unchaining of appetite can only be the beginning of general decomposition.

This is precisely what the materialist Utopia has done for Russia. As a principle of social decomposition it has displayed an amazing power. In a few months it dispersed an army of ten million men and ground the world's greatest empire into dust; at the same time it has shown a complete impotence to reconstruct society on any new basis whatsoever. Its attempt to separate the body from the spirit of social life

has only proved once more that the *life* of society is its *spirit*. When that goes, the material embodiment decomposes and falls into dust; and there is no human skill that can resuscitate it. Nothing save the breath of the spirit can restore the life it has lost. And this miracle of resurrection is actually taking place in Russia at this moment.

The real opponent of Bolshevism in things moral and intellectual is the religious movement which began in Russia after the revolution, towards the end of 1917.

The period which preceded the revolution was one of religious decadence. After what I have said in the preceding pages, it will be readily understood that the empty triumph of Bolshevism would have been impossible but for the utter enfeeblement of the religious life of the nation. The growth of unbelief among the masses, which is a universal feature of modern society, has had in Russia [a long history]: and this it is which has rendered our people so easily accessible to the temptations of the revolutionary spirit.

But now, thanks to the persecutions which the revolution has set on foot, there has come into being a genuine religious [revival]. We see here a phenomenon which has often been repeated in the history of mankind. The experience of prosperity is nearly always [dangerous] to the spiritual life. On the other hand, suffering, [loss] and . . . of many kinds serve to revive the spirit of religion and [to give wings to] its flight.

Contemporary events in Russia furnish a new confirmation of this [well-known] rule. During the imperial period the protection of the Church by the secular power was a source of large material benefits [to the former]. But in the domain of the spirit these benefits cost the Church dear. Large numbers of bishops and priests became State functionaries, docile instruments of the Government. Needless to say, this lowering of the priesthood was itself one of the signs of the general religious decay. To whatever degree a priest retains a lively sense of his sacred character, his subservience to the secular power becomes psychologically impossible. Moreover, the transformation of the priest into an employee of the State is always accompanied by the loss of his influence over the masses. Of course the revolutionary propagandists have largely profited by this to [discredit] the Russian clergy, representing them as tools of the reactionary tendencies of the old régime.

The revolution was the beginning of a complete [reversal] in these relations. The Church, pillaged and persecuted, lost all the material advantages it had hitherto enjoyed: in return,

the loss of all these relative values was made good by the absolute value of spiritual independence. There is here no question of any exterior change of its position in the State. My point is that independence of ecclesiastical power brought into the life of the Church independence of spirit and of thought. It was a psychological renewal, a return to the ardent faith of old Russia. This it is that explains the growing influence of the Church on the masses of the people: the blood of the new martyrs won their hearts. This is not an overstatement of the fact. I am acquainted with provinces in Russia where the number of priests assassinated amounts to 10 per cent. of their total number. The Bolsheviki have not [been content] to kill them; they have torn out the eyes of some, have cut out the tongues of others; and they have even crucified [them]. In Siberia, at Tobolsk, an aged archbishop was compelled to . . .¹ and after that they . . .¹ At Perm, before killing a bishop, they tore out his eyes and cut off his cheeks; then they had him [exhibited] in the streets.

In many instances these atrocities were provoked by the heroic conduct of the clergy. Priests have been run through with bayonets for having the audacity to speak a word to stop the cruelty of the soldiers. Others have been put to death for having locked the doors of their churches against [marauders] bent on pillage. Bishops, notably the bishop of Perm, have suffered for having preached against the Bolsheviki; and the Metropolitan of Kieff, Vladimir, was shot dead for having refused to introduce "the régime of communal equality" into a convent.

We know that in ancient Rome it was precisely such happenings as these that gained for the Christian Church the largest number of proselytes. Thus it is [at this moment]. These awful sufferings are becoming a source of new power to religion in Russia.

The endeavours of the Bolsheviki to "annihilate" religion and suffocate the Church have produced exactly the opposite effect. The minds of the Russian people have been profoundly impressed by the coincidence of national disaster with the triumph of irreligion. [They see that] this coincidence is not accidental. The attempt that is being made to expel religion from social life only serves to reveal, even to the unbelieving, the importance of their lost sanctuaries and of the religious bond so rudely broken. They see that hitherto the existence of social life has depended entirely on this bond. They see that religion has raised man above the savage state

¹ Words undecipherable.

and made him *man* in the true sense of the word. The Bolsheviks have given them a demonstration *ad oculos* that irreligion [erected into a principle] ends in bestiality. . . .¹

At the present moment the sense of a connection between the sins of the Russian people and the [ruin of Russian society] is penetrating deeper and deeper into the consciousness of the [masses]. At the Council of Moscow in 1917-18 and in [many] other religious gatherings I have heard the speeches of simple peasants, and been deeply impressed by the lucidity of their thoughts about this matter. They see clearly that all their sufferings, even the famine which is destroying their fellows by tens of thousands, has its origin in a moral source; it is not the sterility of the soil that deprives them of their daily bread, but "iniquity walking on the earth"; it is the strife of brother with brother which has ruined the country and destroyed honest labour. "We have forgotten God and become wild beasts. That is the sole cause of our [misery]." This is the summing up of all these simple folk have to say about the present condition of [their country].

To understand the psychology of [this new movement] the reader needs to remember an outstanding trait in the national character of the Russians. Before the Revolution religion was pre-eminently the *national* bond. In the mind of the people the *national* cause was so closely identified with the cause of the Church that "Russian" and "orthodox" were often employed as equivalent terms. When a peasant speaks of "the orthodox people" he means the Russian people. Religious feeling, while serving as a support to national [undertakings], was thus inseparable from patriotism. It will be readily understood that this essential characteristic is strongly accentuated, now that patriotism in Russia is challenged to hold its own against [a movement] which is internationalist and anti-religious at the same time. From the moment that Bolshevism [cut the nation off] from its sanctuary the reaction of *national* feeling [was assured] . . .

[The next four pages of MS. are damaged to an extent which renders continuous translation impossible. From the fragments that are decipherable it is clear that Prince Troubetzkoy gives, in the first place, an historical survey of the part which religion has played from the fourteenth century onwards in building up a vast multitude of scattered elements into the unitary whole of the Russian people. He then goes on to describe the peculiar function of the Greco-Russian Church as a national force in recent times, a function

¹ Three sentences undecipherable.

widely different from that performed by "the Church in other countries." The Roman Catholic Church, for example, has an international character; but the Greco-Russian Church is and always has been the chief organ for the expression of the Russian *national* consciousness. This it is which renders it chiefly obnoxious to Bolshevism. But in striking at religion Bolshevism has struck at the very soul of the Russian people, and so ensured its own downfall by provoking the resistance of a nation which feels that at this point its very life is at stake. The reaction has already begun. In proof of which Prince Troubetzkoy cites various evidence, especially an immense religious demonstration which he witnessed in Moscow in 1918. No such mass of human beings had ever before been seen in the streets of Moscow, and every individual present was there at the peril of his life. "In that vast assembly, composed of people from every rank of society, the 'division of classes' was no more. One spirit animated the whole, the spirit of absolute self-abnegation, the spirit of men and women, in tens of thousands, all willing to lay down their lives for the faith of Russia. It was the rebirth of the national self-consciousness of the people."

He then traces the spread of the movement to other centres and describes the vain efforts of the Bolsheviks to suppress it. Similar demonstrations are now taking place in many towns and villages, often ending in the massacre of those who take part in them. The last page of the four, in which hardly a single sentence can be fully deciphered, appears to be a description of the various measures adopted by the Bolsheviks to deprive the Church of the remnants of its property and rights, and of the cruelties practised both on laity and priesthood wherever the signs of religious revival are detected. The Bolsheviks are fully aware of the danger confronting them, and are determined to prevent it gathering head. Religion is being persecuted on a scale and with a ferocity without precedent in history. But all in vain.]

What renders the Red authorities most uneasy is the growth of friendly relations between the "classes" under the influence of religion. One day the commissaries of Moscow "nationalised" the auditorium of the church of S. Barbe, where religious addresses were being given to the people. The "orthodox" working men, who had founded the auditorium, demanded the restitution of their property, insisting that they had a right to it as members of the proletariat. They were met with a formal refusal, the motives of which are interesting. "This auditorium," they were told, "has

become a place for pacific meetings and for friendly intercourse between the bourgeois and the proletariat: from the revolutionary point of view nothing could be more inadmissible."

The growth of a national unity which shall include all classes is feared by the Bolsheviks before everything else. And well may they fear it! For the spiritual bonds of Russia are unquestionably being renewed; the nation is coming to itself again, and one feels once more the breath of the spirit which binds a great people into a living whole, and gives it the victory over death. Russia is being brought back to life by the blood of her martyrs!

At a time when all the civil institutions and the whole secular order of Russia went to pieces, the Church alone retained its integrity, as though immune from the general decomposition. Overthrown at first in the common cataclysm, it was the first to recover itself and actually to begin a powerful effort of reconstruction.

[In another greatly damaged passage the author describes the complete reorganisation of the Church which was carried through in Moscow in 1917-18. All external despotism was abolished and a new order adopted which gave the Church autonomous control of her own affairs.]

It was nothing short of a revolution. I shall not speak of the various ecclesiastical reforms accomplished by the Assembly, but call attention only to the great national work it took in hand. Its first task was to combat anarchy. With anarchy the surrounding atmosphere was saturated, and it naturally became the chief theme of discussion. The nation was falling to pieces around us. Throughout the whole land no other national assembly was in session. Composed of clergy and laity elected in equal numbers, it was an assembly truly representative of "the orthodox people." It could not do otherwise than give the safety of the fatherland the chief place in its thoughts, knowing well that the temporal safety of Russia could only be assured by her spiritual regeneration.

It [dared] to address appeals to the army, then in process of decomposition under the Bolshevik propaganda: it reminded the army of the soldier's duty to his oath. It supported the priests at the front in their heroic attempts to stem the shameful flight of the troops, and preserved the memory of many a courageous preacher put to death by the soldiery in the act of exhorting them to stand firm. It took measures to prevent the "war of classes" in the army itself, that is to say, the murder of officers by their men, and issued stirring appeals which gave

some defence to these victims at a time when they were being assassinated *en masse*. Another object of the Council's efforts was to mitigate the ferocity of the class war in the towns and [villages]. Every means the clergy could bring to bear were made use of to put a stop to murder, pillage, and [incendiarism], and to avert the outbreak of civil war, then imminent. And there was [a response] from the masses which proved that all this was not in vain. At a moment when ferocious appetites and bestial passions were everywhere pursuing the work of destruction, the Church stood alone in Russia to remind its children that they were men and not wild beasts. It gathered them round the churches; it [exhorted] them to defend the sacred places; it lifted up [the Cross] before their eyes. It was by efforts such as these that the Church [in these terrible days] sought to [preserve] the foundations [of the safety] of the fatherland.

But the greatest work of the Council was without doubt the restoration of the patriarchal power. . . . Here too there was to be observed a remarkable coincidence of the national with the religious motive. It was the dire necessity of combating anarchy that made this reform indispensable. The object of the Council was to set up a power at once national and spiritual as a barrier to the universal chaos and decomposition—the power of the Head [of the Church]. This unification of power was called for by the supreme danger of the moment. The Council intended thereby to emphasise the fact that orthodox Russians, in spite of their division into “classes,” were still obedient to one and the same spiritual authority. This common “father” would be, in their eyes, the living incarnation of the national idea. The peasants present, members of the Council, kept on saying with touching simplicity: “We need a father, whom we can love, that so we may be reminded that we are all brothers.”

[In making the appointment the Council was guided by the memory of the Patriarch Hermogenes, who saved Russia during the anarchy which followed the extinction of the old dynasty of Tsars in the seventeenth century. A strong minority of the Council objected on the ground that the restoration of the patriarchal power would lead to despotism. These arguments, however, were refuted by the event.]

[What followed] deserves to be reckoned among the most marvellous of contemporary events. . . . Immediately after the *coup d'état*, while the bombardment of Moscow was still going on, the Church was preparing her answer to the fratricidal conflict. As soon as the combat had died down we proceeded

to enthrone the newly elected Patriarch in the ancient Cathedral of the Assumption, the dome of which had been pierced by a Bolshevist shell. Never have I witnessed a sacred office so deeply moving. When the Patriarch appeared in the midst of the Cathedral, clothed in the ancient vestments of his predecessor of the eighteenth century, vast numbers burst into tears. They saw their fatherland, "Holy Russia," personified before them, and felt that she had awakened again as she was of old. "The persecutors who would have buried her for ever have brought her back to life," was what they said.

And yet we could hardly believe that what we saw was not a dream. The Archbishop Tykone, now Patriarch, was beloved by all for his sterling honesty and sweetness of disposition. All who came into contact with him fell under the spell of his goodness: without doubt one of the most deeply religious of the Russian bishops. And yet even his most ardent admirers could not help asking if this gentle soul could be the hero we expected, if he indeed possessed the qualities needed to steer the barque of the Church through the hurricane. None doubted his moral force and resolution, hidden though they were under a humble exterior. . . . The preceding period of our history had furnished few opportunities for our bishops to display their force of will. It was a quality rarely seen, and mostly conspicuous by its absence. Tykone was an exception to the rule. He had qualities hitherto concealed.

The moment he became Patriarch he grasped what was required of him. Deeply impressed by the historic memories which had caused his election, he saw that, if he would follow in the steps of Hermogenes, the love of Russia must dictate his policy. He understood that the circumstances in which he was placed demanded of him [beyond all else] self-abnegation and courage. [Every act of his] from the day of his election proves his firm [resolve] to sacrifice himself entirely [to the cause] of Russia.

At a time when the blood of priests was being shed in streams he delivered an anathema against the Government, and ordered it to be read in every church. In spite of their scorn for religion in all its forms, the Bolshevists could not remain indifferent to so signal an act of courage and to the immense impression it produced among believers. Accordingly they arrested a considerable number of priests for reading the anathema, and shot some of them. But they shrank from attacking the person of the Patriarch himself.

When the Bolshevists executed the unfortunate Emperor Nicolas II the Patriarch at once raised his voice against the

deed. In one of the cathedrals of Moscow, packed with a great crowd, he stood up and told the people that it was a crime without a name, and for which no excuse could be given. "They may accuse me of counter-revolution," he said; "they may shoot me, but no threat shall hinder me from speaking the naked truth." In October, when the Bolsheviks were arranging a *fête* to commemorate the first anniversary of their *coup d'état*, he sent to Lenin in person, and to the whole Council of Commissaries, a letter which was nothing less than a plain act of accusation covering the whole activity of the Government during the year. Tykone told them in so many words that their deeds were one long series of crimes, treachery, brigandage, murder, abolition of law. He exhorted them to restore the course of civil justice and put an end to the civil war. He ended the letter by a solemn warning that those who took the sword would perish by the sword.

There was hardly a word in this letter but might cost the author his life. Many priests had been shot for "crimes" infinitely less. To some of his friends, who begged him to take care of his life for the sake of Russia and the Church, he answered: "I am ready to die at any moment." . . . The Bolsheviks fear the indignation of the masses. Tykone was indeed arrested once, but . . . released afterwards. A plot against his life was arranged, but happily it failed. . . . The whole of his retinue goes in daily fear of its life. He alone is afraid of nothing.

One day a young telegraph clerk ran in to warn the Patriarch that a message had been received that a party of sailors from Petrograd were to arrive next day to seize his person and kill him. "Hide yourself, your Holiness," cried the clerk. "I cannot do that," said Tykone; "to-morrow I shall hold my reception as usual." And he repeated the answer next day when the clerk reported that the sailors had arrived. And he remained where he was, waiting for the assassins in his lodgings. Happily, the news turned out to be unfounded. Certain it is that if the Patriarch still lives it is owing to no precautions that he takes for his own safety.

His . . . is marked by a simplicity of manner which only serves [the more to reveal] his true greatness of soul. Very remarkable is the absence of all pomp from his bearing during the great religious processions. Hundreds of thousands of men pass before him, but he has no bishops and hardly any clergy in his retinue; only one priest and one deacon. His friends tried to impress upon him that more ceremony was needed in his public appearance. "For the love of God," he

answered, "don't make an idol of me." He is absolutely free from pedantry; always cheerful and, when it suits him, ready with a jest. His humour is charming and his serenity undisturbed in the most dangerous situations. Never have I met a man with such a power of calming those about him. Standing in his presence one has, before all else, the feeling of certainty that the fatherland will be saved. A people which can produce a moral force such as his cannot perish; its regeneration is near at hand and beyond all doubt. [Never will I believe] that such greatness of soul is altogether exceptional. It is . . . the fruit of a . . . collective life: the personal character of Tykone is the quintessence of a great national movement.

The description of this movement as I have given it may cause some surprise to those who have read the many accounts that have been published of the demoralisation and the depravity of the masses in Russia. I do not deny that our revolution has been the classical instance of the letting loose of passion and the appearance on the earth of the human beast. But equally it has been a time of the most astonishing contrasts. To break the superhuman power of evil the guardian angel of my country has concentrated all his forces. Posterity will be amazed and moved to the depths by the grandeur of the moral forces which have risen up in the midst of this appalling outbreak of human depravity.

I end by asking the reader's pardon for an essay which at best can give him but a faint conception of the present movement of spiritual life, on which the future of Russia depends.

At the time of writing¹ the armed conflict is not at an end; the decisive battle is not won. The civil war may drag on for weeks, for months, and longer. But the end is decided in advance. It is in the realm of the spirit that the fate of nations is determined. What pass in the political arena and on the field of battle are but reflections and after-effects of deep and intimate changes which are wrought out in the soul of a people.

In the spiritual realm the secret of victory is summed up in the four words of our . . . hymn, sung by the crowds in Moscow—"The Christ is risen." When the Christ rises in the souls of men they care no more for materialist utopias . . . As the Patriarch truly said, those who began the war of classes will "perish by the sword" they have taken up. They must face the consequences of their own principles. To convince ourselves of this we need only to watch what is passing on the

¹ The article was sent from Russia on September 12.

battlefield. Little more than a year ago the volunteer army was a handful of heroes—three thousand men at the most. Since then it has grown to a considerable host. None the less the superiority of numbers on the Bolshevist side is immense. Not long ago—August 1919—one of the most famous generals in the volunteer army declared in an interview that the number of prisoners of war made by his troops in the course of a few months exceeded ten times the number of the troops themselves. This is no exaggeration, and the civil war furnishes abundance of similar facts. What is their meaning?

[The concluding paragraph is again undecipherable. So far as can be judged from the remaining words it is a prediction that the Bolshevist forces, which have no internal bond, will decompose from psychological causes the moment they are left to themselves. The last words appear to be: "The materialist Utopia is doomed. The victory of the spirit is assured."]

EUGÈNE TROUBETZKOY.

[Further evidence of the religious movement described by Prince Troubetzkoy is furnished by the following communication received by the Editor, while the above article was going to press, from a responsible British source in Siberia:—

"A strong religious movement has begun among the laity and clergy of the Russian Church in Bolshevist Russia. The Muzhiks are convinced that Lenin is Antichrist, and the Soviets are very alarmed in consequence.

"In Omsk, a detachment of Crusaders has been formed for the purpose of fighting against the Reds at the front, in defence of the Christian faith, menaced by Bolshevism. The members of this militant religious detachment bear a large cross on their uniform, and are said to be all men of really Christian life.

"The Vice-President of the movement has approached the British Military Mission in Siberia with a request for bibles in Russian from England, and this request has been cabled by General Sir Alfred Knox to the War Office. All other kinds of religious literature in Russian would be welcome so long as the tone is not sectarian, and so long as there is nothing of a proselytising nature. No offence should be given to the religious feelings of the people in connection with their belief in confession, transubstantiation, the intercession of the Madonna and the Saints, the efficacy of ikons and relics, etc. Attacks on Catholicism, Judaism, etc., would also be out of place; and only the truths common to all Christian bodies should be taught, in very simple language. Pictures should be sent in large numbers, as many of the people here cannot read.

"Professor Sir Bernard Pares, King's College, Strand, is acting in this matter, and will give all information.

"Perhaps a movement of assistance might be started in London, for Christianity in Russia is in real danger of perishing under the blows of Bolshevism, which is, certainly, as ex-President Taft described it, 'a great conspiracy against our Christian civilisation.'

"Small pocket bibles, such as soldiers carry in their knapsacks, would be best. The Crusaders' Association has also informed the British Mission that it will be glad to get bibles and religious literature in Russian from American Missionary Associations.

"Since the above was written, the British Bible Society has despatched 17,000 bibles and testaments in Russian, and intimated that further consignments are on their way; but, nevertheless, much may still be done by other organisations. A prominent Russian ecclesiastic told the present writer that Russian bibles are now almost unprocurable.

"Bolshevism is 'an idealism gone wrong.' Only a homeœopathic remedy can ultimately cure it, 'a Christian revival the world over,' as Dean Burroughs of Hertford College, Oxford, put it,—*une nouvelle explosion du Christianisme*, as Cieszkowski said, using the phrase of his great French master."

THE VALUE OF MORAL IDEAS.¹

PROFESSOR EMILE BOUTROUX,

Member of the French Academy.

I SHOULD like to take as my motto for the present lecture the remarkable words of Huxley in his *Lay Sermons*, p. 297: "Legitimate materialism . . . is neither more nor less than a sort of shorthand Idealism."

I propose to consider with you the value of moral ideas. It may indeed seem that this vexed question has been solved in our day by arguments which nullify all the abstract deductions of philosophy: I mean by facts, by the most striking and significant of facts. Can one reasonably discuss the value of moral ideas after those ideas have themselves proved their value so forcibly through the efficiency which they have manifested in this war? Those ideas have determined to engage in the war many who had made a vow never to join in what they considered the supreme outrage against God and Humanity. These ideas have roused, in millions of individuals, a heroism of which they did not think themselves capable, causing them to meet and suffer death with admirable serenity, intrepidity, and even enthusiasm. Indeed, we cannot forget that what characterised this war was precisely the prevailing part played in it by reflection, by stern consideration of the Good, the Just, the Right, and the True. This war was not, on the whole, a war of interests, ambitions, passions, or instincts. It was essentially a war of ideas, or, in the words of a distinguished English writer, Mr Edmund Gosse, it was a literary war.

And the question arises: How could it be that causes which produce effects so considerable should fail themselves to be both efficient realities and high and noble standards of

¹ The Huxley Lecture for 1919 in the University of Birmingham. The introductory portion of the lecture is not given.—EDITOR.

life, worthy of all our reverence and pursuit? Carlyle wrote somewhere: "Strength, well understood, is the measure of all worth." In the present case, if in any, we cannot help saying: A thing which proved so powerful for good must be a right thing.

Such arguments may have seemed irresistible during the period of fighting, but it seems to be questionable whether they still will suffice, when we examine the problem coldly and with the view of clearly discerning truth from mere opinion. Is efficiency, we must ask, an adequate proof of truth? We know that suggestion and contagion may confer efficiency on the most fantastical ideas. For example, would it be fair to assert that all Germans were mere impostors when declaring that through the atrocities they committed they intended to pave the way for the advent of God's Kingdom? Surely many of them were fanatics, and sincerely believed themselves to be the agents of God's will. If an idea is to be recognised as true, it must be possessed of the distinctive characters of truth. Our own age, as it has been trained by science, has formed a standard of certitude which makes it very particular about the validity of a demonstration. It regards as mere subjective belief any assumption which cannot be demonstrated through arguments akin to those of science proper.

Let us, therefore, inquire whether moral ideas, while answering our dearest wishes and hopes, and fitted to inspire the most heroic deeds, conform equally to the requirements of reason in search of true and valuable knowledge. We want to inquire, in this connection: (1) whether moral ideas are really endowed with the ideal value which we attribute to them, that is to say, whether they effectively constitute the end towards which we ought to direct our activity; (2) whether those ideas are really efficient—whether they actually are, as we think they are, capable of playing a part in the history of our world, or of modifying the course of events in a world subject to the action of physical laws.

Do what we term moral ideas, *i.e.* ideas of duty, justice, equity, liberty, self-control, sincerity, sanctity of word, respect for personality, etc., possess such characteristics as are involved in the notion of value? Do those ideas really constitute, as we are accustomed to think, the noblest and highest thing in the world? The difficulty, in this matter, is to pass the limits of the field of merely subjective knowledge, and to demonstrate validly that our appreciation of the value of moral ideas, so far from being nothing but a belief or the expres-

sion of a desire and a hope, is, literally, the recognition of a truth. It will be interesting to study, in this respect, the German doctrine on our subject, the more so as it aims precisely at getting an absolutely objective view of the matter.

The German method of passing from the subjective to the objective side of things consists in proceeding from the parts to the whole. Very long ago I heard a celebrated German chemist, Professor Hermann Kopp, say: *Ein Text ist gar nichts ohne den Kontext*, "A text is nothing at all, if isolated from its context." You only need to take this principle quite rigorously and to apply it to metaphysics, and you immediately come to the great German principle which Professor William James so happily formulated in these terms: "The part has no reality save in terms of the whole." Following this method, German thought, from Kant to Hegel, absorbed the individual more and more completely into the community, and thus came more and more to transform and sublimate moral ideas, with the result that, as compared with this lofty and transcendent morality, our poor common traditions took the appearance of being something quite miserable, egoistic, and subjective. True morality, according to the teaching of German philosophy, knows little or nothing of what mankind is accustomed to understand by the name. True morality, Germans teach, sets as the end of the Universe the realisation of the Whole, as it is to be found in the absolute *Geist*, existing not only *an sich* (in itself) or *aus sich* (out of itself), but *für sich* (for itself). Practically, this fathomless and inaccessible *Geist* is embodied and realised in the German Ego, as the great philosopher Fichte puts it in his celebrated *Reden an die deutsche Nation*. And of this Ego the visible and active organ, the only true representative and agent of the supreme moral ideal in our world, is the German State, of which the Prussian State was the embryo and the model. The will of the German nation as expressed by its representatives: this and nothing else is, in the field of real life, the adequate principle and standard of moral value.

This was the view that was faithfully set by the famous ninety-three in their "Address to the Civilised World": *Unsere Kriegsführung kennt keine zuchtlose Grausamkeit*, "Our warfare does not know of any undisciplined cruelty." These words do not mean, as it might seem at first sight, that cruelty is abhorrent to the German spirit. The true meaning is that, "Since our soldiers are all of them perfectly disciplined and are commanded by German officers, that is to say by the Kaiser or by the Almighty God Himself, nothing

they may commit can, without a patent lie and sacrilege, be termed a cruelty." When ordered by God, evil is good.

From such a transcendent point of view, Germans came to despise the classical morality which acknowledges the absolute value of the individual personality and of the virtues pertaining to personality. As Professor Treitschke, the chief educator of contemporary Germany, says: "The individual virtues are good for the cloisters."

It must be conceded that those extraordinary doctrines are justified logically the moment the starting-point of the deduction, the definition of objectivity and truth as synthetical totality, be granted. But the very starting-point may be questioned. The identification of objectivity and truth with synthetical totality means that a preference is given to quantity over quality. First the indifferent elements, then the synthesis and totalisation of them: this is the principle. But the antique doctrine still holds good, that it is inconceivable that measure should be applied to an absolutely unqualified thing, and that, consequently, quantity cannot be conceived save in dependence on quality. The notion of value loses all effective significance as soon as quality is rejected as a genuine and primitive reality. Greater quantity never can confer superior value. Suppose, Plato says, a white spot to be enlarged infinitely with no change as to colour: it will by no means constitute a more perfect thing. No whole, however immense it may be, can have value assigned to it, save by an intelligent being, who distinguishes himself from it, examines it, and forms a judgment about it. Knowledge of value, more than any other knowledge, must be recognised, in Huxley's words, as "a knowledge of states of consciousness." The question arises what attitude of consciousness would be the most fitted to permit us to form solid judgments about the value of things. I should venture to adopt, only transposed from terms of quantity and externality to terms of quality and consciousness, the criterion of wholeness which German philosophers failed to apply in a truly spiritual manner. The right criterion of value, according to the doctrine I am suggesting, is not this or that power of consciousness, such as emotion, or intelligence, or wish, or will. It can only be consciousness as a whole, that is to say, that triple unity and unified triplicity in which the three powers of emotion, intelligence, and will, although distinct one from another, mutually penetrate and exert their influence upon one another. Ἐὖν ὄλη τῆ ψυχῆ . . . εἰς τὸ ὄν, as Plato said in his *Republic*.

Confronted with these different powers of consciousness,

moral notions exhibit the following peculiarities. In the first place, they contradict every one of our psychical powers as long as these are taken separately. They contradict abstract intelligence or the pure faculty of scientific knowledge, by claiming the privilege of certitude, though unsusceptible of scientific demonstration. In the second place, they contradict the trend of the emotional being as such, through the preponderance they assert of duty over pleasure. In the third place, they contradict the proper law of will, inasmuch as, while will, left to itself, tends to increase its power indefinitely, they subordinate power to right and justice. On the other hand, moral ideas are in perfect conformity with a right and well-developed consciousness taken in its living unity, a consciousness wherein the three main faculties, intimately united, exalt and enrich one another in a harmonious whole. In such a consciousness, intelligence is no longer the mere sense of logical identity or contradiction; it is also, as Plato taught, the sense of inner and spiritual connection. Sensibility, on the other hand, is no longer a sense of pleasure only, but becomes capable of aspiring to and being affected by noble and true satisfactions of mind. And will is no longer a mere force admitting of no moral law, but it becomes the power of submitting to a spiritual law, which it spontaneously recognises.

The traditional moral ideas correspond precisely to those tendencies of a normal human soul. Personality means the individual emotional Ego, enlarged and ennobled by the union of emotion with intelligence and freedom. The idea of moral Goodness is the notion of order, developed into that of justice and equity through the accession of such elements as the consciousness of free-will.

And the true notion of self-control represents Will as determined, not by itself only, but also by the idea of Goodness and by this superior form of emotion—Love.

In this way moral ideas prove themselves to be possessed of a value not only subjective, but really objective and indisputable, inasmuch as they satisfy the demands of the sole legitimate judge of any value—consciousness in its fullest and highest form.

In the preceding inquiry I have discussed the question whether moral ideas are entitled to be taken as the supreme rule for our conduct. I now propose to consider another meaning of the phrase, "value of moral ideas," and to ask whether those ideas are likely to be efficacious by really affecting the

course of things as determined by physical laws, or if they are only objects of passive and ineffective contemplation.

In common life we hear people emphatically but summarily asserting that ideas are a dominating influence in the world. On the other hand, we hear scientific philosophers maintaining that ideas are interesting themes for metaphysics, literature, or poetry, but that the affairs of the world, as a matter of fact, depend solely on the necessary laws of physical nature and on the blind instincts and passions of man, which are merely physical impulses as they appear in consciousness.

The problem is as difficult as it is important. Can moral ideas play the part of working causes in our life, or are we simply deluded when we flatter ourselves that we have introduced a little more justice, equity, or morality into the world? In view of the immense credit which scientific determinism has won, it seems more and more difficult for a man anxious to do justice to science to understand how things like ideas—which are radically different from physical realities—can co-operate with them, so as to prove influential upon the course of events in our world. We are here face to face with what might be called the vital problem of philosophy. Are ideas realities, or are they mere curious and useless epiphenomena? Is the ideal world capable of becoming real, or will it eternally remain a mere amusement for reflective minds?

Here also we meet German theories which it would take us too long to enumerate in detail. It suffices to note that German philosophy rests on the dogma of the absolute necessity and solidarity of things, from which it proceeds in two opposite directions, both of which lead to the same result. On the one hand, it attributes to the moral world a reality of its own, independent of, yet co-existent with, the reality of the physical world. In this case the course of things in the physical world has nothing to do with the ideas which obtain in the moral world. The mystic may hold with Kant that it is possible to live our separate lives, but he cannot without inconsistency summon us to conform our terrestrial life to the celestial.

On the other hand, German philosophy, while admitting a secret solidarity between physical and moral determinism, prompted by the strong realistic disposition of the German mind as well as by the more evident character of physical compared with metaphysical efficiency, in the end gives in its cohesion to physical determinism, and arrives at the result that moral reality is only another name for physical.

We willingly acknowledge that the development of German philosophy, when taken as a whole, presents itself as a large, rich, and harmonious process. But the starting-point of those doctrines, the assumption of an absolute necessity governing moral actions as well as physical phenomena, is in reality nothing but a *petitio principii*. We ought first to consider moral ideas in themselves, and then inquire in what relation they stand to the physical world, instead of starting from an *a priori* principle and then deducing from it the character and rôle of moral ideas. How could the question of the influence of moral ideas upon the physical world be seriously discussed, after it has been admitted that all that exists or can exist is subject to an absolute necessity—in other words, that it is, at bottom, of purely physical nature? It was not the introduction of a new factor into the doctrine, it was the logical development of the doctrine itself, which led it crudely to derive right from force.

While German philosophy fails to demonstrate the efficiency or even the existence of moral ideas, seeing that it starts from principles which exclude the characters of true morality, Darwinian evolutionism, which was born not of theology or metaphysics, but of biology, maintains upon our subject a quite different and, in some ways, an opposite doctrine. For this philosophy, moral ideas must be recognised as really substantial and efficacious. For, according to the Darwinian principle, those beings only survive which outrun their competitors in the struggle for existence. Applying this law to moral ideas, we conclude that inasmuch as they survive they must have been real and strong enough to overcome every obstacle to their preservation.

Strong as this argument is, it does not seem to be philosophically quite convincing. For it has been proved that in many living beings some characters are to be found which probably never were of any utility to them. And apart from the objections that science itself can raise, philosophy could hardly be satisfied with the mere fact of survival.

The difficulty concerns the nature of the admitted law of evolution. If this law be purely mechanical, we are bound to acknowledge that our moral ideas, which imply the possibility of non-mechanical action, are but illusions and errors.

Yet we may suggest that the law of evolution is not a merely mechanical one, and that there is included in it some psychical, æsthetic, or moral element. If so, moral ideas could be real and true as to their moral contents proper; but

so far from being justified and explained by the system, they would now be presupposed by it. And the question whether something ideal can really interfere with physical events would remain unsolved.

It seems to me that the problem of the relation between Ideal and Reality is no secondary one, of which the solution could be deduced from any other consideration.

Our question then is: Given, on one side, the physical world, with those very laws which science has discovered in it, and, on the other side, the moral laws with those characters which constitute their originality and grandeur, may the latter be considered as really capable of interfering with the former?

Before Galileo, Descartes, and Newton, nobody found any difficulty in admitting that spirit can intervene as a force in the play of natural forces. For there was no essential difference suspected between force which operates in bodies and force experienced by consciousness in the exertion of will. But, in the opinion of modern science, only mechanical forces are true forces; spiritual forces are forces only in a metaphorical sense; and it is stated as an inviolable axiom that the quantity of force in the universe remains unvarying through all changes which occur in natural phenomena.

These doctrines of natural philosophy make it extremely difficult to understand how a moral entity could have any real influence upon physical things. To create motion with ideas is manifestly impossible, since motion implies force, and the creation of force would alter the quantity of force in the world. Descartes thought he could escape the difficulty by allowing the mind the power of modifying not the quantity but the direction of the movement. Indeed, with the same quantity of force displayed, different directions of movement are conceivable. But given a real movement with its actual direction, as it is always given in nature, if I wish to alter this direction and to substitute another for it, I must needs display some force. Now this force cannot be borrowed from the existing forces, each of which has already a determinate direction and is exactly in the same case as the one upon which I am anxious to act. There remains no other means conceivable but that of introducing a new force, the quantity of which would inevitably alter the quantity of energy in the universe.

Either we admit that spirit can modify the direction of movements, which means admitting that it can create a certain amount of mechanical force; or we treat the idea as being

itself a force, which is nothing more than answering the question by the question itself.

With the view of escaping from the dilemma in which we are thus placed, I venture to ask if the difficulty may not be due to the manner in which the question has been asked, a manner which is by no means dictated by the things themselves. On the one hand, moral ideas have been conceived of in a highly refined and idealistic form; on the other hand, reality has been conceived in the highly abstract form to which mathematics and logic have reduced it; and the question has been put how the one can act upon the other. To the question so put no satisfying answer can be found. But this conception of moral ideas and reality is far from being adequate, as an inquiry into their origin and development will show.

As far as our moral ideas are concerned, they have their origin in nature itself. Reflection has led men to distinguish between such beings as arrive at the term of their normal development and such as fail to arrive at it. This plant produces leaves, flowers, and fruits: it has realised its destiny; that other produces only leaves, or flowers which do not bear fruits: it has missed the mark. Men took notice of this fact, and, as they were endowed with reason and felt capable of somehow directing their life, they set before themselves the task of striving to accomplish their destiny such as they conceived it. And as reason itself points to ends ever higher and higher, man was led to dig a chasm ever deeper and deeper between his nature and his destiny. We know that some philosophers went so far as to place the destiny of man quite outside of the field of his nature. In this way Kant refuses to recognise human determination as a moral one, unless it is formed quite apart from natural tendencies, under the sole influence of a pure supernatural reason: *Und abgestreift den Erdensohn*, as Goethe says.

This is going too far. Nevertheless, it is true that, in advancing to an ever higher morality, we more and more tend to expunge from our moral ideas all that pertains to nature; and thus to conceive of freedom as the power of escaping the action of natural laws, of right as the opposite of custom, the ideal as the antithesis of the real.

But as we proceed on this way our conception of moral ideas becomes more and more abstract and artificial. As a matter of fact, in our actual life we never put in

¹ As one well-known theory does.

practice such a separation of our moral ideas from their natural basis. While philosophers enjoy the conception of pure spiritual ideas, which flatters the ingenuity of their dialectics, mankind in general cannot be satisfied with a real world which is radically alien to reason, and therefore only able to be governed by violence, brutality, and arbitrary power. We demand that our moral ideas shall have a certain influence upon our actual condition, and for that reason we actually combine them with other ideas which directly refer to reality, such as ideas of utility, possibility, and the like. Thus we seek to realise in this world, not justice or goodness absolute, but a little more justice, a little more goodness.

Nay, human nature, as we know it, does not appear alien to benevolence, pity, sympathy, generosity. It is possessed of mild instincts as well as of instincts of strife and domination. So that morality does not need to break with nature, as some metaphysicians would teach, in order to preserve its reality and its grandeur.

Vice versa, it is not certain that the first principles of the science of nature are as opposite to the postulates of morality as materialistic philosophy would have us suppose. It seems quite legitimate to question whether this notion of mechanical force as admitting of no relation with moral ideas is anything more than a fiction of the mind.

If we consider the mode of formation of scientific principles, we realise that they are the product of a very complicated elaboration of the immediate data of experience, and thus far removed from the natural suggestions which these bring with them.

If we try to realise how from the most simple and direct data of experience we rose to the refined notions of force, number, law, as they are now defined in natural philosophy, we find that the desire of explaining things in a manner satisfactory to our intelligence and conducive to our control over nature at the price of more and more transforming the pure suggestions of experience has been our rule. As the Pythagorean Philolaus already taught, because numbers are what we best understand we resolve to treat everything as if it were at the bottom a complex of numbers. And, in the same manner, because mechanical motion is the sole phenomenon which we apparently can produce in a direct way, we resolve to treat, as much as possible, any phenomenon as being at the bottom a mechanical one. Only after many trials have we succeeded in substituting for the given quali-

tative unapproachable phenomena such mathematical equivalents as are both tractable by us and fitted to confer upon us a control over the course of natural phenomena. Science does not pretend to have brought those concepts to a perfect form. It is hardly conceivable that they should admit of an absolute and definite form. We shall go on indefinitely trying to confer on them more generality, precision, tractability, and efficiency.

Scientific work is thus a never-ending attempt, not to know things as they really are, but to make things more and more usable for man by the creation of symbols which have no claim to conformity with the nature of things themselves. However unlike the reality these symbols may be, they nevertheless are valuable in that they allow science to predict what nature in any given circumstances will produce. This may be said to be sufficient to prove that those symbols, if not properly images of reality, are at least somehow akin to it and represent it with some fidelity. In this way real or natural force, if not similar to scientific force, may be said to be analogous to it.

But even this view, as it seems to me, expresses a wish of the mind more than a simple truth :

“Thy wish was father, Harry, to that thought.”

Nature manifests two opposite processes: a process of creation and a process of dissolution, which are susceptible of explanation in very unequal degree. Our scientific principles satisfactorily explain the process of dissolution. For, according to the Clausius-Carnot law, any phenomenon is a determinable step towards universal uniformity. But our explanations of creation remain always incomplete, for they always imply the admission of a certain diffused energy, so that the organisation of the world as a whole remains unexplained and even unintelligible.

Our mechanical concepts would be perhaps sufficient, if we were to limit our science to the explanation of universal dissolution—the transformation of biological, chemical, physical energy into mere uniform heat. But they do not permit us to deal with composition, life or consciousness, as far as these forms of existence are marked with peculiar characters. Yet by rejecting a purely mechanical conception of life or feeling and adopting methods which admit of principles not only quantitative but also, in some measure, qualitative, we have learned how to study living and conscious beings with fruitful results—principles, it is to be noticed, that are not without relation to moral principles. For, under names that make

them, at first view, difficult to recognise as such, they really are no other than finality, consensus, action, unifying centre, individuality, society.

I wonder whether it may not be possible and legitimate to go further in that direction and to ask whether even mathematicians are contented with purely quantitative principles, entirely reducible to logical ones. They also distinguish between the process of resolution, or purely analytical development, and the process of composition or creation. And though they willingly concede that dogmatic or pedagogic demonstrations may be performed on purely logical principles, they would hardly allow that the invention of principles could be the result of purely mechanical operations. They feel as if they were in communication with an ideal reality which they must continually observe and scrutinise, if they are going to advance to axioms and definitions of greater accuracy, generality, and fruitfulness. 'Ἀρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς χρείπων, "The invisible harmony is superior to the visible": this saying of old Heraclitus seems to be the very motto of the mathematician who would not only discover known principles, but extend and develop the principles themselves.

Thus not only the special science of feeling or living beings, but science in general, and even the science of motion, force, space, or number, is less alien to moral ideas than is commonly supposed. It may be affirmed that, in any inference that tends not only to explain known things but to make some real discovery, the scientist uses not only those logical concepts which science yields him, but also some notions less quantitative than qualitative, whose discovery is to be traced, in the words of Pascal, not to the *esprit de géométrie*, but to the *esprit de finesse*, that is to say, not to a sense of geometrical accuracy, but to a sense of living and profound reality.

This is the line I would try to follow while searching for the solution of the vexed problem we have been discussing.

Idea and force do not really exist in the form which our refined concepts attribute to them. They are, in truth, united in one and the same thing, but this primordial community is not to be assimilated to a mathematical unity which has no inner side and is quite empty. On the contrary, this concrete unity contains in it many virtualities, as we find if we consider that form of it which a living being exhibits. Such a living unity, in which each member may be said to be a unity for itself while the individual body remains itself an indivisible whole, seems to be the character of the Divine Trinity as understood by Christianity.

But force and idea, which, at the starting-point, were one and the same, have, as intelligence has reflected upon them, become clearly distinguishable, and in the long run seem to part company altogether, so that we no more understand how the one can exert any influence upon the other. Yet their common origin has made them for ever relative to each other; and by a sort of communication which we cannot perceive, they secretly continue, and will ever continue, to be able to act upon one another. The laws which we assign to each of the two domains, considered quite apart from the other, are abstract and inadequate. They mean merely that all will happen according to these laws, provided no interference of one domain with the other takes place. But, in fact, such an interference remains always possible, so that our abstract laws always remain purely approximate and contingent.

The true standard of Being thus remains the God of Religion, in whom Idea and Power, Truth and Reality are so united that He exists because His essence is Perfection, and He realises perfection by virtue of His very existing.

As he was created after God's likeness, man is possessed of an activity which is capable of realising ideas, and he conceives such ideas as can determine his will and combine with the natural conditions of life.

The thought of man is practically comparable with a force; and his physical strength may be said to obey his will. All goes on as if between force and idea, such as our abstract concepts define them, a communication would take place.

What more heterogeneous, at first sight, than sound and thought? Yet in speech sound adapts itself to thought, and thought takes advantage of the laws and beauties of sound. And lo! out of Homer's genius thoughts arise which, while expressed with all the clearness, logic, precision, accuracy, and elegance of which intelligence is capable, happen, as through miracle, to result in verses the most easy, pure, gracious, harmonious, which ever human ear has heard. Is this perhaps the effect of a pre-established harmony between the laws of sound and the laws of thought? By no means. For many a thinker has never been able to find for his thoughts any harmonious form; and many a writer has never succeeded in thinking in a manner worthy of his brilliant style. But idea and sign, at the bottom, are one and the same thing. 'Εν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, "In the beginning was the word" (or the reason). This fundamental unity of word and thought it is which makes the marvel of Homer's style possible.

It is our destiny to realise in the world a work analogous

to Homer's performance in poetry. Despite appearances, Force and Justice are not irreconcilable. Ideal and real are one in God, and combine in the very germs whose development constitutes our human world.

What opposes the rapprochement of Justice and Force does not lie in the nature of things, but rather in ourselves, in the weakness of our will, in our prejudice that there is a chasm existing between idea and reality. Let us be firm in our faith, profound in our reflection, accurate in our science; let us work and act with all the means we are able to make use of, and especially let us persevere indomitably in our effort; then we shall succeed in maintaining and increasing moral culture with and through material culture, and in securing the empire of moral ideas on our world.

Thus we will succeed in loyally fulfilling our task as men, the task which the Greek poet so well realised when he wrote: *Ὡς χαρίεν ἐστ' ἄνθρωπος ὅταν ἄνθρωπος ᾖ!* "What a lovely thing man is when he really is a man!" and St Paul so highly praised when he taught: *Θεοῦ γὰρ ἐσμὲν συνεργοί,* "We are workers together with God."

Such would be the answer I would propose to the ever reappearing question of the relation between moral ideas and given reality.

It will perhaps be objected that such a view is wanting both in the accuracy of a purely scientific doctrine and in the impressiveness of a doctrine immediately drawn from simple experience. Quite true; but the aim of this lecture was not to rival science or to appeal to immediate experience, but to be in the proper sense philosophical.

Since it means the activity of the human *νοῦς*, or reason, Philosophy seeks to confront all our conceptions with the Reality, of which we, so to speak, possess some secret experience, and thus to determine their degree, not only of utility or logical consistency, but of truth.

Reason is present in individual experience, so that it may govern it, and lead it towards ever higher aims. Likewise reason is the very soul of scientific thought proper, and has the power to make it both more and more accurate and more and more appreciative of the value of variety and individuality in things real, and more and more aware of the process of creation as presupposed by that of dissolution. Intelligence, thus genuine and complete, is possessed at the same time of logical or mathematical, and of æsthetic, moral, or religious elements. It may judge, not only about the possible

(τὸ δυνατόν), but also about the convenient (τὸ πρεπόν), as Aristotle said. It is equally, in the words of Pascal, *esprit de géométrie* and *esprit de finesse*.

Reason, in man, is susceptible of culture, and needs it in order to rightly develop, as Descartes insisted. Our task as men principally consists in cultivating our reason. This can be done by reflecting both upon the development of science and upon the experience of life, and by seeking to discover the deeper meaning of both life and science. And it is the life and activity of reason itself, more and more instructed to grasp reality through phenomena, which constitutes the life and progress of Philosophy.

The problem which man, as a double being, is confronted with, consists in preserving his material life while striving towards a superior one, and remaining loyal to the Ideal while satisfying the needs of the natural life. The surest means of answering those two demands, and constantly uniting reality with the ideal, remains that which classic philosophers recommended, namely, loyalty to reason as the faithful witness of truth: Ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζῶν . . . ἀρίστη καὶ ἀίδιος.

EMILE BOUTROUX.

PARIS.

REUNION IN THE SCOTTISH CHURCH AND THE PROPOSED ARTICLES.

WILLIAM A. CURTIS, D.D., D.LITT.,

Regius Professor of Biblical Criticism in the University of Edinburgh.

Two contributions from Scottish pens have already called the attention of readers of this Journal during the present year to the problem of Presbyterian Reunion north of the Tweed, and made reference to the "Draft Articles declaratory of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland in Matters Spiritual" which have emerged from the protracted conference between the committees representing the Church of Scotland and the United Free Church. In the January number Dr Macmillan subjected the movement and the resultant Articles to bitter criticism. His zeal, however, again and again outran his discretion, leading him into inconsistencies so picturesque as to destroy much of the effect of his polemic. The movement, he complained, has been so tardy as to take "the heart out of those who are most anxious to see it brought to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion," but his remedy turned out to be nothing more accelerative than a firm application of his vacuum brake. The Church of Scotland "has no leader," he wrote, and "has fallen into the hands of political intriguers." Their work threatens it with destruction, and yet its ministers and members are so apathetic that "of the two hundred and ten members of the Presbytery of Glasgow only twenty-four took the trouble of being present to discuss the Draft Articles." The Articles, he holds, leave ecclesiastical minorities unprotected, and place "the Church not only independently of, but above, the State," whereas the State "invariably grants protection to minorities" (*sic*). The procedure contemplated in connection with the Articles, he says, betrays the patrimony of the Church, since "its property is to be handed over to Parliament, which, through a Commission, is to divide it

between the two uniting Churches"; but elsewhere he insists that the property is "national money" which Parliament cannot "allow two Churches to walk off with" without control. In one breath Parliament is the champion of distressed minorities and the dispenser of ideal justice; in the next it is not to be trusted with the disposal of the Church's possessions. In one sentence the Church's endowments are her own; in another they are national money. The cause of Presbyterian Reunion has impediments to face and difficulties still to overcome, but Scottish Church folk will ask for clearer thinking and more solid pleas than Dr Macmillan has yet advanced before they can be induced to resist its appeal. As a matter of fact, in a crowded meeting the General Assembly of his Church which met in the month of May endorsed the policy of the Union Committee by an overwhelming majority, fewer than a dozen votes in all being cast in favour of the counter-motions of their critics.

In the April number Mr Thomson published a thoughtful and temperate rejoinder from the standpoint of the sister Church, in which, while repudiating Dr Macmillan's strictures upon the Church of Scotland promoters of the movement and their alleged motives, he supported his plea for wider publicity, but dealt effectively with his unguarded admissions and justly condemned his Erastian preference for the voice of the State as the ultimate arbiter in ecclesiastical dissensions.

To the present writer the time would seem to have come for a short narrative of the steps which have been taken towards Scottish Presbyterian Reunion, and for a brief analysis and description of the Draft Articles which are now under discussion and formal review by the Scottish Churches and the Scottish people. The facts are not only honourable to both the conferring parties, but, as I think, of national importance and of wider than national interest. Scotland has so long been identified by the public mind with ecclesiastical divisions that her response to the universal demand for increased unity and efficiency in the Christian Church has a significance that is unmistakable. The Union negotiations were entered upon five years before the stress of war came upon us to intensify the motives which had prompted them, but no work of national reconstruction appeals with greater urgency to our people now that the agony is over. The five years of war-time arrest which practically suspended the labours of the conference have not been years given over to the locust. They have drawn the Churches in question nearer to each other in a score of ways. Common losses, common gains, common

trials and failures and responsibilities, parochial work and military duty shared, theological colleges united, Presbyteries and General Assemblies linked in a new and moving comradeship, national and spiritual aspirations quickened in both communions—these for our Churches will remain in memory as part of the silver lining of the dark cloud of war. Our already happier relations before the war made it easy for us to forget rivalry and grasp hands during the conflict. But even if we had had no such preparation we should now have felt a solemn obligation to call a halt to traditional differences. We could not, in the name of God and in the interest of the nation, have called our people to turn to swift account the lessons of the grim experience through which we had passed, without putting our ecclesiastical house in order and practising at our spiritual hearth what we preached from the pulpit to the world. With what face could we have appealed for the termination of class warfare, for a new conception of political partisanship, and for the leaguings of all nations in enduring peace, if we had not set our hands as honest men to the task of ending our own separation and the prejudices and suspicions and misunderstandings which are its inevitable fruit? If there was ever a time when reunion seemed to us a sentimental dream, or a luxury with which our frugal Scottish menage could dispense, that time is gone. In the committees that have conferred, men who at first were sceptical or maintained an attitude of vigilant suspicion and guarded policy, have yielded to an influence that seemed higher than human argument and statesmanship. Chasms that opened up before them in debate were bridged from either bank. Reunion became a real possibility because it was seen by both to be a real necessity.

Since the situation in Scotland presents many features of interest to people in other lands, and the movement in progress may offer helpful analogies to other Churches which are alive to the Christian duty of reunion, it may be useful to set down some simple facts about it. The two Churches in conference number among their adherents some three-fourths of the Scottish population, and an overwhelming majority of the Presbyterian population. I wish with all my heart that the four small residuary Presbyterian communions, the Free Church, the Free Presbyterian Church, the Reformed Presbyterian Church, and the Original Secession Church, could have seen their way to help us to make our reunion complete by bringing their brave and tenacious testimony to enrich our future fellowship, but as yet they stand apart. The communi-

cant membership of the Church of Scotland is over 700,000, its ordained ministerial and foreign missionary strength about 1550, its parish churches, chapels, and mission stations at home 1700. The communicant membership of the United Free Church of Scotland is over 500,000, its ordained ministers and foreign missionaries about 1625, its churches, stations, and congregational missions at home 1538. The congregational life of the two Churches is lived side by side throughout the whole land. Each is national in range as well as in title, and each is essentially territorial in its system. In doctrine, in government, and in worship there are happily no essential differences recognisable either by outsiders or by ourselves. Even our Church buildings present something like the same range of variety to the eye that examines them. During the war it was found easy to combine the theological colleges and to have United Free Church students instructed even in Church History by a Church of Scotland professor, as in Edinburgh, and *vice versa*, as in Glasgow. Interchange of pulpits has long been a settled practice, joint services have been frequent, and not seldom in the absence on war service of a minister of one denomination his duties have been performed with readiness and with acceptance by his neighbour in the other. Missionary colleges in India have been merged. Missionary enterprise abroad and Church extension at home have been concerted. Military chaplaincies have been arranged for in common. Educational policy in relation to the national school system has been single and harmonious. United Free Church theological curricula and certificates qualify candidates for ordinary degrees in divinity in the Universities whose theological faculties belong to the Church of Scotland. Honorary degrees in divinity have never been withheld on ecclesiastical grounds. At Edinburgh University the faculty of divinity has secured the recognition of the professors of New College and the principals of the theological colleges of the Episcopal and Congregational Churches as University lecturers and members of the Board of Theological Studies. It would be difficult to conceive a situation more favourable to reunion.

On the other hand, traditional loyalties are strong, especially among our older folk. Neighbourly relations in parochial life are not always easy to maintain. Each denomination has something like a tone or accent of its own, though as the years advance its distinctness is sensibly waning. The Church of Scotland has its position as the National Church recognised by statute and by public courtesy. Two-thirds of its churches enjoy ancient endowments for the support of the ministry and

are innocent of pew rents. A generation ago it might have been described as less emphatically evangelical in type than its Presbyterian neighbours: it is still far less ardent in foreign missionary enterprise and much less exacting in its attitude towards intemperance. But its interest in the poor, its concern for social amelioration, its zeal for general education and for theological culture, have never been in question. It has been deeply and keenly sensible of its national responsibilities. The United Free Church, with as scholarly and efficient a ministry and as generous and devoted a membership as can be found in the Christian world to-day, represents the combination of two great and honourable voluntary traditions, each possessing not only the memory of a disruptive origin but also the memory of subsequent reunion. Not one of the secessions from which they are sprung proceeded on a theory hostile to the national establishment of religion in a Church recognised by and related to the State. Without exception our Scottish seceders resented, and justly resented, the forfeiture of the people's right to select and call their ministers, and the failure or refusal of the State to respect the Church's deep conviction of its spiritual rights. It has been ecclesiastical separation with its inevitable estrangements and rivalries, aided by a long-continued despair of a better understanding on the part of the civil power, and supported by a cheering experience of the possibilities of voluntary effort, that has led to the development of anti-establishment theory. But at no time has the mind of Scotland as a whole gone over to the disestablishment of the National Church, and there is probably at the present day an opener mind among those outside the Church of Scotland than there has been for long on the question. Religiously regarded, the civil establishment of a Church is not viewed by either side as involving a principle vital to its existence or perfection as a Church. Rather it is a principle of religious patriotism, the practical and concrete acknowledgment by a nation and government that its ideals and standards of life and activity are, and ought to be, Christian. Just because our Protestantism narrows the difference between minister and layman, between religious service and duty in the world, we have encouraged and always will encourage the civil power to assume educational and moral and philanthropic responsibilities. As Churchmen we have been pioneers of a Christian democracy, and we have not grudged to lose many of our most valued traditional Church responsibilities, for example in the provision of schools and the administration of relief to the poor, so long as the State was willing to assume them under a

sense of Christian decency and obligation. For us, accordingly, it has been since the Reformation an instinct to co-ordinate Church and State as equals in distinct spheres, each with a separate jurisdiction and each furnished with a popular apparatus of self-determination, legislation, and progress. Church and State are both for us Divine in origin and authority. Each is pledged under our system to support the other in right and appropriate ways. Each is free under pressure of conscience or deliberate expediency to part company from the other. But neither ought to invade the other's province. When doubt arises as to authority or jurisdiction, as may be in exceptional cases, common sense and Christian feeling suggest conference and goodwill between the partners in the alliance as the obvious recourse. In the past our Scottish difficulties and secessions have arisen through untimely obstinacy and inconsiderate independence, on one side or both, through defects of temper, and through disloyalty to a noble theory held in common, with an adverse balance against the civil authority upon the whole.

It cannot be denied that recent history has strangely and, for many, disconcertingly reinforced the ancient theory of a close relationship between Church and State. Where Church and State are both increasingly democratic, the conception receives a new opportunity. Dogmatic and liturgical differences among the separated Churches make the application of the theory anything but easy. But religious men and women in all lands are longing for the moralisation and spiritualisation of government and nationality. Before the problem of popular and national education, threatened as it has been with utter secularisation, they have instinctively drawn nearer to one another. Confronted by the religious needs of military organisations so vast as to be in reality nations under arms, they have made haste to furnish their brave defenders with religious ordinances through a unified and harmonious force of chaplains. On great public and national occasions public sentiment grows increasingly impatient of every evidence of ecclesiastical exclusiveness or bigotry in the conduct of religious ceremonial. And beyond all, while proud of the nationalism which has characterised our age, we have awakened, throughout Europe and America and throughout the world, with a sense of horror to the appalling consequences which follow a godless patriotism in international relations. For the peace and salvation of the world we realise with new intensity that Christian nations and Christian governments are as necessary as Christian Churches and Christian ministries.

Not merely religion in a nation, but national religion in some sense, has to be achieved if a Christian world is to be attained. Not restraints and impulses from without but restraints and impulses from within are needed by the responsible authorities in all peoples. Churches that are separate may work for that end, must and do work; but in proportion as they do so with success they make possible the old vision of a Church which is really national, a Church which means the nation on its knees.

In Scotland, as I have written, Presbyterianism commands the allegiance of three-fourths of the people. It is established in the Church of Scotland, recognised and safeguarded by a sequence of historic statutes, surrounded by a group of sister Churches outside it but not estranged, and in cordial relations with all other Churches save that of Rome. The National Church already enjoys such autonomy as makes it the envy of other established churches, possesses unfettered jurisdiction over its members and ministers, has an orderly gradation of Church Courts, recognised by civil law as courts of the realm, ascending from the parochial kirk-session through local presbyteries and provincial synods to the General Assembly, in which is vested the supreme legislative and disciplinary power. The authority of the General Assembly is not subject in ecclesiastical or spiritual matters to the Civil Courts or to Parliament or to the Crown. It meets according to its own will, and its decisions are not liable to external review. But there still remains a species of limitation to its freedom involved in its special relationship to the State. There are steps which *as a Church* it is free to take in the interests of its own efficiency and the good of the Scottish people, but which it is not free, not expressly or constitutionally free, *as an Established Church* to take without the concurrence of Parliament. For example, the formula of subscription to the Confession of Faith subscribed by its ministers was felt to be in need of revision. In 1906 Parliament, by a clause in the Scottish Churches Act, granted power, so far as it was concerned as a party to the alliance, to the Church to frame its own formula, recognising that such action belonged properly to the Church. And it is to be remembered that from the beginning the doctrinal standards of the Church were framed or accepted by authority of the Assembly, their recognition by Parliament being requested by the Church on its own initiative, and without demand made by the State, but in fulfilment of the Church's conception of its honourable duty towards its partner in the nation's service. Similarly

the Church has submitted to Parliament, or to the Court representing it, modifications of its parochial boundaries and therewith of the membership of its Courts. In such cases there has been a traditional limitation of the Church's freedom. Law and courtesy have dictated concurrence on the part of the allied authorities. If the Church owes it to the State to be mindful of the partnership, the State owes it equally to the Church to throw no gratuitous or irksome impediments in the way of constitutionally formulated changes. History records that upon occasion both partners have fallen short, and history has pronounced an agreed judgment upon both. The time accordingly has come when on the basis of experience the ancient theory of a co-ordinated Church and State may, it is believed, be embodied in an improved arrangement, designed to obviate friction and based on national goodwill. No time could be more propitious for such an understanding than the present. The State has at least as much to gain from it as the Church. For it becomes increasingly evident that in the coming years the problem of civil government will be desperate if Christian principles are not maintained in social and political life. A government which is secular and pagan in its policy need not expect to be supported by the active loyalty of Church folk. A people which is secular and pagan in its motives, a medley of nations which ignore the rudiments of Christian duty, will head for ruin. Both in social life and in international relations, something more than calculated justice and a chilly code of ethics is going to be required for the peace of the world. That something Christianity alone can provide. The religion which has so profound and so elevating a message for the individual soul and for men's daily relations with each other has a mission to the nations both in themselves and in their everyday intercourse. If in Scotland a fresh trial is to be given to the old concordat revised in the light of three centuries of chequered experience, it is not merely because a cherished tradition pleads to our antiquarian sentiments for survival, but because Church and State cannot live wholly apart, because increasingly religion must assert its power in the counsels of statesmanship and patriotism, because we have been driven to realise that the State is not a secular institution, and because, with the reviving passion for Christian unity, we have begun to discern that the future calls for the closest possible co-operation between the two master foci of organised human loyalty.

Whatever faults may justly be laid to the charge of the Church of Scotland, it has never regarded with a callous or

superior eye the secessions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, or left unaltered the situation from which they sprung. Immediately after the latest and greatest of them, through the tardy remorse of Parliament it secured in 1843 legal authorisation to reduce the arbitrary powers of the patronage which had been thrust upon it against all remonstrances by the Act of 1712, only five years after the Union of the English and Scottish Parliaments, an Act against which the Church protested year after year in vain, and which has in fact been responsible for almost all its experience of schism; and in 1844 it received civil authority to set up new parishes *quoad sacra*, endowed by voluntary effort, as constituent parishes in the presbyteries. Finally, in 1866 patronage was abolished by Parliament, the Church undertaking to pay monetary compensation to the patrons of livings who were sordid enough to claim it. Our great historic occasion of separation was done away with by the same authority which had imposed it, but the evil result and the injured temper remained. The hurt was far from healed. Many Free Churchmen who had resented patronage and had made sacrifices rather than endure it, stoutly opposed its removal from the Established Church. Those on both sides who had hoped that the way would now be clear to reunion were speedily disillusioned. The "Establishment" regained strength with remarkable steadiness while the separated Churches flourished, but disestablishing inclinations also grew apace. Yet with the arrival of a new generation on both sides the situation grew easier. Disestablishment could only be secured by protracted and bitter campaigning in the political field, if indeed it was practicable at all. And alliance with a political party was felt by many to be at least as objectionable as alliance with the State, while much less dignified. Party politics in pulpit or on platform has never seemed to the Scottish people to be the proper exercise of the vocation of their ministers. And finally a fresh experience of unwelcome and embarrassing litigation, culminating in the legal catastrophe of 1904 in connection with the Church union of 1900 between the Free and the United Presbyterian Churches, suggested to many that "freedom" had its own hazards and difficulties outside an ecclesiastical establishment.

In 1878 and in 1886 the Church of Scotland made friendly overtures to the Free Churches to confer with a view to co-operation and union on any terms "consistent with the maintenance and support of an establishment of religion" and "the sacredness of the ancient endowments." But the

time was not ripe. In 1907 an invitation to unreserved conference was accepted by the United Free Church, and two years later large and representative committees of ministers and laymen were appointed "to enter into unrestricted conference on the existing ecclesiastical situation, and on the main causes which keep the Churches apart." From that time the work of conference has proceeded without a hitch, in spite of sectional apprehensions and hesitations on either side and in spite of the retarding influence of war conditions. The onus of constructive responsibility has naturally rested upon the Church of Scotland "Hundred," as the Committee is often called; but the burden has been, by common consent, not unworthily borne. Laymen have rendered signal service. The United Free Church representatives have co-operated with unfailing courtesy and loyalty. Year by year a spirit of mutual confidence and esteem has steadily grown. Though many of the most valued personalities in the conference have passed away, the desire for union has never wavered. The General Assemblies have annually approved of the action and policy of their delegates.

In 1910 an interim report was issued which dealt with the vital facts of the ecclesiastical situation, with the spiritual freedom of the Church, and with the national recognition of religion. In 1911 a report outlined a constructive policy. Following it in 1912 the Church of Scotland tabled an impressive "Memorandum" outlining a suggested course of procedure and of possible legislation, which was received with reassuring favour by the United Free Church, and which has formed the solid basis of subsequent construction. This document marked a determinative stage in the negotiations. Its preparation proved that the Church of Scotland was in earnest with the project, and its reception across the ecclesiastical border was decisive evidence that its effort to appreciate and to accommodate the position of the sister Church had achieved very substantial success. Both Churches believed in national religion, though they stood apart and viewed it from the standpoint of a different experience. Both believed in the spiritual freedom of the Church, though each had a different method of attaining it. Could a Church be both national and free? Could it in Scotland be recognised as the National Church though a far from negligible fraction of the people still remained outside? Could it be spiritually free although it retained a statutory and traditional recognition as national by the State? An answer in the affirmative depended upon the willingness of the Church of Scotland to seek for the removal

of certain limitations which, while in no wise advantaging the State, retarded the constitutional freedom of the Church in its operations, upon the willingness of the United Free Church to respect the substance of the historic theory and practice of Church and State relationship provided that those limitations were removed, and upon the willingness of Parliament to concur in the requisite procedure and, within the civil province, to effectuate the desired revision.

The Memorandum of 1912 has been officially summarised as follows:—

(1) The pressing problem in relation to union is that of the adjustment of State relations in a manner acceptable to both Churches.

(2) It would be difficult, if not impracticable, to secure concurrence in an attempt to define special State relations in a modern statute. The problem must therefore be approached on the footing of modifying and adapting what is ancient, and not of attempting to create something new.

(3) A constitution might be framed and adopted setting forth the spiritual liberty claimed by the Church; this constitution might be recognised as lawful by Parliament, and all statutory provisions inconsistent therewith might be declared to be repealed.

(4) There are expressions in some of the ancient statutes which give colour to the argument that the special recognition of the Church of Scotland is so conceived as to be inconsistent with the recognition of other Churches as Christian Churches, and it seems desirable to endeavour to obviate this suggestion by an express statutory disavowal of any exclusive claim of the Church of Scotland to recognition by the State as a Christian Church.¹

¹ It may be of interest to append the terms subsequently employed by the joint-statement issued by both the conferring committees in the Assembly reports of 1919:—

“The position of other Churches in relation to the State or the law is a matter of general public policy, in regard to which positive proposals cannot well appropriately be formulated except upon the initiative of these Churches themselves. On the other hand, the Church of Scotland cannot assent to be deprived of the recognition by the civil courts of the independence and finality of the action and judgments of her courts in matters spiritual, nor would such a measure be in the real interest of other Churches. But whilst it does not appear to be within the province of the Church of Scotland to approach Parliament with any positive proposals with regard to the position of other Churches, it has been suggested by the representatives of the Church of Scotland that it is in the power of the Church to take advantage of any approach to Parliament

(5) In regard to endowments, the Church of Scotland will go forward with the matter only upon the footing that the endowments are conserved for the United Church and are not secularised. On the other hand, certain readjustments would be necessary to meet the new conditions. These would fall to be framed by a Parliamentary Commission, acting upon general lines antecedently agreed upon between the Church and the Government in charge of the proposed legislation.

In 1914 the desire of the United Free Church to see the terms of the contemplated Articles of Constitution before pronouncing a definite opinion upon the proposals of the Memorandum found fulfilment in the presentation of the first-published draft of a memorable group of "Articles declaratory of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland in Matters Spiritual." From 1914 to the present year a process of revision and amendment has been constantly undergone by the document in the light of discussion in the committees, in the Assemblies and subordinate courts of the Church, and elsewhere. The United Free Church representatives have accepted the Articles as forming a satisfactory basis of union. Church of Scotland minority groups have had their apprehensions regarding the security of the Historic Faith and of National Religion largely allayed as revision progressed. A United Free Church minority of somewhat larger number, while practically satisfied with the declarations of theoretic freedom contained within the Articles, stoutly maintains its suspicion and dislike of anything like a national establishment, and accordingly deprecates further movement towards union upon the basis of the draft. Meanwhile there has been no set-back. Presbyteries have been reviewing the proposals afresh. At the Assemblies it was evident that it was the conviction of an

to secure that the recognition of the position and work of other Churches in Scotland shall not be prejudiced by any legislative provisions in regard to the Church of Scotland or ancient statutory expressions based on the theory that there is 'na uther face of Kirk . . . within this realm.' In this view it has been suggested that in the Act which is contemplated a provision shall be inserted to secure that the recognition of the Church of Scotland as the national Church shall be divorced from all such associations to the prejudice of the recognition of other Churches. The terms of such a statutory declaration would be matter of careful consideration. But some such provision as the following has been tentatively suggested:—

"Nothing which is contained in this or any other statute dealing with the Church of Scotland shall be construed to the prejudice of the recognition of any other Church in Scotland as a Christian Church protected by law in the exercise of its spiritual functions."

overwhelming majority of ministers and laymen that the work should go forward without avoidable delay.

In their most recent form, as presented to the Supreme Court of the Church, the Articles are nine in number. They are not a draft of a new constitution. They presuppose the existing constitution of the Church, but are intended to declare the liberty of the Church in spiritual matters. State relationship and the security of the Church's patrimony are outside their scope, being determined by civil statute and traditional use and wont. They are a statement of the Church's character and rights and obligations as a true branch of the Universal Church.

Article I. asserts the place of the Church of Scotland within the Church Catholic, summarises its essential faith and spiritual mission, declares its adherence to the Scottish Reformation, and its acceptance of the Word of God contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as its supreme rule of faith and life. In its testimony of faith it will be noted that this Article is not content with the formula, "believing in . . ." It deliberately widens the character of the Church's witness-bearing and confession, using the phrases, "worshipping . . . adoring . . . confessing . . . glorying in . . . owning obedience to . . . trusting in . . . proclaiming . . . labouring for . . ." Incomplete though the sentence necessarily must be, it is a welcome and significant departure from confessional usage. It prefers the vocabulary of religion to the vocabulary of creeds and dogmatic systems, except in the use of the historic terms "the same in substance." In the clause, "trusting in the promised renewal and guidance of the Holy Spirit," there is affirmed the Church's confidence that in spiritual experience and in progressive knowledge of the truth the grace of God will not fail either the Church or the individual Christian. And in the final clause, "labouring for the advancement of the Kingdom of God throughout the world," an age-long lacuna in the creeds is filled up by the profession of the Church's ethical and social and missionary vocation at home and abroad. The article runs thus:—

I. The Church of Scotland is part of the Holy Catholic or Universal Church; worshipping one God, Almighty, all-wise and all-loving, in the Trinity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, the same in substance, equal in power and glory; adoring the Father, infinite in Majesty, of whom are all things; confessing our Lord Jesus Christ, the Eternal Son, made very man

for our salvation; glorying in His Cross and Resurrection, and owning obedience to Him as the Head over all things to His Church; trusting in the promised renewal and guidance of the Holy Spirit; proclaiming the forgiveness of sins and acceptance with God through faith in Christ, and the gift of Eternal life; and labouring for the advancement of the Kingdom of God throughout the world. The Church of Scotland adheres to the Scottish Reformation; receives the Word of God which is contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as its supreme rule of faith and life; and avows the fundamental doctrines of the Catholic faith founded thereupon.

The Second Article relates the Church to its historic subordinate standard, the Westminster Confession, defines its polity as presbyterian, and indicates the character of its worship, orders, and discipline through a reference to ancient manuals interpreted or modified by ecclesiastical legislation and practical usage.

II. The principal subordinate standard of the Church of Scotland is the Westminster Confession of Faith approved by the General Assembly of 1647, containing the sum and substance of the Faith of the Reformed Church. Its government is Presbyterian, and is exercised through Kirk-sessions, Presbyteries, Provincial Synods, and General Assemblies. Its system and principles of worship, orders, and discipline are in accordance with "The Directory for the Public Worship of God," "The Form of Presbyterial Church Government," and "The Form of Process," as these have been or may hereafter be interpreted or modified by Acts of the General Assembly or by consuetude.

The Third Article affirms the Church's continuity with the Church of Scotland reformed in 1560 and subsequently secured by Parliamentary statutes in its liberties, and acknowledges its distinctive obligation "as a national Church representative of the Christian Faith of the Scottish people."

III. This Church is in historical continuity with the Church of Scotland which was reformed in 1560, whose liberties were ratified in 1592, and for whose security provision was made in the Treaty of Union of 1707. The continuity and identity of the Church of Scotland are

not prejudiced by the adoption of these Articles. As a national Church representative of the Christian Faith of the Scottish people it acknowledges its distinctive call and duty to bring the ordinances of religion to the people in every parish of Scotland through a territorial ministry.

The Fourth Article defines the nature and scope of the autonomy of the Church as a branch of the Universal Church in matters spiritual and ecclesiastical, recognition by civil authority neither conferring its proper government and jurisdiction nor implying the right of the State to invade them.

IV. This Church, as part of the Universal Church wherein the Lord Jesus Christ has appointed a government in the hands of Church office-bearers, receives from Him, its Divine King and Head, and from Him alone, the right and power subject to no civil authority to legislate, and to adjudicate finally, in all matters of doctrine, worship, government, and discipline in the Church, including the right to determine all questions concerning membership and office in the Church, the constitution and membership of its Courts, and the mode of election of its office-bearers, and to define the boundaries of the spheres of labour of its ministers and other office-bearers. Recognition by civil authority of the separate and independent government and jurisdiction of this Church in matters spiritual, in whatever manner such recognition be expressed, does not in any way affect the character of this government and jurisdiction as derived from the Divine Head of the Church alone, or give to the civil authority any right of interference with the proceedings or judgments of the Church within the sphere of its spiritual government and jurisdiction.

The Fifth Article states the Church's liberty in matters of doctrine, its safeguards and its self-appointed limits in the exercise of that freedom.

V. This Church has the inherent right, free from interference by civil authority, but under the safeguards for deliberate action and legislation provided by the Church itself, to frame or adopt its subordinate standards, to declare the sense in which it understands its Confession of Faith, to modify the forms of expression therein, or

to formulate other doctrinal statements, and to define the relation thereto of its office-bearers and members, but always in agreement with the Word of God and the fundamental doctrines of the Christian Faith contained in the said Confession, of which agreement the Church shall be sole judge, and with due regard to liberty of opinion in points which do not enter into the substance of the faith.

The Sixth Article attests the divine appointment and authority of the civil power, and affirms the obligations of the State and the Nation as Christian towards Religion and towards the Church. It declares the mutual duties and the opportunities of mutual service which fall to the Church and the State, and the freedom inherent in both.

VI. This Church acknowledges the divine appointment and authority of the civil magistrate within his own sphere, and maintains its historic testimony to the duty of the nation acting in its corporate capacity to render homage to God, to acknowledge the Lord Jesus Christ to be King over the nations, to obey His laws, to reverence His ordinances, to honour His Church, and to promote in all appropriate ways the Kingdom of God. The Church and the State owe mutual duties to each other, and acting within their respective spheres may signally promote each other's welfare. The Church and the State have the right to determine each for itself all questions concerning the extent and the continuance of their mutual relations in the discharge of these duties and the obligations arising therefrom.

The Seventh Article acknowledges the duty of working for Christian unity and further reunion in the Church. Like the First Article it thus repairs one of the standing defects of confessional literature. And it keeps the door legally open to union with other Churches without loss of identity, the Church itself determining the consistency of such a step with the Articles.

VII. The Church of Scotland, believing it to be the will of Christ that His disciples should be all one in the Father and in Him, that the world may believe that the Father has sent Him, recognises the obligation to seek and promote union with other Churches in which it finds the Word to be purely preached, the sacraments

administered according to Christ's ordinance, and discipline rightly exercised; and it has the right to unite with any such Church without loss of its identity on terms which this Church finds to be consistent with these Articles.

The Eighth Article conserves the Church's right to interpret the Articles and under its own safeguards to modify or add to them, but always in harmony with the First Article, which thus becomes the permanent anchor of its faith and mission. The Church itself is to be the judge of the consistency of such modifications with that Article. The second sentence prescribes a formal method of safeguarding legislation from undue haste, but to many it will occur that the dignity of the document would not suffer if this provision, an eleventh-hour insertion, were omitted, since it requires even for secondary changes a larger majority of Presbyteries than the Church has ever demanded under its ancient Barrier Act procedure. To the present writer it appears to be a reprehensible procedure, too common in constitution-making, to impose upon the future a more stringent demand for approximate unanimity than the Church has required either in the past or in the present vital instance. It implies distrust of the Church in coming generations, and it suggests that the Church of to-day has a greater competence in matters of faith and freedom. It ought to suffice in terms of the first sentence in the Article to insist upon the customary safeguards of a majority in one Assembly, a majority of the Presbyteries during the subsequent year, and a repeated majority in the following Assembly. The Article runs as follows:—

VIII. The Church has the right to interpret these Articles, and, subject to the safeguards for deliberate action and legislation provided by the Church itself, to modify or add to them; but always consistently with the provisions of the first Article hereof, adherence to which as interpreted by the Church, is essential to its continuity and corporate life. No alteration of or addition to these Articles shall be made until the proposed alteration or addition has been transmitted by the General Assembly to the Presbyteries of the Church, and has obtained the consent of a majority of two-thirds of the whole of the said Presbyteries in two immediately successive years, and in case in either year the requisite majority is not obtained, the same or a similar proposal shall not be again transmitted for the consent of Presbyteries until an interval

of five years after the failure to obtain the requisite majority has been reported to the General Assembly.

The Ninth Article is a formal ratification and confirmation of the Church's constitution as a whole in view of the declaratory explanations contained in the preceding eight paragraphs.

IX. Subject to the provisions of the foregoing Articles and the powers of amendment therein contained, the Constitution of the Church of Scotland is hereby anew ratified and confirmed by the Church.

Such are the contents of this remarkable Scottish effort to prepare the way for one of the most interesting Church unions ever undertaken. By a decisive majority the Presbyteries of the Church of Scotland have already approved of the Articles "as the basis of an approach to the Government," opening the way to prompt and effective forward steps. In the United Free Church it has been thought to be right that the Established Church, in view of its relation to the State, should alone approach Parliament in order to secure the State's recognition of the Constitution as contemplated with a view to reunion. It is not very material either to Parliament or to the Churches concerned whether both Churches go forward together or the Established Church goes forward bearing an agreed basis of union in its hands. The action of the Churches which formed the United Methodist Church in 1907 would have served as a useful precedent for a joint approach to the civil legislature. In that case three Free Churches, influenced, it may be, by the recent Scottish Churches' litigation, had prepared a joint constitution dealing both with property and with spiritual powers, went jointly to Parliament and obtained "An Act to authorise the Union of the Methodist New Connexion, the Bible Christians, and the United Methodist Free Churches under the name of 'The United Methodist Church' . . .," the last clause of the preamble being: "Whereas the purposes of this Act cannot be effected without the authority of Parliament." Among the provisions of the enacting clauses is included power to resolve on union, to adopt a deed poll of foundation, to unite with other religious bodies. In the Foundation Deed Poll thus recognised by the State there appears a statement of doctrines held and taught, and a provision enabling the United Church to reconsider every tenth year alterations in doctrinal tenets, basis of membership, constitution, powers and duties of its highest court, etc. The policy of the Scottish Church is thus

paralleled in an interesting fashion by this English analogy. Neither by the United Free Church nor by the Church of Scotland need there be felt any doubt as to Parliament's freedom and willingness to concur in the proposed step. Parliament, like the Scottish public, may be trusted to welcome a healing of our schism. The Church of England is not likely to grudge such legislation to the sister Establishment in the Northern Kingdom, to whose history and constitution its prelates and divines and lay leaders have devoted in recent years such close study as is evidenced in the Report of the Archbishops' Committee on Church and State in 1916. In that report the Anglican Committee say of the outline of principle and policy in the Scottish Memorandum: "The breadth, completeness, and uncompromising character of this Declaration make it one of the most remarkable expositions in modern times of the meaning of spiritual independence"; but with a certain ruefulness they have elsewhere to add: "It is obvious that the present position in Scotland is in no way analogous with ours. When the two Churches are united, the vast majority of the people of Scotland will be included in the United Church." *De jure* and *de facto* the United Church, concerning whose title "The Church of Scotland," *simpliciter*, there has never been a moment's question, would in the language of the Articles be "representative of the Christian faith of the Christian people." And as to the prospective attitude of the English Free Churches, when I remember with what eager goodwill so ardent an English voluntary as the late Mr Silvester Horne, and so resolute a Free Churchman as Principal Fairbairn, welcomed our project and the policy on which it rests, I cannot bring myself to be afraid that they will put any obstacle in our way. Unless I am mistaken, both Anglicans and English Free Churchmen would agree in the opinion that no small part may yet be played by our reunited Scottish Church in the promotion of those closer and happier relations between the Churches of the United Kingdom and of the Empire and of the English-speaking world to which we all look forward and for which we already are united in prayer.

WILLIAM A. CURTIS.

EDINBURGH.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE CHURCH TO THE PHENOMENA KNOWN AS SPIRITUALISTIC.

SIR OLIVER LODGE.

THE recent Church Congress at Leicester attracted considerable attention, partly because it dealt with a live subject—the question of human survival, whether there could be any proof of it, and what future existence would be like. A good deal of irresponsible chatter, mingled with some sense, was reported on the subject by the newspapers. But it is probably unfair to judge of Congress-proceedings by newspaper reports: certainly it would be unfair to judge of a meeting of the British Association on that basis. Reporters are bound to attend the most popular sections, and in the present state of popular education they have to present only the most superficial aspect in order to be intelligible, even if they themselves understand fully what they report;—whereas those behind the scenes know that good work is being done, fruitful ideas promulgated, important friendships made, and stimulus supplied for another year's secluded exploration. The best of everything lies in the unseen, the unheard, and the unreported. Let us hope that what is true of a scientific organisation may be true of a religious one also.

A certain amount of flippancy appears to have invaded the proceedings at times; but perhaps that is permissible. Even when dealing with grave subjects one cannot always be grave; and amusing phrases, like a wish for “unfurnished lodgings in Gehenna” as preferable to the kind of work and service attributed in some books to our dead young soldiers amid surroundings not very different from those of earth, mean no more than the gouty connoisseur may have meant when, on being recommended a remedial brand of sherry, he said that he would prefer the gout. Yet it is rather surprising

that the helpful and happy though rather mundane activities of our lost sons and heroes should be regarded as repellent by the vicar of a London parish ; and certainly this jocular treatment of human destiny illustrates the distance the clergy have travelled from mediæval eschatology, or even from that which prevailed half a century ago, when hell was held over the laity as a terrible and authoritative threat. So, I venture to say, it will be with other doctrines which hold the field now. Beliefs will imperceptibly change, and in due time a reference to these now half-accepted but then silently-discarded teachings will furnish occasion for a laugh. Already the recently orthodox and hymn-bolstered teaching about a long long sleep in sepulchres till a distant day of judgment, followed by resurrection and reanimation of the corpse, has become subject matter for a jest about the fate of missionaries who had become incorporate with cannibals. And so enlightenment gradually proceeds ; even when no effort is made to cast off the fetters with which Christian theology, after its inspired infancy and during its worldly maturity, was bound. The bonds seem to be of a material which rots off in time, so that they can be discarded with little exertion and without any appearance of revolt.

The chief objection to this simple kind of conservative inertia is that each generation is behindhand ; decay of belief has to precede emancipation, which therefore lags unduly behind contemporary intelligence. Conscious effort might break the fetters before they were manifestly rotten. The vows of mediævalism should not hamper and impede the Church to-day. A living organism cramped by a shell which it has outgrown is in hard case ; the shell can be cast, but not before it has become a danger. It is true that the protection of a doctrinal shell has been sought, quite naturally, by earnest men. Without such an outer covering the soft parts of the body politic would seem to run great risk ; yet, in the animal kingdom, the process of evolution has shown that advance and progress really lay with the organism which reversed the position of hard and soft. That creature succeeded best which had its hard parts inside, as a supporting skeleton, and which exposed its flesh and skin and delicate organs to the healthy stimulus of wind and weather, and if need be to dangers and wounds. It was found in fact that in a state of health they possessed recuperative powers against all minor injuries. The act of faith involved in dispensing with shell protection was justified. So may it always be !

The casting of any hard shell of doctrine is however a

dangerous period, from which the organism naturally shrinks. In its doctrine of the Last Things the Church at the present epoch is in the position of having cast its mediæval shell,—it no longer believes in the fixity of eternal fate at death, nor in two extreme regions in the hereafter, one of “bliss unending,” and the other of “eternity of woe,”—but it has not constituted for itself any new form of words, nor any creed of equal strength; and accordingly it is acutely sensitive to any attempts at such a doctrine, made by those whom it must regard as quacks: that is, people who trespass on an outlying fringe of the theological domain,—the scientific explorers who enter upon it without prejudice or presuppositions, ignoring all desires and longings and mediæval learning, and setting to work carefully and critically to ascertain what the truth really is. The real question is the old one,—What is the truth?

The ascertainment of truth is always a slow process, and there will be plenty of people to urge that the Church cannot put itself in the position of an unprejudiced investigator unhampered by vows and promises of belief. They will say that it is bound by its great traditions, that it is based upon a foundation of faith, that it cannot be a free enquirer; it must resist to the uttermost all crude and unsanctified attempts to peer through the barrier of death and to report what really lies beyond. Even among the laity, not so closely bound by vows, the attempt seems to some people impious: either the screen is impenetrable, or we were not meant to pierce it. Historically it has often seemed as if science were penetrating into forbidden regions, prying into secrets which were better hidden, and seizing things too mighty for its grasp. But never yet in the long run has it so turned out, nor will it turn out so in the present case. The idea that we have no right to search for hidden treasure, or to knock at closed doors, is mere superstition, by no means supported by high authority; which, on the contrary, definitely instructs us to ask, to seek, and to knock. Apart from authority, however, science is bound to examine everything it can; and a common familiar thing like death is not likely to be the sole exception.

If the old beliefs concerning the hereafter are really extinct before the new ones are formulated,—if henceforward the Church can keep its mind open to discoveries, and be ready to advance to new perceptions of divine truth as fast as they are gradually revealed to reverent scrutiny, using all reasonable care not to accept things prematurely and not to be deceived,—then the present period of uncertainty and feebleness may

turn out beneficial in the long run. But it *is* a period of feebleness, and something should be done during the present generation, something to secure the safety of the organism and to ward off the dangers which threaten it during the transition period.

But although the clergy can hardly form a good court of enquiry, they can decide what their attitude shall be if things prove true. The ascertainment of truth must be conducted on non-ecclesiastical lines; investigation must start free and unprejudiced; if it takes its "stand upon a foundation of faith," or "looks at the matter from the Christian standpoint," its conclusions will not carry much weight. A scientific enquirer ought to have no predilection for one conclusion rather than another; his sole business is to ascertain what is the actual fact. If, after having spent many years on the enquiry, he comes back and says,—Yes, now I can stand upon a secure religious foundation, now I can regard the universe from a Christian standpoint,—it will be because his enquiries have brought him into this position, not because he started thence on his journey. If the conclusions of science are found to agree in any respect with the intuitions of the saints, well and good. Saints and prophets doubtless have their own avenues to truth; they may be led by an inner light. Science is not the only avenue, it is one avenue; but it must be free and untrammelled, never bound by a vow, or a creed, or anything else.

And if any men of science at the present time forget their charter of freedom, for which their ancestors struggled, and exhibit rigid adherence to some system of conservative orthodoxy,—if they reject facts in regions which they have not explored, on the ground of presuppositions and prejudices,—they are false to the highest scientific tradition and are falling into a morass from which they should have been safe.

But is it true that diversity of opinion exists in the scientific camp? Yes; there are those who have investigated and those who have not. There are some who think they know beforehand that these phenomena are impossible and absurd. They would even put the civil law into action to stop the enquiry if they could. Dogmatic prejudice coupled with a desire to persecute, to expel new truth under the name of heresy, is unfortunately no exclusive privilege of theologians. This fact increases the Church's difficulty, no doubt. If every scientific man taught the same thing, probably the Church would see its course clear. But that never happens,—in the early stages of a subject it never will. In the days of Galileo there were

scientific and philosophic as well as clerical opponents. In the early days of Charles Darwin there was plenty of scientific hostility. When Lister began his beneficent work he was ridiculed by the medical profession. Unanimity is not to be expected. The plain man must judge for himself about the reasonableness of the contending factions. The more cultivated man may try experiments for himself, and endeavour to learn something of the phenomena at first hand. That is what I think some individual members of the Church might do. It is what a few undoubtedly have done. It is possible that many may not consider themselves good judges of truth in these sublunary affairs; no one is infallible, and few are trained in science. But what they can do is to ascertain what the asserted phenomena are really like, rid themselves of misconceptions, and become able to estimate the critics at their true value;—a process which may take a little time and patience, and might well be relegated to those specially called to the task. It is not a subject on which everyone is equally competent. Indeed no such subject exists. If it were a question between the rival claims to veneration of Beethoven or Wagner, of Bach or Strauss, a person with an unmusical ear or one with a dislike of classical music would not be a suitable member of a committee. (Though it is likely that people of that kind would be put on, in a spirit of fairness, so that all varieties of opinion should be represented.) But, whether conducted by individuals or a committee, examination of the facts should be mainly for the purpose of enlarging experience, hardly for the purpose of deciding between rival hypotheses and determining the exact nature of the truth.

What I should recommend the Church to do, as a living organism, and what I think it might do with some promptness, is to proceed hypothetically. If the asserted phenomena turn out to be true, if communication between the dead and the living is even in a minor degree really possible, what should be the attitude of the Church? If for a time it really does not know what is truth and what is falsehood, it must suspend judgment and proceed cautiously: but if ministers of religion really open their minds to the evidence, if they examine the proofs carefully and without prejudice, they will surely be guided in the direction of the truth. A mass of work has already been done, and there are many books to be read. A student must be critical and cautious, but, if he is to make progress, he must not be led away by loud-voiced assertions, easy slander, and careless

misrepresentation. Quotations should be verified, contexts should be studied, everything should be given a fair chance.

I cannot say that these precautions were conspicuous in recent Church Congress utterances, and I must now enter upon a few criticisms. I know that newspaper reports are not to be treated as authoritative, but I choose the soberest account, from *The Times* of 16th October 1919, and select some statements; citing them not for the sake of controversy but for the sake of explication, since it is to be presumed that the statements made represent some kind of general misunderstanding.

First I will take a sentence from a leading article in *The Times* of October 17. The writer says that I and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle "proclaim the existence of people with two powers, the power of raising spirits and the power of foretelling the future."

Well, as it stands, the statement is unintentionally untrue. Practice of necromancy, and incantations to raise ghosts or the devil, are redolent of the middle ages: so far as I am concerned I know nothing about such processes, nor have I any knowledge of people who practise incantation or any form of magic.

As to foretelling the future, such a power is at present *sub judice*. To say that it is non-existent is absurd. Every astronomer foretells the future; so do doctors; and even statesmen and politicians sometimes. Predictions are usually inferences from the present, and are always liable to unforeseen contingency. They are never infallible. Something may interfere with the predicted return of a comet or a swarm of meteors, or even with an eclipse, though the latter contingency is unlikely. If a wider knowledge of the present, and a closer acquaintance with the springs of human action, enable some Intelligences to infer about the future more than would ordinarily seem possible,—especially about human affairs subject to the disturbing influence of genuine free will,—well, it is for us to find out if such a power exists. At present I have never dogmatised on that subject—and the communicators with whom I have been in touch are very modest about it, though they imply that occasionally exceptional sources of information are open to them,—but I am willing to collect trustworthy evidence of such a power and seek to ascertain its Laws. Evidence not properly authenticated before the event cannot be allowed to count.

Oddly enough, however, it would appear that strictly there is something illegal about receiving predictions and recording

them. If so, then it is our duty to break the law to that extent. It is kind of the law to use its great machinery for the purpose of protecting ignorant people from fortune-telling gipsies and the loss of half a crown; it is proverbially easier to punish the theft of a goose from a common than it is to proceed against him who steals the common from the goose; but surely there are graver cases of swindling which better demand attention, and cases where the persons protected would be grateful. There is more than a suspicion that the prime motive of a petty persecution of mediums is hostility to the subject. Pretenders to powers they do not possess should be dealt with otherwise. No one really wants to be deceived, and fraudulent persons could be black-listed and avoided. Even the possession of genuine power is no guarantee of high motives: not all mediums are equally desirable. But most of those I have encountered are simple earnest folk, anxious to use a power they hardly understand, for good objects, and especially for the help of bereaved people and persons in distress. Indeed I am inclined to think that actual intentional fraud is not common, and can be guarded against if reasonable precautions are taken: The imperfect understanding, the wrong interpretation, and the occasional feebleness of genuine power are much more serious difficulties. Every communication through a medium is necessarily sophisticated by that medium. It is like light coming through coloured glass. In some cases the colour is slight—but I have never known it absent. Even when glass appears perfectly transparent to ordinary vision, spectrum analysis of the transmitted beam shows large tracts of opacity. It is a subject on which I must write more, but the S.P.R. has always allowed for sophistication and unconscious bias. We have had the same communicator speaking or writing through a large number of mediums, and though he conspicuously preserves a common element, the kind of message is never quite identical. The same note may be sounded on a flute, a violin, or a trumpet, but there will be differences of tone; and in that simple case the harmonics which affect the quality are known. In more complicated cases the laws have still to be ascertained.

Another analogy may be helpful. Sulphide of lead, carbonate of lead, and chloride of lead, all truly contain the element lead, but the compounds differ. To detect the common element in different ores needs experience and analysis.

So it is in the psychic realm. No message must be

treated as infallible and obvious and simple. It is even the same with biblical utterances; scholarship is needed to interpret them, and mistakes may be made. The misapprehensions displayed by casual readers are obtrusive; and when prejudice is added to ignorance the result is either ludicrous or painful.

In the matter of publication, however, the S.P.R. has adopted a consistent procedure. The whole of a message is usually reported if any of it is (unless there is something necessarily private in the social sense); the conscientious reporter does not feel justified in selecting those portions which happen to conform with his own views, and suppressing others. There is always the possibility that his estimate may be wrong. Some of the apparent rubbish or padding included in earlier S.P.R. reports has been recently found full of meaning. See for instance *Proceedings*, vol. xxx. pp. 175-229 and pp. 291-305. Besides, in the long run, more instruction is obtained by collating and studying over a wide range. When a student records something which has an air—at any rate a superficial air—of absurdity, he may append a footnote to show that he is aware of its humorous appearance, but he entertains a hope—a rather over-sanguine hope—that readers will be sufficiently literate to understand or to exercise discrimination, and not guffaw. Tares are often mingled with wheat, but it is a delicate and presumptuous, or at any rate premature, task to root out the one without injuring the other. The casual reader is bound to be incompetent, and yet is often self-satisfied and noisy. Responsible criticism is no frivolous amusement—it involves much comparative study. A man of one book is proverbially an incompetent critic of literature; a person who only studies one medium cannot have a broad enough basis for psychic discovery.

Clear recognition of troubles of this kind makes the leaders of the S.P.R. reticent, perhaps over reticent. They do not, as do some enthusiasts, proclaim the good tidings wholesale, in the spirit of the revivalist preacher; yet enthusiasm is a thing to be thankful for: it is possible to overdo caution, and to hide light under a bushel. There must be a happy mean, in this as in all else, and it is through no bad intention that I myself perhaps err on one side or the other. Had it not been for the widespread misery of war-bereavement I should probably have continued a more stringent policy of reticence. But the solace which the facts themselves have brought to many homes amply justifies a reasonable amount of publicity. Families have been reunited, sorrow has been alleviated, despair

has been checked, and a sane and religious outlook has been restored; and this not in a few cases but in a multitude.

It has been suggested to me that I should give one example of the help afforded by the facts. It is difficult to select, so I take a letter from a war-widow (personally a stranger) which happened to come to-day, and extract a few passages; explaining however that the feelings of gratitude are rightly due to the facts themselves, not to a mere agent:—

“A sense of overwhelming gratitude . . . for all you have done for my husband and myself compels me to express my feelings. . . . You may remember that some few weeks after my husband’s death in action I wrote to you and besought your aid. You can never guess what that meant to me, then and now, also I doubt not that the kindness was an aid to my husband, and in years to come I trust will help our boy. [She then speaks of her own experience through a medium and of her reading of books, and continues:]

“I have the greatest pleasure in watching the affection between my small boy (who was six months old when his father left us here) and his father, whom he speaks of in the most natural if still babyish manner. I am perfectly confident of the presence of my husband—at some times more than others,—and I feel a mutual joy between us in consequence. Love has not been weakened by the passing, and whilst grief is natural . . . I can and do sense the very close companionship of my husband, and that alone has helped me through these two years.

“With all my heart I thank you. From my childhood I have been brought up to follow the Church’s teaching, but in my awful sorrow I needed something beyond it. I wanted to *know* and to realise that what my husband himself had always so ardently believed was true, and that death did not destroy beyond the body. I thank God you helped me, for no sorrow could have been greater than mine—and no gratitude greater than mine.”

Well, that represents the kind of effect produced in a great number of cases, though not all are able to express themselves. I am not surprised that people who possess the knowledge wish to scatter their pearls broadcast, even though they themselves run the risk of being rent by the inappreciative. Perhaps this is a time when truth should be proclaimed from the

house-tops,—I do not know. One would have thought it a question eminently appropriate for the wisdom of the Church;¹ and probably that is why they have begun to discuss it in Congress. I trust they will have more knowledge when next they meet, and will remember not to forbid the performance of good works by those who do not belong to their own profession. Surely Luke ix. 50 has more valid authority than “Article XIII.”

I regret to have to comment adversely on a few passages in the Church Congress speeches which were intended to discredit our investigations in the past;—for instance about Mrs Piper’s “Control” Phinuit:—

“Professor Charles Richet made exhaustive enquiries and showed that [a person with a nick-name] Phinuit never existed in the flesh.”

This is contrary to logic. Enquiries would indeed be exhaustive and exhausting if they did more in the negative direction than fail to find evidence of the existence of any given person. One cannot prove non-existence.

Again one of the speakers claimed to quote authority for the statement that “Phinuit was a vulgar, inconsistent liar.” Well, he wasn’t; but it is a safe libel, no legal action can be taken. Up to his lights he was a friendly well-meaning rather rough and hasty but affectionate hardworking personality. I say this of him, as a personality, from actual acquaintance. I make no statement that he ever existed in his own person in the flesh: how that may be I do not know. The occurrence of secondary and multiple personalities is now recognised by medical authority, and is perhaps not quite unknown to general readers at the present day. Such personalities have characters of their own, and false witness should not be borne against them.

The above abusive sentence is said to be taken from an expository book by M. Sage, subsequently translated into English and called *Mrs Piper and the Society for Psychological Research*.

The book is not a firsthand authority, but it is fairly trustworthy. I know the book, and I challenge the reverend critic to find the sentence there. M. Sage has no high opinion of

¹ In passing, is it too much to ask the clergy—all who preach, of whatever denomination—to read the first half of an article in the last November number of *The Nineteenth Century*, called ‘Not through Eastern Windows only’? They will find therein serious and I think useful selections of what purport to be communications from ‘the other side,’ and might rid themselves of some misapprehensions.

Phinuit, whom he only knew from reports, but what I find in his book is the following:—

“What is Phinuit? Whence his name? Whence does he come? Should we believe that he is a disincarnated human spirit, as he himself obstinately affirms, or must we think him a secondary personality of Mrs Piper?”

“If he is a spirit, that spirit is not endowed with a love of truth, as we shall see, and on this point he too much resembles many of ourselves. In any case we may notice in passing the obstinacy of these controls in wishing to pass for disincarnated spirits; the fact is at least worthy of attention. . . .

“To return to Phinuit’s character. This doctor in the Beyond is not a bad fellow; on the contrary, he is very obliging and his chief desire is to please everybody. He repeats all he is asked to repeat, makes all the gestures suggested to him by the communicators in order that they may be recognised; even those of a little child. In his rather deep voice he sings to a weeping mother the nursery song or the lullaby which she sang to her sick child, if the song will serve as a proof of identity. I find at least one such case in Dr Hodgson’s report. The couplet sung was probably well known to Mrs Piper; it is a common one. But as this song had often been sung during her last illness by the child who was communicating, as it was the last song she sang upon earth, the coincidence is at least surprising.”

Quotations from rubbishy books about the effect of being “buried in salt” and such like, are only adduced in order to bring discredit on the subject. Rubbishy writings about Christianity and Astronomy and everything else may be quoted from, if it were worth while.

To proceed to more important matters. I find that some even enlightened speakers use the phrase “the heaven portrayed by Raymond”; but Raymond has not attempted to portray Heaven, he was only allowed there on a momentary visit. Surely a young engineer soldier, if suddenly transported to a condition where even saints might feel overwhelmed, would be blinded by excess of light. What he attempts to portray is only the sort of Paradise in which he and others live and work, helping their brethren and doing the jobs committed to them, as they did here.

It is the kind of Paradise associated in the mind of Christians with the penitent thief, one of the many regions of Hades which may have been visited by the Master during the Forty Days. I see nothing repulsive in the description—the flowers and the beauty of this rather earthly Paradise—nor anything uncongenial in its occupations. I am surprised that a London Vicar, even though he is eagerly anticipating the glories of Heaven as his own portion, could feel so great a repugnance to this intermediate state as to prefer Gehenna.

It is true that Raymond has reported how an occasional new-comer, fresh from the slaughter-pits of France, enters with erroneous and pitiful ideas,—that at first he may feel as if he ought to continue fighting, or, from habit, may call for unsuitable and preposterous refreshment;—but these new-comers, who have qualified in the school of sacrifice for treatment above what might seem their deserts, are said to be wisely and kindly dealt with; so that they soon settle down into a better understanding of their position, and before long are able to leave their residual cravings of the flesh behind. In one respect it would seem that the denizens of that home-like region are better off than we are here. They receive some of the ignorant and the undeveloped, it is true—those of them who have sacrificed their lives in a noble cause,—but they are not troubled with the vicious or the cruel or the besotted, as we are here. Those go to another place, another state of existence. Not hopelessly and for ever degraded, even there, not beyond the reach of redemption,—there is nothing that can properly be called Hell in the mediæval sense of eternal hopelessness; but yet Hell in very truth in so far as they suffer the pangs of remorse when their rebellious spirit is broken, and when in their felt poverty of soul they begin to long to return to the Father.

The stratified condition of society there is curious, for here we seek to break down strata in human society. But this is because our strata are artificial. The strata there are regulated by tastes and character, by real truth of personality, not by mere possessions or accidental accretion. Moreover the higher grades are accessible at times to the lower, for purposes of enlightenment—as our writers of great books are here,—we can all ascend to lofty human beings of the past, when we choose, though we seldom do. It would appear, moreover, that the lower grades are accessible to missionary effort on the part of those above them, as is also the case here. Indeed I might say far more to professed Christians, for does not the Apostle's Creed contain the strange clause, "He descended into

Hell"? This, like the phraseology of so many other traditional beliefs, can be interpreted in a luminous manner.

But it will be said,—what guarantee have we that the reports we get about life on the other side are true? The most convinced spiritualist can only say, None except that they are the statements of those already there; our friends explain that they are trying to convey their impression of things familiar to them as nearly as they can, to our apprehension: and what we get as the result of those efforts is unfortunately liable to be influenced by the training of the medium.

But how do we know that the information does even partially come from friends on the other side?

Well, now we are getting down to the real crux. Either it is so, or it is not. If it is not so, the sooner we devise some other explanatory theory for the dramatic semblance of these assertions, the better. But suppose communications do come from them sometimes. It is not an unreasonable hypothesis. It is the hypothesis to which I have been impelled after thirty years of study. Suppose the fact is true, and the information given not altogether unreliable; what should be the attitude of the Church?

I can imagine clerics saying, We prefer to walk by faith not by sight, we want no quack religion, we object to spurious forms of comfort, if the Church doctrines do not bring adequate comfort to bereaved people they had better go without such comfort than resort to unauthorised methods. Even if you profess yourselves as in harmony with real Christianity you are not in harmony with the Church's teaching, and we are bound by that.

Well, I fear they are: but it appears not to demand anything higher than an Act of Parliament to set them or their successors free.

They say they offer the Communion of Saints. But do they? That clause has been spoken of as "the lost Article of the Creed"; and surely Anglican teaching about the Last Things is in temporary abeyance. The subject is avoided. Terribly depressing doctrines, about repose in graves and fleshly resurrection at some long distant day, have obtruded themselves into the Burial Service and popular tradition and have obscured the sense of communion.

If ordained ministers were freed from saying or implying that they believe sundry things which they do not and cannot believe, what a blessing it would be, and how the Church would be strengthened by an influx of energetic and enthusi-

astic and conscientious youth! Even now the clergy do not have to say officially that they believe in the Resurrection of the Flesh. They inflict that mediæval absurdity on the laity, at Baptism and Confirmation and when they are sick: though individuals among them are probably already charitable enough to brave the threatenings of Tudor prefaces, to bethink themselves rather of Matt. xxiii. 4, and to modify the words.

Before concluding I must criticise in a friendly way, and solely for the removal of misapprehension, a few more quotations from the utterances of the more enlightened of the speakers at the Church Congress.

(a) "It is plainly easier to get in touch with foolish and frivolous than with deep and serious spirits."

It may be easier for foolish and frivolous persons to do so, but this is not the experience of ordinary sane and healthy people. In my correspondence with bereaved people there are many who pine to get into actual communication with their lost ones, if it be possible; and for those who show themselves sane and sensible I have been fortunately able to facilitate the process, if they were willing to take the necessary trouble and give the needful time. The outcome is that, every week, and indeed oftener, I manage to arrange so that a new bereaved person can go anonymously to a trustworthy medium; giving no name and not the slightest information. Their loved one almost invariably gets through; not because he is summoned—we cannot effectively summon him—but because he is eager and waiting to come. And most of these communicators, by little traits and special reminiscences, give striking proofs of identity. The longing to give help and comfort to those left behind is strong in these young fellows, whose interests and affections are still linked with earth. The bulk of evidence is overwhelming. Folly and frivolity have no place in these experiences.

(b) "There is the further question whether the higher and purer spirits desire to be called upon to communicate."

Is then the communion of saints a one-sided communion? Is it supposed to be limited to spirits who are not high and pure? Is prayer to meet with no response? Surely we have on record a statement of some authority that the Highest is "more ready to hear than we to pray, and is wont to give more than either we desire or deserve." If so, then, whatever may be the case with intermediate grades, sufficient eleva-

tion in the scale of existence does not seem likely to render the comparatively lofty ones less accessible to the needs of sorrowing humanity.

Then comes a strange assertion:—

(c) “Certainly few communications have come from convinced Christians to convinced Christians.”

What on earth can be the foundation for this statement? I do not know. If by “convinced Christians” are meant Churchmen, and if Churchmen refrain from giving opportunity for communication because they are forbidden by the Church, then the statement may be true. But certainly, if we understand the words in their ordinary significance, the assertion agrees with nothing in my experience. If the Church, or any branch of the Church, forbids prayer for the dead, it doubtless is understood to forbid communication likewise. If the condition of the dead is either exaltation into the presence of God or else degradation into association with devils, we may well feel afraid and ashamed to disturb them. In the latter case indeed the fear of hearing from them may be intense! The attitude of the Church to the dead—at least in its teaching to the laity,—is still largely influenced by these strange and antiquated beliefs.

If the truth be (as it certainly is) that death makes no sudden change in personality or character,—if existence is continuous, and only the surrounding conditions change—even that change being, in the ordinary case of neither lofty saint nor degraded sinner, not nearly so great or revolutionary as had been anticipated,—there is nothing specially holy, or profoundly painful, no, nor even unduly solemn, in the thought of communicating with a lost and loved one. It may be difficult. It might have been impossible. That is a question of fact. In the primitive stages of the human race communication across the ocean would have seemed impossible. America was an undiscovered country; and, long after it was discovered, no cable was laid. But under proper conditions even ordinary speech over the Atlantic can be accomplished now. The miracle of one generation becomes the commonplace of the next. We of this and the preceding generation find, that by the kindly help of living persons possessing a certain faculty, the lack of material organism is no absolute bar to communication. *A physiological instrument is necessary, but it need not be owned, it may be borrowed.* The whole thing will seem simple enough when understood. The instrument should be protected, not persecuted.

Dogmatically negative certainty can make good people very bigoted and rather cruel. The spirit of the inquisition is not yet dead. If communication is feasible, no Church has a right to forbid it, any more than it forbids an emigrant in a new country to make use of such means of correspondence with those at home as the progress of engineering has made available.

I observe that one speaker at the Congress succeeded in making capital out of what he uncharitably calls an "admission" of mine, viz. that the stress and urgency of Raymond's need to communicate subsided after identity had been proved and family conviction had been attained, so that now communications from him were for the most part easy and chatty like an occasional letter home. It was not an admission, it was a statement; made, as I hope all my statements are made, with the sincere object of presenting the truth, whatever it may be. I see nothing in it but what is perfectly natural; and I may now take the opportunity of supplementing that statement by adducing an exception. The exception is when anything of importance is happening or likely to happen in the family, with whose doings Raymond still keeps in close touch. Then he indicates a desire that we shall give him an early opportunity of speaking.

Our friends on the other side are not far from us; they are removed from the range of our animal sense-organs, that is all. They appear to be less limited than we are. Love bridges the apparent chasm, and they are more in touch with us, more aware of our troubles and joys, than we can well imagine without special knowledge. Whether or not they succeed in piercing the veil of tradition which obscures the unity and obstructs the sense of communion, we are still all one family. They and we together are still unworthy servants of the Most High God. They and we together are striving, with our poor best, to do our duty in that state of existence to which we have been called. They and we together have been blessed by links of affection, which are not earthly alone, or temporary, but divinely ordained and permanent. We feel unable to live out our life here, in its fulness, without some friendly intercourse with those on the other side; neither can they be made perfect apart from us, *et non sine nobis consummarentur*.

OLIVER J. LODGE.

BIRMINGHAM.

LIFE AND DEATH: CONSIDERATIONS ON A POEM OF THOMAS HARDY.

T. W. ROLLESTON.

POETRY has many aspects, besides that which is distinguished as literary or æsthetic. An eminent critic and poet has called it "the conscience of mankind." It is the imaginative and emotional record of man's deepest thoughts, his feelings, his whole attitude towards the world; and it brings to light things which the intellect, speaking to intellect, never allows to appear. I am not, in this essay, dealing with a piece of literary art as such. I have chosen the poem which I am about to quote in full because when I first read it, it seemed with more than usual stringency to compel thought on the subject which it sets before us. That subject is my real theme. The poem is entitled, "During Wind and Rain," and appears in Hardy's last volume, *Moments of Vision*:

"They sing their dearest songs—
He, she, all of them—yea,
Treble and tenor and bass,
And one to play;
With the candles mooning each face . .
Ah, no; the years O!

How the sick leaves reel down in throngs!

They clear the creeping moss—
Elders and juniors—yea,
Making the pathways neat
And the garden gay;
And they build a shady seat . . .
Ah, no; the years O!

See, the webbed white stormbirds wing across.

They are blithely breakfasting all—
Men and maidens—yea,
Under the summer tree,
With a glimpse of the bay,
While pet birds come to the knee . . .
Ah, no; the years O!

And the rotten rose is ript from the wall.

They change to a high new house,
 He, she, all of them, yea,
 Clocks and carpets, and chairs
 On the lawn all day,
 And brightest things that are theirs . . .
 Ah, no; the years O!
 Down their chiselled names the rain-drop ploughs."

That is the poem. In its plain, unadorned way, with its precise and biting realism, it evokes an image terrible in its meaning and in the intensity with which that meaning is conveyed. Out of what everyday materials has the poet here distilled what we may truly call a world-tragedy in four stanzas! We are shown a picture, or successive pictures, of happy, wholesome domestic life—not the life of people of whom the world has ever heard, or who by great sacrifices, great battlings, passions, or victories might be thought to have made life indemnify them for the dishonour of death. There is *nothing* in the scale against oblivion; just the ordinary gaieties, innocent excitements, tender little charms and refinements common to millions of such families—and all ending in that vision of the lonely tombstone in the rain. The poem is just one example—I might have chosen among many others, but I know none more poignant—of the poetic expression of the universal tragedy of death. Always against this dark background, conceived in the vein of horror or of pathos, of bitter mockery or of desolating grief, Art has painted for us the brilliance of the world.

This instinctive feeling about death seems to demand that we should probe and analyse it, for it stands in signal contrast with the declarations of another world-wide instinct—that of Religion. It not only contrasts with the latter, but it seems to conquer it, for it appears as if there were really very few people who genuinely, and with real as opposed to formal assent, believe the comfortable tidings which religion has to tell of the world beyond the grave. In Mr Hichens' last novel, a woman who has lost her only son in the war, and who is herself smitten with a fatal disease, is being comforted by her religious sister. "Darling, I want you to live," says the sister; "but if that may not be, I hope you will share the glory with poor Ronald." The mother replies: "If you think Ronald is in glory, how can you call him poor?" and she reflects bitterly that good Christians seem to have a great aversion for death. It is above all in the literature of Christendom that this aversion has found most abundant expression. We recall the fearful portrayal of the other world

given us by Shakespeare in *Hamlet* and *Measure for Measure*. That these descriptions embodied the considered theology of Shakespeare is most improbable. They were, no doubt, merely a way of giving definiteness to the vague horror of death. We do not, indeed, know what Shakespeare's theology was; but let us take a modern writer whose opinion, or at least whose formal creed, we really do know. We know Wordsworth's theology; but it was not out of his theology, it was out of his heart, that he wrote the sonnet:

“ Surprised by joy, impatient as the wind
I turned to share the transport—O with whom
But thee, deep buried in the silent tomb,
That spot which no vicissitude can find.

. . . That thought's return
Was the worst pang that sorrow ever bore
Save one, one only, when I stood forlorn
Knowing my heart's best treasure was no more—
That neither present time nor years unborn
Could to my sight that heavenly face restore.”

Alexander Pope, no eighteenth-century sceptic but a sincere Roman Catholic, wrote of a lost friend:

“ How lov'd, how valued once avails thee not,
To whom related or by whom begot;
A heap of dust alone remains of thee,
'Tis all thou art, and all the proud shall be.”

Herrick, in one of his gayest poems, “On Corinna's going a-Maying,” breaks out at the thought of death into a cry of dismay:

“ Come, let us go, while we are in our prime,
And take the harmless folly of the time!
We shall grow old apace, and die
Before we know our liberty—
So, when you and I are made
A fable, song or fleeting shade,
All love, all liking, all delight
Lies drowned with us in endless night
Then while Time serves, and we are but decaying,
Come, my Corinna, come, let's go a-Maying.”

It is as if, in tracking the course of a little stream in a flowery dell, one saw it suddenly vanish without a sound into the black mouth of a fathomless abyss.

We know also Christina Rossetti's theology, and no one ever held a sincerer faith; but she has written many terrible

verses about death ; as when she evokes the spirit of a dead man calling his love from the arms of her bridegroom :

“ To see one much more fair
 Fill up the vacant chair,
 Fill his heart, his children bear ;
 While thou and I together
 In the outcast weather
 Toss and howl and spin.”

Or, again, when she wrote of a beautiful woman :

“ Whether she flush in love’s summer
 Or in its winter grow pale,
 Whether she flaunt her beauty
 Or hide it away in a veil,
 Be she red or white,
 And stand she erect or bowed,
 Time will win the race he runs with her,
 And hide her away in a shroud.”

Archbishop Trench has written a noble and well-known quatrain on death :

“ Where thou hast touched, O wondrous Death,
 Where thou hast come between—
 O there forever perisheth
 The common and the mean.”

The common and the mean, but not the tragic and the mournful ; for he writes like Wordsworth of a great loss :

“ Half unbelieving doth my heart remain
 Of its great woe ;
 I waken, and a dull, dead sense of pain
 Is all I know.

Then dimly in the darkness of my mind
 I feel about
 To know what ’tis that troubles me, and find
 My sorrow out.

And hardly with long pains my heart I bring
 Its loss to own,
 Still seems it so impossible a thing
 That thou art gone.”

These are not the words, this is not the natural sentiment, of a man who genuinely believes that one whom he has loved and revered, and lost, has only stepped a little before him into a realm of keener life and deeper happiness.

Direct philosophic denials of immortality such as we find

in Catullus or in the Greek Anthology¹ are not common in later literature, except, of course, in utterances like Swinburne's "Garden of Proserpine," which I take to be merely a youthful pose of revolt. But this by Eugene Lee-Hamilton is both fine and sincere :

"The hollow sea-shell that for years hath stood
On dusty shelves, when held against the ear
Proclaims its stormy parent ; and we hear
The faint far murmur of the breaking flood.
We hear the sea. . . . The sea ? It is the blood
In our own veins, impetuous and near,
And pulses keeping pace with hope and fear,
And with our feelings' every shifting mood !

Lo, in my heart I hear, as in a shell,
The murmur of a world beyond the grave—
Distinct, distinct, though faint and far it be.
Thou fool ! this echo is a cheat as well ;
The hum of earthly instincts ; and we crave
A world unreal as the shell-heard sea."²

I need not multiply these quotations : parallel passages will no doubt occur to many readers. I know, of course, that some of the poets I quote, and many others, have also put into verse the optimistic teachings of their formal theology. Yet in spite of this, in defiance of it, this cry of dismay, sometimes of despair, continually breaks through, and turns the hymn of praise and faith into a wail.

At what is it, then, that we are dismayed ? Hamlet tried to analyse the sentiment. It is not death, he concludes ; death in itself is nothing—it is the dread of the undiscovered country which may lie beyond it that daunts us when we have to look death in the face. If Shakespeare really meant this, and is not merely showing us Hamlet fencing with his own shadow, it seems to me very bad psychology. An undiscovered country—surely that in itself is not a terror but a lure ! An Elizabethan of all men might have understood that. It is one of the most melancholy results of successful exploration that no undiscovered countries are left us—that never again in the

¹ Οὐκ ἤμην, γενόμην, ἤμην, οὐκ εἰμι · τοσαῦτα.
Εἰ δ' ἄλλως τις ἐρεῖ, ψεύσεται, οὐκ ἔσομαι.

² The writer of these beautiful verses suffered from a torturing disease, and spent twenty years on a bed of torment. The sonnet may stand with other things that have been finely said by Landor, Wordsworth, Yeats, on the sea-shell and its murmuring echo. But it is bad reasoning, for the sea is no illusion, and the shell only reminds us of it because we know from other sources that it exists. Even so the "murmurs of a world beyond the grave" really tell us of a spiritual life of which man has had a profound experience.

world's history will any Cortes stand upon a peak in Darien and gaze on a boundless ocean never furrowed by the keels of men. No—it is the dread that there may be no country at all—that the brief and dreadful saying of Catullus may be true :

“ Soles occidere et redire possunt,
At nobis, cum semel occidit brevis lux,
Nox est perpetua una dormienda.”

It is commonly and, I think, very justly felt that if this be true, it is a truth which poisons the whole of life. If this earthly life is the end of everything, it never was worth while to have begun it, and love, truth, duty, and sacrifice are empty names. Yet man, however his passions may sway him, whatever his observation and intelligence may try to persuade him, is darkly but invincibly assured that there is a mysterious something that makes right right and wrong wrong in the teeth of every visible sign that right may mean failure and wrong success. There are, he is convinced, in those wonderful words of Sophocles, “ laws that have established holy purity of word and deed ; exalted laws that had their birth in the skies, of which Heaven alone is the father ; nor did the race of mortal men beget them, nor shall oblivion ever put them to sleep, for a mighty God is in them, and groweth not old.” These laws, it is felt, have values which lie outside the visible order of the world ; but these values are not always evident here, and so far as they are evident they would all finally disappear if the visible order came to an end. Man therefore, it is urged by theologians, must, in order to safeguard his moral life, add to the mere savage belief in ghosts, offspring of the terror-haunted jungle, the conception of a future life as an eternal continuance of this, under such conditions as each of us has earned by his own work and worth. Man on the whole has obeyed ; yet still he doubts, and we witness the singular phenomenon, side by side through all the history of the human spirit, of two distinct currents of thought and sentiment, each of them logically fatal to the other, yet each persisting even in the same human breast. On the one side we cling to the conception of immortality because it seems the only justification of the sacrifices and heroisms, the only consolation for the frustrations of earthly life ; on the other, since there is no direct evidence of this future life (apart from spiritistic phenomena, apparitions, etc., which I do not find convincing), while the evidences of mortality and of the supremacy of matter encounter us wherever we look, man never can rid himself of the sense of awe and uncertainty regarding death—he

instinctively recoils from the tomb, however fervently he may try to believe it the gateway to heaven.

Illogical as this attitude may be, it is curiously right in its practical results. If a philosopher had it in his power to endow mankind with what he considered to be the most desirable kind of belief and feeling about death, could he do better than this? It is true that he never would do it! We, with our precise logical intellects, would work out some neat philosophic system and shut up the human mind within its firmly traced boundaries. *We* should never think of setting it in a continual state of oscillation between faith and doubt. And yet it is from this very indetermination that all the glory, the tragic beauty, the eternal awe and indefinable mystery of life and poetry are derived. The anguish of bereavement, the pathos of frustration, the ardour of service, the summons of duty and self-sacrifice—these are the experiences that enrich and fertilise, that deepen and exalt the spirit of man, and evoke its noblest activities. Terribly deep they plough, but they are for ever bringing new soil to the surface and making it quick and fertile—for what mysterious harvest? But all this depends on the conviction that death is really tragic, and is something quite different from stepping a little before one's companions into a world very much like the best of this with all its plagues and hindrances abolished. Yet to say that it is tragic is not to say that it means extinction and nothingness—on the contrary, it seems to preclude that: there is no tragedy when a finite existence has reached the end involved in the law of its being. The fall of a leaf is not tragic: the tragic element appears when Homer says: "Like unto the leaves of the forest, so are the generations of man."

What then is the real significance of death? Is it possible to find in human language and with our limited conceptions any adequate answer to this great question? All those religions of the world which make any pretence to a philosophic and ethical conception of immortality have attempted, often in much detail, to supply such an answer. With one important exception, all of them agree on two points: first, they confine immortality to human beings; secondly, they represent this life as a period of probation and trial—the only such period which man is to enjoy. Death finally closes his account; the divine judgment then at once and for ever assigns his place of reward or punishment for all eternity. So it was in ancient Egypt, so in Greece, so in Christianity, so in modern Judaism, so in Islam. Yet I do not see how either of these conceptions can stand a moment's critical examination. As regards the first,

the restriction of immortality to mankind, we have now learned to regard life as an unbroken chain of gradual ascent from the earliest speck of living protoplasm, of which we cannot say whether it is animal or vegetable, up to man; and although there is still an unbridged gap between inorganic matter and the lowest organism, it is a gap which is constantly being narrowed, and I have no doubt that we have to do merely with an apparent not a real break of continuity.¹ At what point, then, can we say that there began to be a spirit as distinct from a body, and when did this spirit become endowed with the capacity of persisting when the physical organism was dissolved? Was the Piltdown man immortal? Were his half-simian remains committed to the Pliocene gravel-drift 500,000 years ago "in the sure and certain hope of a joyful resurrection"? When, indeed, in the life-history of any individual did he become endowed with this tremendous gift—and burden? Is the new-born infant an immortal soul? Is the infant on the eve of birth immortal? or when it began in a microscopic germ? When one probes the matter one sees at once, I think, that this conception of an exclusive immortality for man will not work in any natural system, and I am considering only such systems here. It will not work, because immortality is not a condition which can be evolved. One cannot be a little immortal, and then a little more, and finally quite immortal. It must have come all at once and altogether—and one cannot lay one's finger on any stage in the history either of the individual or the race when this vast and sudden change can be rationally conceived to have taken place.

And the conception of a Judgment Day whose sentence is perfected and irrevocable (even if not actually carried out) at death is evidently a fairy-tale of the world's childhood. Is a man's eternal destiny to be decided in one way because he died in an accident at twenty, when it might have been wholly different if he had lived to forty? If such a notion were true, surely the most reasonable and merciful thing we could do would be to put to death every infant before it had a chance of imperilling its soul's weal.

But there is, as I said, one of the great religions, numerically the greatest of all, which does not conform to these puerile imaginations of the nature of death and judgment. Here Buddhism alone has worked out a thoroughly philosophic and rational creed. According to Buddhist ideas, the judgment is always in progress—each day is the judgment

¹ As will be seen later, I do not interpret continuity as a mechanical chain of cause and effect.

day. The whole life of a man, both his inmost thoughts and his outward actions, constitute what is called his "Karma," and the Karma builds up gradually his new personality, which after death gravitates automatically to the state of life for which it is fitted. It leaves conscious memory behind it when it parts from the body, but the results of its actions remain. If you live like a swine in this world, you will be a swine or something like it in the next, but not for eternity: the ever-revolving Wheel of Life continually presents new opportunities, and on this Wheel not only man but every living thing is constantly ascending or descending. But from the Wheel itself there is a way of escape. The spirit, when purified by long trials and sufferings, ennobled by love and sacrifice, and enlightened by ages of experience, can quit for ever the world of change and unrest, and enter into Nirvana—a conception for which there appears to be no term in any Western language, for it is not annihilation, nor is it existence as we understand existence: the nearest description that we can give of it is, I suppose, to say that it means a complete absorption in the ultimate Reality. To my mind this is the most satisfying and most rational view of what we may call the mechanism of the future life which has ever been framed by man. It makes all other speculations look childish, and if we are to define at all the conditions of survival after death, I think we might say in the wise words of Socrates in the *Phædo*, "If this is not the exact truth, it is at any rate something very like it." Ibsen has embodied the whole scheme in one pregnant sentence: "Man's work is his soul."

But now the question arises, *Can* we define this mechanism? And if not, the further question remains to be answered, Is there any sense in which we can speak of the survival of the spirit after the death of the body as a reasonable expectation of man?

To the first of these questions I think we must say No. Poetry and symbolism may try—for that is one of their true functions—to express the essential meaning of a dimly apprehended reality, but in philosophic discussion I cannot see how human experience, and the language which has grown out of that experience, can be competent to describe the conditions of an existence divorced from our present bodily organisms.

But the question whether we are to exist at all, whether anything whatever would be left of man and his works and thoughts if this planet were dashed to pieces in some cosmic catastrophe such as we have sometimes actually witnessed

in the skies—this question of questions is not so easily disposed of.

Let us, to begin with, consider the course of world-development as science has laid it open before us. First, as far back as we can penetrate in our research, we find the atom; not an indivisible particle as we used to suppose it, but a complicated structure of balanced forces in violent activity. It holds together in obedience to some law or tendency of which we know nothing, but its unity is not absolute and unbreakable; the phenomenon of which radium offers the most conspicuous example is common to all forms of matter; the atom can and often does part with one or more of its elements, and then as an atom of that particular kind it dies—that is to say, it changes into something else. In the next stage we find atoms combining into molecules which exhibit exactly the same union of the tendency to maintain themselves with subjection to forces of disintegration and change. Next, under conditions at present obscure, we find molecules combining to form living organisms, each of which combines the same resistance to dissolution with the same capacity for suffering it. But two new faculties have now appeared on the scene—the living organism is *adaptable*; it maintains itself better and more obstinately than any aggregate of inorganic matter: strike off a piece from a rock and it remains as the blow left it, but cut off a ray from a starfish and it will grow a new one. Secondly, the living organism seeks not only to maintain but to multiply itself; it has the instinct and capacity for reproduction. At a higher stage we have not only the instinct for self-maintenance and the instinct for reproduction, but the instinct of the flock for mutual protection and help, and the mother-instinct for the care and nourishment of the helpless young. In mankind we have seen this flock-instinct growing deeper, wider, more conscious. We have seen it extend from the family to the tribe, the tribe to the nation, the nation to the whole of mankind, and even to an affectionate concern and care for all living things. But we have seen something more than this, something that science could never have predicted. We have seen the emergence of a conscious spiritual energy which has nothing to do with the life of the body. We have seen the primal instinct for self-maintenance transferred from the physical organism to the spirit—we have seen men and women scorn the body and deliver it to death and agony rather than be false to a creed or betray a cause. And this is also self-maintenance; only now the spiritual energy is

deemed more worthy of maintenance in its purity and fullness than the physical organism. In the spirit we find our deepest self—through it we seem to become aware of the Power by which the whole universe subsists and grows, which is partly in us and partly outside us, and which has supreme claims upon us whenever its call is heard. We call this Power the Universe when we are talking science; we call it Reality when we are talking philosophy; when we are talking religion, we call it God.

From this outline, brief and crude, but not, I think, disputable as matter of fact, two conclusions seem to arise. First, we have clearly here to do with no chain of blind mechanical causation. It is amazing how some thinkers, in their just horror of superstition, contrive to persuade themselves that in evolution, physical or ethical, you can somehow get more out of the end of a chain of mechanical force than you put in at the beginning—without taking it in from some other source upon the way. John Stuart Mill thought that the conception of duty and the moral law—those laws which Sophocles thought had their birth in the skies—could be simply derived from associations of pleasure or pain attached to various actions by rewards and punishments in early life. Herbert Spencer saw that this would not quite do, but thought he could get over the difficulty by making the rewards and punishments antenatal. But neither explanation will do, for the same reason that we cannot produce a perpetual-motion machine. What is lacking to these philosophers and to all of their school (when reasoning as philosophers) is a vital perception of the matter with which they are dealing. No amount of juggling with the laws of association or of heredity can get more out of pleasures and pains than the idea of pleasure or pain. There is no physico-chemical sequence of cause and effect by which you can begin with the microbe and end with the martyr. Reality is not a branch of mathematics or of physics, nor a concrete aspect of formal logic. Formulas help us to a certain limited extent to make use of it, but it is not to be comprehended as a whole in any formula: one might as well try to get the Atlantic into a test-tube. It is something incalculable, dynamic and alive. It is apprehended by us as a vast unfolding of cosmic energy. What we used to think of as "dead" matter is only one of the forms of this energy, and for us it culminates in the spirit of man.

Can we now, from this standpoint, suppose that the hero and the martyr who have sacrificed the body for the spirit really end in destroying both? Is this what we have come

to? Has the Power which has somehow urged the long ascent of life up to this height only done so in order, at the end, to push it off into an abyss of nothingness? I do not wish to be deluded by false hopes, but this seems to me totally incredible. The creature of an hour could have no thoughts beyond the hour: the journey of the time-spirit could hardly have been begun in order to find its asses, and end by discovering a kingdom—which wasn't there! To suppose that a high spiritual energy such as the world has seen embodied in a Joan of Arc, or a St Francis of Assisi, or a Florence Nightingale goes clean out of existence like a blown-out candle-flame when the organism through which it expressed itself is dissolved, is a conception which I should think only possible to minds which have never had any vision of reality, or which have closed their eyes to it when they began to reason—as if reason, to be right in the end, does not absolutely depend on a true vision of the beginning.

Therefore to the second of the questions which we set out to answer, if we could, I believe we may assuredly say Yes. Spirit is a part of reality, and there is no reason whatever to suppose that it is dependent for its existence on any particular form of matter, while matter itself is only apprehensible as one of the forms of cosmic energy.

But when we come to consider the conditions under which survival may take place, we are on much more difficult ground. For my own part, I find it impossible to believe that matter or spirit or any of the phases of them ever really die at all. I cannot believe in a universe which every instant leaps out of nothingness into existence and is immediately swallowed up in nothingness again. But here precise language fails us, for we cannot gain any point from which we can observe the universe as it were from outside, and as a whole. We can only speak in similitudes. All mythologies are such similitudes, and among them that of the old Norsemen who conceived the universe under the aspect of a Tree, the World-Tree Ygdrasil,¹ seems to me profoundly suggestive. Suppose there were a consciousness at every growing tip of such a tree, this consciousness would only be directly aware of what went on at that tip, though much might be inferred as to the past of the tree. That past would seem to be dead and gone. But an outside observer would know that it was still very much alive, was constantly growing

¹ Which we unconsciously venerate every Christmas, hanging candles in it to represent the stars, and gifts to signify the abundance and fertility of Nature.

and developing in its own way, and was as necessary to the growing tip as the tip was to the tree as a whole.

There is much more than this in the Ygdrasil symbol, but this is enough for our present purposes.

But the question which is just now pressing so hard for an answer, the question of reunion after death with those whom we have loved and who have gone before—the question whether we carry over our personal identity, memory, affections,—this, I admit, is not to be solved by any similitudes nor by appeals to the moral law of the universe. I recall a wise saying of one of the greatest of spiritual teachers, Æschylus: “Do not dictate to the Gods.” Seeing what the endowments of humanity are, we may regard human life as an attempt to express and to make prevail some greatness, some beauty, some sweetness or nobility of character, or even, it may be, to provide the everyday conditions out of which alone these qualities can arise, and in which they must subsist. The attempt may issue in distortion and failure, or it may be frustrated by an early death, or it may gloriously succeed; but in any case the tragic solemnity of death lies just in this, that so far as we can see it closes that effort, that particular movement of the life-impulse for ever: never again will it be made in precisely the same form. I say, “so far as we can see”; I do not want to “dictate to the Gods” in any direction. I am satisfied that whatever we have made, whatever we have been, even to our inmost unspoken thought, remains a part of the texture of the universe. If two souls have loved each other here, that love has enriched the universe for ever, and will work there for ever. For the rest, there is a veil which we cannot and must not lift. It is better so. The idea that there is a future life which is to this merely what to-morrow is to to-day would, if it were genuinely believed—which it never is—destroy the value of this life as much as if we believed that there were no to-morrow at all. How many of the noblest elements of this life are due precisely to our deep sense of its unique value! We have the strange paradox that this precious thing must often be risked or even deliberately sacrificed in order to save it. But we are never to part with it except to save the lives of others, or our own spiritual life. To cling tenaciously to life in whatever form of it one finds oneself to be, is the very law by which things are what they are, and by which they become better. It is right that the divine secret of the grave should be impenetrable to earthly eyes. Christianity, in a thousand utterances of infinite tenderness, has warned us that the passion for the individual must not blind us

to the claims of the Power which embraces all, and which gave us the very faculty of loving. *That* remains; in that is the whole of life; and in saying with Dante, "In His will is our peace," or, with Epictetus in another idiom, "Whatsoever seems good to thee, O Universe, seems good to me," thus and thus only we can truly reach beyond the grave into the region where our departed are.

In the foregoing study I have, I believe, sincerely tried to see things as they are, and not to impose on the scheme of the world any fancies of my own. The result, I admit, is inconclusive as regards the point, I will not say of greatest importance, but the point about which man's hopes and longings are most deeply stirred. But I have tried also to show that this very inconclusiveness, this impenetrable veil, is a part of the scheme; that we have at present no intellectual faculty by which we could hope to understand what we should see if the veil were lifted, nor language in which to describe it, and that to know all, as the spiritists, for instance, or the Churches, profess to know, would alter our relations to this life so profoundly that we should (it is not too much to say) *cease to be men* before we were fitted in ourselves or in our circumstances to be anything else. And I am content to be a man—but I interpret the word as Sir Thomas Browne did in perhaps the loftiest utterance ever penned on the subject:

"Thus we are men, and we know not how; there is something in us that can be without us and will be after us, though it is strange that it hath no history what it was before us, nor cannot tell how it entered in us.

"There is surely a piece of Divinity in us, something that was before the Elements and owes no homage unto the Sun."

T. W. ROLLESTON.

LONDON.

THE ETERNAL LIFE OF LOVE.

J. R. MOZLEY,

Author of *The Divine Aspect of History*.

THERE are those who do not believe in God ; and there are those who do not believe in a future life. But it is very difficult to argue on such subjects with a view to convincing an opponent. What is wanted is a clear knowledge of the mind of the person with whom one is arguing ; and it is hard to obtain clear knowledge of the mind of another. Indeed, it is not easy to obtain a clear knowledge of one's own mind, or of the history of one's own desires and thoughts. Yet this latter task has been attempted by some of the most famous writers whom the world has ever seen, and not without benefit to mankind.

Now, when we look back through the generations of the past, we are sensible that there have been persons, living in many different generations, who have carried on the same sequence of thought ; and when I say the same sequence, I do not deny differences in the individuals who have carried it on ; there ought to be expansion if the sequence of thought rests on a true basis.

Such expansion there has been in the conception of a future life ; we who at the present day believe in a future life cannot believe exactly what our ancestors believed one thousand, or two thousand, or three thousand years ago. Science and history alike are now surveyed with different eyes from those with which they were regarded by former generations ; it cannot but be that religion has, in its external appearance, changed also. Yet the science of the present day recognises Euclid and Archimedes as originators of science ; and the history of the present day acknowledges Thucydides as an originator of true historical narrative ; the ethics of the present

day will acknowledge that in many ancient nations true precepts of morality were propagated; and similarly the religion of the present day will confess that a thread of true identity, amid much that is diverse, unites it with the religion of times long past.

I propose to show how this sequence holds in regard to the belief in a future life; explaining the beliefs of many generations as having true kinship, as being parts of one and the same sequence, in spite of much dissimilarity; endeavouring, too, to show that that defect of proof, which belongs to the conception at the present day, is one that admits of being removed by the experiences of the future. It will appear, I think, that future life is adequately interpreted as eternal life, and not otherwise; and that the universe has as its heart an eternally expansive life.

I suppose that the most ancient known conception of a future life is that which we find in ancient Egypt; but I am unable to trace in it any connexion with the sequence which I am explaining. The Homeric idea, dismal as it is, has some connexion. In the *Odyssey* we find good and bad, after death, involved in one common misery; without suffering acute pain, they are yet more hopeless than the meanest peasant on earth; there is, perhaps, a shade of comfort in the fact that their personality is not destroyed. The most ancient Hebrew or Biblical conception of futurity is milder than what we find in Homer, but is of the same kind; the dead are wholly unconscious, though capable of being roused from that unconsciousness, as we see by the story of the witch of Endor; and the words of Samuel in that story show that the righteous and the wicked, after death, are not distinguished. The same kind of view is frequent in the Psalms; for instance, one psalmist addresses God thus:—

“Wilt thou show wonders to the dead? shall the shades arise and praise thee? Shall thy lovingkindness be declared in the grave? or thy faithfulness in destruction?”—Psalm lxxxviii. 10, 11.

Or again, in similar words, in another psalm:—

“What profit is there in my blood, when I go down to the pit? Shall the dust praise thee? shall it declare thy truth?”—Psalm xxx. 9.

Yet, side by side with lamentations like these, the Psalms contain another and widely different teaching, in which the doctrine of a glorious immortality for the faithful soul unmistakably appears; for instance:—

“Thou wilt show me the path of life: in thy presence is

fulness of joy; in thy right hand there are pleasures for evermore.”—Psalm xvi. 11.

And even more remarkably in the following:—

“Thou shalt guide me with thy counsel, and afterward receive me to glory. Whom have I in heaven but thee? and there is none upon earth that I desire beside thee. My flesh and my heart faileth; but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever.”—Psalm lxxiii. 24–26.

Is it not a most remarkable fact that in the same book of the Bible, although a book composed by many different authors, views should be expressed in such pointed antagonism to each other, respecting the future which awaits men after death? It may be thought that the authors of these respective psalms lived in centuries widely distant. But there is no other sign that they did so; the fervour, the uniqueness of the religious belief, and also the feeling of being surrounded by venomous adversaries, is common to the whole series of psalms. Also another feeling pervades the whole of them—the acknowledgment that the race of Israel have sinned against God, balanced by a claim that they are now repentant and in the right way. These signs suit one period, and one period only—the long period of struggle after the Babylonian captivity, during which the Jews were regaining their ancient land, and Jerusalem, their ancient capital. Was there anything in that long period to explain a change of belief in their minds respecting this important point of religion? Yes, there was.

During the whole period of the Babylonian captivity the religion of Zoroaster was dominant in the regions which extended from Media southwards towards Babylonia, eastwards towards Bactria and the confines of India. I myself believe that that was the period of the first overflowing force of the Zoroastrian religion¹—not of course of the Magian religion, which had existed possibly for centuries before. But Zoroaster stood out from the Magi, to whom he belonged by birth, by the extraordinary force of his trust in God (Ahura Mazda, in his nomenclature), by his confident belief in immortality and in a righteous judgment of men by God. Immortality had in a certain degree been conceived by the Magians; but Zoroaster, by his intense belief in righteousness, added a new force to the conception. It is no unreasonable thought that the northern

¹ I have endeavoured to vindicate this date for Zoroaster in a work published for me a few years ago by the Cambridge University Press, *The Divine Aspect of History*; and I may refer to the same work for proof of the date of the psalms. (The fourth and fourteenth chapters are those in which these subjects respectively are discussed.)

Israelites, many of whom were in Media in the seventh and sixth centuries before Christ, imparted to Zoroaster that sense of the righteousness of God which was so profound in the whole race of Israel. But if it were so, he repaid the obligation by extending the view of mankind beyond their present narrow life to a more glorious future; this was essentially his doctrine, and how much Judaism, and after Judaism Christianity, owes to him has never yet been adequately acknowledged. This doctrine of a glorious immortality is likely to have reached the Jews through the northern Israelites (for the two branches of the race of Israel were at that time by no means wholly separated); but we cannot suppose that Zoroastrianism was wholly excluded from Babylonia (whither the original Magianism, the parent of Mithraism,¹ had penetrated in great strength), and it may have reached the Jews in this way also.

Whatever the method by which the Zoroastrian doctrine of a future divine judgment, and of a glorious immortality for the righteous, came to be absorbed by the hearts and consciences of the Jews in Babylonia, it can hardly be doubted that it was so absorbed, at least by many of them. By many, not by all; and it is an evidence that the doctrine was received by them from without, and not developed from within, that many of them did not receive it. For instance, the author of that notable book, *Ecclesiasticus*, written in the second or third century before Christ, appears not to have accepted it; and the New Testament tells us that the Sadducees, who more than any others were the official class among the Jews at the time of Christ, did not accept it. But it is a doctrine deeply involved in those wonderful chapters which form the close of the book called by us the *Book of Isaiah*, written (as we see by their contents) at the very beginning of the return of the Jews from Babylonia; it can hardly be doubted that it was received by the prophet Malachi, though he lays more stress on the future divine judgment than on personal immortality; and the *Book of Daniel*, written in the second century before Christ, brings into one focus many different provinces of human thought: history, mingled no doubt with fiction, but still very seriously and wisely conceived in its essential character; the divine judgment of the future, operating upon nations and upon individuals; and as regards nations, the pre-eminence of Israel is affirmed, yet not in any rigid manner;

¹ The mutual independence of Zoroastrianism and Mithraism, though both springing from the common source of Magianism, is affirmed and vindicated by Cumont in his great work *Textes et Monuments Figurés relatifs aux Mystères de Mithra*, vol. i. p. 11.

as regards individuals, we cannot forget that in the seventh chapter it is "one like unto a son of man" who receives dominion; and in the twelfth chapter, when it is said that "many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake," it is plain that individual persons are meant.

I am coming to Christianity, the greatest seed-ground of the doctrine of immortality in modern times; but before doing so, it must be remarked that the doctrine of Zoroaster had penetrated, as we must judge, into Greek thought about the very same time that it was penetrating into Jewish thought. It was in the sixth century before Christ that the Orphic societies, the Eleusinian mysteries, and the Pythagorean brotherhoods first assumed prominence; and in all of these a doctrine was taught which brought in a future life and rewards and punishments therein, to be accorded to good and bad respectively. The great poet, Pindar, in his second Olympic ode, enunciates this as the conclusion to which the destinies of man lead him; and very solemnly he writes. Socrates, in his last moments, at the dividing-point of the fifth and fourth centuries, accepts on the whole the same view, though with characteristic caution; Plato is a more fervent promulgator of it. But yet the Greek intellect loved clearness too much to dwell zealously on anticipations which, however true, are mysterious; and the philosophers who followed Plato, including Aristotle, while in many ways preachers of righteousness, are not prophets of futurity. Neither a divine judgment of the world, nor eternal life, nor a new creation and regeneration of mankind were to the Greeks, after the time of Plato, important elements of the future. But to Zoroaster they had been important elements of the future; and to those Hebrew prophets who came after the Babylonian captivity these doctrines were important elements of the future. Zoroaster, in his own country, had no adequate successor; the Hebrew prophets had an adequate successor.

Jesus of Nazareth inherited the thoughts of the Hebrew prophets; and there is one of those prophets, not yet mentioned, who was an important link in the chain. The great prophet who accompanied the first return from the captivity had predicted a new heaven and a new earth; the prophet Malachi, a century or two later, had written, "Behold, the day cometh: it burneth like a furnace"; and the writer of the Book of Daniel had foreseen a great judgment, in which "one like unto a son of man" was brought before God, and received an everlasting kingdom. It was John the Baptist who added to all these predictions the crowning prediction, that all these

things were in his day on the point of accomplishment. Jesus, following upon John the Baptist, made the same prediction; it lies at the heart of his whole message. Moreover, it is perfectly evident that Jesus regarded himself as the "Son of man" who, according to the Book of Daniel, was to receive an everlasting kingdom: this conviction was in his mind very early in his public career, and was formally acknowledged by his chief disciples shortly before his last journey to Jerusalem; but, according to the best criticism of the documents before us, it was not affirmed by him publicly till he was brought for trial before the Jewish authorities at Jerusalem, when, in answer to an adjuration by the high priest Caiaphas, he accepted the title of "the Christ, the Son of the Blessed." His acceptance of this title was the immediate cause of his crucifixion, for the Jews regarded it as blasphemy.

How very far all these predictions, which had their origin in the heathen prophet Zoroaster, but were accepted and expanded by the Jewish prophets, and accepted with the most serious determination by Jesus of Nazareth—how very far all these predictions go beyond a mere theoretical belief in a future life, such as Socrates and Plato persuasively taught, is obvious. But it is not less obvious that if we are to take the predictions of the Book of Daniel, or of Jesus of Nazareth himself, in their literal material sense, they have been falsified by the history which we actually know, by the events which have happened since the Christian era. "Verily I say unto you," said Jesus, "this generation shall not pass away, until all these things are accomplished"; and "these things" have been described as the darkening of the sun and moon, the stars falling from heaven, and the Son of man coming in clouds with power and great glory.

As these things have not happened literally, the next question is, Have they happened in any sense which we can deem worthy of acceptance, and embrace without an unnatural twisting of the meaning of words? This supposition is not lightly to be rejected. The whole Bible is full of similitudes and parables; and if there be such a thing as a spiritual world transcending and enveloping the world of sensuous perceptions, that spiritual world is one of which the knowledge can only be conveyed to us indirectly, and not by an appeal to faculties of which all men are the natural possessors. Moreover, the whole Hebrew genius, while fruitful in the region of exalted and tenderly imaginative hopes, was not characterised by minutely accurate research, of the kind that we justly call scientific. In the region of careful accuracy,

the Greeks were the first teachers of mankind ; the Jews had an even greater task, and did a service to the world even greater than that which the Greeks did, but the precise service which the Greeks rendered to the world was not one which the Jews rendered, or were qualified to render. The only book written by ancient Jews, or by ancient Israelites altogether, in which detailed accuracy can possibly be thought to exist is the First Book of the Maccabees ; but it stands alone. Of every other work written by an ancient Jew, the great characteristic is an exalted imagination interwoven with deeply significant prophecy ; interwoven also with important elements of true history ; but far from scientifically exact. This, then, is what we must look for in the sayings of Jesus of Nazareth, in whom the genius of the whole Jewish race culminated ; and this we shall find. No sayings of equal importance to his sayings have ever been given to mankind by the lips or by the pen of man ; but they are important, not because they give us exactly defined truth in any region, but because they reveal to us the form and character of a spiritual world transcending our sensuous world, because they exhibit to us love and faith as the moving forces in that spiritual world, because they show us this love and faith operating in Jesus himself, and give us the initial ground for thinking (what after experience has, I believe, ratified) that that love and that faith continued in him after his physical death, and still form the channel by which the spiritual world, which eternally exists, can be appropriated, known, and understood by ourselves. We, his disciples, have abundant time and abundant materials for imparting to his principles that exactitude which he himself was unable to give to them ; but we are none the less dependent on him ; whatever courage we may have, we do not stand before an imminent death, necessary in the eyes of God, though easily to be escaped, as he stood. He is the centre of human history, now and for ever.

But in spite of this, we must not look for perfect exactitude in his sayings ; nor must we look for exactitude in that record of his deeds which we find in the three earlier gospels, still less in the poetic deliverances of the fourth gospel. But when the conclusions of a fair criticism have been accepted, and the properly miraculous element (in which I do not include everything that may at first sight surprise us) is excluded from his life, we shall find that we still know a great deal about him, and that his life and death are the key to all which we most admire and reverence in the subsequent history of

Christianity, and have lain at the root of the progress of our modern world.

It is, of course, not to be denied that Christian history is not altogether admirable; nay, the Christian Church was for a long time a powerful and tyrannous adversary of all free thought in religion, and of a great deal of free thought in science and history as well. It is the just Nemesis of this erroneous and sinful side of the Christianity of the past that the Christian Church is now broken asunder, and that the different branches of it cannot reunite into one organism, strong as is the desire for reunion among many Christians; nor will the Church ever present itself to mankind as one organism again until the sins and errors of the Church in the past have been wholly acknowledged and forsaken.

But it is a great mistake, and a mistake not unfrequently committed by sceptics, to suppose that the Christian Church has been simply the adversary of progress. Never, even in the worst darkness of mediævalism, was that the case. The soul is deeper than the intellect; and the deliverance of man from selfish and unworthy passions, the formation of true unselfish love in the hearts of men, has been the aim, in all ages, of the saints who have taken Jesus of Nazareth as their Master, some of whom are known to us in their names and lives at the present day, but many, many more have lived and died in obscurity. Out of the conflict and welter of races partly barbarous, partly the decayed remnants of old civilisations, a new world is arising to-day; and to suppose that we can eliminate Christianity from that new world, and account Christian teaching as superfluous, is an extraordinary misreading of what we see with our eyes.

If, then, my sceptical reader will allow it possible that the Christian Church, with all its errors and sins of the past, has something to teach us still, and something in the region which lies beyond our sensuous world, I will now try to show what that something is when divested of metaphor and mistake.

In the first place, when Jesus of Nazareth contemplated his own imminent death, he contemplated in the same moment of vision that which lay beyond death. His agony in the garden of Gethsemane was due to that natural fleshly fear which, had it not been overcome, would have separated these two conceptions, and made the earthly vision a threatening dominant power, without counterbalance on the spiritual side. By the help of God he surmounted this fear, and during the hours which intervened between the moment when his captors seized him and his death on the cross the vision of what lay

beyond death was never lost to him. What was that vision? Essentially, the vision of himself drawing into the close contact of his own loving heart all the loving spirits among mankind. This perspicacious choice of his was the act by which he would exercise the office of judge; and those whom he selected as worthy of his companionship would exercise the same office, and choose among those known to them the worthy souls, capable of loving eternally. Thus would the kingdom of God upon earth be filled and replenished; but as for those whose lives had been unworthy and animated by selfish purposes, what was to happen to them? They could not be partakers of the kingdom of love, because their nature forbade it; therefore they would be carried away into a region variously described as "the outer darkness, full of weeping and gnashing of teeth," and "the everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." Meanwhile, what was to be the duty, in the kingdom of God, of the loving souls who had been chosen as partakers of that happy lot? This question was nowhere proposed, much less answered, by Jesus; and under all the circumstances we must conclude that his vision did not clearly include anything beyond what I have said; though the parable of the talents, which is in juxtaposition to the prophecy of the future judgment, is a strong recommendation of practical work, and makes it probable that Jesus esteemed practical work as of necessity interwoven into the inmost being of those who attained to the kingdom of God.

Now, in considering this message of Jesus of Nazareth to the whole human race, uttered in immediate prospect of his own violent death, which took place only two or three days afterwards, we must remember that it was the first sketch known to us (and I do not doubt the first sketch absolutely) of what was to happen after death, uttered by one who trusted with his whole heart and soul in the future reward for right-doing, to be given by God to righteous souls hereafter. Not that there had not been martyrs who fervently believed in a future life before the time of Jesus; if the Second Book of Maccabees (in its seventh chapter) tells truth, there were such among the Jews in the age of the Maccabees. But Jesus was the first to survey the ground of that future life, and to describe it as he saw it with his own inspired vision; he described it as I have above stated; and we must be prepared to find defects in so rapid a glance, however keen-sighted and sincere the vision of him who spoke what he saw. There are such defects; but while maintaining this, we must not diminish our love and devotion to Jesus on account of them; he did all that was

possible in his own age, under circumstances far more perilous and trying than those which confront us to-day.

What he did see clearly and truly was that the reign of human love upon earth was about to begin in no long time; nay, within the lifetime of some of those whom he, being yet in the flesh, saw standing before him. Now, this is the assertion which believers and unbelievers alike find it so difficult to accept, both alike insisting on the fact that Jesus has not yet returned in the clouds of heaven before the eyes of millions of witnesses, and both alike holding that until he does so return his promises and his prophecies are unfulfilled. But both alike are wrong. We must not look so unspiritually upon things spiritual, or upon the divine guidance of men; the great renovation of mankind has its root in the death of Jesus, and no strange wonders in the heavens above or in the earth beneath are required to authenticate it. Human love has increased upon earth since he lived his life in the flesh, and of all the causes of its increase none has been so dominating, so penetrating, as this—that he, from the invisible region beyond death, has touched and moulded the hearts of men who remain in the visible world, has brought the spirit of God to bear upon them, and (as we may well believe) has gathered to himself the holy departed to be administrators with him of the divine power. Look at history: with all the faults of Christians as individuals and of the Christian Church as an organic institution, the trace of love is everywhere to be seen. Take this small incident from one of the martyrdoms which took place at Carthage early in the third century of our era:—

“As to Felicitas, on her return to the dungeon, she was seized with the pains of labour. The jailer said to her, ‘If thy present sufferings are so great, what wilt thou do when thou art thrown to the wild beasts? This thou didst not consider when thou refusedst to sacrifice.’ She answered, ‘I *now* suffer *myself* all that I suffer; but then there shall be *another* who shall suffer for *me*, because I also will suffer for him.’”¹

Faith and love are commingled in that Christian reply; but human love is shown in its simplicity in the following sentence, which is taken from the same part of the same volume, and relates to the same series of events:—

“After they had been torn by the wild beasts, and were about to receive the merciful stroke which was to end their sufferings, they took leave of each other, for the last time, with the mutual kiss of Christian love.”

Never, in all Christian history, were examples of sacred

¹ Neander's *Church History* (Torrey's translation), vol. i. p. 170.

love wanting; and it reached to regions where sentiment was not obviously present: to measures for the amelioration of the state of slaves and for the gradual abolition of slavery, to measures which involved resistance against tyranny and the strengthening of city communities, to the discovery or acceptance of useful arts, and to educational and artistic efforts. It is true that these great merits were for a long time hindered in their operation. Partly the low station of the first Christians made it difficult for them to value properly the degree of material knowledge and power which heathen nations, especially the Greeks and Romans, had accumulated; partly the persecutions to which they were exposed alienated them from the heathen and from all the works of the heathen; but more than all, the literalness with which they accepted their own sacred documents led to a spirit of fear being implanted in their minds, and even made it not unwelcome, because it operated against their heathen persecutors far more than it operated against themselves. This spirit of fear, with real intolerance accompanying it, is seen in some of the very earliest Fathers of the Church; and when the Church acquired material authority and power, it showed itself in deeds of great intolerance and even cruelty. Thus it was that the truly holy and loving spirit which lay at the root of the Church was hidden beneath a mass of accretions, useless and even noxious. Now at the present day these accretions have been largely though not entirely removed, and persecution by Christian authorities, in the form in which it existed in the Middle Ages, is hardly known now; but in this process of reform the Church has been broken up, and the theory on which Christianity is to be defended has become dubious and uncertain.

Yet it ought not to be uncertain. There is no haziness in that primitive conception that God, and not only God the Absolute Creator, but Jesus Christ the purifier and redeemer of human nature, and holy persons, more than we can tell, who have lived in the past, do now send love into the hearts of those who still live in the flesh, and enable them to unite and co-operate and to govern this worldly scene. It may be said indeed, that though this is not a hazy conception, we have no assurance that it is true. I concede that it needs some personal religious experience, which not everyone has, for the assurance to be a true stimulus to us; it is not to be expected that everyone will be convinced of this secret life-giving office of Christianity. I do not doubt that the conviction will spread; but the positive outward sign of it must lie in the increase of good will among men through Christian

belief, and in the increase of power which men will thence acquire over the material universe. It requires to be shown, in short, that Christianity, when its precepts are carried out, is a fruitful system of government, capable of being extended over the whole earth and over all mankind. This degree of proof we cannot show at present ; but this is the line on which proof may be attained. If it be attained, and evidenced by the spiritual and material progress of the world, the actual condition of departed spirits will have received great illustration, though absolute clearness of conception will hardly be reached while we remain in this fleshly garb. Prayer to God is the first key to this whole subject ; but the life and death of Jesus is the first clear instance of the operation of that key.

Eternal life, as I have described it in the above pages, is the manifestation of a continually increasing power of love among those who obtain a part in it. Through what channels that love will show itself we, with our imperfect faculties, cannot imagine at present ; nor can we fully imagine the regions in which it will show itself. But we may fairly believe that some part of it, in those who are departed, is directed towards those whom they have left behind them, and who still live in bodies of flesh ; and it is in this region that we must look for the verification of the whole hypothesis. Can human society exist and flourish with ever-progressive energy and happiness without a spiritual alliance between those who are still in the flesh and the good and brave souls who have departed out of the fleshly life through the gate of death ? I think it cannot ; that is my reading of history, that is what I learn from the chronicles of the past. But it is not possible, in the present article, to enter upon the interpretation of those chronicles in detail. Yet to interpret them is a most important task ; and this, combined with personal experience, must be the test of the true existence of that invisible, spiritual, and divinely ordered world, in which, according to Christian belief, we may hope to participate.

J. R. MOZLEY.

LEEDS.

WORLD-LOVE.

SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.

INCLUDED in our world-wide Empire are peoples of every variety of race, colour, creed, and degree of culture and civilisation. Besides English, Scotch, Welsh, and Irish, and their British descendants, Canadians, Australians, and South Africans—these last three now becoming quite distinct nations,—there are French-Canadians and Dutch-South Africans. And these European-descended are Roman Catholic and Dutch Reformed Church as well as Church of England, Wesleyan, and of other Christian sects. Then in the Empire there are over two hundred million Hindus and a hundred million Mohammedans, many millions of Buddhists, and millions and millions of animists of various kinds—fire-worshippers, sun-worshippers, devil-worshippers. There are primitive forest tribes and islanders, and there are highly cultivated Hindus, Arabs, Parsees, and Chinese.

The countries are no less varied. There are richly luxuriant tropical lands and there are utter deserts. There are level plains, hundreds of miles in extent, and there is the highest range of mountains in the world. There are tiny little islands and there are countries of continental magnitude like India and Australia.

We who have served in the far parts of the Empire and travelled about it, we who have had to live for years with these varied peoples in their varied countries, love our gentle English island more than ever, and have untold admiration for the splendid qualities our race display in their home-land. But we love also the great Whole of which England is the proud centre. We love the lofty mountains which draw our souls up to unimaginable heights. We love the open deserts where our souls expand unfettered. We love the majestic rivers and the glorious forests with their gorgeous plant-growth

and mysterious animal life. We love, too, the people among whom we have worked. We have gone through battle and pestilence and famine with them, and given the best of ourselves for them, and they are bound up inextricably with us.

So while we love the home-land we love, too, the Empire which our fathers and we ourselves have helped to make. We like to feel the whole as endlessly varied in its constituents, but tightly held together in one indivisible community.

What we hate is that in the matter of religion—that is, in the very basis of our lives—there should be any dividing line between us. As long as there is this difference in the foundation of our lives, we feel that there cannot be any solid, lasting union. And as we look up to these mountains, and as we look out over those limitless expanses, as we rub up against men of these varied races and religions under life-and-death conditions, some instinct within us tells us that there is no valid reason why there *should* be any vast chasm between us at the base. Whatever the official exponents of the varied religions and sects of religions may say in the sanctity of their official precincts, we of the open air, we who have met man to man, and risked our lives for each other in the common service of the Empire, know for a certainty that there is no necessary division between us at bottom. We are confident that if we go deep enough down we shall find some common spring of action, and that if we fix our gaze high enough we shall find some common star to guide us all.

So we earnestly search for some idea and sentiment which will conciliate all these divergent views of religion, and gather into one great collective act all the different individual energies. Variety of religious opinion there must always be. Sects and sub-sects must continually be arising. Their occurrence is the sign not of the decadence but of the growth and vitality of religion. But there must surely be some single plain, irresistible idea as the ground of them all, and round and on which all are unconsciously building themselves up. Such an idea there must surely be! And if we can discover it, if we can find some single sentiment which will readily appeal to all the varied races of our Empire, we shall have found something which will appeal to all mankind.

For thirty years I have sought for such an idea and sentiment. In the Himalayas, in Tibet, in Central India, in London, on many a voyage—wherever I have been and whatever I have been doing—the search for it has been the principal object of my thought. To find it has been the chief purpose of my life. At last I believe I have discovered it.

The basic sentiment can, I think, be found in the sentiment of World-Love, that is, Love of the World—of all Creation, of all Nature, and the plants and flowers, and birds and animals, and our fellow-men, summed up together in one great interconnected Whole; and that Whole a Supreme Being, a thinking, feeling, striving Being, with a capacity for loving as well as an attractiveness for being loved. It is the ancient and universally felt sentiment of love of God interpreted in accordance with the spirit of our own times and with the increasing advance of thought.

The hearts of men are deeply drawn towards the world. Most men are quite unaware how devotedly attached they are to it. But there the sentiment is far down at the bottom of their beings and forming a foundation for their lives, as they soon find when some critical emergency arises. During a philosophical discussion in the early days of the War there slipped out from one of the philosophers the naïve confession that he had thought patriotism was an exploded sentiment—that in these advanced days men did not allow themselves to be influenced by sentiment as Englishmen were at the beginning of the War. We may quite admit that an Englishman's love of country would be the better for a process of purifying and refining. We may allow, too, that its activities may be more wisely directed, and that the ends which it seeks to achieve may be better chosen. But few would not also recognise that love of country is something very real and very valuable. We feel that a man who is devoid of any love for his country is unworthy of our respect. We rightly spurn him—as we despise a man who has no love for his mother.

Now, men love the world just as they love their country. All healthy people have this love of the world, though they are generally as unconscious of it as the philosopher was unaware that he had an enthusiastic love of his country burning at the bottom of his heart all the time. This love of country carries men to lengths which cold reason would set down as absurd. It will take men from their homes and their occupations and their comforts, and tear them away from those they love best, make them undergo the most dreadful hardships, and cheerfully face death itself. It all seems utterly unreasonable. And yet we know that in spite of this "unreasonableness" there are good grounds for loving our country. We never cease decrying it, reminding ourselves of its many defects, deficiencies, and shortcomings. We admire much in other countries which is better than we find in our own. For all that, we love our country. If it has its defects, we know

that it is within our own hands to better them, and that in it we can live our own lives in accordance with our own way of thinking.

Men have the same grounds for loving the world in which they have been born and grown up. There is evil to an appalling extent. There is pain and suffering on every side. We see iniquity and oppression, cruelty, meanness, spitefulness, rancour, vindictiveness—everything that can sour and embitter life. Even the best have some disfiguring feature in their lives. The most advanced nations lately showed themselves capable of fearful barbarities. Yet we are convinced that the world is not radically wicked, that in its essential nature it is good. We have faith that something good is working away at its heart.

If we investigate its constitution we are astounded at the order and regularity which prevail. At the foundation we do not find chance and caprice. The deeper we delve, the more evidence of orderliness do we find. The world is made up of countless myriads of ultra-microscopic electrons, and these electrons are active beyond conception. They move with the speed of light, and their activity never ceases for one fraction of a second. Yet all this tremendous and unceasing activity does not result in chaos. They hold themselves together in an ordered whole. And through the whole there runs a tendency, or what might be better described as an insistent impulse, towards organisation, and system. The units tend to combine and interact upon one another, and by their combination and interaction to form units of higher and higher complexity—and units which, owing to this complexity, possess qualities which the component entities by themselves did not possess.

All this order and regularity and tendency to organisation and system is something *good*. It gives us confidence in the world, makes us feel we can depend on it. If we are of an incurably pessimistic disposition we may take the view that, in spite of the order and organisation there has been in the world for hundreds of millions of years, it is only within the last quarter of a million years that man has existed, and that, because of this very regularity in the order of nature, man's life may be snuffed out in another quarter of a million years, and the planets roll on for æons to come as if he had never existed. The congenital pessimist may think thus. But there is no solid ground for his gloom. As nature is so regular, and as the tendency to organisation is so evident everywhere, it is just as probable as the reverse that beings as

highly developed as we are—perhaps more highly developed—have evolved on planets of other suns than ours. And as to ourselves, the orderliness of nature may be made the very means by which we may prolong our existence. It may enable us to control natural processes and use them for our own purposes.

But the world has other claims than orderliness to be considered good. The crude materialistic view that it is of the nature of a well-regulated machine or merely consists of physical and chemical processes is hopelessly inadequate and narrow. The world has a soul, or *is* a soul, just as much as a man has a soul or is a soul. A man is a magnificent piece of mechanism—a piece of mechanism in comparison with which the most perfect aeroplane engine is the clumsiest toy. Who ever heard of an engine which could from within itself produce a little engine its exact reproduction? Yet this is what the human machine does. Simply as a machine man is marvellous. But a man is a great deal more than a machine. He is capable of thought and feeling and striving. He has capacities for affection, for the enjoyment of beauty, and for acquiring a knowledge of the truth. He has, too, the power of improving himself. In short, there is in him a soul. So also is there in the world. Always there has been in the world order and a tendency to organisation. But even before man appeared—for millions of years before his appearance—plants, trees, animals, insects, birds, fishes were showing beauty of form and beauty of colouring. And in the higher animals the affection of mates for one another and of parents for offspring was beginning to appear, as well as virtues such as fortitude and industry, patience and endurance. And with man has come the heightened capacity for love and affection and for the creation and enjoyment of beautiful things. And if these high qualities have at length emerged from the long world-process, may we not take it that all the time there has been latent in the world, working away at its heart, this something good which was ever striving to express itself, and which has at last begun to find expression—to come into being? We may be stunned by the amount of evil in the world. But we cannot possibly deny that there is also a positively astounding amount of heroism, devoted love, and loyal friendship. Nor can we deny that there is within the world a capacity for infinitely more of these very best things than has ever yet been brought forth. And as we judge of a man not so much by his obvious imperfections but by his capabilities, by what he has it within him to be, and love him if he has both the

capacity and the will to love his fellows and enjoy beautiful things, so we love the world for precisely the same reason. We have trust and confidence in the world because of its orderliness and reliability; and we love the world because it manifests those very things which we love best. However imperfectly it may have so far succeeded, it is quite evidently striving to bring into being those high qualities which we most admire and most enjoy, and long to have.

And the world will be all the more to a man when he realises that not only is he a constituent member of this Supreme Collective Being, the World, as he is a constituent member of that Collective Being, his country, but that he has a real voice and share in the government of the world, as he has in the government of his country. The old idea of the world as being governed by some distant external Ruler—some already perfect Being living far apart from the world and directing its affairs from outside, as an Indian peasant would think that Indian affairs are directed by the distant King of England—is now being abandoned as not in accordance with observed facts. In its place we have the more stimulating conception of a self-governing world, a world that contains within itself the power and the impulse for self-direction and self-improvement. According to this view the world is not governed from outside, but organises itself from inside and directs itself, expresses itself and shapes its own destinies—all in virtue of that spirit of self-improvement which animates the whole. And as individual Englishmen in their collectivity, together with the land in which they dwell, make up England and make England—the England of the future—so individual men in their collectivity, together with the Universe in which they dwell, make up the world, and make the world—the world of the future.

Man is not—as he was on the old conception—a frail puppet expected to play a most difficult part under the eye of a perfect Being judging his actions from afar—to play this part, too, under the depressing conviction that he was neither endowed with the qualities nor placed in the conditions which made it possible to approach anywhere near the standard of perfection by which he was being judged. Man has not really to live under these disheartening conditions. Conditions stern and inflexible there are within which he has to act. If he puts his hand in the fire it will be burnt. If he leans too far over a precipice he will fall to the bottom. But he has the power of acquiring knowledge of these conditions, and he can utilise them for his own, purposes. And

within them he is free. He can rule his own world and be his own judge.

Possibly science may some day find units simpler still than the electrons. But at present science has not gone beyond these as the ultimate units of which the whole world from nebulae and the stars to this earth and men are all alike composed. Yet even these ultimate units are not inert but very *active*—and *self-active*. They are not like billiard-balls which the player—an outside person—has to push here and there to get them into a certain position which he has in his—outside—mind. They are not like bricks which a builder has to take up and place in a position planned in his—and not their—mind. They are not like pieces of marble which an artist arranges according to a plan which he has in his mind. Nor, again, are they like drops of falling water which are merged in the ocean and lose all individuality. They are so minute that the strongest microscope would not detect a million of them rolled in a ball. But in spite of their diminutive proportions they maintain an individuality of their own. They act of their own accord—in accordance with the dictates of their own nature. . . . On the other hand, they can *only* act in relation with one another and under the mutual influence of one another. An electron is active, and self-active, but it cannot act entirely on its own account, with no consideration for its neighbours. Except in company with its neighbours it cannot act at all—or even exist. The activity of each is felt by all, and all affect the activities of each. Under this mutual influence these little units combine with one another and interact upon one another, organise themselves into collective beings, molecules, and collective beings of collective beings, till we come to men and nations and mankind as a whole, and finally the World as a whole: a self-contained, self-governing world, making its own laws—the laws of nature and the moral laws.

Everywhere we see activity. Inertness is unknown. When it seems to exist it is merely activity held in suspense through some counterbalancing activity. But all this activity is self-activity, the activity of individuals, from electrons to man, under the mutual influence of one another. Under this mutual influence they are held together in an interconnected whole, and are penetrated through and through with the impulse towards organisation and system and self-betterment.

In this world each individual plays its own effective part. But that part becomes more and more effective according as it groups itself with other individuals. Electrons, when they

have organised themselves into the highly complicated system of systems which constitute a human being, are vastly more effective than they would be if they were each acting separately. And men know by experience that they are more effective when they organise themselves into communities, nations, and groups of nations. So each individual man plays his own part, but his instinct drives him into playing it conjointly with his fellows, that his part may become more and more highly effective. And as men get grip of the fact that the world is a self-governing world, directing and bettering itself—and that they are part, and the most important part, of the world, and that its governance and direction can be taken more and more into their own hands, they will come to take a vastly increased interest in the world, and be more and more drawn towards it.

But the confidence which the world inspires by its orderliness and regularity; the devotion which it arouses by its display of the good it has at heart; the interest it creates when it shows man that he shares in its direction—all that these things do to make a man love the world is a hundredfold increased by the evidence the world gives that it cares for him, that the love is returned, that indeed it was the love of the world for him that was at the bottom of his love for the world. How did he come into the world at all? From the ecstasy of love which has come welling up through all the ages and brought his parents together. Love was the origin of his birth. In his first moments he was surrounded by that most beautiful thing in life, a mother's love as her child is born. The tenderest love from father, from nurse, from brothers and sisters, from friends, was lavished on him in his infancy. True it is that as his little world expanded—as he grew up and went out into the rough world about him—he experienced a good deal else than the tender love in which he was bathed at his birth. Yet it would be wrong to conclude from this that the world no longer cared for him. Let him be knocked down in the street, and, though no one knows who he is, and simply because he is a fellow human being, he will immediately be surrounded by the tenderest care. And then even if it be the case that in the world he finds hostility and perhaps animosity, and that he has to battle his way through opposition, neglect, and indifference, does he not also find to a far finer degree and a still greater extent the devoted love of friends and a staunchness and loyalty which bow him with humility and silence every complaint? Does

he not find that on the whole and in the bulk the world is well disposed towards him, is filled with high expectations of him, and is ready and keen to help him directly he tries to help himself? And when his dying moments come, will he not once more find the same tender love surrounding him that wrapped him at his birth—the same but greatly extended, and now including the love his country and perhaps distant nations have to give him, and the love of lifelong friends? As a man leaves the world the gentlest peace falls on him. All discords are merged in harmony. Only the sweetness of love remains in his memory. In the same ecstasy of love in which he was born into the world he is borne out of it again. In memory of him after he has gone, as in anticipation of him before he came, the world's chief feeling for him is that of love. The world has always loved him.

It is sad to think how few men know how much they love the world and how much the world loves them. A child is quite unconscious how much it loves its mother and how much the mother loves it. It is only when the child is separated from its mother that it realises these things. And it is only when a man sees a risk of being taken from the world that he realises how much it is to him—how much it loves him and he loves it. But now that mankind is emerging from its childhood it ought to take this thing to heart and understand it better—that love of the world is the root sentiment of a man's being, by love of the world being meant not love of humanity only, but love of all nature as well, love of this whole great glorious world of ours, with all its hard but bracing conditions, and all the joys it has to give.

Everyone now recognises the value of love of country, and because we know its value we seek to stimulate and refine it. We have yet to recognise the value of love of the world and stimulate and refine it also. We have to recognise its full significance and meaning. And the main significance of the new conception of things is that it will bring to every man and to every nation, and more especially to leaders of men whether in the sphere of thought or art or religion or politics, a heightened sense of responsibility. They will realise how much depends upon their action and guidance. They will understand too that on occasions and for the time being they are to those about them representatives of the world—just as an Englishman on occasions stands for England. Men will rise to the understanding that the destinies of the world are in our hands in the same way as the destinies of England are in the hands of Englishmen.

The responsibility will be great, but if we have real responsibility we also have real freedom. The future is in our own hands. We can make of it what we like. Our scientific men, enlarging every year their knowledge of things, will be able to organise the efforts of mankind so that we may together get control over the material conditions of our existence. We may, for instance, find ways of utilising the forces of nature to the full, and perhaps tap that stupendous source of energy stored up in the atoms. And there is no limit to the extent to which we might, under scientific guidance, improve plant and animal life. Those who are imbued with a fervent love of the world, like those who are devoted to their country, will be most delicately sensitive to the evil of evil and the good of good. And they will ache to remove the evil and achieve the good. They will be filled with a quickened compassion for those many who have to suffer through no fault of their own, as well as for those who have never had a proper chance. But they will also have a fined-up sense of what is best, and a hot impatience of whatever is short of the best in those who *could* achieve it. They will be possessed by a consuming passion for the best, and never will be completely satisfied till they have attained it and made it everywhere prevail. And the best, even when attained, they will straightway strive to better. Satiety will never overcome them. The joy of divine adventure will be with them to the end.

As to what is best men will always differ, for it has infinite varieties. But as to its main character men are generally agreed. Not often, but to most of us at some time or other in our lives, there come moments when we know we have been in Heaven. What produced those moments for us we want to reproduce for others. We want to make earth Heaven for everyone. To some those moments come in the satisfaction of great work done; to others, through a vital truth in a flash revealed; to others, through the touch of music, of poetry, or of love. Many and various are the ways in which Heaven is made. But what makes Heaven, that for us is good. "Heaven's Light Our Guide" is the motto under which we serve in India. A better guide for all the world we could not find.

FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND.

LONDON.

STARS AND FLOWERS.

EVA MARTIN.

“Star-dust and Star-pilgrimages.”—EMERSON.

FLOWERS are the stars of earth, and seem to hold, as in a myriad mirrors, some spiritual reflection of those mightier flowers that blossom in the fields of heaven. None whose inner eyes are open can walk through an April wood illumined by the pale glow that rises from a host of primroses without fancying that the hand of some heavenly gardener has been scattering star-dust there—star-dust that was really living seed, and so took root and bloomed. And scarcely can one pass by a crowd of single daffodils or narcissi, thick-sown in the grass, without involuntarily glancing upwards to see if others are still falling from the sky, so star-like are they, so redolent of the freshness and purity that we associate with the far ethereal spaces.

“Wide are the meadows of night,
And daisies are shining there,
Tossing their lovely dews,
Lustrous and fair” . . .

So sings a modern poet, and speaks of the planets as “wanderers amid the stars,” who

“circling, whisper and say,
Fair are the blossoming meads of delight
Through which we stray.”

Whence comes it, and what does it mean, this mystical relationship between stars and flowers, recognised by poets and mystics of all ages? What can be the bond linking earth's frail ephemerae of a few days to those stupendously vast and fiery masses ever burning in the darkness? Even the similarity of shape is but a fancy, for when we liken a jasmine blossom, for instance, to a star, we know well that no star in reality is

five or seven-pointed, although to our inadequate vision it sometimes appears so. But the spiritual relationship exists, and is perhaps of greater significance than we are apt to realise when we use carelessly such phrases as "meadows starred with daisies," and the like. Said Francis Thompson :

"I do think my tread
Stirring the blossoms in the meadow-grass
Flickers the unwithering stars" ;

and the German poet Rückert had a kindred vision, when in his lines describing a soul's realisation of Eternity he spoke of

"the still moment . . .
When Earth and Heaven close around thee as a mist ;
Thou think'st the flower a star, the star a flower sun-kiss'd."

What divine madness ! What cosmic blindness ! Yet such madness and such blindness may perhaps endow us with clearer perception than that given by any light of reason. For there are some matters in which poets and dreamers prove surer guides to the searching spirit than men of science or of mathematics—and it may be remarked, in parenthesis, that the word "star" alone has poetry in it, "star" and "dew" being, at any rate in our English language, two words from which the essence of poetry is more easily distilled than from most others. The imagination of man has ever been busy with stars, and by studying the star-legends evolved by primitive man throughout the ages, down to the last and most beautiful of all—that concerned with the birth of Christ—we may possibly learn something that astronomers could never teach us.

But leaving poets and legends aside, one explanation—which Science cannot deny—of this brotherhood of stars and flowers may lie in the seldom thought-of truth that our Earth is herself a star, using the word in its widest sense—a bright, heavenly body. Flowers that feed on the substance of a star—literally, on "star-dust"—should surely be star-like. Nothing could seem more natural. But we grow so complacently accustomed to the solid feel of earth under our feet, and to the thought of her as a fixed mass of soil and rock existing solely for our pleasure and sustenance, that for the most part we altogether fail to realise her as a unit in a vast and ordered fellowship of circling stars, held in their orbits at measured distances from one another by invisible forces beyond our comprehension. How often, when we watch the planet Venus as "Evening Star" glowing whitely in the western sky, do we reflect that to the dwellers on Venus, if such exist, our earth appears similarly as a magnificent star of the first magnitude ? "In

the clear sky of Mars, after sunset," says Camille Flammarion, astronomer-poet and philosopher, "this radiant star of a beautiful greenish-blue courses in space accompanied by a little satellite, sparkling like some splendid diamond." So do her nearer brethren see Earth in her true colours, as a bright, quick-moving sphere, flinging back into space the light that she receives. It is only we who dwell upon her, climbing her mountains, navigating her seas, delving below her surface for gold and gems, and finally lying down to our long rest in the rich soil that we have dug and tilled and sown, who fail to recognise her as she is—brilliant, swift, and star-like. Our very nearness blinds us to her true self, even as in many human households the light of a soul that shines out in dazzling purity to other beholders is unseen by those who dwell under the same roof.

Only on rare occasions, and in rare moods, do we become even vaguely conscious of the stupendous journey through space which our Earth accomplishes in all serenity, bearing with her how fantastic a freight of invisible emotion out-breathed by the human beings who swarm like flies upon her rounded sides! No tragedy retards her; no joy quickens her steps. Only at perihelion, her nearest approach to the sun, does she hasten a little, running faster, as it were, for fear of being drawn into that fiery heart whose influence holds her in such faithful allegiance. From day to day, serenely unconscious—or should we not more truly say *all-conscious*?—of the million-fold life that envelops her, she swings along her appointed path at the inconceivable rate of over sixty-five thousand miles an hour, turning on her own axis, meanwhile, at an average rate of about a thousand feet a second. And man remains as unconscious of this as she, to all outward appearance, is unconscious of his activities.

Yet if we could but cultivate some awareness of the great voyage which day by day and year by year we accomplish in our "sky-cleaving boat," the Earth, would it not lift us out of those ruts of boredom and dulness into which we are so apt to fall? How unnecessary would then become the oft-given advice to "travel for our health"! How superfluous the constant desire for change of air and scene! Change!—when we never for one instant remain at the same point of space, when our position in relation to the sun, moon, and other stars is altering momentarily in a fashion whose marvel we cannot even dimly comprehend. We talk of Time and its power to heal all sorrows, but seldom do we pause to think that Time is merely our own measurement of the earth's journey in space

—once round the sun, one year; a hundred times round the sun, a hundred years! Considering the distance we earth-passengers travel from year's beginning to year's end, we need scarcely wonder that mortal sorrows are washed away, and broken lives made whole again—by Time!

Once it came to me to realise, in some measure, the fact that we live on a spinning ball upheld by nothing solid. At the end of a long September day spent alone on a moor purple with heather, that lay as in a wide, irregular saucer among pine-crested hills, I watched with half-closed eyes the sun sinking westwards. I was lying stretched out at full length from north to south, and as the sun neared the distant hill-tops on my right, I became aware with a ridiculous shock of discovery that it was not "sinking" at all, but that the hills were moving upwards, that the whole earth on which I lay was turning eastwards, leaving the sun behind in western space. I saw one black pine-tree on the horizon. Its crest touched the sun's crimson rim. It moved rapidly upward until its branches were outlined as in ink upon the fiery disc, and then all at once the trees and hills seemed to rush across the Sun-god's face, and only a golden line of light was left to show that he still shone behind them. I turned my head, and saw, to my left hand, the half of an enormous moon above the sloping edge of the moor. The earth raced on, turning ever to the east, the moor's edge dipped and dipped, until the moon's full circle grew visible. With lower rim resting on the heather-slope, it looked like a golden plate balanced there by the hand of some titanic conjurer. Then all support slipped away from under it; it stood alone, hugely round, in the sky, and closing my eyes I lay with cheek upon Earth's scented breast and felt myself borne along with her in immeasurable circles.

What a wild adventure it is—and yet what a safe one! For ever since the unchronicled beginning of this immense earth-journey in which we take so somnolent a part, there has been neither collision nor delay. Little do we know of her with whom we travel, and still less of her fellow-wanderers through the uncharted ether. Scientists have accomplished wonders. They have measured the distances of the stars with results which, when expressed in figures, make the brain stagger in the vain attempt to grasp them. They have even weighed the stars! What a chimera that seems! How our not so remote ancestors would have shaken their sides with laughter at the notion! But one thing that they have not told us we should like to know—especially those of us who have had the love of a garden planted in our hearts—and that is

whether the surface of any other heavenly body is composed of the same soft, damp, sweet-smelling substance—the substance that we call “earth.” We know that Mercury and Venus have an atmosphere much denser than ours, and that from the former the sun’s disc appears seven times larger than from the earth. We know that Mars has polar snows and a perpetually clear and cloudless sky; that Jupiter, although twelve hundred times larger than the earth, rotates upon his own axis with such rapidity that his “day” is only ten hours long; that Saturn is surrounded by a vast, luminous ring and attended by no less than eight satellites; and that the atmospheres of Uranus and Neptune contain gases quite foreign to our own. Further, we have it as the opinion of the famous astronomer before quoted that “to pretend that our globe must be the only inhabited world because the others do not resemble it is to reason, not like a philosopher, but like a fish. Every rational fish ought to assume that it is impossible to live out of water, since its outlook and its philosophy do not extend beyond its daily life.” We find it comforting, and infinitely fascinating, to conjecture that life does exist on other globes, that we are not the only conscious travellers along the cosmic railway-lines; and sometimes we cannot refrain from speculating as to what different forms this universal life may take in the worlds removed from human ken. We may even dream of a day when it will be given to us “to read the inconceivable, to scan . . . The myriad forms of God those stars unroll”—a day far hence when we, with denizens of other planets,

“shall compare together, hear
A million alien Gospels, in what guise
He trod the Pleiades, the Lyre, the Bear.”

And in lesser matters also we long for knowledge with that insatiable curiosity which is one of man’s chief claims to immortality. We do actually know that “forms” such as we can recognise exist, not only in the spheres and circles of the nearer planets, but even in the whirling nebulae whose distance from our solar system is so immense that the human mind reels and darkens in the mere effort to imagine it. In one nebula Science has discovered two luminous circles occupying the foci of an ellipse; another has the shape of a sponge; and “the nebula of Canes Venatici, a species of flaming hair, revolves in a spiral round a blazing nucleus. Only the eternity of a hurricane,” exclaims Victor Hugo, whose titanic mind rejoiced to grope amid these infinitudes, “can express this frightful torsion.” We see that on earth the three main forms

in which the life-force manifests itself are the globe, the star, and the cross, with their innumerable variations. Of the first we may take as familiar examples the human eye, bird's eggs, seeds, fruits, and pebbles; of the second, crystals, star-fish, and an infinite variety of flowers; of the third, all trees and plants having upright stems and leaves or branches growing at right angles, not forgetting man himself, who, tree-like, with trunk and branches, makes with outstretched arms throughout long vistas of human history "the sign of the cross."

But whether or no these predominating earth-forms may exist elsewhere, we want to know, we earth-lovers, whether other stars have soil in which things would *grow*; whether the inhabitants of those distant worlds know the delight of putting seeds in the ground and watching the miraculous result—of welcoming the first snowdrop or gathering the last rose. We feel that it would be strange, and sad, to miss the pungent scents of sun-dried grass or rain-wet loam, the joy of sifting warm sand through one's fingers, or plunging them deep into rich soil when planting summer treasures. For there is something about this element we call "earth" that endears it to us strangely. Some indefinable quality it has that makes it difficult for many of us to imagine any satisfying happiness or beauty on a globe from whose composition the earth-element were absent.

Others again there are who, loving no less intimately this outer garment of the earth-star, see it as indeed only a garment, a cloak, concealing from their gaze some vast and mighty spirit who is in very truth the Mother of mankind.

"I the grain and the furrow,
The plough-cloven clod,
And the plough-share drawn thorough,
The germ and the sod,

The deed and the doer, the seed and the sower, the dust which is God."

In all creation, say these, there can be found no such thing as lifeless form. Of "the dust which is God" are all things made. In every particle of matter spirit lies hid—spirit conscious or unconscious, sleeping, dreaming or waking. How, then, should spirit be absent from this mighty, never-resting body which we call Earth, or from her starry brethren of the skies? "The spiritual thought within of the far-distant star without unites instantaneously with the identical star-indwelling spirit," says a modern seer and prophet—and perhaps it is only the narrow limitations of our minds that prevent us from realising this omnipresence of spirit. Perhaps

we have only to reach out fluttering banners of thought to find ourselves caught up into cosmic circles of harmony and wisdom surpassing mortal dreams.

It is a vast conception which sees the stars and planets as huge nuclei of matter at varying stages of evolution, circling around some central Sun which is, like the sun of our own planetary system, Giver of Light and Life to the rest, Symbol of that Unknowable Power to which man, ever striving to express the inexpressible, has given the inadequate name of God. We are told that as the sun symbolises (but is not) God the Life-Giver, so do the planets symbolise and are ensouled by other aspects of the divine, and that all these qualities and forces go to the moulding and making of humanity, in the mass and in the individual. The spirit of Jupiter, for instance, is the spirit of compassion, of charity in its widest sense; Venus expresses the spirit of love and gentleness; Mars symbolises dynamic force, energy, incentive to action, as opposed to Saturn's patient crystallisation and limitation—Saturn the Reaper, unto whom "are committed weight and measure and number" . . . who can be put under foot only by him "who is released by thought from the bonds of desire."

So comes it that such students of the stars claim to be able to distinguish, often at sight, the ardent, courageous, perhaps aggressive, sons and daughters of Mars from those upon whose brows the dark hand of Saturn has been laid; the peace and beauty-loving children of Venus from the quick-thinking, knowledge-desiring servants of Mercury, swiftest of all the planets; in accordance with the positions and aspects of the heavenly bodies at the moment of birth. For there are, they assert, inconceivably strong magnetic currents, invisible forces of attraction and repulsion, vibrations as of some cosmic "wireless telegraphy," ever at work among the stars—currents and forces no more and no less wonderful, though less studied, than the currents of electricity and the force of gravity which Science glibly names but cannot even yet explain; and by these is every human being moulded, body, mind, and soul, and guided throughout its earthly evolution, ever bearing the impress (though faint and dim, and perchance grievously distorted by the human mirror) of the planetary Powers which prevailed in the heavens at the critical moment of birth.

A wild dream—a fantastic theory devoid of foundation—so say the sceptics. Yet here, as in all other matters with which the human mind concerns itself, it must be admitted that

only those who have seriously investigated are competent to speak.

Enough for our present purpose to concede that Earth, the star on which we dwell, is one of a mighty brotherhood whose true nature, meaning and purpose it is beyond the wit of scientific man to fathom. For it is only when astronomy is treated as poetry and as religion, not merely as "science," that we gain some glimmering of its inner significance. "Astronomy," says Victor Hugo, "is the most magnificent of the sciences because it is mingled with a certain amount of divination. The hypothesis is one of its essentials. . . . Astronomy has its clear side and its luminous side; on its clear side it is tinctured with algebra, on its luminous side with poetry." And again: "The eye has seen six thousand stars; the telescope has seen one hundred million suns; the soul has seen God."

Truly none who have for the first time viewed the heavens through a powerful telescope can ever forget the experience, little less awe-inspiring than that of the first man who

"in the midnight stirring in his slumber
Opened his vision on the heights and saw
New without name or ordinance or number
Set for a marvel, silent for an awe,
Stars in the firmament above him beaming,
Stars in the firmament, alive and free,
Stars, and of stars the innumerable streaming,
Deep in the deeps, a river in the sea."

And to behold those fiery globes "alive and free"—no longer star-shaped, as to the unassisted eye, but round—hanging poised in space as though flung there at random by some unseen hand; to witness even momentarily this cosmic game of ball, each one seemingly free and unattached and yet linked to the rest by invisible forces of strength inconceivable; to see, separately, the glowing rings of Saturn, the moon-phases of Venus, the jagged edges and immense shadows formed by the mountains and craters of the moon—all this should leave the human mind overwhelmed, not by the insignificance of our Earth-star, but rather by indescribable joy at realising her to be one link in a chain of such stupendous glory.

Have we not in these latter years often prided ourselves on having expanded our old narrow patriotism of country alone into a wider patriotism of Empire? Have we not witnessed the will and the desire to transcend even that wider patriotism, as, for instance, in the men who gathered from every corner of Britain's far-flung dominions to fight not for

England, nor for Britain, nor even for the Empire, but, in their own words, "for decency and cleanness and fair-play," because an evil thing had shown its face that must at all costs be swept off the earth? Have we not seen these men and millions of others fight and die willingly for the rescue and the welfare of peoples whose language they could not speak, whose thoughts and feelings they had no means of understanding save the magic means of human sympathy? And is it so far a step from this to what might be called "earth-patriotism," when man, without distinction of race, creed or tongue, shall strive (never again, we hope, with arms and engines of destruction) for the well-being of *all* who dwell together upon the self-same star?

Already we see this possibility taking shape, through man's growing desire that the nations' representatives shall in future work together for the realisation of wider and higher ideals than statesmen of bygone days ever dared to suggest putting into practice. In the development of flight, also, we see it foreshadowed. Long content to travel, steam-drawn, over Earth's solid and watery expanses, man now seeks to encircle her by swifter means, depending for support no longer on Earth herself, but only on the airy particles of her outer envelope. Passing at incredible speed, as soon he will, from temperate to tropic zone, from east to farthest west, annihilating all boundaries and barriers, natural or artificial, surely he brings nearer the day when nothing and no one will seem to him "strange" or "foreign," when all Earth's varied children will in truth feel themselves to be brothers in one great planetary family. And when at last humanity is so linked together, so co-ordinated, so spiritually united—in spite of all unavoidable, and indeed desirable, surface differences—then the unforgettable reproach thrown at Galileo, the first man who dared to state openly that the earth was a rounded star revolving round the sun like other stars, can never be repeated. "For," said the Jesuit monks, refuting Galileo's statement in a spirit of bitterest enmity, "the earth is not a star, but a most vile place, full of dirt and wickedness, while the stars are the glorious creations of God."

So has Earth been, so have men thought of her, in the past. But to-day more of her sons and daughters are united, perhaps, than ever before, in willing that she shall rise from the low estate to which she had fallen, until her great, benign spirit be so expressed through her children that eventually she may shine with spiritual light even as now she shines with the reflected light of the sun. Let, then, the flowers that grow

in "star-dust," and bring strange secret messages from their sister-blossoms in the sky, be to us an ever-present reminder of our Earth's "star-pilgrimage," as she weaves amid her partners wide circles in the heavenly dance, bearing with her on that immeasurable journey flowers and mountains, seas and men,

"And all town-sprinkled lands that be,
Sailing through stars with all their history."

EVA MARTIN.

DOES HISTORICAL CRITICISM IMPERIL THE SUBSTANCE OF CHRISTIAN FAITH?

THE REV. G. W. WADE, D.D.,

Professor of Latin and Senior Tutor at St David's College, Lampeter.

IN this paper it is proposed to survey briefly, in the light of historical criticism, a few of the factors in the traditional estimate of our Lord's life and teaching, and to consider whether acceptance of the results of such criticism is inconsistent with essential Christianity.

The basis of the Christian Faith is the history which is contained almost exclusively in the Gospels. These are not, indeed, the earliest of the New Testament books; in date they are later than St Paul's Epistles, and probably than the Epistle of St James and the First Epistle of St Peter.¹ But few of the Epistles mentioned furnish any information about our Lord's life and death, or about the visions of Him seen by His disciples after His burial, though what they supply is very valuable, so far as it extends; and for what we know about Christ's words and works we are dependent mainly upon the four Gospels. These fall into two groups—the first three, usually called the Synoptists, which bear a general likeness to one another, and the Fourth, which is very dissimilar in contents to the rest, and is almost certainly later and less historical than they. Of the Synoptic Gospels, St Mark's is the earliest, for it has been incorporated almost entirely in substance and largely in diction (though with much variation in places) by the author of the First Gospel, and less completely (so far as its present form is concerned) by St Luke. Embedded in the First and Third Gospels is a document, consisting principally

¹ The writer of this paper is inclined to place 1 Peter between 61 and 64 A.D., and to regard James as written between 50 and 52, during St Paul's second missionary journey.

of discourses and precepts delivered by our Lord, which probably is even earlier in date than St Mark. This document, inasmuch as its real nature can scarcely be determined, is commonly denoted by the symbol Q, which, since it is merely the initial of a German word meaning "source," commits no one to any theory about it. It will be seen from this brief statement that for an outline of Christ's ministry Mark is the primary and most trustworthy authority; whilst for a supplementary account of His teaching, the most authentic materials are supplied by those portions of the First and Third Gospels which are substantially identical and which are derived from the hypothetical document Q.

Now, if we wish to enumerate in brief the principal features of Christ's history as represented by these two earliest and most authoritative sources, the summary will be something like this (the various sections being numbered for convenience of reference):—

1. When John the Baptist in the wilderness of Judea was preaching repentance in preparation for the Kingdom of God, which he declared to be at hand, Jesus came from Nazareth to be baptized by him (probably through a sense of humility consequent upon His liability to temptation (*cf.* Heb. ii. 18, iv. 15)); and being at His baptism endowed with the Holy Spirit, was pronounced by God to be His Son, the Divine Voice which He is represented to have heard marking the beginning of His consciousness of His Messianic vocation.

2. After John's imprisonment Jesus repeated in Galilee John's announcement concerning the nearness of the Kingdom, and the need of repentance on the part of all those who sought to enter it, and explained the type of character which alone would obtain admission.

3. In the course of His ministry He healed the mental and physical infirmities of numerous afflicted persons (attributing, in common with the opinion of the time, many maladies to the influence of demons), and also performed various miracles upon inanimate nature.

4. Since He roused the fears of the Sadducean High Priests by reason of the enthusiasm manifested about Him by the populace, and provoked the anger of the Scribes and Pharisees through His attitude towards the letter of the Mosaic law, causing them to seek His life, and since He was compelled, in consequence, to avoid the synagogues, He chose twelve out of His followers to be His emissaries in preaching and healing.

5. At Cæsarea Philippi He acknowledged Himself to be

the Messiah, and declared that He was destined to be put to death, but would rise from the dead, and that His life would be given as a ransom for many.

6. Going up to Jerusalem, He ejected from the Temple courts the traffickers who desecrated them; and thereby occasioning His enemies to make a renewed attempt to destroy Him, He was arrested and brought to trial, and in the process of it He declared that His accusers and judges would shortly see Him sitting on the right hand of Power¹ and coming with the clouds of heaven.

7. His execution being demanded by the Jews, He was crucified by Pontius Pilate and was buried. The Second Gospel, which is mutilated, ends with a narrative relating no more than that certain women, visiting the tomb two days after, found it open, and were told by an angel² that He had risen and was going before His disciples into Galilee, where they would see Him. But probably the Gospel originally concluded with an account of the fulfilment of this announcement, similar to that in the First Gospel (Matt. xxviii. 16 f.).

This summary of our Lord's life and teaching, derived from Mark and Q, offers certain points of contrast to the reports presented by the other Gospels or to the course of subsequent history. The principal differences which emerge in the process of comparison are as follows:—

1. It will be seen that our earliest authorities make no mention of the supernatural Birth described in the First and Third Gospels. Clearly no trace of it can be detected in the expression attributed to the Jews (Mk. vi. 3), "the son of Mary," not "son of Joseph," for it is compatible with the supposition that Joseph was at this time dead. It is in accordance with this silence that St Mark recounts that on one occasion when Jesus was at a certain house His friends (*οἱ παρ' αὐτοῦ*), who are most naturally taken to be His relations, including His Mother, tried to lay hold of Him under the impression that He was beside Himself.³ To the Virgin Birth there is likewise no allusion in St Paul, for obviously the statement (Gal. iv. 4) that "God sent forth His Son born of a woman" no more implies it than our Lord's own words in Matt. xi. 11, "Among them that are born of women there

¹ This is probably a title for God, like *Heaven, The Blessed, The Most High*, etc.

² By the "young man . . . arrayed in a white robe" of Mk. xvi. 5, the evangelist clearly means an angel; cf. the descriptions in Lk. xxiv. 4, Acts i. 10.

³ Mk. iii. 21; cf. v. 31, and the tone of repudiation in vv. 33-35.

hath not arisen a greater than John the Baptist," apply to a class of persons born in an exceptional way instead of to mankind in general.¹ The Voice from heaven at the Baptism, declaring Jesus to be God's Son, suggests that in St Mark's view it was on that occasion that our Lord was invested with the function and dignity of Messiah, becoming such in virtue of the descent upon Him at that moment of the Holy Spirit. There is nothing in St Mark's account of our Lord's baptism favouring the idea that John recognised Him to be the greater Successor whose advent he foretold; and this conclusion that he did not distinguish Jesus from any of the others who came to be baptized is confirmed by the inquiry which at a later date he, through some of his followers, addressed to Him asking whether He was the One who was expected to come²—an inquiry which clearly points to ignorance of His character and office. On the other hand, in the First and Third Gospels (in each of which the first two chapters are mutually independent of those in the other, and represent beliefs that arose in Palestinian circles) our Lord is born the Son of God, through the descent of the Holy Spirit upon His Mother, His Divine Sonship (an attribute of the Messiah, Ps. ii. 7) being carried back to His birth, and associated with a physical miracle, perhaps under the influence of Isa. vii. 14, LXX.³ It is not meant by this that the passage in Isaiah directly created the conviction, but that, when it came to be believed that Jesus was the Messiah from His birth and not from His baptism only, the LXX. rendering of the passage suggested a way of imagining how He became such from the first beginning of His existence, viz. through the action of the Holy Spirit upon Mary, whilst she was still a virgin, which enabled her to conceive and bear Him. In the First Gospel it is implied that Jesus at His baptism was recognised by John to be his expected Superior, for John is represented as expressing surprise that Jesus should come to be baptized by him;⁴ whilst in the Fourth Gospel⁵ John designates Jesus as the Lamb of God, and explains that he had previously recognised Him through the descent upon Him from heaven of the Spirit like a dove, which was discernible by John and not by Jesus alone (John i. 29 f.). By St Paul the pre-existence of Christ and

¹ Cf. also Job xiv. 1.

² Matt. xi. 2 f. (= Lk. vii. 18 f.).

³ The Hebrew word translated in the LXX. by *παρθένος* does not really connote virginity. The other Greek versions render it by *νεάνις*.

⁴ Matt. iii. 14.

⁵ The writer shares the opinion that the Fourth Gospel is not the work of the son of Zebedee.

His equality with God are explicitly affirmed (Phil. ii. 6); but the Apostle, whilst asserting that He laid aside the form of God which was His originally, and took the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of man, does not indicate how the assumption of human nature was effected, but apparently takes for granted that He was born in the ordinary way. The author of the Fourth Gospel identifies Jesus with the Divine Reason or Word, which was with God and was God, and through which the world was made;¹ but whilst affirming that the Word was made flesh, yet, like St Paul, he does not give any explanation of the manner in which the Incarnation was brought about. It is true that in John i. 13 there is a variant reading which replaces the text, "who were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God," by the words, "who *was* born, etc.," and this has been thought to refer to the Virgin Birth. But the reading, though known to Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Irenæus, and some other Patristic writers,² only survives in the Verona Codex (*b*) of the Old Latin version; and there is no likelihood that it is authentic. The author of John, however, was probably acquainted with the accounts of the Birth in Matthew and Luke, and may possibly have accepted them. In this connection the tone of Mary's address to her Son in John ii. 5 is noticeable.

2. Although Christ declared that of the judgment which was to precede the advent of the Kingdom of God He knew neither the day nor the hour,³ yet He expressly affirmed that the Kingdom would come with power within the lifetime of His own generation.⁴ And that this was the impression received by His hearers appears from the belief of St Paul (who in this doubtless reflected the expectation of the Apostles generally) that he himself might possibly be alive when Christ appeared.⁵ That anticipation was not verified by the event; and when 2 Peter was written (perhaps early in the second century A.D.), the delay already caused some to ask mockingly, "Where is the promise of His coming?"⁶

Our Lord's teaching about God and His requirements and about the conditions upon which entrance into His Kingdom depended was naturally determined largely by the existing ideas and beliefs which He desired to modify and correct. A deeply rooted conviction among the Jews was that they were God's peculiar people; and it was against reliance upon any

¹ John i. 1-3.

² The evidence is given in Box, *The Virgin Birth of Jesus*, pp. 228-231.

³ Mk. xiii. 32.

⁴ Mk. xiii. 30; cf. viii. 38.

⁵ 1 Thess. iv. 17; 1 Cor. xv. 51.

⁶ 2 Pet. iii. 4.

privilege of race as a security in the approaching judgment that John the Baptist had uttered a grave warning.¹ But the most thoughtful of the Jews no doubt recognised that not all descendants of Abraham would be saved, and anticipated that chastisement was in store not only for the Gentiles but also for the irreligious among their own countrymen. It was scrupulous obedience to the Law that was thought to ensure admission into the Divine Kingdom; and it was said that if Israel would repent together for a whole day, the redemption by Messiah would come.² It was to promote the more complete fulfilment of the Law and to safeguard the pious against inadvertent transgression of it that the written code had been supplemented by the oral traditions of the Scribes, which constituted a fence about the Law. This belief that the righteousness which God demanded consisted in external conduct regulated by the letter of the Law or by the rules enjoined by the Scribes, without regard to the motives inspiring it, Jesus sought to destroy. He emphasised the importance of fulfilling the spirit rather than the letter, and laid stress on the worth of the inward motive rather than of the outward deed. And the fact that He insisted that God valued morality above ritual involved the consequence that entrance into His Kingdom would not be confined to the righteous of Jewish race, but would be open to those Gentiles who, though ignorant of the Law given by Moses, yet obeyed the unwritten law of their consciences. This is implied in the declaration that many would come from the east and the west and sit at meat with the patriarchs of Israel.³ Nevertheless our Lord did not extend His teaching during His ministry (so far as can be judged) outside the limits of His own country (for His journey into the borders of Tyre and Sidon⁴ seems to have been for the purpose of security against the designs of Herod Antipas); and since He declared that heaven and earth should pass away sooner than that one iota should pass away from the Law,⁵ it seems necessary to assume that He expected that such Gentiles as should enter the Kingdom would do so as proselytes of Judaism.

3. As regards the miracles attributed to our Lord, the two earliest authorities for our Lord's life present a great contrast. St Mark's Gospel abounds with narratives of the miraculous, whereas the source styled Q contains only a couple of miracles. This by itself is not surprising, since Q (as has been said)

¹ Matt. iii. 9 (= Lk. iii. 8).

³ Matt. viii. 11 (= Lk. xiii. 29).

⁵ Matt. v. 18 (= Lk. xvi. 17).

² Schürer, *Jewish People*, II, ii. 163.

⁴ Mk. vii. 24 f.

consists mainly of discourses. But there is included in it a section which seems to exclude from the writer's view of the marvels actually wrought by Christ at least one of the miracles recorded in the Second Gospel. This is the section narrating the Temptation, in which Satan is represented as tempting Christ, in virtue of His being Son of God, to work a miracle for the satisfaction of His wants, and to place Himself needlessly in danger in reliance upon God's readiness to send His angels to safeguard Him.¹ As our Lord is described as repelling the suggestions, it is difficult to think that with His refusal to perform a miracle for His own relief, or to presume upon God's power to protect Him, if He should thrust Himself into peril, such a miracle as that of walking upon the sea to join His disciples,² instead of going to the destination to which they were bound, is compatible. The narrative of the Temptation points to the conclusion that the author of Q had a conception of our Lord's miracles different in some respects from that entertained by St Mark. It is also difficult to reconcile with the idea of our Saviour's character as traced not only in Q, but in the Gospels generally, the cursing of the fig-tree because He did not find upon it the fruit which He needed to stay His hunger and which the abundant foliage promised.³

In St Mark, as already observed, miracles are very numerous, including some of the most extraordinary. In respect of the historical value of the narratives various conflicting considerations have to be taken into account. On the one hand, the writer, like the rest of his contemporaries, had a very imperfect notion of natural law, and must have been deeply influenced by the stories of miracles in the Old Testament. There, several of the prophets, especially Elijah and Elisha, are described as performing a series of wonderful acts; and since Jesus was greater than they, it was natural that miracles exceeding theirs should be readily ascribed to Him. There is a suggestive parallelism between the restoration to life of two children by the prophets named (1 Kg. xvii. 17-24; 2 Kg. iv. 18-36) and the revival of Jairus' daughter, between the feeding by Elisha of a hundred men with twenty loaves (2 Kg. iv. 42-44) and the feeding of the five thousand, between the infliction of leprosy on Gehazi by the same prophet (2 Kg. v. 27) and the healing of the leper. In the Pentateuch, where there exist parallel reports of certain miracles, the later

¹ Matt. iv. 1-11 (= Lk. iv. 1-12).

² Mk. vi. 45-52.

³ Mk. xi. 12-14, 20-25.

narrative generally surpasses the earlier in the wonderful character of the occurrence related; for instance, in regard to the first of the plagues of Egypt, whereas the Prophetic narrative (denoted by JE) recounts that the waters of the Nile alone were turned into blood, the Priestly narrative (P) extends the wonder to the water standing in all ponds and pools and vessels.¹ If from the Old Testament Scriptures we pass to the Gospels, there may be observed in the later of the four also some expansion of the miracles described by St Mark, resembling that just noticed in the later, as compared with the earlier, constituents of the Pentateuch. Thus, whilst St Mark in the account of the raising of Jairus' daughter, though probably thinking that the maiden was dead, allows the inference that she was in a swoon or trance, St Luke represents that she was certainly dead by subjoining the statement that when Jesus addressed her, her spirit returned.² To the numbers mentioned by St Mark as fed with the five loaves and two fishes the First Evangelist adds, "besides women and children."³ In the same way, in the narrative of the walking on the sea, the Fourth Evangelist augments St Mark's account by declaring that when Jesus was received into the boat, it was straightway at the land whither it was bound.⁴ Again, in the story of the cursing of the fig-tree, whilst St Mark represents that the tree was seen to be withered the next day, the writer of the First Gospel affirms that it withered immediately. The process of enhancing the miraculous is scarcely likely to have begun with the First or Third Gospels. St Mark's Gospel, though the earliest of those now existing, must have been preceded, if not by earlier written sources, at any rate by oral traditions; and it is impossible not to suspect that in it the miraculous features comprised in such traditions have been expanded, though positive evidence is of course lacking. A circumstance suggesting that, before St Mark wrote, the stories of miracles had already begun to fluctuate is the existence in the Second Gospel of two narratives of feeding a multitude, which bear so close a resemblance to one another (in spite of certain divergences) that they look like variant versions of the same incident. Some of the distinctive miracles of the Fourth Gospel, as compared with parallel incidents in the other Gospels, have this heightened character. It is noticeable in the story of the restoration to

¹ Cf. Ex. vii. 17, 18 (JE) with vii. 19 (P).

² Lk. viii. 55.

³ Matt. xiv. 21.

⁴ John vi. 21.

life of Lazarus as contrasted with the narratives of Jairus' daughter and the widow's son ; for whilst in these two instances the miracle is represented as wrought upon one who was just dead and upon one who was not yet buried, the Fourth Evangelist describes Lazarus as revived after being dead four days.

On the other hand, there are counter-reflections which, in an estimate of the historical worth of the miracles of the New Testament, must also come into the reckoning. The miracles may be conveniently divided into three classes—(a) those wrought by Jesus on human beings, (b) those of which He Himself was the subject, (c) those which He performed on inanimate nature. In regard to the first class, we have become in recent years familiar with faith-healing, cures by mental suggestion, and the like ; and the existence of faith on the part of the sufferers healed by Jesus (seemingly as a condition of their cure) is accentuated on several occasions,¹ so that, if allowance is made for some historical amplification in the Evangelists' accounts, there is nothing incredible in the relief of various maladies, both mental and physical, which are represented as remedied by Jesus. The influence of personality is known to be great, and in the case of One who conveyed to all who came in contact with Him an impression of authority,² that influence is likely to have been quite exceptional. Ordinarily, indeed, the diseases which are amenable to faith-healing are functional and not organic ; but the boundary line between the one kind of disorders and the other is not always easily defined, and the control of the mind over the human body is possibly more extensive than is generally supposed. In respect of the second class, which is exemplified by the narrative relating how He walked upon the water, some thinkers are inclined to believe that certain persons, perhaps drawing, in some mysterious way, upon molecular energy, can counteract the results of the law of gravitation. It is stated, for instance, that an individual has been seen to float out of a window and pass through the air into another room without any material support ;³ and if molecular energy can be thus utilised, it is suggested that some such explanation will account for one of the marvels recorded of our Lord. The evidence, however, which is forthcoming for the existence of a faculty of levitation is far from being as ample and cogent

¹ Matt. viii. 10 (= Lk. vii. 9) ; Mk. ii. 5, v. 34, x. 52.

² Mk. i. 22, 27 ; cf. vi. 2.

³ See Podmore, *Modern Spiritualism*, pp. 255–256 ; Barrett, *On the Threshold of the Unseen*, p. 70.

as that for the restoration of physical health through psychic influences; and the mere act of walking upon the sea has no ethical quality and throws no light upon the character of the person who performs it. Miracles of the third class are sometimes explained in a similar way, by the contention that the limits of spiritual power are unknown, and that the control which our Lord is represented to have exercised over external nature ought to be judged in the light of the influence which He has exerted over the lives of successive generations of men.¹ But experience does not seem to justify the supposition that there is any real parallel between the religious influence exerted by Christ's Spirit upon the lives of His followers and the control over physical matter implied in the accounts of the stilling of the storm, the feeding of the multitudes, and the withering of the fig-tree. There are grounds, indeed, for believing that a single spiritual Personality, whom we call God, is the ultimate source of both mind and matter; but the laws of each, so far as can be ascertained, are distinct; and though in human nature the spheres of the two touch and the motions of the mind and the will influence the material structure of the bodily frame directly, yet upon inanimate nature mental operations have effect only indirectly, through the activities of the living bodies within which they occur. The possibility, indeed, cannot be overlooked that much that now seems beyond the range of human faculties may eventually be discovered to be within it. Accounts of hypnotism and telepathy, for instance, are regarded now quite otherwise than was the case not long ago. Nevertheless, in the light of our *present* knowledge the cures recounted as wrought by our Lord upon the paralytic, the dumb, and other afflicted persons seem more likely to be historical than the multiplication of a few loaves so as to satisfy the hunger of thousands, or the blighting of a tree by a curse.

4. Though the appointment by Jesus of the Twelve to be His agents for teaching when it was no longer safe for Him to speak in the synagogues, was the beginning of the cleavage between His followers and the Jewish ecclesiastical system, He Himself did not institute any independent organisation for worship; nor is it likely, in view of the speedy end of the world which was anticipated, that He gave any instructions to His disciples to do so. During the early period of His ministry in Galilee the local synagogues were the scenes of His preaching; ² after He healed a leper He bade him observe

¹ See Allen, *St Mark*, p. 37.

² Mk. i. 21, vi. 2.

the requirements of the Mosaic law;¹ and when He was at Jerusalem He frequented the courts of the Temple.² After His death His Jewish followers still attended the centre of the national worship almost as long as it stood,³ and the only distinction between them and the bulk of their fellow-countrymen was that they accepted Jesus as the Messiah of their race. It was not until the great majority of the Jews refused to believe that One who had been crucified and had thereby incurred the curse of God could be the Messiah, and St Paul thereupon turned to the Gentiles, that a separate organisation, in which the rites and requirements of the Jewish law were disregarded, was set on foot. In the earliest Gospel no mention is made of the Church, to which only two references occur in the Gospel according to St Matthew—references that probably proceed from the Evangelist himself and appear to represent conditions initiated in Apostolic times.⁴ In these circumstances it is difficult to think that any particular ecclesiastical system can claim in an exclusive degree Christ's personal authority and sanction.

5. Our Lord, when He declared that He came to give His life a ransom (λύτρον) for many, used a metaphor derived from the money paid in lieu of a forfeited life (*cf.* Ex. xxi. 30; Prov. xiii. 8). The metaphor, like others, does not admit of being applied in detail, though in Patristic theology there was raised the question to whom the equivalent of the ransom was paid, and the answer sometimes returned was, to the Devil. The Hebrew equivalent for the Greek λύτρον occurs in the Old Testament as a figure of speech to describe the costliness of some deliverance (Job xxxiii. 24; Ps. xlix. 7); and our Lord's words do not necessarily imply more than this. It is not improbable that He had in His mind Is. liii. 12 (though the word "ransom" does not there occur), and that He thought of His death as a costly sacrifice rendered necessary by the sin of His nation; but He did not explain how His death availed for the sinful. In early Hebrew religious history the offence of one person could be atoned for by the sacrifice of one or more innocent persons connected with the offender;⁵ but in the Priestly code of later date the principle underlying sin-offerings (both animal and cereal) is very obscure, and sacrifice seems to have been inadmissible as expiation of sins committed "with a high hand" (Num. xv. 30). In the time of the Maccabees,

¹ Mk. i. 44.

² Mk. xi. 11, 15, 27.

³ Acts ii. 46, iii. 1, v. 12, 21, xxi. 26.

⁴ Matt. xvi. 18, xviii. 17; *cf.* Allen, *St Matt.*, pp. 179–180.

⁵ 2 Sam. xxi. 6.

however (*i.e.* in the second century B.C.), sacrifice for offenders guilty even of idolatry was practised¹ (2 Macc. xii. 39–45). On the occasion alluded to, the sacrifice was of the ordinary character, the expense being defrayed by a collection of money; but on another occasion a certain Eleazar, when about to die for his faith, is described as praying that God would let his punishment be a satisfaction on behalf of the people, would make his blood their purification, and would take his soul to ransom their souls (4 Macc. vi. 27). And if our Lord was influenced by Is. liii., where the language conveys the idea that the sufferings and death of Jehovah's Servant were in substitution for the punishment deserved by others, it is possible that He regarded His own death as substitutionary, the sacrifice of His, the Messiah's, life being accepted by God in lieu of the forfeited lives of the unrepentant people. Nevertheless it should be noted that Jesus, on the occasion in question, spoke of His own forthcoming self-sacrifice as an *example* of the kind of conduct which His followers were to pursue in order to achieve true greatness: they were to be servants and ministers; "for the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for (*ἀντί*) many." The passage Mk. x. 45 and its parallel Matt. xx. 28 are the only two places in the Gospels where the proposition *ἀντί*, implying substitution, is used in connection with Christ's death; elsewhere the preposition employed is *ὑπέρ* (see Mk. xiv. 24; Rom. v. 8; 2 Cor. v. 15, etc.). And in the speeches contained in the first half of Acts, reflecting the teaching of the early Palestinian Church, there is no suggestion that the death of our Lord was vicarious, although it is represented as pre-ordained by God and predicted by the prophets.² St Paul, however, in referring to Christ's Passion uses several terms derived from the Jewish sacrificial system, depicting Him as a victim offered for sin (Rom. viii. 3; 2 Cor. v. 21), speaking of Him as making propitiation in His blood (Rom. iii. 25), and declaring that He gave Himself for us an offering and a sacrifice (Eph. v. 2). The Apostle, indeed, does not represent the Father as *punishing* the Son for the sins committed by men; but he seems to have thought that God's righteousness would have been obscured, had it not been vindicated through Christ's dying in place of sinners, though to our minds the vindication, as thus presented, appears to be accomplished at the cost of justice.

¹ The offenders in question were dead, so that there is a parallel to the occasional Christian practice of baptism for the dead (1 Cor. xv. 29).

² Acts ii, 23, iii, 18.

6. When our Lord at Cæsarea Philippi acknowledged Himself to be the Christ, He admitted the application to Himself of a title which in current tradition was given to an ideal Sovereign portrayed in the Scriptures, who, richly endowed by God with high qualities of mind and character, would ensure within His Kingdom peace, piety, and prosperity, and would exercise external dominion over Israel's enemies.¹ A temptation to aim at the realisation of such an ideal of world-sovereignty is represented as rejected by Christ;² and though He did not break altogether with the idea that the Old Testament prophecies relating to the appearance of a King in Israel were fulfilled in Himself, it was as the King pictured in Zechariah (ix. 9), "lowly, and riding (not on a war-horse, but) on an ass," the animal used in times of tranquillity, that He entered Jerusalem. But besides the expectation of an earthly Messiah there prevailed in certain circles the anticipation of a heavenly Messiah. This anticipation finds expression in *The Similitudes of Enoch*, a work of the first century B.C. By Enoch there is seen in vision One, termed the Son of Man, who has been hidden with God before the creation of the world, and to whom is committed the sum of all judgment; who is to cause sinners to be destroyed, whilst the righteous will be saved, and will, with the Son of Man, eat and lie down and rise up for ever. The name "Son of Man," which was first used in Daniel to denote the collective people of the Jews,³ was thus applied by the writer of *The Similitudes of Enoch* to a heavenly Personality; and it was by this name that Jesus commonly designated Himself. And it was in language borrowed from Daniel that He declared that those before whom, at His trial, He stood would see Him sitting on the right hand of Power and coming with the clouds of heaven.⁴ It is difficult not to think that our Lord meant these words to be understood literally, for language of a corresponding tenor was employed by St Paul and St Peter.⁵ But if this is so, they reflect an idea of the universe which time has antiquated, for we no longer imagine the earth to be a flat disc overarched by a solid vault, above which is the dwelling of God. A second coming of Christ in the manner thus described is now scarcely credible except figuratively; and it may be added that a corresponding meta-

¹ Is. ix. 1-7, xi. 1-9; Mic. v. 2.

² Matt. iv. 8-11 (= Lk. iv. 5-8).

³ Dan. vii. 13, 22, 27.

⁴ Mk. xiv. 62; cf. viii. 38.

⁵ 1 Thess. iv. 16; 2 Thess. i. 7; Acts iii. 21, cf. 1 Pet. iv. 7, 13.

phorical interpretation seems necessary of the account of the Ascension in Acts i. 9, 10.

7. The account of the Resurrection with which the Second Gospel must originally have concluded has perished, and has been replaced in most MSS. by one of two alternative endings, the longer being translated in the English Version.¹ This seems to be dependent upon the narratives of the First, Third, and Fourth Gospels, and to have no independent authority. But though the original conclusion of Mark has been lost, it may be inferred from what remains of the last chapter that it related that Christ was seen by His disciples (amongst whom St Peter is especially mentioned) in Galilee. St Mark's hypothetical account is the earliest of those in the Gospels, but a still earlier authority is St Paul; and though St Paul says nothing about the locality of the Resurrection appearances, he in some measure confirms St Mark's statement by representing that the Risen Saviour appeared first to St Peter.² Hence from the combined evidence of St Paul and St Mark it may with some plausibility be concluded that Christ was seen in Galilee first by St Peter, and next by the collective Apostles.³ But if this is so, it is impossible to suppose that the earliest visions occurred on the third day, for Galilee was sixty miles from Jerusalem. It is true that both St Paul and St Mark alike associate the Resurrection with the third day after the Crucifixion; ⁴ but the former, by adding the words "according to the Scriptures," leaves room for the inference that the statement "hath been raised on the third day" was deduced from some prophecy in the Old Testament, such as Hos. vi. 2. The expression in Hosea, "After two days will he revive us; on the third day he will raise us up," probably means no more than that restoration will take place within a brief interval; and similar phrases in 2 Kg. xx. 8 and Lk. xiii. 32 most likely have a parallel significance.

Since St Paul's testimony to the Resurrection is the earliest of all, and is first-hand evidence, it is the best authority for the nature of the Resurrection Body. In the accounts of the vision ⁵ which the Apostle saw near Damascus there is no description of the appearance of the Risen Lord; allusion is made to a light that was beheld and a Voice that was heard,

¹ A few manuscripts (including L) have both endings.

² 1 Cor. xv. 5.

³ Cf. Mk. xvi. 7, and 1 Cor. xv. 5.

⁴ 1 Cor. xv. 4; Mk. xvi. 2 f.

⁵ This term (*ὄπτασία*) is used by St Paul in Acts xxvi. 19: the other instances of its occurrence in the New Testament are Lk. i. 22, xxiv. 23, and 2 Cor. xii. 1.

but there is no mention of any Form. But besides the fact that the Apostle claimed to have seen Jesus, his statements about the resurrection from the dead in 1 Cor. xv., which seem to apply to Christ as well as to Christians, appear to place it beyond doubt that he thought of Him as having a body, though not one of flesh but one of "spirit." It is difficult to feel certain whether he regarded the material body, which was laid in the tomb, as being transformed into the "spiritual" body in such wise as to leave the tomb untenanted, or considered what we call the personality to be endowed at the moment of resurrection with the glory which constituted the "spiritual" body, the former fleshly material of the body remaining behind. It has been argued¹ that his doctrine is to be explained by such Jewish ideas as find expression in the *Apocalypse of Baruch* (xlix.-li.), where it is represented that the earth will restore the dead just as it has received them; but that they will afterwards be glorified and beautified, so that they may acquire the world which does not die; and that St Paul shared this view, only holding the change to be instantaneous instead of gradual. It may be suggested, however, that his conception was different from this. The early Hebrews thought of the dead as retaining in Sheol (or Hades) spectral shapes which were the counterparts of their former selves.² And since St Paul in 1 Cor. vi. 13 appears to regard the "belly" as destined to perish, but the "body" as something lasting, it looks as if he drew a distinction between the "body" and the material of which, in different phases of its existence, it was composed, the first being a permanent "form," which was invested during life on earth with flesh and blood, passed at death as an immaterial shape into Sheol, and was endued at its return from Sheol with some radiant ethereal integument provided by God, the flesh and blood undergoing dissolution in the grave. This is what seems to be implied by the Apostle's language in 2 Cor. v. 1-4, where he declares that if the earthly house of our tabernacle be dissolved, we have a habitation which is from heaven, and with which he longs to be clothed, that he may not, through dying before the coming of the Lord, be found naked. It is not, indeed, very easy to construct a perfectly consistent theory of the Resurrection from St Paul's writings, for he had to take account both of those who were already dead and of those who might be alive at Christ's return, and he seems sometimes to have passed in thought from the one to the other without marking the

¹ See Lake, *The Resurrection of Jesus Christ*, pp. 22-27.

² Cf. 1 Sam. xxviii. 14; Is. xiv. 9.

difference (the latter alone being in mind in Phil. iii. 20, 21).¹ But the fact that in speaking of the Resurrection of our Lord he nowhere refers to any discovery that the Tomb was empty favours the belief that he was unacquainted with any report of such, and allows us to think that into his conception of Christ's Resurrection the actual resuscitation of the physical Body that had been buried did not enter.

In the First and Third Gospels a very different notion both of the place where Christ first appeared and of the nature of the Resurrection body is found. In both of these Christ is first seen at Jerusalem on the third day after the Crucifixion,² whilst His body is represented as so far material as to be capable of being felt and grasped;³ and St Luke describes our Lord as taking food, though he also depicts Him as vanishing out of sight in a moment.⁴ The author of Matthew, besides mentioning an appearance in Jerusalem, alludes to another in Galilee;⁵ but St Luke records none in the last-named locality. If the appearances were caused by Christ's Spirit acting directly on the mind of the witnesses (which externalised the impression) and were not conveyed to it through the senses, there is no reason why they should not have occurred both to the women at Jerusalem and to the disciples in Galilee, as described by the author of Matthew; but since he represents the women as being the first to see Christ, there is a contradiction between his statement and that of St Paul, who declares that St Peter was the first. St Luke, as well as St Paul, seems to imply that St Peter was the first to see the Lord, but he places the occurrence at or near Jerusalem.⁶ The Fourth Gospel, if it originally ended with ch. xx., only describes visions of the Lord at Jerusalem, though it differs in the details of these from the narrative of the Third Gospel; but the appendix in ch. xxi. adds an account of an appearance at a later date beside the Lake of Galilee. This Gospel likewise implies that Christ had a body which could be touched and handled and apparently could take food, though it was also able to pass through closed doors.⁷

¹ In the case of those who might be alive at the Return he presumably imagined that the corruptible constituents of the body would be replaced by incorruptible constituents, without considering how the former would be disposed of.

² Matt. xxviii. 9; Lk. xxiv. 13, 15, 36.

³ Matt. *l.c.*; Lk. xxiv. 39.

⁴ Lk. xxiv. 31.

⁵ Matt. xxviii. 16, 17.

⁶ Lk. xxiv. 34.

⁷ John xx. 26, 27, xxi. 5, 10.

In the presence of these inconsistencies, it seems reasonable to abide by the earliest evidence available, and to conclude (as is there represented) that Galilee was the place where Jesus was really first seen, and that St Peter was the person who first saw Him. It is intrinsically likely that the disciples, after the despair produced by the Crucifixion, would return to their home in Galilee, that they would start after the Sabbath was over, and that they would take some three or four days to accomplish the journey. The accounts in Luke and in the Fourth Gospel of appearances at Jerusalem as well as in Galilee may have a basis in fact; and certainly the appearance to "all the Apostles," as contrasted with "the Twelve" (1 Cor. xv. 7), probably happened at the Jewish capital; but it seems impossible to suppose that any can have occurred on the third day after the Crucifixion, for if they had taken place then, they would have preceded those of which the scene was Galilee, where the appearance to St Peter (according to the best evidence) was the earliest of all (Mk. xvi. 7, compared with 1 Cor. xv. 5). The representation in Mark that the sepulchre was found empty on the third day may be explained through the influence of a materialistic conception of the Resurrection (such as was generally current among the Jews and receives illustration in 2 Macc. vii. 10, 11), combined with a literal interpretation of the phrase "on the third day" (originally meaning, within a short interval). In that age and country the renewal of life after physical death would, in the popular mind, be considered to involve the revival of the bodies of the dead; consequently when reports came to be circulated that the Lord had been seen by His disciples, they would soon be understood to mean that His Body had been resuscitated from the grave, with the flesh and bones pertaining to it. If the earliest visions of the Lord occurred in Galilee, the reports about them would not reach Jerusalem until too late for the Body which had been laid in the Tomb to be identified, even if the manner in which the Resurrection was first proclaimed suggested that the announcement could be tested by examination of the sepulchre, which is far from certain, or even probable. When eventually the belief entertained by Christians that Christ had been raised from the world of the dead¹ did take the form that He

¹ This is probably the sense of St Paul's words "hath been raised" in 1 Cor. xv. 4. In Aramaic (and St Paul presumably thought in Aramaic as well as in Greek) the word that ordinarily means "to rise" could be used to signify the continuance of the spirit (see Professor Kennett in the *Interpreter*, April 1909, p. 268), and therefore (it would seem) could be employed of the restoration of the spirit from the passivity of Sheol to the activities of heavenly existence.

had been raised from the grave, which was left empty, it would be naturally assumed that those by whom the grave was found vacant, and who were the first to see Him after His resurrection, were the women who went to anoint His body.

It is now desirable to sum up the conclusions to which the above brief survey points. (a) Literary investigations having determined the order of priority of the New Testament writings, and arranged these in a scale of relative value as historical sources, two facts emerge. The first is that there is observable in the later, as compared with the earlier, a tendency towards an expansion of the miraculous narratives, though this does not mean that miracles in the earliest are few and not very remarkable (for some of the most astonishing are found in Mark). The second is that later authorities are generally more materialistic in their conception than the earlier, though this generalisation has to be qualified in the case of the Fourth Gospel, where materialistic and spiritual ideas are strangely combined. (b) The inquiry into the beliefs and expectations of Judaism which were current in our Lord's age seems to show that He participated in several. Such were the conceptions of a Messiah and of a celestial Son of Man, which He blended together and regarded as realised in His own Person; of a universal and final judgment, to be inaugurated by the descent of the Son of Man from heaven; and of the redemption of many from the Divine wrath through the vicarious sacrifice of an innocent life, an object for which He was prepared to offer His own. (c) The lapse of time and the prevalence of a different notion of the universe have led to the inference that in the beliefs and expectations just described there are comprised elements which are not of permanent value and which now have to be discounted in the exposition of the traditional Christian faith, if it is to impress modern minds. It is not, of course, implied that there is any finality in the views of the present day; but if the Christian faith is to retain its hold upon the intellect and conscience of any age, it can only do so if, from time to time, there is a modification of those elements in the earlier presentations of it which no longer appear to harmonise with truth and right.

It remains to consider whether these conclusions are compatible or incompatible with the essence of the Christian creed. No doubt, opinions differ widely as to what constitutes this; but possibly a definition which may suffice is that it consists in the belief that Jesus has been, in human experience, the most effectual Intermediary between God and humanity, explaining

God to man and drawing man to God. And in virtue of His revealing, as fully as is possible under human conditions, God's character, and enabling mankind to share the Divine life, it is recognised that He was in a pre-eminent sense "the Son" of God, as He represented Himself to be. In the first place, then, it may be asked, are the illuminating qualities of His teaching and the redemptive power of His influence,¹ and the unique Sonship to which these bear witness, dependent upon His having entered the world in a supernatural manner? Has the fact of His being an unparalleled source of spiritual religion any vital connection with such a physical wonder as birth from a virgin? Even by some who believe thoroughly in the substantial historicity of the two opening chapters of Matthew and Luke it is allowed that the supernatural birth is not the foundation of faith in the supernatural personality of Jesus: "It is because, on other grounds, we believe in the supernatural character of Jesus that we can believe in His supernatural birth."² It has already been pointed out that neither St Paul nor the author of John refers to the Virgin Birth; and it may be added here that St Peter's teaching also does not seem to have included any mention of it. There are three sources which throw some light upon St Peter's thoughts about our Lord, viz. his Epistle,³ some of the early speeches in Acts, and the Gospel of St Mark. In the first of these sources, 1 Peter, there is no allusion to the manner of our Lord's birth. In the speech reported in Acts x. 35-43, delivered by the Apostle on the occasion of the conversion of Cornelius, a brief account of Jesus begins, not with any reference to His having been born supernaturally, but with mention of His having been anointed with the Holy Ghost and with power, *i.e.* it begins with His baptism. It is noteworthy, too, that in St Peter's speeches Jesus is called "the Servant" (*ὁ παῖς*, a term derived from Is. lii. 13, LXX., etc.), not "the Son" (*ὁ υἱός*) of God; see Acts iii. 13, iv. 27, 30. The omission of all reference to any remarkable circumstances connected with our Lord's physical origin suggests that none such were known to St Peter, which would hardly have been the case, had any occurred; for it is difficult to suppose that, after Jesus had been declared to be the Messiah by His resurrection, His mother would have maintained

¹ In estimating Christ's influence, it is important for us to remember (as Professor Burkitt has rightly observed) that the Gospel story ought not to be judged as a thing complete in itself. It is only the prologue to the history of Christianity.

² Box, *The Virgin Birth of Jesus*, pp. 137-138.

³ The writer holds that 2 Peter is not by the Apostle.

silence about anything unusual in the manner of His nativity, or that, if she had broken silence, the Apostles would not have been the first to learn what she had to tell. Finally, the Gospel of St Mark, who was the interpreter of St Peter¹ and who opens his book with the words, "The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God,"² commences likewise with nothing earlier than Jesus' baptism and the descent upon Him of the Spirit. If, then, an evangelist who is believed to have derived most of his information from St Peter, and who in his Gospel describes Jesus as the Son of God, could use that title of Him without any indication that He had no human father, it can scarcely be incongruous with the Christian faith to hold the evidence for the Virgin Birth, confined as it is to the later Gospels of Matthew and Luke, to be inadequate. It may be added that nowhere in the Gospels is it represented that Jesus Himself alluded to any wonder attending His birth as substantiating His claim to be Son of God (even in John x. 36, where an allusion would have been apposite, it is absent); and yet from Him, when once He had avowed His Messiahship, His mother would scarcely have concealed such, had there been a wonder to disclose. It is important to recall the fact that in the Old Testament not only is the expression "God's son" employed or implied in connection with beings like collective Israel (Ex. iv. 22; Hos. xi. 1) or Israel's King (2 Sam. vii. 14); but even the title "God" is applied to persons who, in virtue of their positions or functions, were the representatives of God, without any hint being furnished that they were physically of supernatural birth (see 1 Sam. ii. 25 *mg.*; Ps. xlv. 6, lxxxii. 6 (*cf.* John x. 35); Is. ix. 6).

Probably the reason which leads many to accept the narratives of the Virgin Birth in the First and Third Gospels (which, though not necessarily inconsistent, are very dissimilar and to which are attached discrepant genealogies), in spite of the little support they receive from other sources, is the belief that, without such a departure from the normal mode of birth, the taint of moral corruption which many think to be inherited by the human race from Adam (or from the first of mankind to sin consciously) must have been transmitted to our Lord. The transmissibility of an acquired quality (such as a sinful bias contracted by a person previously sinless must be) is doubted by some biologists; but if it is assumed to be possible, the entail of corrupt propensities would have been communicated

¹ Eusebius, *H.E.*, iii. 39. 15.

² The words *υιου Θεου* are omitted by the Codex Sinaiticus, the Palestinian Syriac, and some other authorities.

to our Saviour not more surely by a human father than by His human mother, unless she was herself free from it. By the Roman Church the force of this consideration has been appreciated, and in consequence the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin has been promulgated; but the doctrine has not yet been taught in the Anglican Church. It is perhaps well to remember that the original Nicene Creed, as distinguished from the Constantinopolitan Creed, which is used in the Communion Office, contained in its fifth article only the words, "who for us men and for our salvation came down and was incarnate and was made man," and did not include after "was incarnate" the additional words, "by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary."¹

Next, is it incompatible with the Christian faith to regard with grave suspicion, in the light of present knowledge, some of the miracles attributed to our Lord even in the earliest of the Gospels, and to consider that the marvellous powers He showed in healing diseases probably much exceeded such as are manifested by various persons gifted with peculiar psychic endowments, but did not differ in kind from these?² Is it not permissible for members of the Christian Church and of its ministry to hold that Jesus, possessing a unique insight into God's nature and purposes, revealed His Divine Sonship through works of beneficence accomplished, not in virtue of any supernatural powers, but by means of purely human faculties. It is significant that on two occasions, to aid the cure of the afflicted, He employed saliva, which in antiquity was credited with remedial properties³ (Mk. vii. 33, viii. 23). And if He is thought of as performing His works of wonder exclusively through the exercise of capacities similar to those which certain human beings are known, or may hereafter be discovered, to possess in some degree, we gain a much more coherent and intelligible conception of Him. In the evangelists' portrayal of Him there is a most perplexing lack of coherence between the superhuman authority and control represented as exerted by Him over the forces of Nature (as exemplified in stilling the storm and the feeding of the multitudes) and the very human limitations of His physical strength and of His knowledge, as shown on various occasions by His hunger,⁴ His requests for information,⁵ and in other

¹ Attention is called to this by Professor Bethune-Baker in his book, *The Faith of the Apostles' Creed*, p. 66. See Heurtley, *De Fide et Symbolo*, p. 6.

² Cf. Matt. xii. 27 (= Lk. xi. 19).

³ Cf. Tac., *Hist.*, iv. 81: "Precabaturque principem, ut genas et oculorum orbes dignaretur respergere oris excremento."

⁴ Mk. xi. 12.

⁵ Mk. v. 30, vi. 38.

ways. He is depicted as acting like a man and like God by turns,¹ a Figure wanting self-consistency and reality. By the hypothesis that the only miracles wrought by Him were cures of mental and bodily disease, the idea obtained of Him becomes harmonious and comprehensible. The Divineness of His Personality is thus visible through a Life that was perfectly human, and He appears in history as real and lifelike.

Again, is the value of what He taught fatally impaired by the recognition that there were included in it certain elements of Jewish eschatology which have passed away with a pre-Copernican theory of the universe? Belief in human responsibility to a Divine Judge, and in the vindication of righteousness over evil, is independent of the particular shape which it assumed among the Jews. And it is immensely strengthened by the emphasis given to it by One whose moral perceptions were so penetrating and steadfast, even if He shared some of the ideas of His contemporaries in regard to the way in which the triumph of good over ill would be manifested. And to the conviction concerning human immortality of which some individual thinkers in earlier ages had become possessed, and which they had transmitted to later generations, a strong assurance has been added by the visions of the glorified Christ, which were seen by many of His followers after His Crucifixion. The force of the evidence that persuaded them that He was victorious over death it is impossible for those who have not had the same experience to estimate justly. But it was strong enough to restore them from despair to confidence, and to nerve them to endure persecution and violence; and their testimony is sufficiently consonant with the anticipations of our moral consciousness to be credible, if it is relieved of the obstacle presented to belief by some of the Resurrection narratives in the Gospels, with their accounts of the empty Tomb and the tangible Body. St Paul draws no distinction between the vision seen by himself and the visions witnessed by the other Apostles; and if, as seems probable, his own conceptions of a spiritual body applied to all the occasions recorded in 1 Cor. xv., we get a much more intelligible idea of the appearances of our Lord than is afforded by those records which represent His body as materialised and dematerialised by turns. The combination of the terms "spiritual body" is not perhaps very comprehensible to us who are accustomed to contrast the spiritual with the cor-

¹ Cf. Rawlinson in the *Interpreter*, October 1911: "No sane theologian to-day regards our Lord in His life on earth as having acted, so to speak, as God and man in turns."

poreal ; but the notion it is meant to convey seems to exclude altogether a physical frame, whilst preserving the essential elements of individuality and identity. And if St Paul believed that flesh and blood could not inherit the Kingdom of God, is it inconsistent with the Christian faith to share his conviction, even though the Church has committed itself to the clause in the Apostles' Creed which affirms, *Credo . . . carnis resurrectionem* ?¹

Finally, is the redemptive power of Christ affected by the moral difficulties attending a substitutionary idea of His Atonement, if He Himself shared such an idea ? Even if our Lord, in common with His countrymen, supposed that the sacrifice of His own innocent life would avail with God to relieve others of the retribution merited by their sins, He at the same time showed Himself ready and willing to make the sacrifice ; and greater self-devotion than this there can be none. It is through the self-renunciation which He manifested, and the challenge which it offers to all in whom sympathy with goodness exists, that He redeems men from evil, and unites them with God. He showed to what length He Himself was prepared to go to save others, even though those others included men whose sin did not fall short of the desire to destroy Him ; and His example has been the inspiration of multitudes. The fact that mankind are so linked together by physical and social bonds that the consequences of evil-doing extend beyond the authors of it, and that the moral redemption of the mass of men can only be achieved by the exertions and self-sacrifice of the minority, constitutes indeed a perplexing and perhaps insoluble problem. It has its roots, so far as we can judge, in the nature of the world and of humanity, and makes us wonder why the Creator has willed it so. But the circumstance that, in consequence of the conditions of human life, the good of the many is largely secured by the travail, and at the cost, of a few, does not cause such a shock to the conscience as the idea that God could accept as expiation for the guilt of the sinful the vicarious suffering of the innocent. Whether our Lord in declaring that He was about to give His life as a ransom for many actually thought of His expected death in this light, cannot be confidently decided, though, as has been said, there prevailed amongst the Jews beliefs countenancing the idea of vicarious atonement. This, however, leaves untouched the greatness of His self-devotion ; and by the appeal which His

¹ The original language of the Apostles' Creed is more faithfully represented by the rendering used in the Baptismal Service than by that with which we are so familiar in Morning and Evening Prayer.

life and death make to mankind He takes away the sin of the world. Happily, the Church has never officially adopted any particular theory of the Atonement, though a doctrine of substitution has often widely prevailed within it.

Numbers of persons both religious and intelligent have no difficulty in accepting all the Gospel narratives at their surface value, and deem all investigation of their relative historical worth superfluous. But there are others who, besides having religious instincts, are interested in historical inquiry and have some acquaintance with historical methods, and who feel in consequence compelled to adjust, if possible, the claims of both faith and reason. In this paper an endeavour has been made to show that the frankest historical criticism of the Gospel records is no bar to confidence in, and allegiance to, the Person described in them, and does not preclude the belief expressed by the author of Hebrews that in Him God spoke as in a Son.¹ This belief does not seem far removed from the substance of the Christian faith. And the writer of the paper, in bringing it to a conclusion, finds much support for the position here maintained in the following words of the Lady Margaret's Reader in Divinity at Cambridge:—"Whether the person who has won [our] allegiance was born of a Virgin Mother or not, whether He could walk on water, or feed a multitude with a few loaves and fishes, or blast a fig-tree with a word, or clothe Himself with a visible body after His death or not; whether disease is the work of demons or microbes:—these are not questions on the answer to which the religious convictions of a Christian depend."²

G. W. WADE.

ST DAVID'S COLLEGE, LAMPETER.

¹ Heb. i. 1-2, *margin*.

² Bethune-Baker, *The Faith of the Apostles' Creed*, p. xiii.

THAUMATURGY IN THE BIBLE.

A PROTEST FROM WITHIN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

THE REV. T. R. R. STEBBING, F.R.S.,

Formerly Tutor and Divinity Lecturer, Worcester College, Oxford.

AMONG so-called miracles none are more impressive than those of recalling the dead to life. In the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures only a very few persons have been accredited with the exercise of this remarkable power. They are Elijah, Elisha, Jesus, St Peter, and St Paul. The persons raised number only nine during a millennium. In five of the cases it is quite reasonable to suppose that instead of a miracle there was only a misunderstanding. This would apply to the child of the Zidonian woman restored by Elijah, to the Shunamite's son revived by Elisha, to the daughter of Jairus, of whom Jesus Himself said, "The maid is not dead, but sleepeth" (St Matt. ix. 24), to Dorcas, whom Peter rescued from an untimely grave, and to Eutychus, the victim of Paul's long preaching. In this last instance the narrative declares that the young man "was taken up dead," though Paul himself is recorded to have said, "Trouble not yourselves; for his life is in him" (Acts xx. 10). In Paul's own experience at Lystra, we read that his persecutors "drew him out of the city, supposing he had been dead. Howbeit, as the disciples stood round about him, he rose up, and came into the city" (Acts xiv. 19, 20). In this case the misunderstanding was too obvious for the imputation of a miracle. The apostle could not be supposed to have raised himself from the dead.

The power of recalling the dead to life is so exceptional that any claims to the possession of it should be treated with extreme caution. It must be admitted that none of the persons favoured with a renewal of ordinary human life make

any subsequent mark in history. They leave no record of uncommon piety or uprightness, no memorials to show whether a second lease of life was fraught with peculiar blessing to themselves or fruitful in instruction to others. Elijah uses this unique power to repay the personal kindness of the widow at Zarephath. The same Elijah slays four hundred and fifty prophets of Baal, consumes a hundred and two soldiers by fire from heaven, and by prayer prevailed with the same heaven against his own country, so that "it rained not on the earth by the space of three years and six months" (St James v. 17). This inhuman outrage is in fact cited by St James to prove that "the effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much." In the history of Elisha there are some impressive features of a lofty spirit. He declines a great reward from Naaman the Syrian, lest the gift of God should seem to have been purchased with money. He inspires his own timorous servant with a splendid vision of divine protection. After capturing an army he rescues it from slaughter, and besides treating it with chivalrous hospitality restores it to freedom. Yet this man, supposed capable of opening the eyes of the blind and depriving the seeing of sight, of making an iron tool float in water, of dividing the river Jordan so as to cross it dryshod, of multiplying food at his will, and of raising a dead man to life by the mere contact of his bones (2 Kings xiii. 21),—this man was not only capable of instigating political treason, but out of personal vindictiveness is said to have cursed a flock of "little children," so that "there came forth two she bears out of the wood, and tare forty and two children of them" (2 Kings ii. 24). Had the mighty prophet wreaked his vengeance on the parents or guardians to whose neglect the little ones owed their want of good behaviour, it might have been a useful lesson for that and other times. As it is, it only makes a pitiful contrast between his compassion for the son of the great lady of Shunem and his vengeance on the little vagabonds torn to pieces by wild beasts.

The narrator shows not the slightest sign of being shocked at the barbarity of such proceedings. He is concerned only to exhibit the marvellous powers of Jehovah's deputies. Hundreds of years later, James and his brother John, the beloved disciple, were eager to punish the Samaritans' foolish bigotry by the use of Elijah's celestial fire (St Luke ix. 54). This savage instinct, though reproved by Jesus, has long survived his endeavour to restrain it. A few years ago (1909) the gracious and venerable Mar Ignatius Abdallah II., Patriarch of the Ancient Syrian Church in Mesopotamia, visited

England. He distributed a pamphlet in which twenty-two paragraphs, each beginning with "Whosoever shall say," and ending with "let him be anathema," minutely indicate the theological misbeliefs for which the Syrian Church invites the wrath of heaven on the misbelievers. The present writer audaciously deplored this orgy of cursing to the friendly Patriarch, who through his interpreter excused it as important to make clear to the great Church of England the strict orthodoxy of the Ancient Syrian Church. So can the righteous think to secure themselves by devoting to destruction those who differ from them on abstruse points of religious opinion! It is true that many persons may escape the threatened condemnation by neither caring nor wishing to say anything whatsoever as to the several propositions, regarding them as matters absolutely beyond human cognisance. But supposing some miscreant were to go out of his way to affirm "that the Son of God, when He sojourned on earth in the flesh, was not in heaven with the Father," shall we frighten him out of his opinion by cursing him, or does the All-seeing Eye need to be reminded that here is a criminal against whom the thunderbolt can usefully be hurled? If we are all the offspring of the Most High, and if the Kingdom of God is within us, then that local separation of earth and heaven implied in the Syrian creed has no existence, and the anathema is futile.

In balancing the good and evil effects of ordinary human charity, more and more is it recognised that caprice ought so far as possible to be eliminated. We are entitled, therefore, to expect that, when superhuman power is exercised in this direction by inspired prophets, it shall be free from all suspicion of a mischievous example. Examine, then, Elisha's behaviour from this point of view. By a miraculous creation of oil he could raise a widow from pauperism to competence. At his will a scanty supply of bread more than satisfies a hundred men. At his word a little salt makes brackish water sweet and barren ground fertile. Yet in the siege of Samaria women were reduced by the pinch of famine to the dreadful expedient of eating their own offspring, without Elisha's interposition. A sentimental or a spiteful exercise of thaumaturgic capacity may excite amusement or disgust in fairy tales or records of witchcraft. When such conduct is imputed to a servant of Jehovah, it is reverent to suppose that the biographer has been misled by his own vanity or by some false tradition—by anything rather than divine inspiration. The same judgment will apply to accounts of miracles in general

when they are fantastic, trivial, or intrinsically improbable. If the whisking of a mantle could stop the flow of a river, it would have been easy for the same agency to throw a permanently useful bridge across the stream. As an inspired adviser in military affairs it has been already observed how nobly Elisha in one instance used his opportunity. *O si sic omnia!* But a melancholy contrast is afforded in a chapter (2 Kings iii.) which the modern lectionary of our Prayer Book now omits from public reading. The kings of Israel, Judah, and Edom, at war with the Moabites, are in desperate straits. Elisha is called to the rescue. He prophesies deliverance, which speedily ensues; and this is how the Voice of Jehovah, by his expounding, bids the victors treat the vanquished: "Ye shall smite every fenced city, and every choice city, and shall fell every good tree, and stop all wells of water, and mar every good piece of land with stones." A commentator appears to apologise for these proceedings by saying, "The plan of thus injuring an enemy was probably in general use among the nations of these parts at the time," and "the stoppage of wells was a common feature of ancient, and especially Oriental, warfare." If such conduct really had divine sanction in those days, unless the divine Mind has changed in the interval, we shall waste our indignation against those who, in the twentieth century of Christianity, have done (as we deem them) precisely the same dark deeds of cruel outrage.

To those who have been accustomed to regard all that is told them in the books of the Old Testament as of equal and that sacred authority, it may come as a strange or even a shocking idea that any of the miracles therein recorded could be spoken of as fantastic. Nevertheless, in almost every department of literature the facts of science are so generally discussed that they make an impression on all but the very dullest or most prejudiced elements of society. It is no longer, therefore, wholly ignorant and uneducated masses to whom this subject is submitted for consideration. We read (Gen. ii. 19) that the Lord God brought every beast of the field and every fowl of the air "unto Adam to see what he would call them, and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof." Seeing that there are thousands of species of beasts and fowls distributed over all the regions of the globe, and that not one single name of a species can be recognised as having been given by Adam, it is folly to impute to "the Lord God" such a miraculous concourse of animals, and to Adam an ingenuity in inventing names for

which he could have had the smallest possible use. Had the names been suitable, based on characteristic features, Adam at a stroke might have become the founder of systematic zoology, forestalling the results which have tardily been obtained by the laborious efforts of many generations. Later on, God, the Lord, is represented as repenting that He had made "man, and beast, and the creeping thing, and the fowls of the air" (Gen. vi. 7). Like a child discontented with its toys, He determines to destroy all but a fraction. So a representative concourse is again brought together and enclosed for a hundred and fifty days in a ship about the size of the *Great Eastern*. It would be a lesson in economy to all the zoological gardens of the world, had it been explained how eight human beings during five months of strict imprisonment (let alone the full period of a year and ten days) managed to look after the feeding and other necessities of this amazing aggregate. Nothing is told us as to the behaviour of the lion and the lamb when released from their irksome confinement. No allusion is made to the consequential miracle involved in redistributing the animals to their appropriate homes in all the degrees of latitude and longitude. Such details may be demanded by the historian or the scientific inquirer. They do not matter to the fabulist or to the simple-minded retailer of a legend.

Apart from the known effects of early education, by which opinions are passed on persistently from one generation to another, it would be astounding that grown men and women should believe in such a course of action as the writer in Genesis directly or implicitly assigns to the Creator. It is enough, they argue, that the inspired writer says so and so. But how can they tell that he is inspired, when his statements are not only in conflict with common sense but also unworthy of divine wisdom? For look at the signal example of "terrifying frightfulness" in the drowning of all mankind except one boat-load. What good did it do? Was Providence so blind that it could not foresee the behaviour of Ham in Noah's family, the crimes that dishonour the patriarchal household of Jacob, the backslidings of the Chosen People in long array, and the dark infamies that range through history down to our own times? For the credit of human nature we feel disgust at the wish of a shameless Roman tyrant that his people had but one neck, to let him slay them at a single blow. How callous or thoughtless we must be in imputing to the divine nature the remorseless, indiscriminate slaughter not of one nation but of all nations in a universal

flood! To get at the hardened sinner, was there no other means available to omnipotent justice than the drowning of suckling babes and lisping infants and unfledged boys and girls? Since Noah is stated to have been in his six hundredth year when he entered into the ark, the limitation of his family to himself and his wife, and three sons with their respective wives, is an almost ludicrous feature. In all those centuries he must have had a crowd of descendants, from prattling innocents through successive generations to men like himself many hundreds of years old. What an ineffective "preacher of righteousness" must he have been that he could make no impression on this vast brood, derived from himself, sufficient to rescue young or old from a watery grave! The ages of his three sons at the time of the Deluge are a matter for conjecture. From their recorded success in beginning to repeople a vacant globe, we may infer that they had reached no very late stage of vigorous manhood. But if they were anything short of a hundred years old, Noah must have become their father when he himself was in his sixth century! On the other hand, if they were born while their father was still a young man, say, something short of a century old, they must at the critical date have been at least five hundred years of age, at which period of life Ham's youthful insolence and their common fertility belong rather to romance than realism.

As is now well known, geology and palæontology give abundant evidence as to the occurrence of disastrous floods in past times. But there is no evidence of a universal flood, and disastrous floods still occur. Therefore it is a vain pretence in Genesis that the natural phenomenon of the rainbow was appointed by God as the token of a covenant between Himself and mankind that a universal deluge should not occur again, since it had not occurred before, while such floods as have occurred in the past still occur, with perfect indifference to the rainbow and its æsthetic beauty, though in Ezekiel's vision that is finely described as "the likeness of the glory of the Lord."

In my earlier essays much has been already said in regard to confidential conversations which in the Pentateuch God is stated to have held face to face with such representative persons as Adam, Noah, Abraham, and Moses. If not exactly what is generally understood as miracles, these incidents share to an uncommon degree the character of the marvellous. It will perhaps be admitted that when in other religions similar claims are advanced we simply regard them as impostures. It is difficult to imagine the degree of sanctity

in a Christian prince of Church or State which would induce us as a nation to believe his statement that he had had a personal interview with the Lord of Hosts. Yet this is believed of Moses on the authority of the Pentateuch, a work of obviously miscellaneous authorship, handed down to us from an age of credulity, and rife with now exposed fables and improbable fiction, such as the change of Lot's wife into a pillar of salt, a parallel to the heathen tale of Niobe metamorphosed into a rock.

Let the conscience of Christendom awake to the true import of its faith, still tenaciously pronounced, in all these miraculous interventions. They are attributed under varying circumstances to the Most High, the only God, or to His coequal Son, in human form before His actual incarnation, or to angels, heavenly messengers from the right hand of Jehovah. What an extraordinary picture of divine justice is presented to us, and cherished as something adorable! Because Adam and Eve ate forbidden fruit the very ground is cursed, and millions of women then unborn are sentenced in advance, irrespective of their future character and conduct, to physical suffering when simply taking their normal share in the progress of humanity. If one act of disobedience could deserve all this complicated wrath, it need scarcely surprise us that complicated disobedience should lead to the wholesale destruction of a naughty world. Since that world became apparently as evil after the flood as it had been before it, one would think that a thorough purging by a few weeks of rain might have usefully been employed a second time. But, to judge by their ill-favoured record, not many of the twelve Patriarchs could have been found worthy of inclusion in a new-found ark. This plan has not been tried, nor as yet has internecine war proved an adequate substitute. But Jewish history shows us that the general principle of indiscriminate punishment was upheld in the case of Pharaoh. Because the king of Egypt was obstinate, "the Lord smote all the firstborn in the land of Egypt, from the firstborn of Pharaoh that sat on his throne, unto the firstborn of the captive that was in the dungeon; and all the firstborn of cattle" (Exod. xii. 29). O hapless captive, why wert thou found fighting against Jehovah in thy dungeon cell? Again, in the rebellion of Dathan and Abiram against Moses, "their wives, and their sons, and their little children" (Num. xvi. 27) appear to have been involved in the catastrophe which overtook the mutineers. That this is recorded in the Book of Numbers may well remind us of a promiscuous slaughter later on, when, because David numbered his people,

the angel of the Lord smote seventy thousand of the men who had been included willy-nilly in the census. David is credited with supposing that the pestilence which followed his action had been caused by it, and with this feeling strong upon him, in the very hour of his humility, he expostulates with God: "Lo, I have sinned, and I have done wickedly: but these sheep, what have they done?" (2 Sam. xxiv. 17). It is notorious, indeed, that in the incidents of wars, plagues, earthquakes, conflagrations, and shipwrecks saints and sinners suffer in the common destruction, and sometimes the brutality or ignorance of human beings may be definitely counted among the natural causes which have levied so heavy a toll on the lives of men. But few of us now attribute pestilence either in our own or hostile camps to miraculous intervention by the Lord of Hosts. We may feel confident that He never did so interfere for "a disobedient and gainsaying people," to whom He swore in His wrath that they should not enter into His rest. In the choice of punishment offered to David the precision of seven years, three months, or three days has all the character of a fairy-tale. Who could hesitate between the protracted agony of seven years' famine and a retribution which would end the day after to-morrow? But the human origin of the story may safely be inferred from the fact that in any case it is not the conscience-stricken king who is to suffer in his own person, except for the comparatively easy burden of compassion for his afflicted people. The record states that the word of the Lord came to David's seer, that is, that he was inspired, but whether by converse with an angel, or a voice from the sky, or a dream, or his own fancy, we are not informed. There is another alternative, that the whole history was invested, for pious reasons, by some one after the event to which it refers, with the air of prophecy. Even in the New Testament we find some of this ruthlessness attendant upon supposed miraculous agency. For when Peter, doomed to death, is delivered from the custody of sixteen soldiers, it is to an angel of the Lord that he owes his deliverance, the chains fall from his hands without waking his guardians, the gate of the prison opens of its own accord. Peter is delivered from the malice of Herod, but not a word of pity is vouchsafed for the sixteen soldiers who in consequence are led away to execution. Supposing that they had all taken bribes to connive at the escape, they may have deserved their fate, but then there was no need of angelic interference; Peter might have walked out of the prison of his own accord.

Consider again the remarkable history of Lot. The cities

of the plain in which he dwelt were to be visited with a punitive catastrophe, similar to those natural convulsions with which in our own days we have been made familiar in New Zealand, Krakatoa, San Francisco, and other parts of the globe. But the overthrow of Sodom has this unique feature, that it was actually delayed by the angel in charge to give Lot and his precious family time to escape. Note the results of this special providence. Just as in the pagan tale Orpheus lost his loved Eurydice, so Lot's wife forfeited her redemption by the same fatal curiosity. The remnant of the family take refuge in Zoar. But Lot did not trust the angelic assurance that he would there be safe. Then follows the pitiful story of a drunken father and deceitful daughters, from whom were descended the Moabites and Ammonites, consanguineous, be it remembered, with the Chosen People, but for the most part hostile to them. What object can an inspired writer have had in ascribing this disgraceful origin to kindred tribes? In profane history we should probably impute the narrative to the malice of a prejudiced biographer, and wonder why such a family could have been supposed worthy of exceptional preservation. There were plenty of thorns in the sides of the Israelites, without the addition of Moab and Ammon.

The life of Elijah, apart from his mode of leaving it, apart from his heroic sturdiness of mind and body, apart from his arbitrary dealing with the lives of other men, is made interesting to many by two miracles, one wrought for him, the other by him. In our Versions we read that, while Elijah was hiding by the brook Cherith at the bidding of the word of the Lord, that word further told him, "I have commanded the ravens to feed thee there" (1 Kings xvii. 4), "and the ravens brought him bread and flesh in the morning, and bread and flesh in the evening." The learned tell us that the word translated "ravens" may equally well mean "Arabians." But the unlearned are not alone in favouring "ravens." Evidently they wish the incident to be miraculous, whereas, if the supplies were furnished by human beings, it would only be a piece of commonplace benevolence. The story of Androcles, the fugitive slave, rescued in the amphitheatre from the hungry lion intended to slay him, is vouched for by Seneca as an incident of his own day (*De Beneficiis*, lib. ii. 19). Androcles had relieved the lion of a painful wound, and the grateful beast not only provided him with food in his desert cave but stood his friend in the imminent perils of the arena. Biology cannot easily provide a more agreeable incident, surpassing the fancies of Æsop's fables. But that ravens should supply the prophet's

commissariat in the way described, without any link of gratitude between them and him, should tax the belief of reasonable men. However this may be, we come to the far more important event, in which Elijah was rather the agent than the patient—the dramatic scene on Mount Carmel, endeared to many minds by the charms of thrilling music, as well as the claims which they hold to be sacred. It is easy to understand that the prophet's successful appeal for fire from heaven and his own imposing personality would win the suffrages of the excited multitude, so that they readily help him to slaughter his unfortunate rivals. But the subsequent history shows us that this revival of religious faith had no permanent value. This theatrical display of a contest between Jehovah and Baal thus becomes in the highest degree undignified and improbable. For a transient and barbarous triumph, is it credible that the Creator of the universe would place heavenly fire at a fallible man's disposal? An American has suggested that the fire was an earthly one, the altar being lavishly drenched with petroleum instead of water. It needs but small acquaintance with the history of Christianity for the reader to be aware that from age to age pious frauds by ministers of religion have been copiously practised. The long record is flooded with what a modern writer has stigmatised as "the grossest deceits, called miracles." They are of every conceivable description, and innumerable. Let English readers study the lives of Simeon Stylites, St Bernard, Fulk of Neuilly; let them examine such examples as the blood of St Januarius mysteriously liquefying from time to time at Naples, the supernatural kindling of holy fire at Jerusalem, the house of earthly materials transported through the air from Nazareth to Ancona by ethereal angels; or read what Hallam has to say of "the prevailing system of the clergy" during the Middle Ages. In regard to the prevalent "belief of perpetual miracles," he writes: "Successive ages of ignorance swelled the delusion to such an enormous pitch, that it was as difficult to trace, we may say without exaggeration, the real religion of the Gospel in the popular belief of the laity, as the real history of Charlemagne in the romance of Turpin. It must not be supposed that these absurdities were produced, as well as nourished, by ignorance. In most cases they were the work of deliberate imposture. Every cathedral or monastery had its tutelary saint, and every saint his legend, fabricated in order to enrich the churches under his protection, by exaggerating his virtues, his miracles, and consequently his power of serving those who paid liberally for his patronage" (*View of the State of Europe during the*

Middle Ages, 10th ed., vol. iii. p. 299: 1853). What compliment is it to Christianity to suppose that the professional servants of God, whether you call them priests or prophets, had a lower regard for veracity centuries after the Christian era than centuries before it? It is common knowledge now that a man may safely plunge his naked arm into molten metal. Science may well have had useful secrets of that kind in old times when a favourite of the priesthood had to undergo a nerve-racking ordeal. At an earlier date it was marvellous that a Jewish saint could pass a night uninjured in a den of lions, but seeing that he was the beloved prime minister of an earthly potentate, how easily may the savage beasts have been gorged with food before the holy man was entrusted to their temporary keeping!

In the earlier part of this essay the suggestion is made that persons supposed to have been restored from death to life had never really died. The raising of Lazarus was not among those considered. In that case the revival of a man who had been four days in the sepulchre was foretold and deliberately advertised as a sign that the worker of the miracle was exercising divine power. Yet the account is surrounded with difficulties. It must surprise us that the chief of wonder-working guarantees is recorded by only one of the four evangelists. It seems a feeble explanation to say that the three who tell nothing about it were afraid of directing Jewish malice against the person of Lazarus. Must not the least sparkle of faith have assured them that the Power which raised him from the grave could protect him from commonplace injury? What was the use, too, of a faith-quickening sign, if the evidence of it was to be timidly suppressed? Passing strange also is it that neither the risen saint himself nor his friends and companions should have told us anything of his experience during the time of his soul's absence from the body. From the promise of Jesus to the crucified malefactor, "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise," one would infer that the soul of Lazarus could have brought back some much-desired information from that region of serene repose. If he had nothing to tell, the suspicion may arise that he had in fact not died, but was only in a trance. On the other hand, the unpleasing suspicion arises of a pious fraud. The young people, devoted to their beloved Master, arrange with him that their brother after an illness shall pass four days in the tomb, from which the divine Teacher shall foretell and effect his recovery. At the dramatic moment the untainted corpse answers the call, "Come forth," and "he that was dead

came forth, bound hand and foot with grave-clothes"—in itself a difficult performance, since it was only after this coming forth that the command was given, "Loose him, and let him go." It may fairly be asked, if the miracle was a real one, why was this favourite of heaven made the victim of it, for, having once passed "the waves of this troublesome world," what was he to gain by a second ordeal? The supposed effect on the chief priests and the Pharisees is also most perplexing. According to St John, they did not discredit this or many other miracles, but thought that a consequent belief in Jesus would lead to a fatal Roman invasion. It is a pity that the persons impugned have not been allowed to supply something which would connect the premiss with the conclusion in this argument. All difficulties in the narrative, however, more acceptably vanish if we suppose that the "pious fraud" is not to be imputed to the family at Bethany and their Master and ours, but to an inventor of the whole story at a time long subsequent to that of its supposed occurrence.

Consider once more the raising or rising of Jesus himself from the dead. The accounts are in several instances earlier than the story of Lazarus. But if their credibility may be commended by their number, it is far otherwise in regard to their agreement. According to St Matthew, early in the morning of what we should now call Easter Sunday Mary Magdalene and the other Mary come to see the sepulchre, "And, behold, there was a great earthquake: for the angel of the Lord descended from heaven, and came and rolled back the stone from the door, and sat upon it. His countenance was like lightning, and his raiment white as snow: and for fear of him the keepers did shake, and became as dead men" (St Matt. xxviii. 2-4). This great earthquake is passed over in silence in all the other accounts of the Resurrection—surely an astounding omission, if such an incident really occurred. According to Dean Alford, it was not an earthquake proper, but a great shock, the sudden opening of the tomb by the angel, He, "by whom all things were made," having previously passed out of the rock-hewn cavern, regardless of seals and soldiers and massive stone to bar the way. But why, in the name of justice, were the unhappy soldiers to be scared out of their wits and to run a risk of their very lives by this dramatic performance, when of all things it was most desirable that the Jewish leaders should come and find their guards awake, their seals unbroken, the stone unmoved, and then on entering—Behold, an empty tomb! In miracles one may reasonably expect some sense of proportion between the means adopted and the object attained.

For the moving even of a very bulky stone a small shock, let alone a great earthquake, would suffice. How could it be necessary for the angel of the Lord, with an awe-inspiring countenance like lightning, to descend from heaven, that is, from the sky, for the purpose of rolling back the stone and giving the women a message which they were presently to receive from Jesus himself? For this dread angel outside the tomb we have in St Mark a young man, also in white raiment, sitting inside the tomb. According to St Luke, after the women had inspected the empty tomb, "behold, two men stood by them in shining garments." According to St John, Mary Magdalene, looking into the sepulchre, saw "two angels in white sitting, the one at the head, and the other at the feet, where the body of Jesus had lain." These and other inconsistencies in the narratives of the Resurrection have long exercised the ingenuity of the so-called harmonists. They need to be recalled to the attention of those who think they can rely on "many infallible proofs" of that resurrection. In the Acts of the Apostles (xxvi. 22, 23) St Paul declares that the prophets and Moses had foretold the suffering of Christ, "and that he should be the first that should rise from the dead." How could he be the first if Lazarus and several others had risen before him? According to St Matthew (xxvii. 51-53), at the death of Jesus there was a veritable earthquake, by which rocks were rent and graves were opened, "and many bodies of the saints which slept arose, and came out of the graves after his resurrection." That a dead body should resist the temptation of rising from an open grave is possibly not surprising, but the reason which to some minds is found sufficient to account for this reserve is truly remarkable. These unsepulchred saints would not forestall their Master's claim to be "the firstfruits from the dead," although according to both Testaments and even by his own action such claim had been negatived.

Spiritualists, I am told, believe that "Jesus at the Resurrection materialised, and a materialisation is not always a perfect likeness, hence difficulty of recognition. Again, at first the materialisation was not very stable. Hence the 'Touch me not.' Later it became more so. Hence Thomas was permitted to touch. Most of the appearances were in the evening, or while it was yet dark, or in a room, evidently to assist the phenomena." For ordinary mortals this varying stability, which permits at one time the possession of flesh and bones, at another the power of rising unaided into the air, may suit our post-mortem capacity. But that the Creator of the

Universe, the Brightness of the Glory of God, should indulge in such eccentricities are two ideas which I cannot with any reverence combine. Fit them, if you will, to the ingenuity of a human conjurer or any imagined or imaginable conditions of posthumous humanity, but beware, I beseech you, of attributing futilities to the Majesty of God.

When an appeal is made to infallible proofs, it may well be asked, in what branch of human knowledge do we find any approach to infallibility among the professors and students? And if we except religion and theology, as under the special protection of Providence, history is crowded with infallible books, infallible popes and churches and general councils, and innumerable creeds contradicting and anathematising one another.

My aim has been, not to say anything startlingly original, but to bring together considerations the most simple and obvious, the least open to contradiction or mystification. There are so many idolatries of which the worshippers are themselves unconscious. It is likely enough that everything which I have urged has long been fully accepted by thousands of rationalists. Nevertheless, there are obviously thousands of preachers, clergy of all denominations, whose appeals week after week to large and more or less sympathetic audiences are founded on a theology which is no longer tenable. The policy of ignoring the evidence against them cannot for ever be successful.

There are some earnest minds prone to fear that all religion will fall to pieces, if deprived of some long-cherished articles of its creed. They may be consoled by reflecting on the whole duty of man in the prophet Micah's admirable summary: "What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" (vi. 8). To these general precepts John the Baptist gives practical illustration for conduct in several walks of life (St Luke iii. 11-14), as Jesus more pathetically in the parable of the Good Samaritan (St Luke x. 25-37). When St Paul says in the Epistle to the Colossians (iii. 14), "And above all these things put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness," and when St James (i. 27) writes, "Pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this, To visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world," these are but central points in their theory of the Christian life, already mapped out in the Sermon on the Mount. In that "candle of the Lord" (Prov. xx. 27) abides a lofty ideal for the true followers of Christ, a beacon set on a hill, spark-

ling with such ordinances as these: "I say unto you which hear, Love your enemies, do good to them which hate you, bless them that curse you, and pray for them which despitefully use you" (St Luke vi. 27, 28). For this management of his life Christ's disciple needs no reliance on legendary miracles, on fantastic dreams, on conflicting reports of aerial sights and sounds, or the supposition that the throne of God is to be approached through a rarefied stratum of our planet's atmosphere. Religion is not lost, even if the most wholesome doctrine "that we are justified by Faith only" (Art. xi.) loses its hygienic importance. Reverence is not impaired but enhanced if we relinquish the presumptuous distinction of personalities between the Spirit of God and God Himself a Spirit, with the interpolation of a phantom man, also possessing the attributes of God, as a third personality.

There were several dramatic incidents in the life of St Peter from which moral lessons of great value might be drawn, but it may be doubted whether any of them would excel the quiet sketch of personal religion which he gives in his first epistle (iii. 8-11): "Finally, be ye all of one mind, having compassion one of another; love as brethren, be pitiful, be courteous: not rendering evil for evil, or railing for railing; but contrariwise blessing. . . . For he that will love life, and see good days, let him refrain his tongue from evil, and his lips that they speak no guile: let him eschew evil, and do good; let him seek peace, and ensue it." The pitifulness and courtesy of the Athanasian Creed had not yet been elaborated. Some of our clergy have given up reciting that venerable document. May one innocently pretend to wonder why? Is it that they can no longer conscientiously invite their congregations to join them in professing a creed which they know to be incredible? St John in a single sentence seems to provide a touchstone for true religion: "He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" (1 St John iv. 20). St Paul too in one noble and celebrated chapter appears to laugh all creeds to scorn compared with the one thing needful, when he says: "Though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not loving-kindness, I am nothing."

One might be inclined to give credit for a certain sublime audacity to the theologians who gradually prevailed with Christendom to accept many extremely intricate mysteries of the kingdom of heaven as having been revealed directly by the mouth of God Himself. Not only in creeds and formal Articles of Religion, but in beautiful songs and hymns, in

prayers, in confessions, as well as in argumentative homilies, the various points of essential belief were, so to speak, embalmed and consecrated. But, seeing that in regard to these mysteries the teachers of old were in fact as profoundly ignorant as we still are, differences of opinion on some points arose, with the result that the disputants forgot all about the Sermon on the Mount and took to vilifying one another, and even employing torture and death as suitable arguments for controverting error. What a shameful record have we of fighting over contradictory falsehoods! If error fortifies itself by reiteration, why should not reproof of it use the same weapon? Therefore I say again:—

Truth is the flaming sword that turns every way, not to keep mankind out of paradise, but to pierce and scatter the sophistries of the crafty, the follies of the ignorant, shameless trickery, and mischievous self-deception. The religion which makes a mock of reason and flouts the teaching of truth may send its missionaries over all the globe, but unless it mends its ways, instead of establishing a kingdom of righteousness, it must itself perish before the awakening conscience of mankind.

THOMAS R. R. STEBBING.

TUNBRIDGE WELLS.

IS CHRIST ALIVE TO-DAY?

TWO OR THREE WITNESSES.

MISS CONSTANCE MAYNARD,

First Principal of Westfield College, University of London.

IT is the opinion of many thoughtful writers of to-day that belief in Christianity is trembling in the balance ; that perhaps it will depart from the world altogether, or that it will assume a form so changed as to be barely recognisable. The cry of the public is on the whole for Social Reform without Religion. That I am a "layman" I need hardly point out, and as such I apologise for coming forward while our honoured and learned leaders are for the most part silent. But if these hold their peace, the stones must cry out.

This peril to our creed is the result of the Great War. For five years the War has rubbed us through so exacting a sieve that our preconceived notions have been rubbed into almost nothing and have fallen through into vacuity, and only the hardest grains of truth survive to bear our handling. There may be several reasons for this loss, but surely the chief one is that under the bright surface of gallant patriotism we have caught sight of deeds of such revolting sin and shame, entailing such hatred and disorder, such suffering beyond endurance, that we dare not look upon them steadily ; and all the while, as Browning has it, "God stands by and has nothing to say." It is not much wonder that some indignant hearts cry out, "Therefore I don't respect Him," or that others turn away with a sigh, saying, "The solution is simple. He is *not there* at all." With some minds I know the War has worked in the opposite direction, arousing the dormant spirit to a sense of Eternity. The poor body is like dust, like smoke, like a vapour, before the whirlwind of physical catastrophe, and the only permanent realities are felt to lie in

the world invisible, among things not realised before—things such as the Soul, Goodness, God; but to most men their pre-War faith has been flatly contradicted by personal sight, and it is natural that the verdict of sight should, however reluctantly, be accepted. Let us examine this matter. In as far as our difficulty is but a part of the eternal Problem of Evil, it is, I suppose, the best we can do to say, "An enemy hath done this," and accept the mysterious position; but in as far as the existence of Christianity is at stake—Christianity which adopts the blackest spots conceivable as a part of its plan, and in fact as its *raison d'être*,—our way is much more clear, for there are Two or Three Witnesses.

What is Christianity? It is imperative to know this, or we cannot tell whether it is lost or not. We are well aware that our creed has become shorter during the past thirty years, and assertions we used to be dogmatic about we now hold loosely or pass over in silence. But what is "the irreducible minimum"? Can we put into words the central spot, the citadel which if lost, all that is distinctive is lost, and if held, all goes well? Is there a core undisputed by us all, a truth worth all the rest of our knowledge, a hope worth our lives?

In order to feel the more free and unbiassed, let us choose a brief summary of our faith as given by a heathen man. Porcius Festus was the Roman provincial governor stationed at Cæsarea, and he found a prisoner left him by his predecessor of whose case it was difficult to judge. He had naturally supposed some criminal offence was in question, but on inquiry found it was nothing of the kind, and only concerned some intangible superstition about "one Jesus, who was dead, whom Paul affirmed to be alive." That was all. If a man is dead, he must have lived first, and it was not so long ago but that one could ascertain that this Teacher had gone about the villages of Judea and Galilee, and then, for some obscure reason, had come into collision with the authorities of his own nation, and was handed over to Rome to suffer the extreme penalty. Dead; that was the end of him. He may have left writings, or an example to influence others, but as regard himself?—*dead*, and he could do no more good or harm. But this solitary prisoner, Paul, said, "He is *alive*," and that means the existence of a continuous force, a mind that can be consulted when a fresh emergency arises, and is a wholly different thing from the kind of "immortality" of respect and affection which we unite to confer on the memory of the great men of our race.

Festus has hit the nail on the head. He has put out his

hand and given a passing touch to the central spot of Christianity. Science tells us conclusively that that which has died is dead, and remains dead ; and experience, gathered both from the long course of history and from our personal observation, tells the same tale. Here are two independent witnesses, and they give the verdict, "Dead." Nevertheless here stands St Paul, representing the voice of the Church through nineteen centuries, and he says, "Alive." Here is a flat contradiction of the most formidable kind. What shall we say ? Faith must be based on reason, or it cannot endure, and where can we find any witnesses able to stand up in the face of those two most potent, science and history ? Ethics are grand, Theistic ethics are better because more enlightened and encouraging ; but the comparatively unobtrusive event on which Festus laid his hand for a moment is the one which differentiates Christianity from these. Our heart trembles at the balancing of the scale. Is Christ alive to-day ? All stands or falls with this.

The method of the Resurrection is not the point. There are possibly more ways than one of understanding it. We love to read of the solitary weeper in the dewy grey of the Syrian morning, and how one single word (and that no solemn pronouncement, but her own name) turned the very extreme of desolation into light and courage and gladness. We have an inner conviction that this is true, because we have seen the incident repeated in the world of the spirit. We feel no wonder that the chronological evidence is a little confused in face of so tremendous an event, and we cling to every detail of how the obstinate doubt was banished from the mind of first one and then another ; but for all these appeals, the bare narrative may go, so long as the present certainty is allowed, that "He is alive." The personal testimony about the empty tomb is in any case too narrow a foundation on which to base a fact so stupendous that it changes the course of human history, and we must look elsewhere.

"Two or three witnesses"—such is the Mosaic law ; two are indispensable, and three are more satisfactory, and we cannot arrive at truth without them. Practical truth, that is. In speculative matters, such as the distance of the fixed stars, we may remain ignorant century after century and no harm is done ; but where we are called to act we must find out the truth, and that speedily. Suppose a man's life is at stake, or the honour that he values more than life, and we are asked to decide whether he is guilty. How can we judge ? It is impossible that we should see for ourselves an event already

past, and we must trust to testimony. One witness will not do, for error or prejudice may easily creep in; but if two are found who come from different points of the compass, at the spot where the lines of evidence intersect will be found the truth we seek. Let us freely admit that this is a different type of "truth" from that offered us by arithmetic. In number we have a direct appeal to reason, and no witness can add to or detract from the certainties arrived at. Witnesses, whether two, three, or three thousand, are out of place. This fact made John Stuart Mill aver that the only sure knowledge we possess is that of mathematics, and that all else is founded on "various degrees of probability"; the laws of Nature represent "a high degree," but as we approach history, the probability becomes fainter. No one can live on these barren regions of number and space, and as the plan of witnesses is the only groundwork on which human life can be conducted, let us accept it, and work upon it.

Seven times in the Bible is this one rule enforced: "In the mouth of two or three witnesses shall every word be established" (Num. xxxv. 30; Deut. xvii. 6; Deut. xix. 15; Matt. xviii. 16; John viii. 17; 2 Cor. xiii. 1; 1 Tim. v. 19). Very seldom is a precept so often reiterated, but in the old reckless days of disregard of human suffering, such warnings were needed. Not one man's life or reputation is now at stake, but the mainspring of existence, the courage, the happiness of some few millions of us; where shall we look for the witnesses?

Our Father in heaven, like a constitutional sovereign, acts on His own commands. If He bids us be just to one another, He Himself is embodied justice, and if He says, "Be ye merciful," He shows more mercy than we can do. He knows the need of a rational foundation for faith, and He has given us two witnesses, so strong that they can venture to stand up against the formidable charges laid against our creed by science and by history. Nay, I believe there is an extra third provided, but this witness is not indispensable, and we will keep him in abeyance. The two necessary are, first, the Bible, and, secondly, Experience; and I pray you have patience with me while I give a few words to each, in explanation (as I apprehend it) of the mighty task before them.

The Bible is, as we know, a national library, slowly added to, century after century, and yet it grows from one root. Grant what scholars demand, grant and grant again, and yet something absolutely priceless remains. Throw over

Elisha's axe-head, if you will; give up those two animals—the most distressing in all literature,—Balaam's ass and Jonah's whale; go on to allow for ignorance, misinformation, national prejudice, and ethical immaturity, and everything else that may be asked of you, and yet a consciousness remains that we are in the presence of Divine Life, of something altogether beyond this world. Here is a testimony to eternal principles which we cannot explain away. Far better than any words of my own on this subject, listen to those of Dora Greenwell, that wondrous prophet who lived in sympathy with an age some fifty years in front of her own; she is writing to Professor Knight of St Andrews University (he of Wordsworth celebrity), and the date is the 5th April 1866, when Biblical criticism had appeared in its first crude impact, and was chiefly represented by Colenso. She writes: "The very strength of the motives which Christianity brings to bear upon the human heart, the absolute claim it makes upon the whole of life, is the cause to which we may trace much of that weakness with which its adversaries have had reason to reproach it. There is, no doubt, a timidity and a rigidity in Christian thought as such. A Christian is too deeply pledged to a foregone conclusion to be bold and fearless in tracking out ultimate truth. He shrinks—*he cannot but shrink*—from issues that are, or seem, at variance with all that is most dear and sacred to him. We know the way in which old-fashioned people hold themselves bound to admire the character of Jacob and to justify the deed of Jael, just because they are 'in the Bible,' though they would blame such acts and dispositions in real life. And this timid way of looking at things, however it is shown, is founded on a deep truth, *a sense of the organic unity of revelation*. Colenso, I do not doubt, is a greater lover of truth, and probably of God also, than many of those who have opposed and reviled him, and yet one thinks he must have heard the shriek of the mandrake, the universal groan which goes through the whole when any fibre, even the slenderest, is wounded." Less than twenty years after the date of this letter, I myself heard an old lady say with triumphant courage—and she was a very honest and good old lady,—“Could not the whale swallow Jonah? Why, if the Bible told me that Jonah swallowed the whale, I would believe it!” There was some awe-struck laughter among the young people at the table, that I fear had in it not much of Dora Greenwell's beautiful forbearance, that reading of a foolish act in the light of a pure motive that is the very hall-mark of regal generosity.

Turning to the New Testament, we find the atmosphere has cleared. That which before was archaic and dim is now transcribed in other words by One who was "the brightness of His Father's glory and the express image of His person," One whose life was, as Hugh Miller says, "the law of His Father reduced to practice." The whole range of thought and hope is wider, loftier, more beautiful, more authoritative, so that we may well ask, "Will not this magnificent Witness serve alone?" *No, it will not.* There is a bare possibility left that the whole is a dream, a vision made up by the best men of each age to satisfy the pining hunger of our needs. Do we feel the laws of Nature like a cramping iron framework round our lives, and long for some power to break them up and show the personal favour of a personal ruler? Such events we call miracles, and we have made up plenty of them in the *Arabian Nights*. Do we wish for a perfect State? Plato invented one, and Sir Thomas More another—both very dull places to live in. Or a perfect character? That is harder, but perhaps invention is conceivable. Are our minds fixed on the melancholy presence of death, and is it our supreme desire to find some outlet? We have the stories of Eurydice, and Alkestis, and others, and beside these Renan's solution comes at once to our memory: "The Hero must not die—at all costs *he must not die.*" In short, man is so made that, however blindly, he must reach out after two things, perfection and eternity, because he is acutely conscious that he is surrounded with imperfection and transitoriness, the two fatal marks of our condition. Why, then, should not his beautiful gift of imagination leap into the gap and deal with things "whiter than snow," "clear as crystal," shining "above the brightness of the sun," and enduring "for ever and ever"? If this witness stands alone, it is at least conceivable that (as the Agnostic is constantly telling us) we "first make our faith and then believe it." Let us now turn to the second witness.

Experience.—This record begins to be narrated in the all-too-short book we call the Acts of the Apostles, and rolls down the ages in a stream we may well be proud to belong to, for, as Professor James says, "The best fruits of religious experience are the best things that history has to show." Amid ignorance, prejudice, and an antagonism to us almost inconceivable, the Church of Christ has brought forth the noblest characters and conformed to the highest standard of ethics of which the age in question was capable, in a series unbroken to the present day. Take a list of names almost at random. Think of the Fathers of the Church and the early

martyrs under Rome, of the mediæval saints, St Catherine of Siena, St Francis, and others, and of the Mystics who have appeared singly in all ages, such as Henry Suso, Lady Julian, and Jacob Boehmen; turn to the Reformers, Savonarola, Wickliffe, Huss, and Luther; to the second crop of martyrs produced by the second Rome—to John Bunyan, John Milton, and the Puritans, who, for all the abuse poured on their lean lives, laid the foundations of England's commercial righteousness; look at the heavenly-minded community of the Jansenists, and the faithful Huguenots, to whom our country owes so much; at the German Pietists, Tersteegen and the hymn-writers, at George Fox and the beneficent Quakers, at John Wesley and the Methodists who controlled for good the very foundations of society, at Zinzendorf and the second half of the Moravian Church; take up isolated names, and see what they have done for the world: Samuel Rutherford, Brother Lawrence, Archbishop Leighton, William Wilberforce, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Dr Arnold, Lord Shaftesbury, Henry and John Lawrence, Josephine Butler, and Henry Drummond; look where you will, down to us who are still alive, even to us, and you will find a similar experience running through the ages, embracing thousands upon thousands whose names are unknown, but all showing an unmistakable *cachet* that belongs only to the Church of Christ. These good things, mind you, are not the result of ethics either Theistic or a-Theistic, nor are they the result of legislation, though in no way would I undervalue these influences; but rather they spring from those who under varied conditions unite to say with St Paul, "He is alive," and, acting on this hypothesis, have proved its truth. Sainte-Beuve, an unbeliever, is greatly struck by "the phenomenon of grace," as he calls it, and says it deserves earnest study, "for the soul arrives thereby at a certain fixed and invincible state which is genuinely heroic, and out of which the greatest deeds which it ever performs are executed," and he goes on to give a beautiful description of the invariable mark of this grace—"severity to one's self, accompanied by tenderness to others."¹

Has, then, the Christian creed no rival in this splendid show? Sir Roland Wilson thinks that "Humanism" may overtake it in the future, though, with the modesty of the true scholar, he admits that the leeway it has to make up is enormous.² In reverent language he reminds his readers that the new creed is an experiment, and has little or none of "success already demonstrated" to bring forward, and of "the

¹ Quoted in *Types of Christian Saintliness*, by Dean Inge.

² See the HIBBERT JOURNAL for October 1919.

very different scale on which the triumphs of the Gospel have been displayed, as compared with any regenerating influence that the whole aggregate of non-Theists, whether called Positivists, Secularists, Agnostics, or Humanists, has up to now been able to exercise." These words are both honest and wise, for at least five hundred years must pass before the worth of the two motives can be rightly estimated.

When Count Zinzendorf was ten years old he heard a learned discussion at the table of his grandmother about the great First Cause of creation. The little boy misunderstood the talk, and, going out alone into the garden, shouted aloud, "Well, if even they discover that there is another God"—"Wenn es auch ein anderer Gott giebt,—so bleibe ich bei dem Herrn Jesu!" That child's determination had something to do with the most marvellous output of missionaries the world has ever seen. In the early days the Moravians never took return tickets, and often died in such solitude that the Mother-Church did not know their fate; some voluntarily sold themselves as slaves to work with a gang in the cruel cotton plantations, and others lived among lepers and died of leprosy. If even you do not believe the dogma of the Gospel they preached, think of the little flame of human love and hope and sweetness, lighted and burning steadily amid the darkest, most repulsive, and most malign surroundings the world has ever had to show. That is the sort of thing Christ can do.

These things are with us still, for the world of space has as varied an evidence as the world of time: read of Livingstone, and Coillard, and Hudson Taylor, and Mary Slessor, and a score of others abroad; and of the Salvation Army, who, this very day, are doing that spiritual scavenger-work which we Church people are not able to do; read and be convinced that here we have discovered the finest society in the world. It is good to bear a noble name and to have heroic ancestors, but it is better still to belong to the "one family in heaven and earth" that is named after our Lord, and to be able to claim all these "knights and ladies of the court of heaven" as our brothers and sisters. For the curious and living point about the whole matter is that if we too can say by personal experience, "He is alive," if we have but a faint adumbration, but a passing glimpse, of the position involved, we at once recognise where our home is, and where we belong. This intuition is somewhat the same in art. When young Murillo first saw the supremely good work of Velasquez, he was not overwhelmed: he hardly paused to express admiration, but, feeling the urgent response within,

he said, "And I, too, am a painter!" When a student, Antonio Allegri (for that was his real name) had painted his first picture; he knew from the testimony of this imperfect effort that he belonged to the great brotherhood of art, and, thinking himself alone, danced up and down before the easel, singing "Hurrah for Correggio! for Correggio!" Correggio was his native village, but from this incident the name was attached to the artist for life. Our "citizenship," or whatever we like to call it, is something like that.

Such is the testimony of Experience. Even with only the Old Testament to look back upon, one writer calls it "a great cloud of witnesses," and it is a thousand times better now, because, being more varied, there is a more definite differentiation between unity and uniformity. We speak every language, conform to every custom, and some of our skins are yellow, some brown, and some inky black, yet we can all sing the *Te Deum*, and *All hail the power*, and *How sweet the name*, and the whole body may be described as "Holy, Catholic and Apostolic"—holy, because we try to become so by obeying our increasingly enlightened conscience; catholic, because we are one all the world over, both as to space and time; and apostolic, because ever and again we push past the growing accretions of mistake, and revert to the day of Pentecost and the teaching which immediately followed. Much is said, and said bitterly, about the disunion of the Church; but look closely, and you find that is a trifle compared with the standing miracle of its unity. Sainte-Beuve rightly says, "The fruits peculiar to this condition of the soul have the same savour in all, in St Teresa of Avila, just as in any Moravian brother of Herrnhut." The largest waves on the ocean, those off Cape Horn and Cape Agulhas, are said to be not more than thirty-five feet high from top to base, and what is that as against the miles of still water below? Unfortunately the big waves roar till you cannot hear yourself speak, and the little waves slap noisily about, while the grand unplumbed depths below have no voice. They are silent, because at rest. When you think of the mid-ocean, it is a mistake to think only of the waves. Such is the unity of the Church.

If one gets on a subject one loves with all one's heart, one may easily give the neighbours too much of it, and here I must crave pardon. But it is a wonderful thing to have this evidence straight before our eyes. In these days we cannot help our faith getting into difficulties. The Good

Shepherd came once into the world, and has He left it again because the wolf pounced down upon us in the shape of the Great War? Has He fled and left us? "But He is invisible." That is the worst of it, *invisible*. What shall we do? We have advice given us. "If thou know not"—that is the Agnostic position,—“go thy way forth by the footsteps of the flock.” Footprints are faintly to be seen in the desolate places of the earth, follow the way they point, and see how closely they converge and thicken as we approach the centre, till there is hardly a square inch unmarked. In the midst, unseen, we may have some reason in supposing that the One stands who said, “I was dead, and behold I am alive.”

It is difficult to distrust such multiplied testimony. Is, then, this witness enough alone? *No, it is not*. Professor James, in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, tries to take it alone, and this is the reason why, after all his noble testimonies gathered from every quarter, his conclusions are so curiously limited and hesitating. There remains always a chance, even if a small one, that we are dealing with mental delusion. Turn to the history of thought during our own lifetime, and you will see that the “storm-centre” has changed. Hostility used to be directed against the letter of the Bible, the inspiration of the past. The critics furnished facts, and the enemy made use of them, and again and again said with satisfaction, “Now your Word of God is torn to bits.” Prompt as an echo came the reply of the Church: “It is not a fraction the worse; it is still the Word of God to us.” Tired of our hopelessly unreasonable obstinacy—the same which Marcus Aurelius complained of in his day, and which Dr Inge happily translates by “pure cussedness,”—our foes have picked up a wholly new set of weapons, this time furnished us by the experts in psychology, and they attack what we may term the inspiration of the present. They now declare that the whole series of the Christian experience—the sense of sin, pardon, guidance, courageous joy, and all else—can be imitated in the hypnotic trance, and can be explained by “auto-suggestion” and other workings of the subliminal consciousness. Is our second witness then demolished? The attack is serious, because the suitable apologetic has scarcely yet had time to arise, but the way out lies along the same lines as before. Admit the facts, but deny the conclusions drawn from those facts. Our wise Creator works as strictly through mental laws when he deals with our souls as he does through physical laws when He deals with our bodies: there is no doubt of that, and no doubt either that

we are far more ignorant of the mental than we are of the physical laws; but this does not settle the question that the testimony of the result is false, and that no objective reality lies behind the experiences.

Let us now combine our Two Witnesses. One chance in a dozen exists that the Bible is the record of a pathetic dream, and possibly a stronger chance that our experience is due to delusion, but if the two are taken together that chance is reduced to a very low figure indeed. There is final and conclusive authority in neither, and yet the point where the lines intersect brings us to so very high a degree of probability that it is not unreasonable to act upon it. Faith is still needed, but it is not used to stultify reason. As an illustration, think of a book on chemistry describing an experiment that seems as you read of it to be absurd and to contradict the rest of our knowledge, *e.g.* that out of two transparent colourless liquids can be formed a scarlet solid. Some faith in the writer you must have, or you would not go up to the laboratory to try the experiment, faith sufficiently strong to stand a few disappointments, owing (you gradually discover) to your own inaccuracy; but when the book and the experience at last coincide, and the amazing result lies before you, you would be right in saying that you had found the truth. Your work might be empirical, and you might not have the least glimpse of understanding as to how the result came about, and yet you would be sure the advice given you was not against the laws of Nature but in accordance with them, and that the same effect was certain always to follow the same delicate series of causes.

In a similar way we may act upon the advice of the Bible. Had we nothing left but the Psalter, it would be enough. Here is an ancient book of songs that run through the whole spiritual gamut, from a grief and depression that is all but despair up to an exultant confidence and joy that can scarcely find itself words. This book deals with the most subtle and hidden part of our souls—a part where reticence is natural to us, because emotion is more prominent than thought,—and yet it fits our hearts as a key may fit a lock. If we can take any psalm, even the most doleful, and say in private, “It was not David wrote that, and not Asaph, and not some unknown post-exilic son of Israel, it was I myself; I wrote it,”—then we know something of what inspiration means, whether it is of the past or of the present. If we cannot say such words, it is wiser to leave the subject alone.

Only two witnesses are necessary, and these two we all may arrive at. Our Lord Himself quotes the oft-repeated text as, "It is written in your law, that the testimony of two men is true." John the Baptist had the first only, and he felt the ground sinking beneath his feet, so unlikely did it seem that the last of the long series of prophets had been reached. The two disciples came back bringing him the second witness, and he was fully content. We too may hesitate, but though the miracles are worked on mind now, there they still are; the ignorant are enlightened, the weak of will are strengthened to act, the morally infectious are cleansed, the materialistic hear the claims of the world invisible, and the totally indifferent begin to stir with a new life. If we look in the right places, we may see these things still going on.

It would be very pleasant, to say the least of it, if in these days of extreme difficulty, the third witness would appear and speak up. To some the Bible appears to be "a hopelessly mutilated document," and to others spiritual experiences, even those often repeated, seemed to be riddled through and through with doubts as to their origin. It would be very satisfactory if another testimony arose from a different point of the compass, a voice wholly without collusion, that should endorse, even if only by a few words, the verdict of the other two. And we have it. The Rosetta Stone was but a short fragment dealing with an obscure subject, and yet its few and broken lines verified Champollion's patient labours of the fourteen years past. Even so our third witness is partial and interrupted, and yet it is strongly corroborative. In what direction shall we look? God, who sent us the Bible written through a considerable space of time "in many parts and various fashions," He who evolved the soul of man through a period perhaps a thousand times as long—has He created some other thing in the same manner? He has. This visible and tangible world, which may well have taken a thousand times as long again to bring up from inchoate, formless, timeless ages to its present perfection of order,—that is the extra or supplementary witness.

Nature.—By this word we express the vast surrounding universe, from the sweep of the fixed stars to organisms of microscopic dimensions. This is, I know, the very region where men say God and Goodness are not to be found, but all is pitiless Law that "grinds out life and grinds out death," careless of pain. You may dissect the brain and nerves of man, and no soul is to be found; you may dive into infinite

space, and find neither God nor heaven. If you grope about to discover the ultimate constitution of matter, you may possibly get a little nearer, for as the idea of matter (as solidity) retreats, its place is occupied by that wondrous thing we call Force, and thus we may arrive at Herbert Spencer's thought of God as "the Infinite Energy that lies behind phenomena"; but this is not the God of Christianity, and the inexorable iron framework we find on all sides of us seems to preclude further advance in our knowledge of the character of the supreme Ruler.

Is this really so? Turn from science to history; turn from what seems likely to be the effect on the mind of man to that which actually has been, and we shall see a sight which tends to reverse this judgment. It is shown in three main stages:—

First, there is Primitive Man. He is a poor low creature, a good deal more repulsive than the ox and the ass that are beginning to serve him; how shall he be brought to have a care beyond eating and multiplying his kind? how be given even the faintest idea of a power superior to himself with which he might cultivate relations? It is Nature gives the first conceptions. Whether it were the steady beneficence of the sun, or the destructive crash of the thunderstorm, here is something before which to bow. This is a point gained, for no animal (not even the elephant) can offer worship.

Secondly, the testimony of the cleverest of all people, the Greeks. Never, I think, did they look on Nature as cruel, but as a bounteous mother, not only "filling their hearts with food and gladness," but giving glimpses into the world invisible. Socrates called the sun the "child of God," and other writers spoke of the transitory death of the insect in the chrysalis and its emergence in a new and better form as giving a comforting glimpse of a nobler life beyond the grave.

Thirdly, look at the greatest Teacher the world has ever known, and observe His constant use of such analogies. At one period indeed, He seems to have taught by means of nothing else—"Without a parable spake He not unto them." And what was the result? "And all the people were very attentive to hear Him," "and they came early in the morning for to hear Him." As a teacher myself, my heart glows over such words as these, for the great work is half done if keen interest is awakened, and I love the immature minds who to this very day have the same characteristics as of yore. They can hold to a parable (for I have tried it) and can carry away some new thought about God and the soul, and keep it by them for

years, being always reminded by the presence of some outer object which, in sacramental fashion, has been to them associated for ever with the invisible world of the spirit.

Before going further, let me bring forward the limitations of our third witness. There is in Nature no parallel to the freedom of the will in man, and this failure has effects so widespread that it renders more imperative than ever the distinctive revelation of the Gospel, which may almost be said to deal with nothing else. For instance, one of the supreme laws of Nature runs thus, "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap," and the whole of agriculture is founded on this obvious truth. What, then, of the possibility of pardon which steps in between the sowing and the reaping, and makes the one not (at any rate not fully) correspond with the other? Nature replies, "Pardon is not possible; nor were it possible, is it desirable"—a remark which is the foundation of the strangely blind verdict we sometimes hear, "The Gospel of Christ is not framed in the interests of virtue." I care only to answer Nature's version, and I tell her that though she has hold of a profound truth she makes a mistake in its application through ignorance of the nature of man. There is no use in forgiving a billiard-ball for missing the mark, and hoping through kindness to turn it into better ways, but as soon as you deal with vitality you are in another world. Even a plant can be trained, and a horse can be made to understand your mind in a marvellous way. Take a step onward, and imagine a being who can be dealt with without the physical touch, by moral suasion alone. The reason demands an explanation, and the heart is won by an exhibition of love and self-sacrifice; give a clean slate as regards the past, help for the present, and hope for the future, and (on account of man being made as he is) you can awake contrition and gratitude, and the desire to follow and obey an ideal. At one blow you have all the constituents of the highest ethics. These facts have been proved a million times over.

Take Nature for what she is worth, forgive her the Great Omission, and you will find her a noble teacher. Reverting to our Lord's parables, we see they are of two classes—first, those drawn from surrounding objects, such as the germinating seed, the hen and chickens, or the power of light; and, secondly, those drawn from the actions of men. He knew exactly the point where Nature began to stand dumb and inadequate, and whenever He wanted to portray man's responsibility or God's forgiveness He tells a tale of entrusted talents, or of a prodigal

son. But this does not invalidate the worth of the seeds or the chickens, or the lighted candle.

These things are not proofs, they are merely illustrations; but when some scores of illustrations all point the same way and will all bear the same interpretation, the probability that they are not accidental but intentional becomes very high indeed. The appeal is a new one, to the eye rather than to the ear, but the tale told is the same. Suppose you are struggling to understand the working of a complex machine such as a turbine, and are beginning to grasp the main principle, when, on turning the page, you see a diagram. You may feel almost annoyed. "Why did you not show me this before? It is all as clear as the light!" No, my friend; without the initial understanding, without the letterpress, it falls on unheeding eyes, and the arrows pointing this way and that way, and the little alphabet and footnotes would be equally unintelligible. The diagram tells you nothing new. It is only after you have attained some mental outline that it begins to be of use; moreover, you can then read the sign-manual which is our point to-day, namely that the drawing came from the same mind as the text.

A teacher must never disport himself outside the range of the knowledge of his audience, but must carefully and gently step from the known to the unknown. Our Lord had a rural congregation, and so He dealt with sparrows and lilies and other familiar sights; but I cannot help thinking that if He were here to-day and were preaching at Oxford or Cambridge, He would take up more difficult matters. The presence of the bacteria of disease gives us the only analogy in the least adequate to represent that hostile power that seeks to feed its own life and destroy that of the soul of man; the action of electricity on various kinds of matter is a wonderful illustration of the influence of the Spirit of God on the human character, and contains urgent warnings as to how easily this mighty force may be baffled and lost by some slight barrier at the point of contact. I think He might speak of things such as these.

In closing, may I offer one such parable, one which bears on the subject we began with—the great division of opinion among men about Christ the Lord, Festus heading the majority by saying, "He is dead," and St Paul the minority by saying, "He is alive"?

We all know that the moon causes the tides; that her power of attraction is a real thing, not strong enough to pull

over the whole body of the earth, but fully strong enough to pull up the ocean into a great sloping wave, which always stands steadily beneath her, but which (on account of our rotation) seems to us to go sweeping round the globe every twelve and a half hours. This hill of water is, in the open ocean, not much more than thirty feet high, though it covers hundreds of square miles in size, and there it remains, the particles changing, but the form never—a witness to the perpetual presence and force of the moon. The nature of water is to fall down, and never rest until it had attained the lowest place possible, but here is a comparatively small body of water, having the same weight and tendency as the rest, that does not obey that law, but chooses to stand a little above the usual level. Now suppose for a moment that the moon was invisible and always had been so—a change that would easily be effected by a slight permanent thickening of our atmosphere,—what would be the result? The tides would go on exactly as they do to-day, but it would be hard to account for them. In early days they would be accepted without inquiry, and then as science awoke and rubbed its eyes, there might be some silly attempts at explanation, like Charles the Second and his fish in a glass bowl; and finally, as the powers of observation and of calculation increased, scientific men would discover that the only hypothesis that could satisfy the facts would be found in supposing a great body hanging in the sky, and exercising a counter-attraction on the water. Then the size and weight of the moon would be calculated with great exactness, its distance from the earth, and all its movements (which are exceedingly complex), and nothing would be wanting to our knowledge but its appearance, to which we should have no clue. And from what would this mass of knowledge be derived? From the presence and movement of a belt of water which defies the universal laws of earthward gravitation; that and nothing else. A witness on the earth to the existence of some power in the sky, strong but invisible.

I need hardly translate. Our Lord is represented by the moon, the nations are the ocean, and the Christian Church is the raised belt of water. He is invisible, and so there are some things about Him that cannot be known, but His main characteristics are clear. He is there, a real acting presence, and so powerful that He can draw human hearts away from their natural downward trend of self-interest, and lead them to follow and obey Him up to the heights of heroism. We admit the hypothesis “He is alive” is a stupendous one; but

find another, if you can. The power of the moon will account for everything we know about the tides of the ocean, from "the reversible cataract" of the Bay of Fundy to the rise of an inch on some unknown shore. Even thus can spiritual phenomena be accounted for by this one hypothesis from the greatest to the least, and I believe by no other.

This illustration is no proof, it is not even an argument. It is only the second witness told over again in the form of a picture. Instead of having to read history, and to note one by one "the noble roll-call of heroes and martyrs, saints and missionaries," you look at a diagram silently held up by Nature, that gives you the principle of the whole position at a glance. Collusion is impossible.

Among the millions of facts furnished by the surrounding universe it would be strange if one here and one there could not bear spiritual interpretation. Of this I am well aware, and can only say that when you find a hundred such analogies, chiefly shown in the laws that rule the vast impersonal forces, a conviction begins to dawn that there is more here than coincidence, and that the same Mind that sent us Revelation has inserted these diagrams here and there in the great picture-book of Creation, to tell the same tale in another language.

Such are the Two or Three Witnesses, and, though the difference between Festus and Paul involves questions of overwhelming weight, up till now our Witnesses have been able to support them, and we believe they will do so in the future and to the end of time.

CONSTANCE MAYNARD.

LITTLE BOOKHAM, SURREY.

WHAT IS PRIMITIVE ?

A. M. HOCART.

THE word "primitive" ought to be banished from the vocabulary of the historian. It is the great patron of obscure ideas, the harbourer of unauthorised assumptions, of surreptitious theories that slip in disguised as self-evident truths. It is the enemy of simple and precise ideas, for it flourishes in obscurity. Turn the light on it, and it is exposed; define it, and its power is gone.

What is primitive? That which is first, that which was in the beginning. Primitive man is man as he first emerged from the brute; primitive culture is the culture he founded.

We know something about the physique of primitive man, because we have found his bones. Those modern races that resemble him may justly be described as primitive; they are nearer to the original, to the really primitive. So far everything is straightforward: knowing the starting-point, we can measure the distance which modern races have travelled away from it: those who have covered least ground are primitive compared with the rest; they lag furthest behind.

It is when we come to the works of man that ambiguity creeps in. An object is called primitive in two senses—either because it was used by primitive man, or because it is the earliest form of its type. A stone implement is said to be primitive because it belongs to prehistoric times. On the other hand, we speak of primitive Christianity, meaning the earliest stage of a comparatively new religion; and the Van Eycks are primitive, not because they are ancient, but because they were pioneers of Flemish art. This latter usage is open and above-board; there lurk no secret treaties behind it. Would it were the only one ever accepted in history; but the other one has often substituted itself with its train of stealthy assumptions.

So long as we are dealing with prehistoric remains no harm is done; we know that stone implements are primitive because they are found associated with bones of prehistoric men. Modern races which still use stone implements are therefore justly said to use primitive tools. The case is different with language, religion, social organisation; we know nothing, absolutely nothing, about the thoughts of primitive man or how he expressed them, how he behaved towards his fellows, and what was his attitude towards nature and death. Did he marry or give in marriage? Did he live in families or tribes? Did he recognise degrees of kinship and abhor incest? Did he people the universe with occult powers, or take it all as a matter of course? Had night any terrors for him beyond the danger from foe or wild beast? Did he bless the sun for shining and the clouds for watering the earth? All that side of his existence is to us perfect blank. How then can we say that this or that custom is primitive which we find at this day? It is comparing the known to the unknown and pronouncing them alike. The anthropologist is busy measuring the distance which customs have travelled from a starting-point of which we do not even remotely know the position.

If anyone should say, "We do not know what may have been the customs of the Hivites, and the Jebusites, and the Perizzites, therefore we cannot tell if any of them survive in modern Palestine," his words would pass unnoticed as a truism; no one would mind, because nobody ever suggested the contrary. But let one arise and say, "We know nothing of primitive thought, therefore we cannot tell what primitive ideas still subsist in our modern world"—out upon him for a miscreant and a heretic! Have not books been written about primitive culture? Have not lecturers made it their theme and societies discussed its details? Have not expeditions gone out to study it in the Arctic regions and below the line, in the recesses of savage continents, and in the scattered islands of the tropic seas?

The anthropologist's views concerning primitive man rest on a basis scarcely better than the public's faith in the latest meat extract or patent pills. The names of Bovo or Dean's Stomach Pills posterred large on every wall and every fence soak into the mind, till they become familiar without our remembering why: to be so well known, it is concluded, they must be in great demand; so everyone asks for them, and thus creates the demand which perpetuates their reputation.

Even so we are obsessed with the name of primitive culture, till we come to believe that we really know all about it, and

thus we land ourselves in a vicious circle from which it is difficult to emerge. First of all we slide quite unconsciously from the obvious fact that the modern savage is primitive in his physique or his dress or his weapons, into the assumption that he is also primitive in his religion and polity. Out of the customs of the savage, then, we construct a model of primitive culture. This model in its turn is used to prove the primitive character of modern savage customs. Totemism is found among the rude Australian blacks, therefore it is a primitive institution; the Australian blacks are totemistic, therefore they are primitive in culture; and so we go on in a circle.

There is no justification for the assumption that the culture of the savage represents that of primitive man. Because a race is primitive in appearance, it does not follow that it is primitive in other respects. You cannot change your face, but you can change your language or your religion. Among students of civilised races it is a commonplace that you cannot argue from the physique to the language, from the language to the religion, from the religion to the social organisation. No one suggests that the people of Savoie are Alpine in culture because they are Alpine in race, or that French architecture is Latin because the language is Latin. Yet students of savage races do not hesitate to use stone implements as an index of the religion in whose company they are found. Wherefore this inconsequence? Why do we forget in the tropics the truths which we have learnt in the temperate zone?

It may be contended that though a race primitive in its type is not necessarily primitive in its customs, it is more likely to be so than a higher race, and that we are therefore justified in seeking among them for the most ancient forms of culture. So far from admitting this, I will maintain that the savage is the least likely to have preserved his customs unaltered through the ages, that he is the last person to give us trustworthy information about the thoughts of primitive man. The reader will think I am carrying the passion for paradox rather too far. But let him have patience yet a while, and he will find that it is not quite such a paradox as he imagines.

If there is a difference between the savage mind and the civilised, it lies in the force of personality. Those savages I have met have impressed me by their weakness of character compared with ours: they have not the same determination as white men, nor the same unswerving devotion to distant ends; they have not that intensity of belief which impels us to make sacrifices for the triumph of our views. They are easily overawed and dominated by the white man, though they

be one against many; they grumble, yet they comply, and their murmurs are hushed when he appears. Nor is this peculiar to those I know: narratives of exploration and missionary work show that they are seldom able to withstand the forceful ways and persistency of the white man; they take the impression of his will as wax yields to the hardness of the seal. A lonely missionary unarmed will in a few years convert a whole tribe by the mere insistence of his dictatorial will. Everywhere savage customs go down before European ideas, and the higher civilisations alone remain standing and still defiant. Thus rude tribes have become less primitive than mighty nations, and the last have become the first. The Hindu still prays to his Vedic gods, but the Methodist Fijian worships God according to rites not two hundred years old. The Chinaman continues faithful to the immemorial cult of his ancestors, while the African negro has adopted the recent austerities of the Mahommedan creed.

What is happening now has surely happened in the past. We are not the first masterful people to have moulded weaker brethren to their will. Migrations are not a recent thing; they are as old as the ages. Everywhere we find the tracks of peoples that have moved about the world carrying with them their beliefs; and as we spurn barbaric ideas and seek to supplant them by our own, so did they everywhere teach that what they held was right and meet. Not the least rich in traditions of such propaganding immigrants is Australia, that hunting-ground for all searchers after the primitive; yet the aborigines themselves tell us that some of their most fundamental customs were taught them by strangers. The neighbouring islands have the same tale to tell, and those are most silent about the origins of their customs who possess the highest civilisation.

Need we wonder? Proselytism is at least as old as Akhenaton, the fanatic Pharaoh, possibly much older; and since then what floods of migration have not surged over the globe as far as the Cape of Good Hope and Terra del Fuego? Ever since men have been enthusiastic about ideas, and anxious to communicate them, civilisation has supplanted civilisation, and that enthusiasm is not of to-day nor of yesterday, but very old indeed: those comparatively primitive people that yield without a struggle to the stronger personality of the white man are keen propagandists, be it of the Christian faith or some secret society, among people of weaker will or lower culture than themselves. In a world teeming with races constantly driven by force or need from their ancient homes,

all of them convinced of the truth of their convictions, and anxious to impose them on their weaker brethren, what mighty movements have not taken place in the course of ages, what conquests, what pacific penetrations, what conversions and reconversions? And who less likely to stand firm amid this turmoil, who less likely to save intact the spiritual heritage of their forefathers, than the timid, easily swayed, and unorganised primitive races?

It is hard, very hard, for the anthropologist to admit that he is not finding the origin of human society among modern savages. He will protest against drawing conclusions from the influence of white men over dark races to that of dark races over one another. He is so accustomed to draw a hard-and-fast line between the phenomena of European society and those exhibited among peoples of crude culture, that he takes this arbitrary distinction for granted and never once pauses to consider on what foundation it rests. He will allege "different conditions" and "different mental processes" in order to escape the inevitable conclusions which the study of European history would force upon him. It is only natural and human that he should fight against a point of view which blasts all his cherished hopes of reconstituting in his own lifetime the customs and beliefs of primeval man. Every change of front in science means a wrench which is the more painful as the enthusiasm was greater; yet the sooner the anthropologist resigns himself to it, the sooner will he leave his wild-goose chase for purposeful work. What has he done so far? He has piled up masses of facts from all over the world. But if we already know what primitive culture was like, why collect all these facts? If we do not, how can we tell which of all these customs we have collected resemble the habits of primitive man?

If the principle of uniformity of all social processes closes the gates on some of our hopes, it opens them to others. If we can no longer expect in this generation or the next to get near the beginnings of human thought and endeavour, on the other hand we can be sure of tracing the development, and sometimes the origin, of many living institutions that have played a great part in the fortunes of the human race. We can study the many different forms they assume in various parts of the earth, and from them we can gradually reconstruct the original from which they derive; working down again from this original, we can follow its developments and ramifications, and its influence on human destinies. The rise and growth of divine kingship, of monotheism, of incarnation and initia-

tion—surely these are prospects to fire the enthusiasm of the historian, themes to satisfy the most ambitious pen. Can a nobler pageant be unfolded to our view than the gradual sublimation of ancient kingship into the Christian conception of the Kingdom of Heaven?

The issue between the two schools of thought is one of practical importance for field work. Theory and field work must react upon one another. For research, to be profitable, must not be blind, but be guided by purpose; and theory, to be sound, must base itself upon discovered facts. The illusions which still widely prevail about the primitive have had on research a baneful influence which is only beginning to wane; it has favoured an individualistic policy of each man for himself. As long as an anthropologist imagines that he is going to discover among naked savages the beginnings of civilisation it will be his ambition to work among the crudest tribes he can find, among those that are least known and weirdest in their ways. He will not concern himself with what his colleagues have done, and seek to link up his work with theirs or his own; he will cheerfully jump from the southern hemisphere to the Arctic, from Sahara to Melanesia; his one ambition will be the glory of describing an unknown tribe, rather than the merit of continuing the researches of his predecessors.

This state of affairs is, indeed, coming to an end, thanks to a few pioneers. But the old conceptions still hold too much sway. If once the anthropologist clearly realises that the rudest is not necessarily the most primitive, their power will be gone for ever. Sobered by this discovery, he will sit down to systematic work and turn into a comparative historian. He will direct his researches, not to isolated tribes here, there, and everywhere, but to areas already known, and to the unknown areas that adjoin them. He will not make erratic descents here and there, but advance systematically from his base. If it be Samoa, he will proceed thence to occupy Tokelau in the north and Tonga in the south; he will visit Wallis Island on his way to the Ellice and Gilberts; thence onwards to whatever may lie beyond, annexing by degrees the whole of the Pacific Ocean. If his field is Indo-China, he will not despise the Annamites because they are civilised, nor the Burmans because they are Buddhists.

When this spirit prevails, the future of anthropology is assured.

A. M. HOCART.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"WHY WE ARE DISAPPOINTED."

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1919, p. 5.)

I.

BUT who are the "we"? I would not venture to say anything in criticism of Dr Jacks' paper, radically as I disagree with it, were it not that I find an impression abroad that it speaks for the *Hibbert Journal's* Editorial Board. It is an erroneous impression. Dr Jacks is scrupulously careful to avoid any suggestion of the kind, and I have pointed this out to the readers who have complained to me about the matter. Still, the impression exists, and I write this note to remove it, so far as the protest of one person can avail.

Were I concerned to discuss the arguments of the paper, there are two points which might be raised. Dr Jacks says that "many of us were not indifferent to their (the Germans') repentance." You cannot be indifferent to a thing which does not exist. I have read one or two solitary individual expressions of repentance, but surely it is notorious that Germany is unrepentant. She is sorry for having lost the war, not sorry for having made it, not sorry for the way in which she conducted it. To adopt the policy suggested in the article would have implied the immoral attitude of positing a fact which is non-existent; it would have simply confirmed the Germans in their unrepentant mood. I need not enlarge upon this, except to add that those who read the facts of the situation in this light are not at all disappointed with the Peace Treaty, which to them appears not the work of a "thoroughly frightened world," but of a world justly alarmed and determined to see that iniquity is not to reap impunity.

The other point is the reference to President Wilson. "We thought of Mr Wilson as a possible 'great man,' overpowering the Paris Conference by the vigour of his moral idealism." Whoever the "we" were, they were justly disappointed. This kind of voice was heard among some discomfited party politicians, who spoke of European statesmen as if Europe, bankrupt of all moral vigour, was to be refreshed by a transatlantic gift of honesty. No responsible American shared this view. Responsible Americans have

too much modesty and sense of humour. Lord Charnwood, in his biography of Lincoln, observes acutely that "Americans from the first have been more prone than their kinsmen in England to pay homage to large ideal conceptions. This is a disposition not entirely favourable to painstaking and sure-footed reform." Some Americans have that disposition; so evidently have some Britons. But fortunately those who were responsible for the Treaty of Peace were determined to make a "painstaking and sure-footed reform," and some of us are not a whit disappointed either by their aim or by their success, all things considered.

As I said, I do not wish to enter into a detailed criticism. Politics are not our orb in the *Hibbert Journal*. My simple desire is to write a line which may serve to dissipate the impression to which I have alluded. Carlyle, speaking of Pitt's American policy, once compared it to "a seventy-four under full sail, with sea, wind, pilot all of one mind, and only certain waterfowl objecting." I should not like people to think that the *Hibbert Journal* had been transformed into a squawking sea-gull. There are plenty of these bright-eyed, self-important little creatures in English journalism nowadays.

JAMES MOFFATT.

[The "we" of the article under criticism most assuredly does not refer to the Editorial Board of the *Hibbert Journal*, and it is surprising that it should have been construed in this sense. "We" is consistently used throughout the article as an indefinite pronoun, the near equivalent of the French *on* or the German *man*, which it often correctly translates. It indicates an undefined group of persons, who are known to exist, whom there is no reason to particularise further, and of whom the writer using the word is often, but not always, one. For example, in the last paragraph of the article the statement is made that "we have been bidden [by Lord Robert Cecil] to make the best of a bad job." It is a strange exegesis which identifies the "we" of this sentence with the Editorial Board of the *Hibbert Journal*.

The word "us" is used by Dr Moffatt in the course of his communication in a sense which exactly answers the question he has raised as to the meaning of "we." "Some of us," he remarks, "are not a whit disappointed," etc. The "us" of Dr Moffatt who are *not* disappointed, and the "we" of the original article who *are* disappointed, illustrate the same usage of the pronoun. On no account must the former, any more than the latter, be construed as indicating the Editorial Board. Dr Moffatt is careful to point out that his protest is that of one person.

At one point, however, the protest is superfluous. "Whoever the 'we' were (who expected Mr Wilson to dominate the conference)," says Dr Moffatt, "they were justly disappointed." This is precisely what the writer of the article himself said about them. "We exposed ourselves," he remarks, "to a deserved disappointment." There are signs that Dr Moffatt has not read the article with the care he is wont to bestow on the criticism of more important documents.

The striking figure of the "seventy-four" in full sail to which Dr Moffatt compares the Peace Treaty would, perhaps, present a closer analogy to the facts if the word "seventy" were to be deleted. The change would give the "squawking sea-gulls" a slight excuse for their noisy performance.—

EDITOR.]

II.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1919, p. 1.)

“THE nature of the terms imposed upon the Central Empires would have been brought more closely into line with the British tradition in dealing with a conquered foe, which is not based on fear.”

Surely Dr Jacks begs the question, or rather puts his syllogism in such a form as to create the conclusion he desires. Has the nature of the terms been based on fear? Has not, rather, an intelligent prudence been the motive power? Remember the *present character* of the people to be dealt with—accounted to be of foremost civilisation and of highest intellectual instruction, yet so educated in Prussianism as positively to use this intensive civilisation and intensive instruction for the propagating of their atavism.

The illustration of the Sikhs and of the Boers is, I submit, most inappropriate, as in neither of these cases was there calculated inhumanity and sadistic cruelty—both Sikhs and Boers fought as honourable foes.

THEODORE P. BROCKLEHURST.

THE WELL HOUSE, GIGGLESWICK-IN-CRAVEN,
YORKSHIRE.

DR LANGFORD-JAMES—PROFESSOR DRAKE—SIR ROLAND
WILSON.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1919, pp. 129, 27, 145.)

AFTER reading carefully three articles in the last number of the *Hibbert Journal*, I fail to see how an impartial and unbiassed lay mind can come to any other conclusion than that Religion is in just the same state of seething inconclusiveness as ever.

Dr Langford-James, who proclaims himself a High Churchman, while professing the utmost fairness of treatment for all other schools of belief; Professor Durant Drake of New York, who asks whether we shall remain in the Church, without, however, specifying which; and Sir Roland K. Wilson in his outline of what he calls Humanism in Religion regarded experimentally—one and all convey the same great question, viz.: What really constitutes an all-round, acceptable, soul-embracing, brain-convincing creed: such as may appeal to all sincere searchers after Truth, of whatever race, country, climate, or mental capacity?

Regarded in this light the undoubted answer is: No Religion as yet developed can possibly meet all these requirements.

But looked at from the point of view of the writers themselves, there is clearly a strong common foundation for a perfectly sincere fellowship of united action in all the circumstances of everyday life, such as shall combat the everlasting opposition of the Spirit of Evil, which requires no definition, as it is patent to all.

To each there is clearly the same aim, the same desire, the same work—and that is none other than to see the Divine Spirit prevalent throughout the world. For whether one be an agnostic, or doubt if there be any

hereafter or indeed a God at all—all sober-minded, unprejudiced searchers after Truth recognise what is meant by the phrase "Thy Kingdom come," with all the attendant blessings of peace, goodwill towards men.

Each may have his own view of how best this is to be brought about, but none condemns the other for differences that after all may be merely due to educational bias, early upbringing, and physical and social distinctions or breadth of mental calibre.

Clearly the Spirit of God, of good, of holiness, sincerity, and love or charity is present in each. What the layman looks for is a real manifestation of the Spirit in its practical working and teaching as well as in the teachers themselves.

It is the lack of this sincerity which in so many cases shocks the thoughtful layman, who sees clearly enough that ceremonies, formalities, phrases are but a poor substitute for simplicity, sincerity, love, and charity.

The plain man wants reality, deeds, sympathy—never mind what the creed. Not the Dead Sea apples of easy armchair disquisitions, or pleasing intellectual discussions, or even sensuous Levitical rituals. All these are useful, all of the greatest importance, each in their special line; but the tendency of all these schools of thought is to condemn the other and waste untold energy on useless polemics—or worse. A Religion to win the world is one that will embrace all really sincere creeds which recognise the love of Truth as their leading principle, and that Truth to be the practical essence of a God-like Spirit. "Pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and keep himself unspotted from the world."

FRANK COWPER.

SOUTHAMPTON.

"HUMANISM: AN EXPERIMENT IN RELIGION."

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1919, p. 27.)

I.

I HAVE read with great interest and much sympathy Sir Roland Wilson's article in the October number of the *Hibbert Journal*.

As bearing upon the problem which he there presents to us, may I quote the following from Robertson of Brighton, from the Rev. R. E. Welsh, the author of *In Relief of Doubt*, and from Archbishop Temple? The first quotation is taken from a sermon on "The Scepticism of Pilate," in the first series of Robertson's published sermons; the second will be found at p. 18 of *In Relief of Doubt*; and the third is from a sermon on "Doubts" in the first series of Temple's *Rugby Sermons*.

From Robertson's Sermons (First Series).

"Lastly action. This was Christ's rule—'If any man will *do* His will.' A blessed rule, a plain and simple rule. Here we are in a world of mystery, where all is difficult and very much dark—where a hundred jarring creeds declare themselves to be the Truth, and all are plausible. How shall a man decide? Let him *do* the right that lies before him; much is uncertain—some things at least are clear. Whatever else may be wrong, it *must* be right to be pure—to be just, and tender, and merciful,

and honest. It *must* be right to love, and to deny oneself. Let him do the will of God and he shall know. Observe—men begin the other way. They say, if I could but believe, then I would make my life true; if I could but be sure what is truth, then I would set to work to live in earnest. No. God says, Act—make the life true, and then you will be able to believe. Live in earnest and you will know the answer to ‘What is Truth?’”

From “In Relief of Doubt.”

“One thing stands clear and scathless. Even when the truth about Christianity seems unattainable, *the spirit of the life of Jesus may be kept as the guide and motive of our own life.* Even if it seems impossible to be any longer sure of any revelation, of immortality, of God Himself, this at least remains unshaken—that the Christly life is the best worth living, that the man who enshrines that ideal in his heart and strives to realise somewhat of its sane, chaste, unselfish, loving spirit in his life, has won the highest blessedness attainable here, and cannot miss the best that may lie beyond the veil. That, at least, is possible under all conditions of belief. That is the secret of Jesus, and the essence of religion. Whatever else be true or false, the spirit of that life is the true one for us. Nothing can rob us of that. That anchor holds—that path is clear and leads to light.”

From Temple’s “Rugby Sermons” (First Series).

“However far our doubts may go, they cannot root up from within us, without our own consent, the power which claims to guide our lives with supreme authority. They cannot obliterate from within us the sense of right and wrong, and of the everlasting difference between them. They cannot silence, unless we join in silencing, the voice that bids us believe, that in spite of all that can be said, or seen, or felt, the law of right is the eternal foundation on which all things are built. By this a man may yet live if he have nothing else to live by, and God will assuredly give him more in His own good time.”

The above truly Christian teaching seems to me to offer the right solution of the difficulties felt by those who now “see through a glass darkly,” a solution by which they may live true and noble lives, till the time comes when, life’s puzzles ended, they may hope to “know as,” they may trust even now, “they are known.”

ARTHUR A. PEARSON.

THE ATHENÆUM CLUB.

II.

My approach to Sir Roland K. Wilson’s article was that of a Methodist minister, inheriting the pronounced traditions of his denomination, but preserving, as he hopes, an open mind towards all truth from every quarter. It is not, therefore, my purpose to follow Sir Roland in a critical review of his argument. Indeed his intellectual modesty, his evident sincerity, his fine temper, and marked consideration for those who still dream dreams from which he believes himself to have awakened, would make criticism an uncongenial task. I desire, if I may, to state a difficulty, and to offer a comment.

My difficulty is to understand how such noble and courageous altruism as that commended in "An Experiment in Religion" finds root and soil in the human heart, apart from the "non-human or superhuman" help which the writer repudiates. For if there is one fact more commonly received than another, it is the universal bent towards selfishism that characterises the race, a bent so strong that only the highest motives and incentives enable men to achieve an imperfect victory over it. And it is to be noted that the same experience which testifies to the presence of selfishism testifies to the need of some motive and power, not self-originated, by which we may rise superior to it. It is hardly rash to say that those who struggle most ardently and successfully against this evil disposition are most conscious of the insufficiency of their unaided strength to win an unending conflict.

This is very mild language compared with Professor Thomas H. Huxley's words (*Christianity and Agnosticism*, p. 51): "I know no study which is so unutterably saddening as that of the evolution of humanity. . . . And the best men of the best epochs are simply those who make the fewest blunders and commit the fewest sins." I am unable to follow Huxley without considerable qualification, but quote him to show that it is not the theologian alone who doubts the possibility of the victory of humanity over its selfish predispositions, unless some power, not itself, making for righteousness, shall intervene to save it. I feel that Sir Roland is partly aware of this difficulty. His sympathetic references to prayer, his characteristically frank confession (p. 32), "On my susceptibility to this influence, to which the scriptural term 'Holy Spirit' would not be inappropriate, depends very largely my good or bad conduct," his warning that the experiment for which he makes so noble a plea may result in the "drying up of the soul," all suggest this. My difficulty, my despair, I might say, in respect of the success of the "experiment," deepens if I am forbidden to cling to my old hope of redemption by Christ through the ministry of His Spirit.

My comment relates to the first and second of the "illusions" noted on page 30. For myself the evidence is too inconclusive to dogmatise on Christ's share in the belief of His day regarding demoniac possession; for the purpose of this discussion I yield the point and accept Sir Roland's position. That Jesus was followed very often, and to His own sorrow, by many who were attracted to Him by the wonders He wrought rather than by the beauty of His moral teaching and His lovable personality, the New Testament makes plain. But conceding these points, I must protest against them as furnishing anything like an adequate explanation of our Lord's power. For this we must look finally to the purity of His life, the clarity of doctrine, and, above all, the winsomeness of His sacrifice. These are the abiding forces, even as, in the days of His flesh, they were the real secret of His authority.

I turn from Sir Roland's article with feelings of mingled sorrow and hope: sorrow that he has not, as I see it, found the best way out for weak human nature; hope arising from the conviction that those who sincerely seek to translate the "experiment" he suggests into life will not be left to struggle alone, but will receive strength from an unrecognised Source, "the Light that lighteth every man" who loves truth and would walk uprightly.

SAMUEL P. ROSE.

ST PAUL'S METHODIST CHURCH,
OTTAWA, CANADA.

"REGROUPED RELIGION."

(Hibbert Journal, October 1919, p. 129.)

THE article by the Rev. R. Langford-James in the current *Hibbert Journal* is in many ways most useful. There is, however, one passage in it which, after having quoted it, I should like to criticise, as it embodies an idea which seems to run all through the article, but which I do not think could be maintained. The passage (*Hibbert Journal*, October, p. 136) is this:—

"The modern Roman Catholic body in England is undoubtedly in communion with Rome, but it teaches two things as 'of faith'—the Immaculate Conception of our Lady and the Infallibility of the Pope—which were not so taught and held by the mediæval benefactors. . . . Catholics in the English Church, though lacking outward communion with the Holy See, teach and hold what the mediæval Church taught and held."

Is it not erroneous to argue thus? Ought we not rather to look at the *line of development*? Previous to the Protestant revolution in this country, the religion of England was following the same line of development as was followed by all other Churches in communion with Rome. It is true the doctrines of the Infallibility and the Immaculate Conception were not then, in England, held as articles of faith. But this is merely to say that England was in the same position as every other Catholic country. The doctrines in question were under discussion, and the questions were still open. It is not here needful for me to go into the general principle of "development"; it is well known to all. It is needful, however, to *mention* it, as it shows the mistake in the passage quoted above. The mediæval English Church did not hold (*de fide*) Infallibility and the Immaculate Conception, simply because *no* part of Christendom did so (*de fide*). All the evidence shows, however, that the mediæval English Church, both as regards our Lady and as regards the Pope, was on the same road as, say, Spain or Italy. It condemned Wyclif for derogating from Papal power; it consecrated (under Henry V.) England as *dos Mariæ*. The proper test, then, is this: Who, in England, is it that has followed, without break, the line of doctrinal development to which the mediæval English Church belonged? This test can be applied by noticing all the other Churches (Italy, France, Spain, etc.) with which we were then in communion. We shall then see they have developed to the modern Papal system, and that "the Roman Catholic body in England," by developing likewise and also by still being in communion with them, must be held to represent (which the Anglican Church does not) the legitimate development of the ancient Church. By the way, we must not forget that even the "Highest" Anglican clergy do not receive Holy Orders by a rite the mediæval Church would have thought valid—and this is a vital point. In conclusion, may I query whether the term "Roman Catholic *body*" is correct as descriptive of the Roman Catholic community here? That community has the full hierarchy of Archbishops, Bishops, and parish Priests, and is therefore a *Church*, as really as it is in Spain or France.

J. WM. POYNTER.

LONDON.

SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

By THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT.

DR GEORGE GALLOWAY'S Baird Lecture on *The Idea of Immortality* (T. & T. Clark) is a small book of considered judgment, which has the merit of disentangling the central issues and of presenting them without haziness or undue dogmatism. The idea of immortality, as he shows, has not always been the same, but its variations point to a persistent interest in the belief—an interest so persistent that it has constantly been re-shaping its expressions. Science does not permit of a decisive answer, either way. The results of psychical research are an insecure basis for what the religious man means by "eternal life." "On any showing they do not imply more than a limited survival of the soul after death. The evidences, even when rated at their highest, cannot carry us further than a conviction that the souls of the departed linger on in a kind of attenuated existence, and may be ultimately extinguished." Even philosophy, in spite of Royce and McTaggart's arguments, does not yield a metaphysical proof. The moral postulate, with its inherent claim for a transcendent fulfilment of human life, seems more promising to Dr Galloway, especially as that fulfilment cannot be satisfied in the "Choir Invisible" idea. He has some sound criticisms of the latter view, popularised by writers like George Eliot and George Meredith. (a) It involves a distinct loss in value, since the ethical personality is not conserved; and (b) a permanency of the corporate order cannot logically be deduced from millions of impermanent individuals. In the closing chapter he reiterates the truth that philosophical and ethical speculations upon immortality rise from the fact that it is already present to the religious consciousness. But "the ethical conception of life cannot stand by itself; we must either try to reduce it to the natural or carry it up to the spiritual," and the latter effort leads to the Christian recognition of personality as eternally valuable to God. We would have welcomed an analysis of the theory of Conditional Immortality; but Dr Galloway is content to say that an abiding dualism between God and evil is unthinkable.

A cordial welcome must be given to *Peake's Commentary on the Bible* (T. C. & E. C. Jack), in which, for the modest price of half-a-guinea, the reader obtains a compressed series of introductions to the meaning and setting of the various books, with commentaries and maps. The editor has written several essays himself, and contributed notes on one or two

books, especially on Genesis and Isaiah i.-xxxix. But he has gathered a large company of scholars round him. The volume is an admirable specimen of popular exposition along scientific lines. It "is designed to put before the reader in a simple form, without technicalities, the generally accepted results of Biblical Criticism, Interpretation, History and Theology." Dr Peake has managed to keep this aim steadily before the mind of his contributors, and the outcome of his labours is a book which ought to be educative. It is certainly readable, in spite of its severe compression. Even those who know little or nothing of Hebrew and Greek will be able to follow the arguments, while the book now and then offers suggestions to advanced students.

On Deut. xxxiii. 8, "thy holy one," which Professor Witton Davies rightly identifies with Levi, Mr M. L. Margolis has a critical note in *The Journal of Biblical Literature* (1919, pp. 35-42), in which he argues that the poet had Moses primarily in mind, "as the Levite *par excellence*, the one who was the originator of the Levitical functions," and in whose spirit the tribe afterwards acted. Mr G. Margoliouth's translation and notes upon the Song of Deborah (*Expositor*, September) are to be compared with Professor Burney's recent study in his edition of Judges; Mr Margoliouth pleads for "the substantial accuracy of the received text even in the middle part of the poem," and for the theory that the war-ode was composed by Deborah herself. In a sensible article on Old Testament Prophecy in *Peake's Commentary*, Dr G. C. Joyce urges that "the distinction between the abnormal and the morbid needs to be kept steadily in view when the psychology of prophetic inspiration is being investigated." It is kept in view by Mr W. A. C. Allen, in a fresh little study of *Old Testament Prophets* (Cambridge: Heffer), although his main aim is to describe the historical and social significance of the prophets. He does justice to their high idealism and belief in a living God, but "as social reformers, in our sense of the term, they may be considered useless, for they had no practical remedies to suggest. The fulfilment of their dreams demanded either a return to ancient conditions, which were once and for all passed away, or else a recasting of human nature to suit altered circumstances such as has not been effected yet." A stimulating appreciation. Mr Allen thinks that Isaiah's work might be summed up in four words, "The exposure of shams," although he recognises that the prophet was more practical than Carlyle. The contribution of the prophet is analysed sympathetically by Professor A. R. Gordon in *The Faith of Isaiah* (James Clarke), whom he regards as a statesman and an evangelist. Professor Gordon translates a number of illustrative passages, and is constantly applying the prophecies to the present age. Professor Wheeler Robinson's edition of Jeremiah in *Peake's Commentary* appears almost simultaneously with Mr L. E. Binns' edition in the *Westminster Commentaries* (Methuen), a large and fairly full study of the English text. Mr Binns enables the English reader to understand the messages of this lonely, misunderstood, sensitive soul, and points out that, although Jeremiah is pre-eminently the prophet of personal religion, he spends less time than Micah in denouncing social abuses, since the urgent problems of his age were international. This is noted also by Mr Allen, who shows further that Jeremiah's "earlier warnings" against injustice and other social crimes "lack grip; they are vague, general, many times repeated." One of the suggestive features in Mr Binns' work is the repeated use of semi-mystical phenomena in order to throw light

upon the structure of Jeremiah's messages. Professor Kemper Fullerton's *Prophecy and Authority* (New York: The Macmillan Company) is a general discussion of the predictive element in Old Testament prophecy, as understood in the early and later Church. He analyses with much care the varying stress upon this, for apologetic reasons, and urges that it is high time for the Protestant Churches to regain the only satisfactory position of denying that messianic prophecy has any predictive value. What Jesus came to fulfil was the ideals of messianic prophecy. He is specially concerned to destroy the flimsy foundations of anything like the millennial hope, which "is an anachronism in modern life," and, as such, harmful. The argument is trenchant, but it may be doubted if many of those whom it seeks to warn will care to face the elaborate historical proofs. Dr J. E. H. Thomson's large book on *The Samaritans: their Testimony to the Religion of Israel* (Oliver & Boyd) is more than a careful, detailed account of this interesting community, about a hundred and fifty of whom have survived the recent war. Dr Thomson's climax is a restatement of the theory that the Samaritans possessed the Pentateuch before the days of Ezra, and that this tells against the dominant theories of Old Testament higher criticism. But he will have no dealings with Naville's theory that the Pentateuch was originally written in cuneiform; his refutation proves, if proof were needed, that his learning is accompanied by independence of judgment as well as by conservatism. Mr R. H. Malden's *The Old Testament* (Macmillan) is one of those praiseworthy attempts which need to be made still, to educate members of the Church in the principles of criticism. In some quarters of late there has been a tendency to disparage the Old Testament. An unguarded recourse to it during the stress of war has provoked a reaction which requires to be watched. Mr Malden is alive to this duty and danger in the Church of England, and his book is devoted to the task of explaining the meaning and value of the Old Testament. The audience he has in mind is one of readers who are perplexed. His aim is to initiate them into a knowledge of the structure and composition of the Old Testament books, and to show that these still retain their value as part of God's Word, in spite of the fact that "we do not know by whom the greater part of the Old Testament was written, that it contains a large admixture of poetry, myth, and legend, and that it was edited by unknown hands between the years 450 and 150 B.C." A similar aim stirs Mr A. W. Fox, in his *Theology and Ethics of the Old Testament* (Lindsey Press), which gives a popular account of the methods and results of modern criticism, in order to exhibit the evolution of the religious ideas in the literature. Books of this kind, written by men who have not only a grasp of the subject but a knowledge of the popular mind, are a genuine service; they prevent the perpetuation of old-fashioned views, especially among the younger generation, and they extend the circle of those who are prepared to take an intelligent interest in the further advance of theology.

In the region of New Testament criticism there is less to chronicle. Mr S. C. Carpenter's *Christianity according to St Luke* (London: S.P.C.K.) is a study of the third gospel "as a Church document" written by "an ecclesiastically minded layman." "Layman" is an unhistorical word for anyone in the Christian Church of the first century, but Mr Carpenter succeeds in avoiding the mistakes into which an unwary use of the term might have led him. Indeed, his closing section is upon Luke as artist, psychologist, and democrat, and, without ignoring the Pauline atmosphere

in which the evangelist wrote, he does not make too much of it. The book is a pleasant, popular exposition of the gospel. It does not grapple with some of the real difficulties, *e.g.* with the problem of the "Great Interpolation" (ix. 51-xviii. 14); but it will serve to familiarise young students with the main subjects of discussion. In *The Journal of Theological Studies* (July 1919, pp. 330-336) Mr Cuthbert Lattey writes on "The Semitisms of the Fourth Gospel," to prove that the writer of the gospel was familiar with Aramaic, as most Jews would be. In *Peake's Commentary*, Mr Bisseker leaves the authorship of the Pastoral Epistles an open question, in view of modern criticism. Dr A. E. Hillard's edition of *The Pastoral Epistles of St Paul* (Rivington's) presupposes their Pauline authorship. But Dr Hillard's notes on the Greek text are mainly for candidates preparing to be ordained, and naturally confine themselves to such practical needs, although, whenever they touch points of exegesis, they are scholarly. In *The Theology of the Epistles* (Duckworth), Professor H. A. A. Kennedy omits the Pastoral Epistles from his survey of Pauline documents, ranking them with Jude, James, and 2 Peter "as monuments of the general religious thought of the developing Church." This forms the third section of his book, the Church in these documents being "regarded not so much from the Pauline standpoint as the Body of Christ, but rather as a carefully organised institution, administered by special functionaries." The second part treats 1 Peter and Hebrews as witnesses to Christian thought moving along lines which in the main were independent of Paulinism. The opening section is a shrewd estimate of Paulinism itself. Professor Kennedy has supplied students with a clear survey of the central issues. He agrees with those who find that Hebrews must have been addressed to Jewish Christians, and at this and one or two other points he will not carry all his readers with him. But the general trend of his discussion is convincing. As a manual, the book is well equipped with notes and indices.

The stream of text-books about the Bible is one remarkable feature of recent publication. For some reason or another there appears to be a demand for—at any rate there is a supply of—books which explain, in untechnical language, the significance and form of the English Bible as a whole. This, for example, is the design of Professor J. F. Genung's *Guidebook to the Biblical Literature* (Ginn & Company). He shows how the successive literary products arose out of the historical fortunes of Israel, and arranges the material with a really artistic touch. When he comes to the New Testament, he groups the Synoptic Gospels under the title of "The Literature of Fact," the Epistles and the Fourth Gospel as "The Literature of Values" (not a very happy title), and the Apocalypse as "The Resurgence of Prophecy." There is something particularly attractive in Dr Genung's general treatment. He has his eye upon the central religious issues, and he has gone to good sources for information about disputed points. This is a book which may be put into the hands of anyone who desires a reliable and vital account of the Bible's contents. Two other popular books on the Bible reach us from America. Professor J. H. Penniman, who teaches English literature in the University of Pennsylvania, publishes *A Book about the English Bible* (New York: The Macmillan Company), which is much more than a literary appreciation of it as an English classic. The author has endeavoured to give his students an outline of the critical structure of the various books, and also to trace the fortunes of the Bible

in manuscripts and translations. If a book like this will send its readers to read the Bible, and to read it intelligently, much will be gained. Dean Hodges, of Cambridge, has the same design in *How to know the Bible* (London: Skeffington & Son), but he follows another method, confining himself to the Bible text, and giving an account of each book, or group of books, with a running series of extracts. He also writes from the standpoint of a moderate, modern criticism. The Bible, however, is to him "the library of the grace of God," and the reader is introduced to the newer view of inspiration. He adds, at the close, after a warm tribute to Tyndale and Wiclif, that "the Bible is a dangerous and dynamic book, radical and revolutionary, essentially democratic, and puts all conservatism in peril."

The S.P.C.K. continue to issue their handy "Translations of Early Documents." Two fresh volumes are to hand, Dr W. O. E. Oesterley's *Sayings of the Jewish Fathers* (the Pirke Aboth) and Mr Herbert Danby's *Tractate Sanhedrin*. The former is fairly familiar to students of the New Testament, thanks to the late Dr Charles Taylor's standard edition; but there was ample room for such a cheap and convenient book as Dr Oesterley has provided. The Pirke Aboth yield rich information, as he argues, upon "the general mental outlook and the method of expression of the early Synagogue"; besides, these sayings form quite a readable tract. The Sanhedrin tract is more technical, and, so far as the New Testament is concerned, it simply bears upon the criminal procedure followed at the trial of Jesus. Mr Danby puts the general reader in a position to understand its significance in this respect. The same publishers issue two volumes for the study of Early Church history. (a) One is a translation of *Novatian upon the Trinity*, by Mr Herbert Moore, which renders this tract accessible to the student of Early Christian theology. Novatian had something of Tertullian's incisiveness, both in temper and in style. Mr Moore notes the former, and endeavours in his version to preserve the latter. (b) The other is a handbook to *The Letters of St Augustine*, by Dr W. J. Sparrow-Simpson. He arranges the letters in groups and according to subject, giving an outline of their contents and enabling the reader to find his way about the large correspondence. It is always better to read books than books about books. But this is the kind of guidebook which prompts the reader to study the sources for himself, instead of resting content with paraphrases of the letters at second hand.

Dr James Heron's *Evolution of Latin Christianity* (London: James Clarke) is a posthumous work by the late professor of ecclesiastical history at the Belfast Presbyterian College. Dr Heron is an uncompromising critic of Latin Christianity, which he identifies with Roman Catholicism. This leads him to do less than justice to a man like Tertullian, by the way, but it makes his book a piquant manual for those who are dissatisfied with Newman's somewhat facile conclusion that the Roman system answers the real tests of evolution in a living organism. Dr Heron traces the changes in the priesthood, the sacraments, and worship, ending with the conclusion that such so-called "developments are not legitimate growths, but excrescences which contradict and violate the fundamental principles taught by our Lord and His Apostles, and degrade the pure, spiritual religion which they inculcated to the level of pagan cults." A more positive and balanced survey is offered by Professor Williston Walker in *A History of the Christian Church* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark). The Yale professor has

compiled what is the most satisfactory English manual of Church history in one volume. It is well proportioned, generally readable, and equitable in its judgments. If we might criticise the method, there is too much space given to personal notices, and too little, now and then, to the task of disentangling the broad lines of movement. This is felt in the account of a movement like the Aufklärung, for example. But on the major issues Professor Walker makes his points clear, and his book guides the student from period to period with unflagging care. The bibliography at the end is adequate, and, though compiled for American readers, will not be found useless by students on this side of the Atlantic. Finally, with regard to the theology of Church history, we note, in the *Theologisch Tijdschrift* (1919, pp. 181-223), an article by Professor J. Lindeboom of Groningen University, in which he subjects Troeltsch's theory of the history of dogma to a severe examination. He takes particular exception to Troeltsch's well-known thesis that the older Reformation theology was strongly attached to its heritage from the Middle Ages, and that the Protestantism which Luther's reform exhibited was originally little more than a modified Catholicism, with more stress on the Augustinian idea of grace than on the Pauline conception of the Spirit. Lindeboom's analysis of modern Protestantism is of special interest in this connection. He seeks to establish a continuity between the older and modern Protestantism; the article is important in this respect, as an attempt to meet Troeltsch's interpretation by a rival, positive interpretation of the phenomena in modern Protestantism.

JAMES MOFFATT.

REVIEWS.

An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge. By
A. N. Whitehead, Sc.D., F.R.S.—Cambridge: University Press, 1919.
—Pp. xii + 200.

THE theories of physics, as summed up in its differential equations, are in terms of the points of absolute space, the moments of absolute time, and the distribution of point-masses or point-charges. Long before the theory of relativity arose to trouble the simple-minded, it might have struck observant persons that all these entities are removed by many stages from anything that we do or can perceive. They are remote from perception, not merely in the sense in which a light-wave or a molecule is so, viz. that our senses are not acute enough to perceive such small objects. A light-wave or a molecule is at least thought to be more or less like objects that we can and do perceive; it has *some* extension and lasts for *some* time, just as a wave in the sea or a cup on a table does. But an unextended, instantaneous mass-point is something utterly different from anything that we perceive, and it cannot even be regarded as a part of a perceived object in the sense in which a little bit of matter may be called a part of some bigger bit. The position of space and time is even more peculiar. Physicists, indeed, did lip-service to the theory that these are only relative, *i.e.* that they are simply relations between objects and between events respectively. But in practice they contented themselves with stating this as a pious opinion in the preface, whilst in the body of their works they always presupposed a space of geometrical points and a time of moments without duration within which particles formed now one configuration and now another. The spatial relations of particles and the temporal relations of events to each other were never, in fact, treated as ultimate, but were regarded as compounded out of the relations of particles to points or of events to moments, and of the relations of these points or moments to each other.

Yet of course physics is an empirical science, and its laws must begin from what is observed and end by predicting truly what will be observable under given conditions. This curious discrepancy commonly struck the idealist philosopher rather than the physicist. The latter, through the "bias of happy exercise," would naturally, in dealing with the traditional concepts of his science,

"Be to their virtues very kind;
Be to their faults a little blind."

The former, having quite different interests, was under no such temptation. But he unfortunately had as a rule neither the desire nor the knowledge needed for reconstructive as distinct from purely destructive criticism. He contented himself with saying that the concepts of physics were merely "descriptive instruments," and hurried on to prove the existence of God without condescending to tell us what they described, or how, if they were completely out of accord with the facts, they happened to describe them so successfully.

Even in those early days, before Einstein had tactlessly produced the most original and sweeping modification in physics since Galileo, in face of the dictum of our "patriotic" scientists that "the Hun is merely a sedulous elaborator of the genial ideas of the French and English," Professor Whitehead had seen the real problem, and, with his unrivalled equipment of boldness in philosophic speculation, endless patience in working out detailed consequences, and complete command of modern mathematical logic, had started to solve it. An early effort in this direction is his difficult but extremely powerful paper, "Mathematical Concepts of the Material World," in the *Phil. Trans.* for 1906, where he is already sitting very loose to the traditional concepts of space and material, and suggesting a number of new alternatives which will do their work equally well, though he still holds pretty fast to the traditional concept of time. Somewhat later he began to develop the Method of Extensive Abstraction, which is the keynote of the work now under review. A foretaste of the results of this method was given to us by Mr Russell in the *Lowell Lectures*, and Professor Whitehead himself gave an actual example when he showed how moments could be defined in terms of certain series of events, in a paper on "The Relative Theory of Time" in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*.

The theory of relativity, with its denial of a single time-system common to all sets of spatial axes, added to the perplexities of the traditional concepts, and thus provided an additional motive for a root-and-branch reconstruction of the foundations of physics. This is what Professor Whitehead has attempted in the present book. Three factors have gone to the making of it:—(i.) The attempt to discover and describe as accurately as possible the crude data which are actually observable and from which empirical science must actually have started; (ii.) the conviction that the results of physics are substantially true of nature, and that the real problem is to show in detail the precise logical connection between the concepts employed in its final statements and the crude observable data which are its ultimate subject-matter; and (iii.) the recognition of the fact, brought home to us by modern geometers, that entities of very different types may function as points or as straight lines, and that what is a straight line or class of straight lines in one set of relations may function as a point in another set of relations, and conversely. It is the last fact which makes the Method of Extensive Abstraction, to be described later, so powerful an instrument for Professor Whitehead's purpose.

The *Principles of Natural Knowledge* begins with a severe criticism of the traditional physical concepts. According to this traditional view the "really real" things in nature are momentary configurations of mass-points, and change is just the fact that at different instants the same mass-points are differently distributed in space. Now, in order to predict configurations

it is not enough to know one of them; you need to know not merely the positions, but also the velocities, accelerations, etc., of the particles, at the instant. But the notion of "a velocity at an instant" certainly cannot be counted as one of the "really real" facts; it is actually the limit of a series of ratios of distances travelled to time taken, and this is simply nonsense if you confine yourself to a single unextended instant.

There is much the same objection to taking unextended particles for ultimate facts as there is to instantaneous configurations. How are we to interpret interaction on such a view? The tradition is to regard space as a principle of disconnection and to hold that things separated in space cannot directly affect each other. Action must then be interpreted as stress across an intervening medium. But where does the stress act? We naturally answer: Across the boundary between the medium and the body. Now, since space is continuous, there will be no point within the boundary that is *next* to the latter; if any point within it be taken, there will be another between it and the boundary. Thus the stress must act on points at a finite distance within the boundary if it is to act on the matter within it at all; and so *actio in distans* returns. The fact is that one is obliged to think of a *finite* volume of matter as a single unity whose behaviour is partially determined by surface stresses.

Finally, all the characteristic properties of the special sorts of matter take time to show themselves. This is most marked in an organism, since *the* characteristic of an organism is its behaviour and life-history. A "momentary cat" would simply not answer to the definition of a cat at all, since one of the characterising marks of a cat is to climb trees and catch birds, and this characteristic takes time. This is most marked in an organism, but it is no less true of a molecule, if molecules be systems of electrons circulating with characteristic periods. The upshot of the matter is that the ultimate facts of nature are spatio-temporally extended events. And their most important relation is their total or partial overlapping.

Again, the classical concept of space is thoroughly incoherent. If we assume absolute space we are at many removes from anything observable. If, as most scientists profess to do, we accept only relative space, we shall have as many spaces as there are instants, since each instantaneous configuration is an instantaneous space, and, on the relative theory, is all the space there is. At once there arises the difficulty of correlating these spaces with each other, and the further difficulty that, since all our observations take time and are on objects of finite extension, we never perceive any of these spaces. Moreover, the classical theory assumes our ability to identify a piece of matter through time; but how could one know that what is at P_1 in the instantaneous space of the instant t_1 is the same as what is at P_2 in the different instantaneous space of t_2 ? If you say that it has been under continuous observation, you must allow that the ultimate data are not instantaneous, but are the contents of a specious present. The moral once more is that we must give up the point and the instant as ultimate facts, and start with extended events and their observable relation of overlapping.

Lastly, the classical concept is faced with the difficulty of connecting what we do perceive with what it supposes to be really real. As we know, it generally adopts a causal theory of perception, and supposes that movements in what is physically real cause us to become aware of colour, sounds, etc., which are not themselves physical facts. This theory is a mass of

inconsistency; it leaves the connection between the sense-data which we do perceive and the particles which cause our perceptions utterly obscure, and, when fully worked out, it leads to a highly agnostic attitude towards the physical world. For the latter is only known to us by a precarious inference from our sense-data. If such scepticism about particles, points, and instants is to be avoided, they must be shown to be, not *inferences from* our sense-data, but logical *functions of* our sense-data.

Before working out his own theory in detail in Parts II. and III., Professor Whitehead concludes Part I. with a very clear statement of the results of modern dynamical physics and of the theory of relativity. It is these results that he has to connect with the crude data of sense, and therefore it is important that they should be stated at the beginning as simply and clearly as possible. He finds that reflection on Maxwell's equations reinforces his objection to instantaneous configurations of unextended points as ultimate facts. For (a) they involve vectors, all of which need *two* points to define their direction; (b) the density of electric charge which enters into these equations is meaningless if you literally confine yourself to unextended points; and (c) the differential coefficients with respect to time are meaningless if you literally confine yourself to instantaneous configuration. The assumption of an ether amounts to no more than the assumption that "something is going on always and everywhere," and the continuity of the ether is simply an expression of the fact that all events overlap and are overlapped by others. Thus Professor Whitehead admits what he calls "an ether of events," but rejects an "ether of material" on the ground that, like Full-Private James in the *Bab Ballads*,

"No characteristic trait has it
Of any distinctive kind. . . ."

This part contains much the best account, from a philosophic point of view, that I know, of Einstein's first theory of relativity. Whitehead accepts the Lorentz-Einstein transformations for axes in uniform relative motion, as being necessitated by the negative results of the Michelson-Morley and other experiments to detect motion relative to the ether. He then points out that the main paradoxes to which they lead are only paradoxical because we are not in earnest in our professions of giving up absolute space and time. *E.g.*, the events P and Q are observed from two sets of axes α and β which are in uniform motion relative to each other. In strictness it is only the events themselves, not the points at which they happen, that are common to the two systems. To a consistent relativist the point P_α , where P is in α , cannot be the same as *any* point in β , and therefore cannot be the same as the point P_β , where P is in β . Now there is obviously not the least paradox in holding that the distance $P_\alpha Q_\alpha$ is different from the distance $P_\beta Q_\beta$ when we remember that P_α differs from P_β and Q_α from Q_β . But, when we forget this and suppose that, because we are dealing with *events* common to two systems, we are dealing with *points* common to both, $P_\alpha Q_\alpha$ and $P_\beta Q_\beta$ become simply the names for the same distance, and so the paradox arises that the same distance has different lengths in α and in β . The other paradoxes, that there ceases to be a common time-system, and that the velocity of light becomes an absolute maximum, are dealt with later.

Nevertheless Whitehead is not satisfied with Einstein's passion for light-signals as the ultimate test for simultaneity in different places. He

interprets Einstein to hold that the very *meaning* of simultaneity at different places is given through light-signals. On this interpretation, of course, Whitehead scores an easy triumph, for it is perfectly certain that no one *means* by simultaneity anything to do with light-signals, and that in fact it is not usually determined in this way. Personally, I doubt whether there is really much difference between the two authors on this subject. I suspect that Einstein simply meant that we have a vague notion of simultaneity at different places, but that the only criterion for its presence or absence that can be made definite enough for scientific purposes is that based on light-signals. But Whitehead is *especially* concerned to show that all judgments of congruence rest ultimately on the immediate recognition of identical factors in different circumstances. These judgments are not infallible, but any one of them can only be tested and corrected by others of the same kind, so that the class of such judgments is irreducible and ultimate. Such judgments play an important part in his theory of objects, and judgments about congruence are only a small sub-class of judgments of recognition. He also blames Einstein's theory for failing to account for the fundamental position of Newtonian axes (*i.e.*, if we reject definitions that involve absolute space, axes relative to which accelerations obey Newton's third law of motion). I take it that Einstein would reply that, if all matter gravitates and all axes be material, there really are no Newtonian axes, and that his extended theory of relativity (which Professor Whitehead does not treat in the present work) is an attempt to deal with this situation.

We are now in a position to explain Whitehead's positive theory. This is expounded verbally in Part II., worked out in formal logico-mathematical detail in Part III., and completed in Part IV. I shall try to state it, so far as I understand it, in my own words. There are two fundamentally different factors in nature, events and objects. Events are of the type of particular individuals, and objects of the type of universals. Common-sense and natural science often confuse the two; so that properties, such as recurrence, which only apply to objects, are asserted of events, and properties, such as having parts, which only belong to events, are asserted of objects. Corresponding to these two types of entity are two ways of knowing, both essential to knowledge—the apprehension of events and the recognition of objects. Under these two headings there are numerous sub-groups corresponding to the different kinds of events and the different kinds of objects. Let us begin with events, and illustrate them and the apprehension of them.

An event, as I understand it, is a bit of the content of a specious present. It has extension in space and time, or, more accurately, it has an extension out of which what we know as spatial and as temporal extension are to be developed. The total content of nature contemporary with a specious present is called a *duration*. It thus includes all that we discriminate in a specious present and all in the universe that is contemporary with this. A duration may thus be regarded as a "slab of nature" of limited duration but unlimited spatial extension. Perceived events are the parts of a duration which the percipient discriminates; he knows them, never as isolated facts, but against a background consisting of the undiscriminated remainder of the duration, with which they are felt to be continuous.

The characteristic relation of events is that of extending over each

other. If one event extends over another, the latter is a physical (and not merely a logical) part of the former. A duration extends over all the events in it, and one duration can extend over another. The extension of durations over each other leads to the definition of moments, in a way that will be described later.

There is, however, another relation of events to duration. This is called *cogredience*. There are events that are temporally coextensive with a duration, but which all the time occupy one and the same spatial place in it, and are spatially only parts of it. Such events are said to be cogredient with the duration. Cogredience is obviously not reducible to overlapping; it is this relation that enables us to define sets of spatial axes.

Events are to be regarded as pure particulars; they neither recur in time nor occupy different parts of space. (*E.g.* two events of precisely similar character are still *two*.) Strictly speaking, events do not change. As the course of events advances, one event is seen to be a part of another that extends over it and beyond it into the future.¹ This fact is referred to as the *passage* of events, but it does not involve change in the strict sense. Change belongs to objects, with which we have yet to deal.

Among the events cogredient with a duration, one stands in a special relation to it; this is called the *percipient event*, and, so far as I can make out, consists of the course of the percipient's conscious life throughout the specious present. The peculiarity of this cogredient event is that it is *here* in the duration, while all other cogredient events are *there* in the duration.

There are certain assumptions that must be made about events if our knowledge of them is to give rise to a science of nature independent of particular observers. In the first place, events as known to us do not have perfectly sharp outlines; you cannot say exactly where an event of one kind leaves off and an event of another kind begins. In order to apply logical thought to them we must assume that in nature there is a determinate answer to such questions. This does not imply either (*a*) that there are atomic events, or (*b*) that events do not overlap. It merely means that if a characteristic be assigned it must in *fact* be quite definite what events in nature have it, and what events do not, even though there are marginal cases where *we* cannot definitely decide. Again, we are immediately aware only of the contents of the specious present, and only from a definite position among those contents. We have to assume that there is such continuity between the contents of successive specious presents and between the events perceived by different observers from their different positions that the knowledge of a nature common to all can be inferred from our immediate knowledge.

We can now leave events for the present and deal with objects and our recognition of them. Many of Whitehead's statements—*e.g.* that a chair is not really in space or time, and that the leg of a chair is not strictly a part of the chair—will appear very puzzling unless the reader bears in mind that objects for Whitehead are universals. Objects characterise events, and the events that they characterise are called their situations. Precisely the same object can characterise events separate in time and in space; thus, in the only sense in which objects are in space and time at all, the same object can be in many places at once. Let us reflect on what Whitehead means by saying that the leg of a chair is not strictly

¹ I understand the view to be that an event only changes in the sense that later events are juxtaposed on to the front end of it.

a part of the chair, but that the event which is the situation of the leg is extended over by the event which is the situation of the chair. It sounds odd to say that the leg of a chair is not part of the chair, yet it does not sound odd to say that the apron of an archdeacon is not part of the archdeacon. And the difference clearly cannot lie merely in the fact that an archdeacon can take off his apron, for a chair can lose a leg also. The puzzle vanishes if we remember that Whitehead means by a certain chair the fact of being this chair. Now the fact of being a leg of this chair is connected with the fact of being this chair, but it is not connected *as part to whole*. But when we talk of this chair we often mean the set of events characterised by being this chair, and these *are* connected by the relation of whole and part. Being this leg and being this chair are objects (or universals) (*a*) of a low degree of abstractness, and (*b*) of the same degree. Universals of a very low order are liable to be confused with the events which are their particular instances. But being an archdeacon and being an apron are (*a*) universals of different orders, and (*b*) the former is of a much higher order of abstractness than the latter. Thus we are much less inclined to confuse an archdeacon with the event characterised by the fact of being this archdeacon than to make the same mistake about a chair or an apron. We have, therefore, little temptation to speak of the apron as part of the archdeacon.

We can clearly split up the continuum of events in various alternative ways. The events that emerge as the results of these alternative methods of analysis will have different characteristics, and these will be different types of objects. There is nothing subjective in the results of this; whatever course of analysis you pursue, you can only analyse out events that really are in nature. But some methods of analysis may be much better adapted for giving a knowledge of the laws of nature than others. Corresponding to different modes of analysis we get sense-objects (sense-data), perceptual objects (the chairs and tables of common-sense), and scientific objects (the electrons of the physicist). Many errors arise from either (*a*) confusing objects of different types, or (*b*) supposing that the reality of objects of one type (*e.g.* electrons) excludes the reality of objects of other types (*e.g.* sounds and colours).

In one way sense-objects, *e.g.* a perfectly definite shade of colour, are the simplest objects. It will be noticed that they are universals of the lowest type in the sense that their instances are necessarily particulars. And they cannot be reduced to relations between simpler elements. A coloured patch is the event which is the situation of a sense-object; its colour is the sense-object in Whitehead's phraseology. The recognition of sense-objects is sensation.

Perception is a more complicated business. A perceptual object is an universal of a higher order, since it means a more or less permanent association of sense-objects of various kinds. Absolute permanence is not required; allowance is made for objective changes and for the different appearances presented from different situations. In general when a perceptual object is perceived all that we directly apprehend is a few sense-objects (*e.g.* in seeing a chair and not touching it we only literally *see* a coloured patch). These sense-objects, however, *convey* the remainder which we do not at the moment directly apprehend. This conveyance is not in itself judgment, though judgment nearly always supervenes on it, and the judgment that supervenes may actually modify what is conveyed.

(The last fact seems to me to be clearly illustrated by the changes in the appearance of solidity which happen when we gaze at certain combinations of lines.) Conveyance is doubtless what psychologists refer to as complication and acquirement of meaning. Perception is not, however, complete until a perceptual *judgment* has been made. The content of such a judgment is (a) that an analogous association of sense-objects (with certain admissible modifications) can be recognised in the same situation by percipients in other situations, and (b) that this common situation is a necessary condition for the perception. If the perceptual judgment be true the perceptual object is physically real, otherwise it is delusive. Delusive objects are just as real as any others in their own way, but not in the way in which the person who believes in them believes them to be real.

Psychologists have underrated the complexity of the relation involved in perception; it cannot be dealt with as a two-term relation, but has at least four terms. It is of the form $\Pi(\sigma, e, p, c)$, where this means: The sense-quality σ characterises the event e from the standpoint of the percipient event p subject to the conditioning events c . The conditioning events fall into two sets, generating and transmitting, and in all non-delusive perception the situation of the perceived object is a generating condition, or, as we say, "an active cause" of its being perceived. Now sets of conditions tend to recur pretty often; hence when we recognise a sense-object of a certain kind (*e.g.* the visual appearance of a rat) we almost automatically assume the presence of the normal conditions (*viz.* events which are characterised as forming part of the life-history of real rats, and transmission of light from their situation to ours). Generally we are right, but, if we happen to have *delirium tremens*, our uncritical faith in the uniformity of the conditions for recognising a given kind of sense-object betrays us into a delusive perception, since the generating condition here is not rats but alcohol.

The perceptual object is the result of the natural and normal way of analysing the continuum of events, and it is the most useful for everyday life. But it does not admit of much scientific elaboration, (a) because such objects are constantly being confused with the events which are their situation, and (b) because the identity of character that constitutes a given physical object is so very vague (*cf.* Sir John Cutler's stockings). For this reason science finds it necessary to analyse events in a different way, and the events that are fundamental on this method of analysis are the situations of *scientific* objects. These objects are reached by reflecting on the generating conditions for the recognition of sense-objects. Our perceptual judgments always assert that what we perceive could (with certain modifications in some of the associated sense-data) be equally perceived by anybody else from any other situation. Hence arises the notion of *common* generating conditions, which, in combination with differences in situation of the percipients and differences in the transmitting conditions, will account for the substantial identity and partial differences in the perceptions of different observers. These common generating conditions are what we mean by scientific objects. Thus, as Whitehead puts it, perceptual objects are the connecting link between nature as perceived (chairs, tables, etc.) and nature as conditioning its own perception (electrons and ether). The ultimate scientific objects are (at present) electrons. The electron is just an expression for certain recognisable permanences of a highly abstract kind

throughout the course of nature ; while the ether, as we have seen, is not, in Whitehead's sense, an object, but is the whole continuum of overlapping events which make up the course of nature.

Finally, we must notice that the electron by itself does not fulfil all the conditions needed for being recognisable. It is certain fairly stable combinations of electrons or certain recurrent modes of behaviour of such groups that are recognisable. These stable groups with a characteristic rhythm in their charge are molecules or sets of molecules.

We have now seen how Whitehead answers two of the three questions that he has put to himself, viz. (i.) What are the final results and concepts to be accounted for? and (ii.) What are the data from which we have to start? It remains to see how he answers his third question, viz. How is (i.) connected with (ii.)? Evidently space and time must be connected with the extension and cogredience of events, and material with the permanence of objects. It is impossible in a review to explain in detail how the connection is made out, but it is possible to give a rough idea of Whitehead's method and of some of its results.

The method is that of Extensive Abstraction, so often mentioned but not yet described. When we consider the relations of events which have a large extension in time and space we find them intolerably complex, and it is hopeless to try to disentangle their laws. But, as we consider shorter and smaller events, the relations become more manageable and the laws more obvious. Still, you will, of course, never arrive by this process at *momentary* events of *no* volume ; and Whitehead will not allow us to say that they are at any rate convenient fictions, and leave it at that, for his whole object is to keep the *convenience* and eliminate the *fiction*. Accordingly he adopts a device which was no doubt originally suggested by the definition of real numbers as segments of rationals. You cannot define, *e.g.*, a particle as the limit of a series of volumes one inside the other like Chinese boxes, because there is no such limit ; but you can define a particle as the series of volumes itself which careless people would say "converge to a point." Particles thus become certain series of events with certain properties ; other series with other properties (*i.e.* converging in different ways) are taken as what we mean by lines or by planes. The merits of this procedure are (*a*) that such sets of volumes do have all the properties which are wanted in points, lines, etc. ; (*b*) that if this is what you mean by points, lines, etc., there is no doubt that they exist, since the volumes do exist and do stand in the required serial relations ; and (*c*) that you are not thereby assuming the existence of anything unextended and therefore utterly different from the events that we perceive. Points of space and instants of time are of course a degree more abstract than point-particles, but it is possible to define them in analogous ways into which we need not enter now, and, with these definitions, their existence is as certain (in their own appropriate type, which is, of course, *not* the type of particular existents) as is the existence of extended events in *their* type. I think we might sum up the difference between a consistent believer in absolute space, etc., and Professor Whitehead as follows. Both would say that points, instants, etc., exist. The former would mean that they are particular individuals as much as anything that can be perceived, only that we cannot perceive them. The latter means (*a*) that he can define entities which have all the properties required by science for points and instants : (*b*) that they are certain classes of series of extended events ;

(c) that extended events do in fact fall into such series in nature; and therefore (d) that points and instants "exist" and are "real" in the only sense in which an entity of the type of a class can be accounted to do this, viz. (i.) these classes have members, and (ii.) these members are particular events that actually exist in nature, related by serial relations in which they actually do stand to each other in nature. A person who can truly give this sort of answer, as Professor Whitehead can, does seem to me to have kept the *convenience* and got rid of the *fiction* in these concepts.

This review is already far too long, and I will therefore close it by mentioning one interesting and important result of Whitehead's detailed deductions. In dealing with nature there are three different meanings to be attached to space, and it is most important not to confuse them. (i.) The whole course of nature gives rise to a four-dimensional "space-time" whose points are event-particles. (ii.) For a given time-system (that is, for a given set of durations such that any pair in the set are extended over by some third duration in the set) there is an instantaneous three-dimensional space corresponding to each moment of this time-system. (iii.) For a given time-system there is also a three-dimensional space which is timeless, in the sense that it does not refer to any special moment in the time-system. Of these spaces (ii.) is the space approximated to by our observations as we make them take less and less time, and (iii.) is the space (and the moments of its time-system constitute the time) of an admissible set of axes for stating the law of physics. For a given time-system (ii.) and (iii.) are exactly correlated. Any point in the instantaneous space of a given moment is an event-particle which occupies one and only one point in the timeless space of the same time-system.

To mathematicians Professor Whitehead's deduction of the Einstein-Lorentz transformations, and his account of the geometry of these three sorts of space, will be of intense interest; but the subject is too technical to be discussed at the end of a review. I have perhaps said enough to show that this book is of the utmost importance; there are very few men indeed who combine the various gifts needed to write such a work, and we must be grateful that such a combination happened to exist at a time when the practical and theoretical advances of physics have made a reinterpretation of its fundamental concepts an absolute necessity.

C. D. BROAD.

UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS.

The Idea of Immortality. By George Galloway, D.Phil., D.D.
T. & T. Clark, 1919.

OF the making of books on Immortality there is no end. A few of these may be of permanent value; others, no doubt, have served a useful though temporary purpose: the majority might be consigned to the flames without any serious loss to the moral and spiritual life of mankind. For the best things that have ever been said on this subject are not to be found (except in inverted commas) in formal treatises, or studies, or courses of lectures, but in the utterances of the seers and in the songs of the poets. How could it have been otherwise? Eternity presents no "problems"

to the discursive intellect of man. All treatises on the illimitable and infinite are pre-doomed to failure. Even in mathematics a definitive treatment of the infinite is only possible by the substitution of an unreal for a real infinity. The most abstract of all the sciences is least able to cross the threshold which leads from the finite to the infinite; for the region of the infinite is life, and of that mathematics knows nothing.

Yet it may be instructive, and it is certainly interesting to see what the mathematicians, and still more the natural scientists and philosophers and systematic theologians, have said regarding immortality; though it is not to be expected that any of them, as such, will make any real contribution to our knowledge of the infinite. The finite is their province. The Absolute in any form, if form it can be said to have, is not so much an insoluble problem as the negation of all problems. The last despairing effort of the waning intellect of Greece to solve the "problem" of immortality ended along the more purely intellectual line in the intoxication of the Neoplatonic trance, and along the more moralistic in the Stoic's deification of the finite individual will and the privilege of suicide. The same kind of thing happened in China, where Taoise philosophies of the Absolute ended in the dethronement of reason, the search for the elixir of immortality, and the worship of Chaos. Similar movements took place in Egypt, India, and elsewhere, affording mournful illustrations of the danger of concentrating attention on the "problem" of immortality. There is no "problem" of immortality. Life is never a problem, but always either the solution or the solvent of problems.

Principal Galloway has qualifications beyond most other men for writing a treatise on immortality, but happily he has not attempted to do so. What we have given us in this neat little volume is a remarkably succinct and comprehensive survey of the ideas which men of various times and races and culture have formed. Such a sketch, written by one so exceptionally competent and well-informed, is to be heartily welcomed, not simply in the hope that it may do something to consign to oblivion many more ambitious books, but for its own sake. When, however, Dr Galloway assumes the role of philosopher and attempts to assign "values" to the different moments in the historic evolution of the idea of immortality, he inevitably parts company with some of his readers; and who is to say whether the Principal or his critics may be nearer to the truth? Who shall say whether the earliest or the latest ideas of immortality are to be preferred, the most persuasive or the least attractive, those which in each generation win the largest number of adherents or the despised and rejected claimant for the suffrages of the race which persistently raises its head, to be again submerged by its more popular rivals? Dr Galloway, no doubt, has his own answer and his own line of justification, which he advances with the modesty of one who knows how difficult it is to convince those who approach the subject by a different path, and with the confidence of one who believes he has found the right way for himself.

Just criticism of a book like this, so short and yet so full, so conscientious and painstaking and yet so coloured by the author's own peculiar habits and experiences, is very difficult to achieve in a few sentences or paragraphs; and on a subject like this one wishes to avoid criticism and simply state impressions.

An impression which was hard at least for one sympathetic reader to evade was that occasionally an unconscious bias narrowed the outlook

and hampered the argument. It was perhaps the audience to which the lectures were originally spoken (the book contains the Baird Lectures for 1917) that exercised the slightly deflecting influence. Or it may simply be due to the author's desire for clearness and brevity. But it mars the total effect of an otherwise attractive presentation of the positions for which the writer contends. In a work of this kind a Christian thinker can hardly be too respectful to the religious susceptibilities of his readers, and is it not wiser to extend the connotation of the word "Religion" so as to include at least all those ways of thinking and acting which large masses of men have been accustomed to regard as religious? Is there any necessity to deny to the pantheistic systems the right to call themselves religions just because they strike at the root of what constitutes for us the essence of the religious relationship? As a rule, Principal Galloway is respectful to all religions, even those that he regards as the crudest. But when he describes the "constituent elements of the religious relationship" which "are present of necessity in every form and at every stage of religion" in such a way as to exclude the pantheisms of ancient Greece or modern India, he seems needlessly severe, if not inaccurate. I suppose we shall never decide on our definition of religion. But I have sometimes wished that we could frame it somewhat along the lines which the late Professor Robert Adamson suggested to his students some thirty years ago. As I remember it, he merely threw out the suggestion in one of those interesting impromptu replies which he was in the habit of giving to his inquisitive students. I do not think it was meant exactly as a definition, and probably Professor Adamson would have been the first to point out its inadequacy; but I have never yet met with one which seemed to me more serviceable—a man's religion is the recognition of his place in the sum-total of things. That recognition may not be primarily intellectual—it certainly cannot be exclusively intellectual. Emotional and practical elements must needs enter into every man's religious attitude. One man's universe also differs immeasurably from another man's. Yet we want a word to describe a man's relationship to the largest whole known to him, and the best seems to be the word "Religion."

Another impression, derived from a perusal of the last chapter, is that the author has done less than justice to the Christian hope of immortality. This, again, is due no doubt very largely to the time-limits of a lecture and to a publisher's desire to economise space in these days of expensive printing. It must be almost impossible just now for anyone who wishes to write on great themes to get justice done to his subject. The New Testament doctrine, in spite of many illuminating remarks, is very inadequately presented. "In the teaching of Paul and the Johannine writings the hope of immortality is intimately associated with the Christian experience," says Dr Galloway. Yet why this limitation? The hope of immortality is as intimately associated with the Christian experience in 1 Peter and in the Epistle to the Hebrews as in the writings most commonly assigned to Paul or John. We should not expect to find the association so fully revealed in the Synoptic Gospels, for the "power of the endless life" is there but dimly manifested in the life and death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. In the view of the "Synoptic Jesus" eternal life was connected with "the age to come" rather than with "this age." But that age began at Pentecost; and who will say that even during the earthly sojourn of their Lord the personality of Jesus roused no intimations of

immortality in the hearts of His disciples? It is always the influence of a greater personality that rouses the soul from its slumbers and assures it of the life eternal.

Again, Dr Galloway says: "The Epistles of Paul and the Gospel and Epistles of John take common ground in finding a witness of immortality in spiritual experience. Yet Paul also connects the Christian hope with the resurrection of Christ." But why the antithesis? Is the connection of the Christian hope of immortality with the resurrection of Christ not established in the Johannine writings, in the Apocalypse, the Gospel, and the First Epistle? The Gnostic, speculative, non-historical view of the Christian idea is as alien to the teaching of John as to that of Paul. Paul's enthusiastic statement that he now henceforth knew Christ no longer after the flesh might be misinterpreted; but what is there in the Johannine writings that even an "ignorant and unsteadfast" Gnostic could "wrest unto his own destruction"?

Again, one would much like to ask what exactly is in Principal Galloway's own mind when he refers to the objection some feel to making "a single historical fact a sufficient basis for a universal inference." He is very patient with the objector. But why? Well, the Christian teacher will be patient even towards those who seem to him to mistake phantoms for facts. But is there any such thing as "a single historical fact"? From the human point of view there certainly is not. Uniqueness in the sense of solitude and detachment belongs to nothing that is purely human. Does it belong to the Divine? We shall answer the question differently. Some will say that the entrance into, or presence of, the Divine within the human is always a unique fact in the experience of mankind. Others will say that at one point in the course of human development the Divine Being clothed Himself with humanity or, in our orthodox language, "became man." Others will deny the uniqueness of Christ's entrance into the world of time and sense, and make the last act of Calvary when "He who knew no sin was made sin for us" God's solitary act in the midst of time. Others will see "a Lamb slain before the foundation of the world," and an obedient Son working as His Father had been working even until then. "Let each man be fully persuaded in his own mind."

The publishers have helped the author. The printing is accurate (I have noticed only two or three slips); the size is convenient; even the colour of the binding faithfully reflects the tone of the book. Let us have no more drabs and browns. Even yellows and greens and blues would be less inappropriate clothing for books on immortality which end on the Christian note. But the best colour for a Christian book is suggested by Goethe's description of the appearance of heaven and earth on the day of Judgment—brilliant sunshine through a purple glass. "Let all the earth rejoice before the Lord, for He cometh to judge the earth; with righteousness shall He judge the nations and the peoples with His truth."

H. H. SCULLARD.

A Theology for the Social Gospel. By Walter Rauschenbusch.
New York : The Macmillan Co., 1918.

THE number of people in Britain to whom the name of Walter Rauschenbusch has any meaning can hardly be more than a remnant. But in the United States, during roughly the past seven or eight years, it has been no uncommon thing to hear, in progressive circles, some such statement as that "Rauschenbusch is our American prophet." Certainly it is true that no English visitor could move among the social workers of the cities, and the audiences gathered week by week in the almost innumerable open forums, without hearing of Rauschenbusch as something markedly different from the ordinary type of reforming enthusiast or religious teacher. It might be difficult for the passing inquirer to gain a definite idea of the man and what he stood for; but the evidences of his influence in New England and the Middle West was decisive upon one point: it was the emanation of a rare and peculiarly beautiful spirit, which was working as such spirits do, through varied and chiefly very quiet channels.

Rauschenbusch was born at Rochester, and went to school in that now flourishing city of the western end of New York State. His parentage was German American. His own intellectual life drew largely from German sources. He completed his university course in Germany, and returning to Rochester, he became professor of church history in the Baptist Theological Seminary. Here he remained to the end, being enabled to hold his position in a thoroughly orthodox atmosphere by virtue, I should imagine, of his careful scholarship, his wonderful fineness of temper, and his personal influence with the students. I have no knowledge of this matter, but I take it for granted, that his theological liberalism must have been regarded as a rather dangerous thing in the seminary. His special distinction in the religious movement of the past decade came to him through the vivid form which Rauschenbusch gave to the social interpretation of Christianity. He was at his best as a speaker and public teacher when he published a pair of books which made a special appeal to a large body of people—men and women within and on the fringe of the Protestant churches of North America, who were feeling after such an interpretation of orthodoxy as would enable them to work with the old ideas, and through the ancient religious forms. These books were, *Christianity and the Social Crisis* and *Christianizing the Social Order*. Their immediate effect was very remarkable. I should judge it to have been actually greater than the effect made by the contribution of any other teacher, in this section of American life, for many years. I do not think that either book was thought, even by a public that is easily satisfied on the intellectual side, to be at all profound or original. The English reader, even if he brought to the reading a special sympathy with this particular method of approach, would probably feel that the core of the matter had been presented with more force and beauty by the greater masters of the social gospel in the past generation. But it is undeniable that both were remarkably suited to their day and audience. They furnished to the earnest American citizen, anxious not to break with the old ways, at once an inspiration and a programme, together with something of which he stood in deep, if largely unconscious, need—the expression of a delicate personality wholly surrendered to the call of the modern community for civic and social service. And from the same mind

came a volume of *Prayers of the Social Awakening*, which to-day you may hear read in meetings of varying character all over America.

The rarity of Walter Rauschenbusch was in the fulness of his dual character and appeal. In his teaching and public work he was given over to the activist position. He cared nothing for any faith which could not be uttered in deed, and especially in active membership of the community. But in his own person and spiritual habit he was of that other company. To come into his presence at any time was to feel the reality which we recognise under numberless forms, but which, in whatever form, we know to be the fruit of the dedicated being alone. Modern society, especially in the western world, has almost destroyed the conditions which allow of its growth and flowering. Contemporary America demands of its religious teachers and intellectual ministers precisely the same kind of energies as those which have made American citizenship. Publicity, scientific management, the card index, the telephone, have invaded the study and the sanctuary. It is very nearly impossible to escape them. As every observer knows, it is even rarer in America than in England to come upon the older type of receptive and meditative character. Walter Rauschenbusch was of that order. I am tempted to say that Providence, in depriving him of a sense, had endowed him with a conspicuous advantage. He was deaf. This disability inevitably reduced his activity in the college, prevented him from exerting his full personal power among the members of the faculty and students, and during the years of his wide activity as a speaker (he had notable power on the platform) cut him off from much that would have been of immense value to him, more especially in association with those influences of religious citizenship which had received a main impetus from himself in the spoken and written word. But the separation from the continuous whirl that his deafness imposed cannot be counted a loss to his inner life. Indeed one feels that the opposite is true.

No sketch of Walter Rauschenbusch, however brief, would be passable which omitted mention of the tragedy in which his life came to its close. He was killed by the war. He could not survive its mortal strain. He was German: German thought and feeling were behind the fine Americanism of his nature. Early in the conflict, two years and more before the United States intervened, he wrote for a religious journal a statement of the German case, on what was to him the natural assumption that the Protestant world of America was prepared to hear and consider it. He was miserably mistaken. It was extraordinarily pitiful to hear him describe what he had done and what the result had been—in misunderstanding, abuse, and the breaking of ties in his own country and in Canada. He died in July 1918—as his friends could not help seeing, brokenhearted.

So much have I dwelt upon the man and what he has been to his generation in America, that I have left myself no room for an estimate of the book which appeared some months after his death. It is made out of a course of lectures delivered two years ago, on the Nathaniel W. Taylor foundation, before the annual convocation of the Yale School of Religion. In a score or so of short chapters Rauschenbusch strives to develop his theme of theology for the social gospel. "The new thing in the social gospel," he says, in a keynote paragraph, "is the clearness and insistence with which it sets forth the necessity and the possibility of redeeming the historical life of humanity from the social wrongs which now pervade it,

and which act as temptations and incitements to evil and as forces of resistance to the powers of redemption." His attempt is sufficiently thoroughgoing. From the contrast of the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Evil, he proceeds to an endeavour to re-state all the greater dogmas of Christianity in simple terms of what the American of to-day is in the habit of calling community service. The result gives no evidence of unusual scholarship, or of exceptional thinking; and I suspect that most readers familiar with English work in kindred fields will urge that it makes no concession to, and shows little understanding of, what is so often asserted to be a reality of, the religious consciousness—the human head of some form of sacramental religion; while others will feel its absence of historical basis. Many, too, will complain of its too facile expositions and the use of needlessly ungainly words, such as "solidaristic." But the volume is one that a man in Rauschenbusch's position was bound to write. And we may be sure that many good Americans who, as long as they live, will walk by the light of his spirit and example, would say that it is manifestly a sincere statement of one man's personal belief, and since that man was Walter Rauschenbusch, it cannot but be a valid modern faith.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

LONDON.

The Army and Religion.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1919.

THE character and aim of this volume are perhaps more readily suggested by the sub-title, *An Enquiry and its Bearing upon the Religious Life of the Nation*. The "nation" rather than the "army" is the objective; but the nation to-day is the army of yesterday. That is the perspective. The clue to a full understanding of the new situation created by the war is in "the mind of the young manhood which has so heroically borne the burden of its country's honour in the great camps and in the battle-line." "If we do not know their thoughts our plans for reconstruction will be simply castles in the air." The main problem dealt with is how the Christian Church in our country shall retrieve its past losses and enlist our manhood for the Kingdom of God. To face successfully the situation she should know what faiths and what standards these men are living by, how they have been affected by the war, and what is their relation to the churches. The book is the outcome of an extensive inquiry conducted along these lines by a committee representative of the leading Christian communions and organisations in England and Scotland, and of which the Bishop of Winchester and Professor D. Cairns were conveners. The evidence, the gist of which is given, was obtained from many hundreds of witnesses, comprising men of all ranks from generals down to privates, chaplains, doctors, nurses, hut-leaders and workers, also from committees appointed for the purpose in the great bases of England and France. The book, however, is more than a report. The statement given in Part I. of the facts disclosed by the evidence, together with quotations, is followed in Part II. by an examination of their spiritual meaning, with suggestions for the solution of the problem they present.

While the committee is responsible for the book, it owes its literary form to Dr Cairns. In its production "he has," as the Bishop of Winchester remarks, "done a great service to the Church," and, it may be added, to the nation. Very vital issues are brought before us in the book. The

importance is urged of recognising what is borne out by the preponderance of the evidence,—namely, that the experience of the war has deeply affected the minds of the men. “The soldier has got religion; I am not sure that he has got Christianity,” is the saying quoted as representing the general effect. It is meant to indicate that the men who had been in the trenches experienced an awakening of the primitive religious convictions—God, prayer, immortality—but that they did not associate these with Jesus Christ, that their thought of God was not christianised. Something of the significance of this awakening can be appreciated when one recalls the activity of materialistic and anti-religious propaganda before the war; also the fact that it is “in this region of elemental faith the materialism of the age has most vitally affected the structure of the Christian faith.”

“To talk slightly” of the experience as “funk-religion” is to miss its meaning. It may be that the religious consciousness had been awakened by a sense of helplessness in the presence of danger. Yet it was a definitely religious experience, and it may be the foundation for further building. That the first effect of actual life on the battlefield, the awakening of an immediate and intuitive consciousness of God, should, as was inevitable, be followed on reflection by difficulties, especially that of reconciling “God and the war,” proves, it is held, the inadequacy for the spiritual needs of the men of “a vague and instinctive theism,” and leads the writer to the conclusion that “the faith that will command the future will be that which deals most adequately with the problem of evil.”

Most startling of all, probably, is the revelation of the men’s relation to Christianity. While there is universal respect and even reverence for Jesus Christ, the men’s ignorance of him is described as “appalling”; not only are the facts of his life largely unknown, but the whole deeper side of the Church’s teaching about Jesus Christ seems to have little or no hold upon them, except of the loosest kind. “That probably four-fifths of the young manhood of our country should have little or no vital connection with any of the churches, and that behind this detachment there should lie so deep a misunderstanding of the faiths by which Christian men and women live, the ideals of life which they hold, *is perhaps the most salient factor of our evidence.*” Of Christianity it is said that the men “have not the foggiest notion what it is all about.”

In dealing with the causes of this disquieting situation, it is pointed out that “our unhappy divisions” are responsible for the fact that the Church has not fully realised its gravity. And where there has been partial recognition the Churches have contented themselves with explanations that are “too facile.” Perhaps at this point one may be tempted to question whether full justice is done to all the facts. It will be conceded that, in view of the great Christian qualities unconsciously displayed by the men, along with much moral frailty, to ascribe the alienation to “the depravity and weakness of the human heart” is only a half-truth; yet it may be asked, have the masses availed themselves of the facilities provided by the Church for becoming acquainted with the truths and power of Christianity? The object of the book is, however, so urgent that one hesitates to criticise. That the responsibility for the comparative failure of these efforts lies partly with the men themselves is indeed acknowledged when the root of the evil is traced to that materialising of life which has been steadily increasing since the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century, and which has been precipitated by the growth of wealth and

power incident to the scientific discoveries of the nineteenth century. Nor does the responsibility for the drift rest entirely upon the churches of to-day. The serious thing is that not only have the churches failed to counteract the advance of this practical materialism, they have themselves been affected by it, with disastrous results to their faith and life. It is contended that this materialistic disease which has overspread Christendom and which culminated in the war can be counteracted only by a new birth of faith in God, which will give a fresh interpretation of life, and that such faith must begin in the Christian Church. What is also imperative if the situation is to be retrieved is that the Christian Church should set forth in all its breadth and grandeur Christ's ideal of the Kingdom of God.

In view of the widespread ignorance of the Christian message, so startlingly revealed in the evidence, and the repeated demands for "interpretation," the "vitalising of the Christian doctrine," its restatement, that is, in terms of modern life, is urged as a task into which the Christian Church must put its very heart and soul. Valuable suggestions are given as to the lines along which such a statement should be made. "Christian doctrine should be taught as a revelation which makes reason of the riddle of life." Very emphatic is the contention that the situation is indisputable evidence of the failure of our educational system, both secular and religious. The chapter dealing with this subject is illuminating. It is generally agreed that our "education has been too much merely imposition, the learning of lessons, not a stimulus to think." The bearing of the facts on the question of Church unity is amply brought out. In dealing with the need of Social Evangelism, it is urged that co-operation on the basis of interdenominationalism will solve, in a measure at least, the problem of visible unity. It will, perhaps, be questioned whether the after-the-war scheme of the Y.M.C.A. will best serve that purpose.

The feeling with which one lays down the book is that of despair of having been able to do it anything like justice within the limits of a short review. It deals with matters vital to the hour. It should be read by all, especially by those who exercise leadership in however humble a sphere. Avowedly concerned with one aspect of the situation—the religious—it yet touches the whole, for the religious situation is at the heart of the problem. While there may be much to provoke discussion, yet it must be admitted that we have here on the whole a trenchant and convincing statement of the reaffirmation by the war of the oft-repeated saying "that the soul of all improvement is the improvement of the soul," that reconstruction is primarily a question of regeneration, and this, first and foremost, a question of faith in God. Such is the note on which the author closes: "the ultimate need is for faith in God." The Church must return to Christ, to his "spiritual hope," to the conviction that human nature is morally and spiritually recoverable, and that the Kingdom of God is a practical proposition. The Church must return to his love for man, and, above all, to his faith in God. "He was the greatest believer that ever lived." The facts may depress, but the rediscovery of Christ's idea of God will bring hope. "Depression in his presence is impossible. The future is lit up with promise."

A. E. DAVIES.

The Early Christian Attitude to War: A Contribution to the History of Christian Ethics. By C. John Cadoux, M.A., D.D. (Lond.), M.A. (Oxon.). With a Foreword by Rev. W. E. Orchard, D.D.—London: Headley Bros., 1919.—Pp. xxxii + 272.

DR CADOUX has accomplished a task that has been long overdue. The fact that the outbreak of a war which threatened to disturb society to its foundations found the Christian Churches a babel of discordant voices reveals the need that Christianity should co-ordinate its thought and attitude on this subject. The bias towards the acceptance of the State as paramount in times of crisis, although it worked on the whole for comfort while the crisis lasted, cannot be regarded as altogether satisfactory for a society with world-vision and inclination for world-adventure in idealism. Of course the attitude of Christians in the years before Christianity was recognised by the State cannot be taken as the final word for these times when the State has been accepted, in some form or other, by the Churches as a part of the world order. Yet what Jesus taught, and what the early disciples thought that teaching involved, must guide us in making our decision to-day. Christianity is historical, both in its manifestation and its method. And this book proceeds on right lines in its careful and scholarly attempt to let the facts of early Christian life and literature utter their own messages. There is no other book in English that covers the same ground; nor is there any other book at all that gives the evidence with such impartiality. Dr Cadoux knows the literature of his subject; he gives a list of nearly two hundred books and documents, and it is apparent that he knows the contents of these. Of modern books, Harnack's *Militia Christi* covers much the same ground as this book, although some of its conclusions are not accepted; but it has not been translated. Archdeacon Cunningham in his *Christianity and Politics* follows Professor Bethune-Baker's war-accepting theory in his *Influence of Christianity on War*, and thus his examination is not impartial.

It ought to be said that Dr Cadoux is a pacifist. This, however, does not bind him to any theory. He investigates the evidence that seems to make against his conclusions with the same thoroughness as he pursues the evidence on the other side. His method is to "present the facts as to the early Christian attitude to war—with just so much discussion as will suffice to make this attitude in its various manifestations clear and intelligible—and to do this by way of contribution towards the settlement of the whole complicated problem as it challenges the Christian mind to-day." There are no purple patches in this book; there are no rhetorical attempts to slur over weak points. "The rigid demands of truth, the dignity of scholarship, and the charitableness of Christianity" are everywhere regarded.

The first main division of the book deals with "The Teaching of Jesus." While there was no occasion for Jesus to make "any explicit pronouncement on the question as to whether or not His disciples might serve as soldiers," the conclusion is drawn that "He regarded acts of war as entirely unpermissible to Himself and His disciples." The question of "letter and spirit," the attempt to evade this conclusion by saying that Christian ethics are "counsels of perfection" for a perfect society, and also the limitation of Christ's teaching to life in its private capacity are discussed; as also are those parts of Christ's teaching that seem to regard warfare

as legitimate. The incident of the "whip of cords" used in the Temple, upon which the advocates of physical force insist so much, is shown to be an instance of the authority of powerful personality. The "interim ethic" view of the teaching of Jesus is shown to be inadequate. Jesus was not always thinking in face of a world catastrophe. The next section deals with "Forms of the Early Christian Disapproval of War," and this is followed by a section on "Forms of the Early Christian Acceptance of War." These sections overlap. Yet the arrangement makes for clearness, and certainly for a more satisfactory presentation of the evidence. The painstaking tracking down of detail and the unswerving loyalty to the facts, whatever their implications, are noteworthy. Only brief references to the method of procedure can be given. The most striking feature in the early Christian literature is the firm hold taken by the "ploughshare" passage from Isaiah. The conclusion was generally drawn that Jesus as Prince of Peace had come to inaugurate this revolution. It may be, of course, that the conclusion of the early Christian writers was wrong. That, however, is just the question at issue. An unprejudiced study of the documents leaves the impression that they regarded the Christian profession as involving separation from the career of arms; more than this, it involved an active propaganda for peace. Celsus, towards the end of the second century, charged the Christians with disinclination to serve in the army, and Harnack says that "the charge was undoubtedly well founded." Tertullian was charged with boasting to the heathens that many Christians were soldiers, and then declaring to Christians that they ought not to be soldiers at all. He is not the only man who, while holding to a general principle, has had to deal with conditions where the general principle has not been followed, or where other circumstances hindered its application before a certain course had been adopted. There were many during the late war who, while not believing in militarism, spoke sincerely in commendation of soldiers, and did hearty service in their behalf. It must be remembered too that the question was complicated for Tertullian by the fact that the duties of the soldier and the magistrate were often combined. Origen regards war, on the part of Jews and non-Christians, as part of the world order; but, on the other hand, he regards the Christian method of life as a contrast to and a protest against this order. His evidence proves that as late as "the middle of the third century, the predominant opinion among Christians was that their religion forbade them to serve in the legions." Arnobius claims that the amount of war had diminished since the coming of Christ, and he goes on to say that if the world had accepted Christ it would "long ago have turned the uses of iron to milder works, and be living in the softest tranquillity, and would have come together in healthy accord without breaking the sanction of treaties." It is refreshing to find this recognition of the softer virtues as desirable. This is altogether antagonistic to the view taken by so many Christian leaders in more recent days. They regard the softer qualities as tending to physical, moral, and spiritual flabbiness—a state that demands the rude awakening of war for purposes of health. Origen claims that the Christian by abstaining from war does more for the State than soldiers. Intercessory prayer and the influence of the Christian example are the most potent forces for safety and progress. When modern writers take the position that those who conscientiously abstain from war do the State disservice, they fail to recognise the meaning of the Christian attitude.

The recognition of Christianity by Constantine wrought a vast change in the Christian attitude towards the State, and therefore towards war. The cessation from persecution was a great relief, and there followed the will to regard all the activities of the State as legitimate. Yet it must not be imagined that the older attitude vanished. The Church Orders of the fourth century and later prove that a soldier could not be baptized unless he had left the service, and that a Christian could not become a soldier without exposing himself to excommunication. Athanasius was the first to teach that for a Christian to kill in war was permissible and praiseworthy, without any reserve in regard to war against pagans.

It is impossible to summarise the evidence brought together in these pages. Dr Cadoux attempts this in his last section. Even then the evidence itself cannot be dispensed with. That the study of this book will work a sudden revolution is not to be expected. Organised Christianity of all patterns is too much wedded to the modern idea of the State to make this possible. Yet nothing but good can come from careful study of what is presented here. Christianity, whatever its sanctions under stress of circumstance, is greater than statecraft. "The laws of State can never make right for the Christian what according to the higher law of the Kingdom of God is wrong for him." It may not be possible to abolish war. When all Christian thought in the world was practically pacifist, war was not abolished. "But if the fact that a certain calling cannot yet be abolished because the world is unprepared is sufficient to justify a Christian in pursuing it, then it is difficult to see why the sale of intoxicants, and prostitution, and even highway robbery, should not be regarded as permissible." J. C. MANTRIPP.

COALVILLE, LEICESTER.

Jewish Theology systematically and historically considered. By Dr K. Kohler, President of the Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati.—New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918.

THIS book is an English reproduction of the author's treatise in a series of works on Jewish lore (*Grundriss der Gesamtwissenschaft des Judentums*, Bd. 4, 1910). The German original speedily won friends in Europe, and Dr Abrahams of Cambridge induced a young friend to prepare an English version. This led Dr Kohler to revise and remodel his treatise. Its main structure remains unimpaired; its three parts deal respectively with God, Man, and Israel. The titles of the divisional chapters are retained, and a final chapter (the 59th) is added on "the Ethics of Judaism and the Kingdom of God." Especially valuable are the very numerous additional references to Rabbinic, mediæval, and modern literature, which supply the student with precious clues at once to the original sources and to different schools of thought and interpretation. In a future edition it might be well to indicate the dates of the great teachers whose views are cited or discussed. How many even of the loyal sons of Israel could put Albo or Crescas,—nay, even Akiba, Judah ha-Levi, or Maimonides—into their right chronological connections?

Dr Kohler stands as the Rabbis fancifully conceived Adam, on the ground of the Psalmist's phrase, "Thou hast beset me behind and before,"

with two faces, one surveying the known past, the other directed hopefully to the unknown future. His view embraces the whole history of his people; his imagination, kindled by the great words of prophetic hope, conceives for them a glorious part in the final evolution of the world's religion. He lays it down at the outset that Judaism is more than a mere legal religion confined to a particular race. Nor is it a Theism divorced from actual life, a sort of sublimated philosophy, on which all believers in one God may be ultimately united into a Church. Israel cannot surrender its great privilege as the bearer of "a message concerning the *One and holy God and one undivided humanity* with a world-uniting *Messianic goal*; a message entrusted by divine revelation to the Jewish people." The foundations of this conception lie, of course, in the Scriptures. On the literary side these are treated in full concurrence with the approved results of modern study. In the application of their details, however, the author is not always consistent in his method. The gradual evolution of the Sacred Law is frankly recognised, but we are also told that God made such-and-such declarations by Moses. The old language of authoritative revelation still remains, while its support in external miracle is frankly discarded. The Law falls into a second place; the voices of prophet and psalmist lead the chorus for the age to come. This implies a complete change in the conception of revelation. At the outset we are told that "Judaism has one specific term for religion, representing the moral relation between God and man, viz. covenant," and the writer then informs us that "the covenant was concluded by God with the patriarchs and with Israel by means of sacrificial blood" in accordance with the primitive custom by which tribes or individuals become "blood-brothers" (viii. p. 48). Why does Dr Kohler thus present the legendary scene as actual reality? He thus plays fast and loose with legitimate method, in order apparently to get a positive divine sanction for an idea which must be established—if established at all—on other grounds. Very different is the later chapter (xlvi.) on the "Election of Israel." It is introduced, it is true, by a quotation from Exodus xix. 4-5, as a promise addressed by God to the people "through His chosen messenger Moses." But this crude literalism is very soon abandoned as the author sails bravely down the broad stream of history. He sees clearly that other nations have been distinguished by special intellectual or moral and social achievements, which may be read in a religious light as due to equipment by Providence with suitable capacities and gifts. The genius of Israel made the higher minds of her people more fully conscious at once of the duty devolving on her, and of the loftier Power which laid it on her. We are here planted in the wide field of human evolution, and the conception of revelation no longer rests on specific scenes in which God and the patriarchs, or Moses and the people, are joint agents, as Scripture relates, but on a vast process of experience which finds its best interpretation in the recognition of a super-human or divine purpose. The use of the older language is a concession to older traditional sentiment, which is out of place in a "scientific manual."

In tracing the development of specific ideas such as the unity of God, personal immortality, the early phases of the Messianic hope, the doctrines of retribution and repentance, the author does not resort to such ambiguities of presentation. His recognition of facts is admirably frank. The abundant Biblical illustration is supplemented with a wealth of material

from Talmud and Midrashim, besides the apocryphal, eschatologic, and Hellenistic literatures. Where the exposition of the divine character trenches on metaphysics, the reader is conducted on interesting excursions into mediæval philosophy, when Arab teachers passed on the lore of Aristotle to Jewish doctors in Spain, and Maimonides founded a school of Hebrew rationalism. Dr Kohler is perfectly ready to recognise the various influences—Persian and Greek—which helped to mould Israel's thought (we cannot think his identification of the late Metatron with Mithras tenable); and his incidental examples of the feats of exegesis by which desirable conclusions were fetched out of Scripture, and undesirable issues were sometimes avoided, are full of interest. When no text was handy, imagination supplied the necessary detail. In the universality of the divine beneficence the thunders of Sinai (literally "the voices") proclaimed the Ten Words in the seventy languages of all the nations of the earth, though Israel only was there to hear; and when the people entered Canaan the words of the Law were engraved in the same seventy tongues on the stones of the altar on Mount Ebal (p. 360). The same desire to vindicate the widest purpose for God's government prompted the teaching of Joshua ben Hananiah—"The righteous of all nations will have a share in the world of eternal bliss"—and the generous conviction that "when judging the nations, God determines their standard by their best representatives" (pp. 340, 402).

The final sketch of Jesus is brief but sympathetic, and Dr Kohler remarks with clear vision that "Rabbinic Judaism was not in a position to judge Christianity impartially, as it never learned to know Christianity as presented in the New Testament." Paul, indeed, made a caricature of the Law, and aroused the hatred which generated the age-long passion of Jewry. Yet it cannot be denied that the expansion of Christianity was largely due to him, and this secured a diffusion of Jewish doctrines which neither Judaism nor the Judæo-Christian sect of the first days could ever have accomplished. The growth of the Church through its alliance with Rome enabled it to "develop the ancient Jewish institutions of charity and redeeming love into magnificent systems of beneficence," and by the creations of art and music Christianity cultivated the emotions and enriched human life in all directions. Mohammedanism revived Greek science and philosophy after the dark night of mediæval ignorance, and can still do more for the advancement of life in Eastern Asia or in Southern Africa than either the Russian Church or some branches of Protestantism. Tried by the test of history, both Christianity and Islam must be recognised as Providential instruments for the world's education. It is even bravely affirmed that "eventually the whole of civilisation will accept, through a purified Christianity, the Fatherhood of God, the only Ruler of the world, and the brotherhood of all men as His children." Then the Church and the Mosque will recognise their debt to the Synagogue, and Israel will "arise with renewed prophetic vigour as the bearer of a world-uniting faith, as the triumphant Messiah of the nations." The place of the Law in this consummation is not very clear. Dr Kohler delicately minimises the significance of circumcision, declaring that "it is not a sacrament and does not determine membership in the Jewish community." He has no sympathy with Zionism; the centre of the future must be a spiritual Jerusalem. When all mankind have learned the lessons of the Jewish festivals, the ideals of liberty and law and peace, the

solemn truths of the divine justice and mercy, then (it may be conjectured) the Law will be needed no more, and God's kingdom of righteousness and truth will be attained.

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

OXFORD.

Benedictine Monachism. By the Right Rev. Cuthbert Butler, Abbot of Downside Abbey—London: Longmans, 1919.

THE non-Benedictine reader will find this an unequal book, both in interest and in historical value. It deals partly with details of modern monastic politics which may well seem savourless even to Benedictines a few years hence; in other parts it is intensely interesting, for it reveals the mind and the ideals of a cultured English gentleman who is also a devoted monk. Historically, it is even more unequal. The author has long been favourably known for his studies in early Eastern monasticism and in the Benedictine Rule. In the present volume he shows familiarity with original Benedictine authorities for the first century or so of the Order; with modern Benedictinism he is equally familiar: but (if we except the reforms of Benedict of Aniane and the Commentary of Paul Warnefrid) he seems almost entirely dependent upon second-hand authorities for the nine centuries which separate modern English Benedictinism from those scanty documents which shed a few rays of twilight on the early history of the Order. His frequent references and quotations for those 900 years are preponderantly from modern authors, among whom he is far from choosing the most trustworthy. He makes no attempt to balance such authorities against each other, nor does he use even his favourites in a manner to command our confidence. Newman's essays on the Benedictines are hopelessly out of date for all matter of historical scholarship; they survive only in virtue of their admirable style and the deep religious feeling which inspired all that Newman ever wrote: yet it is by them that Abbot Butler attempts to decide the most important historical questions. The educational activities of the monks, for instance, are shown to us in the light of only one primary authority, Paul Warnefrid, whom Abbot Butler translates incorrectly, omitting the very important qualification *or month after each week* (p. 324, line 1). After this, we are referred to modern authors of whom the two principal are not specialists in monastic history, and Abbot Butler ignores three of the latest monographs on this subject, though one was written under direction of a distinguished Dominican, Professor Mandonnet, and another was by a Roman Catholic. But those monographs aim rather at fact than at edification, and it is evident that they have not found their way into the Downside library. Meanwhile our author bases nearly all his history upon "by far the best account known to me"—the above-cited essays by Newman (p. 324). Later (p. 375) he quotes from the second of these essays an extract containing a statement of which Abbot Butler himself recognises the falsity on p. 325, to the effect that St Benedict admitted to his schools "lay-boys, destined for the world." This statement lies at the very root of the controversy as to the actual services of the monks to mediæval education; yet Abbot Butler imposes upon us, without a word of warning, these words which he knows to be false. And this indulgence to Newman contrasts glaringly with his injustice to the late A. F. Leach, who was a specialist in fields where Newman was a mere compiler. On

p. 325 he accuses Leach of asserting what, in fact, Leach mentions only for the sake of holding it up to ridicule. When his prepossessions betray him into such a blunder on a matter of plain English, we need not wonder to find him tripping in his too rare references to, or quotations from, mediæval authorities. On p. 91 he assures us that St Bernard never "manifests any fear of his (the devil's) intrusion in the intimate personal relations of the soul with God." Yet St Bernard expresses this fear very strongly in one of his most characteristic passages (*Serm. in Cant.*, xxxiii. §§ 9, 10, 13)—the "noonday devil" who comes as an angel of light and tempts the very best at their brightest moments—the devil whose hand even Mary was obliged to suspect in that angelic message from the Holy Ghost. This *daemon meridianus*, whose voice is so like to God's, is in fact one of the commonplaces of mediæval mysticism.

Such errors of detail are not infrequent; but let us now bring the Abbot's history to a broader test, so far as space will permit. In taking the subject of Benedictine writing and learning, we choose what the public would probably judge to be his strong side. Here, compiling as usual from Newman, he draws a ludicrously exaggerated picture of average Benedictine scholarship and scriptorial work in the Middle Ages (pp. 354 ff.). "Most monks had been brought up on the Latin classics; and what had been their study as boys became their recreation as men." Has he ever looked carefully into the catalogue of a monastic library, and asked himself how it would have been physically possible for "most monks" to feed on the handful of classical books there recorded? Take, for example, Glastonbury, Peterborough, and Reading Abbeys, with more than 150 monks among them. The three libraries together could produce only two copies of Virgil's *Æneid* and (possibly) two of Horace's *Odes*, and other classics in proportion. Why, if the monks wanted to read the classics, were they content to go on for centuries without multiplying these copies? Has Abbot Butler tried to discover a single mediæval catalogue which implies that any but the most insignificant fraction of the average monk's leisure was spent in writing? At St Bernard's great abbey of Clairvaux, for instance, the whole amount of writing contributed to the library during the first three and a half centuries was less than it would have been if, instead of 100 monks, a single professional scribe had worked in the monastery for about three hours a day. It is distressing that the old legends should still be repeated in the face of the plainest documentary evidence.

Take, again, the question of reading. When, about 1240, Grosseteste warned his Franciscan friends against idleness, he expressly instanced the lamentable example of the older monastic Orders, "whom, alas! we see walking in the darkness of ignorance." To Roger Bacon, writing a generation later, the "duo Ordines studentes" are no longer the older Orders, but the Dominicans and Franciscans; yet, even among these, "many thousands enter who cannot read their Psalter and grammar." At Westminster, about 1260, twenty-one monks signed their vow of profession not with their names, but with the mark of the cross. At about the same time, we find the Archbishop of Rouen providing that his decrees should be published to the monks in French as well as in Latin, to make sure that they understood: yet Rouen province was one of the most civilised in Christendom. And the state of the parish clergy corroborates these startling revelations of monastic ignorance. To know nothing but parrot-

Latin would be a worse and more public scandal in a parish priest than in a monk; yet, in 1222, Archbishop Stephen Langton decreed in full synod that the archdeacons should see that priests could at least read, and know the sense of, the most solemn portions of the mass-service. In that same year, a visitation of seventeen parishes is recorded in which five priests were found unable to construe the first sentence of the essential prayer of the mass, the *Te igitur*. Two centuries later the records of monastic visitations become more frequent. Peterborough was one of the greatest of the "solemn" Benedictine houses; yet, in [1432], it was necessary to translate the Rule and constitutions into English, that the monks might all understand; so also at the great Benedictine abbeys of Bardney and Croyland, and five Augustinian monasteries. At another important Benedictine house, Eynsham, and at two others, the Bishop found no grammar-master. At three houses he found the reading neglected. In the later visitations of Norwich diocese the absence of schoolmasters is constantly noted; in 1514 the great cathedral monastery of Norwich had none; and in 1520 a young monk there was examined and found to "understand nothing of those things which he was ordered to read"; masters were lacking also at the three next greatest houses in the diocese—Walsingham, Wymondham, and St Benet's. As to university education, we find it far below even the moderate statutory requirement. Benedict XII. had decreed, in 1336, that every community of twenty or more should keep one of its number at Oxford or Cambridge; yet this was constantly evaded; the defaulters were often quite great houses, and we get still fuller evidence of this from the General Chapter records. In 1511 we find Archbishop Warham visiting his own cathedral monastery of Canterbury and insisting that a schoolmaster must be appointed, "seeing that, in default of instruction, many [*plerique*] monks who celebrate mass and other divine services are utterly [*penitus*] ignorant what they are reading, to the great scandal and disgrace both of religion and of the monastery." The General Chapter Acts of the Augustinians, still unprinted, tell the same tale. We need not wonder, therefore, that the Oxford Chancellor Gascoigne [1450] speaks strongly and repeatedly of the monks' idleness and uselessness, and asserts that they destroy more books than they make. We find his great German contemporary, Abbot Trithem, casting in the teeth of his fellow-abbots that some of them "are involved in such darkness that they do not understand the simplest sentences of St Benedict's Rule." To the monks of his own abbey he complains bitterly of their envious opposition to his studies. A whole book of similar complaints might be compiled from Trithem; yet he belonged to a newly reformed congregation. It may be asked why Abbot Butler, who claims at least a nodding acquaintance with Trithem, ignores all this evidence. But that would raise a wider question: Why do all other historians of his communion steadily ignore this and equally valuable contemporary testimony?

If space allowed, on every point of monastic life we might mark the same contrast between these pious fancies borrowed from Newman and the actual documents. The book is of real value, because it contains many pages, and some very good pages, which could scarcely have been written by any but a sincere and devout monk. But, on the historical side, it justifies two of Newman's most pessimistic utterances. On the very threshold of Roman Catholicism he wrote: "Perhaps the only English writer who

has any claim to be considered an ecclesiastical historian is the infidel Gibbon." Nineteen years later, when he had taken full stock of his co-religionists, he wrote again: "Unless one doctored all one's [historical] facts, one would be taken for a bad Catholic." There is a deep significance in the last words of Abbot Butler's book: "*Nihil obstat*. D. Michael Barrett, O.S.B., censor deputatus—*Imprimatur*. ✠ Geo. Ambrosius, Ep. Cliftonien."

G. G. COULTON.

GREAT SHELFORD, CAMBRIDGE.

Tradition and Change: Studies in Contemporary Literature. By Arthur Waugh.—London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1919.—Pp. viii + 303.

TRAINED in an older generation, and yet by his alert mind and critical habit well aware of the new, Mr Waugh is a vigorous appraiser of the poets and other writers, late and early, of his time. He is, we judge,—indeed, he frankly admits it in his first pages,—a thorough believer in the tradition carried on by Tennyson and Dickens in their separate ways last century. He holds by the tried standards and the assured values that they held by. Yet he discovers the symptoms of change, and finds them intensely interesting and worth curious attention. These symptoms, as we have reason to know, are not always read alike. It is easier to diagnose a man than an era, and while the account of the individual may be convincing, that which sums up his epoch is not so sure of its mark. So it is here. The spirit of the age that was Victorian, writes Mr Waugh, was at variance, "in many essential points in direct variance," with the spirit of the present hour; and there we agree. But when he goes on to say that its very watchword was Caution, that the prevalent faith of its representative middle-class took "the easy-going form of Broad Churchmanship," and that it was terribly afraid of democracy, which it regarded as anarchy's runner-up, we are not so sure. The critic himself gives us the cue, in this uncertainty, when at a later stage he speaks of Dickens as the man who epitomised his age, who was its most exuberant mouthpiece—a dictum that leaves us wondering if the two accounts can be squared? As well try to reconcile the caution of Mr Spenlow and the prodigal tongue of Mr Micawber. For the Victorian era too was complex, and needs full as many labels as that, let us say, which bred Wycherley and Milton. However, Mr Waugh has his own angle of vision, and judges his regions accordingly, and the personal estimate he puts on his picked men and the movements they signalise does not depend for its value on exact arithmetic. The interesting thing is that he has himself bowed to the tradition and felt the change, and that he is in a vital degree his own confessor.

The maintainers of the older tradition in his survey do not lead us very far back. Swinburne, Stevenson, Henry James, Mrs Humphry Ward, Mr Conrad, Mr Galsworthy, Mr Arthur Symonds: these, besides Dickens, who was noted above, and the author of *Erewhon*, represent the old stagers. The new comers range from Rupert Brooke and Elroy Flecker to those latest verse recruits who appear to start up for a moment, only to disappear again in the dark vista:

"To endure for a little,
To endure and have done."

The two volumes of Georgian poetry published before and during the War, and the so-called *Catholic Anthology* of four years ago, give him a good opening. He wishes to take stock of the latest fashions and the boldest and most revolutionary innovators, while he asserts the maintenance of the permanent laws. There are certain true conceptions of poetry, he says in effect, which have stood fast, and first among them—one implicit in the very charter of poetry itself—the belief in its power to make universal the individual emotion and the single idea. To this add the concrete lyric fact. Unless the living idea, which is a part with our universal human experience, is cast in the personal mould of the poet, and fused in the live word, you may have good or bad verse, you will certainly not have good poetry. Mr Waugh does not need to range far in the New School, before he runs up against some rank heretics of the art as he conceives it. The later Georgians are out to express the accidents in casual idioms, and let the essences take care of themselves. These revolutionaries, he says, proclaim that they paint the thing they see for the God of things as they are. Any and every aspect of life will do, and what they see they put into everyday words. "The result shall be the New Poetry, the vital expression of a new race." Wordsworth, in his famous preface to the *Lyrical Ballads*, made the same bid, in revolt against an artificial convention; and at points he suffered for his Spartacist creed. His genius saved him, in his magic years of youth, and with genius the new poets will attain the extreme liberty of their art: without it, they may strive as they will. Theoretically free, they will be the victims of literary moods transient as Paris fashions. Force may come of that instantaneity of effect they seek, and even a new kind of rhetoric or vivid verse. "But poetry is something more than these."

By contrast, the writer of these essays finds the poetry of Stephen Phillips, Lionel Johnson, and some members of the old Rhymers' Club much more satisfying. He brings his Oxford reminiscences to bear on the pages on Lionel Johnson, with a welcome relief to the mere critical portrayal. He cordially appreciates the poems of Mr J. C. Squire, and in no wise objects to any of his novel expedients in verse, and quotes a text to show his varying of the old mode:

"Now I have broken Beauty's Wall,
Now that my kindred world I hold,
I care not though the cities fall
And the green earth go cold."

We have tested Mr Waugh on the side where he is most symptomatic in his criticism; but when he turns to the question of realism in the novel, or to the psycho-therapeutic art of Mr Henry James, or to the epic of fear—fear of life and fear of death—as written by Mr Conrad, he gives us by turns cause for agreement and disagreement. In short, his book is a stimulating and provocative one, well fitted to maintain the finer aims of art in this transition-time of ours.

ERNEST RHYS.

LONDON.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

EUCLID, NEWTON, AND EINSTEIN.

C. D. BROAD, M.A.

I PROPOSE to try in the present paper to put into simple terms, which shall neither make a layman feel dizzy nor a mathematician feel sick, the main points of Einstein's principle of relativity. The bright young men who instruct us daily on the problems of science and religion from their desks in newspaper offices have succeeded in conveying the impression that Einstein has proved Euclid to be a fool and Newton an ignoramus. One famous journal, with a large circle of readers in Scotland, so far departed from the customary subject of its leading articles—the reiterated demand that the ex-Kaiser shall be executed, condemned, and tried—as to inform the world, on the alleged authority of one who obstinately insists that he is a German in spite of the most charitable attempts to prove him to be Swiss, that “circles are not round.” It is rash, but not (as yet) criminal, to suggest that, when newspaper editors write on subjects which they cannot be expected to understand, they are liable to talk nonsense. I therefore venture to think that there may still be something useful to be said as to the precise relation of Einstein's theories to Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics. It will also be worth while to inquire whether the new views have any important bearing on philosophical problems. It is more than likely that I shall fail to fulfil my promises; but I can hardly be more absurd than the newspapers or less intelligible than the experts.

It is highly important at the outset to understand clearly that Einstein has put forward two theories of relativity: the “restricted theory,” as he calls it, and the present generalised theory. The former has nothing whatever to do

with gravitation ; the latter has no *especially* intimate connection with optical or electrical phenomena. The new theory is, in a very important sense, an extension of the old one ; but it is not a mere generalisation which contains the old one unmodified as a part. *E.g.* the constancy of the velocity of light is the keystone of the old theory, whilst this velocity is not absolutely constant on the new one. I shall begin with a sketch of the restricted principle, which has been before the world since 1906.

The grounds for the restricted theory are best understood by considering the famous Michelson-Morley experiment. The principles of this are perfectly easy to grasp. Suppose one had a platform moving through the ether in a certain direction with a constant velocity. On this platform let there be an observer, a source of light, and a couple of mirrors. Draw a line on the platform through the source of light and parallel to the direction in which it is moving. Draw another line on the platform through the source at right angles to the first. Mark off equal distances from the source on both these lines. At the points thus obtained place the two mirrors normally to each line respectively. At a certain moment let the source give out a flash of light. The part of this that travels parallel to the direction in which the platform is moving will have to travel more than the marked distance before it reaches the mirror ; for the mirror will have moved on through the ether while the light is travelling up to it, and thus the light will be overtaking it. Now let it be reflected back along its old path. It will now have to travel less than the marked distance, because, while it travels back through the ether, the source will be moving up to meet it. The total distance travelled by the light through the ether from the time when it leaves the source to the time when it gets back to it can easily be shown to be $\frac{2lc^2}{c^2 - v^2}$, where l is the marked length, c the velocity of light relative to the ether, and v the velocity of the platform relative to the ether.

Let us now follow the fate of the light that travels to the other mirror and is reflected back from it to the source. By the time that such light gets back the source is no longer at its original position in the ether. Hence light that travelled out at right angles to the direction in which the platform is moving would not return to the source at all after reflexion, for it would be returned, not to the place where the source *is*, but to where it *was* when the flash left it. We have therefore to consider light which strikes the mirror at a point in the ether

equidistant from the point at which the source was when the light left it and the point at which it will be when the light returns to it. The light thus describes an isosceles triangle in the ether, with a point on the mirror as apex and the distance between the initial and final positions of the source as base. It can be shown that the actual distance travelled in the ether by such light between leaving the source and returning to

it is $\frac{2lc}{\sqrt{c^2 - v^2}}$.

In fact, the light that travelled to the first mirror and back has traversed a distance $\frac{2l}{1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2}}$, and the light that travelled to

the second and back has traversed a distance $\frac{2l}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2}}}$. Now,

when beams of light from a common source come to the same point after travelling different distances, they "interfere," *i.e.* they produce a spectrum with bright and dark bands. And there is a perfectly definite relation between the position of these bands and the difference in the distance travelled by the two beams. Hence in the present case there should be interference, and it should be possible to determine from it the velocity of the platform with respect to the ether, if our instruments be delicate enough. In the Michelson-Morley experiment the platform was the earth and v was the velocity of the earth in its orbit. The apparatus was quite delicate enough to detect effects of the order of magnitude predicted. *No trace of such effects was found.* There are many other experiments, more difficult to understand without special knowledge of the laws of electromagnetism, by which one might hope to detect and measure the velocity of the earth with respect to the ether. *In no case has any such effect been observed*, though the methods used were quite delicate enough to detect them if they had been present. This negative experimental fact, that no effect due to the uniform motion of a body through the ether has been observed, although it was predicted and although it could have been noticed and measured if present, is the basis of the restricted theory of relativity.

These being the facts, what conclusions are we to base on them? In the first place, what assumptions did we make when we calculated the different distances travelled by the two beams? Apart from assumptions about the measurement of space and time, with which we shall have to deal later, we

assumed (*a*) that the ether is not dragged along in any way by the platform, as water would be by a stick moved through it; (*b*) that the velocity of light in stagnant ether is the same in all directions; and (*c*) that the fact that a source which emits light is itself in motion does not affect the velocity of the emitted light. Would it be reasonable to account for the negative result of the Michelson-Morley experiment by rejecting or modifying any of these assumptions? As regards (*a*), the opposite alternative would bring us in conflict with another set of experimental facts. The aberration of light from a star due to the annual motion of the earth will be different according to whether the ether is stagnant or whether the earth drags some of it along in its course. The amount of aberration that should be observed on any hypothesis of this nature can be calculated and compared with that which is actually found. What is actually found is that which would follow from the hypothesis of a stagnant ether. If we assume that the earth drags the ether along with it to the extent needed to account for the negative result of the Michelson-Morley experiment, the resulting value of the aberration will differ widely from that which is actually found. Hence assumption (*a*) cannot be rejected.

The assumption (*b*) seems to be the only reasonable one to make on the subject. Nor would it help us to reject it, for, since the earth is moving in its orbit in different directions in the ether at different times of the year, the supposition that the velocity of light in the ether varies with absolute direction in the ether, even if it can be made intelligible, ought at most to make the result of the Michelson-Morley experiment null at one point in the earth's orbit. It should make the discrepancy between prediction and observation worse than before at other seasons of the year.

(*c*) On the wave-theory of light there is no reason why the velocity of a source at the moment of emission should have any effect on the velocity with which the disturbance set up subsequently travels in the ether. If we held the corpuscular theory of light, matters would be different; for a corpuscle shot out of a body that was itself moving would presumably have a velocity compounded of that due to the discharging impulse and that of the source itself. But the evidence for the wave-theory and against the corpuscular theory is so strong that it seems idle to try to explain the negative result of the experiment by making an assumption which is only plausible on the latter hypothesis.

It seems, then that all the *physical* assumptions that led us

to expect a positive result from the Michelson-Morley experiment are highly plausible, and that the rejection of any of them will merely bring us into conflict with some other set of well-attested experimental facts. We are thus absolutely forced to turn our attention to the assumptions that have been made as to the measurement of distances and time-lapses. This brings us, as regards space, to the celebrated Lorentz-Fitzgerald Contraction, and, as regards time, to the notion of Local Time.

It will be remembered that we marked out two lines on our platform, both passing through the source, one parallel to the direction in which the platform is moving and the other at right angles to this. Along these we measured off what we took to be the same distance l . On the assumption that we had really measured the same distance along both lines, we saw that the distance travelled by the light which goes parallel to the motion of the platform is $\frac{2l}{1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2}}$, whilst that travelled by

the light which goes at right angles to this direction is $\frac{2l}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2}}}$.

Yet nothing corresponding to this difference can be observed. We could account for this fact if the distance at right angles to the direction of motion which is measured as l "really is" l , whilst the distance parallel to the direction of motion which is measured as l "really" is only $l \sqrt{1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2}}$. The actual distance

travelled by both beams will then be the same, viz. $\frac{2l}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2}}}$, and

therefore the negative result of the experiment will be explained. If we suppose that *everything* contracts in this proportion in the direction of its velocity with respect to the ether, it is obvious that no process of direct measurement will tell us of the fact. A measuring rod that goes l times into a line at right angles to the direction of motion will also go l times into a line of length $l \sqrt{1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2}}$ parallel to the direction of motion, because its own length when turned in the latter direction will change from l to $l \sqrt{1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2}}$. This is what is called the Lorentz-Fitzgerald Contraction.

We can now deal with the question of Local Time. Let us suppose, that the observer on our moving platform is trying to determine the velocity of light relative to the platform. The numerical value of a velocity will naturally depend on the units of space and time chosen; it will be different according to whether we reckon in centimetres and seconds or in inches and hours. Therefore, if we wish to compare the velocity of light relative to a moving platform with that in the stagnant ether we must be sure that our time-measurer is going at the same rate. We have supposed the velocity of light in stagnant ether to have a certain numerical value c when distances are measured in centimetres and time-lapses in seconds. Now, suppose we have some time-measurer at our source, and that the arrangements are otherwise as before. We first want to be sure that it is measuring seconds in order to get a fair comparison between the velocity of light relative to the platform and that in the stagnant ether. Now, we have seen that, assuming the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction, the distance *in the ether* travelled by a beam which leaves the source, strikes one of the mirrors, and then returns to the source, is $\frac{2l}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2}}}$,

where l is the measured distance from source to mirror in centimetres. Since c is assumed as the numerical value of the velocity of light in the ether, it is clear that our clock ought to indicate a lapse of $\frac{2l}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2}}} \div c$ between the departure and

return of the light, if it is accurately measuring time in seconds. For a fair comparison we should have to set it so as to do this. Now, the distance travelled by this beam *relatively to the platform* when measured in centimetres is $2l$. Therefore the velocity of light relatively to the platform will be $\frac{2l}{2l}$,

or $c\sqrt{1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2}}$ centimetres per second. It will thus vary with

the velocity of the platform. This seems a perfectly reasonable result, and exactly what one might expect. But it is not confirmed by experience. Actually we find that the measured velocity of light does *not* depend on the velocity of the source, the observer, and his instruments. So we have another conflict between prediction and observation to account

for. Evidently we cannot meet it by any further modifications about the measurement of *space*, or we shall have the Michelsen-Morley difficulty, which we had hoped to be safely buried, back on our hands. We are therefore forced to reconsider our measurements of *time*. Suppose that when a period of one second has "really elapsed" our clock indicates a lapse of

$\sqrt{1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2}}$ seconds, *i.e.* is a little slow. Then the *measured* lapse between the departure and the arrival of the beam at the source will not be $\frac{2l}{c\sqrt{1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2}}}$ but $\frac{2l}{c}$ seconds. The measured

distance traversed by the beam with respect to the platform is of course still $2l$ centimetres. Thus the measured velocity of light with respect to the platform now becomes $\frac{2l}{\frac{2l}{c}}$, *i.e.*

c centimetres per second. It is thus independent of the velocity of the platform, which, as we saw, is the result actually observed. We have therefore to assume that the clock at the source goes slower than the same clock at the same place would do if the platform were at rest in the ether, and that the ratio is $\sqrt{1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2}} : 1$. This assumption, of course, makes no difference to the Lorentz-Fitzgerald solution of the Michelsen-Morley difficulty.

But we are not even yet at the end of our troubles about the measurement of time. We have assumed so far that we have only had to deal with *one* time-measurer in *one* place; for the light came back in the end to the place from which it started, and the lapse was measured by the clock there. This, of course, does accord with the way in which the velocity of light actually has been measured by purely terrestrial experiments such as those of Fizeau and Foucault. Still, it is clear that we often want to compare the time at which something leaves one place with that at which it arrives in *another* place, and that in order to be able to do this we must have some ground for believing that the clocks in the two places are going at the same rate and that they agree in their zeros. Now, the mere fact that they agreed in these respects when together does not guarantee that they will always continue to do so when one has been taken away to a distance. In the case of a pair of clocks, *e.g.*, the shaking that one of them gets on the journey, the possibly different average tem-

perature of the region to which it is moved, the difference in the gravitational attraction at different parts of the earth, and many other factors, would make it most unsafe to argue that, because they agreed when together, they must continue to agree when widely separated. It is thus absolutely necessary to have some criterion of sameness of rate and sameness of zero which can be applied even when two clocks are at a great distance from each other. Now, the only criterion that suggests itself makes use of signals sent from the place where one is to the place where the other is. Let a light signal be sent from clock A when it marks t_A and received at clock B when this marks t_B . Let this be repeated when the first clock marks t'_A , and let it be received at B when the second marks t'_B . Then if we find that $t'_B - t_B$, the lapse recorded between the reception of the two signals, is equal to $t'_A - t_A$, the lapse recorded between the despatch of them, it seems reasonable to conclude that the two clocks are going at the same rate. Again, if a signal leaves A at t_A , reaches B when the clock there marks t_B , is immediately reflected back to A, and reaches there when the clock at A marks t'_A , it seems reasonable to conclude that the two clocks agree in their zeros provided that $t_B = \frac{1}{2}(t_A + t'_A)$. The plain fact is that these criteria seem reasonable, that no others suggest themselves, and that *some* criterion is necessary if we are to deal at all with events that happen at different places. Moreover, with this criterion, and with this alone, will observers find the same value for the velocity of light, whether they measure it by observations all carried out at one place (as described above) or by observations made at two distant places. We can easily see this as follows. We have seen that the velocity of light relative to a platform, as determined by observations at a single place on the platform, will be found to be c , no matter what velocity the platform may have in the ether. Now, let our other clock be put where the first mirror is in the Michelson-Morley experiment, *i.e.* at a measured distance l from the source in the direction of motion of the platform. Let a flash leave the source A when the clock there marks 0, reach the clock at B when this marks t_B , be reflected back, and return to A when the clock at A marks t_A . Then by our criterion $t_B = \frac{1}{2}(0 + t_A) = \frac{1}{2}t_A$. But we know that the velocity of light relative to the platform, as measured entirely by observations at A with the clock at A, is c . And the measured distance that this light has travelled relatively to the platform is $2l$, *i.e.* the distance on the platform backwards and forwards between A and B. Hence $t_A = \frac{2l}{c}$. Hence

t_B (which = $\frac{1}{2}t_A$) is $\frac{l}{c}$. That is to say, a beam of light, which left A when A's clock marked 0 and travelled the distance l relative to the platform to the point B, reaches B when the clock there marks a time $\frac{l}{c}$. Thus the observers at A and B on comparing notes will again conclude that the velocity of light with respect to the platform is c , which is exactly the same conclusion as experimenters who confined themselves to making observations at A with A's clock had already reached. So that the conventions for standardising distant clocks are not only reasonable in themselves, but are the only ones that will lead to the same measure of the velocity of light with respect to the platform when two different but equally reasonable methods of measuring that velocity are used.

But, as I shall now show, these conventions, reasonable as they are, imply that, if the platform is moving, clocks at different positions are wrong in comparison with what they would record if the platform were at rest, not merely in the sense already noticed that they are going at a slower rate, but also in the further sense that agreement between their readings does not imply identity of time. We have just seen that if a flash leaves A when the clock there reads 0, it will reach B when the clock *there* reads $\frac{l}{c}$. Now, if there were nothing

wrong with the clock at B except the systematic slowness of rate that we have already noticed, the real lapse of time corresponding to a reading $\frac{l}{c}$ should be $\frac{1}{\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}}\frac{l}{c}$. But actually

the light that left A at 0 has travelled (i.) a distance $l\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}$ in the ether (taking account of the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction), and (ii.) has had further to catch up B, which is itself moving in the same direction with velocity v . A very simple calculation will show that the time which must actually

have elapsed between leaving A and reaching B is $\frac{l\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}}{c-v}$.

Now, we have seen that if we only take account of the slowness of rate of the clock at B, the time elapsed since this clock marked 0 will be $\frac{1}{\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}}\frac{l}{c}$. These two quantities are

not equal. Hence the clock at B is not merely going slow like the clock at A: it must also be out in its zero. The

amount of error is of course $\frac{l\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}}{c-v} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}} \frac{l}{c}$. This comes

to $\frac{1}{\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}} \frac{vl}{c^2}$. Thus when a platform is in motion and clocks

are dotted along the direction of its course and synchronised according to the conventions mentioned above, these clocks are not merely all slow in their rate as compared with the same clocks on a platform at rest, but further they are all out in their zeros by an amount that depends on the distance from the standard clock. In fact, to get the "true" time at a place you must not merely take the reading of the clock there and divide it by $\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}$; you must add to the reading

an amount $\frac{vl}{c^2}$ before dividing by $\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}$. These facts are

what are referred to under the name of *Local Time*. It should now be perfectly clear that local time is neither a mystery of the higher mathematics nor a metaphysical whimsy of minds debauched by German philosophy. We have used no mathematics more complicated than simple equations, and we have seen how the experimental facts and the most obvious conventions for synchronising distant clocks force us step by step to this conception.

We have now really got the gist of the famous Lorentz-Einstein transformation. We may sum up our results by saying (i.) that, if you measure a distance l in the direction of motion of a moving platform, the distance between the same two points, if the platform had been at rest, would have been

$\frac{l}{\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}}$; and (ii.) that if a clock, synchronised according to the

method given below with a standard clock at the origin, marks t , the same clock at the same place would have marked

$\frac{1}{\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}} \left(t + \frac{v}{c^2} l \right)$ if the platform had been at rest. The first

result is due to the necessity of assuming the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction in order to explain the negative result of

the Michelsen-Morley experiment. The second is due (a) to the general slowing of clocks which has to be assumed to account for the fact that the measured velocity of light is independent of the motion of the platform containing the observers and their instruments, and (b) to the variation in the zeros of the clocks which has to be assumed if the velocity of light, as measured by two distant observers on the platform who compare notes, is to be the same as that found by a single observer who stays in one position with a single clock and only notes the phenomena that happen there. (c) In the calculations by which we reach the second result we make use of the already assumed Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction, both in dealing with the rates and in dealing with the zeros of the clocks of the moving platform.

Now, these *results* had already been reached by Lorentz before Einstein came on the scene. The contraction, as its name implies, had been suggested by him and Fitzgerald. The conception of local time and the equation of transformation for time had been introduced by Lorentz for mathematical reasons into which we need not now enter. The originality of Einstein at this stage consisted in his way of connecting these results and viewing them as the consequences of a single general principle. Our next task is to try to understand Einstein's conception of relativity, and the motives for it.

I have stated all the arguments and deduced all the results on the assumption of an ether which is "really" at rest and of clocks which accurately measure the "real" time. I think that there can be little doubt that, with our traditions, this course is *psychologically* the most satisfactory one to follow in order to make the conception of contractions and local time intelligible. But as soon as one reflects on the results one begins to feel that *epistemologically* (to use an unpleasantly pretentious phrase) this whole way of looking at things is artificial and unsatisfactory in the extreme. There are three interconnected points where this becomes specially obvious. (i.) The only velocities for which we have any *direct* evidence are those of one material system relatively to another. Since we cannot perceive the ether we can have no direct knowledge of the velocity of any material system with respect to it. But also—and this has been of the very essence of the business—we have no *indirect* evidence of velocity with respect to the ether; for the main motive for all these transformations has been this very fact, that such supposed velocities have *never* produced the observable effects

which they might have been expected to do. In particular, the velocity c of light, though originally defined as its velocity in free ether, has ceased to have any special reference to the ether. For we have seen that the measured velocity of light with respect to platforms moving with *different* velocities is still the same. Now, we *can* tell that two material systems are moving with different velocities, because we can refer them both to a third material system. And it follows that, if there be an ether at all, they must be moving with *different* velocities with respect to it, though we do not know the absolute values of these. Hence we can conclude that, whether there be an ether or not, velocity with respect to it makes no difference to the measured velocity of light or to anything else. The effect of all this is to make the notion of the ether, of uniform motion with respect to it, and of rest in it, utterly unimportant. The results do not, of course, *prove* that there is no such thing; but they do show that, if there be an ether, it is of such a singularly retiring disposition that we need never intrude on its privacy.

(ii.) The Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction, regarded as a physical phenomenon, is certainly not plausible. In the first place, it has a peculiarity which we shall later on have to notice in connection with gravitation. It is entirely independent of the nature and of the chemical or physical state of the matter concerned. A piece of elastic and a piece of steel would undergo precisely the same contraction if moving with the same velocity. Again, ordinary physical contractions generally have observable physical results. If you strain a piece of glass it begins to exhibit polarisation effects with transmitted light. Such results have been looked for as a consequence of the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction, and no trace of them has ever been found. Thus it looks as if this contraction were something quite different from ordinary change of shape and size due to physical stresses.

(iii.) Much the same remarks must be made about the slowing of clocks. It is not easy to see why uniform motion should make all clocks go slower, or why moving a clock in the direction of motion of a platform should upset its zero according to a definite law.

Now, Einstein said: Let us take it as a fundamental principle that uniform motion with respect to the ether makes no difference to the laws of any physical phenomenon. If the ether be a mere fiction this will be necessarily true; and, in any case, so many experiments of the most varied kinds have failed to produce any evidence that such motions are relevant,

that it is not rash to generalise their negative results into a principle. Further, let us recognise it as a well-established experimental fact that the velocities of light found by observers in uniform relative motion to each other are the same in spite of their relative motion. Let us then see what follows from these assumptions. Physical laws state relations between the magnitude of some phenomenon in one place and that of some other phenomenon in another. In their most usual form they state that the magnitude of the one is a certain function of that of the other, of the distance between the two places, and of the lapse of time between the two events. So long as the facts are expressed by the *same* function of the same sorts of variable quantities we say that the law remains the same, even though the actual magnitudes of some of the variables should be different. Now, the first part of the principle asserts that if two sets of observers in uniform relative motion observe the same phenomena and discover laws connecting them, these laws will be the same in form. Let the two sets of observers be called A and B, and let them observe the same set of phenomena. It is not a part of Einstein's principle, and it is not in general true, that they will ascribe the *same* magnitudes to the phenomena that they both observe, or regard them as being separated by the *same* distance in space or by the *same* lapse of time. But it is of the essence of Einstein's principle, and it is (so far as we know) true, that the magnitudes that A ascribes to the phenomena, their distances, and the time that elapses between them, will be connected by the same functional relation as the (in general different) magnitudes that B ascribes to the phenomena, their distance, and the time-lapse. *E.g.* if A and his instruments be at rest with respect to an electrically charged body, A's electrical instruments will be giving certain readings dependent on their position with respect to this body, whilst his magnetic instruments will be giving zero readings. If B and his instruments be moving uniformly with respect to this body, both his electrical and his magnetic apparatus will be recording values other than zero. But the law connecting electric readings, magnetic readings, position with respect to the charged body, and time will be precisely the same for both A and B; though of course in the particular function that expresses this law the value that A will put for the magnetic variable will be zero, whilst the value which B will put for the same variable in the same function will be other than zero.

The above may be described as the Physical Principle of Relativity. Taken by itself it would not help us much. What

we should like to be able to do would be to pass from a knowledge of the magnitudes that are observable when we are at rest with respect to a system, to those which would be observed if we were moving uniformly with respect to it. For the former are likely to be specially simple, as in the example where the magnetic reading is zero. But a *mere* knowledge that the form of the law must be the same will not enable us to do this. We need also to know the *actual* values that the moving observer will ascribe to at least some of the magnitudes. If we knew this for some of them, in terms of the magnitudes which the resting observer ascribes to the same variables, we could deduce the values ascribed by the moving observer to the remainder. For they will have to be such as to keep the relation connecting all the variables identical for both observers.

This is where the experimental fact of the identity of the measured value of the velocity of light for all observers in uniform motion with respect to each other becomes important. For here we have something that does not merely retain the same *form*, but also retains the same *magnitude* for all such observers. This fact has its implications; we ourselves have seen some of them; Einstein worked them out completely. What he proved was that observers in uniform relative motion will ascribe one and the same velocity to light if and only if certain relations exist between the magnitudes which they each ascribe to the distance between two objects which both perceive. Certain relations must also exist between the magnitudes which each ascribes to the time-lapse between two events which both observe. Now, these relations are precisely those which we have already met with. If one observer reckons a certain distance to be l , another who is moving parallel to this distance with a velocity v as compared with the former will ascribe the length $l\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}$. If one observer reckons the time

when a certain event happens at a certain place to be t , the other will reckon the time when this event happens as $\frac{1}{\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}}\left(t-\frac{v}{c^2}l\right)$, where l is the component, parallel to the

direction of relative motion, of the distance between the place where this event happens and the place where the first observer's standard clock is. These are formally the same results as we reached before by considering motion with respect to a supposed ether; but they are now much more

plausible and intelligible. Our v was the velocity of the platform with respect to the ether, and our c was the velocity of light with respect to it. But neither of these magnitudes could be measured either directly or indirectly. The v of Einstein's equation is the velocity of any platform with respect to any other, and is therefore directly observable; similarly his c is the velocity of light with respect to any platform, and is therefore again a measurable quantity. We are dealing with nothing but *relative* velocities with respect to *material* systems, and are thus entirely within the region of observable facts. So far, then, from Einstein's way of looking at things being a piece of speculative metaphysics, it is a resolute attempt to be as empirical as possible. It is the consistent application of the principle, enunciated *ad nauseam* by earlier physicists but never really carried to its logical conclusion, that we can and do know nothing but relative motion.

On this interpretation, things which seemed paradoxical and arbitrary on the former method of deducing these transformations become perfectly intelligible. The Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction ceases to be a physical shortening and becomes a mere question of units of measurement. We have two observers in relative motion. There ceases to be any question of one being "really" at rest and the other "really" moving. Each moves with respect to the other: A counts B to be moving in a certain direction with a velocity v as regards himself; B counts A to be moving in the opposite direction with the same velocity as regards *himself*. Everything is perfectly reciprocal. Each reckons the other man's distances to be shortened and his clocks to be slow by precisely the same amount; and, if we consistently remember the principle that motion is just the rate of change of distance between two pieces of matter, there ceases to be any question of right and wrong between them. Both are right in the sense that they are proceeding on consistent principles and that each will arrive at the same laws of nature.

One question, I think, still remains over. A man might say: "I accept Einstein's physical principle of relativity as both plausible in itself and suggested by the negative results of great numbers of experiments. I also accept it as a fact that observers find the same numerical value for the velocity of light, notwithstanding that they and their instruments are in relative motion. And, since Einstein has proved that this implies certain relations between the measurements of space and the measurements of time used by observers in uniform relative motion, I am logically compelled to accept these

relations as a fact. But I do not understand why, as a matter of history, observers in relative motion should have arranged their units of space and time in just this way. As a matter of historical fact, they must have set up their conventions for measuring distances and time-lapses without a thought of the velocity of light. Since they do find afterwards the same numerical value for this, their measures of distance and of time-lapse must in *fact* have had the relations which Einstein asserts; but I do not in the least see why they should have done so. Their choice of units was in their own power; they made their selection without any reference to the velocity of light; surely it is an extraordinary coincidence that the units which they actually hit upon should have happened to stand in these relations."

This is a perfectly reasonable question to raise. It can be answered, I think, by reflecting on the way in which our judgments about identity of length, sameness of rate, and identity of time begin and develop. We start with crude immediate judgments on such matters. As our researches become more accurate we develop new and more searching tests for congruence, isochronism, simultaneity, etc. But these tests always contain an element of convention; and the more minute the differences with which we are dealing, the bigger will be the dose of convention. Let me explain. The first step is to put two rods or two clocks in such positions that differences of length or in the time of swing of pendulums can be noted with special ease if they exist. So far there is but little convention present; we are still resting on our immediate judgment, and are simply arranging objects in such a way that such judgments shall have the chance of being as accurate as possible. But, when we pass beyond this point, perception and immediate judgments of congruence have done all that they can do. Our further refinements, our more accurate tests, must be of a different nature. We are now, by hypothesis, dealing with differences too small to be *directly* perceived even under the most favourable circumstances. Hence our tests must now involve the supposed perceptibly different *consequences of imperceptible* differences of magnitude. They thus imply that there are certain laws of nature, relating imperceptible differences in the magnitudes to be compared and perceptible differences in something else, and connecting the two, moreover, by some mathematical relation which will enable us to infer the size of the former differences from that of the latter. All such laws are necessarily hypothetical, since, by hypothesis, one term in the relation (the imperceptible

differences of magnitude) can never have fallen under direct observation. The assumed laws are therefore largely in our own power, and, according to the special form that we suppose them to have, the magnitudes ascribed to imperceptible differences will differ, even while the resulting differences in the observable magnitudes remain the same. Thus our more accurate and minute measures of magnitude, judgments of congruence, etc., depend upon the special form that we choose to give to laws which are necessarily hypothetical. We naturally try to make these laws as simple as possible, and also as much in accord as possible with what we have gradually learned about the general "make-up" of the material universe. This very greatly restricts our choice. Now, all the differences between Einstein and commonsense are extremely small, depending as they do on terms of the order $\frac{v^2}{c^2}$, where v is the velocity of one piece of matter relatively to another, and c is the enormously greater velocity of light. But only a very small group of men have ever had to deal with measurements carried to this order of accuracy. And all these men have been physicists, saturated with a common tradition, and holding substantially the same view as to the general "make-up" of nature. It is therefore not in the least surprising that they should all have hit on the same conventions as to the measurement of space and time. Some of these were used quite unconsciously, and it is a great merit of Einstein to have dragged them to the light and deduced their consequences. I think that on these lines a satisfactory answer can be made to the question which I supposed an intelligent objector to raise. If the reader wants an illustration, he has only to refer to our previous discussion of the synchronising of distant clocks. The criteria there used no doubt seem a little odd so long as we assume an ether and suppose a platform moving through it. We might be inclined to say: Surely they can see that their criterion for identity of zero, *e.g.*, is only valid if the platform be at rest. But, once we clearly understand that motion or rest with respect to the ether cannot be detected and may be the merest fiction, it becomes clear that this is the only criterion that the observers can use, and that it is as reasonable for those on one platform to use it as for those on any other; for there is no sense in saying that one is at rest and the other is moving. Each is at rest with respect to itself, each is moving with respect to the other, and these are the only motions that we can detect and deal with.

When once the transformation equations for space and

time measurements have thus been established, the physical principle of relativity comes into play. We find that a certain law connects a set of phenomena, their distance, and the time-lapse between them, when all these are measured by an observer at rest with respect to these phenomena. We ask: What magnitudes will be ascribed to these phenomena by an observer who is moving uniformly with his instruments with respect to the first? The physical principle tells us that the *form* of the law will be the same for both, and we know what that form is for the first observer. The transformation equations tell us the values that the second observer will ascribe to the distances and time-lapses in terms of the values which the first ascribes to them. We have therefore merely to see how the magnitudes ascribed by the second observer to the phenomena must be related to those which the first observer ascribes to them in order that the form of the law may be the same for both.

The last point to notice is this. Many physical laws were already in such a form that they accorded with the principle of relativity. Examples are Maxwell's equations for the electromagnetic field, and the equation of continuity in hydrodynamics. But other laws, as stated, were not in accord with the principle. As the principle is perfectly general, such supposed laws needed slight modification to make them admissible laws of nature. *E.g.* it is incompatible with the principle of relativity to hold both that momentum is conserved and that mass is wholly independent of velocity. If we keep the former belief we must suppose that the mass of a particle, as reckoned by an observer moving relatively to it, differs from the mass of the same particle as measured by one who moves with it. The difference depends on terms of the order $\frac{v^2}{c^2}$. Now, this had already been predicted and verified for electrons shot out with great velocities in vacuum tubes. In fact, the greatest triumph of the restricted theory of relativity has been that numbers of results, which had formerly been predicted from special *physical* hypotheses and verified, simply tumble out as consequences of the principle without needing any special physical hypothesis at all.

I trust that I have now clearly explained Einstein's restricted theory of relativity, its grounds, and its consequences. We are now in a position to try to understand his generalised theory, which involves the new views about gravitation. In what sense is the principle of relativity sketched above "restricted"? It is restricted in the sense that it only refers

to motions which are rectilinear in direction and constant in magnitude. It does not follow from the restricted theory that if one observer and his instruments be accelerated with respect to another, or be rotating about the other, the form of the laws of nature will remain the same for both. Yet of course, if we are to be in earnest with the view that all motion is relative, that it is always simply a change in the respective positions of material systems, accelerations and rotations are just as relative as uniform rectilinear translations.

Now, long before Einstein, indeed ever since Newton, accelerations and rotations have been a stumbling-block for a purely relative theory of time and space. Newton's laws of motion (the third law in particular) assume "unaccelerated axes." Given a set of axes such that motions with respect to them obey Newton's laws, any other set of axes that moves with a uniform translatory motion with respect to these will do equally well. But, if you refer the motions of a system to axes *accelerated* with respect to the set mentioned above, these motions will not be subject to Newton's laws. Thus a certain group of sets of axes which we will call *Newtonian*, and which is such that any pair of sets from the group are either relatively at rest or relatively in uniform motion in a straight line, occupies a privileged position. But not every group obeying these conditions will be Newtonian; and you must either *define* the Newtonian group by the fact that motions with respect to any member of it obey Newton's laws, or by the fact that all members of it are unaccelerated. The former procedure implies that Newton's laws are not true for *all* sets of axes, and thus prevents us from applying a generalised principle of relativity to them as they stand. The latter suffers from the two defects that it assumes absolute space, time, and motion—as of course Newton did,—and that, whether there be such things or not, they cannot be perceived, and therefore cannot be the actual criterion by which we in fact determine whether a set of axes is or is not Newtonian.

The difficulty about rotation is excellently illustrated by an example of Einstein's which I shall give in my own words. (It had, of course, already been discussed by Newton in his famous "bucket experiment," and used by him as a proof of the necessity of distinguishing between absolute and relative rotation.) Suppose there were two masses of liquid so far from each other and from other matter that each is subject to no force except the gravitational attraction among its own particles. Each will assume a spheroidal form under the action of these internal forces. Now, suppose that on the

surface of each (say on the equator) there is a mark that can be seen through a telescope by the inhabitants of the other. Lastly, suppose that the inhabitants can communicate with each other by wireless, and that each can carry out a survey of the surface of his spheroid. Suppose that the people on A noticed that the mark on B was rotating with a velocity Ω about the common axis of symmetry. Then of course the people on B would equally judge that the mark on A was rotating with the same velocity about the same line in the opposite sense. This information they could communicate to each other. But if they then proceeded to survey their respective spheroids, A might be found to be a perfect sphere and B to be flattened at the poles, *i.e.* at the points where the common axis of symmetry cuts the surface. When this information was communicated difficulties would arise. Each is rotating in precisely the same way as judged from the other; why then should one be flattened and the other remain spherical? *We* might say: "B is 'really' rotating, and A is 'really' at rest, and that is the cause of the difference." But this assumes absolute rotation; if we confine ourselves to relative rotation, the circumstances of each are precisely similar, and the observable difference of shape is a mystery.

This is Einstein's example, and it is such a striking one that it will be worth our while to discuss it much more fully than he does. Suppose we agree to drop the notion of absolute rotation, what alternatives are open to us? (i.) Mach would say that the whole example is like discussing whether beggars would ride astride or on side saddles if wishes were horses. We only know how matter behaves in the presence of the whole stellar universe; if that were away, as the example assumes, both masses of liquid might be spherical or both flattened. Either we assume that the two masses of liquid actually are the only matter in the universe, or that the fixed stars, though assumed to be too distant to produce appreciable gravitational effects or to be seen, still exist. On the former alternative we have not the least idea what would happen, because the conditions are so widely different from those under which all our actual observations have been made. On the latter we shall simply have to say that B is rotating with respect to the fixed stars and A is not, and that this difference is the source of the differences which only puzzle the inhabitants because their eyesight is not strong enough to see the fixed stars. The first part of Mach's objection seems to me obviously sound; we really have no right to conjecture what Einstein's two masses of liquid would do if

they constituted the whole material universe. We must therefore assume that the material universe as a whole is much as we know it, and that the two liquid blobs are simply very remote from other bits of matter which in fact exist. On this hypothesis we may generalise the present answer to the difficulty by saying that there is ordinary matter concealed from the inhabitants of the spheroids; that in fact one of them is rotating with respect to the concealed matter, and the other is not; and that these relative rotations which they do *not* notice have physical consequences which do not follow from the relative rotations that they do notice. This is a logically possible view. Einstein goes further and tries to prove by an epistemological argument that it is the *only* possible one ("Die Grundlagen der allgemeinen Relativitätstheorie," *Annalen der Physik*, 1916, No. 7). And he deduces from it that "the laws of physics must be so constituted as to hold good in relation to any set of axes, however it may be moving." As regards the first point his argument simply is that the law of causation is a law of phenomena, and therefore any epistemologically acceptable cause for the observed flattening of B must be something that is in principle capable of being perceived. It must therefore be something that happens in ordinary matter, and not anything that involves absolute space or ether. This argument he calls "*schwerwiegend*"; it seems to me to rest on the merest prejudice, inherited probably from Kant. An electron is apparently a permissible cause, the ether is not. But in actual fact you can perceive neither. If you say that we could perceive an electron provided certain alterations were made in our senses, it is always open to an opponent to say that, if there be any ether at all, we could perceive *it* provided suitable modifications were made in our senses. The fact is that anything that could exist could in theory be perceived if we had the right kind of senses, and the question whether our senses would need much or little modification in order to perceive a suggested entity has not the least bearing on the question whether that entity exists and can be taken as a *vera causa*. Thus no weight can be laid on Einstein's epistemological argument to prove that the explanation of the flattening of B *must* be found in its relation to other parts of the *material* world which are imperceptible from A and B.

(ii.) Thus an alternative is open to us, which Einstein erroneously believes to be cut out by his epistemological argument. Why should we not say that here at last the ether has emerged from its *otium cum dignitate* and produced

a measurable effect on ordinary matter? Why not say, in fact, that B is rotating with respect to the ether, and that such rotations cause flattening; whilst A is at rest with respect to the ether, and therefore remains spherical? There would be no contradiction in this to the restricted principle of relativity, for that did not disprove the existence of the ether, and only asserted that uniform translation with respect to it (if it existed) made no difference to any observable phenomenon. Nor, again, should we be giving up the view that all motion is relative, though we should of course be dropping the view that it is always relative to ordinary matter. There are even some positive advantages in this as compared with the Mach-Einstein view. I have said that the interpretation put by Einstein on his example is logically possible though not epistemologically necessary. But it has its difficulties. Its great defect is that it puts some pieces of matter in an unintelligibly privileged position in the universe. Rotations with respect to these pieces of matter (*e.g.* the fixed stars) have physical effects; rotations of precisely the same kind with respect to other pieces of matter (*e.g.* those of the spheroid A with respect to the spheroid B) have no such consequences. Now, there is nothing mysterious or unusual about the fixed stars. It is extremely difficult to see why certain perfectly ordinary bits of matter, distinguished by nothing else from other bits, should stand in this exceptional position, especially when one remembers that, in the case of the fixed stars at least, their one outstanding feature is their extreme *remoteness*, which is the last factor that one would expect to be associated with special causal efficacy. The present alternative avoids this difficulty; the rotations which have special importance are rotations with respect to a special kind of matter (*viz.* the ether).

Is Einstein justified in concluding that, if all motions be those of one piece of ordinary matter with respect to another, the laws of physics must be capable of statement in a form independent of the movements of our axes? He just states this dogmatically; but I imagine that, when expounded, the argument would run as follows:—Suppose you choose any one set of material axes and any one periodic process as a time-measurer. The motions of *all* other pieces of matter with respect to these axes and this time-measurer will obey certain laws, which will be simple or complex according to the bodies that you have chosen as axes and the process that you have chosen to measure time. Now, suppose you choose any other set of bodies for axes and any other set of events

for time-measurers. The motions of any material system with respect to the new axes can be compounded out of their motions with respect to the old axes and the motions of the old axes with respect to the new ones. Now, the laws of the former are known. And the latter are uniquely connected with the motions of the new axes with respect to the old ones. And the laws of these are known. Hence the laws of motion with respect to the new axes are simply a mathematical transformation of the laws with respect to the old axes. I suspect that this is Einstein's meaning, and, if so, he seems to me to be right.

The upshot of the discussion so far seems to be this:—Einstein is mistaken in thinking that he can prove epistemologically that all motion must be that of one piece of ordinary matter with respect to another. But if this be in fact true, he is right in supposing that it follows that the laws of physics ought to be capable of statement in a form that is independent of our particular choice of spatial axes and temporal rate-measurers. And it will evidently be a great triumph if we can succeed in doing this; it will be at once a great extension of the principle of relativity, and a setting to rest of all the difficulties that have sprung from the fact that, ever since Newton stated his laws of motion, we have wanted to believe that all motion is that of one piece of matter with respect to another, and have at the same time felt that these laws involved (as their author asserted) a distinction between absolute and relative motion.

Let us now consider the application of the principle a little more in detail. Newton's first two laws say that a material particle is either at rest or in uniform rectilinear motion when not acted upon by forces, and that if a force acts upon it the particle will be accelerated in the direction of the forces by an amount equal to the force divided by the mass. Now, if we drop absolute space, time, and motion, all these statements are vague in the extreme. A particle at rest with respect to one set of axes will move in a straight line with respect to another set, and in some other curve with respect to a third set. And if time be measured by one process it will be moving uniformly, whilst if another process be used it will be accelerated. *E.g.*, suppose we have a particle at rest relative to a platform on which it is lying. Let there be a wheel also lying on this platform, and let us take two mutually rectangular spokes of it as our axes. Then, so long as the wheel remains still with respect to the platform, the particle will be at rest with respect to these axes and will therefore be said to be

under the action of no forces. But suppose that the wheel begins to rotate with respect to the platform with uniform angular velocity Ω . With respect to the axes the particle will now describe a circle about the centre of the wheel with this angular velocity. If all motion be purely relative this rotation with respect to one set of material axes is as genuine a fact as its rest with respect to the other. But a rotation with angular velocity Ω implies an acceleration towards the centre of amount $r\Omega^2$, where r is the distance from the centre of the wheel to the particle. People who use this set of axes will therefore say, in accordance with Newton's laws, that the particle is acted upon by a force $mr\Omega^2$ towards the origin. It is therefore perfectly open to us to choose any axes we like and to hold that Newton's first two laws apply to all motions with respect to them; but we shall have to assume in general that different forces are acting according as we refer the motion to one set of axes and one rate-measurer or to another. Thus force ceases to be something given once and for all; the field of force that has to be assumed, if Newton's first two laws are to hold independently of choice of axes, itself depends on the axes chosen and the process of time-measurement used.

It will be noticed that I have carefully confined the above assertion to Newton's first two laws. The reason is this. Newton's third law implies that force *on* one particle is always a one-sided way of looking at an event which in reality consists of a stress *between* two particles. This means that when we find a force acting on a particle we must always expect to find that this is due to some other particle on which the first exercises an equal and opposite force. Now, if we call forces that obey this law Newtonian forces, we shall have to admit that some at any rate of the forces that are connected with a change of axes are non-Newtonian. Let us revert to our example of the particle and the wheel. The people who choose two spokes of the rotating wheel as their axes can, as we saw, keep Newton's first two laws, provided that they introduce with their new axes a new force of amount $mr\Omega^2$ acting on the particle towards the centre of the wheel. But this force is non-Newtonian; there is no equal and opposite force on the centre of the wheel to balance it, as there should be by Newton's third law. If there were, the centre of the wheel should either be accelerated or at least subject to a pull. It is clearly not accelerated with respect to the axes under discussion, for it is and remains their origin. And, although it is no doubt being pulled by the spokes, the magnitude of the pull has no connection with the mass of the particle, but only

with the inertia of the wheel. Thus, to keep Newton's first two laws true when motion is referred to the new axes, we have had to introduce a force that breaks his third law. Such forces have another peculiarity. They are independent of the physical or chemical state of the bodies on which they are exerted and of the medium in which they may be swimming. Every particle, whatever it may be made of and whatever may surround it, will be accelerated by an amount $r\Omega^2$ with respect to these axes, and therefore the force that will have to be assumed to keep Newton's first two laws true will depend on no property of the particle except its mass.

Now, Einstein observes that the force of gravitation stands out from all other physical forces by possessing just the peculiarities that we have noted for non-Newtonian forces. Particles in a gravitational field are acted upon by forces that depend on no property of the particle except its mass. Most elaborate experiments have been performed to test whether the acceleration produced by a gravitational field on bodies depends in any way on their temperature, crystalline form, chemical composition, surrounding medium, etc. No trace of any such dependence has been found; the one relevant factor seems to be their mass. Thus there is a very strong motive for treating gravitation as one of those non-Newtonian forces that are associated with changes of axes or of time-measurer.

Just as we introduce forces which were not present with one set of axes by passing to a new set, so, in many cases, we can get rid of forces which were present with one set by using another. If we are dealing with phenomena in space just over Trafalgar Square, and use Nelson's column and the lines joining the diagonally opposite lions as our axes, our phenomena will be taking place in a practically constant gravitational field. If we drop a stone from the top of the column and take as our new axes lines in this stone parallel to our original axes, we have "transformed away" the gravitational field for this region. *I.e.* if we refer the same phenomena to the new axes, we can treat them as not being under the action of gravitation. For any bodies that are falling to the earth will now be unaccelerated with respect to our axes. Other bodies, such as Nelson's statue, which are not falling, have an upward acceleration with respect to our new axes, and are therefore subject to a force which, in the particular example, we should ascribe to the reaction of the column on the statue. (With the old axes this reaction was also present, but balanced by the gravitational pull on the statue.)

It is not, however, in general true that gravitational forces can be wholly transformed away by suitable choice of axes over every finite region; for the field in such a region is not in general the same everywhere or always. It is greater in parts of the region that are near large pieces of matter, and it may change with time as bodies approach the region. Thus we cannot guarantee that any change of axes will get rid of it permanently and for the whole region. What we can say, however, is this. The smaller we make the region, the more nearly can we transform away the gravitational forces by suitable choice of axes; and we assume that in an infinitesimally small region for an infinitesimally small time a set of axes and a time-measurer can always be found such that with respect to these there are no gravitational forces.

Let us call a set of axes and of clocks such that the restricted principle of relativity holds with respect to them a Newtonian frame of reference. The principle does not hold with respect to any and every frame of reference. *E.g.*, with respect to our wheel that rotates relatively to a Newtonian frame light evidently does not travel in straight lines or with a constant velocity. Thus the restricted principle, which assumes the rectilinear propagation and the constant velocity of light, presupposes a Newtonian frame of reference.

Now, if we could find some magnitude connected with a pair of events closely adjacent in space and time, and such that it was independent of the system of axes and the time-measurer chosen, we should have found a certain common condition that all possible frames of reference must obey. There *is* such a magnitude for any adjacent pair of events; it is called their "separation," and is denoted by the symbol $d\sigma$. To get some idea of the notion of separation let us consider two adjacent points in space. They determine an unique magnitude, their shortest distance—usually denoted by the symbol ds ,—and this is the same whatever spatial axes we adopt for giving co-ordinates to the two points. Now, we have to deal, not with adjacent *points*, but with adjacent *events*. Hence we want an extension of the notion of the distance between two points which shall include also the time-lapse between two events. As I have said, there is such a magnitude, the separation $d\sigma$; and separation is best regarded as an extension of the notion of distance.

Now, we know how the separation is connected with the co-ordinates and the time for a Newtonian frame of reference. Suppose that two events happen at two adjacent points whose spatial co-ordinates with respect to Newtonian axes are

respectively x , y , z and $x + dx$, $y + dy$, $z + dz$. Suppose further that the first event happens at a time t , and the second at a closely adjacent moment $t + dt$, as measured by a Newtonian clock. Then the separation is given in terms of the co-ordinates and of the time by the expression

$$d\sigma^2 = -dx^2 - dy^2 - dz^2 + c^2 dt^2.$$

This fact is a consequence of and is equivalent to the fact that the velocity of light with reference to all Newtonian frames is c .

Now, the fact that $d\sigma^2$ depends solely on the two events and not on the particular frame chosen for placing and dating them imposes a condition upon all possible frames of reference. Every possible frame will be characterised by the equation that expresses the separation in terms of the co-ordinate differences of the two events with respect to the axes and the time-lapse between them as measured by the clocks of the frame. Thus, whatever frame you choose, there will be a certain function of the co-ordinates and the times of the two events with respect to it which must be equal to the function $-dx^2 - dy^2 - dz^2 + c^2 dt^2$ of the corresponding Newtonian magnitudes for the same pair of events.

Thus, although an infinite choice of frames of reference is open to us, it is not absolutely indefinite. Nature imposes a certain very general restriction upon all frames of reference that can be used for dealing with natural phenomena. For events that take place at an infinite distance from matter the expression for the separation in terms of the co-ordinates and the time will take the specially simple form contemplated by the restricted theory. But everywhere else there will be gravitational forces; and if you choose such a frame as will transform them away over a small region, which we have seen you always can do, the expression connecting the separation with the new co-ordinates and the new time will be different. Thus the common condition imposed on all possible frames expresses the universality of the law of gravitation, and the particular form of the expression for the separation expresses the special gravitational field in the small region for which this particular frame has to be used if the field in that region is to be transformed away.

Even apart from these special considerations we can see in a general way that the law of gravitation imposes certain limitations on our frames of reference. Gravitation is supposed to act between all pieces of matter in the universe. If we are in earnest with the view that all motion is the change of position of one piece of matter with respect to others, all sets

of axes that we can possibly choose will be material, *i.e.* they will be defined by certain actually existing pieces of matter. Thus all possible axes will themselves exert some gravitational attraction on every body in the universe, and therefore on every body whose motion is referred to them. Thus the gravitational attraction between axes and what is referred to them is a feature common to all possible frames of reference; the most we can say is that the further the referred bodies are from the axes of reference, the less this influence will be. Thus we see that the statement that all possible frames of reference are subject to a certain limiting condition, and that this condition embodies the law of gravitation, is not a wild paradox which we can only accept through the *force majeure* of a "knock-down" mathematical proof. It is a fact which commonsense and our previous ideas about the universality of gravitation might have suggested to us; so that we can regard the mathematical arguments rather as clearing up the details of what was previously a vague general anticipation than as ramming a new and utterly unforeseeable fact down our throats.

I hope that I have now succeeded in giving the reader at least a rough idea of the meaning and the motives of Einstein's theory of gravitation. It will be noticed that I have done so without saying a word about non-Euclidean geometry. This seems to me to be an advantage in a statement of the theory to persons who are unfamiliar with the concepts of that branch of mathematics. But my paper would be incomplete if I left matters at this stage. Everyone has heard that the new theory has a great deal to say about Euclidean and non-Euclidean space, and I shall conclude by trying to indicate the connection of the two subjects.

For this purpose it will be best to return for the moment to the restricted theory of relativity and to explain Minkowski's geometrical representation of it. Everyone has seen a recording barometer. In this instrument a drum covered with paper rotates at a uniform rate whilst a pen-point attached to the barometer presses against it. As the barometric pressure rises and falls, so does the pen. When the paper is unrolled at the end of the week we find a curve on it. One axis represents the time elapsed, the other the position of the top of the mercury column. Thus any point on the curves represents a momentary event, *viz.* the presence of the top of the mercury column at such and such a height at such and such a time. Now, the notion of Space-Time¹ is simply an

¹ I borrow this convenient name from Prof. Alexander without necessarily using it in the same sense as he does.

extension of this. Every event in the world happens somewhere and somewhen. To define its spatial position we need three spatial co-ordinates, to define its temporal position we need one temporal co-ordinate. Thus to represent events in general in the same kind of way in which the particular event which is the momentary position of the top of the mercury column is represented we need a four-dimensional diagram. Naturally we cannot draw such a thing, but we can treat it analytically just as easily as one of three or of two dimensions.

Suppose that we choose as our axes for space-time the ordinary x, y, z of a Newtonian frame, and ct , *i.e.* the time measured by a Newtonian clock multiplied by the velocity of light. Any event that ever happens will be represented by a point in space-time. The history of a particle that is moving about will be represented by a curve in space-time, and, if the particle happens to be moving in a straight line with uniform velocity, this curve will be a straight line. But, if our space-time is to do the work required of it, it must differ from an ordinary Euclidean space, not merely in the fact that it has four dimensions instead of three (a comparatively trivial distinction), but also in the fact that the "distance" or "separation" between two adjacent points in it is related to the differences of their co-ordinates in another way than it would be in a Euclidean space. In an ordinary three-dimensional Euclidean space the distance between two adjacent points is related to the differences of their co-ordinates by the equation

$$ds^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2 \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (i.)$$

If, therefore, space-time were Euclidean, though four-dimensional, the separation between two points in it would be given by

$$d\sigma^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2 + c^2 dt^2 \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (ii.)$$

But actually the restricted principle of relativity requires that the relation should be

$$d\sigma^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2 - c^2 dt^2 \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (iii.)$$

Now, this sort of relation is characteristic of an hyperbolic space, *i.e.* of the sort of space first noticed and discussed by Lobatchewsky. It is easy to see in a rough general way why the restricted theory requires the relation (iii.) instead of the relation (ii.). Suppose that one event is the fact that a beam of light has reached a point x, y, z at a moment t , and that the adjacent event is that the same beam has

reached the point $x+dx$, $y+dy$, $z+dz$, at $t+dt$. The distance travelled by the beam in space is ds , which by (i.) is equal to $\sqrt{dx^2+dy^2+dz^2}$. The time taken between the two events is dt . Since c is the velocity of light, and one event is the arrival of light at one place and the other is the arrival of the same light at the second place, we must have $ds = cdt$.

Thus for this pair of events the formula (ii.) would give

$$d\sigma^2 = c^2dt^2 + c^2dt^2 = 2c^2dt^2,$$

whilst the formula (iii.) would give

$$d\sigma^2 = c^2dt^2 - c^2dt^2 = 0.$$

Now, on the restricted theory nothing can move faster than light. Thus we should expect the separation between two events which are respectively the departure and the arrival of the same beam of light at two adjacent places to be the minimum possible separation. This is secured by the relation (iii.) but not by the relation (ii.). So the space-time of the restricted theory of relativity is not Euclidean but is hyperbolic.

Now, the transformations of the restricted theory can be put in a very striking form when stated in terms of this non-Euclidean space-time. It can be shown that the relations which we have seen to exist, on the restricted theory, between the values which two observers in uniform relative motion ascribe to the co-ordinates and the time of the same event, can be interpreted as follows:—You have simply to imagine the axes of your space-time twisted, without changing the angles between them, by a certain amount about their origin; the co-ordinates of a given event with respect to the new axes will then be related to the co-ordinates of the same event with respect to the old axes by precisely those relations which we deduced from the restricted theory of relativity. We may put it in this way. The change involved in your spatial co-ordinates and your measure of time, when you pass from one platform to another which moves uniformly with respect to it, is completely represented by twisting the axes of Minkowski's hyperbolic space-time about their origin, without change of their mutual relations, through a suitable angle. Now, everyone admits that if you take a set of three *spatial* axes at right angles to each other and intersecting at a point, it will make no difference to the laws of nature to twist them as a rigid body about this common point. Suppose, *e.g.*, that the spatial axes were the three edges of a biscuit-tin that meet in a

corner: you could evidently turn the tin into any position about this corner without altering the form of the laws of nature. The restricted principle of relativity is equivalent to a generalisation of this fact, which is so obvious for space, so that it also includes time. For it tells us that the form of the laws of nature is unaffected by passing from one platform to another in uniform motion relative to the first. And this change we have seen is equivalent to a twist of axes in *space-time*, comparable to the twisting of our biscuit-box about one of its corners in *space*. The analogy is not absolutely complete, because space-time is hyperbolic, whilst the space of which the edges of the biscuit-tin form a set of axes is Euclidean. And a twist of a body in hyperbolic space is not quite the same thing as the twist of one in Euclidean space. Still, the analogy is great enough to render this a most striking and helpful way of visualising the restricted principle of relativity. There is no need, so far as I can see, to suppose that this representation is anything more than an attractive mathematical device; it no doubt *invites* us to develop metaphysical theories about space-time, and this is worth doing when it is undertaken by competent people like Mr Robb, Dr Whitehead, and Prof. Alexander. But it certainly does not *necessitate* anything of the kind, and philosophers in general will be unwise to rush in where physicists fear to tread.

We ought now to have little difficulty in understanding how the new theory of relativity is connected with non-Euclidean geometry. A Newtonian frame of reference is one for which the restricted principle of relativity holds, and is therefore represented by the hyperbolic space-time of Minkowski, which we have just been discussing. Such a space-time is not indeed Euclidean, but it shares with Euclidean space the important property of being "homaloidal." Roughly speaking, this means that it is everywhere alike: the separation of two points depends only on the differences of their co-ordinates. This is obvious from the expression

$$d\sigma^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2 - c^2 dt^2,$$

where nothing occurs on the right-hand side except the differences of the co-ordinates of the two points in space-time, and certain *constants* which multiply these, viz. 1, 1, 1, and $-c^2$. But we have also seen that Newtonian frames can only be found for finite regions at places infinitely remote from matter. Near gravitating bodies there are forces; we have seen that for infinitesimal regions these forces can be "transformed

away" by a suitable choice of axes, but these axes will have to move in various complicated ways with respect to Newtonian axes in order to compensate for the acceleration which the gravitational attraction produces with respect to Newtonian axes. Such moving axes will obviously be represented by a very different kind of space-time from that which represents a Newtonian frame. The nature and the motion of the frame will be completely represented by the expression for ds^2 in terms of the differences of the co-ordinates and of the time of the frame. In general we shall get an expression for the separation of the form

$$ds^2 = g_{11}dx'^2 + g_{22}dy'^2 + g_{33}dz'^2 + g_{44}dt'^2 + g_{12}dx'dy' + g_{13}dx'dz' \\ + g_{14}dx'dt' + g_{23}dy'dz' + g_{24}dy'dt' + g_{34}dz'dt',$$

very different from the elegant simplicity of the Newtonian frame. Now, these g 's will not in general be constants: they will themselves be functions of x' , y' , r' , and t' . Thus the geometry of space-time in such a part of the universe will differ wildly from the Euclidean and even from the tamer kinds of non-Euclidean geometry to which we have become accustomed.

The position, therefore, is this:—In the neighbourhood of a piece of matter (*e.g.* the sun) all bodies are acted on by gravitational forces with respect to a Newtonian frame. You can transform away these forces for small regions by a suitable choice of moving axes. The particular frame needed for this purpose can be expressed in terms of the geometry of space-time for the region, just as Minkowski expressed the Newtonian frame by a hyperbolic space-time. The complete geometry of space-time for the region is summed up in the form of the g 's which appear in the expression for the separation. These g 's can therefore be regarded from two points of view. (i.) From one point of view the g 's express the forces that bodies in this region would experience, judged from a Newtonian frame. (ii.) From the other point of view the g 's express the geometry of space-time for that particular non-Newtonian frame of reference with respect to which these forces have been transformed away. This geometry is in general wildly non-Euclidean.

I will conclude by stating the practical consequence, for physical purposes, of the new theory of relativity. The extended principle is that any genuine law of nature must have a form independent of the frame of reference that we happen to use for placing and dating phenomena. This by itself would not be of much value unless there is something that

keeps not merely its *form* but also its *value* fixed for all possible frames. We noticed just the same fact about the restricted theory: there the constancy of the velocity of light for all Newtonian frames came to our help; here the constancy of the separation of two adjacent events for all frames whatever plays the same part. Now, we have a good many laws of nature already stated with respect to Newtonian frames, *e.g.* Maxwell's equations. We now know that they must be capable of statement in a form that is independent of any particular frame. It is therefore our task to find this form, guided by the two facts (*a*) that we know the form of the law for the specially simple case of a Newtonian frame, and (*b*) that we know that any possible frame must be so related to a Newtonian one that the value of the separation of the same pair of adjacent events is the same for both. With these facts it is possible to solve the problem by means of a certain branch of pure mathematics called the Absolute Differential Calculus, which had been developed for other purposes by Riemann, Christoffel, and Levi-Civita. As with the restricted theory, we find that some laws have already been stated in a form consistent with the principle of relativity; others have not. As before, Maxwell's equations obey the principle without any modification; Newton's law of gravitation does not, but needs a modification which makes a difference that is excessively small in all but a few cases. One of these cases is the position in space of the perihelion of Mercury: on the old law it should be fixed; on the law as modified to meet the principle of relativity it should gradually change its position. This it actually does, and by almost exactly the amount predicted by the new theory.

Finally, we must notice the following important consequence of the theory. We have seen that for small regions a frame can always be chosen that will transform away the gravitational forces. Thus for a sufficiently small region the presence or absence of a gravitational field is simply equivalent to the use of one or another frame of reference. But the form of the laws of nature is independent of the frame of reference chosen. Therefore for a sufficiently small region the form of the laws of nature should be independent of the presence or absence of a gravitational field. The *amount* of independence will depend on the size of the region for which the field can be transformed away by a mere change in our frame of reference. Thus we might expect that some laws will change their form in a gravitational field and that others will not. Now, light moves with an uniform

velocity in a straight line with respect to a Newtonian frame when there are no forces. This is the particular case for Newtonian frames of a law of the general form that light travels in such a path between two points as to make the time-lapse a minimum. This law holds for all possible frames of reference. Now, the gravitational attraction near the sun may be transformed away by choosing a suitable frame, which will of course be non-Newtonian. So light there will, with respect to this frame, be under the action of no forces, and will therefore move so that the time-lapse is a minimum. But a path which, in respect to the new non-Newtonian frame, fulfils these conditions will not do so with respect to a Newtonian frame. Thus, judged from a Newtonian frame, light that passes near the sun will not move with an uniform velocity nor in a straight line. The deflection can be calculated on Einstein's theory, and it has been verified by observation.

I have now fulfilled my promise to the best of my ability. We have seen what exactly Einstein's theory is and how it is related to Euclidean geometry and to Newtonian mechanics. The connection with the former is not really very intimate, and Einstein himself makes very little play with it. The connection with the latter is all-important. Einstein's discovery synthesises Newton's two great principles—the laws of motion and the law of gravitation. It removes the obscurity that has always hung over the former, by working out the relativity of motion to the bitter end, whilst it generalises and slightly corrects the latter and accounts for its peculiar position among all the other laws of nature. Such work can only be done by a man of the highest scientific genius, and we have no right and no need to enhance his greatness by decrying the immortal achievements of his predecessors. It is enough that we can, without the slightest flattery or hyperbole, class Einstein with Newton, and say of the former what is written on the tomb of the latter:—

“Sibi gratulentur homines tale tantumque extitisse humani generis decus.”

C. D. BROAD.

UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS.

THE CITY ON EARTH, THE CITY IN HEAVEN, AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

MISS M. D. PETRE.

IN a sketch of the work and life of St Augustine by an Italian scholar, Dr Ernesto Buonaiuti, he says of the *De Civitate Dei* :—

“ We must, obviously, not content ourselves with the vulgar opinion according to which St Augustine regarded the Church as the City of God, and the world, with its institutions, as the City of the Devil. . . . Between the Church and the Society of God there is no identity of space and time limits. . . . Augustine says, in a passage of the *De Civ.* which I regard as fundamental: ‘ Two loves have built the two cities : love of self, or the egotism that issues in blindness and contempt of God, built the earthly city ; the love of God and of the ideal urged to the point of self-sacrifice raised the celestial city. . . . ’ The two societies are, respectively, that of idealists and altruists and that of egotists.”¹

During all the centuries that have passed since the days of Augustine, the dividing category here suggested has maintained its force ; the great distinction between the two cities has never become obsolete. Those two cities, under varying names, have competed, throughout history, for the possession of the world ; and they are yet competing for it. Many men, many material or political or religious associations of men, may belong in part to the one, in part to the other ; at times to the one, at times to the other ; in theory to the one, in practice to the other ; but the fundamental distinction is never obliterated—the policy of the two cities remains irreconcilable, however

¹ *Profili : S. Agostino* (A. F. Formiggini, Roma).

much their population may fluctuate, passing from one to the other and hardly conscious that they are doing so.

Although Augustine's City of God should not, according to the writer from whom we have quoted, be identified with the Church, yet it was surely to a great religious organisation that he looked for its fulfilment upon earth. It was not the civil State that could accomplish the great work save in co-operation with a Divine institution. The task, in short, was one for religion and not for politics. Nay, more than this, it was not a work of Nature but of grace; nor could the most enlightened and disinterested statesmanship achieve it save in subjection to divinely directed guidance.

For Plato, too, the ideal city was "nowhere on earth," yet he conceived of its foundation by human wisdom and effort because, for him, the religious and the political ideal were one, just as religious and political authority were one; the great division of Church and State was, as yet, non-existent. Boldly, then, he fashioned his model city, fearless of the missiles that practical criticism might direct at it; he carried its light through the world, though the darkness rolled up in its track. He knew, indeed, that the foundations of his city could never be destroyed nor its walls cast down by material force; that for him who would live in it "it is of no consequence whether it does exist anywhere or shall ever exist here," because he will perform the duties of this city alone and of no other. Yet what do these words signify but that, like Augustine's City of God, the ideal city is not wholly of this world; that its character is essentially religious as well as political?

In these our own days we are talking once more of such a city, and talking of it as a political possibility—a city of human love and human peace, a city in which social ideals shall be facts. Like the city of Plato, it must be governed according to wisdom—wisdom in the Greek sense—wisdom in the Hebrew sense,—wisdom which signifies sense and knowledge and vision of the real and eternal, of values that do not change and pass. But, furthermore, like the city of Augustine, it must be built for all mankind and not for a chosen few.

Of those who went out to the war with a conscious, spiritual purpose, some died for England, or for France, or for Belgium—others died for something vaster still—for that yet unmade city of human love: "in a moment of time, at the climax of their lives, they were rapt away from a world filled, for their dying eyes, not with terror but with glory."¹

They died for that ideal, and others are dying daily, in soul

¹ "Funeral Speech of Pericles." See *The Greek Commonwealth*, A. Zimmern.

if not in body, for the need of it. The great question is: Are we in any way nearing its fulfilment? Is such a city truly in process of erection, however long time that process may demand? Is it to be, not, as heretofore, a purely spiritual city in which the soul of man can take refuge from the sordidness of the world, but a true political city or state, the home of body as well as soul, a city of earth as well as heaven?

Furthermore—is this city of our dreams to be national or international, racial or human? Is each land to have its own city, or are all lands to congregate in the one great city? Such a question is superfluous in regard to a purely spiritual ideal, but it is a crucial one when we are dealing with a scheme that claims to be within the scope of practical politics.

Mr Bertrand Russell says:

“One of the reasons that led men to welcome the outbreak of the present war was that it made each nation again a whole community with a single purpose. It did this by destroying, for the present, the beginnings of a single purpose in the civilised world as a whole; but these beginnings were as yet so feeble that few were much affected by their destruction.”¹

It is because the distinction here laid down has been loosely apprehended that the professions of political idealism, so widely set forth during the late war, are susceptible of such contrary interpretation. Professedly the Peace Conference assembled to found the ideal city of mankind; actually that ideal city was so ambiguous in character that national ambition could claim shelter within its walls.

Thus the League of Nations, which is the only, so far suggested, *political* attempt at its construction, is variously represented according as its advocates are inspired by the national or the human ideal. According to the first it would become, at its best, a great alliance of nations for the better administration of the world; according to the second it would be a vast association of humanity, in which distinctions of state and nation would be progressively effaced in so far as their political character was concerned. Many arguments urged against the practicability of the scheme are only valid in regard to this, its second, conception; for it is hardly possible to prove that a big alliance for the administration of international questions is impracticable. But, on the other hand, it is surely the second conception that is truer to the thing in point—the League of Nations, regarded from the

¹ *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 28.

point of view of its chief advocate as a *Mandate of Humanity*, stands for something more than a new and wider political alliance; it stands for a super-state ideal; it is an essay towards the erection of the ideal city, the city of love and disinterestedness, which is to be the city of Plato, only open to barbarian as well as Greek, to slave as well as free; the city of Augustine made for earth as well as heaven, fashioned by Nature as well as grace.

Now in regard to all idealistic schemes there may be criticism of two kinds—the criticism of the materialist or utilitarian, for whom idealism has no use; the criticism of the idealist, who is tormented with a sense of facts. “He is not risen,” said the Pharisee, whose ears were deaf to the message of Christ. “He is not risen,” said the trembling disciples, “non credentes proegandio.”

For the mere idealist, whose mind can be lulled by dreams, the fair city is easy of achievement; for the human idealist, to whom a dream is precious as the shadow of reality to come, that city is so glorious, and yet so remote, that he cannot, for joy, believe in its prompt fulfilment. And not only for joy, but also for facts—for he looks at the machinery that has been got ready for its erection, and he asks how such an end is to be accomplished by such means. As easy would it seem to him to fashion a rainbow out of gold and red and purple silk, the product of human looms, as to build the City of God on earth by the forces that have produced the modern State, with its armies and navies ripe for the work of destruction, its tariffs and treaties shaped for rivalry and self-enrichment.

But, as most frequently happens, criticism is somewhat confused in character—the scheme in question is attacked as though its nature were clearly defined, whereas the national and the human interpretations are, on certain points, irreconcilable.

Yet the ambiguity persists, for the simple reason that our statesmen are interested in its doing so. Not definitely and consciously, indeed, but from a deeper, unexpressed sense that the scheme is dependent on a certain amount of confusion. Divide its advocates into the two parties of those who desire a political alliance for the better government of the world, and those who desire a human society of all nations in which rivalries and antagonism shall be progressively extinguished, and you may wreck the entire scheme in so far as its political achievement is concerned.

The League of Nations, carried out in the form of a political alliance, might do a great work for mankind; it might prepare the way for yet wider schemes in the future.

But it would, none the less, fall short of what constitutes a Brotherhood of Nations; it would be a political device, not a "mandate of humanity."

The League of Nations, according to the second and wider conception, is open to all the practical criticisms that have been directed against it, though, by reason of the accepted ambiguity, those criticisms appear to affect both schemes. It implies what Nietzsche called "a transmutation of values"; it contravenes the recognised maxims of political wisdom because it is super-political in character.

Yet, as regards the actuation of the scheme, each side depends on the help of the other, and both are probably co-operating to the production of a mixed result, of which only time can test the use and value.

Is it better that it should be so, or is it not? Do we risk losing all by an untimely attempt to unravel the political skein? Is clear thinking in political matters much more dangerous than beneficial? Should the tares and the wheat be allowed to grow together, or should we endeavour to clean up the land and have a pure crop of golden grain? Christ told us, indeed, that this was the policy of the Heavenly Father, but He spoke of the All-Strong in His relation to weaker, blinder, feebler beings. Are we wise to adopt that policy in regard to matters that are within the range of our own effort? And, as to risks, "all grand things are dangerous," and perhaps the danger of daring is not greater than the dangers to which sloth and cowardice ever expose us.

On the whole, it is men who set themselves a definite and clear-cut aim in life who most often achieve their purpose; in science, as in business, efficiency is the result of clearness and not of confusion; in art and in religion the aim is one, though there are thousands of ways of fulfilling it. So that perhaps in politics too the confused methods are not, finally, the successful ones, and mixed aims are more conducive to immediate convenience than to ultimate security and good.

If this be so, then it were better to admit the limitations of our political condition; to recognise that statecraft, like other sciences, has its own laws which are not necessarily those of higher human ethics. To insist that the City of God, in the sense of our opening passage—a League of Nations shaped according to the principles of that city—shall be produced by prevailing political methods, may be to insist that they shall not be produced at all. While, on the other hand, to confess that the policy of every State must be directed primarily to the welfare of that State, and that all statecraft is inevitably self-

interested in so far as it regards the law of self-preservation and self-development, is not to condemn a scheme as humanly impossible because it transcends the aims and methods of political science.

The name of a great political genius has become a byword, and most modern politicians agree to repudiate any taint of what is called Machiavellism. The instinct may be a good one in so far as it signifies an effort to rise from a national to a human policy, yet it is also productive of evil in so far as it is productive of insincerity. Our modern statesmen would be not more, but less Machiavellian, did they recognise how far all existing statecraft is necessarily Machiavellian; and their policy would at least be delivered from that touch of cant which infects all professions that are morally in advance of the corresponding deeds.

Machiavelli's principles were directed, in the first place, to the political conditions of his own time; but they are pertinent, in their measure, to the policy of every time, in so far as the world is made up of separate nations and states with separate and rival interests. Abolish the separateness of interests, of which rivalry is an inevitable consequence, and you may abolish Machiavellism; but so long as the separateness and the rivalry exist, Machiavelli remains a political teacher whose virtue is in the soundness of his analysis and his endeavour to make of political science a means to the ultimate betterment of mankind; whose vice is in the perspicuity wherewith he showed how the prevailing political immorality should, at any rate, be made efficient and conducive to the good of the State.

In Machiavelli's model city the Prince, or the governing body, whatever it might be, had but one end before them, and that was the sound ruling and welfare of the State. It was scarcely likely that, in a country torn by continual wars, he should speak much of the ideals of peace. The first thing a country had to do was to live, and life was so great a struggle that much had to be sacrificed to its preservation.

“Our fatherland must be defended by glory or by shame . . . when her safety is at stake there must be no consideration of justice or injustice, of pity or of mercy, of shame or of honour; we must put aside all else and follow whatever course may conduce to her life and freedom.”¹

Machiavelli's statesman was for the State, even his Prince was for the State, for his advice to him was as to a ruler who

¹ *Discorsi sopra Livio*, lib. iii. cap. xli.

must rule for the good of his own land, and not as to a tyrant who sought merely personal honour and advantage.

“The well-being of a kingdom or republic is not in having a prince who governs wisely while he lives, but in having one who leaves it fit to maintain itself after his death.”¹

For the State the citizen, *qua* citizen, was to live,—for the State he was to die. State policy was a self-contained science, with its own moral laws and principles—it was not a department of Christian morality. It might lead on to higher moral developments, but, actually, it was the science of the preservation, welfare, and development of the particular State. The principles of a purely human idealism were, absolutely, not admissible, though Machiavelli gives ample indication of higher visions beyond. But, *hic et nunc*, the statesman was to procure the good of the State; he was to work for a city whose foundations were not in heaven, but on earth, and even on a particular patch of earth. He was to aim as high as was compatible with these essential duties, but not higher; he had no mandate to offer his country as an oblation for the rest of the world.

Even the philosophical guardians of Plato's city, with their eyes fixed on eternal truths, were to cherish and protect the city for her own sake; how much more the rulers of the Machiavellian State, which existed in those later times when religion and politics were no longer one.

In detail, the vice of Machiavelli's maxims is in their exceeding candour and their Latin logicality.

The modern statesman need not go all the lengths that Machiavelli suggests, and still less need the modern Prince conform to all his dicta; but, in fact, is not our own statecraft substantially the same? And need we regard such an admission as pessimistic unless we have no hope that state policy may eventually be absorbed into a vaster human philosophy?

In the days when Aristotle taught that man was a “political animal” religion was woven in with citizenship, Church and State were one. With Christianity came a new division of life, in which the Church stood out as representative of man's spiritual requirements and the State undertook responsibility for his civil life. The Church too has had her political entanglements, which have weakened her rights as a purely spiritual guide, yet the great line of division has persisted; religion has

¹ *Idem*, lib. i. cap. xi.

claimed a right of independent existence, and has upheld ideals not always compatible with the reigning principles of civil policy.

Nowadays some may not give to this spiritual force the name of religion; still less may they connect it with any existing Church. But under whatever appellation its existence may be maintained, it still stands for a life not based on maxims of material loss and gain; for principles of faith and conduct kindled by other than egotistic motives, directed to ends whose value transcends that of merely individual existence.

Now, can it be denied that such ends transcend also those of recognised State policy, whose main object is the material preservation and prosperity of the subject? Political authority should, and does, protect religion, but it is not its part to enforce it; it guards morality, but for the sake of man's life as a citizen and not as a spiritual being with an outlook on eternity. With private impiety it has no concern, nor with private immorality save in so far as it inflicts public injury.

Can anyone seriously maintain that the counsels of Christian perfection could be adopted as State maxims? Greece and Rome had their War Gods as well as their War Lords; Christianity knows none such. The great law of disinterestedness, of self-abandonment, of life for others, can it find a place in sound politics? Could the Gospel be used as a manual of statecraft? Could any statesman allow himself the luxury of loving a rival State as his own?

And yet we need not say, for this, that a civil government is indifferent and impotent in all that regards the higher moral and spiritual considerations, that it is to be everlastingly unfertile of all in the way of idealistic achievement. If its immediate object be to secure the outward and material interests of its people, that object can always be regarded as subordinate to nobler ends. Man was not born to eat and drink—though unless he eat and drink he can do nothing else. It is the duty of the State to foster those conditions under which human life can expand and put forth the best that is in it; were those conditions permanently and universally secured, political science could be absorbed into something wider. The State cannot, must not outstrip the level of its own citizens; in regard to human ideals it must be executive rather than originative. As society rises the State rises; were rulers to attempt a national policy that was too exalted for those in whose behalf they held office, they would be tyrants, even though beneficent ones. In point of fact, this is not a danger to be apprehended. A Pope Angelo might attempt

it, but the days of such are gone by. The chance of obtaining a superhumanly excellent ruler has been wisely sacrificed to man's long experience of the evil incurred from selfish and ambitious ones; while in other forms of government the task of our rulers is such that they are little likely to rise above the normal level of the average citizen.

To look, therefore, solely to political machinery for the fulfilment of human ideals is to face reiterated disappointment; it is to endeavour to accomplish our end by means that are inadequate. The State can follow and can execute, it cannot usually lead—the mandates of humanity must be accepted by humanity before politicians can put them in force. In short, politics and religion are no longer united, and cannot be reunited save in a different and better world, which may, some of us dare hope, be the world of the future to which mankind is painfully tending. Political science must follow its own laws at the risk of self-destruction; religion must work on those higher spiritual forces which can never be finally defeated, for, as Plato has told us, the wise man knows what the others know as well as what he knows himself; the others know what they themselves know but not what he knows.

In speaking of religion, we take the word in its widest possible sense. It must include the wisdom of Greek philosophy, the discipline of the Stoic; the contemplative life of the mystic; the humanism of Comte and all who think with him or after him; Christianity in all its forms, and every expression of spiritual belief and life. Through all its differences there is, in religion, one abiding characteristic, the one that was set forth in the opening passage of this article—the characteristic of idealism as opposed to materialism; of universal love as opposed to egotism. In virtue of religion man lives for ends that are greater than himself, and for others as well as himself. In virtue of religion, also, man can sacrifice the goodwill of the world around him to the goodwill of the world to come, for in religion alone can he find justification for the pursuit of ideals that are not yet in accordance with the immediate convenience of mankind. Religion, incorporated in the Christian Church, transformed the old world; but its work of regeneration remains sadly incomplete. Religion, whether Christian or ultra-Christian, has yet a new world to remodel; it may use political machinery for its task, but that machinery will never accomplish the job by itself.

As though politicians themselves were becoming newly conscious of this truth, they appeal to society at large to

strengthen their hands for the accomplishment of the great human mandate. Richard Cobden had a *dictum* that, for the peace of the world, it was well that there should be as little communication as possible between governments, as much as possible between peoples. Our politicians have something of that instinct when they call on all citizens to co-operate in the formation of a League of Nations.

In doing this they are calling for "direct action" of a kind which no government can afford to condemn. This is the "direct action" which consists in so shaping the citizen that nothing else than the ideal in question will satisfy his requirements. The City of God will never be built until its inhabitants are ready for it; politicians can only deal with human nature as they find it, it is not their task to raise and ennoble it. This is the work of religion understood in its broadest sense as the faith of those who believe in a supreme good that enfolds and transcends all lesser goods; the good by which man is truly man, and in which he can rest, feeling that his destiny is accomplished. Only in the pursuance of such an end can complete human brotherhood be established; a brotherhood with which national boundaries and national differences cannot interfere.

To religion, then, and to the "direct action" of humanity as a whole, must we look, as did St Augustine, as did Plato, for the achievement of our political ideals. The best government is not that which does the most, but that which leaves its subjects free to do things for themselves. That freedom we possess to a great extent, but, by a kind of sloth, we abstain from using it. Half the social evils that the Government is urged to remove could be cured by the combined action of those directly concerned. Industrial corporations of every kind; intellectual associations; religious bodies; a combination of women, working from the point of view of their own sex, and dealing directly with the evils for which they reproach the laws—all could, by faith in the ideal, promote its fulfilment; by action within their own domain modify, purify, and transform political action. Every industry that is justly and generously conducted; every school that is directed according to noble and disinterested principles; every organ of the Press that aims at truth and not self-interest; every moral or philanthropical association that is carried out on lines of broad human love, can advance the State itself on the path of human development. As to the family, one hardly dares name it in such a relation; it is at once so potent and so little regarding its powers.

M. Zimmern writes of Solon :

“ He was doing what many social reformers, wise or unwise in their efforts, are trying to do to-day : he was associating the State with ideas not only of power but of kindness. No part of his work took firmer root. He succeeded in perpetuating a tradition of mercy and generosity which to the Athenian of the fifth century seemed one of Athens' oldest and most natural toasts.”¹

It may be said that Solon was a law-giver ; but are we not all law-givers to some extent ?

For the remaking of the world we need, in short, to deepen our sense of collective responsibility. We court failure by either trusting too much to the political machinery, or by trusting too little to the action of society at large. If mankind is not ready for a more human conception of international relations, no statesman can bring it about.

The directing force we need is one that shall be independent of material considerations, and that force can only be supplied by religion. We hear a good deal of the failure of the Churches, and some think it is time for them to quit the stage. Even were such a proposition true, the need would remain for some form of corporate belief in spiritual ideals if any general moral advance is to be achieved. The aims and purposes of State policy are definite and precise, and worldly diplomacy will prevail so long as there is no higher faith to control it. It is not to politicians that we have a right to look for the kindling of that faith ; but let it once be kindled in society at large, and politicians will obey its behests.

The first duty of the State is to guard the interests of its own citizens, and it is only when the interests of those its citizens are identical with the interests of all mankind that the policy of a State can be human without being self-destructive. Until then the policy of the Two Cities cannot be reconciled.

I dare to ask, in conclusion, whether such opposition as is raised in many places to the project of a League of Nations be not, half consciously, inspired by the sense of this truth ; by the belief that there is danger and insincerity in confusing the practical and material ends of statecraft with the idealistic aspirations of humanity ?

¹ *The Greek Commonwealth*, p. 134.

M. D. PETRE.

SAINTS AND PHILOSOPHERS AMONG THE TAMIL ÇAIVAS.

THE REV. J. E. CARPENTER, D.LITT., D.D.

AMONG the many obscure chapters of the religious history of India none has recently received more interesting illumination than the Çiva worship of the Tamil-speaking peoples of South India. Third in the great Triad after Brahmā and Vishnu, the Creator and the Preserver of the universe, Çiva was charged in the perpetual cosmic rhythm with its destruction. Of ancient descent, for he was known also as Rudra of the Vedic hymns, he was an extraordinarily manifold character. His name was a familiar adjective, meaning the "kindly" or "auspicious," an epithet applied to various deities, and to Rudra among them. He was associated with the destructive energies of the storm, and is the father of a group of violent winds known as the Maruts or "pounders." The poets deprecate his wrath; he is entreated not to use the celestial fire (the lightning), or attack the worshipper with fever, cough, or poison. But as the storm clears the air, and fresh breezes revive drooping energies, he is implored to bestow blessings for man and beast; he grants remedies for disease; from his hand come restoration and healing. He dwells on the mountains, with a thousand eyes and braided hair; he is to be seen in sunshine and fair weather. Already in the Rig Veda he is "Lord of the world" and "Father of the universe." Yet he has a strangely local character. Homage must be paid to him at cross-roads, at the passage of a river, or the entry into a forest. Awe and terror gathered round his name. He came out of the common life of the people; he was the product of experiences of dread in lonely places amid Nature's violences.

When such a god was brought into the higher religion, what could be made of him? As he came dancing down the

mountain slopes with a coil of snakes round his neck and a troop of frenzied devotees behind him, he was identified by the Greek observer Megasthenes (300 B.C.) with Dionysus. And just as the Greek god became to some of his worshippers the symbol of an exalted spiritual reality, so Çiva, in spite of the grotesqueries and brutalities which mythology piled around him, became an accepted type of Supreme Deity. In one of the later Upanishads he is identified with the Brahman, the ultimate Spirit, the Absolute, the source of all existence.¹

In the great epic known as the *Mahābhārata*, substantially complete by A.D. 500, his figure is of bewildering complexity. He has one aspect as the hero of mythological imagination, a second as an object of personal devotion, a third as the lofty goal of religious and philosophical intuition. He is the divine Ascetic, and the Revealer of truth and law. He is the great rival of Vishnu, lord of Death and Time, the agent of the Dissolution which closes a world-age. But in the unceasing process there was no finality. In due course the wondrous renewal would begin, and into the darkness Çiva would bring light and life once more. So he is extolled as the Maker and Creator of the world, the divine Architect, conversant with every art. He is Maheçvara, the Great Lord; Mahādeva, the Great God. Once born from Brahmā's forehead, like Athena from the brow of Zeus, he is exalted to be Brahmā's creator, the Manifest and Unmanifest, Changeless and Eternal. Soul of all beings, he dwells in their hearts. To him the desire of every worshipper is known: "Seek then the protection of the King of the gods." Like the Calvinist who was ready to be damned for the glory of God, the true believer can say, "At Mahādeva's command I shall cheerfully become a worm; at Hara's word I would even become a dog."²

I.

During the early Middle Ages the worship of Çiva was carried widely through India. In Bengal it gradually supplanted Buddhism, which was, however, still strong enough largely to influence its rival and successor, and even to maintain an attenuated existence till the sixteenth century. The Buddhist sovereign Nārāyana Pāla found it expedient to erect temples to Çiva, but arrangements were made for the residence and maintenance of Buddhists as well as Hindus;

¹ The Çvetāçvatara Upanishad, *Sacred Books of the East*, xv.

² *Mahābhārata*, xiii. 14, 182 f.

the Buddhist festivals were celebrated there, while the rites of Çiva, accompanied with song and dance, drew worshippers of all creeds. At Bhuvaneçvar in Orissa a sacred city grew up around the lake, dedicated to the "Great God." Around its chief temple, reared in the seventh century, tradition reckoned 7000 shrines. Half a century ago the late Sir William Hunter estimated their survivors at five to six hundred. The sanctuaries were often richly endowed. An elaborate ceremonial required various orders of priests; food, incense, and flowers must be provided for the daily cultus; bands of musicians and singers, dancing masters, drummers, accountants, lamplighters, cooks, brasiers, carpenters, goldsmiths, astrologers, washermen, potters, barbers, watermen, made up a regiment of dependants; the poor and infirm must be fed; and a great temple often maintained a college of Brahman teachers and a number of students. Here were centres not only of worship and charity, but also of learning; philosophy was studied; books were written; dramas were acted; and the religious enthusiasm of the people was stimulated with splendid processions and the busy activities which gathered round the solemn fêtes.

Meanwhile the most remarkable product of Çaiva religion presents itself among the Tamils of South India. By what means and at what date the Brahman culture was carried among the Dravidian peoples it is no longer possible to determine. Legend has its own version, and the Tamil chronicles boldly assigned an enormous antiquity to the famous Academies after the Brahman Agastya had provided the language with an alphabet, as Ulfilas did for the Goths on the lower Danube. A learned judge, editor also of important Tamil texts, recently allotted a period of ten thousand years (10,150-150 B.C.) to these institutions! A more sober estimate places the really distinctive work of the so-called Third Academy at Madura, the capital of the Pândyan kings, in the early or middle centuries of the first Christian millennium. English scholars have differed almost as widely as native investigators. One of the most copious hymn-writers, Saint Nānasambandhar, who was assigned by Taylor to 1320 B.C., was transferred by Bishop Caldwell to A.D. 1292. Such were the uncertainties of chronological inquiry; he is now fairly securely lodged in the seventh century of our era. Active poetical production had then, no doubt, been for some centuries in progress, but the early forms of the cults of Çiva and Vishnu beside the Buddhists and the Jains are shrouded in obscurity. The best native scholarship recognises that as late

as the third or fourth century A.D. there was no Çaivism or Vishnuism as understood now.¹ Yet in the sixth century Çaivism is firmly established in Dravidian countries, with its characteristic piety. An inscription from Mysore (500–550) celebrates him as the Eternal *Sthānu* (“Steadfast”), “whose one body is formed by the coalescence of all the gods, and whose grace (*prasāda*) constantly guards the three worlds from the fear of evil.”² Plates from the Nāsik district (Bombay) in the year 595 commemorate the military success, the learning, the charities, the aids to the afflicted, the blind and the poor, of King Çankaragana, a worshipper of Çiva under the title of “the Lord of souls.” When Yuan Chwang, the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim, made his way down the eastern coast in 640 to the Pallava kingdom, and stayed at its capital Kanchipura (commonly identified with Conjeeveram), he found ten thousand Buddhists in the country with a hundred monasteries, and eighty Deva-temples, of which the majority were Jain. The worshippers of Çiva were not yet numerous. But the Tamil poets of Çaivism were already at work. The struggle with the dominant Jains was severe, and the religion which was established in conflict generated a new energy of emotion. Bands of Brahman theologians came down from upper India. The air was full of debates and disputations. In the seventh century St Nānasambandhar converted the Pāndyan king from Jainism, and tradition related that, with the fierce wrath of an Elijah, he celebrated his victory in controversy by the massacre of 8000 Jains. Like his earlier contemporary Appar, he produced an immense number of hymns, 384 poems being assigned to him. So powerful was the impress of his work and character that “there is scarcely a Çiva temple in the Tamil country where his image is not daily worshipped.”³ From this time an impassioned stream of sacred verse flows on for centuries. The power of Çaivism—and Vaishnavism by its side—continually grows. Hundreds of temples rise through South India to the two great gods. Each can boast its line of saints, its poets, its teachers. The first collection of Çaiva hymns, the *Devarām*, is made about 1025, and others follow. By the year 1100, sixty-three Çaiva saints are commemorated in the *Periya Purāna*.⁴ Here is no systematic theology, but a vivid record

¹ M. S. Aiyangar, M.A., *Tamil Studies* (Madras, 1914), p. 251.

² *Epigraphia Indica*, viii. p. 33, translated by Kielhorn.

³ P. Sundaram Pillai, *Some Milestones in the History of Tamil Literature* (1895), p. 9. Annual feasts are even held in his name, with dramatic representations of events in his life.

⁴ *South Indian Inscr.*, II. part ii. (1892), p. 152.

of personal experience. Its fundamental motive is most briefly expressed by one of the later poets, St Mūlar, in a single verse :—

“The ignorant say that Love and God are different ;
None know that Love and God are the same.
When they know that Love and God are the same,
They rest in God's love.”

And the further lesson ran :—

“They have no love for God who have no love for all mankind.”¹

The Çaiṅva hymns are one long series of variations on these themes. Mingled sometimes with strange mythological allusions and unexpected metaphors, they tell of raptures and ecstasies, of fears and falls. There are periods of gloom when the heavens are shrouded and the face of God is hid. There are spendours of light when the world is transfigured in the radiance of love. At the outset of the great chorus the first voices are calm and gentle ; and even Appar, who tells how he had been bound by heretics to a granite pillar and flung into the sea and was saved by repeating the sacred Name, can muse tranquilly on the “fellowship of the Spirit” in contrast with conventional practice, or even with ethical endeavour.

“The grace of God is as pacifying as the soft music of the lute,
Or the tender moon in the evening sky.
All learning and wisdom are for doing reverence to God.
God should be worshipped out of pure love as the Great Benefactor,
Who gave us the instruments of knowledge, speech, and action,
For escape from destructive desires.
Such desires are hard to conquer without the grace of God.
God rescues from the onsets of sensuous desires those whose hearts
melt for him ;
When the [churn of the] heart is moved hard by [the staff of] love,
Rolled on the cord of pure intelligence.
They, who would be free from sin and corruption,
Should think of God deeply and continuously with joy.
Then he will be at one with them and grant them his grace.
Freedom from sin and corruption is to those only who see him in all
things,
And not to those only who see him in particular places,
Nor to those who merely chant the Vedas or hear the Shāstras ex-
pounded.
It is to those only who crave for at-one-ment
With the omnipresent and all-powerful Lord,
And not to those who bathe at dawn
Nor to those who have at all times striven to be just,
Nor to those who make daily offerings to the Devas.

¹ Quoted in the *Siddhānta Dīpikā*, xiii., Nov. 1912, p. 239. The translations in the following pages (unless otherwise specified) are by native writers in this magazine, which ran for some years in Madras, and then expired.

It is to those only who know the Lord to be boundless in love and light,
 And not to those who roam in search of holy shrines,
 Nor to those who practice severe austerities, or abstain from meat.
 No gain of spiritual freedom is there to those who display the robes
 And other insignia of Yogins or Sannyāsins, or who mortify the flesh.
 That gain is only for those who glorify him as the Being
 Who vibrates throughout the universe and in every soul."

Very different are the confessions of Mānikka Vācāgar ("whose utterances were rubies") in the ninth century. His fifty-one hymns depict the progress of a soul out of the bondage of ignorance and passion into the liberty of light and love.¹ Their devotional idiom may often sound strange to Western ears; their mythological allusions will sometimes repel readers accustomed to a different imaginative outlook. But their sincerity is indisputable. The poet's theme is the wonder of divine Grace shown forth in his own life, and he tells without reserve the marvel of his first conversion, his joy and exultation, his subsequent waywardness, his despondencies, his falls, his shame, and his final recovery and triumph. Dr Pope compares the influence of these verses in shaping the religious life of the Tamils of South India to that of the Psalms in the Christian Church. They are daily sung throughout the country with tears of rapture.

The story of the poet's life is enveloped in legend. Born in a Brāhman family on the river Vaigai, near to Madura, he attracted the notice of the king, and was early called to the royal service. A student of the Vedas, he sought wisdom from many masters, but was satisfied with none. The world had woven its bonds around him. Court favour, wealth, dignity, the charms of women,—all were at his command, and he was "caught in the circling sea of joyous life." The ancient Scriptures failed to hold him. "Busied in earth, I acted many a lie." He gave no thought to birth and death, sunk in the flood of lust and the illusion of "I" and "mine." Suddenly, as he was on a mission for the king, he was arrested in mid-career by a power that he could not resist: "He laid his hand on me." The experience could only be described by saying that "the One most precious Infinite to earth came down"; but what he saw could not be told.

"My inmost self in strong desire dissolved, I yearned;
 Love's river overflowed its banks,
 My senses all in him were centred; 'Lord,' I cried,
 With stammering speech and quivering frame
 I clasped adoring hands; my heart expanding like a flower."

¹ *The Tiruvācagam*, or "Sacred Utterances," translated by G. U. Pope (Oxford, 1900).

All sorts of emotions struggled within him : loathing for past sin, amazement at the divine condescension, a bounding sense of assurance and freedom :—

“I know thee, I, lowest of men that live,
I know, and see myself a very cur,
Yet, Lord, I'll say I am thy loving one !
Though such I was, thou took'st me for thine own.
The wonder this ! Say, is there aught like this ?
He made me servant of his loving saints ;
Dispelled my fear ; ambrosia pouring forth, he came,
And while my soul dissolved in love made me his own.
Henceforth I'm no one's vassal ; none I fear ;
We've reached the goal.”

But his triumph was short-lived. He will hide nothing, he will confess all :—

“Faithless I strayed, I left
Thy saints ; a reprobate was I. How did I watch the one beloved,
The quiverings of the lip, the folds of circling robe, the timid bashful
look,
To read love's symptoms there !”

It is a familiar story, but rarely told with such truthfulness. Out of his falls he is once more lifted into “mystic union.” With a tender familiarity he explains it, “There was in thee desire for me, in me for thee.” He was, then, worth something even to God. It suggests a still profounder thought :—

“The tongue itself that cries to thee—all other powers
Of my whole being that cry out—all are Thyself.
Thou art my way of strength ! the trembling thrill that runs
Through me is Thee ! Thyself the whole of ill and weal.”

So through the storms of emotion he makes his way to peace, to a security so profound that he can truthfully exclaim :—

“Though hell's abyss
I enter, I un murmuring go, if grace divine appoint my lot.”

From the tranquillity of the Sage's path as he withdraws from the world and wanders from shrine to shrine (tradition tells of his encounters with Buddhists from Ceylon), he looks back over his life in the world :—

“Glory I ask not, nor desire I wealth ; not earth or heaven I crave ;
I seek no birth nor death. Those that desire not Çiva nevermore
I touch ; I've reached the foot of sacred Perun-turrai's king,
And crown'd myself ; I go not forth ; I know no going hence again.”

In a quieter mood St Mūlar summed up a less varied experience:—

“I learnt the object of my union with the body,
I learnt of my union with the God of gods.
He entered my heart without leaving me,
I learnt the knowledge that knows no sin.

“Seek ye the true support, hold to the Supreme,
Your desires will be satisfied when his grace is gained;
With humility of heart the learned will secure
The bliss enjoyed by the bright immortals.”

Among the strange legends of the saints in the *Periya Purāna* is the story of Kāraikāl Ammaiyār, a merchant's wife, whose beauty so distressed her that she prayed for the form of a demoness who could stand by God for ever in prayer. Amid a shower of divine flowers and applauding music from the skies, she shed her flesh, and, after wandering through the world in her bones, approached the dwelling of Çiva upon Mount Kailāsa. There, as she humbly drew nigh to the God upon her head, it was vouchsafed to her to behold him. She loved to sing afterwards of the “God of gods with throat of shining blue,” to tell of his braided hair and necklace of skulls. These were the accepted conventions of mythology. As she entered the presence, the Lord called out to her “Mother,” and she fell prostrate at his feet murmuring “Father.” That one good word was uttered by the Lord, says the poet, St Sekkilar, “so that the whole world may be saved”; for the mother's love that would free from all harm and redeem from all sin is indeed divine. And Kāraikāl sang:—

“If one desires the path that leads to God,
And wishes to deserve his grace, and asks
Where he dwells sure—even in the heart of those
Like my poor self, it easy is to find!”

Here are significant forms of religious experience. What could philosophy make of them?

II.

Within the orthodox fold of Brahmanism, as is well known, six different schools of philosophy acquired distinct recognition. Many obscurities hang over their history, and their origins can only be conjecturally fixed within very wide limits. Most important of all for the metaphysic of religion was the famous system of the Vedānta, founded on the *Sūtras*, the “threads” or brief aphorisms five hundred and fifty-five in number,

ascribed to a teacher named Bādarāyana. Only his name is known; when or where he lived, no one can tell. The Sūtras were designed to gather up in the most condensed form the great philosophical tradition derived from the ancient Upanishads, in its threefold aspect, ontological, cosmological, and psychological. How these venerable compositions had been put together and attached to different Vedic collections can no longer be traced. They formed the last deposit of the great Vedic complex, and their teaching became known as the "Veda-end" or Vedānta. The brevity of the Sūtras rendered them unintelligible without a commentary; and the philosophy of the Vedānta reaches us through the expositions of different teachers who undertake to unfold the contents of Bādarāyana's abbreviated summaries. Most famous of these was Çankara, himself a Brahman of South India. The first written record of his life only reaches us from the fourteenth century, and his chronological place is not determinable with certainty, but a growing consensus of opinion assigns his birth to A.D. 788 and his death to 820. He was himself probably a worshipper of Çiva, and he grew up in the midst of the struggle with Buddhism in which the devotees of the Hindu deity were actively engaged. He was not the earliest commentator on the Sūtras, and the chief doctrine of the World-Illusion, which was the key of his interpretation, was by no means new. But he elaborated it with a comprehensiveness and a detail which no predecessor had attained, and his Monistic Idealism is still the type of Vedānta best known to Western students.

Meanwhile another system under the name of *Siddhānta*, the "Accomplished End," the fixed or established truth, had long been in the field in South India under the protection of Çiva. It is, indeed, but one among several branches of Tamil Çaivism, and itself includes as many as sixteen schools.¹ It rests upon a twofold Scriptural authority, the Vedas and the Āgamas, "both of them true, both being the word of the Lord," but not of equal value. Çiva had been the great Revealer, and from him the Vedas had originally proceeded. They were the more general, the common basis provided by him for all religions. The Āgamas were the more special, suitable for advanced believers and maturer experience; they were twenty-eight in number. Of their origin no tradition

¹ Attention was first called to it by the translations of Hoisington in the *Journal of the American Oriental Soc.*, iv., 1854. Cf. the "Fruit of Divine Grace," in Pope's *Tīruvāçagam*; the volumes of the *Siddhānta-Dīpikā*; Nallaswāmi's *Studies in Çaiva Siddhānta* (1911); and Schomerus, *Der Çaiva-Siddhānta* (1912).

remains; but they seem to have been already regarded as products of grey antiquity in the fifth or sixth century A.D. They supplied the material for a theological compendium, entitled "The Sacred Word," by St Mūlar, who is placed by some native scholars in the first century A.D., though Western students bring him down much later. Their main teachings were afterwards developed on the basis of a summary in twelve Sanskrit verses by Meykanda Deva ("the Divine Seer of the Truth"), in his "Enlightenment in Çiva-Knowledge," in 1223. This brief exposition was supposed to have been revealed to Meykanda by a messenger from heaven, and as the foundation of Çaiva scholasticism it acquired a canonical character. The work was designed to supply answers to questions which inquiring disciples might be expected to ask, such as—"Is the world eternal, or had it a beginning? Is it self-existent, or produced? If produced, was the cause Time or Karma or intelligent? If intelligent, what was his nature?"—and so on through a series of ontological and cosmological puzzles, many of them of venerable descent. The earlier Çaivism had its own solutions of such problems, and repudiated the doctrine of "Non-Duality" to which Çankara had not yet given precise expression. The later scholastics marshalled a row of arguments against his monistic Vedānta, which they regarded as their most dangerous foe. St Arulnanti wound up a long series with the plea that "if you say that all knowledge is Illusion, what you call Brahman is Illusion; and if Brahman is Illusion, the assumption of intelligence falls to the ground."

Like other philosophies of religion, the Çaiva Siddhānta sought to determine the relations of the three orders of beings, God, the world, and the soul. In agreement with the Vedānta of Çankara, it viewed the successions of birth and death as without beginning; but, instead of attributing to the process only a relative reality, it declared that matter and souls were, like God, eternal. But the world, as we know it, passes through a series of phases. It is for ever marching through evolution and maintenance to dissolution. Its form continually changes, but its substance remains the same. Its material cause is Māyā, no "Illusion," but the primeval stuff whence the universe is organised, like the clay converted into the shapely jar. And it requires an efficient cause; it cannot have produced itself spontaneously. How should the undifferentiated mass in silence and darkness set about to change? The elements have no intelligence, and cannot be the agents of the great development. Time, Karma, atoms—all are without mind. Time is in reality changeless in its nature, except (says

Meykanda shrewdly) to the observer who views it as past, present, or future; but it is no energy, it can produce no effects. It supplies a condition for God's action, it is impotent to take its place. The efficient cause must be eternal, like Māyā itself; it must be intelligent, for the universe is an ordered unity. True, God's changelessness preserves the divine nature in sublime independence of vicissitude. "All things are to him one eternal consentaneous whole." He operates through his *Çakti*, his semi-personalised "Energy," as the instrumental cause, just as the potter uses his wheel and moulding-stick.

The cosmologic argument is reinforced from the moral side by the necessity of providing for the action of Karma. This also is eternal, but its sphere was in matter, and was lodged in the soul's bodily environment. It could not itself originate the distinction between good and evil, it could only register their issues. None but an omniscient Mind could have ordained the principles of morality, and none but omnipotent Power could have so arranged the world that the proper "fruit" should be attached to every act, and souls should everywhere and always get the rightful deserts of their virtue or their guilt. Once more the aid of the *Çakti* (which has various modes of activity) is invoked. The "sport" theory of the production of the world is vigorously repudiated. There is a purpose in its endless successions. Metaphysically the Absolute has no emotions. It is unaffected, that is, by pleasure and pain; it derives no profit from its operations. But with such an abstraction religion is not content. Through its "Grace-form" it is for ever engaged in the rescue of souls from the bondage of matter, and the three "Stains" which defile their purity. This is the meaning of the unceasing rhythm of origin, existence, and destruction; and this is the explanation of the experiences of the soul which bring the transcendent God into relation with man as an object of intellectual recognition and adoring love. Over against the monist "Universal Subject," the *Çaiva* philosophers placed a real pair, Divine and human. "If there is no other object but God," asks a native interpreter, "how could we maintain that God is Good, that he is Love, and that he is Beneficent? To whom does he do good? Whom does he love? Can we say that his goodness benefits the illusory forms for which he is himself responsible?"

Whatever Metaphysic may require in the theory of God as Being, Religion is frankly dualist. Accepting the current formula (which *Çankara* did not himself employ), "Being,

Intelligence, and Bliss," the Siddhânta enumerates eight divine attributes as the expression of these three characters—self-existence, essential purity, intuitive wisdom, infinite intelligence, essential freedom, infinite grace or love, omnipotence, infinite enjoyment or bliss. Such a being is "neither male, female, nor neuter," said the sage Çivavâkkiyar, "neither Brahman nor Vishnu nor Rudra, but is Spirit"; and the Swâmi of Tâyumânavar (eighteenth century) could exclaim:—

"All space is thine, O thou far and near, immanent thou art,
And thou well'st up as a honied fountain of bliss in my heart!"

This dual presence in the world and in the soul was expressed by the doctrine known as *bhedâbheda*, or "distinction without distinction" or difference. The old Upanishad formula "One without a Second" must be in some way received and explained. "God is not different (*abheda*) from the world," argued Meykanda, "but as the world is not spiritual and God is a spiritual form, he is different" (*bheda*). Similarly "the soul is not God, for if it were not distinct, it would have no power of motion or action." All kinds of analogies were pressed into the service of illustration. Just as sound filled all the notes of a tune, or flavour pervaded a fruit, so did God by his Çakti pervade the world so intimately that they do not appear to be two, yet this divine energy is essentially different from unconscious matter. As body and mind together form a unity, so God is the soul whose body is the universe of Nature and Man. He is not *identical* with either, he is not their substance, but he dwells in them and they in him. "Non-duality" is not one-ness, but inseparability. To realise this union in diversity is the high calling of the soul. So Arulnanti Çivâchârya wrote:—

"Say, 'I am not the world, and separate from it,'
Say also, 'I am not the unknowable Supreme One';
Then unite with him indissolubly by loving him
In all humility, and practise 'I am he.'
Then he will appear to you as your Self,
Your defilement will all cease, and you will become pure.
So it is the old Vedas teach us
To practise this sacred saying, 'I am Brahman.'"

How was this consummation to be reached?

The doctrine of the soul was elaborated on the one hand against the materialists who only recognised the body and its organs, and on the other against the Vedântist identification of it with Brahman. The materialist was asked how the action of the five organs of sense, each independent and

ignorant of the others, could be combined in acts of cognition without a knowing subject. Accepting much of the traditional physiological psychology, Meykanda presented the soul in the midst of the senses, the co-ordinating *manas* (or *mens*), and other faculties that rose above them, as a king attended by his prime minister and councillors. But that was not its primæval condition. In the unbeginning eternity it was plunged in a strange stupor, a state of ignorance and darkness, yet charged with dangerous powers, for it led the soul unwittingly into action. It did not, however, exclude the influence of God's grace, which was present even in this antecedent and unexplained mystery of "original sin." The story of creation and the endless succession of universes is the story of God's purpose to give the infinite number of uncreated souls the opportunity of extrication from this unhappy blindness. The process involves them in the influence of two additional "defilements"—*Māyā*, or the material world and its attractions; and *Karma*, the power which registers the moral issue of every activity and determines the character of successive births. This is indeed independent of Çiva. Its operation is in a sense conditioned by him, for it works through the entry of the soul into creation, and these time-periods are started at Çiva's good pleasure. But its eternal law was not willed by him. It is an august coadjutor beside his sovereignty, whose authority even Çiva himself cannot set aside, and he provides the means of the recompense for good and the requital for evil which Karma demands.

But as the soul starts on its long pilgrimage, the Grace of Çiva, operating in many modes, is its unfailing companion. Even in the human frame God's agency is needed to give power to the soul in union with the perceptive organs, as the sun's light is needed to enable the observer to perceive objects in a mirror. The divine beneficence is like a field which yields its stores to those who cultivate it; without partiality, unmoved by desire or hatred, he carries out the results of Karma, "having no will or power to do otherwise." Like flowers which shut or open while the sun shines unclouded, God remains unchanged, while his Çakti assumes different forms to meet the varying needs of the soul's discipline. For the soul is no puppet in the grip of fate. The effect of past Karma does not destroy moral responsibility for the future, nor does the presence of Grace override the soul's own choice. Beside the sphere of external act there is the internal sphere of feeling. The act is done, and its issue for good or ill cannot be altered. But the feeling may remain, and good dispositions may carry

the soul forward, morally and religiously, to a point at which—though at first belonging to Karma—they ultimately transcend it. Technically the soul's process is laid out in three stages of successive deliverance from the Three Defilements. The process of moral advance is always conceived as an increasing enlightenment of intelligence, which brings Çiva ever more and more clearly into view. So the soul is prepared to make the right choice when Grace is offered to it. As the light arises in darkness, will you put it before you or behind you? There are those who say, "No need for Grace to effect these results, the soul can do its own work." Against such self-confidence Umāpati flings a scornful protest:—

"May I not say, 'I need not Grace to see by, I will see myself?'

Easy the way of vision, but 'twixt eye and object light must be.

Without the light of Grace 'twixt soul and known soul sees not."¹

It is for the *Guru* or Teacher to let in the light. He is in reality a manifestation of Çiva himself, even when he comes in human form to souls in the lowest rank. "The thinking man," says a modern Çaiva writer, "who has learned to worship the ideal he lives in spirit and in truth, finds it clothed in the form he thinks, and meeting and greeting him in person, to give him the helping hand that he so much needs and longs after. The *Guru* appears now and here, it may be in vision, or it may be in name and form and flesh as the thinker has been longing after to see, and seconds his efforts, describing to him the glory of the ideal that he has been vaguely thinking after. Hitherto he has been hazily building only with Hope and Faith. He has yet to learn that Love which endures to the end, and transcends time and space and the limits of causation. (For this purpose) the *Guru* describes to him in the clear light of reason the glory of the Promised Land, and prepares him therefor by testing his powers, his constancy, and his moral stamina, by a series of disciplinary exercises."² This is a form of *yoga* practice, rising above the common duties of ritual and charity, demanding severe concentration, and sometimes generating ecstatic raptures of song and dance. It is, therefore, only in this life for the few. It requires the suppression of all personal regards. "Set not thyself in the foreground," sings Umāpati; "what thou beholdest, let it be That." But however long be the way, the Çaiva believes that the goal will be reached at last. The divine Love can be satisfied with nothing less. "Çiva desires that all should know

¹ "The Fruit of Divine Grace", vi. 56, translated by Pope, *Tiruvāçagam*.

² *Siddhānta Dipikā*, August 1910, p. 70.

him," says Meykanda, emphatically. It is an infinite process, and we are more conscious of the process than of the goal, as we see the strange varieties of human character and conduct. "It is God's prerogative," says the mediæval theologian, "to encourage and save those who resort to him; therefore he will surely save such as come to him, and while he will not save those who do not resort to him, yet he bears no ill-will towards them. Those servants who resort to him he will clothe in his own image, but others who do not come to him he will cause to eat of the fruit of their own doings." That diet will at last be found unsatisfying, and the divine Grace which has accompanied the soul through all its wanderings will lead it home.

Such at least is the disciple's faith. The theologians do not, indeed, describe an age of complete attainment when universes for recompense or retribution are needed no more. They concentrate their view on the blessedness of the individuals saved. "Did the soul perish," says Meykanda, "on becoming united with Çiva, there would be no eternal being to be associated with Deity. If it does not perish, but remains a dissociated being, then there would be no union with God. But the Defilements will cease to affect the soul, and then the soul, like the union of salt with water, will become united with Çiva as his servant, and exist at his feet as one with him." The consummation may be far off, but faith unhesitatingly awaits it. "Will not Çiva, who is not subject to the Three Defilements, who ever exists in his own imperishable form of happiness—will not he come as the Understanding of the soul, which, wonderful to say, will never leave it, and in a manner far transcending the rules of logic reveal himself? *He will thus reveal himself.*" And so the deliverance of all souls is sure.

Many consequences flowed from a religion thus spiritually conceived. As the source of all enlightenment, sole Deity of intelligence and grace, Çiva was really the true object of all devout aspiration. "Let me place on my head the feet of Çiva," said Arulnanti, "who stands as the goal of each of the six forms of religion, and fills one and all inseparably."

"Into the bosom of the one great sea
Flow streams that come from hills on every side.
Their names are various as their springs,
And thus in every land do men bow down
To one great God, though known by many names."¹

¹ Gover, *Folk-Songs of Southern India*, Madras, 1871, p. 165, "written before the advent of Europeans."

The Çaiva teachers were confronted by an elaborate worship of temple and ritual, priesthood and sacrifice. The sacred images into which the Deity had been mysteriously brought by a ceremony of introduction must be daily tended and garlanded, fed, and bathed, and jewelled. They had been cherished for centuries; gifts and services had been lavished upon them; they were associated with reverence for saints and sages; they had become the media through which the gracious help of Çiva had been realised by the piety of generations. On the other hand, how could the Thought, the Truth, the Light, the Love of God, be embodied in wood or stone? So protest after protest flowed forth against idolatry, and an elaborate external cultus was met by a demand for a Puritan simplicity of devotion.

“If thou would'st worship in the noblest way,
Bring flowers in thy hand. Their names are these,
Contentment, Justice, Wisdom. Offer them
To that great Essence,—then thou servest God.
No stone can image God; to bow to it
Is not to worship. Outward rites cannot
Avail to compass that reward of bliss
That true devotion gives to those who know.”¹

Such a religion was necessarily open to all. It was independent of birth, rank, or sex. From ancient times Çiva had been hospitable to all: “Even if a man is a Chandāla, if he utters the name of Çiva, converse with him, live with him, dine with him.” So Nīlakantha, the first known commentator on the Vedānta Sūtras, quoted from an Upanishad, but the passage cannot now be found. St Mūlar laid it down that “there is only one caste, and there is only one God”; and a thousand years ago the poet Pattakiriyar appealed to an earlier sage, Kapila, to justify his aspiration:—

“When shall our race be one great brotherhood
Unbroken by the tyranny of caste,
Which Kapila in early days withstood,
And taught that men once were in times now passed?”²

Will India be more ready under the influences of the twentieth century to respond to an appeal which she was unable to answer in the tenth?

¹ Gover, *ibid.*, p. 133.

² Gover, *ibid.*, p. 159.

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

THE PELAGIANISM OF TO-DAY.

THE REV. CANON T. A. LACEY.

A QUESTION has lately been raised: What would have been the course of Christian theology if St Augustine had grown up, like Pelagius, in the placid life of a monk? Dr Figgis—*tam carum caput*—said to me one day, speaking of a certain academic theologian, “What does he know of sin? He has lived all his life in a college.” These questions play over the surface of things, but send down feelers into the depths. Without assuming that a fellow of a college is elected in the time of man’s innocency, or that a common-room is a paradise without a serpent, one may guess that a life spent at Magdalen or Clare will lack some rough experiences which are encountered in less guarded surroundings. Monks have sinned hotly enough, but it is pretty certain that Pelagius knew little of the storm and stress through which Augustine fought his way to the doctrine of grace. That doctrine rests upon a sense of need. Augustine had felt the need, and in his case it was not the need of the weak, but of the strong. The failure of the weak teaches little; the failure of the strong teaches much. It was because he knew his strength that he saw the force of the declaration, “Apart from Me ye can do nothing.”

The theory of Original Sin deals with the results of psychological observation. There are facts to be accounted for. Every man finds himself solicited by mental and bodily desires to think or do what he knows to be wrong. He becomes conscious of a divided lordship over him, and he feels himself to be in a measure unable to decide freely which lord he will obey. The theory is an attempt to account for this experience. If you say that Augustine took it ready-made from St Paul, you are only thrown back upon St Paul’s experience; but Augustine, with his keen interest in psychology, and

especially the psychology of childhood, verified that experience by his own observation. From his first entry into the Pelagian controversy he complained that his opponents ignored facts, and fitted their theory to a state of things that does not exist. He notes, for example, their abstract reasoning about the question whether a man can live without sin,¹ and their neglect of the practical question whether any man does live without sin. He is always appealing to facts: facts, in some cases, which do not now greatly impress us, but facts and not fancies. His doctrine of Original Sin keeps them in view. Robert Browning was struck by it as an explanation of unpleasant facts in the case of the golden-haired girl at Pornic. The facts in question, the obstinate facts of concupiscence, the puzzling facts of sheer perversity, are not constructions of human life on a theological basis. It was the most mundane of poets who wrote, "Nitimur in vetitum semper, cupimusque negata," and it is not for nothing that he put that line in a volume of verse glorifying sensual indulgence. Ovid's observation was superficial, but shrewd, and generally accurate. He was a pessimist in morals, because he saw no way of escape from habits and impulses which he condemned and enjoyed. If there was no escape, there was not much guilt in yielding. Pelagius, wishing to enhance the sinfulness of sin, taught that a man could escape if he would. Perhaps that belief was derived from an experience of temperate temptations. Augustine, who knew more about it, combated this optimism, but without letting himself lapse into pessimism. He upheld the freedom of the human will, in spite of the shackles of habit, inherited or acquired. It was capable of many things, but it was not capable of one great thing: it could not put away sin. In this the help of divine grace was needed, first and last.

On these lines the theology of the Catholic Church proceeded. It was not unwavering. There is an Augustinianism which has little savour of Augustine, except in phrase. But the middle way which he plotted is followed in the main until you come to the *servum arbitrium* of Luther. Again experience and observation are the basis of doctrine; the experience, in this case, of one tormented soul. Luther felt his will enslaved, and read his own feelings into the language of St Paul. That is intelligible. Many smaller men have had the same sense of helplessness, running near to insanity. The wonder is that he should have succeeded in passing off his diseased fancy as a true description of the normal state of man. The consequent

¹ *De Pecc. Merit.*, ii. 6.

reduction of divine grace to an arbitrary pardon, giving a joyous sense of relief but no real deliverance from the grip of habit, spread far beyond his own surroundings. Why were men content to accept the valuation of themselves as beasts, to be kept with bit and bridle? They must have known that they were free, with a measure of that freedom which can be neither proved nor denied: "all argument against it," as Johnson said; "all experience for it." Whole communities of men do not go insane at once, nor do they accept conclusions of abstract reasoning in defiance of experience. But Luther's doctrine was not abstract determinism; it was a pragmatic conviction that there was in human nature a perverse factor of determination potent enough to vitiate every activity. Perhaps the general experience of mankind in the fifteenth century, despite its humanism, seemed to justify this conviction. But if sin thus enters into the very constitution of human nature, the operation of divine grace meets with no natural response from man, and its effect becomes arbitrary. The element of the irrational, discernible in St Augustine's conception of the allocation of grace, is exaggerated into a principle. The root of this exaggeration is in Luther's formless theology; it bears fruit, if not in Calvin, certainly in Calvinism, where the doctrine of the total depravity of human nature, balanced by the absolute sovereignty of God as legislator and judge, dominates religion. The controversy *de auxiliis gratiae* shows the same leaven working elsewhere; readers of the *Lettres à un Provincial* will remember its aftermath.

The sentimentalism of the eighteenth century was a movement of violent reaction against Calvinist and Jansenist extravagances. I speak of Calvinism and Jansenism because there the belief was avowed and formulated, but in less definite form it had a wider range. Bossuet was no Jansenist, but his teaching on this head was hard enough, perhaps, to satisfy even Saint-Cyran. Thomas Hobbes was no Calvinist, but he went even beyond Calvinism in depicting the natural state of man: a life "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short"; a state in which Right is so entirely absent that "nothing can be unjust"; sheer strength, arbitrarily employed, is the only foundation of Law.

Against this travesty of human nature sentimentalism revolted. You find the best of it and the worst in Laurence Sterne: the best in his sermon on the Good Samaritan, the worst, perhaps, in the sermon on the Levite and his Concubine. But Sterne was no systematiser: for the postulates underlying the revolt you must look elsewhere; to the Abbé Prévost,

to Rousseau, above all to William Godwin. You find the scheme of Thomas Hobbes exactly reversed. Law is the enemy. Leave human nature to its own impulses, and the world will go very well. The intended moral of the story of Manon Lescaut is that the control of external discipline, civil or ecclesiastical, confounds all moral values, ruins the character, and induces misery. If you argue that the misery and moral degeneration are produced by revolt against discipline, you are made to observe that those who conform to a standard artificially imposed are morally no better than the rebels, and if they avoid misery for themselves they are exempt only as they pass it on to others. The unhappy lovers find interior peace only when they escape from this pernicious environment into the wilds of Louisiana; misery still dogs them, and is fastened upon the survivor, as a consequence of their former state. Godwin's ethics are even gloomier. He depicts man as crushed by the burden of law and convention beyond the possibility of revolt. Here is pessimism; but it is the pessimism of circumstance, not of the soul. The oppressed nature retains instincts and impulses, the release of which will be a sufficient remedy. Break up the social order, and Godwin becomes an optimist.

It is the vice of sentimentalism to select facts for exclusive observation, and to separate feeling from action. There were facts enough in the eighteenth century, if carefully selected, to make the portraits of Manon Lescaut and of Caleb Williams seem realistic; there was a riot of benevolence that rarely subsided into beneficence. Set against his life, Rousseau's writings appear as masterpieces of irony. Laurence Sterne may have done one or two kind things, but he did not steadily console his sensitive heart with such exercises; he sought other consolations. Unlike Rousseau, however, he was a conscious humourist.

In the cataclysm of the Revolution this sentimentalism was strangely combined with its opposite, a formal pedantry that was mainly of Jansenist origin. The pedantry got the upper hand. It would be curious to reflect on what might have happened if the balance had inclined the other way; if Robespierre, for example, could have finished with the aristocrats and carried his darling project of the abolition of capital punishment. But sentimentalism went under. It is hard to say whether it was wounded more by the Terror or by the Empire.

Yet it survived after a fashion. It has been remarked that the principles of the Revolution, like some theologies, came to

England only when they had failed elsewhere. There was no need to import sentimentalism; it was a native growth. But the reconciliation of sentimentalism with law did cross the Channel. Effected by violence, it remained in force when the violence caused a reaction towards order, and the union was fruitful. The facts which Godwin had selected were not forgotten. The brutal oppressiveness of the existing law was recognised. The inherent goodness of human nature was urged. The proper function of the law was not to repress, but to safeguard liberty. It was a noble conception, not new, but coming to a new birth from apparent death. It found a persistent advocate. Bentham was not among the sentimentalists; he was remote from them; but he learnt something from them, and he tied their feeling to action.

The drastic amendment of the English criminal law was mainly due to him, and it is no derogation from his credit to say that he brought most of his formed ideas from France. But his influence on ethics counts for even more. He is the father of utilitarianism. And what is utilitarianism but the quintessence of all practical morality? It supplies no source of moral action, taking that for granted, and concerning itself only with results. It maps out the results, and not inaccurately. It is altruistic, even when pretending to be nothing of the kind. It is not even individualistic, though it loves to pose as such. To seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number may be a sure way to secure your own happiness, but that is only a secondary consideration. It is, however, important. The individual, if subordinated to the whole, is not made to suffer, and political justice is safeguarded.

But who shall determine what it is that makes for the general happiness, and lay a corresponding obligation upon the individual? It seems clear that the question must be referred to the general sense of the community, and this will be expressed as Law. The wheel comes full circle, and Law is once more enthroned. But Law is no longer an arbitrary command, independent of natural right. It is, by hypothesis, the very expression of fundamental morality. Utilitarianism seems to lead direct to the complete confusion of legality and morality—a confusion which has in fact been characteristic of the common thought of England since utilitarian ethics became dominant. It is hard to persuade an Englishman that what the law allows may be immoral.

A further consequence, or another form of the same consequence, is the decay of the conception of Natural or Divine Law. The great English lawyers of the seventeenth

century believed in the Law of Nature as firmly as any juriconsult of ancient Rome, or as any canonist of the Middle Ages. Their successors of to-day openly scoff at the idea. They will not hear of any law which is not the expressed will of a community, registered by courts and enforced by penalties.

Under the impulse of utilitarianism began what has been called the Century of Hope. Men no longer looked back to the golden age of the sentimentalists, the state of nature anterior to the artificialities of civilisation. They had achieved the finer and truer idea that civilisation is the natural state of man, the state in which alone he can attain his normal development. Law was become a protector, not a tyrant, rather a guide than a driver. Boundless possibilities of improvement were in view. Hope was justified by success. "What we have done is but earnest of the things that we shall do," says the confident young man of *Locksley Hall*, when he has recovered from his one disappointment. Amazing triumphs were being won, material and moral. They were all the work of man, and where should he stop? Everyone believed in the Progress of the Race—even Carlyle for a time. Optimism was the note of the day. It was a reasoned optimism, a spiritual optimism. It did not depend on a sentimental selection of facts; it rested on a conviction that the worst things existing in the world were but discords in a world-symphony that could and would be resolved into harmony. Carlyle took Emerson to see the worst slums in London, and said, "Now, man, do you believe in the devil?" The optimist replied that this also was part of the great scheme of good. Kingsley rebounded quickly from the gloom of *Alton Locke* to his most exuberant mood of confidence. Tennyson found in the Crimean War speedy relief from the depressing peace of the Great Exhibition. And so the Century of Hope ran its course.

It was said some time ago that the modern man is not troubling about his sins. It seems to be generally true. The existence of evil is not denied. There is hot anger against it, and much noble indignation. But that is directed rather against other men's sins. There is in it something of the attitude of the man who says, "Look at me!" The anger is the reversal of Swift's *scæva indignatio*, his loathing of human nature, which was partly, at least, introverted. It is directed against men who are false to their own noble nature. I do not quarrel with it on that account. I think that St Augustine would not have quarrelled with it, though from his experience

he would have drawn more tenderness, more pity for the vicious. In the moral judgments of our day, it seems to me that consciousness of sin is an element that is lacking. This will be found true both of the sterner and of the more indulgent judgments. Indulgence abounds. Men cannot help what they do; then why condemn them? Why, especially, when all will come right sooner or later? We seem to be hovering uncertain between exaggeration of will-power and exaggeration of determinism; and the contraries are fused. Evil is in circumstances, not in the will; he who wills it has power in himself to mend circumstances. It is contradictory, for is not the man himself part of the circumstances? But we remind ourselves that life is more than logic.

If a theoretic basis of this treatment of sin be explored, I think it will be found in the exaggeration of the negative aspect of evil. Evil has no positive existence; true, it is defect of good. But this principle seems to be pushed to the point of making evil a lesser degree of good. It is not a falling away, but a failure to rise. Sin is not a lapse from the integrity of nature, but contentment with a lower level of achievement in nature. It is a lagging behind in the progress of the race. The idea of evolution, transferred with much looseness of thought from the region of biological facts to the sphere of morals, seems to be in part responsible for this conception. But belief in the moral progress of man was firmly established before evolution became a popular creed, and perhaps it has derived from this no more than a persuasive terminology.

There is formulated thought, and there is current opinion. For evidence of current opinion there is hardly anything better than a study of third-rate novels. Precisely because of their lack of invention they are a mirror of the time. They are saturated with these ideas. Evidence of deeper penetration is found in religious movements which appeal to the popular mind. There seems to be in America a widespread conviction that nothing is evil but thinking makes it so. To think right is to overcome evil. The idea is perhaps older than Plato; in modern times you may trace it from Thoreau, through the strange experiences of Laurence Oliphant, to the conviction that underlies the moral and intellectual side of that which calls itself Christian Science. The doctrine of Karma as taught by Mrs Besant—very beautiful, very stern, and in some ways very salutary—is of the same kind. There is in Leeds a crank who issues tracts prescribing an excellent rule of diet and of ablution, a sort of

Stoic ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν. He promises to all who will follow his prescription complete immunity alike from disease and from concupiscence.

These things are beyond Pelagianism. I am concerned rather with the effect of the ideas underlying such extravagances on thought which is substantially Christian. I have spoken of a misapplication of theoretic evolution, but the biological theory itself has had an effect. It has made the Miltonic Adam incredible. The Miltonic Adam was not peculiar to Milton; almost simultaneously the eloquent South was declaring in a sermon that "an Aristotle is but the rubbish of an Adam." It was a commonplace, though not often so paradoxically expressed. There seems to be nothing in theoretic evolution to exclude the idea of degeneration, and if there were it would stumble over known facts; but it does run counter to the idea that man, as we know him, is the ruin of a manhood originally perfect in all points. The abandonment of this idea has illogically brought with it the denial of another kind of lapse. If it is not to be thought that man has fallen from a state of original perfection, it is assumed that neither has he fallen from a state of original innocence—the innocence of brute creatures. That kind of fall is not excluded by theoretic evolution, but is rather indicated. We see the process reproduced, like other evolutionary movements, in childhood. The question may, however, be debated whether the movement can properly be called a fall. Then one may observe that neither is there anything in theoretic evolution to conflict with the plain teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews that man, to attain perfection, must rise out of the state of entire innocence by suffering temptation. Given this method of advance, continued victory over temptation will mean continuous moral elevation; failure may bring the experimenter below his original standing. Innocence will be moral zero; there will be positive and negative qualities superadded. And the negative qualities may be inheritable. I know that Weissmann's denial of the transmission of acquired habits stands in the way, but I am not sure that moral values need follow his physical law. It is possible that we may work out a new theory of Original Sin along these lines. At present we must be content, like St Augustine, to take our stand on observed facts. The tendency of the Century of Hope was to ignore the facts, and then to buttress the implied denial with fallacies about evolution. There was no *damnosa hereditas* of sin; man was the master of his own life, the architect of his own moral fortunes; he might fall; he was capable of rising to all heights.

Here is the *nidus* of Pelagianism. It does not follow that good influences, human or divine, are treated as unimportant. There is room for the recognition of divine grace, name and thing—the sort of thing for which the Epicureans, according to Cicero's complaint, left no room. But the Grace of God is flattened out into a sort of genial Providence. The element of perversity in human nature is neglected; the real difficulty of keeping free from sin is underestimated; and consequently the sense of givenness in moral effort—that great characteristic of Christian theology—is lacking. Self-help is a favoured theme, and the current proverb, "God helps those who help themselves," stands in curious contrast to St Augustine's *Da quod iubes*.

The Century of Hope ended with a catastrophe. Expectations have been fooled; triumphs are become a curse; culture is a byword. What will men do? Will they set to work wearily building up the waste places on the former foundations? Some dream of it, at least. But there is also a tendency to flog the old idols. Will there be a return to sentimentalism, to the disparagement of discipline, the glorification of passion? It is probably an ingredient in Bolshevism, and there are signs of it elsewhere. I cull this choice flower from one of my third-rate novels: "I think it was in this half-derelict little cottage more than anywhere else that I learned how essentially good human nature is at its well-springs. The stream flows pure and full there. It is only in its passage through civilisation that it becomes befouled with the dross of our higher breeding." There has been much talk of the same savour about the virtues of the man in the army, and it is accompanied by a relaxation of morals which recalls the experience of other periods of war. Those who have read St Augustine, and learnt something of his secret, may look with confidence for one effect of it all: a renewed sense of helplessness in face of so much perversity, and an impulse from the essential goodness of human nature to seek the succours of divine grace.

T. A. LACEY.

WORCESTER.

SURVIVAL AND MONADOLGY.

BISHOP MERCER.

It is assuredly a matter for surprise and regret that, in the various attempts to grapple with the problems of death and survival, there are so few who adventure a development of Leibnizian Monadology in the light of modern science. Apart from the speculations of the Idealists on the one hand, and of the materialistic Monists on the other, there is an almost universal assumption of a basic distinction between mind and matter; and the question keenly debated is as to whether the individual mind can survive the dissolution of the material organism through which its existence has for a time been manifested to us. And there is the further assumption that the individual mind may be equated, so to speak, with the individual organism. Now, without any direct appeal to the metaphysics of Idealism, and without any serious loss of hold on the "facts" of experience, I venture to think that, by challenging these two assumptions, we may arrive at a new and more hopeful standpoint for reviewing the whole controversy.

As regards the theory that the mind is something separate from, or over and above, the body, an adequate discussion of it is clearly beyond the limits of such an article as this. I am content to take it up in the form so lucidly expounded by Mr C. D. Broad in the July number of *THE HIBBERT JOURNAL*. He has no difficulty in showing that although what he calls "the immaterial" conditions of life and thought are out of the ken of the scientist, we are not warranted in treating them as superfluous. On its own footing, the argument is irrefutable. But I would go a step further back. Why should we want to posit the existence of a gap between "material" and "immaterial" when we are not able to define either term? The fact that science and present-day philosophy cannot seize

a possible homogeneity or continuity is merely an argument from our ignorance; and to suppose an unknown γ as cooperating with the brain to form a thinking individual is to build on this ignorance. Moreover, there is nowadays a marked tendency to deepen the concept of "matter." The rigid definitions of the materialists and of the older school of physicists are being abandoned. The nature and constitution of matter are widely acknowledged to be not merely unknown, but unexpectedly mysterious; and the discoveries concerned with the "immaterial" ether are rendering a transition from physical to psychical concepts not only easier but alluring. The supposed gap between matter and mind is fast closing, like that between organic and inorganic chemistry.

As an introduction to an alternative hypothesis which avoids any drawing of sharp distinction, I take an example from the field of "physical" action. Oxygen and hydrogen, brought together under certain conditions, combine to form a new substance—water,—a substance so unlike its constituents that it is held to be a pivotal triumph of modern science to have discovered its compound character. The first tendency of physics, after formulating the atomic theory, was to regard the oxygen atoms and the hydrogen atoms as physical ultimates. There soon insinuated itself a suspicion that the hydrogen atom might be the ultimate, and that the oxygen atom might be built up of the units thus postulated. In these latter days, radio-activity has shown that every sort of atom is a structure, or system; and scientists are venturing out into new fields of speculation, and are talking of whorls in a homogeneous ether that is not matter, or of the play of electrical forces. Divisions once confidently assumed are breaking down on every hand. We have with us "the new physics."

Take a parallel instance from the sphere of the immaterial. The older psychologists unhesitatingly took the "departmental" view of the mind, regarding it as a compound structure, and distinguishing more especially the three factors, will, feeling, and intellect. Their successors have been obliged to abandon this doctrine. We are now solemnly warned that, while for purposes of investigation and study, we may make use of these and the like distinctions, we must keep clearly in view the unity of the mind—never forget that it acts as a whole. Again we see the tendency to the breaking down of old divisions—the recognition of continuity.

Is it not, then, a retrograde step to posit an unknown γ as compounding itself with a heterogeneous substance called

“matter,” because up to the present we fail to solve the problem of the connection of body and mind? The true line of advance, on the score of probability, would be to discover the “psychical” nature of what we now call “physical.” If it be objected that thinking is different from pushing, there is no question of disputing the fact. But so, also, is will different from intellect. The concept of energy passes easily into that of will. And with the “immaterial” ether as a mediating form of existence, matter is easily conceived to be a mode of energy. Thus the whole universe becomes a direct manifestation of mind. The cumbrous machinery of dualism is thrown on the scrap-heap. With perfect loyalty to science and philosophy alike we can maintain that the brain and its activities are homogeneous through and through. We have no need to bow the knee in the temple of Materialism, nor to deny to modern thought and discovery its legitimate homage.

But I shall be assailed at this point with the reproach that my argument results as completely in undermining the hope of survival as surely as does the teaching of the materialist. I hope to show that this is by no means true, but that rather I have prepared the ground for establishing that hope more firmly.

Let me, in the first place, draw attention to the fact that we have not merely to recognise the existence of “things” as statically given, but also that of their potentialities. So long as oxygen and hydrogen are in conditions which render their chemical union impossible (say, in an incandescent star), there is no such substance as water, still less are there the exquisite forms of snow-crystals. That is to say, we cannot know what the atoms of oxygen and hydrogen are capable of until they get a chance of realising their potentialities. So, in the organic sphere, an acorn has the potentiality of growing into an oak; but certain conditions must be fulfilled if the oak is to be actualised. A human ovum may become a Shakespeare; but it demands, not simply a normal physical environment, but a certain stage of social and literary development. My point here is that we can set no limits to the potentialities of any ultimate Real (let that ultimate be what you will), because we cannot tell what its activities might be under new conditions which it is out of our power to supply. And, with special reference to our present subject, we cannot tell what the constituents of a brain are capable of, because we cannot reproduce the conditions, or enter into the working, of brain structure. The temerity of setting limits to its powers is seriously aggravated if we have the slightest ground for

according to its ultimate constituents a psychical nature—a supposition which I have tried to show is well within the range of probability.

Our next step must be to ask if, on wide grounds of general experience, we can at all apprehend what these ultimate constituents may be. And I am thus brought to the consideration of the second assumption which I set out to controvert—the equating, so to speak, of the individual organism and the mind which manifests itself to us in and through its activities.

In this regard, the appeal to the teachings of recent biology is fruitful in results. The subject is a large one; and I must restrict myself to the merest hints of the evidence available for our purpose. It is now matter of common knowledge that in multicellular organisms every living cell has a definite share of independent individuality—wants and means of supplying them that are peculiar to itself. That is to say, a multicellular organism must now be regarded as a “community” of cells. It is not difficult to realise the truth of this in the case of a plant. It is no less true, however, of the human body. The cells built up into an organism are so interrelated that they have a specialised unity; but the unit is, and remains, a composite one. It is established and maintained by certain functions characteristic of “life,” using the term in its biological signification; and when those functions cease, it is dissolved. We are warranted, then, by the facts of experience, in holding that an individual organism can itself be composed of individuals.

This conclusion is enormously strengthened when we take account of the structure of the more complex organisms. Our hair, our nails, can grow after the “death” of the body. The phagocytes in our blood are independent creatures, travelling about freely in their liquid medium, pursuing and devouring their victims. The germ-cells have in them not only an independent life, but the potentiality of reproducing the whole organism. And so on in endless detail. Moreover, it is discovered that other nerve-centres than those in a brain are capable of purposive, and even rational, action. A frog, a bird, a dog, may have its brain completely removed without losing its organic unity, though necessarily with a lowered range of activities.

The fact is that of late our ideas of individuality have been revolutionised. Let him who doubts read the admirable little treatise by Mr J. S. Huxley, entitled *The Individual in the Animal World* (Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature). Or let him perpend Driesch's conclusions in his lectures

on the Problem of Individuality. His common-sense views will be rudely shaken—he will be aroused from his dogmatic slumbers. We are simply bound, I take it, to allow that the ultimate individual cannot be equated with his organism. Even a human ego will have to recognise that, in relation to his body, his fortunes are organically and intimately linked on to an indefinitely mighty host of other individual lives.

Now comes the most momentous step of all. Mr Huxley, in the book just mentioned, tells us that the problem of individuality is pre-eminently one for the solution of which the biologist and the philosopher must join hands if they are to see it in its entirety. I have glanced at the case presented by the biologist. I now invoke the aid of the philosopher.

If we pass in review the various philosophical systems that have been promulgated in ancient or modern days, can we discover one which gives promise of adapting itself to the latest pronouncements of biology summarised above? I feel fairly confident that my readers will settle on the Monadology of Leibniz. Whether they accept it or no, it is plain that it meets the requirements in a quite peculiar degree. It gives us just the idea of concurring individuals—the monads—that we are in search of. I myself have long since accepted its main principles on metaphysical grounds; and my trust in them is increasingly strengthened by what I have learnt from biologists. "Its main principles," I say, because I freely acknowledge that it must be modified in various important ways if it is to be brought up to date—more especially in regard to the isolation of the monads. The clocks constructed to keep time with one another will not work!

Let me indicate how a modern Monadist may hopefully approach this problem of survival. At the outset, he is at home with the idea that an organism is a community. For him, the body of a man is no mere aggregate of atoms of "matter" mysteriously and inexplicably gathered round a mind. It is a peculiarly co-ordinated multitude of ultimate living units, each of which has its own stream of experience; each of which is developing its own potentialities by virtue of its relations to its fellows; each of which has already attained to some level of development, be it low or high, and brings its store of experience into the common stock. In each organism there is normally a dominant monad in command, like a general in command of an army.

This monad-community, linked together by what we call the characteristic life-processes, has a unity of its own which in subtlety far transcends that of a simple aggregate. It

supplies opportunities for the fulfilling of conditions which, so far as our experience goes, can be gained in no other way. With each gain in complexity of organisation there come new relations; and with these new relations there come the realisings of higher potentialities. "Material" structure and "immaterial" developments thus advance step by step; but the need for supposing a chasm between them is gone. They are factors in one continuous and self-contained process. Nor is there a place for the idea of creation, in any strict sense of the term. The potentialities (as in the case of the atoms of oxygen and hydrogen) are there from the first; they simply await the fulfilling of conditions. The whole of the happenings fall within the categories of mind (will, feeling, intellect) and relation.

The community established in an organism constitutes an individual. It has a definite unity of its own. But this individuality is of a secondary character; the primary individuals are the constituent monads, the ultimate Reals. An army, on the same principle, constitutes a real unity, but of what may be termed a tertiary character; it is a combination of *organisms*. Moreover, an army has a life peculiar to itself which influences and controls its constituent organisms.

See how marvellously the problem of survival is simplified and transformed. We are no longer hampered by the facts of organic decay and dissolution. If an army is disbanded, its constituent organisms do not on that account cease to persist. If an organism dies, its constituent monads—the ultimate Reals—are unaffected save in so far as their relations to one another are concerned. The organism, as such, does not survive. The monads that built it up are set free, each with its own store of realised potentialities, each ready to enter into fresh relations with its fellows and acquire fresh stores of experience.

See, also, how the evolutionary process manifested in the upward curve of organic life is filled with rational and purposive significance. Increasing complexity is a necessary condition of advance in the realising of potentialities. Under the limitations of our present existence, each individual organism can climb but a tiny arc of the ascending curve. It follows that there must be a succession of organisms, and that there shall be a possibility of upward variations. This end is secured by the processes of generation and heredity on the one hand, and of decay and dissolution on the other. We have in these facts a justification of Nature when she is accused of being careful of the type and careless of the individual. Her seem-

ing carelessness diminishes as organisms rise in the scale of value and dignity. But Tennyson's lament will not cease to have its excuse, from a human standpoint, until there has come into being the perfect all-inclusive organism in which all the monads can find their full self-realisation—"the one, far-off, divine event." And thus, as Goethe long ago affirmed, though without grasping the individualistic bearings of his *aperçu*, death is a device of Nature for winning fuller life.

Such in barest outline is the turn I would give to the Leibnizian Monadology by accommodating it to the recent advances in biology.¹ I proceed to apply what I have advanced to the solution of the salient questions mooted in discussions on survival, chiefly concerning myself with those treated of by Mr Broad in the able article already alluded to.

The most obvious, and in some ways the most serious, difficulty raised against belief in survival is the failure of the departed to give any evidence of continued activities. I do not feel at liberty to claim aid from the spiritualists, since I cannot satisfy myself that their case is proven—though I keep an open mind. I retire on my Monadology. If the ultimate Reals of the universe are monads, their persistence is identical with that of the universe they constitute. The universe obviously persists; the monads, therefore, must also persist. Granted the monads, the difficulty reaches vanishing point.

But why the severance of communications? Well, it is only what we should naturally expect. A dominant monad loses the organism through and in which it has manifested itself to us. Its relations to us are drastically changed. Things cannot be as they were before. Let us take a case less drastic to help us on our way. A friend of mine has a fever, and I find him in delirium. The relations normally existing between the monads that constitute his brain are grievously disturbed, and he babbles to me long strings of the veriest nonsense. He is there in body, but I cannot really come into communication with him. Does this lead us to suppose that his ego—the dominant monad—has ceased to exist? If so, we should be needlessly faithless. For when the fever subsides, and the normal relations are restored, the dominant monad reasserts itself with all its realised potentialities in full and ordered play—communications are restored.

But suppose the injury to the brain were so severe that it took a permanent form, and my friend's mind never recovered its balance, why should I argue that the mere continuance of

¹ I may be permitted to refer for a fuller exposition to my essay, *Why Do We Die?* (Kegan Paul).

the ailment alters the fundamental features of the situation? The case still remains one of disturbed relations; and I have a right to believe the same dominant monad persists, prepared to manifest itself if ever the conditions become favourable. Indeed, there may be lucid intervals in which I catch a glimpse of it from time to time.

I take it that the dissolution of the organism is but an extreme case of this disturbance, bringing with it a corresponding difficulty in the re-establishing of communications. And I would venture to suggest to my spiritualist friends that on some such lines they may rationally explain the frequent puerility of the "communications" they receive; though I would have them note that, to gain full advantage of the explanation, they should be Monadists!

The minds of certain people are sadly troubled by the haphazardness of births and deaths. On the basis of Dualism I should be in sympathy with them, for I should then have to think that "souls," as distinct from bodies, were dependent for their existence on what appears to be the caprice of circumstance or of irrational human passions. But as a Monadist my burden is lightened. The monads are already in existence, and they persist; it is only their combinations that are thus decided. The future is always open to them for new combinations and fresh adventures. The main thing for them is the realising of their potentialities, and this is accomplished chiefly by having part and lot in the fortunes of organisms. How these organisms come into being is a further question not now before us.

Another objection urged against survival is based on the growing conviction that there is continuity of organic development between human beings and the animal world. If men survive (it is argued), then animals must survive; and we shall have the next world peopled with monkeys, earwigs, lice, bacteria, and all the rest. Now even taking their own ground, I feel that those who raise this objection must be woefully lacking in imagination. Professor James, in a delightfully characteristic passage of his lecture on Immortality, has dealt with such people according to their deserts. Nevertheless, it may comfort them to know that there is healing in Monadology. An earwig, for example, is no longer to be looked upon as a true individual. Its body is built up of myriads of monads in fruitful co-operation, learning their tasks, storing experience. The organism is merely a means to an end, and does not get into the next world at all. So with the monads in the brain of a Shakespeare. Everywhere the same kind of

beings are striving towards fuller life, though they are in enormously diverse stages of development.

“Striving to be man, the worm
Mounts through all the spires of form.”

Interpret Emerson's thought in the light of Monadology, and you will have the keystone to a philosophy of evolution.

This same thought can guide us through the perplexities caused by attempts to estimate probabilities of survival in accordance with high or low place in a scale of comparative worth. Confusion arises (says Mr Broad) “from failure to distinguish between persistence and personal identity.” As a Monadologist, I put the case differently. I assert that the confusion arises from failing to distinguish between organisms and monads. If organisms are dissolved and monads persist, the argument is void of force that would give an earwig less chance of surviving than a man. It is beside the mark to urge that the earwig runs an allotted course before its death, whereas a man dies before he has accomplished all he is good for. Even on ordinary grounds, a new question would arise as to the fate of an earwig that had *not* run its allotted course. But from a monadological point of view the difficulty no longer exists. We fix our attention on the realisation of potentialities in the monads; and we hold that until realisation is attained there is need of new conditions and continued activities. The comparative worths of organisms are to be gauged by their helpfulness as means to the development of monads. Their survival chances do not enter into the count save from a Darwinian point of view. The teleological aspect of the doctrine of “the survival of the fittest” stands out in clearest prominence.

The distinction between the primary unity of the monad and the secondary unit of the organism affords a clue for a rational explanation of even the most startling phenomena of abnormal psychology. The harmony of a healthy system may be disturbed by loss of connection between the parts. The unity of the organism is impaired, as in cases of aphasia, aboulia, and the like. Or a monad may be unable to regulate and control the activities of those of its fellows over whom normally it exercises authority. The most serious cases, of course, are those in which the dominant monad is overpowered by other centres which unduly assert themselves.

Consider the case of a cheerful, amiable man who, in consequence of some injury to the brain, is changed into a morose, vindictive character, or, at times, into a homicidal maniac.

It is plain that not only is there profound disturbance of normal relations between certain parts of the organism, but also an emergence of tendencies hitherto inhibited. Are we therefore to suppose that the cheerful, amiable man was boiling with malice and homicidal tendencies even during the period of his mental health? Mr Broad affirms that "a theory which has to go to these lengths may safely be rejected." And I am in accord with him. And yet, setting aside all sentiment, we are compelled to admit that if an amiable man does actually become a homicidal maniac the conditions must in some way have been there all along. How escape the dilemma? Monadology comes to our aid. The original dominant monad, in such a case, does not undergo the violent moral change which is exhibited by the behaviour of the organism. It is simply overpowered. The accident has caused such a change of relations between various centres that some unruly monad gets the upper hand—just as a mob-leader works havoc when the police force is thrown out of gear. For we cannot suppose that in such a multitude of centres as go to the making of a human organism, there will be none on low planes of moral development. Common experience recognises that there are slumbering in us the passions of the tiger and the ape. Who among us is not often startled by the strange thoughts that wander through the brain? Different controlling centres may be alternately active, and each of them may be but in small degree responsible for the conduct of its fellow. A new light is thus thrown on the whole subject of responsibility in mental disease.

What yeoman service we get from Monadology in explaining the phenomena of automatic writing, mediumship, split personality, and the like! The famous Sally Beauchamp, though she continues to be a person of intensely interesting mental constitution, ceases to be one whom we must deem fundamentally abnormal. We can say of her that her normal ego had less than average control over other centres; and we can rationally justify the treatment adopted by her doctors who brought reinforcements, as it were, to the aid of the centre they decided to favour. It would be the merest folly to think that we thus gain a full solution of such mental abnormalities; but we can at least have the satisfaction of feeling that we are on a track trodden by biologists and by those among the philosophers who have anticipated the latest speculations of the biologists.

Two problems of peculiar difficulty, prominent in the case of Sally Beauchamp, demand consideration—that of conscious-

ness, and that of memory. And first of consciousness. Sally Beauchamp claimed to be co-conscious with one of her other "personalities." This suggests the natural question, Why it is that, if our organisms are composed of conscious centres, each with its own stream of experience, the dominant monad we call our ego is isolated and cannot share those experiences? It will clear our thoughts in this regard if we recur to the parallel of a general and his army. The general controls his tens of thousands of conscious individuals; but he cannot enter directly into the consciousness of any single one of them. His means of communication with them are limited to the making of signs which are interpreted by them, and so render possible the unity which is necessary to the existence of an army. Is it really hard to apply this to the monads in an organism? True, there is no elaborate system of artificial signs possible. Nevertheless, the monads do, as a matter of fact, make their wants and feelings known to one another. I am hungry—that is to say, certain cells of my body want nourishment. They do actually let me know their condition, and clamour till they are satisfied. I have a toothache, and my "sympathy" with the nerve is very acute!

But it may be asked, What of the cases where consciousness seems to lapse altogether, as in case of sleep, fainting, and the like? In answer to this I am prepared to grant that the consciousness even of an individual monad may have gaps, for I can see that if there is to be active consciousness there must be stimulus. If the conditions are ever such that adequate stimulus is lacking, there will be a state of unconsciousness. But this fact in no way impairs my belief in the persistence of the monad. A bell does not sound till it is struck; but the bell and its potentialities abide. During sleep, the dominant monad is partially, possibly sometimes completely, withdrawn from those stimuli which arouse it to consciousness. But other monads in the organism are awake and keep to their tasks. The whole organism is never asleep, or vital functions would cease. On awaking, those relations are again established which put the dominant monad into communication with other centres, and the stream of conscious experience again flows on. What happens at death we cannot say, because we do not know what new relations may be established. Nevertheless (*pace* Mr Broad), a Monadologist can argue from the case of sleep to that of the greater change of relations involved in the dissolution of the organism. The monad, as an ultimate Real, persists, with all its potentialities, and will respond to such stimuli as are appropriate to its

condition and phase of development. The stream of experience will again flow on.

How about memory? Ah, that is indeed a big question! I must refer my reader, for a general answer, to Bergson, who distinguishes two kinds of memory—that connected with the organism, and therefore partial, fallible; and that connected with the true life, and therefore complete, infallible: with the modification, however, that for the vague concept of the *élan vital* I substitute that of persisting centres of the will-to-live—the monads. There is no difficulty in seeing that organic memory must be partial and fallible; for it depends on the maintenance of certain relations between the constituent monads, and if these relations are disturbed or dissolved there is lapse of memory. The case of monad-memory is much more puzzling.

If my ego, my conscious thinking, willing, feeling centre, is a persisting monad which has gone through an untold number of experiences in an untold past, how is it that I have no memory of those experiences? Here again I must refer my readers to another thinker, Samuel Butler, and ask them to study his brilliant work on *Unconscious Memory*. Again, however, I must venture to qualify my acceptance of the doctrine to which I refer by emphasising the individuality and identity of the persisting centres of experience. Unless there be continuity in the being of the learner, I do not see how learning is conceivable.

By way of general statement of my own view on this subject, I may venture this much. If we grant the persistence of the monad, we can allow the persistence of its realised potentialities. Nothing it has learnt can be forgotten. But I do not think it necessary, as a corollary, that there must be continued conscious memory of all the specific experiences which served to realise the potentialities. On the other hand, it does seem to follow that, should occasion require, and the conditions be fulfilled, the conscious grasp of any specific experience would be revived. Such a view is in harmony with our present experience, and furnishes a basis for surmising what may be our lot when our organisms are dissolved. I need not enlarge on the consequences of the distinction between organic memory and monad memory, nor show how it applies to cases of lapses of memory, whether normal or abnormal. In the case of the organism, connections are at fault, as when we try to remember a name, and actually "feel" it eluding us. In the case of the monad, it is a question of lack of stimulus—a lack due to the imperfection of the relations set up among the monads which constitute

the brain. The total compounded memory of the organism is very different from that of the individual monad, and the complex character of its conditions must be kept in full view if we are to avoid confusion of thought—more especially if we are probing the secrets of what happens after death.

I claim, then, that, in all the cases above considered, the philosophy of the Monadologist “works,” and that, in so far as it “works,” it is on the side of the probabilities of survival. It remains to glance at certain wider questions which more definitely transcend the sphere of science, and raise issues appealing largely to the moral sense.

“The world,” says Mr Broad, “as it appears to common sense offers no reasons . . . for human survival.” He supports his statement by an analysis of the *causes* which have led to a belief in survival. With the general course and the results of that analysis I am quite in agreement. I also consent to the conclusion that none of the *causes* treated of amount to *reasons*. And yet I am not satisfied that the whole truth of the matter has thus been attained. I would rather appeal to the *totality* of human experience as interpreted by common sense. I cannot help suspecting that the various *causes* at work, taken *en masse*, betoken the influence of a deeper cause, which is also a reason, and which underlies them all. The really big fact surely is the Will-to-live—the fact that is at the centre of systems so different as the evolution hypothesis of Darwin and the philosophy of Schopenhauer. This Will-to-live does not result as an induction from experiences, primitive or advanced; it is an elemental force. It asserts itself in the lowest organisms as in the highest. Apart from negligible abnormalities, it is perennial, universal. This Will-to-live it is that I believe to be the background, the source, of all the causes which are so inconclusive as reasons. Is there not a strong probability that a force so elemental, so all-pervading, must have some positive outcome that shall be equal to the rôle it plays? A negative answer would seem to be impossible, save on the assumption that the Cosmos is founded on unreason. Monadology provides for a recognition of this mighty force. It starts with the monads as centres of the Will-to-live, and regards the whole evolutionary process as a means to the realisation of their potentialities. It thus enforces and rationalises the dictates of common sense. Materialism and Dualism can, indeed, suggest doubts which in some degree lessen the probability. Neither of these philosophies, however, has established a right to hold the field.

Mr Broad also concludes that the ethical arguments have

no bearing on the probabilities—that they may “simply be dismissed as irrelevant wherever they occur.” Is not this too sweeping? As a matter of fact certain conscious centres have attained to self-consciousness. And it is precisely in these highest types that the cosmic process, here and now, has reached its worthiest consummation. These highly developed centres have elaborated the ethical arguments, have been impressed by their urgency, and have felt their poignancy most keenly when their natures have been touched to the finest issues. So plain is the leading that many impartial, thorough-going thinkers, like Mr M’Taggart, have concluded that the development of Persons is the goal of the cosmic drama. Is it safe to dismiss as irrelevant arguments that can be thus formulated and sustained? Can it be probable that they have no place in estimating probabilities?

Doubtless the dualism that distinguishes between the material and the immaterial factors has its advantages, but it purchases them at a great cost. It cleaves the world asunder with a hatchet. If there were no alternative, we should have to make shift with it as best we could—like the early astronomers, with the cycles and epicycles they were driven to multiply. But there is an alternative—Monadism. Why not give that a trial? It regards the whole world, organic and inorganic, as being built up of will-centres and their interactions. These ultimate Reals persist. They are ever learning, ever storing experience, ever realising fresh potentialities. Thus no values, ethical or other, can be lost. The resulting doctrine of the conservation of values lifts on to a higher plane the scientific postulates of conservation of matter and energy. Full weight can thus be given to the ethical arguments, because they are founded on the inmost nature of the beings who have framed them.

Contenting myself with this suggestion of wider reaches of thought on an immense subject, I close by restating my chief propositions. To set the material factors over against the immaterial as though they were fundamentally distinct, is not sound, and needlessly confuses the issues. Confusion is worse confounded when the physical organism is not seen to be a community of individuals. Monadology, biologically edited, wondrously simplifies the problem of survival.

J. EDWARD MERCER.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SANITY.

EDMOND HOLMES.

I HAD heard so much about the new science or would-be science of psycho-analysis that at last I determined to study it for myself. I began by reading a little book called *The Psychology of Insanity*, by Dr Bernard Hart. I found this book so interesting and suggestive and even (within limits) convincing, that I read and re-read it. And the more carefully I read it, the more it set me thinking.

Psycho-analysts claim that the science which they are elaborating will be useful for the treatment of mental disease. They might, I think, make a bolder claim for it than this. To cure disease is a good thing. To prevent disease is better. To secure good health is better still. If the psycho-analytic method can cure insanity, why should it not also be used for the higher purpose of securing sanity, in the more positive sense of that word? If it makes for psychiatry, for soul-healing, why should it not also make for psychotrophy, for soul-culture and soul-growth? Why should not the psychology of insanity form the basis of the psychology of sanity, the psychology of mental, moral, and spiritual health?

The latter science would have to be based, in part at least, on the former. If we would know what is normal, we must study departures from the norm. And the more flagrant the departure from the norm, the more deeply will it initiate us into the secret of normality. Such flagrant departures from the norm of mental health are offered by the phenomena of insanity, in the medico-legal sense of the word.

Insanity takes many forms. One of the commonest of these, and from the point of view of psychology the most significant, is what is known as "dissociation of consciousness." "A vast number of abnormal phenomena," says Dr Hart, "ranging from hallucination and delusion to . . . complicated

phantasy production . . . are to be regarded as examples of dissociation." What do we mean by dissociation of consciousness? "We mean," says Dr Hart, that "the mind has lost that homogeneity which is the ideal of the normal personality, and has become disintegrated into more or less independent portions, each pursuing its own course and development without reference to the welfare of the whole." "This disintegration," continues our author, "invariably owes its existence to the presence of a conflict." By a conflict he means an internal conflict, a civil war in the kingdom of the mind. The parties to this internal conflict are, on the one hand, the personality as a whole; on the other hand, what is known to psychology as a *complex*.

What is a complex? Dr Hart defines it as "a system of connected ideas with a strong emotional tone and a tendency to produce action of a definite character." Dr Maurice Nicoli, in his book on *Dream Psychology*, says that "when a mass of ideas and emotions collect round a nucleus in the mind, a system is formed which will react in a particular way to incoming stimuli," and adds, "This system is called a complex."

A complex is not a thing to be ashamed of. If we had not, each of us, many complexes, we should be less than human; or rather, we should fall below the level of organic life. A complex is nothing more nor less than a sub-centre of the soul's life, analogous (within limits) to a nerve-centre in the body, or to a centre of local government in a well-organised state. A hobby, as Dr Hart points out, is a particular variety of complex. So is each of the many sub-selves which each of us is aware of in himself—the domestic self, the social self, the professional self, the commercial self, the artistic self, the religious self, and so on. If a man is deeply interested in a subject of study, a corresponding complex is formed in his mind. If he takes up a cause with energy and enthusiasm, such as the emancipation of woman, social reform, educational reform, the remedying of an evil or an injustice, a mass of ideas and emotions will collect round this centre of interest, and a complex will be formed. Different men take up different hobbies, different subjects of study, and different causes, and the corresponding complexes are therefore not strictly analogous to the nerve-centres of the body, which are common to all men. This differentiation is due to the fact that the constitution of the soul is far more complicated and much further removed from finality than that of the body, and that consciousness extends indefinitely the environment of the race, whereas circumstances limit the environment of the individual, with

the result that no two individuals have exactly the same environment or the same opportunities for the formation of complexes. But however great may be the diversity of complexes, however much they may vary from man to man, the fact remains that complexes are sub-centres of the soul's life.

How then does a complex cause insanity? By drawing to itself more than its share of the man's thoughts and emotions, and so impairing the inward harmony of his soul. More especially is this the case when the complex has a morbid origin, when it has no right to be a sub-centre, as, for example, when a man broods over a wrong which has been done to him, or feels remorse for a crime which he has committed.¹ The loss of inward harmony need not amount to insanity. There are few men whose inward harmony is even approximately perfect. Hypertrophy of a complex is a very common phenomenon. A man may easily ride a harmless hobby to death. His devotion to a worthy cause may amount to fanaticism. He may overdo a good habit (such as economy), till it becomes a bad habit (such as stinginess). He may become a monomaniac, a man of one idea, of one absorbing interest, of one cankering grievance. And yet he may be far removed from the insanity which necessitates confinement and restraint. He is, however, on the road to that goal; and if he does not keep himself in hand, he may possibly arrive at it. When hypertrophy of a complex is carried so far that what ought to be (at most) a mere sub-centre of a man's life becomes, whether permanently or temporarily, *the* centre, or, in its attempt to become *the* centre, disintegrates the man's personality, then we have insanity, in the strict sense of the word. In other words, when a complex becomes a centre of rebellious, and therefore disruptive tendency, when it provokes a civil war which will lead to its dividing with the ruling self the kingdom of the man's life, and may even, in extreme cases, end in its forcibly usurping the throne, then its victim is said to be insane; and for his own sake, as well as for the sake of his neighbours, he has to be interned.

According to Dr Hart, the conflict which produces insanity is, as a rule, one between "primitive instinct" and "herd

¹ Complexes may perhaps be classified as *essential, desirable, useful, harmless, and morbid*. A morbid complex, if not duly controlled, may easily become malignant. But there is no complex which will not, if hypertrophied beyond measure, become first morbid and then malignant, and therefore a menace to the sanity of the soul.

instinct." Dr Freud, the founder of psycho-analysis, resolves all primitive instinct into sex-instinct; but few of his followers go as far as this. I doubt if the problem of conflict is quite so simple as Dr Hart seems to think. The soul is a complex of many complexes; and the civil war which sometimes afflicts it may be expected to have many causes and take many forms. It is not easy to say where primitive instinct ends and herd instinct begins. And it is possible to exaggerate the importance of the part that herd instinct plays in man's life. Dr Hart says that "from it (herd instinct) the tendencies generally ascribed to tradition and education derive most of their power." It would, I think, be equally correct to say that from tradition and education the tendencies sometimes ascribed to herd instinct derive much of their power. In any case, it is well to remember that in our complicated modern society each of us belongs to many herds. There is the family herd, for example, the class herd, the clan herd, the professional herd, the national herd, the human herd. And any one of these, if its claims are unduly insistent, may give rise to a complex which will upset the balance of one's life.

On the whole, then, it is safer to say, in general terms, that the normal cause of insanity is a conflict between a usurping, self-assertive sub-self, and the self which ought to rule. Even the enthusiasm of humanity, if the enthusiast brings too much self into it—if, for example, he insists on reforming the world in his own particular way,—may become a rebellious and dissociative complex, and may even in the last resort give rise to actual insanity. So may devotion to God, if it is allowed to degenerate into religious fanaticism, or into undue concern for one's own individual salvation. Selfishness, in the sense of absorption in a narrow and ever-narrowing self, is of the essence of insanity. The rebellious complex, if we may for the moment personify it, thinks only of itself and subordinates to its own imagined interests the well-being of the whole personality. And this inward selfishness, this claim of the subordinate part to dominate the whole of the man's life, has its counterpart in outward selfishness, in callous indifference to the claims and interests of others and to the demands of social life. Speaking of those who have become insane, Dr Hart says: "The patients have lost the gregarious instincts of the normal man, and the sanctions of traditional conduct have no longer any significance for them. In the milder cases this shows itself as a loss of interest in the affairs of their fellows, a tendency to be solitary and unsociable, an

atrophy of their affections for friends and relations, and an indifference to the ordinary conventions of society. In the advanced cases the change is much more marked, and the mind is completely withdrawn from participation in the life of the herd. The code of conduct imposed by convention and tradition no longer regulates the patient's behaviour, and he becomes slovenly, filthy, degraded, and shameless."

The conflict between the rebellious complex or sub-self and the self which ought to rule does not always, or even often, lead to actual insanity. When that is the issue of the conflict, what has happened? The ruling self has not been strong enough to enforce its authority. This is the answer which common sense and psycho-analysis unite in giving. Psycho-analysis sets forth the answer in its own peculiar notation. "In cases of insanity," says Dr Hart, "homogeneity ['which is the ideal of normal personality'] has disappeared because the mind contains elements which are incompatible with each other, and dissociation has arisen as a means of avoiding the storm and stress which the warring of these mutually hostile elements would otherwise inevitably produce." Is not this equivalent to saying that the ruling self has so far yielded to the pressure of the rebellious sub-self as to consent to divide the kingdom with it, just as in history we sometimes read of a monarch who ended a rebellion by allowing the rebel leader either to share the central authority with him or to become ruler of part of his realm. The monarch who could do this was a weak ruler who had never been firmly seated on the throne; and the ruling self which allows a rebellious sub-self to usurp its authority, either in part, as in cases of dissociation, or, as sometimes happens, in full, proves its incapacity by its failure to put down the rebellion against its lawful rule.

The antidote to civil strife in a community is twofold—to remove legitimate grievances, and to strengthen the central authority. Should it not be the same in the soul? Should not our aim be to relax the pressure of tradition and convention on primitive instinct or on any other natural instinct so far as that pressure is injurious and provocative, and at the same time to strengthen the authority of the ruling self? Psycho-analysts, if I may judge from Dr Hart's book, are more concerned with relaxing pressure than with strengthening authority. "It is possible," says Dr Hart, "that the future may demonstrate the fault to be, not in the tendency to dissociation, but in the nature of the conflict which has provoked it. The only remedy would then lie in altering

one or another of the antagonists so that incompatibility no longer existed. The primitive instincts cannot presumably be altered, and the attack would therefore have to be directed against the traditions and codes which obtain their force from the operation of herd instinct. . . . It is at least conceivable that our present complacent assurance that every individual must live and act within the arbitrary limits assigned by conventional and purely artificial standards of conduct, or else be segregated from society, may be fallacious and inimical to the best development of the race. It is possible that insanity, or a part of insanity, will prove to be less dependent upon intrinsic defects of the individual than on the conditions in which he has to live, and the future may determine that it is not the individual who must be eliminated but the conditions which must be modified." Here our author goes perilously near to suggesting that the only way to prevent insanity is to make concessions to primitive instinct. Not a word is said about the need for strengthening the central authority, the ruling self. Yet, unless this is done, the policy of indulging primitive instinct, by relaxing the pressure to which traditions and codes have subjected it, can lead to nothing but general demoralisation.

The truth is that when we are dealing with problems of insanity we are too ready to assume that what is not actually or approximately insane is sane, and that, if dissociation of personality can be avoided, all is well. I doubt if we shall ever really master the psychology of insanity until we have materially widened the scope of the idea of sanity; until we have risen to the conception of perfect or ideal, as distinguished from normal, sanity; or rather, until we have realised that in the world of life and growth the ideal is the norm. Between actual insanity and perfect sanity, between disintegration of personality and perfect homogeneity or inward harmony, there are many intervening stages, which partake in varying degrees of disharmony, of want of sanity. If we could find a remedy for these shortcomings we should have made the best possible provision against the outbreak of insanity, which is the natural goal of mental and spiritual disharmony—a goal which the latter may never reach, but towards which it necessarily tends. The problem of securing sanity covers and far overlaps the problem of preventing (and curing) insanity; and it is to the former problem that the psychologist should give his closest attention and his deepest thought. Let him by all means continue to study what is morbid and abnormal—it will have much to teach him,—but let him add to this the study of the

conditions under which sanity, in the fullest sense of the word, is attainable—the sanity of inward harmony, of radiant health.

I have said that for the cure of the civil strife which we call insanity two things are needed—the redress of grievances by the removal of injurious pressure, and the strengthening of the central authority. The two remedies are really one. To redress grievances is to strengthen the central authority. What causes the growth of a morbid complex is, as a rule, either illegitimate pressure, or legitimate pressure carried too far. In the latter case, which is the more common, the source of the pressure is undue regard for tradition and convention, the authority of which is accepted as full and final instead of as partial and provisional. In other words, the source of the pressure is the weakness of the ruling self, which, led astray by the desire for finality, leans exclusively on tradition and convention, instead of trying to walk, in part at least, by its own inward light. And the effect of the pressure which it exerts is to increase its own weakness. For repression, when carried too far, starves and stunts natural tendency, with the result that, if the pressure is evenly distributed, growth is arrested, and if it is unevenly distributed, certain tendencies only being selected for repression, growth becomes inharmonious and one-sided, and balance and symmetry are lost. But whatever tends to arrest or distort the growth of the soul must needs weaken the central authority; for the ruling self is the whole personality, just as in a well-ordered commonwealth the whole community, acting through a hierarchy of administrative nerve-centres, is the state.

If, then, the relaxation of injurious pressure is to be accompanied by the strengthening of the central authority, our aim must be, not so much to cure this or that morbid complex, as to secure the well-being of the whole personality by fostering mental and spiritual growth. It is when an organism is making vigorous growth that the inward harmony of its various vital parts is most nearly perfect; for then all the parts are functioning with one end in view, that of furthering the growth of the whole organism; and as they draw to themselves all the rising sap of the organism's life, there is no opportunity for morbid sub-centres to establish themselves at the expense of the health and harmony of the community. It is to the organism as a whole that the various parts owe allegiance. But what is the organism? The process of growth alone can answer this question. What the organism will be when its process of growth (if healthy and

unimpeded) is complete, that it really is. Therefore the parts owe allegiance to the organism, not as it is at the passing moment, but as it will be when it has reached its maturity. In other words, they are sustained and animated and kept in harmony with one another by devotion to a common ideal.

It is the same with the human soul. But there is a difference between the growth of the soul and the growth of any physical organism. The organism does arrive at maturity. It has its moment of consummation. But the growth of the soul goes on, or should go on, for ever. The potentialities of the soul are limitless, and the process of realising them is a veritable adventure into the infinite. If we would attain to sanity, the sanity of spiritual health, we must pursue that adventure to its limitless limit. We must always, and at all costs, resist the lure of finality. Devotion to an unattainable ideal alone can keep us sane. If we forswear the service of the ideal and try to content ourselves with finite ends, the worse type of dissociation, dissociation of the actual from the ideal self, may be our doom.

Let us take the case of a man who is neither a criminal nor a lunatic, but who leads a sordid, selfish, self-indulgent, immoral life—an unfaithful husband, an unkind father, a churlish neighbour, a grasping and exacting creditor, a shifty and evasive debtor, unsympathetic, uncharitable, recognising no obligation which is not legally defined, taking no interest whatever in the deeper issues of life. Such a man is sane enough, as the lunacy laws measure sanity. But he is not sane in the deeper sense of the word. He has not attained to spiritual health. What is wrong with him? No civil strife mars the harmony of his mean, narrow, ill-spent life. His being, such as it is, is all of a piece. But his very harmony is disharmony. His very sanity is insanity. He has no more attained to wholeness than has a stunted, diseased, misshapen tree. It is true that there is no rebellious, dissociative complex to upset his inward balance. Yet that balance has been completely and, as it seems, irretrievably upset. For his whole personality, or what passes for such, has degenerated into a rebellious, dissociative complex; and what it is in rebellion against, what it is dissociating itself from, is his own real or ideal self.

Or let us take the case of the miser, a familiar figure in the annals of the human race. Here we have a typical example, not of a personality degenerating into a morbid complex so much as of a morbid complex overrunning the entire field of consciousness and becoming, apparently, the whole man. The miser is a

monomaniac, a man of one ignoble but all-absorbing interest. Yet he seldom qualifies for the madhouse. The explanation of this is that, owing to the completeness of the victory won by the complex over the personality, the former is able to annex and use for its own purposes all the psychical machinery of the latter, including its power of reacting to a social environment. In other words, the sub-self has compelled the man, the ruling self, to identify himself with it and devote himself to its service. Hence his apparent sanity. Yet, in the deeper sense of the word, he is insane, and insane in the highest degree. For, in the act of absorbing into itself the whole of his normal personality, the miser in him has dissociated itself, and therefore dissociated him, from his real or ideal self. It has seated itself, a lawless usurper, on the throne of his spirit; and its reign, though orderly to outward view, is really a prolonged riot of insanity. For sanity is health; and health comes with vigorous and harmonious growth. But the triumph of a rebellious complex means that all the forces which make for the growth of the soul are diverted into one narrow channel, with the result that the process of growth—which is nothing if not harmonious and many-sided—is forcibly arrested, and degenerative insanity takes its place.

These are extreme cases. Yet something akin to this is happening to each of us when and so far as we succumb to the lure of finality, and give up that adventure into the infinite which is of the essence of spiritual growth. Self-integration, which is the true antidote to insanity, in every sense of that word, is to be achieved only by realising the limitless possibilities that are wrapped up in the human embryo, by growing into oneness with that soul of all things which is the true self of each of us. The goal is unattainable. Yet to pause in the pursuit of it is to bring disharmony, or the menace of disharmony, into one's life. The infinite in man is the lawful ruler of all his parts and powers and passions; and it is rebellion against that ruler, it is dissociation of personality, to accept any actual self as the true man.

In conclusion: the secret of sanity is devotion to the infinite and the ideal. This is the lesson which psycho-analysis, so far as I have studied it, has taught me. Dissociation—disintegration of personality—makes for insanity. If we would be sane, then, we must take the opposite path, the path of self-integration, the path which leads to wholeness of spirit, to inward harmony. If inward harmony is to be achieved, the whole personality must assert its supremacy over each of the subordinate centres, and so prevent the hypertrophy of any of

these, as well as the outgrowth of morbid sub-centres, which cannot establish themselves as long as the legitimate sub-centres are energising vigorously under the direction and in the service of the whole. By the whole personality we mean, not the actual average man, "the finished and finite clod," but "the light that lighteth every man," the ideal or universal self. The ideal self asserts its supremacy by becoming the goal of an eternal process of growth, the end of an endless quest. So long as that quest continues, so long as the soul continues to grow, so long as the man lives in the infinite, the subordinate centres of his being will fulfil their several functions in obedience to the will of the self-evolving, self-revealing whole, and therefore in perfect harmony with one another. This is sanity, in the fullest sense of the word, the sanity of organic wholeness, of immortal youth.

EDMOND HOLMES.

THE ATHENÆUM.

RIPÆ ULTERIORIS AMORE.

HAROLD P. COOKE.

I.

I HAVE decided, with much hesitation and at the risk of much misunderstanding in more than one sense of the term, to attempt some account, in the cause of philosophy, of certain intimate and secret experiences as bearing upon the problem of what has been called immortality or, more correctly, survival of death. For the reader who suspects my motive or is radically unsympathetic, prepared to condemn me offhand as fanciful, credulous, or foolish, I would beg him to read me no further. No one is anxious to obtrude a disclosure of a serious and delicate character, unless he is honestly convinced it may have a real import for others, and is confident the personal note, so unpleasant in a sense as it is, so inseparable withal from his subject, will be granted a generous indulgence. Moreover, I have nothing to tell but "the greeting of spirit with spirit."

II.

I must preface my remarks by recording (I write from notes made at the time) that on a certain Monday this year,¹ turning home about half-past four, a feeling of unutterable gloom and blank depression came suddenly upon me. There was nothing in my immediate experience, my physical condition, the events of the day, to which I could properly attribute it. It came—and I knew not why. In an hour and a quarter, however, news was brought me by a cousin of his of the death of my dearest, most intimate friend. I was quite unaware of his illness; I did not even know of his whereabouts; indeed, I was under the impression he was not

¹ I write upon the festival of victory, July 19, 1919.

at that time in this country. At first, as the common phrase goes, I could not realise the fact; I said to myself that I could not believe it; I was simply as one that is dazed or has met with some terrible physical injury. I wrote some necessary letters; I said I must go on with my work, for surely he himself would have wished it; I went through some business in mechanical manner; I took up a volume of Tennyson's poems, and opened upon "In Memoriam." This mood of a blank amazement continued for twenty-four hours, so long as I was unoccupied or was left alone with myself. The following evening, however—and I hope it will not appear strange or impertinent in me to say so—I asked him to give me strength, I besought him to cheer and encourage me. A new feeling of peace supervened—of a peace that seemed almost joy. This was not, it soon appeared, to endure. The next evening it had faded away; and I returned to the stanzas of "In Memoriam," now earnestly, now fitfully, perusing them. And after a time I said, "Thou wilt love and remember and understand." By way of explaining the words I can only suppose they came into my mind from my having, some years before, put together a copy of verses, in which, as I think, they occurred. I caught the reply, "I will." But of this I will say no more, as being open at least to the suspicion of being "subjective" in origin, owing to its being the answer I looked for and, some would consider, invented, and also its not bearing on it beyond any reasonable doubt a unique, indefinable character. The following evening, however, I returned to the poem once more. I read without manifest pain, till (as good or bad fortune would have it, and I count it the greatest good fortune) I came on the terrible stanza:—

"I watch thee from the quiet shore;
Thy spirit up to mine can reach;
But in dear words of human speech
We two communicate no more."

This stanza had long appeared to me by far the most poignant in the poem, which, viewed as a whole in its substance as distinct from its language and style, I had ever considered as very unequal. I could scarcely feel any real interest in the numerous passages touching upon science and creeds (to me) long outworn; nor, again, was the author's philosophy (if, indeed, such a term could be used) profound or in parts comprehensible. How different it was with this stanza! For surely the poet has set down what we cannot but, most of us, feel in the loss of our intimate friends as the heaviest

of our personal burdens, so distressing, so appalling to the mind:—

“He placed our lives so far apart,
We cannot hear each other speak.”

I was seized with unspeakable dismay; I said to myself that I would take up the challenge; if I am to bring out the whole matter, I asked him in tones half-aloud to speak to me yet once again “in dear words of human speech.” I poured forth my whole soul to him, little guessing how my wish would be answered. From a feeling of reverence, perhaps, or as borrowing poetical language, I addressed him throughout as “thou,” with a certain grave choice of my phrases, like one upon some great mission. It was then that I first understood the meaning of Myers’s phrase, “That mingling of emotions, which makes the utmost ardour of worship and love.”¹ My monologue or meditation was suddenly broken in upon by two definite and piercing words, cutting in—shall I put it?—upon it. These words were, exactly, “Cheer up!” How can I describe this experience—like none that had ever befallen me save that of the previous evening? While I could, of course, repeat the mere words and say them again to myself, I tried and have tried ever since to repeat or recapture their quality; but I cannot produce an experience even remotely resembling that answer. I was startled out of myself. It had an unmistakable character, a “note” or a “tone” of its own, to which the whole compass of language (be it common, scientific, metaphysical) appears to be simply unequal. Shall I say that the accents were “difficult” or “struggling” or “broken” or “hard-won”? Shall I say they were “heard” or “unheard”? They bore no resemblance whatever, in the language of everyday life and of science, so full of metaphysical assumptions, to speech apprehended by sensible organs, nor, again, to those myriad fancies that are said to “career” or to “run through the mind.” I do not know how I can put it, so as to convey some impression to the reader, save by adopting the current phraseology and saying they were not, as the term goes, “external”; they seemed “in one’s inmost soul,” “closer than breathing,” as the poet has it, “and nearer than hands and feet.” I may, perhaps, add that the words were not such as would have come to my lips—I had never been given to using them—and were, indeed, out of all harmony with my mood and my own terminology. I was afterwards very much struck and have since been reminded by others, who had a

¹ *Classical Essays*, p. 120.

close knowledge of my friend, that they were, on the contrary, such as he was himself fond of employing and might have been expected to use in a parallel context in this life.

III.

A later and similar experience, if what I have written be clear, I need not here comment upon, as involving much repetition and so appearing an unwarrantable intrusion of intimate and delicate matter—not that I should have the heart, sensitive, nevertheless, as I am to all that may readily be urged against bringing such secret experiences into the public view, to shrink from a further revelation, could anything thereby be added. For the cause of an ethical metaphysics (if the term may be allowed in this context) will override personal feeling and take for its field *all* experience. Moreover, an intimate friend, to whom I had opened the matter, observes to me in one of his letters—in speaking of what men call “death” (the new life or the *vita nuova*), and discoursing upon what he there calls with a certain grave aptness “the communion of souls”—that such experiences as those I am dealing with were not altogether unique. I should hope this is really the case; and it is, of course, perfectly notorious that many, who have had some exceptional experience, cannot for this or that reason or prejudice—a shrinking from the judgment of others, a sense of propriety, privacy, or delicacy—be brought to describe it (as it were) upon oath, or submit it to psychological study. And yet I do not now recall ever seeing any published account of experiences similar in substance. We read of the hearing of “voices,” but accepted accounts give no adequate hint of their character, nature, or quality. No inquiry has yielded their secret; they are *vox et præterea nihil*.

In the course of the next few weeks I put together the following verses, which, as I was engaged at that time in experiments in classical metres, fell naturally into hexameters. I venture to insert them here, in case they may convey to some readers a clearer conception of the facts:—

Animæ Dimidio.

They said that thou and I should speak no more as aforesaid
 One to the other, no more for awhile in accustomed accents
 Lightly commune, for late thou camest hardly from Egypt
 (Sultry Palestine saw thy pain, importunate Egypt)
 Home to perish, thy strength nigh-broken, awariéd wholly,
 Sore-stricken in body, in heart with fever faint to the failing.
 Could love thus bid adieu? Thus love's unquenchable ardour?
 Swiftly of thee my soul sought instant, intimate answer:

"I lov'd thee and love thee for ever. Dear heart, as aforetime,
 Speak, ah! speak but a word—but one word only." . . . Triumphant
 Then did thy spirit hear, made sweetly-imperious answer,
 Clear, vivid, heard yet unheard, in mine; deep virginal accents
 Bade me cherish sweet hope, as some deep-throated emotion,
 Bursting all barriers, breathes godlike. Hourly reviving
 Their tenor, ah! their tone no tongue can essay to recapture.

Yet to me cleaves thy voice. So bear I forth to that ampler
 Life, when in after-days mine earth's eternity closes,
 So rich a debt, so dear, that know thee human—immortal.

IV.

If such is the character of the facts, what, then, is the conclusion I drew? Immediately, without any reasoning, I attributed the experience of which I am speaking to the agency of my intimate friend, as I attribute the hearing of this or that speech in the course of my daily proceedings to this or that counsellor, companion, or stranger. And I think of it still in like manner, and that for the following reasons, which will, no doubt, already be clear:—the experience was unique in its kind, and I cannot myself reproduce it; it came in response to my question; it was alien from my own temper not only at all times, but then more especially; it was such as, on further reflection, I could see to be true to his custom and character, and so may be said to have borne the very mark of its origin upon it. I recall that vivid phrase of Newman's: "The heavens had opened and closed again."¹ But he spoke of one that had seen a ghost; and my supplication was not for a vision, which a "common-sense" theory of experience might ascribe to an "overwrought brain," a "distorted vision," a "hysterical temperament."

There are those who will doubtless consider the message with which I am dealing so brief or so trivial in substance, as telling us nothing (I conceive them to argue) of that life beyond what we call "death"—τὰ ἐκεί, as Plato would have it, the beyond, its conditions and prospects—as simply to be unworthy attention. But even should I grant this objection in a measure surpassing all reason (for do I not also conclude that "he loves and remembers and understands"?), I cannot see how it comes into the question, so far as my primary inference goes. The brevity, the plain insignificance of this or that particular answer are assuredly nothing whatever against the survival of its author or his power of communicating with us. I fear the generality of men, were they judged on a similar principle by what or by how much they tell us,

¹ *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, p. 118.

would be proved in the main non-existent. Moreover, had my friend so desired to assure me that he not only lived but could also communicate with me, *in that case*, I venture to ask, what more suitable words could he fashion? As Socrates says in a similar context, *μοὶ γέγονεν μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας*. And how could a thousand words or words of a different character have brought me more readily into the inference? Nay, words of a different character might simply have left me bewildered. Indeed, I should now maintain, upon careful and continued reflection, that no other terms in our tongue could have borne in upon my mind so unqualified and definite a judgment; and I gather up now in my memory tender, emotional occasions upon which they had leapt to his lips, in his college rooms in old days, and elsewhere. Like a good archer, he hit the mark; and I think of the shaft as love-sped. It brought me immediate satisfaction; I ceased my inquiry, I was filled with great joy. What else could I do but be grateful in a measure surpassing all language to my dearest, most intimate friend for this dearest, most intimate gift?

V.

Now I have no difficulty at all of a metaphysical character in accepting the conclusion to which I was brought. Discarding the distinction between "subject" and "object" (which has long, indeed, appeared to me groundless); supposing that what has been called, in the time-honoured language of the schools, the *summa rerum*, or totality of things (the Universe, as some men would have it), is wholly constituted or composed of all various lives or experiences; that each individual experience is unbroken, continuous, and changing; that my concrete experience or life in its widest, all-embracing significance is simply nothing else than myself; that "objects" or "things" there are none, but for each but one life, one experience; that I am in this sense (so to speak) *solus cum solo*, alone with myself; that this or that life or experience may determine or modify others; that what is called "space," for example, is an aspect or phase of the self—supposing all this, then I say that I see no difficulty at all in ascribing to my intimate friend the experience of which I have spoken. To draw out and defend these grave theses is, however, not possible here. I can but indicate my position, and there for the present I leave it.

HAROLD P. COOKE.

THE MIND OF ITALY.

SIGNORA RE-BARTLETT.

“Italia, il tuo nome è mistero
nel cuor dei tuoi figli. Che sei
nell’ alto consiglio di Dio?”

GIULIO SALVADORI.

IN all our talk of reconstruction, in the adjustment of frontiers and recasting of many institutions, economical as well as political, it is only a very small section of public opinion which is paying any attention to what we might call the psychological fruits of the war, or inquiring—in an international sense—what these may mean. Yet if the League of Nations is to have reality, if it is not to be merely a new piece of machinery serving the old diplomacy, surely it is imperative that in addition to the political organisation, a new intellectual and spiritual understanding should arise among the nations? In the belief that this is indeed one of the most basic needs of the moment, this article will be devoted to depicting something of the inner mind of Italy as it has been shown to one who has lived for many years in the country, including nearly the whole period of the war.

Of all our Allies, Italy is the one whom we have least understood, and apart from political considerations, viewing the alienation solely from a broader cultural standpoint, it is of the deepest interest to all of us to seek to bridge the presently existing gulf. We hear *ad nauseam* of the fruitful exchange achieved between England and Italy in other centuries, yet could we but reach to true interior understanding, the exchange to-day might be greater than in any period of the past. And to live exclusively in the past, and prefer the past, surely that indicates a kind of spiritual bankruptcy—the same as makes some adherents of revealed religion see in such revelation a denial rather than an assurance of further revelation? The law of life is growth—let us consider our relations with Italy for a moment in that light.

Although the present political conditions of the Italian people would appear to be conditions reflecting grave unrest,

for the judge who can see beneath the surface they offer indeed a greater psychological unity than anything at present existing in this country. We must not be misled by the violence attendant on the November elections: violence in politics and even in industrial troubles is a much more common thing in Italy than here. What we want to consider is the mind of the people, and that mind as revealed not merely in the party controversy of newspaper columns, but as more truly shown in intimate, unpremeditated utterance.

Thus revealed, there is no such gulf between any of the considerable parties of Italy as between, say, the extreme Imperialists and the Independent Labour Party of this country. For in using the expression "considerable parties" we deliberately exclude her Nationalists from any considerable part in Italy's political life. Despite all their clamour of the past five years, they conquered only two seats in the November elections, and this must be accepted by all as proof of what many already knew—namely, that for the great mass of the Italian people the imperial idea has no attraction whatsoever.

At the same time, if we have not got, save amongst an exiguous minority, anything that can be called imperialism in Italy, equally we have not got anything like an absolute intransigent pacifism. The main body of the Socialists—the "Official Socialists" as they are called, in contradistinction to the "Reformed Socialists"—are against war as a general principle, and were hostile even to the war just ended. But nearly all of them would admit opposition to invasion, as was shown after Caporetto, when only the marvellous rally of the whole Italian nation made possible the saving of the military situation. What we find, then, is that despite a greater violence of expression, due to southern blood, two extreme wings of thought which divide and dissipate energies in this country, in Italy are practically non-existent.

What the elections of last November showed as the net psychological result of the war was an enormous increase of strength to Catholicism and Socialism. The Socialists, who held only 48 seats in the last Parliament, hold now 156, with 30 Independent Socialists; and the Catholics have evolved an entirely new party, numbering 101 deputies. Many, looking at the Socialist returns, cry "Bolshevism!" and in view of the Catholic victories, "Reaction!" But surely since the two parties, with certain groups which each will attract, will almost balance one another, a more reasoned judgment would lead us to expect neither the one evil nor the other, but such vital conflict and interchange as give alike stability and advance.

Some are saying, and saying with a considerable modicum of truth, that the Socialist increase is due to the extreme disillusion felt by all Italians for the results of the Paris Conference. But this explanation would not cover the Catholic increase, for if the Vatican was neutralist, it would be quite untrue to say the same of many simple, independent Catholics. General Luigi Cadorna, to whom was entrusted the vast task of creating the Italian Army in 1914 and endowing it with a new discipline and tradition through the first two and a half years of desperate conflict, is the son of General Raffaele Cadorna, who precisely for his reputation of staunch Catholic no less than staunch patriot was chosen for the delicate task of wresting Rome from Pope Pius IX. in 1870. There were many Italian Catholics behind this war, interpreting and supporting it with the same quality of conviction as was recognisable amongst many of the spiritually minded in this country. These did not owe their success at the polls to neutralism. But the superficial observer would surely cry: "They owe it to being *organised*—they and the Socialists are the only strongly organised parties in the country!" This is true in the same degree as it is true that Socialism owes part of its victory to the disillusion created at Paris. But it is not the deepest truth: behind both assertions we must seek for a deeper reason if we wish to really understand the mind of Italy at this moment.

Just as behind Socialism there is something deeper than a bitter revolt of class consciousness, so behind Catholicism, especially the Catholicism of Italy, there is something far deeper than the organisation of a Church. The international outlook which distinguishes both bodies is something which finds constant nutriment in all the history, tradition, and environment of the Italian people. This is probably the reason why Socialism in Italy counts far more cultured men in its ranks than it does in this country. And it is certainly the reason why many who have broken entirely with the Catholic Church still retain as a part of their temperament and outlook much of that particular synthetic sense which is characteristic of Catholicism.

Now, these men who have broken with the Church are of course not those who have returned Catholic deputies to Parliament, yet, philosophically considered, they are struggling with their country's destinies at this moment in what one can only define as a Catholic manner. And this note of *Catholicism*, this balance of the ideal with the practical—as the believing Catholic would say, of the flesh with the spirit—is probably destined to be Italy's chief contribution to our international

politics in the time ahead. Neither her idealists nor her cynics are ever so extreme as ours—let us seek to realise this by some illustrations from the war.

The Treaty of London, which may be taken as representing the “cynics,” in so far as it sprang from the very conservative, certainly not idealistic mind of Baron Sonnino, was yet the most moderate document drawn up between the Allies. Even had it been applied in its full integrity, it would only have brought within the Italian Kingdom some 800,000 subjects of other race—considerably less than one million. And little Bohemia has been permitted to engulf $4\frac{1}{2}$ million, Poland 7 million, Jugo-Slavia $2\frac{1}{2}$ million, not to mention France’s occupation of the Saar Valley, or Britain’s newly declared Protectorate over Egypt. If Italy risked the wrath of the Slavs in claiming, under this treaty, one-third of their Dalmatian coast-line, yet her moderation prompted her to leave them two-thirds for their own expansion. And if the line of the Alps has obliged her to include some 200,000 Tyrolese within her northern frontier, this dire necessity is so far removed from any empty love of power that even Mazzini—the supreme defender of nationality—declared it to be both inevitable and right.¹ The Treaty of London has been so fiercely attacked in a certain section of the British Press that many people are quite ignorant of its true terms. But the facts are as here stated, and surely they suffice to show that the cynics of Italy are really considerably less cynical than many of their *confrères* in other countries.

And if we pass to a consideration of the idealists, we find them equally less extreme. As has been said, Italy has no absolute pacifists. And in the defence of such a claim, for instance, as that of Fiume, we find the whole country united, —not in approval of D’Annunzio, but in recognition of Italy’s

¹ See *Scritti editi e inediti di G. Mazzini*, pp. 216–217. (It is to be noted that in this passage Mazzini considers the district we now know as the Trentino and Upper Adige as one unit, and uses sometimes the one name and sometimes the other. But that he considered Italy’s right frontier could only be drawn by the Alps is clear.) “Ours—if ever land was ours—is the Trentino; ours to the further side of Bruneck, to the summit of the Rhetian Alps. . . . The natural character of the country, the olives, the southern fruits, the temperature, in contrast with the Valley of the Inn, all speak to us and to the foreign visitor of Italy. And Italian equally are the traditions and the habits—Italian the economical relations—Italian the natural lines of communication. And Italian is the language: out of 500,000 inhabitants, only 100,000 are of Teuton stock.” (These last figures show conclusively that Mazzini was considering this district as one whole, for the figures to-day, allowing for the increase of half a century, correspond very fairly: the population of the Upper Adige and Trentino, taken together, being now 600,000, of which 420,000 are Italians.)

right to Fiume, and of the many injustices of the Paris Conference from which the D'Annunzian expedition sprang. Some people in this country are misled into thinking there are two parties on this question because of the hatred felt by the Socialists for D'Annunzio and for the little Nationalist *clique* which stands noisily behind him. But ask any of these Socialists privately what they think of Fiume apart from D'Annunzio, and they will speak just as clearly of the indisputable Italianism of the city, and as bitterly of the injustice of the Allies, as any other section of the country. Bissolati, leader of the Reformed Socialists, in January 1919, at the moment when he was resigning his seat in the Cabinet through his disagreement with the Dalmatian policy, declared for the annexation of Fiume; Turati, leader of the Official Socialists, admitted in the Chamber the unquestionable Italianism of the city; Salvemini, the Socialist professor who edited the paper and led the party which throughout the war fought most ferociously against Baron Sonnino, has put the annexation of Fiume, city and port, on the programme of the group which he now leads in the new Parliament. So much for the idealists of Italy—one sees that in the final test they are no more deficient in practical grasp than the "cynics" are deficient in moderation.¹

But these are only political illustrations, and the best and deepest part of Italian life can no more be found in Press and

¹ In the face of this unity of feeling prevailing throughout the country, the large concessions which have been made by Italy in the hope of arriving at an amicable Fiume settlement are the more noteworthy. According to the last proposal (compromise of January 20), Italy renounces the claim to annexation and requires only that Fiume be a Free City. She abandons also the suburb of Susak to the Slavs, and agrees to the port and railway being international. In the event of acceptance, she cedes also a considerable slice of territory in Istria and nearly all the Dalmatian territory which would fall to her under the Treaty of London. The narrow corridor which she insists must connect Fiume with Italian territory is a simple guarantee to prevent the submersion of the city in the Jugo-Slav State which will surround it at every other point, and the consequent loss of its Italianism, for which so much is being sacrificed. A large section of our press and public would appear to require that Italy alone among the Allies should ask no guarantees, and should sacrifice all for nothing, though no greater Power is giving the lead in this line of reckless altruism. A truer note was struck by Mr Balfour in a speech at the Mansion House in October last, in which he reminded the Jugo-Slavs that they owed their whole freedom to-day to Italy's victorious struggle against Austria—a struggle which has cost nearly half a million of Italian lives. Mr Asquith's speech at Paisley on 5th February last is also noteworthy: he declared in this speech that he would be perfectly prepared to support every one of the conditions of the Treaty of London, and personally would be only too glad for it to go before the League of Nations to be subjected to the most minute and, if necessary, suspicious scrutiny by the impartial representatives of all the nations in it. (See *Manchester Guardian*, 6th February 1920.)

Parliament than the heart of England can be found at Westminster: let us come to some more intimate manifestations.

Until a year ago—and we shall come to the explanation of that exception presently—Italy was an easier country to live in than any other of our Alliance, because of the relative absence of war bitterness. This certainly was not due to any lesser degree of suffering: Italy's death list, in proportion to her population, was as heavy as our own, and her sufferings through poverty¹ and lack of raw materials were far greater. The foe she was mainly engaged in fighting—Austria—was, moreover, an age-long foe, with a terrible list of wrongs to her credit. Yet it is a fact that throughout all the years of the war, bitterness and blindness never really engulfed the soul of the Italian people. Their prisoners interned in Sardinia erected a statue to Dante with the inscription: "*Raised by Austrian prisoners in gratitude.*" And nothing like a Hymn of Hate distinguished the conversation of the ordinary person. It was as though unconsciously—certainly unconsciously—the mass of the people were imbued with something of that wisdom we find in the *Bhagavad Ghita* when, at the battle of Kurukshetra, Krishna urges his pupil, Arjuna, to *fight*, fight with all his might, but *without hatred*.

And behind this quite unusual tolerance, the attentive observer felt that what was speaking was the deep, ineradicable internationalism of the Italian people. Not that abstract internationalism, springing from creed or party, which fails inevitably in the hour of passion, but that which is rooted in the blood: internationalism which, in the case of Italy, has been learnt from long centuries of subjection as well as centuries of empire—so deeply learnt, so deeply absorbed, that there is little in human action which escapes her comprehension, and failure must be great indeed ere she cannot murmur over it: "*è umano.*"

This is the real heart of Italy—this tolerance which the partisan mind calls "slack"—this balancing of many elements which for the simpler Saxon spells jugglery, but which, in the Latin, is simply the catholic, universal habit of mind. *Vis-à-vis* to Germany, it is a quality which has made many in this country doubtful of the loyalty of Italy in the past five years, even as the same people are suspicious to-day of her plainly declared sympathies for Soviet Russia. Such people mistake

¹ Not too often can British readers be reminded of the remarkable computation made by the Hon. Luigi Luzzatti, ex-Minister of Finance. He has declared that when Italy entered the war in 1915 her entire capital was about equal to Great Britain's yearly income.

for a political attitude what in many cases is simple humanity. Yet if we could but abstract ourselves sufficiently from the defamatory campaign of certain Slavophil papers, it ought to tell us something that Italy at this moment is feeding several thousands of the starving children of Vienna—has taken them into her own homes—is treating them like her own. And if we remember the many foreign colonies which have lived happily within the boundaries of the Italian peninsula for centuries—Greeks in Otranto, Catalanians in Sardinia, Albanians in Calabria, and French in Piedmont—it is hard to believe that when artificial incitement has subsided, Slavs and Tyrolese will find themselves in any different case. Rather, remembering the fiercely tenacious sense of nationality in such a people as the French, do we find exhaustive reassurance in recalling even a single instance like that of Fenestrelle, the little town of Piedmont which up to 1871 jealously preserved the right to draw up its municipal acts in French, but which on the 21st of March of that year solemnly decided to substitute Italian—“*l'italien qui est la langue de notre patrie*”! Italy, indeed, conquers those who live with her, but not by force: she conquers as she conquered her Austrian prisoners in Sardinia—by a deep humanity, and perhaps even more a great *simplicity*.

But there are some minds, we know—even noble minds,—who will find in all this nothing but a piece of special pleading. “Granted,” they will say, “that Italy has sinned less than we thought—that she has not really shown any such outrageous greed as we have been led to believe—of what avail is it to discuss the more and the less? Her annexations may be smaller, even proportionately, than those of France or Britain, but they *are* annexations—in some degree she *is* imperialistic—the measure matters little—she is within the same condemnation.” We will all recognise this attitude—it is the attitude of that very large number of British people who, to their honour, have condemned the Treaty of Versailles, and, in condemning the injustices committed by their own country, feel equally free to condemn those of others. The attitude is quite logical, and enormously superior to the much more common attitude which would seek to justify the beam in our own eye whilst lamenting the mote in our neighbour's. Yet the strictest logic does not always embrace the deepest truth, and there is, in fact, a very deep element of truth which escapes these too hasty judgements.

Firstly, we know that duty is not the same for all, or if it were, *noblesse oblige* is a phrase which would have no meaning. In the fight for life, while the law makes no distinctions, or

makes them on the wrong side, we all know that the public conscience judges very differently the theft, say, of the poor man pressed by hunger, and that of the millionaire who deals unjustly. Let us admit for a moment, in defiance of Mazzini, and just for the value of the parallel, that Italy has, in fact, stolen from the Tyrolese a slice of their territory—we take this case because, since her offer of renunciations in Dalmatia, this remains now absolutely the only moral charge which can be brought against her. To secure the line of the Alps, her natural geographical frontier—to ward off for ever the invasions which again and again, through the centuries, have descended on her through these gateways—she has committed this one small sin, let us say, against the principle of nationality. Supposing this is so, do we really think that even to-day in the general opinion of the world, in the opinion of neutral countries, in the opinion of Austria herself,¹ this tiny defensive annexation excites anything like the same feeling of anxiety and resentment as has the colossal expansion, the rise to an almost indisputable sway, of the Anglo-Saxon Powers? The offence is not the same, neither in nature nor extent, and as many can feel that even to-day, so will it surely be still more clear to-morrow.

Yet we would beg the reader to believe that it is not in any sterile *tu quoque* spirit that these observations are being put forward here, but in the hope that seeing the true proportion of things more clearly ourselves, we may better understand Italian feeling, and adopt, in our dealings with it, a wiser attitude. Italy is seething with bitterness at this moment precisely because she feels she has been betrayed alike by our cynics and our moralists: for, according to the standards of cynicism, she argues, treaties at least are sacred, and stipulated payments should not be discussed—and, according to the standards of morality, we must practise what we preach, and if the initiation of a new order is in question, the first examples in sacrifice should not be demanded from the younger and weaker members of a family.

In seeing these things Italy surely is not wrong, as—in

¹ One of the most anti-Italian of journals, the *Reichspost* of Vienna, recently published the following remarkable testimony to the fairness of Italy's administration:—

“If South Tyrol is to be our Alsace-Lorraine, at all events no Zabern episode will occur there. As we were able to note already during the first months of occupation after the Armistice, the Italians have laid themselves out to captivate the inhabitants by gentle means, which are much more efficacious. We willingly admit that the population of the Upper Adige, unlike the populations of other Austrian countries that have passed under other States, have met with a comparatively mild destiny.” (See letter of Mr T. Boston Bruce to the *Times*, 4th November 1919.)

the opinion in at least of the present writer—she is not wrong in being content with gradual evolution, in idealism as in everything else. But it must be admitted that during the past year her serenity of outlook, which had resisted all the strain of war, and the worst that her declared foes could do, has broken down before what she feels as the injustice of her friends. To-day her vision is not serene, and thus, together with many things which are just, she is saying others which are unjust—an embitterment has momentarily engulfed her soul through which full truth cannot be perceived. But surely none of us can find in such a situation an excuse for turning impatiently aside. More than any special blunder on our part, more than any territorial muddle, it is for some of us precisely this general spiritual bitterness we have aroused which calls most loudly for remedial treatment, leaving us with a sense of guilt, towards Italy and towards ourselves, while such treatment is not found.

For the natural Italy, freed from bitterness, should have a great contribution to make to our world politics of to-morrow; through the absence of extremes in her thinkers—through her catholic balance of ideal with real—above all, through that ingrained, unquenchable international sympathy which this article has striven to show is a constant factor of her mind. But before she can bring her offering, we need to realise that she has an offering to bring, and understand something of its nature. Italy's special note is a realism which we have too often called cynicism, and a simplicity, in the midst of all her many-sidedness, which we have not measured at its worth. We allude continually to Machiavelli, forgetting that this greatest of cynics was after all no more than the ablest exponent of views which in his age were universally held, and that Mazzini has surely done more for the cause of political liberty than ever Machiavelli for enslavement. Yet Mazzini, the unconquerable idealist, surely shows himself also the eternal realist when he says in one of his best known passages: "God created us not to contemplate but to act. He created us in His own image and He is Thought and Action, or rather in Him is no Thought without simultaneous Action."

This passage leaves no scope for any ideal divorced from life, and in so far it may be taken as representative of the best quality of the Italian mind.

LUCY RE-BARTLETT.

RELIGION AND THE CHURCHES.

HENRY PRESERVED SMITH, D.D.,

Union Theological Seminary, New York.

THE effect of the war on religion has been discussed in the leading reviews of Europe and America. What the writers usually discuss is the state of mind of the men in the army. It is not always made clear that this state of mind is not in all cases something induced by the war, but is something which already existed. This is brought out by the paper of the Reverend Bernard Iddings Bell in the September *Atlantic Monthly*, and indeed is indicated by the title—"The Church and the Civilian Young Man." The young men under Dr Bell's observation were in a training-camp in this country and had seen nothing of war. Their attitude towards religion was one that they had brought with them from civil life. This must be measurably true of the attitude of the men in the field. Their situation may have made them reflect more seriously than before on the questions raised by religion. But in substance their attitude was already there when they entered the army. Dr Bell says as much: "The Churches ought to recognise that they have never gained the interest and enthusiasm of eight out of ten of the generation just coming to maturity." This means, of course, that the Churches had failed in gaining this interest of young men before the war came. We are faced with a fact of long standing rather than with one of recent growth. The only thing new about it is that these chaplains and other observers have been brought into closer touch than before with young men from all classes of the community. The training-camp has revealed a state of affairs to which they had been blind.

The fact alleged is no less ominous because it is chronic instead of acute. Indeed it is more so. If it were due to

the war, we might hope that it would disappear with the coming of peace. As a chronic state of affairs it must alarm all to whom religion is the chief concern in human life. Before discussing it, let us notice the more precise form in which it is stated by Dr Bell in this sentence: "Most American young men care little or nothing about organised religion." Underscore the word *organised*, and we see that there is a double question to be discussed. Is the lack complained of a lack of interest in religion, or is it lack of interest in the organisation? What is meant by "organised religion" is plain from the sentence quoted above: it is the religion which has taken form in the several Churches. These organisations are well known to us. They are a group of societies differing much in government and ritual, but all professing a common aim. That aim is the salvation of men. But salvation from what? Historically the answer to this question is easy. The solemnly and officially declared end for which Churches exist (the Universalists are only the exception which proves the rule) is the salvation of men from eternal damnation.

Now, the present situation is characterised by the fact that this declared aim of the Churches is tacitly ignored by most of them. Dr Bell makes this clear in a sentence, the full significance of which seems to have escaped him. Speaking of the young men under his observation in the training-camp he says: "Few cite the selfish inadequacy of a faith which bids men save themselves from hell. That quaint and fearsome Calvinistic motive has apparently, save in a few rural neighbourhoods of the Southwest, never been presented to most young men of this generation." I say the full significance of the sentence escapes the author, because it is a confession that the Churches no longer urge the motive which in the past has been the strongest which they could present. By its own profession the Church invites men to accept salvation, yet all the while declines to point out the fate from which they need to be saved. This would seem to account in large measure for the lack of interest we are considering.

To men of this generation this motive may be quaint and fearsome (that it is no more Calvinistic than it is Catholic or Lutheran, we may note in passing), and it is easy to stigmatise its selfish inadequacy. But to a sober thinker it is no more and no less selfish to wish to be saved from hell than to wish to be saved from drowning. And that the motive has been inadequate in the past no one acquainted with the history of the Church would affirm. Not so many years ago I myself saw a

congregation of more than average intelligence much moved by the singing of the hymn (Wesleyan in origin, be it noted) :—

“Lo, on a narrow neck of land,
 ’Twixt two unbounded seas, I stand
 Secure, insensible !
 A point of time, a moment’s space,
 Removes me to that heavenly place,
 Or shuts me up in hell.”

Perhaps there is no more significant sign of the times, and confirmation of Dr Bell’s statement, than the fact that the Presbyterian Church (Calvinistic, if anything) omits this verse from its officially authorised Hymnal, although it uses the rest of the hymn.

And as we are considering this motive, let us note that it is not altogether and necessarily selfish. The preaching of a Judgment Day compels men to face the question whether before the bar of their own consciences they could plead innocence of transgression. To hold up the Law of God as the standard by which we must judge ourselves was once the task of the preacher, and that that Law was enforced by sanctions of immense importance was the firm conviction of his hearers. They suffered from the thought that they deserved the wrath of the Judge, quite as much as from the fear of a literal Gehenna of fire. The acute desire of parents that their children should be reached and touched by the Gospel, while no doubt it took account of the threat of future punishment, was in large measure a desire that those children should attain peace of conscience and should lead upright and useful lives. Dr Bell’s quaint and fearsome motive has therefore been effective in more ways than one. The great missionary movement of the last century originated and was carried on because of the belief that millions of our fellow-beings were going down to death under sentence of condemnation. Church-goers now in middle life must have in their memory the impressive appeal on behalf of these perishing millions. In the picture drawn for them, the hearers saw with every tick of the clock a soul passing out of this world into another which it would find to be one of hopeless and endless woe.

So much for the motive alleged to be inadequate. That it is now inadequate is shown by the fact that it is no longer presented. But if so, the Churches must face the question whether, having surrendered the motive which made them strong in the past, they have any longer a reason for being. At least we cannot wonder that these organisations do not

evoke interest and enthusiasm. But there is still a possibility that, though the organisations have lost their hold, religion may have power to call out the enthusiasm of young men. To determine whether this is so, we must attempt a definition of religion—or, to be specific, of Christianity, since Christianity is the religion that concerns us. That it has something to do with Christ is evident, and to find out what that something is we turn to the Gospels.

The Galilean fishermen who first heard and obeyed the call of Jesus were not very articulate, and they probably had no phrase in their vocabulary which corresponded to our “personal magnetism.” But the very fact that they followed the Master showed that he attracted them by something in his personality. But more than this—he gave them something to hope for, and he gave them something to do which seemed to them worth while. He promised to make them fishers of men—that is, he invited them to take part with him in his work. What that work was is clear from the hope which he proclaimed, as well as from his own example. The hope which he proclaimed was embodied in the words: “The kingdom of God is at hand.” What he meant they knew, for the hope of the nation had long been directed to the coming of a new era. In this new era peace and righteousness was to prevail throughout the world. In other words, Jesus taught his disciples to look for an ideal society, and he invited them to help in the work of preparing men for that society. This was his mission—to prepare men for citizenship in the new commonwealth, the republic of God. He told all who would listen that to be fit for that society they must be pure in heart, peacemakers, not given to anger, chaste in thought, loving their enemies, ready to discover a neighbour even in the despised Samaritan.

It would be misreading the texts to assert that Jesus made loyalty to himself the supreme virtue. He expressly declared that not every one who called him Lord should enter the kingdom—even though such a person had wrought miracles in his name. Citizenship in the kingdom belongs to those who do the will of the heavenly Father. And, lest there should be any doubt on this point, he declared that the test was loving service given, not to himself personally but to any human being in need, to the least of these his brethren. And here the modern reformer will raise his protest. He will say that this is mere individualism, and that if Jesus had no remedy for the ills of society he is no leader for this age. Let us confess frankly that Jesus was not a sociologist. He

was content to leave great issues to God. Certainly he did not expect to bring in the millennium by legislation. To lay a programme of social reform before the Roman Senate or before the Jewish Sanhedrim would have seemed to him the height of absurdity, as indeed it would have been. Doubtless, in common with his contemporaries, he expected the new society to be inaugurated by an act of God. What troubled him was that, if that new society were to be inaugurated, it would find so few worthy citizens. He, for his part, was not called upon to deal with men in the mass, nations or peoples, but with individuals, each a child of God, each of infinite worth, and each a potential citizen of the new commonwealth. We, from our advanced point of view, may criticise him because he did not see the forest for the trees. But he might retort that we, in looking at the forest as one great mass, forget that, after all, it is made up of trees. Society is made up of individuals, and he who educates the individual for citizenship is to that extent a social reformer.

Whether there is such a thing as *mere* individualism we need not stop to inquire. Certainly Jesus did not forget that human beings must exist in society. Not only were the duties he enjoined social duties; the message he preached had in itself organising power. The comradeship to which he invited men was a bond of union. His disciples were brothers, children of one Father, a family made a unit by love. While he lived they felt that he was the bond that held them together. The onlooker might have expected their society to fall to pieces after he was taken from them. But the contrary took place. His legacy was the work in which they had engaged with him, and in carrying on that work they felt more than ever united with him. Almost without set purpose they found themselves organised in a society of which he was still the head. Its vitality was shown by the attraction it exerted on those outside the circle of early hearers of Jesus. The most important of these was undoubtedly the Apostle Paul.

Whether Paul was the second founder of Christianity, or whether he even deflected it from the path in which it had been moving, it is not our purpose to inquire. What interests us is that, being a man of scholarly training, he was able to give clear expression to the experience which the early disciples had felt rather than described. He was enabled to do this not only because of his mental training, but because of the intensity of his experience. At first, as we know, he rejected the new teaching. But, through a crisis which we

can describe only by the word "violent," he came to adopt the faith which he had persecuted. And in essence this faith was the faith of the early disciples—comradeship with Jesus and partnership in his work. "What wilt thou have me do?" was the cry with which he surrendered to his new-found Lord. But, having adopted this work, his active mind sought to give rational expression to his experience. His formulation has been fundamental to Christian theology down to the present day.

However, we are not now dealing with theology, but with religion. To the religious mind the question of questions is: Has God come into this human life of ours? The early disciples had already found the answer in Jesus. To them he was the Messiah, the Son of God especially anointed for his work. Paul adopted this answer, but carried it further. In his experience, faith in Jesus had given him peace of mind because it had shown him his God not as the stern Judge but as the loving Father. His formulation of this experience was in the words: "In Christ God was reconciling the world to Himself." That this gave a cosmic significance to the work of Christ such as the early disciples had not conceived, must be evident. But a fuller formulation of the Christian faith was to come later. It was given by a disciple who probably had not seen Jesus in the flesh. His advantage was that he had been trained in Greek philosophy and could formulate the faith in terms which appealed to the Gentile Christians, now becoming the most important element in the Christian community. Greek thinkers had already distinguished between the essential Deity who is beyond our comprehension, and the Logos, the Deity coming out of his isolation to enter into relation with the world which we know. Adopting this distinction, our Evangelist is very bold and says: "The Logos became flesh and tarried among us, and we have seen his glory, full of grace and truth."

The idea of an incarnation was not new. What was new in this declaration was the description of the divine glory. Most men would say that if a god took on human nature he would be distinguished by superhuman power, or by celestial majesty, or by omniscient wisdom, or by all three. Not so our author. To him the divine attributes are grace and truth. Let us take the terms in their natural sense. What this author means is that the divinity of Jesus is seen in his graciousness, his charm, his love for men. This is one side of his character. The other is truth, not veracity merely, but fidelity, steadfastness in carrying out his high mission even

when this involved the suffering and the shame of the cross. The purpose of the incarnation is not simply the display of these qualities, but it is their communication. "Of his fulness all we have received, and one grace after another." In Paul's language, God is reconciling the world to Himself by communicating His own love to men through Jesus. The comradeship with Jesus which unites all his disciples flows out from his person, because there is a divine contagion in his grace and truth which brings men into fellowship with God.

We have reached the definition of Christianity that we were seeking. Our religion is comradeship with Jesus, partnership in his work, motivated by such love as he showed, and pursued with a fidelity to conscience which will not be deterred by any obstacle. This is the common element in all three types of Christianity—that of the early disciples, that of Paul, and that of John. In essence it agrees with the statement on which Dr Bell says clergymen of many denominations agreed as the statement of the Christian faith. But is it conceivable that this religion, if fairly and simply presented, should fail to arouse the interest of young men "pathetically anxious for spiritual leadership"? Yet these clergymen confess that they have failed to arouse interest in organised religion. We begin to suspect that the failure lies somewhere in the organisation. That there must be organisation, we have seen. The Church is the community of those who share the spirit of Jesus, and their association together has as its aim to foster his spirit in its members, to enlighten them as to what that spirit requires in the way of service to humanity, and to invite others to join in that work. Like other organisations, it works through chosen men, its ministers; and if these ministers are to be criticised, this is the standard by which they should be judged. The work of the minister of the Gospel is to make effective the divine contagion which communicates the grace of Christ. He is to induce the Real Presence, not in the elements on the altar, but in the hearts of men. His success or failure in this is his only success or failure. All his activities and all the activities of the Church he serves are legitimate so far as they contribute to this end. Public worship, exposition of the Scriptures, preaching, prayer-meetings, young people's societies, sacraments, are means to bring men, women, and children into comradeship with Jesus, and to induce them to take part in his work.

Now, the trouble with an organisation is that it either thinks of its own existence as an end in itself, or it confuses means and ends. In a political party the stalwart despises the

mugwump because he will not stand by the machine through thick and thin, but inquires whether the machine is doing the work for which it was constructed. Anyone familiar with the history of the various religious communions in this country will have no difficulty in recognising the same phenomenon. Half a dozen small churches in a community which would be efficiently served by one or two are kept alive, or at least are kept from dying, by the determination in each one to "stand by our principles," and these principles are in reality those which Thomas Aquinas, or Martin Luther, or John Calvin, or William Laud formulated in language strange to the people of to-day.

To test this, let one of the young men who Dr Bell met in his camp make an experiment. Let him go to the clergymen who have agreed on the simple expression of the Christian faith given by Dr Bell. Let him approach the Roman Catholic and say: "I find in Jesus the revelation of God which I need to help me in right living; I desire to be in comradeship with him and to take part in his work; let me join your people in their service of him!" Doubtless the heart of the friendly clergyman will rejoice at such a confession. But he will say: "What you have experienced is good as far as it goes. But our Church holds that all righteousness begins, grows, and, if lost, is restored, by the sacraments, and she has the proof that valid sacraments are administered by her priests alone. What you have to do is to submit to the discipline of the Church, believe all that she declares to be of faith, come to confession, and receive absolution as the Church directs." If this seems to the young man more than he is prepared to do, he may turn to the Anglican. His welcome will be equally cordial; but the inquirer will be instructed that he must affirm certain things about the historic Jesus, things on which he may not have attained certainty, and will be informed that the Church holds to the three orders of the ministry and does not recognise as true Churches of Jesus Christ any organisations that have not these three orders and the Apostolic Succession. The Presbyterian minister will be as friendly as the others; in fact, it is almost pathetic to see the eagerness of all ministers to get into touch with young men. But this one, again, will advise the young man to study the historic faith for which the Church stands—in this case the faith of the Reformed Churches, including the fall of man in Adam, the consequent inability of the human will, and the salvation of an elect number chosen by divine decree so definitely that it cannot be increased or diminished. The Baptist minister, in his turn, will find it his

duty to expound the true meaning of the Greek word *Baptizo*, and to point out the fundamental duty implied by the word thus interpreted.

Why should I go on? Everyone knows that similar responses would be given by ministers of other denominations. Perhaps the particular clergymen with whom Dr Bell was associated will rise up in some indignation and say that they do not treat inquirers in this way. But if they are faithful to the obligations they have taken in the several communions to which they belong, they ought to give the responses I have supposed. For the principles for which I have made them answer are the officially declared principles of those communions. Even if the individual clergyman lays little importance upon them, it ought to be plain that a conscientious young man, before taking so important a step as joining the Church, would want to have a clear idea of the constitution and laws of the society with which he identifies himself. But these documents have really overlaid the original purpose for which the Church exists with extraneous matters. Historically the case is easily accounted for. It was thought necessary to guard the original faith from perversion. As monuments of what Christians have thought in times past, Confessions and Articles of Faith are still important. But they ought not to stand in the way of any man who wants to take part in the work of Jesus.

The sentence from which we started our discussion affirms that the young man of to-day has little interest or enthusiasm for organised religion, and we now begin to see why this is so. Organised religion suffers from accretion of dogma. The formulas which have resulted from past controversies cling to it and hamper its activities. For it must be evident that essential Christianity expresses itself in activity. Love to one's fellow leads one to seek him out and communicate of one's best. Steadfastness in following one's ideal means battling to subdue the lusts of the flesh and to resist the temptations which the world presents in such abundance. So far as the Church brings other objects before its members, it suffers from defect as well as by excess. And that it does so suffer must be plain to anyone who studies the social movements of our own time. For these movements show that the organising power of religion is manifesting itself outside the Churches. It is sometimes said that there is more religion outside the Churches than within them, but this seems to be an exaggeration. The men active outside the Churches are, many of them, faithful members of the Churches. But that they do not find

scope for their religious impulses in the Churches is evident from the number of other organisations in which they enrol themselves. We need only name the Christian Associations, the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the Charity Organisation Society, Social Settlements. All these are evidences of the vitality of the religious principle we have defined. Although some of them decline to use the name of Jesus, they are in fact working out the grace and truth which has its fullest expression in him. It is here that the interest and enthusiasm of young men and young women are enlisted. And by as much as these organisations flourish, while the Churches complain that they cannot attract the masses, they attest the lethargy of the Churches, or prove that the Churches are laying stress on what people of this age regard as unessential. The conclusion that we must draw as to the future of the Churches is plain. What can be done, this paper does not attempt to discuss. It is a diagnosis, not a prescription.

HENRY PRESERVED SMITH.

NEW YORK.

PRIMITIVE ART AND MAGIC.

THE REV. H. J. D. ASTLEY, M.A., Litt.D.,

Rector of East Rudham, Norfolk.

THE expression "Primitive Art" might be made to include all that primitive man ever made, whether in the past or in the present, his weapons, his tools, his utensils and suchlike, whether ornamented or not, whatever he has manufactured beyond the simple raw materials put in his way by Nature. It would include the roughly fashioned flint of the Mousterian cave-dweller as well as the beautiful leaf-blades of Solutré and the incised and ornamented bones of La Madeleine. But it is of none of these that I wish to treat here, except, perhaps, incidentally of the ornamental work of La Madeleine; by primitive art, in this article, I mean more particularly the pictographic art of primitive man as we find it displayed in Palæolithic caves, or in prehistoric Egypt, or in the Mycenaean wall-paintings of Crete and the mainland of Greece; or, later on, speaking chronologically, in Neolithic times in the North, in such examples as those on the Kivik Rock, in Sweden, and, among modern primitive races, the drawings of the Esquimaux in the far North and of the Bushmen in South Africa, or the natives of Australia, more especially among the Arunta in the central region; and, from a comparison of the present-day examples with those of the past, we shall demonstrate, as far as it is possible to do so, that it is primitive magic that lies at the root of all such art, and that for the most practical of purposes—the well-being of the community through the increase and preservation of the food-supply. This may seem a very prosaic reason to assign for what are in many cases really beautiful works of art, but it lies in the nature and constitution of primitive man.

There are few to-day, I take it, even among those who are

not professed students of prehistorics, who are not familiar with the wonderful examples of Aurignacian art which the discoveries of later years have brought to light in the caves of Southern France and Northern Spain; those who have no opportunity of seeing the originals may obtain the best idea of them from the illustrations in Professor Obermaier's book, *Der Mensch der Vorzeit*, which gives some in facsimile of the original colouring, and in Professor Hoernes' *Der Diluviale Mensch in Europa*, and Professor Buttel-Reepens' *Der Urmensch vor und während der Eiszeit in Europa*; English books that I have seen, such as the British Museum Catalogue of the Stone Age, or I.aing's *Human Origins*, only illustrate some of the Magdalenian specimens.

These Aurignacian drawings, which are probably of an antiquity of some thirty thousand years or more, are admitted on all hands to be the most lifelike and artistic of any to be found in primitive art; we have only to look at the bisons (thirty in number) on the wall of the cave of Altamira, the mammoths (fourteen) and horses in the caves of Marsoulas and Combarelles, the dancing women in the cave of Cogul, to be at once struck by the marvellous outburst of artistic ability which is apparent. In an article published in this Journal in January 1918, I described many of these, and referred to the Presidential address delivered by Sir Arthur Evans before the British Association at Newcastle in 1916, in which he enlarged fully upon the subject; it is therefore unnecessary for the description to be repeated here: but, as Sir C. Hercules Read pointed out in his Presidential address before the Royal Anthropological Institute in 1918, it is evident that such a glorious outburst of art predicates a long period of effort, and learning, and attempting before the power to execute such masterpieces was attained. Shall we ever discover any of these earlier efforts of the great Cro-Magnon race? It is possible, and to be hoped, that we shall.

In the Magdalenian period, which carries us on to that of Mas d'Azil and to the verge of the Neolithic, the art of fresco-drawing would appear to have been abandoned, but lifelike figures of the mammoth, reindeer, horses, cattle, men and women and other objects are depicted, or rather incised, on mammoth-ivory and bone, and, as Sir C. Hercules Read pointed out, the animals would appear to have been studied by the primitive artist in a state of rest as well as in one of activity; beside the bounding and crouching bisons and the galloping horses and reindeer we have the reindeer standing quietly drinking by the side of the pool, and the cow at

Bruniquel waiting to be milked; as Mr Pocock affirms, "the age of domestication has begun."¹

In the primitive art of Egypt prior to the commencement of the regal period under Menes, and onward through the earlier dynasties, so graphically described by M. Capart in his book *Primitive Art in Egypt*, we find the same freedom and breadth, the same naturalness, the same consummate skill in depicting the creatures by which the artist was encompassed in his daily life. What can exceed, for example, the perfection of the drawing of the geese of Meidum from one of the mastabas at Sakkhara, now to be seen in the museum at Cairo?

It is only as time goes on under succeeding dynasties that the art of Egypt becomes conventionalised into the type which remained unchanged to the end of Egyptian history; and though the monotony of the frescoes on Egyptian temples becomes wearisome, the beauty of the designs and the colouring in the mastabas of the nobles and, above all, in the tombs of the kings in the Theban hills, cannot be denied.

When we turn to the art of the Mycenaean Age in Greece, delved from the ruins of Mycenæ and Tyryns and Troy by the patient, though somewhat unscientific, labours of Dr Schliemann, and to that of Crete, the discovery of which we owe to the wholly scientific exploration of Sir A. Evans at Knossos, and to the Italians at Palæocastro and elsewhere, we find, along with a great deal of geometric and spiral decoration, frescoes depicting great bulls in act to charge, and athletic youths and maidens engaged in dancing, leaping, running, and other exercises, all of them drawn and coloured in the most free and natural and unconventional style—one that differs as much from the later style of classical Greece as the art of the Cave-men and of primitive Egypt differs from the later conventionalised art of that country.

In Neolithic times and among the Neolithic peoples art degenerated sadly, and required to be slowly recaptured; it has been well described as exhibiting the earlier efforts of children more than anything else, and whatever may be true as to a hiatus between the Palæolithic and Neolithic periods, it goes to show, at least, that there was no communication between the Cave-men and their later successors. Taking as our illustration of Neolithic art the drawings on the Kivik monument in Sweden²—later, no doubt, in time though earlier in age than the Bronze Age art of the Mycenæans—we are struck by the truth of the above description. On the

¹ Quoted by Sir C. Hercules Read, *J.R.A.I.*, vol. xlviii. p. 13.

² Hoernes, *Urgeschichte der bildenden Kunst in Europa*, 377-9.

surface of the rock we find depicted there: on one panel, two axes, a dagger, two lance-heads, and below, a boat, or more probably a sledge—the axes remind us of the double axe in the Mycenaean cult; on a second panel there are two horses following each other above, and two facing one another below, a chevron ornament enclosed in lines; on a third panel there are two circles, which may be meant for the sun and moon, with crosses, between two bands of zigzag ornament; on a fourth and fifth panel there are figures of men and women, a two-horsed chariot, and what may be bears; and on the sixth panel two more circles with crosses, and above, two crescent moons with horns. The art is childish, but it falls into line.

Among primitive peoples of the present day we will only specify what has already been mentioned, the art of the Esquimaux, of the Bushmen of South Africa, and of the Central Australian tribes.

The Esquimaux, a people of the Reindeer period to-day, as is well known, execute beautiful little pictures on whale and narwhal ivory, representing hunting and fishing scenes, in a most graphic and lifelike style; some North American Indians are equally clever in executing drawings of a remarkably life-like character depicting the animals in the midst of which they live—the bison, the beaver, the squirrel, the tortoise, the frog, engraved on trees or rocks; the drawings of the Bushmen depicting ostriches, antelope, elephants, rhinoceros, the gnu, and others electrified the scientific world not so many years ago—indeed, a drawing of a herd of ostriches executed in black and white and greyish blue is worthy to be compared with the geese of Meidum for perfection of workmanship; on the other hand, the human figures, for example, a man and woman facing one another, the latter *steatopygous*,¹ are strangely crude.

When we go to Australia we find ourselves in face of the rudest forms of art; but it is from that strange island-continent, so long isolated and cut off from all intercourse with the rest of the world, that we gain our clue, and find light thrown upon all this widespread diffusion of art and the expression of the artistic instinct throughout the ages, and it explains why the most exquisite drawings of the Cro-Magnon

¹ *Steatopygous*.—This is a term applied to describe the curious accumulation of fat on the buttocks which seems to have marked the females of the Cro-Magnon race, and which is to be seen to-day, in a somewhat modified degree, in the Hottentot and Bushmen races. The “doll-images” from the cave of Brassempouy and others are characterised in this way, and I have seen similar figurines in the museum at Valetta, Malta, from an ancient necropolis in that island.

people in the Aurignacian period were executed in the innermost recesses of inaccessible caverns in a darkness to which the light of day never penetrated. It is our argument that the principle which lies at the basis of these Aurignacian and Australian drawings is also explanatory of those which were executed in the full light of day, and in which the primitive artist, like his civilised confrère, could find a real pleasure as well.

In passing, we may note a curious record of the survival of the form of art in vogue among the Aurignacian people and the modern Australians among a people who had long left the savage and even the barbaric stage behind. I refer to a striking passage in the book of the Prophet Ezekiel, where the prophet describes how he beheld in a vision some of the practices of the people who had been left in Jerusalem in the early years of the Babylonian Captivity. The passage will be found in the eighth chapter of Ezekiel. It runs as follows:—

“He brought me to the door of the court; and when I looked, behold, a hole in the wall. Then said he unto me, Son of man, dig now in the wall: and when I had digged in the wall, behold a door.” He is bidden to enter, whereupon he tells us: “I went in and saw; and behold, every form of creeping things, and abominable beasts, and all the doll-images of the house of Israel, pourtrayed upon the wall round about. And there stood before them seventy men of the ancients of the house of Israel, and in the midst of them stood Jaazaniah the son of Shaphan, with every man his censer in his hand; and a thick cloud of incense went up. Then said he unto me, Son of man, hast thou seen what the ancients of the house of Israel do in the dark, every man in the chambers of his imagery? for they say, The Lord seeth us not; the Lord hath forsaken the land” (Ezek. viii. 7–12).

These people are doing precisely what the Cave-men presumably did, and what the Arunta and other native tribes in Australia are doing to-day. Let us examine this more closely.

As we have seen, the artistry of all these varied expressions of the artistic instinct differs from the most wonderful perfection hardly to be excelled by any modern artist to the most crude and child-like poverty in design, and in Egypt becomes stereotyped into conventional forms which are not devoid of their own beauty; but the contention here put forward is that none of the work was done for a purely artistic purpose, or, as it were, to satisfy man's æsthetic sense.

Primitive man is nothing if not practical; and, judging by

his environment and the necessities of his existence, and taking the hint we derive from Australia, we may discover without difficulty the practical end he had in view.

Here some objector may say, It is all very well: we know what you are driving at, and you are only wearing thin a thrice-told tale; it is agreed that it was *religion* that led to all this development of art. Thus Professor Solomon Reinach discusses what he describes as "the masterpiece of this phase of art"—that is, the quaternary phase, the art of the Cave-men. It consists of a group of reindeer engraved on an antler from the cave of Lorthet in the Pyrenees; the animals are shown "galloping in attitudes first revealed to us in modern times by instantaneous photography," "unknown to all artists in intermediate ages"; the spaces between and under the reindeer are occupied by a couple of salmon, and above the last reindeer are two pointed lozenges. Discussing this, the Professor says: "This association of the great river-fish with the reindeer is doubtless due to some religious idea"; and again: "The study of the birth of religion is interwoven with that of the origin of art; born simultaneously, art and religion were closely connected for long ages; their affinity is still evident enough to the thinking mind." The latter statement is obviously true; it is the words "born simultaneously" that I criticise. As I take it, art was born long antecedently to, and for long continued independently of, what can in any proper sense be called religion. Professor Reinach is nearer the mark when he says, further on in the same passage: "Civilised man makes hyperbolic use of the expression 'the magic of art'; the primitives actually believed in it."¹

Again, Mr McCulloch, writing in *The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* on primitive art, follows Professor Reinach in holding that the art of quaternary man had a "religio-magical character." Here I would delete, for the period spoken of, the word "religio" from the epithet.

It is our contention that the origin of art is to be found in magic, pure and simple, and that it is coincident with the totemic system as the basis of social arrangements.

In my opinion Sir J. G. Frazer, however much one may disagree with some of his conclusions, has proved to demonstration that magic preceded religion in the time-history and psychology of man, and that totemism, in itself is not a religion, though it may develop into one.

¹ Reinach, *The Story of Art throughout the Ages*, 5, 6.

² "Totemism is not a religion." True; but it develops into one when the representation—whether pictograph or sculptured figure (doll, not yet idol)—

Religion, as he says, implies the existence of superior forces or powers, who may be propitiated and bent to the will of the worshippers by prayers and offerings. But as we look at primitive art and take our hint from Australia, we see that there is nothing of this kind in it. Messrs Spencer and Gillen distinctly say: "The performance of the ceremonies is not associated in the native mind with the idea of appealing to the existence of any supernatural being."¹

Primitive art, whether in its rudest or its most finished expression, in the past or in the present, finds its explanation in sympathetic magic, which, as Sir J. G. Frazer says, is "the science of primitive man"; like science, it is founded on a belief in the orderliness of Nature, and the conviction that like causes will always produce like effects, so that the performance of the proper ceremony and the use of the correct spell or charm will inevitably be attended by the desired results. It was only after long ages and many failures that man discovered his impotence; and religion arose on the bankruptcy of magic.²

But what was it that the magic of the pictures—whether in the darkness of secluded caves, as among the Aurignacians and the Arunta, or on rock-surfaces or on trees, as on the Kivik monument, or among the Bushmen or the North American Indians, or engraved on bone and ivory, as among the Magdalenians or the Esquimaux—was intended to produce? Primarily, the well-being of the tribe through the increase and stabilisation of the food-supply and the multiplication of the totem species.³

Come with me to Australia, and I will show you there the natives engaged in their *Intichiuma* ceremonies in the

comes to be personified, or viewed as the abode of a spirit. Worship then easily follows. The object has become a fetish. Thus the progress is from totemism, with its concomitant magical ceremonies, through fetishism to idolatry. See the whole subject discussed in Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. iv. pp. 4, 5, 27, 101 *seq.*

¹ Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 170.

² Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, 3rd ed., part i. "The Magic Art," vol. i. 220-243.

³ It must, of course, be understood that a totem clan is not permitted to eat of its own totem, except under special and exceptional circumstances. Consequently the ceremonies engaged in for the multiplication of the totem species are primarily for the benefit of neighbours whose totem it is not. As Sir J. G. Frazer says: "One at least of the functions of a totem clan is to provide a plentiful supply of its own totem animal or plant to be used as food by the other members of the tribe." Thus we have among these primitive people one of the highest examples of altruism the world affords! (Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. i. pp. 109 *seq.* Spencer and Gillen, *op. cit.*, p. 207; but note: "It seems not to have been always so," *ibid.*, p. 208.)

Ertnatulunga, or secret and sacred recesses in the hills, where are the sacred paintings, and where are stored the churinga, that is, the sacred stones or pieces of wood engraved with the symbols of the totem tribes, in which the soul of each individual member is kept safe; and we can picture to ourselves the men of the Stone Age in the caves of France and Spain indulging in precisely similar corroborrees and orgiastic dances and ceremonies for a similar purpose twenty or thirty thousand years ago. The same thing holds true of the men who fashioned the Kivik monument, or executed the prehistoric work of Egypt, or the fine drawings on Mycenaean palaces and temples; though, in this latter case, religion is already taking her place. As is well known, in the historic period in Egypt magic and religion are inextricably blended, as we find them in some forms of Christianity to-day. That the differentiation is a true one may be seen by a reference once more to the passage previously cited from Ezekiel. Against the practices carried on in such "secret chambers" the Deuteronomist had thundered his prohibition: "Lest ye corrupt yourselves, and make you a graven image . . . the likeness of any beast that is on the earth, the likeness of any winged fowl that flieth in the air, the likeness of any thing that creepeth on the ground, the likeness of any fish that is in the waters beneath the earth" (Deut. iv. 14-19). This was about the year 620 B.C., the time of the great reformation carried through under King Josiah. There is nothing said here, it will be observed, about *worship* of the figures displayed; it is magical practices that are clearly envisaged by the prohibition. On the other hand, when the comments on the "Ten Words" were issued as a part of the priestly code, the prohibition in that on the second commandment is directed against idolatry fully developed: "Thou shalt not bow down to them nor worship them."

Magic and totemism, which still survived in the lower strata of society—as magic does still among the lower strata of our own people¹—have given place to religion.

¹ How strong the belief in magic still is among the lower strata of our own population may be seen from the following example, which occurred quite recently not a hundred miles from where I am writing. A woman had been suffering for a long time from a large tumour in the right side of her neck and face, and always steadily refused to allow any operation to be performed. An aged man died, and she was persuaded by her neighbours and her own superstitious hopes and fears to allow the tumour to be stroked by one of the dead man's hands, in the full expectation of its disappearance; the idea, of course, being that as the body decays in the grave so the tumour will gradually vanish *pari passu*. She is now anxiously expecting this to take place! In

Thus, just as religion gave a marvellous stimulus to art in the Athens of Pericles, after the strain of the Persian wars had been relaxed, and to Christendom in the Middle Ages when the world had begun to settle down once more after the cataclysm of the Gothic invasions, so magic, with a more practical aim in view, gave a similar stimulus, under the strain of the daily struggle for existence, to the nascent artistic instinct which is an inseparable factor in the complex nature of man.

And let us not forget that totemism and magic are also inseparably combined. The origin of totemism has been variously explained, but the one thing certain is that in some subtle way primitive man felt himself to be akin to the creatures among whom his lot was cast, and the question as to which of them any particular tribe or clan should take as their totem depended largely upon circumstances and the abundance of the species in the locality; but once the relationship was established it became an undying one.

Thus, in Australia, in the kangaroo totem, it is immaterial whether one speaks of men-kangaroos or of kangaroo-men; both are one. Formerly, as I have said elsewhere, I was inclined to think of totemism as having its origin in, and being characteristic of, the Neolithic Age, or of people in what may be designated the Neolithic stage of culture. A study of the art of the Cave-men leads me now, with Sir C. Hercules Read, to believe that the origins of totemism are to be sought as far back as the Aurignacian period. Take that very picture which Professor Reinach describes as "the masterpiece of Palæolithic art," though I would rather reserve that term for the paintings in the caves of Altamira, Alpera, Cogul, and others, and it is probably later than these, being Magdalenian rather than Aurignacian. In that drawing the reindeer and the salmon are probably the totems of two contiguous tribes who lived by fishing and hunting, which the appropriate magic spells, combined with the representation, would cause to increase and flourish; and further, there are the two lozenge-shaped figures with the dot in the middle, which are clearly totem signs "understood" of those who fashioned them.

So with the bisons of Altamira, and the horses, the mammoth, the rhinoceros, the reindeer, and the rest of the creatures so graphically portrayed; in all probability they are the totems of various tribes; certainly it is the increase and

his discussion of "The homœopathic magic of the dead" (*The Golden Bough*, 3rd ed., part i. "The Magic Art," vol. i. pp. 147-150), Sir J. G. Frazer does not refer to this use of the dead hand.

the successful hunting of them that is intended to be effected by sympathetic magic; and an idea of the ceremonies by which this purpose, in conjunction with the drawings, was brought about may be made more plain to the eye of our imagination not only by a study of the ceremonies performed, and the drawings, rude though they be, executed by the Australian natives in the *Ertnatulunga*, but by a study also of the scene so realistically described by Ezekiel in his vision of what was going on in the secret chamber of the temple at Jerusalem as late as 590 B.C.!

For now, in that age of decadence, it was the most primitive cults that reappeared; in the prophet's picture we have them all, and so vivid is it that we can almost see them for ourselves; there, as we have seen, on the walls of that sacred and secret chamber were portrayed "every form of creeping things, and abominable beasts," that is, beasts reckoned "unclean" in the lists in the books of Leviticus and Deuteronomy, and reckoned so for the very reason that they had been held sacred by the old totem clans in primitive times, "and the doll-images of the house of Israel," the very things that call to our minds the curious steatopygous images of females from the cave of Brassempouy and elsewhere. Before these pictures the ancients of Israel were performing sacred rites, derived from the old days of totemism, with the idea, in this case, that by their magic they could avert the calamities impending over them, and restore prosperity to Israel.¹

It is impossible in the compass of this article to enlarge on the subject as it concerns prehistoric and historic Egypt, Mycenaean Crete and Greece, the Kivik monument in Sweden, and similar examples, but though in many cases religion has intruded and become inextricably intertwined, and totemism

¹ Compare the making of an image, clay or wax, or even wood, of the person it is desired to injure, in the Highlands of Scotland and among primitive peoples in other parts of the world. In the Highlands it is known as the *Corp Chre* or *Chreagh*, i.e., clay body; this is placed in a running stream; pins inserted in various parts denote the mode of death desired; and as the water washes it away so the patient will suffer; if the image is of wax it is placed in front of a fire to melt; if of wood, it is buried in soil where it is likely to undergo slow decay. (See Frazer, *op. cit.*, pp. 55 seq., where the subject is fully discussed, and particularly pp. 68, 69.) The image *is* the person, and as it melts or is otherwise destroyed so the person to be affected comes to his appointed end. A remarkable instance of the survival of this belief occurred not many years ago in Norfolk. A person of influence in his village died lingeringly of cancer in the throat. After his death one whom he was supposed to have wronged, mysteriously remarked: "So-and-so did me an injury—he is dead now!" She had often, half in jest, spoken of the practice referred to, and accordingly was fully believed by many to have made a waxen image and fastened pins in it after the orthodox fashion!

has faded or altogether passed away, it is still the ideas connected with sympathetic magic that explain them all.

The question may be asked: What about the human figures which are found in so many of the drawings? We find them in the Bushmen and Esquimaux examples, and on the Kivik monument, and we find them also on the oldest and finest examples of all, that is, in the caves of the Aurignacian period. In the cave of Abri Mège, in the Dordogne, there are figures of men dressed in skins and with animal heads engaged in a dance exactly after the fashion of the Australians in their corroborees; in the cave of Cogul we find women dancing, and drawn with great spirit; and at Alpera there are huntsmen with bows and arrows in various attitudes; other examples might be mentioned, but these will suffice. Now none of these could possibly be the totems of any tribe, nor would it be specially desired to conduce to an increase in their numbers! No, but all the same they may be explained on precisely the same principle. It is one of the canons of sympathetic magic that the image is not merely a symbol, but is itself actually the thing portrayed or fashioned.

Thus in Egyptian tombs the Ushabti, or little figures of servants and other dependants of the deceased, are actually what they represent, and they are there to serve the Ka, or spirit, of the person interred, which is himself. So the hunting and fishing Esquimaux figures are actually performing the actions which the designer desires to have carried out: so is it with the figures in the caves. Just as by dressing up and dancing and by the shooting of arrows and other such exercises which formed an integral part in their magical ceremonies certain definite results were, or were believed to be, brought about, so these men and women, engaged in their perpetual exercises and dances on the eternal walls of the caverns bring the same effects eternally to pass. It must, of course, be borne in mind that in all we have been just saying we have been envisaging the subject from the point of view of primitive man.

In this article we have traversed rapidly a very wide field; much has been left unsaid; many arguments that would have strengthened our position have been perforce omitted, but enough has been adduced to lend the highest degree of probability, if not absolutely to prove, our thesis: that art commenced and for long ages pursued its course as a concomitant of magic, with which totemism as a living element was combined, before religion in any proper sense made its appearance; it is true of magic, *i.e.* of sympathetic magic,

rather than of religion to say: Born simultaneously, art and magic were closely connected for long ages.

And, as a concomitant of, and part and parcel with magic, it is equally true to say that art and totemism, if not exactly "born simultaneously," were closely connected for long ages. and are so still.

Thus Sir J. G. Frazer is justified in saying: "While totemism has not demonstrably enlarged the material resources of its votaries, it seems unquestionably to have done something to stir in them a sense of art. . . . If it was not the mother it has been the foster-mother of painting and sculpture"; and after one of his well-known eloquent outbursts in which "the rude drawings of the natives of Australia" are said to "represent the germ of that long development which under happier skies blossomed out into the works of Michael Angelo, Titian, and Turner"—and in saying this he strengthens our argument that there must have been an antecedent "germ" which "after long ages" blossomed out into the perfection of the Aurignacian and Magdalenian drawings and artefacts—he concludes, combining magic and totemism in one pregnant phrase, "Thus in Australia, as in many other parts of the world, magic may, with some show of reason, be called the nursing-mother of art."¹

In conclusion, I may refer to a recent article in the Press in which that great artist, Mr Solomon J. Solomon, suggests that art should be constituted a "key-industry"; that is to say, that the young should be more systematically trained in the arts, especially in architecture. Thus in free-hand drawing, instead of giving a child a spray of honeysuckle to draw, as it were, *per se*, he would have it correlated to actual use, and the child shown its position as an ornament in architecture. And this co-ordination should be made to run through all its education in drawing. In this way a living interest would be imparted to what might otherwise appear a merely sterile attainment in skill, and a knowledge of the evolution of architectural styles and the meaning of ornament would follow. Thus our people would learn not only to wonder, but to admire, and to know *why* they admire, and certain elect souls would be stimulated to follow and surpass.

Thus might something of "the magic of art" be recaptured in the modern world.

Some modern artists have recently stated that the drawings in the caves of the Aurignacian period have been "much overrated." In support of what has been said with regard to

¹ Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. iv. p. 25.

them here I will quote Sir C. Hercules Read, in the address already referred to: "As to the artistic perfection of his drawings of the fauna of the time (and in my opinion perfection is a term that is but little in excess of the truth), I fear that words can be of but little avail. A long and sympathetic study has led me to believe that it is hard to use any but superlative terms in referring to them. But however sympathetic we moderns may be towards Cave art, the word is weak and inadequate when one tries to realise the relation of Cave-man to his animal models. This relation was refined and intensified by a superhuman understanding of every attitude and every detail of the beast to be represented, and such was his competence as an artist that he often performed marvels in the subtle indication of characteristic features. Our ignorance both of the animals and of the conditions under which they were drawn is so great that many points of this kind must inevitably be lost to us. But enough remain, and are recognisable, to prove the statement true, and I seriously question whether the most competent artist of our day, if provided with only the materials possessed by the Cave-man, could surpass, even if he could equal in all ways, the drawings of that distant time" (*J.R.A.I.*, vol. xlviii. pp. 13, 14.)

It has been stated, in opposition to the thesis of this article, that many works of primitive art in the past and the present may be explained on the principle of a love of beauty for its own sake, and that they were executed therefore to gratify the æsthetic sense of the artist; we are told, for example, that the Easter Islanders, when questioned as to the meaning of the wonderful statues and other works of art which they have received from their ancestors, reply that they were executed merely to give pleasure. This may be nothing but a confession of ignorance on the part of the modern Islander; in any case, it would only explain those works that have been done in full daylight; what about those, and some of them the most perfect, executed in the deepest darkness of the caves, or in Egyptian tombs? We prefer to take the explanation of sympathetic magic as covering the whole series, and in doing this we have the psychology, and known constitution and habits, of primitive man as our ally.

H. J. DUKINFIELD ASTLEY.

EAST RUDHAM VICARAGE, KING'S LYNN.

LIQUOR CONTROL AND THE CARLISLE EXPERIMENT.

THE REV. CANON H. D. RAWNSLEY.

WE have come to the parting of the ways. The Liquor Bill shortly to be introduced into the House of Commons will decide not only whether Great Britain is to be dry or free, but whether that dangerous traffic in strong drink shall be taken out of the hands of those who work it for private profit, who must by that fact and the fact of constant competition push the sale, or whether it shall be left to the brewers and distillers to make what fortunes they can out of it, under such control as may be possible.

It is quite clear that public opinion, and this especially in Labour circles, is growing in favour of taking the liquor traffic out of private hands and putting it in the hands of the State. Rightly or wrongly, they believe that it is only by eliminating the chance of private gain that the sale will cease to be pushed. They see also that so long as the Trade, with its huge army of shareholders behind it, can remain a licensed thing in our midst there must be always present a political danger. Our House of Commons cannot be elected on a ticket that is free of the Trade, and will always be in danger of having its power of legislation hampered by the brewers' vote. "If," said Mr J. H. Thomas, the Labour M.P., "you want to keep the drink question free from politics, you can only do it by taking the drink traffic out of the hands of private ownership."

At the same time, those who press for State Ownership or State Control see, or think they see, that local option will then have a fair chance of coming to the front; and if the Pussyfoots in a given area are numerous and clamant enough, there will be the possibility of the Alliance coming at last into its own, which its obstinacy has so often put further and further into the future.

It may be asked, how do we know that the Labour Party are in favour of State Purchase and State Control? We know it from such a meeting of the trade unions and Labour organisations in the Carlisle area as took place early in November 1919. The delegates who met that day represented 15,000 working men, who have been able to see with their own eyes the beneficial result of the Carlisle Drink Control experiment. They listened to a straight talk from Mr J. H. Thomas, M.P., who asked pertinently, "Is there any man or woman in the country, no matter how prejudiced they were by the action of the Control Board, or how much they resented its restrictions, who would dare to suggest that our experience of the war would justify the State in letting the drink traffic and the public-houses return to the old system?" and they passed unanimously—no not unanimously, for one hand out of 201 was held up against it—the following resolution:—

"That this Conference of Trade Unions and Labour Organisations in the Carlisle area, convened by the Carlisle Trades Council and Labour Party, affirms its belief in the public ownership and control of the liquor trade, and urges local Labour Parties and Trades Councils to press for the extension of the principle of State ownership and control to the whole country, subject to such modifications in the administration as experience may have shown to be necessary."

The Prime Minister will at least have Labour behind him in any well-conceived plan for State Purchase and State Control. He will have all the Churches behind him as well.

At a meeting held at Downing Street on 26th November, a deputation waited on the Prime Minister representing all the Churches. The Archbishop of Canterbury, who introduced it, was careful at the outset to declare that they were not present as Prohibitionists, and were not suggesting fanciful plans, but rather were there to endorse methods that had already been adopted with success. He referred to control of the drink traffic by the organisation presided over by Lord D'Abernon. He said the deputation was united in its wish that the restrictions now in existence should not be relaxed. Sir Alfred Pearce then presented a memorial from the medical profession, urging the same course, viz. that restrictions, proved to be beneficial during the war, should not be relaxed when a satisfactory measure had been evolved by Parliament. The Bishop of London, who also supported

the measure, went so far as to say that if they were going to have houses open for 19½ hours a day or anything like that, they did not deserve to have won the war. The Prime Minister felt unable to outline the Bill that was shortly to be introduced, but assured the deputation that the measure was in sage and sympathetic hands—the hands of the Minister of Education, Mr Fisher. Commissions with drastic powers of control and the duty of vigilance and report would be set up under the Bill, which he hoped would be introduced before Christmas. He spoke warmly of the Carlisle Liquor Control experiment, and intimated that the measure of such control would not be allowed to lapse. He referred sympathetically to the dry measures in America, but expressed doubts of our country being fit for any such prohibition experiment, and concluded by emphasising the need of co-operation of all the Churches with the legislature in its efforts. The Christian Churches in the land, said he when united, are irresistible.

That they are so united in Carlisle may be gathered from the results of a meeting of clergy and ministers of all the Churches which took place there last December. These clergy and ministers know, and none better can testify to, the temperance results of the Liquor Control in their city. After a long discussion of the matter, they agreed *nem. con.* upon the following resolution:—

“ We, being clergy and ministers of religion in the city of Carlisle and the immediate neighbourhood, desire to place on record our general approval of the work of the Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) in the Carlisle area: and we earnestly trust that there will be no return to the old licensing system.

“ At the same time we suggest that local opinion should have more influence on the action of the Board in each place; and that for this purpose the Local Advisory Committee (or at least a majority of them) should be appointed by popularly elected bodies, such as Town and County Councils. We hope that future legislation concerning the traffic in strong drink will follow the lines which have proved so beneficial in the Carlisle area.”

It is well to point out that the Local Advisory Committee at Carlisle has at present a majority of its members appointed by such elective bodies as the County Council and the Urban Council, that in addition the Magistrates' bench or the Licensing Authority is very properly represented on it, and that

two or three independent citizens of standing are co-opted on to the Committee. Our quarrel is not so much with the constituents of the Local Committee as with the small powers accorded to them by the Central Board.

There seems to be no reason why this Local Advisory Committee should not elect a local vigilance committee, whose duty should be to visit and report on the houses under their control, and be the *via media* for suggestions of improved management from time to time.

Such Advisory Committees ought to remember that we are not content with the existing type of public-house, which is the outcome of the endeavour of the Trade so to arrange their premises as to give the greatest sale of their goods in the least possible space. This is a result of the absurd system of basing licence duty on the annual value of the premises. The public-house of the future must attempt to meet the needs of the social life of the place, and minister not only to the drinking abilities of the public but to their enjoyment linked up with their refreshment.

Now we are face to face with one or two facts. The fact is that prohibition is not practical politics. No matter how Mr Leif Jones and his friends may beat the big prohibition drum, their policy is discredited. He may belittle the Carlisle experiment and may take high moral ground, defaming State Purchase, as he did in a letter to the *Times* of November last, and say that millions of good citizens, presumably members of the United Kingdom Alliance, object to carrying on this trade, which they agree with Mr Asquith in thinking a "trade which the State should not touch with the tip of its fingers"; but at least he should recall how in 1898 Mr Asquith said, "I do not hesitate to say that if politics are to become the battlefield of organised and privileged interest—which they certainly are in danger of becoming so long as the Trade can pull party strings—and if the electors are to be invited to subordinate their views on all the larger questions of public policy to bring them into harmony with the requirements of a particular trade, we are entering upon an era of demoralisation in British politics"; and he might remember with advantage that Lord Rosebery in the same year said, "If the State does not control the liquor traffic, the liquor traffic will control the State. I see the danger coming nearer and nearer that, owing to the enormous influence wielded directly and indirectly by those who are concerned in upholding the liquor traffic, we are approaching a condition of things perilously near the corruption of our political system." The late Lord

Peel was no visionary, but he declared that "it has come to be a struggle between the State and a trade, and the time has fully come for the decision of the question who is to be master."

The Prohibitionists, if State Purchase comes about, will not be in worse but in better case. They will have at any rate a clear field in the various areas for bringing in prohibition by the wish of the people, for local option will probably be part of the provisions of the Bill.

What those of us who are not averse to local option, if a substantial majority decide upon it, feel, is that local option is one thing and an Act for compulsory dryness is another; but until State Purchase is effected we see no real chance for local option on any sufficient scale, and we agree with Mr Gladstone, who, writing to Lord Thring in 1894, said, "For many years I have been strongly of opinion that the principle of selling liquor for the public profit only, offered the sole chance of escape from the present miserable and almost contemptible predicament, which is a disgrace to the country. I am friendly to local option, but it can be no more than a partial and occasional remedy."

The Prohibitionists will never learn by experience, and if we may judge by Mr Leif Jones' letter to the *Times*, they are still out to wreck any large measure of State Purchase and State Control, though it will almost certainly be coupled with the chance of Local Option. They refuse to recognise that State Purchase would at once withdraw from their power of mischief the forces of the great Trusts of the big brewers and distillers, and their fabulous profits; and that, if the State Control still admitted of abuses, Local Option could bring its guns to bear. We can only hope that they and other enthusiastic advocates of a dry England will not be able to defeat the promised Bill.

One thing these extremists seem to ignore, is the need of speeding up such licensing reform as was forecasted by the Act of 1904. That Act has failed by reason of its slowness in operation. Here in Carlisle, at the pre-war rate of reduction of licensed houses, it would have taken more than quarter of a century to accomplish what was done in a few months by a reduction of unnecessary licences.

And the slowness of action is easily accounted for. Under that Act, licences that were extinguished were compensated out of a common fund formed by a yearly levy on existing licensed premises. But that levy was made, not on the takings of these houses and the amount of liquor sold, but on the

annual value of the premises; whilst, on the other hand, the actual amount of compensation paid when a licence was extinguished, was based upon the takings and the liquor sold.

Sir Thomas Hughes, who for more than twenty-five years was chairman of the Liverpool Licensing Committee, in a letter to the *Spectator* of 22nd November gives us a good example of the state of things in that city. A miserable house, hardly more than a cottage, which without a licence would have let for about 8s. a week, held a licence. The annual value was £28, giving a yearly payment of £4 to the compensation fund. When the Justices decided that the licence ought to be cancelled, they found that the average weekly takings amounted to £47, which meant that, under the existing system of calculation, compensation of £4000 would have to be paid, with the result that the licence was allowed to continue.

Mr W. Waters Butler, the head of a large Birmingham brewery, who is also a member of the Liquor Control Board, supports State Purchase, and his words, seeing that he is chairman of a company that owns 1400 licensed houses, are worth weighing. In an interview reported in the *Westminster Gazette*, dated 15th October 1919, this is what he says:—

“For a number of years I have been chairman of the Birmingham Property Association, which was formed to represent the Trade in negotiating reductions of licences, transfers, improvements, and so on, with the Licensing Bench of that city. I do not know a better set of brewers, more open to reason in the matter of the well-being of the community, or more willing to act together, than these Birmingham men. Yet we soon found ourselves up against the difficulty of the small owner. As a rule, the small brewer owns the lowest type of licensed house. But if the Justices withdraw the licence from one of his nine houses on the ground that it is redundant, in all probability they will make his whole business unprofitable. They might as well take away the whole nine as the one, as far as he is concerned. This fact is a continual stumbling-block in the way of the reduction of licences.

“Again, supposing you have two public-houses in a street, one with good premises and management, the other of a lower class altogether. In nine cases out of ten the former will belong to a large company, the latter to a small firm or to an individual owner. When the case

for reduction comes up, the Justices, inspired by sentimental reasons, will say, 'The large company will not feel it,' and take away the licence of the better house—which is quite contrary to the public interest.

"In the matter of improving the premises, we are met with the same trouble. The small man cannot afford to expend the money. And the Justices will refuse consent to the large firm's application on the ground that it will ruin the other's business.

"It is notorious that the difficulties of management are intensified in the small house. The owners or managers of these places cannot afford to offend a customer by strict adherence to the spirit of the licensing laws. So all kinds of abuses and evasions of the law creep in, which would not for a moment be sanctioned in the houses owned by large firms. Yet under the present system it is mainly these houses which receive the most consideration from the Licensing Bench.

"The pretension that the Trade can put all these matters right is sheer nonsense. With the utmost goodwill in the world they are powerless to do so, so long as the competitive element remains, and that means so long as the trade rests in private hands. Competition compels me to brew and sell a stronger liquor than I would like to produce. Competition compels publicans to wink at practices they acutely dislike.

"All these matters could be rapidly reformed if the State purchased the Trade—lock, stock, and barrel. Uniformity of management, economy of production, ruthless cutting down of licences to the actual needs of the community, the elimination of bad liquor, and immense saving in transport, as well as the general provision of amenities and the rigid insistence on regulations for the prevention of excessive drinking—these are the benefits which State Purchase would confer upon the community.

"With rare exceptions, the Trade does not really want to return to the pre-war position. Large profits have undoubtedly been made during the war, but the future is full of uncertainty. Taxation is not likely to be reduced. Improvements requiring a heavy outlay are demanded by the public: if, as I believe, the Trade is unable to reach the new standard of public taste, the consequent outcry will add heavily to the forces in favour of prohibition.

“In view of these and many other considerations I might bring forward, I am of opinion that a fair scheme of State Purchase would be best for the community and best for the trader.”

This is a good instance of the factors that make against reduction of unnecessary licensed houses, but, *per contra*, strongly makes for putting an end to such anomalies, as can only be done by State Purchase.

There is another matter that urges men to push for State Purchase. It is the absurd extravagance in advertisements, and the overlapping in all areas where the Trade is competitive. The economies which would be effected in this direction are so enormous that an expert who knows what has been effected in the Carlisle area by way of stopping this waste, assures me that the State, if it purchased the Trade and did away with unnecessary houses and needless advertisements, would easily be able to add a million to the Exchequer in the economies effected.

But one of the prime factors in urging State Purchase is that the State will at once come into a business which, while it can be controlled, will be a paying concern also. Mr Leif Jones gives as his third reason against State Purchase that the nation has no money wherewith to buy the liquor trade. He puts the possible purchase price at seven hundred millions. Lord Sumner's Committee puts it at about four hundred millions, but let that pass. What he has not realised is that there will be no need of adding to the burden of the taxpayer. For the bulk of the transaction could be in transference of bonds. Any cash that had to be supplied from the Treasury would probably be recouped at the end of the first year's trading. The owner of brewery shares would have fair compensation paid to him, and the State would, if we may judge by the Carlisle experiment, come into a going concern that is financially sound.

At Carlisle the management had been able by the end of last March to recoup one-third of the first cost, and by the end of five years from now it is believed that the whole of the original outlay will be repaid, and the nation will stand possessed of all the valuable properties that it purchased, free from any debt.

Now, what has the Carlisle experiment done to make those who know of its work press upon our legislature not only a continuance of its powers, but an extension of them throughout the land? This can only be answered by remembering

the state of Carlisle as regards the drink traffic in pre-war days.

In 1914 there were 121 licensed houses in Carlisle, and four breweries. Many of the houses were in narrow entries and back streets, which rendered police supervision very difficult; and in many the interior accommodation was cut up into snugs and tiny rooms which lent themselves to secret drinking. Among the licensed premises were six grocers' shops.

With regard to the convictions for drunkenness, the number for the years 1912 to 1915 inclusive averaged 262, or about 49 per 10,000 inhabitants. In contrast with such towns as Bolton (16 per 10,000 in 1913), Preston (20), Wolverhampton (22), Rochdale (23), York (25), Sheffield (31), Carlisle shows up unfavourably.

In 1915 Carlisle was scheduled as a munitions area, and the usual restrictions were imposed in November 1915. Amongst the more important of these restrictions were the cutting down of the hours of sale of intoxicants to five and a half per day; the limitation of off-sales of spirits to the midday opening periods on five days in the week, and to quantities not less than a reputed quart bottle; no treating, no credit, no hawking of liquor, no long pull, compulsory dilution of spirits, and the abolition of the *bona-fide* traveller. Sunday closing was also imposed in the part of the area situated near the Border, so as to prevent migration for drinking purposes on that day.

These restrictions failed to produce the desired result. This was accounted for by the fact that there had been a sudden influx of navy labour into the immediate neighbourhood, where the Government had commenced to build, in the autumn of 1915, an enormous munition factory. This was situated at Gretna, some dozen miles away; and from September 1915 till June 1916 the number of navvies steadily grew, until by the middle of 1916 it is estimated that there were something like eleven thousand navvies lodged at Carlisle. On Saturday afternoons a further two or three thousand from the Gretna area came into the town for shopping and recreation. As a matter of fact, the convictions went up steadily each month after September 1915, thus:—October, 25; November, 59; December, 76; January (1916), 51; February, 73; March, 89; April, 98; May, 114; and June, 139. After that month, although the number of workers remained more or less stationary until the end of the year, the number of convictions dropped considerably.

It was quite clear that more drastic measures would have

to be taken, if both the good name and the sobriety of the town were to be considered, for the sights and scenes at night, and especially on Saturday nights, were often lamentable beyond words. In these circumstances, in June 1916 the Central Control Board decided to put into operation certain wider powers conferred on them by the Liquor Control Regulations, and to acquire the whole of the local trade in a defined area, consisting of the city of Carlisle and a fringe of surrounding country. This work was commenced in July 1916, and the Board at once put a stop to all grocers' licences, closed two of the four breweries, and suppressed in all fifty licences. They did not add to the general restrictions imposed by the Order in November 1915, but the results were visible at once. Thus, while in the first six months of the year the convictions for drunkenness totalled 564, in the last six months the total was 389.

The Board at once went to work to remodel some of the houses they decided to keep open, the general principles of such remodelling including the doing away with back doors and side entrances; the enlarging of the drinking-rooms to ensure greater ease of supervision and more adequate light and air; arranging for food rooms with adequate kitchen equipment at seven selected houses, and rest rooms where necessary; and the redecorating with considerable taste of both the inside and outside. They also did away with all unnecessary liquor advertisements; they arranged the old Post Office as a central tavern, at which the general public could obtain meals throughout the day; and at all their houses managers were placed in charge at a fixed salary, without any interest in the sale of liquor, and these were given a commission on the sale of food and non-alcoholic drinks.

Experience proved that the Carlisle experiment was elastic, and met the needs as they arose. It was seen, for example, that the harmful custom of drinking neat spirits followed immediately by beer was a constant cause of drunkenness. This practice was at once stopped. It was also noted that young people asked for spirits at the bars. A regulation was therefore passed which made it impossible for anyone under eighteen to be supplied with spirits, or with beer except at a meal.

It had been proved that the prohibition of spirits for "on" consumption on Saturdays preceding Christmas Day 1916 and New Year's Day 1917 had had a marked effect in reducing drunkenness, and so in February of 1917 the sale of spirits was prohibited on all Saturdays. The result was very

remarkable. On the seven Saturdays of 1917 preceding this new order, there were 45 arrests for drunkenness; whilst on the 45 remaining Saturdays of that year only 24 arrests were made (of which seven were on St Patrick's Day, which happened to fall on a Saturday). It is interesting to notice that, although these restrictions have now been removed, no bad effect has resulted therefrom; and to the complaints that are sometimes heard, that Carlisle is treated differently from other parts of England, it should be stated that, except for the restriction as to supplying intoxicants to young persons under eighteen, the only restrictions in force now in the Carlisle area are those which affect nineteen-twentieths of the people of England to-day.

This elasticity of the experiment at Carlisle is proof of the ability, under a system of State Purchase, to apply special restrictions to meet special difficulties. Friends of Local Option may be much encouraged thereby.

Not the least important of the temperance measures that were introduced at Carlisle was the sale of food at certain of the public-houses. At such houses, not only are the customers in the house supplied, but the off-sale of cooked food, hot and cold, is carried on, and is taken advantage of to a large extent, especially by children whose mothers are away from home at the dinner hour.

The tariffs throughout the houses show that a substantial dinner can be obtained for 1s. 6d.; a bowl of soup can be obtained for 2d., potato pie for 3d., and a plate of rice pudding for 2d. As many as 100 children will obtain their supplies from a single food house; and the amount of takings from the sale of food alone in seven houses in Carlisle amounted in the year 1918 to no less a sum than £16,370. Great care is taken in the selection of the food. A lady superintendent gives her whole time to the superintendence of the food supply at the taverns and hotels.

Emphasis should be laid on another improvement, namely, the provision of a rest room for factory workers at one of the houses, and the opening of a central building (unlicensed) for hire for meetings of friendly societies and trade unions.

The accounts, as published in the *Carlisle Journal* of the 24th October 1919, show that the capital involved in this area amounted at 31st March 1919 to £853,550, 7s. 9d., while the total trading profits were £137,985, 15s. 6d. After providing for interest on Exchequer and other balances, depreciation of leaseholds, and writing off the preliminary expenditures incurred during the year, the net surplus accruing to the

Exchequer from the area was £98,518, 12s. 5d., which sum gives a surplus of nearly 12 per cent. on the average capital involved, in addition to the interest already provided for—in other words, a full return of 17 per cent. The *Journal* continues:—

“The Carlisle accounts show that from the inception of the scheme up to the 31st March last the total surplus accrued to the Exchequer was £203,911, 9s. 8d., and from them it will be seen that, after meeting all ordinary recurrent expenditure and depreciation, defraying the charges for preliminary expenses and the cost of improvements not estimated to add to the realisable value of the properties, and paying interest on Exchequer issues and unpaid purchase monies, upwards of one-third of the average capital employed in the undertaking has been repaid.”

One need not be a prophet to assert that on the basis of these figures the whole cost will be paid off within the next six years.

As to the social effect: First of all, the Control Board scheme has been an object-lesson in how by a colour scheme and artistic lettering an air of distinction can be given to the public-houses, which were before often eyesores. It has shown that, given opportunities, a man and his wife will both come to take their simple meal in a well-lit, cleanly room. It has proved that food taken at the time of drinking has itself considerable bearing upon temperance. It has shown that it can befriend the working folk who live in a public-house area, by supplying them with hot food to take to their homes at a reasonable price. At its central Gretna tavern it has catered for a class of clerks, shop-workers, etc., who before had no dining-room on a large scale open to them, and in one or two of the other houses it has specially accommodated the factory girls for their midday meal. In a large number of the public-houses in the country tea-rooms have been provided; but it is, of course, on the question of the reduction of drunkenness that the experiment will be most widely judged.

The pre-war average of convictions for drunkenness in the city of Carlisle was about 260 per annum. In 1914 they were 275; in 1915, 277; in 1916, 953; in 1917, 320; in 1918, 80. The 1918 figure of 80 convictions was the lowest on record for Carlisle, and whilst the convictions for drunkenness have, during the year 1919, gone up considerably in other towns, the figure for Carlisle remains at the 1918 level.

As the *Cumberland News* of the 15th November 1919 puts it:—

“Both socially and financially, the Carlisle ‘experiment’ has been fully justified; and there is a growing consensus of opinion that the only satisfactory method of carrying on a necessary trade which is liable to abuse is for the State to become entirely responsible for its conduct.”

It may be well to summarise the results of the Carlisle experiment in the words of the writer of a letter to the *Times* under date 14th November 1919:—

“1. It has effected the suppression of nearly one-half of the licences in the city which were in existence in 1915—and these the worst of the type. This reform would have taken a generation to carry out under the 1904 Act.

“2. It has installed salaried managers, without any interest in the sale of intoxicants, in every licensed house owned by the State, and has encouraged the sale of food and non-intoxicants by means of a liberal commission to the managers on such sales.

“3. It has abolished all grocers’ licences.

“4. It has limited the ‘off’ sales of spirits to less than one-fourth of the number of premises in which they could be obtained before.

“5. It has introduced food into public-houses.

“6. It has done away with all advertisements relating to the sale of intoxicants, and has so altered the external appearance of licensed premises as to eliminate all adventitious aids to the sale of intoxicants.

“7. It has provided places where rest and refreshment can be obtained, without any inducement to buy intoxicants. It has established tea-rooms in country houses.

“8. It has reduced the convictions for drunkenness as under:—

“ In 1914 the convictions were	275
„ 1917 „ „ „	320
„ 1918 „ „ „	80
„ 1919 (10 months) „	56”

In his report for 1919 to the Annual Licensing Sessions on 2nd February 1920, the Chief Constable of Carlisle stated that the number of licensed houses now in the city was 69, being 50 less than in 1915. He commented upon the fact that

the convictions for 1919 would have been less but for the habit of drinking methylated spirit, which appeared to be on the increase, and against which he urged measures should be taken by the Legislature. He added:—

“The number of convictions for drunkenness for the past year, in spite of the augmentation of the police force, the extended hours of sale, the increased supplies of intoxicants, and the return of large numbers of men from the Army (all of whom were in possession of a considerable amount of money from their demobilisation gratuity, and many also in receipt of unemployment donation), has again touched a low record at 78, being two below the number for 1918. This is a very satisfactory state of affairs, especially when it is compared with the figures of many of the other towns in the country, where a substantial increase in the number of convictions has occurred. The orderly condition of the streets shows that these figures are a fair index of the sobriety of the city. The continuance of sobriety I attribute almost entirely to the system under which intoxicants are sold in Carlisle, where none of the managers have any interest in the amount of liquor sold, and all are given strict instructions not to serve customers who appear to have had enough. I am unable to account for it in any other way, for while Carlisle is unique in its licensing system, it is subject to all the causes just mentioned, which, in the country generally, have contributed to a very decided increase in drunkenness. There can be no question in the minds of careful and impartial observers that the direct management of the licensed trade by the Control Board has been of great benefit to the city.”

It may not be out of place here to quote the concluding paragraph of Sir Edgar Sanders' last report (White Paper Cmd. 137 of 1919), which is well worth careful study:—

“Whatever be its fate, the ‘Carlisle experiment’ will have left its mark on the social history of this country. It is the first piece of constructive licensing reform undertaken with the prestige and authority of a Government department. It has shown that the liquor trade can be carried on, subject to reasonable regulation, without detriment to the well-being of the community, and without undue interference with the liberty, tastes, and preferences of the large mass of the adult population.

It has shown that the transfer from private ownership to public control can be carried through without undue friction and without loss to the National Exchequer. Above all, it has offered a new solution of the problem of intemperance."

Those who wish for further information with regard to the "Carlisle experiment" are referred to the exceedingly interesting report of the General Manager just mentioned, which can be obtained from H.M. Stationery Office, at Imperial House, Kingsway, London, W.C. 2, or through any bookseller, for 9d.; and the two following publications contain chapters on the same subject:—*The Control of the Drink Trade*, by the Rev. Henry Carter (Longmans, Green & Co., 2nd edition); *State Purchase of the Liquor Trade*, by Joseph Rowntree and Arthur Sherwell (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1s. net).

H. D. RAWNSLEY.

CARLISLE.

THE CHILD OF GENIUS.

SIR GEORGE DOUGLAS, BART.

“ Long time a child, and still a child, when years
Had painted manhood on my cheek, was I ;
For yet I lived like one not born to die,
A thriftless prodigal of smiles and tears.” . . .

I WOULD ask the reader to visualise a diminutive middle-aged man—standing scarcely over five feet in his shoes, and looking older than his fifty years. He is clumsily dressed ; his figure is odd and ungainly and his countenance homely, notwithstanding that the excessive breadth of the nose is redeemed by width of brow and depth of eye. His hair is prematurely white, and there is something questionable about him. For he is not of the common breed, nor yet what is called distinguished ; but, rather, singular. So long as it is in repose, his countenance is stern, to the point of appearing “almost startling,”—this by admission of the witness who knew him best of all. In the conventionally-minded such a figure is bound to inspire dislike, in the indifferent curiosity,—sympathy only in the simple or select, who divine that he has a burden of his own to bear, poor soul ! Once take him out of himself, however, and his native humanity works like a charm. And I think you will best accomplish this by setting him talking ; for he belongs, as De Quincey did, to the class of talkers. Talk is his *métier*. What a pity—no, what a blessing it is that this class of talk has never yet been paid for ! It remains virgin amid prostitution. It is the only manifestation of genius out of which a living cannot be made. And, as our dwarfish acquaintance talks, his aspect is transformed. All that has hitherto been forbidding in his expression disappears. His dark eye glows and smoulders as he speaks, and the strangeness of his manner yields to, and is fused in, the warm genial tide of his discourse. But there is this of special irony in his circumstances, that his talk has almost always to be addressed to those who cannot possibly understand, or, say rather, appreciate it. For the most part, his is

a voice crying, or declaiming, in a wilderness. We hear, for example, of his discoursing of metaphysics to a hind, or pouring forth his views on history to farmers storm-stayed in a wayside inn. And though he is said to have delighted his hearers, something less than encyclopædic knowledge, and command of language such as his, might have sufficed for that consummation. The Nemesis of brilliant talk is that so much of it must always run to waste. So, talking thus, our little friend may he said to have talked his gifts away. For what is left of him in books is not, I doubt, his best. He was conscious of this, and this knowledge served to deepen the shadow which lay upon his life.

Suppose these oddly assorted attributes—this dull exterior and this dazzling brain—to have aroused a momentary curiosity, the reader might be tempted to inquire as to the antecedents of this Vagabond Philosopher. He would be answered readily enough that the little man lived, as a lodger, with a small farmer and his wife; that he was poor, but a mighty scholar, and divided his time between writing, desultory study, and rambling afield. And then, with the utmost indulgence, the cat would be let out of the bag. The good gentleman was no man's enemy but his own. And, in silence, the gesture of quaffing would be made. So, then! that was the heart of this poor rustic Hamlet's mystery.

Further inquiry might elicit his story. He was sprung from the highest aristocracy of intellect, and his poet father—mindful of a miserable boyhood dragged out amid London streets—had consigned him early to Lakeland, to be brought up and educated. And there, when he was six years old, the great Seer of those mountains had cast his horoscope. Strong in his own great powers of self-control and sense of duty, the diviner had pored with anxious foreboding upon that fragile elf, dowered with such tremulous sensibility, whose every movement seemed to obey some impulse peculiar to itself. What power would be its shield and guide in after life, amid the rude shocks of the world; or would restrain an innocent impulsiveness from degenerating into license? The prophet, optimistic as his nature was, found himself reduced to hoping for the best. Might Heaven avert the doom!

The child's early years, spent at Keswick under kind guardianship, were the happiest of his life. For schooldays brought to light the singularity which was his portion. "*J'étais trop différent,*" remarked Stendhal, with self-pity that was not unjustified. But the grown man may make shift to put up with that difference which bears so

heavily on a child. Young Hartley Coleridge could not catch a ball nor shy one, punt or drive it. Boyish dexterity had in fact been omitted from his composition, which, ironically enough, had an extra share of impressibility in place of it. Hence he took no part in school games—"never played" is his biographer's grim phrase. Only at night-time, in the dormitory, as the spinner of endless yarns to breathless hearers, did he enter into his own. Worst of all, his schoolmates had soon made him aware of the oddness of his appearance, and this to one so avid of admiration was a source of secret grief. But, though debarred from excelling in the palæstra, scholastic distinction remained open to him. His father—as little like other fathers as he himself was like other boys—had drawn up a Greek grammar for the tiro's exclusive use—thus embodying a deep affection in a form inapt to please. But young Hartley made good use of it, and entered Oxford under promising auspices. Of his undergraduate course, however, the most memorable experience was deep mortification occasioned by his failure to carry off the English Verse prize. Here was fresh disillusionment—disillusionment scarcely conceivable perhaps by any other. And whereas most young men would have learned from it, it merely wounded him. In an analysis of the character of Hamlet, he was long afterwards to write as follows: "They (the Hamlets of life) will generally be found, either by a course of study and meditation too remote from the art and practice of life, by designs too pure and perfect to be executed in earthly materials, or from imperfect glimpses of an intuition beyond the defined limits of communicable knowledge, to have severed themselves from the common society of human feelings and opinions." . . . This is well expressed, nor can there be much doubt that he is here interpreting the creation of another poet by a reference to his own inner life. Upon the whole, however, his academic course was successful, for at the age of twenty-four (1820) he won a Fellowship at Oriel. But this was the turning-point of his career. He was not cut out for a College don, and it is difficult to avoid suspecting that he had his own experience in mind when writing as follows of the great Bentley's notoriously unhappy relations with his colleagues: "Worse than all, he did not associate with them, he could not be 'one of us' among them, and of all crimes which any man can commit against common-room, corporation, or coterie, of which he is an enrolled member, this is the most grievous." . . . Be this as it may, the voicing of heterodox opinions and the harbouring of an undesirable in his rooms supplied specific grounds for com-

plaint against Hartley Coleridge. But the head and front of his offending was more serious than this, being nothing less than a charge of intemperance, which led to his being deprived of his Fellowship at the end of the probationary year. His friends endeavoured to stand by him, but their efforts merely served to swell the buzz of tongues aroused by such a scandal. So, disastrously, ended young Coleridge's brief period of defiance of constituted authority. And though the expression "broken-hearted" is essentially poetical, in the sense that henceforward he was permanently discouraged, permanently disposed to rank himself with the defeated in life's battle, it may be applied to him. It is certainly a little unfortunate that Shelley, Hartley Coleridge, and, in less degree, Swinburne, should all of them have fallen foul of university authority. But no blame rests with that authority. For colleges, as the name implies, are democratic institutions, and must be conducted for the good of the majority even though genius have to pay for it.

Taking up his abode in London, the deprived Fellow now essayed to support himself by literature,—a project which at first sight appeared promising, for he composed with ease—many of his poems partaking of the nature of improvisation—whilst the name he bore, coupled with the fact that he had Southey for uncle and Wordsworth and Wilson for friends, would facilitate his access to editors. None the less did this new attempt prove a failure, to be abandoned as hopeless after a trial of two years; and this notwithstanding his own acknowledgment (*Essays*, vol. ii. p. 79) that the "veriest bookseller's drudge makes more, I say not than an honest journeyman or day-labourer, but than a man without interest can calculate on doing in the Church, Army, or Navy." The temptations of London might be blamed for this fresh disappointment, were one not aware that, for nearly half the period of his residence there, he lived with those hospitable friends of literary men, the Basil Montagus, who might be trusted to take good care of him. More plausible, then, is the view (which his brother seems to countenance) that he was the victim of congenital weakness of will, transmitted to him by the great lymphatic dreamer who left "Christabel," "Kubla Khan," and "The Three Graves" unfinished. And, for one so penalised, the great drawback of the literary life is that he is his own taskmaster—free to take up his work, or lay it down, as the spirit moves. A career to which this objection would not apply was now sought out for him, and was found in that *ne plus ultra* of routine, the life of a schoolmaster. Alphonse Daudet has feelingly described the woes

of one who teaches school against the grain, and has drawn on his own recollections for the details of the picture. But whereas Daudet was good-looking and of good address, Hartley Coleridge, in addition to all Daudet's capacity for misery, laboured under the initial disadvantage of a grotesque appearance, or at least believed he did so. His experience of pupils at Oxford had already been unfavourable, and being now called upon to spend a thirteen-hours day in the society of schoolboys, it is by no means surprising that they got upon his nerves by day and haunted his dreams by night. He had no skill whatever in maintaining discipline, and has himself acknowledged that his days at this time were passed in a state "more nearly related to fear than to anything else." The wonder is that he contrived to endure this purgatory for as long as four or five years. It was, however, his last hope of earning a living according to the recognised methods of ordinary men. For, if we except a few months' tutoring at Sedbergh—where, strange to say, he was happy and got on well—and a brief sojourn with a Leeds bookseller for whom he did hackwork, his retirement from the Ambleside school marks the close of his active career. Twenty years or so of life remained to him; but henceforth he lived mainly as the birds live, or, in other words, as impulse prompted—a law unto himself. Thus was Wordsworth's prophecy fulfilled. And had Hartley only found happiness in freedom from conventional restraint, the writer would be the last man to quarrel with him for indulging it. But I fear that his was less a case of active self-emancipation than of the passive dreeing of a weird. He failed fully to realise himself, and, in so failing, missed the chief good of life. How far he was himself responsible for this, how far he was the mere creature of fate, or inheritor of a curse, is a nice, even a fascinating question, which can never be finally resolved. Yet I hope to show that, as his life was not wholly futile, so neither was it wholly unhappy.

First, then, as to his literary legacy to posterity. This consists of five volumes of verse and prose, of which three were published posthumously; and it may be as well to acknowledge from the outset that the final impression they produce is that of an author who has it in him to do better than he has done. A page or passage here or there in his prose, a sonnet, line, or lyric in his verse, go to establish that conviction. His *magnum opus* as regards bulk is the unfinished *Biographia Borealis*, or Lives of Northern Worthies, which he undertook to execute for the Leeds publisher—a piece of literary hackwork from which the generic marks of

its kind are happily absent; for the greater part of it is written with freedom and spirit, just as though the artificer had joyed in his performance, as we may be sure he did. But, though an individual and original piece of work, it is none the less far from satisfying,—as witness the poverty of criticism in the article on Congreve, and the minute details in regard to Bentley's lawsuits, which, though narrated with gusto, are out of place in a brief notice of a great man. Without insisting too much on the distinction, it may be said, then, that these Northern Studies display more of liveliness than justice, as doubtless also more of reading and research than of felicity in portraiture or skill in hitting the mark. And as with these papers, so is it, in more or less degree, with the shorter pieces which make up the two volumes of Essays and Marginalia. In addition to numerous animated comments on the Bible, Shakespeare, and the British poets generally, these comprise a fair selection of the author's magazine articles, which are of very various merit. The most characteristic, such as, for instance, the series headed "Ignoramus on the Fine Arts," may be taken as illustrating the qualities which gave brilliance to the author's monologue: namely, native wit and facetiousness, together with command over wide reading, displaying itself chiefly in illustration and allusion. Delightful as these are, however, they are not seldom overdone—a fault doubtless fostered in the younger writer by the influence of Kit North, his friend and editor, as was also the detestable mannerism of futile phrase-making, which would overlay a grain of meaning with half a ton of words. In the rapidity of impromptu speech, such faults as these may even pass as merits. Print betrays them. And the same may be said of a yet graver defect. It is Professor Saintsbury, if I remember rightly, who has taken exception to the great bulk of De Quincey's writing as being made up mainly of "rigmarole,"—thus implying, as I understand, that it lacks a vital and essential principle of development, that its progress is dictated by whim or chance as much as by purpose, and that a large part of it consists, in fact, of writing for writing's sake. Well, precisely the same objection may be urged against the prose of Hartley Coleridge, who not only responded with feminine readiness to outside influences, but was likewise betrayed by his own native facility. To fill a sheet with sprightly matter cost him small effort, and so long as he accomplished this, neither verbal castigation nor the principles of literary construction troubled him. It is not thus that a good style is formed, or good work turned

out, and it indicates but too surely a lack of whole-hearted devotion to his craft. But spontaneity, though by no means the last word in literary composition, is the first essential in the art of talking. And hence it becomes intelligible that the spoken word of the younger Coleridge should have been so much more impressive to his hearers than, for all its brightness and animation, is his written word to ourselves.

It is by virtue of his verse, and mainly of his sonnets, that his name is still remembered in literature as distinct from literary history. His longest poem—the blank-verse tale of “Leonard and Susan”—has none of the exquisite naturalness of similar tales by Tennyson and Wordsworth; whilst of the shorter pieces many are simply trivial, exhibiting the characteristics of album verses (which not a few of them are), and exciting impatience by their presence anywhere but in an album. For this, however, the editor rather than the author is to blame. Of much deeper and more lasting interest is the handful of sonnets which reveal his own personality and trace the workings of his mind upon itself. For Hartley Coleridge, philosophic student as he was, had given much study to his own being, and the results of that study, though not wholly free from morbidity, serve to throw an interesting and pathetic light on a rare and in some sense representative existence. It was Humboldt, I think, who declared it to be for the advantage of humanity that the greatest possible variety of human types should be produced; and if this were demonstrable in Humboldt’s day, much more so is it, surely, at a time when individuality yields daily to collectivism. What, then, do the sonnets in question reveal? As I read them, mainly a character at war with itself—a self-deprecating and self-accusing spirit, whose abnormal sensitiveness leads it, perhaps, to exaggerate its own defects and delinquencies. And this, as I read the riddle, is the essential Hartley Coleridge.

If he chose to look for them, there can be no doubt that he might easily find causes enough for being unhappy. For one thing, he was an ardent admirer of womankind, and yet firmly convinced that no woman could care for him as he alone wished to be cared for—that is, in his own words, not for his sake but for her own. In this, his homely appearance notwithstanding, he may well have been mistaken, all the more so if there be truth in the aphorism I have heard enunciated, that a man loves with his eye, but a woman with her ear. Then, though intellectually brilliant, sincerely religious and essentially amiable, his qualities had done little for him; for despite the staunch attachment of Wordsworth and other noble-minded

men, he lived in doubtful repute, in some respects not unlike a species of pariah. Why was this? His poetical confessions lead us to the conclusion that it was partly his own fault, and partly due to the "adamantine stress of things," as expressed in the peculiar constitution he had inherited. Bitter, indeed, is the self-reproach with which he looks back "on many a murdered morn"; bitter the reflection

"For I have lost the race I never ran."

But at once more fatalistic and complacent, or at least resigned, is the sonnet (No. XI) in which, after painting his own native irresponsibility, he is driven to acknowledge that, after all, a nature such as his has consolations of its own,—his "sweet it were for ever so to roam" being, indeed, the less tragic counterpart of Leopardi's famous line,

"E il naufragar m'è dolce in questo mare."

What, then, of his self-accusations on account of a career gone grievously awry? His intemperance cannot be denied, but candour likewise demands the acknowledgment that, whatever Nemesis may follow, the drink-habit is not necessarily fatal to the production of inspired verse, or even of very large quantities of the same. Our own age has proved that. Probably the worst witness against Hartley Coleridge is Mrs Gordon, a daughter of Christopher North and authoress of his *Life*, who, after telling of the little man's eager escape from a room in which her father had imprisoned him pending the accomplishment of a prescribed task, goes on to describe him (*Life of North*, vol. ii. p. 134) as "hidden in some obscure den, where, drinking among low companions, his mind was soon brought to a level with theirs. Then these clouds would after a time pass away, and he again returned to the society of those who could appreciate him, and who never ceased to love him." This account of Hartley's habits is no doubt substantially correct, and the first clause of the passage cited is in truth deplorable enough. The second clause, however, goes a long way towards redeeming it. And, in support of this evidence as to the esteem in which he continued to be held by the Elleray circle, we have the following statement from a witness so unimpeachable as James Spedding (*Memoir of Hartley Coleridge*, p. cxliii): "The error of his life sprung, I suppose, from moral incapacity of some kind—his way of life seemed in some things destructive of self-respect, and was certainly regarded by himself with a feeling of shame, which in his seasons of self-communion became passionate;—and yet *it did not at all degrade his mind*. It left, not his understanding only, but also

his imagination and feelings, perfectly healthy—free, fresh, and pure.” All who have ever felt interested in Hartley Coleridge—and as these were many in his own day, so I believe they are not few to-day—will rejoice over the above testimony, and will, I think, admit the probability that the same tenderness of conscience which preserved his integrity may have led him to magnify his misdeeds. That his career belied its early promise may be conceded. But Nature, which produces plenty of effective characters who are not interesting, produces also ineffectuals who are both interesting and sympathetic, and it is as a type of the latter class that Hartley Coleridge descends to posterity.

So long as he does it by legitimate and not unbecoming means, the man who breaks down the barriers which divide social classes, thus promoting better mutual understanding, deserves well of his generation. And in this respect, at least, Hartley Coleridge rendered good service. At the time when we meet him in the pages of this brief notice, he was living at the Nab Farm, by Grasmere, and associating on terms of perfect equality with the neighbouring peasantry, as a frequent caller at cottage and farmhouse throughout a wide extent of that beautiful countryside, and a welcome guest at sheep-shearings, rush-bearings, weddings, christenings, and other rural festivities. He died in January 1849, at the age of fifty-two, and, by Wordsworth's direction, was interred alongside the spot where he himself designed to lie. His life had come near to realising that of Arnold's Scholar Gipsy, or of Gray's youth “to fortune and to fame unknown,” and the epitaph of the latter may be fitly applied to him.

More than thirty years after his death, a friend of my own devoted some labour to collecting ungarnered traditions of the distinguished men of his period, which were still recoverable in Lakeland. She found traces and stories of Wordsworth, Southey, De Quincey, and John Wilson, and knowing, as she did, that your Westmorland peasant is apt to be shrewd and outspoken and to cherish no delusions, she was not surprised to discover, in all these cases, censure tempering appreciation. She also brought to light recollections of Hartley Coleridge, and it is strange to tell that of him, the black sheep and the unsaved soul, not one of her informants, male or female, had aught but kindly speech to utter.

“Love had he found in huts where poor men dwell,”

and he who does that lives not in vain. His memory was still fragrant. *Requiescat.*

EVANGELISM OLD AND NEW.

REV. A. T. CADOUX, D.D.

FEW of to-day's preachers do not feelingly recall a now long-obsolent evangelism widely different from their own. The older evangelist was convinced that unless his hearers accepted his message before death ended their ever-shortening opportunity they were doomed to an eternity of torment. And this risk was both matter for an overwhelmingly strong appeal and the source of an urgency in the preacher which was wonderfully effectual; and though all did not use it as means for playing directly upon their hearers' feelings, many preferring to speak of the divine redemptive love, nevertheless, whether explicitly enforced or not, this unspeakably fearful fate of the unrepentant dominated the whole purview of the message and could not but move a sensitive speaker to an agony of earnestness.

To-day we seldom hear this presentation, and those who use it complain that it grows ineffective. We have become more and more convinced that God's love forbids us to look upon death as the final closure of life's greatest opportunity and that the nature of the punishment proclaimed and the emphasis put upon it did injury to the quality of His righteousness. Men and women rightly, though perhaps dimly, apprehend that if God is the highest goodness, then in man's greatest transactions with Him a dominant part must not be played by so low a motive as concern for one's own safety.

So the preacher of to-day, possessed by worthier thoughts of God's ways, forgoes his predecessor's use of hell. And yet, despite his assurance that he has a more adequate conception of the divine love, he is ever vexed by the painful consciousness that his preaching lacks the urgency of the older evangel—which, of course, creates misgiving and so calls for a further examination of the two positions.

For if the older evangelism had an easier road to urgency

and was yet less true than its successor, it may—and in the nature of things probably will—be found that the immediate advantage was more than counterbalanced by concomitant evils. A business man may create an artificial demand for his wares, do a profitable trade for a time, and then bequeath lean years to his successors. And it is conceivable that the same thing may happen in religion, and that the older evangelism's forcing of results may have discounted the growing spirituality of the race and anticipated the resources of the present generation.

It is clear enough that the questionable premises of this older appeal had their counterpart in very serious practical consequences. The very source of its urgency tended to compromise the ethical purity and sublimity, and so to vitiate the effect, of the Gospel. Not only was God's love confronted in the fate of the lost by a damaging and unanswerable question, but He was made to seem more concerned in the exhibition of His hatred for sin than in the increase of righteousness, His majesty being somehow supposed to be more implicated in the former than in the latter. The pronouncement of an infinite penalty for the sin of a short lifetime introduced into divine justice something that from any human standpoint was decidedly excessive. No attempt could be made to justify it by an appeal to conscience: the greatness of the punishment was taken to prove the extent of ill-merit, and thus conscience was overridden by dogma. The stupendous nature of the expected penalty almost dignified the sinful life and went far to divert attention from that meanest element of sin, the suffering which it brings to others. And all this resulted in prompting the sinner rather to fear the horrid fate to which he might go than to loathe the sin that was held to deserve it.

These unethical elements in the old evangelism produced two results: they secured its obsolescence, and prejudiced the interests of its successor. As soon as attention was pointed to the questionable character which it imputed to God, the credal base of its hold upon the age began to dissolve, for the modern age is inexorable in the application of ethical criteria to religion. And the continual emphasis upon the fearful penalty of sin could not but result in diminishing the emphasis upon the intrinsic hatefulness of sin itself, so that when at last the appeal of the former began to weaken, the ethical and spiritual sense of the hatefulness of sin was found lamentably reduced. When, therefore, the modern preacher, conscious that hatred of sin ought to be as urgent with him and his

hearers as the fear of hell was to the older evangelism, finds, despite all his effort and heart-searching, that it is not so, part at least of the cause of this defect must be set down to the debit of his predecessors.

Another aspect of the ethical deficiency of this older evangelism is that the main consideration and dynamic in the process of conversion did not lead directly to the positive values and activities of good life. When all allowances have been made, no one can deny that the most important thing in its eyes was by an act of faith to escape from hell and be assured of heaven: "lost" was an incomparably more tragic word than "unsanctified." This tended to make the interval between conversion and death comparatively irrelevant: nothing half so critical and important was before the saved soul as the crisis through which he had already passed and beside which all else must shrink into insignificance. The very danger which, he believed, God had attached to his former state and the means which God had provided of escaping that danger once for all, could not but suggest that his escape from the consequences of disobedience was really more important than the doing of God's will. Hence his most important relationship to God exerted no direct pressure upon the activities of his remaining life: he was spiritually in the position of a man who finds himself suddenly enriched but without any imperative call for activity in any particular direction. The less earnest kind of man was very likely to become the spiritual counterpart of the Rich Fool: disburdened of life's greatest fear for the future, and confirmed in the supposition that to be so was to have completed life's most important transaction, he found it not inconsistent to devote the main energies of his remaining days to securing the future's immunity from minor risks by "laying up for himself treasures upon earth."

The more earnest man, moved by the awfulness of the fate from which he had escaped, was eager to offer the escape to others. But, apart from the fact that in their case, too, he was more concerned with release from the punishment of sin than with the positive increase of righteousness, it cannot be denied that the endeavour to save others did not follow as the supremely important thing to which his own conversion turned him; it sprang rather from a natural pity for his fellows than from the most important point of his relationship with God. His own salvation did not depend on it, but had been defined in terms of immunity for himself from the pains of hell and assurance of the bliss of heaven; and these had been secured. No doubt the divine love and redemptive activity to which he

owed his security suggested that he should imitate them, but the point is that the older evangelism did not make human imitation and participation of the divine redemptive activity the supreme thing, which with it was rather the benefit of safety accruing therefrom ; and in our ethical and spiritual life everything depends not upon that which we include in our scheme but upon that which we make supreme, and which therefore controls the actual movement of life. So that, according to the scheme of the older evangelism, the supreme interest of life was secured at conversion and was without direct and vital connection with the activities of the life that followed, so that it was possible for the evangelical interest to proceed with little reference to the ethical.

From all this it followed that the intensest evangelical interest was not inseparably connected with the endeavour after social betterment. When you had been the means of assuring a man escape from endless torment and the assurance of endless bliss, his condition and circumstances for the few remaining years of life were of very small account, and the call to improve them was drowned in the cry to save more souls from hell. Such an evangelism can pursue its way unencumbered by the sense of social obligation, and is only too easily obvious to the charge of indifference to the aspirations of the masses. It became lamentably possible for the main stream of Church life to run in channels quite unconnected with those of the most significant social movements of the day. And thus was bequeathed to the preacher of to-day one of his greatest difficulties, consisting on the one hand of the accusation that the Church stands aloof from social and industrial reform, and on the other hand of the extreme difficulty of dealing Christianly with the social and industrial problems of to-day under the handicap of accumulated and overdue arrears inherited from a past generation.

The statement of these considerations must not be construed into a wholesale attack upon the practical goodness of a bygone time. Amongst the older evangelicals were a multitude of men and women of saintly life and unwearied beneficence and not a few of the pioneers of social and industrial reform ; for the most inadequate theology cannot altogether obliterate the Sermon on the Mount or sterilise the influence of its Preacher. But the fact that wrong strains of thought do thus find partial correction in humble and pure hearts ought not to withhold us from recognising their wrongness and danger.

But to come to the evangelism of to-day, how is the

preacher to make men feel the importance of the Gospel of Christ? As we have seen, the older preacher had his constraint of soul from the envisaged risk of unending penalties; but if his successor is right in holding that the hatred of sin itself should be the moving factor and that the former, being a self-regarding sentiment, cannot have the same power over the better nature of man as the latter, then he ought to be able to give effect to his conviction by making the new evangel more urgent than the old, and rousing an abhorrence of sin greater than any fear for the future. But he is here obstructed by that characteristic of the sinful state which produces an obtuseness to the heinousness of sin. To save the soul the hatefulness of sin needs an emphasis which the sinful soul cannot yield; and it was doubtless the conscious or unconscious recognition of this that drove the older evangelism to seek the necessary stimulant in the fear of hell. But if that way is wrong, is there any other? The only alternative is to find what we need in the Cross, where the vision of what sin is to God shall quicken conscience into truth. The theory of the older evangelist helped him to miss this lever. For the problem is to bring home to the soul the eternal truth about sin—that is, God's relationship to it,—and to his thought God's penalisation of sin was the point from which the necessity of the death of Jesus must be explained: he interpreted Golgotha in the terms of Gehenna, and in the attempt to be fundamental always found himself in the nether world; but, as we have seen, there is no foundation here: the pit is bottomless.

The new evangelism has surely been right in making the Cross absolutely fundamental in God's relationship to sin, in believing God's deepest reaction against sin to be that He suffers, not that He inflicts. Not in the prospective sufferings of the lost hereafter, but in the suffering of Christ and of God in Christ must the preacher find the means to make the soul feel the truth concerning sin and discover that compelling vision of its hatefulness which man's own dulled conscience cannot evoke.

The manifold wealth of this vision has been used indeed, but as yet only sparingly. Relieved from dogmatic diversions, the simple story of the death of Jesus becomes the most terrible of all revelations and condemnations of sin; but this is so patent that it needs no elaboration. The way in which Jesus forced the representatives of His people to a choice concerning Him is deeply significant of the truth that in face of human opposition God is not merely passive, that in face of God's pursuing love man must either yield or proceed to

such extremities of opposition as the Cross made manifest. And Jesus' acceptance of the Cross as the divine reply to opposition makes clear that the final truth of sin is in God's suffering rather than the sinner's.

Jesus suffered by sympathy with the suffering which a sinful world must draw upon itself. But, as we have seen, the suffering visibly occasioned by sin falls largely upon others than the sinner, to see which adds to sympathy a painful loathing of the selfishness of sin. So that the consequences of sin as seen in the suffering of Jesus make this strong appeal to the altruistic in man as compared with the individualistic appeal of the torments of hell.

Jesus' sympathy for the suffering that sin brings was but a concomitant of that still heavier burden of agony which He found in the sin itself. For Jesus was greater than Gautama in this, that the sin of man was more painful to Him than even its suffering. But when we consider what the hateful-ness and degradation of sin meant to Him we at once apprehend that the pain of these things was the direct result of the splendour of His vision of humanity and of His assurance that the vision disclosed a real and imminent possibility. It is clear what an appeal this makes to the higher part of our active nature. The threat of hell may lead to frantic activity of a lower sort, but the vision of imminently possible achievement calls piercingly to the highest in man. It is the Master's own cry, "The Kingdom of God is at hand : repent."

But we need further to remember that the sorrow of Christ over the sin of man is not merely the grief of the artist for a disfigured landscape : it is the grief of a mother over the reversal of her vision for her child. Behind the sorrow and the vision was a love for men so complete that when its beneficent purpose was foiled nothing in the universe could bring solace to His heart. For the characteristic of sin is that it adds torture to the love whose intent it thwarts. All the gold of Christ's great vision of what man might be consisted in the fellowship of God with man, and of man with his fellow, a fellowship the means to which grew where the vision had its source—in God's love, in the Father's infinite desire for the fellowship of His children ; and the essence of sin is that it breaks all fellowship, human and divine. Behind the undoing of the vision lay the still deeper hurt of fellowship disrupted and denied.

Nor must we shut our eyes to what is involved in the refusal to believe in that abrogation of human freedom and of possibility of repentance implied in an everlasting hell. If God's gift of freedom to man is irrevocable so that it will

never be impossible for him to repent, we cannot refuse to acknowledge that this freedom must likewise entail the power always to persist in refusal; and we have to bear in mind the psychological law that refusal on one occasion makes a second refusal probable, and to recognise that there is no reason to suppose that it will be easier to turn to God hereafter than now, but on the contrary that it will be harder to do in a future life what ought already to have been done in this. And, of course, when we think rather of the hatefulness of sin than its punishment, every day's delay is not merely an increase of risk but in itself a dead loss. These considerations must be given their full weight if we would see the seriousness of the opposition which sin presents to the love and purpose of God and the reality and intensity of the pain which it inflicts upon Him.

Here, then, in the love that could and did and does so suffer, lies God's final answer to sin, and here surely is an appeal that ought to be stronger, a motive that ought to be more urgent, than any impending punishment. And yet the preacher will probably say, "Yes, here it ought to be found, but as a matter of fact it is not." He has thought these things, and yet when he stands before his congregation he is conscious that if he believed that his hearers were doomed to an eternity of torment unless they accepted his message before death he would probably be much more urgent than he is. And if he feels so, let him not despair. The reason and the remedy are near at hand. It is the dullness of his own conscience that feels not the stress of the vision of what man may be; it is his own love's lack of intensity and purity that fails to catch the urgency of God's love; it is, in fact, in his own heart, the very blindness and lovelessness that crucified his Master and drew from God the conquering answer of a love that loved and suffered to the uttermost. And so he finds that he cannot preach the gospel to others except in the very act of finding a gospel for himself. He can never offer the salvation of God's love to the world without being constrained feelingly to acknowledge his utter and immediate dependence on that love.

"So shall all speech of now and of to-morrow,
 All He hath shown me or shall show me yet,
 Spring from an infinite and tender sorrow,
 Burst from a burning passion of regret:
 Standing afar I summon you anigh Him,
 Yes, to the multitudes I shout and say,
 'This is my King! I preach and I deny Him,
 Christ! whom I crucify anew to-day.'"

His gospel is not a proposition to be passed on like a recipe: it is a fire with which the imparted burns. He preaches to his last day with the fervour of a new convert.

Another aspect of the same general relationship shows us again that the new evangelism compels the preacher to keep close to his base. We are far more willing to save souls from hell than to do our utmost to make them outshine us in all that is best. In pity for the fate of sinners there may easily be a sense of superiority which contributes to our good opinion of ourselves: in loving the vision of what others may be, in glorying as we look down the future to see them achieve that beside which our present state is absurdly and disgracefully low, there must needs be much humility. The love that longs to see this and that man "attain to the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ" is a higher, harder quality than the love that would rescue from the fire. In the one case fervour in preaching is compatible with not a little self-exaltation: in the other case there is a direct and healthful correspondence between humility of heart and earnestness of speech.

We must also bear in mind the advantage of the new evangelism in preaching a salvation that is not a supreme crisis which, having been achieved, leaves the after-life with no interest that is not secondary, but one that is rather the secured beginning of an unending climax. It sees that in the Cross the heart of God achieved for itself an adequate comment upon man's refusal to realise the great vision of what might be, the vision which God's love apprehended and His offer of co-operation made possible. To believe this is to be lifted to God's way of thinking, and so to feel the power of His love: it is to see again God's vision of ourselves and the world, and by the pulse of His life in our being to be assured that it is possible, and to be drawn to dedicate ourselves to its achievement. To be saved is to find this vision, this hope, this power, this divine fellowship. The security is not that which makes action irrelevant, but that which makes it effective. Salvation is not a paid-up policy payable at death, but a treasure-trove in the field of common earth that shall endlessly enlarge and ennoble the life and activities of the possessor.

As we have seen, this promise of life makes a very strong appeal to all that is highest in modern life, and we can add, in passing, that the evangelism that makes it also provides the right atmosphere for its productiveness. While the older evangelism found a shorter way to immediate effects the climate of its thoughts was not so wholesome as that of the

new. The chief source of its power being the fate of the soul after death, and the picture of heaven being not nearly so moving as that of hell, it suffered from the fact that the contemplation of the horrible depresses and is thus inimical to activity, and that fear, though it may produce intense activity, is rather a stimulant than an energiser, and accomplishes its effects at the expense of future reaction. Now, the new evangelist may, and indeed must, see man casting himself in utter self-despair upon God, but he would see no salvation there unless he could share God's vision of the penitent growing up into Christ Jesus and finding life's glory in sharing the travail that regenerates the world. So that his basal vision and the source of his power stir the activities of the soul with hope and enablement, and flood it with a vitalising joy. This distinction, of course, must not be exaggerated. The older evangelist had his sunshine, and the newer knows the use of shadow; but on the whole it cannot be denied that the latter's chamber of imagery is more exhilarating and energising, and so psychologically sounder, than the former's.

The relation also of the new evangelist to social betterment is very different from that of the old: it becomes an essential part of the vision and hope and intent which are the forward elements of his salvation. For the vision of what man may be includes, of necessity, all conditions needful to the full development of his bodily, mental, and spiritual stature. And the identification of sin as the negation of fellowship makes it impossible that anything which, on behalf of class distinction or privilege, opposes the dictates of universal brotherhood should be able any longer to dissemble its tainted parentage. The central power of his Gospel is aimed directly at the selfishness and self-preference in which the injustices of the world have their stronghold.

We may, perhaps, be accused of doing scant justice to the new evangelism. We have shifted the emphasis from sin's punishment to sin itself, whereas it may be maintained that the new evangelism goes a step further, and puts the emphasis upon the love and goodness of God. But we must not forget that both the Sermon on the Mount and the Epistle to the Romans find God's love to show most Godlike where it deals with the sin of man (Matt. v. 43-48; Rom. v. 8). And to lose sight of this is to change "the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ" for a God whose goodwill is shallower than His world's evil. To atrophy the sense of sin is to close the approach to our most vivid enjoyment of God's love. For the sense

of sin, except in its lower (or less genuine because more self-regarding) stages, is not a depressing experience. "There is joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth," and to repent is to share heaven's thought. How essential a sense of sin is to any true thought of God appears at once when we see what must happen in its absence,—if a man thinks of himself and is satisfied to be as he is, if he thinks of God and dreams that he has fulfilled God's thought of him, obviously he has uncoupled himself from the pull of the divine holiness and love. The sense of sin is an automatic switch which, whenever a man begins to think about himself, swings him back upon the glory of God's goodness. It is depressed and dispirited only when it is the mask of a despairing and harassed self-righteousness—when the man is grieved because he is not satisfied with himself and has yet to learn that he can find satisfaction only in God. A true sense of sin is thus a sense of life's possibilities lit by the golden light of God's purpose, and made imminent by the incidence of His love.

A. T. CADOUX.

EAST BOLDON, Co. DURHAM.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"IS CHRIST ALIVE TO-DAY?"

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1920, p. 361.)

I.

A FEW days ago I began my evening's reading by taking up a volume by Rabindranath Tagore. I soon shared with him the vision of a universe lit up by the glory of the Spirit of God. But as we cannot remain on these great heights for long, I turned to Lord Morley's *Reminiscences* and learned something of the thoughts and last days of the little group of notable Agnostics with whom he associated—Mill, Huxley, Spencer, Leslie Stephen. How Huxley would not believe in an after-life because there was no evidence of a consciousness without a brain, and Spencer was sad when he reflected that soon he should no longer be able to gaze upon the great mystery of space. Then, resting, I took up the *Hibbert Journal*. The title "Is Christ alive to-day?" caught my eye, and, thinking it would be an apt conclusion for the day's thought, I began to read. But it did not appear to harmonise with the mood I was in, and it was put aside for another occasion. I have since read it, and can sympathise with the point of view of the writer: earnest and winsomely pleading it is, enriched with illustrations from a cultivated mind. But is it convincing? The group of notable men I have referred to must have weighed such evidence, yet found it insufficient; or it was overborne by reasons of a different order. We must recognise, I think, that there is a class of mind to which the spiritual does not appeal, just as there is another which finds no charm in music. But these defects will be found in men of upright and noble disposition, seekers after truth, and unselfish servants of humanity. On that side we need say no more. If the seers are right, the faithful Agnostic, we may be sure, will enter into the glory that is to be.

Let us turn now to the Indian poet. He would make short work of the question, Is Christ living? "Without doubt," he would say, "for is it not written in the Upanishad, 'The deity who is manifesting himself in the activities of the universe always dwells in the heart of man as the supreme soul. Those who realise him through the immediate perception of the heart attain immortality.' And Jesus was a Mahatma, 'a man of the great soul.' The testimony of Jesus is to the same effect. For early in his career he said, 'Behold my mother and my brethren, for

whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother and sister and mother.' If that were so in the flesh, how much more so when the veil of the flesh became rent and they were all one in spirit!"

The writer is very loyal to her faith in Christ, and insists that it must have for its foundation a real living personage, "a mind that can be consulted when a fresh emergency arises." And the two chief witnesses to the fact are the Bible and experience. But will she do justice to other Bibles and other experiences? Will it surprise her to learn that I have seen the eyes of a Hindoo light up with holy love as he has poured forth his soul in devotion to Krishna? Is Krishna an existing reality? The witnesses are the same, scripture and experience. Is he a myth? Then the witnesses are not conclusive for the purpose of the argument, although they may be valuable for another purpose.

Take Buddha, again. Will the Christian accord him reality? Some say not. In any case, he taught that the object of life was to attain Nirvana, which is popularly supposed to be equivalent to extinction. How then can he have influence? But his power goes marching on.

Mere teaching is not enough, we are told. Certainly not in the abstract. But when it is the expression of the inner life of a soul speaking to another living soul, deep answering deep—that is another matter. Why does Tagore influence me? He may be dead this moment for aught I know. Because his words are incarnate thought, and I, understanding them and being of like spiritual nature, assimilate them, so that they fructify and live again.

The purpose of this note is not to oppose Miss Maynard's thesis, but rather to plead that Christianity to-day should be interpreted on universal lines, adjusted to our widest knowledge, and reconciled with what we have learned of other religions. Christianity came from the East, and our brethren in the East have thrown valuable light on many of its teachings.

Theism is much more than a system of ethics: it is a recognition of the spiritual nature of humanity, and how man can learn to know God through it. God is spirit, and must be worshipped in spirit and in truth. Through filial service man can grow into likeness with God, and the rise in the tidal waters of the soul is God's response to man's devotion.

The two great religions of the world have come from a single source in the East. They have separated and flowed in opposite directions, and have taken up accretions from the countries they have passed through. As men unite, so will the streams join together again, until in the end, enriched by experience, that which is eternal in them will alone remain, and man will become one even as God is one. EDWARD CAPLETON.

LONDON.

II.

I DESIRE to offer some comment on the confusion of thought in Miss Maynard's parable at the end of the article. I pass briefly over the incorrect statements that the moon causes the tides, and that the power of the moon will account for everything we know about them—the moon is only one factor in their production; that the moon is not strong enough to pull over the whole body of the earth—the moon does attract the earth, just as the earth attracts the moon; that the form of the tides as a whole changes—the form is always changing because of the

combined action of the various tide-producing forces; and I point out that it is not the nature of water to fall down—most distinctly not; and what, after all, *is* “down”?—but water stays where it is made to stay by the resultant of all the forces acting on it. In a capillary tube water actually mounts “up”; but that does not upset our universe. If part of the ocean does not “obey” some law, so much the worse for the law! It is to be feared that Miss Maynard does not quite grasp the fact, often misunderstood, that what we call natural laws are mere human guesses, entirely without driving force, and altogether devoid of moral implications. They are but a description of our idea of the process by which natural sequences occur, and if things do not happen according to the natural laws we have made up, it is time to alter the laws. The discoveries about the moon which Miss Maynard thinks could be made from the tides, even with an invisible moon, would not tell us with exactness what its size, and weight, and so on, were, simply because the sun also makes tides, and there are other influences as well, which we might wrongly think were due to the moon; so our guess about the great first cause of the tides would be just about as accurate as that of a deaf man about the sound of the buzzing of a bluebottle might be. And to talk of “a belt of water which defies the universal laws of earthward gravitation” is absurd. First, it is impossible to “defy” any natural law, although it is always conceivable that it may be proved untrue; only now our law of gravitation itself is being shown to be incomplete, and, to that extent, inaccurate. Next, there is no such thing as a “law of universal earthward gravitation.” The very fact that water acts as it does proves that. The last inexactitude is to talk of “the laws that rule the vast impersonal forces.” Laws do not rule forces; they only describe them, and that not always accurately. There are laws—social sanctions and prohibitions—made by the community; there are guesses and generalisations tentatively put forward by investigators, which are called natural laws. But to confuse these two kinds of laws as identical in character, or to argue from the implications of one to those of the other, as if there were any analogy between them, is as little logical as to say that it ought to be easy to draw out King George V. because, being a sovereign, he must, like all gold, be ductile.

THOMAS CARTER.

NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE.

“THAUMATURGY IN THE BIBLE. A PROTEST FROM WITHIN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.”

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1920, p. 345.)

I PROTEST against the statement that this article emanates from within the Church of England. I deny that the author can be a true and consistent member of that Church, for his statements are not in accordance with the Articles of her Faith. He is evidently a Rationalist, and his conclusions are heretical.

The Church of England, in common with all Christian Churches, teaches that without faith it is impossible to please God; and that “all scripture is given by inspiration of God,” and is to be received and believed as the Word of God.

But, as St Paul says (1 Cor. ii. 14), “The natural man receiveth not

the things of the spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, for they are spiritually discerned." Again, "Other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid." Mr Stebbing evidently is content with a foundation of morality only, or none at all. He labours under the misconception that this world is the only sphere or plane of man's existence and life, and that the Almighty does not, yea cannot, vary the nature and order of His works; in short, that He is the slave of His own laws, as we see them in operation. This is a fundamental misconception.

The religion of the Bible—the Christian religion—is of two worlds, a natural and a spiritual, and both need, and have received, "Revelations" from Him who is over all, from whom they are, and by whom all things exist. Man too is of a dual constitution—a natural and a spiritual, and this is plainly taught throughout the Bible. Is it impossible, then, or even a matter of surprise, that the Almighty Father should condescend to the lower plane of human existence and do wonders in furtherance of His gracious purposes, or commission and empower His agents (even men) to do them? Is it reasonable to think it impossible, or even incredible, that the Almighty should summon men to His more immediate presence for similar Divine purposes, as in the cases of St John, St Paul, and others?

To find God, man must be raised to a higher plane of existence, or be spiritualised; for, as Augustine says, "Our souls can find no rest till they find and rest in Him."

Job says (xxiii. 3), "Oh that I knew where I might find Him!" Also in chap. xxxviii., etc., God challenges Job to answer Him concerning things of the Creation; but Job answered the Lord and said, "Behold, I am vile: what shall I answer Thee? I will lay my hand upon my mouth" (xl. 3, 4). When Job was humbled, then he became wise. God magnified and blessed him (Job xlii. 10).

May Mr Stebbing follow Job's example and acknowledge his misconceptions, and then with honour to himself and help to others speak from within the Church of England.

JOHN T. MARRIOTT.

TUNBRIDGE WELLS.

"REGROUPED RELIGION."

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1919, p. 129; January 1920, p. 390.)

I DESIRE to express my thanks to both Mr Cooper and Mr Poynter for their kind words concerning my article "Regrouped Religion." The latter raises some questions which require a reply. I stated: "The modern Roman Catholic body in England is undoubtedly in communion with Rome, but it teaches two things as 'of faith'—the Immaculate Conception of our Lady and the infallibility of the Pope—which were not so taught to and held by the mediæval benefactors. . . . Catholics in the English Church, though lacking outward communion with the Holy See, teach and hold what the mediæval Church taught and held." Mr Poynter criticises me thus: "Is it not erroneous to argue thus? Ought we not rather to look at the line of development?" He also queries "whether the term 'Roman Catholic body' is correct as descriptive of the Roman Catholic community here." I am perfectly prepared to accept the term "community": it is

as colourless as "body." I avoided using the term "Roman Catholic Church" because there cannot, strictly speaking, be two Churches in one country, and I hold, of course, that those in communion with Canterbury are the true Church of England. I certainly meant no disrespect by the term "body," for it would be impossible for me to feel anything but respect and veneration for those in communion with Rome. The point of development is more important. In answer, I beg to point out that the Ultramontane development has not been "followed by all other Churches in communion with Rome" previous to the sixteenth century. Holland has not so developed (I am aware of the Jesuits' accusation of Jansenism; I do not think it can be sustained; I believe it masked a private quarrel). France was Gallican till political circumstances drove her into the arms of the Ultramontanes. Her Church was little, if any, freer than ours was in the sixteenth century. Gallicanism is not dead. *Americanismo*, too, is not beloved at the Vatican. Yet America seems to hold the future. Italy is largely infidel, and Spain is not a profitable example to quote. The position of the Pope, of course, is the real crux. The Council of Constance (1414-1418) established the position that the Council is above the Pope, and the then Pope, Martin V, endorsed this. It was this declaration and its endorsement which encouraged the Greeks to come to the Council of Florence twenty years later. It was the discovery that subsequent Popes had got over Constance and Martin's endorsement that made Florence a failure. It is precisely the Ultramontane theory, with its extravagant claims for the papacy, that keeps East and West apart now, and has sundered the West itself. I hold, therefore, in common with the East, with Holland, with the spirit of France and America, that we have followed the true development. Time has a way of revenging itself on such *tours de force* as the Vatican Council. Hildebrand may have captured most of the West for a time. He never captured the East, and he has alienated some important sections of the West also, among them the most virile nations. What is required is a development that will unite and not divide.

Mr Poynter also mentions our Orders ("even the 'Highest' Anglican clergy do not receive Holy Orders by a rite the mediæval Church would have thought valid"). *Apostolicæ Curæ* is really wearing a bit thin. It is another "judgment of policy rather than of Law" on which Time is already beginning to have its revenge. The Eastern Orthodox—mediæval enough, in all conscience, even in the present day—show ever-increasing signs of willingness to accept our Orders. As regards the rite by which they are conferred, their theologians (*e.g.* Sokolov, Bulgakov, Androutos, Bp. Chrysostom of Smyrna) declare themselves satisfied. And it is well known (or should be) that Cardinal Vaughan's attempt to get Moscow to endorse *Apostolicæ Curæ* signally failed.

R. D. LANGFORD-JAMES.

"LIFE AND DEATH."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1920, p. 275.)

THE article by Mr T. W. Rolleston on "Life and Death" in the January issue of the *Hibbert Journal* is of an arresting character, and holds the reader's interest throughout; but it is curiously inconsistent with itself.

It is illogical: perhaps the writer meant it to be so, but there is a point at which to be illogical is a weakness, and that point seems to be reached in this article. For instance, he writes: "If earthly life is the end of everything, it never was worth while to have begun it"; and, "If this be true, it is a truth which poisons the whole of life." But further on he says: "The idea that there is a future life which is to this merely what to-morrow is to to-day would, if it were genuinely believed—which it never is,—destroy the value of this life as much as if we believed that there were no to-morrow at all." What does he mean by this? If he means what F. W. H. Myers expresses in his ode on "Immortality"—if he means that a future life which could give us nothing better than the present life would deaden both our value for this life and the next—one can only agree with him.

But after re-reading the passage carefully it seems to bear a different meaning, it seems to imply that a certainty of a future life which is as secure as our assurance of to-morrow would not be a blessing but the reverse; and in order to make this point Mr Rolleston assumes that no one genuinely believes in this secure to-morrow, and that, if anyone did so believe, the present life would lose its "unique value." Why? Would life seem less valuable when it is seen as the seedtime of a future state than when it is regarded as having no certain relation to the future? He fears that men would cling to life less if they so believed; but the natural instinct would operate, as it does now, and there would be a deeper sense of life's responsibility.

Mr Rolleston states that the veil cannot be lifted and ought not to be lifted: both statements are a pure assumption. He quotes with admiration *Æschylus*' saying: "Do not dictate to the Gods"; but he goes very near to such dictation when he asserts what ought not to be, and cannot be, done in relation to our knowledge of a future life.

In a fine passage he points out that the attempt to account for the evolution of human consciousness on the basis of belief in a "chain of mechanical causation," or to suppose that "high spiritual energy" goes clean out of existence like a "blown-out candle-flame," is a conception "only possible to minds that have never had any vision of reality." He seems to see clearly that this fact of spiritual consciousness cannot be got out of an evolutionary process unless it was pre-existent in the Source. But he does not seem to see that the same reasoning would lead one to believe in the survival of the sense of identity, of memory and affection.

These qualities have been evolved in us, and they give to life its essential value: is it, then, reasonable to suppose that they will be extinguished at death? Do they not witness to us of the character of that "Power which has somehow urged the long ascent of life up to this height"? And yet Mr Rolleston treats the question of the reunion of those who love each other after death, of the continuance of memory and affection, as one to which no answer can be given. He tells us that "reason, to be right in the end, absolutely depends on a true vision at the beginning." I would ask him what is his vision of the character of the Originating Power if that Power can inspire His offspring with love and faithfulness, with devotion unto death, and then can extinguish those high qualities in a moment, frustrating altogether the hope which made life happy and death endurable? Could we worship such a Power as that if He can "push" our highest affections "into nothingness"?

I venture to say that the assurance that this is not so, whether it be gained by faith only, or by direct evidence such as Sir Oliver Lodge and many others believe they have had, is one which adds immensely to the value of life here, without robbing it altogether of its tragic aspects, or death of its mystery; for although it is no longer a dark river, but a covered way to light, the character of the experiences which await us in the Beyond remain to a great extent hidden, and probably must so remain even if our knowledge is increased in some respects. On this point Mr Rolleston says truly: "We have no intellectual faculty by which we could hope to understand what we should see if the veil were lifted"; but he is surely mistaken in thinking that either the Churches or the Spiritists claim to "know all." They claim to know a very *little*, and that the little they know raises their appreciation of all the relations of life here, and makes them realise *more* completely the significance of Sir Thomas Browne's words, "Thus we are men," with which Mr Rolleston's article is concluded.

H. A. DALLAS.

CRAWLEY.

PROFESSOR CURTIS ON ECCLESIASTICAL REUNION.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1920, p. 240.)

PROFESSOR CURTIS will forgive a not unfriendly critic if he ventures to suggest to him that the particularity of the criticism and the acerbity of the expressions which he applies to Dr Macmillan's article on "Ecclesiastical Reunion" invite reprisal. For example, Professor Curtis informs his readers that Patronage in the Church of Scotland was abolished in 1866. The correct date is 1874. A mistake of eight years in an event within living memory is rather uncommonly "picturesque." Again, he mentions (p. 242) that "the two Churches in conference number among their adherents some three-fourths of the Scottish population," but later on (p. 246) says curiously: "In Scotland, as *I have written*, Presbyterianism commands the allegiance of three-fourths of the people." These are not identical statements. There is, in fact, a "picturesque" difference between them. Perhaps it might be well to quote figures. Three-fourths of the population of Scotland at last census amounted to 3,570,678. Now, the communicants of the two Churches in question, together with the youth in Sunday-schools and Bible-classes, and Gaelic adherents—all told—amount to 1,757,384. Making the most liberal allowance for children in arms and others not scheduled, it is still certain that Professor Curtis stands convicted of a "picturesque" exaggeration; and it must be added, though with regret, that it is highly improbable that all the Presbyterian bodies, taken together and reckoned down to the last baptised, can truthfully "claim the allegiance of three-fourths of the people."

Criticism of this kind, however, is futile, and as unfair to Professor Curtis as it is to Dr Macmillan.

Professor Curtis finds the present situation in Scotland to be highly favourable to Union (p. 243). So runs his brief. The Committee whose views he expounds is of the same opinion, for this reason amongst others, that "precedents are not closely examined" (Report, p. 20). It would appear that the opportunity which the Committee has observed is very much like that which the thief discerns in darkness. Professor Curtis,

however, is not cynical. He grounds his opinion on the new sweetness, helpfulness, and mutual intelligence which he observes to prevail in ecclesiastical relations. One wonders whether the loss by Dissent of its once great political power may not have had as much effect in improving the tone of ecclesiastical relations as the causes which Professor Curtis enumerates. But let bygones be bygones. Sweetened relations are welcome, whatever their origin. But they certainly do not imply compromised ideals or surrendered convictions on either side. They may carry us to the furthest verge of tolerance—they cannot carry us into an incorporating union. The situation is, in fact, far from being as favourable to Professor Curtis' views as he represents it to be. There is no evidence of any popular desire for Union, no surge of impatience, no force of agitation, no spark of enthusiasm. In any question of union this is a serious lack, for, except at white heat, iron cannot be welded to iron. Even the professional element is singularly languid and incurious. Out of 2904 ministers and elders qualified to vote on the issue of the Draft Articles, 1639 did not trouble to vote at all.

The Articles (IV., V., VI.) pivot upon the dualistic doctrine of the Two Spheres, and Professor Curtis (p. 245) concurs. It is the Brocken phantom of the distinction between the "Communion of saints" and the "principalities and powers" projected upon the mists of the Committee's mind. It is bad monotheism. What begins by specialising and concentrating the domain of God must presently pass on to contract it. Dualism of this kind cannot be accepted in the region of ecclesiastical politics without descending into the daily life of the Christian community, and encouraging it to keep its piety in one compartment and its conduct in another. There are many now who kneel down to pray, and rise up to oppress and plunder and defraud. Religion means to them a punctilious observance of ordinances and a generous support of the Church, but not a heart and conscience in business. The State does not respect the ecclesiastical territory. The standard of morals is more affected by the teaching of the State than by the teaching of the Church. It tends always to what is permitted by the law of the State rather than to what is enjoined by the precept of the Church. As the State is, so is the nation; as the nation is, so is the individual. And the problem of sanctifying the State is not to be solved by a Church which screams at it admonitions and objurgations from afar, but only by a Church so wedded to it that it can sanctify it by the same intimate processes as those through which the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the believing wife. Moreover, Scottish religion, in spite of Professor Curtis and all his Committee, has always insisted on the Spiritual function as well as the Divine origin of the State. Take Knox's Confession of 1560:—"We confess and acknowledge empires, kingdoms, dominions and cities to be destinated and ordained by God to be God's holy ordinance ordained for manifestation of His Own glory, and for the singular profit and commodity of mankind. . . . Moreover, we affirm that to kings, princes, rulers and magistrates chiefly and most principally the reformation and purgation of the religion appertaineth, so that not only are they appointed for civil policy, but also for maintenance of the true religion." "I do not look," wrote Dr Chalmers eight days before his death, "for the general Christianity of the people but through the medium of the Christianity of their rulers." It would be a poor country to live in, as Scotland knows, if the Church had the exclusive control of that part of life which is to the rest of

it as the rudder to the ship; and the State which would allow it would be by so much less a State, as the Church to which it was allowed would be other than a Church.

The Articles claim for the Church an "independent jurisdiction" and an "inherent right to rule therein" (Arts. IV. and V.). To conform, Professor Curtis speaks of a "limitation of the Church's freedom" and an "improved arrangement"! (pp. 246 and 247). It cannot escape notice, however, that the mind which is in him is not the mind which is in the Articles. For his support of the Articles let him answer to his own conscience.

By an early exercise of the principle of devolution, the State granted to the Church of Scotland so much of its judicial prerogative as was necessary to enable the Church to maintain its discipline. But, in order to provide security against injustice, it received from the Church the symbolic documents by which the powers granted were defined in character and limited in extent, and not for two centuries has the Church of Scotland or the State had to complain of the arrangement. As in all compacts, a stipulation was implied that neither party should alter the terms without the consent of the other. The Church cannot amend its Confession without the concurrence of the State. This is the "Erastian limitation," the "Egyptian bondage," of which Professor Curtis elaborately complains (p. 246).

The State is bound to maintain justice in every part of its realm, especially where the Church is concerned, because it is precisely in the sentimental atmosphere of the Church that the sense of justice is most prone to wither. Nor can doctrine be excluded from the purview of the State, because a Church that oppresses can always produce a doctrine to vindicate its oppression. Autonomy in the Church may mean freedom of a kind in the Church, but it means danger to the rights and liberties of its members; and experience has shown that in its Erastian subjection the Church of Scotland is a freer habitation than any of the so-called "Free Churches." There may be a difficulty in adjusting the frontier between spiritual liberty and civil justice, but Professor Curtis has not shown that the adjustment proposed by the Articles is any improvement upon that which the Church of Scotland at present agrees to. And he might have observed that any difficulty with the State which exists, arises through the unscrupulous use by Dissent of the political power which still remains to it.

There are many other points which ought to be noted. Professor Curtis speaks of a "cheering experience of the possibilities of voluntary effort." A cheering experience, truly, which has excluded Christ's poor from Christ's Church, and threatens to make Mammon the lord of His heritage! He desires a national Church. But a national Church cannot exclude the poor: it cannot divorce the State, and it cannot be made to consist with that "religious equality" which, if ignored by the Articles, is to be provided for by the Act of Parliament (App. to Report, pp. 29 and 30). He has made a poor case for the Articles. There is as much against them as for them in his paper, and it may be surmised that the reason is, that he is writing on what is, for him, the wrong side. JAS. B. GRANT.

ST STEPHEN'S, GLASGOW.

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

I VENTURE to call attention first of all to a book by an American writer which, although it was published apparently three years ago, has only recently become known to philosophical students in this country: I refer to *The Problem of Knowledge*, by Professor D. Clyde Macintosh, of Yale University (London: Allen & Unwin, 1916). The book contains a vast amount of information upon current epistemological literature, and for the purpose of orientation in a field where of late the literature has become stupendous it will certainly be useful. The volume is divided into two Parts, the first dealing with immediate knowledge, or "acquaintance," as it is now—misleadingly, as I think,—customary to call it, the second with mediate knowledge, or the nature of truth and the proof on which it is based, while it is recognised that all three lines of inquiry involve the criticism of intellectual values. In the first Part the author takes his departure from the Critical philosophy of Kant and passes in review the multitudinous movements of thought, idealistic and realistic, that have been developed in recent times. That the review will be of service I do not doubt, but I am bound to confess that it seems to me far too overweighted and to be lacking in a sense of proportion. The first-class work of such thinkers as Meinong and Husserl is smothered, and receives altogether inadequate treatment in the midst of an account of the innumerable essays of lesser lights, while the eminently original and profound researches of Adamson are not so much as mentioned. Sometimes, too, errors have crept in,—e.g. Professor Stout will be surprised to learn that he is "a recent convert to English neo-realism" (p. 264 *et passim*). The author's own theory, which is described as "critical monism," is that what we perceive is existentially identical with the independent reality, but that it has, when being perceived, certain qualities, notably the sense-qualities, which it does not possess when not perceived. Upon occasion of certain stimulations, sense-qualities—particular colours, sounds, etc.—are creatively produced by each psychical subject for itself, and in many cases located with more or less accuracy in or upon the very object in the environment from which the stimulation proceeded. The secondary qualities are created, and thereby the primary qualities are revealed. This theory is, of course, not new; it is virtually a re-statement of Locke's doctrine as presented in the second book of the *Essay*. Here I can only urge that Professor

Macintosh offers no ground whatsoever for assuming that the mind is "a creative activity" of this kind; and that if it were, to designate such activity "spiritual" would be a glaring misuse of the term. For if the mind does thus give rise to sense-qualities, certain it is that the whole business takes place mechanically, without the psychological subject being in the least degree aware of what it is doing, and without the smallest fraction of any purpose or design on its part. A mind would be, in so far as it was engaged in this operation, a mere piece of unconscious mechanism. In the long run, therefore, an idealism of the subjective type and materialism come to very much the same thing. In the second Part the author propounds a view of the nature of truth—a view which he calls that of "representational pragmatism," and describes as intermediate between "traditional intellectualism" (whatever that may be) and "current pragmatism." According to this view, what is *taken as* truth is representation (of subject by predicate, of reality by idea) sufficient to mediate satisfactorily the purpose with which the judgment is made. But what is *really true* is representation sufficient to mediate satisfactorily whatever purpose or purposes ought to be recognised in making the judgment. It is a view that opens out many themes for discussion, but here I must be content to point out the necessity of having a clear notion of what is meant by "representation" before any discussion can be profitable. In regard to the other topic handled in the second Part of the book, the author again attempts to steer a middle course, this time between rationalism and empiricism. The method of all really scientific proof, *i.e.* of all demonstration of the truth about reality, is, he insists, one and the same; it is both inductive and deductive in character. And he contends that all inductive inference, or generalisation, is based upon the fundamental principle of the uniformity of nature.

With respect to the contention last mentioned, Professor Macintosh will now have the opportunity of considering the extremely able and suggestive article by Dr C. D. Broad on "The Relation between Induction and Probability" (*Mind*, Jan. 1920). Dr Broad dismisses at the outset in the briefest manner possible the dogma of inductive arguments being based upon the principle of the uniformity of nature. On that view, he points out, inductive arguments would all of them be syllogisms with a common major. Their minors would be propositions summing up the relevant observations, and if these had been carefully made the propositions in question would be practically certain. So that, according to the theory, the conclusions of all inductive arguments in which the observations had been equally carefully made would be equally probable,—a preposterous result, as he expresses it, sufficient in itself to refute the theory which leads to it. Dr Broad maintains, as the outcome of an elaborate and most illuminating piece of investigation, that all particular inductive arguments depend on probability and only lead to probable conclusions, *whatever* we may assume about nature, but that *unless* we assume something about nature they give no finite probability to any law. What we do assume is that nature consists of some comparatively few kinds of permanent substances, that their changes are all subject to laws, and that the variety of nature is due to varying combinations of the few elementary substances. A simple ground-plan of the material world is suggested to us by crude experience, and, as we investigate nature more and more thoroughly, experience itself suggests ways in which we can state this plan with greater and greater definiteness

and rigour, nature at the same time being found to accord with the more rigorous and definite plan far better than it did with the first crude suggestion of a plan. We believe, *e.g.*, that we have got very near to the ground-plan of the material world in the theory of the chemical elements, in the laws of mechanics, and in Maxwell's equations, and it is relative to these beliefs that particular inductions in chemistry, electricity, etc., are practically certain.

Those who are prepared to wade through a tangled mass of rather commonplace criticism will find a considerable amount of suggestive reflexion in Professor E. G. Spaulding's volume, *The New Rationalism* (New York: Holt & Co., 1918). Conceiving philosophical problems as capable of being treated independently of their historical origin and development, Professor Spaulding sets himself the task of ascertaining the postulates from which each philosophical system is logically derivable, as also the one body of principles that is common to all systems and logically presupposed by them. The historical systems of philosophy are, so the author contends, all grounded in the Aristotelian logic which is dominated by the "thing-concept." Broadly speaking, these systems may be grouped under two heads—(a) causation philosophies (*e.g.* phenomenalism, subjective idealism, and naturalism), and (b) substance philosophies (*e.g.* objective idealism and voluntarism). The former are criticised as affirming a number of things to be matters of fact, and likewise affirming their own truth, while at the same time inconsistently laying it down that in the knowing relation the terms necessarily undergo alteration. The latter are criticised on the ground that, while they are committed to the view that all relations are internal relations, yet they are, in the long run, compelled to recognise that some relations are external to their terms. The criticism is made to yield the conclusion that all philosophical systems imply that there are some things known that are not affected by the fact of their being known, and that it is possible to examine and to accurately analyse the nature of objects without having to take account of the circumstance that they are objects for a subject. These principles, then, are made to serve as the points of departure for the author's metaphysical position, which is based on a modern logic of relations as opposed to the traditional logic of substance and attribute. This modern logic is concerned with symmetrical, asymmetrical, transitive, and intransitive relations, with types of order, series, and variables, the latter being related not causally but functionally. Thus equipped, Professor Spaulding proceeds to deal with the fundamental problems of nature and mind, and also with certain crucial questions of the theory of value. Empirical methods reveal, so he maintains, two great classes of entities, those which exist and those which merely subsist. All existents subsist, but not all subsistents exist. An existent must either *have* or *be* that full quota of characteristics which the sciences of physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and the like find it empirically to have; and of such existents there are two kinds—namely, physical and mental. Subsistents, on the other hand, lack that full quota of qualities, including temporal and spatial localisation, which are essential to objects that exist. Within the vast realm of subsistents are included such diverse entities as space, time, number, logical principles, series, infinity, imaginary and illusory objects, and also ideal values of various sorts—justice, goodness, truth, beauty, etc. A developed theory of realism is necessarily forced to admit the reality of ideals that are discovered by

reason as well as of those entities that are disclosed to the senses; hence neo-realism, when fully worked out, may be described as a new rationalism. Professor Spaulding has boldly pushed forward in the direction towards which many of us have, of late, been looking, but where it has seemed dangerous to tread. And I think it must be confessed that he leaves us with a host of tremendous problems rather than with solutions of them. How is the timeless, changeless realm of subsistents related to the realm of time and change? How, for example, is goodness related to the deeds described as good? He has, in fact, Plato's old problem upon his hands, and I cannot find that he gives so much as a hint as to how it is to be dealt with. Then, again, I feel considerable misgiving in the apparently unhesitating way in which agency is predicated of merely subsistent entities. And, finally, when God is said to be "justice and truth and beauty, both as these are 'above' our world and as they are *in it*"; and, again, to be "value, the active 'living' principle of the conservation of values and of their efficiency" (p. 517), one is in a state of perplexity before the all-important question whether God is to be conceived as an existent entity or as merely subsistent. But Professor Spaulding has opened out promising fields of speculation, and his book, in spite of many inaccuracies in matters belonging to the history of philosophy (as, for example, when Kant is said to regard the knowing self "as a *substratum-like entity* in which both *a priori* concepts and sensations and ideas inhere," p. 217), is one that deserves to be known and discussed.

Written from a very different standpoint, and yet under acknowledged influence from the works of the neo-realists and of Bertrand Russell, is Mr C. A. Richardson's interesting and thoughtful volume, *Spiritual Pluralism and Recent Philosophy* (Cambridge: University Press, 1919). Mr Richardson is an ardent disciple of Professor Ward, but he has developed several portions of Dr Ward's metaphysical theory in an independent way and thrown not a little new light upon its mode of solving certain crucial problems. At the outset, he challenges the neo-realists upon a matter in regard to which they speak undoubtedly with halting voice. What, he asks, are they going to do about the subject of experience? Admitting, as they do, the distinction between objects, and the experiencing of these objects, what have they got to say about the experiencing as distinguished from the objects experienced? On his own part, as we should expect, Mr Richardson is in this connexion perfectly explicit and unwavering. Experience is the one sure starting-point for philosophy, and experience implies in its very meaning presentation of an object to a subject. The existence of the subject in this duality is as much a fact as the existence of the object. To argue that nevertheless the subject may be merely a logical construction, is to be oblivious of the obvious consideration that the agent which constructs can be no other than that subject which is alleged to be a logical construction. And to analyse the subject into sense-data is equally impossible, for sense-data, as the name indicates, are "given" or "presented," and if there be something given, there must be something else to which it is given. Moreover, the part played by the subject in experience is never a purely passive one; the subject interferes in the course of events, and, within limits, guides the latter to the fulfilment of ends. Our notions of efficiency and causality are grounded in the realisation of this ability. Recognising that the existence of other selves than our own is an assumption, but claiming it as an assumption

which every philosophy is bound to make, Mr Richardson concentrates his efforts to showing the possibility of explaining the facts of experience entirely in terms of selves. One of the most noteworthy features of the book is its author's resolute and persistent attempt to wrestle with the problem which is evidently for the position he is defending a problem of vital significance—that, namely, as to the nature of what is commonly called “inorganic matter.” The fact upon which he bases to a large extent his case is the plastic retentiveness of mind which is manifested in the formation of habits. As we descend lower and lower in the scale of life, habit, he points out, increases and spontaneity decreases without, however, entirely disappearing. But, seeing that on any theory the line dividing the organic from the inorganic is excessively narrow, he contends that the latter may be regarded as constituted by individual agents of extremely inferior mentality, whose behaviour is therefore sufficiently habitual to admit, *for the most part*, of description in general terms. Individuality seems to be here absent because we are probably dealing with individuals in bulk, so that our results are statistical. Such results, on account of the nature of the individuals concerned, will be even more uniform than the majority of statistics; but, it is argued, there is no reason to suppose that, if we could observe the behaviour of one of these individuals in isolation, we should be unable to observe any traces of uniqueness. I think, however, Mr Richardson accepts far too readily the doctrine that physical objects, such as chairs and tables, or entities such as atoms and electrons, are “conceptual constructions,”—a doctrine, by the way, which is singularly incompatible with Dr Broad's argument referred to above. Another striking characteristic of the volume before us is the clear and lucid way in which the author succeeds in bringing out what he takes to be the nature of presentation. Sense-data are, he maintains, *appearances* to an individual subject of other subjects. As such, sense-data cannot be said to be existent in any really concrete sense of that term (for that only is existent, I understand him to mean, which has being *for itself*), but they have *being* of some kind—they are there, that is to say, they are presented to a subject. The existence of certain entities in certain relations to a subject involves the perception by that subject of certain objects termed “sense-data,” which may also be called the “appearance” of those entities to that subject; *appearance*, in other words, must be regarded as an ultimate mode of being pertaining to the data of perception, and be carefully distinguished from *existence*, which is another ultimate mode of being. I agree entirely with the writer in holding that appearances are not existents; but I think he is wrong in describing them as objects. The object, it seems to me, is the existent entity, whatever it is, that is in relation to the subject; the appearances are but ways in which that object is apprehended. Were they themselves the objects of apprehension, they could not be appearances *of* existent entities. There is much else in Mr Richardson's book to which I should like to refer—his treatment of determinism and free-will, of the relation of mind and body, and of abnormal mental phenomena. I must be content, however, with adding an expression of warm appreciation of an honest and careful piece of philosophical investigation.

The second part of Professor Ward's article on “Sense-Knowledge” (*Mind*, Oct. 1919) will be welcomed by a large number of readers. It is concerned with perceptual relations and the apprehension of spatial order.

Dr Ward shows that in the development of experience perceptual processes implicating comparison precede and lead on to the intellectual processes in which comparison is explicit, and that such progressive differentiation fully accounts for what Lotze called "the primary universal"—the epistemological significance of which Lotze was perhaps the first to recognise. The primitive generality is not a logical universal, because it is not a *result* of abstraction but a *basis* for further determination. It not only precedes but persists in the differentiations that emerge later as its specialisations. In dealing with space-apprehension, Dr Ward emphasises the importance of what he has called "extensity" as being involved at the very beginning of experience in coenæsthesis, or general sensibility, and proceeds to discuss the connexion between spatial percepts and spatial concepts. It is, he maintains, only by the synthesis of what we receive and what we contribute that we attain to spatial perception: the interest of Kant's theory consists in his recognition of both these factors. In the same number of *Mind* there is an interesting treatment of "Introspection" by Professor J. Laird, who tries to show that the objections commonly brought against introspection as a method of psychological inquiry cannot be sustained.

In the last volume (N.S., vol. xix.) of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1919) there are several papers of importance. The Presidential Address of Dr G. E. Moore on "Some Judgments of Perception" is a very careful and thorough attempt to deal with a question of fundamental moment in the theory of knowledge,—namely, what it is that we are really judging in making such judgments as that "this is an inkstand." The chief interest of Dr Moore's argument consists in his recognising that there may be an ultimate, not further analysable, kind of psychological relation involved in perceptive experience,—a relation not to be identified either with that involved in being "perceived" to be so and so, or with that involved in being "judged" to be so and so, but describable as a relation of *seeming* or *appearing*. Dr C. D. Broad's paper on "Mechanical Explanation and its Alternatives" is a masterly piece of logical analysis, and ought to clear away a mass of prevalent misunderstanding and confusion. Dr Broad shows that unless homogeneous mechanism at least be adopted, science must take the form of a hierarchy of laws of which the higher and more specialised cannot be regarded as merely particular cases of the lower and more general. If homogeneous mechanism be accepted, we do have a unitary system of explanation holding at all levels; and all differences are then due to differences of arrangement or motion in what is qualitatively alike. And if in addition pure mechanism be accepted, the laws connecting structure and behaviour are of a peculiarly simple type and are everywhere the same. But scientific explanation is by no means dependent on the truth of the more rigid forms of mechanism, and macroscopically they are certainly false. Colours, sounds, temperatures, etc., must be connected with microscopic mechanism (if it be a fact), but they are not themselves susceptible of mechanical explanation. The paper concludes with some very pregnant observations upon the connexion between mechanism and teleology. Professor J. B. Baillie contributes a suggestive article on "The Stereoscopic Character of Knowledge." The interpretation of the nature of human knowledge must, he contends, start from the integral reality of the individual mind. In the first instance, knowledge is a specific expression

of the vital energy of the individual; it subsumes within itself all the energies, organic, chemical, and physical, which together compose the constitution of a human being. The reflective activity is a further and fuller expression of the same principle which operates in the perceptual phase of knowledge. This principle is the realisation of the individual mind through the process of apprehending the nature of the object as an independent being. It is the unity of the individual mind which is manifested in each stage, and operates in both alike. Reflective activity gives a richer cognitive experience because it carries with it the acquired achievements of the earlier stage, because the mind brings to the focus of its single unity the specialised functions of perception, and grasps by the conscious exercise of its unity the diverse results of the spatially constituted organs of perception in which the unity of the individual mind is least implicit. Mrs N. A. Duddington, in a paper on "Our Knowledge of Other Minds," contends that there can be apprehension of other minds by the same processes of discrimination and comparison by which there is apprehension of material things. In *knowing* another mind, she maintains, I contemplate the mental states which that mind itself "lives through" or "enjoys." Since the experiencing of mental states is not the same thing as knowing them, there is no reason for assuming that mental states can be contemplated by that mind alone whose states they are. Dean Inge's paper on "Platonism and Human Immortality" presents an interesting defence of his well-known view of a timeless mode of existence, and Mr A. F. Shand, in dealing with "Emotion and Value," works out an extremely suggestive theory of the way in which an object which possesses intrinsic value evokes in the mind an emotion which also possesses intrinsic value.

I have been asked to draw attention to the Summer School of Theology which will be held in Oxford from 26th July to 6th August, embracing about forty lectures, under the general heading of "Aspects of Contemporary Theology," which will be treated in connexion with the Philosophy of Religion, Biblical Study and Comparative Religion, and current movements in Sociology, Science, Literature, and Art. The school will be opened with an address by the Dean of Carlisle, and among the lecturers are Professors P. Gardner, A. S. Pringle Pattison, and Paul Sabatier, the Dean of St Paul's, Mr Graham Wallas, and Mr C. C. J. Webb. The Lectures will be given in the Hall of Trinity College. Communications may be addressed to Rev. Dr Carpenter, 15 Marston Ferry Road, Oxford.

G. DAWES HICKS.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

REVIEWS.

The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology. Being the Bampton Lectures for 1915. By Hastings Rashdall, D.Litt. (Oxon.), etc., Dean of Carlisle.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1919.—Pp. xix + 502.

THIS is a weighty book. It would be difficult to mention any writer in Great Britain besides Dr Rashdall who has done first-class work in all three departments—history, philosophy, and (not now for the first time) theology. Everybody knows that his pages act upon the mind with unusually stimulating power. His knowledge and penetration lend force to the implicit appeal everywhere present to put aside convention and come to reality. This new and admirably written volume will undoubtedly aid the Church in the too long neglected duty of re-thinking its traditional theology, of transposing ancient doctrine into ideas and terms acceptable to a mind not only modern but Christian; and it will do so none the less effectively inasmuch as Dr Rashdall's reforming proposals spring out of a profound and reasonably sympathetic knowledge of the older thought. Erudition is not obtruded, but the book is a really learned one. Only those who have worked in the same field will appreciate the quiet remark in the Preface: "Except in the case of St Augustine I have read through all the writings of the Fathers whom I have dealt with at any length in the lectures: in his case I have read, I believe, all that was at all relevant to my subject." It is when he advances to the modern period that his knowledge appears to be rather less full and less trustworthy. The account of Luther and the Reformation in Lecture VII., for example, will gain the applause of the partisan, but hardly of the serious student.

In an opening lecture on the teaching of Christ concerning forgiveness, Dr Rashdall, in company with various scholars of repute, takes the view that the words in Mark x. 45, "to give His life a ransom for many," are most probably "a doctrinally coloured insertion" (p. 30). Taken as an isolated saying, the genuineness of the words might be conceded; but, he adds, "when we look at them in the context supplied by the general tenour of Christ's teaching as a whole, I feel that the probabilities are very strongly against them" (p. 36). I think that a slight and unfortunate but of course wholly unconscious *suggestio falsi* affects Dr Rashdall's argument on this point owing to the fact that throughout the main portion of his book the "ransom theory" means really the theory of a ransom paid to the Devil; and the impression can hardly fail to be given that, if the ransom passage be admitted, it must count on the side of strict orthodoxy. But, as is perfectly well known, many scholars accept Mark x. 45 as genuine who have no particular interest in orthodoxy,—a matter which Dr Rashdall

makes quite clear in his notes. I shall return to this subject later. As regards the Synoptic narratives of the Last Supper, we are told they contain nothing "to suggest that the approaching death was in any way whatever to bring about the forgiveness of sins" (p. 45). Finally, the conclusion is drawn that "our Lord never taught that His death was necessary for the forgiveness of sins, or that any condition was required for forgiveness but the supreme one of repentance and that amendment which is implied in all sincere repentance" (p. 45). It will be seen that this is a very unqualified statement. It asserts a good deal more than, I think, Dr Rashdall wishes to assert. In the closing lecture, where his own convictions are set out, he does not hesitate to describe Christ's death as a necessary part of the self-revelation of God, and the object of that revelation he regards as being "to excite in men that love which would inspire sorrow for past sin" (p. 443). In other words, Christ's death is necessary for forgiveness after all, inasmuch as it provides the only adequate motive for true repentance. But in that case, and especially if Dr Rashdall can deliberately say that there is a sense in which "traditional theology is right in regarding the idea of an atonement through the death of Christ as the central truth of Christianity" (p. 454), we are free to believe it an extremely probable thing that Jesus Himself would somewhere touch upon the subject. Not that we should expect Him to give a theology of redemption; for, as Dr Rashdall points out, from the nature of the case He could not well have insisted Himself upon the influence of a death which had not yet taken place.

The doctrine of atonement which Dr Rashdall proceeds to expose and castigate is that which holds that sin cannot be forgiven without a vicarious sacrifice, a vicarious punishment, or some other kind of expiation. He is out to discredit an idea which, as he puts it with an apt quotation, has never taken form more definitely than in Ambrose's statement that Christ died in order that "since the divine decrees cannot be broken, the person rather than the sentence should be changed" (p. 328). Personally, I cannot doubt that the effect of his book will be to deepen our sense of the amount of traditional Church teaching on the Atonement which has no reality that the modern Christian mind can apprehend. As an exposure of the theory of substitutive punishment, it admits of no answer. But this leaves the profoundly true and spiritual idea of vicarious suffering all the more dominant, as Dr Rashdall is the first to acknowledge.

The new conviction that the forgiveness of sins was definitely and specifically connected with the death of Jesus took its rise even before St Paul. Its source lies in Jewish prophecy. Nothing but authority could have led to its adoption, and it was simply and solely on authority, Dr Rashdall affirms, that it was adopted. That is as may be, but to say that apart from authoritative assurances of this kind "there was nothing to suggest any special connexion between what the Christian experienced and the death of the Messiah" (p. 82) is to say what we cannot possibly know, and it is out of keeping with what Dr Rashdall elsewhere argues as to the vital place of Christ's death in His revelation of God. Indeed, a difficulty in criticising this book is the difficulty of choosing between what Dr Rashdall says first and what he says next. Initial statements which now and then are extremely hard of belief are apt to be followed a few pages later by qualifying reserves and companion truths which materially alter first impressions. This exaggerated emphasis

on prophecy is repeated further on, when Dr Rashdall is summing his results on primitive Christianity; and it seems to me to allow far too little for the actual influence of Jesus' attitude to His own career, and to the fact that if we can see His death to have been one of self-sacrifice, that fact can hardly have been altogether hidden from the apostles. They defended this or that, no doubt, by quotations from the Old Testament; such quotations may have helped to crystallise beliefs dimly forming in their minds; but we cannot explain the directions in which the mind of the Church about atonement was spontaneously led if we cut out every kind of religious experience.

St Paul, we are rightly told, held that by Divine appointment Christ suffered for men the penalty of the broken Law; it is vain to express his doctrine without this element of "substituted punishment or substituted sacrifice." But he gives no clear or categorical reply to the question why the endurance of such a penalty by an innocent Being makes it just or right for God to forgive the sinful (p. 94). In general his language is more juridical than sacrificial. Dr Rashdall, however, emphatically declares that St Paul nowhere even suggests that God was placated or reconciled to us. The love of God is the fount of all redemption. There is an atonement, but it is provided by God. Vicarious punishment is an idea with which the Christian mind is ceasing to work, but after all that Dr Rashdall has written in various passages of this book I cannot myself see that the idea of "substitution" is inapplicable to what Jesus did and suffered, so long as we are careful to construe His surrender of will as substitutionary not in the sense of making ours superfluous, but in the sense of making ours possible. He identified Himself so utterly with the sinful, that, as others after His example have done in their faint measure, He bore the force of men's sins in His body, the weight of their sins on His conscience, and the guilt of them on His sympathetic heart. In His experience supremely we see a Brother on whose innocent head the consequences of others' sin had gathered making or showing Himself consciously implicated in their wrongness, and standing by them in the shame and suffering that goes with evil. He kept Himself in the love of God all up the new and living way that passes through pain into oneness with the heart of God; and no man need repeat that experience in so far as it was the experience of a pioneer. The pathfinder is the real substitute of those who follow Him because he is first, and no one else has the agony of being first. I should myself prefer "representative" to "substitute"; but, whatever our term, we must point to the truth involved in "vicarious," a word freely used also by Dr Rashdall.

The volume under review follows the general lines of Ritschl's great monograph, though with no dependence of any kind, in respect of its parallel treatment of atonement and justification. And in most particulars it does not suffer by comparison even with that famous work. I confess, however, that Dr Rashdall's section entitled "St Paul's Doctrine on Justification" impresses me as not quite on the same level as the rest. We catch our breath at a statement like the following: "I think it cannot be denied that St Paul does habitually identify faith with intellectual belief" (p. 108). Elsewhere faith in the Pauline Epistles is described as "mere intellectual assent"; and a climax is reached in the phrase, "his theory of justification by belief" (p. 121). Of course this has to be softened down, and the opening dictum that "faith never seems by

St Paul to be used in the sense of trust, except so far as trust is implied in believing the statements or promises of another" passes within a few pages into the concession that "the giving of the heart to God" is the modern equivalent of what St Paul means by faith. The line which Dr Rashdall draws between St Paul's formal and his religious teaching about faith cannot, in my judgment, be maintained. The grain of truth in the huge exaggeration with which this section starts is fairly represented by the statement, made in quite another connexion, that "religious emotion is dependent upon intellectual conviction, and cannot be felt by those who lack the requisite conviction."

An intensely interesting chapter on "The Teaching of Primitive Christianity" must be passed over briefly. The usual primitive type of passage, Dr Rashdall finds, is "an assertion of objective atonement expressed in traditional language followed by an ethical or subjective explanation." He rightly calls attention to the fact that the New Testament has much more to say about the saving power of Christ's whole life and teaching than we might gather from treatises which follow Anselm's bad example in representing Jesus as only a sinless Person with an infinitely valuable life capable of being sacrificed. One must demur, however, to the idea that in Hebrews purification means "present moral improvement." The passage from Pfeiderer which on p. 159 Dr Rashdall quotes with doubtful assent would, I fancy, be accepted as entirely sound by most exegetes to-day. Sanctification in the Bible means primarily not any moral state, but a relation to God; the moral state flows from that.

In a striking paragraph at the close of this survey Dr Rashdall throws out the suggestion that "if we put out of sight everything in St Paul which finds no echo in St John, we shall be on the way to an appropriation of that central core of eternal truth which underlies them both" (p. 184).

Irenæus was the first of the Fathers to hold the theory of an objective redemption approximating to the idea of substitution. Some doctrine of atonement had now become necessary because rival Gnostic theologies were in the field; also the idea of atonement was too deeply embedded in the Christian tradition to be simply ignored, and St Paul's teaching enjoyed very great authority. The chapter in which Dr Rashdall reviews the theories of Clement of Alexandria, Irenæus, Tertullian, and Origen is nothing short of masterly. He is conscious of their greatness, but he is never overawed by it, and there are no conventional compliments to patristic finality. Origen he regards as by far the greatest mind among the Fathers, as indeed in a class by himself. Excellent reasons are given for this verdict, though Dr Rashdall's attempt to clear Origen's from complicity in the theory of a ransom paid to the Devil are only partially successful. At every point we are shown a conflict between a doctrine of salvation which is rational, intelligible, and in the highest degree ethical, and one that is none of these things. In particular, the idea that Christ rescued men from the Devil, Satan's just rights, acquired by the fall, being as it were bought out by the transcendent merit of Christ's death, is followed through all the windings of its history. It is humbling to think that for close on a thousand years, even though never sanctioned by any creed, it remained the dominant orthodox theory. According to Dr Rashdall, new or original thoughts concerning the atonement were in the East few and far between after the time of Origen. Athanasius' teaching represents the normal Greek view from his own day to ours. The tendency

is to make salvation virtually something given in the incarnation as such. The thought of the Eastern fathers exhibits a perennial struggle between an ethical and a metaphysical way of construing atonement. The times fostered the predominance of unethical categories, and when the process culminated in John of Damascus, in the eighth century, metaphysics held the field, "but a metaphysic of a kind which shows a strong tendency to degenerate into mere myth or mere magic" (p. 317).

Dr Rashdall joins issue with Harnack and other Ritschlians upon the point whether Latin theology is more ethical than the Greek; he contends that the Greeks are very decidedly the better thinkers. It is a subject on which one would gladly hear counsel further; at present I can only say that the Ritschlians seem to me to have it. Athanasius is the normal Greek father: his description of how Christ saved men is that He "took from our bodies one similar" and surrendered it to death, "in order that He might turn again to incorruption men who had turned back to corruption, and quicken them from death by the personal appropriation of His body" (*de Inc.*, c. 8). Of course there are very many other ideas in Athanasius, but this typical passage does strike a preponderantly physical or semi-physical note. And with all the manifest defects of Latin legalising, still civil law is a nearer approach to morality than the other.

St Augustine is dealt with severely. He is shown to be the leading champion of views "which have continued to blacken the character of God long after the formal abandonment of the ransom theory itself" (p. 325). While he accepts the traditional scheme, and adds little to it, he yet receives and dwells with special favour on the theory of a *quid pro quo* paid to the Devil. The idea of substituted punishment, says Dr Rashdall, "stands out in his pages naked and unabashed." And again: "It would hardly be possible to worship the God of St Augustine without contracting some of His indifference to suffering." In short, St Augustine petrifies St Paul. It is gratifying, by the way, to have Dr Rashdall confess that he cannot see much difference between the two ideas, punishment and satisfaction. I have always felt the same. Protest will very likely be made against the severity of Dr Rashdall's censures, but it is good for most of us to have the light turned fully on to the darker aspects of Augustinianism, and to have their utter incompatibility with Jesus' thought of God displayed in careful and reasoned statement.

Dr Rashdall travels over familiar ground in his exposition of the Latin and Mediæval theology, but there is nothing in English to compare with what he has written, either in force or clarity, nor is there any German writer one-half so readable. He points out that Anselm was the first to transfer the idea of satisfaction, through payment of an equivalent, from the region of ecclesiastical jurisprudence to the relations between the Father and the Son. As we should expect, he writes of Abelard with profound and instinctive sympathy. "At last we have found a theory of the atonement which thoroughly appeals to reason and to conscience" (p. 360). There is nothing new in St Thomas, with one exception. He introduces the conception of a mystical unity of believers with Christ. In the great phrase, *caput et membra sunt quasi una persona mystica*, Dr Rashdall indicates in a single line the real importance of this suggestion:

Luther comes off badly in a vivid chapter on the Reformation. He is not merely painted, "warts and all"; we are allowed to see too much of

these unsightly growths. The same charge is levelled at him as at St Paul, that "for him faith meant mere intellectual belief—that and nothing else." I confess that this section on Luther appears to me a mysterious lapse in a great book. If Dr Rashdall will glance again at three or four classical pages in the late Principal Lindsay's *History of the Reformation*, he will realise, I think, how exactly he has missed the truth. What value can be given to the assertion that for Luther faith means "intellectual belief and nothing else" when we confront it with these characteristic words from the Reformer's own pen: "There are two kinds of believing: first, a believing about God, which means that I believe that what is said of God is true. This faith is rather a form of knowledge than a faith. There is, secondly, a believing in God which means that I put my trust in Him, give myself up to thinking that I can have dealings with Him, and believe without any doubt that He will be and do to me according to the things said of Him. *Such faith, which casts itself upon God, whether in life or in death, alone makes a Christian man.*" Take again the statement that "Luther admitted the possibility of a saving faith which was accompanied by little or no moral improvement" (p. 414), and once more let us read what Luther himself writes. "It is a living, busy, active, powerful thing—faith; it is impossible for it not to do us good continually. It never asks whether good works are to be done; it has done them before there is time to ask the question, and it is always doing them." Small wonder that Dr Rashdall gradually mitigates his censure, and before long can say that there is a sense in which "it is impossible to exaggerate the beneficent effect of Luther's counter-formula, 'justification by faith only.'" There are many phrases struck out in course of Luther's fiery rhetoric which are totally indefensible. But with a little goodwill we can often see that he is talking in didactic hyperbole. To isolate details and obscure his main drift is not the way to comprehension.

In the closing lecture there is given a powerful and moving exposition of the theme that "the death of Christ saves from sin because it is a revelation of the love of God." This is the truth of the atonement. The atoning efficacy of Christ's work depends on subjective and ethical effects produced by the contemplation of that work upon the mind of the believer. I do not think it can be denied that the most Protestant theologians to-day will agree that Dr Rashdall has stated at all events the chief part of the truth. I have already tried to indicate the sense in which a true meaning may still be found in the word "substitute." The Cross, one may hold, is the condemnation of sin as well as the revelation of Divine love; but I do not gather that Dr Rashdall would at all deny this.

Before touching on two points of importance on which I find the argument of this book unconvincing, it will be convenient to call attention quite shortly to certain admirable passages on peripheral matters. These are such as the two pages on St Paul's knowledge of the historic Christ (pp. 106-8); striking observations at more than one point on the influence on atonement doctrine of "sympathetic magic" (pp. 297, 377), and on the "bastard Platonism" which makes an abstract universal of "human nature" (p. 353); a short but decisive statement on the religious and moral emptiness of the conception "merit" (p. 343); and in the latter part of the book considered pronouncements on the Trinity, the relation of Christian ethics and eschatology, and the hollow theory that all higher religions yield the same spiritual experiences. On the other

hand, Dr Rashdall's refutation of the retributive theory of punishment does not seem to face the crucial fact that penalties simply demoralise and infuriate when they are seen to be unjust. If the sinner's punishment is to do him any good, it must be felt to be his sin finding him out—the moral reaction of being which he must recognise as his due.¹

Two matters of some moment on which I should demur to the author's findings are these. First, his rejection of the great ransom passage in the Synoptics, and of the similar words used on the betrayal night. These passages are really amongst the numerous pieces of evidence to be found in the Gospels that Jesus had in His mind the Suffering Servant of Is. liii., and that that picture of vicarious and redeeming pain had revealed Him, or helped to reveal Him, to Himself. We need not at all suppose that He took out of it the idea of substitutive punishment or anything at all like that. It is our wisdom not to narrow the conception, but to leave it something of the elusive depth-greatness it must have had for Him. And along with this there went in His thought and feeling the noble covenant-idea of the Old Testament, which pointed to the initiative of God in bringing about salvation. By a ransom Jesus may well have meant, in broad but divinely impassioned ways, that He gave His life to *liberate* men from all to which they were enslaved. He was resolved to stake His life rather than be unfaithful to the vocation entrusted to Him by the Father, and by faith He saw that His death, far from ruining His purpose, would serve it efficaciously. This is to read a very minimum into the word, but a minimum which is there: and interpreted in this large sense, there is not no important reason why we should not ascribe it to Jesus.

The second matter is Dr Rashdall's view of what forgiveness means. To forgive the sinner, he more than once declares, is to reform him. Abelard, he comments approvingly, "sees that God can only be supposed to forgive by making the sinner better" (p. 329; *cf.* p. 308). And on this assumption he comes down very hard on the doctrine of justification by faith only. The sinner being made better, the need for punishment is removed. I confess this seems to me as completely out of touch with the supreme human experiences as the legal interpretation of forgiveness as "acquittal" which haunted post-Reformation Protestant theology. And it is so just because the central thing in religion is not good works, but God. A man no more seeks forgiveness *primarily* for moral gain than he falls in love in order to improve his character. In both cases what he is most concerned with is a new relation to a person. A good mother pardoning a naughty child is first and foremost taking him back into unhindered fellowship with her—is putting him right with herself. She is, *imprimis*, neither acquitting him nor reforming him; she is taking his penitent young self back to her heart. Similarly, what we get in forgiveness is primarily restoration to the Father's fellowship, of which moral improvement is the fruit. That restoration is ours, and can be ours, solely by trust—the noblest attitude of spirit possible to man; and this, as I think, is what St Paul and Luther both meant by the central vein of their teaching.

¹ I observe that in a recent article in *Mind* on the late Professor Cook Wilson it is stated that the retributive character of punishment was one of his favourite ideas.

The Spirit: God and his Relation to Man considered from the standpoint(s) of Philosophy, Psychology, and Art. By various Writers. Edited by Canon Streeter.—London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1919.

To review such a collection of essays as is found in this volume presents a difficult task. The various authors are, no doubt, in close sympathy with one another, and so far there is some unity evident. But whether that unity goes beyond feeling it is not easy to be sure, and it is best perhaps for a reviewer to abstain from using the contribution of any one of the authors to elucidate what is obscure in that of any other. The editor in the Introduction says that "the Essays form a continuous series, the order of which is self-explanatory." And he adds, in effect, that they are directed to or converge upon "a conception of the Spirit of God which is definite but not scholastic, and which is capable of affording an intellectual basis both for a coherent Philosophy of the universe and for a Religion passionate and ethical, mystical and practical." I must admit that the desire to reach such a conclusion is more obvious than the success in its achievement, and that the perusal of the essays one after another in the volume scarcely confirms the hope of an ordered march; in particular, the editor's own final essay seems but loosely to be connected with the others. A common relation to so large a problem as is suggested by the title is hardly enough to bind the collection into a unity except of the vaguest kind.

Generalisations, therefore, must be eschewed, but it is only right that the impression be acknowledged of the unquestionable qualification of all the writers to speak of the nature and implications of spiritual experience. They are all, in the best sense of the word, "spiritually minded" and speak out of a rich and full spiritual experience. A tribute must be paid to the warmth, intimacy, purity, and elevation of the spirit that breathes throughout the volume, and spreads contagiously to the reader. But undoubtedly the writers would be disappointed were this all, however valuable in itself it may be, that was there found by those to whom it is addressed. For, as the words of the editor which are quoted above show, it aims as well, or perhaps more, at enlightening, at supplying a "conception," an "intellectual basis," etc. The claim is a high one, but it is put forward modestly and the question of success is left for others to estimate. It is from this point of view that here I venture to consider what is offered to us, admitting with regret how inadequate in various directions is my experimental basis compared with what they command or enjoy. More particularly what I have to say cannot profess to rest upon "a first-hand study" of "Psychology and the theory of Art" or "the relevant branches of modern scientific Theology."

The aim of the writers is "constructive," and constructive of a "conception" or "intellectual basis" or of "a coherent Philosophy of the universe." And in doing so, it is to displace on the one hand "a general vagueness," and on the other "a definiteness of the wrong kind." "Definiteness of the right kind is in sight," and presumably its lineaments can be described and described in advance of its actual presence. But I confess that I am unable to discover what according to the writers the nature of this "definiteness of the right kind" is, what positive characteristics it possesses. All that I can divine is that it is somehow to come about by the promotion of a closer friendship between Religion and Science

—between a Religion rendered scientific by acceptance of a critical spirit in the study of its own expressions or embodiments in History, and a Science more sympathetic than of old to the spiritual significance of “the psychological phenomena” which accompany the cruder or lower forms of religious experience. With the general design which underlies this suggestion—that of linking speculation with experience—it is impossible not to sympathise, but it appears to be accompanied in the minds of the writers with a gloss from which I venture to dissent, viz. that Theology as the self-created theory of the religious experience has been displaced by a critical account of the forms of historical religion, and Philosophy by a “psychological” account of its normal or abnormal “phenomena.” The result of this unconscious gloss or prejudice betrays itself (after the first essay) in the relaxation of effort to think out the logical consequences of the writer’s position and in the anxiety to adjust what the writer’s own experience suggests or confirms to the loose and unchecked generalisations of “modern Psychology.” Upon the writers whose essays occupy the centre of the volume the compounds of psycho-appear to exercise a peculiar fascination. (I presume it is they—and not Dr Hadfield only—who represent the approach from “the standpoint of Psychology” and “the results of a first-hand study” of that subject.) But—with the possible exception of Dr Hadfield’s essay—I cannot see evidence of anything but an outside acquaintance with the more popular “results” of such investigations. In Mr Emmot’s essays the employment of the word “psychological” is little more than an innocent literary habit; the adjective is an *epitheton ornans* of a “fact” which he thinks important or of “explanations” which he thinks helpful. In Miss Dougall’s contributions the word is connected with an interest in the cruder and more marvellous “phenomena” in which it is popularly believed that “spirit” occasionally manifests itself. I do not wish to exaggerate this tendency or to belittle the value in other respects of their contributions.

Dr Hadfield’s contribution is eloquent and even moving. It is based on a large and wide experience as a successful physician of broken and disordered minds, and as a discourse on the theme “*possunt quia posse videntur*” it is interesting and informative. But—for there is a “but”—the theorising of his experience seems to me scarcely to reach the level of scientific thought, and the words he uses have too much the character of counters, or at best of worn and defaced coins the value of which are vague and uncertain. The light which his reflections cast upon his experience is as yet but a twilight, and is hardly enough to illuminate the more important and less abnormally occupied provinces of the spiritual realm.

It is peculiarly difficult to know what to say about Mr Clutton Brock’s two essays. Interesting, attractive, suggestive they are, as all Mr Clutton Brock’s works are sure to be, yet they are also desultory and, to use a harsh word, somewhat irresponsible. How does he mean his professed distinctions of “kinds of experience” or his definitions or characterisations of “the artistic experience” to be taken by his readers? As passing hints or as theories that will stand examination? In my uncertainty I can only abstain from criticism.

I have left Prof. Pringle-Pattison’s essay to the last. It stands at the head of the series, but in logical order its place seems to be rather at the end, for here, if anywhere, is to be found that “conception” of the Spirit towards which the editor intimates that the whole discussion is

moving. Here at least Philosophy comes to its rights, not as side by side with Religion or as a coherent account of the universe (with Religion left out), but as acknowledging Religion and bringing it within the scope of its theorising. Here the mind attempts to extend its view over the whole realm of the Spirit, and faces the whole problem of God and His relation not only to man but to whatever else is in any sense not God. The problem, without any diminution of its universality, takes the special form of "the question of immanence and transcendence." Does God dwell in or beyond what is not Him? No question can be more fundamental in philosophy (surely we need not qualify philosophy here by the epithet "religious"). Prof. Pringle-Pattison begins by distinguishing two "pure" forms of the immanent and the transcendental answers—which he calls Pantheism and Deism respectively. The former is exemplified, as far as it is possible to exemplify it as an actual or historical belief, in some phases of Eastern thought and, I think, also in "some absolutist philosophers" (of the Western world), the latter in "the rigid monotheism of the Hebrew religion and still more in Mohammedanism." Still he scarcely regards these pure or extreme views as likely now to be advocated or defended. Ever since the advent of Christianity the movement of thought has been towards a *via media* or harmonisation of the two, in spite of occasional tendencies to extravagance in the one or the other direction. But the prescription to avoid the Scylla of the one and the Charybdis of the other seems scarcely an adequate sailing direction for the mind that seeks a *principle* of harmonisation. And with regard to the principle I cannot find much help in this essay. (The problem somewhat suddenly—I do not say unjustifiably—restricts itself to the indwelling of the Spirit in the process of *human* history.) We are told that "the immanent God is always the infinitely transcendent" and that "the two aspects imply one another." Yet does it follow that because neither extreme can be held separately, both (in their extreme form) must be held together? Perhaps so, but surely harmonisation still remains a problem, and not even the form of a solution. The fine words in which (*Synopsis*) "the conception of the divine immanence suggested in Christian thought" is formulated but set the problem to us afresh. It is no part of a reviewer's business to attempt to supply a want—for a want there is. But do these words really contain "a conception" or only indicate the absence of one? For, whatever a conception is, it must at least be understandable (or rather understood) and the source of further and fuller understanding. Our problem is "to explain the progress so far achieved" or "the essential nature of man"—does "the conception" suggested so explain, or does it too not fail to explain (and that because it is not itself self-explanatory)? I seem to see an advance in the doctrine that what is real and intelligible is the process or progress so far achieved, with its implication of lower and higher as requisite for its existence and intelligibility, but does not that inevitably lead to a refutation of the view that either of these "implicates" can be found outside the process itself?

J. A. SMITH.

Outspoken Essays. By William Ralph Inge, C.V.O., D.D., Dean of St Paul's.—Longmans, Green & Co., 1920.

It has been said that the feature in which men most resemble one another is original sin, and that when all the other differences between man and man, or between nation and nation, have been abstracted, original sin will be found to remain as the one quality they have in common.

The consequence is that, whenever we group men into great classes under general names, the quality which we tend to mark is the particular form of original sin in which the members of the class resemble one another. This at least is what usually happens when the members of one class think of another class, though it does not always happen when they are thinking of their own. Thus, when a working man thinks of "capitalists," what strikes him first and foremost is their common greediness. Contrariwise, when a capitalist thinks of working men, what strikes him first and foremost is their objection to work.

Men who envisage their neighbours in great masses, or under immense generalisations, are nearly always *enragés* against one or other of them. One of the reasons why the nations of the world have been and still are on such bad terms with one another is that the members of each nation think of the members of the other nations not as individual men and women but as huge masses characterised by particular forms of original sin—the Germans by their brutality, the English by their cupidity, the Americans by their 'cuteness, the French by their immorality, and so on; and the bigger the masses into which we group our fellow-men, for the purposes of general thinking, the more aware we become of their bad qualities and the less aware of their good. To do justice to men's good qualities, to respect them, and still more to love them, you must know them individually, you must break the habit of conceiving them under sweeping generalisations, whether national, or economic, or social, or ecclesiastical, or any other. Put a man into any kind of class, and instantly he loses something which makes you like him and often gains something which makes you dislike him. This is why the Bible, always wise in these matters, enjoins upon us the love of our *neighbour*, that is, of the particular individual who comes *nearest*, and not of the generalised unit who is neither far nor near. For a similar reason we can understand the remark of Huxley that he would sooner worship a wilderness full of monkeys than worship humanity. That is the remark of a true lover of his kind. Nobody who ever loved men one by one—which is the only way of loving them—would suffer his love to be degraded into the mean hypocrisy of worshipping abstract humanity. It has been observed that to hate men in the mass is much easier than to love them in the mass; and when, instead of a mass, you have a mere abstract conception, it is not possible to love at all. Hence, in these days, the hearts of many have waxed cold. More and more we tend to overlook the significance of the individual and to think of our fellow-men under huge statistical totalities, which become, humanly, the more insignificant the bigger they grow.

I think it is doing Dean Inge no injustice to say that he hates democracy. But after reading what he says in one of these essays about the "absolute values" of Christianity, I am pretty sure that he could not hate a single democrat even if he tried; just as during the recent war

there were multitudes of persons who hated the Germans *en masse* with an exceeding bitter hatred, and yet liked the particular Germans they happened to know. Much the same may be said of the Dean's attitude to the working men. He judges them harshly because he judges them as a class. And they on their side judge him harshly for precisely the same reason. They look upon the class to which he belongs as time-servers, as defenders of their own vested interests, in accordance with the principle that the conception of the class always tends to be unfavourable to the individuals who compose it. When the Dean thinks of the working men as predatory and idle, and when the working men think of the Dean as a proud and self-serving ecclesiastic, each side is doing the other precisely the same kind of injustice. And yet both parties have a large measure of excuse. Class policy is invariably selfish. The class policy of the Anglican clergy is selfish; the class policy of the dissenters is selfish; the class policy of the employers is selfish; the class policy of the employed is selfish. There is not one of us, Dean or layman, millionaire or wage-earner, who, if he were judged exclusively by the public policy of the class to which he belongs, would not be instantly marked as no better than he ought to be. Unfortunately, we all tend, in these days, to judge one another more and more in that way. Thanks to the immense generalisations, and to the enormous masses, which occupy our minds when dealing with human affairs, we are losing the sense of individual values—the *absolute* values of which the Dean speaks with so much wisdom and insight. As individuals, most of us are foully misrepresented by the "policy" of the class to which we belong—most Deans by the "policy" of the Church, most employers by the "policy" of Capital, most working men by the "policy" of the Labour Party, most electors by the "policy" of the party they put in power. For these policies almost invariably take the form of mean compromises, in which everything characteristic of the minds of the best individuals is struck out, until at last we reach the vulgar minimum at which all the original sinners composing the class can be persuaded to agree. This is why the Peace Treaty came out such a disappointment not only to the world at large, but to three-fourths of the individuals who had signed it. In short, whoever begins by judging his fellow-men from the class end of his doings will find it hard to avoid the conclusion that there is something radically wrong with them.

If we take the class to which Dean Inge belongs—I mean the general class of Dean, in which the separate Deans are stripped of their individual qualities and reduced to what they have in common—if, I say, we take this class and consider Dean Inge as a specimen of it, then unquestionably he deserves all the hard things which the Labour Press has said about him and his book. I agree with the Labour Press so far as this: that if the Deans were to form themselves into a fighting group with a specific Deans' policy, it would be every whit as selfish as the present policy of the Labour Party, perhaps more so. In such a group the best Deans would find themselves compelled to dance to a tune which had been called by the Deans who were not the best. But no man is a mere specimen of his class—certainly not Dr Inge; and the Labour Press is castigating an abstraction. Considered in himself, as revealed by this book, he has one of the most luminous minds the Church of England has ever produced, which is probably the reason why the public calls him gloomy; for the

public is not fond of deep shadows, and these are inevitable when strong lights are moving about. A Platonist by temperament and training, and a Christian in the deep and broad sense which embraces Platonism, he has ever before him the vision of the Eternal City whose foundations are in the heavens. Like all true Platonists, he is full of hope—not indeed of the hope which looks far forward and treats the interval between now and the millennium as though it were of no account, but of the hope that looks *deep inward* into something very near him, in fact into the substance of things. He speaks in one place of “this half-real world,” and that single phrase, dropped in an aside, reveals his whole mind. The conflict which this book has evoked is, *au fond*, a conflict between those who believe, as the majority do, that the world of economic values is *wholly* real, and one who knows very well that *half* real is the very best you can say for it. One might sum up the theme of all the essays, not excepting those which deal with the Modernists, with Cardinal Newman, and with Bishop Gore, in these terms. A Church, a State, a party, which becomes obsessed with “institutions,” and with the “policy” which institutions seem to require is founded on things which are half real, and will sooner or later pass away under the impact of “absolute values.” The Dean sees quite clearly that so long as democracy chooses to occupy itself with the half real it can take no other form than a process of levelling down, in which the best has to give way to the second best, and the second best to the third, until at last the movement destroys itself by setting up the rule of the worst. With the vision of the Eternal City always before him, and feeling himself in presence of a public which treats it as moonshine, it is natural that Dean Inge should look with some disdain, and express himself with some acerbity, on the peddling, earth-born “policies” of the hour, as Plato would unquestionably have done if he were alive to see how we have translated his politics into ours. In that sense, but in no other that I can think of, the Dean deserves the name that has been given him of “aristocrat.” He has no patience with the second best, which is always the half real. This, I take it, is the substance of his criticisms against the Modernists, against Cardinal Newman, against Bishop Gore. Judged by the Platonic vision, he can give them no more than “a second” in the schools to which they severally belong. At one point or another they have, unwittingly, made a compromise with the Best, with the Real, and for that reason their work is destined to go down hill and not up.

As one might expect, the Dean has the defects of his great qualities. A mind such as his tends inevitably to class judgments, which are never wholly true when applied, in *human* affairs, to the individuals of whom the class is composed. Had Mary Magdalene been judged as a member of the class to which she belonged, things would have gone much harder with her than they did. Perhaps the fault lies less with the Dean than with those whom he judges. In suffering ourselves to be totalised into vast summaries, and to be “represented” by the “policies” which emerge when all our individualities have been reduced to units in an addition sum, we have exposed ourselves to harsh judgment, and thoroughly deserve it. And the Dean can plead with some reason that even if the “programme” of the Labour Party (or of democracy) utterly misrepresents the mind of the individual working man, it is none the less pernicious on that account. In any case the defect in question is a cheap price to pay for the great qualities to which it is attached. Minds such as Dean Inge’s are among the most

precious assets of any nation ; and the pity of it is that their function in public affairs is mainly confined to criticism, while actual leadership is denied them. Were it proposed, for example, that the League of Nations might be made enormously stronger by including on its Council Dean Inge and a few others like him, in place of some of the diplomatists and politicians who now control it—were this proposed the public would probably gasp. But it would gasp at an obvious truth.

L. P. JACKS.

OXFORD.

Pagan and Christian Creeds: Their Origin and Meaning. By Edward Carpenter.—London: Allen & Unwin, 1920.—Pp. 318.

THE distinguishing feature of Mr Edward Carpenter's book is that while he is dealing with the comparative and psychological study of religions, he has an interesting theory of religion which is full of significance, alike for the study itself and for the future of religion. His old readers might already know what to expect from him ; and they will welcome his incisive, penetrating, and sympathetic treatment of the subject as a whole. The most exacting of critics, too, though they may feel bound to differ from the author in various statements and interpretations, will appreciate the stylistic charm and the absolute sincerity of the author's point of view. There can be no completely objective treatment of religion, and works which purport to be objective and thoroughly scientific reflect many an unconscious theory or presupposition which is as much material for the next study of religion as the data from backward or ancient peoples. But Mr Carpenter comes into the open with his own convictions of religion, and with his own theory of the origin and development of religious beliefs and customs. No one can interpret religion contrary to his inmost convictions—whatever they may be ; and the effort to systematise the study of religions is essentially that of systematising our own beliefs and of understanding wherein and why we differ. It is the more welcome, therefore, when a man of Mr Carpenter's ripe experience and feeling gives what is virtually an interpretation of the psychological development of religion in harmony with his own beliefs.

On this account the Appendix, containing the substance of two popular lectures on "The Teaching of the Upanishads," really gives a clue to the whole book. He observes that Western psychology, philosophy, and religion are taking on an Eastern colour (p. 285), and the Upanishad doctrine of the ultimate unity of the self with the Universe is expounded in these lectures and is the foundation of the argument in the book itself. For, it is obvious that if the doctrine be true, it is true of all peoples and ages ; it is not specifically Indian, and we may expect to find approximations and variations among other religions, as indeed, so Mr Carpenter urges, is the case. This method raises the question whether and how far (1) ultimate truths necessarily impose themselves upon mankind, and (2) men's thoughts and actions can diverge from what is in some degree real and true. In a variety of ways the study of religions leads sooner or later to problems of epistemology ; and Mr Carpenter's treatment of the growth of consciousness and the realisation of the unity of man and nature is extremely interesting in its bearing upon theories of knowledge. It may

be recalled, in this connexion, that Durkheim's extraordinarily suggestive work on the Elements of the Religious Life raised in an original and attractive manner the fundamental problem of the interrelations between our religious and our scientific and all other knowledge.

Mr Carpenter very properly distinguishes between the similarity in essence which obtains among all religions and the difference of external detail; there is one World-religion, but the tree has expanded and sent forth branches, differentiating itself, but always embodying certain main ideas, although each branch has its distinctive features (pp. 16, 163, 198, 259, etc.). Christianity itself is a branch, an important one, emphasising some features which other religions neglect, and the reverse. Considerable attention is paid to this argument in order to show how intimately Christianity is one with other religions, even though it marks an advance in making explicit what was implicit. On the other hand, the distinctive features of Christianity come in for criticism—notably its attitude to sex and morality, and it is not a little interesting to note how very naturally, from Mr Carpenter's point of view, and that of the Indian Upanishads, Christianity is and must always be a stumbling-block. Among the special features may be mentioned Chapter VIII. on "Initiation and the Second Birth," and Chapter X. on "The Saviour-God" where, however, his treatment of the historicity of Jesus strikes me as weak and vacillating (especially pp. 210 *seq.*, 214, 217 *seq.*, 258). For, although he admits the significant part played by men of powerful personality, and cites the case of the Persian Bāb as an illustration of the quick growth of "traditions," he dwells upon the myth, legend, and absence of certainty where the Founder of Christianity is concerned. Yet the historical question has not the importance for his thesis that he gives it, and he leaves a distinct impression of anti-Christian bias, which is supported by other passages, and may distract the attention of the reader from the many valuable features which are of greater significance for a better understanding of Christianity.

The second main argument is the fundamental unity of Man with Nature. It runs throughout the book, it is constructive, and one would be grateful to Mr Carpenter for this alone. No doubt the argument can be exaggerated or imperfectly stated, but having myself come to realise that this truth lies at the back of the vicissitudes of Religion and Magic, I cannot but welcome his admirable treatment of what, it is to be hoped, will find its proper place, however it be restated, in the process of the reconstruction of religions. For the rational reorganisation of the religious and non-religious thought of the future, the exposition of Man's oneness with Nature seems to me to be indispensable.

The third main argument is bound up with the preceding. There are three great stages of consciousness: (1) Simple Consciousness, (2) Self-Consciousness, and (3) The Universal Consciousness (pp. 16, 186, 222, etc.). At first man did not differentiate himself from nature; this is the stage of tribal solidarity and a latent sense of solidarity with nature. Man had no doubt the grace and efficiency of the animals, and their acuteness of instinct, for they are "imbedded, so to speak, in the general world-consciousness." The next stage began with man's thought of himself; he stood apart from the tribe, from nature, and came to recognise differences. Mr Carpenter goes so far as to date this at the commencement of the neolithic period, at the time when rude tools and language were used; with this change there arose, in due course, property, slavery, the subjugation

of women, war, class-rule (pp. 255, 271 *seq.*). Further, with man's new self-consciousness we have fear, the dominant factor in religion, disunity, which is sin, and all the rites connected with man's separation from and reunion with the tribe. The essentials of religion (community with nature and the common life) became explicit when man realised his self and by projecting agencies like himself in the background of nature found his gods (p. 149). But the second stage is one long aberration (p. 250). The third stage will be a return to the first; Self-consciousness will surrender itself back into the arms of the Mother-consciousness to be affiliated with the cosmic life (p. 142). There will be a new sense of the undifferentiated oneness (p. 269 *seq.*). Society is perishing (p. 232), a new order will appear (p. 254), and a chapter on "The Exodus of Christianity" indicates, by its title, what Mr Carpenter anticipates. A new rebirth will mark the entry into this last stage; there will be a growth and expansion of the human heart and a change in its psychology, a new mentality, another kind of knowledge, a renewed power of perception, not the laborious product of thought but a direct and instantaneous intuition "like that of the animals—and the angels" (pp. 78, 232 *seq.*, 236, 278).

Whatever we think of the theory, a conviction of this kind is in itself of extreme interest; and its constituent elements taken separately have various points of contact with the theories—and convictions—of Robertson Smith, Durkheim, and many others. The theist's experience and convictions of "God" are of some ultimate reality otherwise apprehended by men who are not theists; and even if Mr Carpenter's theory be rejected, it explains so much, answers to so much, that it has much to teach even those who cannot accept it. The characteristic feature of development, it will be seen, is, according to him, the stage of differentiation which is to be followed by a return to a higher non-differentiated state. Here, it appears to me that he is taking a repeated and regular process—corresponding to that of synthesis-analysis-synthesis—and is giving it an absolute value. The process of reflecting upon and analysing what had been sensed unconsciously as a whole, a synthesis, and of proceeding to make a fresh synthesis, is rather a perpetual process which applies to particulars and not to ultimate stages in world-history. Like the notion of the childhood of the world, there is a certain truth about the scheme; human consciousness is an advance upon that of the animals, and men have anticipations of some further advance: their convictions of God, for example, being in part an intuition of what is not wholly outside the limits of their future development. But in practice there is a resultant artificiality about such schemes which condemns them for sober research. The differentiation, objectivity, and severance which Mr Carpenter regards as the historical beginning of sin and of all the rites that grew around the sense of sin (p. 227 *seq.*) are recurrent; and when he praises the state of unity with Nature, surely both animals and plants, by their various structures, functions, and so forth, *display* a differentiation, even as they, unconsciously no doubt, differentiate in their choice of food and mode of activity. There *is* differentiation in Nature, animals and plants have their different forms and types; and if our mental processes have made us realise this, are not our processes analogous to those in Nature? Thanks to them, we are able to understand something of Nature's richness and beauty, and only further differentiation can add to our knowledge. If, however, at the same time man is to have a new consciousness of his

unity with the Universe, that is quite another matter; for, in this unity, the differentiations will be better appreciated.

I do not think Mr Carpenter wishes us to take his scheme too literally. Granted that ideas implicit in ritual have already been made explicit during the second stage, the further continuation of this process which he assigns to the third stage (p. 267) requires further self-consciousness. Moreover, his hopes of democracy (p. 254) scarcely involve that oneness with the tribe which is so patent in early societies and animal herds. Indeed, if there is really a deeper sense of individual responsibility (p. 273)—*if* there is that—this surely entails a greater differentiation though on the basis of a newer recognition of oneness and solidarity. We can find an analogy in research, in the world of thought. Specialism in research is severance and differentiation, it is a mark of progress, it can be extreme and harmful; but every recognition of the interconnexion of two or more branches promotes their separation and ability to contribute to the welfare of each and of the whole. One is led to conclude that while Mr Carpenter's triple scheme as a theory of the world-process is untenable, some new consciousness of the unity of Man and Nature is sorely needed, and would give new shape to the process of differentiation.

STANLEY A. COOK.

GONVILLE AND CAIUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

Philo's Contribution to Religion. By H. A. A. Kennedy, D.D., D.Sc., Professor of New Testament Exegesis, New College, Edinburgh.—London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1919.—Pp. x+245.

PROFESSOR KENNEDY'S name on the title page of this book warrants the expectation that a recondite subject will be thoroughly explored and lucidly explained. This expectation is fully met. In fastening on the religious experience of Philo as a clue amidst his chaotic and contradictory teaching new ground is broken so far as the English literature of the subject is concerned. By the use of selected quotations a good case is made out for the position that Philo "in his exposition of the great text-book of Judaism, the Mosaic Law, taken in its widest sense as including the patriarchal history, had set himself as a rule to show that the details of ritual and biography were but a rich symbolism veiling the story of the soul's progress from the sense-bound life of earth to the vision of perfect reality in God." This may represent one phase of a personality that was porous to the influences both of Hebrew religion and Greek philosophy. But the eclecticism of Philo lends itself to support many positions when the method of selection is followed.

Philo is of interest to students of religious development both on account of the time at which he lived and his contact with the different currents of thought that mingled in the world of his day. He was a Jew of Alexandria; a contemporary for some part of his life with Jesus and Paul. His orthodoxy was unquestioned by those of his own generation; yet in thought he was the child of his own age; or, perhaps it would be more correct to say, the child of an earlier age—the age of Plato and of the Stoics. He was in Rome in A.D. 40, the leader of a mission seeking for exemption from Emperor worship for the Jews, but there is no evidence that he came into contact with Christianity. Phrases and ideas in the

New Testament afford evidence that some of the early Christian writers lived with him in a common atmosphere and used a common language, but nothing more. Paul and, more especially, John and the writer of the letter to the Hebrews use the same intellectual moulds, but the ideas to which they give expression are generally different. Philo was "quite the most important representative of Hellenistic Judaism, and his writings give us the clearest view of what that development of Judaism was and aimed at." His influence is most potent, especially so far as the use of his allegorical method of interpretation is concerned, in Clement and Origen—leaders in the Christian Catechetical School of his native city in the second century.

Any attempt to make Philo popular would prove a forlorn hope. His many works are dead literature; or, if they have a living interest, it is only for scholars who are interested in the conditions that marked the beginnings of historical Christianity. Philo, for the multitude, is only a tradition. One word has been rescued from the mass of his writings—the word "Logos"; and even this, often as it is quoted, is seldom understood. They are few, apart from scholars, who are acquainted with its content, or could say just what it connotes in Philo in contrast with its Christian use. It is hardly likely that there will be a new translation of all his writings, although the only translation into English was published in 1854. A new translation would prove an unprofitable labour, even if it were undertaken as a labour of love. Philo lived in times when writers were comparatively few. The problem of the world and the many problems of thought and experience were felt and discussed, but not many records of such movements of thought were made; or, if made, they were not preserved. When a writer emerged he would tell with painful patience, with no regard to style and little regard for perspicuity, the thoughts that were in him as a ferment. Philo is of the number of those who wrote as they thought. Thus, while sometimes thought becomes fused into passionate eloquence, for the most part his prose is cumbrous, involved, baffling; and his thought, although sometimes stimulating, is flat, stale, and unprofitable.

This makes the debt we owe to Professor Kennedy all the greater. He would be the first to admit that in this book he has not told all. Indeed, he says that "Philo deserves to be made the subject of many special monographs." But his present study is certainly the triumph of a judicious selection. His introduction deals with the personality of Philo—"the mental alertness, the moral balance, and the real loveableness of this remarkable Jewish Hellenist who stood on the threshold of a new and wonderful epoch"—and the value of that personality, in its religious aspect, for gaining some understanding of the problems that confronted the Jewish writers of the New Testament. Then follow chapters on "Philo's Relation to the Old Testament"; "Fundamental Problems—(a) God and the World, (b) The Constitution of Human Nature"; "Man's Yearning for God—(a) The Meaning of Sin, (b) Conscience, (c) Repentance, (d) Faith, (e) Immortality"; "God's Approach to Man—(a) The Grace of God, (b) Mediation"; "Union with God—(a) Fatherhood and Sonship, (b) The Spirit of God, (c) The Vision of God"; and the "Mysticism of Philo."

There are aspects of thought in Philo that are arresting for those who come into contact with popular religion. He is a literalist in theory.

He regards all scripture (although Moses is supreme) as inspired; the writers are passive instruments in the hands of God. Even the Septuagint version is verbally infallible. But in practice he leaves his theory far behind. As Benjamin Jowett reminds us, "the Jew and the Greek had mingled minds at Alexandria," and his theory of literalism will not bear the pressure he puts upon it in his endeavour to co-ordinate Greek with Hebrew ideals. It gives way again and again, although perhaps he is seldom or never conscious that it does give way. He dwells on the letter; he insists on the value of every word. But sometimes he substitutes other words to suit his purpose, and he exercises the freedom of a modernist in matters of interpretation. He is diffuse, his doctrine is esoteric, yet he is most simple when he is dealing with the deepest things. He juggles with words, but some statements of the Scriptures he declares are not to be believed apart from an allegorical interpretation. And when he penetrates beyond the literal sense it is generally worth while to follow him. "Let no such impiety," he says, "enter our minds (as that God literally planted Paradise), . . . for even the whole world would not be a worthy place or habitation for Him, since He is a place to Himself, filling up and surrounding everything else." Perhaps both his approximation to and separation from the New Testament way of looking at things may be illustrated by his use of the "Logos" idea. This he regards as in some sort representative of the Platonic Ideas and the Hebrew powers or angels; there is some approach to mediation between God and the world, though at the same time there is that which keeps these apart; the term goes towards personification, yet never attains it. Drummond denies it any personal meaning; Dr Inge thinks that the question is better left undiscussed. "Neither Philo," he says, "nor any Greek cared to define personality, a concept which has no name in the Greek language." Professor Kennedy thinks that the idea of personality is suggested and that traces of its influence are to be found "in the primary place assigned in 'Hebrews' to the work of intercession in the priesthood of Christ." On the other hand, the Christian "Logos" begins in personality, and all its influence streams from personality; in Christ the Logos, God and the world are brought together. There is the same term in Philo and in the New Testament, but the use is vastly different. "The Logos became flesh and dwelt among us" is an idea from which Philo would have shrunk with horror. To him, "as to any of his pagan contemporaries, it would have appeared an inversion of all values, whether religious or metaphysical."

What Professor Kennedy has to say regarding Philo's religion as rooted in experience and his mysticism is worth close study. So also is his constant allusion to methods of thought in the New Testament that touch and sometimes mingle with the thoughts that flow through Philo's mind. Some of the quotations from Philo's writings afford light for the study of modern theological and religious problems, and these are worth seeking out and pondering. Quotation here is not possible. Altogether this book is a fresh and refreshing reminder of a man and his thoughts whom and which the modern world seems to have entered into a conspiracy to forget. This study may not make Philo popular; it is calculated to do more—to make one phase of his personality better and more profitably understood.

J. C. MANTRIPP.

A History of the Christian Church. By Williston Walker, D.D.—
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1919.—Pp. xiii + 624.

MUCH is claimed for this volume by the publishers, and it must be freely admitted that the book is well written and also admirably printed. The author surveys the course of Church history from New Testament times down to the outbreak of the Great War. Special attention is given to the development of Christian thought, and this feature of the work will, no doubt, secure for it an important place as a book of reference for students of theology. The author analyses the standpoint and the thought of the great leaders of the Church with remarkable lucidity. The treatment is brief, for the most part, but the views of the Continental Reformers are examined with considerable fullness. His account of the way English deism influenced German rationalism, and of the continued effect of the latter upon the modern attitude of mind in Protestant countries, is of great interest. The impartiality with which the subject is treated is refreshing; notwithstanding a remark, when referring to Paulus (p. 537), that his *Life of Jesus* "is typical of the woodenness of the rationalism of the period."

It is to be inferred from the warmth the author evinces when dealing with the "Great Awakening" in the eighteenth century in Great Britain and America that he belongs to the evangelical school, and from his survey of Church organisation, that he leans towards Congregationalism. However, this book is the work of a historian, to whom every branch of the Church represents a spiritual force making for the uplifting of mankind.

The general reader, when he reaches the end of the story, so skilfully told by Dr Walker, will be inclined to ask, What, after all, is Christianity? For the modern type as reflected in the popular Churches, Catholic, Greek, and Protestant, is partly the product of non-Christian ideas and practices, and partly the result of erroneous interpretation of some simple primitive religious experiences and observances.

He cannot fail to be impressed, as he follows the author in rapid strides across the centuries, with the modifications of Christian thought, due to influences exerted by Greek philosophy, Neo-Platonism, mysticism of the Middle Ages, and modern philosophic and scientific ideas, and with the indebtedness of the Church to pagan Mystery Religions as regards its sacraments and rites. It is good to be thus stirred. But the inquirer is not left to find an answer to his question from other sources. The author suggests the way along which a clear conception of the essence of the Christian religion may be gained. On p. 152 he speaks of "the fundamental conviction of the Church that in Christ a complete revelation of God is made in terms of a genuine human life," and on p. 587 he adds that there is a growing conviction in the Church to-day that the "message of the Gospel is social," and its purpose is "not a rescue by individual salvation, but the establishment of a reign of righteousness among men."

The Church has been concerned chiefly with defining the "fundamental conviction" and with "individual salvation" throughout the ages, and has failed in its mission partly because it paid too little attention to "righteousness among men." The author, with great penetration, traces the difference between Greek and Latin Christianity to the influence of the idea of salvation, which was identified with immortality by the Greek writers, and regarded as atonement by Latin writers. The idea

of sin underlay the religious consciousness of the West. Atonement for sin loomed so large in the thought of the Latin Church that it gradually became the central theme of Western theology until modern times. Around this idea of sin and atonement there emerged the doctrine that the Church is the channel of grace, which in its turn reacted on the East and is adumbrated in Protestantism. The author refers to Paul, Pelagius, Luther (p. 186) as standing together on a higher plane than that represented in the Church theology of the West, when they made "righteousness by faith," which implies a "a spiritual priesthood," the first truth of Christianity. Without stating it in so many words, the book suggests that a return to the source and to simpler forms of faith and practice will assist the Christian Church to reunite and to offer more effective service to the world.

This volume is valuable also because in it is traced the part played by the Church in the political and the economic history of Europe and America. Her influence was great, but seldom helpful. The expansion of Christianity East and West, North and South throughout the centuries is not neglected by the author, but the field is so vast that justice cannot be done to the missionary efforts of the Church within so small a compass. There is no mention here of the work of the Russian Church, and the story of the early Jesuit missionaries in S. America, Mexico, and S. California is so briefly told that a reader can scarcely realise that they were heroes, if courage and self-sacrifice be heroism. There is no reference, again, to the Culdee missionaries in N. America, although the story of Christianity in N. America is told with considerable detail.

There are other corners in Christendom whose story is worth the telling, but are passed over in silence in this book. Notwithstanding, it is a learned survey, and fills a vacant place among Church histories.

On p. 94, it is stated that the writer of the Fourth Gospel represented Christ as saying, "Verily, I say unto thee, except a man be born *of water* and of the Spirit." The phrase "born *of water*" has been interpreted as teaching baptismal regeneration. But the words reflect sacerdotalism so strongly that one would, without external evidence, suspect them of being an interpolation, and the oldest text of the Irish Church probably omitted them. Suggestive too is the fact that in the Kodithea Codex, reflecting Armenian Christianity in the fifth century, the words *of water*, instead of preceding, followed "born of the Spirit." Indeed, these words are not in harmony with the standpoint of the Fourth Gospel, nor with that of Jesus.

The conjecture of Sir J. Rhys that Bannauen may be Banwen, near Neath, Glamorgan, S. Wales, is accepted by Dr Walker as possibly correct, for on p. 195 he suggests that St Patrick was a native of South Wales. Northamptonshire also claims him. So far, however, no new evidence offered has weakened the tradition that he was born in Scotland.

A long bibliography is added, which enhances the value of the book for the student.

M. B. OWEN.

The Samaritans, their Testimony to the Religion of Israel.
By J. E. Thomson, D.D.—Edinburgh, 1919.

THIS volume contains the substance of a series of lectures delivered before the University of Glasgow in 1916. Its publication has been delayed through the war; and the writer seems to fear that even now very little interest will be shown by the reading public in the book, which contains the results of many years of study. It is to be hoped that such fear may be groundless, for the author has much to say that is interesting and valuable, as is only to be expected from a writer who has a close personal acquaintance with the people of whom he writes. Information about the Samaritans is not to be had every day, and it is a great convenience to have so much of it presented in so compact a form. Whatever may be thought of the conclusions which the author draws from the facts he presents, a point on which more will be said presently, the reader may be honestly grateful to him for the facts. If they do not seem very numerous or very important, that is not a reason for blaming the author. He himself would be only too glad if the history of the Samaritans contained more than it appears to do of well-authenticated facts and reliable records. For it gradually becomes clear, in the course of the book, that the Samaritans are being studied for a purpose, and a purpose of which the title page of the book gives no indication. That purpose is to confute the Higher Criticism in its application to the Pentateuch, and to show that the now very generally accepted view of its fourfold composition is contradicted by the evidence furnished by Samaritan history. Certainly no scientific scholar would resent such an attempt. If there is such evidence by all means let it be brought forward; and no better exponent of it could be desired than the scholar who has made the Samaritans in so great a degree his peculiar study.

It would, however, have saved the reader (one reader at all events) some perplexity if the author had stated in his preface or his opening pages exactly what his real purpose was, and not waited to disclose it until he arrived at his last chapter. When the reader sits down to learn about the Samaritans, desiring in all good faith to be instructed on a subject concerning which he is very ignorant, his feelings are somewhat mixed on finding at last that the Samaritans have been used by the author as a kind of stalking-horse from which to shoot at the Higher Critics. When once this discovery has been made, and the reader has adjusted himself to the new point of view, the process of forming an opinion upon the worth of the book has to proceed on other lines than before. The information given about the Samaritans, meagre as it is, but no doubt as much as there is, can no longer be taken merely as information. It has to bear the weight of an argument which assumes that information as its premisses. It is the fulcrum on which to rest the lever wherewith the author essays to overturn the critical theory of the Pentateuch. The fulcrum and the lever also which should be sufficient for that task would need to be of very great strength; whether either the one or the other is anywhere near being strong enough for its purpose, the candid reader will judge for himself when he reads the book.

As everyone knows, the Samaritans have the Pentateuch in a form substantially the same as that in the Hebrew Bible—apart from occasional

differences of reading. If the critical theory is well founded, then the Samaritans could not have had it before the time of Ezra. The author accordingly builds up his argument to show that the Samaritans must have had it, or may have had it, in times long before Ezra. The various converging lines of his argument are set forth very clearly on pp. 384-5, and are ten in number. As space will not allow me to go through them seriatim, I will take one or two of them which the author regards as specially important. One is founded on the incident related in 2 Kings xvii. 24-28—the sending of a priest, at the request of the deported Assyrian colonists settled in Samaria, to teach “the manner of the God of the land.” The priest came and took up his abode in Bethel, where presumably his ministrations were successful, for nothing more is said about the lions which were the original cause of the trouble. Now Dr Thomson does all he can to make it appear probable that this priest (he thinks there was more than one) brought with him the complete Pentateuch, and that that was how the Samaritans became possessed of it, retaining it ever since. But it is not stated that the priest brought a book at all, let alone the complete Pentateuch, and that is precisely what needs to be proved. Moreover, the rest of the passage in 2 Kings xvii., to which, so far as I have observed, Dr Thomson does not allude, shows clearly that the people to whom the priest in question was sent continued to practise the forms of worship they had brought with them. If the priest had really brought the complete Pentateuch with him, they paid no heed to its teaching, and in that case what becomes of their fidelity in clinging to it? The passage in 2 Kings is evidently later than the date of the incident related, perhaps centuries later; so that the author may not be well informed as to what happened then. All the more weighty therefore is his evidence that the utter disregard on the part of the Samaritans of the teaching of the Pentateuch was notorious in his own day.

Dr Thomson has a good deal to say about the “Manasseh” who was the son-in-law of Sanballat and who took refuge in Samaria with his father-in-law when expelled by Nehemiah. It is not essential to the critical hypothesis that Manasseh (if that was his name) conveyed the complete Pentateuch to the Samaritans, though the fact would fit in well with the theory. But when Dr Thomson urges that the Samaritans, being an intensely conservative people, would never have accepted a new book of religious teaching at the hands of a runaway priest, it has to be remembered that the Jews were also a conservative people, and that they accepted from Ezra all that Manasseh could have brought with him. The opposition which Ezra had to overcome was not on the ground of the Torah as new, but on the ground of the severity with which he enforced its requirements in regard to mixed marriages. So far as the ritual was concerned, the code of laws and the ancient histories, the Jews were in much the same case as the Samaritans, and the motives for accepting the book which Ezra put forward need not have been greatly different. As to this opinions will differ. Possibly Dr Thomson may be right, and that the Samaritans did not accept the Pentateuch from Manasseh. But in that case the possibility must not be excluded that they received it later than his time. The critical theory of the Pentateuch rests on grounds of its own, quite independent of anything that the Samaritans may have done so far as has yet been established. And the critical theory will not be even weakened, let alone undermined, until some clear and

unmistakable proof is brought forward that the Samaritans had the complete Pentateuch before the time of Ezra. The place of that decisive proof cannot be taken by speculations about the schools of the prophets and how they, perhaps, anticipated the later synagogue worship, and how they, perhaps, spent their leisure time in writing religious books. (See the chapter on Prophetism in Northern Israel.) If the writer's purpose had been, as it seemed at first, to throw light on the religious history of the Samaritans, one might have read with much interest these suggestions of unsuspected piety; but when they are offered as evidence wherewith to support an elaborate argument against a theory built upon very solid and massive foundations by the labours of hundreds of scholars of many nationalities, one can only put them aside as wholly inadequate.

The Samaritan case is put in this volume as strongly and ably as it could be put. At least it is hard to imagine a scholar more fitted to present that case than Dr Thomson. But if it amounts to nothing more than is here put forward, then it would seem that the critical theory of the Pentateuch is in very little danger of being overthrown.

R. T. HERFORD.

LONDON.

The Old Testament: Its Meaning and Value for the Church of To-day.

By R. H. Malden, M.A., F.R.Hist.Soc., Vicar of St Michael's, Headingly, Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Norwich.—
London: Macmillan & Co., 1919.—Pp. xiii+246.

THE publication of this little book may certainly be accounted a sign of the times, and a healthy and encouraging one. We have indeed made progress when a Bishop's Examining Chaplain can write a book in which the results of the Higher Criticism of the Old Testament are not merely grudgingly admitted, but are made the basis of teaching and the groundwork of the argument. Thankful as one may be, one feels inclined to exclaim: "Is Saul also among the prophets?" and one begins to inquire how this much-to-be-desired result has been arrived at. The answer is simple: the author was for some time Principal of the Leeds Clergy School, in a position in which such questions had to be faced; he had there opportunities of open-air preaching, when the difficulties of the "man in the street" had to be met; then came the war, and he served as a chaplain in the Royal Navy, where again he was obliged to meet the questions of men of intelligence, though unlearned; and the consequence has been that he has been compelled to face the problem for himself, and, having done so, has felt constrained to pass on his conclusions, if so be he may thereby prove a help to others in like case.

The book, he tells us, was written on board one of H.M. ships at sea, and grew out of a course of sermons preached at sea between Easter and Christmas 1917. This, no doubt, accounts for some repetitions, as it does also for some striking illustrations, which add a flavour of the sea and a breath of the salt wind to his pages.

The author does not profess to be an expert, but he knows something of science; he has read many of the books which deal with the critical problem, and he writes with the conviction that much in the Old Testa-

ment is a matter of perplexity to many Christian people, and that anything which helps to resolve any of these perplexities strengthens our hold upon the salvation which our Lord has won for us. He is quite prepared to find that many Old Testament scholars will consider his opinions unduly conservative, and he modestly expresses the hope that he may not be thought guilty of presumption in having ventured to write on the subject. In such circumstances criticism is almost disarmed; nevertheless there are one or two things that must be said.

First of all, for a small book, the author's plan would appear to be somewhat unnecessarily cumbersome. The first chapter is introductory, and gives clearly and lucidly a view of Inspiration and Revelation from the modern standpoint which quite meets the case, and should set at rest those inquiring minds who are anxious to know whence Cain got his wife, or how it is that David can be called a man after God's own heart. "We must not settle in our own minds," he says, "what inspired writings ought to be, and then try to make the Bible conform to the standard which we have set up." His remarks on this point, it need not be said, are founded on Driver, put in more popular form. The rest of the book is concerned with the contents of the Old Testament, arranged according to the Jewish classification—the Law, the Prophets, earlier and later, and the Writings; and this necessitates a sort of introduction and running commentary upon each book in turn, which, as he draws to the end, is apt to become somewhat meagre and jejune. This rather detracts from the popular character of the book, and will, we think, be calculated to make the "man in the street," if it falls into his hands—as we hope it may,—shut it with a sigh of boredom before he reaches the end; and this would be a mistake, because he thereby would miss the "conclusion of the matter," which is quite good.

In discussing the book of Genesis and the rest of the "Law," he is quite clear that Moses, although the undoubted founder of the Hebrew nation, is not the author of any part of it, but that it is a composite and much later production; but he scarcely attempts to differentiate between the documents, and, forgetting that the Book of the Covenant—Exod. xx.—xxiii.—bespeaks a settled agricultural population, he thinks it may be of the time of Moses himself. He also speaks of Moses as though he were already a monotheist, forgetting that monolatry was then the religion of Israel, and that monotheism did not arise till the time of the later prophets. He thinks, too, that history may be said to begin with Abraham. His remarks on the first eleven chapters of Genesis are confined to the headings: The Creation, The Fall, The Flood, and The Tower of Babel. A study of Sir J. G. Frazer's *Folklore in the Old Testament* would have rendered what is said on the two latter points more instructive; in what is stated as to the Creation, the results of the latest science are fairly, if not quite adequately, set forth; but in regard to the Fall he lands himself in a dilemma, for if he holds, as he states he does, that man is the product of evolution, and is everywhere found advancing from savagery through barbarism to civilisation, where is room to be found for what is ordinarily called a "Fall"? It is to be remembered that the Fall is never alluded to in later Jewish literature, until we come to St Paul, although we find a constantly growing sense of sin in the best members of the race, of which the fullest expression, perhaps, is in some of the later Psalms, themselves an echo of ancient Babylonian hymns. While fully agreeing with all that our author says on the subject of sin, we think he will find

it unwise to press the story of the Fall as bearing upon it. Rather should this story be taken as, in reality, an attempt on the part of early Hebrew thinkers to explain the origins of civilisation; and, as regards the question of sin, may not a solution of his dilemma be found in the fact that, as man progressed upwards and became more and more an intellectual and spiritual being, he found the vestiges of the animal continually holding him back and fighting against his higher nature? Thus arose the consciousness of a freedom of choice and the distinction between right and wrong—the origin of conscience—and the conflict with sin is the constant endeavour towards the elimination of the ape and tiger from our nature; in order to this the revelation of God in Christ is as essential as ever it was in the days of pre-scientific orthodoxy. In any case, he frankly describes the story of the Garden of Eden as a “myth.”

The book is not definite enough to serve as a text-book, and yet somewhat too technical to be “popular”; but if it falls into the hands of intelligent laymen it will at least do good in opening the eyes of its readers to the fact that there is an Old Testament problem; that revelation was progressive, and that the books must be read with a constant reminder of the time of their composition and of the original hearers or readers to whom they were addressed; and that therefore the standard of Old Testament morality is not that of those who have enjoyed two thousand years of Christian teaching. The best service that it can render will be to lead its readers on to a wider study of the problems with which it deals, and for this purpose we can heartily recommend it; for it is as a sign of the times, as we have already said, that it is most valuable; and for this, as for many other blessings in disguise, we have to thank “the Great War.” There is an adequate index, but no references are given to authorities.

H. J. D. ASTLEY.

EAST RUDHAM, NORFOLK.

The Infinite Attributes of God. By Rev. W. Powell, M.A., B.D.—
London: Arthur H. Stockwell, 1919.—Pp. 220.

THERE is hardly a problem of metaphysical importance that is not touched upon in Mr Powell's book. The nature of God, His relation to the world, the purpose of creation, the meaning of good and evil, the reality of space and time form the main subject of discussion, and a number of minor questions, such as that of qualitative intensity and of the divisibility of matter, are settled by the way. The author's main position is, briefly, this. He maintains that God is the ground of all existence, is a person, is perfect, and ever conducts His creatures towards fuller good, increasing thereby His own blessedness. He is omnipotent, omniscient, and infinite, and these attributes are shown to contain “nothing to alarm or alienate us.” Thus, by omnipotence is meant, not that God can do anything we like to imagine, but that He is the ultimate ground of all that is; divine infinity means not that God includes all beings within Himself, but simply that He is infinitely good; omniscience means not that God can know the future as He knows the present, but that He correctly infers the future from the past. God has existed for an infinite stretch of time and will go on existing forever; there can have been no beginning and there can be no end to His creative

activity, the purpose of creation being to bring to the state of blessedness as many souls as possible "with the maximum possible rapidity."

The way in which the author presents these doctrines is certainly somewhat novel. As a rule religiously minded persons refrain from speaking with too much confidence about God's thoughts, intentions, and desires; they feel that their knowledge is insufficient, and that it is hardly possible to speak in the same terms of the Divine and the human mind. Mr Powell, however, is free from such scruples; he gives us a wonderful amount of information concerning the experiences of the Deity, and applies human standards to that experience without apparently being in the least aware of their inadequacy. This is evident from the nature of the arguments he uses and the kind of problems he feels called upon to discuss. Thus, *e.g.*, he is troubled by the question whether God is not in danger of becoming tired of His own blessedness. "May not God become surfeited with good?" he asks on p. 117. "Is not such an experience common to us? Sweet things may be indulged in till the appetite is sickened by them, though they continue to be as sweet as ever. May not God have a similar experience?" The reader is relieved to find that such a contingency cannot arise: God's pleasures, we are told, can never pall, because there is no weariness in Him. Another question that the author raises is whether the Divine mind, being omniscient, is not likely to be overburdened with a lot of useless knowledge. The answer, however, is that "there is no fact that it is not useful for God to know," and that "He knows all things because He finds everything interesting to Him" (pp. 73 and 74). Omniscience is involved in God's moral perfection, for if He did not know everything His moral judgments, Mr Powell fears, would lack certitude, and, worse still, He might be unable to do some things "through lack of the requisite intelligence" (p. 62). Omnipotence is also involved in God's moral perfection. "The difficulties we encounter in the work of moral improvement are so great that we are tempted to think that not even God can overcome all the difficulties belonging to the moral life" (p. 5); hence, if we did not believe that God is omnipotent we should find it hard to believe that He is holy.

The author's view of knowledge leads him to the conclusion that God can only know the nature of sin by inference, and of physical pain by actually experiencing it! We are informed, however, that "God's pains are far more than counterweighed by the pleasurable and joyous experiences which He has, so that on the whole the Divine state of feeling is always intensely happy" (p. 81)!

But perhaps nothing humanises the Deity more than Mr Powell's interpretation of the dogma of the Trinity. The Father is said to be the Author of the being of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, whom He brings forth in order to give fulfilment to "the social side of His nature." "God has to perfection the inner capacity for social intercourse" and, as the ground of the existence of the other Persons of the Trinity, "He has no need to seek outside of Himself for social satisfaction." This account of the *raison d'être* of the Trinity does not accord with the teaching of the Nicæan or the Athanasian Creed; but Mr Powell evidently interprets the dogma in his own fashion and finds it possible, in speaking of the Trinity, to give the name "God" to the Father only.

Unfailing optimism inspires the author's conclusions with regard to the moral problems. He maintains that it always pays to do right, and that

altruistic conduct is better than the selfish because one's personal good becomes "numerically greater" when there is added to it the knowledge of the well-being of others. Evil is the necessary condition of the good and seems to be specially designed for increasing our happiness. "The fullest possible blessedness of love would not be ours without the experience of evil. Love delights to express itself, and one of the chief ways in which love is expressed is by ministrations to the unfortunate." It must give Mr Powell some satisfaction to find that the present condition of the world does not threaten to deprive us as yet of the opportunities for exercising "the pleasurable activity of alleviating evil."

It is difficult to say to what class of reader Mr Powell's book may appeal. Those who do not believe in the doctrines he is defending are not likely to be convinced by him; those who do, will hardly find that their conception of religion has gained in depth or dignity from his treatment of the subject.

NATHALIE A. DUDINGTON.

LONDON.

The Faith of the Apostles' Creed: An Essay in Adjustment of Belief and Faith. By J. F. Bethune-Baker, D.D.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1919.—Pp. xxxv+211.

It seems evident that the question of the historicity of Jesus must needs be discussed once more. Dr J. F. Bethune-Baker says: "It is with Jesus that the Christian's faith in God begins. Jesus is its true creator. Christian doctrine, as far back as we can trace it, has been inseparably connected with a historical Person. It has always been based on the belief that Jesus really lived, and was crucified and rose again from the dead. . . . Of Christian theology, the centre is not God, but Jesus. The significance of the Person of Jesus is its supreme concern. He is the one fact on which Christian theology is built. . . . The real centre of the Apostles' Creed is to be found in the clauses which express belief about Him. . . . If Jesus did not really exist, there has not been made that manifestation of God to men, on belief in which the whole Christian doctrine of God depends. . . . The more human and natural Jesus becomes in the crucible of critical study, the clearer also the proofs of His real existence become. 'Criticism' of Christian 'origins' gives a fatal blow to the theory that Jesus never lived. . . . On belief in the resurrection of Jesus Himself depends the belief of the Church in the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come." Such is Dr Bethune-Baker's important statement. It shows the question of the historicity of Jesus is not settled. It is of urgent importance. It must now be faced.

We are told that Christian doctrine has always rested on a personal Jesus, "as far back as we can trace it." That may have been so as far back as the epistles of the New Testament, at a time when it was thought that many were written by Paul. But this is now questionable. Their descriptions of Paul are artificial, and as of a hero who lived in the past, and was equal to the apostles. Moreover, we can now, by the help of Gnosticism, get behind the *New Testament doctrine*. The article in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (11th edition) on "Gnosticism" must be a revelation to theological students. It shows what Reitzenstein showed in his *Poimandres*, that Gnosticism in all its main features was not a matter

merely of the second century A.D., as the old Commentaries used to declare, but was *pre-Christian*. The terms in the epistles—pleroma, æon, teleios (initiated), length, depth, height, spiritual and natural, heavenly man, archontes (world-rulers), ektroma (abortion)—are all from a pre-Christian Gnosticism of Alexandria. So it may well be that the very scheme or mould of thought into which the Christian Ideal was run was from Gnosticism. For Gnosticism was a soteriology, telling of the Soter (Saviour), the Primal Man who descended, fought the demons (archontes), and ascended to heaven, lifting souls with him. The very important passage, Philippians ii. 5-8, the *locus classicus*, is from this Gnostic scheme. Even the cross was in Gnostic thought, but it was *stauros* in its earlier form, as a stake, and so a fence or boundary. Irenæus tells of this in the writings of the second century A.D., but the idea is in *Poimandres*, a pagan work originally, which tells of the Logos breaking through the "boundary" that separates the eternal from the phenomenal. It is the pre-Christian Gnostic gospel of the Eternal descending as the Saviour of men, and the parable of the Sower is a Gnostic parable, going back to Plato's idea of the Divine Life sown as seed in men. For though Gnosticism was of Eastern origin, it was eclectic, and it used Plato's works, and his idea of the *dikaios* or Just One, who would be "crucified" (*Republic*, ii. 361). The term *dikaios* is often applied to the Christ in the Gospels and in Acts.

We can now go *behind* the New Testament, not only to the Logia, but to the scheme of thought which led to the whole story of the Eternal Christ descending, conquering demons, being crucified, and rising up to heaven, carrying souls with him (Ephesians ii. 6). We can now "trace" Christian doctrine further back than is implied in Dr Bethune-Baker's statement, and see the source of the doctrine in a mystery-mould, current in all the religions around the Mediterranean then. Indeed, Christianity (as a sense of the Inner Ideal, against Pharisaic formalism) had no chance to remain unless it *was* run into such a mystery-mould. Christianity became a new moral mystery-religion, and so spread in Asia Minor and Europe. Its competitor was another, but lower, mystery religion, viz. Mithraism, which extended to London and York.

Dr Bethune-Baker tells us that the significance of the Person of Jesus is "the supreme concern" of Christianity. But is this so? May not men be quite orthodox in this, and yet know not the Father? "It is not everyone who says to me, 'Lord, Lord,' who will get into the realm of heaven, but he who does the will of my Father in heaven" (Dr Moffatt's translation). The "brothers of Jesus" are they who do the will of the Father, the will of sincerity-humility-magnanimity-purity. That is the supreme concern of Christianity, and even of its doctrine, for only those who do that will of God can find God. They *feel* the Inexhaustible or Infinite Life, which *is* God, the background of stars and souls.

It is true "the Apostles' Creed has its centre in the clauses which express belief about Jesus," but that is all the worse for the Apostles' Creed. Its phrases go back largely to the writings of Ignatius, who insisted over-much that Jesus "truly (*alēthōs*) was born, truly died, truly rose again"—against teachers of his day (125 A.D.) who denied that Jesus really suffered on the cross. (Their Doketism is in the New Testament to some extent, as in Philippians ii. 5-8, Romans viii. 3, where we learn Jesus was only in the semblance, similitude, or likeness of a man. Such

clearly is doctrine, not history.) The Apostles' Creed was composed by men of the *outer* school, who knew not "Jesus" as an inner Ideal. They insisted on a man Jesus because many even in that day refused to see the divine as given fully in one local person. The Apostles' Creed shows Christianity relying on a dogma of a man instead of on a spirit, a life of God *in* men; and that has been the weakness of the Church ever since. Even now we see the Church insisting on a man instead of on an inner Ideal, which came to be personified, as nature-forces had been personified in an Attis or Dionysus. The Church's weakness at the present time, its inability to lead into a social order of men sharing the woe and work and wealth of the world, is partly due to the Church everywhere (except in a few groups) teaching Christianity as a doctrine about a *man*, his "person" and "work," instead of teaching concerning the MAN in men, the mass-man in the unit-man (as Edward Carpenter puts it), the Divine Idea of man unveiled in the Ideal of the early Christians. The whole of the Christian doctrine of God does not, surely, depend on "Jesus" having lived as a man, but it does depend on men living the Christ-Ideal, without which life no doctrine of God is available. Some who so live may still intellectually believe a man Jesus lived, but they are open to be convinced otherwise; and if so convinced, they would not feel that the heart had gone out of Christianity.

Dr Bethune-Baker further tells us that critical study showing Jesus as human gives "a fatal blow" to the idea that he never lived. But surely that is because the critical study is not taken far enough back. It stops with the "Epistles of Paul." It sees not the Gnosticism that lies behind those Epistles, the Gnostic mould of thought, which the outer circle of Christians more and more denounced, because they could not understand it. That outer circle, hearing of the Christ as the Primal or Heavenly Man having descended, died, and ascended, thought it was a man who had so descended, died, and risen; and hence arose the story as in Philippians ii. 5-8, which was enlarged by "Messianic" additions in the "Gospel of Mark." If criticism of Christian origins will "dig deeply," we shall find something better than a local man Jesus. We reach the Father, unveiled in His own Ideal Spirit, as it welled up in the pious Jews who were called Christ-men, a new sect in Judaism, which was rejected ("crucified") by the Sanhedrin and rose to be a new free Church. This was described by Gnostic Christians (after A.D. 50) as the crucifixion and resurrection of the "Christ," just as, when the worshippers of Dionysus were persecuted, it was said that Dionysus was persecuted. It is God the soul really wants, not a man, a human person, whose thoughts follow one another, who can think only of a few people at a time, and really comprehend no one.

Lastly, Dr Bethune-Baker tells us that "on belief in the resurrection of Jesus himself depends the belief of the Church in the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come." But do we believe any more in the resurrection of the dead? Do the bodies placed in the graves in any sense rise again? Do not they go to dust? Do the bodies of brave men blown to pieces by shells rise again? Surely not. We need no such belief. We do not want these bodies for ever. The doctrine is a stumbling-block now. As to the belief in the life to come, that has existed in many lands which know not of a man Jesus, and it does not depend on a belief in a man Jesus. It depends on a realisation, an

experience, of a greater life than the body, a sense of an inexhaustible life, and hence a deathless life, which is exactly what the ideal life of truth-love-faith gives to the soul.

It seems, then, that belief in a man Jesus is not only not necessary to Christianity, but is more and more becoming a hindrance to real Christianity. For the more deeply men delve into their own souls, and the further back they pierce in their research into origins, the more they realise that the heart of Christianity is in a Divine Ideal—the sincere soul aflame with sacred love—which did not once leave heaven to be a man, but has been gradually evolved through Judaism and Hellenism, which together struck a light in those brave hearts we call the early Christians. Thus the New Testament has a wonderful Figure of the Christ. But is it historical? This Eternal Son of God, the Alpha and Omega begotten before creation, in the form of God, who emptied himself, was made in the similitude (only) of a man, born of a Virgin, called the “Beloved Son” at baptism, spoke a new Law on a mountain, as God did to Moses, said he was greater than the Temple, greater than Solomon, greater than Jonah, and claimed the power to dispose of all souls to hell or heaven, a power only God possesses: this Son of Man, Man-Ideal who said he could give to his followers the thrones of the future, and would come on the clouds; he who calmed the storm, raised the (spiritually) dead, was transfigured, made water wine, and healed the man (the Gentiles) born blind; who instituted a Supper (like Mithras), and lifted his dead body from the grave; who “fills all things,” and is the Head of the Church—is this Figure a historical one? Surely not. It is better than history. It is an eternal work of art, wrought from a deep religious experience of the Ideal Divine, of truth-love-faith, *i.e.* serenity, magnanimity, intrepidity. The Figure is not of a God-Man once incarnate, as the New Testament writers thought; nor of a good man, a teacher and martyr. The Figure is of God in man, the Infinite in the finite unveiled, the Ideal Life evolved at last in the aspiring thoughts of the Christ-group. This Life “descended” as the Primal Man (of the Gnostics), conquered the demons (in demoniacs), was crucified (in the persecutions of the Christians), and rose to power (in the Church’s freedom from legalism and sin). This Christ is the Ideal Life of God, which alone is man’s Saviour and eternal joy.

The value of Dr Bethune-Baker’s volume lies in its setting forth the heart of Christianity as a moral obedience to Christ as Lord. From this the author thinks that some can gain a belief in the Virgin-birth; but he plainly says “that there is a determination now that such old beliefs as the birth of our Lord from a Virgin and His resurrection in the body which was laid in the tomb shall not be treated as of the essence of the faith of a Christian.” Indeed, about both these points Dr Bethune-Baker seems to be unhappy in his own mind. He feels he is in the “paradoxical position” of being obliged to put his faith in Christ in the form of a belief in the Virgin-birth, “which appears to have no fundamental relation to the conviction we wish to affirm.” So in regard to the resurrection of Christ. Clearly the Creed means that Christ lifted his body from the grave. The Articles of the Church of England also affirm this (Article IV.). But our author is unhappy about it, though he believes Jesus in some way convinced men that he was alive again, to guide and help them. One cannot help asking when the leaders of the

Church of England will secure a real freedom for its clergy, and an end to the necessity to recite the creeds in Church. Dr Bethune-Baker speaks of "the impasse" which theology has reached, and "the changes in our outlook" (p. 174). Is not the time now ripe for a bolder move, a release from the authority of Parliament and a spiritualising of worship, freed from any one form of words? The age demands it. Perhaps the very existence of the Church of England demands it.

GILBERT T. SADLER.

PUTNEY, S.W.

Pantheism and the Value of Life. By W. S. Urquhart, M.A., D.Phil.
London: The Epworth Press, 1919.—Pp. 722.

THIS work embodies in a slightly compressed form the results of a thesis presented by the author to the University of Aberdeen for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Though there is given a short discussion of Pantheism in Western philosophy, dealing with the Stoics, Spinoza, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, the author's main concern is with Indian thought, and to the elucidation of Indian Pantheism and views of the value of life the greater part of the work is devoted. There has been noticeable of late a growing interest in and appreciation of the Indian point of view. But, as Dr Urquhart points out, this appreciation has not always been discriminating. He has lived in India for fifteen years, and his sympathetic insight into and appreciation of Indian thought should make his criticism all the more valuable. No attempt can here be made to follow the details of Dr Urquhart's lengthy exposition, but his main thesis as to the relation between Pantheism and Pessimism may be briefly stated.

Pantheism, whether in its negative aspect, in which it insists that the world is in God, or in its more positive aspect, in which it holds that God is in the world, tends to produce a state of mind which cannot but result in pessimism. The escape from the troubles and sorrows of life, which it seems at first to offer in ultimate absorption in the Divine and in the doctrine that pain and evil are illusory, is really nugatory. It is an ostrich-like escape, and tends to produce a state of apathetic inactivity which severs the nerve of effort, lessens the hope of progress, and discourages any attempt at amelioration. The hope of ultimate identity with the Divine which Pantheism holds out is a hope of an identity in which all individuality is lost, and, what is worse, lost and merged in a Being of whom no predicate can be affirmed, a Being who, from the point of view of the struggling finite subject, dangerously resembles nonentity. In the world of thought, it is argued, Pantheism often leads to a neglect of detailed scientific work, and to an "explanation" of things, by referring them to a mysterious ground of which nothing can be said. In the world of practice it often leads to an idealisation of the actual, and therefore a conservative justification of the *status quo*. Further, the determinism which characterises most pantheistic systems inculcates an attitude of submissiveness and resignation and thus saps all effort. The emphasis on the illusory character of the finite cannot but result in the feeling that all is vanity and illusion, and consequently in the evisceration of every interest and ideal. It may for a

moment encourage an escape into the life of sensuous enjoyment, but to the ascetic mind this cannot but be disappointing and end in deeper gloom. An ideal of negative absorption cannot spur us on to effort. Even the consolation that might be derived from resignation to the inevitable is illusory, for what is the good of suffering for the sake of a process that is futile and meaningless? To dismiss pain and evil as illusory may afford momentary satisfaction, but the illusion has a way of refusing to be dismissed; and if pain and evil are dismissed, so must be dismissed happiness and good, and thus the blessedness of the good is forfeited and the hope of salvation abandoned. If a rationale of suffering is to be found at all, it must lie in the possibility of progress and victory through struggle and freedom. But this is impossible for Pantheism, which denies or cannot consistently admit the reality of freedom and which excludes all purpose. Pantheism, therefore, cannot but end in indifference, quietism, and passivity, the loss of all effort and hope—cannot but end, in short, in a profound pessimism.

I am not quite sure that Dr Urquhart has done full justice to the more positive side of Pantheism, at any rate in its Western form. In European thought Pantheism has often tended to the enrichment and glorifying of existence, and has quickened the sense of the wonder and beauty of nature. Nor is the connexion between Pantheism and Pessimism always conclusively proved. One illustration may be given. The "indifference" of the Stoics to social change or progress is attributed to the static character of their view of the Universe. But this indifference was much more probably caused by their emphasis on the *inward* character of virtue and happiness. This attitude in fact finds a close parallel in early Christianity, for which, too, worldly institutions were secondary, the main object of pursuit being the salvation of the individual soul. Hence, *e.g.*, though both the Stoics and the early Church accepted the principle of human brotherhood, they did not make the attempt to abolish slavery, and they preached the doctrine that the slave could still be lord of himself, or that master and slave were equal in the eyes of God. It should also be remembered that, after all, in the hands of the Roman Stoics the ideal of a universal brotherhood did become something more than the mere dream of a philosopher, and it is by no means clear that this was in their case the result of the introduction of theistic elements. Many difficulties occur to me in Dr Urquhart's treatment of Spinoza and Hegel, but perhaps it is not worth while dealing with these as the author does not wish to emphasise his discussion of Western Pantheism.

The defects of Pantheism are all made to bring grist to the mill of Theism and even of Christianity. Pantheistic identity is impossible, and affords neither intellectual nor moral satisfaction. The relation of the finite being to God cannot be one of absorption but of communion, of love, of co-operation. But the latter all involve a distinction of personalities. An analysis of knowledge shows the ultimate character of the distinction between subject and object. To know anything cannot mean to *be* that thing. Hence our knowledge of God does not imply that we are identical with Him. It rests upon the fundamental relation of all knowledge, *viz.* the subject-object relation. It may, I think, be doubted whether this argument does not raise more difficulties than it solves. Does it follow that because identity is impossible, we know God as an object?

Again, Pantheism can give no explanation of moral effort. The latter implies a belief in a Best or Supreme Value. Such a belief in the Best means, it is urged, that we assign existence to the Best. The supremely valuable must include existence. Stated in this form, I fail to see that the argument goes beyond the ordinary statement of the Ontological proof. Clearly Dr Urquhart cannot mean that in God the best is already realised, for that on his own showing would make all human effort a vain and useless struggle to realise what already exists. The best can only exist in God as an ideal. Now, it might conceivably be argued that such an ideal cannot be due to the finite mind, but must have its source in an infinite mind. But whether this be valid or not, Dr Urquhart at any rate does not pursue this line of thought. The idea of goodness and reality must, he argues, be united. Yet this merely means that the world must be such as to admit of ideals of goodness arising and developing, but it does not necessarily mean that a reality which is best already exists. The question is not whether existence has value, but whether from the conception of supreme value the existence of a supremely valuable Being can be deduced. This has not, to my mind, been shown, much less that this supremely valuable Being must be a person. Nor does Dr Urquhart's account of the theistic explanation of pain and evil, and of the stress and travail of the process of history, seem to me satisfactory. The idea of creation is insisted upon, but it is a "creation of creators," *i.e.* the finite subject is free and the explanation of pain and evil is found in his misuse of freedom and in the fact that they contribute to the ultimate and permanent welfare of ourselves and others in the sight of God. God is ultimately responsible for all that happens, since He contributed the original impulse, but this impulse, it is argued, is one of "urgency or forward push" and not of compulsion. One fails to see how this forward push is any the less mechanical than compulsion. The purpose which the finite mind realises can in either case be none of his making. The only explanation of evil and of the process of history that is compatible with Theism would seem to be found in the conception of a Spirit that is working in a medium not of his creation, a medium which by rational effort can be ultimately harmonised. If, however, we insist on combining the idea of creation with the idea of infinite goodness and knowledge, then evil and suffering remain a baffling mystery, and the "attitude of seriousness which God has taken to the world" of which Dr Urquhart speaks cannot but strike one as tragi-comic.

Dr Urquhart's work will be found very helpful by all those who wish to study Indian thought; and as in India Pantheism appears in a pure form, and he has been able to observe its influence both upon philosophical thought and in actual life, the conclusions which he arrives at with regard to the effects of Pantheism upon a general sense of the value of life should be also of general interest.

MORRIS GINSBERG.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

RELIGION AND THE STATE.

THE VERY REV. W. R. INGE, D.D.,
Dean of St Paul's.

AN impartial consideration of the various forms of State which have appeared in human history, and of the various theories and ideals which thinkers have evolved in the course of their attempts to devise a perfect scheme of government, must lead the student to one conclusion. Good government is the hardest of all problems, and it has never yet been solved. History is an almost unrelieved tragedy, because there has never yet been a hopeful experiment that did not break down after a time; there has never been a constitution that did not bear within itself the seeds of its own decay and dissolution. Theocracy, which in theory is the organisation of mankind under the authority of divine revelation, has in practice meant the domination of a priestly caste ruling by superstitious fear and fraud, and extorting money by false pretences. The City State of Greece and mediæval Italy, unrivalled as a forcing-house of genius, and the mother of the arts and sciences, has been the shortest-lived of any form of polity. Nor have the philosophic structures reared on this foundation done much more than serve as the models for the impracticable Utopias which idealists of all ages have loved to build in the clouds. Roman imperialism and the dual world empire which was its heir looked imposing while "the world" meant the countries round the Mediterranean; but the Holy Roman Empire was a phantom, the ghost of the mighty power wielded by the Cæsars; and the Roman Church was never able to make good its claim to be the one legitimate embodiment of the Christian faith. Its pretensions were always far beyond its power to realise them; and now that its rival and counterpart has

ceased to exist even in name, these pretensions have lost their intelligible explanation. The most powerful modern nations have repudiated their spiritual allegiance to Rome; and though the Latin countries are so far negatively faithful to the old *caput orbis* that they have shown but little disposition to adopt any other form of religion, their culture has in fact broken loose from ecclesiastical control, or where it has not done so, it has remained in a backward and mediæval condition. Roman Catholicism everywhere confronts modern civilisation as an enemy, and that is precisely why it has so much more political power than Protestantism. The opponents of "the ideas of 1789," and even discontented provinces which have no uniting principles except antipathy to the central government, tend to place themselves under the leadership of the Roman Church, and to take advantage of its incomparable gifts for organisation, discipline, and cunning intrigue. Protestantism has amalgamated far more closely with the development of secular culture, so that in Protestant countries it is impossible to form strong political parties of clericalists. Religion with us is no monopoly of Conservatives, Liberals, or Socialists; still less does it desire to be a "party of the Centre," separated from all of them, and devoted to the interests of an international corporation. The apotheosis of nationalism which marks the modern period has probably nearly reached its term. It was from the first morally indefensible; and it has ended by plunging the world in the greatest calamity that has ever befallen it—a disaster which has brought ruin and desolation to half the continent of Europe, and which has shaken the whole fabric of civilisation to its base. Nationalism in its extreme Machiavellian form is discredited; and the internationalism which offers itself as the alternative does not seem to have any promise for the future. For it is not based on any love for mankind, or any real desire for peace and good will. The two international organisations which confront each other are ultramontane Catholicism, which is the service of a militant corporation existing rather for its own ends than for the welfare of humanity; and international Labour, which is frankly based on a predatory class-war. There are other international forces such as finance, art, philosophy, and science; but these are not political organisations, and do not even aim at any new integration of society.

As Dr Bussell says in a recently published lecture: "The very root-principles of the man in the street are shaken, and no one knows to whom or to what he owes allegiance. The

disappearance of monarchy, except in a few cases, has removed an intelligible principle of personal loyalty, leaving a void which no one at present even proposes to fill. Instead of a unifying influence, the government of the modern State tends to be frankly sectarian and partisan; it has no stability and no general popular support. It is at the mercy of plotters and anarchists no less than the older personal monarchies. While founded, at least in theory, on a popular franchise, it creates no affection or respect among the people. . . . Meantime, if government is weaker and more precarious in its tenure, it is asked to do more. It is saddled, by general consent or apathy, with duties and functions which it cannot possibly fulfil. It does not seem to be developing, here or elsewhere, into a responsible directorate of business men—a somewhat sordid but still working hypothesis for society and its rulers. It is still largely composed of amateurs detached, by an unreal public life and its catchwords, from any true knowledge of men and women. Those who demand its interference most warmly are the least confident of its motives and its ability. In the general chaos of thought to-day, nothing is commoner than to find the same treatise insisting on the universal control or competence of the State, and yet holding up as an ideal the unfettered freedom of the subject, his conscience and his movements. . . . The State is now stripped of its venerable trappings and exposed in all its nakedness as a hotbed of intrigue, waste, and self-seeking. No one cares or troubles to define democracy, and the old constitutional methods of vote and parliament and debate seem highly unpopular. The prevailing features of modern life are impatience, distrust, and an unwillingness to set to work until the meaning and worth of work are explained.”

This analysis of our present condition seems to me entirely true, and I would lay special stress on the complete discredit into which ballot-box democracy has fallen. Those who still babble about the “general will” only want a stick with which to beat the life out of minorities, and an excuse for relieving politicians of all moral responsibility. It seems as though all the expedients for establishing an ordered human polity had been tried, and that all have failed.

But we may be reminded that this is the age of science, and that science has tried its hand at moral and political philosophy. Perhaps what we want may be found here. The new knowledge ought surely to have something new to teach us in the art and philosophy of government. This claim has been made. As Professor David Ritchie says: “Evolution

has become not merely a theory but a creed, not merely a conception of the universe, but a guide to direct us how to order our lives." It is in this aspect that we have to consider the social ethics of science. Can we find in its teachings a realm of ideas which may form a standard for social life, to take the place of the supernatural sanctions which are no longer operative in the nations of the West? Can we retrace the steps of philosophy to its earliest beginnings in Ionia, when Thales and his successors sought to find in the ultimate constitution of matter and the laws of nature a basis for individual and public morality?

I do not think that the scientific school has produced any political philosopher of the first rank. Darwin wisely confined himself to his own subject, though it was Malthus on Population that first set him thinking on biological problems. Herbert Spencer, though he does not by any means deserve the acrimonious aspersions of critics who hate him on political grounds, started with strong prejudices—those of a Radical dissenter—and never corrected them by study of earlier writers on political philosophy. His education on this side remained very scrappy, and it is not difficult to trace some of his leading ideas to their source in the few books which he had read. "Morality," he said, "is a species of transcendental physiology." The adjective gave admittance to a mystical theory of "life," as a quasi-divine force, operating in all nature, from the highest to the lowest forms—a Plotinian doctrine which he probably borrowed from S. T. Coleridge. This loan from Platonism was given a peculiar character by combining it with a doctrine of universal evolution, which was then in the air, and which Spencer began to hold before the appearance of Darwin's famous book. The process of upward development, according to Spencer, is always in the direction of higher individuation. The higher organisms are more complex and more specialised. This furnishes him with a teleological standard of value, to which, as he supposes, all nature tries to conform. By a very superficial reading of history, he regards militarism as a lower integration of the social organism, and industrialism as a higher stage—a condition of differentiation. He looked forward to a time when this differentiation into independent units should be complete, after which he hoped that an "equilibrium" would be reached, and the individual would be free from all external control in a permanent and "static" paradise of unlimited liberty and low taxes. It is not easy to reconcile this ideal with all that he says about the social organism, nor to defend his rather

absurd analogy between the State and the bodily organism, with nerves for telegraph wires, and so on. But it is his justification of competition, as "a beneficent private war, which makes one man strive to stand on the shoulders of another," which has made so many writers of the younger generation treat him as a personal enemy. Only a middle-class Victorian Englishman could have fallen into the error of contrasting militarism with industrialism, which, as Germany has shown, may easily be fellow-workmen and fellow-conspirators. Strauss, who goes even further than Spencer in his dislike of trade-unionism, advising that employers "should send to foreign countries for workmen, and then let the refractory see who will be able to hold out longest," defends military conquest as well as social inequality as right, because natural, and ridicules those who hope for or expect the abolition of war. Mr Clodd sees that militarism and industrial competition are equally war, though the weapons are different, and thinks that war, in one form or the other, is a law of nature. "Man's normal state is one of conflict; further back than we can trace, it impelled the defenceless bipeds from whom he sprung to unity, and the more so because of their relative inferiority in physique to many other animals. . . . The struggle was ferocious, and under one form or another ranges along the line to this day. 'There is no discharge in that war.' It may change its tactics and its weapons; the military method may be more or less superseded by the industrial—a man may be mercilessly starved instead of being mercilessly slain; but be it war of camp or markets, the ultimate appeal is to force of brain or muscles, and the hardest or craftiest win." It was indeed plain that the "survival of the fittest" can only mean that those survive who are fittest to survive, not the fittest by any moral standard; evolutionary optimism, though it continued to be preached by many, was an amiable superstition, based perhaps on the superficial Deism of the eighteenth century. And so, while Darwinism was applauded in Germany as giving the blessing of science to militarist government and Machiavellian politics, English Darwinians, unwilling to accept so unwelcome a conclusion, were driven to what a more theological age would have called Manichean dualism. "Nature," says Huxley, "is no school of virtue, but the headquarters of the enemy of ethical nature." The "cosmic process" is frankly handed over to Ahriman, and man, who is endowed with an ethical sense which at every point revolts against Nature's methods, has been given, or has given himself, the formidable task of "resisting the cosmic process." Man is on one side a self-

asserting natural organism, and on another a self-renouncing social being. But what is the foundation of this moral sense which flies in the face of Nature? Huxley gives no clear answer; Wallace, who felt the same horror at Nature's methods, was driven to postulate "an influx from the unseen universe of spirit," thus definitely joining the ranks of theism.

These scientific dualists were undoubtedly dismayed by what seemed to be the unavoidable conclusions to which evolutionary ethics must lead in practical politics. If "history is a good aristocrat," science seemed to be a very heartless kind of Tory, or even a Prussian militarist. This was so contrary to the main current of opinion at the time, which was pacifist and humanitarian, that science, which at one time in Queen Victoria's reign seemed to be in possession of the intellectual field, was assailed by new enemies from every side. The remarkable work of Aliotta, *The Idealistic Reaction against Science*, gives a good survey of the miscellaneous host of allies—Neo-Kantians, Voluntarists, Pragmatists, Activists, and others—who have tried to subvert the foundations of the scientific world-view. These intellectual campaigns have been assisted by orthodox theology, overjoyed at finding such allies against its old enemy; by sentimentalists of every kind; and by the inheritors of the "ideas of 1789," whose *idola fori* were faring very badly at the hands of biologists. Further, the widening cleft between a philosophy based on physics and a philosophy based on the study of living organisms, with psychology as its crown, threatened to break up natural science from within, and was of great service to its enemies. The scientists, who not long ago claimed to be the dictators of morality and the expounders of the whole scheme of the universe, are in danger of being ousted altogether from philosophy, ethics, and politics, and being bidden to confine themselves to their laboratories. As an example of the language which is popular to-day, I will quote a sentence from a very able writer, Mr Ernest Barker: "It may still remain a matter of doubt whether ethics and politics, which belong to the sphere of mind, will gain by the importation into their sphere, in whatever way, of the laws of the natural world." The laws of the natural world, he implies, do not belong to the sphere of mind! What must be the hatred and dread of naturalism in politics which can entrap a philosopher and a student of Plato and Aristotle into so egregious a statement as this?

I have not the least doubt that this "reaction against science" is shallow, transient, and retrograde. No doubt the

self-confident scientists of the last century brought it on themselves. They knew so little of metaphysics that they supposed the world as interpreted by science to be an objectively existing material structure, independent of the human mind. They attempted to interpret life by the laws of inorganic matter. They thought that they had disposed of Christianity by challenging it to substantiate miracles. They were (without a shadow of excuse) carried away by the popular delusion that the world is necessarily getting better, of its own accord; they were, many of them, quite incompetent outside their own subject, and they did not know it.

But there is no sign whatever of the "bankruptcy of science" which some of its enemies have been proclaiming. Its methods continue to work; they win new and signal triumphs every year; and can any thinker now be satisfied to cut the world of knowledge in two with a hatchet, and to separate religion, ethics, and politics from the study of Nature? It is a monstrous expedient, which could only end in absolute scepticism. It is not philosophers who are attracted by such a theory; it is politicians. They heap scorn on those whom they call "intellectuals," not because they are wrong, but because they are few. They ignore the fact that they have to deal with Nature herself, who, as Plotinus says, is not in the habit of talking, but who is in the habit of striking.

The new knowledge has, in fact, made many changes in religion, in ethics, and in politics. It has made an end of the supernaturalistic dualism which has been the philosophy of Catholicism. There are not two orders—the natural and the supernatural—dovetailed into each other on the same plane. We can no longer (unless we are on a coroner's jury) explain a mysterious event as an act of God, because (as has been said) we don't know what the devil else to call it. In ethics it has presented us with new duties. We know now that the so-called lower animals are our cousins, and we are coming to recognise that wanton cruelty to them, whether out of sheer devilry or in the service of fashion, is one of the most detestable and meanest of crimes. I trust that before long a woman wearing an egret plume will be made to feel that she is a repulsive object, and that the sportsman, instead of swaggering at railway stations, will try to hide his tools as a golfer who ought to have been at the Front hid his clubs during the war. Science has also taught us to look with a more discerning eye on the beauties of Nature. It has taught us that no moral duties are more imperative or more important than our duties to posterity. We do not want premature eugenic legislation;

but when the science is further advanced, we shall insist upon it. Many "false opinions" (*ψευδεῖς δόξαι*) have been undermined. The ridiculous statement that men are born equal is dead, if not buried. The "sanctity of human life" must give way to the obvious truth that a good garden needs weeding. The prohibition of euthanasia will have to be reconsidered. The question of population, which Huxley rightly discerned to be "the problem of problems," will have to be thoroughly investigated with reference to the health and welfare of the next and future generations. These are only examples of the ethics of the future, which modern science has made inevitable. The nation that learns these lessons first will lead the world in civilisation and good government.

It is a blunder to call scientific ethics "materialistic." The word is a mere term of abuse for anything that we do not like. If we believe in God, the laws of Nature are the laws of God for the world in which we live. We know them only through the reason which God has given us; and it is that reason which finds law and order in the dance of atoms which is all that can be said to be presented to us from without. The laws of Nature are a large part of divine revelation. If we disregard them and make, as Heracleitus said, a private world of our own, we shall not be "splendid rebels," but fools. And science is no friend either to selfishness or to hedonism. Self-sacrifice is part of Nature's law.

It is, however, a legitimate question to ask whether, besides the evolution of species, there is an evolution of ideas, which obeys the same law favouring the survival of the fittest, but is relatively independent of biological change. The question is important, because if human nature can only improve by the agency of natural or rational selection, the hope of measurable progress within so brief a period as five hundred or a thousand years would seem to be very small indeed, until we know enough of the laws of heredity to breed for moral improvement.

No one can deny the immense progress of knowledge, which, as we have seen, carries with it important ethical implications; nor the cumulative weight of experience, gained by the method of trial and error. And it is by no means easy to separate this kind of progress from improvement in human nature itself. To say that environment does not modify character is untenable. But the evolution of ideas is not necessarily towards a higher morality, any more than biological evolution is necessarily towards the production of "higher" or more complex types. "There is a way that seemeth right

unto a man, but the end thereof is the way of death." Civilisation may pursue a course which brings present success and future ruin. Or ideas may stagnate, and cause a whole civilisation to stagnate too. There are several instances in history of a degeneration of ideas, comparable to the change of a freely moving animal into a parasite. The evolution of ideas is not a purely biological process; but it is strictly limited by the innate capabilities of each generation which acts as carriers to the ideas. A bad social organisation will produce a counter-selection—the worse ideas will tend to prevail.

The lower animals, acting from instinct rather than reason (though I cannot allow that these faculties are mutually exclusive), subordinate self-preservation to the instincts of the race. For us there is a conflict between self-regarding and external duties. We have to "save our own souls"—to make the best of our lives,—and we have to consider the welfare of others, especially of posterity. These duties conflict, except upon the highest plane; and purely scientific or naturalistic ethics cannot, I think, prevent them from conflicting. Nor can biology give us any clear answer to the question whether our duty is to serve humanity as a whole, or the particular national or social group to which we belong. In short, though science has revealed new duties, and has increased our knowledge of those laws of Nature which, in Bacon's words, we can only conquer by obeying them, it does not possess any dynamic which can lift our lives to the spiritual realm in which alone our higher natures are at home, and which alone can give us an absolute standard whereby to measure all human actions and aspirations. The neglect of scientific sociology is deplorable; but naturalism is an abstract and defective view of life, against which men will always be in revolt. We cannot accept a view of the world which practically leaves *us* out.

We are therefore compelled to reject the idea of a purely scientific State as the solution of our problem: not because science is "materialistic," for it is not; but because science concentrates itself upon a particular kind of values, leaving others out of account. And when an attempt is made to construct a rounded scheme of reality, those values which are excluded are virtually repudiated.

If I were asked to state in one word the cause of the failure of our civilisation, I should answer, "Secularism." There must surely be some very deep ground for the universal discontent and *malaise* which has overtaken Western civilisation.

There is but little happiness and content anywhere, and the reason is that we have lost faith in the values which are the motive force of our social life. Capitalism is in danger, not so much from the envious attacks of the unpropertied, as from the decay of that Puritan asceticism which was its creator. The glory of subduing the earth and producing something—no matter what—on a large scale; the accumulation of wealth, not for enjoyment, but as the means of increased power and the instrument of new enterprise—this conception of a worthy and God-fearing life no longer appeals to men as it did. The capitalist now is too often an idler or a gambler, and as such he can justify his existence neither to himself nor to others. The working man also has no pride and no conscience in his work. He works in the spirit of a slave, grudgingly and bitterly, and then ascribes his unhappiness to the conditions of his employment. He is becoming well educated; but he twists everything round, even religion, to his alleged economic grievances, and nothing else really interests him. Industrialism drags on, because the alternative is starvation; but the life and joy have gone out of it, and it seems likely to pass into a state of gradual decay. Civilisation presents the spectacle of a mighty tree which is dying at the roots. When masses of men begin to ask simultaneously, "Is it all worth while? What is the use of this great Babylon that we have builded?" we are reminded that the mediæval casuists classified *acedia*, which is just this temper, among the seven deadly sins. We had almost forgotten *acedia*, and few knew the meaning of the word; but it is at the bottom of the diseases from which we are suffering—the frivolous and joyless emptiness of life among the rich, and the bitter vindictive sloth of the hand-workers.

Troeltsch, writing about twelve years ago, after mentioning the decline of Calvinistic asceticism, the character of which he was one of the first to lay bare, names as "the final characteristic of the modern spirit," "its self-confident optimism and belief in progress. This" (he says), "was an accompanying phenomenon of the struggle for freedom in the period of illuminism, which without such a confidence could not have broken the old chains, and it then found confirmation in a multitude of new discoveries and new creations. The old cosmic conceptions dominated by the Fall, the redemption of the world, and the final judgment, have fallen away. To-day everything is filled with the thought of development and of progress upward from the depths of darkness to unknown heights. The despairing sense of sin, the sense of a great world-suffering imposed upon us for our purification and

punishment, have been banished." Since Troeltsch wrote these words, the baselessness of this secular optimism has been thoroughly exposed. The loss of a faith, even of a fantastic dream like this, is a grave matter for humanity. But it was, after all, a will-of-the-wisp; and now that is gone, the path is open for a truer philosophy of history, based on a truer philosophy of life itself.

Troeltsch is confident that "a Church-directed civilisation" is no longer possible. This is certainly true, while the Church cannot make up its mind whether to go into politics or to stand aloof from them. A Church which allied itself wholeheartedly with Conservatism or with Revolution might conceivably "direct civilisation" again, of course at the cost of complete apostasy from the religion of Christ. And a Church which determined to combat spiritual evil with spiritual weapons, confronting "the world" with another standard of values, and offering mankind the blessedness promised by Christ to all who will renounce the world and follow Him, might also conceivably win civilisation to make trial, for the first time on a large scale, of those doctrines which would in truth solve all the gravest of our problems. But a secularised Christianity, such as is now preached from our pulpits, has neither savour nor salt; "it is good for nothing, but to be cast out and trodden under foot of men." It tries to please men who have obviously no conscious religious needs, no sense of sin, no craving for redemption from it, "whose god is their belly, whose glory is in their shame, who *mind earthly things*." St Paul's climax has come to sound in our ears as a bathos; but it is not.

Eucken, whose whole philosophy is based on a sharp opposition between the earthly and the spiritual life, thinks that there is a danger lest those who live as citizens of the Invisible State should withdraw from the visible world, and fail to set their mark upon it. He says that "Christianity was established in an age which was wanting in vigorous vitality, and was chiefly intent on gaining a safe harbour of refuge. It seemed that this could only be found in opposition to the confused activity of the world, in a supernatural order. . . . A sharp opposition runs through the whole history of Christianity, the opposition between an inwardness which withdraws from the visible world and an adaptation to this world, with the danger of an intrusion of the sensible into the spiritual." He is thinking, no doubt, of monasticism, which may be justified as a calling for a few, and which only becomes popular when the conditions of life in the world are thoroughly miserable

and barbarous, as they were during the dark ages. At such times havens of refuge have a value for posterity, since they preserve some relics of culture from destruction. On the whole, I do not think that Christianity has ever quenched human activities. It has been the religion of the most energetic peoples of the earth, though I do not pretend that they have done much to recommend their principles. The Christian attitude may be summed up in the maxim, "Value spiritual things for their own sake, and the things of sense for the sake of the spiritual." "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you." A whole philosophy is contained in these simple words. Those who in heart and mind are already citizens of the State Invisible, the Kingdom of God, will be inwardly detached from the external world around them; but just as the mind and will of God, which find complete expression in the eternal world, create continually, by an inner necessity, the world of time, in which the thought of God is transmuted into vital law, and the will of God into an interwoven complex of finite purposes, so the soul of man, in the act of contemplating the eternal order, creates, by an inner necessity, a copy of that order in the scene of his temporal probation. We are not to regard this world as an end in itself; its deepest reality is the complex of divine purposes which are being worked out in it; and since those purposes have their source and their goal in the eternal world, it is only by knowing the eternal world that we can know things temporal as they are. The real is the ideal; but a deeper reality than our ideals. As the American Professor Hocking has lately written: "We have learnt that we must go to school to Nature to obey her, without letting the will or fancy mislead us; we must learn the same lesson in religion. All our creativeness must be within the framework of that which independently *is*." The mature mind would rather be defeated by reality than triumph over the products of its own imagination.

The State Invisible is the kingdom of absolute values, the kingdom of eternal life. It is because we have been misled into attaching absolute value to things that have it not, to man-made institutions, to transient enthusiasms, to all the idols of the cave and the market-place, that our faith in immortality has come to burn so dim. We have, as Mr Clubton Brock says, parodied our certainties in a wrong medium, till they have lost their certainty for us. To some extent, I think, we must admit that this scepticism about a future life has been wholesome. Men have denied themselves

the consolations of belief because they are not sure that the values which it embodies are absolute. They feel the unworthiness of the doctrine of immortality as it has been presented to them. They have no desire for rewards for themselves and punishments for others; they do not feel that either are deserved. But it is the prevailing secularism which has caused the belief in eternal life to be swept away along with the travesties of it which made up the picture-book eschatology of the Churches. If we looked within, we should find both heaven and hell there. The highest human life tells us most about heaven, the lowest human life tells us most about hell.

The eternal values are commonly classified as Goodness, Truth, and Beauty, and we cannot improve on that classification. Goodness, Truth, and Beauty are the threefold cord which is not quickly broken. What are the marks or tests which give some of our experiences a much higher value than others, so that we feel that there is something divine about them? In the first place, they bring with them their own satisfaction. They are not means to something else. Secondly, they have an universal quality. They take us out of ourselves, out of the small circle of our private personal interests. They make us breathe a larger air, untainted by selfishness. Thirdly, they delight and uplift us in such a way that when the moments of vision are past we feel that we are still the better for having had them. These are the marks of the things of the Spirit. They are, firstly, precious for their own sake; secondly, they have God and not our little selves for their centre; and thirdly, they bring us a peace and happiness which does not wholly perish when they seem to leave us. And what are the experiences which have this character? First of all, moral goodness. When we are brought close to moral goodness, especially in the form of disinterestedness, sympathy, love, we feel that we have reached the heart of life, and come into the presence of God Himself. This is why it is said that God is Love, and that Love never faileth. Pure affection is stronger than death. Secondly, Truth has this character. By Truth I mean right thinking, the correspondence of our minds with the nature of things. Here, too, is something which stands firm in its own right, so that a brave statesman could say, "It is better that I should suffer for speaking the truth than that the Truth should suffer for want of my speaking." This, too, is why the work of the scholar, the scientific investigator, and the philosopher, is a branch of the larger priesthood, a direct worship of God.

And I cannot doubt that Beauty is also an absolute value, a divine attribute. It has the three marks of spiritual reality which I have mentioned. It claims to exist in its own right, and not as a means to anything else. It takes us out of ourselves, as pure affection and pure search after truth take us out of ourselves; and it is a permanent enrichment of our life. We may say with Augustine: "All that is beautiful comes from the highest Beauty, which is God."

Here, then, we have a definite content for the State Invisible: we are not reduced to talking vaguely about "Spirit," the word which so annoyed a practical reformer like Luther. Spirit should be the fullest of all concepts; it is sometimes in danger of being the emptiest. But if in place of this too general term we take these three absolute values, Goodness, Truth, and Beauty, and make it our ideal that these shall prevail "on earth as in heaven," we have a definite standard and a goal in sight. We also know our enemies—pride, sensuality, and selfishness, the world, the flesh, and the devil. It is pride which most prevents us from keeping our minds open and teachable for the reception of new truths. It is sensuality which most often poisons our appreciation of the beautiful, so as even to make it, in Tennyson's words, "procurers to the lords of hell." And it is selfishness which thwarts and spoils disinterested affection. All three shut up the soul in itself, and cut it off from its true and happy life in the eternal world.

The relations between matter and spirit, between the outer and the inner, between the visible and the invisible, between earth and heaven, are a problem never to be completely solved. But it may be helpful to remind ourselves that the contrast between outer and inner are misleading. The inner world is the whole field of consciousness, from which the physical world is a selection. Practical needs and the pursuit of specialised knowledge both tend to break up the *continuum*; and language, which was made to express our needs in intercourse with each other, helps to emphasise an artificial view of reality. The highest and most universal truths cannot be fitted into a scheme of reality such as we construct for our external life in time. We sometimes try in vain to find a place for God inside the artificial construction which we mistake for "things as they are"; and when this attempt fails, we are tempted to thrust Him out altogether. A truer philosophy will abate the claims of natural science to divide the contents of our consciousness into dreams and realities, the former being all that an abstract view of the world has left out; it will do this without in any

way impairing the value of science as a revealer of many of the laws under which we live.

It is because man is a microcosm that he can only find his full life in membership. Potentially we have all reality within us, and potentially what we call the external world is a part of our higher selves. But, as Krause has said in a profoundly true passage, "The fellowship of higher beings with lower beings is immediate and direct, whereas the fellowship of co-ordinate beings on the same plane, in and through their common higher spheres, is mediate and indirect. Community is everywhere present whenever the inner manifestations of the life of the beings meet, mutually influence, and limit each other; and when at the same time they strive to maintain and heighten their independence. There is a degree of community even when there is no recognised unity of life, as when several beings are useful to one another in a community; but such communities are kept up merely by a common external interest, and have value only when the members are held together by justice." According to this philosopher, who is here rightly interpreting the Platonic doctrine, there can be no durable and valuable coherence in the State Visible, except so far as its members are also members of the State Invisible. True union between human beings can be achieved only in the spiritual sphere; in theological language, it is only as sons of God that we are in any real and effective sense brethren of each other. Any other kind of union, based on mutual convenience, is precarious and morally valueless. History confirms this view. Associations for unworthy ends find it very difficult to hold together long enough to accomplish the ends for which they were formed, whereas a community the members of which have in common a deep religious conviction resists all attempts to disintegrate it. This fact is connected with the necessity which compels all lower forms of association to curtail the freedom of its members, to impair their individuality, and turn them into mere tools. But the unity of the Spirit is not only consistent with, but vitally connected with, the fullest development and enhancement of individuality. A union of this kind lacks the cast-iron discipline of a military confederacy; but it has creative and assimilative powers which more than make up for this deficiency. Every person who is, by virtue of his rich and consecrated inner life, a citizen of the heavenly City, not only lives on that higher plane in which alone our personality is fully developed, but acts as a unifying, integrating force in society. Love, as Krause goes on to say, is the living form

of the organic unification of all life in God. Love is the eternal will of God to be vitally present in all beings, and to take back the life of all His members into Himself as into their whole life. This love pours itself into all beings as the divine impulse to rejoice in the perfection and beauty of every being, and blissfully to feel this unity of life.

This is unquestionably the principle of the Christian religion, as we have it from the lips of its Founder and of those who have understood Him. We are to regard ourselves as strangers and pilgrims on earth, immortal spirits on our probation, but charged with the duty of making earth, which is the shadow of heaven, as much like its archetype as we can. And the way to do this is to develop our spiritual faculties to the uttermost, knowing that it is only in the spiritual life that we really come into contact with our fellow-men as they are. Social problems cannot be solved while we regard men merely as subjects of claims and counter-claims against each other, nor can any legerdemain of legislative machinery cure the deep-seated vices of human nature which are the cause of our troubles. The mere politician never awakens the sense of sin in those whom he addresses; on the contrary, he encourages them to think that their unhappiness is due to the injustice of other men. Thus he directly fosters hatred, bitterness, and alienation; instead of unifying the State, he disrupts it. We can all see how our civilisation is falling to pieces under this treatment. The government is despised and disliked by all; the State is torn asunder by warring factions, some of which are openly plundering their fellow-citizens and holding the nation to ransom. The State has completely lost its moral authority and its power of evoking reverence and loyalty. The idea of the Nation is not dead; men are still willing to die for their country, but the name of the State only calls up the picture of a collector and payer of blackmail. Nor can I see any remedy except in the adoption of the Christian standard of values and the Christian philosophy of life.

The question may be raised whether the citizens of the State Invisible should organise themselves as a Church, or in any other way. Some kind of mutual support is clearly necessary. What the New Testament calls the World, human society as it organises itself apart from God, is largely a system of co-operative guilt with limited liability. Each member of it can shift moral responsibility on to someone else; and when any of its tools is conscience-stricken, it says, as the Chief Priests said to Judas, "What is that to us? See thou to that." To meet this formidable organisation, there must be

another society founded on the opposite principles, pledged to assist its members in the promotion of righteousness, peace, and good will. Such a society constitutes the invisible Church of which so much has been said at various times of history ; and it needs the active co-operation of all high-minded men and women, who are shocked at the idea of using for their own purposes the faults and weaknesses of others—that sinister art without which, we are often told, it is impossible to get anything done in this world. But how far is it desirable to organise the moral forces of society into a visible corporation ? Or, to put the question otherwise, Is the separation of Church and State a permanent thing, or a temporary accident ? On the one hand we must emphasise that spiritual victories can be won only in their own field. The influence of the Church, as a spiritual agency, must be exercised upon the will and conscience of men ; and a Church that leaves this, its legitimate sphere, and goes into politics, or attempts to use coercion, always comes out badly smirched, and generally outdoes secular governments in craft and cruelty. On the other hand, if the secular State has no spiritual or ideal basis, it is deprived of the strongest and noblest attractions that might hallow the obedience and kindle the devotion of its subjects. Nor does the dualism of Church and State seem altogether natural. The old idea, that the Church is the nation under its spiritual aspect, is surely the right one. It is impracticable at present, partly because the spiritual Roman Empire, with its claims to supernatural or extranational obedience, still survives—a relic of the dead world-empire still vigorous in the midst of modern nationalism ; and partly because the Church has split up into smaller corporations, none of which is capable of acting as the complete embodiment of the religion of the nation, while many prefer to stand outside all religious organisations. But if the State could once more be placed under protection of religion—not in the sense that it should be controlled by priests, but that it should be recognised by all, as it was in Greek antiquity, as a moral institution, existing to promote the highest possible life among its citizens,—we might hope to see a great improvement in the lamentably low standard of international morality, and a diminution in the sordid corruption, class-bribery, and intrigue which made up the life of democratic politics. If politicians came to regard themselves as the priests or officers of a holy corporation, pledged to stand or fall by the noblest ideals, the whole spirit of political life would be altered, and instead of lagging far behind even the most mediocre standard of private morality, the government

might set an example of high-minded justice, generosity, and chivalry. There does not seem to be any reason, in the nature of things, why governments should be unjust in foreign policy, nor why they should, as a matter of course, appeal to the worst passions of the electors, their cupidity, pugnacity, and mean prejudices. The evil is partly due to a mutual shifting of responsibility. The government says, "We are only the servants of the people"; the people say, "We must leave it to the government to say what is right." Men of high character either keep out of politics or are driven out of them, and this is most true in the most democratic, which are also the most secularised, States. The dualism of Church and State may some day come to an end; and the truths which underlie both Hebrew theocracy and Greek political philosophy may be brought together in some form of polity which can also find room for the ideals of a spiritual world-commonwealth, and of a purified and exalted patriotism.

W. R. INGE.

THE CONDITIONS OF EFFECTIVE IDEALISM.

F. R. HOARE.

“He who would do good to another must do it in minute particulars.
General Good is the plea of the scoundrel, hypocrite, and flatterer.”

BLAKE.

I HAVE in my mind a picture of a “world-lover.”¹ He stands upon the edge of a prairie, or the seashore; in a mood of exaltation he feels an impulse to spread his arms as if to embrace the vast spaces in front of him. In their subtly diversified emptiness he perceives the crowding images that people his world, and he yearns towards them and loves them. He loves the whirling atoms and the streaming nebulae; he loves the strange undergrowth of the oceanic depths; he loves the star-fish on the sand and the beetle on the leaf; he loves the upturned soil where the plough has passed; he loves the labourers, the teeming millions of Asia, the little brown babies in the jungle village, the muffled herdsman on the snow-line, the patient fisher with his cormorant, the patient hoe-er in the rice-field. Again, it is his native land he loves, and all lands, their heroes, sacrifice, and great careers. He loves the burning spirit of adventure; he loves the horse for its fleetness, the humming car, the clouds scudding overhead, the cry of the poet throbbing in his brain. He loves music, and lamps, and dusk, and his mother, and the world. . . . But his feet are cold, and he turns to his hotel, where there is a horse-hair sofa which he hates, and an eyeing waiter whom he hates, and greasy soup that he hates, and many other things that he forgot when he loved “the world.”

What, then, was he loving? What is it, indeed, that we all love in these moments of exaltation? Can it be ourselves?

¹ See the article entitled “World-Love,” by Sir Francis Younghusband, *HIBBERT JOURNAL*, January 1920, p. 301.

Can it be that these moments of fancied love are really moments of pure self-satisfaction, and that the objects of our "world-love" are but a few items from the unthinkable diversity of the universe selected, half-unconsciously, by our reverie because they can be woven into a pattern that affords us unalloyed gratification? It is obvious enough that a world-lover who was a city clerk or a worker with his hands would form a very different world-picture, and, what is more, would react very differently to the picture seen by the world-lover on the seashore. For all its apparent comprehensiveness this picture could scarcely fail to stir quite opposite emotions in, say, a student wrestling with the equations of stellar dynamics, or a deep-sea diver, or a fruit-farmer, or a ploughman with mud-caked boots and aching calves, or a census-official, or a hungry Chinaman with cramped limbs and cold wet back in an open boat, or the men who had to fail if others were to succeed, or the grooms at the stud-farm, the skilled mechanic who had to blow up the tyres, the piano-tuner, the girl who had to trim the lamps in the morning. It is not that these others necessarily have less emotional capacity or less capacity for unselfish affection; in so far as selfishness counts, it is not clear that the balance is in favour of the man who loves patience—in the teeming millions, and adventurous swiftness—for himself. Perhaps the different effects are due chiefly to the fact that, where all world-pictures are self-centred, no picture can lie evenly about another's centre.

It seems a shameful thing to have to admit that this monstrous figure of the world-lover came into my mind after reading Sir Francis Younghusband's moving and beautiful essay upon "World-Love." And let me disclaim at once all intention of mocking at that essay or at any of the aspirations expressed in it. If I mock at all, it is at the creature of my own perverse fancy. I feel sure that in the vision of that essay there is something that I miss, so that, missing it, I am incapable of doing justice to the essay. But the fact remains that this figure did thrust itself upon me after reading it, and, furthermore, that I do believe that for most of us the world-concept actually is of such a kind as, by its very largeness and lack of definition, to induce a highly subjective selection of objects when we reflect upon it and exceedingly egotistical emotional reactions. Some minds—the mind of the man in the street, for example, who has not trodden the Great Table-land of Asia or the Pathway to Reality,—will unresistingly accept a localised picture as the world-picture; another will attempt comprehensiveness by an effort of vagueness or abstraction that selects

some moral or intellectual principles as world-unifiers; either sort will be making the world in its own image and loving it for the image it sees. As Sir Francis himself says: "We love the world because it manifests those very things which we love best."

But since I seem to be missing so completely the intention of his paper, I will make no attempt to consider it in detail in the all too disjointed reflections that follow. Yet, as I shall be concerned in part with the character of the world-lover and, particularly, of the world-lover in action, I will, before I leave the paper, quote in full the description of him that it contains. It may serve at the same time to afford some clue to my own perversity and to keep it within bounds. It runs as follows: "Those who are imbued with a fervent love of the world, like those who are devoted to their country, will be most delicately sensitive to the evil of evil and the good of good. And they will ache to remove the evil and achieve the good. They will be filled with a quickened compassion for those many who have to suffer through no fault of their own, as well as for those who have never had a proper chance. But they will also have a fined-up sense of what is best, and a hot impatience of whatever is short of the best in those who *could* achieve it. They will be possessed by a consuming passion for the best, and never will be completely satisfied till they have attained it and made it everywhere prevail. And the best, even when attained, they will straightway drive to better. Satiety will never overcome them. The joy of divine adventure will be with them to the end."

Certainly this beautiful description has no obvious relation to my portrait of the world-lover contemplating a portion of the ocean. Accepting it as descriptive of the type of man and activity produced by world-love at its best translated into action, what are we to think of this man, and what of his activity? Is he not even in this description a man with a passion for abstractions, a worker for abstractions? When he has to find for his daily conduct some motive more tangible and more specialised than world-love, some criterion detailed enough for decisions upon daily problems, will he not be the kind of man who fastens upon abstract principles, anchors his mind to them, and makes them the guide of life? For surely any man whose religion is world-love, and who is consumed with a passion for the world as he has conceived and unified it, must be driven to take as rules for action the principles in which he finds its unity, as the world-lover of my portrait took as the objects of his contemplation such items of the

universe as gratified his self-complacency. And if so, though ever so much better than my day-dreamer, is not this man of action of somewhat questionable shape? There are ugly names that might be applied to him—names like “idealist,” “fanatic,” and “enthusiast.” He will be hard to distinguish from the impracticable dreamer, the crank, the heartless devotee, the impossibly scrupulous citizen, those saints so intolerable as family men. For indeed all these folk are chiefly characterised, personal prejudices apart, by a single-minded passion for an ideal, whether it be contained in some worship or creed, or in some vision of personal destiny, apotheosis or martyrdom or both, or in some single rule of conduct, a conscientious objection or objective. It is from this devotion that they draw their undoubting faith, their high pride in the truth, and their scrupulousness; but hence also their dogmatism, their self-righteousness, and their priggishness. Hence, again, their fixity of purpose, their tenacity, and their courage; but hence also their “hot impatience,” their obstinacy, their blindness, their callousness, and their cruelty. Hence a Francis vowed to poverty, or a Liebknecht to the people, but hence also the Inquisition and the Terror and the monstrous figures of a Torquemada and a Tinville; hence the “C.O.” of popular imagination and not impossibly of real life, saving his soul while his sister is raped or the *Lusitania* sunk; hence strike-committees and Admiralties cutting off supplies from men, women, and children alike as an episode in the class-struggle or the war against Prussianism.

It may seem a travesty of world-love to associate the world-lover in action with some of these, but what, in the last analysis, is there to differentiate them? Loveless though some of these seem to be, there is none of them who would admit that he was not a world-lover. There is none who would not claim that in the last resort his motives derived from love of all the world, and each of them could with some show of truth deduce his principles from that all-embracing emotion. For each could claim that all his actions, whatever their immediate incidence, were subordinated to and justified by the ultimate benefit they were designed to secure to every creature.

Then what has gone wrong? Am I simply harping on the inevitable “weak side” of idealism, and is it not merely perverse to emphasise the darker aspects of so rare a gift, the very dynamic of moral and social progress, when there are enough already to assail it and all too few to defend; when

moral and intellectual compromises are so prevalent and so ready, and half-measures and easy-going codes form most of the texture of our state and society? And certainly the man whose life is guided by principle, for all his occasional weaknesses, is a far nobler and more inspiring figure than any of those who mock at him from the unassailable ground of moral indifference.

Now, there seem to be two ways in which the following of universal ideals is able to betray us: one is through the harm that may be done to individuals by dealing with mankind on general principles, and the other is through the diversity of motive and spirit compatible with formal adherence to a rule. I will illustrate the latter danger first.

Some pacifists, and some educational idealists, have found their formula in the prohibition of the violent use of physical force; this formula may by some be considered misguided, but all will allow that it represents goodwill. Yet, let us obey it as scrupulously as we like, it will not prevent us from, and may even provoke us into, exercising control or giving vent to impatience by undue pressure of will or by furious reproof. We do not break our rule; but what essential difference is there between an overbearing manner and physical roughness, or between a sharp word and a slap to a naughty child? And yet so many of us who teach or control children are apt to think that we can save our consistency, if that be our formula, by these paltry distinctions.

If this rule seem too narrow, and too little representative of world-love, take such a lofty and difficult one as the requiring of evil by good. It is perfectly possible, as most of us know from our own experience, to obey this from motives that make the obedience perfectly detestable, as when we take the advice of the Book of Proverbs and go out of our way to do a kindness to one who has injured us, in order to make him feel uncomfortable by heaping "coals of fire" upon his head. Or take the great passage from the Sermon on the Mount that tells us not to discriminate, in our behaviour towards them, between our friends and our enemies, between the good and the wicked, any more than our Father in Heaven discriminates between the just and the unjust in the weather he sends. Surely we may hold that rule to be one that cannot betray us, a rule that we can follow blindly; yet if our feelings are not the same towards these two sets of persons, our attempts, our most successful attempts at treating them alike—in distributing benefits or disappointments, for example—may become a really horrible process, hard and calculating, some-

times even sullen and bitter, as we scrupulously, doggedly mete out perfectly even-handed consideration.

All this is obvious enough, and it is obvious enough also, it will be said, what has gone wrong. In these cases we are obeying the principle without being possessed of the spirit that inspired it. The obvious solution is to capture that spirit, and that means, in the last resort, to become a true world-lover. But few of us will feel that such a demand can be fulfilled to order, and in any case we shall want to know what to do with our principles meanwhile. To be able to be so horrible without ceasing to be high-principled is surely worse for us, and ultimately for others, than if our horribleness violated shamelessly every law of God and man.

And then the other weakness of idealism has to be reckoned with. To the damage we may do in spite of our principles must be added the damage we may do because of them, the suffering we may cause or permit in the course of realising our ideals. This consideration is unendingly insisted on, and I need not stay to elaborate it; I have already referred to examples both great and small. Here again we are pointed to an obvious solution: the principle must not become a fetish, and when occasion arises we must break it and be, superficially, inconsistent; instinct, honour, self-respect, common-sense, good-nature—any one of these is a better guide at such moments. But I cannot feel that principles or the practice of obeying them are so lightly to be abandoned, or subscribe to the paradox that rules were made to be broken. If a rule is a good one its value would seem mainly to lie in guiding our actions, not when its reasonableness is obvious, but when our judgment would otherwise be at a loss.

We are left with the fact that our idealism benefits some and injures others, and we are driven to inquire who it is that we really expected to benefit by it. It might be ourselves, for the effect of idealism in giving zest to life and simplifying its problems is plain enough. But in spite of all the dialectic of orthodox theologians and hedonist, egoist, and determinist moralists, I cannot see how anyone can consciously base a real religion or ethic upon benefit to himself. There remain apparently only two possible sets of gainers by our obedience to principle: one is the world in general, and the other is my next-door neighbour.

Now, in so far as we are concerned with the world in general, the universe, humanity, the race, or, as some would prefer to limit it, the workers, the proletariat, the allied peoples, or other large body of persons conceived in the

mass—in so far as we are concerned with them it is easy to persuade ourselves that obedience to sound principle is the right thing, scrupulous obedience as such, no matter how we manage it; that is what will benefit humanity and so forth in the end. In fact, it is just by persuading themselves of this that men commonly justify their fanaticism, as persecutors or martyrs, as propagandists or autocrats, and so on; compromise, they would say, may win a point or ease a situation for the moment, but the cause, the right, “the best,” or whatever it may be, can only ultimately triumph through unswerving loyalty to principle. Well, it may be so; and, if so, the ultimate benefit to a million men in the mass may outweigh the sufferings of those to whom our idealism has made us cruel or indifferent. For myself, I can scarcely see meaning in this counting of heads. But when we consider simply our next-door neighbour, when we make up the account of pain and benefit for some one person towards whom we have acted scrupulously on principle, we have no such abstruse calculations to make. Often we *know* that we have hurt him, perhaps in spite of, perhaps because of, our principle, and cannot persuade ourselves that we have given him compensating benefit. And, when we know that, most of us, if not on a platform or our high horse, are uncomfortable. Our idealism or our world-love is worth nothing to just the one person, may be, with whom we are concerned at the moment; is not that enough to show that something is wrong?

Each of us will have his own answer, and I do not wish to dogmatise. But, for myself, I find that I generally come down on the side of making my relations with my next-door neighbour the final test of the value of loyalty to principle; and I do so believing, seldom though I live up to my belief, that the act of direct help to my neighbour, typified by some such simple gesture as putting out my hand to lift him up when he has fallen down, is the one thing ultimately worth doing, and should in the last resort override all those considerations of tactical advantage and “the long run” that beset us whenever we attempt to apply principles.

The so-called “journey-section” of the Gospel according to St Luke contains sayings and incidents that seem at first sight an exaltation of fanaticism; but it contains also a story of another traveller, an alien from Samaria, that illustrates very well the point I am trying to make. It seems not far-fetched to see in the priest and the temple-servant the idealists whose devotion to ceremonial purity made them cross to the other side of the road to avoid contact with an apparently dead

body, though there was just the possibility that they might have been able to do some good, and, no doubt, the desire to do so. The story, in fact, stresses the importance of helpfulness as compared with scrupulousness in daily life.

If all this is sound, it would seem that what is wrong with "principles" is that they do not individualise enough, and that even the spirit that inspires them does not individualise enough. And perhaps that is what is wrong with world-love. It may be that we cannot fruitfully love all the world, that the love that vitalises and is infallible is a selfless emotion directed towards a particular person, and that it is only when a principle does somehow express our actual love for other individual persons that loyalty to it cannot be involved insolubly in the conflicts of which I have been speaking. Certainly I feel that in loving all the world we may be far from loving any one creature in the only way that helps him. There is more hope, for most of us, of benefiting humanity by our love for one other, than of benefiting one other by our love for humanity. There are some we can think of who have done the latter or seem to have done so—characters as different in temperament and range as the Buddha, Socrates, and Plimsoll; but I believe that if we interpret them so we miss the effective sources of their power. It is easy to dogmatise, and indeed it is difficult not to be dogmatic in such a matter, for we are dealing with very intangible things; but I do feel that in so far as their world-love was real it was probably because it arose out of love for individuals and care for individuals. We ordinary people may perhaps find an intelligible analogy in the effect of marriage upon workers for others. Marriage, that on one view seems so often the ending of the idealist's career, is really, often enough, the renewing of strength. To most, both men and women, who have served many with heart, and hands, and brain, there comes a time when, unmarried, their love becomes strained and abnormal, and when, married, they can love and serve all with a greater and a purer love for undertaking those intimate adjustments and tendernesses required of him or her who loves one other with the whole mind and with the whole body.

I will not press an illustration that can be so variously interpreted. My concern is with these two contentions: first, that individualised loving-kindness is not so much the exercise and strengthening of world-love as its very root, the activity and experience out of which alone true world-love can grow; secondly, that it is, and in no transcendental sense, the secret of the hold over others of the great world-lovers. In the case

of these we are apt to estimate the means as we estimate the results, by the degree of publicity they achieve. Let me take an, at present, less exalted example. I know a "fanatic," and surely a world-lover, the dearest to me of all, who was once so placed that for lack of opportunities his loving-kindness could only take the form of the simplest pleasantness, the barest courtesies; and one day someone said to me that she hated to think that his loyalty to principles, the principles that should have done the world such good, had brought him into a position in which his motives would be mistrusted and in which he could do no good to anybody. I tried to persuade her that what we knew of his conduct in prison was enough to tell us that his personal relations with both his comrades and his persecutors were as fine and considerate as ever, and that while that was so we knew that his loyalty to principle was no mere wrong-headedness or stroke of tactics, and that if anyone did any good anywhere he was doing it where he was. "Yes," said she, "but no one will ever know." It is true that few may ever know of his daily actions at that time, yet surely it is upon such unknown deeds that all power of influencing others for good is ultimately based. Would the Prince Gautama be adored as divine by millions in Asia to-day, would Francis of Assisi have founded so great an order, if each had not first laid his spell upon his immediate circle by countless acts of everyday kindness of which no one will ever know?

A difficulty some may feel about this line of thought is that it is too negative to be helpful, going too far in the reaction against conscious idealism. They may urge that there is something rather planless and groping, almost blind, about the operations of this sort of loving-kindness, and that it can afford no foothold for belief, even for faith, in anything but just "going on." It would be easy enough to retort that blindness of a worse kind is often characteristic of the world-lover, holding his head so high that it is always "in the air," and with so clear a vision of the goodness of the universe that he has little healing for the badness in his neighbour. It is more profitable to remember that this working in the dark, this mole-like burrowing, is often the only resource of men. For beliefs may be shattered, ideals and purposes change, and even the conscious love of others be quenched, and yet this working in the dark be able to carry intact the hidden faith and hope and love by which man lives. I do not know when kindness to the universe has ever saved a man from suicide, but many a body has pulled through a time of desperation by just doing jobs for his neighbours.

I am not going to put this forward as the chief recommendation of neighbour-love as against world-love; we cannot derive much moral stimulus from making provision for our worst moments. Yet a very considerable practical difference between the two ideals does seem to lie here. I suggested earlier that world-love could not be achieved to order; it is at least as certain that we cannot love our neighbour to order. So far, generalised love and individualised love fail equally as a basis for conduct if for that basis we desire a continuously and consciously felt emotion. But if we are content to allow, with Matthew Arnold, that life and conduct may be, and indeed have to be, in a large measure based upon just "going on" in courses consciously willed in our best moments, then it is clearly of the first importance that our fundamental idealism should be readily translatable into acts for which there are opportunities under any circumstances and in every mood, and acts that cannot of themselves be harmful to anyone. Love of individuals, translatable into kindnesses to individuals done without ulterior considerations, seems to me to meet these requirements more nearly than anything else. I cannot see that world-love has any such practical counterpart, and I do see many instances of attempts to translate it into conduct by means of general principles and universal methods of benefiting the world that can be positively harmful in their operations both to the world-lover and to those with whom he comes in contact.

Furthermore, when I suggested that individualised loving-kindness is perhaps the source of all wider love (and, I would add, of all wider conceptions of love), I touched, I believe, what is really the root of the whole matter. I know what large questions this raises, of psychology individual and social, of social evolution, and, if we like, of theology. It is perhaps a foolish thing to say at this stage of a paper that already contains a superabundance of challengeable assertions. Two considerations may perhaps serve to mitigate its crudeness, considerations bearing on the practical rather than on the philosophical side of the question.

But before passing to them I should like to avert a possible misunderstanding. When I refer to motives of kindness and the like I am not speaking of the resolve to "do good" to other people. That intention is often ridiculed, and deservedly ridiculed when it means, as almost always in common speech, the determination to impose on others our own standards of thought and conduct, and the gratuitous intrusion into other people's affairs. But the first objection only arises if "ulterior

motives" and general principles lie behind our actions; the second is directed against the conversion of acts of help into acts of self-assertion, as when we begin to "manage" when we are only asked to serve. No one who has had any practical experience of helping others should be unconscious of this distinction or wish to quibble over it.

In the first place, then, we must all have learnt that our acts of kindness have tremendous power not only to carry into operation our neighbour-love but to awaken it within us. We could all give instances of this, ranging from the commonplace prescription for depression or self-centredness, that the patient should "think of someone else" or "do things for other people," to the deliberate ordering of his whole life or career by a man or woman who, at a time of utter agnosticism and despair, chooses some occupation in which the service of others is more direct and visible than is usually the case in our intricately organised society, in the hope or the instinctive knowledge that in such an occupation he will in time acquire as a fact of experience conscious love for others, and a sense of spiritual things, both of which have gone down in the wreck of some system of beliefs. I spoke of the extent to which life seems to be based on continuing in courses at some time consciously willed; it seems even to be true that often the "going on" has to precede our consciousness of what is behind this act of will; often we must will while yet blind in order to receive our sight, and perform the deeds of love before love itself can well up in our hearts. Like water underground, the power to love, with all that it may achieve, may lie concealed within us until an outlet is pierced.

And to pierce this outlet there are no means so ready as lending a hand to neighbours, who are always with us. The love that emerges may at first seem narrow, and limited in its direction, but not for long. Out of it will grow a wider love—of the world, of nature, or of God—giving hope and meaning to our neighbour-love, and easing the harshness that may tinge even the service of others if too long it lacks interpretation. For many, indeed, some such wider emotion, aroused by a less personal contact, by a preacher's appeal, by flowers, by "a chorus-ending from Euripides," has itself been, in appearance, the seed of their love and the herald of their awakening; but I doubt the reality of such beginnings. For unless the wider emotion is caught up into the current of an emotion with a personal objective, and given a direction such as only the practice of loving-kindness can give, it is all too apt, like the emotions of our world-lover, to begin and end

as a mood of complacency centring in ourselves. To arouse unselfish love in us, a personal object is needed. The "world" is not such an object. God is, and that distinction is indeed as vital in religion as in theology; but, as a theologian put it long ago: "He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, cannot love God whom he hath not seen."

Of love for God I must speak again. Here I must turn to my second consideration relative to the primary character of love for individuals. It is, briefly, that for most of us it is only our interest in and our care for individual persons that gives any real vitality to our efforts for persons in groups or in the mass. When we think of the innumerable organisations for the reform, protection, or comfort of large classes of scheduled persons, and of the enthusiasm with which they are run, this may seem an overstatement. But whoever has been mixed up with such organisations knows how inhuman their enthusiasms can be, how remote from the love of man or of God, being indeed sometimes rather the perverted form taken by the need to love that has found no personal outlet. He knows, too, with what a startling and novel sense of reality love for an individual can break into such enthusiasms, narrowing their scope for the moment, but making them concrete and personal beyond all experience, so that the rules and methods of the organisation, hitherto so universal and decisive, become for him trivial formalities or obstacles to be brushed from his path. And then two processes will take place side by side: on the one hand the care for the particular case will make far more understanding and acute his sympathy for all like cases, known and unknown, immeasurably re-enforcing, or rather re-creating, his original enthusiasm; on the other hand it will prove a remarkable solvent of groups and classifications, since the awakened love does not depend on the fact that the loved one falls into any particular class, and will quickly find how lovable and needy are other men and women who may even have been explicitly excluded from that class. Certainly such individualisation is a powerful solvent of those simplifications of mankind that universal ideals are apt to make, those comprehensive groupings into our particular versions of "the just and the unjust," so easily deducible from our conceptions of world-good and world-love, but in practice the perpetuators of every personal antagonism. Few have loved another better because he was classified as lovable, but many have found themselves loving another very readily as soon as they have forgotten that he was classified as hateable. It is a commonplace that most

soldiers learnt this when the fortune of war, denied to civilians, thrust them into human relationship with some individual enemy. And, in the absence of some such accidental contact, hatred for men in the mass does more to divide men than love for men in the mass does to bring them together. We can hate in the mass more effectively and more readily than we can love in the mass. Even when we do combine expressly for fellowship and mutual love, the combination seems often to fail just because of its success in focussing love upon a group-object, thereby making it independent of personal sympathies. When hatred is thus focussed the Devil has done his work, for hatred thrives on generalities; when love is thus focussed the Devil has done his work again, for love dies of them.

No view could, superficially, appear more pessimistic from the standpoint of social policy, of international *Sittlichkeit* and of the brotherhood of man, and this essay would have to be doubled in length if even a beginning were made in working out and justifying its implications. I will only say that I do not shrink from them. Some may point out that it implies the impossibility, in the present phase of human evolution, of developing the highest forms of community-sentiment in any but quite small groups, as Rousseau limited the true manifestation of the "general will" to city-states no larger than Athens and Geneva. I should be inclined to acquiesce in the inference; holding that the typical states of the modern world are indeed far too large, and that the technique of political integration has as far outstripped the average human capacity for social good-will as the technique of applied science has outstripped the self-control and good feeling necessary for its humane use. Sir Francis Younghusband urges the value of the love of one's country as a type of and preparation for world-love, and with that we may agree; but this love is a tender growth and fitful, and we know that when it is assumed, organised, and exploited, and made to carry more than it can bear, it is swallowed up in that hatred of other countries and of dissenters in its own that is, in such circumstances, inevitably evoked to reinforce it, so that "patriotism" has seldom, if ever, in all history manifested itself on a very large scale except in organised conflict or persecution, or readiness for them. In the same way I could acquiesce, though for different reasons, in the views of the most cynical of *real* politicians as to the prospects of the League of Nations as at present constituted. I recognise the existence of a certain amount of vague international sentiment among world-lovers, a certain

(and infinitely more valuable) amount of acts of kindness to aliens, "enemy" or otherwise, and a certain amount of indifference to political divisions among villages on frontiers not patrolled by armed forces, and all this is stuff for a League to work on; but it surely shows a lack of all sense of proportion to suppose that sufficient pressure can be generated from this to drive the vast machine set up at Paris or save it from being exploited as the tool of a clique of Governments.

Indeed, we seem to have acquired fundamentally wrong ideas as to the true bases of social and political solidarity. Otherwise we should not imagine that Governments can be a substitute for peoples, nor form a League of their delegates; we should not thus work from the inhuman and utterly loveless end of societies and, in so doing, sterilise such social and international sentiments as they contain. It has been argued before, and I think with truth, that reliance on the mechanism of the great state as the social nexus has atrophied those elements of fellowship in its constituent units that should be the most active elements in its life, and might be, I would add, as they have been in the past, effective links between its life and that of other societies. To me as a student of history the emergence and consolidation, political and economic, of great states in the last six centuries in Europe, for all the advances it facilitated in culture and even in the conception of freedom, appears as a swift and tremendous aberration in human history, to which previous eras afford only partial parallels and to which the European catastrophe we have witnessed was the only possible end. And I infer that, whether it is world-love that is our ideal, or peace between neighbours, the higher organisation of the state-system is an unsound basis for European reconstruction.

I must turn to my last inquiry, as to why it is that this love for men in the mass or for the world in general is so comparatively ineffective even where it exists. For if we are not to take a magical view of love, we ought to be able to give some account of the causes with which we associate its effects. I am not referring to metaphysical questions as to the basis in reality of our ideals and emotions. I do not know that from that standpoint there would be any reason for differentiating between different modes of love. I am thinking of the fact that, in practice, the power of love, its power of conquering all things, seems to be related very closely to its ability to evoke a response in the loved one. There can be few that have not learnt in their own lives that to be loved truly and in all circumstances is the most redemptive and the

most life-giving experience that we can undergo ; and, when we have loved others in the same way, it is in what we awaken in them that we often discover and measure what we have done—indeed, too often, an answering response becomes the consciously sought and quickly sterilising motive of our action. Now, we know that in some measure it is possible to love a whole people, and we can conceive that in such a group a living response should in some measure be awakened. Belief in the possibility of this has entered into a good deal of pacifist thinking ; the idea is illustrated from another point of view in a striking story called “The Flying Teuton,” published in the *Cornhill Magazine* two or more years ago. But real as I believe such possibilities to be, and strongly as they appeal to the imagination, they are, after all, rare, depending on some great crisis when a people is for a moment psychically one. As for world-love, it is hard to conceive of its object concretely at all, and harder still to conceive of its object as benefiting by it or responding. Almost inevitably world-love, when it has not its root in love of individuals, becomes self-love from sheer lack of a personal object and an objective response—and the picture of the world-lover on the seashore recurs again. And as a matter of fact, wherever man, emerging from the fragmentary and discontinuous world of his primitive consciousness, has found himself in a universe, and feels (in Sir Francis Younghusband’s words) “the confidence which the world inspires by its orderliness and regularity ; the devotion which it arouses by its display of the good it has at heart ; the interest it creates when it shows man that he shares in its direction,” and feels also that the world cares for him, he does indeed find that the love in him grows and reaches out and becomes universal in scope ; but he finds that what he loves is not the world but God, bringing to that concept, maybe, his early notions of potencies behind events, of the spirit world, and of the tribal hero, enlarging it by a new sense of something completer, higher, and more lovable, but keeping it personal, making it, indeed, more personal than ever, just because of his greater need to love. For, whatever his theologians may tell him, in his heart he knows that God is better for being loved ; he cannot know it of the world. And so with God’s love for us—we are told often enough that man makes God in his own image ; it might be truer to say that God has in truth grown with man’s needs. However that may be, in so far as either is true we have some measure of the worth of love for individuals in man’s greatest religious discovery—that God loves him individually. God

loves mankind, no doubt, and to bring that home man invents schemes of redemption ; but " God loves me "—what smallest child cannot find something thrilling and renewing in that ? Indeed, I think that perhaps the most intense spiritual experience possible for a child is to feel vividly for the first time that God, who loves everyone and knows everything, also knows all about *him* and loves him personally. Certainly it was so for myself, and now, after those phases of belief and disbelief through which every restless spirit must pass, it remains one of the freshest and sweetest memories of childhood.

For that is what man really wants—to love and be loved by someone else. To build a life on that seems slow ; to build a world on that seems not to move at all. When the great world-movements flame up and the great world-prophets speak, we want to bring miracles to pass and build the Kingdom of Heaven in a day. To care first for our neighbour seems to be to work ant-like and blindly. But, if there *is* something ant-like about the life of the human millions, how else should their loving seem ? And the very prophets themselves, Zaratustra, Lao-tze, Gautama, Jesus, and the rest, the higher their vision and the wider their purpose, urge neighbour-love the more. They may speak of love for God and His love for men, but it is certain that if they speak of these things as in some sense separable from neighbour-love their enduring message will be only for a few mystics and a few wholly self-centred, and their world-movement or " revival " will swiftly burn itself out. They may kindle the fuel, but they cannot create it, and the wood for the burning is the habit of giving a hand to a neighbour day by day. That is one reason why the flames take hold so firmly and linger so long among " the common people."

F. R. HOARE.

CROYDON.

MRS HUMPHRY WARD AND THE THEOLOGICAL NOVEL.

HERBERT L. STEWART,

Professor of Philosophy in Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia.

To write a theological novel is to hurl the most defiant challenge in the face of those who glory in "Art for Art's sake." Why this special field of man's experience should be judged incapable of artistic treatment, the critics do not very precisely explain. But as often as a new work of fiction appears, with characters arguing against one another on "dogma," the pundits of the æsthetic world are irritated afresh, and they complain that their old rubric has once more suffered outrage. Mrs Humphry Ward sinned more frequently and more deeply in this respect than most other novelists of her time. But she remained unrepentant, and in the preface to the sixth edition of *David Grieve* retorted upon those who reproached her, with a vigour and a completeness which leave little more to be said. Against those who hate all fiction that subserves propaganda she had no difficulty in quoting impressive precedent. She could point to "novels with a purpose" that could be far less easily spared from our literature than those other novels of which the most obvious, if not the most flattering, description is that they seem to have no purpose whatever. Yet in the end there is no book of which this last account is strictly accurate, for the only choice we have is between those which serve purposes that are important and those which serve purposes that are trivial. Mrs Ward, in most of her work—and that by far the most successful part—wrote for those whose minds are awake, or at least capable of being awakened, to the great issues of contemporary thought. It is worth while to sketch all human types, and even the generally neglected type of educated, progressive, but somewhat bewildered thinker on the high themes of

religion seems to deserve some place in what Balzac called *La Comédie Humaine*. Treat him, if you choose, only as an "interesting figure." But the man has at least a personality of his own, with which it is well for us to become acquainted. And the signs of our own age appear to indicate that the time for figures merely interesting has almost gone by. Mrs Ward insisted on sketching the sort that is not only interesting but momentous. How could she draw this sort if she left out the deepest concern of all?

I.

There are few of this writer's books from which the religious interest is wholly absent, and there are at least five in which it may be said to predominate. *Robert Elsmere* is the best known, but in any such general survey we must not omit *The History of David Grieve*, *Helbeck of Bannisdale*, *Eleanor*, and *The Case of Richard Meynell*. The first point which calls for notice is one that all of these novels exhibit alike, and that constitutes a notable merit in the authoress when compared with many others who have imported speculations about faith into a work of fiction. We all know with tolerable exactness what Mrs Ward herself believed, or at least some things that she emphatically disbelieved. But her first concern was neither to proclaim what she thought true nor to repudiate what she thought false. The Evangelical school, the Broad school, the Romanising school—all pass before us in order, and if the writer's sole or even her chief object had been to take sides among them she would have deserved all the artistic censure that some quarterlies have bestowed upon her work. Her first desire was to enter with what St Paul called "charity" into the attitude of all candid souls who have set out, in however blundering a fashion, upon the great quest, to give all the credit that seemed to be their due, and to wean the angry disputants of each school not from the zeal that springs from conviction but from the bitterness that has its roots in misunderstanding. It would be too much to expect of anyone that this purpose should be achieved with perfect impartiality, and one can recall places where far less than equal justice has been done. For instance, George Eliot was at least as remote intellectually from Methodism as Mrs Ward can be, but the fervid Wesleyan must feel that sympathy is further from her perfect work in the hand which drew Mrs Fleming in *Robert Elsmere*, or the smithy prayer-meeting in *David Grieve*, than in the hand

which gave us Dinah Morris in *Adam Bede*. The prejudices of temperament are hard to overcome, but we should be thankful to those who manage to overcome them as consistently as Mrs Ward has done, and thus set a pattern to that great number who do not even attempt to overcome them at all. On the whole she deserves the high eulogium passed upon her own Henry Grey, for she was sympathetic to "every genuine utterance of the spiritual life of man."

Again, while many others have introduced religious and anti-religious debate into a novel, she is one of a very few who have given us studies of *cultured* unbelief as it exists at the present time. We know how Dickens and Thackeray, for example, used to poke fun at the narrow evangelicals. Sam Weller in *Pickwick*, making his unseemly jests about Regeneration; Miss Murdstone in *David Copperfield*, rolling her dark eyes with delight over the congregation around her as often as the prayer-book mentioned "miserable sinners"; Miss Miggs in *Barnaby Rudge*, who hoped that she knew her own unworthiness and hated and despised herself as every good Christian should; Lady Emily in *Vanity Fair*, tying up her parcels of tracts, with mild exhortation for real ladies and warmer stuff about "The Frying Pan and the Fire" for the servants' hall—such matter as this has become quite familiar, and can be produced, now that the pattern has been set, in almost any quantity by very indifferent artists. It is often very successful wit, but its fault lies in the absence of humour, that lack of a background in charity which our own sobered age increasingly demands. Charlotte Brontë used to keep up the fun at the expense of the High Church. Mr Wells never lets us rest from laughing at the formulæ of "vindictive theologians." And Mr Winston Churchill—the American of that name—provides us in such books as *The Inside of the Cup* with most effective satire upon those who are zealots for dogma, but not zealots for the housing of the poor or the living wage. Mrs Ward's interest in religion was different. She was concerned with the state of mind of persons of culture, and although "culture" is an object of scorn just now to those who think it just the English word for Kultur, and keep themselves in readiness to explode the moment it is named, yet this is a misunderstanding which must soon pass away.

Mrs Ward spent her life in the atmosphere of the intellectuals; the university was her spiritual home; it is of the leaders of thought that she loved to write. She had the great advantage of personal acquaintance with literary and scientific men of wide celebrity, and it is their varying moods and

attitudes towards religion which she has drawn with the most unerring hand. Taine, Edmond Scherer, Mark Pattison, Jowett, Walter Pater, and many others are made to pass before us in *A Writer's Recollections* by a critic who knew them well, and she has made us very much her debtors by helping us to know them too. Everyone must have been struck by her frequent allusions to two men, Ernest Renan and Matthew Arnold. The brilliant gifts of the former were enough to impress any keen receptive mind during the seventies, and we may well pardon the partiality of an admiring niece if Arnold's *bons mots* are treated by her as if they now formed part of the linguistic inheritance for all educated Englishmen. One may, perhaps, object that such phrases as "Barbarians, Philistines, Populace," "Hellenist and Hebraist," "Stream of tendency not ourselves that makes for righteousness" are not quite such universal counters of human thought as Mrs Ward seemed to assume, and not a few may be puzzled to find them used as if they came from *Hamlet* or *Faust*. So too we may smile at a writer who is still harking back for illustration to something that was done or said or felt by Renan, for the men of our own time have had many other teachers, and recognise many other landmarks as at least equally significant with the *Vie de Jésus*. But very few of those who grumble so were under the immediate influence of these magicians. Arnold and Renan were perhaps the two most original minds with which Mrs Ward in her youth was brought into close contact, and it is to her credit that she so appreciated each of them as to be unable afterwards to escape from the power of his personality.

The historic impulse which produced the first, and still the most famous, of her theological novels is quite apparent. In the five years from 1869 to 1873 Matthew Arnold made his well-known contribution to the great debate. The four books, *Culture and Anarchy*, *St Paul and Protestantism*, *Literature and Dogma*, *God and the Bible*, form together a manifesto of humanitarian Christianity. No one who reads *Robert Elsmere* can mistake the source from which some of its most arresting features were drawn. The strange re-interpreting of St Paul on the Resurrection, the spiritualising of the words "risen with Christ," the breaking away from the "envelope of miracle," the dissolving of supernatural occurrences into mere clothing for moral ideas—for all these, if a chief inspiration was found in the *Lay Sermons* of Thomas Hill Green, it is no less the thought and often the very words of Arnold which persistently recur.

But at this stage Mrs Ward was also in somewhat sharp revolt against some of her distinguished uncle's positions. The hero of her book could find no satisfaction in the Broad Church. She quotes Renan's judgment that if the prophecies of Daniel have to be placed by criticism in the period of the Maccabees, there is no option for critics but a resolute schism. And she adds, curiously enough, that the Protestant "is in truth more bound to the book of Daniel than M. Renan." In those days Mrs Ward could see no place for religious compromise, depicted *Elsmere* as confronted with a situation which left no room for choice to an honest man, set before us in the proposals of the cynical squire on the one hand and the idealistic Oxford tutor on the other the great contrast between temporising disguise and resolute veracity. "It can't be said," declares Henry Grey, "that the Broad Church movement has helped us much. How greatly it promised! How little it has performed!"¹

In the sequel to *Robert Elsmere*, published more than twenty years afterwards under the name *The Case of Richard Meynell*, this attitude of bold secession is very suggestively modified. Meynell is a Modernist, but by no means willing to be in consequence a schismatic. He believes that the time is ripe for a new Reformation, and, though he thinks that this should be a Reformation from within, he is determined that it shall adopt no half-measures of timidity or concealment. Like Erasmus, he would move slowly, but he would not be so slow as to make no perceptible movement at all. If his movement fails he is prepared to be its victim, taking no refuge in the comfortable thought that Providence has bestowed upon him "no gift for martyrdom." But he is determined that, so far as lies in the power of himself and his friends, it is the orthodox resistance that shall be made to fail, and that the old historic Church of England, once more reformed, shall rise as she did three centuries ago to meet the new dawn.

Thus Meynell's case is that the so-called "orthodox" have no more right to expel Modernists than Modernists to expel the orthodox. If we defend the retention of the Roman cathedrals, though the English people had cast off Roman supremacy, why cannot we assert a similar ownership in the same fabrics if the supremacy of the Thirty-nine Articles has now to be repudiated. In the end this must no doubt be a trial of strength between parties, and the voice of the nation as a whole must decide. Hence arises Meynell's curious

¹ *Robert Elsmere*, chap. xxvii.

emphasising of the significant increase in the *number* of Modernists as compared with the days of Elsmere. Speaking to the daughter of that vigorous secessionist, he says: "All *within* the gates seemed lost. Your father went out into the wilderness, and there, amid everything that was poor and mean and new, he laid down his life. But we!—we are no longer alone, or helpless. The tide has come up to the stranded ship—the launching of it depends now only on the faithfulness of those within it."¹

Almost exactly equidistant in time of composition between *Robert Elsmere* and *Richard Meynell* came that fascinating pair of romances in which Mrs Ward gave us her study of the Church of Rome. *Helbeck of Bannisdale* appeared in 1898, *Eleanor* in 1900. If we trace our authoress's interest in the broader Anglicans to the stimulus imparted by her uncle, it may equally well have been filial piety which made her touch so delicate when she drew those in willing and glad subjection under the Roman obedience. Charles Hargrove, whose frequent changes of creed the editor of this Journal has lately been setting before us,² is among the very few parallels one may quote to the chameleon-like religious career of the younger Thomas Arnold. That a son of the famous headmaster of Rugby should have begun as a disciple of his father, seceded in early manhood to the Church of Rome, swung over after a few years to Rationalism, and having remained there for a period should have made a fresh submission—not again to be recanted—to the Holy See, was by itself a sufficiently curious phenomenon to set any thoughtful mind upon the task of its unravelling.

In *Helbeck of Bannisdale* Mrs Ward has given us a psychological picture of an old Catholic household, whose representative is a man of the finest feeling, torn between the promptings of human nature and what he takes to be the inexorable obligations of his religion, preserving in a hostile neighbourhood the loyalty of his mistaken creed, and struggling in vain to reconcile his duties towards the true faith with an attachment he has formed, in spite of himself, to a girl who is, alas! among the "sinners of the Gentiles." *Eleanor* has its scene laid in Italy, the Italy that had just passed through the period of hot contention between the papal power and the national movement, and makes us realise with great vividness the two sides—the party of Pius IX. and the party

¹ *The Case of Richard Meynell*, p. 81.

² *From Authority to Freedom, the Spiritual Pilgrimage of Charles Hargrove*. By L. P. Jacks, 1920.

of Victor Emmanuel; but to many of us the most important interest of the book centres round the case of Father Benecke, who has published a book about the Church and her history which is condemned by Propaganda. Shall he recant and escape deprivation? Or stand firm, and be a martyr? Father Benecke's dilemma, like that of Elsmere and Helbeck, brings home to us the everlasting issue between the spirit of the past and the spirit of the future.

II.

Mr G. W. E. Russell declared that, so far as he knew, the Rev. Robert Elsmere was the only human being whose religious faith had been shattered by the discovery that "miracles do not happen." "That long-legged weakling," wrote Mr Russell, "with his auburn hair and 'boyish innocence of mood' and sweet ignorance of the wicked world went down, it will be remembered, like a ninepin before the assaults of a sceptical squire who had studied in Germany."¹

Probably this is, on the whole, the most inept comment that was made by any critic upon the hero of Mrs Ward's great novel. Whether religious faith is, or is not, bound up with acceptance of the miraculous, is a matter upon which there is fair ground for difference of opinion, and the present writer at least is in thorough agreement with what he takes to be Mr Russell's view upon it. It may be conceded, too, that Elsmere after his ordination was curiously unacquainted, for a man of his training and powers, with the trend of modern unbelief. But it is absurd to suggest that he is an unintelligible or even a very unusual type, and that he is not—as the dramatic critics say—"psychologically convincing." He presents no greater problem than, for example, the Rev. James Anthony Froude at the time when he wrote *The Nemesis of Faith*. There is not the least doubt that many men, brought up to Holy Orders in the Oxford of forty years ago, were similarly immune from the infection of the *Zeitgeist*. No one who is in the least familiar with the moods of the theological student of our own time has the least difficulty in recognising Elsmere's distress, and most of us could quote parallels from men whom we have personally known.

The reason is obvious. To many—perhaps to the greater number of Christians—the whole fabric of faith stands as a solid system of which no part can be invalidated without invalidating the rest. That which, so far as Mr Russell was

¹ Cf. Mr Russell's *Matthew Arnold*, pp. 236, 237.

aware, had never occurred in the experience of any human being except "a character in a popular work of fiction" has, as others are well aware, occurred historically again and again, when religious faith has been shattered by discoveries about the antiquity of the earth, the dimensions of stellar space, the evolution of species, and the higher criticism of scripture. In all these cases the rule *falsus in uno falsus in omnibus* was applied, to the immense dislocation of fixed beliefs, and it was the principle of a supernatural—or a miraculous—revelation which was on each occasion held to have been overthrown. The inference may have been exaggerated, or it may have been wholly wrong; but there is no doubt of its occurrence as a fact of religious psychology. It is no failure of insight into the moods of the human mind which we can justly charge against Mrs Ward, for the verisimilitude of her characters—Roman, High Anglican, Broad Anglican, and Agnostic—is well-nigh perfect.

It may be argued with far greater force against her, as Gladstone and many others argued, that the prestige of learning and intellect are by no means so exclusively on the side of her own school as she has tried to suggest. And it may be maintained that she has undertaken far more than she can effect in trying to find the essence of Christianity in Thomas Hill Green. But these discussions would carry us much too far. What I wish to consider is her proposed practical solution of the issue about Modernism as she has set it forth in *The Case of Richard Meynell*. Here she touched the newest and most urgent problem of our own time, and revealed, I think, the most vulnerable side in her whole programme for the future of the Church.

Some historian will yet be much interested in that singular alliance between Freethought and Erastianism of which Mrs Ward in her latest phase was so striking a representative. It is significant that in matters of Church Reform she again and again appealed to "England" as the ultimate authority, and one cannot help feeling that she had often in mind Reformers not so much like John Knox as like Henry VIII. The national Church, she kept reminding us, is a national possession, with its cathedrals, its ecclesiastical fabrics of every kind, its endowments—its "plant," as she occasionally, breaking into the vernacular of commerce, rather startles us by summing the matter up. Her idea seemed to be that just as state machinery, provided from the public purse, must not be monopolised by the interests of a single class, so the spiritual organisation is in essence a public affair, and must be wide

enough to allow a home to men of every Christian faith. Why it should thus be limited to those whose attitude is *Christian*, or whether she would set any limits at all, Mrs Ward did not make quite clear. She did not meet such embarrassing proposals as that of Mr Ronald Knox in *Reunion All Round*, or such dilemmas as are set in *A Spiritual Æneid*. "For the life of me," says Mr Knox, "I could never see why we had to regret being out of communion with a good man like Dr Horton, more than being out of communion with a good man like Professor Gilbert Murray, who repudiates Theism."

Perhaps the most extraordinary position taken up by Richard Meynell is that the High Churchman ought to be as willing to tolerate the Broad as the Broad is to tolerate the High. For what this really means is that, while the Broad keeps his own view, the High ought either to become Broad or at least to act as if he had become so. The demand for tolerance is by no means identical as applied to each of these two parties. Rather, one is forced to say, must the orthodox be driven to exclusiveness by the very same logic which drives the liberal to charity. Those to whom dogma is comparatively indifferent may, and indeed must, adopt a generous attitude towards those whose honest beliefs they cannot themselves share. But men to whom dogma is essential cannot without absurdity be other than unbending towards men who preach that creeds are a matter of ceaseless change. The Modernist can remain in the Church undisturbed by the fact that his brother in the next parish imposes penances, pronounces absolution, and reserves the sacrament; for, although he does not himself approve such doings, he does not think of them as endangering souls in another world, or of the communion of saints as fundamentally vitiated by these divergences of practice. But the sacerdotalist cannot in the same way look on without fierce protest while his neighbour in Holy Orders is teaching that belief in the miraculous is superstition, that there was no Virgin Birth, and that the Tomb at Jerusalem did not on the third day yield up the body of the Lord; for he does not simply dissent from all this as a lamentable error of judgment: he regards it as a blasphemy, and a mood of complaisant indulgence for peace's sake towards those who commit it is, for him, denying his Lord before men.

I speak of this with all the more vigour because I do not share in any degree most of the objections which the orthodox level against Modernism. Perhaps, however, I understand them all the better just because of some very real objections

with which I wholly sympathise against the presence of certain so-called Modernists, and because the principle involved appears to be the same. From time to time we have to hear or read sermons in which, for example, the notion of "subjective immortality" is insinuated, elegant Emersonian scorn is poured upon those—generally psychic researchers—who dare to take the survival of man as a genuine and perhaps even a verifiable fact, and the idea of evil as a mere negation of good or a necessary form of finitude is played with under some such nonsensical phrase as "supra-moral sphere." Are we to pretend that the Christian Church should make room for incoherences like these? And, if not, is our revolt different in kind from that which inspires the Anglo-Catholic to cut himself loose from association with Modernists in general? Are not the yearly secessions to Rome, however deeply we may deplore the fact that men feel driven to make them, thus the tokens of both clear-sighted and resolute candour? Aptly indeed from his own point of view may the High Churchman find a parallel to this theological issue in that old affiliation case tried before Solomon, and see men like Meynell typified by the latitudinarian mother who cried out, "Let it be neither mine nor thine, but let us divide it." And, though we may think that his point of view is wrong, we cannot fairly reproach him for acting upon the situation as he sees it, or set him in discreditable contrast with those who act differently because they see differently. The present writer, Modernist as he is in his own sympathies to an extent by which many evangelicals would be appalled, cannot acquiesce in this programme of easy-going complaisance for those to whom it would mean a denial of truth. Not thus shall the new Reformation be achieved. The coming change must involve no disguises, for the thing at stake is too momentous. Perhaps the Church should be divided in two, but where the differences are radical the division must be radical. Those within her pale who believe, however erroneously, that saving truth lies in rigid dogma, should not be browbeaten in the name of toleration into taking liberties with that which—as they hold—is not theirs to compromise. The stigma of narrowness is not to be expunged by the mop of prevarication.

One might point out, as further illustrating this tendency in Mrs Ward, how the spirit of revolt which has been so conspicuous in her theological novels is moderated into an enthusiasm for what Lord Eldon called the "wisdom of our ancestors" when she deals with problems of government. No one will be surprised, or at any loss to guess the reason,

when he finds in *A Writer's Recollections* such grateful adoration of Mr Kipling and such nasty resentment towards Mr Wells. Some of us feel that old church tradition deserves at least as respectful a treatment as old political usages, that ecclesiastical authority is not more open to reproach than the prestige of an hereditary ruling class, and that there are dogmas about imperialism not less obsolete in the living thought of our new world than any dogmas of old theology. But Mrs Ward's mind was curiously blended—half conservative and half liberal,—and to those who, like England herself, “love not coalitions,” this sort of compromise is far from satisfactory. It is not, indeed, uncommon in cultivated circles. Like many others, this novelist was a very orthodox aristocrat, though a quite unorthodox theologian. Robust rationalism in dealing with religious tenets can easily make its peace with a tenacious traditionalism in one's theory of the State, so that the abuse of radical politicians in *Marcella* and of the suffragettes in *Delia Blanchflower* gives willing place to a quite different tone when the radicals are causing upheaval of the Church in *Richard Meynell*, or an Italian countess is plunging into political discussion against Pio Nono in *Eleanor*. The Germans, as Dr Sarolea has aptly remarked, used to combine great freedom of thought about the divinity of Christ with a docile subservience to the divine right of their Kaiser. Imperialistic politics almost everywhere can be cherished by some side by side with the most vigorous spirit of theological anarchy. And although I mean nothing so offensive or so absurd as a likening of Mrs Ward to German exponents both of religious agnosticism and of earthly Realpolitik, I cannot refrain from noticing that the liberal trend of her thought was restrained by some astonishing limits. Inconsistency, however, is a poor charge in these days when our world has been shaken to its base, and we have much ground for thankfulness to this writer of fiction for at least some healthy ethical conventionalism. As we think, for instance, of the abyss of immoral nonsense into which the sex novel so often degenerates, even those pious folk who have been most shocked by *Robert Elsmere* must not forget what they owe to the authoress of *Daphne* and *The Marriage of William Ashe*.

There are many others too who in these times of religious disturbance are “wandering between two worlds—one dead, the other powerless to be born.” Few have been able to present this state of mind with even a tithe of the vividness and strength with which this novelist has set it before us. By a curious coincidence the name of “Ward” has been

borne by three persons in recent years, quite unrelated to one another, but each of whom has contributed in some notable way to the discussion of religious problems. In a previous issue of this Journal I drew attention to some resemblances between the late lamented biographer of Cardinal Newman and the author of that most suggestive series of Gifford Lectures, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. There is an analogy too between our gifted authoress of fiction and the author of *Problems and Persons*. For Wilfrid Ward's haunting interest in the phases of modern unbelief was not unlike Mrs Humphry Ward's interest in the genius of the Church of Rome. The former felt an intellectual kinship with the men whom his soul abhorred; the latter feels an emotional yearning after the symbols which Reason forbids her to trust. The disciple of Newman could not quite put from him that keen dialectic temper which inspired the *Grammar of Assent*. The niece of Matthew Arnold cannot escape from that wistful sympathy, joined to a stern disbelief in the Catholic Church, which produced those lines about the Carthusian monks on the Grande Chartreuse:

“Not as their friend or child I speak!
 But as on some far northern strand,
 Thinking of his own Gods a Greek
 In pity and mournful awe might stand
 Before some fallen Runic stone—
 For both were faiths, and both are gone.”

Mrs Ward's faith was not gone, and she remained the friend of all the faithful among mankind. But she was in error, I think, in supposing that the path of progress now lies in any other direction than that in which it has always lain, that fundamental discords can with advantage be superficially disguised, or that truth will be furthered by minimising rather than by intensifying the “clash of Yes and No.”

HERBERT L. STEWART.

HALIFAX, NOVA SCOTIA.

ETHICAL RELIGION.¹

PROFESSOR J. S. MACKENZIE.

As first President of the Union of Ethical Societies, I conceive it to be my duty to survey the work of these Societies and try to interpret their function and assess their value. They have now become pretty well established in this country, and their influence has probably extended considerably beyond the limits of their membership. They were initiated here in 1886, chiefly through the energy and enthusiasm of my friend Professor J. H. Muirhead, who became the Hon. Secretary of the parent Society. Edward Caird was its first President, and Dr Bosanquet was for many years chairman of its executive committee. The first of its public lectures was given by Professor (now Sir Henry) Jones. These names give a sufficient indication of the general point of view from which it was started. Most of its promoters belonged to the Hegelian school of philosophy, or at least to that English variety of it of which T. H. Green had been the most prominent representative. They sought to communicate something of that deep interest in moral problems by which Green had been inspired, and to discuss methods of social reform. A branch was formed soon afterwards at Cambridge, with Henry Sidgwick as President and Seeley as the first public lecturer—thus showing that the movement was not confined to any particular school of thought. In these early days the work of an Ethical Society could hardly be said to be of a definitely religious character. In America, however, where the movement was first initiated under the leadership of Dr Felix Adler, it was much more decidedly religious; and in our own country also it has gradually acquired this tone, mainly through the influence of Dr Stanton Coit. Even from the first, indeed, our meetings tended to be held on Sundays;

¹ Presidential Address to the Union of Ethical Societies in London.

and they served then, as they do still, as a refuge for those who are not attracted by any of the older religious bodies, but who yet like to associate themselves with one another in the effort to maintain an earnest outlook on the aims of human life. Hence, if not definitely religious in their character, they might at least be described as providing, in the phrase of E. Dühring, a substitute for religion—*Ersatz der Religion*. In some places at least they have been warmly welcomed by educated Jews, whose religion has always given a special prominence to righteousness. It was reflection on the Jewish religion, more than on any other, that led Matthew Arnold to define religion in general as “morality touched by emotion,” and that is on the whole what the religion of the Ethical Societies has tended to be; though it has certainly been touched by a good deal of reflection, as well as by emotion. The question by which they are now confronted, and by which they are often assailed, is whether this is a sufficient account of the significance of religion, or whether such an attitude can be taken as an adequate substitute for religious belief.

That most religions have contained elements other than those that are explicitly moral, is sufficiently apparent. Some have had hardly any connection with morality, and some may even be said to be opposed to it. But it may at least be contended that with the deepening of men’s spiritual experience religion tends to become more and more moral in its character. This is notably the case with the Jewish religion, both in its earlier and more purely national form and in its transformation into a world religion through Christianity and Mohammedanism. Both in its earlier and in its later forms it has often shown a disposition to relapse into ceremonial observances and esoteric doctrines; but its greater prophets have been constantly protesting against such lapses. We may remind ourselves of the emphatic declaration in the book of Isaiah:¹ “Is not this the fast that I have chosen? to loose the bands of wickedness, to undo the heavy burdens, and to let the oppressed go free, and that ye break every yoke? Is it not to deal thy bread to the hungry, and that thou bring the poor that are cast out to thy house? when thou seest the naked, that thou cover him; and that thou hide not thyself from thine own flesh?” From the point of view of Christianity, the apostle James is even more explicit:² “Pure religion, and undefiled, before God and the Father, is this, To visit the fatherless and the widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world.” With regard to

¹ lviii. 6-7.

² i. 27.

the teaching of Jesus himself, it is certainly rash to dogmatise ; but it seems probable that he was in the main a moral teacher and social reformer, with a strong leaning towards what in our time would be called socialism, and that he attached but little importance to any particular theological doctrines.¹ The parable of the Good Samaritan is probably the best indication of what he regarded as the essential feature of true religion. The most spiritually minded of his followers, such as St Francis, have laid a similar emphasis on ideas that are almost purely moral ; and, with the gradual evanescence of dogma in recent times, it has more and more been recognised that the chief value of Christianity lies in its moral inspiration. I am very glad to observe that Dean Inge—who is not commonly supposed to be unduly optimistic in his outlook—has, in his recent *Outspoken Essays*, expressed his conviction that “the new type of Christianity will be more Christian than the old, because it will be more moral.” I believe it would be even more Christian if it were moral altogether.

Even if we penetrate behind the lofty shield of the Himalayan mountains, where almost all the great religions of the world appear to have had their cradle, we find that the sages of the East seem to have been to the full as eager about the saintly life as about the subtleties of metaphysics. “Not birth,” it is said, “nor initiation, nor learning, nor descent, are the causes of Brahmanhood. Good conduct alone is verily the cause thereof.” Buddhism is an almost purely ethical religion. “Buddha,” says Swami Vivekananda,² “is the only prophet who said ‘I do not care to know your various theories about God. What is the good of all the subtle doctrines about the soul? Do good and be good. And this will take you to whatever truth there is.’” Buddhism is thus, as Professor and Mrs Rhys Davids have brought out, not very far removed from the religion of Humanity and from what in recent times has been called Agnosticism.

In the last few years, however, there has been some evidence of a tendency to lay more emphasis on dogma and proportionately less on moral ideas. This is partly due to the fact that philosophy has become bolder and more constructive and less subservient to the materialistic tendencies of the special sciences. In literature Mr Chesterton is perhaps the

¹ The most convincing treatment of this subject to my mind is that contained in Mr I. Singer's book on *The Rival Philosophies of Jesus and Paul*. The more imaginative treatment of Mr George Moore in *The Brook Kerith* is on somewhat similar lines; and of course it is a view that was very strongly supported by Tolstoy.

² *Karma Yoga*, p. 170.

most prominent representative of this change of attitude; and among more definitely philosophical writers Dr M'Taggart¹ is conspicuous for the stress that he lays on the importance of certain dogmas for religion and for his denial of any specially close connection between religion and morality. The dogma on which Dr M'Taggart lays most emphasis is that of individual immortality; and this has been emphasised by many other writers, partly on the basis of occult experiences. Mr Lowes Dickinson has strikingly brought out the value of the belief in personal immortality;² and it is undoubtedly a belief to which the emotional experiences of the war have given a fresh force. The belief in a personal God—as distinguished from a superpersonal Absolute or Brahman—has not been so much dwelt upon in recent years; but writers so eminent as Dr Ward, Mr Balfour, and Dean Rashdall serve to show that the conception retains some vitality. These writers, however, while giving much weight to certain metaphysical conceptions, do not in general deny that morality forms a large part of the content of religion. Their arguments for God and Immortality are often based upon what they believe to be moral demands. But a certain depreciation of the moral element is rather characteristic of several influential writers in recent times.

Even Dr Bosanquet, who was one of the leading representatives of the ethical movement in its earlier years, has recently described morality as being “the *bête noire* of religion.”³ He quotes in illustration of what he means the saying of Mause Headrigg in *Old Mortality*: “Mony a hungry starving creature, when he sits down on a Sunday forenoon to get something that might warm him to the great work, has a dry clatter o' morality driven about his lugs.” He quotes also her characterisation of such morality as “fizzenless” or sapless, and adds: “It is not ill-meant towards men and women whom I highly esteem, and of whose movement I was a member for a considerable time, if I venture to see inevitably and by no personal fault some such character in the ‘ethical culture’ propaganda, as also in the Positivist doctrine.” “There seems to be a common reason,” he concludes, “why none of these sects can get to the heart of a nation.” The common reason he finds, as I understand him, in the tendency of such sects to promote a certain pharisaic self-satisfaction in their adherents, instead of the “salvation” or deliverance from self

¹ His lecture *Dare to be Wise* may be referred to, as well as *Some Dogmas of Religion*.

² *Religion and Immortality*.

³ *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 97.

which the more definitely religious doctrines proclaim. If there is any validity in this criticism, it is a particularly serious accusation for us, since many competent observers have declared that such pharisaism is the besetting sin of our country.

There are, of course, other influential writers who have attacked "mere morality" in a much more ruthless fashion. Nietzsche definitely described himself as an "immoralist," and he has not been without his followers in our own country. The fact that he wrote in German, and the fact that among his many paradoxes there are one or two that appear to glorify war, have led many people in this country to treat him as little better than a moral pariah. Certainly some of his utterances are apt to strike one at first as immorality touched by hysteria. But that he cannot be lightly set aside by the members of Ethical Societies is made apparent by the recent publication of a very thorough and sympathetic exposition of his teaching by Mr W. M. Salter,¹ one of the earliest and most distinguished of the ethical lecturers in America. I think Mr Salter overrates somewhat the importance of Nietzsche's message; but most of the attacks that have been made upon him are pretty clearly based on misconceptions. He was a "good European," and by no means a supporter of the Prussian State, or indeed of any State. He referred to the State in general as "the coldest of all cold monsters." His main attacks are directed against Christianity rather than against morality; but they are directed against Christianity as an ethical religion, and their general point is somewhat akin to that which is suggested by Dr Bosanquet. He blames Christianity for being "too human": he thinks that it does not sufficiently liberate us from ourselves. Hence he seeks refuge in the thought of something that is above humanity—in the conception of the Superman.

What are we to say in answer to the strictures that are thus apparently made from various quarters, not specially connected with any of the older dogmatisms, upon the conception of a purely ethical religion? There are, I think, several things that may be said, partly in defence and partly in recognition of certain dangers against which we ought to be on our guard.

1. The first thing to be noted is that morality is an ambiguous term. Its primary meaning has reference to the

¹ *Nietzsche the Thinker*. This is, I believe, the most complete account of Nietzsche's work in English. The shorter book on *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*, by Dr A. Wolf, however, is equally sympathetic and well informed.

mores or customs of a particular community, as distinguished from the legal enactments by which its life is governed. It is evident that such customs, though they generally rest on something that was once important, and often on something that continues to be important, cannot be regarded as having any absolute or eternal value. But the sanctions of religion gather round them; and certainly the tables that are thus set up have to be broken from time to time, sometimes even with violence. The pharisaic morality or religion of the Jews seems to have become antiquated in this way. The tables in which it was embodied were almost sufficiently broken by the later Jewish prophets with a vigour hardly inferior to that of Nietzsche himself. On the other hand, the virtues that were described by Aristotle and illustrated by Plutarch cannot easily be superseded, though even they may be liable to a gradual transvaluation. Generally it will be found that when men describe either themselves or others as immoralists they are referring only to particular customs or taboos to which they or others object, not to those essential attitudes of mind that ethical writers seek to cultivate, such as "kindness in another's trouble, courage in our own." I do not mean to imply that they are always right in objecting to the customs or taboos that they criticise; some of them may be more deeply rooted in human nature (which is a very complex nature) than is at once apparent; but at least the question what particular things should be done or avoided is a question of detail, not of fundamental principle. Special institutions, such as the family or the State, call for particular forms of loyalty, sacrifice, or chivalry; and the exact nature of these varies with time, place, and condition. This is still more true of particular modes of etiquette, fashion, and ceremonial. If the observance of these is what we mean by manners or morals, the fact that anyone is an immoralist—*i.e.* opposed to some of the conventions of his time and country—need not greatly disturb us. Especially in a very conservative country like our own, such immoralism may be a great service to morality. "Propriety," according to La Rochefoucauld, "is the least of all laws, and the most obeyed." It is easier to be "correct" than to be good.

But even goodness may be understood in different senses. One of Nietzsche's sayings¹ is that "The noble one wishes to create something new and a new virtue. The good one wills that old things should be preserved." This is a somewhat peculiar use of the term "good"—rather akin to the sense in

¹ *Thus spake Zarathustra*, i.

which a child is said to be good when it sits still and makes no noise. Nietzsche himself corrects this usage when he speaks of "creative goodness."¹ On the whole, Nietzsche's meaning seems to me to be pretty nearly the same as that which Lowell expressed in the saying that "Time makes ancient good uncouth." There is, of course, some ground for occasionally understanding "good" in the lower sense. It is often so used in English, and perhaps more often in German. *Gut* and *böse* often refer to what we should call good-nature and ill-nature, rather than to good and bad will.

2. From what has now been urged it follows that morality, in the sense in which it is to be identified with religion, is not dry or cold. It is "touched by emotion." It would seem to have been chiefly the absence of this that was felt by Mause Headrigg and her associates. It is certainly possible to treat morality as if it were merely a set of rules of etiquette or a legal code. Perhaps the ancient scriptures of the Chinese and the laws of the Jews, associated with the names of Confucius and Moses, may fairly be characterised as belonging to this type; but even in these the conceptions of family or racial piety give the regulations and injunctions a certain warmth and depth that are generally lacking in matters of law or etiquette—just as, among ourselves, the conception of a "perfect gentleman" tends to mean a good deal more than external observances. In the case of the Jews at least, the essential significance of their moral code was eventually summed up in the conception of love towards God and man, and in the efforts to behave towards others as we should wish them to behave towards us. It would be a strange kind of religion to which such a morality as this could present itself as a *bête noire*. It is undoubtedly possible, however, to have some degree of religious warmth without the sense of social obligation, to have a sort of love of God without love of our neighbour. It has been noted that even the friend of man is not always a friend of men. It is such a religion that is apt to be cultivated in the cloister; and it is specially against this type that ethical religion, in all its forms, is a protest. Swift's gibe is well known, that "some people have just enough religion to make them hate one another, not enough to make them love one another." Even ethical religion, if we are not careful, may engender sectarian animosity; just as the love of our country may turn into the hatred of other countries, or even of some of our own fellow-citizens.

3. Again, I think it is important that ethical religion

¹ Thus spake Zarathustra, ii.

should not be interpreted in a too purely subjective and self-centred way. It is somewhat liable to this danger, owing to the fact that it has no external deities to appeal to; nor does it lead us to worship our ancestors or even, like the religion of Humanity, connect itself definitely with the historical achievements of mankind. It is apt to be deficient in altars and oracles, sacraments and impressive rites. In this respect it is somewhat akin to Quakerism and to the more severely Protestant sects; and these are the types of religion that are specially exposed to the dangers of individualism and spiritual pride. The adherents of such religions are too prone to congratulate themselves that they are not as other men. Mr Bradley has reminded us that our own country, "the chosen home of moral philosophy," is apt to be thought of on the Continent as being specially characterised by hypocrisy and cant; and indeed even our own writers sometimes refer to us as "the island Pharisees." Such references may not be entirely fair; but it is well at least that we should be on our guard against the tendency to value our own attitude of mind instead of beneficent activities in the world around us. The Stoics, who may almost be said to have had a purely ethical religion, appear to have been somewhat liable to this defect; and I fancy it is also a besetting sin of Buddhism. In times and places nearer our own, the influence of Kant is in some respects comparable to that of the Stoical teachers. His insistence on the view that there is nothing intrinsically good but the good will may be so interpreted as to lead us to undervalue the objective achievements at which a good will aims; and the more recent contention of Green, that the only good is goodness, may be exposed, though in a less degree, to the same danger. "If our virtues did not go forth of us, 'twere all alike as if we had them not." I suppose the Good Samaritan in the parable was not pluming himself much on the excellence of his volition, but was thinking rather of the needs of the man who had fallen among thieves. It is one of the merits of Utilitarianism that it directs our attention to such ends. However true it may be that merit is not to be measured by results, yet there is at least no kind of merit that does not aim at results. In fairness to Nietzsche, I think it ought to be recognised that his attacks on pity are mainly directed against the sentimental attitude that values "the tears of sensibility" rather than the effort to remove their cause. Carlyle, who is not usually regarded as an immoralist, resembled Nietzsche in this respect, as in several others. When Blake tells us that "pity would be no more if we did not

make somebody poor," most of us would agree that we could well spare a considerable amount of pity for the sake of eliminating poverty—at least indigence, the squalid kind of poverty that calls for pity. We can dispense even with the Good Samaritan in favour of a social organisation that makes it increasingly difficult for anyone to fall among thieves. The love that forms the basis of morality is what Kant called "practical love"—the love that seeks actively to promote the good of its object—not "pathological love," which begins and ends in feeling. Professor MacCunn, in his excellent Liverpool Addresses on Ethics of Social Work, refers to "a certain great surgeon, one of the most tender-hearted of men, who once said that with him pity as an emotion had to cease in order that pity as a motive might do its work. Similarly, we have the saying of La Rochefoucauld about himself: "I am not very sensible of pity; and I should wish not to be so at all. Nevertheless, I would do everything in my power to comfort a person in distress." Sensibility and active beneficence are by no means coincident; and he who enjoins us to "be hard" does not necessarily intend us to be cruel. All the same, I think it is a kind of injunction that should be somewhat sparingly used. Without some tender feeling, the more active kind of benevolence would be apt to lose its motive power. If too much feeling paralyses, too little would surely deaden. The distinction between practice and emotion is probably not as complete as Kant imagined. But I think it is a sound doctrine that what is morally important is to act; and that action is directed to ends beyond itself.

4. This leads me to notice a further point, viz. that a purely moral religion must probably be regarded as a somewhat incomplete one. If religion, in its most developed form, is, as I believe, concerned with ultimate values, it is concerned, directly or indirectly, with everything that contributes to human well-being. It is concerned directly with truth and beauty, and somewhat more indirectly with the promotion of individual health and happiness and of a stable and righteous social order. Morality can hardly be held to cover all this, except in the sense that it is morally right to pursue these objects. Religion may be said to be concerned with ultimate ends, whereas morality is concerned with the direction of the will to the attainment of such ends. The Stoics, Kant and Green, as I have just indicated, tended to ignore this distinction by representing moral goodness as being in itself the only ultimate end. Kant partly corrected this in his treatment of æsthetics and religion; and Green seemed to be on

the point of advancing to the view that knowledge and beauty may also be accepted as ultimate ends; but neither of them succeeded in showing how the acceptance of these ultimate ends is to be reconciled with the doctrine that the only good is goodness. On the other hand, Mr Bradley has definitely stated that to make morality absolute is to break with every considerable religion, which, in view of Buddhism, is perhaps an exaggeration on the opposite side. But certainly when Carlyle tells us that all religions are here to remind us of "the quite infinite difference between a good man and a bad," the statement must be taken with considerable qualifications. Some religions at least have reminded us rather that even the best men have limitations that prevent them from growing into the skies, and that even the worst are not hopelessly incurable.

Perhaps all religions are in some respects incomplete, and it is not easy to state satisfactorily what is required for a complete one. So far as I can judge, the best general definition of religion is that it means devotion to what has the highest value. It is generally said that the highest value has the three aspects of truth, beauty, and goodness; but merely to enumerate these is hardly satisfactory. When it is said that truth, beauty, and goodness are intrinsically valuable, what is really meant is that perfection is intrinsically valuable, and that perfection has these three aspects. It must be admitted that it is difficult to form any quite clear conception of what we are to understand by perfection: but it would seem that we have to think of it as coherent and intelligible, and so as possessing truth; as an orderly system of many in one, and so as beautiful; as living and self-creative, and so as having goodness. This conception of the perfect whole is what the Cartesian philosophers called the idea of God; and I believe it is also what Plato meant by the "form of Good"; and it certainly seems to me to be the only ultimate object of worship. For us, however, the aspect of goodness may be said to be the most central and fundamental; because for us the idea is an aspiration rather than a possession. It is the guiding principle in our efforts to improve the general conditions of human life; and this effort is the essence of morality. In the carrying on of this effort we are realising such perfection as it is possible for us to achieve: and in this sense, as a French poet has put it, each one of us can, in a small way, be creating God—*Chaque homme fait Dieu un peu avec sa vie*. But we aspire to a greater perfection than any that we can ever hope to attain. Our human attitude is one of reasonable

hope rather than of fulfilment. Some have even said that, if they held truth in their hands, they would let it go again for the pleasure of pursuing it. I cannot agree with this. If I had truth in my grasp, I believe I would hold it pretty tight. But I admit that our human attitude is that of pursuing truth, beauty, and goodness, and catching occasional glimpses of them, as Moses was said to have caught a passing glimpse of the back of Deity. Hence the active element—the element of striving forwards—predominates in our attitude.

Thus, while I think it right to make some qualifications on the claims of ethical religion to be regarded as in itself complete, I still think that the ethical element in religion is the most fundamental; and perhaps it is also the element in which we may most confidently look for general agreement in the near future. Even in this respect I am anxious not to exaggerate. It would be a mistake to suppose that, beyond somewhat narrow limits, people readily arrive at a complete agreement on questions of right and wrong. Heroic self-sacrifice is perhaps universally admired, and meanness and cruelty disliked; and almost everyone approves of justice, though there are wide differences of opinion as to what in any particular case is to be regarded as just. But recent history has probably led most people to realise that there are important questions of principle on which even thoughtful men are by no means unanimous. There are some who appear to believe quite genuinely that the life and prosperity of one's country are of such supreme importance as to justify almost any action that seems to be necessary for its defence or even for its enhancement. There are others who quite as genuinely believe that it is hardly right to incur any serious sacrifice for these objects. I suppose most of us would agree that the correct view lies well within the limits that are indicated by these extremes; but between them there is still considerable scope for divergence of opinion. And similar differences would be found in questions relating to commercial morality, the rights of property, the treatment of animals, and many other problems in practical ethics. It is doubtful whether the substitution of moral ideas for theological dogmas is a simplification. For this reason the important question of moral education for the young is not quite as simple as has sometimes been supposed; though I believe that, when the nature of education is rightly understood, as a development from within rather than an imposition from without, it can be satisfactorily dealt with. In any case, it can hardly be doubted that the questions that arise with

reference to right and wrong in most men's lives are of more fundamental importance than those that arise with reference to either truth or beauty. A mistake about beauty is seldom important except in the case of those whose special business it is to produce beautiful objects; and a mistake about truth is seldom important except in science or philosophy or in cases in which it leads to wrong action. The discovery of truth and the creation of beauty bring glory, in the main, to particular individuals; but, in general, it is righteousness that exalts a nation. The saying of Matthew Arnold, that conduct is three-fourths of life, is no doubt a somewhat misleading way of calling attention to this relative predominance of moral issues. It follows, I think, from this predominance that a purely ethical religion is less incomplete than one that is purely metaphysical, as some Oriental ones have tended to become, or of the purely æsthetical type to which perhaps that of the ancient Greeks may be said to have approximated. An ethical religion at least lays the emphasis on what is most important for men in general. It is at least concerned, in the memorable phrase of Aristotle, with what can be done and achieved by man; not with the thoughts of unattainable perfection and inconceivable bliss, which has tended to make some religions blighting influences on human life instead of gospels of hope and encouragement. One of the Jewish characters depicted by Mr Zangwill in *The Children of the Ghetto* is represented as exclaiming, "Oh, why is religion such a curse?" The general answer would seem to be that it is a curse when it is based upon fear instead of hope, on law instead of love, on dogma instead of free inquiry, on priestcraft instead of the light of reason. One of the current theories with regard to the origin of the more primitive forms of religion is that they sprang from a set of taboos based upon the fear of the old man of the tribe. One is often tempted to think that some of the later forms are based upon the fear of the old woman typified by Mrs Grundy. It is only by slow degrees, as Goethe urged in *Wilhelm Meister*, that fear gives place to reverence; and even from this it needs some further progress to bring us to "admiration, hope, and love." Even if you take so relatively hopeful a religion as Christianity, with its "glad tidings of great joy," it is a melancholy spectacle to note how largely its followers have been preoccupied by fear. Hell seems to have counted for much more than heaven, except in a few somewhat mystical minds. It is particularly sad to see how even so brave a spirit as that of Samuel Johnson was overclouded by religious fears. The case of Cowper is no doubt more exceptional.

It is very noticeable, however, that the attitude of people almost everywhere has been undergoing a rapid change in this respect. There have been, I think, few times in the history of the world in which there has been a more widespread longing for some genuine form of religious faith, or a more deep-seated discontent with the sham religions that have been so commonly provided. This desire for something better was growing up even before the time of the European War, but it has been greatly intensified by that terrible catastrophe, which has, I fancy, stirred the general mind of our peoples more profoundly than anything that has happened since the earthquake at Lisbon. The shock of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, though also to be reckoned among those great rebuffs "that turn earth's smoothness rough," was more purely political and social in its significance. Unfortunately all such awakenings are apt to be of short duration.

This revival of religious interest has shown itself chiefly, as I have already noted, in attempts to establish the persistence of individual life after the death of the body. The present is not a suitable occasion for any discussion of the value of such attempts. It cannot be denied at least that the desire which underlies them—the desire that those whom we have loved and lost should have, in Tennyson's phrase, "the glory of going on," and that we should recover some personal contact with them—is a very natural one for our human hearts. Sometimes the hope for such persistence has been connected with Oriental theories of animism and reincarnation, and may thus be said to involve a return to very ancient forms of belief. But it is well to remember at least that these old beliefs were seldom regarded as gospels of hope. Most of the ancient believers in future lives seem to have regarded the prospect with some alarm, and hoped chiefly for some ultimate relief from the process—some form of Nirvana. It is characteristic of our more hopeful outlook upon the world that almost all our modern believers in the prolongation of life conceive of the continuance of conscious existence and individual personality as a good to be desired. Nearly all the major prophets of our time have forward-looking thoughts. One might almost say that they nearly all cherish Messianic hopes. Nietzsche taught us not to think about the fatherland, but to look rather with eager longing towards the land of our children. Bergson's doctrine of creative evolution and the striking conception of creative imagination that has recently been set before us by Mr E. D. Fawcett turn our minds in the same direction. The Invisible King of Mr H. G. Wells is not God

the Father, but rather God the Holy Spirit—the undying fire within our hearts urging us on to our higher destiny. He is, as Heine described himself, a Knight of the Holy Ghost. In the remarkable Gifford Lectures—on Space, Time, and Deity—by Professor Alexander (one of the earliest and best of the lecturers to our Ethical Societies), Deity is represented rather as that to which we aspire than as that from which we come. I have purposely referred to writers of very different types and representing very different modes of thought.

Whatever we may think of such hopes and speculations, it must, I suppose, always be true that our main interests have to be centred upon the mode of existence that is carried on by us here and now on this comparatively insignificant planet. It is to this, on the whole, that the Ethical Societies very properly direct their attention; and I think we may feel confident that, if they continue to devote themselves to this seriously, courageously, sympathetically, and hopefully, they will really be working in harmony with all the most vital developments of philosophical and religious thought; and they will not in that case be merely the creators of a new sect to be added to the already too numerous bodies that exist among us, but will rather be essentially co-operating with others in bringing to fruition the germs of a genuine religion of humanity.

It is of course perfectly natural and legitimate that those who agree with one another in certain opinions and attitudes of mind should associate themselves together, and to some extent segregate themselves from others. Probably for a long time to come there will continue to be rival forms of religious union. Indeed, the attempt to establish a universal world-religion, like the attempt to establish a world-empire, might only lead to more intense forms of conflict. What we may reasonably hope is that there will be a gradual approximation, and that at least it may rapidly come to be seen that the various religions—to adapt a saying of Carlyle—except in opinions do not disagree. It can hardly be doubted that the most important of all practical problems at the present time is that of finding some *modus vivendi* among the rival nations of the world. There were high hopes about this at the time when the armistice was arranged; but it can hardly be said that the outlook is quite as hopeful now. There are obvious troubles in Russia, in Ireland, in India, and in many other countries; and anyone who reads such a book as that by Mr Cheng on *Modern China*, or that by Mr H. J. Mackinder on *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, may realise some of the less immediately obtrusive

dangers that lie in front of us. I believe it may be taken as certain that no mechanical arrangement will ever introduce peace and goodwill among men. At most one may say that the actual formation of a workable League of Nations might be taken as some evidence that people were ripe for the establishment of peace and goodwill. The ripening must come from within. It is for this reason that I look with special hope to the "Concordia" movement that was initiated by the late Principal Naruse of Tokio a little before the outbreak of the war, and that I am glad to learn is now likely to be revived. The special object of that movement is to bring about friendly relations between East and West, and especially to promote the mutual understanding of their moral and religious conceptions and their social ideals. We have heard too much of the saying that "East is East and West is West"—commonly quoted in a sense almost contrary to that which Mr Kipling intended. There are many "good Europeans" who have felt the call of the East, just as there are many Orientals who are ready to appropriate what is good—and even what is bad—in our Western civilisation. There are many who stand, like the souls that were depicted by Virgil, at the edge of their respective worlds, stretching out their hands with a yearning love for the remoter shore—*Tendebantque manus ripæ ulterioris amore*. I expect—I may even add, I hope—that there will always remain some differences between these two worlds; just as there will always be many smaller ones within each of them. Differences of sun and wind and soil and sea will always be accompanied by some differences in mind and soul; and humanity is all the richer for such variations. But we have surely seen enough of each other to realise that it is quite possible to have a fundamental unity of spirit underlying these differences. I do not believe, however, that there can be such a genuine unity on any basis that does not lie deep down in the essential nature of man, and that may not be properly described as religious; and I am convinced that any religion that is to accomplish this object—the greatest surely of all earthly objects—must be predominantly an ethical religion.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF RELIGION AND RESEARCH.

STANLEY A. COOK, M.A.

Fellow and Lecturer in Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge.

IT is a familiar fact that a man's reflections and inquiries outside the sphere of religion can exercise a powerful influence upon his religious convictions and his conceptions of religion; and also that his religion or theology can control his ordinary scientific and other "non-religious" thinking to such an extent that they are not rarely considered to be prejudicial to the spirit of free and fearless research. Evidently, therefore, our religious and our non-religious thoughts are not naturally contained in separate water-tight compartments; and it would seem that whatever "realities" belong to the sphere of religion, and are experienced or recognised by the men whom we call "religious," must be associated with whatever "realities" are recognised outside that sphere in such a way that our ideas about both can interact in the way they do. Indeed, the history of thought has been characterised by increasing differentiation—the separation of religious from non-religious aspects, the appearance of new departments, bodies, or, we may say, "species" (*e.g.* astronomy, chemistry, astrophysics, etc.), and the process is significant for our conceptions of objective progress. One of the most fascinating and fundamental of inquiries is that into our own mental development, whereby we come to realise even the necessity of distinguishing between the "religious" and the "non-religious" or between what is and what is not "scientific," a development which accounts for our present conflicting attitudes. In fact, it may be submitted that in the pursuit of truth a closer examination of the dynamic and differentiating aspects of the processes of thought in the history of individuals and peoples is the necessary prelude to

any critical reconsideration of the implicit and explicit theologies and philosophies which now sever us and impede social and other advances.

Although thought has become increasingly specialistic, there are many indications of the feeling that analysis may outstrip synthesis, and that the interrelations of existing divisions or subdivisions cannot be neglected with impunity.¹ Two studies, geology and geography, for example, may be pursued independently; but from time to time one is found to depend upon the other, and throughout the vicissitudes of departments of thought there are alternating phases of isolation and interrelation, processes which are especially instructive when we turn to problems of religion. For, without further ado, I wish to suggest that the future of our progress outside the sphere of religion depends vitally upon religion, indeed upon a further development of religion itself, and that the latter will rest upon an advance in those realms which our science and criticism jealously shield from religious, confessional, and subjective entanglements. In other words, the separate aspects which we dichotomise into "religious" and "non-religious" are so united that progressive development cannot be partial or one-sided.

It will doubtless be agreed that the further social, political, and other development of individuals and peoples turns, to a certain extent at least, upon their self-control, moderation, and so forth; that is, upon their ethical and moral character. What I submit is that we are at the stage where, if we are to maintain our position and make a further advance—and the two aims are one,—only a religious development will stimulate and unify our research, and only an advance in our research will bring religion into harmony with the best thought of its day. The advance, in a word, will turn upon a further development in man's relationship with the God of whom it has been said that "in Him we live, and move, and have our being." For, if this is true of God—and it is the living experience of many,—"God" must stand for some tremendous reality, on another plane, but inconceivably more vital, than all our other and non-religious conceptions of reality. Consequently there is a fatal rift in our outlook upon life until we have made up our minds and formed some Theory of Reality. Either we differ hopelessly upon a question than which there

¹ See, e.g., Professor Coulter on "The Evolution of Botanical Research," in *Nature*, 29th January 1920, p. 581. (The analogy between evolution in the world of life and that in the world of thought is to be borne in mind.)

can be none more vital for every aspect of human welfare; or we do lip-service to an agreement, but our research does not at present enable us to interpret our experience and give it a real meaning. Our religion and our research thus appear to be inevitably interconnected.

My starting-point is the field of Biblical Criticism, the uncompromising study of Sacred Writings in the light of all that research has to offer. As a result of past advance of thought the Church is no longer the sole interpreter of the Bible, nor does the Bible interpret itself alike to all men. The three types—Conservative, Moderate, and Radical—differ from one another, and among themselves; and such are the cross-divisions and combinations that scholars can no longer be easily labelled. Not to speak of the ethical, moral, and religious problems, the claims of textual, metrical, literary, and historical criticism frequently conflict; while archæology, anthropology, psychology, and history often pull in opposite directions. Consequently, not only do readers differ seriously because of their different temperaments, preconceptions, convictions, and the like, but the “secular” studies have not reached the stage where they can be so co-ordinated as to preclude the extreme divergences which now hinder the progress of biblical criticism. This criticism can justify itself by the fact that its methods are those employed in other fields; but its progress is bound up with those fields, and, accordingly, biblical study itself needs a methodology, not merely of the departments of research, but more especially of the distinctively “religious” and “non-religious” inquiries.

The Bible, then, will not interpret itself to ordinary readers, nor be interpreted by the Church, in any adequately harmonious manner until our research has reached a higher and more co-ordinated stage than that at present, where scholars and readers alike are at hopeless variance. The goal, however, is no monotonous, static identity of view, but a congruence of method and a new underlying unity, so that the various problems and the departments of thought may be less out of harmony, and the road be open for the newer problems—each age has its own—now being impeded and obscured through the absence of methodological unity and the conflict between religious and other knowledge.

The really fundamental problem of the Old Testament is not the literary analysis—there is sufficient agreement upon essentials—but the reconstruction of the political and religious development of Israel, to replace the traditional narrative which modern criticism cannot, in any circumstance, accept in

all its details.¹ There are the gravest internal and external difficulties, and there is not that development between the Mosaic and the post-exilic ages which we are entitled to anticipate on the ground of the teaching of the religious reformers and other evidence. The attempts to reconstruct in the light of our modern knowledge and of our conceptions of development are, in general, opposed to the religious philosophy of the old writers, with their periods of apostasy and penitence, of decline and reform; and the fundamental biblical conception of a primitive revelation is replaced by the no less impressive conception of a progressive revelation. It is this problem of religious development, whether in the history of a people, viz. Israel, or in the history of the race, which now comes to stand in need of reconsideration.

In reconstructing the outlines of the history of Israel insufficient attention has been paid to the vicissitudes in and around Palestine. The problem was studied too narrowly within the covers of the Old Testament.² Now, however, we are gaining a broader view of the history of a small people in a land surrounded by ancient civilisations, and our ideas can be further enlarged by a better knowledge of the history of the rise and vicissitudes of other religions. Here we find alternating periods of decay and revival, the latter not infrequently associated with great political and other movements; and at the same time there is a genetic development, such that the revival is a return of the old, but of the old in a new form. Very subtle and rather novel problems arise when one seeks to determine more narrowly the distinctive features: the disappearance, reshaping, or re-interpretation of the old, the appearance of new positive elements, and the inauguration of new stages, cycles, or, as one is tempted to call them, "species." The history of religions elucidates the principles of the development of religious and other thought; and, in forcing a reconsideration of Old Testament religion, it also brings us to the problem of the reconstruction of modern

¹ Scholars are of course divided as to precisely what may or may not be accepted. I, myself, am frequently radical and sceptical as regards the value of the historical narratives for the period with which they deal, but freely recognise their value (including the book of Chronicles) for the light they throw upon the periods when they were written, collected, and edited. This light illuminates not the earlier periods, therefore, but later ones.

² This was largely inevitable. It was necessary to concentrate upon the biblical evidence, and external evidence has not always been reliable or accessible. A very important step is, however, taken by the Rev. Professor Burney whose commentary on *Judges* (1918) includes the first really critical and comprehensive account of "external information bearing on the period of *Judges*" (pp. lv.-cxviii.).

thought. The history of transitional periods in other lands and ages now becomes of supreme interest, and the history of Israel, in particular, gains another significance.

The problems of the Old Testament turn upon a few centuries in the middle of the first millennium B.C., when the downfall of the Hebrew monarchies was followed by a certain disintegration, leading to a new reconstruction which was essentially religious. Instead of a simple evolution—from nomad religion to priestly legalism—we have to understand (1) the earlier vicissitudes in the entrance of semi-nomads into a land of long-established culture; and (2) the later decline from the height of the monarchies, the appearance of relatively simple conditions, and the work of reconstruction which produced post-exilic Judaism. Assyria fell, artificial archaïsation in Babylonia and Egypt led to decay; but the reconstruction of Israel, with its results so profoundly beneficent for humanity, is a phenomenon which cannot be too carefully investigated, so suggestive is it for our own tasks of to-day. The study of that reconstruction and our new reconstruction of Israelite development belong to biblical criticism; but, involving as they do a reconsideration of the facts and theories of the development of life and thought, the biblical problems become essentially problems of this age. This age will both interpret and be interpreted by them.

I cannot delay upon further details; I will only remark, at this point, that if we feel we have outgrown earlier stages of religious or other thought, nothing is better attested than the repeated renewal or reassertion of elements in forms that are in harmony with newer conditions. In this fusion of resemblances to and differences from the old we have analogies in the history of successive stages in organic evolution; and while it may be said that we of to-day are witnessing, if not helping to introduce, a new stage in human evolution, we have this responsibility, that our knowledge of development in the past can enable us more consciously to contribute to the next stage. But our research has yet to investigate critically and without prejudice the nature of the resemblances and the differences. "Mediævalism," "obscurantism," "reactionism" are terms which no thinker can employ.

Tendencies in life and thought are leading to what, on the analogy of literary, textual, and historical criticism, may be called "religious" criticism. The problems of the relation between Christianity and other or earlier religions need more objective treatment than they usually receive. The application of psychology to religion is also raising new questions.

Problems of the relation between religion and magic, of religious decline and pathology, of holy men, intermediaries, and the like, have far-reaching implications. The theory of the priority of magic over religion has an often unsuspected significance for our ideas of God. The theory that religion "began" with totemism or with ancestor-worship—to mention no other views—bears upon that of the source of our own religious experience to-day and of our convictions of God's place in the world. The comparative and psychological study of varieties of Christian experience, of non-Christian religious experience, and of non-religious but related experience (*e.g.* cosmic emotion, etc.) raises profound problems which are bridging the gulf between "religious" and "non-religious" thought. Anthropology, psychology, and the study of religions are preparing the way for a veritable science of religion; they are leading gradually to conceptions of religion in accord with the best thought. If only scholars were agreed upon the essential nature of magic and the real difference between magic and religion we should have an immeasurably firmer grasp of true and progressive religion—and of its antithesis—than we possess at present.

While research is thus impinging upon the sphere of religion—and to an extent to which organised religion cannot be indifferent—another change becomes inevitable. The problems which belong to "religious criticism" sooner or later raise the question, How did people think of *their* gods? what did their gods *mean* for them?¹ And it is not difficult to see here how one's personal experience both affects and is affected by one's study and treatment of the problem. When we ask ourselves what reality—and I suppose one must begin by adding "if any"—is represented by the data of religion, our research is applying itself to men's conceptions of God and Reality. Moreover, not only is the consistent thinker consciously or unconsciously developing his own personal convictions—which will be the less "subjective" as religion is studied in a scientific spirit—but to the fearlessness and sincerity demanded by the temper of science there must be added, as the ideal, a "spiritual" training, equipment, and character. The fact, for fact it is, is assuredly significant for our conceptions of the subject of inquiry, for what must "God" mean if our inquiries into ancient or modern, primitive or developed religion seem to take us to our own inmost depths?

¹ This method of inquiry, though commonly ignored, is, significantly enough for his theory of the communion-sacrifice, that of Robertson Smith (*Religion of the Semites*, 2nd ed., p. 82 *seq.*).

Already the psychological study of religion emphasises the "naturalness" of religion and associates "religious" truth and reality with what is open to the psychological discussion of human nature. Moreover, sociological and other students incline to admit that religious experience has *some* reality or actuality to justify it; it is the theistic or other interpretation and expression which is adversely criticised. Yet it is very instructive to observe the efforts to express what, if it is not "religious experience," is at least related to it—"cosmic emotion," for example—in a way that shall avoid theology or philosophy; they indicate how inextricably our distinctively "religious" experience and mode of thought is interwoven with all the deeper experiences and thought outside the sphere of religion. But when it is said that religious experience is "really" connected with man's social nature, or that it is of some actuality no less intelligible, it is difficult to see how this is to be proved or disproved. Whatever be the reality experienced so variously by theists and others, we evidently need some clearer formulation of what this Reality means for our own life and thought. The question cannot be left where it is; we desire a more or less systematised Theory of Reality which shall interrelate the rival and opposing conceptions of ultimate reality and co-ordinate our own particular conceptions of this and any other realities we recognise.

I cannot formulate a Theory of Reality, but I suppose that one of the main differences between (a) the God of Theism, (b) the Humanity, or other "God" of ethical and positivist cults, and (c), let us say, a mascot (which can be psychologically very effective), lies in the realm of thought and action proper to each, the content of each, and the significance of each for the rest of our life and thought. Conceptions of reality are thus bound up with the efficacy of our reality under discussion. According to our thought of it so we use it. Now, to go back for a moment to biblical criticism we find that theories, principles and the like proved imperfect or erroneous as they became less effective in their relevant field; difficulties increased, inconvenient facts had to be ignored or forced; old principles conflicted with new ones. To this we may add a growing uneasiness and dissatisfaction which was more than merely "intellectual." But in biblical criticism, as elsewhere, when old theories have been replaced by new ones, the data have been more effectively handled, the relief has been more than "intellectual," and even when the new theory has been uncommonly drastic, it has really been less complex, more synthesising and unifying, and more in harmony with new

tendencies, principles, or facts. The test, then, of our theories, principles, and conceptions is their efficacy in their proper field.

This process, one well worthy of more careful treatment, is that wherein theories and so forth are found inadequate, and are replaced by new ones which, in spite of the intervening struggle, have often, like new stages in the history of a religion, grown out of their predecessors. The process of reconstruction in the world of thought has its analogy in that of the world of life, where our theories, principles, and outlooks are less consciously held. And the analogy may be pursued, for if our theories and views of life are imperfect and erroneous, like our theories in research, they will be ineffective, do what we may to ignore or suppress inconvenient facts. We may even *feel* a certain dissatisfaction which it is difficult to specify. Now, if we agree that there is a Moral Law in the Universe, our life and thought cannot proceed with impunity along lines contrary to it. With greater force will this principle apply to our conceptions of God. We may say, with the contemporaries of Zephaniah, that the Lord will do neither good nor evil, or we may think of God as Him in whom we live, and move, and have our being. But if men act upon wrong conceptions of what is most vitally real and true the consequences are bound to be untoward; although at present, however, we are not agreed as to how far religious reality is significant. The more significant it is, the more prejudicial will be our imperfect and erroneous conceptions.

In any case, it is unfortunately unnecessary to refer at length to the prevailing bewilderment, disillusion, unrest, suspicion, and despair, the indications of moral, ethical, and spiritual ill-health, and the many bizarre, fantastic, and often veritably pathological features of the age. Psychologists emphasise the results of the possession of a well-organised or of a discordant or dissociated personality, of good or of bad complexes. The prevalence of what is abnormal enables one to realise what is normal; and "the psychology of insanity" leads to a "psychology of sanity" (*Hibbert Journal*, April, p. 509). Moreover, the psychology of adolescence and conversion has much to suggest for an age distracted, anxious, and in search of rest, confronted with the disintegration of one system and the necessity of constructing another. How far may this ill-health not be due to erroneous ideas of life and reality, to imperfect or misleading conceptions of "God" and of the reality for which this Name stands? The answer will depend upon our conceptions of the meaning of God for man,

and the relationship in which a man, consciously or unconsciously, stands to Him.

The question is much more than merely "religious"; it is not disposed of by leaving it to the theologians. The assertions and claims which recur throughout the religions are such that, if religion is not a stupendous lie—and this is inconceivable—man is in some way part of the Universe more profoundly than we can understand. Science can indeed associate the human organism with the rest of the Universe, but the extraordinary convictions and statements of man's place in the Universe are not only contained in man-made mythologies, theologies, or philosophies, they are also in large measure implicit in men's activities, which, as they become more earnest and fundamental, have a significance transcending our positive knowledge. Man himself is but a very recent appearance in the history of the earth, and as he becomes more conscious of himself and the whole of which he is part, the differentiating process whereby he severs God and Nature, or distinguishes the religious and non-religious aspects, tends to obscure the earlier unity of experience.

Yet the way in which the individual is influenced by what we call a "religious" experience, the effect of a consciousness of "God" upon his life and thought, and the nature of the development of his world of ideas combine to show that the "realities" of religion cannot be held utterly apart from those of ordinary experience, and that "God" represents a reality significant even for the individual who knows Him not. The experiences which have forced men to convictions of an existence "outside" and "beyond" this life point to a consciousness of something that "transcends" (in the strict use of the term) what we call "this" world of Space and Time. In a word, then, there are convictions and experiences that are unintelligible and meaningless unless they point to certain ultimate facts of which our interpretations are natural approximations—facts, too, such that the genetic development of individuals and of the race leads to truer and more effective interpretations. There is a religious dialectic and a certain naturalness and orderliness in the vicissitudes of religion which force the assumption of some Reality even though it be known only through our imperfect apprehension and statement of it.

We often entertain conflicting beliefs, for example, of a bodily and non-bodily resurrection, which if pursued consistently would speedily land us in hopeless confusion. So, as regards our experience, interpretation, and systematisation of whatever is real and true, if we are consciously and uncon-

sciously proceeding in diverging directions our whole self must suffer in some measure. If, as religious experience suggests, we are normally part of a larger life, we thwart our deeper selves if we persist in thought and action that denies and excludes this.¹ If we think that reality is only physical, the more consistent and systematic our ideas in all their ramifications the more imperfect will be our personality—that is, *if* our fundamental conviction is “really” wrong. Hence, for the credit of research, it is incumbent upon men to make up their mind upon the significance—“if any”—of the religious consciousness and religious experience for scientific and other “non-religious” thought; and it is no less incumbent upon them, for the credit of religion, to utilise “non-religious” inquiries and “religious criticism” to the end that religion may once more live by being brought into harmonious relationship with the progress of thought.

The value of the comparative study of theological and non-theological conceptions of God and Reality lies in its contribution to new developments. It enlarges our ideas of God and Reality, and in showing how, on the religious standpoint, God has revealed Himself to individuals and peoples at different levels, enables us to form some more objective estimate of these “levels” in terms of concepts, categories, knowledge, and systematisation of thought. Further, this study throws light upon the dynamic processes of the mind: the mind’s consciousness of something outside ordinary experience and the effort to consolidate the ground gained in its new advance. Here we find ourselves passing between God and Man, between Human Personality and Divine, between man’s convictions of ultimate reality and the consciousness of his own reality. Thinking of God’s nature and activities man has grasped new possibilities, and reflecting upon God’s rule in the Universe he has developed his own mental processes and illumined his own nature.

There are two extremes. On the one hand, there are speculations which may seem futile—the old discussions of the movements of angels, the space they occupy, the way in which the universe is contained in God’s mind, the mode of thought of disembodied beings or of an omnipresent Being,

¹ I say, we “thwart,” just as men are said to thwart and impede God’s work. But if we agree that ultimate facts of our existence (*e.g.* God, a life beyond the present) ultimately force themselves upon our consciousness, we seem to imply that by our nature we are (? subconsciously) one with Reality. We imply, that is, certain facts of human nature and existence which, together with much else in comparative theology, can be handled logically, and are assuredly vital for our theories of all kinds of knowledge.

and so on. On the other hand is the cruder rationalism and positivism which would thwart the individual's development by rigorously rejecting all that falls outside so-called rational thought. Meanwhile, however, the extension of ideas of relativity, the impetus given by mathematical speculation, and the widespread interest in psychology have broken down barriers. We are confronted with an irrationalism, an anti-intellectualism, and the prominence of sections of population averse from specialistic thought. False idealism and unworthy belief prevail, and there are no coherent, systematising conceptions of God, Man, and the Universe to unify men and lay the basis of a new reconstruction. None the less, recent decades have seen great strides in our knowledge of the physical Universe and in our knowledge of man, his nature, his conceptions of himself, and of his ultimate realities. The age, it may be hoped, is preparing its own cure.

The educated classes—whether biblical critics, scientists, and the rest—have their share of the responsibility for the disintegration of life and thought, and if they refuse to take part in constructive work, destructive work will be pursued by others. The striking absence of idealism among the middle classes, the despised *bourgeoisie* of the extremist, is the clearest indication that *their* education needs synthesising. Before we can educate the masses, the classes need re-educating; it is their apathy and inertia which make so many impatient minds see the sole hope of the future in the more impressionable masses. Just as we become forced to take long views in economic and political questions, so, where thought is concerned, a more dynamic outlook is needed of the development of individuals and peoples. We have to make up our mind touching the importance of Religion, and to find conceptions of Religion, God, and Reality that shall guide us to the next stage in our development. Religion alone, without an advance of thought, might tend to be magic and superstition; and theologies that form closed systems will leave no room for further advance. Life and thought need a new co-ordination and re-organisation; and it is necessary to do justice alike to rival and conflicting facts and to opposing and hostile factions.

A new way of correlating the distinctively "religious" and the distinctively "non-religious" aspects of life and thought is demanded, and the work of research will proceed *pari passu* with the duty of acting justly towards the divers religions within our sphere of government. The reconstruction of social and political life and of religious and other thought is one task throughout. The task is, in a word, to advance to the

stage where differing competing and conflicting "facts"—and some of them uncommonly vociferous ones—may be treated in a way that does justice to the principles of the best thought. And if it be admitted that social and political developments are forcing a higher type of character, if we are not to fall behind; so, if we are to maintain our intellectual level, the reconsideration of our conceptions of effective Reality will also demand, and tend to produce, a higher character. The goal at which to aim is, in truth, another and higher stage in human evolution; and an advance to a higher conception of ultimate Reality can only be made in a newer consciousness of the relationship upon which it depends. And the religious "theory" is that man cannot do this unaided.

Again and again men have been able to reconcile their profoundest experiences and their conception of the Universe. To-day the task is greater—it is to transcend the accumulated experience and knowledge of past ages. We cannot ignore man's modernity nor the implication of his experiences. There has been a repeated experience of the oneness of the Universe; and when St Paul speaks of the whole creation as the object of redemption (Rom. viii. 22), modern knowledge tells us that man cannot be the sole object of cosmic evolution—this would be Nietzsche's "superman" over again! Man may be unavoidably anthropocentric; but he is infinitesimally small, and only if man is an integral part of Ultimate Reality can the anthropocentric intuitions be justified. And forthwith a religious "theory" of Grace is involved! There is something intellectually "shocking" and clearly "undemocratic" in the supposition that we can form a lasting outlook upon life which ignores the best scientific, mathematical, and other "non-religious" thought, or which can find no place for religious and related experiences, however diverse and difficult. We need a synthesis of the conflicting interests in the worlds of life and of thought; and this involves some new advance, and a co-operation on the part of all men of good will. No more "creative" task can be imagined.

STANLEY A. COOK.

THE ROYAL ACADEMY PICTURE SHOW AND HIGHER CRITICISM OF ART.

PROFESSOR W. R. LETHABY.

It used to be explained that the "Higher Criticism" made no claim to exaltation of status, but that it occupied other ground than the ordinary variety in trying to see particular facts in their wider relations. Such criticism, however it might be called, is required for all our modern institutions and professionalisms. It may hardly be realised by students of current thought, policies, and tendencies, how the annual show of pictures at the Royal Academy is arranged and catalogued matter for an estimate of the quality of modern existence. Those pictures, with the foreground of moving groups of "sightseers," make a perfect cinematographic exhibition of well-to-do people and their desires. The paintings themselves by the economic "higgling of the market," assisted by the skilled intervention of jurors and dealers, and the outflow of press comment, represent exactly what English culture expects of "Art" in this year of grace—this special year following the war. There are here in fact many exhibitions—the waiting motors in the court, the great suite of galleries, the crowds flocking through the turnstiles to see the biggest picture-match of the year. The paintings themselves furnish an absolutely perfect exhibition of exhibitionalism. There is much here to suggest thought, for if deep does not call to deep, shallow reflecting shallow might evoke another kind of profundity. Just this is what English artists, trained, too, for the most part at the cost of the State, have to supply to satisfy the national longing for art. Observers and students require material, statistics, and tabulated facts to work on. Here are all these excellently arranged and indexed. What does it all mean from the national, human, and—if I may use the word in my way—from the religious points of view?

People have been put off by the propaganda that art is a high mystery not to be understood by the uninitiated. Why then do artists perform in public? There are, of course, more technical and traditional approaches to art valuation, but from the human point of view all that is required is a clear shining mind to hold the mirror up to fact. We need a study of the psychology of pictures which shall recognise that in them we have minds invitingly laid open before us. Painting is a language for mind and spirit communication; well, then what does it say? These pictures make up indeed a composite photograph of the British mind and heart in 1920—reverence, pity, love, fashion, commercialism, low comedy and harlequinade must be here in their due proportion, although I must confess I have thought that the latter categories are even over-represented. The great picture-shows are only one class of specimens of our ruling institutions at this time, and a study of each of them should be put on record. In to-day's paper I read, "Miss Lena Ashwell, speaking at Cambridge on Saturday, said that the artistic genius which ought to have been stirred by the war had no chance of finding expression because the entertainment of the people was in the hands of commercials. William Shakespeare would not have a dog's chance to-day."

We are often told that art is imagination, and it may be admitted that imagination is one important factor. What imaginations have we at the Royal Academy? There is, in fact, hardly a design for a monumental, symbolising, summarising picture in the whole show. It is not that we have ceased to think in that way and cannot produce these imaginations, but it is a quite astounding fact that such serious monumental designs of a national character have gravitated to *Punch*, where we accept them under the name of *cartoons*. The only serious designs that I have seen during and since the war which dared to touch the note of nobility have been in the comic press. Here the artist may still speak without the exhibition standard in his mind or the fear of dealers in his heart. Here we may still find the eye language of serious imaginations. In great epochs of civilisation many of these comic-paper cartoons would have been thought worthy to be put into public frescoes and mosaics for speech with the people: now that paintings may only be seen behind barriers by paying gate-money, there is "no demand for that sort of thing." It is difficult to maintain an ideal in a deal!

We are also told that art requires an object seen through a temperament, and that it is the temperament that matters.

Quite true in a way, so it is, and cannot be helped; in any case we are all "temperaments." We may take it for granted or go on to question the temperaments and spirits what they be of. Should a painting temperament be balanced and central or, if not always that, should it be eccentric in noble or ignoble ways?

Arguments have raged on the question how far "subject" is of importance in painting, and an uncomfortable feeling has been raised that to care for "subject" or to have an objection to vulgarity is vulgar. That is, it is suggested that it is dull and bourgeois to care for touching and teaching subject matters, but that the reverse and the perverse don't count as such. There is here a dim reflection of a half-truth by accident. A gin bottle might, once in a way, be painted more nobly than a lily; and always it is not so much what the subject is *called* that matters as the way it is "seen." It is a question of goodwill, health, and sanity; indeed, more and more we shall have to fight to maintain sanity. I find a passage in a book by Michaelis, the late great scholar of Greek art, which I must quote as it shows how similar arguments on art for art's sake had been "made up" and pressed in Germany.

"The work of art has a language of its own, which it is our task to understand and to explain. There is not only a written but a pictorial tradition, each of which follows its own laws. But it does not appear right to me—though these may be unwelcome reflections—to appreciate in a work of art only the form, in a picture the colour, and to declare the content more or less indifferent. Least of all can this be the case in regard to ancient art. The painter Nikias observed that the subject formed a part of painting. Ancient art knows as little as ancient life of an absolute mastery of form. The Athenians only considered the person perfect who combined beauty with an inner efficiency, and ancient art is not different. It may be conceded that Lysippos said the last word in perfecting Greek art, yet Phidias ranks above him, as his content is richer and higher, and his form equals his content. The form is only the robe which the content creates for itself. Content and form are inseparably one. It is only their relation to one another which determines the value of a work of art."

Much well-intentioned talk about art is confusing because art is so many-sided, and while the speaker is thinking of *a* the listener hears in relation to *b*. Art is not only high imagination and invention, it is also skilled workmanship and patient record. It is "design," but it is also imitation. All art is labour as well as thought. All *doing* indeed includes some *saying*, but some forms of art, like building, *do* more and *say* less; while other forms, as painting, while doing less should say far more. Their doing is for the saying's sake. Painting, indeed, is another form of language—thought ad-

dressed to the eye instead of to the ear. In all forms of art the spirit triumphs over mere brute toil. Art is best conceived as beneficent labour which blesses both him who gives and him who receives. Beauty is its evidence—Beauty is virtue in being.

The purpose of this little paper is to ask for interest in, and general understanding of, the functions of art by all who are interested in thought, and life, and civilisation. I wish to suggest that the art of picture-painting must be studied from the human and communal points of view and not be left to breed in and in to the point of insanity.

One of the reasons for latter-day extreme doctrines and practice in painting is to be found in an attempt to find a ground not occupied by the photographic camera. Having got machines to draw, and paint, and sing, and act drama, we do not know what to do with ourselves. Art philosophies are very largely conditioned by economics; "Cubism" and End-of-the-worldism are almost mechanically simple reactions from mechanism. If good art is a form of pleasant human speech, great art is teaching and worship. All art is the wisdom of men's hands. We cannot for long love triangles, zig-zags, and jazzeries. Beauty is that which when seen we should love. I saw the other day that the elder Mr Yeats had said that beauty is that which suggests affection—I quote from memory, but it seemed a critical saying which may hardly be bettered.

Of the current exhibition at the Royal Academy of Arts I will only venture to say that the four record pictures of the Peace Conferences seem to me to be far and away the most real and worth while. They at least have a reason for being, and they are wonderfully skilful. Then in order of reality come the portraits, and these too fill a want that seems to be felt. But—if I may say just what I think in a world where that is hardly permitted—the portraits as a whole, however clever they may be, seem to lack humanity. Many of them are like impersonations of success, competence, pride, force, riches, commercialism—masks rather than faces. Only one of those I saw seemed to be just a human creature: here there was tenderness, reflection, shyness—the mystery of a man; my heart leaped within me to see a soul. And this reminds me that English people as such have hardly been painted since Holbein; they have been painted as titles, or as property, or fox-hunting, or clothes and fashion. Reynolds was an exquisite painter of perukes, powder, and perfume; in

his time, however, the position of a painter as another kind of valet was well understood. After the portraits come some decorative pieces, about half a dozen of which might be gay and delightful in a great financial dining-room or a restaurant. The next series in order of sincerity appeared to be the studies of "interiors"; we are all interested in pleasant rooms and fine old furniture and tea-things. It is not exactly great-minded; but it is charming, so let us be thankful. As for the landscapes, there are several small portraits of places which are excellent and evidently done for love and interest. Of more grand-manner landscape I do not remember any which had the moving quality except perhaps one of Venice by a survivor from the last generation who holds something of Turner and Samuel Palmer by apostolic succession rather than by wilful revivalism. There seems indeed to be a noticeable failure in "the will to" paint poetic landscape. It may be that men are unconsciously getting frightened by a feeling that untrampled country only remains in the narrow cracks between the railways and factories. To paint a landscape now requires so much "leaving out" that hearts may well fail. As Morris said of one of Fred Walker's "Idylls," "But 'tisn't like that." Up to now, indeed, our composed landscapes have been canvas screens put up between us and our desecration of England.

Of course there are dozens of nice little pictures of slight incidents and pretty corners, very well done. As a whole, indeed, the artists are competent and sometimes amazingly skilful. It has been said recently that painters have lost the traditions of their art, but I have not found it explained whether this refers to the types of pictures produced or to sound methods in workmanship. In the knowledge of pigments and how to mix and lay them so that pictures will last, there has probably been a most serious loss of workmanlike tradition. ("You might make an artist, but a workman—never!" said Stevenson.) On the other hand, it must, in fairness, be said that the traditions which well-equipped modern painters still have are only acquired by earnest work for a dozen years. The loss of purpose and the general anarchy are largely the result of exhibitionism itself: not even of "academicism" in general but of Royal Academicism. Still our painters and craftsmen of every kind would do true and impressive work if they could get out of the limelight of the press and find other ways of employment than that of amusing the financial world. The great fact of the whole business is that we are witnessing the maturing of the Capitalistic school of painting. If the Royal Academy, as a

powerful and wealthy corporation enjoying the hospitality of the nation in regard to its premises, had had guild rules, it might have been different, but possibly only in a small degree. The Royal Academy régime, as it is, has led to the sad identification of "art" with painting, especially the oil variety, and further, with the sort of oil painting which is likely to sell at an annual bazaar and bring in gate-money. It is an old, and in some ways a generous body, but there is too much confusion between a semi-public institution and a private-interest-making corporation—it is too ambiguously ambidextrous. While I am finishing this, I read: "*Purchase of Paintings*.—The President and Council of the Royal Academy have purchased the following works under the terms of the Chantrey Bequest: *Feeding the Fowls*, oil painting by ———, R.A.; *Epsom Downs*, oil painting by ———, A.R.A." As far as may be judged from the titles, these do not appear to be pictures of an epic character and of national importance. The selection, however, is manifestly impartial as between the two classes of members of the institution.

Painting is properly a craft and should be organised as a trade-guild having relations with house-painting, the parent art. Then the drainage of all "art" to London should be intercepted and diverted to many centres of civilisation. Above all, public bodies should spend less in educating artists and more in obtaining sound work of all kinds in their several towns. It seems a silly sacrifice, this education for what is not required, or required only as oil paintings in gilt frames to hang on the walls of the smoking- and billiard-rooms of the "moneyed classes." They who pay for paintings certainly call the pictorial tunes. "How can it be otherwise?" may be asked: but why should art students be brought up at the public expense for such a fate? Another way must be found at one end or the other. I said to a serious old student the other day that if the faculty for art was a "gift," then its mission must be to *give* and not to show off. "Yes," he replied; "but no one wants our giving."

Artists wish to give; they want to be allowed to work. A few "fine arts," so called, are the last refuges left in a world which has destroyed reasonable employments. Artists have the proud distinction of making things, and doing something with their hands. Many, indeed most, of the rebellions in art and the resorts to shock tactics are the result of disillusion. The exhibitional way is too severe a task; a few only can fight their way through with expert swordsmanship to journalistic

recognition and high prices. The heart of art must wither under such conditions. Art should be peaceable, modest, helpful, health-giving. "All great art is praise"; yes! and—forgive the word for the meaning—the greatest pictures are preached. Was any sermon, indeed, of the whole nineteenth century so prophetic as Madox Brown's *Work*, with the philosophers and politicians of 1860 riding by on the other side for an outing? As it is, what has been accomplished save the stuffing of sale-rooms? Hardly anything has been done for a serious purpose since the Death of Nelson was painted at the Houses of Parliament. A private person may hardly be sure of getting a competent portrait painted without going to one of half a dozen fashionables and paying an unknown sum. We must begin again at the other end and commission young painters to do their best for ten or twenty pounds. That is on a small scale, and as drawings tinted or otherwise, rather than as show pieces in oil paint. The fact is, exhibitionist portraits do not make house portraits, nor gallery pictures room pictures, nor popular successes food for human joy. In truth there is an artificial standard all along "the line." Too many pictures are merely professional products. Picture-making may be strictly analogous to the better-understood "book-making" exercise. The right way to get art is to pick a man and trust him to do something for you personally, if necessary mentioning a sum of money—"what can you do for me in painting up this room for fifty pounds?" That is the way our national arts might be improved. Visit local Art Schools and draw out the spirit of locality. Every town should have its pleasantnesses (if any) and its antiquities (if not torn down) recorded, and its public buildings adorned in some civilising way. The men are able and waiting, it is the tradition of employment which has broken down. We must bring back simplicity and confidence. The setting up of an aristocracy, an æsthetic house of lords, has not answered in the democracy of art. Was it this Blake had in mind when he said something to the effect that all are equal in the heaven of art? It is a great national question—the cause of art is the cause of civilisation; but this exhibitionism is one of many symptoms of "the sickness of acquisitive society."

W. R. LETHABY.

HARTLEY WINTNEY, HANTS.

A BUDDHIST VIEW OF SPIRITS AND SPIRITISTIC PHENOMENA.

W. A. DE SILVA.

THE thirst for knowledge of what appears to be shut out from one's eyes is ever present in man. Curiosity, love of novel sensation, desire for information which may be of use in promoting one's ambitions, the interpretation of the secret yearnings of the heart, the desire for the acquisition of power and knowledge that are not in the possession of others, have all contributed in various degrees to stimulate this quest after the unknown. In recent times a new factor, a desire to make use of this knowledge for better and higher service in strengthening the mutual bonds that link together the whole human race, has come into play. Love and sympathy have first to be evoked in oneself; but they cannot develop and become effective in the place where they originate. They must at once be freely bestowed and transferred beyond self. The average man bestows these gifts on those who are near and dear to him—wife, family, parents, relations, friends—in a widening circle. And as the circle of love and sympathy widens, so do his own happiness and peace grow fuller and deeper, and he longs to extend it beyond the bounds of earthly and visible existence.

The East long ago investigated and studied what are called spiritistic phenomena, and the results of their studies are found implicit in the vast mass of Oriental religious literature. They have obtained the acceptance of the bulk of all Eastern peoples. The Eastern point of view on matters of this kind should interest many investigators in Europe and America. It will suggest lines of thought which may explain much that is strange and puzzling at the present stage of knowledge in the West, and help investigators in their own quest after the unknown. The records of experience in regard

to life here and hereafter, and beings seen and unseen, have been handed down by tradition and have been incorporated in the religious literature of the East, not as matters requiring investigation and proof, but as accepted facts that had been investigated and realised long ago by our ancient teachers and their remote ancestors. We now no more think of enquiring and experimenting for ourselves as to the existence of other beings, or the conditions and characteristics of such beings, than a person here thinks of investigating for himself the conclusions of science in connection with every-day physical phenomena.

The Old World views in regard to spiritistic phenomena can be summarised in a few general statements. Life consists of beings in innumerable stages of existence without beginning and without end. We realise life in the average human unit in the expression, more or less, of six senses—those of Sight, Hearing, Smell, Taste, Touch, and Thought. These senses are expressed by the different organs of the sensory body, and Thought is a sense and has its organ like any other. Each of these may be developed in various stages of intensity. The expression of one or more senses may be entirely absent or very slight, and sometimes almost imperceptible, while the expression of others may be more pronounced than the average in its intensity. The differences and variations in different individuals are innumerable and hardly measurable. It follows, in accepting this view, that it is possible that there can be beings other than human in whom are found variations and differences in these same senses and sense-organs. There are beings whose physical state is denser or rarer, as the case may be, than the physical state of man or animal. Those with rarefied bodies are invisible to an average impression of sight. These beings with rarefied physical bodies are classified for the purpose of description in accordance with their stages of sense-development. For want of a better term the unseen are classed as “spirits.” The word itself is not taken to define any unchangeable or permanent individual class; it is a relative term employed merely to express beings who are not usually perceived by the senses of average man.

Some of these unseen beings are classified as gross elementals, *i.e.* spirits whose opportunities and senses are cramped, whose mental development and development of character are erratic, and therefore whose ideas of right and wrong are hardly measured by considerations of harmony. Their attributes of craving, passion, and self-delusion are at their full height, and their activities and life are governed by these conditions. There

are others who are more advanced in the development of their character, but still addicted to erratic action due to a predominance of one or more of the attributes of being, till we come to others of higher and higher scales of harmonious development.

Suffering, sorrow, and pain are the results of craving, passion, and delusion. In a being whose cravings, passions, and delusions are intensified the suffering is great in proportion. When these are diminished or under greater control, the suffering and pain are lessened and happiness is increased. The spirits ascend in the scale of happiness in proportion to the diminution and inhibition of the attributes of being. The higher the scale there is less sorrow and more happiness, till in certain higher spheres of development the experiences of the sense of pleasure, love, and sympathy are at their greatest intensity.

Birth, death, and being¹ cease only when craving, passion, and delusion are entirely eliminated in the long upward march of beings. All beings that we speak of are subject to birth, death, and re-being, which occur in consonance with nature. Nature is conceived as existing in the three conditions—namely, the continuous element of change marked by its two great crises of birth and death.

Everything is in a state of continuous change. In consequence of these changes there is absence of harmony, and the resulting disharmony may be scarcely perceptible or may be extremely violent. All things are correlated to each other, a change in one acting on every other.

The phenomenon of birth in a physical sense is varied according to the state of the senses and organs of senses of each particular class. We know of the conditions of birth in a physical sense in animals and human beings. We know of the division and multiplication of organic living cells. Births in the sphere of the unseen differ in accordance with the state of sense and sense-organs existing in that sphere. They necessarily do not bear any physiological resemblance to what we notice in the animal world.

Death is the dissolution of the senses and sense-organs through various means, through effluxion of time, through age, and through cessation of functions. The span of natural life in one stage differs from the span of natural life in another stage; we know only of the average span physiologically in average man and animal. We are aware that

¹ To the Eastern "being" implies craving, passion, and the activities which follow on them, and is therefore, and in this sense, an evil.

certain conditions make a considerable alteration in the time of this dissolution. The less dense the physical form, the greater is the average time that it takes before dissolution sets in. In the unseen world the span may be comparatively great according to the state of the development of the senses and sense-organs. The sense-organs have no permanent character. They are only media where activity takes shape.

Activity is "being" and produces force, and this force, which has a distinctive character directly resulting from the diversity of activities, we call Karma. When sense-organs dissolve, force that has been shaped through them does not disappear. It remains distinct so long as it is not merged in harmony. There is no harmony so long as the activities of being are tinged with the variations due to craving, passion, and delusion. In describing the phenomena of electricity the terms "positive" and "negative" are used to denote variations whose real nature is hardly understood, except that they describe conditions which are dissimilar. We can in like manner describe the force of being, or Karma, as having an indefinite number of variations and not merely positive and negative. The electric force sent out by a wireless operator is caught by another operator through the medium of an apparatus sensitive to the particular wave of force. Similarly the Karma, when freed from a particular group of sense aggregations, gets itself expressed in a nascent field suitable for its manifestation, and this is the sense in which we understand survival and reincarnation, or re-being. This suitability may be slight or intensive. One Karma cannot combine with any other distinct from it, for each has its own individuality, as activities differ in different individuals. For that very reason a Karma cannot take its field in any other sense-group which is already under manifestation.

It is not quite easy to demonstrate re-being by any actual physical analogy. We have already mentioned the three attributes that constitute being, viz. craving, passion, and delusion. Happiness consists in the weakening and uprooting of these; the less one possesses or is possessed by them the greater is the state of happiness. In life and its activities there is a continual striving for happiness. Various methods are followed, some consciously and of set purpose, and others unconsciously and without feeling that one is trying for anything special. The codes of ethics, the sanctions of society, and the teachings of religion, all aim at gaining this object. Some of the means adopted are more effective than others: some lead straight to the goal; others take devious paths; but

activity is continuous, and this activity shapes itself and carries with it its sum of results which continue on and on till its object is gained of uprooting its motive power, craving, passion, and delusion.

There is one aspect in this continuous activity for gaining happiness and diminishing craving, passion, and delusion which one has to bear in mind—that of the interdependence of all beings. It is the progress of the whole. To accomplish this process, each unit has to improve itself. The greater is the perfection of each unit, the greater is the progress of the whole. The unit at every turn finds it difficult to progress if it thinks of itself without realising its relation to others.

A continuity of acquired character is manifested in re-being. The sphere in which the re-being takes place is largely determined by the attitude of the conscious mind at the time of dissolution. At this time the mental process becomes active. With the release of energy required in the maintenance of the senses which more or less cling to the body, the thought-sense is freed and made active and potent. Before the mind's eye appear all the immediate past activities—the cravings, the passions, and self-delusions, the combat against these, the training undergone to resist and subdue these, the joys that accrued from such resistance, and the sorrows and pangs due to their manifestation. These crystallise, as it were, and take shape. When a being dissolves with thought-results shaped by craving, passion, and self-delusion, he passes into spheres of darkness and suffering, where such conditions find easy root. Where these defects are more or less under control he passes on to spheres of light, peace, and rest in consonance with the predominant thought-ideas. If a person's dissolution sets in with his faculties unimpaired and in happy surroundings, unworried by cares, cravings, and passions, his future being is cast in a happy sphere. In Eastern countries friends and relatives remaining near a person at his dissolution endeavour to do their best to relate to the dying person the good acts he accomplished in his life—they endeavour to remind him that nothing is permanent, that he is himself but a part of the ocean of beings, that he should have no cravings nor passions. He is thus helped to a harmonious shaping of his last thoughts.

The old writings and traditions of the East go into minute details of the various divisions of unseen beings. The spirits of the unseen world range from suffering spirits to shining spirits.

To the lowest form belong those in the dark spheres, where

there is much suffering and sorrow, and they are beings whose cravings, passions, and self-delusions have been great.

Next in order come spirits who are near to the earth ; who have obtained their re-being with a prominent expression of craving or passion, but whose suffering is less and whose freedom is greater than that of the former class.

These are also malevolent spirits whose powers and freedom are great, but who suffer from passion.

In the fourth class there are the shining spirits—those who enjoy pleasure and happiness in varying degrees.

To the fifth class belong the tranquil spirits, whose happiness is great and whose faculties for the enjoyment of the senses of the mind are high.

To the sixth class belong the fine and subtle spirits who have no individual form, but are thought-groups in the enjoyment of transcendent tranquillity, and happiness.

In the spirit-spheres there are activities and there are all the changes of moods and conditions due to the activities of the senses, expressed differently from the human environment, to suit the conditions prevailing among them according to the development of their various sense-organs. There is individuality ; there is variation of development and attainment. There are those who lead and those who follow. There are society, association, and attachments.

There are conditions under which man can have access to the spirit-world. The manner in which a human being can communicate with the spirit-world is one that has received much attention in Eastern writings. The physical senses of a normal man differ from the physical senses of a spirit in different degrees. In certain individuals some of the senses are abnormal. By practice and training it is possible to make the senses either finer and more sensitive or denser and more resistive to impressions. In some human subjects we find in their sense-perceptions great variations from the normal. Where a man is able to approximate some of his sense-resources to those of the spirit-world he becomes a medium through which communications can be established. Thus we have three conditions under which a person can get in touch with the unseen world :—

1. Where there is manifested a natural abnormal development of some of the senses.

2. Where by practice and by concentration through the repetition of words or phrases, and by adopting other devices and controlled activities, certain senses are approximated to those of some of the beings in the spirit-world.

3. Where mental training is practised for the advancement of any faculties such as those related to certain religious practices.

The first of these includes mediums. In the majority of cases a medium will be found to be abnormal in one or more of his senses, and is often unbalanced. Some of the senses thus weakened and others that have been strengthened enable him to get into touch with spirits, some of whose senses or faculties approximate those of the medium. The use of the planchette, the crystal, or even the automatic hand, concentrates the abnormal faculty enabling the spirit to make the communication.

In the second class can be placed magicians, or those who are said to practise witchcraft by various formulæ and rites. They induce conditions in their own senses, or the senses of others subjected to them, approximating them to those of some of the spirits. In the first division a medium, through his natural abnormality of the senses, is enabled to communicate with spirits of weak powers. In the second case when a magician or necromancer practises his art for gain or for acquiring power for his own sordid purposes, he usually comes in contact with gross spirits, who possess also characteristics mostly of an unsympathetic nature, and who, if the opportunity occurs, may perpetrate acts that are far from agreeable.

The third case is that where the senses are well trained and where mercy, compassion, love, and altruism predominate, and where the subject attains a state of ecstasy. This state is obtained by great religious teachers and adepts, who work for the uplifting of humanity and who are able to help both man and the unseen spirits to a higher state of harmony and beneficent activity.

The spirits themselves, when their ties are close to earth and when their cravings prompt them, try to get in touch with the human world through similar means. The advanced spirits, whose passions and cravings are far removed from the earthly sphere and whose enjoyment and happiness are great, do not, as a rule, desire any communication with the earth mediums—only under two conditions would some of them express themselves to man. One is where they are eager to do some service to humanity and where they find some human being who is likely to be able to carry this out. The second is where through compassion and love, by some timely warning or otherwise, they attempt to avert or modify some avoidable evil or calamity. The powers of spirits have similar limitations

to those of the human race. They do not possess miraculous powers. Their powers are governed according to the development of their senses. They cannot foretell any event except through deductive reasoning, but where their senses are greatly developed they may be able to make the deductions with better knowledge and insight than man, and they can sometimes describe things with greater detail where their sense-perceptions are acute. In other matters they may not be able to go so far as the average human being, when through any circumstances their sense-development and sense-conditions prevent them from perceiving what the average human sense perceives.

There are certain grades of spirits who desire when they are in a weak state the help of human beings and the help and sympathy of those whom they regarded as near and dear to them, and this help can be communicated just as among the living. Every kind thought and wish extended towards these spirits helps them in their development. Those who die a sudden death without having time for reflection and composing their minds, those who at their dissolution have some longing or passion, are weak spirits that specially benefit from the kind thoughts of the living. Buddhists have a definite method in their religious practices of daily sending out their thoughts of love, compassion, and kindness to all beings. They specially think of those who had been near and dear to them; the spirits of such, if born in any of the weak spheres, expect this help from their friends. The relatives and friends do special deeds of charity and acts of love, so that they may extend their kind thoughts—which have been thus exalted and ennobled—to their departed friends. When these thoughts reach the departed they feel exalted and become stronger and happier. This may be described as the Buddhist or naturalistic version of the Catholic or ecclesiastical doctrine of Purgatory and masses for the dead.

W. A. DE SILVA.

COLOMBO, CEYLON.

THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND IN CANADA AND REUNION.

THE RIGHT REV. EDWARD J. BIDWELL,

Bishop of the Diocese of Ontario.

It is only right for me to begin this article by disclaiming any special commission or authority to speak on behalf of the Church in Canada, though I have good reason to believe that, speaking generally, what I have to say would be endorsed by the majority of the Canadian Episcopate. Two at least of the younger Bishops, both Canadian born—the one a graduate of Oxford, and trained at Cuddesden; the other trained at the Leeds Clergy School, and a former curate under the present Archbishop of York at Portsea,—certainly share my views, as we discussed the question at length during our passage to England. For myself, though an Englishman, I can claim the experience gained by seventeen years' work in the Church in Canada—six years as Headmaster of one of the oldest of her Church boarding schools, four as Dean and Rector of a fairly large cathedral parish, and seven as Bishop,—during which time I have been brought into contact with all sorts and conditions of men throughout the country. These are my credentials for what they are worth.

That I may be scrupulously careful not to claim more weight for my utterances than rightly belongs to them, let me add that my diocese, which is named after the Lake, is only one of six in the vast province of Ontario, and though big in area compared to an English diocese (it comprises six large counties), is the smallest but one in the Province.

My reason for soliciting the indulgence of the editor of this journal is the following. When we Canadian Bishops come over to such a gathering as the Lambeth Conference, our natural attitude is one of the deepest respect and reverence for the great ecclesiastical leaders whom we are privileged

to meet. The names of many of them are household words to us; to their learning and spiritual power we owe an incalculable debt. We are fully conscious that the conditions and circumstances of our young country cannot as yet produce such men. We rightly come therefore to listen and to learn, rather than to inflict our views upon men so much wiser than ourselves.

But when so great and far-reaching a question as that of Christian Reunion comes up for discussion this attitude of deferential silence cannot be entirely maintained. For in order to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, all the facts of the case must be tabled. And while we fully recognise the infinitely superior academic attainments of our English brethren on this subject, and their necessarily intimate knowledge of its bearing upon conditions in the great Mother Church in England, yet we, and we only, can give accurate and first-hand information of conditions and work in the Church in Canada, relatively small perhaps, and comparatively unimportant at present, but probably destined, as that vast country develops its extraordinary resources, to become the greatest branch of the Church overseas. And whatever shortcomings may be justly laid to the account of the Canadian Episcopate, at least they are now without exception men who have had full opportunity of acquiring a thorough knowledge of local conditions before being elected to the Bench, as the practice in vogue in most cases in the other Dominions of bringing men straight out from the Old Country as Bishops has been dropped in Canada for upwards of twenty years. It is true that several of our Bishops were born and educated and have worked some time in England. When I was enthroned, the Bishop officiating for the Metropolitan was an Oxford man, as was the Bishop who preached, and as I am. But all three had worked for years in the Church in Canada before becoming Bishops. We can I think, therefore, claim to have a unique knowledge of problems and conditions in the Church in Canada which have a direct bearing upon this most important question of Christian Reunion.

Let me try to state some of these problems and describe these conditions, which are widely different from those confronting the Church in England. In the first place, we have none of the prestige of a National Church except in so far as the glory of our venerable Mother in England faintly reflects upon us. We are simply one Communion, and that not the largest, amongst others. Our endowments are trifling in amount. There is practically nothing of the social cleavage

between Churchmen and Nonconformists which exists, or did for so long exist, in England. Anglicans, Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, and others meet each other constantly in social intercourse, and our children marry their children. Consequently our Church has to justify its existence by its message and its efficiency.

Further, we are only upon the fringe even now of our responsibilities and possibilities. New regions in this vast country are constantly being opened up and developed, certainly involving, now the war is over, a great inrush of emigrants. To keep pace with these demands is a tremendous task, well-nigh impossible under present conditions. For it must be remembered that the older Eastern dioceses all have their mission districts, which, owing to sparseness of population, can never be self-supporting, and for the maintenance of which large sums have to be raised every year.

In the next place, spiritual influences in Canada have to fight the battle against materialism with almost none of the adventitious allies to be found in the Motherland. There is little as yet of that semi-spiritual, semi-intellectual atmosphere, the inheritance of the ages, which predisposes men to respect religion even if they do not accept its message whole-heartedly. There are no cathedrals and churches many centuries old to remind men of the dominating force of religion in the past. There is little of that indescribable background common in the older lands which makes so valuable setting for a spiritual appeal. In a country of vast distances (the diocese of one of my colleagues referred to above is 80,000 square miles), of amazing resources, the extent of which has hardly as yet begun to be realised, of potential wealth almost beyond imagination, it is a small wonder that men's eyes are on the future, regardless of the past. And the ever-present danger is that sheer stark materialism may triumph over all spiritual ideals.

None but those who have lived and tried to carry on spiritual work under these conditions can possibly realise what they mean, and how infinitely more difficult they render that work. Certainly to one brought up and trained in the Church at home, who is open in any degree to new impressions, as he must be to do successful work in a new country, these conditions are almost certain to effect a profound modification of outlook. His conception of values changes. He faces realities, sometimes ugly, but always vitally interesting, and has to reckon with them.

Speaking frankly, I am of opinion that the only chance

that the spiritual forces in Canada have of triumphing over the foe of sheer materialism which threatens to destroy them is by uniting those forces in one common task. Look at the facts. For years our Church has found the task it has been called on to perform quite beyond its powers, in spite of generous aid from the Mother Church, and of the heroic efforts it has made to cope with the situation. The other Communion is in no better case. (I do not take the Roman Catholic Church into consideration, as unfortunately for the present at any rate they hold absolutely aloof.) Side by side with this inability to meet obligations there exists serious overlapping. In my own diocese, in several parishes with a population which could easily be cared for spiritually by one man, there are often three—Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian,—each with their handful of adherents. An English rector or vicar is, theoretically at any rate, rector or vicar of the whole parish. In our case it is not so. The priest must strictly confine his spiritual work to his own flock. The result is that we have often to combine two or three or even four churches many miles apart into one so-called parish, involving for the priest excessively long drives on Sundays and weekdays, with the resultant fatigue and loss of time, not to speak of the scanty Church privileges for the people such a system involves. Meantime the Methodist and the Presbyterian are probably covering the same ground. Whereas the three men, each stationed at one point, could produce ten times the effect, *ceteris paribus*, on the spiritual life of the community.

Now while this is happening in the more settled portions of Canada, the West is simply crying for men. We want men; so do the Presbyterians and the Methodists and other denominations. But there is not and cannot be, as things are now, any settled plan of action. As an illustration of what can be done by a single corporation acting on a definite policy, take the great "C.P.R.," as we Canadians like to call it. Wherever settlers were likely to come it threw out its tentacles to provide transportation facilities, it staked out farms, and went so far as partially to equip them for the intending settler. Districts were mapped out and arranged for, and even buildings erected in advance. But the Churches could not make preparations beforehand. They had to wait to see to what denomination the newcomers might belong, and then decide whether there were enough of their own to justify the necessary outlay on equipment. Too often the result has been competition, rivalry, and consequent failure

on the part of all adequately to meet the situation. The Canadian Government also has done much in providing facilities for settlers, and in meeting their material needs. I believe it would not be averse from assisting to provide for their spiritual needs if only it could be approached with a united voice. But it certainly cannot and will not give help to any particular denomination. There is no doubt also that our "unhappy divisions" are a greater hindrance to the influence and progress of Christianity in a country like Canada than they are in England. For the social cleavage being non-existent, people see that we work together, live together, and unite in every possible way except for worship, so that religion appears to them as a far more outstanding divisive factor than it would to the majority of Church people in England, who have probably moved strictly in their own Church circles all their lives. For this reason alone many have, as they say, "no use for religion." Even the well-instructed, who understand thoroughly and appreciate the position of the Church, find it hard to acquiesce in this state of affairs.

All thinking people agree that the present disunited condition of Christendom is wrong, and contrary to the mind of Christ. My point is to urge that, while no doubt any steps that are to be taken towards reunion must ultimately depend on fundamental principles, our leaders should take into most careful consideration the tremendous problem with which we in Canada are confronted. We are engaged in endeavouring, in the face of great difficulties, to build up a nation on the only sure and lasting basis—that of righteousness. And the feeling is shared by most religious leaders of all the Communion in Canada that, while by a strong united effort we might grapple with the task with some hope of success, it appears to be almost beyond our powers in our present divided condition. So strongly is this felt that a united body is even now in process of formation, consisting of the Methodist, Presbyterian, and Congregationalist Churches. It is no doubt much easier for them to unite than for us to join in any such movement. But even in their case nothing short of the overwhelming needs of the situation would have been strong enough to overcome the weighty opposition the proposal aroused when first mooted. The great National Church of England, with all its prestige and resources, could no doubt accomplish much in England, even if it felt obliged to continue in splendid isolation from all the other religious forces in the country. In Canada there is no national Church, only separate religious Com-

munions. And while we know well that we are still in the day of comparatively small things, yet we feel an exceeding responsibility when we remember that the spiritual future of what appears likely to become a very great nation largely depends upon the foundations we can lay now.

It is not my purpose here to set forth any definite proposals in the direction of reunion. I leave that to men possessing a measure of wisdom, insight, and learning to which I cannot lay claim. But I venture to assert that any proposals or suggestions coming from us would be received with most courteous consideration by the other Communion in Canada. By a resolution of the House of Bishops passed at the General Synod recently, individual Bishops were requested to hold "informal conversations" with representatives of the other Churches on the subject of reunion. No general report of these conversations has been issued; but, speaking for myself, I found an unanimous agreement that union was not only most desirable but really necessary if Christianity was to be the factor in our national life that it ought to be. University professors and pastors of churches were in complete accord on this point. When such a spirit exists, can it be impossible to find a solution?

In proof of the good feeling and courtesy towards our Church which exists in the other Communion in Canada, let me give two personal illustrations. When the Armistice was declared, we had of course arranged for a special service in the Cathedral, as had the various denominations in their own churches. But at a special meeting of the Ministerial Association of the city, it was unanimously resolved to approach me with a view to holding a combined service in the Cathedral, on the ground that it was the great historic church of the city (Kingston), and therefore the most fitting place in which to hold such a service. They most courteously offered to leave all the details of the service to me, and requested me to deliver the address. I explained that while I could not legally invite them to take part in an Anglican service, I saw no reason why a combined service should not be held in the Cathedral, provided that it was drawn up and arranged by a committee of representatives from all Communion including our own, and that there should be another address as well as my own from one of their own body. My directions were scrupulously carried out; ministers from all the principal churches took part in the service, which I do not suppose will ever be forgotten in Kingston, and nothing was done to offend the most rigid of our Church people.

Again, only a few days before I sailed for England, I attended, as representing the Church of England, a very important conference in Toronto between the Churches in Canada and the Y.M.C.A., with regard to the religious work carried on by the latter. After considerable discussion a resolution was brought in by a very distinguished Presbyterian divine, which would undoubtedly have been accepted by the representatives of all the other Churches. I knew, however, that the Anglican Church could not accept it, and so, before it was put, rose and stated that I should be obliged to vote against it on that ground. The resolution was at once gracefully withdrawn, and I was asked to frame one which would be acceptable to the Anglican Church. This I did, and it was carried unanimously.

Perhaps even a more striking illustration of the spirit in which we are met is the fact that when the various religious Communion in Canada formed a Joint War Commission, Dr Roper, Bishop of Ottawa, was unanimously elected their chairman.

I am, of course, well aware that these matters lie in the confines of the "No Man's Land" of ecclesiastical controversy, and leave the barbed-wire barriers of denominational differences untouched. But at least it is something for both parties to have come out from behind those barriers and met in such friendly spirit. Does it not afford room for hope that the barriers themselves may be removed?

The present writer belongs to a school of thought which is even passionately attached to the Anglican Church, accepting implicitly her Divine Commission, her Apostolic Ministry, Creeds, and Sacraments. We could not tolerate any surrender of her priceless heritage which would endanger her Catholic position. But we do plead very earnestly that the door which is ever so slightly open should not be closed and barred without at least the most earnest consideration of the problems our Canadian Church has to face, and the tremendous results pending. We feel that it must be possible for the united wisdom of our revered leaders, under the guidance of God's Holy Spirit, to arrive at some practical solution of this most momentous question.

One final word. On the voyage over, at the usual saloon service in the morning, one Bishop took the service, a well-known Professor of Theology at Edinburgh University read the lessons, and another Bishop preached. At the steerage service in the afternoon a Bishop conducted the service, and the Professor preached. The sea remained (comparatively)

calm. During the passage the present writer had much converse on the question of reunion not only, as above stated, with his brother Bishops, but also with the Edinburgh Professor, and a layman—one of the most public-spirited men in Canada, a graduate of Balliol and by religious profession a Methodist, married to an Anglican wife, daughter of a public man whose name is well known on both sides of the Atlantic. We all agreed that there ought to be no insuperable obstacle in bringing our respective Communion together. I know that we shall never cease to pray that the attempt to secure a result so eminently desirable will not be abandoned in premature despair. *Sit Spiritus Sanctus dux et lux.*

EDWARD ONTARIO.

THE POVERTY OF THE CLERGY AND THE WIVES OF THE CLERGY.

MRS H. L. PAGET.

THE Bishop of Exeter is reported to have said that he does not attach great importance to finance; that it is relatively the unimportant part of the Church's work, and he goes on to say that "The Church wants devoted clergy, but you cannot go into the market and buy a devoted man for so much money. No, to attract devoted clergy it is not a question of finance; it is much more a question of spiritual appeal." This is propounding an ideal truth, but there are certain complications that affect the whole situation to which the Bishop does not apparently allude. The theoretical man called to minister as a priest in the Church who need not hesitate in regard to poverty and self-sacrifice presumes a celibate clergy. Rome realised this long ago and made her regulations accordingly; she was certainly worldly wise and may have proved herself spiritually wise as well. It is possible that the need of the world demands celibacy at the present time; we dream of a mobile force of ideally obedient clergy who are ready to go at a moment's notice to the ends of the earth. Indeed, committees have been formed to bring this obedience and call home to the hearts of others. If this be so, it ought to be receiving a large share of attention at the Lambeth Conference, and we can hardly believe that Englishmen would be found wanting in response.

If, on the other hand, our fellow-countrymen still desire "a married man," then of necessity those that are married, or that intend to take the holy estate of matrimony upon themselves, do well to pause before committing others to a life of very complicated poverty. Poverty in a monastic cell is a very simple affair, or even poverty in a cottage or a workman's flat; but only the wives of the clergy know what it means

in a house that is far too large, a house that has never been modernised, entailing the maximum of expense and labour and the minimum of comfort.

Before leaving London I had begun an informal enquiry into the Church housing problem in the diocese from the woman's point of view; it is an enquiry that should be made throughout the Church. We who are commonly called clergy wives have shown ourselves ready for any sort of work and a good deal of self-sacrifice, but we have an uneasy sense that much that we do is wasted because of the antiquated administration of Church property and Church funds. Our circumstances have been muddled for us, and we bear the brunt. It might be difficult to place responsibility, but we have our quarrel with Church dignitaries and ecclesiastical commissioners and absurd architects who invented the prim, uncomfortable little houses with hairpin windows and ecclesiastical eyebrows. Certainly no real effort has been made to enquire into the impossibilities of the majority of parsonages, and the most that is offered has been in the form of doles which stand condemned by every serious charitable organisation.

Some personal experience is worth a good deal of theory. When I was very young, a neighbour came in to call at our vicarage—a very rich woman. "You and I know," she said with a charming smile, "that it is impossible to live in these houses under a thousand a year." My knowledge was more accurate than hers; all that the vicar then received was about £200. The house had five flights of stairs from basement to attic, it had no bathroom and no hot water above the ground floor, and there was a fine display of stucco outside to keep in paint and repair. Of course, money for improvements can be borrowed: Queen Anne is quite ready to consider bathrooms, but people think twice before they make a fresh charge on such a small income. An unmarried vicar has been able to make improvements since our time. A further experience of important work, which necessitated a curate kept at our own charge, made one regret the annual payment for the rebuilding of the house out of the net income of under £300. I have also had lately as a housewife to refuse to live on half the nominal income in an official house that comprised (as the guide-books have it) about forty-five room and offices. And still there are annual payments for past improvements, fires to be kept going lest the property should deteriorate, and the inevitable menace of dilapidations. Such a responsibility should not be personal; it is not fair, it is not common sense.

I know of another Bishop's wife living in a large house on a diminished income who finds the burden almost too heavy to bear. Any man of the world would mock at those who accept office under such circumstances; but even if, by a paradox, we are often accounted worldly for doing so, it may be real obedience to the spiritual appeal. If that be so, then the Church as a whole should set its houses in order, and overweights of material things should not be hung round the necks of those who sincerely wish to respond to the higher call. We could all struggle along in good humour if we could be sure that anyone was at work on these subjects. Meanwhile it is left to the individual to battle as best he can, and there seems to be no serious effort to deal with the whole question. Many doors have been opened of late years to women—one that is at present closed and which might yet be unlocked is that of the Ecclesiastical Commission.

But after all, my own experiences, even if my problems as a housewife are not yet solved, are easy as compared with many others. The servant difficulty, acute everywhere, is over so far as most clergy households are concerned. Few of us can compete with the wages now offered, and, though it is easy to insinuate that pious people desire to lower wages, we really have learnt something about the conditions of labour and realise that for the most part we must do without help.

Here is a country vicarage in the south. The clergyman's wife gets up between 5 and 6 a.m. to get on with the housework and out into the parish and more especially to her guide's work. Another, this time in the north, where the housewife, who never complains, speaks with wonder that by the grace of God she has been able to take on the whole of the domestic work so late in life without loss of strength. A very big and old-fashioned vicarage in an industrial centre is run by the women-folk of the family and one maid, for in this case the house-mother is not single-handed. But every bit of outside work depends in some way or another upon them as well. They are indeed overworked, and when it was suggested that they must have more help the answer came swiftly that a curate was wanted first. This offers without doubt a fine spiritual ideal in a somewhat materialistic part of the world. My mind turns back to London. The house I am thinking of stands in the noisiest thoroughfare where dock traffic and trams clatter and clang all day and all night. It is tall and spare, like an ill-fed, elderly woman, and has not even the reserve of an area, though it has the inevitable basement. To add insult to a woman's injury,

it has that pious, semi-ecclesiastical expression which always means discomfort. I think of patient, willing feet toiling up and down the stairs during a time of illness. It was impossible for the single-handed wife to use the basement, so a cooking-stove was fixed upstairs; but even though she was thus saved one flight of stone stairs, the inevitable ghost of dilapidations haunts her when she tries to forget the basement she does not use.

Take a case of prolonged illness necessitating a cottage in the country. Expenses increase until it is impossible for the family to extricate themselves. Death comes, and dilapidations—to be borne by the incoming priest, thus tightening the vicious circle. And the big houses, like changelings, must always be fed before the pitiful human beings can get their share. Think, too, of the widow, unpensioned as a rule and with no savings; for when could she have saved out of the small income? I know one who worked in and out of the house, in and out of the parish, and who now bears real poverty alone. Then there is not only poverty but loneliness, and these react upon each other. Women are essentially social; we must have companionship. A country village can be very lonely, for it is obvious that everyone needs some outside interest and escape from work. The wife of the clergyman is bound to know more of the sad side of life than any other woman. She is not allowed to remain in ignorance of any failure, whether it be of the flock, of her husband, or of herself. Such a claim is made upon her sympathy that the depression which few people guess at is often a form of emotional exhaustion. Of course we know that we grow dull and narrow, novelists and dramatists may make their thin fun of us; but we do shoulder, as far as possible, the burden of others, having neither preparation nor blessing for any vocation but that of marriage. Anyhow there is little money for holidays, or books, or recreation. Invitations do come along, but we have not the clothes or the small talk. I know a woman who said, "My husband bicycles over because he doesn't want special clothes, but I can't go." We get prickly about kindness, which is stupid of us, and we are quick to detect the diminutive: "The vicar is *such* a good little man, and his wife a most hard-working little woman." But we smile when we think that with all the kindness, and even with a certain amount of occasional patronage, we retain something over and above independence, seeing that our work is voluntary, though it is seldom recognised as such. I know two cases where the wives of clergymen have been told that they must be well-to-do because of their rich relations. The line of argument is not

easy to follow, but it is evident that the conclusion was to relieve the speaker of any responsibility for church maintenance in her own district.

Yet, after all, people still seem to want married clergy. I suppose we keep things homely and save our men-folk from getting out of touch with an actual, troublesome world. There are those who, desirous that the diaconate should not be a celibate order, urge that it would be a great advantage to have the wife of the missionary or the parish priest ordained as a deaconess. That would be to professionalise what the clergy wife, with all her faults, is keeping less professional. Let us offer all the ecclesiastically built houses for such very professional couples, and ask that we may, for the most part, be left as part of the common life with just sufficient means to live without debt and anxiety. I do not think I would like to be born in the other sort of household if I were a baby. But that brings me to the vicarage children, and when we think of them, our eyes brim over with love and pride. Only they are one more problem in regard to the spiritual appeal. All the same, the nation might well thank us for the great men and women born of us. Legend tells that someone looked through the *Dictionary of National Biography*, marking the sons and daughters of the clergy. I do not know with what result, but I am not afraid of any such undertaking; had I but time, I would do it myself. Our children are splendid; we cannot give them all that we would wish, nor even all that we had ourselves as children, but they share our economies and bear patiently the church talk we cannot altogether avoid. Yet zealous neighbours are shocked if the vicarage children are not foremost in every good work that is going. "So curious," said a lady, "I asked the vicar's daughter to help when we had the garden meeting for the waifs and strays, and she did not come. I thought it would have been so nice for her." I never met that daughter, but I hope she was as I fancied her—a rebel, bent on establishing her own personality; she should have done good work by this time if it were so. The priesthood in the Church of England is not Levitical.

Give us then a chance to be homely. We want to be hospitable without having to reckon the cost in money or labour; it is humiliating to know the right way to do the right thing on the right occasion, and then to be obliged to let the chance go by. We want the little house and modern conveniences, and we shall never want a crowd of servants. I know a servantless vicarage where any threat to "start servants again," ensures a particularly fine polish on the boots which the

children clean. Give us the chance to be just sufficiently free in time and money that we may get outside our work now and again and be neither conspicuously dull nor dowdy.

But this complicates the simple "spiritual appeal" of the Bishop who does not attach much importance to finance. We cannot have it both ways, and the whole Church should tell us which way is best. Given that we clergy wives remain, then let a commission get to work on our houses. Some parishes which are not suitable for married people should be set apart for unmarried men, where they might work from a clergy house; others could be counted as family livings with a new interpretation of the words. Some parsonages and many palaces could be sold or altered. The need for diocesan retreat houses might solve the problem of palaces. In regard to alterations, kitchens could be brought upstairs and basements turned into clubrooms; others could have the top storey cut off and turned into a separate flat for one of the staff, either man or woman. Hot water should be available on every floor, and bathrooms and hand basins installed; if we are to do all our own work under difficult conditions, we must have labour-saving devices. As the clergy are without capital, and as the livings are too small to bear the repayment of loans, we stand in need of help. The whole bad system of dilapidations should be reformed, and many of the official residences, notably bishops' palaces, ought to be partially furnished. It is a reckless waste of a man's income to have to carpet and furnish enormous rooms; the master of a college is not required to do this.

If we, as housewives, have to attach a disproportionate importance to finance, it is because our strength is being wasted by the encumbrances of past ages. For the most part our heavy work brings its great reward of joy, but the pressure of circumstances is beginning to tell; and I, for one, would advise the man to hesitate who, desiring ordination, desires also to be married. People still talk platitudes of "the richest Church in the world." If it be true, which I doubt, it is a further indictment of the management of funds and of those who, demanding a married clergy, make it impossible for their wives and children, and so increasingly difficult for men to respond to the spiritual appeal.

ELMA K. PAGET.

THE RESIDENCE, CHESTER.

THE MYSTERY OF CHRIST.

THE REV. STEWART MEANS, D.D.,

New Haven, Connecticut.

SINCE the days of Copernicus the universe has widened and deepened beyond the power of the mind or the imagination to grasp. The mass of knowledge which has grown through all these years now surpasses the ability of any intellect to compass or co-ordinate. Man himself seems but an atom swept along by a complex of forces and laws infinite in number and in power. Face to face with this new and immense world, man seems to shrivel before the sway of these forces and the operation of these laws. Overwhelmed by the sense of their power, man is humbled into helplessness and looks with awe and with dread upon a history in which his part seems to be reduced simply to that of a spectator. Yet, in spite of all these intellectual affirmations and convictions, there is an instinctive resistance to this subjection, and man claims for himself what he too often is unable to justify—an individual position in the midst of this world. He feels, though he may fail to prove it, that he is a person. What that assertion involves is seldom fully realised, for personality is one of the most difficult problems which man has to solve. Too often the whole subject of personality is avoided, and one of the questions which has absorbed some of the most intense thinking of the centuries is deliberately shelved.

In a way, and in a very striking way, the story of the world is the story of individuals. Social conditions may shape, and racial inheritance may qualify, the expression of life; but Plato and Alexander have influenced the world far more than they did the history of Greece. And Homer's song has set men singing who never heard his speech. In its most significant form the history of the world or of civilisation lies in the history of some dominating and overpowering personalities.

Taking history as it is, and facing the facts as they stand out before us, we come to the underlying problem: What is personality? The more we study it, the more we are puzzled by it. Not only is the ultimate question itself a mystery, but its effects are equally mysterious. Why does one mind or heart move other minds or hearts which come long after the first has ceased to think or beat?

Nowhere is this seen in such an impressive way as in Jesus Christ. In His own age and among His own people and associates He was a mystery. He overwhelmed men with surprise. He still overwhelms and subdues them by the unknown possibilities which come to light in Him. He has been a surprise because it has always seemed not only improbable but incredible that such as He could in any way be significant or conclusive in a world like this. And the mystery gains in depth when we see that history, both in the individual and as a social story, shows that He has been and is of the most signal, radical, and profound importance.

We each feel the mystery which surrounds all beginnings, and in no field of research, no matter where cultivated, is there so much energy and earnestness displayed as in the attempt to lay bare the roots of life. The moral and the spiritual qualities of personality are of the very essence of it. These, too, are the fundamental characteristics of the person of Christ, the unique and impressive elements of His very being. More than that, however much we think we are able to estimate the force and value of the intellectual powers, when we come to the spiritual our realisation halts far behind the facts. For of all the forces of the soul the most mysterious is Holiness. We think we know what it is and what it does, but we cannot really tell how it comes or through what channels it flows. Moreover, its value as an element or force in human life is not appreciated. This whole problem of life and personality, especially the problem of the personality of Christ and all that it involves, at this the most tragic period of human history for centuries, is assumed to be relative, and the meaning of His living energy a vague and unnecessary question. It is not relative: it is primary and fundamental. If there is one thing which the story of the past makes impressive and convincing, it is that the Mystery of Christ is the key to human history. For Jesus Christ has been the centre of heroic efforts and of passionate hopes. He has been their ideal, and ideals are the power which rules the soul. Yet ideals are always less than the ideal. That is, the interpretation which is offered rests upon a more or less perfect

appreciation, and is shaped by the individual needs and the individual capacities. So we find in the actual history. No particular individual and no particular age has done more than grasp, in part, all He is. The necessities or needs of the times and the individual soul have led men to see that which met their life and with which they often were satisfied and rested. And the matter which counts is that the particular social or individual soul has found inspiration and energy in Him when they found it nowhere else. He has been the centre and the heart of vital changes which mark the progress of the world, not towards material or even intellectual achievements, though here, too, He is to be found; but towards those finer instincts, that purer and nobler spiritual eagerness which sees the promise of goodness and of holiness in each and every human soul. No age has ever fully expressed Him, and no age has ever exhausted Him, any more than it has been possible for the individual to do so.

At the beginning the spiritual anxiety was so great and the barrenness of soul so poignant that it is hard to fix the eye upon the central point. All the moral forces which make life worth living and fill the soul with energetic aspirations were reduced to exhaustion. Running all through the New Testament and the contemporary literature of the Empire, the underlying appeal, the working of an inward necessity, is for life itself. Not, of course, for mere physical life, but that alone which makes the physical life worth having. Whether the words are His or not, they express what was in the soul of the world and what it found in Him: "I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly." No one who reads the story of His first preachers has any doubt that the immense fervour, the hearty delight, the splendid joy which blazes from every window of their souls, was the shining forth of the soul's gladness in this new life, which was an actual reality, though so mysterious that they could not measure it. That personality, what it was and what it did for them, was quite enough, for life was more than speculation.

The first five centuries were largely devoted to the investigation of that problem. It was, however, approached from the metaphysical side: What was He? What was His inmost essence, and how was it related to God and Man? These questions, no doubt, appealed to the prevailing philosophical temper of the Greek mind, and are, no doubt, of primary importance if they can be solved. What the Greek did has remained; but the question whether this was the ultimate

problem His person suggested and brought to light, is not easy to determine. What personality actually is, is an impressive problem, no doubt; but what it does, and how it does it, appeals more to the instinct for reality which is planted deeper in the souls of men. Metaphysics are not the only questions presented by this fact, but a deeper and more mysterious one—that of spiritual dynamics. And here we see the problem stated, not in the terms of the schools, but of life.

It has been this aspect of it which has produced the immense variety of opinion in all the centuries. Each has tried to state that ideal which He presents to it in the imperfect terms of its own experiences and its own needs. But always when it has issued from the touch of His life, the flow of His spirit into others, there has been something which makes one feel His presence, even though it has been so imperfectly apprehended and expressed. Only in the hard tones of the dogmatist and the iron hand of the ecclesiastic has it been difficult to recognise His spirit. For in the days of their triumph there has been a failure of spiritual life which has brought sterility to the soul and emptiness to the heart.

In the first flush of the new inspiration men flung away the life they had, for the very fullness of being made them prodigal and indifferent to the ordinary values as men then understood them. So in the days of struggle and of trial the martyr stood for the highest to which the Christian soul could aspire. And the martyr has never lost his inherent worth, though oftentimes the spirit which moved him was so strained and ecstatic that it removed him from the immediate presence of the One whom he thought to serve. When one looks into the face of the young Felicitas and hears her calm and gentle words, one feels sure that she was right and that He was with her for whom she died. In all the changes of history there were still some who felt instinctively that the noblest and best in them called for Him.

It may be that in His wisdom the monk was the chosen vessel to keep alive the memory and the power of One whom the world could not live without. Yet when we look at the outward form in which he strove to express the ideal, it is impossible not to feel that other elements were mingled in this dream besides those which came from Him. The rejection of the world, the denial of the common affections and happiness of the family, the friendships which fill life with peace and thanksgiving—all this is so unlike Him who in the hour of human gladness looked with tender eyes on those young people who were beginning their new history in

Cana of Galilee. We see that He spent all His days among the poor and the unhappy, finding in human relations the highest expression of His Sonship to His Father; we see His last words were for the mother who bore Him. The vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience seem hardly an echo of His voice; and if they are not anti-Christian in their origin, at least they are, to coin a phrase, sub-Christian. In the changing times to come they revealed not only their strength but also their terrible weakness. It was in the humility, the gentleness, and the unselfishness of the best of the monks that men heard the voice of Him for whom they felt such a strange awe, and through it new cravings awoke in hungry hearts.

After the awful centuries of the Merovingians and the changeful and troubled years of the Carolingian period, when pity and mercy, love and compassion seemed swept out of life for ever, a strange yearning arose in hearts unable to feel any of these things which seem to mean so little in the rough struggle of a brutal world. What had they to do with that far-away Mysterious One of whom they had heard? Then some pilgrims came back from the East, where a pathetic longing to feel the reality of that long-ago life had led them. There on that sacred soil they had seen where He had lived, where He had died, and the whole story grew vivid and living. He was the One Sufferer whom a suffering world could fully love. The "Ecce Homo," the patient Christ, the dying Saviour, filled their inner life. And men who could not pity, and women who could not love, felt fountains of sweet waters rising in their burnt-out souls. They flung themselves at the foot of that cross, and never has mankind forgotten the vision of that Sufferer which rose before a world that was weary of its own brutality.

And yet, in spite of the new pity and the new sympathy, they shut themselves apart and sought, prostrate before that sacred Figure, a personal grace and an inward peace which the stormy world forbade. The fame of St Bernard has lived long, and the age he led brought a new and a finer spirit. The passion of it all shows how new visions were haunting the souls of men. And yet those very visions passed beyond the cloister wall, and men were stirred by the thought of a Redeemer of mankind. It was not enough that a soul here and there, brooding in passionate pity for this wretched race, should find its path, through the stony road, to God. A longing grew that others too, outside the silence of the cloister, driven by the pressure of life and stained with the toil of common tasks, should see that which would lift them up.

Just one generation after the great Abbot of Clairvaux had lain down to rest a man was born in a small Italian town who has shone through all the ages in the beauty of his spirit. There was about St Francis, Dante said, "a certain spiritual splendour," and men have never ceased to wonder at his joy. He saw in every flower and bird, in the shining of the sun and the beauty of the moon, the glory of the day and the solemn grace of the midnight sky, one never-ending song of praise to God who made them all. In each human soul he saw a child of God and wanted to gather these dispersed sheep into the security of that unchanging love. The religious spirit has never found a purer expression. The mystery of Christ seemed more fully revealed to him than ever man had seen it. He died broken-hearted at forty-four, knowing that his dream was fading away and men were going back to the gross light of common day. The world was too blind and too brutal to see or feel the beauty and the power of this great dreamer. But his dream could not be realised through the half-monastic way chosen, or under the conditions more or less self-imposed. The mighty energy and the breadth of action of that Mysterious Person went far, far beyond what even St Francis had dreamed. The whole of human society must feel the force of His influence. The great body of organised mankind must in the most direct way be brought under His sway.

It is hard to see all the elements which were mingled in the great revolution which marks the sixteenth century as one of the critical periods of human history. But here as before, as in the first century and in the twelfth and the thirteenth, the storm centre was the person of Christ. Men's deepest instincts, their spiritual and Christian sympathies, sought first to determine what their relations to Him were, what He was to them in these growing and changing times.

It is this fact, this new interest and interpretation, which makes the name, the character, and the history of Martin Luther of supreme significance. It was because to him and for him Jesus Christ was the necessary element in his living and the heart of all his actions that he became the leader of the great movement which was pointing towards an unknown future. All the infinite variety of hopes and dreams drew men towards Him as the ideal whose realisation would bring life into a new and nobler world of energy and love. All the demands which different ages and different needs had made upon Him had been met by fuller and fuller unfolding of the spiritual resources of His personality, and with the coming history the question pre-

sented itself: How is He related to it? What has He to offer to the bewildered, confused, and yet hopeful world which too often felt itself far off from Him? Luther presented the ever-living ideal, which had changed the world of the past, to the men of his own day as the hope, the heart, and the life of the future. But with a new interpretation. The Christ whom Luther loved and adored was the same as of old. The change was not in character or purpose, but in fullness of sympathy, in breadth of interest, in depth of action. He was no longer, or only, the Saviour of the individual, but the Saviour of the world. He was the One who gave to all the world not only a new value and a new sacredness, but was in close relation with all that was most vivid and real. He was no longer the Awful Judge or the Sad-eyed Sufferer alone, looking down from the high elevation of His perfection, but an inner and intimate force in the soul of each man; a living power daily and always working in and with the spirit of those who needed for their highest and most perfect realisation of themselves some power which was above and beyond them. This organic relation with the souls of those who trusted Him lifted men far above the traditions of the past; freed them from the burden of history, whether in thought or institutions; changed the sanctities of the soul from the outer expressions and the bondage of old inheritances, and made them free. A boundless spiritual future filled men's souls with wonder and with awe. The old Paradise where man had walked with God became to them a supreme and present reality. Nothing is stranger than the inexhaustible spiritual energy of those men who saw the new vision and walked in the life of the Lord that lived with them. There is something titanic in the vitality, the labours, of those leaders of the sixteenth century. The whole world seemed to shake and rock as the new forces broke forth. The simple virtues and the common affections, the actual life with its tears and its laughter, which had been crowded away in shame and silence, spoke now with a new voice. He was with them, sanctifying and elevating the whole of man's most sincere experiences into that very life which God wished him to lead. The dreary subtleties of the schools, the rigid austerities of a life which had in it no joy but the joy of pain, were swept away, and a life of sunny gladness in the presence of the Christ gave all things a new meaning and a new value. Breadth, reality, freedom, power: these were the spiritual gifts of the new expansion of the old ideal.

Man was intended to have the whole of Christ. The mystery of that life was to be the mystery of his own.

Men have understood Him in their own way and with their own limitations, but He has always been unfolding more of Himself as they have been able to see more, and His fullest meaning for man and in man will never be completely known until that most complete and perfect union has been realised, when men have grown into the fullness and stature of Christ. Each age has failed to fulfil its dream, and yet each age has opened the way for some higher vision, even if realisation has halted.

The last days of the classic world seemed to leave mankind in ignorance, blindness, misery, and hopelessness. Out of the long agony of the early Middle Ages came a new world in which man at least had a new value, and this value came from a realisation, however imperfect, that the highest ideal the world could think was a man. The divineness of His manhood oftentimes made them blind to the humanity and the reality of it; but it worked as all truth works, silently and secretly, sending up new dreams out of the depths, new longings, and new desires out of the hidden places of the human heart. And each and all were looking to Him, and groping for a relation of some kind with Him which would release their higher instincts and hold in check all that was mean, and cruel, and base. Their best instincts they took to Him, and He fed them with His interest and sympathy. Nothing that was fine and true ever feared to face Him, and draw upon His inspiration and help. No noble movement, no great aspiration ever failed in that appeal. In spite of all mistakes, distortions, and even perversions, His name has always led men higher, and the ages which have walked freest and most fearlessly have been those in which men have rejoicingly felt they were following Him. However far they go with Him, men feel that there is always farther beyond, where He will lead those who are able to follow Him and are willing to walk, even alone, if He be with them. There is no age in the past, since He came, that can be understood in its inner meaning and far conclusions without Him.

We are facing a world to-day outwardly unlike the world of the sixteenth century, yet in its spiritual conditions not so unlike. Spiritual bankruptcy threatens us. The proud industrial world, which was to bring success, happiness, and victory, has fallen into ruins, as Feudalism fell. The old relations and interpretations of life are, too many of them, a complete failure, and do not meet the new conditions. The "hands," which were to toil and labour for the building up of a great social system upon the foundations of the inexorable

and immutable laws of economics, have also feet and eyes, heads and hearts—are, after all the technical phrases of the market, simply men. The failure to see this is obvious. The results may be disastrous. The world has devoted its energies to power and wealth. It found the secret of life in material success and achievement, and not in spiritual growth. It is poorer to-day in the things which make nations great than it has been for generations. At the foundation of all its tragic experiences which have brought such untold suffering lies the fundamental denial of the worth of personality, the rejection of spiritual values, the repudiation of the infinite significance of the human soul.

A re-interpretation of life is necessary before the world can return to the path of its highest history. This re-interpretation involves a new relation with Jesus Christ, more intimate and organic than that which now exists or ever has existed. For the old interpretations are imperfect and incomplete, inasmuch as they are not adequate to the larger needs and the more varied necessities of the spiritual life. Man himself has become more significant in his spiritual nature than he has ever before been. He makes claims for himself which seem bewildering, confusing, and brutally offensive, in the form in which these claims have too often been stated. The very meaning of personality itself, as a sacred, wonderful, and mysterious thing, appeals but little to the mind which finds itself involved in purely material and economic estimates of life. It is only when man's personality is connected organically with a personality whose meaning and power rise above the formal and conventional, that it becomes impressive. The deep unrest, the outraged instincts, the hungry desire for some kind of recognition of this inner worth of life, are working blindly and madly in many souls. It is not what men say or even what they think, but what they feel, what they are groping for, which makes the mystery of Christ more awful and impressive than ever before. A new unfolding of His spiritual capacities, His infinite resources of character and power, will do in the present what they did in the past. They will open a new history for the world and mark out a new path for human energy and human life.

Institutions and organisations have no dynamic quality. The fixed and formal order of life has no creative or transforming power. All these, whether in social, political, or religious life, are merely conservative—that is, they are functions through which the energy or force which is the creative element in life works. All institutions, whether secular or religious, are characterised by this static and rigid

character, and again and again have stood in the way of life and movement.

Below the mechanism of life lies life itself. Below institutions are the soul and inspirations which move them. Beyond the limits of the individual life lies the source of that which flows into his personality and gives it power. The very root of all Christ's relations with life lies in the fact that there is some organic connection between them. This is the very heart of the Christian consciousness. It is the basis of all Christian experience. It makes the difference between a philosophy and a religion. It is vital, and it is dynamic. It is the beginning of everything to the soul, and in its action and development it moves into unknown spiritual histories.

We need to know what the relation of Jesus Christ is to this new phase of man's strange history. The necessity of this is seen when one recognises that the attitude which sets Him apart from the daily concerns, the common interests, the everyday occupations, the trials, tribulations, ambitions and hopes of men, inevitably involves an actual rejection and denial of any relation whatever with Him. For, once admitted that this world has no relation with Him, except as a preparation for the future, there follow an instinctive scorn and contemptuous repudiation.

The way in which that life of His flows into this world of ours is the secret of His personality. He who interprets the inmost meaning of our present world, and also the meaning of Christ for this world and in this world, will have opened the way for a history so vast that all the past seems but a timid prelude for the mighty years that are to come.

A new power will flow into the lives which have found the way to let Him in. Nobler living will come from a completer entrance into that history which finds its highest meaning in what He is. While we wait for this new expression of His Mystery, we can pray that the power of it may live in us, even if we cannot speak and know not how to put it into words. It may be no word is needed save the word which comes through lives which live always and more in the Mystery of Christ.

STEWART MEANS.

NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT, U.S.A.

THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF PASCAL.

MISS E. F. JOURDAIN,

Principal of St Hugh's College, Oxford.

THE main difficulty which confronts us in the study of Pascal is that the book which was to be the crowning effort of his life has come to us in fragments, and it is not easy to find the particular blend of imagination and precision which is necessary for the reconstruction of Pascal's thought. But the more closely we bend ourselves to a study of the *Pensées* the more clearly there emerges a philosophy of the spirit which is at once incisive and suggestive—alien to confusion and to conventionality, and uplifting in its constructive force. "The philosopher," says Pascal, "must see the thing all at once in one glance," and that, I venture to think, he has been able to do with some success. And thus because of their universal appeal parts of the *Pensées* have become deeply imbedded in the religious consciousness of the world.

In one direction at least the thought of Pascal marks the beginning of our modern era. He breaks away from the analytic method imposed by scholasticism on theological argument, and he learns new ways of approaching the subject of the Christian mysteries. Since man, he says, is a complex, reason alone is insufficient to enable him to grasp a system of reality which itself includes man's own perception of God. This was a new step in thought, and its results are to be seen in the growth of religious philosophy from the time of Pascal to the present day. Pascal's idea of the function of philosophy reappears in the system of Hegel with all the force of a new element; and it is seen more clearly still in the groundwork of Bergson's philosophy. In each writer the most important advance seems to be the realisation of man's position as a part

of the system which he attempts to grasp. In all this the initiative belongs to Pascal.

In the course of the development of Pascal's thought we find he applies the same theory to the spiritual world. Man is himself part of the spiritual order which he attempts to apprehend. Thus Pascal conceives of religion as affecting the whole nature of man, as making an appeal to which the whole nature responds. Upon this groundwork Pascal builds his theory of the method by which man, in the fullness of his nature, seeks contact with God. No one method of approach, he thinks, can be sufficient. For the schoolmen's logical demonstration of the existence of God, Pascal substitutes the method he calls "persuasion." On this new method not only must the intelligence be eager for conviction, but the will must learn to bend, and the heart to feel love to the point of sacrifice.

In discussing this method Pascal is careful to give full weight to the beauty and dignity of each part of human nature:—reason, will, emotion. While he criticises the exclusively intellectual method of approach to God, he shows how ennobling is the possession of intelligence. He does not diminish the part played by reason, but shows that other means of approach are necessary. An illustration of this point is the well-known passage about the "thinking reed." Descartes had defined man as "une chose qui pense." Pascal was the first to use a less abstract expression, and allied man in all his glory of reason to the physical world by calling him "a thinking reed." "Man is only a reed, the feeblest thing in nature, but he is a thinking reed. The whole universe need not arm itself to crush him. A breath of air, a drop of water, suffice to kill him. But even should the universe crush him, man would be nobler than that which overcomes him, because he *knows* that he is dying, and he *knows* the advantage the universe has over him. The universe knows nothing of it. Our whole dignity, then, consists in thought. It is that to which we cling, and not to a space or duration that we are unable to fill. Let us then work to think well: that is the basis of morals."¹

"By means of space the universe comprehends and absorbs me like a point; by means of thought *I* comprehend *it*."²

While, however, in Pascal's mind the glory of man lies in his thought, in his conscious relation to all things—for in his mind even the acceptance of death is the final effort to apprehend that relation,—man in regard to the infinite finds the glory and dignity of human reason turning to dust and weakness in the sight of God. By reason man's moral

¹ Page 117, ed. Havet.

² Page 118, ed. Havet.

dominion over the external world can be given form and expression, but by reason alone man cannot gain the knowledge of the existence and nature of God. Mere argument on the subject is apt to issue in scepticism rather than in faith. Pascal has learnt this from his study of Montaigne and the Libertins, of Descartes and the Rationalists. And he places in the same condemnation all writers who have given themselves exclusively to scientific and logical argument. "Reason (without imagination) may protest, but cannot get things valued by her measure alone." Purely mental processes, Pascal knows, will never release the human spirit from the deadening clash of material interests. It will not by itself give spiritual freedom and energy, nor bring man to Christ. Some other human powers and faculties must be brought into play when man attempts to gain a relation with the Divine. Instinct, imagination, and experience are all called in by Pascal, and finally he uses an argument familiar to St Augustine, where the highest use of reason is defined as the preparation for faith. Thus reason, says Pascal, may submit itself to what it has itself judged to be right. In the letter of St Augustine to Cosentius (c. 3) occurs the thought afterwards developed by Pascal:

"It is a rational principle that faith should take precedence of reason. For if this precept is not reasonable, it is unreasonable, which God forbid! If then it is reasonable that in order to arrive at heights, which we cannot yet reach, faith should precede reason, it is clear that reason, in so far as it convinces us of that, itself precedes faith."

Pascal comments on this thought and develops it as follows:

"Reason would never submit itself unless it judged that there were occasions when submission was a matter of duty. It is then right to submit itself."¹

And again:

"The final effort of reason is to recognise that it is surpassed by an infinity of other things. It is but weak if it cannot go so far as to recognise this. And if natural things surpass it, what about supernatural things?"²

And again:

"Nothing is so essentially natural as this abandonment of reason."³

¹ Page 302, ed. Havet.

² Page 301, ed. Havet.

³ Page 303, ed. Havet.

Reason, then, he concludes, is man's claim to greatness, but by itself cannot bring man to God. Pascal now considers in their turn the will and the heart of man.

In considering the will he gives value to this element in the personality of man and to its function in the act of faith:

"The will is one of the principal organs of belief—not that it forms the belief, but because things are true or false according to the aspect which one sees in them."¹

And in another passage:

"Let man hate himself, love himself, he has in himself the power to know the truth and to be happy; but he possesses no truth that is constant or satisfying. I should then wish to urge man to desire to find it, to be ready and disengaged from passions, to follow it where he will find it; knowing how much his knowledge is obscured by passion, I should wish him to hate the concupiscence which of itself determines his action, so that this should not blind him when making his choice, nor stop him when he will have chosen."²

But just as the full value of reason is only seen in the reduction of reason to faith, so Pascal conceives of the will at its highest point as being satisfied in submission:

"The personal will can never be satisfied, even though it gains authority over everything it desires, but *satisfaction comes with the moment of renunciation*. Without the will one cannot be dissatisfied: but through it one cannot find satisfaction."³

The bearing of Pascal's theory of the will on the thought of a later age is important. Its basis is opposed to that of Kant so far as Kant completed his own work. It is interesting to consider it in connection with William James's "*The will to believe*," which gives the will its place in religious psychology, but does not contemplate the sacrifice of the will.

Pascal next deals with the purely emotional response in human nature, with its dangers limitations, and with its actual place in development. He first shows how necessary is the function of feeling in the religious life.

"Do not be surprised," he says, "at seeing simple folk believe without argument. God bestows on these the love of Himself and the hatred of themselves. He

¹ Page 144, ed. Havet.

² Page 118, ed. Havet.

³ Page 453, ed. Havet.

inclines their hearts to faith. You will never believe with a useful and faithful belief unless God moves the heart, and you will believe as soon as He moves it.”¹

And again, in a well-known passage, he affirms that man knows God primarily through the heart :

“The heart has its reasons, unknown to reason : this can be seen in a thousand ways. I mean that the heart naturally feels love to the Universal Being, and also naturally feels love to itself, according to its purpose : and, by its own choice, hardens itself against one or the other. When you have neglected one and accepted the other, is your love a matter of reason ? It is the heart and not the reason that knows God. This is faith : God perceptible to the heart, not to the mind.”²

The idea of an emotional impulse, dissociated from the will and the reason, became increasingly important at the end of the eighteenth century, and affected Rousseau's religious idea, where feeling predominates, and in fact dictates the *credo* of the worshipper. We cannot derive this incomplete view from Pascal. He saw the danger of isolating feeling and treating it as the sole means of approach to God. Nowhere in Pascal's writings is there any hint of sentimentality, or of the cultivation of the emotional religious sense at the expense of man's other faculties. Thus he consistently urged on all grounds that the appeal to the nature of man should be a three-sided one and should call out reason and will and love. He believed that all man's faculties—physical, mental, and spiritual—should be exercised to the utmost, but that man's isolated effort would be unable to bring him into touch with the Divine. He felt that it would be through effort and also after the acknowledgment of failure that the goal would be finally attained. It is only when the limit of failure is reached, the end of effort, when man realises that he is unable to apprehend God with any one faculty, or even with all developed and combined, that God stoops to gather to Himself the human spirit, and the “sense of God” flows over and into the whole nature of man by channels unaccounted for in any mental analysis. Thus man is finally able to offer himself to God as a “reasonable, holy, and lively sacrifice.” But we shall see, when we come to consider Pascal's idea of the relation of theory and practice in the Christian life, that the submission of human faculties does not bring about their destruction, but rather the resurrection of what is

¹ Page 304, ed. Havet.

² Page 419, ed. Havet.

best in them. This extremely consistent theory of Pascal's is borne out in his life, where it is evident that he sharpened the weapon of his mind, controlled his will and gave it direction, and lifted emotion to a continuously higher plane in the effort to prepare himself for the personal relation with God. His best and most inspired work, too, was done after his vision¹ and the great renunciation that was its consequence. Man, as with Dante, must become king and priest over his own nature before he can ascend into Paradise.

The venture of such faith as this is independent, as Pascal recognises, of proofs of the validity of Christian doctrine: though he considers that he should not neglect the study of evidences. In regard to statements of the Christian faith Pascal says that mathematical argument is "inutile en sa profondeur."² While geometric truths can have their demonstration, there can be no demonstration of spiritual truths, which are a matter of conviction coming after long-sustained efforts of reason and will, and succeeded by yet more efforts. "Certitude, certitude, joie, paix." But all forms of the approach to truth, whether by argument or by the uncharted methods of faith, are to Pascal presumptions of the reality of truth itself. There is one Truth to which all roads tend. Thus what Pascal attempts to show in his unfinished apology for the Christian faith is the agreement in aim of many methods of apprehending God.

It is significant that recent apologies for Christianity have frequently consisted of attempts by one person or by different people to treat different aspects of a subject in turn, with a view to expressing a common agreement in aim rather than in method. All hold that there can be no complete demonstration of the truth, but a general presumption of its reality. Such books as *Lux Mundi* and *Foundations* have been the efforts of two successive generations of thinkers to state their manner of approach. But how different this plan is from the method of the period before Pascal, is best gathered from a study of St Thomas Aquinas and his followers down to the seventeenth century.

The *substance* of Pascal's religious philosophy is intimately connected with his method of approach. We have seen that he considered man to be part of the whole system of reality, and therefore that man needed to use his whole powers in order to apprehend in any degree the nature of that reality. Pascal also believed, in common with all the great thinkers of his age, that the whole of reality was summed up in the nature

¹ In 1654.

² Page 539, ed. Havet.

of God, and that therefore men should look to God both as the source of all and also as the metaphysical unity within which they perceive differences and distinctions. In this he expressed his own age and generation. For the same assumption can be found in Descartes, Malebranche, Bossuet, Fénelon—and later, in divergent forms, in Spinoza and Leibniz, whose thought in all cases had its origin in the belief expressed by Descartes and others. A few concentrated and typical expressions of these writers will illustrate the point. Descartes in his Third Meditation postulated the existence of God, of whom a finite being could only form a partial conception.

“Whatever the mind clearly and distinctly conceives as real and true, and as implying any perfection, is contained entire in this idea.” Malebranche “saw all things in God.” Bossuet saw all the course of history as the expression of one mind, that of God. Fénelon chose the mystic way of approach to a unity of all things. Spinoza saw everything *sub specie æternitatis*; and Leibniz renews the thought by saying (in the *Discourse on Metaphysics*, 27): “God is for us the only immediate external object, and we see things through Him.”

The problem of philosophy in Pascal's time was to discover the relations between different parts of a recognised whole, and to state the relation of the parts to the ultimate harmony and unity. We may call the thought both Platonic and Christian. It works from two assumptions—the reality of the whole and the reality of individual experience.

Pascal shared fully in the philosophic outlook of his time. He dealt, however, with a large number of problems, and his claim on us as a thinker and a guide is that he probed to its depth the problem he was examining, and where he gained a conviction of harmony it was at the expense of unsparing effort, and thus it was never a shallow accommodation of experience to theory, or *vice versa*. He made the beliefs of the time his own by wrestling with all the difficulties they presented. He analysed, too, very clearly the elements of the harmony he discovered.

It was something more than the unity of the passing experience; the Stoics had gained that, but Pascal went further. It was more than the abstract mathematical conception of an infinite which includes all finites; the Schoolmen had seen as much as that. But Pascal, by combining the two trains of thought, came very near to a conception that transcended both; for he thought of the unity of God as both personal and inclusive, as present and alive, and as lasting endlessly. It was, in fact, the conception of St John's Gospel

which he reached through Christian thought and experience: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."

We might illustrate the process by taking one of Pascal's mathematical conceptions and showing how he was led on step by step to think out—first in connection with mathematical ideas, and afterwards in connection with psychological ones—the relation of man to the universe and to God.

He begins by observing that space is both infinitely divisible and infinitely extendible; thus he concludes that the universe represents two types of infinity. It is worth while to notice that by thinking of space as *extendible* rather than *extended* he anticipates Bergson.¹ Also by thinking of space as infinitely divisible he anticipates the work of some modern mathematicians, who argue for the reality of space and the matter that fills space.

Pascal next seeks for illustrations of his thought. In the effort to connect imaginatively the infinitely great and the infinitely little, he arrives at a magnificent comparison which, though probably originally derived from Empedocles' *Hymn to Nature*, he has made his own and developed in many ways:

"All this visible world is only an imperceptible heaving of the vast breast of Nature. No idea reaches (this immensity). We may stretch our conception of it beyond all imaginable spaces: we still only produce atoms at the expense of the reality of things. (*Reality is an infinite sphere of which the centre is everywhere and the circumference nowhere.*)"²

In another passage Pascal illustrates his idea of the infinitely little:

"I wish (man) to see within it (the extreme littleness of nature) a new abyss. I wish to picture for him not only the visible universe but the immensity one can conceive of in nature, within the limits of a minute (but not indivisible) atom."

Here Pascal imagines, as some modern physicists have done, the movement of the universe reproduced in the constitution of an atom. Thus in the delicately subdivided portions of this natural world Pascal teaches man to strike new depths of infinity. He now turns his thought to man,

¹ Kant's theory of space and time rested on a different basis, that of the priority of the infinite.

² Page 100, ed. Havet.

set in a universe characterised by these two types of the infinite, and he realises that man can perceive neither in any fullness, for man's perceptions are limited to the mean :

“ Our senses perceive nothing extreme. Too much noise deafens us, too much light dazzles us, too great distance or nearness prevents us from having sight : too much length or brevity in a discourse makes it obscure : too much truth astonishes us—I know some people who cannot understand that if you take four from nothing nothing remains. First principles are much too clear for us to understand them : too much pleasure inconveniences us : too many harmonies in music are displeasing : too much kindness is irritating—we wish to repay the debt over and over again. . . . We do not feel extreme heat nor extreme cold. Any qualities in excess are hurtful to us, and do not stimulate feeling ; we suffer rather than feel them. Too much youth or old age are hindrances to the spirit ; and so with too much or too little learning. And so extreme things might as well not exist for us, and we are not in regard to them : they escape us or we them ” :¹

In this condition of moderation, enforced by the life of the senses, man, feeling that the two infinities are fleeting past him at every moment, seeks at all cost a stability, and a certainty, which his reason desires, though he knows he is mistaken if he imagines he has gained a position of certainty :

“ Nothing can fix the finite between the infinities that enclose it and flee from it.”²

“ For ever uncertain and wavering, we sail over a vast space, impelled from one end to the other. Whatever the goal to which we think we can attain and cling, it wavers and falls away from us : if we follow it, it escapes from our grasp, slips, and flees with an eternal flight. Nothing waits for us. It is the state which is natural to us and yet that which is the most contrary to our inclination. We burn with desire to find a firm foothold and a final and constant foundation, and to build on it a tower which may rise to infinity.”³

Man therefore is incapable of grasping the two infinities which are only harmonised in God :

“ One depends on the other and one leads to the other. These extremities touch, and are connected by reason of

¹ Page 106, ed. Havet.

² Page 109, ed. Havet.

³ Page 108, ed. Havet.

having been removed from one another; and they meet in God and in God alone."¹

Pascal now faces the whole of the problem. What is the relation between God, in whom both infinities are satisfied; the universe, which bears the marks of His being, and thus of the two infinities; and man, sharing also in these marks, and yet unable to comprehend them?

"When one has learned, one understands that, nature having engraved her image and that of her Maker on everything, nearly all things have the marks of her double infinity."²

Man, he says, aspires to know the parts of creation, and finds he can understand at least that these parts have a relation to one another:

"If a man first studied himself he would see how incapable he is of going beyond. How could a part know the whole? But man will perhaps aspire to know at least the parts to which he is related. But the parts of the world have all such a relation and connection with one another that I think it is impossible to know one without the other and without the whole."³

The difficulty of knowing the whole lies in the complexity of the nature of man, though it is that very complexity which knits him to the varied whole:

"And what completes our powerlessness to know things is that they are simple in themselves, and we are composed of two natures in opposition and of different kinds, soul and body; for it is impossible that the part in us that reasons should be anything but spiritual even if people were to assume that we are only corporeal—that would cut us off the more from the knowledge of things, there being nothing so inconceivable as to say that matter knows itself. It is not possible to us to know how it should know itself. And thus, if we are only material, we can know nothing at all; and if we are composed of spirit and matter, we cannot perfectly know the simple things, spiritual and corporeal."⁴

But, on the other hand, within that very complex human nature which is conscious of itself and its powers and limitations there lies the key to the greatness of man, which is

¹ Page 106, ed. Havet.

² Page 110, ed. Havet.

³ Page 104, ed. Havet.

⁴ Page 111, ed. Havet.

independent of the small part he plays in the physical universe, and depends on the fact of man's personality, with which he is able to apprehend not only nature but God:

"The greatness of man is great, in so far as he knows himself to be miserable. A tree does not know itself as miserable. To know oneself as miserable is then to be miserable, but to know that one is miserable is to be great.

"All these miseries only prove the greatness. They are the miseries of a great Lord, of a dethroned King."¹

Man's consciousness, then, according to Pascal, is that which ennobles him, and gives him eyes to see what he is:

"Man is nothing and yet everything. He is as a colossus to the minor divisions of the universe, and as an atom to the major divisions."

". . . For who would not notice that our body, which was just now imperceptible in the lap of all, is at present a colossus, a world, and everything in regard to the nothing which one cannot reach?"²

Thus man becomes in his mind the mean between God and nothing, because man is a complex of soul and body in which one element, the soul, is divine and infinite, the other, the body, is of the earth and finite:

"For, after all, what is man in nature? Nothing in regard to the infinite, everything in regard to nothing, a mean between nothing and everything. Infinitely removed from understanding the extremes, the end of things and their principle are irremediably hidden from him in impenetrable secrecy; equally incapable of seeing the nothing whence he has come and the infinite in which he is absorbed. What then will he do but perceive the appearance of the mean of things, in an eternal despair of knowing their principle or their end? Everything has come from nothingness and reaches out to infinity."³

"Let us then know our worth: we are something and are not everything. What being we have conceals from us the knowledge of first principles, which arise from nothingness; and the little being we have hides from us the sight of the infinite."⁴

Knowledge and inquiry have led Pascal to the utmost humility in considering man and his relation to God. Looked

¹ Page 115, ed. Havet.

³ Page 102, ed. Havet.

² Page 101, ed. Havet.

⁴ Page 106, ed. Havet.

at in relation to the infinite, all finite things become of equal value—that is, of no value at all.

When Pascal had reached this point light began to break. Man's very consciousness and aspiration, even though they may seem to fail, must be a consequence of the existence of that spiritual whole of things to which he belongs. Unless, thinks Pascal, we are all bound together in a mystical communion and fellowship with God, we should not even have the desire to know Him. That desire in itself proves that we are part of a whole, the nature and end of which is Divine. "Tu ne me chercherais pas, si tu ne me possédais, ne t'inquiète donc pas," says the confessor in *Le mystère de Jésus* to the spirit of man. And here Pascal is at one with St Augustine, who said, "Thou hast made us for Thyself, O Lord, and our heart is unquiet until it rest in Thee."

Thus our very efforts, he considers, are a proof of the unity that includes us all: a unity he first assumed, and has now reached by argument and experience.

He next considers the question of the relation of God to the individual soul. Where can God meet man? How can the spark be transmitted through which man will become conscious of his union with God? God and man in the same sphere are unthinkable if man as a finite being limits the infinity of God. This was assumed by seventeenth-century thinkers. But if, with Pascal, we consider God and man, not as extensions but as persons, we find that there can be a bond between them, and that bond of union is love. Such love gives the idea of interpenetration without absorption, and thus helps the Christian to the full doctrine of the Trinity in Unity. Of such grace, such love, every Christian, thinks Pascal, may be a channel.

The ground, as far as we can see it, of our drawing to God is, then, partly due to the natural structure of our thought and partly to man's own immediate necessities. The complexity of human nature implies contradictions which can only be satisfied in God. Man, says Pascal, seeks an explanation of these in philosophy, and finds the dogmatists and the Pyrrhonians at war. The sole useful result is the stimulus to think further. But when he turns to religion he finds that one hypothesis satisfies the contradictions—that is, the union of the Divine and human as expressed in the Incarnation of our Lord. This belief depends to a large extent on the action of grace, met by the human effort of faith. If grace and faith are wanting, let man act, says Pascal, as though they were within his reach. When luxury and worldliness disappear, faith will enter in.

In this connection it is interesting to examine Pascal's belief in regard to the actual nature of this contact of man with God. He believed that mystical union was reached through suffering, and not by veiling or destroying pain and the consciousness of pain. Thus, as he strikingly puts it, the contact with Christ is by His wounds :

“After His resurrection, as it seems to me, Christ only allowed himself to be touched in His wounds. *Noli me tangere*. Thus we should only join ourselves to Him in His Passion.”

Pascal, then, considers suffering as an actual means of contact with Christ.¹ In a sense, too, suffering emerges from that contact and is a consequence of it. For the vision of holiness produces in man the sense of his own sin and short-coming, and thus of suffering for sin. This suffering is felt both for ourselves and, by the sympathy of strong substitution, for others. It is here that we reach Pascal's theory of the relation between action and vision.

Pascal's theory is sharply separated from that of Calvin. Both writers were concerned with the starting-point of experience in the Christian life. Calvin thought that moral action originated in the conviction of sin; Pascal that the Christian becomes convinced of sin only through the vision of holiness. Pascal, like Calvin, was strongly preoccupied with the moral fact, and with the necessity of distinguishing good from evil, and he was led to regard life as a tragic conflict, but he felt that the conflict was a necessary consequence of the possession of an ideal. His mysticism, like that of other mystics of the seventeenth century, was, then, an effort to deal by will and emotion with problems of good and evil. It was this admixture of moral and intellectual discipline with his mysticism that led Pascal to conclusions of extraordinary interest.

Thus he recognised pure mysticism as belonging to the early and primitive stage of religious experience. It is the starting-point of that experience and not its goal, and everything depends on the use that is made of it. So far as it tends to blur the distinction between man and the universe and between man and God, the mystic's vision has only incompletely helped him. Pascal arrives at a truer consciousness. Beginning with a clear perception of the oneness of the individual spirit with God, and yet recognising the limits of personality, he goes on to apprehend a religion of the spirit, a conception of the fellowship of souls in an *Ecclesia* which is the

¹ *Prière pour la Maladie*, written in 1648.

image and interpretation of Christ to the world. Only by passing through two stages of experience, the individual and the social, can man claim to share in the vision of an Absolute God, transcending all apparent oppositions between subject and object, between the individual and society, between man and the universe, "between affirmation and negation," as Dionysius puts it. Such an ultimate vision is more than the "personal experience of eternity" claimed by all mystics. It implies this, but it also implies that the pilgrimage of life has been both a hard and a joyful one, and that other spirits have thrilled with emotion at the upward movement of the soul to fulfil its spiritual destiny. The true vision is not a solitary survey of the incommunicable. This view was held by Dante in the *Divina Commedia*, and illustrated in many beautiful ways. There the soul passes through a helpless isolation in the *Inferno*, through the "fellowship in hope" of the *Purgatorio*, and lastly to the fruition of personality in the power of sharing with other spirits the sense of the abiding consciousness of God. Between the "mystic blur" of the first blinding vision, and the "unconfused union" of the end, there lies the Pilgrim's Progress of this life.

The Pilgrim's path follows in the case of Pascal another and a very remarkable course. He is not only the Pilgrim to the Holy City, but he follows Christ in the way of the Cross. Like all the Port Royalists, he felt that in every action of his life the Christian celebrated the great mysterious rite, and shared in the life of the Church, the body of Christ. The Port Royalists transferred the significance of the life and death of Christ both to the spiritual experience of each individual and to that of the Church as a whole. Mystics and symbolists, they bore the spiritual stigmata of the Passion both in their persons and as members of the Church.

True mysticism such as Pascal's, the mysticism of the spiritual philosopher, prepares the soul for life, for the activity of reason and will. False mysticism, in its artificial separation of the spirit of man from the rest of the created world, is an anticipation of physical death, and produces paralysis of the best human powers.

Pascal, with the greatest mystics, beheld the transfiguration of human nature in the vision of Christ, and on his way down from the Mount into the restless world learned to judge of it sanely, and to know its present part in the future perfection of all things.

E. F. JOURDAIN.

THE MINISTER WHO BAPTISED SHAKESPEARE.

BY THE REV. E. I. FRIPP,
Altrincham.

JOHN BRETCHGIRDLE, or more commonly in Cheshire, Bracegirdle, was a native of Baguley near Manchester, and it is interesting to trace his steps from the Cheshire village to Stratford-upon-Avon, where, as vicar, on the 26th April 1564, he baptised William Shakespeare.

An old timber mansion, Baguley Hall, still stands as a landmark of Bretchgirdle's youth, but nothing is known of his parentage. He went to Oxford in or about the year 1540, to that nest of Protestant heresy, Christ Church College.¹ He and a fellow-student, who was probably also a fellow-countryman, John Sankey, "supplicated" for their B.A. in March 1544; were "admitted" upon the same day, the 7th April; and, after being twice "dispensed" in the Michaelmas term, "determined" together in 1545. These facts are recorded in successive entries in the University Register.² Sankey apparently left Oxford for the Church in 1545, to become in time Protestant parson of Shalston in Buckinghamshire;³ but Bretchgirdle remained at Christchurch until 1547, taking his M.A. degree on the 11th July 1546, and then, in or about 1548, returned to his native country as perpetual curate at Witton *cum* Twembrooke near Northwich.⁴ At Witton was a Free School attended by boys from Northwich. Bretchgirdle was master of this school as well as perpetual curate of the parish. So we learn from Latin poems addressed to him by a grateful pupil, John Brownsward. In one of these poems the author

¹ Wolsey's "Cardinal College," which from the outset was frequented by men of Reformationist principles. See the story of Dalaber in Foxe: *Acts and Monuments*.

² Boase, 208.

³ See Bretchgirdle's will, 20th June 1565.

⁴ Ormerod: *Cheshire*, iii. 156.

speaks of having benefited for a twelvemonth from his master's "piety, perpetually resounding in his ear," and "the chaste simplicity of his learned breast," and his "diligent study, putting to flight the shadows of loathsome error."¹ Others trade over seas, flying from poverty but also from the security of home; others engage in war and ambitious projects, in crime and popular applause: but his is the fame the Muses give, which neither greed nor oblivion can take away. He follows the right hand steadfastly, and murmurs not when "Justice overlooks him, wandering in the liquid skies."² "Happy the man who is strong to resist the blandishments of Venus! And happy the boy who submits to such a master's rod, and bears his yoke, and passes (his) early years under his tuition!"³ In another poem Brownsward urges the Northwich youth to "honour and love their master, who deserves so well of them, making it his constant care to 'crucify fierce manners' and file them smooth"⁴—an indication that Bretchgirdle, like a good Calvinist, could use the rod when he thought an extra dose of original sin demanded it.

In 1549 or 1550 Bretchgirdle leased, for the term of his own life, from Sir Thomas Venables of Kynderton, a house and croft and half an acre of land adjoining the Witton "chapel-yard," and spent upon repairs and a new chamber, which may have been a study, a sum of £20 and more—the equivalent of £200 to-day. In such expenditure, probably, he was not sufficiently watchful of his rights, "Justice," as Brownsward says, "wandering off into the liquid skies." Here, unmarried, but looked after by one or more sisters, among his boys and books, with a horse to ride when he visited distant

1 *Bis sex flammifera concitus orbita
Phoebus proripuit signa per aurea
Cursus, ac toties emicuit vaga
Accensa facie soror:
Nostram dum pietas perpetuo tua
Aurem personuit, castaque pectoris
Docti simplicitas, et studium tetri
Erroris tenebras fugans.*

2 *Astraea vitiis cedere nesciae
Coelum dum liquidum rapit.*

3 *Felix ille tuae qui ferulae manus
Submittit teneras et tolerat pia
Vitam militiae qui virides tuo
Annos transigit in sinu.*

4 *Qui feros cura meditatur omni
Atque aeri mores cruciare lima:
Ore Norwicum placido erudito
Ore reformans.*

parishioners, he lived for about ten years—years of King Edward and Queen Mary—until, shortly before Mary's death, he was appointed vicar to the neighbouring parish, one of the largest in England, of Great Budworth. His presentation is dated the 14th November 1558; Queen Mary died on the 17th of that month; and on the 4th December, when Queen Elizabeth had ascended the throne, he was instituted in his new charge. The living was the gift of his College of Christ Church at Oxford.¹

But he soon resigned it. Stirring events called him into the Midlands. Who was the means of his coming to Stratford, we can only conjecture. He had a kinsman there in Master John Grantham, of whom very little is known. He had also a warm friend in Alderman William Smith, farmer of the College tithes, and paymaster at this time, under the Corporation, of the vicar's and curate's salaries. Alderman Smith was brother-in-law of John Watson, the Chancellor of St Paul's and, early in Elizabeth's reign, Master of Holy Cross at Winchester. Bretchgirdle may have known John Watson at Oxford, as a Fellow of All Souls' and a Master of Arts of less than two years his senior. Be that as it may, Stratford parish was in difficulties and in need of a wise Protestant leader. The Romanist vicar, Roger Dyos, had been practically dismissed by Alderman Smith and the Corporation. He was Queen Mary's nominee, and had not been a *persona grata*. Half-a-year's salary was owing to him at his entrance into the vicarage, and a further year's salary was unpaid at Michaelmas 1559. Two justices in the neighbourhood, Sir Robert Throgmorton of Coughton and Sir Edward Greville of Milcote remonstrated in vain on his behalf.² The parishioners, in these days of change and freedom, held the purse-strings, and Dyos had to go. His curate was already dead, his burial being recorded in the Register of 1559: "January 31 William Brogden, *priest*." This was the last *priest* entered in the registers. Henceforth for a long period the common name for vicar and curate was *minister*.³

In the autumn of 1559 or the spring of 1560, we may believe, John Bretchgirdle arrived in Stratford. At any rate, his successor at Budworth was appointed on the 19th May 1560. His presentation to the vicarage of Stratford followed in due course, on the 28th January 1561. On the 27th February he

¹ J. Harvey Bloom, Notes to the *Stratford-upon-Avon Herald*.

² See their letter of the 14th October 1559. William Clopton must have been a powerful supporter of Dyos. He died 4th January 1560.

³ Once in 1564 there is *sacerdos*.

was officially admitted to his charge in virtue of a commission to Master Richard Cheyne, rector of Hampton Lucy. Behind these proceedings were more than Alderman Smith and the Corporation. They had the approval, beyond question, of Thomas Lucy and the expectant House of Dudley, and of course, the new Protestant Bishop of Worcester, Edwin Sandys.

From the spring of 1560, then, at the latest, until his untimely death in the summer of 1565, John Bretchgirdle was head of the parish of Stratford, helping to shape the life of the town in the difficult, divided, contentious days of transition from Roman Catholicism to Protestantism. The Prayer Book was introduced, stained glass was removed from the church and chapel, frescoes were whitewashed, and carvings hacked. Feeling ran high. Cases of assault and drawing of blood were dealt with at the Court-leets of October 1560 and May 1561. Men of good family or position in the town fought in the streets and taverns—Thomas Trussell, Thomas and Edward Walford, John Lane, John Grantham (the vicar's kinsman), Alderman Rafe Cawdrey, Thomas Dickson of the "Swan Inn." Households were divided, and brothers were at variance.

In these days John Shakespeare served as a Constable and helped to keep the peace. He came in for "opprobrious words and reviling" uttered against the officers. In October 1561 he was promoted to be a Chamberlain, and entered on a period of signal service to the borough. From October 1562 to October 1565 he was the acting Chamberlain, busy in carrying out an extensive scheme of repairs and improvements in the Corporation property. He overhauled the vicar's house, making it thoroughly habitable—rebuilding the central chimney, tiling the roof, restoring the timber, claying and sanding the kitchen floor, spending upon the house at one time no less than £6, 15s. 5d.—well over £60 in our money. Then he protestantised the Gild Chapel, "defacing images," "taking down the rood-loft," "making seats" and a communion-table. Next, he put the school, and master's house, and the almshouse in order, re-roofing them all. He made also a pinfold on the Chapel premises, and obtained the Chapel orchard with its dovecote for the use of the members of the Council. The Corporation had reason to be grateful to him, and on 5th July 1565 they made him an alderman.

In these and other works vicar and chamberlain must often have met. They were probably of one mind, stout Protestants and men of public spirit, setting the good of the town before their own advantage. Several times John Shakespeare lent

money to the Chamber, receiving no interest and waiting a considerable period for repayment—*i.e.* 25s. 8d., £3, 2s. 7½d., and 7s. 3d.: in all £4, 15s. 6½d., or upwards of £50 in our money, a no despicable sum to a man of business who could only borrow with difficulty at 10 per cent.

Twice John Shakespeare brought a child to John Bretchgirdle to be baptised, and once to be buried. A christening was an important family function, attended by godparents and friends as well as the father and the nurse. The mother, on the other hand, was rarely present, the interval between birth and baptism being very short. On Wednesday, 2nd December 1562, a little procession followed baby Margaret Shakespeare from Henley Street through the town to the parish church. The ceremony differed in several respects from that of four years previously, when the first-born of John Shakespeare and Mary Arden was christened *Joan* by the Romanist vicar, Roger Dyos—probably after and in the presence of her aunt, Mary Arden's sister, Joan Lambert of Barton-on-the-Heath. Then, part of the service was in the porch, some of it was in Latin, and the infant was both dipped and anointed with chrism. Now all was in English and at the font, and the anointing was omitted; and Master Bretchgirdle concluded with an exhortation to the godfathers and godmothers, in which he urged them, among other things, to call upon the child, so soon as she shall be able, "to hear sermons."¹ Margaret was probably named after her aunt, Margaret Arden, who married Alexander Webbe of Bearley.² But the following spring this child died, and on the 30th April 1563 another and a sad procession wended its way to her grave. Again later, almost a year afterwards, on the 26th April 1564, John Shakespeare followed his third child and first son to church, and named him after some friend—probably his neighbour in Henley Street and colleague as a principal burgess on the Council, William Smith the haberdasher—*William*. William Smith, like John Shakespeare, was making his way in business and public confidence, was conspicuous for his independence of character, and a father of sons, contemporaries of William Shakespeare, who became leading and well-to-do townsmen. Moreover, whereas John Shakespeare named his first son William, William Smith named his first son *John*.³

Another link between the chamberlain and the vicar was

¹ *The Prayer Book of Queen Elizabeth*, 1559: The Ministration of Baptism.

² Now living in John Shakespeare's old home at Snitterfield.

³ William Smith was this year the junior of the two Chamberlains for whom John Shakespeare was acting.

the Plague. It had been brought from Havre to London, and thence into the Midlands by the troops of the Earl of Warwick. When it ceased in London in January 1564, it raged in the provinces. It was at Leicester towards the end of June, and about the same time at Coventry, where it was serious. On the 11th July it broke out virulently in Stratford. "*Hic incepit pestis*" are the words written by John Bretchgirdle in the Burial Register of this date. From January to 11th July there had been 21 interments. From the 11th to the 31st July there were 17. In August there were 35; in September, 84; in October, 58; in November, 26; and in December, 18. Whole households perished, mostly of the poorer folk, but well-to-do homes suffered. Alderman Smith lost his sister-in-law, Mistress Watson, at the College. The Town-Clerk buried two children, and Master Rafe Hilton, the curate, three. The vicar, who had his private troubles (he lost his sister Cicily in March, and heard that his landlord, who was "not favourable to True Religion," had seized his house at Witton at Whitsuntide), found his hands full.

John Shakespeare's accounts show payments for extra ministerial services:—

“ Item paid to Master Vicar £1, 7s. 0d.

Item paid for a priest's board and his drinkings at the
‘Swan’ 11s. 6d.

Item paid to the preacher £2, 10s. 0d.

Item paid to the same preacher £1, 0s. 0d.

Item paid to Master Vicar ” 6s. 8d.

To avoid infection the Borough Council held their meetings in the orchard, which John Shakespeare had secured for their use. “At the Hall holden in our Garden,” runs the minute of the 30th August 1564, “money was paid towards the relief of the poor”—*i.e.* the sufferers from the pestilence. Members were assessed according to their means: Master Bott of New Place, at 4s.; the Bailiff, George Whateley, at 3s. 4d.; the Chief Alderman, Roger Sadler, at 2s. 8d.; Alderman Smith, Adrian Queeny, John Wheeler, and Robert Perrott, at 2s. 6d.; Alderman Rafe Cawdrey and five others, at 2s.; John Shakespeare and five more, at 1s.; John Tayler and three others, at 8d.; Alderman Brat at 6d.; and William Smith, the corviser, at 4d. The Town Clerk, Richard Symonds, who this day attended the funeral of his son and daughter, is not rated. There were further levies on the 6th and 27th September, when payments varied from 18d. to 4d. On each occasion John Shakespeare contributed 6d. At a fourth levy on the

20th October he gave 8d. For safety the local Court of Record suspended its sittings during September. What happened in the school it is not easy to trace. Probably it was closed for some months on account of the sickness and for repairs. And there was a change of headmaster. Some years before, Bretchgirdle had received from his old pupil, John Brownward, a Latin poem in which the latter complained of his scanty leisure and circumscribed lot, and vain struggles with poverty and competitors. This was written, apparently, at Christmas, 1560, on the eve of Brownward's promotion from the mastership of Wilmslow to that of Macclesfield.¹ Probably to be near Bretchgirdle, he came to Warwick, where he was schoolmaster at the Old Burgess Hall (now Leicester Hospital) for the half-year 29th September 1564 to 25th March 1565.² Bretchgirdle now sought and obtained for him the mastership of Stratford. There was an increase of salary by the change from £13, 6s. 8d. to £20. Accordingly, on Sunday, 1st April 1565, Brownward signed an agreement with the bailiff and burgesses to "serve in their Free School, as a good and diligent schoolmaster ought to do, for the term of two years from the date above said . . . in consideration of the sum of £20 yearly and his dwelling-house"; and it was further covenanted "that if he shall fortune at the end of the said two years or at any time after to mislike with anything and mind to give over, and to teach no more within the said Borough, then he shall give warning and shall serve for the space of one quarter of a year freely without taking any wages or else pay to the Chamberlains £5 for that they have been at charges in placing of him, his wife and his goods." To John Shakespeare, then, fell the task of bringing Master and Mistress Brownward, and their goods, to Stratford from Warwick, as well as making their house water-tight.

The vicar's house and the schoolmaster's house were close together within the chapel precincts. The two friends must have looked forward to happy co-operation. But within three months John Bretchgirdle was dead. He made his will on the 20th June 1565, and next day he was buried. "June 21, Johannes Bretchgirdle, Vicarius," is the entry in the register. The will is interesting: "I, John Bretchgirdle, clerk, Vicar

¹ "John Brownward, now schoolmaster of Wilmslow, *grammaticus*, is elected to be the Headmaster, 30 January 156^q" (Macclesfield.)

² As we learn from an entry in the Burgess Account made by John Fisher on the 15th December 1565 (transcribed by Mr T. Kemp of Warwick), and from Brownward's agreement with the Stratford Chamber. At Warwick, Brownward followed John Skerrow, and was succeeded by the Puritan, Ralph Griffin.

of Stratford-upon-Avon," says the testator, "which am at this present visited with the hand of God, howbeit of good and perfect memory, thanks be unto God, being desirous to be in readiness against the uncertain hour of death, make my last will and testament in manner and form following. First, I commend my soul unto the hands of God, to be received of His fatherly goodness unto the fruition of His heavenly kingdom through the merits of our Saviour Jesus Christ; and I bequeath my body to Christian burial¹ in the parish church or churchyard where I shall decease. And I bequeath to the church where my body shall be buried 6s. 8d.² for breaking of the ground for my burial, and to the Poor Man's chest of the same parish, 6s. 8d." He remembers the poor of Baguley, where he was born, of Witton, and of Great Budworth, and bequeaths 40s. "to be a stock for the Almsfolk of Stratford to be employed by the Chamberlains for the use of the said Almsfolk," with 10s. to be distributed among the poor of Stratford. To his sister Maude goes his best gown and round cloak, his best bedding and two best silver spoons; to his sister Elizabeth, wife of John Finlowe, his gown of Bristowe frieze, his cloak with sleeves, and his second bedding. A cousin, Richard Goodwin, receives his wearing apparel and carpentering tools. £3, 6s. 8d. is allotted to the children of poor kinsfolk. Bequests of books show his interest in education and his Protestant principles: *Unio Dissidentium*³ to his old fellow-student, John Sankey, parson of Shalston; *Musculus upon Matthew* and *Homiliae Nauseae* to "Master Brownward, Schoolmaster of Stratford"; Eliot's Library of Cooper's Castigation, "to the common use of the scholars of the Free School of Stratford"; unto his friend Robert Bendbow, Vicar of Horley, "the four singing books" he bought of him, "and the other four for service in the church," and to Thomas Bendbow his son, parson of Wappenham, *Margarita Theologica*, in Latin and English; to his godson Edward Winnington, his *Trilingua Lexicon Graecum* and to his brother, Hugh Winnington, his *Josephum De Antiquitatibus Judaeorum et Bello*; to his godson George Marson, his Virgil with comment and Horace with comment; to his godson Robert Venables, his *Encheiridion* in English and Latin; and to Christopher Sankey—a son, perhaps, of John Sankey—*Tully's Offices* of the largest volume, and Eliot's

¹ Cf. *Hamlet*.

² The regular payment for an interment within the church.

³ The heretical work which got the Oxford scholars into such trouble in 1529. See Foxe.

Dictionary for Young Beginners. Gifts to the sons and step-daughters of Alderman Smith point to close friendship between the vicar and the College household, and suggest that he was tutor to the boys. They are:—"To William *Apophthegmata* in Latin and *Aesopae Fables*; to his brother Richard *David's Psalms* and the *Acts of the Apostles*, both in English metre, and one of my *Copias Verborum*; to Robert Smith my *Tully's Offices* in English and the *Acts of the Apostles* in English metre; to Thomas Smith another of my books, the *Acts of the Apostles* in English metre; to John Smith *Salustii* text and *Justin*; to William Smith, the youngest son, and to Alice Savage and her sister Elizabeth, to every of them 12d." A tenant and a debtor are not forgotten, and a foundling child is not overlooked: "Item. I give to the poor foundling that William Stubbs doth keep, 5s."

What he has spent on building at the Vicar's House is to remain for the commodity of his successors. As his executor he appoints, "for that great trust he has in him," his cousin, John Grantham of Stratford-upon-Avon, to whom he leaves his coffer with the plate lock, his writing-desk, coffers without locks in the loft, and 20s. owing from Roger Atkins. For witnesses he has "caused to be called" Alderman Smith, mercer, Alderman Adrian Queeny, mercer, John Sadler, miller, Robert Salisbury, brewer, and others.

The inventory made on the 30th June, by Queeny, Sadler, and Roger Bragg, with others, adds little to our knowledge of the vicar's bachelor establishment. He had a handsome clock (which he bequeathed to John Sankey), books valued at £10, and two cows. He was not Puritan enough to object to the square cap, three of these being found among his effects and valued, with "two night-caps of cloth," at 4s.¹

John Brownsward served his two years, and possibly a third, in Stratford, and then returned to Macclesfield, where he was headmaster until 1588. He died on 15th April 1589, greatly respected, as his monument testifies in Macclesfield church. This, a brass plate, was put up by a pupil, Thomas Newton of Bentley, who, in 1590, published his Latin verse under the title *Joannis Brunswerdi Macclesfeldensis Gymnasii Synchronici Progymnasmata quaedam Poetica*. A copy, a thin quarto of 56 pp., is in the British Museum (1213 l. 39).

¹ Both the Will and Inventory have been unearthed and transcribed by Mr Richard Savage of Stratford-upon-Avon, who lent me his copies for this article. Unfortunately the books, valued at £10, were not catalogued.—E. I. F.

MAN IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY.

EMMA MARIE CAILLARD.

THE quest of origins seems to have a special attraction for the modern mind. Both in science and history the tendency is very marked, and the department of science which most lends itself to research of this kind, biology, has enormously profited in all its branches by the energy with which it has been pursued. At the same time it must be acknowledged that there is much truth in the words of a modern writer: "The embryology of the body is to those who have had no biological training far from being a gratifying subject of contemplation. The stages through which the body passes before reaching its familiar form, have a superficial aspect of repulsive and ugly caricature with which only a knowledge of the compressed pageant of nature they represent can reconcile the mind."¹ What is this "compressed pageant"? Nothing less than the whole history of organic life from its first appearance in a speck of protoplasmic jelly to its highest point of development in man. The living cell from which the human embryo takes its start is indistinguishable from such a speck. We might expect (did we not know the wonderful process it is destined to undergo) any sort of development, or none at all; yet within that apparently formless, microscopic compass lie potentialities which will ultimately result in the production of the complex and wonderfully co-ordinated human body, with its array of specialised organs. Such a history may well illustrate the impossibility of passing a judgment on any form of life from contemplating its origin alone.

We have to a considerable extent become accustomed to the knowledge of the lowly biological origin of man. It has very usefully contributed to the lowering of that conceit which

¹ Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, p. 88.

was the natural result of our anthropocentric outlook on living nature and on the universe at large. But a younger science than biology, one in the full flush and energy due to the remarkable results obtained by new methods and a wider and deeper knowledge, is now also claiming to show that not only the human body, but the human mind, exhibits signs of a lowlier origin than our pride approves. Man's "Godlike reason" appears, according to modern psychology, to have gone through a distinctly animal stage, and to bear about it still the unmistakable signs of its parentage.

This conclusion is largely due to the discovery of the wide and persistent prevalence of instinct in human mentality, to the fact that much of the conduct which we fondly suppose founded upon our logical reason is in reality due to impulses derived from primeval and elementary instincts to which we unconsciously give a rational basis undeserved by them. So important and fundamental a factor is instinct in the human as well as in the animal psyche, that one of our chief English psychologists is led to state "that directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity; by the conative or impulsive force of some instinct (or of some habit derived from instinct), every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained."¹

We seem here to have Bergson's *élan vital* presented to us in a somewhat different guise, and with an application even more definite than is to be found in his well-known and exceedingly interesting work, *L'Evolution Créatrice*. It will be remembered that he there points out that human evolution has been one-sided because in it intuition has been sacrificed to the development of the logical reason. If the latter is of the preponderating importance which man has assigned to it, the sacrifice was doubtless justified; but even then the resulting feebleness to which intuition has been reduced is a grave and distinct loss, and the fact that modern psychology is discovering how large a part of human conduct and opinions is really derived from instinct, and not from reason, may be a step towards perceiving how evolution—now that it is self-conscious and can be made purposive—may be so guided as to lend itself to the development in due proportion as well of intuition as of the logical reason.

The consideration of such a point is by no means of the purely academic interest that might at first sight be supposed. It has the most directly practical bearing, for much that is

¹ M'Dougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 44, 1914 edition.

quite inexplicable in human behaviour, both individual and collective, receives a wonderful amount of illumination from this result of modern psychological research. To understand *why* men and women are impelled to such and such conduct, and to such and such explanations of it, is the preliminary and indispensable step to discover whether the conduct is wise and the explanations not only justifiable but true, and such knowledge is of equal practical importance in education, legislation, and statesmanship. The lack of this last which we, as a nation, are never weary of deploring may indeed be directly due, at any rate in part, to the lack of any sure guidance as to the comprehension of either conduct or its motives. We are beginning to see that psychology alone gives promise of affording such guidance, and the object of the present essay is to point out both the fact that it does so, and the consequent necessity of availing ourselves of its help.

The reason why ignorance of the instinctive bases for human conduct has so long prevailed lies in the high mental development of man: "Large mental capacity in the individual . . . has the effect of providing a wide freedom of response to instinctive impulses, so that while the individual is no less impelled by instinct than a more primitive type, the manifestation of these impulses in his conduct is very varied, and his conduct loses the appearance of a narrow concentration on an instinctive object. It needs only to pursue this reasoning to a further stage to reach the conclusion that mental capacity, while in no way limiting¹ the impulsive power of instinct, may, by providing an infinite number of channels into which the impulse is free to flow, actually prevent the impulse from attaining the goal of its normal object. In the ascetic the sex-instinct is defeated, in the martyr that of self-preservation, not because these instincts have been abolished, but because the activity of the mind has found new channels for them to flow in."²

The "activity of the mind" does more than find new channels for the impulse to flow in; it also satisfies the demands of the logical reason by "rationalising" the impulse itself, that is, by inventing a rational basis for that of which the true foundation is instinct. "That a man generally knows why he thinks in a certain way, and why he does certain things, is a widespread and cherished belief of the human race. It is, unfortunately, for the most part an erroneous one. *We have an overwhelming need to believe that we are acting rationally,*

¹ It ought not to *limit* but to *guide* it.

² Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, pp. 120, 121.

and are loth to admit that we think and do things without being ourselves aware of the motives producing these thoughts and actions.”¹ To the consideration of this “overwhelming need” we shall presently return, but it is necessary first to gain a clear idea of the way in which the rationalising process takes place. It is for the most part quite unsuspected by the subject himself, and takes its rise in “a system of connected ideas with a strong emotional tone, and a tendency to produce actions of a definite character. Such a system of emotionally toned ideas is termed in technical (psychological) language a *complex*. . . . Complexes may be of all sorts and kinds, the component ideas may be of every variety, the accompanying emotional tones pleasant or painful, very intense or comparatively weak.”² When they are intense—as in the case of falling in love—they have a very powerful effect upon the whole consciousness, and they may probably be fully recognised by the subject; but in very many, perhaps the majority, of cases they are not so recognised, though they continue to exert a strong influence upon the mental trend and consequent conduct. Dr Bernard Hart gives as an illustration the behaviour of a party politician: “When he is called upon to consider a new measure, his verdict is largely determined by certain constant systems of ideas and trends of thought, constituting what is generally known as ‘party bias,’ [in psychological terminology] a *political complex*. The complex causes him to take up an attitude towards the proposed measure which is quite independent of any absolute merits that the latter may possess . . . [yet] he fondly imagines that his opinion is formed solely by the logical pros and cons of the measure before him. We see, in fact, not only that his thinking is determined by a complex of whose action he is unconscious, but that he believes his thoughts to be the result of other causes, which are in reality insufficient and illusory. This latter process of self-deception, in which the individual conceals the real foundation of his thought by a series of adventitious props, is termed rationalisation.”³

The remarkable and deeply interesting fact about this peculiar but quite normal mental process is that it is in many cases entirely unconscious. We very commonly observe it in other people; we see clearly that so-and-so has a party or a class or a scientific or a religious “bias”; we are usually indignant if any such bias is attributed to ourselves.

¹ Dr Bernard Hart, *The Psychology of Insanity*, p. 66. Italics mine.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 62.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 64, 65.

Yet in "common justice" we should be ready to suspect in ourselves a trait which we see to be exhibited by such a vast number of our fellows.

Attention has already been drawn to the fact, so strongly corroborated by rationalisation, that a craving for rationality is a normal phenomenon of human mentality. But if this is so, as observation and introspection certainly bear out, and if instinct, instinctive impulses, and habits which are the result of following instinct play so important and fundamental a part in mental processes, the question arises whether this craving for rationality has not itself an instinctive basis, whether it is not at the human stage of evolution a direct consequence of the onward pressure of the *élan vital*. Bergson certainly countenances this view. He points out that it is very doubtful whether science, with its present mode of explanation, will ever attain a complete analysis of instinct, because instinct and intelligence are two divergent developments of the same principle, respectively directed upon the inward and outward aspects of life. "Consequently, that which is essential in the former (instinct) could not express itself in intellectual terms and analyse itself."¹ Nevertheless, the two are closely connected: "There is no intelligence in which traces of instinct are not discoverable, emphatically no instinct unsurrounded by a fringe of intelligence. It is this fringe which has been the cause of so many mistakes. Because instinct is always more or less intelligent it has been concluded that instinct and intelligence are things of the same order, that the difference between them is one of complexity or perspective only, and especially that one is definable in terms of the other. The fact is that they are found in company because they complete one another, and they complete because they differ from one another, that which is instinctive in instinct being opposite to what is intelligent in intelligence."² In a later passage of the same work Bergson points out that intelligence *per se* can never do more towards explaining the secret of life than give a translation of it in terms of inertia, studying from without that which can only be understood from within. It is intuition which conducts us within, and intuition Bergson defines as instinct become "disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting on its object, and of expanding it indefinitely"; and he regards the possibility of such an intuitional development, intuition become intelligent as well as self-conscious, as proved by the coexistence in man of the æsthetic faculty and ordinary perception.

¹ *L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 182.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 147-8.

He suggests that research having an orientation similar to that of art, but taking as object life in general, might attain of this a knowledge of the same kind as that reached by physical science in its own domain. Such a body of knowledge would be philosophy, not science, and, as he justly says, could never hope to attain an exactitude comparable to that of science on its own ground. "Intelligence is the luminous kernel round which instinct, even when so expanded and purified as to become intuition, forms but a vague nebulosity."¹ Nevertheless, intuition may enable us to grasp what the data of intelligence fail to give us, and thus indicate the road to their completion.

According to this view, intuition and the logical reason or intellect are branches from the same root, and that root is instinct; but they are divergent in their activities. Intuition knows, but knows not how it knows; it attains its object, but has no need to represent to itself the path by which that object is reached. By the intellect, on the other hand, each step is consciously recognised; it desires above all things *to understand* what it is doing, it is in doubt of any result otherwise achieved. It is by the intellect that man regards himself as chiefly impelled, and to which he desires to refer his unique position in the world of life. Without doubt his contention is largely true. Intuition alone ends in a blind alley; uncombined with intellect, it seems to have a strict limit set to its progress. Evolution under its sole guidance can produce the communal life of the bee, the ant, and, among mammals, that of the herd and the pack, but once produced it is stationary: it has achieved the perfection of which it is capable, it can advance no further. To a being possessed of intellect, on the other hand, it is impossible to say, "Thus far and no farther," because every onward step instantly opens the way to a further step. No man could venture to assert that the progress of the human race is blocked. It is quite another danger which threatens it, viz. that of turning aside from the path of the highest development of which it is capable and pursuing another, or others, every step of which the self-conscious, intelligent reason might justify to itself, and yet which would tend to the appearance of a race of super-animals, not of super-men. "The big blonde beast" of Nietzsche would then represent the goal to which human evolution was inclining, and there are not many persons who would be willing to grant that it represented the highest path, nor that leading to the greatest and widest power.

¹ *L'Evolution Créatrice*, pp. 191-3.

There is another goal which science envisages, and it has been graphically and attractively presented to readers of *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* as "the perfect unit which Nature has so long foreshadowed, in which there shall be a complete communion of its members, unobstructed by egoism or hatred, by harshness or arrogance or the wolfish lust for blood. That perfect unit (the whole human race) will be a new creature, recognisable as a single entity; to its million-minded power and knowledge no barrier will be insurmountable, no gulf impassable, no task too great."¹ This goal, according to the writer from whom the above passage is quoted, is obscured from sight and eliminated from endeavour by the invincible strength of the gregarious instinct in the individual man, and the immense size and strength of the major unit of the species (the nation) . . . leading to segregation into classes which form, as it were, minor herds in which homogeneity is maintained by the external pressure of competition, of political and religious differences, and so forth. In fact, there is, as experience but too evidently corroborates, a lack of unity in the nation which woefully obstructs that complete and serviceable specialisation which would enable the individual at one and the same time to attain his own particular and highest development and to use the capacities thus placed in his possession to the best advantage of the "major unit" to which he belongs, and through it to mankind at large.

The lack of unification is a point on which, in the psychology of the human individual, modern science lays great stress. All students of psychology and all readers of psychological works are familiar with the term *dissociation*, indicating the pathological condition in which the mind no longer acts as a single entity, but groups its activities round two or more distinct centres which acquire an apparently independent consciousness, each pursuing its own course regardless and ignorant of that of the other. A classical instance of this condition is given in Dr Morton Prince's *Dissociation of a Personality*, a highly interesting and curious account of the various mental metamorphoses passed through by a patient of his own who developed three to all purposes quite distinct personalities, and was cured by the fusion brought about by the apparently voluntary self-obliteration of one of them. Dissociation carried to such a length as this is startling and unusual, but it is to be observed that it could not happen at all unless in the normally healthy mind there existed the

¹ *L'Evolution Créatrice*.

possibility of conflict between its constituent aspirations, motives, and ideals. And, as a matter of fact, we are all aware that such an unseen conflict very frequently occurs in ourselves, and, judging from their words and conduct, in others also. Very few of us, however, are at all conscious of the fundamental nature of this conflict and of its widespread and very often disastrous effects on health, happiness, and usefulness. It has been reserved for a development of modern psychotherapeutics, psycho-analysis, to run the mischief to earth, with results which are far from flattering to our self-conceit, but which cannot be left on one side in an inquiry having for its object some clear vision of man as psychology leads us to regard him.

Psycho-analysis is the latest and apparently the most successful method of getting into touch with that region of human mentality known as the *subconscious*, or sometimes as the unconscious, mind.¹ It has long been known that the imperfection of the memory we consciously retain of our past is only apparent. Stored within the psyche, but usually inaccessible and to be reached only by some stimulus of abnormal strength, is the whole record, without exception, of every experience the individual has ever passed through, every influence felt, and every impression received. This fact asserts itself in delirium, under hypnosis, through some powerful mental shock, in insanity, and *in dreams*. It is of dreams that psycho-analysis has largely made use, and there seems something curiously revolutionary in the fact that, after being relegated to a position in which only superstition saw anything noteworthy in them, they should now be raised to a position of such great psychological importance. The interpretation of dreams holds in the minds of modern psychological experts a status hardly inferior to that enjoyed by it in the times of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar. It is not, however, with the future but with the past that the twentieth-century dream-interpreter concerns himself. He has ascertained that—as was implied in the earlier portion of this essay—the subconscious mind is not only an indelible record of individual experience, but also retains the impress of primeval impulses and tendencies which, so far from being outgrown as we fondly deem in civilised man, are still subconsciously active and apt to break out in disconcerting strength at unexpected moments. It is common to say, after witnessing an outbreak of passion or sensuality in a person whom we deemed actuated by a high moral standard, “How could he have

¹ Myers, who first advanced the hypothesis of its existence, called it the subliminal mind.

committed such and such an act or followed such and such a course of conduct?" It was not the least like him. It was not the least like what he appeared to others and probably to himself, but it denoted part at any rate of what he really was, a hidden but true aspect of his actual self; and when no such evident manifestation occurs, these secret tendencies may yet find a kind of symbolic outlet in abnormal mental and bodily symptoms and in dreams. The method of interpretation employed with regard to the latter is highly technical and somewhat complicated in detail; it can only be usefully employed by trained students of psychology and experts in psychotherapeutics. The point of relevancy to our present considerations lies wholly in the results attained, which have been too consistent and too definite to be set aside, and which show clearly the survival in civilised man of the present day of instincts and impulses of his savage and animal ancestry.

Some of the conclusions based on these results, however, are more than questionable. By the discoverer of psycho-analysis, Dr Freud of Vienna, and the school of psychotherapy which he founded, the sexual element in human nature is far too exclusively dwelt upon. It is held to be present in almost every phase of human mentality, normal and abnormal, to affect every relationship in life, even that of parent and child and brother and sister—in fact, to be pre-eminent and active from the cradle to the grave. Such extreme conclusions proclaim themselves as morbid, and they have probably arisen because all the first subjects of psycho-analysis were in a morbid condition either of body or mind or both. It is not wise to generalise from such premises alone; nor even when normally healthy subjects are also taken into account is there certainty with the Freudian school that knowledge of mental states, ascertained to be true in those whose conditions were pathological, has not unduly influenced the conclusions reached with regard to the healthy. It is the case that many psychologists of eminence have been unable to accept extreme Freudian conclusions.

While giving due weight to this fact, however, it seems nevertheless to be true that sex has an earlier, a wider, and a more lasting influence upon the human psyche than we have been willing openly to acknowledge to ourselves, *and this is where the mischief lies*. We have endeavoured to ignore instead of facing a conflict which exists between that higher nature which is the specifically human, and the lower animal nature which we have inherited through untold ages, and which is not evil in itself but evil in man when it is allowed to have the

predominance. After all, this inner conflict is nothing new. It was experienced and graphically described by St Paul two thousand years ago, and by many before and after him who have recognised that the battle-ground of the "spirit" and the "flesh" is the human psyche. What modern psychology impresses upon us with fresh force is the danger of ignoring or trying to ignore this conflict. If we recognise it for what it is, we are forearmed, we know what we have to expect. If we try to hide it from ourselves, to pretend it does not exist, and call it by euphonious names, we drive it underground and confuse the whole issue; we lay ourselves open to defeat by an insidious foe who gains strength from our insincerity, but half conscious probably, with ourselves.

To be forearmed does not necessarily mean to be assured of victory. Indeed, the scientific forecast of human development appears to end in an *impasse*: "The regulation of the sex-instinct, despite the possibility of sublimation—that is, the fact that its energy, if not expended wholly in its own channels of expression, may function as a reinforcer of purely intellectual activities,—is regarded by a foremost psychologist as a perennial problem of which the difficulty increases with every forward step of civilisation and every increase of the control of far-sighted intelligence, over the more immediate promptings of human (animal) nature. There is a perpetual effort on the part of the intellect to frustrate the end for which the powerful sex-instinct exists, thus evidencing a fundamental disharmony of human nature which not only endangers the happiness of individuals of all times and places, but also threatens every advancing civilisation with stagnation and decay. . . . To weaken either factor of this discord would be fatal to humanity; the weakening of the instinct would mean the extinction of the race; the weakening of the intellect would mean the loss of human attributes and of all that renders human life of more value than the animals."¹

What is clearly wanted is a supreme unifying principle able to dominate and transform this "fundamental disharmony." Psychology points to none such; but then no branch of science affords any final solution to any perplexity which its researches raise. Psychology is not peculiar here; we must look elsewhere for a resolution of the problem set by the conflict between the sex-instinct and the growing intellect of man.

The unifying principle of which we are in need is not to be found in either party to the struggle, but in that of which,

¹ M'Dougall, *Social Psychology*, pp. 404-5.

because it transcends the phenomenal, science takes no cognisance, the spiritual element in human nature, that in which the relationship of man to the Eternal Reality of the universe, named by us the Divine, consists. This unifying principle is not definable in words—that must be acknowledged at once; it cannot be adequately described in any human language; it can to some extent be expressed in a human life, as the life of Christ (and in a minor degree the lives of other great religious geniuses) testifies, and it can be experienced by normal individuals and by communities also. It does not act in opposition to nature; it acts *through* nature, which it can harmonise because it is the basis and sustainer of nature as well as its culmination. This is the Christian solution to the sphinxian riddle formulated by modern psychology. “Who shall deliver us from the body of this death?” we cry with St Paul, meaning, as he did, from this bondage either to our animal or our intellectual nature; and his answer is ours: “I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord.” The Christ-life perpetuated in us is the victory which sets at rest the agonising conflict we experience, not by annihilating either combatant, but by giving to each due place and recognition, and by bringing both under control of that which alone has claim to be the reigning factor in man, the Divine life in him.

In the light of this Christian solution to man's agelong inner conflict (and, in the writer's belief, modern psychology points in the same direction), the human psyche is neither a unit nor a duality, but an imperfectly developed *unity*, a many in one, progressing with pain and difficulty towards that complete unification of all its various capacities, desires, and prerogatives in which alone a rightful proportion and entire satisfaction are to be found.

Modern psychology is a comparatively new science; it cannot yet be supposed to have said the last word, even from its own standpoint, with regard to the function of the sex-instinct in human evolution, the inner significance of which is a matter which the intellect *per se* will never be able to grasp, because the intellect, as Bergson insisted, forms its judgments solely from without. Intuition, checked by the intellect, may some day carry us further, but the only adequate interpretation of this, as of so many other natural facts, will be attained by the spiritual illumination and unification which are the common goal of both intuition and intelligence where human beings are concerned.

There appears to be need for a caution against regarding the subconscious mind too exclusively as the record of animal

tendencies and impulses. In individuals the subconscious memory retains all the experiences and impressions of which the psyche has been the subject. Should not the racial record of which the individual psyche is, as it were, a compendium, be regarded from the point of view of spiritual impressions also? Man has *actually progressed*; his present stage of evolution is in advance of that to which the survival of the animal impulses in him points as having been his once, and to which their unchecked indulgence would cause a retrogression. There have, therefore, already been victories of the "higher" over the "lower" nature; and the records of these and their results must be equally present in the subconscious mind with the animal records to which such prominence has been given. We should take courage from this consideration, which is in no sense weakened by the fact that the good impulses which we receive from that ever-active subconscious region of our mentality have a natural source. Their tendency is upwards and forwards, not downwards and backwards as in the case of the unregulated animal impulses; and we may justly conclude that, if we have a hidden foe to reckon with, we have also an unsuspected friend whom it depends upon ourselves to reinforce.

EMMA MARIE CAILLARD

LONDON.

RETREATS AND RECONSTRUCTION.

THE REV. CHARLES PLATER, S.J., M.A.,

Master of Campion Hall, Oxford.

ENDLESS and bewildering has been the talk about social reconstruction. Theories abound. Society has been reconstructed—on paper—according to every conceivable pattern. It is becoming a sort of a game—and a game which is trying to the temper of people who are waiting to see something *done*.

Yet, while many have been talking, some have been laying the foundations of a new order, and laying them, not in the air but in the hearts of men and women. It is a relief to turn to the record of their obscure but successful labour.

Twelve years ago I wrote for the *HIBBERT JOURNAL* an account of the work of popular Retreats as I had seen them working in Belgium, and urged their introduction into this country. Immediately I began to receive sympathetic letters of encouragement and enquiry from clergymen and laymen of every denomination all over the world. Anglican Bishops and Nonconformist leaders assured me that they would take practical steps to set the work on foot. A prominent Australian citizen had the article reprinted and sent to every minister of religion, editor, and public man in the Commonwealth. Working-men, in particular, wrote with enthusiasm to say that here at last was a practical way of solving the social question. And in the Catholic Church these retreats have, as we shall see, actually been established on a large scale.

It seems an opportune moment, then, for taking stock of the movement as it has developed in England since 1908. And if I confine myself to the retreats organised by the Society to which I belong, it is not because I underrate the excellent work done by others, but because I wish to describe only what I have myself seen.

But first let us enquire why it is that this work of retreats

has such an important bearing on the problems of reconstruction which agitate the world.

In a word, it is because the retreat provides a sound *moral basis* for individual and social life. It not only presents a theory, a philosophy of life, but it impresses itself upon character, clarifies the moral vision, strengthens the will, exorcises the selfishness which is at the bottom of the mischief. The dynamic principles of spiritual life are not merely talked about: they are assimilated. The process is one of self-discipline, of spiritual adjustment. And this is ultimately the only way to secure social stability. Ideas are dynamic: get hold of them, assimilate them, and they become part of life influencing action.

Society to-day threatens to fall to pieces. We cannot heal the breaches by Acts of Parliament or resolutions passed by societies. Our laws are discredited because our politics are suspect. They are evaded or flouted because men see no reason for observing them. Industry, commerce, finance, have become a struggle of hostile and largely demoralised forces.

The evil is deep seated, and the remedy must go deep to meet it. We must bring home to individual men and women the sovereignty of the moral law and, as has been said so often of late, we must create "a new spirit."

But here is a psychological difficulty. People to-day are tired and restless. Their lives are full of anxiety. They are bewildered by the multitudinous and contradictory voices of very minor prophets. They are, as many of them would put it, "fed up." Is it possible to get them to give a hearing to any message, however salutary? The noise of life is all against it.

Get them away! Break the current of their working lives and superficial pleasures. Carry them off bodily for two or three days at least to a restful and attractive country house. Feed them well, and allow plenty of sleep. Tell them to drop worries, anxieties, regrets, plans—everything except the thought of God and their souls. Set before them the Christian philosophy of life, and let them look at it steadily. Then send them out with a new resolve and a high hope, peace in their hearts and the path of duty clear.

That is what a retreat is, and it is eminently practical and effective.¹

¹ The actual organisation of these retreats, the methods of attracting people to them, the arrangement of the day, and similar matters need not be described again here. Some account of them may be found in my *Retreats for the People* (Sands & Co.).

The first permanent retreat house for men was established at Marple near Manchester in 1908. Occasional retreats had been organised in religious houses, but this was the first attempt to set aside a house for retreats and for nothing else. The opening retreat in May was attended by 14 men, including a carpenter, a bricklayer, a painter, some mill-hands, a solicitor's clerk, a postmaster, and an alderman. By the end of 1909 nearly 700 men had made retreats in the house, and it became necessary to take a larger building. A move was accordingly made to Oakwood Hall, Romiley, a few miles away. Here the retreats have gone on ever since. The war years, of course, brought down the numbers, but the average is steadily rising again. Last year the retreats were followed by 564 men.

In 1912 a house was established at Osterley, near London. A series of three-day retreats at the week-ends made a very powerful impression on the business and professional men, the labourers, mechanics, and clerks, who attended them. The various social classes fused in a most encouraging fashion when all these men found themselves facing the great realities. But for various reasons this London house has not attracted the great crowds which have thronged to the other centres.

In June 1913 a third house was started on the Tyne, near Gateshead. In the first year we had 240 men, in the second nearly 400. The outbreak of war stopped the work completely, for the house was at once lent as a Red Cross Hospital, where, in the years that followed, nine thousand wounded soldiers were tended. But the retreats were started again there last year at Easter, and before Christmas some 600 Tynesiders had picked up the retreat habit again.

It was actually during the war that one of the most important of the retreat houses was set going. Glasgow has an enormous Catholic population, and it had long been felt desirable to have retreats in the neighbourhood. A house was taken at Airdrie and opened in June 1915; before the end of the year it had provided retreats for 400 men. A more suitable house was taken at Bothwell in 1916. Hither the men have flocked at the rate of 1000 a year. Lack of bedrooms alone prevented the numbers from being very much larger.

Thus we have four houses, all of them (with the exception of the London house) attracting a large and increasing number of men. But let me finish this dry and statistical record of the retreats for men by describing two war-time experiments, both rather significant in their way.

In July 1914, by the kindness of the Archbishop of Birmingham, two retreats for laymen were given at Oscott College, the diocesan seminary. They were attended by 84 men, but it was quite evident that a very much larger number of men in the Birmingham district would gladly make a retreat if they had a chance. Accordingly a number of "overflow" retreats were extemporised in a borrowed and none-too-large house at Edgbaston. How the men all fitted in is still a mystery to me. At one of these retreats we had 40: they slept on shakedown in the attics, took their meals in a passage, overflowed from the chapel down the stairs. Not an ideal arrangement, but a proof of their earnestness. They were largely miners from Cannock and Chasetown, but included business and professional men from the city. These annual Oscott retreats and subsequent overflows went on during the war. By 1917 about 1100 men and boys had taken part. The work is now merged in a great permanent house of retreats at Edgbaston, a spacious mansion in Somerset Road with a half a dozen acres of beautiful grounds. This retreat house is managed by nuns, and is unique in this respect that it provides retreats for groups of men and women alternately.

The second war-time experiment was the provision of retreats for soldiers. These were given first at the London retreat house, and subsequently at Oxford. A full account of them has been written elsewhere:¹ here it must suffice to say that the men were taken mostly in small groups of ten or a dozen, and that some fifty groups were provided for. Of these retreats Fr. Martindale has written:—

“If one result of the retreats should be more certain than another, it ought to be the ultimate conversion of the man who gives them. They are a revelation of the very best qualities in human nature, and of the most varied, yet most direct, action of God upon the soul. God and the soul! Men come to retreat with their ideas, naturally enough, thrown out of perspective; some of them quite eclipsed, some just flickering through the mists of opinion and the illusions of experience, and with their will tired somewhat, suffering it to drift, to be pushed about by the intolerable business of life; feeling themselves middle-aged before their time, in spirit, that is, with no real independence of thought and choice, and

¹ *Retreats for Soldiers*, by Charles Plater and C. C. Martindale. Published by Harding & More, 119 High Holborn, 2s. 6d. net.

no ambition left. For such, a retreat drives their ideas into right order, and is a strong tonic for their will, so that they revive and seek to obtain the hundred per cent. from themselves, and to become real 'self' throughout, and no mere wisp of personality within the unreal cocoon, like Kipling's 'Tomlinson.'"—*Retreats for Soldiers*, pp. 29, 30.

And now for some account of the retreats for women since 1908. That women as well as men need retreats is obvious, and the need is all the more urgent in these days when women are playing such an important part in social and civic life. As a matter of fact it was for women that these retreats were first organised in England on any large scale. Cardinal Vaughan, then Bishop of Salford, introduced the Cenacle nuns into Manchester as early as 1888, and established them in London in 1899; they started a third house, in Liverpool, in 1909; a fourth, at Grayshott, in 1913. At these houses a very large number of women and children make retreats annually; at Liverpool, for instance, the record for 1918 was as follows:

604 girls, 694 business girls, 70 mothers, 49 ladies,
50 secondary school girls, 530 boys. Total, 1997.

A number of convents organise occasional retreats for women. Thus in London alone retreats for working girls are provided at a dozen centres for the August Bank Holiday week-end, Friday evening till Tuesday morning; the girls all declare that they know of no holiday so restful and helpful as a retreat.

Altogether, in the houses which we have mentioned, probably about 10,000 Catholics make annual retreats, and the number is rapidly increasing. This is worth bearing in mind, for it shows at least that there is no insuperable difficulty in getting people to bury themselves for two or three days when once they realise the advantage of it.

But we need not pay too much attention to numbers. The tendency of a retreat is to form an *élite* in every class, to leaven the mass of the unthinking and selfish world.

More and more does one become convinced that this is the only way to mould public opinion. Get a group of thoroughly convinced men, with their ideals clear and their wills set, and they will inspire the rest. So many priests have told me that it has made all the difference in their parishes having even half a dozen men who have been in retreat. A

retreat makes talkers into workers, and fussy, self-important workers into quiet, unselfish workers.

It must not be thought that the aim and purpose of retreats is to promote social reform or improve material conditions. Such is not the case. If it were the case, these retreats would probably be much less effective in promoting social reform than they actually are. You do not hear much about housing or infant welfare in a retreat; but a retreat is more likely to stir up a sense of responsibility in face of these problems than would be stirred up by a conference which dealt with them exclusively.

A retreat puts man right with God, and consequently with himself and with his fellow-men. All good things follow from this: the inner man is set in order, the great purpose of life unfolded, duty is faced joyously, slackness and selfishness are conquered by love.

In a word, it is because the retreat is supernatural that it is so effective. Man is lifted on to a higher plane.

The following words were spoken, not by a recluse, but by a prominent American manufacturer who had just made his first retreat:—

“I am getting old now, and I have taken part in many movements in my time, but never in one so inspiring and invigorating as this. Other movements were outward to the world; this is inward to the heart and spirit. I feel for the first time, as it were, unfolded and revealed to myself, with the inner man set in order and eyes that look out and see straight. It is, indeed, a wonderful awakening. Life has new perspectives and new values, and the spirit breathes free and is refreshed. Talk of science and progress; here we have the science and progress of life itself, where the logic of right living is made as clear and as forceful as the logic of right thinking. My friends, this is the one great movement of our day.”¹

“Invigorating”; yes, that is just the word. One is struck by the number of times the idea recurs in letters from those who have made retreats. Father Martindale² quotes some examples:—

From an Australian soldier: “I’ve been talking about the retreat to X, and we both found the same

¹ Quoted in *Retreats for the People*, p. 179.

² *Retreats for Soldiers*, pp. 30, 31.

thing. We feel we've got more *physical vitality* since we came."

"I put more buck into everything."

"I did feel what you called middle-aged; the war had tired me inside: now I'm full out for things."

The results of these retreats are surprisingly durable. Men will write years afterwards to say how a certain retreat shifted their whole outlook on life and gave them guiding lines. There may have been relapses and falls, discouragement and clouds, but the men knew how to deal with them. They had the principles of the spiritual life inside them: the retreat had not been a mere burst of emotion.

These principles issue into very practical *work* for the betterment of the world. It has been through these retreats that the Catholic Social Guild has won so many of its study-club members—young working-men from the industrial centres who, without any thought of self-advancement, give up their evenings after a hard day's work, to mastering social science and economic history and the moral principles of social reform. They look upon such study as direct service of God and their neighbour; they tackle it with courage in spite of immense difficulties, and they strive to apply in workshop and factory the principles which they have assimilated. They think for themselves and are proof against the clap-trap which sweeps away the indolent-minded. Such men are a steadying influence in the community.

As for the relations between employers and employed, it is evident that nothing can adjust them so satisfactorily as a retreat made in common. That relation has to be humanised; but how can it be humanised unless it is made supernatural? Efforts are being made to "bring masters and men together"; but there is not much prospect of bringing them together on the purely economic ground. So long as both are simply out for all they can get, the disastrous tug-of-war will continue, and apparent concessions, extorted by fear or force, will be recouped at someone else's expense.

Again, it is suggested that employers and employed should live their lives and take their amusements together; idyllic pictures are painted for us of institutes in industrial districts where the various classes should meet round the billiard-table or at the improving lecture and drown their economic differences in the festive tea-pot. That is all charming, but how many of either side would feel really comfortable? How long would it last? It would be what Aristotle calls "a watery friend-

ship," and the harmony (if not the tea-pot) would speedily be broken, *unless* the minds of both sides had previously been attuned to the situation.

On the other hand, nothing could be more natural, unconscious, spontaneous, than the instant *friendship* among men of different classes who meet in a retreat. It is only comparable to the breaking-down of social barriers which took place, in moments of stress, during the war, and, like this, has the whole weight of custom and class-tradition against it. When a group of men are staring at eternity, grappling with a consciousness of sin, feeling at the same moment their utter nothingness and their unspeakable worth as sons of God,—well, they are not likely to be severed from one another by differences between their respective balances at the bank.

The short after-dinner recreations during a retreat are a revelation of how simple and real men can be with each other. There is no forced hilarity, but a joyous lightheartedness. The atmosphere is that of the *Fioretti* rather than of a Public Meeting for Improving the Relations between Employers and Employed.

Here is a picture of a retreat supplied by a well-known doctor :

"Have you ever heard of Christian Democracy? I believe there are books written about it. But if you wish to see it alive, in operation, you must join one of these parties. For here was the brotherhood of man. We gathered together; we talked seriously on serious things. But we also told funny stories and laughed hugely at them. We had fine arguments, about nothing, leading to nowhere, as every good argument should. And when we tired of talking all at once, we split up into little parties, and the professional man and the working-man, the manufacturer and the mechanic, the gentleman at large and the docker, walked side by side and opened their hearts to each other."¹

Or again, take the social evils one by one—drink, dishonesty, impurity, conjugal infidelity, betting and gambling, selfishness, pride, and the rest,—how are you going to deal with them? If you regard them *primarily* as social evils, you may multiply prisons and asylums and punitive laws and information, but you will not check the flood. For it issued from the individual heart, and only by quickening the individual conscience and stiffening the individual character will you

¹ *Retreats for the People*, p. 190.

rescue society. A man grappling with a drunkard's habits will need a stronger motive for self-control than is furnished by statistics about the national drink bill. One who is devoured by sexual passion needs more help than is provided by a paper read at a medical congress. Even the merely listless and indolent may not find a sufficient spur to action in the Utopia-vision of the social reformer; and the prospect of national bankruptcy or general anarchy will not always be enough to keep a workman from slacking, an employer from exploiting.

But an earnest retreat does, as a matter of fact, reach down to these centres of disintegration in the moral life. I speak of what I have seen, not a few times but in many hundreds of cases. Long-standing habits of drink or impurity are subdued—sometimes by a sudden strong, heroic blow, sometimes after a long and courageous struggle. The irresolute are shown how to make up their own minds. The apathetic find a dominant interest, an ideal which pulls together all their dormant energies. The self-centred are shown a means of escape. Taken merely on its human side the process of a retreat is soundly scientific; the Ignatian method of "Spiritual Exercises" is a very carefully considered soul discipline.

And surely there is need of discipline, of guidance, of scientific treatment in the enormously complex and unspeakably important life of the soul. For lack of it, what religion there is in this country tends to go off into arid speculation on the one hand or vague emotionalism on the other. God is the God of order and life in the supernatural as well as in the natural order. To neglect His laws in either sphere is to invite disaster. How often disasters are due to lack of *knowledge*, we cannot guess; but we all meet them with distressing frequency. What needless perplexities, what unnecessary discouragements, what futile friction, what cruel burdens imposed on men by their own ignorance or that of their would-be guides! No practical business man would suffer his temporal affairs to get into a ruinous muddle for lack of method; why, then, not import some method into the spiritual lives of the bewildered who need guidance? We have seen lately an enormous demand for such mind-training as will make men efficient in business or public life. It would be interesting to compare in detail the methods in popular use with the methods of St Ignatius' *Exercises*, to which, it may be, some of them owe not a little.

"But why not go straight to God, following His spirit?" Yes, but what is thought to be His spirit may be the delusions

of self-love. The director clears away impediments and then—stands aside. Nothing is more clear than that, as a retreat proceeds, God is taking the men into His own hands and leading them by His own ways.

Here is the goal of the retreat—loving self-surrender to the God who made and redeemed us. There is the key to the complexities of life, to the mystery of suffering, to the social problem. That gives meaning and worth to the monotonies of life and opens out unsuspected vistas to the discouraged and the suffering.

Such, then, is the contribution made by these retreats towards social reconstruction. They set in right order the life of man—first the inner life, then the outer. They deal with the human heart which has been the source of all the mischief, and they deal with it delicately, firmly, skilfully. They do not cram opinions down unwilling throats, like Thrasymachus in the *Republic*: they lead men gently from the shadows of the cave into the light of the sun.

CHARLES PLATER.

OXFORD.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

RELIGION AND THE CHURCHES.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1920, p. 534.)

THE striking paper on this subject by Dr Henry Preserved Smith demands the serious attention of the Churches. It affords a strong confirmation of the facts so forcibly brought out in the book *The Army and Religion* reviewed in the January number of this Journal. Here we have from religious workers both in the English and American armies the testimony that "the Churches have never gained the interest and enthusiasm of eight out of ten of the generation just coming to maturity." "The majority of men have no clear idea of what the Christian religion is." True, these enquiries as to religion were made with regard to men engaged in the war; but this is not material. Dr Smith says, "The fact alleged is no less ominous because it is chronic instead of acute. Indeed, it is more so. If it were due to the war, we might hope that it would disappear with the coming of peace. As a chronic state of affairs it must alarm all to whom religion is the chief concern in human life."

These enquiries fit in with the fact, which statistics establish, that only some ten to fifteen per cent. of the population are found within our churches and chapels. Dr Smith rightly draws a distinction between religion and organised religion, and he defines organised religion as "the religion that has taken form in the several Churches." This really touches the root of the matter, and indicates the region in which all the trouble arises—the forms, dogmas, creeds in which the Churches express and propagate religion. It is here that the leaders of religion are so smitten with blindness and fail to discern the signs of the times.

In *The Army and Religion* it is stated, "There is a surprising unity of testimony that the men as a whole believe that the Churches are out of touch with reality and out of touch with ordinary humanity. They think them irrelevant to the real business of their lives, antiquated in their ideas and methods, and wanting in vitality and conviction. There is little or

no life in the Church at all, it is an antiquated and decaying institution, standing by dogmas expressed in archaic language and utterly out of touch with modern thought and living experience."

And this is not the view of any one section of the men, for we are told "there is a surprising unity of testimony that the mass as a whole" believe this. It is stated that "many are asking for a new theology." Yes, and nothing is given them but the old. "The Atonement, the Divinity of Christ, justification by faith, they consider are no concern of theirs."

All this relates to "organised" religion. What is the testimony with regard to "unorganised" religion—character and conduct, the religion of the masses outside the Churches? One of the witnesses says, "I have been puzzled often to find men of no profession of religion exhibit such an unselfish, brave, kind, and just spirit to an extent not seen in professing Christians. Taking the whole moral achievement of our armies in four years of war, we must surely feel that along a great and difficult range of virtues they have raised the standards of the whole nation. They have exalted devotion to duty, sacrifice, and brotherhood. The wonderful spirit displayed in the war is Christian and God-inspired."

Dr Smith says, "The young man of to-day has little interest or enthusiasm for organised religion, and we now begin to see why this is so. Organised religion suffers from accretion of dogma. The formulas which have resulted from past controversies cling to it and hamper its activities."

In truth the new wine is with us, but the leaders will persist in using the old bottles. Happily the old bottles are bursting, but it is a long process, and meanwhile much of the new wine is spilled and wasted. Who will supply the new bottles, and where are they to come from? Ah! he will be a wise man who can solve that problem. If the leaders of the Churches, instead of employing their powers to buttress up the old, would use them to construct new forms that would meet the religious wants of the age, what fruitful work it would be!

P. E. VIZARD.

LONDON.

"EVANGELISM OLD AND NEW."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1920, p. 581.)

THE article by the Rev. A. T. Cadoux on "Evangelism Old and New" presents with force and clarity a point of view which prevailed, say, fifty years ago, and that which finds favour in thoughtful minds to-day; but the writer surely posits an antithesis where none exists—or, at least, by silence, suggests a state of things in the after-life which must necessarily be really foreign to his thought. The driving power of the older preaching no doubt came, in a measure, from the preacher's belief in unending torments; but the modern evangelist, while eliminating the doctrine of *eternal* punishment, is not thereby constrained to forego the sanction of pains and penalties for ill-spent days. The hell of orthodoxy conflicts with modern notions of righteousness and compassion, and has therefore become much less terrifying, much less deterrent, than the newer conception of a future where the judge exacts payment to the uttermost farthing, where sowing and reaping are inalienably correlated, where the

anguish may be acute, but where the wrongdoer admits his liabilities and would not, if he could, escape the just reward of his deeds, knowing that only through such purgatorial pain can entrance to the upward path be gained.

The fear of hell need not be regarded as an obsolete incentive to nobler living, for the hells pictured by those "travellers" who *have* returned are indeed awe-inspiring and ruthless in the inexorable logic of their discipline. The "place prepared" has been prepared by the man himself; in every pang he may recognise an inevitable sequence to thoughts, words, and deeds remembered as part of his earthly equipment. The punishment is not enforced from without, but is the natural fruitage of a life lived in rebellion against the Divine laws; and the only chance of restoration lies in a voluntary, a joyful, acceptance of the pain—in a realisation that each throb of agony is the outcome of some special sin and, owing to this acceptance, is doing its remedial work. The duration of the suffering may be long or short according to the attitude of the sufferer; it may conceivably be eternal if his will continue in opposition to God's; but there is no such thing as divine condemnation to endless misery; if such a condition exists, it is self-inflicted.

The preacher of to-day will, as Dr Cadoux truly says, "think rather of the hatefulness of sin than of its punishment," will dwell on its inherent antagonism to the Divine scheme and on the necessity for a Divine sacrifice and sharing in the consequences of transgression; but he need not throw aside a potent aid for arousing sinful consciences. As the hatefulness of sin is not apprehended by the soul steeped in sin, a lower appeal must be made—the appeal to fear,—and the élan of the old Evangelism may be preserved, alongside broader thought which refuses to worship a Deity who could sentence finite beings to infinite tortures. The "necessary stimulant" remains if only the clergy will acquaint themselves with what is familiar to those who read the literature of psychic research.

The writer of the article also remarks that "the picture of heaven is not nearly so moving as that of hell": we agree, if heaven be pictured as a place where "congregations ne'er break up and Sabbaths have no end"; but the newer knowledge portrays it as a place of infinite attraction, full of interest and vast possibilities, where every talent can be developed, every intellectual desire be gratified, all loving, serviceable activities have free scope. Were such a heaven presented from our pulpits, the hearers would be allured by its beauty, its sweet reasonableness; while the companion picture of a state of remedial purgation, where the punishment accurately fits the crime, would commend itself to common sense and love of fair dealing, and the preacher will not lack material for soul-appalling descriptions of the horrors which must be endured by those who choose the ways of death.

One would like to know if Dr Cadoux really means his article to carry the implication that a disbelief in eternal punishment involves a disbelief in any after-world penalties; because if he does not so mean, if the cleansing fires of retributive justice *will* furnish effective texts for the evangelist though the word "everlasting" be deleted, then his argument would seem, in some respects, to fail in relevancy.

BETH FINLAY.

"EUCLID, NEWTON, AND EINSTEIN."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1920, p. 425.)

I READ with much interest the article on "Euclid, Newton, and Einstein," and should like to ask the author whether certain experiments have been tried which I have not seen referred to in any of the articles upon the subject. The starting-point, as the article explains, is the discovery that the speed of light measured across the presumed "ether stream," compared with that in the line of it, shows no indication of the presumed "ether stream." Then various explanations of this fact become possible, such as the contraction of all distance measurements in the one direction as compared with the other.

I would ask, Has the matter been investigated by measuring the speed of light in the two opposite directions over the same course, in the direct line of the supposed ether stream? This would eliminate such possible explanations as the above, for clearly the distance over the same space is the same in both directions, and any difference in result would be directly due to the motion through the ether. There are, I know, many difficulties in doing this measurement, as compared with the measurement on the double journey, going and returning, but still *it is possible* (space forbids discussion of methods here). If this method show the existence of the ether stream, then it is established, and one of the explanations of its non-appearance on the transverse course becomes necessary; but if this method also show no evidence of it, then we are left with only the three other possibilities—namely (1) there is no ether, (2) the ether near the earth is carried along with the earth, (3) the velocity of light is dependent partly upon the motion of its source.

There is another test that can be applied, and that is the measurement of light from a star that is sometimes approaching the earth and sometimes receding from it. This may have been tried; but, as I have not seen it mentioned in any paper on the subject, I ask for information. If the light from such a star is found to be the same, independent of the motion of the star, while yet the speed of light near the earth's surface is the same in every direction relative to the earth, showing no ether stream, then it is certain that the ether exists, and is being carried along with the earth; for the light, having traversed the space between, has taken on a component due to the motion of the earth, when coming into the region of the earth.

If, on the other hand, the speed of light from such a star is dependent on the motion of the star, then either there is no ether, in the sense that has hitherto been supposed, or else wave propagation through it depends upon the movement of the source, which latter seems improbable, as pointed out in the article, and would throw us back to the other alternative, involving the projectile theory of light—which also seems improbable, because as the article also remarks, the evidence for the wave theory is so strong. But it is not absolutely impossible that both the wave theory and the projectile theory of light may be true. The projectiles might oscillate as they travel, and so produce a wave motion which might satisfy all the phenomena of light. It will be asked, What could make the particles continue oscillating? The reply is: That same force, whatever it be, that ties them together, when they are in the molecule.

If the stream of projected particles be tied together by an elastic force, they will continue to oscillate as they follow one after the other with the same period that they had at the start. This idea would lead on to many more, which it would be out of place to discuss until one has the result of the two experiments concerning which I ask for information.

G. A. SEXTON.

DR BROAD'S REPLY.

In reply to Mr Sexton's questions the following remarks may be made :

(i) (a) If the velocity of light is to be measured by observations of the times when a beam leaves A and when it reaches B, a different point, we must know beforehand that the clocks at A and B are going at the same rate and that they agree in their zeros. Even if they agreed when together at A, it would be most unsafe to assume that they would continue to do so when one is moved to B. Agreement would therefore have to be tested when the clocks were *in situ* for the experiment; this could only be done by light signals; and such signals only constitute a criterion of sameness of rate and of zero when we make definite assumptions about the velocity of light. Thus an experiment of the kind suggested would involve a circular argument if used to settle the question of the connexion between the observed velocity of light and the motion of the observer and his instruments in the ether.

(b) Even if this difficulty could be avoided, I think it is certain that no *direct* measurement of the velocity of light would be capable of detecting such relatively small differences as would be involved in the composition of the velocity of the earth in its orbit with that of light in the ether. The latter velocity is so enormously greater than the former that the composition of the two could only affect the resultant velocity by an amount below the limits of experimental errors.

(ii) The same theoretical difficulty certainly, and the same practical difficulty probably, apply to all such attempts at settling the question, and therefore to the proposed experiment with the light from a star when approaching and when receding. Dr F. W. Aston of the Cavendish Laboratory, who has kindly answered some questions that I have put to him in connexion with Mr Sexton's letter, says that the practical difficulty due to the comparatively small velocity of the earth might be overcome by using instead Positive Rays, which consist of particles moving with a velocity of about 10' cm. per sec. But he also says, and I agree, that the argument would still be circular, because of the difficulty about the test for sameness of rate and of zero in clocks at different places.

(iii) There is no theoretical objection to a combination of the undulatory and the emission theories, such as Mr Sexton suggests, if this be found necessary to explain the facts. In Lane's book, *Das Relativitätsprinzip* (Vieweg), it is said that W. Ritz attempted to meet the Michelsen-Morley difficulty by an emission theory. Full references are given in § 2, note 13, p. 266, of Lane's book. I have not read Ritz's work, neither has Dr Aston; but if Mr Sexton cares to pursue the subject, he will find Ritz's first contribution (according to Lane) in *Ann. de chim. et de phys.*, xiii. 145, 1908. He also appears to have written in *Arch. de Genève*, xvi. 209, 1908; *Scientia*, 5, 1909; and his *Gesammelte Werke*, pp. 427 and 447. The other relevant literature will be found in Lane at the page indicated above.

C. D. BROAD.

"SURVIVAL AND MONADOLGY."

(Hibbert Journal, April 1920, p. 495.)

I WISH to offer an observation or two with regard to the view expressed by Bishop Mercer, in his statements that "the supposed gap between matter and mind is fast closing" and that "the true line of advance, on the score of probability, would be to discover the 'psychical' nature of what we now call 'physical.'"

When we speak of matter we describe things only so far as they are material. So when we say that matter can think, we speak as though materiality were the same as thought. When we speak of conscious being, we are describing things only so far as they are conscious. So when we say that a conscious being can be in space, we are speaking as though consciousness were the same as materiality. Such statements seem to confuse the two qualities. The only truth in the alleged opposition of spirit and matter is that the attributes of spirituality and materiality are distinct from each other, just as redness and greenness, closely connected as they are, cannot be said to be identical. The truth is merely that of qualitative distinction. But the system which is made up of the human mind and the human body is one of which both sets of characteristics can be predicated. This complex entity has the two aspects of consciousness and extension. Only, these aspects should not be confused with each other. It is not correct to say that the person, meaning by this the conscious being which forms one side of the twofold system, is extended. It would be as absurd to say that the body is conscious. The former would be to speak of consciousness as though it were extension; the latter would be to speak of extension as though it were consciousness. There is no reason, however, why the same entity should not be both conscious and material. There is no gap between matter and mind in the sense that both material and mental characteristics cannot be ascribed to the same complex entity. What is physical may also be psychical. And what is psychical may also be physical. Only the physical as such must not be confused with the psychical as such, nor *vice versa*.

It seems to me that the difficulties belonging to the question of the relation between mind and body spring largely from confusing qualitative distinctness with non-connectedness.

W. POWELL.

HITCHIN.

IS CHRIST ALIVE TO-DAY ?

(Hibbert Journal, January 1920, p. 361.)

A COURTEOUS critic has read this article and asks, "But (as an argument) is it convincing?" and tacitly offers his own conclusion that it is not. Far more emphatically would I answer, "No, and never will be." I am aware that such writing as mine, in as far as it deals with argument, resembles the sermon of the preacher in Browning's immortal *Chapel on the Common*, where the unwonted listener heard many strange assertions, "Each proof abundantly convincing, To those who were convinced before,"—but not in

any other case. So it is to this day; the sphere of perception is not intellectual only, and cannot be dealt with on that level only. To hold that Garment's Hem means the light but sure touch of a new range of conviction, to which words are almost inapplicable. It is like a breath of fragrance you labour in vain to describe; like the brilliant sparkle on a heavy wave, the instant it assumes a certain angle with regard to the sun; like the stirring of the seed under the clod, which changes potential into actual life; like an instinct that will not be denied, telling us what is supremely good in Art. It is like a score of other such impressions that convey a confidence of truth to the soul, and then poor clumsy words come halting and trailing after, doing their best to substantiate that which is already known. Their use lies in showing that, given the sum-total of the conditions, the conclusion does not contradict reason. The fragrance is not an illusion, seeing that thousands of others, widely scattered over time and space, have perceived it also; the sparkle is not arbitrary, but obeys certain foretold statements of cause and effect; the miracle of germination will always take place if the same circumstances are repeated; and the appreciation of Art, though almost impossible to define, has a solid basis in truth. Here are four hasty black-board drawings, each one indicating an objective reality behind the subjective appeal, and yet I doubt if they are the least use unless that of which they are the inadequate symbol is already known.

Turning to the stores of enlightenment hidden in the ancient East, I speak with diffidence because I have read but little. Every one of us would, I believe, be willing to submit the worth of a religion to the test of ethics. The eyes of the worshipper of Krishna may "light up with holy love"; but does he go away a better man? When the worshipper of Christ has reached this stage, he certainly does so. Even Gautama Buddha, the beautiful heart, the Prince Pitiful of the world, seems to have but a poor effect on his followers of to-day. He took on his heart the suffering of our race; Christ went deeper and dealt with its sin, therefore dynamic power attends belief in Him, which fails in the case of Buddha. The divine power is (as far as my experience goes) individual only, and has a tendency to fade and die down when applied to a community, a nation, or the social order of the world. We like to talk about "a Christian State," "a world-wide-society founded by Christ," or even "the vision of a universe lit up by the glory of the Spirit of God." There may be help in these thoughts as aspirations and hopes, but we have sadly to confess that they in no wise represent the facts of to-day. They are held in reserve for a future, distant but bright and beckoning, when "the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of our Lord and of His Christ." But the power in the individual is boundless, and they can be found by the thousand.

Let me here turn for a moment to a slighter matter, and deal with what a second critic calls "incorrect scientific statements" put forward in my illustration about the moon and the tides. Let me say in one word that the scantiness of the outline is intentional. It is not due to ignorance. It so chances that I know that the moon pulls the earth out of the ideal orbit, that the sun causes a fraction of the tides, and that water rises high in a capillary tube; also I know the double connotation of the word "law." Yet for all these admissions I reassert that earthward gravitation is a "law of Nature," and that, until the invisible moon were put forward

as an hypothesis, the raised belt of water certainly would appear to defy that law; moreover, when that hypothesis was adduced, it would be fully within the scope of a mathematical genius, like Lord Kelvin, to disentangle the influence on the water of the obvious sun from the far larger amount that would go to the credit of the unknown moon. I have no wish to wrangle over details, but I desire to make it clear that it was not my intention to give with one hand a somewhat intricate lecture on gravitation, while drawing attention to a great spiritual lesson with the other. Experience has taught me that a black-board drawing is the better for having but few lines, so long as these lines convey the main truth, and that touching and retouching detract from its merit as an explanatory illustration.

Let me revert in closing to the main theme. I do not wish to appear to inflict any article of the Creed on another mind by the force of authority, for we are single and individual wills and we each must bear our own burden of decision. But I would once more suggest that those who are bewildered should consult the "two or three Witnesses" presented to them. Faith, in these difficult times, may waver and vibrate on its pedestal; but it need not be overthrown, and we may learn to say with the child Zinsendorf, "Wenn es auch einen anderen Gott giebt, so bleibe ich bei dem Herrn Jesu."

CONSTANCE L. MAYNARD.

SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.D., D.LITT.

IN *The American Journal of Theology* (April, pp. 180-190), Mr J. B. Pratt asks, "Can Theology be made an Empirical Science?" The answer is in the negative, and the reason given amounts to the claim that the knowledge of God does not present the fact of God to us as a scientific fact, but simply as the result of inference and interpretation. It is argued, against Professor D. C. Macintosh's recent book on *Theology as an Empirical Science*, that the historical revelation in Jesus, for example, rests on historical data, not on data such as an empirical science demands; that the evidence of Christian experience¹ presents us with data of psychology; and that the mystic's claim to a direct intuition of God as Reality involves an object or Presence to be apprehended, which, as "the mystics testify, has no definite qualities by which it can be made communicable or identifiable." The theory of knowledge which underlies a paper like this requires closer analysis, however. And the possibility of verifying the experience of God may be developed along larger lines, as indeed is done by Mr C. C. J. Webb in the second volume of his Gifford Lectures, entitled, *Divine Personality and Human Life* (Allen & Unwin). By "a personal God" Mr Webb means "a God with whom a personal relation is possible for his worshippers." He has reached this point in the first series, and now starts from the position that the supreme level of religious experience implies a spiritual life which takes the form of personal intercourse. Can this be verified? Mr Webb sets himself to answer the question by applying the principle to the economic, the scientific, the æsthetic, the moral, the political, and the religious life, in a series of chapters which vary in convincing power, but which are invariably suggestive and ingenious, particularly that upon the moral life. After dealing with Kant's exposition of reverence and conscience, for example, he concludes by asking, "Is not our only way of escape from the embarrassment created by the presence in us of this implanted sentiment of reverence for what, though bound up with our personality, is yet, as the object of our reverence, distinguished from it, the frank recognition of a Personal God . . . who is not only immanent but transcendent, with whom a

¹ Mr D. M. Baillie (*Expositor*, January, pp. 64-77) criticises, from a more positive standpoint, the radical empiricism of James and Höfding, as witness to the real theology of Christian experience.

relation only to be described as personal is possible, and is, in the experience of Religion, actually enjoyed?" The lectures in which he defends his position against naturalism and absolute idealism are most acute, and he makes out a good case for the right, as he says, "to accept far more simply and less grudgingly than did Kant the testimony of religious experience." Few Gifford Lectures have given the theologian a more positive contribution for the philosophical justification of his faith in God.

The second volume of the *History of Religions* (T. & T. Clark), which Dr G. F. Moore has just published in the International Theological Library, deals with Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism. There are obvious advantages in handling these three together. But the difficulty of the task remains, and it is to Dr Moore's credit that he has managed to preserve not only objectivity but proportion in his well-considered survey. "J'ai eu soin d'avertir plusieurs fois," says Voltaire, "qu'on ne doit pas juger les grands hommes que par leurs chefs-d'œuvre." So with the great religions. Dr Moore begins by explaining that he judges each religion by its most intelligent and devout representatives, even although they are always in a minority. His treatment proves that he has acted up to his principles. We have here a succinct historical sketch of each religion, which is compact and comprehensive without being dull. To take only one point, from the section on Hebrew religion. He notes how the stories of the Creation imply a "vegetarian golden age," and that simultaneously the early prophets in the eighth century refused to shut their eyes to a combination of flourishing religion and social oppression. They "were moved to indignation by the wrongs of the oppressed and the decadence of morals, and believed that God must be as indignant as they were at such doings." Now, in the *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* (pp. 237-256), M. Antonin Causse also shows how the prophets protested against the higher civilisation of the monarchy in Israel as an impious declension from the theocratic communism and simple life of the patriarchs. Israel's soul turned back to the golden past, when there were neither kings nor temples. "Dans les jours de puissance politique et de splendeur profane, elle gardait la nostalgie des temps primitifs." Not only eccentric sects like the Rechabites, but prophets like Amos and Hosea, and redactors of the old documents, boldly reverted to the utopia of a society where life was simple and brotherly. The huge empires of the East rested on the toil and slavery of the unnumbered poor, but in Israel alone the voice of protest was heard, the plea of justice for the oppressed, and the recognition of rights possessed by the humble. The autumn number of the *Journal of Biblical Literature* (1919) is almost exclusively devoted to one prophet, Isaiah, and mainly in connection with the literary structure of the book. Dr Kemper Fullerton reconstructs i. 10-20 and ii. 6-21; like Professor G. B. Gray, he develops Marti's view of the latter passage, on the ground that "it permits one of the noblest poems of the master stylist of the Old Testament to stand out in something like its pristine splendour and impressiveness, Isaiah's Dies Irae." In some general notes, Dr J. P. Peters (pp. 88 f.) argues for xi. 1-8 as Isaianic; Mr Moses Buttenwieser (pp. 94-112) upholds the view that the author of Isa. xl.-lv. resided not in Babylonia but in Palestine; and Dr H. G. Mitchell (pp. 113-128) analyses the "Servant of Yahweh" sections, as M. J. Touzard does, from

a slightly different critical standpoint, in the *Revue Biblique* (January, pp. 43-74).

In the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* (1919, pp. 113-138), Gustav Hölscher agrees with Sellin that the canonical book of Daniel consists of an apocalypse or biography of Daniel (originally Aramaic), preserved in chaps. i.-vii., to which the last half (chaps. viii.-xii.) was added during the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes. But he goes into more detail. The Aramaic group of stories, ii. 4b-vi., are from one pen; the author of viii.-xii. translated i. 1-ii. 4a into Hebrew; and—most revolutionary of all—chap. vii. is really pre-Maccabean, the allusions to Antiochus (verses 7b, 8, 11a, 20-22, 24-25) being secondary. Hölscher admits, of course, that viii.-xii. reflect the Maccabean struggle against Antiochus Epiphanes, but his article is a plea for i.-vi. (and indeed vii.) as the work of an earlier storyteller. In the *Expositor* (March), Dr C. J. Ball draws attention to the light cast on Dan. i.-vi., and especially on the story of iv., by the old Babylonian poem, or monologue, of a king who was struck down by a malady from which he could not recover “until at last Merodach relented.” Some of the details in Dan. iv. certainly suggest a reminiscence of the much older Babylonian legend.

The Maccabean period is estimated in Mr Norman Bentwich's *Hellenism* (Philadelphia), which is avowedly written from a less sympathetic point of view than M. Friedländer's book. Mr Bentwich views the literature and philosophy of Hellenistic Judaism “from a standpoint of rabbinical tradition,” treating the Hellenism which the rigid Jews repudiated as an amalgam of superficial paganism and second-rate philosophy. In the closing chapters of a readable though one-sided account, he comes down as far as the second and third centuries of our era; but the opening part, which is most vital, discusses the interaction of Judaism and Hellenism in the Maccabean era and the succeeding age. Mr Bentwich recognises “one splendid figure” in the medley of writers and thinkers, namely Philo. He “does not harmonise the spirits of Hebraism and Hellenism—that was impossible in his day—but he does fuse the spiritual teachings of the two, and that not in an artificial and conscious way, but sincerely and spontaneously. He created something new in literature and thought.” Simultaneously with Mr Bentwich's book, a critical study of the Jewish philosopher has been published in English, the first since Dr James Drummond's standard treatise. Dr H. A. A. Kennedy's *Philo's Contribution to Religion* (Hodder & Stoughton) is an excellently equipped piece of work. In seven chapters he unfolds the essential ideas of Philonism, with ample quotations from Philo's writings. Philo's personality is less interesting than his philosophy. But in order to understand the presuppositions of early Christianity, it is imperative to know the position of this Alexandrian Jew, and Dr Kennedy's fine pages are an introduction to the subject. As he points out, Philo's “enthusiasm for the efforts of Greek speculation concealed from him the fact that he was constantly attempting to fuse together incompatible magnitudes.” But his attempt is significant, especially in view of what his younger contemporary Paul did in theology.

Mr Herbert Danby, who has translated *Tractate Sanhedrin* for the useful series of early documents published by the S.P.C.K., deals in a special article (*Journal of Theological Studies*, 1919, pp. 51-75) with the bearing of this second-century rabbinic tract upon the account of the trial of Jesus. Does the Jewish manual of instructions about legal pro-

cedure contain any data which illustrate contemporary trials before Jewish authorities in the days of Jesus? Mr Danby prefers the Lucan version to the Marcan, and, after examining the Jewish tract, concludes that the compilation "is of little or no value as a picture of native law as practised during the period in question." Indeed, he will not go further, even on the basis of the Lucan story, than the admission "that the Jewish authorities in Jerusalem were empowered to carry out no more than a preliminary investigation of the evidence against their prisoner, and a study of the Gospel narratives makes it doubtful whether they can justly be said to have overstepped this permission." The *Megillath Taanith* is announced in the same series of translations. Meantime, Dr Solomon Zeitlin continues his study of "Megillat Taanit as a Source for Jewish Chronology and History in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods" (*Jewish Quarterly Review*, pp. 237-290), and his annotations will be a boon to the translator and editor. In the *American Journal of Theology* (April 1920) Father M. Power proposes a theory which would have saved many a scholar from anxious research, if it had been known earlier—and if it could be accepted! It is that the well-known difficulties of the calendar about 14th and 15th Nisan are due to historical "camouflage," i.e. that the *Badhu* calculation is a deliberate trick of Jewish calendar-makers, to make a Friday-passover impossible. Dr A. T. Robertson's book on *The Pharisees and Jesus* (Duckworth) is a candid attempt to estimate the recent theories that the writers of the Christian Gospels, if not Jesus himself, were unfair to the Pharisees. Mr Herford, says Dr Robertson, "proceeds to boost the Pharisees by depreciating Jesus while disclaiming it." The aim of this little book is to examine the data of the Gospels and tradition as objectively as possible, and its conclusion is that the attitude of Jesus to the party was justified.

With regard to the criticism of the Synoptic Gospels, Professor B. W. Bacon (*Expositor*, March, pp. 200-218) discusses the "rhetorical symmetry and the pragmatic purpose" in Matthew's alteration (chaps. viii.-ix.) of the Marcan materials, holding that Matthew's order is artificial, not chronological. He makes out a good case for his view. Mr H. McLachlan's *St Luke: The Man and His Work* (Manchester University Press) is a larger book than his previous study of the same topic. He is out to break a lance for the Western text of the Lucan narratives, but his pages contain more than textual criticism. He uses the third Gospel and Acts to show Luke in various aspects, e.g. as editor, as letter-writer, as diarist, as theologian, and even as humorist. A discursive, stimulating book, with several arguments that are liable to be challenged, but with invariable acuteness. The closing chapter is an ardent plea for the Lucan authorship of the "Periope Adulteræ." Mr A. M. Perry's essay on *The Sources of Luke's Passion-Narrative* (Chicago) is a thesis written to prove, from an elaborate analysis of the Synoptic record, that the non-Markan materials in Luke are largely drawn from a special narrative, probably in written shape, which overlapped the Marcan story. This narrative, owing to its association with Jerusalem, is called J. According to Mr Perry, it was a unity, free from doublets, "written in Greek, but possibly a translation of an earlier Aramaic composition or collection of traditions," covering the life of Jesus from his arrival in the city to the resurrection-appearances, i.e. the bulk of xix. 28-xxiv. 53. A less speculative and more synoptic book on the Gospels is the posthumous

work of Dr H. B. Swete, *The Parables of the Kingdom* (Macmillan), consisting of lectures to theological students. The parables are expounded with simplicity and a scholarly care, first the Galilean, then the Judæan, while the book ends with a section upon the general teaching of the parables, in which some of the points are extremely well put. Dr Swete explains Matthew's predilection for the term "Kingdom" by the fact that the evangelist "seems to have felt that he was entrusted with the task of correcting the impression that the Messianic Kingdom was political or racial."

The problem of an Ephesian imprisonment as a time for the composition of the later Pauline epistles is still being discussed. Mr Clayton R. Bowen concludes his discussion (*American Journal of Theology*, pp. 112-135, 277-287) by arguing that, while "Ephesians" is sub-Pauline, Colossians and Philemon and Philippians were written by Paul, when he was under arrest for a while in Ephesus; he incidentally suggests that the first two chapters of Colossians have been revised and interpolated. In the *Revue Biblique* (1919, pp. 404-418) H. Coppeters arrives at exactly the opposite conclusion, after reviewing the evidence from ancient tradition and from the epistles themselves. In *The Irish Theological Quarterly* (January, pp. 43-52) Mr Hugh Pope pleads for the literary unity of 2 Corinthians in its canonical shape, but only by reiterating the hypothesis of Chrysostom that the offender trounced in 2 Cor. ii. and vii. is the incestuous man condemned in 1 Cor. v. All these and other problems of the epistles are set in a clear light by Dr A. H. M'Neile's *St Paul: his Life, Letters, and Christian Doctrine* (Cambridge University Press), which is a compact handbook, stronger in the historical and literary sections than in the theological, but presenting on the whole an adequate survey of the subject. Dr M'Neile seems to regard the Pastoral Epistles¹ as probably sub-Pauline. He also regards the We-sections in Acts as the work of St Luke. But in *The Harvard Theological Review* (April, pp. 136-158) Mr J. A. Blaisdell enters a plea for Epaphroditus (*i.e.* Epaphras) as the diarist, on the ground that the diarist must have been the Philippian representative upon the deputation which conveyed the collection. He takes Phil. iv. 18 to mean that Paul received the gift of money through Epaphroditus, who was already at Rome, and that the latter did not come expressly from Philippi but had been arrested and conveyed to Rome along with the apostle. The larger problem of Paul's doctrine² is handled with singular ability by Dr H. A. A. Kennedy in his book on *The Theology of the Epistles* (Duckworth). It is not every day that the student is furnished with so competent a manual. Dr Kennedy has to cover more than Paul's doctrine, but the Pauline theology comes first, and to it he has devoted more than half of his space. One of the merits of his discussion is its balanced judgment. He has weighed, for example, the evidence adduced by Bousset, which is more than can be said for M. C. Piepenbring's discussion of "La Christologie Biblique et ses Origines," now concluded in the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*. M. Piepenbring constructs, like Bousset, a

¹ Mr R. St John Parry's recent edition (*The Pastoral Epistles*: Cambridge University Press) of the Greek text maintains their Pauline authorship, but without any fresh considerations.

² Dr B. S. Easton's article in *The Constructive Quarterly* (Dec. 1919, pp. 682-700) on "St Paul's Doctrines of the Atonement" argues that Paul only used the sacrificial theory tentatively, as one of several expressions for his faith.

Paulinism for which he rightly pleads there is no basis in the teaching of Jesus, and then casts abroad to the mysteries for the starting-point of the apostle's theology of faith. Dr Kennedy's synthesis is much more convincing. Another recommendation of his book is its admirable arrangement. Mr Kipling's Golightly "was proud of his faculty of organisation—what we call *bundebust*." It is a faculty for which Dr Kennedy's readers are repeatedly grateful; they soon become conscious that he knows where he is going and that he has that rare quality in theology, an orderly mind. One regrets that the Johannine epistles did not fall within the scope of his handbook. However, Dr Gore's *Epistles of St John* (London: John Murray) may be said to fill the gap. Dr Gore takes the older view that the epistles, like the gospel, were written by the apostle John. But it is his exposition which is really the contribution of the book. He brings out, with his accustomed insight, "the momentous simplicities" of the epistles, especially of the first, about God and sin and morality.

Cardinal Louis Billot's *La Parousie* (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne) is a counterblast to the critical estimate of New Testament eschatology by "le modernisme." It is ingenious rather than convincing. When Jesus said that "this generation" would not pass away until all his predictions had been fulfilled, the Cardinal admits that "this generation" meant the contemporaries of Jesus; then, face to face with the prediction not only of invasion and siege but of cosmic convulsions and the advent of the Son of man, he explains that the former were fulfilled at the siege of Jerusalem, and that there was even a partial, preliminary fulfilment of the latter, figuratively as it were! "These simple remarks will be sufficient to clear up all the difficulty," says the good Cardinal. But exegesis of this kind, even when armed with quotations from Chrysostom, Augustine, and Jerome, is like "manning a rush against the breast" of the modernists. He quotes with horror and indignation a "phrase stupéfiante" from Duchesne's *Church History*, which admits that Paul laid down rules about celibacy and marriage "in view of the imminence of the last day"; and this naive expression of anger is a clue to the naive tenor of his own arguments. It is not a book to come out into the open; for readers sheltered inside a theological seminary it might pass.

New Testament eschatology fares better in three recent books on the Apocalypse of John, all written from a scholarly, moderate position. Professor S. J. Case calls his monograph on *The Revelation of John* (Chicago) "a historical interpretation"; it endeavours to set the apocalypse in the Domitianic period, as a tract against Cæsar-worship, written by "a Christian of Asia, bearing the familiar name of John." Professor Case's exposition is readable and reliable. His contentions are generally those of ordinary criticism, but they are freshly put, and put in a way that ought to win a hearing from those who may not be acquainted with the solution of the problem reached in our own day. Dr I. T. Beckwith's *Apocalypse of John* (New York: The Macmillan Company) has much the same line and plan, although he thinks that there is "a reasonable degree of probability in the tradition that the book comes from the apostle," and, instead of arguing like Professor Case that the seer mistook Domitian's place in xvii. 10-11, judges that the number seven simply symbolises the Roman power as a whole. The commentary shows wide reading and hard work; Dr Beckwith has written a most thorough-going monograph. Professor Peake's Hartley Lecture on *The Revelation of John* (London: The Holborn

Press) is less technical and ambitious, but equally well equipped. It is a popular presentation of the results of modern criticism, by a writer who has looked at things with his own eyes and who has the gift of interesting the Christian public in these things. Dr Peake has no certain mind upon the authorship, except that he feels it improbable that the book was written by the apostle John. The strength of his volume lies in the persuasive, continuous exposition of what the book meant for early Christianity towards the end of the first century. He has some educative chapters on the permanent message of the book and on its interpretation, which ought to exercise a healthy influence. Dr Peake is refreshingly frank. He admits the repellent features of the Apocalypse, even in noting its sterling qualities. Altogether, he has done a welcome and difficult bit of work. As for the emergence of the crucial issue about Cæsar-worship, which occasioned the persecution under Domitian, Mr Donald M'Fadyen (*American Journal of Theology*, January, pp. 46-66) traces this carefully to Domitian's personal characteristics and to the need of some such deification as a prop for his imperial pretensions. He calls attention rightly to the importance of the crisis as the first deliberate effort "to suppress the Christian religion as such throughout the empire." Hence the seriousness of the situation which evoked the passionate call of the Apocalypse. And in connection with persecutions of the early Church, we may notice a point raised with regard to a later trouble in the second century. In the translation of *Marcus Aurelius* which has just been issued in the Loeb Library, M. C. R. Haines attempts to clear the emperor from the odium of antipathy to Christians. He translates xi. 3, "The readiness (to die) must spring from a man's inner judgment, and not be the result of mere opposition." That is, he renders *παράταξις* by "opposition," not by "obstinacy," and further conjectures that the following phrase, "as is the case with the Christians," is a gloss (p. 382). This appears to be the view of a recent French critic, M. G. P. Lemercier. The idea of a gloss is, however, not obvious, and when Mr Haines proceeds to argue that Aurelius was so good and just a man that he is unlikely to have punished or persecuted Christians, the argument wears thin. The Roman authorities were not intolerant persecutors, but a good emperor had to enforce the law, and the better he was, officially as well as personally, the less likely he was to tolerate such defiance of imperial regulations as Christians seemed to offer.

The theology of Hermas is examined with admirable penetration by Mr Oscar D. Watkins in the first volume (pp. 47-71) of his *History of Penance* (Longmans). This monograph is most welcome to the student of ecclesiastical history, and naturally the approach made by Hermas to a systematic and rigorous penitential discipline is one of the first data to demand attention. As Mr Watkins points out, "the rule of the *Shepherd* of Hermas that Penance was only admissible once after Baptism became the rule of the Church for many centuries; but it will hardly be wrong to refer its inception to the limiting necessities of the anxious days which preceded a great persecution." The Christology of the book does not come under the scope of Mr Watkins' argument, but, after all, the penitential ideas of the *Shepherd* are among the most characteristic of the book; certainly they were the most influential. In the *Journal of Theological Studies* (April, pp. 193-209) Mr C. H. Turner puts in a timely plea for more attention to the Latin text of Hermas, with a reminder of the significance of the book. It is admitted that Hermas made no great con-

tribution to the rising problem of Christology. But he has been "unfairly neglected. Granted that neither his mind nor his style entitles him to a place in the first rank, yet his moral earnestness, his simple enthusiasms, his championship of a straightforward cheerfulness, *ἰλαρότης*, as a great Christian virtue, should assure him a rightful place in the august company of the Christian worthies of the generations that followed the Apostles."

P. Batiffol's "Synthèse antidonatiste de saint Augustin" (*Revue Biblique*, 1919, pp. 305-349) is an analysis of the ins and outs of the Donatist controversy as an occasion for Augustine's theory of the Church. This theory took shape, according to Batiffol, as "une conciliation de la foi en la sainteté du corps mystique et du fait de la société mêlée qu'est la *Catholica* visible." He argues that the synthesis is as old as the New Testament and essential to Catholicism. Dr Sparrow Simpson's volume, *The Letters of St Augustine* (S.P.C.K.), forms a convenient introduction to the study of this and of other aspects of Augustine's theology. He wrote letters on the subject for over thirty years. These and the rest of his correspondence are analysed, *i.e.* some salient selections from them, and carefully arranged chronologically in groups. The plan is to weave extracts into an outline of the writer's position on any subject, and Dr Simpson has succeeded in producing a highly useful handbook.

JAMES MOFFATT.

REVIEWS.

Divine Personality and Human Life. Being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen in the years 1918 and 1919. Second Course. By Clement C. J. Webb.—London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1920.—Pp. xvi+291.

THIS volume completes a work containing many interesting and important reflections. The earlier volume had for its topic Personality in God, the nature of Personality in man being reserved for treatment in this second volume. This order of treatment was justified on two grounds, historical and philosophical. The historical reason was that the conception of personality had developed under the influence of the theological discussions carried on in the Christian Church regarding the persons of the Trinity and the relations of the divine and human natures in Christ; and "the philosophical reason was the fact that Personality is itself an ideal which may best be studied at the outset apart from conditions which in our experience of finite persons limit its full realisation." These are good reasons, so far as they go; but something may be said on the other side. The question about divine personality would never have been asked unless there had already been some conception of personality as it is found in man to make the question intelligible. The two conceptions affect one another in our thought, and it can hardly be maintained that that of divine personality is primary. Nor, with Professor Webb's complete work before us, is it clear that the discussions concerning personality in God throw very much light upon the definition of human personality. The Boethian definition *naturæ rationabilis individua substantia* is still adhered to. Yet the discussion of personality in God was much occupied with, and in the end was an elaboration of, the distinction in the Athanasian Creed between *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*. Even after the author's learned discussions, questions remained concerning the meaning of these terms as used of God and the Trinity; and some of the difficulties involved were pointed out in the review of the earlier volume in this Journal for July 1919. But the same distinction does not greatly help us in regard to the nature of personality in man. The human person is *individua substantia*; but whether *substantia*, as used here, corresponds to *οὐσία* or to *ὑπόστασις* is a question not put. In this respect the study of the ideal of personality is not allowed to explain our finite personality. Yet the inquiry into human personality could have been carried out on these lines, though it might have led only to confusion. God, according to Mr Webb, is the Absolute, the "ultimate system of Reality." Here is his *οὐσία*. He is

also the persons of the Trinity—three ὑποστάσεις. If this mode of conception can throw light on the relation of God to finite persons, then again we shall begin with the conception of God as οὐσία. God or the Absolute is the “ultimate system” and “an all-inclusive unity,” and human persons will be included in, or be “appearances” of, God. Are they then ὑποστάσεις in the same sense as that term is used of the “persons” of the Trinity? If not, we cut away the ground for that “personal intercourse” between God and man which is fundamental for Mr Webb’s philosophy. If they are, then God is manifested in two personal systems—that of the Trinity and that of finite human persons. How are these two systems related? They are equally included in God, for God is the Absolute and “all-inclusive.” They are both personal, and personal in the same meaning of the term—though that personality may be only incompletely realised in the human system. The divine persons are not subject to error or sin, but it is difficult to clear them of finitude without “confusing the persons.” However this may be, we do not seem to approach a precise definition of human personality by this route.

But I must not go on talking about what Mr Webb has not said. My point is simply that we have to make a new beginning in investigating personality in man, and that the theological definitions of the earlier inquiry do not help us much. What the author gives us is not so much an inquiry into the nature of human personality as (as indeed his title indicates) a discussion of the relation of divine personality—or belief in it—to different aspects of human life. For this purpose the economic life, the scientific life, the æsthetic life, the moral life, the political life, and the religious life are passed in review successively. Thereafter follow lectures on the value of the individual person as interpreted first by naturalism and then by absolute idealism; and the book closes with a lecture on the destiny of the individual person.

The different aspects of life are accepted, in the main, in the form in which they appear in civilised mankind. In its normal functioning life in all these aspects (unless the religious) commonly goes on without conscious reference to divine personality. It is clear also that some of the aspects, such as the economic, have much less relevance to any such question than others, such as the religious life or the moral. It is clear also that, at least at some stages or in some forms, certain aspects of life, such as the æsthetic and the scientific, are found in antagonism to the recognition of divine personality. But, after all allowance has been made for these things, the general thesis of the discussion may be said to be that human life in all its activities attains the highest dignity of which it is capable only when it is recognised that the human spirit can be and is in personal intercourse with the divine. There are many interesting things in this discussion, especially in the treatment of the scientific life and the æsthetic life. These can be mentioned only. The account of the religious life contains a defence of the author’s view of the nature of religious experience against the criticisms of Dr Rashdall. This also must be passed by for the present, in order that a little space may be left for what is said about the moral and political life.

The general problem here is the reconciliation of the factors of consent and of authority in human life. “In our consciousness of obligation,” says the author (p. 132), “we are aware of an imponent of the obligation whom

we must reverence as other than ourselves and as not merely superior to us but supreme over us, even though, in virtue of the unconditional acceptance of the obligation by our reason, that which he imposes may be intelligibly spoken of as self-imposed. We must acknowledge in obligation, as it has been put, an aspect not only of *autonomy*, but also of *heteronomy*, which turns out on inspection to be really a theonomy." Perhaps the terms in which this view is stated seem to imply that the recognition of an obligation as valid is the same thing as the acceptance of it for the guidance of one's own will; and, if this implication is intentional, it seems to me a confusion of thought. Yet, apart from this, the view is in harmony with the author's doctrine of the equal immanence and transcendence of God; and it is also accompanied by a clear recognition that the obligation of morality has "an intrinsic authority, needing not to be guaranteed by any other revelation from God than that which itself is" (p. 129). If then we recognise—however the recognition may have been arrived at—that the consciousness of obligation implies "the consciousness of a divine lawgiver," we have reached a position in which free assent is given to authority. To establish this same combination of consent with authority is also the problem of politics. But political theories have commonly selected one factor only to the exclusion of the other: consent being the fundamental idea of democracy and stated in the old theory of the social contract, while the idea of authority was expressed in the still more antiquated theory of the divine right of kings.

Mr Webb holds that each of these doctrines involves a truth, though a one-sided truth: "the doctrine of social contract, the truth that without consent there is no legitimate authority; and the doctrine of divine right, the truth that the conception of authority with its correlative obligation cannot be deduced from that of consent, but derives from an ultimate experience of the human spirit incapable of explanation in terms of anything other than itself." And so he infers that "the legitimate authority in the community will have in the strictest sense of the word a 'divine right' to the obedience of its members; but that authority alone can be described as legitimate which is established by consent, just as in the individual's moral life the only way by which I can know the command of God to be his is by the recognition that this and nothing else can I will, in Kant's phrase, 'as law universal,' that is to say disinterestedly, and as what it is not merely pleasant but *right* that I should do" (p. 137).

In spite of the ingenuity as well as the earnestness with which this view is worked out, it does not appear to me to be convincing. The analogy of morals and politics seems to me misplaced. Politics is not analogous to morals; it is a very complicated and distracted case of morals. The religious man will certainly recognise that the moral law is God's law; and in all his political activity he will seek to fulfil God's law; but he will not always find it in the law of the State. Again, the consent upon which democracy or a "free" government is based is not the same thing as, or even analogous to, the recognition of the moral law by the moral reason. It is useless to appeal to Rousseau's *volonté générale* until a precise meaning can be given to this conception. The consent to government or the laws is the consent of a majority, which need not be rational and is seldom reasoned. The moral law has no dependence upon consent of this sort. If authority is an "ultimate experience" of the human spirit, it yet remains hard to determine the human depositories in whom this authority is vested; and

tradition would seem to have as good—or bad—a claim to decide where it lies as consent. There are many difficulties in recognising any particular State as “the surrogate of a divine Lawgiver and Ruler” (p. 161).

Mr Webb closes his Gifford Lectures with a dignified if sombre discourse on “the destiny of the individual person.” His recognition of personality as belonging to the essence of the divine life would seem to give him a stronger reason than other Absolute Idealists have for the belief that death may not triumph over the personality of man. But he feels the difficulties, he is perplexed by having to conceive the unimaginable, and alienated by the trivialities imagined. In the end for him, as for many others, the belief in immortality depends upon the religious value of our unique individuality.

W. R. SORLEY.

CAMBRIDGE.

Implication and Linear Inference. By Bernard Bosanquet.
Macmillan & Co., 1920.—Pp. viii + 180.

MR BOSANQUET'S purpose in this brief and lucidly written book is to defend the principle on which his logic is founded against recent attacks, not on his own logical theory, but on the theory and practice of formal logic. While he stands in a manner above the conflict, he has an intense and intimate interest in the fortune of the battle. The critics of Mr Bosanquet and of the philosopher with whom he is closely associated, Mr Bradley, attack the metaphysics on which the logic is based rather than the logical theory itself, and one of the points of greatest interest in this book is the way in which the metaphysical theory is elucidated by the logical principle. In fact the contention which is pressed on us throughout is that escape from the nullification to which formal logic, relying on the syllogism, reduces knowledge is possible only for those who recognise the metaphysical principle expressed in the doctrine of the Absolute. Knowledge cannot start from sense-data, for these offer no means of transition to knowledge; neither can it start from general principles, for these enclose us in a vicious circle from which there is no escape. We must start from the complex situation itself, guided by the principle of coherence in a system.

The opponents or reformers of the formal logic who are criticised are Dr Schiller, Dr Mercier, and Mr Russell, and the criticism of them is not a challenge to their indictment of the syllogistic principle, but is intended to show that their own theories do not in principle abandon the ground taken up by the logic which they attack.

Every inference, Mr Bosanquet tells us, involves a judgment based on the whole of reality, though it may refer only to a partial system, and this need not be actual. This partial system he names a complex. I cannot help thinking the choice of this term unfortunate, because the complex has acquired such a prominent place in the Freudian theory. The Freudians have annexed the term to indicate a self-contained and closed-in system within a greater whole, although they denote a practical and not a theoretical system, psychological not logical in its nature.

Briefly stated in non-technical terms, Mr Bosanquet's contention is that inference is not a habit or custom acquired by observation of sequence

and uniformity, which enables us to anticipate experience with increasing confidence based on an increasing degree of probability. This is the type of inference which he calls linear. True inference is implication. Implication always means reference to a system. It involves a judgment based on the whole of reality, even though it refers to a partial system more or less completely closed-in and self-contained. The full force, and the whole force, of an inference lies in this reference to the whole of reality. Thus, to take one of his illustrations, in the assertion, "Two straight lines cannot enclose a space," the essential basis of inference is present, although the judgment may be immediate and independent of any intervening operation between starting-point and conclusion, because the assertion is implied in the nature of space, the system to which it refers, and this system must be different from what it is taken to be if the assertion is untrue.

I am sorry to find that Mr Bosanquet repeats in this book a criticism of Bergson which he made some years ago in *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, and which I gather from a footnote is also repeated in the recent new edition of his *Logic*, which I have not at hand to refer to. I am sorry, because I think on this particular point Bergson's doctrine is much nearer to Mr Bosanquet's than the words quoted from *Evolution Créatrice* could lead one to suppose. It is quite true that Bergson describes as the characteristic of intellect that "it deals naturally and solely with repetitions. Its function is to bind the same to the same." But this characteristic, in Bergson's view, is derived from the function of intellect and not its original nature. It is intellect which creates the fixity and stability and immobility which is presented to it as matter. The reason why the intellect is "in the main an observer of tautologies" is precisely because it is its essential work to generate that view of the flowing movement which makes it a field of action, and which gives to the human form of activity its specific mode. Is it not clear, I ask, that Bergson's logical theory, like Mr Bosanquet's, is to be appreciated only if we understand and accept, provisionally at least, the metaphysical doctrine on which it rests?

In regard to Mr Bosanquet's book generally, it is enough to say that all students of advanced logic must read it, and also that anyone who may be quite unfamiliar with the technical problems of logic may read it with ease, and will find more enjoyment than the title might encourage him to expect.

H. WILDON CARR.

KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON.

Theology as an Empirical Science. By D. C. Macintosh, Ph.D., Dwight Professor of Theology in Yale University.—London: Allen & Unwin, 1919.—Pp. xvi + 270.

THIRTY years ago there was published a volume of lectures by an American professor, whose early death deprived the theological world of a singularly attractive writer on the themes contained in this volume. It would be too much to say that the mantle of Professor Stearns has fallen upon Professor Macintosh. The qualities of the two writers are very different,

and while they necessarily have much in common in the selection of material and in methods of treatment, the individuality of the authors stands out very clearly, and the results vary in some important particulars.

The titles of the two books are different: the earlier work being *The Evidence of Christian Experience*, and the later *Theology as an Empirical Science*. But the titles suggest wider divergences than are to be found in the contents of the volumes. The apologetic interest suggested by the first title does not destroy the scientific character of the work, any more than the wider term "Theology" prevents Professor Macintosh from concentrating attention mainly on Christian experience and Christian doctrine. More formally, however, and more frequently scientific terms and methods are referred to by Professor Macintosh in order to show the possibility of regarding theology as an empirical science. Unweariedly and with considerable skill the outlines of a theology in all respects analogous to such experimental sciences as chemistry or biology are presented. If the physical sciences have their presuppositions and data and laws and theories, so too must theology, and these things will be similarly handled.

The presuppositions of empirical theology are held to be, over and above certain conclusions of the historical and natural sciences, freedom, immortality, sin, and, especially, the existence of God as "the ultimate object of religious dependence or the source of religious deliverance," whose attributes and relations are to be discovered by a scientific treatment of religious experience.

The data of empirical theology are the facts of the religious consciousness, or rather some of those facts, for Professor Macintosh is careful to remind us that "not all that has been experienced in historic religion is truly divine or really holy." Before we can get our data, therefore, a double sifting of the contents of consciousness is necessary. We must first separate the religious consciousness from the total consciousness of the moment, and then select from that narrower sphere of the religious consciousness such elements only as appear to have real and abiding religious value. "Religious perception is a special case of perception in a complex." Two questions are likely, therefore, to suggest themselves at the outset. (1) If we agree that our knowledge of the external world depends upon a selective power of the mind, upon the mind's ability to break up into parts what is first presented as an undifferentiated continuum, are we right in applying the same method in dealing with religious facts or realities? Is the world of religious reality to be explored in the same manner as the physical universe? Can we by any process of abstraction and analysis find God? Is the object of the religious consciousness simply one object among others, detachable from some larger whole, and capable of being known by the withdrawal of attention from all that we decide is not God? It may be that the value of the analytic method in the physical sciences depends upon the nature of the material with which they are concerned, or upon the kind of knowledge with which the scientist as such is content. (2) And further when we have decided that only certain facts of consciousness are religious data, we are confronted by the serious task of determining which of these data are valuable and which are valueless. Who, then, is to decide? All religions are asked to furnish evidence. "But it ought to be readily evident that the adoption of an objectively scientific method in theology will mean that religions other than the Christian are virtually invited to supply such data as their

experiences afford, as material for theological science." It is conceivable, the author thinks, that the important data are all transcended or re-duplicated in Christianity, but the evidence of each religion should be impartially considered. The most impartial judge, however, must know the principles in accordance with which judgment must be given. So Professor Macintosh supplies him with the pragmatic test, made critical or scientific. "Critical pragmatism passes over into science when a clear distinction is made between that working which constitutes full verification, and other working which falls somewhere short of it. When this distinction is applied in religious pragmatism, then we shall have alongside of the *novum organum* of inductive logic in general a *novum organum theologicum*, a new instrument for the criticism of religious thought and the discovery of religious truth, which will transform theology from mere religious common sense into an inductive empirical science."

The data of empirical theology obtained in this way are not mere images of the mind, but at least as real as other facts of experience. In religious perception, as in the perception of material objects, the mind is in contact with reality. It is one of the merits of the book that it distinguishes clearly between psychology and theology, or, if the word is preferred, between psychologism and theology. It is possible to find in the mental states the indication of the spiritual realities behind them. There is not simply an appreciative but a realistic apperception. Knowledge of reality is given in experience; and it is not always necessary to stop and ask, How can this be?—just as the chemist does not feel himself called upon to demonstrate that the elements with which he deals are something more than images. "There may, of course, be greater need for religious epistemology than for epistemology in general, because of the greater prevalence of religious scepticism than of scepticism as to the knowledge of things in general. But just as there may be much knowledge, and even scientific knowledge, of particular things without much knowledge about knowledge, so there may be much knowledge of God without much knowledge about this knowledge of God."

The data of empirical theology are facts of revelation, and they are found very specially in the historical religions accompanied by the inspiration of the teachers or prophets to whom they were communicated. Within the limits of experimental religion Professor Macintosh finds the most normative revelation of the divine in "the personal life and character of Jesus, 'the Christ,' the atoning 'work of Christ,' the resultant Christian experience of salvation, and the developing 'Kingdom of God.'"

But the empirical theologian, like the physical scientist, formulates laws as well as examines data, and of these the author gives a considerable number. First of all there is the dependableness of God. When there is the right religious adjustment the action of God can be relied upon. That is the foundation of all scientific religious experience, just as the constancy of nature is the ground of confidence in the investigations of natural science. Another example is: "On condition of the right religious adjustment with reference to desired truly moral states of the will (such as repentance, moral aspiration, and the moral elements in self-control, courage, victory over temptation, faithful service and patient endurance), God the Holy Spirit produces the specific moral results desired."

On the basis of these data and laws the empirical theologian may proceed to theoretical constructions, and to the assignment of attributes

to the God surely but dimly apprehended at the beginning. By the experience of the divine, when there has been the proper religious adjustment, a man is led to the knowledge of the goodness and greatness of God. Further, he comes to see that God must be existent in time or He could not have become the object of experimental religion. He must be realised as self-dependent, or He could not have satisfied the religious need for the Absolute. And similarly with other attributes usually associated with Deity.

The value of a work such as this depends not only upon the depth and extent of the author's religious experience, but also upon the use made of the writings of others. Dr Macintosh has said many things that are good and done much to justify the application of his method to theology. But there is need of a wider survey of the relevant facts, and a juster appreciation of what has already been provided in the biographies of the saints and the classical writings of the various religions. Traditional theology is based upon experience to a larger extent than is allowed for here. The New Testament may still be the best handbook of empirical theology, though the least formal and discursive.

H. H. SCULLARD.

LONDON.

From Authority to Freedom. By L. P. Jacks, LL.D., D.D.
London: Williams & Norgate, 1920.

THIS deeply interesting record of a remarkable man illustrates very forcibly the sad prediction of Christ that his coming would bring "not peace but a sword" upon earth, dividing families and breaking up domestic ties. The story of Charles Hargrove's life opens in the home of a stern Evangelical divine of the old school, imbued with a fanatical horror of Popery. In families of this type there was a strange tendency to make one of the children a scapegoat, and not infrequently the best of them was singled out for this treatment. So it was with Hargrove, whose parents early came to the conclusion that his soul was in imminent danger, and that it was their duty to scold and whip him into a better mind. Their worst fears were more than realised when at the age of twenty-two he joined the Roman Church, and four years later became a Dominican monk, a lapse from grace which embittered the old age and perhaps even shortened the lives of both his parents. The grief and indignation of the father's letters are most pathetic, because real affection is apparent under all the invective, and because we feel that Charles Frearson Hargrove unwittingly drove his son in the direction which he least desired him to take. The secession seems to have been made rather impulsively, and as a consequence of accepting that curious syllogism which was responsible for so many conversions to Rome in the days of the Tractarians. "God must have given to man a divine and supernatural revelation. There must be a living authority to interpret this revelation. No other Church except Rome even claims to be this authority." In Hargrove's case it was the major premiss which at last gave way, after he had been for ten years a Dominican. The record of his life in this Order is one of the most interesting parts of the book. There is something terrible in the effectiveness of the methods by which the door of escape is bolted and barred upon a convert who has been once captured.

Not only is he cut off from all outside influences, but to harbour doubt even for a minute is to commit a deadly sin. The wonder is that a man ever frees himself from an obedience which enthralls the soul more completely than the body. In Hargrove's case emancipation came after he was sent to Trinidad, where he began again to mix in society and to read secular literature. Doubts as to a supernatural revelation were reinforced by a revolt of the will against its servitude, and by a horror of the doctrine of eternal damnation, which was of course held by his parents as strongly as by the Church of his choice. The end came abruptly, but doubts may have been stifled for some time before they got the upper hand. He quietly left the Order, and returned to England, where, after drifting for a short time, he threw in his lot with the Unitarians, and had a career of varied usefulness and considerable distinction as a Unitarian minister at Leeds. His duties were too exacting to permit him to produce any important literary work, and there are signs that he would not have found it easy to concentrate himself for long on any one task; but his personal influence was wide and deep, and he was an excellent citizen. He had friends in other religious bodies, but he was inclined to exaggerate the disapproval with which the orthodox regard the society to which he belonged, a disapproval which his own brother was at no pains to conceal. He married some time after leaving the Roman Church, thereby cutting off the chance of return to it, though he felt the pull from time to time, as almost all who have been Roman priests do. The last half of his life seems to have been happy as well as busy, and when he died at a good old age, he had won the respect and affection of a large circle.

The biographer has done his work with great tact and skill, and has given us one of the most valuable religious biographies that have appeared in recent years.

W. R. INGE.

ST PAUL'S, LONDON.

George Tyrrell's Letters. Selected and Edited by M. D. Petre.
London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1920.

To supply a complete picture of the life and thought of Father Tyrrell these letters should be read with his books and biography, of which latter a short summary is provided at the beginning of the volume. By themselves they can yield no more than fragmentary glimpses, but are invaluable as a supplement and as throwing strong sidelights upon the darker places of his more formal writings. They reveal the inner workings of his mind and heart in a way impossible to the latter. For though his published works are plain-spoken, they could not but, in some degree, manifest the sense of restraint imposed by his relations to the Church at large and to the Society of Jesus in particular. These letters, without any circumlocution or *finesse*, display the conditions, internal and external, under which the larger works were written. Tyrrell did not commit himself to a detailed system. He would never have been the author of a new scholasticism. He was too well aware of the necessarily tentative and hypothetical character of all syntheses to fall into such an error. But his writings show clearly enough that a more or less complete *schema* was present to his mind, by which he sought to assure himself of his own position and reconcile the

Church's mission and message to the world with the progressive developments of science and philosophy. As regards the latter he was eclectic. The influence of St Thomas Aquinas never entirely deserted him, though largely modified by Kantian and Pragmatic views. Under the pressure of the inward impulse of his thought and the outer circumstances of his life, his theological opinions matured rapidly in his later years, till in *Christianity at the Cross Roads* he gave to the world a fuller expression of his general trend of thought than in any of his previous writings.

The "increasing purpose" that inspires his works is the conversion of the exaggerated intellectualism of dogma into moral and spiritual values. These latter elements have always been present in Christian dogma, but have been obscured by the Church's almost exclusive insistence on its theological aspect. The task he attempted—truly Herculean—was to effect a revaluation of dogma on these lines, so that these more permanent elements might attain their due predominance, while the theological sank into its humbler position of symbolic significance. This amounted to nothing less than the overthrow of the traditional ideas as to theology and authority, which are coeval with the history of organised Christianity, and which, though they reach their completest and most uncompromising development in Catholicism, are also common to the chief Protestant communions.

The authority that remained was moral. That of Pope and Hierarchy depended, as that of Christ and his Apostles, upon life and example, though he recognises the difficulty of this application of the idea (p. 105). It was a consistent application of his fundamental notion, which he derived from Kant, and on which he repeatedly insists, that the only valid proofs of the existence of God are moral (pp. 13, 26, 27, 108); that the conscience, not the individual or conventional, but the general spiritualised and divinised conscience of mankind, is the only real authority whether for belief or practice (pp. 35, 228 ff.). This conscience (he teaches in *Christianity at the Cross Roads*) was made flesh in Christ, who of all men came nearest to the fulfilment of the Ideal, and this is the true meaning of the Incarnation (p. 230.) The whole body of dogmas must be reinterpreted on similar lines. As for that notion of theological authority which puts its experts in the position of men of science and makes faith a kind of knowledge, and which culminated in the definition of Papal Infallibility, he will have none of it, though he has an unpleasant suspicion (doubtless justified by facts) that it is the inevitable development of a principle which can be traced to St Paul and even in St Matthew's Gospel (p. 104).

It is easy to see how the expression of such views, however guarded, inevitably brought him into collision with such a rigidly dogmatic system as that of Rome and of the Society of Jesus. That such antagonism existed and grew, with the growth of his thought, till it culminated in his excommunication, is a matter of history. In these letters he speaks plainly to correspondents of his hopes and fears, of his own faith in the ultimate triumph of his principles and of his efforts to maintain his position in the face of suspicion and opposition on the part of the authorities. It was a difficult position to maintain, and his sincerity leads him sometimes into interesting admissions of his doubts as to the complete validity of that valuation of dogma, which he may be said to have shared with all "advanced" theologians of every denomination. What made all the difference in Tyrrell's case was his Catholic priesthood and Jesuit member-

ship, and also that his acceptance of the theory was more thorough, consistent, and uncompromising than theirs. This is the distinguishing mark between Broad Catholicism and Liberal Protestantism, which latter, both in history and in dogma, keeps some absolute preserve, whether greater or less. Thus Harnack pins his faith to a doubtful text in St. Matthew, as Loisy showed in his *Évangile et l'Église*, and Anglican Broad Churchmen believe in the Trinity in some refined sense of their own while rejecting Transubstantiation as a later and unhistorical development. Tyrrell, as a Catholic, did not distinguish between the theological values of the doctrines defined by the Church as *de fide*. All are to be reckoned as parts of one whole. "The whole" (he writes on p. 57) "has a spiritual value as a construction of time in relation to Eternity. It gives us the *world* of our religious life. But I do not feel bound to find an independent meaning in each element; or to determine prematurely what elements are of literal, and what of purely symbolic, value—which is the core of historic fact and which idealisation. My faith is in the truth, shadowed by the whole creed." To take one dogma by itself, isolate it and question its credibility or historicity is not only un-Catholic, but uncritical and unhistorical. All the dogmas are interrelated and stand or fall together in the Church's system, just as all parts of knowledge are related to the whole. And even the older doctrines, as that of the Trinity, have an origin and a history comparable to those of the later developed, albeit not so clear owing to the paucity of early records. Hence Tyrrell saw quite clearly, and, in a letter to Lord Halifax (p. 132), put the matter with his usual sincerity, that, while so-called "Anglo-Catholicism" would be out of sympathy with the breadth of "Modernism," the Broad party in the Church of England would be equally so for another reason.

Yet, though in his published works he always treats the whole question on general lines and was opposed on principle to the attempt to apply the theory in detail, he gives some indications in this correspondence of the way in which he conceives his revaluation of dogma would affect particular doctrines. Thus, in a letter to A. F. (p. 63), he writes:—

"Is it not evident that there is often a difference of Yea and Nay between Modernism and popular Catholicism? Can the Christian religion admit the deliberate toleration of error, fable, and superstition out of deference to the ignorance of the crowd? . . . Mysteries and symbols are justifiable just so far as truth does not admit of plain statement. But have we a right to cover up in myths and fables those simple truths of Christianity? . . . If we tell them that Christ's body rose into the clouds, they will only laugh their whole religion to scorn. If we tell them that his self-sacrifice raised him above his fellows, to the level of God, they will understand and believe and love and imitate. The spiritual truth of the Eucharistic presence is within a child's comprehension; the carnal miracle of Transubstantiation is now a scandal to the meanest intelligence."

It will be observed that here, while a clear idea is substituted for the tory of the Ascension, this is not so in the case of Transubstantiation. Yet, after having so candidly stated his negative position, some positive declaration would have been welcome. And, indeed, could any case be imagined where a "plain statement" was more required, when it is considered that this dogma has been one of the greatest causes of misunderstanding between Catholics and Protestants of all grades. His prelude

leads the reader to expect this, and leaves him disappointed. His few remarks on the same important subject, addressed to Baron von Hügel (p. 59), are open to the same criticism:—"So, too, in affirming the philosophical concept of Transubstantiation, or of the Hypostatic union, she but protects the simple truths of revelation on which her affirmation formally falls." It seems to the present reviewer that it is just these "simple truths" which are by no means clear, or, if clear, then very much misrepresented by the dogmas, in view of the critical work done on the old documents of recent years, and especially of Loisy's commentary on the Gospels, wherein he shows that, shorn of all verbal accretions, the institution of the Eucharist was no more than a farewell meal.

Tyrrell is much more explicit on the doctrine of the Virgin birth (p. 58), in the same letter, but hardly more satisfactory. His explanations of this and other questions, here and elsewhere, are very ingenious, but the chief defect is that he seems to read a moral purpose (pp. 57-64) into early Christian mythology, which does not appear to have been present to the minds of its originators. It is, *e.g.*, hard to believe that the authors of the Ascension story (p. 64) had definitely in view the exaltation of Christ's moral grandeur rather than, primarily, an exhibition of super-sensible triumph and power, such as is displayed in certain miracles of the Gospel and which may have had some foundation in superphysical facts. It seems simpler and truer to assume that it is the mystico-magical element which here predominates in the story itself, and that this subsequently gains whatever moral aspect it possesses from the character of Jesus. This has surely been the order of development in all myth-making—first the story, then its moralisation; and if so, it is gratuitous to assume that the Christian myths originated differently. This would of course admit the theological element, of which myth is the *matrix*, into the very heart of what Tyrrell calls "revelation," which is contrary to one of his main principles, but it is simply a question of fact and criticism.

Yet he is wonderfully candid and sincere withal. He writes (p. 61): "To some extent symbolism is a sop to Cerberus. It will do for the present to keep the old and new believers in our Church. But eventually men will ask, Why express symbolically what can be said plainly, and *we shall have to criticise and define the just limits of symbolism.*¹ . . . Again, a good deal of our symbolic interpretation is apologetic afterthought and not quite honest. We should ask, Are we truly interpreting the meaning that the symbol strove imperfectly to express? . . . But then, if we can express it more clearly, why adhere to the symbol? . . . Altogether it seems to me a very complex problem."

"It cannot be denied that the desire of Modernists to hold to the Church at all costs (in which they are right) acts as a bias on their perfect candour and makes them too ingenious. . . . Courage is, I learn daily, the rarest of virtues; and have ceased to look for it—even in myself." In this connection it is interesting to quote from a letter (p. 158) included in that division of the volume which comes under the head of "Personal": "As to your analysis, I never claimed to be more than indifferent honest. As the nearest that man can come to wisdom is to realise his folly; so none is further removed from honesty than he who brags himself honest. I know I am but as a skein of silk that has been touzled by a kitten; still, in that I freely admit it, and also do heartily dislike the state of

¹ Italics are mine.

tangle, I am, at least in aspiration, honest *as any man of my experience* can be. For surely the shorter the thread, the less its capacity of implication; and it is easy for these Yorkshire ploughboys to be simple and straight, but very difficult for a *fin-de-siècle* Jesuit with all my circumstances and antecedents." Again he writes (pp. 108, 109): "Have you ever read John Morley's book on *Compromise*? It is a stronger plea for honesty than I yet feel equal to. But I think his hard sayings apply to those only whose convictions are fixed and subjectively certain, and so I may go on shuffling a little longer." "And yet I have the horrors on me, and feel tangled in the arms of some marine polypus or giant octopus. The Church sits on my soul like a nightmare, and the oppression is maddening; much more since these revelations of bad faith and cruel mendacity. . . . Hence I do long for *simpler* conditions, when I should not have to do good by stealth, and whisper the truth in holes and corners as though it were obscenity. The grotesque insincerity of my position as a Jesuit appals me at times. . . . And then something says: No, wait till you are driven. Initiate nothing. Yet if an opening offered I think my prudence would prove frail against the temptation."

The difficulty of such a position can be well imagined, and he felt it acutely. A man with exceptionally strong reasoning powers, with a correspondingly deep and wide religious sentiment, a nature utterly sincere and open and hating all shams, to find himself by fate and circumstances forced into a position in which his sense of loyalty to his Church and Order was in antagonism to the free expression of what he believed to be the truth—here were all the elements of a tragedy! It is easy for an outsider to say—Why, then, did he not secede? Tyrrell contemplated the possibility of such a step (p. 115), but only if he were "driven" (p. 109). Besides, he had the positive reason for remaining in the Roman Communion that he firmly believed in institutionalism. "The antinomy that I wrestle with," he writes (p. 113), "is that institutionalism, or externalism, is at once essential and fatal to religion." And he believed in each individual, so long as possible, remaining in the Communion from which his spiritual life had been drawn, as is shown by his letters of advice to would-be converts from other bodies (p. 254 ff.), and, in any case, he was utterly opposed to the formation of new sects (p. 111). Further, though he did not believe in the claims of the Catholic hierarchy to intellectual obedience, yet he could not but recognise the historical fact that the Roman Catholic Church was the Mother of all Churches in its jealously preserved continuity of doctrine, discipline, and ceremonial, and in its international extension (see pp. 31, 106, 112, 249). He did not desire to destroy but to fulfil, in the sense of reinterpreting its theology, or, rather, as he would have preferred to put it, bringing to light those hidden foundations which alone give that theology reality.

Although he disclaims optimism (p. 3), he must have been very much of an optimist to believe this possible, and he retained this optimism to the last, as is shown by numerous passages throughout these letters. His optimism was founded on the delusion, which recurs frequently in the course of the volume, that the pressure of the lay element in the Church would eventually bring about reforms which the hierarchy were struggling to withhold. One or two quotations will suffice as examples (p. 110): "One thing I am sure of—that, in spite of theory, the Church is ultimately taught and governed from below; that the formation of the

lay mind is the thing to trust in and work for." And (p. 21) "The millions of the near future will not be the docile, priest-worshipping crowds of dear old Ireland, but will be up in all these questions, now whispered in the ear among ourselves; and so we must get ready."

The chief way in which the "lay mind" has affected the Church in the past, apart from the movement that issued in the Reformation, has been by providing those superstitions which the Church has consecrated. At present, except in a very few cases, not only the uneducated, but even those who pass for educated among practising Catholics, accept quite uncritically the Church's authority as the basis for their belief in her dogmas. They are "blind led by the blind," and "the people love to have it so." The Roman authorities are not entirely fools and would not attempt to oppose a really strong movement in the laity. Those who wrote and published *Pascendi* and *Lamentabili* judged their Catholic public, on the whole, well.

Another thing which helped to keep Father Tyrrell from succumbing sooner than he did to the mental and moral struggle, which his views and position made inevitable, was his saving sense of humour. The "personal" letters are full of this, though one feels that many of his allusions are lost or obscured by the absence of the letters of his correspondents. At the end of the last chapter but one of the volume there is reprinted a delightful little article of his from the *Weekly Register* of 27th May 1899, in which, under the head of "Books that have influenced me," he makes a happy combination, as elsewhere, of the lightest persiflage with a serious philosophic view of life.

H. C. CORRANCE.

HOVE, SUSSEX.

The Beginnings of Christianity. Part I: The Acts of the Apostles. Edited by F. J. Foakes Jackson, D.D., and Kirsopp Lake, D.D. Vol. I. Prolegomena.—London: Macmillan & Co. 1920.—Pp. x+480.

IN the disputes concerning doctrine and practice which arose in the early Church, all parties appealed to Apostolic tradition and writings as the ruling authority in such matters. There is evidence of this in the literature of the second century, and the practice is still observed by the generality of Christian writers. Notwithstanding the numerous divisions in the Christian Church, and the fundamentally different views which are often held by opposing sections within it, Apostolic authority is invoked and accepted by nearly all as final. This is done because such tradition and writings are believed to repose on the teaching of the Apostles to whom the Founder of the Christian faith—so it is claimed—had delivered a certain deposit of doctrine and a body of ordinances. The claim is subjected to a scholarly investigation in the above volume which, by way of introduction to others that are to follow, is the first of a series. The conclusions arrived at on many points will no doubt cause a few to tremble "for the faith that is in them," but every lover of truth will welcome the work as a courageous and honest effort to present a clear and consistent picture of the beginnings of the Christian religion.

The book under review is divided into three parts, the first of which is devoted to the Jewish World; the second, to the Gentile world; and the

third, to the primitive Christian community. Most of the volume is the work of the editors, but Dr Montefiore, Messrs H. Duckworth and Clifford Moore, and Professor George Foot Moore have also contributed. Of five appendices, three are by the editors and two by Prof. G. F. Moore.

There has been no attempt to fit in the chronological data of the Synoptics, into the story of the Jewish state in Chapter I. The historicity of Jesus is assumed, and the reader will naturally infer that the editors have found no sufficient reason for rejecting the accepted theory that Jesus entered upon his public ministry and died during the procuratorship of Pontius Pilate. It may be their intention to discuss this part of the subject in a future volume, otherwise the omission of it from the present one must be regarded as a defect.

Dr Montefiore, in dealing with the spirit of Judaism, is somewhat apologetic in tone. He writes, however, with full knowledge of Rabbinical writings. He boldly states that Judaism taught no doctrine of original sin, that it cherished "a vigorous and healthy sense of human responsibility," and that this passage from the Mishnah—"The day of atonement atones for sins between man and his God; it does not atone for sins between man and his neighbour till he has become reconciled with his neighbour"—represents the considered doctrine of the Synagogue on the atonement. In its highest form, Rabbinical teaching regarded repentance as sufficient ground for forgiveness (p. 72).

The editors, in discussing thought and practice in Judaism, have given us the best treatment of the significance of the ministry of John the Baptist that has so far appeared in English. They exonerate the Pharisees from the charge brought against them in the Synoptic Gospels of making the law more difficult of observance by their use of tradition in interpreting its enactments, affirming that they aimed at making and succeeded in making the observance of it easier. The chapter on the Diaspora is a clear statement of the debt of the Christian Church to the work of the Jews who had settled abroad, especially at Alexandria.

Nothing better could be wished for on the Roman Provincial System than Mr Duckworth's admirable contribution, which is lucid in style and evinces complete mastery of the subject. The space of one short chapter for dealing with the schools of thought, cults, and the public activities of the Roman Empire compels Mr Clifford Moore to be brief in his treatment of his subject. He has given us, however, a valuable summary of the facts. If we are to indulge in a regret, it is that more has not been said about the life of the lower classes, to whom Christianity first appealed.

It is now generally admitted that Christianity was largely influenced by Greek philosophy, many of whose leading ideas were freely annexed in the development of its doctrines. "The ethics taught by the Stoic and the other schools," says Mr Moore, "with their emphasis on the individual life, formed a sound basis on which Christianity could build, and provided it with a body of doctrine which it could advantageously adopt . . . for it was the genius of Christianity to weld together into a new organic unity elements drawn primarily from Stoic ethics, from the later Platonic metaphysics, from Oriental mysticism, and from Roman administration, as well as from the faith and hope of Israel" (pp. 261-2). Christianity had something new to contribute to the ethics of the Greek schools, for, he adds, that "no philosophic system of ethics ever rose to the altruistic teachings of Jesus, or taught that love was to extend to one's enemies."

All this is true, though many will question whether it is the whole truth about the relation of Christianity to pagan ethics; for even the later Stoics failed to appreciate the new religion, notwithstanding the points of similarity between it and their system. Are we not to look for the causes of its unpopularity with the cultured classes of the Empire in a fundamental difference, which had its roots in a difference of attitude towards life?

Little has yet been published by English writers on the lines of Part III. of this book. What we have previously had are mostly translations of works published on the Continent. The editors discuss the teaching of Jesus, the life and thought of the primitive Christians, and Christology of the Synoptics and Acts. They deal with this part of the subject in a commendable critical spirit, for they obviously realise the importance of the subject in its bearing on popular Christianity, and conduct their investigations with caution. Professor Moore has made an independent study of the Messianic hope of the Jews, and handles his subject in his accustomed thorough-going fashion. If his conclusions overturn the generally accepted ideas, he, at least, speaks with the authority of a fearless scholar. It is a false notion, he writes, that the age of Jesus expected a warrior-Messiah. That expectation dated only from the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 A.D. Prior to this event, the Jews had looked for a peaceful ruler, and even in that form the "hope" could not be traced beyond the Hasmonean period.

It is difficult to summarise this part of the volume without the risk of injustice to the authors, for in the light of the context only can the reasonableness of their inferences be seen. Some indication of what it contains must, however, be attempted. Early Christian writers, it is averred, displayed no capacity for appreciating fine distinctions of meaning. They combined the titles "Son of Man," "Son of David," "Son of God," "Prophet like unto me," and "Messiah," and applied them to Jesus, notwithstanding that they connoted different conceptions. The idea of immortality was not a part of the Jewish Messianic hope, and nowhere figured as one of the blessings of the coming era. A belief in the "resurrection" exerted very little influence on Jewish faith. The conception of the end of this world, of a resurrection of the dead and of eternal bliss had originated in Persia. The "Kingdom of God" connoted for the Jews the sovereignty of God in the present life chiefly; whereas for the primitive Christians it referred primarily to the rule of God in a future life, though the Jewish notion is not altogether absent from the teaching of Jesus. There existed a body of Aramaic Christian literature before the Greek Gospels were written. The first part of the Acts is based upon this source, and in all probability Mark and Q. In the oldest synoptic strata Jesus is shown as a preacher of repentance because the Kingdom was at hand. He scarcely ever referred to himself. It is doubtful whether "Son of Man" in Mark can mean the Apocalyptic heavenly being, at least in a number of passages it is the equivalent of the Aramaic *barnasha* (man). Jesus, apparently, rejected the title "Son of David," which enthusiastic followers gave him. He did not centre his teaching on the nature of God, for the doctrine of the fatherhood of God was a popularly accepted Jewish conception. His teaching was concerned with the way men should live and become worthy children of the Heavenly Father. He did not contemplate founding a Church, neither did he command his disciples to baptize. He was

conscious of an indwelling divine spirit urging him to undertake his mission and persevere therein. It cannot be affirmed with any degree of certainty that Jesus identified himself with the "Suffering Servant." After his death he is called the "Son of God" by his followers, but on Jewish lips that meant no more than that every righteous man is a son of God. This relationship for a Jew was a moral and not a metaphysical one. His disciples identified him with the prophetic well-known picture of the righteous man suffering and misunderstood, soon after his crucifixion. He was, however, seen alive by the Apostles after his Passion, which brought them all back to Jerusalem to wait for the Parousia. They had a place of prayer of their own, but they remained faithful adherents of Judaism, and were recognised as such by the temple authorities. The communism practised among them was due to their expectation of a speedy Parousia. They lived on their capital and soon exhausted it. Poverty followed, which the less visionary Gentile churches helped to relieve. Circumstances made the election of the seven deacons necessary. This was a new step, and its results were tremendous; for Hellenistic influences and ideas poured in upon the primitive society. It was then that baptism was introduced, and the doctrine of regeneration was attached to it. Peter, evidently, was in sympathy with the new movement and its missionaries, but Paul became its chief champion. The other Apostles remained loyal to their Jewish conceptions. Both wings, however, emphasised the gift of the Holy Spirit, and the earliest Church is described as a society of those who through the Lord Jesus Christ had received the Holy Spirit. The belief that the Spirit was bestowed at baptism or by the laying on of hands is traced to this early stage of Church history.

It appears somewhat strange that the editors should have accepted the evidence for the inclusion of the reference to the Holy Spirit in the preaching of the Baptist as sufficient to outweigh the inherent improbability of it. Harnack, in his reconstructed Q, brackets the words Holy Spirit. The reference to the disciples of John in the Acts contradicts it, and Josephus knows nothing of it.

That Jesus was conscious of being controlled by the Spirit is evidently an inference drawn by reading between the lines, so to speak, for there is but one mention of the Spirit in Q, and the text there is uncertain. Luke has "finger," whereas Matthew reads "Spirit." The Lucan variant has the flavour of greater antiquity. Once only is the word "Spirit" placed in the mouth of Jesus in Mark (iii. 29). Indeed, in the Synoptic Gospels there is nothing more noticeable than the absence of references to the Spirit in the teaching of Jesus—unless it be the absence of reference to any baptism of the disciples by Jesus, and it is difficult to understand how our authors could have overlooked this important contribution to their argument that the rite was introduced after his death. Dr Lake, who elsewhere admits that the doctrine of transubstantiation is to be found in the Pauline Epistles as an element that was borrowed from paganism, affirms in this book that regeneration in baptism, which he also finds in the New Testament, is likewise traceable to pagan sources. It would thus appear that the whole fabric of sacerdotalism is a foreign accretion. If the cry "Back to Jesus" were translated into action to-day, what a revolution would follow in our methods of presenting the Gospel message!

Needless to say, all the difficulties involved in the Synoptics and in the theology of the Acts are by no means solved in this work. The editors

have, at least, shown us the road by which the truth may peradventure be reached, and for this the student of Christian origins may well be grateful. Amid so many merits, it is perhaps ungracious to draw attention to minor blemishes, but there is apparently a misprint on p. 189, where Aulus Gabinius is said to have been a pro-consul in Syria in 66 B.C. The period of office given by Mommsen is 57-54 B.C., so that the year 56 B.C. must be intended. So too in a footnote on p. 346, pp. 246 to 262 should be pp. 346 to 362.

M. B. OWEN.

THE PRESBYTERIAN COLLEGE,
CARMARTHEN.

The Revelation of John. By Arthur S. Peake, M.A., D.D.—London :
Joseph Johnson, 1919.—Pp. xiv + 390.

DR PEAKE tells us in his preface that it had not been his intention to publish anything on the Revelation of John. He had included this in the optional subjects for the Manchester B.D., with the expectation that Dr J. H. Moulton would take it. This, however, turned out to be impossible, and he had to lecture on the book himself. When he was called last year to deliver the "Hartley" lecture this subject appealed to him as being suitable and timely. The result is the present volume, which is a real contribution to the interpretation of a fascinating but, so often, fantastically treated book.

Circumstances have conspired of late years to deliver the Revelation of John from the clutches of those who fain would find in it a sketch of history from the earliest times to the end of the age. Our knowledge of Apocalyptic has grown. The work of Dr Charles has been most important, although his eagerly awaited commentary in the International Critical Series has not yet been published. There is general agreement now, among scholars who count, that the writer of Revelation is dealing with events of his own day, and that his predictions are for the immediate future that faces him. The difficulties into which "continuous-historical" and "futurist" interpreters have fallen have led to an escape being sought from the fetters of history by means of the theory that the book deals with principles, and not with history at all. This view was developed by Dr Milligan, but he did not succeed in showing that it presents a complete scheme of the book. The war aroused new enthusiasm on the part of those who endeavour to trace current events in the series of seals, trumpets and bowls, and their attendant signs. Har-magedon had come at last, and the Kaiser was certainly the Beast or, at least, the false prophet. The war has passed, and already the need is apparent that the riddle must be read differently, or given up. Experience teaches us that the latter alternative will not be taken. Mohammed, the Popes of Rome, Luther, Napoleon, and others have served their turn, yet failure to fulfil prediction causes no dismay among those who profess to have a key that fits the lock. Discredited at one point they plunge into fresh fancies, making their interpretation of this scripture a riot of futile freaks. Dr Peake follows the "præterist" method of interpretation, but with the concession that the writer of the Revelation often held mistaken views as to the meaning of the history of his own times. He will have nothing to do

with the attempts to fit the scheme of the book into the materials supplied either in Josephus or in Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. The result will be disappointing to those who believe that they can discern in the mysteries of the Revelation clear references to ancient history and to current events, who read into it the history of our own and future times drawn out in prophetic form. But for those who desire to gain some understanding of the meaning of this most prominent representative of the heroic stage of Jewish literature these pages will brim over with interest.

Controversy, sometimes of a lively character, has gathered around the Revelation of John from early days. The East would not accept it, but the West gave it enthusiastic support. That it "has retained its place in the Canon is due," Dr Charles declares, "not to its extravagant claims to inspiration or its apocalyptic disclosures, but to its splendid faith and unconquerable hope, that has never failed to awaken the corresponding graces in every age of the Church's history." Its contents have weighed more than its canonicity.

The matters concerning which controversy has been keenest are its date, its author, and its interpretation. Early testimony regarded it as belonging to the days of Domitian, but in more recent times there was a tendency to push back the date to before the destruction of Jerusalem. The references to the temple as still standing (chap. ii.) were deemed to require this. It was also felt necessary to provide some space between the Revelation and the Gospel if both were to be ascribed to John the Apostle. But the letters to the seven Churches reveal a state of things that could not have existed so early, and persecution on the scale that these letters describe did not occur until the reign of Domitian. Dr Peake, while he does not dogmatise, accepts the last decade of the first century as the most probable date of the completed book.

As to the authorship, Dionysius of Alexandria, in the second century, referred to the shadowy mention of the tombs of two Johns at Ephesus, and to the fact that there probably were many Johns in Asia. He also speaks of John Mark as a possible writer of the Revelation, although he does not give his sanction to this solution of the problem. He is definite, however, in his conviction that the John who wrote the Gospel and Epistles did not write the Revelation. The thought of to-day gravitates towards this position. The style of the Revelation is almost decisive in assigning its authorship to some other than the John of the Gospel. When an earlier date was given to the Revelation this difficulty might possibly have been met (although this is disputed), but since both books, in all probability, belong to the Domitian age this is no longer possible. The books belong to different orders of literature. The atmosphere of Revelation, speaking generally, is sensuous, that of the Gospel is spiritual and mystical. The objective and the tangible appear in the one; the speculative, the free initiative of the spirit, in the other. Many strands of evidence go to strengthen the opinion that the two books, although they have affinities, are not the product of one mind, but the strongest evidence is of a subjective, psychological character. Dr Peake finds it "easier to be confident as to negative than as to positive conclusions. That the Revelation was not written by the Apostle John nor by the author of the Fourth Gospel, and that it is not pseudonymous, are results which can claim a high probability. But beyond this it is difficult to go with any assurance."

It is when we come to the interpretation of the book that we are launched on uncharted seas. Völter, a pupil of Weizsäcker, originally propounded a redaction theory which met with no acceptance. Afterwards he modified this by combining it with a source hypothesis. Vischer, a pupil of Harnack, published in 1886 his theory that the Revelation was merely a Jewish writing worked over by a Christian author. Harnack was at first dubious as to this, but after hearing the arguments he described their effect on him by saying: "There fell from my eyes as it were scales." It is probable that, in addition to actual history and tradition (both from Jewish and mythical sources), there is in this book the record of a real spiritual experience. After criticism has done its best (or worst) to sift the sources of the writer's materials it remains that the book takes its present form by the will of its author, and in response to a deliberate desire to give expression to a definite design. It is a literary unity.

The references to contemporary history cannot be traced easily. The explanation of the wounded beast as referring to Nero Redivivus is to be traced to the Jesuit, Juan Mariene. Protestant expositors have learned from him the way to cultivate this field of topical allusion. Only in their interpretations they have generally turned against their teacher. It is evident that a great conflict is about to break out between Christianity and the Roman State religion. The book is full of glowing hope for the triumph of right. It seeks to inspire to courage those who are in danger of giving way to despair. When darkness seems about to descend the seer looks from the vantage point of heaven upon the world and declares that at eventide it shall be light. But this is not all. There are references to great Christian principles, although it is too much to say that these are always conspicuous, or always clear. There is a hardness that reveals the deteriorating influence of an age of persecution. The rough common sense of Luther seized upon this aspect of the book, "He cannot see that it was the work of the Holy Spirit. Moreover, he does not like the commands and threats which the writer makes about his book, and the promise of blessedness to those who keep what is written in it, when no one knows what that is, to say nothing of keeping it, and there are many nobler books to be kept." Of course, this attitude misses much that is valuable in the Revelation, but on the whole it is more helpful than the many attempts that have been made to conjure with its mysteries. Yet there is even more than this that reveals the spirit of the age in which the book was written. The enemies of goodness are regarded with an unconcealed hatred—without pity or relief of any kind. The reformers were on the right track in finding in it conflicting elements: mingled with much that is Christian there is much that is only cruel. Dr Peake refers to this in plain terms: "It is regrettable that a Christian writer should have permitted himself either to write or to borrow the description of the river of blood, which pours from the winepress till it is so deep that it reaches to the bridles of the horses and extends for a distance equivalent to the length of Palestine." Yet, even here, there is this to remember: "It is obvious that in the human sphere the spiritual movement is no quiet development, no unresisted advance, but a severe conflict, not only with external difficulties, but against resistance from within; in the conflict the victory is often to the lower, which may even attach spiritual forces to itself, alienate them from their true purpose and work their destruction." In the long run, however, the spiritual proves imperishable.

It may be that if we could have the quotation marks of modern literature in the Revelation, the task of interpretation would have been simplified. Some of the sentiments of his sources may not convey the writer's considered judgment. Yet evidently the writer had a way of his own in facing the problems of his own age, and the immediate acceptance of his book speaks eloquently for his success in the purpose he assayed. The border line between fact and figure has worn thin for us moderns. To some it seems all a puzzle.

" For there is nothing in it as it seems
Saving the King ; tho' some there be that hold
The King a shadow, and the city real."

Symbol there is, but how much symbol may be safely allowed is too large a question to discuss here.

There is nothing else in the New Testament literature to compare with this book. More than the letters of Paul or the Gospel of John, it is "an embodiment of average beliefs and hopes. . . . It expresses the faith and the temper of Christianity in the early years of its conflict, its struggle for existence against a hostile world." And it holds its own. Writers, such as Thomas Hardy, who describe the life of the common people bear eloquent though often unconscious testimony concerning its vogue among the vulgar. Its solution of the problem cannot be accepted. Plainly its predictions did not prove true. The poetic description of the New Jerusalem will not bear too literal dissection. It is not a picture of a heavenly consummation that utterly displaces earth's tragedy and disappointment. No sin is to enter it, but there are earthly kings who bring their treasures into it, and the wicked are just outside its gates. If any future is to be made worth while this vision must be left behind. It is a solution for an emergency, not a goal for humanity.

Dr Peake's book can be heartily commended. It reveals grip of the meaning and the message of the writing he sets out to interpret ; knowledge of the vast literature of the subject ; and sound exegetical skill. What one misses is arrogant dogmatism, and the Revelation of John has suffered too much and too often from this. As Tennyson said in reference to some dogmatic summary : "That is the quick decision of a mind that sees half the truth."

J. C. MANTRIPP.

COALVILLE, LEICESTER.

Les Mystères Païens et le Mystère Chrétien. Par Alfred Loisy.—Paris :
chez Émile Nourry, 62 Rue des Écoles. 1914.—Pp. 368, 8vo.

ALTHOUGH delayed in its appearance by five years of war, this book cannot fail to influence deeply the thought of all students of Christian origins. It was complete on August 1, 1914, as its title-page indicates, but was actually published only in 1919. Nevertheless, it has more than mere freshness. It is the work of a great scholar, profoundly qualified for his task by years of marvellous industry in biblical research, later widened into the field of the general history of religion, and now bending all his powers to the supreme problem of comparative religion—the triumph of Christianity in its struggle with the mystery-religions for the prize of Græco-Roman civilisation.

The subject is no longer new. Since Reitzenstein and Cumont we have had a whole series of discussions, ranging from some leaders of English scholarship down to popular works more or less partisan in their treatment. That of Loisy needs no apology for its late appearance. It treats the whole subject with the grasp of a master hand. Especially will the careful reader be grateful for the copious citation in the original, in abundant footnotes, of the often recondite sources on which our knowledge of the mystery-religions depends. Loisy shows here, as in his great commentaries, that he is not content to take his information at second hand. Successively in chapters ii. to vi. he analyses for their content of religious ideas the mysteries of Dionysus and Orpheus, of Eleusis, of Cybele and Attis, of Isis and Osiris and of Mithra. Thereafter follows in chapters vii. to x. Loisy's critical conception of the Gospel of Jesus and of the Risen Christ, the Gospel of Paul, the Christian Initiation (by which is meant the significance attached by the early Church to its two sacraments), and the Conversion of Paul and Birth of Christianity.

We owe a debt of gratitude to the clear, discriminating mind and the persuasive pen which can set before us in its most convincing light the debt of Christianity to the mystery-religions. There will be few unprejudiced minds to deny that the debt is great. The gospel of Jesus conquered by becoming "the mystery of the kingdom of God," as it is explicitly called in our oldest Gospel. Nevertheless, the more completely and effectively the evidence is marshalled in the effort to prove that "Paul found means to transform the sense of the two sacraments" (p. 269) and otherwise remoulded the faith he had formerly persecuted, the further do we find ourselves from admitting Loisy's explanation of the transition from the Galilean gospel of Jesus to the Pauline gospel about Jesus to be adequate. He has made the utmost of the Hellenising influences which to some extent must in reality have affected Paul, but he has failed to observe that fundamentally the glorified Saviour to whom Paul's allegiance is given is not conceived in the image or likeness of any of the saviour-gods of the mystery-religions, but fundamentally and directly on the Exalted Servant of Deutero-Isaiah, who suffers death to achieve Israel's mission of "justifying many," whose life is made an offering for sin, but thereafter "divides the spoil of the strong" (LXX.), is exalted and made very high, "to make intercession for transgressors." According to Loisy (p. 328, n. 4), "Paul does not found his theory of redemption in any way upon this text" (Is. lii. 13–liiii. 12). It was only through the Hellenistic Jews whom he had encountered in his persecuting career far away from Jerusalem that he became acquainted with the doctrine of propitiation through the death and resurrection of Jesus to make intercession with God. In spite of what Paul says regarding the agreement of his gospel with the teaching of the Galilean apostles in 1 Cor. xv. 1–11, and of the implication of his challenge to Peter in Gal. ii. 16, Loisy maintains that this entire element, indeed everything that goes beyond a mere nationalistic reformed Judaism, is an importation by Paul from foreign sources into the simple teaching of Jesus and his Galilean followers. "Honest Peter will not have known what to make of Paul's outbreak in Gal. ii. 15–21."

It is not strange that Loisy should adopt the extreme view of Professor Percy Gardner regarding the "Origin of the Lord's Supper," treating the description of the ritual in 1 Cor. xi. 23–25 as based, not on the traditional practice of all the churches "from (ἀπό) the Lord," but upon a special

revelation of his own. The "transformation" is thus made more conceivable. But how can we conceive the original conversion of Paul himself to a gospel and a Messiah so uncongenial to a Hellenistic Jew of his culture and propensities? If we strip the religion Paul persecuted of every element which could make appeal to one whose religious experience was such as his letters describe, we make it impossible to account for his conversion otherwise than as an arbitrary act of divine intervention.

The key to the great transition is certainly the religious experience of Paul, and Loisy does well to so arrange his material as to lead up to this as its culmination. But the explanation falls short of producing conviction. A great factor is felt to be wanting. It will not be supplied until more adequate consideration is given to the Jewish side of Paul's nature and training. We need more light upon the later development and influence of the Isaian doctrine of the Servant, along such lines as those pursued by Oesterley in his *Jewish Doctrine of Mediation*. After we have studied what Paul calls "the gospel of reconciliation" committed to every preacher of Christ in its whole development from Deutero-Isaiah through the Wisdom literature and Apocalypse down to the rabbinic, we shall be better prepared to appreciate at its true value the modicum of influence exerted upon primitive Christianity by the mystery-religions.

B. W. BACON.

UNIVERSITY OF YALE.

Rousseau and Romanticism. By Irving Babbitt.—Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919.

THIS is not an ordinary book on Rousseau. There are certainly a large number of references to him, but there is no attempt to give a systematical treatment. Rousseau is taken as a convenient representative, especially as the imitator of a type of romanticism. Literature, and indeed mental activity generally, have been permeated since Rousseau's time with a Rousseauistic philosophy of life. Mr Irving Babbitt pays Rousseau a high compliment when he emphasises his influence, and at the same time tells us that the total tendency of the Occident is at present "away from rather than towards civilisation." "Everything," said Rousseau, "is good as it comes from the hands of the Author of Nature; but everything degenerates in the hands of man." Here we have the manifesto of modern naturalism, especially as it appealed to the new romanticists of France, Germany, and England at the end of the eighteenth century and through the nineteenth century. It is, then, this naturalism of Rousseau, rather than Rousseau himself, that Mr Babbitt submits to a searching criticism of about 400 pages. The particular form of naturalism with which he specially concerns himself to deal faithfully is that of "emotional naturalism." Therein he finds the very essence and certainly the logical development of modern Romanticism in literature and in art, as it derives from the Rousseauistic basis.

Mr Babbitt, it should be stated, is the Professor of French Literature in Harvard University. The philosophical influence exerted by such thinkers as William James and Josiah Royce has created in Harvard an atmosphere far beyond the range of their immediate subjects of teaching. Both these philosophers sought to bring philosophy into direct touch with life, and with all the subjects bearing upon the

life of thought. Harvard writers accordingly tend to become much more than mere specialists in their subjects. They often attain to the high distinction of taking up the attitude towards their subjects of philosophical specialists. This is the case of Professor Irving Babbitt. He is Professor of French Literature at Harvard, but his book on *Rousseau and Romanticism*, whilst it is informed with a rare mastery of not only French literature, but also of European literary authors (and indeed keeps an alert outlook on the literature of the East), is yet essentially a philosophical treatise. For it attempts to bring literary tendencies, in their final form, to their underlying human implications, and to bring them under the teleological searchlights of philosophy. Nor is it only in the more philosophical significance of literary tendencies that Professor Babbitt shows his deep interest. The whole book is characterised by the desire to bring literary and artistic activity into the domain of psychological as well as philosophical reflection. As Pestalozzi declared his desire to "psychologise" education, Professor Babbitt brings psychology to the interpretation of mental aspects of literature, both as individual and as national mental products, and indeed as world mental products. His whole treatment is synthetic—in the direction of inducing a unifying of critical judgment as to the aims of life, and of thought, and of the expression of thought in literature. If there be "ends" in life, in thought, and in expression, and if all knowledge be one, then a unity will be discoverable in literature, in art, and in all the concrete products of thought. Romanticism has endeavoured to pursue one of these aims, in detachment, viz. "emotional naturalism," and this aim in Professor Babbitt's view is entirely unsound and against the interests of all that is best in man. It is a form of sectionalism in literature, as a trades union is in social life, and must never be accepted as an interpretation of the whole aim of life. His book is, therefore, a comprehensive inquiry into the modern developments of the tendency, and includes a presentation of an enormous variety of modern literary subject-matter, of keen attractiveness alike to the literary man, the philosopher, and the general reader. It is a philosophical and psychological inquiry, based on a wide exercise of criticism and a collection of literary material of all kinds. It is a strenuous essay combining critical, philosophical, and especially psychological judgments on a great ingathering of the results of wide and constantly thoughtful reading. It is an attempt to combine the concrete with the abstract outlook, and it certainly is calculated to stimulate the reader to the exercise of both attitudes. The book both moves and lives in a psychological atmosphere. The author thinks psychologically about literature, and requires the reader to do the same. To put it at its least, the literary man may get some insight into what is meant by psychology, and the psychologist may get a new impulse towards literature.

It will be seen, then, that Professor Babbitt's attitude towards the special subject of his inquiry—the "emotional naturalism" which he associates with the name of Rousseau (though he is clearly more concerned with its manifestations in our midst to-day)—is emphatically negative. It might be thought that his main characteristic would be that of destructive criticism. This, no doubt, is so, at any rate superficially. But his positive aim so constantly shines through his attacks on the chaotic vagaries of uncurbed individualistic tendencies that Professor Babbitt is no impartial spectator of the literary scene. The contest is the old one

(however varied the forms of literary criticism)—that of Classicism versus Romanticism. The following passage will show Professor Babbitt's line of sympathy:—

“To follow nature in the classical sense is to imitate what is normal and representative in man, and so to become decorous. To be natural in the new sense, one must begin by getting rid of imitation and decorum. Moreover, for the classicist, nature and reason are synonymous. The primitivist, on the other hand, means by nature the spontaneous play of impulse and temperament, and inasmuch as this liberty is hindered rather than helped by reason, he inclines to look on reason not as the equivalent, but as the opposite of nature.”

This is excellently put, and constantly, in substance, kept before the reader in a way which may be said to express the negative of Romanticism of the emotional type, whilst the underlying suggestion of the correlative position calls for constructive consideration which the reader is unconsciously drawn into contemplating. The thorough-going criticism of Romanticism is provided for by the following chapters: Romantic Genius, Romantic Imagination, Romantic Morality: The Ideal; Romantic Morality: the Real; Romantic Love; Romantic Irony: Romanticism and Nature; and Romantic Melancholy.

Professor Babbitt offers many surprises. For instance, Browning can pass as a prophet only with the half-educated person, “the person who has lost traditional standards and failed to work out with the aid of the ethical imagination some fresh scale of values, and in the meantime lives impulsively and glorifies impulse.” On Browning's poem, *Summum Bonum*, with its “Brightest truth, purest trust in the universe—all were for me In the kiss of one girl,”—Professor Babbitt remarks, “the supreme good it would appear is identical with the supreme thrill.” The author is ready with his apophthegm in his treatment of materialistic naturalism. “It makes man efficient without making him ethical.” And again, he sums up the effect of science on human progress: “If scientific discipline is not supplemented by a truly humanistic or religious discipline, the result is unethical science, and *unethical science is perhaps the worst monster that has been yet turned loose on the race*”!

Professor Babbitt, as a critic, must look for some fierce criticism on himself. He considers some of William James's views as “romantic fallacies,” and of Bergson he says he, “more than any living Rousseauist, reminds one of the German romantic philosophers.” Professor Babbitt, at any rate, is a “live man,” and his criticisms on literary men and philosophers abound in warmth and colour. And, in the cause of a “positive and critical humanism,” as opposed to an emotional romanticism in literature, art, and life, he is full of conviction.

The book is very unequal. Yet sometimes it is worth waiting to get some uncommonly suggestive ideas. Thus, a notion of Professor Babbitt's treatment of his subjects may be got from such a passage as the following:—

“What binds together realism and romanticism is their common repudiation of decorum as something external and artificial. Once get rid of decorum, or, what amounts to the same thing, the whole body of ‘artificial’ conventions, and what will result is, according

to the romanticist, Arcadia. . . . The Rousseauist begins by walking through the world as if it were an enchanted garden, and then with the inevitable clash between his ideal and the real he becomes morose and embittered. Since men have turned out not to be indiscriminately good, he inclines to look upon them as indiscriminately bad, and to portray them as such. At the bottom of much so-called realism, therefore, is a special type of satire, the product of violent emotional disillusion. The collapse of the Revolution of 1848 produced a plentiful crop of disillusion of this kind. . . . The imagination is still idealistic, still straining, that is, away from the real, only its idealism has undergone a strange inversion; instead of exaggerating the loveliness it exaggerates the ugliness of human nature; it finds a sort of morose satisfaction in building for itself *not castles but dungeons in Spain.*"

FOSTER WATSON.

ORPINGTON, KENT.

Preaching. By Rev. W. B. O'Dowd.—London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1919.—Pp. x+233.

THIS book is a manual, and one of a series—The Westminster Library—for Catholic Priests and Students. It has been written, so the Preface tells us, "with the purpose of rendering the Catholic pulpit even a little more effective, and of helping the average preacher." To readers outside the pale of the Roman Catholic Church there is something refreshing, if not indeed novel, in the simple title of the book. In my own particular communion, nourished as we have been on the Lyman Beecher Foundation lectures, including those of Brooks, Dale, Stalker, Boyd Carpenter, and others, such a title is familiar enough, but in the present connection it wears an aspect almost of newness.

Notwithstanding the wide renown of great Catholic preachers in the past, such as Bossuet, Bourdaloue—"the first model of good preachers in Europe" (Voltaire)—and Lacordaire, members of different communions do not usually couple, at least in a high degree, the gift of preaching with the priestly vocation of the Romish Church. Nor is this view of non-Catholics the result of prejudice; it is grounded on fact. The present author admits that such is the case, and complains about it. In the first chapter—"The Ministry of the Word"—he blames those priests who make overmuch of the sacramental office to the neglect of the preaching vocation. They are apt, says he, to regard the sermon as a task, and not a privilege. Preaching, then, has not in the Catholic communion the high place given it in other communions. Hence the novelty of the subject.

The manual is called forth by and answers a need long felt by those who have the Catholic religion at heart. Whatever the sacramental office has effected in the past—and it has no doubt done much,—modern conditions insist upon more appealing pulpit ministrations than in olden days. The need, of course, is not peculiar to the Romish Church. It is a problem which confronts other churches as well. All the Christian world over, there has never been a time when a live and influential pulpit is more in demand than the present. But the need for better preaching is

more acutely felt by the Catholic Church than all others, and for two obvious reasons, if for no others that might be mentioned, namely, that the long preparation for the priesthood is not specially the best for effective preaching, and that the sermon in the service ranks below the highest. That is, the priest is first priest, and then preacher.

The book is pleasant to read. The arrangement is clear; the language is direct, simple, and often crisp. The subject is dealt with in a sensible manner and from a modern point of view, and the human note is not absent.

No one, of course, could write on a theme such as this without repeating many old familiar things, but these are not unwelcome provided they come to us in an unfamiliar setting, as they do here. But the work has been conceived in a Catholic atmosphere, and it is in this, inevitably, it differs from other works of the homiletic class. True to character, the author dwells a good deal on the Fathers and their literature. There is no mistaking the Catholic ideas of tradition and continuity. The models and the studies for the budding preacher are fetched from afar, and it is not easy to see where else their betters can be found. The Patristic element in this book is its outstanding feature. It would pay those who are not Catholics to know what the Fathers say on the question of preaching. Take this saying of St Bernard's: "If, then, you are wise, you will show yourself rather as a reservoir than as a water-pipe."

The author urges upon young priests the diligent study of Leo the Great, Gregory, Cyprian, Augustine, and Chrysostom; and, among the moderns, calls special attention to Newman's *Parochial and Plain Sermons*. "St Augustine's Views on Preaching" is the subject of the fourth chapter. Such views are found in the fourth book of *De Doctrina Christiana*. According to this great Father, the first factor in preaching is wisdom—spiritual wisdom, and after this, eloquence. As to the scope of preaching, it is threefold: it is to teach, to give pleasure, and to persuade. These three objects have their corresponding styles—that is, the quiet style, the ornate, and the vehement. St Augustine has a remark which might bring consolation to some. He thinks others' sermons might well be borrowed by those who can make none themselves, and escape the charge of piracy. As to the use of Scripture in preaching (chap. viii.) most readers would agree with the author up to the point where he begins to discuss the various interpretations. Some of the rules that used to govern these latter are long since outworn, that is, as far as we and many others are concerned. Moreover, we come into collision with the author in regard to what he has to say in chapter x. on "Apologetical Conferences." We certainly appreciate the modernity of Father O'Dowd in his desire to bring apologetics into line with contemporary knowledge, but we doubt if the old rational proofs of religion are worth "retouching and rejuvenating" (p. 174). In the last chapter (xi.) various types of sermons are discussed—six kinds in all. Bearing on sermons for children, he points out the value of that gift for which the word *polypsychism* is sometimes used; that is, "the genius of entering into the conceptions of minds differently constituted from our own" (p. 200). The four appendices at the end of the book are curious and interesting.

JAMES EVANS.

INDEX.



ARTICLES.

- ACADEMY, THE ROYAL, ITS PICTURE SHOW AND HIGHER CRITICISM OF ART, 714.
- APOCALYPTIC, JEWISH, AND THE MYSTERIES, 95.
- BOLSHEVIST UTOPIA, THE, AND THE RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA, 209.—
- BRETCHGIRDLE, JOHN, THE MINISTER WHO BAPTISED SHAKESPEARE, 767.
- BYRON'S "CAIN," 74.
- CHRIST, IS HE ALIVE TO-DAY? TWO OR THREE WITNESSES, 361. ✓
- CHRIST, THE MYSTERY OF, 743.
- CHURCH OF ENGLAND IN CANADA AND REUNION, THE, 729.
- CHURCH, THE, SHALL WE REMAIN IN? A LAYMAN'S VIEW, 145.
- CLERGY, THE POVERTY OF THE, AND THE WIVES OF THE CLERGY, 737.
- CRITICISM, HISTORICAL, DOES IT IMPERIL THE SUBSTANCE OF CHRISTIAN FAITH? 321. —
- DISAPPOINTED, WHY WE ARE, 5.
- EDUCATION, A NEW BIRTH FOR, 49. —
- ENGLAND, MOTHER, 154.
- ETERNAL LIFE, THE, OF LOVE, 289. —
- EUCLID, NEWTON, AND EINSTEIN, 425.
- EVANGELISM OLD AND NEW, 581.
- GENIUS, THE CHILD OF, 572.
- HUMANISM: AN EXPERIMENT IN RELIGION, 27. —
- IDEALISM, EFFECTIVE, THE CONDITIONS OF, 659. —
- INDUSTRIAL UNREST: A PLEA FOR NATIONAL GUILDS, 113. —
- ITALY, THE MIND OF, 525. —
- LEAGUE, THE, OF NATIONS, THE CITY ON EARTH, THE CITY IN HEAVEN, AND, 459. —
- VOL. XVIII.

- LIFE AND DEATH : CONSIDERATIONS ON A POEM OF THOMAS HARDY, 275.
 LIQUOR CONTROL AND THE CARLISLE EXPERIMENT, 557.
 >MAN IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY, 776.
 -MORAL IDEAS, THE VALUE OF, 225.
 -PASCAL, THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF, 753.
 -PELAGIANISM, THE, OF TO-DAY, 486.
 -POLITICS, PRACTICAL, TIME AND PLACE IN, 125.
 -PRIMITIVE ART AND MAGIC, 544.
 -PRIMITIVE, WHAT IS? 378.
 PROGRESS, IS IT AN ILLUSION? 18.
 RELIGION AND RESEARCH, THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF, 702.
 RELIGION AND THE CHURCHES, 534.
 RELIGION AND THE STATE, 641.
 RELIGION, ETHICAL, 687.
 RELIGION, REGROUPED : A HIGH CHURCHMAN'S VIEW, 129.
 RETREATS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 788.
 REUNION IN THE SCOTTISH CHURCH AND THE PROPOSED ARTICLES, 240.
 RIPE ULTERIORIS AMORE, 519.
 SANITY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF, 509.
 SPIRITS AND SPIRITISTIC PHENOMENA, A BUDDHIST VIEW OF, 721.
 SPIRITUALISTIC, THE PHENOMENA KNOWN AS, THE ATTITUDE OF THE
 CHURCH THERETO, 259.
 STARS AND FLOWERS, 311.
 SURVIVAL AND MONADOLGY, 495.
 TAMIL ÇAIVAS, SAINTS AND PHILOSOPHERS AMONG THE, 470.
 THAUMATURGY IN THE BIBLE : A PROTEST FROM WITHIN THE CHURCH OF
 ENGLAND, 345.
 TIME, ETERNITY, AND GOD, 36.
 WARD, MRS HUMPHRY, AND THE THEOLOGICAL NOVEL, 675.
 WARD, WILFRID, 61.
 WORLD-LOVE, 301.

Astley, H. J. Dukinfield, M.A., Litt.D., Rev., Primitive Art and Magic, 544.

Bidwell, Edward J., Right Rev. Bishop, The Church of England in Canada and Reunion, 729.

Boutroux, Emile, Prof., The Value of Moral Ideas, 225.

Broad, C. D., M.A., D.Litt., Euclid, Newton, and Einstein, 425.

Brooke, Stopford A., M.A., LL.D., Rev., Byron's "Cain," 74.

- Cadoux, A. T., D.D., Rev.*, Evangelism Old and New, 581.
- Caillard, Emma Marie*, Man in the Light of Modern Psychology, 776.
- Caldwell, W., M.A., D.Sc., Prof.*, A New Birth for Education, 49.
- Carpenter, J. Estlin, D.Litt., D.D., Rev.*, Saints and Philosophers among the Tamil Çaivas, 470.
- Chapman, Edward M.*, Mother England, 154.
- Cook, Stanley A., M.A.*, The Interdependence of Religion and Research, 702.
- Cooke, Harold P., M.A.*, Ripæ Ulterioris Amore, 519.
- Curtis, William A., D.D., D.Litt., Rev. Prof.*, Reunion in the Scottish Church and the Proposed Articles, 240.
- Douglas, Sir George, Bart.*, The Child of Genius, 572.
- Drake, Durant, M.A., Prof.*, Shall we remain in the Church? A Layman's View, 145.
- Fripp, E. I., B.A., Rev.*, The Minister who baptised Shakespeare, 767.
- Harper, J. Wilson, D.D., Rev.*, Industrial Unrest: A Plea for National Guilds, 113.
- Hoare, F. R.*, The Conditions of Effective Idealism, 659.
- Hocart, A. M.*, What is Primitive? 378.
- Holmes, Edmond*, The Psychology of Sanity, 509.
- Inge, W. R., D.D., Very Rev. Dean*, Religion and the State, 641.
- Jacks, L. P., M.A., D.D., LL.D., Rev. Principal*, Why we are Disappointed, 5.
- Jelf, Ernest A., Master of the Supreme Court*, Time and Place in Practical Politics, 125.
- Jourdain, Miss E. F., Principal of St Hugh's College, Oxford*, The Religious Philosophy of Pascal, 753.
- Lacey, T. A., Rev. Canon*, The Pelagianism of To-day, 486.
- Langford-James, R. LL., D.D., Rev.*, Regrouped Religion: A High Churchman's View, 129.
- Lethaby, W. R., Prof.*, The Royal Academy Picture Show and Higher Criticism of Art, 714.
- Lodge, Sir Oliver*, The Attitude of the Church to the Phenomena known as Spiritualistic, 259.
- Mackenzie, J. S., Litt.D., LL.D., Prof.*, Ethical Religion, 687.
- Martin, Eva*, Stars and Flowers, 311.
- Maynard, Miss Constance*, Is Christ alive To-day? Two or Three Witnesses, 361.
- Means, Stewart, D.D., Rev.*, The Mystery of Christ, 743.
- Mercer, J. Edward, Right Rev. Bishop*, Survival and Monadology, 495.
- Mozley, J. R., M.A.*, The Eternal Life of Love, 289.
- Paget, Mrs Elma K.*, The Poverty of the Clergy and the Wives of the Clergy, 737.
- Petre, Miss M. D.*, The City on Earth, the City in Heaven, and the League of Nations, 459.
- Plater, Charles, S.J., M.A., Rev.*, Retreats and Reconstruction, 788.

- Price, E. J., M.A., Rev. Prof.*, Jewish Apocalyptic and the Mysteries, 95.
Rawnsley, H. D., Rev. Canon, Liquor Control and the Carlisle Experiment, 557.
Re-Bartlett, Signora Lucy, The Mind of Italy, 525.
Rolleston, T. W., M.A., Life and Death: Considerations on a Poem of Thomas Hardy, 275.
Silva, W. A. De, A Buddhist View of Spirits and Spiritistic Phenomena, 721.
Smith, Henry Preserved, D.D., Rev., Religion and the Churches, 534.
Stebbing, T. R. R., F.R.S., Rev., Thaumaturgy in the Bible: A Protest from within the Church of England, 345.
Stewart, Herbert L., M.A., D.Ph., Prof., Mrs Humphry Ward and the Theological Novel, 675; Wilfrid Ward, 61.
Troubetzkoy, Eugène, Prince, The Bolshevist Utopia and the Religious Movement in Russia, 209.
Wade, G. W., D.D., Rev., Does Historical Criticism imperil the Substance of Christian Faith? 321.
Walker, Leslie J., S.J., M.A., Rev., Time, Eternity, and God, 36.
Wilson, Sir Roland K., Bart, Humanism: An Experiment in Religion, 27.
Wootton, Mrs Barbara, Is Progress an Illusion? 18.
Younghusband, Sir Francis, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., World-Love, 301.

DISCUSSIONS.

- Broad, C. D., M.A., D.Litt.*, Reply to Mr Sexton, 802.
Brocklehurst, T. R., Rev., "Why we are Disappointed," ii. 386.
Capleton, Edward, "Is Christ Alive To-day?" i., 591.
Carter, Thomas, "Is Christ Alive To-day?" ii., 592.
Cowper, Frank, Dr Langford-James, Professor Drake, Sir Rowland Wilson, 386.
Dallas, Miss H. A., "Life and Death," 595.
Finlay, Miss Beth, "Evangelism Old and New," 799.
Grant, James B., Rev., Professor Curtis on Ecclesiastical Reunion, 597.
Langford-James, R. Ll., D.D., Rev., "Regrouped Religion," 594.
Marriott, John T., "Thaumaturgy in the Bible: A Protest from within the Church of England," 593.
Maynard, Miss Constance L., "Is Christ Alive To-day?" 803.
Moffatt, James, D.D., Rev. Prof., "Why we are Disappointed," i., 384.
Ovenden, Charles T., Very Rev., "The Fetter on Protestantism," 164.
Pearson, Arthur A., "Humanism: An Experiment in Religion," i., 387.

- Powell, W.*, "Survival and Monadology," 803.
Poynter, J. W., "Regrouped Religion," 390.
Rose, Samuel P., Rev., "Humanism: An Experiment in Religion," ii., 388.
Sexton, G. A., "Euclid, Newton, and Einstein," 801.
Symonds, Herbert, Rev., "A Liberal Churchman's Allegiance to the Creeds," 167.
Vizard, P. E., "Religion and the Churches," 798.

 REVIEWS.

- Astley, H. J. Dukinfield, M.A., Litt.D., Rev.*—R. H. Malden, *The Old Testament: Its Meaning and Value for the Church of To-day*, 630.
Bacon, Benjamin W., D.D., Prof.—Alfred Loisy, *Les Mystères Païens et le Mystère Chrétien*, 834.
Boutwood, Arthur.—Stewart A. McDowall, *Evolution and the Doctrine of the Trinity*, 201.
Broad, C. D., M.A., D.Litt.—A. N. Whitehead, *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge*, 397.
Carpenter, J. Estlin, D.Litt., D.D., Rev.—K. Kohler, *Jewish Theology systematically and historically considered*, 417.
Carr, H. Wildon, D.Litt., Prof.—Bernard Bosanquet, *Implication and Linear Inference*, 817.
 Henri Bergson, *L'Énergie Spirituelle: Essais et Conférences*, 184.
Cook, Stanley A., M.A.—Edward Carpenter, *Pagan and Christian Creeds*, 620.
Corrance, H. C.—M. D. Petre, *ed.*, *George Tyrrell's Letters*, 822.
Coulton, G. G., M.A., D.Litt.—Cuthbert Butler, *Benedictine Monachism*, 420.
Davies, A. E., M.A., Rev.—Anon., *The Army and Religion*, 412.
Duddington, Mrs N. A., M.A.—W. Powell, *The Infinite Attributes of God*, 632.
Evans, James, M.A., Rev.—W. B. O'Dowd, *Preaching*, 839.
Ginsberg, Morris, M.A.—W. S. Urquhart, *Pantheism and the Value of Life*, 638.
Herford, R. Travers, B.A., Rev.—J. E. Thomson, *The Samaritans: their Testimony to the Religion of Israel*, 628.
Hetherington, H. J. W., M.A., Prof.—J. W. Scott, *Syndicalism and Philosophical Realism*, 187.

- Inge, W. R., D.D., Very Rev. Dean*—H. G. Wells, *The Undying Fire*, 196.
L. P. Jacks, *From Authority to Freedom: Being the Life Pilgrimage of Charles Hargrove*, 821.
- Jacks, L. P., M.A., D.D., LL.D., Rev. Principal*—W. Ralph Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, 617.
- Johnson, William*—August K. Reischauer, *Studies in Japanese Buddhism*, 200.
- Luce, Morton*—Frederic Harrison, *Obiter Scripta*, 204.
- Mackintosh, H. R., D.D., Rev. Prof.*—James Drummond, *Pauline Meditations. With Memorial Introduction by Edith Drummond and Prof. G. Dawes Hicks*, 192.
Hastings Rashdall, *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology*, 607.
- Mantripp, J. C., Rev.*—Arthur S. Peake, *The Revelation of John*, 831.
C. John Cadoux, *The Early Christian Attitude to War: A Contribution to the History of Christian Ethics*, 415.
H. A. A. Kennedy, *Philo's Contribution to Religion*, 623.
R. W. Peck, *The Coming Free Catholicism*, 198.
- Owen, M. B., B.A., B.D., Rev. Prof.*—F. J. Foakes Jackson and Kirsopp Lake, *The Beginnings of Christianity. Part I., The Acts of the Apostles*, 827.
Williston Walker, *A History of the Christian Church*, 626.
- Ratcliffe, S. K.*—Walter Rauschenbusch, *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, 410.
- Rhys, Ernest*—Arthur Waugh, *Tradition and Change: Studies in Contemporary Literature*, 423.
- Sadler, Gilbert T., M.A., Rev.*—J. F. Bethune-Baker, *The Faith of the Apostles' Creed*, 634.
- Scott, J. W., M.A., D.Phil.*—N. O. Lossky, *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge. Trans. by Mrs N. A. Duddington, with Preface by Prof. G. Dawes Hicks*, 176.
- Scullard, H. H., D.D., Rev. Prof.*—George Galloway, *The Idea of Immortality*, 406.
D. C. Macintosh, *Theology as an Empirical Science*, 818.
- Smith, J. A., LL.D., Prof.*—B. H. Streeter, *ed.*, *The Spirit: God and His Relation to Man considered from the Standpoint of Philosophy, Psychology, and Art*, 614.

- Sorley, W. R., Litt.D., LL.D., F.B.A., Prof.*—Clement C. J. Webb, *Divine Personality and Human Life*, 814.
- Stewart, C. R. Shaw, M.A., Rev.*—R. W. Corbet, *The Message of the Gospel to the Twentieth Century*, 197.
- Watson, Foster, D.Lit., Prof.*—Irving Babbitt, *Rousseau and Romanticism*, 836.
- Williamson, Claude C. H., B.A.*—Benjamin Kidd, *The Science of Power*, 190.
-

SURVEY OF RECENT LITERATURE.

Philosophical Literature. By Professor G. Dawes Hicks, 169 and 600.

Theological Literature. By Rev. Professor James Moffatt, 391 and 806.







BL
1
H5
v.18

The Hibbert journal

**PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET**

**UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY**

