



THE KOREAN WAR

An Assessment of the Historical Record

JULY 24 & 25, 1995 • WASHINGTON, DC

CONFERENCE REPORT





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An Assessment of the Historical Record

JULY 24 & 25, 1995 · WASHINGTON, DC
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY



THE KOREA SOCIETY

Korea-America Society



GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY



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LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN

The Korean War • An Assessment of the Historical Record



On July 24th and 25th, 1995, The Korea Society, Georgetown University and the Korea-America Society sponsored a conference in Washington entitled "The Korean War: An Assessment of the Historical Record." Conference participants came from the United States, South Korea, Russia, China and the United Kingdom, and together they worked to produce the most significant conference ever held on the Korean War.

The conference was given added impact by the fact that it coincided with the dedication of the Korean War Veterans Memorial. The two events worked beautifully together to at last put into deeper and clearer perspective a conflict which had for far too long been in a sort of historic limbo.

The scholarly work of the conference, and the stirring words spoken by President Bill Clinton and President Kim Young Sam at the Memorial's dedication conveyed the same essential message: that the war was terribly difficult, that it had been fought bravely by all participants, and above all, even from the post-Cold War perspective, it clearly had been worth fighting.

The conference was also noteworthy for the opportunity it gave scholars to assess in public recently declassified documentary material from the Kremlin, including cables and records of meetings involving Stalin, Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung. One of the most striking aspects of the entire conference to me was the honesty with which the Russian participants dealt with Stalin's role in starting the war, and in prolonging it. In dealing with these terrible events so honestly, the Russians did all of the conferees a great favor, and at the same time were freeing themselves from the wreckage of the past, and preparing themselves and their country to move forward into new relationships with their neighbors. At the end of the conference, the performance of the Russians was given a spontaneous round of applause by the conferees and the audience in attendance.

This report has been prepared by Dr. Kathryn Weathersby, whose ideas and guidance in the conference's initial planning stages, and her participation during and following the event, were invaluable. I am confident that this will be a work of lasting value, and am proud to write this introduction. I know that the perspectives of history change with time, and that this report does not place the Korean War in its final resting place. I am also confident, as new and more insightful perspectives on the Korean War are arrived at, that this report will be one of their foundations.

Donald P. Gregg

Ambassador Donald P. Gregg
Chairman
The Korea Society



CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

The Korean War • An Assessment of the Historical Record

Dr. Evgueni Bajanov
Russian Foreign Ministry

Dr. Natalia Bajanova
Russian Academy of Sciences

Mr. Clay Blair

General Woo Joo Chang
Korean-American Business Institute

Dr. Jian Chen
Southern Illinois University

Dr. Woong-Kyu Cho
Korea-America Society

Dr. Paul Cole
DFI International

Dr. Valeri Denissov
Russian Foreign Ministry

Dr. Roger Dingman
University of Southern California

General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley

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Dr. Sergei Goncharov
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Mr. Paul Lashmar

Dr. Chong-sik Lee
University of Pennsylvania

Dr. James Matray
New Mexico State University

Father Dennis McNamara
Georgetown University

Dr. John Merrill
U.S. Department of State

Dr. Bonnie Oh
Georgetown University

Dr. John Oh
Catholic University of America

Dr. Chang-II Ohn
Korea Military Academy

Col. Rod Paschall

Dr. J.Y. Ra
Kyunghee University

Dr. Jim Reardon-Anderson
Georgetown University

Dr. William Stueck
University of Georgia

Col. Harry Summers, Jr.

Dr. Kathryn Weathersby
Florida State University

Dr. Litai Xue
Stanford University

Dr. Sung Chul Yang
Kyunghee University

Dr. Shu Guang Zhang
University of Maryland



Dr. Woong-Kyu Cho, President, Korea-America Society



CONFERENCE AGENDA

The Korean War • An Assessment of the Historical Record

DAY I, MONDAY, JULY 24

Opening Remarks

Ambassador Donald P. Gregg, The Korea Society
Dr. Woong-Kyu Cho, Korea-America Society
Dr. Jim Reardon-Anderson, Georgetown University

Panel I: Perspectives on the Origins of The Korean War

Moderator
Dr. Jim Reardon-Anderson

Panelists
Dr. James Matray
Civil is a Dumb Name for a War

Dr. Kim Hakjoon
Soviet-North Korean Relations Before the Outbreak of the Korean War and their Implications upon the Origins of the Korean War

Dr. Valeri Denissov
Korean War of 1950-1953: Thoughts About the Conflict's Causes and Actors

Dr. Jian Chen
Why and How China Entered the Korean War: In Light of New Evidence

Discussants
Dr. John Merrill
Dr. Chong-Sik Lee

Panel II: Assessing the Politics of The Korean War

Moderator
Dr. Bonnie Oh

Panelists
Dr. Roger Dingman
Politics in Peril: The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and The Korean War

Dr. Evgueni Bajanov
Assessing the Politics of the Korean War

Dr. Xue Litai
State Interests and Realpolitik in the Decision Making Process

Dr. Kim Chull-baum
The Triangle of Stalin, Mao and Kim in the Korean War

Discussants
Dr. Sergei Goncharov
Dr. Kim Ilpyong

Dinner

Special Guests
Honorable James T. Laney
United States Ambassador to the Republic of Korea

Honorable Park Kun Woo
Republic of Korea Ambassador to the United States

General Raymond Davis
Chairman of the Korean War Veterans Memorial Advisory Board

DAY II, TUESDAY, JULY 25

Opening Remarks

Panel III: Assessing the Military Strategy of The Korean War

Moderator
Mr. Clay Blair

Panelists
General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley
Notes on the Strategy of the Korean War

Col. Harry Summers, Jr.
The Korean War Paradigm

Dr. Shu Guang Zhang
China's Military Strategy During the Korean War: A Critical Reassessment

Dr. Chang-Il Ohn
Military Objectives and Strategies of Two Koreas in the Korean War

Discussants
Col. Rod Paschall
Gen. Woo Joo Chang

Panel IV: Assessing the Conclusion and Outcome of The Korean War

Moderator
Dr. William Stueck

Panelists
Dr. Kathryn Weathersby
The Soviet Role in Prolonging the Korean War, 1951-53

Dr. Natalia Bajanova
Assessing the Conclusion and Outcome of the Korean War

Mr. Paul Lashmar
POWs, Soviet Intelligence and the MIA Question

Dr. J.Y. Ra
The Politics of Conference: The Political Conference at Geneva, April 26 - June 15, 1954

Discussants
Dr. John Oh
Dr. Paul Cole

Summary Overview

Moderator
Ambassador Donald P. Gregg

Presenters
Dr. Yang Sung-Chul
The Korean War and North-South Korean Political Development

Fr. Dennis McNamara
South Korea's Economic Development Since the Korean War

Dr. William Stueck
In Search of Essences: Labelling the Korean War



CONFERENCE REPORT

The Korean War • An Assessment of the Historical Record

The dedication of the Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington in July of this year proved to be an unusually propitious occasion for convening a scholarly conference to assess the historical record of the Korean War. The release in recent months of a substantial body of documents on the war from Russian and Chinese archives has resolved important questions about the origins of the war that have preoccupied political and scholarly debate on the Korean conflict since the war began. As a result, scholars are now beginning to move beyond old debates to ask new questions about the war and to formulate new frameworks of interpretation. Access to evidence from the communist side has brought great excitement to the study of the Korean War, but it has also brought new challenges. Documents and memoirs from the communist side must be analyzed with the greatest care and integrated with the massive body of documentation available from the United Nations side. Above all, as we move toward a more balanced investigation of the war, researchers must examine this complex conflict from as many vantage points as possible, a formidable task indeed.

The conference held at Georgetown University on July 24-25, 1995, was a significant step toward meeting these new challenges. Jointly sponsored by The Korea Society, Georgetown University and the Korea-America Society, the conference brought together thirty-two scholars from the United States, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China for two days of intensive discussion of a broad range of questions concerning the history of the Korean War. The conference was further enriched by questions and comments from members of the audience, many of whom had served in military or civilian posts during the war and had gathered in Washington for the dedication of the Korean War Veterans Memorial.

This report offers a brief summary of the major arguments advanced in the conference presentations and discussions. The report cannot do justice, however, to the richness of the papers presented; readers who wish a fuller account may obtain copies of individual papers from the Washington office of The Korea Society (for ordering information, see page 32). In order to make the report more coherent, rather than following the order of presentations, the summary is divided into six topics that emerged as the primary foci of discussion during the conference.

ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR

In keeping with the long-standing pattern of the debate on the Korean War, the question of the origins of the war received more attention at the conference than any other topic. However, the discussion of the origins of

the war took a new shape, as the old debate over who instigated the military action on 25 June 1950 has finally been laid to rest. All of the five presenters who discussed the outbreak of the war agreed on the basic narrative of how the decision was made to launch a full-scale attack on South Korea that is revealed in the Russian archival documents presented to Kim Young Sam by Russian president Boris Yeltsin in June of 1994. The Russian documents show that in 1949 Kim Il Sung repeatedly pressed Stalin for permission to attack South Korea in order to reunify the country by military means. Initially, Stalin ruled that a North Korean offensive was "not necessary," that the Korean People's Army could attack South Korea only as a counterattack. By September 1949, however, the Soviet leadership agreed to entertain Kim's proposal for an invasion of South Korea. The Politburo solicited additional information from Pyongyang then decided that an attack was not advisable at that time. Since North Korean forces did not have the necessary superiority, an attack on South Korea might lead to a prolonged civil war, increasing the likelihood of American intervention in the conflict, an eventuality the Soviet leadership wanted to avoid at all costs.

In January 1950, Kim Il Sung again raised the question of reunifying the country by military means. This time Stalin informed Kim that he would "help him in this matter," although he emphasized that "such a large matter needs much preparation" and should be organized "so that there would not be too great a risk." Kim Il Sung and Foreign Minister Pak Hon Yong then traveled to Moscow in April, where they worked out detailed plans for the campaign. Stalin insisted, however, that the North Koreans secure the approval of Mao Zedong before giving his final approval for the offensive. Accordingly, Kim Il Sung flew to Beijing in May, where he secured Chinese approval. The Soviet Union then sent the necessary military supplies to North Korea, and Soviet military advisers went to Pyongyang to work out the invasion plan with officers of the KPA.

While agreeing on this basic narrative, conference participants differed in the relative importance they assigned to various elements in the decision-making process. Valeri Denissov emphasized the importance of the saber rattling by South Korean leaders in 1949 and 1950 in convincing Moscow to approve an offensive campaign against the South. Dr. Denissov, who served for fifteen years in the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang, reported that the Soviet leadership viewed the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea in 1949 as having unleashed Syngman Rhee, enabling him to attempt unification by military means. The war-mongering speeches by Syngman Rhee and others were thus taken seriously in Moscow. They provided Kim Il Sung with a persuasive argument in favor of a preemptive strike by North Korea.

Kim Hakjoon agreed that the military clashes along the 38th parallel were a major factor in Moscow's eventual decision to launch a full-scale military campaign against the South. He emphasized, however, the central role of Soviet Ambassador T.F. Shtykov in the decision to attack South Korea, as well as the importance of Mao Zedong's involvement in the decision. Dr. Kim pointed out that in May 1949 Mao had encouraged the North Koreans not to fear the foreign intervention that might result from an attack on South Korea, but had advised that they should wait until the conclusion of the Chinese civil war before launching their reunification campaign so that China could offer assistance to the DPRK if necessary. Dr. Kim also pointed out that the Russian documents indicate that there was no serious disagreement between Kim Il Sung and Foreign Minister Pak Hon Yong about the wisdom of launching the attack, as has long been suggested in Korea.

Unfortunately, the Russian documents do not reveal clearly why Stalin changed his mind in January 1950 about the advisability of an attack on South Korea. The only evidence they provide about Stalin's reasoning is his explanation to Mao Zedong in May 1950 that due to "the changed international situation" it was now possible to approve the plan of the Korean comrades. The question of what Stalin meant by "changed international situation" has thus become the major interpretive question regarding the outbreak of the war and each of the conference participants offered his own reading of the phrase. Evgueni Bajanov concluded that because the Cold War was in full swing by 1950, a war in Korea had become admissible. Stalin saw the creation of NATO as a serious danger to the Soviet Union; control of all of Korea could offset American control over Japan. In addition, the victory of the Communist Party in China made it seem possible that the North Korean party might also succeed, especially since China could now assist them. Stalin was also influenced by his acquisition of nuclear weapons and by the Americans having lost in China.



Dr. James Matray and Dr. James Reardon-Anderson

Dr. Denissov maintained that the victory of the CCP in China was what Stalin primarily meant by "changed international situation." Since the United States had deserted Chiang Kai-shek, it would not likely fight a war over Korea. A second factor was the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which deprived the Americans of the ability to use the "nuclear card" in a confrontation with the Soviet Union. Discussant Sergei Goncharov suggested that we look more closely at the impact of the acquisition of nuclear weapons on Stalin's thinking, because though he had the bomb he had no means of delivery. This meant that the Soviet Union was actually in a very vulnerable position. It had announced that it had nuclear capability but did not have the actual ability to use it, which gave the adversary a strong temptation to make a preemptive strike. With regard to the impact of NATO, Dr. Goncharov pointed out that when Stalin received Liu Shaoqi in 1949 he had already made up his mind about NATO and therefore his decision in January 1950 cannot be attributed to this factor. Dr. Goncharov stated that some Russian documents indicate that the Truman interview on January 5 and the Acheson speech on January 12 played some role, but these were not the only factor. The situation in Germany and in Europe in general must have played a role, as well as concerns about Japan.

James Matray argued that the Russian documents do not support the conclusion that the infamous speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson at the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, was a factor in Stalin's decision, since the Soviet leader emphasized that the attack "must be organized so that there would not be too great a risk." Furthermore, the Soviet leadership could not have ignored signs in subsequent weeks that American policy in Asia was hardening. Instead, Dr. Matray detects in the Russian documents an increasing desperation on the part of Stalin, Mao and Kim about what the future will hold for US policy in East Asia, particularly in Japan.

Discussant Chong-sik Lee agreed that responsibility for the war lies with South Korea as well as with North Korea and the Soviet Union because of the impact on Moscow and Pyongyang of bellicose declarations by the South Korean leadership. Dr. Lee also argued that since Russian documents show clearly that Stalin was very concerned about American actions in Korea, the war would not have occurred had the US been firmer in its attitude toward Korea. Chen Jian agreed that the possibility of American intervention was the key factor in Stalin's decision, since it had been the central issue in earlier discussions of Kim Il Sung's proposal.

Several American and Korean scholars discussed the impact of the new archival evidence on the long-standing debate between "traditionalists" and "revisionists." Kim Hakjoon argued that the Russian documents show that the "neo-traditionalist" interpretation is closest to the truth, but they also support some of the arguments advanced by the "neo-revisionist" school. Chen Jian concluded that the picture of the war that emerges from the new sources falls between the "traditionalist" and "revisionist" interpretations. The

Korean War was both a civil and an international war. Kim Il Sung was the main driving force behind the plans to liberate the South, but he was not Moscow's or Beijing's puppet. While it would have been impossible for Kim to carry out his plans for unifying the Korean peninsula without Soviet and Chinese support neither Moscow nor Beijing "ordered" the North Korean attack on June 25, 1950.

Dr. Matray agreed that the archival evidence from Russia and China and the recently published memoirs and interviews have undermined the consensus that had been emerging for the last decade plus that the Korean War is best characterized as a civil conflict. At the same time, however, Dr. Matray cautioned that Korean War scholars run the risk of resurrecting traditional interpretations that have also distorted perceptions of the conflict. He argued that the time has now come to escape the traditionalist versus revisionist analytical bipolarity that has trapped Korean War studies in an interpretational straightjacket for nearly a generation.

Dr. Goncharov also expressed concern over discussing the new evidence in terms of schools of interpretation, pointing out that these interpretive approaches are related to American intellectual history and have little to do with the Korean War itself. These interpretations reflect important discussions within American society and should for that reason be respected, but at the same time we should be very cautious about assessing the value of this new documentary evidence by determining which schools of interpretation it supports. Dr. Goncharov observed that it is not difficult to understand how challenging it is for scholars to have a new set of documents appear, after we have invested so much in a particular interpretation. Without this documentary evidence, we were able to choose our ideological stand and, depending on the creativity of our mind, produce a very beautiful picture. Right now, the good and bad effect is that our freedom of imagination has been severely limited. The continued declassification of documents will limit it even further. If we pay too much attention to continuing to build skyscrapers of post-revisionism or some other construction, the resulting discussion will have little to do with the writing of history. Dr. Goncharov also cautioned that it is too early



Dr. Valeri Denissov and Dr. Kim Hakjoon

to give simple, clear-cut explanations of many important questions about the war. Russian documents are missing on just those periods that are most crucial, e.g. Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow in April 1950 and Zhou Enlai's meetings with Stalin in October 1950.

Discussant John Merrill also cautioned against the over-use of categories. He agreed with Chen Jian that scholarly work on this period is far from over, and in fact, is just beginning. He did suggest, however, that a kind of consensus was emerging, focused on the complex interplay of local and international causes of the war. The division of the country was due to superpower influence, but also to Japanese colonialism and to Korean political history. The peninsula was subsequently destabilized due to the withdrawal of the two superpowers and the conflict was internationalized after the war broke out. Merrill also noted the theme of the tail wagging the dog. Kim Il Sung clearly lobbied Stalin to support the attack on the South and by the spring of 1950, due to changes in the international situation, the dog was a little more willing to be wagged.

Dr. Merrill also pointed out that the war had a preemptive aspect. Stalin was worried about the survivability of the North Korean regime, particularly in light of the inflow of American assistance to the South in early 1950. Dr. Merrill noted that the new Russian and Chinese sources shed fascinating light on the guerrilla conflict in the South, the North's campaign in the summer of 1949 against ROK border violations and the guerrilla offensive that began in the winter of 1949 and continued through the spring of 1950. He concluded that international events clearly fed back into North Korean policy on the peninsula itself, whether to present a better case to Stalin or to soften up the South for the planned invasion.

CHINESE INVOLVEMENT AND RELATIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNIST ALLIANCE

Based on his extensive study of Chinese archival materials, Chen Jian argued that China's decision to intervene in the war in Korea was not based solely on security concerns, as has long been believed in the West. Although Beijing made the decision to intervene in Korea in October 1950, it took steps in that direction as early as July. The reasons for China's intervention were much broader and more complicated than simply protecting its borders. Mao's concept of revolution reflected his generation's emotional commitment to China's national liberation as well as its longing for China to take a central, although not dominant, position in world politics. This led Mao and his comrades to emphasize that they would not tolerate Washington's disdain of China and the Chinese people; they were determined to challenge "American arrogance." The rejuvenation of China's position as the Middle Kingdom would be realized through the promotion of Asian and world revolutions following the Chinese model. The Korean crisis provided a test case for this principle. The CCP leadership hoped to use intervention in Korea to promote the international

prestige and influence of the new regime, restoring China's central position in international affairs.

In a deeper sense, Dr. Chen argued, the attitude of the CCP leadership toward the Korean crisis was shaped by its determination to find a way to mobilize the Chinese population to support continuous revolution following the victory of 1949. In other words, the CCP's understanding of China's national security interests was defined by the perceived need to maintain and promote the momentum of the Chinese revolution. China did not make the Korean War, but when faced with the crisis brought about by the war, it acted on the basis of security concerns that had been profoundly penetrated by this revolutionary momentum.

Drawing also on new Chinese sources, Xue Litai offered a somewhat different interpretation of Chinese decision-making. He argued that Mao agreed with Kim Il Sung's plan to attack South Korea for two reasons. First, in his conversation with Mao, Kim exaggerated Stalin's enthusiasm for the campaign against South Korea. Second, Mao had requested Soviet assistance for an attack on Taiwan and therefore worried that questioning Kim's plan might revive Stalin's nervousness about the CCP plan for Taiwan. According to Dr. Xue, Mao decided to intervene in the war in October 1950 for three primary reasons. First, the American decision to send the 7th fleet to the Taiwan straits was tantamount to an American declaration of war. Second, Mao believed the intervention in Korea would have a salutary effect on domestic politics. Third, China's Northeast was threatened by the American advance into North Korea. Dr. Xue argued that neither Mao nor Stalin was motivated by the ideology that so characterized their public declarations. Instead, they were pursuing state interests and realpolitik. With regard to the effects of the war, Dr. Xue concluded that because of the American military buildup that resulted from the Korean War, in all their subsequent mischief-making Moscow and Beijing never again displayed so much stomach for adventures that might risk direct confrontation with Western armed forces.

From research in Chinese archival sources, Zhang Shu Guang offered a third interpretation of China's entry into the Korean War. He concluded that Mao decided to intervene in Korea because he believed he could win. China had a geographic advantage, as it could get supplies from the neighboring Soviet Union while the US had to maintain a very long supply line. China also had numerical superiority, which Mao believed would prevail over American technological superiority.

Though he offered an interpretation of why Mao entered the war, Dr. Zhang's chief concern was the question of how China fought the war in Korea, a subject that has received little attention in the scholarly literature. He noted that Mao had personally directed almost every major battle of the People's Liberation Army during the civil war of 1946-49. On the basis of this experience Mao had developed a "weak army" strategy, the key to which was to fight a protracted war. Mao accordingly planned initially to fight a

strategically defensive war in Korea, to build a defensive line from Wonsan to Pyongyang. He thought this would be possible because he calculated that the US would not advance rapidly to the north. When UN forces did move rapidly northward following the Inchon landing in September 1950, Mao was not discouraged because he saw that there was an opportunity to strike back through a surprise attack. Largely because Chinese forces were adapted to mobile warfare, the surprise attack was successful. At this point, however, Mao became "dizzy with success." He thought the war could be won quickly and therefore planned for a large-scale offensive. After the failure of this offensive in the spring of 1951 Mao developed a new strategy, which he named after a popular candy from his home province. According to this "sticky candy" strategy, the accumulation of small defeats would be so troublesome to the United States that it would withdraw from Korea.

Dr. Zhang noted that it was difficult for China to change from mobile to positional warfare, but they were able to dig deep fortifications and then found that they could turn the fortifications into a staging ground for offensive operations. The Chinese leadership also began to emphasize the importance of winning the war in the rear. Dr. Zhang concluded with a call for further research, identifying in particular the need to investigate the following issues: what China learned about modern warfare from its experience in Korea; questions of command and control during the war; the relationship between Mao and Peng Dehuai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers; Peng's relations with lower-ranking commanders; and the relationship between Chinese and North Korean military forces.

The paper by Kim Chull-baum focused on relations among the leaders of the three communist allies. On the basis of the Russian documents given to South Korea last June, Dr. Kim concluded that prior to China's entry into the war, the Chinese leadership was poorly informed of Soviet and North Korean plans, which they resented. As soon as Chinese troops entered the conflict, however, communications between Stalin and Mao became much more frequent and the two leaders consulted closely on the tactics to pursue in Korea. Dr. Kim concluded that communications were closest between Moscow and Beijing and between Moscow and Pyongyang. The Beijing/Pyongyang line of the triangle remained the weakest, though it grew stronger over the course of the armistice negotiations.

Kathryn Weathersby also examined the nature of the alliance on the communist side. She concluded that the physical demands of fighting against American forces in Korea exacerbated the dependence on Soviet military and economic support that already marked the DPRK's and PRC's relations with Moscow prior to June 1950. The Soviet Union was the only source for the enormous quantity of arms, ammunition and other supplies which the PLA and KPA required to fight the war. A large portion of the correspondence between

Stalin and Mao during the war consists of Mao's frequent requests for military supplies and advisers and Stalin's replies, which were not always favorable. China was particularly reliant on the Soviet Union for the creation of the PRC's air force, a task made urgent by the relentless American air bombardment. The Russian documents show that Kim Il Sung was even more dependent on the Soviet Union than was Mao. In addition to his reliance on Moscow for supplies and expertise, Kim's public actions were closely supervised by Soviet officials in North Korea. Furthermore, after the entry of Chinese troops, Kim Il Sung's role in managing the war was greatly diminished. The result of these unequal relations, Dr. Weathersby argued, was that although Soviet-Chinese relations were complex and Stalin did not simply issue orders to Mao Zedong, the Soviet leader nonetheless had the final voice in decision-making. The Chinese handled the day to day management of the war, but they were forced to defer to Stalin's leadership whenever he chose to exercise it.

US DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE KOREAN WAR

Reflecting the current focus of interest on the new sources from Russia and China, the conference included only one paper on American politics during the Korean War. Roger Dingman reexamined American sources in order to investigate how US domestic politics affected American conduct of the Korean War, focusing specifically on the dramatic conflict between President Truman and General MacArthur. He argued that rather than viewing the Korean War as a pollutant in American politics, as is often the perception, it is more accurate to conclude that domestic political conditions lured American political and military leaders into an internecine struggle that seriously damaged their ability to direct the Korean War to an early and more satisfactory termination.

Dr. Dingman argued that throughout 1950 the demands of the war, the relationships with allies and domestic political circumstances all dictated continuation of a partnership that Truman and MacArthur both realized was difficult but essential. By late March 1951, however, those conditions had changed. Firing MacArthur and thereby repudiating the strategy of expanding the war into China became the only means for President Truman to demonstrate his command over events at home and abroad. MacArthur, for his part, had to challenge the president, not in order to sabotage peace talks or to satisfy his ego, but in order to expose and fill the domestic political leadership vacuum that in his view had produced such disastrous results in Korea. Both men knew that the dangerous political drift at home must be reversed if the US were to prevail on the battlefield and in the truce negotiations. The way to do that was to build a new domestic political coalition in support of an effective war strategy. However, the lengthy hearings prevented Truman and MacArthur from building the consensus they sought. This failure resulted in a military and diplomatic stalemate because

it removed the possibility of escalatory coercion for the remainder of the Truman presidency.

Responding to Dr. Dingman's paper, Dr. Goncharov observed that his analysis revealed the deficiencies of our understanding of Soviet foreign policy. Historians of Russia cannot produce a study of relations between foreign and domestic policy under Stalin that is so comprehensive and sophisticated; we just do not know what that relationship was. In view of the new evidence, historians face a mammoth new task of synthesizing and analyzing Stalin's overall thinking. We have to begin at the very beginning, Dr. Goncharov declared, in order to reconstruct this history.

MILITARY HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR

General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley presented an analysis of the successive strategies employed during the seven discrete stages of the Korean War: the opening offensive, the defeat of the KPA, the UN advance into North Korea, the Chinese intervention, the return to the 38th parallel, the Chinese spring offensive of 1951 and the static defense of the remainder of the war. General Farrar-Hockley concluded that of the several strategies applied by each side, three narrowly failed to yield high dividends. The North Korean offensive of June 1950 came close to success in July of that year. If the KPA had been massed for the capture of Pusan and not diverted to the southwest of Korea, and Pusan had fallen, the Republic of Korea could have been rescued only by a major amphibious invasion led by the United States. In his opinion, it is by no means certain that such an operation would have been mounted.

Secondly, if MacArthur had been ordered to limit his advance in October 1950 to the narrow waist of Korea, and had established there a strong defensive line while ROK forces continued the pursuit, the northern border of the Republic of Korea might well lie on that line today. Thirdly, if Mao Zedong had held Peng Dehuai to the line of the Hansay, from Seoul through Inje, sending him reinforcements and supplies to consolidate his position, that line might now mark the division of the peninsula.

In assessing the mistakes made during the war, General Farrar-Hockley emphasized the arrogance of the US and its allies, who thought that they would teach the Korean and Chinese peasants a lesson once they brought their superior technology to bear. He also emphasized the importance of the poor communications equipment of the Chinese and North Korean troops, which contributed substantially to their failure to push UN forces out in early 1951.

Colonel Harry Summers discussed the importance of the Korean War paradigm in American military thinking. He asserted that because the US military after the Korean War adopted first the atomic model and then the counterinsurgency model for war planning, all past battlefield experiences were deemed irrelevant. This was especially true of the Korean War experience, since



Dr. Kim Chull-baum

it was viewed as a failure. As a result, the hard lessons of air-to-air combat learned in MIG Alley in Korea had to be relearned at a considerable price in the skies over Vietnam. There was in fact no thorough analysis made of the lessons to be learned from Korea, partly because since it was a barely disguised defeat it seemed no model for the future. However, the Korean War model became the basis of US policy in the Persian Gulf, where a new and improved Korean War model paved the way to victory. Colonel Summers concluded that the Korean War is the paradigm for warfare in the 21st century, and we therefore need to look to it for lessons for the future.

Chang-Il Ohn examined the changing military objectives and strategies of the two Koreas during the war. He concluded that neither North nor South Korea was physically capable of independently achieving its military objectives or implementing its desired military strategies. Although North Korea seemed to be able to set its own objectives and strategy, it was tightly controlled by the Soviet Union and had no ability to prepare and launch a large scale military offensive on its own. South Korea was much less able than the North to prepare and conduct even defensive operations. As a result, South Korean military objectives and strategies remained at the tactical level and had to conform to those of the UN command throughout the war. Furthermore, since the South Korean forces were under the operational control of the UN Command from July 14, 1950 until the armistice, it was unnecessary for the ROK military to devise its own objectives and strategy. The North Korean military was placed in the same situation after the entry of the Chinese into the war. Consequently, the two Koreas were not able to develop feasible military objectives and strategies to meet their own goals in the war.

In response to Dr. Ohn's paper, Dr. Goncharov pointed out that one of the important lessons we can learn from the historical record is that since North Korea was not able to undertake the war in 1950 without substantial assistance from the Soviet Union and China in arms, ammunition, fuel, food, etc., the possibility of the DPRK waging war today is even less. He argued that that possibility is, in fact, essentially zero.

On the basis of extensive research in Russia and the United States, Paul Lashmar examined how the Soviet Union used the conflict in Korea to gather intelligence on American military capabilities. He concluded that at least two F-86 airplanes downed in Korea were taken to the Soviet Union, along with related equipment such as G-suits and radar gun sights. American helicopters, tank equipment and technology from the B-29 airplane were also transported from Korea to military institutes in Moscow. Noting that the MIG-15 was essentially a World War II generation airplane, Mr. Lashmar asserted that access to the latest American military technology captured in Korea played an important role in the subsequent development of Soviet military capability.

Mr. Lashmar further asserted that although the question remains unresolved, he has found sufficient evidence to be convinced that at least twenty to forty American servicemen were taken to the Soviet Union from prisoner of war camps in Korea and China. His research revealed that in the initial stages of the war, North Korean troops killed many Allied prisoners of war as an act of retribution, and treated the rest so badly that many died from mistreatment. By the end of 1950, however, the Soviets and Chinese changed the policy toward treatment of POW's and, realizing that prisoners were a valuable intelligence asset, began systematic interrogations. The Soviets were particularly interested in gaining information on US command and tactical structures from Air Force POW's. In the spring of 1951, when F-86's replaced F-100's in the air war in Korea, the Soviet Union organized over 70 search teams to find and retrieve equipment from the new planes. Mr. Lashmar also pointed out that the US Air Force carried out a large number of overflights over Soviet and Chinese territory during the Korean War, a factor which must figure into an overall interpretation of the war because these flights put great pressure on the Soviet Union. He concluded with a call for further research on the development of the idea of a preventive war against the Soviet Union among American military leaders during the Korean War. The idea was promoted particularly by Curtis LeMay, who hoped that overflights over Soviet territory would set off World War III.

Discussant Paul Cole addressed the issue of the great discrepancy between Soviet and American reports of the number of airplanes downed in Korea. He reported that one of the first telegrams sent by General Lobov after he took command of the Soviet 64th Air Corps in Korea harshly criticized the airmen for exaggerating the kill claims. Lobov imposed tighter requirements for reporting a plane downed. There now had to be gun camera footage, eye witnesses and wreckage if they could find it. However, this did not end the dispute

because MIG pilots claimed that their gun camera film was bad. On the American side, the policy of claiming a kill if gun camera film showed seven hits on a MIG distorted the numbers because MIG's could take far more than seven hits and still land intact.

THE CONCLUSION OF THE KOREAN WAR

Natalia Bajanova and Kathryn Weathersby both analyzed the communist strategy toward the armistice negotiations on the basis of the newly released Russian documents. Dr. Bajanova concluded that the Chinese and Koreans were interested in achieving peace if the pre-war status quo could be restored but were willing to prolong the negotiations if desirable conditions could not be attained. However, the Chinese and Koreans generally did not want to continue fighting, particularly because of the heavy losses they suffered from American bombardment. On many occasions the Chinese and North Koreans expressed frustration with "the intimidating and delaying tactics" of the United States at the negotiations. They believed that the Americans were afraid to achieve peace for fear of being placed in an awkward position, since the internal problems of Korea would be exposed. The communist allies tried very hard to avoid any displays of weakness, believing that only strong positions could convince the Americans to be honest and flexible in the negotiations. The Chinese and North Koreans had much less confidence in the peaceful intentions of South Korea, suspecting a hidden desire by Seoul to wreck the negotiations.

Quoting extensively from Stalin's cables to Mao Zedong, Dr. Bajanova argued that the main obstacle to achieving an armistice on the communist side was Stalin's perception of the advantages to the Soviet Union brought by the war in Korea. From the beginning of the negotiations in 1951 and especially throughout 1952, Stalin wanted to prolong the war in Korea. The war tied America's hands and exacerbated tensions within American society and among the Western allies. It also prevented the Chinese from making a rapprochement with the US, an eventuality Stalin had feared since the 1930's. Immediately after Stalin's death in March 1953 the Soviet leadership reversed his position on the war and took steps to reach an armistice settlement.

Dr. Weathersby agreed that Stalin's desire to prolong the war was a major reason for the failure to achieve an armistice before mid-1953. The cable communication between Stalin and Mao in 1951 indicates that the communist allies initiated armistice negotiations in June 1951, following heavy losses suffered in their failed spring offensive, primarily in order to buy time to strengthen Chinese and North Korean forces in preparation for a new campaign in August or September. However, by August 1951 the Chinese leadership appears to have been interested in reaching a settlement, provided the terms were acceptable. Stalin, however, insisted on maintaining a hard line,

"not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations." As he explained to Mao, "although the Americans are dragging out the negotiations, nonetheless they have more need of rapidly concluding them. This results from the overall international situation." As long as Stalin was alive, it proved impossible for the Chinese and North Koreans to take effective measures to reach an armistice agreement.

Dr. Weathersby argued that once the Chinese People's Volunteers eliminated the danger that American troops would cross into China or the Soviet Union, Stalin had little interest in bringing the war to an end. The geopolitical damage the war brought to the Soviet Union was done in the first months of the conflict. Prolonging the war would not substantially increase the harm done to the Soviet position, but it would add considerably to the damage done to the United States. Furthermore, as Dr. Bajanova also argued, the longer the Chinese communists fought Americans in Korea, the less likely it became that Mao's government would abandon its alliance with Moscow and turn to the United States for aid.

Dr. Weathersby further concluded that the documentary evidence of Stalin's role in the war suggests that the Americans and their allies were essentially correct in viewing the Korean War as a struggle with the Soviet Union. Stalin made the final decision to attack South Korea, and he did so only because he concluded that the United States would not intervene. If UN forces had collapsed at Pusan in the summer of 1950 or had failed to repulse the Chinese offensive in the spring of 1951, Stalin would surely have been emboldened in his dealings with the West. Denied an outright defeat of American forces, he was pleased simply to prolong the stalemate in Korea.

Jong-Yil Ra continued the investigation of the armistice agreement by examining the discussion of the Korean question at the Geneva Conference of 1954, the political conference mandated by the armistice agreement. He noted that this conference was the first and last occasion on which the Korean problem was discussed by the two Koreas together with the major powers. He concluded that the conference provided the UN nations with an excuse to terminate the war while leaving Korea still divided. Dr. Ra also noted that the countries which felt themselves more exposed to the danger of war—the Soviet Union and Western Europe—had a different attitude toward the conference than did the United States, China and Korea. In the former group, one could faintly feel a movement toward detente. After discussing the aims of each participant, he concluded that North Korea and China were successful in using the conference for propaganda purposes. He also observed that tensions between the Soviet Union and China were visible at the conference and that the Chinese were anxious to ensure that they would not be seen as Soviet surrogates. Dr. Ra suggested that an examination of the Geneva conference was a useful means of exploring the effect of the Korean War on international politics.

THE LEGACY OF THE KOREAN WAR

Father Dennis McNamara addressed the question of the legacy of the Korean War by examining the effect of the war on the development of the South Korean economy. He cautioned that we cannot say that the Korean War "caused" each of these results, but rather that it strongly influenced these trends. He argued first of all that as a result of the war the political legitimacy of democracy was invested in the success of capitalism. From 1954 on there was no longer any discussion in South Korea about capitalism; capitalism was now defined as democracy. Secondly, as a result of the war, South Korea's integration into the world market system was more political and strategic than economic. While most countries move into the world market as an economic competitor, South Korea and Taiwan moved in part because of their political legitimacy and leverage. From Washington's point of view, South Korea had to become a trading nation so that the US would not have to continue to support it. Consequently, the US opened its markets to South Korean goods. Fr. McNamara cautioned that this historical circumstance should be kept in mind as other countries look to South Korea and Taiwan as models of economic development. Thirdly, the urgency of economic development following the war led to the reconsolidation of the earlier pattern of large-scale enterprises in South Korea.

William Stueck concluded the conference with a discussion of the labels used for the Korean War. He noted that Korea is a much labeled war and suggested that this is so in part because its significance is so ambiguous to so many people. During the 1970's and 1980's, some American scholars, reacting against the prevailing tendency of their countrymen to focus exclusively on the US role in the war, and in some cases reacting against the "Cold War orthodoxy" that justified American intervention in Korea, settled on "civil war" as the proper label for the conflict. Stueck argued that this label is flawed, since the war involved combatants from twenty different governments, virtually all of the weapons and ammunition employed came from outside the peninsula and fifty to sixty percent of the estimated casualties to military personnel were non-Korean. Furthermore, the North attacked the South rather than vice-versa simply because the former was able to get outside support for its venture whereas the latter was not. Stueck argued that the essence of the war is therefore best captured through an examination of the evolving conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War II and of the emerging situation in northeast Asia following the communist victory in China.

After discussing the uses and limitations of the terms "forgotten war," "wrong war" and "limited war," Dr. Stueck offered the term "necessary war" as a fitting label for the conflict. He used the word "necessary" in the tragic sense that the American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr understood it, when he wrote during the Korean War that "the tragic element in a human situation is constituted of conscious choices of evil for the sake of good." Dr. Stueck argued that the evidence

from the Soviet Union supports the conclusion of American policy planners in 1950 that the balance of military power between the Soviet Union and the United States was threatened and that the nature of the Soviet regime posed a threat to world peace. Consequently, it is possible, Dr. Stueck asserted, that had the Korean War not broken out when it did, some other crisis would have occurred which may have been even more difficult to contain. Alternatively, Stalin might have refused to provide the US with a context for major rearmament and continued to build up his atomic capability and his conventional military advantage in Europe. Such a scenario would have encouraged military probes by the Soviet Union and heightened the risk of superpower confrontation. In a word, in its timing and its location on the periphery of the Soviet-American contest, the Korean War may have been necessary to prevent something even worse.

Dr. Stueck acknowledged that Koreans can hardly be expected to take much consolation from this analysis, for though the Korean War was limited for the non-Korean combatants, for Koreans it was the most devastating war they had ever experienced. However, in contemplating the impact of the Korean War on "the long peace" between the superpowers in the aftermath of the holocausts of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, we should at least entertain the possibility that the sacrifices endured from 1950 to 1953, however tragic, were not entirely in vain.

This report was prepared by Dr. Kathryn Weathersby, a conference participant of "The Korean War: An Assessment of the Historical Record." Dr. Weathersby is currently on leave from the Department of History at Florida State University and is in Washington, D.C. preparing a book on Soviet involvement in Korea from 1945-1953.



Dr. William Stueck



CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

The Korean War • An Assessment of the Historical Record

Dr. Evgueni Bajanov

Dr. Bajanov received his Ph.D. from the Institute of the Far East at the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1973 and a State Doctor degree from the Institute of Oriental Studies at SAS in 1986. From 1968-1970 he studied international relations and Chinese dialects at Nanyang University in Singapore. From 1970-1985, Dr. Bajanov served as a Soviet Diplomat in the United States (at the Consulate General's Office in San Francisco) and in China. From 1985-1991, he held a senior position in the international department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, where he was in charge of Soviet relations with the Far East. Since 1991, he has been the Deputy Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Russia's Foreign Ministry. In 1993, he was appointed head of the newly established Institute of Contemporary International Problems, the "think tank" of Russia's Foreign Ministry. Dr. Bajanov has authored nine books and over 300 articles on China, Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia, the United States and Russia.

Dr. Natalia Bajanova

Born in 1947, Dr. Bajanova received her Ph.D. from the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1973. From 1970-1985, she served as a Soviet diplomat in the United States and China. Since 1985, she has held the position of Senior Researcher on Korea in the Institute of Oriental Studies. She has international renown as the author of six books and over 200 articles on Korea, China, the United States, and Russia.

Mr. Clay Drewry Blair

Upon graduation from high school, Mr. Blair enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserve where he served in the Submarine Service and was awarded the Submarine Combat Insignia for war patrols on the U.S.S. Guardfish. After his service, he attended Tulane University and Columbia University for undergraduate school to pursue a writing career. While a student at Columbia, he worked as a copy boy for *Time* magazine and moved up to become chief copy boy, trainee reporter, then finally *Time-Life* correspondent assigned to cover the Pentagon, CIA, NASA, the Atomic Energy Commission, and Congress. He wrote for *Time* and *Life* for seven years, during which he also published four books, most notably a biography of the Navy's Admiral Hyman G. Rickover.

Mr. Blair left *Time-Life* to become a staff writer for *The Saturday Evening Post* in the Washington Bureau where he also performed the duties of Washington Editor and published four more books. Mr. Blair then worked for the *Post* in Philadelphia as Assistant Managing Editor, Managing Editor, then Editor. Meanwhile, he was named the Editor-in-Chief of the Curtis Publishing Company where he held the editorial command for *The Ladies' Home Journal*, *Holiday*, *American Home*, and *Jack and Jill* magazines. Soon afterwards, he became the Executive Vice President

and Director of the company. He left Curtis in 1965. Presently, Mr. Blair remains a freelance author, specializing in military history. He has published a total of twenty-four books, the most current being *Korea: The Forgotten War*.

Gen. Woo Joo Chang

General Woo Joo Chang began his military and academic career at the Korean Military Academy, and continued on to the U.S. Army Infantry School, U.S. Command and General Staff College, the National Defense College, and Harvard Business School. In 1958 he became the Dean of Faculty at National Defense College and three years later became the Commanding General of the 3rd Infantry Division ROK Army. Two years later, he served as the Senior Korean Member of the Military Armistice Commission for the United Nations Command in Panmunjom. In addition, he served as Comptroller and Assistant Minister of Defense for Plans in 1964, and as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy for the ROK Army in 1967. In 1971, he participated in the first South-North Korean Talks as Secretary General.

General Chang pursued his business career to become the president of Korea Overseas Construction Corporation in 1975, Hyundai Corporation in 1976, and Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company in 1978. Presently, General Chang is President of the Korean-American Business Institute, Honorary Consul General of the Republic of Fiji, and a member of the Board of Governors of the Korean Retired Generals and Admirals Association.

Dr. Jian Chen

Jian Chen is Associate Professor of History at the State University of New York at Geneseo, and will join the faculty at the history department of Southern Illinois University in August 1995. He is also Associate Editor of *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*. His published works include *The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center; 1991), *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press; 1994), and *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in East Asia: Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950* (co-editor, Imprint Publications; 1995).

Dr. Woong Kyu Cho

Born in 1937 and currently residing in Taegu, Korea, Dr. Cho received his M.A. in Political Science from Eastern New Mexico University and his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Missouri-Columbia. Upon receiving his doctorate in 1975, Dr. Cho became Associate Professor at Alcorn State University. From 1982-1986, he served as Special Assistant to then opposition leader Kim Young Sam. Following this position, he was Dean of the College of Foreign Studies at Keimyung University from 1992-1994. Presently, Dr.

Cho serves as the President of the Korea-America Society and the Korea International Education Council. In addition, he is a member of the Presidential Commission for Education Reform, Vice President of the Korean Association of American Studies, the Senior Advisor of the National Unification Council, Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies and Professor of American Studies at Keimyung University. Dr. Cho's most current publication is *Internationalization of Higher Education and National Competitiveness* (1995).

Dr. Paul M. Cole

Dr. Paul M. Cole, Senior Associate at DFI International in Washington, D.C., has worked in a variety of foreign policy research institutions and in private industry on trade issues since 1981. He has been a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and an analyst with the RAND Corporation. For the past four years, Dr. Cole has conducted research on Korean War POW/MIA issues for the U.S. Department of Defense. This research has focused on archives in the United States, and five former republics of the Soviet Union, including Russia. Dr. Cole holds the MSFS degree from the Georgetown University Graduate School of Foreign Service and the Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. He authored a three-volume report, *POW/MIA Issues*, at RAND in 1994.

Dr. Valeri Denissov

Dr. Denissov is currently the Deputy Director of the Asian Department, Russian Foreign Ministry. Having spent over fifteen years in North Korea, he also serves as Professor and State Doctor of History and is the author of six books and numerous articles on Korea published worldwide. His published works include *North Korea Nuclear Plans*, *The Korean Problem: Methods of Settlement*, *The Korean Peninsula: A View from Russia and South Korea*.

Dr. Roger Dingman

Roger Dingman, Associate Professor of History at the University of Southern California, specializes in American diplomatic and military history with particular emphasis on Twentieth Century American-East Asian relations. He completed his undergraduate studies at Stanford University (B.A. 1960) and took his graduate degrees at Harvard University (M.A. 1963, Ph.D., 1969). He also studied at the Inter-University Center for Japanese Language Studies in Tokyo. He has taught at Harvard, the United States Naval War College, and the School of Modern Asian Studies at Griffith University in Brisbane, Australia. In 1988-89, he served as Distinguished Visiting Professor at the U.S. Air Force Academy, and in 1991, he was Aspinall Visiting Professor at Mesa State College in Grand Junction, Colorado. He has lectured and given seminars at universities and colleges throughout the United States and in Australia, Britain, Canada, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Singapore. He is the author of *Power in the Pacific* (University of Chicago Press, 1976), a study of the origins of the Washington Naval Arms Limitation Conference of 1921-1922, and co-editor of *Kindai Nihon no taigai taido* (Modern Japan and the Outside World) (Tokyo University Press, 1974). His nearly fifty articles and essays have been published in ten countries and five languages. He is currently working

on two books: one on the impact of submarine warfare in the Pacific on U.S.-Japan relations, the other about American civil-military relations in the Korean War.

General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley

General Farrar-Hockley was born in 1924 and educated at Exeter School, from which he enlisted as a regular soldier in the Gloucestershire Regiment under age. He served in the Second World War with that Regiment and the parachute Regiment, and was a company commander in operations at the age of 20. In 1950, as adjutant of 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment, he took part in the Korean War, in which he was captured in 1951 by the Chinese. He subsequently took part in numerous British campaigns and commanded a parachute battalion, a parachute brigade, land forces in Northern Ireland, and an armoured division, interspersed with various staff appointments. He held a Defence fellowship at Exeter College, Oxford, from 1968-70. His final post was Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe, before retiring in 1983. He has written twelve books, principally military histories and biographies.

Dr. Sergei N. Goncharov

Sergei N. Goncharov, formerly with the Far Eastern Institute at the Academy of Sciences, Moscow, is an advisor to Boris Yeltsin and a member of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, currently serving in Beijing. He is author of *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War* (1993), with John W. Lewis and Xue Litai.

Amb. Donald Phinney Gregg

Donald P. Gregg is Chairman of The Korea Society in New York. He previously served as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (1989-1993). Mr. Gregg was Vice President George Bush's National Security Advisor, supporting the Vice President in the areas of foreign policy, defense, and intelligence. He has had an extensive career in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, serving in Japan, Burma, Vietnam and Korea. Among his many awards include the Order of National Security Merit from the Korean Central Intelligence Agency Director for his service in Korea, the C.I.A.'s highest award, the Distinguished Intelligence Medal, and the Department of Defense medal for distinguished public service. Before earning his B.A. in philosophy from Williams College, Mr. Gregg served in the United States Army from 1945-1947. He has received an Honorary Doctorate of Political Science from Sogang University in Seoul.

Dr. Chull-baum Kim

Kim Chull-baum is currently Professor of International Politics and Chairman of the Department of International Affairs (Research Institute on National Security Affairs) at Korean National Defense University. Dr. Kim is a research fellow at the Ridgeway Center for International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, and serves as President of the Korean Council of Area Studies and the Korean War Studies Association. Dr. Kim, who received his Ph.D. from SUNY at Buffalo, is the author of *The U.S. and Korean War*, and editor of *Perspectives on the Korean War*, *The Truth About the Korean War*, *The Korean War: Politics of Superpowers and the North-South Conflict*, *Korea and the Cold War*, and *New International Order and the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century*.

Dr. Hakjoon Kim

Professor Kim received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Pittsburgh in 1972. Dr. Kim was former Professor and Chairperson of the Department of Political Science at Seoul National University. In 1991, his work *Hankuk Chonjaeng [The Korean War]* was published and later translated into Japanese. He is currently the Chairperson of the Board of Trustees at Dankook University in Seoul.

Dr. Ilpyong J. Kim

Dr. Ilpyong Kim is Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut. He served as an officer in the ROK Army and won the U.S. Bronze Star Medal during the Korean War. Dr. Kim received his Ph.D. from Columbia University, and has been a visiting professor at Columbia, research professor at Harvard University, Senior Fulbright Scholar at Tokyo University (1976-77), and Fulbright Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University (1991-1992). Dr. Kim is an internationally recognized expert on Chinese politics and East Asian affairs in the U.S., and has authored or edited more than fifteen books and contributed numerous articles to academic and professional journals. Dr. Kim has served as the editor of the "China in a New Era" series and recently edited *Korean Challenges and American Policy* (1990) and *The Two Koreas in Transition: Implications for U.S. Policy* (1995). He is currently working on a book project dealing with the Historical Dictionary of the Korean War.

Mr. Paul Lashmar

Paul Lashmar is a TV producer and investigative journalist specializing in historical documentaries. He frequently works for the BBC and is currently producing a documentary on the Korean War for the BBC TV's historical documentary "Timewatch" (shown in the U.S. as part of the A&E Channel's "Time Machine" strand). His previous documentary for Timewatch was "Spies on the Sky," an investigation into Anglo-American spy plane operations over the Soviet Union during the early Cold War. This was broadcast in the U.K. in February 1994 and the U.S. in May 1994. He has also written for the *Washington Post* on the subject. Mr. Lashmar was an investigative reporter for *The Observer Sunday* newspaper from 1978-1989 and was responsible for a number of major exclusives. In 1986 he was awarded joint Reporter of the Year in the U.K. Press Awards. From 1989-1992 he worked for Granada TV's current affairs series "World in Action." In August 1994, Charter 88 published his report on British Government's "Open Government" initiative on public records. In July 1994 he was contributor at The Institute of Contemporary British History Conference on "Images of Masculinity after WWII."

Dr. Chong-sik Lee

Dr. Lee, Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, grew up in Korea and China and received his Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley in 1961. He spent the Korean War years in North Korea (Pyongyang) and South Korea (Pusan, Taegu, and Seoul). Professor Lee's numerous publications include *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (1963), *Communism in Korea* (1973, with Robert A. Scalapino) and *Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension* (1985).

Dr. James Irving Matray

Professor Matray received his Ph.D. from the University of Virginia in 1977 and is now a professor at New Mexico State University, where he has taught graduate seminars on the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and numerous other U.S. affairs in Asia. Dr. Matray was Visiting Associate Professor of History at the University of Southern California in 1988-1989 and Distinguished Visiting Scholar at the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies at Kyung Hee University in Seoul in 1990.

Professor Matray has authored *The Historical Dictionary of the Korean War* (1991) and *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea 1941-1950* (1989). He has co-edited *Korea and the Cold War: Division, Destruction, and Disarmament* (1993), and is currently working on a new book entitled *The Price of Intervention: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1950-1953*. In addition, he has written numerous academic book chapters, articles, review essays, dictionary entries, and reviews and was a member of the Board of Editors for the *Pacific Historical Review*. He is presently preparing a survey of U.S.-Korean relations since World War II, while continuing work on a study of U.S. policy toward Korea from 1950 to 1953.

Fr. Dennis McNamara

Rev. McNamara is Associate Professor of Sociology and chair-elect of the Sociology Department at Georgetown University. He is the University's first and newly appointed Y.H. Park Professor of Korean Studies, teaching courses entitled *Modernization and Development, Comparative Analysis, and Political Economy*. He plans on continuing and expanding the annual Georgetown Conference on Korean Studies.

Fluent in both Korean and Japanese, he is the author of many books and articles. His monograph *The Colonial Origins of Korean Enterprise, 1910-1945* is a highly acclaimed study on the roots of Korean capitalism in the precolonial and colonial society. Presently, he is completing the second volume entitled *Market and Society in Korea: The Grain Trade, 1876-1945*. Focusing on the recent industrial restructuring of Korea and Japan, his book entitled *Textiles and Industrial Transition in Japan* and a similar volume on Korea are forthcoming.

Dr. John Merrill

Dr. Merrill is currently a Foreign Affairs Analyst with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State. Dr. Merrill received his B.A. in Political Science from Boston University, an M.A. in East Asian Regional Studies from Harvard University, and in 1982, a doctorate in Political Science from the University of Delaware. His extensive specialization includes international relations, Chinese modern history, comparative politics and the politics of both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea. He has held teaching and research positions at George Washington University, the University of Delaware, Lafayette College, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Dr. Merrill is the author of *Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War* (1989), *Was it an Invasion or a War of National Liberation? The Korean War, 1948-1950*

(1988) in Korean and *The Cheju-do Rebellion* in Japanese. He is, as well, an author of numerous articles, reviews and review articles.

Dr. Bonnie B.C. Oh

Professor Oh is the Distinguished Research Professor of Korean Studies at Georgetown University. She attended the Law College of Seoul National University, Barnard College of Columbia University, Georgetown University, and the University of Chicago where she received her Ph.D. in East Asian Studies. Dr. Oh has taught at Marquette University, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and Loyola University of Chicago before becoming an Assistant Dean at St. Mary's College of Maryland and at the University of Maryland at College Park. In 1994, she became the Distinguished Research Professor of Korean Studies at Georgetown University where she teaches courses on Korean history and Asian American Studies.

She has authored several articles on Korean history, contributed to an encyclopedia on Chinese history, and co-edited *East Meets West*, a history of the Jesuit entry into China.

Dr. John K.C. Oh

Dr. Oh's educational background includes the Law School at Seoul National University, Marquette University, Columbia University, and Georgetown University where he earned his Ph.D. in international politics. Presently, he is Professor of Political Science at Catholic University of America where he had served as its Academic Vice President. Professor Oh participated in the Panmunjom armistice negotiations as a press officer for the South Korean delegation to the United Nations, and held the position of Cultural Attache for the South Korean Mission to the United Nations. He has completed research projects for various foundations and was featured in several conferences.

Professor Oh has authored *Western Democracy in Korea*, *Korea: Democracy on Trial*, and *Democratic Politics and Economic Development in South Korea*. He has co-authored *Emerging Roles of Asian Nations in the 1980's: A New Equilibrium* and has a book forthcoming entitled *South Korean Politics: Democratization and Economic Development*. In addition, he has written over 150 scholarly articles, reviews, and essays on Korea, Japan, East Asia, and international politics.

Dr. Chang-Il Ohn

Born in southwest Korea, Dr. Ohn received a B.S. from the Korea Military Academy in 1967 and a B.A. from Seoul National University in 1971. After completing his undergraduate studies, he joined the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College in 1967 for one year. He then went on to receive his M.A. from the University of Kansas in diplomatic history, and a Ph.D. from the University of Kansas in diplomatic history and international relations. Since 1983, he has been Colonel and Professor of Military History and Strategy at the Korea Military Academy in Seoul. Dr. Ohn is the author of *World Military History* (1988) and *History of the Korean War* (1990) as well as numerous articles.

Col. Rod Paschall

Author, security consultant, historian, teacher and former commander of Delta Force, Rod Paschall is a consultant to the Ketron, SoftRisk and JAYCOR corporations, designing, writing and marketing emergency management, security and intelligence systems and special operations studies for businesses and the U.S. government. He serves as a senior consultant with the Office of International Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago and as Professor at the American Military University. During 1992, he was a panel leader and writer for the American Security Council Foundation's conference on U.S. strategy. In 1993, he served as a consultant for the Treasury Department during the Waco Review and in 1994 he was an operations analyst for a Department of Defense sponsored study of non-lethal weapons. A contributing editor for *Military History Quarterly* and an editorial board member of the journal, *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*, his fields of expertise include military history, counterterrorism, strategy, special operations, research and development, gaming for executives in the management of serious incidents, intelligence and professional writing.

Rod Paschall holds a Master of Arts in history from Duke University (1971), a Master of Science in international relations from George Washington University (1970) and a Bachelor of Science from the U.S. Military Academy (1959). He is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College (1978) and the Navy Command and Staff College (1970). His military career included command assignments in Special Forces, infantry and Delta Force. He performed staff duties at every level from battalion to corps and JCS, mostly as an operations officer. Additionally, Mr. Paschall had two research and development tours featuring weapons, force structure, and doctrine development. His combat experience included over five years in Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia as well as activities while commanding Delta Force in European, Middle Eastern, Asian and Latin American countries. History assignments were as an Assistant Professor of History, U.S. Military Academy at West Point; Instructor, U.S. Army War College, and Director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute. Mr. Paschall served as an infantry company commander in Korea during 1965-1966. His military decorations include the Silver Star, Purple Heart and four Bronze Stars.

Mr. Paschall's books include *Witness to War: Korea* (Perigee, 1995), *Critical Incident Management* (University of Illinois, 1992), *LIC 2010: Special Operations and Unconventional Warfare in the Twenty-First Century* (Brassey's, 1990) and *The Defeat of Imperial Germany 1917-1918* (Algonquin 1989). He has authored some 30 magazine articles and 25 encyclopedia articles.

Dr. Jong-Yil Ra

Dr. Ra is currently Professor of Political Science at the College of Political Science and Economics at Kyung Hee University, the President of the Korean Association of European Studies, and Director General of the Center for the Reconstruction of Human Society at Kyung Hee University. He received both his B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University in Political Science

and his Ph.D. from Trinity College in Cambridge in the same field. He has also served as Fellow Commoner at Churchill College in Cambridge and as Fulbright Senior Scholar at the University of Southern California. Dr. Ra authored *The Unfinished War - The Korean Peninsula* and the *Great Power Politics: 1950-1954*. He has written other publications related to the politics of Korea in various journals and books.

Dr. James B. Reardon-Anderson

Dr. Reardon-Anderson has been the Director of Asian Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service since 1992. He joined the faculty in 1985 as the Sun Yat-sen Professor of China Studies, and from 1990-1992, he served as the Director of the National Academy of Sciences' Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China. He is now a tenured Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown.

Dr. Reardon-Anderson is a graduate of history of Williams College, and received his M.A. and Ph.D. from Columbia University. He has held academic appointments at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, the University of Michigan, and the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Additional administrative appointments include Librarian of Columbia University's C.V. Starr East Asian Library and Director of the Inter-University Program for Chinese Language Studies in Taipei (Stanford Center).

As the Director of Asian Studies, Dr. Reardon-Anderson chairs the Asian Studies Faculty Committee, directs the Asian Studies Certificate Program, manages Georgetown's Exchange Agreement with National Chengchi University on Taiwan, and advises the Asian Council. Dr. Reardon-Anderson is the author of numerous books, articles, chapters and academic papers. His current research involves a project on the human and natural impacts of the grassland ecosystem of the Mongolian steppe.

Dr. William Stueck

Professor Stueck received his B.S. from Springfield College, his M.A. from Queens College, and his Ph.D. from Brown University. He is now a Professor of History and Coordinator of Instruction at the University of Georgia. He has taught at New College of the University of South Florida, Syracuse University, and Purdue University. During the fall of 1995, he will be teaching at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul on a Fulbright Scholarship.

Professor Stueck has published widely on the early Cold War and the Korean War. His most recent works includes *The Necessary War: An International History of the Korean War* and "The Soviet Union, the United States, and the Division of Korea: A Comparative Approach" in the *Journal of American-East Asian Relations*. He has delivered scholarly papers throughout the United States and in the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea. He has received major research grants from the National Endowment of the Humanities, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Harry S. Truman Library. Currently he is working on a survey of U.S.-Korean relations to be published by Twayne in its International History Series.

Col. Harry G. Summers

An Army War College Distinguished Fellow who formerly held the War College's General Douglas MacArthur Chair and the Marine Corps University's 1993-94 Brigadier General H.L. Oppenheimer Chair of Warfighting Strategy and 1994-95 Chair of Military Affairs, Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr. is now a syndicated columnist for the *Los Angeles Times*, editor of *Vietnam* magazine, and has been named the 1996 holder of the Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz Memorial Lectureship at the University of California, Berkeley.

The Honorary Colonel of the 21st Infantry Regiment, Colonel Summers is a veteran of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Twice decorated for valor and twice wounded in action, his award-winning critique of the Vietnam War, *On Strategy* is used as a student text by the war and staff colleges, and by many civilian colleges and universities. He also won critical acclaim for his other works *The Vietnam Almanac* (1985), *Korean War Almanac* (1990), *Persian Gulf War Almanac* (1995), and *On Strategy II* (1992). His *The New World Strategy: A Military Policy for America's Future* and *Atlas of the Vietnam War* are forthcoming. Formerly the U.S. News & World Report's chief military correspondent and contributing editor for the late *Defense and Diplomacy* magazine, he has written numerous articles appearing in prominent periodicals. Colonel Summers has made more than 200 network television appearances and has been a frequent guest on radio talk shows as a Military analyst for NBC News during the Gulf War.

A member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Colonel Summers has testified before the Congress on strategic military issues and lectured at the White House; State Department; CIA; DIA; National Defense University; and numerous military, academic and staff colleges and academies throughout North America. A graduate of the Army War College, Colonel Summers was awarded a Bachelor's degree in Military Science by the University of Maryland and Master of Military Arts and Science by the Army Command & General Staff College.

Dr. Kathryn Weathersby

Dr. Weathersby obtained her B.S. from Vanderbilt University and both her M.A. and Ph.D. in Russian history from Indiana University. Since 1989, she has been an Assistant Professor of History at Florida State University, teaching courses on 20th century Russia, Modern Japan, and World History.

Dr. Weathersby has been awarded with numerous honors and fellowships, including Research Scholar (Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) and the Advanced Research Grant from the Joint Council on Korean Studies of the Social Science Research Council. She served as a member of the Task Force on Archival Affairs at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, the Acting Director of the Asian Studies Programs, the Outreach Coordinator for the Midwest Program for Teaching about Japan at Indiana University, and as the Outreach Director of the East Studies Center at Indiana University.

Among her many papers, reviews and publications include "To Attack or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung and the Prelude to War" (*Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*, Spring 1995) and "The Soviet Role in the First Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence" (*Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, Winter 1993-94).

Dr. Litai Xue

Dr. Xue is currently a Research Assistant at the Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) at Stanford University. In addition to his work on the Project on Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia, he assists with various other programs sponsored by CISAC. He is also conducting intensive research on the global and regional factors that may cause new-run armed conflicts across the Taiwan Strait and the impact produced by the crisis upon the security and stability of the Northeast-Pacific region. Dr. Xue has written six articles concerning the security of China as well as the following books: *China Builds the Bomb* (1988, co-authored with John W. Lewis); *Uncertain Partners—Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (1993, co-authored with Sergei Goncharov and John W. Lewis); *China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age* (1994, co-authored with John W. Lewis).

Dr. Sung Chul Yang

Dr. Yang is the Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor of Political Science at the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyunghee University in Seoul, and President of the Korean Association of International Studies. Dr. Yang is the author of *Korea and Two Regimes: Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee* (1981), co-author of *A Journey to North Korea* (1983), the author of *A Study of North Korean Politics* (1993), *South Korean Government: A Study of Top Bureaucratic Elites, 1948-1993* (1994), a contributor to *Korea-U.S. Relations in a Changing World* (1990), and *The Korean Peninsula* (1990). He has also contributed numerous articles in English and Korean to academic journals.

Dr. Shu Guang Zhang

Professor Zhang (Ph.D.) is Associate Professor of History at the University of Maryland at College Park, where he teaches American diplomatic history. He was a Nobel Institute Fellow on International Relations at the Norwegian Nobel Institute in 1995. Dr. Zhang has authored *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontation, 1949-1958* (1992), *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953* (forthcoming 1995), co-edited with Jian Chen *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 1944-1950: Documentary Evidence* (1995), and has authored numerous articles on China's foreign policy and U.S.-East Asian relations.



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Below: Mr. David E. Brown, Ambassador James Laney, Dr. Kim Chull-baum, General Ray Davis



Right: Dr. Bonnie Oh

Far Right: Honorable Park Kun Woo, ROK Ambassador to the US, and Ambassador Donald P. Gregg



**Bottom Right: Panel II:
Dr. Sergei Goncharov,
Dr. Kim Chull-baum,
Dr. Evgueni Bajanov,
Dr. Bonnie Oh, Dr. Roger Dingman, Dr. Xue Litai, and Dr. Ilpyong Kim**





Left: Panel IV: Dr. Paul Cole, Dr. J.Y. Ra, Dr. Natalia Bajanova, Dr. William Stueck, Dr. Kathryn Weathersby, Mr. Paul Lashmar, Dr. John Oh

Below: Dr. Sung-Chul Yang

Middle: Panel III: Gen. Woo Joo Chang, Dr. Chang-Il Ohn, Col. Harry Summers, Mr. Clay Blair, Gen. Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, Dr. Shu Guang Zhang, and Col. Rod Paschall



Above: Dr. J.Y. Ra, Dr. William Stueck, Dr. Kathryn Weathersby and Mr. Paul Lashmar

Left: Col. Harry Summers, Mr. Clay Blair and General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley



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- 1862** Korean-American Treaty of Friendship and Commerce signed
1919 March First Movement protests Japanese colonial rule in Korea
- 1943** December 1 Cairo Declaration promises Korean independence "in due course"
- 1945** August 8 Soviet Union declares war on Japan and sends troops to occupy Korea
August 11 Soviet-U.S. agreement divides Korea at the 38th parallel into zones of military occupation
September 2 Japan's formal surrender ends World War II
September 6 Creation of Korean People's Republic in Seoul
September 8 U.S. troops arrive in southern Korea to begin occupation
December 21 Moscow Agreement provides formula for Korean reunification
- 1946** May 8 Joint Soviet-American Commission adjourns after failing to agree on how to implement the Moscow Agreement
- 1947** August 4 SWNCC 176/30 outlines steps to break Soviet-U.S. deadlock over Korean reunification
September 17 United States refers issue of Korean independence to UN
September 29 JCS submits memorandum assessing Korea's strategic significance
November 14 UN General Assembly approves resolution providing for a UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to supervise national elections leading to reunification and independence
- 1948** January 24 Soviet occupation commander refuses to permit UNTCOK entry into northern Korea, thus preventing national elections
April 2 President Harry S. Truman approves NSC-8 as the basis for U.S. Korea policy
May 10 Separate elections held under UN supervision in southern Korea
August 15 Establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK)
September 9 Establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
October 19 Outbreak of Yosu-Sunchon uprising in South Korea
December 12 UN approves resolution recognizing the Republic of Korea as the only legitimate government on the peninsula, calling for Soviet-U.S. withdrawal as soon as practicable, and establishing a UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK)
December 31 Soviet occupation forces withdraw from North Korea
- 1949** March 23 President Truman approves NSC-8/2 as new U.S. Korea policy
April 8 Soviet Union vetoes admission of the ROK to the UN
May 2 Establishment of U.S.-Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG)
June 29 U.S. occupation forces withdraw from South Korea
October 21 UN passes resolution instructing the UNCOK to use its "good office" to encourage Korean reunification, verify Soviet military withdrawal, and observe and report any developments contributing to the outbreak of hostilities.
- 1950** January 12 Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson excludes the ROK from U.S. defensive perimeter in National Press Club speech
January 19 House of Representatives defeats Korean aid bill of 1949-1950
February 4 President Truman signs Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act
February 14 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed
April 14 General Douglas MacArthur submits memorandum emphasizing Taiwan's strategic significance
April 14 NSC-68 recommends substantial increase in U.S. defense budget
May 2 Senator Tom Connally predicts fall of the ROK to Communists
May 30 National Assembly elections in the Republic of Korea produce a majority of representatives opposed to President Syngman Rhee
June 7 Democratic Fatherland Front proposes plan for reunification
June 15 John Foster Dulles arrives in South Korea on fact-finding mission and addresses National Assembly two days later
June 24 UNCOK surveys thirty-eighth parallel and finds ROK troops in defensive positions
June 25 North Korean army invades South Korea
June 25 UN Security Council approves resolution calling for cease-fire in Korea and withdrawal of DPRK forces north of thirty-eighth parallel
June 25 First Blair House meeting to discuss the crisis in Korea
June 26 Second Blair House meeting held
June 27 Arrival of Church survey mission in Korea and the creation of the Advance Command and Liaison Group in Korea (ADCOM)
June 27 UN Security Council approves resolution calling upon members to provide assistance to the ROK in resisting aggression
June 27 President Truman announces U.S. air and naval assistance for the ROK and neutralization of Taiwan
June 28 Han River bridge destroyed prematurely trapping South Korean soldiers and civilians in Seoul
June 28 North Korean troops occupy Seoul, the capital of the ROK

Errata

KOREAN WAR CHRONOLOGY, page 26

1882 Korean-American Treaty of Friendship and Commerce signed

1950	June 29	General MacArthur visits Korea and observes fighting at the Han River
	June 29	Soviet Union informs the United States of intention to remain uninvolved in Korean civil war and declares UN Security Council resolutions illegal
	June 29	President Truman at press conference agrees with a reporter's description of the Korean War as a "police action"
	June 29	Congress approves Deficiency Appropriations Act providing additional aid to the ROK
	June 30	President Truman commits ground forces in Korean War
	July 2	President Truman rejects Chiang Kai-shek's offer of Chinese troops for service in the Korean War
	July 5	Battle of Osan and first Battle of Wonju
	July 7	UN Security Council resolution establishes UN Command
	July 8	President Truman appoints General Douglas MacArthur commander in chief of UN Command (CINCUNC)
	July 12	U.S. and the ROK sign the Taejon Agreements
	July 13	Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins and Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt S. Vandenberg visit Tokyo for discussions with MacArthur lasting until July 14
	July 13	Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru urges United States and Soviet Union to take steps to localize and terminate the Korean War
	July 14	Battle of the Kum River, lasting until July 20
	July 15	President Syngman Rhee transfers control of the ROK's military forces to the UNC for the duration of the Korean War
	July 19	President Truman addresses nation on the Korean crisis
	July 20	North Korean forces seize city of Taejon
	July 29	Lieutenant General Walton W. Walker, 8th Army commander, issues "stand or die" order
	July 31	MacArthur visits Taiwan until August 1 to discuss measures for defense of the island
	August 1	Soviet Union ends boycott of UN Security Council, as Jacob Malik assumes position as president of the body
	August 4	UN forces withdraw inside Pusan Perimeter
	August 5	Battle of the Naktong Bulge, lasting until August 19
	August 6	W. Averell Harriman visits Tokyo with Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway for discussions with MacArthur until August 8
	August 9	Beginning of the defense of Taegu
	August 10	First bombing raid on Rashin (Najin)
	August 15	Establishment of the Korean Augmentation of the U.S. Army (KATUSA)
	August 17	U.S. permanent representative at UN, Warren R. Austin, calls for reunification of Korea
	August 19	General Collins and Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Forrest P. Sherman visit Tokyo to discuss plans for the Inch'on landing with CINCUNC General Douglas MacArthur
	August 25	Publication of MacArthur's VFW message
	August 25	Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews refers to the possibility of waging a preventative war against the Soviet Union
	August 26	Creation of the X Corps in preparation for the Inch'on landing
	September 1	President Truman addresses Congress to explain U.S. policy in the Korean War
	September 1	Mobilization of four U.S. National Guard divisions
	September 4	U.S. Navy fighters shoot down Soviet aircraft over Yellow Sea
	September 5	Battle of Yongch'on, lasting until September 13
	September 8	Congress approves Defense Production Act
	September 11	Truman orders implementation of NSC-81, the plan for the military offensive across the thirty-eighth parallel
	September 12	Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson resigns; General George C. Marshall is his replacement
	September 15	UNC stages Inch'on landing
	September 18	UN forces recapture Kimp'o Airfield
	September 19	8th Army begins breakout from Pusan Perimeter
	September 25	JCS authorizes ground operations north of thirty-eighth parallel
	September 25	Acting Chief of Staff of Chinese People's Liberation Army warns that China will not "sit back with folded hands and let the Americans come up to the border"
	September 27	8th Army and the X Corps link forces south of Seoul
	September 27	JCS directive forbids air operations beyond Yalu River
	September 29	UN forces complete recapture of Seoul operation
	September 30	South Korea's 3d Division crosses thirty-eighth parallel
	October 2	Chinese premier Chou En-lai warns Indian ambassador K.M. Panikkar that People's Republic of China will intervene in Korean War if U.S. forces cross thirty-eighth parallel
	October 7	UN resolution authorizes military operations to reunite Korea and establishes UN Committee for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK)
	October 8	U.S. planes strafe Soviet air base in Siberia
	October 9	General MacArthur demands immediate North Korean surrender
	October 10	North Korean leader Kim Il Sung rejects surrender demand
	October 11	South Korea's 3d Division captures port of Wonsan
	October 12	UN Interim Committee resolves that the UN recognizes no government as having "legal and effective control" over North Korea and asks the UNC to assume administrative responsibility in the north pending arrival if the UNCURK
	October 15	President Truman and MacArthur meet at Wake Island Conference

- 1950** October 19 Chinese People's Volunteers Army crosses the Yalu
 October 19 South Korean forces occupy Pyongyang
 October 24 MacArthur removes restrictions on movement of non-Korean forces to provinces bordering the Yalu River
 October 25 X Corps lands at Wonsan harbor
 October 25 Opening of Chosin (Changjin) Reservoir Campaign
 October 27 China opens first offensive lasting until October 31, and UNC captures first Chinese "volunteers"
 October 28 JCS sends MacArthur an occupation directive for North Korea
 November 1 Battle of Unsan, lasting until November 6
 November 3 UN approves Uniting for Peace resolution to permit the General Assembly to act against an aggressor and to create a UN Collective Measures Committee
 November 6 Chinese forces attack 8th Army north of Ch'ongch'on River and then disengage, starting a three-week lull in the fighting
 November 7 Mac Arthur requests approval for hot pursuit of Chinese planes into Manchuria and destruction of Yalu bridges
 November 8 UN Security Council passes resolution inviting the PRC to participate in debate on the issues of Korea and Taiwan
 November 10 Soviet Union vetoes UN Security Council measure calling upon the PRC to withdraw its forces from Korea
 November 10 British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin submits "buffer zone" proposal to U.S.
 November 24 MacArthur announces while visiting Korea the start of the Home-by-Christmas offensive
 November 24 PRC representative Wu Hsui-ch'uan arrives at UN for discussions
 November 26 Chinese launch second offensive lasting until December 9
 November 28 PRC's representative to the UN Wu Hsui-ch'uan denounces the United States for aggression in Korea
 November 30 President Truman's atomic bomb press conference comment
 November 30 First Korean War briefing meeting at the Canadian embassy
 December 1 MacArthur points to prohibitions on air strikes in Manchuria to explain the UNC retreat in U.S. News and World Report interview
 December 1 Passage of UN resolution establishing UN Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA)
 December 4 British Prime Minister Clement Attlee begins trip to United States
 December 5 UN forces evacuate P'yongyang
 December 6 JCS directive bans unauthorized public statements by government officials regarding the war
 December 8 Issuance of Truman-Attlee communiqué
 December 10 Hungnam evacuation of the X Corps and 7th Infantry Division begins, lasting until December 24
 December 14 UN resolution establishes UN Cease-fire Group
 December 15 UNC forces retreat below the thirty-eighth parallel
 December 16 President Truman declares state of national emergency
 December 19 PRC Delegation leaves UN
 December 20 Former President Herbert Hoover delivers "Gibraltar America" speech
 December 23 PRC premier Chou En-lai rejects UN Cease-fire Group's proposal, demanding U.S. withdrawal from Korea and Taiwan and the PRC's admission to the UN
 December 23 General Walker, 8th Army commander, killed in a jeep accident
 December 26 Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway arrives in Korea to replace Walker
 December 31 China launches third offensive south of the thirty-eighth parallel
- 1951** January 1 Mobilization of two more U.S. National Guard divisions
 January 3 UN Cease-fire Group reports failure of negotiations with PRC
 January 4 Chinese Communist forces capture Seoul
 January 11 UN Cease-fire Group proposes five principles as basis for a settlement of the Korean War
 January 12 JCS rejects MacArthur's plan for winning the Korean War
 January 13 U.S. votes in favor of UN cease-fire resolution that promises discussion of other Far Eastern issues
 January 15 Operation Wolfhound begins, lasting until January 25 and forcing Chinese retreat to Osan
 January 15 Generals Collins and Vandenberg visit Tokyo for discussions with General MacArthur
 January 17 China rejects UN Cease-fire Group's five principles because "the purpose of arranging a cease-fire first [before negotiating] is merely to give the United States troops a breathing space"
 January 25 Operation Thunderbolt begins, lasting until February 1 and forcing Chinese retreat to the Han River
 February 1 Passage of UN resolution condemning China for aggression in Korea and establishing UN Additional Measures Committee and UN Good Offices Committee
 February 5 Operation Punch forces the Chinese to retreat north of Seoul
 February 5 Operation Roundup met with Chinese counterattack, forcing the X Corps on February 11 to retreat southward to Wonju
 February 10 South Korean National Guard units slaughter innocent civilians at the town of Koch'ang
 February 11 Fourth Chinese offensive to force UNC retreat from central Korea
 February 13 Battle of Chip'yong, lasting until February 15
 February 15 General MacArthur requests permission to bomb Rashin (Najin)
 February 21 Operation Killer begins, lasting until March 1 and pushing Communist forces in central Korea north of Han River
 March 7 Operation Ripper begins, lasting until March 21 and forcing Chinese retreat north of the thirty-eighth parallel
 March 7 MacArthur makes "die for tie" statement at a press conference in Korea

1951	March 14	UNC completes recapture of Seoul from the Chinese Communists
	March 15	MacArthur advocates in a press interview crossing the thirty-eighth parallel to fulfill the UNC mission of reuniting Korea
	March 20	JCS informs MacArthur of Truman's planned cease-fire initiative
	March 22	Operation Courageous by March 29 moves the UNC to a position just south of the thirty-eighth parallel
	March 24	MacArthur issues "pronunciamento" demanding Communist surrender
	March 26	Washington Conference of foreign ministers of nations in the Western Hemisphere begins, lasting until April
	March 29	PRC radio broadcast rejects MacArthur's ultimatum and calls for renewed military efforts
	April 3	Operation Rugged allows UNC forces to cross the thirty-eighth parallel and establish the Kansas Line on April 6
	April 5	Republican house Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts reads letter from MacArthur dated March 20 in the House calling for victory in the Korean War
	April 6	Operation Dauntless, lasting until April 11, results in the UNC's establishing the Kansas Wyoming Line
	April 11	Truman recalls MacArthur, replacing him with General Ridgway
	April 14	Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet arrives in Korea to replace Ridgway as 8th Army commanding general
	April 19	MacArthur delivers "No Substitute for Victory" speech to a joint session of Congress
	April 22	China opens first stage of fifth offensive, lasting until April 28
	April 22	Battle of the Imjin River, lasting until April 25
	April 23	Battle of Kap'yong, lasting until April 25
	April 28	JCS authorizes UNC attacks on air bases in Manchuria if Chinese Communist planes threaten the security of UNC forces on the ground
	May 3	Senate MacArthur Hearings before Joint Committee of Armed Services and Foreign Relations commence, lasting until June 25
	May 16	China opens second stage of fifth offensive, lasting until May 23
	May 17	Truman approves NSC-48/5
	May 18	UN resolution calls for selective embargo against PRC
	May 18	Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk delivers speech referring to the PRC as "a Slavic Manchukuo on a large scale" and "not the Government of China"
	May 30	UNC forces restore defensive positions at Kansas Line
	May 31	First meeting between George F. Kennan and Jacob A. Malik regarding possible cease-fire negotiations in Korean War
	May 31	JCS sends new directive to Ridgway on future conduct of the war
	June 1	Operation Piledriver moves UNC forces to Wyoming Line
	June 2	UNC implements Operation Struggle
	June 5	Second Kennan-Malik meeting
	June 15	UNC consolidates defensive position along Kansas-Wyoming Line
	June 23	Jacob Malik's radio broadcast suggests opening of truce talks
	June 29	CINCUNC General Ridgway offers to meet Communist commander in the field to discuss a cease-fire and armistice
	July 10	Opening session of Kaesong truce talks
	July 14	Communist delegation agrees to permit equal press coverage
	July 15	Governor Thomas E. Dewey visits Korea
	July 26	Approval of agenda for Kaesong talks
	July 28	Commonwealth Division established
	August 17	Communist delegation demands UNC apology for ambush near Kaesong
	August 18	Battle of Bloody Ridge, lasting until September 5
	August 23	Communists suspend truce talks because of alleged UNC strafing of Kaesong neutral zone
	August 25	U.S. Bombing raid on Rashin (Najin)
	September 1	ANZUS Treaty signed
	September 8	Japanese Peace Treaty signed in San Francisco
	September 11	Acheson meets with British foreign minister Herbert S. Morrison
	September 13	Battle of Heartbreak Ridge, lasting until October 15
	September 28	JCS Chairman General Omar N. Bradley and State Department Soviet expert Charles E. Bohlen visit Tokyo and Korea until October 3
	October 3	Operation Commando, lasting until October 8
	October 5	U.S. ambassador Alan G. Kirk meets Soviet foreign minister Andrei Y. Vyshinsky and urges him to persuade Chinese and North Koreans to resume armistice negotiations
	October 22	Signing of the P'anmunjom security zone agreement
	October 24	Battle of Namsi, largest air clash of the war
	October 25	Truce talks resume at P'anmunjom
	October 25	Winston Churchill replaces Clement Attlee as British prime minister following labor Party's electoral defeat
	November 12	Ridgway orders 8th Army to implement active defense strategy

1951	November 12	Operation Ratkiller begins to kill or capture guerrillas in South Korea, lasting until March 15, 1952
	November 13	At P'anmunjom, the UNC proposes the battle line as the demarcation line for a DMZ if all other issues are settled in thirty days
	November 27	Agreement reached at P'anmunjom truce talks on agenda item 2, demarcation line and DMZ
	November 28	First Anglo-American discussion of Joint Policy (Greater Sanctions) statement
	December 3	Negotiators at P'anmunjom refer Communist proposal for settling agenda item 3, covering cease-fire inspection, to subdelegates to work out the details
	December 20	Truman administration approves NSC-118/2
	December 27	Agreement on demarcation line at P'anmunjom invalidated
1952	January 2	UNC proposes voluntary repatriation of POWs at P'anmunjom
	January 8	Communist delegation rejects voluntary repatriation principle
	January 27	P'anmunjom negotiators agree to defer discussion of airfield rehabilitation
	January 31	Negotiators shift to subdelegation discussion of agenda item 5, political consultations between governments
	February 10	Operation Clam-Up, lasting until February 15
	February 16	Communist negotiators at P'anmunjom suggest that the Soviet Union should be a member of the neutral commission in charge of supervising the cease-fire
	February 18	Soviet Union charges U.S. with waging biological warfare in North Korea
	February 19	Agreement at P'anmunjom truce talks on agenda item 5 provides for political conference ninety days after the armistice to discuss withdrawal of foreign troops and Korean reunification
	March 26	U.S. delegate at UN denies charges of using biological warfare and criticizes Communists for refusing an impartial investigation
	April 2	Communist delegation at P'anmunjom recommends checking POW lists
	April 5	Operation Scatter results in screening of POWs in UNC camps, lasting until April 15
	April 8	Truman seizes U.S. steel mills
	April 10	Meyer mission to Republic of Korea begins, lasting until May 24
	April 20	UNC announces only 70,000 Communist POWs desire repatriation
	April 28	UNC submits package proposal at P'anmunjom truce talks, but Communist delegation refuses to accept voluntary repatriation
	April 28	Truman appoints General Mark W. Clark to replace Ridgway
	May 2	Communists partially accept package proposal, dropping the Soviet Union as a NNCS member for no limits on airfield rehabilitation
	May 7	Koje-do POW camp uprising begins with seizure of camp commander, Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, lasting until June 10
	May 11	Communist POWs release General Dodd
	May 12	General Clark formally assumes command as CINUNC
	May 19	Publication of John Foster Dulles's "A Policy of Boldness" article in Life magazine
	May 22	Foreign Minister Anthony Eden sends draft of Anglo-Indian Five Point Plan for settling POW controversy to Washington
	May 24	U.S. and ROK sign Agreement on Economic Coordination
	May 25	President Syngman Rhee declares martial law in Pusan
	June 2	Supreme Court declares Truman's seizure of steel plants unconstitutional in <i>Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer</i>
	June 10	UN forces rout militant POWs, ending Koje-do uprising
	June 22	Lloyd-Alexander mission to Tokyo
	June 23	Suiho bombing raids begin, lasting until June 26
	June 25	Assassination attempt on President Rhee
	June 25	JCS authorizes General Clark to develop Operation Everready for removal of Rhee from power in South Korea
	June 26	Battle of Old Baldy begins, lasting until March 23, 1953
	July 1	Operation Homecoming releases 27,000 civilian internees, lasting until the end of August
	July 4	South Korean National Assembly passes amendment for popular election of the president, ending the political crisis
	July 7	Communist delegation at P'anmunjom repeats its demand for the repatriation of all Chinese POWs
	July 11	Massive UNC air raid on P'yongyang
	August 5	South Korean presidential elections produce victory for Rhee
	August 27	Second UNC air raid on P'yongyang - largest of the war
	September 2	Mexican POW settlement proposal submitted to the UN
	September 28	UNC presents final proposal to settle POW repatriation issue
	October 1	Cheju-do POW uprising
	October 6	Battle of White Horse Hill signals Communist acceleration of ground war, lasting until October 15
	October 8	UNC declares indefinite recess of the P'anmunjom truce talks
	October 13	Operation Showdown reveals futility of ground assaults against entrenched Communist positions
	October 14	Battle of Triangle Hill, lasting until November 5
	October 24	Republican presidential nominee Dwight D. Eisenhower pledges to "go to Korea" if elected
	October 24	U.S. introduces Twenty-one Power UN resolution, calling for a reaffirmation of support for voluntary repatriation concept
	October 26	Battle of the Hook, lasting until July 25, 1953

- 1952** November 3 Peruvian POW settlement proposal submitted at the UN
November 4 Dwight D. Eisenhower elected president of the United States
November 10 General Van Fleet, the 8th Army commander, announces mobilization of two new South Korean divisions and six regiments
- November 17 Menon POW settlement proposal submitted at the UN
November 18 Truman-Eisenhower transition meeting held at the White House
December 2 President-elect Eisenhower tours Korea until December 5
December 3 UN resolution endorses Menon POW settlement proposal
December 9 U.S. bombing raid on Rashin (Najin)
December 14 Pongam-do POW uprising
December 17 Eisenhower meets with MacArthur, who submits plan for victory
- 1953** January 20 Eisenhower inaugurated president of the United States
January 25 Operation Smack tests close air support strategy
February 2 "Unleashing" of Chiang in Eisenhower's State of the Union speech
February 7 Clark requests permission to bomb Kaesong
February 22 UNC proposes exchange of sick and wounded POWs
February 22 Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor replaces Van Fleet as commander of the 8th Army
March 5 Death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin
March 15 Georgi Malenkov speech voices support for cease-fire in Korea
March 20 JCS approves Operation Moolah to encourage MiG pilots to defect
March 23 Battle of Pork Chop Hill, lasting until July 11
March 28 Communist delegation at P'anmunjom accepts UNC proposal for exchange of sick and wounded POWs
- March 30 Chou En-lai radio broadcast outlines POW settlement proposal for exchange of sick and wounded plus non-repatriate POWs to a neutral state
April 2 President Eisenhower approves NSC-147, a contingency plan to escalate military operations against the DPRK and the PRC
April 11 Operation Little Switch receives approval
April 17 Start of Tasca Mission to study Republic of Korea's economy, lasting until June 15
April 18 UN resolution calls for convening General Assembly after signing of a Korean armistice agreement
- April 20 Exchange of sick and wounded POWs, lasting until May 3
April 22 Eisenhower approves arms and equipment for two new ROK divisions
April 26 Resumption of P'anmunjom truce talks
May 7 Lieutenant General Nam Il advances eight-point POW settlement proposal
May 13 Start of UNC raids on dams in North Korea, lasting until May 16
May 13 President Eisenhower approves arming four more South Korean divisions, to a total army strength of twenty divisions
- May 22 General Clark sends Operation Everready plan to Washington, D.C., for final approval
May 22 Secretary of State Dulles warns China through India that United States might use atomic weapons if UNC POW settlement proposal is rejected
- May 25 Final UNC POW settlement proposal submitted at P'anmunjom with the intention to terminate truce talks if Communists reject plan
- June 4 At P'anmunjom, Communists accept UNC final POW settlement proposal
June 8 Communists formally approve concept of voluntary repatriation
June 10 Communist forces open offensive against South Korean troops
June 15 President Eisenhower receives Tasca report
June 17 Acceptance of revised demarcation line at P'anmunjom truce talks
June 18 President Rhee releases 27,000 North Korean POWs
June 20 UNC delegation gains approval for recess at P'anmunjom
June 22 Start of Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson's mission to the ROK, lasting until July 12
- July 6 Communists stage new military thrust into Iron Triangle
July 7 Eisenhower administration approves NSC-154/1 and NSC-157/1
July 10 Rhee agrees not to disrupt armistice agreement
July 11 Issuance of Robertson-Rhee communiqué
July 13 Final Chinese offensive of the war inflicts heavy casualties on South Korean forces in Kumsong region
- July 17 Eisenhower administration approves NSC-156/1
July 19 Agreement reached on all substantive points at P'anmunjom
July 27 Signing of the Korean armistice agreement
July 27 Signing of the Joint Policy (Greater Sanctions) statement, issued publicly on August 7
July 28 Military Armistice Commission meets for the first time
- 1954** January 26 U.S. Senate ratifies U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty
February 1 Neutral Nation Reparation Commission formally dissolves
April 26 Opening at Geneva Conference of discussions regarding Korean reunification



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by Han Woo-keun Translated by Lee Kyung-shick Edited by Grafton K. Murphy The 1st edition in 1970. 552pp. 160 × 230/90pp. of photos/\$11.00 (Postage included)

8. Folk Tales from Korea

by Zong In-sob The 1st edition in 1970. Hollym Corporation: publishers/258pp. 140 × 220/\$5.50 (Postage included)

9. In This Earth and In That Wind—This is Korea

by Lee O-young Translated by David I. Steinberg The 1st edition in 1968. Hollym Corporation: publishers/226pp. 130 × 190/50pp. of illus/\$4.50 (Postage included)

10. Meditations of the Lover by Han Yong-woon The 1st edition in 1970. Yonsei University Press/210pp. 140 × 210/\$4.00 (Postage included)

11. Religions of Old Korea by Charles A. Clark The 1st edition in 1961. The Christian Literature Society of Korea/296pp. 150 × 210/6 photos/\$4.00 (Postage included)

12. Korea Struggles for Christ Edited by Harold S. Home, Ji Woo-sung, Kim Chung-choon The 1st edition in 1965. The Christian Literature Society of Korea/254pp. 155 × 215/\$3.00 (Postage included)

13. Guide to Korean Culture by Ha Tae-hung The 1st edition in 1969. Yonsei University Press/400pp. 150 × 210/34 photos and maps, 8 illus/\$7.50 (Postage included)

14. Korea Its People and Culture

Edited by Kim Ick-dal The 1st edition in 1970. Hakwon sa Ltd. 472pp. 200 × 260/120pp. of color and mono-chrome illus/\$18.00 (Postage included)

15. Korean Cultural Series

Vol. 1: Korea-Forty-three Centuries The 1st edition in 1962 and the 2nd in 1970. Yonsei University Press/300pp. 148 × 209/\$2.30 (Postage included)

16. Vol. III: Folk Customs and Family Life The 1st edition in 1968 and the 4th in 1970. Yonsei University Press, 90pp. 150 × 210/15 illus/\$1.70 (Postage included)

17. Vol. IV: Poetry and Music of the Classic Age The 1st edition in 1963 and the 2nd in 1969. Yonsei University Press 80pp. 150 × 210/15 photos and illus./\$1.30 (Postage included)

18. Vol. VIII: The Korean Nights Entertainments The 1st edition in 1962. Yonsei University Press/158pp. 150 × 210/14 illus/\$2.00 (Postage included)

The titles of the books introduced in the catalog No. 2 include:

19. Korean Studies Today-Development and State of the Field

Edited by Lee Sung-nyong The 1st edition in 1970./Institute of Asian Studies, Seoul National University/250pp. 160 × 230/ \$7.20 (Postage included)

20. Seoul: Past and Present (A Guide to Yi Taejo's Capital)

by Allen D. Clark and Donald N. Clark The 1st edition in 1969./ Hollym Corporation: publishers/242pp. 170 × 240/77 photos/1 illus./ \$6.50 (Postage included)

21. The Feel of Korea

by 44 Americans living in Korea The 1st edition in 1966./ Hollym Corporation: publishers/370pp. 130 × 195/44 photos/ \$4.50 (Postage included)

22. One Man's Korea

by James Wade The 1st edition in 1967./Hollym Corporation: publishers/266pp. 180 × 185/30pp. of illus./ \$5.95 (Postage included)

23. Seven Years with Korea's Park Chung-Hee

by Kim Chong-shin The 1st edition in 1967./Hollym Corporation: publishers/306pp. 130 × 190/21pp. of photos/ \$5.30 (Postage included)

24. Korean Patterns

by Paul S. Crane The 1st edition in 1967, and 2nd in 1968./ Hollym Corporation: publishers/244pp. 130 × 190/34pp. of illus./ \$4.00 (Postage included)

25. Thoughts of a Korean

by Park Won The 1st edition in 1970 /Pyung-hwa Press/194pp. 130 × 190/ \$3.00 (Postage included)

26. Pictorial Korea

Edited by Song Jung-hoon The 1st edition in 1970./International Publicity League of Korea/232pp. 190 × 260/ \$5.50 (Postage included)

27. Beautiful Korea

Edited by Chong Bi-sok, Cho Pil-dae, Chong Do-son, Suh Myung-suk, Kuon Yong-chul The 1st edition in 1970./Hui-mang publishing Co./844pp. 190 × 210/2,250 photos and maps/ \$17.00 (Postage included)

28. Korean Cooking

by Yun Su-seok, Hwang Hye-seong, Wang Jun-yon, Yoo Key-wan, Sun Bok-kyong The 1st edition in 1960./Hakwon-sa. L'd./250pp. 200 × 260/200pp. of photos and illus./ \$4.00 (Postage included)

29. The Tragedy of Korea

by Frederick A. McKenzie The 1st edition in 1969 (Yonsei University Press/312pp. 150 × 210/27 photos/\$6.00 (Postage included))

30. Korea's Fight for Freedom

by Frederick A. McKenzie The 1st edition in 1969 (Yonsei University Press/320pp. 150 × 210/\$5.50 (Postage included))

31. Korea and Her Neighbours

by Isabella B. Bishop The 1st edition in 1970 (Yonsei University Press/490pp. 150 × 210/22 photos/2 maps/11 illus/\$6.50 (Postage included))

32. Early Voyagers

by James Wadsworth The 1st edition in 1969 (Hollym Corporation publishers/140 × 210/\$5.00 (Postage included))

33. The Tunnel of Destiny

by Kim Hwang-cho The 1st edition in 1971 (The Christian Literature Society of Korea/334pp. 130 × 190/\$3.50 (Postage included))

34. In the Depths

by Hahn Moo sook The 1st edition in 1965 (Translated by Kim Gung seong, Kim Rye soo, Kim Chong-un, Ro Dai-yong, Chung Chong-wha, Joo Yo-seob/29pp. 140 × 200/\$4.00 (Postage included))

35. The Running Water Hermitage

by Hahn Moo sook The 1st edition in 1967 (Translated by Chung Chong-wha/186pp. 140 × 200/\$4.00 (Postage included))

36. Korean Folk Songs

Edited by Lee Kang yun The 1st edition in 1970 (National Music Research Society/80pp. 230 × 300/21 photos/\$4.50 (Postage included))

37. Let's Learn Korean with Records

by Jung In-hak The 1st edition in 1965 (Hollym Corporation publishers/63pp. 190 × 190/18pp. of photos/10pp. of illus/2 sheets of records/\$4.50 (Postage included))

38. An Intensive Course in Korean (2 vol.s)

by Park Chang-hai Vol. I: The 1st edition in 1960, and 11th edition in 1971 (Yonsei University Press/736pp. 150 × 210/\$6.50 (Postage included)) Vol. II: Yonsei University Press/769pp. 150 × 210/\$6.00 (Postage included)

39. Korea and Christianity

by Spencer J. Palmer The 1st edition in 1967 (Hollym Corporation publishers/174pp. 140 × 210/26 photos/2 illus/\$4.50 (Postage included))

40. Democracy and Mission Education in Korea

by James E. Fisher The 1st edition in 1970./Yonsei University Press/188pp. 150 210/\$4.00 (Postage included)

41. Korean Cultural Series

Vol.II: A Trip through Historic Korea by Ha Tae

The 1st edition in 1960, and the 3rd in 1969 /Yonsei University Press/110pp. 150 210/16 photos and maps/\$1.80 (Postage included)

42. Vol.V: Korea Sings—Folk and Popular Music and Lyrics

by Ha Tae-hung The 1st edition in 1960, and the 3rd in 1970./Yonsei University Press/130pp. 148 209/\$1.80 (Postage included)

43. Vol.VI: Folk Tales of Old Korea

by Ha Tae-hung Yonsei University Press/266pp. 150 210/10 illus./\$2.30 (Postage included)

44. Vol.VII: Maxims and Proverbs of Old Korea

by Ha Tae-hung The 1st edition in 1964, and the 3rd in 1970./Yonsei University Press/320pp. 150 210/2 illus./\$2.30 (Postage included)

45. Vol.IX: The Life of a Rainhat Poet

by Ha Tae-hung Yonsei University Press/170pp. 150 210/10 illus./\$2.00 (Postage included)

46. Vol.X: Tales from the Three Kingdoms

by Ha Tae hung The 1st edition in 1970./Yonsei University Press/192pp. 150 210/16 illus./\$2.20 (Postage included)

For further information on the publications above, make inquiries to the Public Relations Association of Korea.

General & Miscellaneous

47. Korea

Edited by Hak Won Publishing Co., Ltd.

This book contains all the needful materials for those who are interested in Korea. It is divided roughly into six parts, dealing first with the natural environment, weather, animals and plants of Korea, the origin of the Korean race, national traits, and languages, secondly with the history of Korea from the ancient times to the modern age and historical relics, thirdly with Shamanism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Tong-Hak Sect, Christianity, school system, women's education, universities and libraries, fourthly with costumes, food and drink, structure of houses, marriage customs, and fete days, fifthly with sculptures, industrial arts, classic dances, folk music, literature, movies, and dramas, and finally with all the sightseeing spots in the country with minute

historical explanations of their background. The fifty-five writers who contributed to this scholarly work are all famous professors, scholars and experts in their respective fields.

The 1st edition in 1970.

*Hak Won Publishing Co., Ltd./471pp. 188 × 254/122 photos/
\$12.00 (Postage included)*

48. Korea, Past and Present

Edited by Kwangmyong Publishing Co.

This book contains almost all information any foreigner may want to find out about Korea. A casual glance at the entries is sufficient to give satisfaction to those who are eager to know about the historical and cultural traditions, philosophical background, old and new customs, arts, religions, latest economic growth and the current political reformation and future goals of the Korean people. The authenticity of the book is well evidenced by the selection of the writers comprising Korea's leading scholars, journalists, and experts in their respective fields. Composed in easy-to-read capsules and printed on paper of de luxe quality, this comprehensive handbook is abundant in colorful pictures depicting the cultural traditions as well as the energy and vivacity of modern Korea which is achieving a rapid industrial growth.

It was profusely illustrated, with index and appendices arranged to be of maximum help to the readers. And 128 color pictures will make the contents much easier to understand.

The 1st edition in 1972.

*Kwangmyong Publishing Co./450pp. 185 × 245/128 photos/
\$10.00 (Postage included)*

49. "Kwanan"

Edited by Chae Sok Kong and Hang Yong Song

This is a bird's-eye-view of the political organizations of the Yi Dynasty since its founding, with a list of all the government offices that came into existence from the Three-Kingdoms era to that of Koryo.

The 1st edition in 1972.

*Po Chin Chai Printing Co., Ltd./250pp. 148 × 210/\$4.00
(Postage included)*

50. Rebuilding a Nation

by Park Chung Hee, President of the Republic of Korea

In this book, President Park Chung Hee of Korea presents perspectives on Korea's national reform and reconstruction. Briefly reviewing the historical background of the nation, the President describes how he wants to achieve political stability, economic development, and social welfare in his developing country.

In the full-length essay he wrote for the Britannica Book of the Year in 1971, the author emphasizes, first of all, the growth of Korea's national strength to meet the ever-present communists' challenge in Asia. President Park determinedly declares; "We will march forward...for those who give up halfway can never win."

The 1st edition in 1971

*Encyclopaedia Britannica (Korea) Inc./28pp. 210 × 275/
\$9.95 (Postage included)*

51. Relations between Korea and Arabia

by Choe Sang-su

This book is the first scholarly work in our country dealing with the historical and cultural relations between the Koreans and Arabs. This research and study of national, social customs and folklore has been done 30 years ago. In the 11th century, several hundred Arab merchants came to Korea, and conjugal relations developed between the Koreans and Arabs in the 13th century. This book is an important reference document by which to develop diplomatic relations with Arab States, and an aid to the establishment of "People-to-people" friendship with them.

The 1st edition in 1971.

*Korea Saudi Arabia Association/115pp. 150 × 210/10
photos/\$5.00 (Postage included)*

52. Koreans In America

by Warren Y. Kim

This book is an attempt to record how the early immigrants and the refugee students, despite incredible hardship, continued to fight for freedom in a strange land whither they fled from the Japanese oppression. It is also an attempt to bring to light the indefatigable efforts of a small group of patriots who strived to rescue their country from foreign aggression.

As regards the activities of the Koreans in America for the past forty years, there were hardly any sources from which to collect materials except the old Korean records and newspapers, such as those held by the Korean National Associations of Hawaii and Los Angeles. In some cases, the records of defunct organizations were available only from private files.

The 1st edition in 1971.

*Po Chin Chai Printing Co., Ltd./162pp. 155 × 215/\$3.00
(Postage included)*

History

53. The History of Korea

by Sohn Pow-key, Kim Choe-choon, and Hong Yi-sup

The History of Korea was chosen as the first book publication project by the Korean National Commission for UNESCO, and appeared in 1970. The subject was most appropriately chosen, as it has been nearly three-quarters of a century since the appearance of the first—and up till now only—pioneer full-scale study of Korea in English, a volume which is now, of course, obsolete. The present book, written by three leading Korean historians covering their various periods of specialization, is a scholarly, comprehensive, yet readable volume which fills a long-felt need in international historical Orientology and library fields, and is certain to become a standard reference and source.

Profusely illustrated, with index, appendices, and bibliography arranged to be of maximum help to the reader.

The 1st edition in 1970.

*Korean National Commission for UNESCO/363pp. 145 x 225
/40 photos/8 illus./ \$6.00 (Postage included)*

54. A New Theory on Korean History

by Lee Ki-paek

In this book the author attempts to grasp the development of Korean history with a progressive attitude on the basis of independent historical view and historical facts. This is the most authentic edition on Korean history, with all the imperfections in the old edition(1961) removed, periods and eras systematically divided, and chapters and paragraphs reorganized during the author's sojourn in the United States. This book was published simultaneously both in Japan and Korea.

Once translated into English at Harvard University, and now published in Japanese in Japan, this is one of the finest history books ever written about Korea that ought to be read not only by history students but by readers in general.

The 1st edition in 1971.

Il-cho Gag Publishing Co./480pp. 148 x 210/ \$6.50 (Postage included)

Economics

55. The Economic History of Korea

by Hochin Choi

The long history of the Korean economy has so far been hidden behind the barrier of language from the eyes of the Western people. This book is the first of its kind published in English language. It is divided into six parts, dealing respectively with the primitive, ancient and feudalistic societies in the history of the Korean economy. A special emphasis is given to the period of Japanese colonialism before the end of World War II. The book is also characterized by the extensive inclusion of statistics. It may also be utilized as a source of bibliography in the study of the socio-economic history of Korea. The bibliography at the end of the book cover an almost exhaustive number of books, articles, pamphlets, official publications, etc. written in Korean, Japanese, Chinese, English and other European languages.

The 1st edition in 1971.

Panmun Book Co./381pp. 150 x 205/ \$10.00 (Postage included)

Science

56. The Birds of Korea

by M.E.J. Gore and Won Pyong-Oh, Illustrated by Judy North

360 species of birds that are found in Korea are described under the following headings; geographical distribution, shape (to en-

able the observer easily to identify), habitat (with descriptions of geographical features), and present situation (with detailed account not yet published). This guidebook also enumerates birds fit for Korean weather and its ecological features, along with detailed notes on their preservation. Descriptions are both in Korean and English.

Michael E.J. Gore is a British diplomat who has studied birds in Europe, Africa and South-East Asia. Since 1967 he has been Consul in Seoul. A member of the British Ornithologists Union, he has previously published papers on the birds of Cyprus and Borneo.

Won, Pyong-Oh is Director of the Institute of Ornithology, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, and is a recognized authority on the birds of Korea. A professor of zoology, he has published many papers on the subject and on conservation of wildlife in Korea. He is a Secretary of the International Council for Bird Preservation and a member of the Survival Service Commission of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources.

The 1st edition in 1972.

*Korea Branch, Royal Asiatic Society/450pp. 188 × 257/
\$15.00 (Postage included)*

57. The Distribution Atlas of Butterflies in Korea

by D.M. Seok

This book shows by means of dot maps on a county basis, the documented distribution of each species of butterfly. The maps are arranged alphabetically by family, genus, and species within the major group sequence of butterfly. A total of 250 species comprise the known butterflies. The distribution patterns are based upon specimens examined by the authors and deposited in herbaria.

The 1st edition in 1973.

*Po Chin Chai Printing Co., Ltd./260pp. 225 × 320/250
illus./\$25.00 (Postage included)*

Art & Culture

58. Early Korean Typography

by Pow-key Sohn

Mould-making and type-casting were disseminated westward to Europe from Korea, through China-Arabian route.

Korea's tradition evolved in the course of her struggle for culture; her unique cultural heritage achieved a homogeneous entity in world civilization. It was in Korea that the movable copper type was invented and successfully utilized. The invention, originating from the intellectual search for truth and knowledge, contributed to enriching intellectual nourishment in Korea as well as in other countries.

Out of the invaluable collection of the Central National Library were taken the specimen pages for this book. Thanks to Dr. Sohn who analyzed the background of the invention and the

development of Korean typography, the texts are added to his explanatory notes on each specimen page. The design and the format of the book are entirely based upon his suggestion.

The first edition in 1970.

Po Chin Chai Printing Co., Ltd./150pp. 275 × 395/75 illus./\$50.00 (Postage included)

59. Modern Korean Painting

Edited by Korean National Commission for UNESCO

This de luxe art book, published in 1971 to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the introduction of modern occidental painting to Korea, is the second volume of the UNESCO-Korea series. Highlighted by numerous color plates reproducing paintings by 20 of the nation's leading contemporary artists, the book includes brief essays in English on each painter, his career, style, and work. A general introduction and an appendix provide valuable background to the history of art in modern Korea, and this is the first time for such basic materials to be available in a Western language. The 160-page large-size book contains two color and four black and white reproductions of the work of each artist, 120 plates in all.

The 1st edition in 1971

Korean National Commission for UNESCO/159pp. 260 × 245 /\$17.00 (Postage included)

60. Masterpieces of Korean Painting Vol. I

Edited by Chisik Industrial Co.

This is a collection, the largest size of its kind in the world, of 30 color reproductions of the paintings carefully selected out of those regarded as national treasures or of the same importance of the Yi Dynasty, with each painting beautifully mounted for the convenience of appreciation and preservation.

All the explanations are done not only in Korean but translated into English and Japanese, and the book is put in a beautiful slipcase. As valuable data for Korean studies and the studies of Korean paintings, the second (35 paintings) and the third (35 paintings) volumes will soon follow.

The 1st edition in 1972.

Jisik Sanup Co.—Korean Cultural Institute/128pp. 440 × 550 /\$100.00 (Postage included)

61. The Flavor of Korean Folk Painting

Edited by Encyclopaedia Britannica (Korea) Inc. and Zozayong

Thirty-three pieces of Korean folk art, reproduced in color and black and white, are introduced in this book along with essays on each work. The works selected are somewhat crude and rustic in style and form. They are all works done by the common people and are symbolic of their life. They, therefore, do not conform to the orthodox esthetic and technical standards of the artistic establishment.

Symbilizing long life, good luck, repelling evil, education, eternity and nationalism, the paintings carried in this book are

defined as the humble expression of basic human desire and faith. According to Mr. Zozyaong, who is an avid lover of Korean folk art and the collector of the works introduced, the special flavor of Korean folk painting is to be found in its rich humor and satire.

The 1st Edition in 1972.

*Encyclopaedia Britannica (Korea) Inc./44pp. 155 x 260/
\$1.60 (Postage included)*

62. Tanwon's Genre-Picture Album

This album of 25 life-size pictures copied from the original genre-pictures overflowing with sweetness and humor by a great painter in Yi Dynasty, Hong To Kim alias Tanwon, is a valuable contribution to the artistic world of Korea. Among the works are included "A Scene on the Road," "Musicians and Dancer," "Korean Wrestling," "Peddling Tour," "Building a House," "Village School," "Farmers Turning Up the Ground," "Training Recruit," "Collecting Alms," "Ferry Boats," "Firewood Carriers," "A Wayside Tavern," "Women by the Well," "Washer Women at the Stream," "Lunch Time on Field," "A Bridegroom," "Shoeing the Horse," "Scholar Artist," "The Carrier," etc. The original Tanwon's Genre-Picture Album was registered (No. 527) as one of Korea's national treasures, and was also named by Cultural Properties Custody Bureau as one of Korea's cultural properties.

The 1st edition in 1972.

*Tamgu-dang Publishing Co., Ltd./25 pictures 225 x 270/
\$150.00 (Postage included)*

63. Pictures of the Items Deposited in the National Central Museum

Edited by Samhwa Publishing Co.

In order to introduce the ancient art of Korea at home and abroad, the pictures in this collection were carefully selected as the most representative cultural properties out of the many precious items now deposited in the National Central Museum. They were unearthed from all over the country after extensive researches on the relics of ancient Korea. It contains 100 helio-typed pictures, which were most carefully selected and arrayed according to different eras and fields by the National Central Museum. This is a valuable collection both academically and as archaeological data, because in it we can find the pith of all our cultural properties.

The works collected here include pictures of 85 industrial products such as earthenwares, bronze wares, gold crown, personal ornaments, utensils for daily use, Buddhist images, green porcelain works, white porcelain works, etc., and 15 other items such as figure-paintings, pictures of heavenly beings, sketches, landscape paintings, genre-pictures, portraits, etc.

Especially, the detailed expositions attached including the eras of the works, places of digging-up, names of the makers, actual sizes, etc. will be very helpful for you to understand the ancient art of Korea, while the minute color printing will produce an effect similar to that of the originals.

The 1st edition in 1972.

*Samhwa Publishing Co./276pp. 230 × 300/100 photos/
\$15.00 (Postage included)*

Language & Literature

64. Hun-Min-Jeong-Eum "Right Sounds to Educate the People" (Korean Alphabet)

Translated by Jeong Ho Lee

The Korean Library Science Research Institute has for some-time cherished a project for the translation and publication of Hun-Min-Jeong-Eum to introduce it overseas. This book attempts to give a general and brief summation of the contents of the "Explanations and Examples" version of "Right Sounds to Educate the People," and also contains a photostatic copy of the original manuscript at the end of the volume.

The 1st edition in 1972.

*Po Chin Chai Printing Co., Ltd./192pp. 225 × 320/2 photos/
68 illus./\$20.00 (Postage included)*

65. An Introduction to Korean Literature

by In Sob Zong

This is a complete guide book in English for foreigners who are interested in Korean Literature. It gives the general information on the traditional background, historical trend, and comprehensive appreciation of various phases of Korean Literature, ancient and modern. The author also paid much attention to the influences of Western literature on the development of modern Korean culture, so that foreigners might easily excavate the characteristics of Korean Literature by analogical approach.

The 1st edition in 1970.

Hyangin-sa (Book Center)/310pp. 150 × 210/\$4.00 (Postage included)

66. Humour in Literature—East and West

Edited by International P.E.N. Centre, Korean Centre

This book is an arrangement and translations into three languages, Korean, English and French, of all the proceedings, such as speeches, questionings and discussions that took place at the 37th International P.E.N. Congress, which was held in Seoul between June 28 and July 4, 1970. The International P.E.N. Club praised the book as establishing a "new milestone in the history of recording the proceedings of an International P.E.N. Congress meeting."

*International P.E.N. Centre, Korean Centre/981pp. 150 × 210
/\$7.50 (Postage included)*

67. Sea of Tomorrow

Translated by Edward W. Poitras

This book consists of 40 poems by Pak Tu-jin who is one of the most respected figures in the Korean literary world today, as well as one of the prominent trio poets, Pak Tu-jin, Pak Mok-

wol and Cho Chi-hun, known as belonging to the "Green Deer School." His early works were published in the late 1930's, and ever since he has steadily presented new works to the public. This translated collection includes such poems as "Song in a Graveyard," one of his early works, and "The Acts of the Apostles 4," another that appeared while this manuscript was being prepared. The 40 works included here are intended to be representative, although they include hardly more than one-tenth of his total output to date.

The present excellent translation would not have seen the light without such a competent translator as Dr. Edward W. Poitras, who is a well-known authority as an American on the Korean language and literature.

The 1st edition in 1971.

Il-cho Gag Publishing Co./104pp. 150 × 230/\$3.50 (Postage included)

68. A Pageant of Korean Poetry

Translated by In Sob Zong

This book introduces in one volume, a bird-eye-view of the Korean poetry from the earliest time down to the present period, including ancient poems, Korean short sonnets, folk songs, and various poetical works of modern times. This collection tries to visualize in English to the eyes of Western readers the nucleus of Korean Poetry in a complete anthology. The three hundred and twenty poems will show the individual differences of more than two hundred and twenty four poets, but they may represent the historical trend of Korean poetry. In the introduction, the author gives the historical trend of Korean poetical creation, indicating schools or movements of Korean literature. This book was selected, translated and with an introduction and a short preface by William Butler Yeats, the famous Irish Poet. And it secured also the Best Translation Reward by the Korean Centre of the International P.E.N. Club in Oct. 30, 1963.

Hyangin-sa (Book Center)/324pp. 150 × 210/\$3.00 (Postage included)

69. Songs of the Dragons

Translated by James Hoyt

This initial volume in a projected series of joint-venture publications with the Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, is the first English version of an epic-didactic poem of the early Yi Dynasty. Songs of the Dragons is a translation with an introduction and notes by James Hoyt. This important historical literary work also represents the first major writing to be transcribed in the newly-invented Korean phonetic alphabet called Han-gul.

The 1st edition in 1971.

Korean National Commission for UNESCO/186pp. 145 × 235/\$5.00 (Postage included)

70. Modern Short Stories from Korea

Translated and edited by In Sob Zong

This book presents 20 short stories by modern Korean novel-

ists. 8 stories in part I are based mainly on the theme of love and marriage, but the remaining twelve deal with other aspects of human relationships, though some of them touch incidentally on the subjects of love and marriage, but not as the principal issue. This book introduces various aspects of modern Korean life in contrast with those of traditional life of Korea which are elaborately illustrated in "Folk Tales from Korea" written by the same author.

The 1st edition in 1958.

Munho-sa/310pp. 105 × 230/\$3.00 (Postage included)

71. Tales from Korea

by Yong Tae Pyon

This is a collection of fairy tales from Korea carefully selected by the author out of the heaps of those that have been handed down from generation to generation and been on the tongues of men most often, and excellently translated into English by the author himself.

It is a translation of 16 tales such as "The Sun and the Moon" and others, which should be read as a good primer by all the foreigners who take any interest in Korea, let alone English language students.

The 1st edition in 1960.

Il-cho Gag Publishing Co./146pp. 128 × 188/\$1.00 (Postage included)

72. Fragrance of Spring, The Story of "Choon Hyang"

by Sim Chai Hong

Although the plot of this love story is not much different from that of any other story of the same nature, the characters all possess peculiar personalities. The indomitable spirit with which the heroine fought against all sorts of hardship for her immortal love constitutes the central idea of this famous romance. It is because of this spirit that "Choon Hyang" has been acclaimed as an embodiment of feminine grace and chastity of oriental womanhood. In an easy, simple narrative style Professor Sim has rewritten this difficult-to-translate legendary tale of quaint manners and customs of old Korea, treating the chapters as fast-moving scenes of a motion picture.

The 1st edition in 1970.

Po Chin Chai Printing Co., Ltd./232pp. 135 × 195/\$1.50 (Postage included)

73. Plays from Korea

Translated and edited by In Sob Zong

This is the first collection of Korean plays ever printed in English (1968). The thirteen plays included here will bring to life through dialogue and action the background of Korean culture and contemporary psychology of the nation, including a traditional Korean Puppet play, "the Puppet Woman."

The 1st edition in 1968.

Korean Language School for Foreigners, Chung-ang Univ./248pp. 150 × 210/\$2.00 (Postage included)

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S. A. Moffett and J. E. Adams, editors.



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"Jesus Christ our hope."

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INTRODUCTION

The Korea Mission was established in 1884. It is now the largest of the twenty-seven missions under our Foreign Board. It has a total membership (men and women) of 144. Of these 86 are active voting members (men and single women), and 42 are ordained ministers.

The field has been a very open one and the work blessed with the outpouring of the Spirit. This has made possible concentration on direct evangelism, and the use of methods ideal to all missionaries but often made impossible because of greater difficulties. According to the latest Board statistics covering its entire twenty-seven missions, there are in the Korea Mission 26% of all the communicants received on profession of faith during the previous year, 30% of the total communicant membership, 38% of the average attendance, 37% of Sunday School attendance; while there are 88% of the self-supporting churches. The largest Presbyterian Theological Seminary in the world also is in that country. This work is done by something over 10% of the missionaries and 7% of the appropriations. These statistics are given to show that the question of field administration herein brought before the Church is not a small one but involves a marked proportion of the Church's interests in foreign mission work.

The question has been under discussion for seven years, petitions have been made without effect. Recurring cases have made necessary this presentation.

The six evangelical missions in Korea organized an Educational Federation with a constitution ratified by Missions and Boards. A co-operating Finance Committee of Board representatives was organized at home. This Committee, assuming functions constitutionally placed in the field body, took the initiative of organizing a single college for the entire country, at a different location and upon vitally differing principles, from the already organized and operating union college. The matter was brought to a vote of the entire missionary body. Only 30% favored the new proposition. Three Presbyterian Missions carrying from two-thirds to three-fourths of all the work in the country, were almost unanimously opposed. Regardless of this the college was directly ordered established. In consequence the field Federation dissolved itself. None of the three missions have gone into the institution.

Our own Board was one of the most prominent in this action. Our Mission carried over one-half of all the work in the country. It made an 86% vote against the proposition. It protested, petitioned, and explained. The Board finally authorized "such members of the Mission as were willing to do so" to represent it in establishing the College, and it has since been operated outside and

The Japanese Administration issued an Ordinance requiring that all religious instruction and exercises be eliminated from the curriculum of all Mission schools. Those holding a government charter were given ten years in which to conform. New schools must conform at once. The three Presbyterian Missions availed themselves of the ten years, closed all new schools, and started plans for saving the future of Christian education for the Korean Church. Our own Mission made its policy plain in the matter. Our Board decided to take out a charter for the new college under the new Ordinance, secularizing all departments except the theological, and thus, of course unintentionally, gave a ruinous blow to mission efforts.

The Mission had all along been urging the point of the Mission's place in field administration. It was told that the General Assembly's constituting action caused all field authority to inhere in the Board, and the Board did not have power to change this. The discussion was long continued. The Mission finally petitioned the Board to ask for a Commission to go into the matter and provide regulations defining the relations in field administration. This was refused. At the next meeting of General Assembly (1919) the Board presented for Assembly ratification a proposition for a merger Board of all Presbyterian and Reformed churches in which was embodied "on the field abroad all problems of missionary administration should be determined by the new Board." The Assembly adopted it with the provision that "in the consummation of this plan ample conference shall be held with the missionary force of our church."

The reader should give particular attention to the "Brief" prepared at the suggestion of Board representatives, and the Board "Memorandum" prepared for presentation to the General Assembly in 1918. With regard to the position of the Mission it should be said that it has never desired to alter the organic law of the church; it fully recognized that all authority, initial, appellate and final, inheres in the General Assembly, and that the Board is the Assembly's head agent in the work, carrying head responsibility for it. The Mission has never desired autonomy or independence from the Board in field matters. Many powers in field matters should inhere in the Board, and full powers of restraint should also be there. But the missionaries cannot accept the position that "every missionary is on the field * * solely because of appointment by the Board," or that "present world conditions imperatively demand a larger and more effective unification of all missionary activities." Their position is not to be paralleled with that of government employees abroad. They are presbyters of the church, called of God to this work, with the Master's promised presence in their midst, and as such they have some rights, inherent in themselves, in the work which they have built up and to which they have given their lives. Not only does justice and propriety speak in the matter, but rapid growth and increasing complexity of field problems make it necessary to efficiency and progress. It is a definition of these functions of the Mission which is requested and which has become necessary to the work.

To The
EXECUTIVE COMMISSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE U. S. A.

Fathers and Brethren:—

We the undersigned voting members of the Chosen Mission desire to present to you a grave situation which has arisen in this field, a situation which imperils the splendid work which has grown up in it during the past thirty-five years.

Reduced to its simplest terms the cause of the difficulty lies in a difference of principles held by the Board of Foreign Missions in New York and the large majority of missionaries here on the field regarding the proper use of authority in matters relating to field administration.

On the one hand, the Mission while recognizing that the ultimate authority must rest in the General Assembly or in the body to which it may delegate its powers, yet believes that following the principles of Presbyterian polity this authority should largely be exercised along the line of review and control, a principle which holds in all departments of Presbyterian mission work except that between the Mission and the Board. We believe that in framing policies on the field, and in all other matters that are primarily field matters, the very largest degree possible of self-government should be allowed to the missionaries through the regularly constituted mission body. The General Assembly has recognized this principle and has directed that it should be followed out in its missionary work, as appears in its action of 1917:

"The Assembly notes, with special interest, the Board's policy of securing more efficient local administration in the various mission fields, including the largest amount of democratic self-government in the missions, and recommends that whenever conditions permit, or render it advantageous, in the judgment of the Board, further steps be taken in the same direction, especially in the case of the larger missions."

(General Assembly Minutes, 1917, page 219).

On the other hand, the Board of Foreign Missions, or its secretaries acting for it, has, in its relations with the Chosen Mission, tended more and more to set aside this principle and has increasingly sought to substitute for it the opposite one, viz., the principle of centralization of authority. It has gathered into its own hands and exercised directly those powers which should have been exercised through the Mission.

The conflict of these two principles, that of local self-government and that of the centralization of authority in the hands of the Board in New York has resulted in an intolerable situation. There is manifest today on the field a confusion of authority, loss of morale, discouragement and lack of confidence in the Board, and the whole work built up at great cost of life and effort is jeopardized.

We present herewith three statements of particular cases, all occurring since 1912, in which it appears that the Board has acted in a manner to justify the above statement. We have appealed to the Board again and again, but have obtained no relief

and we are therefore seeking redress through the General Assembly.

We respectfully request that you take such action as will secure a thorough examination of the relations existing between the Board of Foreign Missions and the Chosen Mission and obtain an authoritative definition in the Board Manual approved by the General Assembly of the relations which should properly exist between the Board of Foreign Missions and the Missions in regard to the matter of field administration, to the end that relations more suitable for the prosecution of modern complex mission work under definite Presbyterian principles may be established.

Respectfully submitted,

(The original sheets in five or more identical copies, signed by the following individuals):

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Stacy L. Roberts
Edwin L. Campbell
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THE CASE OF THE BOARD'S DEALING WITH THE SENATE OF THE EDUCATIONAL FEDERATION IN KOREA.

(Reference at end of Statement)

I. The Organization and Constitution of the Senate.

The conditions of missionary education in Chosen and the developing of the new Japanese government's relations to it were such that it became necessary for the various Missions to stand together in educational matters, and for this reason in 1911 the six Federated Missions organized an additional Educational Federation with a governing Senate composed of their representatives and gave to it such powers as the current conditions made necessary. These Missions were the Northern Presbyterian, Southern Presbyterian, Canadian Presbyterian, Australian Presbyterian, Methodist Episcopal and Methodist Episcopal, South. The Constitution was adopted by all the Missions and ratified by all their Boards. For the Northern Presbyterian Mission this was done by the Board in April, 1912. (1.)

The Constitution among other powers delegated to the governing body, the Educational Senate, the following: (2) "The location and number of High Schools, Art Colleges, Technical Schools, and Special Schools which shall be founded on or maintained by any of the constituent Missions, their correlation and the delimitation of their respective territory, shall be determined by the Senate."

"That such funds may be secured, the Senate shall take steps for the organization of a holding body and for incorporation as may be necessary." (3).

This holding body when organized became known as the 'Joint Holding Committee.'

II. Assumption of Senate Functions by Joint Holding Committee.

The representatives of our Board upon this Joint Holding Committee were appointed at the same meeting as approved the Senate Constitution, April 15th, 1912. (4). At the first meeting of this Joint Holding Committee organized for the sole purpose of securing and holding necessary joint funds (5) it started to exercise functions the initiative for which was delegated solely to the field Senate by the Missions and Boards. (6).

At this time there was but one college in the country. It was at Pyengyang. It was a union institution of the two principal Missions in the country with a permanent Constitution ratified by both Missions and Boards. It had been running for years, and had an attendance of 68 students in the collegiate course.

The Joint Holding Committee in New York first raised and thrust upon the federated organizations the question of one college for the whole country and a change in location. (7) This is shown in the minutes of its first meeting:

1. Number: There should be but one college in the country.
2. Location: That it should be either at Pyengyang or Seoul.
3. Correlation: Character of Pyengyang school if Seoul should be decided upon as location.

5.A. 4
In its second meeting the Joint Holding Committee sought from the Boards authority (8) and secured it. This was done without regard to the Educational Federation on the field or its Constitution. The real situation and purpose however was not understood upon the field until long after. On the field the actions were understood only as recommendations to the field. These minutes were sent to the field by our Board to secure the action of the Mission (9) which took action (10) not appreciating the coming usurpation of recognized field rights.

The Joint Holding Committee then made an extremely strong recommendation for a new location at Seoul for the College it proposed, secured a favorable vote from the Boards and put the matter to a vote of the missionary body of the six Federated Missions. (11). The Chairman of the Joint Holding Committee who was also secretary of the Northern Presbyterian Board for Korea wrote the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Northern Presbyterian Mission, who was also a member of the Educational Senate, saying that the Boards were not forcing the question of location and that the missionaries were being given the opportunity to put the College where they wanted it. (12). This was accepted as explanatory and in harmony with the Constitution and the vote was taken by the Senate.

III. Field Vote and Overriding of Field by Home Orgnaizations.

The vote of all male missionaries more than one year on the field was taken with the recommendation of the Joint Holding Committee in the hands of the voters. These numbered 121. The vote resulted, in favor of the existing location at Pyengyang 63; in favor of the new location at Seoul 37; votes not received in time limit 21. Of the 21 whose votes were not received it was known by a previous vote that 8 stood for Pyengyang and 3 for Seoul.

This practically two-thirds vote was reported by the Senate Secretary to the Joint Holding Committee with a careful analysis of the vote. (13). The Joint Holding Committee received this and by putting all non-voters on the side of the minority favoring the new proposition pronounced it a fifty-two per cent vote, cast its own vote on the side of the minority, declared this a majority of the parties concerned, and through the Boards ordered the establishment of the institution at the new location in Seoul. (14). The question of its authority being raised (15) it stated that (16)

"The Joint Committee derives its jurisdiction from the Boards which appointed it and in whose behalf it acts, that the Committee is empowered, subject to the ratification of its recommendations by the Boards, to deal with any and every subject affecting educational work in Korea which concerns the co-operative relations and activities of the Boards, that the action characterized by the Senate as that of the Joint Committee was that of all five of the Boards in North America,—and that this action stands unless and until it shall be modified by the Boards which adopted it, and which instructed the Joint Committee to send it to the field."

The grounds of the action of the Joint Holding Committee having become clear, and its incompatibility with the Constitution of the Senate evident, the Senate protested the action and refused to accept the decision. It pointed out the overriding of its Constitution ratified by the Boards, the usurpation of the functions delegated to it, the injustice of the action, and the confusion created by it. (17). (18). This was conveyed to the Joint Holding Committee, but no explanation, justification or reply was ever received.

The college at Seoul was established, upon the authority of the Boards through the Joint Holding Committee, without further reference to the Senate, and against a practically two-thirds vote of the entire missionary body of the country, and the almost unanimous vote of those Missions carrying nearly three-fourths of the work of the country. The chief party in this action was the Board of the Northern Presbyterian church.

The Constitution of the Senate having been shattered and the fact of its shattering left ignored, the Senate ultimately dissolved itself, by the authorization of the constituent Missions, and ceased to exist.

NOTE:

It may be said that the Senate made a reference of the question to the Joint Holding Committee. This is true. But this was done as to an outside body, before any realization on the field of the course that body was pursuing. (19).

It will be seen from the letters referred to that conditions in the Joint Committee led the Senate to invalidate the reference (before the Joint Committee decision was made), and ultimately the Committee itself repudiated it as the basis of its decision. For these reasons it has not been entered here as an essential factor in the sequence pursued.

- (1) Board Letter 64, See Appendix I; Board Letter 80, Appendix II.
 - (2) Art. 5, Sec. 4.
 - (3) Art. 5, Sec. 11.
- (4) B. L. 80, Appendix II. B. L. 102, Appendix III.
 - (5) Cont. Art. 5, Sec. 11, quoted above.
- (6) Minutes, Joint Com., 6-27-12, Appendix IV.
- (7) Minutes, Joint Com., 6-27-12, Resolutions 2 & 3: Appendix IV.
 - (8) Minutes, Joint Com., 7-24-12, Appendix V.
 - (9) Bd. L., 102, Appendix III.
 - (10) Mission Minutes, 1912, pages 51-53, Appendix VI.
 - (11) Bd. L., 145, 4-15-13, Appendix VII.
 - (12) A. J. B. to S. A. M., 7-25-13, Appendix VIII.
 - (13) J. E. A. to A. J. B., 8-13-13, Appendix IX.
 - (14) A. J. B. to J. E. A., 9-15-13, Appendix X. J. E. A. to A. J. B., 10-20-13, Appendix XI, Bd. L., 177, Appendix XII, F. M. N. to J. E. A., 2-24-14, Appendix XIII. Bd. L., 196, Appendix XIV.
 - (15) J. E. A. to F. M. N., 4-6-14, Appendix XV.
 - (16) Joint Com. to J. E. A., 5-19-14, Appendix XXV.
 - (17) Senate Minutes 6-13-14, Appendix XVI.
 - (18) J. E. A. to A. J. B., 4-23-14, Appendix XVII.
 - (19) J. E. A. to A. J. B., 12-25-12, Appendix XVIII. J. E. A. to A. J. B., 3-31-13, Appendix XIX. A. J. B. to J. E. A., 4-28-13, Appendix XX. J. E. A. to A. J. B., 6-27-13, Appendix XXI; 6-23-13, Appendix XXII. Bd. L., 167, 7-30-13, Appendix XXIII. Senate Minutes, 6-13-14, pages 10-15, Appendix XXIV. Joint Com. to J. E. A., 5-19-14, Appendix XXV.

THE CASE OF THE BOARD'S DEALING WITH THE CHOSEN MISSION IN THE MATTER OF THE LOCATION OF ONE COLLEGE FOR THE COUNTRY.

(References at end of Statement)

I. The Northern Presbyterian Mission had, some years previous to 1912, founded a college in Pyengyang. The Methodist Episcopal Mission had united in it, and the two had eventually worked out a permanent union constitution ratified by both Missions and Boards. No question of the desirability of location had arisen.

A few members of the Northern Presbyterian Mission in the Seoul Station had long desired to establish another college in Seoul. The Mission had at times approved, at times disapproved, but finally it came to the position of delaying until the Pyeigyang College was well established.

The work of the Methodist Episcopal Mission centered about Seoul. From the beginning they had tried to establish a college there, but had never succeeded, money and men being insufficient. Eventually their Mission in its Annual Meeting of March 1912, passed a resolution recommending ONE college for the entire country for all Missions and that at Seoul. The other Missions, however, took no action. This was the situation in the fall of 1912.

II. The New York Joint Holding Committee of the Educational Federation of Missions in Korea, composed of representatives from the Boards, held its first meetings in June and July of 1912. Representatives of our Board and of the Methodist Episcopal Board alone were present with certain missionaries of their Missions in Korea. The Council of our Board sent the minutes of these meetings to our Mission in August of the same year, with a strong intimation of the Board's coming approval, and directing Mission consideration in September.

These Minutes covered the question of one Union College for the entire country and of its location at Pyengyang or Seoul. (20) This was the first presentation of the matter to the Mission. The statement repeatedly made in justification of the Board's subsequent course to the effect that the initiative had come from the missionaries and that the Board had acted only upon their request is an entirely mistaken statement. (21).

Appendix VIII. B. L. 456, Memorandum pg. 23, Appendix LXXIV.

III. Under these instructions from the Board, the Mission took action after long discussion. (22). The motion that "we approve a college in Seoul" was defeated by a vote of 6 to 36. The motion that "there be but one college in Korea and that to be in Pyengyang" was approved with but six negative votes; and it was also passed "that our Mission ask all the evangelical Missions to unite with us in the Union College at Pyengyang," in which request the Southern and Australian Presbyterian Missions concurred. Upon the basis of this motion and this alone would the Mission consent to consider the matter or enter into it.

IV. On the receipt of these actions the Board called them "an emphatic decision in favor of one College for Korea," and stated that "the question of location is now to be determined"; (23)

entirely ignoring the real character of the Mission's action, the fact of an existing union college built up upon many years development of work, and that no Mission except the Methodist Episcopal, which handled but fifteen per cent of the educational work of the country, had raised any question as to its location.

V. Board Letter No. 145 (24) brought to the Mission the Board's endorsement of the New York Joint Holding Committee's action strongly recommending the Seoul location, and asking for a vote of the missionary body of the country on the question. The numerous wrong and unbalanced statements favoring the Committee's position as set forth in this communication need not be gone into. Suffice to say that on the field instead of the six Federated Missions having voted for one Union College for the country as stated, the three Presbyterian Missions carrying between them two-thirds and three-fourths of all the work in the country had explicitly voted for the already established location in Pyengyang and formally entered into its union, so that four out of six were in the organization, and this was known to the Board.

A vote of the missionary body on the subject had just been taken on the initiative of the Senate of the Educational Federation, but upon the receipt of this request a second vote was taken with the full recommendation of the New York Joint Holding Committee before each voter. This was done upon the understanding that the vote was a reference to the field for decision, and that a clear majority of the missionaries would decide the question. This understanding was certified by a letter from the Chairman of the Joint Holding Committee, who was also Secretary of our Board for Korea, written to the Chairman of our Mission Executive Committee. (25).

Although the vote was taken with the full recommendation of the New York Joint Holding Committee before each voter, it still resulted in a two-thirds vote of the entire missionary body of the six Federated Missions in favor of the established Pyengyang location. And in this vote our own Mission, carrying a full half of all the work in the country, gave a vote of 35 to 5 with the majority. (26). Immediately following this our Executive Committee made full presentation of conditions and reasons to the Board and presumed that the matter was closed. (27).

VI. The astonishment of the missionary body and of our own Mission in particular can scarcely be understood when we received a communication authoritatively deciding the location in favor of Seoul. (28). An attempt was made to justify this decision upon these assertions:

1. That all the Missions had unconditionally agreed to enter upon a union of one college for the country and were therefore bound to the matter. This was not so. The Northern Presbyterian Mission had made the condition of the already established Union College absolute. This was done because the question of location was inextricably involved with questions of fundamental Mission principles. The Southern Presbyterian and Australian Presbyterian Missions agreed with the Northern Presbyterian

Mission. The Methodist Episcopal Mission and its Home Board had made the condition of the proposed new location in Seoul absolute and the Methodist Episcopal South had agreed with them. The Canadian Presbyterian alone laid down no condition.

2. That the field vote was but a fifty-two per cent vote and so indecisive. This also was not according to facts, but was a direct emasculation accomplished by counting all the non-voters on the side of the minority.

3. That the question of location was not a field question; therefore the Boards would decide. This could only be set forth by a confusing of the issues. For there were three factors in the new proposition: finance, organization, and location. The first was wholly a Board question; the second Board and Field; the third wholly a Field question. Failure of the parties interested to agree on any one of the three might defeat the new proposition, but failure in none could justify the Home Base in usurping the rights and functions of the Field in order to abolish an existing institution and put a new proposition over.

This astonishment was not confined to our own Mission, but was equally manifest in the Southern Presbyterian and Australian Presbyterian Missions—the first of which is the second largest in the country, and both of which have since, like our own, consistently refused to have aught to do with the institution at Seoul; and these two with our own carry from two-thirds to three-fourths of all the work in the country.

VII. Our Mission immediately framed a protest, both as to the decision of the immediate case, and the principles of administration violated in the overriding of our Mission and of the missionary body of the country. (29) This protest or similar ones agreeing with the Mission's main contention with regard to the Board's procedure were signed by forty-eight voting members out of sixty-four in the Mission. (30). The protest is summed up in this statement:

"The general principle is clear. Field operations are to be conducted by and through the field organization. In our view a contrary course is in violation of two fundamental principles of Presbyterianism—democracy in direct operation, and government by graded courts."

Replies came to these protests from the Board (31) but none dealt frankly with the points made or attempted to meet or answer them.

VIII. At the annual meeting of the Mission in 1914 a ballot was again taken on the subject, with the result of, one not voting and forty-two to twelve in favor of the established location of the union institution in Pyengyang. (32) The Board, upon this, took final action. It justified its action upon a difference of educational policy between the Mission and the Board. It asserted that the Mission had limited missionary education to the children of Christians only. This was not the educational policy of the Presbyterian church. It quoted the action of the General Assembly of 1838 recommending to its missionaries to put next to the direct preaching of the gospel the education of heathen youth. 'It insisted upon

the right of the Presbyterian church to conduct education in Korea in accord with these principles, as in all its other Missions. It would permit the Pyengyang Union College to be continued as a Junior College if the Mission could carry it, but the other institution must be established upon the broader basis. It hoped that the majority of the Mission would regard this as the best compromise practicable and co-operate heartily in the Seoul institution by the immediate election of Mission representatives on the Field Board of Managers "who of course must be men who sympathize with the objects of the Seoul College." The Board of Managers was authorized to proceed at once with the organization of the college at Seoul, and if the Mission did not feel prepared to co-operate "the Board authorizes such members of the Mission as are willing to do so, to represent the Board in organizing the College at Seoul." (33). Owing to the inability of the Mission to make an ad interim decision the college was established and operation begun as authorized by the Board letter.

IX. At the annual meeting of 1915 after long prayer and careful consideration and conference with Dr. Speer of the Board, and only after repeated attempts to find some other solution of the problem, in view of the institution being already in operation, the Mission replied:

"Much to our regret we cannot see our way clear to participate in the Seoul College, and we ask the Board to make arrangements to operate the college independent of the Mission."

This was by a vote of thirty-five to eight. (34). To this the Board replied assenting to the arrangement and appointing its representatives, (35) and the institution has since continued upon this basis, supposedly being operated independently of the Mission, directly by the Board, through individual representation.

X. In the Board's final decision it defined certain administrative relations. (36). "It would endeavor to provide its share of faculty and maintenance without lessening the force and budget that would be normally assigned to the mission." "The Board will designate the college appropriations and missionary appointments so that they can be noted separately from those subject to transfer on the field." "Our share in the college is to be regarded as an integral and necessary part of the work of the Presbyterian church in Korea and entitled to full recognition as such." As matters have progressed, however, it has become increasingly manifest that it is not the purpose to have the relation agreed upon continue permanently or to make reasonable adjustments for it, or to pursue other policy than that of constant and unjust pressure upon the Mission to force it into the institution. The appropriations for the institution have been unknown to the Mission but appointees upon its faculty have sought secretaries' salaries and house rent from Mission appropriations, qualified Mission workers have been transferred to the faculty from the already overworked Mission force, over the Mission vote by direct Board action, and their place filled in Mission work with new recruits from home; (37.) the annual popular meeting of the institution has been injected into the annual meeting of the Mission as a pro-

paganda; and members of the Mission carrying large and responsible Mission work are called home for long periods for the institution's interests, without reference to the Mission's provision for their work. (38).

In view of the increasing confusion, through a lack of proper definition of relations, the Mission at its annual meeting of 1918 petitioned the Board to secure General Assembly permission for the suspension of the Manual Rule, Sec. 40, that "the Mission has general care and supervision of all work within its limits," and obtain an authorization for the operation of the institution within the limits of the Mission but wholly outside and unrelated to it with distinct definition. (39).

The Board replied (40) "that the Board had not deprived the Mission of its powers in relation to the college. The Mission had voluntarily and against the wish of the Board abdicated its powers in respect to the college by declining to recognize it as an integral part of the work within its bounds with which the Board and the Home Church are co-operating. The Board agrees with the Mission that the resulting situation is 'difficult and anomalous' and that it is a 'source of constant conflict and confusion.' But this unfortunate situation has been created by the course of the Mission in refusing to accept the decision properly made by the Board and approved by the General Assembly. The Mission is entirely free to remedy it at any time by co-operating with the college." "The actions of the Board were submitted to and approved by the General Assembly the following year in connection with its review of the records of the Board." "The relation of the college to the Mission is the same as that of other union institutions such as the Union Medical College and the Junior Union College in Pyengyang except that the Mission has not availed itself of the right to elect representatives on the Field Board of Managers."

In the last printed pamphlet of the institution for public information the following statement is made: (41)

"Field Board of Managers consists of eleven missionaries representing the co-operating Missions and four Japanese subjects—Northern Methodist Mission (three) Northern Presbyterian Mission (four) Southern Methodist Mission (one) Canadian Presbyterian Mission (one)."

The final inference seems inevitable and the Mission is helpless in the matter. "This unfortunate situation has been created by the course of the Mission in refusing to accept the decision properly made by the Board and the Mission is entirely free to remedy it at any time by co-operating with the college."

NOTE: It should be said that the official correspondence referred to will give a much more comprehensive understanding of the matter than this statement which touches only principal points. It should also be borne in mind that the Manual regulations approved by the General Assembly for its Home and Field agents' operations defines the Mission's functions as follows:

"The Mission has general care and supervision of all work within its limits. All questions of policy, method and expenditure

are subject to its judgment, and all requests requiring the action of the Board should be accompanied by the action of the Mission upon them."

Among all the Missions in the country our own had been most strongly founded upon the policy of a self-supporting, self-governing, self-propagating native church. Within thirty years from the beginning a church of 100,000 Christians had resulted, self-governing, with its own Presbyteries and Assembly and this church is practically self-supporting. In the aggregate of all the twenty-seven Missions operating under our foreign Board twenty-four per cent of the native ordained pastors, thirty-three per cent of the churches, thirty-four per cent of the communicants, eighty-three per cent of the self-supporting churches were in the Korea Mission; while but ten per cent of the missionaries and eight per cent of the appropriations were to this country. The ardent evangelistic character of the Korean church was shown by the fact also that thirty-three per cent of all those each year entering the church among the twenty-seven Missions entered the church in Korea. Practically all these were being brought in by the spontaneous efforts of unpaid native Christians. As all missionaries know these conditions are exceedingly difficult to attain and even more difficult to maintain. The consistent, unwavering, and almost unanimous position of our Mission body arose from its conviction, born through long effort and experience, and fortified by its sense of direct responsibility to the Master, upon this point. It knew that in this almost ideal condition, labored and prayed for in every Mission, higher education should be made the handmaid of the church, and its primary object be the making permanent of this evangelizing character in its life and leadership. This was the great and vital hope of the country's rapid evangelization.

As a result not over ten per cent of students in Mission institutions were non-christian. They were not excluded, but they did not come; or if they came, they did not remain non-christians. The student bodies were ardently evangelistic and those going out carried out the same spirit. Under the system 10,556 scholars were in the primary, self-supporting church schools of our Mission and 1322 in the academies and college. The Pyengyang college had been built up as the capstone of the system, in the only location where it could be most certainly made such, and in it the system's product was completed and being turned back into the life of the church.

Among Evangelical Missions our Mission alone held sixty per cent of all communicant membership and over fifty per cent of the student body of the country. During four years of discussion five formal votes were taken on the subject and none fell below an eight-tenths vote of the Mission in favor of the established location. However, the Board of Foreign Missions in New York in connection with the Joint Holding Committee, established within the Mission boundaries over the Mission's head, and against its practically unanimous protest an institution which is to dominate the Mission education of the country and reverse its character.

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- (20) Bd. L. 102, Appendix III.
 - (21) Bd. L. 228, Appendix XXVI; A. J. B. to S. A. M., 7-25-13,
 - (22) Mission Minutes, 1912, Pages 51-53, Appendix VI.
 - (23) Bd. L. 120, Appendix III.A.
 - (24) 4-15-13, Appendix VII.
 - (25) A. J. B. to S. A. M., 7-25-13, Appendix VIII.
 - (26) J. E. A. to A. J. B., 8-13-13, Appendix IX; 10-20-13, Appendix XI.
 - (27) Mission Ex. Com. to Bd., 9-4-13, Appendix XXVII.
 - (28) Bd. L. 196, 2-24-14, Appendix XIV.
 - (29) Mission Ex. Com. to Bd., 4-14-14, Appendix XXVIII.
 - (30) S. A. M. to A. J. B., 4-8-14, Appendix XXIX; Protest 4-14-14, Appendix XXX, S. A. M. to A. J. B., 4-22-14, Appendix XXXI.
 - (31) Bd. L. 208, Appendix XXXII; 214, Appendix XXXIII; 218, Appendix XXXIV; 221, Appendix XXXV; 228, Appendix XXXVI.
 - (32) Mission Minutes, 1914, page 51, Appendix XXXVI.
 - (33) Bd. L. 249, 12-8-14, Appendix XXXVII.
 - (34) Mission Minutes, 1915, Ex. Com. Report, Sec. 8, Appendix XXXVIII.
 - (35) Bd. L. 316, 2-10-16, Appendix XXXIX.
 - (36) Bd. L. 249, 12-8-14, Appendix XXXVII.
 - (37) Bd. L. 432, 1-25-18, Appendix XL; 458, 6-4-18, Appendix XLI. Mission Minutes, 1918, Ex. Com. Report, Sec. 10, Appendix XLII.
 - (38) Mission Minutes, Ex. Com. Report, Sec. 5, Appendix XLIII. Bd. L. 458, par. 2, 6-4-18, Appendix XLI.
 - (39) Minutes, 1918, Apportionment Com. Report, Appendix XLIV.
 - (40) Bd. L. 473, 11-6-18, Appendix XLV.
 - (41) Chosen Christian College. Seoul, Chosen, Nov., 1918, page 3, Appendix XLVI.

THE CASE OF THE BOARD'S DEALING WITH THE CHOSEN MISSION IN THE MATTER OF DEFINITION OF BOARD AND MISSION RELATIONS IN FIELD ADMINISTRATION.

(References at end of Statement)

I. The First Mission Action.

As has been stated before, when the Board's first decision on the college location question was rendered contrary to the vote on the field, a protest of the Mission was filed which covered the question of the Mission's proper place in field authority. (42).

In 1915 a petition to the General Assembly for definition on this point was drawn up by the executive committee of the Mission. (43). Before presenting this to the Mission it was shown to Dr. Speer. He immediately protested, saying that if the Mission wished to deal the most disastrous blow possible to the church's mission work all over the world, it could go about it in no better way; the Mission knew what the Home Board had just gone through; if it thought it must do something of the kind at least present it first to the Board. When the petition was presented to the Mission, the Mission voted to lay it on the table for one year that it might appear on the minutes and so give the Board informal opportunity to consider it. The Board, however, took no action.

II. Educational Ordinance and Conformity.

In 1914 the chosen Government-General issued a revised educational ordinance requiring among other things, that all religious exercises and instruction should be eliminated from the curricula of all private schools including Mission schools. This covered all grades from primary to college. No college could operate without a government permit. Schools possessing government permits when the ordinance was issued were given ten years of grace in which to conform. Schools seeking a permit after the ordinance was promulgated must conform from the beginning.

Our Board presented a very strong protest to the administration upon the extreme character of the ordinance, (44) but no concession was granted. The Federal Council of the six Federated Missions recommended that the Missions should not conform. The Methodist Episcopal Mission very shortly decided to conform not only in its new schools but also in those holding the privilege of the ten years of grace. The Presbyterian Missions refused to do so, and particularly was the Northern Presbyterian Mission outstanding in availing itself of these years, trusting that ten years of God's grace would bring a change and open a door for the schools under its care, and a future for Christian education in the country. An attempt was made to bring in the Chosen Christian College as a previously existing institution but this request was denied by the authorities, and the question of its conforming to the ordinance arose. (45). The agreement that it should be operated independently of the Mission was an embarrassment and difficulty on both sides. The Board wished the judgment of the

Mission but would not ask for it. The conforming of the institution would be an unspeakable disaster to the whole line of defense which the Mission was framing for the future of Christian education in the country; for it was declaredly to be the dominating institution, established directly by the Boards, for that purpose, yet the Mission could take no action in relation to it. The Board wrote asking the judgment of a number of Mission members. The Mission took action indirectly but clearly stating its judgment. (46). Replies were sent to the personal letters, the chairman of the executive committee being particularly instructed to write in full. (47) After a delay of some months, it was decided by the Joint Committee, the Board consenting, to take out a permit for the institution under the ordinance, conforming to its requirements, in order that the institution be legally and permanently established. (48). The unescapable and lamentable effect of this step upon the larger question of the future of Christian education for the Church of Christ in the entire country, again forced the question of Mission authority in field matters into prominence. (49).

III. Revision of Chapter XVIII on the Form of Government Entitled "Missions."

The proposed revision presented to the Presbyteries in 1916 which had grown out of the discussion of the proper administration of Home Board work gave full power of "direction" to the Boards as the former wording had not done, and, what was not well recognized in the Home land, seemed to foreign missionaries on the field to cover Foreign Missions also; which if true would effectually close the question under discussion and make all authority in the foreign work inhere in the Board, by constitutional authorization.

This became known on the field shortly before the General Assembly of 1917 and at once aroused strenuous objection. Articles pointing this out were sent to the church papers, (50) many missionaries sent personal letters to their Presbyteries and friends in the ministry; the executive committee formulated a suggested "Mission" section for the revision; a cable was sent to a furloughed Mission member, deprecating appealing Board actions, but asking that the Assembly be requested to conserve field authority to the Mission; these two being signed by some thirty-nine voting members. The Mission's delegate to the Assembly, introduced two actions in the Foreign Missions Committee, one on conformity and the other on Mission self-government. These after very material modification in the Committee were adopted as follows by the Assembly: (51)

"That in view of the new and serious problems that the Board is facing in the educational work in several of its fields, resulting in the passage of new laws relative to government control of educational institutions and the consequent secularization of all education, the Assembly approves the continuance of Bible teaching and religious services in all mission schools as long as it is legally permissible."

"That the Assembly notes with special interest the Board's policy of securing more efficient local administration in the vari-

ous Mission fields, including the largest amount of democratic self-government in the Missions, and recommends that whenever conditions permit, or render it advantageous, in the judgment of the Board, further steps be taken in the same direction, especially in the case of the larger Missions."

From these actions nothing has resulted except that the Mission so far as it was responsible has sought to live up to them loyally. (52).

IV. Board Conference With Furloughed Missionaries.

In the summer of 1917 after the meeting of General Assembly three such conferences were held, on the subject of the Mission's functions in field administration. In the second, the desire was expressed by both parties to arrive at some mutually satisfactory adjustment and that this could best be done by an amendment to the Manual; also both agreed that the best mode of procedure would be for the Mission to first formally made known its desires in this respect to the Board, on the basis of which the Board could then take action. The Mission was cabled to this effect and took action at its annual meeting in June. (53). The receipt of this action occasioned the third conference. (54). At this conference it was suggested that the Mission request eliminated the Board from field administration and made it only a money collecting, recruit providing body. This interpretation was at once repudiated by the missionaries who made the point, however, that all real authority in field matters now rested wholly in the Board. No real authority inhered in the Mission. Its actions stood only by current Board permission. This was admitted by the Board representatives as the system under which we worked, made so by the General Assembly. The point was emphasized that this was not Presbyterian. Finally the suggestion was made by Board members that a "Brief" be prepared setting forth the Mission's contention, and the Mission members present were requested to revise the Mission action in such a way as to still express the Mission desire but be more in accord with the points brought out in the conference discussion. Immediately after the conference this last was done and the chairman of the Mission Executive Committee who was returning immediately to the field was requested to secure that committee's approval of the revision. Subsequently the Board took action upon the Mission's suggested amendment to the Manual to the effect that it was impracticable because incompatible with the General Assembly's action constituting the Board but suggested that the question of the relative powers and functions of Board and Mission be considered at a proposed "Post War Conference" with furloughed missionaries. (55).

V. The "Brief," the Mission Executive Committee's Action and Board Reply.

As suggested by Board representatives in the last conference with the Board in 1917 a "Brief" was prepared by the chairman of the Mission's executive committee, approved by the executive committee of the Mission and returned to the Board. The overtures on the revision of Chapter XVIII in the form of Government having been referred to the executive commission of the General

Assembly, a copy was sent through the Board secretary to this commission for its information on that subject. (56.) This the Board forwarded with an accompanying action of its own upon the subject. (57). No commend is made here on this action. It will be noted that in Board Letters 426 (58) and 436 (59) reference is made to a number of reasons for not approving the Mission's proposed amendment to the Manual which "can be explained in a letter to the Mission," "the committee and council deeming it expedient that its written statement and the reasons should be passed on by the committee and council before mailing." In anticipation of some action by the executive commission of the General Assembly this seems to have been prepared as a "Memorandum" to the Assembly of 1918 but not presented. (60). This document of twenty-nine pages, single spaced typing, the reader must study for himself. (61). Its spirit and purpose and method will throw great light upon the general situation, and the difficulties under which the Mission has been laboring for some years. It is the climax of the whole matter and makes clear as nothing preceding had, and renders impossible any further question, as to the real position of the Board on the question of democratic self-government of the field organization in field matters. It takes the unqualified position that Presbyters of the church called of God as His apostles to a non-Christian people cannot have rights in their work similar to their brethren at home, for, "every missionary is on the foreign field—solely because of appointment by the Board" "the Board established Missions, appointed the missionaries, determined their support, provided it and still provides—" "The American Government is admittedly democratic," yet "the authority of the United States Government is autocratic in many directions, especially in relation to its representatives abroad. It is sufficient that the democratic principle be observed in the selection of the Government." (62). "Present world conditions imperatively demand a larger and more effective unification and coordination of all missionary activities so that our force and money can be used to better advantage in this extraordinary period of race upheaval and opportunity. Never has a strong Board, with the full power that the General Assembly has committed to it, been more urgently needed than now." 63. Suffice it to say that the position attributed by the "Memorandum" to the Mission is incorrect and its assertions unwarranted. When first suggested it was at once repudiated by the Mission representatives in 1917 and was specifically barred out in the "Brief" itself. (64). It does not seem comprehensible to us that such a document could be prepared by a Board concerning its missionaries, much less for presentation to the General Assembly. The document must be taken, however, for what it represents, showing the Board's attitude to its Mission and to the question of field administration.

VI. Actions of Mission at Annual Meeting of 1918 and Board Replies.

At its meeting in March 1918 the Mission's executive committee recommended to the Mission a petition to the General Assembly for a commission from the Assembly to the Post War Confen-

ence to settle the questions of field administration and asked the Board to unite with it in the request. This was not passed by the Mission, at that time, but the Board was informed of it before the Assembly met, at which time the Board invited commission members to be present at the Post War Conference. (65). At the annual meeting of the Mission this recommendation was again made in the form of a petition to the Board, and passed by the Mission with unanimous vote. (66). All agreed in feeling the extreme need of having the matter settled and settled to stay. This petition was as follows:

"Request to the Board for the appointment of a commission from the General Assembly to participate in the After War Conference."

Preamble: In view of the long discussion concerning the relation of Board and Mission in regard to field operations, and the confusion arising therefrom to the injury of the work; and in view of the Board's statement that "we recognize the force of the contentions that the Manual does not sufficiently indicate just what the relative powers and functions of the Board and Mission are, and that clearer definition is desirable," and its proposal for a conference of furloughed missionaries for the consideration of matters of vital moment; and, believing that in the conference, the General Assembly as principal of both Board and Mission, should be represented, we request the Board as follows:

Request: In accord with the original action of 1837 to the effect that the functions entrusted were to be "with such directions and instructions as from time to time may be given by the General Assembly" we request the Board to petition the Assembly to appoint a commission of five for the following purpose.

1. The Commission as representing the General Assembly shall participate in the proposed conference.
2. It shall go carefully and thoroughly into the whole problem of democratic self-government upon the field, its proper sphere in accord with Presbyterian and sound business principles; and its relation under present conditions with proper Board authority.
3. It shall frame on this basis such recommendations as seem to it wise, for the adjustment and definition of the respective functions of Board and Mission in field matters, particularly in the case of the larger Missions; and present the same to the General Assembly for its action; to the end that suitable directions and instructions may be given the Assembly's operative organization, both at home and abroad, that the Board and the Missions may more effectively discharge the duties laid upon them by the Master."

To this the Board replied refusing the request saying that the action already taken was sufficient, and in substance denying the consideration of the subjects in the conference. (67). In accord with Board Letter No. 426 (68) intimating that the matter would be given consideration in the Post War Conference, and the instruction of the Board that "the Missions be given notice far enough in advance to enable them in passing upon fur-

loughs for the year in question, to see that their members who will be home are those whom the Mission would like to have represent them," the Mission took action appointing representatives. In reply it was intimated that when the time came the Korea Mission would probably have enough regular representatives at home without the necessity of any special arrangement of furloughs. (69).

VII. The request of the Mission for a clarification of the relations between the Mission and the Chosen Christian College and the character of the Board's reply to the same has been given in Statement No. II.

CONCLUSION:—

After five years of negotiation and patient waiting on the part of the Mission we are constrained to the belief that there is no intention of granting relief, and that we are simply subjects of a Fabian policy. Missions are not supposed to inter-communicate. The administration of the Board, at least, has greatly resented such attempts. But the information coming to us is to the effect that the Korea Mission has not been alone in its experience. We have been told by a prominent missionary of China that seeing the increasing concentration of field authority in the Board, was one of the leading reasons for the organization of the China Council of all our China Missions. The Board settlement of the "co-operating Missions question" in Japan, even after the lapse of years, has still left a soreness. A former China missionary, now the pastor of a leading church in the middle west and chairman of his Presbyterial Foreign Mission Committee writes us:

"I am in hearty sympathy with your effort to secure more authority on the field. I found while in China that the autocracy exercised by the Board in New York was most embarrassing and was causing a great many heartbreaks and many returns from the field. I did not think the Board was so much to blame as the authority assumed by the secretaries and the control which they exercised. They adopt a superior attitude to the missionary, and the wise conclusions in view of the facts locally known are often reversed by those who do not see things because they are too far away."

Secretaries of two other American Boards working in Korea, after a careful investigation on the field, have frankly expressed themselves as amazed at the course which our Board has pursued in dealing with its Mission, and that such a course would never be thought of by their own organization, as it involves principles of operation diametrically opposed to their own Board policies.

It has been seven years since the Joint Holding Committee organized under the constitution of the Educational Federation of Missions in Korea, first usurped the functions of the governing senate in that body. During this period a number of Board actions of similar character in relation to the field force have taken place. The more important of these have been mentioned. They have gradually accentuated the situation until the definition of Mission powers as given in the Manual no longer carries any force; in field

administration a state of confusion exists which is most injurious to the work; and there is no operating basis in field matters, as between field and home base, except that imposed by the Board solely on its own authority. As Presbyters of the Presbyterian Church of America, as many of the signers of the petition to the executive commission of the General Assembly which these papers accompany are and as apostles called by Christ to a non-Christian people which all are, we are unable to regard this as just and right to ourselves, or profitable to the Lord's work. As a body of Christ's servants we feel that we have sought a solution of the difficulty with long patience, under much misrepresentation, and with entire willingness to accept even a minimum of consideration. As the years have passed we have suggested, requested, petitioned and protested. It seems to us that in none of the Board's replies to these actions have our positions been properly met and given the consideration they deserve. The Board's general position is sufficiently manifest in its "Memorandum" to the General Assembly upon the subject. It is only with the deepest regret, and under a compelling sense of the interests of Christ's service, that we are at length driven to make this statement of the situation which we make not as a Mission but as individuals.

- (42) Protest, 4-11-14, Appendix XXX.
 (43) Missio Minutes, 1915, Quoted in 'Brief,' 11-17-17, page 9, Appendix XLVII.
 (44) A. J. B. to M. Komatsu, 6-6-15, Appendix XLVIII.
 (45) A. J. B. to J. E. A. 9-15-15, Appendix XLIX. J. E. A. to A. J. B. 10-21-15, Appendix L; 11-27-15, Appendix LI; 12-21-15, Appendix LII; 12-29-15, Appendix LIII.
 (46) Missio Minutes, 1916, Ed. Com. Report, Sec. 26, Appendix LIV.
 (47) J. E. A. to A. J. B. 10-7-16, Appendix LV.
 (48) A. J. B. to J. E. A. 12-5-16, Appendix LVI. J. E. A. to A. J. B. 1-13-17, Appendix LVII. A. J. B. to J. E. A. 1-15-17, Appendix LVIII.
 (49) J. E. A. to A. J. B. 3-19-17, Appendix LIX; 4-16-17, Appendix LX.
 (50) W. M. B. to The Herald & Presbyter, Appendix LXI. J. E. A. to The Presbyterian, Appendix LXII.
 (51) Minutes, Gen'l Assembly, 1917, Page 219.
 (52) A. J. B. to J. E. A. 1-23-18, Appendix LXIII. J. E. A. to A. J. B., 3-15-18, Appendix LXIV.
 (53) Missio Minutes, 1917, Page 37, Ex. Com. Report, Sec. 18 & 19, Appendix LXV.
 (54) A. J. B. to J. E. A. 8-30-17, Appendix LXVI. J. E. A. to A. J. B. 9-4-17, Appendix LXVII.
 (55) Bd. L. 426, 1-10-18, Appendix LXVIII.
 (56) J. E. A. to A. J. B. with inclosures, 12-7-17, Appendix LXIX. "Brief," Appendix XLVII.
 (57) Bd. L. 436, 2-14-18, Appendix LXX.
 (58) Appendix LXVIII.
 (59) Appendix LXX.
 (60) Bd. L. 456, 5-31-18, Appendix LXXI.
 (61) "Memorandum," Appendix LXXII.
 (62) Memorandum, pages 7 & 8, Appendix LXXII.
 (63) Memorandum, page 16, Appendix LXXII.
 (64) Brief, III D, Appendix XLVII.
 (65) J. E. A. to A. J. B. 5-15-18, Appendix LXXIII. Bd. L. 460, 6-12-18, Appendix LXXIV.
 (66) Mission Minutes, 1918, Ex. Com. Report, Sec. 9.
 (67) Bd. L. 468, 10-9-18, Appendix LXXV.
 (68) Appendix LXXVI.

APPENDIX I

(I.) BOARD LETTER NO. 64, JAN. 17, 1912
 Educational Foundation
 Union Bible Institute
 Second College

January 17, 1912.

To the Korea Mission,
 Dear Friends:

I take up in this letter your actions on an Educational Foundation Committee, on pages 31-34 and 53 of the Printed Minutes of your Annual Meeting, a Union Bible Institute in Seoul, pages 43-47, 64-68 and 80, and a second College, pages 43 and 103.

The principles which apparently underlie both the Educational Foundation Committee and the Union Bible Institute in Seoul appear from the viewpoint of the Board to be so nearly alike that the Board's action on both is covered in the appended minute:

Careful consideration was given to the action of the Korea Mission regarding an "Educational Foundation Committee" and a Union Bible Institute in Seoul. The Board expressed its hearty approval of the main objects which it understands that the Foundation and the Institute are designed to meet and its strong agreement with the Mission that the question of adequate educational facilities should be handled in a large and generous spirit and in united and co-operative relations with other evangelical Missions in Korea. The Board desires to aid the Mission in every practicable way in meeting this fundamental and imperative need. The Board feels that there are several basal principles to be kept in mind in developing such educational plans, two of which appear to be involved by these actions of the Mission.

First: The training of ministers, evangelists and other leaders of the Church in the Mission field is one of the most solemn and imperative duties of the Missions and Boards, a duty which cannot be transferred to independent bodies over which the Missions and Boards have no control and for whose future policy wisdom and soundness in the faith there can be no guarantee, except the personal character of those who for the time conduct them, but whose successors are unknown. It is vital to the success of the whole Mission enterprise that the aims, methods and teaching of institutions of this kind should be kept in harmony with the evangelistic aims and work of the Missions and erroneous tendencies and divisive influences avoided. To this end, such institution should be closely related to the Mission and the Board and under their responsible supervision as an integral and organic part of their work. In the case of union institutions, the control of the Mission should be exercised through a Joint Field Board of Managers, elected by and amenable to the co-operating Missions in the way that has been found so satisfactory in the management of the Shantung Christian University, the North China Union Colleges, and the Meiji Gakuin in Japan.

Second: Under the system adopted by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, the Board is charged with the duty of representing in America the work and workers on the field and is made the agency which is to receive and administer the gifts of Presbyterians for supporting them. The Board cannot discharge the responsibilities that have been committed to it, and cannot adequately maintain the missionaries and their work, unless both missionaries abroad and donors at home recognize and co-operate with it, as the agency created by the Church for this purpose. The organization by missionaries of enterprises which are independent of the Board and which make separate appeals to the constituency upon which the Board depends for the money needed to support the missionaries and their work tends to undermine the Board's ability to maintain the regular work of the Missions, diverts interest and gifts, causes overlapping, confusion, and the division of responsibility, the multiplication of appeals and, if right for one group of missionaries is right for others, so that scores of unrelated and independent enterprises will be launched upon the home Church, the orderly, united and responsible direction of the work will be broken up and the very purpose for which the Board exists will be defeated. Missionaries who accept appointment by the Board become a part of the organized missionary enterprise of the Presbyterian Church. Entitled to all the privileges and support which the Board, acting as the agency of the church, can secure for

2) The following are the parties to the
correspondence given.

Rev. A. J. Brown, D. D. was Chairman of the Joint Holding Committee 1912-1914, and Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions for Korea throughout the entire period.

Rev. Frank M. North, D. D. was subsequent Chairman of the Joint Committee.

Rev. S. A. Moffett, D. D. was Chairman of the Executive Committee and Corresponding Secretary of the Korea Mission 1911-1913, and acting Chairman in the Summer of 1917.

Rev. C. A. Sharpe, D. D. was Chairman of the Executive Committee and Corresponding Secretary of the Korea Mission 1913-1916.

J. E. Adams, D. D. was Executive Secretary of the Governing Senate of the Educational Federation of Missions in Korea 1912-1915, and Chairman of the Executive Committee and Corresponding Secretary of the Korea Mission 1916-1918.

referred to on pages 31-34 of the Mission Minutes appears to encourage this view. But the Board is obliged to deal with the official text of the Mission's actions, and that text clearly, though no doubt unintentionally, makes "The Senate" of the Educational Foundation Committee an administrative agency independent of the Boards, authorizes it to raise and hold "funds in the homelands," and to be incorporated if necessary. (Cf. page 33, Art. 5, Sections 10 and 11.) The Mission action of The Union Bible Institute in Seoul sets up a Joint Field Board of Managers, elected by the Stations in Seoul, as a body inside of the co-operating Missions, which, so far as the constituting act is concerned, will be independent of them (cf. page 80), while no provision is made for relating either the Senate or the Joint Board of Managers to the Boards in America. The Board, therefore, while most heartily sympathizing with and cordially approving the general plans of the Mission saw no alternative but to make its approval subject to the conditions that the Union Bible Institute shall be related to the Mission in the same way as other union institutions which are local to particular stations; that all acts and proceedings of both The Joint Board of Managers of the Union Bible Institute and the Senate of the Educational Foundation Committee shall be subject to the review and control of the co-operating Missions on the field and, through them, of the Boards at home, in the same way as other union institutions; that any appeals that may be made in America shall be made through or with the approval of the Boards; and that any funds which shall be raised, held and administered in America shall be raised, held and administered by the Boards, or by such body as they may constitute for this purpose.

With these modifications, which the Board believes will not hamper but, on the contrary, will materially strengthen the plan, the Board will gladly do everything in its power to assist the Mission in carrying out its desires.

As far as we can judge from your Minutes, the discussion of the Seoul Institute, the Mission meeting turned upon its relation to the policy of the Mission regarding self-support and to the Theological Seminary.

It is, of course, necessary that any institution should work in harmony with the policy of the Mission, but this question is subordinate to the main question of control, for if institutions are under the control of the co-operating Missions and Boards, the Missions and Boards have ample opportunity in their annual review and control of the acts of the Field Boards of Managers to see that the institutions are kept in line. We do not understand why such care should be exercised to keep the Union Bible Institute in Seoul independent of the Union Theological Seminary. The Union Training School for Christian Workers in Peking, which is designed to prepare for Christian

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several basal principles to be kept in mind in developing such educational plans, two of which appear to be involved by these actions of the Mission.

First: The training of ministers, evangelists and other leaders of the Church in the Mission field is one of the most solemn and imperative duties of the Missions and Boards, a duty which cannot be transferred to independent bodies over which the Missions and Boards have no control and for whose future policy wisdom and soundness in the faith there can be no guarantee, except the personal character of those who for the time conduct them, but whose successors are unknown. It is vital to the success of the whole Mission enterprise that the aims, methods and teaching of institutions of this kind should be kept in harmony with the evangelistic aims and work of the Missions and erroneous tendencies and divisive influences avoided. To this end, such institution should be closely related to the Mission and the Board and under their responsible supervision as an integral and organic part of their work. In the case of union institutions, the control of the Mission should be exercised through a Joint Field Board of Managers, elected by and amenable to the co-operating Missions in the way that has been found so satisfactory in the management of the Shantung Christian University, the North China Union Colleges, and the Meiji Gakuin in Japan.

Second: Under the system adopted by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, the Board is charged with the duty of representing in America the work and workers on the field and is made the agency which is to receive and administer the gifts of Presbyterians for supporting them. The Board cannot discharge the responsibilities that have been committed to it, and cannot adequately maintain the missionaries and their work, unless both missionaries abroad and donors at home recognize and co-operate with it, as the agency created by the Church for this purpose. The organization by missionaries of enterprises which are independent of the Board and which make separate appeals to the constituency upon which the Board depends for the money needed to support the missionaries and their work tends to undermine the Board's ability to maintain the regular work of the Missions, diverts interest and gifts, causes overlapping, confusion, and the division of responsibility, the multiplication of appeals and, if right for one group of missionaries is right for others, so that scores of unrelated and independent enterprises will be launched upon the home Church, the orderly, united and responsible direction of the work will be broken up and the very purpose for which the Board exists will be defeated. Missionaries who accept appointment by the Board become a part of the organized missionary enterprise of the Presbyterian Church. Entitled to all the privileges and support which the Board, acting as the agency of the church, can secure for

them, and at the same time agreeing to work with the Mission and the Board and to consider the enterprises which they project as integral parts of the united work.

The proposal of the Board, which has been approved by the General Assembly of 1911, to raise an Educational Endowment and Equipment Fund of \$5,000,000, should also be borne in mind in connection with plans for financing our educational work.

The Board devised this fund because of its deep sympathy with the educational needs of the Missions and its earnest desire to aid most effectively in meeting them. The success of the effort to raise this great sum largely depends upon the co-operation of the missionaries in bringing united influence to bear upon donors at home. As the proceeds of this fund become available, the Board will gladly apportion them among the institutions which are organically connected with our work and under the control of the Missions and Boards. It would be highly unfortunate for missionaries to push independent enterprises which would impair the success of this fund and also deprive their educational institutions of its benefits, if it is successful. The Board believes that, in the long run, it will be better for particular institutions if they retain their organic relations with the whole missionary enterprise of the Church with the privilege of presentation in the published reports and leaflets of the Board and the consequent claim upon the interest, prayers and financial support of the missionary work to which the Church is committed.

The Board is confident that the Korea Mission will cordially agree with the Board in these positions, and it is persuaded that the Mission did not intend to do anything that would be subversive of them. The discussion referred to on pages 31-34 of the Mission Minutes appears to encourage this view. But the Board is obliged to deal with the official text of the Mission's actions, and that text clearly, though no doubt unintentionally, makes "The Senate" of the Educational Foundation Committee an administrative agency independent of the Boards, authorizes it to raise and hold "funds in the homelands," and to be incorporated if necessary. (Cf. page 33, Art. 5, Sections 10 and 11.) The Mission action of The Union Bible Institute in Seoul sets up a Joint Field Board of Managers, elected by the Stations in Seoul, as a body inside of the co-operating Missions, which, so far as the constituting act is concerned, will be independent of them (cf. page 80), while no provision is made for relating either the Senate or the Joint Board of Managers to the Boards in America. The Board, therefore, while most heartily sympathizing with and cordially approving the general plans of the Mission saw no alternative but to make its approval subject to the conditions that the Union Bible Institute shall be related to the Mission in the same way as other union institutions which are local to particular stations; that all acts and proceedings of both The Joint Board of Managers of the Union Bible Institute and the Senate of the Educational Foundation Committee shall be subject to the review and control of the co-operating Missions on the field and, through them, of the Boards at home, in the same way as other union institutions; that any appeals that may be made in America shall be made through or with the approval of the Boards; and that any funds which shall be raised, held and administered in America shall be raised, held and administered by the Boards, or by such body as they may constitute for this purpose.

With these modifications, which the Board believes will not hamper but, on the contrary, will materially strengthen the plan, the Board will gladly do everything in its power to assist the Mission in carrying out its desires.

As far as we can judge from your Minutes, the discussion of the Seoul Institute, the Mission meeting turned upon its relation to the policy of the Mission regarding self-support and to the Theological Seminary.

It is, of course, necessary that any institution should work in harmony with the policy of the Mission, but this question is subordinate to the main question of control, for if institutions are under the control of the co-operating Missions and Boards, the Missions and Boards have ample opportunity in their annual review and control of the acts of the Field Boards of Managers to see that the institutions are kept in line. We do not understand why such care should be exercised to keep the Union Bible Institute in Seoul independent of the Union Theological Seminary. The Union Training School for Christian Workers in Peking, which is designed to prepare for Christian

work men who are not sufficiently educated or who are too far advanced in years to be ordained as pastors of churches, is conducted as a department of the Union Theological Seminary, the plants and faculties being closely related. If a Bible Institute is to stand for a type of teaching for which a Mission is not prepared to assume responsibility, it should not be started at all; but if it is to stand for the common interests and is to differ from an adjacent Theological Seminary only in that it trains a different class of men, there appears to be no valid reason why the two institutions should not be kept together as separate departments of a common institution.

I wish to repeat in behalf of the Board the expression of our deep interest in these great subjects and our eager desire to co-operate with the Mission in every practicable way. The conjecture that the Board's decision will be in harmony with your wishes is strengthened by "the resolutions on Bible Institute and Summer School work" adopted by the General Council of Korean Missions and printed on pages 345-345 of the December issue of the "Mission Field," which was received after the Board Meeting.

We have had some letters from members of Seoul station containing strong advocacy of a College at Seoul, and Mr. John T. Underwood reports the receipt, October 2nd, of a cable asking that consideration of the question by the Board be postponed until further information arrived by letter. A diligent search through your printed Mission Minutes discloses only the following references to the question:

"PYENG YANG STATION REPORT:—Mr. Holdercroft read the general report of Pyeng Yang station. It was moved and carried that the item on page 41—

"Additional steps have been taken this last year to have the other Protestant Missions in Korea unite in the College work, thus making be referred to the Educational Committee."

"Section 7 was presented and after almost two hours of discussion the previous question being put, was adopted as amended, 20 voting in affirmative and 9 in negative.

"Sec. 7.—We recommend that the John D. Wells Training School be authorized to work for one year in union with the Methodist Schools of Seoul, and to participate in two years' instruction above present academic curriculum, it being understood that no added expense or increased force be involved for the Mission. This action must not be interpreted as indorsing a College in Seoul. Affirm. 20; Neg. 9."

We note also that your authorized list of property requests, on pages 52 and 131, does not include any request for a College at Seoul.

As the opinion regarding the inadvisability of attempting two colleges in Korea, which I expressed on pages 190-191 of my printed "Report of a Second Visit to China, Japan and Korea," has been officially approved by the Board as announced in my Mission letter of June 9, 1916, and has now been endorsed in substance by two successive annual meetings of the Mission (1910 and 1911), we assume that the question is settled as far as present plans are concerned.

I may again state, however, that I have tried to make clear in former correspondence that the essential element, in our judgment, is one union college or university for Korea, that we have no special concern whether it should be located in Pyeng Yang or Seoul, but that if there in any strong feeling on the part of the Mission, or of the other Missions with which we should co-operate, in a union institution, that that location should be Seoul, that matter should be squarely faced in the immediate future before making further expenditures for a College plant at Pyeng Yang.

The whole question of higher educational facilities in the Far East is receiving our careful attention. I confess that I have an ardent desire to see one well-equipped union University in Japan, another in Korea, and five in China located respectively at Peking, Tsinan-fu, Hanking, Hankow and Canton. Our Board does not have official responsibility for equipping universities at Canton and Hankow as the institutions there are under other auspices, but we are directly related to the others mentioned. It will take a very large sum of money—more, I fear, than there is any reasonable prospect of our securing—to do our part in equipping these universities, especially when we consider what must be done for higher education in the Philippines, Siam, India, Persia and South America Missions and the great number of auxiliary high schools and boarding schools while you are

for a considerable fund for primary schools. But we wish to present that educational program to our wealthy men in the country and to do everything in our power to co-operate with the Mission in handling this big problem. The constituency of the Korea institution will be considerably smaller than that of the Japan, China and India universities. It is true that your church membership is now relatively large, but universities do not depend for students exclusively upon Christians and, moreover, they plan for a long future when church constituencies are expected to be much larger than they are at present. I agree with you, however, that the Korea educational problem must be handled by itself, although there are men who express the opinion that, as Korea and Japan are now under one government and are to be more and more closely amalgamated, missionary educational work in Korea should be confined to middle schools and that university students should be sent to a Union University in Japan. I venture to believe that I shall represent your wishes if I oppose this view in case it should be pressed. We wish to do everything we can to help you. But you will see how important it is that there should be agreement in Korea and that unless missionaries can agree upon one location, work unitedly for it and avoid conflicting appeals and mutually contradictory plans, the question of getting an adequate share of attention for Korea is likely to be seriously jeopardized. We need great wisdom, much prayer, and full unity of purpose in meeting this extraordinary emergency.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) ARTHUR J. BROWN.

(II.) BOARD LETTER NO. 80, APRIL 17, 1912.
Educational Foundation

April 17, 1912.

To the Korea Mission,
Dear Friends:

You will recall that Board letter No. 64, January 17th, regarding your action on an Educational Foundation Committee as given on pp. 31-34 of the Printed Minutes of your Annual Meeting for 1911 included an intimation that we were persuaded that the Mission did not intend to make the Senate in Korea and the holding body in America so independent of present organizations as the text of the Mission action indicated, but that the Board had no alternative but to deal with the only construction of the language of the Mission action which that action appeared to carry. Afterwards the Rev. J. E. Adams of Taiku was in New York and we asked him about it. We were much gratified by his statement to the effect that the Board's conjecture was correct and that the intention of the Mission was in full accord with the principles which the Board's letter stated. As Mr. Adams is not only one of the senior members of the Mission, but as he was Secretary of the Educational Committee of the Mission and the one who drafted the Mission action, we felt justified in regarding his interpretation as authoritative. I now have pleasure in writing, therefore, that the Board at its meeting the 15th instant took the following action:

"The Executive Council reported that since the Board's action of January 2d on The Educational Foundation in Korea, there had been opportunity for personal conference with the Rev. J. E. Adams, who was Secretary of the Educational Committee of the Mission at the time the Mission acted and who drafted the report on pp. 31-34 of the Printed Minutes of the Mission for September, 1911. Mr. Adams stated that he believed that the Mission was in accord with the position taken by the Board, namely, that the Senate of the Foundation Committee was to be amenable to the co-operating Missions in substantially the same way as Joint Field Boards of Managers of union institutions in other fields, and that the action of the Mission was quite consistent with 'the organization of a holding body for the fuaads in the homelands' by appointment of the co-operating Boards, such holding body to be subject to the control of the Boards in America in the same way that the Senate is to be subject to the co-operating Missions in Korea.

"The Executive Council also reported that at a later date, April 3d, it had conferred with representatives of the Northern Methodist Board, the Southern Methodist Board and the International Committee of the Y. M. C. A.; that Dr. Leonard, Secretary of the Northern Methodist Board, had stated that he had not received any request from the Methodist Mission regarding

the Educational Foundation; that Dr. Cook, Secretary of the Southern Methodist Board, had stated that his Board had received such a request and would act upon it at its next meeting, May 16th; that the Conference felt that it would be highly desirable that the Boards should act together; and that the Presbyterian Board was requested to communicate its action to the other Boards having work in Korea with a view to concurrent action if practicable.

"The Board expressed its gratification with the interpretation of the action of the Mission given by Mr. Adams and concurred in by Mr. Frank Brockman, Secretary of the Y. M. C. A. at Seoul, who was present at the Conference. It renewed its cordial expression of approval of the plans of the Educational Foundation as thus interpreted, appointed Secretaries Brown and Speer as its representatives on a Joint Committee in America, and expressed the hope that the other Boards having work in Korea would see their way clear to take similar action and to appoint one or two representatives each who would co-operate with the representatives of this Board as a Joint Committee to co-operate with the Missions in furthering the very large and important plans which are under consideration."

I am writing to the other Boards having work in Korea and expressing the hope that they will take concurrent action. It will be a great pleasure to us to do everything in our power to co-operate with you in what impresses us as an admirably wise movement.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) A. J. BROWN.

(III.) BOARD LETTER NO. 102

August 8, 1912.

To the Korea Mission,
My dear Friends:

I enclose copies of the Minutes of two preliminary conferences on Union Education in Korea, held respectively June 27th and July 24th. You will note that these conclusions are tentative, as it was not practicable at the dates mentioned formally to organize the Joint Committee which is to represent the co-operating Boards in America. These actions are therefore subject to ratification of that Committee when officially constituted and then to ratification by the co-operating Boards. With this understanding the Minutes are sent to you for your information in order that your Annual Meeting, which we understand is to convene September 8th, may know the trend of opinion which was expressed.

Our Board has adjourned until September 17th on account of the vacation absences of many of the members. It authorized the Executive Council to act with power on any questions which might arise during the interim. The tentative conclusions of the two conferences referred to were presented to the Executive Council July 31st, when the following action was taken:

"Secretaries Speer and Brown, who were appointed April 15, 1912, to represent the Board on a Joint Committee of the Boards having work in Korea regarding the development of union higher educational institutions, reported a conference June 27th with representatives of the Methodist Board, a Special Committee of the Continuation Committee on Education in the Far East, and several missionaries of the Methodist and Presbyterian Boards who were at home on furlough. They also reported another conference July 24th with representatives of the Methodist Board and with missionaries of the Northern and Southern Methodist and our own Boards. The Joint Committee has not yet been officially organized, as some of the other Boards concerned have not acted. Certain tentative conclusions, however, were informally agreed to. The Executive Council deferred final action upon them pending their ratification by the Joint Committee when formally constituted. Meantime, in view of the approaching annual meeting of the Korea Mission, Secretary Brown was instructed to send these tentative conclusions to the Mission for its information, with the statement that while the Board had not specifically acted upon them and could not do so until it reassembled in the fall, the Executive Council regarded these conclusions as so much in harmony with the positions already taken by the Board as to deem it probable that they would meet with the Board's acceptance.

We assume, of course, that you will give the whole question of education in Korea large attention at your annual meeting, and we shall look

with keen interest for the report of your conclusions. We deeply appreciate the solemnity of the considerations that are involved and the peculiar difficulties and delicacies which inhere in some of them. We do not fail to pray that God may give you all needful guidance.

With warm regards to all,

Sincerely yours,

Enc. 2
B/GMS

MINUTES JOINT COMMITTEE—JUNE 27, 1912

EXTRACTS

(IV.) RESOLUTIONS 1, 2, 3
Pursuant to the call of the representatives of the Presbyterian Board, the following convened at 156 Fifth Avenue, New York, June 27th, 1912. Present: Secretaries Frank Mason North and William S. Oldham of the Methodist Episcopal Board; Secretaries Robert E. Speer and Arthur J. Brown of the Presbyterian Board; the Rev. Dr. John F. Goucher and Rev. Dr. W. I. Chamberlain and Dr. T. H. P. Sailer of the Special Committee on Education in the Far East, appointed by the Continuation Committee; Bishop M. C. Harris and Rev. Dr. William Arthur Noble and the Rev. Dr. George Heber Jones of the Korea Mission of the Methodist Episcopal Board, and the Rev. Dr. Horace C. Underwood of the Korea Mission of the Presbyterian Board.

After discussion, during which Dr. Underwood stated that there were already sixteen High Schools or Academies in Korea, the following resolutions were adopted as the sense of the Conference:

First: That the question of Christian education in Korea is of vital and immediate importance, and that it calls for the most earnest thought and prayer, and for prompt action on the part of the Boards and missionaries concerned. (Unanimously carried.)

Second: That instead of developing several denominational colleges with consequent duplication of effort, the Boards having work in Korea should concentrate on one Union Christian College for the whole country, the location of the College to be determined by the co-operating Boards after the judgment of the majority of the missionaries shall have been ascertained. (Carried, Bishop Harris and Dr. Underwood dissenting.)

Third: That if Pyeng Yang shall be decided upon as the location for the Union College, the college already started there by the Methodists and Presbyterians should be developed into the proposed Union College on a larger scale, but that if Seoul should be decided on as the location, the present institution in Pyeng Yang should be made a Middle School auxiliary to the College in Seoul. (Carried, Dr. Underwood dissenting.)

It was voted to adjourn to meet at the call of Dr. Brown. Closed with prayer.

(V.) MINUTES OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE—JULY 24, 1912

EXTRACTS

Minutes of the Second Preliminary Conference on Higher Education in Korea, July 24, 1912, at the Aldine Club, Fifth Avenue and 23d Street, New York.

Present: Secretaries Frank Mason North of the Methodist Episcopal Board; Robert E. Speer and Arthur J. Brown of the Presbyterian Board; and Rev. William Arthur Noble of the Korean Mission of Methodist Episcopal Board; Dr. R. A. Hardie of the Korea Mission of the Methodist Episcopal Church South; the Rev. Dr. Horace G. Underwood of the Korea Mission of the Presbyterian Board.

Bishop Harris was chosen temporary chairman and Dr. Brown Secretary. Prayer was offered by Dr. Underwood.

The Minutes of the last meeting, June 27th, were read and approved.

It was voted that the Joint Committee in America appointed by the co-operating Boards should be understood as constituted to deal with questions affecting union educational work of any and every kind in Korea which may require co-operating consultation and action in America, and that the co-operating Boards should be asked to endorse this interpretation. It was voted to call a meeting in the Fall for the formal organization of the

Joint Committee, the actions of the preliminary conference of June 27th and July 24th to be presented to that Committee for its ratification, after which they will be presented in the form adopted by the Joint Committee to the co-operating Boards for their approval.
Closed with prayer.

(VI.) MISSION MINUTES, 1912—P. 51-53
SUBJECT: COLLEGE QUESTION

Minutes and reports of the twenty-eighth Annual Meeting of the Korea Mission of 1912.

Reports of Educational Committee:—The Educational Committee reported on Sec. 22, requesting the Mission to discuss three propositions regarding College work in Korea. It is as follows: Sec. 22.—In view of the Board's correspondence of Aug. 8th (Board Letter 102, Appendix III.), relative to educational work in Korea, the Educational Committee feels unable to make definite recommendation, but requests the Mission to discuss the following three propositions, take a ballot on the same and report this to the Board as the opinion of the Mission:

- 1. Two Colleges for Korea located respectively at Seoul and Pyeng Yang.
- 2. One College for Korea located at Pyeng Yang.
- 3. One College for Korea located at Seoul.

It was moved and seconded that it be the sense of this Mission that there be but one College for Korea.

Mr. Swallen then presented the following resolution as a substitute, which was seconded. After beginning discussion, a motion was made and carried to lay on the table. It is as follows:

"Resolved that the College in Pyeng Yang be made the one College for all Korea until such time as, in the judgment of the Mission, the Pyeng Yang College is insufficient to meet the needs of all Korea."

Mr. Swallen's resolution, presented yesterday, which was, in fact, a substitute motion, namely, "That the College in Pyeng Yang be made the one College for all Korea until such time as, in the judgment of the Mission, the Pyeng Yang College is insufficient to meet the needs of all Korea," was withdrawn, Mr. Hoffman, who had seconded it, consenting and there being no objections offered to the same.

This having been withdrawn, the original motion, "that it be the sense of this Mission that there be but one College for Korea," being before the Mission, a substitute motion was made and seconded, namely, "that we approve a College in Seoul."

College Question:—The motion under discussion by the Mission at the close of the morning session, namely, "That we approve a College in Seoul," was again discussed. After an hour's discussion, the vote was taken as follows: Aff. 6; Neg. 36.

One College in Korea:—The substitute having been lost, the original motion was amended and carried as follows, "That it be the sense of this Mission that for the present there be but one College in Korea." It was moved and carried that there be but one College in Korea and that it be in Pyeng Yang. It was carried on division with six negative votes, the number of the affirmative not being called for.

Union College Work:—A motion was made and carried that our Mission ask all Evangelical Missions to unite with us in union College work at Pyeng Yang.

(VII.) BOARD LETTER NO. 145, APRIL 15, 1913
UNION CHRISTIAN COLLEGE IN KOREA

April 15, 1913.

To the Korea Mission,
Dear Friends:

Board letter No. 120 of December 26th, 1912, gave the action of the Board of December 16th on the actions recorded on pp. 51-52, 53, 57, and 83 of the Minutes of your last Annual Meeting on the College question and stated that, "In view, however, of the difference of opinion between the Presbyterian and Methodist Missions as to whether this one College should be located in Pyeng Yang or Seoul, the Board deferred action on the question of loca-

tion pending consideration of location by the Joint Committee in America on Education in Korea, which was requested to submit a recommendation on this subject."

Long and careful consideration has been given to the questions involved in the location of the proposed Union College in Korea. Perhaps the delay has appeared trying to you, but we are sure that you will feel that a question which has agitated the missionaries on the field for several years and on which they have not yet been able to agree could not have been and should not have been hastily decided at this end of the line. It had to be passed upon first by the Joint Committee representing the co-operating Boards. As the members of this Committee are widely scattered, this part of the work of the Committee itself called not only for thoughtful study, but time. When the Committee had agreed upon its report, that report had to be submitted to the Boards for their action, and the Boards hold their meetings at different times. At last we have been notified of the official action of all the six Boards concerned and we therefore now enclose the Report of the Joint Committee.

I can personally understand, my dear friends, how disappointing this report will be to many of you. You are aware that I have been in favor of Pyeng Yang. Indeed, the expression of my judgment on page 190 of my printed "Report On a Second Visit to China, Japan and Korea, 1909," called forth some of the sharpest criticisms from Korea missionaries that I have ever received on any subject. You are also aware that in subsequent correspondence I defended the position that I then took and that I have done everything in my power both in Mission and personal letter to support the position of our own Mission. The situation, however, changed in two important particulars.

The first was the definite emergence of the proposal for a Union College representing all the Missions in Korea. You will recall that in Board letters of November 14, 1910, and February 24, 1911, I specifically stated that if this question should arise it would have to be considered on its merits at the time.

The second was the discovery that a majority of the co-operating Boards could not be centered upon Pyeng Yang. We were therefore confronted in our own Board by the necessity of agreeing to go to Seoul or of abandoning altogether the idea of one Union College and of having a Presbyterian College in Pyeng Yang and a Methodist College in Seoul. It became absolutely clear, for reasons which I have explained in former correspondence, that our Board believes that one Union College is more important than the question of location, and that a Presbyterian College in Pyeng Yang could not command the support which would be absolutely essential to any reasonable hope for its success.

The arguments for and against Seoul and Pyeng Yang, which are stated in the Joint Committee's Report, were the ones that were brought out in the various conferences and discussions on the subject. Some of us were startled by the comparative strength of the argument for Seoul. You will note, however, that care has been taken to include in the Joint Committee's Report the arguments for Pyeng Yang which have been urged in your correspondence. We have received a very large number of letters from Korea strongly presenting the arguments for Pyeng Yang. One missionary wrote that he feared that the advocates of Seoul were bringing pressure to bear on our Board. I replied that we had received a dozen letters for Pyeng Yang where we had received one for Seoul. The Rev. Dr. James E. Adams, under date of Jan. 29th, sent one of the strongest arguments for Pyeng Yang that I have ever read, and in order that it might have its full effect, I sent copies of his letter to all the members of the Joint Committee. When the matter came before our own Board, I explained that the report would not be pleasing to you and I summarized your position as best I could. The Rev. Dr. John Fox then took the floor and made an able speech in favor of Pyeng Yang. If you could have heard Dr. Fox I think you would have felt that he admirably stated your views. When the vote was taken, however, he was the only one who voted for Pyeng Yang, the vote being seventeen to one in favor of the Joint Committee's Report. I have since collected the views of the absent members and find that the vote of the entire membership of the Board is twenty-one for the Joint Committee's recommendations and one against them, although one of the majority qualified his vote by the

of that the time will yet come when two colleges will be needed and t... should not do anything now which would make it impossible to resume College work in Pyeng Yang. He said that his present vote, however, was for the report.

I state these things, dear friends, in order that you may know that care was taken to see that your views were understood both by the Joint Committee of the Boards and by our own Board.

You will note, however, that the Joint Committee's Report and the actions of the Board upon it do not finally settle the matter, as the report specifically provides that the missionaries in Korea shall have another opportunity to pass upon the whole question. It is perhaps but just that I should say to you, as your Secretary, that I caused this referendum to be included and that, apart from Dr. Fox, to whom I have referred, the only real opposition in our Board to the Joint Committee's Report was to this referendum, many feeling that in view of the long controversy and the divided opinions on the field, it would be better for the Boards to decide the matter at once out of hand and put an end to the controversy. I urged, however, the considerations stated at the top of page ten of the Joint Committee's report, stating that some letters indicated a belief that a large majority of the missionaries were for Pyeng Yang and that it would be only fair to give you an opportunity to prove it. As many of you have expressed confidence that the great body of missionary opinion in Korea is in favor of Pyeng Yang, you now have a chance to demonstrate the accuracy of your opinion, and if you can do so the whole question will be reopened here in the light of that fact.

Some at this end of the line are rather puzzled by the pleas in a number of letters from members of the Mission not to destroy the educational work at Pyeng Yang. It seems odd that anyone should imagine that moving the College department to another city a comparatively short distance away should be considered as destroying it. Moving the Shantung Christian College from Tung-chou to Waihsien did not destroy it but rather improved it, and moving it again, as has now been decided upon, is not interpreted by anyone as destroying it, but rather as planting it where it will grow to better advantage. Moreover, the Academy and Theological Seminary at Pyeng Yang which form by far the largest part of the educational work there will remain as before. The Board has no idea whatever of "destroying the work at Pyeng Yang," and it is at a loss to understand how anyone could have gotten such an impression.

I could not easily tell you, my dear friends, how much anxious thought has been given to the whole matter. There has been no disposition to take the matter out of the hands of the missionaries. Indeed, the reverse has been true. If the workers on the field had decided it, I believe that all here would gladly have acquiesced. But when the missionaries came to a deadlock, there was no alternative but for the Boards to take up the matter. vote on the referendum with a large-hearted and thoroughly Christian spirit. Knowing you as I do, I venture to believe that you will now go into the Whatever the result, some must be disappointed, and these disappointed ones, whoever they may ultimately prove to be, will have an excellent opportunity to exemplify one of the best graces of the Christian life. The ark of the Lord is not going to be imperilled because followers of the Lord, who are as devoted as we are, believe that one site for a College is better than another. Dissension, however, will imperil that ark.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) ARTHUR J. BROWN.

(VIII.) LETTER BY REV. A. J. BROWN, D.D., TO REV. S. A. MOFFETT, D.D., CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND CORRESPONDING SECRETARY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN MISSION—JULY 25, 1913

Dr. Samuel A. Moffett,
Madison, Ind.
My dear Dr. Moffett:

July 25, 1913.

I think of our conference last Tuesday, the 22nd, with mingled gratification and regret. There were so many anxieties that had to be discussed that there was little opportunity for conference upon those pleasanter subjects

which were also in our hearts and concerning which we would have been glad to speak. It seemed too bad that the only day that you could spend in New York during this hurried trip to America had to be so largely given up to perplexing problems, rather than to the joys of congenial fellowship.

And I am not sure even now that we succeeded in making our position clear; for you of course understood that I was discussing the questions at issue in a representative capacity, knowing the position of others as well as my own, and feeling under special obligation to speak of the things that had led Mr. Severance to ask that the conference be arranged for. You and I appeared to be speaking with different objects in mind and therefore there was special danger that we might misunderstand one another. You were arguing for Pyeng Yang as the location of the College, and perhaps you thought that I was arguing for Seoul. I had, however, no such thought. I was arguing for harmony among the missionaries in Korea, for a frank referendum to them of questions on which they are fairly entitled to an opinion, and for loyal acceptance of the result when known. We are concerned here by an apparent disposition on the part of some members of our own Mission, on both sides of this controversy, not to consider the College location question in that way, but to discuss it with an undue intensity of feeling and in language which seems to portend a refusal to accept an adverse decision of the majority if it shall be contrary to their judgment; or, if not a refusal, at least a lack of co-operation which would be fatal to the enterprise and seriously harmful in other directions.

We are aware that the Mission voted to put union and location together as inseparable, as you explained and as some letters had emphasized. But the Boards and their Joint Committee feel that a distinction should be observed between them; that one of six parties to a union should not prejudge a question which from the nature of the case calls for joint action; that if we are going into a union at all, we should go with a willingness to discuss such a question as location with those who have as much right to an opinion on it as we have, and feeling that the way is clear to decide the issue on the merits of the case. All whom I have heard express a judgment in this country are emphatic in their conviction that the question of a union Christian College for Korea is very much larger than the question of location, and that any place that the missionaries in Korea may decide upon would be far better for the cause of Christ than no college. The Boards are not forcing the question of location in favor of any one station. I doubt whether they or the Joint Committee would have said anything officially on the subject if the Missions themselves had not compelled them to do so. And even then, the Joint Committee and the Boards expressed only a tentative opinion subject to another vote on the field. The missionaries themselves therefore have a chance to put the College where they want it.

And when I say missionaries, I, of course, mean the whole body of missionaries in Korea. Our Mission voted to go into a Union College, and asked the Board to approve its doing so. Having gone into a union, we should carry into it the union spirit—an open mind, a willingness to abide by majority votes on questions which a majority alone can decide, a readiness to accept not only our full share of responsibility but also our full share of risk. We cannot carry one Mission as a distinct entity into a union of six Missions and Boards, and then repudiate union if the majority of those with whom we have voluntarily associated ourselves does not coincide with a majority in our particular Mission. Union means that mission and board lines are obliterated for the purpose of the union and that all concerned become one common body. Of course, this would not be true if we were dealing with bad men or a worldly object, but this is a union among Christian men of presumably equal intelligence and equal devotion to the cause of Christ.

To say, as some of our missionaries have said, that it is the will of God that the Union College should be in Pyeng Yang, is to beg the question. The will of God is precisely what we are trying to ascertain by prayer and study and consultation with our brethren. When that consultation is in progress, is it fair for the advocates of one side to claim in advance that their position alone represents God, and thus imply that equally devoted Christian brethren are, however unconsciously, fighting against God?

We did not ask you to come to New York for conference because we

de. I'd you particularly responsible for the unfortunate situation in the Mission. I fear from what you said that you may have gotten that impression. I think one member of the Board did have some misgivings on this subject; but everyone else whom I have heard express an opinion recognizes the fact that the responsibility must be divided between several men on both sides. You were called upon because you were the only one of these men on either side that is now in America available for conference; and as you are the official head of the Mission and the leader of its dominant party, it was natural for us to appeal to you to use your very great influence to bring about a state of mind more in accord with the spirit of union and co-operation among the various bodies of missionaries. If Dr. Underwood had been in this country instead of you, he would have been invited to a conference in precisely the same way, and I should have urged him to use his influence to acquiesce in a majority vote for Pyeng Yang if given, just as I urged you to use your influence to acquiesce in a majority vote for Seoul if it should be given. We thoroughly understand that your leadership in the Mission is in no sense whatever the result of your planning, but that it is solely due to the confidence of your fellow workers in your wisdom, devotion and experience. That confidence I strongly share. Indeed, I seriously thought at one time of publicly advising the Mission to elect you to your present position, and I refrained only because I became sure that the Mission would in due time elect you anyway, and that it would be better to have it come about in that way. But we who read the letters which come from all parts of Korea have ground for real distress as we note the polemic spirit which some of them indicate—a certain intolerance of mind, an apparent inability to realize that fellow-missionaries may differ with them and yet possibly be guided by the spirit of God as well as themselves. I need not tell you, of all men, what formidable problems and anxieties the whole cause of Christ now faces in Korea—anxieties in some cases created and in other cases intensified by an intruding tide of worldliness and materialism, the strain that had developed between the missionaries and the Japanese authorities, the special problems that grow out of the very success of the work, and, in general, the new conditions which are bringing the Korean Church and the missionaries to a severer testing than they have yet known. Surely at such a time as this we all need to stand together in loving faith and effort and prayer, and it would be most lamentable if at this period of extraordinary emergency, the Adversary of Souls were to sow the seeds of distrust and disunion among the very Christian workers whom we—and surely we may say whom God—is depending upon to meet the new conditions aright.

And thus you see, my dear Dr. Moffett, it is neither Seoul nor Pyeng Yang that we are now thinking of. We shall undoubtedly think of one or the other when the vote of the missionaries is known, as it doubtless will be in the near future; and we must then consider what the Joint Committee and the Boards ought to do. But it is certain that, whichever way the majority goes, there will be a large minority; and whether that minority, either for Seoul or Pyeng Yang, will accept the result in a Christian spirit and throw itself with a whole-hearted devotion into the common cause—that is the question which is troubling us and which the correspondence from Korea, as well as some things that you yourself said the other day, give us some cause for being troubled about. Strong men on both sides have become so deeply stirred that strife will be engendered unless earnest effort is made to avert it.

It is very hard, in one sense, to write in this way to you, my dear Doctor; and yet in another sense it is easy. I regard you as one of my closest friends and most trusted advisers on the foreign field. I have felt very closely drawn to you, and I am eager to have our relations become those of still closer fellowship. It is, therefore, very hard for me, as the Secretary for Korea, to be obliged to discuss such anxieties. And yet the very fact that I do trust you and love you so much makes it easier to talk and to write with entire freedom, assured that we know one another so well that neither of us need to be in the least afraid to speak frankly. I shall, therefore, not only expect, but desire, that you will reply with entire unreserve, and that not only now but at any future time, you will unhesitatingly tell me when and where you think that we are wrong.

We are grateful to you for taking the time and the trouble to make the long, hot and dusty journey to New York at this season. May God bless you as you return to your great work! You have a great opportunity, and I lovingly pray that our Father in Heaven may give you abundant grace for it. And so I subscribe myself as always, and never more than now,

Affectionately yours,
(Signed) ARTHUR J. BROWN.

(IX.) LETTER FROM REV. J. E. ADAMS, D.D., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE SENATE OF THE EDUCATIONAL FEDERATION OF KOREA MISSIONS, TO REV. A. J. BROWN, D.D., CHAIRMAN OF JOINT HOLDING COMMITTEE—AUG. 13, 1913

August 13, 1913.

Rev. A. J. Brown, D.D.,
Chairman of Boards' Joint Com. on Educa. in Korea.
My dear Dr. Brown:

After the reference of the College Location Question to your Joint Committee by the Educational Senate, the Senate decided to take a popular vote on the question in the Missionary body of the six federated missions. The question voted upon was as follows, and was limited to male Missionaries on the field, with a residence here of not less than one year:

"As between Seoul and Pyeng Yang, where do YOU personally think that a college will best secure for the entire country those ends which as Missionary workers we seek in collegiate education?"

There were 128 eligible voters. Of these 109 voted; of these 38 voted in favor of Seoul and 71 in favor of Pyeng Yang.

About the time this vote was completed, the communication from your Committee, recommending the Seoul location, giving your reasons for the same, and making a referendum to the missionary body by means of a popular vote with your letter before the voter, was received. The Senate held another meeting, and in deference to your request, and those favoring the Seoul location, directed that another vote be taken. Your request indicated that you wished a vote of the entire voting body of the several Missions. There was some discussion upon this point, but, as I remember, the Senate decided unanimously to adhere to the former limitation. The basis of voting in the several missions varied to such an extent that uniformity of representation would not have been possible to secure, and it was also generally thought that the basis on which the former vote had been taken was, after all, the one which would give the most reliable, and so most satisfactory, returns. It was therefore limited to male missionaries on the field, of a residence of not less than one year, and the polls to be kept open but one month from the time the voting forms were sent out. The wording was as follows:

I. "On the hypothesis of one arts College for the entire country, as between Seoul and Pyeng Yang, where do YOU personally think that a College will best secure for the entire country those ends which as Missionary workers we seek in Missionary education?"

II. "Do you believe in two Colleges rather than one only at Pyeng Yang?"

III. "Do you believe in two Colleges rather than one only at Seoul?"
It was felt necessary in the Senate that the second and third questions should be added. When the Senate referred the matter to your Committee, it was distinctly on the basis that either location was a perfectly possible alternative to all parties in the reference. A reference was possible only on this basis, and this question alone was referred. We since have had reason to think that another alternative, not referred by us to your Committee, entered into your Committee's consideration, and formed no unimportant factor in the determining of your conclusions. This was the alternative of two Colleges. It was felt, therefore, that if there was any considerable portion of the Missionary body holding this position, it was due to them, and to us, the Senate, as the field organization entrusted with common interests of the entire missionary body, and to your Committee, that the facts in the case should be made definite.

I herewith append a copy of the tally sheet of the vote. I was instructed by the Senate to tabulate the returns in such way as to give you the information of the vote in as evident a form as possible.

This vote was taken at a time of year when many of the eligible voters might be not easily accessible. Some who voted before have gone on furlough

and were ruled out. There were 121 voters eligible according to the voting conditions. Exactly 100 voted. Of these 37 voted for Seoul. The remainder voted for Pyeng Yang. I have not received the votes of 21. I have learned that some voters from among these on both sides never received the voting form. Some have said that they received it and returned their vote at once, but I never received it. Both, doubtless, have been due to inefficient mail service. I have no means of knowing what their votes would be, but in the previous vote, of which I have spoken, of these 21 there were three who voted for Seoul, eight who voted for Pyeng Yang, and ten who did not vote either time. You can use your discretion about these. The official vote is the one given above. Tabulated according to Missions, it stands as follows:

(1) Eligible Missions Voters	(2) No. Voting	(3) Voting for Seoul	(4) Voting for P. Y.	(5) II & III Both Neg.	(6) II & III Both Aff.	(7) II Aff. III Neg.	(8) II Neg. III Aff.	(9) II & III De- cline	
M. E.	22	20	19	1	11	0	1	0	8
M. E. S. ...	14	10	8	2	3	2	0	1	4
C. P.	10	6	3	3	6	0	0	0	0
N. P.	44	40	5	35	14	5	1	17	2
S. P.	22	17	1	16	9	0	0	7	1
A. P.	9	7	1	6	3	0	0	4	0
Totals	121	100	37	63	46	7	2	29	15

It will be seen from this that out of the 100 voters there was a majority of 63 to 37 favoring the Pyeng Yang location, on the referendum of the question which your Committee made to the Missionary body. Of these 46 stood for one College as more important than location; 7 favored two Colleges under any circumstances; 2, while favoring one College at Seoul believed in two rather than one only at Pyeng Yang; 29 while believing in one College at Pyeng Yang stood for two rather than one only at Seoul; and 15 declined to define their position upon the two College alternative. The relation of the various positions to the membership of the different Missions may be seen by a glance at the table. The weight of the vote for Seoul, the bulk of the vote one may say, is in the two Methodist Missions, although half of those so voting say they put one College ahead of the question of location, and but one favors two Colleges rather than one only at Pyeng Yang, it is in these two Missions that 12 out of the 15 so voting, decline to define their position on this point. The votes of the Canadian Mission are equally divided, and are unanimous for one College. The weight of the vote for Pyeng Yang is in the three other Presbyterian Missions, and is there almost unanimous, 57 to 7; something less than one-half put the desirability of one College ahead of the question of location; 29 stand for two Colleges rather than only at Seoul; and but 3 have failed to define their position on this point.

It will be not only of interest, but of profit, to your Committee to know how this vote is distributed, geographically, in the distribution of Mission work, over the country. The Missionary work of the country naturally divides itself into three sections geographically, South, Central, North. Politically, also, it divides itself this way, and socially. The conformation of the country makes it easy. Politically Seoul is the center of the country. It is also the center of what we term the central section. Pyeng Yang is in the southern part of what we term the Northern section, although geographically it is about the same distance from the extreme northern limit that it is from the extreme southern limit of the country. Tabulated geographically the vote stands as follows:

VOTE ON COLLEGE

	Population	No. Christians	Seoul	P. Y.
Southern Section				
S. P. Mission.....		15,268	1	16
N. P. Mission.....		17,847	2	10
A. P. Mission.....		7,170	1	6
Total	5,459,231	40,285	4	32

Central Section

M. E. Mission.....	32,673	13	0
M. E. S. Mission.....	6,817	7	3
N. P. Mission.....	10,075	3	5
Total	49,565	23	8
Northern Section			
M. E. Mission.....	15,695	6	1
M. E. S. Mission.....	2,242	1	0
N. P. Mission.....	68,566	0	20
C. P. Mission.....	9,588	3	3
Total	96,091	10	24

You will see from the above tabulation that the strength of the vote for the Seoul location is in the Central Section—Seoul itself and the territory immediately tributary to it. Outside of this area the voters of the entire country, whether South or North, stand for the Pyeng Yang location in a ratio of 4 to 1 (56 to 14), and it is these sections that hold the population (9,512,041 to 3,573,364) and the Christian constituency (136,376 to 49,565) in a ratio of practically 3 to 1 as compared with the Central Section. In the Central Section itself, those voters opposed to the location of the institution there are in a proportion of 1 to 3 (8 to 23), as compared with those favoring it.

It will also be of profit to your Committee to have before you the tabulation of the vote relative to the mission interests of the country, as held by the respective Missions, and brought by them to the proposed pool of the union work. This is shown in the table below. The statistics for each Mission, with the exception of those for population, are taken from their published reports. They are divided and assigned to see Seoul or Pyeng Yang in the ratio of the vote of that Mission's members. Your Committee will be concerned only with the final column.

Mission	M. E.	M. E. S.	C. P.	N. P.	S. P.	A. P.	Totals
College Vote	20	9	8	40	17	7	100
Seoul	19	8	3	5	1	1	37
Pyeng Yang	1	2	5	35	16	6	68
Ratio of Vote							
Seoul	19	4	1	1	1	1	
Pyeng Yang	1	1	1	7	16	6	
Population ... 2,600,000	1,000,000	1,200,000	4,785,000	2,291,000	1,000,000		
Seoul	2,260,000	800,000	698,125	134,763	142,857	3,526,747	30.2%
Pyeng Yang..	125,000	200,000	4,186,875	2,166,235	857,143	8,135,263	68.8%
No. of Churches..	444	291	310	1,104	332	154	
Seoul	423	233	133	138	20	22	
Pyeng Yang..	22	58	163	966	312	132	991
Communicants	10,373	6,912	2,260	39,473	7,173	1,792	1,645
Seoul	9,854	5,530	2,280	4,934	422	233	22,125
Pyeng Yang..	519	1,382	1,130	34,641	6,751	1,527	46,850
Boys' Primary Schools	131	46	36	453	42	10	
Seoul	125.5	37	18	66.6	2.6	1.4	241
Pyeng Yang..	6.6	9	18	396.4	39.6	3.8	478
Male Scholars..	4,239	357	929	7,746	633	179	
Seoul	4,027	686	464	967	37	26	6,207
Pyeng Yang..	212	171	464	6,779	598	153	3,377
Academy Stud'ts	206	222	155	987	262	20	
Seoul	196	178	77	123	15	3	592
Pyeng Yang..	10	44	77	864	247	17	1,269

The last column shows that those endorsing the Seoul location represent 30.2% of the population as against 68.8% for Pyeng Yang; they represent 32.6% of the total communicant membership of the Church, as against 67.4% for Pyeng Yang; 38.5% of the over 700 boys' primary schools of the country as against 66.5%; something less than 42.6% of the scholars in those schools, as against 57.4%; and 32% of the academy students of the country as against 68%.

If calculated on the basis of Missions instead of an individual vote the ratios are somewhat more unfavorable to Seoul.

We have appreciated the strong position taken by your Committee on the point of hut one institution, we thoroughly agree with you that the question is one that ought to be settled by the voice of the missionary body on the field. We have appreciated greatly the course you have pursued in seeking to ascertain this point and if clear, making it determinative. It appears from this vote, that in answer to your Committee's referendum on the question of the location of one union college for the country, the missionary body, by a very large majority (whether of votes polled, geographical distribution, or vested interests brought to the union) states its position as that of endorsing the Pyeng Yang location.

This completes the report which I was instructed by the Senate to prepare and forward to your Committee, immediately on the closing of the poll.

The cheerful concession, and acquiescence in, the principle of majority rule is so fundamental and so essential to the success of any co-operative undertaking; the fact that the present vote would seem so decisive on this point; and the further fact that of the 37 voting for Seoul 29 either failed to express themselves on this point, definitely stated that they believed in one College wherever located, encourages me to think that the suggestion made in your Committee's letter is a feasible one, and that "an effort at compromise, led by the Educational Senate, may be successful." To this end I am writing the members of the Senate, proposing that a statement of the results of the vote be prepared and sent to the members of the minority by the Senate, and that an appeal be made to them, in view of the results of the vote, to concede the will of the majority. I hope shortly to be able to write you favorably of the result. Believe me, with every prayer for the guidance of your Committee,

Yours in the Service of the King,
(Signed) JAS. E. ADAMS.

(X.) LETTER FROM REV. A. J. BROWN, D.D., TO REV. J. E. ADAMS,
D.D.—SEPT. 15, 1913.

Sept. 15, 1913.

The Rev. James E. Adams, D.D.,
Taiku, Chosen. (Korea.)

My dear Dr. Adams:

I have received your letter of August 13th, addressed to me as Chairman of the Joint Committee of the Boards on Education in Korea, communicating the result of the vote which was taken at the request of our Committee's report. You will understand our very deep interest in it. As far as I am personally concerned, this vote of the missionaries settles the question of location and I shall cast my own vote in accordance with it. A very serious question remains, however, as to whether the minority, which you report as constituting one-third of the total vote, is willing to acquiesce in the ways indicated in the closing paragraph of your letter. It will be very hard to make much headway in this country in securing support for a College if the College is to be opposed by one-third of the Missionaries, and there would, also, be difficulties on the field. The development of a College is a hard enough proposition even when it has the full support of the Missionary body upon whose good will it so largely depends. I am, therefore, very much gratified by your statement that you have sent an appeal to the minority "in view of the result of the vote to concede the will of the majority" and that you hope shortly to be able to write me favorably of the result. Knowing the situation at this end of the line as I do, I think it will be the part of wisdom for me to defer the question of calling a meeting of our Joint Committee and presenting the matter to the Boards until I have your report on this question, otherwise, I fear that a decision might be reached that, while the vote on the field shows that the Union College, when the way is clear to proceed, should be in Pyeng Yang, the state of feeling among the Missionaries is such as to make it inexpedient to proceed with the matter at present. If you could read all the letters that have come to me on the subject you would understand the danger of this action, for these letters, I am

sorry to say, indicate so much heat as to justify the fear that considerable feeling has been developed. I hope to hear from you soon and will act promptly as soon as I do.

With warm regards, I remain

Cordially yours,
(Signed) ARTHUR J. BROWN.

(XI.) LETTER FROM REV. J. E. ADAMS, D.D., TO REV. A. J. BROWN,
D.D.—SEPT. 20, 1913.

September 20, 1913.

Rev. A. J. Brown, D.D.,
Chairman Boards' Joint Com. for Education in Korea.
My dear Dr. Brown:

I am in receipt of your letter of the 15th ult., acknowledging the receipt of the field vote on college location, and your letter was read at the recent meeting of the Senate, with the other records of the vote. In your letter you spoke of being gratified at my plan of making an appeal to the minority, and that you would delay calling a meeting of the Joint Committee until you had heard of the result. You have, of course, long since received my letter informing you of the failure to get unanimity in the Senate authorizing such an appeal.

At this meeting of the Senate those of the minority opposing the appeal, wished their position to be understood as not one of opposing majority rule, or one of proposed opposition to a Joint Committee decision to locate in Pyeng Yang. They did not interpret the Joint Committee decision as making the referendum to the missionary body final; that the decision became final only after it had again passed through the Joint Committee. They therefore opposed an appeal to the minority as a prejudging of the question at that time, though they were quite prepared to loyally accept any decision which the Joint Committee might make.

Of course I am not in a position to know, but I am inclined to think that you have perhaps magnified the strenuous opposition of some as representing that of the entire minority. There are some in the city of Seoul who probably will never be reconciled to having the College in Pyeng Yang nor cease to agitate if a decision contrary to their way of thinking is made. These are, however, relatively few, the bulk of the minority do not stand with them, and it is scarcely proper that the wheels of the Lord's chariot should be made to drag on account of their strenuous opposition.

My statement that they do not represent the bulk of the minority will be borne out, I think, if you will examine the tally sheet of the vote. The object of the last two questions in the vote was to bring out the position of both majority and minority voters on this point. You will observe that out of the minority of 37 voters, 19, one more than half, have distinctly declared themselves as putting the desirability of one College above a question of location, and that if it is located at Pyeng Yang, they will not favor a second college in Seoul. At the worst, this leaves but 18; 12 have not recorded themselves on the subject, and among these are several whom I know are not such opponents as you speak of. Assume, however, that two-thirds are of that kind. Among the remaining six of the eighteen, two voted for two Colleges rather than one only in Pyeng Yang; four voted for two under any circumstances. Of these last four, two are ardent and influential advocates of the Seoul location—two are not.

To sum up the analysis then, out of this eighteen, eight from the twelve, the two voting for a second college rather than one only in Pyeng Yang, and two voting for two Colleges, or a total of twelve might be fairly estimated as making the body of difficulty. At the very worst (for we must count the vote an honest expression of opinion) it could not be more than eighteen. In reality it is considerably less than that.

There is, however, a factor, concerning which I am not fully informed but of the reality of which I am well convinced, and which I consider militates against the union project much more than the above, and more than any field condition. It is the unwillingness of the Methodist Board to consider the Pyeng Yang location. You yourself very frankly spoke of this in your letter to the Mission. Dr. John F. Goucher, who is out here and attended the late Senate meeting, told me privately of the same thing and

with comparative positiveness. When questioned upon it in the Senate, while not making so flat-footed a statement, he gave it as his opinion, from an intimate knowledge of their Secretaries' position, that they could not consider the Pyeng Yang location. In arguing the Seoul location before the Senate, he also based his remarks upon the fact that the proceeds of the sale of certain Methodist Board properties here in Seoul could be available for a Seoul institution but not for one in Pyeng Yang, and most of his remarks were based on the above assumption.

If this is the case, I think that simple honesty and justice to the missionary body and to all parties concerned in the question alike demand that it should be known, and publicly and officially stated. Otherwise referendums and negotiations are simply of form and not of fact, and are so much valuable strength and time but illy spent.

I feel that I am not out of place in speaking thus freely, in that the missionary body, which the Senate, and I as its executive officer represent, has now spoken decisively on the subject.

Believe me,

Yours in the Service,
(Signed) JAS. E. ADAMS.

(XII.) BOARD LETTER NO. 177 October 21, 1913.

In Re Union College Location Question

To the Korea Mission.
Dear Friends:

I append a copy of a communication, which as Chairman of the Joint Committee on Education in Korea I have sent to the Rev. James E. Adams, General Secretary of the Senate of the Educational Federation of Christian Missions in Korea, regarding the pending College question:

October 20, 1913.

The Rev. James E. Adams, D.D., Genl. Sec.,
Federation of Christian Missions, Korea.
My dear Dr. Adams:

The Joint Committee on Education in Korea held a meeting in New York Oct. 9th and considered your communications June 28th, Aug. 13th, 21st and 28th, and their enclosures regarding the votes of the missionaries in Korea on the College Location Question. Your cable of Oct. 8th arrived during the Committee meeting. Unfortunately only three members of the Committee were able to be present as the month of October is an exceedingly difficult month for a committee meeting, on account of the many meetings of Synods and Conferences, and the membership of the Committee is, as you know, scattered through a number of widely separated cities. There were letters, however, from three of the absentees and another was represented by a colleague who was present.

After long and careful consideration it was agreed that the questions involved are of such magnitude and difficulty, including, as they do, not only a wide difference of opinion among the missionaries, but virtually a difference between them as denominations, Methodists and Presbyterians, though with some exceptions being on opposite sides, that it would be inexpedient for the Joint Committee to take final action until the questions can be more carefully studied and a fuller meeting of the Committee can be held. It was, therefore, voted to adjourn until the Annual Meeting of the Foreign Missions Conference of North America at Garden City, New York, January 13th-14th, as it is expected that all the members of the Committee will be present at that Conference.

I can therefore send at this time merely an acknowledgment of your official communications and this tentative report. It is evident that some of the Boards feel that very serious difficulties are involved, and members who reside so far apart as New York, Nashville, Tennessee, and Toronto, Canada, cannot be assembled before the Annual Conference referred to. It is desirable also that there should be time to exchange letters with the members of the Committee who reside in Australia.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) ARTHUR J. BROWN.

In this connection I wish to acknowledge in behalf of our own Board the receipt of a communication dated September 4th and signed by Samuel

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A. Moffett, James E. Adams, Norman C. Whittemore, Wm. B. Hunt, A. G. Welborn, A. M. Sharrocks, and Chas. Allen Clarke. This communication has been carefully read by the members of our Executive Council, two of whom, Dr. Speer and myself, are members of the Joint Committee. Inasmuch as our Board will not be prepared to take up the question until it has received the report of the Joint Committee, which cannot be presented until January for reasons explained in my letter to Dr. Adams, I can only at this time acknowledge the receipt of the communication and assure you that the whole matter will have fresh and careful consideration when Joint Committee is prepared to present its report.

You will appreciate the weight which some of us cordially give to your judgment and to the majority vote in favor of Pyeng Yang, but there are members of the Committee, who represent important interests, who remind us that on page 10 of the communication of the Joint Committee, dated Feb. 25th, and addressed to the "Boards having work in Korea," a copy of which was sent to you with Board Letter 145 of April 15th, there appeared a sentence which was passed upon by all the Boards. "If a majority vote shall be for Seoul it shall be deemed a final settlement of the question and that prompt effort be made to secure funds for the purchase of land and the erection of buildings as soon as the Joint Committee shall have passed upon the estimates which are to be submitted by the Senate of the Educational Foundation in response to the request of the Joint Committee July 24th; but that if the majority shall prove to be for Pyeng Yang, the Boards reconsider their decision and no further steps be taken pending the results of such reconsideration. It is urged, therefore, that the reconsideration contemplated by that section must now be given to the whole subject. Pending this reconsideration and in view of all the delicacies of the situation there appears to be no alternative but to hold the matter in abeyance until the Committee can have reasonable opportunity to complete its work.

Cordially yours,

(Signed) ARTHUR J. BROWN.
J. E. ADAMS, D.D., TO REV.

(XIII.) LETTER REV. FRANK M. NORTH, D.D., TO REV.
J. E. ADAMS, D.D.

February 24, 1914.

The Rev. James E. Adams, D.D.,
Secretary of the Educational Senate,
Taiku, Korea.

Dear Sir and Brother:

I enclose herewith the action of the Joint Committee on Education in Korea in the matter of the location of the proposed Union College. The statement was adopted by the Committee with no dissenting vote. It has been adopted by the following Boards: the Methodist Episcopal, the Presbyterian of Canada, the Presbyterian of the United States, the Presbyterian of the United States of America. The Board of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, has not yet reported. Its Secretaries, however, were present at the meeting of the Joint Committee and concurred in the action. Its former vote was in accord with the present decision. It is safe to assume, therefore, that its vote will be given in approval of the decision of the Joint Committee. Each Board will communicate with its representatives on the field concerning this action and its relation thereto.

The deliberation with which this decision has been reached, its unanimity, and the ardent desire for prompt and effective action in putting this Union College upon actual foundations seem to the Committee to warrant the hope that with co-operation in the field, the answer to the challenge of Korea's need for Christian education may not be long postponed.

On behalf of the Joint Committee, and with their greeting to the faithful missionaries of the Boards they represent, I am,

Yours cordially,

(Signed) F. M. NORTH.

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Joint Committee on Educational Work In Korea
Action Concerning the Location of the Union College
The Joint Committee on Educational Work representing the Boards at work in Korea has given earnest and sympathetic consideration in repeated

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meetings to the important and urgent problem of higher Christian education. The Committee has had before it the careful replies from the missionaries to the letter of April 15th and February 25th, and a great deal of correspondence from the field presenting valuable comment, and had had the benefit, also, of full statements from Dr. Mott, Dr. Goucher, Dr. Pinson and Dr. Stanley White, giving the judgments which they had formed from observation and conference during their recent visit to Korea. The Committee feels keenly conscious of the heavy responsibility which devolves upon it, and having now come to a substantially unanimous view desires to express its conclusions, if possible, in a way that will assure all the missionaries in Korea of its full appreciation of the complexity of the problem which faces them and the Boards, and of its gratitude for the depth of their conviction which the Committee believes it shared with the missionaries with regard to the fundamental principle which cannot be compromised in the slightest degree, that all the educational work supported by these Boards must be unqualifiedly and powerfully Christian, and be designed to render the largest service to the cause of Christ among the people of Korea.

It is clear that on both sides of the important questions which have been under discussion there are strong convictions enlisted. It was inevitable and it is desirable that it should be so. In no mission field have such vital problems arisen without the most earnest thought and discussion. The Committee has sought to enter with full mind and heart into all the points of view and counterbalancing considerations which have been presented, and as it has done so, has been established in the belief that ten or fifteen years hence the spirit which is now one in us will be marked with a substantial unity of mind, also as to the wisest system of educational organization.

In particular the Committee wishes to emphasize its accord with the desire of those who are eager that the Church in Korea should have a devoted, single-hearted, capable ministry, that the evangelistic character of the Church, for which it has been notable throughout the world should be maintained and that men should be prepared for its perpetuation and richer development. The Committee would be satisfied with no plan which, whatever else it might secure, would in its judgment imperil this vital interest of the Church.

There is also another set of considerations which the Committee has heavily upon its heart, and in this it speaks out of the long experience of the Boards in dealing with educational problems in many lands and in facing the issues not of the ecclesiastical situation of a particular decade or even generation, but of the life of nations, of the relation of religion to the whole temper and destiny of a people, of the enormous task which Christianity is called to meet in every land both of the West and of the East, in the interpretation of the steady flood of new truth in terms of Christian faith and experience. Nowhere in the world are these problems more real or pressing than in the Far East. Christianity must meet her responsibility in this matter vital to her very life, under almost hopeless disadvantage in some of these lands. In Korea we have an opportunity to lay hold upon our problems at the beginning, or almost at the beginning. It would have been better if we could have acted three years ago, but it is not yet too late if we act unitedly at once.

It is certain that a new era in Korea has begun. The problem of the development of the Church there, which for so long a time was uncomplicated by the intellectual and industrial conditions of Japan and of the West, is now plunged into the same great complex of issues which we know in every other land and in which Christianity must fearlessly stand and bear its testimony and do the work which it alone can do and which can be done by it only through efficient educational institutions raising up Christian leaders in Church and State, men who in all the services legitimate for true Christian men will win other men to Christ, build up and extend the Church, and fashion the order of a Christian society.

In this general view of the present conditions and without entering into many associated considerations, this Committee votes to recommend to the Boards which it represents, or their executives, that they unite in the establishment of a Union Christian College at Seoul. In the assurance that time will vindicate the wisdom of this decision, the Committee, deeply re-

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pecting the conviction of the missionaries who favor a College at Pyeng Yang, would not recommend any disturbance of the work now being done with such blessing at that station, but deems it wise that the standard and equipment there should not be advanced with full collegiate ideals. The Committee believes it to be best that the development of College work and of the university departments which in time must be associated with it should be projected in a union institution at Seoul, and bespeaks the hearty and united co-operation of the whole missionary body in Korea in this undertaking.

The Committee recommends to the Boards that it be authorized to proceed with the requisite practical measures including the arrangement of such organization and legal incorporation as may be necessary in Korea and Japan.

The Committee recommends further that it be authorized at once to seek contributions for the acquisition of land and for the erection of buildings and for the other needs of the Union College.

(XVI)

BOARD LETTER NO. 196

February 24, 1914.

The Korea College Question

Report of Joint Committee, January 14th, 1914

To the Korea Mission.

Dear Friends:

You will recall that a report of the Joint Committee on Education in Korea, dated February 25th, and transmitted to you with Board letter No. 145 of April 15th, 1913, expressed a tentative judgment in favor of Seoul, but closed with the following recommendation:

"In view, however, of the importance of the question, the wide division of sentiment among the missionaries, the fact that the action of the Senate in referring the matter for final decision to the Boards has not been passed upon by the Missions, and that the votes thus far taken have been by Missions or the Senate so that it is not definitely known which location the actual majority of the Missionaries in Korea favor, the Joint Committee recommends as a partial compromise that the boards vote at once that the Union College be located at Seoul. With the understanding that other existing or projected institutions shall be middle schools. That our policy shall include one well equipped academy or high school or preparatory grade with an industrial department at each station. That in provinces where are two or more missions at work such academy at a given station be a union academy: That the present medical college and nurses' training school be affiliated with the Union College in such ways as may later be found practicable: And that the question of affiliating the two theological colleges be deferred for further consideration; that this decision, if approved by the board, be immediately submitted for ratification to a popular vote of all the voting missionaries in Korea together with a copy of this letter. Each missionary sending his or her vote to the Secretary of the Senate of the Educational Foundation, who shall collate the result and transmit copies to the co-operating Missions and to the Boards at home; that if the majority vote shall be for Seoul it shall be deemed a final settlement of the question and that prompt effort be made to secure funds for the purchase of land and the erection of buildings as soon as the Joint Committee shall have passed upon estimates which are to be submitted by the Senate of the Educational Foundation in response to the request of the Joint Committee, July 24th; but that if the majority shall prove to be for Pyeng Yang the Boards reconsider their decision and no further steps be taken pending the result of such reconsideration."

It afterwards transpired that the Senate of the Educational Foundation in Korea, on its own initiative, had already taken a vote, the result of which was 71 for Pyeng Yang and 38 for Seoul. In accordance, however, with the request of the Boards, the Senate called for another vote. The result of this was reported in a letter from the Rev. Dr. James E. Adams, Secretary of the Senate, dated August 13th, 1913. To be as follows:

Eligible voters, 121; number voting, 100; of whom 37 were for Seoul and 63 for Pyeng Yang.

This report was transmitted to all the members of this Joint Committee together with several explanatory and argumentive communications from the field, including the printed pamphlet entitled, "the second vote on the

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college location question," and Dr. Adams' official communications of June 28th, August 13th, 21st, and 28th and their enclosures. Each Board in addition received considerable correspondence from its own missionaries. If the other Boards received as many letters as our Board did, the total correspondence is exceedingly voluminous and no one can complain that action has been taken without full information.

A meeting of the Joint Committee was called for October 9th, but a full attendance was rendered impracticable by various ecclesiastical meetings and missionary conferences, the time and expense of assembling a Committee whose members are so widely separated also had to be considered. The annual meeting of the Foreign Missions Conference of North America in January afforded the first practicable time for an adequate representation. An explanation to this effect was sent to Dr. Adams, Secretary of the Senate, in my letter of October 20th. Perhaps the delay was fortunate as it afforded time for further study and correspondence.

Four meetings of the Committee were held in New York, January 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th respectively. All the Boards having work in Korea were represented by the full number of members to which they were entitled, except, of course, the Australian Boards. At the longest and most important session there were also present by invitation, the following brethren who had made a special study of the question, all but one of them having recently visited Korea: John R. Mott, LL. D., the Rev. W. W. Pinson, D. D., President John F. Goucher, D. D., (who also sat as the alternate of Dr. S. Earl Tayler) the Rev. Stanley White, D. D., and Dr. T. H. P. Sailer.

The Committee would have been glad if it could have accepted the vote of the missionaries as a decisive settlement of the question of location and this relieved the Committee of further responsibility. It early became apparent, however, that only one member of the Committee felt able to take this view. All the others and all of the consulting brethren referred to, that is, ten of the eleven men present felt that the matter could not be disposed of in that fashion. It is always a difficult task correctly to represent the views expressed in a discussion of which no stenographic record was kept and especially when some may have regarded the arguments as of varying weight and validity. Knowing, however, your interest in the matter and that you have a right to know reasons for the conclusion that was reached, I attempt a resume as follows:

First: The majority for Pyeng Yang was only 52 per cent. Of missionaries who were eligible to vote on the basis agreed upon, in spite of the strong effort of the Senate on the field to break the force of the Joint Committee's report and to secure a vote for Pyeng Yang. While this is technically a clear majority, it is too close to carry the full weight of the Missionary body. When 48 per cent. of the Missionaries are either opposed to Pyeng Yang or too indifferent or undecided to vote one way or the other, the Boards cannot consider themselves relieved from the responsibility of reviewing the whole question on its merits.

Second: The minority was not distributed through the Missions in such a way that it is made up of minority units in Missions whose majorities were for Pyeng Yang, but the minority included almost the solid membership of the Northern and Southern Methodist Missions. Such a denominational difference raises questions which call for adjustment by the Boards.

Third: The reports and letters from the field show that the vote was not taken on the straight question of location as the Joint Committee requested, but that it was confused with other questions, including the possibility of two colleges for which there was no warrant and also the type of college desired. If any Missionaries voted on question for location with the latent idea that if their choice for location should not prevail, a second college might be established, they voted under a misapprehension and the Joint Committee deeply regretted that the Senate put in Questions II and III as if they were possible alternatives. As for the type of college, two types were evidently under consideration, and each was identified in the minds of voters with a particular city. Some voted for Pyeng Yang, not so much because they really preferred it as location, but because they wanted the type of college which they believed that Pyeng Yang would mean. The Committee noted the arguments on this question which had been sent from the field, but was unable to regard them as valid. In the judgment of the Committee a station institution is, of course, largely influenced by the station personnel;

but the proposed union college is not to be a station institution but to be for the whole country and for all the Missions in that country. No matter where it is located, it will be controlled on the field by a Board of Managers elected by the co-operating Missions. The Committee could not bring itself to believe that the same men would conduct one kind of a College in Seoul and another kind in Pyeng Yang. The Missionaries will be likely to have the type of a college that they want wherever it is located. The Committee noted that the Senate in its "Supplementary Statement on the side of the Pyeng Yang Location," would respectfully ask if in America, (they) would consider a Young Men's College down in the red light district of South Clark Street, Chicago," to which the Committee would reply that it does not regard the differences between Seoul and Pyeng Yang as the differences between "the red light district of South Clark Street, Chicago," and a moral community. If Pyeng Yang's reputation for morals is any better than that of Seoul, in proportion to its size, Pyeng Yang has been most grievously misrepresented by many who have had opportunity to know of its reputation. Please note Dr. John R. Mott's letter on this subject, which I shall quote at a later point in this letter. How many votes were influenced by this confusion of issues cannot be definitely stated, but no one can read the letters from the field without concluding not only that a considerable number of votes were so influenced but that with some missionaries at least the question of type was regarded as more determinative than the question of location, as the vote for Pyeng Yang was only a little over half of the eligible electorate, the Joint Committee felt that the vote did not show where a real majority would stand if the vote had been taken, as the Boards desired, on the uncomplicated question of location, and that if a clear statement could be made regarding the kind of a College that will be developed, the question of location might wear a different aspect.

In these circumstances, the Committee saw no alternative but to conclude that the well-meant effort of the Joint Committee and the Boards to have the question of location settled by the missionaries on the field had failed, and that as the correspondence indicated too great intensity of feeling to make another referendum practicable and the delay had already been unduly prolonged to the injury of the work, the Boards could not evade the duty of re-considering the main question on its merits as the Boards had stated that they would do even if the majority for Pyeng Yang had been much larger.

As soon as this main question was taken up, the fact developed that a union college at Pyeng Yang was impossible for the simple reason that the Boards could not be united upon Pyeng Yang; some whose co-operation would be indispensable to a union college feeling that they could not possibly go there for higher education. Of course, the others could have said that they would not go to Seoul; but apart from any other consideration, that would have meant no union college at all, and this in turn would have meant the abdication of our Christian opportunity and duty to obtain an adequate Christian leadership for the new Korea, as two colleges were unanimously deemed wholly out of the question for reasons which have already been given in former correspondence. Indeed the missionaries themselves had voted for one college. Moreover, the analysis of the vote on the field, sent to the Joint Committee in Dr. James E. Adams' official letter of August 13th, showed that 85 out of 100 voting missionaries had voted on Questions II and III, namely, "Do you believe in two colleges rather than one only at Pyeng Yang?" and "do you believe two colleges rather than one only at Seoul?" Of the 85 who voted on these questions, Dr. Adams states that "46 (which would be a majority of those who voted on this matter) stood for one college as more important than location," and that "15 declined to define their position upon the two college alternative." The Committee felt, therefore, that if any weight was to be attached to bare majorities, weight must be given to the fact that a majority of those who voted on the two college question voted for one college as more important than location. At any rate, prominence has to be given to the fact that according to Dr. Adams' report only "7 missionaries favored two colleges under any circumstances." A further consideration was the strong conviction of the Committee and of all the brethren who had been called in consultation, that facts which were more or less independent of the opinion or control of the missionaries and Boards

imperatively require a Christian College at Seoul, the metropolis, the intellectual as well as the political capital of the country, and the fountain of the influences which will dominate the life of Korea. As all the Boards and a large majority of the missionaries themselves had voted that one Christian College should be deemed sufficient for Korea, and as the considerations which had led to that conclusion are absolutely decisive, the Committee felt that there was no practicable alternative but to put the union college in Seoul.

There was no disposition in the Joint Committee to modify in the slightest degree the Christian and evangelistic type of the college or the direct relationship which it shall sustain to development of the Korean church. The Committee felt, however, that this point was one which was fully within the control of the missionaries themselves and of the Boards in co-operation with them, Dr. John R. Mott, who was very strong in his advocacy of Seoul, has at my request put the substance of his position in writing as follows:

"After considering carefully various printed, written and oral statements regarding the best location for the proposed Union College for Korea, I come to the conclusion that it would be decidedly preferable to locate it at Seoul. I believe this will be best from the educational point of view, from the economic point of view and from the point of view of the standing and influence of Christianity in Korea.

"My twenty-five years of work in Colleges and Universities has shown me that the Christian character and fruitfulness of an institution does not depend primarily or chiefly upon its location, but upon its ideals, its leadership and the policy adopted and followed for cultivating its moral and religious life. There is much more that I would like to say, but I would prefer to say it face to face with any person who wishes to confer with me on the question."

Dr. Mott also urged that the alleged irreligious influence of the capital, instead of being an objection to locating the college there, is really a powerful argument for it, as Korean young men will go to Seoul anyway, since it is the place to which they will naturally turn to obtain that which appeals to ambitious young men, so that if we are not represented there by a Christian college, we shall simply turn the most promising Korean youths over to the government and Roman Catholic institutions. Dr. Mott believes that there is no reasonable hope that any appreciable number of the leading young men of Korea can be induced to go to Pyeng Yang and that they will go either to Seoul or to Japan for their higher education. They can be trained under Christian influences, if we put our college there; otherwise they will be lost to the church.

Attention was also called to the fact that Seoul has forty-five churches and chapels within fifteen li of the center of the city, not including the Y. M. C. A. and Roman Catholics, against twenty-two churches and chapels within fifteen li of Pyeng Yang; that there are four Missions in Seoul, not counting the Salvation Army, the Oriental Mission and the Y. M. C. A., as against two Missions in Pyeng Yang, one of which is almost unanimously against a college there; that there are two Bible Schools and a Theological Seminary in Seoul against one such institution in Pyeng Yang; and that eighty-four per cent. of the graduates of the Presbyterian Academy in Seoul are engaged in Christian work against seventy-one per cent. of the graduates of the Pyeng Yang Academy. The opinion was therefore expressed that there is no valid ground for believing that the Christian influences around students in Seoul could not be made quite as strong as those which would be brought to bear upon them in Pyeng Yang, especially as the professors will be selected by the Missions or their elected representatives.

I am trying to epitomize to you the various points that were brought out by different men around that council table. Of course they should not be deemed responsible for my memory or my version of what was said. The reasons I have named may not have appealed to every member of the Committee with equal force, and some members may have had other reasons which they regarded as even stronger, but which were presented at the meeting which I was unable to attend. I am simply endeavoring to give you some idea of the thoroughness with which the whole matter was gone into. You have a right to know also why the Committee felt unable to regard the vote on the field as final.

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After prolonged and careful consideration, a sub-committee was appointed at the third session to draft a report, and at the last session this report was adopted, every member of the Committee being present except myself who was detained at home by the very critical illness of one of my sons. The report was as follows:

"The Joint Committee on Educational work representing the Boards at work in Korea has given earnest and sympathetic consideration in repeated meetings to the important and urgent problem of higher Christian education. The Committee has had before it the careful replies from the missionaries of the letters of April 15th and February 25th, and a great deal of correspondence from the field presenting valuable comment, and has had the benefit, also, of full statements from Dr. Mott, Dr. Gouber, Dr. Pinson and Dr. Stanley White, giving the judgments which they had formed from observation and conference during their recent visits to Korea. The Committee feels keenly conscious of the heavy responsibility which devolves upon it, and having now come to a substantially unanimous view desires to express its conclusions, if possible, in a way that will assure all the missionaries in Korea of its full appreciation of the complexity of the problem which faces them and the Boards, and of its gratitude for the depth of their conviction, which the Committee believes it shares with the missionaries, with regard to the fundamental principle which cannot be compromised in the slightest degree, that all the educational work supported by these Boards must be unqualifiedly and powerfully Christian, and be designed to render the largest service to the cause of Christ among the people of Korea.

"It is clear that on both sides of the important questions which have been under discussion, there are strong convictions enlisted. It was inevitable and it is desirable that it should be so. In no mission field have such vital problems arisen without the most earnest thought and discussion. The committee has sought to enter with full mind and heart into all the points of view and counterbalancing considerations which have been presented, and as it has done so, has been established in the belief that ten or fifteen years hence the spirit which is now one in us all will be matched with a substantial unity of mind also as to the wisest system of educational organization.

"In particular the Committee wishes to emphasize its accord with the desire of those who are eager that the church in Korea should have a devoted, single-hearted, capable ministry, that the evangelistic character of the church for which it has been notable throughout the world should be maintained and that men should be prepared for its perpetuation and richer development. The Committee would be satisfied with no plan which, whatever else it might secure, would in its judgment imperil this vital interest of the church.

"There is also another set of considerations which the Committee has heavily upon its heart, and in this it speaks out of the long experience of the Boards in dealing with educational problems in many lands and in facing the issues not alone of the ecclesiastical situation of a particular decade or even generation, but also of the life of the nations, of the relation of religion to the whole temper and destiny of a people, of the enormous task which Christianity is called to meet in every land, both of the West and of the East, in the interpretation of the steady flood of new truth in terms of Christian faith and experience. Nowhere in the world are these problems more real or pressing than in the Far East. Christianity must meet her responsibility in this matter, vital to her very life, under almost hopeless disadvantages in some of these lands. In Korea we have an opportunity to lay hold upon our problems at the beginning, or almost at the beginning. It would have been better if we could have acted three years ago, but it is not yet too late if we act unitedly at once.

"It is certain that a new era in Korea has begun. The problem of the development of the church there, which for so long a time was uncomplicated by the intellectual and industrial conditions of Japan and of the West, is now plunged into the same great complex of issues which we know in every other land and in which Christianity must fearlessly stand and bear its testimony and do the work which it alone can do and which can be done by it only through efficient, educational institutions raising up Christian leaders in church and state, men who in all the services legitimate for true Christian

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men. I win other men to Christ, build up and extend the church, and fashion the order of a Christian society.

"In this general view of the present conditions and without entering into many associated considerations, this Committee votes to recommend to the Boards which it represents, or to their executives, that they unite in the establishment of a Union Christian College at Seoul. In the assurance that time will vindicate the wisdom of the decision, the Committee, deeply respecting the conviction of the missionaries who favor a college at Pyeng Yang, would not recommend any disturbance of the work now being done with such blessing at that station, but deems it wise that the standard and equipment there should not be advanced with full collegiate ideals. The Committee believes it to be best that the development of college work and of the university departments which in time must be associated with it should be projected in a union institution at Seoul, and bespeaks the hearty and united co-operation of the whole missionary body in Korea in this undertaking.

"The Committee recommends to the Boards that it be authorized to proceed with the requisite practical measures including arrangements for such organization and legal incorporation as may be necessary in Korea and Japan.

"The Committee recommends further that it be authorized at once to seek contributions for the acquisition of land for the erection of buildings and for the other needs of the Union College."

"This report was at once transmitted to the Boards for such action as they might deem proper. The Joint Committee has now been officially notified that the report has been adopted by the following Boards:

The Methodist Episcopal.

The Canadian Presbyterian.

The Southern Presbyterian.

The Northern Presbyterian.

The Southern Methodists should also be added, for while official notification has not yet arrived, that Board's advocacy of Seoul is so well understood and the Declarations of its two Secretaries, Dr. Pinson and Dr. Cook, are so confident, both of them having been present at the meeting of the Joint Committee which adopted the report and one of them being a member of the sub-committee which prepared it, that we are assured that there is no doubt of the result as soon as the next meeting gives opportunity for the formal vote.

In our own Board, the report was presented January 19th and after brief discussion and an explanation of the attitude of our own Mission, the report was referred to the Boards' Committee on Korea and the Executive Council, with instructions to go carefully into the matter again. Preparatory to this meeting, copies of the essential correspondence in the case, including statements from the field as to the argument for Pyeng Yang, were sent to the members of the Board's Committee, so that they might be aided in their re-study of the question. The Committee and the Council met February 2nd. The following were present: The Rev. J. Ross Stevenson, D. D., the Rev. J. H. Jowett, D. D., Mr. John L. Severance, William E. Stiger, Esq. and Mr. John T. Underwood, Secretaries Speer, Brown, White and Halsey, and by invitation, the Rev. Charles R. Erdman, D. D. There was full and careful discussion. Great hesitation was expressed about taking a position which was not in accord with your wishes, but the Committee and the Council felt obliged to come to the unanimous conclusion that the only practicable course was to approve the report of the Joint Committee and they so recommended at the meeting of the Board the same afternoon. In the Board meeting the main points of your position were brought out in clear statements. But as the discussion proceeded, the considerations for Seoul impressed all as so overwhelming that when the vote was taken, there were no negative votes, even the two members who had advocated Pyeng Yang in the debate, seeing no alternative but to acquiesce. The Rev. Dr. S. H. Chester, Secretary of the Southern Presbyterian Board, transmitted the vote of that Board in the following letter, which I venture to quote in full:

Dear Dr. Brown:

I am instructed by the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions to write you as Chairman of the Joint Committee on the location of the Union Chris-

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"February 10th, 1914.

ian College for Korea that the Executive Committee acquiesces in the decision of the Joint Committee at its recent meeting in New York, that the college should be located at Seoul. The Committee does this with reluctance, in view of the fact that the unanimous vote of our Mission was in favor of the location of the college at Pyeng Yang. We would not feel justified in taking an action contrary to this unanimous view of our Mission except for the following reasons:

"1. We understand that it is only possible to establish such a Christian College in Korea as will meet the necessities of the case in the years to come by combining the efforts and resources of all the evangelical forces having work in Korea, and that it will require the unanimous action of all the Mission Boards interested in the enterprise to secure the establishment and proper development of any such institution. Our Committee is convinced that it would be much better to have a Union Christian College located at Seoul than not to have one at all, and as these seem to be the alternatives in the case, we acquiesce in the decision of the Joint Committee.

"2. The Committee also feels that great weight is due to the opinions of men like Dr. John R. Mott, Dr. Stanley White, Dr. John F. Goucher, and other well known men connected with and deeply interested in the cause of Missions, who have studied this question on the ground from a more unprejudiced standpoint perhaps than would be possible for any of those who have been involved in the discussions which have arisen between the different Missions on the field in regard to the matter. Our having been informed that these brethren have very strongly expressed their conviction that Seoul is the proper place for the location of the proposed College reconciles us in some measure to that proposition, notwithstanding the fact that our Korean Mission has expressed itself as in favor of the other location.

"3. The fact that, as we are informed, certain large donations have already been made and others promised, conditioned on the location of the college at Seoul, together with the fact that any financial contribution which we may make to the institution will probably be a small one compared with those of the other parties involved, makes us unwilling to take any action that might in any way hinder the speediest possible development and establishment of the school.

"For the above reasons the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions acquiesces, as stated above, in the action of the Joint Committee fixing the location of the College at Seoul.

Fraternally and truly yours,

Executive Committee, Foreign Missions.

(Signed) S. H. CHESTER, Secretary."

The Secretary of the Canadian Presbyterian Board in transmitting its vote, also states that the Board hesitated on account of the action of the missionaries whose vote it did not like to underrate, but that nevertheless the Board felt that it should approve the report of the Joint Committee.

The Australian Board has not yet been heard from on account of the time required for correspondence with it; but as five of the six boards concerned have now adopted the report of the Joint Committee, and as the need of early information is urgent, it appears advisable to announce the vote without further delay and the Australian vote will be added when received.

The Joint Committee will now take up at the earliest possible moment the question of finance with a view to co-operating with the missionaries in Korea in getting the new institution started.

We can understand, in some measure at least, how disappointing the decision will be to many of you; and yet we venture to believe that you will appreciate the difficulties that have been involved. As I wrote Dr. Moffett, July 25th:

"We are aware that the Mission voted to put union and location together as inseparable, as you explained and as some letters had emphasized. But the Boards and their Joint Committee feel that a distinction should be observed between them, that one of the six parties to a union should not pre-empt a question which from the nature of the case calls for joint action, that if we are going into a union at all, we should go with a willingness to discuss such a question as location with those who have as much right to an

on on it as we have, and feeling that the way is clear to decide the issue on the merits of the case. 48

"..... Having gone into a union, we should carry into it the union spirit — an open mind, a willingness to abide by majority votes on questions which a majority alone can decide, a readiness to accept not only our full share of responsibility but also our full share of risk. We cannot carry one Mission as a distinct entity into a union of six Missions and Boards, and then repudiate union if the majority of those with whom we have voluntarily associated ourselves does not coincide with a majority in our particular Mission. Union means that mission and board lines are obliterated for the purpose of the union and that all concerned become one body. Of course, this would not be true if we were dealing with bad men or a worldly object; but this is a union among Christian men of presumably equal intelligence and equal devotion to the cause of Christ."

We have to consider therefore the total vote of the missionary body and of the Boards concerned. It is true that a small majority of missionaries voted for Pyeng Yang; but the Missions and Boards are partners in this enterprise, and when we come to consider the combined votes of missionaries and Boards, you will see that the balance inclines to Seoul. — It would have been an immense relief to some of us if the missionaries on the field could have been so nearly united as to have made their judgment more decisive; but as they were not, and as their vote was so mixed with other issues as to confuse its meaning, the Boards felt that they had to take up the matter as best they could.

In the first session of the Joint Committee's meeting, January 12th, I suggested that the first step should be a motion that the majority vote of the Missionaries for Pyeng Yang be regarded as settling the question so that we could now proceed to develop the union college in Pyeng Yang. It quickly appeared, however, as I have already indicated, that this proposal did not have the slightest chance of prevailing, for the reasons that have been outlined. While it is the duty of a Christian man to advocate his own view, up to a certain point, there is a point beyond which his insistence and his refusal to submit to an adverse vote cease to be Christian and become mere regenerate stubbornness and pugnacity. I felt that this point was reached in our discussions here and that it was, therefore, my duty to acquiesce in the judgment of the majority, especially as it was perfectly clear that only in that way could we secure the union college which the interests of the cause of Christ require in Korea. Continued opposition would have gained nothing for Pyeng Yang, but might simply have jeopardized any action at all. Of course, where questions of essential right and wrong are involved, a Christian's duty is independent; but this is not such a question. It is merely one of expediency and judgment between Christian brethren as to what is best for the Lord's work. You have earnestly and valiantly tried to carry your point for Pyeng Yang. Now, that it is clear that the college must be in Seoul, we confidently cherish the hope that you will give it your hearty support.

You are aware that from the beginning my personal opinion has been for a college at Pyeng Yang, if it was to be predominately a Presbyterian one, and even for the kind of a union that we had there, to go on and develop it if the Methodists were willing to stay; but that if they were not willing, and if we could secure one large institution for all Korea only by reopening the question of location, we should deem the getting of such a college as far more important than the question of location. This latter alternative is precisely the one that we have now to face. According to Dr. Adams' official report, the majority of the Missionaries on the field took precisely this position, as out of the eligible list of 121 and a voting list of 100, only 7 favored two colleges under the circumstance, and a majority of those who expressed an opinion on this subject stood for one college as more important than location. Conditions which were quite beyond our control made it apparent that our real choice was not between a college in Pyeng Yang and a college in Seoul, but between a union college in Seoul and no union college at all. When the matter shaped itself in that way, I deemed it my duty, in the interests of the cause of Christ and Korea, as I see them, to vote with the others for Seoul as Dr. Chester says that he did.

You will note that the report of the Joint Committee has tried to guard in every way possible what were felt to be the reasonable interests of the institution that we already have at Pyeng Yang. The Committee has been greatly puzzled by references in numerous communications from the field to the idea that the destruction of the work at Pyeng Yang was involved. No one in America has the slightest intention of destroying it. Even if the whole institution should be moved, which is not contemplated, no one here is able to understand how moving an institution should be considered equivalent to destroying it. The best Christian college we have in all Asia, the Shantung Christian University, has already been moved once from Teng Chon to Wei-hsien, and is now to be moved again from Wei-hsien to Tsinan-fu. So far from destroying the college, which was originally at Teng-chou, the college has been strengthened by the removal that has already been made and there is unanimous agreement that it will be still further strengthened by moving it to Tsinan-fu. But the institution at Pyeng Yang is not to be moved. Almost everything that is there now is to stay and most heartily do we hope that it can be given much better facilities. We understand that the great body of students at Pyeng Yang are not in the college, but in the academy, which no one proposes to disturb. You have reported only 47 students in the college proper, and we are told that about half of them are in the freshman year; while all the college property is needed for the academy. It is the earnest desire of the Joint Committee and the Boards that the Pyeng Yang educational work should be given all practicable development as a first-class, high-grade, thoroughly equipped middle school, carrying its students quite up to the point of the requirements of the best colleges of America for admission to the freshman year, and even if it carried them through the freshman year there would probably be no objection. Doubtless there will be a considerable number of students who wish to go directly from the Pyeng Yang Academy into a Bible Training School or the Theological Seminary, with a view to evangelistic work or to ordination for the ministry. Students of this kind can continue to be trained at Pyeng Yang for your evangelistic work. They will not be obliged to go to the College at Seoul, unless they wish to secure the kind of college work which will be developed there or to prepare themselves for other callings or professions. The way is quite clear therefore for you to train at Pyeng Yang as many of your Presbyterian students for evangelistic work as you desire, within the limitations as to the full college work mentioned in the report. Those who have made careful study of the educational situation in Korea, while highly praising the educational results that have already been achieved against very great difficulties, are nevertheless of the opinion that there is not now in Korea any institution which has the facilities for doing the kind of full college work that the proposed union college is to attempt. The development of such an institution at Seoul should therefore, not be considered as reflecting upon any institution. The idea is not to destroy what we have, but to give new and added facilities for carrying the whole educational plan in Korea to a higher development.

Let me, in closing, give the largest possible emphasis to our strong conviction that the proposed college in Seoul should be and must be pervaded through and through with the evangelistic spirit and aim; that it is no part of our missionary object in Korea to give a purely secular education. Our motto is "For Christ and the Church." We want this institution to be tributary to the missionary body, the way appears to be clear for us to take such steps as will insure an institution that will do the kind of work that is desired.

Sincerely yours,
ARTHUR J. BROWN.

(XV) LETTER OF REV. J. E. ADAMS, D. D. TO REV. FRANK M. NORTH, D. D.

April 6th, 1914.

Rev. Frank Mason North,
180 5th Ave., New York.
My Dear Dr. North:

Your favor of the 24th of February, as the Secretary of the Boards Committee on Education in Korea is at hand, with the enclosure of the Committee action.

The Educational Senate held its semi-annual meeting on the 20-21st. ult. At that time the action of the Joint Committee had not reached us, except in an informal way. The action as before the Senate at that time seems however to have been substantially the action of the Committee. The Senate took action as follows:

"Whereas the Senate at its meeting of December 20-21, 1912, having decided upon one arts and science college for all Korea, referred for decision to the Joint Committee in America the question of the location of said college, and, whereas;

This Senate is in receipt of the letter of the Chairman of the Joint Committee of date February 24th, 1914, stating that a decision had been reached and sent to the Boards, and though his letter did not communicate the nature of the decision we are creditably informed that it is substantially as follows: "This Committee votes to recommend to the Boards, etc., that they unite in the establishment of a union Christian College in Seoul. In the assurance that time will indicate the wisdom of this decision, the Committee, deeply respecting the convictions of the missionaries who favor a college at Pyeng Yang would not recommend any disturbance of the work now being done with such blessing at that station, but deems it wise that the standards and equipment there should not be advanced to full collegiate ideals. The Committee believes it best that the development of college work and if the university departments which in time must be associated with it should be projected in a union institution in Seoul;

Resolved, That the Senate accept this as the reply of the Joint Committee to the reference made it by this body, and conclude the reference."

A careful perusal of the action of the Joint Committee, and your accompanying letter, leads us to believe that the action of your Committee was in no wise based upon the reference of the Senate to your Committee, as no mention is made of this either in the action itself or in your letter, but as was professedly stated in the action, is based wholly upon the authority which your Committee derived from the constituting Boards, and that your communication to the Senate is one of information only.

I can easily understand how your Committee might take this position, as in a letter last Summer, I was instructed by the unanimous vote of the Senate to write Dr. Brown, your Chairman, that the reference was made to your Committee on the explicit understanding that either location would be a perfectly open solution to all parties in the Joint Committee. Otherwise no reference was possible.

The Senate at its late meeting was instructed to write the Joint Committee as follows:

"The Senate wishes to point out to the Joint Committee that in this action it has gone beyond the matter referred to it by this Senate. The Constitution of the Senate as adopted by the six federated missions, in Art. V., Sec. 4, reads as follows:

The location and number of High Schools, Arts Colleges, Technical Schools, and Special Schools, which shall be founded or maintained by any of the constituent missions, their correlation and the delimitation of their territory, shall be determined by the Senate."

This Constitution has been ratified by the Boards with the one provision by certain boards that their approval was "subject to the condition that all acts and proceedings of the Senate shall be subject to the review and control of the co-operating Missions on the field, and through them of the Boards at home in the same way as other union institutions."

This section specifically delegates to the Senate, at least the initial authority to determine the location, number and correlation of all educational institutions. In the exercise of this authority it determined to have but one Arts and Science College for the work of the entire country in the six missions. In the exercise of the same authority it deemed it wiser, under the circumstances, to refer the question of the location of that one college to an outside referee body—the Joint Committee. This aspect alone of the question was referred to your Committee. We would point out that the reply of your Committee assumes, without a reference being made, to exercise initially the functions delegated to this body, and to direct concerning two institutions, both to do college work and what their correlation shall be.

We regret to be compelled to say that we think the exercise of these functions in this manner can lead only to confusion—a confusion exceedingly

51 inimical to union effort. What made the question of location a difficult one was the desire of all parties for one collegiate institution. If more than one institution had been considered, no question would have been raised, no reference made. No difficulty would have been experienced either in number, location or correlation. The question would have settled itself along natural and existing lines.

The Senate, therefore, sees no course open to it, but to take up this aspect of the question as they come to it, with such added light as we now have, and seek their solution in constituted ways, by which in as short a time as is possible we hope to have them reach the Boards.

Believe me,

Yours in the service,
(Signed) JAS. E. ADAMS.

APPENDIX XIV

Minutes of the Senate of the Educational Federation of Missions in Korea,
Meeting of June 13, 1914.

(XVI.) APPENDIX

II. Joint Committee's Decision by Direct Board Authorization.

The second view on which the decision may be regarded is that the Joint Committee acted upon authority derived directly from the Boards and therefore the decision is binding upon the Mission. It is now without question that this is the basis on which the Committee proceeded.

In a sense this relieves your Senate as the matter has been virtually taken out of its hands. We wish to point out however that this view in other respects places your Federation and Senate in a position of even greater difficulty and embarrassment than the other. This is the more true that the Joint Committee has not related itself to field operations through the established channels of Board Mission organization but has undertaken the exercise of direct authority in field matters. This will be clear in the following:—

I. The Constitution of the Educational Federation contains the following:—

PURPOSE, To unify Christian education as conducted by the various Christian Missions, into a single system, regulated from a single head.

ORGANIZATION: The work of the Federation and the administration of its functions shall be conducted by a Senate.

POWERS OF THE SENATE: The location and number of High Schools, Arts College, Technical and Special Schools which shall be founded on, or maintained by any of the constituent Missions, their correlation and the delimitation of their territory, shall be determined by the Senate.

That such funds may be secured the Senate shall take steps for the organization of a holding body in the home lands and for incorporation as may be necessary."

II. This Constitution was ratified by all the Missions and also by all the Boards, in the year 1911. This ratification by the Boards on the basis of which the Senate was organized, and upon which all its operations have been conducted, was without qualification except in the case of the Northern Presbyterian Board which qualified its action as follows:

"The Board therefore while most heartily sympathizing with and cordially approving the general plan of the Mission saw no alternative but to make its approval subject to the condition that . . . the Senate of the Educational Foundation shall be subject to the review and control of the co-operating Missions on the field and through them, of the Boards at home, in the same way as other union institutions; and that any appeals which shall be made in America shall be made through or with the approval of the Boards, and that any funds which shall be raised, held, and administered in America, shall be raised, held, and administered by the Boards or by such body as they shall constitute for the purpose."

III. It seems evident from the above that the very minimum of mutual relations agreed upon as between Senate, Missions, Boards and such future Joint Board body as might be organized at home, may be summarized as follows:—

1. The Senate shall have the exclusive direct field exercise of the func-

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2. The exercise of these functions is however limited. In reserve authority over its own interests, each constituent Mission shall hold the acts of the Senate under its own right of review and control.

3. Likewise each Board, through its Mission, which is the field arm of its organization, shall exercise the same right of review and control.

4. Outside of this any joint body at home contemplates the handling of financial matters only.

IV. The Joint Committee had its first tentative organization in the Summer of 1912. Its operations have been extended to the field as follows:—

1. It has assumed to determine upon its own direct Board derived authority, the number of colleges there shall be in the country.

(See Committee decision based not upon Senate reference but Board authority).

2. It has assumed upon the same basis to determine their location, and correlation.

(See same Committee decision).

3. It has assumed on the same basis direct decision concerning site and purchase of same, through individuals of its own selection.

(See Committees cable; "Secure from funds your possession proposed site Union College Seoul. Consult Adams Noble.")

4. It has assumed upon the same basis the drafting of a Constitution and reserved ultimate decision in the same.

(Official Letter, April 25th, 1914.

The Joint Committee has done considerable work, first through a special committee and then in the session yesterday upon the draft of a constitution which will govern both the Field Board of Managers and the Board of Trustees in America. The main outlines of such a constitution are tentatively agreed upon. When it has been approved by the Committee which will doubtless be shortly, it will not be immediately presented to the Boards but will be sent to Korea in order that the Joint Committee may have the benefit of the criticisms of the missionaries before the draft is put in final form for action by the Boards).

It seems evident that this course of action is not consistent with the previously arranged and officially ratified system of mutual relation for all parties concerned. It takes from the Federation of Missions and from its Senate, and does so with no agreement or formal notification, one of the most important functions delegated to it, for the exercise of which the Federation was in part organized, and transfers the same not only from the hands of the Senate but also from those of its constituent Missions to a Joint Board body in New York. We cannot but view the move with apprehension. In the judgment of this Senate it is contrary to sound principles of missionary administration, and is fraught with peril to the safety, the progressive continuity, and the practicalness of Mission policies. Field operations should be conducted by and through field organizations.

This Senate is the executive body of the Federated Missions. Its members exercise their functions only as they are duly appointed representatives of these organized Mission bodies. It exercises these functions only by virtue of the Constitution given it by the respective Mission-Board organizations. That Constitution places field authority up to actual organization in the hands of this Senate. This Senate therefore does not carry the authority to accept the action of the Joint Committee viewed in this light of direct Board authorization. It can only decline to accept it until its own Constitution is altered, or its constituent Mission bodies unite in directing it to do so.

It would therefore recommend to its constituent Missions that each petition its respective Board to correct this inconsistency of authorization, that these questions may be duly settled by the channels previously constituted and still authorized. We know no other way in which the present tangle may be permanently and satisfactorily settled.

(XVII)

LETTER OF REV. J. E. ADAMS, D. D., TO
REV. A. J. BROWN, D. D.

Taiku, Korea, April 23, 1914.

My Dear Dr. Brown:—

I must acknowledge the receipt, long since, of the Mission letter No. 196, and also the more recent receipt of yours of March 21, 1914, written me as Secretary of the Senate, and giving me the reasons.

As Dr. North sent me the action of the Joint Committee, as its Secretary, I acknowledged the same to him, and conveyed him the action of the Senate.

In this present letter I am writing, not as the Senate Secretary, but a personal letter as a member of our Mission. I have not written before, partly on account of a great rush of work, but principally because I deemed it wiser to wait until the broth cooled and settled before passing judgment on what might really be there. Things now seem to be pretty well precipitated. Viewed from either side or in any light I can only lament the resultant situation, speaking as a servant of Christ. And as I look the matter over, I cannot escape the conclusion that whatever confusion may have existed originally on the field, it has been only worsea confused, and the situation made more irretrievable by the courae which the Joint Committee has seen proper to pursue.

One thing emerges quite clearly to my mind as a very real cause for the mutual recriminations of Joint Committee and Senate, and in a larger sense for the mutual misunderstandings of the Home and Field ends. It is apparent on the field, and is equally apparent in all your communications.

1. The Joint Committee has assumed on the basis of its commission from the Boards that it carried the direct Board authority for itself settling all questions relative to the college, whether field or home.
2. The field has assumed that by virtue of the Constitution of the Senata organized, certain field aspects of the question were specifically delegated to that body and that the relation of the Boards to this were those of review and control.

The two, you will see, are not consistent, and are bound to clash. In our own Mission and in the Senate we have steered our course by Board Letter No. 64, authorizing the Senate, defining its relation to Boards through the Missions in the exercise and control of its functions, and also defining, consistent with these, the functions of the Joint Committee when it should have been organized.

The reference made by the Senate to the Joint Committee of the question of location was in this same sense. It made it as to a referee body, in no sense as to a body that had the right to decide by virtue of its own authority regardless of any reference being made. In the same sense, when it came to its attention that the question was not an open one within the referee body, it at once notified the Joint Committee that such a situation would invalidate the reference. This is the light in which the field regards the Joint Committee's action. You will remember that in one of my letters of last Summer, I expressed apprehension on this point.

This has been particularly true in our own Mission, for our Board took the initiative in setting forth the principles that should regulate Board relation to the Senate, and other Boards simply endorsed it to their Missions. As a result the men here look upon the present action of the Joint Committee as authorized by the Boards, in the light of an attempt to violently overturn the established principles under which our common work is done, and in the field question of location, arbitrarily force upon the field, the contrary opinion of the home end. The theory that all authority rests with the Board may be alright. It doubtless is, and is necessary as a theory, but the indiscriminating application of it can only smash things. In the celebrated words of Grover Cleveland (was it not?): "It is not a theory but a condition, which confronts us." It may be that missionaries are a particularly strenuous lot of men. I am inclined to think, however, that Anglo-Saxonism, Americanism, Presbyterianism, as well as missionarism are component parts of the make-up. At any rate, it is something that you at home, will have to face, with open eyes, as an existing situation. And, let me urge upon you regardless of what you may conceive my personal position to be, that you realize it to be a situation that cannot be resolved, and a body of men who will not be moved, (no invidious references intended) by pious platitudes, or a shuffling of figures, or an imposing assumption of names, of wisdom, or of authority. It is too serious a matter, involving too large issues, and with too large and serious and intelligent a body of men concerned to be handled except strictly upon its merits.

I presume before receiving this you will have received the protest signed by most of our Mission, as also the Executive Committee's reply to your letter. I presume that you will also have received the circular Mission vote started by Seoul station seeking Mission acquiescence to the Seoul College proposition; also the Mission vote on the Senate's recommendation. These will give you much light on the situation. But they are formal communications, necessarily speaking formally. Many things can be said only in personal letters and even then they may be misunderstood. The quality of the speaking cannot be conveyed in writing. I am aware of your belief that the Secretary in New York, because of his correspondence with all parties, is better acquainted with a field situation than any single missionary on the field. But may not the very fact that it is correspondence, voluntary on the part of those writing, that most busy men, even with convictions do not incline to write, make possible such a position to become a source of disastrous mistake. Whatever my record of the past here may have led you to give of weight to my opinion, I wish you to put the whole of it on this statement: I am profoundly convinced in view of all that is patent on the face of the situation here, that the action of the Joint Committee, as ratified by the Boards, is a disastrous mistake. It is calculated to wreck all of union that by long years of patient effort we have succeeded in attaining. And it will not attain even the end sought. For while the method may be a proper one to an Episcopal mind, men bred in the Presbyterial system will never fall in with it; much less will the type of men you are called on to work with here. It can only result in ever continuing and increasing disaster so long as it is pressed.

As this is a personal letter, I trust that you will bear with me if I point out how some things are regarded here.

1. As to the elimination of the Senate from the matter, and the reflections in your letter on the attitude of the Senate, and the Senate's handling of the vote. The first seems very manifest, and yet no statement to that effect has been made, no mention is made of its reference in the Committee's action, in your letter, or in the letter of the Committee's Secretary to myself. It has been quietly eliminated. With regard to the second they were uncalled for and did not represent the real history of the matter, as all the reasons why the other two questions were added was because that they were reasons forced upon the field by conditions in the Joint Committee. This also was widely known, with the result that your representation of these things created an unfortunate impression.

2. What seems to have been the deliberate emasculating of the field vote by the Joint Committee in order to create a basis for the adverse decision which members of it were determined on. The rules for interpreting a vote, and for handling a non-voting factor among those holding the franchise, are well known to all educated men. They may be found in any manual of parliamentary order. Where the question is an open question to be decided by a majority vote, the non-voting factor is usually not counted, but if counted, is always counted on the side of the majority. The present question was that

sort of a question. In reporting the vote I omitted the non-voting factor; but stated the difficult conditions of getting the vote, and now the Joint Committee in its representation of the vote, counts the entire non-voting factor on the side of the minority. It thus succeeds in emasculating the vote to a 52 per cent. basis. If the non-voting factor is counted at all, on any recognized basis, it makes the vote a 70 per cent. one on the other side. Dr. Goucher, when here, set forth the 52 per cent. interpretation. It caused no little amusement even among those who favored Seoul. He was asked why, with such an extraordinary interpretation, he did not also say what the percentage of the other side would be on the same basis. He sputtered and said nothing. There was nothing to be said. I presume he was the father of the idea in the Committee. You can understand, however, how the serious setting forth of such an interpretation as the sole basis of repudiating the Committee's own reference to the field, has greatly helped to accentuate the situation.

3. The purchase of the site, by direct cable authorization of the Joint Committee. I am in receipt of your letter of March 21st in explanation. It can scarcely be said to explain except that it makes clear the propriety of your motive. The difficulty was with your information. I understand that

Dr. Underwood's money is in New York—not here—promised rather than in his possession, and cannot be suddenly called—at least so I am informed by Dr. Clark. The first site sought, it now appears, was not in the market at all, the government refusing to sell, but a second site is now promised, though no price has been fixed. Neither of them were especially on the market, nor so far as I have heard, in any particular danger of being lost, and there is no rumor here of paying a quarter of its value. Possibly Dr. Goucher's information was calculated to accomplish what, in view of the known conditions here, it could only be interpreted as intended to accomplish—a nailing down of the situation by means that usurped the functions of the field part of our organization.

In this whole business, from its inception two years ago, when I was loaded with the handling of the field end of it, and when I was enthusiastic for one college, up to the present, both in the developing phases of it here on the field, and in the Joint Committee, it has become very evident to me that the two systems under which Methodism and Presbyterianism work are so diverse in their practical principles and methods of operation, as to not make possible common direct operation in union work. They have begotten two distinct types of minds, at least here in Korea, and in the direct conduct of work we have not yet gotten to where we can mix. I believe that the hulk of your Mission, and of the Presbyterian missionaries of the country have worked out to this same conclusion. Few of us had it two years ago.

If I have said anything in this letter that has been not pleasing to you, I beg your forgiveness. Believe me,

Yours in the Service,
JAS. E. ADAMS.

(XVIII) LETTERS FROM REV. J. E. ADAMS, D. D.,
SECRETARY OF EDUCATIONAL FEDERATION.
REV. A. J. BROWN, D. D., SECRETARY OF JOINT
COMMITTEE OF BOARDS

Taiku, Korea, December 25, 1912.

To the Secretary of the
Union Com. for Christian Educational Work in Korea.
Dear Sir:—

At a meeting of the Senate of the Educational Federation of Christian Missions in Korea, held December 20-21, the following action was taken:
Re-deciding the location of one Christian college for Korea.

1. That the Senate now proceed to vote on the question of the location of one Christian College for Korea.
2. That we report to the Joint Committee in New York the vote of the Senate, including the vote of the absent members, to be obtained by the General Secretary.
3. That we instruct the General Secretary so to forward to the Joint Committee the results of the votes taken by the various Missions.
4. That we shall consider the decision reached by the Joint Committee final.

In pursuance of this action I beg to report as follows:
1. A vote being taken in the Senate and the vote of absent members being secured, the vote stands as follows:

- For Pyeng Yang:
- Presbyterian, North Mission—W. M. Baird, J. E. Adams, S. A. Moffett, N. C. Whittemore.
 - Presbyterian, South Mission—W. A. Venable, J. S. Nisbet.
 - Presbyterian Australian Mission—D. M. Lyall.
- For Seoul:
- American Methodist Episcopal Mission—A. L. Becker, B. W. Billings, W. C. Rufus.
 - American Methodist Episcopal South Mission—J. L. Gerdine, W. C. Cram.
 - Presbyterian Canadian Mission—D. M. McRae.
2. The official actions of the various Missions on this specific subject with such notes explanatory of them as I have been able to secure.
- A. Northern Presbyterian Mission. Annual meeting Minutes, September, 1912:

The motion—"that we approve a college in Seoul" was again discussed. After an hour's discussion the vote was taken as follows: Affirmative, 6; Negative, 36.

This substitute motion being lost, the original motion (that it be the sense of this Mission that there be but one college for Korea) was amended and carried as follows: "That it be sense of this Mission that for the present there be but one college for Korea."

It was moved and carried that there be but one college in Korea, and that it be in Pyeng Yang. It was carried on division with six negative votes, the number of the affirmative not being called for.

It was moved and carried that our Mission ask all Evangelical Missions to unite with us in union college work at Pyeng Yang.

I was not present at this annual meeting, but the question is essentially an old one in our mission. From all I can ascertain the Mission's attitude is unchanged from what it has been before. With the exception of a few, most of whom are located in Seoul, the Mission is unanimous in its position, and has come to it through an agitation of some years' duration.

B. Southern Presbyterian Mission. Annual meeting minutes, August 2-12, 1912.

"The following is presented as outlining our policy of co-operation with the Union College of Pyeng Yang:

Mr. C. E. Sharp,
Chai Ryeng, Korea.

Dear Brother:—

Your letter to Mr. Cont, of May 11th, 1912, has been handed to our Mission body for action. In reply we wish to call your attention to Article 5 in the report of the Joint Institutional and Evangelistic Committee which was adopted by our Mission last year, which reads as follows:

No. 5. We appreciate the invitation to join in the Union College work at Pyeng Yang, and although as yet we cannot take active part in instruction, we recommend (a) that such co-operation be our aim, (b) that it be our policy to locate a man there as soon as possible, (c) that for 1912 we appropriate \$125.00 for running expenses.

Although this year an unusually heavy cut in our budget prevented us from fulfilling our desires of helping the college last year as in (c) above, we have appropriated \$125.00 again this year and there is no desire on the part of our Mission so far as we can see now to withdraw from the policy stated above, and we regret that the incomplete manning of our own academy schools this year prevents us from sending a man up to Pyeng Yang. We are in favor of one college for all Korea, and feel that the place for that one college is at Pyeng Yang.

Yours truly,

In answer to inquiry the Treasurer of the Mission writes me: While there was some discussion of the matter, and the exact vote was not recorded, I am of the opinion that there were no votes registered against the action of the Mission, as shown on the attached extract.

C. Australian Presbyterian Mission. Council minutes, September, 1912. "Mr. Engel moved and Mr. Lyall seconded that it be the sense of this Council that it should co-operate with the Union College in Pyeng Yang. The motion was approved."

Mr. Lyall, the representative of the Mission in the Senate, states in his communication of this action: "I may add that I know of no opinion in our Mission but what is in favor of Pyeng Yang as the location of the college. The voting members on this question were the eight men of the Mission, all of whom were present. The motion was carried unanimously."

D. American Methodist Episcopal Mission. Annual Conference Journal, March, 1912.

"Concerning College work we recommend:

1. That we rescind the action pertaining to Men's Colleges taken at the third session of this conference, recorded in the Educational Committees' report, page 14 of the minutes of 1910, as follows: The Mission shall plan for three colleges—a man's college in Pyeng Yang, a man's college in Seoul, and a woman's college in Seoul."
2. That the policy of the Mission shall be to give its support to only one man's college in Korea.

3. That we express our preference for one union Christian college in Korea.

4. That we express our preference for Seoul as the place of location.

5. That we instruct our members of the Educational Senate, working through that body to bring the question of location before the Mission working in Korea, and to ask them to take a vote on the question.

6. If practical unanimity cannot be reached by this means, that the question of location be referred to the Boards of Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church and Presbyterian Church in U. S. A.

7. That the Educational Committee be authorized to represent the conference ad interim in carrying out the provisions of these resolutions."

In explanation of this action I am in receipt of the following from two members of that mission, representing their Educational Committee, and both members of the Educational.

Dear Mr. Adams:—

Our Mission has taken two votes on the union college question and we are sending this explanation to prevent any possible mistake in reporting our vote to the Joint Committee or any misunderstanding on your part concerning the attitude of our Mission or its Senate representatives.

The first vote was taken on the resolutions, page 100 (given above) of the conference minutes of 1912, a copy of which you have in your possession. You will notice that the primary issue there is clearly "only one union Christian college," upon which we were unanimously agreed. Our second proposition is concerning choice of location of one union Christian college, and we stated our preference for Seoul; also with a unanimous vote. This is the vote that should be reported to the Joint Committee.

During the Fall of 1912 we took a straw vote on quite a different proposition. Pending the decision of the one union college question we felt that it was necessary to unite our Mission Educational force in one of the two proposed locations, Seoul or Pyeng Yang. This vote stands, Seoul 15, Pyeng Yang 6. One has not voted because he says he voted for Seoul last Spring. This vote is not on the question of the location of one union Christian college for Korea, and should not be reported to the Joint Committee.

Very sincerely yours,
ARTHUR L. BECKER,

Chairman.

W. CARL RUFUS,

For the Educational Committee.

E. Methodist Episcopal Church, South Mission. Annual meeting, minutes September 5-12, 1912.

"Policy for College Work:

Since it seems to be the consensus of opinion that it would be unwise for our Mission to undertake independently, to do college work, and since the question of our co-operation with other missions has been brought before us at this annual meeting, therefore, he it resolved, that it is the sense of this annual meeting that while we recognize the substantial work already established in Pyeng Yang, and bid them God speed in their work, we feel that the situation of our mission work is such that we should express ourselves as favoring a union college in Seoul. We would further express ourselves in favor of having the college outside the city walls where sufficient ground can be obtained to make it possible to create a proper moral atmosphere for the institution."

Mr. Gerdine, representative of this mission on the Senate, in sending this action, accompanies it with this note:

"The vote was not recorded, but I think it was practically unanimous."

F. Canadian Presbyterian Mission:

No representative from this Mission attending the Senate meeting, and not knowing who their representative was, I wrote the Rev. W. R. Foote, of Wonsan, asking him to secure the representatives' vote, and send me any action the Mission had taken on the subject.

I subsequently ascertained that the Rev. D. M. ^{MoRae} Morae, of Ham Heung, was representative, and corresponded with him. From Mr. Foote I received the following:

"Dear Mr. Adams:

Your favor re the location of the proposed union college came to hand while I was in the country from where I have just returned.

The question of location has never been before our Mission, and since the decision to have only one in Korea, I think we have taken it for granted that the future college would only be a development of the present Pyeng Yang institution.

Believe me, very sincerely yours,

From Mr. MoRae I subsequently received the following:

Dear Mr. Adams:—

I was away in the country when your letter of January 9, 1913, came to hand, and only returned the evening before I received your telegram.

I have telegraphed the different stations at once, and hope I will be able to inform you of not only my own personal vote, but that of the Mission, without delay.

Yours sincerely,

Later I received by telegraph from him:

"Vote Seoul. Majority vote of Mission same. M^oRae."

I regret that I can give only this very limited information concerning this Mission's action.

This completes, I believe, the information which I was instructed by the Senate to forward to you. I have received two communications from the Australian Mission, however, concerning the action of the Senate in referring the question of location to the Joint Committee, and making your decision final, and have been requested to represent their position to you. Their representative was not present when the Senate action was taken. I therefore simply send you a transcript of the letters. They will be self explanatory:

"To the General Secretary of the Senate.

Dear Mr. Adams:—

Last week, in answer to your inquiry, I sent you my vote on the matter of the location of the college, voting as you know in accordance with the unanimous decision of our Mission for Pyeng Yang.

Today the minutes of the Senate meeting reached me. I wish to add to my previous letter, with emphasis, that the method of settling the matter is extremely unsatisfactory to our Mission. When we agreed to join in the Educational Federation we did it with the constitution before us. For the good of the whole educational work of the Missions we surrendered a portion of our autonomy, but always with the understanding that we had a voice and vote in the decision of all matters touching educational work. Now we have the spectacle of an important matter in which we are vitally interested, being offered to an outside body on which we have no effective representation.

This seems to me to be a violation of the spirit of the constitution, and I wish to go on record as protesting against it. Another such proceeding and I should personally favor the course of our withdrawing from the Senate altogether as a Mission.

May I ask that you will represent the position as it appears to me, to the Joint Committee. They will not wish to act unjustly to any party involved. In deciding the matter our Mission's point of view should be equally considered with others.

Yours faithfully,
D. M. LYALL."

The second is from the Rev. G. Engel, the secretary of the Mission:

My Dear Mr. Adams:—
I must apologize for my delay in replying to your letter of the 36th ult. Asking for a copy of our Mission's action the Union College at Pyeng Yang.

The following is an extract from the minutes of the Mission Council of the Australian Presbyterian Mission, met in session at Masanpo on the 18th of September, 1912, after being duly constituted by Prayer:

"59. The proposal of the Methodist Episcopal Mission North, with regard to the location of the Union College, now situated at Pyeng Yang, was taken up. The Rev. G. Engel moved and the Rev. D. M. Lyall seconded that it be the sense of the Council that it should continue to co-operate with the Union College in Pyeng Yang. The motion was approved."

There was no division on the question and approval means therefore unanimity on this question. The motion implies that our Council does not favor the establishment of a college in Seoul, and it was worded in the above form so that in the event of the Methodist Episcopal Mission North deciding to have a college of its own in Seoul, our Mission is committed to co-operation with the college in Pyeng Yang.

Our reasons for being opposed to a college in Seoul are that though more central, the influences are more hostile to good discipline, and especially inimical to good Christian influence, being evident too that there is danger of the students dahlhing in politics. On the other hand we have in Pyeng Yang a large Christian community, with every advantage for good discipline and Christian influence which has already been tried and found solid for good, to the seclusion and suppression of political agitation. The claim that college work has been done in Seoul for some years past is to be disposed of by the single statement that if it was it has not been known and there are no graduates, whereas Pyeng Yang college has already a goodly number of graduates.

Further although the personnel of the college staff could be transferred to Seoul, a building cannot be shifted from one place to another. This proposal should have been brought forward before the erection of the college building was commenced. Now that the college exists with the name "Union Christian College" chiseled in the stone above the portal, it seems preposterous to raise the question of removal to Seoul. Here the stones speak louder than any argument of human tongue, removing the question from the arena of academic discussion.

With kind regards,

Yours very sincerely,

G. ENGEL.

I append these two rather lengthy letters, that the views of this Mission, which has not a representative in your Committee, may be known by you and given such consideration as is due. Believe me,

Yours in the Kings' Service,

(Signed) JAS. E. ADAMS.

(XIX)

LETTER OF J. E. A. TO A. J. B.

March 31, 1913.

Secretary of the Joint Committee for
Christian Education in Korea.

My Dear Dr. Brown:—

On the 22nd and 24th of this month the Educational Senate held another meeting and finished the various matters for action on which your Committee has been waiting. I think that in my former letter also neglected to inform you of the Senate's action.

At this meeting of the Senate it also took the following action concerning location and directed that it be forwarded to your Committee.

"Action on the College Location Question."

In view of the fact that the votes received by the Senate on the location of the Union College were the votes of the Missions and not the votes of the missionaries and noting in the minutes received from the committee in New York that the following action was taken—the location of the college to be determined by the co-operating Boards after the judgment of the majority of the missionaries shall have been ascertained—we request delay on the part of the Joint Committee until information can be furnished in conformity with the above quoted action.

We also suggest that since among the co-operating Missions are the Canadian Presbyterian and the Australian Presbyterian Missions, that the votes of their Board representatives be secured before decision is rendered.

Therefore, he it resolved,

1. That we request Mr. Jerdine and Mr. Moffett to each prepare an article setting forth the considerations that should weigh on either side of the college location proposition. The General Secretary shall have these printed in circular form, and sent to the members of the missionary bodies who are expected to vote on the question.

2. That the following form for vote be attached:

Individual vote on the one college location question:

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The Educational Senate desires you to carefully consider the question as set forth above, and then, irrespective of organic Mission vote, express your own individual and personal opinion in a direct categorical answer. The object of this is not to secure a binding vote but to ascertain the consensus of mature opinion in the missionary body.

Question:—

As between Seoul and Pyeng Yang, where do you, personally, think that a college will best secure for the entire country those ends which as missionary workers we seek in collegiate education.

3. That these votes shall be returned to the General Secretary within a month from the time of sending and he shall transcribe the names and send to the Joint Committee.

Members of the Mission body voting shall be limited to male missionaries who have been not less than one year on the field."

It was considered that this would also be a most valuable cross plowing of the question and give your committee even greater light on the real opinion of the missionary body than the majority votes of the individual Missions, although these are of course the authoritative voices, so far as authority exists on the field. It was also felt that it would greatly clarify the situation in the missionary body itself. It might even show the possibility of arriving at a decision on the field. This is greatly to be desired. It is no small factor in securing that hearty co-operation and backing of all parties which is the essential thing in the success of the institution.

In my former report to you I informed you that the vote of the Methodist Episcopal Mission, South, was said to have been practically unanimous on the college location question. I have been lately informed by another member of the same Mission that it stood six or seven to nine in favor of Seoul. No record of the vote seems to have been made in the Mission minutes and it is a question of memory. Both seem to be equally sure.

In the case of the vote of the Canadian Mission on the same question you will remember that my information was limited to a telegram. I have been since informed by a member of that Mission that the vote stood four to five in favor of Seoul with three members not having opportunity to vote. He also informed me that there had been a mistake as to their representative on the Senate. The situation seems rather confused, but I hope to have the correct information in a few days and will then forward the information. Believe me,

Yours in the Service,

JAS. E. ADAMS.

(XX)

LETTER A. J. B. TO J. E. A.

April 28th, 1913.

The Rev. James E. Adams,
Taiku, Chosen. (Korea).

My Dear Mr. Adams:—

The last mail brings your letter of March 31st and as I am deeply involved in some engagements which require absence from the office and then a trip to Atlanta, Georgia, to attend the General Assembly, I send a hurried answer at once.

I note with interest that you are expected, as General Secretary of the Educational Senate, to be the channel of communication with the Joint Committee in this country. I learn this morning, on inquiry and with some dismay that a copy of the Joint Committee's report, together with my letter to the Mission, No. 145, of April 15th, was not mailed separately to you. Of course, you saw it as a member of Taiku Station, but you ought to have additional copies for your official use as General Secretary of the Educational Senate. I therefore enclose these copies herewith.

One question that is not quite clear is as to the extent to which actions of the Educational Senate require confirmation by the co-operating Missions. For example, when the Senate voted to refer the question of college location to our Joint Committee with power, were we to infer that if our Joint Committee had settled the matter finally the Missions in Korea would have supported the position which your Educational Senate took? The same question arises in connection with the budget and list of property needs which you sent in your present letter. Are we to regard them as official, so far as field approval is concerned, before they are passed upon by the Mission?

There will be time enough for you to answer this question because our Joint Committee and the Boards cannot do anything really effective about getting money for new educational equipment in Korea on the proposed plan until the college location question is settled. It is true that considerable sums are asked for apart from the college proper, but it is also true that when we start out to get such large sums of money we must be prepared to submit a unified educational program. I hope this will be made very clear to the Missions. As long as they are so widely divided as they are now, as the correspondence indicates that each side is unwilling to yield, majority or no majority, and as long as individual missionaries are writing letters to their friends in this country advocating their particular view and depreciating the other, it will be very hard for those of us at home who have the educational interests of Korea at heart to make much headway, in comparison with other Mission fields where the missionaries stand together.

It is an interesting coincidence that your letter indicates that the Educational Senate had already decided to call for a vote by missionaries instead of Missions before the Senate knew of the recommendation of the Joint Committee in America. We are heartily glad of this, partly because it confirms my own judgment as to the wisdom of it and partly because it will facilitate an earlier decision.

Personally, I still adhere to the position that I have taken from the first, namely, that the essential thing is one Union College in Korea, in whose support all can unite and that while I have personal preference as to a location I will officially strongly support the location which is favored by the majority of all the missionaries concerned.

We are crowded now with special labors incident to preparations for the General Assembly. Everything points to a meeting of extraordinary character. I wish you could be present.

With warm regards to Mrs. Adams and with many prayers for God's loving blessing upon you all, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR J. BROWN.

(XXI)

LETTER OF J. E. A. TO A. J. B.

June 27, 1913.

Rev. A. J. Brown, D. D.,
Chairman Boards' Joint Committee on
Education in Korea.

My Dear Dr. Brown:—

Your favor of the 28th of April came to hand in due time, on June 19th. A special meeting of the Educational Senate was held and I brought up the question raised in your letter of the Senate authority on the field. The following action was taken:

"Passed that the General Secretary be instructed to answer Dr. Brown's inquiry as to the power of the Senate by saying that all the six Missions have ratified the constitution with the powers therein delegated, but that the delegation has been limited in the case of the Northern Presbyterian Mission alone by the Board Letter No. 64, page 3. We would ask an interpretation of this letter where it requires that actions of the Senate be subject to the review and control of the co-operating Missions. Aside from this the authority of the Senate is final on the field. We also request the Secretary to point out the difficulty of field operation if all the questions are to be passed on authoritatively by each of the individual Missions which only meet annually."

I enclose a printed copy of the constitution as passed by the Missions and ratified, I think, with the exception noted above, by all of the home Boards. Sections 8 and 10 deal with Senates relations and authority in matters of finance. You will see that Section 8 put the responsibility and authority for the direct financial support, administration and work of each institution in the hands of the individual mission, the Senate assisting, if the Mission so wishes, on special occasions and for special purposes. Section 10 directs the Senate to seek to secure and authorize it to administer funds for the maintenance and development of the general educational work under its care which work is designated in Sections 1-4 of the same Article. In pursuance of the meaning of Sections 8 and 10, of Article 5, the Senate in

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making out the financial estimates which were sent to the Joint Committee as representing what was needed for the further "development of the general Christian educational work in Korea under its care," carefully deducted the value of the present plants and the amount of present income. These already belonged to the individual mission. It was also recognized that any administration by the Senate of the funds secured must be general. Section 8 clearly placing limitations on using this matter. The Senate considers that in the matter of the estimates presented the authority of the Senate is final so far as the field is concerned, and so far as we know the point has never been questioned here.

You apply the same inquiry to the Senates' authority in referring the one college location question to the Joint Committee. Is the Senates' authority final on the fields? It may be answered "Yes" and "No". You will observe that Article 5, Section 4, of the Constitution, subscribed to by all the Missions, places absolutely, this authority in the hands of the Senate. There is no qualification, and no exception except the one quoted above of the North Presbyterian Mission Board action. The North Methodist at its annual meeting of 1912 first set the "one college and that in Seoul," hall rolling. Its action, as given you in a former communication, explicitly excludes authoritative action on the part of the Senate, and provided that unless practical unanimity was found among the Missions, it should be referred to America. In the October meeting of the Senate of the same year, the resolutions introduced were, I understand, two fold, indorsing the one college proposition, and providing for determining whether it should be in Seoul or Pyeng Yang. The first was adopted and the second rejected. The Mission representing the bulk of the missionary interests on the field having already taken action endorsing the present location, their representatives on the Senate, exercising the Senates authority, refused to open Panders' box.

At the January meeting of the Senate the matter was again introduced, and its members were made acquainted with the fact that the Cabinet of the North Methodist Mission, then sitting in session, had taken action to the effect that unless the Senate at that meeting consented to make some provision in the matter, the Mission would withdraw its educators from the Pyeng Yang institution and center them in Seoul. The Senate had full authority delegated to it by all the participating Missions, (with the one exception noted) but it became manifest that to exercise it, was to run itself upon the rocks, right in the beginning of its usefulness. It stood for many other important interests beside the one college question and therefore it was considered wiser to give way and refer the question. The Senate therefore in view of this, feels, while nominally referring the question with full field authority, really refers it with such field authority as it is able to exercise. If the exercise of the authority delegated it, had been freely conceded, there would have been no need of a reference. It could easily have been settled on the field, not only did a Senate majority of 7 to 5, and the Missions representing two-thirds of the missionary interests of the country favor the present location, but as was then contended, and has been lately demonstrated in the Senates popular vote, practically a two-thirds majority of the missionary body also stood for the present location.

The popular vote in the Missionary body on the question of the one college location, which was decided upon by the Senate at its March meeting, before the Joint Committees action was known, was completed about the time the Committee's recommendation arrived. The number of possible voters was 128. It was limited to men not less than one year on the field, 109 voted. Those who favored Seoul were 38. The rest voted for the present location.

In view of the request of the Joint Committee, however, that a vote of the Missionary body should be taken with the recommendation of the committee before the voter which should be made the official vote it was decided to take a second vote. That vote is now being taken in response to the committees' request.

The action of the Senate in the matter, at its recent meeting, was as follows:

Whereas the Joint Committee in America to which the question was referred, has requested that a popular vote be taken on the question, with the recommendation of the committee before the voter.

Resolved, that we a second time put the question to a vote in the missionary body as follows:

1. The vote shall be confined to the male members of the missions who have been on the field not less than one year.

2. All votes must be in the hands of the Secretary within one month of the time they are sent out by him.

3. The vote shall be on the following questions:

(1) On the hypothesis of one arts college for the entire country as between Seoul and Pyeng Yang, where do you personally think that a college will best secure for the entire country those ends which as Missionary workers we seek in collegiate education.

(2) Do you believe in two colleges rather than one only at Pyeng Yang?

(3) Do you believe in two colleges rather than one only at Seoul?

4. A copy of the Joint Committee's letter shall be submitted with the voting form to each voter, also a supplementary statement on behalf of either location, if so desired, by one whom the Senate may authorize.

5. The General Secretary of the Senate shall receive the vote, tabulate them, and submit a copy of the tabulation to the Senate members, each of the Missions and to the Joint Committee.

When the results of this vote are in I will forward the same to you for the Committee.

Yours in the service,

JAS. E. ADAMS.

It should be said that the Executive Committee of the North Presbyterian Mission subsequent to the reference, filed notice with the Senate that it had exceeded its authority in making the decision final in that the Board of that Mission had reserved finally of decision to itself, so far as its interests were concerned. (Board Letter No. 64, page —.)

(XXIII)

LETTER OF J. E. A. TO A. J. B.

June 23, 1913.

My Dear Dr. Brown:—

In the meeting of the Educational Senate, held June 19th, a question was raised on that passage in Mission Letter No. 145, a copy of which was enclosed with the copy of the Joint Committee's letter which you sent me as Secretary of the Senate, where you speak of the reasons which led our Board and our representatives on the Joint Committee to endorse the Seoul location for the college. You say:

"We were therefore confronted in our own Board with the necessity of agreeing to go to Seoul or of abandoning altogether the idea of one union college and of having a Presbyterian college in Pyeng Yang and Methodist college in Seoul. It became absolutely clear—that our Board believes that one union college is more important than the question of location."

The Joint Committee's letter takes very high ground on the "one college only" proposition. It repudiates the two college proposition as an impossible one, which neither the members of the Committee nor any of the Boards concerned will consent to consider. It is not an alternative even to be reached. In view of the strong position taken on this point, I cannot but admire the frank courage with which you state the considerations that influenced our Board and representatives on the Joint Committee, to vote in a way that you knew was contrary to the almost unanimous conviction of your Mission. This frank setting forth of the reasons to us, in recognition, that as a party in the question, we also have such interests involved, as to make necessary that the reasons should be made known, goes a long way toward reconciling us to your position. Considerations of expediency, the surrender of a lesser for the attainment of a greater, are often the determining considerations in a decision.

That is to say they may be, if no principle is involved. Unfortunately, in the present case, a very fundamental principle is involved. All parties are agreed that the question ought have been settled upon the field. An unwilling minority, however, insisted upon a reference. The majority gave way and consented, but upon the explicit agreement that the question should, be referred as a perfectly open question, quite capable of settlement for all parties in either of its alternatives; that it should be decided by the referee committee upon its merits; in view of the field conditions that in the mind of the Committee ought to determine in the case. You can readily see that

no other basis of agreement to reference was possible. A question to be capable of reference must be an open question, and the referees must settle it on the basis of the referring parties agreement.

The Senate at the above mentioned meeting took the following action. As I remember it was unanimous—representatives of all Missions agreeing to it.

"Passed, that Dr. Adams be requested to write to Dr. Brown, drawing his attention to the passage in Board Letter No. 145, a copy of which was sent the General Secretary, and asking for an interpretation of the same. If it means that the Northern Presbyterian Board was influenced in its position, because there was no alternative to a Union College in Seoul, except a Presbyterian College in Pyeng Yang and a Methodist College in Seoul, the Senate wishes to state that this does not represent the sense in which the question was referred, but that either location is to be considered as an open alternative for all parties."

I apprehend that your frank statement of reasons, indicates some little restiveness on your own part at the situation, and your assistance upon the referendum is a recognition of the principle spoken of above, and a determination that the actual field facts that should be determinative shall be elicited before the decision is made final. No exception can be taken by any fair-minded man to the position taken in your letter to me, to the effect that while you have your personal preference as to location, officially you will strongly support the location which is favored by the majority of all the missionaries concerned. That is my own position as general secretary of the Educational Senate, on the basis of which I originally insisted upon, and pushed through, the popular vote on the question first taken by the Senate.

With cordial regards,

Yours in the service of the King,

(Signed) JAS. E. ADAMS.

(XXIII)

LETTER FROM BOARD NO. 167

In Repower of the Educational Senate

July 30th, 1913.

To the Korea Mission and the Educational Senate.

Dear Friends:—

The Rev. Dr. James E. Adams, as General Secretary of the Educational Senate, writes me, under date of June 27th, transmitting and explaining the following action of the Senate at its meeting June 19th:

"Passed that the General Secretary be instructed to answer Dr. Brown's inquiry as to the power of the Senate by saying that all the six Missions have ratified the constitution with the powers therein delegated, but that this delegation has been limited in the case of the Northern Presbyterian Mission alone by Board Letter No. 64, page 3. We would ask an interpretation of this letter where it requires that actions of the Senate be subject to the review and control of the co-operating Missions. Aside from this the authority of the Senate is final on the field. We also request the Secretary to point out the difficulty of field operation if all the questions are to be passed on authoritatively by each of the individual Missions which only meet annually."

The question of the Senate is a very natural one and yet one that it is difficult to answer. Indeed, I doubt whether it is possible to limit with mathematical accuracy the precise powers of a Committee as distinguished from the powers of the body or bodies that appointed it. Two extremes are to be avoided.

One is the extreme of requiring that actions of the Senate are not to be deemed valid unless they are ratified by the six co-operating Missions in Korea and the six co-operating Boards at home. If the Mission and the Educational Senate have placed this construction upon the action of our Board, to which Dr. Adams refers, we promptly wish to correct it. Such a position would destroy the efficiency of the Educational Senate and involve such an amount of red tape which would be worthy of the traditional Circumlocution Office. One is reminded of the strict rules of the medieval Spanish Court regarding the persons who had authority to touch a member of the royal family, so that when a baby prince fell into the fire he was badly burned because the numerous servants in the room did not include ones of those who had authority to touch the royal person. The Educational Senate, like

other committees, has presumably been appointed in the interest of efficiency and efficiency would be impossible under any such interpretation of our Board's position.

The other extreme is to regard the Educational Senate when once constituted as virtually independent of the Missions and the Boards, so that it has power to do almost anything that it desires to do. Our Board feels that this alternative is quite as undesirable as the other. It would be especially objectionable in educational matters. One of the most solemn duties and responsibilities of the Missions and Boards is the training of the youths who are to form the future ministry and laity of the church. The Boards and Missions have neither the moral nor the legal right to abdicate that responsibility and turn it over to a body of men who could adopt any policy they pleased without being considered amenable to the Boards and the Missions. It is not a question of confidence in the particular men who, for the time, constitute that Senate. Even the best men sometimes do unwise things, while we must have regard not only to present membership but to a future membership. It was because our Board believed that the first draft of the constitution of the Educational Foundation, which was submitted to the Board, adopted this extreme view, however unintentionally and virtually made the Senate once constituted independent of both the Boards and the Mission; it was because of this construction, I say, the Board took the action that it did. Painful experience in several other fields has shown that the tendency of large educational institutions is apt to be centrifugal to the Missions and Boards which develop them unless they are kept in very close and vital relations with the Missions and Boards. While the Board therefore, deemed it necessary to guard this point, it did not intend to swing clear over to the other extreme.

You will understand, therefore, why I said at the beginning that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a line which shall delimit with mathematical precision the respective functions of the Educational Senate in relation to the Missions and the Boards. It seems to us that there must be a kind of twilight zone here in which each side must trust the other. The attitude of the Board toward the University Council of the Shantung Christian University may be used as an illustration. The University Council has been in existence for a number of years and is the Field Board of Managers for one of our largest and best educational enterprises. It is composed of members elected by the co-operating Missions and it is amenable to the Boards at home. As a matter of fact, however, while our Board receives the minutes of the University Council just as it receives the minutes of the Mission meeting it is not our custom to take action on anything that does not directly and in an important way involve the responsibilities of the Board at home. We leave that University Council a very large measure of discretion in handling its problems.

The same principle governs the relations of the Board to the Missions. Theoretically the Board has complete power, practically the Board proceeds upon the supposition that a Mission is composed of wise and able and devoted missionaries who should be given the largest possible measure of discretion in handling their local problems and work, and that the Board should not over-rule a Mission even when it disagrees with it, unless the matter is one on which it is necessary for the Board to act. If you will eliminate actions of the Korea Mission which call for money which the Board is expected to provide and on which, therefore, it must of course decide whether it can provide it, and if you will also eliminate questions which the Mission itself asks the Board to decide, I think you will find that the Board passes on an exceedingly small proportion of your Mission actions. Even in the case of some questions that you have referred to the Board I have repeatedly advised the Board to acquiesce in the Mission action for which I would not have voted if I had been on the field, because as I have explained to the Board many a time, while the Mission action does not impress us as desirable, nevertheless, it does not affect the responsibilities or expenditures of the Board and as the missionaries on the field are the ones directly concerned by it and as they are good men and women who presumably have had reasons for their actions, which may not have appeared in the correspondence, I think the Board should not interfere.

Q. We not treat the Educational Senate in substantially the same way? A. It is composed of very able, experienced and representative missionaries. Let us trust them and not insist that everything that they do must have the specific endorsement of six different bodies on the field and six different bodies at home. On the other hand, we must, of course, reserve our right in the interest of the general cause to intervene when some large and vital question is involved on which we may justly have a voice. Mutual consideration and forbearance should certainly prevail in a matter of this kind.

This may not be a very satisfactory answer to the question of the Educational Senate but I hardly know what else I could write. I shall be glad to discuss the matter further if either the Mission or the Senate desires me to do so.

Sincerely yours,
ARTHUR J. BROWN.

(XXIV) SENATE MINUTES

Appended Notes to Senate Action on College Location Question.
June 13th, 1914.

The Senate of the Educational Federation of Missions in Korea desires to make the following statement of the situation of the college location question, and its position on the same, to the missionary body of the country.

The mutual relations of several bodies both on the field and at home are concerned in the matter. On the field, there is the Federation of Missions as represented by this Senate; there are also the separate organized Missions, each carrying its own individual interests, and its relations to the home end, in which it alone is concerned, as well as being a constituent body in the Federation. At the home end there is the Joint Committee of the Boards, and each separate individual Board, the governing body, after their own mode of organization, of its own Mission. These relations must be kept in mind, and their proper individual interests and rights, as well as their federated relations, be given full consideration in any position which this Senate may take.

It is well known to all that the Joint Committee of the Boards in America has made a recommendation to the Boards concerning college work in this land, which the Boards have adopted, and which has been transmitted by the Joint Committee to this Senate, and by each Board to its individual Mission. This decision may be viewed in two lights; and for clarity of understanding it is exceedingly desirable that these two should be separated, and each considered in itself.

I. It may be looked upon as the decision of a referee body made such by this Senate, and therefore a decision binding upon all the constituent Missions.

II. It may be looked upon as the decision of a body acting upon authority derived directly from the Boards, the governing bodies of the individual field Missions, and therefore a decision binding upon all the constituent Missions.

I. Senate Reference to Joint Committee.

May we present these in their order.

After a very careful consideration of all the related matter, this Senate feels constrained to inform its constituent Missions, and the Joint Committee, that it finds itself unable to accept the decision as an answer to the reference of the location question made by this Senate to the Joint Committee. We cannot regard it as binding.

The Senate is painfully aware of the gravity of this position, and of the criticism to which it may quite possibly give rise. We are convinced however, that to so accept it would not be a proper exercise of that stewardship of their interests which we hold from the separate constituent Missions. We trust that the following presentation will lead you to agree with us in this position:

1. At its meeting of December 20, 1912, the Senate having decided upon one Christian College for all Korea, deemed it wiser, in the exercise of the authority constitutionally delegated to it, to determine its location by the decision of a referee body, and so referred that point to the Joint Committee in America. Its action was as follows:

"Re Deciding the Location of One Christian College for Korea.

1. That the Senate now proceed to vote on the question of location of one Christian College for Korea.

2. That we report to the Joint Committee in New York the vote of the Senate, including the vote of the absent members, to be obtained by the Secretary.

3. That we instruct the General Secretary to forward to the Joint Committee the results of the votes taken by the various Missions.

4. That we shall consider the decision reached by the Joint Committee as final."

5. At its meeting of March 3rd, 1913, the Executive Committee of the Northern Presbyterian Mission passed and communicated to the Senate, the following action.

"The Executive Committee wishes to point out to the Educational Senate that in its action of reference of the question of location of college to the Joint Committee in America, the clause making the action of that Committee final does not lie within the province of the Senate to decide. The action of our Board ratifying the constitution of the Senate and permitting our Mission to participate included the following:

"The Board therefore while heartily sympathizing... saw no alternative but to make its approval subject to the condition that all acts and proceedings of... the Senate of the Educational Foundation shall be subject to the review and control of the co-operating Missions on the field, and, through them, of the Boards at home, in the same way as other union institutions."

3. The Chairman of the Joint Committee, in sending to the Secretary of the Senate the first recommendation of the Joint Committee for location in Seoul and calling for a field vote on the question, also included his letter to his own Mission on the subject. In this letter was the following passage:

"We were therefore confronted in our own Board with the necessity of agreeing to go to Seoul or of abandoning altogether the idea of one Union College and of having a Presbyterian College in Pyeng Yang and a Methodist College in Seoul. It became absolutely clear that our Board believes that one Union College is more important than the question of location.

This was brought to the attention of the Senate at its meeting of June 19th, 1913, and the Senate took the following action:

"Passed that Dr. Adams be requested to write to Dr. Brown, drawing his attention to the passage in Board Letter No. 145, a copy of which was sent the General Secretary; and ask for an interpretation of the same. If it means that the Northern Presbyterian Board was influenced in its position because there was no alternative to a Union College in Seoul except a Presbyterian College in Pyeng Yang and a Methodist College in Seoul, the Senate wishes to state that this does not represent the sense in which the question was referred, but that either location is to be considered as an open alternative for all parties."

The Secretary in transmitting this pointed out that no other basis for a reference was possible, and that the referee must settle the question on the basis of the referring parties' agreement.

4. On October 20th, 1913, in answer to a query of the Chairman of the Joint Committee, concerning the irreconcilability of the minority in the field vote, to a location in Pyeng Yang, the Secretary pointed out that according to the tally sheet forwarded the irreconcilable minority could not be more than eighteen out of all voting, and then proceeded:

"There is however a factor concerning which I am not fully informed but of the reality of which I am well convinced, and which I consider to militate against the union project much more than the above, and more than any field condition. It is the unwillingness of the Methodist Board to consider the Pyeng Yang location. You yourself frankly spoke of this. Dr. Goucher who is out here and attended the late Senate meeting, told me privately of the same thing and with comparative positiveness. When questioned upon it in the Senate, while not making so flat-footed a statement, gave it as his opinion, from an intimate knowledge of their Secretaries' position, that they could not consider the Pyeng Yang location.

If this is the case I think that simple honesty, and justice to the Missionary body, and to all parties concerned in the question, alike demand that it should be known, and publicly and officially stated. Otherwise referen-

dums and negotiations are simply of form and not of fact are so much valuable strength and time but illy spent.

I feel that I am not out of place in speaking thus freely in that the missionary body, which the Senate and I as its executive officer represent, has now spoken decisively on the subject."

5. Dr. Brown has sent to the Secretary of the Senate a copy of his Mission letter containing the decision of the Joint Committee of January 15, 1914 and his Board. Speaking of the meeting of the Joint Committee he says:

"As soon as the main question was taken up, the fact developed that a Union College at Pyeng Yang was impossible for the simple reason that the Boards could not be united on Pyeng Yang, some, whose co-operation would be indispensable to a union college, feeling that they could not possibly go there for higher education.

In view of these facts the Senate can only regard the reference of the location question, made by itself to the Joint Committee, as having been invalidated; the conditions on which the referring parties agreed, and the sense in which the reference was made having been impaired. We may also say that in substance this would also seem to be the view of the Joint Committee, in that the certified copy of the Committee's decision sent the Secretary of the Senate is in no wise framed as a reply to the Senate's reference; no mention is made of the Senate or its reference in it; nor is it referred to in the accompanying letter of the Committees' Secretary. The decision is expressly based upon direct Board authority, and later the Joint Committee itself expressly puts it upon that ground; (Official Letteer, April 25th, 1914).

"The Joint Committees' Report had no authority until it had been submitted to and acted upon by the constituent Boards."

No position is left the Senate therefore but to hold that neither itself nor constituent Missions, as parties in the reference, are under obligations to accept the decision.

(XXV) LETTER, JOINT COMMITTEE TO REV. J. E. ADAMS, D. D.

May 19, 1914.

The Rev. James E. Adama, D. D.,
Secretary of the Senate of the Educational Foundation,
Taiku, Chosen. (Korea).

Dear Dr. Adams:

We received May 11th the minutes of the meeting of the Senate, March 20th and 21st, and the Secretary of the Joint Committee, Dr. North, received a few days earlier your letter to him of April 6th. We had already seen from another source a copy of the action, but the Joint Committee did the Senate the justice of deferring official action until the arrival of an official communication from you. The Joint Committee has now taken the following action, fifty copies of this letter being sent to you for your convenience, in distributing them among the co-operating Missions:

"The Joint Committee of the Boards on Education in Korea has given careful consideration to the action of the Senate of the Educational Foundation in Korea at its meeting March 20th and 21st and to the letter of the Rev. James E. Adams, D. D., Secretary of the Senate, to the Rev. Frank Mason North, D. D., Secretary of the Joint Committee, dated April 6th. Distant members of the Joint Committee, except the Australians, who could not attend the conference in New York have been consulted by letter and the Joint Committee now makes the following reply, the full text of which has been passed upon by all the North American members:

"First: That as to the protest of the Senate against the alleged 'withholding of and long delay in giving official information' to the Senate regarding the action taken, reply he made that there was no 'withholding or delay,' the official letter of the Chairman of the Joint Committee having been dictated and mailed immediately after the receipt of the votes of a majority of the Boards.

"Second: That as to the action of the Senate 'in concluding the reference' and questioning the right of the Joint Committee to go 'beyond the matter referred to it by the Senate,' reply he made that the Joint Committee does not derive its jurisdiction from the Senate in Korea but from the

boards which appointed it and in whose behalf it acts, that the Committee is empowered, subject to ratification of its recommendations by the Boards, to deal with any and every subject affecting educational work in Korea which concerns the co-operative relations and activities of the Boards, that the action characterized by the Senate as that of the Joint Committee was the action of all five of the Boards in North America, the Australian Board being too far away to be heard from in time; and that this action stands unless and until it shall be modified by the Boards which adopted it and which instructed the Joint Committee to send it to the field.

"Third: That the Joint Committee deeply regrets that partial and unexplained accounts of its report reached the field from private and unofficial sources before the report had been acted upon by the Boards, and therefore before it had any authority, and that the Senate made these partial and unexplained unofficial accounts the basis of official action.

"Fourth: That the construction which the Senate has placed upon the action of the Boards, in 'interpreting the reply of the Joint Committee as meaning that, in their judgment, one collegiate institution only for the entire country is not a feasible proposition and that there are to be two,' is radically at variance with the intent of the Joint Committee and the Boards, the Joint Committee and all five of the Boards in North America having no intention whatever of supporting two colleges in Korea, so that any plans that may be in progress in Korea on the supposition that two Colleges will be countenanced are proceeding upon a mistaken assumption.

"Fifth: That, while the question of two types of College may be a practical issue in Korea on account of present differences of opinion among missionaries who are now on the field, this issue is not a practical one from the viewpoint of the five Boards in North America and of the Joint Committee, as they will support only one type of College in any event, and that type one that is pervaded in every fibre of its organization and personnel by a Christian evangelistic spirit and which will make its chief object the training of students for Christian leadership as ministers, teachers or laymen.

"Sixth: That the difficulty of securing funds is so great that the utmost united efforts of all concerned will suffice to provide only one institution for Korea and that on a modest scale; that the Joint Committee and the five Boards in North America are cordially ready to do everything in their power to provide such a college, that it is clear that it can be provided only in Seoul, and that if the effort to establish it shall fail because of opposition on the field, the missionaries concerned must be prepared to assume full responsibility for losing the present opportunity and for failing to secure for Korea a Christian College which will meet the urgent needs of the situation and obtain respect and support at home.

"Seventh: That in view of the tone of the Communication from the majority of the missionaries in Korea as expressed in the action of the Senate of the Educational Foundation and the protests of March 23rd and April 2d of 44 members of the Northern Presbyterian Mission to the Presbyterian Board, the Joint Committee deems it impracticable to take further steps toward financing educational work in Korea until the coming annual meetings of the Missions shall have indicated the further mind of the Missionaries and show whether they can harmonize their differences, it being quite out of the question to expect givers to make large contributions for education in Korea as long as the present divisions exist.

"Eighth: That in order to afford a concrete basis for such a determinative vote of the Missions, as well as to render it possible to proceed without further delay in case the vote shall justify progress, the enclosed tentative draft of a Constitution he forwarded to be filed for such action as the Missions may deem practicable, that the Senate and the Missions be reminded that this constitution has not yet been officially acted upon by the Boards, the Joint Committee desiring the criticisms and suggestions of the Senate and Missions before asking the Boards to take final action, and it being futile in any event to expect the Boards to commit themselves to the proposed expenditures unless they can be assured that a union college, if established, will have larger support from the missionary body than present correspondence indicates.

Ninth: That the Joint Committee, in line with its action of April 22d as summarized in Chairman Brown's letter of April 25th to the Rev. Dr. James E. Adams, Secretary of the Senate, feels unable to approve or to

assume financial or other responsibility for the provisional action that was taken in Seoul March 27th at a meeting of "those interested in the Union Christian College for Korea," the Joint Committee holding that the union College should not be so organized by one of the parties to the present controversy, but by the whole body of missionaries acting through their respective Missions in approving a new constitution and electing a Field Board of Managers as indicated in the preceding action."

By order of the Joint Committee,

ARTHUR J. BROWN
S. H. CHESTER
ED. F. COOK
JOHN F. GOUCHER
R. P. MACKAY
FRANK MASON NORTH.
ROBERT E. SPEER
(The Australian member, Dr. Paton, could not be consulted on account of distance.)

(XXVI.)

BOARD LETTER NO. 228, JULY 8, 1914

July 8th, 1914.

Reply of the Board to the Protests from the Mission Against the Action of the Board February 2

To the Korea Mission.

Dear Friends:

At a special meeting of the Board June 25th the following self-explanatory action was taken:

"The Executive Council reported conferences with the men who had been asked to constitute a deputation to visit the Korea Mission in accordance with the Board's action of June 15th, that it had been found very difficult to make arrangements for an immediate carrying out of the plan, and that, irrespective of the feasibility of arranging for such an immediate deputation, grave doubts had developed as to whether a deputation at this particular juncture would be opportune or effective until the Missions have reconsidered the whole question by themselves in the light of a clear statement of the Board's position. The Executive Council therefore felt that it should seek further instructions from the Board. After discussion, it was voted to authorize the Executive Council to defer arrangements for a deputation until the September meeting of the Board, the Board believing that the reply of the Joint Committee of the Boards, May 19th, to the Senate of the Educational Foundation in Korea, was a wise reply and that it is expedient that the course indicated should be followed 'until the coming annual meetings of the Missions shall have indicated the further mind of the missionaries and show whether they can harmonize their differences.' Whether a deputation will then be necessary can be determined at that time.

"Meantime, the Board believed that it was due the Mission and at the same time expedient in the interest of a clearer mutual understanding, that some reply should be made to the protests of the Mission, and the following reply was therefore adopted:

"The Board has given long and careful consideration to the protests from the Mission against the action of the Board February 2d, in uniting with the other Boards in North America having work in Korea, on the proposed Union Christian College in Korea, copies of the protests having been mailed to all the members of the Board several weeks in advance of this meeting, so that the full Board has had ample opportunity to know the position of the protestants. Conscious only of an earnest desire to seek that which is best for the cause of Christ, to remove misapprehensions as to the Board's attitude, and to make its position more intelligible, the appended explanations are submitted for the thoughtful consideration of the Mission:

"The protesting missionaries apparently overlook the fact that the Board is not dealing solely with a majority and minority of our own Mission. The Board and the Mission having agreed to enter into a union on the initiative of the Missionaries themselves, the Board is now dealing with five other Boards at the home base and with the whole body of Missionaries in the Missions in Korea. It is true that if missionaries alone are counted, the majority for Pyeng Yang is a majority of the whole body of missionaries. But the Board must consider all the parties both at home and on the field

whose responsibilities are involved. Of the six Missions in Korea, the vote of 1912 was three Missions for Pyeung Yang, two for Seoul, and the vote of the sixth Mission was a tie. The vote of the Senate of the Educational Foundation in Korea in 1912 was a tie and after the votes of absent members were obtained the poll stood seven for Pyeung Yang to six for Seoul. Of the six Boards, all five of those in North America voted for Seoul. While it is true that the numerical preponderance of our own Mission has given a majority for Pyeung Yang in the polls of individual missionaries, these other facts may be fairly taken into consideration in arriving at a balanced judgment. The Board must be governed by a broad view of the entire situation as developed in joint study of the whole situation in conference with all the parties concerned.

"The Board observes that the protests attach essential importance to their belief that 'this is a field question' and that the Board has no 'moral right' to a decision on it other than to ratify the vote of a majority of the missionaries. In the exercise of its trust as the administrative foreign missionary agency of the Church, the Board always gives large consideration to the judgment of a Mission, leaves to it all practicable discretion in the local supervision of its work, and does not set aside its judgment save in exceptional cases, and then almost invariably where the obligations of the Board or justice to other Missions are seriously involved. The project now under consideration is far from being merely 'a field question.' It involves the Board in responsibilities for the expenditure of large sums of money, the appointment and support of missionaries, relations with other Boards, and a variety of other responsibilities which are inseparable from the discharge of the duty which the Church has committed to the Board. The Mission itself tacitly recognizes this when it says that 'all it (the Pyeung Yang College) needs is more encouragement from the New York end' and 'a stronger support.' The kind of 'encouragement' and 'support' needed is evidenced by the Mission's call upon the Board at its last annual meeting for another professor in addition to the four already maintained and for Yeu 260,000 for new property and endowment. In the circumstances, the Board is obliged to consider whether it can assume the financial and other burdens incident to the maintenance of a College in Korea, except as these burdens will be shared by the other Boards which form the union. The Board confidently expects that the missionaries will recognize the reasonableness of this position and that they will not cherish the feeling that the Board does not 'trust their judgment' because after full consultation with them and careful consideration of their views, it feels bound by its sense of duty as an administrator of trust funds to express a conclusion as to the financial and other burdens that it can properly assume.

"The protests apparently assume that the issue is now whether there shall be a union College in Pyeung Yang or two denominational Colleges. The Board does not regard this as a practicable alternative. The other Presbyterian Boards are understood to be unprepared to give large financial support to a College in Korea wherever it may be located, so that a Presbyterian College in Pyeung Yang would have to be mainly dependent upon our Board. The Board believes that it would not be morally right or financially feasible or just to institutions and missions in other fields to undertake to support a denominational College in Korea. When every consideration of efficiency, economy and Christian statesmanship calls for one union College and when it is exceedingly doubtful whether a denominational College could be maintained even if the Board did vote for it. The conviction of the Board, as epitomized in its action of June 6th, 1910, and repeatedly reaffirmed in substance since, is that for a comparatively small country like Korea, with a railway running the whole length of it in twenty-four hours, with a population for which Presbyterians are responsible of only six or seven millions and a total population for all denominations of less than double that number, without limited resources in men and money, and with our immense educational program in twenty-seven Missions and for 100,000,000 of people, one union College for Korea, with its affiliated and auxiliary schools, will be all that there is any reasonable hope of financing from America.

"And the Board believes, as it understands that the Mission also believes apart from any question of type or location, that Korea does not need two mission Colleges. It may be reasonably assumed that in the

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United States the general diffusion of education and the great number of preparatory schools, the proportion of young men who go from the lower schools to College is at least as great as could be expected in Korea, even when full allowance is made for the scholarly ambitious of the people. But experts report that of two hundred children entering primary schools in America, there will be found an average in the last year grammar school of 80, in the fourth year high school 16, and in the graduation class from College, one. On this basis and that of the official returns for all the Protestant schools in Korea, there would be at the most 500 or 600 College students. Any increase in the number is likely to be fully offset by the educational plans of the Japanese, who regard education as a function of the State, who are rapidly establishing government schools, who are pressing Korean parents to patronize them, and who, planning an elaborate development of these schools, and, in time, a government College; while the Imperial Universities in Japan, among the best equipped universities in the world, and how easy of access from Korea, are already drawing some Korea college students and are likely to draw more. Graduates of all the government schools in Korea will be urged by the Japanese to take their higher courses in the government College when established, and until then in Japan. The prestige which a diploma from a government institution gives its holder, and the avenues to official favor and position which it opens will make it increasingly attractive to Korean young men. In these circumstances, the student constituency for College grades will inevitably have to be divided with the government institutions. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that one Christian College could easily handle all the secondary school output from Mission schools that can wisely be counted upon.

"Moreover the Board long ago in common with other Boards definitely committed itself to the policy of union in higher educational work and has adopted it in many fields. Missions in many countries have been active in promoting this policy, and the Korea missionaries themselves, before the present issue as to location became so acute, voted by an overwhelming majority that one Christian College would suffice for Korea. Absolutely no reason has emerged for abandoning this policy except the inability of the Missionaries to agree upon the location and type of a union college. This is not a reason which is likely to impress givers in America, who, as a rule, strongly favor union institutions and who prefer to place their money in those which represent the united efforts of missionaries. Money and men for a College in Korea would have to be secured from sources which are also sought by many union Colleges, professional schools and academies in China, India, Japan and other countries, which represent a harmonious union of the co-operating Missions and nearly all of which serve populations far in excess of the population of Korea, as, for example, the Shantung Christian University whose territory has over 45,000,000 inhabitants, the North China Union College for a population of 28,000,000, the Nanking Christian University for a population of 30,000,000, etc. In these circumstances, a denominational college in Pyeung Yang, four hours by rail from another denominational college in Seoul, would have small chance of surviving; nor could the Board, consistently with its own judgment or in justice to other Missions, give it adequate support or honestly commend it to donors who might ask its judgment as to relative needs.

"It must also be borne in mind that the whole system of Mission primary schools and academies in Korea is in such dire need of better equipment, teaching staff and annual financial support that it is in imminent danger. It will tax to the utmost all conceivable effort that can be equitably made for Korea to obtain even the minimum that will suffice for these schools and for one modestly equipped union College and the theological, medical and normal schools required. It is not within the bounds of reasonable probability that a Christian College can be financed in Korea unless it has the united support of Presbyterian and Methodist Boards alike. Fewer institutions and better sustained ones must be our effort if Christian education is to win respect and hold the leadership in this new era. The two-college 'solution' of the present problem in Korea would therefore not be a solution at all. It would mean not only harmful rivalry but struggling, half-equipped institutions which would sacrifice economy and efficiency to conflicting ideas which ought to be harmonized. The Board carefully recognizes

the right of the Mission to ask the Board not to force the Missionaries to co-operate with a College at Seoul against their judgment; and the Board is sure that the Mission will as cordially recognize the right of the Board to determine what financial and other responsibilities shall be assumed for the Presbyterian Church in its foreign missions. The Board is ready to proceed on the basis of one union College; and if the missionaries are not ready, the monetary and other consequences of their differences should not be devolved upon the Board and its constituency in the home Church by the requirement that the Boards shall furnish men and money for two Colleges where only one is really needed.

"The Board is surprised that the protests should assume that it has acted 'in feverish haste' or without understanding the conditions of the field. The Board reached its conclusion after very long and careful deliberation, copies of the Mission's own presentations of the case having been mailed by Secretary Brown to the members of the Board and before the meetings at which the decisive votes were taken and the votes having been preceded by discussions which brought out both sides of the question. The question of one or two Colleges in Korea has been discussed in Board actions and in letters for four years. The particular question now under consideration has been before the Board at various times for nearly two years and the correspondence has been exceedingly voluminous.

"There are a number of misapprehensions in the protests from the Mission which relate to various details of the discussion and correspondence which, while important and deserving at some time a fuller explanation, the Board would defer in order to deal now only with the central difficulty of the situation.

"Pending some further arrangement, the Board is not disposed to withdraw the support which the Mission is now assigning to collegiate work at Pyeng Yang within the limits of its present force and annual budget. But this must not be construed as implying an acquiescence by the Board in an indefinite continuance of the College at Pyeng Yang, unless it shall be found within a reasonable time, the duration of which the Board shall determine, that the one union College for Korea can be developed there. The Board cannot approve any effort on the part of either party of missionaries to create decision as to the location of a union College at either Seoul or Pyeng Yang and the Board would regard such efforts, if made, as a breach of good faith, the Board agreeing with the Joint Committee of the Boards that the union College should not be organized by one of the parties to the present controversy, but by the whole body of missionaries acting through their respective Missions in approving a new constitution and electing a Field Board of Managers. It would not be just to other Missions or to givers in the home Church or consistent with the established policy of which the Board has been for many years one of the most prominent advocates, with the full knowledge and approval of the General Assembly, for the Board to pledge an increase of appropriations or re-enforcements to Korea on account of a denominational College or to appeal for or accept funds for such a College or for parts of two Colleges where one union College would more effectively serve the larger interests of the cause of Christ. The Board will gladly consider a compromise on any other phase of the College question, but the policy of one union College for Korea as against two Colleges should be regarded as a settled one and no adjustment that is inconsistent with it should be considered. The Board adheres to its repeatedly expressed conviction that there should be developed one well-equipped Christian College in Korea and that this College should represent a union of the Methodist and Presbyterian Missions. If the effort to provide such a College now shall fail on account of disagreements among the missions, it would be better to wait for some agreement rather than to project rival institutions from coming generation on the basis of present differences among missionaries who are now on the field.

"It is painfully apparent that the differences that are pending prevent the successful establishment of a union College under present conditions. The Board fears that long postponement would jeopardize the future of the Church in Korea and the opportunity to secure for Christianity its rightful place in the development of Korean thought and life; but it feels that the correspondence from the field indicates states of feeling there which must be reconciled before any prudent effort can be made to finance educational

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work in Korea.

"Meantime, the Board was gratified to learn that the Methodist Episcopal Board had not authorized its Korea Mission to withdraw the use of the academy building at Pyeng Yang, and that it had cabled and written to its Mission urging the 'maintenance of the union status at Pyeng Yang' pending 'special efforts at conciliation.' This action of the Methodist Episcopal Board, taken in connection with the action of our Board June 15th and at the meeting today, were considered as answering the Mission's request in the Rev. Dr. S. A. Moffett's official letter of May 30th and Rev. Dr. Wm. M. Baird's letter of May 19th for an immediate appropriation, or for authority to appeal for the money for an academy building at Pyeng Yang."

In behalf of the Board,

ARTHUR J. BROWN,
Secretary.

(XXVII.) LETTER OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE TO BOARD,
SEPTEMBER 4, 1913.

Seoul, Korea, Sept. 4th, 1913.

To the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in U. S. A.
Dear Brethren:

The vote taken of the Missionary body of the country, on the location of the one Arts and Science College for Korea, on the referendum to us of the question by the Boards' Joint Committee, has been concluded, and the results returned by our Educational Senate to the Joint Committee. The question will doubtless again come before your Board for action. As the Executive Committee of your Korea Mission and representative of it, we desire that you have certain facts pertinent to the question fresh in your mind when your action is taken. We do not suppose they are entirely new to you, but we cannot believe that your former vote was taken with them clearly present in your mind.

Before proceeding to these, we would draw your attention to the proportionate relation which the work of this Mission holds to the entirety of the work of the 26 Missions which your Board operates. We do not do this in any spirit of vain glory, but that you may have in mind that there is such a proportion of your work here, and that it has developed in such character, and that the number of your Missionaries is such as to command more than a passing consideration to the question, and more than a passing consideration to their judgment.

According to your last annual report there is 11% of your entire body of Missionaries here in Korea; there is 15% of your entire force native agents here; there is 31% of all the full church communicants which you report, and 41% of all those who were added to the church membership last year. In Korea, even under all the conditions we have been meeting during the last few years, there are 42% of all new converts or catechumans. There are 58% of all the Sunday School scholars attached to your work, and 60% of the Sunday Schools. Thirty-one per cent of all ordinary Schools which you control are here, and 77% of all those which are self-supporting. The Church developed here, in Church and Congregational expenses, in building and repairs, and in Home and Foreign Missions, gives 31% of all you report from the field contributed to these objects. But 9% of your total field appropriations come to this land.

Again we say, we do not speak of this in any sense of glorying. "Ye have compelled us. Bear with us therefore though we speak as fools." These data are enough to show that the location and establishment of a College here is for at least one-third of your entire developed constituency. As your representatives here in Korea, we realized far more clearly, probably, than yourselves that as a question it means far more than even this. For the roots of the question, go back to those principles and methods which, we do not hesitate to say, have, humanly speaking, played no small part in securing for you in this one small land that constitutes one-third of your entire constituency and, having done it, relatively, at so small a charge to your budget. If you will bear this assertion in mind, we believe that you will find it amply vindicated further on, where we make a comparison of the relative efficiency of the churches developed in this same land under the different policies obtaining in the various missions at work here. All Missions in Korea do not pursue these policies or adhere to these principles.

In the matter of this College, we are convinced from the communication of the Joint Committee, and from the vote of our Board on the same, that we on the field and you at home have two radically different ideas in mind, and are looking at two radically different things. There are two fundamental principles which determined the policies of your workers here from the beginning. One has been the direct preaching of the Gospel—the putting of spiritual things first—the putting of them clear ahead of everything else and keeping them there—the retiring of possible grounds of ulterior motive—the retiring of even necessary secondary agencies far enough into the rear so that in the mind of the developing church the spiritual standard would be high and clear, and there would be no possible confusion on this point. This has been in the belief that there is in the Gospel itself an accompanying superhuman power that works salvation. The second has been, while continually seeking to secure an increasing dominance of the first, to encourage, inspire, enable the growing church to stand on its own feet, to hold this Gospel as its own, not ours; to thrust upon it a sense of all those responsibilities which before God are involved in this position and to ourselves retire into the rear.

Except you yourselves had been here, and intimately acquainted with the development of the work, it is impossible for you to appreciate in how many ways and how providentially these principles have been rendered applicable, as they have not been possible in other fields, and how they have ramified and determined the policies in every department of our work. We realize that, while perfectly clear to us, it is even impossible for us to clearly set forth the extent of it to others. In their outworking they have entirely dominated the system of education which we have developed. With us the Church throughout its entire rank and file is the evangelizing organization of the country. Education is strictly the handmaid of the Church. Education as a direct evangelizing agency—the Alexander Duff idea—is unknown among us. It has no place among us, until the system of education, developed under the application of the principles which have given us what measure of success we have been accorded, is completed, in the establishment of a collegiate institution of such a character as will close the circuit and direct the system's influence back upon the life of the Church again. The Seoul proposition, and that which manifestly is in the mind of the Joint Committee, and, we think, in your mind, is that of the great universities which have been developed under the relatively hard and different conditions of other mission fields. They are predominantly evangelizing institutions. The Pyeng Yang proposition is for an institution where every influence and every agency shall be bent to the service of this great Church—to make it permanently, through the leaders and influence which this institution provides, in all its life and activities which we have indicated above. There is no question but what Pyeng Yang is the location in the country for an institution of this second type. Practically a two-thirds majority of the entire Missionary body of the country have declared themselves on this point and in doing so have declared themselves as to the character of the institution which we need.

It is because among the missions of the country our mission has been foremost in the practice of these principles, because we have developed and grown as no other has, and because, in consequence, these problems have been thrust upon us earlier, that we are worked out to an outstanding position on these points. Yet until 1912 no question had ever been raised in the missionary body as to the propriety of the present location and, viewed on any basis, the present institution does not suffer in comparison with other institutions. The Joint Committee's Report has mentioned some. Hang Chow College has 117 students, 31 of whom are in the College course; Soo Chow Uni has 305 students, 45 of whom are in the College course; Pyeng Yang College has 392 students, 50 of whom are in the College course. How different the situation and the problem which we face here, and how differently it demands to be considered, as compared with other fields, will be evident to you from the following: In Soo Chow University there are 305 students; 50 of them are Christians. In Forman Christian College there are 490 students; 25 of them are Christian. In Allahabad Christian College there are 302 students; 19 of them are Christians. In Pyeng Yang Union College there are 392 students; 392 of them are Christians. No comparison can be

made between the principles which determined the location and character of such institutions and those which are to determine here. One man's salt is the other man's poison. We believe that your large body of missionaries in Korea are in a position to know this question better than you. We say it with all deference. We are practically a unit on the subject. The bulk of the Missionary body are with us. We protest that what your decision would give us is for us and for our work not salt but poison.

Again, we would point out to you the position which your Mission and its work, relative to other Missions, holds in this country. While in organization you are our superior body, there is, we think, a higher relation—a sense in which you, at the home end, hold in trust for us your Missionaries, our interests upon the field. In a case where your missionaries are so large a proportion of the entire body; where in this particular line their work has become developed far ahead of that of any other Mission; where the fruits of their work may be said to show some degree of wisdom on their part, it seems to us that the repeatedly declared position of your field force on an important field question, affecting their large work far more than that of any other mission, should be given such weight by you as to make you very slow, if not really constitute an insuperable obstacle, to a decision contrary to their position. The relative strength of the six federated missions in Mission units (men and single women) is as follows:

Mission	Members	Per Ct. of Whole
Canadian Presbyterian	14	5.2%
Australian Presbyterian	22	8.2%
Methodist Episcopal South.....	43	16.1%
Methodist Episcopal North.....	51	19.1%
Southern Presbyterian	56	21.0%
Northern Presbyterian	81	30.4%
		100.0%

You will note the order of strength of the six missions. You will not fail to note that your own Missionaries constitute nearly one-third of the entire Missionary body of the country.

What is true of the Mission force itself is far more true of the churches which have been developed in the country under the respective Missions. These stand as follows:

Mission	Communicants	Per Ct. of Whole
Australian Presbyterian	1792	2.6%
Canadian Presbyterian	2260	3.3%
Methodist Episcopal South.....	6912	10.2%
Southern Presbyterian	17173	10.5%
Methodist Episcopal North.....	10373	15.3%
Northern Presbyterian	39475	58.1%
		100.0%

Again you will note the sequence, and you will not fail to note that your own Mission holds 16% more of the total communicancy of the country than all the rest of the Missions put together; that it also holds 43% more of the whole than any other single Mission in Korea. When you recollect that with missionaries in Korea the College question is one of church up-building rather than an evangelistic one, you will appreciate why your mission has stood, and stands, where it does on this question. It is a question which affects the future life and character of the Church in this country, in which church we have a larger stake than all the rest of the missions in Korea put together.

There is another point on which we have great diffidence in speaking. Comparisons are always invidious, and we fear lest some should interpret us as boasting. Nevertheless we feel that we would not be doing justice to our position, neither would we be doing justice to the real interests of this rare church, whose members are the children of our labors, our prayers, and, we believe, in some considerable degree of those policies to which, so far, we have clung through all changes of weather and in which, so far, you have always upheld us.

At the time of the Mott Conference, one Commission prepared data comparing the amount of money used by each Mission for certain objects with that contributed by the native church attached to that Mission for the same

object. In other words, the parallel efficiency developed in the church as compared with the foreign money still being used in it. Mr. Moore, the senior member of the Southern Methodist Mission, was the chairman of the Commission and presented the data. They were referred back as hardly believable, with instructions to carefully canvass the subject again. They subsequently issued this report. The figures are theirs. The percentages are ours because only by percentages can one tabulate relative values.

The amounts spent from foreign sources and contributed from Korean church sources for propagation and sustentation (what is commonly classified as evangelistic work) is as follows:

Mission	Mission Money	Korean Church Money	Per Cent of Efficiency
Methodist Episcopal North, Yen..	33976.00	641.00	2.5%
Australian Presbyterian	2594.00	64.00	3.6%
Methodist Episcopal South.....	25570.00	721.00	3.7%
Southern Presbyterian	13834.00	541.00	5.6%
Canadian Presbyterian	5000.00	571.00	15.1%
Northern Presbyterian	17540.00	920.00	69.5%
			100.0%

Again please note the sequence, and note that our church per member, for that is what the percentage means, has developed 4.5 times the efficiency of the Mission nearest to it, and 28 times the efficiency of the church connected with the Mission farthest from it. You will also notice that this last Mission is the one having the next largest constituency to ourselves in the country.

In the report mentioned the same comparison is made in developed church efficiency in educational matters. It is as follows:

Mission	Mission Money	Korean Church Money	Per Cent of Efficiency
Methodist Episcopal, South.	34634.00	201.00	.9%
Methodist Episcopal, (North.)	32774.00	111.00	5.1%
Southern Presbyterian	8820.00	31.00	5.3%
Australian Presbyterian	2847.00	21.00	11.5%
Canadian Presbyterian	4900.00	71.00	21.5%
Northern Presbyterian	9019.00	341.00	55.7%

Again note the sequence and note that the efficiency per member developed in the church nurtured by our Mission, as compared with what the Mission itself does, is 2.6 times that of the mission nearest to it and 67 times that of the Mission farthest from it. Moreover this is not due to the fact that these Missions specialize on education more than ourselves, for the actual aggregate of educational work, whether in number of schools or number of students is far greater in our Mission than in any other.

Among the missionaries in this country, theoretically no question has been raised as to the college question being a question of church nurture rather than a directly evangelistic one upon a heathen student body. The Mott Conference unanimously declared all education here to be so. Your own Mission comprises nearly one-third the entire missionary body. Its product is 58% of the entire communicant constituency. On the average each one of this 58% has 71.2% of the church efficiency and 51% of the educational efficiency of the whole. As the Mission with the overwhelming largest interest and the work most advanced we have already built up an institution that whether in the total number of its student body or the number in the College department, ranks with the great universities quoted in the Joint Committee's report, and in that peculiar character of a Christian institution developed under the conditions and the needs of the work here, it stands unique in the world. We believe that it is an integral part of that system of policies which has contributed so much to produce what our Mission has. The second largest Mission in the country, the Southern Presbyterian, unanimously backs us in this position. In its annual meeting it has recently passed a unanimous vote for one college and that in Pyeng Yang. A third concurs. A fourth is equally divided. The strength of the opposing theory and position is found in the two missions third and fourth in the order of strength. One of them has the next largest native constituency to ourselves; it has

been in the country the same length of time, yet both pursuing distinctly different policies from our own, stand at the extreme minimum limit of developed church efficiency, whether in evangelistic work, or in education. On the recent popular vote practically a two-thirds majority stood for the present location.

We do not feel that we have ever failed in a willingness to sacrifice for the interests of community, federation or union. We have cheerfully given our developed work to the Australians; in the final comity division with the M. E. Mission we gave concessions out of all proportion with the interests involved; in the interest of union in the college we granted equal control, because it was insisted upon, although but a third of the burden was assumed; in the Educational Senate, in proportion to our constituency, the agreed basis of representation, we accepted half that accorded to the M. E. Mission, for the same reason. But this college question is not such as these. It lays violent hands upon the completing institution of that system that has given us what we have secured at the cost of life and strength and years. Its perverts it to another character and theory. It locates it where the ends we stand for can be but indifferently attained, if at all. This is purchasing union at too high a cost.


As the Executive Committee of the Mission which represents approximately one-third of all your developed interests upon the foreign field, we do most earnestly present these facts to your consideration; when the question again comes before you for decision, we trust that it be with due recognition of the fact that you are not only our superior body, but that the invested interests of your missionaries here is anything but small, and that you hold in trust for them their interests upon the field.

We have loyally abided by the Senate's reference to the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee and the Boards stating their positions, have passed the referendum on to the missionary body on the field, where it should have been decided in the first place. The missionary body in two consecutive votes has given a decision on the subject the tenor of which cannot be misunderstood. In view of this we consider the question closed. Our own Mission and the great majority of the missionary body at large has borne with, and made concessions to, the minority, until forbearance has ceased to be a virtue, propriety, justice, and honor equally permit of but two alternatives to a minority in a case like this, either to cheerfully accede the necessary law of majority rule, or to withdraw. For the majority to go further would be to be false to what they regard as the great interests committed to them by the King. It is largely for the sake of these missions that we have sought union. A fleet's speed is limited to the speed of its slowest unit. Union in the case means difficulties and limitations as much as anything else to ourselves. If the policies of other missions on the field demand such an institution as the Seoul location involves, let them go their way and establish it. We will give them all the fraternal countenance and good will any can ask, much as for their own sakes we would deprecate the policy. But it is not in reason. It is not in justice, that the hulk of the missionary body, holding the overwhelming interests of the country, which they have attained by different and more successful policies, should be dragged in their train.

Yours in the Service,
THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE MISSION

CHART SHOWING PERCENTAGES OF COMITY POPULATION.

- N. P. 35.9
- A. P. 7.8
- C. P. 11.6
- S. P. 17.3
- M. E. S. 8.6
- M. E. 18.8




Exclusive Comity Population.

Northern Presbyterian	4,725,000
Australian Presbyterian	1,034,000
Canadian Presbyterian	1,540,000
Southern Presbyterian	2,291,000
Methodist Episcopal, South.	1,126,000
Methodist Episcopal	2,500,000
Total	13,238,000

COMMUNICANTS.

- N. P. 59.4
- A. P. 3.9
- C. P. 3.8
- S. P. 10.1
- M. E. S. 8.7
- M. E. 15.1.




Communicant Membership.

Northern Presbyterian	42,913
Australian Presbyterian	2,109
Canadian Presbyterian	2,776
Southern Presbyterian	7,290
Methodist Episcopal, South.	6,292
Methodist Episcopal	10,882
Total	72,262

STUDENT BODY.

- N. P. 50.4
- A. P. 2.4
- C. P. 5.9
- S. P. 6.7
- M. E. S. 7.6
- M. E. 27.



Pri., Inter-Med., Academic, Student Body

Northern Presbyterian	10,978
Australian Presbyterian	533
Canadian Presbyterian	1,288
Southern Presbyterian	1,427
Methodist Episcopal, South.	1,661
Methodist Episcopal	5,888
Total	21,776

Pyeng Yang, Korea, April 14, 1914.

Rev. A. J. Brown, D. D.
156 5th Ave., N. Y. C., U. S. A.

Dear Dr. Brown:—

(4196)

Your letter of February 24th (L96) is at hand, bringing full information regarding the action of the Joint Committee and our Board on the college question. A careful reading of the letter shows that the information which had come to us from various sources was in the main correct, but we are glad of the light it gives on some of the details of the question, and the reasons given for the action of the Joint Committee and the Board.

At the same time it is very disappointing in that it in no way enables us to change our previously expressed conviction, nor does it in any way provide for a solution of the difficulties that face us on the field.

If the two great principles of Mission government, viz., the settlement of field questions on the field, and majority rule are to be set aside, the reasons must indeed be weighty. The reasons you give are very unconvincing to say the least. To refer briefly to some of them.

First: The alleged small majority for Pyeng Yang. You figure out that only 52% of the missionaries on the field are in favor of Pyeng Yang while 48% are either opposed or indifferent. By the same process of reasoning only 30% are in favor of Seoul while 70% are opposed or indifferent. Even though we accept your figures we cannot understand why 48% opposed or indifferent to Pyeng Yang is sufficient reason for ruling Pyeng Yang out while 70% opposed or indifferent to Seoul present no difficulty in the way of locating the college in Seoul, but we cannot accept your figure that only 52% of the voters favor Pyeng Yang. Perhaps you did not all have before you the information of the Senate's Secretary, Dr. Adams, given in the letter sent to you August 13, 1913, reporting and tabulating the vote. Dr. Adams wrote you page 3, "I have not received the votes of 21. I have learned that some voters from among these on both sides never received the voting form. Some have said that they received it and returned their vote at once, but I never received it. Both doubtless have been due to inefficient mail service. I have no means of knowing what their vote would be but in the previous vote of which I have spoken, of these 21, there were three who voted for Seoul, 8 who voted for Pyeng Yang, and 10 who did not vote either time. You can use your discretion about these." In the light of that information we cannot understand your decision that all of the 21 non-voters shall be counted as opposed or indifferent to Pyeng Yang.

But setting that all aside, we are astonished to learn that the principle was apparently followed of counting non-voters with the minority. We are aware that for certain reasons that practice is sometimes followed in the U. S. Congress, but those reasons do not exist here. In the "Rules of Order for Religious Assemblies," by Barton, is laid down the following rule. "The member not voting either for or against a measure must be understood as acquiescing in the vote of the majority." If we count those not voting as favoring Pyeng Yang which we had not done, then the percentage for Pyeng Yang is much larger, 70%.

In the second of the reasons you give for the Joint Committee's and the Board's action you say the vote was not distributed evenly through the Missions. We grant the fact but question the conclusion which you deduce from it, that is, that the Boards should therefore take it out of the hands of the missionaries, and decide it regardless of the wishes of the missionaries. We draw a different conclusion. The fact that the voters divide so nearly along denominational lines is a serious fact, and at once raises the question whether perhaps there may not be vital interests on both sides which are imperilled, and whether it is not possible that the time for union is not yet ripe, and hence injury may be done by forcing too insistently the union question. But more of this later.

The third reason that you give for your action is that the question of location was confused with other questions in the minds of the voters by adding questions II and III and that the vote did not show where a real majority would stand if the vote had been taken on the uncomplicated question of location.

To this it may be answered, first, that it was the action of the Joint Committee itself which made necessary the adding of questions II and III. (See letter of Senate's Secretary, Dr. Adams to Dr. Brown, August 13, 1913, page 2). Second, we deny any general confusion of the question in the minds of voters, though we freely admit that in the minds of many there is in this situation a close connection between location and character of the school, of which more later. On the question as to where the body of missionaries desire the college to be located, if the Joint Committee and the Board was confused, we are sorry, for there is no uncertainty here on the field. But we cannot understand why the uncertainty of the home authorities as to what the mind of the missionaries is on certain points should be a sufficient reason for ignoring them on a question of such importance as this one has come to be. It seems to us that it would have been the safe thing to say the least, to have delayed action until that attitude was understood. We cannot understand the reasons for such haste in deciding the question. We already have a college which is doing good work. It has just enrolled the largest attendance in its history, even after the withdrawal of all but 4 of the M. E. students. All it needs is more encouragement from the New York end. A stronger support of the present institution and less feverish haste to destroy what we have and start something different, the success of which is problematical, seems to us to be more in order.

Another reason given for deciding in favor of Seoul, page 4, Board letter No. 196, is that "A union college at Pyeng Yang is impossible for the simple reason that the boards could not be united upon Pyeng Yang." In other words, the Methodist Boards made it "sine qua non" of union that the college be located in Seoul. We most solemnly protest against any weight being given to that attitude in deciding the question. The question was not so referred. When information reached the field that there was such an attitude on the part of some of the Boards, the Secretary of the Senate wrote the Joint Committee explaining the meaning of the reference by the Senate and the Senate's protest to the Joint Committee as follows:

"All parties are agreed that the question ought to have been settled upon the field. An unwilling minority however insisted upon a reference. The majority gave way and consented, but upon the explicit agreement that the question should be referred as a perfectly open question, quite capable of settlement for all parties in either of its alternatives; that it should be decided by the referee committee upon its merit; in view of the field conditions that in the mind of the Committee ought to determine in the case. You can readily see that no other basis of agreement to reference was possible. A question to be capable of reference must be an open question, and the referee must settle it on the basis of the referring parties agreement.

"The Senate at the above mentioned meeting took the following action. As I remember it was unanimous—all representatives of all Missions agreeing to it.

"Passed that Dr. Adams be requested to write to Dr. Brown, drawing his attention to the passage in Board Letter No. 145, a copy of which was sent the General Secretary, and asking for an interpretation of the same. If it means that the Northern Presbyterian Board was influenced in its position, because there was no alternative to a Union College in Seoul except a Presbyterian College in Pyeng Yang and a Methodist College in Seoul, the Senate wishes to state that this does not represent the sense in which the question was referred, but that either location is to be considered as an open alternative for all parties."

In the light of this letter we can understand your action only on the assumption either that the letter was not before the Joint Committee and the Board or else that the Joint Committee has set aside the Senate. Had it been known on the field that that attitude was in the mind of members of the Joint Committee the reference would not have been made, and the knowledge that such an attitude exists has raised a storm of protest on the field and an entire unwillingness to accept the decision. The Joint Committee has exercised authority inconsistent with that already delegated by the Boards to the field.

Again weight seems to have been given to a comparison between Seoul and Pyeng Yang as centers of Christian activity at the present time. (See board Letter No. 196, page 6.) The effort to show, by statistics, that the

spiritual activities of Seoul surpass those of Pyeng Yang, and that the spiritual atmosphere of Seoul equals or surpasses that of Pyeng Yang is amusing.

Again a great deal of weight seems to have been given, in the Joint Committee to the opinion of certain eminent men who had visited the field and had arrived at certain conclusions in the matter of college location. We have great respect for these gentlemen, but this is a field question and requires a full and accurate knowledge of field conditions if a correct conclusion is to be reached. Of most of these gentlemen it may be said that if they, while on the field, made a serious effort to understand this question from the field point of view in all its bearings, we were not aware of it. The unhappy impression created by several of them was that they came here with their minds already made up, with the intention of trying to get the missionaries to adopt conclusions that had been arrived at in New York. Furthermore, of the educational policies of some of these gentlemen it may be said that they are directly antagonistic to those worked out by this mission as an essential part of its general mission policy.

We must take exception to the oft repeated statement that the question of the character of the college is not affected by the location. As an abstract theory, viewed from a council chamber ten thousand miles away, or by one simply passing through and so unable to gain an accurate knowledge of the deep currents of mission activity, that may appear plausible. But the actual facts in this present case, viewed by men on the field who have themselves been factors in the creating of these currents, that statement has little weight. The Mission has followed out a policy of work in Korea which has proved eminently successful. This policy is the result of years of toil and labor and conflict. It has been a continual struggle to maintain it. As an abstract theory our missionaries unanimously approve it. But in practically applying the policy to living situations a constant if unconscious effort has been made by some to break it down. This College question is a part of that struggle. It is not a question between Pyeng Yang and Seoul but between a policy of Mission work, developed for the past twenty years, by very great labor and pain, and a method of work approximating to methods that are older, which were perhaps the best policy under other conditions, in other lands, and with less experience, but which for this land and this Mission, would be a turning of its back to the light, and disloyalty to the truth. In the present case Pyeng Yang and Seoul are not merely points in Korea situated at different points on the map. They stand for different policies. Bunker Hill as a spot of ground near Boston means little. Possibly there are some in those days who wondered why those fighting farmers made such a fuss over the possession of that hill. But they understood and we today understand that the contest for possession of that ground was a contest for a great principle of government which is being recognized more and more, the world around. Pyeng Yang represents the established policy of our Mission and Seoul represents a vital change. We are not surprised that you in New York are unable to appreciate this but it is a fact with which you will ultimately have to reckon. You say the missionaries can have the kind of college they want in Seoul. We were also told that the missionaries could locate it where they wished. (See in extenso Dr. Brown's letter to Dr. Moffett of July 25, 1913, which says, "The missionaries now have the opportunity to locate the college where they want it.") But the location has been decided contrary to the expressed wishes of the missionaries. The Missions on the field, and their Senate have been informed, and negotiations are being carried on for the purchase of a site at a large outlay of money, without reference to any constituted field authorities. What hope is there that other questions which may arise as to policy, etc., will not receive the same treatment!

The present situation in the field may be summed up as follows: Your own mission stands practically unchanged in its position on the question of location, and there has come to be an intensity of feeling such as is found only where strong men are making a stand for vital convictions. While no votes have been taken in the other Presbyterian Missions we are creditably informed that in them too, the opinion on the location question remains unchanged while there is strong feeling against the way the decision of the Joint Committee has been brought about.

Although the Joint Committee recommended that there be no disturbance of the work being done at Pyeng Yang, the Methodist Mission last week drew out in a body all but four of their students in the College department and all but two from the academy and they further inform us that they will sever all connections with the school in Pyeng Yang in all its departments at the end of the present term, this being their interpretation of what is required by their Board's action.

In the light of all the facts, the only action possible seems to us to be along the line of the Senate's recommendation, that is, a Presbyterian College in Pyeng Yang and a Methodist College in Seoul. An effort to force union in one college now in any place will be fraught with disastrous results to the work, and to the cause of real union as well. Feeling as we now know the Methodist people to feel we oppose further effort to compel them to go to Pyeng Yang. Likewise an effort to compel the Presbyterian bodies to go to Seoul is equally out of the question and bears in it the possibility of consequences which we cannot bear to contemplate.

(Signed) The Executive Committee of the Korea Mission
of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A.

SAMUEL A. MOFFETT,
JAS. E. ADAMS,
NORMAN C. WHITTEMORE,
C. E. SHARP,
CHARLES ALLEN CLARK,
A. G. WELBON,
W. T. COOK.

APPENDIX XXIX.

Rev. S. A. Moffett, D. D., Chairman Executive Committee and Corresponding
Secretary of Mission to Rev. A. F. Brown, D. D.
Pyeng Yang, Korea, April 18th, 1914.

Dear Dr. Brown:—

It is with intense regret and great sorrow that we feel it necessary to send you the accompanying protests. Some days ago I sent you a cable message as follows:

"Forty-four voting members sign protest action college also protest authorizing individuals to purchase site." Ex.

The "Ex" added to the last word means as per agreement that the Executive Committee sent the cable.

I transmit herewith the copies of the protests with the original signatures—the protest signed by 39 members—and the protest prepared separately and signed by five members in Syen Chyen. Others there are who sympathize with the protests but did not wish to sign.

We prepared copies of the protest and of the letter of the Executive Committee of September, 1913, to be sent to each member of the Board but remembering your request of some years ago that when so desired that copies should be sent through you, I shall send you all the copies requesting that a copy be sent to each member of the Board and Council as soon as possible, that they may have sufficient time to carefully consider them before the meeting of the Board which is to deal with them. Also the Syen Chyen request that you prepare copies of their protest and send to each member of the Board and Council.

The protest was prepared before your letter was received but all who signed it did so after your letter was received in each Station. Your letter but confirmed us in the desire to protest. As the protest was prepared before your letter came it is not a reply to it, but the Executive Committee has nearly ready a reply to the letter which will be sent you in the following mail. We desire that the Board action be not taken before that reply also is in the hands of the members of the Board.

The copies of the Protest and of the Executive Committee letter of September, 1913, should reach you shortly after the receipt of this but if not received within a few days we request that copies of them be made and sent to each member of the Board. We request this careful individual consideration by the members of the Board because we realize that the interests of our whole life work is involved. In earnest prayer that the Board may be guided by the Spirit of God.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) SAMUEL A. MOFFETT,
Chairman Executive Committee.

Pyeng Yang, April 14, 1914.

Resolution of the Executive Committee to the Mission, for transmissal to the Board.

Resolved: That we recommend to the Mission the following items of protest to the Board as opposed to its action in the College location question.

1. We do formally and solemnly protest to the Board as against its action in approving the recommendation of the Joint Committee of the Board's locating the college in Seoul, contrary not only to the desire, the long and carefully built up policy of the Mission expressed by repeated and overwhelming majorities, but also to the desire and judgment of two-thirds of all the missionaries in Korea; and we do earnestly request the Board to reconsider this action.

2. We also deprecate and formally protest the acquiescence of the Board in withdrawing from the authorized channels of its own field organization the field administration of this matter; authorizing individuals to purchase directly a site for the college without reference to the Mission; and even before the Mission had received notification of the Board's action.

3. We do formally protest the proposition of the Joint Committee authorized by the Boards and already inaugurated, to establish and operate the institution from New York outside the responsible field control of the regular line field organizations. In accord with long and frequently declared policy of the Board, this Mission has resolutely refused to permit in the past the control of such institutions by self-perpetuating independent field Boards. In like manner it does as resolutely refuse its assent to their direct control from the home end. The general principle is clear. Field operations are to be conducted by and through the field organization. In our view a contrary course is in violation of two fundamental principles of Presbyterianism—democracy in direct operation, and government by graded courts.

Mission vote on the above was—Affirmative, 45; negative, 13; not voting, 4; total, 62.

(XXXI)

S. A. MOFFETT TO A. J. BROWN

Pyeng Yang, April 22, 1914.

Dear Dr. Brown:—

Continuing in the necessary but painful duty which falls to me, I enclose the reply of our Executive Committee to your letter of February 24th. Copies of this letter for each member of the Board will be sent you as soon as they are ready possibly in this same mail.

On April 20th I received from Kang Kei the following telegram:

"Kang Kei unanimously protests the discontinuing of Pyeng Yang college and Board's method procedure."

The three men there had not signed the protest sent you so this makes 47 members who have protested.

Mr. W. E. Smith has also signed a formal protest, the action of the Mission which will be sent you to be filed as the formal official Mission action. He had not signed the other.

This means that 48 members have protested and still others may sign this protest; but at any rate three-fourths of the Mission, 48 out of 64, have already signed protests. Will the minority finally consist of two men.

Again I plead that you stand with your Mission and ask the Board to reconsider its action and to accord the Korea Mission the confidence it deserves and to leave it free to exercise the rights in decision of field questions which all just principles of Mission practice should accord to a Mission.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) S. A. MOFFETT,
Chairman Executive Committee.

(XXXII)

BOARD LETTER NO. 208

April 25th, 1914.

Union College in Korea.

To the Korea Mission.

Dear Friends:

April 8th, we received the following cable:

"Forty-four voting members sign protest action college; also protest authorizing individuals to purchase site."

85 I presented this cable at the next meeting of the Board, which was held the 20th instant, and the Board, after full discussion, took the following action:

"The Board gave careful consideration to a cable, received April 8th, to the effect that forty-four voting members of the Korea Mission had signed a protest against the action of the Board in adopting the report of the Joint Committee on Education in Korea, and also against authorizing individuals to purchase a site for the College. Secretary Arthur J. Brown's official letter giving the full text of the report of the Joint Committee and making the necessary explanations, was dated February 24th, which was immediately after the votes of a sufficient number of the Boards had been received by the Joint Committee to enable it to know the result. The Board understands that the Executive Committee of the Korea Mission met March 5th and 6th. Whatever action it took must therefore have been taken before the arrival of Secretary Brown's letter. Allowing for the time required to circulate a protest among all the stations of the Korea Missions and for the Executive Committee of the Mission to obtain the replies which were summarized in its cable, the Board deems it probable that many if not most of the votes of the Missionaries were recorded before the arrival of Secretary Brown's official communication. Unfortunately, fragments of the Joint Committee's Report were sent to Korea by others in personal letters some weeks before the Boards had acted upon it and therefore before it had any validity except as a recommendation of the Joint Committee to the Boards. The Board therefore assumes that the Mission must have acted on this inadequate and unofficial information without having before them the full text of the Joint Committee's report or the explanations which were necessary to its intelligent consideration. The Board therefore voted to defer further consideration of the cabled protest until the arrival of some Mission action which is avowedly based on the official communication of the Joint Committee and the Board for the present and pending any further consideration of the subject, the Board authorized its representatives on the Joint Committee, Secretaries Speer and Brown, to proceed in accordance with the actions of the Board of July 31st, 1912 (confirmed September 16th). December 16th, 1912, March 3rd, 1913, and February 2nd, 1914.

"The Board regarded that part of the cable protest referring to the purchase of land by individuals as sufficiently covered by the Joint Committee's letter of March 21st to the Rev. Dr. James E. Adams, Secretary of the Senate of the Educational Federation in Korea, copies of which were sent to the Mission in Board Letter No. 200 of the same date, explaining that, in view of a reported emergency opportunity to secure a suitable site for the College and the impracticability of organizing a Field Board of Managers before the annual meetings of the various Missions next summer, the Joint Committee had deemed it essential to the interests of the college to appoint a committee of three able and experienced missionaries to take such temporary action as the exigencies of the situation might require, this Committee to be purely temporary and to deal only with the question specified."

As this minute appears to cover the ground for the present, I need add nothing more at this time except to refer to the enclosed copy of my official letter of this date, as Chairman of the Joint Committee on Education in Korea, addressed to the Rev. James E. Adams, D. D., Secretary of the Senate of the Educational Federation. On the receipt of any official communication from you based upon the official communication from the Joint Committee, the whole matter will be carefully considered.

Sincerely yours,
ARTHUR J. BROWN.

(XXXIII) BOARD LETTER NO. 214 May 18th, 1914.
In Re Receipt of Protests.

To the Korea Mission.
Dear Friends:—

We have received a protest dated March 23rd and signed by 39 members of the Mission and a protest dated April 2nd, and signed by five other members of the Mission against the action of the Board of February 2nd, regarding the proposed Union Christian College in Seoul. We have also received copies of the communication of your Executive Committee of September 4th,

86 1913. Accompanying letter from the Rev. Dr. S. A. Moffett, as Chairman of your Executive Committee, requests that these copies be mailed to all the members of the Board. He states, however, that the protest was drawn up before the arrival of Board Letter No. 196, of February 24th, although signatures were attached after the arrival of that letter. He adds that the Executive Committee of the Mission was preparing a reply to the Board letter which would be sent in the next mail, and that the Executive Committee desired that no action be taken until that reply also, was in the hands of the Board. This is May 18th and this last letter of your Executive Committee has not yet arrived. I am therefore bolding the protests until it comes so that all may be mailed together.

I am leaving today for an absence of two weeks in Chicago, where I am to represent the Board at a Conference with the Assembly's Executive Commission and then at the annual meeting of the General Assembly. I have left instructions with my office staff that if the expected communication arrives during my absence it is to be copied and sent with the other communications to all the members of the Board together with the copies of such other correspondence as seems to be involved. It will be premature therefore to anticipate what action will be taken. I merely send this letter to acknowledge the receipt of the documents referred to and to assure you that they will have careful attention at the first practicable meeting of the Board after the arrival of your Executive Committee's expected letter.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) ARTHUR J. BROWN.

(XXXIV) BOARD LETTER NO. 218 June 2nd, 1914.

Official Reply of the Executive Committee, April 14th, 1914, to Board Letter No. 196, of February 24th, 1914.

To the Korea Mission.

Dear Friends:—

You will have seen before this letter reaches you my Board Letter No. 214 of May 18th, written on the eve of my departure for the General Assembly. I now write to state that on my return from Chicago I find that Dr. Moffett's letter of April 22nd with its enclosed copy of the Executive Committee's letter of April 14th, in reply to Board Letter No. 196 of February 24th, arrived May 20th and in accordance with the instructions which I had left with my office staff the Executive Committee's letter together with the rest of the correspondence was mailed to all the members of the Board. I do not yet know how soon it may be possible for the Board to act upon the matter further. I had hoped that the matter might come up at the first meeting following the receipt of your Executive Committee's letter. That meeting, however, was held Monday, June 1st, and on account of the absence of so many of the members and officers of the Board at the General Assembly it was impossible for all of them to read the correspondence before the meeting, while some members of the Board who are deeply interested in the matter could not attend the meeting at all, I am now trying to arrange a date for a meeting of the Korea Committee and the Executive Council at some time before the next meeting of the Board, June 15th.

You may be sure, dear brethren, that the whole matter is receiving very careful consideration and that the members and officers of the Board will go into the matter without prejudice and with an earnest desire to do that which is best for the cause of Christ. I shall not fail to see that the Board fully understands the strong feeling of the majority of the Mission and I unite with you in prayer that God will guide us all aright.

Sincerely yours,
ARTHUR J. BROWN.

(XXXV) BOARD LETTER NO. 221. June 16th, 1914.

Mission Protest on College and Deputation From Board.

To the Korea Mission.

Dear Friends:—

As stated in Board Letter No. 218 of June 2nd, the protests and copies of the essential correspondence was sent to each member of the Board and the Executive Council. After thorough study and full discussion in Board

meeting the following resolution was adopted yesterday the 15th, every member of the Board voting for it.

"The Board has given careful consideration to the protests from the Korea Mission against the action of the Board, February 2nd, regarding a Union Christian College at Seoul. In view of the serious differences and misunderstandings that have developed, the Executive Council is instructed to arrange for a deputation from the Board to visit Korea this Summer in order that there may be personal joint conference and prayer. Pending the report of this Deputation the Board directs that all plans for the future development of colleges at either Seoul or Pyeng Yang shall cease, as the Board does not deem it practicable to support or to accept funds for a college at either place until further effort has been made to secure substantial agreement on one Union College for all Korea in accord with the historic and repeatedly declared policy of the Board for union in higher educational work. As plans for separate colleges are understood to be in progress a cable was ordered to the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Mission to give immediate effect to the action of the Board."

Several men were asked to serve on the deputation, myself among them, but I declined to go for various reasons, among them family conditions which make such an absence impossible at this time. I am trying to secure the consent of others and will notify you as soon as possible whom you may expect, perhaps by cable.

In behalf of the Board,

(Signed) ARTHUR J. BROWN.

APPENDIX XXXVI

Extract from the Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Korea Mission August-September, August 28th, 1914, Page 51.

Educational Committee: A substitute to parts 2 and 3 of Sec. 15 of the Educational Committee's report to strike out the same, carrying with it all actions taken on the same this morning, was put and carried.

In lieu of the articles stricken out, resolutions were presented which were adopted for transmission to the Board. The articles were considered separately. On article 2 a ballot was taken resulting in 42 affirmative and 12 negative votes, and 1 not voting. The remaining articles were adopted viva voce. The resolutions are as follows:—

1. Recommend that the Mission record its conviction that the question of Primary, Academic and Industrial education is now more important than the question of College education and that we urge the Board not only to reconsider its purpose to lay aside these matters until the College question is settled but on the contrary to make every effort to meet the imperative needs of a situation which is daily becoming more and more perilous to the whole scheme of Christian education in Korea.

2. Recommend that the Mission reaffirm to the Board its frequently expressed conviction that the College needed to conserve and further strengthen the work already built up by our Church in Korea should be located in Pyeng Yang.

3. Recommend that we express our appreciation of the Board's deference to the conviction of the Korea Mission, that the College ought to be continued in Pyeng Yang, to the extent of the Board's being willing to continue the work in Pyeng Yang for the present.

4. Recommend that in accordance with this permission of the Board, as granted in letter Number 228, we continue to co-operate in the Union Christian College in Pyeng Yang until such time as the Board shall order otherwise.

(XXXVII)

BOARD LETTER NO. 249

December 8, 1914.

To the Korea Mission.

Dear Friends:—

You are aware from former correspondence that the Board deferred final action on the questions relating to the proposed Union College in Korea in order that the Mission might have further opportunity to consider them at its annual meeting in August, the Board to take the matter up again when it received reports of the Mission's action. The manuscript copy of the minutes arrived September 2nd. As it was a carbon copy whose sheets arrived by different mails and we were not sure that it was complete, we deemed it prudent to await arrival of the printed copies, which we knew were

being prepared on the field. These did not come till November 28th. The thoughtfulness of the Rev. Charles E. Sharp, Chairman of your executive committee and the Secretary of the Mission, shortened the period of waiting by sending in an official letter, dated September 22nd copies of the actions of the Mission on this subject. This letter arrived October 21st and with its assurance that we had a complete copy, the Board, through its Committee on Korea and the Executive Council, at once took up the study of the question.

The whole subject has now been carefully reviewed at several meetings of the Committee and the Council, and at two meetings of the Board and has, in addition, received large attention in personal thought and prayer and conversations. We were gratified to note what seemed to be an earnest desire to have the question settled in some way, in spite of the difference of judgment that still existed. The fact that on Page 50 of your printed minutes you used the expression; "pending final decision between the Mission and the Board," and on page 51 the expression, "until the Board shall order otherwise," led the Board to feel that you expected and deemed it best that the long-standing controversy should be brought to a final issue. The Board certainly felt that the time had come to do this, not because it had the slightest desire to speak in any authoritative way; but because it felt that this vexed matter had to be settled sometime by somebody, and that is the Presbyterian system makes it the duty of the Board to render final decision in cases of necessity, the Board could no longer evade the responsibility which the General Assembly and the Church expect it to exercise in missionary administration. Accordingly, at the meeting of the Board yesterday, the 7th instant, the Korean Committee and the Executive Council presented the following report, which, after discussion, was adopted without a dissenting voice.

"The Korea Committee and the Executive Council have given long and careful consideration to pending questions regarding the proposed Union Christian College, which now comes up for final decision as the Board has received the actions of the Mission at its annual meeting and various explanatory letters, chiefly from members of the majority in the Mission. We have also received the resolutions which were adopted by a conference of members of several missions at Seoul, September 23rd, urging that College work be resumed in that city without further delay. The actions of the Mission were presented to the Committee and the Council in October and the Board, November 2nd, postponed final action, first to November 16th, and then until today, in order to afford ample time to study the question in all its bearings. Meantime copies of the actions of the Mission were mailed to all the members of the Board. After further consideration of the whole subject, the Committee and the Council desire to withdraw their report of November 2nd, to substitute the following:

"It is clear to the board that there is a difference of view in the Mission, as to the character of missionary educational work, which should be definitely faced. The amended constitution for the Pyeng Yang College submitted by the Mission, an article in the October number of 'The Korea Mission Field,' entitled 'Educational Mission Problems' by the Rev. William M. Baird, Ph. D., President of the present institution at Pyeng Yang, and the tenor of a number of letters confirm our impression that the majority of the Mission advocate an educational policy which limits a college to 'the young men of the church.' Dr. Baird says that 'the education of non-Christians is not our commission, that 'an individual here and there might be so near the kingdom of heaven that his influence would not be harmful in a church school even though he were not yet a member of the church, but making exception here is a dangerous thing,' and that 'the mission school should be simply a part of the church studying.' It is clear that this policy is one of the main points at issue, and that one of the chief reasons why the majority of the mission desire the college to be at Pyeng Yang is because they believe that if it is placed there, it can be more easily held to such a limitation.

"It appears necessary therefore for the Board to call the attention of the Mission to the fact that this is not the educational policy of the Presbyterian church either at home or abroad. None of the other Missions under the care of the Board limit their schools in this exclusive way, nor do any of the colleges in America connected with the College Board of our church work within such rigid bounds. The position of the Presbyterian church on this

subject from the beginning is expressed in the message which the General Assembly of 1838 addressed to its first missionaries in non-Christian lands from which we quote the following:

"We recommend to your attention and to your unceasing prayers the children of the heathen. We are far from despairing of the conversion of adults among them. . . . It will be your duty to preach the Gospel to all classes, in every form, and by all the means in your power. . . . But still we consider the children and young people as pre-eminently the hope of your missionary labors. The greater susceptibility of the youthful mind, the durability of impressions made in early life, and the comparative ease with which habits are changed which have not become inveterate—all recommend diligent and persevering efforts to form the minds of children and youth as among the most promising and probably productive departments of missionary labour. But this is not all. Parents themselves are never more likely to be effectually reached and pruned than through the medium of their children. They will of course, regard them with favour whom they see to be labouring for the happiness of their offspring; and when they see their children growing in knowledge and in good habits under the instruction of the missionaries, this will form a new bond of attachment and open a new avenue to their hearts. We exhort you, therefore, next to the preaching of the Gospel, to make the instruction of heathen youth, in every form which you may find practicable and expedient, an object of your constant and diligent attention. But let all your schools and instructions be strongly stamped with a Christian character. Let the Bible be everywhere carefully introduced. Let all your efforts for the benefit of youth be consecrated with prayer; and let the excellent catechisms of our church be as early and as extensively employed as possible as formularies of instruction. Recollect that it is our object to raise up, as soon as practicable among the heathen, a native ministry. The attainment of this object will require the most vigorous efforts to educate the young, the selection of the most promising of their number for special culture and, elevating the means of their instruction as far as circumstances will admit."

"The educational missionary work of our church has been conducted in accordance with this policy for three quarters of a century. The Board believes that the restriction of mission schools to Christian pupils alone or the church alone would abdicate education as a missionary agency, involve loss of the evangelistic power which schools ought to exert upon non-Christian pupils and their relatives and friends, tend to develop a spirit of caste among Christian pupils, deprive them of a training in character and service which they need to meet the mass of non-Christian people into which they go upon leaving school, deprive the church of the opportunity to secure leaders from students who might be led to Christ during their college course, weaken the influence which the church ought to exert upon the educational and intellectual life of a people, deny many promising youths the privilege of a Christian training which might make them Christian leaders, and force them to seek education under non-Christian influences which may make them leaders against Christ instead of for Him. The Christian character and influence of a mission school can be and should be preserved without resorting to such an extreme method. The Board believes that the best policy for a mission educational institution requires that all teachers and a majority of the student body should be Christian, that the missionary spirit and aim should pervade every class room; that consecrated effort should be made to present Christ to every student; that conversion of the unconverted and strengthening the apiritual life of those already converted should be recognized purposes of the college and that the claims of the Christian ministry and of other forms of Christian service should be kept prominently before the students as one of the main objects for which the college is maintained. Experience in many fields has shown that some of the most effective missionary work has been done in schools of this kind, and that some of our best native ministers, teachers and evangelists have been produced by them.

"If a majority of the Korea Mission still prefers an institution at Pyeng Yang on the restricted basis of Christian pupils only, and can maintain it within the appropriations and missionary force that the Board shall make available for ordinary mission purposes, in addition to such support as may be given by any other Missions and Boards that may unite with it, the

Board will acquiesce in deference to the wishes of the Mission, on the condition that the college shall be a 'Junior College,' that is, one whose curriculum shall not go beyond the end of the sophomore year of the usual American college course. Doubtless such an institution will suffice for the college part of the preparation of a considerable number of students whom the Mission may desire to train with a view to the kind of village school and evangelistic work for which many men are likely to be required. The Board feels that it must make it explicitly clear to the Mission that the Board is not prepared to support a denominational college, apart from this understanding, at any place in Korea or one that is really denominational in its financial equipment and support, whatever its terminology.

"The Board is convinced, however, that the large interests of the cause of Christ in Korea require an institution which will have a broader basis than this, which will give a wider training and exert a more effective influence in the evangelization of Korea than it will be possible to exert through an institution of the type that the Mission desires at Pyeng Yang; that there is urgent need of a college of the type sanctioned by the General Assembly, a college which will be in no sense secular but thoroughly Christian and missionary in the sense referred to in a preceding section of this report. The Board feels that it may justly press the right of the Presbyterian church to conduct educational work in Korea in accordance with those principles which are in operation in all the other missions of our church and which represent the established policy of the Board and the General Assembly in their missionary work abroad. The Board adheres to its repeatedly expressed conviction that this college should be a Union College for the whole of Korea and that it should be located at Seoul, the capital, for reasons that have been stated in former actions. The Board has gone to the extreme limit of delay in its desire to secure a degree of unanimity on the field, over two years having passed since the question was raised. It is now evident that nothing is to be gained by further delay and that additional postponement would be gravely injurious to the interests which should be safeguarded. Christianity simply cannot afford to abdicate longer its higher educational mission in Korea. The Secretary for Korea is therefore instructed to inform the Mission and the other Boards having work in Korea that this Board is ready to proceed in aiding to found and maintain a Union Christian college in Seoul, if the sum of \$50,000 gold, referred to by the Rev. Dr. Horace G. Underwood, shall become available as our share for plant and equipment, and if the other Boards having work in Korea are prepared to pledge additional contributions so that the total sum pledged will be approximately \$100,000, which can be paid at such times and in such installments as may become necessary.

"The Board will endeavor, as far as practicable, to provide its share of faculty and maintenance without lessening the force and budget that would be normally assigned to the mission; although the Board cannot of course guarantee this irrespective of any conditions that may arise. To avoid confusion, the Board will designate the College appropriations and missionary appointments so that they can be noted separately from those that are subject to transfer on the field. It is understood that our share in this college is to be regarded as an integral and necessary part of the work of the Presbyterian church in Korea and entitled to full recognition as such. The local management of the college will be vested in a field Board of managers in the manner customary in such cases, as indicated in the tentative draft of the Constitution submitted by the Joint Committee of the Boards.

"The Board earnestly hopes that the majority of the Mission will regard this action as the best compromise that is practicable on the questions that have so long troubled the Mission and that the spirit which has prompted the Board to make it as its final decision will prompt the Mission to cooperate heartily with the college at Seoul, through the Executive Committee, by the immediate election of our proportionate representation on the Field Board of Managers, who of course must be men who sympathize with the objects of the Seoul college. The Board of Managers is authorized subject to the concurrent action of other co-operating missions and boards, to proceed at once with the organization of the college at Seoul and the prompt beginning of such college work and the acquisition of such land as available resources may permit. If the members of the Executive Committee of the

Mission do not feel prepared to do this, the Board does not desire to insist that they shall act contrary to their judgment, and in that case, the Board authorizes such members of the Missions as are willing to do so to represent the Board in organizing the college at Seoul in co-operation with the representatives of other Missions. The Board would deprecate a resort to this course, however, unless the Executive Committee of the Mission shall necessitate its adoption.

"The Executive Council is instructed to confer with the Joint Committee of the Boards as to the desirability of placing the college, Medical College, Pierson Memorial Training School, and any other institutions at Seoul that it may be deemed expedient to include, under a separate Board of Trustees in America, elected by the co-operating Boards in the way that has proved so satisfactory for Nanking Christian University and that has just been agreed upon for the Union Christian University in Peking. This might remove some of the difficulties of administration that now appear to be so perplexing to the Mission.

"The Board notes the desire of the Mission that the question of primary, academic and industrial education should be deemed more pressing at this time than the question of college education and that immediate effort should be made in behalf of the institutions which represent these forms of educational work. The Board recognizes the importance of primary and secondary school work, but it believes that the proper development of college work on a union basis is equally vital and that it should not be minimized in comparative importance. Christian work in Korea has reached a stage where it needs a large and more highly qualified leadership by Koreans than present methods can provide and the money that has been pledged for a College at Seoul does not lessen any other resources. The Board deeply feels the need of better equipment and support of the secondary and industrial schools in Korea. Unfortunately, this is a need which is common to the schools of all our Missions, some of which have poorer plants than those in Korea. The Board will gladly continue to do what it can for these institutions in every field, including Korea. But in the present financial situation and in view of the necessity of concentrating appeals upon the great amount required for the fund, it is not now practicable to authorize additional appeals. As for primary schools, the Board sympathizes with the anxieties which the Mission is facing, but the Board feels unable to undertake the financing of these schools from America under present conditions, except in so far as each Mission may find itself able to grant some measure of relief within the limits of its regular budget. Beyond this, the Board sees no alternative but to continue the policy of self-support in connection with these schools."

You may be interested to know that the only question raised in the Board regarding this report was in the form of a motion to amend one sentence; but as the amendment was not seconded, the report was adopted as it stands without a negative vote.

We are communicating this action to the Joint Committee of the Boards having work in Korea, and we shall communicate with you again as soon as we have received the action taken by those Boards. The Rev. Dr. William F. Oldham, Secretary of the Northern Methodist Board, informs me in conversation that there is no doubt whatever that the Methodist Board will take favorable action, as it has been strongly desirous from the beginning to co-operate in a union College at Seoul, and as its Secretary for Korea, the Rev. Dr. Frank Mason North, now, as you know, in Asia, has written a letter to the Joint Committee urging early action.

It appears desirable that steps should be immediately taken in Korea to get things started, care being exercised, of course, not to incur expenditures except as they may be covered by announcements from time to time by the Board or Boards concerned, that the necessary funds are in hand. But matters can be shaped up on the field so that when the formal actions of the other Boards are received the Union College can be gotten under way without delay.

The Board did not take action on "the amended Constitution and by-laws of the union Christian College at Pyeng Yang," a copy of which was sent with the Rev. R. O. Reiner's letter of September 28th, as it was assumed that you would desire an opportunity to revise it in the light of the Board's action; especially as your adoption of this Constitution, the action at the bottom of page 51 of your printed minutes, and the election of a Board of

Control described on page 80, apparently proceeded upon a construction of one sentence in Board letter No. 228 which widens "the permission of the Board" somewhat beyond what the general trend of that letter was intended to indicate. 92

In closing this letter, we need only give renewed expression to the earnest hope of the Board that the Mission will regard the Board's action as the best compromise that is practicable on the questions which have so long troubled the Mission. The differences of opinion on the field are so wide that no possible action could be satisfactory to everyone and we must therefore depend, as we very confidently do, upon a Christian spirit large enough to lead all concerned into harmonious co-operation. The Board has very cordially gone to what it regards as the extreme limit of concession in its desire to provide those conditions which will render possible the advancement of the work of Christian education in Korea, and all trust that the spirit of the work of Christian education in Korea, and all trust that the spirit of the Mission to co-operate promptly and heartily in establishing the Union College at Seoul.

We feel very keenly the needs of the existing schools of the Mission and that the Junior College at Pyeng Yang in the form that its continuance is authorized by the Board should have a more adequate plant and equipment than it now possesses. The Board does not desire that its report should be construed as indicating any want of appreciation of these needs or any lack of desire to see them met as soon as possible. It is simply forced to take into consideration the extreme anxiety of the present financial situation and the fact that every man and woman in the country that we can think of for a special appeal must be appealed to in the effort to cancel the heavy deficit, carry the enlarged responsibilities of the year, and meet the emergency expenditures which the European War has precipitated upon us. Until we can get a little farther along in the effort to cover these exceedingly large needs, the Board feels that it must be extremely conservative about putting other appeals in the field. It is surely better to get these matters out of the way first, rather than run the risk of closing this year with a mountain of debt which will compel sweeping reductions next year.

While, however, this limitation must apply for the present to special appeals for your schools as a whole, we feel that an exception may fairly be made in behalf of your request for 30,000 yen for a Pyeng Yang Academy building, which we note that you have placed No. 4 on your preferred list of 73 property needs. As the first three objects are houses and wells, the Pyeng Yang Academy Building stands at the head of all your educational needs. We are therefore writing to Mrs. William M. Baird, who as you know is now in this country, that, although a general public appeal cannot be authorized for the reasons that have been stated, we would be glad to have her take up the matter with one or two individuals who might be disposed to make such a gift, as we are sure that the proposed building is urgently required in order to give the Pyeng Yang institution the plant that it will need under the arrangement indicated by the Board.

We have faith to believe that the present reasons for anxiety will not be long continued, and that we may confidently look forward to the day when we can take up again the question of securing additional equipment for institutions in many fields, including Korea.

In behalf of the Board,
(Signed) ARTHUR J. BROWN,
Secretary.

(LXXVIII.) MINUTES ANNUAL MEETING, 1915

Executive Committee Report, Sec. 8.

Executive Committee:—On motion the entire College matter was taken from the table and was discussed at considerable length. During the discussion Mr. Bernheisel and Mr. Crothers led in prayer. A recess of five minutes was also taken. When put to a vote Mr. H. E. Blair's substitute to the Executive Committee's recommendation was lost by a vote of 12 to 33. Sec. 8 of the Executive Committee's recommendation was then adopted by a vote of 35 to 8 as follows:

Sec. 8.—The Committee desires to call the attention of the Mission to the present status of the college question.

According to Board Letter No. 249 the continuance or non-continuance of the Pyeng Yang College, under certain limitations, was left to the decision of the Mission. That decision was rendered. (See Ad Interim Action No. 79.) The Board also decided that it would co-operate with other Mission Boards in starting a union college in Seoul. The organization of this college was to be effected in one of two ways. First, if the decision of the Board commended itself to the judgment of the Mission as a wise decision under the circumstances, the Mission was to proceed at once, through the Executive Committee to the election of our proportionate representation on the Field Board of Managers, such representatives to be men in sympathy with the previously adopted policies of the Seoul institution; and to this Field Board of Managers was given the authority to proceed with the college organization. On the other hand, if the Mission, following its best judgment, did not feel prepared to do this the Board did not insist upon the Mission acting contrary to its judgment and presented an alternative method for the organization of the College, which was, that such individuals in the Mission as desired to do so were authorized to represent the Board in co-operating with the representatives of other Missions in starting the College.

The effect of the Mission's failure to adopt either of the recommendations of the Executive Committee or the Report of the Minority of the Committee (See Ad Interim Action No. 82) was that up to this time the Mission has made no decision as to whether or not it will participate in the Seoul College.

The Mission having failed to decide immediately as to whether or not it would participate in the College, certain individuals in the Mission feeling that they were free to proceed, represented the Board and in co-operation with the representatives of other Missions started the College, and it is now in operation.

The Committee feels that it is due to all parties concerned that the Mission at this time make a decision as to whether or not it will participate in the new institution. As to what, in the mind of the Committee, hinges upon this decision we refer the Mission to the Preamble to Ad Interim Action No. 82 of the Report of the Committee.

We therefore recommend that, in regard to the question presented to the Mission in Board Letter No. 249, after long prayer and careful consideration of the Board's request, and only after repeated attempts to find some other solution of the problem, we reply to the Board that much to our regret we cannot see our way clear to participate in the Seoul College, and we ask the Board to make arrangements to operate the College independent of the Mission.

The meeting stood adjourned with prayer by Mr. Sharp.

(XXXIX.)

BOARD LETTER NO. 316

February 10, 1916.

In Re Minutes of Annual Meeting.

To the Chosen Mission.

My dear Friends:

P. 44-45, Union Christian College at Seoul.

The Board took the following action:

"The Chosen Mission having reported that to its regret it could not see its way clear to participate in the Union Christian College in Seoul, and having asked the Board to support the College independently of the Mission," the Board voted to comply with the Mission's request. The Rev. Dr. Horace G. Underwood and the Rev. E. H. Miller were designated as the Presbyterian representatives on the Faculty, and the Executive Council of the Board was instructed to see that the budget of the College for the ensuing fiscal year was made separate from that of the Mission. Action on the expenses that are being incurred during the present fiscal year was deferred until further report from the Field Board of Managers and the Joint Committee of the Boards as to the exact amount that will be required.

(Signed) A. J. BROWN.

(XL.)

BOARD LETTER NO. 432

January 25, 1918.

Re Enlarged Committee on Education in Chosen.
To the Chosen Mission.

Dear Friends:

"The indefinitely prolonged stay in America of Mr. and Mrs. E. H. Miller, who returned in 1915 on account of the ill health of Mrs. Miller, has made a vacancy in our Board's representation on the faculty of the Chosen Christian College which should not be further continued in justice to the College and in loyalty to the pledge which our Board assumed. The Field Board of Managers is very desirous of having a member of the faculty who is specially qualified to take charge of the Department of Biblical Instruction in order that the Christian character and influence of the institution may have that prominence and efficiency which are so indispensable to the aims of the College, and they greatly desire the Rev. Harry A. Rhodes of our Mission for this Department. Mr. Rhodes wishes to accept this invitation and asked the Mission at its annual meeting to concur; but the Mission replied that it could not see its way clear to do so. The Field Board of Managers thereupon expressed its earnest hope that the Presbyterian Board of Managers could find some way to release Mr. Rhodes for this purpose and letters from Mr. Rhodes are to the same effect. The second section of Paragraph 40 of the Manual reads as follows:

"The Mission assigns and in general supervises the work of individual missionaries, to the end that all forms of labor may have the benefit of united counsel and may promote the interests of the work as a whole. It is proper, of course, that the views of all missionaries regarding their location and work should be heard and fully considered, and if any missionary shall be dissatisfied with the action of the Mission, an appeal to the Board for final decision can be made."

We understand that the case now in question comes under the last clause of this section and the appeal is supported by the request of the Field Board of Managers. The Committee and the Council appreciate the natural desire of the Mission to retain Mr. Rhodes in our denominational station work. On the other hand, we should take into account that the Board voted December 7, 1914, as reported to the Mission in Board Letter No. 249 of December 8 of that year, "that our share in this College is to be regarded as an integral and necessary part of the work of the Presbyterian Church in Korea and entitled to full recognition as such"; that the proposed work for Mr. Rhodes is absolutely vital to the purposes for which the College was established and is maintained; that a new man from America could not do this work as it requires one who has been on the field long enough to know the language and the people and to acquire some experience in evangelistic work; that the Field Board of Managers believes that Mr. Rhodes is eminently fitted for this particular post, and that he desires to accept it. We note, moreover, that the Mission assigned him, not to his former station at Kangkei nor to any other station for which the Mission had asked for a new missionary on its preferred list of requests for reinforcements, but to Syenchyun, where there was no vacancy in the station staff and no house for him and his family to live in except during the temporary absence of another member of the station on furlough who is now on his way back to the field. We are inclined to believe that the Mission's unwillingness to assign Mr. Rhodes to the College was influenced by the decision of the Mission in 1915 that "We (the Mission) cannot see our way clear to participate in Seoul College and we ask the Board to make arrangements to operate the College independent of the Mission." That action renders it impracticable for the Board to refer the present question of Mr. Rhodes' transfer back to the Mission or to await further word from it, especially as the appeal of the Field Board of Managers to our Board was known on the field to have been taken nearly five months ago, August 30th, and Mr. Rhodes' desire was also well known so that there has been ample time for the Mission to make any further representations on the subject if it desired to do so.

In these circumstances, there appears to be no alternative but for the Board to act on the pending appeal on its merits in harmony with Paragraph 40 of the Manual. The Committee and the Council therefore recommend that the appeal of Mr. Rhodes and the Field Board of Managers be sustained and that the action of the Board, December 3, 1917, on the question then pending regarding the proposed transfer of Mr. Rhodes from Syenchyun Station to the evangelistic work of Seoul Station be amended by transferring

Mr. Rhodes from the Syenchyun Station to the Seoul Station for the professorship referred to in the Chosen Christian College. In the Board's action of December 7, 1914, already referred to, the further statement was made that the Board will endeavor, as far as practicable, to provide its share of faculty and maintenance without lessening the force and budget that would be normally assigned to the Mission; although the Board cannot, of course, guarantee this irrespective of any conditions that may arise. In harmony with this policy, we also now recommend that the Executive Council be instructed immediately to select the best available candidate adapted to evangelistic work and appoint him and assign him to the Chosen Mission to take the place in the Mission work made vacant by the transfer of Mr. Rhodes. The Executive Council is already in correspondence with a suitable man for this purpose, whose reply has not been received at this writing, and we recommend that his appointment be referred to the Executive Council with power.

This report was unanimously adopted. As it was drawn with a view to making it self-explanatory, I need only add that an essential element in the matter was the immediate appointment of a man to take Mr. Rhodes' place in the work of the Mission. I confidently expect to be able to announce his name within a few days, as we have approved his papers, have asked him to accept the appointment and now only await his reply.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ARTHUR J. BROWN.

(XLI.)

BOARD LETTER NO. 458

Transfer of the Rev. Harry A. Rhodes and the Return of Dr. O. R. Avison
June 4, 1918.

I presented these actions of your Executive Committee to the Board and read Dr. Adams' explanation. The Board instructed me to refer you to the reasons stated in Board Letters No. 421 of December 6th, No. 425 of January 8th, and No. 432 of January 25th and to add that whether the word "appeal" as descriptive of a technical mode of procedure was correctly or incorrectly used, the essential facts remain that the Field Board of Managers invited Mr. Rhodes to a professorship in the College; that he stated his desire to accept that invitation; that he was more urgently needed there than in the station to which the Mission assigned him where, indeed, there was no vacancy; that the Mission was unwilling to transfer him to the College; that the Field Board of Managers knowing this voted unanimously "that the Board press for the appointment of Mr. H. A. Rhodes to the faculty of the College through the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A."; that this action could only mean an appeal to the Board in a matter on which no relief could be secured from the Mission; that the President of the College informed the Board that the action of the Field Board of Managers was intended to have this effect and that there was no other recourse; and that the Mission voted in 1915 that "we, the Mission, cannot see our way clear to participate in Seoul College and we ask the Board to make arrangements to operate the College independent of the Mission."

As for the return of Dr. Avison, he did not come on a denominational errand but as president of a Union College whose Board of Managers on the field and whose Co-operating Committee on Christian Education in Chosen in North America, representing four other denominational Boards beside our own, deemed it imperative for him to come on the business of the College. The Board simply acquiesced in their request, and it would have been a breach of comity and even of Christian courtesy if it had taken technical advantage of the fact that the President of the College is a Presbyterian to refuse such permission.

In both of these cases, the Board simply acted in conformity with the request of the Mission in 1915 that "we, the Mission, cannot see our way clear to participate in Seoul College and we ASK THE BOARD TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO OPERATE THE COLLEGE INDEPENDENT OF THE MISSION." If the Mission desires to rescind that action, the Board would be glad to know of it; but as long as that action stands, the Board cannot be justly blamed for following the course which the Mission itself has requested. The literal phraseology of the Manual regarding the powers of a Mission must necessarily have a generously Christian interpretation

when applied to our relations with union institutions in which we deal with other denominational Missions and Boards; and when, as in this case, a Mission declines to co-operate with a union institution with which the Board and the home Church co-operate, conditions are created which no manual rule can exactly cover.

(Signed) ARTHUR J. BROWN.

(XLII.)

MISSION MINUTES, 1918

Executive Committee Report, Section 10.

10. The Committee requested the Chairman to write a letter to the Board concerning its action and the grounds for the same, in transferring Mr. Rhodes to Seoul College. The Chairman wrote:

"In Board Letter 432 the Board's action is based upon Sec. 40 of the Manual relating to the 'Powers of the Mission' where the right of appeal is given a missionary when not satisfied with his appointment by the Mission. It is specified that an appeal against the action may be made to the Board for final decision. It is also specified that any request requiring the action of the Board should be accompanied by the action of the Mission upon it. In reference to the statements in the Board action on these points the Committee wished me to say that it had never been informed that any appeal was being made by either Mr. Rhodes or the College; that in so far as any of its members knew no information to that effect had ever been made public on the field. It was entirely unknown to the Mission.

"It wished me also to say that members of the College Board inform it that no such appeal over the action of the Mission has ever been made by the Board of the College. The only action of that Board was as follows:

"Chosen Christian College Board of Managers, 8/26-30/17.

"It was moved and unanimously carried that the Board press for the appointment of Mr. H. A. Rhodes to the faculty of the College through the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in U. S. A."

"Mr. Rhodes writes me as Chairman of the Committee:

"I did not know until Board Letter 432 arrived that my letter to the Board had been regarded as an appeal. I did not use that word in my correspondence, had never looked up the Manual on the point, and had not thought of taking that course. Consequently I am not a little disconcerted at the wording of the Board action."

"A Board action based on Par. 40 of the Manual, providing for a formal appeal over a Mission action to the Board for final decision, surely would call for more preceding history of action on the field than is shown in this case. Manifestly none of the conditions imposed in the Manual upon such action seem to have been met. The action of the Board to the effect that:

"In these circumstances there seems to be no alternative but for the Board to act on the pending appeal on its merits in harmony with Par. 40 of the Manual. The Committee and Council therefore recommend that the appeal of Mr. Rhodes and the Field Board of Managers be sustained." does not seem to us in accord with the provisions of the Manual."

(XLIII.)

MISSION MINUTES, 1918

Executive Committee Report, Section 5

5 In view of the ad-interim action of the Mission No. 163 disapproving the return of Dr. Avison to the States Mr. Koons presented to the Committee Dr. Brown's letter of October 17th to Dr. Avison in which he says: "I am asking Dr. Jones to tell Dr. North that I am in favor of your coming and that I hope he will stretch his authority as Chairman of the Joint Committee far enough to send you a cable, even though he cannot consult all the members of the Committee." Also a cable received by Dr. Avison, October 29th, 1917, as follows: "Return approved. Brown agrees. North." It was passed that the Chairman be requested to write the Board in view of the above information and express our conviction that this further accentuates the necessity of definition of relation between field and Board. The Chairman wrote:

"It seems to us that the primary and fundamental relation of a missionary is to his Mission and Board, under which he has been commissioned and works. Arrangement of work which he carries for these comes first, and when other duties put extraordinary claims upon him the meeting of them must be subject to the permission and provision of these bodies. The Manual regulations on the subject seem clear: 'All requests requiring Board action

should be accompanied with the action of the Mission upon them' and, 'Any other leave of absence other than the furlough (regular) thus provided for will be by vote of the Board on recommendation of the Mission.'

"Dr. Avison had asked leave of the Mission for an entirely other purpose than the College, which had not been granted. No request was made to the Mission for this purpose. There was no action either on the part of the Mission or his Station. Nor was the Mission notified of any such request being made. The Mission has never been informed even of any specific Board action on the matter. Apparently the only request made at home or on the field was one directly and personally to yourself, and was handled in the same way. Undoubtedly Dr. Avison would have the right to prefer such a request to the Board; he would also have the right of appeal over adverse Mission action; without question the Board has power to authorize his return; but the mode of such action is provided for in the Manual, and does not seem to us to have been that which was pursued."

(XLIV.)

MISSION MINUTES, 1918

Apportionment Committee Request to Board with Regard to the Chosen Christian College

In view of the confusion arising from the lack of exact delimitation of the relation between the Chosen Christian College and the Chosen Mission; and in view of the further fact that the work as now administered is in conflict with the Manual rule as regards institutions within the limits of the Mission; and assuming that the Board proposes to continue the institution although in opposition to the judgment of the Mission:

Resolved:

That we request the Board to continue to do so only in case it secures the permission of the General Assembly for the suspension in the case of the Chosen Christian College of the Manual rule (Par. 40) that "the Mission has general care and supervision of all work within the limits"; and obtain its authorization for the establishment and operation of the College as an institution within the limits of the Mission, yet wholly outside and unrelated to it.

The reasons underlying this resolution may be stated as follows:

1. The present system of operating is a source of constant conflict with the recognized work of the Chosen Mission. Without reviewing again the circumstances which led the Mission at its Annual Meeting of 1915 to request the Board to operate the College, if it was to be established at all, as an institution outside of the Chosen Mission, it may be pointed out that the Board's assent on this point without accurate and authoritative definition has given rise to a difficult and anomalous situation.

It has left the institution in the Mission but not of it; its budget a part of the assigned income of the Mission, but separate from it, and the Mission with no relation to it; its faculty full members of the Mission with all privileges and rights towards all the work of the Mission, but the Mission specifically excluded from any authority or rights towards theirs; and the institution established and operated outside of the only field superintendence recognized by the Manual regulations or authorized by the General Assembly, and in opposition to the repeated and nearly unanimous judgment of the Assembly's agent on the field. Proceeding upon this basis without distinct separation and definition by Assembly authorization has produced much confusion and conflict, two instances of which may be cited as follows:

1. The acting President of the College is also at the head of the Severence Medical College and Hospital, an institution connected with the Mission and perhaps the largest of its kind in the Orient. The position is one of large responsibilities and onerous duties, and the work is done under the assignment of the Mission. The Manual regulations require that any leave of absence other than the regular furlough shall be by vote of the Board upon recommendation of the Mission. (Par. 18c.) During the past year, after having applied for leave of absence for medical work which was not granted, he dropped his regular Mission assignment on the invitation of the Chairman of the Joint Committee in America, and returned to America contrary to the disapproving action of the Mission, and so far as the Mission has been informed without specific Board authorization, for nearly a year's absence in relation to the College interests.

2. At the Annual Meeting of 1917 the Rev. H. A. Rhodes requested to be transferred to teaching in the Chosen Christian College. This the Mission declined to do. He was an experienced worker; there were many unfilled vacancies in the Mission; and he was greatly needed in the direct Mission work. The Board subsequently took action upon its own authority, transferring him directly to the College. This lessening of the Mission's forces of experienced workers has not only embarrassed the Mission in its work but made it much more difficult for the Mission to fill the vacancy in Seoul Station's evangelistic work caused by the death of Dr. Underwood.

2. The Revised Educational Ordinance of Chosen raised a fresh complication. The ordinance requires that all private schools from primary up eliminate religious instruction and exercises from their curricula. New institutions must do so at once; old institutions have ten years of grace. The Seoul institution was classified as a new institution and the Administration in granting a charter required that, with the exception of the Theological Department, all departments should be secularized and no student should matriculate in any but his own department.

That the acceptance of a charter under the new ordinance would, in the judgment of the Mission, prejudice all the educational work of the Mission, is sufficiently indicated by the fact that although it approved the application for a charter for the Severence Medical College on the ground that, "A Medical College stands on a somewhat different plane than other institutions of higher general education with regard to religious instruction for the general student body" (Minutes 1916), it specifically refused permission for the establishment of an Academy at Chairyung with the statement that, "Because of the possible effect on other educational institutions of the establishment of such an academy, since it would have to be established under the new educational ordinance, and we do not approve of applying for a permit under these ordinances at the present time."

The Board representatives have applied for and secured such a charter for the College, all the educational work of the Mission is now laboring under the handicap arising from this action, and it is only fair to the Mission that the distinction between the College and the Mission should be made clear to the Government in view of the Assembly resolution of 1917 counseling that the educational work of the Mission should be carried on with religious instruction as long as it is legally permissible.

3. With no intention whatever of discourtesy and with all due respect for our superior body, the Board, we would point out that the irregularity and confusion of the present situation, which must necessarily increase, is in no small measure due to the fact that the whole situation is in entire discord and out of harmony with the General Assembly's regulations for the conduct of the work. The Mission is the Assembly's agent upon the field. (Assembly Minutes 1887, pp. 23-24, Sec. 6.) The Manual contains the Assembly's regulations for the direction of its operative agents in the conduct of its foreign work. The Manual rule (Sec. 40) provides that the Mission have general care and oversight of all work within its limits.

In the case of the Chosen Christian College the Board action stated (Board Letter 249) that if the Mission did not see its way clear to co-operate in the establishing and operating of the College, "the Board authorizes such members of the Mission as are willing to do so, to represent the Board in organizing the College." This was at once done and the institution is still being operated on this basis in apparent disregard of the Assembly's regulations for its foreign work, and of the principles laid down in the Board actions of Board Letters Nos. 64 and 80. In these it is stated:

"The training of ministers, evangelists and other leaders of the Church is one of the most solemn and imperative duties of the Missions and Boards; a duty which cannot be transferred to independent bodies over which the Mission and Boards have no control * * * * *. It is vital to the success of the whole missionary enterprise that the aims, methods and teachings of institutions of this kind should be kept in harmony with the evangelistic aims and work of the Missions and the Board; and under their responsible supervision as an integral and organic part of the work. In the case of joint institutions the control of the Mission should be exercised through a Joint Field Board of Managers elected by and amenable to the co-operating Missions."

The Mission at its Annual Meeting of 1915, after the College had been organized as above, requisited the Board to make suitable arrangements for its operation separate from the Mission. As yet this has not been done. We therefore respectfully request and, in view of the increasing confusion and injury resulting to the general work, we feel constrained to press the request, that, if it be operated at all, proper authorization be secured for the independent position of the College within the limits of the Mission, and an authorized definition of its relation to the Mission's work and workers be made.

(XLV.)

BOARD LETTER NO. 473

November 6, 1918.

The Mission and the Chosen Christian College

To the Chosen Mission.
Dear Friends:

In acting upon the minutes of your annual meeting October 7th, the Board considered your action on page 78 regarding the Chosen Christian College. Second, there was also presented the statement signed by fifteen dissenting members of the Mission. After some discussion, the Board voted to postpone action for two weeks and directed that copies of the full text of the two documents be mailed to the members of the Board so that each one could have opportunity to study them. At the meeting October 21st the matter was taken up again and a draft of a proposed reply presented. The Rev. Dr. Charles R. Erdman made the point that the reply did not sufficiently cover some of the points which he believed the Mission deemed important, and that these points should be more definitely and adequately cleared. The Board therefore referred the whole matter back to the Chosen Committee and the Executive Council with instructions to confer with Dr. Erdman and report at the next meeting, November 4th. In consultation with Dr. Erdman the last sentence of the proposed reply was changed and a considerable section added so as to make the whole report more complete and comprehensive. This revised and enlarged report was submitted to the Board November 4th with the unanimous recommendation of the Chosen Committee and the Executive Council, in which Dr. Erdman concurred, that it be adopted. I have explained this process in order that you may see that the Board does not act hastily or unadvisedly in these important matters, but that it goes into them with care and thoroughness. The report as finally amended and enlarged is as follows:

"Consideration was given to an action of the Chosen Mission to the effect that 'the present system of operating the Chosen Christian College in Seoul is a source of constant conflict with the recognized work of the Chosen Mission,' that it 'has given rise to a difficult and anomalous situation,' and that 'assuming that the Board proposes to continue the institution although in opposition to the judgment of the Mission,' the Mission 'requests the Board to continue to do so' only in case it secures the permission of the General Assembly for the suspension in the case of the Chosen Christian College of the Manual rule (Par. 40) that 'the Mission has general care and supervision of all work within its limits, and obtain its authorization for the establishment and operation of the College as an institution within the limits of the Mission, yet wholly outside and unrelated to it.' The Board also received a communication entitled: Some Reasons Why Fifteen Members of the Chosen Mission Voted Against the Resolution Concerning the Chosen Christian College."

"The Board replied that its actions regarding the College were reported to and approved by the General Assembly immediately following. Four years have elapsed since the essential actions were taken in 1914, during which period the institution has been formally opened and legally chartered by the Japanese Government-General; a valuable site has been secured with the assistance of the Government-General; missionaries have been assigned to the faculty and are at work; students are in attendance; large sums have been secured for buildings; plans for their construction are well advanced; and obligations have been incurred with other Boards and with the Government-General which cannot now be honorably evaded. The Board sees no reason for reopening the question at this late day, nor has the Mission given any new reason for doing so. Paragraph 40 of the Manual, to which the Mission refers, is not involved, since the Board has not deprived the

Mission of its powers in relation to the College. The Mission voluntarily and against the wish of the Board abdicated its powers in respect to the College by declining to recognize it as an integral part of the work within its bounds with which the Board and the Home Church are co-operating. The Board agrees with the Mission that the resulting situation is 'difficult and anomalous' and that it is a 'source of constant conflict' and 'confusion.' But this unfortunate situation has been created by the course of the Mission in refusing to accept the decision properly made by the Board and approved by the General Assembly; and the Mission is entirely free to remedy it at any time by co-operating with the College, as the Board very cordially desires it to do. The Board commended the statement of the fifteen members of the minority of the Mission as a fair and dignified statement of the situation.

"To the request of the Mission that 'if it (the College) be operated at all, proper authorization be secured for the independent position of the College within the limits of the Mission,' the Board replies that 'proper authorization' has already been given in actions of the Board which were communicated to the Mission in Board Letters Nos. 249 of December 8, 1914, and 316 of February 10, 1916, the latter having been based on the action of the Mission as shown on page 45 of the printed minutes of its annual meeting in 1915. These actions of the Board were submitted to and approved by the General Assembly the following year in connection with its review of the records of the Board.

"To the further request of the Mission that 'an authorized definition of its (the College's) relation to the Mission's work and workers be made,' reply be given that the Board's action which was quoted in Board Letter No. 249 of December 8, 1914, stated 'that our share in this College is to be regarded as an integral and necessary part of the work of the Presbyterian Church in Korea and entitled to full recognition as such.' The relation of the College to the Mission is the same as that of other union institutions, such as the Severance Union Medical College and the Junior Union College in Pyeng Yang, except that the Mission has not availed itself of its right to elect representatives on the Field Board of Managers.

"The relation of the members of the faculty to the Mission is in harmony with the policy in many fields, which the Board see no adequate reason for modifying in Chosen, namely: that all regularly appointed Presbyterian missionaries assigned to union institutions are members of their respective Missions in full and regular standing on the same plane as other missionaries, in accordance with paragraph 39 of the Manual which provides that 'a Mission consists of all foreign missionaries under appointment by the Board within specified territorial limits.' Any change in the relation of the Chosen College missionaries to the Mission would necessarily apply to the missionaries who are engaged in union institutions elsewhere, including the Junior Union College at Pyeng Yang.

"From the viewpoint of home administration, the College is not directly under our Board but is under the direction of the Co-operating Board of Trustees in North America representing all the co-operating missionary Boards; but in this respect the Chosen College does not differ from the Severance Union Medical College, the Shantung Christian University, the Nanking Christian University and various other union institutions. The co-operating Missions on the field have their voice in these institutions through their right to elect representatives on the Field Boards of Managers, and the only reason why the Chosen Mission has no voice in managing the College in Seoul is because it has voluntarily chosen not to have it. Meantime, in deference to the wishes of the Mission the Board has followed the course stated in the Board letter referred to (December 8, 1914), namely:

"The Board will endeavor, as far as practicable, to provide its share of faculty and maintenance without lessening the force and budget that would be normally assigned to the Mission; although the Board cannot of course guarantee this irrespective of any conditions that may arise. To avoid confusion, the Board will designate that they can be noted separately from those that are subject to transfer on the field."

"It should be noted that while the Board did 'not guarantee to provide its share of faculty and maintenance without lessening the force and budget that would be normally assigned to the Mission, irrespective of any

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conditions that may arise,' the Board has actually done so thus far. No money has been given to the College that otherwise would have been given to the other work in Chosen; the only missionary transferred to the College (Mr. Rhodes) was promptly replaced by a new appointment; and 'the College appropriations and missionary appointments' have been 'noted separately from those that are subject to transfer on the field.'

This report was unanimously adopted. As it was intended to be self-explanatory, I assume that I need not enlarge upon it. It represents the matured and careful judgment of the Board and we earnestly hope that it will commend itself to your judgment.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ARTHUR J. BROWN.

(XLVI.) EXTRACT FROM A PAMPHLET OF CHOSEN CHRISTIAN COLLEGE—NOV., 1918, P. 3.

Field Board of Managers:

Consists of eleven missionaries representing the co-operating Missions. Northern Methodist Mission: Rev. W. A. Noble, Ph.D., Rev. A. L. Becker, Rev. B. W. Billings. Northern Presbyterian Mission: A. M. Sharrocks, M.D., Rev. James S. Gale, D.D., Rev. H. E. Blair, Rev. Harry A. Rhodes. Southern Methodist Mission: Rev. J. L. Gerdine. Canadian Presbyterian Mission: Rev. Milton Jack, B.D.

(XLVII.) BRIEF

A Brief on the Subject of the Desirability of an Adjustment Between Home Base and Field as Relates to Field Administration

Introduction

November 17, 1917.

The Presbyterian system is essentially a representative democracy expressing itself in a series of graded courts. In these courts of the Church two distinct types of authority are exercised. These are judicial and administrative or operative. In applying the principles fundamental to Presbyterianism as they exist in the relations of these bodies to the organization of our Foreign Mission system, we must not forget that one is ecclesiastical and the other only administrative or operative. But these principles apply to the administrative functions of the Church bodies as much as to their judicial functions, so that we may set the judicial aspect of the one aside and compare them only in the character common to both, that of administrative organization in religious effort. In this they approach so nearly that the application of the fundamental principles of the one may clearly determine the degree of harmony or disharmony of the other.

I. The Organic Principles of Presbyterianism as an Administrative System
In the Church the direct and characteristic series is the congregation, the Session, the Presbytery and the General Assembly.

A. Each Has a Sphere of Exclusive Original Jurisdiction.—Each has a certain sphere of operation in which it holds exclusive original jurisdiction in its relation to the other bodies, whether superior or subsidiary. To illustrate: the Congregation has exclusive original jurisdiction in the electing of Elders, Deacons and Trustees for itself; the Session has the same over the communicant membership; the Presbytery toward its ministerial members; and the Assembly to matters of order and doctrine. No superior body can intrude to exercise these functions or to dictate their exercise.

B. Each Has a Larger Sphere of Ordinary Original Jurisdiction.—Outside of the sphere mentioned above also is a larger sphere in which each body currently exercises original jurisdiction for many functions, but in which it does not have this so clearly as an exclusive prerogative.

C. When Properly Exercised This Also Becomes Final Jurisdiction.—There is a sense also in which each body, certainly in the first and commonly in the second sphere, exercises not only original jurisdiction, but for all practical purposes final jurisdiction as well. For all these functions are exercised by each under a recognized established body of regulations. So that so long as their exercise is conducted in clear accord with those regulations, the body is protected from intrusion from above and its decisions become final.

D. The Power of Review and Control.—The completing factor is the power of review and control which each holds over its subsidiary bodies.

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The system thus assures each continuing to work within its proper limits and in accord with its governing regulation.

All these elements are fundamental characteristics of Presbyterianism in the organized administrative pursuit of its ends. Responsibility with its necessary accompanying authority is appropriately distributed among the graded bodies. Each body is protected from intrusion in the proper exercise of its appointed functions. Each is guarded from the improper exercise of them. In so far as character of organization can give strength and success and glory, that of Presbyterianism lies here, as does that of representative democracy. It is the peculiar source of strength and success in Presbyterianism that, remaining of the people, the organization of its operating administration is such that it can and does locate responsibility for each function in that body of its series most directly concerned in that function, and therefore the body with the most intimate knowledge and the most direct interest, and consequently the strongest claim upon immediate Divine guidance and endowment.

II. Comparison with This of the Operative System of Our Foreign Missions Work

In the system of our Foreign Missions organization the series recognized begins with the individual missionary in charge of his district or institution; then the Station; the Mission; and the Board of Foreign Missions in New York.

A. The Field Organization.—The field organization covering the first three may be said to be framed on a consistent Presbyterian basis. The individual missionary has direct charge of his work which has been assigned him by the Mission. This is under the superintendence and direction of the local station, composed of all active workers in the immediate field, and in it each has a vote. The organized Mission in turn has superintendence and direction of the work of all the Stations within its bounds, and each active missionary is a voting member in it. The work of each body is conducted with limitations and regulations established in the Board's Manual and the Mission's Rules and By-laws.

B. The System Abruptly Broken in the Relation of Field and Home Base.—When we come to the connection of Home and Field organization, however, the system is abruptly broken. The Mission, the supreme operating body on the field, composed of all the workers within its bounds and superintending all the existing work, at once ceases, in its relation to its superior body, the Board, to have any authority whatever inherent in itself over the work it superintends. A well-established body of regulations define the Mission's relations to its subsidiary field bodies and the limits of their mutual operation. No regulations of any kind exist defining the Mission sphere of operations and its jurisdiction in relation to the Board. Organically field jurisdiction as exercised by field bodies is only by current Board permission. At any time, upon any matter, which its own judgment may so direct, the real source in which real operating authority inheres, the Board, may exercise it directly and without regard to the judgment of the field organization. This covers all lines both of policy and work, and is equally true both for initial and final jurisdiction.

In brief, the system in its field organization is Presbyterian and democratic, but in its connection between Field and Home Base it becomes distinctly autocratic. The field organization becomes simply the creature of the Board exercising jurisdiction as it is permitted; unable to exercise it except as it is permitted; and with no defined and mutually recognized regulations for either.

C. This Fact Forbids Real Democracy Even In Field Organization.—It follows, also, that this change at this point makes void the possibility of any real democracy within the field bodies themselves; for it is a fundamental concept of democracy that the functions and authority which bodies exercise, they exercise as inherent in themselves, and not by the current permission of a superior. Scientifically defined, the first only can be a democratic system, and the second, by virtue of the character of its head, as clearly becomes an autocratic one throughout its entirety.

As parts in an organized system the field bodies in relation to the Board have no sphere in which they exercise exclusive original jurisdiction. They have no body of established regulations working in accord with which their

jurisdiction in field matters becomes final. Review and control is the only Presbyterian factor left and in the absence of the other two this ceases to be distinctly Presbyterian.

III. Misinterpretations of the Above Statement to Be Guarded Against

A. This Is Not a Criticism of the Board.—The writer wishes it to be distinctly understood that the above statement is in no sense a criticism of the Board in New York. He is a loyal and sympathetic co-worker with it, and gives place to none in his admiration of all it is accomplishing in the Church's great work of evangelizing the world. It is a criticism of a system. The Board is not the author of the system but simply an agent in it, whose place and responsibility in it has been defined for it by its superior body. The author is the General Assembly and the system is its system. Since the Assembly's organization of the work in 1837 when it determined that it would "Of its own proper authority superintend and conduct the work of Foreign Missions by a Board," and the Board was appointed and "charged with the duty of organizing and superintending the work of disseminating the Gospel in unevangelized lands" no further definition or distribution in administration has been made. Responsibility has been left where it was then placed, solely in the hands of the Board. Authority cannot be separated from responsibility. The two must go hand in hand. Hence the present system.

B. The Present Relation Is Not in Itself An Improper One.—Nor do I wish to be understood as saying that this relation between home and field is in itself an improper one. It is not. The fact that the Foreign Mission work of practically all denominations was organized on the same essential basis sufficiently indicates this. But conditions are largely the determining factor in propriety of method, and changed conditions call for adaptation of method. The days of new fields, of small Missions, of simple evangelism and of inexperienced field forces were, and under the same conditions may be still, the days when such a relation is the proper one; even though it is Episcopal rather than Presbyterian. Paternalism is proper during years of weakness or immaturity. But when fields have been long occupied, the field Mission large and well organized, the working force numerous, tried and experienced, the work complex, differentiated and interknit with multifarious field conditions, to continue wholly in this relation is not only contrary to the genius of Presbyterianism, but unjust to the larger bodies of the Church's presbyters working in the foreign field and, when occasional differences arise, may involve actual disaster to the work.

C. The Present Method of Operation Not Ordinarily a Dictatorial One.—Nor do I wish to be understood as saying that the current mode of operation in the home-field relation is a dictatorial or arbitrary one. It is the opposite of this. In ordinary current operations large discretion is left with the field organizations in almost every line, and even when there may be minor divergence of judgment, not infrequently the judgment of the field body is allowed to stand. This mode of ordinary current permission, however, does not affect the principle of the system; nor does it affect the system's operation in fact, when real and serious differences of judgment arise between field and home base as concerning field matters, as at times they needs must. Responsibility is vested solely in the Board for all matters, great and small, in such case it is but proper that responsibility should have the final and authoritative word. Proper regulations and definition as between operating bodies are not made for the times when they all agree. They exist for those times of serious difference of judgment which occasionally cannot but arise. They are the prohibitor of confusion and dissension; the guardian of harmony and efficiency. Would not ultimate confusion and even dissension be inevitable in the Presbyterian system if the subsidiary bodies were so placed as to not only have no representation in the General Assembly, but had no definition or recognized regulation of their administrative functions in relation to the Assembly's authority over them. If the first were necessary, as in the case of the Foreign Missions system, so much the more would efficiency require the correction of the second.

D. Does Not Mean the Elimination of Board Authority in Field Matters.—No more do I wish to be understood as advocating the elimination of Board authority from field matters. I do not agree with the Report of the Committee on Principles and Methods of Administration in the 1917 Conference of Foreign Mission Boards of North America to the effect that it should

be a relation of co-operative counsel and persuasion. It should also include authority. To not do so is to be deprecated as much as anything in the present method. For the Board has sources and kinds of wisdom which no single field force possesses quite as much as field force has sources and kinds of wisdom with regard to its own work which the Board cannot possess.

IV. The Above Illustrated in the Work and Character of the Korea Mission
The truth of all the above is well illustrated in the case of the Korea Mission. This Mission by comity agreement has exclusive responsibility in a territory of 5,000,000 people. Besides its own evangelistic work, in this territory is a self-governing Presbyterian Church of 1,190 congregations and a Christian constituency of 107,858, with its own Presbyteries and General Assembly, the product of the Mission's work and with which the work of the Mission is most intimately bound up. In its eight stations it has seven Mission hospitals and eight Mission academies. It has federated and union relations with five other Missions involving a theological seminary, a medical college and two hospitals, an arts college, Bible institute, tract society, Bible translation, and many other union undertakings. Since the introduction of modern government by Japan many problems have arisen with the authorities, difficult and delicate of solution, and involving the Mission's own work, its federated and union undertakings, and its relations to the Korean Church. The Mission itself has 130 adult members of whom 76 are active voting ones, all carefully selected when commissioned; and of those 41 are presbyters of the home church. Many of these have been laboring in the field between 20 and 30 years, and the large majority have been there more than ten years. The work is carefully organized and superintended on all lines upon a thoroughly Presbyterian basis of graded bodies in all of which every member has a voice and every active member a vote. Its annual budget runs into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. All that exists has developed under the hands of these missionaries and in many true senses is the intimate fruit of their labors. Outside of the Boards there is possibly nothing in the home church that parallels it as a large efficient operating organization carrying so diversified a direct work.

But organically it has no defined position, and when differences of judgment arise between field and home on any field matter, it has no functions inherent in itself and conserved to it by recognized regulation. Organically it administers simply by the current permission of its superior body, which permission at any time, in any subject, may be withdrawn, and initial instructions issued or field decisions reversed. In a work of such magnitude, complexity and interknit field conditions, which only the body of field operators can fully understand, it is scarcely more than necessary to state the conditions to realize the operative weakness of the method.

V. The Point that Is Being Pressed

The point I am pressing is nothing more than the most fundamental principles of Presbyterianism. At least in the larger Missions, those functions which are proper to the field organization should be definitely assigned to it, their exercise conserved to it, and on this basis the administrative relation of home and field reasonably defined. For the larger Missions, that all real authority, initial, appellate and final, should rest in the Home Base is improper; it is unjust to the field force and it does not conduce to the best operation.

VI. Suggested Solutions to the Difficulty

Of late years, as the growth of the work has produced increased embarrassments along this line, three suggestions for a solution have come from the field.

A. The Petition of 1915.—At the 1915 Annual Meeting of the Korea Mission the Executive Committee presented the following suggestion to the Mission and it was laid on the table for one year that it might appear in the printed minutes and so stir consideration. The proposed action was as follows:

We, the Korea Mission, do respectfully petition the Board that it provide that, although as in the past the Board under its authority of "review and control" possess the power of veto over the actions of the Mission, yet in FIELD MATTERS ONLY, in the rare cases where the Mission would deem it necessary, the Mission would have the right to act again upon the matter voted, and, should it repeat its former action by a two-thirds ma-

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jority, the Mission's judgment shall finally decide the matter, subject only to appeal to the General Assembly.

1. The location and assignment of all missionaries commissioned by the Board to work within the bounds of the Mission.
2. The return from the field of workers whom the corporate Mission does not consider suitable for the work.
3. The powers to be exercised by field committees working within the bounds of the Mission.
4. The superintendence and control of all existing field institutions.
5. The initiatory in new institutions (subject to Board vote as to actual step) as to number, character and location.
6. The principles of self-support in the native church as related to Mission operations.
7. Union or federation upon the field in work with the Missions of other denominations.

8. The relation of the Mission and its members to the Korean Church. This proposal related only to the Korea Mission. Ordinary relations are left as they are and the difficulty is sought to be solved through the idea of giving to the Mission a sort of referendum authority in strictly field matters. The exercise of this, however is confined to cases of practical field unanimity. And only when the matter is considered so important as to be necessary.

B. Request of 1917.—At the 1917 Annual Meeting of the Mission this proposal was taken from the table and the following substituted and passed: "That we request the Board to secure a revision of the Manual so as to secure that:

"Missions as ordinarily organized in foreign lands shall be the agents of the General Assembly for the propagation of the Gospel and the planting of the Church; the Mission to have the direction of the Assembly's work within its bounds; and by the power of review and control to be subject to its Board or other authorized agent. The Missions are also to have the right to appoint Commissioners to the General Assembly."

This approaches the problem by direct and comprehensive definition. The field organization is given a defined place in the Church's foreign operations. Something which it has not heretofore had. In field matters it has exclusive original jurisdiction, and when its actions are within the scope and in accord with such regulations as from time to time may be established from above, this also becomes final. At the same time, the Home Base is given plenary restraining powers; and may also make initial proposals to the Mission in field matters, as is a recognized form of procedure in the Church. The most important point is that with relations thus defined, in new undertakings or new policies the Mission cannot proceed without the consent of the Board, neither can the Board initiate such on the field except through the concurrence of the Mission. In the ecclesiastical body supreme over both the two meet on a parity of representation.

This would seem to be in complete accord with the report mentioned above of the Committee on Principles and Methods of Administration in the 1917 Conference of the Foreign Mission Boards of North America. The subject of the report is "Co-operation from the Home Base in Missionary Administration on the Foreign Field." It says:

"The very wording of the topic announced presupposes, first, that the administration of missionary work is recognized as legitimately centering largely in the foreign field; and, secondly, that a legitimate and vital part of that administration should emanate from the Home Base

"To remove any remaining anxiety in the discussion of the topic, two observations may be made. (a) The co-operation and supervision proposed relate only to larger questions of policy. It is recognized that the routine administration of missionary work belongs properly to the foreign field. . . . (b) A second reassurance may be found in the fact that the co-operation and supervision proposed to be extended from the Home Base to the foreign field will be advisory, suggestive and persuasive, rather than mandatory."

C. Proposal of Certain Furloughed Missionaries in Conference with the Board.—The following suggestion, first made by Missionaries of the Korea Mission on furlough, in conference with the Board on the action given above of the 1917 Annual Meeting, has since been unanimously endorsed by the Execu-

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tive Committee of the Mission as being acceptable and expressing in another and perhaps simpler way the central thought of the Mission in its action at the Annual Meeting of 1917. The Board's Manual authorized by the General Assembly, in Section 40, deals with the powers of the Mission in relation to its work and subsidiary bodies, but it has been authoritatively stated at various times that it does not define the Board-Mission relations. It is proposed to amend this to read as follows:

"The Mission has general care and supervision of all work within its limits. It cannot inaugurate or conduct work, or inaugurate policies without the consent of the Board, and the Board does not do so in the field without the concurrence of the Mission. All questions of policy, expenditure and method are subject to its judgment, and all requests requiring the action of the Board should be accompanied by the action of the Mission upon them. . . ."

(The underlined sentence is the inserted amendment.)

In many ways this is not so clearly comprehensive and definitive as the action of the Annual Meeting of 1917, and so far as this is true there still remain possibilities of confusion. It has this merit, however, that it explicitly places the power of initiative in the hands of each of the two bodies, and limits the exercise of it in operation by the required concurrence of the other.

Conclusion

While clear definition on other points is desirable, this is the central thought of the Korea Mission, and was such in the action of the Annual Meeting. The Home Base has a general knowledge and therefore sources of wisdom which the Mission does not possess. Therefore the system should be such that the Mission may not push ahead solely on its own judgment. Likewise the Mission has particular knowledge and therefore sources of wisdom concerning its own work which the Home Base does not possess. Therefore the system should be such that the Home Base may not push ahead solely on its own judgment. When differences arise concerning new projects far better to wait at the posts of her doors until concurrence makes known the voice of Wisdom. Whether this would be admissible for all Missions or only for the larger ones I do not pretend to say. The General Assembly of 1917 took action to the effect that:

"The Assembly notes with especial interest the Board's policy of securing more efficient local administration in the various mission fields, including the largest amount of democratic self-government in the Missions, and recommends that whenever conditions permit, or render it advantageous in the judgment of the Board, further steps be taken in the same direction, especially in the case of the larger Missions."

In view of this recommendation we cannot but believe that a reasonable proposition to this end will meet with the approval of the Assembly and the Home Church.

We trust that this brief on the matter will be viewed in the assurance that its writer seeks only the interests of the Kingdom and increased efficiency in the common service which we render to the King. And we earnestly petition that consideration be given it and such an adjustment of the present system be devised and brought to the next General Assembly as will be satisfactory to both Home and Field and conserve the proper interests of both.

Corresponding Secretary and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Korea (Chosen) Mission.

The above brief was endorsed by the Executive Committee of the Korea Mission at its meeting of November 17-20, 1917.

(LXVII) LETTER OF DR. A. J. BROWN TO M. KOMATSU.

JUNE 16, 1915

25 Madison Ave., New York,

June 16, 1915.

To His Excellency M. Komatsu,
Director of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs,
Seoul, Chosen.

My dear Mr. Komatsu:

As Your Excellency knows from my acknowledgment of May 18th, I received in due time Your Excellency's letter of April 8th, enclosing an

English translation of certain ordinances and instructions recently issued by the Government-General of Chosen regarding private schools. Your Excellency's article on Ordinance No. 4, entitled "Revision in Regulations for Private Schools," and copies of the Seoul Press of April 2nd and 3rd, containing Your Excellency's articles on the "Separation of Education and Religion." As these ordinances and regulations affect the educational work and plans not only of the Board with which I am officially connected but of all the Mission Boards having work in Chosen, and as I assumed that Your Excellency intended to notify them through me of the character and scope of the Government's requirements, I have consulted with the available members of the Committee of Reference and Counsel, whose names appear upon this letterhead, and who as a Committee represent the Mission Boards of various denominations in North America. I have advised also with a few educators of international eminence whose opinions are of large value. It was agreed in our Committee that the Sub-Committee of which the Rev. Dr. Frank Mason North is Chairman should correspond with the Boards directly concerned, and that meantime I should write to Your Excellency, as I now do, the letter being personal, like Your Excellency's to me, but written with the knowledge and approval of others who have a right to know of the correspondence.

I deeply appreciate Your Excellency's kindness in sending to me such important documents. I am impressed by the evidence of careful study of the subject and by the clearness and strength with which the conclusions are set forth. Our interest is naturally very great, and I wish most heartily that I could have an opportunity to discuss the matter in a personal conversation. As Your Excellency is aware, the Mission Boards are maintaining many schools in Chosen, and expending upon them and the support of the missionaries who conduct them, a very large sum of money. Plans have been made for the better equipment of some of these schools, and in particular for the development of a Union Christian College in Seoul. The Boards were led to make these plans, partly because of our conviction that the interests of the people of Chosen require the best type of Christian education that it is possible for us to aid them in securing, and partly because of our hearty desire to comply with the reasonable wishes of the Government-General of Chosen that all schools, including those conducted by the Missions, should be worthy of respect from the viewpoint of satisfactory educational standards. Your Excellency may recall that when I was in Chosen in 1909, I conferred with you on this subject, and also with the Director of the Bureau of Education, and you have doubtless been informed that when the present Director, The Honorable Teisaburo Sekiya, was in the United States last year, I had pleasure in inviting a number of distinguished missionary leaders to meet him at luncheon and that there and in a subsequent conversation in my office the matter was carefully discussed. I need, therefore, only repeat here that the Boards most cordially recognize the undoubted right of the Government to inspect all schools, to insist that they shall do good work, and to impose suitable qualifications for students who are to practice medicine or enter Government service. The Boards would not countenance for a moment any instruction that would be inconsistent with entire loyalty to the constituted authorities of the country in which our work is conducted.

It might not be proper for me to write in detail regarding all of the ordinances, instructions and regulations, for I do not profess to be an educational expert and I recognize the fact that the Government-General of Chosen is entirely within the limits of its own authority and discretion in making such rules as it deems suitable for schools which educate the children of its own subjects. I may only say that a considerable number of the rules impress me as excellent. Regarding others, my mind is not so clear. Much would depend upon the construction that may be placed upon them by future officials who will be charged with their application. The language of some of these articles is susceptible of an interpretation that might cause serious concern. Perhaps such an interpretation will not be placed upon them, and I gladly admit that we should assume that the policy that has been pursued thus far by the Imperial Government of Japan and the Government-General of Chosen raises a reasonable presumption that an equally broad policy will be pursued in the future. Indeed, some missionaries have assured me that this is likely to be the case.

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Nevertheless we cannot read without grave concern the specific statements that have been issued, and which appear to involve a restriction of the liberty that mission schools have been hitherto accorded. We note such statements in the pamphlet entitled, "The Chosen Educational Ordinances and Various Attendant Regulations," in Your Excellency's articles in the Seoul Press, and in Mr. Sekiya's reported statement in The Nagasaki Press of March 30th, where he says:

"Education and religion will be able to attain their respective aims by each being pursued in its own special way independent of the other. If they are mixed together, students who believe in a certain cult or religion will be unable to enter schools of different faith, or they will be forced to believe in a faith which is not their own, or, in other cases, they will be forced to abandon the faith in which they believe. In this way, freedom of belief will be hampered and the progress of education impeded in no small degree. The authorities are very appreciative of the valuable contributions made by religious schools in Chosen to the development of civilization and education, but they cannot allow the present state of education in Chosen to continue for long, for if they do, those evils above referred to, resulting from the mixing up of education and religion, are sure to appear sooner or later. It is with the purpose of preventing those evils that the revisions of Regulations for private schools have been effected. By these revisions, private schools giving common, industrial or special education in Chosen are required to fix their curricula in accordance with regulations controlling public common schools, higher common schools or Government special schools, it being also prohibited to them to include any course of study other than those authorized by those regulations. In other words, no matter what name or kind, common, industrial or special schools are required to conform to the system regulated for them. In consequence, in all those schools it is prohibited to give religious education or observe religious rites."

Such declarations naturally cause no small concern to the friends of Christian education. Your Excellency will understand the effect which they are likely to have upon the desire of the Boards to raise large additional sums for education in Chosen, including the new College in Seoul, as they apparently indicate an abridgement of the freedom of these schools in religious matters. We have been proceeding upon the supposition that the primary concern of the Government-General of Chosen related to the grade of educational work, and that in other respects, private schools would have the same liberty that similar schools enjoy in Great Britain and America.

We are aware that the Japanese Imperial Government regards education as a function of the State, or, to use Your Excellency's words, "education must be nationalistic." If this be understood as implying that the State should not be indifferent to the education of its people and that it should provide free schools, it is in entire accord with the best educational practice of the world and with the principles which underlie the American and British public school systems. In America and Great Britain, however, this recognized responsibility of the State extends only to the provision of public institutions for free education and to their regulation; it does not extend, nor is it believed that it should extend, to the regulation of private schools. The free public schools are supported by general taxation for those who wish to attend them, and in most States the law compels children of school age to attend some school. But the school attended can be private or public at the option of parents and pupils. Citizens must pay school taxes whether they patronize public schools or not, for these schools are regarded as a public benefit and necessity. But if citizens, in addition to their taxes, wish to incur the extra expense of sending their children to private schools, the Government interposes no objection whatever.

Your Excellency's article in the Seoul Press states:

"There are, of course, private colleges and universities (in America), but common education is entirely managed by the Government. The curricula of schools ranging between those giving elementary education and those giving higher education are arranged by the Government and include no religious teaching. It is true, however, that certain religionists and religious bodies have established private colleges and universities; but the aim they had in founding these institutions was not the propagation of their religion but the promotion and spread of education itself. As it is, with the excep-

tion of theological scholars aiming at the study of religion, no school in the United States gives religious teaching."

Your Excellency has not been given accurate information on the subject. As a matter of fact, there are not only private colleges and universities maintained by the churches or by members of the churches, but there are a great many private schools of lower grade, including kindergartens, primary schools, grammar schools and high schools. All these private schools of every grade have absolutely no relation to or supervision by the Government. The public schools are maintained by the State, are closely supervised by it, and exclude religious teaching, although some of them permit the reading of the Bible and an opening prayer. Private schools, however, are entirely free to teach what they like and how they like, religion included, the Government giving itself no concern regarding them and making no regulations for them, although it freely grants them charters to enable them to hold property as legally incorporated bodies. My own sons and daughters were educated in such private schools. While the masses of the people send their children to the public schools, a very large number of the well-to-do classes send their children to private schools, partly because they believe that sound education includes religion and they wish their children to be trained in the schools which recognize it and teach the Bible, and partly because many of these private schools do a higher grade of educational work than the public schools. This latter fact of itself is significant; namely, that with no regulation of the State to enforce a standard, private schools are doing the highest grade of educational work in the United States. The Government acts upon the supposition that the law of competition is an adequate protection. These private schools are numerous, and as they uniformly charge tuition fees, usually rather high fees too, while public schools are free, the private schools must offer superior educational as well as religious advantages in order to get students. Our American experience, therefore, is that the State runs no risk whatever from private schools.

Your Excellency has also been misinformed regarding "religionists" on the teaching staff of American schools of the best grade both public and private. A large majority of the teachers, professors and presidents in American institutions are Christians, and a considerable number are clergymen. The President of Princeton University is a Presbyterian clergyman. President Hadley of Yale University, whom you mention is indeed not a clergyman, but no one who knows him would ever think of speaking of him as "not connected with religion" for he is active as a Christian layman. He maintains regular preaching services in the University Chapel, often preaching himself, and is widely known as one of the most influential Christian leaders of America. In like manner, Dr. Woodrow Wilson, now President of the United States, was, when President of Princeton University, as he is today, an elder in the Presbyterian Church and he held religious services in the University Chapel. I could give Your Excellency a very long list of presidents and professors in the best private and public colleges and universities of the United States who are devoted Christian men, while in nearly all of the private schools, like the Hill School, Pottstown, Pennsylvania, the Hotchkiss School, Lakeville, Connecticut, Blair Academy, Blairsville, New Jersey, the Groton School, Groton, Massachusetts, the Philips Academies at Andover and Exeter, and hundreds of others, the Bible is in the curriculum and attendance upon religious services is compulsory. Indeed, most of the American private schools will not employ a teacher who is not a professed Christian and a member of a Church.

In short, the American plan is one of absolute freedom in education. The State maintains public secular schools at great expense for the multitudes who want them or cannot afford private schools; but Churches or voluntary groups of Christian individuals can found and conduct private schools without the slightest difficulty and make religion as prominent as they choose.

These statements are substantially true of British educational policy. The best schools in Great Britain, including not only Oxford, Cambridge, and the Scotch Universities, but such secondary schools as Eton, Rugby, Harrow and scores of others, though popularly called "public schools," are not Government schools but are privately controlled and are subject to no Government relation whatever, although the Royal Family and the high officers of the Government have educated their sons in these schools for generations.

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Many of their teachers are ordained clergymen of the Church of England or the Church of Scotland, and nearly all of the others are communicant members of those Churches. Religion is freely taught in all these schools, and many of the best Bible commentaries, devotional volumes and other religious publications of the whole Christian world have been prepared by the members of the faculties.

As the Ordinances, Instructions, Regulations, and Your Excellency's articles have been published and therefore are not private, I have sent copies to a few of the most distinguished educators in America together with a preliminary draft of my reply, and asked for their opinion as to the accuracy of my statement that private schools in the United States are free to teach religion. I append their replies:

Dean James E. Russell, LL.D., of the Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, writes:

"I am greatly surprised that the Japanese Minister of Education, who is usually so well informed on matters educational in this country, should make the mistake of thinking that there are few private schools in this country, and that the teaching of religion is debarred from them. As a matter of fact, no State in this Union places any restrictions whatever upon private schools. The latest report of the United States Commissioner of Education states that there are 1,647,104 pupils reported from private schools. This figure is undoubtedly low, because private schools with us are so free that they do not even have to report to the Government. As for teaching of religion, private schools throughout this country are free to do as they please. I have never heard of restrictions being put upon any sect whatever; moreover, in many of our states the teaching of religion in non-sectarian forms is permitted in the public schools, and in others specific provisions are made whereby pupils in the public schools are permitted to receive instruction by teachers of their own faith in connection with their regular school work, this teaching in some instances being carried on in the public school building and in other cases the children go to nearby churches. The one stand taken generally in this country is that sectarian teaching shall not be supported at public expense, whereas any form of religious instruction may be carried on at the expense of those who desire to promote it.

"Sincerely yours,

"JAMES E. RUSSELL."

President Arthur T. Hadley, LL.D., of Yale University, writes:

"I have read with interest the papers submitted by Mr. Komatsu and the draft of your reply. The lines of this draft seem to me most excellent. You are quite right in indicating that Mr. Komatsu's impressions regarding religious instruction in America are erroneous. If the Japanese Government continues to take the position which it does in the papers in question, we have, I am afraid, no defense against their proposed action except to withdraw capital from educational enterprises in Korea and in other places under Japanese influence; but the Government should not be allowed to force such withdrawals on erroneous grounds. Feeling as I do on this last point, I am not sure that any letter which I could write to you would be of service with Mr. Komatsu. You can judge of the situation far better than I can. You certainly have full permission to tell him or show him anything that I write you.

"Very sincerely,

"ARTHUR T. HADLEY."

Chancellor Elmer E. Brown, LL.D., of New York University, writes:

"I am deeply interested in the question regarding public and private schools in Chosen, which was discussed in our recent conference. It seems to me of importance that the general attitude of our public authorities toward education in this country be well understood, and the matter is one that may easily present some difficulties to any student of educational administration who has not been himself brought up under the American system.

"It is doubtless generally known that we have no national system of educational administration in this country. Our school systems are the systems of the several states. They are pretty generally of one type, yet there are minor variations among them. One national office, the Federal Bureau of Education, while exercising no authority over these systems, collects and distributes information concerning them all.

"The latest published report of the Federal Bureau of Education, covering the statistics of state school systems for the year 1911-12, shows a total enrollment in public schools and colleges of all grades of 18,376,257. The same year there were enrolled in private schools and colleges of all grades 1,902,183. The figures for the same year for elementary schools are as follows: Public elementary schools, 17,707,577; private elementary schools, 1,505,637. For secondary schools, the figures for the same year were as follows: Public secondary schools (high schools), 1,126,791; private secondary schools, 211,256. These figures for elementary and secondary schools are included in the figures for all grades as given above.

"The situation in this country may be illustrated further by reference to the statistics of two of our leading state school systems. The latest published report for the State of New York, that of the year 1912-13, shows a total enrollment in schools and colleges of all grades regularly reporting to the State Education Department, of 1,956,365. Of these 1,329,925 were in the public elementary schools, and 180,000 in the public secondary schools. According to the same report, it is estimated that in addition to the above, there were 225,000 pupils enrolled in private schools of different grades.

"For the State of Massachusetts, the statistics are at hand for the year 1913-14. These show that there were enrolled in the public elementary schools of the State 576,510 pupils and in the private elementary schools of the State 114,192. At the same time, there were enrolled in the public secondary schools of the State (high schools) 76,620, and in the private secondary schools (academies, etc.) 7,429.

"Back of these statistics lie considerations of fundamental importance touching the educational policy of this country. It is a well-known American practice to provide free education at public expense for the children of all of the people who do not choose for their children some other form of education. The teaching in these public schools is non-sectarian in character and for the most part non-religious, although not anti-religious. As it appears from the statistics which I have recorded above, approximately nine-tenths of our pupils are educated in such schools. At the same time, it is also a fundamental tenet of our American system that there shall be freedom of education. As appears from the figures quoted, about one-tenth of our pupils are educated in private schools or schools carried on by certain religious denominations. Our compulsory attendance laws, which are found on the statute books of the most of our States, permit of the satisfaction of their requirements by attendance of pupils on schools other than those publicly provided.

"The significant fact in view of the discussion of the situation in Chosen is that in the most of these privately conducted schools religion is taught. A large proportion of these schools are carried on by one or another religious denomination, or by the adherents of such denomination, and denominational doctrines are systematically and freely taught in such schools. In other private schools, religious doctrine is taught in more general and less sectarian terms; while in a relatively small number of such schools the teaching is conducted on a non-religious basis, substantially the same as that which obtains in the public schools.

"It should be added that while this freedom of religious teaching in the schools directly affects only about one-tenth of our school population, the freedom to conduct education along such lines is a vital element of our educational system. It has also this great public advantage which is widely recognized: that it lends to the education of our people a variety, a flexibility and a freedom for both conservative and radical initiative which is thoroughly in accord with the constitution of our society, and undoubtedly adds much to the enrichment of the American character.

"I have written somewhat at length regarding this matter, because it has always interested me deeply, and because I believe it will contribute to a true understanding of American education that the facts regarding this situation should be clearly presented on any suitable occasion.

"Very sincerely yours,

"ELMER E. BROWN."

I have also conferred with Professor Paul Monroe, Ph.D., LL.D., professor of the History of Education in Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, whose high authority in the educational world has been recognized, as Your Excellency is doubtless aware, by the honors that were given

him during his visit in Japan and by the translation, by the Japanese Society for the Advancement of Civilization of his notable volume on the History of Education. He manifested deep interest in the subject, read all the documents that Your Excellency sent to me, and, at my request put his views in writing as follows:

"My Dear Mr. Brown:

"Herewith I answer your inquiry of June 10th and make some comments on the communication from His Excellency, Mr. Komatsu, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Governor General of Chosen. I am much interested in doing so—First, because of my friendship for the Japanese people, my respect for the great work which they have done and are doing, my admiration for their culture, and the intense desire that I have that they take no action which would alienate the sympathy of the western nations; second, because of my belief that the mission schools have something definite to contribute to the life and the advance of the Orient.

"May I preface my remarks by saying that I am familiar with the work of the Japanese schools by actual visitation and believe that Japanese education has something to contribute to American education just as their culture has something to contribute to ours, and just as I believe that the Occident has something very definite to contribute to the Orient.

"The position taken in these regulations governing private schools by the Governor General of Chosen is so radical that I am convinced that his Excellency, the Minister, was quite misinformed concerning the status of education in western countries, and it is only that his misinformation may be set right that I take the liberty of commenting quite specifically upon his interpretation and comments of these regulations.

"First—May I state that I do not believe that there is any country holding any position in western civilization which forbids private schools as this regulation proposes to do. Nor any which presumes to determine absolutely what shall and shall not be given in those schools as subjects of study. Of course, many of them regulate the minimum of what must be given but none of them take the position that other subjects cannot be added. I make this statement sweeping regarding all nations of the western hemisphere. Perhaps I should qualify it because I do not know personally of the conditions in those countries under the Greek Catholic church; and yet even Russia permits the Jews and other religious sects to maintain their own schools and school their own children. In the countries under the dominance of the Roman Catholic church, taking Spain as the most backward, private schools are permitted. The royal decree of February 3, 1910, restricted the inspection of private schools to the hygienic conditions of the premises and to the prevention of words and deeds contrary to morals, to the fatherland, and to the laws. It was the attempt of the ultra conservative government there to inspect and even to close private schools which led to the Barcelona rebellion and even to revolution and to the overthrow of the Canalefas ministry. In German and Teutonic countries of Europe, which the school system of Japan more closely resembles than that of any other country, private schools are permitted. At least six per cent of the school population of Germany attends private schools. The higher education of girls is nearly altogether through private schools.

"In commenting upon the situation in Europe in the article in the "Seoul Press" of April 2, 1915, the Honorable Commissioner has misinterpreted the French law and I am taking the liberty of pointing out the basis of his misinterpretation, which was very easily made. The French law of July 7, 1904, which he quotes, is a suppression of teaching congregations not of private schools, nor even of schools taught by the clergy so far as these clergy are not members of the monastic order and do not wear the clerical garb. They are even yet permitted to hold schools. On this point may I quote from the article on the French system of education by His Excellency, M. Gabriel Compayre, at the time of writing, 1911, Inspector General of Public Instruction of France: "Further, a large number of the closed schools have been reopened with a lay or secular staff; the members of the orders having exchanged their ecclesiastical garb for civilian mufti. On June 1, 1909, there were 3,069 re-opened as private lay primary schools, 922 for boys and 2,077 for girls. The private schools are established and maintained by individuals or by associations. The State leaves them free in respect to curriculum and method, but the same qualifications as to age and

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ability are demanded from their teachers as from public school teachers. The formalities for opening a private school consist of a declaration made to the mayor of the commune indicating where the school is to be established. (Monroe's "Cyclopedia of Education", Vol. 2, Page 662.)

"Regarding secondary education, M. Compayre has the following statement to make: The dispersion of the congregations, the suppression of the colleges of the Jesuits, Dominicans, and Oratorians brought back to the state schools a part of their clientele. But only a part, for a number of free colleges were reopened under the protection of the bishops or civil societies, and gathered in the heritage of the congregations. The number of pupils who attend these schools may be estimated to be about 50,000. (Monroe's "Cyclopedia of Education," Vol. 2, P. 665.)

"On the same point, may I quote from a more recent statement of the situation in the French schools by Dr. F. E. Farrington, Professor of Comparative Education on our faculty: 'In spite of the dispersion of the congregations and the suppression of the schools under control of the religious bodies, the successors of these schools under private control still contain nearly as many pupils as are to be found in the lycees. The graduates of these private schools, however, must pass the baccalaureate examination given by the state in order to enter the university or any of the higher state institutions learning. (Monroe's "Principles of Secondary Education," P. 87.)

"(Pardon my reference to works of my own, but naturally I can put my hands on the statements much more readily and am assured of the validity of the authorities.)

"May I also take the liberty of correcting the misinterpretation of His Excellency, the Minister, regarding American conditions, though I understand again how he could very readily misinterpret the general statements of President Butler's article. In the first place, as is well known, the national government has absolutely no control over the schools. Further than that, not one of the 40 commonwealths prohibits the establishment of private schools or ever has done so. Not one of the 48 commonwealths even demands the inspection of private schools or holds that the state has the right to do so. The statement in President Butler's articles concerning this has a basis only in the early colonial period—conditions which have passed nearly 150 years ago.

"Second—Regarding the matter of the teaching of religion in private schools, may I venture to correct more of the misinterpretation or misunderstandings of western conditions involved in the article of His Excellency, the Minister. Nowhere in America, that is no commonwealth or local unit of government, has attempted or would attempt or does now prohibit instruction in religion in any private school according to the views of those maintaining the school. It would be considered a grave infringement upon fundamental principles of liberty. Furthermore, there is the misunderstanding concerning the existence of private sectarian schools of the elementary grade, the so-called parochial schools. These exist in practically every state in the union and have an attendance all told of probably two million children. I am not defending these, and do not necessarily believe that there should be built large systems of parochial schools competing with the state system of schools, but simply give as a fact that such do exist and that any attempt to prevent these in this or any other advanced western country would be considered a grave infringement of liberty. In the field of secondary schools, there are private schools in every State in the Union, and a great number of schools of this character are controlled by religious denominations.

"Regarding colleges and universities, a recent investigation of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching shows that two-thirds of the 750 institutions of the United States and Canada, which are appropriately termed colleges, are organically controlled by religious denominations. There is a great variety of forms of this control, but I will not take the time to go into this matter but simply quote this general condition.

"The conspicuous feature which His Excellency, Mr. Komatsu, states and quotes from President Butler to verify, namely, that the college presidencies of our great universities are no longer confined to men trained in the Christian ministry, is a fact, but it is due to other reasons than those inferred. It is due primarily to the fact that there has now grown up a special profession of educators, and men especially equipped in administrative lines are

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to be drawn from the teaching staff rather than from the clerical procession as hitherto. In the case of Yale, which is quoted, President Hadley, the present incumbent, is the first in a long line of two hundred years who is not a clergyman. His Excellency is also misinformed in believing that there is any restriction against a clergyman holding any of these positions in state universities. At the present moment I do not recall any, yet in my acquaintance I know of several presidents who have been clergymen. Certainly it does not bold to the staff, because you will find men on the staff of almost every institution of larger grade who are clergymen. In Columbia, for instance, there are both Christian clergymen and Jewish Rabbis.

"Third—May I take the liberty of pointing out what again I feel is a misinterpretation by His Excellency of the whole tendency of western civilization and its situation regarding the relation of education and religion. There is a profound conviction in which most of us share and a very marked tendency to separate the Church and the State and make the Church absolutely free from the control of the State, and vice versa the State absolutely free from the control of the Church. That has been the fundamental American position. As His Excellency points out, that is true in regard to Japan, but when he carries this idea further and interprets our western situation to be such a separation of religion and education, that is, that absolutely forbids any religious control of even private education, or the inclusion of religion in education in any form in which it may be organized, I am profoundly convinced he has misinterpreted the situation as it exists in any country of western civilization. As I have above cited, no country of which I know attempts to forbid the teaching of religion as it may be viewed by various sects in private schools. The whole tendency is towards freedom in this respect not towards restriction.

"Fourth—May I take up even more specifically the arguments drawn from the American conditions regarding the attitude of State schools towards religion. There are very few commonwealths in which there is any legislation against the reading of the Bible in the school. There are many where sectarian instruction is forbidden and there have been numerous judicial decisions in others against the practice of reading the Bible. On the other hand, there have been judicial decisions maintaining the right to read the Scriptures in public schools and to have simple religious ceremonies so far as there is no objection upon the part of the attendants on the schools on the basis of having their liberty restricted. But some States even have gone to the extent of placing in their Constitution, as did Mississippi, an injunction restricting the right to read the Bible in the public schools. His Excellency's reference to the elimination of religious teaching from American colleges is in part correct. In few of them even controlled by religious denominations is there at the present time required instruction in religion, at least outside of the ordinary daily chapel attendance. Even in all the larger institutions, certainly in all the state institutions, this is voluntary. Here again the principle is that of freedom and not at all of restriction or of enforced elimination.

"In this respect may I cite further the practice throughout the other countries of western civilization. As His Excellency knows, Germany and the Teutonic countries, in fact all continental countries except France, include religious instruction in their schools. Moreover in these Teutonic countries, the clergy of any denomination are permitted to go into the schools and give instruction if the children are of other communions than that giving the dominant character to the school. This same condition prevails, I think I am right in saying, in nineteen of the twenty-one American publics. It does not prevail in Brazil nor in the United States. Here our custom is against this and always has been; though, as I pointed out above, it does not refer at all to the conduct of private schools.

"Fifth—And finally, may I venture to point out a thing which I believe is fundamental in regard to this question and why in our western countries we have rather jealously guarded this right of establishing and maintaining private schools. Of course in Great Britain it is well known that their place is very much larger than in the United States. In Great Britain and the United States, and to a somewhat less degree in the Teutonic countries, very much of educational advance has come through the exercise of this private initiative. May I point out that the kindergarten manual training,

vocational training, much of scientific training, the education of the blind, the deaf, the educational treatment of the various dependents and delinquents in fact the addition of almost every new feature to educational practices, has come into the public school system through being tried out and demonstrated in private schools. In other words, the existence of the private school, or rather the non-state school, is the sine qua non of progress. This is merely in accord with the fundamental natural law underlying all evolution and growth; that such evolution comes from the selection of variance, and unless you permit this liberty of variation, there is very little hope for progress. May I venture to suggest in this connection—and I do it with the very greatest of sympathy and good will—that most of the foreign critics of the Japanese educational system have pointed out as its weakest spot,—though it seems to be a thing which seems to give it its greatest strength at present—its tendency towards absolute uniformity, hard and fast restriction and prevention of variation; and while many of us simply have in mind the feeling of greater freedom which exists in the educational systems of western countries many of them also have in mind the more fundamental thing, that progress, growth, is finally dependent upon this right or room for some variation in activities.

"On the part of the mission educators, it would seem to me that they could not object to the following requirements made by the Japanese Government in Chosen:

First—That all schools should give a minimum curriculum requirement; this to include the essential elements of the government curriculum or whatever the government might require.

"Second—That they should submit to the inspection of schools to see that they comply with government standards not only with regard to curriculum but with hygienic conditions and other matters.

"Third—That the graduates of mission schools would be required to conform to the government standards for admission to various professions such as medicine, law, teaching in government schools, or for admission to other government positions.

"Fourth—Even that the teachers should conform to certain minimum government standards, although I do not believe these should be the same for private schools as for government schools.

"It seems to me that the Government might properly require any or all of the above conditions, though to be sure none of our American state governments do and few European governments, if any, require conformity to all of these conditions.

"It is also to be recognized that the location of Chosen, the general conditions there, and the importance of this as an outpost of the Japanese Empire, make the conditions there somewhat unusual. I think the right of the Japanese Empire to protect itself and to secure the development of this people not only for the advantage of the Koreans but for the safety of the Empire would be fully admitted. It seems to me, however, that His Excellency, the Minister, has so misinterpreted the matter of government control over education as it has existed or at present exists in other countries that his attention might well be called to this matter, and the question raised whether such extreme action was really essential even from the point of view above stressed. Not even in Alsace Lorraine nor in divided Poland, or in any other country so far as I know in any recent times, has this control been carried to the extent proposed by these new regulations in Chosen.

"I have prolonged this letter somewhat unduly, but it seems to me a very fundamental matter. May I call to your attention my well known attitude of friendship towards the Japanese; that His Excellency, Count Okuma, has done me the high honor of entertaining me in his home and I know is assured of my friendliness for the Japanese people and my admiration for their culture. Many prominent educators of Japan could give His Excellency, Mr. Komatsu, the same assurance. In my own classes in Columbia, I have my students each year read Dr. Nitobe's "Bushido" in order that they may have a more sympathetic comprehension of the ideals of our Oriental neighbors and thus each year make hundreds of friends for Japan among influential school men of America. If you wish to assure His Excellency, Mr. Komatsu, of my conception of education and my estimate of its present tendencies, you are at liberty to refer him to the Japanese translation of my volume on the History of Education, which is included in the series published by the

Japanese Society for the Advancement of Civilization, of which His Excellency, Premier Okuma, is President.

"I am,

Sincerely yours,

PAUL MONROE."

It is not the desire of the Mission Boards to make it impossible for "students who believe in a certain cult or religion to enter school of different faith" or "to force them to believe in a faith which is not their own," as Mr. Sekiya intimates in his article in The Nagasaki Press. Missionaries could not, if they would, force any one to be a Christian, and they would not if they could. The statement, that "it is only when the demarcation between the two forces is clear and one does not infringe the domain of the other that the object of education will be attained and religious freedom assured," is contrary to the assured results of experience in both America and Great Britain. The Christian people of these countries who are maintaining the missionary schools in Chosen hold that education and religion are not only entirely compatible, but that they are indissolubly related. From the beginning, education has been an important part of missionary work in Asia, as the history of that work not only in Japan but in China, India, and other countries abundantly illustrates.

It has been said that if the Government-General of Chosen permits Christianity to be taught in the private schools the Mission Boards maintain, it must also permit Buddhism to be taught in any schools that Buddhists may desire to maintain. We have not the slightest objection to this. Missionary work asks no special favors whatever, but only absolute religious liberty. Since the Imperial Government of Japan has recognized both Christianity and Buddhism as religions of the Empire, we are at a loss to understand why the adherents of either faith should not be permitted educational freedom as well as political freedom.

In this unhappy era of international anxieties, I fully recognize the peculiar character of the political questions that are involved in the effort of the Japanese Imperial Government to assimilate a people of different national history and occupying that part of the Empire at which Japan comes into contact, not only with China but with some of the powerful nations of Europe. I believe, however, that history and the experience of other countries conclusively prove that the true interests of the State are injured rather than benefited by any restriction of the freedom of education and religion. While the government school of Chosen seeks to train a child for the State, the Mission school seeks to train him to a high type of Christian character and manhood; and I need not remind Your Excellency that such character and manhood form the securest possible foundation for the State as well as for the Church. I have often quoted the public statement of His Highness, Prince Ito:

"In the early days of Japan's reformation, the Senior Statesmen were opposed to religious toleration, especially because of distrust of Christianity. But I fought vehemently for freedom of belief and propagation and finally triumphed. My reasoning was this: Civilization depends upon morality, and the highest morality depends upon religion. Therefore religion must be tolerated and encouraged."

I should be making a poor return for the kindly frankness of Your Excellency in writing to me on this subject, if I were to conceal the fact that the enforcement of the separation of religion and education in private schools in Chosen would undoubtedly have the following results:

First, it would cripple if not completely close the hundreds of mission schools now in Chosen, compel the abandonment of the plans that are being made for their enlargement, and paralyze the missionary work which depends upon these schools for the training of its ministers, evangelists and other leaders. The Christian people of America and Great Britain firmly believe that religion is an integral and indispensable part of a sound education, and they do not deem it their duty to expend money on schools in any land unless they can do so in the name of Christ and with unrestricted freedom to include the Bible in the curriculum and to conduct religious exercises in connection with school work. No financial reimbursement, however large in amount, would compensate the Mission Boards for the grievous effect upon their whole work in Chosen, for long experience has clearly proved that

schools from which religion is excluded do not yield the native Christian leaders without which the Church cannot live.

Second, it would be construed by the Christian people of America and Great Britain as a disapproval by the Government-General of Chosen of those generous and wholly altruistic efforts which the people of the United States, Great Britain and Canada have been making for the advancement of the people of Chosen.

Third, it would throw the educational system of Chosen out of line with the best educational policy of such nations as America and Great Britain, which give unrestricted liberty to private schools that combine education and religion.

Fourth, it would be equivalent to a denial of that educational and religious freedom which we had supposed it was the pride of Japan to accord and which is universally practiced in the non-government schools of America and Great Britain. A school that is not permitted to teach the Bible does not possess educational freedom, and religion that is not permitted to have its own schools is not free.

Fifth, it would gravely affect the standing of Japan among the enlightened nations of the world and cause deep distress to the multitudes of friends and well-wishers of Japan in western lands who for many years have spoken in high appreciation of the full religious liberty which prevails wherever Japan rules. Your Excellency has already seen published utterances of mine in which I took the position that in the struggle between Japan and Russia for the possession of Korea, my sympathies were with Japan primarily because Japan stood for a liberty in religion and education which Russia denies. Are we now to be proven wrong?

There are some matters of detail which I cannot view without concern, as for example, certain provisions in Ordinance No. 24, but perhaps they should be discussed at another time as this letter has already become quite long and it may be well to confine it to the particular question that I have been discussing. It will be a great relief to us and to the many friends of Japan if the Ordinances, Instructions and Regulations referred to shall be so modified as to permit mission schools to continue to exercise the freedom which they have hitherto enjoyed. We gratefully recognize the consideration that is implied in giving the Mission Boards ten years in which to adapt themselves to the new regulations; but Your Excellency will appreciate the fact that if the regulations are to be enforced at that time, the blighting effect will be immediately felt, and it will necessarily operate to destroy our educational plans. An order to discontinue an essential part of our missionary work at a fixed date is none the less vital because the date is a decade hence. We cannot reasonably expect givers in America to put money into land and buildings, or competent educators to go to Chosen, for instructions which will be rendered useless in ten years unless we abandon a vital part of the purpose for which the instructions are conducted.

I need not remind Your Excellency that the Mission Boards have no selfish interest whatever in maintaining schools in Chosen. They are spending much time and money for the sole purpose of doing good to the people with no thought of advantage to themselves. It is our earnest desire to co-operate with the Government-General in every way possible, and we give this assurance with no reservation whatever, except freedom to conduct our religious work along its four allied and inter-related lines—educational, evangelistic, medical and literary.

Knowing as I do the openness of mind and the high conception of duty which characterize Your Excellency and the other high officials of the Government-General of Chosen, I have written freely and frankly, as I am sure that Your Excellency desired me to do. I gladly count myself among those who have most hearty good wishes for the Government and people of Japan and who wish to co-operate in every way possible in promoting the welfare of the people of Chosen.

Again thanking Your Excellency for your courtesy, I have the honor to remain, with assurances of distinguished consideration,

Very sincerely yours,
ARTHUR J. BROWN.

(XLIX.)—LETTER OF A. J. B. TO J. E. A., SEPTEMBER 15, 1915
September 15, 1915.

The Rev. James E. Adams, D.D.,
Taiku, Chosen (Korea).

My dear Dr. Adams:
I have just received your letter of August 19th with its enclosed copy

of your letter of August 17th to the American Ambassador in Tokyo. Meanwhile, Mr. Sharp has sent me a copy of the Japan Advertiser which gives what purports to be an interview with you on the subject. I have not yet heard from Mr. Komatsu in reply to my letter to him and you will appreciate the interest with which I am awaiting it. I am very glad indeed to have the information which you have sent and I shall be grateful to you for prompt information regarding any further developments.

With warm regards to Mrs. Adams, I remain, as ever,
Very cordially yours,

A. J. BROWN.

(L.) LETTER OF J. E. A. TO A. J. B., OCTOBER 21, 1915
Rev. J. Brown, D.D.,
156 5th Ave., New York City.

My dear Dr. Brown:
Your letter of Sept. 15th has just been received, and I am writing you, in view of more recent information concerning educational matters. Here the Educational Senate had a meeting on the 14th and 15th of this month and on the 13th I had a long conference with Mr. Komatsu, and on the 17th a Committee of the Senate waited upon Mr. Usami, director of the department of Internal Affairs, and had an equally long conference, both on the same subject.

Mr. Komatsu, in the course of our conversation, spoke of your letter and said that he was preparing a reply, a copy of which he would send me also. We arranged to have further meeting but were unfortunate not to meet again. His position was a position to which I rather drove him in the conference, that in the Japanese Empire there was, strictly speaking no private education. He held that the fundamental education in the empire was the separation of religion from education as was also the drift of the modern times throughout all the world. He admitted that while in Japan proper private schools of higher instruction were allowed to give religious instruction, yet this was as an exception, and because they were but as a drop in the ocean in the empire's educational work, but that in Korea this was not true, therefore they could not be permitted. (His statements scarcely hold good, because in Japan proper one-fourth of all the middle schools, their teachers and their graduates, are schools which have a right to avail themselves of this privilege if they so wish). I enclose you a copy of the committee report of its interview with Mr. Usami. You will see in this report that ultimately all we asked for for new schools and which would also be that which the established schools would have at the expiration of the ten years of grace, was that Bible instruction might be permitted as a purely optional course in the school. Waving all questions of the rights of private undertaking, religious liberty and the distinctive place of church and State, it seemed to us that this would accomplish the administration's professed purpose in the ordinance: namely, that of making every possible avenue of education open to all, and at the same time would also leave to us the religious instruction of at least the children of Christian parents; this, however, was refused.

The question of the position of the Seoul College in relation to the ordinance came up in the Senate. Statements on the subject did not agree and a committee was appointed to wait upon the president of the College in the matter. Even this did not make it clear, and the committee was directed to incidentally ascertain the facts from the authorities. The results appear in the report. I had heard the same statement before concerning Dr. Goucher, but was surprised to hear it of Dr. Speer. Before he left our Annual Meeting to go down to Seoul he stated emphatically that the Board of Education where it had stood on the question in Japan, and that if it could not have schools which were thoroughly Christian both in name and in fact, and were given recognition by all as such, it would have none.

I heard from Mr. Koons in Seoul that the College was expecting to shortly receive its permit as a separate institution. It gives me the most grave concern that it should operate under the revised ordinances as a conforming institution, occupying as it does such a prominent position and standing for the head and front of Christian educational work in Chosen. No more disastrous break in the defense line of the general situation could occur. Lower institutions are almost helpless in the face of it, and it greatly lessens the possibilities of what we may be able to obtain through agitation

along various lines of pressure and possible change of administration before the ten years expire.

The Senate, however, while it has a responsibility and relation of authority toward other schools in the country, has not such relations towards this one, and I therefore simply bring this matter to your attention.

Yours in the Service,
(Signed) JAS. E. ADAMS.

(LI.) LETTER OF J. E. A. TO A. J. B.
Taiku, Korea, November 27, 1915.

My dear Dr. Brown:

Enclosed you will find a copy and translation of an instruction which has come down from the Government-General in Seoul to the various local offices with regard to private schools. In the one that was sent me from North Pyeng in Province 9 (for they have come to me from several provinces) this had been added as explanatory, in the office of the Provincial Governor.

"The expression 'The school buildings may be used for religious purposes' means that this may be done in cases where the church and school are using the same building, or, perhaps, where the church building is small, and the school building is temporarily used."

There has been some diversity of opinion as to whether this instruction was intended to be more strict than the original ordinance, or whether it was granting a concession. The first idea was on the basis that religious instruction was not to be allowed even as an optional course outside the regular curriculum; the second on the idea that this granting the use of the building was intended to permit religious instruction, not within the school but informally in connection with the school. This explanatory addenda, however, if it stands, seems to clear up the original ambiguity only too well.

However, even on the original interpretation I cannot say that I see anything desirable. It is not at all a question in any respect of opposition to the Administration. Some have tried to put this interpretation on it. It is only more confusing and prejudicing. It is not a question of frank recognition of the very grave problems which the Administration are trying to solve. It is no more a question of recognizing the propriety of the Administration's purpose to assimilate and consolidate into one people in intelligence and patriotism. It is still less a question of holding an attitude of sympathy and co-operation towards these things. This may all be taken for granted as commonplaces among us, if it were not for the fact that some continually seek to represent it as otherwise. It is not immediately a doubt if it will. The immediate question is a single and simple one. Under the present situation of the number of middle and higher Mission schools which we have as established schools and so coming under the ten-year provision of the ordinance; with the present extreme reactionary administration; with the good prospects of gradual relief during the ten years with changing times and administration, is it the wiser for us, looking toward the ultimate solution, to open new schools or to refrain from opening new schools at this time? The opening of schools is a voluntary acceptance of the conditions on our part, and destroys any point of vantage for future efforts. Refraining from opening new schools is our privilege, and keeps us in a vantage position for future requests and petition as opportunity opens with changing times, ideas and personnel of administration during these coming ten years. One may ultimately negotiate much better terms from an unevacuated position than they may hope to get toward the reoccupation of a position which they have themselves already voluntarily vacated. In my judgment, there is no question as to the course of wisdom, and the course will largely determine the ultimate result for the future of the Church in Korea.

It is not only a mistake, but it is wrong to confuse such a position with one of opposition to the authorities. Neither has it anything to do with the authorities' determination to amalgamate. The teaching or non-teaching of religion in private schools has, in fact, absolutely nothing to do with these things. Nor has it anything to do with their accomplishment or non-accomplishment, except in the minds of the extremists who now happen to occupy office. Those ends would have been accomplished just as well by broader and more moderate-minded men without this point ever having been raised at all. They are ends which cannot be accomplished in a day.

It will take a generation. They will ultimately be worked out by men who are nearer men of the times than those now in office. The elimination of religious instruction from private schools which these men think necessary involve positions on their part that are not permanently teneable, in that it does violent injustice both to the religious and civil rights of private parties. The psychological atmosphere of the entire educated world is too much one in this day, too closely knit together, for such extreme sporadic cases doing violence to the whole current of world-thought to long continue. Succeeding administrations will not stand for them.

I count myself a pro-Japanese man in Korean matters. Their coming in here was no fault of theirs. Their declared purposes of assimilation are entirely proper and indeed necessary. Their problems of working this out are difficult and urgent. In the main, the methods they have taken for the solution command my admiration. The measures they have adopted for the development and strengthening of the Korean people are in the main sound and praiseworthy. As the purposes of the people of this world go, their purposes are good. I have always held a position of sympathy and co-operation toward their work, and have utilized many opportunities to that end. At the same time, granting all this, this is no reason why I should be simply plain foolish, and turn over to them for the mere asking anything they may happen to want, and everything for which I stand and which I represent here. We stand for something here as well as they, and the two are not essentially inimical. We need only to stand and wait and we will get all that justly comes to us. Why tear down our house with our own hands? At the present juncture the course of wisdom, looking toward the ultimate solution, is to refrain from opening new schools and wait.

I am just in receipt of a letter from Mr. Komatsu enclosing a copy of his letter to you. The same came out in the Seoul press a day or two before as an article. I enclose you a copy. This is the most naked expression of intention that I have seen. You will particularly notice the concluding paragraph. In view of the fact that the ordinance not only covers common (elementary) church schools, but all schools of higher grade up to colleges operated by Mission bodies, it is very significant of the present administration's reactionary character.

Yours very sincerely,
(Signed) JAS. E. ADAMS.

(LII.) LETTER OF J. E. A. TO A. J. B., DEC. 21, 1915
December 21, 1915.

My dear Dr. Brown:

I enclose some translations which have come into my possession and which will be of interest to you. Copies of the originals were sent me from the Kwang Ju Local Magistrate's office. I am not sure but that I sent you a copy of the first. The first should be read and then the last, the "Addenda." From Syen Chyen these two came to me together. I sent them to Drs. Imbrie and Ibuka for their opinion. They both replied that unquestionably the instruction was intended in a friendly way, while maintaining the principle of not having religious instruction in the school yet permitting it in connection with the school, and that we should go ahead on the assumption that we could have chapel and Bible before and after school hours, and particularly advising that we ask the authorities for no clearer definition of the instruction.

You will observe that this subsequent correspondence was within a few days after the first instruction was issued, before the missionaries knew anything about it, and that the interrogation was in the hands of Mr. Usami, the Director of Department of Domestic Affairs at the time of his interview with Dr. Speer, or within a few days after. This correspondence has been sent down to all the Local Magistrates as instruction for their procedure.

It would seem evident from this that it is intended that there shall be no religious exercises or Bible teaching inside or outside the regular school work which is intended specifically for the students of the school. At least none is to be permitted in the school premises. This is quite in accord with everything which has been said to me by the various authorities in the various interviews I have had with them. Since last spring I have had long discussions of the matter with Mr. Sekiya, Chief of the Bureau of Education; Mr. Usami, his superior, the Director of the Department of Domestic

Affairs; and Mr. Komatsu, head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau. All have said that they thought we could do all that was necessary in a religious way through the Sunday Schools and Churches, and have never suggested or met any suggestion that went farther than this.

It was thought that when Dr. Speer was here he secured some concessions from Mr. Usami in the way of permission to use the buildings and teach the students of the school outside of regular school hours, if a clear line was drawn between the two. But there seems also to be a more or less unanimous opinion abroad here that in his Seoul conferences with the authorities he rather fell into the hands of the Amalekites, and they did him in the eye. At any rate, this correspondence effectually destroys our hopes in that line.

I am more and more convinced that the course pursued so far, including emphatically your letter to Mr. Komatsu, is the proper course for us to follow. That, having pointed out the indefensibility of their position, that its extreme character was not even necessary for their own interests, we should refrain from opening new schools under the revised ordinance; we should assume that the conditions contemplated as being imposed ten years from now were impossible for us to meet, and then, confessedly holding that position, we wait in hope and faith for a change of times. It will come before the ten years are out, and if it finds us in that position we will probably get what is properly due us.

I am sending you a copy of the minutes of the last meeting of the Senate. I speak of this same matter in my report printed there.

Yours in the Service,

(Signed) JAS. E. ADAMS.

(LIII.)

LETTER OF J. E. A. TO A. J. B.

Taiku, Korea, December 29, 1915.

My dear Dr. Brown:

I enclose herewith a printed copy of the minutes of the meeting of the Educational Senate, held Oct. 14th. My report of the year, especially that part relating to the Revised Ordinance for Private Schools and also the statistical table, will be of interest to you.

After the receipt of the two letters, copies of which I sent you in my last (the ones passing between Mr. Tachibana, Mr. Yamagata and Mr. Usami) the Southern Presbyterian Mission at its annual meeting decided that it would not renew its application for a permit for the Soon Chyen Boys' Academy, but upon the receipt of an order to that effect would discontinue it. They so informed the local authorities. That was in the early part of November. As yet no order for its discontinuance has been received. So far as I know, the same is true of our Syen Chyen Girls' School. I presume that possibly the authorities are a little loath to order a Mission school closed on the direct issue of religious instruction.

It is recognized here that the question with regard to elementary and higher schools are on a different basis. The Japanese looks upon the teaching of patriotism as as much the function of a school as the teaching of the "Three R's." They center upon this particularly in the elementary grades. For this reason, largely, they make education in these grades compulsory, and gather it all into Government institutions. Private institutions are practically eliminated. The reasons that determine this policy in Japan are manyfold more cogent in Korea. The entire probability, therefore, is that the real purpose is to eliminate the elementary church schools. You will see that Mr. Komatsu in his last letter to you is frank upon this point, not even differentiating higher schools. I myself think that this is what it will ultimately come to.

The main objective of our effort must be to secure relief for our higher schools which are practically all run by Mission money and forces, while none goes into the elementary. If they directly forbid private elementary schools they are within the precedent of their own national system. But when we get above the compulsory grades the arbitrary unreasonableness of their position multiplies and increases with a bound; it is contrary to the current of the whole times in Japan; the whole civilized world can offer no example of it. Here we have ample ground for the exercise of confidence and faith, in the strength of which we can hold on and wait with patience.

The idea that has been expressed by some that we will secure larger consideration and concession by going farther than we might properly be expected to go is amusing. The Oriental is not built on that plan. One need go no further than the rickshaw coolie to find it out. They will take all they can get in the way of securing what they want and with no sense of obligation in the taking. "The fact that we are fools enough to give it is no reason they should be such fools as not to take it. Also the fact that we are fools is no reason they should be in return. If we cannot look after our interests, why should they."

Courtesy and consideration, accommodation and a willingness to help, appreciation of their problems and sympathy in them, recognition of the good work they are doing, cheerful compliance with all they require consistent with our essential interests—these will all be recognized, appreciated, and in due time have their effect. But when it comes to a question of essential interests, to band them over voluntarily, before we are even required to do so; to do so without protest, effort, or waiting to see the outcome; to do so in the expectation that it will bring us greater consideration; this is the reasoning of the idealist, not of the man of practical affairs, and will in no wise draw consideration from such men, particularly of this nationality.

Yours in the Service,

(Signed) JAS. E. ADAMS.

(LIV.)

MINUTES, 1916

Executive Committee Report, Section 26

26. Academy at Chairyung.—We recommend that in reply to the overture from the Whanghai Presbytery relative to the establishment of a Mission Academy or Branch Academy at Chairyung we express our inability to accede to the request; first, because of the lack of funds and then make it impossible to establish other educational institutions of any grade at the present time; second, because a branch academy cannot be legally established, except by applying for the same under the new Educational Ordinances; and, third, because of the possible effect on other Mission educational institutions of the establishment of such an Academy since it would have to be under the Educational Ordinance, and we do not approve of applying for a permit under these ordinances at the present time. (Passed.)

(LV.)

LETTER OF J. E. A. TO A. J. B.

In reply to a letter from Dr. Brown to certain individual members of Educational Senate asking their judgment as to the possible Christian character and influence of the Seoul College if established with a permit under the Revised Ordinance.

Taiku, Korea, October 7, 1916.

Dr. A. J. Brown, D.D.,
156 5th Ave., New York City.

My dear Dr. Brown:

The papers which I enclose relate to your letter of July 23, 1916, enclosing a copy of your letter to Dr. North relative to the adoption of the Seoul College Hojin. In this connection, please refer to my letters of April 26th and July 26, 1916. The present letter is a personal one. On receipt of your letter mentioned, assumed that it was sent to me as the Secretary of the Senate of the Educational Federation, and took steps accordingly. Subsequently, however, question was raised on this point. Your communication did not seem to be clear. It was addressed to the Presbyterian representatives on the Senate, and stated that official communication would come through Dr. North. It said that your letter was for their information, that it did not prefer any definite request for action. Therefore, while the object of your letter seemed clear, when some objected that no direct request should come to bodies for official action, the statement could not be gainsayed, although the object of the letter seemed clear from the Board action quoted in the enclosure.

I will relate the development of the matter since my letter of July 26, 1916. I went carefully over the papers received from Dr. Avison and seemed evident that the information was not sufficiently explicit on several points of importance, and that also questions of interpretation might very easily be involved. I therefore wrote to Dr. Avison again, asking particularly for further information, and to Mr. Usami, the official head of these matters.

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You will find these in the enclosures. I may say that my letter to Mr. Usami was written before receiving Dr. Avison's letter of August 7th, 1916.

The papers were sent around to the members of the Senate and a special meeting called for the evening before the meeting of the Federal Council. At this meeting objection was raised by the representatives of the Southern Methodist Mission that no direct request for official action of the Senate had come to us from the Board. Your letter did not represent a request, but explicitly said that official communication would come through Dr. North. Those who were in favor of the College were opposed to any action being taken; those who originally were opposed were loath to take any. So, as there was no direct request, as the hour was late and it would not be possible to meet again during the Council sessions or immediately after, as Mr. Usami had not been heard from, it was decided to leave the matter over until the regular meeting on the 19th of October. Meanwhile we would hear from Dr. North and Mr. Usami, and perhaps yourself. The Senate finally agreed to recognize the request as coming from the Presbyterian representatives on the Senate to whom you had written.

The next morning the Executive Committee of the Federal Council met. I was the only representative of our Mission on it. I brought the matter up. After considerable consultation it was decided that it was not a matter for the Committee to take up. No request had come officially to the Council. If Presbyterian representatives to whom the letter had come wished to bring it up on the floor it would be entirely proper. Having done this in the two bodies, I felt that I had done my full duty, but Dr. Avison, anticipating action by the Council on the basis of your letter, I suppose, had sent the same documents to the Council Secretary, who brought it up, and the matter was referred to a special committee, on which both Dr. Avison and myself were appointed. In the committee the same position was taken—the proper way to come before the Council was for some one who had received the letter to bring it up. I stated what I had done in the Executive Committee, and frankly said that I had done all I was disposed to do. The letter had been addressed to other Presbyterian representatives on the College Board of Managers as well as to me on the Senate. I would not father it in the committee. Dr. Avison said as frankly that he was opposed to the Council taking action; that he thought that if the Board wanted information they should have sought it from the men they had put in charge of the institution, and that he had written you to that effect. Finally the Committee reported, and it was adopted by the Council (I quote from memory), that as regards the communication from the Presbyterian Board which has come before the Council relative to the Seoul College, the Council is of the opinion that the judgment of the missionary body can be much better ascertained through the Missions than by the action of their representatives in the Council.

It was also felt by some, I think, that it was not a function of the Council to pass upon the character of institutions already established and being operated by some of its constituent bodies, and that the Council was already on record as to the general question. The same spirit seemed manifest as appeared in the Senate—an entire disinclination on the part of all parties to enter into the question. A perusal of the enclosed correspondence will make some reasons manifest.

The Mission representatives on the Senate, in making their annual report to the Mission, refer to the matter. It will be found in Section 3 of the report in the Minutes which have been sent you. As stated therein, I question very much if the Senate at its October meeting will consent to give any definite answer to your question. Nor can it be blamed. As I stated in the Senate, and in my letter to Dr. Avison, and as abundantly evident in the enclosed correspondence, "The College question was a past issue. The College was established. But the history of the question was such that we could not go into the question now presented to us and give it such a thorough investigation as the rendering of a conscientious opinion made necessary without laying ourselves open to misinterpretation and criticism that would not be just." And so long as the properly constituted field authorities of the institution were strenuously opposed to such investigation, it was not proper for us to pursue it.

So much for the progress of the matter to date. When the Senate meets on the 19th inst., if further action is taken I will communicate it to you.

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2. On the basis of the last statement in Dr. Avison's letter of September 11th, 1915, I presume there can be no objection if one who feels that he has gone very thoroughly into the matter, and has done so with an open mind, earnestly desiring to find something that would save the general cause and entirely willing to follow it, and yet has come to a different conclusion, should state his conclusion and the reasons for it to you. Indeed, in view of the relation which I have held to the general educational problem in the country as affected by the Government ordinance, I feel it incumbent upon me to do so. The Missions in their Educational Federation have for the past few years placed upon myself more than on anyone else the responsibility of seeking a way out for them in the general situation. The burden of it has been upon me constantly. At the same time, I will be frank to say that the Seoul College proposition has not been of particular interest to me in itself, but it has been in its very important relation to the general situation. It is principally in that relation that I have followed the present investigation, and come to a conclusion with regard to it. With two very enlightening conversations which I had with Dr. Avison in Seoul, one at the time of the Federal Council, and one at the beginning of our Annual Meeting, and now with Mr. Usami's letter, it may be fairly said that all the necessary information is in, and that the situation is entirely clear. I wish to say that this view is wholly a personal one. At the same time I may also say that, in my opinion, it represents the large majority of the missionary body of the country. That, however, is only my opinion.

Two views may be taken with regard to the Seoul College proposition under the regulations with the Hojin and the accompanying documents. Both are tenable. It depends a good deal on what one has in mind what one is working for, and the individual judgment as to which view one takes.

The first is:

The Hojin charter declares the Christian character and purpose of the institution and conserves this character for the future by guaranteeing only Christian managers and instructors.

The curriculum offers six regular departments of instruction, one of which is religious instruction with the Bible as a recognized and permitted text-book.

It is true that religious instruction cannot be given in the other departments, but it is a question if it is desirable. The requiring of Bible study by all students is a debated question even in American institutions, and here the Bible instruction of this department will be open to the students of all other departments who may desire to take it. In other words, it will be permitted as a regular elective department for those who wish to take it regularly, and a possible outside optional for all others. It may, therefore, be made open to all. What more could be expected or asked under the regulations?

The second view is:

The Revised Ordinance in the point of the separation of education and religion covers all grades of schools from primary to college, and is equally drastic for all. Some provision, however, had to be made for Bible institutes and schools of theology—some place found for them in the system. This was done in the College or Semmon Gakko section; and they may be either separate distinct schools as our Bible Institutes or the Seminary at Pyeng Yang, or they may be a separate distinct department in a more general institution. (This last, in my judgment, is probably a result of the Seoul College negotiations.) You will remember that in my letter of July 29th, 1916, I conjectured the grounds of the granting of the department, I set forth as one hypothesis, and said that it might go through on that basis, under the regulations for the Semmon Gakko section. In my first conversation with Dr. Avison I pressed this point, and he himself said that he thought that this was the basis on which it was granted. Mr. Usami's letter makes it perfectly plain.

Nevertheless, it must be carefully kept in mind that the authorities, while granting this Semmon Gakko (special school) of religious instruction in the institution, have rigidly quarantined it off in its own corner. They have applied the regulations on the point of religious instruction to all the other departments with the same rigidity they have applied them in all the lower schools where this sort of arrangement is impossible. In five departments out of six, according to the ordinance, no chapel exercises can be held, with

the students of the institution as such. Five-sixths of the institution, as such, is as strictly secularized as is the Severence Medical College under its new Hojin, or the Methodist Pai Chai School. Whatever privileges of religious instruction the students in other departments are accorded, are accorded them not as students of the institution but in the capacity of their "outside the institution personal liberty." The institution in all its parts is established under the full concession by ourselves, and the full regulation of the Revised Ordinance on the particular point of the separation of religion from education in private Mission schools.

Two points need to be considered: one is the outworking of the arrangement in the institution itself; the other is its effect upon the outworking of the more general question and situation in the country. The latter I consider so far the more important of the two, that the temporary, or even permanent, fate of an individual institution is not to be given great weight in comparison. This the Southern Presbyterian people believed when they closed their Soon Chyen Boys' Academy, and this also our Mission believed when it closed the Syen Chyen Girls Academy; and these were a question of existing institutions, not one of voluntarily opening a new institution.

As regards the outworking in the institution, I can prognosticate no better than another, but I confess I do not see any particular prospects of accomplishing what I take to be the determining purpose in the establishment of the College. My idea of that purpose is that the Boards proposed securing larger Christianizing influence in higher education than what the Board conceived the existing Mission institution gave; reaching out for a much larger proportion of non-Christian students—bright young minds of the people—and training them in a thoroughly Christian institution, with thorough Christian instruction. And because this purpose could be best accomplished in Seoul, the institution was located there. I do not give so much weight as some to the mere declaration of the purpose of the College and the guaranty of Christian instructors. There never was any real question on either point. Both would have been conserved in actual practice, whether in the Hojin or not. The real point is, as relates to the purpose of the institution, that it is strictly forbidden as an institution to formally or stately apply any religious pressure as instruction or exercises in five-sixths of its curriculum, or what will doubtless be far more than five-sixths of its general student body. What the ordinary student is privileged to get must be entirely outside of his regular institutional work, and sought out by himself. This is not in a technical institution but in a Mission institution for higher general education. To me the accomplishment of the purpose of the institution seems dubious.

As to the result upon the more general question and situation in the country in its outworking, I believe that here my feet are upon entirely solid ground. Please go back to my last underlined statement and read it again. Read the paragraph.

The institution in all its parts is established under the full concession by ourselves of the particular point of the separation of education from religion in Mission schools. It matters not that in this particular institution the incident of its being classified as Semmon Gakko enables it to have a Department of Theology; the principle is as unquestionably applied here as anywhere below and the principle is as unquestionably accepted on the part of the Boards. Moreover, the official position of the Boards founding the institution, and the dominating position which it is publicly proposed to give the institution in relation to the Christian education of the country, leave us no grounds either for waiting, hoping or trusting during the next nine years left us. We have hung ourselves with our own hands in the noose which is offered us, without ever waiting to see whether by ten years of God's grace He will give us better things.

This is not simply or primarily a question of this and now. Far above and beyond any question of a single or immediate institution is the larger question of the birthright of the FUTURE CHURCH OF CHRIST IN KOREA to Christian education. It is that question which we hold. No excuse of pressure is put upon us. The authorities are not constraining us to establish the college. We do it voluntarily, gratuitously of our own seeking, and as voluntarily accept the conditions for it. For the immediate accomplishment of such a single thing shall we sell the possible whole future of

the CHURCH? Forgive me, if heat seems to creep into what I write. I am writing with the tears running down my face. I cannot contemplate such a thing. To say that this proposition helps on the solution of the general situation is to have one's mind so fixed on the single thing that the perspective is lost for all else.

After the second explanation and conversation which I had with Dr. Avison in Seoul he asked me what my position would be. I told him that it would depend upon Mr. Usami's answers to my questions. That letter has now come, and it is perfectly clear. There has been no hudding on the vital point. Dr. Avison thinks the College management has done well in view of the regulations. I agree with him heartily. They have done very well in view of the regulations. But they have not done well enough by a long ways to warrant the institution's establishment under the new Ordinance.

Indeed, my whole point is this, and it is a point to which I have returned, more strongly convinced than ever of its soundness, after carefully searching through the whole Seoul College proposition. It is impossible to help the present general situation through negotiating for any new institution now. Such negotiations, based as they must be, upon the Revised Ordinance, can only further compromise the present situation, only make it more difficult—only make it more uncertain of its future outworking. The present Administration has so thoroughly committed itself that it will not, it cannot, alter its position. The only possible course of hope to pursue is to refrain from any advance which will compromise us, keep quiet and wait. The drift in Japan toward more liberal things is so strong that no administration can block it. It will come, and it will come here. If we can content ourselves to refrain from compromising forward steps, to occupy only what we have which is freely granted us, to stand in faith and wait, we will save true Christian education for the future Church of Christ in the land. Otherwise we sell it out, exactly as the Methodists so sold it out in Pai Chai School.

In the present instance we sell it out for what, to my mind, is no more than a mess of pottage. I presume that you are acquainted with what the educational proposition really is in the Seoul College. I myself was not. I ran across it in my investigations for the Senate. A number of others did also at the time of the Federal Council meeting. As I think that no chances should be taken on your acquaintance with the facts, I give them.

Oriental students cannot carry educational courses quite so fast and cover the ground so well as western students. It arises from their social system not being so far advanced to start with. Still the best single basis of comparison is the number of school years involved. Please compare as given below.

	8 Grades	4 High	4 College	3-4 Uni.	
American System	-----			-----	20
System in Japan	6 Grades	5 Middle	3 High	3 or 4 Uni.	18
Mission System in Korea	4 Grades	6 H. C. or M.	4 P. Y. College	-----	14
Gov't. System and Seoul College in Korea	4 Grades	H. C. or M.	3 or 4 Seoul Col.	-----	11-12

The authorities required the Seoul College to admit graduates from the government Higher Common schools to its first year. Prof. Takai, the head teacher, and whom Dr. Avison says was the principal gobetween with the authorities in the negotiations, told me that the authorities were very determined to keep all the College courses down to three years, and that it was only after much negotiation that they were able to get consent to have two of them extended to four years. You can count from the above to where this will carry the end of the college course. In two courses it will carry it through the ordinary preparatory school in America. In four courses it will not carry this far. Students must be taken at the end

of what would be our grades in America and put into the mathematics and physics and applied chemistry departments. Two-thirds of its courses will only carry one year higher than some eight Mission Boys' academies scattered all over the country, including our J. D. Wells Boys' School in the same city, and the remaining two courses only two years higher; while its best courses lack two years of equalling the Pyeng Yang College and all the rest lack three years. This is the institution as a higher educational proposition. To secure it we voluntarily accept a charter that concedes the whole principle of secularization for Mission schools.

That this setting forth of the situation is in its essential points the position of the Presbyterian Missions of the country also seems clear.

The Southern Presbyterian Mission, at its meeting last summer, after the Bible Department concession was known, voted to make permanent its previous participation in the Pyeng Yang College and fully co-operate. The Canadian Mission at its meeting in the summer, after hearing Dr. Avison's presentation of the matter, passed the following:

"That, in view of the possible effect on our Mission schools and the whole educational situation in Korea, we do not approve of applying at present for a College charter under the new educational ordinance."

Our own Mission, having defined its relations to the College last year, did not feel called upon to take direct action, but its position is made sufficiently clear in Sections 12 and 26 of the Educational Committee's Report passed by the Mission and which has already been forwarded you.

I think this completes such presentation of the matter as I have to give. I trust that in the Board's consideration and decision of the matter you may be given very clear guidance from above.

Believe me, with affectionate remembrances,

Yours in the Service,

(Signed) JAS. E. ADAMS.

(LVI.)

LETTER OF A. J. B. TO J. E. A.

December 5, 1916.

The Rev. James E. Adams, D. D.,
Taiku, Chosen (Korea).

My dear Dr. Adams:

In addition to the former letters from you, which I acknowledged shortly after their arrival, I have since received your letters of July 29th, October 7th and 23rd, and November 8th and 9th. We also received the copy of your letter of August 19th to the Senate, with its voluminous enclosures. All of these letters bear upon one or more phases of the perplexing educational situation, and I held them until the Board could take up the matter and make some decision. This would have been done earlier, except that we were very desirous of having all possible opinions from the missionaries on the field and, as you and Dr. Avison and Mr. Reiner were the only ones from whom we had letters on the subject since my letter of last June, we continued to wait from week to week in the expectation that more would come.

I am very much surprised that you and Dr. Avison should have understood my letter of June 25th, "To the Presbyterian Representatives on the Faculty and Field Board of Managers of the Chosen Christian College and the Senate of the Educational Foundation," as intended either for the Senate or the Federal Council. The letter was not addressed to either one of these bodies, with which our Board, as such, has no official connection; nor did the letter state that Dr. North would send "any official notification to these bodies." The intention was simply to emphasize the consideration that my letter was to our Presbyterian missionaries alone and that if any official word were to go to the Senate or to the Council, it would, of course, come from Dr. North and not from me.

At the meeting, June 22nd, called to consider the Hojin, I urged that as the Hojin apparently indicated an effort to make some adjustment with the authorities regarding the terms on which a mission institution can be conducted under the new regulations and as it might be considered a precedent in making future adjustments with other mission institutions, the missionaries on the field ought to be given an opportunity to express an opinion as to its adequacy. This was agreed to. The point was made, however, that a letter of inquiry should not be addressed officially to the Mission as the Hojin is only for the College, and at the Annual Meeting

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last year the Mission asked the Board to deal with "the College independent of the Mission." It was therefore suggested that I should address the letter to "The Presbyterian Representatives on the Faculty and Field Board of Managers and the Senate of the Educational Foundation." These were understood to be Drs. Baird, Moffett, and Messrs. Whittemore and Sharp and myself for the Senate, and Drs. Underwood, Sharrocks, Avison and Mr. Reiner for the Faculty and Field Board of Managers, nine brethren in all, representing different parts of the Mission and including some of its most respected leaders. As they would, of course, show the letter to others, this method would offer opportunity for any opinion that they desired to send, either collectively or individually as they might prefer.

Of the nine thus addressed, six replied; namely, Drs. Avison, Sharrocks, Underwood and yourself and Messrs. Miller and Whittemore; five of them strongly advising the adoption of the Hojin. We decided, however, to wait for the arrival of the Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Mission in order to make sure whether the Mission as a whole chose to take any action. When they came, they showed no reference to the College Hojin, although, as the Board's action states, my letter calling attention to the fact that the whole missionary enterprise in Chosen will be affected by the decision that is reached was in the hands of several members of the Mission, including your own, and your letters and Mr. Reiner's show that this was the view of the question taken on the field. The Minutes indicate that the Mission acted upon other aspects of the educational regulations, but that it was silent upon the specific question now at issue, namely, "whether the proposed Hojin of the Chosen Christian College affords sufficient relief to warrant adopting it." Some here have laid emphasis upon the fact that the Mission made no objection to the Hojin when it could have done so if it so desired and that all the missionaries on the field who must have known of this, only two, Dr. Avison and Mr. Reiner, wrote against the proposal.

This illustrates the difficulty and embarrassment of handling matters of this sort in conformity with the Mission's action of last year asking "the Board to make arrangements to operate the College independent of the Mission." These adjustments dovetail into and affect the whole missionary situation in ways which make it awkward and injurious for the Mission to stand aloof; and if it continues to do so, it simply deprives itself of a voice in matters in which it should have a voice and on which the Board would be glad to have it express an opinion. We delayed action on the Hojin for the specific purpose of giving the missionaries such an opportunity, and we naturally regret that they did not avail themselves of it. Perhaps a majority will be glad that the Board has taken the action that it did; if they are not, we are sure that they will do the Board the justice to remember that it desired the judgment of the missionaries, that it sought that judgment both from those on the field and from those on furlough, and that, in spite of pressure for prompt action, we held up the whole matter for five months while waiting for some opinion from the field.

I may add that in order to make sure that the members of the Board and of the Executive Council should have all the missionary opinions that were accessible, I caused mimeographed copies to be made of all the correspondence that arrived after my letter of June 22nd. Most of the letters were copied in full, including yours and Mr. Reiner's. I also quoted the opinions of the Mission on the Severence Medical College Hojin and the proposed Chung Ju Academy. This correspondence was mailed in advance to a member of the Board so that he might read the original documents for himself and be able to form an independent judgment.

The enclosed report of the Chosen Committee and the Executive Council presented to the Board at its meeting December 4th, and, after long discussion, was adopted. The report itself states the considerations which led a majority to feel that the Hojin offered substantial concessions which materially modified the fears that had been entertained. Please note, however, that this is simply the vote of one Board and that official notification on behalf of the Joint Committee of the Boards to the Field Board of Managers will come from the Rev. Dr. North, Chairman of the Joint Committee, and he has received the votes of the other Boards. I am simply sending you and Mr. Reiner this letter unofficially for your information as to what the Board has done, because you two men are the only missionaries on the

field who wrote me on the subject, except Dr. Avison, to whom I have sent a copy of the report with a brief covering letter.

Sincerely yours,

A. J. BROWN.

Report of the Chosen Committee and the Executive Council Regarding the Proposed Hojin for the Chosen Christian College.
December 4, 1916

June 19th the Board received a copy of a document entitled the Hojin (Incorporation) which was submitted, through the Joint Committee on Education of the Boards having work in Chosen, from the Field Board of Managers of the Chosen Christian College; this document having been drawn up by the Managers in Seoul, after informal conference with Japanese officials, for submission to the Boards at home, with the understanding that, when approved by the Boards, it would be officially approved by the Japanese Director of the Bureau on Education. The Board referred the Hojin to a Committee consisting of the available members of the Board and the Executive Council. This Committee met June 22nd, ten members of the Board and all five members of the Executive Council being present. In view of the fact that the Hojin represents an effort to reach some mutually satisfactory arrangement with the Japanese Government-General regarding the relation of the regulations on the separation of education and religion to mission schools, and the further fact that whatever is arranged for the College will probably be deemed of significance in the determination of educational problems affecting other Mission institutions in Chosen upon the expiration of the ten-year period of grace given to institutions which were in existence when the regulations were promulgated, the Committee and the Council felt that the missionaries had a right to an opportunity to be heard on this point which had not been under discussion hitherto.

Five months and a half have now elapsed since Secretary A. J. Brown's letter to this effect was mailed to the field June 23rd, and during this time the Annual Meeting of the Mission has been held. Only three missionaries on the field have been heard from in reply to that letter; but, in response to requests for the opinions of those on furlough, eleven members of the Mission now in this country have written, so that we have letters altogether from fourteen missionaries written after the receipt of Secretary Brown's inquiry. These replies show no consensus, but, on the contrary, a wide variance, of opinion. The Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Mission show no official action regarding the Hojin of the College, although Secretary Brown's letter, calling attention to the fact that "the whole missionary enterprise in Chosen will be affected by the decision that is reached" was in the hands of several members of the Mission, including the Rev. Dr. J. E. Adams, who was elected secretary, and letters from individual missionaries show that the writers took this view of the question. The Mission by affirmative vote specifically approved the Hojin for the Severance Union Medical College, whose provisions regarding religious teachings are substantially the same as those of the Hojin for the Chosen Christian College. The resolution stated that the Mission considered that "a Medical College stands upon a somewhat different plane from other mission institutions of higher general education with regard to religious instruction of the general student body," and the Mission declined a request for the establishment of an Academy at Chung Ju, "since it would have to be established under the new educational ordinances, and we do not approve the applying for a new permit under these ordinances at the present time." But upon the present question as to whether the proposed Hojin for the Chosen Christian College affords sufficient relief to warrant adopting it, the Mission expressed no judgment.

As we are now in possession of all the information that we are likely to get from the missionaries and as we are being pressed for a decision, it appears desirable that the Board should come to some conclusion without further delay. The Committee on Chosen and the Executive Council therefore met November 14th. Secretary Brown had sent mimeographed copies of the correspondence in advance to all the members so that each one could read the original documents for himself before the meeting. Three alternatives were considered:

the third that the Board approve the Hojin and proceed with the College with certain explanations and interpretations which should be stated as matters of record, so that there could be no doubt as to the basis on which acceptance might be given. After considerable discussion it was voted, though not without misgivings on the part of some, to recommend to the Board the third alternative, and the explanations and interpretations which we have in mind may be stated as follows:

The Hojin evidently indicates the desire of the Japanese authorities to give to the College as large a measure of religious freedom as they deem practicable under present conditions, and, while it does not provide for all the liberty in teaching the Bible and in conducting religious services that we have long enjoyed in Chosen and Japan, as well as in other fields, we readily see in it a proof of the cordial readiness of the officials to recognize Christian character and purpose of an educational institution conducted by Mission Boards and an integral part of their Christian effort in Chosen. The Japanese authorities doubtless feel that they have made considerable concessions in response to the earnest requests which have been made by the representatives of the missionary enterprise, and, having this fact in mind, as well as the interests of the other mission institutions in Chosen, it appears wise to accept the proposed advanced ground in the friendly spirit in which it is offered, rather than to subject all concerned to the embarrassments and hardships that might be involved in declination.

In order that our understanding of the Hojin, which is essential to the recommendation that we shall make, may be a matter of record we note that Article II, which provides that the "object of this Hojin shall be to establish and maintain this college in accordance with Christian principles," and Article IV, which provides that "managers, officers and members of the faculty and all the instructors must be believers in and followers of the doctrines contained in the Christian Bible," cannot be amended except "with the sanction of the proper authorities," which, of course, include the original parties to the adoption of the Hojin, namely, the Japanese Government-General and the Mission Boards. We also note that Articles VI and VII provide that two-thirds of the members of the Hojin are to be chosen by the Missions of the co-operating Board and the remaining one-third of such Christian Japanese subjects as these missionaries shall elect," so that the entire membership of the Hojin remains under missionary control; and that Articles XVIII and XIX provide for the possible dissolution of the Hojin, and the reversion of the property and the proceeds of its sale, to the original donors or their successors, so that the co-operating Boards, after due notice, may withdraw their missionaries and financial support if at any time they should become convinced that the College is not sufficiently Christian in character and influence to justify support as part of missionary work in Chosen. Furthermore, we have the very important and welcome statement of the Honorable K. Usami, Director of Home Affairs of the Government-General, in connection with a letter dated September 22nd, which he gave to O. R. Avison, Vice-President and Acting President of the Field Board of Managers of the College, that "there will be no restriction for students to the free studies of religion if they do it quite apart from the regular curriculum." We therefore understand that the College will be free to teach the Bible and to conduct religious exercises on the College premises separately from the curriculum prescribed by the Government, and either before or after the hours devoted to it, as we are informed that the Pai Chai Boys' School of the Methodist Episcopal Church is now doing.

As Article VII stipulates that the co-operating Boards shall make a annual grant for current expenses, and as the growth of the institution, the fees of students and future gifts and endowments will probably bring about changes in this sum, we assume, of course, that these sums will be subject to changes from time to time as later circumstances may require.

With these understandings the Committee and the Council recommend that the Hojin be approved as, on the whole, and in view of all the circumstances, the most practicable present adjustment of an admittedly difficult problem, and that provided the Zaidan Hojin be accepted by the Japanese authorities and that the Scholastic Charter permitting a Bible Department be established be granted.

We have pleasure in reporting that the \$52,000.00 gold for new property indicated in Article IV in the Hojin as the share of our Board is more than covered by the pledges of two gentlemen of \$50,000.00 and \$25,000.00, respectively, both of these gentlemen having renewed their pledges since receiving copies of the Hojin.

(LVII.) LETTER OF REV. J. E. ADAMS, CHAIRMAN OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND CORRESPONDING SECRETARY FOR MISSION, TO REV. A. J. BROWN, D.D.

Taiku, Chosen, January 13, 1917.

My dear Dr. Brown:

I am in receipt of your favor of the 5th ult., relative to the adoption of the Hojin for the Seoul College. I do not know that I have anything to say on the particular subject. When a thing is done, it is done. There is nothing to do but face forward. I will only say that I think I feel somewhat like Hannibal after the battle of Metaurus, when the head of Hasdrubal was laid before him. Gazing upon it he sadly exclaimed: "O, Carthage, I see thy fate." With the head school of the Northern Methodists, the Pai Chai, a secularized school holding its religious work in a separate building off of the official school premises; with the head school of the Southern Methodists being forced out along an identical line; with the widely heralded Union College established directly by our own Board and these two and applying for a permit under the full application of the secularizing sections of the ordinance, the future of Christian education here is written with sufficient clearness. No ground is left for us with our other schools, and hiding our heads in the sand will not stay the storm. Your other educators will begin to set their course now; for it will be no ten years until they are either conformed or out.

There are one or two things in your letter of which I think perhaps I should speak, as there seems to be some misapprehension with regard to them.

1. Your expectation of a reply from those to whom you wrote. I sympathize very thoroughly with what seems to me to be the strain of dissatisfaction that runs through your letter to me, and your disposition to lay the blame of any possible mistake upon them. And yet one must be just. Your letter to Dr. North said that the Board felt it highly inexpedient and unfair to take final action without securing the judgment of the Educational Senate and the Federal Council, and did not take action. Your covering letter had but two sentences in it, one to the effect that you enclosed for their information your letter of that date in behalf of the Board to Dr. North; the other that any official information to the bodies mentioned would come from Dr. North, but it seemed desirable that these should know the position of our Board. No request or intimation of a desire for a judgment of the subject appears in the covering letter.

While I think that you cannot very greatly blame the men, I can, and I have no excuse to make for them. We talked it over and I urged them to write, after it became clear that the letters were intended as personal ones. They, in substance, said that the Board, having determined upon the institution, even though it had to be established outside of the Mission, they did not feel responsibility for it; their whole experience in relation to the matter did not lead them to think that anything they might say would be given great weight; and last, and most, they were thoroughly wearied of the subject, and had no desire to be parties to it again. I still urged them, pointing out what it meant to the whole educational work of the country, until finally they promised to write. I suppose they were unable to unburden their minds of their reluctance and put off the matter until it was too late. I sympathize with you in the matter.

2. Your expectation of some direct action of the Mission.

The whole question, you know, is one that has a history, on the side of the Mission as well as of the Board. With all due respect for my good friend Dr. Speer, when he was here he took the position of the ideal bureaucrat. That is, the question of the establishment of the College in Seoul was a past one; it was settled; it was no longer open to consideration; it had been decided and it would remain so. Consistently throughout all his stay in all the committee conferences he refused to open it even for consideration. Finally, nothing was left to the

Mission but to take action to the effect that if the Board was settled to follow this course, regardless of its field organization and over its head, we must request it to do it without us—independent of the Mission—and directly. This course it decided to take.

Now if, as your letter states, the Board was reluctant to address an enquiry directly to the Mission on the question in hand, how much more (put yourself in our place) would not the Mission be reluctant to offer an unthought judgment on the matter. Yet, as a matter of fact, the Mission was so concerned that in every way open to it, outside of a direct "butting in" it went out of its way to make plain to the Board its position in the matter. The Severance Medical and Chairyung Academy actions dragged the matter in by the ears and offered ample light as to the Mission's opinion.

3. Your anxiety concerning the difficulty and embarrassment of handling matters of this sort apart from the regular field organization.

Your remarks would seem to indicate that you feel that the onus of the whole matter, you would not lay upon the Mission responsibility for the establishment of the institution upon any basis whatsoever. The Mission's position has been single and consistent from the beginning with a unanimity of seven to one. The conviction of the Board was such that it established the institution over the head of the Mission, against its protest, respecting the equal honesty of the convictions of its missionaries, really has gone so far as to do this independently and outside of its own Mission. It is the Board which must bear the responsibility of the policy's working. And it is yourself, Doctor, I say it with all deference and respect, as yourself as Secretary of this field in its organization, who must carry the individual responsibility. There is nowhere else to place it.

It is not simply a question of difficulty and embarrassment. It is not a possible way of doing work. Every year will accentuate the situation. The major question was not, is not, will never be, who was wise in their judgment on the original question. It may have been either; it may have been neither. The real point is that, as between a home Board and its field organization, Christian brethren working together, given all the circumstances as they were, for the former to have forced its ideas in a field of a new undertaking was wrong, only wrong—the bitter fruit of which will grow and increase in every line of the service year by year. There is an institution stands in our midst, a constant memorial of the Board's falling of the Mission in field matters. The present instance of these men having written and the Mission not having taken action and the possible results that may have flowed from it, destructive of all Christian educational work in this country—the consideration of this gives you anxiety, and well may. It gives more than that to me; for it is but a small illustration of the multitudinous increasing, disastrous impossibility of such a course. One thing is necessary among good Christian men for the accomplishment of spiritual ends in service; that is a mutual cordial co-operating trust and confidence in common service. It is the sine qua non. That lacking all avails nothing and loses its value. The present policy eliminates the thing needful; eliminates it by Board decision. Observe, Doctor, that Boards than ours have been up against the same problem in Korea, though they believed their Missions were mistaken, as yet they have too much practical spiritual wisdom to take this course.

I would not venture to write to you in this free way, with all reserve in an official capacity. This letter is purely private and personal. The misfortune of a man who tries to stand between and work something equally worth while out of a bad situation, that his own position must be more or less misunderstood by both. I trust that you will take nothing as said as having any spirit of animosity in it. I sympathize wholly with the tone of anxiety and dissatisfaction that seems to run through your letter to me. It is with a sad heart that I write myself. Indeed, with us here the time of feeling, when we may have said and done wrong and hasty things, has long since past. There remains only a sort of weariness of spirit as we contemplate the inevitable spiritual failure and damage of the King that lies along the future of this policy.

However, it is made, and being made we will face forward. There is still much work to be done and we are brethren.
Believe me, affectionately,

Your fellow Servant,
(Signed) JAS. E. ADAMS.

(LVIII) LETTER OF A. J. B. TO J. E. A.
January 15, 1917.

The Rev. James E. Adams, D.D.,
Taiku, Chosen (Korea).

My dear Dr. Adams:

I have not written to the Mission about the action of the Board on the Chosen Christian College at Seoul, in view of the fact that at the annual meeting in 1915 the Mission asked the Board to deal with the College independently of the Mission and in view also of the fact that it made no reference to the Hojin in the minutes of its last annual meeting, and thus strengthened the impression that it prefers to have the College question handled without relation to the Mission. And yet, as I stated in a recent letter to you, the interests of the College so dovetail into and affect the general missionary situation in Chosen that it is difficult if not impossible to deal with it as a separate matter, and the attempt to do so will be injurious to the Mission and its work, depriving the Mission of a voice in matters which concern it and in which it ought to be heard. Now that the College is to go on and the Hojin has been approved, subject to the explanations and interpretations that were stated in the Board's action, the question arises as to what course should be pursued by those who are troubled about the matter. You will recall my letter of December 5th to you, copies of which were sent to Mr. Reiner and Dr. Avison as the other men on the field whose letters on the subject were received before the Board acted. I now write a supplementary letter, not officially as a Secretary but only individually, to make some explanations which I wish most heartily that I could make orally in a personal conference. I would like to sit down with the missionaries on the field and talk the matter over at length. But as I cannot do that, I must write, although I keenly feel the difficulty of conveying just the right intention in typewritten statements which must be read ten thousand miles away. I feel this all the more anxiously because my letter of June 23rd, which I thought was so carefully phrased as to be perfectly intelligible, appears to have been misunderstood by the Presbyterian members of the Educational Senate and the Field Board of Managers to whom it was addressed.

I sent you a copy of the Board's action with my letter of December 5th. I now wish to indicate the considerations which influenced the majority to vote for it. The substance of these considerations is given in the action, but I will emphasize some of these points and add one or two others.

First: We have been trying for more than a year and a half to cooperate with the missionaries in the effort to persuade the authorities to make essential modifications in the regulations which require the separation of education and religion in mission schools, and you will doubtless recall my letter of June 16th, 1915, to Mr. Komatsu which you and many others on the field warmly approved. Now it so happened that the effort to secure some modification of these regulations that will enable us to continue our work centered in the Hojin of the Seoul College. This was not so much of design as of chronological coincidence. It appears clear that the Japanese officials so regarded the negotiations for the Hojin and that they considered its final form as their answer to the protests and representations that we so urgently made. Although some here feel that the answer does not go far enough to be satisfactory, it is evident that the Japanese feel that they have made large concessions. The majority of the Board's members and officers believe that these concessions are so substantial and are offered in such a spirit that it would be highly unwise to reject them and run the risk of having the law enforced in such a way at the close of the ten-year period of grace as to shut us up to the alternative of complying with a strict observance of it or closing our schools, as we had to in the case of the Girls' School at Syen Chyun.

Second: The Board was influenced by the reports of the considerable number of recent visitors to Chosen of conversations with Mr. Komatsu and other high Japanese authorities in Seoul, which appeared to indicate that

the personal attitude of these officials is more friendly to missionary work than the cold text of the published regulations might suggest, that if the Boards would not press the matter in such a way as to put the Japanese on the defensive and make it possible for them to yield without losing face, we would have little, if any, trouble, and that the larger and wider interests of the cause of Christ in Chosen urgently call for the College in Seoul. I can imagine what some of you will think about this, but you will understand how natural it was that members of the Board should be influenced by such reports.

Third: We must take into consideration the fact that the missionary interests no longer present a united front on the question. The authorities are fully aware that a large and influential number of missionaries in Chosen, including the bulk of the Methodist missionaries led by Bishop Harris and some of the prominent members of our own Mission, are opposed to making further protest; and the Japanese also know that certain members and officers of the Mission Boards at home take the same position. Our ranks have, therefore, been hopelessly broken. In such circumstances it is futile to expect that we can get any more now than the Hojin offers, and there is fear that, if we reject it, we may get less.

Fourth: The Japanese are in absolute and permanent control of Chosen. All the conditions of the modern world point to an era of stricter national supervision not only in Chosen but everywhere else. We are having trouble with it in several other fields. The European War has revived a waning spirit of nationalism and we must reckon upon its power for many years to come. Now the question is: Can we work under this national spirit, especially in a country like Chosen where military and political conditions under the Government extremely sensitive and where strictness is deemed imperative as a national policy.

Fifth: A further grave consideration is that the Japanese suspect the loyalty of a large part of the American missionary body in Chosen and that this unsympathetic element is believed to be the one which favors the Pyeng Yang College and opposes the Seoul College. You and I have discussed this question before. I think I understand the Mission's views; but, as I stated in the Board letter of February 7, 1916, the question now is not so much what we think as what the Japanese think. They do not like the idea of having the children of their subjects educated by foreigners; but if the children are to be so educated, they want the foreigners to be those of whose attitude they feel most sure. If the Mission interests are going to have a higher educational institution at all, the Japanese would far rather have it in Seoul, and they will probably do for a mission college there what they might not do for one in Pyeng Yang.

Sixth: The Board feels that it is a great thing to have gained the Government's official recognition of the principle that a Mission institution must be manned and controlled exclusively by Christians who believe in the doctrines and principles of the Bible and that no one else shall be permitted to teach in it or to sit in its board of management. This is deemed an enormous gain. It is true that nobody has proposed to put in anti-Christian managers or professors; but it is also true that in some mission institutions there are non-Christian teachers and that there would be danger that, in a country like Chosen where the Government regards education as a state function, the authorities might at any time insist that a professor in a certain department was not satisfactory and should be replaced by a more satisfactory man, when perhaps a suitably qualified Christian could not be found. It is no small thing to have the permanent principle imbedded in the bedrock of a legal document that non-Christians can have no voice whatever in this Mission college.

Seventh: Another consideration which had large influence was the tender memory of Dr. Underwood's recent illness and death. Everyone knows that the Seoul College was the object of his toils and longings and prayers during the later years of his life; that he was its projector, its founder and its first president; that he secured the \$75,000 gold for the Presbyterian share of the property, and that he literally wore himself out in shattered his health in trying to carry the project through. His death in New York and his funeral in the city made a profound impression; and when the family pastor, in the discussion of the Hojin in the Board, dwelt upon this phase of the subject you will readily understand how difficult

sition became. Those who did oppose were frank and earnest; but the atmosphere was not favorable to their views. I must add, in justice to Mr. John Underwood, who was present, that from the beginning he had never taken advantage of his membership in the Board to influence this matter in the slightest degree. He keenly felt the delicacy of his position. Sometimes he absented himself from the meetings of the Chosen Committee when the question was to be considered. When he was present, he almost invariably sat in silence, as he also sat in the sessions of the Board, taking no part in the discussion except when some question was addressed particularly to him; and he expressed no small vexation when his name was mentioned as one of those who might financially support the college, insisting that he wanted the question decided on its merits wholly apart from any personal relationship to himself or his possible gifts.

Eighth: The argument was used, as I intimated in my former letter to you, that the Mission made no protest against the adoption of the Hojin, although it was given ample opportunity to do so, the Board having waited a long time in order to afford it opportunity to express any judgment that it cared to send. Nor did the letters of the individual missionaries who were heard from indicate any clear consensus of opinion, nearly one-half favoring the Hojin. The point was made, too, that the Mission had approved the Hojin of the Severance Medical College, which covered substantially the same ground. It is true that the Mission stated that a medical college is in a different category; but it did not object to the Hojin for the college, and it was argued that the two cases were not so essentially different after all as our object in conducting a medical college is to provide Christian physicians and therefore reasons for having religion in it differ only in degree and not in kind. There were some here who favored the establishment of the college in Seoul, who did not believe that the absence of Mission action disapproving the Hojin should be used as an argument in support of the Seoul College because they were convinced that one reason why the Mission did not take action was because it desired to be as fair as possible and not appear to be exercising authority with regard to the College when the principle had already been established at the Mission meeting a year ago that the College should be independent of the Mission.

You may say that I am piling up ex parte arguments in support of the Board's action. Frankly, I am. And yet I would not have you think that the other side has been ignored. At the meeting June 22nd, when the motion was made to adopt the Hojin and it looked as if the majority would pass it I opposed it and went so far as to insist as the Secretary for Chosen that action should not be taken until the Missionaries on the field had been given an opportunity to express their mind; but I intimated that if, after such opportunity had been afforded them, they did not object, I would acquiesce. I was given my way in the matter, and in spite of pressure for early action, I was chiefly responsible for holding up the matter five months and a half until the minutes of the annual meeting arrived, when I found that they were silent on the subject. In laying the whole question before the Board, I sent copies of the full correspondence to all the members in advance, including the lengthy letters of objection from yourself, Mr. Reiner and Mr. Erdman; and the three alternatives which I submitted to the Board included one to decline to proceed with the College and gave a rather full summary of the arguments for this position. This summary was read in the discussion in the Board meeting. Four members earnestly elaborated and emphasized the arguments and a fifth wrote to the same effect.

But the odds were too great. The conviction that the cause of Christ requires a Christian College in Seoul, the center of Chosen's life; that the Japanese prefer to have it there and will befriend it as they will not befriend it elsewhere; the doubt whether a college in Pyeng Yang will be permitted to live after the ten year period of grace unless it wholly eliminates religion; the Board's unwillingness to commit itself to principles, by rejecting the Hojin, which might destroy all the educational work of the Mission, including Pyeng Yang, eight years hence; the avowed determination of the Government General to control all educational institutions on the ground that education is the function of the state and not of the church so that we must educate under the Japanese rule of Chosen, the fact that we should work in harmony with them if we possibly can; the belief that the refusal of their offer in the Hojin, after all the negotiations which preceded it and in view

the Japanese feeling that they were offering real concessions in a friendly spirit, would jeopardize our relations with them and make things worse for the other Mission work in Chosen; the fact that the desire of other Boards to proceed makes a College in Chosen a certainty anyway and that we ought to stand aloof in opposition to it; the strong recommendation of a College for Seoul and its Hojin by practically all the students of Missions from America who have visited Chosen during the last five years, a consensus of opinion which had great and which was reinforced by the opinion of prominent missionaries; the persistent and wide-spread impression that Pyeng Yang does not offer the most favorable auspices for the College which should powerfully influence Korean thought and life for the new era in Chosen; the grief over the death of the honored and beloved Dr. Underwood; the belief that his death was hastened by his efforts to establish the College and that respect for his memory forbade killing it; the offer of \$75,000 gold for a share of property and equipment from those who loved Dr. Underwood; these and other considerations made a combination too formidable to be overcome, place yourselves in imagination in the position of the members of the Board, and you will understand how natural it was for the majority to do that, although the Hojin did not give all that they would like and although there were grounds for misgivings, nevertheless approval seemed to be the most practicable thing to do in view of all the circumstances.

And now word comes from Dr. North, Chairman of the Joint Committee of the Boards having work in Chosen, that the four other Boards in the United States and Canada have approved the Hojin, so that all five of the Boards of North America are in line; although for other reasons one or two do not their way clear to pledge definite financial support at present.

Since therefore the College in Seoul is a fact decided upon after the most and most deliberate consideration, is it not wise for all concerned to turn in and make the best possible out of the result? Grant that it was unfortunate that our negotiations with the Government regarding the regulations separating education and religion happened to turn on the Hojin of the Seoul College and that we would have chosen different ground if we had. Grant too that some of the considerations are rather extraneous to the question whether the interests of the cause of Christ really require a college in Seoul under present conditions; nevertheless these extraneous influences exist and the majority of the Board feel that it is impossible to leave them out of sight—since things have turned out in this way, is not a policy of Christian acquiescence better than a continued antagonism which would perpetuate strife and grievously injure the Cause of Christ? It would be lamentable if this institution, destined to be so conspicuous and influential, should, by the opposition of missionaries be driven out of touch with the dominant Christian influence in Chosen. As we are to have the institution, why not try to make it as helpful as possible to the common best?

I am sending copies of this letter to Mr. Reiner and Dr. Avison for the reason that I sent them copies of my letter of December 5th to you—namely, that they are the missionaries on the field who wrote to me on the subject. I also send a copy to Mr. Sharp from whom I heard shortly after the Board acted. My thought in writing is to try to make clear why the majority here believed that the Hojin should be adopted and why some of those who had serious misgivings deemed acquiescence the most practicable in view of all the circumstances.

Sincerely yours,
ARTHUR J. BROWN.

J. E. A. TO A. J. B.
Taiku, Chosen, (Korea) March 19, 1917.

J. Brown, D. D.
100 Ave., New York City.
Dear Dr. Brown:
I have been long since in receipt of your letter of January 15, 1917, and beg your pardon for not having given an early reply. I have delayed because of a lack of consideration, but because I have thought that it required much consideration, and I have been somewhat at a loss as to what to take and what reply to make. For it seems clear that your letter was presumably written simply to set forth the reasons which determined

the Board in its purpose there, yet set these forth with a view to the question whether with the situation so determined it was not the proper course for these who had been opposed to the establishment of the institution, to now exercise what you term "Christian acquiescence" and unite in the operation of the institution. Such a proposition of course calls for serious and careful consideration.

Probably my letter of January 13, 1917, which you would have received later, led you to think that I would not be inclined to consider such a proposition. I am however quite willing to consider anything. The suggestion you make however, while no subject for criticism in a private and personal letter, seems to me a quite improper one to emanate from the Board to the Mission, in view of the historical working out of the problem. There was a distinct agreement between the Board and the Mission as to the basis on which the institution was to be founded if the Board insisted on founding it. On this basis the Mission ceased its objections, and the Board saw fit to go ahead. Now that it is an accomplished fact, and accomplished in a way that has put a knife into the heart of Christian education for the future Church of Christ in the land, to apply pressure for "Christian acquiescence" would not be a proper course to pursue. If problems and difficulties and manifest injuries thicken, they raise but one question, which is, whether you have not adopted a mistaken course and should correct it.

I trust that you will believe Doctor, that I appreciate and sympathize with the thickening difficulties of your position as Secretary of the Board for this field in this matter. As I said in my former letter it is not a possible situation. I doubt not that as you look into the future of it you are anxious and troubled. What responsible servant of Christ would not be! You will forgive my saying, as this also is a private letter, that for the last year or more my own interpretation of your letters has been, that personally you would have been relieved to have been able to find grounds for withdrawing entirely from it. Your love for your fellow laborers on the field; your recognition of their moral if not legal rights in field questions; your appreciation that the Lord's work is done "not by power nor by might, but by my Spirit"; your increasing realization of the difficulties and even disasters besetting the path proposed, doubtless have all combined in leading you to this position. But as you say in your letter. "The odds were too great."

The reasons you set forth for the Board's action have been of especial interest to me and have strongly confirmed me in a position which I have been approaching for some time. Some as you say are "ex parte", but all have some application to the matter in hand. You will note, however, that almost all carry their weight or hold their argument, in some supposed condition or hypothetical possibility on the field. Who may in reason be supposed to be best acquainted with field conditions and possibilities? Members of the Board, passing travelers of a day, or the men who have been up against these conditions and parties, in intimate contact with the parties from the beginning? Now at least eight-tenths of your Mission, carrying a half of all the work there is in the country, and with two-thirds of all the older missionaries on the field, will laugh at those reasons. They know that they are not true—they do not exist—their only value is in home consumption. Some of them are such what shall I say—I do not wish to offend; I do not wish to be disrespectful; I know you do not give them as your own—but many of them are such piffle, that the most ardent advocate of the institution has never ventured to produce them for inspection here on the field.

This simply brings me to what is the real object of my letter. The College question is a settled one. No one purposes to revive it. In itself it has never been more than a local question. I may also say frankly that I do not think that the Board has exceeded in any way the authority delegated it by the Assembly for the conduct of its foreign missions. Indeed it would be difficult for the Board to do this for the simple reason that it has delegated to it all the authority this side the horizon, and has been made correspondingly responsible. Authority must go with responsibility, and when questions arise responsibility must decide. The fault is not with the Board but the system. It is an outgrown system.

Since the time when the Assembly appointed the Board and charged it with the duty of organizing and superintending the word of disseminating the Gospel in unevangelized lands, so far as I am aware no further definition or differentiation of authority has been made. It has been

was then placed exclusively in the hands of the Board. The field missions as operating organizations carrying responsibility and therefore to be entrusted with corresponding authority, hold no recognized place in the organized operations of the Church and Assembly. They are simply the creatures of the Board. It is, let us say, a benevolent imperialism; benevolent, or at least with the best intentions of being so, but imperialistic, if for what it considers sufficient reasons it wishes to be, down to the most minute detail of field operation.

This was probably necessary and proper in earlier days; but it is outgrown. The field work has grown to too large dimensions; it has become differentiated and complex; it differs in every Mission; the native peoples are assuming their place in the family of nations and an intimate acquaintance with their social life and psychology is more necessary to wise operation than ever before; the Missions themselves have grown to be large well organized bodies of experienced workers; they are trusted with the expenditure of millions of dollars a year; more over as the operating field organizations of the home church, established by the General Assembly, including hundreds of its presbyters they have moral and spiritual rights in the determining of their field policies and the molding of the product which is the fruit of their life's labor. On the other hand all men are finite. Even those with the best of intentions and to whom the highest honor is to be accorded, particularly is this true in judging a matter with which one has little or no personal acquaintance. It is no disrespect to say that this is true even of Board members, Board secretaries, and passing visitors of renown. The perils of the present system, increasing with the growth and complexity of the work, are not only the perils but the certainties of an absentee imperialism. And lastly we are Presbyterians; born, bred, and broken to harness in a system of representative democracy expressing itself in graded courts with responsibilities and authority, and with their rights correspondingly distributed. As Presbyterians we believe that wisdom in initial jurisdiction is in the main best conserved by locating such jurisdiction in the superior body most immediately concerned; and that it is this body that in general has the strongest claim to divine guidance for wise decision in such matters. The average Mission has a larger permanent voting body in it, all carefully selected by the Board when commissioned, than the average Presbytery in the home church, and its membership is far more permanent. Four per cent of all the Presbyters of the home church are in its Foreign Missions, yet the present arrangement provides no place of recognition of their service in the organization of the great purpose of the Church save that of simple employees.

As I said this is no criticism of the Board. It is the criticism of an outgrown system which I trust the Board will help in seeking to rectify. Time has brought changes until a grave injustice is being done to a large body of the Assembly's agents and the church's Presbyters, and it constitutes a grave peril to the great work that is the Church's highest honor.

At this time when the whole question on the chapter of Missions is before the Church being remodeled, it is eminently proper that this question also should be considered. The relation of Missions in the home land to the immediate controlling body is a minor consideration because of the fact that it works within that body's boundaries, in a commonly known condition, with immediate superintendence, and is itself usually without organization and composed of but few individuals. The relation of foreign Missions as usually organized to its governing body in the homeland is a matter with such markedly distinct features as to raise the question whether it should not be embodied in the legal definitions of the church. As Presbyters of the church I think we are not going beyond our proper functions in seeking a discussion and consideration of the matter by such proper means and channels as may be to us. Believe me,

Yours in the Service,
(Signed) JAS. E. ADAMS.

LETTER OF J. E. A. TO A. J. B.

Taiku, Chosen, April 16, 1917.

(LX)

Rev. A. J. Brown, D. D.
36 5th Ave., New York City.

My Dear Dr. Brown:

Your favor of March 7th, came to hand some time ago. As we have both

not infrequently said, it is very difficult to put a thing onto paper, send it half way round the world, and have the other party take off just exactly what we intended should be put on. It is easy to say things without offense or misinterpretation, that are very difficult to write without both. So I trust that whatever I have written you will try to interpret in the light of the very real respect and affection which the long years of our fellowship in the service has given me for yourself. My own letter of March 19 which you have doubtless since received, will, I think, help you somewhat in this line. I beg that you will not for an instant question it.

I do not doubt that all you say with regard to the difficulties of the situation are true, and doubtless you could have said much more. I also do not doubt that what you say with regard to positions and statements from the field is true. Some men make unfortunate statements most of the time and most men make them some of the time. That is to be expected and it is not peculiar to the foreign field, nor can wise policies be built on such alienations. In justice, however, it should be put over against this that these statements were stirred to life by a course which the Board inaugurated, and a priori probability would lead an impartial investigator to look for the root of the whole difficulty quite as much in the cause as in the effect. My own belief is, speaking in the large, that that is where it lies.

The theory on which Mission administration has run in our work has always been recognized as one—all ultimate authority resting with the Board. In practical operation, however, this has not been the case. But for some years now it has been recognized by the older missionaries in most of our fields—at least I can speak for many in the China Missions, the Japan Mission, and our own—that there has been a well marked tendency toward concentrating the exercise of authority in the Home Board. It covers the whole of field policies and field operations. If for reasons which appear sufficient to the Board its judgment is otherwise, it does not recognize the propriety of the field being determinative in such matters. A year ago last Summer I took my vacation in Karia Zawa. In conversation with a member of our Mission there, I happened to mention the petition for a definition of relations which the Korea Mission had proposed to present to the Board. He inquired earnestly with regard to it, and then said, "How I wish you had mentioned it before our Annual Meeting. Our Mission would have been one with you on it."

Last year I happened to fall in accidentally for a half day's travel with an old and prominent member of one of our China Missions who was passing through. He raised the question of the difficulties the Korea Mission has been having along this line; then himself spoke of the tendency I have mentioned, and said that they had recognized it in their China work and its recognition was one of the strong underlying causes of the formation of the China Council.

If I were asked to put my finger on the root of the present difficulty I should say, that whereas with the growth of the field work in extent and complexity, and with an increase of the workers in numbers, experience and organization, the natural and proper sequence would be an increased committing of responsibility and authority to the field, the actual sequence with the passage of time has been the exact opposite. If I were asked the underlying cause I would say that it was a well meant misapplication of the modern movement toward union. Dr. Goucher in his address before the Conference for the Promotion of Unity in Foreign Missions voiced it well. He said, "No great manufacturing, commercial or financial institution would commit the determining of its policies to its various departments. No general would expect a successful campaign if he left its planning to his separate corps of commanders. An organism with more than one head is abnormal, and without a head it is a fit subject for burial." True! But who is the head of this Business? A Board? Evidently he counts Christ out of the reckoning. Christ is an autocrat. But He will give no such place to any among his people or in His service. He reserves that to Himself alone, and primarily operates direct with those whom He calls and places. It is the recognition of this that is the glory and abiding power of Presbyterianism.

Speaking with full recognition of the concessions and modifications of the principle necessary in order to efficient organization, it is this which the concentration mentioned violates. And with the increasing complexities of

incongruity of it is becoming an impossibility. It is ceasing to be a question as to whether the field organization is willing to stand it and becoming a question as to whether it can. For you will readily acknowledge that the foreign missionary is not simply a Board employee. That is but a minor aspect of his calling. He believes whether rightly or wrongly, that Christ calls him and places him and that primarily he works under his orders direct, and (again recognizing necessary concessions for necessary organization) in general he must follow His orders as it is given him to understand His orders. Therefore under the process mentioned of the concentration of real authority in a body on the other side of the world the acquaintance whose members with actual conditions is almost wholly a matter of hearsay (I beg you will not take offense at the expression) there may easily come a time when the field body can go no further. Loyalty to Christ at whose call they have come; loyalty to His service, as it is given them to see His needs; for which they have already given their lives, their ambitions and their loved ones; direct personal responsibility to Him all alike made it possible.

A large experienced field body with practical unanimity, judge a certain new proposition, vitally affecting the whole field service, to not be for the best interests of their work. The home body goes ahead and inaugurates it in the field outside of and independent of the field body. The field body submits. Time passes. New conditions arise. The field body goes out of its way to say that it believes that no such step on the field as a certain designated one should be taken under present conditions. The home body sees the step, and the thing is done—done for all time and for everything in the field—for the whole future of Christ's Church in the country. What are the field workers to do? To whom and to what degree are they responsible for the Lord's work in that field? It is not a question of whether I love you or you love me. We do love each other. But I have a stewardship of Christ in this field. Every missionary here has, and he cannot surrender it to the Board. He holds it to Christ alone. Some proper recognition of this must be granted and its exercise conserved. In the nature of the service and our several relations to the Head, the field has the same right to check upon the Board that the Board has to a check on the field. The welfare of the service requires that each should check the judgment of the other.

I think I may say without the fear of your even wishing to contradict me for you too are His servant and carrying a stewardship from Him, that a system that makes possible such a situation to arise, has somewhere in it, a radical defect. The larger the work grows, the more complex, technical, pressing its problems, the more certain does it mean continued failure. The field body cannot consent to it. The home body ought not. For it relates to the good of the service. No consideration of unfortunate alienating elements on one side, or (pardon the suggestion) of unwise action on the other, should be permitted to stand in the way. Personalities have no place. It is a question of adjusting our system so that each of the several parties engaged have assigned and conserved to them that degree of responsibility and authority which accords with the admitted stewardship of each. It is equity and righteousness, those fundamentals without the careful guarding of which by all concerned, no enterprise has the blessing of God, without the cordial mutual granting of which, self respecting men who love Christ cannot co-operate.

I doubt not that the situation weighs heavily upon your mind and heart and that you say it is important that you be kept informed as to developments. I almost hesitate to speak lest my motives for doing so should be misconstrued. And indeed I have little information except that of rumor and reported statements. But there is no question but that the sobered dissatisfaction is widespread and deep, and that many are considering whether they can remain in the service. Many are debating their duty of making an adjustment through agitation in the home church and their Presbyteries. I myself have written to a church paper and communicated with the Presbytery. But—when numbers start that, those unfortunate alienating elements of which you speak are bound to appear, and then the fat is in the pan and the damage to the service at large through injuring the Church's influence in the Board no one can measure. Doubtless all are bound to

some adjustment can be made. It is my own hope and I believe that it should and can be done.

Believe me, with most affectionate regards,

Yours in the Blessed Service,

(Signed) JAS. E. ADAMS.

(LXI) W. M. B. TO HERALD AND PRESBYTER.
The New Amendment Chapter on Missions From the Foreign
Mission Viewpoint.

Spring, 1917.

I hesitate exceedingly to speak on this subject because where friends differ in opinion it is easier to keep silence. But I believe that a proposal which causes so much division of opinion as the suggested amendment may well wait a while for final decision. Its effect may be different from what its advocates think it will be.

The discussion, so far as I have seen it, has largely centered about only one phase of the question, viz., the relation between the Home Board and the Presbyteries in America. Those Presbyteries fear that their constitutional rights will be invaded by the Home Board and their power of initiative will be destroyed if this amendment passes. They are undoubtedly right, but the objection applies with even greater force to the effects of the plan upon foreign mission administration.

It is evident that the amendment seeks for the Boards as the General Assembly's agents additional authority to "initiate, direct and control" all mission operations and its originators do not like the action of the General Assembly of 1914 which again gave that power to the Presbyteries. In matters of mission administration differences of opinion have arisen on the question of jurisdiction. Boards desire absolute and final power. Presbyteries and Missions desire some autonomy in their field operations and policies. Presbyteries have always been supposed to have this autonomy constitutionally. But Missions have grown up that are larger and more fully organized than almost any Presbytery and yet constitutionally they are nonentities depending for their being on the good will of the Board. Now it is proposed to give the Boards still more authority. In preparing to give to the Boards a constitutional place and function let the General Assembly take pains not to do so at the expense of the rights and usefulness of the missions and the missionaries.

The missions have absolutely no direct voice in the General Assembly. They may claim no vote nor voice in the Board except by courtesy or on invitation. Missionaries often question the wisdom and justice even of the present working plan. They have reason to fear the proposed one still more. It is at the expense of the missionary's fundamental rights as a Presbyter, and at the expense of the widest usefulness as a Christian worker. More than that the missionaries modestly but firmly believe that the matured judgment of a successful mission, which is on the ground, and knows the conditions, is undoubtedly worth more than that of those who are called "mission experts" situated at half the globe's distance away. They modestly but firmly believe that the mission expert is the man on the field doing the work. It is not merely a theoretical question of rights. Although rights are dear, and it has often been considered the duty and burden of our Presbyterian ancestors to stand for them, yet this is more than a question of rights. It is a question of how to achieve the greatest usefulness. Of all men the missionaries are the most vitally interested. They have invested their lives, past and future, in the enterprise. Their all is at stake. It is due to some extent to their efforts that there is any mission or any mission work in their field. To have no voice, or only a minor voice, in the determination of policies which they consider essential to the success or failure of their life's work is asking more of them than is asked of any equal number of coordinate Presbyters in any other part of the world. The Home Presbyters and Presbyteries would not bear it for an instant. Home Presbyteries, synods and the press would all speak out until they compelled a hearing. The foreign missionary as such has no direct voice in the General Assembly, and very little in either home Presbyteries or Synods or in the Home press. Unless his Foreign Board represents his sentiments correctly he has no representation anywhere. Should the Mission differ from the Board the

Let us face the facts. The Foreign Board by this amendment would be clothed with all power in mission work and the foreign missionary would become merely the Board's hired man, without voice in the management of concerns which are doubtless more vital to him than to any other human being.

The General Assembly by constitution has the power of "superintending the concerns of the whole church." This is as it should be because it is a representative body and all voices are supposed to have a hearing. But unfortunately the foreign missions and the foreign missionary are not represented there directly. Now it is asked by this amendment to give the powers of the Assembly handling mission work to the Board. The missionary would then be further deprived of his rights and have his opportunities of usefulness further curtailed by being placed as a mere employee under a Board, a body of men in whose deliberations and decisions he would claim no part and no representation. Shades of Knox and Melville! Where anything else like it in all Presbyterian history? Three hundred and twenty-four ministers with their associates (1331 in all at present) reduced to employees! Episcopacy and Archbishop Laud could ask for nothing better.

Not to speak of other missionaries, the clerical missionaries alone lack the advantage of being as many as those who in 1843 formed the Free Church of Scotland. Or to use another comparison, the clerical missionary force in service on the foreign field is equal to the total number of ministers (with and without charges and including the foreign missionaries sent from those states) of the states of Indiana and Kentucky, with enough left over to form an extra Presbytery of eight ministers. What would the ministers in these states and Presbyteries think of having the initiation, direction and control of their working policies decided for them by a Board located in London or in Korea?

Of course I do not intimate that it is the Board's intention to be dictatorial, or that the advocates of the measure suppose that the effects will be contrary to Presbyterian precedent. They doubtless hope to add to their efficiency. But they see the matter only from one side. Naturally the Missions' interests are seen best by the missionaries themselves. Only discussion and conference by all persons interested can bring out the whole truth.

My friend Dr. Stevenson in his article, "The Mission Amendment" in the Presbyterian refers to certain times in the past history of our church (1791) when certain Presbyteries or Synods asked the Assembly for "leave to manage the matter of sending missionaries to destitute places within their own bounds." But as the editor well replies this was at a time of meekness in the early days when things were done which would not be practical at this time of fuller development. "No Presbytery today would overture the General Assembly to manage its own missionary concerns." Similarly what was true in the early days of foreign mission work is no longer true and the policies then employed have now become palpably unjust. The system needs to be changed not in the direction of a more rigid oversight but of less oversight toward a wise autonomy, especially in those missions which are large and capable of conducting the work as well or better than the faraway Boards. One effect of the proposed plan would be to give to the Home Board the same power over the home churches and Presbyteries that the foreign Board now exercises over the foreign missions, and it will do for both the foreign and the home Boards what has never been done before, viz., make the exercise of this power constitutional. It would leave neither Presbyteries nor Missions any constitutional ground of complaint. The object is to render legal and constitutional the powers which the Foreign Board has been exercising and to authorize the Home Board to exercise some of the same powers of power the Foreign Board has been tacitly exercising.

It is said. "Restlessness under board direction and control is not peculiar to the home field. Missions under the Foreign Board when they approach the desired stage of self-government begin to petition for the right of initiation, direction and control in the administration of funds."

"The Foreign Board cannot permit the missions or the missionary Presbyteries to override its judgment as to what the will of the whole church is regarding missionary principles and methods, and the right use of benevo-

Now without any reflection upon the unusually good men who are on the Boards I affirm without fear of successful contradiction that there are no men or set of men however good who are capable of being trusted with such arbitrary power. I also maintain the bureaucratic principle of church government is foreign to the Presbyterian system. It is not tolerated in the work in America and is equally intolerable in the foreign mission propaganda. No man or set of men, however saintly, can permanently be willing to yield up, not only their liberties, but the whole direction of their lives and the policies which direct and make useful their life work to the control of a Bureau. Missionaries necessarily surrender many things for the supreme end of being able to preach Jesus Christ to those who know him not. In loyalty to the Master they are perhaps as willing as any class of men to suffer and to surrender rights. But the very loyalty which leads them to be willing to do so also makes them utterly unwilling to surrender what they regard as vital principles. More dear to us even than the principles of "no taxation without representation," the "parity of the ministry," and "no episcopacy in Presbyterianism," etc., is the liberty to follow conscience in the use of mission methods. No body of men, half the earth's distance away, and nominated perhaps by entirely different theories of mission work, are capable of dictating what should be done, what policies are best. It is neither good for them spiritually to have such power nor is it right nor just to the missionaries that they should have it.

If the General Assembly expects to get the most efficient service out of its agents on the foreign field it should not use methods which will deprive them of their self-respect and of their initiative power for offensive service. A self-respecting, efficient, eagerly co-operating field force is just as essential to the enterprise as a powerful directing center. Self-respecting men will not abide under the proposed conditions. They become intolerable. There are limits beyond which even missionary loyalty will not drive men. Their loyalty is to the Master, not to Boards, and should the proposed system go into effect it could not but result in driving some of the most efficient men out of the foreign mission work as well as in destroying work already favorably started. Rather than pass the present proposed amendment let some one propose to give the missions more autonomy and to give them direct representation in the General Assembly. Of course all right thinking missionaries cheerfully recognize that in the administrative affairs the Board must necessarily exercise a certain superintendence over the mission affairs, especially in the carrying out of policies which have been already settled by the General Assembly and on which the church has a fixed policy. But the tendency of the times, and the lessons we learn from history, point not toward autocracy and excessive centralization, but rather in the opposite direction of the more specialized and more efficient co-operation of many autonomous units not working under coercion but in hearty partnership. When we see still further steps taken to place not only the final decisions but even the initiative of mission work into the Board's hands, and that without making exception in favor of those regions where the missions are sufficiently well organized to be abundantly capable of deciding their own policies, it is evident that the system will reduce the missions to be the merest nonentities and will inaugurate into our church a great bureaucracy for which we have no precedent nor parallel, and whose effects can not but be essentially disastrous.

(LXII.) APPENDIX LXIV. J. E. A. TO "THE PRESBYTERIAN"
SPRING OF 1917.

A Foreign Missionary's Point of View, By Rev. James E. Adams, D. D.
Taiku, Korea.

The widespread discussion in church papers of the proposed revision of Chapter XVIII has carried greater interest to none than to the church's foreign missionaries working under the General Assembly. The causes for revision arose in the home church. So the discussion has wholly centered around conditions obtaining in the home church. The revision proposed, however, covers all missions, whether of the home or of the foreign field. In view of this, it seems remarkable to Presbyters in the foreign missions of the church that the discussion has so confined itself; also both revision and dis-

thing is provided and nothing said with regard to the missions' relations with the controlling bodies. It would seem to be chapter on "Missions" with Missions left out.

The reason for this of course is easy to understand. The discussion originated through a lack of definition between the controlling bodies in the home land, and the solution of this has occupied the minds of those Presbyters. The question of a mission's functions—the definition of its responsibilities, authority and rights—in relation to its controlling body, is for the primary mission in the home land, a matter of extremely minor importance. A single mission is not infrequently a single individual. It works within the boundaries of the controlling body; under conditions of common knowledge; under immediate superintendence, and where carried on by local bodies the agents themselves usually members of the controlling bodies, with full representation.

In the foreign every condition is the exact opposite. The controlling body is a single one, the General Assembly or its home agent. The work is at a vast distance, under diverse, complex, and often rather incomprehensible conditions. The mission is usually a large, well organized, operating body, necessarily to a degree administrative, with membership carefully selected, and when once entered involves a life work. As the field work increases in magnitude and complexity, proper distribution and clarity of definition, as regards responsibility and authority in field administration becomes increasingly vital to wise and progressive operation. In a chapter on "Missions" therefore, what is a very minor matter in home missions becomes an extremely major one in our great foreign work. So much so that, in relation to the Church's foreign work, it is Missions with the missions left out.

Since the time when the Assembly organized the Foreign Board, and charged it with the duty of organizing and superintending the work of disseminating the Gospel in unevangelized lands, so far as I am aware, no other definition or differentiation of authority has been made. It has been where it was then placed, as under the Assembly, exclusively in the hands of the Board. The missions as operating administrative field organizations, carrying responsibility, and therefore to be entrusted with corresponding authority, hold no defined place in the organized operations of the church as represented in the Assembly. They are simply the creatures of the Board. It is, let us say, a benevolent imperialism; benevolent of course, but imperialistic (if for what it considers sufficient reasons the Board desires) down to the minutest detail of field operation.

This was probably necessary and proper in earlier days, but it is outgrown. The field work has grown to too large dimensions. It has become differentiated and complex. It is different in every mission. The native peoples are taking their place out in the world, and an intimate acquaintance with their social life and psychology is more necessary to wise administration than ever before. The missions themselves have grown to be large well organized bodies of experienced workers. They are trusted, with the expenditure of millions of dollars a year. Moreover as the operating field organizations of the home church, established by the General Assembly, including hundreds of its Presbyters, they have moral and spiritual rights in the determining of their field policies and the molding of the product which is the stage of their lives' labors.

On the other hand, all men are finite, even those of the best of intentions, and to whom the highest honor is to be accorded. Particularly is this true in matters where one has little or no personal acquaintance. It is no respect to say that this is true even of Board members, Board Secretaries, passing visitors of repute. The perils of the present system are not only perils, but the occasional certainties of an absentee imperialism. And yet, as much as our fellow Presbyters in the home church, we are Presbyterians, born, bred, and broken to the harness, in a system of representative democracy expressing itself in graded bodies, each carrying its proper authority and responsibility, and with those rights definitely conserved. As Presbyterians we believe that wisdom in initial jurisdiction is in the long run conserved by locating such jurisdiction in the body most immediately concerned. We believe that in the long run it is this body that has the

all carefully selected before commissioned, than the average Presbytery in the home church. Its membership is far more permanent. Four percent of all the Presbyters of our church are laboring in them. Yet the present arrangement provides no recognition, makes no place for their service, in the church's organization of its "supreme work," save that of simple employees.

This is in no sense a criticism of the Board. The Board commands the honor of all who know its work. It is a criticism of an outgrown system. Time has brought changes until an injustice is being done to a large body of the Assembly's agents and the church's Presbyters, and the situation constitutes a very real peril to the great work that is the church's highest honor.

At this time when the whole question of the Chapter on Missions is before the church for remodeling it is eminently proper that this question also should be considered. The relation of missions in the home land to the governing body is indeed a minor consideration, but the relation of a foreign mission, as usually organized, to its governing body in the home land, is a matter of such markedly distinct features, as to raise the question as to whether it should not be embodied in the legal definitions of the church.

If I might be allowed to offer a suggestion I would point out that what the revision lacks is a separate section dealing with the "Mission." All other related bodies have their section, and I would suggest a revising to make that section read somewhat as follows:

"Missions as ordinarily organized in foreign lands are the agents of the Assembly for the propagation of the Gospel and the planting of the Church. They have the supervision of the Assembly's work within their bounds, and by the power of review or control are subject to the Assembly or its authorized agents. They may be represented in the Assembly by a delegate."

(LXIII)

LETTER OF A. J. B. TO J. E. A.

January 23, 1918.

The Rev. James E. Adams,
Taiku, Chosen.

My Dear Dr. Adams:—

We have been thinking a good deal about the vexed question of the registration of schools and I thought at first that I would express some of the forming opinion in Board Letter No. 427 of January 10th communicating the action of the Board on the appeal of Seoul Station against the action of the Mission. I concluded, however, that it might be better to write separately about it in a personal letter so it would not be considered official, but merely as a friendly individual conference.

You are of course aware that the position of the Mission is substantially that which I independently took in my letter of June 16th, 1915 to Mr. Komatsu, which was unanimously approved at the time by the Board. I pleasantly remember the warmly appreciative words which you and others in the Mission wrote regarding that letter. I thought then and I still think that if the missionary interests had stood together on that platform we might have had some chance of gaining our point. You are also aware however that it soon developed that the missionary interests could not be held together. The ranks since have been so hopelessly broken that it is no longer possible for us to be supported in a consensus of missionary opinion in further negotiations. The officials know this quite as well as we do and of course they are gratified by what they regard as the approval of so many missionaries and of influential men in America. It is clear that they will show all possible favor to the schools that register and that the schools that do not register will be more and more seriously restricted. You will recall that Mr. Komatsu frankly said that while the government had given the existing schools the benefit of a ten year period of grace, it hoped that they would not take advantage of the full term but would at once begin to make arrangements to adapt themselves to the regulations. Signs are not wanting as some of the missionaries have uncomfortable reason to know, that failure to do this is not pleasing to the authorities. A high Japanese official has asked: "How soon is the Pyeng Yang College going to close?" I could cite many evidences of anxiety from the letters that have been written me by the various members of the Mission and a China missionary who had visited Chosen writes: "It seems a forlorn hope for the church to keep up its Christian schools; they are gradually being closed by the authorities."

It appears to be clear that the present situation cannot be indefinitely prolonged and that the Mission will soon have to do one thing or the other,—either make some arrangement with the Government, or deliberately prepare for the curtailment of its educational work.

Moreover the present uncertainty is highly injurious from the viewpoint of securing better financial support in America. Givers who understand the situation will not be disposed to put money into our institutions until the situation is settled, especially when they have appeals from other equally important and needy institutions whose future is unclouded. It would not be wise to ask for their money without telling them of the law and the present attitude of the Government toward its enforcement; and if they are told they are likely either to decline to give at all or to say that they will wait to see how the negotiations will turn out.

The question has arisen whether our other institutions could secure the same privileges that were given in the Hojin of the Chosen Christian College. I think the Mission has never passed upon the question whether the Hojin should be regarded as satisfactory although I wrote to the field at the time that it was likely to be considered as a precedent for other schools and that the Board would like to have the field opinion. Whether the Mission can now do anything more than the Chosen Christian College obtained in that Hojin is doubtful. While the Hojin is understood to be in harmony with the law it appears to be based upon the most favorable interpretation for mission-aries that the officials were able to give, and they gave it in a form that could be revoked so far as the college is concerned. Will they or their successors interpret the law as favorably seven years hence for a Mission that stands out to the end against their known wishes? "Aye, there's the rub."

It is not probable that quite as favorable arrangements can now be made with the Government officials as can be made later? Indeed, may it not be that the Mission can do better now than if it were nearer the period when it might have to comply with the letter of the law or close its schools? It has been suggested now that it may not have then. The present officials too, are not likely as much disposed to be conciliatory as their successors are likely to be. Hope that the ten year period of grace may bring anything better than a counter balanced by the fear that they may bring something worse. I have misinterpreted some of the letters that have come to me from some members of the majority as well as the minority; but they have certainly given me the impression that our schools will ultimately have to register or close. Indeed, one member of the majority specifically said: "I see no way for anything but conforming." If this is really the alternative that we are not as well faced now as later? If one intends to yield at all, is it wiser for to do so when he can act voluntarily, rather than to wait until he is forced to obey? If one does not intend to yield should he not calmly and intelligently plan to accept the consequences? It seems to me therefore that the Mission was very wise when it voted at its last annual meeting to ascertain whether the Government cannot eventually find some way to give such relief will be afforded as will enable us to continue our schools on the same privilege."

At the same time the Board is unwilling to embarrass the Mission by premature action from New York. It feels that under present conditions the Mission should be given reasonable opportunity to see if the Mission cannot work the situation out on the field in direct negotiations with the Government. I would like to emphasize the consideration again, my dear Dr. Adams, that this letter is not to be considered an official communication in behalf of the Mission. I am not trying to constrain you to do either one thing or the other, but I now express the opinion as to whether the Mission should register or prepare to close them. I am simply trying to explain that at a distance it looks as if something will have to be done soon. It will be that we do not read signs of the times aright; but you will see the fact that we get opinions from a good many sources—members of our and other Missions in Chosen and Japan, friendly visitors, Japanese Christians and public men, and Americans outside the missionary circle. A careful position or careful study of Japan enables them to form an opinion. You will recall the old saying that "the spectator gets the best view of the game." I am well aware, however, that the spectator sometimes

gets a wrong view, and because there is such a possibility in this case I am unwilling to have this letter bear any official character and I write it in this separate and individual way. I am sending copies to Mr. Reiner, Mr. Koons and Miss Lewis, as the principals of the educational institutions which appear to be most directly concerned at this time. Will you not let me know how the matter looks from your view point?

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ARTHUR J. BROWN.

(LXIV.)

LETTER OF J. E. A. TO A. J. B.

Taiku, Cbosen, March 15, 1918.

Rev. A. J. Brown, D. D.
156 5th Ave., New York.

My Dear Dr. Brown:—

Your letter of January 23, 1918, came some days ago and I have laid it by for occasional re-reading and consideration, until I should have some clearly defined conclusions to give in reply. You will pardon the delay.

I may state my general conclusions in a few words. I think the tone and entire drift of your letter a mistaken one, with regard to the situation here. I have charge of one of the middle schools of the Mission of which there are but four boys schools in the country. At one time I had the same apprehension which you seem to have; but consequent experience has led me to largely lose them. I believe the Administration, while a red tape one, is playing fair on the Ordinance which it itself made, and is following it out without partiality to all. I believe that there has not been a previous time when the relation between Administration and Missions have been more cordial. The present Administration has frankly said to the Australian Presbyterian Mission that teaching the Bible outside of official school hours and using school buildings for it is not contrary to the Ordinance, and has given Mr. Koons permission to do so if he wished to conform. It as frankly says and so instructs its provincial officials, that old schools are not to be interfered with but to be given their present full privileges until 1925. This however, is not permitted for those schools which conformed when the Ordinance was not so interpreted. They made their own bed. All of my own relations in connection with my school with the local and provincial authorities are most agreeable. They do every thing they can for me, come out to all my school functions, and are most cordial. I have lately had my official curriculum changed so as to conform to the Government one, and it was done for me by the head officials in Seoul, with no question and with religious instruction left in. When the Ordinance was first passed all were officially asked what they proposed to do. I sent in a written reply to the effect that I would change the curriculum to the Government one as quickly as possible, with the exception of religious instruction. This I would continue until the law did not permit it. The reply was acknowledged by Mr. Usami himself. Last year I had an insurrection in the school. My head Japanese teacher went into the dormitory and beat up a student. I was away at Seoul. The students struck. The Japanese informed the police that the riot was against him because he was a Japanese. The police began to loiter round. I came back and at once went into the matter. I discharged the teacher and expelled the student. The other students struck on me. I called them in one by one and gave them the choice of continuing and obeying rules or leaving. With one exception they all said they would leave. Then I ordered them out of the dormitories and home. At that they broke and wanted back. It resulted in about six expulsions. No finer opportunity could have been had for the officials if they had wanted to make trouble. Instead the mayor's office sent out word that they had watched the matter closely and were greatly pleased with the way I had handled it. The troubles in Sensen have wholly passed and now most cordial relations exist. In Pyeng Yang it was thought lately that they were persecuting the school and arresting students. But it was ascertained that an organization really existed and some of the students were in it, having made a covenant and signed it with their blood to liberate the country and were paying money for that purpose. Those guilty were kept and those not in it were released. What else could the police do? The fault was in the students, not in the Government, and it would have been the same even though it were a conforming school.

questionably the Administration would like for us to conform. But themselves made the Ordinance and put all the provisions in it. They particular ten year one in because they knew the difficulty in which ed us. But they put it in themselves, and they are dealing impartially as we avail ourselves of it. I know of no evidence to the contrary. am aware that what may not improperly be called a campaign has been both here and in the States (doubtless with a sincere belief in the po to the effect that this is not the case, that the Administration is not, all not, follow the letter of the Ordinance, and that its purpose is to dis- cate against schools availing themselves of its provisions, and that be- of this, in the end, such schools will surely only hang themselves. I such men do the Administration an injustice. In the position also of related to the Seoul institution, the motive is so apparent as to rather one to smile. You know the old story of the fox which lost its tail. consular office also from the very beginning has lent all its influence to the conforming side. How very effective, however, these representa- have been is apparent in what you yourself assume as facts of the situa- your letter, and the same is true of other Boards at home. I have the story of the high authority you quote. It has been repeatedly ectively placed here on the field also. But the same authority has quite differently to myself with regard to the ten years provision. ith regard to the privileges you mention as secured by the Seoul Col- its charter, you must not forget Doctor, that the great bulk of the maries on the field, most of whom are well acquainted with the matter, the Administration and the Ordinance, do not look upon the institution ing secured any particular privileges. So far as I know only two can be said. It has guaranteed Christian teachers. But no ques- ver has or ever will arise on that point so long as Christian teachers available. And when they are not, what then? Who grants the license teacher, and decides whether they are suitable? If teachers the Ad- cation thinks are suitable are not securable, will they permit the posi- to stand vacant? The other is the granting of the Theological De- ent (Biblical). All the other departments are strictly and absolutely sized. No student can enroll in two departments at once. Religion anteed in the one. I understand that two students are entered in epartment, and this is but the reasonable and natural result. It was ditions of the Hojin that definitely and finally turned the Southern terian Mission, the second largest in the country, away from the in- n. The bulk of the missionaries in the country regard the taking out Hojin as having been at least as distinctly and probably more effectually ction of the possibilities of proper Christian education for the future of Christ in the country, as the conforming of the Methodist Pai Chai of which you have spoken in such strong terms. Our own Mission ken definitely with regard to its judgment in the matter; as definitely properly could under its circumstances; and with sufficient definiteness its meaning clear. This I explained at the time. I refer to actions 26 in the report of the Educational Committee of the Annual Meeting i. (Minutes page 115, 118.) These actions were taken after the of your letter of inquiry to individual members of the Mission, on this

own judgment is that the necessary minimum that makes continu- ssible under the revised ordinance has been secured by Mr. Engle and ons. This, however, is only an absolute minimum. No one regards ywhere approaching the proper privileges of the Church of Christ stian education. Under the Ordinance, in the providence of God, seven ere still open to us. There is no proof that the Administration has any purposes or is not playing fair, on its own Ordinance. Under such ances I would say with Jehoshaphat, "O Judah and ye inhabitants aleam, believe in the Lord your God. So shall ye be established" and continue rather to wait upon Him, than to rush to shut the door ace.

ave written thus frankly, because your letter was a personal one, as Believe me,

Yours affectionately,
(Signed) JAS. E. ADAMS

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(LXV) MINUTES 1917 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE REPORT

Section 18—Recommend that the Petition to the Board of Foreign Missions for consideration and clearer definition of Board and Mission Relations presented to the 1915 annual meeting (page 73) be taken from the table.

Section 19—Recommend the following as a substitute for the above referred to Petition:

1. That we request the Board to secure a revision of the Manual so as to provide that:

Missions as ordinarily organized in foreign lands shall be the agents of the General Assembly for the propagation of the Gospel and the planting of the Church: the Missions to have the direction of the Assembly's work within their bounds; and, by the power of review and control to be subject to its Board or other authorized agent. The Missions are also to have the right to appoint Commissioners to the Assembly.

2. That we communicate the above action to the other Missions of our Board asking them to unite with us in this request.

(LXVI) LETTER OF A. J. B. TO J. E. A.

August 30, 1917.

The Rev. James E. Adams, D. D.,
537 E. Wisconsin Ave.,
Neenah, Wisconsin.

My Dear Dr. Adams:—

I have run down to New York for a few days and I find your letter of the 27th inst. Such a conference as you propose would surely be exceedingly interesting. The trouble is that my colleagues and most of the members of the Board whose attendance would be desired are now away on their vacations and I have no means of knowing whether they could attend a conference at the time you mention, that is, between September 10 and 18. The only practicable day for me within the dates you mention would be Friday afternoon, the 14th. A number of vacation absences will expire next week and I will ask Mr. Scott to take up the matter with my colleagues on their return and to write you. What is your idea about the traveling expenses that would be involved? As the missionaries are somewhat scattered this would be a considerable item. The war conditions are affecting the Board very seriously and the receipts for the first six months of the fiscal year are only 60 per cent of what they were for the corresponding period of last year. The Board therefore must be extraordinarily careful about additional expenditures. You will recall moreover that we have already had two conferences with furloughed members of the Mission, which were attended by a larger number of the Chosen missionaries than would probably be available now. What reason have you for supposing that a third conference would accomplish anything more than was accomplished by the two conferences already held?

I remain as ever,

Very cordially yours,
(Signed) A. J. BROWN.

(LXVII) LETTER OF J. E. A. TO A. J. B.

537 East Wisconsin Ave., Neenah, Wis., Sept. 4, 1917.

Rev. A. J. Brown, D. D.,
156 5th Ave., New York City.

My Dear Dr. Brown:—

Your favor of the 30th ult. is at hand. September 14th as date for the conference will be entirely convenient for myself, much better than later. Doubtless Mr. Whittemore will see whoever is in the office and talk the matter over as I wrote him asking him to do so. I will also write the other men concerning your letter.

As to the questions raised in your letter. I had not thought of the matter of expense. Nothing was said to me about it at the time of the June conference, and I met my expenses myself at that time. Without any particular thought I had assumed that I would have to do so this time. I do not think, however, that this need be a very large item, as Mr. Whittemore, Mr. Holdcroft, and Mr. Sharpe are all in New York State. And indeed I do not question but what if it were necessary they would be willing to meet their own expenses. Dr. Baird is at a greater distance.

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accomplish more than the other two. The whole object of these conferences is to work out some mutually satisfactory adjustment between Board and Mission in the administration of field affairs. As yet nothing, even tentative, has been reached. But if there is the desire of both parties, it can be much more greatly facilitated by conference than by correspondence alone. As I said in my former letter suggesting it, it would be extremely difficult to get together a body of men, such as are now here, who are so intimately acquainted with the field side of the difficulty, and so representative of the missions practically unanimous desires in the matter.

The former two conferences accomplished two things only. They made clear that it was the desire of both to arrive at some mutually satisfactory adjustment. They also agreed that on this basis it was the best mode of procedure for the mission to first formally make known its desires to the Board. This last is now done, the mission having formulated its desires in the matter, and for the first time the ground is now cleared for a conference of any definite and practical value.

Being here in the country and holding the official position in the mission that I do, with the other members of the mission Executive Committee here, and the action of the mission received, it has seemed to me the proper thing to suggest such a conference and the conference itself to be the natural and desirable conclusion of informal preliminary action.

Its object would be to definitely consider the points involved in the Missions request.

The conference of course, is uncalled for if the Missions request as it stands is entirely acceptable to yourselves in the Board. It will be valuable as there may be points in the request calling for explanation, discussion, or change. Believe me,

Yours in the Blessed Service,

(Signed) JAS. E. ADAMS.

(LXVIII.)

BOARD LETTER NO. 426

January 10, 1918.

Re Amendment of the Manual.

To the Chosen Mission.

Dear Friends:—

I write in this separate letter of the action on pages 37-38 of the printed minutes of your annual meeting regarding a change in the Manual. This has been carefully considered by the Chosen Committee and the Executive Council, which at the meeting of the Board the 7th instant presented the following report, which was unanimously adopted.

"The Chosen Mission at its last annual meeting took from the table a report made by its Executive Committee in 1915 entitled 'Petition to the Board of Foreign Missions for Consideration and Clearer Definition of Board and Mission Relations', and adopted the following substitute:

"We request the Board to secure a revision of the Manual so as to provide that (1) Missions as ordinarily organized in foreign lands shall be the agents of the General Assembly for the propagation of the Gospel and the planting of the Church: the Missions to have the direction of the Assembly's work within their bounds; and, by the power of review and control to be subject to its Board or other authorized agent. The Missions are also to have the right to appoint Commissioners to the Assembly. (2) That we communicate the above action to the other Missions of our Board asking them to unite with us in this request."

"The Rev. Dr. Samuel A. Moffett, Chairman of the Mission's Executive Committee, wrote October 24th that this action had not been sent to the other Missions and that he would ask the Mission to rescind Section 2 and have the communication to the other Missions to be made by the Board.

"The Committee and the Executive Council, after careful consideration of the proposed amendment to the Manual, are of the opinion that it is impracticable for several reasons which can be given in the discussion and explained in a letter to the Mission. It may suffice for the Board's record to call attention to the fact that the Mission's proposal would make changes in the administrative responsibilities of the Board which are incompatible with the directions of the General Assembly which, in constituting the Board, voted as follows:

"The General Assembly will superintend and conduct by its own proper authority the work of Foreign Missions of the Presbytery of Chicago."

Board appointed for that purpose and directly amenable to said Assembly... A Board to which for the time being shall be entrusted, with such directions and instructions as may from time to time be given by the General Assembly, the superintendence of the foreign missionary operations of the Presbyterian Church.'

"Manifestly, if these functions were to be abrogated, the Board could not do the work which the General Assembly and the Church require it to do. If by Commissioners to the Assembly, the Mission means representatives of the Missions with the payment of expenses from their places of residence in the United States and with the privilege of the floor but without the right to vote, the Missions can send them now; but if the Mission means Commissioners in the Assembly's use of the term as voting members, the proposed substitute could not be adopted without an amendment to the form of the Government of the Presbyterian Church which would require the affirmative vote of the General Assembly and ratification by a majority of all the two hundred and ninety-one Presbyteries.

"We feel, however, that it would not be wise for the Board to stop at this point by giving a merely negative answer. We recognize the force of the contention that the Manual does not sufficiently indicate just what the relative powers and functions of the Board and the Missions are and that clearer definition is desirable. While the specific proposal of the Chosen Mission is impracticable, there is a fundamental question that merits constructive treatment; and this treatment should include the relations of the Missions to the churches and governments in the Mission field as well as to the Board. The form of this adjustment should not be influenced by the peculiar local conditions in one of the twenty-seven Missions, but it should have reference to the broad and permanent conditions of modern missionary work as affecting and affected by all of the Missions and fields. It should be given the most careful thought and special care should be made to secure the mature judgment of representative missionaries from various fields. Moreover, there are other important matters, particularly those growing out of the great War, on which the counsel of wise and able missionaries would be of large value. It is already apparent that the foreign missionary enterprise must face new and grave problems after the War and that there should be the most thoughtful consideration of the whole situation and of the heavily enlarged responsibilities which it will entail. Experience has showed that it is difficult to secure a satisfactory consensus of missionary opinion by having each Mission act upon a matter independently. It appears desirable to have some gathering of missionaries which will be fairly representative of all the Missions and where conclusions can be reached after mutual conference. Manifestly, such a conference cannot be held while the war is in progress; and manifestly, too, the Missions on the field ought to be given ample advance opportunity to appoint their representatives.

"The Committee and the Council therefore recommend that all the Missions be advised that, as soon as world conditions shall permit, the Board will plan to hold in New York a conference of furloughed missionaries for the consideration of questions of vital moment; and that the Missions be given notice far enough in advance to enable them, in passing upon furloughs for the year in question, to see that their members who will be at home are those whom the Missions would like to have represent them, each Mission to recommend to the Board any readjustments in the regular times of furloughs that may be necessary to give effect to this suggestion, either by ante-dating some furloughs or by deferring others."

You will note that reference is made to a number of reasons which can be explained in a letter to the Mission." This explanation will necessarily be somewhat lengthy and will be sent to you a little later as I have a very heavy mail to get off within the next few weeks and as the Committee and the Council deemed it expedient that the written statement and the reasons should be passed upon by the Committee and the Council before mailing. The action, however, that is spread upon the records of the Boards covers the main point under present consideration and we are sure that you will be most cordially glad to learn of the representative conference which the Board hopes to hold as soon as world conditions shall permit.

Sincerely yours,
ARTHUR J. BROWN.

LXIX)

LETTER OF J. E. A. TO A. J. B.

Taiku, Chosen, December 7, 1917.

Rev. A. J. Brown, D. D.,
56 5th Ave., New York City.

My Dear Dr. Brown:

In my letter of the 26th ult. concerning the actions of the Executive Committee of the Mission at its meeting of November 7-20 you will remember my saying that there were other matters of which I would write subsequently. There are a number of these, as that of the Rev. W. E. Smith, school deficits for the current year, etc., concerning which the data is still not sufficiently complete for me to take up. I am now at work upon them and will write you from time to time as I am able to get them in hand and present them. At this time I am writing concerning the adjustment in field administration as between Field and Home Base, of which the three conferences were held in New York last Summer.

You will remember that at the last conference a suggestion was made concerning the drawing up of a Brief or statement on the question, and we were requested in view of all that had come out in the conference, to make a restatement which we thought would better embody the wishes of the Mission, and come closer to the ideas of the Board, as given expression at that time. This we did before I left and I was requested by the other men to bring it before the next meeting of the Executive Committee and get action from them upon it. I have only now had time to get copies of the Brief containing the action made, and so forward it to you at once. Will you please bring it before the Board for its further consideration of the matter.

The action of the Executive Committee on the subject was as follows:

Passed: That Dr. Adams' brief on the definition of relations between the Mission and the Board be endorsed as a whole.

Passed: That the suggestion amendment to the Manual as given in Article 6, Section C, of the brief be approved.

Passed: That a copy of the brief be sent to each Station.

Passed: That a copy of the Brief be sent to Dr. Brown requesting him to present it to the Executive Commission of the General Assembly in view of their having charge of the revision of Chapter XVIII of the Form of Government, with the suggestion that if they wish further information concerning the same that they can refer to Messrs. Sharpe and Holdcroft on furlough.

You will remember that at our last conference in New York you made some very strong statements as to what the Mission was attempting to do just before the meeting of General Assembly last Spring. Indeed you were so convinced by evidence you had in hand that you stated that you "knew" that it was an attempt on the part of the Mission to appeal to the Assembly against the Board without the Board's knowledge. Your statement was so strong that I presume that you are still unconvinced to the contrary. However the entire action of last Spring was directed not at all towards the Board but toward this proposed revision of Chapter XVIII with the purpose of holding it up. For to our minds it clenched the direct point under discussion, and by putting it in the Form of Government, settled it for all time. "Superintendence" is a very general term, which may include almost anything the superintendent wishes to put into it, "Direction," is explicit and inclusive.

While the revision was not passed the various overtures concerning it were referred to the Executive Commission to reconstruct and bring in recommendations concerning, next year. At least so it was reported to the Mission by Mr. Whittemore, our representative to the Assembly last year. The matter therefore is still not entirely settled, and for this reason we wish the Executive Commission informed as to the bearing of the matter on the Foreign work, that it may be acquainted with this in formulating any recommendations to the next Assembly.

The Mission has, of course, direct representation in the Assembly and in view of this it did not seem improper to us to communicate directly on the matter with the Executive Commission, but, remembering the misunderstanding which arose concerning the second section of the Missions action on this same matter at the last Annual Meeting and your strong beliefs concerning the character of the actions of last Spring, and being very desirous that no further cause for misunderstandings should arise, I was in-

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structed to send the communication to you, with the request that you forward it to the Commission, and at the same time explain to you our reasons for doing this. Mr. Sharpe and Mr. Holdcroft were mentioned because both are now in America; and one is the former Chairman and the other a former member of our Executive Committee; and either of them can well represent the Missions ideas on the matter. One is our delegate and the other his alternate to the next General Assembly.

With most cordial regards,

Yours in the Blessed Service,

(Signed) JAS. E. ADAMS.

Corresponding Sec. and Chairman of Executive Committee.

(LXX)

BOARD LETTER NO. 436

February 14, 1918.

In Re Brief from the Executive Committee of the Chosen Mission.

To the Chosen Mission.

Dear Friends:—

After the action of the Board, January 7th, on the request on pp. 37-38 of the Minutes of your annual meeting, regarding the relations of the Mission and the Board, as announced in Board Letter No. 426 of January 10th, we received the Rev. Dr. James E. Adams' official letter of December 7th with "A Brief on the Subject of Desirability of an Adjustment Between Home Base and Field as Relates to Field Administration." Dr. Adams enclosed another copy of the Brief together with a covering letter addressed to the Executive Commission of the General Assembly which he requested us to forward. We have, therefore, sent the latter documents to the Executive Commission together with a copy of the action of the Board on the report of its Chosen Committee and the Executive Council as follows:

"The Chosen Committee and the Executive Council presented the following report, which was received and the recommendation adopted:

"Since the action of the Board, January 7th in reply to a request of the Chosen Mission asking for a change in the paragraphs of the Manual which relate to the powers and duties of the Board in relation to the Missions, we have received the Rev. Dr. James E. Adams' letter of December 7th, as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Mission, enclosing 'A Brief on the Subject of the Desirability of an Adjustment Between Home Base and Field Administration.'" Dr. Adams also encloses a letter to the Chairman of the Executive Commission of the General Assembly with another copy of the 'Brief' which he asks the Board to forward to the Executive Commission. The Chosen Committee and the Executive Council recommend that the representatives of the Board who are to attend the next meeting of the Executive Commission be instructed to deliver the documents referred to and to present the following considerations from the viewpoint of the Board.

"1. Dr. Adams states that the Executive Committee of the Mission 'endorsed the Brief as a whole.' Approved 'the suggested amendment to the Manual as given in Article 6, Section C, of the Brief,' and directed 'that a copy of the Brief be sent to each station.' The 'suggested amendment' however differs from that adopted by the Mission at its annual meeting, and there is nothing to show that the Executive Committee had power to alter an action of the Mission without the express action of the Mission itself, vote which does not appear to have been taken. The Minutes of the Annual Meeting for 1911, page 97, state that Sec. 1, Art. 1, was amended so as to include the following 'No vote shall be declared until all the Stations concerned have had opportunity to express their opinions, and in case any Station protests against the action, this protest, together with the votes already cast shall be returned to the Stations and a revote taken.' The Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Mission of November 17-20, show that the Mission voted through its stations on the recommendation of its Executive Committee 'that clause 2, section 19 of last year's Executive Committee's report be rescinded' the vote recorded as 'Affirmative, 41; negative 17.' But the Mission does not appear to have voted on the Executive Committees substitute for the remainder and major part of the Missions action at its Annual Meeting. The correspondence indicates too that while the Brief was circulated among the Stations, it was not voted on by them as the rules of the Mission require when recommendations of the Committee be considered authoritative expressions of the Missions mind. The

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Brief, had the modification does not appear to be an action of the Mission, but an explanation and an advocacy of the request of the Executive Committee. Attention is called to this point not in the interest of the Board which is quite willing to meet the issue, but in the interest of the Mission itself. It is not clear that the Board would be justified in considering the present request and the Brief as actions of the Mission, and this doubt is strengthened by the fact that already protests have been received from one station and from some other members of the Mission.

"2. The suggested amendment with its intent as set forth in the Brief does not remedy the essential defects of the Missions action at Annual Meeting and the statements of the Brief in defense of it appear to be based upon a misinterpretation of facts and of the methods of missionary administration which the General Assembly has found to be necessary to the best interests of the work. So misleading are some of the statements of the Brief that we feel that it would be unjust to the Chosen missionaries as a body if the Board, the other Missions and the Executive Commission of the Assembly were to regard the Brief as a mature and adequate expression of their position unless they shall endorse it as such, which thus far they have not done to our knowledge.

"3. Inasmuch as the Brief calls for a change in the organic relationship of the General Assembly, through its appointed agency, not only to the Chosen Mission, but to all the twenty seven foreign missions of the Church, it would be manifestly unjust to ask the Executive Commission of the General Assembly or the Assembly itself to consider it on the request of a single Mission until and unless it has been passed by other Missions also since their common rights are involved. This consideration is emphasized by the fact that some forlorned members of Missions who have seen the Chosen proposal have strongly objected to it as uncalled for by the situation as they understand it and as in their judgment not representative of the attitude of their respective Missions. The Chosen Mission at its annual meeting recognized the right of other Missions to be consulted; but its action has not yet been sent them for reasons stated in the Rev. Dr. Samuel A. Moffett's letter of October 24, 1917. Manifestly the present action of the Executive Committee estops the Board from sending the action of the Mission, and we are not sure that we have the right to send them the Executive Committee's substitute as the authorized expression of the Missions mind. There is not time to hear from the other Missions anyway before the next General Assembly as the Annual Meetings are held in the summer and autumn, and some of them not till December.

"4. The Board at its meeting January 7th, approved our recommendation that, after the close of the war, the Board arrange for a general conference of the representatives of all the Missions who may be available. We do not deem it proper to place on the docket of that conference any proposal that would call for a change in the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church or challenge the absolute right and duty of the General Assembly to 'superintend and conduct by its own proper authority the work of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church by a Board appointed for that purpose and directly amenable to said Assembly.' We believe that the Church regards this question as closed, nor do we deem it advisable to ask that it be reopened. We do feel however that the Chosen missionaries are right in arguing that the paragraphs of the Manual which relate to the powers and duties of the Missions in their relations to the Board need clearer definition. The Executive Council has had this question under consideration for some time and has already decided to place it on the docket for the General Conference after the War. Meantime the 'suggested amendment' and 'Brief' of the Executive Committee of the Chosen Mission do not impress us as justifying a reconsideration of the report which the Board adopted January 7th. We feel moreover that the Mission is entitled to an opportunity to reconsider the whole matter at its annual meeting in the light of the Board's action of January 7th, the action that is taken today, and the explanatory letter that is to be drafted by the Secretary in charge."

I may add that the personal opinion of some of us that the Overture now under consideration by the Executive Commission and to which Dr. Adams refers as the special reason for referring the matter to that body at this time, appears to concern the relation of the General Assembly's Board of Home Missions to the work that is conducted within and under the jurisdiction of

the Presbyteries in the United States whose constitutional rights are believed to be affected. A reading of the Overture, a copy of which is before me, strengthens this conviction. It gives as the reason for objecting to the proposed change in the Form of Government, "the possible annoyance of Presbyteries and their missionaries in their prosecution of their home missionary work." It appears to have no relation to the General Assembly's Board of Foreign Missions and the Missions on the Foreign Field which are non-Presbyterial bodies. I am informed by one who is connected with the Executive Commission that "In my opinion no changes which are proposed to be made will affect the Board of Foreign Missions."

The fuller letter of explanation referred to in the Board letter of January 10th, is being drafted and will be mailed to you in the near future.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ARTHUR J. BROWN.

(LXXI)

BOARD LETTER NO. 456

May 31, 1918.

In Re Brief from the Executive Committee of the Chosen Mission.
To the Chosen Mission.

Dear Friends:—

You will recall that Board Letter No. 426 of January 10 and No. 436 of February 14, gave preliminary replies of the Board to the action of your last annual meeting on a revision of the Manual and to the substitute of your Executive Committee given in the Rev. Dr. James E. Adams' official letter of December 7, 1917, and his accompanying "Brief," one copy of the latter being addressed to the Board and another to the Executive Commission of the General Assembly; that the Board directed that a fuller and more detailed statement of the reasons which influenced its action should be drafted for a letter. Such a statement was prepared under the title: "Memorandum on Actions of the Chosen Mission and Its Executive Committee Regarding Readjustment of the Powers of the Board and the Mission." The Memorandum had been held for a time, partly because it appeared advisable to wait to see whether the Executive Commission of the General Assembly desired to go into the matter in a way which would call for a detailed account of the Board's position; and partly because of the hope that some further word might come from the Mission which would make its use unnecessary. No word came from the Executive Commission until the day before we left for the meeting of the General Assembly, when we received the following communication:

"These papers are returned because the Executive Commission has reported to the Assembly recommending no action on Chapter XVIII, Form of Government."

The Assembly adopted the recommendation of its Executive Commission. I did not therefore present the Memorandum to the Assembly or its Executive Commission and I sincerely hope that no necessity will develop for doing so.

Personally, I wish that the matter could be dropped here, as I confess that I am growing very weary of this continued controversy which, I fear, is doing no small harm to the Mission. No intimation, however, has come from the field that the majority of the Mission and the Executive Committee have receded from their position. On the contrary, we learn that your Executive Committee recently recommended that an appeal be made directly to the General Assembly to appoint a Commission to attend the Conference which the Board is planning to hold with furloughed missionaries after the war; this Commission to take into its own hands the framing of such recommendations as might be deemed desirable. We are at a loss to understand this proposal unless it was made on the assumption that the object of the Conference is to settle a dispute between the Missions and the Board and that they cannot be trusted to adjust it between themselves. We understand that, while this proposal failed to receive the two-thirds vote which the rules of the Mission require, it actually secured the votes of a majority of the members of the Mission and lacked only two or three votes of the requisite two-thirds. Moreover, the request of your Executive Committee of December 7, 1917, was sent to the Board as well as to the Executive Commission of the General Assembly, and as the Board's reply stated that it would be followed by a fuller explanation, you of course have a right to that explanation in

order that you may know what the Board's reasons are. I therefore avail myself of the first opportunity after my return from the General Assembly to send you this Memorandum which I now enclose.

I could not easily tell you, dear friends, how painful this whole matter is to me and with what reluctance I have written about it. The official actions that you have taken, however, and the Brief sent by your Executive Committee, not only to the Board but to the Executive Commission of the General Assembly impressed the Board, myself included, with the conviction that it was absolutely necessary to state the case with some fullness and with entire frankness. Many of you have very cordially told me at various times that you regard me as in a special sense your friend. I venture to hope, therefore, that you will attach some weight to my candid statement of the position to which the majority of the Mission and its Executive Committee have committed themselves impresses me as quite impossible and that even if it could be brought about, it would be gravely injurious to the best interests of the work. In an appeal to the General Assembly against some of the specific decisions of the Board, within a reasonable time after they were taken, you would have had good standing ground and the sympathy of a minority of the Board. But your present contention is quite a different matter. The Board's opinion you know. As for the General Assembly and the Home Church, I do not believe that they will ever sustain your present contention, and I am very sure that if they were to do so, the ultimate effect upon your work would be so disastrous that the approval would soon be reversed. A prominent layman, a man of large business experience, who had read the Brief from the field and the related correspondence, wrote me:

"To my mind, such change as asked for by the Brief would be suicidal to the work of the Presbyterian Church in mission fields. No business man would contribute funds in this country towards missionary activities that would be subject to such direction and control as proposed."

I trust, dear friends, that you will pardon this candid word. It is meant with all kindness as well as in all honesty, by one who is more deeply troubled than you can perhaps realize; who, in some other matters has stood up for you against strong contrary opinions, and who earnestly desires to see the sacred cause of world evangelization strengthened in every possible way.

Sincerely yours,
ARTHUR J. BROWN.

Enclosure

(LXXII)

MEMORANDUM.

Memorandum on Actions of the Chosen Mission and Its Executive Committee Regarding Readjustment of the Powers of the Board and the Mission.

(This Memorandum has been drafted by direction of the Board to supplement and more fully explain the actions of the Board, January 7 and February 4, 1918, in reply to the requests of the Chosen Mission referred to above. While I have written most of it, some parts have been contributed by others. As the Memorandum is intended to be representative rather than individual, it has not been deemed necessary to differentiate authors by quoting marks except as indicated.—Arthur J. Brown, Secretary.)

In 1915, the Executive Committee of the Chosen Mission presented to the Mission a draft of a "Petition to the Board for Consideration and Clearer Definition of Board and Mission Relations," which included the following recommendation:

"We respectfully petition the Board that it provide that, although as in the past the Board under its authority of 'review and control' possess the power of veto over the actions of the Mission, yet in Field Matters only in rare cases where the Mission would deem it necessary, the Mission shall have the right to act again upon the matter voted, and, should it repeat its former action by a two-thirds vote, the Mission's judgment shall finally determine the matter, subject only to appeal to the General Assembly." The significance of this lay in the Mission's convictions regarding certain decisions of the Board and in the interpretation of the phrase "Field Matters," both of which will be referred to in later pages of this Memorandum.

After discussion and consultation with Secretary Robert E. Speer of the Board, who was then visiting Chosen, the Mission laid the Petition upon the table for one year. The following year, the Mission did not take it from the table. In the Spring of 1917, a number of pastors in the United States and

one of the religious weekly papers received letters from members of the Mission urging the advisability of enlarging the powers of the Mission and characterizing the present relationship with the Board as "outgrown," "unsound," "a very real peril to the work," "an absolute dictatorship," etc. At the suggestion of a member of the Mission who was at home on furlough, thirty-nine members of the Mission on the field cabled a request to the General Assembly. The Board was not informed about this correspondence until pastors and elders in Maryland, Missouri, Illinois, California and New Jersey sent to us the letters that they had received, nor was the Board told by the missionaries about the cable to the General Assembly. We have never yet received a copy of that cable, although twice asked for. The letters and cable were sent by individual missionaries without authorization by the Mission, but the signers were members of the majority in the Mission, and undoubtedly believed that they were expressing the prevailing opinion. The cable was presented to the Assembly's Standing Committee of Foreign Missions which heard the explanations of two members of the Mission who were present and also Secretary Stanley White, of the Board. The result was the following recommendation to the Assembly which unanimously adopted it:

"The Assembly notes with special interest the Board's policy of securing more efficient local administration in the various mission fields including the largest amount of democratic self-government in the Missions, and recommends that whenever conditions permit or render it advantageous, in the judgment of the Board, further steps be taken in the same direction, especially in the case of its largest Missions."

It will be noted that this action calls for no change in the Board's powers or methods but that on the contrary it approves the course that the Board has long been pursuing, as we shall note more fully on a later page.

June 5th and 18th and September 14th, 1917, representatives of the Board held personal conferences with members of the Mission who were then at home on furlough, seventeen missionaries being present at the first conference, twelve at the second, and four at the third, including the Rev. Dr. James E. Adams who was Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Mission and who drafted the "Petition" in 1915 and the letter and newspaper article in 1917.

At the annual meeting of the Mission in June, 1917, the Mission took the Petition of 1915 from the table and adopted the following as a substitute:

"(1) That we request the Board to secure a revision of the Manual so as to provide that Missions as ordinarily organized in foreign lands shall be the agents of the General Assembly for the propagation of the Gospel and the planting of the Church: the Missions to have the direction of the Assembly's work within their bounds; and, by the power of review and control to be subject to its Board or other authorized agent. The Missions are also to have the right to appoint Commissioners to the Assembly.

"(2) That we communicate the above action to the other Missions of our Board asking them to unite with us in this request."

The last sentence was subsequently withdrawn and the correspondence with other Missions was left to the Board. The Board's Committee on Chosen and the Executive Council, after careful consideration of the whole matter, reported to the Board, January 7, 1918, that in their united judgment the proposed amendment was impracticable, indicated some of the vital objections, and stated that a fuller explanation would be sent to the field in a Board letter. The report was unanimously adopted. About a week later, the Board received from the Executive Committee of the Mission a substitute for the Mission's proposal together with an explanatory "Brief" prepared by the Chairman of the Committee, Dr. Adams. This substitute and "Brief" were referred to the Board's Committee on Chosen and Executive Council, whose adverse report was unanimously adopted by the Board, February 4th.

The additional copy of the Brief and the covering letter addressed to the Executive Commission of the General Assembly were forwarded as requested together with a copy of the Board's action.

The present Memorandum deals with the whole question as raised by the four communications referred to, namely, "The Petition" considered by the Mission in 1915, the substitute adopted in 1917, the substitute for that substitute adopted by the Mission's Executive Committee, and the "Brief"

advocacy of it by Dr. Adams. While the four documents differ in phraseology and in certain details, the same idea runs through them all, and the dated correspondence, which is voluminous, and the letters sent to friends of the home Church clearly show that they have the same purpose.

We may observe at the outset that the problem that has been raised is natural and perhaps inevitable. It would be unfortunate if the Mission and the Board were not seeking for better ways of conducting missionary work. So long as there is life in the movement there will be self-criticism. It has been so from the earliest days, and there have been many times when the issues raised were far more acute and strained than they are now. From the beginning there have been difficulties, sometimes personal, sometimes of principle and of policy between the individual and his station, between the station and the Mission, between neighboring Missions, and between a Mission and the home Board. Anyone who studies the history of modern Missions in detail will meet with numerous issues of this kind. A great deal of progress has been made in wise adjustment and distribution of responsibility and authority since those early days, and we do not doubt that there is much progress still to be made.

The great difficulty is that the issues when raised are too often mixed with personal elements tinged with dissension and distrust. The questions involved, however, are questions which should be viewed dispassionately as problems in the discovery of the truest plan and the wisest method. They can never really be rightly settled otherwise. All discussions carried on in all adjustments reached in an atmosphere of suspicion are in danger of being tainted with un-Christian feelings and of falling short of the wisdom and love of the mind of Christ. At the recent meeting of the American Medical Association, Dr. Mayo, the President, said that in his judgment the words and feelings of men contain toxins which react upon their spirit and judgment, and that suspicion and distrust pour poison into personality as bad as any chemical taint. If the majority of the Chosen missionaries, accordingly, have lost confidence in and feel distrust toward the Board, as some of them have declared to be the case, they are in a less advantageous position to contribute to the solution of a great problem in mission policy than they would be otherwise and less so than the Board which has not lost confidence in the Mission although questioning its judgment on certain questions.

The objections to the Chosen proposals, including those mentioned in the Board's actions, may be indicated as follows:

First: The substitute adopted by the Mission at its last annual meeting is incompatible with the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church since it is the Board, which is not an ecclesiastical body and has no ecclesiastical authority, to secure for the Missions, "the right to appoint commissioners to the General Assembly." Presbyteries alone can appoint such commissioners. The Mission means representatives of the Missions with the payment of expenses from their places of residence in the United States and with the privilege of the floor on Foreign Missions but without the right to vote, the Mission can send them now; but if the Mission means Commissioners in the Assembly's use of the term as voting members, the proposed substitute could be adopted without an amendment to the Form of Government of the Presbyterian Church which would require the affirmative vote of the General Assembly and ratification by a majority of all the two hundred and ninety Presbyteries.

The Mission's proposal would make changes in the administrative responsibilities of the Board which are incompatible with the directions of the General Assembly which, in constituting the Board, voted as follows:

"The General Assembly will superintend and conduct by its own authority the work of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church, by a Board appointed for that purpose and directly amenable to said Assembly; . . . a Board to which for the time being shall be intrusted, with such directions and instructions as may from time to time be given by the General Assembly, the superintendence of the foreign missionary operations of the Presbyterian Church."

General Assemblies ever since the original decision have acted in accord with this principle. Manifestly, the Board has no power to alter the functions which the General Assembly has assigned to it, and as manifestly—if

these functions were to be abrogated, the Board could not do the work which the General Assembly and the Church require it to do.

Indeed the proposal would in effect eliminate the General Assembly itself as the body to "superintend and conduct the work of Foreign Missions." The General Assembly consists of nearly a thousand men, meets only once a year, remains in session for only seven working days, must review the entire work of the Church at home as well as abroad, and is able to devote to Foreign Missions only two business hours in an entire annual meeting. It would be manifestly impossible for the General Assembly to deal with a large number of widely separated Missions in any such way as would "superintend and conduct the work of Foreign Missions." It is true that the General Assembly appoints a Standing Committee on Foreign Missions; but this Committee seldom includes more than three or four men who have had special opportunity to acquaint themselves with the policies, methods, and administrative details of the foreign missionary enterprise. They are friendly pastors and elders who are eager to help in increasing the interest of the Commissioners and the home churches in Missions and to encourage the missionaries on the field. They cannot go into complicated questions of detail in particular Missions and they do not attempt to do so. The Committee can seldom begin its work till the third day of the Assembly, and it must meet at odd times between sessions when committee meetings are necessarily hurried and subject to many interruptions. Moreover, the General Assembly is a declarative and not an administrative body. It has large administrative powers, but it has never attempted to exercise them directly but has invariably committed them to boards and permanent committees. If the Assembly found this method necessary in 1837 when the Assembly was a compact body of 263 commissioners dealing with the comparatively simple affairs of a Church of 220,557 communicants in a narrow home territory, only 42 foreign missionaries and a budget of \$35,000, how much more necessary is it when the Assembly numbers 873 members dealing with the vast and complicated work of 1,604,045 communicants scattered over the entire breadth of the continent, and a foreign missionary enterprise involving an annual expenditure of over \$3,000,000, and requiring an intensive acquaintance with fields, personnel, problems and relationships which can be acquired only by men who can concentrate attention upon them through a series of years. If the Assembly had not in that early day delegated its authority to a Board, the demand for such an action at this time would be loud and insistent. To say that the Assembly should exercise its superintendence over the foreign missionary enterprise by direct dealing in such circumstances with twenty-seven Missions is equivalent to saying that it should not exercise it at all. The only possible way for the General Assembly to exercise its control is the present way—namely, to "superintend and conduct the work by a Board appointed for that purpose and directly amenable to said Assembly." The proposed plan would make Missions and Missionaries responsible to no one. As active members and Presbyters of the Presbyterian Church of Chosen, which is as independent of our General Assembly as the Presbyterian Church of Canada, it is doubtful whether our General Assembly can constitutionally regard the Chosen missionaries as subject to its ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and their present proposal would remove them from its administrative jurisdiction. The authority which the proposal would set up is in remote lands and is inaccessible to practicable criticism or review by an annual meeting in America. The annual deliverances of the General Assembly indicate no disposition to alter its methods of foreign missionary administration through the Board. On the contrary, repeated actions down to the present express deepening satisfaction with the present arrangement. The last Assembly declared through its Standing Committee that it was "deeply impressed by the exceptional character of the conditions under which the work of the Board has been done and the complex nature of the problems raised," and it unanimously voted that:

"The Assembly expresses its appreciation of the admirable organization of the Board of Foreign Missions, realizing the largeness and complexity of its work, demanding as it does extraordinary care and discretion in its administration."

Second: The proposal would destroy the administrative unity of the foreign missionary work of the Church and distribute it among twenty-

seven Missions scattered over sixteen different countries in distant parts of the world, making each one of them virtually independent of the others and with no effective agency to co-ordinate their policies and methods. Such distant and disconnected agencies could not command the confidence of the home Church and would have no instrumentality as competent as the Board to represent them before the home constituency. The plan would result in dividing the Missions into groups, sustaining different relationships to the home Church, and it would do this upon an undefinable principle. Just how many missionaries should there be on a given field, and for how long a period in order to make the Chosen proposal applicable? And suppose through deaths and resignations the size of the Mission falls below the prescribed standard, would it automatically lose its autonomy? Anything like unity of policy throughout the whole mission field would be impracticable. One autonomous Mission might adopt principles wholly at variance with those which a neighboring Mission would adopt; the Missions of Chosen and Japan proper, for example. The authority of the General Assembly, exercised in such a casual and indirect way, would not secure unity. It has not done so even in the Presbyteries at home. A Presbytery in the United States has the correctives of the proximity of other Presbyteries, its membership with them a Synod, and its direct relationship to the General Assembly in the same country; but Missions are so widely separated that they cannot act as correctives of one another or have any bond of union whatever except through the Board. The principle of the proposal, moreover, would be disruptive inside each Mission, for the arguments of experience and proximity to the work, which are urged by the Mission as against the Board, are still more valid in behalf of the station as against the Mission. There are stations in Chosen which are larger than entire Missions of the Board in other fields. Such a station might justly claim that it "should be given in its distinctive field an authority commensurate with its responsibilities."

Third: The "Brief" is largely based upon the assumption that there is a proper "comparison between the organic principles of Presbyterianism as an administrative system" and "the operative system of our Foreign Missions work" so that the relation of Presbyteries and Synods to the General Assembly should be deemed the model to which the relation of the Missions on the foreign field to the General Assembly's Board of Foreign Missions should be conformed. This is an altogether unwarranted assumption. The comparison is between systems that cannot be related in that way. Their relationships are not parallel and their organizations are entirely different. A local church is not a body whose members have been appointed by any one of the higher judicatories in the series and dependent upon it for its existence and its support. It is a practically democratic combination, self-constituted, self-supporting and self-governing, except in its relationship to other similar bodies, and then it voluntarily submits itself to the Government of a body representative of all the similar groups of which it is one. A similar relationship exists between these various representative groups in their relationship to another representative body which governs the broader relationships, and so on up to the General Assembly. No one of these groups (Church, Presbytery and Synod) is dependent financially upon one of the higher courts, nor, as a rule, did it get its existence by the will of the higher court. On the contrary, the lower body first existed and the higher came into existence at the combined will of a number of the basic groups. Moreover, the lower courts elect the members of the higher ones.

The Mission is and of necessity must be organized on a fundamentally different principle. It is not composed of representatives elected by its subordinate bodies, and responsible to them, but of persons sent out in accordance with the expressed will of the highest Presbyterian Court, the General Assembly, which, desiring to establish Missions in either lands, recognized that a body such as itself, so large in membership, so changing in personnel, and meeting so seldom, could not possibly direct a work calling for a minute knowledge of special details, involving conditions foreign to the experience of men engaged in other affairs, and requiring the collection and expenditure of large funds, created a Board to do this work for it, retaining to itself the right of review and control so that the Board should not become independent of the body that created it. There is therefore no similarity in the relation of a missionary to his station and that of a self-developed congregation to its Session; nor does this similarity appear in the

relationship between any of the other bodies in the series of judicatories referred to. Every missionary is on the foreign field not because of a call or election by a local congregation or station or mission, but solely because of appointment by the Board.

Not only are the relationships in one series different from those of another because of an entirely different method of development but also because of an entirely different financial status. The development upward from Congregation, Session, Presbytery and General Assembly, is a natural and democratic one, for the constitution of the highest court is dependent upon the will of the lowest and original courts. The financial status, too, is an entirely democratic one. The local bodies at home not only determine their constitution and personnel of their higher courts but they support their work and give their own share to the support of the higher courts which they have established. In the case of Foreign Missions, the Board acting as the authorized agency of the General Assembly, established Missions, appointed the missionaries, determined their support, provided it, and still provides not only that but most of the funds used in their work, from money given to the Board by persons in the home Church and outside of the Mission. In the church organization, the congregation is the foundation, authority and the source of supply of all the funds of the higher courts. In the foreign missionary organization, the exact opposite is the case. On what basis then does the Brief of Dr. Adams make the missionary the responding unit to the congregation and so on up the series? He declares the identity which does not exist, which from the nature of the case cannot exist and upon this illusory foundation he builds his argument that the Mission, third in his series, should have the authority which in the other series is exercised by the congregation or first in the series.

It is a grave misuse of language to call this system "autocratic, benevolent imperialism." The "system" which the Brief arraigns is thoroughly Presbyterian and democratic in that the highest judicatory of the Church is conducting in foreign lands a work in behalf of the whole Church in the only way that such a work can be efficiently carried on. The American system of government is admittedly democratic, but the democratic principle does not imply that the agents of the Government, sent abroad to do the work for which the Government is responsible, should have independent power to determine their own policies or the objects for which they will expend the funds sent them by the home Government. The authority of the United States Government is autocratic in many directions especially in its relation to its representatives abroad. It is sufficient that the democratic principle be observed in the selecting of the Government, and that then the Government do certain things for which it is responsible not to its representatives abroad but to its home constituency which created it.

Any proposal to deal with the relations of the General Assembly as an agency to its Foreign Missions by altering the form of government or organization of the Church will probably be futile. It may be doubted whether a constitutional change could be made that would meet the problem. There are many who believe that organized Missions cannot be written into the Presbyterian Form of Government. A Mission is an extra ecclesiastical body, temporary in its nature, designated to accomplish certain ends for which it thus far it has seemed to be the most useful instrumentality; but it does not fit into a Presbyterian Constitution. It is made up of men and women, not a church judicatory, it is dependent in personnel and money upon the support, and it has necessary limitations which are in conflict with the principles, of Presbyterian parity. Furthermore any constitutional amendment would have to embody universal principles and be stated in absolute terms. It could not provide one form of organization for Chosen, another for Guatemala, another for Alaska, and another for Idaho. It is doubtful whether any such regulations are possible. Moreover, under the present conditions which have grown up through the establishment of independent churches of which in fields like Chosen, the missionaries are members, the proposal of the Chosen Mission involves matters which lie beyond the jurisdiction of the Assembly. The Mission is not a Presbytery or a judicatory of any kind. No constitutional change can provide for a situation of this wholly without the constitution and that cannot be brought within the constitution. Even if some method could be devised by which the matters to be handled constitutionally, experience has indicated that it would be

and difficult process with many unforeseeable pitfalls along the way. Whatever is to be done should be done by adjustment between the Board and the Missions.

Fourth: The proposal ignores the fact that the Board gives the Missions wide liberty of judgment and action. We object very decidedly to the statement of Dr. Adams in his article in "The Presbyterian," that the Board controls the work down to "the minutest detail of field operations" and that foreign missionaries are "simply employees". On the contrary it has long been the practice of the Board to leave to the organized body of missionaries on the field the largest degree of freedom in managing their work that is compatible with efficiency and the responsibility which the General Assembly requires the Board to assume. In dealing with the Minutes and proceedings of a Mission it is the custom of the Secretaries to bring to the Board only those actions which involve trust obligations in financial matters, or the duty of the Board to safeguard the interests of all the Missions in dealing equitably between missionaries in various lands, or the necessity of maintaining a policy of missionary work which represents the judgment of the missionary body as a whole as well as that of the General Assembly. Mission actions which do not involve the Board's responsibilities are not presented to the Board at all, but are left to the discretion of the Mission. Of the actions which do require Board action, the assumption is always in favor of the Mission's request. Many a time the Secretaries have asked the Board to confirm requests of a Mission which did not commend themselves to their personal judgment and which, if they had been members of the Mission, they would not have voted for. Nevertheless, they did not concern the financial or other responsibilities of the Board, and therefore we felt that the judgment of the Mission should prevail. When the Board objects to a Mission action, it is almost invariably because the request calls for money which the Board does not feel able to provide, or because it involves a principle of fair dealing between Missions, or a fundamental question of missionary policy on which the Board knows that the general consensus of missionary opinion and the lessons of experience of missionary work in many fields point to a different conclusion. Even then, the Board seldom interferes unless circumstances compel it to do so. For example, when a majority in the Chosen Mission insisted that schools and colleges in that field should be limited to the children of members of the Church, the Board did not interfere and took no action on the subject until the missionaries of six denominations, including our own, asked their respective Boards to pass upon the proposal to form a union college and differed among themselves on this among other details. Then the Board simply decided in favor of the educational policy explicitly approved by the General Assembly and in operation in all the other Missions of our Church.

In Dr. Brown's second tour of the Missions in Asia, he presented the question of field organization to all the Missions that he visited in China, Japan and Chosen, and in his report to the Board after his return he discussed the subject at length. He urged that each Mission which did not have an Executive Committee should appoint one, that Missions which did have Executive Committees should increase their powers, and that where, as in China, there are several Missions in one country, they should unite in constituting a China Council composed of representatives elected by the cooperating Missions. This plan has been adopted and is in successful operation. The following paragraph from the Eightieth Annual Report of the Board in 1917 is historically accurate:

"The Board has continued to study the problem of how to secure larger and more efficient local administration on the various mission fields. Its policy has been to encourage the largest amount of democratic self-government in the Missions; but it is difficult to develop plans which will provide continuous and effective administration where missionaries are scattered in separate stations, where each individual is already overburdened with his own work and where the necessity of periodic furloughs interrupts continuity. The development of field executive committees, however, with chairmen or secretaries giving their entire time to the service of all the field work in the field concerned, has worked most successfully. The China and India Councils are Executive Committees of all the Missions in those fields, and the best benefit of their work and of the entire development of the field work

Lowrie in China and Dr. Griswold in India to the work of the Councils has been most advantageous."

The practical difficulty in making this policy more effectively operative is not due to the Board but to the fact that the Missions quite naturally want to spend more money than the Board can provide. At the beginning of each fiscal year the Board distributes among the various Missions the largest sum within the limits fixed by the Executive Commission of the General Assembly, which there appears to be any reasonable probability of becoming available. This money is not in hand, but the Board nevertheless guarantees it to the Missions. It was formerly the custom for the Secretaries to go over the itemized estimates from the field and, as they were always in excess of the amount that could be appropriated, to reduce or cut out enough items to bring the amount down to the level of the budget; so much being taken away from this school, so much from the salary of this native evangelist, etc. The Board abandoned that plan long ago and adopted the one now in operation of assigning to each Mission a lump sum for its work and giving the Mission large discretion in using it. Of course the Missions still send their itemized estimates as it is important that the Board should know what work is being conducted. These estimates always call for a larger sum than the Board and Executive Commission deem practicable; but the Board now simply says to a Mission: "Of the amount you ask, the Board guarantees \$..... (specifying the sum) and you may use it as you see fit, making such transfers and readjustments as your wisdom may approve." We believe that this is the right method, as the missionaries are in a position to know where local adjustments can be made to the best advantage.

Now if the Chosen Mission would take the amount of money thus assigned to it—and more has been sent to Chosen than to any other Mission in this world—if, we say, the Mission would conduct its work with this fund, there would be little necessity for the Board to take further actions. But the Mission, like the others, pours upon the Board throughout the year requests for additional appropriations. The Board meets regularly twice a month and there is seldom a meeting which does not have such requests on the docket, sometimes dozens of them from various fields. As a rule, when the Board declines a request from a Mission, it is because the request calls for more money than the board is able to provide. A request to authorize an appeal to the home churches of course is in the same category, for the Executive Commission and the Board have agreed upon the present duty to the church of the largest practicable budget, care must be exercised as many special appeals as it deems prudent, but the number must be fully guarded.

An analysis of the actions of the Board relating to the Chosen Mission for the two fiscal years from April 1st, 1915, to March 31st, 1917, shows during that period the Board took 159 actions regarding Chosen, including seventeen appointments of new missionaries and many appropriations of special gifts, and that of the whole number of 159 only three were declines of Mission requests. At the conference, June 18th, with four members of the Mission who were then at home on furlough, one of them, Mr. Rhoads, said that "the Board almost always did what the Mission wanted, and it had done this so long and so regularly that when it did exercise its power in negating a Mission action, the Mission experienced the shock of the unusual." Another missionary present, Dr. Adams, endorsed this and said "The Board has practically allowed the Mission to do what it wanted. Only exceptions I remember in my missionary experience of twenty-three years are in the Fusan and Seoul College matters, and the former was finally settled as the Mission desired." The Brief (page 6) admits that "In ordinary current operations, large discretion is left with the field organizations in almost every line; and even when there may be minor divergences of judgment, not infrequently the judgment of the field body is allowed to stand." The Brief adds that this "does not affect the principle of the Board." We think it does. A system which works so much to the satisfaction of the Missions as these figures and admissions indicate can hardly be considered arbitrary or exercised without due regard to their wishes.

The "Petition to the Board," adopted by the Mission in 1915 and quoted in the Brief, is the final authority of the Mission desired.

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matters only." We reply that if the phrase "field matters" be properly defined the Mission already has such authority. But where opinions who is to be the judge whether a given question is a field question or a Board question? In a work like Foreign Missions, it is not easy to draw a line of demarcation and to say that everything on one side is a "field question" and everything on the other side is a "Board question." It is important that the "Petition" enumerated the following as "field questions": The location and assignment of all missionaries commissioned by the Board to work within the bounds of the Mission.

The return from the field of workers whom the corporate Mission consider suitable for the work.

The powers to be exercised by field committees working within the bounds of the Mission.

The superintendence and control of all existing field institutions.

The initiatory in new institutions subject to Board vote as to actual number, character and location.

The principles of self-support in the native Church as related to operations.

Union or federation upon the field in work with the Missions of other denominations.

The relation of the Mission and its members to the Korean Church."

The fact is that the Board now recognizes all of these as "field questions," and the Mission has been exercising and is now exercising unchallenged authority in dealing with them as such, except when a particular question has been referred to a form which involved the responsibilities of the Board as the

agent of the General Assembly and the home Church. It is significant of the Mission's meaning that the protests of the majority of the Mission

attached essential importance to their belief that "this is a field question" and held that the Board had no "moral right" to a decision on it

than to ratify the vote of a majority of the missionaries. In its resolution of July 8, 1914, the Board said on this point: "The project now under consideration is far from being merely a 'field question.' It involves the expenditure of large sums of money, the

employment and support of missionaries, relations with other Boards, and a

present duty which the Church has committed to the Board. The Mission

clearly recognizes this when it says that 'all it (the Pyeng Yang College) needs is more encouragement from the New York end' and 'a stronger

support' needed is evidenced by the Mission's call upon the Board at its last annual meeting for another

in addition to the four already maintained and for Yen 260,000

property and endowment. In these circumstances the Board is

to consider whether it can assume the financial and other burdens

to the maintenance of a College in Korea, except as these burdens

shared by the other Boards which form the union. The Board con-

siders that the missionaries will recognize the reasonableness of

their judgment' because, after full consultation with them and

consideration of their views, it feels bound by its sense of duty as an

administrator of trust funds to express a conclusion as to the financial and

burdens that it can properly assume."

In like manner, the contention of the Mission that the Board overruled it

College matter requires modification. The Board's reply to the Mission

letter of July 8, 1914, stated on this point: "The protesting mission-

ary apparently overlook the fact that the Board is not dealing solely with

the Board and the Mission. The Board and the Mission have agreed to enter into a union on the initiative of the missionaries them-

self. The Board is now dealing with five other Boards at the home base and

the whole body of missionaries in six Missions in Korea. It is true that

missionaries alone are counted, the majority for Pyeng Yang is a

majority of the whole body of missionaries. But the Board must consider

parties both at home and on the field whose responsibilities are in-

cluded. Of the six Missions in Korea, the vote of 1912 was three Missions

for Pyeng Yang and three for Seoul. The vote of 1913 was three for

Pyeng Yang and two for Seoul, and the vote of the sixth Mission was a tie.

The vote of the Senate of the Educational Foundation in Korea in 1912 was a tie and after the votes of absent members were obtained, the poll was seven for Pyeng Yang to six for Seoul. Of the six Boards, all five of which in North America voted for Seoul. While it is true that the numerical preponderance of our own Mission has given a majority for Pyeng Yang, the polls of individual missionaries, these other facts may be fairly taken into consideration in arriving at a balanced judgment. The Board is to be governed by a broad view of the entire situation as developed in a study of the whole situation in conference with all the parties concerned.

In 1917, a Mission in China voted to withdraw from two union institutions which had been formed three years before by the concurrent action of that Mission and the China Council and the ratification of the Board. Certainty had been secured and obligations entered into affecting our relations with the Missions and Boards of other denominations. Would it be right to vest in the majority of a local Mission in any given year final power to disrupt work of that kind? What security could any enterprise have in such circumstances, and what assurance would the Boards of other denominations have that when they enter into a compact with us we would not treat "a scrap of paper"? Manifestly, there should be a body which represents the communion as a whole in which authority should be lodged subject to the ultimate power of the General Assembly.

Section 2 of the Brief states that, whereas the field organization governing the individual missionary, the station, and the Mission "may be framed on a consistent Presbyterian basis," "the system is broken in the relation of field and home base"; that "the system in its organization is Presbyterian and democratic, but in its connection between field and home base it becomes as distinctly autocratic." This is an statement whose underlying fallacy we have already shown. As a matter of fact, there are persons who feel that the Chosen Mission is more autocratic in its dealings with its stations and individual missionaries than the Board has ever been in its dealings with the Mission. It is an travesty upon the real facts of the situation to characterize the Mission as Presbyterian and democratic in its relation to its stations, missionaries, and the Board as "autocratic" and "imperial" in its relation to the Mission. It raises a false issue to call the question one of Democracy versus Autocracy. It is really the simple question whether a democratic can conduct Foreign Missionary work efficiently. The Brief states, "this is not a criticism of the Board" but of "a system" and that "the system is the General Assembly and the system its system." In view of the generous and sympathetic attitude of the General Assembly year after year, course which it has gladly taken in its efforts to co-operate with the missionaries and to provide everything possible for them, and in view of the fact that the very strength which the Chosen Mission now advances as a result of "the system" referred to, it is most unfortunate that such a ground and unjust charge should be made.

The substitute now proposed by the Executive Committee of the Mission suggests the incorporation in the Board's Manual of the following tenence: "It (the Mission) cannot inaugurate policies without the concurrence of the Board, and the Board does not do so in the field without the concurrence of the Mission." Passing over for the present the consideration of the fact that we are not advised that this substitute has been adopted by the Mission, the point now to be noted is in the phrase "without the concurrence of the Mission." What is it that the Board is not to do "without the concurrence of the Mission"? The preceding clause informs us that it is to "inaugurate or conduct work or inaugurate policies." In other words, the Board is not to do anything "without the concurrence of the Mission." The history of the agitation conclusively shows that this is precisely what is intended, namely, to deprive the Board of its present powers as the administrative agency of the General Assembly and to make the Mission the final authority. The agency constituted by the General Assembly, and amenable to it, could not "conduct the work" with which the Assembly has charged it out the concurrence of the Mission." In other words, each of the seven Missions would have the power of veto upon work which the General Assembly orders the Board to do! Demoralization of the work would inevitably result.

The Brief says (page 9) that "the point I (Dr. Adams) am pressing is more than the most fundamental principles of Presbyterianism." If that be true, we must confess that we do not understand Presbyterianism. That is to say, it demands the ultimate supremacy of the local unit of the body which represents the whole. Congregationalism stands for consultation of the local body with bodies with a view to their advice, but for the right of the local body as it chooses after having secured that advice. The proposal is not Presbyterian. It is ultra-independency. No Congregational Board has ever acted of going so far. On the contrary, the American Board has always used a far greater measure of control and direction over its Missions than the Presbyterian Board has done, and although administratively the same an Episcopal Church and the S. P. G. of the Church of England have vested themselves of responsibility and located it upon the field, it has been vested in the Missions but lodged almost absolutely in the Bishops of the home Church. We know of no communion which lodges such power in the Missions as the petition proposes. All of the great communions lodge authority either in the supreme judicatory of the home Churches and boards which they create and which are responsible to them, or they lodge it in the duly constituted churches on the field.

The proposal would remove from the missionary Board all direct and administrative touch with the Mission work. It would reduce it to an agency for the appointment of new missionaries, and the collection and allotment of sums to the various missions of financial contributions. Such an arrangement is impossible and undesirable. It is impossible because by the nature of the work the responsibilities of a Board of Trustees cannot be reduced to such elements. Problems of governmental relationships, of denominational interests and institutions, of the responsible representation of the work on the field to the churches at home, of the honest and discharge of financial trusts, of broad missionary policy, and of the occupation and evangelization, arise and simply cannot be evaded. They will forbid any Board from becoming the administrative nullity. Such an arrangement is not only impracticable, it is undesirable. It is needed in the missionary work, and in all great activities of the Church of God, is not less but more central administrative judgment and action. It is desirable to enlarge the responsibilities of boards and committees both on the field and at home in order to secure more life and energy from the best men. It would be suicidal for the work of Foreign Missions to deprive itself of the kind of support and guidance which is rendered from the type of men who have served on missionary boards and whose energy and initiative should be conserved and enlarged, not distrusted and forfeited. Presbyterian Foreign Missions will certainly forfeit the high place now bold in the religious world if, in the face of every rational Christian principle of efficiency, they disintegrate into a scattered congeries of and ineffective local autonomies.

In describing on page 8 the great work conducted by the Chosen Mission the Brief mentions the fact that "its annual budget runs into the hundreds of thousands of dollars." The Brief significantly fails to state that the great sum is provided by the Board which is responsible for securing the home Church. Is it to be assumed that the Board as the representative of the donors can secure such a budget if the proposed arrangement be put into effect and is it reasonable to expect the Board to carry a financial responsibility if it is to have no power in administering the money than the amendment would leave it? It was the Board that inaugurated the Mission, and the Board that has favored it in re-enforcements, property and budget. With the kind of a Board which the adoption of the proposed amendment would make, the work of the Chosen Mission never have been developed. The proposal overlooks the fact that to deprive the Board of its present power would lessen even if it did not destroy the power of the Board to do many constructive things that it has been doing and that are vital to the and effective discharge of the foreign missionary duty of the Church. From the growth of the missionary enterprise obviating the necessity of a central administrative board, it does just the opposite. Present world conditions imperatively demand a larger and more effective unification and

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co-ordination of all missionary activities so that our force and money can be used to better advantage in this extraordinary period of race upheaval and opportunity. Never has a strong Board, with the full power that the General Assembly has committed to it, been more urgently needed than now.

It is questionable whether the supporters of Foreign Missions themselves would be satisfied with the kind of Board that would result from the adoption of the proposed plan. Could busy men, accustomed to deal with large affairs, be induced to give their valuable time to an agency which would be shorn of real responsibility and the power to do much of anything but collect and forward funds which it had no power to administer? An experienced missionary, after reading the Chosen action and the Brief, Dr. Adams, saw this point with concern and wrote:

"What would be the type of Board Secretary who would consent to occupy the position of a simple collector of funds to be transferred by the Missions to be used at their discretion? And how many business men would continue to give such sums as they now give to be sent to unknown members of Missions for their unrestricted use?"

Under the present "system" to which the Brief objects, the Chosen Mission has had the backing of a Board which, with all its defects, has nevertheless been capable enough to provide and send to the field the men, women and money and equipment that were indispensable to the success which the Brief now speaks. Is the Mission sure of its ability to maintain its scale of operations if it has no other organized backing in America than the weakened kind of a Board which the adoption of the proposed amendment would render inevitable? The money which affords the financial foundation for the work of the Mission is not money which the Mission itself has obtained, but money that the Board has assigned to it. It is true that gifts have been obtained by members of the Mission, but they have formed but a small proportion of the annual expenditure and, with very few exceptions, the donors have given them not to the missionaries as individuals but to them as regularly appointed missionaries by the Board. Making allowance for the liberality of some gifts that have been purely personal, the general fact remains that the Chosen Mission could not possibly do what it has done if it had not been for the Board's generous exercise of the power that the present system lodges in its hands and which the proposed amendment would weaken if indeed it would not destroy. It is true that the proposed amendment states that the Board shall have the "power of review and control"; but the clear purport of the amendment is to deprive the Board of the right of initiative, "conduct" and "superintendence" in it by the General Assembly. The term "review and control" is a vague and susceptible of wide differences of interpretation. If it is compatible with the ruling of the General Assembly in constituting the Board, it is nothing more than we have now. If it is not compatible with that ruling as it is plainly not intended to be, it is contrary to the decisions of the General Assembly and the fundamental principles which underlie the General Assembly's responsibility for and relations to the foreign missionary work of the Church. The present proposal nominally recognizes the supervisory power of the General Assembly, but if the Assembly were to attempt to exercise it, the same issue which has arisen now between the Chosen Mission and the Board would undoubtedly arise between the Mission and the General Assembly. There is no ground for believing that a Mission which disapproves of the limiting authority of the Home Church, expressed through the Board, would be satisfied with it if expressed through the General Assembly; the arguments which the Chosen Mission has used in the petition presented two years ago are more valid against any control of the Mission by the General Assembly than against control by the Board. If the Mission would acquiesce in a decision by twenty-six members and officers of an agency appointed by the General Assembly for such purposes and qualified by years of experience in dealing with Mission matters, what ground is there for the assumption that the Mission would acquiesce in a decision by a Committee consisting of twenty-one men hastily appointed after the General Assembly convenes, a majority of whom have had no experience in missionary administration and who can hold only a few hurried meetings before the Assembly adjourns? If the majority of the Chosen Mission do not desire virtual independence from the control of any agency of the Board, a course which naturally suggests the Proposal would transfer an undue proportion of the superintendence and control of the foreign missionary enterprise to the field agencies which, because of the very nature and limitations of their organization and membership, would be seriously hampered in effectively exercising it. An experienced member of another Mission has written:

In the nature of the case, perhaps there is no circle in the world, except the family circle, in which its members need to guard one another's susceptibility so carefully as the foreign missionary circle. The fewness, the isolation, the parity, the isolation, the conspicuousness, the indispensable harmony, all conspire to make this so. It follows that delicate subjects affecting the personal and local interests are nowhere in the world so difficult to handle as in the missionary circle. And it is often necessary, in the interest of internal harmony, to neglect or postpone important measures. Hence, in dealing with such questions the Board must often need to take the initiative, and to follow up, if necessary with no little pressure, to counteract the personal forces which, and get beyond the compromises into which these are apt to lead, to the region of the independent and impartial judgment of the mission as a whole."

The Chosen Mission affords many painful illustrations of this. It is well known that the Mission's attitude toward a number of important matters has been so influenced by considerations of the kind referred to in the above quotation that it was impossible to secure an unbiased vote on their real merits. Nor is the Chosen Mission alone in this. Dr. Speer, after an experience of twenty-five years in dealing with Missions, says: "A Mission is a body incapable of efficiently discharging such functions and powers as the Board proposes to give it. We have not been able as yet in our history to devise any better way of conducting the work than the system of missions, but from the point of view of satisfactory administrative efficiency the Mission is an utterly inadequate agency. It is an annual conference of busy individuals. Its committees seldom meet. In only a few instances are there effective executive committees, and in not one Mission are there such committees sufficiently effective to justify the name of Church, or any trustee acting in its name, to locate full power in them. The Board undoubtedly is inadequately effective, but it is the most effective agency in the whole missionary mechanism; and to a scrupulous and conscientious man who applies to the administration of work and of money the same principles which are required of trustees in America, the proposal to make the Board the authoritative and final agencies of Missionary administration is impossible. With all kindness to the Chosen Mission it must be said that this Mission also that it is not adequately efficient to justify such an entire transfer of power to it as is proposed. There is much efficiency in the operations of individual missionaries, good and bad, as well as in the operations of men and women. It is not the efficiency of missions as organizations, but are, moreover, many problems connected with mission work which Missions cannot settle upon the field, such as problems of furloughs, of resignations, of personal difficulties, of personal character and efficiency, sometimes of personal morals, which again and again it has been shown only a distinct and personal authority can deal with."

Sixth: The proposal, if adopted, would seriously lessen the ability of the Board to secure gifts not only from congregations but from individual donors who are now giving in increasing numbers and enlarging amounts. The Board would be virtually compelled to say to donors: "We will transmit money to the field, but we cannot assume the responsibility for its wise expenditure, for if the Mission should differ with the Board as to the proper use of the money, the decision of the Mission would be final." It is easy to see how the Mission and its work might suffer under such a plan. Business men will not entrust large gifts to a body which cannot be held to accountability for administration of the trust. The Board is a responsible, legally incorporated agency amenable both to the civil and ecclesiastical courts for its use of the trust funds that are committed to it. It is located, too, in a place where the donors know it, and have the means at their disposal for calling it to task if necessity should arise. It is not reasonable to assume that donors would be disposed to make such gifts to widely scattered bodies in foreign lands which are not incorporated and therefore cannot be held to legal accountability, which are unknown to both ecclesiastical and civil law, and which are not designed to be permanent bodies at all but to exist only until

the churches in the mission field are prepared to take over their duties.

The proposal would weaken the sense of responsibility of the home Church and of individual donors for the maintenance of the foreign missionary enterprise. The position of the Presbyterian Church is that Foreign Missions is the work of the Church itself, which should assume the fullest measure of responsibility for it. It is hard enough now to persuade the churches to accept the necessary implications of their responsibility, every effort should be put forth to emphasize them. Anything that would weaken this sense of responsibility, as the proposed amendment would, would be disastrous. The very last thing that missionaries ought to desire is independence from the direct supervision of the home Church through its constituted agency. The principle that men will not be interested in the conduct of an enterprise in which they do not have an authoritative voice applies to ministers and laymen in America as well as to members of the Church on the foreign field. Dr. Adams says: "Authority cannot be separated from responsibility." If this be true, it is fatal to his own argument, manifestly it is indispensable to the success of the missionary enterprise the Church should assume responsibility for it, and according to the principle enunciated by Dr. Adams, authority necessarily goes with responsibility and anything that would divest the Home Church of its authority would divest it also of its responsibility. February 15, 1855, President Francis Wayland, of the Baptist Missionary Society wrote on a question was then pending regarding the relations of that Society to the missionaries under its care:

"It is to be decided whether the brethren who support missionaries to have the direction of their labours, or to have no other duty than to pay the bills. It is claimed that the notions of Baptist independence require on all these points missionaries be wholly untrammelled. I am willing to grant all that the missionaries can ask on this subject, but I must claim the same liberty for myself. I must be relieved from all obligation of supporting men on such conditions. I am bound as a Christian to see to it so far as I can that my contribution accomplishes the will of the Master, and if the missionary cannot agree on this point we must separate. I have no science as much as a missionary. If the missionaries are to be under the control and are to control the Board by appeals to the public, who will control the Board or the Committee or in the mission rooms? The whole arrangement is useless and erroneous, and the ——— are impossible. And from what I have seen I must say that the missionaries who demand limited control have not shown the tempers which would give me the confidence in their judgment."

It needs to be remembered further that the issue is not between the Mission and the Board only, but also between the Mission and the native churches in the Mission field. These churches have often argued, and in some cases are arguing now, against the control of mission funds and the administration of the work by the Missions on the very same grounds that the Mission argues against the control of the Board. A strong native Church asserts that it knows better than a Mission what the conditions are and the work are, that it is far closer to the problems and the elements that enter into them than any body of foreigners can ever be, that the funds were given for them and in response to appeals in their behalf, were not given for the missionaries. Dr. Duff faced arguments like these in Calcutta many years ago, and they have been advanced in Chile, Mexico, Japan, Persia, and several other fields. Almost every argument in behalf of the transferring of all authority in missionary administration from a Board to a strong Mission can be used also in behalf of its transfer to a strong native church, and a Mission cannot meet the arguments by advancing its duty as a trustee without recognizing in so the trust responsibility and authority of the home Board. Indeed, arguments in the Overture from Chosen are more valid for a strong native church against the Mission than for the Mission against the Board. Secretary John C. Lowrie maintained this view. In his papers on "Administrative Missions," he argued for a responsible missionary administration in the Board at home with as large a delegation of powers to the foreign field as possible, and in his papers on "Missionary Presbyteries" and "Presbyteries in the Home Church" he argued that the administration of

Missions on the field should be lodged not in the Missions but in the Presbyteries. In many native churches the very arguments which the Chosen proposal uses in behalf of mission autonomy are pressed against the Mission, namely that "only men of long residence and participation in the work in the field can hope to fully understand its problems and difficulties. . . . time has come when the Mission (Presbytery) should be given in its discharge of responsibility for it. It is hard enough now to persuade the home Church (Japan) an authority commensurate with its responsibilities." The Proposal would imperil the fundamental object of the missionary enterprise (which is to establish a self-governing as well as self-propagating and self-supporting Church in the mission field) by strengthening field organizations which are not composed of ministers and elders of the native churches but of missionaries who are aliens under the laws of the countries which they reside and who are not really amenable to the judicatories of the mission field. It is true that most of the forty ordained members of the Presbyteries in Chosen, about one-third of its membership, are technically members of the Presbyteries in Chosen; but most of them retain membership in their respective Presbyteries in the United States, a relationship that is abnormal and temporary and is doubtful constitutionally under Presbyterian law. They consider themselves American citizens and they claim full recognition and rights as such before the American Government and the American Church, as their present reference to the Executive Commission of the General Assembly significantly shows. It is fundamental to Presbyterianism and to any proper interpretation of the Scriptures that the Church should govern itself and not be controlled by resident bodies of aliens organized separately from the Church and yet sustaining such relations to it and so largely controlling the funds necessary to its work as to give them practical overlordship. Such domination is of the essence of Roman Catholicism; but it is not Presbyterian. As we have already intimated, these Missions came into existence simply as temporary expedients during the stages of the work when there were no churches in the mission field and the expenditure of missionary money were therefore necessarily contemplated in the Missions. It has never been contemplated by the Board or by the missionary administrators anywhere that the Mission should be a permanent body. On the contrary, it is one of the axioms of sound missionary policy that the Mission is a temporary body whose existence can be justified as long as there is no Church which can supervise the work within its bounds. Our Presbyterian methods of missionary administration look directly to the ultimate organization of Presbyteries, Synods and General Assemblies on the foreign field. The Board gladly looks forward to the time when the General Assembly, through the Board as its agency, can transfer a large measure of responsibility in our present fields to the duly constituted judicatories of the churches in those fields, so that the Board can develop other fields in the regions beyond. In Dr. Brown's "Report on a Section Visit to China, Japan and Korea, in 1909," he called attention to the fact "making all due allowance for modifying considerations," "the general policy in its practical operation has not sufficiently taken account the development of the Native Church and the recognition of its rights and privileges. We have built up Missions, emphasized their priority and dignity, and kept them separate from the native Church, until, in some regions at least, the Mission has become such an independent centralized body, so entrenched in its station compounds, and with all power absolutely in its hands, that the native Church feels helpless and irritated by the presence. The larger re-enforcements we send, the greater the danger that is already too strong, to make the separately organized bodies of missionaries more permanent and authoritative than they are now. We are aware that it is the policy of the Chosen Mission to devolve increasing responsibilities upon the Korean Church and we are not unmindful of gratifying evidences of this in certain lines of work; but it is futile to expect that

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the Korean Presbyteries and the Korean General Assembly ever will accomplish what Presbyteries and a General Assembly are supposed to accomplish as long as they must work under the overshadowing moral control of large, compact and powerful organizations of foreign missionaries with such enlarged authority as the proposed amendment would give. We should unhesitatingly recognize the fact that the present status of the Missions is somewhat anomalous and unsatisfactory both in its relations to the Board and to the Church in the Mission field. But the difficulty inheres in the situation and not in the policy of the Board.

We may add that some serious complications with Governments occasionally grow out of, or are intensified by, the ascendancy of the organized body of missionaries over the native Christians. This is notably true in Chosen where grave difficulties have developed, not because the Japanese Government is opposed to Christianity, but because it resents the ascendancy of large and powerful bodies of foreigners over its own subjects. Dr. Brown has explained this in some detail in a pamphlet on "The Korean Conspiracy Case" and in an article on "Japanese Nationalism and Mission Schools in Chosen" in The International Review of Missions, January, 1917. Careful study of the situation has led us to the conclusion that it would be highly unwise to increase the power of a Mission whose present power has become a source of anxiety from the double viewpoint of the best interests of the Korean Church and of needed adjustments with the Japanese Government.

It is well known that leading Christians in Asia are becoming restive, and in some places sharply resentful, under the ascendancy of the Mission. In many fields it is becoming more and more difficult to induce educated and capable native Christians to devote themselves to Christian work because of the subordination to foreigners which they regard it as involving. We are inclined to believe that the time has come when this situation should be directly faced. There has been a good deal of talk about it, but more specific action is needed. This action, should be definitely in the direction of diminishing the powers of the Mission rather than increasing them. It should commit a larger measure of the control of the work to the Presbyteries within whose bounds it is conducted. The pending proposal is directly antagonistic to a fundamental principle of wise missionary administration as well as of proper ecclesiastical procedure. It proposes to intensify one of the greatest dangers now on the field, namely the undue predominance of the Mission as distinguished from the Church. It would make an uncomfortable situation still more uncomfortable, in that it would increase the power of the organized body of missionaries which is already too great for the best interests of the work. If the Mission were given the powers which it now asks, there would be the anomalous situation of two bodies (Mission and Presbytery) exercising Presbyterial authority in the same field. The conflicts that would result can be easily imagined.

Section 4 of the Brief bases an argument for greater power for the Chosen Mission on its large size. Secretaries who have for many years conducted the Board's administrative correspondence with the twenty-seven Missions, including Chosen, have seen no reason to conclude that there is any necessary causal relation between size and wisdom. If mere numbers are to be determinative, just where shall the mathematical line be drawn between the number that should be given autonomy and the number that should not have it? Shall we say that forty-nine or ninety-nine missionaries ought to be dependent and fifty or one hundred independent? The fact is that some of the most efficiently conducted Missions do not have half the membership of the Chosen Mission. Our knowledge of the home Church and of the Missions on the foreign field does not permit us to acquiesce in the assertion at the bottom of page 8 of the Brief that "outside of the Boards there is possibly nothing in the home Church that parallels it (the Chosen Mission) as a large, efficient operating organization." As a matter of fact, the files of the Board contain unpleasant proof of the statement that, with the exception of only one Mission and that a very small one, the Chosen Mission's handling of important missionary matters has been more sadly influenced by personal controversies between missionaries than in any other of our twenty-seven Missions.

The proposal, if adopted, would jeopardize the rights of minorities in the Missions and place them at the mercy of local majorities. Several mis-

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sionaries whom the proposed amendment has been shown have seriously objected to it on this account. So far from affording added protection to missionaries against arbitrary exercise of authority, the amendment would greatly diminish the protection that they now have in the Board with the powers which the General Assembly has vested in it. The proposed plan gives no protection to mission minorities or to small stations as against the big ones, which often absolutely control in the counsels and policies of a Mission. The very troubles which have arisen in Chosen illustrate this consideration. It happens that every case of difficulty between the Board and the Mission has really been due to the fact that in matters which have come before the Board, the judgment of the Board coincided with that of the minority in the Mission rather than with that of the majority. The proposal which has been made would take away all such power from the Board and would deliver in each autonomous Mission the interests of the minority of the Mission, and of every individual in it absolutely into the control of the majority of the voting members. So strongly do some of the members of the Mission feel on this subject that they have not only protested against the suggested amendment but they have declared that "if such an action as this 'Brief' becomes a law," they "will ask that the Board give us permission to form a separate Mission" as "our position would be intolerable." Two members of another station have written:

"The minority can be content to express its convictions and be kept off the important committees of the Mission if it feels that it has fair play and knows there is a tribunal to which it can justly make its appeal. But to be compelled to submit with hands tied and mouth gagged, i. e., with no possibility of winning a case except it appeal to the supreme court (the General Assembly) would be to impose conditions under which missionaries should not be asked to work. Under the present rules and by-laws, it is almost impossible for the minority to be represented on the Executive Committee, and it is very seldom that it has been represented. . . . The Mission needs the wider vision of the Board. At times it may be necessary for the board to decide contrary to the wishes of the Mission in matters pertaining to union movements, relation to the Government, relation of the missionaries to the native church, etc. These are matters on which there is a fairly well defined mission science which should not be set aside because a group of missionaries in a particular field are so occupied with the problems immediately at hand that they cannot see from the historical mountain tops of missions."

A member of a third station writes: "If this amendment is adopted, the minority would be almost defenceless, for it would have great difficulty in using its right to appeal to the General Assembly, even more so than the entire Mission has now when it feels that it must take something to the assembly over the head of the Board. The minority's position is difficult enough as it is." Would the best young men in our home colleges and universities be disposed to apply for appointment with a Board which could afford them no protection from a chance majority in a local Mission, where, as many painful instances show, decisions regarding a fellow worker are not ways free from personal feelings?

An experienced missionary has recently said that "few missionaries would be willing to submit themselves even at the beginning of their career to the full control of a body of men on the field of whom they know nothing, and fewer still would be ready to submit themselves to such control after they do know them, not because they are better than their colleagues but because they are but there at their call, not at their selection, not even at their expense, but at the call of God and the direct selection of the Board which also supports them." Some of the ablest and most valued missionaries of the whole Presbyterian Church, men of international reputation, would have been forced out of Chosen long ago if the majority in the Mission had possessed the powers which it now claims.

The proposal is influenced by the fact that the majority of the Mission is seriously objected to a decision of the Board in the specific instance of the Chosen Christian College at Seoul and by the further fact that the Mission assumed that it had no means of redress in that case and no protection in future decisions, except to deprive the Board of the power to overrule the Mission. Indeed several members of the Mission have frankly admitted that the Mission would never have raised the issue of the Board's power if

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it had not been for the fact that the Board decided adversely to the wishes of a majority of our Mission in this single case, which was the culmination of long standing friction between the missionaries themselves, existing prior to and independently of the course of the Board. "The whole question grows out of the Seoul College," a member of the majority declared in the conference in New York. The Board's judgment, however, was in harmony with the judgment of all the other denominational Boards in North America that have work in Chosen and with that of a large minority in the whole missionary body; for the question related to a union institution and not to our work alone. An overwhelming majority in our own Mission as well as in the other Missions voted for one union college instead of two colleges, but divided on the question of location. In concurring with the other Boards for Seoul, our Board simply acted under its clear duty of "review and control" in a controversy which originated on the field and which came before the Board in orderly course in the minutes of the proceedings of the field bodies. The differences not merely between members of our Mission but between six Missions of as many denominations had reached an impasse which compelled action by the co-operating Boards at home, our Board being only one of the five Boards in North America that were concerned. Manifestly no mechanical adjustment of the relations of one Board to its own Denominational Mission can cover a situation of that kind, especially when, as notoriously in this case the issue was complicated to a large degree by personal and local feelings in Chosen which obscured to some extent the real merits of the question. The most that can be said against the Board is that, in passing upon a matter that came to it from the field, it made an error of judgment. If it did, that error does not justify an attempt to change the fundamental relation of the General Assembly to its missionary work in all lands and to amend the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church. The error should have been dealt with as error, in accordance with the orderly and recognized method of an appeal to the General Assembly in that particular case. If the Board, as the centralized agency constituted by the General Assembly for this purpose, makes a wrong decision in a particular instance, as it undoubtedly has done more than once, and will doubtless do again in the future, the Mission concerned has the right of appeal to the General Assembly if it deems a given question important enough to justify such appeal. Any organization composed of human beings may make errors of judgment, but Presbyterian methods of administration provide an orderly way to deal with such errors by appeal to the body which created the Board and which has power to affirm, modify or reverse its decisions. If a court has made only two "wrong judgments" "in twenty-three years," as Dr. Adams states, surely the remedy of the aggrieved party is to lodge an appeal to the supreme judiciary in that particular case, and not to attempt to deprive the court of the power to render any decision at all.

As a matter of fact, the change proposed by the Chosen Mission would not lessen in the least the liability to error. It would merely transfer it from the Board to the Mission. A missionary has truly said that "you cannot avoid mistakes by shifting authority from the Board to the Mission; you simply prevent the rectification of a mistake when it is made."

Most of the Missions, if not all of them excepting Chosen, appear to be satisfied with the general system and policy as it has been developed. Many of them have wanted the Board to assume more and not less authority. The support which it has given to the Missions and the administrative assistance which they have received from it have vastly exceeded any restraint that it has laid upon them. A prominent member of the Japan Mission wrote to Mr. Speer:

"As to Mission autonomy; I have heard indirectly of the agitation of the Korea Mission. I think possibly Dr. _____ may have written to some in our Mission. However I know of no general feeling prevalent in the Japan Mission on the subject. Some may entertain such ideas, but if so they have not been publicly expressed. At the meeting of the Executive Committee I read this part of your letter and asked the judgment of the members as to the question raised. No one indicated dissatisfaction with the relations in general that now exist between the Mission and the Board. Under Section 40 of the Manual, I think the Mission understands autonomy has been conferred upon it as regards the conduct of the work in its territory. The Mission prizes the fullest liberty in administering the funds entrusted to

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and in initiating and controlling enterprises carried on within the appropriations received from the Board, and in this respect I think we have had little cause to complain of interference from the Board in recent years. I do not think our Board as it is organized could conduct a successful work in any other way, and in this regard we are more happily situated than some other Missions whose Boards confer less autonomy on the field forces."

A widely-known India missionary, to whom the Chosen action was shown without any comment except a simple request for his opinion, replied as follows:

"I do not feel that the authority vested in the Board has ever been used to the detriment of the work on the field either in the matter of policy or administration, certainly not in any really important question that I can recall during my twenty-eight years of service. On the other hand I believe that the authority increasingly extended to the Missions has been both liberal and wise. . . . The collective judgment of a Board, constituted as ours is, is of inestimable value on questions of administration and I cannot clearly see how a Mission responsible directly to the Assembly and subject to a 'Board' or 'Agent' under the Assembly would materially differ from the present organization. The 'Board' or 'Agent' under the Assembly would necessarily have to consist of a number of men experienced in Mission administration with all the complex questions that are involved in matters of finance, recruiting, missionary education and propaganda; and just in what particulars that Board or Agent would differ from the Board as at present constituted, I am unable to determine. Certainly in India with our Missions under their existing constitutions, in addition to the interdenominational Provincial and National Councils to which the Board may refer for advice and suggestion in matters of policy, as indeed it has been free to do, I am unable to see either the desirability or necessity of the plan proposed by the Korea Mission."

Another prominent missionary writes:

"I doubt the wisdom of the Mission having more power than it has. I know it hurts when the Board steps on our toes. But I still feel that in spite of an occasional mistake on the part of the Board, the present form of procedure is safer. I know that I would rather trust my affairs to the present system with the double check than entirely to the control of the Mission. And I am convinced that the average business man of means—the man who is more and more going to finance our Mission work—would be inclined to give to the work more liberally under the present form than if the Mission had full control of its field affairs."

A protest against the proposed amendment signed by two members of the Mission closes with the following words:

"It should not be forgotten that in 99 cases out of 100, the Mission's decision in all field matters is concurred in by the Board. This whole question has come up because of the one hundredth case in which the Board exercises its authority. And in these exceptional cases it is usually better that authority does rest with the Board. When the missionaries are sharply divided and reach a decision, it is far better to forget our differences and abide by whatever decision the Board makes. When a problem delicate of solution arises in connection with the native Church, it may be a happy circumstance if we can say that the final decision rests not with ourselves. If ever strained relations arise between missionaries and government officials, it is very fortunate when we can say that we are working under a Board and a General Assembly, just as it is fortunate that as citizens of a great Republic we can propose our country and our flag if need be. May we be preserved from thinking we are sufficient unto ourselves or from working under rules that will make us so!"

We feel, however, that it would not be wise to stop at this point with a merely negative answer. We recognize the force of the contention that the Manual of the Board does not sufficiently indicate just what the relative powers and functions of the Board and the Missions are and that clearer definition is desirable. While the specific proposal of the Chosen Mission is not practicable, there is a fundamental question that merits constructive treatment; and this treatment should include the relations of the Missions to the churches and governments in the Mission field as well as to the Board. The result of this adjustment should not be influenced by the peculiar local conditions in one of the twenty-seven Missions, but it should have reference to the broad and permanent conditions of modern missionary work as a whole.

PETITION.

and affected by all of the Missions and fields. It should be given the most careful thought and special care should be made to secure the mature judgment of representative missionaries from various fields. Moreover, there are other important matters, particularly those growing out of the great war on which the counsel of wise and able missionaries would be of large value. It is already apparent that the foreign missionary enterprise must face new and grave problems after the war and that there should be the most thorough consideration of the whole situation and of the heavily enlarged responsibilities which it would entail. Experience has shown that it is difficult to secure a satisfactory consensus of missionary opinion by having each Mission act independently upon a given matter. It appears desirable to have some gathering of missionaries which will be fairly representative of all the Missions and where conclusions can be reached after mutual conference. Manifestly, such a conference cannot be held while the war is in progress and manifestly, too, the Missions on the field ought to be given ample advance opportunity to appoint their representatives.

The Board is therefore planning to hold, as soon as world conditions shall permit, a Conference of furloughed missionaries for the consideration of these and other questions of vital moment. We do not deem it proper to place on the docket of that Conference any proposal that would call for a change in the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church or challenge the absolute right and duty of the General Assembly to "superintend and conduct by its own proper authority the work of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church by a Board appointed for that purpose and directly amenable to said Assembly." We believe that the Church regards this question as closed. But we believe that there are several questions of policies and methods which may be wisely considered as well as the large and solemn matters to which reference was made in the preceding paragraph. The Missions should be given notice of the date far enough in advance to enable them, in passing upon furloughs for the year in question, to see that their members who will be at home are those whom the Missions would like to have represent them each Mission to recommend to the Board any readjustments in the regular times of furloughs that may be necessary to give effect to this suggestion, either by ante-dating some furloughs or by deferring others. We the Board ardently desire such a conference in order that we may take counsel with the missionaries, and we are confident that it will be of great value to us as well as to the Missions.

in accord with the original constituting action of 1837 to the effect that functions entrusted were for the time being and with such directions and actions as from time to time may be given by the General Assembly we on the Assembly that it appoint a Commission of five for the following purpose.

The Commission as representing the Assembly shall participate in proposed conference. It shall go carefully and thoroughly into the whole problem of democracy, self-government upon the field; its proper sphere in accord with Presbyterian principles; and its relation, under present conditions, with proper authority.

It shall frame on this basis such recommendations as seem to it for the adjustment and definition of the respective functions of Board and Mission in field matters, particularly in the case of the larger Missions; present the same to the General Assembly for its action; to the end that able directions and instructions may be given the Assembly's operating organizations both at home and abroad, and that the present confusion may be brought to an end and the work of the Board may be done to the continued injury of our Lord's service.

Affirmative 37, Negative 8. Not voting 14. Not passed.

Sec. 176. That we recommend the Mission that we ask the Board to act with us in the above petition.

Affirmative 37. Negative 8. Not voting 14. Not passed.

This is self-explanatory. It was proposed to the Mission as the simplest and most natural way out of an apparent impasse. The Mission had requested larger powers of self-determination than the present system gives and the Board had replied that it was impossible to grant this because of the character of the Assembly's action constituting the Board. In the Board's proposal of the post war conference, accompanying the answer, while matters of definition are suggested as desirable, enlarged powers of self-determination do not enter in for consideration. In the subsequent brief approved by the Executive Committee and the suggested amendment made by Mr. Whitte-Mr. Holdcroft and myself at the request of the Board representatives, I approved by the Committee, the Board's action apparently reinforces this interpretation. It has not authority to consider any limitation of its own authority in order to enlarge self-determination on the field. In view of this petition to the Assembly was recommended, with the request to the Board to join with us in it. I gather from communications from the various Missions, that while there seems comparative unanimity with regard to the method in the petition, it failed because of a difference of opinion as to time.

In behalf of the Board,
ARTHUR J. BROWN, Secretary.

This whole letter is typical of the bureaucratic mind. At the General Assembly of May, 1919, the Board presented for ratification a plan for the Union Board of Missions containing the following:

"On the field abroad, all problems of missionary administration should be determined by the new board."

This was done without consultation with the church's missionary workers and one year before the Post War Conference. The Missions' request for a commission on the subject was refused presentation at the same assembly.

(LXXIII.) LETTER OF J. E. A. TO A. J. B.
Taiku, Chosen, May 15, 1918.

Rev. A. J. Brown, D. D.,
156 5th Ave., New York City.
My Dear Dr. Brown.

I enclose a sheet giving the result of the votes on the various recommendations of the Executive Committee at its regular meeting at Taiku, March 29 to April 1, 1918.

Sec. 195. That we recommend to the Mission that in view of the prolonged and unfortunate discussion concerning the relation of Board and Mission; and the confusion arising from it to the injury of the work; and in view of the Board's statement that,

"We recognize the force of the statement that the Manual does not sufficiently indicate just what the relative powers of the Board and Mission are, and that clearer definition is desirable" and its proposal for a conference of furloughed missionaries for the consideration of matters of vital moment and

Believing that in this Conference the General Assembly should also be represented, we petition the General Assembly as follows:

With affectionate regards,
Yours in the Blessed Service,
(Signed) JAS. E. ADAMS.

BOARD LETTER NO. 460.
June 12, 1918.
The General Assembly.

the Chosen Mission.
Friends:—
I have recently returned from the meeting of the General Assembly at Columbus, Ohio. You will, of course, see accounts of the proceedings in religious papers which you take, but you will be interested in a few additional words about the foreign missionary aspects of the Assembly. The Standing Committee, under the chairmanship of the Rev. Joseph A. Vance, D. D., pastor of the First Church of Detroit, was exceedingly sympathetic and heartily desirous of doing everything in its power for the cause. A considerable number of furloughed missionaries attended the sessions of the Assembly. Three spoke at the popular meeting Wednesday evening, and four or five others took part in the discussion on the floor of the Assembly on foreign Missions day. It was my turn to represent the Board in the address. At the close of the morning session, the Chairman of the committee read the names of the Missionaries who had died during the year. Mr. Copeland, a prominent Assembly standing in reverent silence. Then Mr. Copeland, a prominent man in the Brown Street Church of Columbus, suggested that at the funeral of a soldier of his country the bugler sounded taps and that it would

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be appropriate for the bugler who was on the platform to sound the memory of the soldiers of the cross who had died on the foreign field. The bugler thereupon stepped forward, and you can hardly imagine the solemnity of the moment as the strains of the bugle sounded through the great auditorium. Not a word of criticism regarding Foreign Missions was heard from the beginning to the end of the Assembly. I have never known an Assembly to be more warmly sympathetic, and the Board and the missionaries were encouraged to go forward with the full assurance of the support of the Church. The Chairman of the Sub-Committee on the Record, the Board reported that they had been read from beginning to end and the Committee was amazed and deeply gratified by the immense range and variety of the work of the year. A long list of resolutions was adopted at the Assembly, the ones that will be chiefly interesting to you being as follows:

"10. That the General Assembly approve and commend the plan of the Board to hold, as soon as practicable after the close of the war, a conference with available furloughed missionaries, for the purpose of promoting mutual understanding and fellowship, more fully unifying policies and methods, suggesting such improvements as may be deemed desirable, and considering a program for the enlargement and better equipment of the work, and the way to deal with the extraordinary conditions growing out of the war, which are already bringing great additional responsibilities and opportunities to the Foreign Missionary enterprise. The Board will welcome to the conference representatives of the Women's Boards and of the Executive Commission of the General Assembly."

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) ARTHUR J. BROWN.

(LXXV)

BOARD LETTER NO. 468

October 9, 1918.

In Re Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Chosen Mission—June 23
July 4, 1918. (Manuscript Copy)

To the Chosen Mission.

Dear Friends:—

We received sometime ago the manuscript Minutes of your annual meeting. Our first thought naturally was to wait until the printed minutes arrived as we know of your custom to print them and that they are so much easier to handle in that form. Mr. Whittemore, however, wrote that it might be some delay in getting them through the press this year and as that the Board act, if possible, on the manuscript copy. We have, therefore, gone through them with care and they were presented to the Board at the meeting the 7th instant. I now write regarding them, taking up as usual the items that appear to call for comment or action here, and, of course, omitting the items which have been already cleared in former correspondence. It has not been altogether easy to handle such a great mass of manuscript with unnumbered pages and no index and if we omit anything on which we desire action, we shall, of course, expect Mr. Whittemore to let us know. For convenience of reference I have caused the sheets to be pagged and I have referred to the actions in the order in which they appear in the manuscript.

Page 15. Request for the Appointment of a Commission from the General Assembly to participate in the After War Conference.

The following action was taken:

"The Chosen Mission having adopted a recommendation of its Executive Committee that the Board be requested to ask the General Assembly to appoint a Commission to participate in the conference with furloughed missionaries which the Board expects to call after the close of the war, the Board has replied that in view of the action already taken by the General Assembly the recommendation of the Board no further action is necessary."

The text of the General Assembly's action, which I myself asked the Assembly's Committee to present, was given you in Board Letter No. 466, June 12, Section 10, at the bottom of page 2. While the detailed plans for the conference have not yet been worked out. I may add unofficially that the object is not controversial or to settle questions in dispute between the Board and the Missions. We are happy in the belief that there are no such questions between the Board and the Missionary body as a whole, and that our relations are more harmonious and fraternal than they have ever

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here and there a question is in process of adjustment between the Board and a particular Mission, but such questions are very few and can be handled on the ordinary course of procedure without demanding the valuable time of the representatives of twenty-seven Missions at a time when weighty interests of the kingdom of God are seriously involved. Of course, I do not mean that questions should be excluded which the Missions may deem it advisable to discuss at such a conference and the Missions are cordially invited to send to the Board any questions which they would like to have placed upon the docket. But the main business of the conference should be the frank facing of the large and solemn questions of world evangelization in the light of the conditions which the war has created, and to consider very earnestly and very prayerfully how we can more effectively meet them—not who is greater in the Kingdom of God, the Board or a Mission, but how can the Kingdom of God be more effectively and quickly realized. We are eager to have the presence of representatives of the Women's Boards and the General Assembly and also of other interested friends in the home church—not as judges or umpires at a dispute, but as consellers and co-workers in a common cause at a time of grave crisis when all elements both at home and abroad should be united in heart for the work of our Lord and Savior. It should be borne in mind, too, that the conference should not be a legislative body, but a consultative and advisory one, and that its findings, in so far as they effect missionary policies and methods, should be submitted to all the Missions in order that they may have an opportunity to express an official judgment regarding them. However, this is merely an indication of the way that I am now thinking of the conference. We shall work out the details in due time and send them out to all concerned. I only wish we could tell more definitely when the conference can be held.

DELEGATES TO THE CONFERENCE AFTER THE WAR

The following action was taken:

"The Chosen Mission, having elected representatives for the conference with furloughed missionaries which the Board expects to hold after the end of the war, the Board replied that the date when the conference can be held is still so uncertain and the detailed plans are necessarily so undeveloped at this time, that it appears wise for the Board to defer action until it is able to consider in detail the character and principles and membership of the proposed conference and to report to all the Missions."

We may add that experience shows that of the present missionary force about two hundred are on furlough at a given time, and that they include men and women, ordained and lay, and usually represent all varieties of missionary work, evangelistic, educational, medical and literary, and practically all of the Missions except possibly one or two of the very smallest. Of course some of these missionaries would not find it practicable to attend the conference in New York on account of ill health or family cares, but the Board believes that it can reasonably count on an attendance of a large portion of them. It appears fair to conclude that these missionaries should be deemed the basis of the conference and as reasonably representative of the whole missionary body, so that the work on the field need not be disturbed by extraordinary expenditures incurred by special returns to America on account of the conference save in very exceptional cases. For example, if a Mission which has a large medical work should happen to have no one of its medical missionaries on furlough, or if a Mission which has important educational work should have no representative of that work on furlough, consideration should be given to the question whether a special furlough could be arranged. Where, however, the furloughed members of a Mission include representatives of its varied work, or where, as in the case of such countries as China and India, there are several Missions, the varied forms of work done in that country are represented by furloughed members of one or more of its Missions, it appears fair to take such a fact into account. We must consider, too, the transportation question which we are advised is likely to be more difficult and costly for several years. As the Chosen Mission with its large membership always has a considerable number of its members on furlough or health leave, the presumption would be that there would be less necessity for bringing home other of

its members for the conference than in the case of almost any other Mission. When the time comes, your representation should include, if practicable, representatives of your evangelistic, educational and medical work and it should also include women. Undoubtedly some missionaries should come home for the conference, and perhaps some should come from Chosen. As the year when the conference can be held cannot now be known we cannot state at this time whether it will be necessary to incur the expense of bringing anyone home from Chosen on purpose for the conference, or in case it should be necessary, can we tell now whether the missionaries to be brought should be evangelists, educators or physicians. It will first be necessary to see how adequately members of the Mission who will be in America at that time represent the various forms of the Mission's work. However, all this is merely preliminary and tentative. Careful plans will be worked out in due time and sent to all the Missions.

With warm regards to all the members of the Mission and with frequent and earnest prayer that God's blessing may rest upon you and all your work I remain, as ever,

Affectionately yours,
(Signed) ARTHUR J. BROWN.

Menzies, Isabella [Belle] (b. Ballarat, Victoria, Australia, 30 July 1856; d. Ballarat, 10 Sept. 1935).

Presbyterian missionary in Korea.

✓ Belle was the eldest of ten children of Robert Menzies, gold miner, and Elizabeth, nee ^aBond. She was educated at Ernard St. State School and private 'seminaries'.

Belle helped her mother in the home. She taught in Sunday School at Ebenezer Church (one pupil later a missionary in Korea) and served in a 'mission church' outside Ballarat.

In June 1891 she was appointed as the first Presbyterian Women's Missionary Union (PWMU) missionary to Korea. Of the party of five who arrived in Pusan on 12 Oct. 1891 Belle alone was left after four years, though joined by Bessie Moore in 1892 and Agnes Brown in 1895.

Koreans would not sell property to foreigners and they lived in the Japanese treaty port for over a year before obtaining a thatch-roofed, mud and stone-walled house at the edge of the Korean town, Pusanchin. There were three rooms, about 8 ft square, ceilings too low for standing, and an earth-floored kitchen.

In this modest home the women began sharing their faith as their Korean language improved, teaching classes for children and adults, and soon reached out into surrounding villages. On 22 April 1894 the first three of their converts were baptised - their language teacher and two women.

In Dec. 1894 they were able to move into a newly built house while their previous one housed girls, homeless, orphaned, physically handicapped or in danger of being sold as kitchen slaves or prostitutes. These girls were supported by individuals or groups in Australia where their names were well known.

The orphanage became the centre of Belle Menzies's work. 'The most effective and far-reaching evangelism is to be found in these rescued and regenerated lives.' The teaching of these girls to read was the beginning from which grew the Il Sin Girls' School. The girls became teachers, nurses and the wives of church leaders, one even a governor's wife. And around them grew the Pusanchin church.

Belle taught in the local church, week-long classes for village women, and in the Women's Bible Institute which during two winter months each year trained 'Bible women'.

Above all, she was the wise counsellor and friend to whom Koreans, women, children, and men too, and fellow-missionaries went in times of perplexity, suffering or loneliness and found strength through her humble witness, her loving concern. All called her 'Mother'.

A very special orphan was Sinpogie, a baby abandoned in the garden on a wintry night in 1914. Belle adopted her and took full responsibility including a return to Korea

seven years after retirement to arrange her marriage in 1931.

Although it was premature, Pusanchin church and community celebrated then the 40 years since she came to Korea and set up a stone beside the church to honour her 33 and Bessie Moore's 27 years of service.

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Brian Dickey, Editor

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Kang, WiJo. Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea: A History of Christianity and Politics. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997. Pp. vii = 214. \$19.95.

The remarkable growth of the Korean churches in this century has attracted considerable attention. Kang's lucid and well-researched history of the involvement of Korean Christianity in the complex political history of that troubled peninsula is a much needed addition to the growing body of literature on a neglected aspect of the subject, namely, the impact of a rapidly expanding church, now approaching a third of the total population of South Korea, in a social situation secularizing as fast as the church is growing. Most writing on the subject is in Korean, hence the added importance of Dr. Kang's book.

After two chapters tracing the historical background, ~~the~~ a hundred years of national ^{xenophobia} isolationism and persecution of tenuous Catholic penetration (1784-1884), Dr. Kang lucidly describes and analyzes the shifts in church/state relations for the next hundred years after the arrival of the Protestants.

First was the broadening impact of American influence, both political and missionary, and the awakening of Korean nationalism (1884-1894). But this was quickly followed by a bruising counterforce, Japanese colonial expansion and the important part played by Korean Christian resistance to the Japanizing of their country, most significantly in the Independence Movement of 1919, which was an important factor in rapid church growth (1894-1931).

With the outbreak of war in north China and eventually against America, Japan's military power came near to crushing the last traces of the country's independent identity and forced the churches into a humiliating surrender of their institutional integrity (1931-1945). Kang here ably traces the trauma of encroaching colonialism through the early stages of a politics of Japanese Asiatic cultural imperialism, and its end result in full-scale repression of Christianity when Japan forced its own national religion, Shinto emperor worship, on a conquered people (1931-1945).

The end of the war and the division of Korea into a communist north and an anti-communist south brought new complexities of tensions, both political and ecclesiastical. Dr. Kang deftly characterizes each of the five post-war governments of South Korea from Syngman Rhee to Rho Tae-Woo, and the Christian community's failures and successes in protest and accommodation to authoritarian Korean rule.

The regime of the first president, Syngman Rhee, a Methodist, he describes as the "politics of conservatism", equally pro-American and anti-communist in both church and state--a comfortable, working relationship affording opportunity for startling church growth, but which was oblivious to a largely unrecognized tide of student and working class dissatisfaction (1948-1960).

The "student revolution" which unseated Rhee opened the door, however, not to more democracy as the students naively expected, but to thirty years of military rule under three

successive generals. Gen. Park Chung-Hee (1961-1979) startled the world by propelling South Korea into its "economic miracle". Most Koreans, and most churches accepted prosperity gladly. But a highly articulate and activist minority, including many in prestigious Christian schools, rose in dissent against heavy-handed military leadership. Park was assassinated not by the dissenters but by his own associates.

His successor, General Chun-Doo Hwan (1979-1988), proved to be as arbitrary as Gen. Park, and the Korean military (still technically responsible to U.S. command under the U.N.) spun momentarily out of control. Student resentment turned anti-American, and the churches divided, the majority still preferring economic recovery to student instability, but the minority protest gained strength.

It was enough to force a fair, democratic election and the installation of a new president, Rho Tae-Woo (1988-1993), who wisely resigned from the army and turned civilian. But it was not enough for dissenters who rallied around a new complaint, the issue of reunification with North Korea. By this time the Christian community itself had divided. A Protestant minority represented by the more ecumenical National Council of Churches, representing five denominations and cooperating with protesting Roman Catholics, called for unconditional reunion with the North, and criticized U.S. military presence in Korea. The larger Protestant conservative majority, openly anti-communist, which had organized in 1975 as the "Korean Christian Leaders' Association" urged caution in negotiating with North Korea and approved continuing

the five denominations in the ecumenical National Council of Churches and cooperating with Roman Catholic protests, tended to favor unconditional reunion with the North, and criticized U.S. military presence in Korea. The larger Protestant conservative majority, openly anti-communist, which had been organized by 19 denominations in 1975 as the "Korean Christian Leaders' Association", urged caution in negotiating with North Korea and supported continuing U.S. involvement in Korea. (1988-1993).

Dr. Kang's well-researched book richly deserves a second edition to update the subject to the surprising developments of the next five years. He is on the side of the angels in describing the motives of the dissenters and the corruptions of government power in the south, but is perhaps not quite as equally critical of yet greater corruption of power in the communist north.

A second edition might also pay more attention to the lack of analysis of the conservative side of Korean Christianity. Why has the dramatic explosion of church growth been most predominant in theologically and politically conservative churches which is now mainline Korean Protestantism. Why do the more politically and theologically activist Protestant churches fail to grow. And, a more intriguing speculation: will the election of a Roman Catholic president, himself a former opposition leader, change the equation and make Roman Catholics, now outnumbered about five to one by Protestants, the mainline Christian base in 21st century Korea?.

942 11

U.S. support (1988-1993).

Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea is an indispensable survey of the interplay of Christianity and politics in modern Korea. It deserves a second edition adding some surprising recent developments, and perhaps addressing the question: why has the Korean church growth explosion been so dramatic among the theologically and politically conservative groups, and so missing, thus far at least, on the side of the most politically active?

- Samuel Hugh Moffett

765 vol

A-3, 38 Alexander St,
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10-21-1995

Dear Sam and Eileen,

Thank you so much for your hospitality of last Thursday. It was very good to have the opportunity to get to know you both. I know Mum also enjoyed and appreciated the time.

I include herewith a copy of the dialogues that I wrote on the basis of seven weeks in Korea and then Japan, together with a brief introduction to my project. I would really value any comments that either of you might have about any of this.

I hope to see more of you both before I leave Princeton, perhaps after Fay arrives on 25 November.
With best wishes,
Sandy Yule.

Study Project on Shamanism and Christianity: An Introduction

Rev. Dr. Sandy Yule

This project is designed to review Christian understandings of shamanism with a view to assessing the validity of these understandings. It is therefore a theological and philosophical project. While it involves certain dimensions of interfaith dialogue, it does not feature an equal dialogue between two traditions that are represented by practitioners. It is a preliminary study which could contribute to the Christian side of such an interfaith dialogue.

Christian perspectives on shamanism to be revisited include those which view it positively as an independent religious tradition or negatively as idolatry; as a beneficial form of psycho-therapy or as a demonic co-operation with evil spirits; as a genuine exercise of magical power or as a pseudo-magic which seeks to gain advantage over the gullible. One advantage of an attempt at classification of this kind is that it prompts a recognition of what kinds of factors are relevant for assessing the validity of each perspective and leads us to increasingly useful questions. The questions that follow are posed in very general terms to indicate the areas of interest; the study project will of necessity look at more specific questions and will be shaped by the availability of relevant materials.

✧ As a religious tradition:

What experiences and ideas of the spirit world do we typically find in shamanism?

What spiritual marks should we look for in assessing whether a view, belief or practice is idolatrous?

✧ As a form of psychotherapy:

How might shamanic practice be presented as a form of psychotherapy?

How should we test the spirits invoked in shamanic practice (and the spiritual qualities of shamanic practice itself) to determine their virtue or lack of virtue?

✧ As an exercise of ritual/magical power:

What forms of power are claimed for shamanic practice and how might we determine the validity of such claims?

What attitude should we take to divination of the future for an individual?

What benefits typically accrue to shamanic practitioners in terms of personal spiritual development, financial rewards and socio-political status within their communities?

It will be apparent from this brief description that issues of theological and philosophical method will need to be addressed as well. How do we assess the possible validity

of animistic and magical views of the world? Is it possible to write about shamanism if the subjective dimension of the shamanic experience is not addressed directly? How relevant are our own personal experiences for building an understanding of shamanic experiences? What importance should we attach to questions about the embodied quality of our personally acquired knowledge? What operating assumptions about ritual, liturgy, prayer, interfaith dialogue, evangelism and mission need to be acknowledged?

PERSONAL STATEMENT

This project arises from a variety of sources in my own life. Perhaps the most important is my ongoing concern for peace-making between conflicting peoples and individuals, so that I am regularly fascinated by what I don't understand and by the mysteries of therapeutic processes. More prosaically, I was struck by the references to shamanism as our lost human heritage in Theodore Roszak's book, "Where The Wasteland Ends", which I read in about 1979. Roszak presents shamanism as an antidote to the loss of life and spirit from our collective experience through the ideology and socio-economic processes of the European enlightenment and industrial revolution. In 1979, I was developing a set of first year Philosophy subjects for Education students which were originally called "Miracles", "Psychic Phenomena" and "Life Beyond Death". In these subjects, we worked with particular stories of lived experiences which suggested ways of revising our view of how the world works, which led us into directly philosophical reflection. Many of these stories had a shamanic origin. I have found that a focus upon our conscious experience and upon what comes to us from unconscious sources does provide a perspective from which mysterious experiences can be approached with the possibility of achieving some understanding of such stories.

More recently, I have become aware of a variety of Australians, largely influenced by the so-called 'New Age' Movement, who are looking to shamanic models for help in developing a fresh set of spiritual practices which connect them with Spirit in nature. Some of these people are associated with the Foundation for Shamanic Studies which has been established under the leadership of Harvard Emeritus Professor Michael Harner. I have been positively impressed by the personal qualities and by the practices developed by two groups of these people, whom I regard as friends and conversation partners. One of these groups has had significant contact with a traditional Aboriginal community, though I cannot claim this for myself.

Shamanism and Christianity

Work in Progress

(Rev. Dr.) Sandy Yule

Dialogue 1

This dialogue is subjectively focussed, reflecting my pre-occupations as a Minister of the Uniting Church in Australia who has taught Philosophy to pre-service teachers at a secular tertiary institution in Melbourne for twenty years. I have chosen to study shamanism during this time of study leave as a way of exploring the horizon of human experiences of the spirit. This discussion reflects my initial encounter with Korean shamanism. While the voices do reflect things that I have heard here, they are my voices and are not a serious attempt to represent the actual position of other people. I wish to record my thanks to Dr. Yong Bock Kim for his friendship and helpful guidance to my researches, as well as for his welcome to Hanil Theological Seminary. I am also very grateful to many other Korean colleagues who have been very generous with their hospitality and time as well as their information. While the views expressed here are my own responsibility, the degree of contact with Korean realities that is here achieved is due to these colleagues.

The Participants:

E is a male Korean philosopher. **M** is a *Mansin*(1), a female Korean shaman. **O** is a male Korean Protestant of the Old school. **P** is a female Korean Protestant seeking a Progressive view of shamanism. **W** is a female Western Philosopher.

E: Before we start, I would like to establish that we are all ready to talk with one another. For myself, I welcome the chance of discussing this topic of Shamanism and Christianity with people whose good faith I respect.

M: I am not so happy about this. I don't know what I can say that will be of any use to you. I am surprised that a group of Christians and philosophers asked me to come. I thought all the Christians condemned people like me as devil worshippers. Also, I don't expect well-educated people like yourselves to show respect for the spirits. I am here because I know you well, **E**, and also **P**. So I am waiting to see what you want to know.

O: Yes, I must admit that I am not sure about how far we can get. **P** has persuaded me that I should look again at the *kut*(2) and the way it helps people with the deep problems in their lives, but I must admit that I don't understand the spirit possession and I suppose I have some fear about encountering powerful spirits. I do have deep reservations

about the calling of the spirits of the dead and of the earth.

W: I am very interested in the feminist aspects of Korean shamanism. I have learnt the value of looking again at human traditions that the West has condemned as irrational because the western notion of rationality has been so one-sidedly male. I hope that we can listen to each other with a proper human respect because I expect to learn a lot from this discussion.

M: It is all very well for you westerners to want a good discussion, but I can't forget the pain that I felt as a child when I attended a Christian school which condemned my mother as an agent of Satan himself because she was a shaman(3).

P: I think that we Christians owe you an apology for that attitude. I could quote Jesus, who said, "Nothing outside of a man can make him unclean by going into him. Rather, it is what comes out of a man that makes him unclean.... For from within, out of men's hearts, come evil thoughts, sexual immorality, theft, murder, adultery, greed, malice, deceit, lewdness, envy, slander, arrogance and folly. All these evils come from inside and make a man unclean." (Mark 7:15, 21-3) Applying this to women as well as to men, it seems clear to me that shamans as a group are no worse than other human groups, including our churches.

O: Look, I don't think you can apply that verse to spirit possession because this is a matter of the heart, not simply of food. **M,** I can see that the sincere beliefs of many Christians have, as you say, condemned your practices as idolatry and that this made it very hard for you to participate in a Christian school. I suppose some beliefs are incompatible with each other; I think that this is the case with you and me.

E: That sounds like a good note on which to begin. I appreciate the honesty with which people have spoken and the willingness to continue with the conversation even where there are strong reservations about this. I am interested in a question that no-one else has mentioned so far. I find it puzzling that Christians should be so much against the *kut* as idolatry, and yet there is so much shamanism in their own religious practices. The most obvious example would be the spirit-possession that occurs in the charismatic churches, but the intensity of praying in all kinds of churches is a more subtle carry-over from traditional shamanic practice.(4)

O: My church is not charismatic, so I shall just say that if the real needs of people are met by the true God, it would not be surprising to find that these needs had been

expressed elsewhere or that the people have habits of praying that carry over. This does not seem so important to me as the question of whether or not we are worshipping the true God. I think that there are indeed other spirits than the Holy Spirit of God whom we meet in Jesus and in Christian worship. I object to worshipping these other spirits.

W: I am not sure if we are all meaning the same thing when we talk about worship and idolatry. 'Idolatry' simply means worshipping an idol, which is surely a prejudicial description of someone else's religious practice. People know that the object that they use to focus their thoughts and that they relate to physically (by bowing or whatever) is not spirit but an image or statue. In their belief, they are relating to a spirit who is far greater than the image or statue. I think Protestants forget that the favourite phrases with which they address God are essentially similar, so that it is open to non-Christians to accuse them of talking to someone who isn't there. Perhaps the word 'idolatry' should be reserved for Christian self-criticism.

E: In our ceremonies to pay our respects to ancestors who have died, we bow and we address them directly, with respect. This is how we also relate to our parents and grand-parents when they are alive. It is this bodily behaviour which has given rise to the incorrect view among western people that we are engaging in ancestor worship.⁽⁵⁾ I think something similar happens when we approach powerful spirits with our requests in prayer. We are very respectful, as we would be in approaching a living government official. I think that you are right, **W**, in suggesting that Christian and Eastern understandings of worship may be quite different.

P: I agree. We Protestants are unfair to the religious practices of other traditions. Where I find the word 'idolatry' helpful is in naming the spiritual distortion that occurs when a political or socio-economic ideology is taken too seriously and thereby used to justify the oppression of people. Unjustified appeals to 'national security' in order to maintain political power by imprisoning opponents can, in my view, properly be called idolatrous.

O: I do wish that you would think spiritually as well as politically, **P**. Surely you would not want to be so tolerant of a god such as some of the Aztecs worshipped, who was thought to require regular human sacrifices? If we open ourselves up to a god like that in worship, surely we shall find ourselves compelled to perform the most monstrous and bloody deeds, sacrificing innocent people for no good purpose.

M: You make it sound as if it were a matter of free choice. I can assure you, it's not like that at all. Every *mudang* I know struggled for years to avoid becoming a shaman. We have all been pursued by the spirits who sent us *sinbyong*(6). You get so sick, faint so many times, that you finally decide to let the spirits in and become a *mudang*. There comes a point where it is simply the lesser of two evils(7).

W: What happened to the unpleasant symptoms after you let the spirits in?

M: That's how we know that they were caused by the spirits, because they disappear after the *mudang* lets them in. When you start doing your own *kut*, you just feel your spirits stealing into you and taking over. You feel that you are number one in the world and that you have nothing to worry about because it is all up to the spirits(8).

E: In my view, these spirits are quite real in your experience and such spirits can be quite real in the experience of anyone. Even western scientific thinking is beginning to recognize this, for example, through the influential work of Carl Jung(9) which explicates much about our unconscious mental functioning. Nevertheless, I think that I am enough of a Confucian to be worried by the completeness with which you give yourself over to whatever the spirits may decide to do.

M: You are also a man; it is much harder for men(10).

W: This is a point that particularly interests me. Why do you think that the shamanic experience is harder for men?

M: Because the spirits really possess you and push you around. We women are used to this, but men are not. I get used to letting the spirits run my body and then doing whatever I have to afterwards when they leave me alone.

W: I think I understand the experience of ecstasy, which for me is a state in which my body finds its freedom to move as it pleases, not as my conscious mind and social conditioning dictate. I am wondering whether the idea and experience of spirit possession does not originate from the impossibility of achieving this freedom within the culturally imposed ideas of proper behaviour for men and particularly for women in Korea, so that only a divine power can over-rule these constraints.(11)

M: I didn't expect that you would believe in the reality of the spirits.

W: I don't disbelieve in your spirits, but I don't quite know how to believe in them, either. I experience different

voices in my mind, some of which come from what I think of as myself, some of which do not. I believe in the real existence of such things as these voices and I am quite happy to think of them all as coming from 'spirit', my own spirit as well as spirit from beyond me. These voices also sometimes appear along with images or bodily feelings or in a sense of a presence other than myself. This is what I find in my own experience as something to use in trying to understand what your experience of spirit possession might be.

E: I don't go so far as the European Enlightenment in declaring that spirits other than human simply don't exist, because there are experiences such as the ecstasy, trance and spirit-possession(12) in the *kut* which need to be talked about without prejudging, for example, that such things are always a matter of mental illness. Like Jung, I am also aware of the special experiences of spiritually significant encounters that don't happen in the arena of outward and public experience. Men have such experiences as well as women, though there may be some differences on account of the different socialization of men and women or perhaps our different genetic make-up. I still believe that it is ethically important that we maintain our personal responsibility for our actions; I also recognize that these experiences can't happen if you maintain a tight self-control, which seems required by ethical responsibility. This is not a matter that I can resolve.

O: This shows why it is important to make some judgements about the spirits. **P** is fond of quoting at me the text which says "Test the spirits, to see if they be of God" (1John 4:1-5). She likes to say that we have to encounter the spirits before we can test them. Of course, the text goes on to say that any spirit that does not recognize that Jesus has come in the flesh is not of God, so that I doubt the results will be favourable to the *kut*. I have to admit that I am reluctant to engage in this test because I was brought up to think of the spirits of the *kut* as demons.

W: You are the victim of an inaccurate translation of the Greek of the New Testament, **O**. The word for 'spirit' in Greek is '*daimon*', which is neutral in meaning. When this word is translated into its English derivative 'demon', a strongly negative sense is introduced instead of the more appropriate neutral sense. This brings us back to the question of worship. The word originally had the sense of praising and acknowledging the worthship or value of God. Yet this is rather a formal and external understanding which stays in the context of courtly ritual and the flatteries of high society. I would have thought that worship, at least for Christians, carries a sense of opening your life up before God for direction, healing and energizing.

P: Yes, it does. The same is obviously true in the *kut*, which is why I think it a religious ceremony involving worship. This is where O's difficulties arise. I say that if we Christians accept psychological counsellors using their cleverness without insisting that they be Christian before they help people, why shouldn't we approach the *kut* in the same way? There is also the need to respect the religious beliefs and practices of our friends and neighbours by dropping the prejudicial misunderstandings that we have inherited from our missionary teachers. We now know enough to realize that, while the missionaries were deeply sincere, they were often very narrow and culturally biased in their views of Korean practices and beliefs. Similarly, I don't have a problem in rejecting the European Enlightenment criticism that there are no spirits anyway. There is something beyond the ordinary level at work in the *kut*, whatever language we use to describe it.

E: Have you seen a *kut* ritual, W? Some of your colleagues might be surprised by such practices as the dancing on the sharpened knives.

W: I have seen one *kut*, though it didn't feature the dance on the knives. I have been very impressed by the detailed accounts of this dance that I have read(13). The practice does seem to suggest that human beings are capable of extraordinary physical immunity under the special conditions of trance and of the full commitment to the protection of the spirits called for by the ritual. There are similar claims made for fire walking ceremonies in India and the Pacific, as well as the ritual demonstrations of physical immunity in the worship of the Gadari dervishes of Kurdistan(14).

M: Yes, we dance on the knives. If we don't do it right, we could be seriously hurt. Sometimes I feel really sad about having to be a *mudang*. Nobody should have to dance on knives just because the spirits want to show off(15).

W: Actually, the point that concerned me more was the use of money, overtly to buy favour from the spirits, but as everyone knows, actually to pay the *mansin*. I was brought up on stories about Martin Luther starting the Protestant Reformation as a result of rejecting the practice of the sale of indulgences, which were to pay for prayers for the dead and were thus supposed to assist the souls of the loved ones to get out of Purgatory more quickly. The greedy demands for money that the spirits make could perhaps be justified as requiring a real commitment from people, but I have to say that I find it surprisingly ungracious.

M: Was this Martin Luther a European Confucian scholar? He sounds like a spokesman for the *Yangban*(16). Everyone knows about the money. What people pay is an honest contract that is all agreed before the ritual starts. I don't charge more

than people can afford to pay(17). How else are we going to get paid for helping people with their spiritual problems?

E: The commercialization of the services of the *mansin* goes together with their 'outcast' status throughout the Yi Dynasty and until now. Their low social status made open organizing very difficult, leading the *mansins* to enter into these individual contracts for each occasion.(18)

W: I suppose my problem is that I don't find it easy to believe that the dead ancestors of people want their money. This came home to me in a vivid way through an experience that I had two days after attending the *kut*. It seemed to me that my dead grandmother was somehow present with me. I expressed my concern and guilt that I had not thought about her for years. I mentally referred to the elaborate ceremonies of remembrance performed by Koreans. Her reply shook me; she said, "They have their traditions and we have ours". She was very firm about not wanting anything at all from me. I now accept that this is the attitude of my ancestors, which I find generous and gracious.(19) This is probably why I have difficulty with the role of money in the action of the *kut*.

P: When the spirit of the 'high official' extorts money from people in the *kut*, it is a highly satirical evocation of the frequently encountered reality that powerful people require bribes before they will do their duty. This is a central part of the *han*(20) of the Korean people.

O: I can accept that if people want to spend their money for the *kut*, this is not my business. I can also accept that the ritual is therapeutic for the people who sponsor it. I rather like the idea that the particular stories of people's suffering revealed in the *kut* amount to a social biography of the *minjung*(21), as I can understand how this would be psychologically helpful to the people. I am not a *minjung* theologian because I am not a theologian, and I think that the church is for everybody, not just one class of people(22). My difficulty remains, which is that the *kut* worships spirits that are less than God, as we know God in the Christian tradition.

P: I am really pleased to hear that there is something in *minjung* theology which you like, O. Also, I think you should consider yourself a theologian when you are working so hard on theological questions about our worship of God. I don't think *minjung* theology has to deny that the grace of God is for everybody; the gracious mercy of God can take the form of judgement and a call to repentance for oppressors, along with condemnation of the social dimensions of sin. Maybe W is right after all, that we are basically troubled by different understandings of what worship is. I can see how the attitude of the people in the *kut* is worship as we

talked about it earlier, the opening up of ourselves to the mysterious divine reality which is above us. If the *kut* is a social biography of the *minjung* and a means of identifying and resolving the *han* of the people, this should be thought of as a spiritual achievement which includes, but goes beyond, therapy. The attitude of the *mansins* is a bit different from this, as they have to deliver the divine presence and guidance. Perhaps we should be comparing their work with that of the Christian ministers in their preparation and delivery of the sermon and the conducting of the Eucharist.(23)

E: I have often wondered why Christians make such a fuss about polytheism, which is what I take your difficulty to be, **O**. The spirits of the dead ancestors are individual on the basis that they were individual people when alive. Nobody suggests that the existence of many human individuals is any kind of challenge to monotheism. If we focus on the spiritual presence of a particular place, say a mountain or a waterfall, surely it is being separated out from the rest of spiritual reality only by our attention. I was impressed by the value of H.Richard Niebuhr's distinction between henotheism, the 'one god' of a particular tribe or culture, and monotheism, which transcends this partial and one-sided focus by providing the underlying unity for all our particular experiences(24). I fail to see why polytheism and monotheism cannot coexist as different and necessary perspectives on the mysterious divine dimension, with polytheism reflecting our lived experience of the divine while radical monotheism maintains the transcendent unity of being. Niebuhr's analysis is very helpful in identifying the main opponent of monotheism as henotheism in which a finite source of value and object of loyalty is treated as if it were absolute, eternal and infinite. This henotheism is the root of all forms of imperialism and fundamentalism. He also points out the inevitable tendency of monotheism itself to turn into a new henotheism once it enters into human experience with a definite form(25).

O: I hold to the Old Testament prophetic tradition with its strong critique of human attempts to manipulate God and its call for love and loyalty to God alone. I must admit that I am not quite sure at this moment how this relates to Niebuhr's distinction between henotheism and monotheism, as it seems to have elements of both.

W: You know, **O**, I am quite surprised to find that I have some sympathy for your position here. It must be my Lutheran upbringing or something, though I thought that I had left that behind me long ago. I think that the Hebrew prophets are to be respected for their strong voice for social justice and for their struggle for a coherent theology. **E**'s idea that monotheism can coexist with polytheism strikes me as highly paradoxical. Unless both

ideas are held in tension, one or other will collapse into its opposite. It reminds me of Luther's strange idea that the Christian is *simul justus et peccator*, or as you seem to be suggesting, **E**, *simul christianus et paganus*(26). I can sympathize with **O**'s discomfort.

M: You people lost me quite some time ago. Does this mean that I am in league with the devil or doesn't it?

E: That must be a question for you Christians to answer, as I don't find the figure of the devil at all persuasive as a mythological idea which relates to the *kut*, except in the limited role of hell as the bad destination for departed souls.

P: I would agree that the devil is a mythological figure and not one that relates to the role of the *mansin* in the *kut*, apart from the controlled appearances of the messengers from hell. Anyway, I dislike our tradition of playing up the competition between God and the devil as if they were on the same level. In the Bible, Satan is a fallen angel and therefore a creature originally part of God's good creation. Satan has a role, that of tester, which we should acknowledge and honour. Our hatred of Satan stems from our fear that we might not pass the test.

O: Next you will be telling me that there is no such thing as sin, apart from the social injustices perpetrated by the powerful. Surely Satan is an active tempter, not simply an examination-setter?

P: Yes, but temptation can only work through our own disordered tendencies, so that it is important not to lose sight of our complicity in sins we commit. You haven't answered **M**'s question, **O**. Do you see the devil at work in her spirits?

O: I am sorry to say that I am not sure what I think about that right now. I used to believe that that was so, but perhaps what I really think is that they are something other than the Holy Spirit. For me, this means that worship of these spirits is not appropriate. I am also very doubtful about intimate familiarity with them. They do seem tricky and unreliable to me, which smacks of the demonic. I am sorry that I can't be more definite.

M: I think it is rather sweet of you to be uncertain. I was expecting a much more dogmatic response.

P: I find it helpful to think of the concrete spirits that manifest themselves in the experience of the *kut* as familiar realities, such as our own ancestors, with whom it is possible to deal. We naturally feel some fear at their uncanny nature and threatening aspect. Christian faith

tells me that we should approach every situation in the power of the Holy Spirit which includes that perfect love which casts out fear. We can show respect for the spirits that we encounter, on the basis of being willing to hear what they have to offer us and to discern what their needs might be. I myself would draw the line at being dominated by these spirits; at that point we might need help in gaining our freedom. This is quite dangerous territory in human terms. Without the clarity of religious tradition and specific spiritual practices, such spirits can overwhelm us.

W: I was interested to read about the experiences of Deaconess Chang(27), a former shaman who became a Christian on the basis of an exorcism of her spirits initiated quite contrary to her will by her son. What I found particularly significant was the advice that she received from the old *mudang* whom she told about the pressure that her Christian family was putting on her. The advice, which was to follow her husband's lead into an acceptance of Christianity, would seem to typify the syncretistic and adaptive spirit of the shamanic tradition.

M: Surely her spirits made her suffer for deserting them?

W: Yes, she tells of serious *sinbyong* symptoms for five years thereafter, which were overcome through praying and through constant support from the church members.

E: I can understand the advice of the old *mudang*. There is a strong element of compulsion involved for the shamans, where the spirits come in and push them around, disordering their lives until they co-operate with the spirits. Why should shamans remain loyal to such spirits when a potentially more powerful spirit comes onto the scene? Christianity has shown itself capable of considerable spiritual power and it is part of the shamanic pattern simply to fall in with what the powerful spirits want. This was my original question, whether Christianity is not covertly benefitting from its use of the spiritual power of Korean shamanism while overtly condemning it as satanism.

P: I think that you are right about this, as I said before. I was brought up in the church to condemn shamanism as demonic. I became interested in shamanism in a positive sense when I started to work in a *minjung* church and found that the ordinary people naturally turned to the shamans for spiritual help when they were in trouble. I realized that I needed to respect what the experience of the *minjung* has taught them. Even if I might think that their answers are not the only answers and that perhaps something should be done to address the earthly causes of the sufferings of the people(28), my thoughts are not relevant unless I have earned a place with the people.

E: I have to say that you Christians seem surprisingly willing to turn everything upside down. You have discovered the strength of the small, but your commitment to it seems at times to lack balance. Why do you give the motley and variegated lower groups in society so much authority in the shaping of your work? Surely their voices are too diverse and confused to provide you with reliable guidance?

P: The harmony that we seek is inclusive of all beings. This is what we understand God to have for our world as the preferred future. We take this to mean that the present order, however good in relative terms, is based upon unacceptable distinctions. We find our direction in dialogue with all kinds of people, but under the power of this divine vision which pushes us to this radical inclusiveness.

O: Yes, this is where I agree with **P**. Christian faith really is for all people and we cannot accept human distinctions and limitations in our work. I see great value in challenging the people with whom we work to accept this radical inclusiveness, which is a part of what I would mean by wanting them to become Christian.

W: Well, I am not so ready to rush into a thoughtless abolition of all distinctions. Next, you will be telling me that men and women are not really any different from each other. I would like to continue discussing the *mansin's* experience of spirit possession and how it relates to the singing and dancing, but perhaps you people have other concerns at this point.

O: Yes, I have quite enough to think about for now. Perhaps this discussion has shown me another way of looking at shamanism, even if I am not ready to accept it for myself. Thank you, everyone!

E: Perhaps we have gone far enough for today. I must say that I am pleased with our progress in sharing our different thoughts and perspectives. I would like to think further about your strange Christian vision of an ideal world, fresh from God, somehow descending on us in the future.

M: Well, I am glad that you people had a good time, as I was quite lost when you really got going. Still, you do move into difficult areas like *mudangs*, with no fussing about whether it is OK to say something or not. I think I like you!

P: Thank you, **M**, for your patience with us intellectuals and for your gracious words. I am feeling really happy that we listened to each other for a change, so that maybe we all learned some important things. I was quite impressed by the

ideas of our philosopher friends. I hope that we can find ways to explore these things further.

W: Yes, I hope so. I particularly valued hearing Korean perspectives on spirituality. You have helped me to take another look at my 'Sunday School' Christianity which I have long rejected as worthless. Thanks also for your willingness to talk with a stranger like me.

E: You are very welcome. Please come again.

Endnotes:

(1) I am using the term '*mansin*' to refer to female shamans who experience possession by spirits, even though it is a term mainly used in the Seoul area, on the grounds that it is more polite than the general term for female shamans, '*mudang*'. This latter term is used by the *Mansin* in this dialogue, as part of her 'down to earth' style. Cf. Laurel Kendall, Shamans, Housewives and Other Restless Spirits, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1985, p.xi.

(2) '*Kut*' is the general Korean word for the larger shamanistic rituals involving a household or village. Cf. Lee Jung Young, Korean Shamanistic Rituals, Mouton Publishers, The Hague, 1981.

(3) Cf. Youngsook Kim Harvey, Six Korean Women, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1979, pp.26-7.

(4) Cf. David Kwang-sun Suh, The Korean Minjung in Christ, Commission on Theological Concerns, Christian Conference of Asia, Hong Kong, 1991, pp.11-7. "It is a matter of degree in different churches in Korea: spirit possession is transferred to faith in the Holy Ghost. The practice, theology and structure of spirit possession is the same in the *mudang* religion and Korean Christianity. This may be the strength of Korean churches. But it is also an extreme case of the seduction of the spirit as Harvey Cox has seen it: Korean Protestantism has almost been reduced to a Christianized *mudang* religion. That is, the form and language of the worship service are Christian, but the content and structure of what Korean Christians adhere to are basically the *mudang* religion. Although missionaries rejected shamanism and thought it had been destroyed, Korean Christianity has become almost completely shamanized." Ibid. p.116. I remain grateful to Professor David Kwang-sun Suh for his friendship and for our conversations.

(5) Cf. Hahm Pyong Choon, "Shamanism and the Korean World View", in Shamanism: The Spirit World of Korea, Asian Humanities Press, Berkeley, Ca., 1988, p.78.

(6) Cf. L.Kendall, Shamans, Housewives and Other Restless Spirits, p.57. For an account of *sinbyong*, which is a word for the special sickness afflicting shamans prior to their taking up the shamanic role, cf. Y.K.Harvey, Six Korean

Women, p.5-6. This issue is a main focus for each of the stories of the women surveyed.

(7) *Ibid.* p.107.

(8) *Ibid.* p.32.

(9) Carl Jung, like Sigmund Freud, continues to have a deep and ubiquitous influence upon the thinking and development of western culture.

(10) Cf. "An Interview with Kim Kum Hwa", Koreana: Korean Art and Culture, Vol.6 No.2, Summer 1992, p.52.

(11) Cf. Y.K.Harvey, Six Korean Women, pp.235-40.

(12) Cf. Mircea Eliade, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy, Pantheon, New York, 1951. Professor Yoon Yee Heum (Seoul National University) points out that in Korean shamanism the emphasis is upon the possession of the shaman by the spirits rather than upon the ecstatic spirit journey. Cf. Yoon Yee Heum, "The Role of Shamanism in Korean History", Koreana: Korean Art and Culture, Vol.6 No.2, Summer 1992, pp.6-9. I am very grateful to Professor Yoon for granting me an interview.

(13) Cf. Koreana: Korean Art and Culture, p.54 and Alan Carter Covell, Ecstasy: Shamanism in Korea, Hollym International Corp., Elizabeth, New Jersey & Seoul, Korea, 1983, pp. 48-52.

(14) For the latter, cf. "The Dervishes of Kurdistan", a BBC documentary from about 1975 about the rites of the Gadari dervishes in "The Disappearing World" series.

(15) Cf. Y.K.Harvey, Six Korean Women, p.136-7 and "An Interview with Kim Kum Hwa", Koreana: Korean Art and Culture, p.54.

(16) The word *yangban* refers to the aristocratic class in traditional Korean society which was determined by birth. "*Yangban* in Korean means the highest social class with the highest education. The members of the *Yangban* are supposed to have passed the state civil examinations in the difficult and respectable Chinese letters, not in the vulgar Korean language. They are the ones who receive land free from the king, and they are the largest landowners. The magistrate of a village comes from this class. They do not have to work. They are the masters of the nation and the landlords in the village. They are the political rulers. In short, they are the powerful people." David Kwang-sun Suh, The Korean Minjung in Christ, p.170.

(17) Cf. Y.K.Harvey, Six Korean Women, pp.159-60.

(18) Cf. *Ibid.* p.36.

(19) This reported experience is based upon an experience of my own, which occurred as I was waking up on the second morning after my attendance at a *kut*.

(20) "'*Han*' is a sense of unresolved resentment against injustice suffered, a sense of helplessness because of overwhelming odds against, a feeling of acute pain or sorrow". David Kwang-sun Suh, The Korean Minjung in Christ, p.195.

"The alienated masses are the people of *han*, of that psychosomatic anguish and pain resulting from unrequited

injustices. The people engaging in Shamanistic rituals body, soul and spirit are thus releasing their accumulated *han!*" C. S. Song, "Building a Theological Culture of People", in An Emerging Theology in World Perspective: Commentary on Korean Minjung Theology, p.123.

(21) ". . . the word *minjung* is a Korean pronunciation of two Chinese characters, 'min' and 'jung'. 'Min' literally means 'the people' and 'jung' 'the mass'. Combining these two words, we get the idea of 'the mass people' or simply 'the people'." Lee Jung Young, An Emerging Theology in World Perspective: Commentary on Korean Minjung Theology, Ed. Lee Jung Young, Twenty Third Publications, Mystic, Connecticut, 1988, p.3. The term is not translated to indicate that it has a special meaning in the Korean context (for example, over against the *yangban*, or aristocratic class) and that it involves a practical solidarity with the oppressed Korean people as much as the ideas usually constitutive of a theology. Cf. also David Kwang Sun Suh, The Korean Minjung in Christ, and the Commission on Theological Concerns of the Christian Conference of Asia, Minjung Theology: People as the Subjects of History, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York, 1983.

"Korean Christians became more and more conscious of their own historical roots in their active participation in the people's struggle for socio-economic justice [during 1968-75 approx.]. They started over again in looking into the traditional religious consciousness of the Korean people, in identifying themselves with the culture and language of the common people of the *minjung*, and in studying the history of the development of Korean Christianity." David Kwang-sun Suh, The Korean Minjung in Christ, p.78.

"In the Korean setting shamanism has provided a faith for the alienated masses". Ryu Tong Shik, "Shamanism: The Dominant Folk Religion of Korea", Inter-religio, 5, Spring 1984, p.13. I am very grateful to Professor Ryu Tong Shik for granting me an interview.

For the idea that the central action of the *kut* articulates the lived oppressive and pain-ridden experience, the social biography, of the *minjung*, cf. Kim Yong Bock, "Messias und Minjung: Zur Unterscheidung von messianischer Politik und politischem Messianismus", in Minjung: Theologie des Volkes Gottes in Sudkorea, Ed. J.Moltmann, Neu-kirchen-Vluyn, 1984.

(22) Cf. Lee Jung Young, An Emerging Theology in World Perspective: Commentary on Minjung Theology, pp.21-2.

(23) Cf. Sun Soon-Hwa, Women, Religion and Power: A Comparative Study of Korean Shamans and Women Ministers, Doctoral Dissertation, Drew University, Madison, New Jersey, 1991. I am very grateful to Professor Sun Soon-Hwa for a copy of her Dissertation and for her support for my study project.

(24) Cf. H.R.Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, Harper & Row, New York, 1960 (1943), pp.11-37. "In the following reflections I shall try to analyze this conflict [of faiths] as one between radical monotheism and

the other main forms of human faith, namely, polytheism and henotheism in their modern, nonmythological guise. The chief rival to monotheism, I shall contend, is henotheism or that social faith which makes a finite society, whether cultural or religious, the object of trust as well as of loyalty and which tends to subvert even officially monotheistic institutions, such as the churches." *Ibid.* p.11.

(25) *Ibid.* pp.56-63.

(26) This idea of *simul christianus et paganus* comes to me from Professor Kim Kwang Shik of Yonsei University, as a pointer towards a general approach to an understanding of the appropriation of Christianity within a culture. I am particularly grateful to Professor Kim for granting me an interview.

This Lutheran emphasis upon the co-existence of Christian and non-Christian elements within a culture could perhaps be balanced by the Calvinist expectation that the Christian dynamic will transform the culture, as formulated in the classic study of H.Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, Harper, New York, 1956. There is also the reality that the culture of people will shape new ways of seeing Christ, as noted by Lee Jung Young in An Emerging Theology in World Perspective: Commentary on Korean Minjung Theology, p.18.

(27) Y.K.Harvey, Six Korean Women, pp.205-234.

(28) Cf. Park Il Young, Minjung, Schamanismus und Inkulturation: Schamanistische Religiosität und Christliche Orthopraxis in Korea, Seoul, 1988 (Doctoral Dissertation, Freiburg University, Switzerland).

Shamanism and Christianity

Work in Progress

(Rev.Dr.) Sandy Yule

Dialogue 2

This dialogue reflects my experience of studying Japanese religions from the perspective of their relationships with shamanism and Christianity, particularly as I had just encountered these in Korea. I wish to record my thanks to Kyoto Seika University for their hospitality and support for this work. Particular thanks are due to Professors Hajime Nakao and Richard Tanter, as well as to the staff of the International Education Office. I am also very grateful to the many Japanese colleagues who have been very generous with their hospitality, their time and their information. While the views expressed are my responsibility, whatever degree of contact with Japanese reality that there may be is due to these colleagues.

The Participants:

O, a traditional male Korean Protestant pastor; P, a female progressive Korean Protestant seminary teacher; W, a female Australian philosopher; and J, a female Japanese humanities graduate.

W: I would like to introduce J, who has come to Korea to meet Korean people and to listen to Korean perspectives. She is also interested in religion, particularly shamanism. She is staying in the same guesthouse as myself, which is how we met. She has read the transcript of our last meeting.

O: I am happy to welcome you, J. I wish that more of your people would make this journey to meet with us and to be willing to listen to what we have to say. E asked me to present his apologies; he found himself unable to attend this meeting.

P: We are pleased to meet you and to have you join in our conversation, J. If you were hoping to meet M, I am afraid you are too late. She says that her spirits don't want her to meet with us as a group, though she can meet with us as individuals. I think our conversation was a bit too academic last time.

J: Thank you for your welcome. I am sorry not to meet E and M. This is my first visit to Korea, though I have some Korean friends at home.

O: Then perhaps you are aware that there are some important things that have not been set right between our countries.

J: I am here because I regret our colonization of Korea. I know that Japanese soldiers killed many Koreans so that Korean people and Korean natural resources could be used for Japanese advantage.

O: It is good to hear you acknowledge these things. Have you had a chance to visit the Korean Independence Hall? That gives a good account of Japanese colonialism and Korean resistance.

J: No, I haven't been there. That sounds like a good thing for me to visit.

W: I have visited it. It does give a graphic and moving account of the suffering of the Korean people under Japanese colonialism and of the struggle for national independence. My only concern was with the more contemporary political agenda of the Chun Doo Whan regime that created Independence Hall while brutally repressing domestic dissent(1). I am allergic to nationalistic displays in my own country and tend to be suspicious of nationalism promoted by governments.

O: Are you criticizing the Independence Hall display?

W: I am in no position to criticize how Koreans choose to tell their story. I support the Korean struggle for independence, which is still needed to achieve a proper reunification of the country. Still, fervent nationalism always makes me uneasy. My reaction comes from our Australian experience with patriotism. Australians habitually went to fight overseas in support of the imperial wars of Britain. The Australian national myth has focused strongly on the Gallipoli campaign during the First World War, which was a military disaster. We remember that our soldiers fought with incredible bravery and self-sacrifice when sent into a militarily impossible position by the British. Patriotism like that will get you killed for no good purpose.

P: Why do you present this as a reason for suspecting patriotism in general rather than for developing a patriotism based on your own place and not on an outdated imperial loyalty to the country of your ancestors?

W: Maybe we are the transitional generations who are detached from our ancestral roots but not yet properly grounded in Australian soil. Most appeals to patriotism that I have heard are made by politicians or military figures who ask us to take the justice of our own cause on trust. I want to know when the personal and sectional self-interest of the leaders dominates the supposedly patriotic agenda.

P: I do know what you mean. I support the national feeling of our people, but I can agree with your concern about the manipulation of this feeling by governments. I remember the constant talk about national security by our own recent military regimes, which was used to suppress dissent and avoid talking about unjust happenings in our society.

O: Perhaps I am being unreasonable in expecting that non-Koreans can approach that display with more than a sympathetic respect. I simply find it hard to see any justice in colonialism. Also, I think you should let J find her own response to the Independence Hall display, W.

W: Fair comment! I think that there is now a consensus about the injustice of colonial rule because of the protests and the graphic stories of injustice from colonized peoples all around the world. The dominant international opinion last century was in favour of the 'more advanced' countries taking responsibility for the direction of the 'less advanced'.

J: Yes, I was quite shocked to discover that the 'father' of the Meiji enlightenment, Fukuzawa Yikichi, was prepared to legitimate the colonization of Korea in terms of the image of big brother Japan leading little brother Korea out of feudal darkness(2).

P: It is not so surprising when you remember that Japan took Britain as a model and that at that time Britain had colonized half the world. Even a Protestant like Ichimura Kanzo, who lost his teaching job because of his refusal to worship the Japanese Emperor, was prepared to endorse the colonization of our country because Japan needed to be sufficiently powerful to limit European expansion(3). I am pleased that you can see the damage done by this colonialism, J. But we were talking about shamanism, which has few obvious connections with imperialism; perhaps you could tell us why you found our previous conversation interesting.

J: I am not sure that I know. It certainly made me think. I was interested to learn that Korean shamans are mainly women and relate mainly to domestic needs. Maybe that is why you all found it so benign. I find shamanism quite uncanny and scary.

O: I thought that you didn't have any shamanism in Japan, apart from the traditional practices of the Ainu and communities on Okinawa, and the blind female shamans in the area around Mt. Osore.

J: Those are the groups traditionally called shamanistic, which probably have ancient Siberian roots, like the Korean shamans. But we also have a number of Shinto and Buddhist

schools or sects, as well as a few localized community rituals using trance and spirit possession. Some of these schools support the ascetic practices of the *yamabushi*(4), who live in a close spiritual connection with nature through constant pilgrimage in the mountains. These schools teach ascetic disciplines for achieving the spiritual power to direct and engage with the spirits that possess others. Your reports about shamans dancing barefoot and unharmed on sharp knives reminded me of our ritual climbing of ladders of knives by lay people under the assistance and protection of spiritually accomplished ascetics(5).

W: Why do you find this scary?

J: Well, I find anything to do with the spirit world uncanny, which is also scary. My main fear, however, is that if these powers are available to anyone who goes through a few ascetic practices, how do we know that these powerful people are trustworthy?

W: Noting the fact that many of these powerful people are men, I can sympathize with your feelings here, though it is comforting to note that ascetic discipline and the role of groups both make it more likely that ethical traditions are learned with the powers.

O: This is what I was trying to say last time, when you were all scoffing at me. Personal power is all very well, but if it is not ethically grounded, we have cause for concern.

P: I share your concern about the abuses of power by the powerful, but to oppose abuses we need our own power. I am less afraid of the personal power of shamans than I am of the organized repressive power of the state, as we experienced this in the Japanese and Korean military regimes. This is why I see shamans as potential allies, as long as they are people of good will.

J: I get quite confused when you flip from personal powers to political powers, P. Yet maybe this is one of the things that I found exciting in your previous conversation, because it touches the belief in my country that our emperor is a god, which brings personal and political power into the closest union imaginable.(6)

W: I have never understood the Meiji project of making the emperor into a god. Perhaps this is because I am thinking of the Judaeo-Christian idea of god as infinite, eternal and all the things that mortals like the Japanese emperor are not. Maybe the Meiji restoration was trying to recreate a past time when the rulers were shamans.

O: I imagine that, when the ruler was a shaman, he or she would have consulted the spirits and then done as instructed. I find this quite a scary way to conduct politics! There is no telling what the spirits might want.

P: Shamans are not gods, even if they sometimes talk with gods on their journeys. The Japanese emperor is not noted for shamanic powers, apart from the mystical political representative functions that attach to any ruler. Each ruler is special to their own people. What I would like is a conversation with a Shinto believer so that I might gain a better understanding. I find it hard to see much more than an exercise of state power and ideological indoctrination in the imposition of emperor worship on Japan and its colonies.

O: Worshipping the Japanese emperor was idolatrous, from a Christian perspective. The fact that this was imposed on us by brute force was spiritually humiliating, giving a religious dimension to our national resistance.

W: While I would agree with you that the emperor is not divine in any literal sense, the choice by Japanese society of their emperor as the symbol of national unity does not seem strange to me. The role of the Pope in the Roman Catholic Church seems essentially similar in this respect, as do some of the mediaeval European theories about royalty. Anyway, to understand these ideas properly, we need to hear them presented from the perspective of a believer. I think we should affirm the existence of nations, each with its own national symbols and practices, on a pluralistic basis which requires mutual respect. What I find offensive in the Japanese emperor worship is the willingness to impose it by force on non-Japanese people and on Japanese dissenters.(7)

P: This is an interesting point, W. The literal claim about the Japanese emperor was that he was a living *kami*, or power(8). As I understand it, *J*, *kami* are recognized primarily through the feelings of the appropriately sensitive people in their presence.

J: Yes, many kinds of things are enshrined as *kami*, particularly impressive parts of nature, such as a mountain or a tree or a waterfall, and powerful ancestors who have died, such as former rulers, soldiers and other leaders.

O: Does this mean that, in Shinto, nature is God?

J: Maybe, but I was brought up to think that it was wrong to look for an understanding of what is behind the presentations of the *kami* in the shrines.

W: As a philosopher, I find that kind of prohibition on questioning hard to accept.

P: Many religions other than Shinto discourage questioning.

W: I fail to see how a religious tradition can be maintained with integrity if people are not encouraged to understand it.

O: Perhaps you are right, though looking for understanding is not always the most important thing.

W: I can accept that it might have a secondary priority at times, but not that it be completely prohibited. Anyway, I want to understand the *kami* and I find it confusing that anything, it seems, can be a *kami* if it impresses someone. Does this mean that a drink of water on a hot day is a *kami*?

J: It is rather hard to enshrine something that has been completely consumed, like a drink of water, though a stream could certainly be enshrined. *Kami* is a title of honour, so that while everything has a spiritual side and so is potentially a *kami*, only those which somehow stand out are in fact honoured and enshrined. (9)

P: The *kami* are expected to provide various life-sustaining exercises of power. This is one of the better reasons why they need the support of human energies. This became clear to me when I was in your country once, J. I was walking through a Shinto shrine one night, feeling quite tired and sore in the head. The thought occurred to me that I could ask the power at this shrine for spiritual help and healing. I started to act prayerfully on this thought when I was stopped by the response that seemed to come from the place, which was that I should not bring any impurity into the shrine. If I was sore, that was my problem. I became aware of the difference between this power and the Judaeo-Christian tradition which encourages us to 'cast our burdens on the Lord', or the Bodhisattva tradition of beings whose compassion for suffering humanity leads them to offer help. It seemed to me that the *kami* preferred to be treated as a human emperor might, wanting only the strength and service of other people in support of its difficult life-maintaining work. (10)

W: What I find confusing is that *kami* can be living parts of our environment or the spirits of dead people; I think of these two realities quite differently.

P: This is your western individualism and humanism speaking; you think of yourself and other humans as something other than a part of nature.

W: Perhaps so. I can see that Shinto treats us humans as being on a par with other features of the natural world.

O: In my view, humans have a heavenly destiny which is beyond that of the rest of nature. I agree with your first thought, W.

J: That is the kind of thinking that has helped to put us into our present ecological difficulties. Belief in the *kami* is ecologically useful.

W: I can see the power of the *kami* for Japanese people in the shape of Japanese cities, which seem to avoid the slopes and summits of the surrounding hills almost completely. The human need for living space is intense, so that the power of the *kami* who live in the hills can be seen in this resistance to the expansion of the cities. A partial exception to this is the city of Nagasaki, where belief in the *kami* may be less than elsewhere, due to Christian influence. Belief in the *kami* is useful for preserving forests on hills, but it is not useful for meeting the needs of modern cities for options in land use.

O: In any case, to show that a belief is useful does not mean that it is true. Enshrining *kami* is idolatrous because it means worshipping a creature when we should really worship only the Creator. Worship of the Japanese emperor, a finite power however we look at him, was promoted by the state as if there were no other gods of any value. This is exactly what Richard Niebuhr means by henotheism, as we discussed last time. If the *kami* are separate points of encounter with the one inclusive spiritual reality, I can see how this obvious polytheism could be compatible with monotheism. I would prefer to call these subordinate powers 'spirits' or 'angels' rather than 'gods', but I now feel more relaxed about it if others call them 'gods'.

J: I was wondering whether the spirits encountered by Korean shamans are much the same as our Japanese *kami*.

P: That is a question that you should ask M, though you will have to explain to her about the *kami* in your country. It seems to me that they are very similar. M has a personal shrine with pictures and other resting places for her spirits. Many of her spirits are people who have died, but some are nature spirits, such as the mountain god or the spirit of the house site.

J: Korean shamanism sounds rather like Household Shinto to me, as the rituals and beliefs do seem similar. In addition, we have Shrine Shinto, which is very old and very local, except for some recently created shrines designed to meet modern needs, and State Shinto, which was the Meiji invention designed to unify the country in the image of one family engendered and governed by the divine imperial line. (11)

P: Korea used to have localized rites similar to Shrine Shinto, before they were opposed and suppressed by various governments over the last five hundred years. You can still find a few communities, on Cheju Island for example, that have maintained these communal rituals.

W: So the *kami* are spiritual beings that are encountered through our inner experience of features of nature or the presence of the spirits of the dead. Are they objectively real in addition to the natural features and the earthly lives of ancestors, or are they simply our projected mental construction onto these realities?

P: When people spontaneously have very comparable spiritual experiences, I think that we are dealing with something as objectively real as anything can be.

J: Some ascetics develop the power to see the *kami* residing in certain trees and rocks(12). These are then identified and sometimes enshrined.

W: This sounds like the ability to see energy patterns or auras, which I can't see, though I accept that some people can. What seems really mysterious to me is how such energies connect with archetypal experiences which are recorded and studied in the Jungian tradition of psychology. I do acknowledge the persistence with which such experiences crop up, as well as their intuitive meaningfulness for those who have them. What I find exciting is the idea that we can contact these realities at will, through shamanic journeying.

P: You make it all sound so positive and easy! I can't help wondering why it is so demanding and costly for the shamans, as well as scary and potentially perilous for the inexperienced.

W: Perhaps my sense of fear is reduced because my life has been stable and orderly. This probably shows up in my confused attitudes about worship. I am in favour of respect for people and for nature, but I find the idea of worshipping anything a bit foreign. I am quite perplexed by the pious people who bring their offerings to the *kami* or to the Buddhist images in the hope of attracting benefits such as business success and good health.

P: Do you give presents to your friends, and feel good about it?

W: Yes.

P: Perhaps some religious offerings are like that.

W: Maybe I do see a benefit to me in the friendship that I hope will be strengthened by my gifts, as well as the good feeling I have in giving. I would like to be friends with nature in this way, but I find that my whole upbringing and culture stops me from joining this kind of ritual.

O: Worship for me means communion with God, which includes our need for this-worldly benefits as a subordinate element.

P: I think it is important for us to develop rituals of friendship with nature, just as we have rituals of friendship within human society. The same applies to the spirits of the dead, as far as I am concerned. I don't worship nature or the dead, agreeing with O about worshipping only God, but this doesn't mean that I can't take part in rituals of friendship with nature and with the dead. More normally, I would include the powers of nature and the fellowship of those who have died in the circle of all who join in worshipping God.

J: Actually, you Christians are not alone in criticizing the limitations of the *kami*. In Buddhist terms, the *kami* seem needy and therefore imperfect, acting rather like the spirits of confused dead people who want attentions from their living relatives. Buddhists and shamans agree that such spirits require release from their suffering.

P: Yes, in Buddhist terms, the need to humiliate and subjugate others comes from mental pollutions that block any possibility of enlightenment. The whole idea of a power that is not fully self-sufficient is inadequate by definition. If the *kami* need our pious attentions, so much the worse for the *kami*. Zen Buddhists might say that a proper self-acceptance and meditative practice enables us to root out the pollutions associated with the normal dynamics of power.

W: I find it hard to understand why the Buddhist element in Japanese culture showed very little inclination to see the imposition of emperor worship by force as a mental pollution.

J: The whole history of Buddhism in Japan is couched in terms of political patronage and the inclusion of political rulers in the ranks of the heavenly powers. Is it all that different with the Christianity of Europe?

W: I suppose they are both examples of the unity of throne and altar leading to a corruption of the ideals of the religion, assuming that we don't accept the ideologies supporting this unity.

P: What this unity of throne and altar always neglects is the suffering and sacrifice of the common people. Even when

this sacrifice is acknowledged, as for example at Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo which memorializes the war dead (armed services personnel who died defending the nation), the purpose is overwhelmingly nationalistic. It would be interesting to know what the spirits of the individual Japanese soldiers enshrined there would say if somehow allowed to speak for themselves.

W: I wonder whether our western assumption of non-communication with the dead is correct? This is one of the strengths in Korean shamanic practice, that people are persuaded that it is the voice of their dead relatives that they hear through the person of the shaman. This issue was raised for me by an experience that I had after visiting the Fushimi Inari Shrine in Kyoto and developing a headache. When I looked for an internal dialogue with the pain, I found an angry voice which told me that I was not welcome to walk in that place. The voice was associated with a place of inscribed stones that we had visited. I responded that I had intended no disrespect and ended up feeling resolved with respect to the angry voice and free of the headache. I later found out that I had been in a section of a graveyard.(13) Should I think of this as an encounter with the spirits of the dead?

J: Why not? It is good to think of you being struck by spirits while walking through a shrine and for that to lead to some peace making.

O: I don't know what to say to you about your experience; you do raise an interesting question about what is possible.

P: Why not accept the experience at face value? It certainly begins to address the unresolved feelings between Australian and Japanese people.

W: Yes, I think that this kind of encounter, apology and acknowledgement is a spiritual action. It does not alter anything material in the present, but perhaps it does allow aggrieved spirits to rest in peace. It certainly has an effect on the person who has such an experience.

P: Speaking the truth in love does seem to be important spiritually, in all our relationships. We don't seem to be free to move on in life until the truth has been properly told. It is as if we have our attention fixated on the painful spot until the truth has emerged in an accepting and forgiving atmosphere, when we become free to shift our attention elsewhere.

O: Here I agree with you, P. You remind me of the old Hussite(14) slogan, "The truth shall prevail", as well as the promise in the gospel of St. John that we shall know the truth and the truth shall make us free (John 8:32).

W: This is one of the things that I find puzzling about you Christians; you speak as if there is only one truth. Yet each of us has our own perspective on this conversation, for example; should we not say that each of us has our own version of the truth? If so, how can we ever know the full truth about anything?

O: Pilate asked Jesus the same question. I believe in a truth which sums up, expands and includes all of our versions of it. This unified truth is God's knowledge of what is. Our knowledge is limited, but it is accurate when it conforms to God's knowledge, even though we don't have this divine knowledge and so can't say which bits of our knowledge are accurate.

W: I would at least agree that it is powerfully therapeutic for a person to find words for their own truth. This has been true for me in terms of women's liberation discussions and books, which have named realities of my own life that used to be unmentionable and so largely excluded from my awareness. Finding words to name these realities, such as the injustice of some of the role expectations for women in my society, has allowed me to make choices about how I relate to such realities.

P: We see the power of truth when the nature of a person's *han*(15) is properly put into words and properly received by the community. *Han* is normally unspeakable, in the literal sense.

O: This is one point at which I fully agree with the *minjung* theologians; when we attend to the experience of those who have suffered, their *han* is where our reflections should begin.

P: What I find valuable in shamanism is the ability to express powerfully felt truths from people's lived experience, though other people such as artists, poets and those who speak for suppressed groups share this ability. Many Korean people are now drawing on shamanic models for presentations that address political injustices, in theatres(16) and at student and other political rallies.

W: I attended one such rally in your country. It was a powerful and emotionally focused event. I have to say that I was uncomfortable in the presence of such strong group feeling. I am hyper-sensitive to the potential injustices that a crowd can perpetrate when aroused; my thoughts go quickly to the highly negative examples of lynch mobs in the USA and the Nuremberg rallies of the Nazi Party in Germany. It requires integrity of leadership and sophistication among participants to control these powerful energies responsibly.

P: If M was here, she might agree with you, as I know that she has concerns about the use of spiritual processes for political ends(17). Yet what alternatives did we have under the dictatorial political system of the recent past?

O: I am interested in M's views on this, as I would also have some concerns along those lines. I am anxious to avoid having politicians of any kind use the church for their own ends. I am comfortable with the church taking political action when it becomes a matter of Christian integrity to do so. I wasn't too sure about the realism of some of the demands of the student movement in recent times, but when government agents started to arrest and torture the students (and even try to stop prayer meetings in which people were expressing their concerns before God), it seemed clear to me that the truth of the Christian Gospel was at stake and resistance was essential.(18)

J: I don't know about realism, but the politics of *han* scares me, just as shamanism does. I suppose I also feel excitement when something unspeakable is spoken; but how can anything make amends for the really deep injustices, particularly after those who suffered have died?

P: As an example, my father was one of the 'prison believers' who refused to obey the Japanese requirement of worshipping the emperor in a Shinto shrine. He saw it as an idolatry in which was not possible for a Christian to participate. His national feeling and his fundamentalist beliefs spoke with one voice. I cannot forget that he died in that prison(19).

J: I feel very bad when I hear about your father. What would you consider a proper response from the Japanese people?

P: For a start, the history of Japanese colonialism needs to be properly acknowledged, with adequate information in Japanese schools. The statement by Prime Minister Hosakawa in 1993 provided a good basis, though the more detailed statement by the Japanese House of Representatives in Diet (June 1995) was unfortunately undermined by the public argument about what it should contain. People outside Japan see that powerful forces within Japan are reluctant to acknowledge Japanese responsibility for unacceptable colonialism and murderous aggression, perhaps because of a desire to rekindle the Japanese imperial dream and to recreate the 'Co-prosperity Sphere' of 1930-45 by force.

J: I can see that what you say is reasonable. I do feel overwhelmed by the difficulty of changing this situation. I feel both helpless and responsible at the same time.

O: J, may I ask if your family is Christian?

J: Of course you may ask! No, I was brought up to relate to the Buddhist and Shinto traditions. I did go to a University which had a Christian and a Socialist background.

O: I ask because it seems to me that you show a willingness to be open to the pain of other people and to recognize collective guilt which is particularly characteristic of the Christian tradition, as well as of some kinds of Socialism. Perhaps you will find it helpful to reflect on how you came to feel as you do.

J: I was not even born when all these bad things were done to Korean people and others prior to 1945. Even if I do acknowledge Japanese responsibility for past and present injustices, it all becomes too big to face. I can't even think of what might compensate for such things as the death of your father, P.

P: In one sense, nothing can compensate for my father's death. Still, it has been good to receive an apology for the wrong that has been done and to be asked for my view of what should be done about it. For this, I thank you, J.

J: This cannot be enough, yet what would be sufficient? The politics of *han* opens up such overwhelming and unanswerable questions.

W: I wonder what the shamanic traditions can offer here?

P: I can imagine that a *kut* for my father's spirit might give me a sense for what he might want done about the injustice that he suffered.

O: I don't know about shamanism, W, but it is just this kind of spiritual problem that preaching based on the Word of God is meant to address.

W: Perhaps I have been unlucky in the sermons that I have heard. Still, I am coming to see that even a consultation with the spirits of the dead cannot resolve all problems. The expression of *han* brings problems to light, but we are then faced with the need for solutions, which usually require action by the living.

P: We Koreans are becoming famous for expressing our *han*, J. We would be honoured if you were to tell us something from your own experience of injustice, to stop this from becoming too one-sided.

J: Thank you for asking me. I am a bit startled by your interest in what I might tell you. Surely you don't want to hear about my very ordinary and unremarkable thoughts.

P: Perhaps not. Still, I am interested in your hopes and aspirations as well as in your sense of frustration. I do have one question. Do you not carry a feeling of resentment at the use of two atomic bombs against your country by the Americans?

J: No, I don't think so. I have accepted the message of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, "Never Again", and not thought much more about it.

O: I find it difficult to believe that Japanese people carry no *han* about the use against them of atomic weapons.

J: I can't speak for other Japanese people. I see it as one of the terrible things that people have done to each other in war. We Japanese did many bad things to others, as I said at the start of this conversation. There is a balance here that I can accept.

P: What about your experience as a woman in Japanese society? I think your society is as male-dominated as ours. (20)

J: There are some expectations that are unfair and difficult, particularly if we want to take a job as well as raise a family. I suppose I have been inclined to look at the ways in which things have been getting better for women through technological inventions and the influence of western ideas about equality.

W: Am I hearing two incompatible approaches to the building of understanding and community at this point? You Koreans seem to be asking J to share her sense of *han*, as a basis for building trust and understanding between you. J seems reluctant to express resentments, either because she genuinely feels none or because she doesn't want to take the risk of expressing them.

P: Yes, I think what you say is true. We could point to the findings of western psychology as a confirmation of the long Korean tradition of the *kut* ritual in which all sorts of guilty family secrets are exposed with mostly therapeutic consequences. If J doesn't tell us her honest feelings, we are left to fantasize what those feelings might be, which generates a bad cycle of deteriorating perceptions and expectations.

J: I feel obligated to deal with my own small problems myself. I think my attitude is based in Buddhist and Confucian teachings.

O: If you are speaking to us as a Japanese person, you are sharing with us your knowledge of large problems. *Han* does not arise from petty hurts but from deep and bitter

injustice. I am interested in your feelings about these larger issues.

J: I find that I don't feel comfortable putting forward my own feeling about large collective issues. There is a voice in my head, perhaps from my education, which says, "Who are you to speak for the whole Japanese people?". I want to speak with you about our collective problems, but I am still learning how to do this.

P: You were doing beautifully up to this point, when our direct questions seemed to bring this inner voice to life.

W: I do think it is essential that we discuss these issues. We face a world in which traditional spiritual practices and understandings have widely been given up in favour of modern science and technology which have met many human needs and created new problems. The fanatical solutions of one-sided, fundamentalist groups will seem inevitable in the absence of a better understanding between peoples and nations.

P: For peace-making, which addresses causes of conflict such as injustice and environmental degradation, we need to develop our networks of international co-operation. We also need to develop our spiritual contact with our ancestors and with spirit in nature if we are to make progress on such issues.

W: For me as an Australian, that suggests the importance of a proper reconciliation with the Aboriginal people and their ancestors, whose land we have taken by force. Maybe shamanic practices do have something to offer in this area.

J: You are making me think about the Ainu, W. This is another aspect of our history that I have not previously had to worry over.

P: Perhaps you need to avoid taking too heavy a sense of responsibility for the whole history of your people, J. I appreciate the fact that you are prepared to look on us as fellow human beings with whom you can join and talk. This is where peace is made, in the acceptance of each other as part of the one human community.

J: Thank you, P. Yes, I do feel quite overcome by it all. Perhaps this is enough for now; you have certainly given me a lot to think about. I have found your approach quite surprising. I was ready to hear many more bad stories about what we Japanese have done to your people.

O: You already know some of that and we respect you for it. My concern is what you and we can do about the outstanding problems. Building trust is more important than expressing our *han* in this conversation.

W: Thanks again for your welcome to a foreigner.

P: You have become our friend. Don't worry, you will have your chance to welcome us to Australia! J, it has been really good to get to know you. Please keep in touch so that we can take these things further.

J: I would like that. Good bye for now.

Endnotes:

(1) The most flagrant example of this repression was the murder of hundreds of demonstrators, mostly unarmed, by the Korean military at Kwangju in May, 1980.

(2) "Japan is a doctor, responsible as a teacher of civilization. Korea is like a sick person whose limbs are paralysed. Japanese interference in Korea should not be made in a retiring manner, but strongly and swiftly to bring Korean entrance into civilization." Fukuzawa Yukichi, Quoted in Conroy, H, "Chosen Mondai: The Korean Problem in Meiji Japan", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol.100, No.5 (October 15, 1956), p.447. I am grateful to Dr. Richard Tanter, Kyoto Seika University, for this reference and for his general assistance with this study.

(3) This assessment of Ichimura Kanzo is perhaps a little unfair. If we look at "Japan and the Japanese", (Collected Works, Volume 3, 1895, pp.169-297), we can find statements such as "Japan is to solve, and is solving the question of the right relation of Europe with Asia" (Ibid. p.185) and "If I am to mention the two greatest names in our history I unhesitatingly name Taiko and Saigo. Both had continental ambitions, and the world as their field of action." (Ibid. pp.206-7). 'Taiko' refers to Toyotomi Hideyoshi who launched the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592; Saigo Takamori was one of the foremost architects of the Meiji restoration and an impatient advocate of the invasion and annexation of Korea. Yet Ichimura Kanzo can also write "That men can live happily without forcing the utmost from the earth, and enslaving one portion of mankind for the other, I believe we did instinctively know." (Ibid. p.180).

(4) 'Yamabushi' means mountain priest or ascetic. Cf. Carmen Blacker, The Catalpa Bow: A Study of Shamanistic Practices in Japan, Mandala, Unwin, London, 1975, pp.164-6.

(5) For a description of this practice as performed by ascetics of the Mitakekyo sect, cf. Carmen Blacker, The Catalpa Bow, pp.317-20.

(6) For an account of the restoration, or introduction, of State Shinto, cf. Shigeyoshi Murakami, Japanese Religion in the Modern Century, Trans. H.B.Earhart, University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1980 (1968), pp.21-32.

(7) The repression of religious groups deemed heretical by the government between 1928 (the year of the passing of the

Peace Preservation Law) and 1945 is outlined in Shigeyoshi Murakami, Japanese Religion in the Modern Century, pp.95-109.

(8) "The word '*kami*' refers, in the most general sense, to all divine beings of heaven and earth that appear in the classics. More particularly, the '*kami*' are the spirits that abide in and are worshiped at the shrines. In principle human beings, birds, animals, trees, plants, mountains, oceans - all may be '*kami*'. According to ancient usage, whatever seemed strikingly impressive, possessed the quality of excellence, or inspired a feeling of awe was called '*kami*'." Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801), quoted in Japanese Religion: A Survey by the Agency for Cultural Affairs, Kodansha International, Tokyo, 1972, pp.37-8.

(9) For an authoritative account of the nature of the *kami*, cf. Sokyō Ono, Shinto: The Kami Way, Charles E. Tuttle Co., Tokyo, 1962, pp.6-9.

(10) This story reflects an experience of my own.

(11) For a more differentiated account of forms of Shinto, cf. Sokyō Ono, Shinto: The Kami Way, pp.12-19.

(12) Cf. Carmen Blacker, The Catalpa Bow, p.237.

(13) This story reflects an experience of my own.

(14) The Hussite movement in Bohemia, now part of the Czech Republic, is named for the Christian preacher Jan Hus.

(15) The basic meaning of Korean words such as '*han*' is given in Part One.

"For Koreans under the oppressive colonization of the Japanese, all Koreans were slaves of the foreigners, so the collective life of the Korean people could not be anything but a life of *han*. This sense of *han* was experienced not only by individual Koreans, but by the Korean society as a whole. *Han* was a collective feeling of the Korean people. Whenever people realize that they have been oppressed by foreign power, and their sense of national independence has been repressed, the feeling of *han* rises up to the level of psycho-political anger, frustration and indignation, combined with a feeling of extreme helplessness. This feeling of *han* is once again an awareness at both an individual psychological level as well as at a social and political level." David Kwang-Sun Suh, The Korean Minjung in Christ, pp.50-1.

(16) An example would be the work of Mr. Sim Woo-Sung, whose monodramas express something of the *han* of Korean people over the continuing division of the Korean nation. I am very grateful to Mr. Sim Woo-Sung for granting me an interview.

(17) Cf. Sun Soon-Wha, Women, Religion and Power: A Comparative Study of Korean Shamans and Women Ministers, Doctoral Dissertation, Drew University, Madison, NJ, 1991, pp.176-80.

(18) This was the general situation in Seoul in 1974, when I met with a number of groups there as part of a delegation from the World Student Christian Federation.

(19) Cf. David Kwang-Sun Suh, The Korean Minjung in Christ, pp.55-6, which tells of the imprisonment and death of Professor Suh's father.

(20) "Under Confucianism's strict imposition of discrimination against women, for example, the very existence of a woman was nothing but *han* itself. *Han* speaks of the kind of feeling a woman has when she cannot produce a male child for the family and thus has to agree, against her will, to her husband's bringing in another woman for child-bearing, or when she has to obey her mother-in-law's orders even when they are absolutely impossible and unreasonable. The feeling of *han* on the part of women, in this case, is due to an awareness of the structural injustice which a Confucian society imposes on women." David Kwang-Sun Suh, The Korean Minjung in Christ, p.50.

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By W. R. Carles



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
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From Journal of China Branch
of Royal Asiatic Society, 1888.

A COREAN MONUMENT TO MANCHU CLEMENCY.

By W. R. CARLES.

(Read before the Society 22nd October 1888.)

The monument which is the subject of this paper, has been mentioned in most books which have treated of Corea or the rise of the Manchu dynasty, and the occasion which it commemorates is referred to at some length in the *Sheng-wu-chi*.¹

In 1619 A.D., when the Manchus were beginning to prove what formidable enemies they were of the Ming Emperor, the survivors of a Corean army of 20,000 men, who had been fighting in conjunction with the Ming forces against the Manchus in Liao Tung, surrendered with their General Kiang Hung-li to Norhachu. The greater portion of the Coreans were set free and returned to their country, Hung-li with a few others being alone detained.

On Norhachu's death, in 1627 A.D., the Coreans failed to send a mission of condolence, an omission which provoked an invasion, before which the king and his court fled helplessly to Kang-hoa, the large island-fortress at the mouth of the Han. Submission to the invading army averted harsh treatment, and the Manchus retired, leaving however a garrison at the mouth of the Yalu, on the northern frontier.

In 1637 Corea was once more subjected to a Manchu invasion, provoked on this occasion by non-observance of the

¹ A translation of the portion of the *Sheng-wu-chi* which treats of this appeared in the *Chinese Times* of September 8th, 1888. See also *Corea: Its History, Manners and Customs*; by the Rev. JOHN ROSS, pp. 285-6.

stipulations of the treaty of 1627, and more especially it would appear by the use of terms in correspondence which failed to recognise the superiority of the "Ta-ch'ing" nation. The terms of peace that were exacted by the Manchus when Corea was completely at their feet, were very lenient, and aimed chiefly at the recognition of the "Ta-ch'ing" Empire, which had been proclaimed the previous year.

Such is a brief summary of the events referred to in the inscription on the monument. The monument itself is a solid piece of stone 15 feet high, 5 feet broad and 15 inches thick, fixed on the back of a stone tortoise, itself 12 feet long and $3\frac{1}{2}$ ft. high. On the reverse of the monument is an inscription in Manchu.

The copy of the inscription which follows was made by a Corean, whose only difficulties were due to the height of the monument, the characters themselves being wonderfully clear. For the translation I am indebted to the collaboration of my friend Mr. M. F. A. FRASER, of H.B.M. Consular Service in China.

[*Translation.*]

A TABLET TO THE VALOUR AND CLEMENCY OF THE
TA T'SING EMPEROR.

In the 12th moon of the winter of the 1st year of the Ta-T'sing reign Ts'ung Teh [A.D. 1636], the Emperor K'wan Wên Yen Shêng grew incensed because we had violated the peace, and drew nigh with a warlike array, who drove their way straight towards the East, and none dared to withstand them. At that time I, your Prince, staying in Nan Han,² trembled like him who walks on spring ice, and waited for the dawn

² Nan Han, a fortress in the mountains to the South of the Han River.

nigh 50 days. In that time my soldiers in the Eastern and Southern Provinces were beaten in succession, and the army of the North and West cowered among the hills, and could not advance a step. In the city the food was all exhausted, and at this moment with the great host he took the city, as easily as the frosty wind curls up the autumn leaves, or the furnace-flames consume the feathers of the wild goose.

But the Emperor warred not only that he might destroy us, but placed first the manifestation of his goodness, and issued an edict which said: "Come, and I will preserve you; refuse and I will slay you, like Ying and Ma the Generals." Messengers carrying the Emperor's commands filled the roads in endless line. At that time I, your Prince, assembled my Generals and statesmen, and thus spake:—

"I have received the gift of friendship from the Great Country for ten years, but, misguided and blinded, I have called down the swift visitation of Heaven upon us, and the fault of me alone has brought tribulation on the myriads. Since the Emperor still cannot bear to destroy us, but has issued an Edict like this, how should I dare not to reverentially receive and obey it, so that, above, my ancestral line may be preserved, and, below, the lives of my people may be protected?"

My Ministers all agreed with and applauded these words, and with some score of horsemen I proceeded to the army and acknowledged my offence. But the Emperor treated me with high honor, and encouraged me with gracious condescension. As soon as he saw me he opened his heart to me, and conferred favors, which he even extended to the Ministers who attended me. When the ceremonies were ended, he sent me, your Prince, back to the Capital, and called in his troops in the South to go Westwards

again. He comforted the people and exhorted them to agriculture, and, scattered far and near like starlings as they had been, they all returned to their homes. Was not this a great and unexpected blessing?

Our small country had offended the superior nation long ago by its deeds of the year 己未 [1619], when Kiang Hung-li, the generalissimo, assisted the Ming dynasty. His army was defeated, and he was captured. But the Emperor T'ai Tsu Wu only detained Hung-li and a few others, and set free all the rest. Was not this the extreme of favor? But our small country was misguided and had no understanding, and in the year 丁卯 [1627] the present Emperor ordered an Eastern campaign against her. Our country's King and Ministers fled to an Island of the Sea, and sent envoys to sue for peace. The Emperor granted their prayer, and regarding us as brothers, he restored to us all our border-lands, and Hung-li was released.

Since that time, we have ever been treated with honor, and caps and umbrellas have crossed on the road. But unfortunately floating talk fanned commotion, and built up a ladder of disturbance and confusion. Our little country rebuked its high officers on the frontier; words of insubmission were employed; and the despatches came into the possession of the servants of the Emperor. The Emperor still treated us liberally, and did not at once send troops, but first issued a clear ultimatum, proclaiming to us the date of war. Carefully did he repeat his instructions again and again, as though he had taken us by the ear and commanded us face-to-face; but finally there was no escape. Thus the punishment of the King and Ministers of our small country became still more inevitable, and the Emperor with a great army surrounded Nan Han, and commanded a wing

of it first to capture the River Capital, where the King's concubines and his sons, his Ministers and Officers and their families were all made prisoner.

The Emperor forbade his Generals to molest or injure the captives, and ordered his palace-guards to watch and protect them,—truly an act of great grace! The small country's King and Ministers, with their families who had been taken prisoner, returned to their old homes. Frost and snow changed to sunny spring, arid drought turned to timely rain. The land had been lost and was restored again; the dynastic line had been severed and was continued. The Eastern Country with its thousands of *li* was all enveloped in the blessings of his favor. In the records of antiquity such a thing has rarely been seen. Oh, how grand was this!

To the South of the San Tien Ferry,³ on the upper waters of the Han, is the place where the Emperor pitched his camp. This was the site of the altar, and I, your Prince, therefore commanded the Board of Works to increase the altar and heighten it, and place a stone monument here to continue through all time, to spread the knowledge of the Emperor's prowess and good works, which will flow on as long as nature lasts. It is not only our small country which will for ages rely on him, but the Great Dynasty's benevolent fame and martial glory will bring all to his feet from the remotest regions; and all this is founded on these deeds of his. Comparisons with the greatness of sky and earth, pictures of the brightness of sun and moon, fail to figure him in a ten-thousandth degree. This reverent inscription conveys but a vague and imperfect record.

Heaven sends down the frost and it sends down the dew. It can be severe and it can be beneficent. The Emperor,

³ About 10 miles to the East of Seoul.

like Heaven, spreads terror and spreads kindness. The Emperor invaded the Eastern Country with ten myriads of men. The roar of his army was like the roar of the tiger and the leopard.

The Si-fan,⁴ K'ung-fah, and the tribes of the North, Carrying their spears, galloped in the vanguard, an imposing display of power!

The Emperor, in his vast humanity, spoke to us with gracious words; full and complete were they, severe and yet indulgent.

At first we had been misled and ignorant, and so had brought down sorrow on ourselves;

But when the Emperor clearly expressed his decree, we awoke as from sleep.

I, the King, have submitted and returned with my followers,

Not only fearing his power, but also relying on his virtues.

The Emperor honored us with magnificent kindness, with a face both happy and benign, and the spear and halberd were put aside.

⁴ The presence of the Si-fan in the Manchu army which invaded Corea, seems to me very remarkable. I have not been able to identify the K'ung-fa nor to find any reference to such a nation or country except in the following extract from the *P'ei-wên Yun-fu*.

池莊窮是蠕受晉
也子髮故蠕正書
註窮之魏者朔摯
窮髮野祖奴北史虞
髮之逐宗揚之裔史傳
不北無威根本蠕窮
毛溟人之耀本蠕髮
之地者鄉武莫傳反
天無之鄉武莫尋景承

What gifts did he give us? Fleet horses and light furs of sable.

The young men and women of the Capital then chanted songs and ballads.

The return of our King was the gift of the Emperor.

The Emperor removed his army, and gave life to our children.

He reunited us from our dispersion, and exhorted us to the works of agriculture.

He built up our city wall as of old, he raised again our splendid altar.

The dry bones had flesh again; spring returned to the wintry roots of grass.

The stone stands majestic at the head of the Great River.

San Han⁵ for 10,000 years will enjoy the protection of the Emperor.

Erected in the Year of Ts'ung Teh, IV, 12, 8 [1639].

Composed, by Royal Command, by Li King-shih, *Tsz-hien Ta-fu*,⁶ President of the Board of Civil Office, Literary Recorder, State Literary Composer, Chancellor of the Royal Academy.

Written, by Royal Command, by the hand of Wu Ts'ün, *Tsz-hien Ta-fu*,⁶ Governor of Seoul.

Heading in Seal Characters written, by Royal Command, by the hand of Lü Êrh-chêng, *Kia-shan Ta-fu*,⁶ Vice-President of the Board of Ceremonies, Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the Court of Judicial Enquiry.

⁵ Reference is made to the capital and its environs, including the northern and southern fortresses.

⁶ *Tsz-hien Ta-fu*, *Kai-shan Ta-fu*: Titles of honor conferred as a reward for merit or service.

November 12th, 1888.

P.S.—I am indebted to Mr. COLIN M. FORD, H.B.M. Acting Consul-General in Corea, for rubbings of the inscriptions on the monument, which have reached me within the last week. The rubbing of the Corean inscription shows the existence of the following errata in the copy which has been photo-lithographed :—

In column	5,	48 characters	from the top,	for	武臣	read	文武
"	"	11, 17	"	"	亦矣茲	"	亦還百茲
"	"	12, 17	"	"	諭師期	"	諭以師期
"	"	14, 58	"	"	宗社	"	宗祀
"	"	17, 17	"	"	特小邦	"	特我小邦



For Dr. Gale

Gregory Henderson

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Korea's Heritage: A Regional and Social Geography, by Shannon McCUNE. Tōkyō: Charles E. Tuttle Company, with the cooperation of the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956. Pp. xiii + 250 + Maps and Charts 21 + Plates 95 + Appendices + Index. \$5.00.

The path to an understanding of the land and culture of Korea has proved a hard and abnormally slow one for American scholarship. It is therefore a pleasure to welcome a thoroughly sympathetic, pleasantly written, and attractively published geography of Korea by a member of a family famous for its deep interest in and long connection with the country. American scholarship has still not approached the writing of definitive works in this field; Dr. Shannon McCUNE's *Korea's Heritage* is thus unavoidably short of the ideal, but it is a welcome extension of our knowledge and, with the deep sympathy and respect for the Korean people which inspire it, of our understanding as well.

Dr. McCUNE's work, 250 pages long, proceeds from the general to the particular. Surveys of the location of the peninsula and the general characteristics of the land are followed by brief treatments of Korea's historical development, basic political quandaries (mostly recent), population, social characteristics, and basic economy. The chapter on population is relatively the most detailed and is certainly one of the best presentations of the subject available to the general reader. The last two chapters, which present descriptions and interpretations of the geographic regions of North and South Korea, probably contain Dr. McCUNE's most original contributions. Here the touch is especially sure and probes ideas and material well in advance of those previously published for the layman in America. It presents a mature consideration of the geographic regions of Korea, the resources and ways of life which characterize them, and the possible ways of fruitfully utilizing them. While much remains for more detailed scholarship, Dr. McCUNE deserves our gratitude for introducing here a subject of basic importance to Korean studies.

The chief deficiency of the book is its excessive generalization. It is both inevitable and ironic that this should be so. Dr.

MCCUNE is well-known for his life-long attempts to encourage the growth of American scholarship on Korea; he is less responsible than any man for the fact that these attempts are still far from fruition. America's academic inattention to Korea still haunts his efforts to fill in the outline of Korea's geography. If we share, as I think we must, responsibility for the present state of American scholarship on Korea, then our awareness of this deficiency should further awaken us to the difficulties of publishing mature scholarship in that field.

Whatever the explanation, generalization does haunt *Korea's Heritage*. There are too many statements such as: "The climate, vegetation, and soils give distinctive character to the land of Korea. They are factors which both aid and limit the activities of the Korean farmer." (page 24), raising the reader's constant question: "Yes, very true, but in just what way?" The impression of generality in the text is partially qualified by the rather full and quite excellent notes in which, with the exception of the book's last two chapters on regionalism, will be found most of the specialized information. Perhaps the publisher is primarily responsible for this generalization, for we read on the jacket the publisher's approving dictum: "Professor McCune . . . has avoided loading the text with detailed technical data, so that the ordinary reader will not be over-burdened with these details." In this and so many other instances the publisher should be warned against underestimating the public's capacity for comprehensive information. Most *Journal* readers will regret that much of the content of the notes was not included in the text—and replaced by more notes with a still further level of informational and interpretive depth. By the same token, however, Dr. McCUNE has advantageously eliminated most possibilities for controversy from his text. General he may be, but what he does say is, unlike much that is written about Korea, almost always true.

In one other general respect the book raises doubt and, to me, disappointment: in its capacity to live up to its theme. No serious scholar of Korea could fail to be excited by the prospect of Korean history, economics, and *Lebensstil* seen through a critical

geographical glass. Yet it frequently seems as if the sections on history, politics, and economics had not been carefully subordinated to the central geographical theme. What is the significance of the peninsula's location for the dynamics of its cultural history? How shall we compare Korea's development in this respect with China's and Japan's? Has Korea's size been restrictive on its intellectual life or has it resulted in greater concentration and depth? Of what significance for Silla's history and culture was it that the peninsula was united by a power centered at Kyōngju, at the opposite end of the peninsula from China? Did geographical factors fundamentally affect Silla administration in the "nine capital" system? Is not geography an important criterion for judging Koryō's "pyōngma-sa" system? To what extent did Korea's families and political factions during the Yi period have roots deep in the peninsula's regional geography? What kind of balance between central and local administration has Korean geography tended to produce? Were geographical factors of significance in Korea's lack of any real feudal period? What has been the effect of the sea and islands on Korean history and culture? These and many more questions arise when, in a "regional and social geography," the student of Korean history sees the apparent promise of broad inquiry. Such questions and the answers to them may be inevitably controversial; yet they invite a geographer of Dr. McCUNE's reputation to parry with them. It is a loss for scholarship on Korea that he has, in general, chosen not to do so.

Korea's Heritage also suffers as a reference text, not only from the general lack of accurate statistics available to the Korean specialists but also from a failure to obtain all but a very few statistics on Korea since the Japanese occupation. One cannot, for example, find the area of the present Republic of Korea (38,175 square miles), nor that of the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (47,071 square miles). The population figures given are largely for 1944 and there is little breakdown of the population living within the present limits of North and South Korea (approximately 22,000,000 and 8,300,000, respectively). There are good tables on resources and industry, but many of the figures

given are for 1944 and are thus outdated several times over. More recent figures than these are, in most cases, available. There is much mention of the 38th parallel, but very little of the Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone which took its place well before publication of the book. Other shortcomings include sparse treatment—in the notes—of geological and topographical elements, and virtually no treatment of soils. While the islands of Cheju-do and Ullŭng-do are described, the many hundreds of other islands get short shrift. In attempting to discover the number of islands in Korea from this volume, I could learn only that there were “many.”

Korea's Heritage illustrates one further problem of general interest: its appearance adds to the evidence that the “McCUNE-REISCHAUER” system of romanization of Korea has broken down for practical purposes and should be modified or replaced. This system, properly used, is perfectly satisfactory for ordinary purposes, but unfortunately, it depends entirely upon the use of diacritical marks which publishers usually cannot be induced to print. Both Dr. McCUNE and his brother, who co-authored the system, had to abandon it in their own, popularly published works, and the U.S. Government faces exactly similar problems today. The abandonment of diacritical marks means that essential distinctions on which the Korean language is structured disappear, producing worse results than would the consistent use of a system theoretically inferior. I would, therefore, plead for the appearance of a romanization system which will retain the basic *hangŭl* distinctions and which American publishers will accept. With some compromise of linguistic elegance, such a system is not beyond the possibility of devising.

While *Korea's Heritage* does not, and perhaps cannot, within the severe limitations set by the above-mentioned circumstances, completely live up to the task set for it, on balance it is a very creditable and welcome book. It contains much good information and many mature observations; it is extremely nicely published, with fine paper and print and an exceptionally good collection of well-reproduced photographs; and it can serve as a commendable introduction to Korea for the layman while still of interest to

the scholar. Last, and most important, through the picture of Korea which Dr. McCUNE paints and the judgments he renders, there shines that genuine sympathy which has won for him the respect and affection of all those seriously interested in Korea.

Gregory HENDERSON

Department of State

Dr. Samuel Moffet
with warmest regards

함평촌

RELIGION AND LAW IN KOREA

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by

HAHM, PYŎNG-CHOON

RELIGION AND LAW IN KOREA

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Yonsei University
Seoul, Korea

I. Problems, Concepts and Definitions

The problems of culture conflict and acculturation (culture contact) have come to occupy a position of increasing importance as a subject of study among anthropologists and sociologists in recent decades. Although these scholars themselves would be the first to agree that there is still considerable room for improvement in theory and conceptualization, there has been substantial contribution to our understanding of the process of encounter between different cultures. With the European colonial powers the question of acculturation of their colonial peoples was a practical one of application. Knowledge of the mechanics of cultural transmission and variety was essential as a basis for their colonial policy. In America the overpowering of Indian culture by white culture has been of interest to anthropologists. Convergence of divergent European cultures in "the great melting pot" has prompted the American social scientists to study the subject from both psychological (personal disorganization) and socio-cultural (cultural change) vantage points (Stonequist 1937 and Beals 1962: 375-395).

In the field of law, culture contact, in terms of an alien legal system being transmitted to a receiving culture with totally different historical background, has been a subject of little interest. It is true that the American Realists (Karl Llewellyn with Adamson Hoebel, for example) and some comparative lawyers have shown some interest in this problem. But the problem has been left largely untouched by lawyers. Even sociologists of law have confined themselves primarily to their own cultures with emphasis on "culture lag." There seem to be several reasons for this neglect. Aside from thoroughgoing ethnocentrism found everywhere with

lawyers, no one seems to have considered the problem of much importance. Receiving cultures themselves have usually decided that their indigenous legal systems were inferior and had to be abandoned in favor of modern systems from European cultures. The adoption of a Western legal system was just another step in a series of "indispensable" measures thought essential for development and modernization. In the case of a colony, the imposition of the legal system of the "mother country" was simply a political question.

In discussing the problems of transplanting a modern legal system, the underlying assumption has invariably been that such an action is unavoidable. Another assumption is that since Roman law "worked" in the case of the Germanic peoples in Europe, there is no reason why the same should not be true with Asians and Africans. Apart from the validity of the assertion concerning Roman law in Europe, the analogy between Europe and Asia seem false. The imported legal system has not "worked" in Korea. It has remained an alien system confined to urban centers. It has failed to make itself relevant, let alone indispensable, to the life of the majority of the population. The indigenous way of life is so different from the European way of life out of which the imported legal system had grown, that the wonder is that it has not caused more disruption and disorganization than it has. The predicament faced by Korea is that the norms of positive law not only lack the support of "the normative customs of the living law" but the two in fact conflict with each other. A major consequence of this state of affairs is "a corruption of legal and political officials which turns positive law into something worse than a dead letter" (Northrop 1960:617)¹.

It is therefore imperative that the conflict between the imported legal system and the indigenous jurial values of the people should be at least minimized. One solution would be to reject the imported system and revert to the traditional system. This appears, however, impossible in view of the existing commitment to modernization on the part of the

political leadership. Moreover, rapidly increasing international interdependence, especially international trade, rules out such a possibility. Another solution would be to go to the opposite extreme and ruthlessly root out the traditional values. But the mores have proven themselves extremely resilient. Such a course of action would only intensify the conflict. It is therefore necessary to accept the fact of conflict and do our best to minimize it. It is the aim of this paper to facilitate a better understanding of the nature of this conflict by examining the relationship between religious and jural values of the Korean people.

The close interconnection between law and religion has received ample documentation throughout history. In many societies law and religion are not differentiated (Maine 1930; Friedrich 1958 8-12; Boddenheimer 1962: 4-5). Even today the willingness to separate the science of law from theology and religion is by no means universal. It is true that the theory of natural law itself has been secularized to a large extent. It is no longer fashionable to evaluate a piece of legislation in terms of "the eternal law of God." Nevertheless, the notion that the law ought to be just and reasonable retains its vitality, albeit its frame of reference is no longer sacred.

Our concern here, however, is not a validation or refutation of any particular theory of natural or divine law. Our interest in the close relationship between law and religion stems from their mutual interaction in the realm of "intuitive legal consciousness" as Leon Petrazycki (1955:221-240)² put it or "in the inner order of association" as Eugen Ehrlich (1936:37) perceived it. It is Ehrlich's "living law"³ and Petrazycki's "intuitive law"⁴ that we find of significance in viewing the legal landscape of Korea. Jurisprudents in the past have endeavored to differentiate as well as to relate law and morality. It is not our purpose to define sharply the respective provinces of law and morality. We shall proceed on the assumption that law and morality share a common territory in which they interact with one another⁵ as well as with religion. "Law,

morality and religion are three ways of controlling human conduct which in different types of society supplement one another, and are combined in different ways" (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:172).

It is not insisted here that the three forms of social control are identical or that the fields covered by them are the same, but it is argued that the three are closely interrelated and that they do interact with one another. Nor is it the purpose of this paper to establish a causal relationship or primacy among these three types of social control. We are interested in religion because it is "an important or even essential part of the social machinery, as are morality and law, part of the complex system by which human beings are enabled to live together in an orderly arrangement of social relations" (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:154). Thus, we are interested in the "social function" of religion. We are concerned with law, morality and religion because they all contribute to the formation and maintenance of a social order.

Durkheim's definition of "collective conscience" (1964:72) and Parsons' concept of "normative culture" (1964:121-125) are broad enough to encompass all three forms of social control with which we are concerned. Taking the latter as a point of departure for our inquiry, we are faced with several important questions. First, "What are the constituent elements of the normative culture?" Parsons differentiates four components of normative cultural patterns according to four levels of generality. That component which belongs to the highest level of generality is called societal values. Differentiated norms, collectivities (collective goals) and roles (role expectations) are the remaining components of the culture patterns in the descending order of levels of generality (Parsons 1964: 121-125).

Law, morality, and religion--the three conventional categories of social control--appear to function at all four levels of normative culture. They cut across the four levels. It would be unwise to force each of the three conventional categories into one or more of the four

components of normative culture. Religion, morality, and law all share their common root in the societal values. All three influence the delineation of what is the desirable and the good society, and they, as differentiated norms, are in turn legitimized by the value system. The three categories also participate jointly in the articulation of collective goals and in the definition of role expectations. Consequently, in dealing with the questions related to the "functional" aspect of law, morality, and religion, we may properly subsume them under the concept of normative culture or its highest level of generality, societal values.⁶

The second question is, "How is the normative culture maintained?" The normative culture patterns are "institutionalized in the social system and internalized in the personalities of its individual members" (Parsons 1964:122). Anthropologists and sociologists appear to have mainly concerned themselves with the institutionalization of culture patterns (culture). The internalization of cultural patterns has been a subject of study by psychologists (personality). But both the social and individual aspects of the maintenance of social order (or cultural patterns) are the same integral order of human phenomena. Inflexible dichotomy between culture and personality seems unrealistic in view of the increasing awareness among psychologists and anthropologists that their fields of study are the same integral reality of human life (Hallowell 1955:351,357)⁷.

The third question to be posed is, "What are the precise mechanics of interaction between the social system and the individual personality?" How society and culture are internalized within the individual human actor has been a subject of great interest not only to the psychologist as a part of learning process but to every student of sociocultural disciplines as the process of socialization (Parsons and Bales 1957:357). It is pertinent to note that law has usually been identified with the institutionalized facet of normative culture, religion with the internalized (Parsons 1964: 148-149).

It seems obvious that no individual incorporates the local culture

of his time intact. The individual must restructure his own values (Brown 1965:405). But it is equally obvious that the individual restructuring has to be largely conditioned by the local culture. The social system must rely on its individual members to carry on cultural patterns, but the values they incorporate initially are given to them by the social system.⁸ Individuals must be made to "want to act as they have to act" [author's italics] and at the same time find gratification in acting according to the requirements of the culture" (Fromm 1949:5).

There are still further questions concerning the specifics of motivation. It may be necessary to learn the exact details of how incorporated values control behavior; how new values are chosen to be incorporated; and what happens when the incorporated values mutually conflict. These and other questions are very important. But they fall outside the scope of this paper. It should nonetheless be pointed out that with respect to motivation it has been noted that its mechanisms, hence the mechanisms of social control, are non-rational (Parsons 1964:144-145). Moreover, religion is usually placed in the context of non-rational components of motivation when its relation with the internalized aspects of values and norms (personality structure) is analyzed. On the other hand, law, at least in its higher level of administration, tends to be classed with the more rational areas of social life, e.g., the market (Parsons 1964:145, 148-149).

Before we can proceed any further some sort of definition of religion is required. I should like to make a functional definition of religion that may serve our purpose heuristically. Religion is defined as a system of beliefs that gives meaning and significance to the ultimate reality of the human existence of the believer. This definition of religion would be considered inadequate and/or improper by many. Aside from its omission of any reference to a god, it also omits two important factors stressed by Durkheim: "sacred things" and "one single moral community called a Church" (Durkheim 1965:62-63). The reason for such

omissions should be obvious to anyone with some knowledge of the religions of Asia. Neither shamanism nor Taoism would qualify as a religion under Durkheim's definition. Confucianism and even Buddhism would have difficulty qualifying under a "theological" definition of religion. The simplified definition of religion proposed here and similarly used by Bellah (1957: 6-7) in his study of the religions of Japan should serve as an adequate conceptual tool for our analysis.

II. Religions from China

History records that as early as 372 A.D. Buddhism reached the northern kingdom of Kokuryo and by 528 A.D. it was officially accepted by the last of the Three Kingdoms that divided the Korean peninsula at the time. As to the other two legs of "the tripod on which the spiritual life of the kingdom may stably rest"⁹--Confucianism and Taoism--history gives us no definite date of official introduction. Having come from China, these three advanced religions were introduced to the Korean people as part of the advanced civilization of China. They were first taken over by the ruling elite, and it was some time before they became the faiths of the common people. It was only after they found responsive chords in the minds of the common men, through the process of indigenization and syncretization, that they became a part of popular faith. The three religions were always thought to be mutually complementary, and each was important in different areas of moral life. They formed an integral whole, for when one of the three occupied a dominant position, the other two continued to play important parts in the spiritual life of the people. This ability of the Chinese and Koreans to tolerate and adhere indiscriminately to many religions simultaneously has already become legendary in the West.¹⁰

Buddhism

Of the three systems of beliefs Buddhism had more of a "churchly" quality than the other two. It formed a "moral community." Specialized

ecclesiastic groups and a strong monastic life were an important part of the religion. Aside from the fact that Buddhism was a religion of Indian origin and therefore non-Chinese, it was in a sense more of a religion than the other two. It preached individual salvation, not the preservation and prosperity of family. It stressed a universalistic ethic, not a particularistic standard of behavior based on filial piety. It had a specific concept of the afterlife, the condition of which was to be determined by the quality of the conduct before death.

The Buddhism of Korea is not noted for radical doctrinal innovations. It has, however, made its own creative contributions to the development and expansion of various doctrines transmitted from India and China. In its height of development it not only made original theoretical contributions to T'ient'ai Doctrine but it also achieved a distinct personality in the form of Korean Sŏn (Ch'an in Chinese, Zen in Japanese) by combining Dhyana (meditation) with Prajna (highest knowledge that leads to the realization of the Deity). Its contributions in the area of translation, printing, and publication of Buddhist literature is truly unsurpassed in the history of Buddhism. The Tripataka Koreana which was completed in 1251 A.D. after sixteen years of labor is known to be the most complete collection of Buddhist literature in the world. It is composed of 81,137 wooden printing blocks which were engraved during the Mongol invasion of the peninsula to seek Buddha's protection, and which are still preserved to this day. Its missionary zeal was responsible for the transmission of Buddha's teachings to Japan soon after its own establishment. On several occasions Chinese Buddhism had to rely on the Korean church to re-export its own literature back to China.¹¹

Buddhism immeasurably enriched the Korean culture, especially during the Koryo Dynasty (918-1392 A.D.) when it reached its height of development and glory as the state religion. It is a part of Korean cultural heritage and has left an indelible mark on language, manners and customs, arts, folklore, and so on. It is an integral part of modern

Korea. Even today Buddha's birthday draws the multitude to numerous temples throughout the country. But it is no longer a dominant force in the spiritual life of the Korean people. It has never been a "political" religion, as has been pointed out by Toynbee.¹² When Confucian literati steeped in Neo-Confucian ideology overthrew the Koryo Dynasty and established a new dynasty in the image of Sung restorationism, Buddhism in Korea met the same fate as in China. After centuries of suppression and decay it became indistinguishable from Taoism and shamanism. Bonzes were finally made social equals of shamans and prostitutes. They in fact performed the roles of sorcerers and diviners. Their temples came to include small pavilions of worship dedicated to local demons or deities. Buddhism's ability to adapt to the indigenous milieu caused its own ultimate decline. And yet, it is still the most important religion of Korea, albeit few Koreans are willing to claim it as the religion they believe in.

Taoism

When Taoism reached Korea, it had already become a "religion", having assimilated a great deal of doctrinal elements from Buddhism. Its capacity to syncretize local deities was no less than that of Buddhism. It borrowed from whatever source appealed to it. Its practicality, without complex and abstract doctrines and precepts, held special attraction for the masses. Its willingness to accommodate local aspirations and conveniences rendered it readily acceptable to the ruling elite. Its doctrinal flexibility removed very quickly whatever foreignness it might have possessed. Its origin as a philosophical system that shared the Book of Changes as a common classic with Confucianism made it an acceptable part of the intellectual dilettantism of the Korean Confucian elite. In the case of China it has in fact been argued that in the realm of political and legal philosophy it was Taoism more than Confucianism that was dominant throughout its history (Tseng Yu-Hao 1930:2). In any event, the importance and powerful influence of Taoism in the political life of the supposedly Confucian Yi Korea cannot be minimized.

But it was in the realm of folk religion that Taoism played an important role. The Taoism that came to Korea had not only borrowed religious ideas, divinities and cults from Buddhism that had come into China in the wake of the disintegration of the Han Empire, but it had also improvised and absorbed local divinities and cults of the Chinese peasants. This popular Taoism that had already met the need of "polydaemonic" Chinese masses was well prepared to meet the similar need of the shamanistic-animistic Korean masses. To the Korean peasant Taoism always stood for the technique of acquiring the power to command the life force of the cosmos. It promised longevity. Medicine was an important part of the religion. Tao, the way of ultimate reality, appeared to the popular mind as the fountain of life force. By manipulating this cosmic ether, popular Taoism promised health, strength, longevity, and fecundity. It had an infinite capacity to make itself relevant at every vicissitude of Korean life. It was the ability of Taoism to enjoy hospitality not only at the Confucian ancestor worship rite and at the Buddhist temple but also at the shamanistic ecstasy that made it an important part of the folk religion of the Korean people.

Confucianism

Of the three religions under discussion, it is Confucianism that encounters greatest difficulty in being classed as a "religion." One finds greater readiness to classify Confucianism as an "ethical system" than as a religion. Professors Reischauer and Fairbank (1960:30) qualify their view of Confucianism as "this great ethical institution" by saying that it "in a sense occupied in China much of the place filled by both law and religion in the West. . . ." The Korean Confucianism with which we are concerned is the Neo-Confucianism that came to serve as the ideological foundation of Yi Dynasty Korea (1392-1910 A.D.). This Confucianism, "reformed" at the hands of Chu Hsi and his successors in China and Korea, had been profoundly influenced by Buddhism which they considered

an enemy. Buddhist ideas were appropriated by the reformed Confucianism to a very large extent. But, as Professor Wright points out, the Neo-Confucianism remained "basically social and ethical in its interests" (Wright 1959:89). In spite of the great influence of Buddhism, this revived Confucianism of Sung China never adopted a central deity of transcendental supremacy or a certainty of the other world.

The real reason, however, for classifying Confucianism in Korea as a religion, lies not so much in the fact that it had appropriated a great deal from Buddhism as in the fact that it provided or at least attempted to provide some meaning and significance to the ultimate reality of the human existence.¹⁴ It is for this reason that we cannot brush Confucianism aside as an ethical system in discussing the religions of Korea. Moreover, ancestor worship which constituted the ritual expression of filial piety--the fundamental principle of Confucian ethics--became in fact a religious (or superstitious, if you will) rite. Rituals became elaborate and standardized, with the male head of the family acting as priest. In any culture the dead seems to inspire awe rather than affection (Cumont 1959:3, 47). Whatever the orthodox Confucian rationale for mourning (Fung Yu-Lan 1952:344-350), it tended to go beyond mere expression of affection and "human feelings." It was used to extract material blessings, especially male children, from the dead. It was used to appease the loneliness and the vengeance of the dead. Mourning and ancestor cult came to be encrusted with supernatural meanings.

It is in geomancy that Confucianism and Taoism came to share a common ground. It was the height of filial piety to find a best possible resting place for one's dead ancestors. If, by securing such a comfortable nether abode for one's "sleeping" ancestors, one could fulfill one's filial duty as well as secure bountiful blessing, it was only proper and wise to acquire such a choice piece of land. It was the art of geomancy that located such a blessed spot for a filialson. No amount of expense or sacrifice was considered excessive for its acquisition. If a geomancer

could convince a filial son of the reliability of the information in his possession, he could well-nigh name his own price. The extent to which a filial son was prepared to go to take possession of myōngdang (a beneficent plot) was unbelievably great. We can still hear many fantastic stories being told of wonders wrought by the opportune use of myōngdang. It seems that the ruling elite of Yi Korea expended almost all of their energy in performing mourning and ancestor worship rites, locating myōngdang and grabbing hold of it. Having forsaken Buddhism as a superstition fit only for gullible women and the ignorant masses, they seemed to have needed a "religion" of some kind that could give them something certain beyond metaphysical disputations. In fact popular Confucianism and Taoism became almost indistinguishable with respect to ancestor cults.

The vulgar aspect of Korean Confucianism described above does not, of course, give us the whole picture. As the state religion and the state ideology of Yi Korea, it was in a position to command the exclusive allegiance and attention of the best minds of Korea for over five centuries. During the sixteenth century it reached the apogee of philosophic development when it produced a host of great intellects, whose prolific writings have been recognized as authoritative expositions of Neo-Confucianism both in China and Japan. The metaphysical debate between the monists and the dualists took Korean Confucianism far beyond the theories of Chu Hsi. The monists who argued that ch'i (Ether) was the Ultimate One from which all life force emanated and that ch'i was the Prime Mover came very close to repudiating Chu Hsi himself whose dualism placed li principle before ch'i. Having been stimulated by the contact of China with Western science and Roman Catholicism, a reformist school called "Silhak" gathered some momentum in the second half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries. The school stressed greater administrative efficiency and rationalization. They emphasized economic growth and welfare of the common people. They advocated the acceptance of Western science. But in the end Korean Confucianism failed

to reform itself. Its traditionalism prevented it from acquiring dynamism and aggressiveness needed to meet the challenge of the West.¹⁵

Today, not many Koreans would acknowledge their religious affiliation as "Confucianism." Few young Koreans would profess any interest in its doctrines, but Confucianism still remains the moral foundation of the nation. From family life to the standard of morality, the Confucian heritage is still making itself felt in every facet of the nation's life.

III. Shamanism: The Indigenous Cult

As with other Asian countries, shamanism was the indigenous "religion" of Korea. The existence of shamanism in the early history of China has been well established (de Groot 1910:1187-1341; Fung Yu-Lan 1952:22-31). The fact that the shamaness of ancient Japan had a close resemblance to that of Korea and of the Altai has been pointed out by Haguenuer (1956:178-179). Although shamanism cannot be restricted to any one region of the globe, Eliade considers "shamanism in the strict sense" to be "pre-eminently a religious phenomenon of Siberia and Central Asia" (Eliade 1964:4). It is in Central and North Asia that the shaman has found himself at the center of the magico-religious life of his society. It was in this area of the world that the earliest travellers began documenting shamanism. As a peninsula appended to the northeastern part of the Asian continent, it is only natural that Korea partook in this form of religious life. It is important, however, to remind ourselves that the shamanism we find today in Korea has undergone profound changes through the two thousand years of recorded history. The three religions from China have had ample opportunity to work on the indigenous cult.

The oldest recorded history of Korea contains a specific reference to the employment of a shaman to discover the desires of a dead Kokuryo monarch concerning the planting of rows of pine trees along his grave for the purpose of screening his resting place from the tomb of his unfaithful wife.¹⁶ A Chinese source tells us that the tribes in the

southern part of the peninsula each had a shaman whose ritual officiation was centered around a big tree.¹⁷ The essential significance of a tree (the Cosmic Tree) in shamanism has been fully shown by Eliade (1964: 269-274). The importance of birds (raven, cock, crane and others) in the Korean mythology has also been pointed out by historians, thus again connecting Korean shamanism to that of the rest of North Asia. As a people called by their neighbors the People of the Bear, the Koreans have a mythology that claims the first shaman-king of the Koreans to be the son of Bear-Woman conceived by the illegitimate son of Heaven who had come down to earth with various superhuman powers. From the shaman of ancient China who danced with bear-skin masks to the ubiquitous bear symbolism throughout North Asia the bear has occupied an important place in shamanism of the Asians (Eliade 1964:452, 458-459). Another indication that the Koreans have shared shamanism with other peoples of East Asia is the symbolism of stag horns employed in the elaborate gold crowns of Silla (57 B.C.-935 A.D., one of the Three Kingdoms) kings. The same symbolism is used in the headdresses of shamans throughout the large part of Siberia (Eliade 1964:155).

Korean shamanism of today has much less in common with its counterpart in Siberia. It has not only rendered the Supreme Being largely otiose as with shamanism everywhere (Eliade 1964:8-9, 504-505), but it has also lost the masculinity characteristic of Siberian shamanism (Eliade 1964:462). Nowadays the shamans in Korea are almost exclusively females. Male shamans are rare and considered an exception. The appellation mudang refers to female shamans. The profession is inherited through the maternal line. There has been no satisfactory explanation for the femininity of Korean shamanism. A Soviet Russian ethnologist takes the traditional Marxist position that the shamanism in a primitive-totemic society is usually feminine, but when a clan society becomes a tribal society, the transition from matriarchate to patriarchate takes place. He explains the masculinity of Siberian shamanism by arguing that "the

appointment of the shaman as a specialist of the religious cult" was "conditioned by the establishment of the patriarchal clan system. . ." (Anisimov 1963:84, 97). From this theoretical perspective, "early" shamanism is feminine whereas in its later stage of development shamanism becomes masculine. The femininity of Korean shamanism is thus "explained" within the Marxist framework by arguing that the Korean shamanism failed to progress beyond the "primitive" stage of development, i.e. stagnated. While the Korean society in general has accomplished the transition from the nomadic-matriarchal to the agricultural-patriarchal stage in obedience to "the law of historical development", its shamanism froze at the nomadic-matriarchal stage under the overwhelming impact of the more advanced patriarchal religions from China. On the other hand, it may be said that the Marxist theory "works" better in China where the ancient wu-ism which had been predominantly feminine (de Groot 1910:1209) has since become predominantly masculine. Today the descendants of the ancient wu are called sai kung and they are mostly males (Eliade 1964:455).

Another theory attributes the femininity of Korean shamanism to the southern (Southeast Asia, southern China and Japan) influence. This theory divides Asian shamanism into northern and southern branches and characterizes the former as masculine and the latter as feminine. According to this theory, Korean shamanism falls into the southern category. But it seems there are as many male shamans as female shamans in Southeast Asia, although there are regions in that part of the world where only female shamans are found, e.g., the sibaso of the northern Batak of Sumatra (Eliade 1964:346). Moreover, it is not at all certain that Korean shamanism has always been feminine. On the contrary, in the ancient days male shamans were as numerous as female shamans, if not more numerous. This is especially true if we accept the thesis that shamans were political and military leaders of the community as well in those days (Hahm 1967:13-14).

The predominance of shamanesses in Korea today may perhaps be

better explained by the "decadence" of traditional shamanism. It has been pointed out by Akiba that the Korean shamanism is primarily "domestic" (Akamatsu and Akiba 1937-1938). In Korea shamanesses are invited to the home of their client. There is no permanently demarcated sacred ground to which the faithful must journey to obtain, or participate in, the services of mudang. There is no temple or shrine where the seance must be held. The dwellings of shamanesses have no sacral significance. In this respect Korean shamanism very closely resembles the "family shamanism" of the Koryak and the Chukchee (Eliade 1964:252-258). In Korea the senior female member of a household usually undertakes to perform the simplified functions of a shaman if the rituals required are minor in importance and routine in nature. Some formalities were required in connection with various events in family life--from birth, minor sicknesses, weddings, long journeys and anniversaries, to death, funeral, mourning, and ancestor worship rites. The senior female of a household usually undertook the task of imitating the mudang in performing the basic rituals required under the routing circumstances. Of course, no amateur could carry out the entire gamut of the shamanistic seance. But she could at least meet the minimum requirements to prevent ill luck or misfortune. If she could save money by obviating the need for inviting a mudang, so much the better. When the importance of the occasion appeared beyond the competence of amateurs, a mudang was called.

Eliade cites Bogoras in stating that some of the Chukchee shamans underwent a change of sex (Eliade 1964:257). They dressed as women. Some of them even married other men. Male shamans of Korea often dress as women. In fact there have been a few instances in Korean history when male shamans, dressed as women, were allowed into the inner quarters of the palace, causing scandals. These and similar scandals with respect to the ruling class were possible because of the widely accepted assumption that the mudang was always female. It is by no means certain that there is a definite causal connection between family shamanism and femininity of the

profession.¹⁸ In the case of Korea, however, one important factor should be pointed out--the dualism in the religious life of the Korean elite. There was a sort of division of labor between the two sexes in matters concerning religion. Confucianism which was both a political ideology and a religion of the ruling elite preempted the attention and the allegiance of the male sex of the elite. The female sex on the other hand had neither the ability (so the myth pretended) nor the duty to understand and observe the requirements of Confucianism. Their indulgence in "superstitions" was generously tolerated by the male yangbans. Indeed, the male yangbans had no reason to interfere in the superstitious practices of their women-folk so long as they did not have to be involved directly. If their wives and mothers could secure blessings from Buddha and successfully avoid misfortunes with the help of shamans, they saw no point in opposing such behavior. Moreover, under the prevailing Confucian code of behavior, the sexes were rigidly segregated, women being completely quarantined from any contact with the opposite sex except immediate kin.

The yangban males, therefore, had more reason to oppose their women having contact with Buddhist priests who were males, after all, though celibate. The faithful female had to journey away from the seclusion of her house to the temple to worship Buddha. With the mudang, however, the problem was much simpler. Since the mudang was a female, she could be safely let into the inner courtyard of a yangban home. The yangban female did not have to forsake the safety of her seclusion even for a minute. As there were no sutras to recite and no temple stairs to climb, the whole mudang ceremonies could be carried on in strict domesticity. The yangban women could never feel comfortable with the male-centered tenets of Confucianism. But with a mudang, they could feel completely at home. It was their own religion. It had more warmth than their men's religion which never ceased to harp on their duty to obey and serve their men. Inasmuch as the mudang's pantheon included any of the numerous Buddhist deities, Confucius, Lao Tzu, famous Chinese and Korean

generals, "mountain women", Taoist Immortals, infant spirits, etc., the yangban woman could have all the protection she could hope for through her mudang.

Eliade (1964:4) defines shamanism as "archaic techniques of ecstasy." He also indicates many ways in which a shaman may attain ecstasy. Those shamans with less competence resort to tobacco, mushroom, narcotics and other toxins (Eliade 1964:221). What appealed to the domesticity of Korean females is the fact that shamanism offered them ecstasy, not salvation. This emphasis on the here and now made family shamanism possible. A senior female of a Korean household could attempt to simulate the shamanic techniques of ecstasy without any professional training or "calling" simply because she could attain at least some degree of ecstasy, however incomplete. No lay female would have dared to appropriate the "techniques" of salvation in her domestic seclusion. Ecclesiastical specialization most probably would not have permitted such an appropriation.

IV. Conceptual Contributions of the Three Religions

It is in this shamanic milieu that the three religions from China had to function. The three religions came to Korea well equipped with fully developed bodies of concepts and doctrines. Through their interaction among themselves as well as with the shamanic tradition, the three belief systems contributed to the creation of the religious value system characteristic of the Korean people. In order to gain acceptance from the people, the religions from China had to modify, deemphasize or even abandon certain concepts and doctrines that conflicted with the basic desires and aspirations of the Korean people. Confucianism and Taoism encountered least opposition from the native tradition. They experienced little need to syncretize. It was Buddhism that encountered greatest resistance from the native milieu. In addition, it had to reckon with the hostility of the two religions of Chinese origin.

In discussing the conceptual contributions made by Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism, we will begin with the examination of their conceptualizations of death and afterlife. Death and afterlife, of course, do not exhaust the totality of any religion's doctrinal complex. But as the primary concern of religion is the ultimate significance of human existence, death, either as its termination or as a moment for passage into another dimension of human existence, occupies a very important position in every religious system. If the purpose of religion is to make the believer a stronger man to face life (Durkheim 1965:464), it should also make him stronger to face death.

Confucianism

Confucianism has taken the position that afterlife has no special importance. What is important is to attain that degree of perfection of virtue on earth during life where a man could reach complete beatitude (Weber 1951:228). Like the Stoics, a Confucian would have argued that "the sage, a blissful being, was a god on earth; heaven could give him nothing more" (Cumont 1959:14). Confucianism has placed the realization of its ideal in this world, not in the next. All of its five cardinal principles of human life deal with interpersonal relations on this earth. None concerns itself with the individual vis-a-vis God. A man is to be judged by his fellow men, even after death, by what he has accomplished in this world in his interpersonal relationships. One's afterlife had little to do with moral considerations. There was no eschatology for the world. Nor was the eschatology of an individual a "judgment."

Taoism

From the beginning Taoism had more to offer to the "this-worldly" Koreans. It willingly promised its followers eternal youth and longevity. Those who could plumb the profundity of its creeds could acquire super-human powers; their eyes would penetrate a thousand leagues; they would

be able to travel a hundred miles in one stride; they could make themselves invisible, etc. Although there were elements of ascetic self-denial in its theories, such material rewards as wealth, honor and many male descendants were to be the ultimate goal of ascetic training. Its reputed ability to divine the fate of individuals strengthened its popularity among a people whose primary concern was with the earthly life. Taoists did not bother themselves with the afterlife. Though they did borrow various notions from Buddhism, they remained essentially this-worldly.

Buddhism

Buddhism did have a comparatively well formulated theory of afterlife. But it was a circular theory of transmigration of souls. Afterlife takes the form of continuing life on this earth in different biological forms. The final attainment of beatitude comes only when all forms of selfishness are extinguished. This state of extinction--extinction of "the boundary of finite self" (Smith 1965:125)--is, of course, called Nirvana or Enlightenment. Here again the salvation from pain and suffering is not something to be gained only in the other world. Salvation is, furthermore, not by grace but by training, the Eightfold Path. To be sure, there are two kinds of Nirvana: one attained at enlightenment and the other attained at death (Finegan 1965:248). Death is not a condition precedent for Nirvana. "Affirmatively [Nirvana] is life itself" (Smith 1965:125). It is not of the "other world."

Buddhism, however, does have many elements that are at odds with the indigenous concept of life and death. To the Koreans, the totality of human life is certainly more than a condition steeped in suffering, a condition to be emancipated from with single-minded endeavor. Its transitoriness is something to be made a subject of sentimental balladry, always with a tinge of regret, not a cornerstone of religious wisdom or truth. Buddha said that five skandas--body, sense, ideas,

feelings, and consciousness--are painful. But to a Korean they are precisely the elements that make life bearable and liveable. To him these five skandas make up the sum total of human life. After all, a profound social sensitivity is the foundation of virtue to a Korean.

Another possible source of dissonance with the Korean mentality was its individualism. Buddha appealed to the individual to work out his own salvation. This individualistic element in the religion could have come into conflict with the familism of the Koreans. But whatever individualism there might have been in Buddhism had been greatly diluted by Buddha's emphasis on the importance of having a right kind of association as a preliminary step to the Eightfold Path. Its insistence on transcending the boundary of the finite self robbed it of much of its "individualism." The fact that it did not have a God as a personal being who created the universe by a deliberate act of will and guided it to a final goal according to a plan took a source of novelty out of Buddhism for the Koreans who felt much more at home with a host of Bodhisattvas, Lohans, Kwannons, guardians, doorkeepers, etc.

Having undergone Sinicization and syncretic decadence in the Korean milieu, the universalistic tendency in Buddhism lost its force. It had to incorporate familistic ethics of Confucianism in order to enjoy the protection of the state. Its ethics became as particularistic as Confucianism with its emphasis on filial piety and ancestor cults. Although the purity of the faith was maintained among a large number of priests, as far as the popular Buddhism was concerned, it lost power to transform the deeply ingrained mentality of the Korean people. Such profundity as Buddha's negation of soul (the anatta doctrine) was simply too obtuse for the average Korean, especially in view of seemingly contradictory affirmation of transmigration of "streams of consciousness." The notion of soul as some kind of mental substance was much more comprehensible to the Koreans.

Buddhism in Korea had to downplay its emphasis on otherworldly

goals in order to appear less anti-social. Its universalistic ethic which ignored differences of race, class status, sex, age, culture and family identification had to be compromised in order to appear less subversive. If a Korean sought salvation, it was within the family. Shamanism taught him to seek ecstasy, not salvation. Taoism encouraged his search for eternal youth, longevity, wealth and honor. Traditional familism reinforced by Confucian stress on filial piety made him seek more male offspring who could assure him immortality through ancestral rites. Fame or lustrous name preserved in history was another acceptable mode of attaining immortality in the eyes of Confucianism. In this context Buddhism could not insist blindly on salvation outside the family.

V. Religious Values of the Korean People

It is difficult to designate any one of several religions found in Korea as the religion with which to characterize the religious values of the Korean people. The pacifism in Confucianism was reinforced by the strong aversion to destruction of anything living fixed firmly in Buddhism. Confucius' emphasis on this-worldly life has been strengthened by similar elements in popular Taoism and indigenous shamanism. Nevertheless, it is possible to delineate a few salient features of the Korean religious mind.

Anthropocentrism

Humanism or this-worldliness may be an acceptable synonym for anthropocentrism as used here. For the Korean a deep interpersonal commitment is the bedrock upon which human life rests. It is not a commitment to God. It is not a "surrendering to God," as a Muslim might say. It is a total surrender of one's self to other men. This is essentially what Confucius meant by jen, human-heartedness. But with a possible exception of a few Confucian "scholars" the outlook on life we are here discussing should not be given a metaphysical or universalistic meaning. Confucius might have intended to go beyond the national boundaries with

his jen and apply it to a universal brotherhood of man. To an average Korean, however, such universal brotherhood would have little meaning. For him the warmth of interpersonal affection is an emotional necessity, not merely an ethical ideal. It is a psychological nutriment. It renders life meaningful.

This interpersonal commitment starts with one's own kin. Nothing can be warmer or thicker than blood. Where geographic proximity and social intercourse bring two persons who are not kinsmen close together, an interpersonal commitment of a quasi-consanguineous nature may be created. It is usual for Koreans to turn the second kind of relationship into the first through the means of quasi-adoption. Thus, my close friend would call my mother "mother" and my brother "brother." Kinship and family relationship is the foundation on which all other interpersonal relations are based. If a man could not form and maintain an unconditional commitment with his kin, it was unavoidable that his humanity itself would be suspect.¹⁹ It was not simply a matter of his ethical integrity in the sense that such a man could never form a viable interpersonal relationship with any man. Rather, he lacked the essential ability to make life meaningful to himself as well as to others.

The interpersonal commitment we are here discussing is unconditional and total. It is therefore irrational, illogical, inefficient, unproductive, parochial and often unpatriotic. It is biological ("animal") and emotional rather than intellectual or objective. It is usually blind. This is the reason why it is often referred to as "primitive." According to the modern ethics of industrial society, such a primitive interpersonal dynamics is only detrimental to progress and development.²⁰ It jeopardizes scientific objectivity. It vitiates rationality and efficiency. It is extremely "wasteful."

The Koreans have not yet succeeded in rationally committing themselves to efficiency and rationalization by sacrificing at least some of what they consider to be the essence of humanity. They have not yet

been able to "shatter the fetters of the sib" (Weber 1951:237). It has not yet been possible for the Koreans to depersonalize the intensely personal nature of their social activities. It should be noted, however, that in the face of the overwhelming influence of a civilization impelled by the energy unleashed by the shattering of the fetters of kinship affection, a gradual disintegration of traditional human relationship is already visible in the name of humanity, progress, science, rationalism, technological efficiency and democracy.

The Koreans have indeed created an "idol." They have made an absolute out of earthly life. It is not God's grace and love that are absolute and certain but the warmth of human affection--affection reciprocated by other human beings with flesh and warm blood. A Christian theologian would call this "idolatry" or "ontocracy" (Van Leeuwen 1964: 165-173). The Koreans have certainly made an earthly phenomenon into an absolute, thus "absolutizing the relative." For the Koreans it is not a transcendental and infinite God that occupies the sovereign place in life, but human affection, man himself.

Death as a Mode of Life

When death is spoken of as a mode of life, a contradiction in terms is apparent. It may have been due to the influence of Taoism which eschews all forms of clear-cut dichotomies that the Koreans are willing to tolerate such a contradiction. The tendency to discern the identity of contraries in life is clearly present in the Korean mind. On the other hand, the Koreans are not the only people who have been willing to admit a life after death, be it in the tomb or in the inferno. Reluctance of the Koreans to accept the finiteness and the transitoriness of human life created a need to take death as something other than the irrevocable termination of human existence. It was easier to view death as a prolonged sleep.

The dead continued to linger on among those whom it loved. It had to be remembered at mealtimes. Those who had been close to it during

life had to supply it with necessities. Above all the dead abhorred loneliness. The ancestor rites of the Korean people even today are aimed at making the life of the dead ancestor as comfortable, warm and cheerful as possible. In the old days, a filial son kept vigil for at least two full years by eating and sleeping alone in a hut erected beside the grave of his deceased parent. A portion of a room in the family dwelling was set aside by a curtain, and there the departed ancestor continued to live as a member of the family. Food was offered there at every meal, including tobacco and wine. A bereft son would postpone the burial as long as possible. He could not bear to hasten the departure of his beloved parent to his grave. There was always the possibility that what appeared to be death might in fact have been only a sleep.

Having placed such a high valuation upon interpersonal affection, it was not easy to sunder it abruptly at death. The Koreans still hesitate to cremate their dead unless the dead is unmarried without descendants, the reason being that the cadaver is still a body that seems to retain all the senses. Many dead are said to have complained to their kinsmen in dreams of the discomfort of their water-logged burial chambers. Reinforcing the lingering affection was the notion that the dead acquires superhuman capabilities due to death. Having gone over the barrier of death, the dead becomes in a sense a more complete human being. Just as the shaman is able to exercise superior powers over men because of his ability to die and come back to life, so the dead acquires superhuman powers because of his death.²¹ Inasmuch as the dead are thought to be capable of gratitude as well as resentment, prudence, if not affection, dictated affectionate treatment of the dead.²²

Although there is some tendency to view death as a moment for a final accounting for one's life history, primarily due to Buddhism, there is no definite notion of death as the time for meeting the Creator face to face and submitting to His judgment. To be sure, an evil man may be condemned to a most miserable afterlife. But the reason is not so much

the punishment imposed by the Creator for his sins as that his evil nature would certainly have destroyed any possibility of his having other human beings with enough affection toward him to care for him after death. The spirit most feared by the Koreans is that of an infant or a young girl who has died without ever marrying. It is felt that such a spirit grudges its own untimely death as well as the life of others because it has been deprived of the enjoyment of life. Such a spirit, having no offspring to console it, is considered more dangerous than the spirit of an evil person. Consequently, a man may be more afraid to die without offspring than to die in a state of sin. "Salvation" lies more with the affection and care of one's offspring than with the grace of a transcendental abstract entity.

The lack of a transcendental sanction indeed means a lack of "guilt," as has been pointed out by Benedict (1946:222-224). There is certainly no notion of "original sin" that renders God's grace indispensable for salvation. Moreover, the concept of guilt or sin itself has a different cultural content in Korea than in the West. If there is a sense of guilt among the Korean people, it has primarily an interpersonal connotation. It has little significance in terms of Tillich's "I-Thou" relationship. A man's transgression is against another human being, not against "Thee." This is the reason why the Koreans are said to be preoccupied with "face" and "shame" rather than with guilt. With the Koreans guilt is a this-worldly concept. Interhuman and social substance is so predominant that to the Western observer the sense of guilt disappears entirely and only the sense of shame remains.²³

Thus, expiation of guilt is not through a supplication to God. It lies in the procurement of forgiveness from the victim (or his family) for one's wrong. The importance of making peace with the object of trespass can never be minimized among the Koreans. It is for this reason that the Koreans are unwilling to punish a man who voluntarily confesses his wrongs and makes restitution. This is especially true when the victim

himself is willing to forgive and forget. It is almost entirely in the hands of the wronged to extinguish or continue the crime or guilt of the wrongdoer.²⁴ The doctrine of sin, be it "original sin" or "estrangement," is the most difficult of Christian doctrines for the Koreans.

There is, however, a correlative duty on the part of the wronged to expedite reconciliations. If the trespasser shows even the smallest sign of readiness to atone for his trespass, humanity requires that the atonement be facilitated and reconciliation accomplished. This community expectation for the speedy reconciliation can often become an intense group pressure. When the transgressor has attempted in good faith to seek forgiveness and reconciliation, it is now the recalcitrant victim who becomes the object of opprobrium if he refuses the proffered reconciliation. Herein lies at least a portion of motivating force that drives the Korean people to compromise always by giving or losing a little and taking or winning a little in every kind of dispute settlement.

But in the case of a homicide a much more difficult question is presented. Seeking forgiveness and reconciliation from a dead man is infinitely more difficult and complicated. As we have seen, the Korean concept of reparation and reconciliation is human and social. A homicide victim is no longer available in an ordinary social milieu. To be sure, there are means by which the offender can still effect a settlement with the dead victim. A shaman might be able to mediate. The victim's family might agree to a reconciliation after an adequate compensation. The killer may undertake to care for the dead by giving him a decent burial and consoling him as if the dead were his own ancestor. But there is no assurance that any of these substitute means will be effective. They usually are not, as most folktales abundantly attest. Worse still, the spirit of a dead man who has died without granting a reconciliation to the murderer is a spirit to be feared. Having died with enmity and vengeance, he keeps begrudging his own untimely death and the life of the killer. No man can have a worse enemy than the spirit of his own

vindictive victim. A dead man is under no social pressure to accept offers for reconciliation and recompense. With his superior power a vengeful spirit can play havoc with the killer's life at will. A most devastating manner in which the killer may meet his nemesis is to witness a gradual destruction of his offspring and to die without any kin who can care for him after death. Retribution may now be considered complete. It is not a sudden cruel death or material impoverishment but the assurance of lonely, cold and neglected afterlife that is the most dreaded revenge against any killer of man.

It has often been pointed out that one of the reasons for the traditional Chinese pacifism lies in the doctrine of filial piety. The oft-quoted passage is from the Hsiao Ching (The Classic of Filial Submission) that exhorts: "Seeing that our body, with hair and skin, is derived from our parents, we should not allow it to be injured in any way. This is the beginning of filiality" (Makra 1961:3).²⁵ For the Confucian Korean it is the height of filial impiety to have his life and limbs exposed to a danger of maiming and destruction. As is pointed out by Wright, it is the fear of dying without offspring that is primarily responsible for the strenuous avoidance of violence and perilous adventure (Wright 1959:74). When a Korean dies without offspring it is not he alone but all of his ancestors who will be left without solace and care after death. But there seems to be another more important and compelling reason for the implacable abhorrence of physical violence that might lead to injury and death. If a Korean has to kill someone else to save himself, the outcome will not be much of an improvement.²⁶ He has now to reckon with a vengeful spirit of his victim who can bring about practically the same result as though he himself had died. It mattered little whether the killing was to achieve justice or to exterminate evil. To a Korean justice can never be achieved through violence. Evil is as much a part of life as good even if one were to accept the dichotomy which is relative and dubious at best.²⁷ Killing of an evil man would

not result in "killing" evil. Evil would continue to live with the spirit of the dead man. It is the ultimate paradox of supposedly pacifist other-worldly religions to sanction homicide and violence in the name of God, justice, patriotism, loyalty and salvation.²⁸

Practicality, Syncretism and Worldliness

Many observers of the Chinese scene have commented on the excessive practicality of the Chinese religious mind that seems to verge on commercialism in its relationship with God.²⁹ It has often been pointed out that a Chinese would not hesitate to worship any deity. He believes that the more gods he worships the greater the number of blessings he will receive, and therefore it is advantageous for him to have as many gods on his side as possible. Consequently, religious syncretism is said to be an ingrained trait of the Chinese character. Such crass worldliness appears to shock the Western observer. These characteristics of the Chinese religious mind are fully shared by the Korean people.

The Koreans have no god (until Roman Catholicism began to gain followers in the second half of the eighteenth century) that demands an absolute and exclusive allegiance with jealous vengeance. Nor is there a personalized Supreme Being who created the universe. Efforts have been made by Korean Christian scholars and Western missionaries to attribute the rapid expansion of Protestant Christianity in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth to the existence of an indigenous god that possessed attributes similar to the God of the Old Testament.³⁰ But the Korean deity, Hananim, who was the chief of the shamanic pantheon could not be more dissimilar to the God of the Jews and the Christians. The Koreans do not possess a creation myth. Hananim has not been credited with a responsibility for creating the universe and mankind with a preconceived plan, nor has he even demanded an exclusive loyalty and devotion in the manner of the first four commandments of the Mosaic Decalogue. No universal laws of human behavior by which his people were to be judged were laid down, and his princes were never commanded to destroy

evil and to "wield the sword of justice."³¹ Hananim never permitted his son to be most cruelly killed by men to save them.³²

It seems more reasonable, therefore, to look for the reason for the "phenomenal" success of Protestant Christianity in Korea in the practicality, syncretism and worldliness of the Korean religious mind rather than in its ability to identify with the native theology. Had Christianity been identified with Japan, it would never have been able to make any headway among the Koreans. The fact that Christianity was identified with nationalism, anti-Japanese colonialism, America's lack of imperialistic interest in Korea and America's fabulous wealth seems to be the most important reason why it succeeded to the extent that it has. For those Koreans who became Christians there was nothing for them to lose in worshipping the God that had been so munificent to the Americans. Its nationalistic stance made the membership in the church respectable. There were practical advantages, too, such as literacy, thriftiness, overcoming of social class barriers and so forth that followed from membership. Rigid prohibition against smoking and drinking along with a severe interdiction against ancestor cults and other "superstitions" enabled the Korean Protestant Christians to dispense with financially ruinous practices sanctioned by the traditional patterns of social intercourse. With a people whose scheme of social interaction has been entirely built around drinking, non-drinking alone was sufficient to enable the Korean Protestants to avoid most of the financially burdensome social obligations. I hesitate to go so far as to state that the native propensity to syncretism has reduced Jesus to the status of an exceptionally capable shaman who could perform miracles and rise from the dead and has rendered revival meetings indistinguishable from shamanic seances. It is, nonetheless, important to keep in mind that the features of the Korean religious mind we have been discussing are very much in evidence even among the Korean Christians of today.

VI. Jural Values of the Korean People

Justice and Peace

Law in Korea has been synonymous with punishment. Its foundation has been physical force. Law has been the antithesis of virtue, good, peace and harmony. It has been a detestable necessity at best and a symbol of violence, disruption, conflict and bloodshed at worst. Order and peace have been based upon virtue and affection, never on punishment. The sword is the cause as much as the result of disorder and violence, and although it may be an indispensable equipment for the goddess of justice in the West, Koreans cannot help but feel an instinctive aversion to it. The sanguinariness of the Western concept of justice prevents Koreans from accepting it wholeheartedly as the ideal of their social life. Law and order may come to an American town when the sheriff shoots a bad man to death in a gun fight, but for the Koreans such bloodshed can never bring peace and order to a community.

From the Western point of view Koreans do little to fight corruption and evil. They seem to condone evil. They have no civic conscience. They have no sense of justice. But for the Koreans, justice has to be for man, not for God; for life, not for death; for peace, not for violence; for forgiveness, not for punishment. This is the reason Koreans consider the Western concept of justice "inhuman."

An American employer who fires (what a martial word!) his Korean employee who has embezzled money will often be called inhuman by Koreans. He naturally feels disconcerted by having his just action so characterized, and his immediate reaction is to accuse the Koreans of thinking nothing of stealing.

How is a "human" employer to act under such circumstances? He tries first of all to determine the truth of the matter, as any American employer would under similar circumstances. But what is involved is not a mere matter of factual investigation. Motives and reasons for the misdeed

must be discovered. The employer must make every effort to get himself fully involved in the life of his wayward employee. Clear willingness to forgive the wrong is implied. This in turn imposes an obligation on the employee to confess his wrongs fully as a prerequisite for obtaining forgiveness. Guilt must be fully admitted. Reparation or restitution in some form and manner is assumed by both parties. The employer's willingness to get himself involved in the life of his offending employee makes him a "human" employer. Having once established an interpersonal relationship, the employer cannot now act as though he were a stranger toward his guilty employee, however evil. No employer in Korea, Korean or American, can enjoy the loyalty of his employees without getting himself fully involved in the total life of his employees. (The French call this engagement, a commitment to a particular human being.)

Matters will not rest there with a really "human" employer, however, he will go a step further and help his guilty employee to remedy the state of affairs that gave rise to the offense initially. Having committed himself to the life of his employee, he cannot now turn his face away. If there is extreme financial hardship, he will at least show a genuine desire to render as much assistance as is practically possible. To a Western employer this would amount to rewarding an evil rather than punishing it; an honest employee gets no attention whereas the "prodigal" one seems to benefit from his wrong in the form of more attention, financial benefits, and the like. For the Koreans, however, what is involved is a progressively intensifying mutual commitment. The employer "cares" and so does the employee.

Truth and Harmony

The Westerner is apt to complain that Koreans are dishonest. They do not mind telling lies. It is shocking to the Westerner that a surprisingly large number of Koreans do not hesitate to lie even under oath.

If telling a factual truth means destruction of harmonious

social life and of the equilibrium of interpersonal dynamics, a Korean feels little compunction in telling a lie. A guest might falsely express his appreciation of hospitality to a terrible host in order not to hurt his feelings. One might express admiration of an ugly and stupid boy so as to please his mother. A man might tell a lie to his friend's wife for the purpose of hiding the friend's indiscretion with another woman. A son would vouch for his father's false alibi so that his father might escape prosecution. A neighbor might pretend ignorance of facts he witnessed in order to avoid embarrassment to his neighbor. The list can be endlessly multiplied.

To the Korean the whole truth of a matter arising out of interpersonal dynamics can be explicated only when the parties involved voluntarily agree to its formulation. The factual circumstances observed accidentally by a third person are only a portion of the truth. He cannot have understood fully enough the temporal, spatial, and interpersonal dimensions involved to grasp the whole truth. An objective truth without the benefit of involvement and the understanding of particular equities and special reasons is little short of meaningless. Truth is not the concern of an uninvolved third person. It is a matter of concern for the parties involved, and only they can define it in a meaningful way. The whole truth can be delineated only by the voluntary admission and agreement of the parties involved. This is the reason a confession has always been thought of as the best evidence.

When Western law undertakes an investigation, the primary purpose is prosecution and punishment, and the result is further disruption of social harmony rather than a speedy restoration of jeopardized concord. It is rare that the Koreans will cooperate readily with the official investigating authority by coming forth with facts. Factual information will be forthcoming only if it will assist a quick reestablishment of equilibrium. On the other hand, if the investigating authority manifests in a tangible manner a readiness to get itself involved in the lives of

the parties and the community of which they are members, the truth will be more readily established. This is what has been known as "paternalism." The structure of law has been "patrimonial" in Korea (Weber 1951:100-104). The underlying ethics are particularistic rather than universal.³³

Judgment and Reconciliation

There has been no great lawgiver in Korean history, nor any great legendary judge. A truly great magistrate is a bureaucrat who so inculcates virtue in the people that law (the rules of punishment) and courthouses are rendered superfluous. A great magistrate is not one who vigorously prosecutes and punishes criminals; under a great magistrate there would be no criminals in the first place. A great judge with Solomonic wisdom would be a miserable failure in comparison with a magistrate who so shames quarrelsome elements in his jurisdiction that they settle their differences amicably among themselves. Law signifies the failure of princely virtue, and the administration of justice is premised upon the breakdown of harmony and peace.

The Koreans have always favored mediators as peace-makers over judges who fix blame. Mediators do not try to fix blame or lay down the law, but instead encourage the parties themselves to lay down the law applicable to their own case. As Northrop points out, the law is what the disputants themselves approve through mediation. Since the disputants specify the solution, there is no external sanction needed to enforce it. Sanction is built into the solution. Violence, even that inflicted by authority, is avoided (Northrop 1958:347, 351).

To the Korean a litigation is a war, as fully typified by the Anglo-American adversary system of litigation. In a litigation both sides rely on the formalized violence supported by the state. If a man hauls another into court, he is in fact declaring war upon the latter. For a Westerner, who thrives on adversity, who is thrilled by "a modern, dynamic system of dialectic struggle," and who glorifies his "supramundane God" by subduing sin, a courtroom may represent the quintessence of civilized social

living. To the Western man--a Prometheus, a Faust, or just a Christian following the commandment of his God (Genesis 1:26-30)--conflict and struggle are the essence of life. Tension is everywhere: in the world he rejects yet seeks to dominate and master; in the God he sees yet does not see; and in himself, a creature in the image of God and yet a vessel of sin. For him interpersonal conflicts are to be tamed by the rules of fair play and justice. Justice is on the winning side. Good triumphs over evil. It is out of the dialectic struggle that progress comes. And even when the Westerner finally comes to think of reconciliation, he seems more concerned with making peace with himself or with his God than with his fellow man.

A litigious man is a warlike man to the Koreans. He threatens harmony and peace. He is a man to be detested. If a man cannot achieve reconciliation through mediation and compromise, he cannot be considered an acceptable member of the collectivity. It is true that violence can never be eradicated. There will always be those who forfeit their humanity by resorting to violence, and they must be met with violence--although only as a last resort. But Koreans cannot see why violence should be glorified and honored as an instrument of justice. To them wrath, jealousy, vengeance, and judgment cannot be indispensable attributes of God, nor should similar attributes characterize human behavior. Through the Japanese, the Koreans have been exposed to the notion that violence when disciplined and victorious has its glorious beauty. It is needless to add that the Japanese were not alone in this notion. The Koreans were told that war made men out of boys; it fostered courage, altruism, and other spiritual qualities valued by the Japanese society.³⁴

Such Western thinkers as Hobbes, Nietzsche and Sorel may be eccentric extremists,³⁵ but the wish for power to dominate other men by force, if necessary, and the conflicts and struggles engendered thereby is not merely the obsession of eccentrics. Periodic open conflict itself is often viewed as having the salutary effect of reducing or minimizing

social instability by keeping sources of mutual irritation from accumulating (Wilson and Kolb 1949:713-716). Moreover, if one accepts the notion of a primordial murder--whether that of Abel by Cain or that of the marine monster by the god--as the common heritage of mankind (Eliade 1964:100-101), bloodshed may be a sacred imitatio dei. Thus, even a reconciliation with God may have to be through bloodshed. In a culture in which conflict, violence, and bloodshed occupy such an exalted position, perhaps a rationally regulated and disciplined combat in which one has to be the winner (right) and his adversary the loser (wrong) must be the foundation of social life.

VII. Conclusion

The Rule of Law is a concept very dear to the hearts of lawyers in the West. It has become synonymous with a sum total of cherished Western political ideals. This concept has been transported to Korea as a part of the "superior" civilization of the West, but it has been very slow in gaining ground there. The Korean linguistic equivalent of the concept means nothing more than rule by punishment. Such a concept has never been the ideal of the Korean people, nor is it likely soon to become so. This "alegalness" of the Korean people has sometimes been interpreted as lawlessness. A nation of more than 27 million people with a legal profession numbering about 1300 (of this less than 800 are full-time practitioners) (Murphy 1967:12) can scarcely be labelled a nation under the Rule of Law.³⁶

It has been nearly eight decades since Korea first began to model its laws and legal institutions after those of the West. As Roman law is said to have failed to remodel German mores (Sumner 1906:81-82), so the Western legal system has thus far failed to remodel Korean mores. The perennial question raised by this state of affairs is, "What should be done to 'remedy' or 'improve' the situation?" The underlying premise

is that the traditional "alegal" way of life is inimical to the development and progress of the country. Whether one evaluates the present situation as "bad" or not, of course, depends on one's value preferences. Even if one assumes that the present condition is undesirable and needs amelioration, it is still necessary to understand completely the underlying factors that are responsible for the condition. I have attempted to trace in this paper the Korean unwillingness to resort to the law to the religious values of the people.

Inasmuch as religious values are at the core of cosmology and of social ethics, the fundamentally this-worldly life-view of the Korean people has made them prefer human affection to God's grace, ecstasy to salvation, peace to justice, harmony to truth, and mediation to adjudication. If the mores of the Korean people are as inert and rigid as mores are said to be in general (Sumner 1906:79-82), it is not likely that Koreans will become a legal people in the foreseeable future. The questions of whether the Koreans ought to become more legal and how they can be made more legal are not answered here.

Both the jural and religious values of the Korean people are in a state of flux. The change is more pronounced in certain segments of population than in others. The impact of the life-views of other cultures is overwhelming. It may be the duty of the social scientist to facilitate "inevitable" change, but he seems doomed to doubt the "inevitability" or desirability of some social change.

NOTES

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¹Vinogradoff expresses a similar view as follows. "Laws repugnant to the notions of right of a community or to its practical requirements are likely to be defeated by passive resistance and by the difficulty of constant supervision and repression." (1960:45).

²Petrazycki (1955:221-240) also employed another term, "intuitive legal conscience." The concept has substantially the same meaning as what is meant by "jural value" in this paper.

³Ehrlich (1936:493) defines the "living law" as "the law which dominates life itself even though it has not been posited in legal propositions." He distinguishes it from the law of the courts and other tribunals.

⁴Petrazycki says, "[Those] legal experiences which contain no references to outside authorities and are independent thereof we shall call intuitive legal experiences or intuitive law" (1955:5).

⁵Hocking observes that there is a "natural and minimal organic connection of the living law with the living ethical convictions of a people" (1931:245). A lively discussion was started by Lord Devlin (1965:6) in connection with the Wolfenden Report (1957) on homosexuality and prostitution. He argued that it was wrong for the Wolfenden Committee to separate "crime from sin." He said, "The criminal law of England has from the very first concerned itself with moral principles." The opposing views were expressed by Professor H.L.A.Hart and others.

⁶"Morality", "value" and "norm" all have respective ambiguities. They are often used as equivalents (Brown 1965:454 and Edel 1959:189-192).

⁷For Parsons, personalities and social systems are "not merely inter-dependent, they interpenetrate" (Parsons and Bales 1955:357).

⁸"[A] human person exists only in so far as he has taken 'society' into himself" (Parsons and Bales 1955:358)

⁹This is in specific reference to a passage under the heading of the second year of King Pochang (643 A.D.) of the Kokuryo Kingdom in Samguk-saki (History of the Three Kingdoms). Samguksaki is a 50-volume compilation under the editorship of Kim Pusik. The corpus was completed in 1145 A.D. The analogy of the three religions to a tripod can be found in many writings throughout East Asia. In the year in question the chief minister recommended to the king that Taoism should be strengthened. To this end he sought to send an emissary to T'ang to acquire a better understanding of the religion. The first specific reference to Taoism in the historical records is found under the year 624 A.D. In that year T'ang sent a Taoist with icons and literature to Kokuryo. But the introduction

of that religion seems to antedate this event considerably. It seems quite probable that Confucianism and Taoism reached the northern region of the Korean peninsula as early as the first century B.C. when the Han Empire colonized that region.

¹⁰There are few books in English on the subject of Korean religions. Clark's Religions of Old Korea (1932) has been reissued in Seoul, Korea and is about the only book available in spite of its dated and missionary perspective. Underwood (1910) is out of print. Korea Journal, published by the Korean National Commission for UNESCO, has had several issues devoted to various religions in Korea.

¹¹The May 1964 issue of Korea Journal (Vol. 4, no. 5) contains several articles in English by Korean Buddhists, including a historical survey of Korean Buddhism.

¹²"[The] Mahayana was a politically incompetent religion" (Toynbee 1957:247).

¹³For the Sung revival of Confucianism and the suppression of Buddhism in its aftermath, see Wright (1959:86-107).

¹⁴If religion is taken in its widest sense as a way of life woven around a people's ultimate concerns, Confucianism clearly qualifies. Even if religion is taken in a narrower sense as the concern to align man to the transhuman ground of his existence, Confucianism is still a religion albeit a muted one (Smith 1965:188).

¹⁵The September 1963 issue of Korea Journal (Vol.3, no.9) contains several articles by Korean scholars on Korean Confucianism.

¹⁶See under the heading of the eighth year of King Tongch'on (234 A.D.) in Samguksaki (Pusik:1960).

¹⁷Wei Chih, in San Kuo Chih (History of the Three Kingdoms).

¹⁸It should be remembered that Confucianism, the religion of Korean males, was a "family religion" also.

¹⁹The importance of family is not a phenomenon unique to the people of East Asia. An old Indian in California had this to say, "A man is nothing. Without his family he is of less importance than that bug crossing the trail, of less importance than the sputum or exuviae." (Aginsky 1940:43).

²⁰Weber makes the point succinctly:

The great achievement of ethical religions, above all the ethical and ascetist sects of Protestantism, was to shatter the fetters of the sib. These religions established the superior community of faith and a common ethical way of life in opposition to the community of blood, even to a large extent in opposition to the family. From the economic viewpoint it meant basing business confidence upon the ethical qualities of the individual proven in his impersonal vocational work." (1951:237)

²¹Death is often viewed as the supreme initiatory passage (Eliade 1951:184-201).

²²For the Chinese fear of the dead, see Kazantzakis (1963:215-218)

²³Kluckhohn and Leighton had the following to say about the Navaho: [There] is no belief that the way one lives on this earth has anything to do with his fate after death. This is one reason why morality is practical rather than categorical. . . .White life is so permeated with the tradition of Puritanism, of the "Protestant ethic," that much Navaho behavior looks amoral or shiftless (1946:232).

²⁴The wish of the family of a homicide victim was also decisive in old Japan (Simmons 1891:121-122).

²⁵Professor Wright says: "The Chinese cult of filial piety has a chilling effect on martial ardor" (Wright 1959:74).

²⁶Kazantzakis relates an interesting episode as to how a Chinese might revenge himself on his enemy not by killing the enemy but himself (1963:217-218).

²⁷Weber's following observation on the traditional Chinese ethics may serve as an apt description of the Korean scene. "Both forms of religion (Confucianism and Taoism) lacked even the traces of a satanic force of evil against which the pious Chinese, whether orthodox or heterodox, might have struggled for his salvation" (1951:206).

²⁸For the case of Buddhism in China, see Wright (1959:74-75); for the case of Buddhism in Japan, see Bellah (1957:181-182); for the case of Christianity and Islam, I need not cite any specific references.

²⁹Kazantzakis indignantly observes: "The relationship between the Chinese and God is a commercial one; give me something, so that I may give you something" (1963:208).

³⁰See Palmer (1967) and the references cited therein.

³¹I am referring to the Byzantine view of the emperor as the executor of justice. See Medlin (1952:28, 48-56).

³²To the martial Japanese the crucifixion seems to have an entirely different meaning. In this sense they seem to have much more in common with the Christian West than with the Koreans (Sansom 1958:29-30). Kazantzakis found a Japanese Christian closely identifying the Christian concept of sacrifice with Japanese harakiri (1963:36). See also Ishida (1963:21).

³³Particularism in law and ethics is characterized by Northrop as a perspective in which

Each legal judgment, each moral choice, each dispute and each individual is regarded in its essential normative nature to be unique rather than an instance of a universal scientific law

or a determinate normative ethical and legal commandment or rule. . . . (1960:621).

On the other hand, universalism is characterized as a perspective in which "for any act to be good or just, it must be an instance of a formally constructed universal law which applies to any person whatever who implicitly or explicitly assents to it." In addition, if such a law confers any right or privilege to a member of the community, "it must confer those rights, privileges and duties on any one" (1960:656).

³⁴For an interesting comparison of diverse cultural responses to war, see Benedict (1934:30-32).

³⁵I am referring to Hobbes' idea of war as a "natural condition" of man (1955:80-84); to Nietzsche's "the will to power which is the will to life" (1955:203); and to Sorel's "creativity" of violence (1941).

³⁶These figures should become more meaningful if we compare them with 10,854 (as of 1965) licensed medical doctors who had to complete 18 years of formal education (2 years more than required of an attorney) and pass the national examination. Every year approximately 800 medical college graduates are licensed. There are hundreds of M.D.'s currently receiving training in the U.S. alone. Besides, there were 1,762 licensed dentists and 2,849 licensed doctors of the Chinese school. See Haptong Von'Gam (1966:826-827) and Statistic Yearbook of Education: 358-359.

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with sincere compliments
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KOREA AND THE EMERGING ASIAN POWER BALANCE

By Pyong-choon Hahm

EVEN before the Nixon Doctrine was enunciated in the summer of 1969, the international power alignments in East Asia had already been undergoing a fundamental change. The phenomenal growth of Japanese industrial might was clearly making itself felt throughout the world. The polite Japanese did not have to force themselves to be querulous in compelling the world to sit up and take notice of this new Asian industrial state. Their economy was enough of a "miracle" to attract everyone's attention. Indeed, they did everything in their power to belittle their own economic achievement. It was the prodigious yearly jump in their international trade surplus which advertised their truly embarrassing riches almost against their wish.

It is an interesting fact of world history that this conclusive demonstration of explosive Japanese economic power has coincided in the United States with the budding mood of self-doubt caused largely by its inability to win a decisive military victory in Vietnam.

The changing international power configuration affecting Asia, however, was not entirely due to Japan's remarkable economic growth, nor was it wholly explainable in terms of the relative decline of American economic and military power. To be sure, the principal damage inflicted upon the United States by the Vietnamese war was economic. The deteriorating balance of international trade and the domestic inflation has been among the most significant liabilities of the frustrating war in Indochina. But the Vietnamese war was destined to have a much wider significance than the economic difficulty for the United States. It signified in essence the end of the cold war. The United States suddenly discovered itself deprived of the loyal support of most of its allies for the first time since 1945. The cold war, which had been characterized by bipolar power alignments with strong intra-bloc cohesion, was definitely coming to an end by the time the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war was reaching its climax.

The fact that most of the West European allies not only

refused to coöperate with the United States in its anti-communist war, but often harshly criticized it for its involvement there, was as much an indication of the innate political pluralism of the West as a reaction to the damaged monolithic unity of the East. The increasing restiveness among the NATO members was in fact a reflection of the impaired bloc solidarity of the communist world. Just as America was afflicted with de Gaulle's France, so did Russia have her own Mao's China. As the Sino-Soviet conflict steadily and ominously intensified, the impression of communist disunity, and even of fragmentation, has grown so strong as to render the dissension and frictions among the Western allies quite insignificant by comparison.

Even as late as 1967 when China appeared to be tearing herself apart in an ideological frenzy called the Great Cultural Revolution, the world refused to take the Sino-Soviet disputes very seriously. China was still considered a protégé of the Soviet Union, without whose patronage China could hardly sustain herself as an autonomous political entity. Quite a few observers in the non-communist world were deeply skeptical of the ability of the communist régime to govern the most populous state with one of the oldest political cultures on earth. The predominance of the Soviet Union in what appeared to be a monolithic bloc so overshadowed this gigantic Asian experiment in Marxism that the Cultural Revolution seemed to be yet another proof of the political incompetence of the Chinese communist élites in the absence of close Soviet tutelage. But then, in a year or two, the same combination of events in the much intensified form of a Sino-Soviet border war and gradual restoration of domestic order in China gave evidence not only of the viability of the Chinese communist system but its resilience in the face of hostile pressure from the second most powerful nation on this planet. The result was the greatly enhanced stature of communist China in the world power arena. It became no longer realistic to ignore the régime on the Chinese mainland which appeared solidly in power both domestically and internationally. The sudden willingness on the part of the Chinese communist élites to claim their place in the international community only expedited the process of recognition of the nation's political stature by non-communist states which were relieved to find her willing to coexist with them. The political and economic advantages to be derived from their interaction with China were of course quickly perceived by the new members of the Peking fan club.

II

In the global power strategy of the United States, the advantages to be gained by establishing some form of rapprochement with communist China were simply too many and too great to be ignored. Aside from the immediate sense of relief resulting from any reduction in the tension built up during the past two decades between the two countries, any leverage which the United States might derive from the rapprochement with communist China in its dealings with the Soviet Union and Japan was certainly welcome. If some measure of "checks and balances" were to inhibit Russian adventurism and expansionism in the Middle East, the Indian Ocean and Latin America, an attempt at improved relations with communist China would be such a sensible and wise proposition as to require no special justification. The speed with which the Four Powers in Europe could reach an agreement on Berlin since the announcement of the projected trip of President Nixon to Peking seems to bear out the practical advantages of a new Sino-American détente. As the Soviet Union expects that tension with communist China will increase in the future, in no small part as a result of Washington's approach to Peking, it would be most imprudent for Russia not to secure her European front as soon as possible. A moderate amount of Sino-Soviet tension and hostility plainly helps the United States by making the Soviet Union, the one power which possesses the actual resources to pose a serious military threat, much more tractable.

On the other hand, it is equally apparent that a full-scale war between the two communist giants would not be in the interest of the United States. The destruction of communist China as a serious rival of the Soviet Union and the absorption of the one by the other would so undermine U.S. security interests as to be utterly unacceptable. This is, of course, not to mention the risk of a global nuclear holocaust such a war would entail.

Ever since the beginning of 1970, there has gradually emerged a noticeable tendency in communist China's foreign policy toward wider contacts with the non-communist world. Treading as it did on the heels of the Cultural Revolution, the world was at first skeptical of China's new affability. Inasmuch as the conventional ideological rhetoric persisted, it was all the more difficult for the world to grasp China's real intentions. Moreover, the predominance of the People's Liberation Army in the

period subsequent to the Cultural Revolution further contributed to the world skepticism. But the army seems to have been persuaded of the value of friendly public opinion, especially in the non-communist world. It was not difficult for the Chinese élites, for example, to comprehend that a timely public statement by the U.S. Secretary of State that the Sino-Soviet war was not in the interests of the United States would be worth a few dozen army divisions on its side against Russia. This was especially true in the face of a perennial Chinese fear of tacit American acquiescence, if not outright collusion, in a Soviet military subjugation of China.

In the case of the Vietnamese war the value of public opinion in the non-communist world sympathetic to communist North Vietnam has been fully demonstrated, this time against the United States. What has frustrated a decisive military victory by the United States in Indochina has not been its military inferiority but hostile public opinion at home and on the part of its European allies. Had the Indochinese war taken place a century ago with a similar disparity in military might, no one would have had any difficulty in predicting a quick and decisive military victory for the United States over North Vietnam.

The growth of Japanese economic power, on the other hand, has signaled a need for constructing an international order that would permit room for Japan to play a more independent and influential role. Japan has come to chafe increasingly in the role of a military base for the United States on the far side of the Pacific Ocean. The seemingly unlimited access to the U.S. domestic market enjoyed by Japan for the past two decades and a half has suddenly turned into an economic nightmare for the United States. A generous giver of economic aid and a promoter of free trade has turned into a disadvantaged champion fighting with one arm tied behind his back against a strong challenger. There is now serious economic competition, if not war, across the Pacific Ocean. The United States clearly intends either to blunt the thrust of the Japanese economic challenge or to divert it to other markets of the world. From now on, Japan will be more on her own in the international power arena as well as the economic market. She will have to do her share of maintaining "checks and balances" against the major powers of the world, including the United States.

But the United States cannot help but wish that Japan would

do most of the checking and balancing against communist China and the Soviet Union while those two Asian neighbors would in turn check and balance Japan. They could surely take more of the brunt of Japanese economic expansion by granting Japan more access to their natural resources and markets.

Faced with this prospect, the Soviet Union is perhaps more ready than China to play the game of checks and balances against Japan. It has more power and, perhaps, more self-discipline. It feels powerful enough, and therefore confident enough, not only to withstand the Japanese challenge but also to profit by coöperating with Japan economically. At a minimum, the Soviet Union wishes to prevent Japan from amalgamating her prodigious managerial skills and scientific technologies with the vast labor pool of mainland China. More immediately, the Soviet Union desires to draw Japan away from China, keeping the two Asian powers checking and balancing each other as much as possible. The more pressure there is on communist China from Japan, the less pressure there will be on the Soviet Union from China and Japan. Ideally, Russia would find it most advantageous if America, Japan and communist China—all three—checked and balanced one another rather furiously, affording her the greatest room for manœuvrability.

III

Logical, and even mechanical, elegance is the virtue as well as the vice of an international balance-of-power system. If the game is played with cool rationality and chivalrous gallantry, it could even become a gentlemanly sport. Unfortunately, international balance-of-power games have not always been played with finesse and sportsmanship. This has been especially true in the case of the three powers immediately surrounding the Korean peninsula. At the turn of the present century, even without the modern complications of differing ideologies, one could not easily find a combination of three nations with more dissimilar cultural and political backgrounds and yet with such a singular identity of political purpose. Superficially, China and Japan shared the same Confucian culture and common racial characteristics. But in many ways Japan has had more in common with Europe than with China. Perhaps this dissimilarity is more obvious to the Asian eye than to the European. The difference between China and Japan is best typified by the greatly

differing manners in which the two cultures have responded to the imperialistic Occident. The uniqueness of Russian culture, on the other hand, needs no elaboration here.

It is essentially the lack of a cultural consensus as to the acceptable mode in which the balance of power is to be maintained among the Asian powers (the Soviet Union, China and Japan) that makes the prospect of international peace and stability in East Asia rather bleak. In order for a delicate and sophisticated game such as that of the balance of power to be played with a reasonably satisfactory result for the players as well as the spectators, the players must have a set of rules on which there is some common agreement. If there is no consensus on the validity of the rules and no willingness to abide by them, a game would invariably deteriorate into a "dirty fight." Even within the so-called Western state system which had taken centuries to work out a set of commonly accepted practices, the game has broken down often enough to bring despair to lovers of peace.

But the members of the Western state system have had much more in common in terms of history and culture than the three Asian powers. International law, which has been considered a salvation by many, is also a set of authoritative decisions that has grown out of the power interactions among the members of the Western state system. It is enough to point out that two of the three Asian powers are not particularly willing to respect this system of law either by virtue of their ideology or ethnocentric worldview.

The Asian powers, however, have several things in common. Aside from their geographic proximity, they are united in their suspicion and fear of one another. During the past century, each has had reasons to denounce the aggressiveness and malevolence of the other. The Japanese have difficulty in forgiving the Russians for their entrance into World War II in its last days in violation of their nonaggression pact of 1941. On the other hand, Chinese and Russians see no need to condone Japan's militaristic rampage on the Asian continent. The Sino-Soviet border disputes, of course, still continue.

It is the sad fate of Korea to be stuck in the midst of these three powers, continuously victimized by their dehumanizing and destructive violence. One hears Japanese describe the Korean peninsula as a dagger pointed at Japan's heart or a pistol aimed at her head. At the same time, Chinese and Russians re-

gard it as a bridge over which Japanese militarism has exploded all over the Asian continent. Thus, the peninsula has always been described as a chronic source of international conflict and military violence. And yet, Korea by herself has never been a threat to anyone. She becomes a threatening dagger or pistol aimed at Japan only if she falls into the hands of China or Russia. By the same token, it is as a bridge for the Japanese military that Korea has been a menace to China or Russia. The Korean people have never threatened their neighbors; they have always wished merely to be left alone. Indeed, it was her smallness and military weakness that made her a source of trouble in East Asia at the beginning of the present century. Korea was a threat to world peace 70 years ago because of her thorough-going pacifism and aversion to military violence.

Korea's big neighbors attempted to neutralize the threat posed by others by each securing for itself a predominance there. Each of the three endeavored to keep the other two out while consolidating its own paramountcy there. The disadvantage of this approach to Asian peace was that paramountcy was attainable only at the cost of war, with devastating consequences for the inhabitants of the peninsula. But, however preposterous such an approach to Asian peace may sound today, it was precisely the approach adopted successfully by Japan with American public approval under President Theodore Roosevelt. Korea's colonization by Japan in 1910 after five years of protectorateship was justified in terms of world peace and a more stable order in East Asia. This was "the final solution" of the Korean question—the elimination of a Korea which was not powerful enough to defend her independence by placing her firmly under Japanese imperialist rule. By letting herself become a perennial battleground for her powerful neighbors, Korea courted her own political demise as an independent nation. Korea was no more to be a source of violence and international disorder. But having turned Korea into a "bridge," Japanese militarism soon went to work to transform the worst of Chinese and Russian fears into a reality.

Not that other approaches to peace never occurred to Koreans. International neutrality was the first to be tried and as a result Korea was ravaged by the guns and the bayonets of her neighbors. Unless a state has sufficient military capability to guarantee its own neutrality, its neutrality is entirely at the mercy of its more

powerful neighbors. Inasmuch as the ambition of Korea's neighbors was to secure supremacy in Korea to the exclusion of others, a declaration of neutrality was simply ignored whenever they decided to contest each other's claim by force of arms. As soon as Japan fancied that the influence of either China or Russia in Korea was becoming "excessive," she undertook to counteract it by increasing her own influence. This in turn triggered counteractions by China and Russia, giving rise to a spiral of intervention and conflict.

On the other hand, being separated by a body of water from Korea, Japan constantly felt herself at a strategic disadvantage vis-à-vis China and Russia, who had overland access to the peninsula. In order to compensate for this disadvantage, Japan endeavored to have some prior foothold on the peninsula. China and Russia, of course, were not inclined to recognize such a prior foothold as legitimate.

Another approach tried by Koreans with equally disastrous consequences to themselves was the dangerous game of playing the three powers off against one another. The failure to play this age-old game with any degree of finesse may have been due to an innate clumsiness of the Korean people. But the real reason seems to have been again the weakness of the Korean polity. The game only intensified the mutual distrust and belligerence among the three powers and encouraged the fear that Korea might at any time undermine the position of one in the peninsula by snuggling up to one of the others.

Moreover, the game helped Koreans to earn a reputation among their neighbors for being tricky and deceitful, thus reinforcing their desire to extinguish Korea's political independence. Having learned the truth the hard way—that political weakness is an international sin and that power politics as played by a nation which lacks power is at best international treachery and at worst an invitation to political calamity—Koreans are not likely to get their fingers burned again by indulging in the games of neutrality, big-power rivalry or neighborly protection.

IV

What, then, is the Korean approach to political survival and peace in East Asia? The first principle is Korea's nonalignment, especially in the military sense, with any of the three immediately surrounding powers. This principle is easier to expound than

to practice. There is no question that Korea must maintain normal and amicable relations with all three of her neighbors. This is essential for her survival and for peace in East Asia. But a strong alignment with any one of them would immediately be interpreted as inimical by the other two. Intensification of tension and hostility would promptly follow. Korea would again become a source of instability and war.

A very important corollary of this principle of Korea's non-alignment with the Asian powers is her very close special relationship to the United States. To put it more bluntly, a close alignment with the United States is the only practicable way for Korea to remain nonaligned with any of her immediate neighbors. When Korea was first drawn very reluctantly into the international power process in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, she immediately found herself relying on the United States as a power that could give her leverage against her neighbors. The United States was unique in that it was far enough away from Korea to have a friendly relationship, relatively free of tension and strain, between the two countries, but was involved enough in the Asian affairs to be a Pacific power. Korea was too small to be a threat to the United States while the latter had no territorial interest in the Korean peninsula. These qualities enabled Koreans to use the United States as a means to break out of the suffocating geopolitical encirclement by the three Asian powers. The United States was in an ideal position to play the role of peacemaker, or referee, on the Korean peninsula, keeping the Asian powers from coming to blows.

But America at the turn of the present century had her own reason for declining the role of referee on the peninsula. She had good reasons to fear involvement in Asian power politics, one of the most important being her territorial interest in the Philippines at the time. By cultural heritage and ethnic inclination, the United States wished to keep Asia at a cautious distance. Even the role of referee, if played too aggressively, could embroil the United States in Asian conflicts especially when there was no consensual acceptance of such a role by the Asian powers. When America, upon the cessation of the Russo-Japanese War, threw her weight behind Japanese hegemony in Korea, the subsequent fate of Korea and Asian peace seemed authoritatively settled.

It is not necessary to describe the train of events that led to the

division of the Korean peninsula into two zones of military occupation at the end of the Pacific war and the subsequent U.S. involvement in the Korean War under the aegis of the United Nations. In the two decades following the Korean War, the United States has played the role of an opponent of one of the Asian powers, communist China. Now the United States is endeavoring to redefine the Asian power structure as well as its own role in it.

It is in the interests of the United States and of Asian peace that the United States now accept the role of an active referee on the Korean peninsula. It is clear that a new set of rules of the game for the Asian power balance must be hammered out with active American participation. And it should not be difficult for the United States to persuade the Asian powers to accept its new role of referee.

It is a stark reality of Asian power politics that China and Russia would prefer the American presence on the Korean peninsula to the Japanese. Given a choice between Japanese militarism and American militarism, the Chinese and Russians would choose the latter any time. On the other hand, the American troops on Korean soil are there as much for the defense of Japan as for the Republic of Korea and the United States. The Chinese communist élites are realistic enough to know that the American military presence in South Korea is in fact impeding the pace of Japanese rearmament by giving the Japanese people a greater sense of security from the continental powers. Chou En-lai must realize that one sure way to speed up Japanese remilitarization is to have the American troops in South Korea withdrawn precipitously.

Moreover, if the U.S. role of referee is to be effective, it has to endow its presence in South Korea with realistic components of military power and wealth. To be sure, the military strength need not be great, and substitution is possible between the two components. It is not a mindless exhibition of paranoia on the part of communist China to denounce Japanese militarism for having already gained a foothold in the Republic of Korea in view of the fact of the rapidly diminishing American military presence there and the outstripping of the American economic presence by the Japanese. It is one thing for China to be wary of American presence in South Korea but it is entirely another to be confronted with a Japanese economic ascendancy which com-

pletely dwarfs the American economic interests in the peninsula. If any country should insist that American troops remain on the Korean soil, it should be communist China.

If the U.S. presence in South Korea, even in the present form of 42,000 troops, were to be a protective and impartial shield for each of the three Asian powers against the aggressive intentions of the other two, the Asian powers should be willing to accept the American role for the sake of peace in Asia. There seems to be no other alternative. The strategic importance of an independent and stable Korea for Asian peace cannot be overemphasized. A peaceful Korea is a linchpin for a stable Asian balance of power. The Asian powers are all too preoccupied with relative power advantages on the Korean peninsula to leave the linchpin alone. Only the United States has enough detached interest in South Korea to help keep the linchpin functioning properly.

One of the highest policy objectives of the Republic of Korea today is the prevention of another war on the Korean peninsula. It is on the basis of this objective that the Republic of Korea has been working toward the easing of tensions with her three big neighbors. She has been willing to risk the formalization of the division of the nation by taking the initiative in contacts with North Korea in spite of North Korea's continuing revolutionary commitment to its "war of national liberation" and military provocations. She has made it very clear that, if the only means for achieving national reunification is another fratricidal war on the Korean peninsula, she is prepared to defer national reunification indefinitely. This has involved a serious political sacrifice on the part of the Republic of Korea because the issue of national reunification is such a nationalistic imperative that any appearance of procrastination in trying to achieve it is liable to provoke charges of national betrayal. But she is convinced that the only legitimate, or even "patriotic," means for reunification is a peaceful one. She has publicly renounced force as an instrument of national reunification.

Given the revolutionary commitment of North Korea in its "war of fatherland liberation," the policy of peaceful unification of the Republic of Korea has put her on the defensive against the North. But it has been a consistent foreign policy of the Republic of Korea during the past decade to ensure peace on the Korean peninsula by deterring North Korea's war of national liberation. Every foreign policy move of the Republic of Korea

has been designed so as to pressure North Korea into abandoning its avowed method of war. From her stand on the involvement of the United Nations to the Red Cross negotiations, the policies of the Republic of Korea have aimed to increase the prospect of peace on the peninsula.

It is sincerely hoped that the United States will be coldly realistic in redefining its participation in the newly emerging power equilibrium in East Asia. It is understandable that the United States does not wish to be a belligerent again in that part of the world. But its desire for peace in East Asia cannot be fulfilled by retreating completely from Asia. America is a Pacific power regardless of her desires. Whatever happens in East Asia is bound to affect her immediately and profoundly. A war there would be brought to America against her wish. Therefore, whatever form U.S. participation in the East Asian power balance may take, it must be for the sake of increasing the probability for peace.

The chances for peace in East Asia, however, will be diminished without American involvement in South Korea as a force to keep Korea's neighbors from warring against one another. If the newly emerging power system which must revolve around the Korean peninsula is to maintain itself, the participants must come to an agreement on the common rules of the game within which the participant roles are defined. Unless the United States succeeds in convincing the other three participants to consent to its role as a referee on the Korean peninsula, neither the power balance nor peace in East Asia is a realistic possibility.

Japanese-Korean Relations

by

I. Yamagata



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JAPANESE-KOREAN RELATIONS AFTER THE
JAPANESE INVASION OF KOREA IN
THE XVIIth CENTURY.

BY

I YAMAGATA, EDITOR, *Seoul Press.*

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen :—

Some time ago Dr. Gale kindly suggested to me that I should read a paper before a meeting of this learned society. I was very much flattered, but well knowing that I am but slightly qualified to undertake the task suggested I hesitated to reply in the affirmative and gave him a rather vague reply. My hesitation was all the greater because I knew too well what a bad speaker of English I was. Moreover, I knew that the lecturers who preceded me were all gentlemen possessing profound knowledge of the subjects they dealt with. Mr. Komatsu, Prof. Starr of Chicago University, Dr. Gale and Mr. Gillett—these were the gentlemen who spoke before me and the lectures they gave were all of absorbing interest. After these learned gentlemen, I was sure I should make myself a laughing stock. For these reasons, I hesitated to accept the suggestion thus made to me by Dr. Gale, though an extremely flattering one. On second thought, however, I decided to agree to it, for this reason, that I possess one great advantage which is denied to all the learned lecturers who preceded me. By the advantage I mean, paradoxical though it may sound, the very fact that I am a bad speaker of English. Now as you may have already noticed I speak English in an extremely outlandish way and without endeavouring to be amusing, I can amuse you by simply talking in my quaint Japanized English. All my learned predecessors had to say something interesting in order to delight you.

Your humble servant, however, has only to speak in English and it is enough to make you smile.

I remember having spoken before a great assembly of students in Tokyo some four years ago. The speakers on the occasion were, besides myself, the late Rev. Dr. Lloyd, of the Imperial University, Mr. Iwaya, who is the best writer in Japan for young people, and Captain Sakurai, hero of Port Arthur and the famous author of "Human Bullets." I may say I am a better speaker in Japanese and I believe I made a pretty good speech. Mr. Iwaya and Captain Sakurai are eloquent speakers and were, as usual, eminently successful. But the laurels of the day were won by Dr. Lloyd, and he was accorded the loudest applause by the audience. It was not because his speech was specially good, but it was because he spoke in Japanese and that in very quaint Japanese. The late Dr. Lloyd was a great scholar of Japanese literature, but I must say he spoke very funny Japanese. Every sentence he uttered was greeted with immense delight by his hearers and for half an hour, during which he spoke, he received round after round of thunderous applause. I do not venture to hope to score such success as was won by him that day, but I do hope that the quaint English in which I speak will prevent you from sleeping for half an hour.

With this rather long introduction, I now propose to read my little paper, which, I assure you, is not such a long one as my introduction may suggest. The paper I am going to read deals with the intercourse between Japan and Korea immediately after the Japanese invasion of Korea in the 16th century and during the Tokugawa or feudal government of Japan. As you are no doubt well aware, the Japanese invasion of Korea in the 16th century was a dismal failure. Toyotomi Hideyoshi, often called the Napoleon of Japan, undertook it with no higher motive than satisfying his boundless ambition. The expedition was at first quite successful. It was on May 24, in the year 1592, that the advance guard, of the Japanese army under the command of Konishi landed at Fusan. By the way, it is interesting to note that Konishi was a Christian. He and the nineteen thousand



Standards (1)

men under him were almost entirely Christians. Within less than twenty days after landing at Fusan, Konishi, and Kato, Commander of the Second Contingent of the Japanese Army, occupied Seoul, and the Korean King fled to Pyongyang. The Japanese generals did not stop long in Seoul. Kato marched into the province of North Hamkyong and went as far north as Hoilyong on the Manchurian border, while Konishi pursued the King to Pyongyang, which town he occupied on July 16, that is only fifty-four days after he had set foot in Korea. In the meantime the whole of South Korea was overrun by other Japanese generals and everything looked rosy for them. But the Japanese success stopped there. Konishi could not march northward beyond Pyongyang and was ultimately driven back to Seoul by a vast army sent from China to help the Koreans. The Japanese were also greatly harassed by guerrilla warfare waged by Koreans. They were especially placed in difficulty by the great Korean admiral Yi Sun-sin, who wrested from them the command of the sea and frequently cut off the supply of men and provisions from home. On land, however, they mostly got the better of the Koreans and Chinese. And thus the war dragged on for seven long years until the end of October of the year 1598, with the exception of a short interval when unsuccessful peace negotiations were carried on. In September of that year Hideyoshi died, and the Japanese invaders weary of the war withdrew without accomplishing anything, except the ruin of nearly the whole of Korea, from which the poor country has never recovered. It is true that the Chinese who came to help Koreans against the Japanese contributed not a little to the devastation of the country; but of course the main part of the blame must be borne by the Japanese. Before that disastrous Japanese invasion, Korea was the equal, if not the superior, of Japan in wealth, in culture and in civilization. That war was a death blow to poor Korea and the country has since been growing weaker and weaker. To-day we are endeavouring to revive Korea. It is a case strongly illustrative of the Japanese proverb which says: "The sin of a father is atoned by his

children." We are to-day doing our best to atone for the sin committed by our ancestors in Korea three centuries ago. In this connection, in the name of Japan I must thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for the great and valuable help you give us in our work to restore life to Korea.

Having been so cruelly dealt with by Japan, as described above, it is but natural that after the war Korea did not regard Japan as her good friend and was in no mood to resume friendly relations with her. In fact it was Japan who first made overtures to become friends again. Tokugawa Iyeyasu, who became the virtual ruler of Japan after the death of Hideyoshi, was bent on restoring peace to the country which was in a perturbed state in consequence of the passing away of the Japanese Napoleon. In order that his attention to domestic affairs might not be distracted by foreign complications, he wished to restore friendly relations with Korea and instructed the Daimyo or feudal lord of Tsushima to put forth efforts for that purpose. This order was a very welcome one to the Daimyo of Tsushima, for that island lying midway between Fusan and Shimonoseki had been suffering a great deal on account of the suspension of its tradal relations with Korea. Being a mountainous country and not having enough land to produce rice crops to support its people, Tsushima had been accustomed to send trading vessels to Fusan, fifty in number annually, and to import Korean rice in exchange for various commodities. The Japanese invasion of Korea interrupted this tradal relation to the great inconvenience of the people of Tsushima. For this reason, the order from Iyeyasu to try to restore friendly relations between Japan and Korea was received by the Daimyo of Tsushima with great joy. In the year 1599, that is only two years after the Japanese troops withdrew from Korea, the Daimyo of Tsushima sent a messenger to Korea with the purpose of sounding the feeling of the Korean Court towards Japan. This messenger and two others, who were sent one after another with the same purpose, were all made captives by the Chinese troops then still stationed in Chosen and sent to Peking. A



Band (3)



fourth messenger, sent in the year 1601, succeeded in reaching Seoul and returning home with a reply from the Korean Court. In that reply Korea demanded of Japan the return of Korean prisoners if Japan really wanted peace. The Daimyo of Tsushima, therefore, collected some Korean prisoners and sent them back to Korea and otherwise endeavoured to win the good will of the Korean Court. On the part of Korea, she also wished to conclude peace with Japan, if for no other reason than that of getting rid of the Chinese braves stationed in the country, who constantly acted outrageously and caused great suffering to the Korean people. In the year 1603 Korea sent to Tsushima an envoy in order to see if Japan was really in earnest in wishing peace and in the following year again sent two messengers for the same purpose. The Daimyo of Tsushima accompanied these Korean messengers to Kyoto, where in the spring of the following year they were received in audience by Tokugawa Iyeyasu, the first Shogun. On this occasion, Iyeyasu consented to the request made by the Korean messengers to return the Korean captives. In consequence, more than 3,000 Korean captives were allowed to return to their country during the same year.

This substantial proof of the desire for peace on the part of Japan was sufficient to convince Korea of its reality and the latter now showed herself ready to respond to Japan's friendly overtures. In the year 1606 the Korean Court sent a note to the Daimyo of Tsushima, in which two demands were expressed. The first of these demands was that Iyeyasu should first send a formal letter to the Korean Court asking for peace and the second was that some Japanese soldiers who had opened some Royal tombs during the Japanese occupation of Seoul should be arrested and surrendered to the Korean Court. Upon the receipt of these two demands, the Daimyo of Tsushima found himself in a dilemma. It would be easy enough to send to Korea some criminals pretending that they were the men wanted by her, but how could he induce Iyeyasu to send a letter to the Korean Court first? It amounted to Japan suing for peace—a great blow to Japan's pride, which Iyeyasu would

never consent to receive. The mere mention of such a demand having been preferred by Korea would drive the Shogun Iyeyasu into a violent fit of anger and all efforts put forth by him for restoring peace between Japan and Korea would come to no purpose. The poor Daimyo of Tsushima was at his wits' end, when Yanagawa, his prime minister, came to his rescue, by devising a tricky solution to the difficult problem. It is not known whether or not the Daimyo of Tsushima connived at his prime minister's act, but it is known that this crafty and unscrupulous Yanagawa fabricated a state letter in the name of Iyeyasu, the virtual ruler of Japan. He sent this forged letter to Korea along with some criminals whom he pretended to be the men who had desecrated the Royal tombs and who were wanted by the Korean Court. Now the funny thing was that these criminals were all young men little more than twenty-five years of age, so that at the time of the desecration of the Royal tombs some fourteen years before they were still children and could scarcely have committed the heinous crime with which they were charged. The Korean Court easily detected the trick but failed to see that the alleged state letter of Iyeyasu was a forgery and accepted it in good faith. As for the criminals referred to, Korea no less eager than Japan for peace, was glad to overlook the minor point and received and executed them as the real offenders.

The two demands preferred by Korea having thus been satisfied, the Korean Court concluded that it was in duty bound to respond to Japan's courtesy. Accordingly early in the year 1608 it despatched a mission to Japan. It consisted of an Ambassador, a Vice-Ambassador and a Councillor, with a suite of about 270 men, and carried with it a state letter and some presents to the Shogun from the King of Korea. This letter of the Korean King was naturally worded in the form of a reply to the letter of Iyeyasu, which, as before said, was a fabrication by Yanagawa, Prime Minister of the Daimyo of Tsushima. Hence if the Korean King's letter were presented to the Shogun in the



Palanquin bearing King's auto-graph letter 39



original form, the little trick played by Yanagawa would at once be discovered. Under the circumstance, the crafty Yanagawa did not hesitate to alter the wording of the letter in a way convenient to himself and likely to be pleasing to the Shogun. Not only that, he also added many costly articles to the presents from the Korean King and said that all came from His Majesty.

Having thus completed preparations for the presentation of the Korean mission, the Daimyo of Tsushima accompanied the Koreans to Yedo, that is the present Tokyo, the seat of the Government of the Tokugawa Shogunate. They left the island of Tsushima on the 21st day of the 3rd moon of the year 1608 and arrived at Yedo after spending about sixty days on the way. Iyeyasu had retired from the office of the Shogun two years before and his son Hidetada had succeeded him. The three superior Korean representatives were received in audience by the Shogun Hidetada, when they presented him with the king's autograph letter and some presents, including 300 *kin* of ginseng, 20 tiger skins and other Korean products. The reception of the Koreans by the Shogun was very cordial. They were entertained at dinner and presented with 600 pieces of silver and 15 swords. They were also entrusted with a reply by the Shogun Hidetada to the Korean King. The Korean mission, on its way home, stopped at Sunpu, which is the present city of Shidzuoka, at the foot of Mt. Fuji, where Iyeyasu had retired. Here the Korean messengers were received in audience by the ex-Shogun and besides being dined and wined were given some presents. One good result of this Korean mission was that several hundred Korean prisoners, who still remained in Japan, were allowed to return home and many Japanese retained in Korea were allowed to come back.

In this way friendly relations between Japan and Korea were at length restored. In recognition of the service rendered in this connection, the Daimyo of Tsushima was rewarded with an increase in his revenue and promotion in Court rank. Besides this, the Daimyo of Tsushima had the satisfaction of being

allowed by Korea to send 20 trading vessels every year to the port of Fusan to sell Japanese products to Koreans and buy Korean rice. All this was the good result of the little trick played by Yanagawa, his ingenious and unscrupulous prime minister. I may add that Yanagawa again tampered with state letters exchanged between Japan and Korea in the year 1624. Some years later, this and former crimes were discovered, with the result that Yanagawa and some subordinate officials, who were concerned in the business, were tried and found guilty. Yanagawa was stripped of his position and exiled, while some of his subordinate officials were beheaded.

As I have already said, peace was formally restored between Japan and Korea in the year 1608, the latter having sent a mission to the former. It was quite natural, however, that the relations between the two countries were not all that could be desired. Korea still harboured suspicion against Japan and for some time continued to respond rather indifferently to courtesies shown by Japan. In the year 1615 a great civil war in Japan resulted in the downfall of the House founded by Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who undertook the invasion of Korea. This event was utilized by the Tokugawa, who was now supreme ruler of Japan in reality as well as in name, to win the goodwill of the Korean Court. A special messenger was despatched to Korea with a message that the enemy of the Korean Court was destroyed by the Tokugawa, and Korea should congratulate the House for this. The Korean Court was pleased and in the year 1617 sent another mission to Japan. From this time down to the year 1763 Korea sent ambassadors to Japan on the occasion of the appointment of a new Shogun. Altogether such missions arrived in Japan eleven times. On the part of Japan, she also sent envoys on the occasion of the death of a Korean King and the accession to the throne of a new King. These Japanese envoys were usually sent from the Island of Tsushima and men appointed as envoys were chief retainers of the Daimyo of Tsushima.

Let me now give you a brief account of the Korean mis-



Pages 10 Ambassador (4)



sions in Japan. The mission was invariably composed of three superior dignitaries, that is Ambassador, Vice-Ambassador and Councillor, beside a very large suite, which exceeded 300 and sometimes totalled nearly 500. The mission came to Japan via Fusan and Tsushima. From Tsushima to Yedo the Koreans were accompanied by the Daimyo of the island. They took the sea-route as far as Osaka through the Inland Sea. Landing at Osaka, the party proceeded to Kyoto and thence passing through the province of Oni, which is my native place, and the neighbouring province of Mino, went to Nagoya and then travelled along the Tokaido highway until it arrived at Yedo. After an audience with the Shogun, the Korean party visited Nikko and then went home by the same route they took in coming. The journey took seven or eight months to complete. From the time the Koreans set foot on the Island of Tsushima, they were treated as guests. All the Daimyo or feudal lords along the route on which they travelled appointed special commissioners to welcome and entertain them. On their arrival at Yedo, they were very cordially received, some big and fine temples being assigned as their hotels, and the entertainment given them in the castle of the Shogun was of the most cordial nature. The fact was that the visit of the Korean mission came to be regarded as the chief event attendant upon the appointment of the new Shogun and was made very much of. The expenses incurred by the feudal lords and the Shogun in connection with the visit of the Korean mission were great. For this reason, about the end of the XVIII century, when the finances of the Tokugawa Government were in a crippled state, the Government could not afford to receive the ceremonial visit of the Korean mission at Yedo and made arrangements to receive it in the Island of Tsushima. From this time the visit of the Korean mission to Yedo was discontinued.

On the occasion of the audience with the Shogun at Yedo, the Korean Ambassador presented him with the King's autograph letter, besides a large number of presents. The wording of the letter was almost identical every time and expressed

cordial congratulations on the appointment of the Shogun. On the part of the Shogun, he also gave in trust to the Ambassador a reply to the King, acknowledging and returning his courtesy. The Shogun also sent many presents to the Korean King by the same Ambassador. He also gave the Ambassador and all the members of his suite valuable presents. I have brought here with me some pictures showing the procession of the Korean Ambassador on the occasion of his formal call on the Shogun. These pictures are reproductions from an old painting in the possession of Viscount Akimoto of Tokyo, whose ancestors probably took part in the reception of the Korean mission. I hope those pictures will give you some idea of the gorgeous procession.

I am now about to conclude my little paper. In doing so, let me tell you a little story. I was born in the province of Omi, near Kyoto, through which the Korean mission passed in going to and returning from Yedo. My native place is a little feudal town called Minakuchi, a post station on the Tokaido highway. Travellers going to Yedo from Osaka and Kyoto along the Tokaido highway usually passed through my native town. Oddly enough, however, the Korean mission did not pass my native town, but swinging to the left from the town of Kusatsu, some ten miles away from my native place, they followed a highway known as Chosenjin Kaido or highway for Koreans. The reason that the Korean mission did not honour my native town with a visit was probably that the feudal lord of the place was too poor to entertain them. At any rate while passing through the province of Omi and the neighbouring province of Mino, the Korean mission did not travel on the regular Tokaido highway, but followed the Chosen-jin Kaido or highway for Koreans. This highway is a fine road with rows of pine-trees growing along both sides. I remember having travelled on foot along this road in my boyhood with my father. I was tired and foot sore and the road seemed to be unreasonably long and winding. I asked my father why the road was so winding and the reply given me was: "Don't you see,



Ambassador (3)




Vice-Ambassador (6)

my boy, that this is a road specially made for Koreans to travel along? It is made long and winding in order to impress them with the extensiveness of our country." I don't know whether the road was really made with such a purpose, but, I tell you, I thought on the occasion that if it was, it was really a very foolish policy.

Ladies and gentlemen, I beg to thank you all heartily for the patient attention with which you have followed my paper.

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STUDIES IN THE THEOLOGY OF THE
KOREAN PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH

AN HISTORICAL OUTLINE

Part IV

HARVIE M. CONN

IV. CONFLICT AND DIVISION — 1945 TO 1954

THE early months immediately following liberation had made clear to many the tremendous complications that would be involved in any reform program within the church. Some, like the Chaikun (Reconstruction) movement leaders, felt the program so impossible that they had withdrawn from the Presbyterian fold almost immediately upon liberation. Others, like Lee Ki Sun and his sympathizers, had severed their connections, or had been put out of the church, in 1946 and following. Many, as Kim Yang Sun has indicated, simply felt that reform was unnecessary. Conservatives in Korea north of the 38th parallel, particularly in North Pyungan Province, had taken a stronger position against the Japanese-enforced compromises of the war years and may have been less in need of rehabilitation than those in other areas.¹ In any case, these men quickly found themselves facing another dangerous foe to the church's purity — Communism. Their attention, of necessity, was turned in another direction.

¹ Kim Yang Sun, *History of the Korean Church in the Ten Years Since Liberation (1945-1955)*, (K), Religious Education Committee of the Korean Presbyterian Church, 1956, p. 44. Kim's remarks that "the several hundred churches of this Presbytery really did not need any rehabilitation", may be excessive in view of the nationwide capitulation to the Japanese demands. But, at the same time, the refusal of the North Pyungan Province Presbytery to become part of the Japanese-made 'united church', indicates a stronger degree of resistance than was evident in other areas of the church.

A. *Program for Reform*

It was in South Kyungsang Province that the first successful step for reform was executed. There, in the summer of 1946, at the instigation of Han Sang Dong and Choo Nam Sun, a theological institute was held. And, on September 20, 1946, "at the urgent request of the church",² it continued its services as Koryu Theological Seminary.

Conceived in the minds of its two Korean founders during their prison years,³ the school quickly became a rallying place for conservative thought in the church. Consciously aware of the liberalism of Chosun Seminary, the institution intended to carry on the old ideas of Pyungyang Seminary. Because of the stand of its founders, it quickly became associated with "the spirit of the martyrs" during the war. Most of the 53 students who enrolled during its first year

² *Ibid.*, p. 153. Cf. Bruce F. Hunt, "Trials Within and Without", *Presbyterian Guardian*, February 25, 1960, pp. 37-40.

³ The prison diary of Han Sang Dong was printed in *The Watchman*, (K), March, 1953, pp. 9-15; April, 1953, pp. 11-16; May, 1953, pp. 10-15; June, 1953, pp. 11-16. His intentions regarding the erection of a new seminary may be found in the June, 1953, issue, pp. 15-16. Kim Yang Sun's remark, that Han intended "to rehabilitate the seminary closed by the shrine worship demands", is inaccurate. In his diary, Han speaks of the erection of a new seminary (Cf., to the contrary, Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-147). In this same connection, some confusion also exists as to the participation of missionaries of the Independent and Orthodox Presbyterian Boards in the erection of the seminary. Rhodes and Campbell, for example, imply that the erection of the seminary was done jointly with missionaries of these two boards (Harry Rhodes and Archibald Campbell, *History of the Korea Mission, Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 1935-1959, Volume II*, Commission of Ecumenical Mission and Relations, the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 1965, p. 215). However, the first returning missionary of these groups was the Rev. Bruce F. Hunt of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church. He did not reach Korea until October, 1946, some months after the founding of the seminary. The only information Mr. Hunt had concerning the institution seems to have come from an Orthodox Presbyterian Church chaplain stationed in Korea at the time. He was not even asked to help in the seminary until his arrival on the field. It is true that these missionaries became intimately associated with Koryu Seminary. But they were not at all instrumental in its founding.

“had been imprisoned by the Japanese for their faith”.⁴ Their spirit was clearly reflected in this letter of matriculation read on the opening day of the seminary by a student:

“We did not come to this school to study at magnificent buildings, and we do not ask for splendid arrangements. We have come to this school to be inspired by you with the spirit of the martyrs who laid down their lives for the gospel of Christ, and we have come to this school to learn the truth of the cross. We will be satisfied with a small cottage, if you teach us this truth and make us the ministers who can be the servants of Christ and useful to Him in our age”.⁵

The direction of the Seminary quickly took form. And perhaps the one man who formed it more than any other was Pak Yune Sun, Th.M., D.D. (1906–). The acting president of the fledgling institution during its first year, Dr. Pak provided a link with Pyungyang Seminary, where he had lectured on biblical languages from 1936–1938. He brought to Koryu Seminary an insistence on the promotion of a distinctive Calvinism. From research under J. Gresham Machen at Westminster Theological Seminary (1934–1936), and again under Dr. C. Van Til (1938–1940), Dr. Pak saw more than the need for just the continuation of an old tradition. He had learned that there were areas in Korea’s Calvinism that needed strengthening. In 1939, he wrote of those areas in these words: “The Korean Church must now proceed to a higher plane — the plane of right understanding of the Scriptures. This advance can be made through Calvinism and through nothing else. It will be Calvinism, as it has always been in the past, that will really impart Bible truth as a system to human souls”.⁶

⁴ “Korean Presbytery Founds Orthodox Seminary”, *Presbyterian Guardian*, August 25, 1946, p. 233.

⁵ Quoted in Chun Young Chang, *Modern Daniels in Korea*, pamphlet published by author, n.d., p. 18.

⁶ Pak Yune Sun, “The Korean Church and Westminster Seminary”, *The Presbyterian Guardian*, April, 1939, p. 71. The effect of Westminster Seminary upon Dr. Pak and Koryu Seminary was most profound. By 1952, the school had six full-time teachers and five of the six had received full or extensive training at Westminster. Pak Yune Sun’s classes were

Fearful of the weaknesses of fundamentalism, Dr. Pak envisioned a seminary where those weaknesses might receive needed attention, where Korean affections for pietism, other-worldliness, and mysticism might meet the pure light of sound theological training. Pak feared that the old Pyungyang Seminary had concentrated its scope on too limited an area, and by doing so had created a church unaware of the areas of common grace. He wanted something larger than a mere fundamentalism. He wanted the Korean church to see, and be moved by, the larger perspectives of Calvinism.⁷

Unlike Pak Hyung Nong, his associate in the Reformed faith,⁸ Pak Yune Sun sought to achieve these purposes, not primarily through the discipline of Systematic Theology, but through New Testament research. His approach was

the first to introduce the apologetic system associated with the name of Cornelius Van Til to Korea.

⁷ These larger perspectives are frequently displayed in Pak's early articles appearing in *The Watchman*, (K), the monthly magazine published by Koryu Seminary, which began making its appearance in 1951. Note especially his lengthy series on Calvinism, which began in April, 1952. Reminiscent of Kuyper's approach to the same subject in the Stone lectures of 1898, Pak treats such themes as "the fundamental principle of Calvinism", "Calvinism's world-and-life view", and "Calvinism's View of the State". The articles also make frequent use of H. Henry Meeter's *Calvinism* (Baker Book House, 1939), a title Pak, in association with the Rev. Kim Chin Hong, translated in 1959. Cf. Pak Yune Sun, "Calvinism", *The Watchman*, (K), April, 1952, pp. 6-13; May, 1952, pp. 7-14; July, 1952, pp. 32-35; September, 1952, pp. 26-32; October, 1952, pp. 9-15; November, 1952, pp. 5-7; December, 1952, pp. 11-13; January, 1953, pp. 18-20; March, 1953, pp. 22-24. Cf. also Pak Yune Sun, "Calvinism and the State", *The Watchman*, (K), October, 1953, pp. 9-13; "The Believer and the Development of Culture", *The Watchman*, (K), August, 1953, pp. 7-9. For a later sample of Pak's writing on these themes, note Pak Yune Sun, "Weaknesses of Fundamentalism", *Logos*, (K), edited and published by the Students' Association of the Korean Presbyterian General Assembly Theological Seminary, Seoul, 1964, pp. 5-11.

⁸ The association has been a long and close one. The two men co-authored a commentary on II Corinthians, appearing in 1939 as part of the *Standard Bible Commentary* series of the Korean Presbyterian General Assembly. From 1941 to 1943, Pak Yune Sun served as professor of Biblical Exegesis in the Manchurian Theological Seminary, of which Pak Hyung Nong was president. The seminary was a project of the Korean Presbyterian Church in Manchuria.

both literate and positive. From 1953 to 1962 he published eight volumes in commentary form, covering the entire New Testament.⁹ And if one can regard his methodology in writing as typical of his approach in the classroom, one finds great difficulty in understanding the assaults on the so-called inflexibility, dogmatism, and crudity of Pak and the Koryu Seminary he helped to shape. ✓

Whether magazine article or full-length book, Pak's work shows a steady reluctance to produce strictly polemic or critical study.¹⁰ Writing primarily with inadequately trained church leaders, or ministers lacking theological background, in mind, Pak produced commentaries that did not dwell at great length on advanced critical or introductory problems.¹¹

⁹ Though Pak's full impact on New Testament studies did not really begin until 1953 and the publication of the first of his now completed eight volume series, *Commentary on the New Testament*, his writing had begun long before. From 1944-1945, he had stopped teaching to devote full time to his commentary writing. During this time, portions of his commentaries on the Synoptic Gospels, Psalms, and the Book of Revelation were completed. For this reason, his work, though published at a later date, provides us with a fairly reliable picture of his early approach to theological studies. His titles during this period cover *The Synoptic Gospels* (1953), *Romans* (1954), *The Revelation of St. John* (1955), *The Pauline Epistles* (1955), *Hebrews and the Catholic Epistles* (1956), *The Gospel of John* (1958), *Acts* (1961), and *I-II Corinthians* (1962). With the exception of the last volume, all the titles were published by the Sung Moon Publishing Company. A commentary on the *Psalms* also appeared in 1957 and, since completing the New Testament, apart from revisionary work, Dr. Pak has undertaken a similar series on the Old Testament.

¹⁰ An early series of articles on mysticism illustrates Pak's methodology quite well. In the opening article, he traces briefly the history of mysticism in the western church, then discusses its Korean aberrations, and concludes with a rather thorough refutation of the general characteristics (Pak Yune Sun, "A Critique of Contemporary Mysticism", *The Watchman*, (K), July-August, 1956, pp. 4-24). The second and third articles in the same series are almost completely exegetical, consisting of a careful analysis of John 14 and 15, in terms of the original problem he had posed in the first article. In fact, if any charge be laid against the series, it would be that the exegetical materials are so positive that their polemic intent is almost lost sight of altogether! (Cf. Pak Yune Sun, "The New Testament and Mysticism: A Commentary on John 14", *The Watchman*, (K), November, 1956, pp. 4-11; "The New Testament and Mysticism: A Commentary on John 15", *The Watchman*, (K), December, 1956, pp. 4-19).

¹¹ The first post-war commentary Pak produced was a 1116 page com-

While he himself was fully aware of these problems, he chose to underplay them in his titles. Beginning to write when New Testament commentaries were virtually unheard-of in the Korean language,¹² Pak planned his books as something more than merely grammatico-linguistic commentaries. He was writing for a church that was not fully prepared to deal with such technical questions, a church he felt to be lacking in theological depth. To meet those needs, he produced titles strongly theological in character, tapping the resources of Holland Calvinism for the first time in Korea.¹³ For the poorly trained lay leader, he provided full-length sermons at the end of each chapter of exegesis. In keeping with this goal, his writing had much more the flavor of Matthew Henry than H. A. W. Meyer.

But behind all his writing was an immense desire to promote Reformed theology as the only antidote for Korea's grave theological situation.

mentary on the synoptic gospels, using the harmonistic method adopted by Calvin in his work on the gospels. The introductory material covers only nine pages and only half of these are devoted to questions of origin and authorship (Cf. Pak Yune Sun, *A Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels*, (K), Fourth Edition, Yung Eum Publishing Company, 1964, pp. 27-35). By contrast, a recent commentary on Matthew's gospel by a conservative writer, Lee Sang Keun, Th.D., occupies 22 pages of its 406 page total with a rather full discussion of the synoptic problem (Cf. Lee Sang Keun, *Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew*, (K), General Assembly Education Committee of the Korean Presbyterian Church, 1966, pp. 1-22). Dr. Pak's approach to introductory problems has not changed over the years. His last commentary on the New Testament appeared in 1962. Seven pages are devoted to introductory questions of authorship, unity, and content (Cf. Pak Yune Sun, *A Commentary on I-II Corinthians (Commentary on the New Testament)*, pp. 9-12, 263-265).

¹² A very brief sketch of the progress of New Testament studies in Korea, with some attempt to place Dr. Pak's significance in that history, will be found in Pak Yune Sun, "New Testament Studies in Korea: An Historical Outline", *Reformed Bulletin of Missions*, September, 1966.

¹³ Pak spent 1953-1954 in the Netherlands, at the Free University of Amsterdam, pursuing work on his doctorate in theology, when his studies were cut short by the death of his wife in Korea. His commentaries constantly show the impact of these studies. Herman Bavinck, F. W. Grosheide, Herman Ridderbos, and others are repeatedly referred to in his work.

“In terms of the commentary, I am convinced that the principles of Calvinism are Biblical and have adopted them uniformly. At those places where I have quoted the interpretations of other scholars, I have quoted principally from Calvinistic commentators. Even though there occur instances where I have quoted from the contributions of other writers, this is not to be understood as an acceptance of the totality of their theological thought but merely demonstrates agreement on questions of exegesis. . .”¹⁴

The Calvinism Pak advocated was militant. Han Sang Dong had conceived of the school as an institution which would “prepare ministers willing to share their fate with the Korean church on behalf of the truth”.¹⁵ Pak sought to carry out those convictions. In the years immediately following liberation, the seminary became the center of protest over the church’s Shinto shrine collaboration. And when Chosun Seminary began its vocal propagation of Barthian theology, Koryu Seminary, and particularly Dr. Pak Yune Sun, denounced Barth in classroom and pamphlet.¹⁶

¹⁴ Pak Yune Sun, *A Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels (Commentary on the New Testament)*, p. 7.

¹⁵ “The Prison Diary of Han Sang Dong”, *The Watchman*, (K), June, 1953, p. 15. Further reflections on the founding purposes of the seminary will be found in the special issue of *The Watchman*, published in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the school. See particularly, Pak Son Hyuk, “A History of the Seminary’s Ten Year Development”, *The Watchman*, (K), September, 1946, pp. 13–17.

¹⁶ A sample of this criticism is provided in Pak Yune Sun, *The Crisis Theology of Barth and Brunner in Comparison with Orthodox Theology*, (K), Publications Committee of the Koryu Theological Seminary Student Body Association, 1950, pp. 1–15. One of the earliest printed pamphlets to come from Dr. Pak’s pen, the booklet was circulated widely in the nation’s Presbyterian circles and was the first in a series of several such small tractates. The brief preface comments on the 1949 visits of Mackay and Brunner as the occasion for writing. The pamphlet itself is restricted to a contrast, in parallel columns, between the Westminster Confession of Faith and the writings of Barth and Brunner. Some comment is also made on the apparent divergencies. Beginning in April, 1953, a much expanded series on the same general topic began to appear in *The Watchman*. Cf. Pak Yune Sun, “The Westminster Confession of Faith and the Crisis Theology”, *The Watchman*, (K), April, 1953, pp. 5–10; May, 1953, pp. 6–9; June, 1953, pp. 6–10; July, 1953, pp. 9–14. Compare also Pak Yune Sun, “The Basic Principles of Calvinism and the Basic Principles of Karl Barth”, *The Watchman*, (K), January, 1952, pp. 14–18; “A Critique

That criticism is perhaps nowhere more clearly drawn than in Dr. Pak's commentary on Romans. After each chapter of exegesis, a critical appendix is added, drawing specific attention to Karl Barth's comments on the same passage. A verse-by-verse analysis of Barth's study is then made, with searching criticism following the line of Pak's early mentor, Dr. Cornelius Van Til.¹⁷ Eighteen pages of such criticism are documented in the first ninety pages alone.¹⁸

It was this vigorously conservative posture that gained quick support for Koryu Seminary, particularly from the Kyung Nam Presbytery, in whose area it was located. Even before the seminary had officially opened its doors, a July, 1946, meeting of the Presbytery gave "enthusiastic approval . . . to the setting up of the seminary by the formerly imprisoned group, and a promise of support in the enrollment of students and securing teachers was given. . .".¹⁹ But it may also have been this same posture that gained equally quick opposition for the seminary. For at the next meeting of Presbytery in December, 1946, that decision was reversed

of Karl Barth's Exegesis of I Corinthians 15", *The Watchman*, (K), April-May, 1956, pp. 15-18.

¹⁷ Unlike the more philosophically oriented criticism of Dr. Van Til, Dr. Pak has structured his criticism around the exegetical patterns set up by Barth. Nevertheless, though the approach is different, the viewpoint both of Van Til and of Pak is the same. Pak still believes, as he did in 1939, that Van Til's "thorough-going philosophical defense of Christian theism reveals that the systems of all human beings . . . have no ground upon which they can rest. We may justly say that he is the one who has exploded the cannon ball on the playground of the modernist theologians. This great theologian is the one who teaches us how we may truly defend the Word of God against non-Christian attacks. His system of thought is not mere human speculation, but the system of defense presented by the Bible itself, and a means of honoring God" (Pak Yune Sun, "The Korean Church and Westminster Seminary", *loc. cit.*, p. 72). Note also the introductory essay by Dr. Pak which prefaced the Korean appearance of Cornelius Van Til, *Has Karl Barth Become Orthodox?*, (K), Korean Society for the Reformed Faith and Action, 1959, pp. 3-11.

¹⁸ Pak Yune Sun, *Romans*, (K), Fourth edition, Yung Eum Publishing Company, 1962, pp. 50-59, 83-90.

¹⁹ Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, p. 151. Kim concludes the sentence by remarking that the approval "seemed proof that all were in favor of the plan for rehabilitating the church". In view of the action taken by the same group only months later, this statement seems rather precipitous.

“and it was decided not even to recommend students to it”.²⁰

Kim Yang Sun, in exploring the reasons behind this rather quick and sharp reversal by the Presbytery, is willing to admit that part of the blame for this sudden shift must be placed on the shoulders of the church's ambition-motivated liberals. But his strongest attack is reserved for the supporters of Koryu Seminary, its founder, Hang Sang Dong, and its co-operating missionaries, the men associated with the Orthodox Presbyterian Mission and the Independent Board for Presbyterian Missions. “Thus, the Koryu Seminary, while keeping the co-operation of the Machen group of missionaries, began to estrange itself more and more from the leading group in the presbytery and finally, became critical of each other, defending their own party and indulging in self praise. . .”.²¹

Some grounds are provided Kim's charges by the action of Han Sang Dong at the December Presbytery meeting. He announced his withdrawal from the body because of its reversal. However, Kim's emphasis and interpretation of this action seems misplaced and inaccurate. He terms it “a threat”, aimed at forcing the Presbytery to concede its control to the Seminary supporters.²²

But it may be fairer to regard Han's withdrawal as a protest, honestly given in the face of some rather obvious political maneuvering by unrepentant ecclesiasts in the church court. The fuller picture of that meeting, provided by a missionary supporter of Koryu Seminary to his home board, would seem to corroborate a more favorable picture of the Rev. Han's action. The missionary notes, “. . . a man whom I consider one of the worst in the Korean Church was elected moderator. It was a definite slap at our group. After he got in, it was moved to have this presbytery join the Southern General Assembly. Several spoke against it. When Mr. Han was calling for the floor the moderator rushed the vote through. A move to reconsider was lost. Then the moderator turned the church over to the vice-moderator

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 152.

and from the floor moved to reconsider the action of the last presbytery meeting taking action to back our seminary, so now the presbytery is not back of it. Han has withdrawn from the presbytery. . .".²³

Kim's appraisal of this meeting seems to be regulated by his consistent refusal to see the Koryu Seminary program as anything other than a political struggle for the control of the church. It was, to be sure, a struggle for the control of the church. But it was far from political. The questions were theological in their character. And the most basic one revolved around the marks of the church and the proper exercise of discipline as one of those marks. Han's withdrawal was not a political threat. It was a theological protest.

The theological character of the protest seems to have been emphasized in the subsequent activity within the presbytery. Eventually 67 churches in the presbytery repudiated the December decision and issued a statement supporting Han Sang Dong. Reactions from the presbyters included even the possibility of "all the officers resigning". The sole missionary of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church present on the field records Han's reaction to this possibility: "Han says this will not help. He says the presence of 49 votes, supporting the man they did, indicates that there is a serious lack of repentance in the Presbytery".²⁴ Surely, if legal control of the presbytery had been Han's motive, his reaction to such a possibility as the resignation of the entire slate of presbytery officers would have been far more positive than the reaction recorded in this letter.

In March, 1947, the presbytery dealt with the rising threat of division by accepting the resignations of all the officers in the presbytery, and reaffirming their own repentance for Shrine worship. The motives behind the action, however, have been held suspect by both Kim Yang Sun and the Koryu Seminary supporters. Kim notes that the Seminary's proposed plan for church rehabilitation was endorsed "in

²³ Bruce F. Hunt, "Report From Korea", *The Messenger* (Missionary periodical of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church), February, 1947, p. 2-3.

²⁴ Letter of Bruce F. Hunt to the Foreign Missions Committee, Orthodox Presbyterian Church, January 25, 1947.

order not to hurt the feelings of the ex-prisoners".²⁵ This apparent lack of theological motivation was also felt by Han Sang Dong and others. One observer notes, "... when they re-elected officers they said that none of the commissioners of the churches which had signed the protest could be elected as officers, either, and to me nullified the action of the Moderator thereby, for they thus kind of put it down on the level of a personal quarrel, where both sides were to be reprimanded. The protestors are not completely satisfied and are holding a meeting on the 15th of this month".²⁶

Some perspective on this conflict is also added by remembering that it was precisely at this moment that 51 students in the Assembly-recognized Chosun Seminary were protesting the theological liberalism of their school and demanding action by the Assembly's courts. The question being raised by Han was not a narrow one, limited to the ecclesiastical control of one presbytery. In the midst of the conflict in the Kyung Nam Presbytery, another reminder was provided by the students at Chosun Seminary of the larger issue at stake. It was this very issue that had kept the Kyung Nam Presbytery from membership in the Assembly until now, and the action of the moderator, in urging membership in the Southern Division General Assembly while seeking to refuse recognition to the Koryu Seminary at the same time, could not help but be understood by many as an attempt to avoid the theological questions precisely at the heart of the Koryu Seminary protest, the same questions now emerging again in connection with the Chosun Seminary students' protest.²⁷

Great encouragement came at this time for the Seminary's

²⁵ Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-153.

²⁶ Letter of Bruce F. Hunt to the Foreign Missions Committee, Orthodox Presbyterian Church, April 5, 1947.

²⁷ Kim Yang Sun's study, by dealing with the Koryu Seminary question and the Chosun Seminary question in two sharply separate sections of his book (*op. cit.*, pp. 146-165, 173-288), does not seem to this author to give a proper historical perspective to the theological aspects of the Koryu Seminary question and to its interrelatedness with the Chosun Seminary problem. His division of the two questions seems to be dictated largely by his own evaluation of their significance, rather than by their chronological place in history. A more chronological treatment might help to set the basic similarities of the two questions in a more proper setting.

reform program. Dr. Pak Hyung Nong, the leader in the church's early struggle against liberalizing influences, and for years connected with theological education in Manchuria,²⁸ was persuaded to join the faculty of Koryu Seminary as President. He reached southern Korea in late September, 1947, and began his duties at Koryu the following month. Apparently strong appeals from former Pyungyang Seminary board members and influential church leaders had been made to Dr. Pak before he reached Pusan to re-establish another conservative seminary.²⁹ But Dr. Pak chose³⁰ to cast his lot with Koryu Seminary and the reform effort it represented.

This needs to be stressed. Contemporary studies, by and large, emphasize Dr. Pak's eventual decision to withdraw from the Seminary and his differences with them.³⁰ However,

²⁸ Dr. Pak had been associated with the United Theological Seminary of the Korean Church in Manchuria since the fall of 1942. Though he had taken part in the "Workers' Cleansing Meeting" in November, 1945, in northern Korea, he had returned to Manchuria to continue his labors with the work there, apparently out of concern for the Manchurian churches and with hopes of reforming the church from that vantage point. Appealing by letter to the Rev. Bruce F. Hunt to join him in Manchuria for the restoration of the church, he comments on his own motivations for service in Manchuria, and why he did not return to Korea after liberation. "I wanted to go to Korea when many other Korean pastors were going. But I could find no footing there. For in the North the Churches are suffering under the red rule, and the Southern Churches are under the theological leadership of those who do not agree with me in faith. So at the request of the remaining church leaders here I decided to stay with them and to re-establish the seminary. Being arrested in this pocket area I am very lonely. But I am trying to be patient with the hope that the Korean churches may be restored to some extent and the seminary may be increased" (Letter of H. N. Park to Bruce F. Hunt, December 24, 1946).

²⁹ "Even after he arrived in Korea, we were not sure that he would come to the Korea Seminary, because a great effort was made in Seoul to keep him there to start another orthodox seminary there. He is here, however, and our Seminary is entering into another phase of the struggle . . ." (Letter of Bruce F. Hunt to the Foreign Missions Committee, Orthodox Presbyterian Church, October 31, 1947). Cf. Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

³⁰ For examples of such emphasis, cf. Kim Yang Sun, *ibid.*, pp. 227-228; G. T. Brown, *Mission to Korea*, Board of World Missions, Presbyterian Church, U. S., 1962, pp. 178-179; Allen D. Clark, *History of the Korean Church*, Christian Literature Society of Korea, 1961, p. 246.

emphasis needs to be placed also on his basic support of the theological motivations of Koryu Seminary's rehabilitation program, and the convictions of the men who stood with her.³¹ Along with Koryu Seminary, Pak disapproved the failure of the presbyteries and the General Assembly to carry out the church reform plans. In profound sympathy with the doctrinal views of the "Machen group missionaries",³² he held also that "the ex-prisoners' appeal for repentance and confession, loyalty to the truth, and active growth in faith" were "all goals toward which the church must press forward".³³ His presence in Manchuria after liberation seemed to come, in part, from his disillusionment with the church's leadership and their lack of concern over the disintegration of the church as a guardian of truth. And, of course, his earlier controversies

³¹ His invitation to Bruce F. Hunt to participate in the restoration of the Manchurian work, although Mr. Hunt had renounced the jurisdiction of the Korean Presbyterian General Assembly in 1938, echoes these convictions. He wrote, "If you take up the work and send out graduates with conservative theology it will contribute very much to the Korean church in preserving conservative faith. At present the seminary in Pyeng Yang is going on very feebly by the labours of a few pastors there. The General Assembly of South Korea is supporting the liberal seminary in Seoul which was established when the old Pyeng Yang seminary had closed. So it may be good for the church that a conservative seminary should remain in Manchuria in order to furnish conservative ministers to Korea. Will you think over the matter . . .?" (Letter of H. N. Park to Bruce F. Hunt, December 24, 1946). Mr. Hunt's reaction to the letter was a sympathetic one. "But his letter rather assures us, as it indicated that he didn't hold anything against us, in fact held us in high enough esteem to invite us to work with him and expect we could assume quite a position of leadership there" (Letter of Bruce F. Hunt to the Foreign Missions Committee, Orthodox Presbyterian Church, February 18, 1947).

³² "The Machen group missionaries", a phrase found repeatedly in the work of Kim Yang Sun, is generally descriptive of missionaries of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church and the Independent Board for Presbyterian Foreign Missions. Actually, at the time of Dr. Pak's installation as President of Koryu Seminary, there was only one missionary in the country, representing the so-called "Machen group missionaries". That was Bruce F. Hunt. By mid-year, 1948, only two others had arrived, William H. Chisholm, M.D., and Dwight R. Malsbury, both of the Independent Board. A third under that same Board, Floyd E. Hamilton, arrived at a later date. Further male members of the two missions were not added until following the Korean war.

³³ Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

with Kim Chai Choon would only make him more sympathetic to the Koryu Seminary's attack on Chosun Seminary and the liberalism it represented. In the language of one missionary, "Anyway, he did what a lot of others (missionaries and pastors) have not done, he did come to this despised seminary".³⁴

With the presence of Pak Hyung Nong on the faculty, the Seminary's hopes for genuine revival in the church seemed brighter than ever. Over thirty students transferred from Chosun Seminary in Seoul.³⁵ At Pak's urging, Han Sang Dong appeared at the December, 1957, meeting of the South Kyungsang Province Presbytery to withdraw his statement of a year before and to resume his relations with that body. The Presbytery itself finally voted to join the General Assembly and Koryu Seminary was again recognized by the Presbytery.

It is at this point that a second concept for reform in the church must be introduced. For it was basically due to this second concept that, within months of Han's return to the Presbytery and Koryu Seminary's brightest anticipations, Dr. Pak Hyung Nong left the institution and plans were initiated for another conservative theological school. What were the reasons behind Dr. Pak's sudden departure from Koryu Seminary? The answer to that question provides a microcosm of the basic differences that divided conservative from conservative in the struggle for church rehabilitation.

There had never been any disagreement among conservative forces within the church over the necessity of reform and rehabilitation. The week-long "Workers' Cleansing Meeting" in 1945 had found Pak Hyung Nong supporting such demands. Pak's very presence at Koryu Seminary was a testimony to that common desire. But regarding the nature and methodology of the reform, there were differences. And these differences had been mirrored in the church almost from the beginning of liberation.³⁶

³⁴ Letter of Bruce F. Hunt to the Foreign Missions Committee, Orthodox Presbyterian Church, October 31, 1947.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ One might even say that these differences could be detected before liberation, latent in the reactions of the church itself to the Shrine worship.

One area of difference had been displayed almost immediately upon Pak Hyung Nong's arrival in Pusan. That was the question of the relationship of Koryu Seminary to the General Assembly. Those laboring in the orbit of the Seminary, fearful of the lack of Assembly interest in reform and a return to the church's pre-war conservative posture in theology, had not placed the institution under the direction of the General Assembly. The possibility of eventual separation may even have been contemplated by some.³⁷ Han Sang Dong had contemplated seriously such a necessity as early as 1940. But, though the Seminary insisted on remaining independent, their original intention was not division or separation.³⁸ Their intention was a reform of the existing

One observer described these reactions thus, "The Presbyterian Church in the South is divided into five camps: (1) Those who aggressively propagated and fought and worked for the Japanese policy. Some of these are unrepentant, still defend themselves and are still trying to push themselves forward and assume places of responsibility in the church and in society. They are naturally very strong, aggressive leaders. . . . (2) Those who compromised but did so under pressure and rather reluctantly. They are for the most part sorry for their weakness but are not esteemed too well by many. (3) Those who did not compromise, or, if at all, on some of the lesser points, men and women who suffered imprisonment and wanderings in the hills to keep their faith. This group, though recognized as uncompromising themselves are trying to win back their erring brothers. They say if true confession is manifested we must receive them back as brothers. They do not want to overlook their past sin, but they are willing and anxious to receive as brothers and sisters, those who have sinned if they truly repent. Of course it is hard to tell when one is truly repentant but they say we have to take a man's word until he proves otherwise. (4) Those who were uncompromising to the last, who feel the church became a temple of Satan and the ministers, priests of Satan. They say we must no longer recognize ministers who survived as ministers and that we dare not use the buildings polluted by shrines. They will not speak to or greet men who have compromised or receive them into their houses. (5) A group that, whatever their past history, are now using the church as a sounding board for their political views, and are extreme nationalists . . ." (Letter of Bruce F. Hunt to the Foreign Missions Committee, Orthodox Presbyterian Church, November 7, 1946). The second group may be somewhat representative of the background forming the supporters of Pak Hyung Nong, the third group supported the Koryu Seminary.

³⁷ Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

³⁸ "We are not starting a new church. We are trying to re-form a church

body. They seemed to be willing to have Koryu Seminary under the Assembly, but only insofar as the institution was left free of interference in the choice of its faculty and students. But, above all else, the school's supporters were determined to keep Koryu Seminary as it had been started — a Calvinistic institution pressing for truth in a compromised church.

This refusal to discard the possibility of division was opposed by Pak Hyung Nong. Pak, who had felt such a policy was rash in 1945, continued to feel it was dangerous to harbor at Koryu. In keeping with this feeling, he insisted that Koryu Seminary be under the Assembly and be supported by the whole church. Perhaps somewhat akin to the reluctance of Clarence Macartney and Samuel Craig to enter fully into the program of the Constitutional Covenant Union, organized in 1935 to "defend and maintain the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.",³⁹ Dr. Pak feared the costs that might be involved in such an attitude.

During the year that Pak spent at Koryu Seminary, it seemed to him that such nation-wide support for the Seminary that he coveted was not forthcoming. In March, 1948, he attended a meeting of conservative church leaders from all over the country. Called to consider the erection of a conservative General Assembly Seminary,⁴⁰ the group postponed concrete action for such a plan. But it seemed clear from the

that has thrown over its creed and constitution. The evangelists and laymen are demanding fast action, and things may take shape before I can get an answer back. The laymen have a tendency to be more extreme than I am. I tremble at a division because even the leaders get a bit extreme, and those who follow go off the beam on this or that point, and make a sharp division without a foundation of faith to make it on . . ."

(Letter of Bruce F. Hunt to Mrs. Kathy B. Hunt, February 7, 1947).

³⁹ N. B. Stonehouse: *J. Gresham Machen: A Biographical Memoir*, Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1954, pp. 493 ff.

⁴⁰ Kim Yang Sun intimates that the beginnings of this Seminary rehabilitation movement came "as a result of the changed attitude of the Koryu Seminary" (*op. cit.*, p. 228), and that these attitudes were basically self-righteousness and spiritual pride. The accusation ignores the deeper theological roots of Koryu's protest and the consistency of that protest. The only change of attitude on the part of Koryu Seminary at this time seemed to be an increasing despression over the lack of response to appeals for reform. Reform movements always seem to get a notoriously bad press.

discussion that "those who called the meeting are not sure they want to back the Koryu Seminary. They are sure they can't back the Chosun Seminary".⁴¹

When the 34th General Assembly met a month later in Seoul, the issue that concerned Pak Hyung Nong was brought to a head through a question raised by a South Chulla Province presbytery. Was it all right to send their students to Koryu Seminary? Though the Assembly, now facing this question for the first time, declined to discuss the problem, the Chairman of the Assembly Committee on Church Polity, the Rev. Kim Kwan Sik, a man whose liberal convictions we have noted in other parts of this outline, presented "a rather cool legal ruling to the effect that 'Since the Koryu Seminary has no connection with this General Assembly, there is no need for Presbyteries to recommend students to it'."⁴² Kim's reply was adopted by the Assembly. ✓

Though the ruling did not face the issue squarely, it was sufficiently clear to indicate the growing lack of support for the Koryu Seminary program. In the face of that indication, and feeling strongly the necessity for Assembly recognition, Pak Hyung Nong took the course his principles dictated. In the middle of May, 1948, after the Assembly had been held,⁴³ he submitted his resignation to Koryu Seminary. ✓

⁴¹ Letter of Bruce Hunt to the Foreign Missions Committee, Orthodox Presbyterian Church, March 17, 1948. Cf. Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-229.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 157. Cf. Lee Dae Yung, *et. al.*, *A Brief History of the Korean Presbyterian Church: in Commemoration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding of the General Assembly*, (K), Calvin Publishing Company, 1962, p. 76.

⁴³ Kim Yang Sun says that Dr. Pak "had already left the Koryu Seminary" before the Assembly convened (*op. cit.*, p. 156). However, in a letter dated May 25, 1948, we read, "Our Seminary has been in quite a turmoil for the last month or so. Dr. Pak has been talking of withdrawing and taking a bunch of the boys who came down from Seoul with him. Some of the boys have already left in fact. Dr. Pak finally gave in his resignation last week. Some of the middle of the road Presbytery men have been urging him to stay as well as we . . ." (Letter of Bruce F. Hunt to the Foreign Missions Committee, Orthodox Presbyterian Church, May 25, 1948). Mr. Hunt's dating would also seem to indicate Dr. Pak's timing was much more consistent with the basic principle he seemed to be trying to defend.

About fifty students accompanied him. Fearful that "just a few men are running the Seminary",⁴⁴ one of his main complaints was that the Seminary was "fighting from outside the church, trying to form a new denomination".⁴⁵ The Seminary, on its part, tried to reassure Dr. Pak of their intentions. "We tried to show that we are not outside the church and are not trying to form a new denomination, though our present course may lead to that...".⁴⁶ But, in the face of other actions taken by the Assembly, the Seminary could say no more or no less.

A second area of difference came to light also in the year of Pak's association with Koryu Seminary. And, like the question of the relation of the Seminary to the Assembly, it also illustrates the reformers' inability to arrive at complete agreement on methodology. We refer to the question of the relationship of the missionaries to the re-constituted Assembly.

When Pak Hyung Nong assumed the presidency of Koryu Seminary, a fear of the alignment of the Seminary with "the Machen group missionaries", long labelled as a rebel minority,⁴⁷ was growing in the church. Many were concerned that the Machen group would refuse to co-operate with the other missions.⁴⁸ Some cause for this alarm may have been

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Letter of Bruce Hunt to the Foreign Missions Committee, Orthodox Presbyterian Church, June 6, 1948.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ This fear seems to have been used, according to Kim Yang Sun, in July, 1948, when "the formerly humiliated politically-minded group" issued a statement on the situation, in another of their bids for power. The statement at least shows how many in the church regarded "the Machen group". They wrote in part:

"Let us now consider. When a faction was formed from the American Northern and Southern Presbyterian Churches and peace and order were destroyed, the rebel minority which withdrew was the Machen group. To entrust our Korean Presbyterian Church to them would mean cutting the Church off from the world body of Christians. . . . Also, to follow blindly their lead would be to forget about setting up the nation and we would be like the Communists, subordinating ourselves to other countries. . ." (Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, p. 155).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 154. The difficulty, as a matter of fact, seemed to be the reverse, *i. e.*, the refusal of the other missions to co-operate with the sole missionary representing "the Machen group" at that time. "... The

provided by the action of the Rev. Bruce F. Hunt at what came to be called the 33rd General Assembly in April, 1947. When his name was called at the time of the reading of the roll call, he responded by saying simply, "I am not a member of this Assembly". His remark, badly misunderstood, was apparently taken as an accusation that the Assembly had not repented. Though Kim Yang Sun defends the remark, he too takes it as a turning point in the relationship of "the Machen group" to the Assembly. "From this time on, the Machen group missionaries regarded the General Assembly as a set of ignoramuses and left the General Assembly to form a new organization with the ex-prisoners".⁴⁹

Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., Board took a dim view of the Pusan Seminary and strongly disapproved of its missionaries cooperating closely with those who supported the seminary. Its attitude, of course, was chiefly aimed at the Independent Board and constituted an extension of the controversy raging in the United States" (Kim Chang Yup, *Protestant Theological Education in Korea*, an unpublished thesis submitted to the Biblical Seminary in New York in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Sacred Theology, 1960, p. 102). Early evidence would seem to indicate that Bruce Hunt, the one Orthodox Presbyterian missionary on the field until mid-1948, although not seeking Mission-wide support for the movement, had not refrained from co-operation, or from seeking support from individuals whom he felt might be one with the program theologically. Reflecting this mood, Koryu Seminary had apparently sought for the services of Dr. J. C. Crane, of the "Southern" Presbyterian Mission, even before the arrival of Mr. Hunt on the field in late 1946 (Letter of Bruce F. Hunt to the Foreign Missions Committee, Orthodox Presbyterian Church, November 7, 1946), and Mr. Hunt then joined them in seeking his co-operation (Letter of Bruce F. Hunt to the Foreign Missions Committee, Orthodox Presbyterian Church, February 18, 1947). In this same spirit, Mr. Hunt did not refrain from inviting missionaries of the larger Boards as speakers to the youth meetings in the Koryu Seminary orbit, nor did he officially protest re-entry into the General Assembly in December, 1947. The Independent Board of Presbyterian Foreign Missions and their representative laborers in Korea may have had a more severe policy on the question of "separation" from fellowship with the larger Boards. They reached Korea two years after Mr. Hunt.

⁴⁹ Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, p. 163. Kim, like the Assembly, seems to be reading much more into the sentence than was intended. It was primarily, as Kim himself admits, simply a statement of fact. Mr. Hunt had not been a member of the Assembly since 1938 when his name was dropped from the rolls of Presbytery. Further, the 1947 Assembly had still not

In this background of fear and suspicion, Pak Hyung Nong joined Koryu Seminary. And, though strongly sympathetic with the theological convictions of "the Machen group", he was not willing to cut the church off from co-operation with the four large missions which had always been traditionally associated with the Korean Assembly.⁵⁰ If a choice would have had to be made between "the Machen group" or the other boards, Pak would, at this time, most likely have sided with the latter. On the other hand, the founders of Koryu Seminary and many of its closest supporters, through temperament and theological convictions, shared much closer affinities with "the Machen group", and, in this deteriorating situation, though willing to work with the four boards as well, if a choice had to be made, would have chosen those laboring with the Orthodox Presbyterian and Independent Presbyterian Boards.⁵¹ As far as this writer can judge, Pak's departure from Koryu Seminary was not made on the basis of such a choice.⁵² But it was most certainly part of the background that framed the differences

declared itself, in any sense, an official general assembly, but simply a "Southern Division General Assembly". Later, at this same session, without northern representation, the 1946 session was officially declared to be the 32nd General Assembly of the Korean Church, and the 1947 body therefore declared itself in session as the 33rd General Assembly. Mr. Hunt seems to have regarded this section as, in some sense, an illegal one, and this might also explain his reluctance in responding to the roll. In any case, his actions were misunderstood and "because of this, the feeling between the General Assembly and the Machen group gradually deteriorated" (*ibid.*, pp. 162-163).

⁵⁰ Even Dr. Pak's 1946 invitation to Mr. Hunt to be associated with him in the Manchurian Seminary work was not an exclusive sort of relationship. The closing paragraph of the letter indicates a similar invitation had been sent to missionaries representing other Boards as well (*cf.* Letter of H. N. Pak to Bruce F. Hunt, December 24, 1946).

⁵¹ Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-156.

⁵² Kim Yang Sun alleges that continued disagreements arose between "the Machen group missionaries" and Dr. Pak on matters of theological education and finally, the self-righteous attitude of the Koryu Seminary orbit drove him from the school (*ibid.*, pp. 153-156, 227-228). Though friction of some sort may have been present to an extent, it was not a motivating factor in the proportions with which Kim has presented it. The differences in the Seminary stemmed more from very different approaches to the question of reform methodology.

between conservative and conservative in the struggle for reform.

A third area of difference also came to light through Pak's departure from Koryu. Pak, representative of a sizeable portion of conservatives in the church, had, as early as 1945, urged against possible rashness in a precipitate use of action. And there were many who felt that the actions of Koryu Seminary were the actions of rash men. Han Sang Dong's withdrawal from the presbytery in 1946 did not help that image. Many seemed to fear that Koryu Seminary's insistence on repentance for Shrine worship was too excessive, and that their desire for repentance, though wholesome, needed moderation. The situation, they said, demanded instruction and forbearance more than discipline.⁵³

This seemed to be one of the main complaints given by Dr. Pak when he left Koryu Seminary. In the language of one missionary observer, Dr. Pak said that "we were emphasizing the Shrine issue too much and offending many good men by so doing. . .".⁵⁴ In 1951, Dr. Pak uttered much the same charges in an appeal to the Koryu Seminary group. "Can it be right to say that our whole church has given insufficient evidence of repentance, and, for this reason, to go out as a separate denomination? A reformation of the entire church is a difficult matter. Would it not be better to bear with these imperfections, and is it not your very mission

⁵³ This difference in approach to discipline seemed to be mirrored in the student body of Koryu Seminary as well. The students who came down from Seoul showed rather obvious differences on this issue almost from the moment of their arrival in Pusan. "The students from Seoul are pleased with the instruction they are getting, and find they have to work harder than they did there, but they are not so clear cut on the issues in the church, it seems to me. They are strong against liberalism but not on opposing the ecclesiasticism of the men who ran the church under the Japanese and led it in Shrine worship and are still running it. They recognize the sins of these men, but their great desire for keeping the peace of the church at any cost, almost, is a little different from the attitude of the present student body" (Letter of Bruce F. Hunt to the Foreign Missions Committee, Orthodox Presbyterian Church, October 31, 1947).

⁵⁴ Letter of Bruce F. Hunt to the Foreign Missions Committee, Orthodox Presbyterian Church, June 6, 1948.

to point out these imperfections, with a view to encouraging repentance?"⁵⁵

Many of the same charges seemed to have been made by the students who left with Dr. Pak. "Some students in leaving sounded like it was because they were not willing to go as far as we. Others, however, didn't want us to feel that that was their reason. They wanted us to believe that it was so they could carry on the battle right in the camp of the enemy, where they had started it — Seoul. They asked us to think of them as the front line trench, as a bomb, etc. I told them if that was the case we could most heartily recommend their Seminary. That group did make a scholarly battle against liberalism but they seem not to see the dangers of the present ecumenical movements or the fundamental defection in the church over the Shrine issue"⁵⁶

The whole incident was a sad one, perhaps the saddest part of the reconstruction period. The conservatives had made an attempt to join forces in their effort for reform. The attempt was an honest one, genuinely made. But it had ended in failure, a preview of the final results of their efforts as well. Though they shared a common desire, there simply did not exist a common approach to the achievement of that desire. The conservatives had been sharply divided, almost from the first, regarding the nature and methodology of reform. And this very disagreement was to provide one of the reasons for the ultimate failure of rehabilitation efforts. One group saw the Shrine issue as integrally related to the question of Chosun Seminary's theological defection. The other did not. One group regarded the existence of an independent seminary within the church structure as highly exceptional but necessary under the unusual circumstances. The other group did not. One group insisted on the proper exercise of discipline in the church as the proper method of purification. The other group pleaded extenuating circumstances and moderation. The disagreement was fatal.

From this picture emerges also another defect in the conservative effort. And this defect was to be amplified repeatedly

⁵⁵ Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

⁵⁶ Letter of Bruce F. Hunt, June 6, 1948.

in the years ahead. It was particularly magnified among the "moderates" of conservative stripe. "Church politics" became a substitute for discipline. Theological questions began to be handled through political adjustments, maneuvering in the Presbytery. Administrative discipline replaced judicial discipline. Theological issues became questions of good order. From moderation, conservatives moved to maneuvering. And from maneuvering to manipulation. All this, plus the continued unrepentant attitude of Korea's liberal leadership, was to bring not only failure but also division.

B. *The Failure of Reform*

1. *The Growing Tension Before Division*

Pak Hyung Nong's departure from Koryu Seminary had signalled the failure of Korea's conservatives to find a common course of action. In the same way, the 34th General Assembly of 1948 signalled the failure of church reform. ✓

Attention has been drawn earlier in this article to the Assembly's action regarding the Koryu Seminary. Before the body also was the awesome task of dealing with the alleged liberal teaching of Kim Chai Choon and his associates at Chosun Seminary. A committee had been appointed by the 1947 Assembly in response to the accusations of a large group of the institution's students. In our previous chapter, we drew attention to some of the areas covered by the Committee's investigations. The Committee's conclusion had been that Kim Chai Choon's teaching "was not acceptable. The Committee reports that Professor Kim denies the infallibility of Scripture and unanimously agreed that his statement . . . be sent to the Board of Trustees".⁵⁷ It should be noted that the Committee, though affirming the Rev. Kim's negative position regarding the Scriptures, made no recommendations regarding disciplinary action, either to the

⁵⁷ Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, p. 226. Out of eight members on the Committee, five supported the conclusion of the report, regarding the acceptability of the Rev. Kim's teaching, two were against it, and one abstained. *Cf.*, to the contrary, H. Rhodes and A. Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 265, who comment that the charges were not sustained.

school's Board of Trustees or to the coming Assembly. Nor was such action ever taken at the 1948 Assembly. Rather, the Board of Trustees "recommended the re-election of trustees and expulsion of the present professors, as their idea of an enforced reform for Chosun Seminary. But the Board members were outnumbered and the recommendation failed".⁵⁸ The motion that was eventually passed restricted itself to Professor Kim and, rather than demanding his expulsion, requested that he be sent to the United States for study for a one-year period. To Rev. Kim's friends, this seemed "an indirect way of dropping him".⁵⁹ To the Koryu Seminary circle, it seemed "like a promotion".⁶⁰ In no sense was it an act of discipline. The Assembly had sought to solve a difficult question through indirect manipulation. A pattern had begun to be cut.

Coupled with this recommendation of the Assembly was the presentation of a list of seven men as a new temporary faculty. Among the names were men that Koryu Seminary had tried to secure: Pak Hyung Nong, Nyung Shin Hong, Kim Chin Hong. But among them also was Dr. William Scott, recognized by many as one of the mission force's leading liberal theologians.⁶¹ Though the move was an obvious effort to provide conservative leadership in the Seminary, it was not without compromise. Scott's nomination insured that. It provided no reassurance to the Koryu Seminary group. "The move was supposedly to purify and make the Assembly Seminary more orthodox but by appointing this liberal they show they don't have the discernment to make it orthodox if they wanted to".⁶²

The program failed on every side. Chosun Seminary refused to accept the recommendations and continued as before, still the Assembly's only recognized theological training school. The Koryu Seminary group, in the face of

⁵⁸ Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

⁵⁹ Letter of Bruce F. Hunt, June 6, 1948.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Dr. Scott's theological convictions received some attention in an earlier part of this outline (*Cf. The Westminster Theological Journal*, Vol. XXIX, no. 2, May, 1967, pp. 138-139).

⁶² Letter of Bruce F. Hunt, June 6, 1948.

the Assembly's rebuff to them and its efforts to handle theological liberalism through postponement and adjustment, grew increasingly distant. Conservatives like Pak Hyung Nong, who had sought moderation, saw that moderation, in the face of Chosun Seminary's resistance, was not enough. Two months after the conclusion of the Assembly, the earlier proposal for another conservative seminary was taken up again and, with Pak as temporary president, the doors of a second independent school were opened.

In the year that followed, the lines began to harden in many areas and the final stage was set for division. Again, the South Kyungsang Province Presbytery became the center of controversy. In September, 1948, the Presbytery met to discuss again the issues involved in their recognition of Koryu Seminary. In the light of Pak Hyung Nong's withdrawal, and against the background of the April Assembly's rather cool attitude towards Koryu Seminary, prospects for a favorable attitude of the Presbytery seemed dim to say the least. Coupled with these tensions were the efforts of a minority group in the Presbytery to have the "action of the Presbytery, for showing public repentance, rescinded".⁶³ Though the abortive plan failed at this time, the plotters were surely not to be sympathetic to Koryu Seminary. They combined their votes with those conservatives who wanted the Seminary under the direction of the Assembly and, for the second time in two years, the Presbytery cancelled its recognition of the school. When the Presbytery reviewed this decision at a December meeting, the September decision was reiterated.

Three groups now sought the leadership of the Presbytery, in many respects, the same three groups that sought the leadership of the church: Koryu Seminary's supporters, a vocal minority of liberals opposing repentance of any sort, and those conservatives who feared Koryu Seminary's in-

⁶³ "Presbyterianism in Korea", *The Messenger*, July-August, 1953, p. 4. Twelve men, under the leadership of Kim Kil Chang, sought to have the action rescinded. Kim is described as "the man who was declared to have been the tool of the Japanese in forcing this sin upon the local presbytery" (William Chisholm, "A Welcome Development in Korea", *Biblical Missions*, March, 1953, p. 22.)

dependent status but opposed also the liberal character of Chosun Seminary. In the spring of 1949 there were three presbyteries representing each of these groups.

The first division in the Presbytery apparently occurred when that body's dissident liberals, who had sought cancellation of Presbytery's action recommending repentance, became aware of imminent Presbyterial disciplinary action against them. Approximately eleven presbyters "did not come to the regular presbytery meeting, but instead formed themselves into another presbytery".⁶⁴ Within a very brief span of time, a second minority pulled away from the Presbytery, this group strongly sympathetic to the actions of Pak Hyung Nong and his desire for an Assembly-controlled school. Led by Noh Chin Hyung, pastor of a large Pusan church, this second group also decided to set up its own presbytery, again without authorization. Fearful of the attachments made by Koryu Seminary, but equally opposed to the theological liberalism of Chosun Seminary's followers, Noh seemed confident that he would be supported by the majority of the Korean church and by those missionaries moving in its main stream. Though this second group also had no legal authorization, it too formed itself into yet another presbytery. The majority remained in the "legal Presbytery", now basically sympathetic to Koryu Seminary. They promptly expressed that sympathy by once again reversing their previous action, again supporting the school, and by doing so, "going contrary to the declaration of the 1948 Assembly".⁶⁵

The events within the Presbytery from 1948-1949 were to prove prophetic of the larger situation. They helped to provide part of the reason for the eventual division of the church in 1951. And the same groups that formed their presbyteries were to form their own assemblies eventually, along much the same lines. The conflict had begun to shatter the church's monolithic structure.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Pak Yune Sun, "Presbyterianism in Korea", *The Presbyterian Guardian*, June 16, 1952, p. 105.

⁶⁵ "Bruce Hunt Finds New Doors Opening in Korea", *The Presbyterian Guardian*, June, 1949, p. 117.

⁶⁶ Kim Yang Sun's account completely ignores these events in the Presbytery's history and speaks with some scorn of the Koryu Seminary

In April, 1949, the 35th General Assembly met to face several acute problems threatening the unity of the church: an already thrice-divided South Kyungsang Province Presbytery; a liberally oriented theological seminary with no intention of changing its course; two independent, conservative seminaries vying for Assembly recognition; three groups within the church, each represented now by its own seminary, each expressive of its own program for reform in the church.

Strongly sympathetic to those conservatives concerned with the continuing influence of Chosun Seminary, but unwilling to commit themselves to the full-orbed reform demanded by Koryu Seminary and its supporters, the Assembly moved most strongly against Koryu, while seeking a more moderating course regarding Chosun Seminary.

The problems raised in connection with the divisions of the South Kyungsang Province Presbytery were referred to a special committee "with full powers",⁶⁷ appointed by the Assembly to examine the situation. The action regarding Koryu Seminary was more direct. "In accord with the statement of the last General Assembly, the Koryu Seminary has no connection whatever with this General Assembly. Since it is contrary to the action of General Assembly for any Presbytery to have any connection with this seminary, it would be well to be careful in this matter".⁶⁸ In this same connection, expressing the fears of those who were concerned about Koryu Seminary's western connections, the Assembly took action against the missionaries of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church and the Independent Board for Presbyterian Foreign Missions. "The South Kyungsang Province Presbytery should sever its relation with missionary Bruce Hunt's group and take every caution against the Koryu Seminary,

group's defense of their presbytery as "the legal presbytery". The existence of "the legal presbytery" is thus made out by Kim to be grounded largely in the divisive, martyr-spirit of the group (*op. cit.*, pp. 156-157). The omission of this history is most unfortunate and misleading.

⁶⁷ The extent of these "full powers" was apparently not even understood by the Committee, later to be rebuked by the 1950 Assembly for their excessiveness.

⁶⁸ Kim Yang Sun, *ibid.*

according to the previous decision of the General Assembly".⁶⁹

None of these actions provided any encouragement to those who had struggled for church reform. Many denounced them as illegal.⁷⁰ Others, like Pak Yune Sun, deplored them as symbols of the church's unrepentant mind, and a tragic misunderstanding of Koryu Seminary's program. "In the five years that have followed liberation, we have never had thorough repentance. Because of this the church has not yet found unity. . . . The problem of the South Kyungsang Province Presbytery, severely misunderstood by the Korean church, finds its source in the legitimate request that the motion for repentance be fairly practiced. . . . The past

⁶⁹ Quoted in Kim Eui Hwan, "The Christian Conflict with Shintoism in Korea", unpublished Th.M. dissertation, submitted to Westminster Theological Seminary, 1963, p. 107. Cf. Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

⁷⁰ Kim Eui Hwan points out, for example, that the Form of Government of the Korean Presbyterian Church clearly endorses "the right of the Presbytery to recommend any ministerial candidates to any seminary according to the applicant's desire. 'Any seminary' here indicated not only refers to a seminary which is run by the denomination but also any other seminaries which have sound Reformed doctrine. Therefore the action taken by the Assembly against the Koryu Seminary was unlawful and contradictory to the principle of the church government because it made the decision without examination of the doctrinal position of the Koryu Seminary and even without condemning it to be heretical, in spite of the fact that Koryu Seminary, though independent, was approved by the South Kyungsang Presbytery. Therefore the responsibility for the split lies with the General Assembly rather than with the so-called 'Koryu-pa' church. There is little justification to label the formation of the 'Koryu-pa' church as schismatic" (Kim Eui Hwan, *op. cit.*, p. 108). The action against Mr. Hunt was open to similar criticism. States one report, "The Assembly also stated, with no reasons attached and no form of trial, that the Presbytery at Pusan was to have nothing to do with Bruce F. Hunt and the missionaries associated with him. In spite of the fact that the Korean Presbyterian Church was officially on record as receiving missionaries from the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, it was alleged privately by some at the Assembly that Mr. Hunt belonged to a heretical group. Actually Mr. Hunt is not currently connected officially with the Korean Presbyterian Church, so that the declaration means little. However, since he is frequently being invited to preach in particular churches — at the request of local sessions — the matter is being pressed in some circles" ("Bruce Hunt Finds New Doors Opening in Korea", *loc. cit.*, p. 117).

35th General Assembly has broken off relations with Koryu Seminary and missionary Bruce Hunt. . . . Because this action seems to raise many difficulties regarding the repentance movement, we cannot help but be deeply concerned".⁷¹

Other actions at the Assembly caused even deeper concern among the reform supporters. Again, as in 1948, the Assembly sought to deal with the question of Chosun Seminary's liberal direction through ecclesiastical indirection. Still ignoring the application of juridical discipline, the body secured the passing of a motion supporting the conservative theological seminary, which had begun under the presidency of Pak Hyung Nong the previous year. Then, pleading the financial inability of the church to maintain two recognized seminaries, conservatives began to maneuver towards "action disallowing the Chosun Seminary. If a proposal to merge the two seminaries succeeded, demanding submission to the conservative seminary, the only conservative seminary would be in the ascendancy. If it failed, the removal of the liberal seminary could be effected by church politics, or so it was thought. Therefore, the Assembly decided to merge the two seminaries and make a joint board as a compromise, and so make the joint seminary a fact".⁷² A committee to execute such a plan was selected by the Assembly, and, within two months of the Assembly, seven principles for merger were proposed to both seminaries by the committee.⁷³

⁷¹ Pak Yune Sun, *Where is the Korean Presbyterian Church Going?*, (K), Publications Committee of the Koryu Theological Seminary Student Body Association, 1950, pp. 1-2. The same posture is also displayed in William H. Chisholm, "The Battle for Korea", *Biblical Missions*, November, 1951, pp. 24-31.

⁷² Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

⁷³ The seven principles were:

- (a) Theological education to be basically evangelical and in accord with the Creed of the Korean Presbyterian Church.
- (b) All employees of both seminaries to resign.
- (c) The board to be made up of members approved by the Assembly, and decisions to be by an affirmative vote of 3/4 of the members present.
- (d) The president and faculty to be chosen by the board; the president to be chosen from among the older Korean ministers, the professors, and three Northern Presbyterian missionaries, two

Again, the merger proposals failed. Chosun Seminary, fearful that most of their faculty members would be rejected under the terms of the agreement, urged that the two faculties should be unconditionally merged, and that board actions be by majority vote of those present. The conservative institution insisted, in reaction, that no one could be a professor who did not accept the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. Kim Chai Choon, long the Korean spokesman for liberalism, was singled out by the conservatives as definitely unsuited for faculty status. Concerned also that a mere majority vote on board actions might provide Chosun Seminary with too much political leverage, the conservatives insisted on 2/3 majority decision. With both groups at a stalemate, the merger was as doomed as the 1948 proposals.⁷⁴ Neither side was to emerge with clean hands. Both conservative and liberal seminaries had freely resorted to parliamentary posturing to resolve a deeper issue. The issue still remained to trouble Pak Hyung Nong's group and the followers of Koryu Seminary's program.

At this point of confusion, the Assembly Committee appointed to examine the situation in the South Kyungsang Province Presbytery undertook action. Their actions eventually provided the match to ignite the smoldering fuse. Without even calling the Presbytery together, the Committee met with Lee Yak Sin, its moderator, and, until now, one of those conservatives not associated with the Koryu Seminary movement. Lee was told that his presbytery was to be divided into three presbyteries, and those men who had withdrawn were ordered reinstated. Mr. Hunt and other missionaries associated with him were not to be allowed in the pulpits of the Presbytery. Ministers associated with

Southern Presbyterian missionaries, one each from the United Church of Canada Mission and the Australian Presbyterian Mission. The important courses to be entrusted to missionaries and others to Korean ministers.

- (e) The name and constitution to be decided by the board.
- (f) Rules governing students of both institutions to be revised.
- (g) The property and furnishings of both institutions to be unconditionally given up (Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, p. 247).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 247-248.

Koryu Seminary were to be tried. The Committee also appointed conveners for the three new presbyteries, and a time and place for convening. The three conveners appointed were all members of the liberal minority associated with Kim Kil Chang, who had escaped presbyterial discipline by earlier withdrawing to form their own presbytery.⁷⁵

Nothing could have delighted the liberal element more or infuriated the conservatives less. Kim Kil Chang's liberal party submitted quickly to the demands of the Committee and went into the three newly erected presbyteries. The action turned Lee Yak Sin into a strong supporter of Koryu Seminary and provided even more fuel for the Pusan Seminary's case against liberal machinations in the higher church court. Even those like Noh Chin Hyung, supporters of a more inclusive sort of conservative thinking, were incensed by the action of the Committee.⁷⁶

2. *The 36th General Assembly and the Koryu Group Division*

In this state of tension, the 36th General Assembly convened in April, 1950. Five groups came representing the South Kyungsang Province Presbytery, each demanding recognition from the Assembly.⁷⁷ The two seminaries now

⁷⁵ "Missionary Life in Korea Has Good and Bad Sides", *The Presbyterian Guardian*, July, 1949, p. 137.

⁷⁶ The gravity of the situation may be judged by the large "pamphlet warfare" that began almost immediately after the action of the Committee. Lee Yak Sin, moderator of "the legal presbytery", circulated "A Notification", in June, 1949, attacking the decision of the Committee. In July, a small booklet appeared from the pens of Han Sang Dong and Choo Nam Sun, explaining the character and reason behind Koryu Seminary's foundation. By September "An Appeal and Declaration of Public Pledge" had come from the pen of Bruce Hunt. In October, still another "Proclamation Statement" was circulated, this time by Sim Moon Tae. (The general contents of the papers are described in Ahn Yong Choon, *The Atom Bomb of Love*, (K), Sinmangae Publishing Company, 1966, pp. 272-273.) In view of the importance of the events, it is very unfortunate that Kim Yang Sun completely neglects their narration. The omission places the Koryu Seminary supporters in a very ill-deserved light.

⁷⁷ The five groups represented the three presbyteries set up by the

actively seeking the support of the church courts had been "extremely active in spreading their opinions and defenses. Both sides were trying to seize church control. Whoever won control would control the Assembly's traditions and power, and whoever failed would criticize the other group as politicians".⁷⁸

The power struggle erupted almost immediately, centering over the question of the seating of delegates. Even here the motivations were theological. "The Chosun Seminary group contended that missionaries not related to the Church-Mission Conference had no qualifications as delegates. The Presbyterian Seminary group thought that the five delegates of the South Kyungsang Province Presbytery should be denied their qualifications. If the Chosun Seminary opinion prevailed, a number of Southern Presbyterian missionaries who were not in the Church-Mission Conference, would lose their right of membership, and the Chosun Seminary would be free of their strong opposition. If the Presbyterian Seminary group prevailed, the delegates of the South Kyungsang Province Presbytery who supported the Chosun Seminary would be out of the Assembly, and that would give them the majority".⁷⁹

For three days the issues were debated with great heat. And most of the Assembly time was spent in a discussion of the seating of delegates. The actions of the Assembly Committee appointed in 1949 "with full power" to examine the situation existing in the southern presbytery met with rebuke from the Assembly. They were told that they had no authority to set up presbyteries, but had been instructed merely to investigate and seek to settle problems in the area. In this same connection, the presbytery established under the leadership of Noh Chin Hyung received some censure by the

Assembly Committee, the self-appointed presbytery associated with the name of Noh Chin Hyung, and the "legal presbytery", whose moderator was Lee Yak Sin.

⁷⁸ Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, pp. 248-249.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 249. *Cf.*, to the contrary, H. Rhodes and A. Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 267, who, in asserting that "the specific questions were not with regard to the seminaries themselves nor in the realm of doctrine", separate, more than necessary, the essential unity of the problems.

Assembly. The conclusion of the Assembly was not to seat the four illegally formed groups associated with Kim Kil Chang and Noh Chin Hyung. However, when the "legal presbytery" prepared to be seated, Assembly action was blocked in a climax of fistfights and "rowdyism", apparently led by the Chosun Seminary group members.⁸⁰ ✓

When further debate seemed fruitless, the Assembly named a committee to study means of resolving the situation. Several recommendations of the committee were presented and eventually adopted. The Assembly was to be adjourned until September. A special committee of seven was named to settle the South Kyungsang Province Presbytery matter. "On the seminary question, two representatives from each presbytery and four missionaries, with the Assembly officers . . . were named as a special committee to meet during July in Chungju to work out a plan. If this meeting works out a proposal, that this be sent at once to each presbytery for discussion, and if approved by the majority, that it be passed".⁸¹

Considerable debate seemed to have centered around a committee recommendation regarding section one of the Creed, that pertaining to the infallibility of the Bible. Apparently supported by those conservative elements seeking the ouster of Chosun Seminary's liberal teachers, the motion was regarded by those like William Scott as an unfortunate change in the creedal basis of the church, moving towards a theory of "Biblical inerrancy" or "verbal inspiration".⁸²

⁸⁰ "Korea Presbyterian Assembly Blocked by 'Rowdyism'," *The Presbyterian Guardian*, June, 1950, p. 114.

⁸¹ Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

⁸² Scott's own analysis of the debate is included in a letter written by him on May 20, 1950, to some of his Korean associates:

" . . . I then, unfortunately, entered upon a discussion of the issue and pointed out that the creed had been wisely and purposely drawn up in terms which are generally used in the Presbyterian Church throughout the world, and to which we are all heartily subscribed. But when we tampered with the creed and began to add such words as 'Biblical inerrancy' we were fomenting strife.

"I then said that this issue had been brought into prominence after 'Liberation', and that it had come from America, which is the only country where you can find any considerable body of Christian people

As it finally passed, the motion stated "that anyone holding, propagating, or arguing contrary to section one of the Creed on the infallibility of the Bible (original manuscripts) be subject to Chapter 6, Section 12-13 of the Book of Discipline by each presbytery".⁸³ Though the motion was not specifically directed to any individuals in the church, many regarded it as the preparatory step in proposed disciplinary action against Kim Chai Choon and William Scott.

The step, however, was taken too late to allay the fears of those concerned with the undisciplined liberal leadership of the churches and its moderating drift. Its very ambiguity in terms of specifics, an ambiguity clouded by ecclesiastical

holding that view. I said that no responsible seminaries in Canada, Australia, Britain or Europe taught that kind of 'Biblical inerrancy'. . . . I pointed out that the presence of errors did not invalidate the scriptures as the Word of God — that it was the Spirit rather than the letter which constituted the Word of God. I quoted Paul's words in II Corinthians that 'the letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth life'. I mentioned that even in America, no responsible seminary of the Northern Presbyterian Church taught 'biblical inerrancy', and referred to Dr. John Mackay's repeated warnings against the danger of placing the Bible above Christ.

"I then urged that they leave the creed as it is, without adding any words which might be the cause of strife, and that we do all that is possible to avoid a split in the church. . . . My thought was that even a good word like 'inspiration' could raise questions in people's minds and be readily used to read 'verbal inspiration'. Unfortunately I did not know the word for 'verbal inspiration' and so left the matter inadequately explained. I ended with a strong plea that such a momentous question be not settled in such undignified haste but be referred to the special committee that was to meet during the summer to discuss the seminary issue.

"My remarks were immediately interpreted as a confession that I did not believe in the inspiration of scripture. Mr. Kinsler quoted II Timothy 3:16 and Rev. Kwun Yun-ho expressed horror. I replied that I, just as truly as Mr. Kinsler, believed that the scriptures were inspired, but that the same Holy Spirit which inspired them should guide us in our reading and interpreting of them. . . ." (Quoted in, Shin Sung Kook, "A Historical Study of the Ecumenical Movement in its Relation to Christianity in Korea", unpublished thesis submitted to Emmanuel College, Victoria University, Toronto, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Theology, 1963, p. 241).

⁸³ Kim Yang Sun, *ibid.*

maneuvering, seemed to nullify its effect as far as many were concerned.⁸⁴

Now, to heighten an already tense situation, the special committee of seven appointed by the Assembly to settle matters in the South Kyungsang Province Presbytery acted. Southern conservatives, already concerned about the make-up of the committee,⁸⁵ were repelled by what they regarded as the brutalizing manner in which the committee operated. Ignoring the teaching elders, the committee called only ruling elders as representatives of the presbyteries. The outcome was a committee declaration that "the original presbytery and the . . . new ones were all . . . dissolved; and they set up a . . . presbytery which they declared would be the legal one and that any desiring admittance could make application. Members of the . . . newly formed 'presbyteries' went into the . . . presbytery, newly formed by the General Assembly's committee. The discipline that was to fall on those who refused to repent of Shinto obeisance was of course lifted, because the General Assembly's committee declared the original presbytery (in the Pusan area) which had intended to discipline these men, now dissolved and non-existent. The true men of God in the original presbytery here of course felt outraged. They believed the whole action high-handed, unfair and illegal, and refused to enter the newly formed presbytery along with those who refused to repent or accept discipline on the shrine issue. They felt it would be sin for them to do so".⁸⁶

⁸⁴ These sentiments can be found reflected in Pak Yune Sun, "The Historical Position on Which We Stand", *The Watchman*, (K), September, 1946, pp. 12-13; Ahn Yong Choon, *op. cit.*, pp. 274-276.

⁸⁵ One missionary sympathizer with the Koryu Seminary comments that "according to the present moderator of the General Assembly, the committee was made up of four modernists, one U.S.A. Presbyterian missionary, and two others" (William Chisholm, "The Battle For Korea", *loc. cit.*, p. 26).

⁸⁶ William Chisholm, "A Welcome Development in Korea", *loc. cit.*, p. 22. Chisholm's account confuses rather badly the number of presbyteries involved in the dispute. For that reason, we have deleted his references to the number of different groups involved. He seems to have regarded the three presbyteries declared set up by the 1949 committee as essentially one.

The situation now bordered on the explosive. Repeatedly the reform efforts of the Koryu Seminary supporters had met with opposition from the Assembly. The liberals attacked their conservative stance and the conservatives, through ecclesiastical pressure, ignored or nullified it. Five years of efforts had brought the Assembly only to the point of passing a general stricture regarding section one of the Creed. No orderly steps of discipline had yet been initiated against the church's liberal forces. And the Assembly's firmest steps had been against the only presbytery seeking consistently the rehabilitation of the church.

In the midst of this tension, communist troops poured across the 38th parallel to initiate the Korean war and bring still more delays in the reform efforts. The 36th General Assembly, which had recessed to meet in September, 1950, was forced to delay its reconvening until May, 1951, when it met in Pusan. Also because of the emergency, the special committee elected by the Assembly to meet in June, 1950, and work out a seminary proposal to be submitted to each presbytery, was unable to meet at such an early date. The committee did meet, but the gathering took place just before the reconvening of the 36th Assembly. Their recommendation, which had no time to be sent down to the presbyteries, was that neither seminary be recognized but that a new General Assembly Seminary be set up in Taegu.

The actions of the 1951 Assembly, in many ways, finalized the growing rifts in the church. Especially for the supporters of Koryu Seminary the time was decisive. The report of the special committee elected to handle the South Kyungsang Province Presbytery matter was presented and received. The presbytery, newly organized by that committee, was thus recognized by the Assembly. "The result was to drop the traditional presbytery from the constituency of the general assembly (and so from the church). Delegates from the traditional presbytery were sent to the assembly, to make their testimony before that body, but were refused permission even to speak a word concerning the action of the assembly".⁸⁷ The rejected commissioners, unable to

⁸⁷ Pak Yune Sun, "Presbyterianism in Korea", *loc. cit.*, p. 105. Pak

speak on the floor, circularized the Assembly with leaflets, interpreting the action of the Assembly against them as an action against the cause of reform:

"We are sorry that the 36th General Assembly of the Korean Presbyterian Church made an irregular decision regarding the South Kyungsang Province Presbytery.

"That the General Assembly should accept a presbytery with those of unsound doctrine contrary to the creed and constitution of the Presbyterian Church, while at the same time rejecting those of the orthodox theology and evangelical faith, is a matter that even a child can discern as not right.

"Representatives and ministers of this General Assembly and all laymen who believe the evangelical faith! The General Assembly maintains two seminaries which are diametrically opposite in doctrine. How can you unite truth and error, orthodoxy and modernism? The people of the church recognize this as hypocrisy and surely will not follow such leadership.

"You are willing to go along with Dr. John A. Mackay who wishes to recognize Red China.

"We believe the reason God has spared this city of Pusan where you are meeting is because of the true testimony to the gospel which has been carried on here. We feel that the action of the General Assembly toward the local presbytery is analogous to the releasing of Barrabas and crucifying Christ.

"Beware! You should lead the sheep into the truth. This is your mission and one for which you are responsible to God".⁸⁸

The very unsophisticated language of the protest emphasizes again the basic nature of the Koryu group effort — a simple appeal for the Assembly's return to their own creeds, uncluttered by conservative latitudinarianism or liberal capitulations. Again it failed. And again the basic responsibility for its failure need not be imputed to the would-be reformers. "... The few ambitious ones who held the reins in the Assembly, and a few opportunists who hid behind them, casting away any sense of Christian love for the sake of their own ambition, pushed matters to the point of cutting

might have added that they were not even allowed to enter the building.

⁸⁸ William Chisholm, "The Battle for Korea", *loc. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

off the ex-prisoner-centered Koryu Seminary group from the Assembly. . .".⁸⁹

From this point, until September 2, 1952, when the first "General Assembly" of a separate group oriented to the Koryu Seminary was held,⁹⁰ the actions of the 36th General Assembly were amplified and reinforced, on both sides. In August, 1951, the South Kyungsang Province Presbytery, created by the Assembly committee and now having Assembly authorization, forbade sending students to Koryu Seminary. A time limit was also set for the return of workers and members who had gone over to the Koryu presbytery. The original presbytery, still refusing to disband, sent its delegates to the 37th General Assembly in April, 1952, and again they were refused admission.

The near-conclusion came in September, 1952, when the presbytery, still refusing to be dissolved, "decided to enlarge their presbytery and carry their testimony beyond the limits of their original boundary".⁹¹ This meeting is often called the first General Assembly of the Koryu denomination.⁹² But it should be noted that, even at this time, the intent of the group seems not to have been a divisive organization, but rather an organization freed of compromise, an organization which, they hoped, eventually, would effectuate a General Assembly, not only spiritually, but legally,⁹³ the successor of the pre-war church. For that reason the September, 1952, meeting called itself "a General Presbytery", rather than a

⁸⁹ Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-158. *Cf.*, to the contrary, Samuel H. Moffett, *The Christians of Korea*, Friendship Press, 1962, p. 114.

⁹⁰ *Minutes of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Korea, 1952-1960*, (K), Publications Committee, Korean Presbyterian Church, 1961, p. 3. *Cf.*, to the contrary, G. T. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 179, who gives the impression of a division as early as 1949.

⁹¹ "Presbyterianism in Korea", *The Messenger*, September, 1953, p. 6.

⁹² Though the body is popularly called the Koryu group or the Kosin group, its official name is exactly the same as the parent body.

⁹³ This insistence on being the "legal succession" of the Korean Presbyterian Church provides a rather different perspective from similar western parallels familiar to us, such as the creation of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church in 1936. However, the treatment of the southern presbytery by the Assembly had convinced these men of the illegality of the Assembly's action and of the Assembly itself. And this insistence was one method of drawing attention to a basic disorder.

General Assembly.⁹⁴ For that reason also, commissioners from this presbytery attempted to be seated at each General Assembly session until 1954, when "the General Assembly reiterated its action that there was no connection between the General Assembly and the Koryu Seminary. Whereupon the group, after a final speech by the delegate from the 'legal presbytery', Elder Um Choo Sin, formally withdrew from the General Assembly".⁹⁵

The spirit and purpose of the group was manifested almost immediately. Three weeks were set aside for self-examination and self-judgment, "during which time all the ministers, elders, and evangelists (helpers), were to refrain from carrying on their official and public duties, and give themselves to prayer that they might receive the leading of the Lord according to His Word. The idea was that if any one had any part in the shrine iniquity that he had not cleared up before God, he should accept this to himself as discipline, and get right with God".⁹⁶

At the conclusion of the three-week period, three days of meetings were held in the church pastored by Han Sang Dong. On the closing night a Manifesto was read, launching the new movement and reflecting on its past and purposes:

"Mankind has fallen into a state of sin and misery and the only hope is found in the cross of Christ, where God alone dealt forever with the question of sin. God did not leave mankind without a witness. Repentance has been proclaimed throughout the ages by Moses, Elijah, Jonah, Paul, Calvin and others, all witnessing to the completed work of the Son of God on the cross.

"During the Japanese persecution our church was very greatly oppressed. Among us there were a certain number of faithful servants of God who suffered in Japanese prisons. After the liberation there arose a goodly number of Chris-

⁹⁴ Even periodicals friendly to the cause of the Koryu group seem to have missed the significance of the title. Articles portraying the significance of the General Presbytery—herald it as a "new church organized in South Korea" (*The Presbyterian Guardian*, November 15, 1952, p. 206) or the formation of a "new church" (*The Messenger*, January, 1953, p. 1).

⁹⁵ Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

⁹⁶ "Presbyterianism in Korea," *The Messenger*, September, 1953, p. 6

tians who repented of the sins committed during the persecution. We are very glad of this but on the other hand we are very sad to see that the majority of Korean Christians do not approve of this emphasis on repentance. Their attitude of excusing themselves is the fruit of Modernism and superficial evangelism which goes along with modernistic indifference.

"The path they tread may be an easy one but it is not the way of restoring the church of Christ to its original purity. Speaking of the Korean Presbyterian Church it has departed from the Presbyterian faith and constitution to a large extent.

"Since the liberation we have insisted on true repentance and Calvinistic theology, i. e. the Reformed faith. A goodly number of Christians have responded to our appeal. But we are sad to see so many hindering this noble movement. We advised the General Assembly repeatedly but they have ridiculed us and severed us from them. For three years they have refused to recognize our delegates. We have resolved therefore to organize a true General Assembly according to the constitution of the Presbyterian Church in succession to the old uncorrupted General Assembly which was in existence prior to the capitulation of the Korean Church to Japanese shrine idolatry. With this goal in mind we today hold this service inaugurating the General Presbytery. Our determination is that our spiritual fight go on right straight to the end. . . .

"We hold to the great time-honored system of the Reformed faith, i. e. the Westminster Confession of Faith, its Larger and Shorter Catechisms.

"We hold that Calvinism is the most tenable system of Christian faith and try to teach it according to the presentations of Bavinck, Kuyper, Warfield, Hodge, Machen, Berkhof, and others.

"We are opposed to liberal theology and to the so-called neo-orthodoxy, i. e., the theology of Barth, Brunner, Niebuhr, and other dialectic theologians".⁹⁷

The first rent of any sizeable proportions had taken place in Korean Presbyterianism.⁹⁸ It was not created without

⁹⁷ *Loc. cit.* The Manifesto, in full form, appears in the *Minutes of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Korea, 1952-1960, op. cit.*, pp. 11-14.

⁹⁸ A July, 1953, report lists 363 churches and 50 ordained ministers in the fledgling group. The 1956 Assembly Minutes note a total of 568 churches and 102 ordained ministers. From this year on, the church's

fault from all sides — liberal opportunists “casting away love for the sake of ambition”; inconsistent conservative moderation, that sought for reform without renewal, purification by pacification; Koryu Seminary supporters, whose zeal sometimes exceeded bounds of knowledge; the prejudgments and “mind set” of western missionary boards. But, in spite of all these weaknesses, the creation of the Koryu denomination by no means could be called “only a question of control within the church”.⁹⁹ The question was more basically a theological one. Should discipline be properly exercised in the church against liberal perspectives? Or should it not? Should the Word of God be truly preached? Or should it not? Any alleged seeking of “control within the church” was motivated by that question. Shall the liberals win?, asked Koryu Seminary. Their proposed answer was, No.

3. *The 37th General Assembly and the Kichang Group Division*

The 36th General Assembly had taken steps which were to antagonize the Chosun Seminary supporters as well. Notice of discipline had been issued against those uncomfortable with the standpoint of the Creed regarding the infallibility of Scripture. The adjourned session in May, 1951, had moved still further. Acting on the hurried recommendations

expansion seems to have levelled off to a more normal rate of growth. By August, 1960, 590 churches and 126 ordained ministers are listed on the church roll. By contrast, the parent body, in 1960, claimed 2177 congregations.

⁹⁹ Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, p. 164. Kim's final judgment on the Koryu group seems most ill-advised. He writes, “Even now, they brag of eventually absorbing the whole church and of making their denomination the governing body of the Korean Presbyterian Church. It is not really a question of shrine worship or modernism. Rather, it is a question of who controls the Korean Presbyterian Church, which is the reason for the Koryu Seminary group's remaining separate”. In view of Kim's critical appraisal of the political ambitions of the Koryu group, it is rather striking to note his constant references to the same features in the struggle that ensued between the remaining conservatives with the Chosun Seminary supporters, but without similar condemnations (*Cf. ibid.*, pp. 248-249, 253-259).

of the committee appointed in 1950, Assembly recognition for both Chosun Seminary and the conservative Presbyterian Seminary of Pak Hyung Nong had been withdrawn and instructions had been issued for the erection of a new General Assembly Seminary.

The motion was not passed without strong protest from the Chosun Seminary supporters. In particular, the group argued the action "was unconstitutional and contrary to the action of the Assembly. For the 36th General Assembly had directed that the proposition be submitted to the presbyteries, and if it was necessary to suspend this action because of the emergency, then the previous ruling should first have been changed. Since it had not been set aside, the whole thing was illegal".¹⁰⁰ But the protest was ignored and a collision course was set.

In September, 1951, the decision of the Assembly was implemented when the new General Assembly Seminary was opened in Taegu. With a very strong conservative faculty,¹⁰¹ it was quite apparent that the movement of the Assembly was throwing its weight against Chosun Seminary's liberal leadership. The independent conservative institution associated with Pak Hyung Nong had closed its doors in answer to the appeal of the Assembly. The direction of the Assembly's efforts had been clear to them. It was clear also to Chosun Seminary.¹⁰² It refused to close its doors and, moving to Pusan because of the war, it was reorganized under the name, Hankuk Theological Seminary.

In the time that intervened between the 36th and the 37th

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

¹⁰¹ A popularized account of the school's beginnings can be found in Arch Campbell, *The Christ of the Korean Heart*, Falco Publishers, 1954, pp. 107-116. Campbell was the first president of the institution. The full-time teaching staff included Pak Hyung Nong and Myung Shin Hong (both sought formerly as teachers for Koryu Seminary), Han Kyung Chik, Kim Chi Sun, and missionary Francis Kinsler of the Northern Presbyterian Church. Kim Chi Sun was much later to be instrumental in the formation of the Korean Bible Presbyterian Church, a denomination similar, in intent and goals, to the same named American denomination.

¹⁰² It does not seem so clear to Samuel H. Moffett, *op. cit.*, p. 115, who emphasizes a fear of division in the church as the main factor in pressing for a new seminary under its own authority.

General Assembly, Chosun (now Hankuk) Seminary continued its emphasis on the so-called illegality of the action taken against it at the 1951 gathering. And coupled with this legal protest was a strong reaction to the newly set up Assembly Seminary in Taegu. The new institution recognized by the Assembly, completely dominated by former Presbyterian Seminary men from the church's generally conservative wing, was denounced as "a retreat to the control of missionaries", a return to the former days of Pyungyang Seminary.¹⁰³

The issue came to a head at the 37th General Assembly, in April, 1952. And the first clash centered on the seating of north Korean refugee presbytery commissioners. Hindered since 1945 from communication and joint action, the northern churches had fled to the south in the years of the war. By 1952, several hundred thousand Christians and more than 400 northern church workers had found their way to the south. Should representatives of the northern churches now be seated in the Assembly? Ten northern presbyteries and a possible 67 delegates were involved in the decision.

Conservative forces in the church, eager to "guarantee church control", supported the seating of the northern presbyteries. They "believed the northern presbyteries would

¹⁰³ Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, p. 253. These sentiments seem to be reflected also in the statement made by Hankuk Seminary three days prior to the 37th Assembly, on the occasion of the school's tenth anniversary:

- "(1) The 36th (continuation) Assembly's illegal and unconstitutional decision on the seminary should be reconsidered to remove from Korean church history this unparalleled disgrace.
- (2) We protest last year's illegal action and state that the reply was confused, so at this Assembly, the fact of the reconsideration should be made clear and a sufficient reply given.
- (3) If this Assembly, carried away by the influence of numbers, represses or ignores free speech and thought, the Assembly should let the Korean church judge for itself the responsible response to such repression.
- (4) If the Assembly continues this illegal action and ignores righteous protests in order to maintain the peace of the church, some definite action must be taken.
- (5) Unless this is done, there will be an appeal to world opinion" (*Ibid.*, pp. 255-256).

unconditionally join their side and be a great help to them, and so favored it. The liberals felt that their joining the Assembly would not necessarily mean their joining the seminary fight and were delighted at the petition and approved it, thinking they could swing over about seventy neutrals to their side".¹⁰⁴ With politicking from both conservative and liberal side, the 67 delegates were seated. A tactical mistake had been committed by the Hankuk Seminary supporters. The action only increased the pro-General Assembly Seminary's majority.

The Assembly now proceeded to deal with Hankuk Seminary and its president, Dr. Kim Chai Choon. Hotly debated on both sides, the motion was eventually passed, ordering the Kyunggi Province Presbytery to suspend Dr. Kim from the ministry.¹⁰⁵ In this same connection, Dr. William Scott, long a supporter of liberal causes, was asked to be recalled to his homeland. In both cases, the basic reason for the action was directly related to the two men's rejection of the infallibility of Scripture. The 1951 decision of the Assembly regarding this doctrine was now concretely applied.

None of this was done without charges or counter-charges. Dr. Kim's liberal supporters "criticized the vagueness of the condemnation and insisted that the theological views of these men should be determined before they were condemned". There were even conservatives, themselves not yet altogether clear about the exact nature of Dr. Kim's position on the Scripture, who were sympathetic to this criticism. After all, no trial in a formal sense seems to have been held and the decision to suspend Dr. Kim and Dr. Scott was made without testimony of the accused. "The nervously upset conservatives, for the sake of control, had tried by every

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 256-257. Chun Sung Chun estimates that conservative and liberal forces were about equally divided around this time. He asserts "there were exactly 51 conservative representatives in the General Assembly and only 46 liberal representatives to contest them at the legal General Assembly in 1951" (Chun Sung Chun, "Schism and Unity in the Protestant Churches of Korea", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, submitted to the Graduate School of Yale University, 1955, p. 202).

¹⁰⁵ Lee Dae Yung, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79. *Cf.*, to the contrary, H. Rhodes and A. Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 269, who state simply that "the General Assembly proceeded to suspend him from the ministry. . .".

means possible, to root out the liberal seminary".¹⁰⁶ Unfortunately, in their quest for judgment, they had ignored Presbyterian order. The mistake was not to be forgotten in the ensuing conflict.

The Assembly also took direct action against Hankuk Seminary and its students. A motion not to use workers who had come out of that institution was "passed by a large majority".¹⁰⁷ The effect of the motion was to bar any graduates of the seminary from ordination.

The body was not adjourned before a sign of things to come took place. "In protest against what they felt to be the illegal activities of the Assembly, the main body of the liberal group present walked out of the Assembly. On May 2, 1952, a statement was issued by the dissident group and, according to Kim Yang Sun's account, they "set about setting up a separate denomination".¹⁰⁸

Now the situation rapidly began to deteriorate. The Kyunggi Province Presbytery, in which Dr. Kim held his membership, met on May 13, 1952. The largest in area and membership, the presbytery had its geographical center in Seoul, long the focus of liberal sentiments. In reaction to the Assembly's demand for the defrocking of Dr. Kim, the presbytery attacked the illegality of the Assembly's recent actions against Kim and the Hankuk Seminary:

"The following three actions of the Assembly at Taegu, April 29 — May 3, 1952, are not in accord with the Constitution and are therefore illegal:

- (1) At the 36th General Assembly in Taegu, in April, 1950, an action was taken on the seminary question

¹⁰⁶ Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, pp. 260, 261.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 261. *Cf.*, to the contrary, G. T. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 217, who states that "they ruled that graduates of the Hankuk Seminary must attend the General Assembly's institution for one year before ordination". Actually, the ruling was much stronger than Brown contends. The actual motion was that "graduates of other seminaries, after a year of study in the Assembly Seminary, may be licensed". Then, after some fiery debate, conservative forces succeeded in placing an interpretive rider onto the original motion. Passed by majority vote, the explanatory motion ruled that "The phrase, 'other seminaries,' means an orthodox seminary and not a liberal one like the Chosun Seminary. . .".

¹⁰⁸ Kim Yang Sun, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

which, after approval by each presbytery, would be considered passed. Kyunggi Province Presbytery named a seminary committee to work on this motion, . . . but then, without any action by this presbytery, the so-called Assembly Seminary was illegally set up.

- (2) The refusal to use as ministers graduates of Chosun Seminary, which up to now has been supported by the Assembly, is completely illegal.
- (3) It is illegal to expel the Rev. Kim Chai Choon, a member of this presbytery, in defiance of the Constitution and Book of Discipline, and to so order this presbytery without testimony of the accused. . .'.¹⁰⁹

Sympathy movements began to form from those who supported the Hankuk Seminary program for the church. A national Presbyterian Convention in Defense of the Church Constitution was held September 17 in Taegu. The 35 ministers and 12 elders present attacked again the illegality of the Assembly's decisions and issued worldwide appeals for clarification. Insisting also that their intent was to support those movements concerned with constructive counter-measures, they emphasized their plans to maintain the unity of the Presbyterian Church of Korea. Their goal was not schism but justice.¹¹⁰

"After this convention, the conflict between the liberal and conservative groups became daily more intense. (Four) presbyteries broke away; many single churches seceded, and quarrels arose over church buildings".¹¹¹

The 38th General Assembly opened in April, 1953, to face still more conflict. Again, after fiery debate, the body repeated its former declaration discharging Kim Chai Choon from the ministry. Myung Shin Hong, long a conservative leader in the church, and the Assembly moderator, announced that "the Rev Kim Chai Choon, having ignored the decision of the 36th General Assembly and continuing to hold to the fallibility of the Scripture, according to Chapter 6, Section 12 of the Book of Discipline, he is expelled from

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 265-266.

¹¹⁰ The full statement of the Convention is recorded in Kim Yang Sun, *ibid.*, pp. 270-271.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

the ministry and forbidden to exercise his office, in the name of the Lord Jesus”.

It was the beginning of the end. On June 10, 1953, representatives from nine presbyteries gathered in the auditorium of Hankuk Seminary to open “the legal 38th General Assembly”. Still smarting from the rebukes of the past assemblies, fearful of what they felt to be the one-sided, minority rule of fundamentalist influences from the west, yet still not wanting to divide the church, the Assembly stated its intentions:

“It is now some seventy years since the gospel of God broke down the doors of our nation bringing the joy of freedom to this nation, and during that time, by the wisdom of the missionaries and the active faithfulness of our scholars, the Korean Presbyterian Church has become an influential church, giving glory to God and honor to our teachers. But after liberation, in our Presbyterian Church circles, a group standing for an extreme ‘fighting fundamentalism’ appeared, and by the 1951 General Assembly counted the delegates’ places, and being a one-sided, self-righteous group, did not work with or make friends with the membership, but formed their own group, a ‘holy gathering,’ and led a lying and abusive quarrel. So the Constitution and conscientious scruples were trampled under foot and the majority’s established practice became heavily oppressed. This group (which in 1929 split off from the American Presbyterian Church and in all the United States and Canada barely numbers 300,000 members and is hardly worthy to be called a separate denomination), after liberation, taking advantage of the Korean Presbyterian Church emergency situation, brought its influence to bear. We are of the normal Presbyterian Church. We cannot entrust its world-wide traditions to this small group or hand over our freedom in the gospel to this extreme legalism or our freedom of conscience to their illegal church control. . . .

“We are not schismatics. Rather, we wish only to restore the spiritually, legally, morally self-destroyed General Assembly, which has only the shell left remaining. Our door is always open and there are still many churches and teachers who sympathize but have not declared themselves. . . .

"This, now, is the statement of our convictions:

- (a) We stand for the freedom of the gospel which is salvation through the living Christ, opposing all Pharasaic attitudes.
- (b) We stand for firm doctrine and also for freedom of conscience.
- (c) We oppose slavishly-held views and encourage freedom of thought.
- (d) We oppose a narrow-minded isolationism and urge cooperation with Christians around the world in the formation of a world church attitude. . .".¹¹²

During the year that followed, presbyteries continued to divide, congregations moving in one direction or another. By the summer of 1954, "the legal 38th Assembly" had approximately 568 churches from 12 presbyteries. 110 of those congregations were from the Kyunggi Province Presbytery. 291 ministers had joined the cause of the Hankuk Seminary group, and 20,937 baptized members were listed on their rolls. The climax came on June 10, 1954, when the liberal group "decided to show clearly the fact that it had set up a new denomination" by taking a new name.¹¹³ Approximately a week later, the United Church of Canada Mission joined them in their efforts. The remaining large missions continued to labor with the parent body.

4. Conclusions

1954 is a sad year in Korean Presbyterianism from anyone's point of view. Less than ten years before, there had been one organized church in Korea. Now there were at least three major ones. Within the memory of the church's leaders, there had been a time of firm biblical Christianity, rather firmly held. Now two religions were competing for the

¹¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 281-284.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 287-288. The officially selected name, "Daehan Kidokyo Changno Hwe", is commonly westernized as "the Presbyterian Church of the Republic of Korea", in distinction from the larger body, called in English simply "the Korean Presbyterian Church". The group is also popularly called the Kichang group.

control of the church. One was Christianity. The other was liberalism.

How was the issue to be joined? The conservative forces insisted, as their counterparts had done in the similar struggle in the west, that "it is highly undesirable that liberalism and Christianity should continue to be propagated within the bounds of the same organization".¹¹⁴ However, there was disagreement on the methodology by which that result could be secured. Some sought to do it through a renewal of Christian education and the exercise of biblical patterns of discipline. Some sought to do it through administrative handling of the key centers in dispute and, seemingly when this failed, through judicial discipline. Within one conservative fold, charges and counter-charges were made. One side was too narrow, the other side was too broad. One side was too severe, the other side was too mediating. And then, to add to the conflict, were the tensions of a divided land, a war, and what some have felt to be a natural regionalistic spirit that often pits Korean against Korean.¹¹⁵ And, behind all this, was the background of the western struggle reflected in the mission bodies supporting one side or another in the conflict.

On the other hand, those expressing liberal postures, particularly with respect to the Bible, sought to avoid any such separation. Presupposing the relative unimportance of doctrinal issues, many could not understand the conservative's attention to what they felt to be trifling matters. The major issue faced at this time was the infallibility of Scriptures. And Kim Chai Choon, speaking for many in the church, was perfectly willing to recognize that infallibility in terms of the bounds of faith and doctrine. Where then, many thought, could there be substantial differences if both sides admitted such a common platform? The conservatives pleaded for repentance. But the liberals felt there was nothing that demanded repentance.

¹¹⁴ J. Gresham Machen, *Christianity and Liberalism*, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1956, p. 160.

¹¹⁵ Paul S. Crane, *Korean Patterns*, Holly Corp., Publishers, 1967, pp. 93-97.

Then, to complicate the picture, the struggle often descended into questions of law and technicalities, for which both sides had to accept partial blame. Liberal pressure joined with conservative moderatism to denounce the southern presbytery that had been a prime mover in the struggle for reform. This turned the presbytery to a strong defense of its "legality" and may have dissipated its broader theological case to some extent. It most certainly antagonized even conservative friends from a wider circle. Then, on the other side, the same conservative maneuvering⁴ that eventually rejected the Koryu group was turned against the Chosun Seminary supporters and was denounced again (and with some justice) as an illegal quest for power by the liberals. Neither conservative nor liberal hands were completely clean in the bitter ten-year struggle.

The conflict cannot be fairly described in any comprehensive sense as a failure. It had drawn attention to the basic issue dividing conservative and liberal — one's attitude toward the foundation of Christianity, the Bible. That issue would remain. It had resulted in the formation of two churches, both committed to a more or less conservative position regarding that issue. It had aroused the church to the dangers latent in liberalism, and, through struggle, forced the church to re-examine its own thinking in these areas.

But it had not finally resolved the issue. Future years would see it returning in other forms, particularly, the question of membership in the World Council of Churches as it developed in the largest of the three denominations now formed. Again, the question would be clouded and troubled by many weaknesses on both sides. But it would be still the same question. Should the church be broad enough to include both conservative and liberal? Should honesty with regard to doctrine and truth be relinquished for the sake of harmony and peace? Unlike the results of the battle within ✓ American Presbyterianism, the Korean church has, by and large, stood far more firmly for biblical answers.

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