

HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY MOHAMMED REZA PAHLAVI
SHAHANSHAH, ARYAMEHR
AN "OPERATIONAL CODE"

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California



THESIS

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SHAHANSHAH, ARYAMEHR
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by

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The research indicates that Mohammed Reza Shah, acutely aware of the twenty-five centuries-old Persian kingship tradition, is striving to modernize his nation while strengthening its international standing. Independence from foreign influence marks Iranian domestic and foreign policies, and careful exploitation of the nation's oil riches has enabled the Shah to develop his country so that it now is a major actor in global affairs as well as in the Middle East and in South Asia.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION-----	7
	A. OVERVIEW-----	7
	B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND-----	8
	C. GOVERNMENT-----	12
	D. MOHAMMED REZA SHAH-----	13
	1. Youth and Early Reign-----	13
	2. Mossadegh and the Oil Crisis-----	1
	3. Social Reform and Modernization-----	18
II.	THE "OPERATIONAL CODE"-----	24
	A. METHODOLOGY-----	24
	B. PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS-----	25
	1. What is the nature of the actor's political universe?-----	25
	2. How does the actor assess the probabili- ty of successful realization of his political goals and aspirations?-----	27
	3. To what extent does the actor believe he can predict his political future?-----	29
	4. How does the actor perceive his role in controlling and shaping history?-----	30
	5. What effect does the actor attribute to "chance" in historical development?---	31
	C. INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS-----	32
	1. What does the actor deem to be the "best approach" for selecting politi- cal action objectives?-----	32
	2. How does the actor pursue his politi- cal objectives?-----	34
	3. How does the actor assess the "risks" of pursuing political objectives?-----	36

4.	How does the actor "time" his political actions?-----	38
5.	Of what value are various methods of pursuing one's objectives?-----	39
D.	APPLICATION-----	40
III.	LOCAL POLICIES-----	47
A.	DOMESTIC IMAGE-----	47
B.	THE PERSIAN GULF-----	51
C.	IRAN'S LAND NEIGHBORS-----	55
1.	Iraq-----	55
2.	Pakistan-----	57
3.	Afghanistan-----	58
4.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-----	59
IV.	REGIONAL INTERESTS-----	65
A.	MIDDLE EAST-----	65
B.	INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH ASIA-----	72
V.	GLOBAL POLICIES-----	79
A.	THE "THIRD WORLD"-----	79
B.	THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD-----	86
VI.	CONCLUSIONS-----	95
	BIBLIOGRAPHY-----	106
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST-----	124

I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW

His Imperial Majesty Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Shahanshah (King of Kings) and Aryamehr (Light of the Aryans),¹ is a most important personality in the Middle East. The Iranian monarchy and indeed Iran itself, has contributed enormously to the world during the last 2500 years. Iran, traditionally known as Persia, in the course of its twenty-five centuries of existence has been both the nucleus of a widespread empire and at times an ineffective, undeveloped country subject to foreign exploitation.

The approach used here to gain understanding of modern Iran--as personified by the Shahanshah--is the "operational code" construct derived by Alexander George from work by Nathan Leites. [Refs. 55 and 56] This essentially is a means to examine a personality's instrumental and philosophical beliefs in order to understand how, in George's words, "The actor's beliefs and premises...serve, as it were, as a prism that influences the actor's perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political events, his definitions and estimates of particular situations." [151:191]

Before developing an "operational code" for the Shahanshah, background information concerning the socio-political climate in which Mohammed Reza Pahlavi ascended Iran's Peacock Throne and began his reign at the age of twenty-one was studied. Significant events during his early reign including a power

struggle with Prime Minister Mossadegh in the early 1950's and the Shahanshah's programs of social reform and modernization embodied in the White Revolution.²

The "operational code" is more meaningful when developed considering this background. Once formed, the code serves as a basis from which to view the Shahanshah's political actors. This research project examined actions involving the neighboring states, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean region, the Third World states, and the industrialized nations.

Transliteration is a problem which must be addressed by any researcher involved with the English rendering of words of Farsi or Arabic origin. With this researcher having no background in either of these Middle Eastern languages, the approach used here has been to use the spellings most commonly encountered in English sources or as found in the English-language editions of the Iranian press.

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND³

Cyrus the Great, son of Cyrus I who established the Achaemenid Dynasty, successfully unified what is now Iran and extended his empire by conquest in the sixth century, B.C. Ancient Persia came in conflict with first the Greek and then the Roman Empires. In the seventh century A.D. Arabs invaded Persia bringing Islam. During its long history the Persian Empire has had periods of greatness interrupted by periods of corruption and decline.

Various dynasties have developed, flourished and receded during Persia's existence. The Qajar Dynasty emerged in 1796; the present Shah describes the Qajars as "by far the weakest of the major Persian Dynasties" and credits them with nearly ruining the country by financial mismanagement and encouragement of foreign intervention." [67:26]

Persia at the beginning of the twentieth century was but a shadow of the former magnificent periods. European nations were quick to exploit the riches of the region by taking advantage of the inept leadership of the last Qajars. The Russian Czars had long held designs on the warm water of the Persian Gulf, and by the end of the nineteenth century, Russian influence was strong in northern Persia. In the south, Britain was developing its interests in the commercial and petroleum potentials of the area and also was concerned with Russian activity so near to India.

Britain and Russia were able to formalize their spheres of influence in Persia with the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907.⁴ Each power agreed to respect the other's interests in Persia including the many trade concessions which had been granted by the Qajar rulers.

The founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty (and the present Shah's father) literally rose through the ranks. Reza Khan, later Reza Shah Pahlavi, enlisted in the Persian Cossack Brigade as a teenager. His father and grandfather both had served in the army. Through "force of character and his

dominant personality" he was able to move from the enlisted to the officer ranks. [67:36] Reza Khan worked to rid his brigade of its Russian leadership and then he became its commander in August 1920. His rise continued as he endeavored to free Persia from foreign domination, and he began a military advance on Teheran. As a result, the government yielded on 21 February 1921 with Reza Khan becoming Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the army. In 1923 he assumed the duties of Prime Minister, and the National Assembly declared him Shah on 13 December 1925 after deposing Ahmad Shah six weeks earlier.

Reza Shah Pahlavi's coronation as Shahanshah, Shadow of the Almighty, Vice Regent of God, and Center of the Universe occurred on 24 April 1926. His son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, became the Crown Prince at that time. The son writes that "it seems that the era, the people, and the necessities of a nation demand that at a certain time the right man be found in a particular position: such a man as will profoundly affect the fate of a country and modify the course of history." [67:38] He strongly believes that his father was such a man at such a time.

The founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty undoubtedly possessed a very strong, energetic, and overpowering personality. During his sixteen-year reign, he worked to unite his country once again by subordinating the locally-powerful leaders, who paid only token allegiance to the central government.

Reza Shah also endeavored to modernize Persia despite foreign presence. He retained the parliament established by the 1906 constitution, but he probably dominated that body with his overwhelming character while he proceeded to modernize Iran. As one study of Iran notes, "While Iran had a constitution guaranteeing a representative form of government since 1906, its Majlis, until the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, was almost completely the creation and the rubber stamp of the Shah." [87:83]

The German offensive against Russia in 1941 greatly disturbed the Allies. The rich oil fields of the Caucasus were endangered, and the Allies feared that Germany would push into Iran to keep oil from flowing to the Allies. In 1940 and early 1941 the British and Russian governments warned Reza Shah of the dangers of allowing Germans to work in Iran. In August the two Allied powers entered Iran from the south and the north respectively to secure a supply route from the Persian Gulf to Russia.

The Iranian forces were overwhelmed and Iran quickly acquiesced to the change in its fortunes. The Allies announced a week in advance that they would enter Tehran on 17 September. On the sixteenth the Majlis received the notice that Reza Shah had abdicated; his son succeeded him. The 29 September 1941 edition of Time Magazine included the following comment on Reza Shah's abdication. "Reza, a choleric old man, admitting officially to 65 years, probably closer to 75, had for 16 years fought to keep control of Iran. Now

he well knew that, beaten by the British and Russians, he could not deal with the domestic turmoil that his defeat would produce. By abdicating he at least saw his son to the throne." [241:23]

C. GOVERNMENT⁵

The government of Iran is a constitutional monarchy, but not in the same sense as Great Britain with its monarchy primarily a ceremonial head of state. Iran's may best be described as a "working monarchy" functioning within a constitutional framework. The Shah has powers which are delineated in the 1906 constitution: he appoints the Prime Minister, other ministers, and many government officials; he is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; he has veto power and can dissolve the National Assembly and/or the Senate requiring new elections; and he can wage war and conclude peace. He is also the most important figure in the government. [81:251]

The Majlis, or legislative body, consists of two houses.⁶ The National Assembly delegates are elected by the people from districts determined by population. Of the Senate delegates, one-half represent Tehran and the remainder represent the provinces. The Shah has the power to appoint one-half of each of the Senate groups with the remainder being elected by the people.

D. MOHAMMED REZA SHAH

1. Youth and Early Reign

Mohammed Reza Pahlavi had grown up under his father's tutelage for Iran's Peacock Throne. His glowing description of his formidable father in Mission for My Country is a testimony to his respect for Reza Shah. He recognizes his father's efforts to force Iran to face "the modern world, rather than trying to escape from it through an inertia that led straight towards national oblivion." [67:44]

The young Shah ascended the throne just prior to his twenty-second birthday. He had been born on 26 October 1919 in Tehran and lived with his family until he became Crown Prince six years later. At that time his father placed him in a specially established military primary school, and he received a French governess who "opened my mind to the spirit of Western Culture." [67:52] His education continued in Switzerland from 1931 to 1936 where "the democratic Western environment moulded my character to an extent that was second only to my father's influence." [67:60] In Switzerland he developed his athletic ability in addition to studying and increasing his awareness of the West. On returning to Iran, the Crown Prince completed his education at the Military College of Tehran, graduating in 1938 as a Second Lieutenant.

The early years of the young monarch's reign were not easy for him. The educational, judicial, social, and governmental reforms initiated by his father were only a first step

towards modernization in what was, by Western standards, a backwards nation. The young monarch, recognizing that his father's position of neutrality became moot when British and Russian forces occupied the country, agreed to a tripartite alliance formalizing the status of his two "Allies." In January 1941 Time Magazine reported the event by saying, "Twenty-two-year-old Mohammed Shah Pahlavi, the Allies' straw man in Iran, proved last week that he is not too young to understand affairs....He had sense enough to know on which side his throne was buttered." [224:29]

Iran's social and economic sufferings which resulted from the "accomodation" of Allied resupply movements to Russia were recognized at the November 1943 Teheran Conference. The joint communique cited the Iranian contribution to the war effort and foretold economic aid for Iran. During the conference Stalin offered Soviet tanks to the Shah; however, the latter was concerned about the Soviet crews which would accompany the equipment and remain indefinitely. He therefore declined the offer. [67:80] The country did benefit greatly from post-war economic and military aid from the United States through the Lend-Lease program.

2. Mossadegh and the Oil Crisis⁷

During the Second World War the British and Russian representatives effectively controlled Iran by co-opting the candidates to the National Assembly. The Shah consulted Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh to be Prime Minister but the British

thought it unwise to change the government, and Mossadegh would not accept without British endorsement. [67:86-87] Mossadegh proceeded to help organize a National Front movement and associated himself with the Communist-oriented Tudeh Party for a power base.

Iran received some American financial aid in 1950, but the Shah felt that his visit to Washington in 1949 to request substantial aid had failed "because the Americans realized that we were not yet handling our internal affairs with the necessary firmness." [67:89] In November 1950 Iran concluded a twenty million dollar trade agreement with the Soviet Union to bolster Iran's financial position.

The Shah was plagued by domestic unrest in the early 1950's. Negotiations to increase Iran's profits from the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were unproductive and in 1951 the oil industry was nationalized. The first Seven-Year Plan for development was in financial difficulty with only a portion of the aid requested by the Shah forthcoming from the United States. The National Front, in the guise of Iranian nationalism, contributed substantially to the civil unrest.

The Shah's Prime Minister, Razmara, was assassinated by an extremist group supporter of Mossadegh on 7 March 1951. His successor, Hussein Ala, was able to function for only two months in the face of Mossadegh's opposition. The Shah once again approached Mossadegh to become Prime Minister, and the latter this time accepted.

The political change did not significantly help the domestic or the international situations. In his autobiography the Shahanshah characterizes Mossadegh as apathetic, illogical, and endowed with a spirit of negativism. [67:82ff] However, the Shah appears to have had little control over the governing of Iran during Mossadegh's two years in office. On 17 July 1952 Mossadegh resigned because the Shah "dared" to refuse the former's demands to become Minister of War and to have the right to govern without the consent of the Majlis for a six month period. Riots greeted his successor, and Mossadegh was reinstated five days later with his demands met.

The oil industry, in particular, suffered under Mossadegh. He adamantly insisted on ousting foreigners, but the country did not have the technical skill to run the industry. His policies led him to break diplomatic relations with Great Britain in October 1952, and the oil industry remained virtually idle.

The Shah seems to have felt compelled to support Mossadegh during this period. The riots which followed the latter's resignation and the threat of civil war were probably adequate indicators to the Shah that his power to effectively govern was very limited. The Shah states of Mossadegh, "I wanted to give him every opportunity to develop a constructive oil policy." [67:95] But during that period, the Shahanshah probably could not have challenged Mossadegh effectively.

The Shah also recounts, "In February 1953 he [Mossadegh] suggested that I temporarily leave the country. In order to give him a free hand to try out his policies, and to gain a little respite from his intrigues, I agreed." While a direct confrontation with Mossadegh might have been fatal to the then heirless Pahlavi Dynasty, indirectly the Shah was able to enhance his position. He continues, "Somehow the people had learned the secret of our planned departure. The ensuing mass demonstrations of loyalty to the Shah were so convincing and affecting that I decided to remain for the time being." [67:97] The Shah appears to have spent much time at two residences, built by his father, near the Caspian rather than in Teheran during this period. Whether willingly or perforce, he gave Mossadegh a free hand to pursue his "negative" policies.

In August 1953 the Shah finally made a stand against Mossadegh. On the thirteenth the Shah signed two decrees, one dismissing Mossadegh and the other naming General Zahedi as his successor. The Shah gave the responsibility for delivering the decrees to the Commander of the Imperial Guard, Colonel Nassiry.

The arrival of the news in Teheran resulted in street fighting between forces supporting Mossadegh and those loyal to the Shah. The civilian populace also participated actively. However, the Shah and his Queen had departed before the results of the conflict were known. "It had been decided

weeks before that if Mossadegh should use force to resist his disposition, we would temporarily leave the country." [67:104] The royal couple fled to Rome to await the outcome of the short-lived conflict, and within a week the Shah was able to return to his capital in triumph.

3. Social Reform and Modernization

The popularity of the Shah was a decided asset as he endeavored to lead his country. In contrast to Mossadegh's negativism, the Shah evolved a policy of "positive nationalism." This "implies a policy of maximum political and economic independence consistent with the interests of one's country." [67: 125] The first Seven-Year Plan had stalled under Mossadegh; the Shah revived it and in 1956 implemented a second plan.

The Shah believes that social justice includes a basic right to food, shelter, clothing, education, and medical care. His social reform programs have been instituted based on these principles. In 1950 he started a program to turn much of his extensive land holdings over to peasants. This program also stalled under Mossadegh, but by its completion in 1958 about 25,000 peasant farmers had received over 500,000 acres of land. [68:33] In 1960 the Shah tried to have an extensive land reform act passed by the Majlis designed to limit the size of private holdings, but the bill eventually passed was so diluted that it was inadequate.

The most ambitious and significant reform program instituted by the Shah was what has become known as the "White Revolution." This originally was a six point program which the Shah submitted to his subjects in the form of a referendum on the Sixth of Bahman 1341 (26 January 1963). Impetus for the revolution is summed by the Shah: "The realization came to me that Iran needed a deep and fundamental revolution that could, at the same time, put an end to all the social inequalities and all the factors which caused injustice, tyranny and exploitation, and all aspects of reaction which impeded progress and kept our society backward." [68:15]

When the Shah announced his reform referendum, he anticipated "that the forces of black reaction and red destruction would attempt to sabotage this programme, the former, because they wished the nation to remain submerged in abject poverty and injustice, the latter because their aim was the complete disintegration of the country." [68:36]

Despite the nearly unanimous results in favor of the referendum, riots broke out in June 1963, and on 10 April 1965 an assassination attempt was made on the Shah as he was entering the Marble Palace. The former incident the Shah attributes to "black reaction" and the latter to "red destruction."⁸

The six original provisions of the White Revolution were the following: large scale land reform, nationalization of forest and pasture acreage, sale of shares in national

factories to help finance land reform, labor reforms including profit-sharing by factory workers, electoral reforms to achieve a greater degree of democracy and to enfranchise women, and educational reform including the creation of a "Literacy Corps" to educate the rural population. Six additional reforms measures have been added to the continuing Revolution of the Shah and the People: the establishment of "Houses of Equity" to arbitrate local matters and to reduce the judicial burden; the "Health Corps" to provide rural medical care; a "Reconstruction and Development Corps" to aid in the development of the land redistribution under the land reforms; nationalization of the nation's waterways; institution of a program for reconstruction of the countryside; and educational and administrative reforms directed toward satisfying the demands of Iran's growing middle class. [112: 24ff]

The Shah developed many of his views concerning social reform when he was young. He is a strong believer in democratic principles encompassing three areas. Political democracy requires an intelligent, mature, honest, tolerant, and vigilant population with a sense of a mission. [67:169-78] Economic democracy "implies a great many independent entrepreneurs engaged in a wide variety of industry and commerce." [67:179] Social democracy requires that "every man, woman, and child in this nation is entitled to a decent minimum of these five things: food, clothing, housing, medical care, and education." [67:185]

Mohammed Rez Shah Pahlavi has developed his statesmanship skills tremendously during the three decades that he has occupied Iran's Peacock Throne. When he succeeded his father, there was little that he could hope to accomplish domestically with his largely illiterate population subjected to British and Russian occupation. At the end of the war, Iran had barely started to attain the modernization goal originated by Reza Shah and continued by his son.

The power struggle waged by Mossadegh during his unproductive term as Prime Minister delayed progress in Iran. After Mossadegh's ouster, Mohammed Reza Shah seemed to be more determined to actively govern his country. The widespread reforms instituted as part of the White Revolution have done much to improve the domestic situation in Iran; however, the country still has much work to do.

Today, the Shah appears to be very popular with his subjects, and he has emerged as a prominent leader in world affairs. While he is directing domestic progress, he is strengthening his military position. The Shah is also making effective use of Iran's petroleum resources. During the recent Arab oil embargo Iran benefited from its freedom to pursue its own interests as a non-Arab state.

The Pahlavi Dynasty has become much more secure than it was during the uncertain period of World War II. The Shah's first and second wives did not provide a male heir, but his

present wife, Empress Farah, is the regent-designate for their elder son, Crown Prince Reza Cyrus.

In October 1967 the Shah felt that his country had progressed sufficiently that, after 26 years as Shah, he would finally have a formal coronation. Before the event the Shahanshah told Time Magazine, "I have always thought, and often said, that it is not a source of pride and gratification to become king of a poor people. In the past I felt that a coronation ceremony was not justified. But today I am proud of the progress we have made.' " [214:28]

NOTES

¹E.A. Bayne notes "The term Arya Mehr is usually interpreted as 'Light of the Aryans,' and was instituted...as a substitute for the Western concept of 'majesty,' which does not transliterate into Farsi easily." [12:17]

²So called because of its bloodless nature.

³For more detailed information see References 34, 63, and 81.

⁴References 18 and 22 provide detailed information.

⁵For more detailed information see Ref. 81.

⁶The Senate did not exist in fact until 1949 and first met in 1950.

⁷His Imperial Majesty's autobiography [Ref. 67] is the primary source for this section; see also General Hassan Arfa's account [6:385ff].

⁸This concept possibly stems from Islamic or Zoroastrian dualism; see [16:54].

II. THE "OPERATIONAL CODE"

A. METHODOLOGY

One of the key contributors to the understanding of the behavioral aspects of decision-making is Nathan Leites. His research of the elite political group in Soviet Russia, the politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, led him to publish two works early in the 1950's. Both The Operational Code of the Politburo [Ref. 55] and A Study of Bolshevism [Ref. 56] developed and employed the "operational code" methodology as a means to examine the belief system with which the Soviet leadership functions. The first work was primarily concerned with the codification of the elite beliefs, tactics, strategies, and values by means of qualitative content analysis of Politburo action accounts and statements of Lenin and Stalin. The second utilized this framework, going much farther to discern the meaning and the development of Bolshevism and the "Bolshevik character."

Alexander L. George of Stanford University has since distilled Leites' concept of the "operational code" to make it a valuable research tool for studying an elite's belief system as an important although not exclusive, component of the actor's decision-making behavior.¹ The "operational code" approach does not provide a means to predict actions in specific cases; however, it does, as George notes, enable "the investigator to clarify the general criteria requirements, and norms the subject attempts to meet in assessing

opportunities that arise to make desirable gains, in estimating the costs and risks associated with them, and in making utility calculations." [151:200]

Two types of beliefs comprise the code: philosophical and instrumental. Philosophical beliefs are determined from a set of five questions regarding the actor's views of the nature of politics; the instrumental beliefs involve a more detailed examination of his political style concerning calculations and strategies, also using five key question sets. Together these ten questions comprise George's model for developing an actor's operational code.²

B. PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

1. What is the nature of the actor's political universe?

The "political universe" in which an actor functions is an important influence on his belief system. Central to this is the actor's perception of his political opponents' capabilities are most important since "the characteristics the political actor attributes to his opponent [exercise] a subtle influence on many other philosophical and instrumental beliefs in his operational code. [151:201-02]

The Shah ascended the Peacock Throne during a period of growing conflict; the European eruption of World War II had sent disruptive shock waves toward Iran. Germany, with strong technical-support ties with Iran, eyed the then-weak state as a valuable source of petroleum. Similarly, the Allies recognized the value of this Middle Eastern state;

they were first to act militarily both to secure a supply route to the Russian Front and to prevent Germany's takeover of the territory. In his autobiography the Shah refers to Iran's seeming unavoidable occupation: "If the Allies had not sent huge quantities of war materials through Persia in aid of the Russian, probably the German spring offensive of 1942 would have succeeded, and just as probably the Germans would have invaded my country." [67:68]

This, however, was not the first time in this century that European nations had intervened in the internal affairs of Iran. Britain and Russia were able arbitrarily to divide Persia, then under the terms of Qajar Dynasty, into two spheres of influence separated by a "neutral zone" under the terms of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. Also, "neutral" Iran suffered the ravages of the First World War. The Shah has observed, "Foreign interests, naturally, were best served by a weak central government incapable of protecting the country's rights against foreign invaders." [93:8 Mar. 75]

The present international situation remains on of conflict.³ The uneasy Arab-Israeli cease-fire is still a long way from peace, and the leader of Iran recognizes the potentially dangerous situation developing as a result of the rampant inflation affecting the industrialized world and its trading partners. He reportedly told delegates to the 1974 Ramsar Conference on revision of the Fifth Plan, "We know well that we cannot be happy in a world consisting of poor,

shattered nations. If the world and civilisation we know now crumbles in ruin or goes bankrupt, no one will emerge unscathed from the chaos." [93:10 Aug. 74]

His Imperial Majesty has a well developed conception of the forces of "black reaction" and "red destruction" which he sees as a very real threat to his life and to his reign.⁴ The communist-oriented Tudeh Party is outlawed in Iran, and saboteurs are not tolerated by the government. The Shah's efficient security force, the SAVAK,⁵ is an active deterrent to internal subversion. The Shah's dominance of Iranian decision-making, his involvement at all levels of government and the workings of the long-established Iranian bureaucracy make it difficult for would-be political opponents to establish a viable power position.

2. How does the actor assess the probability of successful realization of his political goals and aspirations?

The Shahanshah projects enthusiastic optimism regarding this question, optimism tempered slightly by objective realism. Source of much of this optimism is an appreciation of Iran's position as a world leader in petroleum production. Oil revenues enable the Shah to finance his extensive modernization and reform programs and are the single most significant factor in Iran's dramatic development into a world financial power in recent years. A Kayhan International article reporting the revision of the 1353 (1974-75) budget stated, "The Government's ability to double the size of the budget late

in the year was due entirely to considerably higher revenues from the oil and gas sectors." [93:7 Dec 74]

Indicators of the Shah's optimism are the repeated references to (and the implied comparisons with) the great Persian empire developed twenty-five centuries earlier by Darius and Cyrus. Perpetrating the tradition of Persian kingship as unbroken during the interim helps to legitimize the still-new Pahlavi Dynasty; but connection with the ancient glory also helps to establish a focal point for present development in Iran--to once again be a major international actor. The Shahanshah's coronation after twenty-six years of rule, the lavish anniversary celebration at Persepolis commemorating 2500 years of Persian monarchy, and the "Great Civilization"⁶ goal are manifestations of optimism regarding the eventual realization of the Shah's goals.

The tempering realism surfaces in the monarch's statements acknowledging that the rate of progress in Iran, rapid as it has been, has practical limits. For example, in a recent British Broadcasting Corporation interview the Shahanshah remarked that "we are progressing in such a way that it would be very difficult to criticise things other than the weakness of human nature....They [the people of Iran] are only human, they are not machines that you can tune at the momentum that you want." [93:14 Dec 74] Shortages of manpower in many technical fields, the continued high illiteracy rate especially in rural areas, and economic drains

resulting from defense procurement are all significant. A report on the revised Fifth Plan budget states, "The Government will try to meet manpower shortages by much expanded educational facilities, better utilisation of women in the work force, and where necessary and as a temporary measure, the import or skilled labour from abroad." [93:7 Dec 74]

His Imperial Majesty intends to continue to guide his nation's progress, but he recognizes that his active participation depends upon continued good health and vitality. He would like to see his son rule while he advised from "retirement"; the Shah responded to the question "How much longer do you see yourself actively leading this country?" as follows:

If I was not of the opinion and the belief that I should let my son ascend to the throne and be there for a while, I would have said until my natural death, and when that will come, I cannot say. How long will I remain alert and in the full capacity of my brain and body, I cannot tell. But I know that in about 13-14 years time the foundation will be so firmly laid down that after that I don't think any danger could threaten our country.
[93:14 Dec 74]

3. To what extent does the actor believe he can predict his political future?

Predictability of the future depends upon thoroughly understanding the present and recognizing current trends. The future of the industrialized states, with which Iran has a close affinity, will be significantly dependent upon the way those nations deal with the current pressing problems of inflation and the extravagant use of raw materials. The Shah

seemingly will do all he can, based on his perceptions of the world economic situation, to encourage an expedient resolution of the present fiscal and monetary problems of developed nations so that Iran won't "fall with the West." "The Monarch stated in the interview [with Le Point] that he could not wish the destruction of the Western World because 'after all, I belong to this world.'" [93:11 Jan 75] To this end, Iranian oil will serve as a useful tool, and Iran will not join the Arab boycott schemes.⁷

The long-range future is less predictable than the short-range of five to ten years. However, the Shah appears to believe the future is deterministic, and actors must recognize their role in history and play it successfully. The Shah does believe that he has been aided in life; "I am convinced that I have been able to accomplish things which unaided by some unseen hand, I could never have done....Indeed, I should consider it arrogant to believe that I could accomplish my life-work without God's help." [67:58]

4. How does the actor perceive his role in controlling and shaping history?

This question is closely related to the preceding one. The Shahanshah chose "Mission for My Country" as the title of his autobiography; throughout the work he strongly suggests that he has a significant role in shaping the history of Iran. Whether called to his "mission" by God or by accepting more responsibility for Iran's development as a result of

reaching political maturity in the 1950's, His Imperial Majesty has demonstrated that one can indeed play a key role in controlling development.

Mohammed Reza Shah's style of government also indicates that he strongly believes that one can have great "mastery" over historical development. The Shah is informed and involved in all phases and levels of decision-making in Iran, and it is his policies and decisions which are predominantly responsible for his country's course of action.⁸

5. What effect does the actor attribute to "chance" in historical development?⁹

The policy of "positive nationalism" formulated by the Shahanshah more than two decades ago describes both his approach to his reign and his goal for his subjects. The Shah defines this as follows: "Positive nationalism, as I conceive it, implies a policy of maximum political and economic independence consistent with the interests of one's country.... It means that we make any agreement which is in our own interests, regardless of the wishes or policies of others.... We place no reliance on supine passive neutrality." [67:125] As a result of this aggressive approach, one is prepared to take advantage of "chances" or opportunities to act which might otherwise go unnoticed.

"Chance" can also be an opportunity presented to one's adversaries due to corruption and to negligence in carrying

out one's duties. The others to be vigilant in the performance of their responsibilities and thus decrease the negative effects of "change" on Iranian development.¹⁰

C. INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

1. What does the actor deem to be the "best approach" for selecting political action objectives.

His Imperial Majesty can select political objectives for four purposes. First are goals designed to dramatically improve Iran as it continues its development under the Pahlavi Dynasty; areas addressed include industrialization and self-sufficiency. Second are those pursued to enhance Iran's position in the international community; these include international trade, foreign policy objectives and national security. Third are goals which are to promote the welfare and happiness of the Iranian people; these are socially oriented such as education, health care, and rural development. Lastly are goals of a large scale which make up a grand program such as the "Great Civilization." This last type includes elements of the first three sets, and while designed to achieve a better lifestyle, the massive scope suggests that realization of these goals is directly related to the continuing reign of the monarch. Thus, this fourth class of goals is designed to help maintain the Shah's power.

The "Great Civilization" is the objective of Iranian policy today. Iran is still far from achieving the world pre-eminence known by Persia under Darius and Cyrus during

its first "Great Civilization." Petroleum resources are the immediate key to the nation's development. However, the Shah is well aware that this valuable resource is nonreplenishable and hence potentially exhaustible. While in Australia the Shah emphasized Iran's decision to use nuclear power to generate electricity saying, "We are the first to say that petroleum and gas are too valuable commodities to be burnt, for instance, for heating houses or making electricity." [93:5 Oct 74]

This constraint necessitates the adoption of short-run goals which will be attainable using oil revenues and will provide a basis for future development of a "post-oil" economy. The monarch told a group studying problems of the Shah-People Revolution, "Competent Iranian executives, backed by popular participation in production, can keep the nation's capital growing even after oil reserves are depleted." [93:11 May 74]

Concurrent with consideration of eventual depletion of the source of oil revenue is concern for domestic stability in order to provide a favorable climate for development. Popular unrest and rioting in Iran may help a leader to take a more active role in government such as resulted after the "People's Uprising" of 28 Morbad 1332 (19 August 1953). Since that time Mohammed Reza Shah has greatly expanded his leadership role in Iran. However, such upheaval could just as likely mark the end of another Persian dynasty.¹¹

Thus, when selecting objectives the Shah must satisfy his subjects with goals designed to fulfill their desire for education, medical care, good housing, and security. He must also appeal to a sense of greater national goals which will necessarily take a long time to meet and will also require sacrifices resulting from the allocation of scarce resources, especially adequate trained-manpower reserves.

2. How does the actor pursue his political objectives?

The answer to this is best expressed by the name given to the reform movement originally termed the White Revolution: "The Revolution of the Shah and the People."¹² The method of action adopted by the Shahanshah has been to form a link with his subjects; his major goals are presented to the nation as objectives common to the monarch and to the populace. During his speech to the nation announcing the agreement giving the National Iranian Oil Company complete control over the nation's petroleum exploitation and distribution, the Shahanshah told his people, "My strength derives only from your strength, and your strength is the strength of the solidarity of the Iranian nation that today commands respect in the world." [93:4 Aug 73] In his Constitution Day speech the following week he asserted, "The people's will is the dynamic drive behind all the measures which have pushed the levels of welfare and progress to staggering heights in Iran." [93:11 Aug 73] This Shah-People bond helps the monarch to establish national

priorities and to administer the allocation of funds and resources thus having direct control over the pace of fulfillment of his goals.

A desire to integrate the concepts of democracy and constructive political opposition has been part of the Shah's stated objectives for some time. "In a democracy the people must share in deciding their own destiny, and in most matters the best way to choose the wise path is through public discussion and argument. I am happy to say that Persia's modern parties are gradually setting aside our traditional weakness of thinking in personality rather than policy terms." [67:172]

The monarch has encouraged a minority or opposition party to function, until recently represented as the Mardom (People's Party).¹³ During an interview given to Nedaye Iran-Novin, the newspaper of the majority Iran Novin (New Iran) Party, the Shahanshah expressed support for a minority party, but he also indicated that it should be limited in scope:

We have said of political parties that since a one-party system leads to dictatorship, naturally there must be another party, at least one party and, possibly, if the people desire and the need be felt, other organisations can exist.

However, they will be of limited scope, since the various analyses of the ideology of the Revolution of Shah and the People, the extent of whose acceptance by the Iranian people is known to all, cannot greatly differ from one another. [93:23 Jun 73]

The first week of March 1975 the Shahanshah announced a marked departure from his support of a "two-party system":

the merger of Iran's political organizations into a single Iran Resurgence Party. He expressed his view of democracy in his speech to the nation:

With all due respect to constitutionalism, or, as it is termed in the West, democracy, I should point out that the democracy we recognize is that in which the nation somehow expresses its will. And once the will of the majority is known, the minority will respect it as if it were their own, even if they are half the population minus only one. [93:8 Mar 75]

He observed that "playing the role of a loyal opposition is very difficult in this country." To "straighten out Iranian ranks" the Shah suggested "two categories: those who believe in Monarchy, the Constitution, and the Sixth Bahman Revolution; and those who don't." [93:8 Mar 75]

The Shah foresees that "wings" of differing opinion may form within the new party observing that this will provide the constructive criticism necessary for democracy. If a person truly does not accept the three principles of the new party he will enjoy freedom in Iran, provided that his is not a traitor or a Communist who "belongs in an Iranian prison" or should leave the country "because he is not an Iranian." [93:8 Mar 75]

3. How does the actor assess the "risks" of pursuing political objectives?¹⁴

Political action by the Shah can have two external effects: action directed toward the Soviet Union, the United States, or other major industrialized states may jeopardize existing or pending trade agreements, or it may have grave

security implications; action directed toward the Third World states and the smaller industrialized nations either enhance or diminish Iran's standing within the developing community.

The first type of action requires firmness and decisiveness on the part of the Shah. His developing nation, despite its modern arsenal of advanced weaponry, is no match for the super powers should an act lead to military confrontation. "The only country capable of landing troops in Iran, the monarch noted [in a recent interview with Der Spiegel], was the Soviet Union. Such an invasion, he stressed, would meet die-hard solid resistance and whatever might fall into the hands of the invaders would be turned into a heap of useless ashes." [93: 15 Feb 75] Iran does, however, have a commodity of recognized wealth, petroleum; the resulting Iranian capital is valuable to the East and to the West, with both the Soviet Union and the United States anxious to maintain cordial commercial relations with Iran.

Actions of the second type are exemplified by foreign trade with and aid to other nations, notably in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. The Shah has done much to promote himself and his nation into a position of leadership in the circle of developing states. Iran recently has pursued trade and aid agreements with such states as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Zaire, and Senegal.

In addition to investing in German's Krupp Steel and the United States' Pan Am World Airways, the Shah has advocated joint investment ventures with such states as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Poland and Rumania. Iran's monarch dismisses charges of "economic imperialism; "because we do not try to get majority shares or controlling shares where we invest...this alone will be sufficient to show that we have no such intentions." [93: 5 Oct 74]

Boldness and decisiveness are the keys to the Shah's political action.¹⁵ These two traits not only serve to promote an aggressive and vigorous image abroad for the developing nation, but when applied to domestic political action they serve as indicators of the Shah's aggressive leadership and his continued dominance of Iranian decision-making.

4. How does the actor "time" his political actions?

The Shahanshah must time his actions well to continue the pace of domestic progress while actively pursuing the development of Iran's international interests. To satisfy the former requirements, the Shah uses a demanding series of public appearances such as ceremonies marking the completion of public works or the opening of new or expanded factory facilities, national conferences such as the recent 7th Annual Ramsar Education Conference, and national holiday messages.¹⁶

The Shah initiates international action as well as responding to world event. He uses his state visits abroad and those to Iran by foreign dignitaries as a means to regulate

his "international timing." He has proven himself quite able to meet with heads of state from both sides of the Iron Curtain as well as with non-aligned actors. Remarks during state banquets both in and out of Teheran and during press conferences are the two primary methods that the Shah employs to make public his foreign policy actions.

The Shahanshah's timing, then, must provide coordination for his domestic and foreign policy actions. To facilitate the boldness and decisiveness characteristic of the present, this timing must be crisp. His Imperial Majesty must vigorously pursue his domestic and foreign actions in order to keep Iranian development at its present pace.

5. Of what value are various methods of pursuing one's objectives?

The Shah is keenly aware of his country's unique position: as a developing nation Iran can be identified with the Third World, but its close ties to the industrialized states, through its substantial investments of petroleum revenues and its continuing need for technical assistance, allow Iran to freely associate with the industrialized nations. As a result, His Imperial Majesty is able to make the most of both affiliations: the former to actively participate in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and to gain support in the United Nations; and the latter to further economic development.

Iran's monarch can use either affiliation to pursue different goals; however, he refrains from making any moves which would decisively place Iran in one camp or the other. Instead, he allows himself the freedom to appear affiliated in whichever direction is dictated by a given objective while continuing to develop an Iranian national consciousness based upon twenty-five centuries of Persian tradition. The desired effect is that observers from industrialized nations tend to view Iran as an emerging industrialized state while those from developing countries view Iran as similar to their states. This frees Iran to its independent national policy.¹⁷

D. APPLICATION

Alexander George, in his article, cautions researchers to "take note of the possibility that in some non-Western cultures the problem of knowledge and its relation to the calculation of political action may be approached differently and, hence, the list of fundamental questions identified here may not be entirely applicable." [151:200-01] Mohammed Reza Shah has a substantial Western orientation--his Swiss education, his friendships with United States and Western Europe, and his Western approach to modernization and industrialization; however, the effect of the non-Western Iranian culture is great upon the Shah's perceptions. George's ten questions concerning philosophical and instrumental beliefs provide a valid framework around which initially to develop an "operational code" for Iran's monarch, but George's

perceptive caution is quite applicable, especially when moving from the code to estimate the Shah's political behavior.

The answers given above to the ten questions attempt to consider that the Shah definitely perceives himself as a non-Western, traditional monarch working closely with his people.¹⁸ In general, he views the political universe, in which he rapidly is becoming a major actor, as one of tension and conflict. A thorough understanding of the present particularly the current economic situation, and an aggressive pursuit of one's national objectives aid greatly in predicting and in shaping future events.

The climate of detente is helping to ease the tensions of the Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, continuing conflict in the Middle East, insurgent groups such as the Dhofar rebels in Oman, and separatist movements in Pakistani Baluchestan all cause the Shah to view his political climate as one of conflict.

Faced by a universe of conflict, His Imperial Majesty projects an air of optimism; despite the widespread economic uncertainty, Iran will continue to develop at a phenomenal "40 percent" growth rate, [93: 6 Apr 74] so that perhaps within a decade the "Great Civilization" envisioned by the Shah, with its social reform and industrialization so advanced that it will place Iran among the leading nations in the world, may be realized. Iran once again will know the glory known under Darius the Great centuries ago, and the Iranians

will be able to view their long history without yearning for past greatness. This is the essence of the Shah's perception of his "mission."

The five answers offered to develop the more specific, instrumental political beliefs indicate the the Shah uses a bond between himself and his people as the most effective method to approach his mission. Iran enjoys the ability to identify with either the developing states or the industrialized nations, and the monarch exploits this asset in foreign affairs. His Imperial Majesty, however, clearly is pursuing an independent policy designed to accomplish the enrichment and modernization of his nation while avoiding the "pitfalls" of Western democracy.¹⁹

The above points are the result of applying the "operational code" approach to analyze information about the Shah's political beliefs. The resulting "operational code" according to Alexander George, is to be taken "as a set of premises and beliefs about politics and not as a set of rules and recipes to be applied mechanically to the choice of action."
[151:196-7]

The "operational code," while not the sole factor describing an actor's behavior, serves as a useful frame of reference when analyzing the individual's political actions. Having codified the Shahanshah's belief system using George's model, the next phase of this project was to examine His Imperial Majesty's political actions. The intent of the research

resulting in the analyses in the following sections was to avoid biases possibly present in foreign reports; without a knowledge of Farsi on behalf of the researcher, the English-language Iranian press was scrutinized. Daily editions of the Tehran Journal and the Kayhan International were reviewed, but the weekly airmail edition by Kayhan was finally selected as a workable format to provide information between June 1973 and March 1975. Qualitative content analysis was used to generally discern the Shah's political actions in light of his "operational code."

The domestic Iranian political atmosphere is extremely interesting, but proved so complex that it could not be adequately covered in this research project. However, the Shah's domestic image is a valuable complement to his international image and for that reason was included in Section II below.

The Shahanshah's approach toward foreign affairs was examined on three levels: local, regional and global. The local aspect addressed those areas perceived by the Shah to be immediately vital to his nation's security. Foremost is the Persian Gulf, Iran's "lifeline," crucial as the waterway facilitating transport of petroleum exports which finance Iran's rapid development. Also important are Iran's relations with its land neighbors: Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union.

The regional foreign policy considerations of Iran center around two main areas: the Middle East with its Arab-Israeli

situation and the Indian Ocean. The latter area is the focus of a proposal by the Shah to create a "common market" of the littoral states.

Iran's global considerations encompass its relations with the industrialized nations on one hand and its relations with the Third World states on the other. Attendant is the Shah's leading role in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

Sections III, IV, and V below deal respectively with important aspects of the Shahanshan's local, regional, and global political behavior based upon a qualitative analysis of English-language Iranian sources utilizing the set of beliefs forming the "operational code" expresses above as a point of reference.

NOTES

¹For similar approaches see [43:359-65], [48:254] and [81:45-51].

²The questions which follow were derived from those posed by Professor George [151:201 ff.].

³For a discussion of conflict as it affects a decision-maker see [33:43 ff.] and applied to the Shahanshah see [12:144 ff.].

⁴Refer to page 19 above.

⁵An acronym derived from Sazeman Etteloat va Amniyat Keshvar, "National Security and Information Organization" [80:635].

⁶The "Great Civilization" is a collective term for Iran's policy objectives in a wide range of reforms and advances; Iranians will be able to enjoy the fruits of prosperity resulting from present education, work, and participation in fulfilling national goals. For cultured sources of the concept see [Ref. 184].

⁷The Shahanshah has consistently avowed that Iran would not join the Arab states' oil boycott; he would use oil as a weapon, he told the German magazine, Der Spiegel, "only if I were in a war myself, for my country." [93: 12 Jan 74]

⁸See [12:57 ff.].

⁹See [184] for a discussion of "chance" in Islamic tradition; refer also to [81:58-59] and [33:174 ff.] concerning "chance" in political actions.

¹⁰This theme recurs particularly in remarks made when ministers present new members of their staffs. "Addressing Interior Minister Jamshid Amugezar, who introduced five new undersecretaries, the Shahanshah said that 'bullies and their victims will invariably resort to corruption. If you eliminate bullying, corruption will end.'" [93: 31 Aug 74]

¹¹Refer to chapter 5, "Revolution and Political Order," in [Ref. 46].

¹²See pp. 19-20 above. Also applicable is chapter 6, "Reform and Political Change," in [Ref. 46].

¹³Of the 268 Deputies elected in 1971 for the twenty-third session of the Majlis, only thirty-six were from the Mardom Party while 228 represented Iran Novin, two seats went to independent candidates while the remaining two were vacant. Statistics from [65:310].

¹⁴See [48:242-44].

¹⁵Refer to [15:135 ff.] concerning Middle Eastern personality traits and values.

¹⁶For example see "Labour laws are a model for others" [93: 26 Oct 74] or "A 21-year leap from bankruptcy to affluence" [93: 25 Aug 74].

¹⁷Refer to [Refs. 12 and 17] concerning the Iranian decision-making process. Also see [75:79-80] for "maxims for a king."

¹⁸"The Shah, under the law, is a constitutional monarch with powers in trust from the nation, vested by the people and 'by the grace of God.' " [80:250]. During his speech on the twentieth anniversary of the 28 Mordad Uprising "the Shahanshah reiterated his faith in the bonds between the monarch and the people and his determination to 'devote all my life to the greatness of the country and the progress and prosperity of the people.'" [93: 25 Aug 73]

¹⁹"We must vaccinate ourselves against the evils arising from great material comfort and what is commonly known as Western democracy....We should master highly advanced Western technology without falling a victim to the corruption and submissiveness bound up with it." [93: 10 Aug 74]

III. LOCAL POLICIES

A. DOMESTIC IMAGE¹

Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi began his reign under most adverse conditions. He had been carefully groomed for his role by his energetic and aggressive father; however, when the young monarch rose to "power" in 1941, his function was little more than decorative. The Shah's rise was rapid indeed; only three years earlier he had completed his formal education at the Military College of Teheran, graduating with the rank of Second Lieutenant. One eventuality by which his father's tutelage could not have adequately prepared Mohammed Reza Shah was to deal effectively with occupying Allied powers.

After World War II the Shah endeavored to develop his leadership role in Iranian decision-making, and seemingly reached "political maturity" by successfully weathering the tumultuous civil strife of the early 1950's. The post-war attempts by the Soviet Union to gain dominance in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan, the Tudeh Party's bid to dominate Iranian politics, and Prime Minister Mossadegh's xenophobic approach to the development of Iran's oil resources were all major trials for the young monarch.² His ability to utilize foreign friendships (notably that of the United States) and to maintain his domestic support (particularly that of the army) enabled the Shah to consolidate his position of leadership and to embark upon his ambitious reform programs.

Today the fifty-four-year-old monarch is a distinguished and politically mature statesman. Whether in Western business suit or in impressive military uniform, His Imperial Majesty projects an image of refinement and style befitting his position of Shahanshah--King of Kings; the image fits a monarch who is so intimately involved in his nation's remarkable development.

Western reporters once characterized the young Shah as follows: "Like most Oriental princelings he has the reputation of liking females and a passion for driving his licenseless Bugatti as fast as it will go." [241:23-24] Now the image portrayed by Western publications is more similar to that of the head of a large corporate entity. The Shah's image, however, is more complex in that he is the latest monarch in a centuries-old tradition. Lavish ceremonials such as His Imperial Majesty's coronation in 1967 and the twenty-fifth centenary celebration at Persepolis in 1971 remind both Iranians and foreigners of the symbolic importance and magnificence of the Peacock Throne.

Modernization rather than exploitation has characterized the present monarch's reign. As the second of the Pahlavi line, the Shah would understandably criticise the preceeding Qajar Dynasty.³ Although Iran was not subjected to European colonization as were many of its Middle Eastern neighbors, nineteenth century Persia was far from free to pursue policies independent of its European "friends": Britain, Russia, and to a lesser extent Germany.

As a result of recent past experience, one of His Imperial Majesty's most important goals is national self-sufficiency. During the Shah's public address on the sixty-eighth anniversary of Constitution Day he stated, "In the night of its independent national policy, Iran now determines its own destiny, has full sovereignty over its natural riches and has surpassed all other nations in economic development." [93 10 Aug 74]

Domestic policy in Iran continues to focus on social reform and industrial development. While a student in Switzerland Mohammed Reza Shah recalls, "I...began to think about specific policies that I might adopt when I became king. Already I had acquired a special concern for the peasants." [67:62] His program to distribute Crown properties to the Iranian peasantry was the first major attempt at land reform. Following this were the ambitious programs of the White Revolution with education, medical care, and rural development being three key areas of concern. The Shah's perception of his mission will most likely cause him to continue his programs of reform, expanding them to the full extent possible based on Iran's expanding oil revenues.

The Shah's sense of his mission is also manifested by his regal style: displaying splendor befitting the lengthy Persian kingship tradition and reflecting Iran's petroleum wealth while continuing to be an active "working" monarch aggressively pursuing his nation's domestic and foreign policy goals.

As he told the delegates to the August 1974 Fifth Plan revision conference,

The favourable circumstances we enjoy today only rarely occur. Not every country in the world can count on having them easily. Fortunately, these unique opportunities are available to us today. It is a pity to let them slip. The failure to seize them is not only a pity but an unforgivable sin. [93: 10 Aug 74]

Industrial development in Iran continues rapidly under both private and governmental supervision. The huge capital requirements of heavy industry have usually resulted in government sponsorship and control. On "Oil Day," 9 Mordad 1352 (31 July 1973), the Shahanshah signed an agreement with international oil companies participating in the exploitation of Iranian reserves to give the state-owned National Iranian Oil Company full control of Iran's oil assets; this made Iran one of the first major OPEC nations to so act. [93: 4 Aug 73] Steel making and mineral exploitation are also controlled by the Iranian government. In many cases in which the government originally owned and operated manufacturing plants, workers are now permitted and encouraged to buy shares of stock thus gaining the right to participate in the companies. The Shahanshah told a study group concerned with problems of the White Revolution that

Iranians must increasingly participate in national affairs and shape their own destiny. The extent to which every Iranian must participate has already been clarified. People were offered 49 percent of private factories and 99 percent of state corporations...The one percent of shares left from Government factory stocks, he added, represented the right to management, which, he stressed, had to be intrusted with especially trained executives not those owning businesses. [93: 11 May 74]

Heavy industries including petroleum, steel, and copper "would remain nationalised" and therefore not open to worker participation in shareholding.

B. THE PERSIAN GULF⁴

The traditional name of the strategic body of water separating Iran and the Arabian Peninsula is the "Persian Gulf." The Iranian monarch can see no basis for the Arab's claim that the body should be termed anything else, especially the "Arabian Gulf." "To a suggestion [during a Kuwaiti press interview] that Arab-Iranian relations could be improved by renaming the Persian Gulf the Islamic Gulf instead of Persian or Arabian as it is known from opposite sides the Monarch said: 'You have no historical or geographical right to say such a thing.' " [93: 11 Jan 75]

The Gulf has become a "superhighway" for huge vessels laden with precious petroleum from the region and destined for the world's markets. "The Persian Gulf, he [the Shah] argued was Iran's lifeline; it must be kept open at all costs. It was also the lifeline of Europe and the United States, providing 60 percent of West European oil consumption." [93: 22 Sep 73] Security in the Persian Gulf accordingly receives much attention in Iran.

The "jugular vein" of the "lifeline" is the Strait Hormoz between Oman and Iran. The latter nation dominates the northern shore of the narrow strait and also has assumed possession of the small islands Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tumbs.

[93: 12 May 73] The massive expansion program underway to develop the Imperial Iranian Navy has as a premier objective control and defense of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the Indian Ocean shipping-lane approaches. "In building up a strong navy, our aim has not been confined to leadership in the Persian Gulf or Iran's territorial waters...because in the world today, Iran enjoys a position which is giving its duties regional dimensions, 'the Shahanshah pointed out during ceremonies marking the 42nd anniversary of the establishment of the Imperial Navy.'" [93: 9 Nov 74]

In November 1974 the "biggest manoeuvres of its 42-year-old history" tested the defensive and offensive capabilities of the Imperial Iranian Navy in this context. [93: 9 Nov 74] Iran's forces have a professed defensive mission; they are unquestionably well-equipped and capable of unilaterally providing military security for the Gulf.

His Imperial Majesty has attempted to establish a security system⁵ for the Persian Gulf with participation by all Gulf states, but response has been minimal. While emphasizing economic development in the area, Iran is ready to assist any state in the region to maintain security and stability. "His Imperial Majesty noted that welfare and justice would make the environment unfavourable for the growth of subversion." [93: 9 Mar 74]

Sultan Qabus ben Said of Oman has availed himself of this offer resulting in an Iranian task force operating against

the communist-inspired rebels in Dhofar.⁶ The Shah views this utilization of his troops as vital to keep a radical regime from gaining control of the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz and possibly disrupting the seaborne transport of oil from the region. "The reason why we are helping Oman is first that they asked for our help, secondly that it would give them an opportunity to bring peace and security to their country and thirdly that the 'jugular of the Persian Gulf which faces Bandar Abbas will be secure.'" [93: 11 Jan 75]

The Shahanshah would like the Persian Gulf to be a "closed sea" with military defense a function of the littoral states. He once told the London Times, "We would be willing, in conjunction with Saudi Arabia, to provide protection for the Persian Gulf states...We would like to see a common defence policy established for the area. We would propose that the Persian Gulf becomes a closed sea and that the port of Bahrain be used as a joint naval base." [93: 14 Jan 69]

The oil resources of this area of the Middle East are very valuable to all states therein. Included are the underwater reserves in the Persian Gulf. In the interest of a peaceful settlement of mineral claims by littoral states, Iran has reached agreements for cooperation "to prevent the illegal exploitation of sea food and facilitate the tapping of seabed mineral deposits" in the Persian and Omani Gulfs with Oman, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Bahrain. [93: 3 Aug 74]

The Shah recognizes the tremendous importance of the Persian Gulf to Iran. He recognizes the real potential for conflict over resources and transit rights and optimistically attempts to promote good relations with his Arab neighbors across the Gulf. He seeks a peaceful solution to problems which arise, but he also prepares for the event that Iran and its neighbors disagree leading to combat in the Gulf. The understanding and the cooperation existing between Iran and its Arab neighbors across the Gulf imply that the most immediate threat to Iran's security in the area from radical groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) operating from the People's Republic of Yemen.

Kayhan International reports,

The Shahanshah has said that Iran will stamp out terrorists threatening the Strait of Hormoz even if the Persian Gulf countries from which they operate do not consent to Iran's intervention...[but] Iran would prefer to do so at the terrorist-infested countries' request. But he stressed, Iran could not afford to sit idle when its lifeline, the Strait of Hormoz, was threatened by closure. [93: 4 May 74]

Expressing a Persian Gulf "domino theory" the Shah told the Kuwaiti press "that if Oman falls into the hands of those whose policies are opposed to the existing regimes of this region, all the regional countries, including Kuwait, would be in danger." [93: 11 Jan 75]

The marked exception to Iran's generally favorable relations with its Arab neighbors in the Gulf is Iraq. Premier Hoveyda has stated "that cooperation and understanding characterized Iran's relations with all states, except Iraq." [93: 7 Dec 74]

C. IRAN'S LAND NEIGHBORS

1. Iraq

The boundary between Iran and its Arab neighbor to the west, Iraq, is disputed by both states. Navigation rights on the Shatt-al-Arab River, the southern portion of the boundary, are one area of contention. The huge Iranian oil refinery at Abadan, near the river, is quite vulnerable to attack or sabotage operations from Iraq. Consequently, Iranian forces are vigilant; Imperial Iranian Navy hovercraft stand ready to operate in the area, and Iran's border troops are in a high state of readiness along the land portion of the frontier.

The United Nations has refused to hold debate on Iraq's internal problem with Kurdish separatists in the north-east, and Ba'athist government forces have recently mounted another military campaign against the Kurds.⁷ Iraq claims that the Kurdish troops have received military supplies from Iran while Iranian reports such as "Iran gives refuge to 70,000 Kurds" [93: 31 Aug 74] highlight the plight of Kurdish refugees who have been able to reach Iran.

Stories of Iraqi atrocities against the Kurds and Iraqi attacks on Iranian border outposts and villages enable the Iranian press to portray Iraq in the obvious role of the villain threatening to undo all the work of the Shahanshah directed toward peace and stability in the area.⁸

The differences between Iran and Iraq are much more basic than concern for Kurdish tribesmen. Fundamental ethnic, religious, and political differences underlie the continuing uneasy situation.⁹ Iran is a conservative monarchy adhering to the Shi'a sect of Islam. Iraq is an Arab state controlled by a radical Ba'ath-Socialist regime; its last monarch was deposed in a 1958 coup d' etat. Iraqis are predominately Sunni Muslims.

The Shah would prefer to settle the border disputes peacefully. He referred to his views of Iraq during a Kremlin dinner speech while in the Soviet capital during November 1974: "I just think that if Iraq followed the policy you [the Soviet Union] did, as a much greater neighbour, in settling your border disputes with us, and did not consider itself heir to British colonialism, there would remain no problems between Tehran and Baghdad." [93: 30 Nov 74]

One justification offered by the Shah for his purchase of sophisticated weaponry, such as American F-14 aircraft, is the large inventory of Iraq. The latter has received substantial military aid from the Soviet Union, and according to the Shah's figures, "they have more tanks than we have, with less than one-third of our population...they have more planes...Mi G-21...the TU-22 bomber...one squadron of SU-20 ...Frog ground-to-ground missiles...[and] the latest radar, like the P-41." [93: 6 Apr 74]

His Imperial Majesty must continue to be wary of his Arab neighbor to the west. Recent press coverage of the March 1975 Algiers meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries highlighted an improvement in Irano-Iraqi relations. The Iranian press reported, "President Boumedienne [of Algeria] announced the reconciliation plan at the closing session of the OPEC summit conference to the vigorous cheers of the delegates. The Shahanshah and Saddam Hussein left their seats and walked together to the rostrum where they embraced Boumedienne amid rousing standing ovation in the hall." [93: 15 Mar 75] Whether this is a result of the Shah's continued efforts for peace or is an Iraqi effort to mend its "back fence" in preparation for a renewal of hostilities with Israel remains to be determined.

2. Pakistan

A major security concern of the Shah is his neighbor to the east, Pakistan. His biggest fear is that a separatist movement in Pakistani Baluchestan might "spill over" into southeastern Iran. The recent war resulting in Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan and the latter's conflicts with India make the future territorial integrity of Iran's neighbor uncertain. In June 1973 the Shah stated that "Iran cannot be, an observer to the disintegration of Pakistan.' He said another blow against Pakistan's territorial integrity would be contrary to Iran's national interests and well-being." [93: 23 Jun 73]

His Imperial Majesty is committed to assisting Pakistan to recover from the wounds of war and also from the recent, devastating earthquake. Iran loaned the country 580 million dollars in 1974 [93: 27 Jul 74] and after the January 1975 earthquake donated one million dollars to the relief fund. The Shah perceptively considers the stability of the Indian subcontinent to be in Iran's best interests. Therefore, he has stated that peace between India and Pakistan is a "cardinal policy" in Iran's foreign affairs. [94: 31 Oct 74] To counter India's concern about Iranian military aid to Pakistan, the Shah has stated that "we are not encouraging Pakistan to adopt an aggressive, hostile attitude towards India. On the contrary, we would like these two countries to be friends, to cooperate." [93: 4 Aug 74]

One of the Shah's foreign policy objectives is to create a "zone of stability" in South Asia with particular attention to Pakistan. This has become part of a larger objective: an Indian Ocean "common market" organization to be discussed in Section IV below.

3. Afghanistan

Iran's landlocked neighbor to the northeast, Afghanistan, is not as significant to Iran's security considerations as are the latter nation's three other "land neighbors,"; however, the Shah is concerned about developments in Kabul. Most significant to consider is Afghanistan's affinity toward the Soviet Union. The Shah does not view the

recent change in Afghanistan's government as altering its relations with Iran. "What is important for us is to have a strong, independent and progressive Afghanistan, that's all."
[93: 14 Dec 74]

The Iranian monarch would like to aid Afghanistan's economic development and has been trying to tie the two states more closely together with road and rail systems. The Shah envisions eventual commercial lines of communication through Afghanistan to Asia and the Soviet Union. [93: 6 Apr 74]

Economic development and political stability in Afghanistan would not only help fulfill the Shahanshah's goal of regional development, but it would also help tie Kabul much closer to Teheran. Afghanistan might thus become a more stable and reliable element in the Shah's security and economic considerations.

4. Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics

Iran's relations with its northern neighbor have not always been as cordial as they are today. Czar Peter the Great advocated Russian expansion southward to the "warm water" of the Persian Gulf.¹⁰ The weak status of Iranian politics in the nineteenth century enabled Russia to gain territory once part of northwestern Persia. Russia participated with Britain effectively to divide Persia into spheres of influence in 1907.¹¹

Soviet Russia first disavowed all Czarist dealings, but then the Soviets proceeded to follow foreign policy toward

Iran similar to that of Czars. Reza Shah's rise to power in the 1920's strengthened his country's ability to deal more effectively in international relations, but the pressures and opportunities of World War II were too great for the Soviets to withstand. The Red Army was quite ready to move into Iran with the British in 1941.¹²

The post-war situation presented a grant opportunity for the Soviets, with troops remaining in northern Iran, to extend control over at least a part of the country. This resulted in the Tudeh Party movement to "liberate" the province of Azerbaijan in northern Iran.¹³

His Imperial Majesty is strongly opposed to Communism; he has banned it in Iran and he actively seeks to thwart its spread in the Persian Gulf. As an expression of his independent policy the Shah has referred to the Iranian situation as follows: "Our social system is neither Communist nor Capitalist, it is a mixture of individual freedom and the responsibility an individual has toward society." [93: 22 Sep 73] His nearly-fatal struggle with Communist-inspired elements in Iran two decades ago has undoubtedly done much to sustain the Shah's anti-Communist sentiments.¹⁴

Iran's monarch has shown a remarkable ability to actively develop his nation while maintaining amicable relations with Soviet Union. Undoubtedly Moscow would much rather have a militarily weak neighbor to the south and would much prefer the backward, underdeveloped Iranian economic situation

of twenty years ago to the vigorously expanding Iran of today. Iran's long common boundary with the Soviet Union makes cooperation imperative for the former's survival, notwithstanding the state of relations which had existed until after World War II. The Shah recognizes this important aspect of his foreign policy considerations as evidenced by a press report following the leader's 1974 visit to Moscow: "The Shahanshah said this week that the extensive and varied relations between Iran and the Soviet Union showed Iran's success in promoting international understanding and cooperation." [93: 2 Nov 74]

The Shah is proud of Iran's economic ties with the Soviet Union. They complement the diplomatic relations between the two states and allow Iran to develop markets granting greater independence from the United States and Western Europe. A major Irano-Soviet agreement in 1966 resulted in Iranian natural gas being pumped north in exchange for a Soviet-built steel mill at Isfahan.

The price at which the Soviets would purchase gas was the subject of much Iranian press commentary during the summer of 1974. Iranian articles ranged from "Moscow Response on Gas Awaited" [93: 13 Jul 74] to "Russia Getting Iran's Gas on the Cheap." [93: 1 Jun 74] Controversy stemmed from a "price escalation formula" which was part of the original treaty but had not resulted in a higher gas price called for by increasing petroleum prices. "According to the clause, the price of gas is pegged to that of light

diesel oil sold at Bandar Mahshahr. The gas price is automatically readjusted in direct proportion with changes from 10 to 30 per cent in diesel oil rates, the proportion being one third of the change in price....For changes higher than 30 per cent, the two sides must negotiate an increase in the gas price." [93: 24 Aug 74]

Noticeable during the period prior to the eventual agreement on a new gas price was that the Shah refrained from making references to the dispute. This most likely was in the interest of preserving his relationship with the Kremlin leadership. Following the early August agreement to increase the price from thirty to fifty-seven cents per thousand cubic feet, Farrokh Ebrahimi authored an article titled "Iran Scores a Quiet But Great Victory of Gas." In the article he states, "The credit for the success of the gas negotiations went undoubtedly to the Shahanshah who had set the guidelines for Iran's negotiating team to safeguard the best interests of the nation." [93: 31 Aug 74]

Mohammed Reza Shah is well aware that his nation is far from able to successfully challenge the Soviet Union militarily. Should a situation occur like the 1941 Allied occupation, the Shah has called upon his people for an all-out struggle noting "that the 1941 invasion probably would not have taken place if the aggressors knew that they would never capture the country intact even if they could overpower the armed forces." [93: 9 Nov 74]

The present peaceful situation indicated that the Shah will likely continue his active stand against the proliferation of Communism into the Middle East (particularly into Iran) while striving to maintain his cordial relations with the Soviet Union. A result of the Shah's two-day visit to Moscow in November 1974 was that "Iran and the Soviet Union have agreed in principle to expand their economic, technical scientific and commercial cooperation." [93: 23 Nov 74]

NOTES

¹See [Refs. 12 and 67].

²Refer to [67:82 ff.]; for a second viewpoint, see [6:391 ff.].

³See page 9.

⁴See [Ref. 72] for a detailed analysis of Iranian interests in the Persian Gulf.

⁵Robert Jervis defines a "security area" as the area in which whatever happened concerned the security interest of the nation in question." [45:245]

⁶For background information see "Dead-end for Dhofar Rebels" [93: 8 Feb 75].

⁷See [Ref. 7].

⁸For example, "Why Iran must defend itself" accompanies "Pictures that tell the tale of Iraqi atrocities" with "appropriate" photos captioned, "This WAS a man...and this WAS a home /;/ This IS an Iraqi bomb." [93: 28 Dec 74]; also "IRAQI CRUELTY CITED BY IRAN: Iranian nationals ousted through minefields" (also with photos).

⁹See [Refs. 16 and 69] and particularly for the Shi'a Sunni split [88 and 184].

¹⁰Refer to the "Celebrated will of Peter the Great" quoted in [18:63], "And in the decadence of Persia, penetrate as far as the Persian Gulf," etc.

¹¹See [Refs. 18 and 22].

¹²For a contemporary account see [6:279 ff.].

¹³See [6:348 ff.] and [67:114 ff.].

¹⁴The Shahanshah narrowly escaped death at the hands of a would-be assassin 4 February 1949. [67:57]; see also [12:142].

IV. REGIONAL INTERESTS

A. MIDDLE EAST

Iran is a major non-Semitic nation in the Middle East along with Turkey. During its long history the "Land of the Aryans" has both dominated and been dominated by the politics of the region. The ancient empire of Darius the Great spanned most of the Middle East sharing a frontier with Greece in Asia Minor and with spreading along the Mediterranean coast to what is now Lybia. Later, in the sixth century A.D., Persia was engulfed by Islam spreading from the Arabian Peninsula.

Doctrinal splits developed in the "sphere of Islam" with the passage of time, and today the Shi'a sect predominates in Iran while most Arab believers are Sunni Muslims.¹ The Shahanshah has a strong belief in God and affirms in his autobiography, "I am convinced that I have been able to accomplish things which, unaided by some unseen hand, I could never have done." [67:58]

A major objective of the Shah's policy in the Middle East is Islamic unity.² This is a recurring theme and transcends the Shi'a-Sunni split. In remarks during a 1974 visit to Iran by the President of the Sudan, the Shahanshah noted that "only in unity can the Islamic World regain the material and spiritual glory of its past." [93: 2 Mar 74] In remarks to Islamic diplomats during Salam ceremonies at the end of Ramazan last year, "the Shahanshah reiterated his view that only through

unity could the Islamic countries safeguard their independence and sovereignty and help establish justice and spiritual integrity in the world." [93: 26 Oct 74] Anwar al-Sadat observed that "Iran with its faith in Islam is of necessity a powerful champion of the Arab nations." [93: 11 Jan 74]

The theme of Muslim unity provides a common focus for the regional policy of Iran and its Arab neighbors. It serves to supersede the rivalry caused by the different ethnic backgrounds of Iran and the Arab states across the Persian Gulf; it encourages regional cooperation; and it facilitates the cooperation of states with different socio-political systems in the region.

Iran generally enjoys friendly relations with the Arab nations of the Middle East. Iraq, the notable exception, may even be moving toward more amiable ties with Iran.³ During January 1975 Mohammed Reza Shah and Empress Farah visited King Husayn in Jordan for three days and then made a four-day visit to the Egyptian Arab Republic (E.A.R.).

The two visits were significant indicators of the Shah's interest in his Arab neighbors. Iran is using its increased petroleum revenues to finance aid to developing nations, and both Jordan and the E.A.R. benefited from the Shah's visits. The trip to Amman, the first since 1959, coincided with agreements for "an interest-free \$10 million loan to finance a housing project for Jordanian Army officers" and a grant for "a \$500,000 medical and vocational rehabilitation centre." [93: 11 Jan 74]

The Tehran Journal reported five Irano-Egyptian trade agreements in its 27 November 1974 edition announcing the following joint ventures: a fertilizer plant, a cotton spinning factory, an investment bank, engineering and construction companies for work in Port Said, and a Suez City-Port Said pipeline to be completed by the National Iranian Oil Company.

The Shahanshah continues to pursue independent policies in the Middle East. His close friendship with the Arab states does not prevent him from dealing with Israel. While the Shah strongly believes that Israel should withdraw from occupied Arab territory as a move toward peace and stability in the region, he also recognizes Israel's right to survive as a nation recognized by the United Nations. "'The whole thing is based on the unacceptable situation of the occupation of the land of Arabs by Israel. On the other hand there must be some gesture towards the State of Israel which has been recognized as a member of the United Nations.'" [93: 28 Dec 74]

Arab states in the Middle East receive encouragement and aid from Iran to assist their efforts to regain lost territory. During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli fighting "Iran put a number of Iranian aircraft at the disposal of Saudi Arabia." The Shah stated, "'These aircraft did what was required of them.'" However, the Shah resents his Arab neighbors' charges that Iran should stop dealing with Israel. He remarked in the same interview with the Beirut paper,

al-Hawadis, "that there was 'no contradiction' between Iran's support for the Arabs and its economic relations with Israel."

[93: 1 Dec 74]

The sale of petroleum to Israel is an economic rather than political action by Iran. The Shah has stated, "Once the tankers are loaded, we do not mind where it goes...For us this is purely a commercial transaction." [93: 22 Feb 75] During his recent winter holiday near Zurich the Shah granted C.B.S. an interview during which "the Monarch said Iran was not 'the godfather of Israel' " in response to a question asking if Iran was going to insure oil for Israel if the latter withdrew from the Abu Rudeiss oilfield in the Sinai. "The Monarch said Israel would not be denied of oil. 'All the oil companies could sell oil to Israel...She will probably have to pay for it, that's all.'" [93: 15 Feb 75]

His Imperial Majesty views stability and development to be central goals for the Middle East as in other regions of the world. Stability, so essential for continuing development, will not characterize the Middle East until the Arab-Israeli conflict is resolved. The Shah's objectives for settlement are the following: implementation of United Nations Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 calling for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory, restoration of rights of self-determination for Palestinians, prevention of any unilateral change in the status of Arab Jerusalem, resumption of the Geneva negotiations with the Palestine Liberation

Organization participating in behalf of the Palestinians, and abrogation of all military agreements with power outside the Middle East.⁴

The week prior to the monarch's January visit to Amman and Cairo he reasserted that Iran would not participate militarily in any renewal of the Arab-Israeli fighting. A Kayhan report states, "'There is no question, of course, of Iran participating in the fighting,' the Monarch said in an interview published by the Egyptian daily al-Ahram. 'You know there are geographical and other obstacles. But our sympathies will definitely be with you.'" [93: 4 Jan 75]

"Other obstacles," while unspecified, would probably include the fact that the basis of the conflict is "Arab" versus "Israeli" and as the Shah notes, "It is very, very strange: The Jews are Semites and the Arabs are Semites, too." [93: 12 Jan 74] Sustaining possibly heavy losses of arms and men in an Arab-Israeli conflict would hinder the realization of the Shah's effort to build a strong, well-equipped force able to defend the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, thus enabling Iran credibly to challenge the rationale for the major powers' presence in those seas.

Iran's support for the Palestinians reflects the decision of the Islamic Summit meeting in Rabat, Morocco, last year. United Nations Ambassador Fereydoun Hoveyda, according to a Teheran Journal report, voiced Iranian support for an independent Palestinian state saying that "the General Assembly could

do no less" after the Summit. [94: 20 Nov 74] Yassir Arafat, interviewed by the National Iranian Radio and Television, "said the Shahanshah's statement that in a new Arab-Israeli war Iran would sympathize with the Arabs had greatly touched his heart." Arafat drew a parallel between Iran and Palestine; "'Iran and ourselves created a great civilisation during the Abbasid period together. A civilisation with humanitarian roots, spread all over the world.'" [93: 11 Jan 75]

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (commonly termed "OPEC") is one vehicle through which Iran is able to work with many of its Arab neighbors in the Middle East. While Iran's position as the second largest exporter makes Iranian actions significant, the Shah characterizes his nation as "one of the more moderate members" of OPEC. He views the biggest difference between his oil company and that of his Arab neighbors to be that while they wish to use petroleum as an offensive weapon in their struggle with Israel, Iranian oil will be used to further the country's development.

His Imperial Majesty chooses to refer to Iran's oil as "noble product." As he informed delegates to the 1974 Ramsar Conference to revise the Fifth Development Plan, "The oil we call the noble product will be depleted one day. It is a shame to burn the noble product for the production of energy to run factories and light houses. About 70,000 products can be derived from oil." [93: 10 Aug 74]

The National Iranian Oil Company (N.O.I.C.) gained complete control of the nation's petroleum resources on "Oil Day," 9 Mordad 1352 (31 July 1973).⁵ Since that time the Shah has been working to establish a "just price" for oil from the Persian Gulf. He would like very much to do away with the present, confusing system with posted and market prices in favor of a single price depending only on quality and location. He advocates determining this price as the cost of developing and using alternative sources of energy such as coal liquification, tar sands, shale oil, and nuclear energy. [93: 29 Dec 73]

A further suggestion is to link the price of oil to a "basket of 20 to 30 commodities" so that as the price of goods used by oil exporting countries increased or decreased, the price charged for their oil would change accordingly. [93: 9 Nov 74] This is an attempt to keep the West's rampant inflation from completely destroying the purchasing power of the exporting nations since the latter usually rely on the industrialized states for many goods.

A regional goal in addition to settlement of the Arab-Israeli situation in the Middle East is to make it a "nuclear-free zone." Iran intends to utilize nuclear power to generate electricity, purchasing reactors from both France and the United States, but the Shah is strongly against his nation acquiring nuclear weapons. "However, if every little country obtained a few atomic bombs, then Iran would be forced to

reconsider its position." [93: 15 Feb 75] To dissuade nations from forming nuclear arsenals, Iran proposed the establishment of a nuclear-free zone to the United Nations.

Princess Ashraf, the Shah's twin sister, made the presentation to the United Nations in October 1974, while heading Iran's General Assembly delegation. The Princess "called for the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East backed by an adequate system of guarantees." [93: 2 Nov 74] The EAR subsequently co-sponsored the measure, and with "a vote of 128-0 with Israel and Burma abstaining, the UN General Assembly this week commended Iran and Egypt's idea of establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and called for countries there to promise now not to make or acquire nuclear weapons." [93: 14 Dec 74]

B. INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH ASIA

Iranian naval security is most readily associated with the Persian Gulf. This is because of the extreme importance of the Gulf to the Iranian oil industry. Iran is definitely a dominant factor in the Gulf and has built its naval forces with security of that important waterway in mind. However, the Shahanshah is well aware that his security considerations do not end at the Strait of Hormoz but continue to the Gulf of Oman and into the Indian Ocean. In a Kayhan International report, "The monarch said that 'we have no reason to be ashamed of our (military) [sic] presence in the Indian Ocean.

We have our own rights to the Ocean, certainly more than any foreign power does?" [93: 4 May 74]

The European colonial utilized naval and marine forces to guard and to protect their overseas empires. Britain, during the height of its power, dominated vast areas of the Indian Ocean to protect its ships engaging in commerce with India, Singapore and the other colonies in the region. The Royal Navy was the dominant force in the Persian Gulf while Iraq was a British Mandate and the shaykhs of the Trucial Coast enjoyed British protection.⁶

Independence movements after the Second World War and the enormous financial burden of administering the vast British Empire both contributed to the disintegration of the once mighty colonial system. Eventually London made the decision to withdraw its forces from the Indian Ocean including the Persian Gulf in 1971. The Shah was very concerned that the Soviet Union and the United States would quickly act to fill the "power vacuum" created by the British withdrawal.

His Imperial Majesty envisioned a regional security plan for the Persian Gulf in 1969 he called for "a defensive alliance with all the states of the region to ensure its stability after the British military withdrawal in 1971." [93: 14 Jun 69]

Eventually the concept was enlarged to take in the entire Indian Ocean and was presented during a five-nation tour in the region.⁷ Basically, the proposal is for the South Asian

littoral states to unite in a military and eventually an economic union similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Economic Community. The major objective is for the states of the region to provide the security necessary for the valuable shipping in the Indian Ocean, and thereby powers outside the area would have no reason to maintain naval forces there. The Shah would like the Indian Ocean, like the Middle East, to be a "zone of peace." [93: 5 Oct 74]

Such a security arrangement would greatly benefit Iran. With the great wealth from oil, the country is in a good financial position to develop the naval, ground, and air forces necessary to help insure the region's peace; the ability to pay "cash" for military equipment frees Iran from many of the "strings" so often attached to aid programs. If the Iranian proposal is effective in forestalling a large naval buildup in the region by the Soviet Union and the United States, then Iran will be in a good position, because of its military forces, to dictate policies for the region.

The Shahanshah outlined his proposal for an "Indian Ocean Common Market" during remarks to the National Press Club in Canberra, Australia. [93: 5 Oct 74] During the following stop in New Zealand the monarch stated that although the island nation was actually outside the Indian Ocean, there was ample reason why "morally you can build it [the proposed system] up; economically, you can join, if not entirely but in some of its aspects." [93: 5 Oct 74]

Australia and New Zealand would like to expand economic relations with Iran as the latter is able to offer attractive agreements involving petroleum. The Shah, careful to avoid the criticism of "economic imperialism," promoted his policy of establishing joint ventures in overseas investments rather than using Iranian capital to establish Iranian business ventures abroad. In conjunction with the royal visit, Iran concluded trade agreements with each nation. [93: 5 Oct 74]

Associated with the proposal and consistent with Mohammed Reza Shah's policies is a move to create a nuclear-free zone in the Indian Ocean. The Shah prefers to invest his military budget for conventional equipment and use nuclear energy only as a replacement for petroleum. He expresses no desire to equip Iran with nuclear weapons and thereby increase the risk of devastating nuclear exchange. He reportedly told Le Monde, "An atomic arms race in the region...was pointless. 'What is to be done with these weapons? Do they want to use them against the big powers? Do we want to commit suicide with them?'" [93: 29 Jun 74]

Iran advocates a military cooperation agreement, but the economic impact of greater regional interaction and interdependence greatly interests the Shah. Much of Iran's development results from exchanging petroleum for Western technology. As Iran builds its industrial base, the monarch is seeking to expand Iran's export markets and to reduce his nation's

dependence on the West. The Shahanshah expressed his national policy objectives while greeting President Georges Pompidou in Tehran,

The similar [to that of France] policy of national independence we have adopted permits us to be masters of our own destiny: to ensure the defence of our territory, to be masters of our wealth, to develop our economy and to choose the path most appropriate to our national interest. [93: 22 Sep 73]

Iran is investing a great deal in nations of South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Aid to developing nations greatly enhances Iran's world standing and can promote international friendships. However, it can also lead to charges of "economic imperialism" and turn aid recipients against the donor as the former become more self-sufficient. For this, Iran would much prefer to pursue a policy of international trade than one of foreign aid. Joint Iranian ventures in host countries stimulate the economic development of both parties and will probably have much more positive long-range policy implications for the economic "allies" than will a foreign aid policy.

Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, French military forces at the Comoro Islands off East Africa, and United States' naval activity at Diego Garcia and by carrier task forces concern Iran and all Indian Ocean states. This "Big Power" incursion with the accompanying ominous implications of foreign intervention in regional affairs is the object of the Shah's proposal for a "zone of peace and prosperity" in the Indian Ocean. Iran's monarch realizes that a viable

regional military and economic union will take a long time to evolve, and until such time he welcomes American presence to offset that of the Soviet Union.

The Shah has stated that "we have the presence of Soviet Union warships in the Indian Ocean, I don't see why one nation could be represented so forcefully and not another."

[93: 9 Nov 74] A later report notes, "On the U. S. naval base at Diego Garcia, the monarch said Iran's long-standing policy favoured withdrawal of all 'outside powers' from the Indian Ocean. But as long as some powers are there we will not only not object, but we will welcome the U.S. presence there.'" [93: 22 Feb 75]

Should an Indian Ocean "common market" develop, the Shah would be quite interested to promote the development of road and rail routes to more closely tie the states of the region economically. Iran is now actively supporting an admittedly awesome undertaking, but the Shahanshah most probably is already planning for his nation to transition from advocate to architect, financier, and contractor. This would surely benefit Iran and correspond with the Shah's projection, "If everything went according to plan, Iran would in a decade, catch up with European countries; in 25 [years] it would rank with the world's most advanced countries." [93: 11 Jan 75]

NOTES

¹See [Refs. 88, 89, and 184].

²For a chronology of Islamic Summits and the Saudi proposal for an Islamic Pact see [79:109 ff.].

³See Section III.B.1 above.

⁴The Shah has stated these objections several times; see, for example [93: 1 Dec 73, and 93: 11 Jan 75].

⁵The oil industry was nationalized in 1951 with the National Iranian Oil Company replacing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; however, the international oil companies still controlled the marketing. Now Iran is able to "sell to Western oil companies...market independently or consume locally... without any foreign interference." [93: 4 Aug 73]

⁶See [Ref. 22].

⁷The proposal was presented during an October 1974 series of visits to Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, and India.

V. GLOBAL POLICIES

A. THE "THIRD WORLD"

Iran is a rapidly developing nation; the economy is expanding at a tremendous rate, social reform is proceeding with similar speed, and what even recently was a backward, struggling state supplying the West with inexpensive petroleum is fast becoming one of the more significant actors in the modern world. Iran was not a colony of the western powers as were so many of the areas of Africa, Asia, and Latin America that now are loosely grouped into the "Third World"; however, Iran's experiences, even only in this century, with European intervention, occupation, and domestic domination are quite analogous to the colonial experiences of other Third World states.

The present situation in Iran both supports and denies classification of the Middle Eastern state in the Third World. Supportive points are that Iran is an emerging, developing state; it has struggled with foreign powers for control of its natural resources, only recently gaining full control of its petroleum reserves;¹ the nation's foreign policy goals are similar to those of other Third World states in that Iran wishes to be able to deal effectively with both the Free World and with the Communist Bloc with the ability to pursue national objectives independently from either major alignment.

The negative aspects of grouping Iran with the Third World include the following: Iran is closely linked with the United

States for military equipment support, for technological and educational assistance, and for protection against aggression by the Soviet Union. Iran's rapid development, its emergence as an industrialized state, and its military capability elevates the nation from the "rank and file" of the Third World to a prominent leader and possibly indicate that Iran will attempt to take its place with the major powers of the world, even forming its own "bloc."

Iran is not the only oil exporting nation to enjoy greatly increased profits from the exploitation of its valuable reserves; rather, higher international prices for oil have generally benefited all exporters. The major difference with Iran is that the National Iranian Oil Company controls the petroleum industry compared with other producing countries which still are in "partnership" with multinational oil companies.

The Shahanshah is providing leadership to other exporting countries by proposing a single price system for oil. He supported his position at a press conference for American newsmen accompanying Secretary of State Kissinger to Iran in 1974 saying,

I think that a fixed price for oil has the advantage that nobody could manipulate it further. I mean, everybody will know that there is one single price for oil and how much profits the oil companies should make on a barrel of oil and how much it will cost the consumer to use and to consume that oil and how much he is going to pay his own country in taxation. [93: 9 Nov 74]

A report in the Tehran Journal states of the plan, "Iran's scheme, backed by an expert level working group from all OPEC nations in October [1974], would abolish the current two-tier pricing system for oil, which puts OPEC governments at a disadvantage to the big multinational oil companies." [94: 28 Nov 74]

His Imperial Majesty referred to his nation's leading role in OPEC in his 1974 Oil Day address:

The assumption by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries of the unqualified right to determine posted prices for oil under Iran's leadership is among the most important objectives ever achieved throughout world oil history. This achievement not only vastly increased our oil revenues, but also firmly entrenched our sovereignty over our petroleum reserves. [93: 3 Aug 74]

The rapid economic growth in Iran makes the country quite noticeable in the modern world generally suffering from inflation and talks of recession. Iran is not physically expanding its empire as was the Persia of twenty-five centuries ago, but it is extending its economic influence throughout the world. The nation is proud of the attention received from the United Nations concerning Iranian foreign aid; however, the monarch is deeply concerned that the effects of international inflation and revaluation will include a need to curtail a part of Iran's aid programs. Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda emphasized this possibility in an interview with Kayhan International: "'The real purchasing power of our oil income is on the decline due to world inflation....

We are, therefore, forced to think of the volume of our aid to various countries.'" [93: 23 Nov 74]

Many Third World states have received aid from Iran including Bangladesh, Pakistan, Syria, Jordan, the Egyptian Arab Republic, the Sudan, and Senegal.² While this aid is partly in the form of grants or long-term loans at little or no interest, Iran is also anxious to develop joint ventures which will directly benefit both nations involved.

The People's Republic of China (P.R.C.), like Iran, does not easily fit into the classification of the Third World. The P.R.C. actively projects an image of an agrarian society struggling to develop in a world dominated by the industrial powers, the Soviet Union and the United States with their respective blocs. However, the P.R.C., with its vast natural manpower resources, has done much to develop and to industrialize and must be considered to be a world power on nearly the same level as the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

The Shahanshah has used his troops actively to combat the Maoist-oriented forces of PFLOAG in Dhofar³ and he has no more desire to witness the spread of Chinese Communism in the Middle East than he does the Soviet variety. This does not cause Iran to ignore the existence of the P.R.C.; rather, the monarch is working to improve Sino-Iranian relations and to expand trade between the two.

Iran's economic foreign policy has unquestionably enhanced the nation's standing within the Third World; the Shahanshah's

country serves as an example for developing states. His Imperial Majesty can be understandably proud of his nation's achievements during the three decades that he has reigned. Domestic policies have resulted in vast social reforms which have transformed a traditional, feudal society into a modern state in a matter of a generation.⁴

The Shah is grateful that his nation was one of the first to receive American aid under Lend-Lease in the early 1950's; now he quickly points out to reporters that Iran no longer receives foreign aid; it pays for what it acquires and is in a position to offer aid to those countries in a less fortunate position. He replied to a Paris press conference, "You also spoke about U.S. armaments aid; such aid does not exist. We pay cash for weapons." [93: 6 Jul 74]

The Iranian monarch is also a world leader in promoting international cooperation and understanding.⁵ He consistently advocates that countries find peaceful solutions for disputes, and Iran actively seeks the ban of nuclear weapons proliferation through the nation's efforts toward making the Indian Ocean and the Middle East "zones of peace" and "nuclear-free regions."

Le Point magazine, published in France, proclaimed the Shahanshah its "Man of the Year" for 1974 as reported by Iranian sources: "'He symbolizes better than his Arab neighbours the crashing resurgence of the Third World.'...The

Monarch's leadership would soon enable Iran to join the club of great powers." [93: 11 Jan 75]

An article originating from Singapore and authored by Eckhard Budewig states, "The Shahanshah has become the 'man of the hour' of the Third World countries worst hit by high prices of oil and industrial goods alike." This group of nations is termed "a Third Front, developing nations lacking petroleum reserves, which rejects U.S. power politics as well as the Arab oil policy." These states look to Iran for assistance as its monarch "has made it known that he wants to share his country's oil revenues with the developing countries by investing in their economic reconstruction." [93: 5 Oct 74]

Iran is clearly a developing nation requiring and receiving more attention in world affairs. The concept of the "Third World" was a convenient device to group the states which did not easily fit into the two Cold War camps, the Free World and the Communist Bloc. Applying such a label is too restrictive in the case of Iran. Certainly the nation sympathizes with what might be termed the Third World, but the key element of His Imperial Majesty's approach to decision-making is Iranian independence.

Independent action characterizes the Shahanshah's domestic reform measures. These have progressed from the grants of royal lands to the six-points originally comprising the White Revolution which matured into the Revolution of the Shah and the People.⁶ The ultimate aim is to reach the

Great Civilization, within the next ten years if possible. In this state Iran will have achieved widespread social reform, the population will be well-fed, well-housed, and well-educated. The standard of living for all Iranians will be high and the people will have the educational background essential for democratic participation in the government.

The Shahanshah will still be the head of state, as per the 1906 constitution, but the people will be better able to participate in Iranian decision-making. Iran will also be able to make the transition from the rule of Mohammed Reza Shah to that of his son, Crown Prince Reza, without political disruptions.

The Great Civilization concept embodies an international dimension to complement the domestic one. By pursuing independent foreign policies the Shahanshah will help to insure that Iran will be an active nation in all areas of the world, unhindered by any bloc affiliations. Toward this end the Shah has "called for a new world economic order that would ensure 'economic justice and equality' between the world's industrial and developing countries." [94: 26 Oct 74] This call for a new economic order may well signal that the Shah is calling for a new international order which has Iran bridging the gap existing between the Third World and the industrialized states.

B. THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD

Iran is leading the oil exporting states in the transition from a source of raw materials for Western industry to a supplier of resources for the international market. The Shahanshah strongly disputes Western allegations that increasing oil prices are a direct cause of the inflation problems now plaguing industrialized states. As the Shah told delegates at the conference to revise the Fifth Plan,

For about 26 years our natural riches were plundered, every day more savagely than the previous one. In 1947, the posted price of oil in the Persian Gulf was \$2.17 per barrel. By 1969, it had been chipped away to \$1.79. Meanwhile, the industrialised had raised their commodities' rates from 300 to 400 per cent. You can easily imagine how badly we had been taken in. On the one hand, our purchasing power had shrunk so low and, on the other hand, we had to buy their industrial goods at such high rates. [93: 10 Aug 74]⁶

A major example of the Shah's independent action is policy for a single price of oil based on the cost of providing alternative sources of energy.⁷ Before this price can be determined, the developed world must realize that it will no longer be able to enjoy the "luxury" of inexpensive petroleum. [93: 3 Aug 74] By working within OPEC the Shah hopes that Iran will lead a price restructuring which would ensure that all member exporters would benefit; this would enhance Iran's leadership role within OPEC.

The United States has figured significantly in Iran's development and is likely to continue to do so. Iran's value in the United States' security system which linked the northern Tier" states of Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan to the United

States in CENTRO once was a strong bargaining point to request American aid. Iran no longer requires financial assistance and military aid from Washington, D. C., preferring to purchase foreign goods outright. The Shah will be unable to forget that support from the United States was so significant in resolving the Azerbaijan difficulties with the Soviet Union. Also, aid from the United States was instrumental in developing Iran after World War II.

Irano-American relations continue to be strong. Many Iranian students, both military and civilian, come to this country for education which is not yet adequately available in Iran. Also, Iranian purchases of military equipment such as the F-14 aircraft and the Spruance-class destroyers benefit industry in the United States as well as bolster the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces.

The recent warnings by President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger that the United States would possibly use force in the Middle East if threatened by inadequate supplies of petroleum do not seem to have greatly strained Irano-American relations. The Shah has stated that the United States' "threats of military intervention in the Middle East to prevent strangulation of Western economies by the Arab oil producing states has caused a 'dark and explosive' situation." [93: 18 Jan 75] The Shahanshah later stated, "But strangulation would not occur, even in the case of a renewed embargo, because many producer governments, including Iran,

would not take part in it." [93: 15 Feb 75] The desired effect of Iran's actions toward the United States is probably to accustom the latter to accept Iran as a nation ready to assume a role of leadership among the world powers.⁸

Iran is working to gain a more favorable economic relationship with the European Economic Community. Reporting an interview of the Shah by Der Speigel, Iranian sources note, "The Shahanshah said that Iran was entitled to special trading privileges with the Common Market because it would soon provide the nine nations with 50 percent of their gas needs." [93: 15 Feb 75] Since the collective organization was not anxious to recognize Iran's potential as a trading partner a few years ago, the latter has had to deal independently with member nations. The agreement with West Germany permitting Iran to purchase 25.04 percent interest in Krupp Steel is a major achievement. This arrangement provided Iran with direct access to much needed steel technology; in addition, Iran is now represented on the board of Freid. Krupp GmbH, the parent organization, and is participating in a joint investment fund with the German group [93: 27 Jul 74]

A more recent attempt by Iran to purchase a package of shares of Daimler-Benz stock and to establish a Mercedes-Benz factory in Iran was unsuccessful; the shares were sold instead to a German bank.⁹ "The monarch conceded that every country has the right not to sell stocks in vitally important companies, but added: 'Iran could probably have used some

100,000 Mercedes-Benz cars. That may have made all the difference in the economies of this company.'" [93: 25 Jan 75] A 1967 offer by Iran to attract the Volkswagen firm to manufacture sedans in Iran was unsuccessful. With the changing economic situation, Volkswagen now would like to establish a plant in Iran, but the Shah was able to dismiss the offer "not because it wants revenge, but because cars with similar cylinder capacity are already being produced in Iran, the monarch said." [93: 15 Feb 75]

France also has close economic ties with Iran. The Shah admires the late General de Gaulle for his ability to pursue France's interests, even when his policies were counter to those of the United States.¹⁰ A visit by the Shahanshah to France in June 1974 was highlighted by "the biggest-ever agreement for technological cooperation between an oil producing nation and an industrial power," estimated to total five billion dollars. Included were five nuclear power plants for Iran and joint petroleum projects.

A massive trade protocol resulted from the Shahanshah's visit to Paris. While the United States supplies most of Iran's large, sophisticated weapons systems, France will be the source for some Iranian weapons including fast search boats. [93: 29 Jan 74]

Great Britain, struggling with severe financial difficulties, has benefited from its relationship with Iran.¹¹ The latter has provided substantial aid to Britain and is

ordering 800 Chieftain tanks for the Imperial Iranian Army. [93: 15 Feb 75] The Shah referred to Britain's becoming an oil producer with the following comment to the German press: "'How much do you think Britain and Norway will charge you for their North Sea oil and natural gas?'" [93: 11 May 74] The Iranian press also quotes British Trade Secretary Peter Shore as stating, "With its ability to transform its oil wealth into major development of its industry, agriculture, and infrastructure, it represents a market of first importance for Britain." [93: 8 Feb 75]

Petroleum is a commodity much sought by Italy. The Italian group, A.G.I.P., was one of the first to reach an agreement with the National Iranian Oil Company after the complete nationalization of oil in 1973. On the occasion of a December 1974 visit to Tehran by President Giovanini Leone, the Shah "stressed the centuries-old cultural and political relations between Iran and Italy and the major contributions each country had made to civilisation." [93: 21 Dec 74] Associated with the state visit was a three billion dollar series of agreements concerning "a vast range of joint ventures including steel, oil, petrochemicals, rubber, textiles, aluminum, construction, agriculture, and capital good manufacture." [93: 21 Dec 74]

The Shahanshah is actively dealing with individual governments in Western Europe for two immediate purposes. Iran is able to invest oil revenues in Europe and gain access to

European technology through joint ventures. Also, the Shah hopes that the resulting bonds between his nation and particularly France and Germany will enable Iran to receive preferential treatment in dealings with the E.C.C. as a whole. A third result is that Iran is able once again to demonstrate its ability to deal with the established European powers on an equal basis. This gives rise to the Shah's claim that Iran will soon rank with Britain, France, and even Germany as a world power.

Iran, by being outside the United States' Free World Bloc, has been free to develop commerce with the Communist Bloc. Cordial relations with the Soviet Union, Iran's northern neighbor, are essential for the former's survival. While desiring to remain free from the Communist Bloc, the Shahanshah has accepted aid in the past from the Soviet Union. [See 67:306] Iran's recent policy has been to pay for foreign goods rather than to receive aid, and the most widely known trade agreement between that country and the Soviet Union is the so-called "Gas-for-Steel" treaty of 1966.¹²

Iran's relations with the Eastern European states of the Soviet Bloc are limited; however, the Shah is working to expand economic ties with several of these states. In conjunction with a 1974 visit by President Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria to Tehran, "agreements worth well over \$600 million in mutual trade exchanges and joint ventures" were reported by Kahyan. The arrangements were primarily agricultural and included

meat and dairy products and facilities, fertilizer and transportation. [93: 30 Nov 74] Rumania, Poland, and Yugoslavia have also recently reached agreements involving primarily meat and foodstuffs and associated facilities.

His Imperial Majesty's global policies center around two issues: friendly relations and economic exchange. The Shah hopes to insure his regional security by acquiring adequate conventional forces to counter any reasonable attack threat. He realizes that a global conflict, a nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States, would be disastrous for Iran and the world. Therefore, he is a strong supporter of detente.

The Shahanshah's global security considerations are simplified by the devastating nature of the circumstances. Hence, his major global policy decisions involve Iran's economic relations with other states. While linking his nation closely with the industrialized countries of Western Europe plus the United States, the Shah is pursuing investments in other areas: Australia, Canada, the Soviet Bloc, and the Third World. This promotes Iran's global friendships and is a hedge against Western inflation.

Iranian investments in Europe are designed to provide Iran with technology and non-oil income; but they also serve to stave off financial collapse of the industrialized West. The Shah realizes that the oil producing states must "think of the economy of the whole world...because if the world

collapses we shall collapse with it. We belong to that world.
We belong to that that you call--the so-called--free world.
And we do not want to see you collapse because we are going
to collapse with you." [93: 9 Nov 74]

NOTES

¹See p. 71 above.

²In July 1974 the Shah told a Paris press conference, "We have so far unilaterally placed \$3,000 million at the disposal of the United Nations. At the same time, we are pressing for the acceptance of our proposal for a neutral world development fund." [93: 6 Jul 74]

³Refer to pages 51-52 above.

⁴See [Refs. 46 and 112].

⁵The Shahanshah greatly rates the "humanitarianism of the Persian spirit" as "one of the virtues and qualities of Old Persia" he most admires [93: 14 Dec 74]; see also [75].

⁶See pages 18-21 above.

⁷This approach has been used repeatedly especially with Westerners; for example, with the American Press [93: 9 Nov 74] and with French newsmen [93: 6 Jul 74].

⁸During his July 1973 visit to the United States, the Shahanshah reasserted his independent policy while appearing on "Meet the Press": "We are not the toys of any country, including the United States; we are friends, maybe as close as any friends could be, but we are not receiving orders and we are not puppets." [93: 4 Aug 73]

⁹A recent interview with Der Spiegel magazine contains interesting questions from the German interviewers relating to this and related issues. [93: 12 Jan 74]

¹⁰During remarks welcoming the late French President Georges Pompidou to Tehran, the Shah remarked "that Iran and France pursued similar policies, adding that this similarity became greater during the 'new era' inaugurated by General Charles de Gaulle in France's overall policies." [93: 22 Sep 73]

¹¹Anglo-Iranian relations have not always been the best; regarding the British withdrawal of forces from the Persian Gulf Iran's monarch stated to the London Times, "'We have never regarded British presence in the Gulf as being for us. It has always been against us. It was your Government decision to go and we shall not invite you back.'" [93:14 Jun 69]

¹²See pages 60-62 above.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

His Imperial Majesty Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi is unquestionably one of the most important political actors in the Middle East, and he is a leading statesman in the world. He is determined to see his nation prosper and once again experience the glory of world leadership known by ancient Persia. His nation has the blessing of vast petroleum reserves which will greatly assist Iran to attain the Shahanshah's goal of the Great Civilization.

To understand Iran one must both appreciate its centuries-old tradition and be familiar with its prime decision-maker, the Shahanshah. Persian kingship is an integral part of Iran's heritage; Mohammed Reza Shah's execution of his perceived mission--his approach to the "job" of being King--to a great extent determines Iran's future.¹

The "operational code" approach is one method with which to systematically evaluate an actor's political belief system. The code helps to discover how the subject views the political universe and his perceived role in it. The code also helps to understand the actor's political behavior. However, as Professor George states, "Such a belief system influences, but does not unilaterally determine, decision-making; it is an important, but not the only, variable that shapes decision-making behavior." [151:191]

This perhaps is the largest drawback to applying the "operational code" technique to analyze political actors.

The method is not complicated; therefore, it is easy to forget that the results from this approach only partially explain the actor's political behavior. By itself, the "operational code" only provides information on the actor's belief system. Many other social, political, and economic factors also bear on decision-making behavior.²

The major strength of the code is that it provides a framework within which one can systematically examine and evaluate an actor's beliefs and perceptions. In the course of this research the "operational code" proved to be a valuable aid for the second portion of the project, analyzing the political actions of Mohammed Reza Shah. Developing the code and then proceeding with a content analysis as was done here provided a valuable tool for understanding the "why" as well as the "what" of the behavior. The results are of necessity general as the method does not fully account for externalities with which the decision-maker must cope but which are outside the scope of his belief set. An approach combining the "operational code" and content analysis could be readily applied by analysts in the intelligence community to produce decision-making profiles of major political and military actors.

The set of beliefs discerned using the "operational code" applies only to the actor analyzed. This is perhaps an obvious statement, but it must be remembered that a code derived for Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi applies only to his set of

beliefs and perceptions. A researcher wishing to analyze a political statement or action of another Iranian elite would not be correct in applying the results of the "operational code" developed in Section II above. A code can be developed for a decision-making group, such as in Nathan Leites' research on the Soviet Politburo [Refs. 55 and 56], but the resulting belief set would not necessarily be applicable to members of the group when acting individually.

The "operational code" derived during this research project indicates that Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi considers himself a monarch in the Persian kingship tradition coping with problems of modernization and reform in a political universe made uncertain by the constant threat of conflict. The Shah is optimistic about his nation's ability to thrive and prosper in a world showing the strains of an imperialistic era during which some nations advanced and industrialized at the expense of others.

Mohammed Reza Shah has forged a strong bond with his subjects, expressed by the Sixth of Bahman 1341 Referendum and the resulting Revolution of the Shah and the People.³ The monarch wishes to instill a sense of pride and responsibility in his population as together they reach the Great Civilization; this also will facilitate the transfer of authority and power to his son, Crown Prince Reza.

As Iran strives to join the circle of industrial powers in the world, the monarch is urging popular participation in

Iran's expanding economy. This also helps to promote domestic stability by giving farmers and factory workers a sense of involvement in their nation's future just as the bureaucrats and middle-class merchants are concerned with Iran's continued expansion and prosperity.

Oil is the obvious key to the economic growth and the industrial development of Iran. Fifteen years ago the monarch had ambitious dreams for his state; today those dreams are being realized. Social reform and modernization are established objectives of Iranian policy. While actively pursuing his domestic programs, the Shahanshah has worked hard to establish an independent foreign policy.

His Imperial Majesty seeks international peace and disarmament. However, until these goals are realized, he is working to insure Iran's survival. The Shah has built his military to be a dominant force in the Middle East and South Asia. Iran's Arab neighbors have strengthened their armed forces, but with the objective of battling Israel. This places Iran in a position of leadership in the Persian Gulf, so important to Iran's petroleum industry.

The Shahanshah wishes his country to be a leader and an example in the Middle East and the rest of the Third World. While supporting the Muslim Arabs' cause to regain lost territory, the Shah prefers to see the situation settled peacefully.

To the east, the Shah wishes to see peace and stability mark the relations between Pakistan and India. One of Iran's goals is to promote the economic development of South Asia. Iran is already more advanced than most of the neighboring states working to develop, and this would put Iran in a position of leadership in any regional development system which might evolve in the Indian Ocean littoral region.

Mohammed Reza Shah is determined to improve Iran's position in the world community. He well remembers the conditions under which he ascended the Peacock Throne three decades ago: his nation was occupied by the British and the Russians, and Iran suffered greatly during the Second World War. Post-war recovery was aided largely by the American Lend-Lease program; however, Iran was unable to follow an independent course of political action. The nation's valuable petroleum resources were controlled by foreign concerns under oil concessionary agreements.

Nationalization of the petroleum industry in 1951 "further confirmed Persia's sovereignty over her own oil industry" according to the Shah, [67:112] but it was not until 31 July 1973 that the National Iranian Oil Company took full control over Iran's valuable resource.⁴ Other oil producing states can be expected to follow, gaining complete sovereignty over their petroleum resources, but Iran will retain the position of leader.

Third World states not enjoying the fortune of oil reserves, the "Third Front" which must import both oil products and finished goods, will continue to look to Iran and to other producers neither part of the Arab oil bloc nor the industrial states.⁵ Iran will not only be a country progressing rapidly with industrialization, it will have the continued respect and support of the Third World.

The Shahanshah hopes to enter the small circle of industrial powers. However, he intends to enter the group with an independent, Iranian policy. He does not care to associate his nation with "Capitalism," "Communism," or any other "-ism";⁶ rather he intends to reassert the Persian tradition, marked by humanitarian ideals. This heritage which spans more than two millenia, has much more significance to the most recent monarch of an age-old tradition than could any of the "recent" "-isms."

A primary objective of this research project was to concentrate on Iranian press information when analyzing the political behavior of the Shahanshah. This was to try to avoid possible biases of non-Iranian sources. Use of the "operational code" to determine Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi's political belief system proved extremely valuable as a means to counter the researcher's own "Western bias"; as one begins to study an actor's code, one easily begins to apply to actor's beliefs to the analysis of the actor's behavior than one's own beliefs.

This research project would be incomplete, however, were it not to include some observations of His Imperial Majesty from the researcher's Western orientation to complement what hopefully has been an unbiased examination of the Shahanshah's belief system and its applicability to political action.

Alvin J. Cottrell, in an article titled "Explaining Iran's Actions" reprinted from the Washington Post by Kayhan International, has observed the following:

One key country whose motives have been particularly misunderstood or distorted, intentionally or not, by press reports and analysts, is Iran. The gist of a number of these reports and some statements by a highly-placed U.S. Government official seems to be that the Shah's arms and oil policies are at best irrational and at worst motivated by greed. This interpretation seems to reflect a myopic perception of the Shah's intentions and of the factors that are impinging upon his policies. [93: 21 Dec 74]

The West cannot ignore Iran any more than it can deny the latter the right to develop its vast resources and join the "industrial nations club." Too easily, Western observers are tempted to view Iran with the same eye as the other states of the Middle East, disregarding such facts as Iran is a Persian rather than Arabic state, the Shi'a sect of Islam predominating in Iran distinguishes the nation from its Sunni Muslim Arab neighbors, and Iran's "constitutional monarchy" founded on twenty-five centuries of Persian Kingships is quite different from other Middle Eastern governments.

The Middle East recently has been the focus of much Western attention: the Arab-Israeli conflict has affected

states of the West either directly, as with American aid to Israel, or indirectly, as a result of the Arab embargo program.

The oil boycott imposed by the Arab petroleum exporting nations proved to be a valuable weapon in the Arab world's struggle with Israel. The West benefited from the Shahanshah's continuing position that Iranian oil would be used constructively for his nation's development; Iran's support for its Muslim brothers in the Arab world does not include sympathetic participation in the Arab boycott program. Rather, Iran's objective has been to work with the West to tie the price of oil to that of the latter's industrial goods.

The United States and other Western nations have greatly benefited from economic relations with Iran. In addition to being a dependable source of petroleum, the Middle Eastern nation's capital investments have particularly aided British, French, German and American industries.

Iran's choice of the United States as a supplier of major weapons systems may provide the latter with valuable information. Hopefully, American military units will not become engaged in combat with the Imperial Iranian armed forces; however, should expensive, American-made systems such as F-14 aircraft or Spruance-class destroyers be utilized by Iran against other states in the Middle East or South Asia, the United States might gain experience lessons without the involvement of American forces or equipment.

The United States has a valuable Middle Eastern ally in Iran. The nation and its monarch must be considered as ready to recognize both the effect of the Persian tradition on the Shahanshah and his nation's potential role in the security of the Indian Ocean region.

American forces should maintain the capability to operate world-wide in the interests of the United States. However, encouragement of a regional defense agreement in line with that proposed by the Shah could reduce the potential expense of more frequent visits to the Indian Ocean by American naval units or permanently basing forces in the region.

A Westerner cannot easily understand the complexities of the Persian tradition; however, the increasingly important position of Iran in the world makes it imperative for Western analysts and observers to acquaint themselves with Iranian values and traditions. In Iran the monarchy has been a thriving force behind modernization and reform moves as well as a long-standing custom.

Iran's rapid development during the last three decades is quite commendable; the United States in particular must be aware that the Middle Eastern kingdom is no longer a struggling, underdeveloped state highly dependent on American foreign aid as protection for survival. The Shahanshah is succeeding to build a strong nation: one that is capable to support itself in the modern international community and one that

will be able to survive the transition of authority from Mohammed Reza Shah to Crown Prince Reza Cyrus.

The preceding two centuries have marked a low ebb in the Persian experience. The forceful character of Reza Shah established the Pahlavi Dynasty, but the reign of his son, Mohammed Reza Shah, has seen Iran reborn from the desolation of the middle of this century to the verge of the Great Civilization.

NOTES

¹See [Refs. 12 and 67].

²Refer to [Refs. 43 and 48] for approaches to government-al decision making.

³Pages 18-21 above.

⁴See pages 49-50 above.

⁵See page 84 above.

⁶The Shashanshah has strong religious beliefs; for the effect of Islam on Middle Eastern government see [Refs. 16 and 184].

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
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